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Multiple Concepts of the Church
Hermeneutics, Identity, and Christian Community

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Abstract

This thesis aims to contribute to Western theology by exploring plurality as well as unity within Christianity. By looking at the history of orthodoxy as a narrative construction of identity, I argue that Christian identity is not based on doxa, dogma, or practises. Instead, I suggest that Christian identity should be rooted primarily as a practise in the experience of and participation with God through the living Christ. I propose that ecumenical unity is not ecclesial or doxalogical but rather practical because unity is achieved when groups act together and participate in each other without ceasing to be different.

I explore in my first chapter the philosophical concepts (time and narrative) which form the basis of identity. I introduce the thoughts of G. Deleuze and P. Ricœur separately before bringing them together in a dialogue. The dialogue develops the concepts of time and narrative into a general theory for constructing identity. I analyse identity in the second chapter by reading historical reactions to I. Kant’s conception of a permanent identity because Kant is a central focus in contemporary philosophical thought on identity. Inspired by the dialogue between Deleuze and Ricœur introduced previously, I construct a new approach to identity. My concept of identity can be applied equally to individuals and groups, however I primarily follow group identity in my thesis.

My third chapter applies this theory of identity to the discussion of the concept of orthodoxy. I present a model for interpreting orthodoxy in terms of group identity, then I trace the history of orthodoxy in three general periods: the early Church, the Reformation era, and our contemporary period. I show that concerns with theological truth in questions of orthodoxy were often politicised and used to establish an authority to control Christian identity. During the Reformations, reforms were treated as questions of authority and at times resulted in exclusion rather than reform. Political moves subsequently created multiple authorities which I suggest reveal the contingency of authority. Since the nineteenth century, groups approached Christian unity without addressing the implications of authority’s contingency. In my fourth chapter, I pursue the question of ecumenical unity by interpreting authorities as created and embedded in particular contexts which render impossible a single, universal authority. In contrast to a singular definition of the Church, I argue that Pauline images of the body of Christ shape Christian identity as polydox. My model of relating differences within unity reveals the extent to which many theological ‘controversies’ still are politicised. Finally, I argue that the ecumenical dialogue overlaps with inter-religious and ‘secular’ dialogues, both of which are necessary for the Church’s work on identity as organic unity.
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Introduction: A Prelude to Thinking about Orthodoxy

Appeals to ‘orthodoxy’ have long permeated theological discourse. Whether one is referring to a particular denominational family (as in Eastern Orthodoxy), a concept of ‘true’ dogma and practises (as in Roman Catholic orthodoxy), or a theological school of thought (as in Radical Orthodoxy), the term is a symbol which refers to a particular story that shades how one approaches faith. The different uses of the term ‘orthodoxy’ are neither mutually exclusive nor wholly reducible to a single concept. Instead, the stories to which they refer are narratives constructed as identities in time; and in the case of Christian theology, these identities share roots in an event: the experience of Christ. To discuss ‘orthodoxy’ at the beginning of the early twenty-first century, one cannot ignore the prevalent shift in philosophical thinking towards identity and subjectivity.

In our contemporary world, identity is used often as a tool of convenience in anything including political rallies, derogatory comments, or asserting a desired relation with a community. These uses imply two very important questions: ‘who am I?’ and ‘who are you?’ Relatively recently — since approximately the nineteenth century — these two questions have been answered by referring to a perception of dialectical partners idealised as the Self and the Other. However, these partners cannot be imagined simply in terms of a dichotomy nor as mutually exclusive.

The Other is and has always been a mirror of the Self, reflecting back the very projections from which the Self constructs the Other. As this reflection was noticed, thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Paul Sartre began to find that the Self and the Other are not impregnable, monolithic structures; rather they have discovered the connections between the two that complicate the simple ideals of Self and Other. In addition to these shifts in understanding, there looms in the background the ‘death of God’. This idea is ascribed to the nineteenth century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche whose madman in The

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1. Throughout this thesis, I capitalise Self, Other, Selves, and Others to distinguish the concept of these identities from other uses (e.g. indicating directions of relations).
Gay Science proclaimed the death of God, but Nietzsche tied a second death of the Self to the death of God. The connection between God and the Self is plainly stated by the twentieth-century philosopher Gilles Deleuze: ‘we are no more human than God, the one dies with the other’.3

Systematic approaches to identity construction and the relations between Self and Other can be seen as relatively popular topics within theology. Anglican thinkers such as David Ford and Anthony Thiselton provided different theological approaches to identity: Ford with a phenomenological approach and Thiselton with a hermeneutical one.4 However, the ambiguities of the relations between individuals as Self and Other were the primary focus in Alistair McFadyen’s work The Call to Personhood.5 McFadyen, with a history of working as a nurse in a psychiatric hospital, pinpointed the difficulty in establishing an identity because it is ‘a structured, continuous identity sedimented from significant “moments”’.6 Because identity is ‘dynamic’ rather than stable, the relations between Self and Other cannot be interpreted through ‘absolute’ boundaries. In fact, as McFadyen notes, even the idea of a Self must be questioned because beneath the mask of the wholly single individual, there is a ‘plurality of local “selves”’.7 Because of these internal differences, McFadyen argues that the external relations between Self and Other can also be constructed in terms of communities which are similarly united within differences.8 From this definition of communities, McFadyen connects the Church to society as a distinct community within the world. Finally, McFadyen turns this analysis of identity into a call for the Church to ‘resist the permanent and static stabilisation and over-rigidification of its institutions’ because the dynamics of identity found in individual identity are also ‘intrinsic to the nature of the Church’.9

Nearly a decade after McFadyen’s analysis, Amos Yong published a book on the relationship between identity, community, and orthodoxy from an American pragmatist and Pentecostal perspective.10 Yong shares similar themes as McFadyen because he also seeks to construct

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6. Ibid., 73 (emphasis mine).
7. Ibid., 103.
9. Ibid., 248.
an ecclesiology around the plurality of relations between different members within a single unit (i.e. the Church). Yong begins his approach with hermeneutics, agreeing with the theologian Stephen Sykes that Christianity has always had a plurality of interpretations and methods.\(^\text{11}\) In establishing his methodology for analysis, Yong suggest five general categories in which the relations of community (and identity) can develop: classical foundationalism, minimal foundationalism, postfoundationalism, nonfoundationalism, and antifoundationalism.\(^\text{12}\) Of these, Yong identifies his own work as a ‘shifting foundationalism’ which seems to be close to (if not within) postfoundationalism because of his hermeneutical concern for contextualisation which he identifies in the postfoundationalist category.\(^\text{13}\) Through this rubric, Yong employs John Zizioulas’s work on community in conjunction with his own socially contextualised understanding of community and relationality rooted in his pneumatological understanding of the trinity.\(^\text{14}\) Yong’s analysis of community and identity leads him to define orthodoxy without creeds or statements so that it can be contextualised in differing communities; to achieve this, he defines theological orthodoxy as ‘reconciliation with God’ which can be interpreted through different theological methods.\(^\text{15}\)

All of these analyses have focused on the relations between individuals within Christianity. In this thesis, I shall explore the relations of identity primarily between groups within Christianity. This does begin with an analysis of the Self which echoes much of McFadyen’s and Yong’s approaches, but I reconstruct the image of the ‘sedimentary’ Self as a theological construct for analysing the concept of orthodoxy. In other words, the Self whose identity I seek to define is that of the universal/invisible Church. To understand the question of identity, I shall navigate a few related topics which provide the context in which identity emerges: [1] hermeneutics, [2] time, and [3] narrative. This context is necessarily theological because it implies more than just an individual identity whose life and existence continue after Nietzsche’s proclamation. The first topic, which will provide an initial reference point for this thesis, is a general theory of ‘sense’ which I develop from Deleuze’s semiotics and Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. The ‘death of the Self’ as well as the ‘death of God’ are to be read and interpreted as implications about ‘identity’ rather than propositions concerned with ‘real’ objects.

\(^{11}\) See ibid., 1.

\(^{12}\) Both classical and minimal foundationalism agree that there must be a core set of beliefs which serve as the groundwork upon which all other beliefs are built. Their differences lie in whether these foundational beliefs are ‘self-evident’ (classical) or ‘warranted’ (minimal). Antifoundationalism, much as it name implies, rejects all such foundations and places all rationality as wholly subjective/relative. Postfoundationalism mediates these two genres by acknowledging the contextuality of knowledge while also seeking to construct or discover a common, inter-contextual rationality. Nonfoundationalism is more broadly defined than postfoundationalism as it does acknowledge the contextuality of knowledge but it seeks to construct rationality along the lines of coherence to (subjectively) accepted beliefs rather than an intersubjectivity likes postfoundationalism. See ibid., 97–9.

\(^{13}\) Cf. ibid., 98, 100.

\(^{14}\) See ibid., 111–2.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 238.
Identity is somehow denoted, therefore I must first describe how denotation itself occurs in the wake of ‘postmodern’ philosophies. The semiotics found in Deleuze will be one hermeneutical starting point, yet it is insufficient on its own for my task in this thesis.

The complement to Deleuze is found in his contemporary, the twentieth century philosopher Paul Ricœur. Most of Ricœur’s works have already been linked to theology, and it is through this connection (though there are others) that Deleuze is brought into theological thought. In combining Ricœur’s and Deleuze’s hermeneutical works, there begins to emerge a necessary discourse on identity since both thinkers have related the two concepts of hermeneutics and identity in their works. A pairing of Deleuze and Ricœur is perhaps an odd one because of their admitted biases with regard to theology and religious thought; however I believe this opposition between the two is ripe for exploration and analysis. Deleuze the atheist has been critiqued by some philosophers (e.g., Peter Hallward) for smuggling theological thought into his work, yet this line of thought fails to acknowledge a difference between the philosophical nature of theology and the apparent ‘theological’ character of philosophy. Many of these criticisms see the ‘theological’ possibilities of Deleuze’s philosophy and treat them as necessary aspects of a hidden theological project, yet they do not recognise the polysemic nature of signification which creates both theological and non-theological possibilities without making either necessary to a philosopher’s project. Rather than attempt to ‘separate’ the ‘theological’ Deleuze from the ‘philosophical’/‘non-theological’ Deleuze, I employ Ricœur’s project of subjectivity in order to highlight one way in which Deleuze can be appropriated in theology without mistaking Deleuze for a ‘theologian’. Deleuze brings an interesting mix of semiotics and difference which integrates with Ricœur’s narrativity and hermeneutics in order to provide a historiographical perspective on Christian theology.

This thesis is not the first to propose bringing Deleuze and Ricœur together, and it is hopefully not the last. I am indebted to the work of Declan Sheerin in bringing the two divergent thinkers in his Deleuze and Ricœur. In his book, Sheerin sees the wedding of Ricœur and Deleuze as a difficult one which would result in something more similar to a mythological monster than a tidy weaving of complementary thoughts. However, the ‘monstrous’ result is a line of thought open to exploring the psychic construction of the Self reformulated between the cohesive narrative of Ricœur and the instability of becoming-other in Deleuze. Sheerin’s analysis re-creates a narrative Self in terms of Selves which change over time. The

16. Subjects are included in this category insofar as they are also objects.
19. Cf. ibid., 2.
historiography of the Self in Sheerin is transposed into my construction of a historiography of theology which, much as Sheerin does within the confines of a human individual, traces the ever-changing narrative and history of identity as a process of the Deleuzian becoming-other of the Ricoeurian narrative Self.

The path I follow towards identity takes the relation between Self(s) and Other(s) in terms of notions such as presence and difference. Identity is felt as something present, yet such a notion must first be contextualised within time. Through this course, it will become noticeable that identity has never been an absolute, permanent ‘substance’ and having an unbroken, uninterrupted existence and experience of an ‘external’ world. Instead, identities will be discerned as fabricated ideals that exist in minds, frequently interrupted and transformed by new experiences. Identity will be seen as what it is: virtual, imagined, and fragmented. There have been two distinct approaches to resolving the question of identity during the past century: the creation of a ‘Self’ by some kind of narrative (e.g. Ricoeur) or the dissolution of such a Self into a chaos of many ‘Selves’ (e.g. Deleuze). What is the ‘story’ of identity? By reading identity through a construct of time — something which Deleuze roots his hermeneutical work on difference, I wish to argue that both approaches are, in some sense, appropriate. Taken through the repetition of time, identity becomes the result of a hermeneutical process between a narrative construction of ‘Self’ and the constant interruption, dissolution, and re-creation of this narrative by the many ‘larval selves . . . beneath the floorboards’. 20

My second goal in this thesis is to outline a ‘hermeneutics of identity’ in order to understand Christian identity. In what way, if any, does a group’s identity differ from the above ‘Self’? I suggest that there is no difference between the construction of a group identity and an individual identity; what is more important is how the two interact with and displace each other.

Identity can be stripped down to a single idea: difference. 21 One identifies oneself by differentiation — an observable peculiarity that stands out against the massive crowd. This kind of distinction is epistemological, and its major fault is that it subsumes difference to identity in such a way that difference is always connected to an identification. I may be different from everyone else, but it is possible to have an exact copy of me no different from me. An example of this model of identification occurs in the 1997 film Face/Off: the two main characters switch faces and they are able to assume each other’s lives almost perfectly. 22

By identifying oneself as Self, one also creates an Other. The Other is perceived generally as an undifferentiated object from which the Self stands out in stark contrast. In this man-

20. Ibid., 3.
ner, reality is seen as an interplay of binary oppositions of Self against the Other regardless of any complexity within either identity or the relation(s) between them. A prime example can be found in American politics which tends to reduce opinions to a binary pole: Republican/Democrat (or liberal/conservative). The effect of this identification is that of the Doppelgänger where the Other must be seen as a mirror (inverse, negative) image of the Self. I wish to contrast this conception of difference with that of Deleuze.

Difference for Deleuze is ‘the state in which one can speak of determination as such’.\(^{23}\) It is something that exists prior to comparison and distinction.\(^{24}\) It is the ‘state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction’.\(^{25}\) Difference is first and foremost intrinsic and internal. The theological implication I pursue with this conception of difference is to establish separate Christian groups as different such that reconciliation in the manner of absorbing institutional distinctions (e.g. ecclesial structures) is difficult at best. Rather, reconciliation within an ecumenical framework must first and foremost recognise differences as differences and seek to find harmony without removing those differences.

The relationship between identity and difference actually creates more than the two poles of Self and Other; it constructs an entire ‘ecosystem’ of identities which are always in relation to one another. Only out of the many identities does a Self emerge as a cohesion of many divergent identities in such a way that the binary of Self and Other is contained within each many times over. In other words, the Self is composed of many Selves and Others in relation to one another. Because of this construct of identity, ‘the concepts of person, community, and God are inseparable and essentially interrelated’.\(^{26}\) The understanding of identity which I shall construct is equally applicable to groups in general and, for the primary purpose of this thesis, Christianity in particular. In drawing a single identity from many divergent groups of Christians, I am seeking to define ecclesial unity in terms of ecumenical dialogues because ‘visible’ unity is possible only because ‘invisible’ unity already exists. The ‘invisible’ unity follows from the shared participation in the single Christian identity; it may be interpreted and appropriated differently in its becoming visible. Unity in this case will be visible by mutual participation and interaction: ‘While visible unity, that is, actually and visibly doing things together, has a high priority in ecumenical work, …organizational unity is of considerably lower priority’.\(^{27}\)


\(^{25}\) Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 28.


INTRODUCTION

The discussion of identity entails another discussion in Christian theology. What are the consequences of the above discussion restructuring time and identity for theological discourse? While the effects are far-reaching, I wish to focus on one effect in particular: the conception and development of theological orthodoxy. My hermeneutical analysis of claims to orthodoxy shall show that it is first and foremost an identity construction that has two different aspects. The first aspect of orthodoxy is to define a central, ‘common orthodoxy’ (e.g. the understanding of death and resurrection of Christ in Christianity). However, ‘common’ here should not be read as something that is agreed upon within all communities of faith but as a nexus of beliefs which function as a central aspect of many groups; it is not a unanimous agreement. The second aspect of orthodoxy is to define boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy (or heresy). However, I argue that such boundaries are constantly changing because orthodoxy-as-boundaries is defined in relation to orthodoxy-as-centre which changes as traditions, doxa, and practises are received into new generations, re-interpreted, and re-created. There are a few problematic areas in attempts to define orthodoxy in terms of an institutional authority. First, I explore the mistake of equating the boundaries with the ‘centre’. However, it would be equally dangerous to ignore one aspect in preference for the other (e.g. thinking of orthodoxy only in terms of boundaries). A definition in light of identity for ‘orthodoxy’ is one that sees its two aspects (of boundaries and centres) in dialogue, much as identity is always unfolding in a similar dialogue between Self and Other. The cohesion of orthodoxies comes from this dialogue between an absolute paradigm and the (r)evolution of all paradigms. By exploring these issues, I will demonstrate that orthodoxy is a conceptual tool worth having — not as a weapon to divide the many theological camps but as a rallying point by which some camps (as ‘Selves’) can see themselves connected to others (as ‘Others’).

As a result of the connection between individual and group, questions of theological orthodoxy can be re-interpreted in light of identity. By re-reading the development of orthodoxy, it becomes clear that there is an instability in the conception of orthodoxy which is tied to changes in scriptural interpretation: ‘in Christianity there is a complicated history of shifting interpretations, and the distinction is recognised between the divine text and human approaches to it’. These shifts create and re-create the relations within Christianity between selves and others and produce new orthodoxies as identities for a particular time which can claim a faithful reception of the past in tradition(s). In other words, the result of this ‘identity hermeneutics’ within theology has been the creation of multiple ‘orthodox Selves’ with each claiming to be the ‘one true Church’ (see 3.2.5). By invoking a ‘hermeneutics of identity’ based on the dialectic between a narrative ‘Self’ and ‘larval Selves’, I will show that

the construction of identity is a temporal synthesis of discordant identities that transforms ‘Christianity’ into an identity composed of many different Christians and Christian groups in addition to revealing that each ‘Christian’ is composed of many identities (including ‘Christianity’). The temporal paradox here is intentional for neither element exists without the other.

However, these divergences have been scrutinised in the past century because the desire for an ecumenical unity has created dialogues between these divergent identities. While some Christian groups see ecumenism as the re-conversion of the Christian Others which have left the ‘one true Church’, I shall argue that only a unity which includes differences can truly achieve the goals of unity-within-multiplicity — the reverse of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s definition of ‘beauty’ — sought by ecumenical movements and institutions (e.g. World Council of Churches). For this, I employ the term ‘polydoxy’ as the divergence of orthodoxies within an single, unified Christianity. In other words, my aim is a sociological one that reverberates with Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s goal in his thesis *Sanctorum Communio*: ‘to research phenomenologically the structural distinctiveness of [Christian] communities’.29 I differ from Bonhoeffer’s work in the area of rationality as identified by Yong: I approach the question of orthodoxy in order to recover the ‘traditional’, metaphysical theology with a non-metaphysical, postfoundationalist theology. The result of this approach is a ‘return’ to an organic model of Christianity re-inscribed in the hermeneutics of identity and difference. I shall accomplish the analysis of communal difference in four chapters.

In my first chapter, I introduce the problem of identity indirectly by framing a dialogue between two twentieth century French philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur. First, I stage the dialogue by introducing a subset of philosophical concepts — semiotics/hermeneutics, time, narrative, and identity — from Deleuze (1.1) and Ricoeur (1.2) which develop into a ‘hermeneutics of identity’. I shall demonstrate the shared commonality and divergences between the two philosophers before drawing their works together in a dialogue on the emergence of identity (1.3). This dialogue is extended further in the second chapter when I explore the question of identity in greater detail. I place the conception of identity in the context of Immanuel Kant’s critical understanding of identity and subsequent reactions to Kant’s conception (2.1) because of his centrality in the shift from earlier conceptions of identity to recent and contemporary conceptions. After describing this context, I further explore the dialogue between Deleuze and Ricoeur by (re)constructing the notion of identity in hermeneutical and phenomenological terms, taking into account the post-Kantian developments (2.2). The benefit to this new, ‘unified’ construction of identity becomes immediately visible when I shift the discussion towards group identities (2.3).

The third chapter utilises the group aspect of identity to discuss the concept of orthodoxy and re-interpret its historical development. I first define a methodology for re-interpreting the concept of orthodoxy as a complex theory of theological truth, the political power and authority to control that truth, and the relations that develop as a result of variations in embodying both the political and theological aspects (3.1). To show how these three themes come together, I analyse the history of orthodoxy within Christianity, especially its Western developments. From the original question of truth in the early period of Christianity through the fifth century (3.2), the issues arising from assertions of authority and power are re-interpreted in terms of identity construction. I show that the question of truth and authority shifts during the Reformation period (3.3) to questions of salvation and control as the figures prominent in this period re-interpret orthodoxy differently. The reconstruction of orthodoxy during the Reformation, coupled with philosophical developments during the Enlightenment, again shifts the focus of orthodoxy to that of embodying Christianity correctly. This shift is seen most readily in the development of ecumenism since the late nineteenth century (3.4) because the question of orthodoxy is seen as implying questions of relating divergent groups which begin to recognise affinities in other Christian groups.

In my final chapter, I show that the ecumenical movement has been promoted through finding commonalities and expressing affinities while at least some participants still wish to assert an authority over others as the means by which ecumenism should be fulfilled (4.1). I reject this ‘ecumenism’, arguing that it is tied to the conservation of a pre-ecumenical idea of orthodoxy; and I argue that a new model for orthodoxy is necessary for the goal of ecumenical unity. This new model is based on the earlier construction of identity and analysis of orthodoxy, re-creating orthodoxy in terms of a unity-within-multeity (4.2). I argue that my polydox ecclesiology is coterminous with the aim of ecumenism and is vital not just for dialogues between particular Christian groups but also within these individual groups because they are also composed heterogeneously (4.3). Finally, I show that my ecclesial model pushes into inter-religious and ‘secular’ dialogues (4.4) because the universal Church is called to be the representation of Christ to humanity (2 Corinthians 5:20).
1. The Contributions of Deleuze and Ricœur to Identity

Time out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship. It is now movement which is subordinate to time. Everything changes, including movement.¹

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) writes that humanity ‘did not survive God, nor did the identity of the subject survive that of substance. All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical “effect” by the more profound game of difference and repetition’.² In order to formulate a response to Deleuze’s ‘death of identity’, identity must be placed into a context of time. Without time, the question of identity has no coherent answer in terms of the question ‘who am I?’ because it implies the existence of an ‘I’ that persists in experienced time. An ‘I’ can be constructed mentally only when it can be seen as something existing in multiple experiences. The ‘I’ exists in time at a particular moment within particular contexts (e.g. social, cultural). It is true for any subject of experience, whether it be an individual, a group, a Church, or even a world. What is this time in which subjects are situated? How does it operate? What is the relation between time and the ‘I’ of identity? These are the guiding questions that run through this chapter.

To begin with time, I shall start with a relatively common notion of time. In 1927, Arthur Eddington first coined the term ‘arrow of time’ (or ‘time’s arrow’) to indicate the flow of time. However, this notion of a linear flow of time predates Eddington by centuries. The generally perceived sense of time is, like the arrow, linear and flowing from the past into the future. Humankind anticipates a once-lived past, a living present, and a yet-to-exist future. While this may be the ‘common sense’ view, it is not the only perspective of time. All images of time are mental constructs which are not organised in precise empirical units of time (e.g.

² Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, ix.
seconds, minutes) but rather co-inhabit the same mental ‘space’ as both undifferentiated and differentiated. For example, one can think of a future interaction with another and yet at the same time reflect on past interactions without much effort. In this chapter, I wish to look at two strands of theories of time that are recent (late-twentieth century) developments of earlier thinkers: Paul Ricœur’s use of Augustine and Deleuze’s use of Henri Bergson.

I want to suggest at the outset that both of these accounts grapple with the same question: how do the ‘pieces’ of time relate to time as a whole? The importance of this question for my analysis of identity is clear: without a relation between individual pieces of time (e.g., ‘instants’) and a whole measure of time (e.g., a lifespan), it is impossible for memories to form, as we are left with either a succession of points that have no relationship to one another or a lifespan without moments. While the direct implications may be construed to be individuals as persons, the more relevant implications for this thesis point towards groups which claim the same identity, particularly the identity which can be labelled ‘Christian’, though this does not emerge until much later (see 3.1.4). By drawing connections between the Ricœurian and Deleuzian conceptions of time, I shall be able to synthesise a central understanding of time that can serve as a model for how pieces of time relate to a whole of time. Furthermore, the resulting notion of time provides an alternative to the ‘arrow of time’, showing how the flows of time and narrative are unstable and how the contemporary empirical measures of time lose their importance when ‘histories’ change. The instability of time and narrative create the possibility of change, adaptation, re-interpretation, etc, in a hermeneutics of time.

I shall construct the discussion of time by first presenting Deleuze’s understanding of time and some closely related concepts such as virtuality and difference (1.1). I propose that Deleuze’s ‘death of identity’ above is understood only within his philosophical system because he still holds to a notion of identity in relation to time and difference. After presenting Deleuze, I shall provide a parallel presentation of Paul Ricœur’s notion of time and its closely related concept of narrativity (1.2). Ricœur shall provide a contrast to Deleuze’s theory while also allowing the two to be joined together into a single theory of time (1.3). As I suggest later (1.3.3), the two projects of Ricœur and Deleuze are closer than what either may admit and it is for this reason that I shall join them together. It is also for this reason that I choose the pair of them for my analysis of identity (in chapter 2). Further, while they are not the only possible candidates for inclusion in an analysis of identity, both Ricœur and Deleuze represent two distinct strands of twentieth century French thought; and the connection of these two different lines of thinking provide ample room for future development in a theological analysis of identity.
By utilising a Deleuze-Ricoeurian view of time, I shall create a functional diagram of time, showing how time operates as a network of syntheses, series, and repetitions. From this operational model, loose connections hint at a ‘subject’ that can formulate these questions and a self-reflexive ‘object’ that can answer them. The creation of a Self which makes possible the individuation of that Self into an identity is a dynamic process which links the differential system that creates fragments of identities with a transcription of these parts that actualises them as fragments of a Self. Here, the Deleuzian ‘death of identity’ can be unveiled as the realisation that ‘the “I” is fractured and the self no more than a differentiated psychic organ/isation after the event that cancels difference and suffocates the so-called creative larvae that populate an intensive space’.\textsuperscript{3} In other words, formation of identity takes place in time as the organisation of Selves into a Self by a (perhaps retroactive) projection of a single narrative onto the many; and consequently, this Self is ‘unstable’ because new Selves are integrated into the whole and destabilise every narrative. This discovery highlights the connective tissue between what will be called the ‘temporal-mimetic’ process of narratives (1.3.2) and the analysis of identities which exist in time (developed in chapter 2).

1.1 Difference and Time in Deleuze

Gilles Deleuze is known best for re-reading (or strategically misreading) the history of philosophy such that it ‘re-emerged unrecognisable, totally refreshed, as if it had not been properly digested before’.\textsuperscript{4} Deleuze inherits thoughts and concepts from other philosophers by his peculiar way of re-reading philosophy. Along these lines, Deleuze devotes books to analysing and understanding a set of philosophers with whom he aligns his own project: Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Gottfried Leibniz, Baruch Spinoza, and David Hume.\textsuperscript{5} Deleuze continually returns to these philosophers, employing them frequently throughout his works, though often through his own creative ‘misreading’ of their works. There is also a second set of philosophers to which he places himself in opposition, most notably Plato (or at least what he calls ‘Platonism’), Immanuel Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel.\textsuperscript{6} The relations

\textsuperscript{3} Sheerin, \textit{Deleuze and Ricoeur}, 83 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{6} Only Kant is given an entire monograph while Plato and Hegel are left to passing comments throughout Deleuze’s writings. Deleuze, \textit{Kant’s Critical Philosophy}. 
between these two sets of philosophers develop throughout and root Deleuze’s own philosophy with each philosopher holding varying degrees of importance. I wish to introduce this thesis by first outlining a few philosophical concepts created by Deleuze — namely those of sense, difference, and time — and secondly by linking them together as a single trajectory of thought. The theological importance of this trajectory will be the later application towards understanding the relationship between parts of a whole to each other and to the whole. That is, Deleuze provides a way to understand how differences can be contained within a single object as a unity-within-muliteity — an understanding which shall advance contemporary ecumenical thought (see 4.2.3).

Out of Deleuze’s many works, two serve as the groundwork and framework through which my thesis proceeds: *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*. In this section, I will introduce the relevant concepts from each book, leaving their application and valuation for a later section (1.3). All of Deleuze’s concepts inhere on each other despite being defined independently and redefined at different points throughout his writings. I contend that Deleuze’s semiotic theory developed in *Logic of Sense* serves as one focus around which his works revolve. Additionally, *Logic of Sense* serves as Deleuze’s own foray into literary theory (despite having published *Proust and Signs* a few years earlier), resonating with his secondary love of literature. As I shall show in the following section (1.2.4), this is yet another area of thought where there is significant overlap between Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur. A second focus for Deleuze is his *Difference and Repetition* which has long served as the primary (if not only) starting point for understanding his philosophical œuvre. Nearly every concept introduced in it is re-used throughout Deleuze’s works. The philosophy of difference which Deleuze promotes cannot be understood clearly without *Difference and Repetition*. Consequently, I propose to read Deleuze as an advocate of a ‘hermeneutics of difference’, a path in which this thesis will follow.

### 1.1.1 The Image of Sense

Deleuze’s analysis of meaning and sense in *Logic of Sense* stands as one of the strongest works in post-structuralist thought. Instead of romancing the ‘linguistic turn’ that was common to much of twentieth-century thought, Deleuze quickly moves past it, focusing instead
on the moment of creation that is found at the point between sense and nonsense. In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze takes the image of the hermeneutical circle from Heideggerian thought and gives it a thoroughly Nietzschean twist by envisioning the circle as a Möbius strip. Unlike a typical circle, a Möbius strip is a single strip of fabric twisted before being connected end-to-end such that one can encounter both sides of the circle by moving along its surface without ever crossing an edge. It is a cycle imagined as ‘the coexistence of two sides without thickness, such that we pass from one to the other by following their length’. Its relevance to hermeneutics is that the understanding which comes from hermeneutics is never encountered directly. In the movement from one side of the Möbius strip to the other, the event of sense briefly occurs.

The movement in which sense is discovered is lateral — sliding sideways along the edges, not rising to lofty heights or digging deep underground. Deleuze equates these two false directions with two polarised dyads: Platonism–Pre-Socratics and Nietzsche’s Apollonian–Dionysian. Only the Stoic philosophers were able to discover the geography of sense, and Deleuze attributes Nietzsche with rediscovering the Stoic understanding of the surface of sense. This rediscovery is why Deleuze suggests that Lewis Carroll’s character Alice has only one adventure twice: ‘her climb to the surface, her disavowal of false depth and her discovery that everything happens at the borders’. Sense is not something that can be attained because its only existence is as the ‘boundary between propositions and things’; it is only experienced as an event at the moment the relationship between signified and signifier is realised. The event of sense occurs at boundary between signified and signifier as the very act of signification which brings the two into relation. As something extra — *aliquid*, sense inheres or subsists within the hermeneutical cycle itself. If there are no relations between objects, sense cannot exist; sense exists only in the interstitial void between objects as they relate to each other.

The indirectness of sense leads to a paradox of regression: sense must be presupposed in order to be understood. Unlike a traditional hermeneutic circle, Deleuze’s is one of paradoxes in which meaning is only possible within the context of a fully interactive system of denotations. This regression is the double series of signification which is in constant disequilibrium as the signifying series presents an excess while the signified series presents a lack.

12. Ibid., 127–9.
13. Ibid., 9.
15. Ibid., 28.
16. Ibid., 48.
The result of this paradox is that every act of language — every act of communication — implies the entire system of language at once because without the infinite regression of signification, there is no disequilibrium that can produce sense. Sense as the boundary between propositions and objects is produced only when there is a disequilibrium of signification that can displace the entire double series. Sense moves in opposite directions simultaneously, not as a linear progression but as a compounding of all significations.

Meaning, as an effect of the production of sense, occurs when a sign is seen as being formed from other signs as well as constituting the formation of other signs. Semiotics provides a way in which signs participate with each other at the ontological level rather than associate at the epistemological. In Deleuze’s work, this changes attribution where the properties of one sign are given to another sign (e.g. ‘The tree is green’) into an ontological property (e.g. ‘The tree greens’). Meaning, as the sense of a sign, occurs twice because the two events of denotation are ‘two simultaneous faces of one and the same surface, whose inside and outside, their “insistence” and “extra-being”, past and future, are in an always reversible continuity’. At the point of convergence — where the two series of excess and lack inhere on each other — a singularity of sense is created in both series: the signified as an empty place within the signifier series and the signifier as a supernumerary object (an ‘occupant without a place’) within the signified series. Meaning is produced in both series at once: ‘it appears in one of the series as an excess, but only on the condition that it would appear at the same time in the other as a lack’. This singularity is the disequilibrium that produces sense as a relation between propositions and things. Meaning is always ‘displaced in relation to itself, of “being absent from its own place”’, flowing through each series as it becomes ‘word and object at once: esoteric word and exoteric object’. This singularity of meaning transforms both the signified and the signifier (i.e. propositions and things) so that neither can be fully comprehended without the other.

Deleuze also speaks of time as an important part of the full conception of sense. Running throughout the discussion of sense is the opposition of two readings of time: Chronos which ‘is composed only of interlocking presents’ and Aion which ‘is constantly decomposed into elongated pasts and futures’. Chronos is the living present or the always-existing ‘now’ of Parmenides. Aion, on the other hand, is the infinite subdivision of the present into past and future; it is the phantasm of instant which overturns and fractures Chronos. For Deleuze, ‘Aion is the eternal truth of time: pure empty form of time, which has freed itself of its present

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17. Ibid., 12.
18. Ibid., 34.
19. Ibid., 51.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 62.
corporal content and has thereby unwound its own circle, stretching itself out in a line’. In other words, Deleuze’s reading of time parallels his notion of sense because the present becomes the produced effect of the two series of time similar to sense being the produced effect of the two series of signification. Much like the endless regress of signifying symbols, Aion is ‘the most terrible labyrinth’ of a single line of ‘pure events which the instant, displaced over the line, goes on dividing into already past and yet to come’. Combined with the image of Chronos as a circle, the present is the point of contact between the two series as a tangential line to a circle. This is where Deleuze locates sense as the boundary between propositions and things. However, this is not the complete form of Deleuze’s conception of time; for that, I shall turn to a second text: *Difference and Repetition*.

The theory of sense is Deleuze’s hermeneutical method, particularly because he follows its path in regularly returning to and refining his earlier concepts in his later works. A result of this methodology is a rich development which supports a growing network of thought and interrelated concepts. Despite his lack of interest in hermeneutics and disregard for interpreting the thinkers at hand in his writings, Deleuze artistically re-creates these thinkers and their concepts poetically in his re-thinking the very structures of philosophy. The sense of language resists closure and completion, and it is for this reason that he is not enthralled in the ‘linguistic turn’ or the dominant structuralist theory. In other words, Deleuze practises an art of interpretation rather than interpreting a history of philosophy. This will become important later in my thesis where the hermeneutical question of tradition is found precisely in this distinction between practise and history (see 3.4.3).

### 1.1.2 Duration and Eternal Return for Deleuze

Deleuze’s intersecting images of Chronos and Aion represent intensified concepts drawn from Bergson’s duration and Nietzsche’s eternal return. As these two concepts play a subler role in *Difference and Repetition*, I wish to explore their themes so that they will be more identifiable in Deleuze’s theory of time. Deleuze’s concept of Chronos as the ‘eternal present’ is imported from Bergson’s concept of duration in which time is a synthesis linking the many with the one. In almost every case that Deleuze combines Nietzsche with another thinker and the two differ, Deleuze introduces Nietzsche as completing the second thinker’s concepts. This is the case with Bergson’s duration and Nietzsche’s eternal return: the eternal return reconstructs Bergson’s duration as lacking an order of succession.

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24. Ibid., 176.
For Bergson, duration is the abstract expression of time itself, defined initially as ‘a succession which is nothing but a succession, but not an addition, i.e. a succession which culminates in a sum’. With regard to time, duration takes the form of a sempiternal consciousness, forever enduring in the present. The past and present are formed into ‘an organic whole’ with each piece permeating one another. It is through duration that a succession of ‘moments’ can be homogenised into a single concept. For example, the many individual events that occurred in North America in the late eighteenth century are connected as parts of the single ‘Revolutionary War’. History has shown that the borders between individual events and the larger Event(s) which they compose are fluid. For example, while the War of 1812 ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent (24 December 1814), the final major battle of that war (the Battle of New Orleans) occurred two weeks after the treaty. While this was due to the limitations of communication in the nineteenth century, it does not change the temporal relations of these individual events. Events homogenised through duration lack precise boundaries.

Bergson tempers the concept of duration with an ordering of time. The perception of motion is a mental synthesis of successive ‘instants’; while an object occupies a point in space, the motion of that object occupies a point in duration. For Bergson, succession is an issue of ordering the synthetic whole from duration. Without order, a multiplicity of ‘instants’ is perceived simultaneously within a single ‘moment’. In Bergson’s conception of time, a notion of ‘the future’ has little value because such exists only as expectation and prediction from within the present. In other words, there are only two aspects of time: the past and the present.

However, Deleuze combines Bergson’s ordering of time with Nietzsche’s eternal return, blotting out Bergson’s ‘instants’. The eternal return of Nietzsche is the the pure Event — a non-temporal ‘point’ in time that alters one’s perception of time itself — which affirms the entirety of time. The affirmation takes the form of the disjunctive synthesis such that ‘instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of the concept, each “thing” opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its centre, that is, its identity as concept or as a self’. This loss of the centre is the becoming-mad that sees ‘the being of becoming as such, the unity of multiplicity ... the

27. Ibid., 79.
28. Ibid., 100.
29. The capitalised ‘Event’ is used in French thought (e.g. Deleuze, Alain Badiou) to indicate the representation of a large-scale ‘moment’ which breaks the narrative of history and reconstructs the narrative around the one Event.
30. Bergson, Time and Free Will, 111.
31. Ibid., 102.
32. Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 174.
necessary result of all chance’ in a dicethrow.\textsuperscript{33} The eternal return is the passage of time that affirms the act of becoming because the loss of a centre allows the discovery of many centres which are ordered by time into a coherent trajectory. A return is ‘a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation’.\textsuperscript{34}

The fragments of time are necessarily synthesised into a whole, infinitely subdivided tunnel: Aion. The necessity in Deleuze of Aion is what creates both past and future as singularities, thus extending Bergson’s dimensions of time to three while successfully maintaining an indebtedness and inheritance of Bergson’s original concept. The eternal return of Aion inheres upon the duration of Chronos, creating the boundary between temporal propositions (e.g. memory) and expectation and temporal things (e.g. past and future), producing a relationship between the two that is defined by the disequilibrium of the ever-changing multiplicity of instants within an ‘eternal present’. The paradoxes of time are parts of a generative ‘machine’ of difference.

\textbf{1.1.3 Deleuze’s Syntheses of Time}

In \textit{Difference and Repetition}, Deleuze describes time as an extensive ‘machine’, a network of relations between three different syntheses of perceived time.\textsuperscript{35} By combining this imagery of time with the imagery in \textit{Logic of Sense}, I will reconstitute Deleuze’s concept of time as a hermeneutical process which will form the groundwork for a later section (1.3.1) where I bring Deleuze’s concepts into dialogue with the works of Paul Ricœur. For the purpose of my dissertation, the first synthesis is the most important; but it should be understood that this is one piece of a monadological system: each synthesis entails the other two.

The first synthesis of time is what I have largely described as the interactive relationship between Chronos and Aion. Deleuze names this ‘habit’, crediting David Hume as the first to recognise its process in \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding}.\textsuperscript{36} Deleuze’s notion of habit initially appears similar to that of Hume because habit is formed so ‘whenever A appears, I expect the appearance of B’ in a sequence of repetitions (i.e. AB AB AB AB A . . . ); however, the first synthesis of time ‘contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present’.\textsuperscript{37} The sequence of repetitions is contracted into a single repetition, as the eternal return reconstructs the fragmented se-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 48.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 228.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 70.
\end{itemize}
quences into a multiplicity. Because of this synthesis of time, the present is never itself present as an active dimension of time; it is a passive effect that ‘occurs “automatically”, as it were’. The present ‘is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself’, paralleling the becoming-mad above. The present is never actually present since it has always already just occurred. With the always-passing of the present, there is a paradox of constituting time while passing in it: ‘there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can occur’. Deleuze, following his readings of Bergson and Nietzsche, roots this first synthesis in a second which preserves the passage of time.

This second synthesis is the ‘pure past’, for which Deleuze utilises the concept of Memory in Bergson. This is not a particular contingent memory but Memory as an ontological dimension or the ‘past as such’. It is through this synthesis that Deleuze responds to the two questions of duration and succession, which again returns to the relationship between Chronos and Aion. One cannot think of time as an infinite succession of presents nor as a single present of all instants. Rather, time is produced between duration (Aion) and succession (Chronos), with all three aspects of time extending out into multiple directions.

The present is not seen as a past waiting to be actualised in the future, but as a moment of synthesis. This synthesis reveals a representation of the past in the present and vice versa. Time is always already differentiating from itself; and this should be recognised in the sense of a multiverse of bifurcations. This fits with ‘many-worlds’ theories that blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s which propose that parallel universes exists and are necessarily different by at least one action or event — and are separated from each other (including our own) exactly at that moment of difference. Habit provides for this differentiation by representing the pure Memory in the present. The past itself does not exist; it subsists in the present. That is, the past is the contraction of time (habit) inhering in the present as all past presents (memory). The past is not a dimension of time, it is ‘the synthesis of all time of which the present and the future are only dimensions’.

41. The capitalised usage of Memory will be used throughout the thesis to distinguish between what Bergson calls habit-memory and the true or pure Memory. This follows Deleuze’s usage.
42. Bryant, *Difference and Givenness*, 105.
44. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 82.
Similarly, the future always inheres in time as expectation. This expectation is the possibility of a repetition which is always new. Repetition within Deleuze’s framework is based on difference such that repeating behaves ‘in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent’. It is not a cycle of adding ‘a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the “nth” power’. Repetition is related to the process of signification in that it is always an excess of difference. In Deleuze’s syntheses of time, time itself is revealed as repetition in different modes: ‘the present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated’. Whereas the past is the synthesis of time itself, the future ensures the ordering of time and ‘the totality of the series’ of time. Deleuze reconstructs Bergson’s ordering of time in the intersecting of Chronos by Aion. That is because repetition, as a temporal function, is never repetition of the same (as a relived past) but of the different and unique because ‘for each present there is no going back . . . we have lived it once and for all’.

A good example of this would be the 1993 film *Groundhog Day* with Bill Murray. In the film, Murray’s character, Phil, is trapped in an endless looping of one single day. However, no repetition is the same because each day unfolds differently. It would not be accurate to think of each day in the film as a copy of the previous day because each repetition differentiates itself from every other. For 43 repetitions of Groundhog’s Day, Phil commits suicide 43 different ways, hoping that one would stop the endless repetition. As Phil tires of suicide, he begins to find ways to live a life through repeating the same day by acquiring an omniscience through observing every possible part of the day, learning multiple talents, and leaving his cares of the world behind. This continues until he is able to find that the one thing he wants, a romantic relationship with another character, is the one thing he cannot obtain through these simple acts and tricks, especially since his romantic interest does not remember what has happened on ‘previous’ days. Only once he discovers that the repetition of the day is the discovery of unlived futures is Phil able to finally find romance and break the cycle of Groundhog’s Day since he has found an always-new future for which to live.

The repetition of time is not a cycle of repeating and reliving the past as present, but the cycle of repeating an unlived future. It can be equally said in this synthesis of time that ‘the present and past are in turn no more than dimensions of the future: the past as condition,
the present as agent’. Both past and future exist without being, while the present always is without existing. It is through the notions of difference-in-itself and repetition that Deleuze shows how the three syntheses of time interact. Every ‘moment’ of time becomes a new totality of time, synthesising past, present, and future and ordering them as time. In other words, time is ‘motion’, always creating something new:

Time itself does not ‘change or move . . . but is the form of everything that changes and moves . . . the immutable form of change and movement’. This is, for Deleuze, the totality of time in a moment, an ‘empty form of time’. But it also seems to be ‘a profound mystery’ that requires a new definition of time.

Time becomes unhinged, transcendental in the Kantian sense — that is, an a priori possibility of the concept of time as signified within the mind through the mind’s apprehension of the concept in experience. The concept of time is finally transformed so that it ‘is in the present that we make memory, in order to make use of it in the future when the present will be past’, a cycle from present to past to future back to present.

1.1.4 The Concept of Difference

Closely connected to Deleuze’s notion of time is a second concept which influences the process of repetition in time: difference. It is customary to organise Deleuze’s philosophy solely around his concept of difference; however, that tactic generally reduces Deleuzian thought to the single concept of difference and ignores the codependent and co-emergent nature of Deleuze’s concepts. For this reason, I discuss Deleuze’s notion of difference after his notion of time in order to highlight my own ‘disorder’ in describing Deleuzian thought. As was noted above, Deleuze uses ‘difference’ quite differently from much of Western philosophy before him. This is because previous thinkers have confused ‘the concept of difference with a merely conceptual difference . . . [remaining] only with a difference already mediated by representation’. In analysing this understanding of difference, Deleuze seeks to overturn what he calls Platonism and its ascension of forms and ideas, re-creating philosophy based on intrinsic difference. In overturning Platonism, Deleuze also claims to ‘conserve many Platonic characteristics’ by conscious choice. As Plato ‘gave the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of dialectic’, it is accomplished simultaneously as Platonism is

51. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 93.
52. Sheerin, Deleuze and Ricœur, 90.
54. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 27.
55. Ibid., 59.
overturned; something that Deleuze suggests is first accomplished by Plato himself.\textsuperscript{56} This change will radically alter conceptions of identity (2.2.4) as well as the relations between things (2.3.1). This transfiguration will also have an impact on theology which has yet to be discussed (see 4.2.2). Through this transmutation of philosophy, theology must progress as, I will argue, Deleuze has shown the limits and terminus of the previous reign.

For Deleuze, difference is ultimate, the ‘state in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction’.\textsuperscript{57} While Platonism, according to Deleuze, argues that a thing is differentiated by all else because the latter would recede into the darkness, Deleuze suggests the opposite: that difference is internal to a thing and is self-differentiating. In other words, something determined emerges from the undetermined primarily because it is already self-determined. Difference is not an empirically measurable quality from which a large enough measure of difference creates a new concept. Rather difference is internal, ontological, and qualitative, not external or epistemological.\textsuperscript{58} There is no minimum measure of difference. This is because things are defined by ‘degrees of difference itself and not differences of degree’.\textsuperscript{59} The problem of difference in Platonism continues to affect Aristotle since the concept of difference remains reflexive and mediates actual differences by the analogy of representation.\textsuperscript{60}

Deleuze’s argument against Platonism is that Platonists confuse the logoi of species with the logoi of genera. While species in Aristotelian difference centre on the ‘condition of the identity or univocity of concepts in general taken as genera’, the logos of genera ‘is free of that condition and operates . . . in the equivocity of Being’.\textsuperscript{61} This confusion is seen in cases where names and propositions ‘designate exactly the same thing as in the case of . . . Israel–Jacob’.\textsuperscript{62} In other words, the confusion between species and genera determines difference semiotically rather than ontologically. Deleuze, following Duns Scotus, argues that

univocity of being, in so far as it is immediately related to difference, demands that we show how individuating difference precedes generic, specific and even individual differences within being; how a prior field of individuation within being conditions at once the determination of species of forms, the determination of parts and their individual variations.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 67–8.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Proust and Signs}, 41.
\textsuperscript{60} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition}, 34.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 32–3.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 38.
Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s eternal return is where the univocity of being first proclaimed by Duns Scotus overthrows Platonism. This is because the eternal return ‘does not bring back “the same”, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes . . . Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different’. 64 This is repetition, which is seen in action as a ‘motor’ of the time ‘machine’ above (1.1.2). Because of the eternal return, similarity now must be based on ontological difference. As Deleuze argues, univocity of being can only be affirmed and realised in the eternal return. This stems from Nietzsche’s perspectivism which places resentment against noble morality, ‘the point of view of the slave who draws from “No” the phantom of an affirmation, and the point of view of the “master” who draws from “Yes” a consequence of negation and destruction’. 65 The former perspective merely conserves old identities while the latter creates new ones through differentiation. If the eternal return is circular, it is in a state of disequilibrium and is twisted into a Möbius strip.

