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Nationalism and National Identity in Scottish Politics

Murray Stewart Leith

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Glasgow, Department of Politics

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Abstract

Scottish nationalism has long been a conundrum to scholars of nationalism. As a political movement it has never followed the same patterns of activity as other areas of Western Europe. Scotland has long been a nation within a wider state, the United Kingdom, but only within the last four decades has a political party dedicated to the establishment of a Scottish state emerged as an electoral force. Yet since that time the political landscape within the United Kingdom has changed rapidly. The end of the 20th Century saw the establishment of a legislature in Scotland, the first since the Act of Union in 1707. However, while some see devolution as a step towards the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, others argue it is a strengthening of that relationship.

This thesis argues that only by acknowledging the ethnic and mass influences on the nature of Scottish national identity will an understanding of Scottish nationalism be possible. After considering the theoretical arguments surrounding nationalism, and specifically Scottish nationalism, the work shifts to an empirical analysis of Scotland. To examine the nature of Scottish nationalism and national identity, this research considers the manifestos of the political parties over the past thirty-five years, examining how they have employed a sense of Scotland the nation, and Scottishness. This consideration is then linked to an analysis of mass perceptions of national belonging and identity, which are themselves contrasted with elite perceptions, gleaned through interviews conducted amongst MPs and MSPs.

The results indicate the need to recognise that ethnic aspects of Scottish national identity are more significant than the foremost theoretical considerations of nationalism and national identity allow. Furthermore, this case study illustrates that the impact that mass perceptions have on national identity also requires greater recognition within the field.
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Member of the Scottish Parliament</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Plaid Cymru</td>
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<td>SNP</td>
<td>Scottish National party</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Introduction

This is my country
the land that begat me
these windy spaces
are surely my own
and those who here toil
in the seat of their faces
are flesh of my flesh
and bone of my bone.

Inscription on the Canongate Wall of the Scottish Parliament Building
Taken from Scotland, by Sir Alexander Gray

Scottish nationalism, together with an understanding of the nature of Scottish national identity are politically important issues. The formal relationship that binds England and Scotland together, the Union, has allowed Scotland to maintain a separate legal and educational system as well as an independent church throughout the duration of this Union. This has required different political considerations and legislation crafted specifically for Scotland and its unique position within the Union. The British State has employed a variety of political and institutional devices to address this situation, but Scotland has never been integrated into the central state structure to the level of Wales. It is a truism of many a study of Scotland that this 'holy trinity' of church, education and law have provided for the continued existence of a sense of Scotland and Scottishness. It was never forgotten by the Celtic periphery within the UK that they had all, at various points in history, been separate political entities. As a result the centralised structure of the British State faced periodic political demands from the peripheral members, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales\(^1\), as groups sought either autonomy or complete separation. The 20\(^{th}\) Century saw significant movement in this direction, with Ireland in the early part and Scotland and Wales in the latter achieving varying levels of political self-

\(^1\) There are, of course, also smaller independence movements among other areas of the UK, the Isle of Man and Cornwall for instance.
government. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the issue of nationalism has again become a matter of importance in the political arena – and therefore also of interest to academics. The UK is not alone in facing this situation. Minority groups that seek greater political autonomy or independence based on national claims challenge states around the world. The need to understand the political dynamics of nationalism thus remains as important today as it has ever been.

Nationalism, despite claims to the contrary, has not disappeared from the political scene, nor is it likely to do so in the near future. Many of the studies of national movements and nationalism focus on aspects other than politics, such as culture, history, language or even art. Ultimately, however, any national movement is political. The very existence of any organised national group, or groups, ensures political demands based on a sense of nationhood. The enunciation of nationhood, the willing division of a group into a nation, one that differentiates itself from its surrounding neighbours, even when they occupy the same polity, will result in political activity. Even if the majority within the national movement in question do not seek political autonomy for their nation, they seek alterations within the institutional or political framework of the existing state polity. Nor is the impact of nationalism on a political system solely confined to that state. Many national groups cut across existing state boundaries. The Kurds provide a clear example of a group that consider themselves a nation, and yet exist within more than one state. The creation of a Kurdistan would require at least three states to surrender territory and population. This scenario is a prime example of the need to understand the political nature of nationalism.

Nationalism remains a widespread phenomenon today. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of several independent states, many with sizeable national groups within them. These national groups, whether a minority or a majority of the new state population, seek political power for their nation and directly challenge the existence of the state in its existent form. Nor is the continued political agitation of nationalist groups restricted to emerging democracies or former Soviet states. Many of the oldest states in the world face renewed challenges from

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2 It is clearly recognised that 'a national movement' may consist of a series of groups that contend with each other about the proposed direction of the nation.
minority national groups, the UK being a prime example. Westminster, the 'mother' of so many parliamentary systems, is no longer alone in her state. At the very end of the 20th Century, a provincial assembly in Northern Ireland, a national assembly in Wales, and a national parliament in Scotland joined Westminster to provide for several legislative bodies within the UK. These bodies stand as testament to the continued presence and strength of national demands. Yet few studies continue to question the political nature of national identity in Scotland. There are many studies that provide for the history of Scotland, and the history of the nationalist movements in Scotland. The events leading to, and the future implications of, devolution continue to be areas of significant research. Investigations into Scottish national identity also continue, but few challenge the existing view of that national identity. This thesis aims to do just that. It is a theoretically grounded empirical analysis of nationalism and national identity within Scottish politics. It serves as a consideration of the political implications of Scottish nationalism and national identity – examining the nature of national identity in Scottish politics.

The creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 was considered by many as the culmination of years of effort in the fight for Home Rule, or Devolution. Many individuals of various political persuasions had fought for the creation of a Scottish legislature – yet one firmly within the British State. Although this thesis speaks of the national movement in Scotland, it recognises that this movement was (and is) made up of disparate groups and individuals, many with different political aims and objectives. The Labour Party, which held the referenda in 1997 that led to the creation of the Scottish Parliament, were most certainly committed to keeping Scotland within the Union, and thus saw the creation of the Parliament as the end of journey rather than the start of a process. Others, such as the SNP, would argue it is simply the first step in a process that needs to continue. Although supporting the devolution movement in the late 1990s, the SNP made it clear that they still sought independence for Scotland. Nor is the SNP the sole political organisation dedicated to the creation of an independent Scotland.

What is certain is that the creation of the Scottish Parliament will not bring an end to any national based demands. Nationalist movements of varying public, electoral and political strength have existed at various times throughout the last 150 years;
beginning with the establishment of the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights in 1853; through the Scottish Home Rule Association which bridged the 19th and 20th Centuries; to the creation of the SNP during the 1930s as a formal party, and its emergence during the 1960s as a serious electoral force. Today, there are several political parties in Scotland that subscribe to the idea of a politically independent Scotland, and the SNP represents the formal opposition in the Scottish Parliament to the Labour/LD Executive. Despite fluctuations in electoral strength (see Chapter Three) the nationalist SNP remain a significant political presence in Scotland and serves as evidence that nationalism remains a potent aspect of Scottish politics. Nonetheless, as the analysis within this thesis shows, the SNP cannot claim the sole mantle of being the ‘Scottish’ party or the only party that believes in Scotland. All the major parties make such claims and seek to project a sense of Scotland that ties the political and the national together. Nor is there a clear link between national identity and party identity (see Chapter Seven) in Scotland. Identifying oneself as a Scot does not result in one voting SNP, or not. The impact of a continued presence of Scottish national identity on the political system is not so easily read. These factors alone provide evidence for the need to understand Scottish nationalism, and national identity, and examine how political parties, elites, and the masses, conceptualise and project the Scottish nation.

1. The Research Questions
To understand the political importance of nationalism and national identity in Scotland it is important to understand the underlying nature of that national identity. The excerpt quoted at the start of this thesis is from the poem Scotland and is one of several inscriptions adorning the outside of the Scottish Parliament Building. It unmistakably provides a firm historical and ethnic connection to the nation. There is little doubt that it calls upon a sense of Scotland as a geographical place, invoking the territorial relationships found in many images and statements employed or adopted by national movements. This statement clearly states that to be Scottish is to be one of the people connected to the land, “the land that begat me”. At the same time the bond of blood is also clearly invoked by the terms flesh and bone. Being Scottish is to be so through birth and family. However, such descriptions of Scottishness seem to stand in direct contrast to how nationalism is generally portrayed in Scottish politics. This contrast provided part of the inspiration for this
thesis. The Scottish nation has so often been portrayed as a family connected by culture, history and blood. It has also been, and continues to be, described as clearly distinct from the immediate neighbours to the south, the English. Yet modern political representations of Scottish identity are far more inclusive than this. Flesh and bone are either downplayed or dismissed, and even the English can be Scottish if they so choose. The emphases within political discussions on the distinctiveness of the nation are on the multicultural, connected nature of the UK. The nation, as represented in contemporary Scottish politics, downplays the blood and bone aspects of Scottish identity, providing a very inclusive, civic framework for belonging. Scotland is presented as a place, a welcoming place for all people, with little emphasis on the ethnic aspects of nationality. The question is what is the nature of national identity in Scotland, how do the parties connect these two separate ideas of belonging? In what form do parties present Scotland as part of their political arguments, and how do they connect the political and national us in their language? These questions motivate the analysis contained within Chapters Three through Six.

As discussed in Chapter One several writers on nationalism have stressed the importance of elite actors within the study of nationalism. Consequently, a study of individual elites is also essential when considering the nature of nationalism and national identity. While parties represent a conglomerate view, the importance of individual elites to the political process cannot be ignored. It is within the ability of one leader, or a group of organised individuals, to alter party policy. Therefore this thesis also seeks to understand the views of elected elites within Scotland and gain an insight into what they consider the Scottish nation, and the nature of national belonging to be.

As this work deals with the political conception of the nation, the mass view of Scotland must also be considered. It is the masses that provide the nation with being. Political movements may speak of the nation, elite actors may seek to shape the nation and direct it for specific ends, but it is the masses that actually provide for the nation. Without the multiple individual attachments of the masses to the idea of the nation, it would cease to exist as a viable social, let alone political, entity. The methodological advancements of the 20th Century, and the evolution of social and political science, has allowed for the collection of mass data and the development of
software which allows for analysis of such data. This thesis argues that the nation is given presence and strength by the attachment of its individual members. Several theoretical approaches accentuate the importance of elites within nationalism and national movements, but this thesis argues that the role of the masses is as important, but has not received the required attention. How the members of the nation conceive of that nation is as important as the elite conception. The ability of elites to engage with the nation and project a sense of belonging must be tempered by any consideration of how this is effected by the mass conception of belonging.

Therefore, this thesis considers the issues of nationalism and national identity in Scottish politics, focusing from the 1970s through to today. It explores how the four major political parties, elected elites, and the masses within the Scottish political system conceptualise the Scottish nation, and the nature of Scottish national identity.

The questions that this thesis asks can be consequently considered simply. How do the Scottish political parties conceive of the nation? This requires an investigation of what sense of the nation parties project, what representations of Scotland they employ, and how do they characterise Scotland. Also, what is the nature of national identity as projected by Scottish political parties? Who, according to the parties is, or can be, Scottish and what is it to be Scottish. These questions will allow for a consideration of the nature of Scottishness today, and how the political parties within Scotland portray the character of Scottish national identity.

In addition to the party political view, such questions are also asked of the masses and the elected elites. The question of how the elites, and the masses, view the Scottish nation will be considered. What is the nature of being Scottish, what is it to be Scottish in Scotland today? These questions seek insight into the foundations of national identity. Do the masses connect with the elite view, do they agree with the view of Scotland and Scottishness as projected by the parties? These are the questions which drive this research.
2. The Approach

This thesis considers these questions by firstly focusing on the theoretical considerations of nationalism and national identity. The wider phenomenon of nationalism and national identity will thus be investigated, as well as Scotland being specifically focused upon. Chapter One deals with the wider aspects of nationalism theory, where Chapter Two focuses more specifically on Scotland. This thesis is not as widespread as several of the studies considered in these chapters. Although drawing on work from across the social sciences, it specifically focuses on the political nature of nationalism and the political implications of national identity. While the academic study of nationalism often employs a strong theoretical, or even historical focus, it often does so to the detriment of the political aspects of the phenomenon. Many case studies of Scottish nationalism exist (and are considered in Chapter Two) but these can be seen to have a strong historical focus, or a strong theoretical focus, yet few connect such to the political implications of contemporary national identity. This work attempts to connect the theoretical discussion with the political aspects of nationalism and national identity.

In endeavouring to emphasise the political aspects and implications of Scottish nationalism and national identity, this thesis adopts theoretical approaches that more often engage with the historical approach. The ethnosymbolic approach of Anthony Smith is employed to consider the nature of Scottish nationalism and national identity. However, this thesis challenges the elite emphasis that Smith and others place on the study of national identity. Aspects of the perennialist argument also occur during the discussion, as part of the emphasis on the importance of the mass view of the nation. Ultimately, however, this is not a theoretical work. The thesis engages in empirical analysis, informed by the ongoing theoretical debate. It is this empirical analysis that is the second aspect of this work. We will now move to a consideration of how this analysis was conducted.

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3 This draws distinct boundaries around what is not considered. Religious identity in Scotland is not addressed. Although this has clearly impacted on the political system in Scotland, there is no attempt to limit membership of the nation by religious identity today.
3. Methods and Evidence

This thesis employs a number of data sets to examine the evidence available. The primary sources employed to create the new data employed within this thesis were the political party manifestos created for the General Elections from 1970 through to 2005. The analysis of election manifests has created a significant amount of research and data available for analysis (see Chapter Three). However, the manifestos created specifically for Scotland have not been subjected to the same rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis as their British counterparts. While the parties have challenged each other UK wide, the nature of the Scottish political system created a need for a specifically Scottish document. These documents allow for a very specific insight into how the various parties deal with the national question. Such an approach allows for a direct way in which to consider how each of the major parties have visualised and projected a sense of Scotland and Scottishness.

There are a number of data sets conducted within Scotland over the past forty years providing a wealth of information on the mass viewpoint on national identity. Secondary analysis of three data sets was undertaken to consider the views at specific times during the last thirty-five years. Both 1979 and 1997 saw referenda on the creation of a devolved legislature within Scotland and such political activity allowed for the consideration and collection of material on national identity. These results were augmented by consideration of the most recent mass data available – that from the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey. Thus a consideration of how mass opinion has shifted over the past thirty-five years was undertaken to allow deliberation into the mass conception of the Scottish nation and the nature of Scottishness both in the past and today. Finally, to provide insight into how certain elites view being Scottish and how they conceive of the Scottish nation, semi-structured interviews with forty-five elected members of the Scottish and British Parliaments were conducted. The results from these interviews allow for a more individual insight into elite opinion, as well as serving as a counterpoint to the mass opinion so widely available.

4. Terminology and Definitions

Many of the terms employed in the political and academic discussion of nationalism and national identity can be confusing, misleading and inappropriate. Different
theoretical approaches to the study of nationalism can employ the same conceptual term with distinctly different interpretations. In an attempt to avoid misconceptions a nation is here considered to be a group of people who share a common ancestral myth or common culture that allows them to mobilize through appeals to a relationship. However, reference to a ‘nation’ can also be in the context of a distinct territory. This differing emphasis that each application provides creates a significant part of this study. The employment of the territorial frame of reference allows for a wider conception of the nation than the ethnic conception of the nation allows. This thesis employs the term to apply to both, depending on the material under consideration. It must be remembered that the nation is not a political group. Individuals within the nation may form nationalist groups that agitate politically on behalf of the nation, but the political activity usually takes place within a state. The state is a political unit that has sovereignty over a specific population inhabiting a particular territory. Most states in the world today cut across national boundaries, with the UK being a prime example. These terms are quite distinct from one often applied, the nation-state. This term dominates much of the discussion with the popular press and even academia and serves to confuse. For this term to have any validity, the state and national boundaries must correspond. Thus the term is regularly and incorrectly applied to apply to various states. The SNP seek to make Scotland a nation-state but currently Scotland is a nation within a larger state.

As Connor (2004) notes nationalism is defined by identification to the nation and not identification to the state. To speak of British nationalism (as many political actors in the UK do) is thus to confuse the term with patriotism, this being loyalty to one’s state. Nationalism can also refer to the political belief that aims to create a political boundary in which the nation and state are congruent. This thesis argues that any form of nationalism is ultimately political (even when labelled cultural) as it seeks to empower the nation. Although political, nationalism is not linked to any specific political ideology and cuts across the traditional left-right spectrum (see Chapter Three for consideration of this).

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4 This section is heavily influenced by Connor (2004, p38-39).
Often employed alongside the term nationalism, national identity is closely related but distinct nonetheless. National identity has no widespread standard definition. Members of a nation are provided with a national identity, but the construction of national identity can be undertaken, according to various theoretical approaches, through the employment of a variety of factors such as language, customs, culture, etc. The term Scottishness serves as an example of a specific national identity and is widely employed within this work. The manner in which it is employed, by interviewees, within mass data surveys, and by this thesis, is indicative of the encompassing nature of the term.

This thesis employs the phrase modernism (or modernists) as an umbrella term to refer to theorists that support the interpretation of nationalism as a modern movement with no historical or ethnic basis. It therefore covers those employing an instrumental or constructivist approach to the study of nationalism.

5. Thesis Structure
This introduction has discussed the focus of the thesis and outlined the questions that this work seeks to answer. The empirical approach has also been outlined, and the nature of the evidence to be employed has been illustrated. It has, briefly, outlined certain of the major concepts employed within the field of nationalism and national identity studies, and discussed how they will be considered. The structure of the main body of the thesis is now provided.

Chapter One examines the state of the theoretical debate on nationalism. It considers the various approaches and the leading contributors to those approaches. The various arguments provided by each of the theoretical approaches are investigated and analysed, followed by an investigation of their justifications for these. Each theory is then evaluated in the context of the Scottish case in an examination of which theoretical approach provides the strongest explanatory value for this particular case study. Strategies provided by previous studies are highlighted in order to guide this thesis in its investigations. This discussion is continued in Chapter Two, which focuses specifically on the case of Scotland and Scottish nationalism, allowing for an analysis of the existing theoretical considerations of Scottish nationalism and the
nature of national identity. The reigning paradigmatic explanation of Scottish nationalism is identified and an alternative approach is put forward.

Chapter Three begins the empirical analysis of the thesis. Election manifestos from the four major political parties are subjected to quantitative based textual analysis. This analysis allows for a numerical assessment of party support for nationalist goals. The measurement tool also considers party positioning, over time, on a Unionist-Nationalist spectrum. The Chapter provides insight into the changing emphasis on national issues throughout the last thirty-five years. Chapter Four provides the theoretical grounding and argument for adding a qualitative aspect to the manifesto analysis. The history of Scottish manifesto production, and the impact of the rise of the SNP on party behaviour and production of manifestos for the Scottish political system are also considered.

Chapters Five and Six consider the rhetorical and image based content of the manifestos of the four main parties in Scotland over the past thirty-five years. The changes in language and presentation in the areas of national identity and nationalist content are specifically focused on. The manifestos are compared inter and intra-party over that period, with the changes in how the Scottish nation is conceived and projected being examined.

Chapter Seven employs secondary analysis of mass data from the 1979 Election study, the 1997 Referendum Study and the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey. The analysis within the chapter begins with a consideration of the sense of Scottish identity within the Scottish population at these times. It then moves to an investigation of questions focusing on the nature of national identity, examining how the masses conceive of Scottishness and whether this has shifted significantly since 1979.

Chapter Eight draws upon the interviews conducted among MPs and MSPs. It starts with a consideration of the political elite in Scotland and then provides a contemplation of the emphasis given to elites within studies of nationalism. The main section of the chapter discusses the individual responses of interviewees, scrutinising their conception of the Scottish nation, and the nature of Scottishness.
Differences between the opinion of the interviewees and the mass opinion discussed in Chapter Seven become apparent at this point.

Chapter Nine concludes the thesis. The arguments considered by and presented within the thesis are summarised and the implications of the research findings are examined. The conclusion challenges the modernist interpretation of Scottish nationalism and stresses the need for an understanding of the ethnic aspects of Scottish national identity. The difference between the party political and elite conception of the Scottish nation, and the mass conception, is also stressed. The thesis closes by stating the need for a greater appreciation of the ethnic components of nationalism and national identity and the role of the masses in the formation of that identity.
The study of nationalism has undergone a renaissance in recent times, coming back into favour as an area of study (Calhoun 1993, Ozkirimli 2000). Indeed McCrone argues that the study of nationalism is only just over forty years old (1998). This is a harsh assertion, as many works on the subject can be identified long before the 1960s. Smith discusses the existence of discourse in the 19th Century (1986) and others identifying nationalist discourse well before the 20th Century (Greenfeld 1992, Anderson, 1991, Breuilly 1982). However McCrone is implying that a clear divide between the studies of nationalism preceding the 1960s and since can be made. He dismisses works prior to those of Gellner, considering him an inspiration (and irritant) for much of the work done in the last forty years and puts him “at the heart of modern nationalism studies” (McCrone 1998: viii). Yet this dismissal of pre 1960s work seems cavalier at best. Kant, Herder, Fichte, Marx, Engels and Rousseau all contributed to the discourse on nationalism (Kedourie 1985, Ozkirimli 2000) and many historians considered the subject at the same time. Kedourie’s *Nationalism*, first published in 1960, argues that Kant had a great influence on the study of nationalism. Ozkirimli (2000) highlighted that once the debate entered the academic realm, the subject generated significant research. This significance was not limited to the late 20th Century. Renan’s *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation* is one of the most quoted considerations and was a far-sighted, discerning study. From a Marxist perspective Otto Bauer also brought insight, providing the keystone argument that the nation had no direct links to the past. It is this consideration upon which the modernist school of thought is based on.

Whatever went before though, there has been an explosion of interest in the subject of nationalism over the past two decades, especially from social scientists and historians (Brown 2000, Hutchinson 1994, Smith 1998). The modernist school reached ascendency during the 1980s with the publication of seminal works by Anderson, Breuilly and Gellner, among others. It was at this exact time when a new direction in nationalist studies was emerging (Ozkirimli 2000). The literature on the subject diversified and became much more mature in its approach (McCrone 1998, Ozkirimli 2000). The modernist camp rightly came under criticism for laying too
much emphasis on modernism and ignoring the cultural and historical strands that tie the nationalities and nations of today to the ethnic groups of yesterday (Smith 2003).

Criticism has come from scholars such as Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson, who have argued that ethnic aspects and the ties of history are important and must be considered.

Several recent works have identified the major strands of research into the subject of nationalism during the past decade (Kellas 1998, McCrone 1998, Smith 1999). It is an indication of the width and variety of the field that these studies apologise for the limitations that their works employ. Smith states that any book into nationalism requires firm parameters lest it become unwieldy. Just two years later Umut Ozkirimli (2000) also admitted to leaving out several authors and works due to space and time limitations.

This consideration of the theoretical issues of nationalism and national identity will be led by such examples. Any overview must be limited in scope and nature and yet also seek to place the forthcoming discussion firmly within the current literature. Therefore this chapter will provide an overview of major approaches to the study of nationalism; major contributors to each approach; and criticisms of approaches and contributors. In reviewing various approaches and theorists this work will focus on continuing problems and questions, and how the approaches can be applied to clarify and elucidate the subject matter of this research: nationalism and national identity in Scotland.

1. Approaches to the Study of Nationalism

Nationalism stretches across the academic spectrum, involving all the social sciences, as well as the arts and sciences. Sociologists, historians, psychologists, and others espouse ideas, comments and thoughts on the subject. Typologies and other frameworks are employed to specify how and why nationalism should be studied. Major schools of thought are identified, major theorists, and their critics are used as classification, and even timeframes are used to compartmentalise the consideration of the subject. Some of the major works on the subject, including those mentioned
above, have taken a variety of approaches to the subject. Smith (1998) focuses on the issue of modernism, employing this umbrella to consider a series of theories and then their critics and alternatives – mostly primordialism and ethno-symbolism (of which Smith is a major contributor and proponent). Ozkirimli considers these and more contemporary “new” approaches (2000). Kellas focus on individual scholars, highlighting their contributions (1998).

The ‘traditional’ theoretical approaches to nationalism come under three headings – Primordialism, Instrumentalism\(^2\), and Constructivism, although the latter two are incorporated within the umbrella term modernist. These three approaches will be examined to illustrate the ideas of various theorists and scholars. The justification for this is that the modernist school of thought is, in many ways, a behemoth of similar yet distinct ideas. Although comparable in their central argument (the link between modernism and nationalism) they do differ. This investigation considers such issues as elite activity and mass support for nationalism and nationalist movements to be a core consideration of any study of nationalism, and this is a point upon which modernists diverge. The term ‘modernism’ will be used within this research but the fact that it encompasses a significant variation of thoughts and ideas must be recognised.

2. **Primordialism**

Primordialism is the oldest academic approach to the study of nationalism. This is due to the fact that it was initially the approach. A historically accepted idea that considered nations to be an implicit part of nature; their existence was *a priori* and unquestioned; not only are nations natural, but each also has a right to self-determination. We can clearly see the roots in revolutionary thought about mass self-determination. The organic nationalism of which Smith speaks (1998) argues that nations are natural, the rock upon which human history could be based. Smith (1998) labels these approaches as primordial, although disputing the relationship between organic nationalism and primordialism.

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1 It should be noted that Kellas leaves aside “the controversial primordial type of theory” though he discusses the issues of human nature and psychobiology.

2 This approach is also sometimes called situationalist.
An examination of the extant literature shows that primordialists are seen as more homogenous in terms of their discussion than other categories (Ozkirimli 2000). Ozkirimli is dismissive of primordialism; labelling it shallow and arguing that this has been revealed in recent debates on ethnicity (2000). The term is almost pejorative in nature; many scholars go to great lengths to distance themselves from the approach, identifying themselves as something other than primordial. The ethno-symbolist approach incorporates some aspects that could be considered as primordial, but significantly recognises other aspects outside the traditional primordial approach as being important. Comparisons between the primordial and the ethno-symbolist approach are sometimes made but remain unwarranted and unfounded.

Perhaps the strongest difference between primordialism and modernism is the importance of ethnicity to the idea of primordial nationalism itself. The nation, as conceived by primordialists, is the ethnic group; ethnicity and nationalism are one and the same. Perhaps the first to use the term primordial in this respect was Shils. His main argument on the subject is that the ties of kinship (and religion) remain important even in the modernised societies of today (1957). Another scholar who employs the term primordial is Geertz. He clearly indicates that there is great ambiguity surrounding the uses of the term’s nationality and nationalism, and he employs several examples to make this idea clear (1963). Geertz argues that to burn away some of the haze around the conceptual issues one must consider two powerful animators driving nationalism. One is the need to be recognised as a specific identity and for that that identity be recognised as important. The other aim is progress; a better standard of living; greater political order; and having influence in the social and political world order. For Geertz (1963) the sense of self is still closely tied to the basic actualities of blood, race, language, religion, or simple tradition.

Walker Conner is often labelled a primordialist. He argues that scholars and policy makers have continually underestimated the importance and influence of

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3 A common accusation directed against ethno-symbolists is that they also hold to this conception—which is clearly not the case, see Smith (2003) for a clear discussion on this point.
ethnonationalism\(^4\), especially the rather non-rational and passionate qualities. There can be little doubt that Conner attaches great significance to the ethnic nature of nationalism. He considers nationalism a given, a part of human nature, he was not taken by surprise when nationalism burst back onto the international scene in the 1970/80s. Conner is a member of the perennialist variant of primordialism (Smith 1998, Brown 2000) in that ethnic and national groups are assumed as part of his work. He argues that modern nations are updated versions of the same ethnic communities that have always existed, or are a modern expression of the group community that has always been part of the ethnic community. In this respect he relates closely to the ethno-symbolist position argued by Smith.

Primordialism has been strongly challenged by the modernist school of thought. It came under a scathing attack for being unsatisfactory in explaining the issue of national identity (Eller and Coughlan 1993)\(^5\). They argue that the concept should be discarded once and for all due to several defective aspects. Primary among these is that it suffers from apriority, considering personal attachments and social realities to exist prior to any interaction among groups. Eller and Coughlan charge that ethnicity should be seen as a social construct of the self, which undergoes constant change, and reconsideration (1993). Along related lines Brass has also argued that ethnicity is a creation of the elite (1991). Whilst not defending Primordialism, this research must reject both challenges, especially that of Eller and Coughlan. National identity is not simply a social construct that exists as part of modern society – it also exists outside of the social construction of society. It may be influenced by it, but also clearly influences it. The nature of national identity and belonging can direct social activity and inhibit certain actions within and by members of that society.

Among the arguments made by modernists such as Eller and Coughlan, the attack on ethnicity as little more than a social construct denies the existence of history on society and contemporary politics. This thesis will consider the views of political parties, elites, and members of the Scottish nation and illustrate the importance of ethnicity as both a vehicle and limit of political and elite actions.

\(^4\) Conner provided a conjoined term that employs national and ethnic belonging – which is why many include him in the primordial camp.
The primary attack against primordialism is the date of nations’ emergence. Modernists argue that nations have no relation to historical units that previously existed. As Breuilly argues, ethnicity was not important in the political units of history as it is today (1993). Smith also criticises this idea, although he does draw a link between the national groupings of yesterday, ethnies, and the nations of today (1991). However, the modernists firmly argue that it is not possible to speak of nations existing prior to the French Revolution.

Brown (2000) points out most people generally accept the basic argument of primordialist thinkers; that ethnic/national identities are emotionally powerful, ascriptive and fixed. This acceptance is given because it accords with what individuals think and yet it is firmly rejected by most modernists. Smith (1998), more accepting as an ethno-symbolist, argues that primordialism does provide some useful aspects for consideration, especially in regards to culture, individual belief and emotion. Likewise Kellas seems to agree that such considerations are important. Indeed he makes an important, and key point by arguing that the emotional strength of nationalism, in the political realm, is explained by its roots in ethnocentrism (Kellas 1998). Brass also concedes that when it comes to understanding ethnic groups that have a long history and cultural heritage some aspects of the primordial perspective are useful (1991). In addition, Ozkirimli (in many ways a strong critic of anything primordial or ethno-symbolist) argues that primordialism, as espoused by Geertz in terms of meanings and emotions, is also important as a concept in explaining human action (2000).

Thus it can be seen that the more extreme versions of primordiality have been discredited and dismissed. Any argument that draws upon a strict sense of blood and belonging must be rejected as unscientific and unsupported. Nevertheless an outright rejection of some primordial argument is a step backwards, and a need to understand the importance of ‘blood’ or ethnicity remains. Certain concepts continue to be employed in the study of nationalism by modernists, and ethno-symbolists such as Smith. The political importance of the emotional attachment to ethnicity and a sense of national identity, as highlighted by Kellas, is clearly key. Any study on the nature

5 Eller and Coughlan have been challenged on the grounds that they have misread the arguments of
of national identity must consider just this point if it hopes to provide insight into nationalism in the modern political world.

3. Instrumentalism

Brown defines instrumentalism as explaining ethnic and national identities "as resources employed by groups of individuals for the pursuit of their common interests" (2000 page 13). He argues that as the opportunities, or threats, that the group in question faces change then the options available to them, and thus their response also change. So, the form that their national or ethnic identity will take will change in response to different situations.

The most dominant explanation from the instrumental camp is an economic factor. This clearly shows the relationship between instrumentalism and rational choice, a theoretical model that applies economic theory to the study of politics. As instrumentalism goes, rational choice explains contemporary nationalist behaviour in the following fashion. Modern states came about as a result of the early stages of industrialisation. This was due to the need for compact economic units that could provide for the market requirements of the time. As we witness the rise of the global economy, the state system as it originally emerged has become obsolete. Thus the modern states of Western Europe have become both weaker and less able to supply the wants and needs of their citizens and systems.

Instrumentalists argue that individuals seek their best rational self-interest – the classic liberal assumption that individuals aim to promote their individual freedom and self-interest. In this they band together with other individuals in various groups that share similar goals or aims. The centrality of the group to individual identity is based upon the self-interest in question and thus the threats and opportunities that the individual is facing. Consequently in today’s changing world system, where traditional states are no longer capable of meeting the self-interests of certain

Shils and Geertz, the main objects of their criticism (Ozkirimli 2000, Smith 1998).

He calls it situationalism.

A popular idea among many historians and proponents of the early emergence of nations is the dating of the nation-state system from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Even al-Qiada has employed this idea among their announcements.
individuals, they have come under threat from nationalism. Nationalism promises the ability to meet group needs with greater efficiency.

Among instrumentalist theorists and scholars is Karl Deustch, who presented a new idea of mass social communication that created a community of like-minded people (1966). He also set himself apart from other researchers in nationalism at the time by employing quantitative analysis. He sought to measure and quantify the elements of nationalism. His ideas were based on the systems theory of cybernetics and he saw nations and nationalism as a product of modernisation. Although Deustch provides data to support his claims it is difficult to relate them to actual political movements. For instance he charts the decline of Gaelic speakers in Scotland and yet this bears seemingly little relation to the political strength of Scottish nationalism. Indeed, while the number of native speakers of Gaelic has continued to decline, the political presence of nationalism in Scotland has not. Deustch’s work was criticised in several areas by Ozkirimli (2000). Likewise Smith argues that the communications approach fails to consider the beliefs and interests which provide the context in which the mass communications take place. He dismissed this approach as western orientated as it assumes any non-western results were the same (1983). However, the overall idea of social communication remains a useful addition to the literature. As a building block of national identity, social communication remains important.

Brass (1991) openly admits that his ideas place him firmly in the instrumentalist camp. He denies the primordial aspects of works by the likes of Smith and Armstrong. Instead arguing that ethnic identities and modern nationalism came about because of the “interactions” between the elite of the modernising state and the “elites of the non-dominant ethnic groups – especially, but not exclusively on the peripheries of those states” (1991 preface). Brass posits that ethnicity and nationalism are not a given; rather they are social and political constructs, creations of the elite. These elites employ symbols and other cultural materials, some distorted, others completely fabricated, drawn from the group they wish to represent. This is done to ensure the well being of the elites and to further their political and economic ambitions, as well as those of the group in question. Thus Brass sees ethnicity and nationalism as being fixed to the existence of the state.
The importance of ethnic and national group identity within the instrumentalist camp is not based on the idea they the present a greater utility to their members than other forms of identity. There are many markers that identify separate groups and allow for intra communication (Brown 2000) and thus they can present themselves as natural group markers. In instrumental terms ethnicity is often employed in claims that are based on cultural factors, while nationalism is more territorially based. This is not to say there are easily demarcated boundaries between the concepts and they can both be employed to support the ideas being put forward as being natural or "right".

Several criticisms have been made of the instrumental approach, but Brown argues that they can be addressed. Brown claims that emotions can distort the perception of any given situation and bring about irrational actions (2000). However Brown fails to address the anomaly present in this argument. He does indeed point out, correctly, that is perfectly rational to be afraid in the case of attack, or have emotional attachment to the central goals of group life and thus be involved in their defence. Yet at no time does he state how this addresses the central issue of irrational activity on the part of either individuals or groups in emotionally charged situations. The instrumental approach simply ignores the idea that some actions may not be in the rational self interest of the individuals involved. The idea that emotions or human nature may be involved is rejected by instrumentalism. This is unfortunate, as the importance of emotion cannot be dismissed out of hand. Indeed the importance of this issue has been recognised by many theorists within the ethno-symbolist, perennialist, and even modernist camp.

Secondly Brown points out that while an individual can choose certain attributes such as race, language, and religion, the importance of these attributes changes from situation to situation (2000). Furthermore, differences in dissimilar groups only become important when those groups engage in confrontation and employ markers as mobilisation techniques. Yet individuals cannot change their racial characteristics; and language and birth are often key requirements for specific group membership. It is true that the salience of one's particular identity changes from situation to situation.
but the fact is that individual action in many circumstances is severely limited by the possession of specific attributes. Being Jewish in some conditions is a barrier even if one is also African or Italian or speaks Arabic or German. The action and options of that individual are severely curtailed irrespective of what situation they face. Once again instrumentalism ignores the fact that the most rational choice may be closed to either the individual or the group in question.

In regards to elite activity individuals often make decision that are in agreement with their peer group or the ruling elite, even if these decisions do not seem rational. Therefore, an individual may be making a decision based on the judgement of an elite group that is presenting either faulty rationale or mistaken judgement (Brown 2000). So the rational choice may not be rational after all. This argument that the decision to react in a certain way may be mistaken, but is rational on the part of the individual seems disingenuous at best. However, Brown challenges the core assumption of instrumentalism later on, on this very point. “Mobilising elites” may, intentionally or unknowingly, provide false information, which is accepted by the group. This can be done despite evidence to the contrary. If this is so then the basis of the instrumental approach is in doubt.

There is an inherent conflict in the instrumentalist position in that the forms of identity an individual or group may employ are seen as being changeable and fluid in response to any given situation. Yet ethnic and national identities are seen as being permanent in themselves. Brown argues that this conflict exists because once the specific marker is chosen then it becomes permanent. Identity can be seen as being fixed because the marker it has been based on is fixed (2000). This argument is circular in nature. Quite simply an identity cannot be both fixed and permanent and at the same time changeable and fluid. Instrumentalism is again faced with a problem. Once given, accepted or employed an identity marker becomes fixed and this negates a number of responses in succeeding situations and circumstances – even if the negated responses are the most rational.

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8 Many criticisms are based on the fact that rational choice theory underpins the instrumental approach.
As a subset of modernism instrumentalists see the states of Western Europe as a creation brought about to best meet the needs of the groups or ruling elites in question. As mentioned above changing economic times have brought about challenges to the traditional state. Nationalism is a challenge as individuals and groups see their needs and wants outside of that framework. It may well be that the erosion of the capabilities of the various state elites has led to the reaction of nationalism. However, there are several problems with this approach as seen above. Instrumentalism fails to clearly provide a link between nationalism as an ideology, a mass movement and an elite activity. However there are modernists who make their position clear in terms of the elite activity and mass mobilisation, and they fall under the heading of constructivists.

4. Constructivism

According to constructivists nationalism is a created ideology. This approach can be defined as one that considers national identity as an institutional or ideological framework. This framework is created to provide simple answers in terms of identity and as solutions for modern problems, to individuals who are both confused and insecure (Brown 2000).

Constructivists argue that the contemporary centralised state arose through the need to provide for a segmented territorial system that would assist the socio-economic integration of specific regions into the greater society. The ongoing process of economic integration and social reconstruction that states assisted led to the creation of a set of common cultural values. This high culture became the focus of a new national community within each state. Hence we have the modern 'nation-state' of western European experience. This centralised and sovereign entity has a population that shares a culture, educational system and collective interests. Formed during the rise of the industrial capitalist system, states both assisted and were assisted by capitalism. The emergence of the modern social class structure, where the middle class sought economic and political authority outside of the traditional framework, also assisted both. Industrialism brought with it a whole new range of economic

Obviously this term is misleading at best, and ill conceived at worst. A true nation-state would be where the borders of the state and the nation are contiguous. This work employs the term state as being conceptually correct.
interactions that caused greater social interaction and mobility, which created new social relationships. Also the common educational system that arose as a requirement to train the new workers required by the new economic system led to a common culture and a common language. It was these two lynchpins that would provide the glue for a more cohesive unit, or nation.

It should be noted that both instrumentalists and constructivists share this central (indeed core) theme of modernism. Their divergence comes about within consideration of the nature of nationalism. For constructivists it is very much a constructed ideology with no relation to what may have existed before. Furthermore there is divergence within the modernist camp with differing emphasis placed on economic and political factors. Many stress the importance of the change in the economy and how this drove transformation. Others, such as Breuilly, argue that the emergence of the state itself was an important aspect of the creation of nationalism, more important than the economic drives (1982).

Kedourie's *Nationalism*, published in 1960, must be considered a theoretical milestone within the field. Kedourie argued that nationalism was a doctrine invented in the European area at the beginning of the 1800s. It was the French Revolution that provided the basis for nationalism. Yet it took another revolution in the realm of ideas to second that political action (Kedourie 1985). It is the idea of self-determination as a freedom to be enjoyed by humankind that makes nationalism vital. Kedourie sees nationalism as inward looking; neither left nor right ideologically speaking. For him the introduction of nationalist thought changed the political order of the world at the same time that the industrial revolution changed the socio-economic order. This led to the emergence of new demands on the political system as a new class of people arose who would not accept the traditional system.

Kedourie is clearly not a lover of nationalism. His examination of the creation of nationhood in Eastern Europe after the world wars ridicules nationalist statements made. He dismisses any idea that nationalism is an ethnic based identity. National identity for Kedourie is the creation of nationalist doctrine – not the other way around (1985). This is a principle that remains a central plank of modernism. Kedourie does dismiss the idea that nationalism is a reflection of capitalism though
(1985) attacking Marxism for a failure to address this point. Indeed, the inability of either capitalism or Marxism to provide a clear answer to the nationalist issue has not been properly addressed since Kedourie raised the issue.

The importance of Kedourie’s argument on the theoretical studies into nationalism has been noted. However, there were many criticisms of his approach and several disagreements within the modernist and constructivist approaches. Breuilly argues that other identities, such as race or class, can answer the problem that nationalism addresses for Kedourie (1993). Such criticism is supported by Smith, who argues that the need to belong remains a key issue. Kedourie argues that nationalism is the answer to this need, a need inherent in mankind. But as Smith (1983) points out, this need could be addressed by means other than nationalism. Also criticising Kedourie is Ernst Gellner, whose theories are central to our understanding of nationalism (McCrone 1998). Gellner (1983) think that studying the “prophets” of nationalism will not provide answers to the study of the subject. As noted above McCrone argues that the modern study of nationalism begins with Ernst Gellner (1998). This is a breathtaking statement that seeks to dismiss much, if not all, previous scholarship on the issue. It may well be that Gellner is indeed the greatest thinker on nationalism of the 20th Century – another claim McCrone submits. But he did not start in a vacuum and others contributed much to the debate before Gellner.

Gellner’s theory of nationalism stresses the importance of material conditions in shaping political thought and also social change. He disavows the Marxist approaches and rejects any idea of influence. He argues that it was the rise of industrialised society that allowed the rise of nationalism. Kellas (1998) supports the charge that Gellner associates nationalism with industrialism. Marxism, which shares with Gellner the roots in terms of economic determinism, sees nationalism as being dependent on capitalism. When proletarian rule comes about, nationalism will become redundant. Gellner on the other hand sees no future without nationalism – if he does he provides no details. Indeed, as Ozkirimli (2000) points out, one of the core aspects of Gellner’s arguments is that nationalism in post-industrial societies would continue to exist, but it would be muted in tone and “less virulent”.
The process of change in society was the main vehicle for nationalism's spread. Gellner rejects the approach made by Kedourie (among others) that nationalism was an invented system of certain European thinkers, but that it has "deep roots in our shared current condition, is not at all contingent, and will not be easily denied" (1983 p56). As industrialisation occurred, older states within the European area (and then other geographic regions) were unable to achieve maximum profits and gain greater advantage within the emerging capitalist system unless they altered the structure of both their core society and state system. Any agrarian society has a wide diversified language, culture and ethnic makeup. In order for industrialism to work though it needed a large homogenous society with a widespread educational system - to ensure a literate work ready population. Such an education system would ensure the emergence of a "high" culture, one shared by all of society - employing the same language and symbols of everyday life.

It was this shared culture, this mass education system, and the ability of the population to move throughout the social realm, that created the conditions for nationalism to emerge and succeed. According to Kellas, this means that nationalism achieved its successful position because it was appropriate for the need at the time – not because it was an ideology that could compete with other ideologies in the intellectual and political realm (1998). However, Kellas does agree with Gellner that the structure of the state is a necessary condition for nationalism. As stated above, Gellner argues that the medieval style European state was not suitable for industrialism. Usually with a weak centre it operated through a series of semi-autonomous hereditary hierarchies, such as the nobility or church. These had to be removed from their positions of power, or their influence curtailed dramatically—although there was no uniform attempt to do so. Education was in the same state – often fragmented, just as often taught in Latin and the reserve of the Church or high society – this too had to change. Thus we have two major changes to the social and political structure that need to take place for nationalism to occur.

10 While most of these observations are taken from his 1983 Nations and Nationalism, his 1964 Thought and Change and 1997 Nationalism have also been considered.
Furthermore, the social and political system had to undergo change in order to alter the economic system. A literate, mobile, and above all homogenous, society was required (according to Gellner) for economic reasons. The emergence of a strong centralised state, holding sovereign authority over the region in question, allowed the growth of nationalism as it shaped a homogenous society. Control over law, education and even religion, changed the localised nature of much of Europe and swept away the older orders, replacing them with the new political form of 'nation-states'. In areas where these formations did not meet the nationalist requirements (such as one-state one-culture) nationalist activity ensued.

In considering Gellner's theory, McCrone states that the key to understanding nationalism lies in the nature of the strong relationship between culture and structure "especially the inverse relationship between the two" (1998 p67). McCrone argues that Gellner sees citizenship in the modern society as one where identity is culture. Cultural classification is national classification and to assume a nationality in the modern culture is essential. In the modern condition one is national; this is the natural form of political loyalty. One can synthesise Gellner's theory of nationalism into seven observations of modernising societies (taken from McCrone 1998):

1. Modern society is politically centralised - it is more pervasive than ever before, more complete and non-optional in industrial societies.
2. Economic specialisation in modern society is very high.
3. Industrial societies are occupationally mobile in that the nature of technological advancement and improvement means that new specialisms will constantly emerge.
4. The formal education process is very necessary and very important in that the specialisms of the modern society require high levels of training.
5. There must be both inter and intra generational mobility in the society.
6. The political ideology of modern society is not a fixed issue but can run from mild to extreme socialism.
7. One of the general conditions of both economic and political existence in modern society is participation – tribalism is not an option.
The society, for Gellner then, is one that depends on nationalism because of the fact that a cultural homogeneity arises. This is due to the emergence and continual need for an educational system that can provide for a social and geographic mobility. Thus one ends up with a population that reflects the same wants needs and abilities. So you have the emergence of the modern nation-state; a state that relies on nationalism as glue that holds it all together. It is not that the state requires nationalism, or that nationalism requires homogeneity, but rather that the need of modern society for homogeneity manifests itself (to use McCrone’s term) as nationalism (McCrone 1998).

Despite his placement as the lynchpin of the modern study of nationalism Gellner has rightly been subject to several criticisms. This work would not be the first to criticise his theories of the relationship between nationalism and modernism for being functionalist, a point clearly discussed in Hutchinson (1994) and Ozkirimli (2000). The process is presented as a once and for all movement – the role of nationalism is seen as nothing more than the ideological support system for the modern state (McCrone 1998). However, many nationalist movements are questioning the modern state in which they exist – often on associated ideological grounds. Indeed, Gellner seems almost proud of his theory in functionalist terms. He argues that many people apply the term to their work without considering it as pejorative. In this sense other scholars can agree with him. Functionalism is not always a negative if the theory is explanatory of all the facts. However, Gellner also comes under criticism for his approach in that it does not meet the full facts of history (McCrone 1998, Ozkirimli 2000). This is a criticism that seems fully justified. England did not develop mass schooling until the late 1800s and did not fully modernise until that century either and yet there is support for the idea that nationalist sentiment had occurred in that state much earlier (Greenfeld, 1992). Furthermore, as McCrone and others have clearly pointed out, mass schooling was introduced into Scotland in the 18th Century too but nationalism there remained dormant or extremely limited until some time later – despite the fact that a large homogenous population with similar wants and needs existed.

One can find nationalism in areas that do not conform to the 19th century emerging industrial national pattern. In terms of the developing world, colonialism plays an
important role in emergent nationalism and the anti-white backlash. Moreover what would Gellner make of the emergence of nationalism in the UK? As McCrone clearly states he fails to address what has been labelled neo-nationalism – a point also supported by Kellas (1998) and previously made by Hutchinson (1994). Indeed, neo-nationalism makes little sense in Gellner's brand of nationalism, as the drive is certainly not economic, and could indeed be considered a form of the tribalism that Gellner's work argues is not an option. Quite simply Gellner fails to address Scottish nationalism in any form.

Gellner has also been attacked for drawing too much inference from the use of the term invention in his discussions on nationalism. Anderson (1983) argues that he equates the word invention with fabrication and falsity rather than the imagining employed by others and thus presents nationalism in a manner unfair at best if not downright misleading. This is a complaint that can be levelled at many proponents of the modernist school. It represents one of the strongest limitations of the school.

Kellas (1998) finds Gellner compelling, but points out he has limitations. He fails to address the primordial roots of nationalism or the powerful emotional appeal. Kellas asks the question of why people would be willing to die for what is an economic and social system requirement. This is also a criticism raised by Smith (1986) and long a charge that the primordialists and ethno-symbolists have levelled against the modernists in general. One of the key issues is that his theory is apolitical because it fails to consider the role of power politics in the formation of nations and nationalism. Rather it looks at the reasons why industrialising states altered their form on order to maximise their potential – and the nationalism that grew out of that change.

This lack of politics has to be considered a serious failing in any theoretical consideration of nationalism due to the nature of nationalism. This work has noted the emphasis that Gellner places on the impact of politics in modern societies. In McCrone's observations on Gellner, politics is an integral part of the analysis and key to understanding the nature of nationalism. Yet such criticism points to a fatal
flaw in Gellner’s approach in that the nature of politics, the fight for power and control in any polity, is missing. This criticism can be levelled at the modernist school in general, where the impact of economics and social change takes precedence over political events. As nationalist movements inherently seek change through political means any consideration of nationalism and the importance of national identity must address the issue of power politics.

As Gellner was presenting his theory in 1983 another major work was published – Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*. Its central thesis is perhaps one of the most quoted in nationalism studies. In short, Anderson argues that the rise of nationalism, and the idea of a shared ethnicity among groups of people, came about because of ‘print capitalism’. He further argues that with the decline of religion and the rise of the printed word it became easier for people to ‘imagine communities’. These communities are limited in their relation, but sovereign in their authority, and diverse and otherwise unrelated individuals can identify with them. Thus, a form of immortality is invoked and placed upon this group who become members of an imagined community (1983).

This possibility of an imagined nation only became possible when, Anderson argues, three distinct cultural conceptions “lost their...grip” on the minds of humankind. These were the ideas that a particular script language was the gate to all truth, society should be centred around a divinely inspired hierarchy, and that cosmolology and history were temporally linked. Once these problems were out of the way, print capitalism would allow people to relate to each other in an entirely new manner. With technology and capitalism allowing mass printing people could see themselves as part of the greater community where there was a bond between themselves and large numbers of people they could never hope to meet. This, Anderson argues, is the “basic morphology” that provides the modern nation (1983).

Anderson dismisses the idea that liberalism, the enlightenment, or economic interest brought about group consciousness, but that the official waves of nationalism that created the nation-states throughout the 19th century were only possible when

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One could level the same charge at Kellas – although he address psychology and the issue of human
language driven nationalisms had emerged. Such official nationalism arose as moves by the elites to maintain their authority over the masses. To do so they employed the feelings of imagined community, which attracted the sentiments of the masses, the core of which is the imagined community.

