Polish Foreign Policy Between East and West, 1989-2004

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Abstract

After Poland assumed a pro-Western orientation following the end of the communist regime in 1989, its immediate foreign policy goals became to join NATO and the EU. The importance of Poland's relations with the newly emerging states in the ex-Soviet region lagged behind in the foreign policy agenda. While there was political consensus among the policy making elite and the populace about Poland's integration into Western structures and necessary resources and efforts were channelled to this end, challenges posed by the transformation in Poland's East was dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, devoid of a coherent conceptual Eastern policy framework and a strong institutional backing. However, as Poland's prospects of joining NATO and the EU became more secure, Eastern policy was increasingly debated in intellectual and academic circles and foreign policy makers searched for a more structured and robust response to the challenges brought about by relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours. Poland's Eastern policy has progressed since the early 1990s when its existence was doubted and became an important dimension of Poland's foreign policy and after joining the EU in 2004, Polish policy makers even contemplated how Poland's Eastern policy could influence and even shape the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours.

This study investigates the factors that contributed to the formation of an Eastern policy concept and domestic and international determinants that shaped Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours. It presents how Polish foreign policy responded to a changing regional and international environment and gives an account of Poland's accession process to NATO and the EU and concurrent development of relations with the Eastern neighbours. It explores the legal framework and institutions that take part in foreign policy making and execution and offers an analysis of 20th century historical currents and intellectual and academic debates on EP. Poland's bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus constitute the main case studies where the impact on relations of domestic political discourses in Poland, the EU and NATO enlargement, economic and investment links, regional energy politics and the role of minorities and historical heritage are examined. As well as extensive primary and secondary sources, the study utilises in-depth interviews with high level Polish policy makers, academics and businessmen undertaken during fieldwork in Poland.

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List of Acronyms

ABW	Internal Security Agency - *Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*
AK	Home Army - *Armia Krajowa*
AW	Foreign Intelligence Agency - *Agencja Wywiadu*
AWS	Solidarity Electoral Action -*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*
BBN	National Security Bureau - *Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*
BNF	Belarusian National Front
BTSK	Belarusian Social-Cultural Association - *Białoruskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne*
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBOS	Public Opinion Research Center - *Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*
CEEs	Central East European states
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CFE	The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSM	Centre for International Relations - *Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych*
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
EP	Eastern Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOZZ	Foreign Debt Servicing Fund - *Fundusz Obsługi Zadłużenia Zagranicznego*
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
GUS	Central Statistics Office - *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*
IPN	Institute of National Remembrance - *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*
IR	International Relations
ISP	Institute of Public Affairs - *Instytut Spraw Publicznych*
IUD	Industrial Union of Donbas - *Industrialnii Soyuz Donbassa*
KERM	European Committee of the Council of Ministers - *Komitet Europejski Rady Ministrów*
KIE	Committee of European Integration - *Komitet Integracji Europejskiej,*
KOR	The Workers' Defense Committee - *Komitet Obrony Robotników*
KPN	Confederation for Independent Poland - *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*
KUKE	Export Credit Insurance Corporation - *Korporacji Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych SA*
LPR	League of Polish Families - *Liga Polskich Rodzin*
MG	Ministry of Economy - *Ministerstwo Gospodarki*

MON	Ministry of Defence - *Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej*
MP	Member of Parliament (Sejm)
Mtoe	Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
MSZ	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – *Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych*
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NKVD	People's Commissariat Internal Affairs - *Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPZZ	All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions - *Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych*
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSM	Centre for International Studies - *Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych*
OSW	Centre for Eastern Studies - *Ośródek Studiów Wschodnich*
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists -*Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv*
PAUCI	Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PERN	Oil Pipeline Operation Company "Przyjaźń" - *Przedsiębiorstwa Eksploatacji Rurociągów Naftowych "Przyjaźń"*
PfP	Partnership for Peace programme
PGNiG	Polish Mining, Oil and Gas Company - *Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo*
PHARE	Polish and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring their Economies
PISM	Polish Institute of International Affairs - *Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych*
PKN Orlen	Polish Oil Concern Orlen - *Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen*
PKWN	Polish Committee of National Liberation - *Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego*
POLUKRBAT	Polish-Ukrainian battalion
PPN	Polish League for Independence - *Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe*
PPS	Polish Socialist Party - *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*
PRL	Polish People's Republic - *Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*
PSL	Polish Peasant Party - *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*
PZPR	Polish United Workers Party - *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RG	Rafineria Gdańska
RBN	National Security Council - *Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*
ROP	Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland - *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*
ROPCiO	Movement for the Defence of Human and Civic Rights - *Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela*
ROPWiM	Council for the Defence of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom - *Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa*
SDPL	Social Democratic Party of Poland - *Socjaldemokracji Polskiej*
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SKL	Conservative-People's Party - *Stronnictwo Konserwatywno- Ludowe*
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance - *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise

SN	National Democrats - *Stronnictwo Narodowe*
TNK	Tyumen Oil Company - *Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya*
TR	Transferable Roubles
UD	Democratic Union - *Unia Demokratyczna*
UKIE	Office of the Committee of European Integration – *Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej*
ULB	Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus
UNR	Ukrainian National Republic - *Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika*
UOP	Office of State Protection - *Urząd Ochrony Panstwa*
UP	Union of Labour - *Unia Pracy*
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army - *Ukrainska povstanska armiia*
UPR	Union of Real Politics - *Unia Polityki Realnej*
UW	Freedom Union - *Unia Wolności*
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEU	Western European Union
WiN	Freedom and Independence - *Wolność i Niezawisłość*
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZBwRP	Union of Belarusians in Poland - *Związek Białoruski w RP*
ZChN	Christian National Union - *Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego*
ZPB	Association of Poles in Belarus - *Związek Polaków na Białorusi*
ZUNR	Western Ukrainian National Republic - *Zakhidno Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika*
ZUwP	Union of Ukrainians in Poland - *Związek Ukraińców w Polsce*

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 PRESENTATION AND THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH

This study is about the changing context and content of Poland's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Poland did not lose its formal statehood after the Second World War and had even a quasi-independent foreign policy. But due to the transformation of the Polish state and the emergence of a completely different international system and regional context, the scope for continuity of any pre-1989 foreign policy was unfeasible and undesired. Therefore, the study will take 1989 as a starting point and will refer to the periods before it only in the context of historical and intellectual background shaping the conceptual framework of current foreign policy debates and policy making.

From the very beginning of the period in question, the new Polish political elite harboured hopes of becoming a part of Western political and defence structures. The cautious policy of avoiding any conflict with the Soviet Union while gradually building up relations with the West gave way to a bolder policy of actively seeking membership in NATO and the EU following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The changing regional context, with newly independent states emerging on the eastern border of Poland, presented a new challenge for Polish foreign policy, which Poland perceived as a chance to create a zone of friendly countries, buffering itself from a possible Russian expansionist resurgence. Policies geared towards the main focus and the two ultimate goals of Poland, namely Polish accession to NATO and the EU, were allocated most of the foreign policy resources and necessary institutions were formed thanks also to an almost universal support for these goals across different political parties and public opinion. Relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours, meanwhile, developed in a more piecemeal fashion owing to the persisting political and economic ambiguities and diversity in the region as well as the difficulties posed by the process of developing a coherent foreign policy concept applicable to the region. However, as the confidence in the prospect of Poland's participation (and eventual membership) in Western structures grew, the debate among intellectuals in search for an Eastern policy (EP) concept intensified, as did the activity of foreign policy making agencies attempting a more structured response to the challenges arising from relations with the East.

Poland's entry into NATO in 1999 and Russia's acceptance (albeit reluctant) of NATO enlargement brought an end to the deeply instilled historic perception of constant insecurity. It was the first step of anchoring Poland in Western structures. Now Polish

foreign policy could look towards extending the zone of security, which was demonstrated by Poland's support for extending NATO even further east. Similarly, a process of gradual emboldening emerged as Poland's membership in the EU became imminent. The next challenge to be tackled was set as how to make Poland's vision of EP operational within the EU context, utilising the EU's power and capabilities. However, Poland's own EP was in a process of evolution and its implementation exposed the means and ends gap and tested the coherence of the concepts it entailed.

This study will analyse aspects of Poland's foreign and Eastern policy and relevant developments up to Autumn 2004. There are two reasons why this particular cut off point was chosen. The first stems from the intention to cover events as recent as possible but permitting a safe temporal distance to be able to place the analysis in a context. The second reason is that Poland's EP faced its biggest test in Autumn 2004 during the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine following the contested presidential elections in October. By this time Poland was a member of the EU and had formal participation in and a greater influence on EU institutions. It was, hence, acting not only as a neighbour and aspiring regional power but also as an EU member state. Poland's response to the "Orange Revolution" was a case in itself to test how operational its EP concepts were and the constraints for action. Therefore, this episode merits a study in its own right.[1]

Within the time frame given, the present study will be concerned with the evolution of the Eastern dimension of Polish foreign policy. It will analyse the factors that contributed to the formation of an EP concept and domestic and international determinants that shaped Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours. The limitations of the EP concept and its application will be assessed. In order to address these questions, the study will present how Polish foreign policy responded to a changing regional and international environment and give an account of Poland's accession process to NATO and the EU and concurrent development of relations with the Eastern neighbours. This study regards the nation state level as the fundamental realm of foreign policy formulation. Therefore, an account of the legal framework and institutions that take part in foreign policy making and execution processes will be provided. However, this is not to mean that foreign policy is simply a product of interaction within and between government offices and the legislature. The external factors that emanate from international or regional settings also contribute to foreign policy alongside domestic actors. This study will take up an analysis of intellectual debates on EP as one such domestic and non-governmental influence. It will also point out linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy.

[1] Two books about the "Orange Revolution" have already been published since then: the first by Wilson in November 2005 and the second, edited by Aslund and McFaul, in March 2006. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul (Eds), *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

Bilateral relations between Poland on the one hand and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on the other constitute the main case studies. The relationship with Russia is pivotal as it is the dominant power in the region and its relations with Ukraine and Belarus, and the EU for that matter, have a direct impact on Poland's policies. As a middle size state Poland's policy choices in terms of its relations with Russia are limited by the circumstances of Russian-EU or Russian-NATO (or Russian-US) relations. Similarly, relations with Ukraine and Belarus cannot be considered without reference to international and regional contexts. However, the power and size gap between Poland and these countries are not as large as it is with Russia and there are specific issues such as minorities, historical heritage and border relations that have a direct impact on the formulation and implementation of Poland's EP. Looking at bilateral relations with the strategic-partner-to-be, Ukraine, and bête noire of the West, Belarus, also demonstrate what a diverse variety of geostrategic, political and economic issues an EP had to address.

Relations with Lithuania will not be examined in detail as its accession process to the EU and eventual membership puts its bilateral and regional relations in a context different than that of Poland's EP. Moldova, which has officially become an EP concern as it was to become a direct neighbour of the enlarged EU, will not be covered, either. The scope of Poland's EP is flexible and can be extended to the whole ex-Soviet area, but Poland's policies towards the countries in the region other than Russia, Ukraine and Belarus still rank lower in importance and are mostly issue driven. However, examination of how Poland's EP expands to govern relations with the remaining ex-Soviet states (as well as Russian regions) would make an interesting study in the future.

1.2 THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy, according to Hill, is "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations."[2] A comprehensive study of foreign policy requires a multilevel and multidimensional analysis of both domestic and international environments, governmental or non-governmental actors that influence decision making and goal setting processes, linkages between policy issues and responses to foreign policy actions (outcomes). Although the role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organisations, NGOs or civil movements has been widely acknowledged, the nation state is still the main agency that generates the bulk of foreign policy.

[2] Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 3.

While foreign policy has been studied by historians, political scientists and area specialists, the field of International Relations (IR) has produced the most considerable body of theoretical work on the subject. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has developed as a sub-field of IR since the 1960s. The present study does not purport to be an analysis of Polish foreign policy in this fashion or to advance (or negate) any particular IR or FPA theory. It is a case study that adopts a traditional area studies approach and focuses on the analysis of empirical data. However, it takes into consideration contending approaches and theories generated by IR and FPA. The ideas offered by these theories help us to understand how complex and multifaceted a subject foreign policy is and confirm the need to select and focus on analysing certain aspects of the foreign policy to bolster the explanatory power and consistency of the study at hand.

Central to any foreign policy study is the choice of level of analysis. Theoretical trends have changed since the days of Singer who defined the levels of analysis problem and advised against studying a certain phenomenon at different levels simultaneously.[3] A sound FPA is now considered to build on a multilevel analysis, taking into consideration all three main levels utilised by IR, namely system, state and individual levels.[4] A strict categorisation of theories (especially those examining foreign policy) in terms of levels of analysis is almost impossible as many include aspects relating to different levels. Foreign policy analysis, as mentioned above, is multilevel by nature. However, for the sake of clarity, a survey of a select number of theories will be given below, classified under the three levels of analysis.

1.2.1 System level theories

The system level deals with the interaction between units active in the international arena such as states, international organisations and transnational civil groups. System level studies produce generalised (and often deterministic) theories that intend to explain the behaviour of international actors by identifying inherent rules and limitations of the international arena, which is regarded as something more than the sum of its constituent parts. The realist school maintains that the governing principle of international relations is anarchy, which arises from the lack of a central authority and the struggle between self-interested (and rational) states for maintaining sovereignty. The power struggle between states is a zero-sum game and states seek power as an end in itself.

Neorealists (or structural realists), on the other hand, interpret power seeking by states as a means to maximise their security. While classical realists regard a selfish and power

[3] J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", *World Politics*, Vol. 14, 1961, No. 1, pp. 77-92.
[4] Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, pp. 11-14.

grabbing human nature to be at the root of international interaction, neorealists argue that it is the anarchical system and the position of states within that system dictates how states behave.[5] This approach and its rationality assumption are often utilised in explaining NATO enlargement in Europe or Russia's foreign policy towards the states of the ex-Soviet sphere. But it is a less useful tool in studying foreign policy as it considers domestic factors that shape foreign policy as irrelevant, as according to it the structure determines how states behave and not the other way round.[6] Its state centric approach and the state as unitary actor assumption also rules out examination of any domestic-international linkages or the role of non-state actors in explaining foreign policy behaviour.

The main rival of realism, liberalism, regards human nature as altruistic (without challenging the rationality aspect), believes in the existence of an international society in which cooperation is possible and desirable. It stresses the importance of strengthening international institutional arrangements to lessen conflict and war. The main challenge to neorealism was posed by neoliberalism, which disputed the neorealist explanation of international cooperation as states seeking relative gains (i.e. gaining more than others).[7] According to the latter, states are motivated by absolute gains that benefit all parties in cooperation. Focusing on international political economy and underlining the role of transnational regimes and institutions rather than security arrangements, neoliberal theories allow an insight into cooperative phenomena such as trade regimes or the EU.

The theory of complex interdependence (or transnationalism) explains international politics through the interconnectedness of societies in a web of international transactions performed not only by states but also by transnational actors. There is an "absence of hierarchy among issues" and, unlike the realist claim, security and military power do not dominate the agenda.[8] Complex interdependence is a useful concept for examining Poland's relations especially in the European context. Throughout the 1990s Poland had been gradually integrating into the complex web of European interconnectedness that ranges from security arrangements to economic interdependence. Poland's relations with its East also involves promotion of economic and intersocietal ties at different levels, and the decreasing salience of the use of military power in favour of more mutually beneficial conflict resolution, carried out both bilaterally and within international institutions.

A third and most recent theory is a challenge to the positivist methodology employed by neorealists and neoliberals. Constructivism challenges the rationality assumption and the

[5] Main proponents include Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, London: McGraw Hill, 1979 and John J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of great power politics*, New York: Norton, 2001.
[6] Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, p.7 and p.161.
[7] David A. Baldwin, "Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and World Politics" in David A. Baldwin (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 3-25.
[8] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 25.

notion that identities and interests of actors are predetermined by the structure of the international system.[9] It shifts the focus from structure to processes during which identities and interests are formed. In turn, through these identities and interests, social reality is created. In effect, agent and structure constitute, reproduce and shape each other. As Wendt has put it, "anarchy is what states make of it" as states do not automatically find themselves in a security dilemma.[10] States perceive the international system to be anarchic and adjust their identities and values accordingly and respond with a self-help behaviour.[11] As constructivism involves analysing identities, norms and culture as determinants of interests and behaviour and studying endogenous processes of social construction within a state, it is more conducive towards foreign policy studies than neorealism or neoliberalism.[12]

A recent study that utilises a constructivist research framework is Cordell and Wolff's work on Germany's *Ostpolitik* and relations with Poland and Czech Republic.[13] It analyses the link between societal and international norms to explain the consistency in *Ostpolitik* emerging in the 1960s and continuing after the end of Cold War. It also explains variations in policy outcomes in terms of Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic primarily by reference to the existence of different norms governing the relations. The book examines the changing attitudes of political parties in Germany towards *Ostpolitik* and the influence of German expellee organisations and German minorities on relations between Germany, Poland and Czech Republic.

Another important contribution of constructivism was reinstating the importance of historical analysis in examining the emergence of values, norms and ideas (which form foreign policies). In contrast, the positivist (or rationalist) theories held that state behaviour was determined by a universal mode of rationality and exogenously given system dynamics which are not context or value sensitive.[14] In keeping with a constructivist framework, historical narrative is also extensively employed in the above referred study by Cordell and Wolff. The present study also regards the constructivist approach as relevant to explaining and interpreting how concepts of Polish foreign policy are shaped. For this

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[9] There are other post-positivist or reflectivist theories such as feminist theory, post-modernism and normative theory that also challenge the tenets of neorealist-neoliberalist discourses. However, only constructivism will be covered here for reasons of space. For information about these theories see Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, "Alternative Approaches to International Theory" in John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Third edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 271-293.
[10] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, 1992, No. 2, p. 407.
[11] Neack, *The New Foreign Policy*, p. 169.
[12] Vendulka Kubálková, "Foreign Policy, International Politics and Constructivism" in Vendulka Kubálková (Ed.), *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2001, p. 19.
[13] Karl Cordell and Stephan Wolff, *Germany's Foreign Policy towards Poland and the Czech Republic: Ostpolitik revisited*, London: Routledge, 2005.
[14] Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism" in Scott Burchill et al. (Eds), *Theories of International Relations*, (2nd edition), London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 226.

reason, a chapter is devoted to elite debates on EP and the historical background to the way in which Poland's perceptions of its Eastern neighbours were formed.

1.2.2 State level theories

State level theories examine two categories of factors that affect foreign policy: governmental factors such as regime type, institutions and bureaucracy; and societal factors such as history, political party and NGO activities, culture, media and public opinion.[15] Although FPA is a multilevel and multidisciplinary approach, its beginnings as a subdiscipline in IR could be traced back to middle range state level theories. For instance Rosenau classified states according to their economic development, size and regime in order to determine which level of analysis would have the biggest explanatory value for a certain state type.[16] Other forerunners were Snyder, Bruck and Sapin who laid the foundations of decision making theory which offered analytical models to study decision making units and their settings.[17]

A classic work in decision making was written by Allison who analysed three conceptual models, criticising the system level Rational Actor Model, which assumes that states are essentially rational and unitary actors.[18] Instead, he proposed the Organisational Process and Bureaucratic Politics models. The former defined foreign policy behaviour as outputs of autonomous governmental institutions, each of which has its own internal rules and dynamics and focuses on solving a specific, short-term problem. Therefore, decisions are not always the results of deliberate and rational choices made by a unitary government. They are, rather, the result of coordination among separate government organisations that deal only with specific aspects of a foreign policy issue and are bound more by their inner rules than any overarching governmental strategy.[19] Bureaucratic Politics, on the other hand, sees bureaucracies and leaders with different agendas and conflicting perspectives of foreign policy competing against each other. Whichever bureaucracy has more power and better bargaining skills can reflect its own vision in foreign policy decisions. In the case of Poland this could be a useful model in explaining competition between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President concerning foreign policy (especially EP) initiatives. Allison's work is important in terms not only of opening the "black box" of the

[15] Neack, *The New Foreign Policy*, pp. 77-78.
[16] James N. Rosenau. "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (Ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 27-92.
[17] Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics" in Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (Eds), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, pp. 14-185.
[18] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.
[19] Michael Clarke, "The Foreign policy System: A Framework for Analysis" in Michael Clarke and Brian White (Eds), *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, pp. 50-51.

state to a vigorous examination of its components but also of demonstrating the use all three levels of analysis to the study of foreign policy.[20]

In addition to decision making processes and institutions, state level theories also emphasise regime type, political culture, public opinion and the media. Theory of democratic peace, for instance, holds that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war than non-democratic states and do not engage in violent conflict with other democracies because of the democratic norms and institutions that constrain foreign policy makers at home and the political culture that favours non-violent conflict resolution.[21] Analyses of linkages between public opinion and foreign policy abound, with varying results. Earlier studies, such as Almond's, found that public opinion was mostly indifferent to and vacillated over foreign policy issues whereas later researchers, such as Shapiro and Page and Risse-Kappen, found public opinion about foreign policy much more stable. They concluded that public opinion mattered in terms of setting limits to policy choices available to governments (in liberal democracies) and has indirect influence on the course of coalition building processes among the policy making elite.[22]

A useful theoretical approach to explain linkages between domestic politics and international relations was offered by Putnam. Using a game theoretical model he maintained that foreign policy decision makers played games at two levels, domestic and international, at the same time and had powerful incentives to achieve consistency between the two games:[23]

> At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central-decision makers as long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.

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[20] For a survey of recent works in decision making, psychosocial and leadership theories of FPA see Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, 2005, No.1, pp. 13–21.

[21] T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, 1991, No. 2, pp.189-190. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War world*, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 30-42.

[22] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950, pp. 54-71. Y. Robert Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign policy and the rational public", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, 1988, No. 2, pp.211-247. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies", *World Politics*, Vol. 43, 1991, No. 4, pp. 479–512. Pierangelo Isernia, Zoltán Juhász and Hans Rattinger, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46. 2002, No. 2, pp. 201-224.

[23] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization*, Vol. 42, 1988, No. 3, p. 434.

This analytical framework proved popular especially among authors that studied EU negotiations.[24] Onis, for instance, used this model to compare the EU's negotiations with Poland and Turkey and explain why it led in the case of the former to a relatively smooth membership accession, whereas for the latter, to an unending process stalled by empty promises and half measures.[25] He found that for historical and cultural reasons Poland's EU membership was more acceptable to domestic constituents of EU member countries than Turkey's and the elite consensus on joining the EU was stronger in Poland than in Turkey. At the same time, the EU displayed a strong commitment to Poland's integration whereas it sent weak and conflicting signals to Turkish decision makers.

1.2.3 Individual level theories

Individual level theories take the impact of leaders as their focus. Hermann and Hermann identified three "decision units" within a state that make foreign policy decisions.[26] These are the predominant leader (an individual with the "power to make the choice and stifle the opposition"), single groups (members of a certain organisation who "collectively set a course of action") and multiple autonomous actors (individuals, groups or coalitions who, "if they concur ..., can act for the government").[27] Decision units may vary from one foreign policy issue to the other. The study argues that single groups are the most likely to adopt more extreme foreign policy behaviour than predominant leaders and multiple autonomous actors. In a more recent study, Hermann et al. examined the predominant leader category and found that when taking foreign policy decisions, "contextually responsive" leaders are more constrained by the domestic political setting and behave in a more consensus seeking, flexible and pragmatic manner.[28] In contrast, "goal driven" leaders apply their own beliefs and attitudes regardless of their environment, opt for quick resolution of problems and are more likely to undertake extreme foreign policy decisions that may lead to conflict. The leadership styles of the two Polish presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski could be analysed within this framework. Kwaśniewski was contextually responsive and utilitarian in his outlook whereas Wałęsa displayed a more goal driven and conflict prone attitude.

When analysing foreign policy making at this level, effects of various factors on the decision making process are assessed. While some studies build on the assumption of

[24] His original article published in *International Organization* was cited 594 times according to ISI Web of Knowledge (compared to Alexander Wendt's groundbreaking "Anarchy is what states make of it" (also published in *International Organization*) which was cited 340 times. (as of September 2006) http://wok.mimas.ac.uk.
[25] Ziya Onis, "Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 18, 2004, No. 3, pp. 481-512.
[26] Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, 1989, No. 4, pp. 361-387.
[27] Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions", pp. 363-364.
[28] Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany and Timothy M. Shaw, "Who leads matters: the effects of powerful individuals", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, 2001, No. 2, pp. 83-131.

rationality, others challenge this by examining the process of forming perceptions and images (cognition) by decision makers while others focus on the effects of flow of information, pre-existing belief sets, normative concerns and value judgements. For instance, in her study on post-Soviet foreign policies of the Baltic states, Park examined the political and social background of leaders as domestic determinants of foreign policy decisions.[29] She argued that the effect of interest groups, public opinion, media or political parties had no significant explanatory value in analysing the foreign policies of Baltic states and individual level analysis of leaders offered more insight into the foreign policy processes of small states undergoing transition.

1.3 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The following chapter will offer an outline of Poland's evolving foreign policy and its relations with West and East since 1989. Important events and turning points, such as NATO and EU accession, will be highlighted and events will be presented in a chronological approach. This chapter aims to present the setting in which both Eastern and Western policies developed and to provide reference points to the events and concepts elaborated in the following chapters.

Chapter Three will focus on the legal and institutional context of foreign policy making in Poland. The provisions of the 1992 Little Constitution and 1997 Constitution governing the sphere of foreign and security policy will be explained. Institutions that take part in making and supervision of foreign policy will be discussed. The supervisory and advisory functions of the legislature, the Sejm and the Senate, will be explained through the functions and practices of their relevant committees. The role of the executive will be explained through its most relevant offices, i.e. the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Economy as well as the Intelligence Agencies and offices dealing with European integration. Finally, the President's role will be discussed.

The origins of and contemporary conceptual debates on Eastern policy will be the subject of Chapter Four. The evolution of an EP thought will be traced throughout the 20th century beginning with the opposing Piłsudskiite and Dmowskiite approaches which created the basic terms of reference for the ensuing debates about EP. The continuity of the debate was ensured by Polish émigrés in Europe after the establishment of the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa* – PRL) and the vision created by the Paris journal *Kultura* was to become a reference point for formulating EP after the collapse of the PRL. The intellectual debate did reach Poland before then (in the 1970s) but was confined to samizdat publications by the opposition and was of a highly speculative and abstract

[29] Ausra Park, "Starting from Scratch: The Role or Leadership in the Foreign Policymaking of the Baltic States, 1991-1999", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 39, 2005, No. 2, pp. 229-270.

character given that a regime change or the collapse of the Soviet Union was not considered imminent at the time. The second part of the chapter will cover selected intellectual and academic debates on EP in the post-1989, Third Republic period. The main trends in the evolution of the intellectual debates in the mid-1990s will be evaluated. A somewhat simplistic but practical classification of main positions on EP will be employed and thoughts of prominent advocates of three camps, pro-Russian, pro-Western and *Kultura* will be highlighted. After establishing the dominant discourses in EP, the chapter will follow how the debate was diversified and present a sample of the most commonly debated issues regarding relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus (*Kultura*'s ULB concept), importance of Russia and gaining Eastern markets. The last section of the chapter will cover the most important recent intellectual and conceptual exercise on EP, the so-called minimalism debate of 2000-01, sparked by a newspaper editorial questioning how realistic the dominant EP of the government was and criticising the grandiose aims set forth by it. The ensuing debate not only highlighted the means and ends gap of Polish EP but also signalled the search for a more effective and engaging policy bolstered by increasing confidence in a more consolidated position for Poland in the West.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven are on Poland's bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, where Poland's EP is put to the test, revealing the weaknesses as well as strengths of the dominant concepts and contending visions. A general structure and methodology is applied to all three case studies: The first section in each chapter deals with the evolution of bilateral relations within the European and international context, i.e. towards the backdrop of NATO and EU enlargement as well as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus's own relations with these organisations. These sections highlight the fact that the Western and European context is a highly significant determinant of Poland's relations with its East and Poland's EP cannot be analysed in isolation from its Western policy, hence the title of the thesis. The second section of the chapters cover economic relations. Issues such as changes in bilateral trade, investment and the effects of EU enlargement will be discussed. In the case of Russia the recent scandal concerning the sale of the Polish oil refinery Orlen will be highlighted to point out the linkages between domestic politics in Poland and Poland's economic relations with Russia. This episode also demonstrates competing visions of and discourses on Russia across the post-communist/post-Solidarity axis in Poland. In the case of Ukraine, the extent of "strategic partnership" in terms of economic relations is examined through the attempts of the Ukrainian steel giant Industrial Union of Donbas to buy Poland's Huta Częstochowa which was privatised.

Trade and delivery of energy sources is pivotal both in terms of Poland's relations with its East and for the EU and the West. Poland, like other European countries, is dependent on imports of gas and oil from mainly Russia and also imports a fair amount of crude and

refined energy products from Ukraine. It is also an important transit route for carrying Russian gas and oil to Western Europe. For that reason, and given the objective and strategic nature of energy demand and supply, energy politics is one field that exposes the limits of Poland's EP the best. A case study of Poland's natural gas purchase contracts with Russia and the controversy on the building of a second gas pipeline is presented in Chapter Five. In the case of Ukraine the building, management and uses of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk Pipeline, projected to carry Caspian crude oil to Western European markets via Poland and in turn decrease the dependence on Russian crude oil, will be considered. Chapter Seven on Belarus will not contain a similar case study as the volume of trade and investment between Belarus and Poland remains relatively low compared to Russia and Ukraine and no major energy projects have been proposed.

Chapters Five on Russia and Six on Ukraine highlight controversial issues stemming from different interpretations of their common history. The case of the Katyń massacre in the case of Russia and contending perceptions on the events in Volhynia following the Second World War and Action Vistula and the controversy over the Eaglets' Cemetery in Lwów in the case of Ukraine will be examined. Chapters Six (Ukraine) and Seven (Belarus) will also cover the issue of ethnic minorities.

Poland's relations with each of the countries in focus have their own characteristics and present a diversity of issues specific to each country, which renders a parsimonious concept of EP impractical. Two of these country specific issues will be considered: Chapter Five on Russia will present the hard and soft security challenges posed by the Kaliningrad region in bilateral relations as well as Poland's involvement in the Chechen problem and Chapter Seven on Belarus will elaborate Poland's attitudes towards and relations with the Belarusian opposition. The final chapter (Eight) will sum up the main findings of the thesis.

Findings from the fieldwork undertaken in 2002 by the author was published in the journal *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* (Vol. 6, 2005, No. 1, pp. 1-30) under the title "Regional Perceptions of Foreign Policy: Eastern Poland". It explores the perceptions of foreign policy in the borderlands of Eastern Poland and assesses the impact of Warsaw's foreign policy decisions on these regions with a focus on the Podlasie region on the border with Belarus. This study is relevant to the thesis as it considers the effects of EU accession, prospects of economic change, Euroregions, cross-border contacts and trade, perceptions of foreign and Eastern policy, and ethnic and religious minority issues, which have an impact on Poland's foreign and Eastern policies. However, the article focuses on the local level, in contrast with the national and international levels employed

throughout the thesis and is a complete study in itself. For this reason, it will be will be presented separately in the form of an appendix and will be referred to where relevant.

1.4 SOURCES USED

1.4.1 Secondary sources

Post-1989 Polish foreign policy has been extensively researched in Poland and in the West. However, the majority of publications deal with Poland's EU negotiations and accession process and NATO membership. Of numerous books and articles, *Poland and the European Union* edited by Karl Cordell is the most comprehensive covering issue areas ranging from Polish public opinion to regional reform.[30] Two books in Polish by Austrian journalist, Klaus Bachmann, *Polska Kaczka--Europejski Staw* and *Którędy do Europy*, offer original insight into the eurodebates and competing visions of the European Union in Poland.[31] The books offer a very good assessment of Poland's uncomfortable position between Germany and post-Soviet East.

Poland's security policies and accession to NATO was covered in Roman Kuźniar's edited volume *Polska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa 1989-2000*, which presents a comprehensive account of how Poland's security policies evolved in the context of both bilateral relations and multilateral institutional settings.[32] *Polityka Zagraniczna RP 1989-2002* edited by Szczepanik and Kuźniar is also a large collection of articles relating to all aspects of Poland's foreign policy.[33] The process of Polish accession to NATO and the intensive diplomacy and lobbying activities behind the scenes were recounted in *Wielki finał* by Tomasz Lis and, although not an academic work, reflects the process by which arguments against NATO enlargement were defeated and makes the point that Poland's NATO accession was the result of concerted activity by Polish policy makers and pro-enlargement Western elites and not a natural process which unravelled by itself.[34] Research reports written by NATO fellows, some of whom are prominent academics such as Kobrinskaya and Stadtmuller, also offer valuable analysis.[35]

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[30] Karl Cordell (Ed.), *Poland and the European Union*, London: Routledge, 2000.
[31] Klaus Bachmann, *Polska Kaczka--Europejski Staw: Szanse i Pułapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 1999. Klaus Bachmann, *Którędy do Europy*, Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 2002.
[32] Roman Kuźniar (Ed.), *Polska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa 1989-2000*, Warszawa: Scholar, 2001.
[33] Krzysztof Szczepanik and Roman Kuźniar (Eds), *Polityka Zagraniczna RP 1989-2002*, Warszawa: Askon, 2002.
[34] Tomasz Lis, *Wielki finał. Kulisy wstępowania Polski do NATO*, Kraków: Znak, 1999.
[35] Irina Kobrinskaya, "Implications of the PfP Program and Perspectives of NATO Enlargement on the Reform of the Military in the Central Eastern European States and Impact on Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy", NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1998. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/ (accessed 11 March 2007). Elzbieta Stadtmuller, "The Issue of NATO Enlargement in Polish – Russian Relations", NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 2000-01. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/f99-01.htm (accessed 11 March 2007)

A detailed description of the institutional framework of foreign policy making is given by Stemplowski in his 2004 book, *Kształtowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce*.[36] Sanford's 1999 article focuses on the legal basis of foreign policy making in Poland and the parliament's means of controlling the process.[37] It also explains the relative power and influence of the president, the government and the parliament in terms of foreign policy decisions. Sanford's book, *Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989*, is the most authoritative publication in English and a standard reference concerning the shaping of the institutional make-up of the Polish state and post-1989 democratisation process.[38]

Poland's relations with its East and the historical roots of EP has recently become a popular subject, especially after Poland's attempts to introduce an Eastern dimension to the EU. However, literature on the subject is still scarce in English. The only work that covers similar strands with the current study is Prizel's study of Polish, Russian and Ukrainian foreign policies where he examines the effect of national identity and historic perceptions on foreign policy.[39] The chapters concerning Poland also refer to early 20th century influences on historic thinking, post war émigré literature and its effects on Poland's post-1989 foreign policy. There are a number of valuable publications on the historical evolution of Poland's EP, published both in Poland after 1989 and before that abroad by Polish émigrés, the émigré journal *Kultura* published in Paris being the most prominent voice on EP. Discussion on EP ceased to be an exclusively émigré matter when domestic opposition in Poland gradually emerged in the1970s and opposition figures started publishing their views on Poland's future EP both as samizdat in Poland and through émigré channels in Western Europe. Texts published in *Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe, Polityka Polska, Niepodległość* and *Głos* reflect the perceptions of the anti-communist opposition (albeit of different political leanings) on Poland's relations with neighbouring nations to the East and the Soviet Union.

Among post-1989 publications, Hofman's book and articles are the most comprehensive on *Kultura*'s "Eastern programme" and vision of *Kultura* on Poland's relations with Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus (ULB) and Russia.[40] Hofman argues that *Kultura*'s doctrine on EP is the only strategy which is devoid of nationalistic overtones and requires good relations with

[36] Ryszard Stemplowski, *Kształtowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. Wstęp do analizy*, Warszawa: PISM, 2004.
[37] George Sanford, "Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in Democratic Poland", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, 1999, No. 5, pp. 769-797.
[38] George Sanford, *Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989*, New York: Palgrave, 2002.
[39] Ilya Prizel, *National identity and foreign policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, No, 103, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[40] Iwona Hofman, *Ukraina, Litwa, Białoruś w publicystyce paryskiej "Kultury"*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Forum Naukowe, 2003. Iwona Hofman, *Szkice Paryskiej "Kulturze"*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2004. Iwona Hofman, ""Kultura" paryska 1989-1999 – problemy jednoczącej się Europy", *Przegląd Europejski*, Vol. 2, 2001, No. 1, pp. 262-274.

Russia and ULB at the same time. As such, it is the main basis of Poland's post-1989 EP. In the same vein, Figura and Bakuła investigate the role of *Kultura*'s vision in shaping Polish-Ukrainian relations and maintain that in the post-communist bilateral relations were built on the basis of concepts devised by *Kultura*.[41] However, not all commentators agreed on what *Kultura*'s EP prescription actually was and an intellectual debate ensued in *Tygodnik Powszechny* to reassess Poland's role in the East and different perceptions of EP.[42]

As mentioned above, the subject of EP was in the beginning overshadowed by Poland's NATO accession and relations with the EU but following the success of Polish Western policy, rose gradually to prominence. Earlier discussions of EP can be found in two books: *Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartościowań* and *Patrząc na Wschód,* edited both by Bieleń.[43] The first is a collection of conference proceedings which reflected the view that Poland's policy towards Russia needed to be based on a more pragmatic approach and that Russian sensitivities about the ex-Soviet republics and NATO should be taken into account when approaching ULB. The second is an edited volume with chapters analysing the international and regional contexts Polish EP had to address as well as bilateral economic and cultural relations.

Since the late 1990s, Polish think tanks, governmental or otherwise, have produced a steady stream of reports and books on EP and Poland's relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This study makes extensive use of reports published by the Stefan Batory Foundation, Centre for International Relations (*Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych* - CSM), Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych* - ISP), Centre for Eastern Studies, (*Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich* - OSW) and Polish Institute of International Affairs (*Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych* – PISM). Publications by ISP, CSM and PISM have more analytical and academic content (and those of PISM reflect government policy). The Batory Foundation, funded mostly by George Soros, is more policy oriented in line with its funded programmes that aim to influence political and social life in especially Ukraine and Belarus. Although the main focus of OSW is the countries of the post-Soviet region (and recently Balkans) and not Poland's foreign policy, it has published reports about issue areas such as the EU's Eastern policy or Kaliningrad that are of direct concern to Poland. The Yearbooks of Polish Foreign Policy (the in-house publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), are a good source for following developments in government policies.

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[41] Marek Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukraiński w Działalności Jerzego Giedroycia", *Przegląd Zachodni*, Vol. 306, 2003, No.1, pp. 127-139. Bogusław Bakuła, "Polska i Ukraina w działalności kultury", *Eurazja* (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich), 1995, No.1, pp. 122-131

[42] See *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-279.

[43] Stanisław Bieleń (Ed.), *Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartościowań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Wschodnich, 1995. Stanisław Bieleń (Ed.), *Patrząc na Wschód: Z Problematyki Polityki Wschodniej III RP*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Wschodnich UW, 1997.

Poland's bilateral relations with Russia and Belarus, just like Poland's EP, has not yet been widely examined in the West, except for a few contributions to edited books such as Magdziak Miszewska's essay in *Independent Belarus* edited by Balmaceda, Clem and Tarlow and Gromadzki's contribution to *The EU and Belarus* edited by Lewis.[44] Publications in Polish, on the other hand, multiplied only in recent years parallel to the ascent of EP concerns in Poland's foreign policy agenda. *Polska i Rosja*, edited by Magdziak-Miszewska, contains a sober analysis of asymmetrical interests of two countries in the region and Polish misperceptions about Russia's attitude towards Poland.[45] Accordingly, Russia viewed Poland as an element of its Western policy rather than a partner in its own right. Poland's relations with Belarus are examined in detail in *Polska i Białoruś* and especially the Belarusian contributors' essays reflect the expectation of Belarusians that Poland would pursue a more flexible policy towards Belarus than the EU or the US.[46]

Unlike Russia and Belarus, Poland's relations with Ukraine have received much greater attention by Western academics. This is hardly surprising, given the importance of Ukraine's position in shaping the geopolitical map of post-Soviet Europe and the unique place Ukraine has in Poland's EP both currently and historically. The Wolczuks have published extensively on the subject and investigated the "strategic partnership" between Poland and Ukraine.[47] Their work is based on primary research and employs a multilevel analysis not only within the context of the EU and NATO but also at a domestic and local level, examining societal relations, minority problems and transborder relations. Like the Wolczuks, Burant also argued that a strategic partnership between the two countries had not developed in full yet. [48]

1.4.2 Primary sources

Owing to the contemporary nature of this study and the scarcity of secondary sources on many issues covered, this study makes extensive use of news media to obtain factual information and statements by policy makers and to find out about intellectual debates on EP. The centrist and liberal leaning *Rzeczpospolita* has been until recently one of the most

[44] Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, "Belarus: Poland's Strange Neighbor" in Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, Lisbeth L. Tarlow (Eds), *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 344-365. Grzegorz Gromadzki, "Not all roads lead to Moscow: Belarusian relations with Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania" in Ann Lewis (Ed.), The *EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*, London: Federal Trust, 2002, pp. 249-259.
[45] Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska (Ed.), *Polska i Rosja. Strategiczne sprzeczności i możliwości dialogu*, Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 1998.
[46] Adam Eberhardt and Uładzimir Ułachowicz (Eds), *Polska i Białoruś*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, 2003.
[47] Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002. Roman Wolczuk, *Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy 1991-2000*, BASEES/RoutledgeCurzon Series on Russian and East European Studies, No. 1, London: Routledge, 2003.
[48] Stephen R. Burant, *Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership*, The Carl Beck Papers, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, 1999.

objective newspapers on the Polish market. It has extensive coverage of Polish foreign and Eastern policy. So does *Gazeta Wyborcza* but political undertones are more apparent in this case. *Trybuna* and *Przegląd* are especially valuable as they reflect trends and perceptions among Poland's post-communist elite, in contrast to *Rzeczpospolita* and *Gazeta Wyborcza* which support the liberal wing of the post-Solidarity elite.[49]

Although electronic accessibility of debates and resolutions on the Sejm's efficient website made the researcher's life somewhat easier, she still had to read through thousands of pages of transcripts and bulletins of parliamentary committees, of Foreign Affairs, Liaison with Poles Abroad and Economy among others. General parliamentary debates and, in particular, the annual expose of the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented to and debated by the MPs contain important clues about the shaping of foreign policy. In addition, interpellations (and responses to these by the relevant governmental office), oral and written questions and resolutions issued by the Sejm were referred to. *Zbiór Dokumentów*, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contains parallel texts in Polish and other languages of many key bilateral and multilateral treaties that form the basis of Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours. Laws, regulations and ordinances are published in the official gazette of laws, *Dziennik Ustaw*, and *Monitor Polski*. Texts published in both since 1995 are fully searchable online.

This study also uses the official publications on foreign trade and industry figures published by the Central Office of Statistics (*Główny Urząd Statystyczny* - GUS) when analysing economic and financial relations between Poland and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and energy politics. Statistical yearbooks published by GUS's Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts were also examined. Complementary information was obtained from the websites of the Economic and Trade Departments at Polish embassies in the region. Reports by government ministries were also used as reference, especially the Ministry of Economy's programme for regaining Eastern markets. To examine energy policies in the region, especially the trade and transport of natural gas and crude oil, both Polish and European Union documents on energy policies were consulted.

As for public opinion polls, the study makes use of reports published by the two reputable research agencies, Public Opinion Research Center (*Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej* –CBOS) and TNS OBOP (formerly *Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej*).

[49] It must be noted that the editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Adam Michnik, was accused by right wing commentators of having made a deal with SLD politicians and president Kwaśniewski and of whitewashing the corrupt ways of the post-communist politicians. See Bronisław Wildstein, "Koniec świata Michnika", *Wprost*, 16 October 2005.

1.4.3 Interviews

The author conducted 38 in-depth interviews with members of the policy making elite, academics, local government officials, business consultants, minority activists and journalists in Warsaw and the Podlasie region bordering Belarus in 2002. Interviewees were asked a set of questions on Poland's foreign and Eastern policy, effects of the EU enlargement on Poland's relations with the East and effects of EP on the Eastern regions. Except for two all interviews were conducted in Polish and some were totally and others partially recorded. Interviewee confidentiality was fully respected and some of the names were withheld upon request. Still, the author was much impressed by the openness of the respondents, with most of them spending hours answering questions in detail.

The focus of the interviews differed according to the position, expertise and the location of the respondent, with interviewees in the Podlasie region elaborating more on the regional aspect and ethnic minority viewpoint and those in Warsaw and Białystok commenting on foreign policy making and the EP concept. Interviews were indispensable for gaining insight into how some elites defined, perceived and criticised EP and especially finding out a great deal of information about Poland's relations with Belarus. Based on part of the interviews, the author published a journal article on how Podlasie elites located on the border with Belarus and having the most direct contact with it, perceived Poland's foreign and Eastern policies. The article is presented as appendix.

It must, however, be noted that the author does not claim to have mapped elite opinion as such due to the qualitative manner by which interviews are conducted and the number of interviews. It is the insights, interpretation and information gained from the interviews, which cannot be found in available printed or electronic sources, that made the greatest contribution to the study.

Chapter Two

Poland's Relations with its West and East, 1989-2004

Relations with the European Union (EU) and the West became the dominant feature of Polish foreign policy rhetoric after 1989, and most commentators treated this phenomenon as a natural consequence of Polish independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Poland, indeed, had the chance to regain control over its foreign and defence policies. However, Poland had to form its new policies amidst uncertainty in the international environment between 1989 and 1991 and radical transformation at home.

For most Poles the demise of the Communist regime meant a return to Europe after 45 years of foreign domination. However, the Europe they meant to return to was much different from when they were forced to leave it. Western Europe had undergone an institutional transformation itself, drawing gradually towards integration by means of the European Community (EC).[1] Polish policy makers, elites and the majority of public opinion expected a swift reorientation towards liberal democracy and a market economy, and a quick integration into Western economic and security structures.[2] Events from 1989 to 1991 proved that these expectations were unrealistic and that Polish integration with the West was dependent upon three factors. First, Poland had to radically transform its economy, political system and society to be eligible to join Western organizations. Overthrowing the Communist rule was a good start but did not suffice in itself. Second, even though the Soviet Union was obviously heading downhill, it still existed and Poland had to play its hand very carefully as long as the threat remained extant. Third, how Poland was perceived by the EC countries proved to play a much more decisive role than how Poland perceived them and the Community. The process of European integration and institutional reform occupied the agenda of the Community. Chances for enlargement to become a priority were not high.

Starting from this point, the following chapter will give a chronological outline of Poland's foreign policy towards its West and its East until 2004 and highlight the changes in Poland's international environment and challenges it faced.

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[1] For reasons of consistence and clarity, the term European Community (EC) will be used in the first two parts of the history until 1994. From then on European Union (EU) will refer to the same organization. This does not reflect the actual history of the evolution of the Community into a Union.

[2] Teresa Łoś-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes towards the European Union" in Karl Cordell, *Poland and the European Union*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp.8-9.

2.1 FROM THE END OF THE COMMUNIST RULE TO THE EUROPE AGREEMENT, 1989-1991

2.1.1 Poland's westward turn

Poland's official relations with the EC date back to September 1988 when it established diplomatic ties and began negotiations on a trade and economic cooperation treaty.[3] The treaty was signed on 19 September 1989 and included a Most Favoured Nation clause for both sides giving Poland tariff reductions on its industrial exports to the Single Market through participation in the Universal System of Preferences for developing countries.[4] With this so called first generation agreement, Polish trade was reoriented towards the West and the EC became its main trading partner.

Meanwhile, the first non-communist government was formed under Tadeusz Mazowiecki in June 1989 following the Roundtable negotiations and the first semi-free elections. Even though the Mazowiecki government was intent on reorienting Poland towards the West, international political circumstances as well as domestic required "cautious self-limitation".[5] Poland's free hand in foreign policy was constrained by three interrelated factors: the power sharing arrangement of the Roundtable Talks, the Warsaw Pact troops on Polish territory and the uncertainty of the effects of German unification.

The Roundtable Talks had resulted in a negotiated distribution of power between Solidarity and the incumbent communist regime. Foreign and home affairs and defence policies remained under the control of the communists. The new presidency under Wojciech Jaruzelski was to oversee foreign policy and security issues. The appointment of a lawyer and a political independent, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, as Minister of Foreign Affairs was a sign that Warsaw was cautious with regard to the Soviet Union.[6] Both Skubiszewski and Mazowiecki reiterated Poland's wish to stay in the Warsaw Pact alliance.[7] It was noted, however, that Poland perceived this alliance as a "sphere of security" and not a "sphere of influence" and that allies should be free to choose their domestic political orientation.[8] In October 1989, a Soviet-Polish communiqué confirming the "principles of the free choice of the path of development, respect for sovereignty, equal rights, non-interference in internal

[3] Katarzyna Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie Polski z Unią Europejską", *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 1998, No. 19, p. 70.
[4] Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie" and *Negocjacje Członkowskie: Polska na Drodze do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Pełnomocnik Rządu do Spraw Negocjacji o Członkostwo RP w Unii Europejskiej, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2000, p.9.
[5] Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p.9.
[6] Terry, "Poland's foreign policy", pp.9-10.
[7] Andrew Cottey, *East Central Europe After the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 28-29.
[8] Cottey, East Central Europe, p.29.

affairs" was issued.[9] The Polish government was also reluctant to push the Soviet Union on the troop withdrawal issue prematurely despite popular pressure and Czechoslovak and Hungarian calls in January 1990 for immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

By September 1990, Poland began to pursue a clearer policy towards the Soviet Union by formally requesting troop withdrawals. After long and hard negotiations, it was agreed in 1992 that combat troops would be withdrawn by November 1992 and support troops by the end of 1993.[10] By later 1990, it also became clear that Poland no longer regarded the Warsaw Pact as its long-term security arrangement. The Pact was disbanded in Prague at the last meeting of its Political Advisory Committee in July 1991.[11]

One of the most important events that prompted more determination in Poland's policies was the outcome of the Ottawa and Paris summits on German unification. The uncertainty about how the unification would proceed and what shape the new Germany would take had fuelled security concerns in Poland. There had been talk in the Polish media about German neo-imperialism and a possible irredentist movement by the German minority in Silesia. However, in July 1990, the feeling of insecurity was alleviated by the commitment made at the Paris summit (after a diplomatic campaign by Poles during the Ottawa summit) to sign a border treaty and ratify it as soon as German unification was completed.[12] The final settlement on the German unification issue, signed in Moscow in September 1990, provided for an international guarantee for the current border and prompted the signing of a border treaty. Subsequently, in November 1990, the border treaty, confirming the Oder-Neisse line and prohibiting parties from making any territorial claims in the future was signed by Poland and the united Germany.[13]

A further development which effectively freed Poland of all ties to the formerly communist structures was the collapse of CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) in June 1991. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, CMEA was initially seen by Poland as a structure which could be transformed into a genuine forum of cooperation between the Central and Eastern European countries.[14] In fact, Poland was trying to prevent the collapse of its

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[9] "Wspólny komunikat o wizycie członka Biura Politycznego KC KPZR, Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych ZSRR, Eduarda Szewardnadze w Polsce, Warszawa, 25 października 1989 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 522, 1990, No. 4, pp. 35-41.

[10] The treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops was signed in Moscow on 22 May 1992 but the text was not published. Ryszard Stemplowski, *Kształtowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. Wstęp do analizy*, Warszawa: PISM, 2004, p. 48.

[11] See "Protokół o utracie mocy układu o przyjaźni, współpracy o pomocy wzajemnej, podpisanego w Warszawie 14 Maya 1955 roku oraz protokołu o przedłużeniu jego obowiązywania, podpisanego w Warszawie 26 kwietnia 1985 roku", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 144-147.

[12] Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "The Signing of the Polish-German Border Treaty", *Report on Eastern Europe*, 7 December 1990, p. 18.

[13] "Traktat między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o potwierdzeniu istniejącej między nimi granicy (traktat został ratyfikowany 26 listopada 1991 roku), Warszawa, 14 listopada 1990 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 26-30.

[14] It is hard to say that other Central Eastern European countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary shared Poland's enthusiasm. Los-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes", p.13.

regional economic and trade relations until it firmly redirected its trade and secured necessary revenues from trade with the West. However, reforming the obsolete structures of CMEA proved to be impossible and the reluctance of its members to cooperate within its framework brought it to an end. In June 1991, it was disbanded by a protocol signed in Budapest. At the same time, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary decided to retain their economic ties and enhance mutual security within a new regional cooperation framework, the Visegrad group. However ingenious the idea of regional cooperation sounded, it never made a breakthrough because each country perceived it as nothing more than a stepping-stone to joining the EC.

2.1.2 Eastern neighbours declare independence

Another important development to the east of Poland was the declaration of independence by Lithuania on 11 March 1990, and declaration of sovereignty within the Soviet Union by Ukraine on 16 July and Belarus on 27 July 1990. In the period lasting until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, Polish foreign policy towards its East was described as "dual-track" (*dwutorowość*). On the one hand, Poland recognised the sovereignty and independence of Soviet republics and established direct relations with them; on the other hand it maintained relations with the central Soviet authorities and exercised caution in relations with republics so as not to jeopardise Poland's security and economic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Poland had all the reason for being cautious. First of all, political uncertainty dominated its East. Secondly, Poland was going through a transition period itself. Thirdly, the United States was pursuing a policy of forming a partnership with the Soviet Union and existence of the Soviet Union was convenient for the West in general. Under these circumstances Poland had no alternative but to keep a low profile.[15]

Lithuania's declaration of independence was received positively in Warsaw and support was extended quickly. Besides verbal expression of support for Lithuanian independence, the Polish government made symbolic gestures like sending a parliamentary delegation to Vilnius in March 1990 when Moscow was threatening Vilnius militarily.[16] However, Poland did not extend formal recognition to Lithuania until after the August 1991 putsch in Moscow which culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and opened the way to international recognition for Lithuania (as well as the other constituent Soviet republics). On 2 September 1991, Poland recognised Lithuania but the relations between the two states were less than amicable due to the tension caused by the pro-Soviet and anti-

[15] See Paweł Świeboda, "Zachodnie uwarunkowania polityki wschodniej III RP" in Stanisław Bieleń (Ed.), Patrząc *na Wschód: Z Problematyki Polityki Wschodniej III RP*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Wschodnich UW, 1997, pp. 98-100.

[16] Stephen R. Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours - Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, 1993, No. 3, pp. 395-418.

independence actions of the Polish minority in Lithuania. Tensions were exacerbated by the fears in Lithuania that Poland might be tempted not to recognise the post war border settlement and to claim its lost territories. Despite tensions, Poland officially recognised Lithuania and the two countries issued a declaration on friendship and cooperation. However, signing of a full treaty was delayed due to a controversy which arose after the Lithuanian government requested a formal denunciation by the Polish government of incorporation of Wilno region into Poland in 1921-22.[17] After several rounds of negotiation, deadlock was overcome as both sides agreed not to include controversial historical issues in the body of the treaty and the treaty was signed on 26 April 1994.[18]

Like Lithuania, Ukraine also received support from Poland in its initial declaration of sovereignty and on 13 October 1990 the two countries signed a declaration of friendship. Similarly, the Polish government initially fell short of establishing official diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Poland's support for Ukrainian sovereignty as well as connections with the West became increasingly important for Ukraine in the face of Moscow's threat.[19] Realising the strategic importance of Ukraine, the Polish government signed a consular convention on 8 September 1991 and an agreement on trade and economic cooperation on 4 October 1991.[20] Finally, Ukraine proclaimed its independence on December 1991 and Poland was the first state to recognise it on 2 December. In comparison, the signing of the state treaty was delayed until 18 May 1992. Burant attributes this to Poland's fear of provoking Russia in the face of ongoing negotiations between Poland and Russia over specific issues regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.[21]

In this period the legacy of historical animosity and minority issues were not on the forefront of Polish Ukrainian relations. With the 1992 treaty the two sides recognised the current borders and provided extensive freedoms to minorities on each side of the border. Nevertheless, the underlying reasons for the lack of manifest conflict on these issues seem to be the strategic importance attributed by each country to the other. For Poland, an independent and friendly Ukraine meant relative freedom from a direct threat on its border and a buffer zone between itself and Russia. For Ukraine, Poland could be a gateway to the West and Polish support (which might link up with the West) was a possible counterbalance against Russian domination.

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[17] Józef Kukułka, *Traktaty Sąsiedzkie Polski Odrodzonej*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1998, pp.100-101.
[18] "Traktat między Rzeczapospolitą Polską a Republiką Litewską o przyjaznych stosunkach i dobrosąsiedzkiej współpracy Wilno, 26 kwietnia 1994 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 538, 1994, No. 4, pp.36-41.
[19] Burant, "International Relations", p. 409-410.
[20] Kukułka, "Najważniejsze dokumenty", p. 91.
[21] Burant., "International Relations", p. 412.

Belarus was the last among Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia to declare its sovereignty and to issue a declaration with Poland on friendly relations on 10 October 1991.[22] In the period preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Poland and its Eastern neighbours developed on a level commensurate with the degree of their independence from the Soviet Union. Belarus, with its "tame reputation", took observers by surprise when it declared independence, as it was known to be one of the most pro-Moscow republics.[23] That might offer an explanation for the lack of intensity of Polish-Belarusian relations. A treaty on good neighbourliness and cooperation was signed by the two countries on 25 June 1992.[24] Relations flourished from that point on and several agreements on economic cooperation and defence matters were signed.

2.1.3 Association with the EC

With the Soviet Union collapsed, the Warsaw Pact and CMEA disbanded, good relations with Germany and its Eastern neighbours secured, Poland could now concentrate its foreign policy on how to access Western institutions. The EC was quick to respond to changes to its East. After signing economic cooperation treaties with Poland in September 1989, it set up the Polish and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) programme to assist the process of transformation in those countries. PHARE was the brainchild of the July 1989 meeting of G7 in Paris which gave the EC Commission the task of coordinating financial assistance to Central and Eastern Europe.[25] The establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in May 1990 to aid the economic initiatives in the region was another timely step taken to address the new situation.

The impetus of the first steps taken by the EC did not last very long. The negotiations for an association agreement between the EC and Poland exposed the hesitancy of the former and the overoptimistic expectations of the latter. As early as October 1989 Poland began unofficial talks on association with the EC.[26] In April 1990, the Dublin European Council decided to open negotiations for association, and a month later Poland submitted its formal application to the EC to begin with the negotiations. The application was prompted by the speech made by President of the European Commission, Jacques

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[22] "Deklaracja o dobrym sąsiedztwie, wzajemnym zrozumieniu i współpracy między Rzecząpospolitą Polską i Republiką Białoruś, Warszawa, 10 października 1991 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 18-22.
[23] Walter Stankiewicz, "The Events behind Belorussia's Independence Declaration", *Report on the USSR*, 20 September 1991, pp. 24-26.
[24] "International Chronology", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* (hereafter *PQIA*), Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1-2, p.229.
[25] *Negocjacje Członkowskie*, p. 9.
[26] Teresa Łoś-Nowak, "Od adaptacji do integracji: Model polityki integracyjnej Polski z Unią Europejską", Polska a perspektywy integracji europejskiej, Zeszyt 4, Zeszytyt Naukowe Instytutu Badań Społecznych i Międzynarodowych, Warszawa: Fundacji im. Kazimierza Kelles-Klausa, 1999.

Delors, to the European Parliament in January 1990.[27] He proposed that the EC sign association treaties with the Central and Eastern European countries to create a framework for political dialogue and extend cooperation in technical, scientific, cultural and environmental issues. However, he did not endorse future membership.[28] The Commission was apprehensive about opening the way for new members at a time when the deepening of the integration process was a priority.

The first round of negotiations between Poland and the EC started in December 1990 in Brussels. The overoptimistic approach of many in Poland led them to expect a relatively swift negotiation process and elimination of all complications by early 1991.[29] The first round exposed the discrepancy between the perceptions of the two parties. The Commission was opposed to setting full membership as the main aim of association as it was apprehensive about possible negative economic consequences. It was unlikely that Poland could catch up with even the poorest member of the EC in the foreseeable future and it expected its transformation process to be a protracted one. The Commission's opinion was tempered by the Council of Europe which perceived the situation more in political terms. In the Council it was felt that the gesture of including the prospect of future membership in the association treaty would lend support to the democratisation and economic transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe and would fulfil the expectations of the societies and the new governments in the region.[30] The European Parliament shared the concerns of the Council of Europe and in May 1991 passed a resolution suggesting the inclusion of a clause in the treaty which defined membership in the EC as the final aim of association. [31]

However, the importance of economic concerns should not be overlooked. The first round of negotiations gave a good indication of the problems which were to complicate negotiations for years to come (for instance, liberalisation of trade in sensitive sectors, such as textiles, agricultural products and steel). Especially the poorer states of the EC feared competition from cheap Polish raw materials and food and were afraid of fresh competition for the community funds.[32] For the time being, a gradual liberalization in the trade of sensitive products and a very limited elimination of customs barriers on agricultural products was foreseen. The negotiations were complete at the end of the eighth round in

[27] Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie", p.71.
[28] Stanisław Parzymies "Integracja europejska w polityce zagranicznej III RP" in Roman Kuźniar and Krzysztof Szczepanik (Eds), *Polityka Zagraniczna RP 1989-2002*, Warszawa: Askon, 2002, p. 72.
[29] Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie", pp.71-72.
[30] Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie", p. 72.
[31] Kołodziejczyk, "Proces stowarzyszenie", p. 72.
[32] Parzymies, "Integracja europejska", p. 69.

September 1991 and on 16 December 1991, the so-called Europe Agreement forming the association between Poland and the EC was signed.[33]

Parallel to the efforts to join the EC, Poland endeavoured to have closer ties with NATO and to obtain security guarantees. Even though NATO established diplomatic contact with Central European states as early as 1990, it followed a cautious approach towards making any commitments. The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in November 1991 was meant to be a positive response from NATO. However, Central Europeans were disappointed at what they saw as a half-hearted initiative.

2.2 RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPE AGREEMENT, 1991-1994

The signing of Europe Agreement was a significant milestone on Poland's road to integration into Western Europe. The main aim of the agreement was first and foremost to create a framework for closer relations between Poland and the EC, to start an enhanced political dialogue, eventually establish free trade, regulate free movement of goods, capital and services and harmonise Polish law with that of the Community. The Agreement did include a provision regarding possible future membership of Poland but it did not provide a date or specific conditions for accession[34]:

> Recognising the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective, have agreed as follows: ... to provide an appropriate framework for Poland's gradual integration into the Community. To this end, Poland shall work towards fulfilling the necessary conditions.

This reflected the compromise reached between the economic concerns of the Commission and the political necessity to acknowledge the Polish effort to integrate with the West and transform its system. The EC felt it could not commit itself yet to a future Polish membership (which would no doubt be accompanied by Czech and Hungarian memberships). There were too many uncertainties as to how Poland would cope with the transformation process and what priority would be given to Eastern enlargement within an EC agenda dominated by deepening of integration.

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[33] Complete text of the Europe Agreement and amendments can be found at the European Union website, "Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part", *Official Journal* L 348, 31/12/1993 P. 0002 – 0180. (hereafter Europe Agreement)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993A1231(18):EN:HTML (accessed 06 November 2006).

[34] Europe Agreement.

The EC fulfilled its obligation to open up prospects for Poland's integration into Europe. However, such a prospect was dependent on the efforts of Poland to adapt its economic and legal structures to those of the EC. For the first time, faced with the technical requirements of their country's "return to Europe", the Polish political elite had to analyse the situation with reference to facts and not to emotional rhetoric. It was clear that joining the EC was an undisputed aim, but the question now was how and on what terms.

During the discussions in the Sejm on the ratification of the Europe Agreement, MPs from the Christian National Union (*Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego* - ZChN), Union of Real Politics (*Unia Polityki Realnej* - UPR), Confederation for Independent Poland (*Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* - KPN) and the non-post-communist left wing Union of Labour (*Unia Pracy* - UP) expressed their concerns about the treaty. [35] The main points raised were threats to sovereignty, national identity and values within the EC, possible negative effects of opening up the Polish economy and agriculture to EC competition.[36] MPs also voiced doubts about the viability, desirability and the costs of adaptation of the Polish economy and its legal system to those of the EC.[37] Doubts were voiced mostly by members of post-Solidarity parties which dominated the Sejm after Poland's first fully free elections in October 1991. These were the initial stages of the anti-EU discourse of the right wing.

The Sejm finally ratified the Europe Agreement on 4 July 1992. After all Poland did not have any other alternative to signing the treaty but isolation from mainstream European economic and political developments. The speech of MP Andrzej Malachowski (*Unia Pracy* - UP) at the Sejm on 3 July 1992 illustrated the dilemma between misgivings about the treaty and lack of a better alternative: "I think that the idea of rejecting the [treaty] is wrong. The idea of accepting is double madness... The choice is not between accepting or rejecting it but between madness and insanity- and only in madness is there some hope."[38]

Growing apprehension about the terms of the Europe Agreement and doubts of Central Eastern Europeans about their prospects of EC membership led the EC to formulate a somewhat clearer road map at the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993. Here the political, economic and legal criteria for membership were set. Unlike the Treaty of Rome which laid down geography as the only condition for eligibility, the Copenhagen criteria

[35] The first session was on 21 May 1992 and the second one was on 3 July 1992, just before ratification.
[36] Most of the concerns voiced about national identity and sovereignty revolved around Christian values, the subsidiarity principle of the EC and supranationalism. Janusz Korwin-Mikke (*Unia Polityki Realnej* - UPR) in his speech to the Sejm on 21 May 1992 pointed out, in his humorous style, that most EC governments and the European Parliament were dominated by socialists and the Sejm would be in effect voting for or against joining the "European Soviet Socialist Republic". Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja , 15 Posiedzenie, 1 Dzień, 21 May 1992. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006)
[37] See Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 19 Posiedzenie, 3 Dzień, 03 July 1992.
[38] Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 19 Posiedzenie, 3 Dzień, 03 July 1992. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. Also quoted by Łoś-Nowak,"Od adaptacji do integracji", p.66.

spelled out specific requirements.[39] These were having a democratic system, respect for civil liberties and minority rights, a functioning market economy, a legal system encompassing EC laws, i.e. *acquis communautaire,* and economic and institutional compatibility to join the Single Market.

The criteria for joining the EC were indeed clearer but the tasks set for candidates were getting more difficult. The eastern enlargement of the EC (if it were to take place) would not be based solely on political motives (or so it looked at the outset), as had been the case in the Mediterranean enlargement. The Central East European countries were already on a steady course to transform themselves and anchor their systems firmly in Western Europe. As there was no imminent danger of a return to an authoritarian system and no alternative in the East or in the region in terms of economic cooperation, the EC was in a good position to demand all the effort from the aspirants. Meanwhile, it could proceed with its internal reforms. The EC did pledge financial aid to assist the adaptation process.[40] However, the final result depended entirely on the abilities of the candidate and outcome of the negotiation process. This raised some concerns in Central East Europe about how genuine the willingness of the EC was to eventually include new members.[41]

Domestic political developments in Poland gave rise to concerns in EC circles. At the September 1993 elections, two post-communist parties, Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* - SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* - PSL), dominated the Sejm and formed a coalition government. The origins of these parties and the sceptical attitude taken by some of the PSL members towards Poland's association with the EU gave rise to bleak scenarios about a U turn in Polish transformation. The scenarios proved in no time to be completely wrong and the new government turned out to be even more pro-European and market oriented than the previous ones.[42] Besides, Polish politics was entering a period of consolidation and relative stability after two years of a fragmented parliament which caused the ouster of two governments and the eventual dissolution of the Sejm.

Poland waited patiently for the Europe Agreement to enter into force upon its ratification by all the EC states. As the Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7 February 1992) occupied the agenda of EC members, ratification of the Europe Agreements was put on the backburner.

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[39] "European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.Conclusions of the Presidency." http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/newsRoom/loadBook.asp?target=1999&infoTarget=before&bid=76&lang=1&cmsID=347 (accessed 20 February 2006)

[40] Articles 96-101 of the Europe Agreement spell out the framework for EU financial assistance to Poland.

[41] András Inotai, "The CEECs: From the Association Agreements to Full Membership?" in John Redmond and Glenda G. Rosenthal (Eds), The *Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.159.

[42] As a representative of the rural population, PSL was indeed sceptical about the EU and it remains to be so. However, it was well balanced by the SLD within the coalition and it did not take any actions contrary to the general foreign policy line.

But after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 1993, having overcome the Danish and French obstacles, the stormy debate abated and Europe Agreements were once again on the agenda. Consequently, the agreement went into force in February 1994 after being ratified by all EC members and the European Parliament. At Athens on 8 April 1994, the Polish government submitted its application for membership to the Greek Presidency of the EC.[43]

2.3 THE BEGINNINGS OF POLISH EASTERN POLICY

The coalition formed after 1993 elections raised concerns not only about its European policy but also about its Eastern policy (EP). Especially, PSL leader and Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's idea of cultivating the Russian market for Polish agricultural goods and developing a special relationship with Russia (at the expense of Poland's Eastern neighbours) caused apprehension in several quarters. Commentators criticised the government's lack of initiatives towards Ukraine and Belarus and of a well-defined EP. Kamiński suggested that Poland so far had only one foreign policy aim, i.e. to join NATO and viewed its geopolitical environment through that prism only.[44] He mentioned that even the deepening Russian-Belarusian military cooperation (thus heightening the security threat) was perceived as serving the cause of bringing Poland closer to NATO. In the same vein, Zajączkowski criticised the government for considering Russia as the partner in the East for economic relations.[45] Accordingly, this illusory approach towards "mythical Eastern markets" overlooked the fact that Russia was in economic and financial chaos and had not much to offer.

In fact there were both domestic and international reasons that limited the Polish government's room for manoeuvre. First, the new left-wing government had to coexist with a Solidarity president, Wałęsa, who held the key appointments of Foreign and Defence ministers (see Chapter Three). Domestic political tensions were inevitably reflected onto foreign policy. Second, the post-Soviet politics were taking shape as Russia's position over the Black Sea Fleet conflict and the future of nuclear arsenal and debts was becoming clear. That was one of the reasons why Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk's project of building a Baltic to Black Sea security zone received no enthusiasm from the new government (like its predecessor).[46] Another reason was the lack of any concrete perspective at the time for Poland to integrate into the Western security structures even though this was the main foreign policy aim. Given that the West also pursued a Russia-first policy towards ex-Soviet space, it would have been difficult for Poland to undertake

[43] "International Chronology", *PQIA*, Vol. 3, 1994, No. 3, p. 170.
[44] Antoni Z Kamiński, "Dlaczego Polska nie ma polityki wschodniej", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 March 1995.
[45] Wojciech Zajączkowski, "Spór o Moskwę", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 May 1995.
[46] See Roman Wolczuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations between 1991 and 1998: From the Declarative to the Substantive", *European Security*, Vol. 9, 2000, No. 1, pp. 127-156.

any actions contradictory to Western policy. Thirdly, Poland had an economic interest in not provoking Russia given the prospect of building pipelines carrying Russian gas to the West through Poland, as well as Poland's need for Russian energy supplies.[47] In 1993 Poland and Russia signed an agreement to build two pipelines carrying gas from the Yamal peninsula through Belarus and Poland notwithstanding Ukrainian fears that Russia would reroute some of the gas from the Ukrainian pipeline and deprive Ukraine of a bargaining chip.

In this period, the dual-track policy of Skubiszewski was reformulated into a relatively more assertive EP by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Olechowski. In his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate on 17 February 1994 Olechowski set out the new aims of Polish EP.[48] He stated the need for "a clear warming of the climate" with Russia and expressed the hope that Russia would join the Partnership for Peace. He said that the "rock-bottom condition" for friendliness with Russia was the latter's respect for Poland's integration into Western institutions like EU, NATO and WEU and warned about the threat of a neo-imperialist option in Russian foreign policy.

Olechowski attributed Ukraine almost equal importance to Russia and underlined the strategic importance of Ukraine for Poland, expressing hopes of further cooperation in international fora like Partnership for Peace, Central European Initiative and CSCE. He added his concerns about the "special interests" of Russia in Ukraine and reiterated Poland's commitment to the independence of Soviet successor states. Not surprisingly, hopes of good relations with Belarus were expressed only briefly.

Olechowski's straightforward comments and Poland's unwavering commitment to NATO membership did not go down well with Russian policymakers. Instead of a warming of the climate, a cooling down of relations followed as demonstrated by the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to Warsaw in February 1994 and Sejm speaker Oleksy's visit to Moscow.[49]

Meanwhile, Belarus was already drifting towards acknowledging its dependence on Russia. It had the most Russianised population, it was economically dependent on Russia (which supplied 67.7% of Belarusian trade and 90% of its energy supplies) and its army was dominated by Russian officials.[50] In 1994 two events signalled to Poland that Belarus would have a different foreign policy orientation than Ukraine: In February the Supreme

[47] The issue of energy dependence and pipelines are examined in Chapters Five and Six.
[48] "Wystapienie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP Andrzeja Olechowskiego na Posiedzeniu Komisi Spraw Zagranicznych Senatu RP na Temat Głównych Elementów Polskiej Polityki Wshodniej", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 535, 1994, No. 1, pp. 42-54.
[49] Terry, "Poland's foreign policy", pp.27-28.
[50] See Ustina Markus, "Belarus a "Weak Link" in Eastern Europe?", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, 10 December 1993, No. 49, pp. 21-27.

