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THE TENANTS' MOVEMENT AND HOUSING STRUGGLES IN GLASGOW, 1945-1990

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(c) CHARLES JOHNSTONE, 1992.
THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED

TO KATE, LOUISE, KATHRYN AND,

MY MOTHER, MARY
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Charlie Johnstone,

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.M.C.</td>
<td>Area Management Committee(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.P.T.</td>
<td>Area of Priority Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.D.O.</td>
<td>Community Development Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.D.P.</td>
<td>Community Development Project</td>
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<td>C.H.I.P.</td>
<td>Castlemilk Housing Involvement Project</td>
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<td>C.I.D.</td>
<td>City Improvements Department</td>
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<td>C.I.T.</td>
<td>City Improvements Trust</td>
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<td>C.R.A.G.</td>
<td>Community Renewal Action Group</td>
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<td>G.C.T.A.</td>
<td>Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations</td>
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<td>G.D.C.</td>
<td>Glasgow District Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.E.A.R.</td>
<td>Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>I.L.P.</td>
<td>Independent Labour Party</td>
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<td>N.A.T.R.</td>
<td>National Association of Tenants and Residents</td>
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<td>N.U.W.M.</td>
<td>National Unemployed Workers Movement</td>
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<td>S.C.T.A.</td>
<td>Scottish Council of Tenants' Associations</td>
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S. R. C.    Strathclyde Regional Council
S. S. H. A.    Scottish Special Housing Association
S. T. O.    Scottish Tenants' Association
T. P. A. S.    Tenant Participation Advisory Service

**************************************************************************
ABSTRACT

In recent years local authorities, urged on by central Government, have been extending the 'rights' of council tenants under 'tenant participation' schemes. These developments have been documented by the new parvenu class of academics in housing research centres. Like most other academic studies of housing issues, these reports concentrate on administrative, legislative and managerial aspects to housing policy development. They therefore ignore, or underplay, the fact that there has been intense and widespread local class struggles over the state's provision of housing for the working class for the last one hundred years. Sociologists have not totally ignored the importance of housing struggles and some recent studies within the 'localities' framework have taken such struggles into consideration. However, there are no studies, as far as I am aware, which attempt to explain the nature of local housing struggles historically.

This study is concerned with the development of the tenants' movement and housing struggles in post-War Glasgow. It seeks to locate the changes relating to housing struggles in the context of wider social and economic changes within the
'locality'. Glasgow's public sector tenants' movement has been in existence for over 60 years and there is a wealth of undocumented housing struggles that have played an important part in the history of working class life in the city.

The analysis taken in this dissertation seeks to conceptualise these housing struggles in a framework based around the concept of social reproduction. It is with a class analysis of relations of reproduction, as opposed to consumption cleavages, that we can understand housing struggles at a local level.

The introduction is concerned with providing an outline of existing sociological approaches to the study of tenants' organisations and 'urban' struggles.

The origins and development of housing provision in the specific context of Glasgow is the focus of chapter one. This chapter also examines the emergence of housing management ideology in the city. An attempt at explaining the response by the local state to the 'housing problem' will be discussed in this context.

In chapter two the emphasis moves to a discussion of two important early post-War housing struggles: the squatting campaign of 1946 and a
campaign against the sale of council houses in 1951-52. This is contextualised within a discussion of wider housing policies and explained in relation to the city's working class culture.

Chapter three contains a discussion of a Rent Strike which began in Glasgow in the summer of 1958. Both of these chapters challenge the common assumption that housing struggles were non-existent during the period under discussion.

In chapter four the focus shifts to a discussion of tenants' associations in a massive post-War peripheral housing scheme: Castlemilk. An attempt is made to locate the changes in tenant activity to the re-structuring of the scheme in the 1980s.

Chapter five provides an account of the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations and relates the discussion to recent developments within housing management towards 'tenant participation'.

In the concluding chapter we will focus on the significance of housing struggles for an analysis of 'urban' protest.
"...The poor man...feels himself out of the sight of others, groping in the dark. Mankind takes no notice of him. He rambles and wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in the market...he is in as much obscurity as he would be in a garret or cellar. He is not disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only not seen". John Adams, quoted in Herbert G. Gutman. The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925. pIx.
INTRODUCTION:

TENANTS' ORGANISATIONS AND HOUSING STRUGGLES

I. INTRODUCTION

"People fight and lose the battle, and the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it turns out to be not what they meant, other people have to fight for what they meant under another name". - William Morris. News From Nowhere

For well over a century now working class housing in Glasgow has formed one of the most persistent political issues for the local state and, for different reasons, for tenants' organisations struggling to improve the living conditions of working class Glaswegians. Throughout all of this period numerous commentators have referred to housing conditions in Glasgow as being the worst in Britain. In the mid-nineteenth century Engels, quoting from a report on a section of the city by a government Commissioner, refers to the appalling conditions pertaining then:
"I have seen wretchedness in some of its worst phases both here and upon the Continent, but until I visited the wynds of Glasgow I did not believe that so much crime, misery, and disease could exist in any civilised country. In the lower lodging-houses ten, twelve, sometimes twenty persons of both sexes, all ages and various degrees of nakedness, sleep indiscriminately huddled together upon the floor. These dwellings are usually so damp, filthy, and ruinous, that no one could wish to keep his horse in one of them". (1)

The working class experience of housing conditions has obviously improved since Engels was writing. One significant factor in the amelioration of the living conditions of the working class was the struggle over rent control and the provision of council housing in the 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike. This was an important struggle against the private landlords who factored most of the properties Engels was referring to in the above quotation (see S. Damer, 1980 and J. Melling, 1980 and 1983). Nevertheless, as one witness to the 1986 Grieve Inquiry Into Housing in Glasgow indicated, the improvements have remained relatively poor:
"You are talking about families who have maybe five kids in a three apartment. It was not wall to wall carpets, it was wall to wall beds! You have got to live there to know what it is like". (2)

So, despite the changed conditions, there are still, in William Morris's terms, battles to be fought. Indeed, the question of who will provide adequate, affordable, rented housing for the poorer sections of the working class in the 1990s and beyond- in Glasgow and elsewhere- is almost identical to the questions that were raised in the late nineteenth century. The hegemony of orthodox Conservative ideology on housing and social policy over the last decade has left thousands of families homeless alongside the relative and absolute decline in the availability of council housing. Ironically, this period has also witnessed a rapid decline in the number of academics, politicians and 'housing experts' who have been willing to argue the case for the provision of council housing (see, for example, D. Clapham, 1989; Forrest and Murie, 1988). The new financial regime for Housing Associations, which came into operation with the passing of the 1988 Housing Act, could also mean that these agencies, like their counterparts a century ago, are less
likely to provide substantial numbers of houses for the poorer sections of society at rents they can afford (see N. Ginsburg, 1988; and R. Best, 1992). The issue of tenants' rights as "customers/consumers" has also, paradoxically, arrived at the same time as council housing is in decline. While many local authorities have responded to this, by pursuing policies on 'tenant participation', the overall changes in housing policy during the last decade has seen a growth, particularly in the last few years, of tenants' organisations being formed spontaneously to defend their own interests. For instance, in 1980 the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations had 30 affiliated tenants' associations but, by 1990, their number of affiliated members had grown to 138. This growth is directly related to the fears that many council tenants express regarding the recent developments in the state's plans for housing provision in the future.

While housing conditions and housing policy in Glasgow will be a recurring theme in this dissertation it is not the main focus of the arguments presented. This dissertation is specifically concerned with the development and changes in the tenants' movement and housing
struggles in post-war Glasgow. During the past two decades Urban Sociologists have been searching in every corner of the world's cities— from Berlin to Boston, from New York to Turin, from Los Angeles to Madrid and Glasgow— in the quest to find "urban social movements" (see, for instance, M. Castells 1983; S. Katz and M. Mayer 1985; S. Lowe, 1986; C. G. Pickvance 1985; and C. M. Reintges, 1990). These researchers have been mainly concerned with producing the relevant evidence to support a taxonomy of collective behaviour which asserts empirical similarities between 'new social movements' and the effect they have on the social structure. This kind of classification leads to the absurd grouping together of the American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Women's Libertion Movement, the squatters movement in the barrios of Latin America and the shantytowns of South Africa, the urban protest in Italy in the mid-1970s, the Green/Ecology movement and so forth, in the forlorn hope that some kind of elective affinity between these movements will be found. Although it is not often explicitly stated, a good deal of this literature relies on the notion that the potential of the labour movement to act as a transformative agent of
social change has collapsed. Therefore, these writers implicitly endorse the description of the 'new' sets of social relations developing within contemporary capitalist society that are contained in the writings of post-modernist theorists (see, for instance, A. Gorz, 1982; J. Habermas, 1981; A. Melucci, 1989; C. Offe, 1985; and A. Touraine, 1974. For a critique, see D. Byrne, 1984 and 1989; and D. Harvey, 1989). This kind of conceptualisation has made it all but impossible to understand what constitutes a 'social movement' or, as Eyerman and Jamison noted: 

"...the understanding of social movements has come to be subjected to the whims of the academic marketplace. Sociology has provided a number of mutually irreconcilable modes of understanding social movements, what philosophers call incommensurable explanations". (3) 

In this elusive and unconvincing search, few of these sociologists have thought tenants' organisations worthy of serious study. There has been a general lack of interest in the study of the development of tenants' organisations within British urban sociology, as one recent study suggested:
"Council house tenants' associations are common in Britain but are a relatively undocumented form of urban movement....There are no studies of these organisations across a time span of more than a few months..."(4)

This is surprising in itself, since the sociological significance of studying rent strikes was emphasised by Moorhouse et al (1972) almost twenty years ago. Schifferes (1976) has also drawn attention to the tenants' movement in the 1930s and the independent role of the working class in shaping housing policy. However, it was not until Damer (1980) and Melling (1983) produced their different analyses of the 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike that sociologists and Labour historians began to take the study of the tenants' movement seriously. This had both positive and negative outcomes. The 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike, in spite of attempts by liberal historians like Mclean (1983) to deny its significance, is now widely recognised as a classic example of working class struggle outside the sphere of production. However, this is the only serious attempt to address these issues and the study of tenants' campaigns has progressed little since then. It has been a case of 70 forgotten years.
The scarcity of significant secondary sources and the difficulties associated with tracing primary sources meant that an account of the tenants' movement in Glasgow could only be assembled after detailed study of archival material, participant observation and recorded testimonies from various sources. (see research note at end of chapter). This has allowed me to produce an historical account of the tenants' movement in Glasgow which also takes into consideration the role of the local state during specific periods. There are no other accounts of tenants' organisations, as far as I am aware, which attempt to provide an historical analysis of the changing nature of these organisations in relation to wider social and political processes. Therefore, this dissertation must proceed through a discussion of the major themes which characterise existing studies of tenants' associations and similar organisations. These studies fall into two main areas- the 'community studies' tradition and those studies concerned with 'social movements'.

II. SOCIOLOGY AND THE 'COMMUNITY' TRADITION

According to Williams (1975) the word 'community' has been part of the English language
since the fourteenth century, when it probably derived from the word common— as in 'common people'. By the nineteenth century the sense of locality was strongly developed, in the context of rapidly industrialising societies, and 'community' was used to define a mythical past or an alternative future, and sometimes both. In the twentieth century the term 'community' has come to permeate our language and is used in a wide array of contexts to define real or imagined relationships. The passing away of 'community' has been a central and recurring feature of sociological writings, and literary texts, for the past 150 years. Therefore, the concept of 'community' has had a peculiar history in sociological writings. A list compiled in 1955 produced 94 definitions, of which the highest common factor was that "all definitions deal with people" (G.A. Hillery, 1955). According to Hillery, three aspects constantly recur in definitions of 'community': area, common ties and social interaction. Nevertheless, there remains a lack of a clear definition of the concept of 'community'. The central contradiction has been summed up neatly by Abrams:
"The paradox of the sociology of community is the coexistence of a body of theory which constantly predicts the collapse of community and a body of empirical studies which finds community alive and well". (5)

The confusion that Abrams is referring to arises from the failure to distinguish between social and spatial variables, which was inherent in the term 'community' itself. Therefore, while this section is primarily concerned with an analysis of the relevant empirical studies ('community studies') it is essential to begin our discussion with a brief outline of the history of the idea of 'community' within sociology.

There is a strongly effective continuation of old ideas of 'community' which permeates the sociological writings on this subject (see R.A. Nisbet, 1967). The foundation for the British 'community studies' of the post-war years derives from two main sources: the nineteenth century 'urban way of life' debate and the Chicago school of sociology.

The nineteenth century witnessed a massive intellectual revolt against the city, a factor which was expressed in the contemporary literature (see R. Williams, 1985). One reaction to the
horrors of urban living led to a debate which indicated that there was something intrinsically distinctive about cities which affected the lifestyle of the individual, as evidenced in Simmel's writings:

"The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture and of the technique of life". (6)

The destruction of 'traditional values', according to Simmel, leads the migrant to detest the city and is expressed in the urban dweller becoming cynical, blase and exploitative or, more precisely, to adopting an anti-urban persona. This conception of urban living was similar to the theoretical framework established by Tonnies in the late nineteenth century (see C. Bell and H. Newby, 1974). Tonnies developed his sociological analysis through a distinction between two different types of society: "Gemeinschaft" (translated as 'community') and "Gesellschaft" (translated alternately as 'society' or 'association'). Gemeinschaft, which characterised social relations in the agrarian village, was
regarded by Tonnies as a living, 'natural' form of society where all its members were bound together by a shared order of 'natural' relationships. Relationships were centered on shared commitments, work, leisure and customs. This shared understanding of the world led to a deep attachment to place. It was this 'community of natural relationships' which the Industrial Revolution destroyed and replaced with the Gesellschaft form of society. There was no necessary 'community of feeling' amongst the people who entered into the Gesellschaft arrangement, things had only value as regards to profit. Tonnies argued that there was something unnatural about this kind of society which could only lead to ambition and the desire for power over others.

This was the theoretical background to the development of anti-urban attitudes which led to the planning of utopian settlements to counteract the evils of cities while attempting to create Gemeinschaft type of relationships. It was also from this anti-urbanism that middle class philanthropists posited communal societies as models for a more rigid system of social order: the 'community as ideology'. This was exemplified
in the attempts to bring 'nature' back into the city by designers such as Ebenezer Howard in the nineteenth century and Lewis Mumford in the twentieth.

The second precursor of the 'community studies' was the Chicago School of sociologists, centered in the University of Chicago from about 1915 (see C. Bell & H. Hewby, 1971. and M.Bulmer, 1984). The Chicago School developed the theory of human ecology, or urban ecology. These ecological theories, exemplified in the work of Robert Park (1967), tried to explain both how cities grow and how they come to take the shape that they do. Their attention, therefore, was directed at the interrelationships between physical form and social organisation. In 1938 Louis Wirth attempted to combine the findings of the Chicago School into a comprehensive theory of the social order of cities (L. Wirth, 1938). Wirth attempted to account for the changes in social relationships which result from the expansion of cities and to examine the implications of this growth. He defined the city as a 'relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals'. These three factors created a social structure in which primary relationships were
inevitably replaced by secondary contacts that were 'impersonal, segmental, transitory, superficial, and often predatory in nature'. As a result the city dweller became 'anonymous, isolated, secular, relativistic, rational and sophisticated'. In order to function within urban society the city dweller was forced to combine with others, to organise corporations, associations, representative forms of government and so forth. These replaced the primary groups and the integrated way of life found in rural and other pre-industrial settlements. (7) Wirth, like Simmel and Tonnies before him, was critical of urban-industrial society and regarded the 'loss of community' as a major disadvantage. British sociologists were also concerned to make their mark in this debate, as an early twentieth century study indicated clearly:

"...our subject is community, and the science of community is sociology". (8)

It was against this theoretical background that the 'community studies tradition' in British sociology developed in the post-War years. The definition of 'community' that most of these researchers accepted was similar to the one provided by Macivvar and Page:
"...an area of social living marked by some degree of social coherence. The bases of community are locality and community sentiment." (9)

The notion inherent in this definition is that 'community' is an autonomous social system with certain analytical values of its own. In the 1950s and early 1960s a large number of studies based on this view were conducted in various British cities (see, for instance, R. Frankenberg, 1966; M. Kerr, 1958; L. Kuper, 1953; T. Lupton & D. Mitchell, 1954; and M. Young and P. Willmott, 1957). However, the forerunner to all of these studies was Durant's study of a new 'cottage estate' at Watling, on the outskirts of London, in the 1930s (R. Durant, 1939). What really concerned Durant was the apparent lack of 'community life' on the estate. Her key question was: 'has the new housing estate grown into a community?'. The new residents on this estate had moved from London, and Durant details the hostile reception they were faced with from middle class residents in an adjoining estate. (10) The experience of hostility led Watling residents (the male ones) to seek an active social life of their own. The first stage was the formation of a residents' association, followed by the production of an estate paper.
Durant's main contention about the associational life on this estate was that, there was a pattern of initial loneliness followed by unity against the outside world, giving rise to an agitational residents' association. When this had achieved its task, most of the residents 'settle down to a home-centered, but small group oriented social life'. Her approach, and some of her findings were to become familiar themes in the 'community studies' of the 1950s and 1960s.

The exemplar of this genre of studies was, undoubtedly, Young and Willmott's research for the Institute of Community Studies, a privately-funded research institution with an explicit policy development focus (M. Young & P. Willmott, 1957)

The purpose of their study was clearly indicated from the beginning:

"This book is about the effect of one of the newest upon one of the oldest of our social institutions. The new is the housing estate...the old institution is the family". (11)

Young and Willmott were concerned with the question of what happened to family life when people moved to a new suburban housing estate, and what consequences this entails for older members of the family. Their study, therefore, was
explicitly concerned with the relationship between social service provision and family life. Young and Willmott followed 48 families from Bethnal Green in East London to the ficticiously named 'Greenleigh', twenty miles outside London. This comparative study focused on the family as the main unit of analysis. The thing that the authors found to be the most important single phenomenon in Bethnal Green was family and kinship. The cohesion of life in Bethnal Green was seen to have depended on the shared poverty and lack of social and geographical mobility. The extended family acted as a bridge between the individual and the 'community', the result being a strong sense of shared identity and 'community'. In Greenleigh, however, this bridge had apparently collapsed.

Young and Willmott, and most of the other 'community studies' literature of this period, show a particular fascination in 'traditional working class communities', which were thought of as harbouring a distinctive subculture characterised by solidaristic and closely knit social systems. The family as a basic unit of analysis runs through many of the studies, as does the consequences for family life of resettlement on a suburban housing estate. Frankenberg's review
of the 'community studies' literature identified a common model of associational life contained in most of them:

"...There is a familiar pattern of initial loneliness followed by unity against the outside world giving rise to an agitational Resident's Association. This achieves its tasks and most of the inhabitants settle down to a home-centred but small group orientated social life....A minority continues the public life of the community centre. This minority is drawn from one status group". (12)

This partial account of the development of tenants' associations in new housing schemes resulted from a faulty methodology, with most of the studies being restricted to the 'settling in' period, and the concepts of class and 'community' generally treated separately. While the analyses were presented within a framework which revealed some fascinating empirical observations of family life, they were often romantacised, ignoring the gross sexual inequalities within such 'communities'. They also failed to provide a critical account of the state's purpose in embarking on a wide-scale process of urban renewal and the removal of whole populations to the outskirts of British cities (see E. Brook and D.
Finn, 1977). These weaknesses are a reflection of the lack of clarity over the concept of 'community' itself, and through attempting to study social relations solely in relation to geographical space as a determinant of social action. These criticisms were clearly exposed by Dennis, and are worth quoting in full:

"...The locality-community idea implies fixing one's eyes on the part locality factors play in the actiology of social and personal problems, and it presumes that these problems can be dealt with efficaciously by adjusting locality institutional forms and applying psychotherapeutic measures to persons who work and live in the problem locality. This is obviously not a very threatening thing to do. On first sight it does not present a challenge to any fundamental institutions or established social beliefs. It does not appear to involve the examination of the contribution of more general social structural and cultural factors. Certainly, any serious study of problems which happen to be concentrated in a locality is bound to lead to a study of extra-local explanations. But such studies are comparatively rare. Generally, the presumption that neighbourhood causes and cures are of very great importance effectively
stultifies the study. No great good is achieved; but neither are any powerful interests affected, nor any important established beliefs questioned. It therefore remains an ideology which can attract research funds, and catch the ear of established opinion. It is a minor example of a 'myth' in Sorel's sense— a social belief which is not necessarily invalid (though it is likely to be to some extent) but which is believed for reasons other than its objective validity". (13)  

The reason that Dennis has been quoted at length here is that, the social science literature has come full-circle with regard to this debate. The critique of 'community studies' which developed in the late 1960s emphasised the weaknesses inherent in an analysis that reified the notion of 'community' into a territorial entity, rather than viewing it as a social category to be studied with reference to wider socio-economic and historical processes. The abstract version of this critique was exemplified by studies from a political economy perspective, (M. Castells, 1977a; and D. Harvey, 1973 and 1985), and the reports of the CDP's provided empirical and theoretical backing to the continued scepticism with regard to the 'community-locality'
approach (C.D.P. 1976 and 1977). Nevertheless, recent accounts of changes within contemporary capitalist society have brought the analysis of 'localities' back to the forefront of urban sociology and social geography (see, for instance, P. Cooke, 1987; A. Giddens, 1981; and D. Gregory and J. Urry 1985b). This literature does not take the idea of 'community' as given but, rather locates processes within localities to the changing nature of contemporary capitalist society in terms of uneven development and spatial divisions of labour, within the wider context of debates around the concept of 'disorganized' capitalism (S. Lash & J. Urry, 1987). However, one recent article has argued specifically for the 'rejuvenation of community studies':

"...the sociology of community power remains a topic of enduring interest and importance, both theoretically, empirically and practically in a world where Whitehall-Town Hall, central-local government relations become more rather than less contentious as time goes on, while the possibilities for grass-roots political involvement, whether in housing, planning or social welfare, remain singularly ill defined". (14)
While sharing some of the concerns of Bulmer, this dissertation will attempt to provide an analysis of the tenants' movement and housing struggles in Glasgow which goes beyond the 'community' approach and takes into consideration the cultural and political changes at a broader level and an historical account of how these have had ramifications for actors at the social base. Bulmer's argument for a return to the 'sociology of the primary group' offers limited scope for understanding these processes. The 'community studies' type of approach can, as chapter four reveals, provide a useful, if limited, insight into the social networks and the mobilisation of resources within a locality that are essential to the development of collective organisations involved in housing struggles. However, as more recent studies in the 'locality' framework have recognised, all social relationships and interactions take place in time and space, both of which convey meaning to social actors and become part of the structure which shapes the lived experience of individuals and groups in society (A. Giddens, 1981). The historical dimension to this determination of social relations is clearly emphasised by Preteceille:
"...It is not only present relations of production that tend to organize life, but also the past ones of the individual and of his or her parents and relatives. They influence the present through the possible social trajectories they have determined, through accumulated wealth and goods, through the language, culture, know-how, etc, acquired in past situations..." (15)

Therefore, an account of tenants' organisations and housing struggles (struggles over reproduction) needs to go beyond the 'community' approach to a consideration of the historical, political and cultural changes which have shaped these movements. Before attempting an outline of how this may be approached we must consider the analysis of 'community power' contained in the writings on 'urban social movements', which developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

III. 'URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS' AND THE DECONSTRUCTION OF 'COMMUNITY'

In the 1970s the dominant paradigm in urban sociology came under vigorous scrutiny by a number of European Marxist theorists influenced by Althusserian structuralism (L. Althusser, 1965; for a critique of this general approach see E.P.
Thompson, 1978). One of the main protagonists in this revitalisation of urban sociology was undoubtedly Manuel Castells (see, in particular, M. Castells; 1977a, and 1983). In his earlier writings, Castells adhered to an Althusserian account of 'scientific' or 'theoretical' practices, and suggested that urban sociology is 'not a scientific domain, nor a field for observation, but rather an ideological artefact'. (16) Despite this comment, Castells still accepted the 'urban' as a special focus for analysis. However, in contrast to the Chicago School (R.E. Park, E.W. Burgess and R.D. McKenzie, 1967; and L. Wirth, 1938) who placed an emphasis on 'natural' spatial processes, Castells argued that in conditions of monopoly capitalism the 'urban system' is the spatial expression of the processes of capital accumulation and centralisation (see P. Saunders, 1981 for a critique of Castells' definition of the 'urban'). It is, according to Castells, the sub-system within which labour power is reproduced. This 'urban system', according to Castells, is characterised by secondary contradictions which are caused by the state's inability to make up the shortfall of publicly funded services. The key term which Castells used
to conceptualise these processes within the urban system was 'collective consumption':

"...socialised consumption processes which are largely determined by state activity". (17)

In this interpretation, the effect of state intervention in dealing with the urban 'crisis' in modern capitalist societies generates 'new' popular movements (urban social movements) which emerge to challenge the state. Castells's writings on urban social movements, despite the many criticisms, have had a major influence on recent studies of political action within cities and are germane to any discussion of the tenants' movement and housing struggles (see, for instance, P. Dickens et al, 1985; P. Dunleavy, 1980a; B. Elliot and D. McCrone, 1982; A. Melucci, 1989; C. G. Pickvance, 1985; and P. Saunders, 1981).