Finally, for Deleuze, representation, the single centred, immobile perspective has no actual depth; it is revealed as hollow. 66 Only by multiplying representation to infinity, thereby creating ‘a plurality of centres’ and lateral movement, can identity be wrenched from its seat and fragment all presentations from the univocal repetition of time. Even before reaching the analysis of identity (starting in 2.1), fissures and cracks can be seen forming along the surface of the yet to be defined Self and Other on which post-Kantian thought has fixated. These fissures indicate the ‘ungrounding’ — unmediated releasing — of the distinction between ‘the thing itself’ and simulacra because ‘things are simulacra themselves’. 67

Simulacra here means the ‘instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two divergent series on which [difference] plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a copy’. 68 It is through the concept of the virtual that Deleuze is able to recast simulation and simulacra in terms of difference and devoid of the Platonic stigma once given to them: ‘every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image’. 69 According to Alain Badiou’s criticism, Deleuze sees simulacra as copies of a Platonic model but with full affirmation of univocity. 70 Badiou’s criticism can be

64. Ibid., 41.
65. Ibid., 54.
66. Ibid., 55.
67. Ibid., 66–7.
68. Ibid., 69.
69. Ibid., 209.
contrasted with Jean Baudrillard’s usage of simulacra in which the process of simulation replaces ‘original’ models. Both Badiou and Baudrillard overlook a crucial aspect of Deleuze’s own usage of simulacra which is dependent upon a rejection of the entire scheme of model-and-copy (see 1.3.2). It would be better, then, to define simulacra as the embodiment of the virtual within a given context (or, in Deleuze’s thought, the plane of immanence). Simulacra embody only a part of the virtual because the virtual is chaotic and always changing while the simulacra, as the becoming-actual of the virtual, achieve a consistency within their embodiment.

In this sense, then, Badiou’s criticism of the Deleuzian virtual can be interpreted as mostly accurate because Badiou pairs Deleuze’s simulacra with the virtual in such a way that the virtual is read as the totality and full reality of Being (‘the One’) while simulacra are actualisations of the virtual. However, Badiou’s primary inadequacy is the equating of the virtual with Being; for Deleuze, it seems more appropriate to identify the simulacra with a multiplicity of Being through the production of difference in the process of actualisation. The process of difference in actualisation appears in two aspects: differentiation as the name for the logoi of species (i.e. qualitative differences) and differentiation as the name for the logoi of genera (i.e. complete determination). The virtual gives rise to the concept of unity in terms of an association or collection of differenciated parts around a differenciated singularity. The virtual is completely ‘real’ while being opposed to the actual; it is ‘symbolic without being fictional’. The reality of the virtual is what creates an ambiguous relation between the virtual and the actualised simulacra in which the two are connected through the Deleuzian ‘Event’ which is the excess of the virtual.

The connections between difference and time now begin to emerge. The repetition of time for Deleuze is based on the process of difference, unmediated divergence that obscures all illusions of ‘originality’. Every moment is lived completely new while also creating odd relations between every other moment as interlocking presents of Chronos. The hermeneutical monism of time can only emerge in the ‘chaosmos’ of movement which is Aion. Out of the relation between Chronos and Aion, something pre-individual, a not-yet-subject, is produced as a multiplicity.

72. Badiou, Deleuze, 49.
73. Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 211.
74. Ibid., 208.
75. See Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 156; also Slavoj Žižek implies a similar reading in Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3-4.
1.1.5 Multiplicity

Out of the two series of signification in *Logic of Sense*, the disjunctive synthesis I have mentioned above (1.1.2) emerges in Deleuze’s thought. However, the disjunctive synthesis is not merely the emergence of A and B, but rather another step beyond the simultaneity of both. Deleuze points to the work Lewis Carroll has done with portmanteau words. For example, ‘frumious’ is not merely the simultaneity of fuming and furious but rather the odd balance ‘between fuming-and-furious on one hand and furious-and-fuming on the other’ such that the portmanteau word is the necessary empty-space and occupant-without-place at once.\(^\text{76}\) In the same sense as portmanteau words, multiplicities are singularities in such a way that both are disjunctive syntheses of time within a single object. Contrary to Badiou’s primary objection to Deleuze as a philosopher of the One, the portmanteau of unity and multiplicity is a ‘fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple’.\(^\text{77}\) However, this kind of singularity is ‘essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual’.\(^\text{78}\) A multiplicity is a being yet to acquire a body. The eternal return ensures the creations of multiplicities are ‘always produced by a disjunctive synthesis and they themselves are disjointed and divergent’.\(^\text{79}\) Divergent series give rise to more divergent series.

The relation between Chronos and Aion (see 1.1.2) provides the disjunctive synthesis that sparks the acquisition of a body by giving a multiplicity a connection between its unity and multeity, out of which emerges the presence of a thing. This body which connects unity with multeity is the body without organs (BwO) which is none other than the relational event of the virtual actualised and embodied in simulacra. BwO is not the conceptualisation of a body devoid of organs; rather, it is the body devoid of any organisation which creates an *organism* that ‘profits from the labour of the organs’.\(^\text{80}\) The BwO is the result of making consistent through actualisation the chaotic flux of Becoming that is the virtual. Actualisation combines the univocity of Being with the unstable flux of Becoming into many single bodies, each simulacra of the One-All relationship created in the process of actualisation. The chimera that is the multiplicity-singularity, the One-All or One-Many, is embodied — encapsulated as a monad and incarnated with ‘immediate presence’.\(^\text{81}\) At this point, there is a necessary interconnection between the whole and the parts, mutual coinherence of the One.

\(^{76}\) Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 46–7.  
\(^{78}\) Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 52.  
\(^{79}\) Ibid., 179.  
\(^{80}\) John Protevi, ‘The Organism as the Judgement of God: Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze on Nature (That is, on Biology, Theology and Politics)’, in Bryden, *Deleuze and Religion*, 37.  
\(^{81}\) Deleuze, *The Fold*, 106.
and Many, immutably bound. The relation between whole and parts is now ‘circular in that each is interpreted in light of the other’. The ‘essence’ of the BwO is the interconnectedness between the One and the Many because the organisation of the body is the limit of the One and the Many in a production of difference through simulation (see 4.2.2).

One major problem, as Judith Poxon mentions in her contribution to the Deleuze and Religion collection, persists in the usage of Deleuze’s work — most notably the BwO — within theology because, as she points out, theology is a system which God organises into an organism — precisely the opposite of Deleuze’s BwO. As Poxon argues, Deleuze’s work must be seen as a kind of anti-theology which liberates theological thought from the power of God in order to celebrate the difference and vitality that has developed within theology. In this sense, the relation between theology and Deleuze’s anti-theology is more akin to the relation between philosophy and François Laruelle’s non-philosophy than to the dialectical opposition implied in the prefix ‘anti’. Deleuze is not so much against theology as he is against the totalisation of theology signified in the transcendental God he finds readily in Christian thought. With so much done in the past century surrounding the ‘death of God’ in theology, it seems that theology is not only a plausible field for Deleuzian thought but also a very complementary pairing waiting to be realised.

Deleuze’s hermeneutical project — his work on sense and semiotics which flow throughout his writings, though he likely would object to the use of ‘hermeneutics’ — can now be seen as playing an important role in his theories of time and difference. In subsequent chapters, I will introduce a few more concepts that build on this particular Deleuzian centre. The cycle of hermeneutics is one of repetition: the constant turning of the Möbius strip that always produces something new. Deleuze’s notion of time and the relation between Chronos and Aion develops out of this hermeneutical circle. The tangential convergence of the two series of time create a multiplicity that is always new, always different. This multiplicity is repeated, a simulation, that is intrinsically different from all other repetitions in time. At its convergence (or rather, perhaps, divergence), the multiplicity is embodied through a disjunctive synthesis of being both excess and lack at once. As I shall discuss later (1.3.4), this embodiment sets the foundation for the emergence of a subject and the construction of identity based on the philosophy of difference. However, before that discussion occurs, Deleuze needs a dialogue partner with whom his concepts can progress into a fuller theory, one that can explicate greater applicability and more direct articulation. In other words, Deleuze’s

abstractness needs a counterpart that can translate it into readily accessible concepts.

### 1.2 The Narrative Hermeneutics of Ricœur

One contemporary of Gilles Deleuze was another French philosopher whose work focused on phenomenology and hermeneutics. The philosophical career of Paul Ricœur (1913–2005) brought together the two fields of hermeneutics and phenomenology. In one line of thought, Ricœur follows Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Parallel to this, Ricœur follows a second line of thought which he calls the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’; within this second line are most notably Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. These two lines of thought create one front along the ‘conflict of interpretations’ which opposed the structuralism that was perhaps the dominant mode of French thought in the mid-twentieth century (e.g. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Ferdinand de Saussure). Ricœur’s philosophical œuvre develops from this opposition which he maintains in a balance between each side, taking concepts and methods he finds valuable in each as his own hybrid borne from the perhaps unwilling marriage between the opposition of suspicion and structuralism.

Out of these various lines and fronts of thought, a project emerges which directs Ricœur’s publications of the 1980s when his focus shifts towards questions of time, narrativity, and identity. It is this later project which is most relevant to my thesis, particularly the ‘arc’ that begins with *Time and Narrative*. While some aspects of this multi-volume text can be found in *The Rule of Metaphor*, my focus will be on *Time and Narrative* because the articulation of these issues is still in its infancy in the former. Tied to the main arc is a second text that develops out of Ricœur’s delivery of the Gifford Lectures (1986) near the time that *Time and Narrative* is published. This second text, *Oneself as Another*, provides Ricœur’s mature concept of narrative identity, which will be discussed at length throughout this thesis (cf. 2.2.2).

In order to understand these later developments of Ricœur, I wish to first provide the theoretical context out of which they develop.

#### 1.2.1 Horizons of the Text

While previous thinkers (e.g. Schleiermacher) highlighted the importance of hermeneutics, Martin Heidegger was the first to provide a systematic account of hermeneutics in the recent

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era. Heidegger’s hermeneutical methodology is primarily historiological in character. The act of interpretation for Heidegger presupposes an act of understanding in advance of the act, a *fore-having* that is the foundation for the interpretive act. Understanding, as an epistemological quality, is reached through hermeneutics at a later point in the process. This forms the kernel of Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle which surfaces repeatedly in subsequent thought. This circle is, in one sense, never-ending as it produces the need for its own continuation, something which has been implied in Deleuze’s notion (cf. 1.1.1). In this hermeneutical succession and reception, Ricœur shall provide a historicity to tradition which establishes a hermeneutical connection between different traditions (see 4.1.4).

Gadamer takes Heidegger’s hermeneutics and ties it directly with epistemology: ‘to understand and to interpret means to discover and to recognise a valid meaning’. Gadamer stretches the boundaries of hermeneutics and makes it an integral part of any philosophical enquiry. This is because hermeneutics embodies the differences of meaning, seen in two movements: that of tradition and that of the interpreter. Tradition provides a running summary of historical understanding that speaks into the present. In the act of interpretation, this movement of tradition is integrated into the interpreter’s own movement as a ‘fusion of horizons’ in the present. To interpret is first to understand the historical situation of the text and then bring that understanding into the present. Contrary to some applications which suggest a single interpretation, understanding always falls within a ‘fluid multiplicity of possibilities … of what can be thought’. Gadamer uses legal hermeneutics as an example of this fluid multiplicity because ‘natural’ law is changeable and adaptable; this fluidity is actually a positive feature of legal hermeneutics because ‘every law is in a necessary tension with concrete action … because human reality is necessarily imperfect … and allows of no simple application of the law’. The hermeneutical task for Gadamer is not limited to a particular set of texts (e.g. legal, religious, etc) but extends to every ‘text’ where the meaning of a text is not immediately discernible, to ‘wherever one is not prepared to trust what a phenomenon immediately presents us’.

Paul Ricœur acknowledges the Heideggerean hermeneutics as one route to ‘ground hermeneu-

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90. See ibid., H150.
92. Ibid., 293.
93. Ibid., 388.
94. Ibid., 268–9.
95. Ibid., 318.
96. Ibid., 336.
tics in phenomenology’ in the ‘ontology of understanding’. However, he argues that there is a second route which looks at hermeneutics primarily as an epistemological enterprise and not as an ontological one. This ‘epistemology of interpretation’ operates through two stages: semantics and reflection. Ricœur reads Nietzsche as advocating that life itself is interpretation without ontological repercussions; the subject is no longer a *cogito* but a *being-interpreted*. Tradition does play a role in this process, just as it does for Gadamer; however tradition is seen as the ‘living interpretation of sacred writers’ instead of those writers speaking into the present. Tradition is not just speaking into the present but is something that enters the dialogue as a full partner. It is accounted in the first stage of semantics because the hermeneutical process is an unfolding of understanding that respects the history, traditions, and current identification in order to open towards new interpretations. In other words, Ricœur echoes the Heideggerean understanding that the hermeneutical methodology is historiologial. The open-endedness of Ricœur’s hermeneutics introduces ambiguity within the discourse in two forms: as a lexical fact (polysemy) and as a contextual fact (possibility of multiple meanings).

1.2.2 Mimetic Reading

In the above description of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I placed the word text in quotation marks because the question of what is a text must be answered before questions of reading and interpretation can be properly posed. ‘Text’ here and throughout Ricœur’s work is more general than simply a collection of words and sentences on paper. A text ‘opens out onto other things’, symbolising and encapsulating objects and concepts. Because of this openness, a text for Ricœur can be nearly anything that conveys some kind of meaning: an action, event, book, etc. Through interpretation, a text’s meaning can be discovered as a story/narrative being told. A narrative is dependent on others for definition and, consequently, ‘unable to defend itself against violations of its integrity by ideological readers’. This consequence does not imply there are no ‘original’ meanings or intentions but that such can only be found in a dialogue between narrative and reader because the ambiguities of each participant create new meanings in addition to and hopefully rooted in an ‘original’ meaning.

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98. Cf. ibid., 11.
99. Ibid., 48.
100. Cf. ibid., 71.
At the root of Ricœur’s developed conception of narrativity which serves as the basis for his understanding of time is the process of mimesis. Mimesis is the process by which the ambiguities of discourse are interpreted through metaphors. The mimetic process accomplishes this by adding a plot that synthesises the ambiguities into an unwritten displacement of meaning. Textual meaning is produced in the interaction between reader and narrative through mimesis as the re-creation of a text’s meaning. Ricœur suggests there are at least three senses of mimesis that form the cycle of mimesis: ‘the familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action; an entry into the realm of poetic composition; and finally a new configuration by means of this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order of action’. These three are distinguished primarily by subscript numbers (i.e. mimesis_1, mimesis_2, mimesis_3), but they are also referred to by other names.

The first aspect of mimesis is the collection of ‘symbols’ that appear before understanding. Ricœur makes it clear that these symbols are implicit, between the explicit ‘simple notation’ and the superfluous ‘double-meaning expressions’ or ‘hidden meanings’. In other words, mimesis_1 signifies the initial interaction between language and things, echoing the Heideggerean notion of thrownness: fragmented events which can be ‘understood’ on a basic level (e.g. a wooden beam attached to another) that may have an implicit meaning as a symbol of something else. In later periods of the mimetic process, the implicit meaning emerges out of the basic understanding; continuing the example of the wooden beams, the beams become a cross which might imply additional meanings. Strictly speaking, mimesis_1 is atemporal because the pre-understanding of temporality makes possible the temporal action of understanding. The mediating action of emplotment happens on the surface of this pre-understanding. If mimesis_1 serves as the groundwork for emplotment, mimesis_2 is the organising activity of emplotment. Emplotment connects the various elemental events with encompassing stories, transforming a given collection of events into a single Event. The organisation of emplotment is more than serial concatenation since it ‘draws a configuration out of simple succession’.

The collection of events from mimesis_1 are organised into a coherent story which may be different from the successive order in time for the sake of narrative coherence. An example here would be the organisation of a novel whereby the author may describe events occurring simultaneously in two separate chapters so that each subset of events coheres in a subplot. While the two subsets of events occur simultaneously in experienced time, the narrative may

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106. Ibid., 1:57.
107. Cf. ibid., 1:64.
108. Ibid., 1:65.
be crafted such that the second one only gives a significant meaning in light of the first’s completed narrative.

The final stage in the mimetic process is the moment in which the narrativised understanding from mimesis$_2$ intersects the ‘world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific temporality’.\textsuperscript{109} For this reason, Ricœur holds back from describing mimesis in purely fictional terms because mimesis$_3$ implies its own applicability to ‘history’ and ‘real’ events. Human lives become ‘‘(as yet) untold’’ stories’.\textsuperscript{110} While mimesis$_1$ is a prefigured collection of events, mimesis$_3$ is the projection into time of a ‘binding together’ that supplies mimesis$_2$ with a narrative that organises the events into a story. Because of this image of mimesis, Ricœur can say that mimesis$_2$ ‘opens the kingdom of the as if’ while also suggesting that the ‘as if’ comes from mimesis$_3$.\textsuperscript{111} Ricœur invokes the language of Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ as an apt description of mimesis$_3$ because the intersection of mimesis and the world is itself an application of narrative hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{112}

The points of mimetic application become events in their own right and the dialectic continues, giving rise to multiple interpretations over time, again echoing Gadamer’s language. Mimesis$_3$ returns to mimesis$_1$ as a new event understood in terms of being both temporal (i.e. as an historical event) and atemporal (i.e. as a concept distinct from its historicity). An aspect of mimesis which will be useful later is the implicit multiplicity of narratives that develop from the ‘fusion of horizons’. It is possible (if not likely) that multiple narratives can be overlaid on top of each other, connecting the same pre-understanding of events into multiple stories. The parallax novels of Orson Scott Card are prime examples of this.\textsuperscript{113} Card re-tells the ‘Ender Saga’ series from the perspective of a character who was secondary to the original series while providing new perspectives and understanding to both the original series and its parallel ‘Ender’s Shadow’ series.

Ricœur’s mimesis implies both a multiplicity of interpretations within the progression of a single narrative and also a multiplicity of narratives. Narrativity serves as the mediating factor in mimesis, ‘as the ordering of events . . . into the total action constitutive of the narrated story’.\textsuperscript{114} Following this mediation, Ricœur couples narrativity to time. Out of this mimetic process arises Ricœur’s hermeneutics of time which refigures the Aristotelian notion of mythos and the Augustinian notion of time. Whereas mimesis is primarily a narrative

\textsuperscript{109. Ibid., 1:71.}
\textsuperscript{110. Ibid., 1:74.}
\textsuperscript{111. Ibid., 1:64.}
\textsuperscript{112. Ibid., 1:77.}
\textsuperscript{114. Ricœur, \textit{Time and Narrative} 1:56.}
happeneutics, it occurs within time. An understanding, then, of Augustine’s concept of

1.2.3 Augustine’s Threefold Present

Augustine provides one of the earliest investigations of time that have persisted in Western

thought. While he is certainly not the first, his writing on time has been used as a stan-

dard reference for centuries on the ‘classical’ account of time. Augustine’s Confessions is

where the majority of his writing on time are found, so my analysis will concentrate there.

Beginning in Book X, Augustine turns from an autobiographical sketch to a self-reflective

analysis that can seem disconnected from the previous books. Yet, it is in this analysis that

the Confessions become a philosophical analysis since Augustine begins to reflect on mem-
yory, time, and the image of thought. Augustine’s questioning begins with memory and how

one utilises it. For Augustine, memory is vital to perceiving the passage of time because

everything experienced enters memory and is recalled through memory such that one’s Self

is retrieved from memory.115 I shall return to this discussion on memory in a later section

on the construction of identity (2.3.4), but it should be noted now that memory serves as the

link between Augustine’s autobiography and his discussion on time, a link which occurs in

Ricœur as well as Deleuze. While I will explore this connection, the pathway I take is the

reverse of Augustine: starting with time and ending with memory and identity.

Augustine’s investigation on time begins with the creation narrative: if something — be it

God or some creature of God — literally spoke the words of creation then something corpo-
oreal existed before corporeal reality.116 Because of this, Augustine argues that the words of
creation emanated from eternity beyond time where all things are spoken simultaneously.117

Augustine continues in this manner until he sufficiently separates God and eternity from ex-
perienced reality so that God persists in a panopticon of time. Augustine’s first principle of

time is that it is created by God. I shall return to this narrative of creation in my discussion

of identity (2.2.5), but it is important to note that the creation narrative links Augustine’s dis-
cussions on identity and his discussions on time such that all three are linked together.

The second principle of time suggested by Augustine is that it flows from the future through

the present into the past. It is a one-way movement. While time may flow in this way, only the

‘present’ exists; the ‘future’ and ‘past’ do not exist.118 From these points, Augustine takes up

186–7.
117. Ibid., XI.vii (9), p. 226.
two questions that continue to occur in various explorations of time. First is the question of duration, the experience of the ‘present’ as a single unending point. This is closely tied to the second question, namely the question of succession, the connection between multiple points in time. Augustine’s line of questioning seeks to understand the ontological nature of time. He ultimately asserts a variation of the ‘common sense’ view of time in that there are three times each ‘present’ simultaneously: ‘a present of things past; a present of things present; and a present of things to come’. These three times are correlated in the ‘present’ moment such that they take the forms of memory, direct experience, and expectation. Augustine provides an example of how time operates, which is similar to that of Rumpelstiltskin spinning straw into gold: in reciting a psalm such that the act of reciting is the moment in which the text to be read is transformed into the recited psalm. More interestingly, though, Augustine then comments that the whole action takes place in each individual part and syllable; it seems that Augustine can be read as pioneering a monadic account of time. This example is then extended to an individual life and even the whole of humanity.

Augustine’s aim, then, is to unite a multiplicity of events into a coherent order of time without erasing the individual events that make up the whole. The greatest difficulty Augustine faces is precisely within his threefold present. It presents a simultaneity of the three times without succession. Only the present exists; the past and future are simply dimensions of that present. Time is only a succession of presents, with each past ‘moment’ occurring simultaneously within each present ‘moment’. There is nothing beyond the sempiternal present.

1.2.4 Narrative Time

Ricœur overcomes the difficulty described above in Augustine’s threefold present by tying it to Aristotelian emplotment. This discussion occurs twice in *Time and Narrative*: first as an explication of both Aristotle and Augustine in the first volume, and secondly as a mixing of the two in the third volume. In tying Augustine and Aristotle together, Ricœur can argue that ‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence’. Ricœur specifies that this connection is the mediation between the multiplicity of events in Augustine and the ‘triumph of concordance over discordance’ in Aristotle. This mediation takes the form of two complementary actions: ‘a lived experience where discordance rends concordance and an eminently verbal experience where concordance mends discordance’. The connection of ‘human time’ is achieved by the act of mimetic reading, traversing the

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120. Ibid., XI.xxviii (38), p. 243.
121. Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* 1:52.
122. Ibid., 1:31.
two sides of the text, symbol (mimesis$_1$) and application (mimesis$_3$), by way of metaphor (mimesis$_2$). In this regard, some of Riecœur’s writings can be seen as an example of this transposition as he slowly constructs a theory of subjectivity starting with *The Rule of Metaphor*, running through *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another*, and finally ending in *Memory, History, Forgetting*.123

Because of his inclusion of Aristotle, Riecœur proposes a very different solution to the question of time than Augustine, even though they share similar goals. In the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, Riecœur’s first point relevant for my discussion of narrativity is that Augustine’s unlinking of time from movement does not effectively refute Aristotle’s argument that time ‘without being movement itself’ still ‘is something that “has to do with movement’’.124 This connection between time and movement is the location upon which he constructs narrativity. Secondly, Riecœur suggests that Augustine’s understanding of time is relational; causality has little value for Augustine.125 While Augustine’s understanding here may be directly incompatible with that of Aristotle’s causal notion of time, the two are indirectly compatible because of a difficulty in Aristotle ‘of maintaining to the end the correspondence between the instant and the point, in its twofold function of division and unification’.126 Riecœur formulates a notion of time at this junction, connecting Augustine’s multiplicity of events as the pre-understanding of mimesis$_1$ with Aristotle’s concordance of emplotment as the lived experience of mimesis$_3$. Narrativity, then, is the hermeneutical connection of mimesis$_2$ which is experienced as the passing (and ordering) of time.

Time for Riecœur must be lived, experienced, and applied. It is the point at which the incomplete world of the text intersects the world of the ‘wandering’ reader.127 At this intersection, multiple horizons (again following Gadamer’s usage) are fused together to create an ‘aesthetic’ of reading.128 The multiple dialectics that occur here provide us with a genealogical account of ‘memory’ with a chain of transmission, understanding, and re-imaging. While the implications for identity shall be covered later (2.3.4), I wish to focus on the temporality of Riecœur’s narrativity here. Through the imaginary as a narrative process, the constructed historical narrative is re-inscribed in the ‘real’ past as a unification of the many past moments and events.129 Without time, narratives become incomprehensible because they are ordered by and interpreted through time. The re-inscription of experienced time into the memory of

125. Ibid., 3:19.
126. Ibid., 3:21.
127. Ibid., 1:71.
129. Ibid., 3:182.
experience is the transition from mimesis\textsubscript{2} to mimesis\textsubscript{3} which forges a multiplicity of time ‘pushed to the point of becoming a “being-affected” by the past’.\textsuperscript{130} The past is a collection of individual experiences that are joined together in a narrative as a single memory of all time which, in return, affects how new narratives and experiences are interpreted, read, and included into memory.

The present for Ricœur is transitory, a new link ‘between the shadows of the past and the light of the future’.\textsuperscript{131} This echoes an image, perhaps unintentionally, of one walking down a dark tunnel towards the light at the end, stepping through the grey area between darkness and light. This aspect of time compensates for Augustine’s difficulty of a sempiternal present by employing narrative to order the process of time into a remembrance of experiences which contextualises the present as a succession of moments. The first aspect of time (as sempiternal present) dispels the second aspect (as linear progression). Past events are not written in stone. Rather, Ricœur argues ‘we have to reopen the past, to revivify its unaccomplished, cut-off — even slaughtered — possibilities’.\textsuperscript{132} The present becomes a dialectic of two series: past possibilities revived and future expectations experienced. All three ‘periods’ of time (past, present, and future) are fused together into a collective singular where each is both separate and connected by a narrative of time.\textsuperscript{133} For Ricœur, then, there is no way to construe time without narrativity because narrativity is that which binds the fragments of time together.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, this relation is circular because the fragments of time constitute narrativity. Time and narrativity feed into and off of each other, as a dialectic that is always interpreted.

The mediation of time encapsulated in the revivification of the past gives way to meditations of time. Ricœur’s meditations of time seek to ‘make our expectations more determinate and our experiences less so’, revivifying the past and grabbing hold of the future.\textsuperscript{135} This is nothing more than the lived experience of time and the active agency of a subject. In revivifying the past, time reveals its inner tension to be between the horizons of past and present, ‘imposing upon ourselves the task of overcoming our tendency to assimilate the past too quickly to our own expected meanings’.\textsuperscript{136} In other words, the difficulty of understanding time is the tension inherent in lived time: connecting discordant events while maintaining their separateness. The turn to narrative as a hermeneutics of time eases this tension.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 3:207.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 3:211.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 3:216.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 3:220–1.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 3:241.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 3:216.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 3:220.
1.2.5 Tradition and Ideology

All three aspects of time (past, present, future) converge in the present as an opening of an always-new narrative time. Every moment pushes a narrative to evolve by fusing with new horizons and reinterpreting existing ones, creating a completely new present. This is the revolution of time as a single cycle of the mimetic process.\(^{137}\) Important to this is the idea of a tradition as a ‘received past’ which stands opposite of the novelty of mimesis, holding in tension the reciprocity between being affected by our history and by ‘the history we make’.\(^{138}\) The narrative of time is the passage of tradition because tradition is exactly what maintains discordant events while also connecting them into a ‘received past’ within the horizon of the present.

The dialectic of tradition is mimesis according to Ricœur, constructing not just new variations of a ‘received past’ but also parallel narratives which reflect difference receptions of the past into the present. This dialectic gives rise to a question of legitimacy because the acknowledgement of any given narrative as tradition implies an acceptance of judgement and authority — a question which is at the heart of the issue of orthodoxy (see 4.1.3). For Ricœur, this dialectic of authority is the ‘vicissitude of tradition’ since each rival claimant within our ‘pluralistic society and culture’ is each their own claim to truth (or an instance thereof).\(^{139}\) This is where ideology critique and the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ return to Ricœur’s discussion.

A tradition, as an instance within the dialectic of received time accepted as the singular embodiment of the entire dialectic (cf. 4.1.4), presumes truth by necessity because tradition finds that no better argument in the domain of reason has been established.\(^{140}\) However, this presumption of truth is never taken as occurring at the origin of the truth process but as already occurred prior to critical thought. It is a prejudice in the pure sense of the word. The truth of tradition carries meaning through the ‘received past’ and provides a method for judging other claims to truth through the present instance of tradition. Additional analyses of traditionality by Ricœur play an important role in a later discussion (3.3.2), yet the question of tradition and ideology present a unique case of temporality which has immediate relevance.

Nietzsche, according to Ricœur, proposes that questions of tradition bring forward two related evaluations: that of ‘historical meaning’ and that of ‘historical culture’.\(^{141}\) In other

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 3:211.
\(^{138}\) Ibid., 3:213.
\(^{139}\) Ibid., 3:224.
\(^{140}\) Cf. ibid., 3:227.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., 3:236.
words, every question of tradition as historiographic interpretation is also an evaluation of
the historical situation that stems from ‘the burden of the past’ as a never-ending process of
incompletion. For Nietzsche, the ability to refigure the past (in mimesis) can be done only
by the powerful, by those without ressentiment. Yet, Nietzsche presents a twist for Ricœur’s
notion of time: the projection of the future as an incomplete ending for a narrative of time
only exists in the present. That is, the historical present is ‘the final term of a completed
history, which itself completes and ends history’ as if history were over.142 This historical
present for Ricœur is tied to the revolutionary potential of every present to become ‘the in-
augural force of a history that is yet to be made’.143 It is in this tension that tradition is vital
to understanding the experience of time because tradition is a double-edged sword that both
affects and is affected by history.

Ricœur’s narrativity can now be seen in its entirety. By bringing together both hermeneu-
tics and temporality, Ricœur provides a method for approaching questions of subjectivity in
terms of time and narrative. Mimesis, in all three variations, operates to construct a narrative
plurality in the form of parallax orderings of events into distinct narratives. The multiplicity
of narrative produces a relational time in which the ‘received past’ of traditions can be forgot-
ten, reinterpreted, re-appropriated, and maintained — perhaps all at the same time. Through
the ‘fusion of horizons’ that mimesis creates, time becomes untimely and the narrative of
time becomes mediated. The identity which Tradition provides is unstable and dependent on
a context within which traditionality becomes a particular tradition and mediates narratives
of time. For Ricœur, there is a distinction between Tradition (as the universal), traditions (as
particulars), and traditionality which bridges the two through narrative.

Overlaying the mimetic process with the hermeneutic circle, Ricœur suggests that the nar-
rative identity ‘is not a stable and seamless identity’.144 Rather, narrativity is a fragmentary
weave of multiple narratives into one as both a historicised fiction (i.e. a collection of multi-
ple disconnected narratives) and a fictionalised history (i.e. a single plot). As I shall show in
the next section (1.3.4), this construct has many parallels with Deleuze’s own theories (1.1.5)
and it shall be worthwhile to imagine a dialogue between Deleuze and Ricœur on their par-
allels and divergences on narrative. Ricœur’s contribution to the philosophy of time is a vital
one, particularly because it relates to questions of identity, a lacuna which will receive great
attention and completion in the following chapter (2.2.3).

142. Ibid., 3:239.
143. Ibid., 3:240.
144. Ibid., 3:248.
1.3 Deleuze and Ricœur in Dialogue

The previous two sections develop in parallel the works of both Gilles Deleuze (1.1) and Paul Ricœur (1.2) on the construction of time and narrative through hermeneutics. As I have already mentioned, the nexus around defining a subject as a Self emerges out of both of their works. Only recently, however, have the two been brought into direct dialogue in Declan Sheerin’s *Deleuze and Ricœur*; and this is a trend I wish to continue. In this section, I aim to extend the dialogue between Deleuze and Ricœur by first providing an analysis of each from the other’s perspective. This will then be followed by joining the two through their differences placed in relation to one another.

I shall argue that both Deleuze and Ricœur attempt similar solutions to very similar (if not identical) problems with different emphases, and these emphases produce the tensions between the two. Through these tensions, a new dialogue will emerge that introduces questions regarding the subject in time. However, I also shall argue that by holding these tensions simultaneously as a portmanteau concept, the combined concept of time will lead to a different question of identity as identity emerges from the construct of a ‘Self’. This question continues into Chapter 2 where identity is considered.

1.3.1 Larval Narratives

In the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, Ricœur locates three puzzles (or aporias) of time: ‘the aporia of the inscrutability of time and the limits of narrative; the aporia of totality and totalisation; and the aporia of the dual perspective on time — the phenomenological and the cosmological’. Ricœur uses the last aporia to build a bridge of narrativity across the ‘split which separates these two perspectives of time’. This narrativity holds two unities — one as an interpretive reader, another as creative author — together in the form of a reflexive narration by the subject as Self and Other, two concepts which have already announced their early arrival in this thesis (1.2.4). While Ricœur notes that narrativity is still problematic as a solution for rooting the unities of reader and author because of their instability in the continuous making and unmaking of narrativity, he does not investigate this problematic in *Time and Narrative*. In other words, Ricœur finds that despite the benefits of narrativity, he is unable to remove the ‘sting’ of multiplicity from his solution to the question of unity-with-multiplicity. As I will show shortly below, the irony here is that while Ricœur’s proposed solution does not resolve the problem that invoked its use, it will be useful in resolving a second, different problem.

145. Sheerin, *Deleuze and Ricœur*, 34.
146. Ibid.
Deleuze’s own notion of ‘narrativity’ can resolve the problem Ricœur sees in multiplicity by turning the problem into a necessary aspect of time. By restating Ricœur’s dilemma, this inversion will become more obvious. Ricœur attempted to place discordance and concordance in a dialectic with one another such that each influenced the other. Discordance would break down concordance while concordance would reconstruct discordance. However, Ricœur’s mixture is imbalanced in that he exhibits a preference for the tendency towards concordance, downplaying discordance. This tendency towards concordance is a result of Ricœur overcompensating for the problem of dissolving into multiplicity found in Augustine’s theory (1.2.3).

Ricœur overcompensates for Augustine’s problem by emphasising the role of narrative. Ricœur’s theory of time is necessarily teleological because, as Sheerin describes, all ‘subplots must be resolved before the major plot itself can be given a sense of an ending that will “yield its meaning”’. 148 All narratives must bring together differences of the multiplicity into unison so that there is only one narrative for a Self in time. Ricœur notices a variation of this difficulty in his chapter on Hegel. 149 According to Ricœur, Hegel’s systematic approach to history requires a teleology (such as ‘the self-realisation of freedom’) to mediate the understanding of history. 150 Ricœur’s response to this is to accept the contextual and contingent nature of mediating history which ‘signifies renouncing the attempt to decipher the supreme plot’. 151 However, this break from Hegel towards finitude still anticipates such a teleological reconciliation of history into one narrative; Ricœur can only suggest that any and all understanding of that reconciliation is always contextually mediated by a reader. 152 Ricœur takes an agnostic approach with the hopes that an ‘end of narratives/time’ will occur eventually.

The correction needed to Ricœur can be found in Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis. The most notable aspect of the disjunctive synthesis is that it is an open-ended disjunction of either A or B or . . . or . . ., concatenating the disjuncts rather than dissolving them into a single unity of A and B and . . . and . . .. In Ricœur’s disavowal of discordance, he restricts the production of narrative by requiring a finality or summation to the stories into a single encompassing plot. 153 The disjunctive synthesis erases the necessity of such a plot, reconstructing it as a placeholder remainder and allowing the series of (narrative) signification to continue producing narratives. Multiplicity coalesces with an ordering of time in Ricœur’s narrativity to

148. Sheerin, Deleuze and Ricœur, 48.
150. Ibid., 3:195.
151. Ibid., 3:206.
create a theory of time without requiring a teleology by necessity.\footnote{154}{A contingent teleology is still quite possible and something that I will further discuss in 3.4.3.} This is a preference for what Ricœur calls the ‘historical present’ (1.2.2).

Ricœur’s narrativity develops from his own research into psychoanalysis while he moves away from the Freudian ego. The de-centred subject which permeates Ricœur’s later writings echoes a changed ego which is ‘not immediately given but acquired only through a series of mediations, marked not by its innate possessions but by its “dispossession” of everything, even of itself’.\footnote{155}{Kathleen Blamey, ‘From the Ego to the Self: A Philosophical Itinerary’, in Hahn, The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur, 583.} Deleuze’s own project includes such a movement, though radicalised by his rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis in preference for a new shizoanalysis which is driven to ‘tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress’.\footnote{156}{Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, trans. Helen R. Lane, Robert Hurley and Mark Seem (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 362.} The concept of identity that will emerge in the next chapter (2.2.3) will be situated between the de-centring subject of Ricœur and the dissolving ego of Deleuze; however there is much to address before that.

A notion of time situated between Deleuze’s and Ricœur’s provides a hybrid of ‘real’ history and narrative fiction, parallelling Deleuze’s distinction between actual and simulacral/virtual. In the border between propositions and things, Ricœur’s own mimesis can be found already present and at work. At the site of production of sense in Deleuze, the tangential border between Chronos and Aion, the living present exists and is experienced. In Ricœurian terms, this is the intersection of the ‘world of the text’ and the ‘world of the reader’ where Ricœur places application (mimesis$_3$).\footnote{157}{Ricœur, Time and Narrative 1:71.} In both cases, the production of sense, or experience as the case may be, is the excess created between propositions and things, or thoughts/memories/histories-as-fiction and ‘actual’ reality.

### 1.3.2 Time and Mimesis

While Ricœur’s notion of time bears resemblances to historical variations, Deleuze completely refigures time in a noticeably different way. However, this does not hinder reading Deleuze’s notion of time into Ricœur’s hermeneutics of time. For Deleuze, the future never arrives, it is always repeated. In the context of Ricœur’s theory of time, the narrative ending never occurs, because the ending always changes to something which is ultimately never attained. The future is the banal existence found in Samuel Beckett’s play *Waiting for Godot*: it never arrives.\footnote{158}{Samuel Beckett, *Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts*, ed. Dougal McMillan and James Knowlson, The Theatrical Notebooks of Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove Press, 1993).} The remedy here is not to anticipate the future (Ricœur’s pitfall) but also not
to excise it. To maintain the possibility of change, any teleological mediation — including the ultimate reconciliation of history hoped for — is to be re-affirmed as contingent in order for the sustained existence of the future itself. Visions of a future unity of people, something which I shall discuss later in this thesis in terms of eschatology (4.4.3), do not transcend their historical context in such a way that there is a multiplicity of reconciliations. Rather, time itself becomes a text that is mediated and interpreted with pure Memory acting as a contextual source. The present is read in a hermeneutics of time as both future and historical, from which the historical present creates a historical future in a revolutionary potential that never actualises fully.

This hermeneutics of time is one of participation at the point of connection between Chronos and Aion (1.1.2). To read the present, one must enter the process of time; one must participate within time by becoming both a reader of ‘texts’ and a text read by others in a contingent community of many. In other words, one becomes embodied in a social context at a particular point in time. A more theological approach to embodiment will be given later in this thesis (see 4.2.5). It is in participation that something (aliquid) is created for participation. This is yet another glimpse of the emerging Self. A Self is ‘present’, not as an ‘I’ existing in a ‘moment’ but as an ‘I’ having a presence as a subject or object of experience. Mimesis is found here within Deleuze’s philosophy. This discussion will be continued shortly when the question of identity is drawn through the question of difference.

Difference can be found in the temporal-mimetic process. In traversing the two sides of the text, the text and the reader create a unique situation, one which is always essentially different from all others. There is no reliving the same interpretation because something always changes in the process of repetition. The Möbius strip (1.1.1) of interpretation changes every point into something always new and different. In the context of the Self and time, the signification of relations are constantly changing because these relations frequently are placed into and removed from memory. Memory itself is always changing since new data is being added and the connections between narrative fragments are realigned. This context changes in every act of reception, each traversal of the text, such that there is never a final reading of a text because a text is always read differently.

Above, I proposed that Ricœur’s construction of narrativity was unable to resolve the problem with which he invoked the construction while also stating it would useful for a second problem. This second problem is that of Deleuze’s inability to maintain multiplicity without reducing it to a simple unity. In short, Deleuze’s disavowal of the Platonic Forms and the schemata of model-and-copy transforms the process of repetition (1.1.4) into the affirmation of the only univocal thing: Difference-in-itself. Alain Badiou focuses his critique of
Deleuze precisely at this point, however others — notably Jeffrey Bell and Clayton Crockett — have adequately argued that Badiou’s critique stems from a misreading of Deleuze. Both Crockett and Bell imply that the unity of difference must be seen as an echo of process thought whereby the production of difference ties the One to the Many in such a way that the two become synonymous with one another through the concept of the monad. The monad is both One and Many as a portmanteau configured in such a way that the Badiouan claim of Deleuze being a philosopher of ‘the One’ can only be held if one simultaneously claims that Deleuze is a philosopher of ‘the Many’. In Deleuze’s critique of Platonism, he finds Plato providing the answer to overturn Platonism, but this is done only by also affirming the Platonic project as a radical reinterpretation against Platonism. The problem Ricœur saw in narrativity which he was unable to resolve is the final piece with which Deleuze’s project of overthrowing Platonism is completed because Ricœur’s reconstituted narrativity de-centres the monadological middle of the One and replaces it with a contingent placeholder, thus completely erasing the idea of model-and-copy.

Difference gives rise to the virtual where there is no model from which copies are created. The reproduction of time in memories highlight this exactly. In recalling past events, people do not consider later understandings to be copies of earlier understandings. Rather, each act of recollection displaces the previous instances and takes the place of model. If it were a scheme of model-and-copies, every copy becomes the new model such that speaking of an ‘original’ memory is illusory. The status of memories as ‘original’ is immediately displaced in the temporal-mimetic process, and that which remains is sewn together in a patchwork of memories. According to Sheerin, Ricœur’s narrative is the mythic organisation of events through the dynamic imitation of mimesis. The Deleuzian twist to Ricœur is in bringing such narratives into pure Memory where mimetic imitation is transformed into mimetic production. Resulting from the mimetic production is a patchwork of memories which can be described as the multiplicity of narrativity. As I shall discuss later (3.4.2), particular traditions reflects particular patchworks because they arrange the narratives of tradition to suit the context contemporary to the tradition; narratives are not reconciled to a simple unity.

1.3.3 Multiplicity and Unity

By now, it should be clear that despite some divergences, Ricœur and Deleuze have developed concepts in parallel with one another and are generally complementary to one another.


160. Sheerin, *Deleuze and Ricœur*, 44.
Moreover, the full realisation of both philosophies is possible only by placing them in a dialectic that creates a philosophical chimera. In bringing these two together, I shall show that a 'common' notion of time emerges and is held together not by their overlap but by their divergences. This will result in the utterance perfectly balanced between unity-and-multiplicity and multiplicity-and-unity where the portmanteau 'multunity' emerges. Here is where the divergences between Deleuze and Ricœur become useful since the tension between multiplicity and unity is exactly what holds time together for the genesis of an individual subject. Before this genesis can be understood fully, however, the gaps between Ricœur and Deleuze must be bridged without radically changing either’s individual philosophical œuvre.\footnote{\footnote{161. Cf. ibid., 7.}}

The hermeneutics of time espoused by both Deleuze and Ricœur are largely similar despite different vocabularies and images. Since Ricœur remarks that time cannot be analysed in ‘the direct discourse of phenomenology’ but in ‘the indirect discourse of narration’, the gap between the previous discussions of Deleuzian interpretation (1.1.1) and Ricœurian time (1.2.1) narrows.\footnote{\footnote{162. Ricœur, Time and Narrative 3:241.}} This narrowing is a result of the juxtaposition which Ricœur suggests that time can only be ‘read’ and, subsequently, interpreted by a hermeneutical framework. Deleuze has a similar suggestion running throughout Logic of Sense as he discusses the genesis of (hermeneutical) sense through the relation it has with time. The primary difference occurs in the joining of fragments into a whole and making the many into a ‘one’. Yet, it should be noted that the difference is not whether such should occur but rather how the fragments and whole relate to each other.

While Ricœur argues that sense can only occur in the context of emplotment, the reading of ‘bare events into a story’, I believe the problems of requiring a teleology (cf. 1.2.4) for a narrative far outweigh its benefits.\footnote{\footnote{163. G.B. Madison, ‘Ricœur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject’, in Hahn, The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur, 85 (emphasis in original).}} Instead of maintaining a connection between events through a plot that will bring them all together into a final unity, I shall follow Deleuze’s lead and submit such an end to the eternal return. The multiplicity which Deleuze uses as his response is first ascribed to Maurice Blanchot:

\begin{quote}
How to think about fragments whose sole relationship is sheer difference — fragments that are related to one another only in that each of them is different — without having recourse either to any sort of original totality (not even one that has been lost), or to a subsequent totality that may not yet have come about? It is only the category of multiplicity, used as a substantive and going beyond both the One and the Many, beyond the predicative relation of the One and the Many, that
\end{quote}
can account for desiring-production: desiring-production is pure multiplicity, that is to say, an affirmation that is irreducible to any sort of unity.\textsuperscript{164}

The multiplicity for Deleuze cannot be reduced to a unity as Ricœur may suggest. Ricœur’s teleology of emplotment is replaced with a simulated emplotment (i.e. the historical present) as a conscious construction of a narrative plot to relate existing fragments.