Soviet chairman, one of the few reformists eager to keep Belarus neutral, Stanislav Shushkievich, was removed from office.[51] In July, Alexander Lukashenko, who championed a closer union with Russia, was elected as president.[52]

Around the same time presidential elections were underway in Ukraine, and Leonid Kuchma, who advocated the pursuit of Ukrainian interests in "Eurasian economic and cultural space", was elected.[53] Unlike Lukashenko, Kuchma initiated an economic reform package which gave an opportunity to Poland for invigorating economic ties. But due to its own domestic political turmoil (as well as the reasons outlined above), Poland was unable to undertake the necessary steps. In January 1995, Olechowski resigned due to the divergence on foreign policy between him and Pawlak, without being able to implement his new EP vision.[54] In March 1995 the Pawlak cabinet was ousted by the Sejm. However, it must be noted that, despite shortcomings, relations with Ukraine developed much faster and on more levels than with Belarus. For example, at the end of 1994 the Polish-Ukrainian Presidential Committee established to coordinate policies and improve relations started functioning. In 1995 decision was taken to create a Ukrainian-Polish brigade which would take part in peacekeeping measures (it came into life in 1998). Two agreements on border crossing (29 September) and customs (18 December) were signed in the same year.[55] Poland also backed Ukraine in regional initiatives and supported Ukrainian membership to the Central European Initiative (Ukraine became member in 1996).[56]

2.4 FROM ASSOCIATION TO ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS, 1994-1998

2.4.1 Implementation of the Europe Agreement

The Polish government and Sejm began work on implementing the requirements of the Europe Agreement immediately after its ratification in Poland. An Extraordinary Commission was already established in the Sejm on 4 July 1992 in order to supervise the process, and in January 1993, the government prepared a programme for the adaptation of the economy and the legal system to the requirements of the Europe Agreement. [57]

The political dialogue foreseen by the Articles 2-5 of the Europe Agreement started straight away with the establishment of the Association Council, the Association Committee and

[51] Ustina Markus, "Conservatives Remove Belarusian Leader", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, 25 February 1994, No. 8, pp. 13-18.
[52] Ustina Markus, "Belarus Elected Its First President", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, 29 July 1994, No. 30, pp. 1-7.
[53] Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, 19 August 1994, No. 32, pp. 1-12.
[54] Louisa Vinton, "Poland's Olechowski Abandons Government", *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, 16 January 1995, No. 11.
[55] Kukułka, *Traktaty Sąsiedzkie*, p.95.
[56] See www.cei.org.
[57] *Negocjacje Członkowskie.*, p.11.

the Parliamentary Association Committee.[58] The Association Council was a ministerial meeting where delegations were headed on the Polish side by the Polish Foreign Minister and on the EU side by the Foreign Minister of whichever state holds the EU presidency. The first meeting of the Association Council took place in March 1994 and it has been meeting annually ever since.[59] The Association Committee consisted of representatives of the European Council and Commission and senior Polish government officials and the Parliamentary Association Committee, of representatives from The European Parliament and the Sejm.

With the commencement of structured political dialogue, Poland started pressing the EU to speed up the association process and preparations for the upcoming Corfu and Essen European Councils. On 2 August 1994, Poland submitted a memorandum to the German Presidency of the EU expressing Polish expectations for a quicker tempo for integration.[60] In September, Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kołodko presented the so-called Strategy for Poland at the Sejm.[61] It contained a programme for economic, social and administrative reforms for adaptation to EU requirements. This document was the forerunner of future national programmes for preparation for EU membership. On 31 November 1994, at the first meeting of foreign ministers of the EU and associated states in Luxembourg, Olechowski presented a timetable for integration of Poland but it was not accepted by the EU ministers.[62] The EU's persistence in not specifying dates was to cause great apprehension among candidates in the future.

While knocking hard on the EU's door, Poland also stepped up diplomatic initiatives towards NATO notwithstanding Russian objections. For Polish foreign policymakers, joining NATO was an integral part of their European policy. Accordingly, NATO was the security framework in which the EU operated.[63] WEU was seen by Poland as the European pillar of NATO. Besides, without NATO membership, Poland would always be vulnerable to instabilities on its East. Poland's quest for NATO membership met a more efficient and organised response in comparison with the EU. Already in 1994, NATO introduced the Partnership for Peace programme and in 1995, with the publication of the "Study in NATO Enlargement", Poland's entry into NATO became a matter of time.

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[58] See Małgorzata Lidia-Wenerska, "Foreign Policy Issues Under Poland's Association with the European Union", *PQIA*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1999, pp.102-103 and Clare McManus, "Poland and the Europe Agreements: The EU as a regional actor" in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (Eds), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? : Competing Visions of the CFSP*, London: Routledge, 1998, pp.115-132.
[59] Stanisław Parzymies, *Unia Europejska a Europa Środkowa: Polityczna Aspekty Współpracy*, Warsazawa: Polsak Fundacja Spraw Mlędzynarodowych, 1997, p. 31.
[60] Lidia-Wenerska, "Foreign Policy Issues", p.106.
[61] "International Chronology", *PQIA*, Vol. 3, 1994, No. 3, p.180.
[62] "International Chronology", *PQIA*, Vol. 4, 1994, No. 1, p.208.
[63] Terry, "Poland's foreign policy", p.30.

2.4.2 Pre-accession strategy

The path to EU was still thorny and full of uncertainties. The Essen European Council on 9-10 December 1994 adopted a pre-accession strategy.[64] The document focused on the measures for integrating the associate countries to the internal market, cooperation in trans-European issues like environment and energy, as well as in common foreign and security policy, home affairs and justice. It formulated PHARE, which would be "appropriately funded within a multi-annual financial framework in accordance with the preparatory strategy", as the financial backing to accomplish the tasks. The pre-accession strategy also defined a closer political dialogue enhanced with more meetings at ministerial level. In addition, the Council requested the Commission to prepare a White Paper to identify the relevant acquis which the candidates had to adopt in order to join the internal market. In addition, the document reminded the candidates that while they strove to adapt to EU norms, Community acquis and the Community policies would themselves continue to evolve. The pre-accession strategy envisaged deeper political and economic cooperation but failed to live up to Poland's expectations: a timetable for the accession process and more participation in the EU institutions.[65]

The strongest point (and the only concrete contribution to the accession process) of the Essen strategy was enhanced structured multilateral political dialogue. Yet, the Polish side was not totally satisfied with the nature of the meetings within this framework. In its ever-lasting quest for more certainty, Poland found most of these exchanges insubstantial.[66] The multilateral character of the meetings had earlier become a bone of contention. Poland requested to conduct relations on a bilateral basis at the Association Council but was refused.[67] The Polish Foreign Minister, Władysław Bartoszewski, felt the need to remind the EU states that "It is true that Poland's membership depends primarily on the fulfilment of certain economic and political condition; but it also depends on the conviction of our partners in the Union that this investment will be beneficial for them." [68]

The Madrid European Council in December 1995 called on the Commission to prepare its opinions on the applications by the associate countries. The opinions were to be forwarded to the Council after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996, and consequently a composite paper on enlargement would be prepared. Accordingly, this

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[64] Resolution on the White Paper: "Preparing the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union", COM (95) 0163 - C4 - 0166/95 and Official Journal C 141, 13/05/1996 P. 0135. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51996IP0101:EN:HTML (accessed 06 November 2006)
[65] Lidia-Wenerska, "Foreign Policy Issues", p.107.
[66] Lidia-Wenerska, "Foreign Policy Issues", p.108-109.
[67] Parzymies, Unia Europejska, p. 34.
[68] "Address to the Diet on the main directions of the Polish foreign policy by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Władysław Bartoszewski", Warsaw, May 24, 1995", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 540, 1995, No. 2, p. 16.

procedure would ensure treatment of applicant countries on an equal basis. Yet again, there was no reference to any concrete dates: "Following the conclusion of the [IGC] and in the light of its outcome and of all the opinions and reports from the Commission..., the Council will ... take the necessary decisions for launching the accession negotiations".[69]

The IGC in 1996 opened at the Turin European Council in March 1996 and ended in Amsterdam European Council in June 1997. It dealt primarily with the reform of EU institutions to face the challenges of both deepening and enlarging, and the revision of the Treaty on European Union. The IGC announced that the EU intended to open accession negotiations as soon as possible after the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. It requested the Commission to prepare its opinion on applicants and a comprehensive report about enlargement (Agenda 2000) by July. This was a confirmation of EU's commitment to start negotiations with the applicants. In spite of this, the IGC decisions were inconclusive about the future enlargement. While dealing with the monetary and economic issues extensively, it failed to include solutions to problems which enlargement would pose to the institutional makeup of the EU, like the composition of the EU organs.

2.4.3 Agenda 2000

On 16 July 1997 the European Commission published Agenda 2000.[70] The document covered the future of EU policy, EU's financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006 and enlargement. Commission's opinions about membership applications were included. The Commission proposed that negotiations for membership be launched initially with Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia plus Cyprus. This recommendation started a debate within the EU about the enlargement strategy.[71] The Commission's proposal met with opposition from the EU states which preferred starting negotiations with all of the applicants (so called "regatta approach"). In their view, enlargement was first and foremost a political move to reinforce the transformation process in Eastern Europe. The other states, however, demanded that enlargement should go ahead only with applicants which could live up to EU standards. There was, therefore, no point in starting negotiations with countries which had no prospect of fulfilling the criteria in the near future. The divergence of members' approach had its bearing on the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 15 September 1997 where Italy, Greece, Denmark and Sweden opposed beginning talks with only a selected number of associates.[72]

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[69] Madrid European Council Presidency conclusions, 16 December 1995, Document 00400/95.
[70] Agenda 2000, http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006)
[71] Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, Chatham House Papers, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 56-59.
[72] "International Chronology", *PQIA*, Vol. 6, 1997, No. 4, p.129.

The issue was resolved in the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 when the Council decided to launch an accession process on 30 March 1998 with ten Central East European applicants and Cyprus. It was pointed out that "all these States are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing."[73] However, in compliance with the Commission's opinion, the Council agreed to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences to begin accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus.

2.4.4 National Strategy for Integration

On the Polish front the preparations were continuing. In August 1996, the Committee of European Integration (*Komitet Integracji Europejskiej* - KIE) was established to plan and coordinate Poland's integration with the EU.[74] The Committee consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief Negotiator, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Economy, Finance, Labour, Agriculture and Justice. The Office of the Committee of European Integration (*Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej* - UKIE) was established to undertake the administrative work for KIE. In January 1997, the Council of Ministers accepted the National Strategy for Integration whose aim was to formulate Poland's negotiation mandate and form the basis for an action programme for the 1997 – 2000 period to be prepared by KIE.[75]

In this period, an outstanding legal problem about adopting EU statutes was also solved. The "Little Constitution" of 1992 made it difficult to incorporate EU law into domestic law. The new constitution (ratified by national referendum in May 1997) solved the problem by making it possible to delegate competence of state authority to an international organisation by virtue of international agreements.[76] The 1997 constitution also aimed to define the competence of government bodies dealing with EU integration. Accordingly, KIE would prepare the government's negotiating stance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be responsible for carrying out the negotiations.[77]

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[73] Luxembourg European Council Presidency conclusions, 12 December 1997, Document No. SN400/97.
[74] *Negocjacje Członkowskie*, pp.13-15.
[75] "National Strategy for Integration", The Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, 1997. http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/dokumenty/Nsien.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[76] 1997 Polish Constitution. Article 90. Paragraph 1: "The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters". Article 91, paragraph 3: "If an [international] agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws." For a detailed discussion of Article 90 see Jan Barcz, "The Integration Act of Poland With the European Union in the Light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland", *Polish Contemporary Law*, Vol. 1-4, 1999, No.121-124, pp. 5-18.
[77] Los-Nowak, "Contemporary government attitudes", p.21.

However, the problem of policy coordination was not resolved by the judicial reforms. The new centre and right wing government coalition of Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*, AWS) and Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności*, UW) formed after the September 1997 elections had a direct effect on the institutions of European integration. AWS was intent on the appointment of Ryszard Czarnecki, the leader of the radical Christian Union, as the head of KIE. Appointment of a eurosceptic to such a key position in Polish-EU relations, especially when the negotiations were imminent, gave rise to concern among the predominantly pro-EU Polish political elite and EU circles.[78] Underlying political tensions culminated in lack of coordination. Czarnecki's brusque statements about a tough negotiation style and KIE's failure to communicate with the other related ministries caused serious problems. The government had to intervene when the EU axed 34 million ECU in aid to Poland from PHARE sources in May 1998 because project applications were found to be badly prepared.[79] This inefficiency was due to a brawl between the UW dominated Finance Ministry and Czarnecki's KIE.[80] Subsequently, the government decided to take over the control of KIE and issued a regulation to reorganize the negotiation team and competencies of each department.

2.5 NATO ENLARGEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS ON EASTERN POLICY

2.5.1 Relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania

Alongside the Luxembourg summit, the year 1997 also witnessed an important development for Poland: Poland was invited to join NATO at its Madrid summit in July. The actual entry into NATO was foreseen for until after the ratification of the accession protocols by NATO member states. Yet the firm commitment was there and it was all Poland could ask for. Poland eventually became a NATO member in March 1999.

The security Poland had been looking for was granted at the Madrid summit. The summit results had buttressed Poland's growing attention and initiatives towards its Eastern neighbours. While relations with Ukraine progressed, there was a stalemate in relations with Belarus. Poland, alongside the West, criticised political decision and actions of the Lukashenko presidency and Belarus's plans for unification with Russia. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bronisław Geremek stated in his exposé on 5 March 1998 that Poland strove to maintain economic and social relations with Belarus. He added that Poland did

[78] The UW wing of the government tried to balance Czarnecki with the selection of Jan Kulakowski as the Chief Negotiator. However, Kulakowski's position was inferior to Czarnecki's.
[79] Jędrzej Bielecki and Piotr Apanowicz, "Polska traci 34 miliony ecu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 May 1998.
[80] Bernadeta Waszkielewicz and Marcin Dominik Zdort, "To zły minister", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 June 1998.

not intend to isolate Belarus but to help overcome "Belarus's self-isolation" and help it return to the community of democratic states.[81]

Relations with Lithuania, meanwhile, had progressed after the signing of the friendship and cooperation treaty in 1994. Between 1995 and 1997 key agreements on free trade, cooperation for EU and NATO membership, creation of a peacekeeping battalion and border cooperation were signed. Before and after its invitation to NATO, Poland declared its support for Lithuanian aspirations to join the EU, NATO and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Pleased with Poland's support, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas during his visit to Warsaw on 7 January 1997 referred to Poland as the "main geostrategic partner" of Lithuania.[82]

2.5.2 Relations with Russia

The negative consequence of the Madrid summit was the worsening of relations with Russia which opposed NATO enlargement and Polish interest in Ukraine and Belarus. At the European security meeting in Vilnius on 5 September 1997 attended by leaders of Central and Eastern Europe, the Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin called the eastward expansion of NATO "the largest strategic mistake since the end of the Cold War".[83] He referred to the "anti-Russian tone" of the meeting, which was a Polish-Lithuanian initiative in fostering Baltic to Black Sea cooperation. Russia was also irritated by Poland's support for the Chechen cause.[84]

EP during the period in question has been described by Całka as a period of consensus following periods of doubt in 1992-93 and re-evaluation in 1994-95.[85] There was consensus in the sense that despite the election of a new president in 1995 and the government change in 1997, foreign policy was more or less stable and was assuming a bipartisan character. This is also a good indicator of consolidation of the Polish political system and successful transformation.

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[81] "Sejmowe expose ministra spraw zagranicznych RP Bronislawa Geremka na temat podstawowych kierunków polityki zagranicznej Polski w 1998r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 551, 1998, No. 1, p. 32.
[82] Maja Narbutt, "Dobry odbiór", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 January 1997.
[83] "Chernomyrdin Details Moscow's Ideas on Baltic Security", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 08 September 1997 and Jerzy Haszczyński, "Sąsiedzi dalecy i bliscy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 06 September 1997.
[84] Piotr Jendroszczyk, "Nie omijać Moskwy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 January 1998.
[85] Marek Janusz Całka , "Polska polityka wschodnia w latach 1989-1997. Próba oceny, nowe wyzwania i perspektywy" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* 1998, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1998, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)

2.6 ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU

2.6.1 Negotiations begin

The negotiation process with the EU officially commenced on 31 March 1998 with the opening of a bilateral IGC on Accession. It was envisaged that the process of accession would progress in three steps.[86] The first step to be completed by November 1999 was screening, i.e. checking the compliance of Polish legislation with the acquis and identifying problem areas. The second step to last until June 2000 was formulating position papers for each of the 31 chapters to be negotiated. Simultaneously, the negotiations on separate chapters would begin as soon as both parties had presented their positions. And finally on the basis of these negotiations an accession treaty would be drawn and submitted for ratification.

Stepping up efforts at home, Poland presented its National Programme for Preparation for Membership in the EU in June 1998.[87] The actual negotiations started in November 1998, before the end of the screening process, on seven unproblematic chapters. At the same time, the Commission presented its Regular Report on Poland's Progress for 1998. While praising Poland's credentials as a democracy and a functioning market economy, the report criticized Poland for "gaps in the administrative and institutional capacity in key areas" and for its "uneven rhythm of transposition".[88] The report estimated that Poland would become a member in the "medium-term" if it sustained the current progress. By the end of 1999, Poland had presented to the EU all of the position papers, and by July 2000 negotiations were proceeding on 29 chapters (with 11 already provisionally closed).[89] The chapter "Institutions" was not opened for negotiations until after the IGC in 2000 would take decisions on the future institutional make-up of the Union. The last chapter, "Other", was reserved for any outstanding issues not dealt with under the other 30 headings.

Meanwhile, the EU was undertaking internal reforms to prepare itself for the ensuing enlargement. Berlin European Council in March 1999 agreed on financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006.[90] The budget included financial commitments to future members. It

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[86] *Negocjacje Członkowskie*, p.18.
[87] The programme contained the strategy for 1998-2002 and was modified every year in the light of the developments. Narodowy Program Przygotowania do Członkostwa w UE http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/HLP/files.nsf/a50f2d318bc65d9dc1256e7a003922ed/8945c11b8cea8c5ac1256e7b00489cf8?OpenDocument (accessed 09 November 2006)
[88] Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, November 1998. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_1998_en.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006)
[89] In February 2000, the Government Plenipotentiary on European integration published a report comprising all the position papers. It can be found at http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/WWW/dok.nsf/0/A040340D2A6A5863C1256E86004E7C8C?Open&RestrictToCategory= (accessed 09 November 2006). See *Negocjacje Członkowskie*, pp.48-58 for a detailed chronology of negotiations.
[90] Berlin European Council Presidency conclusions, 25 March 1999, Document 100/1/99 rev.

designated the amount of aid to be given in this period and established two new funds (alongside PHARE) for candidates.[91] On the other hand, the new budget changed neither the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) guidelines to create means to absorb the new member's agricultural sectors nor the distribution of structural and cohesion funds. It foresaw certain adjustments before the first enlargement but did not specify them. This caused disappointment in Poland as it had hoped for inclusion in the CAP system of its huge and inefficient agriculture.[92] Another step towards institutional reform was the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999. In June 1999, the Cologne European Council decided, on the basis of the Amsterdam protocol, that the IGC in 2000 would deal with key institutional reforms like composition of the commission and voting procedures in order to accommodate new members.[93]

2.6.2 Waning public support

The opening of negotiations fuelled public debate in Poland on European integration and public opinion gradually sobered up to the fact that joining the EU was more than just approval of Poland's democratic and Western credentials.[94] Nor was EU membership a natural consequence of any historical process which would unfold by itself. It was rather a detailed cost-benefit calculation and tough negotiation based on political decisions. It became clear that certain sectors of the economy (especially agriculture and heavy industry) and social groups (farmers, workers of publicly subsidized industries) would be at a great disadvantage in the short and medium term, and that the EU was not willing to compensate them. In addition, the deadline for Poland's entry into the EU seemed to be frequently postponed. Public opinion polls reflected this social fatigue with the "return to Europe".[95] In May 1999, asked about how they would vote if there was a referendum on Poland's entry into the EU then and there, only 55% of respondents answered positively and 26%, negatively. In contrast, the response in May 1996, when the euphoria was running high, was 80% in favour and only 7% against.[96]

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[91] One of the funds, SAPARD, is for agricultural development and the second, ISPA, for structural development.

[92] Maciej Popowski, "Polska a Unia Europejska" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2000*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 2000, p. 44.

[93] Cologne European Council Presidency conclusions, 04 June 1999, Document 150/99.

[94] Public frustration with the EU negotiations also supported the eurosceptic movements in Poland which opposed to membership for various reasons. The most prominent of these were the fear of losing national sovereignty, compromising "Catholic values" and the Polish politicians settling for an economically unsound deal with the EU in order to increase their political capital at home. Fine examples of a growing Polish eurosceptic literature are Miłosz Marczuk andTomasz Somer, *Poza Unią jest życie*, Warszawa: AWRIL S.C., 2003 and Filip Adwent, *Dlaczego Unia Europejska jest zgubą dla Polski*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Antyk - Marcin Dybowski, 2004.

[95] Public opinion about the EU in Central Eastern European countries plays a very important role because integration into the EU is treated as a domestic issue running parallel to the transformation process at home. The public in the EU member states, on the other hand, does not treat EU enlargement as a priority or an end in itself.

[96] Beata Roguska, "Poparcie dla Integracji Polski z Unią Europejską", Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS), Serwis Informacyjny, No.11, 1999, pp.49-58.

Another fact Poles (and other Central and East Europeans) realised was that the EU itself was undergoing transformation and was deeply divided over the enlargement issue. The moral imperative of welcoming the Eastern nations and the advantages of access to large Eastern markets were soon outweighed by fears of the enormous costs of enlarging (at the expense of poorer members' benefits), of a flood of cheap labour to exacerbate already high levels of unemployment and a possible delay to integration. Besides motivations for or against enlargement depended to a large extent on the national priorities of individual member states.

The European Commission's Regular Report on Poland in 1999 reflected the increase in tension.[97] The report pointed out difficulties in agriculture, heavy industry and trade. It criticised the Polish parliament for its slow pace in passing necessary legislation and blamed the lack of progress in alignment with the acquis on this situation.[98]

The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 commented on the report and concluded that "Although the evaluation found that some progress had been achieved, ... certain candidate countries would not be able to meet all the Copenhagen criteria in the medium term."[99] It endorsed the Commission's opinion on the date of accession of new members and added that "...the Commission considers it possible to conclude negotiations with the most advanced candidates in 2002. ... therefore recommends to the European Council in Helsinki to commit itself to be able to decide from 2002 on the accession of candidates that fulfil all necessary criteria". The Council reiterated that the EU would be ready to accept new members after the ratification of the 2000 IGC results. Another very important development of the Helsinki summit was the opening of negotiations with the second group of candidates.[100] In line with the "regatta approach" (or "differentiation principle" in EU terminology), candidates started negotiations on an equal footing but the timetable for their accession depended on the progress in each individual case. This meant that accession of any country, be it in the Luxembourg or the Helsinki group, might be delayed if the EU was not satisfied with its progress.

2.6.3 The scramble for a date

The 2000 IGC opened in February and as planned, ended at the Nice European Council in December 2000 having produced a treaty tackling institutional reform for an enlarged union. The treaty outlined the weighting of votes in the European Parliament, the Council,

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[97] Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, October 13, 1999. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/poland_en.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[98] For Polish government's opinion on the report see *Przegląd Rządowy*, Vol. 105, 2000, No. 3, pp. 124-141.
[99] Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions, 11 December 1999, Document 00300/1/99.
[100] Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria Lithuania, Latvia and Malta. They are sometimes referred to as "the Helsinki Group" and the first group of candidates, "the Luxembourg Group".

the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee and extended Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).[101] To its satisfaction, Poland was allocated the same number of votes as Spain. However, when exactly Poland (or any other candidate) would join remained untold. As far as the dates were concerned, the IGC reiterated that the EU would be able to "take in any applicants that are ready as from 1 January 2003".[102] The new members, accordingly, could take part in the June 2004 European elections. This vague roadmap was as far as the EU felt it could go in terms of providing candidates with dates.

Meanwhile, the negotiations were proceeding and talks on controversial chapters such as agriculture, environment, and movement of labour and services. Frustration was growing both in Poland and the EU about the pace of negotiations. EU officials repeated their earlier complaints about the slow legislative process in Poland and the consequent delays in the harmonisation of Polish law. This had yet again spurred discussions on the coordination of EU integration with the government, parliamentary committees and KIE all blaming each other for delays.[103] The elusive quest for obtaining a timetable also occupied public debate and caused much political bickering. The government held on to January 2003 religiously as the projected date of entry into the EU despite the fact that this became unrealistic in the course of negotiations. This obsession with the projected date became almost farcical when the Minister for European Integration was ostracised by the parliament for expressing his doubts about the 2003 plan during his visit to Brussels in May 2001, and had to submit his resignation.[104] However, the aim of accession in 2003 was abandoned soon. The Council of Ministers formed by the new post-communist SLD-PSL government formed after the September 2001 elections issued a European strategy on 15 November 2001 and declared that it aimed to conclude the negotiations in 2002 and accede to the EU in 2004.[105]

2.6.4 Reservations about Poland

The negative image of Poland as the biggest and most troublesome candidate was proving harmful to Poland's prospects. The implementation of "Building Poland's Image in the EU Countries" programme by the government did not seem to yield any immediate results as

[101] The text of the Nice Treaty can be found at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ nice_treaty_en.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[102] Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions, 11 December 1999, Document 00300/1/99.
[103] Referring to the frustration that lack of coordination creates and possible delays to Poland's EU entry, the Head of the parliamentary European Integration Committee, Czesław Bielecki said "When the politicians forget to look at their watch, the citizens do so". Krzysztof Gołata and Andrzej Szoszkiewicz, "Ekspres sejmowy", *Wprost*, 22 February 2000.
[104] "Nie będzie dymisji", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 May 2001 and Dominika Pszczółkowska et al., "Upomnienie, nie dymisji", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 May 2001. The Prime Minister did not accept the resignation.
[105] Europejska Strategia Rządu RP, http://www.rcie.kielce.pl/dokumenty/ Europejska_Strategia_Rzadu_po_RM_15_11_2001.pdf (accessed 09 November 2006)

support for Polish membership among EU citizens fell to low levels.[106] In autumn 2000, only 44% of EU citizens declared themselves for enlargement and 35% against. The fact that only 36% of Germans supported enlargement was alarming for Poland as it counted on the German government's political will to support its membership.

The debates fuelled by the difficulties in the negotiations and the general unease about enlargement did not help Poland's image. It should also be noted that individual EU governments had their own attitudes towards enlargement. National agendas dominated the negotiations most of the time, given that each EU country had the power to block the settlement. For instance, Spain had shown the biggest resistance to the extension of structural funds to new members, as most of its regions would be deprived of Union aid after enlargement. Spain used its veto on the free movement of labour as a bargaining chip to extract guarantees for its funding in return for its support for the common EU position on transition periods (mainly advocated by Germany and Austria, fearing that their labour markets would be flooded by East Europeans).[107]

Various other reservations about Poland's accession to the EU ranged from accusations that Poland would be the "Trojan horse" of America in the Union to complaints about the number of derogations requested by Poland.[108] For instance, France argued that Poland would not be able to implement the Schengen rules and its porous borders would continue to allow illegal immigrants and drugs into the Union. This was perceived in Poland as an easy pretext for France to stall the enlargement process.[109]

The future of its Eastern border did present a problem for Poland. As the Schengen Treaty allowed no derogations, Poland had to adopt EU border and visa procedures on its Eastern border which threatened Poland's good relations with its neighbours, something that Poland has worked hard to achieve. The inability of the Schengen Treaty to allow any scope for the special relationship of Poland to its East became a bone of contention among the Polish political elite and adversely affected Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours. The imposition of invitation and voucher requirements for the citizens of Russia and Belarus in 1998 was received with apprehension in these countries. In addition, the future of the Kaliningrad region, surrounded by the territories of the enlarged EU, entered the agenda. The issue of how Poland could have an independent EP crucial

[106] Eurobarometer Report No. 54 (November-December 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb54/eb54_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[107] Jacek Pawlicki , "Hiszpańskim targiem", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 31 May 2001.
[108] The role of being the spokesman of America has been attributed to Britain but it seems now that Poland is a contender for this position. Jarosław Giziński, "Europa kontra Ameryka", *Wprost*, 28 May 2000.
[109] Piotr Kudzia and Grzegorz Pawelczyk, "Brama Europy", *Wprost*, 04 June 2000. Also according to *Wprost* of 28 May 2000, French President Jacques Chirac allegedly asked Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek whether Poland intended to be the 51st state of the United States. Jarosław Giziński, "Europa kontra Ameryka", *Wprost*, 28 May 2000.

for its security in a prospective fortress Europe started to resonate among the Polish political elite and intellectuals.

2.7 EVOLVING EASTERN POLICY

Even though Poland's relations with its East followed the main trends formed after 1995, EP became increasingly salient as the accession negotiations with the EU progressed. In the face of rising instability and explosive issues that influenced bilateral relations with Eastern neighbours, Poland's EP took an evolutionary leap forward.

Already troublesome relations with Russia were exacerbated when Russia accused Poland of sympathising with the Chechen rebels. Although there was no open stance taken by the Polish government, anti-Russian feelings of the Polish society in general were exhibited through pro-Chechen demonstrations and comments in the media. The fact that Poland headed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 also meant that Polish government representatives had to take up the Chechen issue in their capacity of OSCE leaders.

Polish-Russian relations were further shaken by a crisis at the beginning of 2000. On 20 January, Poland declared nine Russian diplomats on its territory personæ-non-grata, accusing them of spying. In retaliation Russia asked nine Polish diplomats to leave Moscow on 28 January 2000.[110] In February, relations reached a breaking point when Polish demonstrators belonging to a group called Free Caucasus Committee (*Komitet Wolny Kaukaz*) came into the grounds of the Russian Consulate in Poznań and destroyed Russian state symbols. Russia denounced the demonstration and the hands-off attitude of the Polish police. It withdrew its ambassador from Warsaw and cancelled the visit of its Foreign Minister to Warsaw scheduled for 3 March 2000.[111] In addition, retaliatory demonstrations were held in front of Polish missions in Moscow and St Petersburg.

In the background of these scandals, relations were being steadily eroded at a less spectacular level. The economic crisis that Russia plunged into in August 1998 caused trade with Poland to plummet and economic cooperation had to be scaled down. The crisis affected not only Polish-Russian trade but also Poland's economic relations with all the Soviet successor states. No headway was made in bilateral issues even though series of meetings were held between the officials of the two countries in 1999 and 2000. These issues included not only general topics like regional cooperation and European integration but also specific problems like the return of Polish art works and archives taken to Russia during the war and compensation for the damage caused by Soviet troops in Poland.

[110] Anna Marszałek, "Polscy dyplomaci niepożądani", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 January 2000.
[111] Sławomir Popowski, "Duma oskarża polskie władze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 February 2000.

Tension between Poland and Russia was eased to an extent by the Moscow visit of President Kwaśniewski on 11 July 2000 with the express aim of "breaking the ice".[112] Even though no concrete solutions were found for outstanding problems, the visit brought about the revival of the channels of communication at the highest level.

Unlike Polish Russian relations, Polish Ukrainian relations continued to develop at the highest level with frequent meetings between the two countries' presidents. The re-election of the Ukrainian president Kuchma in 1999 contributed to the continuation of the "strategic partnership". This strategic partnership, however, must be interpreted with regard to the limitations in the international politics and geopolitical circumstances of the two countries. Ukraine's ties with Russia, voluntary and involuntary, limited possibilities for revolutionising Polish Ukrainian relations. It is not surprising that Kuchma stressed Ukraine's strategic partnership with Russia alongside his country's positive approach towards European integration and importance of Poland.[113] On the other hand, the strategic partnership of Ukraine for Poland was a secondary aim compared to Polish membership of the EU and wherever objectives of the two aims clashed, the latter prevailed as a priority. For example, Poland committed itself to fulfilling Schengen requirements, even at the expense of curbing transborder contacts with its Eastern neighbours. Kuchma referred to this as the building of a "paper curtain" in the place of the iron one.[114] In short, cooperation between two countries progressed at the economic, social and cultural levels but a full blown strategic partnership was not in evidence.

A good example of the rhetorical character of the strategic partnership was the refusal by Kwaśniewski in July 2000 of the Russian proposal to build a second gas pipeline from Russia to Slovakia through Poland, bypassing Ukraine (the first pipeline was completed in 1999). Kwaśniewski assured Kuchma that Poland would not support "anything that would have an overtly anti-Ukrainian character".[115] Several emotional statements were uttered by Polish politicians, expressing their commitment to the strategic partnership. However, the overambitious advocacy of Ukrainian interests faded away in the face of economic realities such as Poland's and Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas and expectations of revenues from the planned pipeline.

Even though the impact of economic and strategic calculations on shaping Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours was evident, historical grievances also occupied the

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[112] Sławomir Popowski, "Przełamywanie lodów", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2000.
[113] Zofia Szmyd, "Stosunki z Ukrainą" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2000*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 2000, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006).
[114] He made this comment at the Baltic to Black Sea presidential meeting in Yalta on 11 September 1999. "Łukaszenko został w domu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 September 1999.
[115] "Politicians Express Concern over Gas Pipeline Project Bypassing Ukraine", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 2, 25 July 2000, No. 26.

agenda and contributed to the formation of an EP discourse. One instance where historical memory influenced relations was the conflict over the Orlat Cemetery in Lwów where Polish soldiers fighting against the Ukrainians in 1919-20 were buried. In 2000 the objection of Lwów city authorities against the wording of the planned commemorative plaque (perceived as anti Ukrainian) flared into a conflict.[116] The conflict was played down by the presidents and the foreign ministries of the two countries in the name of the "strategic partnership". However, the issue was pursued by the relevant state authorities.[117] The fact that the decision of a local authority could escalate to the interstate level is a good indication of the power of historical memory in the region as well as its potential to divide.

Lithuania is another country where common history proved to be conflictual. However, the divisive potential of historical memory was mitigated by the uniting force of the common international goals shared by the two countries. Throughout 1999 and 2000 there were problems concerning the Polish minority in Lithuania (like education issues and the effects of the new administrative reform on electoral districts inhabited by Poles) and the Lithuanian minority in Poland (the planned Puńsk border crossing facilities). But efficient channels of communication between the two countries and common goals like EU and NATO membership prevented the escalation of such problems. Polish support for Lithuania's accession to the EU was reiterated many times by Polish statesmen. When Lithuania was invited for negotiations with the EU in December 1999, a new platform of cooperation was created.

Relations with Belarus resumed their low key and icebound character as the EU and Polish policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime continued and Belarus progressed towards a union with Russia. The vagaries of Lukashenko damaged the relations even further when he ordered the eviction of Western diplomats from their residences in Minsk in June 1998 in breach of the Vienna convention. The Polish ambassador left the country in June 1998 not to come back until January 1999.[118]

Despite the relaxation of the crisis in the beginning of 1999, relations with Belarus remained cold. Poland insisted on limiting contacts at the regional or ministerial level and Polish officials held meetings on subjects like combating organised crime, border crossing, cultural exchanges and regional cooperation (especially between Podlasie and Grodno regions). Another hitch in relations came in December 1999 when the Białystok based

[116] Conflicts with a historical background featured in Polish-Ukrainian relations before. See Kasia Wolczuk, "Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands and Nation-States. The Case of Lviv and Przemysl" in Kazimierz Krzysztofek and Andrzej Sadowski (Eds), *Pogranicze etniczne w Europie: Harmonia i konflikty*, Białystok: 2001, pp. 213-231.
[117] The Council for the Defence of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom and the Institute of National Remembrance (*Rady Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa* - ROPWiM and *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*- IPN)
[118] "Polska wzywa ambasadora", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 June 1998.

Radio Racja started its broadcasts. Radio Racja was established by the Belarusian Union in Poland, the anti-Lukashenko faction of the Belarusian minority in Podlasie, and it was funded mainly by American sources.[119] The Lukashenko administration was not pleased with this initiative.

2.8 EU ACCESSION AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF EASTERN POLICY

Despite public frustration and protracted negotiations (especially on financial matters such as agricultural subsidies and budget allocation), Poland and the EU managed to conclude negotiations during the Copenhagen European Council on 13 December 2002 and Poland, alongside nine other candidates, were set to become a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004. Poland signed the Accession Treaty to the EU during the Athens European Council on 16 April 2003 and held a referendum on 7-8 June 2003.[120] The results demonstrated that the government's huge efforts for promoting Poland's EU accession and its extensive and costly public information programmes as well as its decision to devote two days to voting succeeded in avoiding a dreaded scenario of a majority no vote during the referendum.[121] While the turnout was a sufficient 55 %, 77.45% voted for and 22.55% against Poland's entry into the EU.[122]

Despite tough negotiations on a possible future constitution for the EU and haggling over the voting system agreed on at Nice, Poland became a member of the EU, as planned, on 1 May 2004. The issue was now what role Poland would play in the EU and not whether Poland would be a full member anymore. Since Lithuania's EU membership became certain, Poland's relations with that country was carried onto a platform much different than its relations with Belarus or Ukraine and Lithuania was no longer an EP concern. Bilateral cooperation became much more intense and problems about minorities eased within the atmosphere of mutual effort to fulfil EU requirements.

However, the main EP concerns for Poland, i.e. relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, remained challenging. The academic-journalistic debate about the theory and practice of Poland's EP in 2000-01 reflected the soul searching that also went on among the policy makers. The debate focused on how active should Poland's engagement in its East be and what kind of role Poland wanted to play in the region. While some participants in the debate criticised Poland's professed policy of being Ukraine's gateway

[119] Interview with Oleg Łatyszonek, 25 July 2002, Katedra Kultury Białoruskiej, Białystok.
[120] The treaty went into force after parliaments of all the EU member states ratified it. "Traktat podpisany w Atenach w dniu 16 kwietnia 2003 r.", *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 90, pos. 864, 30 April 2004.
[121] "Jak przyciągnąć do um?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 June 2003.
[122] "Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 9 czerwca 2003 r. o wyniku ogólnokrajowego referendum w sprawie wyrażenia zgody na ratyfikację Traktatu dotyczącego przystąpienia Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Unii Europejskiej", *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 103, Pos. 953, 11 June 2003.

to the EU and its paternalistic attitude, others believed in the necessity of extensive engagement in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe in general. Historical sources of Poland's EP thought, especially the vision of the émigré publicists Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski, and their reflection on current foreign policy were discussed.

Meanwhile, Poland's impending EU accession encouraged the Polish Foreign Ministry to issue a set of proposals in June 2001 demonstrating Poland's intention to influence the EU's Eastern policy.[123] The paper argued for an active role for Poland in EU programmes for the post-Soviet region and stressed Poland's extensive experience in engagement in its East. It also proposed that EU make security dialogue with Ukraine a priority (although adding a disclaimer about Poland carrying Ukraine into the EU). In January 2003 the Foreign Ministry issued a non-paper with more concrete proposals for the EU's Eastern policy, which called for the creation of an "Eastern dimension" (similar to the Northern dimension which governed cooperation with Russian regions near the EU).[124]

Poland's efforts at increasing its leverage on its Eastern neighbours were visible also in economic initiatives. In 2001 the government introduced a programme for offering export credit insurance to businessmen who wanted to export to Russia and in 2003 announced an initiative called "Programme for regaining the Eastern markets" to boost exports to its Eastern neighbours in order to revive the slump in trade caused by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia.[125] The downward trend in trade figures was reversed and by 2004 Poland's exports to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was almost double the 1998 levels while Polish investment in the region (and investment in Poland by those countries) was lagging behind. (See Chapters Five, Six and Seven for details)

A much more definitive role was played by energy politics in the region. By 2003 almost 90% of Polish imports from Russia and around 50% from Ukraine and Belarus were mineral products (including re-exports of Russian crude oil and natural gas as well as processed mineral products). As mentioned above in the case of Ukraine, Poland's dependence on Russian energy sources and larger energy geopolitics in Europe injected some realism into Poland's ambitious EP. The effects of this dependence could also be observed in domestic political struggles, especially on a post-Communist-post-Solidarity axis. The AWS-UW governments' policy of signing natural gas supply contracts with Norway and Denmark in an effort to diversify supply was quickly reversed when the SLD

[123] "The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU's enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Poland's viewpoint", Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2001.
[124] "Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Non-paper,with,Polish,proposals,concerning,policy,towards,the,new,Eastern,neighbours,after,EU,enlargement,2041.html (accessed 06 November 2006)
[125] *Założenia polityki handlowej wobec rynków wschodnich na lata 2003 – 2004. Program Odzyskania Rynków Wschodnich*, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Warsaw, February 2003. http://www.mpips.gov.pl/pliki_do_pobrania/rynki_wschodnie.doc (accessed 09 November 2006)

came to power in 2001. Another example is the Orlen scandal of 2002-04 where high ranking SLD politicians were accused of facilitating the Russian takeover of Polish oil refining industry and control of oil delivery contracts. Gas contracts and the Orlen affair will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Five.

Another project drawn up with the intention of furthering the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership and breaking the monopoly of Russian oil pipelines was extending the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Gdańsk to carry Caspian oil to European markets (see Chapter Six). Despite continued political support of Poland for the project, the extension failed to materialise due to economic considerations and in 2004, succumbing to intense Russian pressure, the Ukrainian government authorised the pipeline to carry Russian oil in the reverse direction. This was another stark reminder to Poland that it lacked to means to spearhead an ambitious strategic partnership with Ukraine.

Policy towards Belarus, meanwhile, underwent reconsideration both in Poland and the EU as the restrictive approach failed to bring about any political change in Belarus. Stopping short of contacts at the highest political level, the Polish government (especially after the 2001 elections) focused especially on cooperating with Belarusian counterparts on dealing with regional and cross border issues. Policy makers realised that relying on the so far fragmented and ineffectual Belarusian opposition, NGOs and civil society to bring regime change in Belarus was proving impossible and governmental contacts were essential to have any influence on Belarusian policies. They have previously realised that adhering strictly to EU policies towards Belarus disrupted Poland's own EP perception of maintaining constructive dialogue with all its Eastern neighbours and during the Drozdy crisis of 1998 refused to join the travel ban imposed by the EU and the US on high ranking Belarusian officials.[126] In January 2004, shortly before Poland's accession to the EU, Poland also stood against a proposal by the EU Commission to impose trade sanctions on Belarus. [127]

2.9 CONCLUSION

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the constant in Polish foreign policy was the objective of integration into the Western European and transatlantic structures. Subsequent Polish governments, regardless of their domestic political orientation, pursued the cause of Polish accession to NATO and the EU, and domestic political instability had not caused any alteration in the main concepts of foreign policy. Poland's EP, however, evolved much more gradually and had always been perceived as secondary to European integration. The

[126] Andrzej Stankiewicz and Jędrzej Bielecki, "Szczególna sytuacja", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 July 1998.
[127] Mirosław Ikonowicz, "Polska do Unii, Białoruś do...", *Przegląd*, No. 4, 20 January 2004.

discussion on Poland's European policy had always been about the methods pursued and initiatives taken whereas the existence of an EP concept had been periodically questioned.

Poland obtained the security guarantee it sought from NATO and fulfilled its main foreign policy objective i.e. EU accession. The stability factor created by these successes contrast with the growing instability in the East in the face of a new division in Europe following the EU enlargement. That was why EP became increasingly salient in Polish foreign policy discourse and promised to dominate the agenda in the years to come.

Chapter Three

Legal and Institutional Framework of Foreign Policy Making in Poland

The regime change in Poland in 1989 necessitated an overhaul of the legal system and state institutions which made possible the ensuing political and economic transformation and in turn were shaped by the transformation itself. Institutions and laws that shape foreign policy and supervise its application were a part of this process. This chapter will first present the constitutional aspect of foreign policy making and constitutional provisions concerning the power balance between the government and the president in terms of influencing foreign policy. It will give brief information about the institutions that take part in making and supervision of foreign policy. First, the supervisory (and at times advisory) role of the Sejm and Senate and their relevant commissions will be discussed. Second, relevant institutions under the Council of Ministers will be presented and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main foreign policy making institution will be elaborated. Third, the president's role in both making and supervising foreign policy will be considered and institutions that are under his control will be presented.

3.1 CONSTITUTION AND MAKING AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The sweeping changes in 1989 brought about the necessity to amend the legal system in Poland and the legislation concerning the conduct of foreign policy. After several constitutional amendments establishing the basis of the new political system, discussions centred on the need to replace the 1952 Constitution with a new one establishing the legal framework for the new institutions of the Third Republic. The process of drafting a new constitution began soon after the Mazowiecki government took office in autumn 1989.

Notwithstanding its urgency, drafting a constitution proved tricky. Political divisions that cropped up in the anti-communist Solidarity camp hindered consensus, especially regarding the division of power and responsibilities between the institutions in general, and the scope of presidential powers versus parliamentary in particular.

The presidency had been reintroduced by a constitutional amendment in 1989 as a result of the Roundtable deal, with Wojciech Jaruzelski intended as incumbent.[1] Accordingly, the role of the President would be to "to watch over the observance of the Constitution, to

[1] Leszek Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Constitution", *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 6, 1997, No. 2-3, pp. 81-89.

safeguard the security and sovereignty of the state, as well as the inviolability and indivisibility of its territory; and the implementation of political and military alliances with other states."[2] These extensive powers were soon to be taken up by Lech Wałęsa when he won the presidential elections in December 1990. After the parliamentary elections of October 1991, the division of the Solidarity camp reflected itself in the composition of the parliament and the ensuing fragmentation further hindered efforts at constitution making.

3.1.1 The 1992 Little Constitution

The idea of an interim solution was increasingly favoured. As a result, the Constitutional Act, referred to as the Little Constitution, was enacted by the Sejm in October 1992. As Poland was in the process of re-establishing the basic principles of its foreign policy, a constitutional guideline concerning division of powers and duties in the conduct of foreign policy was needed. The Little Constitution aspired to provide this framework but failed to delineate competencies clearly.

The powers of the President in the area of foreign policy was one of the most contentious issues of the Little Constitution. The Suchocka government (inaugurated in July 1992) led by the post-Solidarity Democratic Union (*Unia Demokratyczna* - UD) was well aware of Wałęsa's quest to dominate Polish politics by means of strengthening the presidency vis-à-vis the parliament and the Council of Ministers. The Little Constitution sought to strike a balance between presidential and parliamentary powers, but failed to curb Wałęsa's ambitions.

Article 28(1) of the Little Constitution stated that[3]

> The President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme representative of the Polish State in internal and international relations. The President shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State, the inviolability and integrity of its territory, as well as upholding international treaties.

This provision was further qualified by Article 32(1) which read "The President shall exercise general supervision in the field of international relations" and Article 34, "The President shall exercise general supervision with respect to the external and internal security of the State." The term "general supervision" was interpreted liberally by Wałęsa and used as a justification for his foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, Article 61 stated

[2] Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Constitution", p. 82.
[3] "Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach między władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym", Dziennik Ustaw, 23 November 1992, No. 84, pos. 426. Text of the Little Constitution can also be found at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/pl02000_.html (accessed 08 March 2007)

that "The Prime Minister shall lay a motion to appoint the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of National Defence and of Internal Affairs after consultation with the President". The wording was ambiguous enough to give Wałęsa a free hand to insist on single-handedly appointing these state ministers to work within his Presidential Chancellery. Wałęsa's interpretation was strengthened by the fact that Article 32 (3) was in the Chapter regarding the powers and duties of the President. The article stated that "relations with foreign states, as well as with Polish diplomatic representatives abroad, shall be maintained through the appropriate minister dealing with foreign affairs."

The friction between government and President over the interpretation of the constitution was evident in the conflict about control over the military. The Little Constitution stated that "the President shall exercise general supervision with respect to the external and internal security of the State. The advisory organ to the President in connection with such matters shall be the National Security Council" (Article 34). Article 35 designated the President as the supreme commander of the armed forces and gave him the right to appoint the chief of staff and army generals "in agreement with the Minister of National Defence". Again, to Wałęsa this meant that he could sideline the said minister and the government over army appointments and use the army as a political power base.[4]

After the presidency was taken over by Alexander Kwaśniewski in 1995, tensions between his office and the government, dominated by the post-communists, eased considerably. Kwaśniewski nevertheless carried on exercising presidential powers secured thanks to his predecessor's interpretation of the constitution.

The Little Constitution also provided extensive powers to the Council of Ministers in terms of foreign policy making. Articles 51(1) and 52(2/7-8) stated that "The Council of Ministers shall conduct the internal affairs and the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland." and "[The Council of Ministers] shall maintain the relations and shall conclude treaties with the governments of foreign states and with international organizations; shall ensure the external and internal security of the State." However, due to ambiguous wording, the competencies of the President and the Council of Ministers overlapped. Whoever took the upper hand in political competition, seized the authority.

3.1.2 1997 Constitution

Meanwhile the quest for a full constitution to replace the interim one found its organisational base in the Constitution Committee of the National Assembly, which worked

[4] For more information on the conflicts between Wałęsa and the government over the control of the military see Dale R. Herspring, "Civil–military relations in post-communist Poland; problems in the transition to a democratic polity", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, pp. 71-100.

on the preparation of a constitutional draft from 1993.[5] Its members came from both Sejm and Senate (hence the name National Assembly). Constitution drafting activities could proceed faster now that the Sejm was much less fragmented in terms of party representation and a stable two party coalition was in government. Until the end of 1995 seven constitutional drafts prepared by political parties, the labour union Solidarity and the presidential advisor, Lech Falandysz, were submitted to the Committee.[6]

After long and bitter discussions dominated by tough political bargaining, the Committee completed the constitutional draft in 1996.[7] After going through procedures of editing upon parliamentary and presidential recommendations, the draft was adopted by the National Assembly in April 1997 and submitted for a referendum in May, where it was accepted by a narrow margin of 53.7% of votes for and 45.9% against.[8] The 1997 Constitution went into force after it was promulgated in the Journal of Laws (*Dziennik Ustaw*) in October.

The new constitution limited the powers of the President in the area of foreign and security policy not by taking away specific competencies but by removing ambiguous terms.[9] Article 126(3) set clear limits by stating that "The President shall exercise his duties within the scope of and in accordance with the principles specified in the Constitution and statutes."[10] The 1997 Constitution scrapped the term "general supervision in international relations" that had caused so much bitter political dispute and with Article 133 defined the President as "representative of the state in foreign affairs" and required him to "cooperate with the prime minister and the appropriate minister with respect to foreign policy." The President retained the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the right to appoint the Chief of General Staff and army commanders (Article 134) but that was made subject to the countersignature of the Prime Minister (Article 144).[11] The controversial clause regarding appointment of ministers of foreign affairs, defence and interior was also removed, and Article 161 made it possible for the President to "effect changes in the composition of the Council of Ministers" but only "on request of the Prime Minister."

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[5] Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Dead ends and new beginnings: the quest for a procedural republic in Poland", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p. 102.
[6] See George Sanford, "Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in Democratic Poland", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, 1999, No. 5, pp. 787-789.
[7] One of the most controversial issues in constitution making was whether to include a reference to god and Christianity in the preamble. Lengthy and fiery debates were underway at the Committee between mainly the post-Solidarity and post-communist and secular left wing members. This demonstrated that constitution making was about which political view would dominate the basic organisation and structure of the Third Republic. For discussions about the preamble see *Biuletyn Komisji Konstytucyjna Zgromadzenia Narodowego*, No. 1228/II, 25 January 1995. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf (accessed 06 November 2006).
[8] Jasiewicz, Dead ends", p. 103.
[9] Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Constitution".
[10] *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw: Sejm Publishing Office, 1999.
[11] Garlicki, "The Presidency in the New Constitution".

A more definitive curbing of the presidential prerogatives in foreign policy was put into effect by introducing clearer provisions concerning the duties of the Council of Ministers. Accordingly, "the Council of Ministers shall conduct ... the foreign policy..." The same provision, Article 146, designated the Council of Ministers to "conduct the affairs of the state not reserved to other state organs." According to Ciapała, an inference could be drawn from this provision that neither parliament nor the President could conduct foreign policy.[12] In addition to legal considerations, successful formulation and conduct of foreign policy depended on striking a balance and ensuring political consensus between the branches of the executive and the legislative. Excluding the participation of the President or parliament from the process would have been disruptive. Therefore, a strict application of the above mentioned inference would have gone against the interest of the state, and hence, the political viability of the government.

The 1997 Constitution does not have direct provisions regarding the role of the legislative organ in the conduct of foreign policy. The only exceptions are provisions regarding declaration of war and deployment of foreign troops in Poland and of Polish troops abroad. The Sejm oversees foreign policy decisions by exercising general control over the activities of the Council of Ministers (Article 95).[13] The most important foreign and security policy initiative where the above-mentioned competence of the Sejm came into play was the Polish entry into NATO in 1999. It was seen once more that where political consensus exists between the legislative and the executive, interpretation of legal competences is not contentious. Polish entry into NATO was, thus, smooth and both the ratification of relevant treaties and parliamentary consent for troop deployment was unproblematic. The North Atlantic/Washington Treaty was ratified by the Sejm, the Senate and the President within a week in February 1999, and all three displayed a consensus almost unprecedented in post-1989 Poland.[14]

This brings us to the issue of ratification of international agreements in the 1997 Constitution. Article 89 states that:

> Ratification of an international agreement by the Republic of Poland, as well as renunciation thereof, shall require prior consent granted by statute - if such agreement concerns:
> 1) peace, alliances, political or military treaties;
> 2) freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens, as specified in the Constitution;

[12] Jerzy Ciapała, "The position of the Sejm in the area of foreign policy and international relations", *The Sejm Review Special Issue*, October 1999, pp. 83-104.
[13] Sanford argues that Sejm is concerned more with other governmental decisions than foreign policy due to their "intrinsically executive character". However, Sejm inspects foreign policy activities by means of committee debates, interpellations from MPs and annual expose by the Minister of Foreign Affairs performed at Sejm. Sanford, "Parliamentary Control", pp. 775-776.
[14] The minutes of ratification at the Sejm can be found at Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 4 Kadencja, 44 Posiedzenie,1 Dzień, 3 Punkt, 17 February 1999. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. (accessed 06 November 2006)

3) the Republic of Poland's membership in an international organization;
4) considerable financial responsibilities imposed on the State;
5) matters regulated by statute or those in respect of which the Constitution requires the form of a statute.

Such a statute is passed by two-thirds majority of the Sejm and the Senate with at least half of the MPs and senators present [Article 90(2)]. However, granting consent for ratification may also be done by a nationwide referendum [Article 90(3)] which can be ordered either by absolute majority of the Sejm in the presence of half of the MPs or by the President with the consent of the Senate given by absolute majority [Article 125 (2)].

According to the 1997 Constitution the Council of Ministers initiates the process of deciding which international agreement falls into one of the five categories listed in Article 89, and the parliament and President cooperate in this process.[15] In the past there had been conflicts about this issue due to the wording of the Little Constitution and attempts, especially by Wałęsa, to hijack this function and sideline the parliament had been made. One illustrative example of this was Wałęsa's attempt to ratify the Concordat with the Vatican signed by the Suchocka government shortly after the latter had been ousted.[16]

The 1997 Constitution also addressed the issue of precedence of international agreements over domestic law and delegation of competence to international organisations. These are crucial in view of Polish entry into the EU in 2004. Article 90(1) says, "The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters." This provision is necessary to delegate certain powers to EU bodies. A question may be raised as to whether the Constitution would facilitate a possible loss of state sovereignty by permitting delegation of powers. It can be argued that the provision does not allow for the delegation in general of all state powers, but only those arising from treaties that have already been ratified and approved.[17] As for the primacy of laws, Article 91(2-3) states that "An international agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes" and that "If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws." This means that EU law would have precedence over Polish domestic law and would prevail over the latter in case of conflict. It might be said that the constitution makes

[15] Ciapała, "The position of the Sejm", p.90. See also Jerzy Ciapała, *Prezydent w systemie ustrojowym Polski (1989-1997)*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1999, pp.220-226.
[16] Ciapała, "The position of the Sejm", p.101.
[17] For a detailed discussion of the subject see Jan Barcz, "The Integration Act of Poland With the European Union in the Light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland", *Polish Contemporary Law*, Vol. 1-4, 1999, No.121-124, pp. 5-18.

it all too easy to let the jurisdiction of Polish state organs be limited by international agreements and, by implication, may facilitate the erosion of sovereignty vested in the nation by the constitution itself. However, an international agreement goes through arduous processes of review and ratification before it enters into force. Besides, if the provision is interpreted as to mean delegation of "exercise of powers" and "not the powers themselves", it is not absolute; therefore the state may decide to re-establish its competence in relevant activities.[18] However, integration with the EU and accepting the supremacy of its laws is primarily a political process, and unless the course of Polish foreign policy is drastically altered, it seems unlikely that any Polish state organ would resort to the above-mentioned interpretation of the Constitution.

3.2 INSTITUTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Polish foreign policy institutions are in a constant process of redefining themselves. This arises not only from the new challenges posed by the international environment but also from the domestic political struggles to dominate foreign policy. Constitutional and legal transformation advanced towards consolidation after 1997, and the same trend can be observed in the formation of institutions.

3.2.1 The Sejm

The role of the Polish Parliament, the Sejm, in making and supervision of foreign policy is formally limited. Constitutionally the Sejm is vested with the rights to declare war or state of war, determine terms of peace, to approve of stationing of foreign troops on Polish soil and Polish soldiers abroad and to ratify certain categories of international agreements by statute. The Sejm exercises general supervision over the Council of Ministers and influences the direction of foreign policy by means of debates, questions, interpellations and its specialist committees. Despite the formally limited role, the Sejm still provides a very important forum for foreign policy projects and ideas to be discussed and, especially through its committees, the Sejm provides useful scrutiny into the practice of foreign policy by the executive.

The parliamentary debates on foreign policy provide a forum where opinions of individual MPs as well as party preferences are voiced. Resolutions or appeals may be produced at the end of these debates. These acts are not legally binding but political prudence requires the government to take them into account.[19] High profile resolutions such as the those preceding ratification of an important treaty (like the Europe Agreement) or the decision for Polish entry into international organisations/alliances (like NATO) have an impact on

[18] Barcz, "The Integration Act", p. 10.
[19] Ciapała, "The position of the Sejm", p.103.

foreign policy execution as they provide the executive with the full backing of the democratically elected legislative and symbolise the national resolve regarding the issues at hand. However, not all resolutions are that influential in effect and not all reflect a total unanimity. For instance, the resolution of 19 November 1996 expressing the Sejm's support for the Belarusian Soviet and appealing for solidarity with Belarusian political groups that "stood for the defence of democracy and independence" was passed relatively smoothly with only one MP voting against it and two abstaining.[20] However, when the Sejm considered sending a similar message to the Belarusian nation in 1999, expressing support for the Belarusian opposition, there were fierce debates in the Foreign Affairs Committee (where the text was debated) and after four weeks of debating in the Committee, the final text was submitted for voting.[21] Even the watered down text received seven votes against and 49 abstentions.[22]

Since May 1992, debate on foreign policy has followed the presentation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of his annual exposé (usually presented in May).[23] Minister's exposé is important in terms of presenting the main directions and concepts of foreign policy to scrutiny by the elected.

Other instruments of foreign policy supervision available to the Sejm are interpellations, questions and oral questions. Although questions (*zapytania*) and interpellations (*interpelacje*) are less significant for public opinion, they are the means by which MPs can investigate specific foreign policy issues. MPs can submit written interpellations to any member of the Council of Ministers. Interpellations should focus on policy issues and essence of state policies.[24] The minister is required to respond within 21 days and the issue may further be discussed in the Sejm after a 15 minute exchange between the interpellant and interpellee. Questions, on the other hand, can address more specific issues related to the implementation of foreign policy by the executive and the same rules as interpellations apply.[25] The number of interpellations and questions on foreign policy submitted by the MPs steadily increased from the First Sejm onwards. During the First Sejm (1991-93), a total of 34 requests were addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs, which increased during Second Sejm (1993-97) to 112, Third (1997-2001) to 186 and Fourth

[20] For the number of votes see http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc2/oplsy/2025.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[21] "Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1996 r. w sprawie sytuacji w Republice Białoruś", *Monitor Polski*, 30 November 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.
[22] "Posłanie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Narodu Białoruskiego, Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r.", *Monitor Polski*, No. 4, Pos. 16, 27 January 1999. For the number of votes see http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc3/oplsy/780.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[23] See Sanford, "Parliamentary Control", pp. 776-778.
[24] *Regulamin Sejmu* (Standing Orders of the Sejm), Dział III, Rozdział 4, Art. 191-194, Interpelacje, Informacje Bieżące, Zapytanie Poselskieil Pytania w Sprawach Bieżących.
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed on 20 February 2006).
[25] *Regulamin Sejmu*, Dział III, Rozdział 4, Art. 195.

(2001-05) to 313.[26] Of course, there were interpellations submitted to other ministries and the PM concerning foreign policy issues so these numbers are just an indication of growing interest in interpellations and questions as a tool by the MPs.

Oral questions (*pytania*), on the other hand, must be submitted to the Presidium of the Sejm and Convent of Seniors 12 hours preceding their presentation and these organs decide whether to include the question in the agenda or not. The question must be submitted on the floor of the house in one minute and the response should be given within five minutes.[27]

Specialist committees of the Sejm play the most important and active role in the supervision of foreign policy. There are standing and special committees. The latter are formed to deal with specific issues which need closer scrutiny than a permanent committee can provide and they exist temporarily. Committees can also form temporary subcommittees from their own members to deal with particular tasks. The functions of the committees are examining draft laws and resolutions of the Sejm and providing opinions on these, monitoring activities of the state organs and their administration and checking implementation of laws.[28] Committees can also put forward *dezyderaty* (desiderata - requests) to the Council of Ministers and heads of key state institutions and call for the addressee to adopt a prescribed position on a certain issue. According to Article 84 of the Standing Orders, committee resolutions, opinions or declarations are adopted by a majority vote in the presence of at least one third of the members.[29] Different committees can hold joint sessions if the agenda item discussed is relevant to the competence of all of them.

The standing committees of the Sejm dealing directly with foreign policy related issues are: Foreign Affairs Committee, European Committee, Committee on Liaison with Poles Abroad, National Defence Committee and Economic Committee. Although it will not be covered under a separate heading, mention must be made of the Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities. Even though it does not deal with foreign policy in a strict sense, its subject matter necessitates discussions on bilateral relations with countries such as Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Germany and especially of Eastern policy (EP) as both Poland and its Eastern neighbours have ethnic minorities of considerable size on each side of the border.

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[26] Interpellations, questions and oral questions are fully searchable on the website of Sejm. Full text of submissions and replies can be retrieved from the third term onwards. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/iz.htm htm (accessed on 06 November 2006). The contract Sejm of 1989-91 is considered the 10th term.
[27] *Regulamin Sejmu*, Dział III, Rozdział 4, Art. 196.
[28] *Regulamin Sejmu*, Dział II, Rozdział 14, Art. 150-68, Posiedzenia Komisji Sejmowych. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed on 20 February 2006).
[29] *Regulamin Sejmu*, Dział II, Rozdział 14, Art.150-68, Posiedzenia Komisji Sejmowych. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/regulamin/regsejm.htm (accessed 20 February 2006).

A number of special committees have been formed at the Sejm since 1989. Only one of them, though obsolete at the time of writing, will be discussed briefly here: the European Legislation Committee, formed during the Third Sejm (1997-2001) to act on adaptation of Polish laws to those of EU. A parliamentary inquiry commission formed in 2003 to investigate the Orlen scandal could also be listed under special commissions.[30] Although it was not a commission related to foreign policy per se, its investigations about the government's and the president's dealings with the Russian secret services and energy concerns demonstrated the intersection of foreign economic and political relations with domestic politics and economic interests of the state. The Orlen affair will be covered in detail in Chapter Five and hence will not be examined as a separate item here.

3.2.1.1 Foreign Affairs Committee (Komitet Spraw *Zagranicznych* - SZA) [31]

SZA is the main organ of the Sejm that assists the formation of a general foreign policy line and determining its objectives.[32] SZA (as well as other Sejm committees) has strong means of obtaining information and getting opinions about foreign policy as it can invite visiting foreign statesmen, parliamentarians, diplomats as well as academics and specialists from governmental and non-governmental organisations to participate in its meetings. In addition delegations from SZA can pay visits to foreign parliaments.

Another important function of SZA is its supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych* - MSZ) through the appointment of diplomats, oversight of its policies and its opinion on the allocation for foreign affairs in the state budget. Appointment of ambassadors takes up a considerable part of the SZA agenda as can be seen from the list of opinions addressed to MSZ in the Third Sejm: 77 out of 93 opinions concerned ambassadorial candidates put forward by MSZ.[33]

3.2.1.2 European Committee (*Komisja Europejska* - EUR)

EUR changed its name twice from Committee on European Agreement Affairs to Committee of European Integration and got its current name during the Fourth Sejm formed in October 2001. As Poland moved closer to EU membership, the pace of negotiations accelerated and the scope of issues to deal with was enlarged. Approximation

[30] The full name of the commission is Komisja Sledcza do zbadania zarzutu nieprawidlowosci w nadzorze Ministerstwa Skarbu Panstwa nad przedstawicielami Skarbu Panstwa w spólce PKN Orlen S.A. oraz zarzutu wykorzystania sluzb specjalnych (d. UOP) do nielegalnych nacisków na organa wymiaru sprawiedliwosci w celu uzyskania postanowien sluzacych do wywierania presji na czlonków Zarzadu PKN Orlen S.A. (SORN).
[31] I will use the official abbreviations of the committees as provided in the Sejm website (www.sejm.gov.pl).
[32] For an account of SZA's activities see Sanford, "Parliamentary Control", pp. 780-781.
[33] See http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/opinie3?OpenAgent&SZA (accessed 20 February 2006).

of Polish law to EU law (*acquis communautaire*) and drafting new legislation for EU accession became the most crucial tasks in the process of EU accession and became a specialist subject on its own, which would overextend SZA's capabilities. Democratic control and approval of Poland's European policy, supervision of negotiations and overview of negotiating stance were the main duties of EUR.

It should be noted that draft laws concerning EU harmonisation were submitted to committees according to their subject areas and all parliamentary committees concerning key issues like agriculture, transport, environment and the like would examine the so called approximation laws.

Although sending approximation bills to specialised committees seemed like an all out effort for the Polish EU cause, it actually hindered the process.[34] Many draft laws were under discussion in the committees for months.[35] In order to prevent the slow pace of legislation from stalling negotiations and to avoid further critical comments in the upcoming Regular Report of November 2000, a special committee called the European Legislation Committee was established in July 2000.

3.2.1.3 European Legislation Committee (*Komisja Prawa Europejskiego* - NPE)

NPE was formed with the aim of accelerating the harmonisation process as well as showing the EU the necessary resolve on the part of the government and the parliament about Polish EU accession.[36] As NPE's task was to accelerate the harmonisation process, a new working mechanism, novel to Sejm procedures, was formulated: Draft laws which needed to be harmonised with EU law would be set aside, grouped into a bundle (called the horizontal method) and then sent to NPA as a "package" by the Marshal of the Sejm upon the proposal of the government.[37] The decision making process in NPE was speeded up as well by introducing shorter deadlines.[38] The establishment of NPE was received positively by the EU.[39] However, at home NPE sparked discussions concerning its

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[34] For example it took the Telecommunication Law 15 months to go through the relevant committee and be adopted. Piotr Buras and Marek A. Cichocki, "The Impact of the Political Situation in Poland Following the Formation of a Minority Government on the Harmonisation of Polish Legislation with the Acquis Communautaire (Part 2)", Centre for International Relations, Reports and Analyses No. 3/01, 2000, p.7. (www.csm.org.pl)

[35] Out of 30 draft approximation laws which the government hoped to finalise by the end of June 2000, as many as discussions on 17 were still not completed by the relevant committees. Jerzy Pilczyński, "Szybka ścieżka z wybojami", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2000.

[36] Piotr Buras and Marek A. Cichocki, "The Impact of the Political Situation in Poland Following the Formation of a Minority Government on the Harmonisation of Polish Legislation with the Acquis Communautaire (Part 2)", Centre for International Relations, Reports and Analyses,2001, No. 1/0, p.6. (www.csm.org.pl)

[37] Buras and Cichocki, "The Impact of the Political Situation"(Part 1), p.7.

[38] Jerzy Pilczyński, "Szybka ścieżka z wybojami", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2000.

[39] The Commission's Regular Report on Poland issued in November 2000 reflected the mood: "The fresh impetus which can be noted since the Sejm debate on European integration in February and the creation of the Parliamentary Committee on European Law is already beginning to bear fruit with a marked acceleration in the

effectiveness and democratic credentials. [40] NPE ended its term in September 2001. By that time it had succeeded in processing 67 draft laws and the Sejm had passed 52 of them.[41]

3.2.1.4 Committee on Liaison with Poles Abroad (*Komisja Łączności z Polakami za Granicą* - LPG)

LPG, like its counterpart in the Senate, examines draft laws and resolutions concerning Poland's ties with the Polish diaspora (Polonia) and Polish minorities living in the ex-Soviet states; gives opinion on the budget allocation for Polonia and Polish minority affairs and sends *dezyderaty* to state organs, mostly MSZ and Council of Ministers. Since the beginning of 1990s the Senate assumed the role of the patron of Poles abroad and the Senate committee on Polonia has been much more active than LPG.[42] As the members of LPG expressed in 2001, LPG lacks the financial means of the Senate committee and the coordination between the two committees is weak.[43]

3.2.1.5 National Defence Committee (*Komisja Obrony Narodowej* - OBN)

OBN deals with issues relating to national and civil defence, armed forces and defence industries.

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adoption of the acquis in comparison to the last reporting period."
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

[40] First, there was criticism of lumping diverse draft laws together just because they were to be harmonised with EU law. Second, the new working method required that a minority motion on NPE reports and an amendment to the draft bill could only be proposed by a minimum of three MPs-members of NPE in the first reading. (Jerzy Pilczyński, "Szybka ścieżka z wybojami", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2000.) In the second reading the minimum number increased to five whereas in other committees, individual MPs have the right to propose amendments. The new rule was deemed undemocratic especially by minority parties, as their representation in NPE was congruent with their overall representation in the Sejm. The situation ran the risk of heightening the feeling of those parties of being sidelined by larger parties on the issue of Poland's integration with the EU. Third, questions were raised about possible abuses of the 'fast track' system by the government as it could easily be used to serve for the ruling parties' preferences in which law to pass.

[41] "Komisja Prawa Europejskiego podsumowała swoje prace", *Europap*, 18 September 2001. The concerns expressed about NPE were overshadowed by this success in achieving the aim, i.e. accelerating harmonisation of Polish law. Political parties represented in NPE managed to reach a political consensus on cooperating for the aim of speeding up Polish integration with the EU and mostly refrained from using NPE as an arena to weaken each other. NPE was also successful in terms of showing the EU the Polish resolve to adopt flexible solutions and achieve an all-party consensus on European issues. Perhaps, what facilitated this consensus the most was that the main opposition party, Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* – SLD), had a high stake in cooperating, as it was the most likely victor of the upcoming elections in 2001.

[42] The term "Polonia" refers to emigrants from Poland or those of Polish origin settled outside of Poland. It, therefore, does not include most of the Polish communities East of Poland, who have not emigrated there in the recent past and who are considered local inhabitants. Especially, Poles in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania are considered ethnic minorities and not Polonia. See Ryszard Stemplowski, *Wprowadzenie do analizy polityki zagranicznej RP*, Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międznarodowych (PISM), 2006, pp.18-20.

[43] *Biuletyn Komisji Łączności z Polakami za Granicą*, No. 4709/III, 05 September 2001.

3.2.1.6 Economic Committee (*Komisja Gospodarki* - GOS)

GOS is included here as economic and trade relations with abroad are the most influential factors shaping foreign policy. International trade and bilateral economic exchange are two of many subject areas covered by GOS since 1997. Prior to that, during the First and Second Sejms there was a separate committee focused solely on foreign economic relations. Until June 1994 it was called the Committee on the Economic Relations with Abroad and Maritime Economy and after that it lost the tasks related to maritime economy. Finally its functions were taken over by GOS in 1997, parallel to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation being merged into the Ministry of Economy.

3.2.2 The Senate

The role of the Senate in foreign policy is much more limited than that of the Sejm. Its main task is to ratify laws passed by the Sejm. The Senate may either accept the referred law unchanged and send it on to the President, or reject it and send it back to the Sejm with a notification or proposed amendments. Like in the Sejm, there are special and standing committees in the Senate and their working mechanisms are similar to their counterparts in the Sejm. The committees debate the draft opinions of the Senate and vote on them and express their own opinion to the house. Alongside legislative work, the committees also deal with current issues of importance to the country and can express their views on them by means of resolutions. Just like their counterparts in the Sejm, they can invite specialists, civil servants and representatives of various organisations to their sessions.

Despite its low-key role in foreign policy issues, the Senate has distinguished itself in the area of Poland's relations with Polonia and Polish minorities in the East. The Senate adopted a resolution on 30 April 2002 which defined Poland's policy concerning Polonia and Polish minorities in the East.[44] The main aims were defined as ensuring that Poles' minority rights were upheld; supporting education in their mother tongue, promoting Polish culture, arts and sciences as well as economic activities undertaken by Poles; fostering activities of Polish language media and press; gaining support among Poles abroad for Polish national interests. The resolution pledged to carry out these aims in conformity with international law and national laws of the countries where people of Polish origin live.

The Senate has a budget to finance projects serving these aims. The Speaker of the Senate determines the budget line for Poles abroad and the Presidium decides how it

[44] "Uchwała Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 kwietnia 2002 r. w sprawie polityki Państwa Polskiego wobec Polonii i Polaków za granicą", http://www.senat.gov.pl/arch.htm (accessed 20 February 2006)

should be spent.[45] Senate has been allocating the funds for projects of NGOs, mainly *Wspólnota Polska* (the main recipient) and *Fundacja Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie* (which helps Poles in the ex-Soviet states).[46] These organisations, alongside other smaller NGOs, received 45,216,705 złoty in 2002.[47] The majority of the funds are allocated for Poles in Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, and they concern building and renovation of Polish schools, churches and community buildings, and assisting Polish language press and publications.

The Senate committees concerning foreign policy are Emigration and Poles Abroad, Foreign Affairs and European Integration and National Defence and Public Security.[48]

3.2.2.1 Emigration and Poles Abroad Committee (*Komisja Emigracji i Polaków za Granicą*)

The Committee examines draft laws and resolutions concerning Poland's policy towards Polonia and the Polish minorities in the East and assesses the allocation of funds for relevant projects. It also discusses the resources assigned for Polonia and Poles abroad in the annual state budget. Members of the Commission pay visits to Polish communities abroad.