As Lowe rightly points out, Castells definition of what constitutes an 'urban social movement' goes through three distinct phases (S. Lowe, 1986). In the context of his initial structuralist interpretation of the urban process, the urban system is seen as the arena of the collective consumption process and, as we have already indicated, is the focus of political conflict based on state intervention into the
provision of key public services. At this stage, Castells still regarded the clash between capital and labour in the sphere of production as the primary contradiction in advanced capitalist society. It follows from this that urban social movements, on their own, are incapable of producing 'effects' that transform the structure of social relations:

"...there is no qualitative transformation of the urban structure that is not produced by an articulation of the urban movements with other movements, in particular (in our societies) with the working class movement and the political class struggle". (18)

Castells's position at this stage was that, for urban social movements to be successful in producing sustained 'effects' on the balance of class forces, they required a leadership and organisation connected to the advanced sections of the working class. The alternative was for urban movements to become:

"...instruments of participation within general, dominant institutional objectives". (19)

In the next two phases of his writings Castells moves from his original rigid structural analysis of urban social movements. In his middle
(Eurocommunist) phase, Castells analysis of urban issues goes through a significant change of emphasis. The basis on which Castells arrives at this change in perspective is his focus on a number of interrelated and long-term structural tendencies within advanced capitalism which heighten the significance of consumption issues, particularly the increased intervention of the state in both production and consumption. According to Castells, these developments open up 'new' inequalities in the sphere of consumption between those who satisfy their consumption 'needs' individually through the private market and those who continue to rely on collective provision by a declining public sector. This identification of consumption sector cleavages that cut across the class system, and the promotion of urban issues in his analysis of political struggle, led Castells to a concomitant change in his conception of urban social movements. In this context, Castells signals a move away from his earlier notion of proletarian hegemony to the view that urban social movements of a cross-class nature, remaining autonomous from any political parties, were of more significance in building a democratic socialist alliance united by a common concern with urban issues (M.)
This formulation is extended in Castells major third phase text, where he abandons any notion of the determinate effects of structure and class struggle on the actions of the state:

"...the interpretations of the urban crisis tend to be couched strictly in economistic terms, identifying the source of our problems in a single factor that varies (according to the author's ideological taste) from the inherent logic of monopoly capital to the inevitable incompetence of public bureaucracy.....This book, on the contrary, assumes that only by analysing the relationship between people and urbanization will we be able to understand cities and citizens at the same time". (20)

In adopting this new perspective Castells was responding to a number of critiques of his earlier structuralist position which left little space for an understanding of the structure of social relations and social mobilisation processes (see, for instance, C.G. Pickvance, 1975; and P. Saunders, 1981). In this text, which is based on a number of cross-cultural case studies, the 'urban' is not just regarded as the arena of collective consumption but, fundamentally, within the context of the city as 'a social product
resulting from conflicting social interests and values'. Conflict within cities takes place between social classes, interest groups and individuals over 'urban meaning'. In this context, Castells draws attention to the significance of local 'communities' as the focal point for urban movement activity. Urban protest movements, according to Castells, seem to develop around three major themes:

"1. Demands Focused on collective consumption, that is, goods and services directly or indirectly provided by the state.

2. Defence of cultural identity associated with and organised around a specific territory.

3. Political mobilisation in relation to the state, particularly emphasising the role of local government".[original emphasis](21)

Therefore, in contrast to Castells's earlier writings, urban social movements are not to be judged in terms of their potential to produce 'effects' that transform the structure of social relations but, rather, on their capability for bringing about a change in 'urban meaning';

"...here lies the most important role of urban social movements, their very raison d'être as a
distinctive actor: they are the collective actions consciously aimed at fundamentally modifying the city's role in society, or redefining the historical meaning of 'urban'. It is in this sense that all the movements that we have studied are major urban movements". (22)

Despite this change in emphasis, Castells still focuses on very broad social relationships, notably those between the movement, the urban system, and the wider society, and so is incapable of comprehending the social base and how urban contradictions are translated into social action (see, for instance, P. Mullins, 1987). Castells's theoretical writings certainly have the benefit of deconstructing the weaknesses inherent in sociological studies based on around the concept of 'community', by indicating that class tensions, including those organised around issues of reproduction, have their origins in the economic and political structures of society as a whole. However, collective action is always built by social actors and what needs to be explained is how movements form and how they manage to mobilise individuals and groups around a collective project. Or, as Foster has argued, to understand how particular forms of social protest arise we
need to acknowledge that they originate within historically and locationally specific situations:

"...to deal with real people caught and held in particular historical circumstances, we need a degree of definition about how existing levels of popular culture and organisation enclose the gains of past struggle". (23)

The only case where Castells comes close to acknowledging the importance of social base characteristics is in reference to the 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike:

"...Of the five major movements studied, only the Glasgow Rent Strike appears as the expression of a working class-based-social movement. In all other situations the urban mobilisation either brought together a variety of social classes around a city vision, or expressed a cultural subset of people, organised around classless lines and mobilized around issues that only indirectly relate to class power...". (24)

The 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike, as Damer (1980) rightly argues, was organised within a distinctive working class milieu by 'organic intellectuals' of the working class, with the support of various labour organisations, around a central issue of reproduction: housing. Given this insight, it is
all the more surprising that more attention has not been paid to an analysis of the history of the tenants' movement and housing struggles, in comparison to the elusive search for urban social movements. The only attempt to link the two issues is Lowe's (1986) outline of the development and disintegration of the tenants' movement in Sheffield, which is contextualised in relation to Castells's theory of urban social movements. However, in rightly rejecting any of Castells's theories of urban social movements to explain this type of activity, Lowe provides his own obfuscated account of events in Sheffield:

"...The council house tenants' movement was and remains rigidly locked into its manual worker, public sector social base and did not link at any stage either to private sector tenants or to the owner occupiers. What happened in Sheffield was not a political class struggle but a form of political action based on the consumption interests of public sector tenants which was, to some extent, structured by a class-defined social milieu". (25)

Here we have a movement with a manual worker social base structured by its class-defined social milieu, but we are asked to consider the struggle
solely in relation to 'consumption interests'. This muddled account of the mobilisation of a specifically located working class protest around issues of reproduction arises from Lowe's treatment of consumption issues as being wholly, rather than relatively, autonomous. The discussion of housing struggles contained in this dissertation, particularly chapter two and chapter three, suggests that we need to return to a formulation based on the concept of reproduction. In order to avoid reverting to a functionalist or mechanistic use of the concept of reproduction we also require a historical analysis of the links between housing struggles and the specific sets of social processes that helped to structure them (see E. Preteceille, 1986). This necessarily involves an account of how particular social agents have organised themselves collectively around housing struggles in response to state intervention, and how they have been able to enhance or resist change.

IV. MAKING HISTORY: ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS AND HOUSING STRUGGLES

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but
under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living..."(26)

The tenants' movement in Glasgow initially drew upon a rich associational life of diverse mutualist associations and labour organisations informed by socialist perspectives (see S. Damer, 1980 and 1990). For the past one hundred odd years housing struggles have remained at the centre of the political class struggle in the city, as Melling acknowledges in his discussion of the 1915 Rent Strike:

"...Closer examination of campaigns such as the rent strikes of west Scotland during the War...suggests that there is a longer and more complex genealogy of non-industrial struggles than existing accounts allow, and that their contribution to the shaping of working class politics is as important as that of work-based organisations..."(27)

The evidence from post-War Glasgow suggests that, the continuance of this rich history has had a cumulative effect on how tenants' organisations and housing struggles have developed within the city in response to state intervention. Therefore,
contrary to Cockburn's assertion, struggles over issues of reproduction do not constitute a 'new terrain of class struggle' (C. Cockburn, 1977). Class struggle in the terrain of reproduction, particularly in relation to housing issues, has formed a constant part of the working class counter-hegemonic struggle for social improvement in many urban working class areas of Britain. (see D. Byrne, 1982). Unfortunately, as already indicated, most of this activity remains 'hidden from history'.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the history of the tenants' movement and housing struggles in one city, Glasgow, tracing their development from the early post-War campaign against the sale of council houses through several phases to the present day when they are faced with a fundamental restructuring of housing tenure. In producing this history it is important to acknowledge at this stage that there is a sub-text contained within most of the general discussion which draws on the writings of Gramsci in relation to his discussion of 'organic intellectuals' and his concept of 'hegemony' (A. Gramsci, 1971). While this is not the place to provide a full
exposition of Gramsci's ideas, it is essential to indicate my use of this perspective.

In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci drew a distinction between two fundamental types of political control, where he contrasted the functions of 'domination' (direct physical coercion) with those of 'hegemony' (consent, ideological control). By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil society of an entire system of values, attitudes and beliefs that, in one way or another, support the class interests of those who dominate it:

"...What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies'
excercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government". (28)

Thus, civil society and the state are only partially separate; they interpenetrate each other in a variety of ways or, as Gramsci says, they are 'intertwined'. Hegemony in this interpretation is a concept that is designed to assist us in understanding society and, in particular, in analysing the relation of forces within a society at any particular moment. For example, the tenants' movement is mainly concerned with winning consent and to that extent is part of civil society. Nevertheless, to win this consent, the tenants' movement may be involved in a struggle with the state (if only at a 'local' level) or, alternatively, could be drawn into the state. Therefore, a counter-hegemonic tenants' movement must have its own 'organic' intellectuals who have the function of organisers:

"...One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question
succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals". (29)

Gramsci's use of the concept of 'organic' intellectuals is normally utilised in reference to the role of activists involved in 'revolutionary' parties (see, for instance, C. Boggs, 1976; and R. Simon, 1982). However, as subsequent chapters make clear, the tenants' movement in Glasgow has thrown up its own 'organic' intellectuals of the working class who have been involved in a wide range of campaigns within the social and political sphere of civil society. Before providing an outline of the structure of this dissertation, and in case there is any doubt about this interpretation, it is worthwhile letting one of these organic intellectuals speak for themselves:

"C. J. The point you talk about: the time, the effort, that is really crucial to tenants' associations. How would you explain why people became involved to the extent that they did?

C. W. It's a difficult question to answer. But as near as I can answer it, that to resort to direct political assistance I regarded as useless. If any benefit could be derived politically, from any organised political party, it had to be as a by-product. The action, the impact, had to come
from people themselves who were sufficiently articulate to see the issues and try to do something about them and attempt to by education. It sounds a bit bombastic to say these things but, nevertheless, it is a piece of realism to say it. Because, after all, how did you learn it yourself? You learned yourself because you listened or you read and you saw certain things and you realised that until you decided to do something they would stay the same. You might not be successful but you might obtain some satisfaction emotionally at least, if not intellectually. But you've tried something and, if you can encourage others and they in turn encourage you to continue to do it with a sort of common aim, then your more likely to be successful the more people you get to do that and you will derive more pleasure from it with less hurt, if there is such a thing as hurt in being unsuccessful. Because there's the enthusiasm, the pleasure and pain from being active and not sitting on your backside and letting faceless power people impose things on you. So, I would say that, to my mind, that was the justification for the hard work, the loss of leisure, the deprivation of teaching your child,
and that was in common with many dozens of people who were actively involved". (30)

As organic intellectuals, people involved in the tenants' movement and other housing struggles have not always 'conquered' the dominant ideologies of the state and its intellectuals, but they have formed an important part of the overall counter-hegemonic struggle of the working class for social improvement, which has been too often ignored in academic studies of housing issues.

Therefore, this study was undertaken on the premise that an understanding of the tenants' movement and housing struggles requires a fresh and more historically rigorous approach in order to begin to comprehend the capacity they have for influencing the structuring of housing provision.

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Research Note:

The study of the tenants' movement and housing struggles is relatively difficult to analyse. Many tenants' associations do not keep records of their activities over a lengthy period and some of the people involved in specific issues tend to curtail their involvement after such
campaigns have disintegrated. For instance, one researcher who has attempted to study tenants' associations has commented thus:

"...very little has been written about them and much of the evidence is in the oral tradition of working-class history, which does not easily lend itself to academic analysis but is a very deeply ingrained source of political experience." (31)

This researcher does not accept such an elitist and narrow conception of the relevance of oral history (see P. Thompson, 1978 for a full defence of the oral tradition). Indeed, knowledge of the two important campaigns discussed in chapter two and chapter three only came to my attention by way of the working-class oral tradition, and this thesis would have been weakened without such sources. Therefore, some of the evidence contained in this dissertation draws specifically on the knowledge of those who have been involved in the tenants' movement in Glasgow throughout the post-War years. Information on housing management and the political administration within the city has also been partly assembled through taped interviews.
However, this is not the only, or even main source of data collection that has been utilised. A whole selection of newspapers, both local and national, have been plundered in order to present a wider representation of the issues involved in specific campaigns. Various archives (The Broady collection in Glasgow University library, the Finlay Hart collection in Clydebank library, the Gallagher Memorial library, the Glasgow Room of the Mitchell library, Castlemilk library, and Strathclyde Regional Archives) have been consulted. Many of the documents stored in these collections cover housing issues and, more importantly, contain material on the tenants' movement (minutes, leaflets, handbooks, letters etc) which have been invaluable in completing the analysis in individual chapters. The case studies of the GCTA and tenants' associations in Castlemilk, while analysed by using methods already mentioned, were mainly studied by way of participant observation at a series of meetings over a period of one year (1989-90). By using a diversity of research methods, this study has provided a comprehensive account of the tenants' movement and housing struggles in post-War Glasgow.
The discussion begins in chapter one with an historical outline of the development of housing and housing management ideology in Glasgow. This review and critique provides the essential background information on housing conditions within which housing struggles are necessarily located. This chapter also provides an account of the changes and continuities in housing management ideology which are taken up again in chapter four and five. Chapter two provides an account of two early post-War housing struggles: the squatters movement and a campaign against the sale of council houses in 1951-52. This is followed in chapter three with a discussion of a rent strike in 1958-59. The information contained in these chapters calls into question the common assumption that the tenants' movement were inactive during the 1950s (J. Butt, 1983; and S. Lowe, 1986). Chapters four and five contain case studies of tenants' associations in Castlemilk (a massive post-War peripheral housing scheme) and the GCTA (the main city-wide federation of tenants' associations). These latter two chapters provide an evaluation of the contemporary tenants' movement in relation to recent developments within the local state and changes in national housing policy. In this respect, they illustrate the
attempts by the state, at both a local and national level, to repress urban conflict and 'incorporate' tenants' associations through 'tenant participation' programmes.
INTRODUCTION—NOTES

1. F. Engels (1973) p71. The report Engels was referring to was written by a Government Commissioner: Jelinger Cookson Symons (1839) "Arts and Artisans at Home and Abroad". Edinburgh. p116


6. G. Simmel (1903). p

7. For a critique of Wirth's theory see H.J. Gans, 1968.


10. N. Elias and J.L. Scotson (1965) give a description of similar events in their study in the Midlands. Also, see chapter four of this thesis.


30. Taped interview with Mr Chas Watters, 14-3-89. Mr Watters was involved in the rent strike discussed in chapter three.
CHAPTER ONE

HOUSING AND HOUSING MANAGEMENT IDEOLOGY IN GLASGOW, 1866-1990

1.1 Introduction

The relationship between tenants' organisations and housing management has become central to most contemporary discussions of tenant activities. The principal debates, in this context, have revolved around such concepts as tenant participation, tenant control, decentralisation and customer care in housing management, tenant choice and so forth. Housing management practice and ideology in Glasgow was not responsive to these issues, in any recognisable sense, until the late 1970s and early 1980s—much later, in some respects, than other local authorities. (see Hambleton and Hoggett, 1987; and, Goodlad, 1988).

Therefore, to understand the practices, principles and ideology which formed the foundation of certain strategies adopted by the housing department, it is essential to provide an exposition of the ideology of housing management as it has evolved historically, both within Glasgow and at a broader level. This involves an analysis of problems as defined by housing
management, the practices that were in operation at specific periods, relating the whole discussion to wider social and political changes, and the effect this had on the workings of the tenants' movement in Glasgow.

While the emphasis will mainly be on the changes and continuities in housing management ideology during the period under discussion, it should become clear that there are significant links between nineteenth and early twentieth century private-sector housing management, inter-war council housing management and the system of council housing management which developed in post-war Glasgow. This approach necessarily requires an account of Glasgow council housing but, as this has been adequately provided elsewhere, the discussion presented here will be limited to those issues which seem relevant (see S. Damer, 1990; A. Gibb, 1983; and G. C. Mooney, 1988).

1.2 Historical Overview

It is compulsory when beginning any discussion of the origins of public sector housing management to refer to the 'pioneering' work of Octavia Hill in England in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (1) As Hill's work is by
now fairly familiar to anyone with an interest in housing issues, an interpretation of the main characteristics behind the thinking associated with Hill and her 'women evangelists' is presented briefly, to emphasise the similarities as well as the dissimilarities with early housing management ideology in Glasgow.

Starting in the 1860s, Octavia Hill rehabilitated and managed a number of poor and overcrowded properties in London, putting into practice and developing her ideas concerning the job of a housing manager. Her first acquisition was a slum dwelling called 'Paradise Place', but popularly known as Little Hell (see G. Darley, 1989). These and other slum properties were bought by John Ruskin, who received 5 per cent return on his investment—'philanthropy at 5 per cent'—and then passed the property on to Hill to manage. Hill, it should be remembered, was vehemently opposed to any form of public subsidy for working class housing, and her philosophy of housing management was intended to influence the small landlords who owned the vast majority of working class housing in London. The strict but attentive style of housing management which she favoured had a strong affinity with social work and emphasised
the importance of personal contact between landlord and tenant. Personal contact was, however, on the basis of her belief about the need to 'educate' and 're-moralize' the 'poorer sections' of the working class, or in her own words:

"The people's homes are bad, partly because they are badly built and arranged; they are tenfold worse because their habits and lives are what they are. Transplant them to-morrow to healthy and commodious homes and they would pollute and destroy them..."(2)

In this respect, Hill was very much in line with the thinking of her own class (see G. Stedman-Jones, 1971). This 'benevolent despotism' was based on the belief in the moral superiority of the middle and upper classes, a view which was widely supported and disseminated in late-Victorian Britain.(3). Hill and her associates combined these ideas of 'educating' the working class with the role of landlord to create a paternalistic style of housing management.

In Homes of the London Poor, Hill outlined the main aims and values on which her management was based. Firstly, she wished to free tenants from a 'low class of landlords and landladies'- who were,
apparently, lax about collecting rents. Hill considered this immoral, and she began to recruit a number of middle class women as volunteer rent collectors and property managers, making a strict insistence on the prompt payment of rent. Secondly, she wanted to relieve tenants of 'the heavy incubus of accumulated dirt', and she got women to clean passages in order to 'learn habits of cleanliness'. Thirdly, she wanted to free tenants from the corrupting influence of 'degraded' fellow lodgers. So she selected out the 'deserving poor' who, it was assumed, were more likely to respond to her treatment and she also segregated the 'bad tenants' from the 'respectable tenants'. Finally Hill wanted to rouse 'habits of industry and effort' and she encouraged thrift among people she literally regarded as her tenants. This was to avoid any debts through irregularity of work— a common experience for many of London's working classes. If they were unsuccessful in following her example— and failed to pay their rent— they would be promptly evicted.

While Hill's attempts to 'improve' her tenants went beyond rent collecting and doing repairs (for instance, she provided a community hall for her tenants with murals painted by Walter
Crane and a play area for the children) it was based on an individualistic notion of poverty and an authoritarian style of housing management, which reflected the belief in the moral superiority of her own class. Her contribution to the housing of the poor was inevitably minimal, but she had an enormous influence on the housing management profession, both through her writings and her training of other managers, primarily women, in her methods. (4) But, her contribution to local authority housing management practice is disputed by some commentators:

"...Despite Octavia Hill's valuable pioneering work in this field, housing management was, in effect, reinvented in the 1920s as a wholly administrative activity centred on local government and lacking the moralistic overtones of her method." (5)

In general terms this statement may be considered factual, but it is historically inaccurate if we consider the overall debate within the housing management profession at this time and, more particularly, if we consider the way in which housing management in Glasgow actually progressed during the years under consideration in this chapter.
The first professional association, the Association of Women Housing Workers, was created in 1916 by women trained by Octavia Hill in the early twentieth century. The Society of Women Housing Estate Managers was formed out of this group in 1932 (changing its name in 1948 to the Society of Housing Managers). The Institute of Housing had been formed in 1931, by predominantly male local authority housing managers. These two groups remained separate until their amalgamation in 1965, when they became known as the Institute of Housing Managers (in 1976 the name reverted back to the Institute of Housing). (6) In the 1920s and early 1930s the newly emerging housing authorities, taking on the task of management for the first time, began to question the appropriateness of the organisation and practices of management, which were seen as a necessary feature of the provision of public housing. The debate revolved around two competing views on the role of housing management as providing properly trained staff (à la Octavia Hill), or whether housing management should have a 'welfare role' (the I.of H. view). The result of these debates was, perhaps understandably, that no one system of local authority housing management emerged. But some commentators, have continued to suggest that
the style of housing management associated with Octavia Hill did not prevail:

"...Local authority housing management has continued to be a largely administrative activity, in contrast to the personal, moralistic and authoritarian practices of Miss Hill."(7)

This was certainly not the case in Glasgow, where an authoritarian style of management developed, with the personal and moralistic practices necessarily included, owing much to Octavia Hill but also able to draw upon a pernicious Calvinistic moralism which has a particular heritage amongst the Scottish bourgeoisie.

1.3 The Background to Housing Management in Glasgow

Glasgow has always been a city of paradoxes and contradictions. By the middle of the nineteenth century Glasgow had achieved a substantial measure of economic prosperity, which was founded on the heavy engineering industries that grew up on the banks of the river Clyde. These industries required massive workforces and, as a direct result of this requirement, the city's population grew from 359,000 in 1851 to 1,088,000 in 1931. The boundaries of the city had been
extended from 5,603 acres in 1846 to 39,725 acres (or over 62 square miles) by 1938. (8)

Behind this rapid growth there was a human tale of misery and exploitation, which was nowhere more apparent than in the housing conditions. In the process of the expansion little thought was given to the housing needs of Glasgow's growing proletariat. (9) Glasgow's working class were forced to live in appalling cramped conditions with overcrowding, lack of air or light in dilapidated tenement houses. As early as 1818 there had been an outbreak of typhus fever in the wynds and closes of Glasgow's slums, and throughout the early part of the century there were periodic outbreaks of epidemics such as typhus, fever and smallpox in the city. The web of 'social problems' arising from such a concentration of poor conditions meant that when Glasgow's municipal authorities turned their attention to them, housing and health were defined as part of the same problem. (10)

Throughout the early nineteenth century there were a number of Police Acts passed in Glasgow which contained clauses dealing with sanitary provision in the city. However, it was not until the middle of the century that the association
between bad health and bad housing came to be fully recognised. The 1840s and 1850s saw the introduction of various Nuisances Removal Acts which 'empowered' medical officers of health, as a last resort, to prohibit the use for human habitation of premises which were 'injurious to health'. In 1842 the Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Classes of Great Britain was issued. This report recognised the links between the massing of populations in enclosed areas, bad housing and ill health. (11)

In 1846 Glasgow Town Council used the provisions of the various Nuisances Removal Acts to acquire property in the High Street, Saltmarket and Gorbals areas of the city. The first attempt at slum clearance in Glasgow had begun. In 1843 an Inspector of Cleansing was introduced and was given powers to prevent overcrowding and to see that houses and closes were kept in a 'clean condition'. These powers had little practical outcome and it was not until 1857 that public health was differentiated as a special function of municipal government. In 1863 the first Medical Officer of Health–Dr William Tennant Gairdner– was appointed, initially on a part-time basis. In 1866 Gairdner extended the 'voluntary' scheme for
sanitary visitation, and organised large numbers of volunteers to 'visit the homes of the working people and to encourage cleanliness of persons and of homes'. This idea was to become firmly established in the practice of the Corporation housing management department in the twentieth century, with the introduction of Nurse Inspectresses.

In 1862 another City of Glasgow Police Act gave the authorities wider powers to deal with overcrowding, through measuring the cubic contents of a house. If the cubic contents were found to be under 2,000 feet a 'ticket' was placed on the door or stair wall, on which the cubic space and the number of people allowed to reside within the house was stated. This was based on 300 cubic feet per adult or two children under eight years of age. These 'ticketed houses' were visited by Public Health Inspectors— in those days known as the Sanitary Police— between 11.30pm and 5.00am 'for the purpose of discovering overcrowding'. If the legal number was exceeded the tenants were prosecuted. It was recognised by the authorities that these tenants were not the 'respectable' working class and therefore segregation became part of the overall strategy of surveillance:
"...the better class of tenants avoid such houses and even their neighbourhood. Consequently, landlords are always warned before tickets are put up in fresh localities, so that they may save the reputation of their property by getting rid of the overcrowding tenants..." (12)

The interests of the landlords and the policing of Glasgow's poor seemed to have taken precedence over the provision of adequate housing. Under the guise of 'inspecting houses for overcrowding' houses were 'ticketed' according to the 'character of the property' and the 'character of the tenant'. There were many houses which legally could have been 'ticketed', but escaped owing to the 'character of the tenant'. (13) The segregation inherent in such a policy was to be continued in later years by the corporations' housing department, as was the authoritarian methods associated with such an approach.

In an attempt to resolve the housing situation in the city a special agency, the Glasgow City Improvement Commissioners, was formed. In 1866 the first City Improvements Act was passed. Under this Act the Lord Provost, Magistrates and City Council, in their capacity as Improvement Trustees, were empowered to 'purchase and clear away
insanitary areas in the congested centre of the city', around Glasgow Cross. Thus, the Housing Department became known as the City Improvements Trust (CIT). The purpose of the 1866 Act was threefold:

"[a] To remove the worst parts of Old Glasgow (Cross; Trongate; Calton between London Road, Great Hamilton Street; Gorbals- Main Street) and to replace the Streets and improve the accommodation by leasing sites or building dwellings for working classes.

[b] to improve the communications of the area in the force of three proposals for central railway termini which might prevent new roads and streets being laid after their completion.

[c] To acquire extra lands to re-house displaced persons from the overcrowded areas and to form a N.E. Park (Alexandra Park) lands at Kennyhill (N.E.) 89 ac; Overnewton (W) and Oatlands (S.E) southside."(14)

The CIT had the power to erect new houses on the cleared sites but, apart from a few Model Lodging Houses, this was not taken advantage of until 1889, the land being feued to private building speculators.
The Glasgow Improvements Act of 1871 extended the powers contained in the 1866 Act for the demolition of property as well as 'to provide housing for the working class population of the city displaced by the clearances'. As a result, the council built two 'model tenements' and a men's lodging house in 1871. The lodging houses were under the control of a superintendent, who was supported by three warders. The notion of social control contained in these titles was real, many of the superintendents were ex-NCOs from the Army or ex-detectives. (15) There were also a number of women workers employed who 'came daily to do the cleaning'. This system of management, based on a hierarchical structure and a sexual division of labour, was to become more evident in later developments. However, the financial crisis of 1878, with the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank, put a stop to any investment in housebuilding. The CIT were regarded as one of the worst landlords in the city, with old property in the scheduled areas merely being patched-up instead of demolished.

In 1895 the Corporation of Glasgow was invested with the powers and property of the Improvement Trustees, and two years later a second
Improvement Act was passed, to enable the corporation to 'clear and rebuild seven congested and insanitary areas' and to erect houses for the 'poorest classes'. However, the re-housing of the displaced tenants of the 1866 Act was regarded as a matter for private enterprise and there was considerable opposition to any suggestion that the Trustees should erect new houses as a general policy. It was not until twenty-two years after the passing of the 1866 Act that the Trustees finally began to build blocks of flats for the tenants who were displaced by demolition schemes.

