UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION
- THE MARYHILL CORRIDOR PROJECT

by

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SYNOPSIS

The Study of Implementation has been one of the most obscure aspects of planning, partly because of the lack of documentation and analysis of the processes which it is characterised by and partly because of the complexity and mercurial nature of such processes in practise.

This research has centred around the examination of implementation in the planning process by focusing attention on a particular place through a particular period of time. The place is Maryhill and the time period is the duration of the Maryhill Corridor Project (1978-84).

The thesis is structured on an analysis of alternative views of implementation within a theoretical context where the conventional wisdom of the separation of policy and planning from its implementation is contrasted with an "action-oriented" approach. The issues which the discussion raises provides the backcloth against which the in-depth empirical research of the case study material is presented. This is followed by an evaluation of the factors and processes which have been seen to be significant in influencing implementation.

The analysis is fundamentally based on a critique of the rational-comprehensive conceptualisation of the planning process.

Finally, the thesis returns to an assessment of how the theoretical understanding of the planning process relates to the processes which have been identified in reality.

It is at the interface of theory and practise to which this research is directed, where the study of implementation becomes most significant and where the coming together of different actors and agencies plays a central part.
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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Planning as an activity and as a profession, since the early 1970's, has been the subject of a strong debate concerning questions of its altruistic purpose and its inequitable distributive consequences. A more emotive attack on the planning profession has been the subject of many a radical critique (Glass 1959; Simmie 1974) as well as raising fundamental dilemmas over the utility of planning as a task in its own right (Friedmann 1973, Schon 1971).

The apparent success of the post-war planning system (Cullingworth 1976; Hall 1982) was to meet with growing uncertainty through the 1970's, particularly through a decline in economic growth and constraints on public expenditure and, more importantly, a political climate increasingly antagonistic to the planning system for not delivering the goods.

This apparent inability to get policy on the ground resulted in a re-evaluation of the planning system through various bodies including the Planning Advisory Group (1965), The Royal Town Planning Institute (1976; 1979), as well as by academics who were now emphasising the "crisis in planning" (Healey et al 1982) suggesting that a dangerous relapse into pragmatism was occurring.

However, the issues which have been raised are not confined to physical planning but include the whole area of bureaucratic organisation in public policy. Similarly, the "failure of planning" should not necessarily be seen as a failure of the planning system per se but rather in the ways it has been operated. Perhaps the most important debate has been over the limitations of the rational - comprehensive approach which has characterised planning since the post-war period, resulting in a need to look for other avenues of understanding. In the context of this thesis the most important avenue has been the emphasis on implementation and particularly on "action" within that arena.
The understanding that something has gone wrong, has been evidenced by the problems of coping with growing complexity in the field of planning and difficulties encountered in dealing with questions of uncertainty.

Implementation issues and processes have thus become increasingly important. It would appear, however, that more has been assumed about implementation than has actually been understood. This may partly be the result of the study of implementation of policy lacking "glamour". However, a policy is only as good as its implementation.

The study of policy implementation or the "outputs" of policy is concerned with the capacity of actors, agencies and institutions to deliver the intentions of policy, the difference between the two resulting in what Dunsire (1978) terms the "implementation gap".

The dearth of implementation studies has been bridged by few writers amongst the most notable of which are Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).

"Attempts to plan are no more planning than the desire to be wise may be called wisdom or the wish to be rich entitles a man to be called wealthy. Promise must be dignified by performance. The determination of whether planning has taken place must rest on an assessment of whether and to what degree future control has been achieved ". (P 129)

The lack of study of implementation processes has posed difficulties in assembling material for analysis.
"Few questions have been asked about what the assumed implementation processes actually entail, what factors are likely to affect them, and how likely is a given proposal to improve them in practice". (Prior 1985, p 4)

The implications of the above have therefore resulted in

"little or no consideration given to the complex chain of reciprocal interactions required to implement them". (Op Cit, p 4)

(a) **THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON PLANNING**

Much of the analysis of implementation is embedded within several theoretical frameworks which lie on a continuum from, at one end, the rational/comprehensive paradigm to models based on incrementalism and behavioural studies.

By analysing the rational/incremental continuum and the various methodologies deriving from it, the main features of the debate about factors influencing implementation may be highlighted.

(i) **Rational/Procedural Planning**

The basic dilemma which this approach highlights is the need for and access to relevant information and the examination of alternative strategies. Meyerson and Bamfield (1955) adopted this approach in which rational, comprehensive planning is seen as a linear process of;

(1) listing all opportunities for action;
(2) identifying all consequences following from each possible action;
(3) selecting the action which would be followed by the preferred set of consequences;
monitoring the results (Banfield 1959)

There is a separation of policy from implementation such that the difficulties of implementation are based on inadequacies in the way in which programmes or policies are formulated. This raises a dilemma as to the importance of policy conformance (i.e., the degree to which control can be exerted in order to ensure the execution of policy intentions) and policy performance (concentrating on the ability of "implementers" to act out policy.

A great deal of criticism has been levelled at the rational model for; (1) its apolitical assumptions; (2) its deterministic view of the policy – implementation process; (3) the assumption of the availability of perfect knowledge; (4) the logical, linear progression of decision-making; and (5) its emphasis on consensus to ensure implementation occurs in line with policy, leading Hambleton (1978(a)) to the conclusion that:

"Some of the drawbacks are that such a synoptic attempt at problem solving is beyond man's limited intellectual capacities, fails to recognise that information is either not available or available only at prohibitive cost, ignores the high cost of analysis and is ill-suited to the diverse forms in which policy problems actually arise. More fundamentally the process ignores the political realities of urban government for it assumes that agreement can be reached on the objectives to be pursued when these are the subject of continuing social conflict" (P 6).
Vickers (1976) nevertheless argues that the rules of the game must be established and that "rational analysis is not on this account useless. On the contrary it is essential". This has led to a wider, looser definition of rationality which incorporates differences in values such that there is no one, best answer, rather that many, different rationalities exist - Faludi (1973, 1982) admits the difficulties of bridging the gap between ideals and reality suggesting that it is only as a normative model that the rational/procedural approach has any relevance.

(ii) The Behavioural - Incrementalist Approach

Arising from studies of organisational behaviour and decision making, this approach has been furthered most by Lindblom through his "science of muddling through" or its more technical term "disjointed incrementalism" (Lindblom (1959)). Lindblom totally rejects the ideal of rational/comprehensive planning stating that the incrementalist approach postulates that goals can only be partially achieved. Means and ends, unlike the rationalist approach, are not distinct and includes the assumptions that (1) administrators decide policy without clarifying objectives first; (2) circumstances play an important part in policy choices and (3) the choice of policy combines values in different ways. Agreement on policy is seen as the only practical test of the policy's correctness achieved through mutual adjustment between those involved in decision-making. In this strategy implementation is seen as part of and not distinct from policy-making. However, criticisms have been laid at the approach for favouring the more powerful groups in a pluralist society and neglecting the importance of innovations with its short term focus (Faludi 1973).

The approach has also been criticised for not relating to large scale fundamental decisions which has led Etzioni (1967)
to combine the rationalist/incrementalist approaches through the strategy of "mixed scanning" in which;

(1) high order, fundamental policy-making processes set the basic directions; and
(2) incremental processes prepare for fundamental decisions, and work them out after they have been reached.

(iii) The New Humanist Tradition

This approach is characterised by the writings of Friedmann (1973) and Schon (1971). Basically the approach calls for normative planning where planners subject both means and ends to rational consideration i.e. combining scientific analysis with reform and change. This approach, however, rejects the central control of rationalist thinking and the pragmatism of Lindblom.

There is a rejection of the bureaucratic model of organisation in which traditional planning has been moulded, stressing the cognitive limits of a central intelligence - Schon (1971) sees planning as a form of social learning occurring in small, temporary, non-hierarchical working groups involving inter-personal transactions in a reticular decision-making environment.

The widespread notion that plans ought to get accepted and then when they are not, failure is seen as that of society, rests on a technocratic fallacy that planning proposals are superior to the actions of others.

If the focus is shifted from decisions to actions it is possible to assert that any action that is deliberate is also planned and therefore the "problem is not how to make decisions more rational but how to improve the quality of the action
The problem of "dynamic conservatism" (Schon 1971) in organisations ie. resistance to change, is seen as reinforcing itself through the interests, perceptions and values of the actors involved. This has led to an emphasis on the pathology of organisations as central to implementation problems.

Implementation cannot therefore be divorced from policy as this approach concentrates on those involved with policy and its implementation. The approach has much in common with advocacy planning in the United States and is utopian in its a priori need for changes in social attitudes.

(iv) **Urban Managerialism**

Three strands can be identified in the development of this thesis; (1) the systems approach to planning (McLoughlin 1973); (2) urban sociology (Pahl 1970); and (3) the growth of applied management techniques (Stewart 1971).

By virtue of being able to affect other people's life chances because of the complexity of the industrial city Lambert (1970) argues that this places considerable power in the hands of bureaucratic officials in allocating scarce resources. This is fundamentally a top-down, elitist, hierarchical view of decision-making and implementation and as such this thesis has been attacked on similar grounds as the rational model.

(v) **The Political Economy Tradition**

This approach has formed much of the criticism of the planning system and profession during the 1970's. It postulates
that particular social forms can only be comprehended through an analysis of their development through time and their relations with society as a whole. The particular context in this case is the capitalist mode of production. It views the planning system therefore as an instrument of capitalism which allows the latter to maintain the socio-legal system in the hands of the dominant class.

Therefore town planning is not merely a form of "rational" behaviour applied to urban development but is part of the process of social transformation and class struggle. There is an important emphasis on ideology by its supporters and its critics. Nevertheless, it opens up important questions on the role of the planner and the planning system in a "political" system. As of yet, however, it has little prescriptive value in determining the nature, role and scope of implementation process.

(b) Implementation Within Theory

The introduction of the different models on planning theory above, has been a necessary precursor since the different approaches on implementation which have emerged over the past two decades have used these models to describe the conceptual nature of implementation and its role within prescriptions for action.

Perhaps one of the most difficult questions about implementation is where it actually occurs i.e. after policy is made, or whether it runs through the whole planning process such that the boundaries between policy and implementation become blurred. What is important here is what the segregation of policy from, or its integration with, implementation reveals about the conceptual biases of empirical or theoretical formulations about implementation (Prior 1985). The differing values and assumptions based on the theories outlined above therefore have important implications for the prescriptive value of implementation within a
Two of the main exponents on implementation studies have been Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). In their study they emphasise the complex chain of reciprocal interactions which has to be bridged before even the "ordinary", day-to-day features of implementation can be achieved. They emphasise the importance of the multiplicity of decisions which increase inversely with the probability of programme success:

"When a programme depends on so many actors, there are numerous possibilities for disagreements and delay" (p 102).

Delay, in fact, is seen as a basic pathology of implementation processes. As well as this "failure" is attributed to:

1. the inability to follow through programmes;
2. conflicts of interest;
3. administrative antagonisms within and between agencies; and
4. poorly defined aims and intentions.

These features place the Pressman and Wildavsky methodology within the rationalist approach. The focus on organisation and policy design in order to minimise delay leads them to assert the need to:

"concentrate on those major decision points that determine the course of the programme or that had to be passed in order for the programme to continue" (op cit., p 102)

with the basic dichotomy being that;

"programmes can be delayed, modified, scaled down and otherwise adapted or distorted to fit their environment" (op cit, p 110)
The sheer difficulty would be to determine which decisions were in the direction of the defined goals and which were unplanned diversions from the intended path. The behavioural analysis by Pressman and Wildavsky describes the need for greater co-ordination but accepts the tautology of co-ordination as a term for renaming the existing problems of implementation. Whilst accepting the need to make the difficulties of implementation part of the initial formulation of policy and thus drawing means and ends together criticism has been placed on Pressman and Wildavsky by Barret and Fudge (1981) for their assumption that policy-making and implementation proceed by a series of logical steps, and conceiving implementation as putting policy into effect.

For this reason the approach of Pressman and Wildavsky exhibits characteristics of the rational approach. Although Pressman and Wildavsky recognise that programmes can begin from intentions rather than pre-defined goals and that co-ordination depends on whose terms it is devised, they are not incorporated into their prescription for implementation processes. Hood (1976) and Dunsire (1978) have shown how difficult are the problems of organisational control even within unitary hierarchical organisations suggesting that difficulties will increase within multi-agency situations. For Dunsire and Bardach (1977) the problem becomes one of control whilst accepting, with their emphasis on behavioural aspects, the role of key individuals in the planning process.

Again, the focus is on creating the conditions and resources which can sustain a programme through the process of implementation to realise the initial goals. Bardach suggests that inherent problems of delay in the latter because of uncertainty and the complexity and number of conflicts will serve to shift the intended path out of sequence. The prescription therefore becomes the design of simple, straightforward programmes.

(c) Implementation As Action

Barret and Fudge (1981) state that much of the literature on
policy and implementation takes a managerialist perspective with the problems of implementation seen in terms of co-ordination, control or obtaining compliance with policy. Such approaches, they assert, tend to play down issues of power relations, conflicting interests and value systems between individuals and agencies who make policy and those who put it into effect.

Their approach therefore concentrates on implementation as a political issue stating that:

"rather than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of consequential actions, the policy-action relationship needs to be regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends" (Barret and Fudge p 23)

An emphasis is placed on the need for theories to take account of individuals and groups within institutional settings and focus attention on administrative structures, bureaucracy and the questions of accountability, power, professional "cultures" and the environmental setting. The latter represents the need for a behavioural approach concentrating on "action" within a plural social context. In this conception, the key issues in understanding implementation processes are considered to be;

(a) the multiplicity and complexity of interests involved;
(b) questions of control and co-ordination; and
(c) issues of conflict and consensus.

This analysis takes policy as the starting point from which action
begins. Hill et al (1979) makes the qualification that not all action relates to a specific or explicit policy such that policy may be a response to action at a lower level since in many areas those on whom action depends are not in a hierarchical set-up.

Thus implementation is not just putting policy into effect but observing what actually happens and to understand how and why. From this implementation in the context of action may be seen as a series of responses; to ideology; environmental pressures; or from other groups within a setting of power relations. These responses operate as dynamic processes, changing over time.

This approach has much in common with Lindblom's incrementalism and theories of political and organisational behaviour, and with Etzioni's "mixed scanning" attempting to find practical methodologies that utilise more behavioural explanations of the policy-making process. The need to locate such an approach within its social context draws on the structural nature of processes within the political economy tradition.

The multitude of forces involved in a pluralist society means that this approach contrasts significantly with the idealistic assumptions of the rationalist paradigm. The emphasis is on policy performance rather than policy conformance with negotiation, bargaining and compromise central concern.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that two contrasting (though not unrelated) methodologies have emerged from a concern with the complexity of and capability to respond to, implementation processes which have acted as a stimulus for developments in the prescriptive field.

The rational - procedural approach has developed through the analyses of Pressman and Wildavsky, Dunsire and the related areas of the Systems approach and cybernetics with an emphasis on creating organisation and management structures and processes to deal with the demands placed upon them. Sophisticated technologies
concentrating on technical controls (Dror 1963) are characteristic of ensuring policy conformance.

The incrementalist - behavioural perspective places implementation within the political context responding to the dynamic environment of conflicting interests, values and power. Emphasis is therefore placed on policy performance in which policy and action become firmly linked. Since all planning processes are, by definition, rational, it would appear therefore that the criticisms of the rational approach have attempted to focus on a new rationality. As such the recognition of the Rational - Incremental continuum is important with the rational-comprehensive approach emphasising a technical rationality while the behavioural models tend to exhibit a political rationality.

(d) Conclusions

The real problem centres on the conception of implementation, its relation to the environment and how it is treated as a result. The pursuit of rational inquiry developed through the 20th century has been linked with objectivity and neutrality. This is evidenced in the rational comprehensive paradigm which has characterised planning over the past 35 years. Nevertheless the recurring dilemmas of this system since the post war period highlighted the inequitable rewards it delivered, resulting in conflicts of interest;

"These conflicts exposed the frailty of the claim to objectivity on which was founded the authority of science and of the professions which were expected to advance knowledge and apply it" (Donnison 1975 p 14)

The emergence of behavioural/incremental and structural models, mainly as a response to the rational/procedural approach, placed a greater emphasis on political activity. The resultant plurality of perceptions that have emerged have been characterised by
different perceptions, methodologies, ideologies and values have produced various interpretations of the concept of implementation.

(e) **Issues for Implementation**

The study of implementation therefore becomes problematic. The poor level of understanding of and research into implementation processes is characteristic of this dilemma. For this thesis, however, what is important are the issues which the dilemma raises and which have an important bearing on the case material presented here. The main problem areas which have emerged can be described as:

1. the nature and role of implementation in the planning and policy process;
2. the nature of decision-making processes i.e. linear or reticular;
3. the role of individuals and groups and their perceptions; values and ideologies;
4. the relationship between policy-makers and implementers;
5. the influence of political processes in planning and implementation; and
6. the context of changing circumstances.
CHAPTER 2
MARYHILL - THE BACKGROUND

From the conclusions reached in the last chapter it has been recognised that implementation processes are dynamic and influenced by the context within which they operate. It is thus essential to understand the circumstances leading up to the declaration of the Maryhill Corridor Project in order to show why the latter emerged and what changes needed to take place in order to achieve the desired aims.

This brief chapter and the next attempts to show the complexity of the processes of implementation and of the links between policy and implementation.

In order to simplify and aid discussion a "Table of Events" (Appendix 1) has been prepared which locates various events within the different streams of activity which have had an effect on the Maryhill Corridor Project. This is to be read in conjunction with the thesis. The table is divided into 4 columns entitled;

(1) Planning and Management (describing events in this field affecting local government in general);
(2) Maryhill (which describes events specific to this area);
(3) Politics (highlighting important political events at the local scale);
(4) External (describing national, large-scale events and trends).

It is the interaction between these topic fields and their bearing on developments on the processes of implementation which are significant here.

(a) The Geography of Maryhill

The "Maryhill Corridor" was originally used to describe the
proposed Motorway route which was to run the length of the main arterial route of Maryhill Road which bisects the project area (Plate 1)(Fig 1). The history of the proposed motorway and the subsequent changes which were to lead to its abandonment will be discussed in the next section suffice to say that the title Maryhill Corridor was to be retained for the eventual "Maryhill Corridor Project" which provides the subject matter for this thesis.

The area described as the Maryhill Corridor extends from Glasgow City Centre to the city boundary in the north-west, covering an area of nearly 2,500 acres. The area extends out in a sectoral fashion from the inner city in the southern end to the peripheral housing estate of Summerston in the north along the main Maryhill Road, finally running into the Agricultural and Green Belt.

The area is crossed by the River Kelvin which forms part of the western boundary of the Corridor boundary and by the Forth and Clyde Canal along which much of the traditional industrial activity of the area was and is located (Plate 2).

Population has steadily declined over the last 20 years, leaving the established population by 1977 at approximately 40,000.

There are also important variations within the area. In the south much of the Corridor lay derelict with the closure of many local businesses and demolition of high density tenemental properties. This produced many "gap" sites and larger tracts of vacant land. The middle of the Corridor contains areas of inter-war and post-war housing and, where the original railway station was located, recent shopping developments attempting to regenerate commercial activity along the main route, Maryhill Road. In the north the construction of Summerston housing estate in the 1970's contrasts with the older, southern part of the Corridor, exhibiting a more diversified tenure mix. This reflects significant variations in the age structure of the different communities in the area (Fig 2). Within these different territories exist many community groups, emphasising
Plate 1. - The Maryhill Corridor; following the main arterial route, Maryhill Road, which bisects the Project area.

Plate 2. - A general view of Maryhill showing the interaction of housing and industry.
FIG. 2  NEIGHBOURHOOD AREAS IN MARYHILL.
the parochial nature of much of the activity in the area.