The turn to a contingent teleology is a sign of virtual thought because any notion of an end is changeable at a later time and many different teleologies can be overlaid by one another by interpreting progressions according to different perspectives. Any ‘final’ plot is final only inasmuch as each plot is contingent and necessarily different; there are no copies of a ‘model’ plot because each plot is generated as distinct from all others. This ‘plural unity’ is none other than the actions of pure Memory acting within time.\textsuperscript{165} Memory ‘narrates the transition from one meaning of time regained to the other’ — as the resurrection of time into the narrative.\textsuperscript{166} Memory, as time itself, becomes the ‘distance that joins together’ the fragments of time into a whole.\textsuperscript{167}

Memory is the disjunctive synthesis of mimesis; the Ricœurian ‘...and ...and ...’ of polysemic interpretation becomes the Deleuzian ‘...or ...or ...’ of differential interpretation. Differential interpretation takes two forms out of which the ‘synthesis of the heterogenous’ constitutes the temporal-mimetic production of narrative: differentiation which establishes the surface of the Möbius strip upon which the disjunctive synthesis occurs and differenciation which actualises the synthesis (cf. 1.1.4).\textsuperscript{168} The temporal-mimetic process constructs a (contingent) narrative out of the relations which form between the multiplicities of memories by drawing the narrative out of ‘this sea of multiplicity’ and into time.\textsuperscript{169}

1.3.4 Mimetic Discordance

The play between concordance and discordance leads the discussion towards questions of mimesis. For Sheerin, Ricœur’s mimetic process is circular as ‘we trace an endless spiral returning to the same point but at ever different altitudes’.\textsuperscript{170} I disagree slightly with Sheerin on this because Ricœur makes it clear — as I have argued above (cf. 1.3.1) — that there is a teleology attached to mimesis which drives the cyclical process. I also wish to combat

\textsuperscript{164} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{Anti-Œdipus}, 42.
\textsuperscript{165} Blamey, ‘From the Ego to the Self’, 576.
\textsuperscript{166} Ricœur, \textit{Time and Narrative} 2:145.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 2:151.
\textsuperscript{168} Sheerin, \textit{Deleuze and Ricœur}, 92.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
the image of height which Sheerin finds in Ricœur by following Alice’s disavowal of false depth and height (1.1.1). Deleuze, in following Heraclitus, would likely suggest that there is never a return to the same point because such a crossing can only occur once. Using recent empirical theory, I want to propose a variation of Deleuze’s Aion and Chronos as an image for the mimetic process. The straight line of Aion may, in fact, be crooked. Without an external reference as a sort of Archimedean point, humans do not walk in straight lines and oftentimes end up walking in circles; instead of having a point by which one could lift the Earth, it is more likely that such a point is useful for ordering chaos. This has been shown in biology journals that have confirmed this navigational challenge.171 Perhaps, then, the mimetic process is not circular at different altitudes but rather wandering without a reference point which makes crossing known terrain appear new again. What is intended to be a straight line — the surface of the circle — is actually circular because the mimetic process embedded in language has no external reference by which to guide movement (and, if the empirical studies are to be believed, even then it is not foolproof since ‘with increasing path length, the trajectory will start to drift more and more from the intended direction in a random fashion’).172 One implication of this process shall be described in the third chapter (3.4.5) when I discuss issues of authority in ecclesial bodies.

However, there is still more to mimesis. In the play between concordance and discordance, Ricœur posits two different flows: ‘discordant concordance’ and ‘concordant discordance’.173 In the context of his discussion, it appears that any counter-flow to the first could wreck the mimetic journey; Ricœur calls this the violence of interpretation. Likewise, Deleuze also speaks of a sort of violence that ‘forces us into the search [for truth], that robs us of peace’.174 I suggest here that there is a contradiction between Ricœur and Deleuze in that violence for Deleuze impels one to search for the truth of signs while for Ricœur the violence hinders the hermeneutic process. The contradiction is not about flows and counter-flows but about teleologies. As I have already shown previously (1.1.1), Deleuze’s critique of hermeneutics in Logic of Sense is the disavowal of heights in Platonism and depths in the Presocratics. Only by the rejection of these illusions can one see obliquely and move sideways to find the origin of sense at the edges of signification. The violence of the sign, then, for Deleuze is not the enforced search for truth but rather the enforced illusion that there is a truth to be found! Truth is produced or created within a process of signification rather than found as something external which interrupts the processes of signification or discovered at the end of the process. This reading of hermeneutical violence destabilises Ricœur’s concern

172. Ibid., 1539.
173. Ricœur, Time and Narrative 1:73.
174. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 15.
of the counter-flow, reducing it to just another flow in the ‘horror of chaos’.\footnote{175. Ricœur, \textit{Time and Narrative} 1:72–73.}

There is still a second influence of violence which moves from Ricœur to Deleuze as a counter-flow. Violence of signs also unsettle interpreters, yet Deleuze cannot place this effectively because in chaos there cannot be an established peace without order. Ricœur’s image of hermeneutic violence serves as the creation of a peace through the imposition of order amidst the chaos. In being forced to search for truth, then, the sign operates as a rogue agent destabilising this peaceful order and forcing the interpreter to acknowledge the chaos. Left to wandering without an external reference, the once peaceful reader has become lost and even walking in a straight line becomes circular meandering. The resolved combination of Ricœur and Deleuze here would suggest the creation of a contingent ordering of signs and narrative fragments for a peaceful, stable ‘discordant concordance’. This binding together is destabilised by the unified divergence (i.e. ‘concordant discordance’) of the signs themselves as they share one thing in common: the lack of truth. Mimesis, then, is the process of establishing an order to the series through the usage of time, displacing the unstable pieces in order that their lack generates a totalising narrative to hold together the remaining fragments. In social terms, mimesis is the incarceration of the ‘bad’ criminals and the lack of their existence in the established order that produces peaceful coherence and its enforcement by an authority.

Prior to the initial step of mimesis\textsuperscript{1}, the narrative fragments that constitute the ‘rudimentary beginnings of the self’ are ordered in time.\footnote{176. Sheerin, \textit{Deleuze and Ricœur}, 51.} This is the pre-individual multiplicity produced from the relation between Chronos and Aion (1.1.2). As these discordant fragments are arranged and ordered around a singularity, the experience of time and the process of mimesis begin simultaneously. The very first synthesis of experiences into a pure Memory implies that these fragments already have their own histories as experiences from some other source. In biological terms, this would be described as the moment of conception in which the gametes from two parents are synthesised into an initial diploid zygote of a new biological entity. The gametes do not develop \textit{ex nihilo} but have their own origins of production. This is no different than with the emergence of a Self: it is created from already existing material drawn from Others. While the initial synthesis of fragments into a Self produces something completely new and different, the genealogical affinity is not immediately lost (if ever). In other words, the relation between a Self and its Others is mirrored in the relation between the fragments that constitute the Self. There is also a third relation, that between the Self as a whole and the fragments which constitute it. I will discuss only the third relation (that between the Self-as-whole and its fragments) here while leaving the other two for the
following chapter as each has its own history worth discussing (2.2.3).

1.3.5 Stranger to Oneself

As a notion of identity emerges within the construction of a Self, the relation between whole and fragments will set the stage for analysing the moment of genesis by problematising the existence of a whole which has permanence despite changes over time. What is the relation between the Self as the mimetic singularity of narrative fragments and these fragments? This problem is not a new one, since it can be found in the double-edged dilemma that the ship of Theseus poses. The first known written form comes from Plutarch:

The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same. 177

A more problematic rephrasing asks the following: if the old, decayed pieces were kept, preserved, then rebuilt, which boat is the ship of Theseus? We are left with two ships that are arguably the single ship of Theseus. In terms of a Self and identity, can the narrative fragments be re-purposed for a completely different mimetic singularity? The solution to this paradox lies somewhere along the continuum between the assertion that neither ship is the actual ship of Theseus and the opposite assertion that both are the actual ship.

Once the problem is posed in a philosophical structure of time, the question is a return to the permanence of the Self first posed by Immanuel Kant, a concept which will be analysed in the following chapter (2.1.1). The problem is only amplified with the above rejection of a ‘final’ narrative as there are no longer any guarantees that differences will subside. Through this problem, then, the question of narrative Selves also becomes a question of multiplicity. That is, because there is no ultimate, final narrative which emplots all fragments and partial narratives into a single plot, the Self is left in a state of having multiple separate Selves that do not easily resolve into a singular Self. The tension this creates parallels what Riceur saw in Edmund Husserl: that Husserl ‘must at one and the same time constitute the Other in me and as other’. 178 The notion of a Self creates the notion of an Other at the same time because

multiple Selves exist and persist within a single subject.

The two phenomenological concepts of Self and Other as conceptual notions of identity and difference will undergo their own transformations because the mutual exclusivity implied between the two shall collapse under its own weight. This is because the Self shall often ‘become hermeneutically aware when [it encounters] a text or other self before [it has] taken the step of subsuming the alien or Other’ to the familiar. The notion of the Self has, like time for Deleuze, become unhinged and out of joint because it no longer occupies the central position of identity. Instead, the Self shares the centre with many other Selves as a community bound by allegiance to a few narratives. However, this transformation will not be appreciated fully until after the intermediate analysis of identity is completed in the following chapter (2.2.5).

The very definition of a Self is always already fragmented and in a dual process of rupturing apart and fusing together. It is the trauma of self-reflection that creates a Self amidst the many Selves that are already present. As Talal Asad notes, this trauma has an ethical dimension, which is described in the story of Oedipus:

Is Oedipus the same man at the end of the drama as he was at the beginning? By the end he has undergone horrendous experiences — the mental trauma of self-discovery and the bodily trauma of self-blinding. The self that now becomes visible is also the self that deliberately destroys its own capacity for sight. From a powerful, admired, and protective king to a homeless, blinded, despised exile. Does this rupture allow a continuous identity for Oedipus, a Lockean self-identifying consciousness? And without that continuity, can we really say that at last Oedipus takes up responsibility for what he has done — or has responsibility ascribed to him.

The Self, in its constant quest of ‘becoming-other’, is unstable. Instability is a byproduct of the disequilibrium inherent to the production of sense. The implication must be clear: identity is the sense produced by the temporal-mimetic process of something participating with others in time.

The narrative of a Self drawn through the hermeneutics of time found between Ricœur and Deleuze is the strange interaction of Selves and Others within a single story. An aura of fiction surrounds the notion of the Self because its narrative is always contingent, changing, and mediated; yet it would be inaccurate to claim that the Self exists only as a fictional

179. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, 50.
180. Asad, Formations of the Secular, 93–94.
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character. Following Ricœur’s mimesis (1.2.2), it is enough to propose initially that the fictive experience(s) that construct a Self make it into something that is as real as a virtual construct (parallelling Deleuze’s usage in 1.1.5). In other words, the fictional or immaterial nature of a Self does not make the Self an illusion one must reject.

1.3.6 The Story of One’s Selves

The hermeneutical framework which had been developed in the previous sections (1.1.1 and 1.2.2) and tied together above can finally be used to open up the problem of the identity because ‘there is no self-understanding which is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts’. A hermeneutics of time is necessary to understand identity because ‘language is the reality of the possible as such’ and identity, as something which is always ‘read’ in community (see 2.2.5), can only be experienced as an actuality in time. The possibility of individual identity appears only because it is a mediated self-understanding of difference. By developing an understanding with regards to how this mediation occurs, I shall show that more is at stake than simply the permanence of the Self through time. In fact, the question of identity strikes at the very heart of the notion of community as a collection of individuals under a single banner. In responding to the problem of identity here, the theological consequences will include changes to the notions of orthodoxy and the Church (3.1).

The dialogue between Ricœur and Deleuze has so far created a double-edged sword for hermeneutics, a sword that reconstitutes as it separates. Or, to play on an ambiguity, it cleaves while it cleaves. This hermeneutical duplicity is the tool by which identity can be altered (Chapter 2) to construct religious identity in the Deleuzian ‘minor key’ (Chapter 3). The minor key of identity is important because it actualises the relationship between Self and Other as a necessary dialectic that is not homogenised in a higher unity. Rather, it makes possible the encounter of an Other to be an actual encounter between different Selves irreducible to a process of conversion or homogenisation. Encounters with Others are the narrative fragments and events that construct a Self as a social identity. This social nature of the Self is reflected in its relation with both its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ Others. One implication of this refigured identity which shall be useful in future sections (2.3) is that a ‘group’ identity has the same markings as an ‘individual’ identity because the social aspect of identity changes the distinction between group and individual into a difference of scale rather than composition.

183. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, 259.
184. While the transitive verb indicates separation, the intransitive verb indicates adherence.
Theological implications also abound as the philosophical discourses on subjectivity must turn towards the theological. Such a turn is necessary because discussions of identity face degrees of infinity and absolutes:

‘Infinitely other’ and ‘absolutely other’ are transgressive concepts — concepts which are logically unstable. They are theological concepts and theology employs them in a transgressive discourse ... The act of transgression, of crossing the boundary and affirming an absolutely other and an infinitely other, is an act of faith ... The other is mediated and therefore not immediate. One cannot, therefore, affirm, without crossing the bounds of a strictly philosophical discourse and entering the grounds of a frankly theological discourse, that this otherness is transcendent.\(^{185}\)

While questions of transcendence are mostly, though not completely, beyond the limits of this thesis because it is focused on the sociological issue of relations within Christianity (as a whole), they do serve to relocate the discussion of identity in a theological context, especially when the discussion turns towards questions of group identity (2.3.1) and the communal identity of Christianity (4.2.4). Before turning to explicitly theological themes (see chapters 3 and 4), I shall address the concept of identity more directly (Chapter 2).

At the moment, there are three problems that ensnare the concept of the Self which have been listed above. The first problem was described in the ship of Theseus: how does the Self-as-a-whole relate to the fragments that constitute it? This was further amplified by the Deleuzeo-Ricœurian construct of time which suggests that even if no parts are added or removed, they still change and affect the constitutive whole. An initial solution was proposed by connecting the concepts of identity and difference. Such a connection creates the possible use of the disjunctive synthesis as well as the situation in which identity is a mediated multiplicity. Identity can only be such when it is seen as contradictory because it is composed of opposing Selves which produce two images of the same Self: ‘one to the non-finite, the unlimited, one to the finite and the limited, one monoglossic, one heteroglossic, one bound, the other unbound’.\(^{186}\) They oppose each other but one is not lost in the other (Ricœur’s error) or to the other (Deleuze’s error).

A second problem of the Self is the relation between the Self and its Others. Out of the disjunctive synthesis from the previous problem, the boundaries between Selves and Others are complicated because any given Self is teeming with many Selves (and Others) beneath the

\(^{186}\) Sheerin, *Deleuze and Ricœur*, 103.
mask of identity. The third problem of the Self is implied in the transfigured second problem: what is the relation between the various fragments within a Self? This is different from the first primarily by scale and secondly because it ignores the relation between the Many and the One which is the focus of the first problem. While the second has a long history (see 2.1), the third has become a contemporary problem. I shall address each throughout the following chapter while I explore the concept of identity in further detail. By using the combined hermeneutics of time from Ricœur and Deleuze, the question of identity produces new images of subjectivity. This image of subjectivity can then provide a method for a historiographical mapping of theology.
2. A Contemporary Model of Identity

For when Kant puts rational theology into question, *in the same stroke* he introduces a kind of disequilibrium, a fissure or crack in the pure Self of the ‘I think’, an alienation in principle, insurmountable in principle: the subject can henceforth represent its own spontaneity only as that of an Other, and in so doing invoke a mysterious coherence in the last instance which excludes its own — namely, that of the world and God.¹

The central, yet-to-be-defined nexus of the discussion on time and narrativity (1.3.5) is the concept of identity implied by the experience of time. In what way does identity complete the two-fold hermeneutics of time and difference? Identity binds and permeates the constructs of temporality in both Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricœur, as its frequent and early arrivals in the previous chapter might indicate. The concept and question of identity are so closely tied to the prior discussion of time (1.3.5) that the two cannot be separated completely without revealing a gaping hole in each. However, I have done exactly that with the intention of framing the concept of identity so that its question can be analysed without running two discussions in parallel.

The focus can now shift to the question of identity with a particular focus on the ideas of the Self and the subject. Are the two concepts separate and distinct or connected, codependent, or something between these two poles? According to Talal Asad, the two are directly related: ‘the subject . . . is founded on consciousness of self’.² In other words, notions of identity must emerge simultaneously, creating the Self as [1] a subject, [2] an object of experience, and [3] a self-reflected object. The previous chapter saw the emergence of this Self out of the temporal-mimetic process, particularly with the positing of three questions of relations that are part of the construct of identity (see 1.3.4).

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¹. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 58.
I shall suggest here that the discussion of identity in these terms has figured prominently in philosophy, particularly since Immanuel Kant. Kant’s theory of a permanent Self existing through time is an excellent starting point because his critical philosophy marks a shift (though not the only) in philosophical discourse which revolutionised prior thinking on the Self (e.g. René Descartes’s *cogito*) and influenced heavily subsequent philosophy. From one perspective, Kant can be seen as a ‘reformer’ in philosophy just as Martin Luther can be seen as a reformer in Christian theology. Kant provides a number of philosophical ‘reversals’ including two which have direct relevance to this thesis: first is the shift in time such that ‘time is no longer related to the movement which it measures’ and second is a revolution of the concept of the Self in such a way that the Self becomes fragmented and dynamic as a receptive experience of time as well as an active division of time into past, present, and future at every instant of experience.\(^3\) Echoes of both of these shifts shall be seen to come from the philosophies of Deleuze and Ricœur; and these similarities develop from readings of and responses to Kant’s œuvre, making Kant a central figure to this thesis.

My first section shall explore post-Kantian continental philosophy within the context of Kant’s own theory of identity (2.1). The responses to Kant reveal some difficulties that Kant had in maintaining his notion of identity. After discussing a few key responses to Kant, I shall bring these responses together in my second section as the tools to construct an alternative to Kant’s concept (2.2). From the relation between subject and Self, I wish to explore identity in multiple, simultaneous aspects: first as the subject in which experiences occur; secondly as the object out of which experiences occur; thirdly as the self-reflexive combination of the two. The result is a refiguration of identity, based on the previously introduced concepts of Gilles Deleuze (1.1) and Paul Ricœur (1.2), that exists as a multiplicity. This is best exemplified in the sublimation of water in chemistry where water exists as steam, liquid, and solid at once without the consummation of one into the others. In the context of chemistry, sublimation occurs most readily in an environment where air pressure and heat are regulated by artificial means. However in this laboratory of thought, the sublimation of identity shall be shown to occur naturally; and the artificial regulation of environments is what allows for the separation of identity into its components.

Lastly, I wish to begin to anticipate the next chapter by turning the discussion of identity towards groups (2.3). Asad suggests that ‘[Emile] Durkheim’s view of the contradictory relation between the individual and the social *within each human being* provided a basis for his theory of ritual’.\(^4\) While I shall leave the discussion of ritual aside, Asad’s analysis has importance for my thesis in that Durkheim’s attribution of identity could be said to be

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reciprocal: not only did a human being have her own ‘individual’ identity but she also had others rooted in social identities. I propose that these social identities become the fragments of identity which are then used to (re)construct individual identity. Just as the atom was discovered to hold smaller particles, I have already implied (1.3.6) that the Self is composed of smaller Selves based primarily on social relations. Consequently, the construction of identity bears no relation to magnitude, and the difference between individual and group identity is only one of scale and not of construction.

Throughout the question of identity in the notion of a Self, there ‘looms the spectre of “[an] other”’. The relation between Self and Other will echo throughout the question of identity until the distinction between the two concepts blurs together in the single concept of identity. In other words, the answer to the question of identity must be relational or social, embedded in a dialectic between Self and at least one Other: ‘to explore the delineation of the other is not just to discover the construction of identity by opposition; it is also to be invited to search for traces of such otherness within, and to ask why these cannot be integrated’. This problem found at the core of identity will rupture notions of a singular Self in order to find the multiplicity of Selves that lie behind the narrative mask.

The previous discussion of time (1.3.4) should not be forgotten since its importance will continue to appear throughout the discussion of identity. Time and identity — as concepts — have been made to fit each other in the same way that a narrative cannot be told without both content (i.e. identity) and ordering (i.e. time). The separation is primarily to allow the tracing of one concept rather than a perhaps more direct (and also more obtuse) development of the two together. In other words, discussing both identity and time together complicates the understanding of both issues because the two consistently inhere on each other. A result of keeping the two concepts relatively separate is a distillation of identity which will have important consequences in theology, particularly in relation to conceptions of orthodoxy (Chapter 3) and ecclesiology (Chapter 4). These consequences will be seen in my re-interpretation of the development of orthodoxy as a construction of identity because many (though not all) theological differences can be seen as the result of non-theological factors — something which ecumenical activities in the past century have shown to be the case. Out of the Deleuzo-Ricœrian dialogue on identity emerges a model for mediating differences within a single identity, and this will provide a way for Christian groups to think ecumenically without removing the possibility of particular orthodoxies (4.1.3).

6. Ibid., 271.
2.1 Philosophies of Identity since Kant

There are two ways of formulating identity: one by similarity and another by difference. A good example of the first is the Law of Identity codified in Aristotelian logic (A ≡ A) in which identity is determined by what extent two things are similar. Identity is based on perceptions and similarity to prior experiences. This green pencil is the same as the green pencil I saw two minutes ago. Since the formulation is based on similarity, one can expect the confusion found with identical twins because their differences are often obscured by their similarities, particularly in appearance. Under this formulation of identity, difference is simply a lack of similarity by comparison; any sufficiently similar object can be confused with another. Paul Ricœur calls this formulation of identity ‘idem-identity’.8

The second way of formulating identity is best seen in the work of Gilles Deleuze in which identity is a function of ontological difference (1.1.4). Difference is not simply difference in kind, such as the difference between species within a genus, but rather essential difference: ‘red₁ differs from red₂ in that they are both absolutely singular events in the order of being such that they are united by no common form of essence or universality that subsumes them both and which is capable of being in multiple places at multiple times’.9 Identity follows from this difference; similarity becomes a poor standard for identity. Even if red₁ appears exactly similar to red₂ (or if one twin looks identical to the other), the two are still different. An identity based on difference does not subsume difference to similarity; two similar objects are always already differentiated. This formulation, I suggest, is equivalent to what Ricœur terms ‘ipse-identity’.10 Both formulations depend on a conception of time and identity that allows the subject to have separate experiences in order to relate these experiences to each other.

One of the relations described in the previous chapter (1.3.4) enters into the discussion: the relation of the Self to its Others. Specifically, for a Self to relate to Others, there must be some semblance of permanence or unity of this Self. This leads to the question of the unity of consciousness and its usage as the groundwork upon which a unity of identity can develop. The Scottish philosopher David Hume used the construct of habit (1.1.3) to ultimately reject this unity. However, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s reaction to Hume has become the foundation for much of contemporary identity construction because Kant is the first major philosopher to adopt formally a unity of identity through time. Kant took what Enlightenment philosophy had been touching implicitly and made it explicit: the unity of

8. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 2.
10. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 2.
consciousness. In order to construct a philosophical structure surrounding experiences, Kant explicitly posited that the subject must somehow remain permanent through time in order to interpret actions and events as experiences. However, this permanence has been based on a conception of time as a linear ‘arrow of time’.

Philosophers after Kant have found various problems with Kant’s unity of consciousness and have tried to re-think Kant’s unity under different circumstances, particularly when time is conceived differently. Much work was done in the nineteenth century around Kant’s unity of consciousness (e.g. Friedrich Schelling, Georg Hegel) — and some even link unity with multiplicity — however, none of that work weighs substantially and directly within the philosophical lineages of Ricœur and Deleuze after Kant. While it would be worthwhile to pursue these additions, such would exceed the limits of this thesis. It is within this vein that I wish to begin exploring the concept of identity: identity in non-linear time. This starts with a brief exploration of Kant’s unity of consciousness, followed by two sets of responses to Kant that reverberate with each other soon beginning after Kant and continuing into recent thinkers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The first set of responses can be traced to Deleuze through the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. The Deleuzian response is one that questions Kant’s usage of time, presupposing a remarkably different structure of time (1.1.3). The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard follows the Deleuzian response and suggests a secondary response that questioned the permanence of Kant’s subject. The second set of responses is traced through the German philosopher Martin Heidegger to Paul Ricœur. This Ricœurian response focuses on how the unity of consciousness is constructed, primarily through hermeneutics. I shall order the responses to Kant by historical development which also includes alternating from one set to the other and showing a consistent progression within which the proposed synthesis in the next section (2.2.5) shall be situated.

2.1.1 Kantian Transcendental Apperception

Kant (1724–1804) famously remarks in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Hume had ‘interrupted [Kant’s] dogmatic slumber’. As Kant writes about consciousness in and through time, he does so in dialogue with Hume’s works. Where Hume rejects a unity of consciousness through time out of necessity, Kant argues for a unity of experiences

through time. Early in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant comes to the synthesis of time by transcendental apperception, that ‘forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws’. The key for Kant is that this synthesis connects experiences into a single continuous progression. Kant further argues that this synthesis occurs within a common subject, a singular consciousness experiencing that single progression of time. In other words, the subject that experiences this moment in time is the same subject that experiences the previous (and the next) moment in time. This unity is vital for Kant because, without it, there cannot be any subject to perceive the synthesis of experiences as a whole. However, Kant conceives time along with space as the two *a priori* forms of intuition which is built into the mental apparatus that perceives these experiences and orders them.

The schema through which experiences are connected in a subject’s consciousness is developed in the Transcendental Analytic. There must be something ‘which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible’. That which connects experiences must operate between the *a priori* categories of intuition and the many contingent experiences. For Kant, this connection is provided by an *a priori* synthesis which ‘attributes a property to the object which was not contained in the representation’. This attribution subjects the object of experience to the *a priori* representations and vice versa; it is the ‘transcendental’ deduction.

At this point, Kant’s break from Hume is complete because this ‘transcendental’ subjectivity requires the primacy of the subject as the centre through which the ‘harmony between subject and object’ construct experience. The subject necessarily becomes a unified Self for Kant’s schemata to account for subjective experiences in terms of *a priori* categories of intuition. A Self that is not unified would be unable to perceive the different representations as occurring within one experience. Kant argues that ‘it is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object’. It is important to note here that the unity of consciousness that Kant calls for is

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15. Ibid., A110.
19. Ibid., 14.
only a conceptual one and not also a temporal one because time is constructed within the act of intuition. In his Transcendental Deduction from the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims that the schemata ‘can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding’. The unity of consciousness exists in the realm of the noumenal as the pure and unchanging ‘I’ which is the subject of this unified consciousness. Kant believes that the unity of consciousness has identical subject matter in both the empirical consciousness (i.e. experiences) and the pure consciousness (i.e. the noumenal Self). Experiences are connected back to the Self by the schematisation of pure imagination, bridging experiences to consciousness so that experiences can be understood.

Much later in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the paralogisms, Kant elaborates on the conceptual Self by explaining how it relates to itself through time in order to experience the passage of time. The Self is linked with the permanence of the soul so that the permanence of both the soul and the Self is necessary. The Permanence of the Real through Time is where the mind grasps and unified the parts of an experience and perceives them as a meaningful whole. This, likewise, unifies the Self through time so that it can experience the Permanence of the Real through Time. Kant concludes his third paralogism by suggesting that identity is tautological, defaulting to the Law of Identity: ‘if I want to observe the mere “I” in the change of all representations, I have no other *correlatum* to use in my comparisons except against myself’. The Self is unique in its own self-understanding so that it cannot be anything else it experiences. This uniqueness may form the foundation on which both Deleuze and Ricoeur re-cast (*ipse*)-identity, essentially using one of Kant’s concepts against Kant’s overall theory. Identity must be singular and ‘cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects’. For Kant, identity is a necessary subject of consciousness that is unified across time and space, never multiple, divided, or disconnected.

### 2.1.2 Duplicity in Nietzsche

Contrary to Kant’s singular consciousness, Nietzsche advocates a plurality of consciousness and identity. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche proposes a duality: Dionysius versus the Crucified. This duality is complex in that it is both an opposition of forces and two perspectives of the same concept. Any philosophical appropriation of this ‘duality’ between Dionysius and...

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21. Ibid., B159.  
24. Ibid., A366.  
25. Ibid., B407.  
the Crucified must recognise their connections more as a multiplicity than a duality. The Crucified represents a nihilistic identity, one that negates and rejects everything — including itself.\textsuperscript{27} For Nietzsche, the epitome of the Crucified is what he terms the \textit{dysangel} of Christianity because it is such a perverse force. On the other hand, Dionysius represents a healthy morality; it is the \textit{evangel} which Jesus preached. The epitome of the Dionysian is the self-overcoming of both \textit{ressentiment} in slave morality and ‘good’ values in noble morality (e.g. justice).\textsuperscript{28} This self-overcoming is the ‘revaluation of all values’ (or ‘transvaluation’) which is the basis for Nietzsche’s critique of Kant (amongst others). Kant’s difficulty, according to Nietzsche, is that Kant’s concept of identity cannot account for diversity and difference because the Kantian categories of intuition are based on measures of similarity.\textsuperscript{29}

The multiplicity that Nietzsche describes at length in \textit{Ecce Homo} serves as the basis for his conception of identity.\textsuperscript{30} Identity is a fully relational term for Nietzsche to the extent that identity has no meaning without a relation.\textsuperscript{31} The relation that determines a self-identity for Nietzsche is that of consciousness which is ‘always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which [the inferior] is subordinated or into which [the inferior] is “incorporated”’.\textsuperscript{32} This relationship is exemplified in the dichotomy of Dionysius versus the Crucified and returns in many polarisations throughout Nietzsche’s works: Apollonian–Dionysian; Master–Slave; Active–Reactive; Paul–Christ; Good–Evil. In each case, Nietzsche’s dichotomy is not one of exclusion, of one over the other, but rather the relations of power between the two disjuncts.\textsuperscript{33} Nietzsche is very clear that one can only overcome one disjunct if one also overcomes the other. In this sense, one can then say that Nietzsche’s ‘death of God is at the same time the death of the self’ because God and Self are constructed and intrinsically connected in a polarised relationship.\textsuperscript{34}

When Nietzsche speaks of the ‘revaluation of all values’, he has the eternal return in view. This is because the eternal return — the willing of all dichotomies as an affirmation of the will to power — is the principle construct of valuation.\textsuperscript{35} In the eternal return, Nietzsche describes identity not only as fated but also willed as such so that ‘I come again . . . not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life’.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 40.
\item \textsuperscript{29} See ibid., 11.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Cf. Craig Hovey, \textit{Nietzsche and Theology} (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 130.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 40.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Cf. Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis (1.1.2).
\item \textsuperscript{34} Taylor, \textit{Erring}, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Cf. Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 50.
\end{itemize}
Identity for Nietzsche is this affirmation of a Self as one who willingly acts in a world of relations; however, this Self is always in a state of flux and always becoming something else. While Nietzsche is only rarely explicit, this becoming-Self identity is intended as a response to Kant, namely according to the demand of post-Kantian philosophers to account 'not only for the synthesis but for the reproduction of diversity in the synthesis as such'.³⁷ In returning, in repetition, difference emerges because each repetition must be inherently different even if it appears exactly the same as another. Nietzsche finds his own repetitions, seeing identity as always multiple: 'I am a Doppelgänger, I have a “second” face in addition to the first. And perhaps also a third'.³⁸ The genesis of difference by repetition is self-overcoming and multiplication.

### 2.1.3 Heidegger and Dasein

Heidegger’s response to Kant is largely one of refinement. One primary area of disagreement for Heidegger is that the unity of disclosedness rather than Kant’s unity of consciousness is vital to experience.³⁹ The unity of disclosedness entails the unity of the World and of existence such that the Self experiences the World at the ‘Moment of Vision’. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger asks, ‘How can Dasein exist as a unity in the ways and possibilities of its Being which we have mentioned?’⁴⁰ He then states that this is done only if Dasein is itself. When Dasein is a Being-in-itself, it has a unity necessary for ‘“hold[ing] together” the totality of the structural whole’ of itself.⁴¹ Consciousness is posited as a call that ‘gives us “something” to understand; it discloses’.⁴² This ‘call of conscience’ appeals to Dasein to call it to ‘its ownmost potentiality-for-Being its-Self’.⁴³ It is in that potentiality-for-Being that Dasein is unified as a Self for Heidegger.

In disclosedness, Heidegger unites the structures of disclosedness — falling, discourse, understanding, and dispositions — as guaranteed by a single temporality of an authentic future: anticipation. In anticipation, there lies a Being-towards-death which lets Dasein ‘come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being’.⁴⁴ Yet again, Dasein becomes unified, but this time in an authentic future. This authentic future temporalises to the present at the junction of its anticipation and resoluteness in the ‘Moment of Vision’. The ecstatic present allows Dasein to understand experience as a unified whole:

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⁴¹. Ibid., H317.
⁴². Ibid., H269.
⁴³. Ibid., H269.
⁴⁴. Ibid., H337.
The transcendental imagination produces, or ‘lets spring up’, the unity of time in performing the original transcendental synthesis of apperception, i.e. in producing the unity of self-consciousness; in the same way originary, ecstatic temporality ‘clears’ the there, the Da of Dasein, enabling Dasein to have experience on a unified ground.\textsuperscript{45}

Temporality itself must be unified for Heidegger just as it is in Kant. For Heidegger, the unification of (inauthentic) temporality enables Dasein in anticipation to experience its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in its Being-as-having-been, or repetition. By remembering that which has been forgotten in Dasein’s ‘ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being’, Dasein remembers its ‘Being in accordance with which I am proximally and for the most part as-having-been’.\textsuperscript{46} A unified temporality allows communication between everyday experiences and the Self. Because of the unified temporality, the horizontal schemata of future, present, and past becomes unified. This unity, in Heidegger, implies ‘something like a world that has been disclosed’.\textsuperscript{47}

Heidegger also agrees with Kant on the concept of a unified Self in spite of the differences between Dasein and Kant’s Self. Heidegger writes that ‘the “I”, however, is this initially pure unity which relates itself to itself’.\textsuperscript{48} More importantly, through the very ‘interpretation of human existence as Da-sein, Heidegger comes to emphasise more strongly that the nature of man is rooted in the “there”’.\textsuperscript{49} It may be better to show that there is a unity in the ‘there’ as well; as Heidegger points out:

The significance-relationships which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material. What is rather the case is that factual Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the ‘there’, comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them.\textsuperscript{50}

We see here that even the ‘there’ is unified in Heidegger. Not only is the Self unified in Heidegger, but it is also very much individualised: ‘Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine’.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, H339.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., H365.
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. ibid., H433.
\textsuperscript{49} Morrison, ‘Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger on Time and the Unity of Consciousness’, 196.
\textsuperscript{50} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, H366.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., H114.
2.1.4 Body Without Organs

The disequilibrium of signification (1.1.1) which produces sense is what Deleuze sees in Kant’s own project as cracks along the surface of identity. With these cracks in Kant’s notion of identity, Deleuze finds the optimal response in Nietzsche’s multiplicity. Deleuze champions Nietzsche as one of the greatest philosophers such that ‘modern philosophy has largely lived off [of] Nietzsche’. In following Nietzsche, Deleuze takes up the concept of multiplicity and magnifies it as a dual appropriation of Kant’s ‘weakness’ and a rejection of the general Kantian thought. Because the question of identity is a vital part of philosophy, it should not come as a surprise that this question runs throughout Deleuze’s works, beginning with his 1953 text on Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*:

> The mind, on the other hand, is given as a collection of ideas and not as a system. It follows that our earlier question can be expressed as follows: how does a collection become a system? The collection of ideas is called ‘imagination’, insofar as the collection designates not a faculty but rather an assemblage of things … Then again the question may be: how does the mind become a subject? 

In the previous chapter (1.1.3), I discussed Deleuze’s notion of time. His conception of time serves as the basis for his conception of identity. Identity is created temporally, as one function of pure Memory (following Bergson). It is a synthetic contraction of events such that a Self is differentiated from Others. Without time, identity cannot exist for it would have no past and no future; in other words, identity is a present place-holder for previous markings and future expectations.

Identity can also be considered the creation of the Self as subject. For Deleuze, identity is the repetition of pure Memory in the synthesis of time that is the present. Deleuze sees breaks, cracks, and fissures in identity, something which he attributes to Kant as the greatest recognition in terms of identity as well as Kant’s own undoing. For Deleuze, the fullness of identity can be seen in the body without organs (BwO); it is a living body without organisation, ‘populated by multiplicities’. The BwO cannot be resolved to some lost totality or unity, as in a fragmented or dissociative identity; it is a ‘conceiving of the multiple in the pure state’ — an assemblage of multiplicities. Assemblages are contingent relations, without necessity or a specific order (in contrast to an organism). The BwO is itself a multiplicity in that it is an expression of polyvocal identity as ‘preindividal and prepersonal singularities, a pure dispersed

55. Ibid., 32,34.
CHAPTER 2. CONTEMPORARY MODEL

and anarchic multiplicity, without unity or totality, and whose elements are welded, pasted together by the real distinction or the very absence of a link'. It is the becoming-conscious of these multiplicities that construct the mind as an individual identity.

These singularities/multiplicities are not connected out of necessity and are often quite disconnected as fragments of Selves lumped together in no particular order. Within the assemblage of a Self, everything is always changing, always creating and destroying, in sync with the repetitions of pure Memory across and through the fragmentary Selves. Identity as a singular notion becomes incoherent in the Deleuzian repetition:

If the eternal return abolishes the coherence of the self, if it abolishes its claim to full self-presence and mastery, this is because the self is like a proposition with respect to the ordinal dimensions of time, such that the self is always already what it was and always already just about to be what it will be. Never, however, is the self first what it is in the sense of presence. In Derridean terms, we could say that the subject is always caught in a play of différance producing a simulacrum of identity through difference as an effect.

The BwO of Deleuze is the concept through which both simulation and identification are expressed as ‘an individual, nondecomposable distance’ on which the production of ‘something real’ (e.g. sense) occurs. This production of ‘something real’ always occurs in multiple, as a polyvocal hermeneutics of difference (1.1.5). The One-Many of Deleuze’s BwO evades singular expressions because everything is always repeated and each repetition is inherently different. Deleuze’s response to Kant is a denial that conceiving identity based on difference excludes the possibility of identity based on similarity. Rather, ‘difference and repetition have taken the place of the identical and the negative, of identity and contradiction’. Deleuze presents here a rejection of identity as singular; a Self is always many and polyvocal.

2.1.5 Ipseity

Ricœur takes up the question of identity primarily in two texts: Oneself as Another and Time and Narrative (particularly in the third volume). In this section, I wish to focus on Oneself as Another, as Time and Narrative has been treated in an earlier section (1.2.4). In Oneself as Another, Ricœur begins with a distinction between two kinds of identity (ipse- and

56. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, 324.
57. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, 190–1.
58. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, 87.
59. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xix.
idem- identity). Ricœur indicates that his primary focus is on uncovering ipse-identity, an implication of identity (‘oneself inasmuch as being other’) rather than a comparison as in idem-identity (‘oneself similar to another’). Ricœur suggests the attack against the Enlightenment’s formulation culminates in Nietzsche as a shattering of identity. In Nietzsche’s ‘On Truth and Lies’, the paradox of identity, Ricœur argues, is that of an illusion in which ‘Nature itself . . . has removed from man [sic] the power to decipher this illusion’. Nietzsche’s strength, according to Ricœur, lies in transforming identity into a consequence of a hermeneutic venture and this hermeneutics is a multiplicity of identities. However, Ricœur’s approach to the question of identity follows Heidegger rather than Nietzsche with his focus being one of hermeneutics.

Once Ricœur has highlighted the problematic he finds in the issue of identity, his first comment is on the question of time and the persistence of identity through time. The issue of time at first seems exclusive to idem-identity. Ricœur’s argument here is that idem-identity is first and foremost concerned with quantitative or numerical identity. In other words, idem-identity’s first question centres on whether an object of experience has been experienced before (e.g. ‘Is this pencil the same one I saw yesterday?’). In the second place is a question of quality (e.g. ‘This pencil looks like the same one I had yesterday’). While these two questions are not interchangeable, they are implied in each other. This is because idem-identity is highly interpretive. However, it is this situation which leads Ricœur to distinguish identity in terms of sameness (idem-identity) and selfhood (ipse-identity). With this distinction, Ricœur turns to narrative fiction (1.2.2) to mitigate between the two forms of identity and to discover a stable object (and subject) to identify.

While Ricœur begins by largely agreeing with Kant and Heidegger on the permanence of identity through time, Ricœur relegates this largely to the overlap between idem and ipse. He uses two ethical features to argue for permanence through time: character and keeping one’s word. It is in the first case that Ricœur sees overlap between the two forms of identity. However, in the second case, Ricœur suggests an opposition between the two forms and, in fact, a resistance to time altogether. In keeping one’s word, Ricœur argues that a person holds to her promises even if she were to change over time. There is some sort of identity that is always implied independent of time; to reduce this identity independent of time to a permanence through time is to conflate sameness and difference. To argue a permanence

60. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 3.
61. Ibid., 11.
62. Ibid., 12.
63. Ibid., 15–16.
64. Cf. ibid., 116.
65. Cf. ibid., 118–119.
through time, like Kant does, is to think in terms of *idem*-identity which is not the kind of identity that is a Self.66

This is why I shall show in the following section (2.2.2) that Deleuze and Ricœur implicate the same argument that identity is based on an intrinsic difference: *someone* is always an ontological entity prior to being distinguishable as an object of experience. For example, even though twins may be identical, they are first and foremost distinct ontological entities. However, Deleuze and Ricœur differ greatly on their answers to the problem of identity. Ricœur, following the reading of Heidegger by Hans-Georg Gadamer, places identity in a structure of narrativity and time. I shall expand on Ricœur’s theory of identity in the following section (2.2.3), but it is worth noting here that Ricœur aims to rehabilitate the Kantian theory rather than completely break from it as Deleuze does. Identity, based in narrativity, reconfigures Kant’s theory of identity in light of the critiques of Kant’s notion of temporality. In other words, the narrative identity that is *ipse*-identity can be seen as still the same unified Self that persists through time, albeit a radically different kind of time. This refiguration of time into a narrative mode creates an area where Ricœur’s theory of identity can be compared and contrasted with Deleuze’s, sparking further dialogue and consolidation following the previous dialogue on time (1.3.2).

### 2.1.6 Virtuality

While Deleuze mentions that identity has been replaced by simulacra ‘produced as an optical “effect” by the more profound game of difference and repetition’, he does not explore this idea beyond *Difference and Repetition*.67 Related to simulacra is Deleuze’s notion of the virtual which is the real ‘potential’ of something prior to its inevitable realisation (echoing Nietzsche’s *amor Fati*).68 Jean Baudrillard takes hold of these two ideas; and they run throughout the course of his writings from *Simulacra and Simulation* in 1980 through *The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact* in 2005. The source of contention for Baudrillard is the modern ‘age of information’, its assault on the symbolic order (i.e. the real world), and the subsequent simulation of the world. This simulation of the world is virtual reality, a ‘counter-world of signs’.69 Virtual here should not be seen as an imagined reality (as in a Virtual Reality game) but rather the opposite — a ‘reality without limits in which everything is realised and technically materialised without reference to any principle or final purpose whatever . . . [it] is the murder of the real, the loss of any imagination of the real’.70

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68. See ibid., 210–2.
70. Ibid., 18.
In rejecting objectivity, Baudrillard also rejects subjectivity, for the perceiving self and the perceived world are interchangeable and mirrored images. Identity for Baudrillard is a recent phenomenon which has arisen in the past two centuries as a result of social processes of individualisation and consumerism. However, this requires two contradictory goals: to gain an identity 'by hounding the identities of others' and to dispose of identity like a burden. These two aims turn humans into both hostages and terrorists in a strange case of Stockholm Syndrome in which not only the hostages positively bond to the terrorists but also the two become indistinguishable. Baudrillard uses the film *Being John Malkovich* as an example. Early in the film, a man finds a hidden room which lets him become John Malkovich, controlling him via an imaginary apparatus. As the film progresses, more and more people discover this until John Malkovich himself discovers it and enters his own body. At this point, he disintegrates and 'everyone around him becomes Malkovich'. Identity becomes here the optical 'effect' Deleuze mentioned.

In this way, Baudrillard responds to Kant following Deleuze’s response. Identity is an illusion because one is looking to become what one is, repeating endlessly an illusion of being something in the first instance. In the domain of the Virtual, identity is non-exchangeable, stuck from the beginning with a mask, an illusion of an individual subject — a simulacrum of singularity. For Baudrillard, the response to this illusion is to do the impossible: ‘to have no end, no ideal formula or alternative solution’ in order to reverse the gaze. In doing so, one is able to realise the material world where one can walk without the illusion of identity. This impossible reversal is the Event where the Real disrupts and inheres on the Virtual, breaking through to reveal the illusion that identity originates from some Form or model which is then copied. In the same vein as Deleuze, Baudrillard turns to difference as the alternative to identity; objects inherently differentiate and the illusion of identity is to totalise this difference. Identity for Baudrillard is anything but tautological; it is something produced through the impossible exchange of simulacra. Baudrillard’s concepts prove most relevant in the third and fourth chapters of my thesis where I begin to develop a Deleuzian ecclesiology (3.4.3) from the forthcoming dialogue on constructing identity (2.3.6).

### 2.1.7 Simulating Identities

Through Ricœur’s analysis of *idem*-identity, I believe a re-appropriation of *Being John Malkovich* can expose the greatest problem with the permanence of identity through time.

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71. Ibid., 39,41.
72. Ibid., 56.
74. Baudrillard, *The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact*, 59.
75. Ibid., 212–213.
In the case of Malkovich, it is clear that the measure of similarity is ultimately a subjective interpretation: What makes John Malkovich himself, particularly as many different people pretend to be him so well? Is it Malkovich’s personality? His appearance? His insistence that he is himself? In the film, all of these are faked (and, in the case of Malkovich, he is not simply a character on screen but also a person who lives in our ‘real’ world as an actor). Even more troubling is trying to answer these questions when Malkovich takes on the role of his own self! It is in this act of becoming oneself — of looking at one’s self as an object — that identity is discovered. By forging together the above responses to Kant, I believe a theory of identity can be found which is based on difference which may prove useful for pluralist theologies.

An identity based on difference (ipse-identity) doesn’t necessarily reject identity as sameness (idem-identity); rather difference renders sameness secondary. The frame of reference for the problem of identity has been transformed in such a way that discussions about singularity and permanence through time are distractions from the answer. Identity is based on difference and is as much a goal as a starting point. By turning towards a hermeneutics of identity, we can now see that it is based on difference and repetition, not as a series of copies derived from an original model but as a simulation of identity. It is a disavowal of model-and-copy because the ‘original’ model never existed. The scheme of model and copy is based on an external distinction, such that it is possible to have a perfect copy that is indistinguishable from the model. This scheme needs to be overcome in order to understand repetition and difference here.

To overcome the primacy of models over copies, Deleuze and Baudrillard use simulacra to replace the scheme such that every simulation is different even when two are absolutely indistinguishable. The argument is not between models and copies but copies and simulacra. There are no ‘good’ copies because there is always already a difference at work in the production of an object. The new scheme means ‘denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections’. Take for example the phenomenon of ‘reality television’: at best, these programs display a simulated ‘reality’ divorced from what most would consider ‘reality’. There is no reality in ‘reality television’ except in the imagination of the non-people on the screen who do not act as a character; they have transformed themselves into a new identity that they believe to be real. In fact, these people are prime examples of a hermeneutics of identity at work as they all become both themselves and something other-than-themselves: a nice school teacher is discovered to be a psychotic criminal. It is not enough to say that identity is simulated, as if we each carry

76. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, 150.
77. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 66.
only one at a time. Instead, identity is always multiple, combined, fragmentary. The ‘reality television’ celebrities aren’t isolated cases of schizophrenia — they are indicative of our own fragmentary identities. Out of the two strands of responses to the Kantian notion of identity, a dialogue has begun to emerge, centreing on a fragmentary cohesion.

2.2 Constructing Identity as an Internal Community

Following the critiques of Immanuel Kant in the previous section, I wish to probe the constructive side of the critiques by Paul Ricœur and Gilles Deleuze. Every critique needs an alternative constructed out of the rubble that remains in an ongoing dialectic without a permanent goal; a new concept of identity can now be forged centring around the Ricœur–Deleuze dialogue that began in the previous chapter (1.3.2). At this point, I have collected some pieces to a theory of identity; what is lacking is the connective tissue between them. In the previous section, I employed the critiques of Kant to outline this gap. In this section, I shall begin by highlighting the problem inherent to the way in which the very question of identity itself has been posed. This is followed by analysing this problem as the gap between the pieces I have already mentioned. Lastly, I shall connect these pieces in relation to one another, in order to provide an alternate theory of identity for my analysis of community.