Between 1850 and 1900 private enterprise built over 100,000 houses in Glasgow's 'inner city'-mainly 1-2 bedroom flats in 4-storey tenement blocks. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, ill-health and poverty were characteristic of much of this 'inner-city' area. On the other hand, only 2,199 houses were built by the corporation under the Improvement Acts. The responsibility for managing corporation properties was handed over to outside factors, who collected rents and attended to any repairs. However, in 1892 a new management system was devised and a General Manager was appointed to take over the supervision of the properties of the CIT. Below the manager a number of caretakers were
appointed. The caretakers (later to become known as 'Resident Factors') were responsible for the daily inspection of the property in which they lived, and were 'brought into close contact with the tenants'. The benefits of such a system of management were fully recognised by the corporation:

"....This method of management has proved to be very satisfactory. It has resulted in a financial saving, and brought all the properties and tenants directly under the control of the corporation." (16)

So by the end of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that housing conditions for Glasgow's working class were abominable, a rudimentary decentralised system of housing management began to emerge. This system drew on the experience of private factors, had a strong moral educative element in the style of Octavia Hill and worked on an authoritarian basis aimed at social control through the policing of Glasgow's working class in their place of abode and in the dead of night.

By the end of this period the housing of Glasgow's working class was fast becoming the most important political issue in the city. In 1914
Glasgow had the most densely populated area in Europe, with 700,000 people resident within three square miles of Glasgow Cross. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the corporation still concerned themselves with slum clearance but were not concerned with the public provision of housing. (17) In 1916 the corporation set up a small commission to investigate the 'housing problem' in the city. This commission consisted of the City Engineer, the Medical Officer of Health, the Chief Sanitary Inspector, the Manager of the CIT and 'men known to be familiar with working class housing in the city'. This committee directed much of its attention to 'improving slum areas'. However, they also decided to constitute a Special Sub-committee of the corporation to concentrate on housing matters, and from this the Housing Committee of the Corporation of Glasgow was established.

The Housing Committee combined action regarding slum clearance with estimates of the housing needs of the city. Their recommendations, like those of the 1917 Royal Scottish Commission on Housing, were prevented from being implemented by the 1914-18 War. It was not until 1919 that Parliament passed the Housing (Town Planning)
(Scotland) Act, which established the principle of state subsidy for housing for the general needs of the working class, a notion first mooted officially by the 1917 Royal Commission, and fought for by Glasgow's men and women in the 1915 Rent Strike. (18)

The 1919 Act required each local authority to give certain particulars regarding the existing accommodation in its areas and an assessment of the number of new houses which would be required to make adequate provision for any shortages which were found. Prior to 1919 the Housing Committee of the Corporation had been advised by the City Engineer on housing matters and the practical work in connection with this had been undertaken by his department. When the new responsibilities under the 1919 Act were laid upon the corporation, it was realised that the question of housing was one involving a considerable amount of specialised work and it was decided that a separate organisation should be created by the corporation to deal with housing matters. In September 1919 the Housing Department of the Corporation was created. The then Chief Sanitary Inspector, a Mr Peter Fyfe, was appointed the first Director of
Housing. Nevertheless, the City Engineer was to remain a fairly powerful figure. (19)

The Housing Department's work in the immediate inter-War period consisted of estimating the housing needs of the city, and the building of new dwellings. In the Housing Committee's first estimate, made in 1920, the number of new houses required was put at 57,000— the numbers game had begun. In fact, between 1920 and 1939, the corporation erected over 50,000 new houses and an extra 10,000 had been built by private enterprise. About 30 per cent of the corporation's output of houses were erected in slum-clearance schemes in the older parts of the city under the Housing Acts of 1923 and 1930; and a further 46 per cent in the new housing schemes such as Carntyne, Mosspark and Knightswood on greenfield sites on the outskirts of the city.

However, the city's new housing schemes were not all of the same standard. The inter-War housing schemes were stratified into three groups based on the rentals charged, irrespective of the types of houses built. The three groups were named 'Rehousing', 'Intermediate' and 'Ordinary'. The 'rehousing' schemes, like Blackhill and Moorepark, had particularly low rentals because of the higher
subsidy that was provided under certain Housing Acts— the 1930 and 1935 Acts. The latter aimed at 'de-crowding' and the former to slum-clearance. 'Rehousing' schemes were built for tenants who were to be rehoused from slum clearance areas, or for those tenants who required houses but whose income was below a fixed minimum. On the other hand, 'ordinary' houses, built under the 1919 Act to meet the "general needs of the working class", were let at much higher rents despite the fact that the Act did not require rent levels to be "economic". Put simply, the 'ordinary' houses were let to a certain strata of the working class which, in general, meant clerks, businessmen, school-teachers and professionals., with the total exclusion of people in unskilled or semi-skilled work and very few skilled workers. In 1933 the Housing Committee introduced an 'Intermediate' class of houses, for those who did not 'qualify' for 'rehousing' houses and who were unable to afford the rental charged for 'ordinary' houses. In short, the allocation of houses led to the spatial segregation of Glasgow's working class population in addition to the social segregation reflected in the class structure (see S. Damer, 1991).
On an organisational level, there was a distinct division of responsibility between the Housing Department and the City Improvements Department during the initial period when the housing department was formed. The Manager of the City Improvements Department was responsible for factoring all City Improvements property, as well as the municipal houses built by the housing department. The Manager of the City Improvements Department, and not the Director of Housing, was responsible for the letting of Corporation houses, which he (and it was always a male) carried out in accordance with the stratified plans devised by the Housing Committee. The Director of Housing, on the other hand, was responsible for carrying into effect the Housing Committee's decisions on all matters affecting the provision of new houses. The Housing Department was responsible for the acquisition of the necessary land for housing, the design of the houses themselves, the layout of the housing schemes, the supervision and construction of the houses by direct labour. In short, the Manager of the City Improvements Department let and factored the houses and the Director of Housing was responsible to the Housing Committee for the provision of new houses and their maintenance. This underlying balance of
administrative power often led to protracted inter-departmental disputes over the development and design of housing schemes. (20) These disputes continued into the immediate post-war period.

So far we have been mainly concerned with the overall structure of the housing department. However, some of the internal workings of the department provide useful insights into the ideology and practices of housing management in Glasgow in this period. As we have seen, the beginnings of housing management can be traced back to the work of Octavia Hill and her associates. The relationship between Hill and 'her tenants', despite claims to the contrary, was one that was often repeated by local authority housing management departments, and was described by her biographer thus:

"Octavia had defined her business relation to her tenants as one of 'perfect strictness'.......the word Octavia used to express her ideal for the personal relationship between herself and her tenants was 'perfect respectfulness'..." (21)

In Glasgow 'strictness' was an aphorism which working class tenants came to understand as the mainstay of housing management in the city. The
raids on 'ticketed' houses, mentioned above, was only one aspect of a system of housing management which developed over the years, in which a relationship of 'perfect respectfulness' was the guiding principle. The Municipal Commission Report of 1904 made this evident, with regard to the need for Caretakers:

"...Mr Menzies says, 'I think a caretaker is a very valuable officer in connection with any housing scheme. He both reduces disorder amongst the tenants and prevents tenants troubling each other, and sees that the closes are kept in clean and proper order. I don't think a housing scheme for the poor or dishoused population is properly equipped unless there is a caretaker...." (22)

According to this witness a roving social worker-cum-health inspector was required to keep certain sections of Glasgow's working class in order in their place of abode. It was not long before such a practice was adopted by the corporation. In 1923 the first post-War slum clearance scheme was opened at Hamiltonhill. The corporation decided to monitor the response of the tenants to their new housing conditions, and regular inspection of the houses was carried out, initially by a Public Health nurse from the Public
Health Department then by a "Nurse Inspectress" appointed by the Housing Department. Visits were made to all the houses in the scheme on a regular basis, with special attention being given to those 'found in a dirty condition, to which repeated visits were made'. At this time there were also resident caretakers in Hamiltonhill and other schemes responsible for rent collection and general supervision of tenants, but confusion arose concerning the respective duties of the inspectress and the resident caretakers.

A report in August 1927, by a special subcommittee on Insanitary Areas, helped to clear up the confusion with the appointment of a special officer attached to the Health Department. This Nurse Inspectress, employed by the City Improvements Department, was the first of what were to become commonly known as 'Green Ladies', and much later Housing Visitors (see S. Damer, 1991, for three categories of 'Green Ladies'). The role of the nurse inspectress was to 'exercise intimate supervisory duties over the less satisfactory tenants'. (23) The powers accorded to the corporation to carry out such inspections were allowed under both the Glasgow Corporation (Police) Order Act, 1904, Section 9; and Section
56 of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1925. The former Act gave authority for a sanitary inspector to deal summarily with houses, bedding or furniture, found to be in a 'dirty condition', and to issue notice 'on the spot' to the occupier to clean the house within twenty-four hours, under a penalty. The latter Act enacted that 'houses provided under this Act shall be open at all times for inspection to the Local Authority or to any duly authorised officer of the Local Authority'. Therefore, the state, at both the local and the national level, supported this pernicious intrusion into the homes of working class Glaswegians.

As a means of sorting out the 'unsatisfactory' tenants from the rest the nurse inspectress graded slum clearance houses in terms of cleanliness and order, and separated them into three different categories—'clean', 'fair' and 'dirty'. Not surprisingly, the 'clean' houses provided the nurse inspectress with 'complete satisfaction'. Houses in the 'dirty' category accounted for 10 per cent of the total houses under inspection in 1927, and the nurse inspectors' attitude to these tenants is worth quoting in full:

"There remains a group, which varies in the different schemes and which may be roughly
computed at about 10 per cent, who may be regarded as difficult or even incorrigible tenants. This may seem a high percentage, but it may be pointed out that this percentage does not apply equally throughout all the schemes; in one or two of the smaller schemes the percentage of this class is lower or does not exist. A very great deal of attention has been given to this group, and after the experience I have had I am satisfied that the results of repeated visitation have had the effect of removing a number of what at first sight seemed to be incorrigible tenants into a higher category. The work of endeavouring to impress tenants of this group is slow, and when one goes fully into the cases and learns the individual history of the families some leniency must be extended towards them. In practically every case there is a definite cause for their non-progress, usually illness, low mentality, profound ignorance, pregnancy, child birth, physical disability, and in a few cases alcoholism". (24)

There are a number of important points concerning this ideology about the "undeserving poor" which these urban gatekeepers operated with. Firstly, the judgement about whether a house was 'clean', 'fair' or 'dirty' seemed to lie solely
with the nurse inspectress, though supported as corporation policy, which presumably meant that it was her own standard of 'cleanliness' that she was imposing on working class tenants—a powerful role indeed! Secondly, as the above quotation makes clear, her belief in her own 'educational' crusade led her to adopt a victim-blaming-ideology to support the general beliefs about the need for 'improvement' amongst poor tenants which was part of a dominant perspective accepted by middle class professionals.

This subjective, even arbitrary, judgement was never justified. It was sustained in a situation documented in numerous official reports on housing conditions, where there were two families sharing the same two-roomed house, shortage of sanitary facilities in many houses, a chronic shortage of decent houses across the city and poverty on a wide scale. In this situation Glasgow corporation decided that what the tenants of the city really required was discipline and regimentation into the standards set by the nurse inspectresses. The total number of houses in the slum clearance schemes that were under the supervision of the nurse inspectors in 1935 was 10,576, situated in 57 'rehousing' schemes. (25) However, the number of
houses that were recorded as 'dirty' amounted to 44, a mere 0.4 per cent of the total. Therefore, despite the miniscule numbers involved, these strategically placed "urban gatekeepers" (R. Pahl, 1975) were driven by a powerful ideology which was confused and contradictory but had real consequences for a number of Glasgow's tenants as well as setting an example to others.

Unlike the Octavia Hill system of housing management, where all the duties were carried out by one person, Glasgow corporation had a number of officials 'supervising' council tenants throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The other important officials in this context were the Resident Caretakers, later to become known as Resident Factors. The resident factors were attached to the CIT, the house-letting department of the Corporation. They collected rents, looked after repairs complaints and, in co-operation with the nurse inspectors, ensured that 'windows and common stairs were thoroughly washed'. The resident factors dealt with the collection of rents etc from tenants of 'intermediate' and 'rehousing' schemes only, while tenants of 'ordinary' schemes were trusted to make such payments to the Head Office of the CIT, at that time situated in the Trongate. Being the sort
of people they were, the resident factors also collected payments in respect of the hire purchase of furniture from tenants in 'rehousing' schemes, kept a list of defaulters and informed hire purchase companies of tenants who were a 'bad risk'. (26)

Each resident factor was provided with a house, free of rent and rates, in the scheme where they worked, and were thereby well known to all tenants. They dealt with an average of 500/600 intermediate and rehousing houses, and were linked to Head Office via a supervisor, who they reported to daily. From collecting rents through to evictions, the resident factors operated a system where Glasgow's council tenants 'knew their place'. These individuals held a noose over the heads of Glasgow's council tenants in the shape of their 'own bible': Court Action. It was a noose that was to be tightened on many occasions after the Second World War, as we shall see in the next section dealing with this period.

1.4. Housing Management in Glasgow 1945–1970:

"...the housing problem for the lower income groups in this country has not been solved since the industrial revolution." (27)
Aneurin Bevan was referring in the above quotation to the housing situation in Britain at the end of the Second World-War. The housing situation in Glasgow in this period, while not unique, was in many ways worse than that which prevailed in other British and European cities. (28) To understand the changes in housing management in post-War Glasgow, we need to be reminded of the enormity of the situation regarding housing conditions in the immediate aftermath of the War. The expansion and changing function of the role of housing management must be located in the context of the changing situation regarding slum clearance, the building of the peripheral schemes, 'comprehensive redevelopment' and the building of high rise blocks of flats. Although housing management practices were slow to change, we have to contextualise them in this way, as many of the justifications for the adoption of new ideas in the 1970s and 1980s constantly refer back to the failures of this period and the lessons which were learned by housing management.

Between 1919 and August 1939 of the total houses built by Glasgow corporation, 25,537 were tenement houses, 15,552 were flatted four-in-a-block houses, and 8,227 were cottage type houses.
In the immediate post-War period the Housing Committee concentrated on constructing three and four-apartment houses. The Housing Committee, it should be remembered, was responsible for all policy decisions on housing matters affecting the city. During the War years Glasgow corporation's role in building new permanent houses was seriously curtailed, due to shortage of labour and materials. Between 1940 and 1945 only 4,882 permanent houses were completed by the corporation. (29) The increasing pressure on the housing accommodation in the city was exacerbated by the lack of repairs that was carried out to existing dwellings. The latter factor led to a steady deterioration in a number of properties. The situation for many people in the city was grim, to put it mildly. As official reports noted:

"It is estimated that some 100,000 houses will require to be built to replace unfit houses, to relieve overcrowding, and for general needs". (30)

Therefore, at the end of the War, housing remained the 'largest public health problem' in the city. There were no 'homes for the heroes' and, as the discussion in chapter two reveals, Glasgow's working class had to struggle for the continuance of the provision of council housing.
Glasgow still had the unenviable reputation of containing some of the worst slums in Western Europe. The problems faced by working class people in the city seeking a decent form of shelter remained acute. (31) However, council housing had become a subsidised social service by 1945, and the corporation had acquired the power, through the house-letting system, to determine the social composition of large areas of the city.

The immediate response to the economic and housing problems in Glasgow came in the first major effective planning document for the Greater Glasgow area, The Clyde Valley Regional Plan of 1946. (32) The plan covered not only the Clyde Valley, but also the county of Ayrshire to the south west. However, the main concern of this plan, for our purposes, was the recommendation that there should be a planned decentralisation of both population and industry from Glasgow; a large-scale restructuring of the housing and labour markets. Glasgow's overspill problem, estimated at 250,000, was to be accommodated by housing schemes on the 'edge' of the built-up area and within and beyond the green belt in New and Expanded Towns; 'overspill reception areas'.
The Clyde Valley Plan had been prepared under the auspices of an advisory committee, convened by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1943, containing representatives from all the region's local authorities. Glasgow corporation, mainly through the Master of Works and City Engineer Robert Bruce, objected to the plans initially (he resigned in 1947) and argued against any loss of land within the city's boundaries for the proposed 'green belt' (see S. Damer, 1990). However, by the 1950s the corporation had come to accept the role of East Kilbride (set up in 1947) and supported the idea of the other New Town at Cumbernauld (designated in 1956).

By the early 1950s the housing situation in Glasgow remained desperate. The house waiting list had stood at around 90,000 families in 1949, and continued to grow. (33) As Bruce had indicated in his own plan, all of the people who needed rehoused could not be accommodated in the 'overspill' plans highlighted in the Clyde Valley Regional Plan. So from the late-1940s there was a 10 year period of intense development of the four large peripheral schemes. While some of these schemes contained a significant proportion of cottage-type dwellings, like the inter-War
schemes, the trend was to three and four-storey tenement flats. These peripheral working class schemes absorbed over 10 per cent of Glasgow's population, and by 1979 Castlemilk contained 9,752 houses, Drumchapel 10,346 houses, Easterhouse 14,961 houses, and Pollok 11,528 houses with a total population of 160,000 (34). They came to be epitomised in the words of Glasgow comedian/folksinger Billy Connolly as: "deserts wi windae's".

They had been built to very high density and there was a shift to more one-apartment and three-apartment dwellings in these schemes. Little consideration had been given to the needs of the incoming tenants to these schemes, and there was minimal provision of amenities and community facilities. As chapter four reveals, the struggle by tenants' organisations to have such facilities provided began almost immediately the houses were occupied. The creation of a more humane environment has been a recurring theme in much of the official literature on the 'peripheral' schemes, and recent developments in Glasgow suggest that some of these schemes will have a much higher profile in the imagery of the policy-
makers than has hitherto been the case, a point we will return to at a later stage.

In the mid-1950s there was an acute shortage of land and a growing awareness that the policy of building houses on what vacant land was available on the periphery of the city was not solving Glasgow's chronic housing problems. Therefore, around this period, there was an important policy shift towards those living in unfit properties throughout the city. In 1957 the corporation began its post-War slum clearance programme with the 'comprehensive redevelopment' of a site in the Hutchesontown/Gorbals district of the city. The programme of 'comprehensive redevelopment' was extended to other areas of the city (Govan, Royston, Townhead, the Calton and Springburn) and whole tenemental neighbourhoods were demolished. The people who were displaced by this process, like their grannies and grandpas before them, had little say in the actual outcome. (35) 'Participation' in decision making was a long way off.

In spite of the overspill policy, the building of peripheral schemes and 'comprehensive redevelopment', Glasgow was still faced with a chronic housing shortage in the late 1950s and
early 1960s (see, for example, J. B. Cullingworth, 1968). The problem was apparently exacerbated with the scarcity of building land in the city, though the abundance of new office blocks in the city gives a clearer indication of the corporation's priorities. Nevertheless, in an attempt to resolve the situation the corporation, in response to the new subsidy regulations, decided to erect a number of multi-storey blocks of flats, the first of which were Moss Heights in Cardonald which were completed as early as 1953. By 1982 321 high-rise blocks had been built in Glasgow, ranging from 8 to 31 storeys. In 1986 flats in multi-storey blocks amounted to 24,949, or 14.79 per cent of the District Council's housing stock. In some districts of the city multi-storey flats accounted for 36.07 per cent (Springburn) and 39.68 per cent (City North) of the housing stock. (36) Obviously, the 'streets in the air' had caught the imagination of the planners and politicians, and Glasgow's history of tenemental living was exploited to promote high-rise living (P. Worsdall 1979). By the beginning of the 1970s the drastic demolition and clearance approach and the building of high-rise housing became increasingly unacceptable, both politically
and economically, as one ex-leader of the Council put it in 1974:

"In Glasgow we will not be building any more high flats after this. It is just not worth the candle. We have had a large number of complaints from both young and old people. The planners should have told us about the difficulties before they were built— but they did not. We had to find out for ourselves...They are socially undesirable." (37)

It was not the planners, and few of the politicians, but Glasgow's council tenants who suffered the consequences of these 'socially undesirable' buildings. However, it should be remembered that it was the major construction companies who were the real beneficiaries of this phase of council house-building (P. Dunleavy, 1981). It is somewhat ironic that these companies profited to such an extent from the last mass house-building phase in post-war Britain. But it is against all of these background factors that we need to locate certain changes in housing management practice in Glasgow during the same period. This should also assist us in contextualising later shifts in policy orientation and ideology in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The housing department in the immediate post-War years was under the control of the Director of Housing and his Deputy the Assistant Director. Below them a chief official was in charge of the activities of the various sections of the housing department—Civil Engineering, Architecture, Surveying and the Clerical section. In addition to this the corporation had, since 1921, developed its own Direct Labour Organisation. This section expanded rapidly in the post-War years, even though the majority of corporation houses in the city had been built by private contractors. While we are not particularly concerned with other forms of public rented housing, it is worth pointing out that from 1937 onwards (to April 1989) the Scottish Special Housing Association took on the responsibility of providing rented housing in the city. (see chapter three). The SSHA was not a housing association, in the conventional sense, but was funded directly by the Scottish Office and effectively influenced by its authority. The SSHA took applicants from the corporation's waiting list when considering applicants and, therefore, was to become an important source of housing for some of Glasgow's working population. The
corporation also 'factored' some of the SSHA housing. (38)

The City Improvements Department operated a points scheme, as early as 1942, based according to the year in which the application was made and the degree of overcrowding, as part of the letting regulations. In 1944 the corporation revised the letting regulations. It was agreed that the degree of need of the applicants was to be the only determining factor. However, it was also decided to insert a residential qualification into the regulations. A prospective householder, or his wife, required to have resided in the city for at least ten years before being considered for housing accommodation. There were also two main categories of applicants which were to be accepted on the waiting list—overcrowded families, and newly married and homeless. The former category were to be allocated approximately 90 per cent of the available accommodation, and the remaining 10 per cent were to be allocated to the latter category. (39) In other words, this was a system of allocation based on priority groups and a points system for grading applications. This allocation system existed, with some minor changes in categorisation, into the mid-1960s and the
points system was not finally overhauled until the early-1980s. (see chapter five).

This was the allocations policy as officially documented. But to understand the operations of such a system we must return to the role of the nurse inspectors and the resident factors, who were ultimately responsible for administering it on a day-to-day basis. The important point that is being re-emphasised here is that, like the inter-War period, the housing management department's relationship with council tenants was mainly on an individual basis during this era. The ideology behind this individualistic approach was both oppressive and regulatory. The consequences of such a housing management strategy were also divisive, with strict selection policies putting the 'incorrigible' tenants into the lowest standard of housing.

By 1944 Glasgow corporation had 65 resident factors, 6 supervisors, 6 full-time and 13 part-time 'health visitors', the latter were trained nurses involved in the supervision of mothers and new-born babies. The resident factors were based in both intermediate and rehousing schemes, whereas the nurse inspectors were responsible for the visitation of tenants in the latter schemes.
The resident factors collected rents door-to-door or payment could be made at their house, where a room was fitted out as an office or in some cases a hut was provided. Ordinary scheme tenants were still trusted to pay their rents on a regular basis and never suffered the discipline which re-housing or intermediate scheme tenants faced on a regular basis. Each individual health visitor was responsible for approximately 1,250 houses, averaging over 5,000 visits a year. In April 1944, at a special sub-committee meeting on letting, the then sub-Convener of the Housing Committee (councillor J. McInnes) proposed a number of changes to this system. The main proposals included the following:

"a) making resident factors responsible for the lodgement of cash in the bank, therefore ending the necessity of attending Head Office each morning, b) Additional employment of health visitors, and the extension of the system of 'visitation' to the 'intermediate' schemes, c) As health visiting was considered essentially a woman's job the substitution of the title health visitor with female health visitor, d) that before individuals become tenants of corporation houses they be visited by a health visitor and: 'where it
is revealed that their house is not kept in a reasonably clean and satisfactory condition then they should be made aware of where they fall short of the desired standard and given the opportunity of improving'. e) Supervisors to be responsible for the supervision of the Division and dealing with applications for transfers, complaints, condition of houses prior to re-letting etc". (40)

This proposal was met with a response from the Manager of the City Improvements Department, the City Chamberlain, and the Medical Officer of Health. The manager of the City Improvements Department approved of the expansion of the role of the health visitors, and raised little objection to rents being collected at district level. However, the Medical Officer of Health, while supporting the extension of the duties of the housing visitors, objected to their services being transferred from the health department to the City Improvements Department on the grounds that 'there was an important distinction to be made between the functions of housing management and the functions of the health department'. The justification for this separation was based on his view of the proper role of health visitors:
"Each inspectress is given a certain area and her work consists of visiting, advising and helping the families. It has been found that the trained nurse is an acceptable person for this medico-social function. It should be emphasised that her functions are as much those of a housing inspectress, and I regard it as essential that they should be kept on this level. The health of the family, particularly the women and children, is and should be as much her concern as the manner in which the house is used and kept". (41)

These differences were not merely semantic but based on the belief that, under existing legislation, the nurse inspectress's and health visitors could best carry out the function of assisting in the reproduction of Glasgow's working class from within the Health Department. A special meeting between the City Improvements Department, the Divisional Sanitary Inspectors and the nurse inspectors was held on the 31st of May 1944, in an attempt to resolve these differences. Out of this meeting it was agreed that rent collecting was to be changed to a district system, the nurse inspectresses were to remain within the Public Health Department, and that supervision was to be extended to the intermediate schemes. The first
two of these proposals were consequently accepted by the Housing Committee, but the supervision of tenants in intermediate schemes did not begin until 1949.