Anderson lays out his arguments clearly and draws support from a number of sources. His position that capitalism is responsible for the emergence of nationalism, or is at least the prime factor (Anderson 1983, page 37), places him on the same ground as other Marxist leaning scholars. Wallerstein would agree freely as he argues that what he calls *peoplehood* is not a “primordial stable social reality” but a more complex historical product of the capitalist system. It is central to the system and likely to become even more so and we must understand it in order to understand how it will affect the system which will replace this one (1991). Anderson also quotes freely and pays homage to Tom Nairn whose ideas are examined below.

There are relations to Gellner in this approach too, with the appeals to literacy. According to Kellas, Anderson combines the approach of Deutsch and his community of communication (1998). Indeed, his argument that you need print capitalism to create the imagined community seems to rest strongly on communication as a factor. Plus he clearly incorporates ideas from Hechter’s cultural division of labour.

Other parts of the modernising process are also required. The scientific revolution and exploration broke the Church (any Church) stranglehold on society and the language monopoly that they held (Latin and Arabic). Plus sovereignty shifted from the traditional order to the people or the idea of the people anyway. It is at this point that Anderson goes beyond Gellner and considers the emotions behind nationalism. The appeal, he argues, lies in the feeling that the nation is a larger family, a greater community that provides a sense of continuity beyond one’s life and even one’s self. He argues that with the decline in religion nationalism is the secular equivalent – providing continuity and meaning. Thus he considers the cultural aspects of nationalism, giving it religious characteristics (1983).

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nature his work on nationalism bypasses primordial theory due to its contentious nature.
Anderson’s work generated much discussion and criticism within the discipline. Ozkirimli provides a synthesis of them highlighting some major issues (2000). Anderson presents a culturally reductionist argument and ignores other possible impacts on nationalism – such as the influence of the state. Also, the relationship that Anderson posits between nationalism and religion does not always work out in the manner he describes. Kellas also argues that religion may go hand in hand with nationalism – Ireland, Poland, Israel and Iran. Therefore, he argues it is difficult to relate nationalism’s rise to religion’s decline (1998). The Scottish case clearly inhibits Anderson. Scottish national identity arose long before the Church influence on society declined – indeed both became closely linked.

Alongside the publication of Anderson and Gellner was scholarship from Eric Hobsbawm, a Marxist historian influential during the 1980s and 1990s. He presents classic Marxist themes including the idea that nationalism is a false consciousness and a construction of the elite or rather the bourgeoisie (1990). He directly rejects the main thrust of Anderson’s ideas because different people, inside their heads can mean different things even when employing the same words.

Hobsbawm stresses, as does Gellner, the elements of invention, myth creation and social engineering that go into making nations. “In short, for the purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalism but the other way around” (1990 page10). Nations require national languages, which require mass printing, mass literacy and mass schooling. An important aspect of Hobsbawm is that he stresses that nations are constructed from above, but must be analysed from below. They require examination of the interests of the ordinary people; many of which are not national let alone nationalist. He states that Gellner’s perspective of modernisation does not allow for examination of the view from below. Kellas denounces Hobsbawm for his a priori reasoning based on Marxist principles (1998). He argues that Hobsbawm fails to accept the facts – prime among which is that, despite claims to the contrary, the end of the 20th Century

\[12 \text{ This concept, of belonging to a people is equal to Anderson's idea of a nation.} \]
has not witnessed an end to nationalism, but has seen communism collapse\textsuperscript{13}. This is a classic response to dismissing most of Hobsbawm's claims (McCrone 1998, Ozkirimli 2000, Smith 1998) and must be agreed with here.

5. Modernist Critiques and Ethno-Symbolism

Much criticism of modernism arises from the ethno-symbolist approach; which has provided a body of literature that draws upon themes from a variety of sources. Indeed, Anthony Smith's 1998 consideration of nationalist theory is, without explicit statement of such, an attack on the modernists and a statement of the ethno-symbolist position. Ozkirimli (2000) considers a list of similar criticisms. The first criticism that arises is that the date of the first nations is misleading with modernist arguments. Greenfeld locates the first nation well before the rise of nationalism (1992), during the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century. Hastings goes further than that by placing it in the 14\textsuperscript{th} Century (1997). This argument is in direct conflict to those of Gellner and Hobsbawm, and an example of the difference between modernists such as Hobsbawm, Gellner, Kedourie, Breuilly, and Anderson.

Somewhat linked to the above criticism, and an argument posited by Smith (1991), is the claim that modernists do not consider the existence of pre-modern ethnic ties. Ethnies as Smith calls them have existed for hundreds of years and have direct links to ethnic groups of today. Smith directly challenged the ideas of Hobsbawm and argued that the historical records and traditions act as a restraint on elites in terms of what they can employ as symbols. They can interpret selectively and manipulate somewhat but are constrained nonetheless (Smith 1991). Hutchinson clearly agrees with Smith and shows that religion and war have played a very important part in shaping nationalism and that nationalism is "not a correlative of modernisation". He states that factors which account for nationalism existed in the pre-modern era (Hutchinson 1994). This dismissal of historical importance in the formation of specific societies and states remains one of modernisms chief problems. Scotland provides a prime case from which to draw evidence to challenge the modernist link of nationalism and modernisation.

\textsuperscript{13} Hobsbawm compared nationalism and its revival to the owl of Minerva - it only flies at dusk. This
Another criticism of the modernism school is the equating of nation building with state building. The state and nation have often been confused with each other in academic and political terms. Conner discussed the problem of conceptual ambiguity (1994) which is reflected in a lack of clarity within some discussion in the modernist approach. Smith also argues in several works that the role of the modern state in the origins of nationalism should not be over emphasised. When one considers the work of Greenfeld and Hastings it becomes clear that in some particular case nationalism preceded the modern state. Several aspects of the modernist argument fail to address these concerns and cases.

Perhaps the most important criticism that has been levelled time and again at the constructivist and instrumental viewpoints is the emotion and passion that people have for nationalism and nationalist movements. Kellas argues that no “socio-economic functional explanation” provides an answer to nationalisms emotional attachments (Kellas 1998 page 40). Ozkirimli argues that this is the core of the ethno-symbolist critique of modernist theories (2000). Brown is openly constructivist and admits to the existence of a non-rational aspect of nationalism yet fails to fully incorporate this into his examination. It is interesting to note that both Ozkirimli and McCrone employ Gellner to support the idea that modernism can detect the “spell” of nationalism. Unfortunately, this defence is weak, non-academic, and seemingly employs an emotional aspect.

Much of the ethno-symbolism argument has already been presented as a foil for the approaches and theories presented above. However, in 1998 Smith both acknowledged the label and clearly defined the term. Some scholars included in the ethno-symbolists camp, which is more homogeneous than the others previously discussed (Ozkirimli 2000) are Anthony D. Smith, John Hutchinson, John Armstrong and Adrian Hastings. A basic argument of this grouping is that nations, and their formation, should be examined over a period of several centuries (la long duree) and that the emergence of modern nations cannot be understood without considering the various ethnic groups that have gone before. Hutchinson argues that the rise of

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14 Indeed, it remains a distinct problem today, where the terms are frequently misemployed.
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nations must be seen within the ethnic context that shaped them (1994). Smith argues that nations have a link to the ethnic groups of the past and differences between them are of degree only (1986, 1995).

Smith presents much of the lucid defence of the ethno-symbolists position in his survey of the theories of nationalism (1998). As can be seen by his comments and critiques on modernism Smith represents a halfway house between primordialism and modernism. National identity must be seen as a cultural and collective phenomenon (thus he agrees with Anderson). Yet he dismissed Hobsbawm, as nationalism is more than mere invention (1991). Likewise Smith argues that by stressing only the modern features of nationalism Breuilly ignores the historical evidence (1998).

Ethno-symbolists are accused of using confused concepts (Ozkirimli 2000) a problem almost endemic in nationalism studies. The *ethnie* concept has spawned much debate and remains a contentious point that clearly divides theoretical approaches to nationalism. The key criticism levelled is that nations and nationalism did not exist before the modern era. This is, of course, a keystone of the modernist school and yet it is used in reverse to criticise critics of the approach. Yet, this charge has been discussed. Smith freely admits that nations are a modern phenomenon, but argues that they incorporate features from the ethnies and previous eras (1986). In other words, history is a key aspect of understanding nationalism and national identity in the modern context.

A related criticism made is the use of cultural material from history. Modernists charge that it is difficult to prove the relationship and that many “myths” and symbols are invented or misinterpreted – this point is made by Breuilly and has been echoed by Calhoun (1997) and Ozkirimli (2000). Such modernists feel that ethno-symbolists ignore the fact that cultural myths and symbols are as much constructed16 as the nationality in whose service they are employed. Ethno-symbolists admit that myths and symbols are interpreted; they are not constructed but drawn from the

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15 The quotation in question is Gellner discussing how he plays “schmaltzy” Bohemian folk songs on his mouth organ. (see McCrone 1998 page 84).
16 Harsher critics employ the term ‘invented’.
ethnic past and the history of the nationalities in question. While elites and others may attempt to interpret such material to further their particular cause, they are constrained in their use of them by the historical legacy of the group in question. One can present William Wallace and Rob Roy as nationalist heroes fighting the English, and this may or may not be the actuality of who they were, but neither are inventions. Both carry important cultural symbolism, and they cannot be dismissed as unimportant, nor can they be presented outside of a limited range. Any attempt to alter history too much is met with resistance from members of the group to whom that history "belongs". In the classic sense mythological heroes may have been bandits, but any attempt to change the public perception of such heroes is difficult if not impossible. This point will be illustrated within this work.

Ethno symbolism is a return to aspects of the nationalist debate that had been dismissed or disregarded by the rise of the modernists. It is clearly not a return to Primordialism. The difference lies in the argument that the historical and cultural legacy that runs through history must be considered when nationalism as a political force is considered. At the same time \textit{la long duree} may be regarded as looking too far in the search for understanding. The historical aspects of the nation, the ethnic underpinnings of national identity, and the impact of history on nationalism are clearly important. Smith presents strong arguments that require consideration rather than simple rejection. However it is the legacy of history that is important. The search for an understanding of nationalism and national identity as a political force requires an examination of contemporary political nationalism. An understanding of history is key, but to consider the politics of today should not require a shift to the past. Ethno-symbolism has highlighted the importance of factors dismissed or overlooked by modernism, but has lacked a strong contemporary political focus. By considering the employment of the past in contemporary politics one can explain nationalism and national identity today. By rejecting the past the modernists ignore this political importance. By focusing on history the ethno-symbolists ignore the importance of politics today.

6. New Approaches
The theoretical considerations of nationalism have entered a new era with a new discourse (Ozkirimli 2000). Among the other works that have stretched beyond the
conventional school in the last few years has been the seminal work of Billig. He introduced a new conceptual understanding of nationalism. Banal nationalism refers to the daily reproduction of nationalist sentiment in the established nations of the Western world. Billig argues that nationalism is not, as is commonly felt, the actions of others. Patriotism, seen as positive, belongs to us, while nationalism, a negative, belongs to them, the others. This distinction is criticised by Billig who sees, within the daily habits of people the constant reaffirmation of nationalism; hanging flags; singing the national anthem at sports games and cultural events; even money constantly enforce the nationalist sentiments of the populace.

Billig examines the speeches and writings of various political leaders to show that they employ nationalist discourse within their messages. He concludes that nationalism is an ideology so common to us that it goes unnoticed the vast majority of the time. Billig argues that academia reproduces nationalism in the homeland of the scholar by considering it a psychological need. Additionally scholars see nationalism as an extreme aspect of nationalist movements and thus part of the other. It is thus overlooked as part of the normal socio-political order (Billig 1995). These key insights provide an opportunity to place nationalism squarely in the political frame. An analysis of political communication, in a territory with a nationalist cleavage, must bear Billig’s approach in mind.

This is not to say that Billig is representative of the new theoretical approaches to the study of nationalism. Indeed, he is often critical of postmodernism, and the idea of globalisation affecting nationalism (1995). Smith is also dismissive of much of the more recent post-modern and deconstructionist scholarship on nationalism (1998). Although he feels that some of the research has provided “important empirical contributions” to the subject of nationalism, there have been no major advances in terms of theory. He argues that while some new approaches, particularly the perspective of gender, have incorporated useful concepts and modified paradigms, overall their utility to the understanding of nationalism remains limited. Billig must be considered an important exception to any such dismissal though. His recognition

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17 This point raises all sorts of interesting questions in regards to the new European currency.
of the importance of nationalism as part of the everyday discourse within the political order is a key insight and will inform the direction of this body of research.

7. Conclusion

The various theories examined above show that the debate on nationalism is alive and well. They also provide a number of guidelines for any consideration of the study of nationalism. At the other end of that scale a scholar is faced with the need to avoid what Calhoun has called ‘casual parsimony’ and throw into the equation every variable short of the kitchen sink – a charge that Ozkirimli levies against Smith (2000).

Starting with primordialism it can be seen that the ideological view that nations have existed since time immemorial and must be defended against outsiders and interlopers is very much a “pseudo-scientific one” (Ozkirimli 2000) and can be disregarded. What is important is the need to consider the ethnic dimension and the connection between nationalism and ethnicity in any discussion. Shils' identification of the importance of public ceremonies and symbology resonates in approaches other than primordialism. Furthermore, the comments by Geertz on the wishes of certain groups not to be lost in the emergence of the modern civil state would seem to support some of the nationalist or ethnic activity in the UK and Western Europe in general. The debate on the Welsh language, and to a lesser extent the Scots and Gaelic tongues, seem to reflect a wish of smaller national groups not to be subsumed by the more general state culture. In the same vein, Catalan nationalism, Corsican nationalism and Basque nationalism all seem to be driven by in part by the same considerations.

The combined efforts of modernism have clearly exposed some of the illogical and ideological aspects of the primordial argument. Some aspects of modernism are important, but other contributions can be disregarded. Despite the claims of Hobsbawm, nationalism has not disappeared. Also it seems well supported that it is very much a western European born phenomenon and did not initially arise in

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18 It is interesting that Ozkirimli argues that Shils and Geertz are “wrongly” included under the primordialist heading – a surprise when one considers that Shils employs the terms in his writings and Geertz’s position seem fairly inclusive of primordial aspects!
economic peripheries of other regions of the world. Indeed, when nationalism did emerge outside the west, it was often in anti-colonial forms, or post-colonial forms, which reflected language previously employed by western style nationalism against western powers and authorities.\footnote{It should be noted that this is not a view held by all. Panarin is especially dismissive of this idea.}

Instrumentalism seems a weak explanation of nationalism and nationalist activity. Many of the modern nationalist and national movements of Europe have taken actions that were not in the best interests of the groups in question and could not be considered rational. Furthermore, Brass’ arguments that instrumentalism fails to correctly identify the relationship between the mass and elite activity in nationalist movements is a telling blow. This research must discard instrumentalism as an explanatory approach. However, some of the modernists who employ this approach, such as Hechter, will be considered, as their ideas contain common threads that run through a variety of theoretical considerations. Taken as a whole instrumentalism must be considered as little more than a weak form of constructivism; a charge that has been levied before (see Comaroff, 1996).

Nonetheless the modernist school of thought has contributed to the understanding of nationalism and the constructivist stream has provided much. The idea of a common culture and common language (arising through a common educational system) crop up in several examinations on nationalism. Although as noted above, primordialists also consider culture important. The structure of the state as an influence on nationalism –as well as being influenced by it, is an important aspect that some constructivists have highlighted.

The importance of capitalism and the world capitalist system arises again and again in the study of nationalism. A concern shared by such diverse bedfellows as Gellner, Hobsbawm, Nairn, Anderson and Smith, there is much disagreement about its exact role. Some charge that it is the sole cause of the rise of nationalism while others; rightly so, see this argument as reductionist. Other scholars have debated the importance of capitalism alongside other influences on the rise of nationalism. Nairn sees nationalism as the price that the world had to pay for its capitalist system. Nairn
regards nationalism as very much an elite creation, and Brass and Breuilly support him in this consideration. Elite activity is a theme that cuts across approaches, with modernists and ethno-symbolists seeing it as an important aspect in any examination of a nationalist movement. Any consideration of the view from above should be balanced, as Hobsbawm argues, with a consideration of the view from below and the importance of nationalism as a mass movement. The role of the masses must be explored in order to ascertain whether they simply follow where led or whether they have more influence on the direction of nationalism and the group sense of identity than that argued by some modernists.

The ethno-symbolists stress the importance of the positive aspects of ethnicity, symbolism, and the historical aspects of nationalism. The consideration of history, cultural legacy and their continuing impact on current movements is a point well raised by Smith and Hutchinson both. Any consideration of a national identity must take into consideration the historical and cultural basis that provides for the emergence (or re-emergence) of nationalist claims. Those who dismiss the importance of ethno-symbolist claims, such as Ozkirimli, would even support this. Ozkirimli’s argument that ethno-symbolists are essentialists at heart, little different from other forms of primordialism (2000) is unsupported when the ethno-symbolist approach is considered in depth.

It remains that there is no singular theory of nationalism that a scholar can employ. Indeed, there are those that argue, quite directly, that such a theory is impossible (McCrone 1998, Ozkirimli 2000). Ozkirimli provides several propositions, drawn from his analysis of theoretical works (2000). First he argues that there can be no general theory and he draws support from Hall, Smith and Zubaida on this point. In a second and related point he argues that there is no such thing as one form of nationalism – but a series of heterogeneous forms. His third proposition is that these heterogeneous forms of nationalism are linked by the discourse of nationalism - as identified by Billig and others. Three features can identify this nationalist discourse; claims that the interests of the nation override all others, the nation is the source of all legitimacy, and it operates on a clear binary distinction (them and us). Ozkirimli and argues that other forms of nationalism have arisen in non-western areas of the world (1994).
continues by arguing that the nationalist discourse is only effective if reproduced on a daily basis – the banal nationalism of Billig is important in his propositions.

Smith (1998) does not despair of reaching a grand theory; rather his work closes with a more optimistic view that forward movement to such a theory will take place. He is among those who see a grand theory as the only option. “An integrated or general theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity must be the aim of all students of the subject. Without such a theory it is impossible to make a claim that understanding has been advanced beyond the level of the description and partial analysis of apparently unrelated case studies” (Kellas 1998, page 209). This seems a harsh assessment. The post-modernist movement throughout political science has seemed to accept the idea that Meta theories are either unsuitable or impossible to construct with the tools and concepts currently at hand. While post-modernism may have added little advancement, it has illuminated areas that have been ignored. Combining this partial illumination approach with the search for an overarching view will provide greater insight. Kellas and his focus on the emotional aspects of nationalism, the importance of Billig, the need to balance the elite and the mass view of nationalism and national identity, all provide avenues for investigation. Nationalism does exist in a multitude of forms and by understanding each form, and how it relates to others, further insight into the overall phenomenon can be provided.

Nationalism has not died with the emergence of a globalised world system, nor does it show any sign of doing so. Scotland, and the UK, stand at the forefront of a new era in international relations as they engage with the EU. The nationalist movement in Scotland has been seen to grow politically alongside the integration of the UK into a supra-national system. This is a seeming contradiction in several ways. Scottish nationalism is considered a neo-nationalism yet it did not arise from the ruins of a communist system but in opposition to one of the oldest states in Europe. In considering the character and nature of Scottish nationalism and national identity the possible impacts on the future of Scotland, the UK, and Europe could become clearer. The impact of nationalism on the larger picture will only become clearer when we examine all aspects of the canvas – each greater understanding of a single thread adding to the understanding of the whole.
Chapter Two
Nationalism Theory and Scotland

The Scottish case is anomalous in the study of nationalism. No nationalist movement\(^1\), seeking separation, emerged during the 19\(^{th}\) Century. In terms of identity, Scottish identity exists alongside the existence of a British identity. It is a truism that identity is a multifaceted concept. Any individual has several identities and many overlap and interact with one another. Being Scottish also means one is legally British and both of these identities have political, social, and cultural claims on, and meanings for, individuals within Scotland. A Scottish individual may deny the fact they feel British, but this does not negate the fact that their citizenship is British. They are a citizen of the British State. The last 40 years of quantitative analysis within the field of political science has seen any number of studies questioning Scottish and British individuals on whether they see themselves as Scottish or/and British. Despite some often significant, fluctuations over time, a large minority (and sometimes majority) of Scots have always identified themselves as both. One position put forward is that Scottish identity is a national identity, while British is a state identity\(^2\), and this distinction allows for a consideration of the political impact of identity from both a Scottish and a UK wide perspective.

In terms of nationalism itself, there have been several waves of nationalist activity throughout Europe over the last couple of centuries. Scotland has not followed the general pattern exhibited. Scotland did not show signs of a significant political nationalism during the middle of the 19\(^{th}\) Century when national movements were sweeping across the rest of Europe. This is despite the fact that the multi-national, yet centralised, political structure of the UK seemed to present a case ripe for nationalist activity. Ireland did see several periods of nationalist activity throughout the 19\(^{th}\) Century, culminating in the 1920 Act, which created the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. When national movements again reared their political heads at various points in the 20\(^{th}\) Century Scotland was again misaligned. Yet Scotland did

\(^1\) A nationalist movement can take many forms. This thesis considers them from a political perspective. As this chapter discusses any movement that seeks to highlight national characteristics is inherently political. Even when subsuming the idea of the nation within a wider state a movement is acting in a nationalist fashion if it is employing national characteristics or markers.

\(^2\) For a longer discussion of this point see Henderson (1999).
reflect a potent national identity and nationalist feeling. On several occasions the nationalist movement had a significant impact on the political scene within Scotland and upon the structure and politics of the UK. However, these events took place at times when nationalism was more quiescent on the wider socio-political stage. On the world stage it seemed that nationalism had become part of the politics of yesterday.

Thus it is important to consider the case of Scottish nationalism, and Scottish national identity, in order to assess the overall validity of theories of nationalism and national identity. This is because the Scottish case, as with similar other, regional mobilisations within Europe (Wales and Catalonia for example), does not fit securely into certain established theoretical considerations of the birth/growth of nationalisms as either social or political movements.

It is important at this point to note that in many theoretical considerations of nationalism and national identity; non-parliamentary political nationalist movements are “downgraded” (Morton, 1999). However, while Morton sees this downgrading as being for “quite legitimate” or even “rational” reasons, this work would strongly disagree. The approach here is to consider nationalism and national identity from a political perspective. Nationalism studies cut across many academic boundaries and much of the work produced concerning nationalism is not overtly political in focus. Even when the focus is cultural or social, nationalism impacts on the political system even if parliamentary national(ist) movements are formally absent. Simple absence from the parliamentary system does not indicate an absence of nationalism. A nationalist movement may exist, yet be unrepresented, or even not formally organised in the political arena. A movement may be unable to break through electoral or other political barriers set by the state. Such a movement may eschew the existing state system as illegitimate. Or mainstream political parties may incorporate a nationalist element in their policy objectives.

The question must always return to what the aims and objectives of a national movement are. As an ideology nationalism seeks congruence between the national and state boundaries and control of the nation’s destiny by people of that nation. An overt nationalist movement may not seek outright independence but it will still strive
for empowerment of the nation. A perfect example of this is Plaid Cymru, the Party for Wales. Although eschewing outright independence, the constitution of PC still lists as the first of five objectives, “To promote the constitutional advancement of Wales with a view to attaining Full National Status for Wales within the European Union” (www.plaidcymru.org).

The existence of a political movement outside of the parliamentary system indicates that there is political agitation for change based on national claims. Several theories argue that a political party need not have elected representation or even a significant electoral base for it to affect the political and policy arena. A nationalist movement may seek to impact the system whilst operating as a movement rather than a formal political party. Such a movement may still have a strong impact on the political issues and policies. Many national movements are found in literary or other forms of cultural activity. While the expression of nationhood and national identity may be taking place outside the formal political realm, this does not reflect, nor place limits on, the influence such activity may have within that realm. The downgrading of a national movement due to it being non-political questions how nationalism is being employed and conceptualised. Can it ever be the case that any nationalist movement, or display of any national identity is non-political? If one draws on the work of Billig and his discussion on banal nationalism, then the daily impact of symbols of national identity may be below the political radar, but their ultimate impact is strongly political.

This brings us back to the question of what nationalism is, and what theorists consider it to be. As discussed in the previous chapter, Gellner considers it very much a political concept. “Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (1983, p1). He goes on to emphasise that the ethnic boundaries should not separate a distinct group from the power group. Even in Anderson’s “imagined community”, nationalism is inherently political in form, with his analysis following the development of communities into the modern world with the “modern nation” being central to the socio-political order. The key to a political understanding of Anderson lies in the fact that he argues that the community that individuals connect with (the nation) has both a territorial (or limited spatial) and sovereign aspect to it. Politics, or a political
question, has always been at the heart of theories concerning nationalism. Weber, a foundation thinker of nationalist studies, saw the nation as being a community founded on a common culture that "normally" produced a state in its own right (Gerth and Mills, 1948). Even though the focus is a cultural one, the end product of a state is political.

The downgrading or conceptualisation of nationalism as something other than political is clear in some considerations of nationalism in general, and Scottish nationalism in particular. Davidson considers the argument that there is a clear difference "between cultural nationalism (emphasising the 'ethnic characteristics' of a people) and political nationalism (expressing the 'collective will' of a people)" (2000, p21). He draws this idea of separation from the works of Herder and Rousseau, but also employs the classic Kulturnation and Staatsnation of Freidrich Meinecke.

Such divisions are clearly rejected within the works of Anthony Smith though, who argues that nationalism "as a socio-political movement" clearly links the cultural and political. Indeed, as a "working definition" he proposes the following: "An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or 'potential' "nation"" (Smith 2001, p9). Smith also provides a definition of national identity that would seem to have strong association with the Scottish experience of nationalism:

"'national' identity involves some sort of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all members of the community. It also suggest a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong" (Smith, 1991, p16).

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1 It is interesting to note that these concepts do not easily translate into English and are not clearly equivalent to cultural and political nationalism.
Several of the aspects that Smith identifies relate to Scotland. The existence of common institutions, a territory and bounded “social space” can all be applied to the Scottish case. These allow for the existence, and growth, of a separate identity within a larger state unit. Certainly several theorists and scholars have focused on these aspects when considering Scottish nationalism and national identity. We shall now turn to these theories to consider their explanatory value.

1. Locating Scotland in Theory

It is difficult to locate Scotland within many leading theories and works on nationalism due to the anomalies of timing and activity previously mentioned. Even when located, several questions and doubts can be raised about the applicability of those theories. As highlighted in Chapter One, Deustch’s (1966) cybernetic, social communication approach provides limited applicability to Scottish nationalism. Deustch charts the decline of Gaelic speakers in Scotland – but this bears little relation to the emergence and growth of Scottish nationalism, which as a political movement has actually lacked a strong language aspect, unlike its British counterpart, Welsh nationalism (Fowler 2003).

Several scholars have advanced theories specifically constructed or designed with regards to Scotland. The last decade has seen several works written specifically to address the issue of Scottish nationalism and national identity. These works have followed upon strong studies from the 1970s. The emergence of Scottish nationalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s had an impact and such scholars as Hechter and Nairn emerged as leading thinkers on Scottish and Celtic nationalism at that time.

Within the various considerations and theories that have been advanced certain major conceptual themes and concerns are evident. Obviously the nature of Scottish identity is, perhaps the major one of these. What does it mean to be Scottish, how is Scottish national identity formed and shaped, on what basis was it created and how is it envisaged in contemporary times? While these are major questions within the nationalism field itself, they are perhaps even more important given the somewhat contrary nature of the Scottish case. It becomes clear (as Deustch’s work clearly shows) that Scotland does not fit neatly into certain, almost orthodox, conventional
theories in regards to the nature of identity within Scotland. Morton (1999) states that both Breuilly and Hobsbawm have no place for Scotland within their analysis of nationalism.

Another key question is the issue of when a Scottish nation and a sense of Scottish national identity began to form. A firm historical answer of when nations began to emerge is still a hotly debated topic amongst historians and nationalism scholars. The acceptance of the existence of nations before nationalism, of the emergence of nations prior to the modern period (and before the French Revolution), places this thesis firmly outside the modernist school. Yet this work must also reject that *la long duree*, first highlighted by Armstrong and built upon so strongly by Smith, is a mandatory aspect of any nationalism study. An analysis of the links between the nation of today and the *ethnie* of yesterday is not required to examine the nature of national identity within the given polity. An awareness of how the history impacts upon the nationalism and national identity within that polity is vital. Understanding how that history is employed, how the connections are presented, and the limitations that the history places upon the nationalist movement are key. The focus is political, but an understanding of history is important.

Several major historical studies of Scotland exist, and many claim the existence of a nation long before modernism. This research accepts these arguments and seeks to illustrate how history, myths and symbols are employed in the contemporary period to support nationalist sentiment. The key importance is in how the emergence impacts upon the nature of Scottish identity today and what boundaries it places upon that identity. As we will see below, the issue of the nature of the historical aspects of identity, especially the relationship to identities of the past, remains a major cleavage within nationalism studies in general, and the Scottish case in particular.

2. The Timing of Nations

Focusing on this issue we now turn to an argument that considers this particular issue as a central theme – Davidson’s *The Origins of Scottish Nationhood*. Davidson

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4 For the early nation argument see Greenfeld (1992) or Hastings (1997).
5 For historical examinations of Scotland and Scottish identity see Broun, Finlay and Lynch (1998) and Devine (1999), especially section one.
(2000), in this revisionist discussion of the emergence of the Scottish nation, is at
great pains to differentiate between what he considers several very different, and key
ccepts. National consciousness, national identity, nationalism, patriotism and
Billig’s banal nationalism are all discussed and differentiated between. Davidson
seeks to establish when the Scottish nation came into being. Davidson argues that
there was no Scottish nation prior to the formation of the Act of Union in 1707.
What did exist, and what joined with England to form the UK, was the Scottish State.
A lack of collective identity at any time prior to 1707 meant that no sense of
nationhood could exist (Davidson 2000). To understand his argument requires a
consideration of his conceptual bases. Davidson rejects national identity in the form
Anderson would employ, and agrees with Billig’s (1995) interpretation – national
identity is a descriptor of “social life”. It is a form of identity that indicates what
particular traditions, culture and politics pervade the overarching notion of the nation
in question. To Davidson, what Anderson presents as national identity is rather a
form of national consciousness. Davidson defines this as being what each individual
holds as a conception of themselves and their relationship to others. This is an
imagined relationship nonetheless, the identity that one is aware of within oneself.
This is a fairly small, and yet important distinction. Davidson seems to be arguing
that while national identity exists, it can only do so on a group level. At the
individual level, it is simply a form of consciousness, and thus individually created
and maintained. Only when elevated to the group level does this become a national
identity.

Consequently, for Davidson, the Scottish nation began to emerge in between the
years of 1746 and 1820. He admits that constituent parts of what would become
nationhood or national identity, easily identifiable, existed prior to this period, but a
collection of ingredients does not provide the metaphorical cake that would be
nationhood, or a national identity. His argument is based on the premise that
national consciousness is neither national identity nor nationalism. Davidson claims
that there is no necessary connection between a national consciousness in Scotland
and Scottish nationalism⁶. This supports his contention that nationalism did not exist
in Scotland until the 1920s and only seriously in the 1960s. Davidson is not a

⁶ For a closer consideration of this argument, see Davidson 2000, p203.
supporter of nationalism. In his conclusion he labels nationhood as a prison, the escape from which is the socialism he so positively discusses at the same time. This reflects his Marxist approach, which he openly acknowledges from the beginning. Marxism has always struggled with nationalism. Marxist, and neo-Marxist scholars have struggled in their analysis of nationalism as they seek to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable political movements.

The struggles within Davidson's consideration of Scottish identity and nationalism lie within the nature of nationalism as he sees it. In his conceptual deliberations he compares nationalism to patriotism. He declares the difference to be almost non-existent. In the 18th Century patriotism was a predecessor for the concept of nationalism "because the latter term was not yet available" (Davidson 2000, p21). Just because the term was not available does not mean the behaviour or idea was not present. The 'imagination' or individual consciousness of the individuals who held themselves to belong to a collective group based on a territorial, ethnic or state basis was present. The differentiation between concepts within Davidson's work is very questionable, despite his strong emphasis on just this very point.

Nonetheless Davidson has provided some interesting considerations on the dual nature of Scottish identity. He argues that as the Scottish nation was only formed during the 19th Century, it emerged at the same time, alongside the British identity. It was not an accident that both formed at the same time. The process of formation of either identity was "intertwined". Davidson argues that Scottishness is not simply a part of Britishness, but that Britishness is also a part of Scottishness and it would not exist in the fashion it does today without the involvement of Scottishness. This is a key consideration of identity in the UK today. Any consideration of Scottishness must be considered alongside that of Britishness, and this work considers this point in Chapter Eight.

While accepting certain insights, this work strongly rejects the core of Davidson's arguments. A sense of Scottish identity was present prior to the formation of the UK. It certainly is not possible to draw a direct line between the identity of then and the modern identity of Scotland today, but a lack of a sense of nationhood prior to 1707 is a point strongly open to much argument. On the subject of dual identity, others
have agreed to the existence of a dual identity, but Davidson’s argument that most people would agree to or “concede” that Scottishness is a part of Britishness is a very arguable position. The results from a significant number of election studies indicate that respondents see the identities as quite separate, and most scholars treat them as clearly distinguishable.

Foster, despite his own Marxist tendencies, would clearly disagree with both Davidson and Nairn. Referring to Nairn’s statement that nationalism presents “Marxism’s greatest historical failure” (1977, p1) Foster strongly rejects this point in his consideration of Scottish nationalism. He also rejects the position of Davidson, and indeed the position of most of the modernist school, such as Gellner, Breuilly, and Hobsbawm.

All historians agree that ethnically the Scottish landmass was occupied by at least five linguistically separate and distinct groupings in the middle ages. Most historians also agree that by the eleventh to thirteenth centuries at least four of these groupings had fused together into a nation that identified itself as Scottish; long before any moves towards modernisation and at a time when Scots society was decidedly uncivil (Foster 1989, p35).

According to Foster, nations, especially the Scottish nation, are not a particularly modern phenomenon, and this argument agrees with Hastings and Greenfeld. Indeed, any dismissal of the early emergence of a Scottish nation, and Scottish identity has inherent problems for many scholars. Some argue that the nation can clearly be traced back prior to the 18th Century. Many point to the 13th Century, around the time of the wars of independence (Broun, et al 1998). Any consideration about the emergence of the Scottish nation often points to one specific document from this time – the Declaration of Arbroath. It is a point used as both evidence of the existence of the Scottish nation (Watson 1998) and also attacked as being representative of nothing more than a power play attack by one feudal elite on another (Davidson, 2000, Kerevan 1981). However, Cowan (1998) has argued that it
is “the supreme articulation” of an early nationhood that stresses both a sense of freedom, and more importantly to this study, a unique sense of Scottish identity.

It is important to again stress one specific point; the exact point at which a Scottish nation, or national identity, emerged is not in itself important for this body of research. The possibility of the existence of a Scottish nation or a sense of Scottish identity prior to the 18th and 19th centuries is important. This would question the validity of certain central aspects of the modernist argument. It also raises questions in regards to the formation and maintenance of national identity within ethnic groups. Modernists would argue, especially within the constructivist approach, that the employment of history is simply a tool, employed by elites to create a sense of identity that is then employed to achieve certain socio-political or economic goals. Certainly, both modernists and Marxists alike would usually argue that in seeking an answer to the identity question, one must focus on the historical development of the capitalist, industrial system, and the actions of the elite therein.

3. Theories Relating to Scotland

Thus we return to Nairn, who has written extensively on nationalism, and specifically Scottish nationalism, over the past forty years. Nairn’s *The Break-up of Britain* (1977) provided a solid framework within which to consider Scottish nationalism. Nairn presents an argument structured around the widely accepted idea that identity in Scotland was, and is, a dual one for most individuals, with the existence of both a British and Scottish identity. He employs the same conceptual consideration of Gellner in terms of considering the economic development of the UK and Scotland. However, unlike Gellner who focuses on the rise of capitalism and mass industry, Nairn focuses on the decline of the industrial basis of capitalism as the British Empire began to dismantle and disintegrate.

Nairn argues that the elites within Scotland had done well within the confines of the Empire, and that being a ‘mother nation’ of Empire had been considered a positive aspect of being part of the UK. He discusses how several aspects of Scotland’s development where somewhat unique, when compared to other smaller nations or

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7 Davies (1996) considers this to be the key political tract of the Scottish nationalist movement.
states within Europe at the time. Scotland was allied to the ‘first nation’ and was able to develop both economically and socio-politically, without suffering issues of underdevelopment. However, economic development, and the development of civil society within Scotland were related and yet separate events. Scotland was able to develop a civil society that existed outside of the purely English framework, and it became an eccentric case. “It was too much of a nation, had too different a civil society, to become a mere province of the UK; yet it could not develop its own nation-state on this basis either, via nationalism” (Nairn 1977, p146).

For Nairn nationalism in Scotland did not develop in a political form, as it is not required or allowed to do so by the Scottish elites. Nairn explains this in terms of a disablement of political nationalism by the controlling “new bourgeois social class” who sought to keep their economic position by working within the Union, especially politically, and avoiding any challenge to it. For Nairn, the nationalism that did develop in Scotland during the 19th Century was a cultural form of “sub-nationalism”. Nairn holds this form of nationalism somewhat in contempt, relating it to images of the ‘Tartan Monster’, considering it a weak and parochial form. What Nairn does highlight is the fact that political elites within Scotland had no need of nationalism, as they had access to the British state and Empire. Thus any inherent nationalist movement was denied a significant number of potential leaders.

Another Marxist, who employed quantitative techniques to support his theoretical consideration of nationalism, was Michel Hechter. His was a “landmark contribution” (Kellas 1998) to the study of nationalism. He was also interested in the argument that modernisation theory would produce homogenisation. He argued that diffusion theory would not necessarily bring about ethnic unity. Rather increased contact between ethnic groups within a single state may bring about ethnic conflict as a result of what he called “internal colonialism” (Hechter 1975). This situation comes about due to the inequalities that exist between regions within the same polity, regions consisting of different ethnic groups. The peripheral regions will be relegated to inferior positions, leaving the core region dominant. If, these regions are also noted by their differing ethnic composition and are national in character the end

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8 It is at this point that Nairn’s Marxism (especially the deterministic nature) becomes an explicit part of his argumentation rather than a simply overt one.
result will be the formation of nationalism within the regions. Following Hechter’s argument and line of reasoning, the nationalisms that have existed in the British Isles, the Irish, Welsh and Scottish variants, have all been caused by internal colonialism.

Hechter presented data that showed how minority groups within western European states were subordinated by a number of economic actions, as well as being socially excluded and discriminated against culturally. Furthermore, the economies of the regional areas in question were tailored to meet the requirement of the core economy. Local or regional elites were assimilated culturally, and high status positions in areas of control were reserved for members of the dominant core group – thereby creating a cultural division of labour. This original formulation was criticised on a number of fronts and Hechter undertook revisions to his original analysis due to these criticisms and factual/theoretical inconsistencies (Kellas 1998, Smith 1995, 1998, Ozkirimli 2000).

In his revision of his earlier model Hechter submitted a new consideration, stating that Scots could occupy specific niches within distinct institutions that existed within their national competence. Thus, Scots could fill positions within the education, legal, and to a certain extent the political system where they did not have to compete with the English (Hechter 1985). Furthermore, these positions were not socially inferior and thus presented the ethnic minority with some prestige in their own eyes. This was a “segmented cultural division of labour” and presented what Kellas calls a vertical stratification system (1998). Hechter argued that the Scots had not been subjected to internal colonialism to a high degree due to the nature of the union in 1707. This theory is reflected in the argument put forward by Paterson that Scotland retained a degree of autonomy during the 18th, 19th, and 20th Centuries despite being part of a unitary state.

Ozkirimli still subjects Hechter’s argument to major criticisms. First, is the simple issue that the original model does not fit the facts of the case and is not supported by in depth analysis of the supporting data. The amendments to the original model, made specifically with Catalonia and Scotland in mind provide no additional help, as the conditions of segmentation, Ozkirimli (2000) argues, did not exist there. Along the same lines, Smith points out the number of Scots who worked in the environs of
the British Empire (Smith 1983) as a criticism of the idea of segmented cultural divisions. Kellas also attacks this theory because it seems to be at variance with the facts. Scots were and are not, in practice, relegated to inferior social positions in Britain, and Scotland was very much at the heart of the industrial revolution and has been as imperial a nation as England since the 18th century (1998). Political history is replete with individual Scots who have risen to command positions of power within the socio-political system of the UK; clearly there were opportunities available for Scots to avail themselves of.

Ozkirimli also highlights the criticisms of those who have attacked Hechter for being a reductionist in his arguments. The concepts employed with Hechter’s model to explain nationalism are called “purely economic and spatial” (2000). Smith charged that economic inequalities would only increase pre-existing ethnic issues. In challenging the limits of Hechter’s model Smith states that it fails to explain why nationalism was quiescent in Scotland, and other Western European states, and why a regional nationalist backlash did not form in Northern England or Southern Italy (Smith 1983). However, with reference to the above charges by Smith on Hechter’s limitations, it must be clear that the majority ethnic group in Northern England are the same as the ethnic group in Southern England – English Anglo-Saxon. Thus any backlash in the north of England could not be considered as nationalistic as the ethnic factor is constant variable rather than a distinctive one. Nonetheless Hechter’s argument is lacking in regards to other issues that Smith considers. The economic focus of the internal colonialism model, given Hechter’s strong economic foundations, remains a key problem. There can be little doubt that the Union of 1707 saw a distinct benefit to Scotland in terms of economic growth and general prosperity, albeit not an immediate one. It has been clearly pointed out that in the immediate aftermath of the Union an economic downturn did occur. However, Smout (1970) has clearly argued that, in the long term, the economic benefits from the Union were very much in Scotland’s favour.

While many of Smith’s criticisms of Hechter are valid, there is one argument made against Hechter, and also Nairn, that is important to challenge. This is the idea that

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9 This is also a reductionist argument.
nationalism in Scotland was quiescent. Nairn has been challenged for this portrayal of nationalism within Scotland, especially for considering it so negatively prior to the emergence of a political movement in the 20th Century. Such a portrayal is the same position taken by Davidson. His argument being that nationalism did not exist prior to the 1920s, or probably the 1960s. Both fall back on the idea that the absence of a political nationalist party or movement indicates non-nationalism or some form of non-political nationalism. Morton (1999) correctly challenges this position. The absence of an openly nationalist party in the political mainstream does not equal the absence of nationalism. Billig has shown that nationalism is present in many polities, clearly present, yet unacknowledged.

Any consideration of Scottish nationalism can present a strong argument that nationalism was both present, and not quiescent in Scotland for the time period that Hechter and Nairn consider. Morton has argued that nationalism did exist, but that it was a “unionist nationalism” that supported the UK state as it was then formulated. If one accepts Morton’s argument, and the evidence he provides is convincing, then any nationalism that does exist in Scotland is not, as Hechter would argue, a backlash against the internal colonialist policies of the British state. These policies were strongly supported by the Scots, or at least the middle classes and elite portions of Scottish society. This was especially the case from the emerging middle classes and the upper classes that benefited strongly from the economic prosperity of the British Empire.

It is important to understand the nature of the 19th Century British political system as envisaged by Morton. He argues that “The nature of the Victorian state was not a centralised one” and to understand Scotland as a political entity at the time was to recognise that the bourgeoisie “had all the power it needed to govern its own society” (Morton, 1999, p56). Hechter’s model cannot be applied to Scotland as the periphery was governing itself to a great extent. Scots did occupy specific niches within Scottish politics and society and as such, “then their material and their national aims can be said to be satisfied” (Morton, 1999, p56). There is no nationalist backlash because this would be a backlash of Scots against Scots. In many ways Hechter’s approach fails due to the fact that a political nationalism was not necessary at the time. The vast majority of political decisions affecting Scotland
were being made within Scotland. This argument is supported by the historical analysis of Paterson (1994) on the nature of Scotland’s relationship with the UK central government.

Morton (1999) has also challenged Nairn’s interpretation of Scottish nationalism in the 19th Century as being purely cultural or even deformed in some fashion. He clearly argues that the lack of a centralised state in the period allowed for the existence of a Scottish nationalism within Scotland. Drawing on Nairn’s conceptual basis of the state and elite, and the existence of distinct civil society within Scotland, Morton has argued that the bourgeoisie within Scotland did have a form of political nationalism. However, this nationalism was served by the fact that they, the Scottish bourgeoisie were “self-governing” in Scotland, and thus had no need to present a political nationalism to challenge the UK State. Indeed, they actively supported the existence of the Union because it provided them with positive economic aspects, while the decentralised nature of the UK at the time allowed for the continued existence of a Scottish sense of identity and nationalism. Thus Morton introduced the idea of Unionist-Nationalism into the equation.

Whilst Morton correctly challenges Hechter or Nairn the latter do provide positive input. Kellas sees Hechter’s arguments as being quite compelling with the recurrence of cultural division of labour in many multiethnic societies being quite striking (1998). Kellas is correct in his statement that the Hechter model has limited applicability in regard to Scotland though. Smith clearly agrees with this idea of limited applicability. He dismisses Hechter, stating that in terms of the revival of nationalism in “complex societies” the model is of limited capability and for explanations one “must look elsewhere” (Smith 1998, 63). Hechter’s analysis and argument provide for further insight into the case of nationalism. He does not provide an explanation for the causal roots of Scottish nationalism, let alone the growth of nationalism in the 20th Century. Any deliberation on the nature of Scottish national identity and nationalism must look elsewhere for explanatory insight.

Nairn’s rejection of the existence of an early nationalism, due to the lack of a political presence, is also problematic. Nairn (1977) predicted the break-up of Britain, and this has not occurred. It could be that devolution is a step in this
direction, although supporters of both devolution and the Union declare it be a strengthening exercise. Nairn attacks devolution as a tool to continue the British State. This inherent dislike of the UK structure clouds his analysis on several occasions. Many of his later works (Nairn 2000, 2002) continue this attack on the British state and the political elites that continue to maintain existence of both the state and the British identity. He is extremely derogatory of the existence of the dual identity of Scottishness/Britishness. He discusses the nationalism of Scotland in very positive terms – but only from a perspective of that nationalism as being ‘civic’.

How is it that this form of nationalism, not inherently political, is acceptable, while the 19th century nationalism was “sub” and somehow defective? Although his insights into Scottish nationalism remain academically powerful, his answers remain problematic.

One of the strongest paradigmatic interpretations of Scottish nationalism and national identity within the literature today is a modernist one that both supports and diverges with Nairn’s considerations of the nature of Scottish identity. The support comes from interpretation of Scottish nationalism as being a civic, rather than ethnic form. The divergence comes in the form of an acceptance of the dual nature of identity (Scottish and British, or vice versa) within Scotland today as being more positive than Nairn would allow. Both these, and other points of this modernist interpretation are best represented within the works of David McCrone. His Understanding Scotland: The sociology of a nation was an updated edition of an overall sociological consideration of the case of Scotland that Nairn declared as “benchmark” for any future consideration of the case of Scotland. As an overall consideration on Scotland, nationalism, and national identity, the work represents a milestone in the academic literature.

4. McCrone and the Modernist Interpretation

McCrone recognises that there are several assumptions made about the nature of identity – many of which are very arguable. In relation to Scotland he argues that identity is not a fixed immutable object, but a constantly changing and evolving concept – both individually and academically. He argues that an understanding of Billig allows for realising the “personalised and negotiated nature of national identity” (McCrone 2001, p153). McCrone states that people, on an individual level,
have a choice in terms of how they present themselves and what national identity they choose. He argues that we have to be cautious about Scottishness being the same through space and time, but that being Scottish is something that takes place through the social discourse that takes place on the issue of Scotland. Yet such a distinction misses the importance of the political discourse. How Scotland and Scottishness are defined within the political arena can impact upon individual ability to choose an identity.

McCrone states that there are links that can be made between the past and the present, but clearly points out that one cannot consider being Scottish today and being Scottish in the 14th Century as the same thing. McCrone argues within his works that history is a politically contested issue in the politics of Scottish identity. He stresses the claim made by the Scottish writer William McIlvanney that the Scots are a “mongrel nation” and echoes the argument of Ferguson in that “Scottishness was never exclusive, but on the contrary, has always been highly absorptive, a quality that it retains even in the vastly different circumstances of today” (Ferguson 1998, p305). Indeed McCrone stresses this point with the statement that “Those who wish to argue that an ethnically diverse Scotland is the morally correct one are able to mobilise history to considerable effect” (2001, p157). It becomes clear that a morally acceptable Scottish nation is one that is not ethnically based.

In terms of Scottish nationalism McCrone argues that Scotland today has a neo-nationalism, a direct quote from Nairn (1977). This is a “different and quite modern form of nationalism which cannot be accommodated or dismissed” (2001, p189). According to McCrone neo-nationalism is different from nationalism in that it surfaces in states with well developed economies, and from areas that, rather than being underdeveloped, are usually “relatively advantaged”. He states that they are very different from the nationalism that one can find in former communist controlled states or from states in the developing world. However, he later says it has “much in common with other variants” (2001, page 192) of nationalism and then provides, as examples, the variants of former controlled communist states!

The key difference for McCrone is in his encapsulation of what Scottish nationalism is. For him neo-nationalism in Scotland is a progressive movement that stresses the
civic rather than the ethnic features or "demos rather than ethnos". It has an adaptable political ideology and has built in social democracy and neo-liberal aspects. This reflects the modernist interpretation of neo-nationalism as a positive socio-political force or identity. This stands in direct contrast to the depiction of 'unreconstructed' or 'traditional' nationalism as a negative identity or movement. Thus neo-nationalism, or civic nationalism is both socially and politically acceptable, while ethnic nationalism is exclusionary and unacceptable as either a social or political movement.

In regards to this civic, democratic nature of nationalism McCrone considers the shift from ethnicity to a more territorial or spatially located nationalism as discussed by Linz (1985). McCrone states that the implications of this argument are that the primordial demands of a nationalism based on exclusion are not suited to "a multicultural, interdependent world" and that "Nationalist movements which take the regressive primordial route may flourish in the short term, but ultimately are doomed to fail" (2001, p188). Again he clearly dismisses an ethnic sense of identity as being morally, socially and politically unacceptable.

McCrone makes his modernist interpretations of Scottish nationalism very clear in a briefing paper published online in 2002. This document, aimed at providing an overview of national identity for an audience both inside and outside academia, draws together a number of considerations on national identity. It puts forward arguments and ideas espoused by McCrone in a number of his publications. McCrone’s work, as summed up by this document, clearly shows his modernist interpretation and reflection of national identity within Scotland quite clearly. Seven "general points" are given about the nature and structure of Scottish national identity and are supported by information gleaned from a variety of national and social attitude surveys. Such information includes the now classic Moreno question, which gauges, in a limited fashion, the nature of individual feeling on national identity.

His opening point is that the majority of people living within Scotland place a sense of Scottishness above a sense of Britishness. McCrone argues that individual respondents to surveys from within Scotland are more likely to emphasize the distinct national aspect of their identity in greater numbers than their counterparts in
Wales, and certainly in England. However, the point is emphasised by McCrone that respondents from Scotland are comfortable with a sense of dual identity, and remain British in significant numbers. It is also shown that although the referendum of 1997 and the election of the first Scottish parliament in 1999 “saw a firming up of “Scottish only” identity” (McCrone 2002) the results over time from the Moreno question on the nature of identity are fairly constant. In considering these results, McCrone argues that there has not been a significant shift one way or another in terms of strength of feeling in Scottish identity.