3.2.2.2 Foreign Affairs and European Integration (*Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych i Integracji Europejskiej*)

This committee is the successor of the original standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Economic Relations. It was amalgamated with the special Committee on European Integration which operated under the auspices of the former in the Third Senate (1993-1997) and the special Committee on European Legislation formed in August 2000 during the Fourth Senate (1997-2001) which paralleled NPE.[49]

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[45] "Involvement of the Senate of the Third Republic of Poland in the life of Poles abroad", 1999, http://www.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/historia/noty/nota21a.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
[46] http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/ and http://www.wschod.org.pl/dzialanie.html
[47] "Zestawienie przyznanych dotacji sporządzone na podstawie uchwał Prezydium Senatu zlecających wykonanie zadań państwowych w zakresie opieki nad Polonią i Polakami za granicą w roku 2002." http://www.senat.gov.pl/k5/polonia/Res.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[48] The competence areas of committees are defined in the Senate Regulations. See Regulamin Senatu, "Uchwała Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 23 listopada 1990 r." http://www.senat.gov.pl/senatrp/ustawy/regulami/regulamin.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
[49] http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl/ngcj/ngcj2f.html (accessed on 16 December 2001).

3.2.2.3 National Defence and Public Security (*Komisja Obrony Narodowej i Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego*)

The committee functions in the area of national security and defence, defence industries, army and institutions of public security.

3.2.3 The government

Constitutionally the Council of Ministers conducts the foreign policy of Poland and it does so through its agencies responsible for preparation and execution of foreign policy. It also supervises Poland's negotiations with the EU and approves Poland's negotiating stance through the institutions of European integration subordinate to itself. MSZ is the key organ dealing with all aspects of making and application of foreign policy.

3.2.3.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych* - MSZ)

According to the Law of 04 September 1997, the main duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs are to maintain relations between Poland and other states or international organisations; to facilitate diplomatic and consular representation of Poland abroad; to initiate and formulate foreign policy to be adopted by the Council of Ministers, to carry out these policies by coordinating agencies subordinated to or supervised by him; and to cooperate with other state organs.[50] In addition to 103 embassies and permanent representations and 186 consular offices abroad, MSZ operates 20 Polish cultural institutes in European cities as well as Tel Aviv and New York. MSZ also has three research institutes under its sponsorship and supervision that provide academic analysis and expert opinion on international affairs and foreign policy. There were three such institutes at the time of writing:

Among them the Polish Institute of International Affairs (*Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych* - PISM) is the biggest, having inherited some of the resources of its namesake, which functioned from 1947 to 1993, only to be liquidated in 1993 by Minister Skubiszewski. The new PISM began functioning at the end of 1999 and is financed by the state budget (about 1.4 million USD in 2005).[51] Western Institute (*Instytut Zachodni*) has been in existence since 1945 and although it maintained its original focus on Polish-German relations, since 1989 it has also been working on issues of European integration

[50] "Ustawa z dnia 4 września 1997 r.o działach administracji rządowej", *Dziennik Ustaw* , 24 November 1997, No. 141, Pos. 943.
[51] "Sprawozdanie z wykonania budżetu państwa za okres od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2005 r.", http://bip.mf.gov.pl/index.php?dzial=337&wys=4&idp=28294 (accessed 06 November 2006)

and East-West relations.[52] Institute of Central Eastern Europe (*Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*) is, on the other hand, a creation of the post-communist era, responding to the increasing importance of Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours and position in Central Eastern Europe. It was established in 2001 in Lublin to undertake research and consulting activities regarding politics, history society and economy of the region and also regarding the development of Eastern borderlands of Poland.[53]

Ministers of Foreign Affairs were members of the President's Chancellery until the 1997 Constitution came into force. This was due to Wałęsa's personal interpretation of the Little Constitution during his presidency. This anomaly was the source of many political disputes within the state structure and was remedied by the 1997 Constitution according to which the Minister ceased to serve in the President's Chancellery and took his place in the Council of Ministers.

Organisational structure of the MSZ evolved continuously since 1989 and especially with the EU accession process in progress and relations with Poland's Eastern neighbours being cultivated, new departments were created and the tasks of existing departments modified. European Department (ED), created in 1990, were divided into two sections in 1994 which were reorganised into ED-East and ED-West, alongside a separate European Integration Department to oversee EU affairs and the Department of Security Policy to deal with NATO.[54] In 1998 ED-East and ED-West were once more merged under the European policy Department and in 2002 was renamed the European Department and dealt with Poland's relations with both the East and West Europe, alongside the European Union Department.[55] As Poland's membership in the NATO and the EU became a certainty and the importance of Poland's EP was gradually recognised, a separate Eastern Policy Department was finally created within the MSZ with a focus on Poland's relations with the whole of the ex-Soviet states.[56] Issues related to Polonia and Poles abroad were covered by the Consular Department and, like EP, the importance of the department and scope of its activities grew and by the end of 1990s the department itself was renamed Consular and Polonia Department.

As well as structural reorganisation, constant reform of MSZ included also personnel changes which proved often to be controversial. Keeping in mind the pendulum effect of

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[52] http://www.iz.poznan.pl/ (accessed 06 November 2006)
[53] "Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych z dnia 6 października 2001 r. w sprawie utworzenia jednostki badawczo-rozwojowej Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej", *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 20, pos. 1296, 17 October 2001.
[54] Krzysztof Szczepanik, *Dyplomacja Polski, 1918-2000. Struktury organizacyjne*, Warszawa: Askon, 2000, pp. 161-163.
[55] "Zarządzenie Nr 81Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 1 lipca 2002 r. w sprawie nadania statutu Ministerstwu Spraw Zagranicznych", *Monitor Polski*, 03 July 2002, No.28, pos. 456.
[56] "Zarządzenie Nr 136 Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 23 grudnia 2005 r. zmieniające zarządzenie w sprawie nadania statutu Ministerstwu Spraw Zagranicznych", *Monitor Polski*, 30 December 2005, No.84, pos. 1217.

Polish elections since 1993 with the power shifting to and fro between the post-Solidarity and post-communist parties, political appointments and dismissals at every term was commonplace and the spectre of decommunisation was prevalent. In January 1994 a subcommittee of SZA was established to look into the personnel issues at MSZ after 23 mostly senior officials of MSZ dismissed by Minister Skubiszewski in September 1993 (just before the elections that ended with victory for the post-communists) took the decision to court claiming that they were dismissed due to their communist party membership pre-1989.[57] Since 1989 almost three quarters of MSZ diplomats left their jobs or were dismissed and almost 90% of ambassadors and consul generals serving abroad were replaced.[58] The work of the subcommission was quite controversial as statements of anonymous informers to the subcommission accusing Skubiszewski administration of pursuing an aggressive political cleansing of the cadres were leaked to the media. Besides, the subcommission was bitterly opposed by post-Solidarity deputies, the new Minister Olechowski (nominated by President Wałęsa) and Wałęsa himself.

Ambassadorial nominations also turned into political struggles from time to time between post-Solidarity and post-communists. For instance in October 1996 post-Solidarity members of the SZA attempted unsuccessfully to block the nomination and appointment of Ewa Spychalska, head of the post-communist trade union, the All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (*Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych* – OPZZ). Spychalska had to resign in February 1998 under pressure as her status caused a conflict between Minister Geremek and President Kwaśniewski, and she was harshly criticised by the members of AWS and UW at SZA for her close relations with the Lukashenko administration.[59] In September 2000 President Kwaśniewski in turn blocked the nominations of Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, two figures close to the ruling post-Solidarity AWS and UW, for key EP ambassadorial posts in Moscow and Vilnius.[60]

Allegations of political favouritism had not ceased since 1994. Despite MSZ claiming to have achieved a meritorial system for appointment of ambassadors and high level officials, this was commonly disputed.[61] An MSZ official writing anonymously to *Rzeczpospolita* in 2004 argued that most ambassadorial appointments approved by Minister Cimoszewicz after 2001 were diplomats trained by the Communist Party Foreign Service School or its

[57] Danuta Frey, "Zaskarżone MSZ", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 January 1994. It was also claimed that the commission was created by Longin Pastusiak's, an SLD MP and a long time worker of PISM, to take "revenge" on the liquidation of PISM by Skubiszewski. Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort, "Targi o dyplomację", *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 January 1994.
[58] Sanford, "Parliamentary Control", p. 785 and Kazimierz Groblewski and Marcin Dominik Zdort, "Targi o dyplomację", *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 January 1994.
[59] *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 2, 68/III, 05 December 1997. "Polish Ambassador to Belarus resigns", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 16 February 1998.
[60] Katarzyna Montgomery, "Kulisy nominacji", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 09 September 2000.
[61] Bogusław M. Majewski, "Ambitni, zdecydowani i pełni pomysłów", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 May 2004.

Moscow counterpart and most were connected to pre-1989 intelligence services.[62] It is highly likely that political appointments and decommunisation issues will burden not only the MSZ but also the whole political system for the foreseeable future.

3.2.3.2 Ministry of Defence (*Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej* – MON)

The Law of 14 December 1995 sets out MON's main responsibilities as shaping the concept of national defence and managing activities of the armed forces in times of peace and national military service.[63] According to Article 143 of the Constitution the President, as the supreme commander of armed forces, exercises his command through the Minister of Defence. MON also plans the army's participation in international peacekeeping or humanitarian missions and military exercises carried out jointly with foreign armies or within international organisations.

Poland's quest to join NATO brought about reforms which increased the competence and importance of MON. The main challenge was the subordination of the military to civilian control. This was achieved by efforts to depoliticise the military, appointment of a civilian Minister and implementation of parliamentary control over the armed forces.[64] With the Law of 14 December 1995 General Staff was fully subordinated to MON and Article 26 of the 1997 Constitution guaranteed the political neutrality of armed forces and their subjection to civilian and democratic control.

MON also contributed experts to the Negotiating Team created in 1997 to carry out Poland's accession negotiations with NATO. Other members of the team came from MSZ, Ministry of Finance (*Ministerstwo Finansów*), National Security Bureau (*Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* - BBN) and Office of State Protection (*Urząd Ochrony Państwa* - UOP).[65]

3.2.3.3 Ministry of Economy (*Ministerstwo Gospodarki* - MG)

As mentioned above MG took over the foreign economic relations agenda in 1997. MG plays an active part in the execution of EP. Following the Russian financial crisis of 1998 and plummeting trade with Poland's eastern neighbours, MG introduced a programme in 2000 offering state guaranteed export credit insurance to Polish businessmen trading with

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[62] "Widmo PRL krąży po MSZ", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 May 2004.
[63] "Ustawa z dnia 14 grudnia 1995 r. o urzędzie Ministra Obrony Narodowej", *Dziennik Ustaw*, 30 January 1996, No. 10, Pos. 56.
[64] *Report on Poland's Integration with NATO*, (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland), Warsaw: Adam Marszałek, 1998. http://www.wp.mil.pl/Poland-NATO.html (accessed 19 March 2000)
[65] Bogusław Świetlicki, "Integracja Polski z NATO: Rozwój współpracy z Sojuszem w 1997 i 1998 roku", December 1998. (www.msz.gov.pl, accessed on 11 April 2003).

Russia. In 2003 MG prepared the "Programme for regaining the Eastern markets" adopted by the Council of Ministers. MG is also active in shaping energy policy, a crucially strategic sector, as Poland's energy dependence on Russia and gas and oil pipeline politics concerning Belarus and Ukraine are dominant factors in shaping EP. These will be covered in detail in the oncoming chapters.

A very important area studies institute researching mainly politics and society in Central East Europe, Balkans, ex-Soviet states and Central Asia is curiously situated under the supervision of MG. Centre for Eastern Studies (*Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich* – OSW) was established in 1990 and is financed by the state budget, having received about 2.1 million USD, a third more than what PISM had received in 2005.[66] OSW publications analyse events in and policies of the countries in the region mentioned and do not comment on Polish foreign policy. However, many of its analysts, such as Tadeusz Olszański, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz and Jacek Cichocki, were active participants in the academic and journalistic debates surrounding Poland's EP. This will be examined in Chapter Four.

3.2.3.4 Intelligence Agency (*Agencja Wywiadu* - AW) and Internal Security Agency (*Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* – ABW)

AW was created in June 2002 as a result of its predecessor State Protection Office (*Urząd Ochrony Państwa* - UOP) being divided into foreign (AW) and internal intelligence (ABW).[67] ABW's task is to protect the internal security and constitutional order of the state but it also has an international dimension as it deals with terrorism, drugs trade, economic crime and runs counterintelligence activities in the territory of Poland. AW, on the other hand, deals with external threats and it is authorised to operate abroad. ABW and AW are directly answerable to the PM. Both agencies also cooperate with the Military Information Service (*Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne* – WSI) which is subordinated to MON. An organ of the Council of Ministers, Special Services Affairs Commission (*Kolegium do Spraw Służb Specjalnych*) and the Special Services Committee (*Komisja do Spraw Służb Specjalnych*) at Sejm control the operations of these three agencies.

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[66] "Sprawozdanie z wykonania budżetu państwa za okres od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2005 r.", http://bip.mf.gov.pl/dokument.php?const=6&id=34372&dzial=337 (accessed 11 March 2007)
[67] "Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu", *Dziennik Ustaw*, 14 June 2002, No. 74, pos. 676.

3.2.3.5 Government bodies dealing with European integration

Since Poland applied for EU membership in 1991, structures supporting Poland's European bid were gradually formed and slowly metamorphosed into a coherent network. In January 1991 the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance was established within the Office of the Council of Ministers (the predecessor of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister) to run Poland's European policies. It functioned until October 1996 when Committee of European Integration (*Komitet Integracji Europejskiej* – KIE), which submitted to the Council of Ministers position papers on negotiating chapters, draft legal acts and progress reports on economic and legal integration, replaced it. [68]

When KIE was established, concerns had been raised especially by Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności* - UW) about the possible conflict of competence between this new organ and offices dealing with EU affairs in ministries (especially in MSZ).[69] Such a conflict did, indeed, materialise, and a political struggle to dominate Poland's European policy was at the core of the matter. The rift between the Solidarity Election Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* – AWS) and UW was evident, as AWS feared that if UKIE and KIE were subordinated to MSZ, UW, already in control of MSZ, would completely capture the sphere of European integration. After the PHARE scandal, calls were made to transfer the inspection and control of foreign assistance allocation to the Ministry of Finance. This sparked yet another protest from AWS as that ministry was also UW's turf. However, under the pressure from its UW wing and due to the deadlock caused by lack of coordination of institutions of European integration, the government decided to reappoint the Prime Minister to the Chair of KIE and the Secretary of State at MSZ (Andrzej Ananicz) took on the political coordination of integration and all elements thereof relating to foreign policy.[70] The government also issued a decree on 16 June 1998 whereby the Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Finance would become the Plenipotentiary for Financial Assistance from the EU administering and inspecting EU funds. The shaping of Polish EU institutions was continued in 1998 with the creation of the post of Government Plenipotentiary for Polish Accession Negotiations to the EU, i.e. the Chief Negotiator (*Główny Negocjator*) as well as the Negotiation Team for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the EU (*Zespół Negocjacyjny*).[71] The Inter-Ministerial Team (*Zespoł Międzyresortowy do Spraw*

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[68] "Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996 r. o Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej", *Dziennik Ustaw*, 30 August 1996, No. 106, Pos. 494. Agnieszka Biegaj (Ed.), *Accession Negotiations. Poland on the Road to the European Union*, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the European Union, Chancellery of the Prime Minister Republic of Poland, October 2000, p.20.
[69] *Rzeczpospolita*, 9 June 1998.
[70] "Wielowładza integracyjna", *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 July 1998.
[71] "Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 24 marca 1998 r. w sprawie ustanowienia Pełnomocnika Rządu do Spraw Negocjacji o Członkostwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej.", *Dziennik Ustaw*, 26 March 1998, No. 39, Pos. 225. "Zarządzenie Nr 19 Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. w sprawie Zespołu Negocjacyjnego w Sprawie Negocjacji o Członkostwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej"

Przygotowania Negocjacji Akcesyjnych z UE) to prepare draft negotiation positions on each of 31 negotiating chapters was also established by an ordinance on 16 July 1998 as an advisory organ to the PM.[72] Poland's former EU Ambassador and the Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Jan Kułakowski, was appointed in 1998 to the position and was succeeded by Jan Truszczyński in 2001.

Following the elections in 2001 a new "European Secretariat" was created to embrace UKIE and the Department of European Integration at MSZ and was headed by the new Secretary of State at MSZ, Danuta Hübner.[73] In another move to avoid past mistakes and as a gesture to the opposition, the government offered three extra-governmental seats at KIE to figures associated with the former government, Tadeusz Mazowiecki of UW, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (the former head of UKIE) and Jan Kułakowski (the former Chief Negotiator).[74] A European Committee of the Council of Ministers (*Komitet Europejski Rady Ministrów* - KERM) was also established in March 2004 in order to form the official position of the Polish government on for EU matters and resolve interministerial conflicts.

3.2.4 The President

Until 1997 the President enjoyed wide ranging authority in foreign policy thanks to a flexible interpretation by Lech Wałęsa of the vaguely worded Little Constitution. With the new constitution the President lost the authority to appoint ministers of foreign affairs, defence and internal affairs and his appointment of Chief of Staff of armed forces (and ambassadors) needed the PM's countersignature, but he still kept an important role in foreign affairs as the head of state. In addition to directly influencing foreign policy through his powers of representing the state abroad, ratifying (and if necessary referring to the Constitutional Court) international agreements and declaring state of emergency or war, he also exerts indirectly effect on foreign policy by official acts or "prerogatives", for which he does not have to seek the PM's countersignature.[75] These are listed in Article 144(3) of the Constitution and are powers such as proclaiming referendum, addressing the Sejm, Senate of the National Assembly, granting and withholding Polish citizenship to foreigners and ordering appointments to important state organs like Council for Monetary Policy, National Security Council and National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television.

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http://www1.ukie.gov.pl/test/WWW/dok.nsf/0/FB6FB87E4E76BEA8C1256E83005F228E?Open&RestrictToCategory= (accessed 06 November 2006).

[72] "Zarządzenie Nr 53 Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 16 lipca 1998 r. w sprawie Międzyresortowego Zespołu do Spraw Przygotowania Negocjacji Akcesyjnych z Unią Europejską", http://www1.ukie.gov.pl/test/WWW/dok.nsf/0/FB6FB87E4E76 BEA8C1256E83005F228E?Open&RestrictToCategory= (accessed 06 November 2006).

[73] "UKIE włączyć w struktury MSZ", *Europap*, 15 October 2001 and "Sprawy europejskie w jednej ręce", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 November 2001 and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 4 February 2002.

[74] "Dwie osoby spoza rządu będą członkami KIE", *Europap*, 08 November 2001. Mazowiecki declined the offer whereas Saryusz-Wolski and Kułakowski accepted it.

[75] Ryszard Stemplowski, *Kształtowanie polityki zagranicznej w Polsce. Wstęp do analizy*, Warszawa: PISM, 2004, pp. 101-103.

The President's influence stems not only from the powers conferred upon him by law but also from his popular standing due to electoral support as well as mass media exposure and his ability to utilise his domestic contacts and foreign connections through visits and meetings.[76] The President retained also his position in the process of Poland's integration with the EU. As the 1997 National Strategy for Integration put it[77],

> The carrying out of tasks by the organs of the Government will take place with the consent and co-operation of the President of the Polish Republic and his Office. The constitutional role of the President in the field of foreign policy allows him, as Head of State, to become actively involved in promoting Poland's interests in the states of the EU, and in implementing and monitoring the process of attaining full membership of the EU.

The President's influence is also increased at times when the political party or parties in government do not have a clear majority in the Sejm which de facto limits the PM's power and strengthens the President's role.[78] By the same token, the President's relative power increases when there is a government from the same political orientation as his and decreases when otherwise. However, Kwaśniewski managed not only to coexist but also to cooperate with the AWS-UW dominated parliament and government from 1997 to 2001 on foreign policy issues and he claimed credit for successes like Poland's entry into NATO in 1999 and in the EU in 2004. No wonder Kwaśniewski owed his popularity at home and abroad to his non-partisan and fairly objective (and utilitarian) attitude in implementing foreign policies. And it seemed true that after the election victory of Kwaśniewski's old party SLD in 2001, he had an even stronger influence on foreign policy. This was also obvious in terms of appointments: Key positions in the reorganised European integration institutions were handed to people who were previously working for the President at his Chancellery. The Secretary of State who heads the whole structure, Hübner, was the Head of the Chancellery from 1997 to 2000. The Chief Negotiator, Truszczyński, was the Undersecretary of State, advising the President on European affairs. Likewise, Paweł Świeboda, the new head of Department of European Integration at MSZ, was the head of the Office of European Integration.[79] Also, the ambassador to EU as of spring 2002, Marek Grela, was a close associate of Kwaśniewski.

Assisting the President is his Chancellery consisting of secretaries of state, each responsible for a different subject such as security, foreign relations and culture. Advisers

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[76] George Sanford, *Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989*, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p. 139.
[77] "National Strategy for Integration", The Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, 1997, http://www2.ukie.gov.pl/dokumenty/Nsien.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
[78] Sanford, *Democratic Government*, p. 139 and Stemplowski, *Kształtowanie polityki zagranicznej*, p.96.
[79] It was alleged in the conservative daily *Życie* that SLD was dependent on Kwaśniewski to run European integration policies and dominate the field. Arkadiusz Dawidowski, "Sojusz wprowadza Polskę do Unii", *Życie*, 29 October 2001.

and press and public relations officers also serve at the Chancellery. An important office under the President's administration is the National Security Bureau (*Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* – BBN) which is the secretariat of the National Security Council (*Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* – RBN), an advisory body to the President on issues of internal and external security. Within RBN there are three presidential consultative committees, Poland-Lithuania, Poland-Romania and Poland-Ukraine.

Poland-Ukraine Committee was established in 1993 on the basis of the Polish-Ukrainian Good Neighbourliness Treaty of May 1992 in order to provide a continuous forum for the Presidents of both countries and their representatives to discuss issues such as cooperation in international organisations, common security initiatives (such as the Polish-Ukrainian battalion), cultural and economic exchange and problems of historical heritage. The Committee had produced many important agreements and declarations such as the 1996 agreement emphasising the "strategic partnership" between the two countries or the February 2003 declaration calling for opening of the Eaglets' cemetery in Lwów.[80]

As mentioned above, the President was a part of the concerted and highly organised and institutionalised effort of Poland's EU accession. However, the office of the President and especially Kwaśniewski was much more visible in relations with the Eastern neighbours. Especially through presidential contacts Kwaśniewski was highly active in building Poland's relations with Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Kwaśniewski boasted in 2000 about having met the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma more than 40 times (in 5 years).[81] He managed to sustain dialogue and cooperation with the Ukrainian President and upheld Poland's commitment to building a "strategic partnership" despite the pressure by some post-Solidarity politicians to boycott Kuchma's domestic political decisions, deemed undemocratic also by many Western governments. Kwaśniewski was also instrumental in toning down much of anti-Russian rhetoric pervasive among conservative post-Solidarity and right wing circles and approached relations with Russia from a pragmatic point of view.[82] He was also pragmatic in his approach to Belarus, stressing the need for dialogue when appropriate and mobilising protest against Lukashenko's policies when Poland's alliance with the West necessitated it. These will be covered in detail in the oncoming chapters.

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[80] http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?strona=pl_komitet_archiwum#1 (accessed 20 July 2006)
[81] Aleksander Kwaśniewski, *Dom wszystkich Polska*, Warszawa: Perspektywy Press, 2000, p. 201.
[82] Kwaśniewski, like most post-communist politicians, was accused of being subservient to Russian interests many times. The last time he faced this accusation in a serious manner was during the Orlen commission and even though the accusations were not substantiated, the inquiry process cost him his popularity and his SLD colleagues, the election. See the section on the Orlen scandal in Chapter Five.

3.3 CONCLUSION

Since 1989 Poland's legislative, executive and judicial institutions and the legal framework supporting them have undergone extensive reform and reorganisation and a degree of stability has been reached. For purposes of foreign policy the most important milestone was the 1997 Constitution which brought an end to the power struggles caused by the ambiguities of the Little Constitution. Although the institutions that formulate and supervise foreign policy have become organisationally stable, they are still prone to the effects of party political struggles between the post-Solidarity and post-communists. As shown above, personnel issues have arisen every time after the government was changed. It also became clear that not only the legal framework but also the personal approach of the President matters in maintaining a balanced working relation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential offices dealing with foreign policy. Despite the remarkable consensus between different political parties on the main objectives of Poland's foreign policy, the formulation and application of specific policies depended highly on the smooth working of the institutions presented in this chapter and the power balance between them. That is why reference to institutions and consideration of their remit is necessary to assess the making and execution of foreign policy.

Chapter Four

Polish Eastern Policy: Origins and Debates

The need for a comprehensive Eastern Policy (EP) was pronounced by Polish policy makers from the beginning of the Third Republic. However, the presence of the Soviet Union until late 1991 and the uncertainties surrounding the nascent republics in Central and Eastern Europe made it difficult for foreign policy makers to establish at the outset any medium and long-term objectives concerning the East. Reorientation of Poland towards the West took priority due not only to ideological reasons but also to pressing security needs. While the Western orientation of Poland was swiftly and firmly consolidated, EP developed only gradually. Commentators on foreign policy criticised Polish EP for lacking a solid concept, a doctrine, behind it and dealing with problems arising in the East on an ad hoc basis.

Transition from PRL (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa* – Polish People's Republic) to the Third Republic was a systemic change, involving a total overhaul of the state and its structures. The Second Polish Republic's experience of the interwar period undoubtedly provided the tradition of independent statehood which the Third Republic could hark back to for the legitimacy of its institutions. The reestablishment of the Senate, which was abolished by the Communist regime, demonstrates this. In terms of foreign policy, continuing a modern historical tradition was trickier. Naturally, there could not be many continuities in terms of foreign policy from PRL to the Third Republic so the Second Republic was also the obvious source to search for linkages. However, as a result of substantial systemic change in the international order, consequent variation in the challenges posed and the controversial results of Polish EP during the interwar period, only the doctrines formed during first half of the 20th century were referred to rather than concrete policies and institutions of the interwar period.

Despite the fact that PRL had no independent EP to speak of, it would be wrong to assume that EP of the Third Republic materialised out of a 43-year void. During this time, Polish émigré publications in the West were debating not only how a future independent Polish state should be structured but also what foreign policy such a state should pursue. They provided a forum for discussing and reinterpreting the EP doctrines of the pre-war period. Unlike the consensus on democratic nature and unconditional sovereignty of that future Polish state, EP was an issue much more open to debate and disagreement. The debate was carried on to Poland via the samizdat publications of the budding anti-communist opposition in the country in the 1970s.

This chapter will present the evolution of EP in Polish political thought from the beginning of the 20th century by highlighting the political, academic and journalistic debates on the subject. It is true that Polish thought about the East has formed over many centuries. However, as the focus of the thesis is on the post-1989 period, the chapter will cover doctrines that were borne out of the Piłsudskiite and Dmowskiite traditions and EP programmes formulated by intellectuals in emigration during the communist period. These two approaches created the basic terms of reference for future EP debates and established a continuity in the modern Polish thought on EP, where abrupt historical changes prevented the formation of a Polish EP as a state tradition.

Debates after the establishment of the Third Republic will be presented in two parts. The first part will deal with the 1994-95 period when EP came to be discussed as a concept in its own right and not merely one of the many dimensions of foreign policy, and was intensely debated due to political developments in Poland and abroad. The second part will highlight a specific debate on EP sparked by a newspaper article in 2000 and which developed into a whole scale appraisal of post-1989 EP. .

4.1 THE ORIGINS OF POLISH EASTERN POLICY

4.1.1 Early 20th Century: Piłsudski versus Dmowski

The roots of contemporary Polish political thought on the Eastern question are the doctrines of the two main political movements: National Democrats (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*) led by Roman Dmowski and the movement led by Józef Piłsudski, the leader of the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) and the interwar *Sanacja*. Piłsudski and Dmowski's views on the Eastern question were diametrically opposed.

Dmowski believed that Germany posed the greatest danger for Poland and saw Russia as a potential ally against Germany. He thought that Germans were more efficient at assimilating Poles whereas Polish national identity had a chance to survive under the Russians. Before the First World War Dmowski's camp advocated autonomy for Poland under Russian rule and not independence.[1] They believed that Russia would never let Poland be independent and that alliance with Russia was too crucial to give up for the sake of an independent state. However, as the independence of Poland became a reality, Dmowski argued for a unitary Polish state of ethnic Poles and polonised Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. He thought that these ethnic groups could be polonised by the methods of the pre-1772 Polish Commonwealth where Polish culture was successfully propagated in the East by the gentry (*szlachta*). He did not see any cultural affinity

[1] Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 398.

between Poles and their Eastern neighbours. He did not believe in their ability to establish their own national states and found such a prospect dangerous for Poland.[2] That was another reason why he believed in the virtues of Polish-Russian cooperation.

Piłsudski, on the other hand, was a federalist who had dreamt of uniting the territories of the Polish Commonwealth under Polish leadership. He toyed with the idea of a federation of free nations from the Baltic to the Black Sea, so called *Międzymorze*. He was a supporter of the Prometheist idea, which aspired to free nations and countries under Russian (and later Soviet) sovereignty, and supported national irredentist movements in order to weaken the Russian Empire.[3] Unlike Dmowski, he believed that Russia was the most dangerous enemy of Poland, and that Germany was a natural ally against Russia. Piłsudski envisaged Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian states which would be a buffer against the Russian danger but at the same time would be politically and economically reliant on and culturally connected with Poland.

Piłsudski and his party assumed the leadership of independent Poland after the war. However, Piłsudski's notion of a Central East European federation did not materialise. Neither could the Second Polish Republic become the sponsor of independence for Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians. During the Polish-Soviet War it became clear that these nations were not necessarily interested in any federative arrangement with Poles. The first blow to the federalist idea was dealt when the forces of Simon Petlura's Polish-sponsored independent Ukrainian state failed to recruit soldiers and most Ukrainians showed no interest in fighting the Red Army.[4] Besides, Polish support for Petlura's state was dependent on the condition that Ukraine would give up its claim to Eastern Galicja (or Western Ukraine) and recognise Polish rule over these Ukrainian inhabited lands. Wary of Polish colonialism, most Ukrainians were not interested in a potential puppet state subservient to Poland. Piłsudski's dream of a federation came to an end when Poland signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921, retaining one third of Ukraine and Belarus and accepting the sovietisation of the remaining halves. Like the Ukrainians, Lithuanians were unwilling to join any Polish-led federation. They demonstrated this by fighting Polish forces on the side of the Red Army during the Polish-Soviet War. Poland took back Wilno region by force in October 1920 and the Lithuanians had little reason to trust Poland after they attained statehood which lasted until the Second World War.[5]

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[2] Eugeniusz Mironowicz, "Mniejszości narodowe w polskiej myśli politycznej przed II wojną światową", *Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne*, 1999, No. 12. http://www.kamunikat.net.iig.pl/www/czasopisy/bzh/12/12art_miranovicz.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

[3] For an assessment of Piłsudski's Prometheism see Włodzimierz Bączkowski, *O wschodnich problemach Polski* (texts selected by Jacek Kloczkowski and Paweł Kowal), Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000, pp. 135-156.

[4] In April 1920 Poland signed an agreement with Ukrainians to recognise the newly established Ukrainian Peoples' Republic led by Simon Petlura who marched with his forces to Kiev.

[5] Konefał states anther reason why the federalist idea failed was the opposition of Western powers to the idea as their economic interests in the area would be better served if the states in question were independent. Jan

The interwar years further exposed the difficulty of implementing the romantic Piłsudskiite notion of peaceful coexistence of Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians within a Commonwealth-like state. Ethnic tensions and irredentism posed serious problems and the National Democrats' policies of polonising ethnic minorities aggravated the situation. Neither the Russians nor the Germans became allies to Poland in the end and Poland was invaded by both of these powers when the war broke out.

4.1.2 Post Second World War period: Émigré intellectuals and *Kultura*

After the war, the intellectual debate about EP was carried on in emigration. Among the émigré publications the journal, *Kultura*, undertook the most intense intellectual effort to propose an EP concept.[6] *Kultura* was the journal of *Instytut Literacki* which was established by Jerzy Giedroyc in Rome in 1946. The institute moved to Paris in 1947. In the interwar period Giedroyc was active in publishing in Poland while he was working at the Ministries of Agriculture and afterwards Industry and Trade. His interest in the lands and peoples east of Poland was reflected in the publications he edited, like the quarterly *Wschód* or *Bunt Młodych* (later *Polityka*). The journals published articles proposing autonomy for Eastern Galicja and criticising the government for its treatment of the Ukrainian minority.[7] He was a supporter of Piłsudskiite federalism and of the Prometheist movement.[8] He believed that the Soviet Union would disintegrate one day and that an independent Ukraine would play an important role for Poland.[9] He also advocated the importance of the nations living in Międzymorze in shaping the future of the European continent. During the interwar years he made the acquaintance of many likeminded Polish, Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals with whom he would collaborate under *Kultura* after the war.

Kultura began elaborating its line on EP in early 1950s and discussion on these issues among émigré intellectuals followed. An article by Józef Łobodowski published in 1952 reflected on the debate which was started after he wrote an article in *Kultura* about the importance of Ukrainian independence for Poland.[10] Łobodowski supported the idea of an independent Ukraine as a neutralising force against the Russian danger and a weakening

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Konefał, "Koncepcja federalistyczna Józefa Piłsudskiego" in Lech Maliszewski (Ed.), *Żar niepodległości. Międzynarodowe aspekty życia i działalności Józefa Piłsudskiego*, Lublin: Norbertinum, 2004, p. 63.

[6] For a detailed analysis of *Kultura*'s coverage of and activities related with Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia see Iwona Hofman, *Ukraina, Litwa, Białoruś w publicystyce paryskiej "Kultury"*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Forum Naukowe, 2003.

[7] Marek Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukraiński w Działalności Jerzego Giedroycia", *Przegląd Zachodni*, Vol. 306, 2003, No.1, pp. 128-129.

[8] Andrzej Stanisław Kowalczyk, *Giedroyc i "Kultura"*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie 1999, pp. 30-31.

[9] Kowalczyk, *Giedroyc i "Kultura"*, p.31.

[10] Józef Łobodowski, "Przeciw upiorom przeszłości", *Kultura*, 1952, No. 2-3, pp. 14-66.

factor in a possible future Berlin-Moscow alliance. He also tried to deconstruct the myth of Poles and Ukrainians being each other's enemies and the recent history written under the influence of propaganda. His critics among the Polish émigré intellectuals argued that an independent Ukraine would be the death knell for Poland as it might cooperate with Germans to destroy Poland, or Polish support for Ukraine might provoke Russia against Poland. Others thought that Ukraine could not survive without Russian control for more than a few months. On the other hand, Ukrainian émigrés were still cautious about any initiatives by Poles as anti-Polish sentiment was fresh due to the wartime atrocities in Galicja and the deportation of Ukrainians under *Akcja Wisła* (Action Vistula).[11]

Polish émigrés in the West were not unlike the Ukrainians in terms of having strong sentiments connected with the events of the Second World War and the interwar period. As the majority of émigrés in the West were originally from the Eastern borderlands of Poland (*Kresy*), the issues of territorial losses of Poland in the East as well as the domination of Soviet controlled regimes over these lands struck a deeper chord with them.[12] The Polish government in exile, formed in London during the war, based its political programme on the revival of the Polish Second Republic. Besides the withdrawal of Soviet forces and holding free elections, that meant the annulment of the Yalta system and the reinstatement of interwar borders.[13] However, the government in exile also argued for keeping the so-called recovered lands (*ziemie odzyskane*), the German territories annexed to Poland after the war, arguing that they were historically Polish.[14]

The floodgates of émigré sentiment were let open when *Kultura* published a letter sent by Józef Majewski, a priest from South Africa.[15] Quoting Churchill's words, "Poles have every virtue, except political sense", Majewski criticised the claim of Poles in the West to the territories east of Poland as well as the recovered lands and accused Poles of looking at current realities through a 19th century perspective. He reminded that Poles actually went to the Kresy as colonisers themselves. He said that Ukrainians and Lithuanians had the right to claim Lwów and Wilno as much as Poles had the right to claim Gdańsk and Wrocław. He added that Poland's Eastern neighbours would trust Poland and cooperate

[11] Akcja Wisła was an operation to resettle the Ukrainian population from Galicja and South-eastern Poland. The Polish government wanted to root out the local support given to the Ukrainian Insurrection Army, UPA. Ukrainians claim that the real aim was ethnic cleansing. This subject is covered in Chapter Six.
[12] Grażyna Pomian (Ed.), *Wizja polski na łamach kultury 1947-1976*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, 1999, p. 174.
[13] *Rafał Habielski, Polski Londyn*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie 1999, pp. 89-90.
[14] Most of the émigré circles connected with the Polish government in exile and those of National Democrat predisposition continued to hold a similar stance until the end of PRL in 1989.There were periods when the London émigré government took steps to cooperate with Ukrainian émigrés, such as in 1979 when the "president in exile" Edward Raczyński signed a Polish-Ukrainian declaration with the members of the émigré Ukrainian National Assembly. He was accused of selling out to the Ukrainians by nationalist circles. Even after the fall of PRL, the ex-government in exile in London harshly criticised the new government in Poland for abandoning territorial claims in the East. Hofman, *Ukraina, Litwa, Białoruś*, pp. 19-23 and p. 93.
[15] "Listy do Redakcji", *Kultura*, 1952, No.11, pp. 157-158.

with it only if Poland decided to rebuild itself within its current borders and give up any territorial aspirations in the East.

After the publication of Majewski's words, *Kultura* was flooded by protest letters and cancellations of subscription.[16] Giedroyc responded to the letters by an editor's note, reiterating the stance of *Kultura* on Eastern territories:[17] Ukraine and Belarus had the right to an independent statehood within the future Europe as much as the states which were independent before the war. Reinstating the pre-war border arrangements was impossible and undesirable. Ukrainian independence was a priority for Poland in the face of current and historical Russian imperialism. Giedroyc also repeated that Łobodowski's article on Ukraine represented the policy line of *Kultura*'s editorial team.

Despite the barrage of criticism, *Kultura* consolidated its stance on EP and gained new readers, especially among the more pragmatic Polish and Ukrainian émigrés, who appreciated the realistic approach to EP.[18] *Kultura* had made active gestures towards the nations east of Poland. In 1958 Giedroyc protested the French TV for showing a documentary which depicted Simon Petlura as a pogrom perpetrator. From then on a delegation from *Kultura* held commemorations annually at Petlura's grave in Paris.[19] In 1976 a Ukrainian-Polish friendship association was established under the auspices of *Kultura* and this body handed an award annually to émigrés from both communities for their contributions to improving Polish-Ukrainian relations.[20]

In 1977, upon *Kultura*'s initiative, a declaration about Ukraine was signed by Polish, Russian, Hungarian and Czech intellectuals. The declaration appealed to all opposition inside or outside Soviet Union to support Ukrainian independence and criticised the current sovietisation and russification of Ukraine.[21] Ukrainian émigré intellectuals responded positively by publishing a declaration of solidarity in Ukrainian in the Russian émigré journal, *Kontinient*, and stated that they were ready to leave history behind and cooperate with neighbours in an atmosphere of trust and friendliness.[22] The *Kultura* team initiated yet another declaration in 1979: A Russian-Ukrainian declaration drawing on the initial *Kultura* declaration on Ukraine, voicing support for decommunisation and liberation of nations and appealing for the formation of a united front of nations in the Soviet Union at whose core would be Russian and Ukrainian cooperation.[23]

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[16] Kowalczyk, *Giedroyc i "Kultura"*, p. 150.
[17] "Nota Redakcji- Nieporozumienie czy tani patriotyzm?", *Kultura*, 1953, No. 1, pp. 83-87.
[18] Kowalczyk, *Giedroyc i "Kultura"*, p. 150.
[19] Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukraiński", p. 136.
[20] Bogusław Bakuła, "Polska i Ukraina w działalności kultury", *Eurazja*, 1995, No.1, p. 130.
[21] "Deklaracja w sprawie ukraińskiej", *Kultura*, 1980, No. 11, pp. 66-67.
[22] "Deklaracja solidarności", *Kontinient*, No. 11, pp.401-402 quoted in Bakuła, "Polska i Ukraina", p. 127.
[23] "Oświadczenie rosyjsko-ukraińskiej", *Kultura*, 1980, No. 11, pp. 59-61 and Figura, "Dialog Polsko-Ukraiński", p. 137.

Kultura's approach to EP was criticised especially by émigré journals like *Wiadomości*, *Myśl Polska* and *Życie*, published in London.[24] Even though some London journals and authors followed the Piłsudski line and others the National Democrat line, they were in agreement about restoring Poland to its pre-1939 borders. London-based *Kultura* writer Juliusz Mieroszewski, the most prominent contributor on EP, accused the London émigrés of "mummifying" both Piłsudski and Dmowski, failing to interpret their doctrines in the light of the political and territorial changes that had taken place since 1939.[25] Being a neo-Piłsudskiite, however, Mieroszewski found the arguments of the National Democratic camp most disagreeable.

Besides *Kultura*, Instytut Literacki published many books written by Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian and Russian writers and some of these works were smuggled to the Soviet Union, just as *Kultura* and the Institute's Polish books were regularly taken to Poland. These activities had symbolic value than anything else, bearing in mind the impossibility of having any impact on actual policies of the Soviet Bloc. However, most of the émigré intellectuals believed that nations dominated by the Soviet Union would sooner or later attain independent statehood. That is why they kept up the intellectual exercise of preparing the conceptual background for future policies.

Kultura's concept of EP was developed by Giedroyc and elucidated by the writings of Mieroszewski.[26] *Kultura*'s EP was about establishing the conceptual framework on which a future independent Polish state would base its foreign policy actions. Mieroszewski's writings were criticised in émigré circles for being too presumptuous about the course history would follow.[27] His EP concept was deemed futile, as neither the émigrés nor PRL would have any power in the foreseeable future to implement the proposals. Mieroszewski argued that Poles should have a unified and strong EP ready to be implemented when Poland became independent. Failing to be ready for that historic moment would be, in his opinion, fatal. The proposed EP would set the grounds for normalisation of Poland's relations with its neighbours and securing Poland a future.

The main lines of *Kultura*'s EP concept can be set out in relation to four main issues:

1. The Soviet Union: Mieroszewski considered any attempts to engage in dialogue with the Soviet government as disrespect for national liberation movements in the

[24] On *Wiadomości* see Rafał Habielski, *Niezłomni Nieprzejednani. Emigracyjne "Wiadomości" i ich krąg 1940-1981*, Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1991.
[25] Juliusz Mieroszewski, *Materiały do refleksji i zadumy*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1976, p. 116.
[26] The following are some of the articles published in *Kultura* by Mieroszewski for that set out the EP concept: Juliusz Mieroszewski, "O międzynarodową brygadą europejską", 1951, No. 11, pp. 75-82, "Listy z Wyspy: Prywatne inycjatywy polityczne", 1952, No. 10, pp. 99-104, "Rosyjski Commonwealth", 1961, No. 6, pp. 61-69, "Może zdarzyć się i tak", 1970, No. 4, pp. 47-53 (part I) and No. 5, pp. 61-67 (part II), "Polska 'Ostpolitik'", 1973, No. 6, pp. 68-79, ""Rosyjski "kompleks polski" i obszar ULB", 1974, No. 9, pp. 3-15.
[27] Mieroszewski, *Materiały do refleksji*, pp. 110-122.

Eastern bloc. He criticised the National Democrats for their willingness to talk to any Russian establishment, regardless of its socio-political attributes. Geopolitics was a factor condemning Poland to be a satellite but it was also the Achilles heel of the Soviet Union which would find itself sandwiched between a nationalist China and budding nationalist movements in Central Eastern Europe. Mieroszewski saw the Soviet Union as an anachronism which would certainly collapse sooner or later.

2. Russia and Russians: The Soviet Union was not the same thing as Russia. Russians were one of the nations which had lost their independence to the Soviet Union and their culture was also under assault by the Soviet regime. Both Poles and Russians viewed each other as potential imperialists who, given the chance, would enlarge at the expense of the other. Compared to Russians, Poles were in a better position to grasp the changes of conjuncture as recent history only confirmed the strong position of Russia but brought defeat and political, territorial and ethnic transformation for Poland. Therefore, Poles should start a dialogue with the anti-imperialist and democratic Russian opposition within and outwith the Soviet Union. As Poland would never have the chance to be stronger than Russia, it should find a way to quell the imperialistic tendencies in Russia by assuring the latter of its unquestioned abandonment of its own imperialistic tendencies.

3. ULB: *Kultura*'s most acclaimed contribution to Polish EP thinking was the ULB concept, which stands for Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus. Mieroszewski argued that the ULB region was the "bone of contention" between Poland and Russia and would determine the future shape of Polish-Russian relations.[28] Accordingly, Poland had to recognise ULB's right to independent statehood and territorial sovereignty. This meant giving up all claims on the lands lost by Poland after the Second World War. Second, Poland had to build a strong dialogue with the nations of ULB and assure them that Polish imperialism, territorial or cultural, was a thing of the past. Historically, Poles were regarded as more effective cultural assimilators than Russians. The Polish political elite had a tradition of assuming the superiority of Poles over the Eastern nations. It would be hypocritical for Poland to fight Russian imperialism under the banner of Polish imperialism. Poland should especially communicate to Ukrainians and Lithuanians that it would never lay any claim to Lwów and Wilno, even if one day it had the opportunity to do so. Mieroszewski believed in the merits of a Międzymorze federation formed by the independent states of Central and Eastern Europe which would be on equal footing with each other. A strong ULB region was essential for this united front to struggle with any possible imperialist attempt.

[28] Mieroszewski, *Materiały do refleksji*, p. 179-180.

4. Ukraine: According to *Kultura*'s EP concept, the biggest country of the ULB, Ukraine, held the key to Polish independence. There could be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine. If Poles and Ukrainians could not manage to foster dialogue and understanding among each other, they might as well be facing each other with arms on the Przemysl Bridge when both Poland and Ukraine achieved independence.[29] Historically, enmity between Poles and Ukrainians has given Russia the opportunity to expand towards the West. By this token, if Ukraine and Poland could create peaceful relations based on mutual trust and interest, Russian imperialism could be curtailed.

Kultura's EP concept was pragmatic as it took into account power and security considerations in the region and based its arguments for Polish cooperation with ULB on national interest. It also rejected Polish historical revanchism towards its Eastern neighbours. However, having been formulated in emigration, far away from any chance of actual implementation, it was highly theoretical and its applicability depended solely on the assumption that the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order would collapse and incoming ULB governments and societies shared the same vision. It was highly courageous at the time to claim that the postwar international order was ephemeral. *Kultura* did not prescribe a time scale about when the changes would happen. Even though the events of 1989-91 might seem like a vindication of *Kultura*'s basic assumption, it was actually the post-communist period which put *Kultura*'s EP notion to the test.

4.1.3 Opposition in PRL

Until the 1970s Poland-based contributors to *Kultura* (sending contributions thanks to excellent smuggling networks) focused exclusively on pressing matters like domestic politics in Poland or the effects of Soviet domination, and it was the émigrés who discussed issues concerning the independent Poland of the future.[30] However, in the mid 1970s, opposition to PRL within Poland had gradually become more organised and efforts to formulate a political programme intensified. In terms of political thought, the intellectual elite in Poland carried home the concepts developed in emigration. EP issues like Poland's relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus and assessment of federalist and nationalist doctrines on the Eastern question entered the programmes of opposition groups and featured in their samizdat publications.[31]

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[29] Juliusz Mieroszewski, "Listy z Wyspy: Prywatne inycjatywy polityczne", *Kultura*, 1952, No. 10, pp. 99-104.
[30] Pomian (Ed.), *Wizja polski*, p. 171.
[31] For a detailed survey of how the Ukrainian question featured in Polish opposition publications see Taras Kuzio, "The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question", *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 12, 1987, No. 2, pp. 26-58.

One of these opposition groups, the Polish League for Independence (*Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe* - PPN), issued its programme in May 1976.[32] It was the first comprehensive party programme of its kind and for the first time problems of foreign policy were given consideration. The programme asked Poles to support independence movements in ULB. It maintained that even though the loss of Lwów and Wilno was still traumatic for Poles, Poland should renounce territorial revisionism towards the lands in the East.[33] The programme was actually published in *Kultura* (and a London journal, *Tydzień Polski*) before it appeared in Poland. PPN activists also published articles on EP related matters. In an article about the Eastern borders of Poland, Andrzej Albert (pseudonym of Wojciech Roszkowski) gave an account of Polish history in the East from the fifteenth century onwards.[34] He argued that by being better informed about how the Eastern border was shaped throughout history and by correcting the misperceptions created through propaganda and diversion, Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians could understand each other better. He concluded that the demand to return to pre-1939 borders was an anachronism and, as a result of the brutal ethnic policies of Germans and Soviets, the lands in question were neither exclusively Polish nor Ukrainian, Lithuanian or Belarusian. He said that the problem could be solved only if ULB became independent democratic states where ethnic groups would have the freedom to retain their identities and cultures.

Other opposition organisations such as the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civic Rights (*Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela* - ROPCiO) and Confederation for Independent Poland (*Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* -KPN), which was established in 1979 by some members of ROPCiO, also dealt with EP and ULB. Despite the fact that these and other opposition groups differed in their views about domestic politics, they had parallel views about EP. They were all closer to the Piłsudskiite tradition and had similar opinions to those of *Kultura* on EP. For instance, during the sixtieth anniversary of the Piłsudski-Petlura agreement in 1980, KPN issued a declaration protesting against Soviet rule over Ukraine and repudiating any territorial claims against Ukraine in the name of the Polish state.[35] KPN stated that the creation of a strong, independent Ukrainian state was in the interests of Poland.

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[32] The programme was issued anonymously but it was actually written by Zdzisław Najder, the founder of PPN in 1976 and a contributor to *Kultura*.

[33] *PPN: Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1978, pp. 18-19. English translation can be found in Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977*, London: Poets' and Painters' Press, 1978, pp. 477-478.

[34] Andrzej Albert , "Wschodnie granice Polski" *in Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe: Wybór Tekstów*, London: Polonia, 1989, pp. 288-325. The article was originally published in March 1980.

[35] Paweł Kowal, "Za wolność naszą i waszą. Ukraina, Litwa i Białoruś w myśli polskich środowisk opozycyjnych w latach 1976-1980", Studia nad polską myślą polityczną, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej. http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=168 (accessed 29 November 2006)

Kultura's EP programme was also reflected by oppositionists within the Workers' Defence Committee (*Komitet Obrony Robotników* - KOR) movement, the intellectual precursor of the *Solidarność* movement. In an article published in the journal, *Głos*, Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik and Antoni Macierewicz took up the *Kultura* line on ULB and argued that Polish sovereign statehood and democracy as well as freedom in Russia could only be guaranteed by the sovereignty of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.[36] They said that Poles, Russians and ULB nations should struggle against mutual enmity, xenophobia and chauvinism fostered by the totalitarian system. They stressed that the historic slogan "For your freedom and ours" was the only realistic programme for Polish sovereignty and appealed to the Russian democratic opposition to support the independence movements in Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus for their and Poland's freedom.

As mentioned above, EP perceptions of opposition groups in Poland were similar to each other and parallel to *Kultura* line. While this is true for attitudes towards ULB, there were varying views about relations with Russia and Russians. For instance in the right wing samizdat publication *Niepodległość* (Warsaw), Leszek Morfeusz (pseudonym of Jerzy Targalski) disagreed with Mieroszewski about Russia ever giving up its imperialistic attitude.[37] He argued that the Russian intellectuals whom Mieroszewski proposed as allies were too few in number and nothing short of a defeat, such as the one suffered by Germans after the Second World War, could persuade Russians to change. Hence, Poles should support national liberation movements in ULB even when they were anti Russian. While Russian democrats could be allies with Poles against the Soviet regime, a real partnership could only established with Russian groups that respected the right of constituent nations to independence. Morfeusz even proposed that ethnic Russians that had emigrated to ULB should be made to leave after these countries gain independence.

A.H (Aleksander Hall) wrote in *Polityka Polska* (publication of *Ruch Młodej Polski*, a splinter of ROPCiO movement) in a similar vein about the difficulty of reaching a consensus with Russians. However, Hall disagreed with the idea of actively supporting ULB independence. Hall pointed out the impossibility of Poland reaching any understanding with Russians while envisaging a Poland which would act as a Piedmont for anti Russian national movements.[38] Like most commentators of the time, Hall did not see the end of the Soviet Union coming soon and believed that the Polish opposition should

[36] Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik and Antoni Macierewicz, "Sprawa polska – Sprawa rosyjska", (Głos, No.1, October 1977), *Głos*, Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1980, pp. 242-244.
[37] Leszek Morfeusz, "Polacy wobec kwestii wschodniej", *Niepodległość*, 1983, No. 18-19. Leszek Morfeusz , "Polacy wobec kwestii wschodniej (c.d.)", *Niepodległość*, 1983, No. 20 (reprinted in *Niepodległość. Miesięcznik polityczny, [wybór z pierwszych 28 numerów]*, London: Polonia, 1985, pp. 182-192.) Also see Artur Wieczysty (pseudonym for Adam Chajewski), "Kwestia Rosji", *Niepodległość*, 1985, No. 39. Scanned copies of original Niepodległość can be found at http://www.niepodleglosc.org/Polish/Archiwum/Archiwum_indeks.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[38] A. H., "Czynnik Stały – Rosja" in *Przegląd Polityki Polskiej*, London: Odnowa 1985, p. 75. English translation in Adam Bromke, *The Meanings and Uses of Polish History*, Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 209-220.

not antagonise Russians by interfering in nationality issues in the Soviet Union or provoke them by overplaying their hand (as Solidarity did according to him). Accordingly, Poland should not sacrifice its independence for the sake of overthrowing Soviet rule.

In the 1970s and 80s, EP issues were dealt mainly by intellectuals and have not become central to the programmes of mass movements like *Solidarność*. As at the time the possibility of collapse of the communist regime and dismemberment of the Soviet Union were not considered likely in the short term, discussions on foreign policy or EP were confined to theoretical deliberations and on the basis of setting out possible scenarios.

4.2 EASTERN POLICY DEBATES DURING THE THIRD REPUBLIC

4.2.1 Evolution and intensification of the Polish EP debate

4.2.1.1 The Background

Even though Polish foreign policy had an Eastern dimension from the very beginning of the Third Republic, the formulation of a unified "Eastern policy" concept commenced from 1994 on. Parallel to this EP began to be discussed on its own right and its merits even though it was still debated whether a Polish EP existed or not.

From 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1992 Polish foreign policy towards its East was described as "dual-track" (*dwutorowość)* as Poland recognised the sovereignty and independence of Soviet republics and established direct relations with them but at the same time maintained relations with the central Soviet authorities and kept a low profile in relations with republics so as not to provoke the Soviet administration. This prudent policy, implemented by the Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, proved successful. Poland managed to avoid conflict in this precarious period and negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of the latter's troops from Polish territory on 26 October 1991.

Having served its purpose, the dual-track policy was replaced by a more active approach towards Poland's Eastern neighbours. The new strategy was to establish the legal basis of bilateral relations by signing the necessary agreements such as those concerning border issues, economic cooperation and defence. Treaties on good neighbourly relations were in place with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by the end of 1992 and several other agreements establishing the framework of political relations were signed by the end of 1993. Negotiations with Lithuania were protracted because of disputes over ethnic minorities and the bilateral treaty on good neighbourly relations was signed by April 1994.

By the end of 1993, Polish foreign policy was re-evaluated and reformulated. The most important factor was the gradual crystallization of the new geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet sphere and the emergence of new security challenges. By 18 September 1993, the last Soviet troops left Poland. At the same time Poland declared NATO membership a foreign policy priority. Meanwhile, Russia started to voice objections to a possible NATO eastward enlargement. Even though Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian statehood were internationally confirmed, their course of transformation was still unpredictable and prone to Russian pressure.

The reformulation of foreign policy and the ascendance of the new EP concept was connected not only to international developments but also to domestic political events in Poland. First, the success of post-communist parties at the October 1993 elections and the formation of an SLD-PSL coalition government brought about a new approach to relations with Russia. Even though the coalition partners did not intend to change the main directions of Polish foreign policy, they indicated a desire for a closer dialogue with Russia about NATO enlargement and regional security. Accordingly, relations with Russia should have priority over those with Ukraine and Belarus. Especially, PSL emphasised the need for Poland to rejuvenate its ties with the Russian and Eastern markets and criticised previous governments for incurring the country huge losses by reorienting Polish trade towards West.

Second, Andrzej Olechowski took over the post of Foreign Minister from Skubiszewski in October 1993. Olechowski stressed the need to formulate an EP concept which would produce more energetic and assertive policies. In his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee in Senate on 17 February 1994 Olechowski set out the new aims of Polish EP.[39] He stressed the need to extend economic relations with the Eastern neighbours and to develop regional cooperation. He underlined the strategic importance of Ukraine for Poland and repeated Poland's commitment to the independence of Soviet successor states. He stated the need for "a clear warming of the climate" with Russia but added that the "rock-bottom condition" for friendliness with Russia was the latter's respect for Poland's integration into Western institutions like EU, NATO and WEU. He warned about the threat of a neo-imperialist option in Russian foreign policy and added his concerns about the "special interests" of Russia in Ukraine. Even though both the government and Olechowski foresaw changes in EP, their approaches were not based on similar premises. It should be kept in mind that at the time the foreign minister was appointed by the President, Lech Wałęsa, and not by the government.

[39] "Wystąpienie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych RP Andrzeja Olechowskiego na Posiedzeniu Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Senatu RP na Temat Głównych Elementów Polskiej Polityki Wschodniej", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, 1994, No. 1, pp. 42-54.

Following these developments, academic, political and journalistic debates on foreign policy gave more attention and space to EP. Almost all contributors to the debate agreed on the fact that EP should be improved or reformed but they sharply disagreed about whether so far the foreign policy line of Skubiszewski and pre-October 1993 governments served Poland's interest in the best way. Similarly, policies proposed by Olechowski and by the SLD/PSL coalition government were contentious. Debate revolved around the EP concept, relations with Russia (especially in connection with NATO enlargement), relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Baltic states and economic ties with the East.

We can discern three main positions in the debate notwithstanding the variety of comments and proposals within each camp: The first one -let us call it pro-Russian for the sake of brevity- advocated that Poland's vital political and economic interest was to improve its relations with Russia and Poland needed to take into account Russian sensitivities about the ex-Soviet republics and NATO. The second, pro-Western camp, on the other hand, argued that good relations with Russia were not necessarily the key to having good relations with the West and that Poland had to have a more active policy in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. The third one comes from *Kultura* which continued promotion of its own EP programme formulated by Mieroszewski-Giedroyc. These three positions will be explained below by reference to the arguments put forward by some of the main proponents of the camps.

4.2.1.2 Pro-Russian Camp

Longin Pastuslak, SLD MP and professor of political science and American studies, was among the ranks of the pro-Russian camp. He supported the Giedroycian idea that the better Polish relations with its East, the better Poland's stance in the West.[40] Accordingly, Poland had to seek a deeper dialogue with Russia, especially on security issues. Pastusiak proposed the creation of a Polish-German-Russian permanent consultation mechanism, "Warsaw triangle", in order to supplement the Weimar Triangle, the Polish-French-German cooperation.[41] He argued that Russia and Germany would develop their own dialogue and Poland should be a partner in this dialogue in order to have an influence on vital issues concerning its fate. He accused his critics, who claimed that Pastusiak wanted to revive the Warsaw Pact or to destroy the Weimar mechanism, of demonstrating their unwillingness for cooperation with Russia. Pastusiak also questioned the merits of

[40] Longin Pastusiak, "Stać nas na consensus", *Rzeczpospolita*, 05 November 1994.
[41] Longin Pastusiak, Informacja rządu o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 20 Posiedzenie, 2 Dzień, 12 May 1994. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).

NATO membership in terms of creating security in Europe. He advocated a Euro-Atlantic collective security system with international armed forces under international command.

Another SLD heavyweight, Marek Siwiec, wrote that anti-Sovietism of the pre-1989 period had been replaced by anti-Russianism and pointed to the similarity between the uncritical appraisal of the West by the post-Solidarity cadres and the same attitude of the pre-1989 Polish United Workers Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*-PZPR) elite of the East.[42] He argued that "the worse the relations with Russia, the better the opportunities in the West" logic did not apply anymore. Accordingly, if integration with the West was the primary task for reinforcing security, good relations with Russia and other Eastern neighbours should be the next.

Not all proponents of the pro-Russian option came from the post-communist camp. The Dmowskiite tradition of a cooperative attitude towards Russia and scepticism towards Germany survived in the thinking of right wing circles. The arguments of Marian Piłka, one of the founders of Christian National Union (*Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe* – ZChN), demonstrates this. He sharply criticised the Western orientation by stating that the current foreign policy concept was based on swapping the Soviet protector for a Western one.[43] He maintained that Poland and Russia could form a community of mutual interests. However, such cooperation was possible if Poland respected Russia's national interests. He criticised Skubiszewski's foreign and Balcerowicz's economic policies for Poland's surrender of Eastern markets to Western countries such as Germany and the US. Rejecting the "myth" that the low trade turnover with the East was due to economic breakdown in Russia, he advocated creating a free trade area with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, parallel to association with the EU. Accordingly, this would strengthen Poland's negotiating position vis-à-vis the West. Piłka argued that NATO enlargement would automatically isolate Russia and make Poland a "front country" in the new division. Having hindered Polish economic expansion towards East, Poland would become a hostage to Germany.

Adam Bromke, an émigré professor of political science, approved the neo-Dmowskiite rhetoric for emphasising the importance of relations with Russia but disagreed with their arguments about Germany.[44] He also criticised the proposals of some neo-Piłsudskiite circles of establishing a Polish-Ukrainian alliance against Russia. That would be against Polish interests, and a Russian-Ukrainian conflict so near Polish borders would endanger European security and the West would do anything to prevent it. Besides, the anti-Russian, nationalist Ukrainians were at the same time anti-Polish so such an alliance was

[42] Marek Siwiec, "Czas pragmatyzmu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 July 1994.
[43] Marian Piłka, "Dwubiegunowa integracja", *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 January 1994.
[44] Adam Bromke, " Na wirażu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 July 1994.

not realistic. In the same vein with Siwiec, Bromke argued that anti-Sovietism was succeeded not only by anti-Russianism but also by Polish megalomania, which hampered the establishment of relations between Poland and Russia and the development of economic ties. Bromke's main criticism of post-Solidarity governments was that they belittled the role of the East and failed to understand the change of Western stance vis-à-vis the East, namely Washington's new priority of establishing good relations with Moscow. Poland's "megaphone diplomacy" of loudly campaigning for NATO membership in international fora gave Russia the impression that Poland aimed to extend NATO's sphere of influence to the Bug and to isolate Russia. That was not received well in the West and Polish demands of a swift entry into NATO were turned down.

4.2.1.3 Pro-Western Camp

The contributors from this camp came mostly from post-Solidarity circles. Even though there was a nominal consensus between the different camps on the need to improve relations, political or economic, with the East, each had different assumptions about the attitude of the East towards Poland and the policy Poland had to pursue.

Henryk Szlajfer, an academic (though best known as Adam Michnik's comrade during the 1968 student protests) and director of Foreign Ministry's Department of Strategic Research, hailed the foreign policy achievements of the post-Solidarity governments.[45] In his opinion Polish foreign policy was subtle and flexible, as evidenced by the shift from the two-track policy to bilateral relations with ex-Soviet states and the recognition of Ukraine. Moreover, not only governments but also civil society groups with Solidarity background contributed to establishing good relations with Ukraine. He maintained that the pro-Russian camp slogan "wasted opportunities in the East" could not be easily verified. He accused government politicians of complaining about relations with Russia with the intention of condemning post-Solidarity circles (or people previously forming opposition against them) for their foreign policies. Szlajfer recalled that Russia was not the only neighbour in the East and Poland had to be active in Kiev and Minsk as much as in Moscow but without any intention of building a cordon around Russia. He dismissed the idea that a great Russian market was there to benefit from and criticised Pastusiak for his childish "geopolitical-geometric" constructions and the SLD-PSL for similar half-baked ideas.

Another criticism to Pastusiak came from Tadeusz Chabiera, an academic and an expert at the Centre for International Studies (*Ośrodek Studiów Międzynarodowych - OSM*) at the

[45] Henryk Szlajfer, "Myśleć nie tylko o Rosji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 03 September 1994.

Senate.[46] Chabiera interpreted Pastusiak's arguments as regret for the downfall of the Warsaw Pact and the hasty dissolution of Comecon. He criticised Pastusiak for not admitting the distorted nature of Poland's pre-1989 trade with the East. Besides, Pastusiak's "Warsaw Triangle" project could only serve to ensure Poland's partnerly presence "between the hammer and the anvil". Chabiera also accused Pastusiak of a hidden agenda: Pastusiak refrained from openly saying that the new security system he was proposing was actually CSCE. It was exactly the Russian plan to use CSCE as the main European security forum and to sideline NATO or WEU. In Chabiera's opinion the Giedroycian logic was open to interpretation, based on political choice: Pastusiak read it as "the better relations with the East, the better Poland's position in the West" but the reverse, i.e. "the better relations with the West, the better Poland's position in the East" could as well hold the real meaning.

Radek Sikorski, ex-Deputy minister of defence in the Olszewski cabinet, declared his preference for the "reverse reading" of Giedroyc by arguing that Poland would not have much of an option in terms of its EP before it anchored itself solidly in Western structures.[47] Without economic power or a say in the international arena, Poland was not an attractive partner for either Russia or Ukraine. He, interestingly, thought that the Russian objection to NATO enlargement was being used as a pretext for delaying Polish accession and accused the Clinton administration of eroding NATO and supporting reintegration of CIS.

An interesting approach came from Kazimierz Dziewanowski, one of the Solidarity negotiators in the Roundtable talks and Poland's ambassador to Washington during 1990-93. He proposed looking at the matter through questioning what Russia's policy towards Poland was.[48] He argued that Russia did not have any clear-cut foreign policy line towards Poland (nor towards the other ex-satellite states, Belarus or Ukraine) and its foreign policies were susceptible to domestic political conflicts. Russia's opposition to NATO expansion was proof that Russia still wanted a divided Europe and considered NATO as an enemy. Russia also considered vetoing NATO's decisions and intervening in the foreign policy of sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe as its rights. Dziewanowski also wondered whether Russia would attempt to "Finlandize" these countries. He concluded, "Russia is a tragic country. We are afraid of it because history taught us to do so."

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[46] Tadeusz Chabiera, "Kwadratura Trójkąta", *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 November 1994. OSM was established in 1989 as an institute within the Senate. It was considered by post-communist parties to be a partisan organisation supporting post-Solidarity views of foreign policy and was eventually liquidated in the beginning of 1995. For more information see Paweł Lisicki, "Utajony spór o politykę zagraniczną", *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 January 1995.
[47] Radosław Sikorski , "Nie odwzajemniane zaloty", *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 October 1994.
[48] Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Bez koncepcji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 December 1994.

Aleksander Smolar, a political scientist, an émigré until 1989 and adviser to Mazowiecki and Suchocka governments, analysed the foreign policy rhetoric of SLD and PSL[49]: These two parties criticised the foreign policies of post-Solidarity governments of antagonising Russia, replacing dependence on Soviet Union with dependence on the West and not strengthening political and economic ties with the Eastern neighbours. They also opposed a hasty entry into NATO and advocated a collective security system based on CSCE (see Pastusiak's arguments). However, SLD and PSL changed their policy line soon after coming to power and assumed the pro-Western orientation of the post-Solidarity camp. During the discussion in the Sejm on foreign policy SLD MP Jerzy Wiatr explained that the change in his party's attitude (especially towards NATO membership) was connected with the bloody confrontation between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament in October 1993 and this event made the SLD realise the danger posed by the nascent hegemonistic tendencies in Russia.[50] Smolar found this explanation unconvincing. In his opinion what SLD actually realised was that they could not govern Poland against the society's aspirations and anti-Western policies and that neutrality would isolate Poland in the region. Smolar also criticised the government of not giving due importance to Eastern neighbours other than Russia. He argued that SLD and PSL's communist past cast its shadow on their rhetoric today even though their world view did evolve after the fall of the communist system: Anti-Western thinking was deeply rooted in especially the older generations in the SLD and the "socialist utopia" of a Third Way was transformed into neutrality under the new conditions. Smolar also underlined a certain inferiority complex lurking in the collective psychology as commentators affiliated with SLD and PSL often mentioned Poland's marginal status in the world and ridiculed Poland's expectations of NATO or EU membership. He maintained that contrary to these claims, location and history made Poland an important element in any analysis about the future of Europe, in terms of not only security but also politics and economic integration. Like Dziewanowski, Smolar believed that the basic problem of EP was not the absence of it (as critics suggested) but the fact that Russia did not have any Polish policy as a consequence of the collapse of the empire and its inability to accept equal relations with smaller states. Accordingly, conflict of interest between Russia and Poland would subside only when Russia accepted the changes in the political map of Europe.

Smolar also questioned whether choosing a Western orientation would cause a permanent loss of Poland's historical identity which had been formed under the influence of close ties with Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia. He conceded that such a choice brought about certain losses but added that integration with the West would also increase opportunities for developing ties in the East. He found the German experience relevant:

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[49] Aleksander Smolar, "Polityka zagraniczna i jej przeciwnicy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 November 1994.
[50] Jerzy Wiatr, Informacja rządu o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 20 Posiedzenie, 2 Dzień, 12 May 1994.

West Germany could develop a dynamic Ostpolitik only when its integration into the West became indisputable whether by the West or the East.

4.2.1.4 Kultura Camp

Even though the collapse of the communist system ended *Kultura*'s role as the sole proponent of an alternative EP, the relevance of its programme increased. *Kultura* continued to give extensive coverage to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania in the early 1990s when the debate on EP revolved predominantly around Russia. *Kultura* continued to debate issues concerning Poland's Eastern neighbours. It had a regular section called "*Sąsiedzi*" (neighbours) devoted to reports and analyses about Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia.

It is difficult to classify the views of *Kultura* authors under the two camps examined above because they were, in terms of political sympathy, much closer to post-Solidarity circles. But at the same time they criticised post-Solidarity governments harshly for their inactivity towards the Eastern neighbours. Like the post-communist camp they advocated better relations with Russia, even though their reasons for this were fundamentally different.

Jerzy Pomianowski, a Russianist and one of the émigré contributors to *Kultura*, claimed that an EP did exist but it was one of inactivity caused by good will: Not talking to Ukrainians to avoid upsetting the Russians (and vice versa) caused a paralysis in Poland's relations with its Eastern neighbours.[51] He noted that the "whatever happens in our Near East is their domestic problem" attitude was based on the mistaken belief that the Soviet Union still survived in some form and on the failure to distinguish between the Soviet Union and Russia (which in his opinion should be one of the main tasks of Polish EP).[52] Pomianowski named Skubiszewski's foreign policy towards Ukraine and Belarus "désintéressement doctrine" and added that this policy did not win any friends among Poland's neighbours.[53] He argued that Polish entry into NATO would be desirable for the latter only when Poland became free of conflict with Russia and of its own insecurity towards it. He criticised both the left wing, i.e. the post-communists, and the right wing: The Left lost the chance of distancing itself from its communist past and starting relations with the Eastern neighbours afresh when at the end of 1994 left wing MPs voted in the Sejm for giving combatant status to Polish NKVD officers who had taken part in the pacification of Ukrainian countryside after the Second World War. He also criticised the right wing for its suspicions about Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania and accused them of

[51] Jerzy Pomianowski, *Ruski miesiąc z hakiem*, Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1997, p. 133. (reprint of "Jak rozmawiać z Rosją", *Życie Warszawy*, 17 March 1994.)
[52] Pomianowski, *Ruski miesiąc*, p. 20. (reprint of "Ruski miesiąc", *Kultura*, 1994, No. 7-8, pp. 12-25.)
[53] Pomianowski, *Ruski miesiąc*, p. 40. (reprint of "Ruski miesiąc w Warszawie", *Kultura*, 1995, No. 1-2, pp. 3-19.)

visiting these three countries only to provoke the local Polish minority against their hosts. These tactics were reminiscent of Dmowski's efforts of gaining Russian support by helping it suppress the nations between Poland and Russia.

Pomianowski believed that Poland had the chance to implement the *Kultura* programme right after the collapse of the Soviet Union but had wasted it. According to *Kultura* logic Poland could develop friendly bilateral relations with Russia only if the latter was non-imperialist and ULB's independence was guaranteed. Prospects for the future was not bright given the recent rise of neo-imperialist tendencies in Russia. Pomianowski touched on a very important subject, which would prove to be a major bone of contention between Russia and Poland and a major source of camaraderie between Ukraine and Poland in the 2000s: He wrote about Russian efforts to erode Ukrainian sovereignty by exploiting Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas. He reckoned that the agreement on the new Yamal gas pipeline project signed between Russia and Poland during the Russian PM Chernomyrdin's visit to Poland in February 1995 was another means by which Russia could threaten Ukraine. He wondered whether any Polish politician thought of reaching an agreement on the issue with the Ukrainians before signing the agreement with the Russians.

Andrzej W. Pawluczuk, an essayist, agreed with Pomianowski that for the previous fours years no one benefited from the *Kultura* programme and under Skubiszewski the East was treated as if "a deep black hole existed between Bug and Vladivostok".[54] The only part of the *Kultura* programme, which was the most straightforward, carried out so far was giving up any claims to Wilno and Lwów but apart from that no real effort for supporting the new republics was undertaken. Pawluczuk entertained no illusions about good relations between Poland and Russia. He maintained that Poland and Russia had conflicting interests because Russia was the only European power which tried to impose on its neighbours its own understanding of international order. He did not mince his words:

> As long as Russia fails to solve its basic civilisational problem, which is productivity in order to ensure wealth and internal prosperity, the only way it will demonstrate its power and realise political interests will be an expansive foreign policy. ... If Russia does not modernise quickly, it will remain a great big *skansen* [an open air museum], inhabited by two hundred million citizens, living with feelings of injustice and resentment towards the world for its sordid fate.

Pawluczuk's brusque words actually demonstrate an attitude towards Russia widespread among post-Solidarity and right wing circles.

[54] Andrzej W Pawluczuk, "Daleko i blisko Rosji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 December 1994.