Under the provisions of the 1949 Housing (Scotland) Act it became no longer necessary to build council housing 'only for the working classes' but, reflecting the populism of Bevan, council housing was now intended to be for all classes (see M. Foot, 1975). Glasgow corporation, responding to this change, decided that such large areas as Drumchapel and Castlemilk should have 'diversified communities', and housing would be provided on the basis of an economic rent. Drumchapel and Castlemilk were two of the 'new-ordinary' schemes, and the supervision of tenants who were rehoused from slum clearance areas began in 1955. The work of the nurse inspectresses was often presented, as in the above accounts, as a necessary function of the Public Health department. However, it is clear from the many references in official reports and departmental memo's to the 'incorrigible tenant', the 'dirty tenant' or the 'unsatisfactory tenant', that a conscious process of stigmatisation, supported by
officialdom, was taking place. One example of the prevailing wisdom will suffice:

"The dirty tenants are usually found to be irregular at paying rent and the children are the most destructive. Often they are under the supervision of probation officers and are well known to the police. Most of them are below par mentally and often they have large families. It has been found that the chief reasons for dirty tenants are domestic worries, money worries, wives not getting a fair share of the husband's wages, low mental standard, gambling, drink, criminal history, and just laziness". (42)

Glasgow's Medical Officer of Health, applying rhetoric similar to nineteenth century accounts of the undeserving poor, the criminal classes, the residuum, the submerged tenth or the lumpenproletariat, was explicitly indicating that housing management should be primarily aimed at the 'underclass'. However, like most contemporary academic discussions of the 'underclass', this account is both a-historical and based on little or no systematic analysis, reverting to ideas which locates the problems of society in a small minority of individuals and families (see J. Macnicol, 1987 and A. Walker, 1990). This notion
has been popular throughout this century, and Titmuss commented on a long but discontinuous concern with:

"...a segment of the population, supposedly characterised by similar traits and thought to represent a closed, pathological entity". (43)

It was on the basis of such stigmatization of a substantial section of Glasgow’s council tenants that the policy of selection and segregation, which subsequently resulted in the identification of 'difficult to let estates', was grounded. The annual reports of the Medical Officer of Health throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s contain many similar references to the one given above. These reports continuously refer to the importance of supervision for the 'less satisfactory tenants', and also, that these same tenants were more likely to get into rent arrears than other tenants, a view given academic credence by Brennan:

"In spite of the improvement in the reputation of the Rehousing schemes there are still, of course, some tenants who are problems, and there are still tenants who for one reason or another are not able to pay the full rent. Very often they are the same people...." (44)
However, if we look at the actual figures contained in the reports of the Medical Officer of Health they do not fit with such assumptions. In the annual report of 1958, for example, the figures for houses under supervision were as follows: a) Ordinary scheme houses: 6,433 houses visited, of which 38 (0.6 per cent) were classified as 'dirty', b) Intermediate scheme houses: 5,075 visited, of which only 18 (0.35 per cent) were classified as 'dirty', c) Rehousing scheme houses: 14,910 visited, of which 89 (0.6 per cent) were classified as 'dirty'. Tenants who were evicted, or left owing rent, in 1958 totalled 47. Of this group, the number whose house came under the 'dirty' category amounted to a phenomenal 1! Of the 487 tenants who left 'voluntarily' in 1958 the number whose house came under the 'dirty' category amounted to a mere 7. 1958 was not an exceptional year, and similar figure are available for most of this period (see Reports of Medical Officer of Health). What is significant is the importance the City Factors Department (as the Housing Management Department became known on the 28th June 1950) placed on these factors and what it indicates about housing management ideology in the early post-war years. A discussion of this issue will follow the section
on resident factors, as there are a number of issues here which are related to the debate over housing management ideology.

The actual duties of resident factors were discussed briefly in the previous section. These duties remained much the same in the post-War years. However, not only was there an expansion in the number of resident factors but they began to become more concerned with rent collection and, more specifically, rent arrears. Despite the qualitative changes in the new schemes the local state ensured that the constant policing of tenants continued. By 1959 the City Factors Department was factoring 111,779 dwellings throughout the city, and was by then employing 386 staff. At the top of this administrative structure was the City Factor and his Deputy with 6 District Offices, where 58 District Inspectors, District Supervisors and resident factors were employed. (45)

Resident factors were responsible, on average, for 600 tenants on monthly tenancies. Rents were either paid at the factor's small local office or collected at the tenant's house, sometimes on a weekly basis. They were also responsible for inspecting properties; dealing initially with
applications from the tenants for transfers and exchanges, liaising with the nurse inspectresses, the Police department, the Childrens department and where necessary bodies such as the R.S.P.C.C. etc; deal with repairs and 'endeavours to deal amicably to adjust matters in dispute between tenants'. (46) Their role was, quite simply, to police, discipline and re-moralize the lumpen sections of Glasgow's working class who had moved from slum-clearance areas to the new post-war schemes.

Thus, a thoroughly efficient system of decentralised housing management, based on functional differentiations and an authoritarian ideology with a long ancestry, existed in Glasgow long before 'decentralisation' became an issue for academics and policy makers. One of the most important, but rarely documented, powers that resident factors had was control over 'their tenants', as one former resident factor described the situation:

"The Resident Factors were introduced under the City Improvements Trust, mainly in Intermediate and Re-housing schemes, poorer areas. This was after the First World War. We were treated as wee God's. The tenants knew that he was
a powerful figure in terms of access to housing. Their responsibilities including collecting rents, allocations and so forth. Their was no real professional training provided for the Resident Factors. Apart from three days training at the beginning, and reporting to a Supervisor, they were left to themselves. However, in most cases, they had previous experience in the job as private factors ".(47)

The main reason that resident factors were regarded as "wee Gods" was undoubtedly related to their power to enforce a warrant sale on tenants in arrears of rent. The power of warrant sales and evictions are the most overt authoritarian methods of housing management that have existed this century. The fact that this process in Glasgow, which prevailed into the 1970s, has remained undocumented is a mystery. For this was no minor management strategy, to be used only in special cases. In 1957 6,900 formal notices terminating tenancies were issued to 'intermediate' and 'rehousing' scheme tenants, which was followed by 1,400 actions in court and the obtaining of 900 ejection decrees. (48) By 1959 court actions for rent arrears had risen to 4,600. (49) The number of council tenants who were to come up against this
form of housing management increased on a yearly basis. By 1971 the number of 'court actions' had increased to 21,170. Of these, 16,562 decrees were obtained, 1,895 tenants 'absconded', and 403 tenants were evicted. (50) The statistics involved in this type of action, when taken from the late 1950s to the late-1970s, are quite staggering (see Annual Reports of Housing Management Department). The harassment and human misery which is hidden behind such figures must have been phenomenal.

A system of housing management which included liaising with Sheriff Officers and the legal system on such a regular basis required a certain amount of co-ordination and efficiency. Glasgow corporation's City Factors department built up such an efficient system over a number of years. Some of the resident factors who were employed by the corporation in the post-war years had already gained a certain amount of experience of collecting rent arrears through the courts in their previous employment with private factors. As the corporation did not have a policy on arrears control in the 1940s and early 1950s, this experience, and their previous involvement with Sheriff Officers, must have been invaluable. In any case, the factors department seems to have
operated the system of controlling rent arrears free from any interference from the Housing Committee.

The actual workings of this system were quite complex and, inevitably, different processes were gone through to recover rent arrears from tenants in ordinary houses than those which were adopted in intermediate and rehousing scheme houses. (51) This elaborate procedure was developed over a number of years, and involved not only a number of key officials within the housing department, but also collusion with the Sheriff Officer (Glasgow corporation appointed its own Sheriff Officer to deal with cases of rent arrears). This style of housing management was not only well organised, but was also draconian and reflected the differentiation and stigmatization of council tenants which had arisen from a conscious policy of selection and 'partial segregation' of the 'not so deprived' and the 'very deprived' working class of Glasgow.

Before concluding this section it is important to outline, briefly, the relevant changes in the housing management department in the late 1960s, in relation to the preceding discussion. The nurse inspectresses continued to operate from within the
Public Health department until 1968, when their services were transferred over to the Housing Management Department, as it had been renamed in 1967. During the 1950s and early 1960s the nurse inspectresses operated from within the various housing schemes, when the corporation had 6 district offices. In 1968 their duties had been passed over to Housing Supervisors, and a new Central Transfer and Exchange office had been established at Head Office in India Street. These supervisors conducted their visits from Head Office and reported their results to the District Managers. By 1969, when there were 11 District Offices, the supervisors were based in these offices and were responsible to the District Managers. The supervisors not only took over the responsibility of regular house inspections but, in addition, some of the responsibilities that were previously the domain of the resident factors:

"Housing supervision, within the sphere of Housing Management, is the process of co-ordinating the principles of property inspection and care and maintenance with the welfare of tenants, the enforcement and conditions of tenancy, establishing a good relationship between
landlord and tenant, and working with other departments where a common interest exists. It is essential that the Housing Management Department proves itself capable of managing the housing under its control, creates and sustains the interests of tenants in property and surroundings and establishes trust within the communities. The key person in local housing units is the supervisor, who is located at District Office level and is responsible for up to 3,000 houses...."(52)

The idea of 'establishing trust within the communities' was a new concept, and could not have been an easy task for officials whose latent function was the policing and disciplining of those same 'communities'. However, for the first time the housing management department began to refer to the importance of building up a relationship with tenants organised on a collective basis- 'tenants' associations. This was to be a central feature of housing management strategies in the 1970s and, more particularly, the 1980s.

What this section has sought to emphasise is that, housing management in Glasgow in the post-War years, despite the vast changes in housing
stock in the city, still operated along the lines of the system that had developed in the earlier part of the century. It was largely based on notions of social control and repression, which had evolved since the middle of the nineteenth century and became more sophisticated as housing management ideology developed. Resident Factors and Nurse Inspectresses were relatively autonomous "urban gatekeepers" who played a central role in administering the latent functions of the housing department at a locality level. Housing management came to be based on a division of functions between 'key' officials employed in different departments of the corporation and, to a certain extent, was 'decentralised'. As the years progressed, important decisions on management policy began to be made at Head Office and the functions of officials at district level came under the increasing control and supervision of their 'superiors' at the centre.

As we have seen, throughout this period council tenants were still treated on an individual basis. This individualism led to certain sections of Glasgow's council tenants being identified as a 'problem', a continuing theme in housing management ideology. The
Identification of 'problem tenants', based on notions of 'cleanliness' and 'ability to pay rent', played a significant part of housing management strategy. It is important, in this context, to state that this should not be seen as simply a reflection of an ideology which individual housing officials held, though there must have been a lot of that too. The identification of the 'social problem group', or whatever term was in vogue at the time, has a long history in British social policy. Charles Booth (1886-1901), in his massive study of life in Victorian London, was the originator of the idea of an 'unstable element within the submerged tenth of the population'. In the inter-War years the Mental Deficiency (Wood) Committee introduced the term 'social problem group' in 1929, to denote an aggregate of families which 'comprised a large proportion of high-grade defectives'. During the Second World War, when there was a massive evacuation of children from large towns, the Women's Group on Public Welfare adopted a new standpoint, and the idea of a 'problem group' was replaced with that of 'problem families'. (53) What is being stressed here is that, the identification of 'problem families' through multiple characteristics, e.g. the inability to cope
financially, the neglect of property and children, poor health, untidiness and so forth, is not something that was unique to housing officials in Glasgow corporation. However, as indicated above, like other accounts of such 'problems', the characteristics applied to sections of Glasgow's council tenants were seen as resulting from the 'natural' or 'pathological' weaknesses of individuals or the families own 'internal deficiencies'. Many of these families were born into areas of overwhelming social deprivation, where neighbourhood amenities were almost non-existent and where the prospects of employment were often negligible. The experiences of people living in such conditions are not often recorded, but Jimmy Boyle has left us with a fleeting picture of such an existence in the Gorbals around 1949, which is worth quoting in full:

"Although the architectural structure of the old buildings may have encouraged a sort of closeness, I think the dominant factor for this unity was that everyone was in the same boat, and didn't have two pennies to rub together. The physical surroundings were bad, but that wasn't the fault of the inhabitants. Each householder did their bit to keep the place as clean as possible,
taking turns to clean stairs and if someone was sick then a neighbour would always do the sick person's turn. The houses were as clean as circumstances would allow. If someone in the street died, the neighbours would go round the street houses collecting money in a bedsheets to help the family meet the costs of the burial. Though people couldn't afford much they would usually try to contribute something. From the extreme circumstance of a death to the simple need of borrowing a cup of sugar, help was always at hand". (54)

It is perhaps asking too much to expect outsiders, including corporation officials, to comprehend this culture of survival built on struggle (also, see J. Faley, 1990). The almost constant experience of living in conditions of poverty, which Boyle allows only a glimpse of, were part of much wider social deprivations resulting from an unequal class structure. 'Problem Families' are among those who suffer the worst forms of social deprivation in capitalist society. However, as the above account has shown, what distinguishes 'problem families' from 'the rest' is that they have been designated a 'problem family' by a social agency; in this case
Glasgow corporation. They were clearly being labelled and treated as a problem for the local state.

"Comprehensive redevelopment" (the destruction of large areas of the city) alongside the building of vast new council housing schemes and high-rise developments, were all part of a sustained policy of physical renewal aimed at eradicating the slums. Housing management policy, informed by a selective system of housing allocation, was more concerned with regulating and controlling the 'behaviour' of those sections of Glasgow's working class who they presumed to be 'anti-social' and/or 'potentially disruptive', as one former Labour councillor commented:

"Considering the city's political tradition, there is relatively little interest in the seriously deprived family. This shows itself only too clearly in the city's attitude to the problem of rent arrears cases, and problem families who are recycled in and out of slum tenements and the lowest amenity council schemes". (55)

This paternalistic style of housing management existed throughout the post-War years into the 1970s. The "urban gatekeepers" in Glasgow's housing management department were still using
methods of discipline and terror which their nineteenth century predecessors in the CIT or Octavia Hill would have recognised a mile off. At the end of this period, however, a number of changes began to take place. Until the late 1960s and early 1970s the methods of housing management in Glasgow mainly developed from within the structures of the corporation, and the policies and practices of officials were learned and maintained partly in isolation, though drawing on the ideology of the wider housing management "profession". From the late 1960s a number of government reports on housing management practice began to appear, which were critical of some of the practices of some local authorities, and in the early 1970s a number of changes to local government organisation were made. Local authorities took more cognisance of these developments than of any official reports which had been made in previous years. The 'professionalisation' of housing management also began to be taken seriously during this period, and in Glasgow training through the Institute of Housing Managers increased. (56) For these, and other reasons, housing management in Glasgow in
the 1970s and 1980s began to follow a new course of development.

1.5 Housing Management and Practice in Glasgow 1970-1990:

"...we regard the successful integration of new housing estates into the surrounding community, and the rehabilitation of some older estates where this has not been achieved, as one of the most important tasks facing Scottish local authorities today, perhaps even the most important of all. Without success in this sphere all efforts at slum clearance, education and the physical development of local authority areas can go for nought. Success can only be achieved by proper management of housing estates and attention to the needs of their tenants as communities, whether the estates are large or small. We are convinced that any authorities which do not pay proper attention to these matters will be unable to meet the challenge of the future effectively". (57)

New developments in housing management practice were being advocated by the state by the late 1960s. The idea, as expressed above, was to treat housing schemes as 'communities'. This new philosophy was intended to encourage housing management departments to stop dealing with
council tenants only on an individual basis and, it was claimed, this would be 'a great help in keeping in touch with the needs and wishes of the people'. It coincided with the 'rediscovery' of poverty and militant tenant activity in a number of cities (see C. Cockburn, 1977). Therefore, these developments were part of a general trend within local government, and were not restricted to the arena of housing management. They arose at the same time as notions of 'industrial democracy' became fashionable. The phrase 'participatory democracy' had become a slogan of the 'New Left' student movements of the late-1960s. The Skeffington Report on Planning (1969), had also referred to the importance of 'securing the participation of the public' in the decision making process. The popularity associated with participation, for some of those promulgating the idea at least, was that it offered a mechanism for transferring power from government and planners to the people/community. In short, participation was seen as a challenge to representative forms of democracy. However, participation in planning, for instance, was advocated as a technical problem to elicit 'consumer preferences' and not as a
political issue, related to the powerlessness of the 'clients'.

In 1973 the Paterson Report on Organisation and Management Structures in Scotland was published. This report not only led to a restructuring of local government in Scotland, but also to a review of local government management. A central concern of the Paterson Report (and its English counterpart, the Bains Report 1972) was the need to improve integration and co-ordination across the range of a local authority's activities and all their recommendations looked towards this central objective. In part, this was to be achieved by greater emphasis on horizontal departments and committees. It was also to be sought by widening the focus of both committees and departments, by grouping related activities together and creating larger committees and 'programme areas' and 'directorates' respectively. However, the main way in which it was intended that integration could be achieved was through the establishment of a 'central co-ordinating team' on both official and elected representative levels. This was the 'corporate management' strategy. As we will see, Glasgow District Council began to be
influenced by some of these discussions in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In 1969 the Housing Committee, and subsequently the corporation, decided that the build up of rental groups and the categorisation of houses into 'rehousing', 'intermediate' and 'ordinary' was now considered to be unacceptable. This was also the period when attention was beginning to be focused on the 'problems' in the peripheral schemes (see G. Armstrong and M. Wilson, 1973). The corporation also made a reappraisal of the rent structure based on 'amenity and letting potential'. In an attempt to control rent arrears weekly tenancies were also introduced for around 5,000 tenants. From this process there emerged a rent structure of eight 'amenity groups'. What this actually meant in practice was that, the corporation ranked the different council housing schemes throughout the city in order of 'physical attraction, public desirability and rental'. As we have seen, in earlier sections, there were already in existence a number of houses which were specifically constructed for 'lower status tenants': i.e. under the Housing Acts (Scotland) of 1930 and 1935. In effect, the residualisation of council housing was
written into these Act's and the corporation's ranking system merely emphasised the inferiority of these schemes in architectural, environmental and social potential.

By 1974 there were 13 District Offices in the 13 areas of the city, which the corporation recognised for administrative purposes, and by the end of the decade this number had risen to 15. Potential tenants gained access to corporation housing either through a waiting list application, or through re-housing due to slum clearance or redevelopment. This was the official policy anyway, the reality was somewhat different. A similar selection process, as described earlier, was still in existence during this period with a newly named "urban gatekeeper", the 'housing visitor', now at the centre of the decision making process with regard to applications. On another level, the corporation began to refer for the first time, in official documents, to the need to establish links with Tenants' Associations and Ward Committee's. Again the strategy was aimed at specific target areas which were considered to have 'serious problems':

"...there are serious problems in housing areas and which in many instances will only be
solved when communities acquire an identity, have facilities of a social, cultural and commercial nature in their midst, and where the environmental provisions and upkeep of property, while being the responsibility of the local authority, become the concern and receive the protection of those living in the area". (60)

After years of being considered as incapable of organising their own home lives in a 'satisfactory manner' Glasgow's council tenants were apparently being offered some responsibility for implementation of a "community package". At this stage, the early 1970s, there really no clear plans about how such a process would be put into operation. The fact that the 'environmental programmes' which arose out of such concerns proved to be environmental nightmares for the people who lived in the schemes indicates that the corporation was more concerned with imagery than tackling the realities of housing conditions in these schemes. Within the space of 10 years, however, Glasgow District Council's housing management department was to move some way from past practices. 'Tenant Participation' became the new buzz-word within the housing department, and
was incorporated into a number of different projects.

The remainder of this chapter will attempt to provide an outline of how these different policies came to be adopted and how they operated in practice. For clarity the discussion will be separated into an analysis of four main management strategies: Community Development, Area Management, Tenant Participation and Community Renewal. There is a certain tendency for these terms to be used interchangeably. Therefore, it should become clear that 'tenant participation', in one form or another, is a central element in all of these cases, and there is a certain amount of overlap and interlinking of policy between each area.

1.6 Community Development:

In October 1969 a conference of British and American social scientists and administrators convened to discuss programmes of social action, and more particularly, an experimental Community Development Project which the Home Office was about to undertake. According to one account, the conference had been conceived at a meeting between Richard Nixon and Harold Wilson in the previous year. (61) In these discussions it had been agreed
that 'the two countries should look together at some of the domestic and social problems faced by their governments'. In the United States at this time 'community action programmes', (set up by L.B. Johnson's 'War on Poverty'), were being dismantled. The British government, it is claimed, were intent on 'learning' from the American experience in its search for relieving 'social distress', through local innovative experimental intervention. As a result of these deliberations the National Community Development Project (CDP) was founded. CDP was an 'action-based research investigation' into small-area deprivation, sponsored and financed by the Home Office as part of the Urban Programme, in conjunction with 12 selected local authorities and 8 universities; (Ferguslie Park in Paisley being the only Scottish area chosen).

The CDPs began as 'a neighbourhood-based experiment aimed at finding new ways of meeting the needs of people living in areas of high social deprivation'. It was assumed that problems of 'urban deprivation' (meaning, in reality, poverty) had their origins in the characteristics of local populations (the individual pathology again) and that these could best be resolved by 'better field
co-ordination of the personal social services, combined with the mobilisation of self-help and mutual aid in the community', an idea with its roots in British colonial administration in Africa. (see C. Kirkwood, 1990). By 1974, however, this analysis was rejected. The problems of the 12 CDP areas were seen, by the local project teams, not as arising from the result of personal inadequacy or flaws in the 'safety net', but rather:

"They are not isolated pockets suffering an unfortunate combination of circumstances, they are a central part of the dynamics of the urban system". (62)

The project teams regarded the 'problems' not as managerial or technical ones, but as integral to the political and economic process. It is hardly surprising, given this kind of critique, that the CDPs were eventually to suffer the same dismantling process as the American 'War on Poverty' programme, which was their precursor. It is important to contextualise our discussion of 'community development' in this way, for by doing so we can begin to see the possibility of contradictions arising from a management strategy emanating from a housing department which includes
a 'community' element which strictly limits 'participation' to a local level, ignoring wider social and economic factors—a point Freire noted in another context:

"...In 'community development' projects, the more a region or area is broken down into local communities without the study of these communities both as totalities in themselves and as part of another totality, (the area, region, and so forth) which in its turn is still part of a larger totality (the nation, as part of the continental totality), the more alienation is intensified. And the more alienated people are, the easier it is to divide them and keep them divided. These focalised forms of action, by intensifying the focalised way of life of the oppressed (especially in rural areas) hamper the oppressed from perceiving reality critically and keep them isolated from the problems of the oppressed people in other areas". (63)

From the beginning of the 1970s a number of official reports by Glasgow corporation began referring to the 'increasing difficulty in letting houses in certain areas of the city'. The imagery associated with the 'difficult to let estate' had arrived in Glasgow with a vengeance. Like the
notion of 'problem families', 'problem tenants' and so forth the image presented of these schemes were all totally negative. (64) The areas concerned were mainly, but not wholly, the peripheral schemes and the 'problems' identified were not all related to housing.

In the early 1970s two of these peripheral schemes, Easterhouse and Drumchapel, were broken down to 10 and 8 districts respectively, to 'give the tenants a sense of identity within a smaller community'. Each district within the larger areas were given a name— for example, Rogerfield, Blairtummock, in Easterhouse, and Cleddans, Kingsridge, in Drumchapel. It was in this context, of the corporation designating certain areas firstly, as 'difficult areas', and then as 'identifiable communities', that the idea of 'community development' arose. Of course, the hidden assumption, or 'latent function', of this policy was that they would become 'manageable communities'.

In any case, the 'problems' in Easterhouse received priority and in early August 1973 the corporation organised a number of meetings with tenants in the ten districts they had created in Easterhouse. As a result of these meetings the
Housing Committee recommended the appointment of three community development officers. It was also suggested at this time that coordination between various departments of the corporation was required. A Working Party of officials from the Education, Housing, Planning, Police, Social Work and Health departments was set up by the Policy Committee of the corporation to 'examine the problems in depth'.

One of the central concerns of this working party was the apparent lack of knowledge on the actual meaning ascribed to 'community development'. A proposal to set up a separate Community Development Department responsible to a Community Development Committee was considered at this stage. Some of the individual departments of the corporation already had a 'community involvement section' in existence at the time (i.e. the Police and Education departments), but the influence of the 'corporate management strategy', as advocated in the Paterson Report mentioned earlier, obviously influenced this proposal. However, the City of Glasgow Police were the only department in favour of the proposal with the Housing, Planning, Social Work and Education departments allobjecting to the proposal. The
then Depute Director of Education went as far as to suggest that such a department could become a 'paper tiger', or even worse, be run by 'political activists'.

Another development at this stage was the carrying out of pilot studies in Blackhill and Govan to assess the feasibility of 'community development' in these areas.

The final outcome of all these deliberations came on the 21st of January 1974 when the Establishments Committee of the corporation decided to set up a Community Development Section within the housing management department. Three CDOs were appointed—two to work with 'residents associations' in Easterhouse, and one in the Broomloan Road (Moorepark) area of Govan. Blackhill, which had been chosen as one of the pilot projects, was left without a CDO. Part of the explanation for this is that there were furious debates within the corporation about whether to demolish or renovate the scheme (see T. Martin, 1982). Responsibility for community development projects was centralised under the control of the Assistant Director of the Management Services Unit. Despite this, and the fact that lengthy deliberations had already taken place, the function of community development
within the housing department was still unclear, or as one of the first CDOs observed:

"There was no training provided for us and we were thrown in at the deep end to fend for ourselves". (66)

While the CDOs certainly had no clear remit, the corporation had already acknowledged the fact that there was apparently few active tenants' associations or community facilities available, particularly in the 'peripheral schemes'. Also one of the main reasons for setting up the community development section was to 'foster the development of local communities'. In this context, the role of the CDOs not only entailed supporting existing tenants' associations, but setting up new ones and providing facilities for a meeting place for such organisations: 'Tenants Halls'. The fact that it was the corporation who were 'fostering' many of these tenants' associations is a significant factor in itself, and was to become part of the overall strategy in the council's relationship with tenants organisations in later years.

The corporation obtained Urban Aid funding for setting up the tenants' halls and other 'community facilities'. They were, and still are, run by management committee's consisting of local tenants
and utilised by many 'community groups'; mother and toddler, old folk, unemployed groups, for instance. One CDO went as far as to suggest that the reason for setting up the tenants' halls was that it was part of a public relations exercise: 'paying lip service to tenant participation'. (67) This may have been partly true, but in a poignant statement the then Director of Housing Management provided other motives for such policies:

"...The removal of the 'them and us' situation which has been nurtured for some ten years now, can achieve the objective of tenants understanding how decisions are made and why things can or cannot be done. If they can't be done, perhaps the tenants themselves can find a solution. This is what cooperation is all about.