The works of McCrone clearly state that the relationship between national identity, political behaviour and constitutional preference are far from simple. It is clearly shown in any number of works that supporters of parties across the political spectrum choose the identity of Scottish before others\textsuperscript{10}. Also, a number of SNP supporters can, and do, consider themselves primarily as British and do not support independence. At the same time a number of Labour supporters do prefer independence as a constitutional option. It is clear from McCrone that being Scottish cannot provide a signpost in terms of how individuals will vote, or support one constitutional structure over another. What McCrone makes clear is a point that was well made by Henderson (1999). People in Scotland can clearly distinguish between their national (Scottish) and state (British) identities. People living in England, who consider themselves English/British, McCrone argues, do not easily make this distinction. It seems that the issue, to return to an analogy employed in the discussion on Davidson, is more complicated than considering the identities as the same sides of a coin – at least for many individuals within the UK.

What remains key from such insights is the existence of a sense of Scottish identity and the need to understand that identity in a political context. As a simple connection between party preference, constitutional preference, and national identity is not possible the need to understand the nature of that national identity becomes even more important. The understanding of that identity as a civic rather than ethnic form allows for a more benign understanding of possible impact on the political and constitutional structure of Scotland and the UK. If the reverse is true

\textsuperscript{10} See, for instance, Brown et al, 1998.
then the political implications of devolution could be very different from those expected by the modernists.

In examining the changing nature of identity McCrone again highlights the very fluid and contextually founded nature of identity. When referring to Scottish identity in particular, he draws upon the work of TC Smout. Smout considered Scottish identity to be based on a “sense of place” rather than a “sense of tribe” and McCrone builds upon this framework. The modernist interpretation put forward is that Scottishness is thus a territorial, civic-based form of identity, whereby an individual resident in Scotland can claim to be Scottish. Voting in elections for the Scottish Parliament is based upon residence and this is taken as support for this modernist position. Being a Scottish individual resident within the UK is not enough to vote for the Scottish Parliament. One must be resident in Scotland. Any British citizen living in Scotland can vote, irrespective of their sense of identity or ethnic basis. Of course, any European Union citizen living in Scotland can also take part in the elections for the Scottish Parliament – as well as stand as a candidate for that institution. This simple fact has ramifications in any discussion on the nature of identity. The modernist position is supported by evidence based on ideas of citizenship rather than national belonging.¹¹

Two other important issues are employed by McCrone to support the civic interpretation of Scottish identity. The first is survey evidence drawn from studies among ethnic minorities living in Scotland. Many individuals within these communities, especially younger ones, are more likely to employ hybrid identifiers than their counterparts living in England. In McCrone’s words “young people of Asian origin” will call themselves, or identify themselves as “Scottish Muslim or Scottish Pakistani” whereas similar individuals living within the confines of England do not claim such identities. The second issue employed to support this interpretation of Scottish identity, as an inclusive one is a return to McIlvanney’s “mongrel people” phrase. McCrone claims an historical basis for the idea that, culturally and regionally, Scotland has always been open for the inclusion of differing groups.

¹¹ This point is investigated in greater detail in Chapter Eight.
McCrone presents a consideration of Scottish nationalism and Scottish identity as an inclusive, multi-cultural, territorially based manifestation. What little historical considerations McCrone does make are limited to highlighting the inclusive nature of Scotland in the past, and the moral supports that can be drawn from such contemplations. This is not to say that McCrone discounts history. He argues that the cultural aspects of recent historiography have helped refocus the debate on national identity within Scotland. This is indeed a positive, as the social, political and constitutional changes Scotland and the UK are undergoing in recent years mean that the questions of exclusion, inclusion and the formation and discourse of national identity are central issues.

By highlighting Scottish nationalism as a ‘neo’ form, he is able to differentiate it from the other negative forms of nationalism that became so clearly and tragically evident in areas of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia during the last 15 years. McCrone argues that “Scottishness falls at the ‘civic’ rather than the ‘ethnic’ end of nation-ness” (2001, p165). He makes it plain that this is a belief with wide support in the literature and states, in regards to the location of Scottish nationalism at the civic end of the spectrum that “much has been made of the fact” (2001, p177). The basis for this, the overall modernist interpretation of Scottish nationalism as a civic form, and for McCrone’s own position is a cultural one. For McCrone, being Scottish has become a stronger, and yet more culturally diverse, feeling in recent years. At the same time, Scotland and England are very similar in overall, general cultural terms. This therefore, means that the emphasis for identity has to be political rather than cultural. Thus the result is a sense of being Scottish that “almost as a by-product, emphasises territorial inclusivity rather than ethnic inclusivity” (2001, page 177).

McCrone does highlight, and recognise, the importance of the social discourse that frames nationalism. However, this work argues that the political discourse is also, perhaps even more so, important. Nationalism is more than a sense of identity it is also an ideology. Nationalism presents demands for political control of the group territory by the group in question. In the case of Scotland, where the territory, and group in question, is a minority in a larger state, surely this has implications in a
political sense? McCrone, and the wider modernist school, see the demands of the Scottish nationalism as being territorial. Nonetheless this does not make the group exclusionary in their eyes. Rather the territorial claims are more spatial, in that 'the sense of place' overrides the 'sense of tribe' and the Scottish people, long a 'mongrel nation' are confident in their dual identity and their multicultural aspects. Likewise, minorities that do live in Scotland do so in a manner, which also makes them comfortable in presenting a sense of dual identity, and thus a sense of Scottishness is not limited to specific groups. This positive interpretation depends upon a civic based sense of identity in Scotland, and modernists interpret the evidence to support this position. This work argues that other evidence exists to contradict this position.

Where McCrone does allow for a consideration of history, this is used to support these inclusive ideals and ideas. Where culture is employed it is shown that Scotland and England are very similar, in many ways, and thus any claims on an identity basis must be political rather than cultural, or even ethnic. Therefore, the history that does count is the history of "institutional autonomy" and not "some vague set of historic emotions". This dismissal of emotion is a classic example of the limitations of the modernist interpretation of nationalism.

McCrone has shown how mass survey data has supported his interpretation of Scottish national identity and nationalism as being of the 'neo' style with few links to the nationalism or even identities of Scotland in centuries past. This is because for McCrone, like other modernists, the nations of today are not historical constructs, but productions of the modern system. However, we have already shown how Scotland does not easily fit this modernist theoretical pattern in terms of the development of its nationalism. Furthermore, we have examined literature that challenges the interpretation of national identity as a modern construct with little historical basis. Furthermore, if McCrone does allow for the employment of history, can that history present a much different form of identity than the one McCrone allows for? For such a deliberation we can return to contemplation of the ethno-symbolist approach and the works of Anthony Smith.
6. Challenging Modernism

As already discussed ethno-symbolist presents a position that is distinctly different in its approach and analysis. Ethno-symbolism argues that there is a connection between the modern nations of today and ethnic groups of pre-modern times. Smith has labelled these pre-modern entities as ethnie’s, which he states is a French term for ethnic communities (Smith 2001, p12). Smith has discussed them at length in a number of works (e.g., Smith 1986, 1989, 1991, 2001). This underlines what he considers to be the core relationship between modern nationalism and the people of that nation – a firm belief in a cultural, ethnic group connection.

This idea of a link, albeit a tenuous one, between the modern nations of today, and the ethnic communities of the past, is what both joins and separates Smith from the perennialist and the primordialist approaches. Smith has sometimes been labelled a primordialist, clearly an unfair charge. He has patently argued that nationalism as an ‘ideology and language’ came about during the 18th Century (Smith 1991). The difference may not be clear at first, as both primordial and perennial arguments support the link between the past and the present. The key to understanding what does separate these paradigms though lies in a firm definitional understanding of the various approaches. The biological claims of primordialism stand neither the test of historical, nor the more scientific genetic analysis. Indeed, while still postulated by some political nationalist movements, they have little support within the academic community. Other strands of primordialism remain useful, but their a priori assumptions firmly separate them from more empirically based approaches, such as modernism and ethno-symbolism.

Perennialism has been defined as “the belief that a few nations existed in antiquity or the Middle Ages, and revived subsequently” (Armstrong 2004, p9). It should also be noted that as an approach to the study of nationalism and national identity it “has more support, along with the concept that national self-assertion generally becomes stronger at historical intervals” (Armstrong 2004, p9). What separates perennialism firmly from ethno-symbolism, and even more firmly from the modernist approach, is the acceptance of the historical pedigree of specific nations, and the more general idea of nations existing outside of the modern era. This insistence on the existence
of nations before the industrial revolution, even in antiquity, stands as a clear boundary between ethno-symbolism and perennialism.

Smith has argued that both perennialism and modernism fail to investigate "the vital symbolic issues of ethnic identity, myth and memory" and he has espoused the ethno-symbolist approach as providing for a "necessary corrective to the often sweeping claims" (2001, p60-61) made by other theoretical considerations. Indeed, the works of Smith, and others such as Hutchinson, have built upon much of the theory discussed here and in the previous chapter. There are many areas of agreement between ethno-symbolists and modernists on key aspects of nationalism theory. It is clear that Smith accepts the importance of economic modernisation as a factor in the development of the modern state system. There is also acceptance of the involvement of social construction in regards to the ideologies and institutions involved in the formation of nations themselves.

Nonetheless, ethno-symbolism is clearly separated from the modernist camp for a variety of reasons. Smith rejects the conception of nationalism and nations as a purely modern construct as being too restrictive. He has provided much analysis to support the existence of pre-modern identities that provide a direct (although not necessarily continuous) connection to the nations of today. His concept of the ethnie has been especially important for supporting this position. In his *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986), he provided six ‘dimensions’ or fundamental aspects of the ethnie. These being; a proper, or collective name; a common myth of ancestry and descent; shared history and memories; culturally differentiated and distinct from other groups; a link with a homeland or specific territory; and a sense of solidarity – which Smith has often employed with a strong elite focus.

These dimensions have allowed for the connection to be made between ethnic communities of the pre-modern past and several of the nations that now exist today. The existence of Scotland as a pre-modern entity has been made by several authors (e.g., Cowan 1998, Foster 1989, Hastings 1997). The existence of Scotland as an ethnie in pre modern times could be made. As previously discussed, this is not the subject of this work. An historical analysis (*la long duree*) would consist of much discussion that took place outside of the era of mass politics. It is in this era that the
political implications of nationalism became even more important. The existence of a nationalist movement within Scotland became a central political and policy issue when the SNP gained a significant electoral share and parliamentary representation. Although the Scottish nationalist movement has a long pedigree little of that history was relevant to the political arena of the UK.

One of the charges levelled against the approach employed by Smith has been that it is too singular in its focus. "Ethno-symbolism focuses on the cultural aspects of nations and nationalism. The political aspects are left practically untouched" (Guibernau 2004, p126). Guibernau considers this singular focus a significant negative. She argues that a full-fledged theory of nationalism must include consideration of the political as well as the cultural. This is a justifiable criticism of the ethno-symbolist approach. As noted above, nationalism as an ideology has overtly political aims and objectives, prime among them being the creation of self-governing nation-state. Any approach that fails to consider the political implications of nationalism and national identity is missing an essential part of the puzzle.

At the same time Guibernau's claims are somewhat overstated. She argues a problem with ethno-symbolism is that key components of the theoretical approach (the myths, symbols, traditions, heroes, holy places) actually serve as a boon to the members of various nationalist ideologies. The political legitimacy of the nation can be 'reinforced' by the use of such symbols as the architects of nationalist movements actively seek to prove links between the past and the present. A theory, such as ethno-symbolism, which draws links between the modern nations of today and the pre-modern entities of yesterday, can serve, Guibernau argues, as a strong vehicle for such groups. Therefore ethno-symbolism can be seen to have a political focus, albeit one that is somewhat secondary to the cultural aspect. The cultural focus of the approach can serve to allow for a consideration of the political ramifications of nationalism and national identity.

This criticism by a modernist echoes Smith's own critique of the modernist approach as being too overtly political in its focus. He has challenged the work of Breuilly for its strong political accent, arguing that a "recognition of the power of myths and ceremonial...cannot be squared with [Breuilly's] strictly political explanation of
nationalism” (Smith 2001, p76) and he expanded this criticism to other modernists. It must be recognised that the historical focus of the ethno-symbolic approach can serve to detract from a consideration of the contemporary political issues related to nationalism and national identity. While modernism, specifically instrumentalism, has come under attack for focusing too strongly on the present (blocking presentism) generation, a similar charge can be levelled against ethno-symbolists. Kaldor (2004) has argued that blocking pastism is a practice carried out by Smith and others, where the focus is to strongly on the past and not the present issues and arguments. This echoes the arguments made by Guibernau, “The political consequences of being a nation, with or without a state, in the construction of national identity cannot be ignored” (Guibernau 2004, p140).

It is clear that the modernist approach has limitations that require the employment of an alternative theoretical framework within which to consider Scottish nationalism and national identity. At the same time ethno-symbolism also has limitations. It, along with other ethnic based approaches such as perennialism, does provide a researcher with tools with which to challenge the modernist, civic interpretation of Scottish national identity and nationalism. In order to employ an alternative approach a study must recognise the criticisms levelled at ethno-symbolism and incorporate applicable modifications into the analysis. With these in mind this work will now consider the issues of Scottish nationalism and national identity from a political standpoint. The focus of this research will be overtly political, considering the use of history, myths, symbols, and a sense of identity within the Scottish political scene. This focus on the contemporary political scene will allow for a consideration of the ethnic components of Scottish nationalism and national identity.

12 Morton (1999) dismissed Breuilly’s approach as not being applicable to Scotland.
Chapter Three
National Identity and Nationalism in
‘Scottish’ General Election Manifestos
1970 - 2005

This work now turns to a consideration of the political focus on national identity and
nationalism in Scottish manifestos issued for British General Elections from the
1970s onwards. The employment of a quantative framework provides the ability to
measure party support for nationalist goals. Such an approach also provides for the
measurement of Scottish political parties on a Unionist-Nationalist spectrum. In
addition, a consideration of statements directly employing appeals to a sense of
Scottishness or Britishness is undertaken. Among the various purposes of the
manifestos, a central underlying task is the creation of a point on this spectrum from
which the parties in Scotland project a stance in the unionism-nationalism debate.
This stance additionally allows for the parties to create a sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’.
Crucially, this sense of identity is both political and national. While seeking to
attract voters to their cause, the projection of this identity within the Scottish
manifestos also has an influence on the overall nature of Scottish identity. As parties
seek to create an ideological and political platform in Scotland, this platform also
impacts, and is impacted upon, by the sense of national identity in Scotland.

1. Introduction

The political and electoral activity that take place within Scotland, and the party
system in Scotland, display significant differences from the wider British system.
These differences are clear in areas such as electoral results and opportunities for
mainstream (and lesser) political parties. The advent of devolution and the creation
of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 created a system that existed both within and yet
separate from the greater UK. For the first time in the history of the UK decisions
being made by an elected legislature within Scotland, chosen by an electorate being
limited to those voters residing within Scotland, became a reality. Today few could

1 As this, and later chapter discuss, this time period is one during which all four major parties began to
consistently issue Scottish version manifestos.
2 While there is a certainly much wider spectrum of political parties operating in Scotland at an
elected level, this chapter will focus on the four major parties that have been represented at the
Westminster Parliament for most of the last forty years. Furthermore they continue to be the only
parties that elect MPs from Scotland.
argue that a truly particular and somewhat separate (albeit still subordinate) Scottish political system did not exist. The identification and recognition of a Scottish political system did not come about at the time of devolution. It has been argued that such a distinct political system has long existed and different institutions, party support, and political behaviour within Scotland have been a political reality for some time.

Kellas (1973, 1984) was among the first to discuss and argue for the recognition of a discrete political system in Scotland. He appreciated that one could not always provide for an unambiguous and distinct understanding between the British and Scottish aspects. Nonetheless he argued a separate system did exist. The clear, distinct institutions that Scotland possessed created the basis for such a system. Thus Scotland operated both within, and yet somewhat separate from the mainstream politics of Westminster and the UK. Mitchell (2003) points out there have been detractors from this position, such as Keating and Midwinter (1983). In addition considerations of a detached Scottish system did not lead to the UK being considered as a non-unitary state. The popular political conception of Britain as nothing less than a unitary state would not become openly challenged until the advent of devolution.

Mitchell shows how “de facto devolution”, which existed during much of the period of the latter 20th Century, was demoted to the second rank of political study. With this area of research receiving minimal consideration there was little direct challenge to the general conception of the UK as a strong centralised state. Nonetheless despite the fact that Scotland was a firm part of the UK, and has been since the Act of Union, Scotland did have many distinct institutional and political singularities that set it somewhat apart. There has been much recognition, and study, of these institutional differences (see, for instance, Keating 2001 or Paterson 1994). Such examinations have been used to show how the continued existence of civil society assisted the maintenance and growth of a separate sense of identity. This is very much Keating’s argument and one he uses to support the idea of Scottish identity as a civic form of belonging.
A sense of Scottish identity impacting on the behaviour and attitude of the major British political parties was argued prior to Kellas. Discussing and focusing on the existence of a Scottish system, Budge and Urwin produced a fascinating study in the mid 1960s. The theory of Scotland as a separate entity that could show "the theory of British political homogeneity has been proved to be defective" (Budge and Urwin 1966 p132) was advanced. This study did just that, closing with the argument that Scotland was a distinct unit within the overall UK.

While showing the existence of, and considering the strength of, a sense of Scottish identity in the political realm, a major caveat was introduced in regards to how this impacted on political parties themselves. Budge and Urwin claimed it was "outside the field of party competition" (1966 p138) that a sense of Scottish identity (or "Scottish loyalties" as they called it) had their greatest impact. Thus the argument was again focused on the distinct institutional aspects of Scotland rather than the competition among the political parties.

Although leaning towards the institutional aspects of the debate, Budge and Urwin did recognise the importance of national identity and nationalism in the competition between the parties and the political arena within Scotland. It is unfortunate that they chose to downplay or disregard this importance. As they clearly illustrated "the widespread existence of Scottish loyalties provides support for the activities of the Home Rule movement but also – and to date more important – that it buttresses the autonomy of the Scottish sections of the two major parties" (Budge and Urwin 1966 p133). This is an important consideration. As this statement shows, the Scottish sectors of the major political parties, even without the presence of an electorally challenging nationalist party, did entertain a certain amount of autonomy. This clearly varied between parties, but existed as part of the wider system.

By downplaying the significance of national identity within the party system Budge and Urwin missed an important opportunity. The impact a nationalist party could have on the autonomy of the Scottish branch parties was not considered. Thus the caveat served to highlight the impending, unexpected, impact upon the political system within Scotland that the electoral growth of the independence seeking SNP, and the Home Rule supporting Liberal Party, would have. The mid 1960s saw the
stirrings of support for the SNP and the Liberals. Such activity was the precursor of the increasing support that was to come. The changes that the next few decades would bring only serve to increase the need to understand the nature of national identity in Scotland from an explicitly political perspective.

The existence of a sense of Scottishness among the electorate within Scotland provides a need for the parties to both recognise and interact with that national identity. Parties must take into account the Scottish dimension when formulating policy and platform. Three of the major political parties that operate within both the British and Scottish contexts have felt the need to address the issue of a Scottish identity and context within their policies and platforms. The SNP has the distinct advantage of not presenting candidates for election within other areas of the UK. The other three parties have to be both British and Scottish at the same time. Whereas the SNP do not have such a conflict, the other major parties must balance their activities, actions and policies with the national dimension in mind. There are times when this policy-balancing act is more than a difficult process. It can become a situation where any avenue would leave a party open to attack by the other political parties and organisations operating in the Scottish or British political arena. All major political parties operating in Scotland must both project and reflect a sense of identity that sections of the electorate can recognise and be comfortable with.

Parties in any democratic political system face a challenge as they seek to expand their support base. They must construct a platform and an image that is appealing to as wide an image of voters as possible. When seeking to expand support they must maintain a recognisable party ideology (which links them to that core group of voters) while not significantly compromising key aspects of the ideology around which the party is based. This general picture of party activity becomes even more complicated when taking place in a sub-state national dimension. The case of Scotland, a nation subsumed within the larger state of the UK, to which the national area elects a minority number of legislators\(^3\), is a prime example of an area where national identity, party politics, and nationalism combine. Obviously, recognising

\(^3\) Yet, the number of MPs elected from Scotland is significant enough to hold balance of power in any number of election result scenarios. The West Lothian Question, the issue of Scottish MPs making decisions that impact England and Wales but not Scotland, is ongoing within the politics of the UK.
the import of a sense of identity, and how that impacts on the range of both electoral and political behaviour within Scotland has been a research area of much consideration. Yet little work has been undertaken to consider how political parties operating both within Scotland and the wider UK have employed a sense of identity within their core documents. Major studies have examined the attitudes and behaviour of the electorate and the impact of such behaviour on political parties has been explored. Likewise the use of nationalist imagery or myths and symbols within the political realm has received great attention from a variety of scholars in a multitude of settings. Yet the existence of nationalist activity and a strong national identity in Scotland creates an opportunity to understand how the political parties deal with these facts of political life from a manifesto perspective.

Elites regularly employ the relationship between nationalism and history in their attempts to create, maintain and legitimise the nation and a sense of nationhood. The modernists emphasise how elites legitimise nationalist ideas by employing the past as a tool in the present (Breuilly 1996, Calhoun 1997), while Smith (1986) shows the importance of the historical myths and symbols drawn from the ethnie. Employing the past of golden ages and mythical heroes to more recent, and perhaps mundane, political events regularly takes place. As Coakley makes quite clear: “The capacity of elites to shape political outcomes by influencing the way in which the past is perceived and interpreted is a well known characteristic of public life” (2004, p531). Coakley’s work, focusing as it does on the way in which elites package the nationalist message is particularly relevant here. As he so clearly states, “The great value of nationalist historiography to ethnonational political elites is, then, clear: it can be used to justify not only past actions, but also current or planned political programs” (2004, p554). This is a key point, which cannot be overstressed.

National identity in Scotland is a widespread phenomenon within the social and political arena. No one party can claim sole ownership of that identity (although some may argue they can). Indeed, the relationship between national identity, party support and constitutional preference is extremely complex. However, Coakley’s point should not be limited in any sense to strictly nationalist actors. It is correct that ethnonational political elites employ nationalist symbols and myths to support their political program, yet the usage is wider than that. Even those parties that do not seek to alter the fundamental political relationship between Scotland and the rest of
the UK employ nationalist imagery and language as part of their contribution to the political debate. The Scottish Conservatives may see Scotland as an integral part of the UK, but the leaders are still ‘ethnonational political elites’ seeking to justify their political programme within a national political arena. Not nationalist in the sense of seeking a nation and state with congruent borders, the Conservatives are still engaged in the ethnonationalist debate.

All political parties operating in Scotland are constantly and consistently engaged with history and national images within Scotland. This is the case whether or not those parties seek to change the constitutional structure of the UK. Speeches and other commentary of political leaders abound with symbolic statements and national myths, as do the central policy planks of the parties within Scotland. Yet the manifestos have not received in-depth consideration with this perspective in mind. This is unfortunate, as clearly any political platform or manifesto produced within Scotland must take into account the national and nationalist dimensions of Scottish politics. Consequently, content analysis of the manifestos issued by the Scottish political parties (or Scottish wings of British political parties) remains an underdeveloped and yet prime research area.

2. A Quantative Approach to Manifesto Analysis

Party manifestos have received a significant amount of analysis from a variety of scholars and approaches. This work builds on much of that previous scholarship. The analysis undertaken here is based on the work of Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Eric Tanenbaum, and a group of associated scholars. First as the Manifesto Research Group, and then as part of the Comparative Manifesto Project, these researchers have produced an extraordinary depth and range of research and scholarship in the study of party platforms (see, for example, Budge et al 2001, Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987, Budge and Farlie 1983). This group focused on the formal party platforms, including such material as; manifestos, newspaper commentary and reports of issue stances, and personal statements by party leaders. Together this analysis has produced a wide-ranging, multinational body of data. As of 2001, the records collected and studied covered over 50 countries and ranged from 1945 through to 1998. While the analysis of British manifestos has been a significant area of research, a consideration of their
Scottish counterparts has not been undertaken employing the methodology created by the MRG. This thesis undertook just such an analysis. The coding of the manifestos provides areas for analysis not only in relation to national identity and nationalism, but also to the overall position of parties within the Scottish political system.

The core question that arises is how salient the manifestos actually are. It has been noted, specifically within the British context, “that only a very small proportion of the electorate ever read the manifesto” (Brack 2000 p1). However the manifesto of any major political party is widely disseminated through the media and other sources throughout the election campaign. Manifesto launches in Scotland today are media events in themselves, with pictures of the party leaders proudly displaying the manifesto being shown on the evening news and in the newspapers the next day. These are accompanied by sound bites, highlighting the key aspects of the party’s stance, thus already disseminating the message. It is also the case that the statement of policies and programmes that the manifestos provide are the central feature of any political party. The winning party within a British election will claim their victory as a mandate by which they may enact the policies contained within the manifesto itself. Even when the winning party does not hold a majority of Scottish seats, that party will still govern the entire UK. The vast majority of the electorate will not have read the document. This does not negate the importance of such documents within the British and Scottish political systems.

Budge et al (2001) provide four justifications for the focus on manifestos. First is the position the documents hold as a central statement that covers a wide variety of themes and policy positions. This allows for a consideration of the parties not only during that election, but across time and policy issue as well. The understanding of the development and evolution of Scotland as a distinct political system within the

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4 The relationship between the British manifestos and their Scottish counterparts has never been undertaken in any depth. While this research covers several issues arising from this research gap, others remain unexplored. Unfortunately they lie outside the parameters of this particular study. But do represent an opportunity for future study.

5 A fuller explanation and description of the coding scheme is provided within the methodology Appendix.

6 This point arises in policy battles between the Commons and Lords, where the Government will claim that as a ‘manifesto pledge’ the Lords should not stand in the way of specific policy enactments.
UK could be enhanced by the employment of the MRG approach\(^7\). Second, manifestos are the authoritative statements of the parties – often subject to ratification by the wider party membership or the party conference. They represent the statement of the party as a whole and thus provide the best picture as to the position of the party at that time. Third, and closely linked to the same point, is the authoritative strength of the manifesto as a statement made by the whole party; the documents do not represent factional positions, or that of individuals, even leaders, within the party. While the manifestos themselves may not achieve a wide audience range, the manifesto is the core of the party for that election. They are an expression of party intent that can provide an understanding for the wider audience through the medium of other interpreters. As Cooke\(^8\) points out “General election manifestos are the best-known documents produced by the British political parties” (2000 p1) and he goes on to point out that they are often produced with “immense care”. Budge et al (2001) also highlight the simple, yet key, fact that manifestos are produced at every election. This has not always been the case for Scottish versions of manifestos published by the British political parties, as the discussion below highlights.

Kavanagh (2000) presents six functions of manifestos, several of which provide reasons why these documents are worthy of analysis. Among them are those that indicate why manifestos reach a wider audience than actually reads them. They serve as a “hymn sheet” as well as a “source book for candidates”. Above all he points out “The opposition parties, research institutes, and the media now devote great resources to analysing manifestos” (Kavanagh 2000 p7). These deliberations point to the centrality of political manifestos as a keystone that provides the hub of a political parties policy and ideological motivation at General Election time.

This work argues that Scottish national identity, and how that identity interacts within and impacts on Scottish politics, can be considered by an analysis of the Scottish version of British political manifestos as national platforms. This impact

\(^7\) Although mainly outwith the framework of this research, an analysis of the differences between the British and the Scottish versions of the political party manifestos could provide insight into the autonomy and policy divergence of the Scottish political system prior to devolution thus further considering the autonomy of the Scottish political system. The limited considerations given here indicate that significant differences did exist.

\(^8\) As Deputy Director of the Conservative Research Department from 1985 to 1997, Alistair Cooke was the editor of the party’s principal publications for much of that period.
of/on national identity has been clearly noticeable in other research areas. This is especially so with the emergence of a nationalist party as an electoral force during the 1970s. However how parties have incorporated national identity into the core of their policy platforms remains uninvestigated. This work now turns to how political parties have done just this in regards to their manifestos issued for General Elections. Since the late 1950s, the Conservative and Labour Parties have issued, at some elections, separate manifestos for Scotland. The two major parties were joined during the 1970s by the Liberal Party, which began issuing specifically Scottish manifestos. Obviously, the SNP have been issuing manifestos with a purely Scottish focus for a much longer period. For many years theirs had been the only truly Scottish manifesto in that it was the only one directly aimed at the Scottish electorate. As Table 3.1 shows, their elected presence within Scotland has been extremely limited prior to the 1970s. The SNP did not, prior to the 1970s, stand a significant number of candidates at any General Election. This limited even further their possible impact on elections.

Table 3.1  
General Election Results in Scotland  
(Seats in Brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Lab</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>38.0 (23)</td>
<td>44.5 (44)</td>
<td>5.5 (3)</td>
<td>11.4 (1)</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>1974 (Feb)</td>
<td>32.93 (21)</td>
<td>36.63 (40)</td>
<td>7.94 (3)</td>
<td>21.93 (7)</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36.28 (41)</td>
<td>8.30 (3)</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>8.99 (3)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>43.27 (55)</td>
<td>16.34 (10)</td>
<td>20.06 (5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>38.9 (40)</td>
<td>22.6 (11)</td>
<td>17.7 (6)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Speaker is not included in these totals (previously sat as Labour MP)

By the 1979 election the pattern for Scottish politics that has remained relatively constant since was being firmly set. The 1970s saw the Scottish electoral system morph into a four party structure, with all the major parties having an elected presence at Westminster. Furthermore, apart from the Liberals in the 1970s, all parties have achieved at least double figure support within Scotland during the period.
This work now undertakes an analysis of the manifestos issued within Scotland from 1970 to 2005. This analysis will examine how parties within Scotland have engaged with and employed the concepts of Scottish national identity and nationalism within their policy platforms.

3. Analysis Results

Table 3.2\(^9\) clearly indicates both similarities and differences between the parties in regards to the areas of focus within their manifestos. All the parties maintain, throughout most of the last thirty-five years, a strong focus on domain four, economic issues, and domain five, welfare and quality of life. Indeed, it is quite rare for parties to have other areas that have a greater focus than either of these. The exception to this is generally the Conservative Party, who often eclipse their focus on welfare and quality of life with other domains of the manifesto occasionally receiving a greater share of consideration. This is often down to the fact that their focus on the economy is often larger than the other parties.

\(^9\) As Table One clearly shows though, the Liberals maintained a steady, if minimal, presence at Westminster.

\(^10\) As this table clearly shows a number of manifestos are missing from the overall analysis. Despite strenuous attempts to locate the entire Scottish manifesto issued by the political parties in the period concerned, there are still eight documents missing from the overall analysis. The missing manifestos are spread across both parties and time and do not therefore present a significant gap in the information or evidence available.
It is also interesting to note that the area that often receives less input is domain six, which concentrates on the fabric of society. Apart from the SNP in 1983 this area rarely saw any party dedicate more than 10% of their comments in that area. Overall the fabric of society was one of the least considered areas within the manifestos during the 1970s and 1980s. This pattern began to change during the 1990s though. In 1997 all the parties, except the LDs, were in double figures in this area, a pattern

\[11\] The Liberal Party, SDP/Liberal Alliance and the Liberal Democrats are all listed as LD.
\[12\] The Liberal Party, SDP/Liberal Alliance and the Liberal Democrats are all listed as LD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Dom1</th>
<th>Dom2</th>
<th>Dom3</th>
<th>Dom4</th>
<th>Dom5</th>
<th>Dom6</th>
<th>Dom7</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>19.65</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>25.58</td>
<td>24.66</td>
<td>4.82</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LD</td>
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<td>16.29</td>
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<td>21.19</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>575</td>
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</table>
that was repeated in the 2001 British General Election. While this area remained a priority for three of the parties, the LDs emphasis in this domain dropped significantly. While it remained an area of priority for the Labour and Conservative Parties in 2005, both the SNP and the LDs focused their efforts more strongly on domain two; which covers freedom and democracy. Thus we can see clear differences among the parties at several elections. Such differences can have both political and national answers. Each party will be playing to their base strength and attempting to focus the political debate in those areas they see as significant for their potential supporters and for the specific election.

These patterns and shifts indicate an important aspect that must be taken into account when considering manifesto analysis and the results of that analysis. The importance given to specific policies and domains within the documents may change as a result of factors to which the parties are responding rather than driving. Each election will produce issues, before the campaign, that may affect the focus of the document, or be taken into consideration during the formation and production of the next manifestos. The 1997 and 2001 manifesto results indicate a focus on domain six. This reflects the attention given to the subjects of anti-social behaviour and crime that were given significant consideration at those election times. While the Conservative Party and the Labour Party obviously gave domain six significant considerations within their manifestos, the LDs and the SNP chose not to do so. Just over one percent of the LD manifesto in 1997 specifically discussed the issue of crime. Yet this area was given much greater emphasis by the other parties. Changes occur, and such changes are representative of not only the preferences of the party involved, but of other demands within the political system.

The overall deliberation undertaken here indicates another important characteristic of the manifestos. While parties generally, as they must, give attention to a broad range of ideas and policies within their manifestos, they also differ markedly in relation to what they consider significant. The importance of this point in terms of studying national identity and nationalism cannot be overlooked. Parties seek to establish a more dominant position in the political system. They will provide not only an ideological, but also a nationalistic sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This creation of ‘us, the in-group, will differentiate themselves from their political opponents, the ‘them, or
out-group. Within the Scottish system a nationalist cleavage exists apart from the ideological one. Thus another 'us' and 'them' must also be given, these groups providing boundaries for the nation. For any nation to exist, there must be a sense of belonging to the nation. This means that out groups will be created – individuals or other groups who do not belong to the nation. This work now investigates how the parties differentiated themselves from their opponents, first politically and then nationally,

4. Party Differentiation - Political
The coding scheme allows for a consideration of how parties score on a left to right political scaling (Laver and Budge 1992). This indicates how the parties have positioned themselves ideologically within the Scottish political system. This is important due to the political nature of national identity and political nationalism within Scotland. Although there is now more than one political party that advocates independence for Scotland (the SSP and the Scottish Greens) the SNP remain the only mainstream party elected to Westminster that advocates this policy. The recognition of the Scottish electorate as being slightly more politically left than the English electorate has been noted (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997). Any party seeking to establish itself as an effective political force in favour of nationalism in Scotland would have to position itself to the left of the political spectrum to make an electoral impact.

13 It is noted that the effectiveness of this left-right scale has been challenged (McLean 2004, Pelizzo 2003), but it has been employed successfully in regards to the British arena.
The Laver and Budge measurement of party position indicates significant changes within the Scottish political arena over the last thirty-five years. It would seem that the claim often made in regards to the SNP in the early to middle 1970s, that they were ‘Tories’ with a specifically Scottish focus (‘Tartan Tories’), is plausible. Specific analysis of the results indicates the slight left wing position of the SNP in 1970 was due to the focus within their manifesto on democracy and freedom issues. A seven-point drop in domain two in 1974 was one of the factors that contributed to their crossing into the right wing of the political spectrum. Nonetheless, the label of Tartan Tories, applied in the 1970s, does indeed have some validity in terms of the focus of their policies during that period. However, by 1979 and during the 1980s, the SNP clearly shifted to, and has remained, left of the political centre.
The Conservatives have occupied the right of the political spectrum within Scotland for the majority of the period in question except for 1974. Their position at this time was moderately left of centre. This singular exception was mainly due to a strong focus within their manifesto on welfare issues. Whilst this in itself is not singular, the absence of significant focus on areas they traditionally give much consideration to, such as law and order and issues within the international arena was. Thus, a combination of these factors, found the party appearing to the left of the spectrum. This clearly points to some of the limitations of the scheme at specific times. Its ability to interpret the Conservative 1974 document is limited due to the nature of the document itself. There is little reason to doubt the accuracy of the data interpretation, or the placement of the Conservatives due to that data. What is absent is an understanding of the nuances involved in that document. It is clear that a more individual analysis would assist interpretation and analysis. By the next election the Scottish Conservatives had regained their traditional locale, and have remained on and to the right of the other political parties since.

Overall, distinct patterns seem to emerge from this analysis of the manifestos left right scoring. One is that the SNP and the Labour parties have similar trajectory patterns. Labour’s movement has been more pronounced and they have passed the SNP during the late 1990s and very early part of the 21st Century, becoming more centrist. Nonetheless both parties have moved from significantly left wing positions in 1979 to very centrist positions during the last three elections. While the Labour Party has remained in the left of the Scottish political spectrum this has not been the case in the UK. As Bara and Budge pointed out “by 1997 Labour moved rightwards and ‘leapfrogged’ over [the LDs] for only the second time in the post-war period. In relative terms, Labour became the most centrist party” (emphasis in original 2001, p594). This situation was mirrored in Scotland, when the Liberals moved to the left in 1997 and Labour made a significant shift to the centre. However, Labour’s left right score in 1997 was still -3.65, the score given to British Labour Party in 1997 by Bara and Budge was 8.03. In Scotland Labour positioned itself to the right of the SNP and the LDs, but remained significantly to the left in comparison to the British Party’s stance14.

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14 A consideration of the implications of divergence for the UK party system lie outwith this study.
A comparison occurs with a direct assessment of the LDs and Conservatives scores in Scotland with the results of the scores from the British Manifesto analysis. In Scotland the Conservative Party had begun to swing to the right from their 1992 position. In 1997 the Scottish manifesto achieved a left right score of 21.67. Despite being a fairly solid movement from their 1992 position, it nonetheless reflected strong similarities with their scores from the early 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, it was still to the left of the British score – reported at 25.75 (Bara and Budge 2001).

The LDs present a pattern that seems to mirror Conservative movement. At times when the Conservative Party shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum, the LDs did likewise. Yet when the Conservatives moved to the right the LDs generally shifted to the left of the political spectrum. The LDs maintain the emerging pattern for Scottish politics during the period in question. A direct comparison between their British and Scottish scores in 1997 provides a similar picture to that of the other two parties. In 1997 the Scottish LD left right score was –19.72, the British score was reported at –5.86 (Bara and Budge 2001).

For most of the period under consideration the Scottish manifesto left right scores were different from the British versions. There were only five occasions during this period when the British scores of parties were to the left of their Scottish counterparts. On three occasions, 1979, 1983, and 1992, the British Labour manifesto returned a score to the left of the Scottish version, although all where within three percentage points. In 1979 the Liberal British manifesto was significantly to the left of the Scottish version. Likewise in 1970, the British Conservative manifesto was to the left of the Scottish version. Apart from these exceptions the Scottish manifestos have placed the Scottish parties to the left of their British equivalent.

Another pattern that clearly emerges from the analysis is the convergence that seemed to be occurring in the 2005 elections. At no other point during the last thirty-five years have the parties all been moving towards a median point at the centre of the political spectrum. While the SNP and Labour tend to have similar patterns of
shift, parties have been moving in opposite directions at the same time. The 2005 election presents a very different picture for Scottish politics. The last election saw the difference between the most distant parties (the SNP and the Scottish Conservatives) drop to less than 15 points on the left right scale. The overall difference between the SNP and the LDs is now only 4.25, with the Labour Party between them on the scale itself. Scottish politics now has three of the four major parties all grouped around a similar point on the political spectrum. This is a point at which the major parties have not been grouped before. This may indicate that Scottish politics is following a trend identified by Downs (1957)\textsuperscript{15}.

5. Use of History and the Future

As indicated above, three additional categories were added to the coding system to allow for the use of historical or mythical references, and identification with the past and future of Scotland. These categories were not widely employed. Analysis of the documents prior to the 1990s indicated that only four specific documents employed any of these categories, and no more than one at the same time. Three manifestos recorded minimal usages of a single category drawn from this group. The exception was the only text scoring greater than one percent at any time.

The exception was the 1983 SNP manifesto, which was, in many ways, out of kilter with the other party manifestos issued at the time. Table 3.2 clearly indicates significant differences between the SNP and the other parties in more than one domain. Domain six shows such a difference, mainly due to the fact that the SNP recorded a nine percent score in category 611 (Scotland’s past reference). Indeed, the document dwelt heavily on such issues, and this could reflect the SNP hoping to regain some of lost ground, having only two MPs going into the contest. However, this significant score in this category represented the first, and last noteworthy use of references to Scotland’s past. The 1987 SNP manifesto recorded a zero score in this category. This shows a distinct shift in regards to the SNP focus. As Table 3.1 illustrates the 1983 General Election saw the SNP vote share drop to a level not seen since 1970, and they failed to advance on their parliamentary representation. The

\textsuperscript{15} Although it is noted that Downsian logic has struggled to explain multiparty systems.
significant swings indicated by Table 3.2 and Figure 1.1 may indicate a clear response to this result.

A clear, if limited use, of these three additional categories did occur in the 1990s. In fact, all the parties began employing categories 609, 610 and 611 during the 1992 and 1997 manifestos. The most regular in the 1992 documents was 610 (Scotland’s future reference) which all parties employed at that time. This indicates a clear shift in the manifesto focus. It is important to note that the focus here is on the future rather than the past. The parties of Scotland were looking forward, and projecting a discussion that focused on that direction. However in the 1997 manifestos, all the parties (with the notable exception of the Labour Party) recorded a score for 611 (Scotland’s past reference) that was very similar to that recorded for 610. The coming of devolution had clearly influenced the focus within the manifestos. Now the parties were tempering their focus on the future with a similar limited use of the past. This service of the past to support change for the future is a classic example of nationalist employment of history. As the following chapters illustrate each party employed history to support their vision of the future. Invoking history, golden ages and myths, while seeking to rally support to a political cause was not limited to the nationalist party at this time. This use of the past as a vehicle for tomorrow, or future-history as this work labels it, was brought about by incipient constitutional change. Those parties in Scotland employing future-history were doing so to justify their position in regards to that change. While the SNP were doing so to support change, the Conservatives were utilizing similar historical images to challenge change.

The use of future-history was not complete within the major parties. The Labour Party made no codable reference to Scotland’s past. It would seem that the Labour Party, operating from a position of electoral strength, felt no major need to include such references. At the other end of the scale was the SNP. They led the other parties in terms of recorded usage within these categories. They were the only party to employ category 609 in 1997, making specific references to mythical or historical events. The nationalist party continued to employ future-history when other parties moved away from this position. The results for the 1997 General Election saw the
SNP maintain (indeed slightly increase) their vote share and double their MPs from three to six.

The 1990s was the first time that such a regular usage of these categories would occur. The usage of these categories was limited nonetheless. The manifestos are not, and should not be considered as entreaties to a sense of historical Scottishness. When future-history is in use the results indicate a limited use at best. The 1990s were the last time such a regular use of the categories would occur across the party spectrum. While the SNP would continue to record a score in these areas for 2001 and 2005, the other parties returned to their earlier pattern and failed to employ future-history in more recent manifestos. Devolution had come about, and the parties saw no need to employ such references, unrelated to any policy, to support their overall positions.

6. **Party Differentiation – Unionist-Nationalist Policies**

The parties in Scotland can clearly be differentiated on the left-right scale. Their differing focus within the policy domains also indicates diverse attitudes and policy directions. This is quite obvious in an analysis of how the parties highlight and frame their policies on such issues as devolution, the Union, and direct appeals to Scottishness and Britishness.

Table 3.3 provides information that relates to two specific points in Scotland’s recent political history. In both 1979 and 1997 referendums were held in Scotland to consider the issues of devolution. A clear difference did exist in regards to the relationship between the manifestos and the referendums. The 1979 General Election was held after the 1979 referendum on devolution and thus the manifestos were produced after the result of that referendum. The events surrounding the referendum, and the actions of members of the Labour Party in regards to the referendum certainly assisted in bringing about the 1979 election.\(^{16}\)

On the other hand, Labour announced its intentions to hold a referendum on devolution well before the 1997 elections were called (Gay 2004). The party had

\(^{16}\) For an insightful consideration of both referendums and associated political activity see Dardanelli (2005).
been involved in the Scottish Constitutional Convention and was formally committed to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. This position was later tempered with the qualification of support of the Scottish electorate as given in an advisory referendum. The timing did impact upon the content, and the nature of that content, of the manifestos. The parties obviously would still provide references to the policies of devolution, and their attitude to the Union between Scotland and England. An analysis of these policies, and expressions that refer to Scottishness and Britishness, allows us to consider the overall stance of the party in regards to national identity and nationalism.

Table 3.3
Unionist-Nationalist Policies 1979 and 1997\textsuperscript{17}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Union +</th>
<th>Union -</th>
<th>Devo +</th>
<th>Devo -</th>
<th>NWL:B</th>
<th>NWL:S</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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</table>

Table 3.3 provides interesting insight into the stances of the parties, and how their positions changed over the 18 years between the two elections. The most striking result on the Union issue is the minimal attention provided by the majority of parties. Almost half of the categories displayed in Table 3.3 record zeros. This in itself is interesting as it indicates limited commentary at key points within the national political debate, or very one-sided comments.

Somewhat unsurprisingly, the SNP results record the highest reported value. In 1979 11\% of their manifesto was given over to negative statements regarding the Union. When the other parties do discuss the issues their statements are negligible. The LDs provide no stance at all on the Union, giving neither positive nor negative support. LD focus in 1979 was strong on devolution. Their policy statements on that issue far outweighed the emphasis given by any other party.

\textsuperscript{17} Due to the 1979 data for the SNP being unavailable, the 1983 scores have been substituted instead.
Even though the Conservative and Labour Party provide support for the Union, that support was limited. The statements given in documents provided limited support for devolution to Scotland. It is interesting to note that no parties directly attacked devolution. Even the SNP, which so strongly opposes the Union, did not directly challenge devolution. As noted above this manifesto was produced after the referendum of 1979. Despite failing to meet the requirements for passage, the vote had clearly indicated a level of support for devolution. There was clearly little political capital in openly challenging the policy. Thus, apart from the LDs, support for devolution policy was present, yet muted in 1979. The picture that emerges from 1997 is very different however. In the intervening years there had been significant movement in several areas.

In 1997 the Conservatives continued to lead support for the Union. This time they provided a much greater emphasis on that policy. While their focus in 1979 was three times greater than the Labour Party’s, by 1997 emphasis on the positive aspects of the Union was significantly greater than Labour. The Conservatives had significantly shifted towards a much more evident level of support for the Union. The other parties remained very similar in regards to their policy emphasis in this area. At the same time as their stated support for the Union increased the Conservative attitude towards devolution had strongly shifted as well. By 1997 the manifesto strongly opposed devolution and provided policy statements attacking devolution of almost seven percent. This made them significantly different from the other parties in regards to their overall expressed attitude to the proposed changes in the constitutional relationship between England and Scotland.

The LDs again provided the most balanced policy on the Union. There were no expressed policy statements for or against. The LDs were, for most of the 20th Century, supporters of a federally structured UK. Thus their policy focus has tended to be on the need for devolution as opposed to radical change or dissolution of the Union. Such a stance was reflected in the absence of policies in this area. The level of policy statements given over to devolution nonetheless continued to make them the leading party in this area. The percentage change was limited to less than one percent.
The SNP continued to present considerable levels of policy statements against the Union. Although the 1997 manifesto score was significantly reduced from the 1979 level. In fact the overall policy stance had changed somewhat. This lower emphasis on the negative aspects of the Union indicated a somewhat more balanced approach to the issue. The SNP had not engaged directly with the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Nor did the SNP formally yet support the campaign for a Scottish Parliament. Immediately after the 1997 election the SNP would openly encourage support for the devolution referendum and a yes/yes vote. The manifesto content reflected this somewhat more restrained attitude. The document did contain a limited amount of negative statements in regards to devolution at the same time. These statements reflected the fact that the SNP saw devolution as only half the step actually required\(^{18}\).

The Labour Party presents the most widespread of policy statements in these areas. While they continued to provide a limited number of statements supporting the Union, their 1997 manifesto also included one negative statement toward it. This is a similar picture to their policy on devolution. Labour had publicly committed itself to a referendum, and party policy was in favour of devolution. There were several positive policy statements within their manifesto, but it also contained one negative statement in regards to devolution. Clearly their support was limited in some fashion. In this area they were not alone. Unlike 1979 when no parties had negative policy statements in regards to devolution, three produced such within their 1997 manifestos, albeit with different reasons and objectives.

In regards to direct expressions of Scottishness and Britishness, these were limited within the manifestos. Again it must be noted that results within this area are reflective of the methods employed. Only the SNP recorded significant levels of expression in these areas. Obviously the SNP emphasis is on Scottishness with none on Britishness. The scores represent very similar pictures at both elections, despite them being 18 years apart. The Conservative Party expressed a limited level of Britishness, while recording zeros in Scottishness. On the other hand Labour

\(^{18}\) As noted in footnote 18, the 1979 data is unavailable. Thus direct comparisons are unavailable.
recorded zeros in references to the British way of life, while providing statements that did support a sense of Scottishness. Not only that, but the limited levels shown in 1979 increased by 1997. Again the LDs presented a more balanced focus than the other parties. Their 1979 scores were almost identical, and by 1997 they were indeed identical. This presents a very balanced policy approach to codable expressions of identity.

7. **Party Differentiation – Nationalism Index**

Employing a similar approach to that taken in providing a left right scoring scheme, the addition of specific categories also allowed for the creation of nationalism index that could measure the stance of the parties across the previous thirty-five years. During that time the parties in Scotland have adopted differing stances in regards to the creation of a Scottish parliament, and positions have changed both within and between parties.

As can be seen in Figure 3.2 the parties have maintained a somewhat standardised positioning within the political system in regards to nationalism. The lack of 'leapfrogging' or significant alteration between parties suggests reliability in the measurement tool, despite the small percentages involved. The data available for
analysis indicates that the SNP have always been the most positive on the nationalist index and they continue to score several points above the other main parties. Equally, the Conservative Party has always maintained the least positive position. They have spent the majority of the period with a negative nationalist (a Unionist) score. Perhaps the most stable of the major parties has been the Labour Party, whose score has maintained single digits during the period. The LDs have provided a similar picture, although they have always scored higher than Labour. Despite this standard positioning there have been changes. It is to individual consideration of these changes that this work now turns.

The SNP presented a fairly extreme position in 1970, achieving an overall nationalism score of 19.59. It is interesting to note the tempering of the party position that occurred during the 1970s. At the 1974 October General Election, where the Party gained its highest ever share of the vote, the score had almost halved to 10.47. Although this score rose slightly by the early 1980s, the downward trend would continue after that. By 1987 the party stood at just slightly above a score of 10, and they have maintained a position within two points of that score since. It is fascinating that the election at which the SNP produced its minimum nationalist index score was 1997. This reflects the fact that they, as all parties, were aware that a devolution referendum was coming. The referendum had been promised by the Labour Party should they form the government after the election. This was a widely held expectation. The SNP clearly saw little need to further emphasise their nationalist stance. The establishment of a Scottish Parliament would provide them with a political arena in which they would hope to form the main opposition, and seek to employ as a springboard to the next level – independence.