4.2.2 Diversification of the debate

4.2.2.1 The Background

In January 1995 the differences between Olechowski and the Prime Minister Pawlak concerning EP intensified.[55] Olechowski was wary of initiatives towards Russia undertaken by Pawlak and the PSL-controlled Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, without consultation with the Foreign Ministry. In return, Pawlak accused Olechowski of not doing enough to improve economic relations with Eastern neighbours. The rift was not only about organisational matters but also about ideological stances. While Olechowski believed in a more active EP, his priority was strengthening ties with the West and ensuring Poland's NATO membership. Pawlak, on the other hand, had his electoral base to please. Pawlak's PSL was the only party in Poland that represented the interests of a specific socio-economic class: the farmers. PSL saw Russian markets as a saviour for plummeting profits from agriculture and Pawlak tried to pay his due to his electorate by trying to foster trade with Russia. Meanwhile, he created "two-headedness" in foreign policy: He was seen as single-handedly giving too many concessions to Russia by his initiatives which contradicted with the current foreign policy doctrine. SLD were also accused of using the same "backdoor tactics" to change the priorities of Polish foreign policy.[56] The standoff came to an end with Olechowski resigning in January 1995, and Pawlak could survive as a PM only until March 1995 when was ousted by a no-confidence vote in the Sejm.

Relations with Russia were still the focal point of EP debates in 1995. During Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw on 17-18 February 1995, economic relations were discussed. A protocol on the proposed Yamal gas pipeline was signed and negotiations on weapons production and fishing were carried out. Even though the Russian side stressed the "pragmatic and economic character" of the visit, its political significance was obvious, especially due to the repercussions of the pipeline project.[57] Throughout 1995 Russian government officials reiterated their objections to Poland's entry into NATO. Tensions between the two countries were exacerbated by the actions of Polish NGOs on the subject of the Chechen conflict: Russia accused the Polish Humanitarian Action aid convoy of violating norms of aid distribution in conflict zones and reacted strongly against the establishment of a Chechen Information Centre in Kraków. While the Russian government perceived these incidents as the acts of "certain circles" in Poland which stood to gain from the worsening of Polish-Russian relations, some diplomatic

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[55] Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, pp.28-29.
[56] Marek Janusz Całka , "Polska polityka wschodnia w latach 1989-1997. Próba oceny, nowe wyzwania i perspektywy" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1998*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1998, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[57] Sławomir Popowski, "Normalna wizyta", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 February 1995.

circles in Moscow commented that Russia's strong reaction was a message to the West, suggesting that if they accepted Poland into NATO, they would end up with a member that would easily spark conflict with Russia.[58] Initiatives to establish a Radio Free Caucasus in Kraków added fuel to the fire, and the Polish Foreign Ministry responded to the protests of its Russian counterpart by refusing to intervene, as control over broadcasting was not within the ministry's competence.[59]

A further incident to spark discussion was the attendance of the Polish PM, Józef Oleksy of SLD (who replaced Pawlak), at commemorations in Moscow on the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism in May 1995.[60] Oleksy's decision was perceived by many as unpatriotic and a rubber stamp of Oleksy's allegiance to Russia dating back to communist times when he was a senior communist party member. The end of the Second World War and the subsequent division of Europe into spheres of influence was (and still is) a sensitive topic.

Domestic events continued to dominate the agenda. In November 1995, the presidential elections were won by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the leader of SLD and an ex-Minister in the last communist cabinet. In addition, Oleksy's allegiances became a topic of debate once more in December 1995 when outgoing Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski (minister in Wałęsa's Chancellery) alleged that he had documents proving that Oleksy had collaborated with the Soviet intelligence and had continued to serve the Russian intelligence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Oleksy resigned in January 1996.

Another important development of 1995 was the signing of several agreements between Russia and Belarus, which made the prospect of Belarusian reintegration into Russia probable. Agreements on friendship and cooperation, customs regulations and joint border protection were signed between the two countries in February and were ratified by the Belarusian parliament in April.[61] Belarus also joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme in January 1995 but declared that it would keep its participation in the programme at a minimal level.[62] This was a confirmation that Belarusian objections to NATO enlargement were due to the threat the Belarusian leadership perceived from

[58] Sławomir Popowski, "Moskwa: ostra reakcja była potrzebna Warszawa: nie chcemy zaostrzać sporu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 03 March 1995.
[59] Piotr Jendroszczyk, "Andriej Kozyriew wątpi w przyjazne stosunki", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 May 1995.
[60] "Premier: targowisko, a nie targowica", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 April 1995.
[61] "Yeltsin And Lukashenka Sign Accords", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* (hereafter *RFE/RL Newsline*), 22 February 1995 and "Belarusian Parliament Agrees to Referendum, Ratifies Russian Treaty", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 14 April 1995.
[62] "Belarusian Foreign Minister In Brussels", *OMRI Daily Digest*, 10 January 1995.

NATO. This was, as Burant noted, unlike the Ukrainian opposition which stemmed from the fear that such a move would consign Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence.[63]

While relations with Belarus were set to sour, Poland undertook some initiatives towards Ukraine to foster closer ties. The Presidential Consultative Committee (established in 1993 but dormant since summer 1994) was reactivated and a decision was taken to create a joint Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion in October 1995.[64] Poland also supported Ukraine's inclusion in regional fora such as Central European Initiative (CEI) at its October meeting and Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) at its September summit.[65]

By 1995 EP debate was in full swing. However, the "camps" were far from consolidating. The domestic and international events of 1995 signalled the increasing complexity of issues concerning EP. In addition, being in government tempered the views of most adherents of the "pro-Russian camp". As a result, the debate ceased to be an exchange between camps and became much more diversified. Therefore, most commonly discussed issues will be presented here and, the main arguments, highlighted.

4.2.2.2 Eastern Policy and ULB

The resignation of Olechowski and public consternation about the domestic strife over EP sparked the debate at the beginning of 1995. Dziewanowski wrote a newspaper article called "An extensive debate is needed" on 24 January 1995 where he expressed his frustration over the recent fight between Olechowski and Pawlak.[66] He argued that the public was alarmed over this fight at the top of the state. He emphasised the necessity to leave aside internal differences and unite against external threats. He wrote that fears about external threat from the East were well founded and warned against indifference to the signals coming from the East. In his opinion there was need for a "vivisection" of the different concepts and ideas floating around in the country.

Dziewanowski's proposal was taken up by Antoni Kamiński, a professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, in an article titled "Why Poland does not have an Eastern policy".[67] Kamiński drew attention to the Russian-Belarusian rapprochement and Belarusian President Lukashenko's decision in February 1995 to

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[63] Stephen R. Burant, "Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, 1995, No.7, p. 1134.
[64] Stephen R. Burant, *Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership*, The Carl Beck Papers, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, 1999, p. 19.
[65] Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002, pp. 15-16.
[66] Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Potrzeba wielkiej debaty", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 January 1995.
[67] Antoni Kamiński, "Dlaczego Polska nie ma polityki wschodniej", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 March 1995.

suspend all arms reduction under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). He saw this move as a gesture by Belarus towards Russia and argued that economic ties between these two countries should give no reason for concern while military ties should. Poland did not react to this recent Belarusian decision and Kamiński identified two reasons for this: First, due to the lack of a functioning government, Foreign and Defence Ministries and a responsible PM, Poland could not be expected to give proper reactions to external events. Second, some politicians and commentators believed that the evolving Russian-Belarusian relations would be in Poland's interest as the bigger the threat in the East, the better Poland's chances of joining NATO (yet another interpretation of Giedroycian logic). Kamiński argued that this approach was mistaken because Poland actually had not one but two strategic security interests, namely integration into Western structures and maintaining the beneficial geostrategic position in the region created after 1991 by supporting the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. He complained that currently foreign policy was built on only the former priority. The fact that the latter was totally neglected was down to the intellectual laziness of policy makers and one-dimensional thinking, reminiscent of the communist times. Implementation of both priorities at the same time would present many difficulties such as souring of relations with Russia. However, Poland did not have much dialogue with Russia, anyway, except on technical issues like pipelines or mutual debt. Russia bypassed Poland and talked about vital issues like NATO expansion directly with the West. By not having a clear EP, Poland would only aid Russian expansionism in the region.

A response to Kamiński came from Dziewanowski who argued that the two foreign policy priorities proposed by Kamiński could not be on equal footing as the actions necessitated by either might conflict and one had to take priority over the other.[68] It was not possible to base Polish security on integration with the West and not raise any suspicions in the East. Ukraine and Belarus would react to Polish entry into the NATO but Poland could not afford to give up this ideal in order to appease its neighbours because staying in the "buffer zone" or the "grey zone" would be beneficial neither to itself nor to its neighbours. Dziewanowski agreed with Kamiński about the necessity to have better relations with Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltics but argued that the Western option should have priority over EP.

Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, a commentator on international affairs and the director of OSM, agreed with Kamiński about the absence of an EP concept.[69] He believed that unclear and conflicting signs from Poland concerning EP damaged Poland's relations with its East as they enhanced the Polish stereotype of a backstabbing, "treacherous and dishonest *Lach*" in the eyes of Russians and gave Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania the impression that Poland was ready to pay Russians with désintéressement in ULB in exchange for Russian

[68] Kazimierz Dziewanowski, "Podyskutujmy o polskiej polityce wschodniej", *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 March 1995.
[69] Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, "Rozprawa z mitami", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 May 1995.

approval of Poland's NATO accession. In his opinion, Poland had to ensure that ULB could sustain their independence and sovereignty so that they would be in a position to choose between a Western and Eastern orientation based on free will. He also expressed his total disagreement with Russian-friendly policies, exhibited especially by government circles, as, according to him, a friendly Russian neighbour was a myth. Poland and Russia had conflicting strategic interests in Międzymorze and Poland should not pretend otherwise: For Poland independence of the countries in the Międzymorze region was a condition for its stability and development whereas for Russia, this region was its natural sphere of influence.

In another article Kamiński dwelt on the Belarusian situation and its significance for Poland.[70] He wrote that Poland had failed to ask the vital question of why Russia was expanding its military sphere towards the West now that the Cold War was no more. He stated that Russia was quiet on that issue whereas Belarus was spilling the beans: Subsequent Belarusian governments had been telling their citizens for the last two years that Poland constituted a threat, hence the need for a military union with Russia. Kamiński maintained that Belarus's real objective was getting economic concessions from Russia, which, in his opinion, would not be enough to sustain the Belarusian economy in the long term. However, he foresaw a worsening of Polish-Belarusian relations as the Lukashenko regime would portray Poland as the enemy in order to legitimise itself, would accuse Poland of intervening in its domestic affairs and would put pressure on the Polish minority in Belarus (as no dictatorship liked minorities). He reckoned that Polish-Belarusian border might suddenly become the new axis of division in Europe, and the tension between the two countries would benefit no one but Russia, who would pretend to play the role of a mediator. He added that Ukraine was also increasingly pressurised by Russia to follow the Belarusian way. He criticised Polish foreign policy for not doing anything to correct the wrong perceptions of Poland created in the minds of Belarusians. What's more, Belarusian domestic opposition would seek moral support from Poland but Kamiński believed that they would not get any as, in his opinion, Poles "get furious when the world is indifferent to Polish suffering, but fail to be moved by others' suffering."

Kamiński also commented on relations with Ukraine.[71] He dismissed the SLD argument that only special relations with Russia could strengthen Poland's position vis-à-vis the West. Intensification of relations with Ukraine or Belarus would alienate Russia, risk Poland's stability by bringing it closer to unstable countries and prompt the West to see it as a sign of Poland's lack of interest in the West. Kamiński repeated the Giedroycian/Pilsudskiite maxim that Ukrainian independence guaranteed the security and stability of Poland. He dismissed sceptics' claim that Poland had nothing to offer Ukraine:

[70] Antoni Z. Kamiński, "Wzajemne i sprzeczne interesy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 June 1995.
[71] Antoni Z Kamiński, "Potrzebna strefa stabilności", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 November 1995.

Even though Poland could not afford to offer material help, it could still extend moral, organisational and technical help which were not less important. After all, Poland was only a poor cousin for the West but an equal partner for the countries in its region. Kamiński argued that Poland had to start efforts at home in order to have good relations with Ukraine and tackle the problems of its Ukrainian minority and work for reconciliation between the two countries about historical conflicts.

4.2.2.3 Russia

An important intellectual contribution to the debates on Russian-Polish relations was a book titled *Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartościowań*, a collection of papers presented in late 1994 at a conference at the University of Warsaw and published in 1995.[72] Even though the contributors to the volume were academics, unaffiliated with any of the post-communist (or neo-Dmowskiite) parties, the book included opinions reminiscent of those advocated by the "pro-Russian camp". This demonstrates that the arguments of the "Pro-Russian camp" in 1994 were not momentarily fashionable ideas spurred by the electoral victory of the post-communists.

One of the contributors, Andzej Drawicz, a professor of Slavic philology, criticised governments, former and current, for basing their foreign policy towards Russia on faulty premises.[73] First, governments presumed everlasting enmity between Poland and Russia. As that would inevitably lead to conflict, they pretended to have friendly relations with Russia while trying by every possible means to enter Western defence structures, which was the only aim that counted. Second, governments thought that when Poland faced the inevitable security conflict with Russia, it would prevail thanks to its membership in the Western alliance. Drawicz called the first approach "incompetent hypocrisy" and warned that history taught Poles not to rely on any alliance in times of crisis. He added that for the West relations with Russia, and not with Poland, was a priority and anti-Russian sentiments in Poland (especially when expressed overtly through what he called "a festival of anti-Russian commemorations" like the 50th anniversary of Warsaw Uprising) caused dismay in the West. Drawicz also wrote that it was not sensible of Poland to demand apologetic gestures from Russia for the wrongs the Soviet Union had done and to treat historical injustices done to it as exclusive. The majority of sufferers were actually the citizens of ex-Soviet countries and Russia and Poland had to be in solidarity with them. In an interview he gave to *Rzeczpospolita* daily, Drawicz opined that Russia was ready to accept Polish entry into NATO but was trying sell its approval at the highest price

[72] Stanislaw Bieleń (Ed.), *Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartościowań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Wschodnich, 1995. (hereafter *Polska-Rosja*)
[73] Andrzej Drawicz, "Przewartościowania w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich" in *Polska-Rosja*, pp. 10-15.

possible.[74] It was the West and Poland that gave Russia this opportunity by acknowledging Russia's right to have a say in this matter.

The editor of the volume, Stanisław Bieleń, a political scientist at the Institute of International Relations of Warsaw University, also referred to the anti-Russian sentiment among Poles and argued that Russophobia could only be eliminated in the long term as a result of the continual cooperation of government agencies, mass media and public institutions and not by sporadic and extravagant proposals like the one put forward by Geremek and Jerzy Milewski (a close aid to Wałęsa) outlining a popular education programme against Russophobia.[75] Bieleń criticised the foreign service for not making enough effort to convince Russians that Poland's integration with the West was not directed against Russia or any other neighbour.

In the same volume Bogumił Rychłowski, a political scientist, argued that if NATO enlargement proceeded without the creation of a new security structure with the participation of Central and East European countries, Russia would perceive this expansion as a breach of the political settlement it had reached with the West and a direct threat at its borders.[76] This would strengthen neoimperialist political tendencies in Russia. Rychłowski, like commentators affiliated with the government, maintained that it was in Poland's interest that Russia participated in the same security system that Poland aspired to take part in through membership in NATO. He also criticised the missionary activities of Polish clergy in Russia, which was perceived by Russians as "Polish expansionism". This issue was set to poison bilateral relations on many occasions in the future.

The Western option was as robust as the pro-Russian one: The book was criticised by a *Rzeczpospolita* journalist, Sławomir Popowski, in his review titled "The discreet beauty of dependence".[77] He criticised the contributors for suggesting that partnership with Russia might be an alternative to a Western orientation. He argued that regardless of whether Russia was democratic or not, it did not offer a viable alternative to NATO and other Western structures. Joining the West was not only about security but also about political and civilisational progress. Polish and Russian geopolitical interests were fundamentally irreconcilable. Popowski also found the criticisms levelled against Polish governments and diplomats unfair. He maintained that even if they had had a much more active policy (bilateral, economic or social) towards Russia, they would not have changed anything as for Russia security concerns dominated over every other aspect. Popowski accused the

[74] Sławomir Popowski, Interview with Andrzej Drawicz, *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 May 1995.
[75] Stanisław Bieleń, "Oczekiwania Polski wobec Rosji" in *Polska-Rosja*, pp. 31-51.
[76] Bogumił Rychłowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie w warunkach transformacji systemowej" in *Polska-Rosja*, pp. 16-30.
[77] Sławomir Popowski, "Dyskretny urok zależności", *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 May 1995.

authors of trying to absolve Russia of its wrongs and interpret all its moves as the natural right of a great power.

Like Popowski, Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, a former Solidarity activist and Charge d'Affaires of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, and Nowakowski levelled their critique against the pro-Russian rhetoric and debated the signals given by the SLD-PSL coalition government's foreign policy to Russia.[78] They argued that blame for the worsening of relations with Russia did not lie in the foreign policies conducted by post-Solidarity governments as first, the current coalition declared itself for the continuation of the main policy line formulated after 1989 and second, relations with Russia broke down after the current coalition was established and not before. They explained how some of the signals given by this government were perceived by Russia and pointed out the consequences: The SLD-PSL government gave the impression that first, they were more open to suggestions and demands from Russia than post-Solidarity governments were; second, they would consider any positive gesture by the Russian government as a success; third, they put economic success and strategic political interests on the same footing. Fourth, the Russian government was led to believe that they would conduct negotiations, especially on economic matters, with cadres who used to conduct them with the Soviet Union before 1989, and an atmosphere would be created whereby any reaction to Russia would be interpreted as unjustified phobia. Fifth, the Polish political scene was presented as one which was divided into two: cooperative coalition members and the uncooperative rest.

In a different article Magdziak-Miszewska examined the weight historical issues bore on Russian-Polish relations.[79] According to her, the Russian elite considered the pro-Western orientation of Poland as treason. The removing of statues and monuments commemorating the Soviet liberation of Poland during the Second World War were seen as "historical amnesia" and utmost ingratitude on the part of Poles. The Russian elite accepted themselves as the rightful successors of the Soviet Union but not of its crimes as, in their opinion, Russians were the first and foremost victims of these crimes. Therefore, Russia had no reason to extend any apology to Poland for incidents like Katyń. Magdziak-Miszewska argued that this attitude stemmed not from ill will but from Soviet historiography and propaganda. This created a major problem, however, as for Poland a full explanation of the Katyń incident was essential in order to have amicable relations in the future. Magdziak-Miszewska also pointed out that the adverse effect of Yeltsin's absence at the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Warsaw Uprising and at Katyń memorial, and Wałęsa's absence in Moscow on the 9th of May (which was interpreted as a demonstration of anti-Russian attitude).

[78] Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska and Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, "Rosja i jej przyjaciele", *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 October 1995.
[79] Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, "Partnerstwo, ale regionalne", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 November 1995.

4.2.2.4 Eastern Markets

Even though more concrete and objective data was available about trade and economic trends than about foreign policy, Eastern markets had not ceased to be a contested subject. Debate centred on Russian trade and markets and the linkages between choices in economic policy and foreign policy orientation. Trade with ULB featured much less often, not only because of the limited volume of bilateral trade compared with Russia but also due to high uncertainty about the trajectories of economic and political transformation in these countries.[80] The latter was also true for Russia but Poland's dependence on Russian energy and raw material imports and the sheer size of the Russian market guaranteed a predominant position for Russia within the debate.

Michał Dobroczyński, a professor in the Department of Economic Sciences and Director of Centre for Eastern Markets, had faith in the progress of economic relations among Central and East European countries whose trading patterns were disrupted due to political , systemic change and trading anomalies of the communist period.[81] He argued that trade between these countries should develop faster than their trade with the economically and politically stable Western countries. He stated that the reform process in the ex-Soviet states was progressing, contrary to the sensationalist stories in the press, and similar reform trajectories in Poland and its East and geographical proximity made intensification of economic ties a natural process. In this sense, it was no coincidence that Polish exports to Russia increased by about 60% in the first half of 1994. Dobroczyński argued that Polish-Russian economic exchange would intensify regardless of each countries' relations with the EU or with other international organisations. However, the crucial factor in whether the economic ties would deepen or not would be the nature of processes of "civilisational change". If both countries maintain similar paths to transformation, it would accelerate not only economic exchange but also political and cultural proximity.

[80] Poland's foreign trade turnover with ULB and Russia in 1993-95 was as follows:

	Year	1993	1994	1995
Country		(in thousand US Dollars)		
Lithuania	Exports	45,634	113,313	189,401
	Imports	90,459	78,571	66,704
Belarus	Exports	103,208	136,582	240,634
	Imports	114,093	165,514	238,397
Ukraine	Exports	187,717	280,394	742,620
	Imports	201,126	204,892	290,760
ULB Combined	Exports	336,559	530,289	1,172,655
	Imports	405,678	448,977	595,861
Russia	Exports	644,583	934,588	1,274,249
	Imports	1,271,338	1,453,098	1,959,786

Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, 1995 and 1996, Warszawa: Główny Urzad Statystyczny, 1995 and 1996.

[81] Michał Dobroczyński, "Polska jako partner gospodarki rosyjskiej" in *Polska-Rosja*, pp. 89-104.

Another professor at the Centre for Eastern Markets and the Department of Management at Warsaw University, Marek Kostrzewski, agreed with Dobroczyński and mentioned Poland's and CEFTA countries' dependence on Russian raw materials: [82] In 1994 Poland's trade with CEFTA (including Slovenia) amounted to 1,844 million USD but trade with Russia to 2,369 million USD. Kostrzewski pointed out that Poland should develop cooperation not only with the EU, CEFTA or Baltic Council countries but also with its East. He maintained that Russian propositions for economic cooperation were often ignored by CEFTA countries as they perceived political motives and a possible demand for concessions behind each initiative. He opposed claims that close economic ties with Russia would harm Poland's reliability in the West and delay Polish accession to European structures. He said "Let us not be 'whiter than white'. Association agreements with the EU or CEFTA do not prohibit Poles, Czechs or Hungarians from entering another free trade area or customs union, let alone having normal trade relations." He reminded that the EU itself had signed a partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia in 1994 which mentioned the possibility of beginning negotiations in 1998 on creating a free trade area between the two parties. He believed that CEFTA should start membership talks with Russia as soon as possible. If Belarus, who applied to join CEFTA, was accepted, Russia and Kazakhstan would automatically be a part of the organisation's territory as Belarus had signed a customs union treaty with the latter on 1 June 1995. This was similar to Liechtenstein's indirect accession to the EU but bearing in mind Russia's size and potential, direct negotiations should be preferred over entry "through the back door". Kostrzewski believed that Poland for the first time in history had captured an opportunity to have good relations with the East and had to, consequently, avoid wasting it.

Magdziak-Miszewska was not as optimistic as Kostrzewski or Dobroczyński.[83] She disagreed with the argument that Poland had lost the Eastern markets. In her opinion Poland never lost the Eastern markets because it had never functioned as an independent actor in a competitive free market environment. It was a mistake to think that Poland would have a privileged position in the Russian market and that Russians would be willing to exchange their oil with Polish potatoes instead of hard currency. She doubted that the improvement of the political climate between Russia and Poland would effect sudden changes in economic relations. Nor would it compel the Russian government to exempt Polish produce from competition. The only way to develop trade would be to lift unnecessary barriers burdening the entrepreneurs. She mentioned the opposing school of thought, whose argument was demonstrated by Arkadii Volskii of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) at a meeting of Polish and Russian businessmen in February 1995. Volskii, as Magdziak-Miszewska cited, said that Western markets were not easily accessible to Polish and Russian goods so a return to forms of cooperation,

[82] Marek Kostrzewski, "Nie przegrajmy Wschodu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 06 November 1995.
[83] Magdziak-Miszewska, "Partnerstwo, ale regionalne", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 November 1995.

which had been tried out in the past, was advisable. Magdziak-Miszewska left it to the reader to make out the political agenda behind Volskii's speech where he openly stated that the reintegration of CMEA countries was unavoidable and the electoral victory of socialists in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan was evidence of that.

4.2.3 The Debate on Minimalism

4.2.3.1 The Background 1996-2001

Throughout the 1990s Poland's foreign policy went through a process of stabilisation and consolidation (in contrast with the constant fragmentation in domestic politics). The Western orientation, already the main pillar of Polish foreign policy since the early 1990s, brought about concrete developments as Poland became a member of NATO in 1999, having been invited to join in 1997 and the EU opened negotiations with Poland in 1998 which led to full membership in 2004. Consolidation was also aided by the 1997 constitution which clarified the appointment procedures and competences of state organs responsible for foreign policy. The absence of a large-scale conflict on the main directions of foreign policy between the President, Foreign Ministry and offices working on EU accession was evident despite the replacement of the post-communist coalition government with a post-Solidarity one towards the end of 1997.

In contrast to the steady progression of integration with the West, Poland's relations with its East remained troublesome. Relations with Russia remained tense and bilateral trade was hit by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. Poland froze its political contacts with Belarus and limited relations to economic and cultural contacts. Relations with Ukraine, on the other hand, developed steadily, notwithstanding ongoing conflict about historical issues, such as the controversy surrounding the restoration of the Orląt Cemetery in Lwów. "Strategic partnership" with Ukraine became even more emphasised by Polish politicians after Ukraine withdrew its objections to Poland's NATO membership in 1998.[84] Ukraine adopted a pro-Western rhetoric as well even though it had certain reservations about Poland's accession to the EU, especially the possible adverse effects of implementation of Schengen regime on Polish borders. Meanwhile, within the atmosphere of ever-closer "strategic partnership", Poland claimed to be the main advocate of Ukraine in the West and the EU. During a visit to Ukraine, Kwaśniewski said that Poland would support Ukraine's efforts to sign an association agreement with the EU and criticised the West for having double standards towards Ukraine and not supporting the reform process.[85] Poland's gestures towards Ukraine were not limited to declarations of support. Foreign Minister

[84] Mirosław Cieślik, "Stosunki z Ukrainą" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1999*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 2000, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[85] "Przeciwko podwójnej mierze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 January 1999.

Geremek also promised Ukraine that Poland would work towards maintaining the visa-free regime on the Polish-Ukrainian border.[86] This was at best an empty gesture and at worst clear hypocrisy as Poland did not even request any derogations from the Schengen treaty from the beginning of the negotiations and committed itself in its position paper for negotiations on Justice and Home Affairs to implement fully the Schengen acquis.[87] Such bold promises by a country which was itself in the waiting room of the EU caused dismay among EU politicians.[88]

Yet another example of Poland's gestures towards Ukraine was Poland's rejection in July 2000 of a Russian proposal to build a second natural gas pipeline from the Yamal peninsula through Belarus (bypassing Ukraine) on the grounds that such a project would harm the strategic interests of Ukraine.[89] This triggered intensive debate in the media and among academics.[90] However, the gesture proved to be empty yet again as by 2001 Poland quietly withdrew its objection to the building of the second pipeline through Belarus.

Despite tensions in relations with Russia and Belarus and a rather incomplete "strategic partnership" with Ukraine, Poland seemed to entertain high aspirations for its EP. Geremek gave in his annual expose in 1999 clear signs of Poland's intention to play a part in determining the future EP of the EU by suggesting that the Weimar Triangle could become a forum to discuss EU strategies towards Russia and, especially, Ukraine.[91] Geremek and his successor Władysław Bartoszewski reiterated, in 1999 and 2000, Poland's ambitions of active participation in the making of EP of the EU and NATO by means of its knowledge of and experience in the region.[92]

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[86] Piotr Kościński, "Wizy jak najpóźniej", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 September 1998.
[87] Poland's negotiation position in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, 05 October 1999)
http://www.negocjacje.gov.pl/neg.nsf/xml/stne2 (accessed 06 November 2006)
[88] See "Polish Policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and How it is Perceived in EU Member States (Transcript of a Debate)", Reports & Analyses, No. 2/00, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, 2000.
[89] Jan Maksymiuk, "Politicians Express Concern over Gas Pipeline Project Bypassing Ukraine", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 2, 25 July 2000, No. 26.
[90] For instance a conference was held at the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw on 11 December 2000 on the EU-Russian strategic partnership and its effects on Polish foreign policy where one of the subjects covered was Russian energy imports to Europe. For transcript of debates see "Unia Europejska a Rosja– strategiczne partnerstwo? Wyzwania dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej", Warszawa 11 grudnia 2000 r. Materiały z konferencji Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych", *Reports & Analyses*, No. 2/01, Warsaw: Center for International Relations, 2001.
[91] Bronisław Geremek, Informacja rządu o podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski. Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 3 Kadencja, 47 Posiedzenie, 1 Dzień, 08 April 1999.
[92] Bronisław Geremek, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, 3 kadencja, 78 posiedzenie, 1 dzień, 09 May 2000) and Władysław Bartoszewski Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski and Informacja rządu o stanie negocjacji Polski z Unią Europejską. Sprawozdania stenograficzne,V kadencja, 110 posiedzenie, 2 dzień, 06 June 2001.

4.2.3.2 The debate

The 2000-2001 debate on EP was precipitated by ambitious declarations by policy makers about Poland's new, leading role in the region and by discussions surrounding the valiant (but empty) gestures of the government towards Ukraine. The debate was triggered by an article titled "In Praise of Minimalism" by Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, an expert on Russia at the Centre for Eastern Studies (*Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich* - OSW), in the weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* on the last week of December 2000.[93] Sienkiewicz wrote that subsequent governments after 1989 had pursued an EP that was loyal in essence to the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP concept. Even though integration with the West and the *Kultura* EP concept were the only doctrines in Polish foreign policy, many commentators, especially those affiliated with *Kultura*, complained that the Third Republic had neglected ULB. According to Sienkiewicz, growing dissatisfaction with the policy outcomes of Poland's EP (especially towards ULB) was a result not as much of objective underachievement but of unrealistic expectations (delusions) among the political elite concerning Poland's role in the Międzymorze region. He listed three of these delusions:

That Poland was a viable adversary for Russia in Międzymorze: In fact Russia saw Poland as a servant of Western policies in the region and not an independent foreign policy actor

That Poland had a duty to cultivate civil society in ex-Soviet states: Such an attempt at "social engineering" could not succeed. Social transformation in post-Soviet states were fundamentally different from those in Central Eastern Europe. It was unrealistic to expect the ex-Soviet states to rid themselves of vestiges of their Soviet past.

That ex-Soviet states were considered to have democratic governance but in practice they were far from being democracies. The communist party nomenklatura were still in key political positions and the democratic opposition, whom the Polish elite had much faith in, had no political clout

Sienkiewicz went on to propose a more realistic diagnosis of the situation. Accordingly, Russia was the key political and economic factor for Poland's EP. Poland could expect to have a predictable foreign policy only towards Lithuania and Ukraine as Belarus had subordinated itself to Russian policies. In contrast, Ukraine managed to uphold its sovereignty in the face of Russian onslaught but a civilisational chasm still divided Poland and Ukraine. Poland had no real economic or political instruments to influence Ukraine's

[93] Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, "Delusions and Dilemmas of Poland's Eastern Policy: In Praise of Minimalism", *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest* (hereafter PFAD), Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-237. (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24-31 December 2000, No. 52-53)

transformation. Neither could it bolster Ukrainian economic autonomy by competing with Russian capital in the Ukrainian privatisation market. Sienkiewicz argued that the recent issue of rerouting the second Yamal pipeline was the first occasion where Poland could make a significant impact in the region.

Sienkiwicz's main message was that for an effective foreign policy in Międzymorze loyal to the *Kultura* EP concept, Poland should have a realistic perception of its capabilities. Poland should not expect to influence relations between Russia and ex-Soviet countries, accelerate their nation building processes, further their democracies or make choices on their behalf about political orientation or cultural affiliation. Sienkiewicz argued that such minimalism would bring about a realistic appraisal of Poland's interests and capabilities in the region, preventing disappointment caused by not fulfilling long-cherished "historical ambitions".

The first reaction to Sienkiewicz came from Wojciech Maziarski, a journalist at the daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* and the former editor of *Obóz*, who advocated a visionary attitude towards EP.[94] Maziarski referred to solidarity between the intellectuals in Central Europe (including Ukraine and Belarus) in the 1980s and argued that such cooperation was regrettably no longer considered, in his words, "cool". He wrote that Poland should not budge under the EU's pressure and, following the *Kultura* programme of cultivating closer ties with ULB, continue to maintain an open border for its Eastern neighbours. He expressed his belief in the cultivation of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Belarusian opinion in Poland in order to enhance the civilisational unity of Central and Eastern Europe against the threat of Russian imperialism.

Sienkiewicz retorted with an article in *Tygodnik Powszechny* where he called Maziarski's views "daydreaming" only to be countered by a new article by Maziarski in the same paper.[95] Polemics turned into a full-fledged debate carried on mainly in *Tygodnik Powszechny* throughout 2001 as well as in other publications. Two camps could be discerned in the debate: The Realist/Pragmatic/Minimalist camp, who agreed with Sienkiewicz's opinions and the Idealist/Romantic/Prometheist camp, who, like Maziarski, disagreed.

[94] Wojciech Maziarski, "Gdzie jest mój sąsiad?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 06 January 2001.
[95] Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, "Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy: Daydreaming is Detrimental" (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 21 January 2001, No.3) and Wojciech Maziarski, "Harmful Views" (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 04 February 2001, No.5), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 238-245 and pp. 247-248.

4.2.3.3 Realist/Pragmatic/Minimalist Camp

Kazimierz Wóycicki, an expert in German history and director of the Institute of Germany and Northern Europe in Szczecin, supported the minimalist approach and argued that the gap between East and West Europe would widen but this would not necessarily be fatal for Poland as long as there was no threat to Poland's vital interests from the East.[96] He maintained that Poland's future would no more depend on the events happening in its East or its EP. Poland had insufficient means to implement an independent EP but could still contribute towards an EU EP and offer the West know-how about contacts with the East.

Klaus Bachmann, a German journalist specialising in Poland, pointed to another reason for disappointment about the transformation in Poland's Eastern neighbours: Public opinion, experts and politicians tried to analyse politics in the East with Western parameters and wrongly believed that there were only two alternatives for Ukraine, Russia or Belarus: either a Western liberal democracy and market or a return to the Soviet system.[97] He also criticised empty gestures towards Ukraine, like advocating its accession to the EU, which actually contradicted Poland's interests as such an eventuality would produce a much weaker and unstable EU.

Dariusz Rosati, former Foreign Minister, repeated the need to replace the romantic approach towards Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania with realism.[98] In his opinion, the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP concept played an important role in Polish political thought. However, it was formulated at a time of different circumstances and did not entirely suit current realities. The concept presumed the creation of fully independent Belarus and Ukraine which would be anti-Russian. Rosati argued that given the lack of an alternative, these states found it difficult to completely break away from Russian domination. Even though it could advocate a pro-European model, Poland did not have the means to provide an alternative to these countries.

Tadeusz Olszański, an expert on Ukraine at the Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, further questioned Giedroyc's EP and pointed out that some of his views might be outdated.[99] Referring to the *Kultura* programme on Międzymorze he wrote that "after the collapse of communism one had to part ways with make-believe ideas on post-communist states' potential and capabilities, face Poland's weakness and that of her neighbours...". He argued that the Piłsudskiite historical maxim, much cherished by *Kultura*, of "There may

[96] Kazimierz Wóycicki, "Nasz los nie decydują się za Bugiem", *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 January 2001.
[97] Klaus Bachmann, "Minimalizm czy koniec złudzeń?", *Unia&Polska*, 16 April 2001.
[98] "Polska polityka wschodnia, pełny zapis debaty zorganizowanej przez Fundację im. Stefana Batorego oraz redakcję 'Tygodnika Powszechnego' w dniu 21 marca 2001", Warsaw: Batory Foundation, 2001, pp. 15-16. (http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/ppw.pdf (accessed 21 February 2006)
[99] Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, "Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy: State Interest Comes First", (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No.11, 18 March 2001), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 263-267.

be no free Poland without a free Ukraine" could become detrimental to Polish interests as it inherently implied an inevitable conflict with Russia. He noted that Ukrainians might be more conscious of Poland's need to have good relations with Russia than the Polish political elite. Olszański argued that the Ukrainians no longer needed Polish support to consolidate their statehood, and the Eastern orientation that dominated Ukrainian policies was a "sovereign choice" that Poland had to respect. Like Sienkiewicz, he stated that Polish NGOs might try to assist the growth of civil society and democracy in the East but that the Polish state should stay clear of such a patronising mission itself and not make it a foreign policy objective. There was one aspect of Sienkiewicz's article that Olszański disagreed with: its title. He found it unsuitable as Poland was hardly a great power and use of such grand phraseology obscured the more down to earth issues like visas, regional cooperation which foreign policy should address.[100]

4.2.3.4 Idealist/Romantic/Prometheist Camp

Polish Nobel laureate and contributor to *Kultura*, Czesław Miłosz, challenged Sienkiewicz's claim about bringing a new interpretation to EP and argued that there had been proponents of disengagement in Ukrainian and Belarusian affairs for a long time.[101] Miłosz thought that Sienkiewicz overestimated the Westernness of Poland and, therefore, argued that there was a civilisational gap between Poland and its Eastern neighbours that made dialogue hard to sustain. He concluded by saying

> ... the minimalism advocated by ... Sienkiweicz is reminiscent of familiar slogans of national realism, or rather national self interest. While Sienkiewicz finds fault with foreign policy inspired by the ideas of Giedroyc and Mieroszewski, his own precepts do not seem likely to produce any salutary innovations.

Another commentator who criticised the realist camp for betraying the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski school of EP was Bogumiła Berdychowska, a Ukrainian expert and Deputy Director of Radio Polonia.[102] She dismissed the three "delusions" listed by Sienkiewicz: First, the fact that Russia considered Poland the servant of the West did not automatically mean that Poland had no independent EP. Berdychowska asked, "Since when have beliefs held by Russians been a measure of reality?" Second, the development of civil societies in ULB was not a delusion but an actual ongoing process. There were already well-established civil society organisations in the region which even the Lukashenko regime could not destroy. Berdychowska agreed with Sienkiewicz about the third delusion

[100] Interview with Tadeusz Olszański, 29 May 2002, Warsaw.
[101] Czesław Miłosz, "Against Minimalism" (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 04 March 2001, No.9), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 249-250.
[102] Bogumiła Berdychowska, "Giedroyć Still Relevant" (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No. 9, 04 March 2001), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 251-257.

and admitted that democratic institutions in Ukraine and Belarus were weak. However, in her opinion, Poland still had to foster good relations with these countries and try to influence developments, regardless of how democratic transformation fared. Besides, there were significant political forces in these countries, advocating democracy and the free market.

Jerzy Pomianowski provided *Kultura*'s reaction to the debate[103]: He argued that the minimalist approach was not a novelty. He gave examples of criticism directed at *Kultura*'s EP in both neo-Dmowskiite publications like *Myśl Polska* and the daily *Nasz Dziennik* and publications like *Przegląd* and the daily *Trybuna*, affiliated with post-communist circles. He claimed that the arguments of these critics were "antiquated and discredited" and they "ignor[ed] new historical circumstances." In effect Giedroyc and Mieroszewski's ideas remained unchallenged. Pomianowski stated that Sienkiewicz's minimalism was in reality passivism and argued that if Giedroyc had followed minimalism 55 years earlier, there would be no *Kultura* which impacted on many people's thinking in the East. He reiterated the traditional *Kultura* claim that post-1989 Polish governments were far from implementing the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine in their foreign policies. The facts listed by Sienkiewicz, such as Poland's weakness in the ULB region or stunted democracy in these countries, were not caused as a result of the inadequacy of the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine, but of the passivity of Poland's foreign policy. Pomianowski argued that Poland's current foreign policy was minimalist enough and there was no need for further encouragement.

Pomianowski criticised Sienkiewicz's and Olszański's opinions on Ukraine. He rejected the argument that there was a large cultural gap between Ukraine and the West (including Poland) but proximity between Ukraine and Russia and that Ukraine itself did not want independence. Pomianowski argued that Turkey had staunch pro-Western policies despite that fact that there was a wider gap between Turkey and the "Christian Europe".[104] He observed that 91% of Ukrainians had voted for independence and that the rise of an anti-independence tendency was ephemeral. He wrote "... when Piłsudski's brigade liberated Kielce in 1914, its welcome were closed window shutters. The Congress Kingdom of Poland was praying for the Tsar. Luckily, moods tend to pass."

Pomianowski maintained that Russia could either give up its expansionism and build a modern economy based on advanced technology or pursue its traditional policy of "appropriation of other nations' land and natural resources". He argued that Russia's

[103] Jerzy Pomianowski, "The Debate on Eastern Policy: All Possible Mistakes Have Already Been Made" (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 25 March 2001, No. 12), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 268-279.
[104] Pomianowski seems to forget that the Ottoman Empire (considered as the predecessor of modern Turkey) had been a player in European diplomacy since the 15th century and the westernisation process started at a time when Ukraine was nowhere to be found on the map.

profits from exploitation of its natural energy resources discouraged it from developing other economic sources for income and supported the inclination to resort to traditional policies. An independent Ukraine was the main obstacle to Russian encroachment, which might spill over into other regions if the Ukrainian obstacle was removed. Pomianowski, a faithful believer in Poland's grand mission in the East, argued that Poland could stop Russian expansionism and make Russia realise that "there is only one viable road which leads to development and peace" by supporting Ukraine. And continued, "Whoever thinks this goal can be achieved by cultivating minimalism and passivism plays a dangerous game which may have dire consequences."

4.3 CONCLUSION

The Polish EP debate developed in the 20th century within a conceptual framework supported by continued reference firstly to the Piłsudskiite and Dmowskiite traditions and secondly to precepts developed under *Kultura* and systematised by Giedroyc and Mieroszewski. Many aspects under discussion became obsolete due to political, economic and systemic changes. For instance, the issue of possible Polish territorial claims concerning Wilno and Lwów, which was the crux of the émigré disagreement following the war, were by 1980s no more on the agenda of mainstream debate. Similarly, Poland's prospective NATO membership had become a foregone conclusion by 1995 despite much ado about its desirability.

Despite changing international and domestic circumstances and relevance of specific issues under debate, the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine proved to be the most robust conceptual reference point for both foreign policy makers of the Third Republic and participants in intellectual debates. The doctrine enjoyed such high acclaim that it almost became a dogma. The 2000-01 debate on minimalism demonstrates the widespread acceptance of the concept as a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. Sienkiewicz's and other "realists'" critical approach towards the concept was considered almost as heresy by many high profile commentators.

Polish foreign policy's largely undisputed Western orientation achieved its main objections of Poland's membership in NATO and the EU. Polish EP, on the other hand, will have to go through a period of reappraisal and adjustment as Poland tries to consolidate its place in the newly enlarged EU. Poland's ambitions of influencing the EU Eastern Dimension will be a test case not only for the applicability of its EP agenda but also for the longevity of Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine.

This chapter aimed to give an outline of intellectual and academic debates that contributed to the conceptual development of Polish EP. The debate has evolved throughout the 1990s, with the pro-Russian, pro-Western and *Kultura* camps at the outset and the diversification of the debate and blurring of camps. By the end of 1990s the existence of EP was no longer discussed but the debate intensified, questioning the aims and means of EP. While the minimalism debate set the tone for future appraisals of EP, with Poland's imminent entry into the EU, Poland's possible contribution to a common European policy towards its East featured increasingly as a focal point of discussions. The following three chapters on Poland's bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus will examine the events and policies that facilitated this conceptual evolution.

Chapter Five

Poland's Relations with Russia

This chapter will present relations between Poland and Russia in the post-1989 period. It will be divided into thematic sections covering the most important issues that dominated bilateral relations. The first section will deal with the impact of NATO enlargement on bilateral relations. Even though the issue of Poland's accession to NATO ceased to be high on the foreign policy agenda following a reluctant Russian acceptance, the process of negotiations for NATO enlargement give important insight into the Polish perceptions of Russia and how Polish Eastern policy (EP) was rendered irrelevant when Russia chose to negotiate directly with the West. The second section will cover economic relations. A brief account of settlement of mutual debt will be given as well as of the effects of EU enlargement on bilateral trade and Poland's attempts to expand its exports into Eastern markets. The section will also present a recent scandal on the privatisation of a large Polish refinery and oil supply contracts. In both cases the allegations were made about murky relations between Polish politicians, businessmen and Russian oil giants and their designs on the Polish energy market.

The third section will follow on the theme of the second and will study the circumstances of and controversies about the most important commodity in Polish-Russian trade, natural gas. It will highlight the politics surrounding gas supply contracts and the building and ownership of pipelines. The fourth section will explain security, economic and transport issues arising out of Poland's sharing a border with Russia's Kaliningrad region. And the fifth section will cover historical and emotional issues that create controversies in bilateral relations. Although issues are many in number and large in scope, the section will highlight only the Katyń problem and Polish involvement in the Chechen problem. The chapter will not cover issues related to the Russian minority in Poland and Poles in Russia. The former is relatively small as a population and the issues relating to the latter are often surpassed in importance by more high profile agenda items relating to security policy or economic relations. It should also be mentioned that Poles in Russia are quite dispersed in terms of geographical location (unlike those in Ukraine or Belarus) so they do not play a significant role in regional or national Russian politics compared to their counterparts in Ukraine or Belarus.

5.1 THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

NATO accession, considered by the Polish establishment as their biggest foreign policy success in the 1990s, was at the same time a thorn in the already troubled Polish-Russian

relations. The issue was, however, far from a bilateral one and Poland, even though a subject of the NATO enlargement issue, was often not even considered by Russia as an opponent or an influential actor in the conflict. Russia saw it as a case between itself and the West (mainly the US) and Poland as only a willing participant, without much say over the final decision. Accordingly, enlargement was a strategic plan devised primarily to safeguard Western interests by encroaching on Russian ones rather than to provide security for Central Eastern Europe. Consecutive Polish governments complained about Russia talking to the West over their heads and ignoring Poland's role in the NATO enlargement issue. However, the gravity of the issue surpassed Poland's self image problems. Despite the fact that NATO enlargement was very much a US and the West versus Russia affair, its implication and expected consequences cast a shadow over Polish-Russian relations.

5.1.1 Early 1990s

Poland established relations with NATO as early as 21 March 1990 when Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski paid a visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Soon after that, in July 1990 NATO invited all Warsaw Pact states to establish regular diplomatic relations with the alliance.[1] On 26 November 1990 the North Atlantic Assembly gave observer status to MPs from Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. In his address to the Assembly Skubiszewski argued that the Warsaw Pact was defunct as a defence organisation and "a system of collective security, including possibly collective defence, embracing the whole of Europe", which benefited from the institutional capabilities of CSCE with the participation of NATO was needed. Skubiszewski ruled out a "broadening of the obligations resulting from the North Atlantic Alliance" or "an expansion of the area where it is competent to act" and added that "nothing should be done to create a sense of apprehension or suspicion on the part of the Soviet Union."[2] At that point neither Poland nor NATO had any incentive to initiate radical changes in their security and defence policies. For Poland, which was pursuing a two-track policy, angering the Soviet Union was too risky while talks on withdrawal of Soviet troops were under way. For NATO and the West, extending the alliance's capabilities to a new area under circumstances of high uncertainty was not reasonable.

However, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991 and the failed Moscow coup in August, Poland, alongside other Visegrad states, took a bolder line and expressed its intention to join NATO in October 1991. NATO's answer was the

[1] London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, North Atlantic Council, London 05-06 July 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm (accessed 11 March 2007).
[2] "Polska a bezpieczeństwo europejskie - przemówienie ministra spraw zagranicznych RP Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego, do Zgromadzenia Północnoatlantyckiego, Londyn, 29 listopada 1990 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 526, 1991, No. 4, pp.7-17.

establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the participation of not only the Visegrad countries but also Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Soviet Union. Poland, alongside Visegrad states, was disappointed with NACC as it put all ex-Warsaw Pact countries on an equal footing in terms of relations with NATO. As Kobrinskaya put it, "it did not satisfy their ambitions to get a special regard of the West as the 'pioneers' of the velvet revolutions."[3] Poland's disappointment with NACC was reflected in Lech Wałęsa's brainchild, NATO-bis, a proposed regional defence organisation which was supposed to fill in the security vacuum in Central Eastern Europe and form a stepping stone towards NATO membership. The idea was floated by Poland at a Visegrad summit in September 1992 but failed to garner any support.

At this stage even though the Polish government, made up of post-Solidarity parties, was trying to make NATO membership a foreign policy priority, there was no consensus on what direction Polish security policy would assume. Competing proposals ranged from cooperation of Międzymorze states to establishing a new military balance in Europe (by the Confederation for Independent Poland, *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* - KPN) to relying on a national army strong enough to guarantee sovereignty (Christian National Union, *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe* - ZChN).[4] The largest opposition party (Democratic Left Alliance, *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* - SLD) was also against NATO membership, mostly due to fears of harming Polish-Russian relations. The SLD believed that NATO and the West's policy towards Poland was inevitably a function of their policies towards Russia so Poland could not rely on Western security guarantees and hence should create a security system based on bilateral agreements and regional pacts created within the OSCE[5] framework (the organisation on which Russians proposed building the new European security architecture).[6] SLD conceded that Poland might join NATO but not before NATO redefined its own strategy within the new geopolitical context. Besides, Polish entry into NATO would stretch the alliance's borders to Bug, and worsen Poland's relations with Russia.[7]

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[3] Irina Kobrinskaya, "Implications of the PfP Program and Perspectives of NATO Enlargement on the Reform of the Military in the Central Eastern European States and Impact on Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy", NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1998, pp. 7-8. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/ (accessed 07 March 2007).

[4] Jadwiga Stachura, "Partie polityczne a polska polityka zagraniczna" in *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej (RPPZ) 1992*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1992, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)

[5] Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) changed its name to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at its Budapest summit in December 1994. For reasons of consistency OSCE will be used in the text even when referring to the period prior to December 1994.

[6] Piotr Mickiewicz, "Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej a NATO 1990-1999. Pomiędzy polityką a rzeczywistością" (published on 05 March 2002) http://bezuprzedzen.pl/poglady/nato1.shtml (accessed 21 February 2006).

[7] See Tadeusz Iwiński and Józef Oleksy (SLD) at the discussion in Sejm on foreign policy, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 1 Kadencja, 43 Posiedzenie, 2 Dzień, 30 April 1993. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).

Meanwhile, Russian objections to NATO enlargement was becoming more vocal after Central European states openly sought membership. However, Russian President Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw in August 1993 brought a surprise when the joint declaration of the Polish and Russian presidents included the following words on the subject of Poland's NATO ambition:[8]

> President Lech Wałęsa explained Poland's well-known position on this issue, which was received with understanding by President Boris Yeltsin. In perspective, a decision of this kind by sovereign Poland aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests of other States, including also Russia.

It is not known exactly how Yeltsin agreed to such a declaration that did not concur with Russia's stance on NATO enlargement at that time. One explanation, put forward by journalist Tomasz Lis, is that Wałęsa managed to persuade Yeltsin by careful word play and diplomatic bargaining.[9] Another, offered by Terry, is Yeltsin intended to prevent a Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement by offering Warsaw its approval for NATO membership in return for Warsaw adopting a "hands off policy" towards Ukraine.[10] Whatever the real reason, Yeltsin soon made a U-turn by sending letters to France, Germany, US and the UK in which he warned them about NATO enlargement and proposed giving joint security guarantees to Central East European countries. Poland reacted to the letter by a statement by the Foreign Minister as well as letters written to NATO and to governments of 16 NATO member states. It was emphasised that Poland had "unhappy experiences" of security guarantees in the past and a Russian security guarantee would mean dependence.[11]

5.1.2 Partnership for Peace

The response of the US to Russian objections and to the expectations of Polish and other Central East European states (CEEs) was the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) launched on 10 January 1994 at NATO's Brussels summit. The programme was intended to be a compromise solution offering CEEs participation in NATO on a larger scale, while refraining from antagonising Russia by not offering them full membership. Another disappointment for CEEs caused by PfP was that the programme was open to all participants of NACC and OSCE countries, therefore not giving any preferential treatment

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[8] "Wspólna Deklaracja Polsko-Rosyjska, Warszawa, 25 sierpnia 1993 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 533, 1993, No. 3, pp. 57-64.
[9] Tomasz Lis, *Wielki finał. Kulisy wstępowania Polski do NATO*, Kraków: Znak, 1999, pp. 34-41 and 48-49.
[10] Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 33, 2000, No.1, p.23.
[11] "Wypowiedź ministra spraw zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego dotycząca polityki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wobec NATO, zwłaszcza w związku z listem prezydenta Rosji Borysa Jelcyna z 15 września 1993 r. do przywódców Francji, Niemiec, USA i Wielkiej Brytanii, Warszawa, 4 października 1993 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 534, 1993, No. 4, pp. 14-17.

to CEEs. Even though the Polish government officially welcomed the programme and joined it in February 1994, they criticised it for "failing to set a time period and criteria for membership" and "making membership dependent on the degree of preparation of candidates and on the assessment of the overall situation of European security."[12]

By 1994 mainstream political parties in Poland had reached unanimity on the issue of adopting Poland's NATO accession as a foreign policy priority. This was no doubt thanks to the electoral victory of SLD in October 1993 and the tempering nature of government responsibility on ideological stances. This unanimity facilitated the formation of the main Polish arguments for NATO enlargement and against Russian objections. Consecutive Polish governments, echoing the US arguments, reiterated that they sought NATO membership not because of a perceived threat from Russia but because NATO would fill in a security vacuum and help bring stability that was necessary for political and economic transformation in the region. Despite the fluffy rhetoric, it was obvious that Warsaw perceived threats to its security from Russia. Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stated that talk of "special interests" or of a "special role" of Russia in its near abroad was worrisome and unacceptable for Poland and would harm regional stability.[13] A 1995 report on Poland and NATO, written by post-Solidarity politicians who had served high level positions in Foreign and Defence Ministries, talked about the Russian elites' intentions of "restoring a European order around a classic balance of power, not integration".[14] It added

> Policy towards Poland and Central Europe is subordinated to a Russian blueprint for Europe's future geopolitics. The maximum plan is preservation of a belt of militarily, politically and economically weak states and gradual expansion of Russia's presence in this area until its effective power enables it to re-draw spheres of influence in this region.

Another Polish rhetoric was its readiness for cooperation with Russia on European security.[15] It was soon demonstrated that such words had no substance: In 1996 the newspapers reported that during a visit to Moscow in April Defence Minister Stanisław Dobrzański proposed Russians to create a Polish-Russian joint battalion to take part in UN peacekeeping operations.[16] This was found to be most controversial in Poland. Politicians from the Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności* - UW) thought this might amount to dissonance between the declarations of successive governments for NATO entry and the actual

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[12] "Przemówienie ministra spraw zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Andrzeja Olechowskiego wygłoszone w Sejmie RP na temat aktualnej sytuacji międzynarodowej i wynikających z niej zagrożeń dla Polski, Warszawa, 21 stycznia 1994 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 535, 1994, No. 1, pp. 19-28.
[13] "Prezentacja polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 1994 roku - Wystąpienie ministra spraw zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Andrzeja Olechowskiego w Sejmie , Warszawa, 12 maja 1994 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 536, 1994, No. 2, pp. 37-62.
[14] Andrzej Ananicz et al., *Poland-NATO Report*. www.msz.gov.pl (accessed 02 May 2000) (Also published by Institute for Public Affairs (Warsaw), 1995 and Polish version appeared in *Rzeczpospolita*. Jan Skórzyński, "Przeciw wojskowej i politycznej samotności (Raport Polska-NATO)", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 October 1995.
[15] See for instance Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Building Poland's security: Membership of NATO a key objective", *NATO Review*, Vol. 44, 1996, No. 3, pp. 3-7.
[16] Maria Wągrowska, "Jak współpracować z Rosją", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 May 1996.

practice. Bronisław Komorowski of the National Defence Committee (OBN) at Sejm said that a joint military exercise with Russia might be interpreted as a return to the past relation between Poland and Russia and was, therefore, undesirable. The controversy also concerned Dobrzański's negotiations in Moscow concerning procurement of spare parts for weapons. Komorowski commented that even though stopping technical cooperation with Russia was impossible (given the fact that the bulk of weaponry in Polish army was Soviet made), Poland should strive to purchase necessary parts from other post-communist countries such as Ukraine or Slovakia. He added, "Entering into deep cooperation with Russia is unsafe."[17]

Kobrinskaya argued that the shadow cast by NATO expansion over Polish Russian relations and Poland's urge to reorient its weapons system to that of NATO (thus offering a lucrative market for Western suppliers), hindered Poland from keeping its armed forces effective.[18] She argued that Russia was also reluctant about sales to Poland as Poland tried to obtain licences for future sales (onward sales to third parties). Quoting Polish military experts, she wrote that Russian-Polish military technical cooperation was at a level lower than what was necessary in terms of meeting the demand.

The NATO expansion issue also plagued the already troubled bilateral relations on several occasions when unnecessary tension was created by a war of words. One such instance was in autumn 1995 when Defence Minister Zbigniew Okoński declared Poland's interest in having NATO troops and nuclear weapons stationed on its territory after becoming a member.[19] A response came in the shape of "leaked" information that Russia was contemplating countermeasures to NATO enlargement which included stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus, Western Russia and Baltic Sea.[20]

5.1.3 NATO negotiates with Russia

Following the disappointment of PfP and the equally noncommittal 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, Poland was given a guarantee by the re-elected US President, Bill Clinton, that it and the other CEEs would not be kept in NATO's waiting room forever. In a speech at Detroit on 22 October 1996, he announced that the "first group of countries should be full-fledged members" of NATO in 1999 during NATO's 50th anniversary.[21] On 8 July 1997 at NATO's Madrid summit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join the alliance and Poland started accession talks in September of that year.

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[17] Maria Wagrowska, "Jak współpracować z Rosją", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 May 1996.
[18] Kobrinskaya, "Implications of the PfP Program", p. 13.
[19] "On Deployment of NATO Troops, Nuclear Weapons in Poland", *OMRI Daily Digest*, 04 October 1995.
[20] Sherman W. Garnett, "Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?", *Foreign Policy* , 1996, No. 102, pp. 71-72.
[21] Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President to the People of Detroit", Fisher Theater, Detroit, Michigan, Office of the Press Secretary (Detroit, Michigan), 22 October 1996. http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/10/1996-10-22-president-speech-on-foreign-policy-in-detroit-mi.html (accessed 05 January 2007)

Meanwhile, Moscow had not wavered its stance against NATO enlargement. On 18 December 1996 during the NACC Defence Ministers' meeting in Brussels the Russian Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, warned NATO that[22]

> ...we'll have to take certain, appropriate measures and we cannot exclude the following measures. In fact, today we should not describe them, but of course they will involve the political, economic and military relations between Russia and NATO countries. We can't rule out that NATO enlargement will stall implementation of certain existing treaties and will make it much more difficult to ratify new agreements and treaties.

He added that Russia could not trust the assurances given by the NATO Secretary General about foreign troops and nuclear weapons not being stationed in the territories of new members. He referred to the time when Mikhail Gorbachev negotiated with the West on Soviet troop withdrawals from CEE and said "Verbal assurances were given by many, many leaders that there will never be any talk about NATO enlargement to the East. Nevertheless, it is happening." He asked for "official guarantees to these verbal assurances." In addition during the negotiations in 1997 between the US, NATO and Russia for defining a new framework for NATO-Russia relations, high ranking Russian officials declared that they demanded the right to veto NATO decisions.[23]

Poles were alarmed at the prospect of a written commitment by NATO to Russia about giving any veto rights to Russia or imposing limits on stationing troops or weapons on Polish soil which would undermine Poland's defence.[24] Earlier Moscow proposed the concept of "political membership" for Poland and other CEEs, which would mean that the new members would not participate in any military aspect of the alliance. Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati warned NATO against "appeasing" the Russians.[25] Deputy Defence Minister Andrzej Karkoszka made another reference to history by saying that "The smell of Yalta is always with us."[26]

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[22] "Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session NATO HQ Brussels, 18 December 1996. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961218a.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

[23] "Russia still wants veto, not just voice in NATO", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 28 March 1997.

[24] Poles were not alone in getting alarmed over NATO's deal with Russia. Henry A. Kissinger had also voiced his concerns about giving Russia too much of a say in NATO. However, he remained a supporter of enlargement and of Poland's NATO accession. He was reported to have said that Poland "was so pro-American that it would help insure that the United States remained embedded in the Atlantic alliance" and would "never exclude the United States from European policy." Jane Perlez, "Blunt Reason for Enlarging NATO: Curbs on Germany", *New York Times*, 07 December 1997.

[25] Lis, *Wielki finał*, pp. 286-87.

[26] Paul Goble, "NATO: Analysis from Washington--'The Smell of Yalta'", *RFE/RL Features*, 18 March 1997.

5.1.4 NATO-Russia Founding Act

NATO's negotiations with Russia culminated in the signing of a NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris on 27 May 1997.[27] The Act established a Russian-NATO permanent joint council, ruled out any intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of prospective members but gave Russia only a "voice" rather than a right of veto. The act was technically not an international agreement, either.

The Paris deal did not have much of a positive impact on Polish-Russian relations as it failed to temper Russian objections to NATO enlargement. First, it intensified opposition to Yeltsin's policy from within Russia.[28] The Head of the Communist Party Gennadii Zyuganov called it "an act of unconditional surrender" and a "betrayal of Russia's interests" and former Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed said that Russia was "the losing side, signing an act on its own capitulation."[29] Second, the Act denied Russia a real say in the workings of NATO so there was no incentive for Russia to lift its objections to enlargement. There was no incentive for Moscow to be more conciliatory towards Poles, either. Moscow hoped, as Terry argued, that by keeping relations with Poland cool, it could delay enlargement, counting on NATO's membership requirement for an applicant to have no serious tension with their neighbours.[30] Third, Warsaw's advocacy of enlargement of NATO further east than Poland irritated Moscow about potential troubles Poland's active EP might cause. The Polish government reiterated its commitment to press for Lithuanian (and eventually other Baltic states') inclusion in NATO (even before Poland itself was in). During a visit to Vilnius on 13 November 1997 Geremek said "Lithuania can expect that when Poland becomes a member of NATO and the EU, she will become a motor pushing for Lithuania's entry."[31] Russia had warned the West repeatedly against any incursion beyond the "red line", into ex-Soviet states. Poland's emphasis on the strategic partnership with Ukraine was also viewed by Russia with suspicion.

Russian suspicion of Poland's budding EP was also reflected in the Russian media's coverage of the issue. There were comments ranging from those accusing Poland of challenging Russian interests in the ex-Soviet territories by trying to become a regional leader to more speculative ones talking about a conspiracy whereby Warsaw was trying to

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[27] "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May 1997. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm (accessed 05 January 2007)

[28] Irina Kobrinskaya argued that Russian unease about NATO enlargement had to do primarily with Russian domestic politics and foreign policy. She wrote that the issue was used as a weapon within government departments as well as in presidential election campaign, which in turn threatened to make Russian foreign policy more ideological and also push more important issues as the economy or regional development to the backburner. Irina Kobrinska, "Użyteczne narzędzie", *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 April 1997.

[29] "Communists respond to attacks on Duma", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 30 May 1997 and "Lebed slams Yeltsin for signing accord...", *RFE/RL Newsline* , 27 May 1997.

[30] Terry, "Poland's foreign policy", pp. 42-43.

[31] *Lietuvos Rytas*, 13 November 1997, quoted in Antanas Valionis, Evaldas Ignatavičius and Izolda Bričkovskienė , "From Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 1988-1998", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 1998, No. 2, p.22.

build a super state made up of itself, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania and extend its influence to "the district of Moscow itself."[32]

5.1.5 NATO enlargement and after

It was suggested that after NATO's invitation of CEE in July 1997, Russia changed its opposition tactics. Realising that the first wave of enlargement was inevitable, it focused on stopping a possible second wave.[33] Russian's acceptance was also claimed to be the reason why the issue of NATO enlargement completely disappeared from Polish Russian bilateral talks.[34] Another claim was that there was no incentive for Russia to respond to Polish initiatives after the prospect of NATO enlargement became a reality and the debate subsided.[35] It should also be stated that Russia was not the only hurdle in front of NATO enlargement. An equally vocal opposition was forming in the US and Western academic, political and media circles.[36] Anti enlargement arguments ranged from the prohibitive financial costs of integrating poorly funded armies in NATO to creating unnecessary tensions between the West and Russia by letting into NATO inherently anti-Russian, small countries.[37] This opposition from the West was considered such a big blow by the Warsaw political elite that Rosati, in a lecture he gave in 1999, listed two serious opponents of Poland's NATO entry: Russia and the New York Times.[38]

It is true that NATO enlargement vanished from bilateral talks but Russia never wanted to negotiate directly with Poland on that matter, nor had Poland ever agreed to open Poland's NATO aspiration up for discussion.[39] However, this does not mean that the issue of NATO altogether stopped casting a shadow over relations, even after Poland became a full member of NATO in April 1999. As Primakov allegedly told Geremek, "We know we can't prevent you joining NATO but don't expect us to enjoy it."[40]

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[32] Jerzy Malczyk, "Conspiracy-What conspiracy?", *Warsaw Voice*, 05 April 1998.
[33] Marek Menkiszak, "Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September", *Prace Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich*, 2002, No. 4, p.35.
[34] Artur Michalski, "Stosunki z Rosją", *RPPZ, 1999*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1999, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[35] Elzbieta Stadtmuller, "The Issue of NATO Enlargement in Polish – Russian Relations", NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 2000-01, p. 34. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/f99-01.htm (accessed 21 February 2006)
[36] A few examples of anti-enlargement literature are Peter Shearman, "Russia and NATO Enlargement: The Case Against", in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds), *Russia After the Cold War*, London: Longman, 2000, pp. 299-318, Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, 1998, No.1, pp. 2-6 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Unheard Case Against NATO Enlargement", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 44, 1997, No. 3, pp.52-62.
[37] George Kennan, a seasoned US foreign policy analyst and diplomat, declared his opposition to NATO enlargement and warned that the decision of enlargement might act as a catalyst for the resurgence of nationalist and anti-Western forces in Russia and bring back the Cold War atmosphere. George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error", *New York Times*, 05 February 1997.
[38] Dariusz Rosati, "System bruksolski. W stronę nowego porządku europejskiego" in *Polska i NATO. Materiały z konferencji*, Warsaw: Instytut Problemów Bezpieczeństwa. Fundacja Naukowa, 1999, pp.45-57.
[39] As Wałęsa said during the Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw in February 1995, "You know our stance: We want to join NATO and we are not going to ask Russia", Chernomyrdin preferred to dwell on economic issues. Jacek Czarnecki, "Do NATO bez pytania", *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 February 1995.
[40] Jarosław Giziński, "Polska marka", *Wprost*, 09 January 2000.

With the first wave of NATO enlargement already finalised and Russia assuming a more cooperative attitude towards especially the US after Vladimir Putin became the president in May 2000, it was hoped that there would be one conflict less between Poland and Russia. Articles appearing in Polish newspapers during high profile visits of Kwaśniewski to Moscow on 10 July 2000 and premier Mikhail Kasyanov's visit to Warsaw on 25 May 2001 talked about "breaking the ice" or "a new dawn" in bilateral relations. Poland's entry into NATO was indeed perceived by some commentators to be an opportunity for Poland to engage in a genuine partnership with Russia. For instance Grzegorz Gromadzki, an Eastern Europe analyst at the Batory Foundation, maintained that with Poland in NATO, anchored securely in the West, Polish political elite rid themselves of the pervading historical fear that Russia might once again dominate Poland.[41] Russia, accordingly, also reevaluated its position towards Central East Europe and the Baltics. A similarly optimistic view (and a reflection of the official stance) was voiced by Prof. Genowefa Grabowska (former head of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and MEP at the time of writing) who argued that Russia stopped perceiving Poland's NATO accession as an anti-Russian decision. [42] This happened through a process of Russia cultivating its own relations with NATO and becoming a member of the "coalition against terror" after 9/11. Grabowska noted the new, more "pro-European" rhetoric of Russian policymakers she observed during Russian-Polish visits and pointed out that there was no threat whatsoever Poland perceived from Russia.

Such expectations were high especially after bilateral relations hit an all time low in February 2000 when a group of protesters demonstrated against Russian involvement in Chechnya and attacked the building of the Russian Consulate in Poznań while the police reportedly did not intervene. Moscow reacted by recalling its ambassador and cancelling the planned visit of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Warsaw. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* commented that Poles had let their anti–Russian sentiment soar after coming under the protective umbrella of NATO and that Polish-Russian relations took a negative turn after the visit of NATO Secretary General George Robertson to Moscow (earlier in February 2000) where NATO expressed eagerness to improve bilateral relations.[43] Events in Poznań were also denounced (and the NATO bombing of Serbia in March 1999 commemorated) by demonstrations in Moscow in front of the Polish Embassy in March 2000. During one such demonstration organised by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, participants protested against Poland's membership in NATO and called Poland "the prostitute of NATO".[44] Such flare-ups concerning Poland's membership in

[41] Interview with Grzegorz Gromadzki, 17 July 2002, Warsaw
[42] Interview with Genowefa Grabowska, 10 May 2002, Warsaw.
[43] Sławomir Popowski, "Zgoda władz na antypolskie demonstracje", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 March 2000.
[44] "Flaga za flagę", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 March 2000.

NATO became more rare after NATO's decision to enlarge further east in 2004, including Baltic states and Russia-NATO relations evolved without Poland having any significant effect.

5.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND RUSSIA

The disruption caused by the 1989-91 period of regime change in CEE, the dissolution of CMEA and the Soviet Union hit established economic relations in the region but none suffered more disruption than Polish Russian trade and investment.[45] A reorientation of Polish trade towards the OECD and especially EU countries (as seen in Figure 1) might be a political success but such a rapid change proved disastrous for many Polish enterprises which concentrated on the Eastern markets.

Figure 1: Reorientation of trade: Poland's trade with Soviet Union/Russia versus Federal Republic of Germany/Germany 1970-2002 (% in total exports and imports)[46]



Whereas one third of Polish foreign trade was with the Soviet Union in 1985, by 1990, it was reduced to one fifth, following the economic crisis in the latter country.

[45] For information on reorientation of Poland's foreign trade and development of Poland's economic relations in the 1990s see George Blazyca, "Poland's Place in the International Economy" in George Blazyca and Ryszard Rapacki (Eds), *Poland into the New Millennium*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2001, pp. 249-273.

[46] Data from *Handel Zagraniczny*, Years 1991-1992 and *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-2002, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Table 1: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with the Soviet Union 1989-1991[47]

	1989		1990		1991	
	(million złoty)	% in total	(million złoty)	% in total	(million złoty)	% in total
Imports	2,688,802	18.1	15,369,501	19.8	23,193,059	14.1
Exports	4,048,255	20.8	19,767,703	15.3	17,311,671	11.0
Balance	1,359,453		+4,398,202		-5,881,388	

The system by which Polish-Soviet economic exchange was managed changed drastically in 1991. A sharp fall in turnover was caused by switching to a hard currency clearing system and to trade by means of market type contracts signed between enterprises instead of multi-annual, multi-product contracts or intergovernmental protocols.[48]

Poland established economic relations with the Russian Federation and signed a trade protocol on 3 September 1991, while the latter was still a part of the Soviet Union. The protocol foresaw for 1992 a turnover of up to 2.8 billion USD but this proved to be unrealistic.[49] Besides, the protocol itself was still not ratified by Duma. In addition to stagnating trade, several disputes started surfacing during negotiations on economic matters.

5.2.1 Settlement of mutual debt

Even though Poland managed to settle its debt issue with Western lenders (Paris and London clubs) and even negotiated a second round of substantial reduction by 1994, the problem of mutual debt between Poland and Russia arising from the Soviet period dragged on through lengthy negotiations. There was disagreement between the parties as to the actual amount of debt, how to calculate it and the currency the debt will be served in (transferable roubles -TR or hard currency). At the beginning Poland argued for a settlement on the basis of a "zero option". Even though the Russian side agreed with this in principle during Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's visit in October 1992, no settlement was reached and a joint commission was formed to look into the matter.[50] Putting the "zero option" into practice was complicated by debts arising out of unpaid trade balances which were accumulated in 1991-92 by Soviet importers. Many Polish enterprises which traditionally traded with the Soviet market kept on sending their exports (theoretically in exchange for hard currency) despite the fact that no payments were

[47] Data from *Handel Zagraniczny*, Years 1991 and 1992, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[48] Michał Dobroczyński, "Polska jako partner gospodarki rosyjskiej" in Stanisław Bieleń (Ed.), *Polska-Rosja. Czas przewartościowań*, Warszawa: Centrum Badań Wschodnich, 1995, p. 96.
[49] Wojciech Zajączkowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie", *RPPZ 1992*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1992, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[50] "In Poland, Gaidar agrees to zero-sum debt settlement", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 05 October 1992.

forthcoming.[51] A solution was found in 1995 and a framework agreement was signed in January when both sides agreed on a "zero plus option":[52] A zero option would be applied to debts accrued from trade before the end of 1990 when convertible currency settlements replaced roubles. The plus option would concern the outstanding payments arising from trade in 1991-92. Accordingly, an estimated 4.4 billion TR and 2 billion USD of Polish debt and 7 billion TR and 366 million USD of Russian debt would be annulled and the Russian side would pay 20 million USD in cash whereas the Polish side would transfer to Russians securities worth 150 million USD.[53] The debt issue was finalised in November 1996 when a full agreement based on the 1995 framework agreement was signed and went immediately into force.[54]

5.2.2 Trade

Economic exchange between Poland and Russia declined sharply in the period 1990-92 and relations were reduced to trade as non-trade forms of economic exchange were almost obliterated. There were efforts by governments to establish a legal framework for economic relations. A trade and economic cooperation treaty was signed on 25 August 1993 during Yeltsin's Warsaw visit. It contained provisions such as a commitment of both parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, which included the granting of most favoured nation status and safeguards against excess imports. The treaty was not ratified until 1995 and trade turnover did not reach the desired volume despite the reversal of downward trend. (See Table 2)

Table 2 :Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 1992-1995 (in thousand USD) [55]

	1992	1993	1994	1995
Imports	1,351,002	1,271,338	1,453,098	1,959,786
Exports	723,298	644,583	934,588	1,274,249
Balance	-627,704	-626,753	-518,510	-689,537

Trade between Poland and Russia was imbalanced in terms of both the composition of commodities and of the high deficit to the disadvantage of the former. Poland's imports from Russia were dominated by energy products like gas and oil and Russia's imports

[51] Ben Slay, *The Polish Economy: Crisis, Reform, and Transformation*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 173-74.
[52] Bronisław Sulimierski, "International debt problems and agreements with creditors" in *Polish Foreign Trade in 1994*, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1995, pp. 214-25.
[53] "Polish-Russian debt settled", *Rzeczpospolita*, 02 February 1995 and Lidia Oktaba, "Zadłużenie na zero z plusem", *Rzeczpospolita*, 31 January 1995.
[54] "Porozumienie między rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej w sprawie uregulowania wzajemnego zadłużenia Moskwa, 13 listopada 1996 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 534, 1996, No. 4, pp. 16-20.
[55] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-1996, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

from Poland were dominated mainly by foodstuffs, followed by chemical goods and machinery (see Table 7 below).