(b) *Background to the Corridor Project*

Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, different parts of the area referred to as the Maryhill Corridor were the subjects of local authority planning activity. The 1960 Quinquennial Review of development plans by Glasgow Corporation had designated Woodside in the south of the Corridor, as a Comprehensive Development Area (CDA) and created two further Outline CDA's in North Kelvinside and Maryhill (Fig 1). This was aimed at providing for the comprehensive redevelopment of the area by ensuring that proposals for the use of particular sites were worked out in advance of any "slum clearance" activities. However, as with many of these projects during this era, they tended to be over-ambitious with much demolition but little development resulting in large areas of decay and dereliction within the Corridor.

On top of this a proposal in the Greater Glasgow Transportation Study (1965), to build a Motorway running through the full length of the Corridor - one of the main reasons for adapting the label now being used for the area - created a blight on a number of areas. The Motorway gained further legitimacy because of the related Inner Ring Road proposed for the city onto which the Maryhill Motorway would feed (see Table of Events).

Central Government, by the late 1960's, was cutting back on capital expenditure on large scale projects which it subsidised and which resulted in uncertainty being placed on the Maryhill Motorway.

Significant changes were also taking place in other fields which were to have an important bearing on planning at this time. The concern over the inflexibility of Development Plans caused the Planning Advisory Group (PAG) Report to be produced in 1965 which became instrumental in the publication of the 1967 White Paper on Town and Country Planning eventually resulting in the Town and

The reorganisation of local government which these Acts provided for, changed the traditional county council system to a two tier system which in Scotland (1975) resulted in the creation of Regional and District authorities as well as three all-purpose authorities who became responsible for producing structure and local plans. This would provide the "stage" when the new Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow District Council were formed and who would be the two tiers involved in the eventual Corridor Project. This important change from the all purpose Glasgow Corporation to the Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District was to lead to significant differences between the two; the District because of its important loss of functions and the Region as a wholly new creature attempting to find its feet in the new administrative arrangements.

Strathclyde Region, which had now taken on the transport function, became responsible for the motorway programme. However, there was continued public concern backed by local politicians over the blight that was being caused in the area. The growing uncertainties over capital funding, were eventually to lead to the Maryhill Motorway being deleted from the Regions "Strategic Highways Schemes" in 1976.

Another significant factor from the early 1970's which was to have an important effect on the Corridor Initiative was the increasing concern for the growing social and economic problems prevalent in the inner cities. The context within which these developments took place can be identified from the Table of Events:

(c) The Inner City Problem

The 1971 census revealed that the severest concentrations of those suffering the greatest social and economic distresses were located in the Inner Cities of our urban areas, most significantly in Clydeside (Holtermann 1975). As well as the blight in these areas caused by redevelopment proposals, these severe conditions
were also related to wider structural issues. As a result a new approach was adopted which would attempt to develop a more "Comprehensive" approach to such problems.

The call for the "total approach" by Peter Walker, Environmental Secretary in the 1970-74 Conservative Government, emphasised the need for a multi-agency response to problems. The publishing of the Bains Report (1972) and Paterson Report (1973) on organisations and management structures for the new local authorities proposed the development of the corporate approach to the organisation of authorities. This was to influence how they would perceive the problems of the inner cities. The 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts also represented a change in emphasis from redevelopment to rehabilitation of older housing stock primarily due to financial expediency.

Therefore the officially received view of the problems to be tackled by urban renewal in the inner cities changed from impatience with delays in reaching the end of the slums in the 1960's, to concern about the "urban crisis" in the 1970's, and indeed the crisis for the planning system in how to respond to these problems.

Many of the problems were related to a declining economic base. Industry was now locating outside the older urban areas and links were being made with the growth of new towns to the neglect of inner cities. The interrelated social and economic problems which ensued were directly tied to growing national problems not least of which was unemployment. By the mid 1970's the inner cities debate had become increasingly "politicised".

(d) Local Implications

The Holtermann Study (1975) highlighted the specific problems of Clydeside in which it was reported in the Glasgow Herald "It turns out that...the national picture is dominated by Scotland (whose cities, particularly Clydeside, apparently contain areas of severe deprivation on a scale not matched in England and Wales" (Glasgow Herald p 5 15/4/75).
Before reorganisation took place, a number of Policy Planning Reports (PPR's) were produced by Glasgow Corporation Planning Department in 1974. These attempted to provide city-wide policies for a number of topics eg. shopping, housing etc. It became evident from these that important deficiencies were to be found in the inner cities of which Maryhill was one such area. In early 1975 the Corporation Planning Department produced "Social Deprivation in Glasgow" which although did not suggest priority areas for Maryhill it did indicate that a number of areas in Maryhill were giving cause for concern.

The newly formed Strathclyde Regional Council had also identified the main problems of unemployment and deprivation as implicit to their social policy. The designation of "Areas of Priority Treatment" by the Region in 1976 identified 3 of the 45 areas which were located in the Corridor area published in the Council's "Multiple Deprivation" document. The growing importance being attached to inner city areas by central government was also becoming more overt under the 1974-1979 Labour Government.

In January 1976, Bruce Millan, Secretary of State for Scotland, announced a programme of £120m for urban renewal in the east end of Glasgow. The project was expected to last 9 years and would be co-ordinated by the newly created Scottish Development Agency with the co-operation of Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District. This, was, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project. It was suggested at the time that central government co-ordination would allow the local authorities to concentrate on other areas. This therefore provided an opportunity for the two councils to show that local authorities could develop their own projects for their identified problem areas. The fact that most of the inner city resources would be spent in Glasgow provided the opportunity to put this to the test. It would allow the Regional Council to develop its deprivation policy to allow a co-ordinated approach to service and infrastructural provision and for the District Council to allow the speedy implementation of its housing programmes.
In early 1977 the Regional Council through its Policy and Resources Committee, consulted with the District Council on their "Multiple Deprivation" Document and discussed the possibility of establishing joint initiatives within the city. Primarily as a result of this the District Council set out to develop their ideas on the establishment of a project in the Maryhill Corridor. By this time the Kelvin Local Plan was entering the latter stages of preparation and a start had been made to the Maryhill Local Plan covering the northern part of the Corridor. In April 1977 public mention was being made in the run-up to the District Council elections that a Special project was being developed for the Maryhill Corridor area.

(e) Conclusions

The particular circumstances identified had thus become conducive to Maryhill being chosen as an Initiative area. Nevertheless important negotiations still had to take place before that special project was fulfilled. These "political" discussions will be considered in the next chapter.

Before turning to the Maryhill Corridor Project itself, it is necessary to highlight important issues which would have a bearing on the Project. These issues would include; how the Project would develop in terms of its political support; the ways in which the "corporate approach" could be used; the effect changed conditions, particularly financial ones, would have on the project. These and other dilemmas would have an important effect on interpreting the processes of implementation affecting the Maryhill Corridor Project.
This chapter attempts to examine;
(1) the factors and circumstances leading up to the Project; and
(2) to examine in greater detail the administrative structure relating to the initiative and the individuals, groups and agencies involved with and related to it.

This, it is hoped, can be achieved by examining different fields of concern which highlight examples of the implementation processes we are trying to investigate. Much of the activity which is examined concentrates specifically on the local authorities, and their relations with other agencies. This selectivity has been a necessary step due to the vast scale of the project whilst at the same time providing the focal point of analysis.

In September 1976, Peter Shore became the new Secretary of State for the Environment. As a response to the growing pressures of the inner city problem, a White Paper was published in 1977 which asserted: "the time has now come to give the inner areas an explicit priority in social and economic policy, even at a time of particular stringency in public resources" (Secretary of State for the Environment, June 1977). The policy was aimed at arresting the decline of inner area population and employment opportunities by spatial discrimination in resource allocation to fund comprehensive Renewal Programmes.

The change in direction, in priorities, was manifested earlier in the setting up of GEAR. The need for central government to be seen to be doing something was very important and was evidenced by the strong Scottish Office influence in setting up the "Governing Committee" of GEAR co-ordinated by the Scottish
Development Agency, an offshoot of the Scottish Economic Planning Department. A great deal of publicity surrounded the projects' initiation as an attempt at the social and economic regeneration of the east end of Glasgow. The Inner City initiatives represented an important innovation in urban policy in an attempt to ameliorate conditions in these areas.

(a) Political Development

In the Labour Government (1974-79), the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey, was pressured into having a second budget in 1977 in which an extra £50m was earmarked for inner areas. The local MP for Maryhill at this time, Jim Craigen, was and still is a very prominent person, particularly in the Scottish Labour Party. He approached Bruce Millan, Secretary of State for Scotland and Hugh Brown, undersecretary of state at the Scottish Office, to lobby for resources and also generate more interest from central government in local areas. A considerable number of informal contacts were carried out to ensure that resources would be available for Maryhill.

After a meeting with Hugh Brown in 1977, Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow District Council agreed that they should accept a commitment to a co-ordinated effort to tackle the urban problems of two areas of the city, namely, the Maryhill Corridor and Priesthill on the south side.

Central Government was keen to be involved in these initiatives particularly because of the growing concern over public expenditure and its effect on inflation. In August 1978, a £56m "lease of life" for Maryhill was announced including the Augmented Urban Programme - a special programme of resources specifically for Glasgow and mainly at this time for Priesthill, GEAR and the Maryhill Corridor. The Regional Council had already put forward its 7 area initiatives including Maryhill and Priesthill which it had negotiated with the relevant District councils. Therefore, before the project could actually go ahead, political support had to be fostered and
commitment obtained through negotiation. In the midst of these negotiations no clear decisions on the organisational structure to be used had been made.

Uncertainty was also prevalent in the political arena. Although, the political debate was focusing around the inner city problem, the peripheral estates were also experiencing severe problems mainly relating to social deprivation. In 1977 when the Labour Government was unpopular nationally, the district council elections resulted in a loss of 20 Labour seats largely in the peripheral estates. The district subsequently came under the control of a minority Conservative administration in which the Scottish National Party held the balance of power, because of their gains in the peripheral estates. No doubt this was a reaction to the lack of attention being paid to such areas. The pre-election announcement of The Corridor Project was perhaps hoped to secure the re-election of Labour councillors did not stop the election of a conservative and SNP councillor in the Corridor area. Nevertheless, a joint agreement between a Labour Region and District in response to Maryhill and other area initiatives would now be executed by a minority Conservative administration. As we shall see, this had important implications in the working of the administrative set-up.

The important fact to emerge was that the Project was a joint Region and District Initiative principally concerned with the intercorporate co-ordination of local authority programmes of capital investment and revenue expenditure. Compared with GEAR, the involvement of the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) and the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) would not be as prominent. The organisational context was also considerably narrower than in GEAR and the management structure was purposely to take a "low key" character. Although this will be discussed in greater detail later, the important fact was that the Project was a response to circumstances, an attempt to achieve the most out of opportunities which had been created.

When the Project was formulated, District Council policy for
Maryhill was already well established through the adoption of the Kelvin Local Plan and the beginning of the Maryhill Local Plan both in 1978. At a broader level the Regional Council's Structure Plan and multiple deprivation policies, mentioned earlier, were being applied to the Maryhill situation and the other area initiatives. This resulted in the production of the Development Plan for Maryhill in 1979 as the product of the inputs from various interests.

An important feature of the success of any project is the need to sustain its momentum, especially in the political arena. After the appointment of an initial joint co-ordinator to the Project which lasted only 2 weeks, the Region and District appointed separate co-ordinators. It was felt that the proposed joint arrangements would be unworkable. With the significant involvement of central government in GEAR it was accepted that such involvement could be an important sustaining factor in a project. The appointment of a civil servant, seconded from the Scottish Office as Glasgow District's Co-ordinator for Maryhill was perhaps important in this sense. Of course, this was variously interpreted by others as to whether it represented central government controls on the District Council or whether it was a genuine attempt to co-ordinate with local government.

Certainly, the 1977 White Paper redefined the role of the Urban Renewal Unit (URU) in the Scottish Office proposing the need for greater co-ordination between central and local government.

Nevertheless, the Maryhill Corridor Project was neither to have the publicity which GEAR had received, nor its highly developed management structure.

At the time when the Corridor Project was initiated it represented a very early period in Inner City Policy. This would mean that the competition for resources between different areas would be negligible and with the existence of the Augmented Urban Programme, meant that things could go ahead relatively easily.
However, this basically applied to the limited financial commitment of the Region. The District funding for the Project was through its mainline budgets and as such would be much more susceptible to postponement since it involved large amounts of capital expenditure, mainly for housing.

The Labour Government was nearing its end shortly after the project was launched. It became pressured into pressing for greater expenditure cuts in local authority programmes. Even, although priority had been attached to Maryhill, central government cuts meant the shelving of whole strategies at Glasgow District, with only one major housing new build development taking place in the city in the late 1970's. The significant fact being that the development took place in Maryhill.

With the coming to power of the Conservative Government in 1979, a new set of circumstances came into existence. The suggestion that Inner City Policy would be kept under review was not enough to allay the concern of local authorities, particularly, with the announcement of a 3% cut in local authority expenditure in 1979/80. The new local government bill which was to be introduced later, with a tightening of control over local authorities was to markedly change the circumstances under which the original policy aims were launched. This resulted in considerable uncertainty over the policy and more specifically for Maryhill because it was a wholly local authority co-ordinated initiative which did not have the high level of political support its counterpart in the east and retained.

These changes were to continue over the years. The ideology at the time concerned the wasteful nature of local authorities and bureaucracy, their inefficiency and high spending, contributing to national economic problems. This paved the way for a stimulation of the private sector and the introduction of "quangos" (quasi - non-governmental organisation) in the form of Urban Development Corporations with much stronger links with central government and strict budgeting limits. This adverse political and economic climate,
particularly for local authorities would increase the uncertainty over their initiatives and their ability to be "responsible" authorities.

Changes were also occurring at the local level by the late 1970's. At Strathclyde Region the strong Labour majority provided conditions of permanent one-party rule harnessing the potential for "strong government" (Dearlove 1973). Certainly, the political continuity was important in creating a stable environment to carry out the area initiatives as in Maryhill. The District Council was a different matter however. The minority Conservative administration relied on the support of the Scottish National Party councillors. In face of changes in central government policy, the Conservatives attempted to introduce similar programmes of expenditure cuts at the local level. An emphasis was placed on increasing the private sector stock (not surprisingly since it is the council's main function) but more importantly this involved selling off 5% of council stock, particularly, in the most "desirable" areas of the city. The Conservative/SNP alliance was faltering however, with the minority administration defeated on issues of "houses for sale" and expenditure cuts. This was ultimately to lead to the resignation of the minority administration after a £30m package of expenditure cuts was defeated by the Labour and SNP councillors.

During the years before the resignation in September 1979, the Labour groups had produced several documents for its members which highlighted the need for new approaches to changed conditions. These were important in the development of the "alternative strategy" adopted when a Labour majority won the District elections in 1980 including the introduction of an area management structure for the city.

The attempt to introduce the politics of the situation is a deliberate act to emphasise the variability of this arena and, as will be seen, the need for individuals, groups and agencies to act and respond within it. The 1977 District elections marked an important turning point mirrored in the transfer of resources
particularly for housing to the peripheral estates (Fig 3).

Nevertheless, GEAR and Maryhill remained the top priorities for both councils, such that in the early 1980's there was a swing back to these priorities in terms of the allocation of resources. Even so, political pressure was growing by this time to end the Maryhill Corridor Project. This was also the case at Strathclyde Region where other initiatives had run their course and other areas had been identified as problem areas. As well as the growing problems in the peripheral estates, pressure was also coming from other inner city areas such as Govan on the south side whose councillors were lobbying for priority to their own area. Increased competition from other areas was therefore becoming increasingly important and particularly affected Maryhill rather than GEAR, since the former lay wholly within the hands of the local authorities.

This raised questions about sustaining the momentum of the project by 1983, after the original 5 years duration for the Project.

Glasgow District Council's Social Deprivation in Glasgow Study (1983) highlighted other areas which were suffering greater hardships than Maryhill or Priesthill. This was also evidenced in the Regional Council's Area Profiles (1982). To a large extent this provided the technical justification for the end of the Initiative, but which was underlain by more subtle political moves.

The above represents the political history of the Project in general terms, relating to local as well as national circumstances. This has been carried out to show the importance of changing circumstances bearing on a particular area and the various influences exerted in different ways and affecting the direction of the Project.

What follows is an attempt to understand what happened in Maryhill and why, by concentrating on the actors and agencies involved at different levels and how they interacted to affect developments in the Corridor Project.
FIG. 3 – RELATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN GLASGOW.
(b) The Organisation Context

The new system of local government and the adoption of the corporate approach were to have a significant effect on the management arrangements for the Project. Arrangements had also to be developed in line with ongoing commitments, particularly on the side of Glasgow District. (Fig 4)

The management arrangements suggested for handling the Project involved setting up a "Maryhill Corridor Working Party" of officials with detailed knowledge of both capital projects and the quality and delivery of services in the Maryhill Corridor. In the south of the Corridor, a working party involving local elected members for both Region and District Councils and representatives from community groups had been meeting for about 3 years as part of the public participation exercise in the preparation of the Kelvin Local Plan, mentioned earlier. While this plan had been approved by the District Council in May 1978, it was decided to retain this working party, calling it the "Kelvin Local Plan Implementation Review Group" and use it as a means of obtaining public involvement in the Corridor Project overseeing the implementation of the local plan. In the north a similar working party had been formed for participation in the preparation of the Maryhill Local Plan. All of these groups would be chaired by a member of the Policy Co-ordination Unit of the Department of Administration and Legal Services in the District.

At the policy level, the idea was that any major issues concerned with the activities of single departments would be taken through normal committee channels. The Co-ordinating Committee at the District Council would receive regular progress reports and have an overseeing role in the Project, relating proposals for the Corridor to city-wide policies where any policy issues involving both Region and District departments would be resolved through a joint meeting between members of the District's Co-ordinating Committee and the Policy and Resources Committee at the Region.

At about this time Glasgow District Council was negotiating
FIG. 4 - MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE MARYHILL CORRIDOR PROJECT.
with the Urban Renewal Unit for the funding of a Policy Co-
ordination Unit which would carry responsibility for the co-
ordination of the District's activities in Maryhill and other areas.
Within these discussions the suggestion was made by the Urban Renewal
Unit that someone from central government might be appointed to the
Unit. This led to a civil servant from the Scottish Economic
Planning Department (SEPD) being seconded to the Policy Co-ordination
Unit in the District for 2 years and within the Unit it was decided
that this Secondee should act as co-ordinator for the Maryhill Project.

In setting up the arrangements for the Corridor Project at
Strathclyde Region, it was decided that the approach should differ
quite significantly from the other 6 area initiatives mentioned
earlier. Given the size of the area, the co-ordinator's role
(appointed separately by the Region) was seen as putting an emphasis
on the "Mini Chief Executive" aspect and playing down the community
development functions relative to the other initiatives. The
individual chosen, Robert Parry, already had 16 years experience in
administrative duties. Also the area management team, which would
be the standard focus of official representation for the Region's side
would be comprised of third tier (senior) officers. Political
representation would be included through local members and a
representative from the Policy and Resource Committee for all the
initiatives, which in the Maryhill Project would, significantly, be
a local Regional member, John Gray. Overall this represented a
significant departure from the kind of structures discussed in the
Region's papers on the Initiatives, although there was clearly scope
for development within this basic framework.

In the District Council the primary aim of the Project was seen
as "to get things done". (more projects, more money). The intention
behind setting up the Policy Co-ordination Unit was to ensure a
speedy and co-ordinated implementation of projects with the Maryhill
Corridor Working Party ensuring proposals did not conflict and that
departments wasted no time in implementation.

For the Region, the scale of the Project and size of the
population (c.40,000) would therefore result in the need for selectivity on the part of the co-ordinator and area management team to achieve purposeful intentions with community groups particularly when the formal structure and negotiations have to be conducted at a much higher level, rather than "the grass roots approach" of other initiatives.