It should be noted though that the moderation of the SNP score does not necessarily represent a softening of their stance in regards to nationalist issues. One of the individual factors involved in calculating the index is the measure of anti Union statements in each individual manifesto. Since the middle 1970s, while the SNP have continued to dedicate a good percentage of their manifesto towards this policy, it is significantly less than in 1970. Further tempering their position is the policy support that the party has expressed for devolution in their most recent manifestos.
They do continue to score above the other parties, and their position remains fairly static as the nationalist outlier.

At the other end of the scale, the Conservative Party presents a more mixed picture. From a positive position in the early 1970s the Conservatives dropped into negative territory. This represents their change from supporting devolution to supporting some form of Scottish ‘assembly’ in the late 1970s. With Margaret Thatcher becoming leader and heading into the 1979 election even this support was removed, and a limited negative score resulted. Even though the Conservatives moved back into positive territory in 1983, with a minimal level of 0.11, a downward movement began. This continued trend was to result in the Conservatives recording a level of \(-11.14\) in 1997. This reflects the outright opposition the Conservative Party had to any alteration to the existing constitutional structure. As Table 3.3 indicates, the party was firmly opposed to devolution, and strongly in support of the Union. These factors and statements combined to produce the most negative score reported by any party.

This extreme position rapidly reversed after devolution. The Conservatives openly acknowledged the widespread public support for devolution within Scotland. They did not widely embrace the policy within the manifestos and negative statements attacking it outweighed limited statements of support for devolution. Nevertheless the Conservatives again achieved a limited positive score in 2005. This score, less than one percent, was mainly achieved through a series of statements coded in category 602 (National way of life: Scottish). While the Conservative support for devolution was not overwhelming, they have begun to provide more statements specifically embracing a sense of Scottishness. Rather than reflecting a support for specific policies, this reflects a change in tone and rhetoric.

The Labour Party has maintained the most stable score with minimal variation. From 1979 through to 2005 their score has remained within a very narrow band. Indeed, starting from a minor positive score during the 1970s, the party increased slightly to 3.81 in 1987, their highest recorded score on the index. On the nationalism index Labour has been in steady decline since the early 1980s. Since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the emphasis given in the Labour manifesto
towards both the Union and Devolution has remained relatively balanced, and minimal. Open statements in favour of unionist or nationalist positions are rare within the manifestos issued by the Labour Party.

Somewhat surprisingly, the LDs have maintained a higher level on the index than Labour. Also, apart from 2001 they have followed a roughly analogous pattern. The higher score on the index for the LDs stems mainly from their continued and steadfast support for the policy of devolution. This has been a strong feature of their manifestos for much of the period. The major difference with Labour in 2001 was a direct result of the proportion of the LD manifesto given over to this policy. In regards to other aspects of the debate, the LDs provide almost negligible policy statements. Indeed, they remain very ‘quiet’ on issues that the other parties engage with on a regular basis.

One very apparent trend is clear from Figure 3.2. There is clear convergence between the major parties. While 1983 saw the three main Scottish, and British, parties converging, the SNP were significant outliers. The SNP actually increased their score at this time while other parties converged on the centre of the scale. The numerical gap between the SNP and the Conservatives was at its narrowest at this time. However the SNP was moving away from the position of both the LDs and Labour and the Conservatives were soon to depart from their previous pattern. Conversely this pattern has not repeated during the most recent period. Since 1997 the Conservatives have begun to achieve a nationalism index score that is much closer to the other parties. With the 2005 elections, the parties were now well within a smaller range on the index than at any other time. Unlike 1983 the SNP did not diverge from the general pattern. Rather they were maintaining a traditionally low index score. The gap that now exists between all the major political parties is less than nine percent.

8. Conclusions
The political and electoral competition in Scotland has been intense. Parties have fought for policies that directly impact on the nature of Scotland, its relationship with the rest of the UK, and thus the sense of identity held by individuals within Scotland. They have sought not just to project an ideological or political sense of ‘us’ and
‘them’, but they have also projected a national identity alongside, and intertwined with the political. At the same time the parties have been quick to react to the results of elections. The drop of the Conservative MPs in Scotland to zero in 1997 saw a subsequent shift in their position on the Nationalism Index. Likewise their continued drop in support, to fourth place in the last two General Elections, has seen the party shift towards a more central point on the Scottish political spectrum. Indeed, the recent convergence illustrated on both figures indicates that all the parties are now placed within a much more narrow political range. Not only is this range political, it is also national. The location of the parties within the debate on national identity and nationalism appears less extreme today than was the case thirty-five years ago.

It has been argued that Scottish electorate both considers itself more working class and left wing that their English counterparts. It is clear that the political parties have presented policy platforms that are in agreement with this. All the major parties have presented a more left wing stance than was evident in the British versions of the manifestos. As the wider political spectrum of the UK has shifted towards the centre, the centre of Scottish politics has also shifted. Although also a shift towards the centre the Scottish parties remain further to the left than their English counterparts.

The parties have also presented a much closer set of statements in regards to national issues. All the major parties have engaged with the policy of devolution. While clear differences still exist, the gap between the parties is much less significant than it has been in the past. This has occurred at a time when the vote share between the parties has also become much more balanced. Few of the parties express direct policy statements in regards to distinct sense of either Scottishness or Britishness. Uses of identity related statements seem very limited, as do those considering history. However this may also be a reflection of the method of analysis rather than providing a full analysis of the research material.

While the MRG coding scheme provides a tool for consideration into the manifestos, and produces a robust and valid series of measurements, it does have limitations. One of the major strengths of the coding scheme is the quantitative nature of the system, which has allowed for a measurement of nationalism inherent in the
manifestos. Yet this scheme is also a limitation in respect to the consideration of nationalism and identity in Scotland. The approach clearly provides an ability to consider policy changes within and between the major political parties. However the rigid nature of the statistical analysis limits interpretation.

The structure upon which the system is based requires all the quasi-sentences within the manifestos to be coded into one, and only one, category. As Budge pointed out, a common coding error was the need to ensure that “precise policy positions” were chosen rather than a more general category (2001 p100). Initial coding of the Scottish documents indicated the need to be precise in many areas, especially because the system was being applied to a sub-state political arena. The nature of many of the comments within the manifestos, while focusing on a specific policy area, was constructed in a style or idiom that provided an extra dimension or nuance important to any consideration of nationalist language. While referring to a specific policy and thus being coded within that policy category, the rhetorical nature of the statement in question could be key to any consideration of national identity or nationalism. Such statements are lost under the scheme employed herein. There is no room to manoeuvre within the coding scheme, or take into account rather subtle nuances or expressions that impact on a sense of national identity. While the coding scheme provides constructive analysis into the content and character of the manifestos, this is somewhat limited by the nature of the approach. This does not negate the results of the analysis, but it does indicate the need for additional considerations, from another methodological perspective.

The engagement of political parties with the issue of national identity and policies impacting on the nationalism debate has been made clear. The employment, and expression of that identity within the documents has not. The ability of the parties to project sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ requires a closer analysis of how the parties have considered Scottishness and Britishness within their documents and portrayed identity to the Scottish electorate through their core documents. While the overall substance has been measured, a consideration of the nuances and rhetoric within the manifestos may provide further insight into the nature of national identity, as envisaged and employed by the Scottish political parties.
Chapter Four  
A Qualitative Approach to Manifesto Analysis

The previous chapter provided an insight into how Scottish political parties positioned themselves on a unionist-nationalist spectrum over the past thirty-five years. It further considered individual party policies, specifically those relating to the issues of national identity and nationalism, and how these have modified over time. By employing a measure of statements directly relating to a sense of Scottish national identity, an index measuring such usage was created. As the results clearly indicated, direct references to identity remained minimal, with the exception of the SNP. As the openly nationalist party, the SNP did focus strongly on a sense of identity within their documents. Such results seem to indicate that identity issues were non-existent within Scottish politics during this period. However, the lack of any recorded references does not reflect a lack of identity issues, but rather reflects the limitations of the measurement method and tools employed.

Therefore the need to employ additional methods to analyse the manifestos has become apparent. This chapter will begin with a consideration of how this can be undertaken. It will then discuss how specifically Scottish manifestos became a standard part of British General Elections. This discussion will highlight the electoral fortunes of the parties over the past thirty-five years, as Scottish politics has transformed from a two party into a multiparty system. The chapter will then close by illustrating how the manifestos of the four main parties will be specifically analysed.
1. **Introduction**

Again, the two time periods when referendums on devolution took place were chosen. The choice was based on the assumption that the parties would employ a greater number of identity references at these times. Yet as Table One shows, and as noted above, the use of direct statements engaging with identity was extremely limited within these manifestos. The results given here are broadly similar to the results within the wider data. It should be noted that the zero recorded for the Conservative Party in 1979 is somewhat of an anomaly as their index average for the whole period was 0.96. Nonetheless, the zero in itself is significant testimony to the seeming lack of focus in identity in 1979. This was a time when one would expect identity to be a significant issue within the political arena. Questions remain unanswered as to the lack of references to national identity within the manifestos.

As a consideration of how parties conceive of and employ national identity, the MRG technique of analysis remains a significant tool for measuring nationalism in a sub-state political system yet provides few, and limited, observations. The analysis provided for deliberation of the policies in specific areas, but gave little insight into how the parties employed the rhetoric of national identity. How the parties engaged in the ethnonationalist debate through the medium of symbolic usage or rhetorical language also remains unexplored. By employing a qualitative analysis of the manifestos further insight into this area is possible.

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1. Due to the 1979 data from the SNP being unavailable, the 1983 scores have been substituted instead.
The content of the manifestos can be examined to consider how parties specifically employed and constructed conceptions of Scottish national identity and British state identity. Furthermore, a consideration of how the political issues surrounding nationalism are structured is also possible. The rhetorical aspects of the documents can be examined for their use of nationalistic symbology as well as overall substance. Comments impacting on a sense of identity are made, but as part of a statement that directly relates to a specific policy area. As previously noted, the nuances of the manifestos are not revealed in a quantitatively based analysis.

Obviously then, there is a need to consider the content of manifestos from not only a quantitative but also a qualitative perspective. Indeed, Smith and Smith have argued that political party platforms, and more specifically the manifestos of the political parties in the UK\(^2\), are worthy of analysis as they are the “rhetorical constructions of political realities” (2000, p457). They argue that manifestos should be studied because they indicate “the ways that individuals, symbols, values and policies fostered a sense of “us-ness” and “them-ness” for each party (2000, p459). Their work, analysing as it does, the British manifestos from 1997, does raise many questions that are key to any understanding of Scottish identity. If, as Smith and Smith state, the manifestos are “as purposive texts intended to attract voters to each party’s “us”” (2000, p469), the production of a Scottish manifesto by the parties is seeking to attract not just the potential voters for that party, but the potential “Scottish us” that would support that party. The sense of ‘us-ness’ and ‘them-ness’ that Smith and Smith speak of takes on an added dimension when the focus is shifted from the British stage to the Scottish. There the fight is not just political but also constitutional as it also poses questions surrounding issues such as identity and belonging.

While political manifestos have been identified as suitable areas for study the Scottish manifestos have not been considered in depth. Smith and Smith, analysing the British manifestos, discuss the centrality of power within the British political system – a somewhat erroneous position from which to operate in light of the

\(^2\) The sub-state national versions (Scotland and Wales) did not receive attention.
discussion in the previous chapter. The political system, especially in 1997 (the election focus of the Smith and Smith analysis), was not as central as would seem to be the case. The political parties had certainly recognised the need for specifically Scottish manifestos, and thus the need to consider Scotland somewhat differently, politically speaking. Furthermore, as the analysis below shows, the use of a sense of Scottish identity within the Scottish manifestos by the political parties in 1997 clearly challenges the idea of the UK as a Unitary State.

Nevertheless the emphasis on the centrality of the British political system, and the focus on the British State documents (to the detriment of the sub-state, national level) are not uncommon issues. They remain significant and problematic ones in any consideration of nationalism within the UK. Again and again, in considerations of the British political system, the focus upon the whole UK as a ‘national’ arena is employed. This confusion serves to create further difficulty for the understanding of the nature of national identity in Scotland from a political perspective. The ability of individuals within Scotland to differentiate between their state identity and their national identity has been made clear (Henderson 1999). All the major British political parties, with varying degrees of autonomy, adopted national levels of organisation in order to reflect this political reality. Yet the conflation of the UK as not only a state, but also a nation, is still made in much research. While this, as the analysis below will show, reflects a political reality, it fails to serve as a useful point from which to analyse national identity within the sub-state, national units of the UK; especially Scotland. Scotland must be treated as an individual entity for any consideration on issues such as national identity or nationalism. Academic research has revealed the separate nature of the Scottish political system. When nationalism and national identity are specifically considered, Scotland must be clearly separated from the wider UK case.

The problem of conflation is clearly encountered within major works. For example, Billig, whose Banal Nationalism provided significant input into the academic debate on nationalism and national identity, presents a prime example. Billig (1995) has discussed how national symbols, and their use in everyday language and society, can

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3 Indeed, Smith and Smith employ Billig’s earlier works and theories to support their analysis.
reinforce the unconscious nature of nationalism and national identity. This is a key consideration in any study of these topics. His central idea serves here as an excellent starting point for an analysis within the purely political arena. The employment of nationalist idioms within politics is certainly widespread, as Billig’s own discussion makes clear. However, it is apparent that in his analysis of political discourse the focus is on the nature of British politicians and their speeches. He comments on the words and imagery of Thatcher, Major, John Smith and Blair. All these individuals speak of Britain, and Billig seemingly equates this with the idea of the ‘nation’. In his defence he clearly notes that by equating Britain with England he is ‘adopting’ “some of the conventional hegemonic semantics of ‘British’ nationalism” (Billig 1995, p111). It is evident that the political rhetoric he examines is taking place in the UK, but it takes place with little regard for the Scottish framework. This only serves as an example of the problematic considerations given to Scottish national identity. Any political discussion that focuses on Scotland and the national identity of Scots, takes place within Scotland, a distinct political arena. This would seemingly reflect the principles behind the creation of Scottish manifestos. The need for the political parties to address the Scottish electorate separately, appealing to both their political and national loyalties.

Criticism of their ‘national’ focus does not, in any way, detract from the insights provided within the works of either Billig or Smith and Smith. They indicate the importance of manifestos as works that provide a basis for political reality and reinforce the sense of shared identity within the polity in question. Yet, their focus is on Britain and the specifically British documents, within a context that either ignores or fails to account for the sub-state national issues. The existence of specifically Scottish political documents, distinct manifestos issued by the major political parties, points to the clear existence of another, often unconsidered identity, and the need to examine and understand that identity within its own particular national political arena.

Billig in particular presents a significant theoretical contribution to the study of national identity within Scottish party manifestos. His work has highlighted the importance of understanding how the nation is ‘flagged’ on an almost sub-conscious level. By understanding how political parties employ a sense of nation, and how that
nation is bordered within their manifestos, will provide the opportunity to question the nature of nationalism and national identity in Scottish politics.

2. The Advent of Scottish Manifestos – a changing political pattern
Whatever the academic discourse on the subject of territorial, or sub-state, politics and the argument about the nature of the British political system, the major political parties within the UK have recognised, in one particular fashion, the different structure, or character of the system, in Scotland. Since 1950 the major parties have, at some General Elections, published separate election manifestos for Scotland. While there have been years when some parties have chosen not to do so, since 1974, Scotland has seen each of the major parties issue a manifesto directly relating to and for Scotland.

The Labour Party was the first to lead the way when, in 1950, they were alone among the British parties in publishing a Scottish manifesto, entitled “For A’ That” (Craig, 1990). Obviously this title is peculiarly Scottish in its own right, drawing as it does on the works of Robert Burns. Such a title would not produce immediate (if any) reaction from the vast majority of the UK, but would be instantly recognisable to many individuals in Scotland. Furthermore, at the same time it would seem to be appealing to a particularly Scottish sense of egalitarianism, and thus fitting strongly with the overall Labour approach to creating a more equal society. Therefore, the work of Burns, an iconic historical figure within Scotland, is employed by the Labour Party to create a sense of connectedness with the people of Scotland. The document is invoking a ‘mythical’ idol of Scottish history, a sense of poetry and a strong sense of Scottishness. Without even examining the text itself the title of the 1950 Labour manifesto for Scotland is a clear example of how political parties can employ national identity in their attempt to harness any political nationalist sentiment within the political arena.

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4 These gaps in themselves raise questions – some of which are considered as part of this analysis.
5 For those individuals not familiar with this work by Burns the following is a key extract:
Ye see yon birkie ca’d a lord,
Wha struts, an stares, an a’ that?
Tho hundreds worship at his word,
He’s but a cuif for a’ that.
For a’ that, an a’ that,
His ribband, star, an a’ that,
The man o independent mind,
At the time the 1950 document appeared to be a singular event. Neither the Liberals nor the Conservative Party produced any separate manifesto for either Scotland or Wales. Moreover, any openly nationalist threat was minor in the 1950 election, as the SNP stood only three candidates and garnered 0.3% of the overall vote within Scotland. The Liberal Party was continuing its downward slide and gained just 6.6% at the 1950 election, although it did win two seats in Scotland – up from zero.

However, it may well be that the Labour Party were responding not to the threat of the SNP or the Liberal Party, but to that of the Conservatives. The 1945 election was the first in which Labour had surpassed the Conservatives in terms of share of the vote and gained a majority of seats within Scotland. Obviously Labour hoped to repeat its performance, but saw that every seat would count, and the creation of a separate Scottish manifesto is indicative of how important maintaining its lead in Scotland would be.

The Labour dominance began to reverse fairly quickly. The 1950 election, and the other elections during the 1950s, saw the Conservatives gain much of their lost ground, falling less than two percentage points short of Labour, while remaining only five seats behind in 1950. The 1951 election saw the parties almost neck and neck in terms of vote share, with the Conservatives 0.7% ahead, but each of the two main parties gained 35 seats, with the Liberals holding only one seat in Scotland. By the 1955 election, the Conservative Party again became the majority party in Scotland, winning two more seats than Labour, and gaining 50.1% of the votes cast in Scotland. This in itself was a singular event during the 20th Century. Since the advent of mass politics no party had, or has again managed that feat in Scotland. Indeed, the nature of the Scottish electoral system, with four major parties vying for seats, does not make this scenario likely in the near future.

With the Liberal Party continuing to lose ground in terms of vote share and fighting to maintain only a single seat in Scotland at General Elections in the 1950s, the
political challenge was between the two major parties. Labour and the Conservatives fought each other for the lion share of the seats from Scotland for most of the next decade. This may, in some way explain the lack of separate Scottish manifestos during the 1950s. It would not be until 1959 that the Conservative Party issued its first particularly Scottish version of the election manifesto. Likewise, the Labour Party introduced a separate manifesto for Scotland in 1959, and both parties would do so again in 1964. Indeed, 1964 saw the two main political parties producing manifestos that were different not only in form, but also in title. While Labour entitled its 1964 manifesto *Let’s Go with Labour for the New Britain*, in Scotland it produced *Signposts for Scotland*. In the same year the Conservative manifesto for the UK was simply called *Manifesto*, yet Scotland had *Scotland with the Unionists*. However, while the Conservatives would continue to produce separate Scottish manifestos, Labour’s *Signposts for Scotland* would be its last Scottish manifesto for a decade. While February 1974 saw a Welsh manifesto from the Labour Party, Scotland would have to wait until October 1974 for another separate manifesto. Consequently one must consider possible reasons why Labour would not produce a specifically Scottish document during this period. Indeed, perhaps the simplest and the main reason was the distinct lack of need for such a document.

Unlike England, where the majority of MPs of the UK are elected, Scotland today operates a multi party system. The four main parties regularly contest for seats in a number of geographical areas. However this is a fairly recent phenomenon. While the SNP was founded in 1934, it was not until the 1960s that it achieved more than a nominal share of the vote, or fielded a significant number of candidates. Prior to the 1960s, the post-war period saw the Conservative and Labour Party sharing over 90% of the vote between them. Even in the 1966 election, where both the Liberal Party and the SNP gained over 5% each, the two main parties had a joint share of 87.6% of the voting electorate. Indeed, it would not be until the Hamilton by election in 1967 that the SNP would have a sitting MP at a post war election. While this seat was

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8 The Scottish version, like the Welsh version had a different introduction, but the title and the content remained the same (Craig 1990).
9 Obviously Labour is the major party in this system, but Scotland is far from a dominant party system.
10 This by-election was the first seat won by the SNP outside of wartime. It represented that start of the SNP presence at Westminster. Both Labour (who had previously held the seat) and the Conservatives lost significant vote share, Labour losing almost 30%.
lost at the 1970 General Election, the SNP did gain another seat at that time, and have maintained a presence at Westminster ever since. Duverger (1959) argued that while the two main parties dominate in a straight bipartisan system, a multiparty system creates greater opportunities for other parties. However, such parties still have to reach a critical mass of support within that system. The critical mass required within the Scottish aspect of British General Elections was reached by the SNP at the end of the 1960s. Despite significant fluctuations in electoral support during the following decades, they have managed to ensure that support has not dropped below that critical level since.

The advent of the 1960s also saw another significant change in the political scene in Scotland in that the dominance of the two main parties began to slip, as their combined share of the General Election vote fell under the 90% mark for the first time since 1945. The Liberal party began a revival under the leadership of Jo Grimond, and their share of the vote, while remaining in single figures, rose from the less than two percent they had achieved in 1955. Furthermore, they also gained ground in terms of seats within Scotland, winning four seats in 1964 and five seats in 1966. However, unlike the two main parties, the Liberal Party had not produced a specifically Scottish Manifesto and would not do so until 1970. Also, and perhaps even more importantly in the context of national identity and nationalism, the SNP began to take significant strides forward in terms of both candidate numbers and electoral share. While remaining unrepresented at Westminster for much of the 1960s, the SNP had gone from fielding five candidates in the 1959 election to 15 in 1964 and then to 23 in 1966. While their share of the vote remained relatively modest, they had broken through the levels they had occupied for much of the post-war period. The 1964 election saw the SNP gain 2.4% of the electoral vote in Scotland – the highest it had ever gained in its existence so far. While still minimal this was the start of a sea change in Scottish politics.

More of an issue for the Labour Party, and the nature of politics within Scotland and the UK, was the result of the 1966 election when the SNP more than doubled its previous support and received five percent of the vote. The SNP was approaching that hump that Duverger identified and was rapidly gaining critical mass. The possibility of the SNP gaining direct representation at Westminster, outside of
wartime and under 'normal' electoral conditions, was becoming a distinct reality. Lynch (2002) has discussed the significant growth of the SNP during this period, and the advancements it made under the leadership of efficient and motivational organisers such as Billy Wolfe and others. There is no doubt that the Nationalists were becoming a distinct electoral challenge to the two main parties, a situation that had not previously occurred outside of by-elections. However, such comments are made with the distinct benefit of academic hindsight. Any electoral challenge the SNP did represent would have seemed small during the late 1960s, especially to Labour. However, the Hamilton by-election certainly provided alarm bells for both Labour and the Conservatives.

The increase in electoral support for the SNP and Liberals that occurred during the 1960s had not come at the expense of the Labour Party. The Conservatives had seen a reduction in vote share during this period, although not near the level of 1945. The number of Conservative MPs from Scotland had been dropping steadily, with the party having only 20 MPs within Scotland after the 1966 election. This presented quite a turnaround from 1955 when they had gained a majority of Scottish seats. On the other hand, the Labour Party had started on the path to becoming the major political party at General Elections in Scotland, a position it maintains to this day. In the 1966 election Labour had gained 49.9% of the votes cast in Scotland, almost repeating the Tory record of 1955. After the election Labour held 46 seats, almost two thirds of the total number of Scottish MPs. Furthermore, the Liberals had begun to challenge the Conservatives for support within their traditional areas of Scotland. In 1965 David Steel, later to become the first Presiding Office of the new Scottish Parliament, took the Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles seat from the Conservatives. In doing so he gained just under 50% of the vote and beat the Labour Party in to a distant third place, albeit in a seat they did not expect to win\textsuperscript{11}.

The Labour Party had thus, by the middle of the 1960s, established itself as the principal electoral and political force within Scotland. Moreover, it seemed that their main challengers within Scotland, the Conservative Party, presented a weakened challenge, open to attack by the smaller third party of British and Scottish Politics.

\textsuperscript{11} It is also interesting to note that the SNP did not run a candidate at this by-election – although there was an independent nationalist, who gained less than one percent of the vote.
Both the main Unionist and the Nationalist parties therefore presented a limited threat to the Labour Party who had little need to employ any form of a ‘Scottish card’ from their perspective. The Conservatives, Labour’s strongest and only real opponent for political power, continued to provide a Scottish manifesto, yet it seemed to provide little electoral return. Likewise, any nationalist threat was still fairly non-existent. The SNP had increased their share of the vote but remained marginal. Any need for the Labour Party to directly engage with the ideas of national identity and political nationalism in Scotland must have seemed minor. It did not meet with either their ideological or their political focus, which remained strongly centralist.

Indeed, the following excerpt from the 1966 British General Election manifesto of the Labour Party, entitled *Time for Decision*, indicated a clear mindset in this regard:

> Labour respects the differences of culture and tradition of Scotland and Wales; nevertheless, we see the economic well-being of Great Britain as indivisible. The Government has therefore set out measures which help both Scotland and Wales, within the context of a true *National* Plan (cited in Craig 1990, p84, emphasis added).

The focus clearly shows that the Labour Party was not highlighting Scotland (or Wales) as a separate national entity. The nation portrayed in the 1966 manifesto was Great Britain. The appeals made to a sense of belonging were to British aspects of identity and not to a Scottish identity. There was little beyond this and certainly no specific references to Scotland. Indeed, Labour used identity in a very British fashion throughout the manifesto. There was no appeal to sub-state allegiances, and in many ways British issues were framed as English issues, and vice versa. There was no attempt to highlight Scotland or Scottish identity in any fashion. Obviously this would be impracticable in that the document was aimed at the whole electorate of the UK and the majority of that electorate was English. It is extremely interesting to note that Labour highlights culture and tradition. These are key aspects of any nationalist movement. In the 1960s there was no implicit recognition of distinct national identity, but the Labour Party was clearly aware of the need to recognise the distinctive nature of Scotland.
In 1970 the Liberal Party produced its first Scottish manifesto for a British General Election. Labour again chose not to publish a separate Scottish document. Furthermore, the language and focus within the Labour British manifesto (Now Britain’s Strong – Let’s Make It Great To Live In) had not changed greatly since 1966. There was still virtually no appeal to any sense of a Scottish nation or identity. The first specific mention of Scotland came during a discussion on the regions of the UK, and Scotland was discussed alongside terms such as the North, and the South West. There is thus a clear identification of Scotland as one of the distinct regions within the UK – but no emphasis on Scotland as a nation.

The attitude of Scottish input was made clear with the following statement, the only paragraph in the document (under the devolution section) that dealt solely with Scotland:

"The Labour Party in Scotland has welcomed any changes leading to a more effective Government which do not destroy the integration of the U.K. or weaken Scotland’s influence at Westminster. They too reject separatism and also any separate legislative assembly... And we shall apply Scottish solutions to Scottish problems (cited in Craig 1990, p148)"

In 1970 the attitude of the Labour Party remained firmly centrist and the attitude so clearly portrayed was of Scotland as a firm part of the UK, with no emphasis on any distinct national aspect. Additionally, there will be no devolution, a move supported by the Labour Party in Scotland, which is not organised as a national party, but is a regionally organised entity. However, there was recognition, albeit very limited, that Scotland had both specific issues and specifically Scottish answers could and should be provided. Yet such recognition was subsumed into the idea that Scotland was and would remain an integral portion of the UK. It would seem that the limited growth of support for the SNP, and to a lesser extent the Liberal Party, that had occurred during the 1970 election required that the political issues of devolution be directly addressed, but there was little response beyond this. Certainly, as noted above, the lack of a specifically Scottish document, whilst in keeping with the Labour Party’s ideological stance, seemed to indicate they did not feel threatened in any way by any potential Nationalist breakthrough. Any commitment to devolution was clearly
rejected, as Labour saw no need to abandon the stance it had adopted in 1958 when it had, for the first time, abandoned a commitment to Home Rule. The by-election results of the late 1960s and the results of the 1970 election did not bring about significant change in Labour’s behaviour regarding separate manifestos or the enhancement of a sense of Scottish identity in those manifestos it did produce.

The last time that the Labour Party chose not to provide a specifically Scottish document in a British General Election was for the February 1974 election. In *Let Us Work Together – Labour’s Way Out of the Crisis*, the shortest by far of the three British manifestos, there was hardly any mention of Scotland at all. Indeed, when mention of Scotland did appear it was in a discussion on regional development, and the sentence indicatively read “...in Scotland and the regions elsewhere...” Again, as in 1966 and 1970, the nation was envisaged as the UK or Great Britain, and with no Scottish document, there was little indication of Scotland as a separate national entity, let alone the idea of a distinct national identity. Again, there would be no direct nationalistic appeal in a British document to any sub-state identity. It would seem that any focus beyond British identity was either politically unnecessary or unimportant at the time. The results of the February 1974 election certainly changed Scottish politics. However, it also changed the behaviour of the Labour Party and its approach to Scottish manifestos.

While 1974 was obviously a pivotal year, the changing face of party and electoral fortunes in Scotland had started in the late 1960s and took its most dramatic turn in the now famous by election victory of the SNP in Hamilton, 1967. The scenes surrounding the election of the first female SNP MP, Winnie Ewing, and the presence of the SNP in a non-wartime parliament heralded a new period within both British and Scottish Politics. This victory had followed on from the March 1967 by-election in Pollok, where the strong showing of the Nationalists cost the Labour Party the seat. The Conservatives won Pollok, although both major parties lost vote share. The Hamilton by-election was not merely a blip on the political radar, as the next three General Elections were to show.

In 1970 Winnie Ewing lost her Hamilton seat, but the SNP gained a seat at a General Election for the first time in their history. Furthermore, the SNP share of the vote
jumped to 11.4%, overtaking the Liberals for the first time as the third party in Scottish politics. And perhaps most tellingly of all, this advance came more clearly at the expense of the Labour Party. Labour's share of the vote fell by over five percent and the number of Labour MPs, which had been steadily rising for two decades, fell by two. Nor was this event a singular one as even greater change was to come. In February 1974, the SNP share of the vote leapt to 21.9% and the Party gained seven seats in Westminster. Again, the Labour share of the vote declined, this time by almost eight percent, and they lost a further four seats. At the same time the Conservative share of the vote declined by five percent and they lost two seats. However, the Liberals maintained their three Scottish seats and increased their electoral share by almost two and a half percent. The electoral challenge represented by the SNP must have become clear to the Labour Party at this point. The next, snap, election of October 1974 saw a Labour manifesto published for Scotland. Thus, for the first time, all four parties represented at Westminster from Scotland produced specifically Scottish manifestos – a pattern that has continue to this day.

However, the results of the second election in 1974 were even more dramatic in terms of changing electoral fortunes. The SNP share of the vote increased to just over 30% and they gained 11 MPs. This level of representation was a historic high for the SNP, one yet to be repeated. The increase in the SNP fortunes did not come at the direct expense of the Liberals or the Labour Party. Both these parties maintained their share of the vote, with very slight increases and decreases respectively. Labour even gained one more seat in October 1974 than it had in February. Even so, Labour must have been very aware of the significant number of second places that the SNP had, in seats won by Labour. Furthermore, a clear pattern of British, or more specifically Scottish, politics had been broken by the 1974 elections. The loss of vote share by either Labour or the Conservatives had not seen transference of that share from one to the other. A Scottish multiparty system was emerging. While Labour certainly had to take notice of this, it was also clear that the political loser in the 1974 elections, especially October, was the Conservative Party. Their share of the vote dropped to 24.7% and they lost five seats. The elections left them with only 16 MPs, their hitherto lowest number in the post-war period. They had been beaten into a clear third place, almost six percentage points behind the SNP.
It had become clear that the SNP could challenge all sides of the political spectrum in the competition for votes and representation at Westminster. The Nationalist threat had impacted on all the other parties vying for representation from Scotland. Certainly the Liberal revival began at the same time as the rise of the SNP as an electoral force. However, one LD politician (Interview 9) stated that the rise of the SNP represented a failure on the part of the Liberal Party in Scotland to capture specific aspects of the Scottish electorate that were available at the time. By the late 1960s and the 1970s nationalism had arrived on the political scene of the UK and had begun to transform the Scottish political scene. With a nationalist party presenting a viable electoral threat the other parties could not ignore issues of nationalism and national identity. Any appeals made to a political ‘us’ had to consider the national element to a greater extent than before. Not to face the challenge of providing a ‘Scottish us’ within a manifesto left any party open to challenge. Such challenges could leave a party open to attack as the ‘other’ and thus not really Scottish at all. Indeed, several parties have regularly employed such a theme in their challenge to opposing political parties – and the SNP in particular have often attempted to paint other parties as ‘London’ controlled. The simple fact that all the political parties (Labour and LD included) chose to issue specific Scottish manifestos from 1974 onwards is a telling point.

3. Conclusions
The two main political parties of the UK recognised the need for specially produced manifestos for Scotland during the late 1950s. The Conservatives were consistent in their use of such documents, issuing them regularly for Scotland since the 1960s. Labour, after gaining electoral prominence, was more sporadic, taking a ten year hiatus from producing Scottish manifestos. However, the emergence of the SNP and LD electoral challenge led to a situation where each party saw a regular need for such documents.

It is clear that the Scottish political system has undergone significant transformation in the past four decades. Several parties have experienced considerable change in their political and electoral fortunes during last four decades. While the Labour Party has maintained a leading position, events have indicated the potential for other
parties to present ongoing challenges to that position. The national element of Scottish politics requires that parties recognise the existence of a distinct Scottish identity. The continued publication of specifically Scottish manifestos at British General Elections stands as a testament to this point. In order to investigate the nature of that identity, and the conception of Scottish nationalism, it becomes necessary to consider the content of those manifestos.

This work will now proceed to a consideration of the manifestos themselves. We shall examine how the nation and national identity, or Scotland and being Scottish, have occurred within them and how each party has employed a sense of 'us' and approached the issue of national identity from a political perspective. Although Labour was the first party to produce a specifically Scottish manifesto they opted not to do so for several elections. From 1974 onwards they did so and it is to these documents that we first turn.

The manifestos will be scrutinized from several perspectives. The visual aspects of the documents, which have changed significantly during the period in question, will be addressed, with specific considerations of photographs and logos. These visual supports can be employed by parties to create a sense of identity that is not only political, but also personal and national. As noted by Smith and Smith (2000) political parties seek to create a sense of 'us' within their manifestos. By issuing separate Scottish manifestos parties are attempting to appeal to a sub-state national feeling as well as political or ideological feelings. Furthermore, national identity offers both individual and group identities and parties must link all three aspects together in their attempt to create an 'us' that appeals to individual voters within the sub state national territory of Scotland.

Logos and photographs, while making no direct political or policy statements nonetheless may occupy a central aspect of the manifestos. Certainly, they are a banal aspect of the manifestos that should not be ignored in any analysis. Furthermore, the emergence of the 'glossy' magazine style manifesto in more recent times has indicated a move towards a more visually appealing document. While the policy within remains key, the packaging of the message has become even more important. Indeed, Rosenbaum notes that the policy aspects of the manifestos have
become more complex, with "greater detail" being provided in more recent times (1997). Interestingly Rosenbaum published his work prior to the 1997 elections, and thus he commented "the design of manifestos has changed remarkably little in the past fifty years" (1997 p210). He further stated that even some changes in the late 1980s "did little to relieve the unremitting visual tedium of the text" (1997 p211). Since 1997 visual images have become more prominent, and changes to the format and structure of manifestos only support Rosenbaum's arguments.

Whatever the visual aspects of the documents, it is the core text which remains the focal point of any analysis herein. As discussed the rhetorical and symbolic representations of national identity may be somewhat hidden by the policy focus of specific statements, and thus an examination of such statements from a distinctly rhetorical and textual perspective must be considered key. This thesis shall not only examine when national identity (or Scottishness) or nation (a sense of Scotland the place) is employed but also more particularly how it is employed. What 'us' are the parties attempting to create – in what way does it reach beyond the political to employ a wider sense that draws on Scotland or the Scottish people? In other words, how are the parties employing a sense of national identity, and what sense of identity are they creating.

Also, the existence of British and Scottish manifestos for the three major parties that operate electorally both within and outwith Scotland, allows for a consideration of how different the documents are from each other. Obviously in such cases, as the central planks of parties operating at a UK level, it is expected that similarities between the documents will occur. However, an analysis of how directly the documents coincide may provide evidence of what level of importance individual parties placed on having Scottish manifestos. British and Scottish manifestos issued by the same party for the same election with little textual variance may indicate that the party in question placed little emphasis on the need for a singularly Scottish text. Such a choice may indicate how a party both envisages Scotland within the political arena of the UK, as well as how it envisages a sense of Scottish identity. This will furthermore impact on how the party projects their conception of Scottish identity, both within and beyond the manifesto message. Thus, the text of the document may be as useful for what it does not say about Scotland or Scottishness as much as for
what it does say. Consequently, the next chapters will consider the rhetorical construction of identity, and the visual images and aspects within the manifestos issued for Scotland by Labour, Conservatives, LDs, and SNP during the last thirty-five years.
Labour and Conservative are the contemporary, customary parties of government within the UK. During the past thirty five years the Conservative Party has spent twenty two in government, while Labour has done so for thirteen. However, the Westminster election results in Scotland have not reflected this wider UK picture. During the 1970-2005 period Labour spent only thirteen years in government at the UK level, yet they were the major party in terms of both vote share received and MPs elected within Scotland. Since 1970 the Conservative Party have never received a plurality of either votes or seats in Scotland. During this time the Conservative Party has been in power for twenty-two years. Thus a picture of Scotland as a distinct political arena becomes even clearer in this rudimentary analysis.

The previous chapter provided insight into the changing nature of political party fortunes during the past several decades of Scottish politics. An analysis of the ebb and flow of support for the Conservative and Labour parties indicated a clear pattern. Labour have, despite the rise of the SNP and the re-emergence of the LDs, maintained its position as the leading party within Scotland; a position almost consistently maintained since the end of the Second World War. During the last four decades, while other parties have jockeyed for electoral position as the second, third and fourth placed finishers, Labour has maintained a clear lead, with a vote share floating around the forty percent mark.

While the challenges and challengers within the Scottish political system have altered somewhat, the Conservatives remain the party most likely to challenge Labour as the party of government for the UK. 1997 saw no Conservative MPs returned from Scotland, and only one since 2001. The Conservatives finished a clear second in terms of Scottish vote share from 1979 through 1992. While the party has achieved only the fourth largest share of the vote in the most recent elections, the SNP maintained a lead of just under two percent in 2005. The recorded nationalist vote was therefore only marginally higher than the openly unionist vote.

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1 Prior to 1999 there was no devolved government for Scotland. Since then Labour has been in government at both levels, although with LD coalition partners in Holyrood.
The Conservatives visibly had a separate Scottish identity prior to the formal separation of the major British parties brought about as a result of devolution. A more distinctive Scottish party with a clear Scottish identity, the Scottish Unionist Party, had existed for conservative voters in Scotland during the 1950s and 1960s. The Conservatives have consistently issued separate manifestos for Scotland since 1959. Thus the party has a consistent presence in Scotland, and an established history. Although currently the weakest party in terms of support received within Scotland at British election time, the Conservatives can draw on an historical and governmental record when they engage with the Scottish electorate. Whatever the level of MPs elected, the current level of support for the Conservative Party in Scotland remains firm. While other parties saw their support fluctuate significantly, the Conservative vote changed by a positive 0.2%. They still form the official opposition at Westminster and the third largest Party in the Scottish Parliament.

Labour has maintained its position as the party gaining most support within Scotland. Despite a cycle of decreasing support over the last three elections, Labour maintains a strong lead in vote share and seats held. They are clearly the party of the majority of Scottish voters. Therefore, we shall now consider the documents of these two parties to consider how they have employed a sense of the Scottish nation and national identity, or Scottishness, during the past thirty-five years.

1. Labour Manifestos
As previously noted, the Labour Party was the first to issue a separate manifesto for Scotland, although it refrained from doing so between 1964 and February 1974. As the discussion in the previous chapter indicated, changing electoral circumstances and the emergence of the SNP gradually led all the major parties in Scotland to issue them on a regular basis. Each election since October 1974 has seen all the four main parties issue manifestos within Scotland. Unfortunately, as Labour’s 1974 October manifesto for Scotland was not available for scrutiny our analysis begins with the 1979 text.

Furthermore, recent election returns, at a variety of levels, indicate that the Conservative vote share is a bedrock, and solid base on which to build.
Although a separate document, the Labour manifesto from 1979 was very similar in many ways to the British version. But there were clear differences in content and structure – as the focus was on Scotland and Britain. While the foreword from James Callaghan was exactly the same in both manifestos, Scotland has an additional foreword by Bruce Millan (Secretary of State for Scotland). It clearly appealed to “the Scottish people” and emphasised Scotland as a distinct entity. This had not been a common pattern in many Labour manifestos. The foreword helped define the nature of Scotland through the manifesto. Scotland was identified as a nation, located within the UK, but recognized as having different traditions and a distinct history.

There was a large emphasis in the manifesto on Labour’s commitment to devolution, and several attacks on “the Tories and the Nationalists” and their lack of support for such a policy. This was an attempt to indicate that neither of the Conservatives nor the SNP operated for what was ‘best’ for Scotland. This represented a clear attempt to create a political ‘us’ that combined the national with the political. Labour was represented as being good for Scotland and thus a vote for Labour was a vote for Scotland. Furthermore, as discussed above, this document set a distinctly different tone than in previous years, but it should not be seen as a total departure as it most certainly provided a firm sense of being British. The employment of a sense of nation was present, but the British connection was firm and clear.

While there was little within the 1979 manifesto that appealed directly to a sense of Scottishness, all policies were, as far as possible, connected to Scotland. Labour consistently mentioned how Scotland had/would benefit from a specific action, but never by directly appealing to Scottish identity per se. Furthermore, there were several clear appeals to a sense of Britishness within the document. The sections within the manifesto that dealt with Europe and the wider world were virtually identical to the British manifesto and made appeals steeped in British perspective. Overall, Labour clearly attempted to balance itself between the unionism of the Conservatives and the nationalism of the SNP. It attacked both, one for being

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3 In 1979 the SNP openly opposed the plans put forward by the Labour Party, which was itself split on the issue. In 1997 the SNP supported a ‘Yes, Yes’ vote. Moreover, in 1979 Labour was far from committed to the idea, and the ‘40%’ amendment of George Cunningham (who while Scottish was sitting as a Labour MP from an English constituency) was instrumental in killing the 1979 Acts.
“irrelevant” to Scotland and the other for seeking the break-up of the UK. However, it did not attempt to create a strong sense of Scottishness in doing so. The political appeals did not attempt to create a clear national identity based connection.

The 1979 manifesto was visually minimalist; there were no logos, no graphs and no photographs, other than those of the Party Leader and Scottish Secretary. This had not changed by 1983, where pictures of Michael Foot and Bruce Millan were the only visual elements of the manifesto. The theme in the overall document had changed, shifting direction on the issues of focus and identity. While there was still an additional foreword for Scotland, even this had much less emphasis on Scotland, and a wider, British view was evident. Indeed, the manifesto was notably closer to the British version in 1983. In most places, the only sense of Scotland was given by adding the word to a sentence. The only other areas of difference were those that emphasised the role that a Scottish Assembly would play in developing specifically Scottish policy. Even the section on devolution, where one could expect a strong Scottish tone, was almost identical to the one in the British manifesto. There is not any clear attempt to differentiate between state and nation. Indeed, when the term nation was employed it was usually in reference to the UK, with Scotland only occasionally specifically named as a frame of reference. Overall, the 1983 manifesto invoked minimal manifestations of Scotland and provided little to no appeal of a sense of Scotland, let alone a sense of Scottishness. There was a separate Scottish manifesto for the 1983 election, but no sense of national identity was appealed to and no attempt to create a link between the national and the core political message was evident. The political ‘us’ the manifesto projected did not have a national element.

The minimal use of visual material continued in 1987. The manifesto front cover carried an image of Neil Kinnock, the Labour leader, and the Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland; Donald Dewar. Dewar also had a picture above his foreword. Otherwise there were no visual representations or images within the manifesto at all.

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4 An example that shows this clearly is “The Tories have been a disaster for [Scottish and] British industry” the only difference between the Scottish and British versions being the words in brackets. This is not an isolated example.

5 It is interesting to note that several areas of the Scottish manifesto are different in wording -- although this is not due to any attempt to refocus the discussion on Scotland. There seems to have been a change in wording rather than a change in policy intent or any sense of identity.
However, it presented a very significant divergence from 1983. The topics covered in the foreword by Neil Kinnock were essentially the same as in previous years – but with key aspects of difference of address. Many references to Britain had been removed – and while Scotland had been substituted in some places others had been neutralised without any reference to place/nation/state. While Scotland had been highlighted and emphasised, there were mentions of Britain, but only in more general terms, as Scotland had been given a distinct role. This was a theme reflected throughout the 1987 document. Although large sections were identical to the British manifesto, there are several additions that specifically discussed Scotland. Taken as a whole, there was a greater emphasis on Scotland as a focus for policy. However, this emphasis on Scotland was not allied to any sense of Scottishness. There was a clear attempt to lessen the levels of Britishness within the manifesto, but this was not as simple as replacing Scotland for Britain. Rather the emphasis on identity had been altered, but only indirectly increased, with more generic terms like ‘us’ or ‘our’ being employed. The appeal to a national us in the document remained muted. The de-emphasis on British aspects of the document had not all been made by emphasising Scottishness. The result is not a firm linking of the political and the national but a decoupling of the political ‘us’ and Britishness.

Moreover, many sections of the 1987 Scottish and British manifestos were identical. Thus ‘our country’ may mean Britain within the British manifesto, but in the Scottish version it could be taken to mean Scotland due to the change in emphasis. The final section was a clear example of this as Labour calls “the people of Scotland” to fight against “national decline” and ensure “their country’s interests” and “our freedom”. This was the most clear and overt appeal to a sense of Scottishness within the document and an almost singular attempt to create a sense of ‘us’ that includes not only Labour, but also Scotland. To summarise, the 1987 manifesto did present an increase in appeals to a distinct Scottish identity, yet such appeals remained notably limited.

The 1992 Labour manifesto was the start of the modern manifesto period in that there was a wider use of photographs throughout the document. However, these

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6Interestingly, sections attacking the Liberals and SDP had also been removed from his foreword.
represented supporting images quite generic in form. None appealed to a sense of identity, let alone a sense of Scotland. Throughout, the 1992 manifesto remained a document aimed at a wider audience. There were several references to England and Wales, which reflected the same format and language as the British document. Nonetheless, there were important differences — and none more so than the foreword. As usual with a Labour manifesto for Scotland, there were two, one from Neil Kinnock and another from Donald Dewar. The Kinnock foreword was very different in tone and content from 1987 and represented a shift back towards a pattern clear in the 1983 manifesto. There was only one direct reference to Scotland — all other references to “our country” were through the British lens — and the foreword was almost completely identical to the British manifesto.

However, the foreword by Dewar was much more emotional in its appeal to a sense of Scotland and a sense of identity than was the case for the remainder of the document. Dewar spoke of a wish to transform Scotland into a “modern European nation”, one of the few occurrences of Scotland being identified as a nation with Labour manifestos. Scotland as a distinct entity was clear, although Britain retained a strong presence in Dewar’s statement.

While the focus of the Dewar foreword was on Scotland, there were limited appeals to a sense of Scottishness and outside of the foreword, no references to the nation that linked directly to Scotland. There were no attempts to create a firm relationship between the political and the national. Such inclusions of national identity that were present lay outwith the policy discussion. For most of the preceding decade Labour had not attempted to employ a strong sense of national identity within their Scottish manifestos. They had fluctuated in terms of emphasising Scotland over Britain, but only very occasionally did they employ a direct sense of nationhood in appealing to the electorate from the manifestos.

The first new Labour manifesto for Scotland, because Scotland deserves better (1997), was the first of the modern manifestos and represented a clear change with the past format. Visually the document was awash with photographs, with many repeated as a montage on the inside cover pages. While many of these photographs were generic in nature (an operating theatre, schoolchildren, a family shopping)
many directly appealed to a sense of Scotland and aimed at creating a sense of national identity. One, of a bagpipe and drum band clearly indicated such intent, as did a shot of a child wearing a Scotland football strip. Likewise, there was a scenery photograph, the highlands of Scotland, showing a loch, a craggy hill, and sheep grazing. This accompanied a discussion on open and local government, although it was not on the page discussing the proposed Scottish Parliament. The appeal therefore seemed to be more localised than a national one. If there had been intent to link the political and the national such imagery would have been located next to the issue of a national legislature. Nonetheless, the connection to the land, a sense of home and place, was strongly made. In fact, the photographs almost overwhelmed the text, with bullet points outlining the main points making the main text almost superfluous in places. Modern manifestos do not seem to invite a close reading of the text – with the use of small fonts often being an added deterrent.

The 1997 manifesto represented shifts in content as well as presentation. A already pointed out, a strong sense of Scotland, and Scottish identity was employed within the manifesto. Constant references were made to the need for, and the fact that Labour would create, a Scottish Parliament. Such references were supported by frequently used phrases such as “the people of Scotland” or “our nation”. Indeed there was even clear recognition of the existence of a Scottish national identity, illustrated by comments such as; “fundamental to Scotland’s sense of national identity” “identity and civic pride that should define our nation” scattered throughout the document. This was never so clear as in the foreword by George Robertson, Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland where he stated that: “Ours is a country enriched by distinct and proud national identities”. This was the first clear statement invoking a direct sense of Scottish identity in any foreword in a Labour manifesto. It was clear that the country to which Robertson referred was the UK, but just as clear was the recognition there are multiple nations within that country. Labour had openly acknowledged and addressed the existence of ‘us’ and ‘them’ from a national perspective. This was one of the few times in the period under examination they would so. At the same time they continued to stress the greater ‘us’ that is the UK. Thus, the manifesto spoke of two distinct, yet related groups as in many ways the

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7 Children are a popular visual theme throughout many manifesto images, whatever the party.
theme of the overall document presented a clear differentiation between Scotland and the UK. Nonetheless, when an ‘us’ that encompasses more than the political was created, it was a wide ranging ‘us’ that included Scotland and the UK. Whenever Britain was mentioned it was routinely alongside Scotland. Even Tony Blair’s foreword, extremely close textually to the British version, contained several references to Scotland. Even with the firm linking of Scotland to the UK, the acknowledgement of national identity was clear – “Scotland has... a distinct and proud national identity”. In 1997 Labour attempted to create not just a political and statewide ‘us’ but also sought to connect that to a sense of Scottishness. This was a significant change from previous manifestos as Labour employed a strong sense of national identity in its core message.

However, such a connection to identity was not based on any mythical sense of the past. There was little use of history or mythology within the document. In many ways the focus was quite the opposite. With the shift to new Labour the political spotlight had moved to the future and tomorrow’s potential, something that had also occurred with more general, non-policy specific statements. Labour made no appeals to the historical links between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Even when challenging the nationalist position\(^8\), it spoke of the need for a parliament “in tune with Scotland’s needs, and designed for the 21st century”. This was the same approach employed in other sections as the comment “traditions that make up modern Scotland” shows. The connection was made between customs, culture and tomorrow; but there was no looking backwards when invoking a sense of history. The rhetoric within the 1997 manifesto was about the future. It was clearly about Scotland, and it clearly recognised the existence of a Scottish national identity, but the future remained a key theme throughout. This use of the past used as a viewfinder for tomorrow provides insight into the nature of identity as projected by the Labour Party. It represents a clear example of the use of future-history, albeit in a limited fashion. Labour, previously so unwilling to deal with a sense of Scottish identity now employed the historical and traditional aspects of that identity – but only as means to create a broad view the future.