A deficit was inevitable as Poland was highly dependent on gas and oil imports from Russia and could not easily find alternative sources which would offer the same prices and easy delivery. A drastic increase in Polish exports to Russia to offset the imbalance was not a realistic option. The development of Polish exports was hampered by the lack of adequate banking and insurance services, frequent changes in customs regulations and high payment risk from the Russian side. Russia's not being a member of the World Trade Organisation was another obstacle.

Despite the existence of objective conditions obstructing development of Polish exports to Russia, the issue was perceived by certain post-communist and groups close to the farmers' party, the Polish Peasant Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* - PSL), as a matter of political choice rather than economic necessity. As explained in Chapter Four, the proponents of the so-called Russian option in foreign policy believed that Polish exporters were losing out on the enormous trade potential of Russian markets for the sake of reorienting Polish trade towards the West. This divergence of opinion was also behind the 1994 conflict between the Foreign Ministry (headed by the Wałęsa appointee Olechowski) and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (headed by PSL's Lesław Podkański) over economic relations with the East.

Poland's trade with Russia had not undergone any radical change in terms of structure or volume from 1992 to 1998. The aforementioned problems that affected trade negatively were not solved. However, new avenues for economic cooperation were sought. In addition to initiatives like the Economic Forum in Krynica, which promoted dialogue among CEEs and post-Soviet states after 1992, specific Russian-Polish initiatives like the Polish-Russian Chamber of Trade and Industry were launched. The chamber was established in 1993 to promote Polish exports to Russia and provides product certification services.[56] Another development was the initiation of economic cooperation with Russian regions. Poland signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the Republic of Tatarstan in October 1996.[57]

Border/bazaar trade must also be mentioned as a flourishing sector. Thanks to visa-free travel between Russia and Poland until 2003, millions of Russians (alongside other East Europeans) were trading in the bazaars in Poland. Many small companies sprang up in the

[56] See http://www.prihp.com.pl/ (accessed 06 November 2006)
[57] "Z regionów/obwodów Federacji Rosyjskiej. Republika Tatarstan", *Biuletyn Ekonomiczny*, No. 57, http://www.polweh.ru/be/be57/be5708.htm (accessed 21 February 2006).

bordering regions to cater for this sort of trade. As most of this trading activity was unregistered, it is difficult to know how much of it was carried out by Russians only.

The most drastic change in bilateral trade was caused by the Russian financial crisis of August 1998. Many Polish exporters, especially small and medium ones, were wiped off the Russian market as the demand for import goods fell and Russian importers lacked capacity for payment. For these companies finding new markets in the East was not an option as the whole region suffered from the Russian crisis and reorienting towards the EU was not possible as their goods would not live up to EU norms.[58]

Table 3: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 1996-1999 (in thousand USD)[59]

	1996	1997	1998	1999
Imports	2,525,849	2,685,489	2,372,279	2,675,722
Exports	1,653,799	2,154,695	1,597,263	710,237
Balance	-872,050	-530,794	-775,016	-1,965,485

Trade deficit with Russia rose from 775.5 million USD in 1998 to 1,965.5 million USD in 1999 due to the collapse of Polish exports. In 2000 it jumped to 3,757.7 million USD, this time due to a surge in gas and oil prices which caused Polish imports from Russia to go up from 2,675.7 million USD in value in 1999 to 4,619.4 million USD. Polish government took several measures in the following years to promote exports to Russia. The Russian crisis was a second blow to bazaar trade after Poland introduced voucher and invitation requirements for Russian and Belarusian citizens in early 1998 (See Appendix).

5.2.3 Regaining the Eastern markets

The Ministry of Economy attempted to remedy the problems created by the crisis as well as the long term trade imbalance. Together with the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (*Korporacji Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych SA* - KUKE) and the Polish Embassy in Russia, it prepared a programme called "Russia – Our commercial partner" to promote exports to Russia by providing credit insurance for trade transactions. The programme aimed to address the problem of finding loans for exporters as so far Polish banks were not willing to give credits to traders who did business with Russia as the Russian market was considered high risk, lacking any guarantee of payment.[60] A draft bill of 7 July 1994 which allowed the state treasury to guarantee the insurance of export credits was ratified by the Sejm on 16 November 2000 and went into force on 1 January 2001, allowing KUKE

[58] Dariusz Styczek, "Grey Eastern Clouds", *Warsaw Voice*, 15 November 1998.
[59] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1997-2000, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[60] Wanda Jelonkiewicz, "Russia – Our commercial partner", *Warsaw Voice*, 19 November 2000.

to offer a programme called "Export credits to the Russian Federation".[61] It offered export credit insurance to Polish exporters or Polish companies active in the Russian market for contracts worth up to 10 million USD with a payment period of one to five years.[62] KUKE would also provide credit insurance to selected Russian banks for loans to Russian buyers interested in Polish export goods. KUKE became the only company to offer products tailored for the Russian market as other insurers, among them the major ones like PZU or Warta, kept away from the high risk Russian market.[63]

Promotion of bilateral trade was also the purpose of the Polish-Russian Economic Forum established by Polish and Russian businessmen in July 2000 during Kwaśniewski's Moscow visit.[64] The Forum met again during Putin's visit to Warsaw in January 2002 and cooperation started giving fruit as four major business contracts were signed.[65]

Yet another initiative was the "Programme for regaining the Eastern markets" issued by the Council of Ministers on 4 February 2003. The programme endorsed KUKE's insurance packages for Russia and proposed several other pro-export measures.[66] It announced, among others, the establishment of a specialist unit in *Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego* which would deal with export credits and services. Subsidies for export of agricultural products would be given (within the limits allowed by the WTO). The government pledged assistance in certification of export goods and financial support for services catering to the export market. Although it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of those measures in the short term, an increase of about 46% was observed in 2004 in Polish exports to Russia.

Table 4: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia 2000-2004 (in thousand USD)[67]

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	4,619,449	4,422,276	4,407,432	5,214,710	6,390,629
Exports	862,052	1,331,827	1,331,827	1,512,330	2,842,669
Balance	-3,363,581	-3,075,605	-3,075,605	-3,702,380	-3,547,959

Share of Poland in Russia's trade remained low. Percentages of Russian import in Polish trade figures made Russia a significant partner thanks to the large volume of purchases of energy from Russia. Share of imports from Russia reached a high of 9.4% by 2000.

[61] "Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o zmianie ustawy o gwarantowanych przez Skarb Państwa ubezpieczeniach kontraktów eksportowych", *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 114, Pos. 1190, 20 December 2000.
[62] *KUKE Raport Roczny 2000* (Annual Report), pp. 17-18 www.signaart.com.pl/signa_proj/pliki/RaportKUKE2000.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
[63] Mariusz Przybylski, "Cisza poza KUKE", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 January 2002.
[64] Anita Błaszczak, "Potrzeba gwarancji, kredytów i reklam", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2000.
[65] "Gesty rosyjskiego prezydenta", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 January 2002.
[66] *Założenia polityki handlowej wobec rynków wschodnich na lata 2003 – 2004. Program Odzyskania Rynków Wschodnich*, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Warsaw, February 2003. http://www.mpips.gov.pl/pliki_do_pobrania/rynki_wschodnie.doc (accessed 09 November 2006)
[67] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 2001-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Table 5: 1993-2004 Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Russia (percentages of total export and import)[68]

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.8	6.3	5.1	5.9	9.4	8.8	8.0	5.2	7.2
Exports	4.6	5.4	5.6	6.8	8.4	5.6	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.8

Table 6: 1993-2004 Russia: Foreign Trade Turnover with Poland (percentages of total export and import)[69]

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	1.2	1.9	2.2	1.5	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.4
Exports	2.4	1.6	2.0	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.4	4.2	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.1

The commodity structure of trade between Poland and Russia remained largely unchanged, with Russia's mineral exports constituting an overwhelming 88.4% of its total exports to Poland by 2003.

[68] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1994-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[69] Data for 1993-2003 calculated on the basis of data from *Rossiia v tsifrakh : kratkii statisticheskii sbornik* (years 1996,1998 and 2004), Moskva: Goskomstat Rossii. Data for 2004 from the website of the Russian Federation, Federal State Statistics Service http://www.gks.ru /bgd/regl/B05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/25-02.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

Table 7: Poland's trade with Russia by commodity groups, 1999 and 2003[70]

	Poland's Export to Russia by commodity groups				Poland's Import from Russia by commodity groups			
	1999		2003		1999		2003	
Commodity groups	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%
Agricultural and food products	277.43	*39.06*	358.40	*23.69*	39.52	*1.48*	37.03	*0.71*
Mineral products	3.40	*0.48*	6.22	*0.41*	2,203.11	*82.33*	4,609.76	*88.40*
Chemical industry products and plastics	137.27	*19.33*	301.74	*19.94*	133.00	*4.97*	213.89	*4.10*
Light ind. products (textiles, footwear, hides and skins etc)	40.68	*5.73*	59.51	*3.93*	20.91	*0.78*	12.30	*0.23*
Wood and paper products	68.27	*9.61*	246.73	*16.31*	62.75	*2.35*	48.71	*0.93*
Stone, plaster, cement, glass products	18.18	*2.56*	89.19	*5.89*	2.83	*0.11*	3.56	*0.07*
Base metals	30.73	*4.32*	90.84	*6.01*	135.86	*5.08*	219.06	*4.20*
Machinery, electrical, transport, optical equip.	90.21	*12.70*	296.36	*19.58*	71.26	*2.66*	59.48	*1.14*
Other manufactured products (furniture, toys etc)	43.39	*6.11*	63.59	*4.20*	0.58	*0.02*	7.15	*0.14*
Arms and Ammunition	0.03	*0.01*	~0	*0*	5.47	*0.20*	3.64	*0.07*
Others	0.64	*0.09*	0.60	*0.040*	0.43	*0.02*	0.13	*0.01*
Total	710.23	*100*	1,513.18	*100*	2,675.72	*100*	5,214.71	*100*

5.2.4 Effects of EU enlargement

Poland's accession to the EU and the consequences of EU enlargement on Russia's trade with the union became the subject of a bitter dispute in 2003 over the extension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA had been signed by Russia and the EU in order to regulate political and economic relations and trade with a view to establishing a free trade area in the future. It entered into force on 1 December 1997. The EU expected Russia to extend the PCA automatically to the new members of the EU as of 1 May 2004. Moscow refused to do this, arguing that this would harm its economic interests as it would lose many trade concessions gained by earlier bilateral treaties with these countries and the current exporters to EU candidate countries would have difficulty adapting their goods to EU norms which would be required if PCA comes into force in the new members. Moscow gave a list of 14 demands which it wanted fulfilled before it could

[70] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 2000 and 2004, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

accept the extension of PCA. One of the demands was compensation for an estimated loss of 150 million USD due to EU enlargement.[71] EU officials ruled out any compensation as Russia was not a WTO member and argued that Russia would actually benefit from the enlargement as new EU members would have to bring down tariffs. Poland, for instance, would have to reduce its tariffs on steel products from 10.3% to the EU norm of 1.7%.[72] The EU claimed that even though there might be limited disadvantage to Russia caused by EU agricultural subsidies extended to new members, within the broader context benefits would outweigh the disadvantages.[73]

The prospect of PCA not being extended to Poland (and other future EU members) brought about the threat of a total breakdown of bilateral trade as Poland renounced the 25 August 1993 trade treaty on 1 November 2003 (in time for the agreement to run out on 1 May 2004, the date of Polish entry into the EU, following a prescribed six month cancellation period.)[74] The Polish media commented that Russia was trying to blackmail the EU into giving concessions on non-economic matters (like visa free travel for Kaliningrad inhabitants) by using the PCA agreement as an excuse.[75] On the other hand, the Russian ambassador to Poland, Nikolai Afanasievsky, warned that the extension of PCA would harm Polish enterprises as customs duties on Polish imports from Russia, such as aluminium, would increase and those on Polish exports to Russia would go up twofold or more.[76] He urged the Polish government to enter into negotiations with Russia on a new bilateral trade treaty independent of the PCA.

After tough negotiations involving implicit threats, the EU and Russia reached an agreement on 27 April 2004 in Luxembourg. Russia agreed to extend PCA to cover EU enlargement after the EU made some concessions on trade matters and assured Russia to preserve its existing exports to the new EU member countries. Concessions included the promise to raise the quota of Russian steel exports to the EU, to increase customs duty on Russian aluminium exports gradually and to reduce tariffs on Russian imports to the new EU members from 9 to 4%.[77]

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[71] "Nie wyklucza sankcji przeciw Rosji w sporze o rozszerzenie", *Europap*, 17 February 2004.
[72] Francoise Le Bail (Director for Russia, DG Trade), "Enlargement of the European Union: Good news for Russia". Presentation given during the visit to Moscow of the Trade Delegation of the European Commission on 11 April 2003. http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/cis_7.htm (accessed 05 October 2004)
[73] Website of the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, "Russia and EU Enlargement: Selected Issues" http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pId/447 /enlargement.doc (accessed 06 November 2006)
[74] Mariusz Przybylski, "Zgoda będzie w ostatniej chwili", *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 April 2004.
[75] Anna Słojewska et al., "Rosja szantażuje, Polska może stracić", *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 February 2004.
[76] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Może nie być preferencji dla Polski", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 March 2004.
[77] *Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations*, Brussels, 27 April 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/js_elarg_270404.htm. Text of the Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement may be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/protocol_0404.htm (both links accessed 06 November 2006).

5.2.5 Economic relations and domestic politics: The Orlen affair

As mentioned above, minerals such as gas and oil constitute almost 90% of Poland's imports from Russia, and Poland is dependant on Russian sources for energy.[78] Poland buys around 95% of its crude oil from Russia.[79] Given the level of dependence, high monetary value of imports and tensions between Poland and Russia, the effects of the issue of energy imports transcend the sphere of economic and foreign relations, and creep easily into domestic politics. The Orlen affair that was kick-started by allegations about crude oil supply contracts in the beginning of 2004 soon snowballed into a fully-fledged scandal concerning the sale of Polish oil refineries to Russians and the degree of alleged collusion by Polish politicians and businessmen with Russian oil giants and secret services.

The interview that started the investigation into the affair was given in April 2004 by Wiesław Kaczmarek, the Minister of Treasury in the SLD-UP government from October 2001 to January 2003, to *Gazeta Wyborcza*, where he made allegations about the arrest and consequent sacking of Andrzej Modrzejewski, the CEO of the biggest Polish oil refinery, PKN (*Polski Koncern Naftowy*) *Orlen*, in February 2002.[80] Kaczmarek, now a member of the newly formed Social Democratic Party of Poland (*Socjaldemokracji Polskiej* – SDPL), a splinter from SLD, claimed that Modrzejewski was arrested on trumped up charges upon the request of the Polish intelligence service (*Urząd Ochrony Państwa* – UOP) which was acting on the orders of Prime Minister, Leszek Miller. Accordingly, Miller was trying to block a huge oil delivery deal Modrzejewski was going to sign the following day with a company called J&S which operated from Cyprus under the ownership of two Ukrainians with Polish citizenship and acted as an intermediary firm buying crude oil from Russian companies (mainly Lukoil) and selling it to Polish (and other) refineries.[81] A parliamentary commission was formed to investigate the matter. As the inquiry progressed, many revelations were made about secret dealings of politicians, businessmen and representatives of Russian oil interests and the scope of the scandal extended enormously. It is impossible (and unnecessary) to present all the ins and outs of the

[78] *Energy policy of Poland until 2025* (Document adopted by the Council of Ministers on 04 January 2005), Ministry of Economy and Labour, Energy Policy Team http://www.mgip.gov.pl/GOSPODARKA/Energetyka/Polityka+energetyczna+Polski+do+2025+roku.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
[79] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, 2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

[80] Dominika Wielowieyska, "Miller, Orlen i UOP" (interview with Wiesław Kaczmarek), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 02 April 2004. See also Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, "Wiesław Kaczmarek: Nie widzę powodu, żeby ciągle przyszywano mi kolejną brodę" , *Poranek radia TOK FM*, 02 April 2004, serwisy.gazeta.pl/tokfm/1,54125,2001932.html, accessed 24 October 2004.
[81] In June 2002 UOP was abolished and two new offices replaced it: Foreign Intelligence Agency (*Agencja Wywiadu* – AW) and Internal Security Agency (*Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* – ABW).

scandal here. The two threads (out of many) investigated, namely the privatisation of *Rafineria Gdańska* (RG) and oil supply contracts will be summarised below.[82]

As mentioned above, the sacking of Modrzejewski and the subsequent change of board members of PKN Orlen was at first linked to the renewal of the 14 billion USD crude oil supply contract with J&S for another five years. However, soon it appeared that the incident was also linked with the privatisation of RG. Discussions on the privatisation of RG had been ongoing since 2001. A British company called Rotch had tried to buy RG, having teamed up with the Hungarian MOL first and Russian Lukoil next but the sale was not permitted. It was alleged that during the meeting in Warsaw of PM Miller with the President of Lukoil, Vahit Alekperov, the latter urged the PM to let the sale go ahead.[83] However, the sale did not go ahead. Later in 2002 Rotch formed a consortium with PKN Orlen and tried to buy RG again after the Council of Ministers declared that the fusion of Poland's biggest two refineries would be acceptable.[84]

However, *Nafta Polska*, the state company that owned RG and handled its privatisation on behalf of the Treasury, did not allow the sale. According to reports written by the Sejm Inquiry Commission members and testimonies given to the Commission, two interest groups were in competition with each other to make a profit out of the sale of RG.[85] The first group consisted of PM Miller, President Kwaśniewski and the richest businessmen in Poland and owner of about 5% of shares at PKN Orlen, Jan Kulczyk, and their supporters among politicians and intelligence services. Accordingly, they wanted the PKN Orlen-Rotch consortium (where Rotch would acquire half the shares of Orlen) to buy RG. Rotch was acting as an intermediary for Lukoil and would be transferring its shares to the latter as soon as the sale of RG was completed. By this way, Lukoil would not only control RG but also *Naftoport* of Gdańsk, the only non-Russian owned crude oil delivery port, in which RG and PKN Orlen had together the majority share. According to intelligence reports, Kulczyk, acting as the representative of this group and allegedly sanctioned by Kwaśniewski, had met an ex-KGB officer (then dealing with Russian oil interests) Vladimir Alganov in Vienna in July 2003 (right after the sale of RG was stopped by Nafta Polska). Kulczyk claimed, Alganov told him that the president of Nafta Polska, Maciej Gierej and Kaczmarek had received five million USD in bribes to let Lukoil to get hold of RG but could not deliver their promise. It was claimed that Kulczyk was trying to convince Alganov that he would succeed in facilitating RG's takeover by Lukoil.

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[82] From June 2003 on Rafineria Gdanska was renamed Grupa Lotos when a few smaller refineries were merged with it. For consistency the new name will not be used here.
[83] "...As Lukoil, Yukos make their own overtures", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 06 September 2002 and "Still no answer to Lukoil's offer to buy into Polish refinery", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 05 September 2002.
[84] Roman Giertych, "Kulisy afery Orlenu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 December 2004.
[85] Roman Giertych, "Kulisy afery Orlenu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 December 2004. Wojciech Czuchnowski and Andrzej Stec, "Raport Aumillera", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 July 2005. Wojciech Czuchnowski, "Jest raport komisji ds. Orlenu", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 September 2005. Jakub Rzekanowski, "Bzdury Miodowicza", *Trybuna*, 04 December 2004.

The second group formed by Kaczmarek, Gierej, Piotr Czyżewski (Minister of Treasury from April 2003 to January 2004), a shady lobbyist called Marek Dochnal, it was claimed, were also trying to mediate the sale of RG to Lukoil but their plan was to sell RG directly rather than through a merger of RG and PKN Orlen. Kaczmarek, Gierej, and Czyżewski all lost their jobs after attempting to block the PKN Orlen-Rotch consortium buying RG. Although members of both groups claimed that they were acting with the intention of "blocking Russian imperialism" (in the words of Kaczmarek), the commission had the impression that there was a competition between the two groups for possible provisions and favours from the Russian oil companies as well as the Russian government.[86]

Another important thread in the Orlen affair was the previously mentioned crude oil supply contract that was blocked following the change in the Board of PKN Orlen (allegedly orchestrated by the Miller-Kulczyk group). In 1997 PKN Orlen[87] signed a five-year contract with J&S for the delivery of 70% of its crude oil demand, which J&S bought mostly from Lukoil, and pumped through the main pipeline carrying Russian oil, PERN Przyjaźń (*Przedsiębiorstwa Eksploatacji Rurociągów Naftowych "Przyjaźń"*).[88] The new management did not extend the contract with J&S and reduced J&S's delivery share to 42% while signing a contact with Petroval, a company registered in Switzerland and owned by Yukos, for 40% of its crude oil.[89]

[86] See *Biuletyn Komisji Śledczej* (do zbadania zarzutu nieprawidłowości w nadzorze Ministerstwa Skarbu Państwa nad przedstawicielami Skarbu Państwa w spółce PKN Orlen SA oraz zarzutu wykorzystania służb specjalnych (d. UOP) do nielegalnych nacisków na organa wymiaru sprawiedliwości w celu uzyskania postanowień służących do wywierania presji na członków Zarządu PKN Orlen SA) (SORN), No. 18, 3781/IV, 27 October 2004. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf (accessed 06 November 2006). See also Agata Nowakowska, Bartosz Węglarczyk and Wojciech Ołkuśnik, "Rosyjska ofensywa", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 November 2004.
[87] PKN Orlen was called *Petrochemia Płock* until 2000. Following the merger of Petrochemia Płock and a motor fuel vendor CPN in 1999, it changed its name to PKN Orlen.
[88] Maciej Wołyński , "W pracy nie politykujemy", *Trybuna*, 06 May 2004. Piotr Skura, "Ból Wassermanna", *Trybuna*, 25 September 2004.
[89] *Biuletyn Komisji Śledczej SORN*, No. 25, 3878/IV, 20 November 2004. See also "Lewica kontratakuje", *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 November 2004.

Figure 2: Russia's main oil export infrastructure and Druzhba pipeline[90]

When Modrzejewski testified to the Sejm commission, he claimed that the Russian monopolist for crude oil delivery *Transneft* preferred to sell the oil through intermediaries

[90] *Russia Energy Survey 2002* (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 12. Also available at www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)

rather than selling it directly to Polish refineries and that J&S was the most economical and reliable partner.[91] However, Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, the head of UOP and AW until June 2002, who also testified due to the involvement of UOP in the detention of Modrzejewski as well as monitoring and investigation of main actors of the scandal, claimed that blocking the contract with J&S was necessary in the name of protecting state interests from "Russian economic imperialism" by achieving diversification in the field of oil delivery.[92]

Theories about the oil delivery contract abounded and most commentators suggested that it had to do with corruption and managers of PKN Orlen and Nafta Polska soliciting bribes from companies such as J&S and Petroval. Another explanation was that oil delivery contracts were offered to facilitate total domination of the Russian government on Poland's oil supply. Perhaps there was an element of judging by hindsight due to the bankruptcy of Yukos and rumours of Gazprom acquiring Yukos's assets in 2004. One theory for why the Russian government might have wanted to get rid of J&S was offered by Antoni Macierewicz, a member of the commission and the leader of a small right wing nationalist party called the Catholic Nationalist Movement (*Ruch Katolicko-Narodowy* - RKN): J&S was founded by people connected with the Russian secret services under the Yeltsin administration. When Putin came to power in 2000, he wanted to eliminate J&S from the market.[93] This was also in the interest of the fuel mafia associated with SLD and the Miller-Kwaśniewski group had carried out Putin's strategy in Poland.[94]

The commission failed to find out the answers to the questions it had set itself. None of the theories mentioned above were proven to be the fully factual or fully fictional.[95] The inquiry process soon turned into political bickering between the right wing members of the commission and the left wing and into a witch-hunt against the post-communist political elite, with Kwaśniewski and Miller aggressively targeted.[96] The inquiry was also bogged down in private vendettas when commission members turned on each other and tried to start separate parliamentary inquiries about each others' suspicious dealings.[97] The commission's already shaken credibility was further damaged when the SLD decided to

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[91] *Biuletyn Komisji Śledczej SORN*, No. 5, 3547/IV, 31 August 2004. Andrzej Rudnicki, "Kasa rządzi", *Trybuna*, 12 November 2004.
[92] Piotr Stasiński, "Czy nadużywać władzy w obronie państwa?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 28 October 2004.
[93] Małgorzata Subotić, "Przyspawani do Rosji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 January 2005.
[94] Presidential advisor, Stanisław Ciosek, one of the many people ranging from the President's wife to ex-Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz's assistant, also testified. He told the commission that Lukoil representatives openly told him that they were adamant about pushing J&S out of the market. Wojciech Czuchnowski, "Minister Ciosek i niedźwiedzie", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 April 2005.
[95] Piotr Stasiński, "Nowy Atak Teczkami", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 June 2005.
[96] Miller called this "Polish style Maccarthyism". *Biuletyn Komisji Śledczej SORN*, No. 25, 3878/IV, 20 November 2004.
[97] Wojciech Olkuśnik, "Polowanie na śledczych", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 November 2004. At one point the commission was at risk or turning into a lustration court when the National Remembrance Institute (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej* - IPN) was asked to submit the pre 1989 intelligence files of people who were asked to testify to the commission (including Kwaśniewski). Agnieszka Kublik et al., "Giertych chce teczek", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 January 2005.

pull its representative out of the commission arguing that they would not want to be a party to a right wing campaign to destroy the left.[98]

The Orlen affair was first and foremost a case about the misuse of political power and corruption that permeated the highest echelons of the state. It also demonstrated the political effects of being dependent on oil. However, a very interesting aspect of the affair, for our purposes, was the perception of Russia and the use of Russian threat in the rhetoric employed by the politicians. As mentioned above, the two groups claimed to be in competition with each other over the sale of RG both argued that they were protecting Polish interests from Russian economic imperialism. The main function of the commission itself was to shed light on dodgy deals which would make Poland even more vulnerable to Russia in terms of energy security (as the right wing members saw it). It is a fact that the perception of Russia as an enemy and the Polish post-communists as Russia's henchmen is prevalent among right wing and post-Solidarity politicians, and reflection of this perception onto any kind of relationship Poland has with Russia is inevitable. However, economic realities dictate much of this anti-Russian rhetoric to be confined to political discourse and domestic political bickering.

As is evident from the Orlen affair, regardless of the amount and style of corruption involved, Poland would still continue to buy its crude oil from Russian sources and the so called "diversification of supply" in effect meant diversification of intermediaries which were either owned or were dominated by Russian oil concerns. As for the sale of RG, it appeared that only the big Russian oil companies were capable of and willing to buy it. No other foreign bidder managed to come up with an acceptable proposal or a big enough budget to acquire RG. To assess whether the sale of RG to Lukoil would be profitable and preferable is outside the scope of the chapter and the capacity of the writer. However, it seems that the economic reality of Poland's almost total dependence on Russian energy and the EU's willingness to purchase more of it will determine political decisions about the Polish energy sector, including future oil supplies and delivery contracts. Any claims of protecting the country from Russian economic imperialism or achieving diversification of oil supplies would be used for domestic consumption only.

The issues and controversies highlighted by the Orlen affair also featured in Poland's purchase of natural gas from Russia. The next section will elaborate on politics concerning natural gas and pipelines.

[98] Wojciech Czuchnowski, "Posłowie Sojuszu opuścili sejmową komisję śledczą", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 08 July 2005.

5.3 CASE STUDY: GAS AND PIPELINES

One of the most controversial commodities in Polish-Russian trade is natural gas. Supply and transport of this strategic import has implications for Poland beyond the economic sphere. For industrial and economic development, Poland had to secure a continuous and affordable gas supply but at the same time avoid becoming dependent on a sole supplier. Given the fact that the only feasible supply was Russian gas, any issue related with purchase or transport of gas became a topic of political debate. Besides, as gas is Poland's main import commodity from Russia (see Figure 3), private capital and corruption also featured in the ensuing clash of interests.

Figure 3: Poland's import of natural gas and other hydrocarbons. Imports from Russia and other countries[99]



5.3.1 Securing gas supplies: The 1993 Agreement with Russia

Within the programme of reorienting Polish trade towards the West in early 1992, Polish governments were searching for ways to diversify the import of gas to end complete dependence on Russia. In December 1992 a programme adopted by the Council of Ministers Economic Committee put forward a proposal to sign multiannual contracts with Russia on gas purchase and to build a pipeline carrying Russian gas through Poland to Western Europe.[100] Purchasing gas from Denmark or Norway was also suggested. Given

[99] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Przemysłu*, Years 1993-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[100] Andrzej Cylwik, "Charakterystyka rozwoju gazownictwa polskiego w latach 1970-1998" in Barbara Błaszczyk i Andrzej Cylwik (Eds), *Charakterystyka wybranych sektorów infrastrukturalnych i wrażliwych w gospodarce polskiej oraz możliwości ich prywatyzacji*, CASE Reports No. 27, Warsaw: Centrum Analiz Społeczno-Ekonomicznych, 1999, p. 43. http://www.case.com.pl/strona--ID-publikacje_raporty_case,ROK-1999,TID-1445,nlang-19.html (accessed 06 November 2006)

the fact that Russia offered the cheapest gas and transporting facilities, any other option than the Russian one was highly unrealistic.

The Polish government worked around the supply problem by signing an agreement with Russia during Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw on 25 August 1993. With this agreement Poland and Russia agreed in principle on building a transit pipeline through Poland (and Belarus) for Russian gas to reach Germany. Russia pledged to increase the amount of gas it supplied to Poland gradually to 14 billion m^3 annually by 2010.[101] As foreseen by the agreement a company called EuRoPol GAZ Transit Gas Pipeline System (*System Gazociągów Tranzytowych EuRoPol GAZ*) was established on 23 September 1993 by *Gazprom* (holding 48% of the share) and the Polish energy monopoly, Polish Mining, Oil and Gas Company (*Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo* - PGNiG), (48%). With a last minute decision a third partner, *Gaz Trading* (4%) had to be included. A provision of the Polish commercial code requiring a third partner to establish a joint stock company was put forward as the reason. EuRoPol GAZ were to be the owner of the 4000 km long pipeline extending from Kondratki on Polish-Belarusian border to Górzyca on Polish-German border. The pipeline would carry gas from the reserves in the Yamal peninsula in Siberia and was, therefore, called the "Yamal pipeline".

A protocol specifying the duties of Russian and Polish sides regarding the pipeline and deadlines for construction was signed on 18 February 1995 during Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw and approved by the Council of Ministers on 18 August 1995. Following that, on 17 October 1995, the government adopted a policy document laying down Poland's energy strategy until 2010. An increase in the volume of gas purchased from Russia, the building of the Yamal pipeline alongside new gas compression and storage facilities and geographically diversifying supply were to be the priorities of Polish energy policy.[102] On 25 September 1996 a long term contract based on the 1993 agreement and 1995 protocol was signed by Gazprom and PGNiG in Warsaw. The so-called "contract of the century" stipulated that starting from 1997 Poland would buy a total of 250 billion m^3 of gas within the following 25 years. It was a "take or pay" contract which forbid the reexport of gas in case demand in Poland would fall below the supply. The details of the contract, which was formally a trade agreement between two companies, were kept confidential.

[101] "Porozumienie między Rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej a Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o budowie systemu gazociągów dla tranzytu gazu rosyjskiego przez terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i dostawach gazu rosyjskiego do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" http://www.europolgaz.com.pl/ firma_geneza.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[102] Official Statement of Council of Ministers Economic Committee, 25 September 1995. http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1937_3446.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

5.3.2 The pipeline debate

The long term agreement with Russia for gas supplies and the pipeline project became the subject of a heated debate. Those strongly in favour of the agreement with Russians were the governing SLD-PSL coalition. Their main arguments for the pipeline and the long term gas contract and pipeline were:

- The existing pipelines which ran through Ukraine, Slovakia and Czech Republic (Orenburg pipeline) and through Finland (Jamburg pipeline) did not have sufficient capacity to deliver the amount of gas needed by Europe or Poland. Russia blamed earlier gas cuts to irregularities in Ukraine so the new pipeline would eliminate that excuse.

- The current gas storage capability in Poland was not enough to sustain demand in case the gas supply was cut. However, capacity would be increased alongside construction of the pipeline.

- Sources other than Russia were unviable. The most probable among all options (importing gas from Algeria, Iran, UK or Central Asia), Norway, would still be too costly. Norway could deliver Poland at most 5-6 billion m^3 of gas annually but the infrastructure investment needed to realise this would be around 3 billion USD which would be better spent for increasing storage capacity.[103]

- The pipeline would afford Poland independence from the provider, i.e. Russia. As Western Europe would become the end user, Poland would not be alone in case political pressure needed to be applied on Russia.

- A long term contract creates the necessary conditions for attracting investors in Polish industry which would be assured that gas supplies would not be subject to fluctuation.

- Having a sole supplier was not all that bad. Countries like Slovakia, Austria or Turkey bought only Russian gas and they did not have fears associated with this. The contract would not have an adverse effect on Poland's EU quest, as the EU had not raised any objections about it.

The opponents, meanwhile, suggested that

[103] Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Roman Czerwiński's comments, *Biuletyn Komisji Systemu Gospodarczego i Przemysłu*, 09 May 1995, No. 1513/II.

- There was no guarantee that Russians would not blackmail Poland over gas supplies in the future. Overdependence on Russian gas would make Poland vulnerable and "once again Polish economy might be subordinated to foreign interests."[104]

- There were many loopholes in the agreement and the state budget would have no income from transport of gas as EuRoPol GAZ would collect the fees as the owner of the pipeline.

- The contract term of 25 years was too long and it was impossible to estimate accurately how much gas Poland would need in that distant of a future. If the demand was overestimated, the take or pay format, with no reexport option, would be highly disadvantageous.

- A more radical criticism directed at the government by right wing parties such as KPN was that they were favouring certain importers by trying make gas the main energy source. This would bring destruction to the coal mining sector in Poland and also make Polish industrial goods more expensive and less competitive as the energy costs would increase.[105]

5.3.3 AWS-UW come to power

After the change of government from the post-communist SLD-PSL to AWS-UW coalition in 1997, the political dimension of the gas issue came to the fore. The parliamentary club of AWS ordered an expert report on the pipeline and asked for the contract to be renegotiated. The report argued that the 1993 agreement (and the 1995 protocol) were null and void as they had been ratified only by the president and not also by the Sejm as prescribed by the Little Constitution that was in force at the time.[106] Also, the agreements were in contradiction with a law dated 1919 which provided that only the state could build, regulate and use pipelines.[107] Objections were also raised regarding the 1996 contract.

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[104] Luiza Zalewska, "Protokół rozbieżności w sprawie gazociągu jamalskiego i 'kontraktu stulecia'", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 March 1998.

[105] During the parliamentary debate on the contract it was even implied by an MP (of AWS but representing the KPN parliamentary group) that West might be pushing Poland to buy more and more gas from Russia, thus supplying the country with necessary funding needed to support Western backed reforms. See Janina Kraus, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 kadencja, 91 posiedzenie, 3 dzień, 25 October 1996.

[106] Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 March 1998.

[107] In addition to this point, right wing and farmers' political organisations had reservations against the methods EuRoPol GAZ used to secure permission from farmers on whose land pipeline would pass. An interpellation submitted by MPs from NK, KPN-Ojczyzna, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (*Ruch Odbudowy Polski* - ROP) and PSL about the heavy-handed methods used mentioned press reports claiming that Gazprom president Rem Vlakhirev said that they would "beat to death" those who obstructed the construction of the pipeline. Michał Janiszewski et al., Interpelacja nr 1191 do prezesa Rady Ministrów w sprawie nieprawidłowości występujących przy realizacji budowy gazociągu tranzytowego z Rosji do Niemiec przez spółkę EuRoPol GAZ, 10 December 1998, 2 kadencja, 38 posiedzenie. Full text of interpellations and replies can be retrieved from the third term onwards. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/iz.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

MPs from AWS argued that securing the energy supplies of a country was an issue that should not be delegated to two corporate entities and accused PGNiG of distorting the reality by claiming that they were working on diversifying the gas supply.[108]

Even though many in the AWS-UW government were anxious to renegotiate the gas deals the SLD-PSL government had made with Russia, this proved to be difficult not only because of Poland's need for gas but also because it was risky for the government to strain the already tense relations between Poland and Russia, not the least due to Poland's NATO accession. Signals from Russia were explicit: The president of Gazprom, Rem Viakhirev, said during his visit to Warsaw concerning Poland's gas debt to Russia "[Poland] should not be afraid of Russia or Gazprom. We are friends and we would like to have good relations with all our partners. However, we can also kick [you] in the teeth if need be."[109]

5.3.4 The elusive second pipeline

Meanwhile talks with the Norwegians for diversifying gas supplies were renewed and a contract was signed on 28 April 1999 by which Norway would sell 0.5 billion m^3 of gas to Poland from 2001 to 2006.[110] By then Poland was already buying small amounts of gas from Germany. Although gas supplied by West European sources increased to about 12% of the total in 1999 from 0.3% in 1992, it was still dwarfed by the supply from Russia, which constituted about 75%.[111] Besides, the government was criticised by left wing circles about the gas deal with Norway. The left wing daily *Trybuna* accused the government of ignoring economic realities by taking purely political decisions and stated that Norwegian gas cost 20-30% more than Russian gas.[112]

[108] See comments by Czesław Sobierajski and Janina Kraus of AWS, *Biuletyn Komisji Gospodarki*, No. 291/III, 17 March 1998.
[109] Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 March 1998.
[110] "Poland, Norway End Talks on Norwegian Gas Supplies to Poland ", *Polish Daily News Bulletin*, 29 April 1999. http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=1030601001 (accessed 10 October 2004)
[111] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-2002, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[112] Maciej Wołyński, "Wpuszczeni w gazową rurę", *Trybuna*, 10 October 2000.

Figure 4: Existing and planned natural gas pipelines from Russia to Europe[113]

Construction of the first Yamal pipeline was completed in 1999 and gas started to flow to Germany, supplying Poland on the way. Before the dust settled on the conflict about the

[113] *Russia Energy Survey 2002* (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 15. Also available at www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)

pipeline and the gas contract, a new dispute broke out, this time over the planned second Yamal pipeline. According to the 1993 agreement two pipelines to carry a total of 67 billion m^3 of gas annually were to be built.[114] The details for the proposed second pipeline were not yet negotiated. At the end of 1999 Viakhirev wrote a letter to Kwaśniewski asking for support to build the second pipeline which was to go southwards from Warsaw and connect to the Slovak pipeline network (so called intersystem connection or *pieremychka*). This meant that Gazprom could cut gas transit from Ukraine and send gas instead along both pipelines to Western Europe through Belarus. This would give Gazprom and the Russian government a free hand to pressurise Ukraine, which was dependant on the transit revenue in exchange for which it received Russian gas. In 2000 about 90 billion m^3 of the total 120 billion m^3 of Russian gas transited through Ukraine to Western Europe.[115] Ukraine had been a troubled customer for Gazprom as it had a huge debt and had also on occasions resorted to extracting gas from the transit pipelines without consultation with Gazprom or offering payment. Gazprom also demanded that it took control of Ukrainian pipelines in payment of the debt.

Apart from creating pressure over Ukraine, there were also economic arguments to the proposed pipeline: First, as the pipeline would have a long stretch on Polish territory, it would bring about 900 million USD a year in transit fees.[116] Second, EU countries were anxious to increase gas supplies from Russia in an attempt to lessen their dependence on increasingly expensive oil from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries. Third, delivery of some of the Yamal gas through southern pipelines was more convenient for Germany than receiving all 67 billion m^3 in one station on the Polish border.[117]

The Polish government went through a period of hesitation about the Gazprom proposal. Kwaśniewski asked the Ministry of Economy and PGNiG to study the matter. The Vice-minister Jan Szlązak reportedly wrote to Gazprom in April 2000 declaring the government's interest in the project. Even though the PM and Minister of Economy denied the existence of the letter, Szlązak resigned a few weeks later, according to the media, in connection with the letter.[118] Meanwhile, Gazprom made an announcement on 17 June 2000, stating that indecisiveness of "East European countries" about the pipeline could

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[114] See Article 1 of the agreement. "Protokół między rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej w sprawie przedsięwzięć organizacyjnych zmierzających do zapewnienia realizacji porozumienia między rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej o budowie systemu gazociągów dla tranzytu gazu rosyjskiego przez terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i dostawach gazu rosyjskiego do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 25 sierpnia 1993 r. - Warszawa, 18 lutego 1995 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 541, 1995, No. 3, pp. 23-30.
[115] Konrad Niklewicz, "Widziane z Paryża", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 31 October 2000.
[116] Piotr Andrzejewski et al., "Broń gazowa", *Wprost*, 06 August 2000.
[117] Andrzej Krzysztof Wróblewski, "Wysokie ciśnienie", *Polityka*, No. 22, May 2000.
[118] "Co leży w interesie Polski", *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 June 2000 and Jan Dziadul, "W oparach gazu", *Polityka*, November 2000, No. 45.

hasten the construction of the North European Pipeline (which was planned to pass either through Finland and Sweden or along the Baltic Sea floor to Germany).[119]

The Polish government decided to make a gesture to Ukraine and announced that it could not agree to the pipeline as the project undermined the interests of Ukraine, Poland's strategic partner. This decision delighted the proponents of an active EP with Ukraine at the heart of it. However, it soon became obvious that Poland was playing Don Quixote as not only Gazprom but also the EU snubbed Poland's decision. The spokesman for the EU Energy Commissioner said that if the Polish government did not want to be involved in the new pipeline, it would be built elsewhere.[120] Gazprom announced on 19 October 2000 that a consortium made up of Ruhrgas (Germany), Wintershall (Germany), Gaz de France and SNAM (Italy) began working on a feasibility study on the project of the pipeline which would bypass Ukraine.[121] One Polish commentator called this "a bitter lesson in realpolitik" as the EU looked after its own interest in reducing reliance on oil and negotiated with Gazprom without taking Poland's concerns into account.[122] The EU-Russia summit at the end of October 2000 also confirmed the EU position that securing gas supplies was paramount.

Another reason why the Polish gesture towards Ukraine proved to be ineffectual was Ukraine's handling of the issue. Soon after the Polish government's and president's hearty declarations in defence of Ukraine's sovereignty and energy security, the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma struck a deal with Putin during a meeting in Sochi on 17 October 2000. Kuchma proposed that in order to settle Ukraine's debts Gazprom took part in the privatisation of Ukrainian gas transit system and Ukraine would stop tapping gas illegally, and in return Russia would assist Ukraine in upgrading the existing pipelines to increase carriage capacity.[123] At the beginning of December Ukraine and Russia arrived at an agreement settling Ukraine's gas debt and methods of payment.[124] Even though Ukrainian state officials praised Poland's support, they nevertheless made it clear that they preferred to settle their problems with Russia on their own. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoli Zlenko stated that Kiev would not oppose a new pipeline that was economically justified, even if it bypassed Ukrainian territory.[125] During a meeting with Kuchma in Odessa on 18 December 2000 Kwaśniewski said, referring to the pipeline problem, "there are economic interests that should not be politicised."[126]

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[119] "Zdecyduj się Polsko", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19 June 2000.
[120] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Rurociąg ominie Ukrainę", *Rzeczpospolita*, 05 October 2000.
[121] Artur Morka, "Gazociąg ominie Ukrainę", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 October 2000.
[122] Krzysztof Bień, "Interesy wygrały z polityką", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 October 2000.
[123] "Russia to accept more IOUs from Ukraine for gas", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 17 October 2000.
[124] "Ukraine, Russia reach 'breakthrough' deal on gas debt", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 04 December 2000.
[125] Zofia Jóźwiak, "Ważne porozumienie", *Życie*, 02 December 2000.
[126] Eliza Olczyk et al., "Gazety piszą, Kwaśniewski milczy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 December 2000.

Having realised the difficulty of their position, Polish leaders made attempts to gracefully get out of the impasse Poland put itself in. While sticking in rhetoric to being sensitive about Ukrainian interests, they started opening the way to negotiations with the Russians about the pipeline. The Polish authorities started talks with both the Russian government and Gazprom on the new pipeline in February 2001. The talks, however, dragged on without an outcome. There were three reasons for this, none of which was to do with Poland's strategic partnership with Ukraine.

First, the AWS government was anxious to renegotiate the 1993 and 1995 agreements, especially with reference to the financing of the new pipeline. This was one of the conditions for negotiations set out by the Polish government in a memo handed to the Russian PM Kasyanov's team during the PM's Warsaw visit on 25 May 2001.[127] Another condition was the Russian side's help in changing the administration of EuRoPol GAZ and returning the 4% of its shares held by Gas Trading to PGNiG and Gazprom so that each of these two companies would become a 50% shareholder in EuRoPol GAZ as originally provided by the 1993 agreement. (see below for details). Kasyanov promised that they would respond to the conditions by 8 June 2001 but failed to do so.[128]

Second, PGNiG was negotiating at the same time with Norwegian and Danish gas companies in a bid to diversify Poland's gas supply and to have a stronger hand at negotiations with the Russians on the new pipeline project. PGNiG did sign an agreement with the Danish gas company DONG on 2 July 2001 on the construction of an underwater pipeline from Denmark to Poland and sale of 16 billion m^3 of gas to Poland over 6 years.[129] This was followed by a deal reached with Norway's Gas Negotiation Committee (GFU) according to which Statoil would supply Poland with a total of 74 billion m^3 of gas over 16 years starting from 2008.[130] The implementation of the agreement depended on the approval by the Council of Ministers of both sides.

Agreements with Norway and Denmark were sharply criticised by the SLD. Leszek Miller, leader of the SLD, stated that, if successful in the upcoming September 2001 elections, they would study the contracts signed for diversification of the gas supply, and possibly cancel them.[131] Bronisław Łagowski, a columnist in the pro-SLD weekly, *Przegląd*, called

[127] Paweł Reszka, "Stanowcze pro memoria w sprawie gazu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 04 June 2001.
[128] Joanna Pieńczykowska, "Liścik do Rosjan", *Życie*, 05 June 2001.
[129] Bronisław Wildstein, "Pod gazową kuratelą",*Rzeczpospolita*, 06 July 2001 and "Poland, Denmark Signed Danish Gas Supply Deal", *Polish Daily News Bulletin*, 03 July 2001.
www.msz.gov.pl/file_libraries/45/8264/ANG03.doc (accessed 12 October 2004)
[130] Michael Lelyveld, "Poland's gas deal with Norway offers relief to Ukraine", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, 04 September 2001.
[131] Aneta Stabryała, "Gaz wciąż dla nas", *Życie*, 29 August 2001.

the deal an example of "Polnische wirtschaft" as it meant buying the same gas at highly inflated prices.[132]

Third, it was alleged that the Russian side were happy with the delay as they were anxious for a change of government after October 2001. The SLD were tipped as the victors.

5.3.5 Problem of shares

The AWS-UW government was in for a cold shower when *Gazeta Wyborcza* publicised in November 2000 the existence of a fibre optic communications cable running alongside the Yamal pipeline connecting Russia to Germany.[133] The Ministry of Communications had not given permission for such a cable as the law required. In accordance with the 1993 agreement, such a cable could be installed to be used exclusively for communications regarding technical aspects of pipeline construction. However, Gazprom subsidiaries had already signed huge telecommunication deals with West European companies such as Alcatel and Pirelli, which announced that data transfers would be done over the cable going through Poland. In effect the cable was de facto an "extraterritorial corridor".

The government formed a commission to investigate the problem. The report produced by this commission in January 2001 concluded that the government had virtually no control over the cable or the pipeline.[134] Even though the installation of the cable was legal, the way it was used was not. The owner of the pipeline, EuRoPol GAZ, leased the cable to a company called *Pol Gaz Telekom*. Even though PGNiG was supposed to be the sole operator of both the pipeline and the cable according to the 1993 agreement, it lost control. The report argued that the reason for that was Gas Trading, the company which held 4% of EuRoPol GAZ. The make up of Gas Trading (as of 1998) and Pol Gaz Telekom's shares (after it was established in 1999) was as follows (Table 8):

Table 8: Share structure of Gas Trading and Pol Gaz Telekom

Gas Trading			Pol Gaz Telekom	
%	Owned by		%	Owned by
43.41	PGNiG		36	Bartimpex
36.17	Bartimpex		32	Gaztelekom (Gazprom subsidiary)
15.88	Gazexport Moskva (Gazprom subsidiary)		32	EuRoPol GAZ
4.54	(Węglokoks and Wintershall)			

[132] Bronisław Łagowski, "O co chodzi?", *Przegląd*, No.37, 03 September 2001.
[133] Andrzej Kublik and Marcin Bosacki, "Kabel Gazpromu", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 November 2000.
[134] "Rura bez kontroli", *Życie*, 17 January 2001.

The key shareholder in both companies, Bartimpex, belonged to a Polish businessman called Aleksander Gudzowaty, who was considered as the "Russians' man" in Warsaw. He established the company in 1992 having made a "food for gas" barter agreement with Russians, benefiting from several intergovernmental agreements between Poland and Russia endorsing barter trade. Gudzowaty amassed a fortune in the gas trade with Russia. Gas Trading, a company with Bartimpex and Gazprom as majority shareholders, was used by Gazprom as an intermediary for gas sales and by 1997 50% of the Russian gas bought by PGNiG went through this company.[135] It was alleged that in 1993 Gas Trading was forced upon the Polish side by Gazprom as a third shareholder of EuRoPol GAZ by using an obscure legal provision which was brought up at the last minute.[136] In practice handing 4% of shares to Gas Trading was contrary to the 1993 agreement which gave PGNiG and Gazprom 50% of the shares each. With the entry into force the new company law on 1 January 2001, the requirement for having a third partner was abolished.[137] A public lawsuit was filed against the Minister of Industry at the time of EuRoPol GAZ's creation, Wacław Niewiarowski, and two PGNiG managers for exceeding their powers and violating the 1993 agreement.[138] The total weight of Gazprom and Bartimpex in both EuRoPol GAZ and Gas Trading was more than PGNiG. Hence, the hijacking of the pipeline and cable, concluded the commission report

There were also financial improprieties involved. EuRoPol GAZ was heavily indebted to Gazprombank, having borrowed 257 million USD in 1999.[139] What's more PGNiG kept making losses while Gudzowaty's firms were thriving.[140] All these prompted the government to push for a change in EuRoPol GAZ board of directors and liquidation of Gas Trading in order to regain PGNiG's control over EuRoPol GAZ and, in effect, over the pipeline.

Perhaps a more important reason for the government's quest to reduce Gudzowaty's hand in the gas deal was that he was an open supporter of the SLD.[141] Most of the directors in companies owned by him were ministers or key civil servants under the SLD-PSL government. Curiously, most of them were involved in the 1993 and 1995 agreements and the "contract of the century" in one way or another. The support was mutual as SLD

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[135] Luiza Zalewska, "Inkasent ze Wschodu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 March 1998.
[136] Michał Matys and Paweł Smoleński, "Stajnie Gudzowatego", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20-21 January 2001.
[137] Kodeks spółek handlowych, *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 94, Pos. 1037, 08 November 2000 replacing the law dated 27 June 1934 (with amendments), *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 57, Pos. 502.
[138] "Podejrzany Niewiarowski", *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 May 2001 and "Były minister ma towarzystwo", *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 June 2001.
[139] Bronisław Wildstein, "Pod gazową kuratelą ", *Rzeczpospolita*, 06 July 2001.
[140] PGNiG made losses of 415.6 million złoty in 2000. By May 2001 it owed Bartimpex 156.3 million złoty. See "Informacja o wynikach kontroli kierunków organizacji importu gazu do Polski", Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, KGP/DG/41100/01, No/ 17/2002/S01002/KGP, 25 February 2002, http://www.nik.gov.pl/wyniki_kontroli/dz_gospodarka.html (accessed 21 February 2006)
[141] It should be borne in mind that Gudzowaty's motives for supporting the SLD may not be all to do with ideological inclination. Gudzowaty's donation of a large sum to Wałęsa's 1995 presidential campaign is an evidence to that.

politicians as well as publications associated with the left wing rose to Gudzowaty's defence. *Trybuna* ran a story in January 2001, following the commission report, accusing the right wing government of harming the interests of a purely Polish company which contributed to the Polish economy.[142] Post-communists supported Gudzowaty on other occasions. One of these was when his project of constructing a 100 km. pipeline from Szczecin to Bernau in order to supply gas from Germany was blocked by the government in favour of the gas deal with Norway. SLD MPs bombarded the government with interpellations, questioning the government's motives for preferring Norwegian gas and demanding an explanation for discriminating against Gudzowaty's firms. These were submitted by 12 different SLD MPs within only two months.[143]

5.3.6 2001 elections and turning of the tide

With the formation of SLD-UP/PSL government in October 2001, a reversal of policy was evident. During Polish-Russian talks in Moscow in December 2001, dominated by economic issues, Vice PM Marek Pol stated that Poland wanted to have such relations with Russia that would secure Poland's energy supply and make it an attractive country for transit. [144] The government also signalled that they would not pressurise Russia about the EuRoPol GAZ problem.

However, it became imperative for the government to renegotiate the 1993 gas agreement as it was clear that Gazprom was changing its mind about the second Yamal pipeline. First, during a CIS summit in Kishinev in October 2002, Gazprom and *Naftogaz Ukrainy* signed a 30 year agreement that created an international consortium to upgrade and manage pipelines running through Ukraine.[145] That meant more gas could be carried via Ukraine and Gazprom had fewer and fewer reasons for avoiding the Ukrainian route. Second, Gazprom started putting more emphasis on building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea and the project was endorsed by the European Commission in 2002.

With the second pipeline project ruled out, Poland had to renegotiate the 1993 gas agreement. The Russian side could not object to this either, as without the second pipeline it was impossible for them to fulfil their obligations and supply the agreed amount to Poland. As of 2002 Poland received only 2.88 m^3 of gas from the first pipeline and gas was also delivered to Poland by other means at two points on the Polish-Belarus border (Jarosław-Drożdowicze and Siemiatycze-Wysokoje). In addition, the estimates about

[142] Maciej Wołyński, "Polskie piekło", *Trybuna*, 22 January 2000.
[143] See interpellation Nos 2412, 2383, 2389, 4504, 4505, 4509, 4576, 4586, 4813, 4912, 4953 sent from August to October 2000.
[144] "O gazie bez szczegółów", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 December 2001 and Sławomir Popowski, "Minimalnie o gazie", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 December 2001.
[145] Sławomir Popowski, "Gazociąg ominie Polskę", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 October 2002.

Poland's gas demand proved to be too high, especially given that the economic growth slowed down in 2000-01, reducing demand for energy supplies.

The Polish government managed to sign an agreement with Russia on 23 January 2003 according to which Poland would buy 161 billion m^3 until 2020 instead of 218.[146] This would save the budget around 5 million USD. However, even after these reductions, there would still be an oversupply of gas as extra supplies would come from Denmark and Norway (and Germany), thanks to the previous government's efforts at diversification.[147] This was the reason given by the government to defer the Danish and Norwegian gas contracts in December 2003 (by simply withholding approval by the Council of Ministers). The government also gave a go ahead to PGNiG to start talks about the Szczecin-Bernau pipeline construction, blocked by the previous government.[148]

It must be noted that even though the SLD-UP/PSL governments reversed certain energy policy decision of the previous government, they by no means aimed to cancel gas contracts with suppliers other than Russia. Efforts at diversifying supplies continued and Poland did achieve a degree of diversification by 2004, especially with the purchase of gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan from 2003 on. According the trade values from 2004, Poland bought about 37% of its natural gas from Western European countries, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, with Poland buying nearly half of its gas from Russia, Russia remained the biggest supplier.

[146] Krzysztof Bień, "Kompromis po roku", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 January 2003.
[147] For figures on prognosis of gas demand see "Ocena realizacji i korekta Założeń polityki energetycznej Polski do 2020 roku", Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 02 April 2002. A copy can be found at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf (Druk No. 427, 18 April 2002) (accessed 06 November 2004).
[148] "Mniej gazu, mniej problemów", *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 February 2003.

Figure 5: Change in Poland's natural gas imports in percentages[149]
(West Europe includes Germany, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and France)



5.3.7 Conclusion

Poland's relations with Russia regarding gas and pipelines presented Poland with a dilemma between the necessity of securing affordable energy and exposure to the dominant partner by way of dependence. Such dependence caused much controversy in Poland because the country in question was Russia. The debate included not only economic calculations versus strategic risks, it also brought about the questions of the

[149] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Przemysłu*, Years 1996,1999, 2002 and 2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

limits of Poland's EP, the security Poland hoped to find by being a member of the EU and the consequences of Poland's post communist economic transformation.

The second pipeline problem and Poland's hasty move in defence of Ukraine's interests (despite Ukraine itself) was a good test case for Poland's budding EP. Not only has it exposed a certain lack of substance in EP but also brought about a realisation that Poland did not possess the necessary instruments and strength to carry it out. The limitations of Poland's claim to be a regional leader and a locomotive leading Ukraine (and maybe Belarus in the future) to join the West became clear. This episode also gave impetus to the minimalism debate of 2000 covered in Chapter Four by which Polish intellectuals spent much mental exercise about the means/ends of EP, the place of Ukraine and Russia and realism vs. idealism.

Another important consequence of the energy issue was that it was a "lesson in realpolitik". The Polish phobia about the West dealing with Russia over their heads (hence the maxim of "nothing about us, without us" - *nic o nas bez nas*) lay at the root of the controversy in Poland created by the EU countries' pragmatic decisions about their energy security. This also ties in with the lack of a realistic assessment of what EU candidacy (and eventual membership) would bring Poland.

Last but not least, the controversy around the gas trade exposed the shortcomings of the process by which private capital was created within Poland's post 1989 economic transformation. The relations cultivated during the Soviet era by those who became Poland's post communist economic elite (like Gudzowaty) laid the ground for unhealthy state-private business relations, as also highlighted by the Orlen affair. Many right wing commentators in Poland saw sale and transport of Russian gas to Poland as a post-communist plot to serve the interests of their Russian masters and even to make Poland once again fully dependent on Russia. SLD's support for Gudzowaty and the gas contract with Gazprom were seen as evidence. As explained in Chapter Four, it is true that the majority of intellectuals and politicians who supported the pro-Russian option in EP were post-communists or of left wing orientation and often affiliated with the SLD. However, as we can see in the pipeline example, the motives behind the actions of the post-communist governments were based also on economic interests rather than pure ideological orientation.

5.4 KALININGRAD

Kaliningrad is the only Russian region that shares a border with Poland and none with mainland Russia. The region is defined as an "exclave" in relation to Russia and an "enclave" after EU enlargement to Poland and the Baltics.[150] The East Prussian Königsberg was named Kaliningrad in 1946 after the Soviet Union took over the territory at the end of the Second World War. Soviets used the region as a military base, populating it with army personnel after its German inhabitants were deported en masse. The break up of the Soviet Union and independence of Baltic states geographically detached Kaliningrad from Russia and rendered unnecessary maintaining such heavy military presence in the region as the Cold War ended. The region was faced with economic stagnation.

Figure 6: Kaliningrad map[151]

Throughout the1990s Kaliningrad gradually ceased to be an exclusively hard security issue for Poland. New aspects such as economic contacts, soft security issues and the wider issue of status of the region following the EU enlargement were added to the agenda of bilateral relations regarding Kaliningrad.

5.4.1 Hard security issues

The agreement on Soviet troop withdrawals from ex-Warsaw Pact countries in 1992-93 brought a relief to Poland as it signalled the diminishing of an immediate military threat from Russia. The concentration of armed forces in Kaliningrad (especially after the stationing of some troops withdrawn from Central Europe) was still a cause for concern.[152]

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[150] For a discussion on the definition of the terms "enclave" and "exclave" see Pertti Joenniemi, "Appendix 1: Kaliningrad – Enclave or Exclave?" in Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz (Eds), *Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 261-265.
[151] Source: http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/konigsberg/Events-Kaliningrad.htm (accessed 15 November 2004)
[152] Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Kaliningrad as a Security Issue: An Expert View from Poland" in Joenniemi and Prawitz (Eds), "*Kaliningrad*", p. 134.

However, Poland did not perceive a direct threat due to this situation.[153] Russian officials declared their readiness to reduce armaments in the region. Realistically it was difficult to expect the region to be demilitarised as first, it was physically impossible to transfer troops and weapons elsewhere in Russia, given that CFE limits meant cutting down on numbers in the mainland (except for flank areas). Second, it would mean a mass exodus from the region, where population indicators were already low, as the army was the sole reason for more than a quarter of the inhabitants to be there. Third, there was no reason for Russia to give up its military presence in this major ice-free port with close proximity to Central and Northern Europe, especially while discussions for NATO enlargement were under way.

Poland approached the Kaliningrad security issue pragmatically throughout the 1990s by not making it an item on the agenda of bilateral relations and reiterating that it perceived no aggressive intent behind military concentration in Kaliningrad. This level headed approach was also necessitated by Poland's efforts against the portrayal of the country as a potential troublemaker by the opponents of NATO enlargement.[154] It was argued that encircling of Kaliningrad by NATO states after enlargement would provoke Russia to step up its military concentration in the region and rely on nuclear capabilities in case of a war.

The arguments of proponents of NATO enlargement prevailed over those of its opponents. However, the issue of nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad was to create a controversy in 2001 when The Washington Times published a report on 3 January 2001, alleging that Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad.[155] The initial reaction of Polish officials was to demand an international inspection of weapons in Kaliningrad, voiced by the government spokesman, Krzysztof Luft and Kwaśniewski.[156] The Russian Ambassador to Poland, Sergei Razov, categorically denied the allegations and Putin called them "absolute nonsense".[157] There were voices of reason, like Defence Minister officials, who reminded the public that where weapons were deployed was not that important as Poland was already within the range of nuclear weapons.[158] It was also stated that Russia would not be violating any international agreements if it decided to place nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. It was assumed that there were no nuclear weapons in the region based on declarations in early 1990s by Yeltsin about Russia's intention to keep the Baltic Sea area nuclear free. Foreign Minister Władysław Bartoszewski also tried to calm the situation via a press statement that there was no change in Poland's security situation and Poland did not

[153] See comments by Defence Minister Piotr Kołodziejczyk, *Biuletyn Komisji Obrony Narodowej*, No. 47/II, 09 November 1993.
[154] See Stanley Kober, "NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 3 Kaliningrad", *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 46, 11 February 1998. http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-046es.html (accessed 06 November 2006).
[155] Bill Gertz, "Russia transfers nuclear arms to Baltics", *The Washington Times*, 03 January 2001.
[156] "Government Wants International Inspection Team in Kaliningrad" and "Kwasniewski Wants International Inspection in Kaliningrad", *Polish Daily News Bulletin*, 05 January 2000 and 08 January 2000. http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php?page=1030601001 (accessed 18 October 2004)
[157] "Przegląd prasy kaliningradzkiej", *Obwód Kaliningradzki*, Vol. 2, February 2001, No. 78, p. 9.
[158] See comments by Stanisław Koziej, Director of Defence Systems Department, Ministry of Defence, Katarzyna Bartman, "W cieniu rakiet", *Życie*, 05 January 2001.

demand a special inspection but just a regular one facilitated by international agreements (i.e. CFE).[159]

Despite the conflicting statements about inspection and a minor nuisance to which Putin had to react, the government managed to temper its reaction and to avoid provoking a crisis in relations with Russia. Internal debates, on the other hand, bordered on the hysterical. Dissonance in threat perception was clear from the statements made during the discussion on the problem at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm on 10 January 20001.[160] Krzysztof Kamiński, an AWS MP, argued that the situation could be a test for ascertaining how NATO allies would react to a threat directed against Poland. He proposed a draft resolution which provided that the Sejm should ask the Russian Duma whether Russia was planning to station nuclear weapons in the Baltic region (the committee rejected the resolution). Another AWS MP, Mirosław Styczeń, took things further and argued that, as a front country, Poland should reconsider stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. Fully supporting Styczeń's proposal, an independent right wing MP, Antoni Macierewicz, suggested that Poland was faced with political blackmail, referring to a Russian-German rapprochement, stationing of nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and new Russian military doctrine which did not rule out the use of tactical weapons. The participants from SLD and the Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, argued against creating an unnecessary controversy based only on a report by a foreign newspaper.

5.4.2 Economic relations

The economic importance of Kaliningrad was recognised by Polish policy makers who signed an agreement with Russia on cooperation between Poland's North-eastern regions and Kaliningrad on 22 May 1992. At the time there were already 111 Polish-Russian joint ventures registered in the region.[161] Poland was the first country to open a consulate (January 1994) in the region and Polish regions and cities close to Kaliningrad signed economic cooperation agreements by 1993. Various meetings of an economic nature were organised to enhance mutual trade.

The reason for increasing interest in Kaliningrad was due to the decision of the Russian authorities to change the exclusively military character of the region and prevent economic stagnation by attracting investment and developing trade. A special economic zone called "Yantar" was established on 21 September 1991 and customs duties and tax concessions were granted to investors by a presidential decree on 7 December 1993. The hope that

[159] "Oświadczenie rzecznika prasowego MSZ ws. dyskusji o broni jądrowej w Kaliningradzie", 08 January 2001, http://msz.gov.pl/index.php?page=4474&lang_id=pl&bulletin_id=9&portlet =biuletyn%2Fpokaz (accessed 06 November 2006)
[160] See *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 3882/III, 10 January 2001.
[161] Zajączkowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie", *RPPZ 1992*.

Kaliningrad would become the Baltic "Hong Kong"[162] came to nothing as due to constant changes in corporate, customs and tax laws and bureaucratic and infrastructural problems, Yantar never reached the desired level of economic activity.[163]

Trade with Poland, nevertheless, developed, albeit slowly, and turnover increased from 64 million USD in 1994 to 292 in 1998 and 370 in 2002.[164] By 2003 Kaliningrad was receiving 15.3% of Poland's total exports to Russia.[165]

Table 9: Kaliningrad trade figures 1998-2001(in million USD)[166]

Year		1998		1999		2000		2001	
Kaliningrad's total trade turnover	Turnover with Poland	1500.2	292.7	1132.9	209.8	1291.6	295.1	1443.0	281.2
Kaliningrad's total exports	Kaliningrad's exports to Poland	351.3	99.7	322.3	106.9	475.2	154.3	455.3	125.2
Kaliningrad's total imports	Kaliningrad's imports from Poland	1148.9	193.0	810.6	114.6	816.4	140.8	987.7	156.0

Polish direct investment in the region had also grown, surpassing that of Germany by 1999.

Table 10: FDI Inflow into Kaliningrad 1995-2001 (in million USD)[167]

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Poland	0.3	0.5	0.2	2.4	1.3	2.9	1.9
Germany	3.5	1.6	2.0	5.0	0.8	0.5	0.2
Total	12.7	21.5	10.6	9.2	4.1	6.6	3.2

Although insignificant in terms of total trade turnover with Russia (only around 1.1% of total imports to Poland in 2003), trade with Kaliningrad became an important source of income

[162] Many different geographical analogies were drawn when questioning the future of Kaliningrad, some of which were Guantanamo (given the military concentration), Kuril Islands (due to the fact that it was a post war gain), Alaska (after allegations in the Sunday Times in January 2001 that Russia was planning to hand over the economic control of Kaliningrad to Germans in exchange for debt reduction) and Hawai (drawing parallels between the coexistence of US military with substantial Japanese investment vis-à-vis Russian military and German investment),

[163] Grzegorz Jóźwiak, "Współpraca Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego I regoinów północno – wschodniej Polski w latach 1992-1998" in Krystyna Gomółka (Ed.), *Problemy transformacji gospodarczej w Estonii, Litwie, Ukrainie, Białorusi i Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku.* Gdańsk: Politechnika Gdańska, Wydział Zarządzania i Ekonomii, 2002, pp. 177-202.

[164] Iwona Trusewicz, "Trampolina do Rosji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 05 June 2003.

[165] Data from the first 11 months of 2003. *Federacja Rosyjska. Przewodnik dla przedsiębiorców*, Warsaw: UNIDO, 2004, p.190

[166] Itogi ekonomicheskogo razvitiya oblasti za 2001 god, http://www.gov.kaliningrad.ru/stat.php3 (accessed 07 November 2004)

[167] Natalia Smorodinskaya and Stanislav Zhukov, "The Kaliningrad Enclave in Europe: Swimming against the Tide. Diagnostics of the State and Potential of Economic Development" (Paper submitted to East-West Institute (New-York), Transfrontier Cooperation program), Moscow, 2003. http://www.inst-econ.org.ru/english/publish/smorodin1.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

for many people living close to the border on both sides.[168] The so called "ant trade", i.e. people crisscrossing the border, mostly carrying goods to local bazaars, dominated economic exchange. The introduction of travel restrictions in 1998 (together with the Russian financial crisis) reduced the volume of this trade (see Appendix for a case study about the Podlasie region) and implementation of visas in October 2003 dealt a further blow.

5.4.3 The corridor problem

The biggest headache in Polish Russian relations regarding Kaliningrad was caused by the EU enlargement and the prospect of the region becoming an enclave within the EU. The problem of isolation was an issue for Russia since 1991, aggravated by voices from Germany and Lithuania questioning the status of the region. Officially neither German nor Lithuanian (nor Polish) governments raised any doubts about Russian control over Kaliningrad. However, revisionist rhetoric by high profile politicians like Vytautas Landsbergis fuelled suspicions.[169] Consecutive Polish governments were consistent in reiterating that Poland recognised Kaliningrad as an integral part of Russia.

Since 1991 the main transport route between Kaliningrad and Russia had been through Lithuania. Air and sea connections were sparse and given the low incomes in the region, expensive. Russia was looking for alternative routes in order to avoid dependence on the Lithuanian link. This became a necessity especially after the Lithuanian government increased transit fees in 1995. In February 1996 during a Yeltsin-Lukashenko meeting in Moscow, the idea of a "transit corridor", which would be a highway and railroad linking Kaliningrad and Grodno through Suwałki region, was discussed. Although building transport links between the latter two regions was already foreseen by a transborder cooperation and transport agreement signed in 1995, the name "corridor" caused an allergic reaction. Press was quick to draw analogies between Hitler's demand for a corridor to Danzig in 1939 and the proposed Kaliningrad link. The Polish Foreign Minister rejected the proposals on ecological grounds (i.e. mentioning Suwałki's fragile environment) and argued that Lithuania was a simpler route.[170]

The Kaliningrad problem once again became a subject of intensive debate in 2001 when the European Commission issued a communication which discussed potential complications of EU enlargement (especially the Schengen regime) on the region and

[168] 44.9 million USD in the first 11 months of 2003. *Federacja Rosyjska. Przewodnik dla przedsiębiorców*, pp.190-191

[169] Landsbergis, leader of opposition at the time, said that Russian sovereignty over Kaliningrad was debatable as it was only due to Moscow's power and West's weakness that made the region a part of Russia. Maja Narbutt, "Mapa Europy do dyskusji?", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 August 1995.

[170] Konrad Niklewicz and Witold Laskowski, "Slamming The Door On Russia's 'Corridor'", *Warsaw Voice*, 10 March 1996.

gave recommendations. The document proposed further meetings attended by Polish, Lithuanian, Russian and EU officials.[171] There was resentment in Poland due to the fact that the first two countries were not consulted during the preparation of the new strategy. A commentator on the right wing daily *Życie* questioned whether the maxim of "Nothing about us without us" (*Nic o nas bez nas*) applied any more, given that the EU chose to consult only Russia about policies which first and foremost affected Poland and Lithuania.[172]

As negotiations between the EU Commission and Russia intensified in 2002, the issue of "corridors" was again on the agenda. Moscow insisted that the EU gave a special status to Kaliningrad, ensured visa free travel for its inhabitants to Poland and Lithuania and concessions for transport corridors carrying goods and people. The EU rejected all these demands. Warsaw followed a similar line and declared that visa procedures would be implemented fully in 2003. The Polish reaction to the demand for a corridor was to categorically rule it out.[173]

Russia kept up the pressure about implementing visa free travel arrangements for Kaliningrad inhabitants. The Russian PM Kasyanov tried to qualify the word "corridor", arguing that it merely meant enhanced transport connections and not extraterritorial links.[174] Besides, a counter historical analogy was drawn by Kaliningrad's governor, Vladimir Yegorov, who said that even during Cold War times West Berliners could travel visa free to the German Democratic Republic.[175] Still, Poles vehemently voiced their opposition to the idea at every opportunity.

The corridor problem was solved for Poland when Foreign minister Ivanov stated that the problem of transit between Kaliningrad and Russia concerned only Lithuania. The EU, Russia and Lithuania reached an agreement in November 2002 on introducing special transit documents for Kaliningrad inhabitants travelling through Lithuania.

5.5 HISTORICAL/EMOTIONAL ISSUES

The key aspects of relations between Poland and Russia are undoubtedly economic or strategic/defence policies such as NATO enlargement. However, it should be noted that emotional issues stemming from history were influential in setting the atmosphere in which relations were conducted and societies formed attitudes towards each other. Not only have

[171] Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU and Kaliningrad, COM (2001) 26, Brussels, 17 January 2001.
[172] Krzysztof Rak, "Kaliningradzki węzeł", *Życie*, 21 January 2001.
[173] See among others reaction by Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz and PM Miller. "Cimoszewicz: rząd wyklucza korytarz do Kaliningradu", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 May 2002.
[174] Maja Narbutt and Katarzyna Wypustek, "Nie ma zgody w kwestii wiz", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 March 2002.
[175] Wacław Radziwinowicz, "Kaliningrad niezgody", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 May 2002.

they caused tensions on the intergovernmental level but also acted as a reinforcement of mutual stereotypes of "imperialist Russian implicitly approving Soviet methods" and "back stabbing, mercenary Pole, ungrateful to Russian (and Soviet) sacrifice for its liberation". Although historical and emotional issues that divide Russia and Poland abound, this section will elaborate two of them: Katyń and the Chechen issue.