2.2.1 Models of the Self

The two formulations of identity in the previous section (similarity and difference, see 2.1) imply two models of identity. Identity based on similarity is a permissive one in that differences are overlooked in preference for any degree of similarity. I was told once by a bird migration expert that a proficient bird-watcher is able to distinguish uncommon and rare birds because of a strategy based on this formulation of identity: the bird-watcher should study and have strong knowledge of the common birds in order to distinguish the uncommon. The argument behind this strategy is that while there may be a significant number of common birds in a region, there are still more uncommon and rare birds that may wander through that same region. Having a good working knowledge of the normal entails being able to spot differences. In terms of the question of identity, this means that Others can be defined only after a Self has been defined; a pattern I shall explore in the context of historical theology in the following chapter (3.2.1). Further, it may mean that the definition of the Other is not clearly defined, along the lines of the US Supreme Court’s 1964 definition of obscenity (‘I know it when I see it’). Like the 1964 definition of obscenity, the boundaries between Self(ves) and Other(s) are fluid and subjective so that there is not always agreed-

upon lines of demarcation even if a Self sometimes feels instantly an act of transgression. Where a Self ends and an Other begins is not always agreed upon with precision but this does not negate the existence of the boundary between the two; the issue in defining a Self is not an ontological one but an epistemological one.

The second model of identity is based on the reign of difference. In this model, individuation is taken to such an extreme that a shared identity becomes nearly impossible: everything is absolutely unique. Mirroring the first model, this one asserts that despite any similarities, differences imply an act of individuation that precedes all dialogue. The two models are mirror images revolving around the concept of identity. The problem with both models is that they each presuppose mutually exclusive, relatively stable units: Self and Other. However, I wish to pull each through the in-between space, not to reduce or overturn them but to connect them as mutually dependent placeholders within a given chain of signification. By revealing them as connected, I shall implicate an inclusive dialogue — the hermeneutics of identity — between the two models. This will be made apparent by looking at the relation common to each formulation of identity: that of Self and Other.

The hermeneutics of identity runs in two directions simultaneously, following the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). First, it differentiates a Self from Others (second model of differentiation). However, this is always tied to a second move in which it connects the Self to Others by associating with some community (first model of assimilation). Identity is always split and fragmented because these two movements of identity proceed to make and unmake each other, leaving incomplete fragments behind. Within the scope of globalising networks, identity becomes a fluid motion of belonging to social networks, a line of discussion which will be developed in the following section (2.3.1) and in the final chapter (4.2.4). A collection of affiliations create the perceived uniqueness of individual identity. The subtitle to Brian McLaren’s 2004 text on spirituality demonstrates the fragmentary nature of that collection: ‘Why I Am a Missional, Evangelical, Post/Protestant, Liberal/Conservative, Mystical/Poetic, Biblical, Charismatic/Contemplative, Fundamentalist/Calvinist, Anabaptist/Anglican, Methodist, Catholic, Green, Incarnational, Depressed-yet-Hopeful, Emergent, Unfinished CHRISTIAN’. Identity, in the sense of belonging to a community, can no longer be seen as totalising because we have discovered that the process of signification is never complete; one has never held to a single identity. The perceived loss of the Other implicit in this discovery is a result of globalised networks in which one’s interactions with the Other show that beneath its surface, the Other has never been completely ‘Other’.

2.2.2 Deconstructing Selves

Identity can now be seen as an interplay of Self and Other within the same individual. From the perspective of the differentiation model, the Other is emphatically Other as such not because it is different than the Self but rather because the Other is not different enough. According to Zygmunt Bauman, we saw this happen in Germany during the Third Reich where the Other was determined to be Jews, Gypsies, Africans, etc; many of these people blended into the ‘crowd’ and needed to be excised from the ‘pure’ identity by any means necessary. These ‘Others’ were punished and killed not because they were different but because they blended in too easily. Extrapolating from these actions, the Other is no longer some ‘outsider’ but the very same Self because of the assimilation model’s move towards creating ‘common’ identities through association. Each model fuels the other’s activity, and this process has been radicalised in modern globalisation because network connections have multiplied. It has been suggested (without verifiable evidence) that a person today encounters more people in a day than what a person a century ago would have encountered in a lifetime. These connections create a multiplicity of avenues for one to discover one’s own identity through social interactions as well as find the lack of that imagined Other. Identity has never been totalising because it has been fragmenting continuously and rupturing in light of other identities. Identities are constantly being de-mapped and re-mapped. Identity has no defined end-goal; it is a making-do with the fragments one has:

You have a lot of little pieces on the table which you hope to arrange into some meaningful whole . . . You do not start from the final image, but from a number of bits which you have already obtained or which seem to be worthy of having, and then you try to find out how you can order and reorder them to get some (how many?) pleasing pictures.

The fragmentation of identity can be seen in an old problem: Orientalism. Ian Almond in his 2007 book The New Orientalists examines how ‘postmodern’ figures represent Islam as some kind of pure Otherness. One of the points he repetitively makes is that each figure misrepresents Islam in significant ways, whether it be Nietzsche’s romanticising or Julia Kristeva’s medievalising of Islam. The reason why Almond can claim these individuals as ‘Orientalists’ in the sense that they misrepresent Islam is because they are not writing about Islam at all; they are all preoccupied with what gets lumped as ‘the West’ or ‘Western Christianity’. However, in the same vein, Almond also falls prey to this critique as his idealised Islam fails to interact with Islam in the same fashion. Almond’s analysis does provide us,

81. Ibid., 48–49.
however, with one key idea: the multiplicity of identity.\(^{82}\) That is, one cannot speak of a singular identity because such generalisations fall prey to being inaccurate generalisations; or as Nietzsche wrote about facts: there are ‘only interpretations’.\(^{83}\)

What used to correlate to some kind of ‘transcendent’ Other (e.g. God in Christianity) no longer factors as the ground for identity. This is the ‘death of God’ that has been seen for many years (and is still not yet ‘here’ as present).\(^{84}\) God’s death is always coming without ever arriving.\(^{85}\) Even with this ‘death of God’, religious identity has not faded away from the social world; in fact, it has only increased in strength.\(^{86}\) This is most visible in the social awareness of various religious fundamentalist and ‘anti-social’ movements. Today, there are more religious groups that not only assert their identity but they do so very noticeably. The disruptive events such as 9/11 and the 1995 Tokyo subway attack cannot be ignored. All of these were at some basic level the assertion of a religious identity in what they perceived as a non-religious (or even anti-religious) world. These events are difficult to comprehend because they draw from an identity that is perceived as Otherness by many people who witnessed (or experienced) them. Here is where Orientalism surfaces again. 9/11 is not simply an attack of the West; it is also (perhaps primarily) an assertion of a kind of Islamic identity against the Western Other.\(^{87}\) Just as too many ‘Westerners’ fall into the trap of Orientalism, here al Qaeda and others fall into the opposite trap of Occidentalism.

A second trap, which lies at the other extreme, is to assert identity as a kind of multiculturalism in which all humans share some same identity which manifests in different ways. Like the totalising identity, this ‘fragmenting’ identity fails to address the Otherness of the Self. Multiculturalism does this by universalising Otherness — everything is Other, like everything else. Otherness becomes simply a foil for similarity, falling back to a totalising identity that ultimately erases the possibility of actual Otherness. Each traps of identity is a totalisation of identity, whether a totalisation of the Self (as in multiculturalism) or of the Other (as in Orientalism). This totalisation of identity must be opposed by an affirmation of both Self and Other, held together in tension through a hermeneutics of identity and difference. From this opposition and affirmation of Self and Other, the question lingering in the background must finally be answered: how should identity be conceived?


It is clear from the previous chapter (1.3.5) that neither a totalising whole nor an infinitely fragmenting multiplicity can survive without the other. The two must be placed in a dialectic process, a hermeneutics of identity that always fails to be reduced to either totalisation or fragmentation. Such a hermeneutics of identity also serves to keep the tensions inherent to the opposition of multitude and unity because of their contradictory natures being placed parallel each other to reveal their complementarity. How do human subjects identify themselves while still acknowledging some kind of Other? As I shall argue in a later chapter (3.4.4), both need to be affirmed in order to conceive of differences within unity as a heterogeneous mixture. The concept of identity exists at a confluence of situations which exists in multiple different forms simultaneously. There is a small point of chemical sublimation at which identity can exist as a totalising whole, fragmenting pieces, and the liquid ‘plasticity’ in between without any one form consuming the other two. Returning to the discussion of time (1.3.3), identities stem from a memory that lives in the present, creating people (both singularly and plurally). One example that comes quickest to mind is an episode of the television series Seinfeld in which George was facing a crisis (‘worlds colliding’) because Jerry had introduced one of their common friends, Elaine, to George’s girlfriend, Susan. His argument is that there are many Georges, ‘Relationship George’ and ‘Independent George’; and the two cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. If ‘Relationship George’ was to enter Jerry’s flat (where ‘Independent George’ roams), ‘Relationship George’ will kill ‘Independent George’. While I shall disagree slightly with George, the idea is the same: a human is an association of many identities that neither consolidate into a complete whole nor dissolve into ununlinkable fragments.

### 2.2.3 Identity’s Many Selves

George knows that he is already a multiplicity, but what he does not realise is that his many Selves are continually re-created. The path I wish to follow is between Kant’s theory and the responses to that theory, constructing a whole through narrative and destabilising that whole through fragmentations and repetitions. Identity is never final because ‘the person does not exist timelessly; a person is not static, but . . . is re-created again and again in the perpetual flux of life’. The process of re-creations can be found in Ricœur’s narrativity which was introduced in the previous chapter (1.2.4). Part of Ricœur’s concept of time is that time is lived and experienced. Time is lived at the intersection of the ‘world of the text’ and the ‘world of the reader’; this is where Ricœur places application (mimesis). How does Ricœur’s mimetic process operate within a Deleuzian construct of time? Declan

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Sheerin argues that Deleuze follows Bergson, suggesting something very similar to Ricœur’s ‘human time’ such that the Self as a multiplicity “comes in contact with the external world at the surface” so that our “superficial psychic life comes to be pictured ... as set out in a homogeneous medium”. The multiplicity of the Self becomes a narrative spoken into the world as something that participates in the world. Is this not the very implication Ricœur has in the refiguration of mimesis in application? Identity is not something that is constructed ex nihilo; identity is always created within a context of human interaction and participation. It is first and foremost applied and practical.

The gap between Self and Other is always constructed after the experience of the relation between the two. The perceived difference between Self and Other is constructed retrospectively and retroactively. Yet, more paradoxically, the very definition of Self and Other is also constructed after such already exist, as a re-interpretation of the past. In the context of time, identity is the continuity of the fragments found in Memory imagined in the present, as a participatory action. In George’s case, he becomes ‘Relationship George’ when he participates with Susan. For him, if he (as ‘Independent George’) must also become his other Self (‘Relationship George’), the consequences for him is the death of one of these Selves for he cannot be both simultaneously and he cannot merge them into one without destroying both. George is still George, but he cannot participate as two different Georges without becoming psychologically unhinged in the process. Yet it is through this unhinging that I wish to proceed in order to find the unstable Self beneath the mask of the singular, stable Self.

Identity for Ricœur must be found in ipse-identity. As I have shown above while detailing his critique of Kant (2.1.5), ipse-identity is exactly what Ricœur desires to uncover. Ricœur seeks out a definition for the Self by reading ipse-identity through his earlier discussions of narrativity and time (primarily those discussions in Time and Narrative). Through narrative, the reading (and perhaps even the prior creation) of a story of a Self is where identity emerges. In light of shifts in the discipline of history in recent years, Ricœur’s narrativity parallels historiography in that it is more focused on the changes of interpretation of events rather than the events themselves. Just as in history, the later revised story often becomes the commonly accepted interpretation (e.g. ‘history is written by the winners’), the new revised story of identity is the common one. For instance, the ‘standard’ tale American children learn of Benedict Arnold’s actions during the American Revolution is always read as the story of betrayal, as a traitor. This reading fails to recognise its own historical context, namely as one arising after Arnold had betrayed the revolutionary forces. It normally does not recognise that before Arnold’s betrayal, his story was one of a hero for the American revolutionaries. By accounting for the act of re-interpretations, the structure that is the Self will be seen as

91. Sheerin, Deleuze and Ricœur, 77.
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an unstable foundation on which the stabilising narrative is constructed and reconstructed through time.

2.2.4 Self and Selves

The way in which I have combined Deleuze’s and Ricœur’s theories of time (1.3.6) provides a different substance for identity. Instead of Kant’s permanence through time as the basis for the unity of identity, I shall use Ricœur’s narrativity. However, prior to this, I must first reformulate what is being unified in narrativity. For Kant, the substance of the unified identity is a multiplicity of experiences located at specific points of time. Experience is an inaccurate word because it implies a (singular) subject of experience; I do not wish to presuppose this subject as singular. I shall continue to use the term ‘Self’ here, but I use it only as a placeholder for a yet-to-be-defined concept.

Before ‘Self’ can be defined, it must be placed in a context of time, recalling again the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). The present, as the moment of time in which experiences and events occur, is always passive. The active moment of time is the past, constructed as pure Memory (following Bergson) in the present. The past inhere in the present, providing many different events that cannot be synthesised in an all-encompassing whole — especially because new moments are constantly added to the mix. For this reason, Deleuze models the Self on systems theory so that it is treated as an open system. In this way, a Deleuzo-Ricœurian variation would find the present as the moment in which many pasts emerge in a multiplicity of events understood as a ‘connected’ history without a stable narrative.

Each event is always different at the ontological level, always divergent. These divergences unhinge every faculty of understanding, developing divergent projects pointing towards things other than themselves. Somehow the Self is able to retain a succession of events which permeate one another. While the how of this ability will be found in narrativity, the importance here is that there is no natural order to these events. Additionally, the way in which events permeate one another make two things possible: recollection (which shall be discussed below with narrativity) and the semblance of an order (i.e. temporality).

Each event retained by the Self brings along a hint of a narrative — a fragment of narrativity. These fragments are like puzzle pieces without a guide or a single order. The fragments can be arranged and re-arranged in many different kinds, yet no fragment can be reduced to the status of a duplicate of another. The Self emerges from these fragments as the collection of narrative fragments. Phrased in terms of an open system, the question of identity becomes

92. Ibid., 84.
93. Ibid., 75.
one of equilibrium: ‘[w]e no longer ask is it one, is it many, is it fragmented, but rather, do we affirm a self near equilibrium behaving like the repetitive and the universal or a self that operates far from equilibrium (some, most or all of time) behaving like the specific and unique from moment to moment?’

Upon reflection, the ‘I’ (as the object of reflection) and the Self (as the subject of reflection) find themselves ‘separated by the line of time’. This crack upon the surface of identity exists because the act of reflection is always delayed slightly — in the same way that live broadcasts (at least in the US) are delayed by a few seconds for censorship. With regards to self-reflection, the delay is because the act of self-reflection cannot reflect on its exact moment for there is nothing there yet for reflection. This returns us to the conception of time from the previous chapter (1.1.5) because the present is always-passing; to reflect on the act of self-reflection when it occurs is to reflect on the unformed abyss that separates the present from the past. Yet it is in self-reflection that a narrative can be constructed, bringing together the fragments of identity in a temporary constellation.

2.2.5 Narrative Identity

Narrativity combines the fragments of identity into a whole, connecting the puzzle pieces together and imagining the puzzle as a complete whole. This whole is never actually whole because new pieces are always added and, given enough time, the puzzle itself is re-constituted in order to incorporate those pieces. Yet the narrative, despite its impermanence, allows the Self to be presented as ‘an egg with a story written on its shell’. Narrativity is a construction of the past placed in the present as pure Memory to the Self and as a face (or mask or persona) to an Other.

In the participation of narrativity as an act of ‘reading the present’, a ‘Self’ emerges. A Self can only be present when one senses or is sensed by another. It is here that mimesis and difference together find a home because difference is in the mimetic process. By traversing the two models of identity (2.2.1), a unique situation is created, one which is always essentially different from all others. There is no reliving the same identity because something always changes in the process of repetition. The context of relations surrounding the situation changes on each traversal of the text. There is never a final identity because the Self is always read (and participated with) differently. ‘Virtual’ time (i.e. the narrative constructed from the past as pure Memory, future expectations, and present experience) creates ‘actual’ time by

94. Ibid., 85.
96. Sheerin, Deleuze and Ricœur, 80.
shaping how ‘present’ experiences are interpreted and remembered as well as how the past is interpreted and re-interpreted. The process also continues in reverse because actual time re-creates virtual time by shaping how the memory, expectations, and experiences will be remembered in successive repetitions of time. The equilibrium of identity is not a point of stability without change but rather it is a sense of stability within the very process of change. In biological terms, one feels oneself to be the same person at both the age of ten and the age of fifty despite the possibility that only thing in common may only be this exact sense of selfhood.

The Self is a ‘text’ which is ‘read’ in time — as a person that participates in the present. The representation of this participation is the very reading of the Self by others: a community. Just as an individual is a ‘community’ of many Selves, so is a social community a collection of many Selves. In other words, the image of the Self found between Ricoeur and Deleuze is the same as the image of a group/community; the difference between an individual and group is a matter of scale not composition.

Fragmented identities create different ‘worlds’ (some which may be mutually exclusive) in which we live. The Otherness of the Self is not a copy of the Self but is a repetition of the Self such that it is intrinsically different. To engage with the Other is to engage with the Self as Other; but it always occurs fragmentarily as one identity conversing with another. However, this also means that there is no universal identity (or identity group). In the context of Britain, there is no single ‘British’ identity because there are always several fragmented identities at once, even within a group that is perceived as homogeneous, through acts of assimilation (e.g. immigration, international marriage).

By passing through hermeneutics and time, identity has been shown to be fragmented, incomplete, and virtual. It is a sign that determines other signs (such as Self and Other) and is determined by other signs (such as group identities). Identity exists as Memory haunting our present, always repeating an unlived future as a new identity that is never completed. To identify oneself is not to remain the same but to become what one is; to repeat endlessly. To copy a Calvin Klein tag line from the 1980s: identity is being ‘always myself never the same’. 97

The interpretation of identity depends on a hermeneutics of time because identity occurs in and through time. Unlike the hermeneutics of time, this hermeneutics of identity is one of application and participation. Identity is interpreted in light of participation within a

‘community’ (or at least a common and public space). Speaking retrospectively, it begins with a presentation of a Self against a field of Others. Neither Self nor Other can be defined until there is interaction at the level of participation. The presentation of the Self is the repetition of identity as a virtual whole — a narrative that can be read — to an Other. As the Self and the Other interact, traversing the two sides of identity, a public space is realised and the boundaries between Self and Other becomes blurred. Neither dissolve into the other but also neither remain absolutely separate. It is here in this interaction that a community is possible.

2.2.6 Self and Others

Communal identity develops from a set of social relations which first occur within an individual and between individuals. In the following section (2.3.2), I shall discuss the possibility of a communal or group identity that develops from these relations. While I have spent much time discussing the concept of the Self, I have not yet explained its opposite concept: the Other(s). Both the Self and the Other serve the same dual purposes opposite each other: one subject and one object of a single experience. This relation between each is also duplicated in reverse. The Self primarily designates the subject which is also an object (either internally as a self-reference or externally), and the Other primarily designates the object which is also (another) subject.

For the purpose of my thesis, these two words are generic terms used to distinguish participants within a given relation. These do not exist separately because ‘the individual becomes a person ever and again through the other, in the “moment”’. The ‘moment’ of which Dietrich Bonhoeffer speaks is one of participation during the passing present. Whenever there is an event of experience between two things, there is the creation of a relation in which Self and Other are constituted reciprocally within each other. Additionally, one can also speak of a self-reflexive experience in which a single person takes on both roles simultaneously. Through this venture of self-participation, the narrative of identity is laid bare as a multiplicity in itself because it is ‘made and unmade according to the conditions which determine [its] fluent synthesis’.

Taken as a multiplicity, the construct of narrativity is quite accommodating for variations and developments while still able to bear a resemblance to former and future instances of itself. In other words, an individual identity as a narrative multiplicity consistently changes over time while still somehow remaining itself (ipse). Identity is the incarnation of narrative multiplicities such that each incarnation need not replicate the preceding incarnation in a

98. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 56.
scheme of model-and-copy. Rather, each incarnation already differentiates itself from others by rupturing and restructuring the narrative (1.2.4). For example, the figure of The Doctor in Doctor Who has undergone multiple incarnations. Each incarnation literally is The Doctor (ipse) while being very different from other incarnations (idem). Not only are the masks (i.e. actors) different, but each portrayal differs from others while still maintaining a resemblance across incarnations. The Doctor has become a community of narratives, each incarnation different while unified together. This allows us to see the Doctor interact with himself by actually talking to his other Selves. The dialogue between Self and Other becomes blurred here because each person, each Self, is already a community of Selves that can interact with each other as Other.

2.2.7 Community of the Self

Communities are possible because the Other exists within the Self as simulations and echoes of their own Selves without reducing Others and Selves to fragments of a universal Self. If this was not the case (i.e. if there was an Other who was absolutely different), then no relation or interaction would be possible because such an Other would be, by definition, wholly unrelatable. The Self relates to Others because it does not exist without them: ‘the individual exists only in relation to an “other”; individual does not mean solitary. On the contrary, for the individual to exist, “others” must necessarily be there’. The construction of identity is necessarily social, both within an individual ‘Self” and outwith as a social community. A Self cannot exist without Others because the relation between Self and Others always already exists within an individual Self. As I shall show in the following section (3.1.2), this is not unfamiliar ground for theology.

Through inductive association (i.e. participation), constructs of the Self and Other begin to dissolve and reconstruct. While this process is colloquially seen as the forging of (social) relationships, I suggest it is an early stage in the process of the hermeneutics of identity. Identity lies somewhere between the many fragments that compose the identity and the overarching narrative(s) that runs through these fragments. A connection between member and group necessarily exists, tying the two together. There cannot be a community that wholly disagrees with itself. The relationship between the whole and the members is reciprocal: as the members constitute the whole group, the group constitutes a fragment of each member. It is easy to see now how one can describe people as having many Selves because these Selves are fragments from the groups to which they belong. One can speak of a person as being a parent, a child, a student, an employee, etc; the simultaneity of these many identities are acknowledged as existing within a single person.

100. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 51 (emphasis in original).
The hermeneutics of identity serves as the focal point between Self and Other; but like the looking glass for Alice in *Through the Looking Glass*, it is fluid. Self and Other easily slide into and through one another, much as Alice enters the mirror world through the looking glass. Just as Alice goes through the looking glass to discover herself, the Self participates with the Other in order to discover itself. While the two interact, the boundary between Self and Other dissipates and the Self finds itself in the Other just as it finds the Other within itself. Once these boundaries are discovered to be porous and a public space is created between the Self and Other (or perhaps I should say between many Selves), a community is formed and new identities emerge. This is exactly what happens (or should happen) in the process of romantic relations and marriage: the discovery of a new identity that encompasses the lovers (i.e. as a couple) without consuming their differences (i.e. as individuals).

Group identities can continue in this process, serving as fragments of larger groups. For example, a particular denomination (e.g. Church of Scotland) is composed of many church communities, spanning a wide spectrum of identities, yet they still fall under the same identity that is the denomination. This dialectic can continue infinitely, yet it never culminates in a singular identity. As groups become larger and more abstract, their identity narrative narrows and fragments. On these two states of becoming, ‘orthodoxy’ will emerge (3.1.1). The concept of ‘orthodoxy’ within Christian theology (and likely elsewhere) serves a dual purpose with regards to identity: [1] to re-interpret the group’s narrative in terms of expansion (i.e. define a centre) and [2] to maintain the memory of the group’s narrative in terms of cohesion (define a boundary). The history of Christian theology shows that either there is no single orthodoxy (see 3.2.5) or, if there is, it is a polysemic narrative which is interpreted in multiple ways. Yet neither of these seem to be accepted within Christian theology as a general idea; orthodoxy is consistently held to be an exclusive property of a particular apostolic succession such that those who disagree with that particular theology — be it Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or even one of many Protestant groups — they are seen, at best, as excommunicate on the basis of their disagreement. I shall return to this issue of ‘orthodoxy’ soon (3.2.4), but first I shall explore the link between Self and community in order to bridge the perceived distance between an *individual* identity and a *group* identity that will provide clarity for subsequent discussions of difference within a shared group identity (4.2.5).

101. I am suggesting here an absolute boundary of what can be thought in the context of an infinite ‘abyss’ rather than a finite world/universe/etc. By tracing the process of signification to infinity, there is no finality to the process because signification continues infinitely. Instead, one’s tracing reaches a point past which the production of sense becomes nonsense — and vice-versa.
2.3 Identity’s External Community

In his *Sanctorum Communio*, Dietrich Bonhoeffer mentions that ‘community can be interpreted as a collective person with the same structure as the individual person’. This sentiment can also be found in Paul Ricœur’s work: ‘the notion of narrative identity also indicates its fruitfulness in that it can be applied to a community as well as to an individual’. The linking of the concepts of individual and community is possible because of the fragmentary nature of identity (2.2.2).

Yet, do the fragments of the ‘collective person’ interact in the same way that the fragments of an individual do? How do individuals interact with each other? Instead of answering this question directly, I shall analyse it indirectly by constructing communities and their interactions. By framing this analysis in time, a few concepts will emerge here, particularly presence, immanence, and transcendence. These three concepts will be useful in the final chapter of my thesis which focuses on the Christian understanding of community. Before turning to the theological concept of community, an exploration of ‘orthodoxy’ provides the connection between community and the earlier analysis of identity (2.2.5).

2.3.1 Communities and Networks

Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the body without organs (BwO) is an image of a fragmented Self. The BwO is always displaced, rhizomatic, and connected. This should not be read as a body that lacks vital parts (i.e. bodily organs such as lungs, heart, etc) but as a body without organisation. The body for Deleuze becomes a complex network of interactions whereby the collection of organs known as the body ceases to be an organism. That is, the BwO does not have a hierarchy of parts where there is a necessary order of control (e.g. brain → heart → lungs → mouth); rather the BwO is a loose association of these organs such that many organs ‘control’ the body, acknowledging the fact that many organs are central to the life that the body produces. In short, the BwO is a summary concept meant to remove any perceived ‘depth’ from the structure of the body, transforming the body from a hierarchy and into a network of interactions between organs.

The BwO is a Self interconnected with many Others, stringing them along associations and intensities through a disjunctive synthesis (1.3.4). An individual can be a church member, a student, a parent, a member of a sports team, etc. All of these relations happen simultaneously, creating a network of interactions that run in and through the individual as one

102. Ibid., 77.
centre within a network that seamlessly integrates with multiple other networks, sometimes connecting otherwise separate groups via the individual. An individual may bring her spouse to a sports team, thereby creating new connections between her spouse and other members of the team, possibly causing a chain of interactions and greetings along multiple lines of connections. Through the creation of these new connections, the original person becomes an intensity around which these groups orbit and interact (e.g. a social circle). Yet this applies equally to all individuals, creating the sense of a ‘small world’ as the many individuals in different groups cross paths with others. This lowered resistance to connections is made all the more possible by modern technologies and ‘social media’ where there are few (if any) physical limitations between groups.

From these interactions that create a ‘stable’ group, a group identity emerges between the many components (i.e. individual Selves) that make up the group and the overarching narrative that runs through that group. Just as a single Self emerges through a narrative constructed out of the fragmentary, ‘larval’ Selves when ordered by a particular configuration of time, a single group Self emerges from the individual Selves which constitute the group. For example, a single local church community’s identity is a mixture of its members. There is no church community that presents an identity that is completely at odds with all of its members because: ‘all conscious community, however, is community of will. It is based on the separateness of persons. Hence community is never “oneness”, neither is it an ultimate “being one” in the sense of mystical fusion; it is only real when constantly created anew by wills’. 104 This is not to say that a community’s identity is completely accepted by all of its members; rather most if not all generally hold to the community’s identity or seek to change it. In Bonhoeffer’s concept of a community, the community ‘has the same nature as each of its members’. 105 A community must will itself to be a community of different and separate individuals because each individual ‘must in some way intend and will the other, and be intended and willed by the other’. 106 The relationship between the whole and the members is reciprocal: as the members constitute the whole group, the group constitutes a fragment of each member. This attitude of ‘agreement’ is what creates a community not an absolute unity of beliefs; this will become a prominent interpretation of ecumenical unity which I propose in my final chapter (4.1.2).

2.3.2 Public Bodies

Within the network of interactions, a ‘public space’ exists. I offer an initial definition of ‘public space’: the locus in which interactions are produced; yet this definition does little

105. Ibid., 145.
106. Ibid., 83.
to clarify the term. In the general sense of the term, there are many public spaces; sometimes these may be referred to as institutions (e.g. religious). This is because institutions, according to one definition by sociologists, are self-replicating social structures that create and organise patterns of human activity.\(^{107}\) A public space, as a locus of interactions, cannot exist without those interactions; and the interactions cannot be produced without the emergence of a public space. An objection may be raised that there are interactions which are not public, such as a family or marriage. To this, ‘public’ should not be interpreted as the opposite of ‘private’; rather ‘public’ (and ‘private’) need to be understood as relational terms that differ in magnitude and context. There are very few if any interactions which do not exist outside of the participants; a family or marriage is ‘private’ only in relation to others, to the non-members of the family. In other words, ‘privacy’ means a smaller public sphere rather than the absence of one. The opposite of ‘public (space)’ here would be a radical definition of ‘private’, along the same lines Ludwig Wittgenstein uses to define ‘private language’, implying a complete isolation from all other interactions. An example here of the opposite of a ‘public’ interaction would be the ultimate spy that has a perfect false identity and is never discovered to be a spy by anyone — including herself and the agency for which she operates.\(^{108}\)

A public space is essentially a loose network of interactions that are themselves connected to other interactions. As public spaces emerge, the interactions within them are open-ended, allowing interaction with other public spaces and peoples. One contemporary example is inter-religious dialogues because these dialogues involve multiple public spaces and oftentimes individuals acting independently. The second group of independent individuals is typically the case of an inter-religious dialogue before there are ‘official’ channels, be it the chance meeting between a Buddhist and a Christian or the first interaction between people practising different religions. These first interactions create the avenue through which large-scale interactions can and do operate. Given enough interactions, a new public space may emerge which gives all interactions that happen through the space an air of authority that would not be accepted without the existence of the public space. For example, it can be argued that the United Nations occupy a public space of international politics that gives it an air of authority that its predecessor, the League of Nations, was not able to gain. As a result of this authority, the UN is able to oversee the enforcement of treaties as well as provide neutral territory for arbitration between nations.

108. The 1997 comedy The Man Who Knew too Little with Bill Murray is an excellent example of this. In the film, Murray’s character takes part in a live-action crime drama on the streets of London except that the message sent to him was intended for an actual hitman. The film proceeds with Murray’s character ‘playing’ the role of the hitman not knowing that he is actually a hitman while his handler is unaware that Murray is ‘only acting’. See also John le Carré, A Perfect Spy (New York: Knopf, 1986).
Extrapolating from the generic definition of public spaces, the public space — as the abstract whole — is the intersection of many public spaces, its boundaries diffusing into the public spaces that compose the whole. For the sake of clarity, I shall use ‘institutions’ to refer to the generic definition of public spaces (always plural) and the public space (always singular) to refer to the abstract extrapolation. Institutions are themselves abstractions from the concrete realities. For example, we can speak of the ‘religious institution’ and its relation with the public space separate from any single, actual institution like the Roman Catholic Church.

A public space can be seen as the gap between individuals, the medium in which connections are established and built. Each individual always has many connections, mirroring the many Selves that are encompassed in the narrative identity. As the connections themselves draw closer, they become intensities: the gathering of connections creates a narrative which amplifies the gathered connections rather than merging them together into one. These intensities are the public bodies that interact with others. The roles by which we identify ourselves (e.g. parent, student, child, employee) can find harmony as public bodies when their disparate connections are drawn together and are amplified by a virtual narrative which connects them. Like the mythical ‘fifth voice’ in a singing quartet, this virtual narrative only exists when the harmonisation of divergent sources does not bind these sources in unison. Bonhoeffer’s concept of the ‘empirical church’ is one such public space since it joins together many individual church communities as a single unity, a universal totality extending through time and over differences.\textsuperscript{109}

The virtual narrative that draws together divergent connections without bringing them to unification is the public body which acts in the public space. A public body tends to be treated as one’s true identity; however, a public body is \textit{idem}-identity, based on the similarity of a previous experience. It is behind the mask of a public body (\textit{idem}) that the identity \textit{qua} identity (\textit{ipse}) resides as the multiplicity of fragmented Selves. Ironically, it is through this mask that a Self interacts with the external world; it quite literally is one’s face. The face, then, presents and represents the multiple Selves in the same way that a spokesperson may \textit{become} the group she represents (e.g. Steve Jobs as the face of Apple, Barack Obama as the face of America) or, as in other case, individuals cease to be individuals and become part of one group (e.g. a unit of soldiers).\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. Ricœur, \textit{Time and Narrative} 3:151.
2.3.3 From Selves to Others

The distance perceived between public spaces is shrinking because of an increasing harmonisation of some public spaces by technology and globalisation. It has become easier for groups to find new members and audiences since technologies such as social networks on the internet (e.g. Facebook, Pandora Radio) have reduced growth to a process as simple as identifying one’s own interests and searching for others with similar interests. An early example of this was found in the concept of ‘meetup’ groups where anyone could create a global community centred on anything and then host monthly local or regional ‘meetups’ open to any and all. Others could organise their own local meetups in different localities such that many groups would meet in virtually every major city around the world. Global communities quickly formed, utilising the social networks for widespread communication.

A result of globalised networks and increased inter-connectivity is an increased desire for differentiation from others. Two hundred years ago, one rarely interacted with the proverbial Other; in fact, this still held true in the mid-20th century. In the relatively isolated clusters of these times, there was a strong connection to fitting within the communal identity where difference was seen as unacceptable divergence. As these isolated crowds began to interact with other crowds, there was a twofold reaction: asserting the original identity as well as the forging of new identities from those that did not ‘fit the mold’ of the already established identities. One example is that of homosexuality: in the 1960s, it was something that should be kept hidden beneath the standard Western identity (read as ‘Christian’). However, as groups began to interact regularly, new groups emerged composed of ‘refugees’ from other groups which were assertive in the sexual orientation of their members. Now, these groups generally share the same level of acceptance as the more established, older identity groups.

As groups are fragmented and reformed into new constellations of identity, old groups reinforced their original identity. This can be seen in the Moral Majority in America where one mantra is that the US is a ‘Christian’ nation. Their group identity is based on the conflation of a group’s identity with a group’s image. The image, like the face that represents a group, is idealised as that group’s identity, ignoring or suppressing internal differences. A group’s image is oftentimes treated as that group’s identity — confusing idem- and ipse-identity. The important point to note here is that this is rarely the case because the image, like the mask, obscures the multiplicity lurking behind it. In many areas of critical studies, the image of other groups is reduced and catalogued as ‘the Other’.

By naming the Other, a particular identity or group of identities can be removed and externalised so that they may be overcome or ignored. Even in our multicultural society, these
identities are treated as radically different, impervious to interaction unless one ‘goes native’. Under this guise, many injustices have been done in order to assert one identity as so radically different that it must be superior. The life of African-Americans after the civil rights movement shows this to be true: in creating an African-American identity, we can celebrate its culture in the National Black History Month while otherwise ignoring its contributions to history and society. One can even hide racism behind those words, as some have done by stating that the civil rights movement has accomplished its goals now that an African-American has become president. People use the language of multiculturalism and tolerance to hide the reality of bigotry and intolerance.

Only when a Self engages with these Others as Other can a community develop and emerge. All interactions with Others are incomplete and partial because ‘what is represented is both absent and present at the same time’. A group identity, as something that is always defined in a relation, can only develop — can only exist — when there is an Other to which there can be a relation. One will discover that these Others had been present in one’s own identity. It is in this dialogue between Self and Other that narratives of identity are read, re-interpreted, and revised. The dialogue creates a new identity for both the individual and the community such that they ‘are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history’.

2.3.4 Remembrance of Time

Narratives are constructed and reconstructed in time (1.3.2). It is through the synthesis of time that a narrative identity reaches into the present from the past disguised as pure Memory. The pure Memory of a community becomes tradition, cultural memory in the present. Tradition takes form in the present through the actions of recollection: remembrance and forgetting. Remembrance is the intentional recollection, remaining mindful of past deeds, ideas, and feelings. Remembrance revivifies an old narrative, sometimes even one that has been cut off, in order to provide a substance on which the present can be written into Memory. On the other hand, forgetting is the disruption of Memory in order to provide an open space in which a new narrative can be grafted into Memory. The transcendent operation of time through the construction and reconstruction of narratives also rewrites the future as expectations. New narratives produce new expectations. This is the first synthesis of time (1.1.3) read through identity.

Recollection in a community finds many avenues of expression. In communities, the expression of recollection can be found in creeds and rituals. In other words, the repetitive

111. Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 75.
mindfulness of the past as contracted Memory is recollection. Within Christian theology the liturgy, as well as its changes through history, is the practise of remembrance and the reception of remembered narratives in community. I shall expand on this in my discussion of community remembrance in the fourth chapter (4.4.3).

Forgetting also finds its own expression, oftentimes as silence. When the past remains silent, it is often because the memory is too difficult to accept. The difficulty is frequently a negative expression: fear, shame, anger. For example, one may be silent about the atrocities of war, especially in the case of events like the Rwandan massacre and the Holocaust. The first response to these horrors may be one of shock; but there must be more to the response than just silence. To move beyond the silence revivifies the narratives cut-off by the atrocities. There is an ethical dimension embedded in the fabric of identity that the narratives of identity highlight (or sometimes repress); silence is the repression of these ethics in order to cope with the Self’s sense of guilt. Like with liturgy, I shall expand on this in the fourth chapter (4.4.3).

Practises of recollection occur within the plane of immanence which is the surface of the Möbius strip. Recollection must be immanent (as opposed to transcendent) in order to be recollection. Immanence is a product of the future series of repetition. It is always returning to the same yet different. Immanence is the exact ‘moment’ of repetition itself, where past and future collide. It is in between the two points of time in which one’s future choice is transformed into past event and where destiny becomes actualised. In this sense, something can still be perceived as occurring throughout an event even though it materialises only at the moment the event becomes real.

Similarly, a new conception of transcendence is needed to progress from something that occurs through and beyond time and finitude. Transcendence must be interpreted as the pure repetition of Memory itself — as an ontological dimension. It grounds the syntheses of time in the present. Transcendence and immanence are opposite sides of the same coin. Transcendence is the pure past subsisting in the future, and immanence is the future expectation insisting in the past. The two always and only meet in the present. Theologically speaking, this is an echo of Tillich’s denial of God’s existence in preference for conceiving of God as the ground of Being. God, as that which is without existing, insists and subsists in our time. In other words, God participates in humanity (and everything) as the ground for its being and existence. Participation requires presence.

114. Cf. ibid., 1:227.


2.3.5 Sacred Spaces

Within the context of the public space, the face that represents an identity implies a presence. Presence, for this purpose, should not be read as having proximity to a subject or object but through the earlier context of time (1.1.3) as the monadic totality of time in every instant. With the past presenting itself always as Memory and the future always as expectation, the present is the subjective presence of a synthesised time (Memory and expectation while they are being invoked). A subject is present, not as one existing in an instant of time but as one having a presence.

Presence is participation at the level of experience, simulated in the sense that presence is not simply a copy of a former participation (parallel to idem-identity) but rather ‘a difference without a model’. In other words, the participation of presence is the (differentiating) repetition of expectation (i.e. the future) — in opposition to the actual (i.e. what may be empirically verified) not the real, between original and repetition. For example, a reproduction of the Mona Lisa is still real, but it may not be the original painting. This is similar to the plot of the 2000 remake of The Thomas Crown Affair in which Crown steals a painting; but he then submits a replica replacement to the gallery which is actually the original covered in a layer of water-soluble paint. The original is treated like a replica because its status as original had been lost. In this manner, the simulation of presence should not be understood as ‘we live in a fake copy of real presence’ but as ‘we live in a reproduction of presence’, an echo of Baudrillard’s Virtual (2.1.6). The recent discovery that René Magritte had forged some of his own works emphasises this difference between simulacra and model-and-copy because it blurs (if not erases) the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘copy’. Presence and participation are always mediated through pure Memory. Humans experience real presence even when it is not necessarily actual. For example, one may perceive the presence of a loved one (or theologially, God) who is not observably present. The experience of that presence is very much real, but it is not necessarily actual. It is a simulation, a virtual presence. Presence is always immanent, because it is the very act of participation which produces presence and participation can itself only be immanent. Theology is always present in society and culture, often serving as the substance of which society is formed.

115. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, 30.
116. Cf. ibid., 106.
2.3.6 Theological Belonging

The notion of presence permeates theology and society. A central issue is one of identity and presence: ‘how does one belong?’ One answer to this can be found in the above notion of presence. Western theology is always virtual (1.1.5), revolving around repetitions and genealogies. The narrative of a pure ‘biblical’ theology which needs to be recovered is and has always been an illusion. Theologies appropriate symbols, concepts, and intuitions to create a present image of the church, connecting people today with their theological predecessors. Every concept, creed, and confession is a memorial of theology throughout the time, contracted in the moment of participation as a synthesis of shared memory (i.e. tradition) and expectation (i.e. mission in a contemporary context). These symbols contract the theological universe into one word such that the two series of signification (1.1.1) run in both directions, simultaneously providing a universe of meaning.

The form of theology is expressive and imaginative, or in Tillich’s words, ‘indirect, symbolic, and mediated’. In two different places, Tillich suggests that theology is always metaphorical and analogical. Metaphor should not be subsumed under a search for ‘truth’ as a direct or deductive set of propositions. Instead, truth itself is simulated with the original lost long ago — a sentiment expressed well by Nietzsche:

> What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms — in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.

Truth in a theological context is plural, a result of the differentiation inherent to repetition. The truth behind theology is expressed through symbols and metaphors that point to something beyond the games of language and truth, to the infinite, to the divine. Truth is not discovered or deduced; it is something within which one participates. It is communal, always inscribed within a presence, repeated and passed down. Truth is traditional in the sense of a tradition received through generations: always changing yet always the same. For example, similar to heirlooms, truth may take on quasi-mythical qualities as the narratives

120. See ibid., 1:266 and 2:132.
surrounding it are forgotten, remembered, and modified so that the ‘original’ story might become something completely different over time.

From this perspective, then, Deleuze’s contribution to theology lies in re-conceiving tradition as a genealogical lineage. Tradition, much like the present, is an empty space within a series of signification that is passively filled with a monadic presence of the theological community and heritage. In familial terms, it is the child who has its mother’s ears, grandfather’s eyes, uncle’s hair, and grandmother’s temper. There is ‘true’ theology because there is no perfect copy; there are only simulacra which are always different. A virtual theology is not a false theology or a ‘bad copy’ of theology; it is, rather, a real theology that does not articulate itself as the only actual theology. It is an opening for many theologies.

Theology has long been a theology of simulation. For instance, within Christianity, we simulate an ‘original biblical text’ as well as even simulate a singular Christianity — even as most Christians acknowledge that there are very different groups. The ‘death of God’ proclaimed by Nietzsche’s madman was not new information but an echo of what was forgotten: we have always simulated God. God’s death is an adaptation of Nietzsche’s definition of truth above applied to theology. It is here that pluralism has found fertile ground. By looking at life as multidimensional, theologians have already stumbled into the problem of identity, albeit from a different direction. Tillich touches on the problem in his Systematic Theology where his concern was that of participation. In a move similar to the one Ricoeur later takes, Tillich argues for the necessity of hermeneutics because of theology’s status as mediated and mediating. Further, Tillich argues for an understanding of difference, much like Deleuze, because it is only in acknowledging intrinsic difference (ipse-identity) that one can participate within a community. By echoing Tillich and seeing theology as a hermeneutical endeavour, as metaphorical and analogical, the focus on identity for theology turns to plurality and difference. In the shift to pluralism, the problem of identity resurfaces differently.

2.3.7 A Religious Necessity

By extending Tillich’s mediation of theology as an identity of many theologies, a single question is raised: how can there be a singular group with divergent understandings of the group’s own identity? More bluntly, this question asks ‘what is essential to the Christian identity if many Christians believe very differently?’ Out of this question arises the necessity for an ecumenical mediation that can connect divergent strands and re-narrate them into a single, perhaps complex, construct. The essence of a ‘Christian’ identity cannot be reduced to a single, particular orthodoxy which is itself existing in a specific, contingent context.
of time, memory, and tradition. Such recognition of self-contingency and recognition of other groups as developing similarly from the same source of a universal (or universalised) identity is what I interpret to be the heart of the ecumenical movement. I shall argue that the connective mediation can be found already existing in the historical dialogue between theological orthodoxy and heresy in the following chapter (3.2.5). As Bonhoeffer notes, the unity that orthodoxy creates is not one based on similarity such that there is a single, correct doctrine accepted by all but rather an agreement with diversity:

The point is not ‘unanimity in spirit’, but the ‘unity of the Spirit’, as Luther puts it in his exposition of Eph. 4:3; this means the objective principle sovereignly establishes unity, unites the plurality of persons into a single collective person without obliterating either their singularity or the community of persons. Rather, unity of spirit, community of spirit, and plurality of spirit are intrinsically linked to each other through their subject matter.\(^{124}\)

In this vein, I wish to turn to the questions surrounding religious orthodoxy and relate the issue of identity developed in this chapter to them.

By establishing a central orthodoxy, theologies can be compared, harmonised, and weighed. Tied to these actions is a second, perhaps more important issue: authority. It is one thing to compare theologies and quite another to enforce these comparisons. The establishment of orthodoxy does exactly that on the basis and assertion of a particular authority. The necessity of religious orthodoxy is taken for granted such that its contingent nature and genesis has been ignored or forgotten. I propose that by approaching the concept of orthodoxy as identity construction, I shall find a possible answer to the issue of divergent beliefs within a group centred around a convergent identity.

Relations of power and authority as relations within a construct of identity have been largely ignored thus far, yet they can contribute a great deal towards the establishment of a communal identity. These relations are necessary to any kind of presence or public identity: ‘the public sphere is a space necessarily (not just contingently) articulated by power. And everyone who enters it must address power’s disposition of people and things’.\(^{125}\) It is no coincidence, then, that the ‘public faces’ of groups (e.g. Steve Jobs, Barack Obama) oftentimes hold a position of authority within their groups (appointed in the case of Jobs, elected in the case of Obama). With religious identities, a problem then arises when there are multiple sets of authorities, some which may be mutually exclusive, within the same group. The dialectic between authorities and identities within a single group has often been described as unneces-

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sary; however I wish to reverse such an argument. Not only is the dialectic necessary, but it is inherent to any ecclesial image of Christianity because Christianity emerges from multiple sources in a way similar to childhood development amidst multiple influences and relations. In order to combat the reductionist thinking generally attributed to religious orthodoxy, a different analysis of the dialectic of authority and identity is necessary. The hermeneutics of identity and difference that has been developed in this chapter will provide the model for analysing authority and identity in the following chapters (3.1.5 and 4.1.2).
3. Reading the Narratives of Orthodoxy in Terms of Identity

If there is a strong thrust towards the formulation of an ‘identity’, that identity does not follow a single prescriptive shape.¹

One major implication of group identity from the previous chapter (2.3.7) is the establishment of authority and control to maintain and organise that identity. While I have established identity as a contingent narrative emerging from fragmentary, ‘larval’ Selves, the existence of this narrative creates questions of organisation and management. The ‘who’ (or ‘what’) that directs the narrative shifts over time. This question is much more problematic to a group identity because in the case of an individual it is easy to imagine a ‘present’ Self directing its own development by establishing ‘future’ expectations whereas it is more difficult — if not impossible — to imagine a sort of direction or leadership *inherent by nature* in a group. In answering this question, I shall analyse instances within time as a historiography, mapping the terrain of each instance and showing how the mapping of space changes over time. In a group, there are many different individuals which can influence the group’s development and it is more difficult to imagine the group as somehow autonomously directing itself as if there were a ‘ghost in the machine’ controlling separately from the group. Yet this is precisely the dynamics between the one Self and many Selves which create individual identity. The question is not who but how the narrative develops. Within a group, this is generally done by establishing a hierarchical authority within the group as a first among equals (or worse, as a separate class of participants above the others).