Consequently, the Region was faced with the problem of adapting their Initiative model to the larger scale of activity in Maryhill. The approach selected was to involve people from senior levels in departments and create a forum in which they could discuss problems in the area plus policies and proposals on how to try to tackle them with local Regional Councillors and the Policy and Resources Representative. The community development function was, to a large extent, left loosely defined. Subsequent developments resulted in the formation of sub-groupings, to allow departmental staff from both local authorities at all levels to discuss issues with each other linked directly to the management teams of the Region and District. Two such sub-groups were the Community Work Management Group and the Commerce and Industry Group. Their importance in relation to implementation processes will be discussed later.

As well as the formation of sub-groups, minor changes were to be made to this structure (Fig 5) through the introduction of area management by the District in 1980. However, in order not to confuse the problem the Maryhill Corridor Working Party was retained as a sub-committee of the North West Area Management Team which included the Corridor area. The development of Divisional Deprivation Groups at the Region in 1981 and the Policy and Resources Sub-committee on deprivation was to be the new link through Policy Planning. The seconded co-ordinator for the District ended his post in August 1980 with his post continued through representation on the North West Area Management Team. In 1982 this led to the appointment of a Joint Co-ordinator, Richard Davies (a District employee) after the Regional co-ordinator, Robert Parry vacated his post after promotion in December 1981. On the whole, however, the formal structure remained intact.
FIG. 5 - MODIFICATIONS (AUG. 80 - AUG. 82) TO MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.
(c) The Co-ordinators

A special section is needed to define the role of the co-ordinator because of their key position between policy and implementation. Obviously, their roles would be clearly affected by their perceptions of the context within which they were working and other factors such as their own individual capacities, personal stances, and openness to learn.

In the case of the Maryhill District co-ordinator much of the thinking as to his role had been worked out prior to his appointment and was largely faced with taking on his role. Without having the links to those in higher levels in departments, as the other co-ordinators had, his ability to influence actions was fairly limited to the Officer groups set up through the Corridor Project. Nevertheless, this did not mean that his role was ineffective. However, the co-ordinator's role was basically seen as a 'lynch-pin' through the whole process of implementation and action. For the Regional co-ordinator and subsequent Joint co-ordinator the important links they had with higher level officials and politicians including local members was crucial to the development of this role and the way they would approach relations between departments, individuals and groups. The fact that they were employed full-time for the Maryhill Project was an important factor in developing commitment and support for the Project.

In time the role of the co-ordinator became characterised by progress chasing on projects, harrowing and persuading departments, individuals and groups, etc. The selectivity in this approach was necessary since "action" would concentrate at a higher level of decision-making of formal and informal contacts with an important overview role of the many communities in the area. The use of informal contacts and flexibility to procedures was an essential prerequisite to achieving progress. These contacts and modifications did not necessarily take place within the formal management structure suggesting that in terms of getting things done a much broader "implementation structure" existed.
The co-ordinator's role was based on the assumption that co-ordination between departments in formulating and implementing proposals could be improved by middle-ranking and senior officials giving more attention to a particular area. This assumption, in general, proved to be correct but not particularly thorough consensual agreement between departmental representatives, to co-ordinators, politicians etc. but rather through the ability of the Area Management Team and Corridor Working Party and those involved with them to direct resources and support for Maryhill through the close contact of senior officials and politicians. Progress was made in Maryhill which probably would not have emerged or been as far advanced without the presence of an area initiative;

"In pursuing progress it is clear that the ability of the co-ordinators to tackle relationships with departmental officials at all levels and with elected members was crucial" (Institute for Operational Research Report) Ch 3 p. 42

To summarise the key, pivotal position of the co-ordinators can be highlighted in that;

1) they were the main liaison between the two councils;
2) they were responsible for preparing the agenda for the meetings of the management team and working party;
3) any departmental activity concerned with the Corridor had to be brought to the attention of the co-ordinators;
4) in the case of the Regional co-ordinator and Subsequent Joint Co-ordinator, important links were developed with local councillors;
5) the lack of frequency of Local Plan Working Party meetings meant that the community input would largely depend on the use of the direct informal channel to the co-ordinators;
6) being responsible directly to their respective Chief Executives meant that they had important links with
top-level personnel.

By the Co-ordinator using his contacts with those in central roles, either over and above the area team representative or using the teams view as a support he was to become seen externally as a leading central figure in pressing for changes in policies, practises or the priority being given to the area.

(d) The Corporate Approach

The corporate approach developed since re-organisation emphasised the need to breakdown the departmental and professional stances and barriers to developing a common understanding of the Initiative aims. However, it was obvious that although the corporate approach would mean gaining consensus and agreement, it would also produce important conflicts which would have to be resolved in the progress towards getting things done in Maryhill. It is important to understand that agreement was not necessarily based on common interests but rather on the relative weighting or power attributed to and by those involved with the Corridor Project. This included the full-time commitment of the co-ordinators and elected representatives and how departments would relate to the "ideology" of the Corridor Project. This is perhaps best evidenced by concentrating on the observed action to reveal significant features of the implementation.

One particular issue, in the face of changing circumstances and uncertainty, was how priorities could be modified from the Development Plan (representing that which was to be implemented) within the political arena of formal and informed contacts which would determine what actually would take place in Maryhill.

One of the main political issues after the construction of Summerston in the northern part of the Corridor, was the lack of community facilities in the area. Lessons had been learned from the previous district elections in 1977 when many peripheral
estates seats were lost from the Labour Party. The concern that Summerston may end up like the peripheral estates as well as the greater tenure mix in the area, allowed a considerable amount of priority to be given to the area. Many of the initial proposals for the area in the Development Plan, such as a library, and swimming pool had already been axed through cutbacks.

A situation then arose whereby the development of a community centre for the area was regarded as a top political priority. However, the finance for the completion of phase 2 of the project lay under the control of the Education Department at the Region. In its view other priorities had been identified the most important of which was the construction of the North Kelvinside Youth Wing in the south of the area in the ward of local Regional member John Gray. The Education Department's priorities were embodied within the development plan. However, these were to become modified in the political arena.

The education department put forward a report holding to their original intention to go ahead with the Youth Wing. The Policy and Resources Committee remitted the report back to the officers to meet with the Regional co-ordinator. The subsequent meeting of the Area Management Team with local member and representative of the Policy and Resources Sub-committee, John Gray, and Laurence McGarry (local member for Summerston and Maryhill) agreed to go-ahead with the Summerston community centre supported by the co-ordinator and conceded by John Gray with the concession that the Youth Wing would retain its position as the next priority. Thus, while the Education department still objected after presenting a minority report to the Policy and Resources Committee, the latter overruled their decision in favour of the area management team.

This highlights the significance of political representation and the powerful role of the co-ordinator as well as the importance of negotiation and compromise which are central to implementation processes. Thus the corporate approach is underlain by much more
subtle processes of political bargaining, in this case to the interests of the area management team located at the important interface between politics and administration.

Thus, even with the low key management structure, this did not mean that it had no power. The very fact of bringing senior officials of different departments together had an important effect on allowing informal contacts to be developed which at least would allow them to identify with the multi-faceted problems of the area and at best allow modification and new projects and proposals through such contacts in terms of financial and political uncertainty.

However, effectiveness in terms of the co-ordination between departments and individuals is never always the case. This was particularly so in one of the sub-groups which was developed, the community Works Management Group. This was an attempt to bring officials from the Region and District together to discuss matters of relevance to community development. This was attended by the co-ordinators, elected members and representatives from Housing, Social Work, Community Education and the community workers who were located in the area. In part the problems of this subgroup were due to communication problem in the sense that community workers were not in daily contact with the management team. This was compounded by the lack of a Community Development Organiser (CDO) for 2 years between August 1980 and September 1982.

However, the main problems occurred through clashes of interests and roles. The community workers tended to fall into the trap of airing views of the community for themselves, and such views were not given a sympathetic ear. The lack of classification as to what the group was to achieve was compounded by the different values of the different departmental representations and elected members involved as to exactly what issues were most important. For example the high level of analysis of the reports of the community workers from Social Work and the greater flexibility they had in which to respond to issues contrasted with the much more limited, and more strictly controlled community education input. Thus, while most
of the social projects had been decided by 1978, they did not really get off the ground till 1981 due to departmental problems rather than financial ones. In 1982 the group was disbanded due to these problems.

This contrasts significantly with the Commerce and Industry Sub-groups consisting of the co-ordinators and senior officials of the planning and estates departments of both councils in general. This group allowed sites to be identified and assessed for industrial and commercial use at a period when there was important lobbying to allocate land for industrial use from the stagnating housing programme. The increasing emphasis by central government and on encouraging small businesses by providing advice and information to local entrepreneurs, a role for which the Commerce and Industry group was ideally suited. The group took a new lease of life when the original District Co-ordinator, Alisdair McLeod, and the Town Clerk Depute, Theo Crombie were instrumental in fostering commitment to industrial and business aspects which was continued under the Joint Co-ordinator, Richard Davies. The small number in the group meant that informal contacts were crucial and allowed it to be much more flexible to the needs in the area. It was also aided by other resources and professional inputs from other bodies such as the Scottish Development Agency.

(e) A Multi-Agency Approach

The input of other agencies is an important aspect of the Corridor Project. Although Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District were the main protagonists of the Project, the role of other bodies including in particular, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) and local housing associations with their own independent programmes provided a necessary addition to the organisational and resource requirements for the project.

In terms of environmental improvements and the construction of the Science Park, which although delayed the adoption of the
Maryhill Local Plan in 1981, the Scottish Development Agency provided necessary collaboration with the two authorities. However, in terms of the main development relating to the Corridor the housing associations although carrying out their own projects were also able to take over developments originally intended by Glasgow District Council who, due to financial cutbacks, were unable to fulfill their commitments.

The Housing Rents and Subsidies (Scotland) Act 1975 and the Holterman Study (1975) provided much of the support for local housing associations which aided the development of Queens Cross and Maryhill housing associations in Maryhill.

Housing Associations and Co-operatives were also strongly supported in the Scottish Office by Hugh Brown, undersecretary of state, mentioned earlier in connection with the initiation of the Project.

The fact that local District Councillors were also represented on the management committees of the housing associations, aided the ability to transfer projects and developments to the housing associations. The role of the Scottish Special Housing Association was also flexible in this manner through the Redevelopment Assistance Programme between the District and the SSHA which is discussed later.

(f) Local Political Factors

The political developments surrounding the Project have been considered at the beginning of this chapter. It is important to look at how those circumstances affected situations at the local level and what part they played in the implementation of Projects.

Towards the aim of initiating the Project, it is quite clear that the situation was conducive to this. There was a broad agreement at national and local level on the need to respond to inner city problems. A broad, vague agreement was important in allowing the various parties involved eg. Strathclyde Region, Glasgow District, the Scottish Office, local MPs and councillors
senior officials etc. to move towards the projects initiation even although the exact procedures on its implementation were perceived differently by those involved. More of this will be discussed in the analysis in Chapter 5.

To a large extent, the Initiative was a response to circumstances with the local authorities, particularly Glasgow District desiring to show that they could develop their own initiatives and responses to local problems. Although the Maryhill Corridor Project did not have the sophisticated structure and political backing on the GEAR project, there were important factors which were to allow the Corridor Project to have an important focus in the political arena (see Table of Events).

There seems little doubt however that the hung District Council from 1977-1979 posed problems for the co-operation between Region and District. This was evidenced in the lack of District political representation on the Region's Area Management Team. The presence of Conservative councillors, it was felt would make things difficult and thus the two management structures remained fairly separate.

Not until the Labour Administration was elected in 1980, were relations more amenable, although by this time changes had taken place in other areas. Nevertheless, much of the work of both councils was carried out separately anyway, although the hung council did represent a significant "political" problem.

An important feature in the Maryhill situation was the prominence of Maryhill politicians on both councils. The leader of the Labour Group at the District, Jean McFadden had her ward originally in the Maryhill Corridor. Six months before the 1980 District elections, Robert Gray (now Provost Gray) took up the position of City Treasurer. Danny Crawford, elected in 1980, was given the title of Baillie Crawford occupying a prominent position on the council. All had their wards in Maryhill and the latter two being represented on the local housing association. The effect of
such prominence is perhaps best seen in the housing arena.

Although the Housing Committee included a large range of councillors from the city, there was a sub-committee of this entitled the housing Core Group formed under the minority administration consisting of a smaller number of councillors but on which all the councillors from the Maryhill Corridor area had a place. One cannot infer too much from this, but it is obvious that this allowed a much easier passage of proposals favouring the priority of Maryhill. It also allowed close contacts between local councillors for Maryhill to be more flexible to changing circumstances. For example, it allowed priorities to be changed to accommodate projects.

The Oran Street housing development (Fig 6) was proposed much earlier than its eventual starting date in 1982. However, for this to be achieved an important deal was made between local councillors Buchanan in the Summerston Ward and Baillie Crawford in the Kelvin Ward. This allowed a change of priority to be made from the original plan intentions of a sheltered housing development in Shiskine Drive in Buchanan's ward to making the Oran Street development top priority located in the Kelvin Ward. This was justified by the greater dereliction in the southern part of the Corridor, such that the whole site could be completed within the 1982-4 capital programme when finance was available.

This important negotiation and bargaining had arisen from the financial uncertainty over housing projects. An important agreement was reached between the SSHA, Glasgow District Council and the Scottish Office in Spring 1979 resulting in the Redevelopment Assistance Programme whereby areas designated for rehabilitation or new build by the District would be transferred to the SSHA. However, in relation to the Oran Street development, the SSHA was experiencing cuts in funding itself and concerned that too much priority was being given to Maryhill. Subsequently, a conflict arose between 2 sites which the SSHA had earmarked, the Oran Street site and another site in Priesthill. Pressure on the priority attached to Maryhill resulted in the Priesthill site being chosen.
resulting in the negotiations between councillors to allow Glasgow District subsequently to fund the Oran Street development. Thus the Oran Street development changed hands 3 times from Glasgow District to the SSHA and back to Glasgow District.

This example serves to highlight an important feature of the Initiative and how projects, through negotiation and compromise by specific individuals, were allowed to go ahead albeit not as originally intended in the Development Plan. This was also an important factor in the Housing Case Study examined in the next chapter.

The role of Regional Councillors was equally significant in Laurence McGarry (Maryhill and Summerston) Chairman of the Economic Development Committee at the Region and more importantly for the Maryhill Corridor, John Gray who became the Policy and Resources Representative for the Maryhill Initiative. As well as this the individual commitment to the area, particularly of John Gray, represented another strong factor in the role played in developing opportunities in the area which will be further examined in the next chapter.

The significance of informal contacts in these situations must not be underestimated, particularly when changed circumstances demanded versatile methods of responding to opportunities which were highly important in how "action" would be achieved.

\(g\) Financial Considerations

Financial Considerations play an important part in the implementation of projects. For the District Council most of the funding for the Project was through mainline budgets, especially for housing. These budgets were to be significantly affected by changes in central government policy which led to the abandonment and postponement of some projects. Thus, obtaining resources for projects greatly needed the priority attached to the area and the support of members and officials alike. The concern that nothing
would get done acted as a spur to look for other sources of
finance which had a spin-off effect in Maryhill. This largely led
to the Redevelopment Assistance Programme discussed earlier.

The Region's input was largely funded through urban aid, which
although being 1% of the total Regional budget, was an important
source of finance for the Project. The growing Competition between
different groups resulted in a great demand being placed on urban
aid resulting in administrative changes to the Region's overseeing
role on urban aid applications. Even within the Corridor Project
this was also the case discussed in the case studies which was largely
left to the area management team. Changes also occurred through
central government with the Circular from the Scottish Development
Department (SDD) in 1981 stating that a greater emphasis should be
given to voluntary groups and community businesses. In practice
this aided the development of Maryhill Community Business Limited,
supported through the Commerce and Industry Groups. At the same
time there was also stricter limits placed on urban aid applications,
partly due to the increasing number of them.

In large part the key to making the most of opportunities was
flexibility. This was highlighted in the use made of the Maryhill
Corridor fund. This fund of £200,000 per annum from the District
was intended to be used for "odds and ends" like signposting and
maintenance etc. It was not realised till 1982 when Richard Davies
became Joint Co-ordinator that the money was not being used to any
large extent. In the event, many departments and agencies including
housing associations used the finance to carry out repairs and
maintenance on selected housing improvements and on grassing gap
sites until construction could begin etc. This shows the importance
of flexibility and modification in developing opportunities for action.

(h) Conclusion

Within the structures that had been created (formal and informal)
people were making progress in expediting many of the larger projects
proposals; mounting smaller scale initiatives to tackle specific
problems; identifying needs in the area and pressing departments and agencies to pay more attention to the area. The Corridor Project developed as a relatively heterogeneous collection of activities encapsulating within itself almost all local authority activity in Maryhill.

The Maryhill Corridor Project from the beginning was established from within each authority as opposed to being based on an apparently independent basis as in GEAR.

In this sense the two authorities have been able to take a more realistic approach to the project accepting the limitations of the underlying economic trends and of the organisational bureaucracy which they are part of. This has also made it easier to respond to changes and add flexibility to the situation. This contrasts with GEAR which tended to take on identity of its own creating difficulties over the "ownership" of the initiative.

The Tavistock Institute for Operational Research Report carried out on the 7 area Initiatives of the Regional Council commented on the Corridor Project suggesting that;

"it is difficult to talk about the implementation of the Initiative; rather the Initiative has developed through a process of influence and counter-influence and adaptation " (IOR 1981, Ch 6 p 4)

and continued by saying that;

"So much depends on negotiations and other transactions between organisations and individuals that one has to continually bear in mind the 'total system' of relationships involved in trying to promote a more co-ordinated and responsive local government stance towards the
problems of the area" (Op Cit 1981, Ch 6 p 4)

It will be evident that a combination of factors has guided the subsequent events in Maryhill. This is further complicated by the multiplicity of linkages between the many individuals, groups and agencies involved in "action" in the Initiative. The key role of politicians and co-ordinators has been introduced as has their response to changing circumstances. In the next chapter these problems which have been identified will be examined in greater detail attempting to show; how "action" is defined in the context of circumstance; the role of those involved and their perceptions/attitudes etc; the dynamic nature of processes affecting the area; and the crucial role of political representation in and for the area. It therefore becomes important not to see implementation as the simple transfer of policy into action but seeing it in the perspective of how "action" is going to be achieved.
CHAPTER 4
THE CASE STUDIES

In this chapter, four case studies have been selected dealing with specific proposals and developments in the Maryhill Corridor. An attempt is made through the narratives to relate the detailed discussion of the cases to the general considerations on the Maryhill Corridor Project which have already been introduced. The case studies attempt to examine the roles and actions of the various actors and agencies involved and the bearing these had on developments in the case studies.

The four cases which have been selected are as follows:

(a) Case Study 1 (Community) - The Maryhill Community Central Halls;
(b) Case Study 2 (Community) - Maryhill Burgh Halls;
(c) Case Study 3 (Commercial) - Taggarts Motor Company (Phase 1); and
(d) Case Study 4 (Housing) - Kirkland St/Raeberry St Development (Fig 7)

Each case study is preceded by a "Chronology of Events", giving a brief guide to the main events in the history and development of the cases which are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent narratives.

These case studies will provide the subject material for the analysis of the factors which have been seen to be significant in the analysis of implementation processes and which are discussed in Chapter 5.
FIG. 7 LOCATION OF CASE STUDIES.
# CASE STUDY 1 (COMMUNITY) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

## MARYHILL COMMUNITY CENTRAL HALLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Action Committee formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Urban Aid Application proposed to buy church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Management Committee set-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1976</td>
<td>Urban aid application for main programme submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1977</td>
<td>Urban aid applications approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>Further funding obtained through the Maryhill Corridor Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1981</td>
<td>Resources obtained from Maryhill Corridor Fund.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) CASE STUDY 1 (COMMUNITY) - The Maryhill Community Central Halls

The Community Central Halls example provides an interesting case of how various agencies, individuals and groups responded to and directed a changing situation. In particular the role of the individual is highlighted in the bargaining process.