5.5.1 Katyń

Nazi forces occupying Russia announced on 13 April 1943 that they had found mass graves of Polish officer POWs killed by the Soviets three years earlier near the Katyń forest (Smolensk region). Even though world public opinion took Nazi accusations against the Soviets with a pinch of salt, most Poles had no doubts that the Soviets could carry out such a crime. The Soviet authorities vehemently denied the accusation and did not have to spend too much effort to convince the Allies to hold the Nazis responsible. After the war the issue was hushed up in the PRL as well as in the West even though the Polish government in exile and émigrés raised the issue of Soviet responsibility for the massacre. Katyń became the symbol of Poland's loss of independence and was seen an evidence of the extent Soviet Union was ready to go to in order to "destroy" the Polish elite which would be an obstacle to taking over Poland.[176]

The silence (and denial) on the part of the Soviet Union ended on 13 April 1990 when official Soviet press agency TASS announced that the Katyń massacre had been carried out by the NKVD. Following that Gorbachev sent a letter to Jaruzelski containing the names of officers killed by NKVD and a committee made up of Russian and Polish historians started research into the so called white spots (*białe plamy*) of history. However, a complete explanation of the incident was to be offered by Russia when the Director of Central Archives, upon Yeltsin's request, handed Wałęsa on 14 October 1992 the copy of a decision on shooting captive Polish officers signed by Stalin and Politburo members in March 1940 and a note sent by the KGB chief to Khrushchev in 1959 informing him that 21,857 files of Poles arrested and shot by the NKVD had been destroyed. The Polish officer corps captured by the invading Soviet army in 1939-40 were taken eventually to camps named Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov and from there sent near Katyń, Miednoje (Kalinin/Tver) and Kharkov (Ukraine) to be executed. A judicial investigation into the incident began.

[176] Another important aspect of the massacre and the cover up that followed was highlighted by George Sanford in his book *Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940. Truth, justice and memory*, BASEES Series on Russian and East European Studies, No. 20, London: Routledge, 2005, which is the most authoritative account and analysis of the issue published in English. Sanford analysed the "management of truth" exercised by Americans and the British and how their mishandling of the issue distorted the facts further and deepened the feeling of injustice on the part of those who suffered.

Even though the admission of responsibility for the massacre by the Russian authorities was welcome, it did not fully satisfy the Poles. Yeltsin's gesture was perceived to be a consequence of the internal conflict between him and Gorbachev rather than a quest for reconciliation and the declarations were insufficient to explain and to own up to Soviet Union's policies towards Poland in the 1930s and 40s.[177] Yeltsin undertook a further gesture when he visited Warsaw in August 1993. He paid his respects to the victims of the massacre by visiting the Katyń memorial in Powązki cemetery in Warsaw and publicly apologised to one of the survivors.

A decision was taken in March 1995 to build cemeteries in Katyń and Miednoje for both Polish and Russian victims of the massacre and the site was visited by the Polish PM and President during their visits to Russia. The cemeteries were opened in 2000 during the 60th anniversary of the massacre. Also, Putin informed Kwaśniewski that new graves had been discovered and invited Polish prosecutors to take part in the investigation.[178]

Despite the aforementioned gestures from the Russian side (albeit welcomed by the Polish government), dissatisfaction dominated the Polish side. First, the fact that Russia had admitted that the massacre was a crime perpetrated by the Soviet government, the issue of compensation was inevitably raised. This upset the Russian side which categorically ruled out any claims as compensation for such an event, as it would set a precedent for a thousand others. In addition to being an obstacle towards reconciliation, compensation claims also gave rise to counterarguments from Russian historians about historical crimes perpetrated by the Second Polish Republic against Russian POWs. Russian historian Yuri Ivanov (among others) argued that between 60 to 130,000 Red Army POWs had suffered "barbaric cruelty" and died in Polish captivity during the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet War.[179] Only in one camp in Tuchola 22,000 POWs died and even though Polish calculations put the total figure killed at 18-20,000, the Polish authorities did not deny the death of a large number of Russian POWs. Ivanov argued that the attitude of the Polish state (which declared itself as the legal successor of the Second Polish Republic) was reminiscent of that of Soviet Union towards Katyń.

Second, the Polish side was unhappy about the fact that the investigation led by Russian military prosecutors took a very long time and none of the perpetrators were brought to justice. During the Moscow visit of the head of the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej* - IPN), Leon Kieres, in August 2004, a divergence between the two sides on how to handle the Katyń issue became more apparent. The Polish side

[177] Zajączkowski, "Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie", *RPPZ 1992*.
[178] "Polish President receives call from Putin over Katyn massacre", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 13 April 2000.
[179] Jurij Iwanow "Tragedia polskiej niewoli", *Niezawisimaja Gazieta*, 16 July 1998 in *Przedruk z prasy rosyjskiej*, 20 July 1998, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich. www.osw.waw.pl (accessed 11 December 1999)

demanded that the act be defined as genocide or a crime against humanity which would mean that about 2,000 people, from those who actually shot the POWS to those who aided their transport, had to be brought to justice.[180] Besides, the case would not be allowed to lapse. The Russian side, however, treated the case as ordinary murder and argued that the case could be closed, as none of the perpetrators was alive.[181] Reactions in the Polish press (especially on the right wing) were strong. "How many people should one shoot in the head so that it becomes genocide? Is 25,000 officers too little? Our future relations with Russia should depend on the answer to that" wrote *Życie* and referred to Russia as the "last confines of Yalta".[182] Right wing *Nasz Dziennik* argued that Soviets had committed genocide as they planned and systematically carried out the murder of Poland's intellectual elite with the aim of "destroying the Polish Nation."[183] Many articles were published (especially in the right wing press) calling for the matter to be taken to the European Court of Human Rights (Russia acceded to the European Human Rights Convention in 1998) by relatives of the victims, with the help of the Polish government. Calls were also made for the Polish government to bring the problem to the International Court of Justice.[184]

The Polish government's reactions to the controversy was more rational and calculated. On the one hand, officials gave the message to the public (voters) that they cared for their concerns and at the same time sent signals to Russia that they had no wish to spoil relations. Marek Borowski of SLD said that there was no need for "sabre rattling" but dialogue and his party colleague, Krzysztof Janik, added that while preventing confrontation with neighbours, they would not avoid facing bilateral problems.[185] Meanwhile, Kwaśniewski called for naming the crime by its name, "calling a genocide a genocide", but was careful to add that Katyń was only one of the crimes perpetrated in "those horrible years" and that under Stalinist terror millions of Russians had also been persecuted.[186]

It is fair to say that Russian gestures to Poland (especially those of 1990 and 1993) regarding Katyń put the process of reconciliation on a solid footing. Some commentators believed that tensions on the issue subsided and, like Kobrinskaya, argued that

[180] Marcin Wojciechowski, "Rosja nie uzna zbrodni w Katyniu za ludobójstwo", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 05 August 2004.
[181] On 21 September 2004 the Russian military prosecutor officially stopped the investigation.
[182] Maciej Łętowski, "Krótka pamięć Kremla", *Życie*, 06 August 2004.
[183] Zdzisław Jastrzębiec Peszkowski, "Wtórne kłamstwo katyńskie", *Nasz Dziennik*, 01 October 2004. Peszkowski was the Katyń survivor to whom Yeltsin apologised in 1993.
[184] It should also be mentioned, however, that there were voices of reason. In the left wing *Trybuna* an author whose uncles were killed in Katyń argued that "an atmosphere of revenge" dominated Poland and questioned why Poles are still pursuing the perpetrators of Katyń, who were already dead, and worsening the atmosphere between Poland and Russia. Maria Szyszkowska, "W stronę przeszłości", *Trybuna*, 14 August 2004.
[185] "Rosyjskie akta ws. Katynia udostępnione IPN?", *Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa* (IAR), 03 October 2004.
[186] "Chłodna wizyta Kwaśniewskiego w Moskwie", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 September 2004.

reconciliation had already taken place.[187] One may argue that there is some truth in this as the public opinion figures demonstrate that only 43% of Poles disliked Russians in 2003 compared to 56% in 1993 (and the figures for Poles who liked Russians were 17% and 22% respectively).[188] However, as Jedlicki put it, "should Russia be perceived as a threat once again, the spectres of the past would undoubtedly revive."[189]

5.5.2 The Chechen problem

Katyń was at least a chapter belonging to Polish-Russian history. How is the Chechen problem relevant, one might ask. Poles had no significant current or historic ties with Chechens but nevertheless were overtly concerned about their plight following the armed conflict in their region.

When an aid convoy belonging to the Polish charity, Polish Humanitarian Action (*Polska Akcja Humanitarna*), headed towards Chechnya in March 1995, the Russian Foreign Ministry protested in very strong terms against what they claimed to be breaches of principles governing the distribution of humanitarian aid. Polish Russian relations already suffered a bout of heightened tension when in October 1994 there was a scandal where Warsaw transport police maltreated Russian train passengers who asked for help after being robbed by a Russian gang. Russian PM Chermomyrdin postponed his scheduled visit to Warsaw in protest.

The Polish press read the issue as Russians unnecessarily harassing a charity convoy. It is hard to know whether this was the case. Perhaps the Russian reaction was related to a Polish Council of Ministers statement of 10 January 1995 where the Foreign Ministry was asked to facilitate bringing humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict in Chechnya through NGOs.[190] Even though the government was careful about not giving the impression of interfering in Russian affairs, the Russian government became increasingly wary of statements issued by parliamentary bodies as well as street protests regarding the Chechen problem.

Establishment of a Chechen Information Bureau in Krakow worsened the tensions, and the Russian Embassy reacted with a démarche in February 1995 arguing that the permission of Krakow city authorities to such organisations was contrary to the spirit of the good

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[187] Kobrinskaya quoted in Peter Cheremushkin, "Russian-Polish Relations: A Long Way From Stereotypes to Reconciliation", *Intermarium* (Columbia University online journal), Vol. 5, 2003, No 3, p. 11. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5no3/ruspol.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[188] Michał Strzeszewski, "Sympatia i niechęć do innych narodów", Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) Komunikat z Badań, No. BS/184/2003, Warsaw, December 2003.
[189] Jerzy Jedlicki, "Historical memory as a source of conflicts in Eastern Europe", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 32, 1999, No. 3, p.227.
[190] Komunikat po Radzie Ministrow, Warsaw, 10 January 1995. http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1937_3538.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

neighbourliness treaty of 1992. Later in May the announcement that a Radio Free Caucasus was to be established by the aforementioned bureau added fuel to the fire. The Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev maintained, given these developments, it was difficult to define Polish Russian relations as friendly.[191]

Demonstrations and protest activities of the Free Caucasus Committee (*Komitet Wolny Kaukaz*), made up of people belonging to marginal radical groups like anarchists, continued to the distaste of Russia and even though the Polish government tried hard not to provoke Russian authorities, interest in the Chechen conflict grew among MPs and public opinion. Whereas most of the press would consider this as humanitarian concern for civilians, there were commentators with a more realistic point of view. For instance, Ludwik Stomma, a columnist at the weekly *Polityka*, wrote that the media did not care about humanitarian tragedies anywhere but as soon as someone rebelled against Russia, they took up the cause with pleasure, spurred by national feelings and complexes.[192]

In 2000 the disruption caused by the protests regarding Chechnya to bilateral relations reached serious proportions. On 24 February 2000 members of the Free Caucasus Committee held a demonstration in front of the Russian Consulate in Poznań and a group went into the consulate gardens, took down and stepped on the Russian flag while the police refrained from intervention (as previously mentioned). This could not come at a worse time as relations were strained after Warsaw expelled nine Russian diplomats in January 2000 on allegations of spying. Moscow expelled nine Polish diplomats in retaliation.[193]

Regarding the Poznań demonstration, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused the Polish government of not doing anything to prevent the activities of extremist organisations which threaten the security of Russian diplomats in Poland.[194] Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, cancelled his planned visit to Warsaw in March and the Russian ambassador was recalled to Moscow. It was impossible that Poznań events would not affect bilateral relations, not to mention political relations, stated Ivanov, and added that he held the Polish government responsible for the event.[195] The Russian Duma repeated the accusation in a resolution, criticising Warsaw for tolerating an organisation aiding the Chechen separatists. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* argued that having NATO's protective umbrella, Poland felt strong enough to openly demonstrate its anti-Russian complexes.[196]

The Russian Vice-Consul in Poznań, Igor Oshchepkov, reflected, if not exactly the official

[191] Piotr Jendroszczyk, "Andriej Kozyriew wątpi w przyjazne *stosunki*", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 May 1995.
[192] Ludwik Stomma, "Donoszą z Czeczenii", *Polityka*, August 1999, No. 35.
[193] Piotr Jendroszczyk, "Polscy dyplomaci niepożądani". *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 January 2000.
[194] "Z Oświadczenia MSZ Rosji", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 February 2000.
[195] Sławomir Popowski, "Duma oskarża polskie władze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 February 2000.
[196] Sławomir Popowski, "Zgoda władz na antypolskie demonstracje", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 March 2000.

stance, the feeling that dominated public opinion: "That was perhaps revenge for the years of partition and communism. When a lion is sick, even a monkey can kick him. But when the lion recovers, what happens then?"[197] Several demonstrations were held in Moscow and St. Petersburg in front of Polish consulates where protesters called Poles a disgrace to all Slavs and called for a boycott of Polish goods.[198] The Polish government and Sejm quickly realised the potential damage the events could do to relations and sent conciliatory messages to Russia.[199] However, no action was taken against the pro-Chechen organisations.

Polish interest in Chechnya dampened down thanks to the atmosphere created by the "anti-terror crusade" that was started by the American President George Bush and supported by Putin after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York. However, Russia become convinced that Warsaw was guilty, if not by commission, by omission of pro Chechen activities in Poland as well as the provocative coverage of the issue by the Polish media. Historical prejudices (or experiences) were again at play: Whereas the Poles thought they were the nation to lead all others rising against Russian imperialism and to be the carrier of European ideals and norms into the East, the Russians became convinced of the treacherous character of *Lach* following the principle that a weakened Russia was a prerequisite for Polish independence.

5.6 CONCLUSION

The balance sheet of Poland's relations with Russia in the post-Soviet period is by no means a straightforward one. The fact that Poland managed to stick (if only in rhetoric at times) to the official line of Russia as an important partner was a success. Despite several scandals and conflicts, channels of political dialogue were kept open. And after the initial objection of Russia was overcome, Poland succeed in joining NATO and sorting out problems its EU accession could cause for bilateral relations and at the same time manage to keep at worst nominally amicable relations with Russia throughout.

Failures should also be mentioned. Polish governments has never really undertaken efforts to fight historical prejudices against Russia that lurk among the public and politicians who at times resorted to manipulating fear and dislike of Russia for domestic political or electoral purposes. The Orlen affair is a prime example to that. Reconciliation between the two nations has also not yet been completed. Some Polish governments

[197] "Flaga pod but", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 February 2000.
[198] Sławomir Popowski, "Dobry Polak to Dzierżyński", *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 March 2000.
[199] The Foreign Relations Commission at Sejm issued a resolution expressing their regret about the Poznań incidents and hope that these incidents would not affect bilateral relations. *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 90, 2517/III, 25 February 2000. Also Sławomir Popowski, "Duma oskarża polskie władze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 February 2000.

(especially post Solidarity ones) overlooked the fact that even as a member of the EU and NATO, Poland had to have sustainable economic and political relations with Russia. The section on gas imports from Russia tried to explain how the AWS-UW governments between 1997 and 2001 tried too hard to reverse the pattern of an inevitable dependence instead of working towards managing its effects by diplomatic and political negotiation. The same section, alongside the section on NATO enlargement, also demonstrated that Poland's policy towards Russia or its EP could easily be rendered irrelevant when the issues at stake concern key economic, political or strategic relations between Russia and the West.

Competing visions of EP in Poland assign Russia a different place in their strategies. Whereas one puts Russia at the heart of it (as a country having much larger power, resources and clout in the region and world affairs), the other advocates Ukraine (and maybe Belarus one day) as the key to Poland's success in the East. Balancing these two visions seems to be the only rational option.

Chapter Six

Poland's Relations with Ukraine

This chapter will dwell on Poland's relations with what Poland calls its "strategic partner", Ukraine. Relations with Ukraine have always been perceived by the Polish political elite as the main focus of Eastern policy (EP). Ukraine and its stance vis-à-vis Russia has been ascribed different meanings by Poles such as Ukraine's independence as a guarantee of Poland's, a pro-Western Ukraine blocking Russian expansionism and a pro-Polish Ukraine enhancing Poland's claim to dominate the EP of the EU. However, it has proven difficult to translate rhetoric into policy. This chapter aims to explain the constraints on building a strategic partnership with Ukraine as well as the processes such as historical reconciliation that helped enhance dialogue and exchange.

The first section will evaluate bilateral relations within the context of EU and NATO enlargement and asses whether a strategic partnership had been achieved. The second section will cover economic relations and the privatization of Huta Częstochowa, which was perceived as a test case for how deep Polish-Ukrainian partnership and trust went. As with Russia, a key element in bilateral relations is energy. The third section will explain the politics surrounding the building of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline and the constraints imposed by the Russian factor and economic realities on projects that aim to curb Russian influence in the region. The fourth section will dwell on attempts at reconciliation on historical matters which had poisoned mutual perceptions for many decades. A brief historical background to the events was given and contending perceptions on the events will be examined. The last section will deal with minorities. Historical reconciliation and minority issues had a bigger resonance among the peoples of Poland and Ukraine than on policy makers on both sides. However, these issues constitute an important part of the debate on EP and Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relations so they are well worth elaborating.

6.1 POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT

Bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine were initiated before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opportunity to establish ties came following the declaration of sovereignty by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 16 July 1990. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski paid a visit to Kiev where he signed a declaration on the principles and

directions of progress in bilateral relations.[1] The provisions of the declaration were comprehensive despite the fact that Poland was following a careful policy of not alienating Soviet Moscow while having relations with the constituent republics, i.e. the two-track policy. The declaration ruled out any territorial claims (Article 3), foresaw the establishment of consulates (Article 4), the protection of minorities (Article 8) and cooperation in the fields of economy, culture, science, ecology, border issues and disarmament.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared independence on 24 August 1991 and Poland became the first state to recognise Ukraine on 2 December 1992 following the referendum in Ukraine on independence on 1 December. Kataryna and Roman Wolczuk state that this should not be overstated (as is the inclination on the part of many Polish commentators). They argue that Poland was not willing to support Ukrainian independence unconditionally before the referendum and this was due to "Poland's readiness to defer to Moscow's anticipated reaction to events" and to "the undefined nature of its policy towards Ukraine".[2]

6.1.1 Beginnings of a "strategic partnership"?

The two-track policy gave way to increased bilateral ties with Ukraine. The basic state treaty was signed on 18 May 1992 (and came into effect on 30 December 1992).[3] Another treaty on the legal aspects of the Polish Ukrainian border was signed on 21 January 1993.[4] In April 1993 a Polish Ukrainian Presidential Consultative Committee was established (protocol signed on 12 January 1993) and held its first meeting in May. In 1993 there were many high level visits from both sides to each other's capitals and several treaties were signed. Poland also gave support to Ukrainian aspirations for joining CEFTA in 1992, even though these were not fulfilled due to objections of other Visegrad group members.[5]

However, it would be a mistake to assume that this meant the full implementation of the much touted Polish-Ukrainian "strategic partnership", a term used since 1993 to define the importance of bilateral relations.[6] There were reasons why this was the case. First, even though there was awareness in Poland about the importance of Ukrainian independence,

[1] "Deklaracja o zasadach i podstawowych kierunkach rozwoju stosunków polsko-ukraińskich, Kijów, 13 października 1990 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 526, 1991, No. 4, pp. 25-30.
[2] Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine: A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe?*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 2002, p. 9.
[3] "Traktat między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkac i współpracy, Warszawa, 18 maja 1992 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 530, 1992, No. 4, pp. 76-87.
[4] "Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on the Legal Relations on the Polish-Ukrainian State Border and the Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Border Related Matters, Kiev, January 12, 1993 (Agreement came into effect on 21 December 1993)", 1993, No. 4, pp. 55-87.
[5] Stephen R. Burant, *Poland, Ukraine, and the Idea of Strategic Partnership*. Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No. 1308. Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1999, pp. 12-13.
[6] Ian Brzezinski writes that it was the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasiuk, who defined Polish Ukrainian relations as "strategic partnership" in February 1993 as he thought that European stability would be based on two principal axes, first German-French, second Polish-Ukrainian. Ian Brzezinski, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis", *Survival*, Vol.35, 1993, No.3, p. 26.

this was coupled with doubts about how much sovereignty Ukraine would retain in the future given both the economic and political instability in Ukraine and the process of CIS formation.

Second, by 1994 Poland had already determined as its goals joining the EU and NATO whereas Ukraine declared itself as non-aligned. The issue of nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine had still not been settled and Ukraine voiced fears about possible adverse effects of NATO enlargement on its security, although did not categorically object to it. Given the divergent orientations and Poland's absolute foreign policy priority of joining Western organisations, a truly strategic partnership with Ukraine was not an option. This was one of the reasons why Poland objected to Ukrainian president Kravchuk's proposals in May 1993 of establishing a "zone of stability" extending from Baltic to Black Sea including the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Visegrad states, Romania and Austria.[7] In fact, this plan was very similar to Wałęsa's failed NATO-bis idea of April 1992 which proposed forming a half way, pre-NATO security organisation together with Poland's Central European neighbours.[8] Wałęsa proposed the idea as he doubted the possibility of Poland's entry into NATO.[9]

Third, Russia was (and continued to be) the main security consideration for Poland and at this stage no Polish government could yet be willing to jeopardise relations with Russia for the sake of making Ukraine a priority. In addition to the uncertainty about NATO's willingness to take on new members and the time frame for the European integration process, there were other important considerations such as the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet troops and Poland's dependence on Russian military supplies and energy sources.[10] Poland's signing of the agreement on building a gas transit pipeline through Belarus with Russia on 25 August 1993 was received with dismay in Ukraine, the main beneficiary of transit revenues from Russian gas imported to Europe.[11] NATO's offer of PfP to Poland as well as Ukraine did not open a window of opportunity for cooperation among these countries, either. First, because of its noncommittal nature, Poland was not offered a security guarantee. Second, being lumped in the same group with laggards like Ukraine was perceived as a let down by Poland.

Another development that raised doubts about possible changes in Poland's attitude towards Ukraine was the October 1993 parliamentary elections in Poland after which a

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[7] Roman Wolczuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations Between 1991-1998. From the Declarative to the Substantive", *European Security*, Vol.10, 2000, No.1, pp.134-135.
[8] Roman Kuźniar, "Członkostwo w NATO w polskiej polityce zagranicznej" in Roman Kuźniar and Krzysztof Szczepanik (Eds), *Polityka Zagraniczna RP 1989-2002*, Warszawa: Askon, 2002, p. 108.
[9] Agnieszka Kasińska Metryka, *Prezydenci Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1989-1999*, Kielce: Wydział Zarządzania i Administracji Akademii Świętokrzyskiej w Kielcach, 2000, pp. 141-142.
[10] Roman Wolczuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations Between 1991-1998", 2000, p.139.
[11] Burant, *Poland, Ukraine, and the Idea of Strategic Partnership*, p. 15.

coalition government of post communist Left Democratic Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* – SLD) and Polish Peasants' Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* – PSL) was formed. The foreign policy rhetoric of both parties advocated that ties with Russia should have priority over relations with other ex-Soviet states in the region, as previously discussed in Chapter Four. Especially the PSL criticised the former governments for the loss of the Russian market and stressed the need to avoid alienating Russia further. These views sparked a lively debate on EP in Poland but no drastic change in the direction of Polish foreign policy ensued. The difference between rhetoric and practice was somewhat similar to Ukraine's experience after the 1994 presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma, elected on a pro-Russian platform, did not in practice rule out cooperation with the West and did not align Ukraine's foreign policy completely with Russia (although it must be kept in mind that there were fundamental differences between Poland and Ukraine in terms of constraints imposed on their foreign policies and the room for manoeuvre they had vis-à-vis Russia). Under Kuchma, Ukraine continued its so called "multivector" foreign policy of maintaining relations with both Russia and the West without a total commitment to either. Ukraine's foreign policy under Kuchma's first term in office (1994-99) has even been described by Kuzio as pro-Western.[12] He mentioned Kuchma's need for Western financial support for his reform programme and his unwillingness to participate in CIS processes other than economic ones as evidence.

Most commentators on Polish-Ukrainian matters agree that relations between the two countries improved gradually after 1994. This was facilitated by both Ukraine's above mentioned policies and evolution of Poland's foreign policy. Of course, the most influential factor was the gradual crystallisation of Western policies towards the region. Followed by Kuchma's reform programme, Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 5 December 1994 solved the problem of Ukraine's nuclear weapons and eliminated doubts about the shaping of how Ukraine's security policy. The US praised Ukrainian efforts and took a more proactive policy towards it, promising financial aid and credits in 1995.[13] Also, the Ukrainian attitude to NATO enlargement became more moderate, and throughout 1996 Ukrainian officials declared that despite still having reservations about the possibility of becoming a "buffer zone" between an enlarged NATO and Russia, they would not oppose NATO enlargement and would seek special relations with NATO. Meanwhile, Ukraine also declared EU membership as a strategic objective.

Relations between Poland and Ukraine intensified after 1994 on many levels. With Ukraine gradually toning down its objections against NATO enlargement, defence cooperation between Poland and Ukraine gained momentum. Following several high level meetings of

[12] Taras Kuzio, *EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?*, ISS-EU Occasional Paper No. 47, Paris: Institute for Security Studies-EU, 2004, pp. 8-9.
[13] Piotr Kościński, "Poszukiwanie nowego partnera", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 August 1995.

Defence Ministers and General Staff, a Ukrainian unit took part in the "Cooperation Bridge 94" military manoeuvre staged in Poland in September 1994 under the PfP programme.[14] And on 5 October 1995, Polish and Ukrainian Defence Ministers announced their plans for establishing a joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion (POLUKRBAT) which would participate in international peacekeeping missions.[15]

Intensifying political cooperation, especially in regional fora, was also evident. During a visit to Warsaw on 25-26 June 1996, Kuchma asked for Poland's support for Ukraine's bid to join the Weimar triangle, the EU, the West European Union and CEFTA. A declaration stressing the willingness to develop two countries' "strategic partnership" was signed by both presidents.[16] From 1995 on Ukraine also paid more attention to regional cooperation in Central and East Europe.[17] With the support of Poland and other CEEs, Ukraine joined the Council of Europe on 9 November 1995 and the Central European Initiative (CEI) on 1 June 1996.

The fast pace of progress in Polish Ukrainian cooperation gave the Prime Ministers of both sides the courage to declare during Cimoszewicz's visit to Kiev on 10 October 1996 that "Ukrainian-Polish relations have attained a level of strategic partnership".[18] Of course, not much should be read into this declaration, keeping in mind that Ukrainian officials used the term "strategic partner" not only for Poland but also for Russia, the US and Uzbekistan. It is a term at best indicating willingness to cooperate. Another rhetorical reflection of Polish Ukrainian rapprochement was the more frequent use of the Pilsudski slogan, much loved by *Kultura* circles, of "There may be no free Poland without a free Ukraine" by Ukrainians. For instance, the Ukrainian head of the Polish Ukrainian Presidential Consultative Committee, Vladimir Horbulin, used it during an interview with a Polish newspaper before Kuchma's visit and Kuchma repeated the saying in his address the Polish Sejm.[19]

[14] Jarosław Bratkiewicz, "Stosunki z Rosją, Ukrainą i Białorusią", *(RPPZ) 1993-94*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1994, pp. 129-138.
[15] Ustina Markus, "Ukraine, Poland to Set up Joint Battalion", *OMRI Daily Digest*, 06 October 1995.
[16] "Wspólne oświadczenie premiera Ukrainy Pawło Łazarenki i prezesa Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza, Kijów, 10 października 1996 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 546, 1996, No. 4, pp. 41-45.
[17] See Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Enlargement and Ukraine's Relations with Other Central and Eastern European Countries", 1998-2000 NATO-EAPC Fellowship Final Report, 2000. www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/pavliuk.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006).
[18] "Wspólne oświadczenie premiera Ukrainy Pawło Łazarenki i prezesa Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza, Kijów, 10 października 1996 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 546, 1996, No. 4, pp. 41-45.
[19] "Razem do Unii Europejskiej", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 June 1996 and "Ukrainian President In The Polish Parliament", *RFE/RL Newsline*, 27 June 1996.

6.1.2 Ukraine and NATO

The momentum of progress in bilateral relations was kept up and alongside frequent declarations of friendship and cooperation, more concrete steps such as the May 1997 agreement on the liberalisation of trade were taken. The US and NATO's support for Ukraine's "pro-Western" orientation also reinforced Poland's efforts. The Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI) was established on the basis of a joint trilateral statement in Kiev on 29 October 1998.[20] PAUCI channels USAID (United States Agency for International Development) money to Polish-Ukrainian projects in order to "strengthen the emerging cooperative relationship between Ukraine and Poland and to take advantage of acquired expertise and lessons learned in Poland's successful transition to free market democracy."[21] Meanwhile, NATO, by signing a Charter on Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine on 9 July 1997 (and inviting Poland for membership at the same time), intended to allay the fears of Ukraine that it would be left in a security vacuum after NATO enlargement. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine decided at a meeting on 23 May 2002 to pursue membership of NATO. On 22 November 2002, a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was introduced in order to intensify NATO-Ukraine relations acknowledging Ukraine's goal of NATO membership in the long term.[22] In addition, POLUKRBAT became operational in 1999, the year when Poland became a NATO member, and in July 2000 joined the NATO led KFOR peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.

Ukraine's relation with NATO and US also developed steadily, despite hitches such as the Kolchuga affair.[23] Ukraine joined the US's anti-Iraq coalition in March 2003 by sending a battalion to Kuwait and in June 2003 Ukraine's parliament, *Verhkovna Rada*, decided in favour of sending troops to join the US-British invasion of Iraq, to be stationed under Polish command. Ukraine became the fourth largest contributor to the allied occupation forces. Russia's amiable relations with the US after Putin's election, especially following the events of 11 September 2001 and its tacit acceptance of NATO's Baltic enlargement relieved Ukraine of the fear of Russia's ire and allowed it to pronounce its ambition of NATO membership openly. At the same time, Russia-US rapprochement brought about the possibility that Ukraine would lose its strategic importance for NATO. Sherr argues that such a drastic decision as sending 1,600 soldiers to Iraq was taken in order to prevent the ebb of Ukraine's importance in the eyes of the US.[24]

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[20] "Wspólne oświadczenie w sprawie inicjatywy współpracy polsko-amerykańsko-ukraińskiej, Kijów, 29 października 1998 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 553, 1998, No. 3-4, pp. 7-8.
[21] See http://www.pauci.org/en/about/about (accessed 06 November 2006).
[22] Text of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan can be found at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm (accessed 06 November 2006).
[23] The affair was caused by the allegations that Kuchma authorised the sale of Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq in 2000 violating US sanctions.
[24] James Sherr, "Edging erratically forward", *NATO Review*, Istanbul Summit Special, May 2004, p.46.

6.1.3 Ukraine and the EU

In contrast to Ukraine's developing relations with NATO, there was not much progress in terms of its relations with the EU. Until 2001 the main document regulating relations between the EU and Ukraine was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 but entered into force in 1998 after ratification by national parliaments. However, the PCA failed to provide the basis for either harmonising Ukrainian laws and regulations with those of the EU or bringing Ukraine closer to European integration process. Despite Ukraine's declarations of EU membership as a foreign policy objective and the 11 June 1998 Strategy for Ukrainian integration into the EU (issued by a presidential decree), Ukraine failed to take any meaningful steps to pursue EU membership and to fulfil the requirements of the PCA. Wolczuk and Wolczuk argue that Ukraine pursued the goal of EU membership solely in order to reverse its economic backwardness and uncompetitiveness due to prospective financial and economic gains associated with closer relations with the EU.[25] They doubt that there was a genuine will to fulfil EU political and economic criteria and add that most of the Ukrainian bureaucracy and society was indifferent towards the EU.

At the same time, the EU was on the one hand interested in some degree of cooperation with Ukraine but on the other unwilling to give Ukraine any perspective of future membership, which is the main instrument available to the EU to ensure a positive response. This stance was confirmed by the December 1999 Helsinki European Council where only a common strategy for Ukraine was drawn up. The document acknowledged Ukraine's European aspiration and welcomed its pro-European choice and encouraged closer cooperation as Ukraine would share an external border with future EU member states.[26] Membership, associate or full, was not listed as one of the strategic goals. The EU pledged support for Ukraine on issues such as countering the negative effects of EU enlargement (e.g. visas) and Ukraine's WTO application. EU-Ukraine summits, held in Yalta on 11 September 2001 and Copenhagen on 4 July 2002, focused on strengthening the existing "strategic partnership" rather than considering any new status for Ukraine. The Wider Europe Initiative of March 2003 brought no progress in the eyes of Ukraine, either. Its aim was to offer "the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital" to not only Ukraine but all Western ex-Soviet states, Russia and South Mediterranean countries.[27] Even though the document mentioned "differentiation" between

[25] Wolczuk and Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine*, pp.93-96.
[26] *European Council common strategy on Ukraine. European Council, Helsinki, 11 December 1999.* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, p. 8.
[27] "Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003)

the countries falling in its scope as the basis of action, it also made clear that the aim was "to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions."[28] Kuchma reacted to this proposal at the European summit in Athens in April 2003 and said that Ukraine would not accept any substitutes for a full membership in the EU. Although he always cited membership of the EU as a main foreign policy goal, this time he said: "Kyiv is not interested in forcing membership in the EU. Today the tasks of integration into the WTO and adaptation of our internal legislation to EU's standards are more important."[29]

A few months later, during the CIS Yalta summit on 19 September 2003, Kuchma signed the agreement creating a Single Economic Zone between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and hinted that disillusionment with the EU was a reason for this decision. He said "Under the present conditions, when European markets are closed for us...it's better to have a real bird in the hand than two in the bush."[30] And following NATO's Istanbul summit of 28-29 June 2004, where NATO postponed decisions about opening up membership talks with Ukraine and stepped up the pressure on Ukraine to get its domestic politics in order, Kiev took a similar action.[31] On 26 July 2004, a new Ukrainian defence doctrine omitting EU and NATO membership as foreign policy objectives was issued.[32] The doctrine made only a vague reference to Ukraine's aim of Euro-Atlantic integration.

According to the EU its reluctance to give Ukraine any membership perspective was legitimised by domestic political developments in Ukraine during the second term of the Kuchma presidency. Increasing authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine and lack of progress in economic and political reform were often criticised by the EU. Serious allegations such as stifling of the media and blocking the judiciary (Gongadze murder in 2000), high level corruption (Lazarenko affair), illegal arms trade (Kolchuga scandal) elicited a strong reaction from the West. The Kuchma administration found itself shunned by the West and tried to counterbalance this by pursuing a more Russia friendly policy and taking more active part in the CIS.[33] Domestic political improprieties and Ukraine's inadequate reform

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104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, p. 4. http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/data/doc/pr_030311c_eng.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)

[28] "Wider Europe— Neighbourhood", pp. 5 and 14.

[29] "Address by President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma at the European Conference "New Neighborhood of the EU" (17.04.03)", *Ukrainian Monitor*, 18 April 2003, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/eng/topic/index.shtml?id=1503 (accessed 11 February 2005)

[30] Jan Maksymiuk, "Kuchma signs accord on CIS Single Economic Zone with 'reservations'", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, 23 September 2003.

[31] Vladimir Socor, "NATO summit takes stock of Ukraine's performance", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, 06 July 2004, No. 45. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2368197 (accessed 06 November 2006)

[32] Ahto Lobjakas, "EU shrugs off Kuchma's strategic manoeuvrings", *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 6, 3 August 2004, No. 27 and Roman Woronowycz, "Ukraine no longer lists membership in NATO and EU as foreign policy goal", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 72, 01 August 2004, No. 31.

[33] When asked by a Polish newspaper whether West or East was more important for Ukraine, Kuchma said "Our policy is neither pro-Western nor pro-Russian. It is pro-Ukrainian. ... Please show me one state which would knowingly have a univectoral policy without harming its development." Wiesław S. Dębski, "Jesteśmy proukraińscy" (interview with Leonid Kuchma), *Trybuna*, 26 June 2004.

performance coupled with conflicting signals given by its foreign policy contributed to the intensification of "Ukraine fatigue" in the West.[34]

6.1.4 Poland's attitude and debates

By the end of 1990s, Poland's commitment to a democratic and pro-European Ukraine became the cornerstone of Polish EP. Multiparty consensus was secured on Poland's strategic partnership with Ukraine and Ukraine's importance for Poland's security, alongside Poland's commitment to support Ukraine's quest for EU and NATO accession. Regular dialogue between Polish and Ukrainian governments was ensured by bilateral structures such as the Presidential Consultative Committee, Permanent Conference on European Integration and Polish-Ukrainian Parliamentary Group. There were also NGOs such as the Polish-Ukrainian Forum dealing exclusively with promoting cooperation in both political and non-political areas. Others like the Batory Foundation started giving closer attention to the place of Ukraine within Poland's EP.

Even though there was near unanimity among politicians and intellectuals as to the importance of Ukraine for Poland, there was also dissent about what policies should actually be implemented. The subject of Ukraine within Poland's EP was a major thread in the 2000-01 EP minimalism debate, started by an article by Sienkiewicz who argued that Polish EP was based on unrealistic assumptions and premises and lacked the capacity to succeed in the tasks it set.[35] (This debate was presented in Chapter Four). Sienkiewicz argued that even though Poland might have had a more stable foreign policy towards Ukraine (than for example towards Belarus), it had had no capacity to influence the domestic political and economic transformation there.[36] In the ensuing debate many authors criticised the current foreign policy rhetoric on Ukraine and pointed to the limitations imposed by realities. One of these authors, Olszański, criticised the previously mentioned Piłsudskiite slogan of "There may be no free Poland without a free Ukraine" as this implied that conflict with Russia was inevitable and assumed that Poland had to have good relations with Russia in order to secure its standing in the West.[37] He argued that Ukrainian statehood was already consolidated and it made a sovereign choice of being allies and partners with Russia. He wrote that Ukraine "need not take stock of our interests... given that for 10 years we have failed to define, let alone viably implement them."

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[34] Kuzio, *EU and Ukraine*, p. 10.
[35] Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, "Delusions and Dilemmas of Poland's Eastern Policy: In Praise of Minimalism", *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest* (hereafter *PFAD*), Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 227-237.
[36] Sienkiewicz maintained that Warsaw's decision on building a second gas pipeline through Belarus for the transport of Russian gas to Europe was crucial. He argued that this was the first time in the last 10 years that Warsaw's decision was "pivotal" for Ukraine. We can say now with hindsight how wrong he was. (See Chapter Five, section on gas and pipelines)
[37] Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, "Dispute on Poland's Eastern Policy: State Interest Comes First", (translation from *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 18 March 2001, No.11), *PFAD*, Vol. 1, 2001, No.1, pp. 263-267.

Even though it is difficult to ascertain the effects of an essentially intellectual exercise such as the minimalism debate on the mindset of policy makers, one could observe some realistic approaches in attitudes towards Ukraine. For instance, Jerzy Osiatyński, an MP from Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności* - UW), a partner in the ruling coalition, noted the discrepancy between Poland's foreign policy goals regarding Ukraine and its capacity to attain these goals and added that a more modest policy should be adopted. He said during the first session of the Polish-Ukrainian forum on 19 February 2000 "We are not able to take Ukraine into our arms and carry her to the EU."[38]

It should also be noted that one of the biggest gestures extended to Ukraine by Poland in 2000 ended in a spectacular let down. The Polish government announced in summer 2000 that it could not agree to the building of a second gas pipeline which would go through Belarus, avoiding Ukraine, as this would harm the interests of Ukraine (See Chapter Five for details). It soon became obvious that neither the EU nor Ukraine agreed with Poland's selfless defence of Ukrainian interests. The episode was aptly called "a bitter lesson in realpolitik" by a newspaper commentator.[39]

Kwaśniewski was to tread more carefully into Ukrainian affairs in March 2001 when he was about to meet Kuchma in Kazimierz Dolny. Meanwhile demonstrations against Kuchma were taking place in Ukraine and the opposition demanded that Kuchma step down. The Ukrainian opposition appealed to Kwaśniewski to cancel the meeting and were supported by the Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* - AWS) and Conservative-People's Party (*Stronnictwo Konserwatywno- Ludowe* – SKL), a grouping within the ruling AWS, which argued that such a meeting would mean approval by Poland of tactics used against political opposition in Ukraine.[40] Kwaśniewski met both representatives of the opposition and Kuchma and encouraged them to engage in a dialogue. However, he refrained from becoming a mediator. The Polish government, similarly, sustained a dialogue with the Kuchma administration until 2004 elections and did not bandwagon with the West in the latter's increasing tendencies towards isolating Kuchma. Kwaśniewski said "Strategic partnership is not a fair weather policy. ...We should not lose even a day in our cooperation with Ukraine."[41]

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document in June 2001 containing Poland's proposals on how the future EP of the EU should be shaped. It demonstrated

[38] Jan Maksymiuk, "Polish-Ukrainian Forum holds first session", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 2, 22 February 2000, No.8.
[39] Krzysztof Bień, "Interesy wygrały z polityką", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 October 2000.
[40] Piotr Kościński, "Aresztowanych demonstrantów czeka sąd", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 March 2001 and "Czy prezydent Kwaśniewski powinien spotkać się z prezydentem Kuczmą?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 March 2001.
[41] "Dialog ze 'zdrowymi siłami'", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 March 2001.

Warsaw's ambitions of gaining a say in EU foreign policy after enlargement.[42] It was a bold attempt, given the fact that Poland itself only got the green light from the EU a few months earlier at the Nice European Council. However, it was also a sign of the realisation on the part of Polish foreign policy makers that Polish EP could have a chance of success only if its postulates could be introduced into the EU EP and if Poland could utilise the structures and resources of the EU in its implementation. The document contained words of restraint regarding Ukraine. While it called for the security dialogue with Ukraine to be made a priority and stressed the importance of Ukrainian independence for regional stability, it formulated most of the cooperation proposals for the whole region and not only Ukraine. And it said "While sharing with Ukraine its own experience gained in the process of preparation for EU membership, Poland takes care to avoid assuming vis-à-vis Ukraine any obligations whatsoever in respect of its future institutional links with the EU".

Even though more realistic tendencies were observed in the Polish government's plans and action, it had by no means changed the ambitious foreign policy aim of bringing Ukraine into NATO and the EU. Polish government representatives lobbied for securing Ukraine's participation in the NATO Prague summit in November 2002 as tense relations between the West and Ukraine had brought about the possibility that Ukraine would not be invited. Polish government also lobbied the EU to give Ukraine associate member status. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a set of proposals in January 2003 and advocated the foundation of an "Eastern Dimension", similar to the existing Northern Dimension and suggested that Ukraine (and Moldova) be given associate member status "to reflect the increased significance of relations with these countries after the forthcoming EU enlargement as well as their aspirations".[43] The document also argued that a full membership perspective should be offered to Ukraine in the long term and market economy status be given as soon as possible.

The Polish commitment to Ukraine became more vocal as first, doubts about Poland's own accession to the EU gradually diminished; second, from Poland's viewpoint domestic political conflicts in Ukraine and Kuchma regime's relations with Russia gave rise to worries about the direction Ukraine's transformation would take; third, the EU and NATO's reluctance to give Ukraine a clear perspective for the future and the West's isolation of the current Ukrainian administration carried the risk of further alienating Ukraine from the path Poland would have liked it to follow.

[42] "The Eastern policy of the European Union in the run-up to the EU's enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Poland's viewpoint", Warsaw, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2001.
[43] "Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2003.

The same concerns were shared by various Polish NGOs and think-tanks which stepped up their activities on Ukraine. One of them, the Batory Foundation, published its own policy proposals for integrating Ukraine into the EU.[44] It suggested that first the EU should declare its political will for Ukraine's integration. This would be followed by the granting of associate membership in the medium term and full membership in the long term. Support for Ukraine's integration into the EU was also the subject of an open letter to the President (also sent to the PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of Sejm) by an NGO called *Grupa Zagranica* which was made up of 28 different NGOs with an interest in foreign affairs.[45] Among them are prominent think tanks like the Centre for International Relations (*Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych* - CSM), Batory Foundation and Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych* - ISP) and humanitarian organisations like Helsinki Human Rights Foundation and the Polish Humanitarian Action (*Polska Akcja Humanitarna*).[46] The letter dated 23 June 2004 appealed to Polish leaders to propose together with Visegrad countries an initiative for the European Council to produce a political declaration which included a realistic road map leading to Ukrainian membership.

However, not everyone was in favour of the Polish governmental and non-governmental campaign of pulling Ukraine into the EU. Zdzisław Najder warned that Poles tended to forget that Poland itself was a big challenge to the EU and that pushing for Ukraine's inclusion in the EU was a disservice to both Poland's and Ukraine's interests. He argued that such an approach "can only perpetuate the impression that Poland wants to join the Union as a maiden with a baby bigger than herself."[47] The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, proved Najder's point when he acknowledged Poland's will to propose EP related initiatives in Brussels but at the same time warned Poles about not promising EU membership to Eastern neighbours.[48]

Intellectual debate about whether Poland should support Ukrainian membership did not cease after Poland became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. Reacting to PM Marek Belka's recent appeal to the Lithuanian PM Algirdas Brazauskas to support Ukrainian membership in the EU, Krzysztof Iszkowski, a junior commentator on political affairs, wrote an editorial in *Rzeczpospolita*, criticising this policy.[49] He argued that Ukrainian membership in the EU was against Polish interests for four reasons.[50] First, as Ukraine was poorer than Poland, any funds extended to it in case of EU membership would also

[44] Grzegorz Gromadzki et al., *More than a Neighbour – The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine: New Relations*, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003.
[45] "Poparcie dla europejskich aspiracji Ukrainy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 July 2004.
[46] See Grupa Zagranica's website, http://www.zagranica.org.pl/.
[47] Zdzisław Najder, "Poland's Role in Ukraine's Integration with the EU and the Possibilities of Creating the "Eastern Dimension" in Paweł Kowal (Ed.), *The EU's "Eastern Dimension"– An Opportunity for or Idée Fixe of Poland's Policy?*, Warsaw: Centre for International Relations, 2002.
[48] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Granica pozostanie na Bugu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 June 2003.
[49] "Bardzo interesuje nas polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej - Spotkanie premierów Polski i Litwy w Puńsku (Woj. Podlaskie) 22.05.2004". http://www.kprm.gov.pl/2130_11543.htm (accessed 22 February 2006)
[50] Krzysztof Iszkowski, "Więcej realizmu", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 July 2004.

come out of Polish coffers. Second, Ukraine's accession would accelerate the creation of a two (or more) speed Europe, where Poland would find itself not with the hard core but with the periphery, together with Ukraine. Third, with Ukrainian membership the influence of Russia on the EU's internal affairs would increase and a stronger Russian lobby would be established in Brussels. Fourth, it was wrong to see a pro-Western Ukraine as a security guarantee for Poland. Poland's security depended more on Western structures than on Ukraine. Iszkowski received many responses to his arguments, the majority of them highly critical and supporting Ukrainian integration in EU and NATO.[51] Iszkowski was also accused of betraying the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski EP doctrine. In this sense, Iszkowski took one step further than the minimalists/realists and said openly that it would be in Poland's (as well as Ukraine's and the EU's) interest to formulate foreign policy on a realistic basis and not on "good wishes, historical sentiments and respect for dead authorities."[52]

6.1.5 Conclusion

Poland's entry into the EU poses certain challenges to its relations with Ukraine. First, given the low likelihood that Poland would lead the EU's Eastern Policy anytime soon, it will have to follow the EU foreign policies regarding Ukraine and will not be able to undertake unilateral initiatives that might not be in line with the general policy. It will also have to accept the realistic approach of EU towards Russia and its prioritisation in areas such as energy cooperation. Second, Poland will lose some of the policy instruments at its disposal which it has been using as a sign of goodwill and as an incentive for economic cooperation towards Ukraine. The main example is the implementation of the Schengen acquis and the imposition of visa requirement for Ukrainians travelling to Poland (see Appendix).

However, it would be wrong to assume that the consequences of Poland's EU membership would severely hamper its bilateral relations with Ukraine. We have already seen that even before the EU enlargement there were obstacles, both domestic and external, for achieving "strategic partnership" and the EP debate in Poland was successful at raising concern over these obstacles. One of the key concerns raised was economic relations, which are a key (if not the most important) element in any strategic partnership. The next section will look at how far Polish-Ukrainian cooperation succeeded at bolstering economic ties.

[51] For polemics see Bogusław M. Majewski (Rzecznik Prasowy MSZ), "Mentalność Kalego....." (dot: artykułu "Uderzający anachronizm" autorstwa Krzysztofa Iszkowskiego, Rzeczpospolita, 01.06.04), 04 June 2004 http://www.msz.gov.pl/index.php (accessed 13 February 2005). Wojciech Maziarski, "Mięso i geopolityka", *Newsweek Polska*, 07 June 2004. Bogumiła Berdychowska and Henryk Wujec, "Uderzający brak wyobraźni", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 June 2004. Sławomir Popowski, "Strachy na Lachy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 July 2004.
[52] Krzysztof Iszkowski, "Uderzający anachronizm", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 June 2004.

6.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS

6.2.1 Trade and investment

Poland and Ukraine signed the first agreement regulating economic relations on 4 October 1991, a few months after Ukraine declared its independence. Trade turnover between Poland and Ukraine was around 350 million USD in 1992 (turnover with Russia was about 2 billion USD). Economic crisis in Ukraine and structural transformation measures, such as giving up the transfer rouble system and CMEA trading regulations, were the obvious obstacles on the Ukrainian side and reorientation of trade from East to West were those on the Polish side.

From 1992 to 1997 trade turnover between Poland and Ukraine increased steadily, despite recurrent problems of lack of regulation and growing incompatibility of economic systems between the two countries. Turnover increased from 350 million USD in 1992 to 1.6 billion USD in 1997.

Table 11: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Ukraine, 1992-1997 (in thousand USD)[53]

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	161,893	201,126	204,892	29,0760	418,458	415,528
Exports	188,170	187,717	280,394	74,2620	977,827	1,206,750
Balance	+26,277	+13,409	+75,502	+45,1860	+559,369	+791,222

Even though treaties on prevention of double taxation (1993), investment (1993), trade liberalisation (1997) and various regional cooperation agreements were signed and institutions and fora such as Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Industry (1992), Economic Forum in Krynica (1992), Polish-Ukrainian Economic Summit (1997) were established, bilateral trade did not reach the desired level. Olszański finds it normal because, as he argued, the two economies were not complementary, could not offer any strategic goods to each other and, therefore, economic cooperation was only widespread at the level of SMEs and shuttle trade (which boomed thanks to a visa free agreement in 1996 and generated trade close to the volumes of official, registered trade).[54] He also pointed out that the increasing gap between the socioeconomic systems of Poland and Ukraine was an obstacle for the development of economic relations, and unnecessary red tape, corruption, organised crime and lack of legal guarantees in Ukraine put off potential Polish investors. As a result investment levels remained low, with Polish FDI in Ukraine at 13.1 million USD in 1995, which constituted about 2.7% of total FDI into the country. Although

[53] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-1998, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[54] Tadeusz A. Olszański, "Stosunki z Ukrainą", *RPPZ 1998*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1999, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)

this figure almost quadrupled to 45.7 million USD in 1999, the relative percentage in total fell down to 1.6%.[55]

Table 12: Polish FDI in Ukraine, 1995-1999 (in million USD)[56]

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total FDI	483.5	896.9	1438.2	2063.6	2810.7
Polish FDI	13.1	20.5	25.4	37.1	45.7
% of Polish FDI	2.7	2.3	1.7	1.8	1.6

The Russian financial crisis of August 1998 changed the upward trend of Polish-Ukrainian trade turnover. Turnover decreased from 1.62 billion USD in 1997 to 1.46 billion USD in 1998 and declined further to 1.04 billion in 1999.The devaluation of the Ukrainian currency, the *hyrvna*, by 65.7% in the second half of 1998 and by a further 52.2% in 1999 resulted in a fall in demand for Polish goods that now became expensive and prompted a rise in demand for Russian goods which became much cheaper thanks to the rouble devaluation.[57] Polish exports to Ukraine fell by 9.9% from 1997 to 1998 and by 35.2% from 1998 to 1999. The fall in Polish imports from Ukraine over the same period was somewhat less at 9.2% and 10.2% respectively.

Figure 7: Poland's trade with Ukraine, 1992-2004[58]



[55] *Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 rik*, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2001. FDI figures as of the beginning of each year.
[56] *Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 rik*, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2001.
[57] Ulana Hnatiuk, "Współpraca handlowa międyz Polską a Ukrainą w aspekcie wejścia Polski do Unii Europejskiej" in Krystyna Gomółka (Ed.), *Problemy transformacji gospodarczej w Estonii, Litwie, Ukrainie, Białorusi i Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku*. Gdańsk: Politechnika Gdańska, Wydział Zarządzania i Ekonomii, 2002, pp. 99-100.
[58] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1998-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Table 13: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Ukraine, 1997-2004 (in thousand USD)[59]

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	415,528	377,190	338,535	475,374	449,299	491,547	744,600	1,038,456
Exports	1,206,750	1,086,445	703,105	798,222	1,002,691	1,180,510	1,561,200	2,023,387
Balance	+791,222	+709,255	+364,570	+322,848	+553,392	+688,963	+816,600	+984,930

The Polish government took some measures to counter the loss of trade with Ukraine caused by the 1998 crisis. Among them was providing state guarantees for export credits through KUKE insurance company for Polish exporters selling to Ukraine (See Chapter Five for details about KUKE). Measures for encouraging exports to Ukraine were also proposed in the 2003 "Programme for regaining the Eastern markets" produced by the Ministry of Economy.[60] Polish-Ukrainian trade started to recover from 2000 on. By 2001 Ukrainian exports to Poland reached the levels of 1997 and by 2002 Polish exports to Ukraine surpassed 1997 figures. By 2003 total turnover reached 2.3 billion USD. Ukraine became the 9th biggest market for Polish exports (22nd for Polish imports), and Poland, 7th for Ukrainian exports (4th for Ukrainian imports).[61]

As for investment, Poland's contribution to FDI into Ukraine increased from 54.5 million USD in 2000 to 98.4 in 2003. By the end of 2003 there were 837 enterprises with Polish capital active in Ukraine (8.9% of all enterprises with foreign capital).[62] The biggest annual rise was recorded in 2004, where Polish FDI increased more than 50% to 152.7 million USD in 2004. However, the share of Polish FDI in Ukraine's total still remained low, reaching its high of 2.2% in 2004.

Table 14: Polish FDI in Ukraine, 2000-2004, (in million USD)[63]

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total FDI	3,281.8	3,875.0	4,555.3	5,339.0	6,794.4
Polish FDI	54.5	62.1	69.3	98.4	152.7
% of Polish FDI	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.2

Poland's FDI in Ukraine remained much lower than those of West European countries such as Germany and Netherlands (whose share in total fluctuated about 16% and 9%

[59] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1998-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[60] See *Założenia polityki handlowej wobec rynków wschodnich na lata 2003 – 2004. Program Odzyskania Rynków Wschodnich*, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Warsaw, February 2003. http://www.mpips.gov.pl/pliki_do_pobrania/rynki_wschodnie.doc (accessed 06 November 2006)
[61] "Polsko-ukraińskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.", *Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy*, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, pp. 6-7.
[62] "Polsko-ukraińskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.", *Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy*, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, p. 8.
[63] *Ukraine in Figures 2002*, Kyiv: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2003 and *Statistichniy shorichnik za 2004 rik*, Kyiv: Vidavnitstvo Konsultant, 2005.

respectively) and was at a similar level with that of Hungary, which had a smaller economy than Poland.

Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine by selected countries, 1995-2004 (million USD)[64]



Ukrainian investment into Poland also remained negligible at an average of 300,000 USD annually since 1995 and constituted less than 1% of Ukrainian FDI abroad.[65] Its share in Poland's FDI was even less. In 2003 Ukrainian FDI into Poland was 330,100 USD whereas total FDI into Poland was 72.7 billion USD.[66]

As for commodity structure, almost half of Poland's imports from Ukraine in 2003 were mineral products. Poland bought 89.8 million USD worth of natural gas and 83.8 million USD worth of petroleum oil and natural gas condensate from Ukraine but these were only 6.1% and 2.8% of Poland's total imports of these commodities.[67] It should also be added that Ukraine itself is highly dependent on imports in this sector from Russia. Only one kind of commodity where imports from Ukraine dominated the Polish market was iron ore and steel, which constituted 69.7% of Poland's imports of those commodities. When we look at

[64] Data from *Statistichniy shorichnik za 2000 rik*, *Ukraine in Figures* 2002 and *Statistichniy shorichnik za 2004 rik*.
[65] *Ukraine in Figures 1998*, Kyiv: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 1999.
[66] *Rocznik 2003, Polska Agencja Informacji i Inwestycji Zagranicznych S.A.*, Warsaw: PAIZ, 2004, p. 9 and "Handel polsko – ukraiński i polskie inwestycje w Ukrainie w I półroczu 2004 r.", http://users.adamant.net/~wehamb/ (accessed 21 February 2005)
[67] "Polsko-ukraińskie stosunki gospodarcze w 2003 r.", *Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy*, Vol. 96, 2004, No. 6, p. 8.

Poland's exports to Ukraine, the commodity with the highest percentage in Ukraine's total imports was sugar with 39%. It is followed by cars at 8.3%.

Table 15: Poland's foreign trade by commodity groups, 1999 and 2003[68]

	Poland's Export to Ukraine by commodity groups				Poland's Import from Ukraine by commodity groups			
	1999		2003		1999		2003	
Commodity groups	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%
Agricultural and food products	135.8	19.4	160.7	10.3	11.8	3.5	41.9	5.6
Mineral products	23.4	3.3	44	2.8	197.7	58.4	389.4	52.3
Chemical ind. products	165.6	23.6	317.2	20.3	29.5	8.7	91.8	12.3
Ligth ind. products (textiles,footwear)	84.2	12	151.1	9.7	5	1.5	12.8	1.7
Wood and paper products	66.1	9.4	146.8	9.4	13.3	3.9	29.1	3.9
Stone, plaster, cement products	15.6	2.2	59.1	3.8	1.2	0.4	0.9	0.1
Base metals	49.9	7.1	160.3	10.3	67.8	20	154.7	20.8
Machinery and electrical equip.	84.6	12.1	441.8	28.3	9.9	2.9	22	3
Furniture and lighting products	75.8	10.8	78.9	5	1.4	0.4	1.6	0.2
Others	0.4	0.1	1.2	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.1
Total	701.4	100	1561.1	100	338.5	100	744.5	100

The Polish and Ukrainian governments reiterated at every opportunity that they had a strategic partnership in terms of economic relations as well but the figures tell us that this was hardly the case. The share of trade with Poland in total Ukrainian trade hardly surpassed the 3% mark in either exports or imports. Although Poland's position in Ukrainian trade seems to be stable, the volumes were not large enough to create a considerable dependency. Ukraine's share in Poland's trade was expectedly even less. Imports from Ukraine constituted about 1% of total, falling down to a 0.1% low with the influence of 1998 crisis and exports also fell from 4.7% in 1997 but recovered only up to about 3% in 2004.

[68] Data from the website of the Polish Embassy in Kiev, Department of Economy and Trade. http://users.adamant.net/~wehamb/ (accessed 28 February 2005)

Table 16: Poland: Trade with Ukraine. 1996-2004 (percentages of total export and import)[69]

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	1.1	1.0	0.1	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2
Exports	4.0	4.7	3.8	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.7

Table 17: Ukraine: Trade with Poland, 1996-2004 (percentages of total export and import)[70]

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	2.9	3.2	3.3	2.1	2.2	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.3
Exports	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.8	3.3	2.9

Bilateral trade has faced additional problems after EU enlargement on May 2004. After Poland's entry into the EU Ukraine's exports of agricultural products to Poland was expected to be affected as the tariffs would rise and additional ecological and sanitary standards would be introduced.[71] More importantly, Poland would have to abide by the import quotas imposed on steel (and other metallurgical products) which might adversely affect imports from Ukraine. In 2004 the EU wide limit of steel imports from Ukraine was 185,000 tonnes, which was less than half of Poland's annual of steel imports from that country.[72] Although the EU agreed to increase steel quotas for Ukraine to 606,800 tonnes by the end of 2004, the increase was still not sufficient to sustain current levels of steel imports from Ukraine to Poland.[73]

6.2.2 Privatisation of Huta Częstochowa

Polish governments has for years been emphasising the need to increase mutual investment between Poland and Ukraine, especially given the low level of Ukrainian investment into Poland. An opportunity to change the situation came up when Ukraine's leading metallurgy and mining corporation, the Industrial Union of Donbas (*Industrialnii Soyuz Donbassa* - IUD), tendered for the privatisation of Huta Częstochowa steel mill in 2003. This was a strategic move by the IUD not only in terms of increasing Ukrainian investment in Poland but also circumventing the threat posed by the application of EU steel import quotas after Poland's accession to the EU as mentioned above. IUD was the second biggest company in Ukraine after *Naftogaz Ukrainy* and its turnover for 2002 was

[69] *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1997-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[70] Calculated on the basis of data from *Ukraine in Figures* (years 1998, 2000, 2003), Kyiv: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. Data for 2001 from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm and for 2001 and 2004 from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ and (accessed 27 March 2006)
[71] "Polsko-ukraińska współpraca po 1 maja 2004 roku", *Rynek - Wschodni Partnerzy*, Vol. 94, 2004, No. 4, p. 5.
[72] Taras Kuzio, "Poland lobbies EU membership for Ukraine", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, 11 June 2004, Issue 29. http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2368085 (accessed 06 November 2006)
[73] "Ukraine's representative to EU Roman Shpek authorized to sign Ukraine - EU agreement on exports of Ukrainian steel", 23 September 2004, Press Release, website of the Ukrainian Mission to the EU. http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/2255.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

2.8 billion USD.[74] It was also the base of the so-called Donetsk clan as many politicians in Kiev had ties with the company which dominated the region it was located in. For instance, the Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovich had been a governor of the region from 1997 to 2002 and had close ties with IUD.[75]

IUD was one of the two companies alongside the Indian-British steel giant LNM (later renamed Mittal Steel) that passed the first stage of the tender. However, in February 2004, it was announced by the Ministry of Treasury that IUD had lost the tender even though its offer was bigger than that of LNM. This caused an outrage in Ukraine. Kuchma ordered the Ukrainian government to look into the process and prior to a meeting with Miller regarding the matter PM Yanukovich said "We will consider the issue and build our relations taking it into account."[76] He said that the decision discriminated against Ukrainian national interests and would create new divisions in Europe.[77] He also referred to IUD's recent purchase of almost 80% of shares of the Hungarian steel mill, Dunaferr, during its privatisation and added "Now Hungary says: let us be your representative to the EU instead of Poland, [as] Poland discredits Ukraine."[78]

The reason why LNM was preferred even though IUD offered more money was explained as follows:[79] The decision about the winner was taken by the Ministry of Treasury, which was assured, orally and in writing, by the LNM that they would pay more than the highest bid offered. LNM was a more trustworthy partner in terms of payment ability. The main argument against UID was that it proposed increasing the production capacity of Huta Częstochowa and this would be in breach of Poland's accession treaty with the EU, which requires a reduction of steel production within the restructuring of that industry.

These arguments were dismissed by both IUD's lawyers and Polish opposition MPs. First, the price guarantee was made by LNM after the bidding closed which was against the rules.[80] Second, lawyers argued that because Huta Częstochowa was not listed in the government's restructuring programme and received no public subsidies, the accession

[74] "Ukrainians Want to Buy Częstochowa Steel Mill", Economic Bulletin (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), No.29 (575), 21 July 2003. www.msz.gov.pl (accessed 23 March 2005)
[75] See Roman Kupchinsky, "The clan from Donetsk", *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report* , (Part 1) Vol. 4, 26 November 2002, No. 45, (Part 2) Vol. 4, 10 December 2002, No. 47.
[76] "Poland, Ukraine PM Discuss Huta Czestochowa Tender Row", *Ukrainian Monitor*, 27 February 2004.
[77] Konrad Niklewicz, "Donbas domaga się Huty Częstochowa", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 02 March 2004.
[78] "Poland, Ukraine PM Discuss Huta Czestochowa Tender Row", *Ukrainian Monitor*, 27 February 2004.
[79] Sekretarz Stanu w Ministerstwie Skarbu Państwa Andrzej Szarawarski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne ,4 kadencja, 69 posiedzenie, 3 dzień , 15 punkt, 04 March 2004, http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm. (accessed on 22 February 2006)
[80] MP Rafał Zagórny's comments, *Biuletyn Komisji Skarbu Państwa*, No. 2914/IV, 09 March 2004. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf (accessed 06 November 2006).

treaty requirements on the reduction of production did not apply. It was also mentioned that LNM also proposed to almost double the production.[81]

What the Ukrainian government objected to the most was the portrayal of IUD as a second class investor in comparison with a company that was already established in the West. Deputy Minister of Treasury Andrzej Szarawarski said that Poland wanted to deal with a "premier league" company and not an "accidental investor". Also according to newspapers the Agency for Internal Security (*Agencja Bezpieczeństwo Wewnętrzne* - ABW) wrote in a report to the government that IUD had an opaque company structure, its capital was of doubtful origin and was suspected of money laundering.[82] Given that IUD is the second biggest company in Ukraine, with ties to the government, a strong reaction to that type of stereotyping was unavoidable, especially at a time when the Polish government praised the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. Besides, IUD saw Huta Częstochowa as an important opportunity to survive on the EU market. Given the problem with EU limits on steel imports mentioned above, IUD was hoping to avoid future quotas by buying a production unit in Poland. This was also why some Ukrainian commentators stated that the rejection of IUD would hurt the pro-European course of Ukraine and play into the hands of proponents of closer integration with Russia given that the Huta incident showed that Poland could not be trusted as a strategic ally and Ukraine would have more difficulty entering European markets after EU enlargement.[83]

Even though some argued that the issue was purely economic, it was perceived as a political matter both by Poles and Ukrainians. The decision of the Ministry of Treasury was devoid of valid economic arguments and the Ukrainian government made it clear that they regarded the matter within the wider framework of Polish-Ukrainian relations. The Ukrainian Minister of Economy and European Integration even pointed out the connection between the tender and the controversial subject of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline (see below). He said "the Ukrainian government sees investment by ... the IUD, as a project of strategic importance which, along with the Odessa-Brody-Plock oil pipeline project, should become the basis for boosting investment in each other's economies and for creating ties of cooperation."[84]

Following the reaction from Ukraine, the process of privatisation was suspended. The Polish government announced that it would consult the European Commission to clarify what rules should apply to Huta Częstochowa. Also in May 2004, the regional court in

[81] Interpellation by MP Grzegorz Dolniak, Interpelacja nr 6935 do ministra skarbu państwa w sprawie prywatyzacji Huty Częstochowa SA, 16 March 2004. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/ forms/iz.htm (accessed 22 February 2006)
[82] Konrad Niklewicz, "Dlaczego Donbas przegrał", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 04 March 2004.
[83] Andrzej Michalski, "Przetarg zawieszony czy unieważniony", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 April 2004.
[84] "...as Ukraine cries foul-play on still mill deal", *Ukrayinska Pravda*, 05 March 2004 and Konrad Niklewicz and Wacław Radziwinowicz, "Między słowami", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 02 April 2004.

Częstochowa, to which IUD applied, ruled that the tendering process was unlawful and put a protection order on the property of Huta Częstochowa, prohibiting its sale.[85] The tender process was repeated in February 2005, with the same applicants, and the new Ukrainian government announced that it supported IUD's bid. In March it was announced that Mittal Steel had won yet again. The question of how this second rejection would affect Polish-Ukrainian relations, and especially the future of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline, was raised again. Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz (of the minimalism debate) called the decision "a catastrophe for Polish EP" and reminded that this was the first occasion to translate the concept of strategic partnership (prioritised partnership, as he put it) into deeds.[86]

6.3 CASE STUDY: THE ODESSA-BRODY-GDAŃSK PIPELINE

Post-1989 economic transformation has taken different trajectories in Poland and Ukraine and as a result "strategic partnership", hailed by both governments, has not been a reality in terms of economic cooperation. Trade has not developed to desired volumes and investment levels remained negligible. However, there is one key strategic matter where Poland and Ukraine found themselves in a vulnerable position: energy. Both countries are dependent on Russia for their energy supplies and under pressure to diversify their energy resources (especially Poland). Poland's need for diversification is dictated not solely by economic concerns but also by having to harmonise with EU energy policies and concerns about real and perceived Russian influence on Poland's domestic politics (see Chapter Five). In the case of Ukraine, the need is more acute and Russian use of energy imports and transport as a carrot and stick more obvious.

Under the circumstances "strategic partnership" would necessitate close cooperation rather than total energy dependence. One attempt at this was Poland's badly planned gesture to Ukraine on the subject of the second Yamal pipeline. This gesture failed because Poland underestimated the EU's will to achieve energy diversification by reducing dependence on OPEC oil by increasing the supply of Russian gas. Besides, refusing the second pipeline meant loss of transit revenue for Poland itself.

A second occasion for Polish Ukrainian cooperation for tackling energy dependence came up thanks to plans for building an oil pipeline through Ukraine and Poland to carry Caspian oil to the West. This pipeline would carry non-Russian oil through a route outwith Russian control, therefore it would be an ideal way of reducing dependence on both Russian oil and transit system. This would be in the interest of both Poland and Ukraine. Poland obtained 94.5% of its crude oil imports from Russia. The ratio for Ukraine's imports from Russia was

[85] Andrzej Siluszek, "Donbas wraca do gry", *Życie*, 11 May 2004.
[86] Konrad Niklewicz, "Huta drażni Ukrainę", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 February 2005.

80%.[87] The EU would also benefit from it as the demand for oil (especially from non-OPEC sources) was on the rise.

Table 18 :Forecast for Demand for Oil (in mtoe) until 2030 [88]

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030
Poland	9.30	11.82	15.79	16.41	18.30	20.65	23.48	24.92	25.85
Germany	96.02	103.33	97.32	99.24	101.88	103.69	106.92	107.41	107.85
EU-15	391.50	414.10	430.60	445.80	462.20	473.10	489.00	496.50	501.90

The idea of building such a pipeline went back to 1993 when the Ukrainian government decided to build an oil terminal in the Black Sea port of Pivdenniy (aka Yuzhniy) near Odessa in order to receive Caspian oil by sea from Supsa (end of Baku-Supsa pipeline) terminal in Georgia or from Novorossiysk in Russia and transport it to refineries. The construction of the second part of the project, a pipeline from Odessa to Brody close to the Polish border started in 1996. From there the pipeline would link to the southern arm of the *Druzhba* pipeline which carries Russian oil to Western Europe through Slovakia. The Odessa-Brody pipeline would be 674 km long with an initial capacity of 14.5 million tonnes per annum which could be increased to 45 million.[89] Construction was completed on 19 August 2001.

[87] "Energy policy of Poland until 2025" (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4 January 2005), Ministry of Economy and Labour, http://www.mgip.gov.pl/GOSPODARKA/Energetyka/ (accessed 22 February 2005) and Roman Kupchinsky, "Ukraine: energy overview (Part 1)", *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 7, 21 January 2005, No. 3.

[88] Mtoe = Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent. Data from "Annex 2: Summary energy balances and indicators" in *European energy and transport – Trends to 2030*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, pp.148-219.

[89] "Peace & stability pipeline. History of Odessa-Brody", *Caspian Energy*, No. 20, 01 August 2004. http://www.caspenergy.com/framee.html (accessed 22 February 2005)

Figure 9: Russian oil export routes to Western markets[90]



[90] *Russia Energy Survey 2002* (International Energy Agency), Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002, p. 13. Also available at www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/russia2002.pdf (accessed 21 January 2007)

6.3.1 Poland joins the project

In 1997 the Ukrainian government proposed extending the pipeline to the port of Gdańsk, by extending it to Poland's biggest oil refinery in Płock. It expected that state owned companies would participate in the project and the Polish government would provide credits and guarantees.[91] Warsaw showed an interest but preferred that an international consortium took over the enterprise and declined to give government guarantees.

Figure 10: Odessa-Brody- Płock- Gdańsk pipeline[92]

Solid maroon: Odessa-Brody pipeline
Dashed maroon: Planned pipeline extending to Płock
Solid blue: Other pipelines

Polish officials emphasised that they would take part in the project only if it was commercially viable. For that reason a committee of experts was formed to work on technological, economic, financial aspects of the pipeline during the meeting of Poland Ukraine Mixed Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation in February 1999.[93] Experts from the two companies with an interest in the project, *Naftogaz Ukrainy* (which had built the Odessa-Brody sector) and the Polish pipeline company, *Przedsiębiorstwa Eksploatacji Rurociągów Naftowych "Przyjaźń"* (PERN), started talks on the project. Despite emphasising the commercial aspect of the pipeline, Polish officials were increasingly vociferous about its political significance. PM Jerzy Buzek expressed Poland's interest in the pipeline and, referring to the strategic partnership, said that Poland would

[91] Marek Siwiec, "Porozmawiajmy o faktach", *Rzeczpospolita*, 04 October 2002.
[92] Source: http://gospodarka.gazeta.pl/gospodarka/1,33405,2585640.html from Tomasz Bielecki, "Zielone światło dla rurociągu Odessa-Brody", *Gazeta Wyborcza* (online edition), 04 April 2005. (accessed 12 January 2007)
[93] "Odpowiedź sekretarza stanu w Ministerstwie Gospodarki - z upoważnienia prezesa Rady Ministrów - na zapytanie nr 1907 w sprawie realizacji polsko-ukraińskiej umowy o budowie rurociągu naftowego", 12 May 2000. http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/iz.htm (accessed 22 February 2005)

take into account Ukraine's interests when choosing its energy sources.[94] President Kwaśniewski was also enthusiastic. He visited the Pivdenniy terminal on 17 December 2000 and expressed his support for the establishment of an international consortium to start the construction of the Brody - Płock sector.[95]

According to the feasibility report prepared by Halliburton Brown & Root at the end of 2001 the cost of building the 560 km pipeline from Brody to Płock would be 450 million USD and the pipeline would become profitable in the medium term as the volume of oil transported through the pipeline gradually increased (up to 25 million tonnes annually).[96] It also stated that for the pipeline to be feasible the Polish sector of the project had to complement the Ukrainian one. However, despite continuous declarations by Polish officials about the project's virtues and pleas for action by the Ukrainian government, no actual steps were taken to initiate the construction process in Poland. Concerns about the profitability of the pipeline and lack of a business plan were put forward by Warsaw as the reasons for inaction.