In many Christian traditions, authority is exercised through the concept of orthodoxy; however there are multiple ways in which this concept is employed. The variations of orthodoxy in names (e.g. Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Orthodoxy) are only echoes of the concept from which those labels develop. Rather than thinking of orthodoxy in these practical terms, I

wish to distinguish three uses of orthodoxy which are interrelated and often conflated: theological, political, and ecclesial. The first use of orthodoxy is theological in that it seeks to provide limits and guidelines for dogmatic belief and doctrine; this was (or became) the primary concern of early Christianity in its councils. However, in seeking to define theological limits, traditions discovered a need for political orthodoxy in order to protect their theological orthodoxy. Without the possibility of an authority to arbitrate theological discussions, it was feared that there would be no cohesion in divergent groups and this fragmentation of theologies would weaken Christianity and sever it from its roots. However, a new ecclesial use of orthodoxy could be found where ecumenical dialogues emerged. Rather than a focus on theological or political orthodoxies which had both failed to bring the unity they sought, this use of orthodoxy was interpreted as the organic relations within the whole of Christianity — as the ‘glue’ which binds Christianity together. This third usage is what I shall develop further as the concept of orthodoxy (3.1.4) based on the development of identity in the previous chapter (2.2.5).

Connected to ecclesial orthodoxy, there is a need to re-interpret the politics and theology of orthodoxy. While groups grow and develop into pluralist confederations of groups (e.g. the Anglican Communion), their identity narrative narrows into more specific areas of contention and breaks into smaller fragments which may be ‘absorbed’ into less abstract identities (e.g. Church of England and Scottish Episcopal Church). It is here on these two states of becoming larger and smaller that the theology and politics of orthodoxy appears. For example, while Anglican theology has specific points to which a group must adhere in order to participate in the Anglican Communion (e.g. Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral), many of these points are open to debate and bring together groups with quite contrary views (e.g. ordination of women). This highlights the dual purpose of orthodoxy within the context of maintaining an identity: [1] to re-interpret the group’s narrative in terms of expansion (i.e. define a centre) and [2] to maintain the memory of the group’s narrative in terms of cohesion (i.e. define a boundary). The first purpose is theological because the centre it creates brings together those who accept its theological content regardless of any political ordering. However, the political exertion of orthodoxy comes in the definition of boundaries because the boundaries are constructed to hold together the theological centre. Discussions of acceptable beliefs and practises, such as the current question of ordaining homosexual priests, are mediating between these two purposes of orthodoxy since the discussions seek to create a central definition of orthodoxy that has some degree of (theological) flexibility while still having some (political) boundaries. In mediating between these two purposes, orthodoxy can be seen in terms of identity construction, providing a narrative through which the two purposes are mediated and united within the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). This narrative is none other than the ecclesial image of orthodoxy while the tension between ‘traditional’ and ‘radical’
elements within the group attempts to re-create the narrative into a contemporary inheritance of a rich history.

The image of the Self (2.2.4) can be transposed onto these discussions of orthodoxy. As the Self emerges from the cohesion of fragmentary Selves, so too does orthodoxy emerge from the fragments of beliefs and practises. These fragments are constructed into a multiplicity despite their varying degrees of contrast and difference. While some overlap and perhaps coalesce into singularities and centres within the larger construct of theological identity, this is not always the case. What becomes noticeable in this image is the usage of recognition as a means of controlling identity: fragments which refuse to recognise others as members of a shared identity do so in order to exclude those others from the commonwealth of that identity. I shall argue in the following chapter (4.1.3) that the act of recognition has been the primary way of defining centres and boundaries of an identity. In this way, the authority of orthodoxy exercises the mutual recognition of others as Other.

Orthodoxy — the organisation of the Christian identity according to an authority — is a product of these processes. As a product, it is finished and does not describe the process which created it: ‘the product appears to be all the more specific, incredibly specific and readily describable, the more closely the theoretician relates it to ideal forms of causation, comprehension, or expression, rather than to the real process of production on which it depends.’ In this chapter, I wish to draw an ecclesial image of orthodoxy and describe how it is produced (3.1), looking specifically at historical acts of recognition between Christian communities. By following the history and development of orthodoxy in both its theological and political usage, I shall argue that these two usages of orthodoxy create a single, virtual representation of identity as an ecclesial usage of orthodoxy. I shall analyse the historical development in three periods of history: early Christianity from its separation with Judaism to the birth of orthodoxy politics in the first council at Chalcedon (3.2); from Chalcedon to the beginning of the Reformation (3.3); and recent expressions from the nineteenth century to the contemporary early twenty-first century (3.4). I shall make it clear that the production of identity has been an aspect of Christian orthodoxy from Christianity’s earliest formations. The historical analysis will prompt a problem that is already implicit: who has the authority to mediate the Christian identity? However, this problem will not be dealt with until the following chapter (4.1.2); I am intentionally leaving it unanswered here in order to focus on the production of orthodoxies and identities which then finally construct their own authorities separate from most (though not all) theological questions. By differentiating the theological from the political, authority will lose its totalising grasp and recede back into a state of recognised contingency.

3.1 An Orthodoxy in Terms of Identity

It has become commonplace today to speak of orthodoxy in two distinct ways: as defining the centre of Christian theology (i.e. a ‘common’ theology) or as defining the boundaries of Christian theology (i.e. an ‘acceptable’ theology). Problems arise when these two usages are confused, for instance, when an Evangelical concerned about boundaries (second usage) interacts with an Anglican who is concerned about centres (first usage).

Both usages are important, but the relationship between them is often obscured in the underlying game of authority and power. However, prior to this game of authority, there is already a concept of orthodoxy that serves as the field in which that game is played. Before I can discuss the game of authority (see 4.1), there must be an agreement on what orthodoxy is at a conceptual level. It is this concept of orthodoxy that I wish to define and analyse here in terms of identity construction. By looking at orthodoxy as a type of identity formation, I shall argue that the tensions found in the various usages of orthodoxy can be found throughout Scripture and the history of Christianity. The tensions that arise in Scripture, particularly the New Testament, eventually give rise to the push-and-pull in the development of orthodoxy, following two kinds of usage I named above. Instead of arguing for the primacy of one usage over the other, I wish to argue that the tension between centre and boundary is inherent to Christian theology and has provided an arena for theology to develop in light of multiple contexts (e.g. tradition, contemporary society).

To achieve this re-imaging of orthodoxy, I shall be utilising the hybrid construct of identity previously developed (2.2.7). Orthodoxy shall be shown to be a concept that is in a process of constant construction and deconstruction while it mediates along at least two axes: centre–boundaries and historical tradition–contemporary society. The correlational theology first suggested by Paul Tillich provides a convenient location in which to situate theologically this concept of orthodoxy because his method of correlation interprets theology as the mediator between questions in contemporary ‘culture’ and historically-attached answers in ‘religion’. Tillich goes so far as to suggest that the two (‘religion’ and ‘culture’) are connected in such a way that ‘the form of religion is culture and the substance of culture is religion’. I shall employ this connection to argue that the two usages of orthodoxy are a double-image rooted in a single concept, neither part able to survive without the other.

For my initial connection between orthodoxy and the previous discussions on time and identity, I shall look at the notion of tradition (1.2.5). Paul Ricoeur suggests that one significant

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4. Ibid., 1:68.
aspect of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s *Truth and Method* is the dialectic of transmission, in which the ‘chain of interpretations and reinterpretations’ mediate traditions across time.\(^5\) This dialectical mediation provides a ‘fusion of horizons’ which is always already fragmented and fragmenting, creating a plurality of traditions:

The past is revealed to us through the projection of a historical horizon that is both detached from the horizon of the present and taken up into and fused with it. This idea of a temporal horizon as something that is both projected and separate, distinguished and included, brings about the dialectising of the idea of traditionality ... It signifies that the temporal distance separating us from the past is not a dead interval but a transmission that is generative of meaning.\(^6\)

Ricœur’s understanding of tradition is implicit in my conception of identity (2.2.4) because tradition is a fragmentary understanding mediated through the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). In other words, tradition is a kind of identity that persists over time, adapting and changing by generating meaning in the present situation.

In passing between two senses of ‘tradition’ — from the material contents of ‘traditions’ to the formal concept of ‘tradition’ — Ricœur introduces the question of authority.\(^7\) He characterises this transition to authority as a genealogical account, one in which authority is received from the past and reinterpreted in the present.\(^8\) The parallel between Ricœur’s analysis here and my presentation of various orthodoxies above comes into focus in such a way that orthodoxy can be seen as a mediation of group identity (2.3.1), equating roughly with Ricœur’s senses of ‘tradition’. To speak about orthodoxy as such is in Ricœur’s terminology to speak about the sense of tradition which legitimates a particular heritage of traditionality. However, Ricœur’s analysis does not go quite far enough because there are two very different movements of orthodoxy.

### 3.1.1 Two Series of Orthodoxy

Orthodoxy read as a narrative identity is transformed from a doctrinal concept into an adaptive, organic system, suiting its current environment while still maintaining a ‘sense of Self’ for a community through time. Orthodoxy maintains a self-reflexive narrative which provides an identity for its community that cuts across time; for example Christians today share the same Christian identity that the early Christians shared despite any changes that may...

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7. See ibid., 3:224.
have occurred between the two eras. This adaptivity can be read in Tillich’s writings. In the first volume of his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich describes the relationship between what he calls the sources of theology (Bible, tradition, history, etc.) and the theologian as a mediation shaped by experience of these sources and the world in which the theologian lives. It is here that I wish to place the image of ecclesial orthodoxy as the construct through which theology is connected with the world. I would like to expand on this while simultaneously expanding on the strengths and weaknesses of the two usages of orthodoxy as cognates of the two series of identity (2.2.1).

The first usage of orthodoxy is the act of defining a centre. I call this usage the *catholic* series because it is a universalising, inclusive movement. Differentiation from Others occurs simultaneously with the differentiation of a Self. There must be a prior internal differentiation before it can be separated from others. However, this prior differentiation is not one of homogenisation; it is the diffusing of an identity to the component selves. With groups, this differentiation takes the form of the group’s identity being dissolved into the members. The catholic series constructs a relational identity that applies to all of its members, giving each something which links them together as a group. For example, the identity of Christianity, in its catholic series, gives each member an identity of ‘Christian’ as Christian. To be a Christian is to be part of the ‘greater’ Christian identity regardless of any differences. By defining a centre, one acts to include as many disparate parts under a single identity. Another example here is one of the rallying cries since 9/11 which still circulates and claims ‘we are all New Yorkers’.

The second usage of orthodoxy is to define boundaries. This contrasts with the first usage in that it separates a Self from others. I shall refer to this usage as the *schismatic* series because it separates one family of traditions from another (e.g. Christianity from Judaism). In my next section (3.2.1), this will be explored further when I look at the ‘parting of the ways’ between Christianity and Judaism as well as some historical schisms within Christianity. The schismatic series corresponds to the second movement of differentiation for Deleuze (1.1.4), readily admitting differences within and outwith the Self. Yet, through the acknowledgement of differences, boundaries are able to define seams within and create smaller factions. The emphasis on discordance creates smaller, more homogeneous groups under the single narrative. New catholic series of orthodoxy emerge, creating a multistable environment with

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many centres. While the catholic series proceeds by way of unification, the schismatic proceeds in such a way that results in division — intentionally or not. Recent trends within Religious Studies have been to speak of particular traditions in their plurals (e.g. Islams, Christianities, etc) as a way of emphasising these differences within a given religious tradition. However, I shall combat this trend because it is a misunderstanding of unity and identity (see 3.4.4).

The two series of orthodoxy combine to form a single process of mitosis, the multiplication of cells by division within a single body. Each series of identity here feeds into the other, creating an endless cycle of reproduction in which the many component pieces are intrinsically connected while remaining individually separate. However, there are certain mutations of this cycle that produce unsustainable outcomes. The two series of orthodoxy create and re-create equilibrium in order to prevent these mutations. The two extremes of a failure to maintain equilibrium are both problematic to identity. An orthodoxy without boundaries, the failure of the catholic series, cannot differentiate between Self and Other, leading to a perverse relativism or syncretism in which no Other can exist as Other (cf. ‘multiculturalism’ in 2.2.2). This failure to differentiate Self and Other will resurface in the following chapter (4.2.5) where I shall address it as a criticism of some ‘ecumenical’ dialogues. Orthodoxy without a centre (the schismatic series) is unable to construct an overall narrative (cf. Orientalism in 2.2.2), turning orthodoxy into a weapon against dissent, something to which I shall return in the next section (3.2.2) where I begin to explore the historical development of orthodoxy within Christianity.

Lastly, it may seem that the two usages of orthodoxy are mismatched. At some points, it may seem easier to link the catholic series with the second failure (i.e. leading to eradicating dissent). However, the appearance of mismatching is due to the dialogue being played out in identity between Self and Other, which will be treated with more detail in the next chapter (4.1.3). The catholic series of orthodoxy is one of concordance, of presenting to an Other a whole, undivided Self. Because concordance can continue without end, the catholic series without boundaries faces difficulties in finding an Other to which it can present a Self. The schismatic series is discordant, presenting the Self as many component ‘Selves’ which are themselves in tension. In other words, the two series are actually one, differentiating by scale such that the catholic series is done primarily at a macroscopic level while the schismatic is done primarily at a microscopic level. It is through this distinction that the two series of orthodoxy can be brought together as a single concept.

3.1.2 Creating Boundaries for Orthodoxy

The first boundary line drawn for Christianity came as a response to questions regarding the relationship Christianity would have to Judaism. This question was not resolved until after a central Christian identity emerged as already distinct from the Jewish identity which also emerged around the same time. However, I first want to look at the drawing of this boundary before looking at the creation of a Christian identity, in a sense working backwards. The penultimate move was the rejection of Marcion’s canon and gnostic Christianities around the second century CE. As a result of these two movements, two possibilities were given to early Christianity: a ‘gnostic Christianity [that] would have bred immense diversity of belief . . . because of gnosticism’s general hospitality to mixtures of doctrine’ or a Marcionite Christianity that ‘would have been a very tidy organisation, [with] given boundaries’.13 Marcion’s complete break with and rejection of Judaism as the genealogical predecessor to Christianity required a response. Tied to this ‘challenge’ by Marcion is the question of authority: who has the authority to decide the boundaries within and around Christianity? This question shall play a major role in the progressive history of Christianity, particularly as church councils from Nicaea to Second Vatican assert some degree of (if not total) authority in these matters. Yet, it should be clear from the existence of Christian groups which reject the pronouncements and proceedings of these councils that the question of authority does not find an answer that cannot be refused. I shall return to this history in the following section (3.2.3).

It is generally regarded that Marcion’s position developed from his reading of Paul.14 Paul was clear that the Christian identity should not be defined as a strictly Jewish one, arguing in many of his letters that non-Jewish converts need not uphold Jewish laws.15 Paul is not alone, however, because Peter also makes a similar argument at the Council of Jerusalem as recorded in Acts.16 Even further back, this idea can be found in the speech of Stephen where he accuses the Jewish council of opposing the movements of the Holy Spirit throughout history — including the resurrection of Christ and the emerging Christian movement to which Stephen belonged.17 It seems that Marcion’s supercessionist position had some justification, yet it was ultimately rejected (in theory). The apparent contradiction is resolved only by finding a second opinion that opposed Marcion’s.

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CHAPTER 3. NARRATIVES OF ORTHODOXY

In the text of the New Testament, the opposition to the argument for separation can be found in the letter to the Hebrews (amongst others). The language used in this book echoes Jewish sentiment, forging a Christian reinterpretation of the Hebrew Bible (e.g. reading Jesus as the guarantee of a new covenant). There is a point in the book of Hebrews (8:13) where it seems that the author agrees with what becomes the Marcionite break from Judaism, in which the ‘new covenant’ brought about Christ makes the first covenant (i.e. Judaism) obsolete. However, this is not actually the case being made. Rather, the argument is that the Christian covenant is a radical reinterpretation of the Jewish one, not breaking from it but extending and correcting it. Additionally, two of the Gospel accounts provide (different) genealogies of Jesus that trace a line from Abraham to Jesus through David. This account is completely unnecessary unless the authors had sought to justify the Christian cult as faithfully inheriting Jewish sentiment. The Gospel genealogies only make sense if the authors (and subsequently, early Christianity) see Christianity’s relationship to Judaism as necessary. The third source of the argument for maintaining a link to Judaism can be found in a second reading of Paul. In his letter to the Romans, Paul interprets salvation by Christ by reinterpretting Jewish texts universally. While this is primarily to justify extending salvation to Gentiles, this action requires the implication that Jewish thought and texts have importance to the emerging Christianity. To break completely from Judaism, as Marcion suggests, would be theologically disastrous.

Subsequent history shows that Christianity took a path in between these two arguments. First, Marcion’s ideas were rejected and branded ‘heresy’ — a concept which I shall look at in depth in the following section (3.2.2). This rejection of Marcion could have led to an open boundary for orthodoxy if that was not also rejected. The end result can be described as a synthesis of two interpretations of Paul, producing a mixed relationship to Judaism which has varied between close interaction (e.g. Alexandrian Christianity) and supercessionary persecution (e.g. Shepherd of Hermas). Christianity’s relationship to Judaism may be described best as that of estranged family members: there are many similarities and resemblances between the two, but they frequently deny or ignore the shared genealogical past. The relationship between Christianity and Judaism was sealed only after Christianity (and Judaism) was able to assert its own identity, but the formation of the Christian identity was a lengthy process that did not present a single authoritative version for a few centuries.

22. See Romans 9–11.
3.1.3 Defining the Centre of Orthodoxy

When it comes to discussing a centre in Christian faith and theology, there are at least two ways to describe that centre. The first is to define orthodox theology in terms of a ‘basic’ or ‘common’ Christianity. However, this method should be taken in a limited context, regardless of how tempting its universal applicability may appear, because such an argument conflates local boundaries with regional boundaries. It relies on a geopolitical conception of a city-state empire (e.g. ancient Rome) in such a way that its horizon of orthodoxy is taken to be the horizon for all of Christian orthodoxy; the boundaries of Christianity conveniently coincide with one’s own boundaries. Horizons in orthodoxy shall be treated in the following chapter (4.1.3). A ‘basic’ Christianity presupposes a central authority, thus turning discussions of orthodoxy into determinations of heresies. While the discussion of authority is necessary, I shall discuss it separate from the concept of orthodoxy so that the image of basic Christianities as limited horizons within a larger world can be emphasised.

The second way to describe a centre in theology is to use the language of catholicity. I believe this method to be more useful because it prevents the ‘contamination’ of authority that can arise in the first usage. Using catholicity provides reference points, which may even be connected to a central authority, but it leaves the relation of this central authority to the whole of Christianity ambiguous. It is for that reason, that I name the first series of orthodoxy catholic since the aim of the catholic series of orthodoxy is to extend open arms. ‘Catholic’ is able to emphasise the commonality between a group of churches without extending that commonality to all of Christianity in precisely the way that ‘basic’, ‘common’, and even ‘orthodox’ Christianity cannot.

In defining the centre of Christianity, then, the task is actually to define one of many centres within its own limited horizon. It is difficult today to overemphasise the plurality of centres within Christianity; talk of Christianities has become a vital part in modern theology, particularly in ecumenical contexts. Some theologians today even argue that the pluralities within Christianity come as a direct result of the various early councils, such as Nicaea which Emperor Constantine convened to prevent divergences. In its first few centuries, Christianity does little to define a centre, much as it had done with defining boundaries. While this is arguably because the early Christians believed the return of Christ was imminent, it is clear that their minds began to change during the second century. When early Christianity shifted away from an imminent return of Christ, theologians discovered that the diversity of Christianity needed to be brought together in order for Christianity to remain coherent. The diversity was great because many groups adopted ‘different gospels as their supreme authority’ with

no way of mediating these differences or harmonising them with any extensive authority.\(^{24}\) Marcion is generally regarded as being the first person to propose a canon of scriptures, yet it is not until the fourth century that we find widespread agreement on a canon that closely matches what we now use.\(^{25}\) The first major council did not occur until 325 CE — three centuries after the resurrection of Christ. What is common to these fourth century dates is that they occur after Constantine began protecting Christianity, perhaps because Christianity was able to organise itself in the open instead of an underground cult as well as there being political pressure from the emperor to unify Christianity. Without the need to survive (quite literally), Christianity was able to develop its identity for the first time.

This is not to suggest that there was no Christian identity prior to the fourth century; rather there were no agreed-upon authorities to assess the many competing concepts which arose in the prior centuries. In what may be a conflict of interest, the rise of a single orthodoxy despite the many competing centres of Christian theology came from the proponents of that particular orthodoxy. In other words, one group asserted its own centre of orthodoxy as authoritative, creating the very authority that justifies itself — even in some cases when such ‘orthodoxy’ was not accepted by the majority of Christians.\(^{26}\) The questions of authority and its role will greatly influence the development of orthodoxy, an area that will be treated in greater detail in the following section (3.2.5). For now, however, my focus is on the form of a self-created orthodoxy and not its authority or content (see 4.1.2 and 4.2.3).

The tradition of catholicity passed down through generations of Christians comes from the balance in Paul’s works between inclusion and exclusion: ‘the balance [Paul] struck represented a tension between a wish to keep the gatherings of Christians exclusive and a wish to keep [Christianity’s] frontiers open in order to make more converts’.\(^{27}\) It is in this vein that the early church took root and expanded. After Christianity was recognised as a legal religion, Christian thinkers began to evaluate that balance. In order to keep the tension inherited from Paul, the identity of orthodoxy that was formed sought to include as many divergent beliefs as possible rather than follow the most common belief amongst early Christians. The resulting orthodoxy was catholic in the sense that it covered as much theological ground as possible. In the wake of the orthodoxy that started to form, a theological centre developed so as to provide a reference point. There are three good candidates for the emergence of this central orthodoxy: the Council of Nicaea (325), the Council of Constantinople (381), and the Council of Chalcedon (451). Most of Christianity today accepts at least one of these three

\(^{24}\) Chadwick, *The Church in Ancient Society*, 100.
councils while subsequent councils become more contested or ignored by later Christians. The point here is not to choose one as the centre, but rather to suggest that all three serve as reference points (though not exclusively) within Christian theology. In short, there is not — and never has been — a single centre serving as the central, authoritative centre for all of Christian theology, despite Christian groups frequently acting otherwise.

3.1.4 Shifting Ideas of Orthodoxy

It has been common to interpret the development of orthodoxy within Christianity as one of refinement. However, the history of creating orthodoxy is anything but that, because too often ‘refinements’ have caused groups of Christians to part ways, choosing a different figure/person of authority. Even after councils declared certain beliefs heretical, the ‘heterodox’ proponents tended to continue their beliefs and practices — sometimes still existing today (e.g. the Assyrian Church of the East can be traced back to the Nestorians, condemned in two major councils during the fifth century). Before addressing the question of authority, there are still a few more issues regarding the construct of orthodoxy as an identity which need to be discussed.

The two series of orthodoxy can be interpreted as always defining reference points by which to navigate the range of Christian theology. For example, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed is often used to define an unambiguous limit for Christian theology. While it may not have represented the majority of Christians in the fourth century, it does today since the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and most Protestant churches accept the creed as a central definition of Christian theology. For most of these groups, the theology expressed in that creed represents the horizon of all Christian thought: to go beyond that horizon (in belief or practise) is certainly heresy. However, those groups who reject that creed see different horizons and limits. In fact, it is interesting that many of the early heretical theologians oftentimes did not appeal to an authority by which to denounce their ‘orthodox’ critics: ‘despite the discovery of some Gnostic heresiology in the Nag Hammadi materials, there remains a “curious scarcity of anti-orthodox polemics in the heretical literature”’. What gave rise to these polemics that seemingly rejected any kind of theological pluralism?

The general argument in response to this question tends to be one of solidifying commonly accepted beliefs or synthesising variant beliefs into a mutually acceptable doctrine. Yet the argument for popularity immediately finds its rebuttal in the writings of Jerome, particularly

where he quips that ‘the world groaned, and was astonished to find itself Arian’.

Yet Arianism is not the only case; there are other times in the history of Christianity where claims to orthodoxy constituted the minority position in Christian thought (e.g. Marcion). Popular doctrine cannot be rejected without some argument, one to which I propose two closely related options that are used in this period of Christian thought: authority and scripture. By asserting a set of texts as sacred scriptures, multiple authorities are established. The first authority is that of the canon, with the implication that doctrinal beliefs cannot contradict the words and principles within these scriptures. The second authority is that of the clergy who are entrusted with the duty to interpret the first accurately. Over time, a third authority arises as that of tradition, the unbroken lineage of the second (clerical) authority which presents itself as the litmus by which new interpretations (i.e. of the first, textual, authority) are weighed and measured. None of these authorities can survive without at least one of the others. I shall return to these three authorities in the following section (3.2.6); however two things should be clear here: [1] popularity does not constitute authority and [2] authority does not constitute popularity. As a result, the argument of solidifying popular opinion into orthodoxy is questionable at best.

If not popularity, then the argument for orthodoxy turns to one of synthesis. By claiming to draw together divergent strands of beliefs, the history of Christianity becomes a myth of evolutionary progress with later Christians being more ‘evolved’ than their ancestors. This argument either ignores or rejects the unreconciled differences as such. Diarmaid MacCulloch identifies three common tools of orthodoxy: ‘developing an agreed list of authoritative sacred texts (a “canon” of scripture, from the Greek for “straight rod” or “rule”); forming creeds; embodying authority in ministers set aside for the purpose’. These tools are joined together under the banner of authority in the argument of synthesis. Yet in the very act of synthesis, the question of authority arises, as I shall discuss in the following section (3.2.4) with regards to the filioque controversy in the council at Chalcedon. Despite attempting to bring together divergent strands, the (perhaps irreconcilable) differences do not always blend together without a force of authority. The question of orthodoxy cannot be resolved separate from questions of authority.

3.1.5 A ‘Fragile’ Kind of Orthodoxy

The centre of orthodoxy was imagined as holding firm prior to the Reformation because it was created by opposition and negation, washing over the multiple in a fabrication of a zero-sum game. The false security of authority constructs its own legitimacy such that its subjects can only assert:

We are all already-constituted subjects, placed in networks of power, and in reproducing ourselves it is also the latter we reproduce. To do otherwise is to risk confronting the powers that give us the sense of who we are, and to embark on the dangerous task of reconstructing ourselves along unfamiliar lines.\(^\text{34}\)

However, as I shall argue the Reformation has shown (3.3.2), the centre never actually held firm because of constant fragmentation, forcing a multiplication of relations. Against the above assertion, I have already begun to produce in this thesis a Christian identity ‘along unfamiliar lines’, following the flows of production to discover the process of Christian identity. The Christian identity is a dialectic that produces new centres and orthodoxies rather than an progression to unity by exclusion. Christianity necessarily is fragmented: ‘the multiformity of “Christianities” is implicit in its own attempt to claim definition’.\(^\text{35}\)

Christianity can be seen as an organic ‘machine’ which is, in Deleuze’s usage, a network of relations connecting smaller-scale ‘machines’ together. The lure of power in authority is strong because system and structure are easily conflated. The two terms serve different purposes in computer applications yet overlap to some extent. The building blocks of programming are sets of coded routines (functions, methods) which produce small, finite results. Oftentimes, these are grouped together to form classes or objects. A common example is if one had a ‘cat’ class, it would have a set of functions relating to what cats do: purr, meow, scratch, eat, etc. A structure is a collection of classes that could serve the needs of an application. However, the structure has no necessary relation between its members. The act of organisation is in the system which provides desired goals and produces the process to achieve those goals. For example, a structure could be a collection of various animal classes (cat, dog, cow, horse, etc). One system could organise the structure such that it was a zoo, but another system could use the exact same structure to construct a veterinary clinic. While the two may have similarities, they are very different environments that cannot be confused with one another (cf. equilibrium of identity in 2.2.5).

\(^{34}\) Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, 270.

\(^{35}\) Lieu, *Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World*, 268.
Following this distinction, Christian identity is a structure of core elements: symbols, texts, histories, etc. The many Christian groups organise that structure to create very different systems in such a way that what may be logical and reasonable in one system is not in another. The desire for authority and control occurs because the authority of a particular contingent system is extended to include the structure as well as other systems. In order to understand the implications theologically, I shall take the development of orthodoxy and differentiate between system and structure (see 3.4.5). By applying this differentiation historically, it shall become clear how orthodoxy has been abused by excluding other orthodoxies; this discovery shall uncover the gap between orthodoxies and heresies that can accommodate a ‘polydoxy’.

### 3.2 Orthodoxy as True Beliefs in the Early Church

In the previous section (3.1.2), the question of authority had been placed on hold in order to analyse the conceptual roots from which theological authority emerges, namely notions of orthodoxy. Now that I have provided a contemporary image of orthodoxy distinct from any particular orthodoxy which may claim it, I shall begin an analysis of the historical development of orthodoxy with its first period.

In this section, I wish to look at the relations between orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy in terms of identity. I begin first by looking at the external manifestation of the Christian identity in its separation from what becomes Judaism. This manifestation parallels a second, internal development which feature prominently in the early ecumenical councils between Nicaea (325 CE) and Chalcedon (451 CE). Even at these very early events, the catholic and schismatic series of orthodoxy (3.1.1) are placed against each other with neither overcoming the other. The developments of orthodoxy at this point shall be read in their historical context as necessary aspects of the social, cultural, and philosophical milieu of their time. Next, I shall re-read this development as the mutual inherence of the two series of orthodoxy. These interactions shall eventually proceed to the point in which they resolve into a new idea of identity during the time of the Reformation (see 3.3.2). The question of identity during early Christianity quickly turned towards externalising differences and, as I suggest, provided an impetus to define orthodoxy by the exercise of political power and authority re-inscribed as the theological orthodoxy. The content of Christian orthodoxy is shaped by authority in order to match a particular form of ‘Christianity’ over time.
3.2.1 A Long Farewell

In parallel with the construction of orthodoxy within early Christianity, the Jewish identity was also forming. By the fourth century, the split between both groups was nearing completion if not already completed. However, the parting was not simple and, as the gap of time between the earliest Christians and this split implies, took centuries to develop. Recent scholarship has provided excellent resources which I shall employ in the ‘parting of the ways’ debate: Judith Lieu’s *Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World* and Daniel Boyarin’s *Border Lines*. Early Christians did not consider Jewish practitioners as misguided believers (i.e. heretics) but rather as nonbelievers. This created at least four different categories of relation between Judaism Christianity while their ‘orthodoxies’ and identities emerged: [1] acceptable Christianity, [2] acceptable Judaism, [3] unacceptable Jewish-Christian hybrids, and [4] people who were neither Christian nor Jewish. The two categories which are pertinent to this thesis are the first and third which develop in this context into orthodoxy and heresy.

The partitioning of Christianity and Judaism was a process of innovative discoveries because both groups began to find their own kind of orthodoxy (which I use loosely here) and the legitimation through history of their orthodoxies. Neither Christianity nor Judaism was ‘protecting the integrity of the theological and orthodox centre’ of their respective religions, but rather constructing them through discursive analogues of the psychic process known as splitting, wherein unwanted parts of the psyche are projected ‘out there’, producing a sense of good self and bad other.

Both Christianity and Judaism could acknowledge each other as ‘pure’ religions, but any group caught between the two were excluded from both. After this point, the concept of ‘Jewish Christian’ or ‘Christian Jew’ became impossible hybrids and, consequently, heresies. Christianity developed as an identity separate from the emerging Jewish identity as well as from the accepted Greco-Roman identity. This first experience of early Christians with a different religious group provides the historical framework for how Christianity dealt with inter-religious as well as intra-religious dialogue.

The construction of borders between Christianity and Judaism at this time led to intensifying the borders within Christianity since Christian groups began ‘discovering’ that their

37. Ibid., 130.
38. Arguably, this is no longer the case as movements like Messianic Judaism have complicated the picture.
lineage could be traced back through the Apostles, Christ, and the earlier stages of Judaism: ‘in different ways these discovered histories serve both to legitimate and to draw boundaries, no longer against Judaism but against competing claimants to a common identity’.  

Through the ages, the Christian identity underwent ‘ecotypification’ as a temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2), being transferred, recontextualised, and retold through later versions of cultural memory in order to remain familiar to its proponents.  

Successive repetitions of orthodoxy (see 3.4.3) reconstructed the interpretive authority of tradition to corroborate and justify its contemporary interpretations. Because of this process, orthodoxy and heresy are always read after the fact mythologically, projecting the contemporary notions of each back into the earliest communities so that apostolic succession can be used to legitimate the definitions of orthodoxy and heresy for their contemporaries.  

During the ecumenical councils, new orthodoxies constantly emerged because groups discovered their own identities, as I shall explain soon. However, only the orthodoxy accepted in council as falling in line with the ‘common’ identity and retroactively drawn apostolic succession survived since the ‘attempt by a newly formed group to claim hegemony over traditional patterns of belief and practise by portraying themselves as ancient and originary is almost a defining characteristic of the discourse of orthodoxy’.  

Discourses of orthodoxy construct both Self and Other(s). In this respect, Christianity’s Others are both other religions as well as other Christian groups (especially those beyond one’s horizon of orthodoxy). An argument can and shall be made (4.4.2) that inter-religious dialogue for Christianity always includes dialogue between Christian groups (i.e. ecumenism) and vice versa; the two sets of dialogues are intrinsically connected. Perhaps most intriguing is that the each of the many Christianities maintain cohesion with an entire history of Christianity running back to Christ himself: ‘what has remained a constant in different settings is the continual engagement with the need to trace a thread from the past to the experienced realities of the present, both through coherence and through rupture, resulting in stories that are never stable, and never closed’.  

Christianity is inherently unstable precisely because of its quest to construct a single, authoritative community from polyvocal sources (e.g. Jewish and Greek/Gentile converts, a multi-authored set of Scripture). The historical connections can no longer be seen as recovering an ideal past but as ruptures in the constructions of identity.  

The schismatic series of orthodoxy (3.1.1) occurs in this moment where the ‘common’ identity of Christianity proves to be insufficient. As greater differentiation occurs, identities fragment and break

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41. Cf. ibid., 158.
42. Ibid., 59.
44. Ibid., 53.
apart under the weight of competing claims of orthodoxy. A new cycle begins with a newer, narrower definition of ‘catholicity’, leading to reduced horizons of orthodoxy.

Not only does this analysis of orthodoxy through identity account for the multiplicity of orthodoxies and centres within Christianity, it expects such to occur because the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2) continues to produce new senses of identity. The double image of orthodoxy that I have presented serves to root these discourses of identity and orthodoxy. However, by bringing the schismatic and catholic series of orthodoxy together, the discourse of orthodoxy cannot simply be prototypical — as the comparison against ‘a member of the category . . . which is considered a “best example” of orthodoxy’. Instead, the discourse of orthodoxy is the narrative of identity, moving between the singular and the plural (2.2.7). As a discourse of identity, the history as pure Memory (2.3.4) is re-interpreted to indicate simultaneous moves toward singularity (‘catholicity’) and multiplicity (‘schismatism’). In order to demonstrate more clearly this re-interpretation of early orthodoxy as the construction of an identity not just between Judaism and Christianity (as in Boyarin’s text) but also within Christianity, I shall analyse the developments of orthodoxy of the early church councils in their original social contexts so that the process of creating and re-creating orthodoxy can be seen as the repetition of pure Memory in particular spaces and times.

### 3.2.2 Excluding Heterodoxies

The first century of Christianity differs from modern variations in that there were no clearly defined boundaries; in fact, early figures in Christianity were driven to create boundaries. The trend of creating boundaries has been well established in both the short *A History of the Early Church* by Norbert Brox as well as the more exhaustive histories by Henry Chadwick and Diarmaid MacCulloch. As communities became more insular with the establishment of regional/local bishops who became the (local) exclusive authority for determining truth by apostolic succession, people from some communities began to be excluded from the welcoming hospitality of other Christian communities when ‘lists of orthodox bishops now had to be made in the communities, so that the communion would not be undermined’. Their boundaries were created and applied retroactively such that a Christian (or group of Christians) who found themselves on the wrong side of the boundary became heretics, sometimes well after their deaths (e.g. Origen). Sometimes these boundaries were the result of cultural or linguistic differences, but each were ‘given a theological foundation and immunised

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against change’. The usage of heresies was a straightforward way to define Christian identity by negation. However, I wish to keep in mind the contingency of these boundaries in such a way that theologians should not ‘define who were the early Christians, or what was Christianity, by adopting one set of clear boundaries’, particularly those boundaries which came after the fact. Following this sentiment, I shall refer to the early Christian groups that develop into orthodox Christianity as proto-orthodox.

By the mid-second century, proto-orthodox writers such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian were gaining authority throughout the Christian world; and out of this authority arose the construction of ‘heresy’. Their reputation stemmed from their willingness to engage and label different opinions — heterodoxies — as more than just different but actually wrong opinions. To this group of writers, the discipline of heresiology — defining and rejecting heresies — became the very centre of the Christian identity and theological articulation.

Perhaps the first consistent usage of the term ‘heresy’ as is generally used today came from Irenaeus when he ‘took the word *hairesis* (“self-chosen opinion”), used in the latest epistles in the NT in the sense of “sect”, and reapplied it to the whole spectrum of gnostic belief . . . [as] the natural counterpart of his concept of a united “Catholic” Church’. The definition of heresy occupies a space in which the heresiologist claims faithfulness to apostolic succession and its truth in order to declare the heterodox group as heretical on the basis of her own self-representation of orthodoxy. The distinction is relative, and one group ‘can be at the same time a [heterodox] sect with respect to one other group and a church, or orthodox, with respect to a different group’. The act of distinguishing these two representations was taken up by the heresiologists who transformed the two categories ‘into explicit winners and losers’.

Campaigns for orthodoxy were ‘successful’ (according to the proto-orthodoxy) because their proponents created what they sought to discover: the truth of Christian faith and belief. Erroneous belief could not be tolerated for they could imply the lack of true faith. Heterodox believers were not true believers because of their errors. As Christian thinkers began to defend Christianity against criticisms from pagans, they sought to defend it as true; to achieve this goal, Christian theology integrated with Platonic and Neoplatonic thought so that Chris-

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48. Ibid., 78.
tianity was superior to paganism because it was closer to the ‘divine Logos’ than pagan thinkers. The theology of early Christianity became largely Platonic, with many prominent theologians being fully indebted to Platonic thought.

Throughout the history of Christian theology, the ‘winners’ were those of the proto-orthodox variety, that is, those who made clear distinctions between orthodoxy and ‘heresy’ regularly conquered, subdued, or expelled those who did not have such clear distinctions. Because the proto-orthodox writers did not already have a set of clear boundaries in place prior to their writing, heresies and heretics were generally others who had **heterodox** — different — opinions. However, this does not mean that what became orthodoxy developed linearly; rather it was ‘a process of trial and error in which the error was not all on the side of the “heretics”, but was shared by the “orthodox” too’. This equating of orthodoxy with a singular set of **true** universal and unified dogma and practices gave rise to the equating of heterodoxy with heresy, of difference with incorrectness. As a result, the proto-orthodox writers rejected the heterodox appeals to Scripture with the implication that ‘heretics’ do not have ‘the right to possess the Scriptures’. The heterodox-turned-heretical opinions were often seen as syncretic hybrids which were incompatible because only ‘pure’ Christianity was true. For the proto-orthodox, there was only further error in mixing their truth with ‘external’ falsity. Through the critique of hybridity, orthodoxy emerges as the opposite of hybridity, ‘purity’: ‘heresiology is not only, as it is usually figured, the insistence on some (or another) right doctrine but on a discourse of the pure as opposed to the hybrid, a discourse that then requires the hybrid as its opposite term’.

### 3.2.3 Unity and Excommunications

While each of the major ecumenical councils were convened by the emperor, there were many synods and councils which occurred between them where debates were made between various groups. Each of the ecumenical councils were convened by the emperor in order to unify Christianity in a single state religion throughout the empire. Beginning with Constantine, there was a desire for a singular Christianity with a single hierarchy to provide a social unity for which each ecumenical council convened to resolve theological disputes in order to create social unity within the empire. However, the bishops and emperor Constantine ‘had different interests in the realm of dogma and church unity’ because the former


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prioritised dogma while the latter wanted ‘religious and political unity’. These differences ultimately led to the intermingling and transformation of (theological) orthodoxy into a political zero-sum match whereby emperors were forced by irreconcilable differences between Christian groups to ‘offer partisan support’. Politicisation of dogma became normative for later councils since each group tried to win support of the emperor in order to exclude the theologically heterodox; schismatics quickly became heretics as theology and politics joined together. This was a shift from earlier churches which saw ‘that concrete differences in church life proved the unity of Christians in faith’.

The first council of Nicaea (325) is recorded as resolving the Christological question raised by the Arian movement. However, at the end of the day, there were still people who accepted what would become an unorthodox position, indicating a second, perhaps implicit, debate of authority. This debate of authority is most visible at this council in the discussion of Meletius and the schismatic Christians centred around him. While seeking reconciliation with the Meletian sect, the council decided that Meletius should be prohibited from ordaining bishops and that those who had already been ordained by him were required to be vetted by first serving under a council-approved bishop. In other words, the Meletian sect was allowed back into the fold of orthodoxy as long as it would either be tempered by already-orthodox clergy or die out. Dissent was not allowed because ‘unanimity was axiomatic for a council’s authority. Dissenters had to be excluded from the Church. They had no minority rights.’

Further, of the twenty canons proclaimed at the council, eight dealt directly with authority, indicating which bishops the council recognised as authoritative, which groups of Christians should be considered beyond the horizon of Christianity, and regulations regarding how a bishop is to be ordained.

The resolutions of Nicaea initially were rejected by many. Firstly, Nicaea had a very weak Western presence which, despite the bishop of Rome sending two influential delegates, the Arian sections of Christianity in the East opposed Nicaea’s wording (homoousios in particular). Secondly, other groups rejected the use of an extra-biblical term (homoousios) to define dogma. Thirdly, there was at least one who used the term homoousios and was condemned already as a heretic for such. As a result of these reactions, ‘Constantine resolved

62. Ibid., 59.
63. Ibid., 68 (emphasis added).
to adopt a pro-Arian policy’.\(^{68}\) Despite a predominantly Eastern presence at Nicaea, the East quickly rejected it while the West slowly accepted it.\(^{69}\) These differences began to congeal into a growing divide between the ‘Greek East’ and ‘Latin West’ which would continue for centuries.\(^{70}\)

Unlike Nicaea I, the second ecumenical council, Constantinople I (381), took stronger measures and condemned anything remotely connected with the Arians previously deemed unorthodox. I hesitate to say the Arian movement was a minority because at one point, at least, Arianism was the dominant theological position. The remaining canons of the second council all deal with authority again: which bishops have precedence, which figures are heretics (and therefore should not be considered an authority), and what must one who has been declared a heretic do in order to return into the fold of orthodoxy.\(^{71}\) Interestingly, Constantinople I does not formulate a new creed but rather takes up formulae derived some time after the Council of Alexandria (362) summoned by Athanasius to reconcile the post-Nicene factions.\(^{72}\) The Council of Chalcedon (451) will associate a creed with Constantinople I after the fact and link it to Nicaea I; and this creed becomes the basis for Christian orthodoxy.\(^{73}\) In connection with the first council of Constantinople, the emperor ‘stated authoritatively in the heresy law of 381 that opposition to [the Niceno-Constantinopolitan] creed was heresy’.\(^{74}\)

### 3.2.4 Shifting Council Authorities

The politicisation of theology continued further in the third ecumenical council, Ephesus I (431), with the condemnations of the Nestorian and Pelagian groups. However, this council was thoroughly contested as some of the delegates (particularly Cyril of Alexandria whose theology originally was to be examined at the council) who arrived early convened early and began issuing strong resolutions and anathemas. The roles of accused and examiner were reversed.\(^{75}\) As a reaction, the Eastern bishops who arrived ‘late’ sent a letter of protest to the emperor who confirmed the offence.\(^{76}\) However, the solidification of authority reaches a critical stage at this council since it is the first to give an ultimatum to groups that have not been named in previous councils. A second, parallel council was convened under John of Antioch in opposition to Cyril’s and was more conciliatory and open to reconciliation in its

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\(^{68}\) Ibid., 159.

\(^{69}\) By 359, a majority of the Western delegates at the Council of Ariminum (Rimini) wanted to maintain the Nicene Creed against the Dated Creed. Cf. Chadwick, *The Church in Ancient Society*, 283.

\(^{70}\) Cf. ibid., 241.

\(^{71}\) Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 150–151 (pp. 65–67).

\(^{72}\) See Chadwick, *The Church in Ancient Society*, 416f.


\(^{74}\) Ibid., 50.

\(^{75}\) See ibid., 168.

\(^{76}\) See Chadwick, *The Church in Ancient Society*, 534.
resolutions.\textsuperscript{77} In the end, both partisan councils had in effect agreed on the Nicene creed (though \textit{which} Nicene creed may be debatable) with Cyril’s council extending it to condemn Nestorius’s theology and John’s council accepting Nestorius.

Both the emperor and the bishop of Rome, who was emerging as the first bishop among equals, adhered to Cyril’s council and it is the one counted retroactively as the third ecumenical council.\textsuperscript{78} Most notably, the sixth canon from Cyril’s council proclaimed that those who do not accept its canons would be removed from office and excommunicated.\textsuperscript{79} This is supported by the seventh canon which retroactively applies the previous canon to Nicaea I so that Nicaea would become the minimum requirements for accepted Christian identity. By Ephesus I, the early Church had established its authority through these (and other) councils; those who disagreed with the ‘consensus’ were not permitted to remain as part of the developing Christian identity. A contemporary geopolitical example that illustrates this ‘consensus’ is the international recognition of nations. Some nations are paired into mutual exclusion (e.g. Republic of China [Taiwan] and People’s Republic of China; North Korea and South Korea) which have, on occasion, included other nations into the dispute.

Through a Herculean effort to reconcile the divergent strands of Christian theology through the resolutions of Ephesus I, Pope Leo had sent a lengthy treatise (now known as Leo’s Tome) to what was to be the fourth ecumenical council and the second held at Ephesus (449). However, the partisan council president opposed Leo’s theology and attempted to stage a theological ‘coup’ (again at Ephesus) with the support of the Eastern emperor Theodosius II.\textsuperscript{80} This coup was short-lived because it had quickly excluded large regions of Christendom in pushing for its own Monophysite Christology. As a result of this council and Theodosius II’s death soon after in 450, a new council was convened and reversed much of Ephesus II and its supporters. Soon after Chalcedon, it was decided that Nicaea would be the defining creed of Christian orthodoxy and inserted into the record of Constantinople I the ‘accepted’ version of the Nicene creed. In addition to the theological orthodoxy created, Chalcedon also solidified the political authority of orthodoxy. However, the Chalcedonian Definition remained ambiguous and unclear despite the ‘evident degree of homogeneity to the thinking’ that produced the Definition.\textsuperscript{81} Another consequence of Chalcedon was the irreconcilable difference between Chalcedonian, Monophysite, and Nestorian Christianities which split them into three separate groups.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Cf. Brox, \textit{A History of the Early Church}, 168–9; Chadwick, \textit{The Church in Ancient Society}, 535.
\textsuperscript{80} See Brox, \textit{A History of the Early Church}, 171; Chadwick, \textit{The Church in Ancient Society}, 560–566.
\textsuperscript{81} Chadwick, \textit{The Church in Ancient Society}, 581.
\textsuperscript{82} See Brox, \textit{A History of the Early Church}, 174.
3.2.5 Orthodox Politics after Chalcedon

The councils prior to Chalcedon were creating structures of power by eliminating competition since only those who agreed with their canons were allowed to be recognised as Christian. The consolidation of power continued for three centuries before it began to collapse. However, ‘collapse’ is not entirely accurate; cellular mitosis might be a better description because the end result (after 1054) was two complete systems of authority rather than two fractured pieces of one system. The split between East and West was at least in part because the cultures, languages, and heritages of the two had diverged enough to produce two separate and intact Churches, something most visible in the assertion prior to the mid-twentieth century that each was the single, true Church of Christ. Following the analogy of mitosis, the Reformation shall be seen not as a fragmentation but as a catalyst for multiplication. In our own contemporary times, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of power structures all bearing the Christian identity. The image of a body is implied because the goal of mitosis is expansion and growth of a single body. However, my elaboration on the image of the body will be delayed until the following chapter (4.2.1).