\(^8\) Only the Conservatives were directly attacked. Other comments were oblique and did not mention the LDs or SNP by name.
However, the 2001 manifesto incorporated changes to both language and content bringing it much closer to the 1983/1992 manifestos than the 1997 version. *Ambitions for Scotland* was visually powerful with a significant emphasis on photographs scattered throughout the document. Bullet points and headlines that presented key aspects of the manifesto accompanied these photographs. However, none sought to present a sense of nation or national identity. Aside from a shot of Loch Katrine (identified as such, and just as visually identifiable as Scotland) which was described as “Scottish idyll” there were no emotional appeals, or visual representations of Scotland or Scottishness.

Overall any appeal to national identity, to a sense of Scottishness was quite limited. What was apparent was the sense of partnership that the document presented. There were clear themes creating both a political and identity based sense of partnership. The first – Labour in Scotland – was between the Labour government in London and the Labour aspect of the Scottish Executive. The second partnership framed by the rhetoric was between Scotland and the wider UK. The foreword from Tony Blair heavily emphasised the British focal point, with only a few comments that directly spoke to Scotland. However, the key paragraph on Scotland focused on the “partnership between Labour at Westminster and Labour in the Scottish Parliament” and even the SNP, “the Nationalists”, were mentioned, negatively of course. However, this was clearly an appeal from the Prime Minister of Britain to the people of Scotland, as part of the UK. Thus the stage is once again Scotland, but as a firm and clear part of the UK. In this fashion Labour manifestos are much closer to the Conservative documents than those of the SNP or the LDs.

The textual discussion of a partnership of Labour and Scottish Labour was also clear in the additional foreword, co-signed by Helen Liddell as Secretary of State for Scotland and Henry McLeish as First Minister. These make the connection even more clear. This foreword also employed both history and identity and strongly emphasised the links between Scotland and the rest of the UK. It stated, “We are proud to be both Scottish and British”. This ‘we’ invoked a national identity, Scottishness, rather than a political identity, i.e. Labour. The rhetoric employed by Labour sought to create strong links between the national and state identities. Liddell and McLeish attacked both the Conservatives and the “single issue politics of
the SNP”, but interestingly did not directly attack the LDs. They emphasised a political ‘we’ but a limited one that challenged on nationalist and unionist grounds. Furthermore, although the historical link was evident, its use was limited. It becomes clear that Labour will employ future-history when necessary. Often missing from Labour manifestos, when history is employed it is as a means to project the future, but also to underscore the Union. Again, this reflects the same use of history as employed by the Conservatives within their own manifestos, as the discussion below will show.

Yet, overall, the use of national identity within the 2001 manifesto was quite limited, especially in comparison to the previous manifesto in 1997. There was a strong focus on Scotland, but also a constant use of ‘Britain’ as a form of identification. The main themes were the link between Westminster and the Scottish Parliament and the link between Labour and the Scottish people. It was in this area that identity was employed. Labour values were identified with “the best values of the Scottish people”. There were clear attempts to create a sense of ‘us’ that linked both the political and the national. However, the national or Scottish ‘us’ was also connected to the wider ‘us’ of the British people. When Scotland was identified as the political arena for action, with Labour in the Scottish Parliament taking the lead, the manifesto invariably drew in Britain arguing that problems required “Scottish and British solutions” and that only with “Labour at Westminster and Labour at Holyrood” could Scotland succeed.

Partnership was continued as a theme in the 2005 Labour Scottish manifesto, yet even more evident from the first was a still greater employment of a British sense of identity. The foreword in Scotland forward not back by Tony Blair, failed to even mention Scotland directly – the emphasis was on Britain. It is to the “British people” that Blair consistently appealed, and when he spoke of “national interest” or “our country” he clearly meant the UK/Britain. It was not until the usual additional foreword by the Secretary of State and First Minister that Scotland was clearly identified. Furthermore, it was at this point that the two streams of partnership were again emphasised. It was stated that “Scotland is stronger when Britain is stronger” but no clear appeals were made to a sense of identity, Scottish or British. The second foreword did not attack the Liberals or the SNP; rather the only political opponents
mentioned were the Conservatives. A clear appeal was made to a political ‘us’ but there was no attempt to link the political to the nation, let alone a sense of national identity or belonging. This may have been a Scottish manifesto, but it was clearly about more than Scotland.

Overall, the emphasis within the manifesto focused heavily on Britain. Scotland was frequently mentioned and was the constant focal point of specific successes or future policies, although often as an additional aspect. For instance, in the introductory section to the discussion on the economy “Scotland” was mentioned three times, but “Britain” or “UK” were employed five times. There was recognition that the UK could be divided into “every region or nation” but the focus remained heavily on Scotland as part of the UK. The partnership that this represented was constantly stressed. Phrases such as “Britain and Scotland” British and Scottish” were regularly employed to create that sense of wider ‘us’ that includes everyone within the UK. Indeed, Labour clearly attempted to conflate the identity of both to being almost the same. Scotland was present, but the attempt was to link the national and state identity so strongly that they became one and the same. This is the ‘us’ that the party seeks to link to their political message.

2. Conclusions on Labour
In 2005 Labour returned to a point not unlike that from which it started when it began to produce Scottish manifestos. Although the sense of Scotland was clear and accented throughout, it was habitually related to the wider UK. The ‘us’ portrayed is both Scottish and British, with the obvious aim of maintaining and stressing the link between these identities. Allied to this sense of Scotland there is usually an absence of any direct appeals to a sense of Scottishness. Furthermore, there is certainly no attempt to create a sense of exclusiveness; any ‘us’ that establishes other parts of the UK as ‘them’. Distinct appeals to a Scottish national identity are unusual in the documents from the 1970s and early 1980s, and also from the first manifestos of the 21st century. Thus, while the structure and visual aspects of the manifestos have changed dramatically, the actual focus within the documents has remained relatively constant.
The exception to this general pattern was the period in the late 1990s. The 1997 manifesto employed a distinct and clearly evident sense of Scottishness. The appeals to a sense of national identity were, for the first time within a Labour manifesto, clear, unambiguous and significant. Alongside this, the Labour Party began to openly acknowledge the existence of a strong sense of national identity in Scotland. Labour utilized terms that identified Scotland as a nation, and the UK as a collection of “nations and regions”. While this had occurred before within Labour manifestos it had remained a rare occurrence. It can be no accident that this reflected a period of high expectations from the Scottish electorate, with devolution a likely outcome during the first Labour government in almost twenty years.

Nevertheless, with the advent of devolution, the employment of national identity within Labour manifesto returned to a minimal, often non-existent, level. While Labour regularly engaged in rhetoric that provided for, and affirmed a sense of the Scottish nation, it did not do so in regards to a distinct and evident national identity. Any emphasis given to identity was undertaken in a manner that affirmed the Scottish aspects of British identity as much as the national identity alone. Consequently, although Labour does emphasise Scotland as a distinct territorial entity, in other words a nation (and this has not always been the case), the national aspects of the identity are firmly linked to a wider, British, identity. The national ‘us’ that Labour seeks to link to the political has, after a short period of change, returned to a firmly British one. The employment of a sense of national identity within Labour manifestos issued for Scotland is once again noticeable by its absence.

What is clear therefore is that Labour will, and did, employ a sense of identity when required. The political challenge presented by the SNP, so evident in the election results of the early 1970s, saw Labour return to the regular production of a Scottish manifesto. When the SNP represented a possible challenge again in the 1990s Labour openly employed a strong sense of identity in order to maintain their dominant electoral position within Scotland. Yet when the SNP challenge failed to materialise Labour shifted back to previous patterns and reduced a distinct identity presence within their documents.
3. **Conservative Manifestos**

The Conservative Party did produce a Scottish manifesto in 1970. *Tomorrow Scotland* was a document very unlike the British version. Overall the manifesto was much shorter, with a completely different foreword by the party leader, Ted Heath. This manifesto committed the party to a process of devolution – with the caveat that it would meet “Scotland’s needs within a firmly UK.” This was in keeping with Heath’s acceptance of some form of Scottish Home Rule made as the Perth Declaration, much to the surprise, and dismay of many members of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party at the time. There was a significant focus on Scotland, indeed the whole language and structure is firmly fixed on Scotland. It is interesting to note that the document had very few visual images. The only two photographs are the cover shot of two children, and a head and shoulders of the party leader. Otherwise, the images are limited to the party logo (which seems to be representative of a corner section of the Union flag) conjoined with very limited drawing of such things as a globe, or a fifty pence piece. This lack of photographs or visual images is a common element in most party manifestos throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

While the focus of the document was directly on Scotland there was little appeal to a sense of Scottishness itself. The document spoke of ‘we’ and ‘our’ when referring to Scottish needs and differences, but there were no strident appeals to a sense of culture, history or difference. Furthermore, the devolution that was promised was distinctly unionist in form. “We reject separatism and believe federalism to be impracticable”. The importance of Scotland was linked to the UK – “We [meaning Scotland] have played and will continue to play a leading part in the greatness of the UK”. A sense of identity was minimal within the document. The absence of strong appeals to Scottishness indicated that the Conservatives saw little need to employ this approach in their manifesto. The document was very much a focus on their policy platform with little superfluous commentary. The appeals made were to a sense of British ‘us’. It was inherent unionist plea that clearly underpinned the policy focus of the 1970 manifesto.
Likewise, the February 1974 document was very heavily focused on policies with little inherent appeal to any sense of identity. The document was specifically Scottish as cover page states “The Conservative party has issued a manifesto for the General Election. Part I of the National Manifesto should be read in conjunction with the enclosed Scottish element.” The Scottish manifesto was an added discussion, rather than a separate one produced for specific audience. This clearly indicates that the nation for the Conservatives in 1974 was Britain. Scotland was an 'element' or an adjunct of the larger stage. A reading of the overall document indicated that it was very much a response to the ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ campaign run by the SNP during this time. Many issues were subordinated to the overall economic focus, and even issues central to Scottish politics, such as devolution and anti-independence statements, were given only one page – and this at the end of the document. The main thrust seemed to address trade and industry, and individual economic issues rather than any other areas. What was clear was an almost total lack of attention to attempts at employing, or creating, a sense of identity, British or Scottish. There were not attempt to firmly link the nation or the national to the political message.

This strong focus on the UK, even if contained in a distinct Scottish document, had not changed by the end of the 1970s. Overall, the Conservative manifesto of 1979 was very similar to the British document – with additional sections grafted onto it to provide a more Scottish focus and tone. Direct comparison indicated almost word for word usage, except to provide a more Scottish tone. In particular sections this was simply the addition of the word Scottish, or the substitution for a Scottish term or word in place of a British one. Hence the Trades Union Congress, or TUC, became the Scottish Trades Union Congress, or STUC. In relation to very specific Scottish issues, such as that of devolution, or the political threat of the SNP, the manifesto provided a few extra paragraphs at the most.

The Conservative attitude towards the ideas of nation and identity in the 1979 manifesto was immediately clear. The first page focused on the problems brought about by Labour in government and how they have made things worse for “this country” and “this society”. These terms could mean Scotland, as they are printed in the separately produced Scottish manifesto, but they are exactly the same words and
phrases as used in the British version. Undeniably, this is the manifesto of the Scottish Conservative Party, but the British threads in it are clear, strong and constant. Furthermore, the attack on the Labour policies then closes with the argument that Labour cannot and “dare not act for the nation as a whole” (1979, p6). The use of the term nation here is both somewhat confusing and illuminating. It is confusing in that it is clearly understood (and argued) that the Scottish clearly identify themselves as a nation, and are able to distinguish between the nation and the state. The Conservative Party was at this time organised along local, national and state lines, as the name of the party publishing the document clearly indicates. In one of the specifically Scottish sections, which obviously did not appear in the British version, discussions of “our own preference” indicate a political party that is distinctly Scottish and then speaks about “our partners in the rest of the UK”. Thus, the Conservative manifesto is presented by the Scottish Conservative Party as a distinctive document for Scotland, and written for Scotland. Yet, the document clearly did not attempt to distinguish between Scotland as a nation and the UK as a state. Rather it employed the terms nation, country and society to refer to the UK. However, it also employed the term UK specifically, and introduced this in the next paragraph, which was spent attacking the “separatist policies” of the nationalists (which it did not name directly as the SNP). It is clear that the Conservatives depict the UK as a nation. In attacking “the nationalists” they stated that only by working together “as one nation...within the UK” can they ensure that “Britain” [remains] one of the finest countries in the world”.

The situation had not changed by the 1980s. If anything, the 1983 document was even more like its British counterpart, and even less a specifically Scottish document. Again, there was no foreword from any Scottish personage (such as the head of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party) and it was page 15 of the document before the text was even slightly different. This particular difference is the addition of eight words – one of which was ‘Scotland’. The Scottish additions were aimed to provide a more localised flavour. However, this flavour was not truly national in tone. All appeals within the document to a sense of identity were to a sense of Britishness. There was no strong sense of Scotland, let alone appeals to a sense of Scottish

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9 Unfortunately, the 1987 Scottish Conservative Manifesto was not available for analysis. Efforts are ongoing to locate a copy.
national identity. When the terms ‘us’ and ‘we’ are employed they are used in the British sense. The manifesto may have been produced for Scotland, but the audience it was aimed at seems to be a British one. Any sense of Scottishness is almost completely absent in 1983.

This absence could be explained by a number of factors. However, this thesis argues that the clear attitude of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party at this time was that the UK was one ‘nation’ and that to hold a national identity was to be British. The events of the period, especially the Falkland Islands campaign had allowed the Conservative to claim the mantle of the British Party. The SNP failed to present any significant challenge, recovering as they were from their 1979 ‘defeat’. The largest electoral challenge at this time was the newly formed Alliance, and as the next chapter illustrates, they did not choose to focus strongly on any sense of identity. The Conservatives simply saw no need to employ a sense of Scottish identity. The last election had seen them increase their share of the vote and MPs returned from Scotland at the clear expense of the SNP. Playing the Scottish card was clearly not a winning option and not necessary politically. However, this pattern was to change significantly within ten years.

In many ways the 1992 document represented a change from its immediate predecessors, and a reversal of the pattern that had been apparent since the 1970s. The foreword is still by the British leader (and then Prime Minister) but it was very different from the British version. Scotland, as a part of the British ‘nation’ was given prominence. Furthermore, the words, Scottish, Scotland, and Scots, were prominently employed throughout the manifesto. For instance, in the discussion on the National Health Service, Scotland or Scottish as a term appeared in 13 of the first 17 sentences of the section – and this was representative of the overall pattern. A sense of Scotland was strongly evident in the document which was significantly different from its British counterpart. While attempting to create a political ‘us’ the Conservatives liberally employed the idea of the nation, Scotland, in order to link the political to a national identity.

Nonetheless, as one would expect within a unionist document, a projection of Britain remained a constant presence within the manifesto. There were regular statements
about Britain, the UK and ‘our nation’. When appeals were made to society, or the
nation, they were ambiguous in that they could appeal to either Scotland or Britain.
However, in a few areas, there were specific appeals to Scottishness; “We are rich in
natural beauty – our hills, mountains and open spaces are the envy of the world”.
The appeal here, employing the idea of territory, the homeland that is central to a
sense of national belonging, was to an ‘us’ that is distinctly Scottish. Yet, this sense
of Scottishness was clearly located within both a British and a Unionist framework.
The importance of the Union, in creating a strong Scotland and a strong identity was
made clear at several points.

Yet even in regards to the Union there was a significant change from previous
documents. Any sense of ambiguity was gone – there was an acceptance and
projection of a Scottish identity, as there was a British identity, and they were
considered as separate. Yet, while separate and distinct, they remained firmly linked.
The identity being appealed to by the Conservatives in 1992 was Scottish, but at the
same time British. It was the same for the idea of nation – there was recognition of
Scotland as a distinct nation within the UK. In 1992 the manifesto spoke of the
Union as “the best example of nations coming together” and declared that the
“development of a clear Scottish identity has been enhanced by the Union”. Gone
was the idea of the UK as the nation. Not only was a Scottish identity highlighted
and directly appealed to, but it was also employed in a fashion that made it central to
being British. Furthermore, the document employed emotional appeals to this joint
identity; “We do not want to see the Saltire torn out of the Union flag”. Here we
have appeals to a sense of belonging, a sense of history and a sense of identity all
tied together. Not only has a clearly defined Scottish identity become a more open
aspect of Conservative rhetoric, but the dual nature of that identity was also now
projected as a given. Any political ‘us’ was directly linked to a form of identity that
while British was firmly Scottish. While this may have seemed a slight change in
emphasis, it represented a critical shift in how national identity was conceived of and
projected in Conservative manifestos.

Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s the logo employed in Conservative manifestos
remained the same. Indeed, this logo, a representation of a section of the Union flag,
was often the only visual tool employed within individual manifestos. In 1992, apart
from the cover shot of John Major, there were no visual images apart from smaller representations of the logo alongside section headings. This was very similar to the 1983 manifesto, where visual images were limited to one use of the logo on the front cover. However, the 1997 Conservative manifesto *Fighting for Scotland* was significantly different in this, and other, key aspects.

1997 saw the emergence of the modern style manifesto, a glossy booklet, with text being blended into, and supported by, a large tableau of visual images. But the first clear difference that was obviously aimed at creating a new ‘us’, and identity that linked the political and the national, was the change in the Party logo. Gone was the union style logo, it had been replaced with a more distinctive image. The new logo was a blue lion rampant, adjacent to a red bar, and the image symbol contained white aspects. The result was a combination of the colours red, white and blue, with a distinctly Scottish character: the patriotic British colours, combined with a symbol of Scottish history and mythology. Although clearly different, the 1997 logo invoked an obvious connection with Scotland through association with the Lion Rampant, often called Scotland’s other flag. The Lion rampant is the sign of the Scottish Stewart kings, and evident throughout much of Scotland, both historically and contemporarily. A visual connection, undoubtedly Scottish, had replaced the previous logo, which evinced Britishness rather than Scottishness. Now the logo was clearly meant to project and inspire a sense of Scotland and Scottishness. The nation was now firmly at the forefront of the visual aspects of the manifesto.

Two other major differences were also evident before the manifesto began to provide distinct policies. The first was that the foreword consisted of two sections. The opening message of John Major was followed by another foreword from Michael Forsyth. Neither individual was given a specific title – although it was clear one was the leader of the Conservative Party, and the other leader of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. Although a common aspect of other manifestos from Labour and the LDs, this two person foreword was never previously an aspect of Conservative documents. Its incorporation, prior to devolution, indicated that the Conservatives recognised the need to provide for a specifically Scottish voice within their document.
The other significant difference was the clear use of history and the strong use of national identities within the messages. Major employed the 290th anniversary of the Act of Union in his message, and urged support for the Union. Again, his recognition of a clear sense of Scottish identity was somewhat masked by his closing statement, where he spoke of “national unity” even though it was clear he was speaking of the UK. These vestiges of one-nation Conservatism only continued to impede the clear expression of Scotland as nation within the British State. They may well appeal to members of the Conservative Party who place their Britishness before their Scottishness. However, such expressions of ‘us’ are distinctly more political than national, and certainly serve to restrict rather than expand the possible receptive audience.

There was no such confusion in the foreword by Forsyth. He made his position plain, “We [the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party] are the Scottish Party” as he attempted to bind historical, political and national identity together. He employed a sense of history to bolster the party support for the Union, and then he invoked the future. Indeed, he consistently invoked a sense of nationhood and identity: “Or you can choose our future for Scotland. A nation...a nation...a nation...a prosperous nation.” Never had this expression of Scotland as a nation been so clear or strong in the Conservative Scottish manifestos – and never before had the leader of the Scottish Party had a foreword alongside the British leader of the party. The 1997 manifesto presented the clearest example of how the Conservatives had come to firmly embrace, employ and project a strong sense of Scotland and Scottish national identity in their core document.

The focus on Scotland, and the employment of rhetoric to demonstrate a sense of Scottishness was clear throughout the manifesto. While the 1992 manifesto discussed the National Health Service, by 1997 it had become the “Scottish Health Service”. When the 1983 manifesto spoke of Britain’s role in the world, in 1997 the focus was on “Scotland’s Role in Europe and the World”. The sense of Scotland, and the prominence of that sense had become much more evident by 1997. Scotland, as a nation, had by now become part of the general debate. At the same time, there was still the occasional conflation of the UK as a nation and the continual presence
of Britain in the manifesto. The Conservatives had chosen to strongly highlight the Scottish nation and national identity, but they nonetheless remained unionist.

Any sense of Scotland remained firmly tied to a sense of Britishness in the Conservative document. This sense of connection between Britain and Scotland, and Britishness and Scottishness was made apparent in two distinct ways. The first was visual—a new aspect to the manifestos, as noted above. Not only did the logo combine a sense of both the state and national identities, but the photographic images employed within the manifesto also played a role. In one section, images of Edinburgh (incorporating the Scott Monument and Edinburgh Castle) appeared alongside a jet fighter and Nelson’s statue atop the columns in Trafalgar Square, which was itself inset against a Union Flag. These images were clearly meant to appeal to both a sense of Scotland and Britain. The martial history of both was employed to create a connectedness between them, and show that while distinct, they remained tied and strong together.

This same message was also present in the text of the 1997 manifesto. Scotland was strong “through the strength of the UK” and “through the Union has been able to punch far above her weight”. Any appeal to a sense of Scottish identity was firmly linked to a similar appeal of a sense of British identity. It was not claimed that to be Scottish was to automatically be British, rather that by being in Britain, both Scotland and Britain had benefited. While Scotland had prominence among the dialogue, Britain also figured significantly. Ultimately, any discussion led back to the UK, which remained a central totem for the Conservatives. Furthermore, while expressing support for a Scottish identity, the manifesto made its opposition to any political reform leading to devolution (let alone independence or separatism) clear. Although being Scottish was not equated with being British, the argument was that being both was to the mutually beneficial.

By 2001 this adamant opposition to devolution had disappeared from the Conservative manifesto. Indeed in time for common sense for Scotland, the Conservatives declared they were now “committed” to the Scottish Parliament, and
remained steadfast in their support for the Union\(^{10}\). Moreover, other aspects of the document were different in key respects to the 1997 production. Again, there were two forewords, although this time they contained three individuals. A second statement followed the introduction from the Party leader, William Hague. This statement was from Malcolm Rifkind and David McLetchie and reflected the new constitutional arrangements which had provided the Conservatives in Scotland with both a parliamentary and non-parliamentary leader\(^{11}\).

There was also a significant use of images within the 2001 manifesto which had fewer identity related visual statements that its predecessor. The logo of the party remained the same, although the colour scheme had been transformed. The lion was now white, the bar remained red, and throughout the document it appeared against a blue background. Consequently, the red, white and blue theme remained, although in an altered form. In contrast to the previous manifesto the photographic images employed in 2001 did not make implied or direct appeals to any sense of Scottishness. Indeed, most did not invoke any sense of Scotland or Scottish identity at all. The image of pensioners talking to the party leader, William Hague, included a woman with a tartan scarf, and the image of schoolchildren, upon close inspection, indicated it was taken at a primary school in Dunblane. However, these were marginal aspects at most. Where identity was invoked (although this was rare) it was through such images as the Union Flag, Big Ben and therefore appealed to a British rather than Scottish sense of identity. Indeed, the visual images were very general and invoked a sense of community rather than a sense of identity. A family, pensioners, policemen, a doctor’s office; these images were not aimed at a national target.

The focus on Scotland, so clear in the comments by Major in 1997, did not enter into the address by the Conservative leader. Hague did not mention Scotland at all. He did discuss “who we are as a nation” and “our country” but it was clearly Britain he was speaking of, not Scotland. Similar issues arose within the other, joint,

\(^{10}\)Whatever the declared support for devolution, vestiges of opposition remained, as analysis in the previous chapter made clear.

\(^{11}\)All the parties struggled with the issue of having politicians (MSPs) not involved in the election, but nonetheless representatives of the Scottish party.
introduction. Here the leaders of the Scottish Conservatives\textsuperscript{12} stated that the UK had an identity “as a sovereign, independent nation”. Scotland was, of course, mentioned—but not as a nation within the UK. Again, as in the case of the Labour manifesto analysed above, a post-devolution shift towards the unionism inherent within the Conservative message had taken place.

The overall content of the manifesto displayed similar tendencies. While the term “Scottish Conservatives” was employed regularly, the words Scotland, or Scots, were far less prevalent than in the 1997 document. Universities were identified as “Britain’s universities” and whole sections of text went by without any mention of Scotland or distinct Scottish institutions. Only when used in conjunction with Conservatives was the term Scottish employed. When a sense of place was invoked it was Britain or the UK, with Scotland occasionally mentioned as part of that. Similarly, the NHS as a term was again employed rather than it being the Scottish health service. Any mention of Scotland was minimal, with Britain again becoming the entity to which a sense of purpose and action was attached. It was only in the discussion on urban and rural issues that Scotland as a term cropped up more than occasionally. Even then the usage of Scotland as an identifier remained very limited. Any appeal to a sense of Scottish identity had been almost completely abandoned, as any sense of Scotland within the document was minimal at best. It had become much more like the Conservative documents of the 1980s than its immediate precursor. Scotland may have appeared in the title, but it was overall absent from the document. In the immediate aftermath of the devolution settlement, the Conservative Party had clearly swung back towards their Unionist roots.

This pattern of an absence of Scotland and a sense of Scottish identity had changed yet again by 2005. In \textit{Are you thinking what we’re thinking? It’s time for action} an interesting reversal in 2005 occurred in the forewords of the document. Again there was a double introduction, this by David McLetchie MSP, and Peter Duncan (the sole elected Conservative MP from Scotland in the previous parliament). This came before that of the Conservative Party leader Michael Howard. Furthermore, Scotland was clearly presented as “our country” and they also spoke of “our identity” when

\textsuperscript{12} Notably, the party identified itself as the Scottish Conservative Party throughout the 2001 manifesto.
discussing the people of Scotland. The manifesto was declared as “Our contract with the people of Scotland”. Equally, although the foreword by Howard was entitled “The British Dream”, Scotland was mentioned in the first two sentences, almost as many times as Britain was mentioned in the whole statement.

Nonetheless, the overall document again started with a strong emphasis on Britain and a lack of focus on Scotland and specifically Scottish issues. There were references to specific policies for Scotland, but little appeal to a sense of history, identity or other aspects of Scottishness. Britain appeared more often than Scotland as a term to signify place and home. Assertions such as “British national interest” indicated a return to the conflation of the UK as a nation. Alongside this was the change in the visual representations of identity. The lion logo had gone, and had not been replaced with any other distinctive party symbol. The photographs within the manifesto were significantly reduced from previous years in both number and presence. Furthermore, incorporated into the document as they were, none offered any specific sense of Scotland, they could represent in any part of the UK. Indeed, the only specific assertion to a sense of Scottish history or identity was the policy to retain distinct army regiments from Scotland. Taken as a whole the document provides a limited sense of Scotland and Scottish identity. While Scotland remained an underlying theme, it was minimal at this point in time. Like the Labour Party manifesto of the same election, the Conservatives had returned to a previous pattern of rhetoric and style in regards to the presence of the nation and the conception of national identity within their manifesto.

4. Conclusions on Conservatives

It is clear that the Conservative manifestos provide a changing pattern over the past thirty-five years. This change was not only apparent in terms of the shift in attitudes towards devolution, but also in the manner in which Scottish national identity was employed within the documents. From a position that, while focusing on Scotland, provided little sense of a Scottish ‘us’, the documents shifted towards an even more British oriented stance. Even the references to, and focus on, Scotland becoming more limited. Indeed, by the 1980s, the differences between the British and Scottish manifestos were minimal. There were no appeals to a sense of Scottish national
identity, and any attempt to create a sense of ‘us’ beyond the political aimed at a British ‘us’ rather than a Scottish.

This pattern underwent a significant change during the 1990s. The 1990 elections produced manifesto that employed a strong sense of Scottishness and history. Specific discussion of Scotland was a regular aspect of the manifestos at that time. The party logo changed from one invoking a sense of Britishness to one that invokes a sense of Scottishness. While many could consider this issue minor, the logo provided a clear link across variety of media and this issue must not be disregarded as unimportant. This work argues that such a representation of party identity must be considered as a central cohesive element for the party image and message. The creation of a logo that so clearly invokes a sense of Scotland (perhaps even more so than any ideological or political identity) is a clear attempt by the Conservatives to emphasise the Scottish aspect of their identity. By employing such a logo the Conservatives were clearly attempting to create an ‘us’ that reached beyond the political into the national and provided a firm link between the two. While under political attack due to their alleged ‘anti-Scottish’ attitudes the party was clearly attempting to project a sense of Scottish identity within their overall political message.

Yet, despite such strong moves towards a sense of Scotland and a strong sense of Scottish identity within their manifestos at that time, the post 1997 manifestos have shown a shift back towards the previous pattern. In more recent times the manifestos have shown Scotland receiving less emphasis, while a sense of Britain has become more pronounced. In many ways, the focus has gone through a cycle to return to a position reminiscent of the early 1970s. Furthermore, the lack of any logo, removing one that so strongly emphasised a sense of Scotland and invoked Scottish identity, is a telling shift in emphasis, or rather a lack of emphasis. Any sense of ‘us’ being created by the Conservatives is very much a political one that links to a British sense of identity rather than a Scottish national identity.

5. Comparative Conclusions
There are both clear differences and similarities between Labour and the Conservatives when it comes to a consideration of how they have employed national
identity within their manifestos. Both parties have clearly attempted to link Scotland, and a sense of Scottish identity, to the UK and a wider sense of being British. While the parties seek to create different political identities in order to attract voters to their policies, both have done so through a distinctly British lens. In addition, both parties have followed roughly the same trajectory in this regard.

During the 1970s both parties focused strongly on Britain and a British identity. Both seemed unwilling to deal with the idea of Scotland, and certainly unwilling to address Scotland separately. This pattern only began to change during the late 1980s in the case of Labour and the 1990s for the Conservatives. It was at this point in time that the parties diverged on their emphasis. Nonetheless, both continued to emphasise the links between Scotland and the UK, and also between Scottish and British identities.

However, during the 1990s Labour become more willing to deal with the idea of Scotland as nation and obviously embraced the policy of devolution. They also began to openly employ a sense of national identity within their manifestos and attempt to clearly create links between a political and a national sense of ‘us’ in their quest for votes. During the same period, the Conservatives also began to employ a firm and clear sense of Scottish identity as part of their political message. In many ways, the Conservative Party has been more willing to deal with the existence of a distinct Scottish identity, and the idea of Scotland as nation. However, unlike Labour, they employed a sense of Scotland and a strong sense of national identity in an attempt to oppose devolution. This seemingly paradoxical approach did not work, and with the advent of devolution the message within Conservative manifestos produced for British elections has reverted to an earlier pattern.

Labour were successful in bringing about devolution, and in maintaining their position as the primary party in Scottish politics (although their share of the vote has declined since 1997). Yet, they too have reduced their use of Scottish national identity and national imagery within their British General Election manifestos. Both parties have thus reversed their paths, choosing to focus on a strong sense of Britishness and provide a sense of ‘us’ that links their political message firmly to a wider stage than Scotland. It seems to be the case that the parties have removed Scotland from their manifestos, which while Scottish, are produced for the British
(Westminster) campaign. The parties see the UK General Elections as being British, and thus choose to emphasize Britain rather than Scotland in those campaigns.

However, while Labour has maintained its primary electoral position within Scotland, the Conservatives remain in fourth place. Furthermore, as the electoral results from 2005 indicate, the challenge to Labour’s electoral dominance in Scotland does not, as perhaps in the wider UK, come from the Conservatives. The SNP and the LDs remain significant parties within Scotland and their presence at both Holyrood and Westminster indicate no change in this aspect. The threat from the SNP is perhaps more muted. Although their share of the vote has dropped by just over four percent they have done well in terms of MPs elected. However, during the same period the LDs have increased their share by almost ten percent and gained 22.6% of the votes cast in 2005. Whatever the individual party fortunes, Scotland remains a system with four major parties in play. The next chapter will therefore consider the manifestos of the LDs and the SNP.
Chapter Six
Liberal Democrat And Scottish National Party Manifestos

The LDs and the SNP represent the lesser parties in British politics. The SNP has only been represented in the UK parliament on a regular basis since the late 1960s. Their electoral presence prior to that period was insignificant. The LDs, having evolved from the Liberal Party, have a much longer history. Having formed several governments during the 19th and early 20th Century the party suffered a major split and lost its place as the second party of British politics to Labour during the interwar years of the 20th Century. Only recently have they re-emerged as an electoral and political force within the UK, and more specifically in Scotland. The advent of devolution has had a significant impact on the status and operations of both parties. Since 1999 the LDs have been formal coalition partners with Labour in the Scottish Executive. The SNP have become the largest opposition party at Holyrood. The creation of a distinct political arena in which the parties can expect a formal role in government or opposition can only serve to influence both behaviour and rhetoric in their manifestos for Westminster.

Both parties have followed a similar political trajectory since the early 1970s. While the Labour Party has maintained a strong electoral position, both the LDs and the SNP have often traded places in terms of electoral share. Both have gained votes and parliamentary seats during the last thirty-five years. However, the SNP and the LDs achieved mixed success in Westminster elections during this period. While the SNP had significant success in the early 1970s, they have never managed to repeat the success of October 1974. This election saw the highest vote share or number of MPs the party has had to date. Election results from the 1980s saw the SNP occupying fourth place in terms of vote share. Furthermore, they finished behind the Conservative Party in 1992, and in 2005 they were third, seeing their share of the vote drop to within two percent of the fourth placed Conservatives. Despite often gaining more votes than the Conservatives or the LDs they have failed to capture similar numbers of seats as Table One in Chapter Three illustrates.

The LDs also provide a mixed and somewhat confusing representation of their presence in Scottish politics. Since 1974 they have usually finished fourth in terms
of vote share. Although the last two elections saw the LDs better their position to third and second respectively. The 2005 election saw them finish strongly with over 22% of the vote and 11 MPs. Since 1979 the LDs have succeeded in electing more MPs than the SNP, even while gaining a lower share of the vote throughout Scotland as a whole. Since devolution they have established themselves as the second party within Scotland in terms of Westminster elections.

Therefore, both parties have published manifestos during periods that have seen them emerge from the electoral shadows and attempt to establish, or re-establish, themselves as a significant force within Scottish politics. Plus, both parties have consistently supported the establishment of a legislature for Scotland during the 20th Century. Therefore, a strong policy focus on such issues as devolution or constitutional change can be expected, as well as a strong sense of nation or national identity in their rhetoric and political discussion.

1. Liberals/Alliance/LDs Manifestos

The Scottish Liberal manifesto from 1979\footnote{This is the first Liberal manifesto from the 1970s available for analysis. Attempts to locate the documents from the 1970 and 1974 elections, among both public and private archives, have so far been unsuccessful.} was, of course, a production of the Scottish Liberal Party and the foreword consisted of two messages, the first from David Steel, leader of the Liberal Party, and the second from Russell Johnston, leader of the Scottish Liberal Party. Both were MPs from Scottish seats, yet Scotland was not directly referred to by Steel. In addition, the message from Johnston focused heavily on issues arising from a parliamentary by-election success in England. Any direct focus on Scotland was noticeable by its almost complete absence.

The Scottish Liberal manifesto grappled with problems similar to that of the Conservative and Labour parties. It opened by asking if Britain is a successful or well governed nation. The clear statement is that Britain is a nation; there was no mention of Scotland as such. This document was not, like the Conservative or Labour versions of the time, modelled on the British version; it was a distinctly separate creation from Scotland. The Scottish Liberal Party had formally separated
from the Liberal Party in 1949\textsuperscript{2} (Kavanagh 1983). Yet, the “national way of life” to which it so often referred, and the “national interest” were clear references to Britain. This must serve to create confusion among any readers. This thesis has consistently noted that Scotland is recognised as a distinct entity, with most people within Scotland recognising it as a nation. The Scottish Liberals existed as a distinct entity, and this document was theirs, but it did not employ a strong sense of national identity to underpin its message. Even when the focus was strongly on issues of Home Rule for Scotland, the discussion remained strictly policy orientated with no emotional appeals. This is a reflection of the nature of the Liberal Party during this period, which Brack considered one of “policy enthusiasts pure and simple” (2000, p17). Whatever their policy preference, the Liberals were not employing any sense of national identity let alone nationalist rhetoric at this point.

The document was very policy focused, with little extraneous language. The whole document was quite bland in that respect. In much the same manner as other manifestos of the period, there was little beyond the text. Apart from a logo on the front page (which included a St Andrews Cross) there were no illustrations or other visual support items within the document. While Scotland did have a textual presence within the document it was very much a British affair – all the policies and discussions focus around Britain. It was only when discussing specifically Scottish areas of concern (fishing, the education system and so on) that Scotland was mentioned without reference to Britain. Yet even there the language remained un-emotive. While there were reflections on the nature of Scotland in some areas they remained very few. Under the discussion on arts and leisure the manifesto stated Scotland “had its own individual identity” but such comments were isolated. The Liberal Party sought to create a sense of ‘us’ that did not reach beyond the political in any way.

The manifesto obviously underwent change by 1983 due to the emergence of the Social Democratic Party. The two parties, as the Alliance, campaigned under a single manifesto in both the UK and Scotland. In many ways, the Scottish manifesto,

\textsuperscript{2} The LDs are formed along federal lines, in keeping with their policy of creating a federal structure of the UK. Such a structure represents the democratic nature of the policy rather than any nationalist goal.
\textit{Working Together for Scotland} was very similar to the British version. Like the Conservative document of the same election, there were numerous similarities. Unlike the Conservative document however, there were also significant differences. It is clear that the British document was used as a blueprint for the Scottish version. However the Scottish version did not follow the document word for word (apart from a few sections) but did focus more strongly on Scotland. This was a movement away from the style and focus of the previous manifesto and reflected the Alliance influence.

The introduction to the document was word for word the same as the British manifesto. While the British manifesto introduction was individually credited to the leaders of the Liberal Party and the SDP, this was not the case in the Scottish manifesto. There was no signature, no credit, it simply read like an introductory section\(^3\). There was no foreword from the Scottish Liberals or any member of the SDP – this sets it apart from other manifestos before and since. This lack of individual presence is somewhat surprising, as is the lack of credit to the leaders of the British parties. Not only was a national ‘us’ missing, but also the political ‘us’ sought to be as inclusive as possible. The Alliance was clearly attempting to challenge political loyalties. At the same time the lack of credit to the leaders indicated an unwillingness to employ British boundaries within the debate, or at least to introduce them at that point.

Again as in the earlier manifesto, there was a minimal use of direct rhetorical appeals to a sense of Scottishness, but the overall presence and the idea of Scotland was in much greater attendance throughout the document. Where policies aimed at the whole UK were discussed, Scotland was considered alongside, but individually: “this scheme will give jobs to 250,000... 25,000 of them in Scotland” and “Unemployment in Britain has increased... In Scotland, as always, the position is even worse”. This focus on Scotland, as part of the UK, but yet distinct, was a key aspect of this document and one that set it apart from the 1979 document. The obvious avoidance of a British dimension was deliberate. The ‘us’ being appealed to in 1983 was clearly Scottish, or at the very least not British.

\(^3\) This brought the manifesto into conflict with the quantitative analysis in Chapter Three as forewords by party leaders are not coded, but this section was not presented as such and thus was coded.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that a sense of nationalism or appeals to a Scottish identity were tempered by an overall view. In the section entitled *Home Rule for Scotland* the need for such actions in Wales and “the English regions” was also stressed. Even the discussion of, and support for, a nationalist policy such as this did not produce any nationalist or identity based rhetorical appeals. Nor were there any such appeals to a sense of Britishness either. Any direct appeals to a sense of identity were absent. What was present were appeals to “citizens” and a sense of community - although this could be any community or society.

In terms of visual presentation the document was very similar to the 1979 manifesto. Apart from a new logo (a diamond shape surrounding the party names) there were no other images or photographs within the manifesto. It remained a somewhat bland document, even by the standards of the time. This could well be due to the limited resources available to the Alliance at this time. It has also been noted that the 1983 manifesto at the British level was a somewhat rushed document (Brack 2000) and as the Scottish manifesto was obviously designed around that, the preparation time available must have been even less.

The overall presentation of the 1987 Alliance manifesto, *The time has come ... ... for Scotland* did have a much more professional overall format and signalled the start of a trend in that regards. The logo remained the same, with a slightly altered, more minimalist appearance. Right away a significant difference from 1983 was clear. Charles Kennedy and Russell Johnston, the Scottish leaders of the SDP and the Liberals, jointly signed the introduction. It opened with the following: “This is the Scottish Manifesto of the Alliance. It deals with our policies for Scotland and the changes we want to see made here.” The whole introduction strongly focused on Scotland – it called on “Scots” who wanted change, and sought the chance to “Build a Scotland we can be proud of”. This strong focus on Scotland was a distinctive tone throughout the whole manifesto and represented a clear change. While Scotland had been present throughout the 1983 discussion, it was presented alongside the policies

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4 This thesis does not equate nationalist appeals and appeals to a sense of national identity. One can do the latter without having any nationalist intent.

5 Another interesting aspect that set this manifesto apart was that the Alliance was complimentary about some actions of the previous government in places – a somewhat singular political attitude.
aimed at the whole UK. Additional discussion was given to Scotland that set it apart in the document. Although the 1987 manifesto was similar in many ways there had been a subtle shift that put the balance more towards Scotland and away from the overall UK.

This is not to say that the manifesto produced wide nationalistic rhetoric, or made direct appeals to a sense of identity and Scottishness – it did not. This was still a document aimed very strongly at policy with very limited appeals beyond this. The appeals to a sense of community were both broad and inclusive and could be applied to any territory or people by substituting another word instead of Scotland.

However, the document was very different from its British counterpart in both organisation and content⁶, and the use of Scotland as an identifier was strong. Thus Scotland was presented as the arena. Yet employment of any sense of national identity was limited to that. The sense of ‘us’ created remained firmly political, but with an added dimension of Scottishness that relied on Scotland the territory rather than Scotland the nation.

By 1997, the party name, logo and layout had all changed; *Make the Difference*, the Scottish LD Manifesto had become much more like the magazine style presentations put forward by the other parties. It employed a less book-like style in how the material was offered, and had several photographs scattered throughout. A new logo inspired no sense of national identity. It had become the vague, birdlike style that the party continues to employ today. Visually key issues were highlighted within the document. Each photograph was accompanied by a question focusing on a specific policy area. None of the images sought to play on national or individual identity issues though. The only possible item that could was the photo that accompanied the devolution issue – an image of the Carlton Hill location in Edinburgh⁷ – which had been touted as a possible site for a future Scottish Parliament.

The foreword was a singular effort by the leader of the Scottish LDs, Jim Wallace. Interestingly, the LD leader, Paddy Ashdown had an afterword in the document,

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⁶ Although it is noted there are some small sections from both manifestos (on the Arts for example) that are word for word.

⁷ Which is almost exactly what the Labour Manifesto did in 1992.
another distinct aspect among party manifestos. The focus on Scotland was particularly strong in 1997 though, especially within the introduction by Wallace. There was no mention of UK; his appeals for support were to Scotland and the Scottish people. His introduction set the tone for the rest of the document in many respects. Although there were mentions of the UK, they tended to be located after Scotland. When the terms nation and country were used they were being applied to Scotland. Britain and “the British people” were employed to differentiate subjects and discussions set on the wider stage, such as EU and world issues. The rhetoric had clearly continued to provide a more distinct form of national identity, and 1997 represented the furtherance of the trend noted.

Throughout the whole 1997 manifesto Scotland was a constant word, and a constant focus. The focus on community had also changed – it was now specifically Scotland or “Scotland’s communities” that were discussed. When the community was Britain rather than Scotland this was made clear. There was still a distinct lack of any emotive rhetorical appeals to a sense of Scottishness. Historical or mythical foundations were not employed to support the party policy of devolution and federalism for all the UK. The manifesto remained a document with a national focus, and included goals that could be supported by the nationalist movement, but employed little to no nationalist language or identity based rhetoric. The sense of ‘us’ created in 1997 was definitely Scottish, but still with a strong focus on Scotland the place, rather than Scotland as a people. The linking to the political ‘us’ was made through territory and location and not any sense of history or group identity.

The 2001 document returned to a somewhat traditional pattern of presentation for Scottish manifestos, with a double introduction. There was a foreword by the leader of the LD Party, Charles Kennedy, followed by another from the President of the Scottish LDs, Malcolm Bruce. The presentation was very much a magazine style format, with emboldened headers and bullet points with key policy promises. Again, there was little in the way of visual material. Most photos were of MPs holding front bench positions, giving leading quotes on party policies. Again, as in 1997, only one image invoked a sense of nation or national identity, albeit this one was much more specific. This was the picture supporting the Scottish LD actions in Scotland, and
shows a Saltire flying above a skyline. While it was certainly not an emotive appeal, it did clearly link the political and the national.

Again, Scotland was a constant throughout the 2001 manifesto, although Britain and the UK were also widely employed as identifiers. There was a clear shift back towards a more balanced use of the two. Even though Scotland and the Scottish focus were strong, often due to much of the discussion bringing in the Scottish Parliament, much was made of Scotland being a part of Britain. Furthermore, the focus on UK was a constant theme of most policies.

If the sense of Scotland was becoming more apparent during the late 1980s and 1990s but somewhat less in 2001, then the 2005 document represented a continuing shift in that pattern back towards the 1979 level. The REAL alternative shared both the name of the British manifesto and much of its content. The visual presentation of the manifesto had a style different from that of a glossy magazine, with columns and photographs structured more in the fashion of a newspaper. Most of the photographs were of the party leader, or MPs or leading public supporters. Photos outside of these categories were the ‘action’ shots helping illustrate specific policy areas.

In terms of content, the manifesto was very much the same as entire sections of the British version. Indeed, the front cover was exactly the same with only slight changes to provide a more Scottish focus. There was a foreword by Charles Kennedy as leader of the LDs, but no other sections by members of the Scottish LDs. Overall, the whole document was not aimed specifically at Scotland and differed little from the corresponding issue for England. The changes were mostly (with slight exceptions) cosmetic but the focus was unabashedly British. Thus, within the document itself the mention of Scotland was slight. There were certainly no appeals to any sense of Scottish identity. The ‘us’ that the LDs presented was very much a policy and political one, rather than a national ‘us’. Even previous connections made to Scotland the place rather than Scotland as a group identity were now almost totally absent.

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The LDs made it clear it was issuing manifestos for Westminster, but within each nation of the UK.
This distinct lack of specifically Scottish issues reflected the changes that the LDs had incorporated into their manifesto in light of the constitutional settlement of 1999 and represented a clear return to an earlier pattern. With the creation of a Scottish Parliament, and the ‘removal’ of many issues effecting Scotland from Westminster, the LDs had chosen to focus strictly on the British issues within British elections. As their manifesto in 2005 made clear: “A separate Scottish supplement to this manifesto details how LDs in government in Scotland would use the additional resources that a LD Government at Westminster would deliver for Scotland.” Yet this document was not easily accessible and does not relate to the Westminster elections, nor focus on acquiring votes for that. Thus, the LDs had firmly separated the national and the political. By removing any consideration of national politics from within their manifestos and choosing to focus on the British dimension the LDs have chosen to dismiss any overt appeals to identity. The political arena was still Scotland, but the chosen focus was very much Britain. This reflects a similar trend to that of the other British parties. Later editions will show whether this trend will continue. The electoral results in 2005, within Scotland, provide little negative feedback on such an approach.

2. Conclusions on LDs

The creation of a Scottish ‘us’ has never been a major factor in Liberal and LD manifestos. While a sense of identity had been minimal throughout most of the period in question, the sense of Scotland was also lacking in the late 1970s. At this point the Liberals did not attempt to create any sense of Scotland as either a place or people and their manifestos were very policy focused, with little attempt to create a wider sense of national identity within Scotland. This pattern began to change as Scotland become an increasing presence within the manifesto text during the 1990s. However, this change was limited in two ways; first, as a form of identification and second as a pattern. The LDs have never focused on creating a sense of national identity within their Scottish manifestos that links to individuals without a clear and connected sense of policy. The sense of Scotland as a place has also been limited, but much more present. The LDs have rarely employed any direct appeals to a sense of history, a sense of national identity, or any other aspect of Scottishness.
This conclusion is even more interesting when one considers that the LDs have been the one party always organised along both British and Scottish lines. They were the only party to have clearly delineated national characteristics within their party structure and the only party continually committed to devolution during the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. Yet, they have also been the party that has least employed a sense of national identity among their manifestos. Any sense of an ‘us’ that stretched beyond the political to the national was limited. Any such connections tended to link the political and the national by focusing in Scotland as a territorial unit – Scotland the place. At the same time LD manifestos have frequently been the least focused on Scotland. As rhetorical and purposive vehicles, the LD manifestos have certainly not operated with a framework employing a sense of national identity.

3. \textbf{Scottish National Party Manifestos}

As the only political party that operates solely within Scotland, the SNP does not face the same challenges as the other major parties. The lack of a need to balance policy statements aimed toward the Scottish electorate with that of wider electorate within the UK is a key point. The SNP organises solely within Scottish constituencies and thus has little need to address issues affecting other areas of the UK that do not impinge upon Scotland. As a party that is organised along nationalist lines any analysis will expect to find a greater emphasis on Scotland. Indeed, any considerations on the UK would tend to be negative, as the core of SNP policy is to remove Scotland from the Union and establish a nation-state along Gellnerian lines of contiguous territorial and state boundaries. As a party that operates with this national framework in mind, one would expect SNP manifestos to focus not only on Scotland, but upon the people of Scotland; thus employing identity at a wider level than any of the other parties involved in the Scottish political arena. In fact, this is the very position clearly evident in the SNP manifesto of 1970.

The document was unmistakably a product of its time. Apart from a simple logo (the ribbon style still employed by the SNP today, and thus perhaps the oldest political logo of the mainstream parties still in use in Scotland\textsuperscript{9}) there were no visual images or photographs involved in the document. This slim pocketbook style manifesto

\textsuperscript{9} In interviews with elected elites it was reported by more than one SNP member that the logo is referred to as ‘Clootie’ as it resembles a clootie dumpling.
opened with the nucleus of the SNP policy platform, by focusing on the issue of independence. In doing so it immediately invoked positive images of a nation that is independent and negative images where the nation is a "province" or an "unimportant and underprivileged region" of the UK. However, such calls were clearly invoked with a forward-looking emphasis. There was very little sense of historical imagery involved. Scotland was identified as "one of the oldest nations of Europe" but all calls for independence and invocations to the Scottish people were done with the future in mind. Scotland is, of course, the central theme that runs through the manifesto, yet there was a distinct lack of focus on a particularly Scottish identity. The 'us' was Scotland, and a political 'us' that focuses on Scotland being independent. There was no attempt to define that 'us' in purely national terms.