6.3.2 The Golden Gate Scandal

The Polish side of the project became the subject of a scandal in September 2002 when a Polish newspaper, *Rzeczpospolita*, published a report about the company Golden Gate which was supposed to form the consortium to build the pipeline.[97] The report argued that the main figures in Golden Gate's administration were tainted by scandals such as FOZZ and had ties with top politicians from both the current and previous governments, who involved these characters in the pipeline project.[98] It was alleged that they were trying to raise finances for the project from public funds. The report maintained that the pipeline project was economically unsound and criticised the government for making too many promises to Ukraine and failing the strategic partnership by not fulfilling them.

Both the government and the president quickly reacted to the allegations and tried to distance themselves from Golden Gate (which later pulled out of the project).[99] It was also said that Poland was committed to the projects, but Ukrainians had not yet submitted a business plan and it was not clear where the oil would come from and who would buy that

[94] Maciej Podgórski, "Partnerstwo zobowiązuje", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 June 2000.
[95] "Robocza wizyta prezydenta RP na Ukrainie, 17 grudnia 2000 roku", Kronika Prezydenta RP, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?strona=pl_kronika_2000_12_1701 (accessed 06 November 2006).
[96] Maciej Janiec, "Uciekająca szansa", *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 September 2002.
[97] Tatiana Serwetnyk, "Złote wrota z FOZZ w tle" and Igor Janke, "Rura donikąd", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 September 2002.
[98] FOZZ (*Fundusz Obsługi Zadłużenia Zagranicznego*) was the Foreign Debt Servicing Fund established in 1989 to clear Poland's foreign debt. Its funds, instead, were embezzled by some companies at a loss of around 90 million USD to the state.
[99] Michał Majewski et al., "Służby sprawdzą Złote Wrota", *Rzeczpospolita*, 21 September 2002 and Michał Majewski and Paweł Reszka, "Prezydent odcina się od Golden Gate", *Rzeczpospolita*, 25 September 2002.

oil after transit through the pipeline.[100] Besides, as the head of the Presidential Bureau of National Security, Marek Siwiec, argued, this investment was perceived by Ukraine as one of the attributes of Ukrainian independence, whereas for Poland it was only one of the alternatives for diversification of oil supplies, hence not as crucial for energy security.[101] He added that the President still supported the project "politically". The contradiction was probably a result of the desire to steer clear of the scandal and yet remain faithful to the rhetoric of strategic partnership with Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the allegations caused a negative reaction in Ukraine and the weekly *Zerkalo Nedeli* even alleged that it was the provocation of the "monopolists", i.e. the companies which control the existing pipelines (meaning *Transneft*, the Russian operator of the Druzhba pipeline).[102] Accordingly, these companies were trying to discredit Golden Gate and eliminate the Poles from the project.

The Ukrainian side stepped up its efforts to convince Warsaw about the viability of the pipeline as the project was stalled due to lack of financing. The Ukrainian sector of the pipeline, which cost 200 million USD, was idle since 2001. When in March 2003 head of the EU Commission Romano Prodi gave his support to the project during a meeting with the Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovich, hopes were raised about the possibility of raising a part of the funding from EU sources.[103] The EU Commission included the pipeline in the list of projects to be supported in a communication on energy policy on 12 May 2003.[104] Following this, on 27 May 2003, a conference on the "Odessa-Brody-Płock Oil Transportation Project" took place in Brussels and a joint declaration on the project was signed by Polish and Ukrainian Deputy PMs and the EU Commissioner for Energy.[105] Even though the sides pledged to "consider further support of the project through the relevant Technical Assistance programmes of the European Community", which would be TACIS and INOGATE, the only concrete financial offer was a sum of 2 million Euro for funding a preparatory study for the project's development.[106] The US ambassador to Ukraine also expressed support for the pipeline to be extended to Poland.[107] Formerly the US

[100] "Golden Gate nie ma wyłączności", *Rzeczpospolita*, 25 September 2002.
[101] Marek Siwiec, "Porozmawiajmy o faktach", *Rzeczpospolita*, 04 October 2002.
[102] Alla Yeremenko, "Fraud or provocation?", *Zerkalo Nedeli*. 5 - 11 October 2002.
[103] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Ukraina u progu WTO", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 March 2003.
[104] "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, its Neighbours and Partner Countries", COM (2003) 262 final, Brussels, 13 May 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm /energy_transport/euromed_conf3/doc/com_2003_0262_en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2006).
[105] "Joint Declaration of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland and the European Commission on the Support of the Euro-Asian Oil Transport Corridor project" (Brussels, 27th May 2003), www.caspenergy.com/20/deklaraciya_e.html (accessed 07 March 2007)
[106] "Speech for the participation of Mrs Loyola de Palacio in the Industrial Conference 'Odessa-Brody-Plock Oil Transportation Project': Enhancing European Union Energy Security and Integrity" Brussels, 27 May 2003", http://www.inogate.org/html/Conference/speech0603.htm (accessed 25 February 2005)
[107] Roman Woronowycz, "U.S. expresses strong support of Odesa-Brody oil pipeline", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 72, 08 June 2003, No. 23.

government was putting its weight behind the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project for the transport of Caspian oil.

6.3.3 Reverse use of the pipeline

Meanwhile, Naftogaz Ukrainy was under increased pressure from Russian companies concerning the use of the pipeline. Ukrainian newspapers reported the signing of a deal on 23 April 2003 between Naftogaz Ukrainy and the Russian Transneft and Tyumen Oil Company (*Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya* - TNK).[108] This happened shortly after the EU Athens summit in April 2003, where Kuchma snubbed the Wider Europe Initiative by dismissing EU membership as top foreign policy priority. Accordingly, a protocol of intention on transporting 9 million tonnes of Russian oil from Brody to Odessa (i.e. in the reverse direction) was signed. The plan was to pump more oil through the Southern Druzhba pipeline, which passes through Brody, and to divert some of the oil towards Odessa. The oil would then be transported to the West from the Pivdenniy terminal by tankers through the Turkish straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

The Ukrainian government denied that any deal had been signed with Russian companies, but the reaction to the lack of concrete support from Poland or the EU was growing. The Russian option was slowly gaining ground and not only the Russian government but also certain personalities within the Ukrainian government and Naftogaz Ukrainy were lobbying for the reverse use of the pipeline. Even Kuchma seemed to get impatient. He reportedly questioned whether there was enough oil in the Caspian to transport through the pipeline and complained about lack of interest on the part of suppliers. He said "it is high time that we stop playing politics and start thinking about Ukraine lest we wind up with an empty, neglected pipeline that no one needs."[109]

Indeed, in the short term the reverse use of the pipeline would be profitable due to the transit fees that would be earned. However, in the medium and long term it would deprive Ukraine and Poland as well as Western Europe of a viable diversification option.[110] Another complication it would cause was increasing the oil tanker traffic passing through the narrow Bosphorus straits. Turkey had already complained about the high volume of traffic and its costs and potential dangers for the country. For West European purchasers of oil, the main concern was that this route would become a bottleneck and swift flow of the

[108] Tatiana Silina, "Whose Interests Are Being Piped Up?", *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 31 May - 06 June 2003.
[109] Borys Biletsky, "Odessa-Brody: Economy should determine politics", *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 21 - 27 June 2003.
[110] A further implication, suggested by Balmaceda, would be the weakening of the GUUAM cooperation. Member countries all stood to benefit from a non-Russian controlled transit system which brought oil from the Caspian. Blocking the Odessa-Brody-Płock pipeline would hurt the future prospects of GUUAM. Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Explaining the Management of Energy Dependency in Ukraine: Possibilities and Limits of a Domestic-Centered Perspective", Working Papers, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2004, No. 79. http://www.verwaltung.uni-mannheim.de/i3v/00068900/18285591.htm or http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp_all_d.php?Recno=2014 (accessed 06 November 2006)

supplies would be jeopardised. Besides, due to the geographical structure of the straits the risk of an accident was very high and if an accident took place, oil traffic might have to be stopped for days.[111]

The Russian government and companies stepped up the pressure in the face of objections to the reverse use of the pipeline from Poland and the US. In July 2003 the Russian PM Mikhail Kasyanov postponed the signing of a general agreement on transit of Russian oil through Ukrainian pipelines between 2004-18 in response to the Ukrainian government's efforts to exclude Odessa-Brody pipeline from the agreement. He said "Russia is expecting that the [oil transit] agreement will encompass all Ukrainian oil pipelines, including the Brody-Odesa. When we solve this issue, we will sign the agreement."[112] It was also reported in the Polish press that some Russian media were running a campaign of misinformation, circulating false news about the pipeline, giving the Ukrainians the message that Poles were planning to make Ukraine pay for the pipeline extension, yet reap the profit themselves.[113]

6.3.4 Ukrainian zig zag

While Russian pressure mounted, the Ukrainian government was engaged in negotiations with its Polish counterpart about the details of the project. In addition, negotiations with the US company Chevron Texaco about the supply of Caspian oil were continuing.[114] Meanwhile the Polish Treasury, as the owner of PERN, approved the decision to create a joint venture with *Ukrtransnafta* (subsidiary of Naftogaz Ukrainy responsible for the Odessa-Brody pipeline) to build the pipeline.[115] On 26 November 2003 the Polish and Ukrainian Deputy PMs signed an agreement to extend the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Poland, subject to ratification. However, the Polish side repeated that they would take part in the project on a commercial basis and no public funds would be allocated.[116] It was still not clear whether the Russian oil or Caspian oil would flow through the pipeline. The Ukrainian Deputy PM complained about the pressure (and even blackmail) exerted by the Russian companies, government and media about the reverse use of the pipeline. He said that in order to make the final decision about the direction of the pipeline they would need to know whether Chevron would supply the oil and European refineries would buy it.[117]

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[111] In addition Turkey's economy would suffer immensely as a result of a large scale accident in the straits. It must be noted that many commentators dismissed Turkish governments' (in the author's view genuine) concerns and argued that this was a ploy to strengthen the case for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
[112] Jan Maksymiuk, "Russia wants to pump through Odesa-Brody pipeline 'in reverse'", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 71, 10 August 2003, No. 32.
[113] Jarosław Jakimczyk, "Bomba w rurze", *Wprost*, 12 October 2003.
[114] Andrzej Kublik, "Kurek po amerykańskiej stronie", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 October 2003.
[115] Agnieszka Łakoma, "Pora na rurociąg Brody – Płock", *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 November 2003.
[116] "Łatwiej o poparcie niż o pieniądze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 November 2003.
[117] "Ważne dla Ukrainy, ważne dla Polski", *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 November 2003.

The Ukrainian and Polish governments ratified the agreement on 16 January 2004 and Poland's Deputy PM, Marek Pol, declared the occasion "a great leap forward bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union".[118] However, there was still no sign of investors interested in the project, nor an agreement with Chevron or any European refinery. Asked when construction of the pipeline would likely begin, the director of PERN, Stanisław Jakubowski, said giving a date would be like fortune telling (*wróżenie z fusów*).[119] On 5 February 2004 the Ukrainian government took a further decision rejecting the Russian reversal offer and endorsing the flow of Caspian oil westwards on the Odessa-Brody pipeline.[120] The decision was hailed by Poland and the Western governments. However, experts warned that Moscow would not be giving up soon.[121]

As time went on other factors hindering the project were added onto the inactivity of the Polish and EU side and Russian pressure. In February 2004, as explained above, relations between Poland and Ukraine suffered a heavy blow after the Ukrainian steel giant Donbas was ousted from the privatisation of Huta Częstochowa under doubtful circumstances. Kuchma suggested that deliveries of Caspian oil to Poland might be threatened.[122] The Ukrainian government was furious with the decision and perceived it as an ultimate betrayal to the strategic partnership. In addition, another alterative route for the transport of Caspian oil through Bulgaria and Greece, that had been proposed in 2002, was made a priority investment by the Bulgarian government and decision to start the construction of the Burgaz-Aiexandropoulis pipeline was taken.[123] Russia was a party to the original intergovernmental agreement proposing this pipeline.

6.3.5 Final decision

By May 2004, the tide seemed to be turning against the proponents of the pipeline extension. At the end of April Kuchma criticised Poland over its inaction about the funding or the construction of the pipeline. He said "...today there is neither a Caspian oil seller or its buyer. As for Russian oil, it does exist, and we can earn $90 million in [annual] profits from the reversed [use of the pipeline]".[124] Kuchma also dismissed a number of supporters of the Caspian oil to flow through the pipeline (such as Ukrtransnafta director Oleksandr Todiychuk and the Minister of Energy, Serhiy Yermilov).[125]

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[118] Agnieszka Łakoma, "Dopełnione formalności, umowa zatwierdzona", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 January 2004.
[119] "Rok pod znakiem analiz", *Rzeczpospolita*, 17 January 2004.
[120] Dariusz Malinowski and Marcin Wojciechowski, "Ropa na zachód", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 05 February 2004.
[121] Marcin Wojciechowski, "Ropa ruszy za 60 dni " (interview with Wołodymyr Saprykin), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 06 February 2004.
[122] Andrzej Kublik, "Huta zatka rurę?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 February 2004.
[123] Andrzej Kublik, "Już go nam nie trzeba ", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 April 2004.
[124] Jan Maksymiuk, "Kuchma slams Poland for inaction over Odesa-Brody", *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 6, 04 May 2004, No. 16.
[125] Andrzej Kublik, "Odessa-Brody: rura się odwraca", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 May 2004.

Finally, on 4 July 2004, the Ukrainian government altered its decision of February to allow for the reverse use of the pipeline. The decision came at a time when Ukraine was being increasingly isolated by the West, and had just recently been refused a membership perspective by NATO at its June 2004 Istanbul summit. Besides, the impending elections in November 2004 put Kuchma and Yanukovich under pressure to hand more concessions to Russia in exchange for support. The agreement between TNK[126] and Ukrtransnafta was finalised during the 26 July 2004 meeting of Kuchma and Putin. Consequently, 9 million tonnes of Russian oil would flow from Brody to Odessa for the next three years on a "pump or pay" basis.[127]

6.3.6 Conclusion

The reversal contract could in theory be terminated by either side giving three months notice and the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline project is still going ahead in principle. However, the bottom line, that the project that could substantiate Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership, had to be shelved for the time being. The pipeline incident yet again exposed the fact that the rhetoric of Polish EP has always been bigger than its deeds.

First, from the start the Polish government gave all the political support they could to the project but failed to come up with the necessary means to carry it through. On this occasion the EU had not extended the necessary support, either. But on the other hand, it is Poland's claim there would be no independent Poland without and independent Ukraine, not the EU's.

Second, any success of Poland's policy towards Ukraine (within the EP concept) depends on the presence of a degree of unanimity among Ukrainian institutions and policy makers on the subject of strategic choices. In this case even though subsequent Ukrainian governments were nominally in favour of resource diversification and the pipeline project, there was no unanimity among the institutional actors that steered Ukraine's energy policy. Various lobby groups that operate in favour of Russia's energy interests in the region exist in Poland. However, in Ukraine the size and influence of similar groups are incomparably greater than in Poland. What is more, energy dependency is perhaps the Achilles heel of Ukraine that stands in the way of any Ukrainian government to making strategic decisions that might contradict with the interests of Russian oil and gas concerns.

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[126] By this time the company was called TNK-BP. TNK signed a merger accord with British Petroleum on 27 June 2003.
[127] Alla Yeremenko, "UKRTRansnafta announces entering a contract with TNK-BP meanwhile, the Russian-British company continues to ascertain its role in the contract arrangements for filling in the Odessa-Brody pipeline", *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 31 July - 06 August 2004.

Finally, the issue of energy supply and transit is crucial not only for Ukraine but also for the whole of Europe. And they are perhaps the most important trump card that Russia holds for sustaining its position of power in the region and globally. This objective factor would for the foreseeable future limit the options of Polish EP and obstruct Polish Ukrainian strategic partnership in the most strategic of all areas of economic cooperation, i.e. energy.

6.4 IMPACT OF HISTORICAL MEMORY

Just as in the case of Polish Russian relations, history is a dividing factor for Poland's relations with Ukraine. Contentious historical issues, most of which were deep frozen or manipulated during the communist era, began to be discussed freely after 1989 and the extent of mutual distrust stemming from historical memory became gradually clear. Just as publications on Polish-Ukrainian history proliferated, and debates became intense, the question of reconciliation through redressing "past injustices" through acknowledgement and apology came to the fore.

Poles and Ukrainians have always had diverging views about the merits of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until partitions of Poland during 1772-1795, burgeoning Ukrainian national movement under the Austro-Hungarian partition and, in general, relations between Polish aristocratic landowners and administrators with Ukrainian farmers and peasants in the *Kresy* (Eastern borderlands).[128] However, it appeared that the most contentious events were the ones that ensued after the First World War, and pre 20th century history issues formed the historical background that had shaped the clash of national movements and aspirations in the 20th century.

6.4.1 Aftermath of the First World War and the Polish Soviet war

The end of the First World War brought about the creation of not only the Polish state but also two short lived Ukrainian ones. Following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia formed a council in October 1918 with the aim of uniting ethnically Ukrainian lands and subsequently established the Western Ukrainian National Republic (*Zakhidno Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika* - ZUNR). In November 1918 Ukrainian units took control of Lwów. The Polish population of the city fought against the Ukrainians and by the end of the month Poles were in control of the city but the battle turned into a Polish-Ukrainian war. In July 1919 the army of ZUNR were sent to fight together with the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic (*Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika* – UNR), that was in established in central Ukraine in January 1918, against the Soviet advance from the

[128] For Polish-Ukrainian issues in history see Peter J. Potichnyj (Ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980 and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987.

east. Meanwhile, Polish units which were sent to the Eastern front to fight the Soviets occupied Eastern Galicia and brought an end to ZUNR.

Facing the Soviet forces, Poland made an alliance with the UNR in April 1920.[129] The agreement, signed by Piłsudki and UNR president Petlura, guaranteed Ukrainian independence under Polish protection and in return the UNR would give up territorial claims to Eastern Galicia. Piłsudki was entertaining ideas of an independent Ukraine to serve as a buffer against Russia and to join the *Międzymorze* federation (as explained in Chapter Four). However, by June the Soviets pushed back the advance of the joint forces and the alliance between Poland and the UNR was over by October 1920 when Poles signed an armistice with the Soviets. The Treaty of Riga signed between the Poles and Soviets in March 1921 divided the territories claimed by the Ukrainians between the Second Republic and the Soviet Union.

6.4.2 Ukrainian grievances

For Ukrainians, Poland was a culprit for destroying a nascent Ukrainian statehood achieved after centuries of foreign rule. As Rudnytsky put it, "... Polish aggression against and occupation of Eastern Galicia ... amounted to the destruction of the very foundations on which an independent Ukraine might have been built".[130]

The interwar period had a connotation no less negative in the Ukrainian collective memory. Separatist tendencies among the 4.8 million strong Ukrainian minority (about 15% of the population), mostly concentrated in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, grew stronger in the 1930s and the Polish government resorted to armed pacification measures.[131] While Poles regard this as a necessary self-preservation measure to ensure the territorial integrity of Poland, for Ukrainians this was the culmination of Poland's racist policies against the Ukrainian minority and an attempt to further polonise ancient Ukrainian lands.

6.4.3 Controversy over the Eaglets' Cemetery

The Third Polish Republic established after the regime change in 1989 was to be in certain ways a successor of the Second Republic and draw on its statehood experience and traditions. The history of the Second Republic, and especially the initial period when the Polish state was created, carried a great significance. One of the most important monuments of this period was the Eaglets' Cemetery (*Cmentarz Orląt*, a part of the

[129] For the history of the Polish-Soviet war see Norman Davies, *White eagle, red star: the Polish-Soviet war, 1919-20*, London: Macdonald and Co., 1972 and Orbis Books, 1983.
[130] Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History" in Potichnyj (Ed.), *Poland and Ukraine*", p. 23.
[131] Norman Davies, *God's playground: a history of Poland* (Volume 2), Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, pp.405-407.

Łyczakowski Cemetery), where Polish fighters, most of them very young, fallen during the battle with Ukrainians for the control of Lwów in November 1918, were buried. It was also a resting place for other soldiers who fought for the Polish cause in the conflicts until 1920.

Eaglets' Cemetery was destroyed during the 1970s but reconstruction work started in 1989 following the negotiations held by a Polish-Soviet Ukrainian commission dealing with the reconstruction of the cemetery. Negotiations with independent Ukraine continued from 1992 on. Throughout the 1990s several protocols were signed between the Lwów City Council and the Polish office responsible for the reconstruction of historical monuments, the Council for the Defence of the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom (*Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa* - ROPWiM) but every time the Ukrainian side came up with new demands about the final shape of the cemetery so the date for opening kept being postponed. Lwów authorities claimed that the biggest problem was the wording of the inscription on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

The issue became an intergovernmental one after the Lwów authorities kept blocking the reconstruction work and the issue was taken up by the mass media. To solve the problem, the Ukrainian government signed a protocol with ROPWiM in August 2000 to reconstruct the cemetery in its original interwar style. During Kwaśniewski's visit to Ukraine in April 2002, both presidents declared that the cemetery would be opened on 21 May 2002, on the fifth anniversary of the Polish Ukrainian declaration on reconciliation.[132] But in May the Lwów Council blocked the opening by a decision which rejected the wording of the inscription on the tomb which was agreed upon in 2001. The compromise version was "to the unknown soldiers who fell in a heroic struggle for Poland, 1918-20" after the Polish side agreed to omit the word "independent" before Poland. This time, the Lwów authorities objected to the word "heroic".[133] The Polish government reacted and Kwaśniewski said "it would be terrible if the inappropriate and irresponsible decision of Lwów authorities would have an impact on the totality of Polish-Ukrainian relations."[134] Even though the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed dissatisfaction with Lwów's decision, the damage was done and by the beginning of 2005 there was still no firm date for the opening of the cemetery.[135]

It would be hard to say that the Eaglets' Cemetery issue derailed the good relations between Poland and Ukraine at the official level. After all, the Ukrainian government was in agreement with the Polish one over the disruptive behaviour of the local officials in Lwów,

[132] "Termin raczej ostateczny", *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 April 2002.
[133] "Lwów się zaciął. nie jedziemy", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 May 2002.
[134] Oświadczenie Prezydenta RP, 17 May 2002, http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=1507565 (accessed 06 November 2006)
[135] Teresa Stylińska, "Prezydent odwołał wyjazd do Lwowa", Rzeczpospolita, 18 May 2002 and Waldemar Moszkowski. "Nie będzie postępu w sprawie cmentarza Orląt?", *Nasz Dziennik*, 21 February 2005.

a city considered to be the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism. It was exactly because of this nationalist outlook that the local councillors blocked the opening of the cemetery. Jacek Kuroń explained the reasoning of Lwów authorities who were accused of creating a storm in a teacup[136]:

> What we are quarrelling about is not the cemetery. ...We are forcing Ukrainians to accept that a pantheon dedicated to Polish armed forces to be erected in a place which they consider to be the heart of Ukraine and that [this monument] would remind them of their defeat in 1918. In Poland there is no place or city that has a pantheon dedicated to the triumph of German or Russian or any other armed forces. Poland would not accept such a thing.

Controversy over the Eaglets' Cemetery not only highlighted the weight of historical memory that had potential to affect bilateral relations but also the differences within Ukraine in terms of approach to historical issues. In the case of The Eaglets' Cemetery, the conflict could be contained and the damage to bilateral relations minimised on the basis that one of the root causes was Kiev's inability to impose its will on Lwów, hence the existence of a centre-periphery relations dimension.[137] The next section will deal with another major controversy over history that likewise exposed differences in opinion in both Poland and Ukraine, but culminated into a deeper conflict at the intergovernmental level.

6.4.4 Events of the Second World War: Volhynia and Action Vistula

Following the occupation of Eastern Poland first by the Soviets and then by Nazi Germany during the Second World War, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv* – OUN) which was established in 1929 for the cause of establishing an independent Ukraine, stepped up its guerrilla activity in 1942. Prior to that some factions of OUN were advocating collaboration with the Nazi regime in the hope that Ukrainian independence might be attained under German tutelage but gave up that hope by mid-1942.[138] By 1943 different OUN factions were united and armed units with the name of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrainska povstanska armiia* – UPA) were organised. OUN-UPA was not only fighting against the Germans but also against local Poles whom they saw as a threat to the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state after the war. Starting from March 1943 OUN-UPA units started attacking Polish villages in Volhynia (*Wolyn*) in order to force Poles to leave what OUN-UPA regarded as Ukrainian lands. On some occasions assisted by the local Ukrainian populace, OUN-UPA perpetrated large

[136] Jacek Kuroń, "Rozumiem protest Ukraińców", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 23 May 2002.
[137] Kasia Wolczuk, "Polish-Ukrainian borderlands and nation-states: the case of Lviv and Przemyśl" in Kazimierz Krzysztofek and Andrzej Sadowski (Eds), *Pogranicza etniczne w Europie. Harmonia i konflikty*, Białystok: Wydawnictwo UwB, 2001, pp. 213-231.
[138] Timothy Snyder, "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 1, 1999, No.2, pp. 86-120.

scale massacres which spread to Eastern Galicia (*Galicja*) by August. Meanwhile, the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa* – AK), the Polish underground resistance organisation loyal to the government in exile in London, started counter attacks and reprisals where many Ukrainian civilians were killed. There are no exact numbers of dead on both sides but it is estimated that around 60 to 80,000 Poles and 15 to 20,000 Ukrainians were killed during the massacres of 1943-45. In April-May 1945 OUN-UPA and AK, together with the anti-communist formation, Freedom and Independence (*Wolność i Niezawisłość* - WIN) came to an agreement to stop hostilities against each other and fight against the Soviets. Attacks did not stop completely but the large scale massacres ceased.[139]

Meanwhile, on 9 September 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego* – PKWN), established with Soviet backing, signed an agreement with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the exchange of populations. "Repatriations", forced and voluntary, started in September 1945 and by the end of 1946 about 780,000 Poles had left Ukraine and 490,000 Ukrainians had left Poland.[140] However, a good number of Ukrainians still remained in Eastern Poland (after the Polish border moved westwards).

The new Polish government, established after the February 1947 elections, took a decision in April 1947 to resettle the remaining Ukrainians and disperse them around the newly gained Western territories of Poland. About 140,000 Ukrainians (and another ethnic group called Lemkos (*Lemki*) were forcibly sent to the West within a plan called "Action Vistula" (*Akcja Wisła*) by the Polish armed forces and intelligence services that lasted until 1948.

6.4.5 Contending Perceptions

Polish postwar historiography reflected a skewed interpretation of the above mentioned events.[141] Ukrainians were portrayed as "Slavic counterparts to Nazis" and collaboration of OUN-UPA with the Nazi regime was emphasised.[142] The atrocities committed by Ukrainians were given extensive coverage. However, the focus was mainly on the postwar territories of Poland and not the lands that were annexed to the Soviet Ukraine at Potsdam.[143] Action Vistula was, accordingly, undertaken to clear out the reactionary OUN-UPA militants that perpetrated mass murder of Poles *after* the militants moved westwards

[139] Grzegorz Motyka, "Od Wołynia do akcji „Wisła", *Więź*, Vol. 473, 1998, No. 3, pp. 121-122.
[140] Grzegorz Motyka , "Co ma 'Wisła' do Wołynia?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24 March 2001.
[141] See Józef Lewandowski "Polish Historical Writing on Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War II", pp. 231-246 and John Basarab, "Post-War Writings in Poland on Polish-Ukrainian Relations, 1945-1975" in Potichnyj (Ed.), *Poland and Ukraine*, pp. 247-270.
[142] Timothy Snyder, "The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since 1989: National Narratives in Relations among Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 4, 1998, No. 3, p. 6.
[143] Snyder, "The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth", p. 6.

having been defeated by the Soviet army in the Ukrainian SSR.[144] Whereas Polish scholarship on the events enhanced the negative stereotype of Ukrainians, there was silence on the part of Ukrainian historians as dealing with these controversial events of the war was discouraged.[145]

During the communist period émigré circles also dealt with these issues. While a large section of the Polish and Ukrainian communities mistrusted each other as a result of the wartime events, *Kultura* started forming the foundations of Polish-Ukrainian partnership by putting the focus on the need to acknowledge Ukrainian national aspirations and support Ukrainian independence in the future. For this, reconciliation between the two societies about their history was necessary. After 1989, the Polish state gradually based its EP on the *Kultura* line and argued for reconciliation. For this reason, in 1990 the Senate accepted a resolution condemning Action Vistula and in 1997 the presidents of Poland and Ukraine signed a joint declaration acknowledging the "dramatic events" including wartime massacres in Volhynia and Action Vistula and condemned the perpetrators of these crimes.[146]

At the same time wartime events began to be freely discussed and competing perspectives were formed. The mainstream perceptions were categorised by Motyka as traditionalist and revisionist.[147] Motyka's own views reflect the revisionist point of view.[148] Accordingly, the traditionalist claim that massacres in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia justified Action Vistula was morally wrong as it assumed collective responsibility of Ukrainians arising from OUN-UPA's deeds. There were other similar claims, endorsed by the historians of the communist period but now disputed by the revisionists. These were the arguments that resettlement of Ukrainians was the only solution to the problem of OUN-UPA attacks on civilians and that the government opted for a humanitarian solution by rejecting reprisals and moving Ukrainians to more prosperous ex-German lands. Accordingly, by 1947 the communist forces in Poland could have easily cleansed the marginalised and weakened UPA but instead they diverted all their forces to ensure full

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[144] Tadeusz Andrzej Olszanski, "All About 'Operation Wisla'", *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol.47, 1991, No.3, p.249. Olszanski refers to one of the most famous and sensationalist account of the period, Jan Gerhard, *Łuny w Bieszczadach*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo MON, 1969.
[145] Wolczuk and Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine*, p. 40.
[146] "Wspólne oświadczenie Prezydentów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy o porozumieniu i pojednaniu, Kijów, 21 maja 1997 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 548, 1997, No. 2, pp. 49-52.
[147] In addition to these, Motyka also mentioned two more categories, namely para-scientific and works written by authors belonging to the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The former category encompasses highly emotional and methodologically non-scientific works while the latter tend to be highly biased, vindicating the Ukrainian nationalist point of view. See Grzegorz Motyka, "Problematyka stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w latach 1939–1948 w polskiej historiografii po roku 1989" in Piotr Kosiewski and Grzegorz Motyka (Eds), *Historycy polscy i ukraińscy wobec problemów XX wieku*, Kraków: Universitas, 2000, pp. 166-178. Also for a different categorisation see Rafal Wnuk "Recent Polish Historiography on Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II and its Aftermath", *Intermarium* (Columbia University online journal), Vol. 7, 2004, No. 1. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol7no1/wnuk.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[148] Grzegorz Motyka, "Od Wołynia do akcji „Wisła", *Więź*, Vol. 473, 1998, No. 3, pp. 109-133. Grzegorz Motyka, "Co ma 'Wisła' do Wołynia?", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24 March 2001 and "Nic, tylko wstyd", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 April 2002.

takeover of power, eliminating the opposition and rigging the 1947 February elections. The main aim of Action Vistula was to bring a final solution to the Ukrainian problem by ensuring the assimilation of the Ukrainian minority and was undertaken in tandem with NKVD's operations in the Ukrainian SSR aimed at clearing out the Ukrainian nationalists. The claim of military necessity was refuted by the argument that many Ukrainians were deported from areas where OUN-UPA was either inactive or unpopular (such as areas inhabited by Lemki). What is more, among the deported were also Poles who were deemed to be a threat for the regime. According to the revisionist view, Action Vistula was a part of a wider scale operation of asserting communist power in Central Eastern Europe and must be condemned.

The traditionalist view, on the other hand, focuses on the 1943-44 events in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, and argues that these constitute "genocide".[149] Accordingly, the Ukrainian nationalist stance was dominated by radical fascism and aimed to cleanse what they considered as Ukrainian territory of other ethnic groups. Post 1989 Polish EP was detrimental to Poland's (and Ukraine's interests) as it was based on underplaying the historical truths about the "genocide" in order to secure strategic partnership with Ukraine. Action Vistula was justified in the face of atrocities suffered by Poles in Ukrainian hands and Poland had nothing to apologise for. Even though most traditionalist arguments are tinted with Polish nationalism, not all of them come from right wing or nationalist writers. Another strain of traditionalism, associated with postcommunist circles, continues the arguments of the PRL period.[150] Accordingly, Action Vistula was fully justified. Solving the OUN-UPA problem by conventional military operations was not possible as it was a guerrilla war which was waged thanks to the support of the civilians. Ukrainians were not punished on the basis of collective responsibility. Vistula was a pragmatic operation devoid of any revenge motive. Communists in power at the time did not operate on the basis of national prejudices (hence did not aim to fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiment) as they were ideologically internationalists and fought against any kind of nationalism.

Conflicting views on the Second World War events also feature in the Ukrainian debate. However, the topic gets much les attention in Ukraine than in Poland and a large part of the Ukrainian population, especially those living in Central and East Ukraine are either indifferent to the debate or unaware of the events. There is, likewise, no unanimity on OUN-UPA, the main Ukrainian player in the controversial events. Berdychowska discerns

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[149] Ewa Siemaszko, "Prawda przede wszystkim", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 February 2003.
Interview with Ewa Siemaszko, "Zbliża się 60. rocznica mordu na Wołyniu", *Sygnały Dnia*, Polskie Radio Program 1, 11 April 2003. Transcript at http://www.radio.com.pl/jedynka /sygnaly/default.asp?ivID=1287 (accessed 10 March 2005), Rafał Zgorzelski, "Kiedy historię piszą politycy..." (interview with Lucyna Kulińska), *Myśl Polska*, No. 32-33, 08-15 August 2004. Władysław Siemaszko and Ewa Siemaszko, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-45* (Vols 1 and 2), Warszawa: Wyd. von Borowiecky, 2000.
[150] Bronisław Łagowski, "Akcja 'Wisła' była słuszna", *Przegląd*, No. 17, 29 April 2002.

three approaches in the debate.[151] The first one is based on the main perceptions of Soviet historiography and regards the post 1991 Ukraine as a continuation of the Ukrainian SSR in terms of statehood. It treats OUN-UPA as anti-hero and accuses it of waging terror on the Ukrainian civilians. However, it still stops short of condemning OUN-UPA of crimes in Volhynia, keeping the focus instead on the organisation's struggle with the Soviet forces. This approach is widespread among the left wing political groupings that dominated the government and administration until 2005.

The second approach considers OUN-UPA as a "national liberation movement" struggling for Ukrainian independence and statehood and dominates the centre and right wing as well as the Ukrainian diaspora.[152] The events in Volhynia, according to this view, were caused solely by the policies of the interwar Polish Second Republic, where Poles first occupied and colonised ethnic Ukrainian lands and then oppressed the Ukrainians.[153] Any condemnation of the murders is ruled out as the real victims were Ukrainians.

The third approach, which is revisionist, agrees that OUN-UPA was established around the idea of Ukrainian independence but does not endorse all of the methods it employed during the war, especially the anti Polish action.

6.4.6 Culmination of the debates

Post 1991 development of Polish-Ukrainian ties, spearheaded mainly by governments and the political and intellectual elite, was a product of first and foremost strategic and economic concerns. However, it also laid the groundwork for dialogue on the above mentioned contentious historical issues. Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation had already been an area explored by diaspora journals, headed by *Kultura* and its Ukrainian counterpart, *Suchasnist* and in the 1980 Solidarity activists started raising the issue in their samizdat publications.[154] After the regime change in 1989, formerly suppressed issues such as the loss of territory and deportations after the Second World War were taken up by not only academic research but also burgeoning civil society organisations and think tanks. Among them were numerous organisations of Poles originating from the lost territory (Kresy) that helped efforts to collect and publish personal memoirs. Most of these

[151] Bogumiła Berdychowska, "Spotkanie nad mogiłami?", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 February 2003.
[152] Kataryna Wolczuk, "The difficulties of Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 5, 04 March 2003, No. 8.
[153] For a Polish discussion on this point see Grzegorz Motyka et al., "Z Ukraińcami po Jedwabnem" (discussion), *Więź*, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 20-36.
[154] See Taras Kuzio "The Polish Opposition and the Ukrainian Question', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 12, 1987, No.23, pp.26-58.

publications tended to be highly emotive and reinforced the traditionalist view, and their content and arguments were given wide coverage in the press.[155]

Attempts for dialogue with Ukrainians were also undertaken. The Polish NGO KARTA that focused on historical documentation, organised a conference called "Poles and Ukrainians 1918–48. Difficult Questions" in June 1994 in cooperation with the International Union of the Home Army Servicemen-Volhynia Region (*Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej- Okręg Wołyn*) and Union of Ukrainians in Poland (*Związek Ukraińców w Polsce* - ZUwP). The aim was to provide a series of seminars where Polish and Ukrainian historians could discuss controversial problems of the period. From 1998 on KARTA published ten volumes containing the proceedings of these seminars.[156]

Academic debates, NGO activities and various publications (at least in Poland) were the natural fora for the discussion of such highly charged "difficult questions" and immensely complex historical events most of which were in living memory. Such issues, however, could rarely remain a subject of purely intellectual discussion as they creep into politics and foreign relations. Wartime events in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia and Action Vistula were no exceptions. Polish and Ukrainian governments had already tried to address the need for reconciliation by the Senate apology for Action Vistula and the 1997 resolution by presidents, as mentioned above. However, the power of historical memory over politics struck again in 2003 in the run up to the 60th anniversary of the Volhynia events in July.[157]

Polish and Ukrainian presidents decided in February 2003 to participate together in the preparation for the commemorations in July. The subject was discussed during a visit to Kiev by the Head of Polish National Security Bureau, Marek Siwiec, on 25 February. Siwiec was reported to have requested that the Polish side decided about the format of the commemorations and that the Ukrainian president apologised for the Volhynia massacres.[158] Siwiec said that this would be an appropriate response to Kwaśniewski's apology for Action Vistula in 2002. (In a letter sent to a commemoration conference on Action Vistula on 18 April 2002 Kwaśniewski wrote "In the name of the Polish Republic I would like to express my regrets to all those who suffered as a result of those shameful actions".)[159] Siwiec's demand for an apology caused a negative reaction in Ukraine.

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[155] Wolczuk and Wolczuk, *Poland and Ukraine*, p. 39. For coverage and analysis of the period by Polish and Ukrainian press see Bogumiła Berdychowska, "Wokół tego co dzieli" and Mykoła Riabczuk "Historia najnowsza na łamach ukraińskiej prasy" in Kosiewski and Motyka (Eds), *Historycy polscy i ukraińscy*, pp. 198-205 and pp. 206-239.

[156] *Polska--Ukraina: Trudne Pytania* (Vols 1-9), Warszawa: Fundacja Ośrodka KARTA, 1997-2002 and *Polska-Ukraina: Trudna Odpowiedź: Dokumentacja spotkań historyków (1994-2001)*, Warszawa: Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych and Fundacja Ośrodka KARTA, 2003.

[157] On 11 July 1943 OUN-UPA attacked simultaneously 167 Polish villages. This was considered to be the high point of atrocities and, therefore, the anniversary is held on this date.

[158] Viktor Zamyatin, "Polish Delegation Arrives in Kyiv to Discuss the Past and Future", *Den*, 04 March 2003.

[159] "List prezydenta do uczestników konferencji o akcji 'Wisła'", 18 April 2002. http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=1507489 (accessed 06 November 2006)

Commentators argued that Warsaw was trying to take advantage of Kuchma's weakness resulting from international isolation and dictate its own terms.[160] It was claimed that an apology would be inappropriate as the Volhynia events were not a result of a decision by a Ukrainian state (as there was no independent Ukraine at the time), unlike Action Vistula, which was based on an order given by the Polish state.[161] The Polish side was accused of trying to impose upon Ukraine the point that only the Ukrainians bore guilt for the wartime events.[162]

A group of Ukrainian nationalist MPs also showed their reaction by signing an open letter in May 2003 about the upcoming commemorations.[163] They stated that it was the Poles who had started the hostilities and committed massacres of Ukrainians in Volhynia in collaboration with Germans and Soviets and the blame for the tragedy laid in the faulty nationality policies of the interwar Polish state. They called on Warsaw to "give up its claims as regards unilateral apologies" and "revise its anti-Ukrainian prejudices" and "give up its Ukrainian policy that has been traditionally false for the last 400 years".

On 10 July 2003 Polish and Ukrainian parliaments passed a joint resolution on the Volhynia events. This was preceded by stormy debates in both parliaments over the wording of the resolution. Approval was secured when the final text of the resolution excluded any accusations of one side towards the other.[164] Ukrainian MPs needed additional persuasion by Kuchma during the parliamentary session and Kuchma reportedly promised them not to say anything that would hurt Ukraine's interests during the commemorations he would attend the next day.[165] The resolution acknowledged that Ukrainian murder and expulsion of Poles by "armed Ukrainian formations" had occurred at the same time with suffering of Ukrainian civilians brought on by Polish armed actions.[166] The text focused on reconciliation of two nations for the sake of the future. The next day, during the commemorations in the Ukrainian village of Pavlivka, Kwaśniewski and Kuchma more or less reiterated the same message in their statement.[167] So far Polish and Ukrainian governments managed to keep away from provocation and to avoid distortion of the official policy of "strategic partnership" by attempts to settle historical grievances.

[160] Kataryna Wolczuk, "The difficulties of Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 5, 04 March 2003, No. 8.
[161] Kost Bondarenko, "The Volyn tragedy: echoes through decades", *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 15 - 21 February 2003.
[162] Taras Kuzio, "Commemorating 1943 events in Volyn", *Kyiv Post*, 10 April 2003.
[163] "An open letter of MPs of Ukraine on the occasion of celebration of the 60-th anniversary of Volyn tragic events of 1943, in Poland", *Ukrainian Monitor*, 16 May 2003.
[164] Roman Woronowycz, "Parliaments of Ukraine and Poland pass resolution on painful events of 1943-1944", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 71, 13 July 2003, No. 28.
[165] "Jednym głosem", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2003.
[166] "Oświadczenie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 10 lipca 2003 r. w związku z 60. rocznicą tragedii wołyńskiej", *Monitor Polski*, 2003, No. 37, Pos. 516, p. 1904.
[167] Marcin Wojciechowski, "Pierwszy krok", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 July 2003.

6.5 ETHNIC MINORITIES

Despite the deportations and migrations of the post war period and redrawing of Poland's border, ethnic minorities still survived on either side of the new Polish-Ukrainian border. According to censuses carried out in both countries in 2002, there are 31,000 ethnic Ukrainians in Poland and 147,900 Poles in Ukraine (both less than 1% of total population).[168] The accuracy of the figures was disputed in both cases. According to different estimates numbers of Ukrainians in Poland range from 70,000 to 250,000 and Poles in Ukraine up to 220,000. Whatever the real figure might be, the percentage of minorities in the total population is quite small. In addition, the Ukrainian minority is scattered around different regions due to Action Vistula and do not form visible majorities in any region. In contrast, the Polish minority in Ukraine is more concentrated in Western Ukraine but likewise lack visibility in towns like Lwów, which was considered an integral part of Poland during the interwar period.

The issue of minorities was dealt with at the interstate level with the May 1992 treaty on good neighbourly relations between Poland and Ukraine. Both parties declared adherence to international norms of protection of national minorities who would "have the right, alone or in association with other members of that minority, to preserve, express and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any discrimination and in conditions of full equality before the law".[169] Education in native language, religious freedom and the rights of association and contacts with their motherland were secured.

6.5.1 The Ukrainian minority in Poland

Despite the fact that minorities gained many rights, legal guarantees and governmental support for their activities following 1989 in Poland, various conflicts involving the Ukrainian minority stirred bigger trouble than they were actually worth. Given that there were no territorial claims between Poland and Ukraine and institutional discrimination was discouraged by the government, the conflicts were mostly to do with the controversial historical issues. One such incident was the dispute over St Theresa Cathedral in Przemyśl. The cathedral belonged to Greek Catholic Ukrainians before Action Vistula in 1947 and after that was used by the Roman Catholic Carmelite order. In 1991 decision of a Catholic archbishop to let Greek Catholics use the cathedral for five years sparked furious reaction from right wing groupings, which occupied the church for some weeks until it was returned to the Carmelites. In 1996, the Carmelites demolished the dome (*kopula*)

[168] Raport z wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2002, GUS. http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/nsp/spis_lud/lud.htm (accessed 07 November 2006) and "Na Ukrainie mniej Polaków niż sądzono", *Wspólnota Polska*, Vol. 118, 2003, No. 1, pp.25-26.
[169] Article 11, "Traktat między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkac i współpracy, Warszawa, 18 maja 1992 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 530, 1992, No. 4, p. 82.

which symbolised the church's Greek Catholic heritage, despite an official ban which was breached by a dubious permission given by a local officer.[170] Although this was a localised incidence (and not the last one from Przemyśl), it demonstrated the distrust of many Poles of Ukrainians and a need to exert the "Polishness" of cities such as Przemyśl with a Ukrainian minority and a historical link to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian minority resented these reactions, as it considered restitution of churches as only one of many measures that the Polish government should take given their claim that Ukrainians were the most suppressed ethnic group after the war and had suffered greatly from PRL's policies.[171] ZUwP petitioned the Sejm in 1992 to condemn Action Vistula and to compensate the Ukrainian minority by means of property restitution and financial compensation.[172] The Sejm was unwilling to undertake such a move whose consequences might reach farther than just compensating the Ukrainian minority.[173] The issue of cemeteries for UPA soldiers also created problems for the Ukrainian minority. It took years of negotiations between ZUwP and ROPWiM to arrive at a compromise about the monuments and inscriptions commemorating Ukrainian and UPA soldiers (similar to the case of the Eaglets' Cemetery). The case concerning UPA commemorations did not cause a conflict at the intergovernmental level as in Ukraine there were different opinions of UPA varying from region to region (with Western Ukraine having the highest opinion of it) and UPA was not yet rehabilitated in Ukraine itself.

6.5.2 The Polish minority in Ukraine

The Polish minority in Ukraine were also dispersed in such a manner that they did not constitute a majority in any town or region. The practical problems they faced were similar to the Ukrainian minority in Poland, for instance restitution of property and access to education in their mother tongue. However, the conflicts caused by questions of identity and burden of history did not reach similar intensity and media coverage as those in Poland. The Soviet administration had been equally distant to the idea of both Polish and Ukrainian nationalism and the religions of both groups, whereas in Poland Ukrainians felt they were victimised by the majority Polish nationalism. Besides, Polish cultural influence was not perceived by Ukrainians as a priority "threat" given that Russification was a much

[170] Michał Wawrzonek, "Polsko-ukraińskie pojednanie. Potrzeba kształtowania nowego stereotypu wzajemnych stosunków" in Włodzimierz Bonusiak (Ed.), *Polska- Niemcy- Ukraina w Europie: Narodowe identyfikacje i europejskie integracje w przededniu XXI wieku*, Rzeszów: Wydaw. Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 2000, pp. 181-182.
[171] Timothy Snyder, "The Ukrainian Minority in Poland" in James Clem and Nancy Popson (Eds), *Ukraine and its Western Neighbors*, Washington DC: Kennan Institute and Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2000, p. 71.
[172] President of the Union of Ukrainians in Poland, Jerzy Rejf's comments, *Biuletyn Komisji Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych*, No. 181/II, 15 December 1993.
[173] By the end of 2004 Poland still had no law governing restitution of private property. A draft law on restitution of private property (reprivatisation) was vetoed by the president in 2001.

bigger issue. In addition, public perceptions in Ukraine of post-1989 Poland were in general more positive than public perceptions of Ukraine in Poland.

The Polish government began to build an active policy towards Polonia and ethnic Poles in the 1990s.[174] The Senate, the parliamentary Commission for Communication with Poles Abroad (*Komisja Łączności z Polakami za Granicą*) and the Polonia department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were the main institutions making and executing this policy. The Senate financed many needs and activities of the Polish minority in Ukraine mainly through two foundations, the Polish Community (*Wspólnota Polska*) and the Foundation for Aid to Poles in the East (*Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie*). Most of the budget set aside for Poles abroad went towards funding cultural organisations, minority publications and Polish language teaching in schools. The Ukrainian state lacked the means to finance its minorities at the level the Polish state funded its minorities. Especially given the large number of people of Russian origin, the scale of minority funding had to be kept to a minimum. Polish governments wisely refrained from demanding reciprocity from their Ukrainian counterpart in terms of funding for and, even more importantly, treatment of minorities. There have been incessant calls for applying the principle of reciprocity, especially from the right wing parties and organisations in Poland and Poles in Ukraine.

6.5.3 Conclusion

Local and institutional conflicts concerning minorities became the subject of intergovernmental talks from time to time but had a limited impact on bilateral relations and foreign policy. These conflicts could be considered as corollaries to the wider historical issues which have been catapulted onto the foreign policy agenda from time to time as in the case of commemorations of Volhynia events. At the risk of generalisation, it could be maintained that the actual effects of historical memory on policy orientation and making at the governmental level are not high.

Foreign policy is in large part an elite driven process and Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation has been a success among the ruling elite and intellectuals whereas it has not yet fully penetrated into the social and local level.[175] The driving force behind the reconciliation at the elite level is the pragmatic, strategic need for cooperation between the two countries, the conceptual framework for which is provided by the post-1989 EP based on the Giedroycian heritage. It is true that reconciliation at the societal level will take much longer

[174] See Tomasz Gąsowski, *Państwo polskie wobec Polaków na wschodzie. Poszukiwanie modelu polityki*, Studia I Analizy, Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2000.
[175] For Poles' and Ukrainians' perceptions of each other see Joanna Konieczna, *Polska-Ukraina wzajemny wizerunek*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2001.

to be realised but the hope lies in the gradual effectiveness of initiatives sparked by this top down process.

6.6 CONCLUSION

By 2004, Poland's foreign policy aims regarding Ukraine, i.e. carrying Ukraine into the EU and NATO, were not fulfilled. The prospects for the Polish ambition of co-creating EP for the EU have not looked promising, either. In addition, having been shunned by the West for its domestic politics, Ukraine started giving many concessions to Russia. What is more, after Poland's accession to the EU, constraints over the room of manoeuvre available to Poland for determining its foreign policy towards will be even less. A second external factor with huge influence over the shape of Polish-Ukrainian relations is Russia's relations with both countries and with the EU. Regardless of the orientation of the government in Ukraine, there are realities of economic (and to an extent political) dependence on Russia and neither the EU nor Poland would be able to offer an alternative in the near future. We have seen the external and internal constraints over developing economic partnerships such as in the case of the Odessa-Gdańsk pipeline and the Huta Częstochowa affairs.

All these might be considered reasons to call Poland's policy a failure. Perhaps, as minimalists and other critics argued, the objectives set for Poland's EP were unrealistic. It is true that these objectives were unattainable solely through the efforts of Poland but the process by which Poland operated towards these aims had also positive results. Strong channel of communications between the two countries were established and plenty of fora for the discussion of bilateral problems were created. Bilateral relations were strong enough to withstand pressures created by the conflict between Ukraine and the EU. Relations also proved to be more steadfast than expected in the face of conflicts regarding historical reconciliation. However, a truly "strategic partnership" is some time away as both political and economic relations between the two countries have to progress further whereby a degree of interdependence and compatibility is created.

Chapter Seven

Poland's Relations with Belarus

This chapter will focus on Poland's relations with Belarus, a country whose foreign policy choices presented Polish Eastern policy (EP) with a challenge. It would be unfair to say Poland has more problems with Belarus on the bilateral level than with other Eastern neighbours. For instance, there are fewer outstanding historical grievances between the two nations than between Poland and Ukraine. Also despite high levels of poverty and social problems, the relative stability of Belarus (albeit in a form undesirable for Poland and the West) and effective state authority prevented the country from becoming an area of lawlessness and crime, which Poland feared its Eastern neighbourhood would become. Belarus, nevertheless, still came to be defined as a "black hole of Europe"[1] for reasons of political incompatibility with the Europe west of its borders.

To illustrate how Belarus was perceived by Poland as a problem neighbour and how B became the weakest letter in the *Kultura* concept of ULB, Polish-Belarusian relations will be explained under four sections. The first will look at the development of bilateral political relations where Poland's policies towards Belarus will be considered within the framework of and in contrast to EU, NATO and OSCE's. The second section will deal with economic relations, focusing on foreign trade and investment. Poland's links with and varying opinions of Belarusian opposition will be discussed in the third section and the fourth will dwell on minorities on both sides and the role they play in bilateral relations. Although memory of historical conflicts between Belarusians and Poles exist, it does not have any considerable effect on bilateral relations at a scale compared to those with Ukrainians. Such conflicts, therefore, will not be covered in this chapter.

7.1 POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT

7.1.1 The Beginning: 1989-1995

Soon after the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty, first steps of establishing bilateral relations with Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic were taken by Poland within the spirit of two-track EP. Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski went to Minsk in October (as well as to Moscow and Kiev) with the intention of signing a declaration on establishing bilateral relations. Unlike with Ukraine and Russia, no

[1] Wojciech Górecki, "Czarna dziura Europy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 November 1995, quoting Valeri Karbalevich.

declaration could be signed with Belarus due to certain reservations about the text on the part of Belarus. The articles in the declaration regarding recognition of borders on the basis of a Soviet-Polish treaty of 16 August 1945 was rejected by the Belarusian government which claimed that it was not a signatory to the treaty at the time of signing.[2] Another contentious point was a request by the Belarusian side to include in the declaration a reference to the Białystok region as ethnically Belarusian.[3] The declaration on good neighbourly relations could be signed a year later on 10 October 1991 after Belarus became independent on 25 August and the dissolution of Soviet Union became imminent.[4]

Poland recognised Belarus's independence on 27 December 1991 a few weeks after it recognised Ukraine's and relations soured by the initial hitch in Minsk started improving. As uncertainties around Belarusian independence dissipated and Belarus started strengthening its attributes of statehood, establishing diplomatic ties with the Western institutions, its relations with Poland took off. In 1992-93 many basic treaties were signed between Poland and Belarus, high level visits took place and embassies were opened in both capitals. According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by summer 1993 among all ex Soviet states Poland had signed the largest number of treaties with Belarus.[5] On his visit to Minsk in June 1993, President Wałęsa said that Poland would never see Belarus as an enemy and even claimed that the border between the two countries would practically disappear by 2000.[6]

There was, however, a growing concern in both countries about each other's choice of alliances. Belarus signed far reaching economic and defence agreements with Russia on 20 July 1992 which, according to Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, was a step in the direction of forming a confederation.[7] Following a visit to Minsk on 18 November 1992 by Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, the Polish government expressed its disquiet about this rapprochement. Suchocka said that she wanted Belarus's road to Europe to go through Poland and stressed the importance of Belarusian independence for Poland.[8] Her comments were rebuffed by the Belarusian PM Vyacheisau Kebich who reminded her of the differences between Poland and Belarus in terms of their geopolitical position.[9] In return Belarus was unhappy about Poland's quest for NATO membership. In November

[2] Stephen R Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and its Eastern Neighbours-Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, 1993, No. 3, p. 406.
[3] Helena Głogowska, "Białoruś w polityce polskiej między Niemcami a Rosją" in Tadeusz Wallas (Ed.), *Polska między Niemcami a Rosją*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1999, p. 177.
[4] "Deklaracja o dobrym sąsiedztwie, wzajemnym zrozumieniu i współpracy między Rzecząpospolitą Polską i Republiką Białoruś, Warszawa, 10 października 1991 r.", *Zbiór Dokumentów*, Vol. 528, 1992, No. 2, pp. 18-22.
[5] Piotr Kościński, "Lech Wałęsa jedzie na Białoruś", *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 June 1993.
[6] Piotr Kościński, "Polska chce suwerennej Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 June 1993.
[7] Ann Sheehy, "Russian-Belarusian agreements: "A step in the direction of confederation", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 21 July 1992.
[8] Anna Sabbat- Swidlicka, "Polish-Belarus relations", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 23 November 1992.
[9] Przemysław Foligowski, *Białoruś - trudna niepodległość*, Wrocław: Atla 2, 1999, p. 93.

1993 the Belarusian government expressed its opposition to Poland's membership in NATO when the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs consulted them on the issue.[10]

Throughout 1994-95 differences between Poland and Belarus in terms of foreign policy orientation gradually crystallised. Belarus signed various treaties with Russia ranging in subject from an eventual monetary union (April 1994) to building a customs union and deployment of Russian troops in Belarus (January 1995) and mutual collective security guarantees (February 1995).[11] Meanwhile, Poland's prospects of NATO membership were becoming more realistic. Despite the fact that Belarus was consistent about its objection to Poland's entry into NATO, this had not led to the break down of bilateral relations. Dialogue continued through high level visits. During one of these the speaker of the Sejm Józef Oleksy took part in the ceremony in July 1994 where the newly elected president of Belarus Aleksander Lukashenko was sworn in. Oleksy repeated Poland's will to move towards European integration together with Belarus.[12] It must be noted that despite its anti-NATO rhetoric and lukewarm approach to the EU, Belarus was still in dialogue with these organisations. It became a member to NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in January 1995 and signed the Partnership and Cooperation and interim agreements with the EU in March (the latter were not to enter into force as they could not be ratified).

Concern in Poland grew over Lukashenko's increasingly harsher tone over Western influence in Central and Eastern Europe and NATO expansion. At the same time Lukashenko's policy of shunning ethnic Belarusian nationalism was criticised in Poland. "Poor national consciousness" of Belarusians and what was seen as Russification disappointed those in Poland cherishing plans of building a buffer region of Western friendly states between Poland and Russia. Lukashenko's administration was also criticised for being antidemocratic.

Most Polish commentators meant by the undesirable political situation in Belarus and the need for Belarusian independence for Poland solely a Belarus conveniently independent from Russian influence. Belarusian nationalism was hailed because it was seen as the only means of ensuring a Belarusian state resisting to Russian dominance. The Polish government, however, was careful enough to express its respect for the sovereign decisions of Belarus in terms of its bilateral ties with Russia.[13]

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[10] Valery Karbalevicz, "Stosunki polsko-białoruskie na tle integracji europejskiej" in Maria Marczewska-Rytko (Ed.), *Polska w systemie międzynarodowym w dobie integracji europejskiej*, Puławy: Wydawnictwo Puławskiej Szkoły Wyższej, 2001, p. 153.

[11] For a detailed analysis of the Belarus-Russia union see Clelia Rontoyanni, "Belarus and the East" in Elena A. Korosteleva, John Lowenhardt, Stephen White (Eds), *Postcommunist Belarus*, Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp.123-142 and Clelia Rontoyanni, *Building the Wider Europe: Ambitions and Constraints in Russia's Policies towards Belarus and Ukraine*, Glasgow Papers No. 3, 2000.

[12] Głogowska, "Białoruś w polityce polskiej", pp. 180-181.

[13] See for instance Minister of Foreign Affairs Władysław Bartoszewski's comments, Informacja rządu o podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 50

7.1.2 Increasing tensions

Despite concerns in Poland about internal developments in Belarus and its ties with Russia, Belarus was not by any means the most important topic of debate in the media or among the politicians.[14] The ruling Democratic Left Alliance - Polish Peasant Party (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* - SLD / *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* – PSL) coalition government and the Foreign Ministry expressed their support for Belarusian independence and named Belarus in all EP related documents and statements but in practice the EP agenda was dominated by issues relating to Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, dialogue with Belarus continued by mutual visits and agreements on practical issues. One such high profile visit in March 1996 sparked interest in Belarus again. The meeting of presidents Kwaśniewski and Lukashenko was criticised both by the Polish and the Belarusian opposition who perceived it as a sign of Polish acceptance of Belarus-Russia integration, an agreement about which was scheduled to be signed.[15] Both Kwaśniewski and Lukashenko tried to give conciliatory messages to the opponents. Kwaśniewski said that he was shown the text of Belarus-Russia Union treaty (to be signed on 2 April) and did not think it would have any effect on Poland's relations with Belarus.[16] Lukashenko, on the other hand, stated that even though they were against a hasty expansion of NATO, Poland had the right to choose its alliances.[17]

The conflict between Lukashenko, who wanted to change the constitution to introduce larger powers for himself and an extended term in office, and the Supreme Soviet, who opposed it and tried to impeach Lukashenko, deepened as international interest in Belarus heightened. The Polish Sejm adopted a resolution on 19 November 1996 that expressed support for Belarusian parliamentarians and warned about the dangers of a return to authoritarianism that threatened transition to democracy and market economy in the whole region.[18] Even though the government and the opposition had different opinions about how to approach Belarusian issues, all parties in the Sejm unanimously voted for the resolution. During the debate on the resolution, some MPs drew an analogy between the events in Poland in the 1980s (Solidarity, martial law) and what was happening in Belarus. It was argued that Poland had a debt of gratitude to the international community (i.e. the West) that supported the anti-regime opposition in Poland through difficult times and now Poland

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Posiedzenie, 2 Dzień, 25 May 1995. All parliamentary debates from the First Sejm on can be searched at http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/forms/kad.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

[14] Agnieszka Magzdiak-Miszewska, "Belarus: Poland's strange neighbor" in Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, Lisbeth L. Tarlow (Eds), *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 361.

[15] Ryszard Bilski, "Mimo zastrzeżeń opozycji Kwaśniewski jedzie na Białoruś", *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 March 1996.

[16] Wojciech Klewiec and Piotr Kościński, "Na różnych falach", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 April 1996.

[17] Wojciech Klewiec and Piotr Kościński, "Na różnych falach", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 April 1996.

[18] "Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1996 r. w sprawie sytuacji w Republice Białoruś", *Monitor Polski*, 30 November 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.

had to pay this debt back by doing the same for Belarus.[19] This analogy was to be repeated many times over the following years. A delegation from the Sejm visited Belarusian Supreme Soviet members in Minsk on 22 November and expressed their support for the Soviet against Lukashenko in no uncertain terms.[20] Meanwhile, Kwaśniewski contacted the presidents of Lithuania and Ukraine to issue a joint declaration on the Belarusian situation.[21]

The referendum on the draft constitution took place in Belarus on 24 November 1996 and received the backing of the voters. The 13th Supreme Soviet elected in 1995 was dissolved and a bicameral parliamentary system was introduced with the establishment of the Council of the Republic, whose members were partly appointed by the president and partly selected with the president's approval. Lukashenko's term in office was extended by two years until 1999. Refusing to recognise the validity of the referendum, the reaction of the Western governments and organisations was to freeze their relations with Belarus. The European Parliament decided to abandon ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in December 1996. The Council of Europe cancelled Belarus's special guest status in January 1997 and the North Atlantic Assembly followed suit in March by freezing its relations with Belarus. Finally, on 15 September 1997 the EU Council of General Affairs decided to suspend the PCA and the interim agreement, cancel all assistance programmes (except for humanitarian or regional projects and those deemed to support democratisation) and ordered member states to refrain from contacts with Belarus at ministerial level.[22]

The Polish government joined the European institutions in their decision not to recognise the referendum results and the legitimacy of the new parliaments in Belarus and to avoid political contacts with high levels of the Belarusian administration. But nevertheless it reiterated that channels of dialogue would be kept open. It also came up with the idea of a Belarusian round table where Belarusian government representatives would negotiate with the opposition (which proved impossible).[23] However, especially with the elections coming up in September 1997, the government (and the president) could not escape heavy criticism by the opposition regarding their policies towards Belarus. The Council of Foreign Policy (*Rada Polityki Zagranicznej*), an NGO whose members were prominent politicians

[19] See for instance Ryszard Bugaj's (UP) and Krzysztof Król's (KPN) comments, "Pierwsze czytanie komisyjnego projektu uchwały w sprawie sytuacji na Białorusi (druk nr 2025)", Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 94 Posiedzenie, 1 Dzień, 19 November 1996.
[20] "International Chronicle- Sejm Delegation Visits Belarusian Parliament", *Kronika Sejmowa*, Vol. 268, 27 November- 3 December 1996, No. 145, http://kronika.sejm.gov.pl/kronika/index.htm (accessed 10 September 2006).
[21] Maja Narbutt, "Białoruski pat", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 November 1996.
[22] "Human Rights - Council conclusions on Belarus", *Bulletin EU*, No. 9, 1997, Point 1-3-56. http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9709/p103056.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[23] See minister Foreign Affairs Dariusz Rosati's comments, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 2 Kadencja, 106 Posiedzenie, 3 Dzień, 09 May 1997.

and bureaucrats of post-Solidarity origin and centre right political orientation, made a scathing attack on the government and president accusing them of hypocrisy. Accordingly, on the one hand, the government claimed that it supported Belarusian independence but, on the other, treated the biggest threat to it, namely Belarus-Russia integration, as a sovereign choice to be respected. Urging the government to shun contacts with the new parliament and presidential administration, the Council proposed to work towards strengthening national consciousness and civil rights in Belarus through activities of NGOs.[24]

The change of government in Poland from post-communist to post-Solidarity in October 1997 had not radically altered the policy line towards Belarus. Poland still avoided a complete breakdown of contacts with Belarus and hoped for a mediating role between the Belarusian government and opposition. Poland assumed the leadership of OSCE in 1998 and, in his capacity as the head of OSCE, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek visited Minsk in February 1998 after the Advisory and Monitoring Mission of OSCE was opened to monitor and advise on issues such as electoral law, democratic freedoms a civil society.[25] The Belarusian government, however, was uneasy about the activities of the Belarusian opposition in Poland and perceived approval of Polish government of these as interference in Belarus's internal affairs. This will be covered in the section 7.3 below.

7.1.3 Drozdy affair

Relations between the West and Belarus came to a breaking point when in April 1998 the Belarusian government asked 22 embassies, including the Polish, to move out from their diplomatic residences in the Drozdy district of Minsk by June and threatened eviction if they did not comply. The stated reason was necessary infrastructural repairs. The EU states and the US called back their ambassadors (who would not return to Minsk until January 1999). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed suit after a period of hesitation. The divergence between Poland and its Western allies became clearer in July when the EU and US decided to implement a travel ban on high level Belarusian officials. In a rare display of defiance, Poland announced that it would not be joining the ban. Geremek said that Poland's relations with Belarus differed from those of the EU's and, as the head of OSCE and a neighbour, Poland had the duty of maintaining contacts with the Belarusian society and facilitate functioning of the OSCE mission.[26] He also expressed

[24] Jan Skórzyński, "Kwestia białoruska to kwestia międzynarodowa", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 January 1997 and Piotr Kościński and Jan Skórzyński , "Wiele sygnałów, różne komentarze", *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 January 1997.
[25] For more information on OSCE in Belarus see Hans-Georg Wieck, "The OSCE and the Council of Europe in Conflict with the Lukashenko Regime" in Ann Lewis (Ed.), *The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*, London: Federal Trust, 2002, pp. 261-275.
[26] Andrzej Stankiewicz and Jędrzej Bielecki, "Szczególna sytuacja", *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 July 1998.

resentment at the EU which took the decision without any consultation with Poland. While Poland's decision did not get a strong reaction from the EU, it was still noted as a divergence from the common EU foreign policy which Poland had to follow in order to become a member.[27]

In January 1999 the relations with Belarus was strained again when the Sejm issued a message to the Belarusian nation expressing moral support for the deputies of the 13th Supreme Soviet and advising the government to negotiate with the opposition in order to break out of its "international [self]imposed isolation".[28]

7.1.4 A new flexibe policy?

Meanwhile, the EU reconsidered its harsh policy of isolating Belarus after the tense atmosphere caused by the Drozdy affair subsided. The so called "selective engagement" policy of complete isolation of the government in Minsk but engagement with the civil society gave way to a strategy more responsive towards possible steps taken by the Belarusian government.[29] The travel ban was lifted in February 1999. The EU offered a gradual lifting of sanctions in place on the condition that Belarus fulfilled four conditions: Freedom of media, increasing the powers of the parliament, participation of opposition in electoral commissions and revising the electoral law.[30] When Belarus signed the final document at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, this was seen a positive response to the EU's new, more flexible policy.[31] The document praised the OSCE mission in Belarus for facilitating dialogue between the opposition and the government to solve the constitutional conflict and promoting democratic institutions.[32] It underlined the need for free and democratic elections.

However, the summit also witnessed angry exchanges between Lukashenko and Kwaśniewski (as well as the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus). When Kwaśniewski pointed to human rights violations in Belarus and the need for democratic elections, Lukashenko retorted angrily by accusing Poland of interfering in Belarus's internal affairs.[33]

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[27] This was mentioned in the EU's regular report on negotiations with Poland. Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, 04 November 1998, p. 38, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[28] Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r. Posłanie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Narodu Białoruskiego. *Monitor Polski*, 27 January 1999, No. 4, Pos. 16.
[29] See Ruta Vainiene et al. (Eds), *Belarus: Reform Scenarios*, Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003, p. 292.
[30] John Lowenhardt , "Belarus and the West" in Elena A. Korosteleva, John Lowenhardt, Stephen White (Eds), *Postcommunist Belarus*, Lanham, M.D.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, p.145.
[31] Paweł Wolowski, "Polityka UE wobec Białorusi. Stan obecny i perspektywy" in *Tematy polsko-białoruskie*, Olsztyn : Wspólnota Kulturowa "Borussia", 2003, p. 177.
[32] Article 22 of OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, Istanbul Document 1999, http://www.osce.org/mc/documents.html (accessed 12 September 2005)
[33] Jan Maksymiuk, "Lukashenka Lectures Poland, Lithuania on Human Rights", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus And Ukraine Report*, Vol. 1, 23 November 1999, No. 25.

The EU's new policy has not produced the desired results and both the parliamentary elections in Belarus in October 2000 and the presidential elections in September 2001 were deemed undemocratic by the OSCE and Belarus was severely criticised by the European institutions for persecuting the opposition and stifling free media. However, the option of adopting a harsher policy towards Belarus was already tried and ruled out. The EU and its constituent countries were increasingly looking for a more flexible approach. So despite criticisms of the elections, the EU acknowledged in a Presidential Declaration of 14 September 2001 "the emergence in Belarus of a degree of pluralism and of a civil society which is aware of the challenges of democracy" and expressed readiness to start "consultations on the subject with all the political forces of Belarus which are prepared to work in the same direction."[34]

However, translating this new relative openness into a common policy was no easy task. Different EU countries had varying attitudes towards Belarus.[35] For instance while Britain and the Netherlands were against having any contacts with the Belarusian government at a level higher than already designated, Germany and Sweden saw higher level contacts as the key to bringing about change in Belarus in the long term.[36]

Polish policy towards Belarus was also undergoing reevaluation: It was becoming clearer that Lukashenko would not be toppled anytime soon and even enjoyed popular support in Belarus. The Belarusian opposition was weak and divided. It was, hence, not possible to bring about regime change in Belarus by either supporting the opposition or offering carrots in exchange for fulfilling certain conditions. Poland could not resume official relations with the Belarusian government as this would be a breach of Poland's commitment to EU policies. And especially when the US attitude towards Belarus was getting harsher (Belarus was added to the list of "axis of evil" alongside countries such as Burma and Zimbabwe by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in January 2005. Rice's preferred nomenclature was "outpost of tyranny".)[37] Poland could not risk alienating its ally. Neither could it abandon the rhetoric of supporting "civil society" in Belarus and playing host to the Belarusian opposition as it could face strong domestic criticism. One area where Poland was successful was managing to maintain contacts with the Belarusian authorities concerning practical issues such as border regime, regional cooperation, economic relations and cultural exchange. Several high level contacts had also taken

[34] "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the holding of presidential elections in Belarus, Brussels, 14 September 2001", No. 11812/01 (Presse 320)
P. 152/01. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/11812.en1.pdf (accessed 23 February 2006)
[35] Catherine Guicherd, "The EU and Belarus: From a Zero to a Positive Sum Game" in Ann Lewis (Ed.), *The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*, London: Federal Trust, 2002, pp. 330-331.
[36] Carl Bjernstam, Joakim Larsson and David Shishoo, "EU divided over dealing with Belarus", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 5, 21 October 2003, No. 39.
[37] "Opening Statement by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18, 2005", http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/RiceTestimony050118.pdf (accessed 12 January 2007)

place during international meetings. For instance, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz met his Belarusian counterpart during the OSCE summit in Bucharest in December 2001 and talked about regional and economic cooperation.[38]

Even though Cimoszewicz pointed out at this meeting that contacts with high level officials could only be possible when Belarus fulfilled democratic criteria, there was an increasing awareness on the part of the government that the consequences of isolating the Belarusian government worked against the regional interests of Poland. At one point Poland even considered applying together with Lithuania for a special mandate from the Council of Europe to hold talks with Lukashenko.[39]

The realisation in Poland about the failure of the previous Western and Western guided Polish policies towards Belarus and the search for new concepts were evident in the July 2002 discussion on the issue at the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee.[40] The Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld began by reiterating Poland's adherence to the "politically correct" perception of Belarus being a "grotesque regime", "*skansen* of authoritarianism" and Lukashenko's policies as the main obstacle in developing bilateral relations. However, he pointed out that the current policies produced no tangible results and proposed initiating contacts with the Belarusian government at a higher level. He listed the reasons for Poland to have its own policy towards Belarus: having a 400 km common border, existence of sizeable minorities on both sides, trade between the two countries and the position of Belarus (and Poland) as the main transit route between Russia and the EU. He also drew attention to positive factors that would help boost cooperation such as having a strong treaty basis for bilateral relations, cultural proximity between the two societies and lack of blatant historical animosities. Accordingly, while agreeing with the general policy attitude of the EU and the US towards Belarus, Poland had to pursue a more "elastic and pragmatic" policy. Rotfeld admitted that the position of Lukashenko was quite stable and he had popular support and, therefore, to achieve success, policies should be directed not only at the Belarusian civil society and the NGO sector but also at the state representatives. There was opposition from the MPs belonging to post-Solidarity parties (who found themselves on the opposition benches after the September 2001 elections) to this proposed regeneration of contacts at a higher level. For instance MP Marek Jurek of Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* – PiS) said that normalising relations with the Belarusian administration would hurt Poland's interests as it would amount to an acceptance of Belarus-Russia union and isolation of the Belarusian opposition. His party colleague Marian Piłka suggested lobbying the US for putting pressure on Russia to

[38] Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski ," Poland's Bilateral Relations – Belarus", *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2002*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 2003, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[39] "Rozmowy zamiast izolowania", *Rzeczpospolita*, 02 March 2002.
[40] See *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 42, 816/IV, 16 July 2002. All commission bulletins from 1993 on are searchable at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf (accessed 06 November 2006).

change its policies supportive of Lukashenko. Bogdan Klich of the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska* – PO) likened the dilemma of Poland between pursuing national interest and standing up against infringement of human rights and democratic principles to the situation in which the West found itself in the 1980s in the case of Poland. He said the proposed policy could be acceptable if ties with the Belarusian opposition were given the same weight as the ones with the state. He proposed building civil society institutions in Belarus together with American funding which would strengthen the "independence" of the Belarusian opposition.