The creation of authority through these councils allowed criteria of identity to be quantifiable and measurable, something which one acquired through proper education. By forcing groups to see the concept of orthodoxy as a choice between ‘heresy’ (i.e. production within polydoxy) and ‘orthodoxy’ (i.e. acquisition through authorised guardians) and conceiving the concept strictly in terms of the latter, the political concept of orthodoxy becomes idealistic and forces the discussion to ‘look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object’. A lack of central orthodoxy was employed as an argument to create one by excluding those who thought differently, retroactively measuring acceptability according to the standard of the established authority. For this reason, Eastern and Western Christianities can never be reconciled while maintaining such a structural self-image because one will always lack the ‘true’ orthodoxy.

The authority established in the councils and subsequent schisms can only view ecumenical reconciliation through the lack of orthodoxy and truth, requiring concessions of the dialectical Other without offering any in exchange. Such concessions tend to focus on the authority of one orthodoxy over the others rather than any possibility of a commonality in the Christian identity. Polydoxy disconnects these two concepts (Christian identity and authority of orthodoxy) by emphasising the horizons of authority and orthodoxy. In doing this, differences can coexist within a single Christian identity without breaking allegiances to a particular authority or orthodoxy. The result is a complex identity which becomes central through the

overlapping of horizons around common concepts, images, and actions. However, the overlap between orthodoxies should not be interpreted as indicating truth because, as the early councils have shown, popularity did not constitute orthodoxy in the cases of both Arian and Pelagian theologies.  

Polydoxy affirms the necessity of ‘schisms’. When difficulties begin to arise because the contextual divergences (culture, language, etc) within a single group push the question of theological orthodoxy into focusing on the question of authority, the emerging distinct authorities may never agree because of their different contexts. Arguably, this requires a schism not so that the one group ‘survives’ but that the discussion of a common identity through differences can continue unhindered by differences of authorities and horizons. The implication here should be clear: the common expression of Christian faith that was expected of the early ecumenical councils became impossible in the attempted realisation of a single orthodoxy. As councils asserted orthodoxy, the very unity hoped to be achieved was lost ‘in favour of the self-assertion of particular Christianities’.  

Furthermore, the councils and schisms which produced ‘heresies’ also produced new ‘orthodoxies’. This production of orthodoxy is one of identifying aspects of a working polydoxy because a singular, unified orthodoxy cannot be replicated without destroying its own stability.

### 3.2.6 Universally Accepted Orthodoxy

Before leaving the period of early Christianity, I wish to situate the concept of polydoxy which I have been employing as a product of the early Church developed in parallel to the councils. The argument for polydoxy can be found in one of Augustine’s contemporaries, Vincent of Lérins (434), as an alternative construct of orthodoxy. Vincent of Lérins uses two concepts to regulate theology: universality and originality. Taken together, these two concepts form a ‘traditional’ view of orthodoxy that is more radical than Augustine’s. Universality, which Vincent names ‘Tradition of the Church’ (cf. Ricœur’s Tradition in 1.2.5), is more than a simple majority of all living Christians; instead, it reaches back into antiquity as the consensus held ‘everywhere, always, by all’. Originality was taken as a negative correlate of universality such that nothing was added to orthodoxy and its tradition. Vincent intimates (if not explicitly states) that orthodox theology has always been practised.
pled with this universality, Vincent suggests that novelty in theology can be allowed only if it conforms with the boundaries created by the earlier Church. Vincent uses the image of bodily growth so that developments in theology are the maturation or harvest of what has always already been.\footnote{Cf. ibid., XXIII:55, 148.} The authority of orthodoxy for Vincent lay between the texts of scriptures and the interpretive reception of the community as tradition.\footnote{Cf. Chadwick, \textit{The Church in Ancient Society}, 471.} Even for Vincent, ‘heterodoxy’ should always be avoided so that there is ‘no variation in [theology’s] limits’.\footnote{Vincent of L´erins, ‘Commonitory’, XXIII:56, 148.}

At this point, Vincent’s argument may appear directly opposed to the implied concept of polydoxy which shall be defined more clearly later in this thesis (3.3.3). However, two points will change this image. First, by reading Vincent’s tradition restrictively as it is implied, he is not suggesting that nothing can be added to theology but rather that the central tenets of orthodoxy should not be expanded to incorporate new statements and creed in order that there can be harmonious disagreements without reducing everything to orthodoxy. Theological opinions beyond the minimal centre of orthodoxy (most likely defined in the Nicene creed) ‘might be right or they might be wrong; but, inasmuch as they lay outside the [universally recognised tradition of orthodoxy], error here need not be heresy. “Orthodoxy” was no longer co-extensive with “true.”’\footnote{Markus, ‘The Legacy of Pelagius’, 220.}

Secondly, by updating Vincent’s analogy of bodily growth to incorporate modern biology and the problem of identity and change (1.3.5), Vincent’s definition of orthodoxy can be found to be quite favourable to polydoxy. It is now commonly accepted by scientists that all molecules (e.g. those which compose a person’s body) have limited lifetimes such that while a young adult is considered the same person as she was when an infant, the actual bodies at the cellular level of the two may be radically different. By introducing Vincent to the ship of Theseus (1.3.5), I suggest the dilemma Vincent now faces is that the people which compose the Church (and therefore, what makes up the Tradition of the Church) change and often are replaced. Despite the seemingly hard boundary between orthodoxy and its opposite, the changes over time ‘weaken’ the walls and make it porous. Through the openings in the boundaries created by earlier Christianity (e.g. rejections and reinterpretations of previous beliefs), Christian theology is not closed off to the outside world. Much like a ship, exposure to the elements affects its boards and eventually prompts their replacements. The question of orthodoxy can be asked only through a hermeneutical framework which focuses primarily on the Christian identity; the practise of orthodoxy is the hermeneutics of identity found in the catholic series of orthodoxy.
Even though Vincent criticises ‘heresies’ for their novelties, he does not suggest the Church remain in stasis without development. There is a vital hermeneutical question here as to how Christian theology remains faithful to its historical narrative while also adapting to a changing world — both socially and intellectually. In taking the problem of change and feeding it back into Vincent’s regulatory concepts, orthodoxy — as a process of adaptation and multiplicity — can be read as discovering the pluralist environment in which Vincent’s ideas already exist. Rather than reading Vincent as a precursor to religious fundamentalism which often negatively views changes in the world (e.g. the sexual revolution, modern science) and calls for a ‘return’ to an earlier lifetime of Christianity, I suggest reading Vincent as expecting these changes. Vincent can be seen as agreeing with Augustine in treating theology as something that can be separated from other disciplines so that ‘it was not the intention of the Spirit of God, who spoke through [the authors of Scriptures], to teach men [sic] anything that would not be of use to them for their salvation’. In this vein, then, the changes in the world can no longer be seen as at odds with the core of Christian theology but rather as the changing application of theology in the world.

3.3 Orthodoxy in Terms of Reconciliation During the Reformation

The grab for authority at Ephesus I (431) is realised just twenty years later at Chalcedon (451). In a bold motion, Chalcedon proclaimed twenty-seven canons that focused on order and discipline in the church, much more than the previous ecumenical councils. Regarding doctrine, Chalcedon gave just one canon which retroactively excluded and excommunicated anyone who did not accept the canons and anathemas of the three previous ecumenical councils. In short, the question of authority was largely resolved and those who disagreed with or did not accept the authority of the developing Catholic church were considered to be already beyond the horizon of theological orthodoxy. One of the primary results of Chalcedon was the division of early Christianity into three groups — Chalcedonian, Miaphysite, and Nestorian — with the latter two excluded from ‘orthodox’ Christianity. This status of exclusion interpreted as already having occurred becomes the standard interpretation of excommunication in many churches such that the notice of excommunication is not a punishment for but rather an acknowledgement of the already existing condition. The ‘punishment’ in a notice of excommunication serves as ultimately an exit notice from Christianity because one

is anathematised and acknowledged as already ‘dead’ (theologically speaking). Contemporary to the solidification of authority, there is a shift in the ecclesial image of orthodoxy: implied in both conceptions of orthodoxy from the fifth century by Vincent of Lérins and the Chalcedonian delegation (cf. 3.2.4 and 3.2.6), orthodoxy was to be defined narrowly and at least partially ambiguous so that multiple groups can be included within its umbrella of truth. Because of this shift, there was a subsequent shift in orthodoxy away from theological truth (which had been settled in the eyes of those who accepted the Nicene creed) towards salvation (during the Reformation era). As I shall show in the following section (3.4.1), the truth of orthodoxy was settled but the interpretations of orthodoxy have regularly changed and groups once excluded from ‘orthodoxy’ may be included again without a change of beliefs (e.g. rejection of ecumenical councils).

The problem with consensus proved irreconcilable in the ninth century. The controversy at that time was not one of doctrine but of authority, language, and culture surrounding an otherwise more benign issue of succession for the patriarch of Constantinople — a political issue which had not been foreign to Christianity. While the Emperor disregarded the then-current patriarch (Ignatius), the Bishop of Rome chose Ignatius over the replacement proposed by the emperor, Photius. The Emperor convened Constantinople IV (869–70) to legitimise his case, but the council voted against him and reinstated Ignatius. Unconvinced, the Emperor again reverted the decision and was able to convene a second council (recognised by the Eastern church as the actual Constantinople IV) ten years later and gained approval for Photius mostly because Ignatius had died two years prior. At this point in Church history, the issue of consensus became problematic since the majority opinion was revealed to be changeable and alterable.

There was a growing disagreement between Eastern and Western forms of Christianity; however these differences were largely permitted between the two groups and seen in terms of linguistic and cultural divergences. The time between the two councils named Constantinople IV and the schism in 1054 showed that these differences were becoming harder to see past, particularly since the differences were mixed with questions of authority. In 1054, the mutual acceptance was lost and transformed into mutual excommunication of Eastern and Western churches: now each side proclaimed to be the one true Church and the other was heretical. On one hand the dispute was about the truth of theology and doctrine (e.g. the filioque clause); on the other hand, the dispute was about the acceptance of authority. Setting aside the content of the theological differences, it is safe to say that prior to these final stages of separation, both sets of doctrinal opinions were recognised as acceptable. To generalise

this: only after an opinion survives the shifting tests of orthodoxy is it allowed to persist as a differing opinion (‘heterodoxy’). The notion of pluralism during this period depended on a prior move of orthodoxy: ‘the possibility of pluralism, we might say, was won precisely by excluding any possibility of real dissent’.\textsuperscript{98} In other words, only the votes of the ‘majority’ were counted and this was re-interpreted as the ‘single voice’ of the Church Fathers such that ‘all orthodox Christians held the Nicene creed [because] accepting that creed was [Athanasius’s] definition of orthodoxy’.\textsuperscript{99} The ‘consensus’ of the major ecumenical councils was always based first on the rule of orthodoxy: those who refused to accept the ‘majority’s’ opinion were treated as sectarian and excluded from the shared Christian identity.\textsuperscript{100} Yet, as I now shall show with the Reformation, the exclusion of dissent in orthodoxy changed the way in which dissent itself was defined, leading to further exclusion when orthodoxy becomes more narrowly focused. As the debates surrounding the Reformations show, this interpretation shall become apparent.

3.3.1 Reformations

By the time of the Reformations, the first council at Chalcedon had become the authoritative measure of Christian orthodoxy across the dominant boundaries of Western and Eastern Christianities.\textsuperscript{101} What was once contested had become the standard theological definition of orthodoxy and was used as a tool by which groups would wield political control of orthodoxy. The Deleuzian image of sense (1.1.1) has already been occurring in the production of orthodoxies within the Church because, as a historiography of theology — an analysis of how the history of theology itself has changed and has been rewritten over time — reveals, Christian theology continually changes, because ‘the relationship between who we are and the past we tell is a reciprocal one and is rarely static’.\textsuperscript{102} The Reformation serves as the boiling point for the dissolution of the imagined whole Church into orthodoxies. Prior to the Reformation, many could still claim (now dubiously) that there were two groups claiming to be the ‘one true Church’ — Western Catholic and Eastern Orthodox — from which all accepted others branched and diverged. However, the Reformation makes it impossible to speak of the Church in this way.

Relatively concurrent with Martin Luther (1483–1546), reformations and ‘rebellions’ occur throughout Europe: Geneva, Strasbourg, Zurich, England, Scotland, etc. Some, if not many, of these were consequences of establishing universities as homes of speculative thought with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{98} Boyarin, \textit{Border Lines}, 180.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Chadwick, \textit{The Church in Ancient Society}, 419–20.
  \item \textsuperscript{100} Cf. Boyarin, \textit{Border Lines}, 174.
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Lieu, \textit{Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World}, 62.
\end{itemize}
minimal direct influence from the Church hierarchy.\(^{103}\) This academic freedom in the universities helped fuel growing conflict between progressive and traditional groups as they represented doctrinal pluralism and unity, respectively.\(^{104}\) In addition to the rise of universities, there were also debates on ecclesial authority within the Western Church because there were as many as three different claimants to the papacy over a period of forty years. Between Rome and Avignon, allegiances and authority were tested.\(^{105}\) At the Council of Constance (1414–1418), the authority of the council was decided to be above even the pope(s).\(^{106}\) The reforms for which council delegates had hoped were postponed to a later council, yet these later councils continued to fuel the rivalry of authority between councils and popes.\(^{107}\) Nearly a century of this rivalry continued before Luther’s small hope at rectifying and reforming the Catholic Church fans the flames of reforms into a crisis of authority and salvation.

The primary focal point of the Reformation for this thesis shall be limited to the figure and legacy of Martin Luther. I shall briefly mention some of the other Reformations, but the question of ‘authority’ which becomes the underlying and perhaps central issue in Rome’s response to Luther’s theological questions clearly fits with what I have described as the shift in questions of orthodoxy. Heiko Oberman’s detailed analysis of Luther’s reformation is an excellent resource for understanding Luther’s theology during the Reformation while Alister McGrath provides a wider context within which Luther can be situated.\(^ {108}\)

Luther breaks from tradition and, following both Jan Hus and the relatively new school of nominalism, Luther sees the biblical texts as the sole foundation for theology, though this was confirmed and interpreted through a ‘tradition’ remarkably similar to Vincent of Lérin’s concept of orthodoxy (cf. 3.2.6).\(^ {109}\) For Luther, there was a disturbing trend in the Church’s teachings on salvation and he made a discovery while lecturing on the epistle to the Romans that would change theology: humans as sinners only could ‘be justified by grace alone’.\(^ {110}\) In his attempts to reform Catholic theology in accordance with this discovery, Luther found himself unwillingly in opposition to the Church which he loved dearly. Luther was denounced as a heretic at universities and excommunicated by the Catholic Church hierarchy multiple times.

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103. There was still a considerable amount of indirect influence because the universities were tied closely to monastic orders.
106. Cf. ibid., 325.
110. Ibid., 164.
According to McGrath, Luther saw ‘spiritual authority’ (i.e. theological orthodoxy) as persuasive and ‘concerning the individual’s soul’ but the papacy (as well as Western Christianity in general) had conflated it with geopolitical authority. This confusion had led to Luther’s excommunication because his theological reforms were seen as political critiques. It did not help that Luther’s theology shifted towards individual Christians and their salvation; these were seen as political subversion rather than the perhaps ethical influences and consequences of salvation. One result of Luther’s reforms was the further fragmentation of the Western Church, though this was linked to geopolitical power in the now well-known doctrine of *cuius regio, eius religio.* However, according to Oberman, Luther saw the Church as an ‘accumulation of schisms’ and that was Luther’s motivation to bring reformation to the Church so that the invisible Church as a polyvocal unity could be realised in the visible institution(s). This unity which Luther sought to realise is not radically different than the aim of this thesis despite my reconception of unity within and because of the schisms which create multiplicities.

In contrast to Luther’s desire to reform the Western Church from within, other reformers had more radical opinions. While both Luther and the ‘radical’ reformers agreed that the apostolic succession which linked them to the early Church was theological, the radical reformers rejected all notions of tradition for reading and interpreting the Bible. Luther still held to a tradition that had continuity with the early Church and those in between. For some reformers, such as John Calvin, the Catholic Church failed to meet his ‘minimalist definition of the church’ and could be safely discarded by Christians. In the same year that Luther dies, the Council of Trent (1546) convened to begin the large-scale reformation that started to take shape at Constance over a century prior. The council issues at least two negative reactions to the other reformation: first, it criticises them for redefining what is ‘Scripture’ in order to justify some of their claims and, second, it asserts the historical tradition handed down within the Catholic Church holds the same authoritative weight as the Bible because the two are intrinsically linked. While Trent did bring about many other reforms, these two reactions make possible a re-interpretation of orthodoxy.

### 3.3.2 Reformations and the Renewing of the Past

Western Christianity during the Reformation faced a problem similar to that of Judaism and early Christianity: how can differences, perhaps irreconcilable, be contained within one
church body? While Judaism and early Christianity drew borders to distinguish one another and expunge any hybrid forms, Christianity at the time of the Reformation was unwilling (or unable) to repeat that division into multiple, separate religions; each Christian group wanted to retain apostolic lineage and some theologians, like Luther, wanted to only reform the existing Roman Catholic Church rather than create a separate institution. There were many similarities and few clearly defined points of differentiation; few, if any, of the theological divergences were seen as fundamental to the truth of Christian orthodoxy or identity. Many of the differences can be seen as issues of authority rather than fundamental truth; for example, Luther’s initial opposition was to the Catholic practise of indulgences rather than a particular error about God, Christ, etc. I suggest that this is the first point in time where Christian identity was in danger of being lost since it was the first time that Western Christianity could not define itself in terms of a single authority opposed to heresies as Christianity had done during many of the earlier ecumenical councils. The rhetoric of defining by opposition is most troubling because it ‘denies “the other” any self-description’, robbing Others of the ability to construct an identity that is not in direct opposition.\textsuperscript{116} However, what happens when multiple, mutually exclusive groups claim authority, fidelity to an orthodox lineage, and adherence to all prior ecumenical councils? At least with the Great Schism, Eastern and Western Christianities could claim the other had failed to accept an aspect of a prior ecumenical council, yet this was not a viable argument during the Reformation.

The narratives of Christian orthodoxy became battle cries during the Reformation because groups each began to claim authority in opposition to one another while also claiming faithful adherence to apostolic lineage and tradition. An interesting part of these narratives were the claims to apostolic succession since each group reinterpreted the single Tradition to become its successors. What is often overlooked in these claims is the multiplicity of Christian Scripture itself. Whether one begins with Genesis or the Gospels, the originary story of Christianity is duplicitous as multiple accounts create multiple possibilities — the Deleuzian disjunctive synthesis (1.1.4) and Ricœurian polysemy (1.2.1) easily visible. While some theologians have tried to harmonise these accounts into single, coherent narratives, all such attempts end in either failure or rejection by others. These acknowledged breaks and disruptions in Scripture ‘shape identity, revealing previously unknown commonalities and continuities with others and giving rise to larger spaces of interaction and negotiation’\textsuperscript{117}

I agree with Judith Lieu that the Christian identity (if not religious identity in general) is found in ‘the sense of continuity through time, belonging to and being able to tell a story, and the sense of separateness or otherness’ which is rooted in a plurality rather than binary

\textsuperscript{116} Lieu, \textit{Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World}, 283.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 316.
opposition between (one) truth and (many) errors.\textsuperscript{118} The shared Christian identity is found not in the claims of authority or orthodoxy but in the common claim to a genealogical tradition despite radically different images of that tradition. Identity is produced from signs and handed down as a living tradition which is continually reinterpreted and changing. As a living tradition, Christian identity is always contextual, differing from others and (re)creating the very roots from which it grows. The ‘one’ living tradition was finally seen as many when groups ‘fought against one another while using the same rationalistic method of deriving at their doctrines from this infallible text’ while also claiming ‘to represent alone the orthodoxy faith.’\textsuperscript{119}

These histories of Christianity with the ruptures and discontinuities in its textual roots create a multistable scenario. Multistability is the ambiguity of systems that are neither stable nor totally unstable as they alternate between two or more mutually exclusive states over time. Christian identity and orthodoxies can and do change over time because history itself is reinterpreted through the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2), re-creating and revivifying cut off pasts and futures. Equilibrium as a stabilised, neutral state is rarely achieved because the system itself is always in a state of change with new variables and variations disrupting every act of stabilisation. Yet there is a coherence — a sense of Christian identity — which emerges and is produced by these disruptions. This is the core of Christian identity: a commonality which maintains a self-integrity and stability from a complete rupture (i.e. into mutually exclusive systems) while it is produced from the very acts of rupturing and disequilibrium. Just as the early ecumenical councils caused the very fragmentation they hoped to avoid, so too Reformation Christianities produced the cohesion between each other precisely in the divergence they hoped to create. To return to the catholic and schismatic series (3.1.1), the origin and culmination of each is found in the other.

The mutual inherence of the two series of orthodoxy becomes clear in the Reformation era. As Western Christianity ‘fragmented’, new centres arose for association and collective identity. For example, the ‘single’ Lutheran movement quickly develops into many different Lutheran groups, each having distinct structures, authorities, and orthodoxies (e.g. Swedish, Danish, and German). Yet despite these small fractures in ‘Lutheranism’, there is some commonality which binds together the various Lutheran Churches. The same can be said of other groups (Reformed, Baptist, Anglican, etc) because they each develop a ‘catholic’ alliance across any ‘schismatic’ differentiation. It follows that it should be expected for even these alliances to fragment and (re)form in new constellations when differences become mutually exclusive. However, it does not follow that these differences will eventually

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 311.

\textsuperscript{119} Jeanrond, \textit{Theological Hermeneutics}, 36 (emphasis in original).
produce something that is not ‘Christian’ (or ‘Lutheran’, etc) except from the limited horizon of a particular perspective. The production of orthodoxies, much like reproduction within a biological species, does not produce something that is not derived from its own species; apostolic lineage, tradition, and scriptures are passed and received.

### 3.3.3 Always Reforming Orthodoxy

Roughly a century after Luther’s Reformation began, René Descartes formulates a *cogito* as the basis for philosophical enquiry. The connection between the Reformation and the ‘thinking self’ may be overlooked, but I want to suggest here that it is vital to answering the question of unity within diversity. Descartes’s *cogito* provides a launching point for subsequent philosophy, culminating in the Kantian unified subject (2.1.1). The twentieth century plurality of Christian theology emerges from this Kantian line of thought as the once ignored link between the many Christianities and the whole of Christianity. Parallel to these arguments for a unified self, debates occur throughout the many new groups of Christians on how they all can claim to be Christian. In other words, there was a concern developing parallel to the unified subject on how to construct Christianity in order to maintain the distinct separateness of the many Christian groups in conjunction with a cohesion of those same groups as Christian. There can no longer be a single orthodox body because, just as the Reformation has made it impossible to ignore the fragmentation of Christianity, the development of a unified subject in philosophy has made it impossible to ignore the possible cohesion of the Christian identity.

The prior development of group identity (2.2.7) becomes the missing link between multiplicity and singularity. Not only can there be multiple centres of orthodoxy within Christianity, but they have already been in practise for centuries. I am not suggesting something novel or innovative here besides a new definition for the concept of orthodoxy *in order to better reflect what already exists*. I do not wish to abolish the ‘traditional’ concept of orthodoxy because it does have value in certain contexts, something which shall be explored in the following chapter (4.1.4). The boundaries between Christian groups are not as hard and strong as they were once imagined, but they do remain and serve an important role: ‘they imply selection and the giving of value amidst the experience of difference’.\(^{120}\)

Orthodoxy as it has been traditionally understood has ended and has been replaced by a virtual creation of orthodoxy. This virtual orthodoxy privileges no particular group since all orthodoxies are found within a field of heterodoxy or polydoxy in which orthodoxy is produced only by moving along the Möbius strip of tradition through the temporal-mimetic

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process (1.3.2). ‘Heresy’ can no longer mean simply everything beyond a particular theological tradition or horizon since one perspective’s field of vision is rarely able to see beyond its own limits. If ‘heresy’ exists, it must be a revolutionary faction ‘within’ one’s borders rather than something external to them.

I propose a new context for ‘heterodoxy’ which employs Juan Luis Segundo’s definition of orthodoxy as something which ‘refers less to the truth of a theology than to the right to exist which a particular interpretation of Christian faith enjoys within a healthy theological pluralism’. 121 I disagree with Segundo’s calling this internal pluralism orthodoxy because it may be used to imply a relativism within thought that is not necessarily implied in the definition. I choose the term ‘polydoxy’ to indicate the acknowledgement of differences within Christianity, though the word heterodoxy (as ‘different doxa’) is also a plausible candidate. It may be of better value to think of the limits of a particular orthodoxy as unexplored frontiers instead of impenetrable borders to an urbanised settlement.

Because of the limited range of a particular perspective, the Reformation movement within the Roman Catholic Church cannot be seen as excluding those ‘revolutionary’ groups from the Christian identity. Rather, the Council of Trent and subsequent changes are reactions to the rising popularity of new authorities which ultimately occurred outside the reach of its own authority. When the groups which separated from the Roman Catholic Church — either willingly (e.g. radical reformers) or unwillingly (e.g. Luther) — established their own authorities and denied the authority from Rome, Tridentine reforms were the consequence of both the political and theological changes which originated within the Church but were excised because of a perceived battle of authority. The irony in the Reformation era was the establishment of dogmatic authorities within the emerging groups of Christians because the authority of orthodoxy once ‘outside the control of Rome’s legal influence was, however, soon limited by the Lutheran and Reformed confessions’. 122 In this sense, the greatest changes during the Reformation were not theological but political. The shift in the European landscape from a single theological power to multiple theological powers subsequently changed theological understanding of Christianity because both ecclesial authorities and thinkers had to decide how to handle this shift. The twentieth century is when these changes mixed with post-Kantian philosophical thought of the nineteenth century and became a dominant theme in Christian practice across any border lines previously separating churches.

122. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics, 71.
3.4  *Embodying Orthodoxy in the Ecumenical Movement since the Nineteenth Century*

While the Reformation itself came roughly four hundred years after the Great Schism and could be seen as the revelation of internal fractures within Christianity, another four hundred years began to reveal within the Reformation something else quite different. This is where ecumenical dialogue fits as the mediation between allied groups, the acknowledgement of each structure of authority *as different orthodoxies*, and the negotiation of boundaries between one another within Christianity. In the past century or so, dialogues have emerged regarding questions of unity within Christianity across the borders that had divided the once imagined single, homogeneously orthodox community. This is at least partly because the borders are now seen as ‘permit[ting], and indeed encourag[ing], interaction, while provid- ing rules for it’. Results of this re-evaluation include the revocation in 1965 of the mutual excommunications from the schism of 1054 and a number of documents from the Roman Catholic Church emphasising a more complex unity of Christianity. Similar suggestions have arisen in other Christian groups as well (see 4.2.3). In fact, it has been suggested that the relationship between Christian groups mirrors that of the actual body of Christ: wounded and disjointed but still a single body. This image of the body of Christ returns in the following chapter (4.2.1) where I shall expand on the image in order to propose a contemporary ecumenical ecclesiology.

### 3.4.1 The Ecumenical Movement Today

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, organisations have created avenues for exploring ecumenical unity. The most famous is perhaps the World Council of Churches (WCC) which has produced an exhaustive anthology of texts, speeches, and statements concerning the development of twentieth century ecumenism. The movements which produced the WCC arose from the tensions inherent to mutually exclusive positions trying to claim the same centre of (theological) orthodoxy and the realisation that the single Christian faith was heading towards disunity and even disintegration. Historically, this disunity developed be-

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cause of ‘a rigid understanding of unity which perceived diversity as a threat’. However, contemporary ecumenism has provoked a re-interpretation of the past and what was once a hard and impermeable boundary between churches becomes porous. For example, the once excluded Oriental Orthodox Church was able to make a joint statement with the Roman Catholic Church in 1984 stating that their disagreements ‘arose only because of differences in terminology and culture’ and now agree that both teach ‘the true doctrine concerning Christ our Lord, notwithstanding the differences in interpretation of such a doctrine which arose’ at Chalcedon in fifteen centuries earlier.

One could argue that the reconciliation of some of the longest divisions between Christian groups has been possible due to the recognition of linguistic and cultural differences rather than a resolution of any important theological differences. Yet this provokes the question regarding theological orthodoxy: is there any creed or statement which can be used to define orthodoxy for all who claim the Christian identity and all groups which are actively recognising (or at least starting to do so) each other as part of the same universal, invisible Church? While it is clear that there are Christian groups which accept and ordain married clergy (as well as female and now same-sex clergy), the same can also be said of the Roman Catholic Church in its ‘Eastern rite’ churches (e.g. the Eastern Catholic Church) which are recognised as being in ‘full communion’ with Rome while allowing clerical marriage. As noted above, the Oriental Orthodox Communion which still rejects the Chalcedonian Definition is involved with the WCC and the broader ecumenical movement, including the WCC’s common declaration in 1984. The Assyrian Church of the East, which also rejects the Chalcedonian Definition is also involved with the WCC and ecumenism. Despite the Assyrian Church not being in ‘full communion’ with the Roman Catholic Church, both have recognised that each other has a valid liturgy and signalled some degree of recognition of each other’s apostolic succession though with remarkable differences.

Even trying to focus Christian dogma on the early Nicene creed as the WCC does can be difficult because Christian groups such as Oneness Pentecostals reject even that creed yet still participate in ecumenical dialogues and are considered somehow ‘Christian’. Ecumenical unity is at a crossroads: should Christian identity be decided by accepting the letter of a statement/creed or should it be decided by accepting the ‘spirit’ of early creeds? The first

129. John Paul II and Ignatius Zakka I Iwas, Common Declaration, 3 (emphasis mine).
CHAPTER 3. NARRATIVES OF ORTHODOXY

option is easier to determine but it excludes groups which may hold to the Christian identity. As ecumenical dialogues focus on interpreting and re-interpreting the past to find common roots in the early Church despite differences in contemporary embodiment, it can be argued that ecumenism has already chosen the second path because it seeks to discern a common spirit in order to recognise the differences of statements as linguistic and cultural rather than theological. The common roots of the past are genetic and genealogical, changing over time in the same way that the ship of Theseus (cf. 1.3.5) changes yet remains the same. The question of ecumenical unity and the shared theological orthodoxy becomes one of identity and relations.

3.4.2 A Present Embodying the Virtual Past

In order to provide a defence of orthodoxy as polydoxy, the past must be revisited. However, this visitation of the past is not a ‘return’ as the term has been traditionally used whereby ‘out of the process would arise the theme of the earliest church as an unsullied virgin, the standard and ideal by which all subsequent developments would be measured and to which the church would ever seek to return’. The alternative here is to revisit the past to revivify it (cf. 1.2.4), constructing new narratives that are not accorded necessity. Polydoxy is at heart a hermeneutics of identity reading traditions through time.

The construction of orthodox narratives is the ‘reading’ of a Self (2.2.5) which creates an identity, yet this narrative is always made weak by others because it is incapable of being defined separate from interpretations (cf. 1.2.2). Narratives of orthodoxy — especially those which create a ‘golden age’ in the past as the ideal to which the orthodox must return — are prone to ideological distortions imposed on the past by present interpreters who wish to reconstruct the narrative around themselves. Polydoxy aims to prevent that by revealing the hermeneutical nature of orthodoxy is already a narrative created in the present as a repetition of identity (2.2.3) in which ‘the present shapes the meaning of the past, and the past can be remembered because, as now understood, it prepares for the present’.133

The mediation of identity which roots polydoxy employs authority to situate each narrative within the ecclesial image orthodoxy, between the unity of the ‘catholic’ series and the multiplicity of the ‘schismatic’ series (3.1.1). For Western theology, these narratives are constructed from texts, creating horizons of orthodoxy which are inhabited by individuals and groups:

texts construct a world; they do this out of the multiple worlds, including textual

133. Ibid., 82.
ones, that they and their authors and readers already inhabit and experience as ‘reality’; that new world itself becomes part of subsequent ‘reality’ within and out of which new constructions may be made.\textsuperscript{134}

The ‘worlds’ of an ecclesial image of orthodoxy are the networks of relations that form the narrative Self, creating a body without organs (2.1.4), something that I shall discuss in further detail in the following chapter (4.2). The network of relations that is the body without organs is transposed as the image of identity and ecclesial orthodoxy at both the microscopic (e.g. individual) level and the macroscopic (e.g. group) level. These relations are always limited by the horizons and ruptures of each member within the network, never complete and yet never incomplete. It is this lack and excess of meaning (1.1.1) which produces each member as orthodox within the polydox identity. The best ‘reading’ of the Christian identity, which is made more possible by polydoxy, empowers the orthodox Self by its heterodox Others ‘to unfold its meaning during the act of reading’ as a conversation of equals.\textsuperscript{135}

The double-image of orthodoxy (the catholic and schismatic series) highlights the necessity of polydoxy. The orthodox Self is always fragmented. The traditional differentiation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy has been that of a single majority (i.e. the orthodoxy) and many minorities (i.e. the heterodox or heretical). To speak of heterodoxies as minority opinions is problematic because it implies that one group ‘truly belongs to a particular politically defined place, but those of others (minority cultures) do not — either because of recency (immigrants) or of archaicness (aborigines)’.\textsuperscript{136} The issue of authority runs beneath the implication, giving an air of legitimacy by necessity and ignoring its own contingent nature.

\section*{3.4.3 Repetitions of Orthodoxy}

Before turning to the question of authority, there are still two more aspects of orthodoxy which can be analysed: first as the medium in which religious authority (i.e. the political image of orthodoxy) can be exercised and second as the establishment of doxa which represent a particular religious authority as tradition (i.e. the theological image of orthodoxy). The first concept I have given the name of ‘heterodoxy’ because it is exercised within the context of different authorities and centres. The second concept is the ‘traditional’ use of orthodoxy (cf. 3.2.2) and proves to be useful once it is reconstituted as a centre around which heterodoxies orbit. Orthodoxy can only work in a pluralist environment ‘as iron sharpens iron’; without

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{135} Jeanrond, \textit{Theological Hermeneutics}, 7.
\textsuperscript{136} Asad, \textit{Genealogies of Religion}, 257.
differences of opinion, there cannot be any systematic regulation of beliefs. Out of this plurality, multiple orthodoxies emerge as competing centres of authority. Yet prior to the competition of authority, the emerging orthodoxies are developed in relation to one another. Similar to the analysis of identity in the previous chapter (2.2.5), orthodoxy re-constructs the fragments of pure Memory (1.1.2) as a whole through narrativity. In the way that Ricoeur has differentiated types of tradition (1.2.5), so too have theologians in such ways that the Tradition of the Church (cf. Vincent’s use in 3.2.6) which is the Gospel is not something possessed by or held exclusively by an individual tradition; rather each tradition has received and is possessed by the Tradition. In order to understand the plurality of orthodoxies, the relations between the many need to be highlighted.

The development of orthodoxies lies in the process of repetition, the continual production of identity through the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). For many areas of Christianity, this process can be seen clearly in the practise of the liturgy and the embodiment of identity in ritual and praxis, concepts which I discuss in the following chapter (4.4.3). Through repetition, orthodoxies ‘splitter’ and create new orthodoxies fully formed. It is this process of mitosis that creates associations, intensities, and pluralities. New orthodoxies emerge in relation to existing ones; they are never created ex nihilo. Roughly speaking, these relations tend to be in practise either derivative or reactive. The derivative is generally positive, inheriting what is seen as ‘good’ beliefs. On the other hand, reactive relations are generally negative, rejecting what is seen as ‘wrong’ beliefs. Viewed through a genetic account of orthodoxies, the relations are more complex than a linear pedigree or claim to apostolic succession may indicate. Some orthodoxies become entangled and create a singularity around which many revolve (e.g. the Anglican Communion). The important factor in understanding orthodoxies is the image of relations between the many: one of chaotic interactions and twists viewed topologically as a network or maze.

It is this chaotic mix of relations that necessitates the need for authority. Authority orders chaos, constructing a framework of orthodoxy through which one can interpret and weigh beliefs. Each orthodoxy becomes its own teleologically idealised Self. The looming question of authority becomes one of relations between these frameworks. The authority to determine horizons of orthodoxy exists only through a mutual recognition of each other as orthodox; this mutual recognition is erroneously called ‘full communion’, something which shall be analysed in the following chapter (4.1.3). To complicate matters more, there are competing orthodoxies.
associations of orthodoxies that regularly disagree on horizons. In the following chapter (4.1.2), I shall analyse the authority attached to orthodoxies. This analysis will connect the disparate pieces of orthodoxy into a single construct of identity that is the Christian faith.

The looming question of authority needs to be placed in a particular virtual context. It is impossible to evaluate orthodoxies on a basis of models and copies (2.1.7). Any conception of an ‘original model’ here can only come from a mediated position which idealises and produces that very image. To oppose such tendencies, orthodoxies must be seen as contingent and contextual simulations in which the ‘original’ is produced just as much as the ‘copied’ orthodoxy. Orthodoxies can only be analysed as simulacra and virtual representations which do not develop out of an original but which repeat the ‘original’ as a simulation — genetic development contrary to both conservative successions or progressive evolutions.

3.4.4 Polyvocal Unity

The limiting of dialogue and communion between Christian groups based on the perception of orthodoxy is the greatest limit to acknowledging unity. This is because dialogues with those beyond the horizon of orthodoxy are dialogues of conversion and absorption rather than reconciliation and communion. To overcome this barrier, two related things are necessary: a change of ecumenical tactics and a reevaluation of Christian identity. The tactic of evangelising non-orthodox Christians should be replaced with the image from the title of Dom Lambert Beauduin’s presentation at Malines in 1925: ‘united not absorbed’. This change towards dialogues of communion cannot be done without also re-evaluating the nature of Christian identity and, in particular, the relationship of authorities. For the moment, I shall discuss the first part, saving the second for a discussion in the following chapter (4.1.4).

What is unity? I propose that it is not simply conversion or adherence to a singular set of beliefs. Rather, unity occurs only in the midst of differences, some which may be of extreme magnitude. For example, in the United States, most if not all people accept that they are Americans. Politicians even play on common themes of ‘American-ness’ and ‘the American dream’. However, despite an almost unanimous acceptance of what it means to be American, there are great differences of opinion on achieving that goal. Beyond the two major political parties, which are already considered widely divergent, there are also smaller political groups with even more disparate opinions. Despite these differences, there is still a unity in the basic American identity; and this unity has been seen before when after 9/11 all Americans

'became New Yorkers’. Likewise, I suggest that Christians can all ‘become Catholic’ (specific group does not matter) without needing to be baptised members of the Roman Catholic Church. Unity is about identity not doctrine, beliefs, or methodologies.

The Christian identity is a polyvocal one, and the acknowledgement of the plurality of Christianity implies an acceptance of multiple orthodoxies which may differ (perhaps even as mutually exclusive) but still are connected by some commonality. This commonality is not propositional in which statements encoded through language and culture transcend their languages and cultures but rather experiential in which the defining hermeneutical event is situated around Christ himself instead of the words of Christ (or Scriptures). In short, what binds Christian groups together is not the interpretation of Scripture and tradition but the collective experience and acknowledgement of the risen Christ. Such experiences are necessarily contingent because the New Testament has multiple, divergent accounts of the Resurrection. Scholars have made it clear that even at its earliest stages, Christianity — even that which we see in the New Testament — did not have any kind of pure ‘unbroken unity’ as imagined in later claims to apostolic succession. These divergences make a unification by absorption impossible. Likewise, the many divergent interpretations of Scripture make an eschatological union of authorities impossible in this life. I suggest that the goal should be ecumenism without this unification, a unity of differences in which the Church becomes the manifestation of divine unity in a human community of love.

3.4.5 Creating Authority

The concept of orthodoxy I have proposed is a dynamic process of production which can be seen as a kind of art because of the creativity which energises the production of orthodoxy. Two of the extremes to orthodoxy are totalitarianism and schizophrenia. Schizophrenia can describe the highly fragmented structure of the Christian identity currently observed, as multiple ‘personalities’ fight for control of both the borders themselves and everything within them. There is a need for authority, as the sociologist Talal Asad, in writing about ‘British’ culture, identifies:

‘One cannot be British on one’s own exclusive terms or on a selective basis, nor is there room for dual loyalties where those loyalties openly contradict one another’. That is, participation in British life does . . . require ‘forgetting one’s

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140. This is not the only possible central experience. See 4.2.
CHAPTER 3. NARRATIVES OF ORTHODOXY

...cultural roots’ if they cannot in some way be accommodated by Britishness.\(^{143}\)

By replacing ‘British’ with ‘Christian’, the argument pinpoints the need for a mediation of identity in addition to the centres and borders, echoing the double image of orthodoxy (3.1.1).

The problem with authority is its teaching ‘us to desire our own repression’, as Deleuze and Guattari have readily pointed out.\(^{144}\) Unlike schizophrenia, totalitarianism is much more of an ‘art rather than a structure or orthodoxy’.\(^{145}\) Totalitarianism has a kind of internal cohesion, which ‘is not a correlate of clearly defined boundaries, as is sometimes supposed, but of the reverse’.\(^{146}\) The art of totalitarianism is that it is order without structure, the mythologised illusion that relations of power imply a structure that supports those relations. This is the ‘terror’ of 1054 in which the mutual excommunication of Eastern and Western Christianities occurs because the two-sided ‘creation of a unitary “heresy” is what enables the perhaps no less mystified and mythologized orthodoxy to claim existence’.\(^{147}\) By opposing all heterodoxy, the quest for orthodoxy produced what it sought: control and order without a structure to mediate them. If left to the totalitarianism wielded by a purely schismatic series of orthodoxy, orthodoxy becomes repetitions of difference itself:

what you see is [one’s] reworking and reworking the ideas over and over and repeating and repeating, nuance after nuance after microscopic nuance, until [one] gets them ‘right’. But there is no right; there is only the identification of wrong. It is an obsessiveness with sterility and removing dirt that doesn’t have room for outsiders ... minuscule disagreements with other thinkers [are] blown into theological catastrophes.\(^{148}\)

The Reformation saw the emergence of many structures that dispelled the illusion the ‘terror’ of 1054 created.

The ‘beauty’ of the dynamics of orthodoxy can now be seen: it is a system operating on two separate scales which forges an identity that functions like an organic body (growing, ageing, adapting, etc). When placed in the context of time, tradition becomes the memory of past orthodoxy in the present (1.2.5). Polydoxy, as the root of orthodoxies, allows for mediation

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\(^{143}\) Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 246.

\(^{144}\) Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, xx.

\(^{145}\) Heather Walton, personal conversation, 16th November 2010.

\(^{146}\) Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World, 131.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., 296.

between different (present) orthodoxies and (past) ‘traditions’ while still claiming a single Christian identity. In this sense, the ecclesial image of orthodoxy is similar to the ancient Greek chorus: a multiplicity of distinct members cooperating as a single unit. The concept of orthodoxy as identity is a hermeneutical process that synthesises discordant members while dissolving the concordant whole simultaneously; it lies between the chaotic flux of becoming and the rigid stasis of being.

In my re-interpretation of the development of orthodoxies within the single Christian identity, I have shown that the relations between Christian groups are changing regularly as they try to understand their identities as both particular and universal. Polydoxy ‘returns’ the Church to an earlier image of Christianity, giving a new life in the growing dialogues of ecumenism, where history shows the emerging Christian groups as ‘having a common identity with, and as also being sharply separated from, each other’. 149 This image is not one of unity as was re-inscribed into accounts of the first council at Nicaea by Athansius. 150 Rather, the image is that of (musical) harmony, which can be found even in discordance in which the resonance of discordant notes constructs new harmonies through overtones. In the following chapter, I shall address the unanswered questions of political orthodoxy, particularly in how polydoxy provides a model for understanding the mediation of authorities for a group that is both diverse and united.

149. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World, 161.
4. The Church in Multiple Social Contexts

The question emerges as to how a unity of faith can be maintained and established with a plurality of proclamations.  

The concept of polydoxy from the previous chapter (3.3.3) creates an interesting situation for theology in practical terms: how can this work in contemporary ecclesial contexts? I shall answer this question of application in multiple ways in this chapter. In order to provide a thorough answer, I shall explore first the relation between polydoxy and authority within the Church which correlates with the earlier analyses of identity and orthodoxy (2.2.5 and 3.1.5). Polydoxy, I shall argue, is not merely possible for the Church but it has been a part of its history and tradition for most if not all of its existence.

The Deleuzian multiplicity (1.1.5) employed within a theological framework has been part of Christian thinking for most of its history though identified by other names. This multiplicity is none other than the doctrine of the trinity of which much of Christianity (and, historically speaking, all of ‘orthodox’ Christianity) has believed. A notion of polydoxy is an attempt to reflect trinitarian relations into the human social image of the Church as a multiplicity. This has become the focus of the metaphorical usage of the term ‘Body of Christ’, particularly in the works of Laurel Schneider.  

Schneider’s collaboration with Catherine Keller in editing the collection *Polydoxy* aims to present Christian theology as a multiplicity of orthodoxies which can be traced back into the legacy of Christian thought. Their argument harmonises well with the historiography of theology I have already provided (see Chapter 3) and the general pluralist theme in this thesis. I have adopted their term of polydoxy in my own

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argument for what I see as the same concept though without the compromised legacy which the perhaps more apt term ‘heterodoxy’ has had in the association of it with ‘heresy’ by various ‘orthodox’ groups.

The theological impetus for polydoxy has been in a process of incubation over the past century and it has begun to emerge in recent theological thought such as Schneider’s. I shall show that this impetus has developed in multiple orthodoxies as a response to mutual interactions as well as to the acknowledgement of each other’s existence. Karl Rahner best proposed the possibility of polydoxy in his hope for a ‘pluralism of proclamations’:

in principle all men [sic] can talk with all others and can reach agreement with one another, these plural proclamations would not simply be disparate factors.
They could mutually criticise and enrich each other, but everyone of them would nevertheless have an historical individuality which in the last resort would be incommensurable with any other.  

My plan, then, is to approach the idea of polydoxy from the perspective of contemporary application and usage. The first area of exploration revolves around the imposition of authority by multiple orthodoxies upon and within a shared ‘territory’ (4.1). By differentiating between various types of authority and placing them into relation with one another, polydoxy can be seen in terms of relations within a single ‘virtual’ body. The image of authority I employ develops from the plurality/unity of the trinity in that the only ‘source of authority . . . is the freedom and love of the Triune God’. Authority as freedom means that the image of a single body composed of many groups is constructed through the mediation between multiple groups and by their particular embodiment of the whole. In other words, each group represents the entire whole despite also being fragments of the whole; the Church and church groups are monadic. Have there been any concepts or general agreements in parts of Christianity which can be re-interpreted as approaching this monadological relationality in light of polydoxy? In the second section (4.2), I shall argue that there is such a case for polydoxy, particularly in the ecumenical proceedings and agreements which have created ways for groups to recognise others as embodying the Christian identity differently without deteriorating into heresy. Recent ecclesiology have been developing organic models of the Church in order to promote the unity implied in these recognitions, sometimes altering or displacing previous ‘artificial’ or ‘institutional’ models.  