Housing Management is the biggest charge on District Council resources. For this reason the District Council must be involved in providing and running better facilities for tenants and making them beneficial to all concerned. Greater involvement at tenant and individual level and the promotion of 'self help' must save the District Council money in the long term...". (68)

Of course, the 'them and us' situation had existed for slightly longer than ten years, and
the promotion of 'self help' is a theme that has existed since Octavia Hill introduced it to housing management ideology a century earlier. However, the period when this statement was made was one in which there was a 'crisis of authority' in the sphere of housing management in Glasgow. It could be said, as Gramsci did in another context, that 'the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born'. 'In this interregnum', Gramsci again, 'a great variety of morbid symptoms appear'. (69) The 'crisis' in Glasgow was related to the 'problems' of the 'peripheral schemes' and the sense of alienation felt by many of the tenants who lived there, and made apparent in the number of applicants on the transfer list. The crisis was one for the local state and the 'morbid symptoms' which appeared was a management strategy to gain the 'co-operation of tenants' (for what reason is not clear), but crucially to 'save money in the long term'. Thus, the 'community package' was part of a management strategy to organise the disorganised section of Glasgow's working class council tenants in order that a relationship could be established between housing professionals and the 'marginalised' sections of the working class.
As Byrne has argued, such a relationship is vital to:

"...the continuing maintenance of the administrative structures of the state which are concerned with facilitating the reproduction of the 'social proletariat' within capitalist relations of production". (70)

The work of the community development section of the housing department expanded to include other areas of the city, and by 1983 there were 12 CDOs based throughout Glasgow and a senior CDO based in Lomond House as part of the newly created 'Directorate'. A number of important changes, in terms of the administrative role of the CDOs, took place during these years. In 1979 the CDOs became part of the 'area teams'—the 'area team leader' being the District Housing Manager. The reasons given for this change were that, there was a lack of integration of CDOs with the rest of the housing department:

"The role of community development in the Housing Management Department has been peripheral rather than central. In terms of organisation structure the Community Development Section was an appendage and in terms of function had little to do with the day to day activities of the Housing
Department. The Area Housing Manager had no line management control of the Community Development Officer working in his area as the reporting link was between the CDO and the Senior Community Development Officer". (71)

The Senior CDO had been appointed, after some dispute about who should get the job, in 1982. The role of the Senior CDO was to act as a central reference point for all the CDOs throughout the city, and basically to coordinate the work of those involved in this aspect of housing management. However, as the above quotation indicates, there was some confusion about what this role actually was. In any case, the housing management department was 'decentralised' in the early 1980s. Any 'control' that the senior CDO had over individual CDOs was passed over to District Housing Managers. The latter officials certainly fought for, obtained and still have a controlling influence on the work done by CDOs. In this period, the early 1980s, there was much debate about the role of CDOs within a 'Comprehensive Housing Department'. The debate really revolved around the issue of how much CDOs should be involved in 'housing issues' as opposed to their 'development' role. For those who were attempting
to raise the consciousness of council tenants, and there were some, the battle was lost at this stage. 'Community development' was now clearly identifiable as part of a wider management strategy, in a time of crisis and financial cutbacks, to attempt to gain the acquiescence of council tenants for whatever policy the housing management department desired (see footnote 72 and City Housing, 1985).

In 1984 the District Council decided to change the organisational structure of the Housing Department. As a result of this there was a change from 7 District Offices to 16 'autonomous' Area Offices. The appointment of additional CDOs to each office continued, and by 1990 each district office had one CDO. The role of the CDO, as explained in official reports, is still not clear and is reflected in the different management 'styles' operating in the various district offices. While there is some evidence that they continue to 'support' tenants associations their development role is now much more specifically management orientated. The 'political activists' have ironically become 'paper tigers'.

1.7 **Area Management:**
As the policy being discussed in this section is not entirely related to housing management it is intended to provide a shorter description of another strategy which includes an element of 'tenant participation'. Essentially this section takes us back to the 'corporate planning' approach to local authority management as outlined in the Paterson Report mentioned earlier. The 'corporate approach' implies:

"...an agency taking overall control of its activities and the way they relate to the changing needs and problems of its area of interest". (72)

In the early 1970s, as previously acknowledged, the most significant changes affecting the way local authority services have been planned and provided were influenced by this 'corporate approach'. Briefly, this was supposed to entail greater coordinated planning and the development of 'area management approaches'. Criticisms of the 'corporate approach' created interest within local government circles, of a 'bottom-up' approach rather than a 'top-down' process of management. This approach was aimed at 'involving local needs and preferences in decision making'. Alongside this was the development of policies to concentrate resources in 'positive
discrimination' to areas with the worst 'urban problems'. In the mid-1970s Strathclyde Regional Council had identified 141 'Areas of Priority Treatment' where the problems of 'multiple deprivation' were most acute. 47 of these areas were concentrated in the City of Glasgow. This led to the idea that 'area approaches' were necessary to tackle these 'problems':

"Area Management is a means of providing an area perspective in the decision making process of the District Council. An 'area perspective' means giving local District Councillors and local people more direct influence and control over activities in their area and to develop a better understanding of local needs and opportunities". (73)

This is how Glasgow District Council defines its 'area management' strategy, which is quite different from programmes for 'area-based positive discrimination'. However, it is a pretty vague statement which needs elaboration through a description of how it first arose and what it actually entails in practice. 'Area Management' was adopted by Glasgow District Council in May 1980, much later than other local authorities. There are at least two main reasons which are
normally referred to by officials and councillors to explain why the council chose such a strategy. One reason seems to be that on the death of its first Chief Executive in 1979 the council appointed a new Town Clerk and Chief Executive. This individual, it is claimed, was far more 'innovative' and 'responsive to staff at lower levels'. (74) He was also, apparently, more ready to support initiatives to 'improve the management process' than his predecessor—in other words, 'corporate management' schemes. Another, perhaps more significant, event was the fact that the Labour Party had lost overall control of the council in 1977, and experienced a short period in opposition in a 'hung council'. While in opposition the Labour Party, it is argued, recognised the 'real sense of alienation, frustration, disaffection and cynicism throughout so many communities in Glasgow'. It was in this context, of being rejected by many working class people in the city, that political support for an 'area approach' developed.

Throughout the post-War period, as we have seen, housing was the most predominant political issue in Glasgow. Apart from brief spells in the early 1950s and mid-1960s, when the Progressives
were in control of the council, Labour has dominated Glasgow politics. This did not mean that Labour was immune from campaigns by tenants' organisations in the city. Jacobs has described the incompetent and insensitive way that tenants in the Gairbraid housing clearance area of Maryhill were treated, by both councillors and housing officials in the early 1970s. (75) In a more celebrated case, Bryant has outlined the campaign by tenants in the Gorbals area of the city to force the corporation to acknowledge the problems associated with dampness in the new blocks of flats known as the Hutchesontown 'E' estate. (76) The problem of dampness and condensation was defined by the corporation as arising from the 'living habits' of tenants and not related to the structure of the housing. It was only after a long, often 'militant', campaign by the tenants that the corporation finally accepted responsibility for the dampness in this architectural disaster, and after twelve years the buildings were eventually demolished. The way in which working class Glaswegians were treated by the 'city fathers' was part of a wider problem, associated with the baronialism encouraged by the
local government committee system and accepted by the politicians in office.

Throughout this whole period there was often talk of corruption and numerous scandals surrounding the allocation of council housing. Labour councillors were often accused of seeking favourable terms for their friends and acquaintances. This issue reached its apogee in the 1970s when there was a number of enquiries into corruption in the housing management department, with the fraud squad being brought in to investigate the situation. (77)

The most notorious case concerning 'letting irregularities' occurred in 1977. The then vice-chairperson of housing and Labour councillor for Hutchesontown, a Mrs Catherine Cantley, was forced to resign her position because of a house transfer involving her son. Councillor Cantley was accused of 'serious misconduct' after her son and his 'mistress' were transferred from a three-apartment house in the Gorbals to a bigger one in the 'high amenity area' of Mansewood. This event occurred at a time when there was already an internal investigation set up to look at house letting regulations, which found around 60 instances of 'alleged irregular house letting'. (78) The present
leader of the council, Pat Lally, who was chairperson of the housing committee in 1977 was implicated in this scandal along with the then Director of Housing Management, Mr Malcolm Smith. Lally was not accused of any direct involvement in irregularities, but rather, that he failed to inform his colleagues of the situation earlier than he did. After threatening his 'comrade', the then Labour group leader Richard Dynes, with legal action amid accusations of a 'smear campaign' councillor Lally was cleared of any involvement in this scandal. However, one senior official of the housing management department was forced to resign his position over this issue, and eventually the Procurator Fiscal called in Strathclyde Regional Police Fraud Squad to investigate house letting 'irregularities' (Glasgow Herald, 22-6-77). Two years later the Director of Housing was to write as if these events had never happened:

"With the strident political and press comments of 1977, and later dates, now muted by the passing of time and in the light of the findings of the two enquiries which have taken place, the Department, which has been subjected to unparalleled abuse and innuendo, hopefully may now be allowed to perform its important and expanding
role in public affairs untrammelled by past events and in the best traditions of public service". (79)

However, Labour had already lost control of the council in the District Council elections of 1977, for the first time in ten years. It was in this context, of being rejected by many working class people in the city and the rise in support for the Scottish Nationalist Party, that political support for an 'area approach' developed. Labour were returned to office in 1980, and could put the plans they had developed in opposition into operation. These 'plans' were by no means clear:

"In retrospect, our objectives were not properly defined. If pressed, we would say that we were groping towards an area perspective in the decision making process- attempting in some way to break down the apathy and cynicism among communities, evidenced by so many things ranging from population decline right down to petty vandalism. We were groping towards improving the delivery of services to make them more responsive to local demands...". (80)

While lacking in clarity, it is apparent that this was another response to the crisis of the local state geared to dealing with the outcome, as opposed to the causes, of alienation and poverty
in council housing schemes throughout the city. . In any event, the structure that emerged from these 'gropings' consisted of a) Central Service Committees, b) Programme Area Teams, and c) Area Management Committees. (81) The Area Management Committees comprise of elected District and Regional councillors, MPs, local 'community representatives' and officials from various departments of the District Council. They are serviced by a full-time officer, the Area Coordinators', and reports go to the central Policy and Resources Committee of the council. At present the city is divided into ten 'areas', with seven area management areas, two Joint Initiative Areas (Easterhouse and Drumchapel), and one Central Management Area. The latter of these committee's deals mainly with the city's 'image', tourism, retail and commercial development: the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' committee! The other committee's all have some form of 'community involvement'. The majority of this consists of representatives from Community Councils, though some committees have representatives from tenants' associations, who attend the monthly meetings in the City Chambers to 'put across the local view'.
Each of the Area Management Committees (AMCs) are allocated finance from the Area Budget and spending is controlled by the Area Coordinator. The AMCs are supposed to allow councillors and 'community representatives' the opportunity to discuss and resolve any matter which may affect their own area. The idea of 'participatory democracy' is evident here, but its significance in terms of changing the decision making process from a 'community' point of view is debatable.

All major decisions affecting local 'communities' are not made at the AMCs, but at committee level within the council. At the very least the AMCs are creating a 'neighbourhood buffer' between the 'community' representatives and the real decision makers in the council. Councillors could even be in the ludicrous position of making speeches at the AMCs which are supportive of the views of the 'community' representatives, but are then free to vote in opposition at central committee level.

Whatever the intentions behind such a complex system of management strategy, Area Management has so far proved impotent in shifting power to 'local communities' and, in effect, very cleverly left local 'communities' isolated from each other in the struggle for better resources and services.
1.8 'Tenant Participation':

"...the most significant factor about Tenants Associations in Housing Schemes has been the largely spontaneous nature of their development...Social Workers are becoming increasingly interested in ways of helping associations of tenants to function in areas where spontaneous local leadership does not appear...Participation is in the air. We should not need to devalue it or be frightened by it. We can try to understand it and help to shape it in a positive way...". (82)

'Tenant participation' is another management strategy which developed within local authority housing management department's in the late-1960s and early-1970s, though again much later in Glasgow. (83) It is one of the most elusive concepts to define, and every housing official, councillor or tenants representative has a different idea of what it actually entails in practice. Nevertheless, as the above quotation indicates, there were a number of local government professionals and academics who were conscious of the dangers inherent in 'spontaneous' developments amongst tenants' organisations which were in need of 'positive' direction.
'Tenant participation' can range from providing information or consultation through to the sharing of power (see S. Arnstein, 1969). It may be adopted, according to official rhetoric, to achieve changes in policy or practice and/or to challenge 'traditional' views of housing management. (84) We need to be aware then of the context in which the term has arisen, and the fact that while most people within Glasgow's housing management department may speak favourably of the idea there is a certain vagueness about its meaning. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that a wide range of initiatives which come under the rubric of 'tenant participation' have developed from within the housing management department and what follows is a brief outline of the main activities.

In early 1982 a 'Task Force on Service Delivery' was set up after discussions between the housing department, the Directorate and the political administration of the Council. The main concern of this group was the 'level of service provided by the Housing Department to tenants and other members of the public'. The group considered the views of the trade unions and certain tenants representatives in formulating
their recommendations. They suggested that 'the service delivered to Glasgow's council tenants must improve and be seen to improve' (85) Later in the same year a Sub-Committee on Tenant Cooperatives and Participation was formed. This group looked at various aspects of 'consultation/participation' then in existence, as well as considering several reports on the consultation exercise which had taken place in relation to the "tenant's lease" and the newly introduced computerised allocation system. The working group was supplemented by the newly formed Tenant Participation Advisory Service (T.P.A.S.). It was in this administrative context that a policy framework for the development of 'tenant participation' arose in Glasgow. After subsequent meetings the Working Party agreed to the following aims for 'tenant participation':

"to assist the development of an informed and representative tenants movement through fostering, assisting and supporting tenants organisations in Glasgow;

to allow tenants to influence decisions by creating opportunities for tenants to engage in a dialogue with the Council;
to allow tenants choice between options arising from such a dialogue;

to create and foster opportunities for direct management and control by tenants". (86)

The wide range of options opened up by 'tenant participation', already referred to, was to become part of the management strategy, and it should be emphasised that it was a management strategy! A number of other sub-groups were set up throughout 1983, to look into specialised activities within the housing department and how these would relate to 'tenant participation'. In April 1984 the above recommendations were incorporated into a Programme For Action for Tenant Participation in the Housing Service, a document produced by the then Director of Housing. To develop and coordinate this programme a Tenant Participation Officer (TPO) was appointed and was directly responsible to the Directorate Management Team, the central decision and planning group within the housing department. Initially it was intended that the TPO would work closely with the CDOs to 'develop a comprehensive Community Development function within the Department'. However, the idea of centralising control of the CDOs met with some opposition:
"At one time, I think he [the TPO] would have liked to build himself a little empire, but he realised he would not get an easy run at it. He came along to a number of the monthly meetings of the CDOs and realised that we would not simply listen to his demands. Quite honestly, there was no malice intended, just that we were not willing to submit to his control". (87)

Already caught in the paradoxical position between "developing" tenants' associations and being responsible to District Housing Managers most of the CDOs rejected further attempts at manipulation from within the housing department. However, the TPO continued to cooperate with some individual CDOs on a regular basis. The TPO, operating from within the Directorate, worked mainly with the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations (GCTA), through the Tenant Participation Management Committee. (see chapter 5). One of the main purposes of this set up was:

"assisting the development of an informed and representative tenants' movement through fostering, assisting and supporting tenants' organisations in Glasgow". (88)

The 'informed and representative' tenants' movement basically became the GCTA. This
organisation now has its own office, staff and is independently funded out of the 'Tenants Action Fund' which came into existence in 1989 and consists of a 5p weekly payment from each tenant, based on an opt-out scheme, and is expected to amount to over £100,000 per annum. GCTA were also involved in discussions with the council which led to the new tenants lease in the early 1980s and to the formation of a tenants tribunal in 1988/89. They are continuously involved in discussions with the Housing Department and councillors on a wide range of issues which concern tenants in the city, and have basically taken on a developmental role.

'Tenant participation' exists in other forms throughout the city. One of the most publicised schemes of 'tenant participation/control' is the council's Community Ownership programme—housing co-operatives. Glasgow District Council has been promoting housing co-operatives since 1980. Yet, despite the fact that it has been promoted in some cases as the only option that tenants can choose, it has not been taken up by a large number of tenants as a management option and remains a fairly small part of tenure development in the city. (89) There are also a number of local letting initiatives where tenants' representatives have a
direct input into the allocation of houses at a locality level, but little power as other social agencies like Strathclyde Police and the Social Work Department have much more influence over the housing department. (90) This aspect of 'tenant participation' reveals that the housing department may listen to what the tenants want, but do not necessarily have to do what they want. The inequalities inherent in this power relationship mean that the housing department can withdraw from any commitments which may have been discussed under the guise of 'tenant participation'. Behind all the facade about 'tenant participation' it seems that the management strategy is to draw the tenants' organisations into the decision-making process on their terms. It is also evident that the fetters of the old ideology of stigmatisation still persist alongside these developments, as one recent official document indicates:

"In the past we have been accused of not recognising the good tenancy records of people. In the future, to encourage people to live up to their responsibilities, we should encourage them to feel that we appreciate the efforts of good tenants. Accordingly, where appropriate, we should reward those people who have obviously been
looking after their close, garden, house, etc and keeping their rent up to date regularly. This can be by using the Estate Management Budget to erect a fence, improving the garden (putting in rosebushes, etc), buying paint for tenants to use to improve the close, etc, or simply just writing and saying 'well done - thanks for your efforts'". (81)

The ideology behind this management strategy should be familiar by now; the 'problem' lies with those individuals/families who do not attain the standards required of them by the housing department, particularly the prompt payment of rent. Octavia Hill can rest peacefully knowing that her legacy is still in place.

'Tenant participation' arose in Glasgow later than it did in other areas. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but it is difficult to escape the fact that a number of external factors had a part to play in the introduction of 'tenant participation' schemes. From at least the time of the 1974–75 economic recession, with sharp rises in unemployment, the state responded with a whole range of inner city policies, as the social and economic problems appeared to be more entrenched in these areas. However, alongside the new urban
programmes the Callaghan government of the late 1970s introduced a series of public spending cuts in capital spending programmes. The programme of public spending cutbacks was taken up with a vengeance after the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. (92) Inevitably, local authority spending was affected by these cutbacks and, particularly public spending on housing, with the proportion of council housing being built in the 1980s at its lowest levels since the early 1920s. Under the provisions of the Tenants' Rights Etc (Scotland) Bill 1980 council tenants were given the 'right to buy' the house in which they lived, but unlike the corresponding Act for England and Wales there was no provisions to encourage the consultation of tenants. The extension of the operation of market forces and the reduction of the role of local authorities in housing throughout the 1980s were met with a response from a number of local authorities to deal with 'new' societal structures and patterns, notably policies of 'decentralisation'. (93) Glasgow District Council responded to these economic, social and ideological changes in similar ways as other local authorities had done, with policies of new municipal interventionism, in response to a 'legitimation crisis'. Therefore,
'tenant participation' explicitly derived from attempts to improve the quality of the relationship between the housing department and Glasgow's council tenants, while the implicit reasons were directly related to changes in the state's support for the idea of council housing per se.

1.9 Community Renewal:

"Community Renewal is the biggest tenant participation scheme in existence in Britain today". (94)

This is how one official within Glasgow's housing department defined the purpose of the 'community renewal' project. The reality is somewhat different, and in any case comparative data would need to be attained before we could justify such statements. Basically, 'community renewal' is the term which is used by the housing department to describe a number of large-scale modernisation programmes which are being carried out to housing across the city. The investment for these projects comes from a 'Covenant Scheme' signed with four major private banks, amounting to an extra £140 million being borrowed to supplement the Housing Capital Programme, which has been summed up thus:
"One of the key objectives of the Covenant Scheme is to adopt a new approach to the way the Council handle improvement projects by seeking to involve the residents themselves in all aspects of a comprehensive renewal and restructuring of their estate. Projects like this are called Community Renewal and the way they are handled is of primary importance to the Council's overall long term objectives for reversing the decline of our worst housing areas". (95)

The worst housing areas were mainly concentrated in the peripheral schemes and other council housing schemes, which are now known in official jargon as 'problematical areas', and this is where most of the Community Renewal projects have been implemented. There has, however, been minimal 'participation' by tenants in most of these schemes. 'Involving' the residents consists of the housing department organising liaison groups/steering committee's of tenants in an area scheduled for 'community renewal'. Whether or not a tenants' association has existed in the area previous to the modernisation project beginning, the housing department sets up a new group which it can liaise with. The extent of involvement does not, as suggested by the official policy, include
a contribution from tenants on the plans for 'comprehensive renewal and restructuring of their estate'. Tenant involvement is limited to choosing the colour of bathroom suites, kitchen units, and so forth, with some further say in the proposed changes to the architectural structure of the building in which the Community Renewal project is being carried out. No group has so far been involved in the decisions about the 'restructuring of their estate'. The idea of 'tenant participation' in this context is quite clear:

"Tenant participation is not about sharing power, it is about gaining the active consent rather than the passive acceptance from tenants for the housing departments plans". (96)

'Tenant participation', in this context, is not about changing the nature of the power relationship between tenants and housing management but merely gaining the consent for the council's objective of restructuring the peripheral, and other, council housing schemes. The vast majority of Glasgow's council tenants have had little say in formulating these objectives, despite years of 'tenant participation' policies.
The contradictions contained within the Council's strategy for council housing in Glasgow alongside the ideology of 'tenant participation' are straightforward. We have already noted that recent changes in housing policy— the cutbacks on subsidies for and the production of 'social' housing alongside policies to promote owner occupation, in particular through the 'right to buy', have increased the marginalised position of council housing alongside the rise in alternative forms of tenure. Alongside the changes in the housing market during the 1980s there were also changes within the labour market, with the re-emergence of a large section of the working class on relatively low incomes, rising unemployment and cutbacks in state benefits. (97) The consequences of all of these changes, in the context of housing policies, are only now becoming clear. The housing agenda set by the Thatcher government has taken place almost by stealth, and in Glasgow the Labour Council have responded in a similar fashion. The situation faced by working class Glaswegians is similar to what it has been for the best part of this century, and was recognised in a recent inquiry into housing in the city:
"There is a major housing crisis in Glasgow which is causing serious hardship to many thousands of people in the city. Some of the individual cases we have witnessed have been highly distressing and would have resulted in prosecutions had private landlords been responsible..." (98)

The authors of this report provided a comprehensive analysis of the housing problems in Glasgow and made a series of recommendations on future policy development and the formation of new programmes for public sector housing. Many of these recommendations have been adopted by the Council and are in the process of being implemented; Community Renewal', for instance, being one attempt to overcome the reduction of state support for housing investment. The strategy behind these new policy developments has been made clear in two recent official reports, and it is within these that the contradictions become apparent. (99) Recognising the changing nature of housing provision in the city, in the context of wider policy changes, the council produced a strategic housing plan in 1989. Among the key components were:
"i) Comprehensive area based renewal of public housing estates to provide high quality mixed tenure housing and a good residential environment; ii) Removal from the social rented sector of surplus stock in ways which positively contribute to achieving Glasgow's housing objectives. This may include demolitions to reduce residential densities and the creation of more popular house types as well as joint ventures with the private sector to diversify tenure and bring private sector resources into area renewal schemes; iii) Further transfers to other social housing agencies including housing co-operatives to extend opportunities for tenant control of housing and to maximise the resource flow into area renewal; iv) Continued improvements in housing management in order to promote tenant involvement and control, better customer service, greater sensitivity to customer requirements and better neighbourhood quality; vii) A continuing role for private developers in inner city renewal and in support of area renewal projects in public service housing schemes". (100)

Behind the language of management and the market, where council tenants become 'customers',
the council proposes to remove at least 20,000 houses from its control through demolition, height reduction and stock transfers, in addition those houses that will be sold off through the 'Right to Buy' and to private developers. There may well be sensible pragmatic reasons for a large local authority such as Glasgow adopting these policy options, particularly transfers to housing co-operatives (see D. Clapham, 1989, for example). However, these policies have fundamental and long-term implications for the provision of public sector housing in the city and, as in the past, council tenants and their organisations have had very little say in the drafting of a strategy with wide-ranging ramifications for their future. 'Tenant participation' is limited to the level of consultation with housing management on small-scale changes in management 'style' with no consideration of tenant involvement in the large-scale restructuring of their areas. It is in this context that we must question the validity of concepts like 'tenant participation'. Behind such notions there is always a mythological element, or as C. Wright Mills suggested in another context:

"We cannot assume today that men must in the last resort be governed by their own consent."
Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to manage and to manipulate the consent of men. That we do know the limits of such power—and that we hope it does have limits—does not remove the fact that much power today is successfully employed without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the obedient. (101)

It is for these reasons that this chapter has stressed that the dreadful sameness between the paternalistic era and the 'community' era of housing management in Glasgow merits more observation than all the differences that are, in other respects, obvious. The hegemony of housing management ideology, as the following chapters will reveal, has not always received the active consent of Glasgow's council tenants, whose own priorities were defined by other circumstances in many instances.
CHAPTER ONE

NOTES

1. This factor has been recognised by a number of writers. See, for example, M. Brion and A. Tinker (1980); D. Clapham, (1987); P. Gallagher, (1982) and A. Richardson, (1977).

2. O. Hill (1875), p7.

3. A. Summers (1979), traces the rise of voluntary visiting of the poor by "leisured" women from the late eighteenth century, giving some indication of the widespread belief in the "moral superiority" of the middle class.

4. If anyone is still unwilling to accept the fact that the ideology associated with the work of Octavia Hill continues to influence the housing management profession a reading of the Institute of Housing Manual of 1985 should serve to dispel the illusion. There are two classic articles responding to views which were critical of the thinking of Octavia Hill and the contemporary relevance.


6. See A. Richardson, (1977) pp71-73 for a full discussion of these issues.


9. This factor is borne out by T. Johnston, (circa 1929). In this much neglected, but nevertheless seminal work, Johnston reveals that while the population of Glasgow rose by 33,031 between 1831 and 1841, the number of houses only increased by 3,551. p291.

10. See A.K. Chalmers, (1905), for a contemporary outline of these issues.

11. See J. English, R. Madigan and P. Norman. (1976), for a full account of these developments.


13. This is indicated in the Corporation of Glasgow (1904), p2.


17. See the Corporation of Glasgow Housing Report 1911.


19. The power bestowed on the City Engineer led to a number of disputes with the City Architects Department in the 1930s and 1940s over the layout of housing schemes. These disputes have been detailed by J. Broady and J. Mack, (1960).


25. City Improvements Department (1944) Report of Special Sub-Committee on Letting, April. Document held in S.R.A.
26. This information was described to me by a former resident factor who informed me that they used Booths Gazette-- a document used by hire purchase companies to 'blacklist' people who were a 'bad risk'. The housing department passed on any information that would be of relevance to these companies, and received such information themselves in return for 'favours done'.