While there were many calls to the people, these calls are quite general in nature. The sense of Scotland presented was quite vague.

What is striking about the 1970 manifesto was the lack of a foreword by the party leader or chair. While the Party did have an MP at the time, they did not choose that individual to provide a foreword either. Likewise in 1974, the SNP did not have a foreword in their manifesto. A preface, introducing the core argument of the manifesto, made no attempt to invoke a sense of identity, but instead focused very strongly on a social justice perspective. However, the manifesto plainly stated that it "assumes that the reader takes for granted the existence of the nation of Scotland" and argues that the majority in Scotland do indeed see Scotland as a nation. This sense of Scotland was a constant aspect of the manifesto, which was again, as in 1970, structured around what a future, independent Scotland, should focus on. With a few exceptions, the document focused very heavily on policy, as one would expect, and made few appeals that invoked any sense of Scottish identity – which, taking into account the introductory section, may simply be taken as a given. Nonetheless, some appeals, or borders that served to delineate a sense of identity were present.

The 1974 SNP manifesto was very different in various ways from those issued by other parties during the 1970s, and somewhat different from its immediate predecessor. Each section was headed by illustrations, rather than photographs, to

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10 The manifesto is entitled Scotland's Future and declares itself "An introduction to a practical programme of social justice for the people of Scotland".
symbolize the material included. Yet none of these visual images attempted to employ a sense of 'us', nor did they invoke a sense of Scotland. Also, the manifesto included two tables, showing the voting share and the seats won by the SNP during the period 1929 to 1974. The SNP were emphasising their significant advance as a political party and hoped to overcome any perception of a vote for them as 'wasted' in any sense. These tables indicated a party seeking to encourage what they considered a latent body of support, rather than attempting to draw on an already existing level. The 'us' to which the SNP appealed in 1974 where not individuals who had necessarily supported the party in the past. This appeal had a strong political aspect of course with the social justice focus, so prevalent throughout, providing that. However the sense of Scotland is also important. The SNP did not employ a strong sense of identity, but the significant rhetorical presence of Scotland within the text sought to serve the same purpose. There was a creation of an ‘us’ that encompassed and clearly focuses on a national dimension.

Perhaps most interesting, in regards to a sense of national identity, was the outline of "National Rights and Liberties" included in the document. This focus on human rights clearly set it apart from the other parties, as the SNP aimed to establish what form a future Scotland might take. Interestingly, Gaelic language rights (equal to English) and access to "the hills and mountains" figured prominently. What we have is the inclusion in this list of two key aspects often used when defining what is a nation; language and territory. At the same time, the list focused on the rights of each individual "Scottish citizen" and yet at no time did the SNP seek to establish what made a person a citizen. Rather than provide an inclusive definition of identity, there were sections of the manifesto that did the opposite. In one, the SNP decried the crowding out of Scottish students from Scottish universities and declared that "Scots welcome students from all lands but it is not their responsibility to accommodate a highly disproportionate number of English students". In the same section the manifesto condemned the "process of Anglicisation" that was taking place in education and argued that "Scots children" must engage with "their own traditions and of the wider heritage they share". While the sense of ‘us’ was ill defined, the ‘them’ was slightly more obvious. Such examples paint the English as the other, in both historical and culture terms.
By the 1983 election, several differences were evident in the structure and nature of the SNP manifesto. The illustrations were gone and the introduction was a foreword from the Chairman, who was also an MP. This was the first personal introduction in an SNP manifesto, and the first from an elected MP. Moreover, the conclusion (discussed below) was attributed to the President of the SNP, again also an MP. The inclusion of these statements provided further status, as the SNP could stress their presence in Westminster. Furthermore, while the first section again focused on the nucleus of SNP policy, independence for Scotland, the constitutional framework was a significant addition:

The right to Scottish citizenship for all those resident in Scotland upon independence, or born (or with a parent born) in Scotland, and to such others as the Scottish Parliament may decide (SNP 1983, p3)

This was both a clear statement on who was eligible to be a Scottish citizen, and was quite inclusive in defining that eligibility. There were no attempts to exclude individuals due to a lack of birthright, as residence alone would suffice. The inclusion of Scots and those of immediate Scots descent outside Scotland at the time of independence was also made clear. It would be difficult to label the SNP as exclusionary in light of this statement. The SNP created a sense of ‘us’ that, while politically polarising, was not so in terms of identity.

There was a considerable presence in many areas of the 1983 document that were more polarising when it comes to national identity. The manifesto had a section entitled “Safeguarding Scotland’s Identity” which clearly focused on the common heritage, culture and “way of life and thought and expression which are unique to Scotland”. Moreover, the SNP echoed the complaints of 1974 in regard to emphasis on “English history and culture” in education. Several negative observations such as this were made throughout. This is not a political but a national ‘us’ that the party created. Furthermore, while it was quite broad, the ‘them’ is much more specific. Once more, the English were the other, and boundaries for a sense of national

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11 The only photograph was one on the back cover, showing children (“The Independence Generation”), and thus continuing a popular motif in all manifests.
identity were clearly provided within the manifesto. There were several comments throughout the policy discussion that served to enforce the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that was not political but national. The right of “non-residents” to own land would be restricted, as would takeovers from “foreign” entities. While the inclusive characteristic of identity, as envisaged by the SNP, were made plain, there were several aspects that stressed the importance of being Scottish as a distinct national identity that required defending.

Obviously, the manifesto stressed, in several places the status of Scotland as “a nation” often employing terms such as “historic” or “distinctive” to further emphasise that status. Also, the SNP utilized negative terms to emphasise the status of Scotland as “a provincial backwater of England”. Perhaps most illuminating of all was the penultimate and final pages of the manifesto. It was stated that “Scotland does well when the SNP does well” and that the presence of the SNP in the political arena required the other parties to focus on Scotland. The final page, written by the President of the SNP, Donald Stewart, quoted the introductory section from the American Declaration of Independence. Stewart focused not only on the need for independence, but also on the “fairer and more co-operative relationship with our neighbours in these islands”. Thus the SNP closed by stressing the future, and the positive aspects of that future. This remained a motif in the SNP manifestos throughout. As indicated in Chapter Three, 1983 was a year when the SNP provided a much greater emphasis on the historical aspect of Scotland. History was employed in a greater and more regular fashion than it had before. The 1983 manifesto, with its strong use of history, but its strong focus on the future presents an excellent example of future-history. However, this pattern was to change, as the following manifesto would demonstrate.

*Play The Scottish Card*, the 1987 SNP manifesto, contained themes which were, again, a forward-looking focus on Scotland as an independent nation-state. Many of the statements made in preceding manifestos were again stated. The statement concerning citizenship was reproduced word for word from the 1983 manifesto. Likewise, the policy of restricting non-Scottish ownership of land was also included. On the other hand, there were few complaints about Anglicisation, or English focused education within the text. This aspect of the rhetoric, this construction of the
English as the other had been downplayed at this point, and this was the start of a trend that would continue to remove such negative aspects of identity formation. While there was a strong accent on the need to increase support for such things as Gaelic and the "teaching of Scottish history and culture" there were no negative statements in these areas.

There were several negative statements that served to provide identity boundaries throughout the manifesto. General attacks on how the "British system has failed Scotland" were regular themes in SNP manifestos and were present here. In 1987 we witness the start of direct political and national attacks on the Conservative Party. Past political attacks had generally been directed towards Labour\(^\text{12}\) with little mention of the other parties. The Conservatives were directly challenged for their "stated hostility", presumably as a nation, and their "record in Scotland". These direct attacks were in addition to the leftward shift of policy emphasis within the document (as shown in Chapter Three). They therefore indicated a realignment of the framing of the political 'us' as the SNP political rhetoric was modified towards the left of centre position. Such rhetoric also indicated a change in the framing of identity. Although the attacks on the English and Anglicisation were far less prominent, attacks on the Conservatives as anti-Scottish had begun. Despite changes in both content and focus, the 'us' continued to be framed in both political and national terms.

The national 'us', the strong emphasis on Scotland as a distinct nation, with a strong history, culture and identity remained a key aspect of the manifesto. There had been a clear reduction in the use of historical appeals and the use of future history had declined. The emphasis on tomorrow and the structuring of policy to provide for "a strong Scottish future" was the strongest facet of all. The sense of Scotland given was one with opportunities for tomorrow, building on a past, but a past that was only rarely invoked. Equally, the identity aspects of the manifesto were based on a limited employment of history. Images of a historically based "Scottish character and approach" were made, but the promise and focus within that identity were portrayed through tomorrow. It was to the future that the SNP looked when they

\(^{12}\) Although such attacks remain part of the 1987 SNP manifesto too.
invoke a sense of national identity, even when employing yesterday to do so. If anything such changes were only to be reinforced during the 1990s.

The 1992 manifesto had, like those of the other major parties, begun to resemble the more modern manifests in that it was presented in a glossy magazine style cover. However, visual images within the document remained limited to just two photographs. The first was of Alex Salmond MP, Convenor of the SNP. His introduction continued the emphasis of Scotland as “a backwater of Britain” and focused strongly on the future. The other photograph, at the rear of the manifesto, was an image that accompanies a personal message from Sean Connery. This use of celebrity remains singular in party manifests. No other parties have employed such messages directly within their core election document. Yet such a use of a prominent Scottish personality was important. While remaining limited in terms of well-known political figures, the SNP had chosen to draw on a figure that represented a strong sense of Scotland and Scottishness worldwide.

One clear change in the 1992 manifesto was the alteration of the logo. The traditional SNP logo had taken on a more angular fashion. Yet the overall use of the logo remained limited. It appeared in the front page of the manifesto, and the only major use was the full-page logo that appeared opposite the message from Sean Connery. This alteration did not go down well with grass roots members of the party; “this small change provoked a bit of an outcry [and] the addition of the ‘Heather’ colour did not go down well” (Interview One).13

The themes prevalent in 1992 reflected many of the traditional aspects of SNP manifests such as looking to the future, but there were significant differences in focus. The employment of a sense of history had been even further reduced. The word history was not actually used with heritage replacing it. The addition of phrases like “new Scotland” and words like modern and progressive illustrated the even greater emphasis on the future that was evident by 1992. In addition, the depiction of Scotland had also changed. It was now seen as “a multi-cultural society” and the manifesto also declared “[t]he presence in Scotland of people from

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13 By the next election the logo had returned to its previous state.
diverse origins is a source of enrichment for Scottish society”. This prominence on Scotland as having a wide and varied society was a noteworthy modification that, when allied to the lack of historical imagery employed, indicated a significant shift in how the SNP related to, and visualized a sense of identity. Scotland as a presence remained strong throughout the document, but a sense of Scottishness was somewhat muted. Overall identity was presented as a much wider phenomenon that national group membership. The focus is now firmly on Scotland, rather than Scottishness. The ‘us’, in terms of identity, had become the people who lived in Scotland, not Scots. This was a key difference that must be acknowledged. The national ‘us’, not the political, although the SNP clearly attempted to link the two, was a wide-ranging and inclusive sense of identity that sought to appeal beyond those simply born into Scotland or Scottish families.

This ‘us’ that was formed around Scotland, and all the various people in it rather than a distinct Scots identity, was even more evident in the 1997 manifesto. In the first section, the SNP President, Winnie Ewing, employed future-history as she called for people to “revive and renew us”. The ‘us’ she spoke of being Scotland, or more specifically, “the people who live here”. This message was clearly formulated to include people living in Scotland rather than Scots. Thus the subtle shift of SNP focus on a wider, more inclusive sense of identity was continued.

In many other respects YES WE CAN Win the Best for Scotland was somewhat different from previous SNP manifestos, and very different from the other parties. Although still presented in a more glossy fashion than manifestos from the 1970s and 1980s, there were few visual aspects to the 1997 production. In fact, all the photographs within the document were of SNP office holders and MPs. These escorted the section for which that individual was responsible for as a policy spokesperson. Most were accompanied by a personal quote supporting the SNP policy in question. Overall the focus of the manifesto was very much on policy. Unlike other parties, the SNP also provided a “fully costed budget” as part of the document which underlined the nature of the manifesto as one of the more policy focused documents of the time.
The foreword from Alex Salmond as leader of the SNP served to highlight two major themes that the SNP had chosen to employ. One was the forward-looking nature of their political nationalism and the other made the inclusive nature of identity even clearer: "A Scotland that doesn’t ask where you’ve come from, but where we are all going together." Thus the ‘us’ identified by the SNP had shifted even further towards an all-encompassing one. This foreword set the tone for the manifesto as well. Although initial aspects of the document, such as the first section, entitled “A Nation Once Again” drew heavily on a sense of history, this quickly gave way to a strong focus on the future. When identity was mentioned it was always with a broad, inclusive nature. Thus Scotland was a “multi cultural society” and the SNP remained “sensitive to the needs of other communities which are a part of the rich tapestry of Scotland”. Unlike past years there were no sections on identity, no statements decrying outside influences, and no policies limiting ‘foreign’ or non-citizen ownership. The negative aspects of the manifesto were now centred on the constitutional and legal position of Scotland as a part of the UK. There were no sections that challenged any individual or national characteristics, and this would allow for any individual in Scotland to support the party. Thus, the national ‘us’ widened, thereby allowing the political ‘us’ to also widen.

This wide-ranging nature of both a sense of national and political identity continued and was enforced in the first paragraph of the 2001 manifesto which stated that the SNP “stand for the people – all the people – who live in our rich country”.

Interestingly though, the SNP continued to provide a strong focus on policy by splitting their manifesto. There was still a ‘coffee table’ style document that provides a general discussion of policy and statements, and has a strong visual element, but this is accompanied by another manuscript entitled Heart of the Manifesto 2001 that had no visual elements and focused much more directly on policy content. It was this document that could be downloaded from the SNP website, thus the party chose to provide a clear focus on its policy stance, and any visual images or photographs were noticeably absent\(^\text{14}\).

\(^{14}\) Somewhat interestingly, the SNP provide text only manifests on their webpage, with all manifests being in ‘easy read’ PDF format with no images in the documents. This is unlike the other parties who provide PDF copies of the manifests as published at election time.
In *We Stand for Scotland*, or manifesto/01 (the initial document spoken of above), there was a strong visual element, with several full-page photographs. Thus the SNP did fall into line with the other parties in terms of presenting a modern style manifesto. Few of the images invoked any sense of national identity or any sense of Scotland. The only image that approached the issue was a cartoon. “Short changed by London” depicted bowler hat wearing individuals and Westminster Palace. This was a clear attempt to depict ‘them’, the outside group not of the nation. Identity was again framed by a depiction of the other rather than a sense of ‘us’. This depiction not only served to outline who the other was, but was also clearly an attack on the establishment. While not an attack on the English as a people, the individuals concerned could only be English. The implication was an oblique statement about the negative relationship; the nation clearly suffering as a result of actions by ‘them’.

Likewise, the logo accompanies the party name, but was not prominently displayed in any other respect. The photographs that were used figured individual members of society engaged in discussions of SNP policy which directly affected them. Smaller insert photographs of these individuals with leading SNP figures accompanied the text. Thus the ‘us’, both political and national, were depicted as ordinary people. The SNP was shown as firmly connected with everyday Scotland.

The foreword was by John Swinney, identified as Leader of the SNP, who was head of the Party at Holyrood and an MSP, although this was not stated within the manifesto itself. He clearly focused on Scotland as a place, speaking of “London controlled parties” and “divided loyalties” and attempted to represent the other political parties as being not Scottish. There was no attempt to define Scottish by any sense of what it was, simply by what was not. Swinney invoked a sense of place rather than any sense of individual identity and the appeals to create a sense of ‘us’ were political but linked to the wider sense of Scotland as a territorial unit. One section focused on a day in the life of Alex Salmond. Although then not leader of the SNP, he was still an MP and one of the wider known figures. His day diary allowed for a firm link between the issues and the fact that this is an election to Westminster, rather than Holyrood.
What was immediately evident in the language of the 2001 manifesto was that while the focus on policy and a clearly managerialist agenda remained key, other aspects, such as constitutional and identity issues, were toned down significantly. While there were still strong anti-union elements within the manifesto, there were certainly no appeals to a sense of history\textsuperscript{15}, and the limited sense of identity that was projected was both modern and inclusive in focus. When a sense of Scotland was invoked words such as modern or future were nearly employed. The sections on culture, Gaelic and Scots were minimal in content, providing only a basic policy, and employed no emotional appeals. In 2001 the SNP was even more directly policy focused than in previous manifestos, and did not attempt to employ a strong sense of identity in their rhetoric. There was, of course, a strong sense of Scotland within the document. But that sense looked to the future, with little historical appeals and a limited sense of individual identity. By 2001 the SNP had shifted significantly in focus from their pattern during the 1970s and 1980s, when a sense of individual national identity and history were evident. This reflected a similar attitude to that of the other major parties. All party manifestos minimalised their statements on identity. What was emphasised within the SNP was Scotland as a place. The movement was firmly away from any ethnic identifiers. The SNP were clearly attempting to widen their scope and bring in individuals who may identify with Scotland, but not identity themselves as being Scottish.

The manifesto in 2005 was the same modern style, with a glossy magazine, 'coffee table' style booklet enclosing a more detailed, policy-focused discussion. The visual aspects of the 2005 manifesto were quite strong. The cover picture was of Alex Salmond MP, leader of the SNP, although both he and Nicola Sturgeon, deputy leader and an MSP, signed the foreword. Neither their party nor elected positions were identified. Likewise, the policies contained within the manifesto blurred the distinct lines between the UK and Scottish parliaments. The foreword also set the tone for the document in terms of identity. Although Scotland figured prominently, there were no appeals to a sense of Scottishness. Any attempt to create an 'us' focused on Scotland the place rather than Scotland as a people. This was a focus and a rhetorical tone that was continued throughout the document as well. Although

\textsuperscript{15} Although the film \textit{Braveheart} still manages to get mentioned in the discussion on crime.
there were visually strong national images (a Saltire figured twice in just eight large photographs) the other photographs did not invoke any direct sense of Scotland. There were no attempts to frame a Scottish ‘us’ that reached beyond the political. The national sense was very amorphous.

There were few references to appeal directly to the people and no appeals to Scots, or the Scottish Nation. When the population of Scotland was referred to it was very general; “Scottish taxpayers”, “everyone”, and “a well educated population”. There were only two direct references that focused on the Scottish as a people. One occurred in a discussion of immigration that highlighted the inclusive nature of the SNP policy. The term “new Scots” was employed here to illustrate the inclusive nature of Scottishness. The other simply spoke of “all Scots” and occurred on the final page. This very general, and very inclusive focus on a sense of ‘us’ continued in the more detailed policy document. The SNP made their stance clear with such statements as “No one country and no one human being is worth more or less than any other”. There was continual reinforcement of Scotland as a place rather than any tribal sense of Scottishness or ethnic based belonging.

Two aspects that should be noted from the 2005 manifesto are both themes that, while constant within the SNP documents, had fluctuated in terms of presence. The first was the policy focus on oil. Although a very significant theme in many earlier manifestos, it had become less so until 2005 when it once more received significant mention. Nonetheless, the SNP stance was still presented in a very positive forward-looking fashion, with limited negative comments towards previous governmental policy. The idea that independence was fiscally possible and would bring prosperity was again a major part of the SNP campaign.

The second theme, unambiguous but less evident than the oil issue, did invoke a sense of identity that fused the political and the national. This was within a section of the 2005 manifesto that attacked the other political parties. While Labour was attacked as untrustworthy, and the LDs dismissed as props for Labour, the Conservatives were identified as having “always been anti-Scottish”. This theme became prevalent during the 18 years of Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997, and has continued since. As noted above, this language goes beyond the political and
creates boundaries for a sense of national identity as well. While the SNP created a political and nationalist ‘us’ that excludes the other major parties, they also created a national ‘us’ that specifically excluded the Conservatives. While the other parties are politically assailed they are not excluded from a sense of Scottishness. The Conservatives are not just the political ‘them’; they are also the ‘other’ in national and nationalist terms.

4. Conclusions on SNP
From 1970 through to 2005 the text and rhetoric of the SNP manifestos have undergone significant changes. In terms of policy, the party is still consistent in providing a clear and strongly focused policy document. However, they have chosen to formally separate such a discussion into a separate text in recent times, whilst other parties have chosen to provide a stronger set of visual images and highlights alongside a somewhat lessened textual consideration of policy. With regards to a sense of Scotland and the creation of a sense of both political and national identity the SNP have also transformed in their conceptions and projections of such. The political ‘us’ projected by the SNP has become much more explicitly left of centre, while still providing clear links to a pro-business and occasionally conservative agenda.

The SNP have clearly altered their stance and language in relation to the other parties. Direct attacks, challenging both the Labour and Conservative parties, continue although attacks on the LDs remain both less common and less direct. In terms of linking the political with the national the SNP continue to challenge both the Conservatives and Labour as ‘London’ run or controlled parties. Furthermore, the Conservatives are attacked as ‘Anti’ Scottish and by inference as an English party. Interestingly, the LDs do not come in for such challenges, although both their party organisation and historical support for home rule/devolution provide a limited form of protection from such attacks. At the same time, anti-English, or even negative statements aimed towards Anglicisation issues or England have become much less common, and indeed have almost disappeared from the modern manifestos. What remains are purely policy-oriented statements - negative terms continue to be employed in purely political issues, but negative aspects in regards to national issues are no longer present.
The SNP focus on the individual sense of national identity. Scotland remains a consistent presence throughout the manifestos. This is, as noted, unsurprising given the raison d'etre of the party. However, this work has recognized an important and key change in the rhetorical use of Scotland, especially as it relates to an individual and group sense of identity. The sense of who is Scottish, who can be Scottish and what the Scottish people are, has become much more inclusive, as the identification of the other has become much less obvious. The national ‘us’ created within the SNP manifestos is much wider and more all encompassing today than was the case thirty five years ago. The national identity that the SNP project from within their contemporary core policy document is centred around the idea of Scotland as a territorial unit – Scotland the place. Thus the people within Scotland gain an identity by being present in Scotland, rather than a sense of national identity created by being Scottish. This is clearly an attempt by the SNP to project a more inclusive sense of ‘us’, both political and national. The predication of belonging is no longer based on firm ethnic factors such as birth. Now the party presents a sense of Scottishness that is very inclusive.

It should be noted that the conceptions of national identity employed by the SNP within their earlier manifestos did project inclusive aspects. However, these documents also included statements that clearly provided boundaries to a national sense of ‘us’. These earlier statements, and the boundaries created by them, provided for the establishment of the other; individuals or groups that were clearly not members of the Scottish nation. In more recent times the membership of that nation has been derived from Scotland rather than being Scottish. Out groups have become much less distinct and certainly not openly or even tangentially identified. Thus the other has become more indefinite (bowler hated individuals in London) and the boundaries of membership of the Scottish nation are now quite hazy. The SNP now predicate the opposition to the creation of a Scottish nation-state on constitutional, institutional and political barriers rather than establishing a firm other group that serves as a block or a threat to Scotland.

The consequences of this shift are yet to be fully evident. While the SNP doubled their MPs between 1992 and 2005, their share of the vote actually declined by four
per cent. The party runs the risk of all parties; by attempting to create an ‘us’ that stretches beyond their traditional boundaries they may alienate their core vote. The issue of who votes for the SNP, and whether this is based upon any firm sense of national belonging is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight. However, what is important is the clear shift in defining the other that the SNP have undergone. The other is no longer the English, but rather English Conservatives (where the Conservative Party is portrayed as not Scottish), or London dominated parties. Even the sense of the other has taken on a less defined national identity and a more political one.

5. Chapter Conclusions

The SNP and LDs provide very different patterns of activity and aims in their use and conceptualisation of identity within their manifestos. Although both parties envisage a different relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK than currently exists, they have dissimilar goals. Likewise, while the SNP has consistently employed a strong sense of Scotland and Scottish national identity within their messages, this has not been the case for the LDs. Indeed, the linking of the political and the national has never been a clear aim of the LDs in Scotland. Furthermore, the advent of devolution has seen the LDs issue manifestos within Scotland that provide the least in terms of appeals to a sense of national identity, or even that create a sense of Scotland within their text.

Nonetheless, there are clear similarities as well. Brack (2000) may have noted the strong policy emphasis of the LDs, but this is also a strong aspect of the SNP, and both stand out from the manifesto of the Labour and Conservatives in this regard. Also, both sets of manifestos went through a metamorphosis during the 1990s. The LDs began to employ a stronger sense of national identity, and allow a greater sense of presence that they had previously. The SNP had also experience change, yet this was certainly not in relation to the presence of Scottishness or Scotland in their manifestos – which had always been significant. The change that the SNP had undergone, and which brings them more into line with the other parties, is to focus less on the sense of Scottishness and more on Scotland the place. As noted above, the ‘us’ that the SNP envisage is now very inclusive, and the borders of the national group are much less defined within the manifestos than the borders of the nation.
Drawing together the findings from the analysis of all four parties in this and the preceding chapter, distinct patterns have become clear, and differences and similarities have been noted. Perhaps most noticeable of all of the similarities is the surge in the presence of a sense of Scottish national identity during the 1990s, and a resultant decrease in the use of such an identity in the following elections. It is clear that devolution has had an impact on the employment of national identity within the British manifestos of the three parties operating at both British and Scottish levels. Furthermore, it has also become clear that while the parties are aware of and will employ national identity within their message how this identity is seen has also changed.

All parties increased their use of Scotland as a sense of place, and of Scottishness or a sense of Scottish national identity during the 1990s. This was especially so during the general election of 1997. All parties saw the issue of devolution as being a key policy within that period, and clearly attempted to link their political message with a national message – attempting to fuse both to create an ‘us’ that appealed to potential voters within Scotland. This usage shows that parties will, and do, employ a sense of sub-state national identity in Scotland when they see it is either necessary or desirable to do so. While two parties, the SNP and the Conservatives, have always been willing to employ a sense of Scotland and Scottish identity, even those parties which have regularly not done so, Labour and the LDs employed these tools at that time.

The question remains as to whether this is electorally driven or something greater. It is clear that the SNP, by ‘playing the Scottish card’, can influence the tone and nature of the debate. At the same time, the SNP and the other parties were clearly responding to demands from the wider political system for a referendum on devolution. One argument, which this thesis proposes, is that devolution tied the political and the national together and required the parties to consider the issues of Scottishness and Scotland within their manifestos. It is clear that Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives did not regularly employ identity within their manifestos. Furthermore, they did not increase the use of identity at times when the SNP threatened electorally. Thus while the regular use of Scottish manifestos was an
electoral response (especially on the part of Labour) the increased use of identity was due to another cause. The cause was the rise of issues within the political system that combined the national and the political. Devolution, the granting of power to Scotland as a nation, was a movement outside of party political control. The rise of a sense of national identity as the debate was ongoing had to be addressed by the parties. Thus there was an increased use of identity within the manifestos during the 1990s.

However, with the advent of devolution there was a clear decrease in the use of nation and national identity within the Scottish manifesto issued by Labour, the LDs and the Conservative Party. Even the SNP turned away from the employment of a strong sense of national identity (thus continuing a trend previously evident) choosing instead to focus on the nation. Even this focus was accompanied by a lessening of the constitutional issues in favour of a focus on the policy aspects of their message. In many ways, the three other parties have returned to positions and patterns very similar to those evident in their manifestos from the 1970s. Regarding the sense of identity, it is clear from a consideration of all the manifestos that the parties tend to draw a very inclusive border around Scottish national identity. This explains the focus on the nation as a place, rather than the nation as a group. By emphasising Scotland rather than the Scottish or the Scots, a much more comprehensive, all-encompassing sense of belonging, or sense of identity is created. The other is kept intentionally vague and ill defined. The only party not to have consistently provided such an image is the SNP. However, it should be noted that the SNP have often provided wide ranging consideration of who is ‘Scottish’ and when elements of the other were introduced they often served to define the other rather than define the in group. At the same time, the SNP also have moved to a position where they exhibit a sense of identity that is much closer to those of the other parties than was previously the case.

In finishing this aspect of the research it must be noted that, generally, the emphasis within the manifestos is on socioeconomic issues, and the political and economic aspects of their specific policies. However, there has always been, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the party in question, an underlying theme of Scottishness/Scotland in many of the manifestos. Scotland is projected as a separate
entity, requiring and/or requesting its own answers. Explicit employment of identity, cultural issues and markers is now rare and has been fairly minimal across time and parties, with the exception of the SNP. Such themes are, however, the underlay beneath the political carpet of Scotland. It has become clear that a sense of national identity does exist within Scotland, and that the political parties operating within Scotland will employ it when they feel it is expedient to do so. This does not deter from the existence of such an identity, though with a wide-ranging and very inclusive indication of membership. Simply put, Scotland exists; being Scottish is a recognised identity. The political elite, within their core political documents, does not challenge the idea that Scottish identity and Scotland are different from others within the UK.
Chapter Seven
Mass Perceptions of National Identity

With the advent of devolution in the 1990s the salience of nationalism, and academic investigations into the nature of national identity in Scotland and other parts of the United Kingdom, became topics of greater discussion and focus. While these subjects had certainly not been ignored prior to this time, academic considerations and general attention had been somewhat narrow. National Election Studies had been ongoing for several years, and have produced a considerable body of data. Yet academic consideration surrounding such issues as the devolution referenda remained limited (Dardanelli 2005). Likewise academic considerations of nationalism and national identity within Scotland had also been somewhat limited prior to this time. The significant political changes taking place within the United Kingdom at the end of the 20th Century provided for increased attention on Scotland. Several academic developments took place in conjunction with the political changes. The ongoing collection of mass data and analysis within Scotland was extended in scope and size, allowing for greater reflection and insight. With the British Social Attitudes Survey well into its second decade of collection, the more specific Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys began. Employment of such data, with considerations into the attitudes and behaviour of the Scottish electorate and how such impacted upon and interact with nationalism and national identity, saw several publications on the subject. Furthermore, considerations of the nature of national identity also covered a wide variety of disciplinary areas such as anthropology (see for example Hearn 1998) and sociology (see for example McCrone 1996) as well as the more overtly political aspects.

Above all else though it is the political implications of national identity that remain paramount. To gain insight into the politics of any polity with an active nationalist party requires an understanding of the nature of national identity from the mass as well as the elite level. Nationalism as a political force gains its strength from the number of adherents and nationalist identifiers. Any movement lacking popular support either withers on the vine or remains a marginal force, as the various

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histories of the Scottish nationalist movements show (see for example Hanham 1968, Lynch 2002). The growth of the nationalist movement as a force in Scottish politics requires an understanding of national identity within Scotland. One of the prime purposes of nationalism, not only as a political but a cultural force, is to provide individuals with a sense of identity. At the same time, it also serves to link that identity to everyday politics (Paterson 1996). With these key points in mind it is important to note the majority of Scots have long held a strong sense of national belonging (McCreadie 1991). It could therefore be expected that nationalism would be a force in everyday politics in Scotland. Yet it must also be clearly recognised that a strong sense of national identity within the electorate will not necessarily guarantee success for a nationalist party. Recent Scottish political history provides evidence of this. The electoral record of various nationalist candidates or groups, and contemporarily the SNP, indicates just such a situation. In the present-day period the fact that a strong sense of Scottish identity does not equate to support for the SNP has been clearly illustrated (Bond 2000). Political considerations of the nature of Scottish national identity remain more complex than initial judgments might indicate.

The creation of the Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s has brought about a significant alteration in constitutional relations within the United Kingdom. The prospect of further changes within the Scottish/UK political system remains a point of great discussion and analysis within both academia and wider society. The existence of a strong sense of national identity within the Scottish electorate indicates the potential support for such change. The likelihood of systematic change is nonetheless dependent upon a number of factors – prime among them the nature of Scottish national identity. Consequently, the understanding of the political nature of national identity – and how this identity relates to nationalism as a political force – remains a key area for investigation and further study. How the nation is conceived of by the masses requires illumination if we are to understand the nature of nationalism in Scotland.

At the same time, and equally important, is the fact that national identity also remains a contested area of study. The nature of Scottish nationalism (and thus Scottish national identity) is generally presented as a modern, civic, inclusive movement, as previous chapters have discussed and illustrated. Commenting on a
text that considered individual views on what it is to be Scottish, Cohen can highlight "the liberal and civic nature of our nationalism" (2003, p162). Yet such a perception may be more an academic or elite interpretation rather than a wholesale or mass conception. Therefore, it is to the mass consideration of national identity within Scotland that this study now turns.

This chapter is not an attempt to provide insight into the nature of national identity from a personal or individual level\textsuperscript{2}. As the discussion below demonstrates this work will examine individual reflection – but on a mass level. Such analysis is not undertaken in order to create a determined view of what being Scottish is or is not (although this remains an aspect of the overall analysis). This investigation is to consider how individuals, when aggregated, conceive of their national identity and the boundaries and borders in regards to membership of the Scottish nation. Who is, or can be, a member of the Scottish nation? It is an attempt to illustrate, through secondary analysis of available mass data, the views on the sense of national belonging and national identity of the Scottish masses from a perspective of belonging. Who can be, according to the masses, a member of the nation is a political question of great importance in the understanding of the nature of Scottish nationalism.

The data is drawn from a variety of sources, including the Scottish Election Study of 1979 and the Referendum Study of 1997, as well as the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of 2003. The selection of 1979 and 1997 data provides insight into the mass consideration of nationalism and national identities at a time when such issues were at the forefront of political discussion. The 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey moves us into a period when the Scottish Parliament had been in existence for one electoral cycle. This period had also seen a lessening of the 'honeymoon support' for devolution. The possibility of a change in behaviour and attitude in this period will be investigated.

The analysis within this chapter will begin with reflection on the strength of feeling in regards to a Scottish versus a British sense of identity. It will then shift to a

\textsuperscript{2} See for example Devine and Logue (2002).
consideration of certain key questions relating to the nature of national identity within Scotland. This consideration will draw on existing literature as well as additional material from the 2003 data set. The chapter will then continue to an analysis of the interaction between strength of national identification and how individuals construe national belonging and Scottish identity\(^3\). However, before considering such material, it is necessary to revisit the theoretical divide that challenges any study into nationalism and national identity both within Scotland and upon the wider stage.

1. National Identity, Individual Belonging and Theoretical Considerations

Cohen, alongside his modernist observations of nationalism, cogently points out that “nationalist rhetoric runs a serious risk if it departs from the terms in which individuals can associate themselves with the nation” (1996 p810). This excellent insight should not be limited so as to include purely positive nationalist rhetoric however. It must be considered as meaning the inclusion of all rhetoric that addresses the issue of the nation or national identity, whether nationalist in aim or not. In the case of Scotland much political rhetoric draws upon the nation and a sense of nationality. While such language may be considered nationalistic in structure much is distinctly not nationalist in aim, whatever it may be in content or tone. As this work has illustrated, political elites and parties that are staunchly Unionist employ a strong sense of the Scottish nation and national identity in their language.

Cohen’s insight addresses the core problem that all political actors, especially the main parties, face in Scottish politics. The political elites must ensure that they present a sense of the nation and a sense of belonging that clearly appeals to the individuals that shape the masses. The political elites within Scotland, whether Unionist or Nationalist in outlook, project a sense of the Scottish nation that attempts to appeal to the all people within Scotland the territory. This is the case whether these political elites are acting as parties in conflict, political opponents vying for votes from the Scottish electorate, or in concert as the overall political leadership of

\(^3\) The three data sets highlighted were examined with the aim of creating regression models for consideration of the impact of various issues upon national identity. This investigation was of limited success. See the methodology appendix for further details.
the Scottish polity. Any activity on their part must ensure a connection between the masses and the political elite that both informs, and is informed by, a sense of identity that the masses can identity with as individuals and recognise as a group.

Such a sense of national identity, created within the framework of Anderson’s (1983) imagined belonging, may be portrayed at the mass level, but it is produced at the individual level, thereby creating a paradox. The ever-present paradox is the fact that national identity is both an individual and a group identity. Being ‘Scottish’ is a state of mind in many ways and thus an individual choice, but ultimately the group mindset defines membership. Any individual may choose to identify him or herself as Scottish, but that self-identification may be challenged by a majority of other individuals within the nation. Any member of a sub group that is considered ‘outwith’ the boundaries of the nation will ultimately have great difficulty in gaining acceptance into the national group, whatever their own personal observances of their national identity. The boundaries of Scotland the nation are drawn by a number of cultural and historical markers, and these markers can, in the minds of the mass of the nation, serve to exclude as well as include. The elites may seek to provide a vision of the nation, but the boundaries of that nation are given substance by the masses. An attempt by elites to include perceived ‘out groups’ within the nation face the obstacle highlighted by Cohen – such groups might not be associated with the nation by the masses of that nation.

This paradox also serves to challenge the modernist interpretation of nationalism. It challenges both the claim that nationalism is a created ideological and political force and that is a modern invention at that. This research argues that any attempt to create a national identity that provided for a homogenised, mass ‘one size fits all’ culture within the United Kingdom has failed. The strength of cultural markers and longstanding symbols within Scotland has meant that ‘North Britain’ has been consigned to the historical dustbin, a point clearly argued by others (for example Morton 2000)\(^4\). The 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) Century Gellnerain approach of imposing a uniform identity within the United Kingdom has clearly not worked\(^5\). The echoes

\(^4\) In addition any number of Scottish history textbooks, at all levels of education, make just this point.

\(^5\) Obviously a mass culture was created, but Scottish culture and identity remains clearly separate and distinct from that of England.
from history that provide for a clear link between the past and the present in the minds of the masses of the nation (Haesly 2005) have defeated the promulgation of a British identity that overrides Scottishness. Obviously ongoing research into the nature of Britishness remains, although such research faces the clear difficulty of attempting to deal with a 'nationality' that is based around a state that is multinational in structure\(^6\). Britishness is not a nationality along the same lines as Scottishness, but something perhaps both greater and lesser; although this question is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, the challenge to consider Britishness and other forms of national identity in the UK remain in progress. Recent investigation has indicated that in England a sense of national identity based on Englishness is growing (Curtice and Heath 2000). It may well be that a sense of Britishness suffuses both English and Scottish identity, but it has certainly failed to replace the latter and possibly either, and while it may have been conflated with Englishness for many decades if not centuries, this situation is clearly undergoing change too\(^7\).

This is not say that a sense of Britishness, and of Britain, is not present within the political and social rhetoric of Scotland. The rhetorical considerations of the manifestos produced for Scotland clearly provides evidence to support just this point. Many Scots would also identify themselves as British. However, most Scots would identify themselves as Scottish first and British second (see below). The attempt to create Britons out of Scots has failed due to the existence, and continued strength, of a separate Scottish history and culture. This history and culture has continued to resonate throughout the modern era, and provides distinctiveness to the sense of identity created by individuals within Scotland.

Smith (1979, 1987, 1991) and Hastings (1997) have clearly illustrated the strength of ethnic and historical roots. Smith highlighted the particular qualities and durable aspects of the ethnie that continue to echo today. These cannot be located by an examination of the class structure, or political relationships, or even the territorial location of the modern national group in question. The strength of belonging felt by

\(^6\) This is the same problem that faces political elites that seek to enhance a sense of Britishness within the UK electorate.

\(^7\) It is arguable that this was ever the case in Scotland at all.
individuals who consider themselves part of the nation of Scotland is located within
the shared myths and symbols, the historical memories and events, and the central
values which the population transmit among themselves and onto the next
generation. As the ethno-symbolist position so clearly illustrates, ethnicity is not a
blood and belonging primordial issue, but rather mythic and symbolic in character.
Through the communication systems and various socio-political agents available in
the modern world individuals are able to identify, through time and space, with
‘their’ nation. Smith has thus argued that identity must be treated as a collective
cultural phenomenon.

Drawing, as it so clearly does, on the ideas of scholars such as Gellner and Anderson,
it is clear that ethno-symbolism does not reject the argument that nationalism is,
certainly as a political movement, a modern creation. To do so would be discount a
key necessity of mass politics, considering that political nationalism requires mass
participation in the political process. Indeed, ethnosymbolism as a theoretical
approach to the study of nationalism tends to disregard the importance of
contemporary political activity while accepting the modern elements of nationalism
as a mass movement. Yet the fact that nationalism is a mass political movement is in
itself a modern creation. Peaceable, regular, and above all legal, mass participation
in the democratic process has only existed within the United Kingdom within the last
hundred years. An established Scottish political party based purely on a nationalist
ideology has been in existence for even less time. In fact the establishment of just
such a party both required and awaited regular mass participation in the electoral
system.

At the same time ethnosymbolism does, properly, challenge the modernist rejection
of historical and ethnically based considerations of national identity. The ethnic
roots of nations come into play when we consider the moves of the various political
elites that attempt to employ historical myths and symbols in order to frame the
contemporary nation. While modern in shape and form, the Scottish nation has
distinct historical roots, and one cannot dismiss their importance – especially at the
individual level. It cannot be denied that elites may attempt to manipulate the nature
and strength of such symbols, as well as selectively employing particular myths. Yet even with such a key point in mind, this work must reject the argument proposed by modernists such as Calhoun (1997) or Ozkirimli (2003) that nations are created through more contemporary social and historical processes. There are clear and distinct limits to manipulation, and the raw materials of culture and history are not creations. Although the finished product of contending elites may be manipulated and created, the importance of Cohen’s insight, with which this section opened, becomes clearer still. National belonging is indeed created – but at the individual level – whereby individuals draw on the history and culture that have continued from the past through to today. Nations, and the allied sense of national identity, have a longer heritage than modernism would allow. The history of Scotland that connects the individual to the group is not a creation of the elites, whatever manipulation the elites employ in regards to such material. Indeed, while the political elites do contend amongst themselves to create a sense of Scotland and Scottishness that will attract support from the masses, they are clearly operating within historical and cultural restraints partially imposed by those masses. It is with this point in mind that this work now turns to a consideration of the mass attitudes and conceptions of the Scottish nation.

2. Mass Conceptions of the Scottish Nation - Nationality

During the 1980s a Spanish political scientist began regular consideration of the nature of national identity within Scotland, and other sub-state national areas, using a likert scale – a measurement to which his name was, and is, applied. Thus the Moreno question became firmly established as part of the study of, and resultant literature on, the nature of national identity. This style of question allows for a consideration of the strength of feeling of national identity not only over time, but also in a polity that employs a bifurcated sense of identity. Scotland, being part of the United Kingdom state, provides for both a national and a state identity. The United Kingdom, as a multinational state, allows for the existence of an identity beyond that of the purely national level, where being British is also considered as a form of national belonging. Although this is actually a state identity rather than a

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8 The considerations of the rhetorical constructions within the manifestos for Scotland have shown just that, see Chapters Five and Six for analysis of this point.
national one, nationalism has often been (wrongly) employed as an allegiance or identification with the state rather than the nation (Connor 2004).

It must be clear that when discussing Scotland, one is looking at national identity, and when considering the United Kingdom one is looking at state identity. Therefore being British, or having a sense of Britishness is actually, and obviously, a sense of relating to one’s state and not one’s nation. However, these concepts are clearly confused, misused and disputed within academic discussion, and their similar employment within political rhetoric only adds to the general confusion and misconception. The development of a scale by which this confusion can be considered (if not actually or directly addressed) allows for greater understanding of the nature of identity within Scotland.

Moreno, by employing a nuanced measuring tool, allows for the existence of the perhaps mutual, and certainly not incompatible British and Scottish identities, and also allows for an expression of that identity which can favour one over the other, or a balance between the two. Connor may, correctly, argue that they are quite separate forms of identity and that a distinction should be made. However, such distinctions are unclear within the literature and are certainly unclear within the political arena. As parties often employ such forms of identity with scant regard to their meaning. This work has previously noted there are those who argue that Scots are capable of making such a distinction (Henderson 1999). Therefore, a consideration of such identities from a mass level, while problematic in some ways is clearly possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% by Column</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results from the Moreno question, now regularly included in many mass surveys, have indicated that while there has been a strengthening of those individuals who identify with their Scottish (national) identity over their British (state) identity, this must be treated with some reserve. However, what we can see from the table above is that there has been a stable continuum during the immediate contemporary period. From the devolution referendum year of 1997 through to 2003, when the Scottish Parliament was about to embark on its second term, the relationship between the identities had changed little. How individuals within Scotland balance being Scottish with British (or not) had not shifted dramatically during the six years between these surveys. What is clear from these results is that a majority of individuals within Scotland prioritize their Scottishness over being British. At the same time, a majority if individuals within Scotland remained attached to their Britishness, to a greater or lesser degree. Such results provide support for individuals and parties on both sides of the nationalist-unionist divide in Scotland, but provide little direct insight into the nature of national identity. Further analysis on this point is therefore required.

3. Forced Nationality

The Moreno question was not formulated until the 1980s, and thus no direct comparison with 1979 is possible. However, the issue of questioning an individual respondent on their national identity is not new, and some measurements are available from that period. Moreover, while it is clear be that the Moreno question is useful in many respects, it does have one, especially in light of the focus of this research, serious drawback. It does not challenge, completely, an individual sense of national identity in a polity such as Scotland, where a bifurcated identity is obviously the norm. The ability to provide a nuanced vision of identity is important, but when considering the nature of that identity a forced choice may be more insightful. Mass surveys undertaken in Scotland have regularly contained such questions, and these provide for a better comparison in this instance.

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Table 7.2
Which Nationality best describes you?10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/None</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1482</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bond and Rosie (2002) have shown that certain qualifications apply to any consideration of data such as that given in Table One and Table Two, which is mostly reproduced from their work. They highlight the anomalous results that have occurred during the referendum period in the mid to late 1990s, when the numbers of individuals choosing Scottish over British increased. What the figures do show though is that overall the data are relatively stable. It is certainly true that a pattern seems to be emerging during the period illustrated above. With 1979 being somewhat anomalous in itself, with the smallest recorded level of Scottish identity (which may reflect the dissatisfaction with the referendum activity of that year), the other figures show striking similarity. Although there seems to be a clear decline in the number of Scottish identifiers during the early years of the 21st Century, thereby indicating that any devolution effect may be waning, the rise in British identifiers has not seen a return to 1970s levels. Furthermore, during the period in question, there has been a clear strengthening of Scottishness, and this can be allied to a weakening of Britishness over the same period.

The analysis provided by Bond and Rosie indicates the complex nature of the relationship between national identity and individual party identification in Scotland, a point also clearly made by McCrone (2001) among others. The point that devolution has clearly not provided for a weakening of ‘Scottish sentiment’ is a central one. As such research points out “only quite a small minority even of ‘exclusive’ Scots support both independence and the SNP, and a much larger

portion of these people in fact support neither” (Bond and Rosie 2002, p43). This is also clearly the case for those who consider themselves more Scottish than British. This unmistakably indicates that the political relationship with regards to national identity is not an easily considered one.

While such research serves to highlight important aspects of national identity within the political arena, it fails to provide illumination into other key aspects in the same setting. It is clear that many individuals who feel ‘Scottish’ do not translate this into support for the SNP. Also, many voters who do not support independence for Scotland do support the SNP. Rosie and Bond provide no insight into the social and political boundaries of national identity. Their analysis fails to provide any insight into the overall character of Scottishness in terms of the nature of national identity. This thesis has shown that all political parties project a sense of identity that is inclusive, modern, forward looking and distinctly civic in nature, even when strongly employing a sense of history and myth to do so. In addition it can be seen that how an individual relates to Scotland, and what sense of national identity they hold, or hold paramount, does not allow for an easy political equation. Yet we know nothing about how the masses conceive of the nation. It is very necessary to understand how the individuals within Scotland envisage the boundaries of the nation at a mass level. Is the nation from below similar in vision to that from above is the nation of Scotland, according to the people within Scotland, a forward looking, modern, inclusive nation?

4. Bordering the Nation

McCrone has been one of the leading figures in academic consideration of the nature of national identity in Scotland. Although a modernist in interpretation, he does not challenge the historical nature of identity and has noted “It might seem peculiar that we know relatively little about the criteria for Scottish identity, given its long historical pedigree.” Yet he states that “there has been no serious debate about who can and who cannot be Scottish in the past half century” (McCrone 2001 p172). As evidence to support this assertion McCrone points to the historical assimilations of the Irish in Scotland, which he proclaims ‘largely successful’. There can be little doubt that assimilation of individuals drawn from this group has been fairly rigorous. However as to the success of that assimilation McCrone seems willing to gloss over
a long and sordid history of anti-catholic, sectarian bigotry within Scotland, and specifically Glasgow and the West of Scotland. Furthermore many individuals would argue that sectarianism in Scotland, while lessened, is still evident today; a point clearly noted within the elite interviews undertaken as part of this work.\footnote{11}{Bruce et al (2004) argue that anti-catholic discrimination in Scotland has been overestimated and their research clearly provides support for McCrone’s position.}

Table 7.3
Criteria for Scottishness\footnote{12}{The question asked was “How important or unimportant is each of the following to being truly Scottish?”}
Column by %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Ancestry\footnote{13}{Defined in the study as having Scottish parents or grandparents.}</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly important</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: McCrone 2001)

Table 7.4
Criteria for Scottish Citizenship\footnote{14}{The question asked was “Say Scotland did become independent, which of the following kinds of people do you think should be entitled to a Scottish passport?”}
(% Agreeing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Scotland and currently living in Scotland</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Scotland but not currently Living in Scotland</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Born in Scotland but currently Living in Scotland</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not born in Scotland, not living in Scotland, but having at least one parent born in Scotland</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not born in Scotland, not living in Scotland, but with at least one grandparent born in Scotland</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: McCrone 2001)

As support for his statements, McCrone considered data gathered during the late 1990s within Scotland, which is re-produced above\footnote{15}{Both tables are structured from McCrone (2001). He drew upon the Scottish Election Study (1997) and the Scottish Parliamentary Election Study (1999).}. His conclusions are subject to
challenge in light of the specific material that he employs. He argues that the data clearly indicate that while birth and ancestry are important, residence is also accepted as criteria for Scottishness. Additional support for this point is drawn from the question in criteria for Scottish citizenship. Here the focus of the question was who would be a citizen if Scotland were an independent nation. Again, he argues that 52 per cent of respondents saw residence as an acceptable criterion “which would make Scotland one of the most open societies in western Europe in terms of citizenship” (McCrone 2001 p172). There are several qualifications to his conclusions that must be considered.

The first of the issues raised in response to McCrone is the format of the questions as presented to respondents in the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Election Study. It is perhaps unfortunate but the framing of the question leaves much unsaid and thus assumed. Each of the responses provides for a hypothetical birthplace of Scotland/Not Scotland, and Not Scotland provides for a large amount of ambiguity. Did respondents assume Britishness on the part of those not born in Scotland? A firmer delineation on this point would provide much clearer and more concise data for consideration and allow greater insight into the perception of national identity and belonging in Scotland.

The second issue to be considered are the response levels themselves, and a comparison between the two questions considered by McCrone and employed as evidence to support his conclusions. In the 1997 data, as he states, 82 per cent of people living in Scotland consider birth to be an important criterion for being Scottish, with 73 per cent seeing ancestry as important, and 65 per cent considering residence an important factor. In 1999, similar answers were provided to a related question, upon which McCrone bases his statements. However here the answers are in response to a slightly different question. The framework has shifted from that of asking about Scottishness, an amorphous concept at best, to that of citizenship, a

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16 Again, perception must play a part in the responses to these questions. It is unfortunate that ancestry did not differentiate between parents and grandparents as reasonable assumptions there could result in a lower positive response to the latter than the former if the questions had been asked separately. The questions were also asked in order, and it is again not unreasonable to assume that an individual respondent would link all together in their mind when answering. The need to de-link residency from ancestry and birth in any analysis becomes clear.
clearly firmer, less malleable one\textsuperscript{17}. The difference is more than simply an artificial one – the basis for inclusion, in regards to ‘being Scottish’ is a national one, when the question is citizenship it becomes a state based issue. It may be there is slight difference between the two in many respondents’ minds, but the distinction between the two questions must be noted.