The necessity for polydoxy can be found in the increasing ‘fragmentation’ of Christianity as more denominations and groups emerge, especially in groups and associations (cf. 3.2.5) that have been relatively peaceful yet with a widening gap between contrary parties (e.g. the Anglican Church in North America split in 2009 from the Episcopal Church in the United States and the Anglican Church of Canada). These ruptures have been sparked, at least in part, by modern social issues such as human gender and sexuality within particular churches. I shall explore a few possible responses to social issues, highlighting the way in which these issues are framed regarding their importance (or lack thereof). Two responses in particular will be analysed in detail: that of drawing rigid, exclusive boundaries and that of disallowing doctrinal ‘controversies’ the power to determine identity relations (4.3).

Finally, these relations are drawn further outwards because the range of possible interactions increases exponentially in the public sphere. I shall provide a few emerging consequences of polydoxy, particular in relation to public/social and inter-religious affiliations and dialogues (4.4). The Church does not exist in a vacuum and its mediation with the ‘secular’ world must become an ecclesial focus since those external relations shape and define the identity of the universal/invisible Church. By interacting with their social Others, Christian Selves rediscover their single, shared identity within the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2) which produces the many different traditions.

### 4.1 Authority and Ecumenical Unity

In a 2010 public lecture, Nicholas Lash proposed that the crisis of modern Catholicism has been the conflation of two senses of instruction — teaching and commanding — and the subsequent replacement of the former (education) by the latter (governance). However, I shall argue that Lash is slightly inaccurate because I have shown that the question of authority and governance has persisted in the history of Christian theology for centuries (cf. 3.2.4). The main difference between the historical problem and the modern problem, as Lash correctly points out, is the domination of education, especially theological education, by the authority structure which has transformed questions of reasonable theology into questions of obedience (or heresy). I suggest that this crisis is primarily one of identity and can be understood best by my analysis of orthodoxy as the construction of identity (3.1.4), which I shall continue here. The historical analysis which constituted the previous chapter (3.2–3.4) showed that issues of orthodoxy were transformed frequently into questions of authority and the exercise of such against the multiform, pluralist Christianities.

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I wish to critique this exercise of authority, arguing that the production of multiple, diverging authorities dissolves any possibility of maintaining a single orthodoxy as the only true authority while simultaneously acknowledging the validity of other authorities in ecumenical dialogues. To re-inscribe particular authorities within the Christian identity as the ultimate solution to this lack is a step towards totalitarianism. This totalitarianism is the breaking down of the production of identity, replaced by the fabrication of discreet Selves into subjects which can then be subjugated by a projected image of reality. The psychic image projected by totalitarianism feeds the desire to be controlled and oppressed.8 Discourse on orthodoxy is not simply about doctrines, practises, or even authority; rather, the question of orthodoxy is about maintaining an identity that reaches from the present into both its past and future. In contrast to this totalitarianism, I wish to establish authority within polydoxy by displacing the certainty of claims to an ultimate authority. Polydoxy reveals the authority of a particular orthodoxy to be contingent and based on its own embodiment of Christian identity. Because of this quest for identity that still speaks with power for the present, polydoxy shall be defended as a vital part of the conception of orthodoxy. By rejecting the common interpretation of the spectrum of orthodoxy–heterodoxy as a play between orthodoxy (as correct) and ‘heresy’ (as incorrect), theology can turn towards a play between orthodoxy (as singularity/fragment) and polydoxy (as multiplicity/whole). This refining of theological orthodoxy does not erase the spectrum of orthodoxy–heresy; it only seeks to add a second dimension to orthodoxy, integrating the double image of catholicity and schism from the previous chapter (3.1.1).

What began in the Reformation as new ways of practising Christianity turned into new ways of perceiving Christianity with the rise of ecumenism in the twentieth century (see 3.4.1). These new ways of identifying as Christian have been altered drastically in light of modern consumer-oriented capitalism within democratic political authority. As a result of this change, the questions of authority and orthodoxy have been relegated to individual choice.9 While an individual may accept one authority of faith by affiliation, that affiliation can be changed quite quickly in the ‘marketplace of faith’. The orthodoxy of authority has become a produced effect of a democratic act of individual choice. Because of this change, authorities seek new subjects by advertisement and market tactics, where each does not seek ‘our submission by force, but by incantation. It has no need to issue orders, for we have given our consent. There is no need for threats as it wins because of our thirst for pleasure.’10

8. See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, 29.
9. This individualisation of identity is often traced back to Martin Luther, but Luther’s individual was not attached to an exclusion of social identity. Cf. Oberman, Luther, 235.
Perhaps the most powerful alternative to the divisive effects of the market means accepting differences within horizons of orthodoxy. I suggest orthodoxy must be ecumenical and cooperative. By showing Christian identity to be something within which one participates rather than something marketed and consumed, individual and community are bonded in participation rather than consumption. For such a change to work, however, the concepts of orthodoxy, heresy, and otherness need to be redefined in light of polydoxy. The redefinition of such concepts is rooted in an ecclesiology of participation.

To speak of an orthodoxy as absolute implies, echoing Jean Le Pen’s arguments, that only those dissenters to orthodoxy who are ‘able and willing to join [the orthodox] (thereby ceasing to belong to a minority) have the right’ to keep the Christian identity.\textsuperscript{11} In contrast to this argument, orthodoxy within polydoxy rejects the divide between majority and minority, instead allowing a dialectic of identity which seeks out commonalities between groups as the overlapping of their own horizons of orthodoxy. The situation can (and does) arise in which groups that self-identify as Christian may mutually exclude one another (e.g. Eastern and Western Christianities just a century ago). How are these authorities mediated in their Christian identity? There is a problem of defining external boundaries when there is no central authority.

\textbf{4.1.1 Jigsaw Harmony}

Before exploring the question of authority, it must be placed in the context of the cohesion of orthodoxy. This is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of orthodoxy because, despite the differences of opinions in authority, the construction of Christian identity maintains a sort of equilibrium. This equilibrium is dynamic in that it binds together the production of narratives so that there is a continuity from past to present despite diverging paths; it is a genetic equilibrium similar to familial inheritance where diverging generations can still share a common name and mutual participation (e.g. a family reunion). From the beginning of Christianity, orthodoxy was duplicitous, following two different conceptions of identity. Out of this duplicity emerged the plurality of orthodoxies which are all connected within the nebulous whole of Christianity. The whole of Christianity can be seen as an organic network in play, with each orthodoxy being connected to others. These connections overlap, criss-cross, merge, and diverge creating the network that is Christianity. It is through this imagery that I would like to contemplate on the Body of Christ. The Body of Christ is, in Deleuze’s terminology, a Body without Organs (2.1.4), a connection which will be explained in the following section (4.2.2).

\textsuperscript{11} Asad, \textit{Formations of the Secular}, 176.
In this manner, the Body of Christ is separate and distinct from all centralised authorities, distinct from hierarchies of orthodoxy. Instead of being a hierarchical institution as Constantine had urged during the first council at Nicaea (325), Christianity now points to the network of interactions and relations between the many orthodoxies, showing each to be vital to the whole of Christianity without any piece being valued over others as necessary to the self-definition of the whole (i.e. in contrast to others which are merely optional). There is no Christian ‘organism’ whereby there is a necessary organisation of the entire body; there is only the association of fragments that make up the (whole) body of Christ which changes and adapts to suit different environments, cultures, languages, eras, and so on. From this, associations such as the Anglican Communion are networks and connections within a metaphorical body similar to the pulmonary and nervous systems in a biological body. Each serve as necessary components of the body without either taking precedent over the others. This echoes Paul’s language where each part of the Body of Christ serves its own role, none being able to claim superiority over others (Gal. 3:38–39, 1 Cor. 12:21–26). Paul even suggests that the various parts of the body need to interact with one another, serving the body (as a whole) in order to serve Christ. Yet there are still authorities within the Body of Christ.

The question of authority for the purpose of this thesis is primarily one of mediation and interpretation rather than specific propositions or practises. This observation might seem counter-intuitive when currently in the beginning of the twenty-first century multiple groups of Christians seem to be nearing points of schismatic exclusion over contemporary debates such as homosexuality in churches (e.g. Church of Scotland, Anglican Communion). However, such debates concerning specific beliefs and actions are precisely because groups can be seen as embodying interpretations of orthodoxy with which there is internal disagreement regarding the extent to which such interpretations reflect a particular interpretation of the tradition. Acceptance of homosexuality in churches is seen as diverging from the interpretation defined in tradition by some interpreters while other interpreters see that acceptance as faithfully upholding that tradition. If there is a schism — something which is always possible in similarly ‘controversial’ discussions — it will produce two divergent traditions with each claiming to faithfully hold to tradition despite disagreeing on this specific question. It would be inaccurate to view such a rupture in community as one set of interpretations remaining faithful to the authority of tradition while viewing a second set of interpretations as a deviation from that first authority of tradition. Rather, both produce new orthodoxies which subsequently produce two new authorities from which there is some degree of exclusion, sometimes wholly and mutually exclusive (e.g. the Great Schism of 1054). With this act of differentiation in mind, I can now turn to the question of authority.

4.1.2 Lost Guardians

Where does the authority lie to determine the inclusion or exclusion of a group within an identity? The two basic possibilities can be summarised as self-identification and external-identification. In self-identification, a group willingly claims to participate in the specified identity (e.g. the Church of England identifies itself as Christian). In external-identification, a group is named as possessing an identity (e.g. the Roman Catholic Church identifies the Church of England as Christian). However, there are cases where there is disagreement (e.g. while the Roman Catholic Church identifies itself as Christian, some evangelical groups which also identify as Christian exclude Roman Catholics as Christian). To frame this issue in terms of horizons: is there an ‘absolute’ horizon of Christian identity to which appeals can be made in order to determine inclusion and exclusion?

On what basis could such a horizon be formed? Historically, there have been two trends: authority and creed. If a group accepted a particular doctrinal/theological authority, it was included. The second trend was more difficult because the degree of acceptance varied. As critical examination and recent dialogues have shown (cf. 3.4.1), some rejections of creeds were based on cultural or linguistic differences rather than actual theological differences. Additionally, there were questions as to which creed (and even which version of the same creed) was sufficient. For some, acceptance of the Nicene-Constantinople Creed was enough while others demanded acceptance of additional creeds and definitions (Chalcedon, Trent, etc). It is through this second trend that we find the logic of ‘full communion’.

I have shown that every attempt to bring together divergent strands of Christianity were generally unsuccessful since each ecumenical council achieved unity only by excluding dissenters and enforcing theological decisions politically (see 3.2.5). The Reformations provided some measure of unity by mediating theological differences through geopolitical allegiances via the logic of *cuius regio, eius religio* (see 3.3.1). As a globalised world emerged over centuries of technological advancement, these theo-political allegiances began to break down as divergent groups were once again mixed together geographically. Theological allegiance was no longer tied to the geopolitical and became a matter of ‘choice’, especially as the political governments were reformed to be ‘secular’ and separate from any religion. It should be no surprise, then, that the once-separated groups of Christians began to re-conceptualise the nature of Christian diversity in ecumenical perspectives (3.4.1).

However, groups which had claimed to adhere faithfully to the historical traditions of Christianity (e.g. Eastern Orthodoxy) wanted to maintain authority in ecumenical dialogues. To this end, the language of ‘full communion’ was used to acknowledge Christian groups in a hi-
erarchical framework of purity which re-inscribed theo-political allegiance into ecumenism. By using this language, groups could claim to be invested in recognising other groups as having a different orthodoxy while simultaneously rejecting that orthodoxy by implications of impurity — only the ‘inner circle’ of those in ‘full communion’ were completely acceptable as orthodox and allowed to participate fully in each group. The two aims of the ecumenical movement and ‘full communion’ have caused some groups (e.g. Roman Catholic Church) to produce conflicting statements sometimes within the same document. For example, while John Paul II identifies the unity of Christianity as the participation in the Spirit with Christ and God the Father, he also states that groups outside of the Roman Catholic Church are imperfect variations from it. Because of this distinction between spiritual unity and visible differences, the degrees of differences are equated with deviation from the authoritative norm despite any spiritual unity and the visible unity is seen in terms of reconciling theo-political differences. The language of ‘full communion’ as the large scale reception of ‘Christian[s] coming from another Christian community’ is intrinsically incompatible with the ecumenical movement which seeks to preserve and acknowledge visible differences as part of the spiritual unity of the Church.

The issue of being ‘in communion’ is shifted further in light of polydoxy because polydoxy suggests that Christian groups are already in ‘full communion’ with one another since they each participate in the Christian identity. Ecumenical ecclesiology in terms of polydoxy becomes the realisation to which extent groups and individuals participate in each other (spiritually) as they participate in the Christian identity, a topic which shall be analysed in the following section (4.2.4). Only through this realisation can any kind of visible unity be achieved without the imposition of one authority over and against all others as if one and only one group is perfectly orthodox in theology.

A second implication of the shift to polydoxy, which needs immediate attention, is the rejection of ‘absolute’ boundaries. This rejection can be found already in the posing of the question because such a question implies the establishment of a new authority (or the re-establishment of an existing one) in order to once again mediate orthodoxy and authority. By recognising the limits of all authorities, any particular authority must be already limited. Therefore, I propose that every act of authority — including the ‘democracy’ of ecumenical councils — must be acknowledged as limited definitions.

4.1.3 Horizons of Orthodoxies

In rejecting ‘absolute’ boundaries, I expect two reactions that revolve around the same issue: relativism. The first reaction comes from the same principle which asks the question of boundaries in the first place, namely how can there be any meaning to the Christian identity if it can be changed ‘on a whim’. To this, the response I wish to employ comes from Latin American liberation theology. Rather than appeal to an objective idea of Christian identity (and yet again re-inscribe a central authority), I am suggesting that the Christian identity and all subsequent theology is always contextual, ‘intimately bound up with the existing social situation in at least an unconscious way’.15 Christianity is something that is first interpretation and secondly participation. This does not mean there can be any meaning to the Christian identity as if it comes ex nihilo; rather, it is produced at least in part by the participants. There can be areas of wide agreement, but these cannot be interpreted within the majority-minority spectrum of incorporation as described in the previous chapter (3.4.2). Neither can wide agreement be interpreted as objective or absolute because the context from which it develops can and will change.

The second reaction is related to the first, but its focus is on chaos and anarchy. This reaction appeals to the established order of a particular authority as necessary because without such authority, some violent external faction may overrun or ‘dilute’ the Christian identity (cf. narrative ‘violence’ in 1.3.4). A response to this reaction turns to the social image used to describe the construction of peace by the incarceration of ‘bad’ criminals (1.3.3). Incarceration is acknowledged as necessary because the established authority then creates the illusion of an excess of criminals in the established order so that the peaceful society demands its own subjugation in the name of peace. However, the appeal of this argument is based on a misconception that no central authority implies there can be no authority at all, as if civilisations could not persist without global control. The flaw in this premise is most readily seen in Belgium since 2010: it has continued to remain and persist without a federal government. This is because local governments do exist and maintain the ‘order’ demanded in the reaction. Furthermore, there is still some level of a Belgian ‘way of life’ which persists despite the country’s own fragmented nature. The denial of any kind of central authority to Christian identity does not imply the denial of all ‘local’ authorities which coexist together.

Orthodoxy within polydoxy is the existence of different interpretations within a theological pluralism. The importance of authority within heterodoxy is not ‘homogeneity versus difference as such but its authority to define crucial homogeneities and differences’.16 Or-

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thodoxy within polydoxy maintains the authority to define its own central identity as proper as well as other identities as different without denying other identities the possibility of their own self-identity. This kind of orthodoxy accepts its own limited horizon and acts within its world of influence. The limit of authority in this understanding is the ‘sovereignty’ of a group to recognise and maintain relations with others, mediated both bilaterally and multi-laterally.

These mediations may appear as individual dialogues (e.g. the revocation in 1965 of anathemas pronounced in 1054) and larger ecumenical movements (e.g. World Council of Churches, Anglican Communion). In each case, there is already an implicit recognition that the dialectical Other(s) is a full participant within the Christian identity. This is because all boundaries ‘are not merely defensive but allow for trade’. The porous and changing nature of these boundaries can be seen in the developing of labels such as ‘Assyrian Christianity’ which come ‘from western Christian missionaries whose purpose was to effect a distinction from “Nestorians”, an implicitly negative label also assigned from outside’.

Christian theology is already and always has been political, and political analyses of power and relations seem to be lacking as a tool for meta-analyses of theology. The shift to polydoxy makes that lack all the more apparent. In the following section (4.3.2), I shall outline the shape of this political analysis of theology where it extends from the developed concept of polydoxy/orthodoxy (cf. 3.2–3.4), tracing the edges of a contemporary debate within one group of Christians. The question of identity inherent to problems of ecumenism cannot be answered without a political engagement because identity is first and foremost social and mediated. As a social construct, the concept of orthodoxy is symperichoretic, a mutual infolding of multiple centres without one rising as the absolute that can judge the rest. The orthodox Self is a multiplicity of Selves without becoming mentally unstable (e.g. like a human with multiple personality disorder, dissociative identity, etc.), and the mediation of internal boundaries which produce its own identity. Any ecumenical movement within a particular Christian group is successful insofar as it is capable of perceiving its own heterodoxy. In finding one group’s own horizons and their limitations, its ecumenical actions can thus turn away from contingent authorities and illusions of dogmatic purity to find the participatory nature of the Christian identity which it already shares with others.

18. Ibid., 239–40.
19. The recent rise of political theology can be broadly seen as theological analyses of the political, or — as one article recently phrased it — the ‘Theologization of the Political’ (Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, ‘Jan Assmann and the Theologization of the Political’, *Political Theology* 12, no. 4 (2011): 511–530). My concern here is how theological and religious communities are already political and how theology is politicised.
4.1.4 Creating Orthodoxy

What, then, is an orthodoxy within polydoxy? It is both a particular and actual orthodoxy as well as a universal and virtual one. The two views complement one another as a single repetition of Christian faith in time (cf. 3.4.3). Every group and church (in both the local and institutional senses) are monadic visions of the whole universal/invisible Church in the same way that fragments of an identity share and represent the entire constructed identity (cf. 2.3.6).

Identities are rarely homogeneous, even at the individual level (2.2.4). The pluralities within are reflected in the pluralities outwith: diversity and differentiation continually emerge. In every present (not necessarily an instant moment), faith is embodied as orthodoxies through the narrative of traditions and is re-created as a ‘universal’ orthodoxy through the narrative of Tradition despite any particular tradition’s inability to claim exclusivity to the transcendent Tradition.

Christianity *subsistit in* the universal Church not because a particular practise of administering the sacraments define the Church but rather ‘wherever the sacraments are accomplished, there is the Church’. The subsistence of the universal in the particular is seen most clearly in the visible diversity of groups acknowledging the invisible unity of all. Diversity — even within the Bible itself — cannot be seen negatively because it ‘neither detracts from its underlying unity nor counteracts its overall authority’.

Authority within theological orthodoxy is not consolidated into one single human office or person; it is dispersed amongst all participants within Christian theology rather than embodied in a few. Diversity does, however, mean that the norms derived from an interpretation of Scripture ‘vary between particular communities of faith and undergo shifts within a particular community’.

For the faith to subsist in a Church, it must be received, interpreted, and embodied as a particular and living orthodoxy.

The centre of the universal orthodoxy is contextually embedded for a particular group at a particular time; it is a hermeneutical understanding of identity. I believe Vincent of Lérins provides a good model for defining the centre of orthodoxy conceptually (see 3.2.6). History

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25. WCC Conference on the Community of Women and Men in the Church, ‘Report of the Section on Scripture in New Community’, 432.
has shown that Christian groups often disagree because of cultural differences. Yet what all agree on surrounds the figure of Christ whose ‘truth is less a form of words than the events of creation and redemption’. \(^{26}\) The truth of orthodoxy is experienced and interpreted before it can be stated; and because of this connection, it is always dependent on cultural differences which can create confusion in attempts to reconcile statements across cultures. Different orthodoxies can be seen through the Abusua idea of family within their African tribal nation where, while ‘orthodoxy is the norm’ for the family, individuality is promoted in such a way that ‘heterodoxy and deviance or dissent do not result in excommunication, rather lengthy and careful dialogue over moot points is the style of conflict resolution’. \(^{27}\) Through differences and dialogue, orthodoxy is created at the mediating intersection of the universal transcendent Church and a particular group.

### 4.2 The Body Without Organs of Christ as Ecumenical Unity

The concept of polydoxy greatly changes the layout of debates regarding Christian identity. It cannot be an individualist concept, lest identity dissolves into an abyss of theological relativism (cf. 4.1.3). It also cannot be a purely singular concept, lest identity flirts with the worst sorts of totalitarianism (cf. 3.4.5). Between these, there remains a question of embodiment: how do groups and individuals experience, participate in, and represent Christ? The answer to this forms the conceptual nature of Christian identity throughout its formulations.

I agree with Juan Luis Segundo that the core element of Christian identity is not a doctrine or ideology but the risen Christ. \(^{28}\) The Christian identity is the relation to and experience of Christ. In choosing a faith centred on the risen Christ, what can be said about the bodies of Christ? I shall begin to tie together strands of thought that have been drawn throughout my thesis. This will begin with a look at the image of the body of Christ from its crucifixion and resurrection. In drawing parallels between the (physical) body of Christ and the (metaphorical) Body of Christ that develops soon after, I shall provide a clear definition of Christian identity and its modern existence.

The image of the Body shifts the concept of authority within polydoxy (4.1.2) towards a theological relation between groups and individuals. Part of my argument is that throughout

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modern Christianity, there has been an appropriation of this image in order to relate different groups with the implied orthodox Self. I shall explore some of these appropriations and interpret them through polydoxy in order to show that they are remarkably similar and should be acknowledged as such. These similarities lead to questions of participation — something that has been recurring in previous sections (2.3.6, 3.4.2). By looking at how groups and individuals participate in Christ, I shall argue that they also participate in one another as a mutual coinherence within the Body of Christ. Lastly, participation and embodiment will be taken together as the necessary parts of constructing a Christian identity.

4.2.1 A Wounded Body

The story of Thomas first encountering the risen Christ is about bodies (John 20:24–29). Thomas would not believe that Christ had risen unless he was able to see and feel the wounds inflicted on Christ’s body. To his astonishment, Christ appeared to Thomas along with the disciples and offered to Thomas the wounds. There are two relevant aspects of Christ’s body shown here: [1] the body was wounded and remained so after the resurrection and [2] the body was not limited by material reality. While the first can be used to describe the wounds suffered through schismatic exclusions (cf 3.2.5), the second describes the universal spread and reach of the Church across time and space. Despite its fragmentation (i.e. wounds), the Church is always united together because of Christ rather than ecumenical dialogues. The modern ecumenical movements did not create the concept of the universal church but rather the movements are anchored by the concept because it already existed.

Notions of a universal church can be found in (or interpreted from) a few texts in the New Testament. In 1 Corinthians 12, Paul employs the image of the body to discuss unity within the universal church (vv. 12–31). The uniting centre of the Body of Christ according to Paul is the experience that ‘in the one Spirit we were all baptised into one body’ (1 Corinthians 12:13). Through this experience, all differences are ignored though not removed. More interestingly, Paul’s usage of this image should be taken quite literally since Christians are ‘the risen organism of Christ’s person in all its concrete reality’. This literal interpretation speaks both to the whole collection of Christians as a community and to each individual. Traces of the Deleuzian multiplicity (1.1.5) are noticeable here since Paul, so I suggest, seeks to maintain individuals as members of a group and also as ‘complete’ individuals. More importantly, as John Robinson’s monograph on this image of the body of Christ illustrates, Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians is that ‘there must be more than one member if there is to be a body at all’. Differences are necessary for a single body to exist. From this linking of in-

30. Ibid., 59.
dividuals to the universal church, ecumenism can be described in two ways: structurally and dialectically. Structural ecumenism is the internal dialogue of a group to acknowledge itself as part of the larger, universal church. It is impossible for there to be any kind of ecumenical dialogue if the speakers do not recognise themselves (let alone their dialogue partners!) as being a member of a greater whole. Dialectical ecumenism follows the structural level of ecumenism in recognising and communicating with dialogue partners as members of the same greater whole that is the universal church. The activities of the World Council of Churches can be seen mostly in terms of the latter while I am interested in exploring the former in this thesis in order to alter the ways in which the latter is practised.

These two complementary forms of ecumenism implicate a connection between all members that is not based on dogmatic or doctrinal acceptance but rather a mutual sharing. An intriguing aspect of Paul’s image of the Body of Christ appears near the end of his analogy: ‘that there may be no dissension in the body’ (1 Corinthians 12:25a). While an interpretation that seeks to reconcile differences and divergences may seem appropriate, such a straightforward reading runs contrary to the analogy Paul makes. There is an alternative in the Pauline move towards a universal community. Rather than preventing dissension of opinion, the universal church is transcultural, cutting across human divisions such as those between Jews and Greeks (1 Corinthians 12:13). This is the same sentiment expressed in Ephesians 2:14 where multiple groups are made into one and Christ ‘has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility between us’. Despite the growing divergence of dogmatic and theological thought in the early years of Christianity, the unity of the universal church was not dependent on any kind of convergence of opinion. This holds true as Paul finishes building his analogy of the body and identifies that the unity is one of love where the members care for each other equally.31 The central unifying factor arguably is not belief but care because care for others changes one’s approach in interacting with others to be mindful of their well-being.

Through care and love, Bonhoeffer’s idea of community mentioned earlier (2.3) returns as a whole that shares each others’ burdens.32 It is through this sharing that a distinction can be made now between unity and homogenisation. This sentiment was offered in Roman Catholic statements as recent as Dominus Iesus.33 Too often, the unity of the body in 1 Corinthians is taken to imply a homogenisation, ‘resolv[ing] historic differences and be-

The alternative sentiment, however, has been found in increasing prevalence after the Second Vatican Council (1962–5), particularly in the writings of theologians such as Karl Rahner:

Unity as a task can never consist of a homogenisation of the subjects that are its elements but only in a reconciliation of innumerable subjects, each different from the others and simultaneously (as subjects of unlimited transcendentality) possessing the whole in each individual and each in a unique way.\(^\text{35}\)

There is a difference between the healing of schismatic wounds in the body and the absorption of all parts into one institution. Time and again, the voices of the ecumenical movement as well as the individual groups and organisations which have developed ecumenical relations reject the idea of unity as uniformity or absorption.\(^\text{36}\) Two of the main exceptions to this have been the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church because each sees itself as the ‘root’ from which all others have separated.\(^\text{37}\) The term ‘full communion’ as well as its cognates have often been used to indicate a high degree of — if not complete — uniformity between two groups. I have already suggested that the language of ‘full communion’ must be replaced with the realisation of the already existing communion because of Christ (cf. 4.1.3). The differentiation which the ecumenical movement seeks to maintain is strengthened by shifting towards a pluralist identity situated in polydoxy (4.1.1).

### 4.2.2 Fragmentary Embodiment

If the task of ecumenism can be described as reconciling the schismatic wounds in the Body of Christ, then a united identity can be realised fully in polydoxy in contrast to the divisive imposition of any particular orthodoxy as the mediating authority over others. To recover unity in this manner, I propose that groups must recognise the distinction between heterodoxy and heresy (see 3.3.3) — between other doxa and wrong doxa. Heterodoxy differs from heresy in that, as Karl Rahner frames pluralism, it does not accept the notion that ‘what I do not understand in the other, what does not positively agree with what I have in mind, cannot be acceptable in the Church’.\(^\text{38}\) Rather, following Rahner’s theological pluralism, heterodoxy is the acceptance of other doxa as different yet equal.

\(^{34}\) Gros, ‘Toward Full Communion’, 31 (emphasis mine).
\(^{35}\) Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, 157 (emphasis in original).
In light of this distinction, the contingency of orthodoxy is rooted in the necessity of poly-
doxy (4.1.1); and the identity that emerges from this internalised relation of Self and Other is what is sought through the body without organs (BwO). The Body of Christ is an organic network and, as such, viewed in biological terms and reflects the image of the BwO. Earlier metaphors of the universal church as an actual body have been lost to inorganic institutional views which see structures and hierarchies rather than contingencies and relations, though this trend has begun to be reversed in recent years.\(^{39}\) These structures organise the body around them as an organism which ultimately suits the ends and needs of the institution rather than the whole body. By acknowledging the heterogeneous nature of the universal church, theological pluralism can be established and difference can be accepted. Truly then, the Body of Christ can be healed and, simultaneously, become a BwO.

A Deleuzo-Ricœurian concept of identity (2.2.5) can be summarised as the establishment of relations among a collection of ideas, transforming the collection into a system.\(^{40}\) Identity is the emergence and creation of an abstract subject that experiences relations, at any scale (individual, group, society). Behind this mask of identity is the BwO, the ‘virtual, unformed body-potential that sustains any actual body’.\(^{41}\) The BwO is not simply, as its name might suggest, a body lacking organs as an undifferentiated body; rather, the BwO is a body deprived ‘of any \textit{actual} organisation of its organs, i.e. of their integration within an actual organism along lines shaped by its needs and interests, by its ability to act and react, by its sensory-motor coordination’.\(^{42}\) In other words, the BwO acknowledges its constitution of fragments as a ‘virtual’ representation embodied in and throughout each individual part (cf. 1.3.5). As such, the BwO is unable to become a subject that eliminates or absorbs its fragmentary nature into a single organism; such an organism can only be approximated through the calculus of difference and repetition. Identity is always ‘only’ an approximation derived from the processes of differential equations (which Deleuze represents in the oversimplification of \(\frac{dy}{dx}\)) that both create and unify fragments as the degrees of difference (\(dx\)) approaches 0.\(^{43}\) This means that as the change in \(x\) (i.e. \(dx\)) approaches 0, the change in \(y\) (i.e. \(dy\)) approaches a limit without \textit{actually} reaching it. However, the rate of change is a limit whose value is never actually reached because if the rate of change in \(dx\) were exactly 0, there would be no change (\(dy\)).\(^{44}\) The implication for a subject is that the mask of identity...
is always a limit created in the process of differentiation, an illusion of actuality which is always displaced and never reached. Another implication is that this process of change occurs indefinitely such that identity only ceases to change when it no longer exists.  

The BwO of Christ is the organic model of relations within the universal church, preventing the Christian identity from dissolving into the institutional abyss and its shibboleth of orthodoxy. It is a rejection of the necessity of institutions that subject the body to their own contingent authority (cf. 4.1.4), allowing instead for these contingencies to remain localised along the body’s surface. Finally, then, the BwO of Christ and its Christian identity is a becoming-Church movement in which the relation between the many ‘larval Selves’ can be realised as simultaneously being many relations between Selves and Others as well as being the single relation of the orthodox Self and the plurality of Selves that is the Body of Christ. The Body of Christ as a BwO is an attempt ‘to develop new ways of acting and new forms of institution for the coexistence in the Church of freedom of belief and a commonly binding profession of faith’.  

4.2.3 Christian Identity

Questions of pluralism are generally aimed at inter-religious dialogue as the recent Terrence Tilley–Gavin D’Costa debate in *Modern Theology* has shown. However, as Perry Schmidt-Leukel points out in response to this debate:

> The claim of *Dominus Iesus* that the Roman-Catholic Church is the Catholic Church and as such the only Church that is fully and truly in line with the single body of Christ hardly permits any other conclusion than that whatever counts as orthodoxy in this particular Church will also have to be seen as the ‘true’ orthodoxy of Christianity in general.

The question of pluralism is hardly one that can be resolved simply within an inter-religious dialogue. I suggest that any inter-religious dialogue from the perspective of a particular or-
hodoxy must be adequate enough to include and incorporate the ecumenical dialogue that occurs ‘within’ Christianity precisely because the pluralities and ambiguities within Christianity reflect the pluralities and ambiguities between Christianity and other religions. As Schmidt-Leukel continues in his response, the ‘orthodoxy’ which both Tilley and D’Costa take as an unbroken line of succession, perhaps nuanced in later years, is in actuality a highly contextualised and contingent instance.49

This image of a ‘temporary’ orthodoxy is exactly the kind of virtual identity which arises in Jean Baudrillard’s later writings (see 2.1.6). Such a virtual identity is the result of the production of difference and identity in time at a given point in time (1.3.2) — something that can hardly be considered a static, unchanging image that exists by necessity. The entirely contingent notion of identity is rooted in the necessary notion of the subject which possesses such an identity.50 A ‘virtual theology’ like this would turn the question of orthodoxy into the question of identity. How can Christianity be defined separate from the multiple sets of doctrinal assertions and creeds which define even more variations of orthodies? The orthodox Self that is Christianity follows ‘one subject, despite the multiplicities of realities making up a [Self], synthesis[ing] the many and at first sight very disparate experiences’.51

The fragmentary nature of Christian identity can be seen in the articulations of various decisions at Lambeth Conferences. Beginning in the 1920 conference, Anglicanism shifted towards an ecumenical identity, calling to unity in fellowship all ‘who profess and call themselves Christians’ without dissolving existing institutions into one.52 After the 1920 conference, a series of conversations occurred throughout the 1920s in Malines, Belgium seeking to explore how that unity might develop. In the 1948 Lambeth Conference, the first fruits of their ecumenical shift came in the form of asserting full communion with the Old Catholic Churches.53 This trend continued as successive Lambeth Conferences made optional the previously required assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles for clergy and endorsing open communion (1968), recognised individual church autonomy within the communion (1978), requested provinces to respect decisions of other provinces (1988), and allowed divergent opinions within the communion (1998).54

49. Cf. ibid., 276.
51. Rahner, Theological Investigations, 13 (emphasis in original).
52. An ecumenical mindset was present in earlier conferences, but the opening with regards to identity do not surface until 1920. See Lambeth Conference Resolutions from 1920, Resolution 9, http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1920/ (accessed 18th April 2011).
Despite diversity, however, the Anglican Communion has an explicit reference point for its identity. This reference point is the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral and is used for both internal and ecumenical unity.\footnote{Lambeth Conference Resolutions from 1888, Resolution 11, http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1888/ (accessed 18th April 2011); re-affirmed for ecumenism in Lambeth Conference Resolutions from 1998, Section IV.2.} The Quadrilateral is peculiar in that its four points are simple yet open to interpretation: (1) Scriptures as containing all things necessary to salvation, (2) the Apostle and Nicene Creeds as the sufficient statement of Christian faith, (3) the two sacraments of communion and baptism, and (4) the episcopate adapted to fit local needs and people. The Christian identity for Anglican ecumenism cannot be seen as an articulation of a full dogmatic theology; rather identity centres around an inflected experience of sources (Scripture, creeds) and interpretive sacraments, adapted to a particular context. Openness to interpretation in Anglicanism is based on its dual view of authority which suggests authority is ‘singular, in that it derives from the mystery of the divine Trinity, and plural, in that it is distributed in numerous, organically related elements’.\footnote{Sykes, The Integrity of Anglicanism, 87.} According to these resolutions, Anglicanism acknowledges the contingency of orthodoxy and accepts the possibility of differences, something that is both its greatest achievement and most difficult point of agreement.\footnote{Examples where this openness has proved difficult include the questions of human sexuality in the 1998 conference with which some members of the Anglican Communion continue to threaten separation.} All of these ecumenical ideals were re-affirmed in the most recent Lambeth Conference.\footnote{Lambeth Conference Resolutions from 2008, §E.71–§E.84, http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/2008/ (accessed 18th April 2011).}

A similar desire for ecumenism can be found in a very different organisation. The Church of Scotland’s ecumenical policy established after the request of the 2003 General Assembly. This policy states that a major factor for schisms within Christianity was the question and disputation of authority rather than the question of acceptable doxa and belief (cf. 3.2.5).\footnote{The Church of Scotland, ‘Ecumenical Policy’, 2004, http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0015/2337/ecumenical_policy.pdf (accessed 18th April 2011), 1.1.1.} For the Scottish Kirk, ‘unity implies something in which we share’ which need not be institutional.\footnote{Ibid., 1.3.5.} Paraphrased in terms of this thesis, it is a shared participation in a common identity that emerges ‘beneath’ structures of orthodoxy and becomes visible through the mask of orthodoxies. In line with the Anglican Communion, the Scottish Kirk also accepts the Lund principle from 1952: ‘the Churches should act together in all matters except those in which deep differences of conviction compel them to act separately’.\footnote{Ibid., 2.7.3.} An implication of the Lund
principle is that disagreements are taken as part of a pluriform theology without regressing into claims of heresy. Agreeing with the principle of polydoxy (3.4.4), the Scottish Kirk proposes that:

Divisions are acknowledged but are not allowed to impede those things that can be done together. Authority lies with the churches and is expressed differently by the churches. In other words it is an expression of the churches’ commitment to one another. … [The denominations] retain their own voice.  

Also rejecting the idea that ecumenism must end in absorption as ‘some bland mixture that loses the great strengths and traditions of the denominations’, the Scottish Kirk seeks to construct a form of unity without dissolving all Christianities into one.  

Similar arguments can be found in the 2010 report ‘Our Fellowship in the Gospel’ which does not deviate from the ecumenical policy of constructing Christian identity from the common participation in Christ.

The tension of divergent unity and absorption exists most clearly in the Roman Catholic Church, yet another organisation different from both the Anglican Communion and the Church of Scotland. As Schmidt-Leukel noted above, Dominus Iesus represents a turn in contemporary Catholic ecumenical thought to exclude any possibility of ecumenism within polydoxy: only Catholic orthodoxy is fully in line with apostolic succession, which is already a claim to sole authority in mediating identity.  

This shift is constructed primarily by providing a particular interpretation of decrees produced during the Second Vatican Council and excluding the possibility of alternative interpretations. In terms of orthodoxy and polydoxy which have been analysed and explored throughout this thesis, Dominus Iesus follows the trend of conflating a particular orthodoxy with the Christian identity and claiming absolute authority to mediate both Christian orthodoxy and identity to the exclusion of all heterodox possibilities — something which has been seen throughout the history of Christian orthodoxy (3.2.5). In seeking to establish a common Christian identity, these authoritarian implications of Dominus Iesus must be rejected as deviating from the ecumenical implications of Second Vatican and even Dominus Iesus itself. Rather than proposing a straightforward rejection of Dominus Iesus as if I had some level of authority in Catholic theology exceeding that of either the present or former popes, my short critique here will show that it can only operate within a framework of polydoxy and necessarily excludes its authoritarian implications.

62. Ibid., 3.8.2.
63. Ibid., 3.10.
65. See Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominus Iesus, 16.
What *Dominus Iesus* argues is that all ecclesial communities not in ‘full communion’ with the Roman Catholic Church, defined as the acceptance of the primacy of the Catholic hierarchy and structure, are imperfect divergences from the ‘true’ Church while also arguing that the baptised individual members of these communities are incorporated in the larger Body of Christ.66 This exclusion of others rests largely on an earlier declaration by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Mysterium Ecclesiae*.67 The ecumenical argument of *Dominus Iesus* (16–17) taken with the interfaith argument (21–22) effectively sets up a hierarchy of salvation with the Roman Catholic Church as the ideal and all others — both other Christians and non-Christians — are unequal to both doctrine and ‘the position of Jesus Christ’.68 In wanting to assert Catholic doctrine as orthodoxy for all of Christianity, *Dominus Iesus* has thus established the impossibility of being other than Catholic and still ‘participat[ing] fully in communion with God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’.69

*Dominus Iesus* contradicts any and all ecumenical impulses of the Roman Catholic Church by its degradation of non-Catholic Christians, despite John Paul II’s declaration in 1995 that all who profess ‘the same truth about the Cross’ are full believers and participants in Christ.70 For John Paul II, the ecumenical unity of the Church is found in Christ’s prayer ‘for all his disciples and for all those who believe in him that they *might be one*, a living communion’, yet this unity is reconciliation using the language of ‘full communion’.71 Vital to this assertion is the lack of accepting a particular orthodoxy or authority, an acceptance which *Dominus Iesus* finds necessary. Such acceptance is implied in the document’s declaration that Protestant churches are not fully ‘churches’; the unity of Christianity is inscribed within the recognition that the one true and complete Church is the visible manifestation in the Roman Catholic Church rather than the invisible community of different believers.72 *Dominus Iesus* can only assert an authority of orthodoxy if it presupposes its own contingency, requiring other voices as polydoxies upon which it can exert its authority. The unity of the Church is only possible in the fellowship and communion of grace and salvation through the Holy Spirit.73 The failure of *Dominus Iesus* lies in its rejection of passing ‘from antagonism

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69. Ibid.
and conflict to a situation where each party recognises the other as a partner.\textsuperscript{74} In this rejection, \textit{Dominus Iesus} asserts the mystery of the Church to be the contingent existence of the Roman Catholic Church and its apostolic succession rather than its being unified around the experience of Christ despite many differences in the interpretation and even experiences themselves of Christ. The plurality of Christianity which reflects the mystery of the triune God is the true mystery of the Church; and out of that mystery, the Christian identity emerges as one of participation rather than dogmatic acceptance.

### 4.2.4 Presence and Participation

A thorough exploration of ecumenical views throughout contemporary Christian theology, while possibly beneficial, is beyond the limits of this thesis because I am proposing a model by which such an analysis — which would itself be enough to constitute a separate thesis — could be made. However, the three readings above are enough to indicate a growing trend across Christian groups to (re-)define Christian identity in similar ways. By focusing on the risen Christ, the centrality of the Christian identity is found in being incorporated to the Body of Christ as the eschatological realisation of unity. The Christian identity is focused on the notion of being present within a cohesive whole amidst the diversity and difference that such inclusion produces. To be present is not just an actuality of physical proximity but also a virtual experience of community (2.3.5) through mediations. For this reason, Christians can say that the Holy Spirit (and Christ) is present without being empirically observable; and, more generally, people can speak of being present ‘in spirit’ with someone while far away. These mediations are most directly found not at the institutional level but at the local level where communities are able to engage directly with others.\textsuperscript{75} That is, the most tangible forms of ecumenism happens when local churches join together in support of one another as a single community of Christians. The virtual Body of Christ is most visibly unified when its organs cooperate with one another and thereby reveal the presence and participation of Christ.

Participation, as the relation between God and human, is the intersection of the transcendent with the immanent (or the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’) in which the point of intersection is where the Church exists. Participation between God and humanity is through the Body of Christ. God’s participation in humanity is revealed as God’s acceptance of humanity; this is the core of what Paul Tillich calls \textit{agape} love.\textsuperscript{76} God’s participation in humanity is

\textsuperscript{74} Cf. ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{75} Groups such as Glasgow Churches Together and Actions of Churches Together in Scotland which organise city-wide and regional events are able to put into practise ecumenical ideals and involve the wider church community in ways that would hinder participation at larger institutional levels such as the World Council of Churches.

\textsuperscript{76} Tillich, \textit{Systematic Theology} 3:48; cf. Werner G. Jeanrond, \textit{A Theology of Love} (London: T&T Clark,
based on God’s love for humanity. By extension, a theological concept of participation cannot be separated from love; participation requires love. Furthermore, as people participate in Christ, they also participate in God and the rest of humanity. This participation is the production of an eschatological ‘destiny’ in the present moment (1.3.4), reverberating with the production of sense in language (1.1.1). The eschatological community is the excess of relations produced in the synthesis of time and is universal in scope. Present participation in Christ is a byproduct of the narrative production of Christian identity in time (2.2.5). Any group or individual which participates in Christ by creating orthodoxy in time must also participate in the eschatological community that is the Body of Christ because the former implies the latter. One cannot be considered ‘Christian’ without ‘being part of Christianity’ — the two are inseparable.

Participation is a mutual process that creates a new language and a new meaning; it is the basis for the religious ‘world’. Through participation, the religious symbols (e.g. eucharist and wine) both have and create (theological) sense because they become singularities along the surface of theology implicating the entirety of theology in a single liturgical act of participation. Furthermore, humanity and God participate in one another through these religious symbols; and it is through participation that presence is created and experienced. The creation of presence through participation is a virtual presence in which it is real without being actual (2.3.5). The experience of presence as a community can be (and is often) intangible and invisible, spreading universally through time and space to create a single body (cf. Vincent of Lérins in 3.2.6).

Participation and presence are not rooted in acceptance of dogmatic theologies or propositions but love of God and one another. Love is expressive, and through its expression communities are formed across boundaries created through differences of opinion. Echoing this theme of love, Dietrich Bonhoeffer also finds the production of community in the burdening of sins: ‘in confession there takes place a breakthrough to community’. Community can only be constructed through the establishment of relations within and outwith itself, and through this entanglement of relations, an orthodox Self emerges (2.2.4). In this way, the Body of Christ — as the single community composed of many orthodox Selves — can only become such through the active participation of its members as a community created not by the establishment of a central orthodoxy as the absolute mediating authority (cf. 4.1.2) but in the relation itself as one orthodoxy among many in polydoxy.

2010), 239–47.
78. Ibid., 3:61.
Relations within polydoxy are as fragile as the actual body of Christ. The fragility of the Body of Christ is most visible when the Body wounds itself because every rupture and infliction of pain threatens not just the affected locality but the entirety of the Body. For example, while the Roman Catholic Church has had difficulty over the years with various cases of abuse by priests (e.g. Ireland, Germany, United States), the entire Body of Christ suffers. Such wounds are intensified when other parts of the Body respond with more pain, for example by using the problem as a marketing strategy to try to gain members. It leads to more divisiveness through a democratic-consumerist ideology (cf. 4.1) that actually does more damage than good to the Body of Christ. Only by responding in love and care can wounds be healed in order to present a healthy Body of Christ. In the following section (4.3.5), I shall look at a contemporary issue in which a polydox love can be applied to promote a healthy community and a healthy Body image.

4.2.5 The Church’s Being

Before looking at a contemporary issue, however, I wish to re-interpret Paul’s image of the Body of Christ in order to provide a context for the analysis. In doing so, I hope to provide a methodology for applying polydoxy to contemporary issues of embodying a Christian identity while also acknowledging differences. In seeing the Body of Christ through the BwO, it must be re-read as an identity of multiplicity. ‘Beneath’ the single Body of Christ are many identities — organs and members of the body/Body — which are situated in relations to one another. It is these very relations, ‘the interdependence of each creature on “its fellow creatures” that makes for each creature’s internal multiplicity’. This inter-relationality and ‘mutual participation’ deconstructs and reconstructs Paul’s image of the Body around the claim ‘that the members may have the same care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together’ (1 Cor. 12:25b-26). I shall address the social-ethical aspect of participation implied here later in this chapter (4.4.3).

The relationality of the organs to the Body is a complex totality; and the full extent of their coinherence is so great that none can ‘grasp the totality’ of what they are individually let alone together. Hence, the call to an orthodox polydoxy is a call for negotiation in light of human finitude. Polydoxy in this light sees the Body of Christ as a living, organic network of many members and not ‘an artificial construction which is or should be built from blueprints by harking back to texts prior and external to it’. This organic polydoxy is the BwO of Christ conceived theologically as the ecumenical unity because of differences within the

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82. Yves Congar, The Mystery of the Church: Studies by Yves Congar (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), XIV.
Body rather than in spite of them. The BwO of Christ is, following the duplicitous nature of identity (2.2.4), an assemblage of many Selves that are necessarily in relation because their shared identity as part of (or even wholly constituent of) the universal Church can be such only in relation to others. The universal Church can only exist in multiple communities — even if one thinks itself alone is the perfect community in which the Church ‘subsists’ — when each is seen as participating in the ‘same’ identity regardless of how complete or perfect that participation may be. In Ricœrian terms, the distinction that polydoxy publicises is between the *idem*-identity — a particular set of beliefs made orthodox — and the *ipse*-identity of Christianity which is the orthodox Self beneath every ideological and doctrinal mask. Beneath the veneer of a single Christianity lies another world of identities (perhaps subterranean from some perspectives) which undercut the singular notion of the ‘top’ mask. In other words, the notion of a single identity — whether an individual’s or a group’s — is contingent upon the relations beneath that identity which create a single virtual image for the changing context in which the Self exists; each identity of each Self given as the ‘true’ image of its Self is inherently different from every other one (cf. 2.1). Every ‘singular’ notion of a Self is multiple.