The Community Central Halls (Fig 7) are located within the Kelvin Local Plan area on the Maryhill Road.

Originally the Halls were a Methodist Church but due to a falling congregation and lack of finance, it seemed likely that the building would close. However, before this doubt emerged over the future of the church in the mid-1970's, its halls were being used by numerous community groups providing for young children to elderly people, and who had become attached to the building and recognised it as a focal point in the area, providing the necessary facilities (Plate 3).

Thus while the future of the building was in doubt, an

Plate 3 - Maryhill Community Central Hall; An example of local community development.
opportunity also presented itself to use the building for community development. If subsequent action was not taken by certain individuals and groups the Church would have closed. In this sense the role of local councillors, John Gray (Region) and John Ross (Glasgow District) became very important. Both councillors held their "surgeries" in the Halls at this time and realising the potential value of the Halls were in a position to act on it. Regional Councillor John Gray became a key individual. In recognising the needs the building would serve, an Action Committee was formed in 1975 and chaired by Mr Gray. Included on this committee were professional people from the area including Colin Williams a local resident who subsequently became chairman of the Management Committee and who was Director of the Glasgow District Council for Voluntary Service.

Initially, however, Mr Gray approached the Regional Council in an attempt to get them to purchase the building as the elders of the Methodist Church had decided they were going to sell the building. At the same time the Kelvin Local Plan was going through its stages and the local Plan Working Party meetings were being held in the Halls. Petitions were organised to increase pressure on the Region to buy the property. However, significant steps had to be taken in order to make progress. This included the need to agree the use of the site within the Kelvin Local Plan to incorporate the Halls new function as a "community centre". The consent, however, for using a former church property for community use also had to be negotiated in order to allow the church to be purchased from the owners.

Time, therefore, became the most important factor. Mr Gray was able to exert, through informal contacts with the local district councillor and the Director of Planning at the District Council, James Rae, considerable influence to allow "flexibility" to be given to the subsequent use of the building. Through pushing the proposal through contacts in the Region's Chief Executive department a grant was eventually obtained from the Scottish Office for £65,000. The money obtained was also partly a product of circumstances in that this was very much the start of the rationalisation of procedures for
urban aid applications in 1976 and therefore they were few and far between. It is doubtful whether such an amount would be obtainable today.

With the knowledge that finance had been secured, agreement still had to be reached for the owners of the church to sell to the Region. Negotiations then took place in which John Gray played a vital part. When the owners agreed to sell to the Regional Council, they held out for 2 conditions: (1) that no alcohol would be consumed in the hall; and (2) that no gambling would take place.

Although there was a Halls Committee at that time, no constitution or management group had been formed to give any guarantee on these conditions. The Urban Aid grant could not be available indefinitely such that a decision had to be made. With the Church owners holding out on the above conditions a compromise had to be found. This involved John Gray giving a personal guarantee that no drinking, gambling etc. would take place for one year and that no licence would be granted. This was balanced by a deadline being placed on the purchase of the property of 24 hours from when the compromise was made. Obviously the church owners would lose out on a substantial amount of money and accepted the guarantee, and sold the building to the Region.

Much of the above activity took place before the Maryhill Project was initiated. Nevertheless, this serves to highlight the processes and characteristics of implementation which this dissertation is attempting to define as well as introducing the necessary pretext to this case study during the life time of the Project.

The Maryhill Community Central Halls is a unique example of a wholly community development run by local people and for local people. It was suggested that it could take on the role of community development in the area through Regional Council aid in line with their policy objectives.

When the church came into the Region's ownership, a proper
management committee was set up in 1976. This committee included local people, some of whom were lawyers, architects who were able to articulate views and who had experience in management. The role of Colin Williams as chairman was also very important through his experience in the voluntary sector. In time, this helped the committee to run their own management arrangements and urban aid applications. However, there was also a considerable turnover of people involved in the project as people moved away through redevelopments and thus could not remain on the committee. Thus there was a problem of continuity.

Nevertheless, the whole project was strongly backed by the Region and particular involvement from the Rev. Geoff Shaw, the first convenor of Strathclyde Region who expressed considerable support for the Community Halls development. Indeed, so much was this concern that a proposal has been put forward to erect a bust of the late convenor in the Community Central Halls.

The support from within the Regional Council was bolstered by the publishing of the Worthington Report which stressed the importance of catering for local needs but not in the paternalistic fashion as in the past. Thus conditions were conducive for the community to carry out what would be the Region's task of community development.

The applications for finance were to be made through the Regional Council. The main urban aid application was in April of 1976 when the Management Committee was formed and obtained on the first of March 1977 for an initial period of 3 years and subsequently funding was obtained for a further 2 periods of 2 years, (1980-82 and 1982-84) and for one final year up to March 1985. Urban aid was granted in November 1979 for 7 years (3 years + 2 years + 2 years) till the 30th of April 1986 as part of the contingency funding for the Project i.e. continuing the Halls project when it came off the main urban aid funding in March 1985. Through these resources the Halls have become a vehicle for local employment eg. renovation projects managing and running the Halls cafe etc.
Much of the progress occurred through community representatives "wising-up" to questions of looking for sources of organisational and resource requirements. At present the total number of staff employed numbers fifty six.

Much of the finance for the project therefore had already been approved before the Corridor Project began. However, the political priority attached to Maryhill at this time had an important effect on the amount of funding obtained for the Halls. At that time there was very little competition between different community groups for funding and most of these were run by the local authorities. Thus the unique character of the Community Halls development and its isolated nature assured that finance would be available. This contrasts with the Burgh Halls saga in the next section where the later application for urban aid ran into difficulties.

This also became the case later on in the Community Central Halls although by that time ie. 1979, it was well established. In fact so successful in attracting resources was the Management Committee that some "differences" occurred between the latter and the Region. The Department of Architectural and Related Services (DARS) was concerned that the size of the premises and the scale of proposals by the committee would lead to problems in accommodating the various functions it performed.

There were other important trends and factors which were also to have a bearing on further implementation of proposals for the Community Central Halls. In 1979, there was a change in Central government when the Conservative Party came to power. Public expenditure cuts were pursued with greater vigour and uncertainty surrounded the future of urban policy. The stricter controls being placed on urban aid applications, was in part due to controls on finance and partly due to the increase in applications for resources. In relation to the case study this meant that it was much harder to obtain resources. This is illustrated by the attempt to obtain funds for renovations which were to be carried out on the building in 1981.
The "expertise" that existed within the Central Halls enabled the committee to process its own applications for funding. However, the concern that was being expressed over the over-attraction of funds to the project at the Region resulted in the latter applying for urban aid for their own architects in May 1981. The processing of the application and the drawing up of plans, however, were subject to delays. In fact, the Region's architects did not draw up the plans for the renovations until Christmas 1981. This meant it was early 1982 before they were able to commence by which time the urban aid funding had been lost since it was now the end of the financial year. In part this resulted in the "differences" between the Region and the Halls mentioned earlier. Other councillors could not understand why applications had been continuously approved for the Central Halls, not realising that none of the money had ever been spent. A similar situation occurred in 1983 but was able to be pushed through before the urban aid "freeze" in January 1984. However, by this time the date for acceptance of the tender for the renovations had expired ie 3 months after the contract was confirmed. In the event, the building contractors Dickies* had to be asked to hold their price for 6 months at the same fixed price, the significant fact being that if the price had been changed in accordance with inflation, this would necessitate having to resubmit the application through the Scottish Office. In the event the request was accepted and the work subsequently carried out.

The Community Central Halls also obtained funding through central Government from the Manpower Services Commission (MSC). The provision of various job opportunities was initially controlled by the Manpower Services Commission until the adjustment of MSC schemes through an agency basis in 1982. This new approach created a new tier within this process. This new tier of "management agents" eg. the Glasgow Council for Voluntary Services (who suggested the Development Officer for the Community Central Halls) had to carry out the task of matching new schemes with those coming off-stream with MSC leaving themselves with the relatively less time-consuming task of monitoring.

Within the present economic climate schemes have therefore
became limited and timetabling has become much more important. Such a trend could be compared to the increase in budgeting and technical controls/limits on management processes.

This example illustrates the increasing difficulties the project faced later on in life as well as the importance of circumstances and external factors bearing on decisions and actions.

There are important comparisons and contrasts to be drawn between the Community Central Halls and the Burgh Halls case study in the next section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1977</td>
<td>Meeting of Policy and Resources Subcommittee on Deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1977</td>
<td>Application made for Urban Aid funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1977</td>
<td>Application approved by Scottish Office for inclusion in Augmented Urban Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1977</td>
<td>Police due to move out of building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1978</td>
<td>Additional £35,000 on original estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1979</td>
<td>Department of Architectural and Related Services (DARS) estimate cost at £200,000 due to deterioration and vandalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>Project recosted to £401,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1979</td>
<td>Policy and Resources Subcommittee visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1979</td>
<td>Letter from Burgh Hall Committee rejecting offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1979</td>
<td>Policy and Resources Committee reject continued funding of project. Memo to Director of DARS to consider demolition of police building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1980</td>
<td>Burgh Halls obtains B-listed status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1980</td>
<td>Gairbraid Community Education Centre proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1983</td>
<td>Urban Aid application submitted by Trust for £100,000 - not approved. Proposed feasibility study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>Feasibility study completed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plate 4 - Maryhill Burgh Hall; A historical landmark.
CASE STUDY 2 (COMMUNITY) - Maryhill Burgh Halls

The Burgh Halls (Fig 7) have a long history in Maryhill as it does in the Corridor Project itself. The Burgh Hall was opened in 1878, the important fact being that the centenary of the building and the adjacent police station in 1978 coincided with the start of the Corridor Initiative and the initiation of the Maryhill Local Plan (Plate 4).

The starting point for this case study is taken in 1977, when concern over the deteriorating condition of the building was voiced firstly by the local MP Jim Craigen and taken up by the local Regional Councillor, Lawrence McGarry. Such concern was hopefully to herald a bright future for the building when it was included within the Augmented Urban Programme in April 1977 after a meeting of the Policy and Resources Subcommittee on deprivation. After which the Region architects were asked to prepare a scheme for modernisation and an estimation of costs, and a draft application to be prepared by Lawrence McGarry.

Such a decision was to be in line with Strathclyde Regional Councils policy on deprivation outlined in its "Areas of Need" document and in the Region's aims and guidelines for Urban Aid projects ie. (1) to alleviate in some way the problems of poverty in the area; (2) to foster some kind of community feeling; (3) to assist underprivileged groups in the community; and (4) to support community initiatives, of which the Burgh Halls was one.

The Burgh Hall Committee formed initially had Lawrence McGarry as its interim chairman. The intention behind the project was to retain the building as part of the historical heritage of Maryhill and to allow it to revert back to its original role as a focal point for community activities.

The April meeting allowed the go-ahead to be made on an Urban Aid application which was for repairs to the Burgh Hall and police station including fire and safety repairs, electrical, heating,
external and roof repairs etc. Also included within this grant was the position of Development Officer and two caretakers, on similar lines to the Community Central Halls.

The application was submitted in June 1977 and approved in September the sum of £102,240 capital costs and recurring revenue costs of £13,500 for 3 years, by the Urban Aid Renewal Unit at the Scottish Office covering 75% of the costs.

The police who were housed in the adjacent building were to vacate the premises in October 1977 to allow work to be carried out as soon as possible. When approval was given a Management Committee of local representatives groups was set up.

It is important to realise that other events were occurring in the area at this time which were to have an important bearing on the outcome of the Burgh Halls.

The nearby Gairbraid Primary School, like many schools in the area, was facing declining school rolls and plans were proposed for the closure of the school. Around the same time Glasgow District Council had proposed a "one-roof leisure centre" for the area which, they perceived, would include the necessary demolition of the Burgh Hall and the Primary School.

It was expected that after the Police vacated their part of the building, the architects from the Department of Architectural and Related Services (DARS) would draw up plans for the building's renovation. However, the Burgh Hall was to be plagued by many difficulties involving conflicts of interest, ambiguity of roles and changed circumstances.

Although the Burgh Halls "Campaign" was begun before the Corridor Project actually began, the lobbying by the local MP Jim Craigen and councillors was done in anticipation of such a project emerging such that the priority to be attached to the area would allow greater attention to be paid to projects like the Burgh
Halls in Maryhill.

Such a priority was to be compounded by the lack of community facilities in the northern end of Maryhill, particularly with the construction of the housing estate in Summerston. The Survey Report for the Maryhill Local Plan stated that the threshold population for a community centre would be 17,500 while the population of the local plan area was 26,000. As well as this the Survey Report (1978) had earmarked the area where the Halls were located as a geographical focal point for Community facilities to serve the area. However, as we shall see, the situation was inherently much more complex than the straightforward circumstances described above.

In January 1978, the Management Committee gained possession of the Building but since that period the project has been fraught with difficulties.

In mid 1978, there was an industrial dispute in the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) which affected the Department of Architectural and Related Services (DARS) and which was mainly concerned with staff shortages. This was the first in a series of difficulties. With the industrial dispute no progress was made on the drawing up of plans and the architects were "blackening" the use of consultants for their projects. However, there were also the "normal" difficulties to be overseen such as the tendering of work to plumbers, joiners, electricians, builders etc. Uncertainty arose as to how the money was to be used, whether the private contractors could be allowed to go ahead and how exactly was the Urban Aid Grant to be managed.

The considerable doubt over the way the project was progressing through the Augmented Urban Programme led in November 1978 to a meeting with DARS, the Regional Co-ordinator (Robert Parry), the Director of Policy Planning, Community Education and local councillors etc. The failure to carry out construction work and the problems of administration and departmentalism had resulted in an estimated expenditure of only £15,000 of the original £102,240.
With the finance being controlled through Community Education at the Region, responsibility was to lie with them. It later transpired from the Regional Co-ordinators notes, that the Community Education section did not see it as their responsibility even although in fact they were the client department. There were also problems relating to the lack of expertise on the management committee, by this time run by local representatives, who did not have the procedures, and continuity which was so successful in the Community Central Halls, and who failed to keep pressure on the various departments at the Region. Again this was not just a problem of communication for the Community Education section were never happy about the use of the Burgh Halls as a community centre. Indeed, the main momentum for the project lay in the hands of the Management Committee and the local councillors and politicians mainly due to the historical significance of the building.

Apparently superficial, communication problems were underlain by questions of departmental responsibility, the lack of clarity over the priority of the project, and a distinct failure in the processes of negotiation and bargaining.

Time was another important factor in the project. Delays in repairing the building resulted in the need for more resources being asked for - blame was placed on vandalism, weather deterioration and the "irresponsibility" of the caretakers employed by the Committee. Some haggling emerged between the Committee and the Region as to what were the real reasons which resulted in the committee asking the Region to re-affirm its support to the project.

The overriding motivation for the retention of the Burgh Hall was the historical link with the area and the vociferous defence of that by the Management Committee. However, circumstances were to change which were predominantly related to finance and to the increasing number of community groups in the area needing new facilities, such that the Burgh Halls Management Committee no longer became the dominant voice in the area. It was also realised that a further £35,000 was necessary over and above the original estimates.
The new cost details had to be submitted to the Policy and Resources Subcommittee on deprivation in January 1979 and subsequently to the Urban Renewal Unit at the Scottish Office in Edinburgh. The continued industrial dispute was to mean that much letter writing had to take place with the Urban Renewal Unit eventually asking for a breakdown of costs. The upper limit on applications of £200,000 was eventually applied for but again the contract date was to run out after the three month tendering for the contract.

Running through this chain of events was the District Council's original intention to construct a one-roof leisure centre. It was eventually proposed to cost £5 million with the foundations alone costing in the region of three quarters of a million pounds. With the cutbacks in public expenditure, the project was no longer seen as viable.

The role of the Policy and Resources Committee was extremely important throughout the project and was to take on a greater role as things were coming to a head in mid 1979. In June 1979, a total re-costing of the project was asked for by the leader of the Regional Council, Dick Stewart. The Department of Architectural and Related Services eventually came up with an estimated cost of £404,300 on 26 June 1979. This estimate was subsequently followed by a visit to the Burgh Halls by the Policy and Resources subcommittee including the leader of the Council. All major decisions affecting the area were ultimately made at the centre. The powerful subcommittee in this case, however, was to directly intervene and strike a deal over the matter.

The estimate was obviously much larger than the original £102,240 such that the project would not be viable. At the same time the closure of Gairbraid Primary School was announced and it was put forward that the conversion of these premises to community use would be in the range of £200,000, the upper limit for urban aid applications. Thus a compromise was proposed that the Regional Council would agree to convert the Primary School to
community facilities for the Halls committee and demolish the badly deteriorating police section of the Halls. This compromise, however, was refused by the Management Committee on the grounds that;

(1) Gairbraid Primary School was not the Burgh Hall, and it was the latter's use as a community facility that was requested; and
(2) the school had no hall.

This led to a further offer being struck that a sports hall could be built in the playground of the school (costing £250,000).

The management committee of the Burgh Hall rejected the offer, stating that it was not an option and was merely foisting off community groups.

On September 13th 1979 the Policy and Resource Committee decided to take no action and rejected the continued funding of the project. This was followed almost two weeks later by a request to the Director of DARS to consider demolition of the original police station.

By this time the Burgh Halls Committee felt they had been let down by the Region. Such a feeling seemed justified at the time particularly with the dramatic increase in the estimated renovation costs which relate directly to the original severe underestimation of the costs in the first place. However, it also signifies the intransigence of the Halls Committee by not considering the alternatives of the situations which were proposed, perhaps being rather over zealous in their fight for the Burgh Hall and overestimating the support of the Regional Council.

After the events in 1979 the Burgh Hall's Committee decided to "go it alone". It was decided to form it into a charitable trust to obtain rates relief and generally reduce costs. The Region owned building was bought by ANTOR Ltd, a company set up through the Burgh Halls Management Committee for £100.
The Regional Council used the Gairbraid Primary School for a community centre for other local groups in the area through the community education section in June 1980. The two developments developed separately from each other and antagonisms developed between the two and between the community groups that used them. The Burgh Hall's Community Trust (status was granted in 1981) became only one of many groups in the area. Thus with the Region commitment, through Community Education, transferred to Gairbraid, the Trust had to look elsewhere for financial support.

After a 3 years lease was granted to the Trust, the Trust drew up its own costs on the refurbishment of the building amounting to one-tenth of the Region's costs. Some behind-the-scene actions were also taking place at this time. Local politicians still supported the historical significance of the building. Jim Craigen MP had written to Malcolm Rifkind (Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment) in an attempt to find out if the Burgh Hall could be classed as a listed building. In 1980, it was given B-Listed status. Treasurer Gray (now Provost Gray) was in touch with the Regional members to assess what was happening in the situation and no doubt being aware of the costs asked for a full feasibility study to be carried out before any applications be processed on behalf of the Trust through the District Council.

Considerable controversy occurred over the future of the project to which Glasgow District responded by giving the Trust £22,500 from the Maryhill Corridor Fund and an MSC grant to carry out basic repairs. This event was reported in the press stating how the Burgh Halls had been saved.

Nevertheless, considerable doubt remained. Lawrence McGarry was an important figure-head in attempting to "move" things as quickly as possible i.e. by going ahead with the Trust, and the feasibility study costing £302,325 carried out by architects and surveyors approved by the Trust. Such a sum, however, was seen as excessive particularly since the Scottish Development Department had
recently published a circular (7/81) stating limitations that were to be placed on grants. Thus, it was decided to concentrate on the Hall itself. The feasibility study was finished early in 1984 and the Trust has now applied to the Region again after the prohibitive costs for the survey were rejected by the District Council.