The responses to the citizenship question are perhaps clearer than those from 1997. They also allow for a firmer distinction in regards to birth, residence and ancestry. For individuals born and living in Scotland 97 per cent of respondents would allow for their entitlement to a Scottish passport. With individuals born in Scotland, but not currently living there the positive response declines to 79 per cent. This unambiguous difference of 18 per cent must not be ignored. It is clear that a significant proportion of respondents would not allow for citizenship to such individuals. What remains unclear is whether they would deny them membership of the nation. What is clear is that in both cases the vast majority would nonetheless be considered Scottish, not only in a amorphous sense of simply ‘being Scottish’ but also in a more institutional sense should Scotland be a state or Scottish passports issued. Both of these responses thus actually increase from the 1997 data to that drawn from 1999. The support given is not for being Scottish by virtue of being in Scotland, but for being Scottish due to ethnic ties.

In the 1999 study the percentage of respondents supporting residence, as a criterion for a passport, is a majority of 52 per cent. In the switch from a question focusing on a less defined form of national belonging to that of a clearly definable sense of both national and state membership, the drop in similar responses is 13 per cent. This leaves McCrone’s assertion (of Scotland being one of the most open countries in terms of citizenship) open to question. It is undeniable that the result is a majority, but a limited majority at best, and one that is clearly subject to the concerns raised above. When the question is asked with firmer boundaries in place, the borders of the nation and state being congruent and clearly defined, the result is more restrictive.

\textsuperscript{17}At this point we approach a more distinct and clear differentiation between that of nation and state which Connor (2004) seeks.
McCrone concludes this analysis of “What makes a Scot?” with the declaration that “There is for the moment no systematic political agenda for exclusion and inclusion in terms of race and ethnicity in Scotland” (2001 p173). This statement must be subjected to challenge. It could be argued that in the 1990s there was no political, institutional agenda regarding the inclusion or exclusion of race and ethnicity in Scotland, but there was a clear political party agenda. The analysis of the major party manifestos in the previous chapters clearly highlighted examples of a very inclusive sense of belonging in regards to both race and ethnicity. Nor was this limited to any one particular party. Few provided any firm boundaries that delineated a distinct national belonging for Scotland. In all cases, most especially the SNP, any boundaries of the Scottish nation as a people were drawn in a widely inclusive manner. Overall the precincts of the Scottish nation, where clearly provided, were done so in order to include, not exclude. To assert the absence of a political agenda in terms of race and ethnicity is misleading.

At the turn of the century and with the establishment of a Scottish Parliament a more overt socio-political agenda came into being. There was, and remains, a systematic political, and institutionalised, agenda on ethnicity and race. This agenda is clearly also one of inclusion. For evidence, one need look no further than the “One Scotland Many Cultures” campaign, undertaken by the Scottish Executive in 2002 and continued since. This campaign ran television and radio advertisements at various times\(^{18}\), and sought to show that Scotland’s goal was one of a multicultural and inclusive society. Indeed, speaking in his role as Communities Minister of the Scottish Executive Malcolm Chisholm stated, “No one should be held back in modern Scotland because of their race, colour or background” (www.scotland.gov.uk 2005). The political parties, established institutions, and executive authority of the Scottish Parliament all thus employed a clear and present political agenda in relation to race and ethnicity in Scotland.

\(^{18}\) Such advertisements were widely employed during October and November 2005 in print, radio, television, and cinema media.
Unfortunately while the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey posed a similar question in regards on who should be entitled to a Scottish passport\textsuperscript{19}, the possible responses were framed in a dissimilar fashion. The question was part of a series which focused on whether individuals of various group could be considered ‘truly Scottish’. However, the responses again provided a distinct category of residence.

Table 7.5
Who should be entitled to a Scottish passport?
(% by Column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only people who in your view are truly Scottish</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone permanently living in Scotland</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with both statements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It depends</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)

While these responses are not as clear as previous data, and the definition of ‘truly Scottish’ is itself quite unclear, the data does provide an unambiguous result. The vast majority of respondents clearly support the idea that permanent residence alone support the right to a passport in an independent Scotland. Thus McCrone’s assertion, challengeable in light of the data he employs, is more greatly validated by the data from 2003.

5. **Bordering the nation - 2003**

What is required at this point is a consideration upon what is, and is not ‘truly Scottish’. Among the several questions asked in regards to attempting to define this category were the following:

- I’d like you to think of someone who was born in England but now lives permanently in Scotland and said they were Scottish, do you think most people would consider them to be Scottish?

\textsuperscript{19} The exact question read “Suppose that Scotland became independent. Who do you think should be entitled to a Scottish passport and full Scottish citizenship?
And now think of a non-white person living in Scotland who spoke with a Scottish accent and said they were Scottish, do you think most people would consider them to be Scottish?

These questions were also repeated with the respondent specifically asked if they would consider such individuals Scottish. These questions go directly to the issues of race and ethnicity and issues of inclusion and exclusion in the Scottish nation. Being Scottish or English makes an individual British by default, and the presence of and attitudes towards English people in Scotland has been the subject of study (Watson 2003). The British State is certainly presented as the ‘other’ by the SNP, and the English represent the largest ethnic or national group within the United Kingdom. At the same time, the SNP are clear in their literature and manifestos, as are the other major parties, that specific groups (particularly the English) are not excluded from being Scottish. The questions also provide distinct and direct attributes concerning potential members of the nation who exhibit different racial characteristics. As the discussion above makes clear, the Scottish political system clearly attempts to provide an inclusive agenda and place few limits on belonging.

Table 7.6
Considered to be Scottish (% by column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>English (most people)</th>
<th>English (respondent)</th>
<th>Non-White (most people)</th>
<th>Non-white (respondent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely would</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably would</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably would not</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely would not</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>1508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)

What becomes immediately clear from the data in the above table is the clear difference between the individual responses and the individual perception of the probable group response. In both questions, individuals provide a more inclusive
view than they consider the overall group would do. While further questions in this area are thus raised, they are outside of the parameters of this study.

In only one column (Non-white, individual responses), would a majority consider the group to be Scottish. However, the difference between the individual and supposed group response is so great as to raise additional questions about the veracity of the responses (especially on the individual level) overall, but again such questions lie outside the parameters of this study.

In all other categories, and especially in response to English individuals permanently resident in Scotland, a majority would not consider them Scottish. These results stand in direct contrast to the responses considered in regards to the right to a Scottish passport. Although 62 per cent of respondents think anyone permanently residing in Scotland would be entitled to a Scottish passport, this does not directly translate onto the specific categories discussed above; providing for the one exception already noted. Indeed, the responses to the questions concerning the English are perhaps most illuminating. In both cases a clear majority, at either the individual or group level, would not consider such persons as being Scottish – despite the survey question making it clear that the subject considers themselves as Scottish. These responses make it clear that individuals within Scotland do place boundaries upon the nation that are more restrictive than those placed by political parties and institutions within Scotland. It is becoming evident that the membership of the nation, as perceived at the mass level is more restrictive than that provided for within the political and elite rhetoric.

6. Birth as Belonging

The question of birth remains a central one in relation to membership of the nation. As discussed above, a survey in 1997 found that only 17 per cent did not consider birth to be important as criteria for Scottishness. The question in 2003 was framed somewhat differently, with the emphasis being on whether birth was needed to make an individual ‘truly Scottish’. In order to consider whether this was a greater requirement amongst Scottish identifiers, the question on birth was cross-tabulated.

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20 The assumption inherent here is that the overall group would be people within Scotland, or the Scottish nation.
with that of whether respondents thought of themselves as Scottish in order to provide for greater insight.

Table 7.7
Does a person need to be born in Scotland to be truly\textsuperscript{21} Scottish?
(by whether respondents think of themselves as Scottish)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% by Column</th>
<th>Scottish</th>
<th>Not Scottish</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)

As the results indicate there is variation between the two groups. The most obvious difference is amongst those who agree strongly with the requirement of birth to be ‘truly Scottish’ with 14 per cent of those who consider themselves Scottish falling into this category. This is more than double the percentage of non-Scottish identifiers who see this as important. The 6 per cent seeing birth as important is the smallest category of non-Scottish identifiers who made a decision on this question. However, in terms of agreement, rather than strong agreement, the percentages are similar, although again the Scottish identifiers place a greater emphasis on the need for birth than non-Scottish identifiers. What is evident from the data then is that Scottish identifiers place a higher value on birth in regards to being ‘truly Scottish’ than non-Scottish identifiers. Indeed 54 per cent of this group agree with the statement, compared with just over a third who do not see birth as being important. Thus to be a member of the Scottish nation, according to individuals who feel part of that nation, birth plays an important role. The importance of birth is somewhat less for those individuals who do not class themselves as members of the nation, however. A sizeable minority of 41 per cent do see it as important overall, although this compares with 47 per cent of non-Scottish identifiers who do not see birth as important in order for an individual to be considered Scottish. The picture is thus less clear-cut amongst this group, with no majority in either direction, although

\textsuperscript{21} The exact question read “And some people have different views about what it takes to be truly Scottish. Some say that as well as living in Scotland, to be truly Scottish you have to be born in Scotland (How much do you agree or disagree with this?)".

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differences between the Scottish and non-Scottish identifiers can be seen. It can be concluded that birth is less important to those who do not identify with the nation. Thus members of the national group place a firmer boundary on belonging to that group than those who place themselves outside of that boundary.

One important, and clear, point that arises from this discussion is the difference between this data and that shown in table three. In 1997 only 17 per cent of respondents saw birth as unimportant – even among Scottish identifiers this number has more than doubled and among non-Scottish identifiers it is now almost a majority. There has been a clear and unmistakable shift in the perceived importance of a direct connection through birth. Part of the reason for the shift may be that ambiguities have been removed in regards to the wording and phrasing of the question. Unlike 1997, the question makes clear that the hypothetical individual in question currently resides in Scotland. There is no longer any confusion about residence. Respondents were being asked to class an individual living in Scotland as to being ‘truly Scottish’. Whatever the exact cause, it is now the case that a significant number of individuals within Scotland no longer see lack of birth in Scotland as a barrier to membership of the nation. At the same time they do not constitute the majority and birth within Scotland remains an important signifier in regards to membership of the nation.

It is unfortunate that we cannot take consideration of birth through to a bloodline connection and to the next level of Scottish parents or to that of grandparents. Such questions were not asked during the 2003 survey considered here. However, it is clear that such analysis may provide more insight into the ethnic nature of Scottish national identity and belonging. Ancestry, as McCrone labels it, is obviously an important aspect of belonging and bordering of the nation. How Scottish identifiers envisage those with a direct family connection would provide greater insight.

7. Scottishness and Race

As this chapter has previously made clear, there is a clear political agenda to ensure that Scotland is considered an inclusive society, especially in regards to race. In

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22 One example of a high profile Scot without a birth connection would be Rod Stewart – born in London he proudly proclaims himself Scottish, although he is a resident of the United States.
2004/5 the Scottish Executive undertook a race equality review and in 2006 through 2008 will provide a two million pound Race Integration and Community Support Fund (Scottish Executive 2005). All these efforts are aimed at challenging racism in Scotland and providing for racial equality. Thus, it is important to consider the issue of being Scottish and not being white and revisit certain questions raised by table six.

Table 7.8
Does a person need to be white\textsuperscript{23} to be truly Scottish? (by whether respondents think of themselves as Scottish)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% by Column</th>
<th>Scottish</th>
<th>Not Scottish</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)

It becomes immediately clear that while there are some who would agree with the need for an individual to be white to be Scottish, this view is not shared by the vast majority of individuals, whether they consider themselves Scottish or not. Indeed the numbers are almost identical with 73 per cent of Scottish respondents disagreeing with the statement and 71 per cent of non-Scottish respondents doing the same. A clear majority reject any link between racial characteristics and national belonging in regards to the Scottish nation.

There is, nonetheless, a minority in both groups who do see a link between being Scottish and the need to be white, and this number is higher from those who consider themselves Scottish. It is interesting to note that no non-Scottish identifiers agreed strongly with the question, yet 5 per cent of Scottish respondents did, with the number of those agreeing being almost equal between the two groups. Again, this supports the argument that those who feel members of the nation place firmer boundaries about that nation than those who do not identify with that nation.

\textsuperscript{23} The full question was “And some say that as well as living in Scotland, to be truly Scottish you have to be white – rather than Black or Asian”.

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There must also be questions raised about the veracity of these responses in light of the information provided in table six. It is clear that 54 per cent of respondents felt that the “most people” within Scotland would not consider non-white people to be Scottish. This data stands in direct contrast to the individual responses provided within table eight. Yet when individual responses between tables six and eight are considered the picture is analogous. Differences between Scottish and non-Scottish identifiers in table eight are almost identical to the individual responses in table six. In all cases individuals provide one answer, yet table six makes it clear that they would consider “most people” to hold a different view. It is clear that the situation in regards to being Scottish and being non-white is far from clear. Individual responses are significantly different from what respondents think “most people” would profess. This dissimilarity must require the results to these questions to be treated with caution at best and leaves the question of race and national belonging in Scotland somewhat cloudy. Nonetheless, while table eight indicates a lack of borders based upon racial characteristics, the expected group response from table six is less positive in this regard.

8. Scottish Citizenship/Passport

A clearer picture on the bordering of the nation, and the boundary placed upon membership by the masses has become clearer by cross tabulating and contrasting Scottish identifiers and non-Scottish identifiers to specific questions. In order to further illuminate this point, we now return to the data originally considered in table five in regards to a hypothetical Scottish citizenship and thus a Scottish passport.

Prior to consideration of the data, it is necessary to further consider the distinction between citizenship and national identity, especially in the case of Scotland. As previously discussed in this chapter there must be a clear differentiation made between citizenship and national belonging or identity. Connor denotes ethnonationalism as redundant “coined in response to the general tendency to misuse the word nationalism to convey loyalty to the state rather than to one’s national group” (p10 2004 emphasis in original). It is unfortunate that such a redundancy is required, but the need for it remains clear as the misuse of nation and state, and national identity and citizenship are never clearer than in such cases as this. Being Scottish and holding a Scottish passport are not synonymous – yet the data collection
methods used to produce the data employed here seems to accept them as such. It may well be that when responding to the question (for the exact wording see footnote 19) an individual is equating the two, but again ambiguity exists and confusion clouds the results. Loyalty to the state and loyalty to the nation are clearly different in the case of Scotland. A simple but illuminating point is the fact that the Scottish already share their citizenship with members of other nations and ethnic groups – most noticeably the English, Welsh and Irish members of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the first two words that face an individual Scot when he or she examines his passport are ‘European Union’. It is clear that the results from such questions must be treated with caution.

Table 7.9
Who should be entitled to a Scottish passport?
(by whether respondents think of themselves as Scottish)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% by Column</th>
<th>Scottish</th>
<th>Not Scottish</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truly Scottish</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone permanently living in Scotland</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with both statements above</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It depends</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Not Answered</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey)

The results from table nine show clear differences between the two groups of respondents. Once again the Scottish identifiers place a firmer boundary to entitlement than the non-Scottish identifiers. Indeed a significant minority of 28 per cent would reserve passport entitlement to the ‘truly Scottish’ while only 11 per cent of non-Scottish would do so. Even in regards to those individuals permanently living in Scotland, the figures provide for a clear differentiation, with a difference of 11 per cent showing the Scottish identifiers as being less inclusive than those who do not consider themselves as members of the Scottish nation. Nonetheless, it is clear that a majority of both groups consider permanent residence to be sufficient for entitlement to a Scottish passport in the event of Scottish independence. Yet the caveats discussed immediately above remain key when considering the conclusions drawn from tables five and nine. The issue of being Scottish is a national one and belonging to the nation is different from ownership of a passport. The conflation of
nation and state within these questions, and the associated research, is problematic and needs addressed.

9. Conclusions

This chapter opened with a consideration of the need for an understanding of the Scottish nation as conceived of by the masses of that nation. The complex nature of possible relationships between national identity, nationalism and political activity in Scotland requires a need to understand who and what the masses see in regards to being Scottish. Furthermore, a consideration of the theoretical approaches to national identity and nationalism indicated a possible conflict between academic investigations of Scottish nationalism and mass conceptions. The need to understand the ethnic nature of national belonging and the mass sense of being Scottish was clearly highlighted.

An investigation of the existing literature indicated not only the existence of a strong sense of Scottishness, but the resilience and continued strength of such during the past thirty years. Furthermore, respondents to various surveys during the period have provided clear evidence for the argument that Scots prioritize their Scottish over their British identity. At the same time, the mere fact of being Scottish, of considering oneself a member of the Scottish nation, was shown to be highly complex and not indicative of any one political position or attitude. Nonetheless, it was argued that the conception of the nation by the masses was key to both an understanding of Scottish nationalism and theoretical interpretations.

An analysis of the membership boundaries placed on the nation, by those considering themselves a member of that nation, provided important results. These results clearly challenge the modernist, inclusive, and civic based interpretations of Scottish identity and belonging expressed by Scottish political parties, institutions, and certain academics. The results from the 2003 data included in this chapter make it clear that there are firm boundaries placed upon the nation by the masses, and that these boundaries are affected by an individuals sense of being, or not being, a member of the Scottish nation. The inclusive nature of Scottish nationalism highlighted by the political elite, and by the modernist considerations of the data is challenged.
The mass conception of Scottish national identity has restrictions that serve to exclude certain groups and individuals from membership of the Scottish nation. In relation to general issues, birth and ancestry are clearly considered important. The place of birth remains a key issue in terms of national belonging and many members of the nation would deny membership to individuals not born into the group. Furthermore, in terms of specific groups, English and non-white individuals who considered themselves Scottish would be considered by a majority on a mass level, as not being Scottish. The ethnic aspect of belonging in regards to the Scottish nation is made clear at this point.

Overall, the family, or ethnic connection, seems a significant requirement that is considered to provide a firm and clear connection. Although it is important to note that the figures differ over time and the 1997 devolution vote may have heightened awareness or attitudes at that point. Nonetheless by 2003 there is still a majority that see birth as being as an essential to requirement for membership of the nation. However, this majority is only present in those who consider themselves to be Scottish. The overall result remains one of firm boundaries and exclusion of other groups within the British family.

The results from this analysis highlight the need for further investigation in certain areas. Above all the relationship between race and ethnicity remains problematic and the picture confused. Furthermore, the results from the questions on entitlement to a hypothetical Scottish passport provide a somewhat ambiguous set of results. McCrone (2001), as cited above, argues, in light of the survey results, that Scotland had a very open opinion of citizenship. Yet, the results analysed here indicate that the openness is quite limited when the focus is shifted from that of a presumed citizenship to that of an accepted nationality. When comparing the mass view with that of the political parties, membership of the Scottish nation is much more restricted. Such results challenge the idea of Scottishness as an inclusive identity. The emphasis placed by the masses on birth and family also serves to challenge the modernist (inclusive) interpretations of nationalism and national belonging.
Chapter Eight

Scottish Political Elite Perceptions of National Identity

Previous chapters focused on the policy content and rhetorical employment of a sense of national identity in the manifestos issued by Scottish political parties. The results of this analysis highlighted changes in both the presence and sense of that identity over time. There were several examples of clear and distinct utilisation of images and rhetoric highlighting Scotland the nation and Scotland the people; although such usage was not consistent within any one party. What did become clear was that the major political parties within Scotland would employ symbolism where and when they saw such as being necessary. The manner in which the sense of nation and nationhood is employed has clearly changed over time, especially in the case of the SNP. Evident in the SNP documents is a shift towards presenting Scottishness as an inclusive identity. This creation of a permeable border for the Scottish nation is also apparent among the manifesto rhetoric of other parties as well. All employed a strong sense of Scotland the place but were, or have become, much more limited in terms of providing any firm and distinct sense of Scotland the people. In the most recent documents, where parameters where provided for the nation, they were quite wide and all encompassing. Thus we are able to gain insight and understanding of the nature of Scottish national identity as envisaged and employed by the major political parties of Scotland.

It must be remembered that the manifestos are documents which represent the specific policies and attitudes of the parties as a whole. Also as political documents they present a programme that is ideologically and politically designed to build as much support as possible within the Scottish electorate. As previously noted this point is recognised as one of their strengths. Manifestos are the clear and concise voice of the party on the political issues and statements for that election and subsequent parliament. As such they provide a key insight into the party ideology and philosophy. Nonetheless this strength can also be construed as a negative, or a weakness. As a statement of a group rather than that of individuals, it is difficult to consider the underlying attitudes and beliefs of those that make up the party – and especially the elected elites that represent the party within the legislative units of the United Kingdom. As a group document, the manifestos want for such individual
aspects. They therefore lack more specific insight into core issues such as national identity and the nature of the Scottish nation, at the elite level. This is not to say that the documents provide zero perspectives on Scottish identity and the nature of the nation; this is certainly not the case, as the previous chapters clearly illustrate. However, perspectives gleaned from individual political elites would help provide greater comprehension into more specific, underlying aspects. Such understanding is essential given the significance of elites in regards to politics. Such significance is also the case in regards to nationalist movements and polities with a national cleavage. The role of the political elite in regards to the presence, strength and nature of nationalism and national identity in such polities has been recognised by any number of scholars as significant. Therefore, this chapter provides a consideration of how elected political elites within Scotland envision these issues.

This chapter will begin with deliberation and conceptualisation of the term elite, and of the political elite, and the applicability of such to Scotland. The focus will then shift to a consideration of the theoretical emphasis given to elites within nationalism studies. The final and major section of the chapter will be an analysis of the individual responses gained from the Scottish political elite. What identities do the elected political elite within Scotland hold? How do the elites conceive of the nation; what is it to be Scottish and who, politically speaking, can be a member of the Scottish nation.

1. Defining the Political Elite
Prior to any consideration of specific arguments as to the interaction of political elites and national identity, we must define who and what the political elite is, both in general and in relation to Scotland. In his famous consideration of politics Lasswell stated that “those who get the most are the elite; the rest are mass” (1950, p3 emphasis in original). We can see that Lasswell considered the elite to be those who controlled “the most of what there is to get” (1950, p3). However, this remains a very ambiguous theoretical definition with little concrete grounding. It was Mills (1956) that gave the elite a more distinct form, with his idea of an American ‘power elite’ that consisted of various individuals from a small number of powerful bodies within that society. His power elite consisted of those individuals “in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such
decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions” (1956, p4). Mills1 has come in for considerable, and largely justified, criticism for his conclusions (for example see Welsh 1979). In regards to politics and politicians Mills did not put most elected office holders (such as Congress) into his power elite—seeing them as being the next step down on the ladder. His use of the elite concept would thus seem to have little direct usefulness here. Elected office holders of state or national legislatures occupy a position whereby they can make ‘decisions having major consequences’ on the life of the masses. Clearly we must look elsewhere for a useful conceptualisation of the political elite.

Rather than Mills, this research employs the term political elite in a similar manner to the ‘political class’ envisaged by Mosca (Bottomore 1966). The political elite then becomes those individuals constituting the ‘intellectual element’ of the governing groups of society. Welsh provided a clear illustration of how such elites fit into a democratic political system. He stated that if “we see democracy as a set of procedures through which elites charged with the responsibility for making important societal changes can be called to account” then we have a position where democracy and elite influence can be reconciled (Welsh 1979, p12). Accordingly the term political elite can be employed to indicate those who elected to make decisions on behalf of other members of society. In the case of Scotland, at a national level the political elite would include MSPs and MPs2; individuals holding the authority to engage in the process of making important societal changes, and subject to an accounting by the electorate at given periods.

An important aspect of the political elite of Scotland is that they are also a part of the political elite of the United Kingdom. It has been argued that the historical ability of the Scottish elite to integrate themselves with the English elite at the United Kingdom level dispossessed any nascent Scottish nationalist movement of prospective leadership (Harvie 1994, Nairn 1977). Such leadership has instead been provided to the British state. Indeed, a common complaint amongst several media

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1 Although focusing specifically on the United States Mills' work does have comparative uses in regards to most western style democracies.

2 This could also argue include MEPs. The decision was taken to exclude MEPs. This was partially on grounds of access and cost, but also on immediate relevance to the research. However, the issue of Scottish nationalism and Europe has been subject to recent consideration. See Ichijo (2005) for a study into Scottish nationalism that employs a consideration of the European dimension.
(and political) personalities at the turn of the 20th and 21st Centuries was the existence of a Scottish ‘Raj’ or a large number of elected Scots who held powerful political office at state level in the United Kingdom. Whatever the reasoning or validity of such a complaint, it does illustrate the ease with which Scottish political elites are able to engage in the wider British socio-political power structure and be part of the British political elite. Therefore, being a part of the Scottish elite has/is not a barrier to engagement in the wider British political scene.

In considering Scotland and elected political elites therein, two distinct groups exist at the national, and/or state level. MSPs and MPs are both elected to represent their constituencies at the national level. Obviously MPs partake at the state level, while the Scottish Parliament is a sub-state legislature. Furthermore while the Scottish Parliament has primary legislative authority it is nonetheless a devolved body and may be overridden by the legislature at Westminster, as the Scotland Act clearly retains such rights for the United Kingdom Parliament. Yet the majority of decisions on day-to-day affairs within Scotland are taken at Holyrood and MSPs as a unit represent the national legislative body. Scottish MPs retain, along with their colleagues at Westminster, ultimate sovereign authority and the ability to legislate in any area within Scotland, but the devolution settlement and political expediency predominantly restricts their activity to reserved matters. In regards to membership and the individuals that comprise the two groups, there has been significant interplay and movement. The first Scottish Parliament saw a large number of individuals holding a dual mandate, having been elected to Westminster in 1997 and then to the Scottish Parliament in 1999. This dual mandate situation did not remain the norm however, with most individuals choosing one chamber or the other at subsequent elections. Thus a large number of MSP have been MPs prior to their selection of the Scottish Parliament as their political locale. While the groups are distinct in terms of specific responsibilities and duties, membership of the political elite clearly embraces both.

This position may actually change with devolution and the continued focus on the West Lothian Question. The removal of voting powers, in some instances, from Scottish MPs could create a barrier to Scottish elite engagement within the British elite circle. Although this question is beyond the immediate framework of this research, it remains a key issue for analysis and future research.

Other dual mandates that existed were MEPs and also members of the Lords elected to the Scottish Parliament.
2. Elites and Nationalism Studies

Many scholars within the literature identify the importance of elites in regards to the issues of nationalism and national identity. For example, Hroch, in his study of national movements, identified a three-stage process of national movements (1985, 1993). The first stage was the academic study of the nation, the middle stage was one where the elite within a national group engage in ‘agitation’ as they spread the idea of the political nation, seeking change to create and support that nation, and his third stage was the emergence of the mass movement. Although Scotland is somewhat anomalous as a case in relation to Hroch’s model, the importance of the elite role is evident in his typology. Furthermore, as an aspect of the political system, nationalism sees contending political elites challenging for political power and authority within Scotland. The previous chapters have clearly provided evidence of the fact that political elites – even those that are not nationalist in aim or intent – will employ images of the nation and seek to employ a sense of national identity as part of their political campaigns. Thus even when a mass movement emerges the elites continue to play a significant role. With the presence of nationalist parties in Scottish politics the national card continues to be a key part of any political battle.

The importance of nationalism, and national identity, as a politically focused academic study partly arises from such significance in the political realm. Within Scottish politics nationalism is a political movement that seeks power within a given polity. Recent events at the end of the 20th Century (prior to which nationalism had been seen as a spent force, and some had assigned the nation-state to the dustbin of history) in Europe and elsewhere indicated the continued importance of national belonging. This only emphasised the need to understand the political aspects of the nation and national belonging and the role of the elite in nationalist activity. Billig notes the weight of political elite thoughts and ideas when he states, “the words of politicians are continually transmitted to mass audiences” (1995, p105). The elites of any national group regularly engage with the wider nation through the political process with elected elites obviously having prime placing to do so. This importance has also been noted by Breuilly (1993) whose understanding of nationalism focuses less on issues of national identity and more on the political factors – especially those of the elite. This work must reject his argument that national identity should be studied separately from political nationalism however. It is indeed the case that the
political elite influence the nationalist agenda, yet he underplays the importance of the masses within nationalism. It is the presence of a strong sense of national identity in Scotland that ensures that nationalism (and the coexisting unionism) does not whither as a political issue, whatever the electoral and political fortunes of those parties openly supporting nationalist goals.

As an instrumentalist Breuilly pays little attention to such mass aspects of nationalist movements as he rejects the argument that nationalism is an expression of national identity. However, although national identity and nationalism are distinct, the two are not detached and remain directly related. National identity serves the functional purpose of providing a group identity and thereby creates a clear link between the group and the individual. At the same time the presence of a national identity does not automatically lead to the presence of a political nationalist movement. Yet the lack of any sense of national identity will assure the lack of a nationalist movement. The existence of national identity remains central to any sense of nationalism, be it political or cultural in expression. Breuilly's separation of political issues of nationalism and national identity must be rejected.

However, instrumentalism does have some ideas to offer in relation to national identity and political elites. Brass highlights a significant aspect when he points to the fact that contending political elites manipulate national identity as they seek to marshal mass support for their political objectives (1991). However, this thesis again notes that such an argument may overstress the ability of elites in regards to the framing of national identity and national myths and symbols. The overall modernist interpretation of nationalism does not allow for the boundaries placed upon the nation by history and the masses themselves.

The importance of the group, or mass, identity has been shown within ethno-symbolist literature. Smith has made clear that the core of ethnicity is placed within the "myths, memories, values and symbols" of the national group in question (1987, p15) and that the durable qualities of the ethnie lie within these shared myths and symbols. Smith also discusses the importance of differing elites (cultural, technical,

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5 A deliberation on the mass interpretation of national identity and membership of the Scottish nation is given in the previous chapter, where the restrictions the masses place on the nation are considered.
and political) in national movements. He makes two, clear important points in this respect. First, is the role of the elite in providing direction in neo-national movement such as Scotland (Smith 1979). The second is that while one can separate the ideological and political movement that is nationalism from the study of identity, the latter must be considered as a shared collective phenomenon (Smith 1991). The importance of identity as a shared political phenomenon is not emphasised within Smith’s works. Yet the political clearly remains of paramount importance when one considers that ultimate goals of the majority of nationalist movements. Even those that consider the Scottish nationalist movement a form of neo-nationalism, and therefore prescribe different goals to it than ‘traditional national movements’, recognise that it seeks to alter the political relationship of the national group with the existing state. Accordingly the political aspects of national identity are paramount in any analysis and must be considered as integral to understanding.

As a result of the above points it can be clearly argued that elites may seek to influence and direct nationalism as a political force, but the foundation for such action is a shared one. The aspects of the ethnie which the elite draw upon for support are not, as Calhoun (1997) would argue, constructed collective identities, but historical rooted forms that have determinate power in regards to the nature and activities of modern nationalists. Various contending elites may seek to control, to a lesser or greater extent, the direction and aims of national feeling nonetheless they do so within a framework not fully of their own making.

Yet, a deliberation of the role of the elites within the national movement in Scotland is not the focus of this chapter. This work does not seek to investigate the role of the political elite in the formation of Scottish national identity. In regards to such a role this work argues that elites clearly have a function in defining and bordering the nation and sense of identity of national groups. However nationalist elites are limited in their ability to manipulate any sense of identity by the historical, cultural and group context of the nation in question. While they can seek to influence and present specific interpretations of historical and cultural myths and symbols, elites cannot ‘create’ or ‘invent’ such material.
Nor does this chapter consider the specific ability of contending elites to frame Scottish nationalism within the British context, although this remains a peripheral consideration throughout. Rather this chapter seeks an understanding of the sense of Scottish identity held by various individuals within the Scottish elected political elite ranks. By analysing their individual responses to a variety of questions, this work seeks an understanding their perception of the Scottish nation, what the boundaries of that nation are, and what it is to be Scottish, as considered at the political elite level.

3. Elite Research on Scottish National Identity

Previous research which employed an elite approach to consider Scottish national identity focused on the need “to get away from the common-sense notion that national identities were essential, given and unproblematic” and also argued that there has been “very little written on this subject outwith social anthropology” (McCrone et al 1998, p635). Indeed there is little substantive discussion on the nature of identity at an elite level. When political elites are interviewed it is usually undertaken with specific issues in mind, such as the attitudes towards devolution (for example see Christopoulos and Herbert 1997), their individual sense of identity (see for example Devine and Logue 2002) or the focus is on clear political topics of the day. Seldom are considerations on such questions as the nature of national identity questioned in any depth. Even as the underlying conceptions and foundations of identity are rarely questioned a patent need for such questioning and understanding becomes even clearer. Identity politics has grown both as an academic and political issue within the United Kingdom in the last twenty years. The issue of Britishness (versus or in conjunction with Scottishness or Welshness) stands at the forefront of politics in the first years of the 21st Century. It is clearly shown in the example of Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1997 through to the present. As a member of the Scottish, and the British political elite, his public comments and rhetoric continually stress the state (or British) aspect of his identity, and that of other people within the United Kingdom. Yet the question remains as to the motivation behind such actions. Clearly as an MP from a Scottish constituency he seeks to maintain a firm connection between himself and the wider British electorate. Being portrayed as Scottish rather than British could serve to sideline his position within
British politics. The need for such activity and stance on Gordon Brown’s part is not unsurprising given that McCrone et al, as early as 1998, identified the fact that the construction and mobilisation of national identity in the United Kingdom had become a “charged political” issue. Although there has been research conducted on the issues of national identity and elite considerations, it remains an under utilised and analysed area of study. Therefore, in order to widen the research within this area this work now considers the responses of political elites within Scotland, and their assumptions about the nature and criteria of national identity.

4. Elite Perceptions of being Scottish and being British

Each interview started with the same initial question. Each interviewee was questioned as to his or her personal sense of national identity, which served as a launching point for a wider analysis of what it is to be, or not to be, Scottish. Out of the forty-five interviews considered herein, table one indicates those who identified with a specific category of identity. As can be seen, the majority selected their identity as Scottish only, with twenty-four of the forty-five interview subjects proclaiming themselves to be Scottish, rather than Scottish & British, or British. These categories were not provided by the researcher, nor were any prompted beyond an attempt to provide focus on the question. Indeed, interviewees provided these categories without any further questions or discussion.

Table 8.1
Self selected elite identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Identity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>24 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish &amp; British</td>
<td>14 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>7 (15.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are roughly proportionate to those obtained in a variety of mass surveys done within the last decade. The majority of Scots, as with the majority of elites

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6 As footnote two notes the West Lothian Question remains paramount, and the attempts to create an ‘English Only’ voting system would have detrimental effects on his position as a prospective Prime Minister.

7 Obviously most elected elites have had exposure to either the literature in its academic form (indeed some contribute to it directly) or through the media. Thus many are already aware of the now standard form of this question. This presents a challenge to any researcher as certain subjects are well versed in the field. Indeed, two specific interviewees questioned the researcher heavily on his theoretical and academic influences.
interviewed for this research, identify more with their sense of Scottish identity than with their British identity. Interestingly a comparison between these elite and similar material collected via mass surveys (see next chapter) do indicate some slight differences. However the differences that exist can be explained by the less precise methodology employed in the collection of this data. Respondents to mass surveys are given explicit categories which allow for more specific measurement than semi-structured interviews.

There were some interesting additional results from this question. One interviewee, after their initial statement, also gave their identity as Irish-Scots, rather than simply Scottish & British. In addition, the European aspect of identity came up, unprompted, in seven answers, with these individuals proclaiming European identity as part of their overall identity – although several other interviewees added such an identity when questioned on Europe. In addition, one interviewee firmly stated that they were not European, and would never consider this as an aspect of their identity. Overall the European connection was very much a secondary aspect, and often couched in the same language as British – a state or legal identity rather than a national identity. Although several noted a greater connection with the European level than the British – “I’m much more comfortable being a European than I am being a Brit” (Interview 42). The answer given during interview 21 “I’m a British citizen, my nationality is Scots. I’m also a citizen of Europe” is very representative of the majority of comments in this area.

While seven individuals identified themselves as being British only one interviewee firmly rejected any sense of Scottishness outright, proclaiming “I am British not Scottish, never have been”(Interview 35). This reflected a point that arose within several interviews – the problem of defining being Scottish. Some approached this problem from a legalistic perspective, “When I see an entry in a journal I say, no, that’s not right, you’re a British national, because I am a picky lawyer”(Interview 54) Others were more politically or power oriented, “I really don’t see Scotland as a nation. Nations are sovereign, Scotland isn’t” (Interview 41). Most envisaged the

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8 Given the strength of national feeling in Scotland this emphasis on Britishness was an unexpected statement, and not matched by any other subject. Indeed, during this interview the respondent seemed to revel in providing such answers.
problem through such an official or legal lens — “How do you define what a Scot is? I don’t think you have hard and fast rules on it because it’s not an official nationality” (Interview 19). Such statements are surprising, as these interviewees seemed to deny the existence of Scotland as a nation. Yet when considered as part of their overall interviews this was clearly not the case. The language they employed later in their discussions clearly indicated they saw Scotland as a nation and the Scottish people as a national group. However they seemed to seek a way in which to deny the nation any formal existence beyond a territorial unit. Nonetheless the majority of interviewees accepted the fact that Scotland existed and being Scottish could be an aspect of being British, but both apart and distinct from that. Indeed one interviewee stated such clearly, “I always totally separate off the two” (Interview 7).

At the same time, a significant number of interviewees rejected any sense of being British, many on a national and personal level; “I would never see myself as British” (Interview 8), “There is no such thing as Britain...[it] doesn’t mean much as a nation” (Interview 12), “I’ve never considered myself British and I don’t quite know why” (Interview 11), “I don’t accept British, as to me it has always had connotations I am not comfortable with” (Interview 47). These individual members of the elite rejected any sense of identity with the British ‘nation’ or state, let alone considering Scottish as being a national group within Britain.

Many interviewees, who argued that it only existed as a state, rejected the idea of British as a sense of group identity. It was a state that they accepted, yet on very different grounds from feelings of national attachment: “I do recognise that we are part of the United Kingdom. There may still be a United Kingdom but there be no Britain” (Interview 6), “There’s no such thing as Britain other than the links between [England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales]...to me Britain doesn’t mean much as a nation” (Interview 12), “I would see ourselves as part of a United Kingdom rather than a Great Britain” (Interview 42). Often linked to such statements was an acceptance of the fact that being British was a prescribed sense of identity, but it was little more than that, “I recognise I am a subject of the British state, but I am not British” (Interview 49).
Such statements indicate that while there is a strong sense of Scottish identity, it is problematic for many interviewees in terms of official definition and form. The state identity of British clearly exists and is supported by formal structures – all the elites recognised that citizenship is conferred by the British state and one is thus a British citizen. Likewise the Maastricht Treaty created the formal category of citizen of the European Union – a fact clearly acknowledged by many of the interviewees, although not welcomed by all. Nonetheless such problems did not hinder the majority from proclaiming themselves Scottish. The lack of a convenient formal or legal framework did not stand in the way of expression of a Scottish identity at the elite interviews. Undeniably a significant number that proclaimed such an identity did so while rejecting any firm connection with Britain or a British identity. Many were at pains to separate Britishness and Scottishness – proclaiming the former to be “very English dominated”.

At the elite level, when considering a personal sense of national identity such clear differences between ‘them and us’ were enunciated from the first. Initial, individual bordering of the nation provided boundaries that were formed from a distinct position of, not so much what individual identity was, but rather from a position of what it was not. A clear example of such language was provided in the following statement.

I am fiercely Scottish in those aspects of my life that I allow myself to be... I feel a sense of identity... but if you ask me to say what... I am affected by the symbols of national identity but I am not sure I can identify it for you. I feel pride in Scottish institutions, I feel pride in Scottish traditions...I find it very difficult to define myself, and perhaps it is easier to define oneself by what one isn’t and I am not English (Interview 9).

This statement represents similar sentiments by many interviewees. Many individual elites expressed themselves as Scottish by not being British (and occasionally English). Alternatively a significant minority of the elected elite included in this research did not feel the need to reject additional or supplementary identities when providing their personal national identity and saw little conflict in being both Scottish and British. Yet even in such cases the tendency was to ultimately stress the Scottish aspect of their being:
Well the first thing I would say is I'm from Scotland but I accept my passport says I'm British and I'm perfectly happy to be British. Proud to be Scottish but certainly not ashamed to be British and I would always say Scotland before the UK. Maybe that's not all that unusual...it would be rare I think for a Scot abroad to be asked 'where are you from' to say 'I'm from the United Kingdom'...they would say 'I am Scottish' or 'I'm from Scotland' (Interview 10).

It became clear from these interviews that the majority of individuals questioned saw themselves as being part of a distinct group, as being Scottish, and thus members of the Scottish nation. Which brought the question of what the Scottish nation was firmly to the fore.

5. Elite Perceptions of the Scottish Nation

How these individual elites verbalised their sense of identity also touched upon how political elites envisaged Scottish national identity as a whole. Elite language and the framing of personal identity provide insight into how they consider the greater issue of national identity and specifically Scottish identity. In the case of the individual who identified as Irish-Scots, the statement was:

My parents are Irish; I was born in England but have lived in Scotland for thirty years... My choice was to live in Scotland...my kids see themselves as Scottish, I suppose what I am reflecting is that I don't particularly identify in the first instance as Scottish...I think it has to be, I think that Scotland, well the interchange, the idea of national boundaries, national identities is becoming increasingly blurred anyway.... London is a melting point of identities. Although the inward and outward migrations are less in Scotland it is the same... I think the Scottish identity has to be flexible enough to accommodate these people and if it does not then it becomes retrospective and backward (Interview 45).

This presents a viewpoint that agrees fully with the modernist position in relation to the issue of national identity. They also present an argument that supports the idea that national belonging is less of an issue within the masses. The claim is that being Scottish must incorporate a wide range of immigrants and second-generation individuals. The self-identification of the children of the interviewee as Scottish is telling indeed. While the parent does not choose such an identity initially, the indication is clear in
that the interviewee argues for flexibility in Scottish identity but does not individually incorporate into that identity even while arguing for the right of such as they to do so. Therefore the individual aspect of identity formation is clearly highlighted.

Yet this ambiguity to firmly identify themselves as individuals, rather than members of the nation, was present in many interviewees – even after they had initially and clearly labelled themselves as members of the nation. Several statements clearly present the fact that several elected elites were quite uncomfortable with placing boundaries on the national group, even at their own individual and personal level.

I don’t wake up in the morning and feel the need to define [my national identity]. I don’t have any feelings of a British national identity at all, but recognise a close affinity with the Welsh and Irish and don’t view any of them as foreign. Scotland is my country, but that has evolved in time... but then Scotland has evolved quite dramatically in my lifetime. But I would be hard pushed to talk at great length about it, as I don’t intellectualise it... I don’t wear it on my sleeve (Interview 44).

It was then pointed out that that interviewee was actually wearing jewellery with a national symbol and indeed was wearing a symbolic identity on their sleeve that day. The interviewee found this amusing and did note the incongruity of the situation in light of the above statement. This represents an example of the banal aspects of national belonging identified by Billig (1995). Clearly, at some point, this individual had chosen to wear such an identification of national belonging, yet had not fully incorporated such identification into their intellectual considerations on the subject of national identity.

Interestingly this individual was bi-lingual, having learned from an early age the language of both parents. One of the parents was of Scottish origin, the other parent was born abroad. The interviewee was born in London rather than within Scotland. Nonetheless, as an individual the interviewee strongly identified with Scotland – and as the interviewer discovered even more clearly during the course of the interview – they firmly rejected any sense of Britishness. Even with such a strong identification,
and a public display of that identification, this individual still felt an initial reluctance to take on a distinct national label in the first instance.

Such findings present several points worth noting in relation to this body of data. First is the number of elected elites within the ranks of MPs and MSPs born outside Scotland. Many were of Scottish family, while others had Scottish partners, and others had moved to Scotland for employment purposes. In addition several elected elite interviewees were themselves born in Scotland, but to parents who had not been. Their comments on this issue are clearly worth analysis. The second point is that previously noted in the section above - the continued rejection by many interviewees of any sense of Britishness. The third point is the unwillingness of many interviewees to provide any firm borders to the nation – although this was by no means unanimous. Many seemed keen to provide an argument that being Scottish was a wide ranging and very inclusive sense of belonging. Each of these points will now be investigated in turn.

6. Coming to Scotland

Several interviewees where born in areas outside of Scotland, but often to (one or two) Scottish parents. Even a cursory consideration of biographical data indicates a significant number of MSPs and Scottish constituency MPs were not born within Scotland. This fact in itself provides evidence to support the idea that the Scottish electorate do not focus strongly on issues such as place of birth and national origin when it comes to issues of representation. However, the vast majority of elected elites had a strong family connection with Scotland, even if they were not born in Scotland.

Many openly recognised this had some form of impact upon their sense of identity as an individual and upon their wider consideration of identity, although various interpretations occurred. As one interviewee stated “I don’t really ever think of [national identity]. To be honest with you I don’t bother about what nationality I am. I suppose if I was in a café in France I would say no, not English, ecosse” (Interview 48). This interviewee had a Scottish mother and English father and was born in England and made several interesting statements regarding identity. Sport played a strong role in their framing of their personal identity. In football the individual
supports Newcastle United, cheers Scotland at Rugby, but always wants to see England win at cricket. They agreed that a strong sense of national identity (they employed the term pride) was important, but did not see it going beyond the images of things such as tartan, haggis and such like – the ‘shortbread tin’ form of identity. They highlighted the cultural aspects of Scotland as helping inculcate a sense of Scottishness and fully agreed with TC Smout and his interpretation of Scotland and being Scottish – that it is a sense of place rather than tribe. Such identification may provide reasons for why individuals did not wish to categorise either themselves or the wider group as specifically Scottish or not. Many individuals with the same circumstances made similar statements, identifying themselves as Scottish, but tending to stress Scotland as a place and thus present a territorial, rather than a group or tribal, sense of belonging. The implications of this are that Scotland is presented as an inclusive society, where being Scottish does not require a birth-based connection. However, very few interviewees had no family, or historical connection to Scotland and those that did firmly emphasised theirs.

Other members of the elite, not born in Scotland, tended to stress the British aspect of their identity, although arguing that this was a generational as much as individual aspect, “I think that people of my generation born just after the war…it was stronger sense of British identity perhaps than there has been since” (Interview 7). “We were a London family until my father brought us back…so while we always had a historical thing that we were Scottish, we were also a London family and so very British” (Interview 3). It is interesting to note that such individuals also placed an emphasis on the multifaceted nature of identity; stressing the large number of identities they held as individuals. As one stated, national identity was fairly complex issue for them. “I would feel more comfortable with the Heinz 57 varieties description…I think you describe yourself as a different national identity depending on the context…national identity is far more complex than one word”. This individual argued that anyone can become Scottish by adopting the ethos and principles of the country they move to. “You can take on the identity of your host country” (Interview 50). This elite interviewee had one Scottish parent; the other

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9 Unfortunately the researcher did not think to ask what the case would be if Scotland had a first rank national cricket team.

10 This term, ‘shortbread tin’ cropped up in several interviews. It was interesting to note that many subjects reacted strongly when the interviewer initiated use of the term, and usually not positively.
was from outside the UK. Born abroad, childhood was spent both in the area of birth and Northern England, thus the interviewee did not come to Scotland before becoming an adult. Although initially uncomfortable with any strong sense of personal identity, many statements during the interview indicated a strong personal connection with Scotland; “we in Scotland...us Scots...we as a nation”. In language and idiom this interviewee presented themself as a member of the Scottish nation, but in directed statements on the subject of personal national identity seemed loath to do so.

As can be clearly seen, while many members of the interviewees were presenting themselves as British, rather than Scottish, they continued to argue for the right of people to consider themselves Scottish, whatever their place of birth or initial origin. This is a clear agreement with the civic framing of national identity so inherent in modernist interpretations of nationalism and national identity. We shall return to this issue of bordering the nation later in this chapter. First this research will consider the issue of what being Scottish is, or rather is not.

7. **Scottish as not being British/English**

One clear thread that ran throughout many of the interviews was the idea that being Scottish was particularly distinct from being British – even when the individual interviewees recognised that they were British, or had identified themselves, individually, as Scottish & British, or British. “If somebody says they feel Scottish and British it doesn’t take away from their sense of Scottish identity that they also feel part of something else” (Interview 5). Such emphasis was usually positive in tone; “I think it enhances your nationality if you see yourself as [having supplementary identities] I think it enhances rather than anything else” (Interview 28). Some comments on being Scottish and British rather than simply British stressed the manner of Scotland’s entry into the Union:

There is no other part of the Union that is similar to Scotland...there are a lot of similarities but I think there are fundamental differences...Scots were never conquered, or we were and regained our independence...most people who say they are Scottish would not boast about it as something narrow...some [Scottish] also feel British, so I don’t think its about being narrow (Interview 1)
Not all interviewees were positive about the differences and many made it clear that they considered the differences to be based on a dislike for the British state, or even the role the English played in what they say as Scotland’s “subservience” within the United Kingdom. As one interviewee so clearly stated there was a clear difference for them as an individual; “I am not British... I am proud to be Scottish and have positive thoughts of being European... but Britain is a more negative identity” (Interview 49). This was not an isolated comment. Although a minority made such statements, they represented a significant minority of the interview subjects, “I feel not a single British fibre in my body... I am pro-European but it is not a strong part of my national identity... growing up it became clear to me that we are not equals in the United Kingdom, this was an English state and it bore no sense of identity for me” (Interview 27).

Others argued that such a clear separation of identity was also part of the political system both old and new, “perhaps from my time in Westminster, it was obvious that people identified which MPs came from Scotland and they could almost identify where we would unite in issues and when we would not, and that cut across the parties” (Interview 37). Many argued that the Scottish parliament functions very differently “the way the Scottish Parliament operates, I think there are differences in style and attitude that are there [rather than Westminster]...partly because there is a heightened sense of different nationality” (Interview 27). These and similar statements were made on the premise that being Scottish was very different from being British and being English.

It is clear that the majority of interviewees argued that the Scottish nation was very inclusive and that any who choose the label could be Scottish. There were no firm boundaries placed around the nation in terms of who could and who could not belong. At the same time, it is also clear that they considered being Scottish as being different. To be Scottish allowed them to operate in a different political fashion. This seems to create a confusing situation. To be Scottish is to be different, and yet anyone, not simply those born in Scotland or into Scottish families, can be Scottish. If anyone can consider themselves Scottish – whatever their origins, how can being Scottish result in operating differently? It was on this issue of difference that the,
cultural, historical and even ethnic aspects of identity began to be employed by interviewees.