28. According to the 1951 Census, Glasgow still contained 1.09 million people, of whom three-quarters of a million were living in 1,800 acres of land at an average density of 400 persons per acre. Some areas of the city still contained 700 persons per acre. 50.8 per cent of the city's houses were of one or two rooms. 24.6 per cent of the population lived at more than two persons per room-- (89,000 people were living at more than 3 persons per room)-- and 44.2 per cent of houses were overcrowded. 29.2 per cent lacked an inside toilet, while 43 per cent had no bath. The equivalent of the last two figures for London were 5.5 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively. See Census of Scotland, City of Glasgow, Vol 3, 1951.

29. Corporation of Glasgow, (1947). There are also details of these operations contained in the
Annual Reports of the Medical Officer of Health for these years, which differ slightly from those in this report but do not change the overall impression.


31. For a description of housing conditions during this period see T. Brennan, (1959); A. Gibb, (1983) and M. Pacione, (1981).


33. See A. Gibb, (1983), p164. In 1951-52 when the Progressive- Re: Conservative- administration proposed to sell off council houses being built at the Merrylee Road scheme there were 104,000 people on the waiting list.

34. Glasgow District Council. Housing Management Department Annual Report 1979. The Scottish Film Archive, based in Glasgow, have a number of fascinating films from the late 1940s on the building of the 'peripheral schemes'. I would like to record my thanks to Janet McBain for her assistance in providing me with these films.


36. The figures for 1982 are derived from A. Gibb. (1983). and those for 1986 are contained in the
City of Glasgow District Council Annual Housing Review 1986-87. The extent to which the planners were influenced by the modernist movement in architecture was made apparent in a promotional film made in 1949- 'Glasgow: Today and Tomorrow', available from the Scottish Film Council. The plans for high-rise building in the city were nothing short of phenomenal.


38. For details of the contribution of the SSHA to Scottish housing see T. Begg, (1987).

39. See Corporation of Glasgow (1944) Special Sub-Committee on Letting, April. Document held in S.R.A.

40. Ibid.

41. Corporation of Glasgow, Report by the Medical Officer of Health on the Work of the Nurse Inspectresses of the Health Department, 13th April 1944. Document held in Strathclyde Regional Archives.

this as a problem is clearly expressed in A.K. Chalmers and Sir John Mann, (1933).


45. Corporation of Glasgow. City Factors Department (1959) Report Prepared by the City Factor for the Property Management Committee on the Organisation of the Department. 12th October. Document held in SRA.


47. Transcript of interview held with former resident factors held on 24-5-89. One of these former resident factors introduced me to the finer points of research by refusing, in a very blatant, bigoted and provocative way, to be interviewed. The problem became apparent at the beginning of the interview when he asked me to spell my name. Unknown to myself, at this stage, the spelling of my surname gives a clear indication of religious background. It turned out that I apparently
'kicked with the wrong foot', hence the unwillingness to cooperate. After some ridicule by his secretary, who was present in the room at this point and by treating his comments with the contempt that they deserved, his resistance diminished as he could not resist the opportunity to tell his own story— which was also described with some bitterness.

48. Corporation of Glasgow. City Factors Department. Reply to Question by Councillor Roberts by the Convenor of the Property Management Committee. 27th June 1957. Document held in S.R.A.


51. An outline of the basis on which this system operated is contained in a report by the Corporation of Glasgow City Factors Department entitled 'Court Work' 12th November 1964. This document was kindly provided by Sean Damer, and I must record my thanks to him for this and other assistance he has given me.


54. J. Boyle, (1977) p8. Similar accounts as those contained in Boyle's book have been described to me in personal interviews conducted with a number of council tenants who lived in various areas of the city during the 1930s and 1940s. It is worth noting that these conditions and the images that surrounded them were not confined to Glasgow, or indeed Britain. Saul Alinsky, when he arrived in the 'Back of the Yards' neighbourhood in Chicago in the 1930s, noted that it was 'a byword for disease, delinquency, deterioration, dirt and dependency'. See Saul D. Alinsky, (1941), p798.


56. For an account of the numbers of housing officials pursuing professional training during this period see the Corporation of Glasgow Housing Management Department Annual Reports from 1968 to 1974.


58. For a fuller discussion of these issues see J. Simmle (1981).


63. P. Freire (1972).

64. The notion of 'difficult to let estate' was first mooted by Roger Wilson, (1963). There is abundant evidence of the negative image of Glasgow housing schemes in BBC documentaries, media representation in numerous journals and in many novels based on the city. The moral panic about the 'problems' in these schemes—particularly juvenile delinquency—had reached its height in 1968 when Frankie Vaughan made a flying visit to Easterhouse and declared an amnesty for gang weapons. See G. Weightman (1977) and S. Damer, (1989) for an account of some of these events and the images portrayed.
65. Letter to Town Clerk from the Depute Director of Education. 8th March 1974. This letter, and other vital documents, was kindly provided by Cath Arthur, former Senior CDO with Glasgow District Council, to whom I am profoundly grateful for all her assistance.

66. Interview with Cath Arthur held on 9-6-89.

67. Interview with CDO held on 10-8-89.


70. See D. Byrne, (1986a) for an extended discussion of these issues.


73. City of Glasgow District Council (1986) 'Area Management, Information Briefing'. 7th August.

74. Interview with D. Horner, Area Coordinator GDC, held on 16-3-89.

77. Glasgow Herald 14th June 1977.
78. Glasgow Herald 14th June 1977.
81. See D. Horner (1987) for a full description of this structure.
83. A. Richardson (1977) has described how notions of 'Tenant Participation' were in existence as early as the 1920s and 1930s but did not come to fruition until the early 1970s. Another useful introduction to this debate is provided by D. Fox (1974).
84. See R. Goodlad, (1988) for a discussion of these issues.
86. Glasgow District Council (1983) Report to Working Party on Consultation by Director of Housing and Tenant Participatory Advisory Service. 15th February. Document held by GCTA.
87. Interview held with CDO. 10-9-89.


89. See Glasgow District Council Housing Management Department Annual Housing Review 1986-87 for details.

90. Interview with CDO 2-12-89, who indicated that tenants representatives were deliberately led to believe that they had the final say on individual letting in areas where local lettings initiatives were in operation. In contrast to this, housing management decisions were based more on reports from police and social workers working in the area, showing the distinct overlap in the work of social control agencies and the limitations to this form of 'tenant participation'.


93. There are a number of accounts of decentralisation initiatives. The best of these include- J. Seabrook, (1984); P. Hambleton. and R.

94. Interview with Central Area Coordinator for Community Renewal Projects, held on 5-12-89.


96. Interview with Central Area Coordinator for Community Renewal, held on 5-12-89. (not taped).

97. In February 1989, around 21.5 per cent of the population of Strathclyde Region were living at or below the Income Support level. In Glasgow the corresponding figure was 31.4 per cent, and if recipients of housing benefit as a percentage of tenant households are taken into consideration the numbers of those living in poverty rises to 33 per cent in Strathclyde and 42 per cent in Glasgow. Stratchclyde Regional Council (1989).


CHAPTER TWO
EARLY POST-WAR HOUSING STRUGGLES

2.1 Introduction

There are many good, and some very good, studies of the development of housing policy at both local and national level (see, for instance, M. Bowley, 1945; A. Gibb, 1982 and 1990; A. E. Holmans 1987; S. Merrett 1979; and R. Smith & P. Whysall 1990). However, most of these studies have a tendency to concentrate on the legislative and administrative side to policy development. They have, thereby, ignored or underepresented the significance of the articulated demands of the working class for social improvement and better, cheaper housing. The material contained in this chapter suggests that the collective demands of the working class, at an apparently locality level, have been more decisive in the development of housing policy than has been acknowledged to date.

The discussion which follows is of a campaign to prevent the sale of 622 houses in the Merrylee Road council housing scheme on the South-side of Glasgow in 1951-52. This was the first serious attempt by a local authority in Britain to sell houses that were initially intended for rental, and took place almost thirty years before the sale of
council housing became a national issue. The working class campaign for improved housing provision in Glasgow had begun in the immediate post-War years and the campaign to prevent the sale of council housing did not exist in isolation. Therefore, a full understanding of the struggle for the provision of council housing during this period necessitates a discussion of the 1946 squatters movement in Glasgow, which has received some attention in the existing literature. (see B. Saunders, 1974; and N. Anning et al 1980) Both of these campaigns reveal the extent to which many working class people in Glasgow regarded council housing as a significant factor in their daily lives. They had, in the words of Melucci, a 'symbolic investment' (1) in the provision of public sector housing which led to a conflict with the political establishment of the local state. This symbolic investment was not a passing trend, but was part of an ongoing commitment to state-provided housing for the working classes that had developed, and had to be invoked, through a series of political struggles over housing issues since the late nineteenth century amongst labour organisations in Glasgow. The Rent Strike of 1915 and subsequent events were the most obvious examples. What is being suggested, then, is that
the values and meanings attached to the provision of council housing arose within the context of specific practices by historically situated actors who were responding to the material living conditions of Glasgow's working class.

While the campaign to prevent the sale of council houses at Merrylee began from a protest initiated by building workers, it extended to include other industrial workers, tenants' organisations, women's groups and a myriad of other working class organisations (see appendix to this chapter). From the spontaneous action by building workers this struggle for housing to be provided on the basis of need was to become a highly significant form of political action in preventing the sale of council housing in Glasgow during this period, and for a long time to come.

Before discussing these issues it is essential to both outline the background to the debate on the sale of council houses and the nature of political action on housing issues in Glasgow in the immediate post-War years. For reasons of clarity, the debate on the sale of council house sales will be restricted to the immediate post-war years. The discussion on the squatting movement will be far more extensive, as it is through an outline of the
events surrounding this movement that we can identify the significance and centrality of housing issues in working class politics in the immediate post-War years. From this discussion it should become clear that the campaign against the sale of council houses did not arise in a vacuum, but was part of the ongoing struggle for decent housing waged by a large number of labour organisations in Glasgow during this period.

2.2 The Political Context of the Sale of Council Houses 1945–52

Debates about the sale of council houses have existed for as long as local authorities were given the right to provide rented housing in 1919. In fact, the 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act included a section which allowed local authorities to build, convert and manage dwellings in clearance areas; with the addition that any housing built in these areas had to be sold off within ten years. Permission to sell local authority houses had also been granted before the Second World War. The Housing Act of 1936 empowered local authorities to sell council houses, with Ministerial approval. The sale of council housing was refused consent during the Second World War. The political debate, however, only really took off after 1945 when the
physical damage and shortages of resources severely constrained housing policies. Housing, as after the First World War, was a major and pressing social problem and housing shortages 'caused more anguish and frustration than any other of the nation's manifold post-war problems'. (2) While it was acknowledged that housing activity would need to be expanded dramatically, there appears to have been little consensus about how this was to be achieved, as Addison noted:

"...Strange to say, a coherent plan was lacking in one of the most important areas of all, housing. When at last a White Paper entitled Housing Policy appeared in March 1945, it was a vague and feeble document of barely eight pages with no clear target for the number of homes to be built in the post-war period". (3)

The Labour government had withdrawn the commitment made in the 1945 election manifesto to set up a Ministry of Housing. Aneurin Bevan, as Minister for Health in the first majority Labour government, was given responsibility for providing a solution to the housing problem and was at least clear about the approach which should be adopted to solve the 'housing problem':
"Before the war the housing problems of the middle classes were, roughly, solved. The higher income groups had their houses; the lower income groups had not. Speculative builders, supported enthusiastically, and even voraciously, by money-lending organisations, solved the problem of the higher income groups in the matter of housing. We propose to start at the other end. We propose to start to solve, first, the housing difficulties of the lower income groups. In other words, we propose to lay the main emphasis of our programme upon building houses to let. That means that we shall ask Local Authorities to be the main instruments for the housing programme."(4)

Bevan's approach to housing problems was quite simple: council housing was for everyone. He was vehemently opposed to the whole pre-war system of house building, which had produced 'castrated communities'. More particularly, according to Bevan, the provision of 'good houses for poor people' could not be achieved through the dependence on the speculative builders who, by their very nature, were not a 'plannable instrument'. The guiding principal of this policy was that new housing should be distributed according to social need rather than market forces.
Bevan believed that only local authorities who were democratically controlled could ensure that houses went to those in greatest need. One consequence of this policy was that building for private ownership was restricted by licence, which was for the purposes of 'supplementing the main housing programme and not for diverting building labour and materials'. (5)

Bevan also insisted that council housing should be of a high quality, as proposed by the post-War Dudley Committee. In some respects, this policy was successful and in 1948 nearly 200,000 public sector houses were built. However, the Labour government's commitment to increased public expenditure on housing had already been cut back in 1947 with the cancellation of Lend Lease, the system of American wartime aid to Europe. The economic crisis was related to Britain's poor trading position and other claims on public expenditure and, by July 1947 the American loan agreed at Bretton Woods had been used up, which led to a convertibility crisis and suspension of the loan. The financial crisis of 1947 led to cuts in the housing programme and the number of houses built under Labour after 1948 declined. (6) In Scotland the revised target for house building in 1947, as announced by the
Secretary of State during the financial crisis, was put at 24,000 a reduction of around 50 per cent. Nevertheless, the commitment to the provision of council housing remained:

"...it is contrary to the Government's policy to agree at the present time to the sale of council houses in view of the importance of ensuring that as many houses as possible are available for letting to persons most in need of them". (7)

The Labour government, however, were judged on their ability to meet the overall targets for house building they had set themselves. The targets for England and Wales were 240,000 new houses a year. In 1947 no more than half that number were built: 139,690. While the Labour government nationalized some major industries, neither the land nor the house-building industry came into public-ownership. Unlike the Health and Education services, there were no equivalent long-term policy proposals in the field of housing. Council housing continued to be financed in the traditional way through borrowing, money raised from the rates and from the rents paid by tenants. Inevitably, restrictions and cutbacks placed on the housing programme in 1947, and again in 1949, contributed to the defeat of the Labour government in the 1951 general election. A
central part of the Conservatives' election campaigns of 1950 and 1951 was the promise to do better than Labour on the housing issue: the post-War housing 'numbers game'? It is worthwhile remembering that, though the Labour Party lost the 1951 election, they obtained more votes than the Conservatives. Indeed, the Labour Party vote of 13.95 million was the highest ever achieved by a political party in Britain (see A. Calder, 1969; A. Sinfield, 1989; and B. Williamson, 1990).

The Conservative government that was elected in 1951 had a commitment to build 300,000 houses a year. The task of achieving this target was entrusted to Harold Macmillan, who was appointed Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Conservative government was also committed to the relaxation of licensing and the encouragement of policies for sale. Their manifesto for the 1951 election had made this clear by pledging that one half of the houses allocated to local councils would be allowed to be built for sale. Under the Labour government, four-fifths of the houses were built for local councils or housing associations of a public character let at subsidised rents, and one-fifth for private ownership, mainly houses built to sell to private owners. This change of
policy was in line with the very clever slogan of a 'property owning democracy', adopted by the leadership of the Conservative party after the Second World War. Throughout the period of the 1945-51 Labour government this slogan came to symbolise the Conservative opposition's alternative housing policies, and was to become more evident when they gained power:

"...we wish to see the widest possible distribution of property. We think that, of all forms of property suitable for such distribution house property is one of the best." (8)

Setting out the new Conservative government's policy on housing in the King's Speech in November 1951, Harold Macmillan confidently emphasised the virtues of home ownership, by proposing to allow the sale of council houses. The government issued a general consent which enabled local authorities to carry out sales and only to notify the Minister on completion. The ideological and political debate on the role of council housing within governmental circles was being reformulated. The 'property owning democracy' advocated by the Conservative party in 1945 was now to become a reality, or so the Minister supposed.
2.3 No Homes for the Heroes

The housing situation in Glasgow at the end of the Second World War was, quite simply, desperate. Housing remained 'the largest public health problem' in the city. During the war the Corporation had repeatedly made representations to the government for facilities to complete such houses as they were at that time permitted to finish. In March 1940 a number of Glasgow councillors met with the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland to stress the need for continuing to build houses in Glasgow during the war. As a result of this meeting, the Corporation were given permission to develop the Penilee scheme (1,500 houses), and to build houses at Berryknowes Road, Holmfauldhead Drive and part of the (Old) Pollok scheme. These special measures were simply inadequate considering the extent of the housing problem in Glasgow. In answer to a questionnaire sent out by the Clyde Valley Planning Advisory Committee in 1944, Glasgow Corporation acknowledged that the city would require a minimum of 100,000 new houses to meet the needs of the population. Glasgow's population was estimated to be around 1,050,000 in 1946. In the first two post-
war years the Corporation had only built 3,684 new houses of which 1,465 were temporary houses. (9)

While the city did not suffer the same physical damage from bombing campaigns, as other British and European cities, the housing conditions in Glasgow's slums in 1945 were the worst in Western Europe, with more overcrowding than even post-war bomb-battered Hamburg. The older houses in the city were in a state of advanced decay and the fact that many houses had to be demolished only served to aggravate the problem. The pressure on available housing was acute as demobilisation increased rapidly. An additional factor was, like other cities, Glasgow was to be caught up in the post-war 'baby-boom', as young people married and sought homes of their own. There were 100,000 people living in sub-let rooms, and 130,435 houses (44.2% of the city's housing stock) were judged to be overcrowded. Sub-letting of rooms was a highly profitable venture, as the City Assessor recognised:

"...in the Townhead Ward, one family are tenants of 18 houses. In this Ward, one tenant paying a rent of £50 0s 5d. for an eight apartment house, draws from nine sub-tenants £215 16s..." (10)
Of course, this exploitation was not new to Glasgow and was really a continuation of the 'made-down' dwellings for the unskilled-poor which had existed from at least the middle of the nineteenth century. The tenement stock, mainly concentrated in the inner urban wards, suffered from an appalling lack of basic amenities, with over 50% of all houses having no bath, and 37.5% having to share W/C facilities. Tuberculosis and other diseases bred by insanitary conditions were rife, as were the rats around the open middens and drains in the backcourts where children played. Glasgow Corporation had 95,000 applications for houses, 41,000 of whom had no homes of their own. There was widespread suspicion that council houses were not going to those in greatest need, and that people in very prominent positions got houses with very little trouble. The Corporation's response to these accusations was that, the people making the allegations were 'never prepared to give the names and addresses of the persons whom they allege were given preferential treatment'. It was a strange and secretive way to run an allocation system and ignored the solidarity of working class families, even in these diverse conditions:
"...People would hear of somebody who wisnae in as bad a position as them getting a hoose, and they were convinced that they were on the waiting list before them. But the greatest ploy of the housing authorities at that time was...eh...'you tell us the name of the person'. Well, you see, there was a loyalty among the working class and they didnae want to do this kind of thing, and they said 'it's no up to to me tac tell ye'. I know of innumerable people who were desperate for hooses and who should have had hooses long before they got them."(14)

For those who were fortunate enough to have a house the conditions were deplorable, and Harry McShane with his customary precision was correct in suggesting that, 'We see.. tragedies which would tax the efforts of a thousand Shakespeares to portray in an accurate manner'.(15) These people also found themselves in a paradoxical situation of apparent powerlessness, as one commentator noted:

"A horrible existence, and yet the unfortunates who were compelled to live there were afraid to complain lest they should antagonise the landlord or landlady and be evicted. To them a "home" of their own in even the foulest tenement would be considered a godsend. To possess a rent book showing that they were the official tenants of even
the most mediocre habitation was a dream which they hardly hoped to realise." (16)

It was inevitable, given these conditions, that housing issues maintained a high political profile in post-War Glasgow. No doubt an added dimension to this situation was the hope that many people held for a better future and social justice after the war (see, for instance, A. Calder, 1969; and B. Williamson, 1990). The growing feeling of determination to avoid a return to pre-War levels of poverty and unemployment had been recognised as a danger by Conservative spokespersons as early as 1944:

"...if you do not give the people social reform, they are going to give you social revolution...." (17)

2.4 Squatting

As in other British towns and cities, the conditions outlined above, led to the development of a highly organised squatters movement in Glasgow. (18) Throughout 1946 families of squatters began moving into various unoccupied properties throughout the city including hotels, churches, mansion houses, a hospital, the premises of the Glasgow Press Club, Army Camps and former warders' quarters at Barlinnie Prison. Many of these
properties had previously been condemned by
government surveyors. The reasoning behind the
squatters action was simple, as one of their
spokespersons at the time pointed out:

"We are all decent working folk and we are
desperate for some place in which to live. I have
five children, their ages ranging from four to
sixteen, and one of them being bedridden. During my
married life I have only once had a sub-let house.
My name has been on the Corporation waiting list
for 11 years." (19)

In other words, to gain one of the most basic
of human needs, a shelter, working class families
had to take direct action and occupy buildings that
were often without heating, lighting or sanitary
conveniences. There was no council housing
available for them, and had not been for some
years. The squatters and their families moved into
vacant properties and chalked their names on the
doors of tenement apartments that had been lying
disused for up to ten years (this was the common
way of 'booking in'). Many of the squatters had
fought in the Second World War and some of them had
been living in sub-let rooms for a number of years
and had been waiting up to ten years for a home of
their own. Their aspirations for a better future
were being tested, and they took the only action available to them to alleviate their situation. On one occasion a prominent member of the Glasgow Communist Party, Johnny Gold, spent the night cutting his way through the back wall of a building which was lying empty and later opened the doors from the inside and admitted a large number of squatters. (20)

The squatters, or more precisely homeless people, began to occupy empty premises and organised themselves into Defence Committees. They were supported by various tenants' associations, the Communist Party, and the remaining elements in the I.L.P. Some of the defence committees collected a weekly payment from squatters to cover rent, fuel and electricity charges. The Glasgow Committee of the Communist Party were actively involved in taking over vacant property and helping families to move into unnocupied buildings. In Govan, the local tenants' association gave over their offices to two families of squatters. By this stage, squatting had become firmly established on the City's political agenda and in the consciousness of Glasgow's working class. In Lanarkshire, 500 miners came out on strike for one week in support of seven families of squatters evicted from the Plean colliery
company's houses. A play written by Robert McLeish and performed by Glasgow Unity Theatre- The Gorbals Story- highlighted the plight of the homeless and those living in overcrowded conditions in Glasgow. A group of squatters were the guests of Glasgow Unity at one of their performances at Queens Theatre. When Peter McIntyre, one of the leaders of the squatters' movement in the West of Scotland, made a speech on behalf of Glasgow's homeless on this occasion, the Lord Provost and other dignitaries were apparently 'squirming' in their seats. (21) The Economist, as part of its overall attack on the Labour government, momentaril adapted its political principles and offered support for the squatting movement:

"In a country so law-abiding as Great Britain it is always refreshing when the people take the law into their own hands on an issue on which the spirit of justice, if not its letter, is so eminently on their side." (22)

Throughout the autumn months of 1946 the number of squatters in Glasgow increased to around 1500 families. They were met with a predictable response from property owners, the Corporation and central government. In early September 1946 a special meeting of the Property Owners and Factors
Association expressed concern at the government's lack of action in protecting private property:

"The government, said a spokesman,...have found an apparent solution so far as their own property is concerned, but they have signally failed to do anything about the invasion of private property by squatters". (23)

The 'solution' was the governments' discussion of a proposal to allow the squatters to occupy Army camps. Governmental directives were not slow in coming under such pressure. On 19th September 1946 the Secretary of State for Scotland, in the first majority Labour government, issued a directive to local authorities asking them to take 'firm and positive action in defence of ordered government and the principles of social justice, on which the allocation of housing was based'. (24)

However, in Glasgow at least, the local state, in the form of the police force, were already actively involved in taking action in 'defence of ordered government'. In late August and early September 1946 a number of squatters families were evicted from properties throughout the city. In one case the police evicted a family at two o'clock in the morning following complaints from property owners. Workers employed by the United Co-operative
Baking Society forcibly evicted a party of squatters supported by Harry McShane and others, who had taken possession of the Grand Hotel in the Charing Cross area of the city on the 29th of August 1946. The squatters, who included one family of 13, resisted the eviction and some fighting took place, but the police finally stepped in to 'restore order'. On the same evening police evicted 13 families from the Bellgrove Hotel in Gallowgate. This group of squatters attempted to break down the doors and regain entry to the building, but were prevented from doing so when police reinforcements were called to the scene. Some squatters barricaded themselves into the properties they occupied and one of the leaders of the Glasgow squatters, Mr Peter McIntyre, after meeting with the Chief Constable, suggested that resistance would be carried even to the point of physical force:

"I think it would be a tragedy to have a social upheaval in Glasgow, but as matters stand it may be necessary to resist police action physically". (25)

Possibly in an attempt to diffuse such situations, the government had proposed that the Service camps which had been occupied by squatters could be converted into temporary housing, with rental charges ranging from 7s6d to 10s per week.
The squatters themselves had already suggested that they should be allowed to run the camps on a non-profit-making basis until new local authority houses became available. The squatters' leaders also requested that all large houses which were up for sale or unoccupied should be requisitioned and squatters allowed to remain. In any event, after a meeting between the squatters' leaders and officials from the Scottish Office, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr George Buchanan, withdrew the proposal and suggested that squatters would neither be allowed to run their own camps or co-operate with the government or local authorities in running them. This was in conflict with an earlier statement by the Secretary of State for Scotland that he was prepared to give local authorities a 100 per cent grant 'towards the cost of adapting huts and vacant houses into suitable houses for the homeless'. Buchanan also adopted a more forthright response to the general issue of squatting:

"such invasions of private premises are a challenge to the law of the land. In the interests of the vast majority of law-abiding citizens the law must take its course".(26)
This condemnation of squatting was no doubt related to the fact that the Communist Party had become involved in moving families into vacant property, and the political threat was being taken seriously. Nevertheless, under the pleadings of property owners, the law was already taking its own course in Glasgow. In mid-September 1946 the first arrests of squatters in Glasgow were made in a number of police raids in the early hours of the morning. These squatters, who had occupied a number of private properties, were charged with trespassing, a criminal offence in Scotland since the Highland clearances. The Trespass (Scotland) Act of 1865 made it a criminal offence to 'lodge in any premises or encamp on any land which is private property without the consent or permission of the owner or legal occupier'. The maximum penalty is a fine and imprisonment up to 21 days. The squatters were not put off easily by this action and were prepared to fight the charges made against them. This was made clear by McIntyre at a packed meeting in St Andrews Hall:

"We are prepared to face that charge, and we are prepared to fight it with the best legal brains in this country. That case will start in the ordinary Magistrate's Court but will finish in the
House of Lords. That will take about three years". (27)