Considerable political support through politicians was exerted to achieve progress on the project. However, as we have seen changing circumstances and the important conflicts of interest which emerged resulted in a failure of the negotiation process. The project has been sustained through acquiring additional financial resources from different sources and mainly through local politicians who recognise the historical significance of the building. In effect the basic difference was between the value attached to the building by the community groups involved, and in the Region situation, the desire for a community centre as part of their deprivation policy but within the strict financial parameters governing the situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1980</td>
<td>Interest expressed by Taggarts in site to City Estates Surveyor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1980</td>
<td>Planning Department introduce possibility of Strathclyde Regional Council giving up site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1981</td>
<td>Firm proposals from Taggarts to Estates Department and Planning Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1981</td>
<td>Firm proposals from Planning Department to Strathclyde Regional Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1981</td>
<td>Agreement from Cleansing Department giving up site for new public convenience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1981</td>
<td>Meeting with Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District to discuss Taggarts Development. Strathclyde Region give up site for area on Trossachs St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1981</td>
<td>Application from Taggarts received (outline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1981</td>
<td>Reserved matters received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1981</td>
<td>Compulsory Purchase Order confirmed by Secretary of State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1981</td>
<td>Date of entry from Compulsory Purchase Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1982</td>
<td>Scottish Development Agency agree to site consolidation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the growing concerns in the Corridor Project was the need to develop local commercial and industrial activity and encourage this through local entrepreneurs. The Taggarts case study (Taggarts is a car dealing company for British Leyland) provides an example of this activity within the context of the Development Plan.

It has been the case that many groups, individuals and agencies tend to be involved in the activities discussed earlier. The Taggarts example is no exception to this. It should be noted that the site is within the boundaries of the Kelvin Local Plan which was the first local plan to be adopted in 1978 (Fig 7). As such most of the proposals for the area had already been identified and it was assumed that the "implementation" of these proposals was the main objective. This, as was noted earlier, resulted in the formation of the Kelvin Implementation Review Group, formed to oversee the implementation of the plan.

It has already been noted that the "plan" as a tool of implementation has been only part of the input to the subsequent developments that have taken place in the area and that, from the evidence, an over-reliance has been placed on the "plan" as the means to various defined proposals.

Taggarts has been chosen as a case study primarily because it shows how dynamic are the processes of implementation and how original ideas which have been accepted by many groups and individuals are modified to suit changing circumstances, attitudes and events. The focus is therefore placed on how action is achieved rather than translating policy/plan aims into action.

For the purpose of this case study the site which has been identified is located in figure 8. The site is on the east side of Maryhill Road adjacent to the Community Central Halls. Within the Kelvin Local Plan the site had already been programmed as an extension to the St Columba of Iona Secondary School's playing fields.
Housing site conceded to playing fields.

Confirmed as playing fields.

Added as playing fields.

Re-zoned from playing fields to commercial use (Taggarts).

Currently vacant.

New pattern of playing fields.

FIG. 8 - CASE STUDY 3 (TAGGARTS).
as part of the emphasis in the local plan on the provision of open space (Plate 5). Included within the site there were also proposals for housing association new build and district council rehabilitation.

The original site, however, was not vacant to begin with such that located in the area were:

1. Queens Cross Adventure Playground
2. The Salvation Army Hall
3. A Clydesdale Bank

as well as a proposal for a public convenience on part of the site.

It was stated in the Kelvin Local Plan, that the minimum total area for the playing fields was 5.65 hectares and a proposal was put forward that the school site be increased by 3.45 hectares to a total of 5.96 hectares.

The Adventure Playground had been initiated in August 1977 when an urban aid application was approved with a capital cost of £2,500. The latter had its roots in the Queens Cross Action Campaign (1976) and was originally located in Kirkland Street, but due to new housing developments (the Kirkland Street/Raeberry Street - development) was relocated to within the site denoted. Despite considerable expenditure the project never came to fruition and was faced with many difficulties with both staff and site. This was partly the reason why the project was monitored by the Social Work Department.

In July 1980, Taggarts expressed their interest in part of the site to the Estates Surveyor at Glasgow District. This was subsequently passed on to the planning department and a proposal was put forward in the event that Strathclyde Region would give up the site which they owned.

The above represents the formal channels which were gone through in order to establish firm proposals. Also located on the site was a taxi business linked to British Leyland owned by a

Plate 6. - Taggarts Motor Company (Phase1); An outcome of the bargaining process.
Mr Paton who was subsequently to become the Managing Director of
the Taggarts development. This business was the largest producer
of taxis in the West of Scotland. For years, Mr Paton had been asking
for land to develop his business. Because of the allocation of
the land on the site for playing fields this was never obtained.
However, pressure was put on Mr Paton by Taggarts and British Leyland
stressing the need for modernisation to his premises as the property
he was located on at present was well below standard.

He was eventually offered a site by the District Council on
Dixon Blazes, an industrial estate on the south side of the city
but declined the offer. This was followed by an ultimatum that if
he did not get the provision of a site in the area he would leave
the city altogether.

By this time (the beginning of 1981) the country was well into
the depths of recession and unemployment was growing steadily, while
businesses were declining, particularly in inner city locations.
These concerns were figuring prominently nationwide and this was
compounded in the Glasgow situation by an increasing emphasis on
industrial and employment aspects relating to the city particularly
supported by the Town Clerk Depute, Theo Crombie and the District's
Co-ordinator from the Scottish Economic Planning Department. This
emphasis continued under the Joint Co-ordinator in 1982.

Earlier it was suggested that the adventure playground which
was located on the site was undergoing severe difficulties which
were causing concern amongst local people and the local Regional
councillor, John Gray. This may be the reason why the Community
Development Services Committee asked the Social Work Department to
report regularly on the project. There was obvious disharmony
between local people, Officials and those who were running the
Project and this provided good grounds on which to call its future
into question and allow the Taggarts site to be developed.

The Salvation Army Hall was able to be relocated as was the
Clydesdale Bank. The proposal for the public convenience was able
to be dealt with through a proposal to locate a new convenience adjacent to the site. The proposals for District Council rehabilitation and Housing association new build were abandoned, the land being acquired for the playing fields development which was to be decreased through the location of the Taggarts development on the site.

However, the most important negotiations were to be over the Taggarts site and the original proposal to locate playing fields on the site.

The playing fields had been identified as an important need in the area by the Local Plan and had been part of a long running problem over the allocation of open space in the area. Thus, there seemed no doubt that the playing fields would go ahead and as such a compromise had to be found over what was basically a conflict of interests.

Firm proposals were obtained from Taggarts to the estates department and subsequently the Planning department in February 1981 and these were subsequently passed to Strathclyde Region. The District Council owned the site for the playing fields and in order to accommodate the Taggarts site the boundaries would have to be redrawn. Therefore for the Region to go-ahead with the playing fields, this would entail them having to promote a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) on the District Council. The Region agreed to give up part of the site of the playing fields original site (Fig 8), taking the site on Trossachs Street where the proposed housing association new build would take place, but was negotiated out of the development. After agreement was reached on a personal level between the District's Chief Executive, Steven Hamilton and the Region's Chief Executive, Robert Calderwood, the District promoted the CPO for the Region easing confirmation to be given by the Secretary of State in November 1981.

Meanwhile, Taggarts submitted an application for outline planning permission in March 1981 when the CPO was promoted. After the date of entry was confirmed a year later (March 1982), the Scottish
Development Agency subsequently agreed to site consolidation of the area.

Thus the expansion of Taggarts Motor Company was achieved with the help of a District Council CPO, ground consolidation by the SDA, co-operation from the Regional Council in redefining the layout of the school playing fields, and from the Queens Cross Housing Association in giving up a proposed new build site (Plate 6).

Intensive lobbying had to take place during 1981/82 to ensure that the work on the playing fields was programmed by the SDA and intensive lobbying during 1982 to ensure that the increased costs, because it was a long running problem, could be met through the Urban Programme. Various measures to speed up the acquisition procedures were taken including assistance by staff of the Urban Renewal Unit in the Scottish Development in dealing with the Scottish Education Department, to agree to the site proposals.

There seems little doubt that the overriding factor was the creation of employment and the retention of economic activity in the area particularly since other large manufacturing companies, including Bryant and May had already closed down. It had been suggested that the Taggarts development would create over 100 jobs. Whether this was the case or not was not as important as the intention that it would, with Mr Paton, Managing Director of the Taggarts development, the threat of locating outside Maryhill, never mind the city, would have important implications for employment in the area.

This case study highlights the importance of less formal contacts and intentions, which were not part of the local plan. In effect this represented an attempt to respond to an opportunity while at the same time, through different individuals and agencies, directing the development through a process of negotiation and bargaining to accommodate different interests.
**CASE STUDY 4 (HOUSING) - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS**

**KIRKLAND ST / RAEBERRY ST DEVELOPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1976</td>
<td>Compulsory Purchase Order submitted on site by Glasgow District Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1978</td>
<td>Project design brief by City Architect approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>Redevelopment Assistance Programme introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1980</td>
<td>Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) start negotiations over development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project design under way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1982</td>
<td>SSHA unwilling to develop site 3 and unwilling to include shops design brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1982</td>
<td>Meeting to discuss shops and site 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1982</td>
<td>Reports sent to Housing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1982</td>
<td>Deletion of site 3 from design brief of SSHA and proposal to market site separately. Two schemes to be prepared by SSHA (with and without shops).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1982</td>
<td>Details of SSHA schemes completed. Concern by Planning Department (District) over aspects of design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1982</td>
<td>Housing Committee agreed to delete shops at Wilton St / Maryhill Rd. Site 3 marketed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1982</td>
<td>Planning Applications submitted for SSHA development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1982</td>
<td>Offer submitted by Barrats for site 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1983</td>
<td>Revised offer by Barrats submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1983</td>
<td>Planning application approved for SSHA scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1983</td>
<td>Planning application submitted by Barrats for site 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1984</td>
<td>Application by Barrats approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>Start made on SSHA scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) CASE STUDY 4 (HOUSING) - Kirkland St/Raeberry St Development

During the years prior to the establishment of the Project, considerable changes had occurred in the provision of housing within the Corridor area through large scale demolition, resulting in many gap sites. Many new housing developments both public and private have since been undertaken. On top of this the scale of housing development envisaged for the area at the inception of the Maryhill Corridor Project was striking with large programmes of rehabilitation (3,500 houses) and new build (2,500 houses) - an increase of nearly 20% to the existing housing stock most of which would be carried out by Glasgow District Council and local housing associations under the rehabilitation schemes.

With such a scale of development envisaged, the major function of the Maryhill Corridor Project in influencing the provision of housing within the Corridor area was quite clearly seen as to progress with the numerous schemes that were around. There was a very complicated environment as far as housing was concerned with Planning, Estates, Housing, SSHA etc. all involved and challenges from the Commerce and Industry groups on the use of land was putting pressure on developments. The change of administration in 1979 and the pressure for increased reduction in public expenditure that followed put the commitment to these schemes to the test.

Although the emphasis was changing towards the rehabilitation of properties, numerous vacant sites had been produced which became an important priority in the Corridor Project - Certainly if these sites could be developed it would do much to change the derelict nature of the southern end of Maryhill in particular.

Housing is obviously a main priority in any local plan. The adopted Kelvin Local Plan in 1978, earmarked numerous sites for redevelopment which were incorporated into the Development Plan in 1979. These were to be carried out by Glasgow District in large
FIG. 9 - CASE STUDY 4 (KIRKLAND ST./RAEBERRY ST.)
part, including the development in Kirkland Street/Raeberry St. It was also clear from the local plan that there was an underrepresentation of housing for the elderly, 2 person householders and family homes with gardens. The latter were to have an important effect on the type of housing constructed by the District Council and housing associations.

The Kirkland St/Raeberry St development was designated, with numerous other sites for redevelopment. The case study, like the other development, was programmed in the Maryhill Corridor Project Capital Programme in 1978. Previously, however, a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) had been submitted in April 1976 and approved a year later in December 1977 for the case study development. A temporary landscape was provided by the newly formed Scottish Development Agency and the District's Park department, with the Project design brief by the City Architect approved on 22 June 1978.

Just 2 months later the Corridor Project began. However, although the future looked bright for the Corridor Project, this was not the case in the housing arena. This was mainly due to the increasing expenditure cuts in capital programmes and the fact that housing was funded through mainline budgets and of such large amounts that any decrease in funds or rumours that they may be cut could result in delay or the scrapping of projects altogether. As far as the Kirkland St/Raeberry St development was concerned (a district council project) considerable uncertainty lay over whether the project would go ahead or not. However, as will be seen, much more subtle political factors were to be responsible for the actual development (Plates 7 and 8).

The area which this case study is concerned with is marked in figure 9. The area borders on to the west side of Maryhill Road and is subdivided into three sections as it is in reality, but this is mainly for the purpose of describing the implementation of the development which in large part relates to the physical nature of the site.
Plate 7.- The new location of shop units within the Barratts development on Raeberry St.

Plate 8.- Part of the site developed by the Scottish Special Housing Association.
By the time of the coming to power of the Conservative government in 1979, the capital allocations for housing were becoming increasingly eroded. Glasgow District and other high-spending authorities, it seemed, were particularly singled out in relation to its needs. Due to those changes in financial and more importantly, perhaps, political circumstances, it would be unlikely that the District could go ahead with many of their projects.

From the late 1970's and into the 1980's, an increasing emphasis was being placed on the private sector to cater for demands where the public sector could, mainly for financial reasons, no longer cope. Combined with the need for a better mix of tenures, this paved the way for private developers to acquire sites. There was also an increasing emphasis on the voluntary sectors and "quengo-type" public bodies, particularly the Scottish Special Housing Association, a trend which had continued since the post-war period.

The important fact as regards this case study is the involvement of the SSHA and the role it played in taking over sites for the District in order to proceed with redevelopment. The Kirkland St/Raeberry St site was very similar to the adjacent Doncaster St site mentioned earlier carried out by Glasgow District, however, the implementation of the proposals was to be totally different. Indeed, if it was not for the fact that the District was unable to carry through this project and others, the SSHA would probably have played only a minor role in the Corridor, which was a predominantly Region and District Initiative. The inclusion of another major agency increased the complexity of the organisational contact and provided opportunities for negotiation and compromise outside the local authority system.

In 1979 an agreement was reached between the District Council and the SSHA resulting in the Redevelopment Assistance Programme. This programme included the Council's mainstream housing programmes and a special needs category which in the event of the District not being able to fund projects, could pass them to the SSHA.
In the late 1970's, Glasgow District was a hung council and as such it became difficult to proceed with projects. The difficulty in supporting the Initiative was one of the reasons that little progress was made on the Kirkland St/Raeberry St development until 1980. After 1980, whatever the ideology of the parties concerned, the atmosphere was much more conducive to getting things on the move. With prominent members of the Council from Maryhill in key positions a great deal of political leverage was exerted to direct resources to Maryhill.

By 1980 the SSHA were negotiating for the project because they realised that if they were not successful they would have to lay off their own architects because of the cutbacks being imposed on them. The desire of the council to achieve progress resulted in lobbying through which the SSHA agreed to develop the sites and would enter negotiations with the District Council Planning Department. Involvement of the SSHA basically began around mid 1980. Within the Planning Department plans contained in the Kelvin Local Plan (1978) it was stated that in accordance with Council Policy, shopping units were to be located on the corner of Maryhill Rd/Wilton St to regenerate commercial activity along Maryhill Road (Fig 9). Basically the intention of the planning department was to have shopping along Maryhill Rd and continue the "red brick" character of the buildings and concentrate industrial activity along the neighbouring arterial route, Garscube Rd.

It was stated earlier that the District Council architects had already prepared a brief for the development. However, this was composed of sketches and basic guidelines such that the SSHA, although having some District input in the sense that it retained the initial special needs complex of sheltered housing, were able to draw up their own design.

From the beginning of 1982, the project got underway. Throughout the following 3 years changing circumstances and the interaction of different interests and procedures, by the Planning Department,
its political leaders, the SSHA and private developers were to combine in a process of compromise and bargaining to allow progress on the development.

By early 1981, after the technical details had been gone through on the site it was realised that it would be difficult to develop the 3 sites. In particular, site three on the map and the southern part of site two were affected by subsidence due to mineworkings in the area. This change had an important effect on the complexion of the situation. In March 1982, the SSHA declared that they were unwilling to develop the third site. In part this represented an important difference between the functioning of the two public bodies, ie. the District and the SSHA. The SSHA felt that the undermining south of Raeberry St (site 3) would need a considerable amount of consolidation by pumping in grout such that the cost of the proportion of land needing grouting would be in excess of the relative size of the area to be developed. Such a difference probably would not have occurred if the District were funding the development due to the much more stringent cost yardsticks applying to the SSHA who were accountable to the Housing Corporation and ultimately central government. Around the same time the SSHA agreed not to develop the shop units stipulated by the Planning department who, however, were adamant on the original proposals for shopping units which was to lead to considerable negotiating difficulties (Fig 9).

Running throughout these events was the Design Group formed by the SSHA and included 20 regular tenants who had been nominated by the District Council as prospective tenants for the properties in 1981. This was the result of the Association's Council of Management in 1977 to approve a policy which emphasised the importance of tenant involvement in both the management and design of properties. This had emanated from the SSHA's experiences in GEAR which had begun 2 years earlier. Its importance in this study will be seen in how the relative importance of this group through the SSHA was able to become a bargaining tool in the negotiating process.

It was suggested earlier that there was an important requirement
for shops in the development. After the problems of the third site were realised, and the SSHA's objections to shopping at Wilton St/ Maryhill Rd due to the fact that providing the shops would mean less houses and that SSHA policy anyway was that there should be no shops under flats for security reasons and as such the planning department's proposals were not amenable to this kind of SSHA development. The alternative suggested by the SSHA was to locate shops on site 3 since there were other shops within walking distance to the north and south of the sites.

A meeting was held in April 1982 to discuss the shops issue involving the newly appointed Joint Co-ordinator Richard Davies whose job it would be to play a vital role in the negotiating process between those involved. Following this meeting reports were submitted to the Housing Committee for assessment. The Housing Committee then decided that the area of subsidence (site 3) should be deleted from the SSHA's remit and asked for a reduced number of shops at Wilton St/ Maryhill Road. It was also suggested, therefore, that site 3 should be marketed separately and which would include shopping facilities. The planning department, however, did not back down on the shopping units which had been incorporated into the planning brief stating that if the shops did not go on the original site then none should be built at all. The importance of shops on the main road was, in the planning departments and the council's view, important in maintaining the "character" of the area.

The Housing Committee subsequently had the political sense to realise the consequences if the SSHA did not develop the site and asked the Town Clerk's Office through Richard Davies the Joint Co-ordinator to negotiate with the SSHA and draw up 2 schemes, one with a smaller number of shops and the other without shops such that if the marketing of site 3 was successful the latter would be chosen and vice versa.

The District Council had accepted that there was a need for private housing in the area. However, private developers were not
keen on the site as they did not see a demand for it. However, Barrats had already developed much of the area along Raeberry St constructing over 300 houses in the area, such that if anyone would develop the site, Barrats would be the chief candidate.

In October 1982, Barrats submitted their offer to develop site 3 to the District Council. Once a user for the site had been found, the Housing Committee agreed to delete the shopping from the SSHA sites after a meeting with senior politicians and officials. When the final date for offers had been reached on 3 December 1982, Barrats had only submitted an application which included houses only. With the brief not met i.e. no shops, Barrats were asked to re-submit their application, this time with shops included.

In the meantime, the SSHA were going ahead with their brief for the 2 sites and were encountering delays with the planning department over design considerations. These delays included the type and colour of brick to be used (since the planning department desired "red brick" all along Maryhill Rd), the detailing of the bay windows and whether the building frontage should face towards Maryhill Rd or not. Such difficulties on technical standards resulted in the need for bargaining.