The path I shall take to find the mutual participation which has been covered over by *idem*-identities does not begin with the ecumenical dialogue. Interestingly, it begins with interfaith dialogues and questions of religious pluralism, following Catherine Keller’s understanding that external differences create internal differences. This is the reason why the discussion of orthodoxy and its politicisation in the previous chapter (3.1.2) began with Christianity’s relation to another religion, namely Judaism. While theologians like Schmidt-Leukel are quick and correct to point out that there is a contrariness in Roman Catholic (and other Christian) theology situated ‘between the conciliar (Vatican II) and post-conciliar inclusivistic affirmation of positive salvific elements in other religions and the pre-conciliar ecclesiological exclusivism of the *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*’, this line of thinking can be expanded.  


Part of the debates at Vatican II surrounded the linking of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* with a definition of the Church. While the phrase comes from an era prior to ecumenical councils (third century) without many churches in mutual exclusion and without a centralised hierarchy to organise the Church, it was used throughout the centuries to include the Church with the general process of salvation. The statement did not include a definition of the Church, and this has inspired definitions and uses which varied, depending on context. During Vatican II, the growing ecumenical movement really pushed the Roman Catholic Church to define the Church in light of its generally restricted past and the new context of interchurch relations.
CHAPTER 4. CHURCH IN CONTEXTS

Throughout the documents of Vatican II, there is an attempt to place multiple contexts and horizons into one arrangement so that a definition of the Church can be developed.\(^85\)

After Vatican II, part of the post-conciliar debate has centred upon the term *subsistit in* in *Lumen Gentium*: in what way does the universal Church ‘[subsist] in the [Roman] Catholic Church’.\(^86\) Two general groups of opinion became dominant in this debate with one choosing to see the subsistence of the universal Church as being *exclusively* within the Roman Catholic Church and the other group seeing the subsistence as a continuity which can include other groups ecumenically. There have been a number of partners in this debate, but two pairs worth noting were Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) and Walter Kasper along with Karl Becker and Francis Sullivan.\(^87\) In 2000, as an attempt to clarify the issue (amongst others), the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith under the leadership of Cardinal Ratzinger and with the blessing of Pope John Paul II promulgated *Dominus Iesus*. This document in addition to subsequent statements from the Congregation and the Pope have made official the ‘exclusive’ interpretation of subsistence. As noted above (4.2.3), this has produced contradictory implications of non-Catholic Christians that are both somehow and to some degree participants in Christ even though the ‘communities’ to which they belong and of which they compose are, at best, derivative elements of the ‘true’ Church and at worst, not part of the ‘true’ Church at all. If *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* is to be held in addition to the definition of the Church in *Dominus Iesus*, then it must be accepted that while there is no salvation outside of the Church, there are some who are somehow saved despite being outside of the Church or, alternatively, there are degrees of salvation. As was argued above, an ecumenical view of the universal Church escapes these theological difficulties.

Hopefully, it will not be a surprise to see that this conversation is deeply connected with questions of inter-religious dialogue. Many of the key Vatican documents which speak of ecumenism also mention interfaith dialogue, and those which speak of interfaith dialogue also mention ecumenism; the two are deeply connected and cannot be taken independent of one another. Changes in attitudes take time, as we have seen in the change with other Christians from the exclusivism Schmidt-Leukel noted to the ecumenical ambiguities of John Paul II’s papacy, from the bold proclamation of Paul VI that ‘the Christian religion is the one and only


\(^{87}\) Summaries of these two debates can be found in McDonnell, ‘The Ratzinger/Kasper Debate’; Lawrence J. Welch and Guy Mansini, ‘*Lumen Gentium* No. 8 and *Subsistit in*, Again’, *New Blackfriars* 90 (2009): 602–617.
true religion’ (again, open to an ecumenical interpretation of exclusion regarding definitions of ‘true’ Christianity) to the possibility that members of other faiths may be able to receive at least some degree of grace.\(^{88}\) Considering the length of time in which there was only one possible means of salvation, this is a lot of change in under fifty years! If Schmidt-Leukel’s claim that only a ‘truly pluralistic theology of religions’ can overcome ‘supersessionism and triumphalism’ is to be taken seriously, then I contend that only a pluralistic theology (e.g. polydoxy) can overcome the anti-ecumenical sentiments and interpretations of extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Only a true acceptance of difference — against the exclusivism that ‘the Church of Christ . . . continues to exist fully only in the Catholic Church’ — can produce actual ecumenical relations and realise the already existing mutual participation of the members of the Body of Christ.\(^{89}\) Polydoxy has been exemplified in ecumenical thought as the recognition of ‘diversities as expressions of the one apostolic faith and the one catholic church’ in such a way that diversities are ‘reconciled and transformed into a legitimate and indispensable multiformity within the one body of Christ’.\(^{90}\) This multiformity is the acceptance of difference, realisation of communion, and participation in Christ by love. Such love does not exclude others from the shared or communal identity but does recognise the spaces between each participant and the differences made possible by their perspectives.

### 4.3 Social Controversies and Different Theological Opinions

I propose that the BwO of Christ should be seen as a living system of relations between many parts. The contradictory nature of living bodies is that they tend to generate chemicals which are toxic to the body.\(^{91}\) A living body is always in the process of self-destruction and re-creation through the creation of toxins and the mediation of these. This connection binds heresies and orthodoxies together as parts of the same process of producing orthodoxy within the Body of Christ. As a metaphorical body, the mediation of toxins within a body would seem to justify attempts to purge such problems (e.g. heresies and heterodoxies) from the body in order to maintain a level of cleanliness or purity. Yet such interpretations are misguided for two reasons: first, they imagine that a sterile body is ideal and, secondly, they imagine their own orthodoxies as the original or perfect, pure remainder.

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\(^{89}\) Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Dominus Iesus*, 16.

\(^{90}\) Seventh Assembly of the Lutheran World Federation, ‘Statement on “The Unity We Seek”’, in Kinnamon and Cope, *The Ecumenical Movement*, 122 (emphasis mine).

In this section, I shall argue that both of these reasons are problematic to an ecumenical ecclesiology and makes ecumenical unity self-defeating. I shall begin by treating each of these misguided interpretations separately. This critique is then followed by a constructive phase in which the concept of polydoxy (3.4.4) is read as promoting a mediation between orthodoxies and as a balance between the two perceived extremes of complete ‘purity’ and complete ‘impurity’. This mediation is the ecumenical spirit (4.2.5) which reveals the mutual participation of differences to be the site within which Christianities are connected. I employ the relational model of Christian identity in a debate where it is increasingly relevant as a method for accepting dogmatic/doctrinal differences. Finally, I shall turn the issue of relations to an external world in order to begin (re-)connecting ecumenism with inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogues, which will be the focus of the next section (4.4.1 and 4.4.2).

4.3.1 Unmasking Selves

A ‘sterilised’ orthodoxy is often deluded into thinking that it not only inherits some ‘original’ identity and doctrine but also keeps that identity unchanged. Despite any possible change in history, the text which ‘sterilised’ orthodox readers use is seen as the exact same text which the earliest community used, and their contemporary interpretations have been received without change for centuries. Within Christianity, a sterilised orthodox believer truly thinks that the Bible as read in her native language (e.g. English) is exactly the same text that early Christians read and their authors wrote — transmission and translation themselves were divinely guided. This ‘inerrancy’ is projected a step further such that there can only be one correct interpretation of the Bible and it comes plainly to anyone who reads literally — no critical apparatus necessary. Sterilised orthodoxy asserts that its tenets transcend history, culture, language, and any other earthly limitation in order to produce itself in time. This sterility has become a prominent feature in American Protestantism in general and, more specifically, American Evangelicalism.

The 1978 summit conference of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) echoes these themes of sterility by delineating the basis for American Evangelical theology.\footnote{92} In its first article, the first Chicago statement affirms the biblical text as ‘the authoritative Word of God’ that maintains its authority independent from any human context which may call upon it as Scripture.\footnote{93} Regardless of humanity’s sinfulness, corruption, or apathy

92. Though each of the three conferences occurred in Chicago and each title includes the phrase ‘Chicago statement’, only the first is recognised generally by that name.

(or lack thereof), the divine revelation of the Bible is unaffected. The statement continues its assault against critical understanding by asserting that the original manuscripts are perfectly and fully inspired by God to contain no errors and the copies and translations which we now possess are accurate representations of the now lost originals. Lastly, and most importantly for the purpose of my thesis, the Chicago statement asserts that their 1978 statement of inerrancy ‘has been integral to the Church’s faith throughout its history’ and is not ‘a doctrine invented by Scholastic Protestantism’.

In the assertion that their historically-situated statement has always existed (either in theory or in practise), the Chicago statement claims to be merely an exegetical exposition of something which has always existed and transcends historical contexts. This is reaffirmed and made clear in the 1982 ICBI statement on hermeneutics. In order to construct a pure, specific interpretation of the Bible, the second statement claims that all biblical truths are objective, absolute propositional statements that are ‘single, definite and fixed’. The 1982 statement is so vehemently opposed to any kind of contextual understanding that one article deals directly with any kind of Gadamerian language: ‘Thus we deny that the “horizons” of the biblical writer and the interpreter may rightly “fuse” in such a way that what the text communicates to the interpreter is not ultimately controlled by the expressed meaning of the Scripture.’ In contrast, other (i.e. non-sterilising) theologies rarely see the external imposition of hermeneutics upon the biblical text as ‘alien to the central concept of Holy Scripture’ but rather as ‘providing just a key to the understanding of what is said in Scripture’.

While it may seem easier to ignore sentiments such as the Chicago statements or sweep them away as lacking critical understanding, the Chicago statements are treated with import in (American) Evangelical circles. Prominent (American) Evangelical theologians see the kind of critical understanding which comes from non-confessional universities as something opposed to the clear understanding of the Bible. This statement may seem strange as scholars sympathetic to the Chicago statement do employ at least some critical methods for

94. Ibid., 4.
95. Ibid., 10, 12.
96. Ibid., 16.
97. There is also a third statement on ‘biblical application’, but it does not extend the prior statements regarding inerrancy.
100. Faith and Order, ‘Scripture, Tradition and Traditions’, 141.
101. Acceptance of the statement forged at the first conference is required to join groups such as the Evangelical Theological Society. See ‘ETS Membership Requirements’, http://www.etsjets.org/about/membership_requirements (accessed 8th June 2011).
Such opposition can only be understood when the guise of hermeneutical accuracy is disrobed and the substance from which sterilised orthodoxy comes is revealed as political (cf. 3.2.4). The question of legitimate understanding for sterilised orthodoxies is not hermeneutical despite its appearance as such. Instead, the question is one of authority (4.1.3) and falls to the acceptance of a particular orthodoxy as not only true but also as the imagined ‘pure and undefiled’ original received from the past. In terms of narrativity, the imagining of a pure, original orthodoxy which can be found by processes of purification is the fabrication of a genetic lineage that reaches across time itself to become transcendental by necessity (cf. the use of apostolic succession in 3.2.5). Sterilised orthodoxy produces the very ‘original’ model it seeks to find.

4.3.2 Centres and Boundaries

The desire for purity is an attempt to use political power to shape religious identity. By driving out all opposition, one shrinks the imagined ‘absolute’ boundaries of Christian identity to coincide with a very limited centre. It would be tempting to see this movement as a return to a city-state geopolitics (cf. 3.1.3), but the key difference here is that a city-state often has larger boundaries than what is allowed by a sterilised Christianity. The sterilised Christian identity is the danger of a purely schismatic series of orthodoxy (3.1.1); it seeks to narrow the boundaries until what remains is a wholly homogeneous group where dissent is impossible. It is a nostalgic vision of identity in which borders, horizons, and centres are reduced to limits that are closely defined and easily transgressed.

This nostalgia is imagined by proponents of a sterilised orthodoxy because they place their own orthodoxy as the sterilised remainder. The procedure operates in terms of centres and boundaries. First, the centre is enlarged to include more and more points of agreement as necessary. This can be seen in something like the ICBI statements above where the minimum level of agreement on methodology and conceptual understanding expands to include the assertion of particular statements forged in recent history and the retroactive acceptance of the idea of those statements into the historical development. This means that the first step is a revisionist approach to doxa which inserts one’s own interpretation into the fabric of history long before its actual appearance. A revision of history like this creates two complementary actions: first, it changes history in such a way that the ‘original’ model anticipates the current revision, providing a convenient succession of faithful believers while, secondly, redrawing boundary lines through history so that what may have been accepted as orthodoxy is transformed into a deficient sect which needs to be either ‘purified’ (and thereby re-align with the revised centre) or purged. Revisions like this can be found in later ecumenical councils.

(cf. 3.2.4) as well as recent practises of excommunication. This kind of revisionist agenda not only censures the process of remembrance but also erases pure Memory by denying the possibility of historical revisions. A sterilised orthodoxy maintains a radical stasis in which it is projected through its history and future as the always-existing and never-changing origin from which differences are seen as *impure* deviations.

In revising the theological history of Christianity, a centre of orthodoxy is enlarged in order to be more applicable, but it is tied to a reduction of boundaries. The centre is transformed from a commonality into a mobile inner boundary to supplement the mobile outer boundary and the two are moved together so that the distance between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heresy’ is reduced. General acceptance becomes definitive requirement so that the distinction between faithful and heretic becomes pronounced and the slightest step may have the greatest consequences. By narrowing the perceived borders, political power is consolidated because the enlarged centre empowers the expanding definition of orthodoxy to be accepted fully or the subjects of such power risk excommunication. This is combined with a strong outer boundary that insulates and isolates the orthodoxy from differing opinions and possibilities.

Here is the implicit power of a sterilised orthodoxy: by laying seige to a centre, it not only establishes the boundaries for that centre but it also establishes all opposition (both within the centre and outwith the seige) as hostile belligerents, creating identities which are unable to be contested or resolved in a less violent manner. Sterilised orthodoxies revise not just history but the context itself in such a way that differences are seen as attacks on its very purity. The result of a sterilised orthodoxy is the maintaining of an *image of* purity. In this light, I suggest that one must see claims for a sterilised orthodoxy as being as much for its proponents’ own self-understanding and attempts at finding themselves in a different world as they are for maintaining an image of purity for a weak-hearted God. Sterilised orthodoxies hope to secure an identity in a world they see as tumultuous and different. By revealing the many centres, boundaries, and horizons — including those of the sterilised orthodoxy — one can show effectively the limits to any assertion of orthodox authority without undercutting the possibility of authority within that world. A sterilised orthodoxy can well assert itself as ideal, but it is only possible to do so by acknowledging the possibility that other orthodoxies exist and claim the same assertion without any loss of ‘local’ authority. While some might claim this is a liberal move that corrupts a sterile orthodoxy, it is quite the opposite because it allows the claims of orthodoxy to remain one’s own without the interference of one on the other except where agreed upon by both.
4.3.3 Recovering Ecumenism

The future of ecumenism is the acknowledged relativity and situatedness that influences one’s horizons. It is not the absorption of all Christians into one Church which mediates and controls the measure of ‘full communion’ for all. Rather, I suggest ecumenical unity in the future shall realise the connections already inherent to the shared Christian identity in which all of Christianity participates. In so doing, Christian groups face their own finitude and limited horizons of orthodoxy which are ‘mere’ fragments along the infinite surface of the Body of Christ, acknowledging other possible horizons of which some share more practises and doxa than others.

The possibility of different horizons is one which humans regularly experience. While I may stand at a high point in Glasgow, I am generally unable to see Edinburgh, let alone London, Paris, New York, etc. There are many factors affecting my horizon: weather conditions, obstructions to my line of sight, curvature of the earth, poor eyesight, etc. None of these factors alter the existence of, location of, or relations between cities; Edinburgh is still 50 miles east of Glasgow, both are still within Scotland. I can choose to recognise things beyond my horizons, but that is indicative of how I perceive relations between objects within and beyond my limited horizons. Likewise, the horizons of orthodoxy are unable to see all of the other parts of Christianity unless ‘Christianity’ is reduced to a small, sterilised orthodoxy. I am arguing that there must be something which defines Christian identity without relying on or removing the limitations of horizons. The defining factor which I have utilised was the participation in and experience of Christ, concepts which are open to interpretation and contextualisation.

The openness to additional, divergent horizons changes the way in which theological differences are mediated and discussed. Within polydoxy, groups still keep their self-definition, tradition, authority, horizons, limits, etc. as their own orthodoxy; but they are no longer able to assert their orthodoxy over and against other groups. While orthodoxies can and should identify themselves, I suggest that they are unable to assert their definition of their dialectical Others upon those Others for the same reason that allows them to define themselves. Polydoxy is the freedom to define oneself and the responsibility to allow others the same opportunity.

However, this does not imply a homogeneity within the horizons of a particular orthodoxy because the differences within the group implies a mutual participation and a disagreement on the boundaries at a smaller level of identity (i.e. each orthodoxy is also a community of Selves, c.f. 2.2.4). For example, while there has been a gap within the Anglican Commu-
nion because of human sexuality, the disagreeing parties are still members of the Anglican identity despite their disagreements. The differences are seen as being between each other as Anglicans rather than between ‘real’ Anglicans and some outsiders. It is possible for the two groups to agree completely on every possible doctrinal issue except for human sexuality; this is evidence not of one group’s already-existent state of being excommunicated but of the two groups disagreement on how they should interpret and embody the Christian (and Anglican) identity.

In revealing the underlying issue to be that of embodying an already existent identity, the method for mediating disputes is hermeneutical and must be open to accepting differences. Even though one may believe another is incorrect in her interpretation and is improperly embodying an identity, one implicitly acknowledges the other’s participation in the same identity. In seeking to ‘correct’ someone else’s doxa, one has already ventured into the realm of polydoxy while simultaneously disregarding differences to assert a single absolute authority over that identity (cf. 4.1.3). A polydox model changes tactics so that one always seeks to understand and be understood by others, thereby participating in a shared identity without asserting one’s own authority as necessary for all.

Polydoxy is the full realisation that the modern democratic ideal has made everyone capable of asserting opinions and authorities without any being necessary; that is, anyone who is allowed to vote in an election can vote for any candidate (and in some cases, anyone at all). Sometimes, others fully agree and the candidate or party wins an election, but such ‘victories’ are impermanent and changing because the circumstances surrounding the political atmosphere changes. Because the climate and context in which Christian identity changes, one’s response should not be the safeguarding of identity through isolation (which is a form of sterilisation) but to participate actively in constructing identity from the pure Memory of tradition (2.2.5) and embodying it for society and Others (4.2.2). These constructions of identity convert most theological divergences into differences of embodiment based on contextual differences (e.g. language, culture). Theological identities are constructed individually by interpreting all of time — past, present, and future — into a new narrative which twists and turns, diverging and converging with other identities as a network of participatory relations (4.1.2) that reverberate in one identity repeated infinitely ($X^n$-selves). The many Selves together (re-)produce the single Self which will again be repeated into the many, following the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2). Identity can only be understood through the punctuation of the continually changing self-narrative by the active self-determination of the self-reflexion and self-understanding of a created subject.104

A model for mediating differences begins to break through the difficulties of pluralist thinking and polydoxy. Participation in one’s identity as another’s is the act of self-determination, not of the whole Christian Self but of a small fragment. Through wide participation, the entirety of the Christian Self produces its own identity in time (*idem*) as the assertion of the self-same Self (*ipse*) which has persisted through time. Hence, differences between Christian groups are mediated by their mutual participation in one another which produces their own self-understanding as related members of the one Body of Christ. The mediation of differences produces self-determined identities instead of a received identity from an external authority acting under the illusion of an original Self from which all others have deviated (cf. *Dominus Iesus* in 4.2.3).

### 4.3.4 Difference and Otherness

Returning to an example from the previous section (4.2.4), I wish to focus on ecumenism by looking at a major contemporary debate within a single group. In May of 2011, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland appointed a special commission to continue investigating issues surrounding same-sex relationships within the Kirk.\footnote{105 See The Church of Scotland, ‘Church Votes for More Dialogue’, *Church of Scotland web site* (26th May 2011), http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/news_and_events/news/latest/church_votes_for_more_dialogue (accessed 14th June 2011).} My analysis here is not which positions regarding same-sex relationships are acceptable and which are not. Rather, my aim is to highlight the usefulness of polydoxy and identity formation as a model for mediating such positions. Through this example, I will show that issues which are often reduced to questions of doctrinal interpretation and games of authority (4.1.2) are issues of clothing and masks (i.e. *idem*-identity) rather than theological identity (i.e. *ipse*-identity). While these issues sometimes centre on the creation of a sterilised orthodoxy, it is not always the case that a perspective of exclusion is involved.

By separating the two aspects of identity (*ipse* and *idem*), I suggest that the future of the Church of Scotland is not a schism breaking the ‘unity’ of the Kirk’s Christian identity but rather the realisation that the unity of the Kirk is focused incorrectly on a virtual image of theology (4.2.1) — *internal* differences rather than the multiplicity of identity (2.2.2) — and the unity-within-multeity which is most often confined to ecumenical concerns. The possibility of a schism is not excluded from my model, but the instigation of a ‘schism’ would focus on identity relations rather than doctrinal claims. The interpretation of any ‘schism’ as a fracturing of unity is the result of incorrectly imagining the prior ‘unity’ as homogeneous; in rejecting the view of unity as homogeneous, ‘schisms’ can be seen as naturally occurring events necessary to the overall well-being of the *heterogeneous* unity (cf. mitosis in 3.2.5). I shall show that the schismatic debate within the Church of Scotland is first and
foremost ecumenical and, subsequently, should be focused on reconciliation and acceptance of differences through the mutual inclusion of multiple orthodoxies by the central mediation and presence of Christ rather than division and mutual exclusion through the rejection of differences as heresy.

The 2007 report ‘A challenge to unity’ given to the General Assembly noted from an earlier (1994) report on human sexuality that ‘members of the Church of Scotland interpret Scripture in a variety of different ways, and in approaching homosexuality come to a number of different conclusions’. This same acceptance of differences permeate the 2007 report which also makes clear that opposing views on same-sex relationships ‘are not by definition morally or spiritually deficient: rather, the theological debate is a Christian theological debate’. This should be interpreted as implying that the debate should not be about defining Christian identity (e.g. whether or not one who believes a particular way on the issue is Christian) but how the Kirk can mediate the different opinions among its constituent churches and members. This is what the first point of polydox mediation is: Christians (even those in the Church of Scotland) have differing opinions and are already Christian. For a schism to occur here, it must be along the lines of re-imaging the nature of the Kirk and the changing of relations within its shared identity. That is, a schism would be the production of two identities which still share some identities in addition to their own divergent identities (e.g. as Christian, Presbyterian as well as for/against allowing same-sex ministers).

Debates on human sexuality within Christianity are questions which will redefine internal boundaries based on already existing horizons and not questions which redefine Christian identity as a whole. The 2009 and 2011 reports already have identified two thematic groups which fall on opposite boundaries on the single set of issues regarding human sexuality: traditionalist and revisionist themes. Both reports take care to point out that both are based in particular interpretive traditions that share a large commonality. I would add that this commonality is the shared Presbyterian identity that has maintained their unity before these issues regarding human sexuality emerged. While there are disagreements and questions of internal boundaries, the key to unity is acknowledging differences and mutual understanding as two particular orthodoxies sharing identities and participating with one another. This understanding is present in the 2011 report in which the special commission suggested that

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107. Ibid., 4.5.2.
there should be ‘mutual understanding between those who disagree with each other’. The implication of this suggestion is that such understanding is not as widespread as the members of the commission had hoped. A lack of mutual understanding possibly reflects the nostalgia of homogeneity in which members perceive their group as sharing their own opinions because they share an identity arguing from the particular to the universal. However, shared understanding and mutual participation had the greatest support from the individual Presbyteries and congregations throughout the Kirk in response to questions initially posed in the 2007 report.

A polydox model favours allowing differences in addition to freedom of conscience by others, an option proposed by the Kirk’s special commission. Such an allowance does not mandate members to accept (in this case) same-sex relationships but it does require each to respect the differences of opinion on the matter. The issue is not whether same-sex orientation is acceptable or sinful. It has been stated by the special commission in every report that there is more than one ‘acceptable’ possibility. This is followed by the question of whether the theological issue is vital to the definition of Christian identity, something which the proposal to allow differences rejects. The 2011 special commission’s recommendations echoed the mediation of differences through polydoxy by emphasising a unity not based on dogmatic assertions but in the mutual love and participation in a pluralist communal identity.

4.3.5 Finding Identity

The orthodox Self is one of many Selves which participate within a single Christian identity. Despite different horizons, an orthodox Self shares a single identity contextualised within its particular horizon while at the same time transcending such boundaries through the inner participation in, with, and through the experienced reality that is the risen Christ. The orthodox Self is itself a symbol referring to God indirectly through its references to the whole Body of Christ and the Christ which it represents while simultaneously referring to the Self’s context within a set of human social interactions that construct the horizons of orthodoxy.

Attempts to impose an ultimate structure of human authority upon a symbol is the result of an exclusivist approach in the strongest sense of the word: isolation. By isolating a symbol and removing it from the network of relations that define it, authorities multiply because each vie for political power over the symbol-institution. Participatory unity is impossible within structures separated by mutual exclusion — something which has often been the case

110. See ibid., 2.1.4.
with historical councils of orthodoxy (see 3.2.4); only those who have accepted the minimum requirements for a particular orthodoxy are allowed to participate as ‘different’. This kind of ‘difference’ which occurs after acknowledging a creed or orthodoxy is not actual difference because it only allows divergence within a homogenised group.

My turn to polydoxy offered earlier in this chapter (4.1.3) seeks to re-imagine the relations between orthodoxies as already existing mutual participation. These relations necessarily hinge on ecumenical understanding and relations, not in order for one group to absorb others under the guise of ‘full communion’ but to realise the degrees to which groups already participate with each other in a shared communion of identity. Diversity within the polydox Body of Christ ‘derives from the pre-existing nature of the unity as organic: it is not a diversity which has to discover or be made into a unity’. An acceptance of shared identity can be found throughout ecumenical documents and statements across internal boundaries of the universal/invisible Church. However, the ecumenical nature of the shared Christian identity has yet to be fully realised within the groups that have proposed such. Despite acknowledging differences as permissible within a group, exclusivist feelings still exist within Christian groups. For example, emerging ruptures within the Anglican Communion and the Church of Scotland may confuse a shared communion (ipse) with a shared orthodoxy (idem). I propose that responses to differences need to focus on identity rather than doctrinal arguments just as the special commission on same-sex relationships within the Church of Scotland has emphasised. By focusing on identity, horizons of orthodoxies can be realised and even affirmed as different while still promoting a shared mutual participation and respect.

The mutual participation of ecumenical dialogue extends beyond the boundaries of Christian identity into other social relations. These social relations are focused in two aspects: (1) inter-religious dialogues and (2) social/public dialogues. Ecumenical thinking is not restricted to relations within Christianity; it necessarily entails an external dialectic between an embodied Christian identity and other religious identities (also embodied) that mutually participate with each other along the lines of similarity and difference and their shared identity as religious beings. Finally, as religious beings, no religious identity exists within a self-contained vacuum of religiosity. A consequence of this nature is the interaction with a wider social realm in public spaces as public bodies (2.3.2). In the following section (4.4.1), I shall employ the correlational method of Paul Tillich to expand polydox identity to these two ‘external’ relations.

4.4 The Church Alongside its Social Partners

While ecumenism and interfaith dialogues are generally seen as unrelated, the question of authority posed in the previous chapter (3.1.5) undermines this position. Both sets of dialogues focus on questions of identity and relations between identities. The difference between the two dialogues is a matter of scale: ecumenism mediates identities and relations between Christian Selves while interfaith discussions mediate identities and relations between Christian and non-Christian Selves. Similarly, dialogues within a public sphere (2.3.2) are between multiple Selves. Ecumenism is the catholic series of orthodoxy (3.1.1) since it brings together different participants under a single shared identity while interfaith dialogue operates as a schismatic series of orthodoxy because it differentiates participants. Both series of orthodoxy imply a shared participation and experience.

Ecumenical unity is eschatological because it reflects the future unity embodied in Christ, yet this unity is brought into the present by the realisation of the heterogeneity of the Body as embodying Christ. While the future of the Church is to be embodied in Christ, its present state is embodying Christ through mutual participation in Christ, the universal/invisible Church, and the world in which it exists. The implication of a shared participation makes it necessary for ecclesial models to define or outline ways in which an ecclesial body interacts with things beyond the boundary lines which distinguish it from other ‘secular’ bodies. The Body of Christ already interacts with the social contexts in which it lives. I shall show in this final section places in which this can occur as well as places where more attention is needed in order to present a more ecumenical Self.

4.4.1 Correlation and Participation

The participation that maintains polydoxy/heterodoxy is not simply internal participation of Selves within a single Self. It also proceeds to the external world and society, becoming the single Body of Christ that acts and effects social institutions (2.3.3). The internal Selves not only negotiate their own boundaries within Christianity but they also find and negotiate the external boundaries which they touch. An implication here is that not every orthodoxy, not every fragmentary Christian Self, interacts with society and others in the same way because they occupy different spaces along the surface of the Body and have different horizons. For these interactions, a contextualised understanding of identity is vital to social engagement. The Christian identity, like all identities, ‘exists within the process of narrative selving (the product being inseparable from the production and the self being an infinitive

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verb). Identity is always a process of becoming one’s Self, constructed from the fragments and interactions within and outwith (2.2.5); its goal, then, is to be a series of relations that reach across boundaries in order to pull Others as Others into the experiential event that defines one’s own identity. A Self shares its own identity with Others and the sharing is reciprocated and a community is formed; but that community is not reduced to the prior Self or Others as if one absorbs all others. I wish to propose one avenue of achieving this goal for the Christian identity that centres around the experience of the risen Christ: correlational theology. Correlational theology will be shown to be highly relevant to social engagement because it mediates theology with the social world through the praxis of Christian identity, and this mediation frees the universal/invisible Church and Christians to participate in the world as well as draw the world into relation with God.

Paul Tillich’s method of correlation is hermeneutical in and through theology in such a way that questions implied in human existence are related to the answers implied in the divine self-revelation; it is a circle ‘which drives man [sic] to a point where question and answer are not separated’. Each answer sparks new questions; and each repetition points to a mutual participation between God and humanity. While Tillich’s method is that of correlation, his theology is ultimately one of participation, namely one with a God who is both transcendent and immanent. It is this kind of participation that satisfies Tillich’s quest for human freedom and destiny as an eschatological vision of community. Participation produces a community. For Christianity, this community is found in the unity of the Church as a future to be realised rather than an ‘assured possession’ in the present or past. Christian theology requires a particularised faith based on the (subjective) participation that constructs a community.

Since theology is particular, the exclusive interpretation of sola scriptura is impossible because a theologian is already implicitly using church history as a complementary source for biblical interpretation. This is further contextualised in a social realm where a theologian’s own ‘world’ of culture and religion serves as her means of expression, as the ‘context in which he [sic] formulates existential questions which his [sic] theology intends to answer’. There is a reciprocity in a theologian’s participation in these three sources because the theologian shapes and is shaped by them. Experience, for Tillich, is the medium by which

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115. Sheerin, *Deleuze and Ricœur*, 86 (emphasis in original).
116. Emancipation theologies are among additional possibilities which I am omitting here for brevity.
118. Ibid., 1:306.
121. Ibid., 1:41.
122. Cf. ibid.
the theologian and these sources interact and participate. The thrust of Tillich’s methodology here is to provide a systematic theology that is both universal and particular in scope: one which brings the ultimate concern into the present situation because Christ was/is both fully divine (i.e. universal) and fully human (i.e. particular). This is the core of ‘revelation’ in its theological usage — not as strict deduction but as an affective participation.

Mutual participation, for Tillich, emerges from the usage of (religious) symbols which connect the particular users with a ‘deeper reality’ of divine participation.123 The symbol not only connects two different series together as the Deleuzian ‘empty space’ and ‘object without a home’ (cf. 1.1.1) but it implies the entire collection of series at once by (re-)producing a filiation of identity (1.2.2) through a temporal-mimetic process (1.3.4) for both the individual participant and a larger community (2.3.1). The symbol is, in Deleuzian terms, the ‘excess’ of signification: the redundancy that arises when a signifier is realised to signify its own self.124 A symbol’s meaning is understood only when the entirety of the semiotic relations that develop out of and into that symbol are understood — the symbol as a singularity. I suggest that Tillich argues symbols are irreplaceable for this exact reason; they are always producing meaning so that replacing them changes everything — the reality which they imply, the participation which implies them, and their own self-signification.

For Tillich, symbols hint at the ontology of the divine: God cannot exist because God is not a being that can exist. That is, God cannot be simply a symbol which implies some ‘deeper reality’. The ontology of God becomes the empty space in the series of signifier as a God without Being as well as the supernumerary object in the series of signified as the abysmal ground of Being. God can never be found along the Möbius strip of theology except as the always immanent yet never present aliquid — something else — within theology. This gives new meaning to Christ’s proclamation that the Kingdom of God is at hand; for the Body of Christ is the Kingdom of God, immanent and transcendent — never just one or the other. It is always both simultaneously.

In simultaneously becoming transcendent and immanent, the Body of Christ reaches towards both the divine reality and the human contexts which situate always-‘contemporary’ Christianities. The horizons and boundaries of this symbolic Body are porous and flexible since the Body adapts to its context in order to maintain its relations with outer society, calling its dialectical Others towards a response to the divine calling which echoes throughout the Body as the symbol of God on earth. Finally, Christian identity finds a stable home betwixt God and humanity as the location in which the two participate with each other.

123. Ibid., 1:265.
4.4.2 Attending to Others

Questions of orthodoxy are reflected in questions of pluralism. An ecclesial multiplicity, such as polydoxy, has implications in any kind of inter-religious dialogue. One may ask whether the lack of a central authority within Christianity implies a necessity of relativism or syncretism. These may be possibilities, yet neither of these are entailed in polydoxy. Against relativism, the polydox claim is that different orthodoxies will have different horizons and different responses to pluralism (cf. 4.1.2). It seems to be the case that exclusivism, at least as it is traditionally understood, is incompatible with polydoxy but only for the reasons already expressed in previous sections (4.2.5) regarding ecumenism: traditional exclusivism is situated so that all things beyond the horizons of its orthodoxy are excluded from the reality its Christian identity symbolises (4.1.3).

At the opposite extreme, polydoxy prevents a syncretic merging of all religions into an ‘essential’ religious identity which supersedes individual identities, contexts, and horizons. Against this claim, polydoxy stands between the two extremes allowing differences, associations, and mutual participation to emerge without erasing the boundaries. The boundaries are porous and flexible instead of being either impermeable (i.e. exclusivism) or nonexistent (i.e. syncreticism). Within those two limits, there are a number of possibilities for inter-religious dialogues and theologies of religions. While expounding a theology of religions is beyond the scope of this thesis, some implications of polydoxy can be introduced for future work.

The linking together of ecumenism and theology of religions provides an intriguing relationship which continually feeds into each other. The relationship between the two is made possible by the schema of identity construction (2.2.5) since attempts to describe or explain internal relations (i.e. between various Christian orthodoxies) have implications on descriptions of external relations (e.g. between an imagined Christianity and an imagined Islam). The opposite is also true, as I have shown in the previous chapter (3.2.1) with regards to the separation of Christianity and Judaism in the ‘Parting of the Ways’. Any attempt to describe an identity must apply to both internal and external relations.

Before the ecumenical movement gained strength and prominence in the past two centuries, ‘other’ Christianities and orthodoxies were considered either false Christianities or other religions.125 As the metaphorical interpretation of the Body of Christ became popular, the question of boundaries between other religions and other Christianities (i.e. between exter-

nal and internal differences) complicated questions of identity. One of the major responses to these questions was to assert one’s own orthodoxy as the authority to define whether another group could self-identify with the ‘common’ identity and what limits to those others were acceptable. This response prompted at most an ‘inclusivism’ in which all others who claimed the common identity were measured according to the self-asserted authority; all others were lacking in some respect and only by admitting their errors and returning to the true community which had full access to the identity which others held only partially could interaction and participation occur (cf. *Dominus Iesus* in 4.2.5). The ‘inclusivism’ of this response was sometimes extended (logically) to those who did not self-identify with the common identity (i.e. those who practised other religious faiths).

In this vein, the universalism of C.S. Lewis which is generally considered an inclusivism can be seen as thoroughly exclusivist because it denies the actuality of other faiths and other beliefs. Lewis suggests that even those who may identify as practising a different faith are actually believers of the ‘true’ faith without knowing it. The most famous image of Lewis’s universalism is the conversation between Aslan and Emeth, a soldier who dedicated his life to the false god Tash, in *The Last Battle*.126 The conversation between the two characters highlights two things: first against some forms of pluralism, Aslan and Tash are different gods and not simply different names for the same god; secondly against a strictly literal interpretation of exclusivism, service done in the name of Tash but out of love for Tash must be accounted as service to Aslan because Aslan is love and Tash is not. Lewis’s universalism separates a ‘traditional’ orthodoxy into assertions (or beliefs) and their practises, in favour of the practises which reflect that orthodoxy across religious boundaries. Lewis re-inscribes exclusivism into religious practises as the true essence of religious practises. Assertions of Lewis’s universal have repercussions in inter-religious dialogues which reveal its underlying exclusivism and denial of practitioners of other faiths as being truly *Other*. In contrast, a concept of universalism informed by polydox thinking would be much closer to religious pluralism.

### 4.4.3 Public Necessities

A polydox ecclesiology entails public interactions with all aspects of social lives. This includes politics, popular culture and media, dialogues on health, etc. The Church does not limit its interactions to the ‘religious’ realm. While the Church is always embodied in particular contexts, its message is more than what this context can explain because it is always the application of a narrative (1.2.4) in a particular context. The message of the Church is somehow transcendental despite its many changes over time.

The method of correlation has great value in engaging with the public sphere since it pushes the Body of Christ to interact with other (metaphorical) bodies. Through (public) discourse(s) with others, the Church can ‘rediscover society and history’ and, as a result, its own internal otherness when it finds that some of the strongest schisms were rooted in the ‘external’ otherness of different cultures and societies.\footnote{127} The Church must learn to speak out and for peoples, actions, and beliefs. In this vein, emancipatory/liberation theologies have led the way in bringing Christianity into the public sphere. Liberation theologies have done this by arguing successfully that ‘history can no longer be separated from the human place where the individual encounters transcendence’ which I suggest is the temporal-mimetic process (1.3.2) of Christian identity embedded in the social, secular sphere where identities emerge and develop in dialogue with each other.\footnote{128} Likewise, correlational theology has also called for the plurality of Christianity to enter the public sphere in order to evaluate ‘ethical-political criteria on what the religious option will mean for both individual and society’.\footnote{129} In both cases, the ‘socialisation’ of the Church is how it defines its own identity. To enter the public sphere as a changing, contingent body is to become ‘a foreigner, but in one’s own tongue’.\footnote{130} By becoming a foreigner to its own context, the universal/invisible Church can discover the ethical implications and goals of being embodied in that particular context because the particular church can realise its status as the presence of God and Christ in the context which makes it particular.

One aim for the Church entering the public, secular sphere is to acknowledge its own complicated, sometimes misguided, past and to speak out against such abuses of power. In doing so, the Church becomes an interactive presence in the public sphere (2.3.5), engaging with and speaking into society as a potential force for change. The greatest abuse of power is trying to forget one’s own misgivings. Groups of Christians have used the inopportune moments of others — both Christian and not — to their own benefit without seeing their own complicity in the violations. Salvation and resurrection affect all of time, revivifying the past to influence the present and future while the present and future give new life to the past. The past, as pure Memory, cannot be repressed as a hidden shame forever because it has a way of returning to the present (2.3.4). By acknowledging the wrongs, sometimes done in the name of God, Christian identity can realise its own eschatology of forgiveness and love.

Liturgy plays a formative role here since it engages tradition, pure Memory, contemporary contexts, and the present orthodox Self. In the public practise of liturgy, the temporal-
mimetic process culminates in application for something (c.f. 1.2.2). Liturgy contracts time into a memorial present (cf. 1.1.2) which speaks to its particular context. This is why emancipatory theologies can be seen as leading Christianity into the public sphere since they engage the public sphere as a voice calling for change. In the case of Latin American liberation theologies, this call is towards a community ethic that goes against prominent economic policies and actions that create disparate inequality. For advocates of the preferential option for the poor, the message is both liturgical and political since ‘all good will throughout the ages is led by the grace of God to the final salvific encounter with Jesus Christ’. The Church follows the good works of its people and becomes, as Heiko Oberman describes Luther’s ecclesiology, ‘radically “horizontalised”’ and ‘no longer done to please God but to serve the world’. The actions of the Church through its members are in themselves liturgical, calling the world to respond to the theological message of Christ’s love. A reverse implication is that local churches will each take ‘seriously the full secular reality of its “place”’. That is, local churches will feed back and shape their environments, ‘unit[ing] all things in Christ’ because they take seriously the universal Church’s mission to the world. Polydoxy and ecumenism are not restricted to the relations internal to the Body of Christ; they extend into all relations and call the Church to its eschatalogical unity through its inclusion in the divine mission to bring salvation into the world.

134. Ibid., 119.
An Interlude for Additional Voices

This thesis sought to re-interpret the development of theological orthodoxy in terms of identity construction so that an ecumenical ecclesiology could emerge. Recognising the multifaceted and pluriform nature of the universal/invisible Church is vital to dialogues of reconciliation between groups of Christians because such recognition implies differences and acknowledges those differences as different. Through the acknowledgement of differences, there is a mediation of authority and identity that alters perceptions and definitions of theological orthodoxy. Authority is seen as contingently constructed around a particular tradition in a particular context and organised around one of many interpretations of orthodoxy that can be seen genetically as faithfully inheriting and keeping the ‘Tradition of the Church’. The reception of the Tradition is a hermeneutical process which creates many traditions.

Traditions are produced by a continual dialogue between identity fragments found by the Self in two temporal ‘locations’: [1] the past as the collection of all previous experiences into a pure Memory which is mediated by acts of remembrance and [2] the future as eschatological expectations that are (re)defined by memories and guide the acts of remembrance. Between these two ‘locations’ in time, the present is the passive results of this dialogue which creates the sense of a Self and a narrative that orders time so that Self is situated in a particular context of its own identity. The relations between these aspects of time figure prominently in the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur, as I have shown in the first chapter (1.1.3 and 1.2.2). Each of the traditions created in their particularity can be seen as Selves because of their different narratives, yet collectively they are fragments in a process which (re-)constructs ‘the’ Self that is the ‘Tradition of the Church’. The universal/invisible Church of Tradition is a dynamic, organic body composed of multiple, necessarily different parts.

I have argued that this image is reflected in Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the body without organs (BwO; see 4.2.2). The BwO is an organic unity of many related members, but it lacks any kind of necessary organisation by some absolute authority of control or immovable foundation. Every member is contingently connected through its relation to the narrative of memories that construct an identity. Many members are connected to multiple bodies
because these bodies as identities can only be defined in relation to others. In the case of the Church, the other bodies with which it interacts include other religions and the public sphere; I have described both and highlighted how some of these relations occur in my final chapter (4.4). The relationality of bodies means that there is no absolute reconciliation or Hegelian Absolute which reconciles everything into a single body. A second implication of these relations is that a single narrative identity has no actual end; future expectations are never reached because they constantly change.

The continual production of a narrative future provokes Declan Sheerin to ask, in relation to his reading of Paul Ricoeur’s narrativity: ‘as death has not yet occurred, does this make the narrative self always provisional or hypothetical, a narrative with a multiplicity of endings or rather a narrative that can only be configured and completed after death — and therefore not at all?’ Rephrased slightly: is identity always evolving and changing or is it simply incomplete until its ‘death’? In this context, it could be argued that the meaning of identity is always deferred; yet when it comes to identity, there is always something more to uncover or reinterpret — an old memory resurfaces or one experiences a new event. Identity never can be deferred or incomplete because it is always within a cycle of reconfiguration and adaptation to new events. The narrativity is always complete and then re-created, as I have argued Ricoeur’s discussions of mimesis has shown (1.3.4).

It is here in this cycle of reconfiguration, that an image of a ‘stable’ (more accurately, multistable) identity emerges as a paradigm for a particular context. These paradigms create a concordant harmony by arranging the chaotic discordant fragments similar to a conductor organising a symphony or a director a play: there are multiple interpretations each of which are partially improvised in order to be distinguished and recognised as a ‘faithful’ adaptation. While there may be a ‘defining performance’ which seems to encapsulate the idea of the narrative, it is praised as great precisely because it gave the narrative a voice within the social context of the performance. The conductor or director does not have complete control of every performance as if she were the authority which defines acceptable and unacceptable performances created by other directors. I have shown that this is the case with traditions and their narratives of orthodoxy (4.1.4). One might say that the ‘defining performance’ embodies the ‘original’ play but it does not erase all other ‘embodiments’ of the play.

Similarly, the traditions of Christianity each embody the whole of Christianity in themselves as narratives. The embodiment of Christianity within a particular tradition gives an identity to a particular set of Christians which provides ‘them with a coherent account of their community and their past as they search for meaning in their lives today’. In their self-

recognition of their own contingency and contextuality, traditions are able to relate to others which are part of the larger Tradition without imposing one authority on the other or needing to determine which tradition is ‘more faithful’ to the larger Tradition. Such questions are unintelligible after the recognition of contingency and polydoxy. Yet, I have shown that the history of Christian theology has focused on exactly those unintelligible issues not because of their theological importance but because of the political aspirations of Christians involved in debates related to those issues (3.2.5 and 3.3.1). Even in recent decades, these issues have defined how some traditions such as the Roman Catholic Church have approached ecumenical dialogues (4.3.2).

In this thesis, I have rejected this political subversion of theology so that theological orthodoxy can ‘return’ to its multiform roots. By recognising the reliance that contemporary constructions of identity have to Enlightenment thought, particularly the ‘Copernican revolution’ that was Immanuel Kant’s philosophical project, I have been able to argue that Christian identity is not based on a particular creed, hierarchy, or tradition. Rather, Christian identity develops from the relationship of Christian individuals and groups with the triune God (4.2.3). While I have suggested that the central focus of this identity is the risen Christ, this is not necessarily the only focus. Indeed, Amos Yong has suggested a pneumatalogical centre rather than a Christological one, but it could just as easily be the case that the single ‘centre’ is each of the three persons of the Trinity.

I have argued that without an open-ended, permeable boundary, an identity will cease precisely because it is an excess of sense which is made multistable by its dynamic process of change (see 1.1.1 and 4.2.2). Lastly, I have provided an argument that the future of the Church is the Church itself; that the Church’s identity is created from its own anticipation and willing to become the Body of Christ in the ‘external’ world (4.4.3). To be is to become, not in a process of synthesis towards a homogeneous unity but a process of difference towards unity-within-multiple.

\[ \text{3. Cf. Lieu, } \textit{Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World, 179.} \]
\[ \text{4. Yong, } \textit{Spirit-Word-Community, 3.} \]
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