However, the occupation of private property was treated far more seriously than the occupation of Army camps. While the squatters had directed their activities to "public" premises like service camps, they represented little threat to the law and to the principle of private property. The invasion of private property was a different matter, as one commentator has noted:

"...Such invasions of property, even in the prevailing circumstances, struck a raw nerve and the authorities resorted to the law of trespass, the police and disconnection of gas and electricity in order to get the squatters out...". (28)

So even under a majority Labour government the interests of private property were seen as paramount and, while Bevan 'sympathised with the squatters he could not allow them to take command'. (29) In contrast the government finally bowed to the growing pressure for accommodation and allowed the squatters to occupy the Army camps. The fact that there were 46,335 people occupying 1,181 camps throughout England and Wales, (and another 7,000 in Scotland), by October 1946 may have had something to do with this. In one sense this may
have taken some of the pressure off the government to provide housing; though in another respect it was actually increasing the pressure by pointing to the failures of provision. However, the fact that the Communist Party was actively involved in helping squatters to take over private properties, firstly on a small scale in Glasgow but more particularly in London, had something to do with the differential treatment. The government was certainly fearful of the criticisms of housing policy being made by the Communist Party, and more so because of it's opportunistic involvement in the squatting movement. The fears were heightened when local Communist branches in London displayed advertisements for unfurnished flats and brought together a group of squatters, few of whom were Communist party members, and moved them into empty luxury flats at Duchess of Bedford House in Kensington. These flats were owned by Lord Ilchester and other peers, and were obviously chosen for the publicity that would be forthcoming. It became known as 'the Great Sunday Squat'. The squatters immediately elected an emergency committee to represent them in negotiations with the government and the local Council. Cabinet meetings were held to discuss the matter and amid accusations of 'anarchy' squatting became
politically threatening. The leaders of the Communist Party were clearly aware of the political potential of this kind of social protest, and expressed their critique of the state's dilemma in unambiguously class terms:

"All this talk about the liberty of the individual and the sacred rights of private property, and about the forces of anarchy that have been let loose is merely a cover for panic attempts to preserve the system of rich and poor, of homeless and those with more than one home. These seizures will stop when local authorities carry out their responsibilities to the homeless, and when the Government overrides those Tory-dominated local councils". (30)

This spread of squatting, organised by the Communist Party, to private property apparently lost the squatters some of the 'public sympathy' they had previously experienced (if judged by contemporary newspaper reports). In any event the state acted swiftly to curtail these developments. For instance, at a cabinet meeting on the 12th September 1946, it was agreed, on the basis of police intelligence, that 'there was risk of these activities spreading throughout the country' and that:
"Ministers considered that further steps should be taken to bring it home to the public that the squatters were overriding the claims of many people who had been waiting a long time for houses, and that the effect of their activities would be to delay the completion of the rehousing programme." (31)

Alongside press accusations of 'queue jumping', the government was making it clear that the expropriation of private property would not be tolerated. Five members of the Communist Party were arrested on the very serious charges of 'criminal conspiracy', and conspiring to incite trespass, in the Kensington case. Eviction orders were served by the High Court and the squatters vacated the premises peacefully. They were found guilty of trespass and bound over for two years. The fact that they were treated leniently by the courts meant that this affair came to a satisfactory end for both the government and those who faced these charges, but the squatters remained homeless. Alongside the state's legal repression and coercion of the squatting movement there were a number of short-term policy responses, as Short has noted:

"...Dwellings were requisitioned, premises converted, repairs hurriedly made to houses and
prefabricated dwellings were constructed. By 1948 almost 125,000 'prefabs' had been built. Although built as a short-term solution, many of them lasted into the 1970s...". (32)

Short, however, has overstated the case for the influence of squatting here. The prefab programme had already started under the Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Act 1944, which had been passed to allow local authorities to ignore bylaws governing building standards. However, the squatting movement provided a necessary stimulant to many dilatory local authorities and did not end at this juncture (people in Glasgow continued to occupy Army camps and condemned properties throughout the 1940s and late 1950s). The authorities were still trying to evict families of squatters from condemned properties they had occupied for a number of years in 1949. In one case the demolition squad refused to carry out their work until the families decided to move out. The squatters own experience of the stigma attached to their 'lifestyle' was not always a happy one, as one contemporary account suggested:

"...Life is a fight, not only against authority, dirt, cold, damp, heat, illness and rats, but against one's own growing apathy. Families begin to crack at different periods. On
the faces of some there is a look of strain, of controlled despair, such as soldiers show when they have seen too much action. At the camp committees they say, quite plainly, there is a limit to human endurance. They live near the edge of that limit, fearing that some day they will slip over". (33)

These people of the abyss did not slip over, and along with tenants' associations and other labour organisations in Glasgow they protested against cuts in the building programme which were a result of the reduced allocation given to the city in the Government's 1947 Housing Programme. (34) The continual presence of squatters meant that the case for the provision of council housing was reinforced. By highlighting the inadequacies of the housing situation the squatters appealed to the aspirations of a radicalised working class population in post-War Britain and put pressure on the government to fulfill the promises they had made, or more precisely in the case of housing, the promises they had not made in 1945. Squatting is sometimes portrayed in the media as anarchistic and individualistic. However, the squatting which took place in Glasgow, and other towns and cities throughout Britain, between 1946 and 1950 was the antithesis; it was collectively based, organised
from within the working class and had a collective goal in mind: public sector housing for all.

2.4 Housing For Need Not Profit: Merrylee

The provision of decent housing continued to be given high priority in Glasgow in the early 1950s, and was of major concern to the people of the city, whose numbers were at a post-war peak of 1,089,555. The 1951 census showed an overall density of 400 persons per acre, a density unparalleled in any other British city. (see Table 2:1) Some 86,592 people were living in single apartments, and a further 350,739 in two-apartment flats, and the result of being forced to live in these conditions continued to have a deleterious effect on the health of the population. Much of this housing was owned by private landlords, with the Corporation being responsible for slightly less than one-third of all the houses in the city.
Table 2.1: Principal cities of Britain, statistics relating to housing conditions 1951.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>% of dwellings with 1 or 2 rooms</th>
<th>% of population households living at more than 2 persons</th>
<th>% of population households lacking a fixed bath per room.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
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<td>Manchester</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Leeds</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>45</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census, 1951.

The policy of the housing department at this time was to build the 'Maximum Number of Houses in the Shortest Possible Time'. (35) The practical outcome of such a policy was the building of the four peripheral estates, (Castlemilk, Drumchapel, Easterhouse and Pollok), which eventually contained 10 per cent of the city's population, as well as many other council housing schemes. These events have been well documented elsewhere, and need not detain us here. However, one other significant
event occurred in Glasgow during this period which has gained little recognition. We have already seen in an earlier section of this paper that the 'Housing Crusade' announced by Harold Macmillan gave local authorities the power to sell council housing. This policy was taken up with a vengance by the Progressive controlled Corporation of Glasgow in September of 1951. This Progressive council was a complete anomaly in post-war Glasgow, as Labour had dominated control of the council since 1933. The events surrounding the proposal to sell council houses, then being built at Merrylee Road, were summed up briefly in one contemporary account:

"...The Progressives proposed to offer a number of Council-built houses for sale. This was a move of ordinary justice and ordinary common sense....In vain did Progressive candidates argue that every house sold was a relief to the rates, and in vain did they point out that a remarkable number of Socialist Councillors were enjoiyng a rent subsidy. There were demonstrations and threats of strikes, and the Socialists were returned on the claim that it was the blackest reaction to interfere with the sacred principle of something for nothing. It was a curious and saddening instance of how far
bitterness and bigotry have penetrated the proletarian mind". (36)

This is how one contemporary right-wing commentator summed up the debate about the proposed sale of council houses at the Merrylee Road scheme in Glasgow in 1951-52. This account is not only derisory and malicious but, as we will see, totally inaccurate. Indeed, there were strikes to support the campaign and people did not want 'something for nothing', but council houses they could rent rather than houses for sale.

In May of 1951, the Housing Committee of Glasgow Corporation first discussed a government allocation of 500 houses to be built under building licences for sale to approved categories of purchasers. This was the first indication that the Corporation, then controlled by the Progressives, was intending to give some priority to building houses for sale rather than to let, despite the fact that there were over 100,000 people on the waiting list. It is important to remember that the Labour government, while ideologically exhausted, was still in power at this point, and the Progressives in Glasgow were pursuing this policy before the 1951 Conservative government had reduced building controls. The Progressives, like their
predecessors in the Moderate Party and before that the Citizens Union, were essentially Conservatives. Local Progressive associations in Glasgow, while corresponding to the Conservative Parliamentary associations, also attracted support from Liberals and those who wished to see local politics being kept independent from national party politics. However, Progressive candidates were supported by the Scottish Unionist Association. They represented an anti-Labour front and had close ties with the local bourgeoisie; most of their members being local businessmen. (37) The direction that the Progressive's policy was to take became clear with the proposal to sell off the houses at the Merrylee scheme, which was moved by the Progressive leader of the Council, Mr Alexander Macpherson-Rait, on the 5th of September 1951. The reasoning behind such moves were given as economic, with Macpherson-Rait arguing that those who could pay and own their own houses should be allowed to free the local authority of the necessity of subsidising them, adding that:

"...the Labour idea seemed to be that building should be for one class only, and that until that class were satisfied nobody else should have a house". (38)
This attack on the financing of council housing was part of a wider debate on the new Conservative housing policy. A leading article in the London Times, commenting on housing subsidies, suggested that the new procedure 'will save public funds even if it does not increase the volume of new housing'. (39) However, while referring to the economics of housing to justify the proposal, Macpherson-Rait had given some intimation that there were also ideological motives behind the move. This latter aspect was to be borne out by subsequent events. When the Housing Committee finally approved the recommendation to offer for sale the houses then being built at the Merrylee Road scheme, this ideology was outlined clearly in the City Assessors report which stated that:

"...the houses were superior in construction and finish to houses being built and sold by private builders and were situated in what from a 'valuation' viewpoint was the best residential district in the city. The cost of upkeep should be low and the amenity value high for many years. If all the houses were sold to private owners they should retain also the value appertaining to a "good address". (40)
In other words, these houses were of a very high quality, being one of only two 'high-amenity' council housing schemes built in Glasgow in the post-war years. Built under the provisions of the 1946 Housing Act, as a contribution to the relief of overcrowding, 204 of the houses were of the 'cottage type' the remainder being tenement flats. The estimated cost of building the 622 houses at Merrylee was £1,159,072, but with interest over 60 years the ultimate cost would be £3,073,980: 'a sum sufficient to build 1650 houses'. (41) Despite the fact that they were originally intended for rent, the Progressives had decided that they should be sold for prices ranging from £1,575 for a ground-floor three-apartment flat to £2,475 for an end-terrace five-apartment house. These prices were equivalent to those which were being paid for similar houses erected for sale in the private sector, and clearly indicates the alternative hierarchy of respectability behind the ideology to sell rather than let such houses: good quality housing should not be subsidised! No doubt these prices were beyond the reach of the 100,000 people on the waiting list in Glasgow and would only appeal to those with the capital to buy them. Corporation tenants at this time were paying a weekly rent of around 15s (75p) or £1 and were
unlikely candidates for houses that would cost them £3 a week plus a downpayment of £250. What this really meant was that, ability to pay had become the determining factor in obtaining a house in the Merrylee scheme. In this respect the Progressives were attempting to radically change the nature of the provision of housing by local authorities, which earned them the title of 'the most reactionary local authority in Britain'. (42) They even met with some opposition from private builders who, perhaps, feared the competition and wanted a larger share of the profits for themselves:

"The Corporation's idea to sell the houses to people with the money to buy them and so take a burden off the ratepayer is an admirable one, but if we got the licences we could do exactly the same thing". (43)

However these protests were mild compared with what was to follow. The first signs of unrest amongst building workers in the city came when the Housing Convener sent a personal message of thanks to them in their pay packets. The message thanked the men for their help in 'this year of solid achievement for all of us engaged in the formidable task of providing housing accommodation for Glasgow's overcrowded and homeless families'. The
building workers on the large Cranhill site in the East End of the city were not easily impressed by this and sent the letters back, with a clear indication of their own feelings on the matter:

"We think this is downright cheek and hypocrisy, viewing the recent decision pushed through by you to sell the 622 Merrylee houses which are being built by our fellow-workers and were originally intended for rent". (44)

The challenge to the proposal to sell the houses at Merrylee was only beginning. On the 3rd December 1951 a meeting, called by the joint-shop stewards committee of G. and J. Weir, an engineering firm situated near the Merrylee site, and attended by over 100 delegates from 20 organisations, mostly building and engineering trade unions, tenants' associations, three councillors and some Labour Party branches called for a demonstration in George Square for the 6th December, the day the full Corporation were to decide on the proposal to sell the houses. They also proposed that a deputation, including shop stewards from 48 factories and works in the city, should seek to put their views on the matter to the Housing Committee, again in the image of the 1915 Rent Strike. This meeting was also addressed by
three Labour members of the Corporation—councillors Andrew Hood, John Mains and Bailie John Johnston. The latter of these speakers described the homes-for-sale proposal as "class legislation with a vengeance". (45) The campaign to stop the sale of the houses was seen as a major challenge by the labour movement in Glasgow and was to be conducted both inside the City Chambers and on the streets outside. There was also to be a challenge for control of the direction that such a campaign would take. Official press reports at the time suggest that between 2,000 and 5,000 demonstrators took part in the protest on a bleak and wet day, though the experience of people on the demonstration suggest that this does not convey the atmosphere created by the plan to sell these houses. For instance, one participant has described the events thus:

"I was in the demonstration and I'll never forget it to my dying day. It was a massive demonstration and, talk about storming the Bastille, we nearly stormed the City Chambers that day....They had the whole o' the police force oot, it must have been kinda like what 1915 wis, when the shop stewards had a massive demonstration wi the wimmin in there about the Rent Act....the
wimmin wanted the best for their kids, they were still waiting for Corporation houses and here this Corporation was talking about this beautiful scheme oot in Merrylee, and just because it was Merrylee we warnie going to be allowed to go and live in it, because if they had opened it up to the ordinary people you see they would have had the jack of a' things living in these hooses. These wimmin were incensed with the idea of selling hooses at that particular time, when there was such a need and such a demand for new housing....Any mention of selling houses was anathema to the people who were desperate to get oot o' the horrible conditions they were livin in... I never have been in a demonstration like it, and I've been in a lot of demonstrations, ...the anger overflowed right onto the city chambers...we marched right roon into the city chambers, and that gives you an indication of the ire against selling council houses". (46)

The demonstrators included tenants' associations engineering workers, workers from Stephens and John Brown shipyards, transport workers, and there were five processions of 'housewives' from Bridgeton, Gorbals, Anderston, Partick and Tradeston; all united to stop the sale of the Merrylee houses. (47) All of those present on
the demonstration had been mobilised through meetings held in factories, building sites and in working class communities throughout the city. As the quotation just cited suggests, the wimmin (women) of Glasgow were prominent in this protest but, unsurprisingly, their role is diminished in the contemporary newspapers to a sentence at the end of a story. Most of these women were active in local tenants' associations and had a deeper understanding of the appalling housing conditions in the city than most of their contemporaries. It was the women, when speaking at public meetings, who were able to provide graphic details of rotting flooring, damp and broken ceilings, examples of lavatories serving at least 33 tenants and rats under floors which was to play a significant part in impressing upon others the need to oppose the sale of the Merrylee houses. Therefore, their participation in this campaign should not be seen as an addition to the protests of the tenants' associations, building and engineering workers, but rather as a central and powerful part of the whole struggle for council housing. The women involved in this campaign were able to use their lived experience in the tenement slums to attack the proposal to sell off local authority houses. Another significant point about this demonstration
is that most, if not all, of the Corporation building-site workers downed tools and joined the demonstrators. They were consciously involving themselves in a political strike and not simply a strike aimed at their employers. In an industry which is historically renowned for being insecure, split along the lines of craft and with relatively weak trade unions, this was no mean feat. Their opposition to the proposal to sell the houses at Merrylee was spelled out in a poem:

Were you there at George Square the time
They marched from every site,
The lads who build the people's homes,
But sleep in slums at night?
From single-end, from back street den
Mothers with children spill.
Bringing before the business men
The challenge of Barnhill.*
The Tories are the men of greed,
The Party of the boss,
They build their case on wealth, not need,
And mock the people's loss.
But smash the Tory plans we will,
Starting with Merrylee,
Resisting them with all our skill,
We'll fight to victory. (48)

(* Barnhill was a 'Poorhouse').

Many of the building workers were themselves living in overcrowded conditions or were homeless, and this no doubt added to the anger at the decision to sell the Merrylee houses. Some of the demonstrators at the front of the march on the 6th of December tried to storm into the building, as one report suggested:

"Police and officials on the doorway were having a rough time trying to hold them at bay, but police reinforcements were soon forthcoming from inside the building.

Comparative order was restored after the closing of the wrought-iron gates outside the City Chambers". (49)

However, some of the demonstrators managed to gain access to the City Chambers and delayed the start of the meeting, with at least one of them being ejected for making a noisy protest. (50) While there were 30 letters of protest against the sale of the Merrylee houses, including 16 requests for
deputations to be received, the Progressives decided that they would only be willing to accept a deputation from Glasgow Trades Council. The Progressives argued that the Trades Council should be heard as they represented the vast majority of trade unionists in the city. The Labour Group argued that all the deputations should be heard, and that the Trades Council had been chosen by the Progressives because they believed, rightly or wrongly, that they were a Communist organisation, and their protests could therefore easily be labelled as extreme. The Progressives' were intent on providing a dilemma for the Labour Party through 'guilt by association' with the Communist Party. Andrew Hood, who was a leading figure in the ILP in the inter-war years and eventually became Lord Provost, fell into the trap nicely, when he stated that:

"We are not allowing the Communist Party to speak for the good citizens of Glasgow". (51)

Whether Hood's analysis of the Trades Council was accurate or not, it indicates that there was some sort of struggle for control over the direction of the campaign against the sale of the Merrylee houses at this stage. In any event the deputation from the Trades Council was the only one
allowed to put its case to the Corporation. (52) In a meeting that lasted over five hours, and was by all accounts full of vehement discussions, one Labour councillor, John Mains, was suspended for protesting at the decision to vote on the sale of the Merrylee houses. (53) For the proposal to sell the houses 56 Progressives voted in favour and the Labour votes were not counted as they carried on their protest; a factor which was to be of utmost concern to Labour councillors in the further meetings of the Corporation. In any case Glasgow Corporation was now in favour of selling the Merrylee houses. One report in a prominent journal summed up the situation cogently:

"...Now the action of the Council seems to have set off a spark. It may flicker out. It could quite as easily burst into a flame." (54)

Within days of this decision being taken working class organisations throughout Glasgow stepped up the campaign against the proposed sale. Socialist organisations in Glasgow at this time had a novel way of advertising their meetings by daubing the streets with chalk paint, and many of the streets were plastered with paint as public meetings were organised throughout the city. It was around this time that real divisions began to
appear between those who wanted to keep the protest within the confines of representative democracy and those who wanted to combine such action with more direct forms of protest. These divisions became apparent at a rally organised by the Labour Party on the 12th of December, with over 1,500 people present. After pledging their support for opposition to the sale of the Merrylee houses the Labour MPs present were challenged to support demonstrations and strikes against the proposed sale. The MPs refused to back such a proposition, but others present were not so reticent:

"We'll have our own demonstration now and we'll succeed in blacking this job at Merrylee.....I give the assurance that it will be over our dead bodies that they build those houses at Merrylee". (55)

The Labour Group on the Corporation also expressed their opposition to such action and stated that they were 'perturbed by this reaction by a militant Left-wing section amongst the building tradesmen'. (56) A Labour Party spokesperson went as far as to describe the situation as being 'quite dangerous', adding that 'it may impede industrial recovery', continuing, 'the Labour Group do not countenance any unofficial
and unconstitutional action on the industrial side'. (57) Despite these warnings the planned demonstration went ahead when the Housing Committee met on the 20th December. Nevertheless, the warnings had some effect with around 1,500 people taking part in the demonstration, instead of the 10,000 which the organisers had hoped for. This did not prevent them from gaining entrance to the City Chambers where they were ignored by the Housing Committee. The elected representatives had decided that the decision about the sale of council houses was to be conducted within the confines of representative democracy, where the views of working class organisations would only be heard through Labour councillors. For their part, the Labour councillors, while willing to listen to deputations of groups opposed to the sale, were intent on retaining hegemonic control over the campaign against the sale of the Merrylee houses. The Labour Group on the Corporation, and possibly the Labour Party itself, was more hopeful of petitions and representations being made within Glasgow Corporation and to the Secretary of State for Scotland than direct action and strikes to prevent the sale going ahead. An almost identical approach was adopted by the General Council of the STUC. (58) The similarities with both organisations
present rejection of 'unlawful activity' in opposition to the Poll Tax are obvious (see M. Lavalette and G. Mooney, 1989).

Around this time a Joint Committee to Prevent the Sale of Merrylee Houses, (convened under the auspices of J. & G. Weir's Joint Shop Trades Committee) was formed, in an attempt to combine all the various organisations opposed to the move. The futility of depending on the goodwill of government ministers was borne out when this group sent a delegation of around 100 members to ask the Secretary of State for Scotland to overrule the Corporation's decision. The Secretary of State ignored them and left it to an official for housing to speak to them. They were also prevented from marching through the streets of Edinburgh to demonstrate their anger at the decision of Glasgow Corporation to go ahead with the sale, and 'many police were noticeable in the vicinity of the deputation'. (59) The state's contempt for working class protest could not have been expressed more clearly than this. Meanwhile, the Labour Group continued with their own protest within the confines of the City Chambers. Their protests in the closing week of 1951 were limited to procedural wranglings over the accuracy of council minutes.
from previous meetings and accusations that the Progressives were encouraging 'queue jumping' by their proposal to sell the Merrylee houses. It was in this context that one Labour councillor suggested that the Labour Party had never been against the principle of owner-occupation, but that under the existing deplorable housing conditions they could not support the proposal to sell the houses at Merrylee. (60) This attitude was no doubt behind the later criticisms by the I.L.P. that the Labour Party were merely opposing the sale of the Merrylee houses on 'electioneering grounds'. (61)

In any event, the campaign against the sale continued along the same lines into the new year of 1952, with the Labour group continuing to challenge the accuracy of the minutes of previous Corporation meetings, and threatening legal action over the issue. (62) However, the discussion about the proposed sale was widened in early January when separate delegations from the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) and Glasgow Labour MPs met with the Secretary of State for Scotland 'in private'. One other delegation representing 24 organisations in Glasgow had to content themselves with a meeting with the Under-Secretary of State, while a group representing Edinburgh's homeless were refused a
hearing. The fact that Glasgow Corporation might be allowed to continue with the sale of the Merrylee houses was now being seen by groups in other areas as a threat to the whole notion of state provided housing; and all over Scotland a great widespread opposition and protest was mobilised. If the sale of council housing was allowed to go ahead in Glasgow it was feared that other local authorities would adopt similar strategies; two other councils had already made proposals to build houses for sale and nine others had made inquiries. (63) The two 'official' delegations of Labour MPs and STUC representatives were given an 'assurance' by the Secretary of State that only people with urgent housing need would be able to buy any council houses that were sold. The MPs, for their part, were "hopeful that reason would prevail". (64) By appealing to 'reason' it seems as if some of the 'leaders' of labour organisations in Glasgow were unaware of the political and ideological distance which had now been opened up between working people who depended on council housing and those who were responsible for providing them. Their 'hopes' were not shared by the Progressive leaders of the Corporation, whose leader had no desire to compromise when he described the houses at Merrylee
as: "The most saleable little property I have seen." (65)

Those who were opposed to the sale were not deterred by such pomposity. Within twenty-four hours of this speech being made the Joint Committee which had been formed to prevent the sale of the Merrylee houses called on workers to strike for half a day and take part in a demonstration on the 30th of January, the day when the Housing Committee were due to meet. The organisers of this campaign held protest meetings throughout the city, with mass meetings in public halls, outside factories and Corporation building sites at lunchtime. They were determined to gather the support of as many working class people and organisations in Glasgow against the proposed sale and were adamant that their agitation would continue. The legal representatives of the state had other ideas. Three days before the planned demonstration was to take place in George Square, Glasgow magistrates invoked the Public Order Act 1936 on the procession. This was the first time this Act had been used in Glasgow, though meetings had been banned in George Square since the 1908 unemployed demonstrations. (66).
The demonstration went ahead, and, despite the fact that the magistrates had imposed a ban on marches in George Square (the site of the City Chambers), nine deputations from among the 2,000 demonstrators marched into the main entrance of the City Chambers. Again they were denied a hearing by the Progressives on the Corporation, who were more concerned with approving the conditions laid down by the Secretary of State for the sale of the Merrylee houses. The Secretary of State had now disregarded all the protests and deputations that had been made to him on behalf of all those opposed to the sale. He had now given his consent to the proposal to sell the houses at Merrylee on conditions which were virtually the same as those laid down by the Progressives. The houses were to be sold to tenants of Corporation houses, persons requiring accommodation for reasons of ill-health (for example, tuberculous patients), and persons who were at the time on the waiting list for houses and who would, according to Corporation letting policy, be offered a house within a year. The Secretary of State also included one additional, and quite novel, stipulation that provision must be made 'to ensure that the houses are not resold at a profit by their purchasers.' (67) The period specified under this clause was three years, and as
we now know it is similar to the 1980 'Right to Buy' legislation. So even this policy development was to have 'unintended consequences' for future generations of council tenants. The proposal to sell the Merrylee houses under these conditions was again carried by the Housing Committee by 19 votes to 17. The conditions attached to the sale were also approved at a full meeting of the Corporation on February the 22nd 1952.

By now there were over 1,000 applications to buy the houses at Merrylee (including 90 from existing Corporation tenants), with some 200 completing the application schedules drawn up by the city factor's department. Perhaps as a result of this apparent success, the Progressives on the Corporation began to increase their attacks on the whole notion of state provided housing. Macpherson-Rait was at the forefront of these attacks:

"...in Glasgow 25 per cent of the houses available to let were municipal houses and 75 per cent were privately owned. The municipal houses carried a Government subsidy, but since 1945 that had not met the gap between rent plus subsidy and the total cost. Between May 1946 and May 1951, £2,628,000 had been paid from the rates. That meant that 75 per cent of the people—those living in
factor's houses - were subsidising those who had corporation houses". (68)

The ideology of the 'oversubsidised' council tenant was now being used with a vengance to justify the sale of the Merryilee houses. The fact that 31 of the 53 Labour councillors, and 6 of Glasgow's Labour MPs, were Corporation tenants may have been behind this scaremongering. To their credit, some Labour councillors challenged the importance attached to the finance of housing, emphasising that social need was just as important. The campaign against the sale continued, with protest meetings throughout the city, opposition from the STUC and Labour MPs. However, by the end of April 1952, 8 of the houses at Merryilee had been processed for sale and a further 96 applications for purchase were being processed by the Town Clerk. Of these applicants only 23 were existing Corporation tenants and 7 from the waiting list.