Perhaps the most important conflicts of interest which was to have a bearing on implementation was the aspect of the houses themselves. The Planning department required the houses to face away from Maryhill Rd, for reasons of safety and in line with the adjacent District Council development in Doncaster St. However, through the Design Group of tenants mentioned earlier, a request was made that the front entrances and living rooms should face onto Maryhill Rd, a proposal which was to eventually win the day with the backing of the SSHA. A great deal of publicity surrounded this aspect of tenant participation in the development (Glasgow Herald 6.2.85 P 12)

The approval for construction of the project was given in April 1983 and a start was made on the site in February 1984 and are now
nearing completion.

The Barrats site now became a separate issue entirely. A revised offer was submitted with shops along the main road frontage. Although this proposal satisfied the District Council, it did not coincide with the Roads Department "policy" at Strathclyde Region. The Roads Department wanted the shops in Raeberry St not on the Maryhill Rd frontage. The Roads Department then stated that if the proposal to put shops on the main road was approved, they would serve a Roads warrant on the development as it would lead to on street car parking and congestion. This was an important factor since the "Roads Warrant" is a very powerful tool which would ensure that car parking on the main road would not be adopted.

Subsequently the problem had to be taken to Directorate level and an arrangement was eventually made that the shops should be located in Raeberry St to which Barrats agreed (Plate 8). The project was approved in January 1984 when a start was made.

This case study serves to highlight the significance of the processes of bargaining and compromise which are at the heart of implementation processes and how, in the face of "normal", day-to-day difficulties opportunities can be steered towards progress on the development.
CHAPTER 5
PROJECT AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

In chapter 1 the conventional understanding of implementation was placed within a theoretical context. The conventional wisdom of the rationalist approach was contrasted within the behavioural approach of examining implementation within the context of action. This chapter attempts to pursue this avenue of looking at aspects of the "issues for implementation" from Chapter 1 and relate these to the Corridor Project and the case studies.

(a) Policy and Action

The conventional "top-down" approach to the conceptualisation of implementation processes has come under attack in recent years. It has been argued that policy does not necessarily originate from the "top" but may be a response to pressures or problems on the ground or develop from specific innovations i.e. where action may precede policy.

This chapter attempts to examine implementation processes from an "action-oriented" perspective which does not assume the existence of "a priori" assumptions about hierarchical relationships in relation to those involved "between policy formulation and implementation or between those making policy and those upon whom action depends" (Barret and Fudge 1981, p 220).

Policy is a broad statement of philosophy and general intentions framed in flexible terms. It is the gap between these policy intentions and their implementations which this research intends to examine and seen as a negotiating process and as a process of action and response.

The Maryhill Corridor Project was a response to circumstances. It could be argued, however, that the Project was (as was GEAR) a proto-type, an experimentation of inner city policy which was being developed by central government at the time (White Paper on the
Thus the lack of specific policy objectives from central government would leave the implementation of proposals clouded in uncertainty. It could be asserted that the desire for central government to be involved with GEAR, and to a lesser extent Maryhill, was to ensure that the policy from the "top" would be translated into getting things done on the ground. The success of the projects therefore would be seen in terms of how close they measured up to the postulated policy objectives, and their failure seen in terms of how the policy objectives became "lost" on their way down from the "top" and the loss of control through this process of successive refinement. This hierarchical, normative approach is probably how the conventional wisdom on implementation processes would interpret the situation.

From the perspective taken throughout this research, however, it seems quite clear that that is not the case. It was stated earlier that policy does not necessarily emerge from the "top". This would appear to be the case in the Maryhill Corridor Project. It was understood in all quarters by the mid 1970s that the problems in our inner cities needed immediate action. The development of the GEAR project then became seen as a response to pressures from below, although with the initiative coming from central government involvement through the Scottish Office and Scottish Development Agency. It has already been stated that central government policy was very unclear at this time and that the White Paper on the Inner Cities was just being produced.

The Maryhill Corridor was one of several areas indicated on a map produced by the Scottish Office from which one candidate was to be chosen for a special initiative. When the GEAR project was chosen, an opportunity existed for the local authorities and politicians in Glasgow to lobby for resources in other priority areas. The political desire existed to set up an initiative in response to GEAR particularly to show that local authorities were as capable as other government bodies at responding to inner city problems. The development of deprivation policy by the Regional Council
provided an opportunity to concentrate on Maryhill as one of its area initiatives. The District Council was eager to pursue developments through its local plans, the first of which was in Kelvin. From this complex situation it can be seen that not all action relates to specific policy and where policy "stops" and implementation "starts" may be extremely difficult to determine. To a large extent it depends where you are standing and which way you are looking.

In attempting to answer the question of what factors affect the policy - action relationship it is important to consider the underlying forces (particularly economic areas) which may help or undermine projects.

The Maryhill Corridor Project was one initiative carried on the crest of a wave of governmental action towards the inner cities. Peter Shore, Secretary of State for the Environment, in 1977 had given his commitment to providing resources for inner cities even in a climate where expenditure cuts would be introduced. With the underlying economic factors worsening and affecting the direction of urban policy, it would be important how those involved in the Initiative would respond.

Problems can also arise with policy if it is carried out at the "wrong" level. The ability of local authorities to solve the problems of deprivation in the inner cities is severely limited by finance and the politically adverse climate. Thus the "area focus" taken in Maryhill is unlikely to yield great improvements in the quality of life in the inner city.

This suggests that difficulties that arise are not directly related to the implementation of the Project but rather that the policy is not focusing on the correct "targets". Of course, the significance of this aspect can be variously interpreted depending on one's ideological standpoint. If one were to suggest that governments (both local and central) wish nothing to be done to the economic forces which are destroying the inner cities except to show how inner cities residents are made worse off then the
study of implementation will be of little interest. If, on the other hand, one sees governments making necessary incremental responses to large problems and using their ability to steer resources, then the study of implementation processes within the context of action becomes central to the analysis. It is the latter approach which is taken in this thesis.

Concern for the problems of inner cities has been voiced by many from central government to local community groups. The significant factor is how these concerns and desires for action meet. The Corridor Initiative has been a predominately local authority initiative. The "policy" for tackling inner city problems therefore became different for Maryhill as opposed to GEAR. Considerable lobbying was necessary from local MP's and senior councillors and officials of the two authorities in order to allow its inclusion in the Augmented Urban Programme.

Most of the discussion over policy would, therefore, be between the Region and the District to decide exactly what form the initiative should take. Ideas and intentions are extremely important in this case but they need not necessarily be translated into rational goals before being institutionalised. This was the case with the initial development of the Corridor Project where support had already been harnessed before the appropriate responses by the authorities and their department had been developed and organisational arrangements discussed. The Maryhill Corridor Project emerged from a complex of processes characterised by different groups each pursing their own rationality.

This, therefore, became a situation where action had preceded the policy in response to circumstances, which at the time were conducive to developing such projects. It is therefore important to recognise that policy is complex and ambiguous, often without clearly defined goals. In this case policy has tended to be coincidental with the implementation process i.e. creating the Maryhill Corridor Project. Thus policy has become an expression of
intention to allow on the one hand, a corporate approach to the Region’s area initiatives by agreeing priority for Maryhill with the District. For the latter, a desire to show that the District was as capable as the SDA in responding to the necessary urban renewal of the inner cities.

The continuity of a policy or project is partly determined through the ability of its supporters to share common ideological impulses which plainly the Region and District do. Obtaining agreement over the means, however, can lead to differences in response. The absence of competition for resources or the availability of special programmes (eg the Augmented Urban Programme) is likely to decrease the chances of uncertainty.

However, the fact that the multiplicity of agencies and actors involved in the project having their own interests and intentions, can result in a situation as in the Corridor Project where continuity and uncertainty can exist side by side. The growth of Urban Aid and its priority attached to Maryhill allowed a continuity of Projects in the area whereas in the housing area a great deal of uncertainty affected housing capital allocations throughout Glasgow as a whole.

An important feature of policy is how it is modified and mediated over time in response to external circumstances or as a result of the actions and responses of those responsible for its execution or upon whom it is brought to bear interacting within the processes of negotiation and bargaining which are central to an understanding of implementation processes.

The failure of the first Joint Co-ordinator and the resultant (mostly) separate arrangements was a significant aspect of the development of the Corridor Project. In part this was the result of the changed political situation at the District and the desire of Regional Labour Councillors not to allow political representation on their area management team.

Modifications also had to be made to the Regional Council's

The scale of the Initiative needed the presence of senior officials on the Area Management Team, with co-ordination taking place at a higher level, contrasting significantly with the "grass roots" approach of other initiatives.

Similarly requests by the Scottish Office to be involved in the Project after the development of the Policy Co-ordination Unit at the District, resulted in the appointment of a Scottish Office Secondee.

Thus policy becomes the produce of compromises rather than the statement of explicit goals and objectives. Policy does not exist in a pure form, independant of those who make or influence it. Therefore, where policy emanates from is open to debate. In large part it determines the formal (and indeed informal) structure which direct implementation processes, and within this dynamic process, is subject to change continually modified through such compromises.

It is also the case that such compromises occur at different levels during the implementation process depending on the issue at hand. For example, the agreement over the Redevelopment Assistance Programme between the Scottish Special Housing Association and Glasgow District had an effect on policy by modifying it to suit changing requirements ie. expenditure cuts in the District's housing programmes. Although this agreement was reached independently of the Maryhill Corridor Project it had repercussions for developments in it. Thus this resulted in the Kirkland St/Raeberry St housing development going ahead. Modification of policy influences the subsequent developments which take place after these changes and remain important. Obviously in the housing case study this involved the continued mediation between the District and its departments in terms of how, when and where projects could go ahead. The interaction of the different intentions of the latter resulted in the necessary mediation on style, aspect and content of the housing development as well as the SSHA's own procedures of community involvement through
their Design Group having a bearing on the mediation process.

Many policies also represent compromises between conflicting values. The agreement of the Redevelopment Assistance Programme mediated through the Scottish Office had to be negotiated through concessions from the District Council whereby the latter would release certain sites earmarked for District Council proposals for private use ie. housing and commercial.

It was suggested earlier that there may be no clear distinctions between policy and action such that it becomes very difficult to say whether action is influencing policy, or policy action. The traditional concentration on examining policy, means therefore that action at the "bottom" has not been as important as from the "top". Examining the detail of the case studies allows a clearer picture to emerge such as in the two community examples. In both examples, it was suggested that the motivation to develop both locations for community use, to a large extent, lay with local politicians. The vociferous nature of community groups in the area and, in the case of the Community Central Halls, those who used the facilities beforehand were important in campaigning for the developments.

At the same time the Region's Deprivation policy had emphasised the need (especially through the Worthington Report) to develop communities through local people. However, the official's role, which one would, in the rationalist approach, normally associate with the implementation and initiation of the projects was clearly not the case. Thus the policy-action relationship becomes blurred to some extent at the interface of politics and administration. These two examples, however, did represent important local ideological impulses, penetrating the policy-action relationship.

It is evident from the study that a multiplicity of linkages exists between the actors and agencies involved in initiating and sustaining the Maryhill Corridor Project and developments within it. In initiating the project the role of key individuals such as Jim Craigen the local MP for Maryhill and on the official side
through the Director of Planning at the District Council, James Rae, to start an initiative in response to GEAR, has been extremely important.

During the progress of the Initiative the role of the co-ordinator had been crucial in attracting resources to Maryhill and in developing linkages with political representatives at the local level and within the respective councils. It has been shown how such links were important in relation to getting things done and the means whereby "action" could be achieved.

"One of the more prevalent myths is that planning and politics are related but separate activities. There is the view that politicians determine the ends of policy while experts select the most appropriate means. Thus politicians are involved in value judgments whereas officials are concerned with factual questions about the instruments of policy. This reflects the fact that the choice of means itself requires evaluation among alternatives, but more importantly, it assumes that means and ends are distinguishable"
(Blowers 1980 p 2)

For example, the end of creating new build and rehabilitation, open space and environmental improvements in Maryhill cannot be divorced from the means towards the political rationale of making Glasgow "Miles Better". Similarly the understanding that politicians make policy and officials implement it is a fallacy borne out through example as with the Regional Co-ordinator's role in changing the priorities of the Education Department in chapter three. Indeed, the full-time role of the co-ordinators in lobbying for Maryhill and "persuading and harrowing" others to respond to the initiative
became a pivotal position at the interface of politics and administration.

The role of local councillors John Gray and Lawrence McGarry in the two community examples in setting up management committees and organising support for the projects highlights the significance of this blurred area between means and ends suggesting that, within the context of action, the latter are inseparable.

The significance of mediation and interaction between the two authorities and other actors and agencies adds to the complexity of the policy-action environment. With reorganisation in local government difficulties appeared in the need for agreement between the two tiers of government e.g. over the management arrangements for the Maryhill Corridor Project, and thus adds to the complexity of determining policy intentions and enlarges the stage (context of action) upon which implementation takes place.

The multiplicity of actors and agencies involved was increased through the role of housing associations carrying out their own independant programmes as well as the Scottish Development Agency and a host of other "quango" bodies becoming involved in the Corridor Project and taking part in the negotiations with the District Council and Regional Council highlighted in the case studies. This further complicates the policy-action relationship in the sense that those involved were not necessarily in a hierarchical set-up and were more "equal" than the master, subordinate relationship which the latter suggests. Thus compromise between different interests becomes implicit within the policy-action relationships emphasising how action is achieved through processes of political bargaining.

As well as this the multiplicity of agencies provided additional organisational and resource requirements which enabled progress to be made on projects.

The relation of the Initiative to the structural context is obviously crucial. Many commentators have suggested that local
authorities are the mere servants of central government (Robson 1966 p 67). This proposition has been challenged by others (Blowers 1980, Dearlove 1973) suggesting that the dominant processes at a national level, hide much of the innovations and developments by local public bodies to direct policy and its implementation. Blowers (1980) comments that even in situations of strong central control and command (as in the present adverse political and economic climate) the ability of local factors to influence how things get done, even to the contrary of national government policy are possible. The Maryhill Corridor Project can fit into this category.

However, the structural context plays a significant part in how "action" is construed. The general approach of the inner area initiatives was to be characterised by taking a comprehensive, future-oriented approach to problems with procedures for monitoring and review in order to anticipate future events and determine the appropriate response. Indeed, this type of "schematic planning" has been that which has characterised the role of the planning profession in the 1970's.

Nevertheless, in the Maryhill Corridor Project, the changing economic climate had a profound effect on how such planning could be put into practice. Much of the activity proceeded along the lines which were to become more strictly determined by financial means. The difficulties in obtaining urban aid funding in the later life of the Corridor became more significant as well as attempting to timetable planning procedures to "fit in" with the annual budgeting cycle. The Housing case study provides another example, where the local authority, complied with central government cuts in public expenditure such that some projects were postponed or abandoned altogether, and others eg. Kirkland St/Raeberry St have succeeded by obtaining resources from other sources ie. the Redevelopment Assistance Programme. This has to some extent replaced the traditional planning approach with an emphasis on pragmatic planning where these budgeting instruments have become more important in
the adverse political and economic climate. Thus although it has been remarked that progress has been made in Maryhill, this has been within the perceived constraints on action.

(b) The Context of Circumstances

The climate of opinions and intentions can be a very important factor in terms of policy and implementation. The Maryhill Corridor Project represents the significance of "action in the context of circumstance" preceding inner city policy but jumping on the bandwagon of what was perceived to be occurring eg. the Holterman Study, White Paper on the Inner Cities, the GEAR project, the Augmented Urban Programme etc.

The development of Strathclyde Regions Deprivation Policy was ripe for experimentation through its area initiatives of which Maryhill became one. With the adoption of the first local plan (Kelvin) in 1978 and the characteristics it exhibited of an inner city area, conditions became conducive to developing the Maryhill Corridor, with the dominant motivation of the District Council to achieve the speedy implementation of proposals.

Changing circumstances also played a significant part in subsequent developments in the Corridor. The most important of these included public expenditure cuts and increased competition from other areas. The adverse economic climate, at the national level, was increasingly compounded by an equally adverse political climate, especially towards the spending and bureaucracy of local authorities. The changing role of urban policy, becoming developed through programmes rather than clear policy objectives (Hambleton 1981) after the Conservative government came to power and the creation of Urban Development Corporation under tight central government control were also to mitigate against the effectiveness of the Initiative.

If one is to take the rationalist criteria of what it terms
effectiveness, this would be in terms of policy conformance i.e. how implementation conforms to policy objectives. If the Development Plan is to be taken as the evaluative focus for the Initiative, then the Maryhill Corridor represents a significant under-achievement for those purporting the concept of the Corridor seen as a largely unsuccessful attempt to regenerate the inner city through marginal measures. This can be seen in terms of the lack of certain proposals to be implemented and the changes which took place in certain developments in terms of their eventual use and in terms of who was implementing the proposals.

The Corridor Project was sustained, however, in a period when local authorities were increasingly coming under attack. But it did not have the necessary central government support after the 1979 election as in GEAR, nor the extra resources given to it primarily because of Scottish Office involvement with the project throughout its history. Neither has the Maryhill Corridor Project received the "academic" publicity that the GEAR project has (Nelson 1980, Wamop 1982, Booth, Money and Pitt 1982). Urin Wannop (1982) in his appraisal of the management strategy for GEAR suggests that the Maryhill set-up differed in two important ways;

(1) the deliberately low profile organisational structure and lack of strong political support; and
(2) lacked the integrated involvement of other agencies.

These aspects, it would appear, did not allow the Corridor Project to remain on its path of policy conformance as the GEAR project has. Nevertheless, this thesis is not concerned with questions of organisational survival but rather in how those involved with the project directed resources towards the "ideology" of the Corridor Initiative. The Maryhill Corridor Project was sustained through the late 1970's and early 1980's even within the unfavourable climate. Developments, in particular, for housing were able to go-ahead (albeit in a modified form) even with cuts in capital expenditure as shown in the housing case study; urban aid applications were proposed that would fit in with changes in government policy; the three housing associations were able to step in on rehabilitation
proposals which could not be undertaken by the District Council; commercial activity through local entrepreneurial has gained benefits (Taggarts) in the face of growing unemployment and business closures.

In the context of more pragmatic criteria of plan performance, therefore, (ie the context of action), the Maryhill Project represents a significant achievement, not least since the local authorities achieved an important development during a period of increasing uncertainty. Indeed, the comments voiced by some interviewees, suggested that the Corridor Project became a victim of its own success in attracting resources.

It has been suggested that most of what took place in Maryhill would have taken place anyway. However, it is extremely difficult, ceteris paribus, to identify how effective the development would have been without the priority status it had. Similarly, the changing circumstances that ensued make it equally difficult to assess alternative courses of action which would have led to the same developments occurring. These comments tend to mitigate against the rational/comprehensive paradigm.

It was suggested earlier that how you look at implementation depends where you are standing and which way you are looking. Part of the function of this research is to show that the action-oriented approach shows that implementation and policy and the actions which they perpetuate occur throughout the whole process. It is important therefore not to see the Initiative as a Static end in itself but rather to see it as part of the process of action in the context of changing circumstances. This is highlighted in the case studies.

The Maryhill Community Central Halls had established itself just prior to the Project was announced. This was an important factor in that urban aid had just emerged, and there was little competition for resources. On the contrary the later development of the Burgh Halls saga led, inter alia, to greater difficulties in obtaining funding, although progress was also hampered by differences in intentions between the various groups, individuals
and agencies involved.

The Taggarts case study must also be placed in its context, with increasing concern by the 1980's for employment and industry and subsequently a much greater emphasis on safeguarding employment opportunities and retaining commercial activity within the local area.

(c) Plans and Intentions

Since the post-war period and the growth of the statutory planning system a great reliance has been placed on plan-making with the assumption that plans represent the policy which is to be implemented.