Indeed, and somewhat obviously, many interviewees made it clear that being Scottish was very different from being English, but most sought to do so on positive rather than negative grounds – which was also clearly the case in relation to the British/Scottish division. “I think you should be proud of whoever you are, Scottish, English, Welsh, French, wherever you are from” (Interview 33). Emphasis on dissimilarity between Scottish and British, or other groups within the UK, tended to be premised on the argument that Scots had different values, history, or overall culture. Comments such as “history plays a huge role...I think we are very conscious of our roots and history” (Interview 42) and “We are a product of our past and our vision for the future. I think if you have a problem with the past that is a problem. If you are comfortable with where your society has come from there is no issue with that” (Interview 27), were regularly made during interviews. Whatever the basis for the belief in difference several elites argued that the distinction would always be made clear. As one interviewee summed it up – “Everybody in Scotland, whether they consider themselves Unionists, supporters of independence, British, or anything else like, would never stay quiet if somebody said they were English” (Interview 18).

While such comments clearly make the point that elites recognise and emphasise the existence and distinctiveness of a Scottish national identity, this research has also consistently touched upon how the elites would frame and conceive of that identity. The majority of interviewees had a tendency to stress a very inclusive sense of identity, although this was by no means unanimous. Therefore we shall now consider how the elected elites within Scotland frame the Scottish nation, and who can be, and who cannot be Scottish.

8. Bordering the Nation

As the previous chapters illustrated the emphasis within various party manifestos on national identity has seen a clear shift towards a very inclusive sense of belonging. In terms of all of the major parties none has made such a clearly evident movement in this direction as the SNP. From a distinctive idea of the Scottish nation that
excluded certain categories, the party now presents a very inclusive sense of identity, where any individual who ‘believes in Scotland’ and resides within Scotland can be Scottish. Nor are the SNP alone in projecting this inclusive and civic minded sense of identity. The Scottish Liberal Democrats, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives all provide for a Scotland that includes all the people within its borders as part of the nation, irrespective of the land of their birth or family origin.

Thus we would expect a similar pattern to be present within the elite considerations on what it is to be Scottish and who can be a member of the Scottish nation. Indeed, one individual commented “You will find it hard to find someone in politics who will argue the [ethnic/birth stance]” (Interview 45). This statement was made with the supporting argument that any other political position is not only ‘off message’ in terms of any major party, and liable to get you into party trouble, but also unpalatable to most political and social commentators and liable to get you into media and public trouble. Indeed the majority of elites stressed the very inclusive nature of being Scottish; “In the first place it [being Scottish] is a state of mind; secondly it is where you are. If you are born in Scotland, live in Scotland, have come to Scotland, are committed to Scotland, that makes you Scottish” (Interview 26). Here we see one interviewee clearly providing a firm set of different foundations on which any individual could claim membership of the Scottish nation. The end result of this argument seems to be that it is simply politically unacceptable to frame national belonging in any other shape than a civic, inclusive framework.

Similar comments also strongly stressed the ability of any individual to choose to become Scottish; “I think living in Scotland gives someone the opportunity to consider themselves Scottish if they wish. I think if you want to consider yourself Scottish, you should have that opportunity” (Interview 19). Another interviewee stated “you can be...not of Scottish origin but have come to live in Scotland and you’ve taken on the Scottish so...it can be either nature or nurture, I suppose” (Interview 14) and one simply stated “Scotland makes you Scottish” (Interview 16). Such arguments clearly support the civic, inclusive nature of being, where nationality is an individual choice based solely upon a combination of location, personal preference and identification with the group. This modern, forward looking vision of
belonging clearly rejects any idea of national identity based upon birth, lineage or family history.

One interviewee summed the issue clearly with the view that Scotland not only had such a sense of identity, but also would need it in order to thrive.

It is going to be necessary that a lot more people who live in Scotland will be born outwith our borders...we will need that in the future. Of me, if you’re in Scotland and living here, you’re contributing to our society either at the economic or social level, then as far as I am concerned, you’re a Scot...It is about where we are and where we will be keeping in geographic terms rather than some great linear thing that takes us back into history so, you know, there are new Scots, Asians Scots...Eastern European Scots...they are Scots, if they want to take on that badge it is there for them (Interview 6).

Many interviewees provided personal experiences to support this viewpoint. Several had individual family members who were not born in Scotland, or close friends who had come to Scotland from other areas, yet argued for their right to be Scottish. “I have a friend who is Dutch by birth, but has lived in Scotland since the 20s and thinks of herself as very much Scottish...I think most people accept you” (Interview 17). “My grandmother was English and lived in Scotland definitely far longer than she ever lived in England. She felt Scottish, she was very proud of being Scottish...You can be Scottish without ever giving up or casting off your background” (Interview 5). “My wife was not born in Scotland and only one of my children was, but they think they are Scottish and so do I’ (Interview 39). Thus, many elites had personal attachments to such a position and the majority interviewed provided unquestionably clear and powerful language in support of it.

What is clear is that this position puts the interviewees at odds with the results from the mass analysis in the previous chapter. Unlike the masses, who placed distinct boundaries around the nation, the interviewees are very inclusive in their vision of Scottishness. Where the masses require, in a clear majority, birth as an essential aspect of being Scottish this is not a view shared by certain elected elites within Scotland. A clear divide between the mass opinion, and the elite opinion considered here, has emerged.
In order to investigate this divergence, additional questions concerning the idea of an inclusive sense of Scottishness were also asked, purposely focusing on issues of specific groups of individuals – those of different racial origin and those of specifically English origin. The majority of elite interviewees argued strongly that such individuals could be included in the nation, “You can be Scottish without casting off where you come from” (Interview 5). Many seemed to support the idea that anyone, and specifically people born and raised in England, could be Scottish – if that individual chose to become so. Comments such as “If they wish I think that’s a personal thing to them” (Interview 31), and “we are as all encompassing as we can be and welcome as many people to a Scottish identity who want to take it up” (Interview 19) represent clear examples of how most elite interviewees saw the point. In relation to how the masses would consider such individuals, most comments were distinctly similar; “Nobody in their right minds would class them [English] as alien or in any way intruders or incomers. If they care about their community, I think that’s the fundamental issue” (Interview 17), “All I can say is I think people are comfortable in their [identity] and I think they are pretty welcoming. God knows I’ve been in many a society where they’re not” (Interview 21).

While a comparison of these statements with the results of the mass analysis in the previous chapter shows some agreement, there is still clear disagreement between the mass and elite arguments overall. The masses clearly rejected the idea that English individuals could be Scottish, but the interviewees, member of the elected elite of Scotland, did not. Once again, a clear divergence between mass and elite opinion would seem to exist. But the elite opinion gleaned through the interviews was not totally contrary to mass opinion.

However, despite strong statements on the part of the majority of elites interviewed, and the assertion given above that no individual in politics would argue from the stance of identity being a birthright, such statements where made by a number of interviewees. Several of these statements reflected a strong belief in the importance of birth, history and other cultural characteristics: “I am a Gaelic speaker within Scotland…the oldest ethnic sub-group within Scotland in a way, you can almost argue that Gaelic was the language that made Scotland. What really matters to
Scotland, initially identifying Scotland is the linguistic root” (Interview 40). Here this interviewee focused strongly on an issue that occurs in many nationalist movements – that of language. However such an issue is not central to Scottish nationalism. Gaelic is very much a minority language within Scotland, and is not a mainstream issue. Nonetheless it continues to be a consistent issue within all the major party manifesto commitments, and several elite individuals interviewed cited it as an issue.

One interviewee brought up all the core issues of history, culture and birth, by stating, “What makes me Scottish is my place of birth, my beliefs, my heritage, my lineage, my genealogy, my upbringing, all of that” (Interview 1). Another interviewee provided the clearest and strongest ethnically based statement by arguing that “Nationalism is from birth. Past has passion and memory” (Interview 42). Such a comment clearly conflicts with the statement made by another elite interviewee that none would argue the ethnic sense of belonging. However, the latter statement was qualified by the assertion that “one must remember the rest of the world” (Interview 42). It is clear that this interviewee, among others, clearly argued for a more tribal and less territorial or individual interpretation of being Scottish.

although the tribe is being diluted, and has been I think, particularly over the last 150 years, I still think people would see themselves as – they tend to say “I am Scottish” rather than “I am from Scotland”… So, yes, certainly the place is fairly easily defined and is more easily defined than the Scottishness itself…I think most Scots would appreciate the difference quite clearly…I don’t think people who come to live in Scotland are Scottish…my view is that people should either be born in Scotland or born in another country while the parents are working abroad i.e. not emigrated but were working abroad (Interview 10).

Thus some interviewees echoed the majority of mass opinion, although they represented a minority. The majority of elites interviewed felt that identity could be chosen by individuals and was not proscribed to individuals born outside of Scotland’s territorial borders – despite this being in clear opposition to mass opinion.
9. Conclusions

By interviewing members of the elected elite within Scotland, this research has gained several insights into their personal conceptions of national identity. This includes both their own views of individual national identity, as well as how such individuals conceive of and envisage the Scottish nation, and national belonging, as a whole. It is clear from our analysis that the majority of interviewees saw themselves as Scottish rather than holding a dual identity. At the same time, a significant minority were very comfortable with holding a dual identity and see being Scottish and being British at the same time as very compatible. Indeed even many of those individuals that classified themselves as British rather than both, and even Scottish rather than both, allowed that other people could easily hold a dual identity – if they so choose.

In terms of the nation, and the boundaries that the interviewees placed upon the nation, the majority provided a very tenuous and porous sense of nationhood and national belonging. Although by no means a unanimous viewpoint, the majority of interviewees questioned the idea that barriers beyond an individuals control limited attempts at identification of oneself as Scottish. While all the interviewees clearly identified a sense of Scotland the place, they were much less firm in terms of identifying a sense of Scotland the tribe. Most avoided any such argument, arguing that Scotland had long been an ‘immigrant’ or ‘mongrel’ nation and that being Scottish was very personal and ‘a state of mind’.

While many interviewees questioned the validity of the present state or constitutional arrangements, very few argued that being Scottish was an exclusive category, or should be considered as such. Several who argued, or accepted the validity of this position, dismissed such an interpretation as politically or socially unacceptable in light of the needs of a future Scotland. However even those individuals that held the position of an inclusive sense of Scottishness argued for a strong sense of Scottish identity – and the distinctiveness of such an identity within the United Kingdom. Thus we are provided with a seeming paradox in relation to being Scottish. To be Scottish is to be distinct within the other national groups of the United Kingdom and to have a strong sense of identity. However the borders of that identity are permeable and any individual, whether from another group within the United
Kingdom, or even beyond, may choose to become a member of the Scottish nation, if they wish. The majority of elites interviewed for this research argued just such a position. They focused on a strong sense of Scotland as an identifier, but even when arguing for a group identity premised the belonging aspect of that identity firmly on the individual level.

These findings provide what is clearly a key point within this body of research. Overall, the majority of these members of the elected political elite in Scotland see identity as very much an individually chosen form of being. Belonging to the national group, having a sense of Scottish national identity is a self-perception and self-choice issue. According to this view, any individual that moves to Scotland and chooses to identify with Scotland can and does become Scottish. This argument, which reflects that provided within the political literature, is clearly a very inclusive and civic-based form of belonging. Obviously there are dissenters from this viewpoint, and examples of that dissent are given within this chapter. Nonetheless the interviewees, all elected members of the political elite within Scotland, would clearly argue, in the majority, that Scottishness is not an ethnically based form of belonging, but a civic based form, where membership of the community and a self selected sense of belonging are the main requisites for being Scottish.

However during this chapter this thesis has alluded to the difference of the mass conception of national identity and the firmer boundaries placed upon the nation by the masses of that nation. A clear divergence between how the masses, and the elected elites interviewed, envisage the nation has emerged. Unlike the interviewees, the majority of respondents to mass surveys have placed firm borders around the nation. Being Scottish is not simply an individual choice and one cannot proclaim oneself Scottish unless that individual possesses certain other, mainly ethnic, attributes as well. There are clear limitations that history and culture, and the interpretation of such by the masses, place upon the elite interpretation of national identity and belonging. Scotland, having existed as a separate nation in its own right, and having a distinct and well-studied history, provides for a strong and vibrant culture – which is also distinct from that of its immediate neighbours within the United Kingdom. The results of the mass analysis challenged the political party view of the Scottish nation and of Scottishness. They also clearly challenged the
civic, inclusive sense of identity as argued by the modernist school. It is now clear that the mass position also clashes with the majority of interviewed elite opinion. This thesis will now bring all these strands back together as it considers the results and implications of its findings.
Chapter Nine  
Conclusion

This thesis has considered the issues of Scottish nationalism and national identity within the contemporary political period. The 1970s through to today has been the particular focus. The major political parties in Scotland have been considered in two distinct yet firmly related ways. Firstly the General Election manifestos of the Scottish political parties were investigated and measured on a nationalist-unionist spectrum, permitting their stance on the nationalist debate over the past thirty-five years to be ascertained. This analysis was undertaken in order that the political stances within the nationalist debate, over the past thirty-five years, could be ascertained. Secondly, the rhetoric and imagery employed within those manifestos has been considered in depth, discovering how the ideas of nation and national identity have been employed and displayed. The research focus then shifted to a consideration of mass and elite attitudes towards the issues of nationalism and national identity. This triangulation was undertaken to gain insight into the issues of nationalism and national identity in Scotland from a political, as opposed to cultural or historical, perspective. One of the arguments raised against an ethnosymbolist or any similar ethnically focused interpretation of nationalism is that it leaves the “political aspects” virtually unconsidered (Guibernau 2004). This work employs just such an approach, focusing on the political aspects of Scottish nationalism and national identity, and identifying the historical, cultural and ethnic features inherent and employed within them. By doing so, an understanding of the ethnic aspects of Scottish nationalism and national identity could be gained, and the modernist interpretation challenged.

The ‘failed’ referendum of 1979, and the birth and activity of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, alongside ongoing political activity within Scotland, kept the issues of nationalism and national identity firmly within the political and academic realm. The growth of support for constitutional reform, especially within the Labour Party, during the 1980s and 1990s, and the devolution referenda of 1997 brought both issues firmly back into the main arena of academic discourse and analysis. Yet the nature of Scottish nationalism and that of Scottish national identity remains a disputed and contested ground. The greatest division that exists would
seem to be between those who would argue for an ethnic understanding of nationalism and national identity, and those who engage within a more civic based framework of understanding. Yet at the same time such a distinction is, in many ways artificial. Although such a distinction has repeatedly been employed here it has always recognised that elements of both exist at the same time. Consequently, any national identity is never wholly one or the other. In the era of modern politics, any nationalist movement must employ some form of civic involvement and similar sense of being within its framework. Even an ethnically based nationalist movement, with a strong sense of ethnic or historical belonging and firm exclusionary ideals, must provide for a civic foundation to order the state which it hopes to operate or build. There are few movements that operate on an exclusive ethnic foundation, or seek establishment of a pure ethnic nation-state.

At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that a civic nationalism must still create a sense of national identity so individuals can identify with a specific group – a nation. Creation of an ‘us’ must have a ‘not us’ or a ‘them’ and thus employs some sense of belonging, whether it be territorial, historical or cultural in basis. This sense of ‘us’ ultimately seeks to create a group, based on a common belonging or common culture, a group that can be ‘ethnically’ identified, however amorphous and limited that sense might be. Obviously a spectrum does exist and the modernist interpretation of nationalism seeks to place the phenomenon of Scottish nationalism and national identity firmly at the civic end of that spectrum. It should be noted that many modernist understandings of Scottish national identity recognise ethnic components within the nature of nationalism in Scotland. Yet ultimately the modernist interpretation of nationalism denies any ethnic aspect of national identity, decrying it (within the most strict considerations) as an artificial, elite created movement with no historical roots of any consequence.

However, it can be argued that the modernist view of Scottish nationalism and national identity (that relies on a strongly civic interpretation) does so to the detriment of greater understanding by excluding any ethnic component from that understanding. By focusing on the political, as well as social, aspects of contemporary national feeling and national identity, it can be shown that a strong sense of national identity exists within Scotland and that such a sense can be found
within the political parties as well as at both the mass and elite level of Scottish society. This conclusion will now draw together these threads, and consider the theoretical implications of the findings.

1. Party Political Nationalism
Scotland exists as a separate political system within the United Kingdom in more ways than one. None of the differences are more obvious than the fact that Scotland does not have a two party system. Furthermore while this second point is clearly apparent it is also key to understanding the politics of nationalism and national identity within Scotland. The divergence between the British and the Scottish party system began during the 1960s, when the Liberals/LDs began their (re)rise as a serious political force. The rising support for the LDs would culminate in their becoming the second largest party in terms of Scottish MPs returned to Westminster, finally eclipsing the Conservatives in this role during the late 1990s. Furthermore, with the creation of the Scottish Parliament the LDs entered government, in a formal coalition with Labour in the Scottish Executive in both 1999 and 2003.

At the same time as the LDs re-emerged, the SNP exploded onto the political scene during the late 1960s and early 1970s, greatly changing the nature of Scottish politics. Nationalism became a blatant characteristic of the political scene, rather than being the inherent aspect it had for the previous decades. Now a party openly espousing the independence of Scotland occupied a significant and ongoing position within the Scottish and British political system. It is no coincidence that within the three decades after the SNP's emergence two referenda on the creation of a Scottish legislature were held. This is in direct contrast to the previous six decades where, despite significant interest group mobilisation and popular agitation, no such constitutional activity took place. The divergence created by the emergence of the SNP has also allowed Scotland to develop a distinct political space allowing nationalism to continue as a political force in Scotland.

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1 Obviously the same change occurred within the UK at the same time. However the LDs remain very much a third force in British politics.
2 Chapter two considers this issue from a traditional left right perspective. For a fuller analysis see Soule (Forthcoming).
However, it must also be remembered that all the major political parties in Scotland espouse some form of Scottish nationalism – even when this is placed in a strong Unionist perspective. The LDs envisage Scotland as part of a federal system, but nonetheless part of the UK. Likewise, both the Labour and the Conservative parties remain committed to the idea of a union between Scotland and the rest of the UK. In consequence, the majority parties envisage a continued relationship within a greater UK state. Nonetheless all the parties employ a sense of nationalist language within their core documents and present themselves as being Scottish and committed to Scotland. These declarations of identity are based on the use of historical imagery and myths. Scotland exists, and has existed as a nation for hundreds of years – and no major political party in Scotland challenges this statement, rather they regularly employ it. At the same time, the SNP remain the only major party supporting the establishment of an independent Scotland, politically separate from the UK.

Overall the last thirty-five years have seen both continuity and change within the parties on nationalism and national identity. Three major conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the political manifesto data from this period. The first is the positional change that all parties have undergone within themselves and on the wider nationalism scale. The second conclusion is one that focuses on how language, symbols and myths of identity employed within the manifestos and how the intensity and nature of this has also changed. The third conclusion relates to the nature of the Scottishness, and the nature of nation membership, that is espoused by the political parties.

The current positioning of all four parties on the nationalism-unionism index is closer to each other than any previous time – and closer within the nationalist portion of the continuum. It is interesting to note that the position today is one of all four major parties providing a sense of Scottish nationalism in their manifestos. Although only providing a limited sense of nationalism within these, all three British/Scottish parties are now located on the nationalist side of the spectrum. Even the Conservatives, long the party out of step with their political opponents (during which

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3 Although seemingly a contradiction in terms the idea of unionist-nationalism is not new. As this work has discussed, Morton (1999) has investigated the concept as a political phenomenon during the 1800s.
period they dropped from being the second largest party to fourth with only one MP) provide a sense of Scotland and Scottishness within their language. All the major parties within Scotland can now be considered Scottish first and British second; the exception being the SNP. However, even the SNP has shifted to a position that is much less blatantly nationalist than was the case in the past. The nationalist party is now less blatantly nationalist, at a time when all the parties can be considered as such. The sense of nationalism is so widespread within Scottish politics that it is not the preserve of one party, but the preserve of all. While political differences on the question of nationalism question can be, and are emphasised, specific policy differences seem to take greater precedence in the present day, with the issues of national identity and nationalism an undercurrent. This is not to say that all the parties are nationalist. Clearly Labour and the Conservatives remain committed to the Union, and the LDs to a federal UK. However, all the parties seek to be Scottish, and employ a nationalist idiom.

Such positioning by the political parties has led to the alliance of a strong sense of nation, with a sense of national identity that is not nationalist per se. In terms of the rhetoric and imagery of identity, it is clear from the data that when it comes to General Elections within Scotland all present themselves as being Scottish. However, the real significance is in terms of when and how they have built this image. A sense of history, a sense of cultural difference and a sense of ethnicity have been, at various times, employed by all the four major parties within Scotland. Although the strength and usage of such have changed over time, and between parties, history, culture and ethnicity do play a role in the various parties’ sense of Scottish identity. Yet today this role is much reduced, with major emphasis of all parties being one of territory. Scotland the place has become the primary focus and basis for most discussion on issues of national identity. Being Scottish is now much more connected to a sense of place than a sense of history, tribe or birth.

It is this change in emphasis, the lessening of a historical, cultural or ethnic role in the sense of Scottish national identity presented by the parties, that brings us to the third conclusion. This conclusion deals with the changing nature of national identity within the Scottish political system. The manner in which Scottish major political parties espouse Scottish national identity today is very much a civic based form
rather than one which employs an ethnic, historic, or cultural perspective. Scotland is presented as a distinct territory, but the other aspects of Scottish identity are less emphasised today – though this was not the case even a decade ago.

When it comes to discussing Scottish national identity and the nature of Scottish nationalism the importance of cultural, historical and ethnic components cannot be ignored. Conversi (1990) may argue that the ‘core values’ that communicate a sense of national identity, do not have to be cultural or ethnic and he may be correct. This does not preclude the fact that such ‘core values’ may employ just such factors nonetheless. Indeed many parties within Scotland attempt to employ a much wider scope than simply history or culture within their messages in order to connect with the Scottish electorate, who clearly display a strong sense of identity. Yet it is also clear that the core documents of several of those parties have employed, to a greater or lesser degree over time, clear elements of ethnic, cultural and historic values.

The LDs have a record of employing a minimal sense of Scotland and Scottishness within their manifestos. Even when a sense of Scottish national identity has been employed it has been as encompassing as possible. Providing a clear link between the national and the political has, historically, never been an important aim of the party. However this changed during the 1990s, when the Liberal Democrat manifesto began to consider national identity. At this time the LDs have remained the party that presented a weak sense of Scottishness within their manifestos, but they did present one. Consequently, even the political party that, on a regular basis, most downplayed any sense of national belonging and that regularly emphasises its internationalist and federal credentials employed a sense of ethnicity and history when such issues were prevalent in the political system. As nationalism became a central social and political issue, the LDs engaged with the issues and employed a sense of Scottish national identity within their manifestos.

The LDs were not alone in employing such material when it became a more politically and socially relevant concern. The Labour Party remains a party that provides a strong link between being Scottish and being British. The party has not been consistent or constant in its use of the concepts of Scottish nationalism and national identity. At times they have emphasised it more than is normally the case.
within their manifestos. However, the nature of that sense of identity is also important. Even when strongly emphasising their commitment to Scotland and providing a strong sense of Scottish national identity, Labour has ensured that a firm commitment to Britain and Britishness remained. During the late 1990s Labour joined the other parties in employing a strong sense of Scottish national identity, one which drew upon history and culture and bonds of ethnie. Nonetheless the distinct emphasis on the relationship between Scotland and Britain remained clear in the manifestos. The overall emphasis has always tended to be on Scotland as a place rather than Scotland as a people or tribe. When employing a strong sense of group identity, the borders placed upon that group were not tightly drawn. Furthermore when devolution was established Labour downplayed any strong sense of ethnicity and immediately refocused its language away from issues of national identity. When such issues arose it was very much around Scotland as a distinctive territorial (and now political) unit. The Labour Party maintains a dominant electoral position within Scotland, especially at Westminster General Elections, and feels little need to employ overt nationalist tones and images within its central electoral documents. It employs a national lens, focusing as it does on Scotland the territory, but feels little need to emphasise Scottishness.

The Conservative Party has rarely presented a distinct sense of nation and national identity in their manifestos. When appeals were made to a national identity, it was as often British as it was Scottish. One firm exception exists to this pattern – and that, like the other parties, emerged during the 1990s. Although having remained committed to a defence of the pre 1999 constitutional structure, the Conservatives undertook a strong rhetorical and visual employment of a sense of Scottish national identity in their 1997 campaign document. Indeed, their employment of history, and the idea of a distinct Scottish culture was clearly evident. However this change was limited and the party has, like Labour, returned to a situation where the issue of national identity remains muted. This removal of national identity as an overt aspect of the party language may indicate an inability of the party to employ nationalist idiom in Scotland. The tension remains between their ideological stance as a unionist party and their positioning of themselves as distinctly Scottish. Additionally, the positioning of the Conservative as 'un-Scottish' during the previous two decades creates further tension if the party attempt to employ nationalist imagery.
or language. Thus a removal of the focus on national identity from the political
debate may be beneficial to the party.

Unsurprisingly, it is the SNP that has employed the strongest sense of Scottish
identity within their manifestos. Yet even there a transformation in language and
attitude towards identity has been evident. From a situation in the 1970s where the
issue of national identity was often viewed through an anti-English lens, the modern
vision of Scottish national identity is much more encompassing. From a more
exclusive sense of national belonging, the SNP today interprets Scottish identity in a
much more inclusive manner. A shift from focusing on Scotland the people to a
greater sense of Scotland the place has clearly taken place within SNP documents
over the past thirty years. The position of the SNP is now much closer to that of the
parties in terms of how they present a sense of Scottishness. The modern sense of
national identity projected by the SNP is one where Scotland the place is an open
society and where being Scottish does not mean belonging to a tribe, but instead is a
sense of individual belonging within a geographical or political entity. Unambiguous
use of cultural markers is rare in the most recent manifestos, and although the SNP
does employ them they are the only major political party to do so, and their
employment is very limited.

2. Elite Conceptions
The majority elite conception of the Scottish nation is one with a wide-ranging
membership. This membership is not premised on any ethnic or ancestral sense of
belonging, but rather allows for individual selection to the nation. Such ideas were
clearly prevalent during the elite interviews conducted for this research. The sense
of Scotland the place, rather than Scotland the tribe, was the direction in which the
majority interview subjects directed their arguments and ideas. Nowhere was this
more evident than among the individual sense of identity of the interviewees
themselves. Although a majority of subjects identified themselves as Scottish, a
significant number were happy to identify themselves as both British and Scottish.
This indicates a strange sense of identity – where one is proud of being Scottish, and
that Scottish identity is clear and firm, yet that identity is also part of being British –
an identity shared with other national groups.
Overall, being Scottish was seen as an individual choice. Elite perceptions of national belonging in Scotland gained during this research provided for a sense of nationhood built upon residence within the territorial boundaries of Scotland. Any individual living in Scotland, and identifying with the Scottish nation could, according to the majority of elite subjects, be considered a member of that nation. Although some interviewees did not take this position focusing instead on ancestral, ethnic or historical aspects of belonging, the majority view was very much a civic based sense of identity. This civic sense of identity gleaned from interviews with elite subjects strongly reflected the perceptions of identity portrayed within the party manifestos. To be Scottish is to have a civic-based identity within the territory of Scotland.

3. Mass Conceptions

It is clear that the major political parties in Scotland present an inclusive sense of identity that is not predicated on any sense of birth, ethnicity or history. Furthermore elite interviewees generally accepted the idea that a dual identity, being Scottish and being British, existed and presented few, if any, problems for individuals. Being Scottish and being British is a standard theme throughout the major parties manifestos. It is a theme that remained present, even when the parties employed a greater sense of Scottishness and Scotland during the late 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, it is a theme that also became evident again after the devolution settlement came into force, and British politics returned to more ‘traditional’ policies as a focus. It is also a theme that becomes apparent when one investigates Scottish national identity at the mass level.

The mass perceptions of the nation differ greatly from the sense of nation portrayed within the political manifestos, or expressed by elite interviewees. The masses perceive the Scottish nation as having distinct boundaries in terms of membership. In relation to being a member of the nation, birthright or ancestry are seen as key by the masses. The masses clearly view the ethnic component of identity as a key aspect of being Scottish. Many individuals who consider themselves as being a part of the Scottish nation would not consider others who do not have direct or familial lineage to be members of the nation. Clearly then, the Scottish masses do not agree with the inclusive nature of identity as argued by the political parties or elite
interviewees. This conclusion thus directly challenges any civic interpretation of national identity and nationalism and points to the limitations that the ethnic components place on national belonging.

4. Implications of Research Findings

There can be no doubt that all four major political parties studied in this thesis are aware of a strong sense of national identity within Scotland. Nor is this awareness the sole reason for the parties employment of a sense of national identity and identity related history or myths. They are also aware of there being, within the masses, a sense of history, culture and ethnicity that combine to create a sense of Scotland that cuts across the political, ideological and social spectrum. This awareness is a clear example of the non-rational nature of nationalism that is so clearly illustrated by those such as Greenfeld and Connor. Whatever the basis for such a connection, the masses connect to the nation through channels the modernist school would discount. As the theory that sees nationalism as a historically recent concept, modernism denies any actual historical basis for nationalist attachment. Guibernau states “national identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature, one by means of which a community sharing a particular set of characteristics is led to the subjective belief that its members are ancestrally related” (2004, p134). She is very dismissive of the use of history, arguing that it “contributes to the construction” of a sense of nation, yet she clearly fails to accept that history also places limits on the construction of that sense of nation. The major political parties in Scotland may choose, when they wish, to discount aspects of history, or even adapt them to suit particular social or political ends. The Conservatives have employed historical events that firmly connect Scotland to Britain. Yet such myths and events have not aided their political cause in Scotland. The fact remains, and is emphasised by modernism, that historical events can be selectively employed, yet it cannot simply be created, which many modernists, such as Guibernau, seem to imply. The Scottish case clearly indicates that while political parties and individual political elites may choose to downplay, if not disregard, this ancestral/ethnic aspect of belonging it is an important part of the individual connection to the nation. Furthermore, it is also clear that political parties will gladly adopt and employ historical myths and imagery when

\(^4\) Labour has also, to a lesser degree, employed the same tactic.

\(^5\) The Act of Union being the most popular example.
the political situation requires it. These myths and images are neither created nor
spun out of nothingness. They may be 'interpreted' but even interpretation must take
place within the limits of historical evidence.

Guibernau admits that nations have an ethnic origin but places this emergent basis in
the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century. She argues that prior to that time “the right to rule was legitimated
by appealing to God's will, royal blood, or superior physical strength, and these
reasons were premised upon the belief that legitimacy came from above, rather than
the ruled” (2001, p139). Yet such a statement clearly runs contrary to evidence from
the Scottish case. The Declaration of Arbroath precedes the 18\textsuperscript{th} Century and there
can be little doubt that, according to this document, the right to rule is premised upon
God's will and superior strength. Yet the Declaration also legitimises rule from
below, and states that should the King turn against the wishes of his people he would
be removed. This document makes a clear, unambiguous statement in favour of
nationhood, has been, and is, regularly employed within the political realm and was
not created by nationalist elites. However, modernists would dismiss it as being
‘constructively’ or ‘sentimentally’ employed. In asserting this claim they risk
dismissing clear historical connections that provide links between the Scotland of the
13\textsuperscript{th} Century and the Scotland of the 21\textsuperscript{st}.

The dismissal of evidence that supports the historical roots of nations has often been
a point of challenge within nationalist studies. It has been argued that the
‘implausible, offensive, sentimental, or exaggerated’ claims made by political
national movements are one of the major reasons that it has remained strong within
many polities during the 20\textsuperscript{th} and early 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries (Hamilton 1999). Yet even
when we consider such claims to be offensive or even somewhat implausible, we
cannot dismiss their importance or political impact – even in such established and
stable political systems as the UK. In their current writings the Scottish parties all
employ a sense of national identity that draws strongly upon a civic-based ideal. The
conception of national identity they employ is one that does not rely on birth or any
firm ethnic basis for membership of the Scottish nation. Yet, in the recent past, they
have all, not just the SNP, employed a sense of history, major historical myths or
cultural differences when they felt it politic to do so. Nor have the parties seen any
issue with employing a sense of history or culture when presenting this inclusive
sense of Scottishness. The political parties have seen no conflict in taking this approach. However, such a conflict became apparent when elite subjects were interviewed and became even more obvious when investigation of mass opinion was undertaken. Modernism would point to the employment of history or culture as the moulding of national identity by elites. But this ignores the key point that such events and culture also limits the manipulation that elites would apply.

It is clear that the political parties principally engage with the civic form of nationalism and national belonging. As they operate within a liberal democratic framework that supports a strong multicultural, inclusive image this may be the only option available to them. However, as Hamilton (1999) so clearly points out, this ignores the emotional aspects of national identity and a sense of national belonging that political nationalist movements must employ within their core message if they do not wish to become ‘inconsequential’ within the polity in question. The SNP faces a challenge of not being able to lay claim to any distinct political label of being the national or Scottish party – although this tactic has been attempted. As has been noted, all parties claim to be Scottish and to employ a sense of nation within their political message. The question is whether the SNP would benefit from a return to their previous manifesto style, employing a more emotional, exclusionary and ethnic based rhetoric and imagery. Such a statement may appeal to a core of the Scottish electorate, as identified in the mass data analysis. At the same time, the connection between voting behaviour, party identification and national identity is so complex that such a move would not be guaranteed to provide electoral results. Furthermore, such a move would put them outside the political rhetoric mainstream, and leave them open to attack by the other major parties. Any possible gains are clearly offset by several potential political pitfalls.

Evidently the SNP face a dilemma in regards to national identity and nationalism. The party cannot solely claim the nationalist mantle, and it provides a similar sense of national belonging to that of the other major parties. The only issue that sets it apart within this area is the stance on Scottish independence; an issue that is no longer predicated on any strong ethnic, or cultural basis. The electorate within Scotland may not support such urges towards independence, as the masses do not appear to perceive of their national identity in this manner. The contemporary SNP
message predicates Scotland as a territorial entity, and the inclusive nature of that message disbars ethnic or culturally based claims for independence. Even the history that is employed is part of the future-history pattern, with history being employed to support tomorrow. The SNP do not portray their vision of independence as a return to a ‘golden age’ of the Scots, but a ‘golden tomorrow’ of all the people in Scotland. The connections that such claims provide to the sense of Scottishness held by many within the Scottish nation are clearly limited. The image of an independent Scotland, as portrayed by the SNP, does not resonate with the image of Scotland as held by the masses.

The masses within Scotland clearly feel a sense of belonging, and perceive Scottish national identity through a strong ethnic, ancestral and historical basis. There is limited support for the idea that being Scottish is predicated upon a territorial connection – although this remains a minority view at the mass level. It is clear that nationalism is a daily activity (Billig 1995, Kaldor 2004), whether that activity is conscious or subconscious. Indeed the ‘flagging’ of the nation is clear within the manifestos of the political parties where such actions are both blatant and conscious activities. However, such flaggings are not, as Kaldor argues, made on political grounds such as democracy. This may have been the case in the late 1990s when the referenda on devolution brought national imagery, symbols, rhetoric and myths to the fore. Yet strong support for such a move had clearly existed within the Scottish masses for much of the 20th Century. In addition such flagging was an aspect in manifestos throughout the period – to greater or lesser levels. The flagging of the Scottish nation is made as it allows political parties to connect easily to the masses, who feel a strong sense of Scottishness, a sense informed and provided for by their ethnicity and culture. Thus the political connection is made via these very aspects of national identity.

Kaldor’s claim that “the view that ordinary people need ethnic or cultural symbols seems to me to be over paternalistic” (2004, p164) may miss a very key aspect of nationalism and national identity – that it is, in part, a mass driven phenomenon, with mass characteristics. This very point is one often neglected, even among supporters.

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6 Also 1979 saw a significant lack of such appeals within the manifestos – despite the recent activity on devolution/home rule.
of ethno-symbolist style approaches. Kearton may argue, "it is the elite who articulate political claims about the nation and put forward political demands. It is in the elite that concepts of the nation are shaped and modified" (2005, p 25). Yet it is in the masses that the nation is given form and concrete subsistence. Various elites compete to provide their conceptualisations of the nation, seeking to shape or modify the nation to suit their socio-political ends. But it is the masses that provide the nation itself. The mass conception of the nation, while being influenced by the elite political activity, also influences and directs the ability of the various elites to control the present. If control of the present is control of the past, as claimed by Nairn (1977), then the masses control who has control of the past.

The importance of this point becomes evident when considering Scotland and the nature of Scottish national identity. The political parties and political elites present their image of Scotland as an inclusive, multicultural nation, where membership is predicated on a civic basis. Even the SNP, the major party dedicated to the creation of a nation-state, with congruent territorial and political borders for Scotland the nation, provides a very inclusive image of Scottishness within its manifestos. Conversely, when this consideration of the nation is directly compared with how the masses conceive of their sense of Scottishness then conflict is apparent. Significant numbers of mass respondents to surveys have consistently produced a much less inclusive sense of Scottishness. The masses place firm boundaries around the nation, creating a much firmer sense of who is, and who is not, Scottish in their eyes.

Scottish political parties are not always consistent in their use of historical myths and symbols when seeking political support. Although the major parties, including the SNP, tend to shy away from the employment of history and historical symbols, they have done so as recently as the late 1990s, in order to gain support from sections of the Scottish electorate. This indicates that party do understand how such images resonate with the masses and connect with them through a sense of national belonging. The history of Scotland may be open to interpretation, and parties may seek to present specific historical events to support their own views. But again, the mass interpretation of events limits how far the parties and elected elites can manipulate or interpret specific events, myths and symbols. It is clear the ability of political elites to manipulate the sense of nation and national belonging is limited in

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the Scottish case. While the political parties, and the elected elite interviewees considered here, presented the nation in one form, the masses hold to another. These results clearly question how certain theoretical approaches interpret nationalism and national identity.

It is clear from this case analysis that the perception of nationalism through the modernist lens leaves unanswered questions as to the nature of nationalism and national identity. The masses within Scotland draw upon their sense of ethnicity to create boundaries for, and belonging to, their nation. Political parties may seek to provide a different view of membership of the nation, and to employ that view, but this is both a recent activity for several parties, and clearly it has limits at both the mass and elite levels. While the majority of elites present a modernist, civic-minded sense of nationalism and national identity, a minority of elite interviewees made it plain that they held similar opinions to those of the masses. They too stressed the ethnic, historical and cultural basis of being Scottish. While a minority, they represent a challenge to the overarching view projected within the political system. Furthermore, Scottish political parties will employ historical, cultural or ethnic conceptions of the Scottish nation when they feel the need to do so – in full awareness that these will connect with the masses. Parties that attempt to employ a sense of belonging, a sense of identity that fail to connect to the mass perception, or parties that become identified as being ‘anti’ or ‘non’ Scottish have, unmistakably, suffered electorally. This may also be the fate of political parties that seek to present themselves as Scottish, yet present a sense of Scottishness that is alien to the masses within Scotland.

The presence and employment of national identity within Scotland has been made clear within this research. Furthermore, the mass construction of national identity has also been made clear, and the difference between this and the pertinent political and elite sense of national identity is striking and extremely relevant to the academic cleavage between the civic and ethnic debate. The case for a reconsideration of the modernist position has been made. By failing to address the ethnic nature of nationalism greater understanding of the phenomenon remains difficult. This research does not argue that nationalism and national identity have no civic component. It does argue that nationalism cannot be considered as a created idea.
used to direct and control the masses. The importance of the masses within the creation of the nation must not be overlooked and clearly requires further analysis and study. Nationalism is both a social and a political phenomenon that derives its strength from the ability to provide a clear connection between individuals. This connection provides not only for an association to those sharing the same territory, culture, history and even family, but also makes sense of the nature of belonging as a political appeal. Being a member of the nation connects us to the past and the present – and the importance of that past as a part of belonging should not be disregarded or discarded.
Appendix I
Methodology

1. Manifesto Analysis – Coding and Framing Concerns

The coding scheme of the Comparative Manifesto Project (initially the Manifest Research Group) translates the text of a manifesto into a percentage based measurement tool. It allows for the individual coding of statements within the documents. The relative importance of specific areas can be considered by measuring the individual codes against the total statements within the document. These coded statements can then be grouped into key policy areas or domains, and there are seven specific domains in all. The seven major policy areas are: external relations (domain one), freedom and democracy (domain two), political system (domain three), economy (domain four), welfare and quality of life (domain five), fabric of society (domain six) and social groups (domain seven). It is important to note that the scheme codes sentences, or quasi sentences that refer to separate policies, rather than words.

After consideration of the coding scheme it became clear that the ability to consider a sub-state political system was not prioritised, or even considered, within the original coding framework. The Budge et al system has one single code (301) for support for federalism and devolution or regional autonomy in regards to policy or economy. Likewise it has one other specific code (302) for opposition to such issues, or support for the centralisation of policy decisions. These codes clearly come under domain three (political system) while the issues concerning the constitution and democracy come under domain two (freedom and democracy). From the perspective of the Scottish debate, issues concerning the nature of the relationship between Scotland and the UK cross over between domains two and three. Much of the recent debate on devolution has tended to emphasise the democratic aspects of the issues, with the arguments focused on related constitutional issues.

Along similar lines, the system problematically equates patriotism with nationalism in the description for code 601, which is entitled “national way of life: positive”. Items coded under 601 include those that fall under the following classification: “Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to
protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas” (Budge et al 2001 p226-7). Clearly this is not suitable for any study of a political system that is contained within a national area, and yet is subsumed within a larger state. Patriotic appeals within the UK are made to the British state. This is not the case in Scotland in appeals to nationalism, whether such appeals be culturally, historically, or politically motivated. The opposite code for 601 within the classification scheme, category 602, is even more problematic. Coding a sentence as 602 (“national way of life: negative”) would require that it fit the following pattern: “Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; otherwise as 601, but negative.” (Budge et al 2001 p227). Several conflicts in any analysis of a national, sub-state manifesto quickly become apparent. The coding requirements for 601 and 602 clearly indicate problems for the original scheme in relation to any consideration of issues of national identity within Scotland. Opposition to the existing state is the driving force behind one of the major political parties operating within the political system and the conflation of nation with state is clearly apparent and even more problematic in this instance. Changes to the system were clearly required for analysis to be conceptually and methodologically sound.

Other examples of application problems also exist. Favourable mentions of ‘linguistic heritage’ in a country are required to be coded as “multiculturalism: positive” in category 607. The policy debate on Gaelic, or the importance given to this debate, could help provide an insight into the nature of national identity politics in Scotland. Subsuming this within the greater debate on multiculturalism could somewhat mask the ability to interpret the results. Such issues are common in a system designed to be a comparative tool. The ability to compare across state boundaries requires a parsimonious approach to category creation and usage. Nonetheless the need to adapt the system to allow for its application to a sub-state system, and to allow for a consideration of issues of nationalism and national identity was clear.

Therefore, seven individual categories were added to the scheme to allow for specific references to the Union of the UK and the policy of devolution. These policies were

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1 In regards to this particular issue, it was decided to leave the coding of minority languages in 607. This is because Gaelic remains a limited issue in regards to Scottish nationalism.
divided into positive and negative reference codes. In addition, in order to consider how parties could employ specifically nationalist sentiments within their manifestos three other codes were added. These were, respectively, historical/mythical reference, Scotland’s future reference, and Scotland’s past reference. It was initially envisaged that these codes would allow for any major uses of history or appeals to a sense of solidarity within Scotland to be coded and included in any analysis.

The need to address the problems in codes 601 and 602 was apparent. Examination of the coded British manifestos for the post war period found that code 602 had been very infrequently employed – there were only seven manifestos where it was even marginally employed, and in only one case (the 1970 Liberal Manifesto) did it break through the one percent mark\(^2\). Therefore, it was decided to reclassify codes 601 and 602 in order to better address the Scottish system. Code 601 thus became National way of life: British and 602 became National way of life: Scottish. This allowed for a direct comparison between appeals to a sense of Britishness and appeals to a sense of Scottishness that could be made within the manifestos. Employing the original coding scheme would have required both of these appeals to be placed into the same category, the splitting of these statements obviously allows for a more insightful analysis of the manifestos. Also the alteration of these codes in this fashion makes the new categories consistent with saliency theory, unlike the original codes.

After initial coding it became apparent that three of the additional codes, those concerning history, past and future references would yield little in terms of results. This was an indication of the limitations of quantitative analysis in this instance. While there were indeed several references that were made within the various manifestos in regards to these subjects, they could also clearly be coded, and required to be so, under other specific policy categories within the scheme. Thus, the usefulness of these three additional categories was ultimately limited. However, while providing minimal returns, the categories did provide slight returns in over one third of the manifestos

\(^2\) In a similar vein, initial coding of the Scottish documents provided no instances when this code would have been employed in its original form.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Number</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Foreign special relationship positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Foreign special relationship negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
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<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Military positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Military negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Internationalism positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>EU positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Internationalism negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>EU negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Freedom and domestic human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Constitutionalism positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Constitutionalism negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Union positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Union negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Devolution positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Devolution negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Centralisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>Government efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Government corruption</td>
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<td>305</td>
<td>Government effectiveness and authority</td>
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<td>401</td>
<td>Free enterprise</td>
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<td>402</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
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<td>403</td>
<td>Regulation of capitalism</td>
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<td>404</td>
<td>Economic planning</td>
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<td>405</td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
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<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Protectionism positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>407</td>
<td>Protectionism negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>Economic goals</td>
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<td>409</td>
<td>Keynesian demand management</td>
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<td>410</td>
<td>Productivity</td>
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<td>411</td>
<td>Technology and infrastructure</td>
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<td>412</td>
<td>Controlled economy</td>
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<td>413</td>
<td>Nationalisation</td>
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<td>414</td>
<td>Economic orthodoxy</td>
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<td>415</td>
<td>Marxist analysis</td>
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<td>416</td>
<td>Anti-growth economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Arts, sports, leisure, media</td>
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<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
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<td>504</td>
<td>Social service expansion</td>
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<td>Social service limitation</td>
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<td>506</td>
<td>Education expansion</td>
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<td>507</td>
<td>Education limitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>601</td>
<td>National way of life British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602</td>
<td>National way of life Scottish</td>
</tr>
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</table>
For the purposes of this research, elite interviews were sought with individuals holding elected office as a MSP or MP from a Scottish constituency. This produced a significant pool of over 180 prospective subjects. Fifty\(^3\) interviews were completed between June and August 2005. These interviews included two abortive attempts at personal meetings which were substituted by submitting written questions to the subject, which were returned at a later date. The interviews themselves were semi-structured around a base of twenty prospective questions, provided to the interviewees in advance. These questions are provided below. While all interviews began from the same starting point, the semi-structured nature was chosen in order to allow for the freedom to follow more specific lines of interest in each individual interview. The average interview lasted about twenty-five minutes, including an overview of the research prior to questions being asked, and generally focused on no more than four or five questions drawn from the prospective list. In several interviews the subjects had specific questions they wished to focus on and the decision was made to allow such direction to take place as this generally provided the information sought. Several additional comments were made ‘off the record’ by interview subjects, and while they are not included here, they did influence the direction of later interviews.

\(^3\) Unfortunately due to an equipment failure data from five interviews was lost before it could be retrieved from the digital recording unit, thus the final data set included only forty-five subjects. Also although several interviews were cancelled due to scheduling problems the original anonymous numbering system remains in use, thus several interviews are numbered above 50.
In order to gain a deeper level of information, and avoid recitation of the 'party' or public line\(^4\), complete anonymity was promised to all subjects. Only where identifiable by their own statements (such as those indicating gender, position or party membership) are such indications given, although attempts have been made to avoid using such material. This approach was recommended by any number of academic texts (see for example Ostrander 1995). Therefore although several subjects indicated a willingness to waive anonymity, and two specifically requested it, all comments are quoted without attribution.

Although the research analysis in the previous chapters focused only on the four major parties of Scottish politics, the pool of prospective subjects included members of smaller parties and independents within the Scottish Parliament\(^5\). These individuals were not excluded from the pool, and interviews from such subjects are included in the data. Although their specific party (where applicable) position has not been analysed these individuals are members of the political elite and their attitudes and statements provide additional insight into the nature of Scottish national identity and nationalism at this level. Such issues cut across the ideological spectrum and generally do not divide parties as clearly and cleanly as other political issues. Furthermore, in several cases the independents within the Scottish Parliament have been members of the major parties for some period prior to becoming independents.

\(^4\) In fact such an event only occurred once, where the subject provided little information beyond what was available from party literature – and actually quoted such literature as an answer at one point.

\(^5\) Roughly 15% of MSPs fall into this category.
3. **List of Interviewees by date (anonymous)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>August 9, 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 17, 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Written Communication
Written Communication
4. Elite Interview Questions

1. How would you define your national identity?
2. How would you define Scottish identity?
3. What makes an individual Scottish?
4. What do you see as being distinctive about Scottish identity?
5. Is Scottishness important to the population of Scotland?
6. How compatible do you see Scottish identity as being with:
   a. British Identity
   b. European Identity
   c. Other identities, such as regional
7. Does living in Scotland make one Scottish?
8. Scotland has been described by some as a ‘mongrel nation’ (McIlvanney), what do you think of this statement?
9. What about the English living in Scotland – can they be Scottish?
10. (T.C. Smout) An historian once described Scotland as a ‘sense of place’ rather than a ‘sense of tribe’ do you agree with this statement?
11. What role does history play in being Scottish?
12. What role does culture play in being Scottish?
13. Where does race fit into Scottish identity?
14. Is a sense of Scottish identity important for the average voter at election time?
15. Does the UK State recognise the importance of Scottish identity?
16. What is Scotland’s place in the Union today?
17. What was Scotland’s place in the Union historically speaking?
18. What impact has nationalism had on Scottish politics in the last thirty years?
19. Is Scottish nationalism dependent on the popularity of other political ideologies or beliefs?
20. Why did devolution occur in the 1990s and not earlier?
Bibliography


**Manifestos Referenced**

**Conservative**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>Tomorrow Scotland</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974 (Feb)</td>
<td><em>Conservative Party Manifesto for Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><em>Conservative Manifesto for Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td><em>Conservative Manifesto for Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>The Best Future for Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td><em>Fighting For Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td><em>time for common sense for Scotland</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2005  

\textit{Are you thinking what we’re thinking? It’s time for action}

**Labour**
1979  
\textit{The Better Way for Scotland}
1983  
\textit{The New Hope for Scotland}
1987  
\textit{Scotland Will Win}
1992  
\textit{It’s time to get Scotland moving again}
1997  
\textit{because Scotland deserves better}
2001  
\textit{Ambitions for Scotland}
2005  
\textit{Scotland forward not back}

**Liberal/Alliance/LD**
1979  
\textit{Scottish Liberal Manifesto}
1983  
\textit{Working Together for Scotland}
1987  
\textit{The Time Has Come for Scotland}
1997  
\textit{make the difference}
2001  
\textit{for a liberal and democratic Scotland}
2005  
\textit{The Real Alternative}

**SNP**
1970  
\textit{The New Scotland}
1974 (Oct)  
\textit{Scotland’s Future}
1983  
\textit{Choose Scotland – The Challenge of Independence}
1987  
\textit{Play the Scottish Card}
1992  
\textit{Independence in Europe – Make it Happen Now}
1997  
\textit{YES WE CAN Win the Best for Scotland}
2001  
\textit{We Stand for Scotland}
2005  
\textit{If Scotland matters to you make it matter in May}