During the discussion there was also a comment about Poland demonstrating double standards about human rights and Rotfeld was asked why Poland entertained heads of countries deemed undemocratic or in breach of human rights (referring to the Kazakh president that had recently visited Poland), while boycotting Belarus for the same reason. In his answer Rotfeld was more open than most of his Western counterparts about applying different standards while preaching a single one:

> If we treat Belarus as a part of our region having a common civilisation-culture, then we judge it with the same measures as we judge ourselves. We cannot judge Belarus on the basis of standards that apply to certain Central Asian states that have a completely different culture. If there is a complaint about Nazarbayev (the Kazakh president) being treated differently than Lukashenko, one can say that Nazarbayev's policies respond to the mentality, tradition and history of that region.

It is hard to say that there was any practical breakthrough in Polish-Belarusian bilateral relations brought about by this new more flexible approach. Poland did continue to not join EU decisions on Belarus that it deemed would unnecessarily strain its neighbourly relations. For instance, the EU decided in November 2002 to impose a visa ban on Lukashenko and his closest associates when Belarus decided to curtail functions of the OSCE mission in Minsk. EU candidates also adopted the ban but Poland refused to join. Minister of Foreign Affairs Cimoszewicz pointed out that Poland had to talk to Belarusian authorities to be able to manage common problems such as border crossings and matters relating to minorities. He said "I assure that nobody will invite Lukashenko [here]. What is happening in Belarus is terrible. But the policy of isolating Belarus is ineffective."[41] Poland had to maintain economic cooperation with Belarus because otherwise Belarusians would be completely left alone in their own country.

On another occasion when in January 2004 the EU Commission warned Belarus about violations of trade union rights and threatened suspending EU trade benefits offered to it, Poland expressed its objection as such an embargo would hurt seriously Poland's trade

[41] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Polska nie przyłączy się do sankcji", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 November 2002.

with Belarus.[42] The Deputy Minister of Economy said that Poland would try to block such a decision which was expected to be taken in June, by which time Poland would be a member of the EU.[43]

7.1.5 Conclusion

The most important aspect of the new flexible policy was that it was an indication of the role Poland aspired to play within the proposed Eastern dimension of the EU. Seeing a possible Eastern dimension as a niche where Poland could assume leadership, it would have a chance to inject its own vision of relations with the EU's Eastern neighbours rather than just carrying out Brussels policies mostly formulated by the larger EU members. However, in the case of Belarus, Poland had limited room for manoeuvre.

First, Poland's relations with Belarus was hardly free from conflicts and tension despite Poland's intended flexibility towards Belarus and initiatives of holding higher level contacts. Poland never hid its contempt for the Lukashenko administration. In turn Poland was perceived by Belarus as a breeding ground for the radical Belarusian opposition and an instrument of the especially hardline US policy in the region. The Belarusian government and Lukashenko have consistently expressed their unease about Poland's NATO membership and, Lukashenko pointed out in harsh terms that he considered this a security threat.[44] Relations were also marred by incidents like the spying scandal that broke out in April 2004 when the Belarusian authorities detained the Polish Defence Attaché in Minsk and announced that they had found on him confidential documents containing military information.[45] As a result Poland called back its attaché for consultations and the planned visit of the Belarusian PM Sergei Sidorski to attend the European Economic Summit in Warsaw was cancelled.

Second, unlike Ukraine, Belarus never expressed any intention to join the EU so Poland could not try to play the "gateway to the EU" role which it cherished in terms of Ukraine.

Third, Belarus (like Ukraine, this time) is an important element in the EU-Russia relations. Therefore, itself hardly on good terms with Russia, Poland's influence in terms of shaping the EU's relations with Belarus is constrained by how much it concurs with the strategic interests of the large EU states.

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[42] Mirosław Ikonowicz, "Polska do Unii, Białoruś do...", *Przegląd*, No. 4, 20 January 2004.
[43] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Nie chcemy karać Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 09 January 2004.
[44] Tatiana Serwetnyk, "Nieprzyjaciel po drugiej stronie granicy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 05 July 2004.
[45] Jan Maksymiuk,"KGB catches spies, as usual", *RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 6, 04 May 2004, No. 16, and Andrzej Pisalnik, "Zatrzymany przez KGB", *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 April 2004.

After becoming a member of the EU, Poland experienced its first disappointment at influencing EU policy towards Belarus when the EU issued its European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper on 12 May 2004. Poland lobbied the EU so that the document would sanction contacts with Belarus at the ministerial level and give Belarus a long-term membership perspective. None of these were included in the final document: raising the level of political dialogue was made dependent on developments in Belarus and, let alone membership, even benefits included by the European Neighbourhood Policy were not offered fully to Belarus.[46] The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that Poland would continue pursuing its current policy towards Belarus and would not give into the pressures from Poland's partners to do the contrary. He said, "Belarus is not appreciated by the Europeans. We are the EU country who is going to lead the way for relations with Belarus."[47]

7.2 ECONOMIC RELATIONS

7.2.1 Trade and investment

The formal foundations of economic relations between Poland and Belarus were quickly established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Poland and Belarus signed an economic cooperation and trade agreement on 10 October 1991 and treaty of good neighbourly relations in 1992, as mentioned above. By 1996 key agreements on taxation, investment, standards and certification and customs were in place. Important institutions such as the Polish-Belarusian Chamber of Trade and Industry were also established.[48] There was optimism about the development of trade especially as Poland became the biggest trading partner of Belarus outside the CIS countries in 1992.[49] Despite a fall in volume of trade between the two countries in 1993 due to limits imposed on barter transactions by Belarus, Polish hopes of holding onto its leading position in Belarus's trade and investment were high. According to the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Abroad (which was merged into the Ministry of Economy and Work in 1997) relations would steadily progress due to not only being neighbours and knowledge of each other's markets, but also "similar direction of economic development."[50]

[46] European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper" [COM(2004) 373, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (accessed 06 November 2006)
[47] Jędrzej Bielecki and Piotr Kościński, "Zabawa w chowanego", *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 May 2004.
[48] *Białoruś. Przewodnik dla przedsiębiorców* (Fourth edition), Warsaw: UNIDO ITPO, 2004, p. 164.
[49] Urszula Kopieć, "Polish Foreign Trade with East and Central European Countries" in Jan Anusz et al., *Polish Foreign Trade in 1992*, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1993, pp. 95-97.
[50] Dorota Margas, "Większe perspektywy współpracy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 01 August 1994.

Table 19: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Belarus, 1992-1998 (in thousand USD)[51]

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Imports	161,154	114,093	165,514	238,397	257,392	220,889
Exports	158,790	103,208	136,582	240,634	272,394	319,381
Balance	+2,364	+10,885	+28,932	+2,237	+15,002	+98,492

Despite optimism, trade with Belarus had not reached desired levels. By 1995 the volume of trade with Ukraine was double that with Belarus even though in 1992 they were on a similar level.

Figure 11: Poland's trade turnover with Belarus and Ukraine, 1992-2004[52]



For Poland, in terms of volume and value, trade with Belarus was not too significant. Percentage of trade with Belarus over Poland's total trade never exceeded 1%. Comparatively for Belarus, trade with Poland was somewhat more significant. Percentage of turnover with Poland within the total trade turnover vacillated between 2.8 to 4.6%. Poland lost its leading position in Belarus's trade with non-CIS countries. By 1995 Germany's trade turnover with Belarus exceeded that with Poland and its imports to Belarus were more than twice Poland's.

[51] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-1998, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[52] Data from *Handel Zagraniczny*, Years 1991 and 1992 and *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Table 20: Poland: Trade with Belarus, 1995-2004 (percentages of total export and import)[53]

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8
Exports	1.1	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.8

Table 21: Belarus: Trade with Poland, 1995-2004 (percentages of total export and import)[54]

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	3.5	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.4	3.0	2.9
Exports	5.7	3.4	2.6	3.5	3.8	3.3	3.4	4.4	5.7	5.3

Although the plans for a Belarus-Russia union were criticised in Poland and the resultant economic dependence of Belarus on Russia seen as a disadvantage, the customs union actually had a positive effect on Polish investment in Belarus and on Polish exports to Russia. Poland became the third biggest foreign investor in Belarus (after Germany and the US), taking advantage of tax breaks offered to foreign investors and the prospect of selling products (51% of which ought to be manufactured in Belarus) in the Russian market. Polish investment in Belarus reached a total of 30 million USD by 1998.[55] Another factor encouraging Polish investment was the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) established in Belarus from 1996 on, which offered foreign investors income tax exemption and the possibility of customs free export of goods produced or part produced in SEZs outside of Belarus.[56] SEZs near the Polish border in Grodno and Brest were especially attractive to Polish investors.

Subsequent governments in Poland strove to limit the effects of political conflict with Belarus on bilateral economic relations and to keep the channels of communication and cooperation on economic issues open. However, this was not sufficient to bring about any significant increase in either bilateral trade or investment. It was true that inefficient bureaucracy, problems in banking, insurance and transport systems, instability brought by economic transition and shortage of foreign currency in Belarus were hindering development of economic relations. This was more or less the case in all ex-Soviet countries. But on the other hand, Polish governments hardly took any effective measures to facilitate trade with Poland's Eastern neighbours. Poland's unquestioning Western

[53] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1993-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[54] Data for 1995-2003 from *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Belarus*, Years 1997-2004, Minsk: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. Data for 2004 from the website of the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the Republic of Belarus http://www.belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)
[55] Anna Stefanko, "Inwestycje na Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 04 February 1994.
[56] "Możliwości, perspektywy i zagrożenia", *Rynki Zagraniczne*, No. 40-41, 05-08 April 2005 and Henryk Borko, "Firmy powoli wchodzą na rynek", *Rynki Zagraniczne*, No 58-59, 17-20 May 2005. http://rynki.sm.pl/archiwum.htm (accessed 06 November 2006)

orientation, i.e. predominantly political reasons, were considered as the reason for the loss of Eastern markets especially by PSL as previously stated in Chapters Four and Five.

The Russian financial crisis of 1998 exposed Poland's weak hold in Eastern and Belarusian markets more clearly. By 1999 the value of Poland's trade turnover with Belarus of 399 million USD was one fourth less than what it was in 1997 and both exports and imports were affected by this decrease. Acting on similar decline in other Eastern markets, the Polish government took action by facilitating guarantees for export credits through KUKE and drawing up a programme for regaining Eastern markets in 2003 (see previous chapters). Trade with Belarus slowly recovered (somewhat slower than with Ukraine) but by 2003 the value of turnover had still not reached the 1 billion USD mark and Poland was relegated to third place after the United Kingdom and Germany among share of Belarusian trade among the non-CIS countries. However, the growth trend continued throughout 2004 and the value of turnover increased by almost 38% to 1.2 billion USD. The increase in Poland's imports from Belarus was much larger than its exports and as a result for the first time since 1992 Poland had a negative trade balance with Belarus.

Table 22: Poland: Foreign Trade Turnover with Belarus, 1998-2004 (in thousand USD)[57]

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Imports	170,411	165,905	153,682	145,445	226,990	386,213	698,524
Exports	265,839	232,927	243,802	276,013	260,200	395,650	565,157
Balance	+95,428	+67,022	+90,120	+130,568	+33,210	+9,437	-133,367

In addition to low turnover, the commodity structure of Polish-Belarusian trade did not permit either country to develop any dependence on the other. In 2003 more than 50% of Poland's imports from Belarus were mineral products such as oil and natural gas, which were mostly reexports from Russia. The only commodity which Belarus was the main importer to Poland was potash fertilisers. Poland's exports to Belarus are even more dispersed: Two biggest groups of commodities are agricultural and food products (about 25%) and machinery and machine parts (also about 29%).

[57] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 1999-2005, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.

Table 23: Poland's trade with Belarus by commodity groups, 1999 and 2003[58]

	Poland's Export to Belarus by commodity groups				Poland's Import from Belarus by commodity groups			
	1999		2003		1999		2003	
Commodity groups	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%	Million USD	%
Agricultural and food products	58.77	25.23	79.07	19.98	3.52	2.12	7.04	1.82
Mineral products	1.88	0.80	2.43	0.61	45.89	27.66	221.95	57.47
Chemical industry products	36.80	15.80	58.83	14.87	62.88	37.90	87.81	22.74
Ligth ind. prod. (textiles, footwear etc)	21.37	9.17	20.28	5.13	16.88	10.18	13.44	3.48
Wood and paper products	15.53	6.67	56.61	14.31	17.29	10.42	18.67	4.83
Stone, plaster, cement, glass products	4.81	2.07	19.00	4.8	2.69	1.62	2.74	0.71
Base metals	14.94	6.41	31.00	7.84	3.38	2.04	14.27	3.69
Machinery, electrical, transport, optical equip.	69.60	29.88	114.90	29.04	12.43	7.49	19.32	5.00
Other manufactured prod. (furniture, toys etc)	9.08	3.90	13.43	3.39	0.94	0.57	0.97	0.26
Others	0.14	0.07	0.10	0.03	0	0	0	0
Total	232.92	100	395.65	100	165.90	100	386.21	100

Polish investment in Belarus also remained minor with 19.9 million USD in 2003 which constituted only 1.52% of total foreign investment.[59] Polish companies investing in Belarus were mostly small and medium enterprises that would find the conditions of the Belarusian markets less demanding than that of the EU.[60] Three fourths of Polish investors in Belarus were engaged in manufacture.[61] The value of Belarusian investment in Poland was and is negligible.

Due to the relatively low value of trade turnover with Belarus and the dispersed structure of traded commodities, Poland's entry into the EU did not create as much debate as it did in the case of trade with Russia and Ukraine. There were worries about a possible decline in the two main Belarusian exports to Poland, potash fertilisers and machinery due to EU

[58] Data from *Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego*, Years 2000 and 2004, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny.
[59] "Stan polsko-białoruskich stosunków handlowych i gospodarczych w 2004 r. i w 2005 r" (Report by the Commerce Section of the Polish Embassy in Minsk) http://www.embassypoland. nsys.by /wehcontent.php?section=wehtrade (accessed 07 October 2005)
[60] Zbigniew Lentowicz, "Brzeskie okno na Wschód", *Rzeczpospolita*, 12 November 2003.
[61] Henryk Borko, "Firmy powoli wchodzą na rynek", *Rynki Zagraniczne*, No 58-59, 17-20 May 2005. http://rynki.sm.pl/archiwum.htm (accessed 07 October 2005)

antidumping measures against the former and high EU tariffs on the latter. As other new EU accession countries from Central Eastern Europe would also be affected by the EU regime on these commodities, negotiations were held on this matter to resolve the emerging problems.

The most important effect of Poland's EU accession was rather on the unregistered border trade with Belarus which, according to estimates by the Ministry of Economy, brought a turnover of as much as 250 million USD.[62] Implementation by Poland of visas on Belarusian citizens in 2003 as a part of harmonisation with Schengen regime raised fears about the loss of this income that would especially harm the economies of the border regions. (See Appendix for a case study on the Podlasie region). The new visa regime, however, was not the only obstacle for the so called suitcase trade and changing customs regulations and certification rules on both sides of the border hindered it. For instance in August 2002, Lukashenko issued a decree limiting duty free import of foodstuffs by private persons to 10 kg and for other goods brought a 1000 USD limit on value.[63]

7.3 POLAND AND THE BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION

The Belarusian government has often accused Poland of interfering into its domestic affairs by offering a haven to Belarusian opposition activists. Even though subsequent Polish governments denied the charges of interference, the Belarusian opposition did attempt to base itself in Poland. Geographical proximity of Poland to Belarus was not the only factor in this choice. One of the strands of Polish EP after the two-track policy period was the importance of Belarusian (as well as Ukrainian and Lithuanian) independence for Poland and this fit in well with the claims of Belarusian opposition activists of protecting Belarusian independence from Lukashenko's pro-Russian course. Another reason, perhaps, was the hope of the Belarusian opposition that widespread anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland would facilitate the flourishing of a movement based on similar premises. The messianic flavour given to EP by mostly centre right formations in Poland was also promising for the Belarusian opposition.

7.3.1 Stance of the government and political parties

Political parties and subsequent governments in Poland made their support for the Belarusian opposition gradually more and more open. In 1996 the first resolution on Belarus passed by the Sejm appealed for solidarity with the political groups in Belarus that

[62] Jędrzej Bielecki, "Większość 'mrówek' nie wróci", *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 September 2003.
[63] Cezary Goliński, "Taniemu importowi nie!", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 28 August 2002.

"stood for the defence of democracy and independence" and the resolution was passed by 337 voted for and one against.[64]

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to organise round table negotiations between the Belarusian government and the opposition in 1996 but failed as the former objected to the participants from the opposition side. The Solidarity Electoral Action - Freedom Union (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* – AWS / *Unia Wolności* -UW) coalition government that was in power from 1997 to 2001 was even more vocal about its support for the opposition. An AWS MP, Andrzej Anusz, even claimed that the strength of Poland's foreign policy in comparison with other countries was that Poland had very strong ties with the Belarusian opposition.[65] The AWS group proposed that the Sejm approved a message to the Belarusian nation which expressed the Sejm's respect and sympathy for "all the democratic powers in Belarus" and offered moral support to the deputies of the13th Supreme Soviet, demanding the release form prison of two of them, Andrei Klimov and Vladimir Kudinov.[66] However, unanimity on the issue gave way to dissent from some SLD politicians. During the discussion on the text of the message Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz said that it would be a diplomatic mistake for a national parliament like Sejm to express support for the opposition in another country.[67]

Despite hopes about the opposition bringing about change in Belarus, Lukashenko's grip on power proved more resilient and the Polish government (alongside other Central European and Western governments) reevaluated its policy towards Belarus, taking up a more flexible attitude, as explained above. The SLD-UP-PSL government that came to power in 2001 did not entirely give up on supporting the Belarusian opposition within the new policy, but put more focus on maintaining relations with the Belarusian government at a fairly high level. The opposition parties, especially PiS and PO, criticised the government for not doing enough to promote the Belarusian opposition.[68] As mentioned earlier, PO MPs proposed funding Polish-Belarusian dialogue and NGOs sympathetic to Poland with money from the US. PiS MPs declared that they worked closely with the Belarusian National Front (BNF) (whose leaders were mostly Catholic) and argued for forging closer ties with the Catholic Church in Belarus to support the anti-Lukashenko opposition. Other opposition parties, while agreeing about the nature of Lukashenko's rule, were less enthusiastic about closer ties with the Belarusian opposition. MPs from the agrarian Self Defence (*Samoobrona*) argued against interfering in Belarusian internal affairs so overtly

[64] "Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 listopada 1996 r. w sprawie sytuacji w Republice Białoruś", *Monitor Polski*, 1996, No. 71, Pos. 654.
[65] See *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 41/III, 05 January 1999.
[66] "Posłanie Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Narodu Białoruskiego, Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 stycznia 1999 r.", *Monitor Polski*, No. 4, Pos. 16, 27 January 1999.
[67] See *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 42/III, 12 January 1999.
[68] See comments by Marek Jurek, Marian Piłka, Bogdan Klich, Donald Tusk. *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 42, 816/IV, 16 July 2002, No. 47, 900/IV, 26 July 2002, No. 186, 3425/IV, 15 July 2004, No. 196, 3537/IV, 26 August 2004.

by supporting the opposition and warned against such interference souring relations with both Belarus and Russia while MPs from the League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin* – LPR) pointed out the anti-Polish stance some Belarusian opposition activists (from especially BNF) had assumed when they were in power before 1994.[69]

Disagreement between the parties were obvious. However, for political correctness, all politicians had to first declare their opposition to Lukashenko's government before voicing any criticism of Poland's handling of Belarus. Pressure to repeat the anti-Lukashenko rhetoric became oppressive at times. The SLD MP and the president of BTSK Jan Syczewski came under heavy criticism both from his party and others when he made an off the cuff speech in Minsk in May 2001, blaming Poland for the state of relations between the two countries and praising the Belarusian government for not implementing privatisation the way Poland did.[70] A similar case happened in 2003 when MP Aleksander Małachowski of UP also came under fire when he strayed from official rhetoric during a visit to Minsk by a Council of Europe delegation of which he was a member. Małachowski said he was impressed by how Belarus was developing and had lower rates of unemployment than Poland.[71] He was also criticised for not having met the Belarusian opposition during his visit.[72]

7.3.2 Belarusian emigration into Poland

Asylum applications from Belarusians started trickling in from 1994 on but most of the political émigrés came to Poland (and to other countries) after 1996. Among the first comers was Zenon Pazniak, the leader of the BNF, who was originally granted refugee status in the US but pursued his political activities in Poland, where his family applied for asylum. Journalists, youth activists, businessmen that fell out with the Lukashenko regime also applied for asylum in Poland and some chose to live in Poland on work permits.[73] Estimates of the number of political émigrés range from several dozen to several hundreds. It must, however, be noted that emigration levels from Belarus remained very low and, despite Western governments, NGOs and media portraying Belarus as one of the

[69] See comments by Tadeusz Samborski, Marian Curyło, Franciszek Stefaniuk, Alfred Budner, Janusz Dobrosz. *Biuletyn Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, No. 42, 816/IV, 16 July 2002, No. 196, 3537/IV, 26 August 2004 and "Sprawozdanie Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych o poselskim projekcie uchwały w sprawie łamania praw człowieka i obywatela na Białorusi (druki nr 3164 i 3203)", Sprawozdania stenograficzne, 4 Kadencja, 83 Posiedzenie, 2 Dzień, 09 September 2004.

[70] Jan Maksymiuk, "Lawmaker to be disciplined for speech at Lukashenka's 'Popular Congress'", *RFE/RL Report: Poland, Belarus and Ukraine*, Vol. 3, 29 May 2001, No. 20.

[71] Filip Gawryś, "Pod wrażeniem Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 24 September 2003. Małachowski explained the situation in his column in the weekly *Przeglad*. He said that Belarus was certainly an autocratic country but looking solely at its democratic deficiencies and ignoring economic and social development in the country was a mistake. Aleksander Małachowski, "Białoruś na nowo oglądana", *Przeglad*, 06 Ocotober 2003.

[72] SLD MP and Orthodox minority activist Eugeniusz Czykwin was a lone voice who said Małachowski had shown courage and had the right to express his opinions. "Pod urokiem Białorusi", *Kurier Poranny*, 25 September 2003.

[73] See Anna Bełka and Karolina Chrząstek, "Portrety białoruskich uchodźców politycznych", *Więź*, Vol. 498, 2000, No.2, pp. 127-136.

most oppressive regimes in Europe, the number of political asylum claims by Belarusians remained lower than most other East European countries. Comparison of asylum claims from Moldova and Bulgaria (which was set to be an EU member by 2007) makes an interesting contrast. Although Belarus has more than twice the population of Moldova and 25% more people than Bulgaria, its number of asylum seekers caught up with Moldova only in 1999 and with Bulgaria as late as 2001.[74] A very low percentage of Belarusian asylum seekers chose to apply in Poland, which is just across the border, and most preferred to wait until they got to North America.

Table 24: Number of asylum applications according to the country of origin[75]

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Belarus	37	84	501	303	290	1,507	2,619	3,696	6,364	7,815
(to US and Canada)	*30*	*55*	*88*	*122*	*163*	*1,195*	*2,281*	*3,309*	*3,384*	*4,092*
(to Poland)	*1*	*5*	*19*	*32*	*23*	*51*	*63*	*76*	*68*	*58*
(% of total to Poland)	*3.3*	*5.9*	*3.7*	*10.5*	*7.9*	*3.3*	*2.5*	*2.0*	*1.0*	*0.7*
Moldova	965	1,292	1,601	1,271	875	1,452	3,735	5,270	5,789	5,556
Bulgaria	6,346	4,133	4,065	4,390	2,430	2,182	3,080	3,351	4,143	2,607

Despite the fact that numbers of Belarusian political refugees in Poland remained low, with local help, they managed to establish organisations and find themselves on the agenda of Polish-Belarusian relations from time to time.[76] BNF, headed by Pazniak, had high hopes about setting up a powerful opposition-in-exile in Poland. During a visit to Wrocław in 1996, Pazniak expressed the hope that the Belarusian opposition would unite in Poland and said "We expect Wrocław to be for Belarusians what Kraków has become for Chechens."[77] Actually, Pazniak and other Belarusian opposition figures found more support in Białystok from a certain section of the Belarusian minority. The political party set up by this group of

[74] Grigory Ioffe points out that Belarus has higher incoming migration from the CIS than outgoing. Grigory Ioffe, "Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, 2004, No. 1, pp. 91-93. This was the third by Ioffe in a series of three excellent articles concerning Belarusian language, identity and politics where he dispelled many negative myths about Belarus created through years of political hostility by the West.

[75] Data for Bulgaria, Moldova, Belarus total and number of Belarusian asylum application to the US and Canada from "Belarus", "Bulgaria", "Moldova", *2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook*, www.unhcr.org (accessed 08 January 2006). Data for Belarusian applications to Poland: Data for 1994 to 2000 from "Dane liczbowe dotyczące złożonych w latach 1992 - 2000 wniosków oraz wydanych w tym okresie decyzji w sprawie o nadanie statusu uchodźcy w RP.xls" and data for 2001 to 2003 from "Dane liczbowe dotyczące postępowań prowadzonych wobec cudzoziemców w latach 2001 – 2003 (wersja polska).zip" from the website of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens, www.uric.gov.pl (accessed 04 January 2006). The figures this table present are intended to give an idea about trends and must therefore not be taken as absolute as data utilised come from two different sources which presumably had used different methods of data collection and categorisation.

[76] It is safe to assume that some of the Belarusians taking part in the opposition's activities in Poland have immigration status other than refugees. Some of them had work permits or other kinds of leave to remain. See Belka and Chrząstek, "Portrety białoruskich uchodźców".

[77] Rafał Bubnicki, "Poszukiwanie wsparcia za granicą", *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 April 1996. The author doubts that such a declaration helped Pazniak score any brownie points with the Polish government which had its troubles with Russia about its support for Chechens. See Chapter Five for details.

local Belarusians, *Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Demokratyczne* (Belarusian Democratic Union), established contacts with the BNF, staged demonstrations supporting the Belarusian opposition and tried to unite the Belarusian opposition.[78] They also set up an NGO called *Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska-Białoruś* (Centre of Civic Education Poland - Belarus), financed by the Ford Foundation, which would work with Belarusian NGOs sympathetic to the opposition and to support "pro-democratic" forces in Belarus. Among other activities, this group facilitated the *Związek Białoruskich Uchodźców Politycznych w Polsce* (Union of Belarusian Political Refugees in Poland), established in Białystok in 2001, to publish a paper called *Emigrant* in Poland to be smuggled into Belarus and distributed there.[79] The Belarusian government expressed its reaction to the Centre and its activities in no uncertain terms. The Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs even accused the leaders of this group to prepare the Belarusian opposition to take over power in Belarus by force.[80]

Belarusian government also applied for the arrest and extradition of a number of Belarusians from Poland, mostly businessmen, on charges of financial irregularity on the basis of a 1994 treaty (Articles 60, 71 and 72).[81] Some of them were accused of substantial wrongdoings like Aleksander Pupiejka who had credit arrears of 1.2 million USD.[82] Belarusian opposition figures argued that this was a method of persecuting those who financed or helped the opposition. Prominent figures like Shushkievich vouched for the anti-regime credentials of some of these businessmen in Polish courts and asked the Polish government to amend the agreement.[83] The Polish Ministry of Justice and prosecutors did not find any fault with the agreement but even then, due to political reasons, courts had not allowed extradition citing lack of fair trial in Belarus as a reason.

Other groups with an interest in the opposition were Polish NGOs and think-tanks such as Centre for Eastern Studies (*Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich* - OSW), the Batory Foundation, East European Democratic Centre (*Stowarzyszenie Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne* - EEDC) funded by the US based National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House among others. These organisations focused on programmes supporting anti-Lukashenko youth organisations, media and NGOs in Belarus and gave Belarusian dissidents a platform to pursue their activities. NGOs undertook most of the "exporting of democracy" work that the Polish government could not.

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[78] Anna Wielopolska , "Zaraza", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 February 1998.
[79] "KGB na Emigranta", *Kurier Poranny*, 03 July 2002.
[80] Piotr Kościński, "Rozmowa z Siergiejem Lingiem, premierem Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 July 1997 and Anna Wielopolska , "Zaraza", *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 February 1998.
[81] "Umowa między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Republiką Białoruś o pomocy prawnej i stosunkach prawnych w sprawach cywilnych, rodzinnych, pracowniczych i karnych, sporządzona w Mińsku dnia 26 października 1994 r.", *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 128, Pos. 691,15 November 1995.
[82] Pupiejka's was one of the first controversies around the extradition process. He was arrested in Poland in 1997 but later granted political asylum and not extradited. Cezary Goliński et al., "Na zlecenie Łukaszenki",*Gazeta Wyborcza*, 05 March 2001.
[83] Ewa Siedlecka , "Łukaszence nie pomagać", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10 March 2001.

7.3.3 Radio Free Belarus

Another project aiming to "export democracy" was "Radio Free Belarus" modelled on Radio Free Europe, to broadcast to Belarus from Poland. Polish press reported in 1998 plans to establish such a station in Białystok with American and European funding and government backing. Although the government denied involvement, it expressed its sympathy for such a project.[84] It was soon announced that the station would not be called Radio Free Belarus but *Radio Racja* and the majority stakeholder would be the Union of Belarusians in Poland (*Związek Białoruski w RP* - ZBwRP). The people behind the project were the same group of Polish Belarusians active in the Centre for Citizenship Education Poland-Belarus (*Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska-Białoruś*).[85] There were press reports that the radio was funded by the Open Society Institute and US National Endowment for Democracy but these were not confirmed by the radio's management, unwilling to disclose information fearing that its broadcasters in Belarus would be targeted.[86]

Radio Racja had its enthusiasts like the government and the ex-director of Polish section at the Radio Free Europe in the 1980s, Zdzisław Najder, but it also had its opponents.[87] Poland's EP legend Jerzy Giedroyc opposed the idea of such a station cooperating openly with the Belarusian opposition and questioned the merits of a radio with undisclosed donors when Polish state radio already had broadcasts in Belarusian and the Americans were pursuing their propaganda through Radio Liberty.[88] Echoing Giedroyc, Jan Nowak Jeziorański, who had also worked for BBC Polish and Radio Free Europe during the Cold War, argued that radio programmes broadcast from Poland should not compromise national security by waging a cold war against one of Poland's neighbours. Poland could not allow any group with sufficient money to "establish a private army in Poland and pursue hostile activities against Poland's neighbours".[89] The objections of Giedroyc and Jeziorański are worth noting as they, unlike most politicians connected with SLD, PSL or LPR, were ardent supporters of Belarusian national revival and independence and opponents of Lukashenko's government.

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[84] Jan de Weydenthal, "Report of a Radio Free Belarus Causes Stir", *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 15 July 1998.
[85] Jagienka Wilczak, "Racja szuka fali", *Polityka*, 1998, No. 30.
[86] Jan Maksymiuk, "Belarusian-Language Radio Racja Starts Testing Signal", *RFE/RL Report: Poland, Belarus and Ukraine*, Vol. 1, 09 November 1999, No 23.
[87] Zdzisław Najder, "Pierwsze – nie podjudzać", *Polityka*, 1998, No. 33.
[88] Jerzy Giedroyc, "Notatki redaktora", *Kultura*, Vol. 691, 1999, No. 4, pp. 109-110.
[89] Jan Nowak Jeziorański, "Bardzo długa miedza", *Rzeczpospolita*, 22 September 1998. Jeziorański was to change his mind about Radio Free Belarus in 2003 and argue that such a radio would be useful for promoting Belarusian cultural heritage and awareness history and teach Belarusians about freedom of speech. He still argued against such a radio becoming a centre for Belarusian opposition. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański and Jacek Gawłowski, "Przebudzić Białorusinów", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 25 November 2003.

Radio Racja stopped its broadcasts in 2002 due to financial problems, having failed to either establish a united and strong Belarusian opposition or to reach audiences on the scale of what Radio Free Europe had in the days of the Cold War.

7.3.4 Conclusion

Radio Racja failed and Podlasie (or Wroclaw) did not become a "Piedmont" for the Belarusian opposition. Just as Polish governments' wish (in the case of right wing coalitions) or guarded hope (in the case of left wing) to bring about regime change in Belarus came to nothing, efforts by either Belarusian activists in Poland or Polish NGOs failed to make an impact. First, the number of Belarusian refugees in Poland (or those on other types of leave who were politically active) never reached any critical level, as noted above.

Second, those that were politically active failed to unite within an organisation or produce a joint campaign. They ended up competing for meagre resources among themselves and accusing each other of being KGB agents or trying to swindle money given by Western donors.[90]

Third, not all local Belarusians in Podlasie were enthusiastic about the region becoming a launching pad for the Belarusian opposition. Among the three main groupings of Belarusian minority, only the group affiliated with ZBwRP showed interest in supporting the opposition. The other groups, one mainly centred around the Orthodox Church and the other around the Belarusian Social-Cultural Association (*Białoruskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne* – BTSK), the oldest minority organisation among the Belarusians, were against what they saw as interference into Belarusian affairs with the help of foreign funding.[91] Even the Polish Belarusians that enthusiastically worked with the Belarusian opposition showed signs of disappointment about the functioning of the latter.[92]

Fourth, as mentioned above, disagreement between different political parties on what to do for Belarusian opposition was often masked by the ubiquitous rhetoric on "Lukashenko's anti democratic regime". This lack of consensus prevented any government from assuming a stance towards Belarus which might be described as "Prometheic" in a Pilsudskiite sense (See Chapter Four for a description of Prometheism in the Polish context).

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[90] See Arkadiusz Bartosiak, "Z żubrem w klapie", *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 October 2002 for quarrels among the émigrés.
[91] Interview with Eugeniusz Czykwin (Editor of *Przegląd Prawosławny* and Podlasie MP from SLD), 18 July 2002, Warsaw.
[92] Interview with Professor Eugeniusz Mironowicz (University of Białystok, Department of Belarusian Cultural Studies), 25 July 2002, Białystok. See also the following articles on the Belarusian opposition in general by the two representatives of this group: Oleg Łatyszonek, "Belarusian Nationalism and The Clash of Civilisation" and Eugeniusz Mironowicz, "The Attitudes of Belarusians and Poles Toward the Independence of Their Countries", both in the *International Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31, 2001, No 3, pp. 62-77 and pp. 79-89.

7.4 ETHNIC MINORITIES

7.4.1 The Polish Minority in Belarus

According to the 1999 Belarusian census there were about 396,000 Poles living in Belarus but this number is not definitive given the difficulties of defining identity in the region.[93] Different (mostly Polish) sources estimate the number of Poles in Belarus to be between 400,000 and 1.2 million. Of the 396,000 Poles accounted in the census about 81% of them live in Grodno and Brest regions bordering Poland.[94] The highest concentration of Poles is in Grodno where they constitute about 25% of the region's population. However, those in Grodno that declared their native tongue as Polish is only about 19% of those who defined their ethnicity as Polish.

The main organization of Poles in Belarus, the Association of Poles in Belarus (*Związek Polaków na Białorusi* - ZPB), was established in 1990 on the foundations of a Polish cultural organisation preceding it by two years. ZPB's membership grew to 17,000 by 1992 and 20,000 by 2002 which made it the biggest NGO in Belarus.[95] During the initial phases of Belarusian independence, the Polish minority became the source of some tensions between Belarus and Poland. The Belarusian government circles dominated by the nationalist BNF were distrustful towards what they saw as the "polonising" activities they thought were supported by Poland and regarded the Polish minority as Poland's agents and a threat to Belarusian independence. BNF were especially uneasy about the large number of Polish priests serving in Western Belarus and Catholic churches that being used to "polonise Belarusian Catholics".[96] The president of BNF, Pazniak, wrote a letter to the Pope in 1991 requesting that he sent priests from countries other than Poland.[97]

The problem was somewhat shifted from Poland's shoulders when the Vatican appointed a Nuncio in Belarus to deal with the issue of Polish priests, which numbered 130 (of a total of 170 Catholic priests) by 1997.[98] However, it was clear that both the ZPB and Polish

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[93] *Respublika Belarus v tsifrakh. Kratki statisticheskii slovar'*, Minsk: Ministerstvo Statistiki i Analiza Respubliki Belarus, 2003, p. 57.
[94] Piotr Eberhardt, "Polacy na Białorusi i Ukrainie: Liczebność i rozmieszczenie ludności polskiej według ostatnich spisów powszechnych", *Wspólnota Polska*, 2003, No.1, pp. 3-4.
[95] Marek Kępka, "Stosunki polsko-białoruskie", *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej (RPPZ) 1992* and J Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, "Bilateral relations: Belarus", *RPPZ 2002*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1992 and 2002, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)
[96] Complaints about Polish priests' "polonising" activities instead of religious service was rife also during the 1980s. In a letter to a Jesuit Conference in Poland in 1987, Władysław Czarniauski, a Belarusian Catholic priest, wrote about Polish priests forcing Belarusian Catholics to pray in Polish and refusing baptism or marriage those who do not speak Polish. Władysław Czarniauski, "List w obronie Białorusinów katolików", *Więź*, Vol. 388, 1991, No. 2, pp. 39-42.
[97] Michał Kurkiewicz, "Mitologia, nie polityka", *Więź*, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 122-127.
[98] Marek Ziółkowski, "Stosunki z Białorusią", *RPPZ 1997*, Warszawa: Zarząd Obsługi MSZ, 1997, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)

political and intellectual elite regarded the church as a bastion of Polishness and were against Belarusian being introduced as the language of church services, despite the fact that a larger percentage of Poles in Belarus used Belarusian than Polish in their daily lives.[99] According to a study by Engelking, the terms Polish and Catholic were identical for most of the inhabitants in the Grodno province and both the fluidity of terms denoting identity and the struggle to establish a place for the nascent Belarusianness led inevitably to conflicts over the activities of the church.[100]

The conflict about Polish priests and the threat of Polish expansionism as perceived by BNF abated and by 1994 ZPB and BNF found allies in each other. ZPB, under the leadership of Tadeusz Gawin, openly supported BNF in its campaigns against Lukashenko in the 1995 elections which led to the Lukashenko campaigners to accuse BNF of trying to open Belarus to Polish domination.[101] ZPB did not assume an anti-Lukashenko position because of any repression by his administration after he became the president in 1994. On the contrary, Lukashenko announced that he would increase the budget for national minorities and both Gawin and his deputy found the political situation in Belarus positive for Polish cultural and educational development in Belarus and for ZPB at the end of 1994.[102] The ZPB leadership thought that it was russification and Belarusian integration with Russia that was a threat to Polish existence as well as Belarusian, hence the need to cooperate with BNF.[103]

However, relations were set to gradually sour between the government, the president and ZPB, which led to ZPB curtailing its contacts with the government in 1999.[104] Despite a reduced enthusiasm on the part of Belarusian government towards ZPB, two Polish schools, funded by *Wspólnota Polska* and *Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie* opened in Grodno in 1996 and Wolkowysk in 1999 and numerous Polish language classes started operating around Western Belarus. Nevertheless, ZPB complained about obstacles raised by the Belarusian government about schoolbooks in Polish and Polish language courses. However, the Belarusian government had never gone into any open conflict with ZPB, nor the Polish government ever demanded reciprocity in terms of government funding for

[99] Iwona Kabzińska, "The Ethnic Identity of the Polish Population in Belarus: a Research Note" in Ray Taras (Ed.), *National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 148-150. See also the articles in the MSZ in-house publication, RPPZ. Marek Ziółkowski, "Stosunki z Białorusią", *RPPZ 1997* and Jerzy Stankiewicz, "Stosunki z Białorusią", *RPPZ 1999*, http://www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/ (accessed 01 April 2006)

[100] For an interesting research on identity and self identification in the Grodno region see Anna Engelking, "The natsyas of the Grodno region of Belarus: a field study", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, 1999, No. 2, pp. 175-206.

[101] Piotr Kościński, "Obawy białoruskich Polaków", *Rzeczpospolita*, 18 May 1995.

[102] See comments by Tadeusz Gawin and Ryszard Kacynel, *Biuletyn Komisji Łączności z Polakami za Granicą*, No. 22, 1017/II, 22 November 1994.

[103] See comments by Tadeusz Gawin. *Biuletyn Komisji Łączności z Polakami za Granicą*, No. 8, 453/III, 19 May 1998. See also Andrzej Pisalnik, "Szkoła odrodzenia", *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 June 1995 and Ewa Wilk, "Tomistry na długą drogę", *Polityka*, 1999, No. 19.

[104] Jan Maksymiuk, "Parliamentary deputies visit compatriots in Belarus", *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, Vol. 1, 13 July 1999, No. 7.

minorities or pursued an overly aggressive policy about Poles in Belarus. Compared to Ukraine, the problems of Poles in Belarus looked rather less serious.[105]

In 2000 there was a sea change in the attitude of ZPB when Tadeusz Kruczkowski was elected its president. His policy was the opposite of Gawin's. Kruczkowski believed that because of its cooperation with the Belarusian opposition and refusal to have dialogue with the government, ZPB unnecessarily caused harm to Poles and their cultural and educational development in Belarus.[106] He was also critical of Poland's policy of not having contacts with the Belarusian government at higher levels and argued that there was no point in sacrificing the interests of Poles in Belarus for the sale of keeping up a political orientation, as neither Poland nor the Belarusian opposition had the power to change the foreign policy of the Belarusian government. In 2002 the conflict between Kruczkowski's and Gawin's supporters turned nasty with both sides hurling accusations at each other and in 2003 ZPB faced a crisis when Gawin supporters tried to bring a vote of no confidence against Kruczkowski.[107]

Polish government and the Foreign Ministry tried to keep a neutral façade about the internal fighting among different factions but it was safe to assume that as the main sponsor of ZPB's activities and in line with Poland's Polonia policy, the Polish government played a part in ZPB's affairs. This caused a reaction from the Belarusian government, accusing Poland of interfering in its domestic affairs by manipulating ethnic Poles.[108]

7.4.2 The Belarusian Minority in Poland

Although the census of 2002 gives the numbers of Belarusians in Poland as 48,700, its accuracy was disputed by many and estimates put the actual figures between 200,000 and 400,000.[109] Just as in the case of the Belarusian census, this disparity is a result of complex and fluid identities in the region. A large majority of Belarusians live in the Podlasie region.[110] As noted earlier, politically active Belarusians in Eastern Poland gather

[105] The president of *Wspólnota Polska*, Andrzej Stelmachowski, also argued that. See his comments at *Biuletyn Komisji Łączności z Polakami za Granicą*, No. 39, 2677/III, 11 April 2000.
[106] For Kruczkowski's policy see Tadeusz Kruczkowski, "Polacy na Białorusi – teraźniejszość i przyszłość", *Więź*, Vol. 522, 2002, No. 4, pp. 113-121. Piotr Kościński, "Związek będzie apolityczny", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 November 2000. Cezary Goliński, "Nowy prezes", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 November 2000. Tadeusz Kruczkowski, "Czego chcemy od Macierzy", *Rzeczpospolita*, 02 May 2002.
[107] Tadeusz Gawin, "Nasz los zależy od nas", *Rzeczpospolita*, 02 May 2002. Tadeusz Kruczkowski, "Rozmawiamy z władzą bez uległości", *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 August 2002. Andrzej Pisalnik, "Burza w Związku Polaków na Białorusi", *Rzeczpospolita*, 20 September 2002. "Kruczkowski kontra Gawin", *Nowa Myśl Polska*, 20 September 2002. Piotr Kościński "Konflikt trwa", *Rzeczpospolita*, 03 March 2003. Jacek C. Kamiński, "Gawin i białoruskie KGB", *Nowa Myśl Polska*, 09 March 2003.
[108] Wacław Radziwinowicz and Jacek Gawłowski , "Łukaszenko atakuje Polskę", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 April 2005.
[109] Raport z wyników Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2002, GUS. http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/nsp/spis_lud/lud.htm (accessed 07 November 2006).
[110] For information on Belarusians in Podlasie see Andrzej Sadowski, *Społeczne problemy miejscowości północno-wschodniej Polski w procesie transformacji*, Białystok: Wydawnictwo UwB, 2001. On Belarusians'

around three organizations with three different orientations, one of which was for cooperating with the Belarusian opposition and pursuing an openly anti-Lukashenko policy.[111]

The Belarusian government so far refrained from manipulating the Belarusian opposition in Poland. It must be noted that unlike the Polish government, the Belarusian one did not have sufficient resources to offer Belarusians living abroad and did not have a "Belarusians abroad" policy as a dimension of its foreign policy. The only hitch in the Belarusian government's neutrality towards Polish Belarusians happened in the early 1990s when the Belarusian nationalists that perceived a threat from Polish expansionism were in power. As previously mentioned, the Belarusian government insisted on including a reference to Białystok being an ethnically Belarusian land in the good neighbourliness agreement and delayed the signing of the agreement. Except for this relatively minor hitch, the issue has not been raised again. Although Polish Belarusians have problems of underrepresentation, assimilation or inadequate resources for culture and education, they have no expectations from Belarus in terms of financial help or political support in extending their rights.

7.5 CONCLUSION

A simple comparison between Poland's relations with Ukraine or Russia on one hand, and with Belarus on the other, is certainly impossible (and not too informative) due to the divergence of issues concerning each country and the level of severity of conflicts. However, to analyse Poland's relations with these countries within the EP concept, it could be said that Poland's policy towards Belarus has been more disjointed and has failed to produce any visible results. In the case of Ukraine, for instance, dialogue and cooperation has flourished and good progress has been achieved in terms of historical reconciliation. Poland's EP, with Russia as the unquestionable "other", has faltered in terms of Belarus. Unlike for Ukraine, Poland failed to assume an easily identifiable role as "locomotive towards Europe", "gateway to Western markets" or "Belarus's advocate in the EU". As explained in this chapter, the reasons for this can be summarized under five points.

First, Belarus's political orientation has not been conducive for Poland's interests and was an obstacle towards Poland's aspiration to have a belt of countries friendly to Poland and the West and unfriendly to Russia. In addition, the lack of any interest on the part of

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participation in Polish politics see Alastair Rabagliati, *A Minority Vote: Participation of the German and Belarusian Minorities within the Polish Political System 1989-1999*, Kraków: Nomos, 2001.

[111] For perceptions of Belarusian elite in Podlasie on Polish foreign policy and Poland's policy towards Belarus see Ayse Artun, "Regional Perceptions of Foreign Policy: Eastern Poland", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 6, 2005, No. 1, pp. 1-30 (included as Appendix).

Belarus to join the EU and a clear policy of close alliance with Russia robbed Poland of any effective way of influencing Belarus's policy choices.

Second, as stated previously, Poland's relations with Belarus were dependent on many levels on the whole framework of Polish-Russian and EU-Belarusian-Russian relations. Although this is true for Poland's relations with all the ex-Soviet countries, in the case of Belarus, this dependence is accentuated due to the extent of Belarus's alliance with Russia.

Third, Poland's economic relations with Belarus are underdeveloped and trade and mutual investment have been low even compared to Ukraine.

Fourth, Poland's potential allies for inducing regime change in Belarus, namely the Belarusian nationalists, have not assumed any significance in Belarusian politics. Poland's half hearted attempts at nurturing the Belarusian opposition in Poland or initiatives like a subversive radio station yielded no visible results. This was partly due to the attempts being half hearted, as stated above, but also partly (and significantly) due to the fact that such a policy overrated the strength of the opposition and ignored the extent of Soviet legacy in Belarus in which nationalists had little popular support and political participation remained low.

Fifth, Poland's policy towards the Polish minority in Belarus has likewise been disjointed, vacillating between a hands off approach and interference in Belarus's domestic affairs using the Polish minority. As hopes of Belarusian opposition abroad or at home for achieving any significant foothold in Belarusian politics waned, the Polish minority organisations became a more attractive instrument for Poland in order to influence Belarus.[112]

Poland's relations with Belarus also brought about a test case for how much Poland could perceive an independent EP within the EU. Poland did argue against proposed EU sanctions on Belarus and refused to limit its official contacts with Belarus but its policy towards Belarus still had to conform to the general policy line of the EU. Poland's search for flexibility towards Belarus was successful in that channels of dialogue on practical issues remained open but still there was no progress on either influencing Belarusian government through these channels or increasing economic or cultural exchange or social dialogue in a visible manner.

[112] Pawluczuk warned in 2000 that the Polish minority in Belarus and the Belarusian minority in Poland could find themselves as pawns in the "global geopolitics" if the Belarusian opposition assumes a more assertive stance with the backing of the West. Wlodzimierz Pawluczuk, "Białoruś a sprawa polska", *Kultura*, Vol. 634-635, 2000, No. 7-8, pp. 106-116.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

8.1 DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND'S EP

Since 1989 the significance of Eastern policy (EP) and relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus for Poland's foreign policy agenda have steadily grown and Poland has increasingly aspired to assume the role of a facilitator for the EU and NATO's policies for Ukraine and Belarus. Polish policy makers, confident that the transformation at home is mostly achieved and that Poland's leverage internationally is higher than ever, are now looking towards a wider engagement on the regional and international levels. Poland's active encouragement of Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" and sending troops to Iraq can be cited as evidence, although it should not be assumed that this more assertive attitude is entirely indigenous. It can also be interpreted, as by Zaborowski and Longhurst, as Poland acting as the US's "protégé in the East" and a "provider of security" in the way the US wished.[1] The recent discussions concerning the possible allocation of US anti-missile defence bases in Poland and the Polish government's enthusiasm for the project despite its potential for souring of relations with Russia, corroborates this view.[2]

Previous chapters examined various domestic and external factors that shape EP and surveyed the gradual process by which EP became more institutionalised and its concepts more widely discussed. The most important reason why this process was so gradual was that the new Polish elite in power embarked on a political and economic transformation with the express intent of joining the Euro-Atlantic consensus. The foreign policy priorities naturally became joining NATO and the EU. Poland not only distanced itself from its immediate ex-Soviet neighbours, but also maintained a lukewarm attitude towards proposals for regional alliances in Central Eastern Europe. Neutrality was never considered as an option, either. The new political elite was fierce in its rhetoric about Poland's independence, but the word only meant independence from the Soviet Union or Russia. The dependence to be created willingly by joining Western organisations and alliances were meant, ironically, to guarantee Poland's "independence" and it was perceived that the tighter the ties to the West, the stronger Poland could become vis-à-vis

[1] Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, "America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader", *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, 2003, No. 5, pp. 1009-1028.
[2] Although US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Dan Fried claimed that the missile interceptors to be located in Poland and Czech Republic were not intended for Russian missiles but for countering threats from the Middle East, Russians were not convinced. Dan Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs; Air Force Lt. General Henry A. Obering, Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Missile Defense Plans for Europe, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC, 22 February 2007, http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/ 80958.htm (accessed 06 March 2007). "Rosja zaatakuje tarczę?", *PAP*, 06 March 2007.

its East. In other words Poland's relations with its East became in a way dependent on how it fared in the West. The more confident Poland felt about its status with the West, the more active its EP became.

Much more attention could be given to the EP concept after Poland's NATO membership became a certainty and the EU negotiations started. However, this was not exclusively due to the fulfilment of Poland's main foreign policy goals. As explained in Chapter Three, the process of transformation of the legal and institutional framework of foreign policy making produced positive results and by the end of the 1990s a power sharing conflict between the President's office and the executive had been to a large extent resolved and foreign policy institutions became organisationally more stable. However, the institutional framework also reflected foreign policy priorities, especially joining the EU. While agencies dealing with EU affairs were numerous and well funded, a separate department on EP within the MSZ was not in existence until 2005. Despite conflicts about appointments and personnel at these institutions recurring after each election, the general consensus on Poland's goals of NATO and EU membership between the mainstream post-communist and post-Solidarity camps facilitated a relatively smooth working of foreign policy institutions on matters related.

The consensus between these camps was less obvious in terms of EP and especially relations with Russia. Although there was a nominal agreement on the main tenets of EP such as having peaceful relations with Eastern neighbours and fostering regional cooperation, the two camps disagreed on priorities and instruments of EP. The post-communists advocated a less antagonistic and more cooperative approach towards Russia and advocated extending economic ties. On the other hand, the post-Solidarity parties have often not shied away from resorting to anti-Russian rhetoric and supported initiatives in ULB which were aimed at curbing Russian interests in the region and were potentially provocative. The mainstream post-communist/post-Solidarity cleavage regarding EP could also be observed in the intellectual debates in the first half of the 1990s. Although the debate expanded in parallel to the evolution of EP to focus on issue areas such as economic relations with the East and Ukraine's importance for Poland, Poland's policies towards Russia remained a highly disputed area.

8.2 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EP

As presented in Chapter Four, the concepts Poland's EP have their modern roots in the political movements of the last century. During the PRL period émigré publications acted as fora where theoretical foundations of a future EP were laid and in the 1970s opposition groups in Poland joined the debate and carried its concepts home. The EP discussions of

the post-1989 period have drawn their references from these earlier theoretical approaches in order to analyse actual policies and to ascertain the applicability of these ideas. Three main strands of EP thought identified in this thesis as pro-Russian, pro-Western and *Kultura* were discernible in the first half of the 1990s. Although the main arguments of the camps have not changed considerably, a diversification of the EP debate ensued parallel to changing geopolitics of the region and differing positions were advocated concerning a wide range of issues.

It is fair to say that the precepts of the *Kultura* doctrine proved to be the most influential on not only the academics and intellectuals debating EP but also policy makers. Official discourse concerning EP more than often referred to the ideas of Giedroyc and Mieroszewski. However, the discord between the blueprint and the practical realities of Poland's relations with its East spurred criticism, causing a major intellectual debate in 2000-01 (the minimalism debate). Critics argued that most EP initiatives of the Third Republic failed because they were based on an idealistic (and romantic) interpretation of the *Kultura* doctrine. EP was formulated without a healthy assessment of the political and economic circumstances of Poland's Eastern neighbours and without the necessary means to implement it.

In this thesis the dissonance in general between the theory and practice of Poland's EP has been observed through analysis of Poland's bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. First, the diversity of issues posed in relations with each country made it difficult to have a unified EP blueprint. While Polish foreign policy looked at Russia from a predominantly security centred (and mostly defensive) perspective, it considered Ukraine and Belarus potential buffer zones or even possible spheres of influence. However, by the end of the 1990s the differences between political orientations of Ukraine and Belarus also posed a serious challenge and the makers of Polish EP struggled to find appropriate methods to pursue Poland's interests in the region. With Ukraine it was a matter of toning down overzealous objectives such as bringing Ukraine into the EU and NATO whereas with Belarus it was a rather an anxious search for a policy that stood a chance of influencing Belarusian politics.

As mentioned above Poland could embark on a more active EP after accession to the EU. Poland's EU membership was considered an opportunity to pursue Polish EP through EU channels by utilising EU policy instruments. Having a say in the EU undoubtedly increased Poland's bargaining power but at the same time Polish hopes of leading a future EU Eastern dimension were in no time dampened by realities. It became clear that whenever Poland's perceived interests concerning Russia were not parallel to the EU's, it would be reminded by leading members of its status as a newcomer and a medium size –at best

regional- power. This was demonstrated when the leading EU members showed determination about negotiating the underwater Baltic pipeline with Russia, to the horror of Poles. The EU's reluctance to offer Ukraine any perspective of candidacy also demonstrated that Poland's regional interests could easily be overridden by the EU as a whole. Poland's historical antagonism towards Russia and its emerging role as the major proponent of US interests in the region is also likely to hamper its ability to lead the EU's Eastern policy in the future.

In order to understand the constraints on Poland's EP, it is imperative to look at economic relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and energy politics. As demonstrated in previous chapters, Poland's trade turnover with its Eastern neighbours remained much below the desired level. Economic instability and financial volatility in these countries, the small volume of their economies and shortcomings in their (and Poland's) legal framework hampered bilateral trade and investment. However, political choices also played a role. Economic integration was the cornerstone of Poland's Western orientation and in the beginning of the 1990s developing trade and investment links with the East was not considered an immediate objective (owing also to the wish to do away with dependencies from the Soviet period). While Poland's economic reorientation towards the West was increasingly successful, Poland's trade with its East had considerably weakened. Serious steps to regain Eastern markets came as late as the beginning of the 2000s and were only minimally successful in the short term (though it remains to be seen how they fare in the long term).

The commodity structure of Poland's trade with its East was also disadvantageous with a large percentage of its imports being mineral products (almost 90% of Poland's imports in the case of Russia). The combined percentage of Poland's exports to these three countries over Poland's total exports was around 7% by 2004 (only a measly 0.8% with Belarus). The percentages of trade with Poland over the total turnover in the three countries were also low, with the highest about 3.8% for Belarus. FDI levels also remained low and, as we saw in the example of Huta Częstochowa privatisation, investment was hampered by the lack of political will (in this case Ukrainian companies were considered risky economic partners due to political reasons).[3] Given the low level of turnover and

[3] Following the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, Polish authorities were finally persuaded about awarding IUD the Huta Częstochowa deal. Mittal Steel was disqualified when it failed to sign a social package with the trade union and IUD took over the steel works in June 2005. This was considered a major step towards putting into practice the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. However, following the failure of the Orange cadres at keeping political power, IUD's ownership of Huta Częstochowa (and other Ukrainian investments) may become a source of contention. Earlier signs of this could be observed when it was announced that IUD and the Russian metallurgical giant *Gazmetal* were considering a merger. Such a merger may, accordingly, facilitate Russians to enter the Polish steel sector by the back door. See Grzegorz Gromadzki and Oleksandr Sushko, "Between contentment and disillusionment. EU-Ukraine Relations a year after the Orange Revolution", Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, December 2005, p. 11. "Press Release: Handing over of resolutions passed by the General Shareholder Meeting of Huta Częstochowa S.A. and the General Assembly of

disadvantageous structure of trade, Poland did not have powerful economic instruments at the disposal of its EP.

Energy politics in Europe posed the ultimate reality check (and a major constraint) on EP as the case studies on gas and oil pipelines in Chapters Five and Six demonstrated. As long as EU energy policy seeks to increase the share of oil and gas imports from Russia, Poland's chances of using pipelines as an effective trump card are second to none. The fact that the second Yamal pipeline project was shelved in favour of a underwater pipeline in the Baltic was a stark reminder that neither the EU would let a medium size state like Poland bargain over its energy security nor would Russia let itself be blackmailed over its main source of revenue and political leverage vis-à-vis both its Near Abroad and the EU. In Chapter Six it was suggested that Poland's reluctance to push ahead with the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk oil pipeline and the resulting reverse use of the Odessa-Brody sector was evidence that a truly strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine did not exist. It also signalled a growing realisation among Polish policy makers that neither Poland nor Ukraine had the means to overturn their dependence on Russian energy supplies and that politicking over it had backfired many times in the past. It must be mentioned that even the enthusiasm for developing strategic partnership with Ukraine reignited by the "Orange Revolution" was not sufficient to change the fate of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline.[4] Despite many declarations about the plans to complete the project, by the beginning of 2007 not much has happened and the pipeline was still being used in the reverse direction.[5]

For the time being there seems to be no viable alternative to Russian oil for Poland (or for Ukraine) and political decisions for diversifying the supply could incur heavy economic costs. This is also true in terms of gas (given that the Danish and Norwegian gas contracts in 2003 were cancelled due to high cost). It must also be noted that Poland has achieved a higher degree of diversification of gas supplies compared to oil. However, by 2004 Russia was still the biggest supplier of gas to Poland providing half of the annual purchase. As for oil, the figure is about 95%. As the Orlen scandal demonstrated, rhetoric about curbing Russian imperialism is pervasive but despite all that political bickering about oil delivery contracts and privatisation of refineries, Poland's choices are limited.

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[4] Vladimir Socor, "Orange Gold", *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 15-17 April 2005. "Między Polską A Ukrainą istnieje strategiczne partnerstwo, a rzeczywistość w ostatnich miesiącach pokazała, na czym polega", 04 March 2005, Centrum Informacyjne Rządu (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów), http://www.kprm.gov.pl/2130_13488.htm (accessed 04 March 2007)

[5] "Ukraine: Russians to continue using the Odessa-Brody pipeline under a new agreement", East Week (Center for Eastern Studies), Vol. 67, 10 January 2007, No. 2, p. 6. Roman Kupchinsky, "Ukraine: Odesa-Brody Pipeline Potential Still Unused", *RFE/RL News Analysis*, 12 January 2007. Andrzej Kublik, "Od gadania ropa nie płynie", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 09 January 2007.

8.3 DOES POLAND HAVE AN EP?

The question that was often asked by Polish commentators throughout the post-1989 period was "Does Poland have an EP?" By 2004 the debate on the scope, instruments and effects of EP was still extensive but there was not much doubt anymore about its existence. The main conceptual framework is firmly rooted in *Kultura*'s programme (which also means that the Pilsudskiite streak was dominant). Commitment to ULB's independence and fostering reconciliation and close cooperation with Ukraine have been the unchangeable principles of EP. So far as these principles go, Poland recorded successes, especially in terms of its relations with Ukraine. Despite the fact that a genuine strategic partnership has not yet been achieved, the process of reconciliation was a success and ghosts of history are one by one being laid to rest through managing common historical heritage and deepening dialogue on issues where two nationalisms clash. A similar dialogue and understanding has also developed in the case of problems concerning ethnic minorities and such problems have not escalated to a level which would harm bilateral relations.

Another positive contribution of *Kultura* doctrine to Poland's EP was its principle of giving up territorial claims on ULB and eradicating signs of Polish imperialism. This was implemented from the very beginning of the Third Republic. However, there were times when the border between supporting the independence of ULB and intervention proved to be too vague. Poland's support of the Belarusian opposition and interventions on behalf of the Polish ethnic minority have often been perceived by Belarus as a reincarnation of Polish imperialism.

While the *Kultura* inspired Polish EP has scored successes in terms of cultivating relations with Ukraine and avoiding large scale conflict with Belarus, its inability to stabilise relations with Russia has constantly made not only its means and ends but its conceptual coherence as a subject of debate. *Kultura* affiliated thinkers argued that this was because the *Kultura* programme was not fully implemented following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Poland's passivity in EP encouraged Russia's uncompromising attitude. Others of pro-Russian leaning laid the blame on subsequent Polish governments' perpetuating traditional enmity towards Russia and relying excessively on Western support in tackling Poland's bilateral problems with Russia. On the other hand, those of pro-Western orientation found the lack of a clear Polish policy in Russia and Russian expansionism in the ULB region as the culprit. Notwithstanding different arguments, it is evident that contentious relations with Russia demonstrate an inherent contradiction within EP: While it preaches the need for amiable relations with Russia, its stated goals concerning ULB

inevitably lead to conflict between Poland and Russia. As we have seen in the minimalism debate, the basis of Poland's EP were deemed delusional due to the fact that it overlooked the fact that Russia was the key economic and political factor for Poland's policy in the region.

In sum, the Third Republic does have an EP inspired by the *Kultura* doctrine and Poland's historical traditions, even though it is in its infancy and its merits may be questionable. Due to the diverse political and economic conditions in the East and challenges posed by regional and international constraints, Poland's EP is in a constant process of conceptual evolution, re-evaluation of goals and testing means and ends. The biggest challenge facing EP seems to be the need to normalise relations with Russia and adjust Poland's policy towards its East in order to minimise (if not possible to avoid) the impact of conflicts resulting from clash of interests in the region. This, as the minimalists argued, certainly necessitates a pragmatic calculation of Poland's power in the region and policy instruments available to it, due regard for Russia's role in the region and adjusting EP goals accordingly.

8.4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As stated in Chapter One, this study did not aim to validate any specific theory concerning foreign policy but took into account the fact that the study of foreign policy required analysis of a variety of domestic and international factors at multiple levels. Hence, a number of theories could offer insight into foreign policy processes and outcomes. Among them the constructivist approach, with its focus on processes by which identities, values and policies are created, has substantial explanatory power when we consider the evolution of Poland's foreign policy. The conscious choice of Polish policy makers and societal support made it possible for Poland to pursue a coherent Western policy and the historical notion of Poland's belonging to the Western civilisation also contributed to the formulation and practice of a unified foreign policy orientation, despite domestic political fragmentation. Poland's entry into NATO and Russia's objections to NATO enlargement have been analysed and explained mostly within a realist framework which still dominates security studies. However, it can also be argued that after the fall of the bipolar world system, a conscious choice of Western orientation by the policy makers and publics of Central and East European countries created the necessary circumstances for NATO expansion which in turn triggered Russian perceptions of antagonism and opposition to NATO expansion.

By the same token, Poland's EP was also a cultural construct based on historical concepts, norms and values emanating from the 20th century historical origins and

Kultura's legacy. This study examined how *Kultura*'s programme came to dominate the EP discourse and its values in turn dominated the official rhetoric. Poland's approach to Ukraine after 1989 demonstrates the influence of the EP discourse in shaping policy. The perception of Ukraine's importance cannot be completely attributed solely to geostrategic circumstances. *Kultura* discourse undoubtedly contributed to the creation of the norm of supporting ULB's independence and the perception of Ukrainian independence being a pillar of Poland's independence. This perception has been institutionalised through its inclusion in Poland's key foreign policy documents and declarations by key policy makers. The much hailed "strategic partnership" with Ukraine is also a product of this process.

A similar process is evident in terms of Polish perceptions of Russia as the "other" in contrast with which Polish national identity is defined.[6] Post-1989 foreign policy discourse was built on the existence of an implicit threat of resurgent Russian expansionism despite advocating friendly bilateral relations. Despite the fact that as a NATO and EU member Poland practically faces no more hard security threats from Russia, historical perceptions still influence the discourse that shapes EP. The Orlen affair analysed in Chapter Five reflects the pervasiveness of a perceived danger from Russia especially among the Polish post-Solidarity and right wing parties.

However, this is not to say that international systemic and economic constraints are not relevant to the making of EP. As discussed extensively in the sections concerning economic relations and energy politics, Poland's options were very much limited and the dissonance between the dominant EP concept and the realities of Ukraine-Russia relations became clear. One of the prime examples where objective economic calculations have overridden the dictates of strategic partnership was the failure to build the Polish sector of the Odessa-Brody pipeline. As mentioned earlier, concerns about the economic feasibility and financing of the project have superseded the commitment to extend the scope of strategic partnership.

This study also acknowledged the importance of institutions and domestic political bargaining in creating foreign policy. It aspired to give an account of who makes and runs Poland's foreign policy by defining the institutions designated by law for the purpose and discussing conflicts and rivalries among them. The study also analysed the influence of domestic political cleavages in shaping foreign and economic policies. As mentioned above, the conflicting views of the post-Solidarity and post-communist parties were discussed and the impact of their vision on foreign policy making when they were in government was presented. The negotiations over economic relations and energy deals

[6] See Tomasz Zarycki, "Uses of Russia. The Role of Russia in the Modern Polish National Identity", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 18, 2004, No. 2, pp. 595-627.

with Poland's East were presented to demonstrate domestic politics-foreign policy linkages.

The role of individuals has also been taken into account when considering the Presidents' contribution to foreign policy. The difference between the foreign policy approaches of Presidents Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski was discussed. However, the impact of the profile of individual presidents on Poland's foreign policy does not have a large explanatory power. Therefore, this level of analysis has no more than supplementary value when considered within the framework of the whole domestic politics and institutional bargaining processes.

8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH

Overall, this study aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge about Poland's foreign policy by investigating the conceptual and practical evolution of Poland's EP and the international and domestic constraints that shaped it. It has discussed the post-1989 international political processes which Polish foreign policy had to respond to and the historic framework in which EP concepts developed. It has also presented current intellectual and academic debates on these concepts and domestic political negotiations on the implementation of EP. Poland's relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were analysed in order to demonstrate policy outcomes. However, especially with Poland's EU membership, the interaction between Poland's and the EU's Eastern policies will be a rewarding subject for future research. The EU's policy towards Ukraine and Belarus will continuously evolve to respond to challenges, as was the case for Poland, and its relations with Russia will for the foreseeable future be a major determinant affecting initiatives towards this region. Even though the current study estimated that Poland's chances of dominating the EU's Eastern policy are not high in the short term, it would still be valuable to undertake a comparative analysis of debates in Poland and the EU on this matter. The impact of Poland's close alliance with the US on Poland's EP and Poland's chances of influencing the EU's EP could also be brought into analysis.

Another future research suggestion would be to study Poland's policy towards the whole of the ex-Soviet sphere and especially the Russian regions and assess whether the EP debate could be expanded to cover the whole region. As for Poland's immediate neighbourhood, Polish-Ukrainian relations will continue to be a key focus for research on EP. An analysis of Poland's role in and attitudes towards the recent "Orange Revolution" is a potential research project which would contribute to the understanding of the outcomes when Poland's pro-Ukrainian orientation is actively pursued in line with the Western powers. For the time being works on Poland's relations with Belarus are scarce compared to Poland's relations with Ukraine and Russia, due to the low level of economic and

political interaction. However, given the intermittent bursts of conflict, such as the troubles with the Polish minority in Belarus in the spring and summer of 2005, a closer analysis of the instruments Poland utilises to bring about regime change in Belarus would bring forth new insights.

Finally, future research will no doubt advance a still wider range of issues concerned with Poland's role in the region and the world. Whether Poland is, following Zaborowski and Longhurst's argument, the US's major European protégé and handyman in the region or is an aspiring hegemon building its regional dominance by steering the EU Eastern policy agenda is perhaps the largest of these questions.

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Interviews

Warsaw

1. Prof. Bronisław Geremek 20 June 2002

Professor, College of Europe at Natolin, ex-Foreign Minister

2. Prof. Elżbieta Smulkowa 10 June 2002
   Professor of Belarusian Studies, Warsaw University, and former Ambassador of Poland to Belarus
3. Eugeniusz Czykwin 18 July 2002
   Member of Parliament from Podlasie, SLD, and Editor in Chief of *Przegląd Prawosławny*
4. Prof. Genowefa Grabowska 10 May 2002
   Professor of Law, Senator, SLD and Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs and European Integration Committee
5. Grzegorz Gromadzki 17 June 2002
   Expert on Polish Eastern policy, Batory Foundation
6. Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz 19 June 2002
   Expert at Centre for International Relations (CSM) and formerly MP and Defence Minister
7. Official 29 May 2002
   Department of Publicity, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
8. Piotr Żochowski 06 June 2002
   Deputy Director, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and formerly diplomat at the Polish Embassy in Minsk
9. Senior official 18 July 2002
   East European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10. Tadeusz A. Olszański 29 May 2002
    Expert on Ukraine, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
11. Dr. Witold Rodkiewicz 07 June 2002
    Expert on Eastern Policy-Russia, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN)

Białystok

12. Andrzej Parafiniuk 24 July 2002
    President, Podlasie Regional Development Foundation
13. Anna Radziukiewicz 24 July 2002
    Historian and member of Editorial Board at *Przegląd Prawosławny*
14. Barbara Ciruk 22 July 2002
    Member of Parliemant from Podlasie, SLD
15. Dariusz Ciszewski 23 July 2002
    Deputy Leader of Białystok Council, Urząd Marszałkowski
16. Prof. Eugeniusz Mironowicz 25 July 2002
    Professor, Department of Belarusian Culture, University of Białystok
17. Jan Smyk 22 July 2002
    Deputy Editor, Polish Radio Białystok
18. Belarusian minority leader 24 July 2002
19. Jerzy Chmielewski 25 July 2002
    Editor of *Czasopis*, publisher
20. Maciej Zając 23 July 2002

Department for Foreign Cooperation, Urząd Marszałkowski

21. Marek Zagórski 22 July 2002
    Member of Parliament from Podlasie, PO
22. Dr. Oleg Łatyszonek 25 July 2002
    Lecturer, Department of Belarusian Culture, University of Białystok and Belarusian community activist at the Centre of Civic Education Poland - Belarus and Radio Racja)
23. Wanda Borkowska 12 September 2002
    Director, Department of Monitoring, Urząd Wojewódzki
24. Witold Karczewski 12 September 2002
    President, Białystok Chamber of Industry and Commerce
25. Wojciech Jarmolowicz 25 July 2002
    Deputy Editor, *Kurier Poranny*
26. Dr. Zbigniew Ejsmont 12 September 2002
    Lecturer in Economics, Vice-Principal of Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczna
27. Maria Ryzyk 24 July 2002
    Director, Union of Ukrainians in Podlasie

Sokółka

28. Franciszek Budrowski 13 September 2002
    Mayor, Starostwo
29. Adam Miron 13 September 2002
    Director, Department of Promotion and Development, Starostwo
30. Marzena Polewko 13 September 2002
    Business consultant, Podlasie Regional Development Foundation

Hajnówka

31. Anatol Ochryciuk 18 September 2002
    Mayor, Urząd Miasta
32. Grażyna Kotuszewska 18 September 2002
    EU Affairs Department, Urząd Miasta
33. Michał Androsiuk 18 September 2002
    Journalist, Radia Racja and activist at the Union of Belarusians in Poland
34. Olga Rygorowicz 18 September 2002
    Head of Municipal Council, Urząd Gminy
35. Piotr Wołkowycki 18 September 2002
    Business Consultant, Podlasie Regional Development Foundation

Bielsk Podlaski

36. Andrzej Stepaniuk 17 September 2002
    Mayor, Belarusian Electoral Front, Urząd Miejski
37. Jan Kiryziuk 17 September 2002

Deputy Mayor, Urząd Miejski and Ukrainian poet

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