The study of the Corridor Project has shown that within the context of changing circumstances and when one looks at implementation from the point of view of the "implementers" and the complexity of actions which this necessitates has placed doubt over the utility of the "Development Plan" as proposed for the Maryhill Corridor Project. It was suggested that in terms of plan conformance, the Corridor did not represent a significant achievement. However, it may be wrong to judge the effectiveness of the formal plan by the extent to which its stated provisions are realised. It was stated earlier that central government, local authorities and other interest groups play a central part in determining the context of plans, but are not necessarily in agreement over either their general direction or their detailed realisation. In this sense, the Maryhill Corridor Development Plan can be seen as the dominant "technical rationality" which emerged from the negotiating and bargaining which took place between central government, local authorities, their departments and other public and private bodies.

The development of a plan in itself, therefore, becomes the outcome of the "rationalities" of different participants' interests, interacting in an essentially political arena, such that the plan becomes the result of compromise in the form of a technical
rationality at a particular point in time. The "plan" therefore is perhaps best seen as a "picture in time". This picture continually evolves and changes over time in relation to external events and changes in power relationships in organisations and society in general. Objectives and aims tend to have an aura of permanency about them in all sorts of plans. The assumption that it is intentions and motivations which lie behind these, reduces their static nature and subjects them to change in the evolving context of circumstances.

The process of decision-making is therefore not discrete, but part of an ongoing complex of inter-related acts.

"Decisions arise from a complex process of interaction among actors. All these people think themselves rational, and are trying to behave rationally for much of the time; but their conception of the rational differ. They have different goals, and different ways of achieving those goals". (Hall 1980, p 196/197)

The Maryhill Corridor Project was not initiated through any clear, technical objectives of planners which were to become embodied in the development plan. It developed from the intentions of being actors and agencies who wished, inter alia, to show that "local authorities were the natural agents for regenerating inner cities". The "technical" justification for the Project had to be mediated within the dominant political rationality and responding to this dynamic environment throughout the duration of the Project.

It is therefore a fallacy to see the implementation of the Corridor Project as a single act, rather it should be seen as a process characterised by a multiplicity of linkages between actors and agencies in a variety of administrative divisions and inter-
organisational dependencies and with a variety of interests and ideologies interacting through a reticular (non-linear) decision-making process characterised by reciprocal power relations and negotiations.

The Housing Case Study and that of Taggarts Motor Company were modified aspects of the Development Plan. Just because a plan does not achieve what it set out to do does not mean, however, that planning has been ineffectual. If, as this research assumes, planning and planners must respond to a whole series of interests as well as their own and if these intentions are dynamic as suggested then it becomes axiomatic that in the face of future uncertainties will necessarily result in modifications and changes to plans.

The two case studies mentioned above highlight these aspects. From the initial designation of the housing site to be carried out by the District Council, development was transferred to the SSHA and private developers involving a whole series of negotiations primarily as to the result of financial expediency. Similarly the redesignation of various proposals including the St Columba Secondary School playing fields in order to accommodate the Taggarts development represented another modification to the original plan intentions as different interests and circumstances were brought to bear.

(d) The Role of Individuals and Groups

It is important to recognise that scope exists for key individuals and groups to influence or "bend" implementation processes at different levels. Within the context of the Maryhill Corridor Project it has been possible to identify such features particularly amongst local politicians and officials of the authorities concerned.

It is important to recognise, however, that individuals are not wholly independent of wider structural issues such that they are "shapers" of events. Neither are they wholly secondary to them.
This assumption necessitates some qualification. By assuming that individuals and groups have a significant effect on policy change it is important to take cognisance of the structural and political context in which action occurs. The uncertainties and changes which characterise implementation processes, which were identified earlier, must also be seen as limiting factors on the role of individuals and groups. Nevertheless, it is asserted that opportunities can emerge, which can be used to effect change or innovation. It is also important to recognise that such developments may include bargaining and negotiations to produce compromises.

The example in chapter three, concerning the Regional Co­ordinators and the role of the Area Management Teams attempt to change the Education Department priorities becomes highly significant here. The team had no real control over the functioning of other departments, however, finance is only one aspect of power. The seniority of officials on the Team and the role of the co-ordinator as "mini" Chief Executive as well as the important political representation through the Policy and Resources Representative made this group very influential on issues concerning Maryhill. In particular, the role of the co-ordinator in obtaining the necessary support from members on the Team and that of the Policy and Resources Representative, John Gray, and his pursual of this modification to the Policy and Resources Committee itself against the views of the Education Department represent a significant aspect of political bargaining benefiting the ideology of Maryhill.

"Organisations are neither the rational, harmonious entities celebrated in managerial theory nor the arenas of apocalyptic class conflict projected by Marxists. Rather, it may be argued, a more suitable notion lies somewhere between the two, a concept of organisation as politically negotiated orders. Adopting this view, we can observe organisational actors in their daily transactions perpetually bargaining, repeatedly forming and reforming
conditions, and constantly availing themselves of influence tactics. Few organisational actors are the totally passive, apolitical entities that are presented by industrial psychologists and organisational sociologists".
(Bacharach and Lawler 1980 p 1)

The above example concerning the Education Department shows how the "technical" rationality of the latter were to be modified in the wider "political" rationality where much of the negotiation takes place, and where in this case individual pressure from the co-ordinator to justify the change in priorities succeeded within the organisational context.

The role of individuals and groups also varies in relation to different factors. The significance of values, interests and ideologies (discussed more fully in the next section) is combined in Young's (1979) notion of "assumptive worlds" which have a mediating effect on the technical rationality of the planning process. These factors are also important at different levels of the implementation process.

The role of the local Regional Councillor for North Kelvinside, John Gray, who incidentally was also the Policy and Resources Representative for the Initiative, played a very influential role in operating and pursuing progress on the Community Central Halls project and who spearheaded the initiation of the Action Committee as well as using his position and access to higher level Officials through other councillors to "bend" the local plan to accommodate the Halls projects. Similarly, in the actual negotiations over the purchase of the Hall and the conditions over its use, (which could have stopped progress in its tracks) the role of John Gray was totally instrumental in compromising and developing bargaining procedures. In all, his ability to draw together the various interests which had to be involved in the bargaining process represents a remarkable achievement through the individuals perceptions of his role as local representative and his own particular interests in the
problems of deprivation.

At a higher level the individual influence of John Craigen MP for Maryhill and Neil Carmichael MP whose constituency boundary included part of the Corridor before the boundary changes and who was instrumental in fostering commitment for the Initiative through the Scottish Office became crucial in obtaining funds and in lobbying through Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District for the Project. This highlights the significance of informal contacts between individual and groups which emphasise the key roles of the latter in developing the Corridor Project.

Therefore, it has been suggested that those people involved in implementation does not necessarily reflect the formal organisational structure. The Housing Core Group mentioned in chapter three emphasised the key position of Maryhill Councillors in this formal subcommittee and its importance in 'getting things done' as one councillor put it. However, there also existed significant informal contacts between these councillors who could bargain over proposals due to the position they had. Their links with local organisations such as housing associations also represented important contacts and additional resource requirements.

The ways in which individuals, groups or agencies work together in implementing policies and plans can be described as "creating" or "forging" new "chains" between policy and action.

The Area Management Teams of the Regional Council and the Maryhill Corridor Working Party of the District Council and the subgroups derived from them (particularly the Commerce and Industry Groups) as well as the roles of those discussed above provided an important means of creating networks of activities and actions that interrelated to carry out a programme of action. The informal relationships that developed in these groups and particularly between officials and councillors had an important effect on the context of action. This can be seen in that the organisational reality to which actors...
carrying out a particular policy or programme refer is not just the formal organisational structure but what Hjern and Porter (1980) term the "implementation structure".

Within Maryhill and between Maryhill and the local authorities in particular placed the various formal groups where the different technical rationalities could be mediated in the political arena through local politicians and key officials.

The role of the co-ordinators in this respect was crucial. They tend, in the case of the Regional Co-ordinators and subsequent Joint Co-ordinators, to become amorphous characters both political (in the sense of bargaining and negotiating over resources) and administrative (in terms of progress-chasing) which had an important effect in sustaining the "ideology" of the Maryhill Corridor.

The pivotal positions of the co-ordinator outlined through the characteristics described in chapter three and the examples and case studies has shown the much greater "action space" they have been able to work in and have taken advantage of the ability to effect "entrepreneurial activity" (Hill 1981) in pursuit of their full-time commitment to the Maryhill Corridor Project.

This also applies to the role of local councillors in the evidence provided in harnessing support from local entrepreneurs and community groups to dealing at higher levels in the two authorities. An important remark that emerged from the interviews was that the local councillors tended to be "your above average councillor".

The most important factor to emerge from the role of individuals and groups in influencing developments in Maryhill is that they tended to be located at the highly versatile interface between politics and administration such that the latter did not become distinct but part of an ongoing series of interrelated acts.
(e) **Values, Interests and Ideologies**

With the analysis of the Corridor Project and how it relates to the wider social context and individual involvement, it becomes necessary to examine what actually took place there and why. It has been seen how policy, of the Region's Area Initiatives, of the District Development Plan and central governments response to the inner cities, has been modified and mediated within the context of action. It is therefore legitimate to postulate that as policy moves away from the centre and becomes more dispersed such features of implementation processes eg. political bargaining continue to have an effect:

"it is only when you move outward from the core (of policy consensus) to deal with how this should be done, what resources should be devoted...and so on that interest conflicts are encountered" (Barret and Hill (1984) p 236)

This section looks at the micro-level of implementation processes in greater detail examining how the various individuals, groups, departments and agencies concerned and their different interests, values, and ideologies interact through negotiating and bargaining. The inclusion of values is a significant diversion from the rationalist paradigm. It is important to acknowledge these aspects of this action-oriented approach since the resolution of interests through the processes of political bargaining identified involves a distribution of costs and benefits. The action-oriented approach is concerned here with the boundaries or margins of professions not their central parts. The concern is perhaps for what they all lack - a realisation that an understanding of their interconnectedness; an interrelatedness which cannot be divorced from the social system of which they form a part.

The ability to bargain is determined by different factors, one of the most important of which is power. Power can be defined in
many ways e.g. organisational status, political status, influence, professional ideologies, access to information etc. The important fact to recognise in this thesis is that these are important characteristics of implementation processes which determine the outputs of decision-making processes.

Blowers (1980) suggests that:

"The power to make policy and to attempt to effect it is formally in the hands of the elected representatives who constitute a planning committee. In reality this power is confined to a small group of politicians and officials". (p4)

and he goes on to suggest that;

"the power to implement however is much more dispersed" (p 4)

The rational, normative approach would suggest the need, therefore, to exert control over policy as it moves away from the centre in order that its implementation can conform to the original intentions. This, therefore, assumes that such control can be exerted, probably within an unitary, hierarchical structure in which commands can be transferred to successively lower levels until it is "on the ground". However, as Hood (1976) suggests the further away one moves from unitary organisational solution to a problem, the more likely are co-ordination difficulties to arise". In reality, as in the Corridor Project, a multiplicity of actors and agencies have been recognised having their own interests and not necessarily in a hierarchical set-up. Therefore as Pressman and Wildavsky suggest;

"decision-makers become forced to gain consent (for proposals) through a system of multiple 'clearances ', a process fraught with diplomatic problems often defeating the best intentions of
Compromise is therefore seen, through this perspective, as policy failure. This research, however, takes a different perspective of such difficulties by focusing on the action of decision-making itself and relating this to the wider context in which those decisions have meaning, rather than attempting to identify a single, linear process of cause and effect. Compromise and bargaining therefore became central to the analysis of implementation processes.

The question of interests is one which has important implications for understanding action. Although consensus can be achieved over many things, conflicts are also likely to arise. The Burgh Halls case study is evidence of a conflict of interests which occurred between the Halls Committee and the Regional Council and related departments. The desire by the Halls Committee to retain the Burgh Hall and adjacent police station as part of the heritage of Maryhill was paramount. To the Regional Council and its deprivation policy through its co-ordinators and management arrangements was to ensure the development of community facilities as its primary aim. The agreement achieved by the successful application for urban aid would provide the means to ensure both interests were served.

The fact that those interests were not achieved in the way intended represented a failure of the negotiation and bargaining process which is at the heart of implementation processes. The failure of this process cannot be viewed as a lack of control since those involved eg. community groups, local politicians were not in a hierarchical situation. Compromises, as we have seen, were proposed but these were not acceptable to the Burgh Halls Committee. As the situation became more complex and other factors came into play eg. one-roof leisure centre, other community groups etc delay became significant which pressured the Regional Council into making a decision. The intention of the Region was to develop a community facility for the area, the intention of the Halls Committee was primarily to retain the Burgh Halls building as well as its use as a community focus.
The failure of the negotiation process resulted in a move to the centre through the Policy and Resources Subcommittee who eventually delivered the ultimatum which resulted in the Halls Committee "going it alone". Therefore, the unresolved conflict of interests, raised the level of negotiations into what Self (1972) terms "the zone of administrative politics" composed of leading members and officials dealing with aspects of policy. The decision not to make progress on the Burgh Halls was not publicly announced, nevertheless, very powerful subcommittees such as that of Policy and Resources made significant, yet unnoticed decisions.

The Burgh Halls case study contrasts with that of the Community Central Halls where (although the circumstances were different) the objective was basically the same; this time spearheaded by the local Regional concillor who formed the Action Committee and who had important links with the community and at high levels in the local authorities. In this case the close links that developed between the Region and the Central Halls enabled a successful negotiation over the projects satisfying the interests of the Council as a facility for community development and for the community groups, the opportunity to run a local facility.

It is important to gain agreement over the resources needed to sustain a project. It is possible to gain such a commitment through formal means i.e. the Redevelopment Assistance Programme or through personal, political or professional influence i.e. contact between councillors, officials, local people etc. To gain the necessary support the "providers" must commit themselves to achieving certain objectives regarded as valuable, or at least acceptable, by those controlling the resources they need and usually involving compromises between the different interests involved eg. the release of sites by the District Council in obtaining agreement over the Redevelopment Assistance Programme. The role of the local Regional councillor and of the management committee in the Community Central Halls case study enabled a commitment to be given for resources to the project. The objectives of the "providers", i.e. the Community Central Halls, to
develop the Halls as a unique community development project were regarded as "valuable" to the Region's deprivation Policy, and in part carried out the role of the Council in the area in this respect. Such a compromise was not achieved in the Burgh Halls which partly accounts for the impasse between the Burgh Halls Committee and the Regional Council, largely constrained by financial expediency.

This raises important questions and dilemmas. The lack of involvement of actors and agencies in programmes may be due to where they define the boundaries of concern rather than how they fit into practical problems ie. the departments view. This is evidenced in the lack of acceptance of responsibility for the administration of the funding for the Burgh Halls by Community Education and in the difficulties encountered in the Community Work Management Group (Chapter Three) in terms of how far and to what extent each department should be involved.

Professional ideologies and values can also play an important part in the processes of negotiation and bargaining in implementation processes. Plainly, this was the case in the Kirkland St housing development where a clash of interests occurred between the SSHA, the Design Group and the District Council Planning Department. The conflicts over shops in the design brief by the Council and the SSHA's desire to build more houses and its own policy against having homes above shops show up such values. The Planning departments views were based on an attempt to re-establish the traditional thoroughfare of Maryhill Road as part of its strategy for the Maryhill Corridor. The conflicts over these professional values continued in relation to the design and aspect of the construction in which the interests of the Design Group were brought to bear, resulting in the latter and the SSHA winning the day. However, to a large extent, these differences in values and interests were superceded by the need for progress on projects such that the success of the "ideology" of the Corridor Project became more important which was supported by the councillors on the Housing Committee and the Joint co-ordinator.
The Taggarts' case study highlights the increasing importance of the value placed on creating employment opportunities and generating local commercial activity in the early 1980's. The prospect of creating over 100 jobs in phase I of the development and perhaps another 100 in phase II laid heavily on the minds of the decision-makers resulting in the modifications of proposals for that part of the Kelvin Local Plan, to accommodate the Taggarts' Development.

The failure of the Community Work Management Group can also be viewed in terms of conflicts over values and ideologies held by the various participants. The ideological bias of the reports of the community workers which were seen to articulate their own views of the communities' needs clashed with those of the senior departmental representatives from the Housing department, in particular, who were on the Group.

It was suggested earlier that a great deal of significance should be attached to the key role of the co-ordinators. The individuals concerned obviously have a specific "action Space" in which to work but they represent a potentially highly flexible, dynamic and pivotal position. How they approach their tasks will depend on their "assumptive worlds" mentioned earlier. The position is a unique one, with no particular allegiance to any department within their respective authorities, but committed to the Initiative which they are co-ordinating.

In effect, the "ideology" of the Corridor Project became dominant. Together with the local councillors and senior officials attempts were made to influence or change the behaviour of others to get things implemented; and others responding according to whether the desired action would fit in with or further their own interests. These processes, however, take place throughout the policy-action relationships. The lack of District political representation on the Regions Area Management Team during the hung council is evidence of this as is the bargaining over the Policy Co-ordination Unit between the District and the Scottish Office, with the former developing its own
interests while at the same time compromising over the secondment of a Scottish Office official to the unit.

What seems clear from the foregoing discussion is that uncertainty about the future can encourage innovation and adjustment to change. Throughout the analysis one can identify many cases where the interaction of values, interests and ideologies becomes important where conflicts emerge. Such conflicts over resources, ideologies and power struggles are not distinct activities but evolve together as different aspects of a continuing process of negotiation, bargaining and compromise in the political arena.

(f) Conclusions

The study of implementation is problematic. How we view the facts about implementation will partly depend on how we conceive of implementation which in itself cannot be settled by observation.

It also depends on how you interpret case studies. The case of an action-oriented approach focuses on a particular conceptualisation of implementation processes.

It is difficult to unravel how far the policy-action relationship can be explained by the influence and the interests-power structure in society, how far it is the product of "bureaucratic politics" and how far it is formed by professional and administrative values and how these interrelate.

This research has concluded that policy and plans are never static ends in themselves and that they are liable to be modified and mediated through processes of political bargaining. The sheer complexity of linkages, interrelationships in decision-making at different levels, scales and times affects intentions and expectations adds to the difficulty in attaining control over policy and its implementation. The perspective of this research has been to emphasise policy or plan performance such that negotiation and
compromise became essential features of the policy-action relationship.

The plurality of interests, values and ideologies and the particular power relationships in which they interact became crucial factors in the mediation process. This has an effect all through the policy-action relationship.

Within this context it is suggested that certain key individuals and groups characterised in different ways by the features above, are able to exert influence on the context of circumstances and relations which exist at a particular point in time to "bend" programmes towards their specific intentions.

Another feature of this research has been to show that the formal aspects of the statutory planning system are not necessarily the most important. The plan as an instrument of purposive rationality does not lend itself to revealing the changing, dynamic nature of implementation processes. It has been shown how it is the intentions which underly these formal aspects and which become embedded in the plan and how these intentions change over time and under different circumstances that become most important. Therefore the plan as a "picture in time" becomes part of the process of political bargaining providing the technical output of the interactions of intentions decided in the political arena. Thus it becomes important to see implementation processes as a series of political acts.

The recognition of informal processes represents a much more dynamic "implementation structure" (Hjern and Porter 1980) which embodies formal and informal relations between individuals and agencies which are formed and reformed in response to different needs and interests and having an important effect on the flexibility of such a structure.

Thus intentions became part of the action sequence within a process of negotiation between officials and members at all levels and from external sources resulting in a dominant direction in which
policy and action proceeds.

This interpretation goes a long way to explaining why policy or plan intentions may yield different outputs and unintended consequences. Emphasis on the control aspects of implementation processes may therefore be misdirected in their attempts since most of these difficulties cannot be resolved through rational decisions.

Through concentrating on plan performance, the emphasis is placed on how action is achieved. Therefore, implementation is not seen as a linear, step by step process but interactive and recursive. Individuals and organisations actions and reactions may determine policy and plans as much as policy and plans themselves determine action and response. Therefore, although action can be constrained by the context of circumstance, it also presents opportunities for entrepreneurial action taking advantage of "ideas in good currency" (Schon 1971) as in the Maryhill Corridor Project.

In conclusion the perspective of this research has highlighted particular features of implementation processes which need to be recognised:

1. the particular organisational and resource requirements available;
2. the existence of significant informal processes in achieving action as well as the formal machinery;
3. the political nature of implementation processes and how they change through negotiation and bargaining;
4. the reticu lar and iterative character of decision-making;
5. how the environmental, organisational and political systems interact and operate;
6. the role of values and ideologies within the political rationality;
7. the mercurial nature of implementation processes; and
8. the opportunities available for individual action within these processes.
This concluding chapter attempts to draw together the conclusions from the analysis and place them within the theoretical positions on planning and implementation discussed in Chapter 1. Before doing so, and since this research is grounded in practice, it is necessary to establish reasons for the so-called "crisis in planning" (Paris 1982) and the issues which the practical reality has raised.

The impact of the economic crisis and the decline of the birth rate in the 1970's, had a profound effect on planning generally and within a few years, planning on the basis of anticipated economic and demographic growth was transformed into planning for a stable population, reduced resources and lowered public expenditure.

At the same time, there was important institutional change. The re-organisation of local government and the introduction of new legislation affecting development plans, land and transport policies, presented sudden and disruptive changes. Together with changes in the administration and organisation of the new local authorities with the introduction of corporate management, to improve the awareness of the interrelatedness of policy, both the local and the national climate produced a turbulent context.

In part these changes were the result of wider structural changes in economic circumstances. Such changes placed considerable stress on the ability of planners and planning to adapt to this different climate had resulted in criticisms being levelled at the planning system;

"the basic problems with the planning process are that it promises to do too much, takes too long, covers too many problems, is too complicated, and produces results that are largely vague and esoteric" (A J Cataneo 1974, p 45)
During the 1970's, the Royal Town Planning Institute published working party papers on growing areas of concern in planning. In Planning and the Future (1976), the basic problems were listed as;

1. Delay in preparing plans and duplication;
2. that the planning system was too weak;
3. the lack of connectedness between planners and the public;
4. the planning system being imperfectly related to other local government activity; and
5. the need for the system to be flexible.

The Report went on to say that;

"there is evidence of a growing dissatisfaction with planning and this particularly stems from the delays, duplication and ineffectiveness of the present system". (RTPI 1976 p 4)

Considerable attention has also been paid to the inability of plans and policies to be carried out as intended. The recognition of the "implementation gap" has resulted in a need to understand processes of implementation and planning in greater depth.

"Any notion of policy being invented or initiated in some central or high place, to be smoothly and painstakingly carried out by agents loyal to the spirit and letter of that policy, is questionable. To expect loyalty of that kind from any lower level is clearly unrealistic. It does not exist within particular agencies, far less between them. The response, in our view, should not be to tighten controls and hope to secure greater loyalty to policy intentions. Rather, we should be seeking ways of recognising and harnessing the positive
advantages of these forces which are inevitably about planning" (RTPI 1976, p. 9).

It therefore becomes important to look for different ways to understand the "effectiveness" of planning. From the analysis of the Corridor Project it is clear the formal planning system - the legislation circulars, statutory plans and procedures - are only one aspect. The RTPI working party (1976) reinforced this;

"In the past it has been commonly assumed that the essential ingredient of the planning process is the plan or policy and to the extent that this is not implemented there is cause for concern" (RTPI 1976, p 30-31)

From this it can be inferred that less formal processes are important involving other interests outside the "technical" planning process of the formal system. Development Plans may regulate and influence market activities but they do not determine them. The problems of the inner city are visible, perhaps obvious, but there causes are complex and planners do not possess the power to solve them. For some, the lack of control accounts for the non-fulfilment of plans where action depends on the decisions taken by a variety of bodies. However, the existence of such blighted areas and other "irrational" features of the built environment demand an explanation that goes beyond assumptions about the failure of planning. It requires us to locate planning in its social context.

The difficulties which planning has faced through the 1970's has led some (Healey et al 1982) to conclude that the emphasis on getting things done has resulted in a relapse into pragmatism to seek an utility for planning. In this sense planners and the planning system are seen as the functionaries of the dominant political economy such that planning principles and values become influenced by the interests of the dominant pressures surrounding them. This emphasises the idea of planning as a political activity where values become dependant on the power relationships in society.
The significance of other less formal ways of approaching the planning task and the need to cope with uncertainties has placed an emphasis on the role of the planner in responding to and developing new opportunities (RTPI 1979) within the prevailing market ideology.

The limitation of the "action space" of planners and their ability to influence has led to criticisms of the rational-comprehensive approach which has characterised planning since the post-war period.

The rational-comprehensive paradigm, it was suggested, sees the planning process in technical terms separating means and ends and placing an emphasis on controlling the various forces which affect the planning process such that "policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private bodies, that are directed at the achievement of objections set forth in prior policy decisions (Van Meter, Van Horn p 445-88). Therefore, "a plan is a course of action which can be carried into effect, which can be expected to lead to the attainment of the ends sought, and which someone (the effecting organisation) intends to carry into effect". (Meyerson and Banfield 1964, p 312).

It is the use which is made of plans, however, which is important rather than their explicit content as such (E Preteceille 1982, p 145). Plans and policies cannot be regarded as constants since they are mediated in implementation by actors operating within different "assumptive worlds" from those formulating policy. Plans have to satisfy a multitude of interests such that conflicts are likely to occur not only within the power structure of government but within the specific organisational "set-up". Plans, therefore, have little control over implementation and further that:

"The political reality is that general public interests are almost impossible to define articulate" (Catanese p 25, 1974).
Much of the concern for the planning system has concentrated on the assumption that plans need to be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. However, in this analysis, interests and intentions play the central part in a multi-organisational context mediated through the political arena such that the emphasis moves away from the "technical" planning process to an emphasis on the factors which achieve action.

The inability of planning to "deliver the goods" has been highlighted by Wildavsky in his article "If planning is everything maybe its nothing" (Wildavsky 1973), in which he states that what is called planning is in fact indistinguishable from unplanned decision-making and, in terms of principle, therefore, is unlikely to achieve the results which planners claim for it. The assumption is that in order to make planning intellectually credible, it has to be able to control events and future uncertainties.

Wildavsky comments on the contention that no superior, planning process exists which allows planners to have a monopoly in decisions, based on technical knowledge. Thus while accepting the existence of a planning process, such a process is not distinctive, such that it becomes part of a number of planning processes which are subdued within the wider political rationality. In effect, therefore, the rational, comprehensive approach becomes misdirected in attempting to develop increasingly sophisticated normative models which exclude the significance of governmental action and the "political" aspects of interpersonal and interagency relations which are crucial in explaining policy outcomes or understanding implementation processes.

The apolitical nature of the rational approach suggests the traditional claim of neutrality of planners and thus avoiding questions of conflict. Exponents of the policy-oriented approach emphasise the need for consensus on human needs and that social priorities can be rationally debated. In reality, however, many planners recognise and act within the sphere of politics, acknowledging political support in order to get things done.
The Development Plan for Maryhill and the subsequent changes to it were seen to be the outcome of a bargaining process in the political arena from the interactions of politicians, officials etc. Assuming the constraints on the planners "action space", in attempting to increase their influence, they adopt principles which are likely to be acceptable to those they seek to influence (Healey and Underwood 1978). This raises the issue of the utility of planning as a state activity guided by the dominant political and economic climate and this, together with the uncertainty of future circumstances and the variability of interests involved conflicts with the apparent autonomy of planners in the managerialist thesis (Pahl 1970).

Blowers (1980) comments that, "There is little control by planning over instruments required to achieve planning objectives, and considerable dependence on a multiplicity of agencies, public and private, to secure the effective implementation of plans" (P2)

Friedmann (1973) suggests that it is only in a situation of stability and clarity that the rational-comprehensive approach would actually work. The latter approach, advocated by supporters of "systems approach" (McLaughlin 1973, Stewart 1971) would see the process of putting policy into effect as:

1. the availability of required resources;
2. the ability to control resources; and
3. communicating what is wanted.

It therefore becomes relatively easy to place the reasons for conflicts on the problems of bureaucracy, seen as a generic whole and the response seen in terms of providing controls, incentives etc. However, as Blowers (1980) suggests;

"it is important to perceive and articulate the political conflicts, concealed and overt, for it is here that the significance of planning as a means of
influencing the lives of individuals
lies" (p 199)

The planning process in therefore not a unitary, logical sequential process integrating means-ends relationships in accordance with rational comprehensibility. The process is characterised by highly complex interactions of different intentions and objectives, at different levels in a reticular decision-making process, within the context of dynamic processes affecting the context of circumstances. Thus, one time salutary development such as urban motorways and high-rise flats, have under different conditions been characterised as opprobrious. The Maryhill Corridor Project and the developments within it were affected by changes in conditions, perpetuated by changes in intentions and aims of different parties highlighting the relative nature of "effectiveness", in planning.

In practise much of what does take place, as in the Corridor Project, tends to be characterised by Lindblom's "disjointed incrementalism", to which the response of the rationalist "recipe-book" approach would be misdirected. Incrementalists urge the avoidance of Utopianism since it involves high risks, and both goals and means to attain objectives are unclear. Utopian approaches, however, can stimulate the imagination into long run thinking. There is a tendency for incrementalists to neglect the unimportant consequences of policy, but among those they concede to be unimportant they rule out of bounds the uninteresting, the remote, the imponderable, the intangible and the poorly understood, no matter how important. It therefore represents a process of adaptation and amelioration, recognising "ills" to move away from rather than goals towards which to move. (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, p 9, p 102).

Hambleton (1978) comments of disjointed incrementalism that analyses and evaluation are disjointed in the sense that various aspects of public policy and even aspects of any one problem area are analysed at various points, with no apparent co-ordination and without the articulation of points that ideally denotes subdivisions of topic in synoptic problem-solving (pp 105-6), suggesting that such a strategy
is no strategy at all. Donnison (1975) contends that Lindblom's pluralist conception generally pictures society as it actually is, but criticises it in asserting that to go a step further and argue that such a strategy is good (p 31) is another matter and leads Eddison to comment that to advocate incrementalism is to "unwittingly buttress complacency" (Eddison 1975).

Nevertheless, in practice planning has been less concerned to initiate proposals which lead to desired (normative) outcomes than to react to circumstances and attempt to rationalise outcomes in terms of some co-ordinated framework. In this respect it becomes difficult to discern the difference between planning and incrementalism.

Nevertheless, the emphasis on the behavioural approach highlights the "political" aspects of planning and implementation and the considerable influence these factors have on planning and action such that planning has deceived itself by evading the realities of uncertainty about the future of change, and the role of the planner within this environment (Eddison 1975). Thus the conceptualisation of the planning process should not be seen as a pathology to be cured but a reality to be faced (Friedmann 1973).

Part of the logic of this perspective places the understanding of planning and therefore of implementation firmly within the context of social processes in general. By recognising planning as an activity per se rather than a discrete technical process it becomes possible to concentrate on the "action" and how this fits in with the dynamic processes of implementation discussed earlier. This style of "innovative planning" has been developed through the New Humanist tradition:

"In Innovative planning, different kinds of technical experts apply their skills directly to the development of new organisational responses to the needs perceived. Rather than preparing
elaborate proposals that are preliminaries to action, they achieve a fusion of plan-making with plan implementation activities during the course of the action itself. In (Innovative) Planning plans and action become conterminous" (Friedmann 1973 in Hambleton (1978) (p 286))

It is important that the above represents a move away from seeing the process of plan-making as central to the process of planning. Implementation then becomes less the automatic process of policy execution and more an arena for political bargaining in the deployment of financial, management, information and other resources.

In the 1970's the shift in local government and indeed central government practise towards the adoption of more corporate approaches to policy-making represented the growing acceptance of the need for more "rational" approaches. At the same time there was also concern over the ability of government to use these new approaches;

"Government, whether rational, regional or local, appears to be adept at making statements of intentions, but what happens on the ground often falls a long way short of the original aspirations"... Government either seems unable to put its policy into effect as intended or finds that its interventions and action have unexpected or counter-productive outcomes which create new problems". (Barret and Fudge (1981) p 3).

It has been argued that government is trying to influence and control much more than it has the material or political resources to achieve. In turn, ineffectiveness has been seen in terms of
inefficiency and incompetence. However, within this perspective there is a tendency to play down issues of power relations, the complexity of interests and value systems between individuals and agencies who make policy and those who put it into action. In this sense the processes of negotiation and compromise become prerequisites to the interaction of agencies and actors involved. Plans and action therefore interact and are no longer separate, and where the emphasis is placed on achieving action and making things happen between those involved, precipitating processes of political bargaining.

In accepting this perspective, the introduction of more rational approaches such as corporate management and simpler management structures (as in the Corridor Project) cannot make one sanguine about their ability to subdue departmentalism nor in making things happen quicker since such procedures themselves are not simply the outcome of co-operation and communication but of overt and covert bargaining and which marked the success performance of the Corridor Project. When the Bains and Paterson Reports were produced they were asserting the predominance of a management system which depoliticised elected members, and encouraged them to identify with the organisation to become "co-opted as a kind of administrator into official decision-making" (D M Hill 1974, p 87)

So often corporate planning has concealed the politics of implementation leading Hambleton and Edidson to suggest the need to use corporate management to open it up in new directions such that values, conflicts of interest and a plurality of objectives are given to councillors".

This analysis raises the issue of "effectiveness" as a relative concept. The current relationships between central and local government are not designed to allow local authorities to learn for itself. Tight monetary controls and constraints on action are agreed to regulation rather than spurring new initiatives, contrary to the initial environment in which the new rational approaches were developed.
The major conclusion of this research has been the significance of the political rationality in affecting action. It is suggested that by focusing on the important links between politics and administration, one can reveal much more of the theory and practice of planning which is the central concern of this study.

An implementation perspective does not just focus on action, reaction, or response, where the nature of organisations and their behaviour influences the differential scope for action and the use made of this "action space" within a particular project. It also focuses on the politics of policy;

"it is indeed because the policy section is so diffuse, so all embracing, and so opaque that it is the implementation process which sheds light on the politics of the policy and on the values and purpose which underlie the policy"

(Stewart and Underwood 1982 p 219)

In effect the processes of implementation become central to the analysis of planning as an activity lying at an important interface involving the interaction of a complexity of interests and intentions and their resultant manifestations in the field of public policy. It is within this blurred, essentially political arena that the planners role can be developed.

Thus, in order to avoid the relapse into pragmatism, as well as recognising the significance of political bargaining, one must also recognise the opportunities for administrative learning. From the planner's ability to "innovate" in understanding what is politically feasible as well as rationally defensible, opportunities exist to develop a heightened awareness of the chasm between knowledge and action.

This research accepts the need to understand action within the
organisational and administrative structures that exist which themselves are part of the wider social processes of societal development. It, therefore, becomes important to attempt to bring together the micro-level processes, which have been the subject matter of this thesis, and those at the macro-level and by doing so help to reveal the processes governing planning and its practice and thus help to understand implementation processes within the epistemology of planning.
APPENDIX 1

TABLE OF EVENTS
**PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT**

| 1960's | Glasgow Corporation Quinquennial Review
Designation of Comprehensive Development Areas
Greater Glasgow Transportation Study |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
| 1970's | Glasgow Corporation; "Areas of Need" Report
Maryhill Corridor District Study (Glasgow Corporation Planning Dept) |
| 1980's | West Central Scotland Plan - comprehensive approach
Maryhill Corridor District Study (Glasgow Corporation Planning Dept) |

**MARYHILL**

| 1980's | Woodside (Comprehensive Development Area)
Maryhill (Outline Comprehensive Development Area)
Maryhill Motorway |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
| 1990's | Kelvin Local Plan begins
Summerston under construction
Summerston Housing Co-operative
Growing public opinion against Motorway
Queens Green Housing Association formed
Maryhill Housing Association
Shelving of Maryhill Motorway
Announcement of forthcoming project for Maryhill (pre-elections)
John Gray (North-Kelvinside; Regional Councillor) appointed as Policy and Resources Representative, Area Management Team (Region)
Working parties formed for local plans
Area management team/Corridor Working Party |
| 2000's | Glasgow Divisional Deprivation Group
North West Area Management Team
Richard Llewellyn chairs working part (District)
Science Park proposed (DEA)
Glasgow Divisional Deprivation Group
Demolition Group |
| 2010's | Maryhill Local Plan adopted
Regional Councillors on Working Party
Greater emphasis on industry and employment (District)
Announcement of forthcoming project for Maryhill (pre-elections)
John Gray (North-Kelvinside; Regional Councillor) appointed as Policy and Resources Representative, Area Management Team (Region)
Working parties formed for local plans
Area management team/Corridor Working Party |

**POLITICS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960's</th>
<th>Glasgow Corporation (Labour)</th>
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<td>1970's</td>
<td>Elections for new Regional and District Councils</td>
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| 1980's | District Council Elections - minority Conservative administration
Labour loses 20 seats |
| 1990's | Co-ordinating Committee (Districts) approve Maryhill Corridor Project
Regional Council approves Projects as one of Area Initiatives
Commitment to private housing (District). Housing Core group formed. Transfer of expenditure on housing to peripheral estates |
| 2000's | Maryhill Motorway deleted from Regional Council's Capital Transport Programme
District Council Elections - minority Conservative administration
Labour loses 20 seats
Meeting at Scottish Office with Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District |
| 2010's | Co-ordinating Committee (Districts) approve Maryhill Corridor Project
Regional Council approves Projects as one of Area Initiatives
Commitment to private housing (District). Housing Core group formed. Transfer of expenditure on housing to peripheral estates |

**EXTERNAL**

| 1960's | Central Government subsidies available for capital programmes
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<td>1980's</td>
<td>Scottish Development Agency (Scotland) Act 1975, Scottish Development Agency (Scotland) Act 1975. 5 Councillors (DOE) - Deprivation Study</td>
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| 1990's | Scottish Office Programme announced for East End of Glasgow
White Paper on Inner Cities by Peter Shore (Environment Secretary) Chancellors Dennis Mealy - 2nd budget (extra resources for inner cities) |
| 2000's | General Election-Conservative Government elected. Increase in public expenditure cuts |
| 2010's | Inner Urban Areas Act |

**MARYHILL POLITICS EXTERNAL**

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<th>1960's</th>
<th>Maryhill councillors on Housing Core Group (District)</th>
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**SCOTTISH DEPARTMENTS**

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# APPENDIX 2

## LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colin Bond</td>
<td>Scottish Development Agency; Manager of Science Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Brown</td>
<td>Greater Glasgow Health Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Craigen MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Maryhill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baillie Daniel Crawford</td>
<td>Glasgow District Councillor for North Kelvin</td>
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<td>John Gray</td>
<td>Strathclyde Regional Councillor for North Kelvin</td>
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<td>Lord Provost</td>
<td>City of Glasgow; Glasgow District Councillor for Maryhill</td>
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<td>Robert Gray</td>
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<td>Barbara Jeffrey</td>
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<td>Mrs B McCanny</td>
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<td>Malcolm McDonald</td>
<td>Lecturer in Planning, Glasgow School of Act</td>
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<td>Lawrence McGarry</td>
<td>Strathclyde Regional Councillor for Maryhill and Summerston</td>
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<td>Felicity McLelland</td>
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<td>David McLennan</td>
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<td>Helen Monro</td>
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<td>James Muir</td>
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<td>Stewart Murdoch</td>
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<td>Robert Parry</td>
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<td>Douglas Stonelake</td>
<td>Architect, Scottish Special Housing Association</td>
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<td>Anthony Tobia</td>
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<td>Hugh Todd</td>
<td>Gairbraid Community Education Centre, Strathclyde Regional Council</td>
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<td>Douglas Veitch</td>
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<td>David Watts</td>
<td>Economic Planning, Glasgow District Council</td>
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<td>James Wintour</td>
<td>Queens Cross Housing Association</td>
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