With an election now only weeks away the campaign took an unusual twist. One prospective Labour candidate for the municipal elections, a Mr William Meikle (Parkhead Ward), applied to buy one of the houses at Merryilee. His excuse was that he made the application 'only for the purpose of establishing in my mind once and for all precisely
what it costs to get one.' (69) As the prices for the Merrylee houses had already been decided by the Corporation, and had been advertised in the Glasgow press as early as November 1951, Glasgow City Labour Party refused to accept this explanation and, despite being supported by at least two Glasgow Labour MPs, they expelled Meikle from the party. The Merrylee issue was the most important factor for all parties in the election, and this was in no small part due to those involved in the campaign group which had been set up to oppose the sale. They continued the agitation right up to polling day, daubing the streets with slogans and were present outside most polling stations. (70). On the day in which the election was taking place in Glasgow, 7th May 1952, the Secretary of State for Scotland, speaking in the House of Commons, was now distancing himself from the decision to sell the houses at Merrylee, stating that:

"...he had no powers to intervene in regard to the plans for the disposal of houses at Merrylee Road, Glasgow....the houses are not all completed yet and we are watching this matter very carefully" (71)

For someone who had taken such an interest in what was happening in Glasgow at this time, and
whose consent was required for the sale to go ahead, this was a real reversal in attitude. The reason for this was not long in coming. On the same day that the Secretary of State was making his statement in London, Labour were returned to power in Glasgow with a majority of 15, overturning the previous Progressive majority of 5. The Labour leader's first statement on the election was on the issue of the Merrylee houses:

"We will take the earliest opportunity of making all the Merrylee houses which have not been sold available to those in want". (72)

On the 29th of May 1952 the plan to sell the houses at Merrylee was reversed by the newly elected Labour council. The main election issue was the Merrylee houses and the Labour party was forced, by the sheer strength of the campaign against the sale of these houses, to give a commitment to reverse the Progressives original proposal. It was on the basis of making the Merrylee houses available for letting rather than for sale that Labour were elected in early May. They had no option but to carry this pledge out and the Merrylee houses were allocated under the existing Corporation procedures. (73) There is no doubt that, for the many working class and
socialist organisations involved in the campaign against the sale of the Merrylee houses, this was a victorious outcome to a campaign that had involved the mobilisation of thousands of Glaswegians and had long-term implications for housing policy in the city. It would be some years before such a serious proposal to sell off council houses was heard in Glasgow again.

2.5 Conclusion

What has been emphasised in the preceding discussion is that, the collective demands of the working class at an apparently 'locality' level have been more decisive in the development of housing policy than has been acknowledged to date. The provision of council housing, in Glasgow at least, did not represent an inevitable and progressive step in policy making. The squatters' and the Merrylee campaigns had a major and determining influence on the provision of council housing in the post-war years.

During the period under discussion, class interests and class relations remained crucial in structuring and determining struggles organised around other interests in civil society and in political formation: namely struggles over the provision of local authority housing to let. What
this suggests is that, alongside struggles over production (i.e. in factories), the struggle over the reproduction of labour power was regarded as significant by many sections of the working class, in Glasgow at least, during the immediate post-war years. Therefore, contrary to Butt's suggestion, action around housing issues during these years did not lead to the adoption of a 'paler shade of Red Clydeside'. While there may not have been a 'revolutionary moment' in Glasgow in the 1940s and 1950s, the campaign over housing conditions remained at the top of the political agenda, especially for working class Glaswegians.

Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that collective action around housing issues are not simple automatic responses to negative situations. This type of action is creative and purposive, arises out of a series of complex social and political conditions within a given 'locality'. From the analysis contained in the preceding discussion of events in Glasgow in the early 1950s, it seems that at least five conditions are necessary for the development of the kind of collective identity and organisation we have in mind here:
1) The existence of a large number of people in the same situation;

2) Geographical concentration;

3) Identifiable targets of opposition;

4) Sudden events or changes in social position;

5) A politically experienced leadership which can articulate readily understood goals.

All of these elements, in one form or another, were present in both the squatters' movement and the campaign against the sale of the Merryilee houses. There was a large percentage of the population living in appalling housing conditions within the city of Glasgow. Both the squatters and the Merryilee campaigners had an easily recognisable opponent in Glasgow Corporation, the body with the responsibility of providing them with houses. In the case of the squatters the events of the war years had exacerbated the housing situation in Glasgow and, therefore, altered the whole position regarding the allocation of houses. The Merryilee campaign began, as we have seen, as a result of a proposed change in the way that the houses were to be allocated. Again, both the squatting movement and the Merryilee campaign were led by 'organic intellectuals' of the working class, mainly members
of the Communist Party. The process by which they were able to gain substantial support for these campaigns was largely dependent on the fact that many working men and women in Glasgow had a 'vision' of municipal housing as a basic human and political right which the Communist Party was able to tap into. The irony is that this vision had been created in the inter-war years by the I.L.P., who had then been dubbed as 'social fascists' led astray by 'reformist illusions' by the sectarian Communist Party. The remainder of this conclusion will attempt to indicate briefly the significance of the events under discussion in this paper.

By taking direct forms of action to provide a shelter for their families, squatters were challenging the 'rules' relating to the allocation of property. The historical context of the squatters' movement should not be ignored. The state had already shown, during the war years, that it was capable of overriding private property interests for the public good, by requisitioning property. The demands of the squatters in the immediate post-war years was for similar action to be taken on behalf of the homeless, in a peacetime situation. These demands were initially ignored by the state and it was only through direct action
that the government finally gave in to the demands of the squatters and allowed them to occupy the Nissen huts on the Army camps, under the management of local authorities. This form of squatting was popular but, when it extended to private property through the urgings of the Communist Party the state could not be seen to stand idly by. Through a combination of propaganda and criminal prosecutions the state astutely prevented this form of squatting from spreading. Support for the squatters seemed to fall away at this point and those who occupied the Army camps, which were in inconspicuous locations away from city centres, were allowed to remain in peaceful, but not always pleasant, surroundings. In some respects, therefore, while there was popular support for the squatters the attempts to widen and strengthen the politicisation of squatting were unsuccessful. While some workers, notably the miners in Lanarkshire, showed support for those who were homeless or living in overcrowded accommodation the trade union movement and wider labour movement failed to fully mobilise their sympathy for the squatters' into any kind of effective industrial action which would have backed the squatters demands. Despite these negative elements the squatting movement of 1946, in Glasgow and beyond, continually applied the necessary pressure on the
state to provide housing for the working classes. Their highly publicised and highly successful activities ensured that the government would have to respond in some way to the appalling housing conditions in British towns and cities in the post-war years.

The campaign against the sale of council houses at Merrylee was a far more significant event in many ways. This was the first time that a local authority in Britain made a serious attempt to sell off a whole estate of houses which were originally intended for letting as council houses. This challenge to the provision of council housing was met with a 'spontaneous' response from a wide range of working class and socialist organisations in Glasgow. The ideology behind the proposal to sell these houses was apparent from the beginning—'good quality housing is not for letting to working class tenants'. The 'organic intellectuals' of the working class in Glasgow, to follow Gramsci, recognised this ideology for what it was and responded with a massive fightback which was part of "the struggle for hegemony". They recognised that the practical outcome of such a policy would have drastic consequences for the provision of housing in the city and through such an
understanding, were able to mobilise thousands of working class Glaswegians behind the campaign to prevent the sale going ahead. As we have seen, there were some leading figures in the labour movement in Glasgow who objected to their tactics of demonstrations and strikes to prevent the sale and attempted to keep the opposition to the proposal within more 'legitimate' forms of protest. This 'ideology of Labourism' has a long historical tradition within working class politics and it is really not that surprising that it should have surfaced in this context (see D. Rubenstein, 1979; and R. Miliband, 1973). It might be suggested that in the dispute over the sale of the Merrylee houses that this ideology proved to be more successful, as it was only when the Labour Party were returned to power that the proposal to sell the houses was reversed. This would be a misinterpretation and distortion of these events. It was through the campaign organised by building workers, tenants' associations, women's groups and other working class organisations in Glasgow that the real opposition to the sale of the Merrylee houses was mobilised. Without their 'spontaneous' action the campaign against the sale and the alternative case for council housing would not have received the widespread publicity and support that became
essential to the success of the opposition. Therefore, while Castells may be correct in suggesting that cities are 'living systems, made, transformed and experienced by people' (75), the important point to emphasise is that these events are not to be analysed in the context of 'urban social movements' but, rather, as part of the overall struggle of the working class for better, cheaper housing. The squatters' movement and the Merrylee campaign were, quite simply, part of the Glasgow working class counter-hegemonic struggle for good council housing for workers at rents they could afford.
NOTES


2. M. Foot (1975). p59. Foot provides an interesting account of disputes on housing policy within the Cabinet and between Bevan and the Tory opposition.


6. In Glasgow, the proposals contained in the governments' Housing Programme for 1947 only allowed for 3,644 houses to be completed in that year. Given the conditions that prevailed at the time this was grossly inadequate. In actual fact, only 2,944 municipal houses were built in that year, 1,438 of these being temporary houses. (see Corporation of the City of Glasgow Housing Committee. 1966. p45). Figures for house building for the period after 1947 were as follows: 1949-217,240, 1950-210,253, 1951-204,117. (Source: A. Sked and C. Cook (1979). p47.
10. Quoted in Harry McShane *ibid* p2.
11. J. Cunnison and J.B.S. Gilfillan [Ed's] (1958). 'Made-Down' is a term that was used to refer to the subdivision of houses for the unskilled poor, often in former middle class areas of the city. For a discussion of this see- S. Damer (1990). pp72-73.
13. Councillor James McInnes, Sub-Convener of Housing Committee. (Undated, circa 1946) *Glasgow's Housing Progress*, p17. Pamphlet published by Glasgow Trades Council, City Labour Party and Glasgow & District Co-operative Conference
Association. This pamphlet was written as a direct response to the criticisms made by the Communist Party, and particularly Harry McShane. See S. Damer (1990) pp170-71 for a discussion of corruption and council house allocations in Glasgow.


18. P. Addison (1985), gives some account of the extent of squatting in Britain in this period. The actual term 'squatter' was relatively unknown at this juncture. Another useful book, which includes a chapter on the Post-War Squatters by Andrew Friend, is N. Anning et al (1980).


20. Quoted in Bob Saunders, ibid p27.

21. See Linda Mackenney [Ed] (1985). One of the original cast of Glasgow Unity Theatre has
indicated to me that some of those who appeared in the original production of The Gorbals Story were in their late teens or early twenties, with a sole interest in the theatre. However, by taking part in the play they all became more aware of housing conditions in Glasgow and were politicised as a result. (personal communication with Alrea Edwards, now with Clyde Unity Theatre, 16-5-90). The older members of the cast probably played a part in this politicisation, as they had been political activists from the days of the 1930s workers theatre. While Peter McIntyre was one of the 'leaders' of the squatters' movement he was not actually squatting himself.

22. The Economist 24-8-46. The press in Glasgow were not as vociferous in their support of squatting, as expressed in The Bulletin editorial of 17-9-46: "...If not checked it could produce only chaos, the sort of complete disorder in which any particular want would be simply regarded as the right to take".


25. Peter McIntyre, quoted in Glasgow Herald 18-9-46.

27. Peter McIntyre, quoted in Glasgow Herald 16-9-46.


30. Harry Pollitt, general secretary of the Communist Party, speaking at a public meeting in support of the squatters in London on the 12th of September 1946. Quoted in The Bulletin 13-9-46. While speaking in support of the squatters Pollitt referred to the fact that the Labour government had been able to provide houses for the 40,000 Poles who he suggested 'ought to be back in their own country'. Quoted in John Mahon. (1976) Harry Pollitt: A Biography. London: Lawrence and Wishart. p320. So, despite his attempts to sound progressive in relation to the squatters, Pollitt was incapable of realising the racism inherent in this analysis.

31. See Peter Dickens 'Squatting and the State' in New Society 5-5-77. pp219-221.


was brought up in a squatters' camp in Glasgow from 1946 to the mid-1950s has outlined the problems that she and her family suffered as a consequence of the stigma attached to squatters, and the treatment they were subjected to by different sections of the local state. This woman did not leave the squatters' camp until she was twelve years old and has suffered lifelong psychological consequences as a result of her experiences. When referring to her childhood she often hid the fact that she lived in a squatters' camp, preferring to tell people that she was brought up in Castlemilk, the scheme she moved to as a child. (taped interview with Mrs M. 28-8-90).

34. Housing organisations and tenants' associations campaigned against cuts in the building programme throughout 1947. On one occasion they held a meeting in Glasgow with over 150 delegates from different parts of Scotland representing over 40 organisations with a total membership of around 14,000. See Glasgow Herald 8-12-47.

35. This was the headline of a Housing Department Publication during these years. See Housing News in Glasgow Room of Mitchell Library VI-7 146-54.

36. C. Brogan. (1952). p216. Brogan was the doyen of right wing polemicists in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. Among other things, he published a
derisory account of the leading figures in the 1945
Labour government- Our New Masters. London: Hollis
and Carter 1948. He also managed to write one of
the worst books ever published about Glasgow.
37. Progressive was the somewhat ironical and
paradoxical title chosen by the Conservative Party
in Glasgow at this time. The Moderate Party, which
was founded in 1920, began referring to themselves
as Progressives in the late 1920s and when the
party was re-organised in 1936 it became known as
the Progressive Party. The Moderate Party itself
had grown out of a loose anti-Socialist alliance
called the Citizen's Union which was founded in
1898. The Moderate Party had set itself the task of
rallying Liberals and Unionists against 'extremist
candidates'. The main information in this section
was derived from two publications- Fred Douglas
Unfortunately, the Conservative Party in Scotland
do not have the records for this period and I was
unable to trace either the origin of this title or
debates within the Conservative Party on the sale
of council houses. The Labour Party in Scotland do
not have archive material for this period either.
Personal communications.
38. A. Macpherson-Rait, quoted in Glasgow Herald 6-9-51. Macpherson-Rait had became a councillor in 1937. He served as a staff captain in the first world war, in which he earned a military M.B.E. He started a career as an architect-surveyor, before starting up his own company manufacturing fashion garments. He owned a fashion shop in Hope Street Glasgow, which closed down in the late-1980s. See Glasgow Scrapbooks Vol8, p1, in the Glasgow Room, Mitchell library.


41. Councillor James R. Duncan (Labour Housing Convener), quoted in the Glasgow Herald 30-5-52. The other 'high-amenity' scheme built in the post-war years was Auldhouse.

42. Forward 8-12-51.

43. John Lawrence, possibly the main Private builder in Glasgow at the time, quoted in The Bulletin and Scots Pictorial 7-9-51.[hereafter The Bulletin.]. Andrew Mickle, president of the Scottish House Builders Association, while supporting the move by Glasgow Corporation summed up the fears of private builders when he stated that; "we don't want them competing with us
indefinitely. "ibid. The Bulletin itself was in favour of the Corporation selling older council houses, but argued that local authorities should not take on the role of building new houses for sale. Mickle's partner in the building firm he owned in Glasgow was John McTaggart, who was a former member of the ILP.

44. Mr Edward Donaldson, then a shop steward on the Cranhill site quoted in the Glasgow Herald 4-12-51. Along with his colleague and fellow Merrylee campaigner- Les Forster, Ned Donaldson is writing a book on the Merrylee campaign to be published by Clydeside Press in the near future.

45. The Bulletin, 4-12-51.

46. Taped interview with Ms R. 18-9-90.

47. The Bulletin, 7-12-51.


49. The Glasgow Herald, 7-12-51. This report conflicts slightly with an account given by one of the demonstrators who was at the front of the march. Ned Donaldson has suggested that a young police officer attempted to hit him on the head with a baton which was knocked out of his hand by
the sergeant at his side. The sergeant scolded the younger officer and told him he could start a riot if he had made contact. (Ned Donaldson, speaking at a public meeting on housing in the People's Palace 27-5-90).

50. London Times, 7-12-51. Ned Donaldson claims that a number of the women gained entry to the meeting of the Corporation, and one of them produced a rat to the councillors present as an indication of the appalling conditions that people were living in.

51. Councillor Andrew Hood, quoted in Glasgow Herald 7-12-52. The Trades Council was officially suspended at this time by the Scottish T.U.C. and no records of their minutes exist for this period. Glasgow Trades Council was eventually disaffiliated from the STUC, over a dispute about a motion at the 1951 Congress on the Labour government's peace proposals. The dispute was basically between some Communist Party members, who favoured the Five-Power Pact and those who wished to defend Labour's position on rearmament. (see Angela Tuckett. (1986) The Scottish Trades Union Congress: The First 80 Years 1897-1977. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing and STUC. pp334-339. Also STUC Congress Bulletin, February 1952).
53. Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, 6th December 1951, p1284.


56. Glasgow Herald 15-12-51.

57. The Bulletin 14-12-51. The editor of the Bulletin was obviously perturbed by this situation and suggested a remedy to his/her readers accordingly: "...it calls for a firm warning to trade unionists that democratic freedom has its responsibilities in the way of conformity to the rules. And it should be accompanied by an equally firm warning from the trade union leaders that any "militancy" or strike will involve the penalties of unofficial action".

58. The STUC's position was identical to Glasgow's Labour councillor's and led to a dispute at the 1952 Congress in Perth where one delgate, William Towell, (an active trade unionist, Communist and tenants' representative) challenged the leadership of the STUC to take more militant action on the Merrylee issue. See Fifty-Fifth Annual Report of the STUC. pp220-221. In Gallacher Memorial Library.
59. Glasgow Herald 24-12-51.

60. Labour councillor T.G. McLure, quoted in the Glasgow Herald 21-12-51.

61. Mr David Gibson speaking at the annual conference of the Scottish Independent Labour Party, quoted in the Glasgow Herald 11-2-52. Gibson also suggested that part of the reason for the Progressives proposal to sell the houses at Merrylee arose from the fact that the words 'working class' had been eliminated from the powers given to local authorities to build houses by an Act passed by a Labour government. [He was referring to the 1949 Housing Act].


63. T.D. Galbraith, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, speaking in the House of Commons on 5th of February 1952 suggested that the local authorities in Prestwick and Cambeltown had put forward proposals to sell some of their new houses, and nine others had made inquiries. See The Bulletin 6-2-52. Opposition to the proposed sale was also expressed at this time by the Executive Council of the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers at a monthly meeting in London on the 13-1-52. See the Glasgow Herald 14-1-52. There
were protest movements of workers and homeless families against the sale of the Merrylee houses in Edinburgh, Vale of Leven and in many other parts of Scotland.


65. Councillor A. Macpherson-Rait, speaking at the annual dinner of the Glasgow and West of Scotland Plumbers' and Domestic Engineers' (Employers) Association on 11-1-52. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald 12-1-52.

66. The Public Order Act 1936 was: "born out of the fascist marches of the 1930s, prohibited quasi-military organisations and the wearing of uniforms for political objects. It developed police powers to keep the peace at processions by providing for the imposition of conditions, usually rerouting, where serious public disorder was apprehended, and, in exceptional circumstances, for banning processions altogether". (Peter Thornton. (1987) Public Order Law. London: Financial Trading Publications Ltd. p1.).

67. These conditions are set out in a letter from the Secretary of State dated 28th January 1952. See


70. Evidence for this is apparent in a film called Let Glasgow Flourish, produced at the time by people involved in the campaign against the sale of Merrylee houses, and available from the Scottish Film Archive. Thanks to Janet McBain for providing me with this film. The film was made by members of the Dawn Cine Group as part of their attempts to revive the workers cinema of the 1930s. Thanks to Douglas Allen for this information and other comments on this chapter.

71. Mr James Stuart, Secretary of State for Scotland, speaking in the House of Commons 6th May 1952. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald 7-5-52.


73. Most of the Corporation's output of housing at this time comprised of tenements (95%). Merrylee, however, was a 'high-amenity' scheme and few of the
houses were let to Roman Catholics. See M. Horsey. (1990). pp35-36.


CHAPTER TWO- APPENDIX

Some of the Organisations Involved In Merrylee Campaign:

1. Amalgamated Engineering Union, Milton Branch.
3. Amalgamated Engineering Union (Jas Howden & Coy's Joint Shop Stewards' Committee).
4. Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of Great Britain and Ireland (Glasgow No 1 Branch).
5. Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (Glasgow 2nd Branch).
7. British Railways, St Rollox Works Committee.
12. Electrical Trades Union (Glasgow West Branch).
13. Electrical Trades Union (Blythswood Branch).

15. Glasgow Trades Council.

16. Glasgow City Committee of the Communist Party.

17. Glasgow and District Co-operative Association.

18. Glasgow City Labour Party.


23. Hydepark Shop Stewards' Movement.


25. Joint Committee to Prevent Sale of Merrylee Houses.


27. National Union of Railwaymen (Glasgow No 12 Branch).

28. National Union of Railwaymen (Glasgow No 18 Branch).

29. National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives.

30. National Federation of Building Trade Operatives (Glasgow Branch).
31. National Amalgamated Union of Life Assurance Workers (Glasgow Branch).


33. Plumbing Department of Yarrows, Scotstoun.

34. Springburn Constituency Labour Party.


37. Shop Stewards' Committee, Messrs Alley & Maclellan.

38. Shop Stewards' Committee, Messrs Mirlees Watson & Co, Scotland Street.

39. Shop Stewards' Committee, D. & W. Henderson Ltd.

40. Shop Stewards' Committee, Messrs G. & J. Weir Ltd.

41. Shop Stewards' Committee, Shieldhall Building Workers.

42. Shop Stewards' Committee, Toryglen Building Workers.

43. Shop Stewards' Committee S.C.W.S. Shieldhall

44. Tradeston Constituency Labour Party.

45. Transport and General Workers Union (Glasgow District Committee).
46. Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (Parkhead Branch).

47. United Pattern Makers Association, (Glasgow No 1 Branch).

Source: Corporation of Glasgow, Minutes of Housing Committee from 3rd October 1951 to 21st February 1952.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ARDEN AND ALL-SCOTLAND RENT-INCREASE STRIKE OF 1958-59

3.1 Introduction

Agitation and protests on the rents issue have always figured highly in the history of tenants' organisations and housing struggles. The significance of working class involvement in this form of direct action, despite the fact that they have often been localised struggles, is apparent in the striking material gains which have often accrued from particular instances of rent strikes. The most notable example is government intervention to control rents in response to the Glasgow Rent Strike of 1915. Several important reasons for studying rent strikes in a sociological context have already been outlined by Moorhouse et al:

"...they illustrate clearly the creative aspect of working class life...rent strikes can provoke a direct physical challenge to the upholders of existing social arrangements...such physical challenges arise from the normative challenge to the status quo which is always implicit and more or less explicit in rent strikes...Incipient within such action is an oppositional statement about social relations in British society: about the
nature of property ownership and about control over men's lives."(1)

With the important addition of control over women's lives, without whose involvement most rent strikes would never have been organised, this idea of a counter-hegemonic struggle around issues of social reproduction is crucial to an understanding of the background to rent strikes. This chapter will attempt to illustrate the centrality of these issues through a discussion of a rent-increase strike which began in the Arden housing scheme on the south-west periphery of Glasgow in 1958, and which spread to other areas of Scotland as the campaign developed. The second section will provide a brief history of rent strikes to emphasize the fact that, while they remain a much understudied phenomenon, they have been a persistent part of tenants' struggles for at least the last one-hundred years. This will be followed by an outline of the wider issues precipitating the Arden All-Scotland rent strike, including the state's attempt to de-control rents in the post-war years. There will then be a discussion of the Arden rent strike proper, and a concluding analysis of the relationship between this campaign and the post-war tenants' movement in Glasgow.
3.2 Rent Strikes in History

David Englander, in his seminal account of the relationship between landlord and tenant in urban Britain, has traced the growth of tenants' challenges to rent determination from the late nineteenth-century to the period of the first world-War. (2) Englander argues that while there is occasional evidence of rent strikes in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, like the one organised by hand-loom weavers in Bolton in 1826, it was not until the late 1880s with the rapid growth in property owners' associations that the struggle between landlord and tenant intensified. It is in this context that Englander refers to the 'endemic strife between landlord and tenant in Glasgow' (D. Englander, 1983). He further argues, however, that the 1915 Rent Restriction Act was the "inevitable" outcome of a prolonged period of struggle between landlord and tenant, without fully explaining why it was inevitable nor why the state intervened in 1915. Other commentators have challenged this incrementalist version of events and have specifically emphasised the central role played by the 1915 Glasgow Rent Strike in detonating state intervention in rent control and housing policy during this period:
"...The state was compelled to produce the 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act out of thin air, as it had absolutely no worked out policy for the systematic provision of working class housing....Working-class demands had been articulated to a level where the state had to intervene to accommodate them. It is my contention that without the 1915 Rent Strike in Glasgow, there would have been no 1915 Rents and Mortgage Restrictions Act, and without the 1915 Act there would have been no 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act in the form in which we know it...". (3) [original emphasis].

Damer's class analysis has the advantage of locating the 1915 Rent Strike within a wider political and economic context, in addition to providing an interesting account of the very real contributions of tenants' organisations and women in the overall struggle for the amelioration of the living conditions of the working class. The first Rent Restriction Act established two fundamental principles of rent legislation. First, it prevented landlords raising rents above the rent being paid for a dwelling at the outbreak of war in August 1914, and secondly it prevented landlords evicting tenants except in the relatively rare cases it
specified. It gave an new degree of protection to tenants.

These themes were continued by Damer in his examination of the Clydebank Rent Strike of the 1920s (S. Damer, 1985). In this analysis the events in Clydebank are directly related to the fact that the 1915 Rent and Mortgage Interest Act, which froze the rents of small houses (poor people's houses) at pre-war levels, was intended to be a temporary measure. The confusion which arose in this situation led the Government to appoint two consecutive committees to investigate the affair: the Hunter Committee of 1918 and the Salisbury Committee of 1920. The report of the Hunter committee resulted in the passing of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage (Restrictions) Act, 1919, which doubled the rental limits of the Act of 1915. A similar Act was passed in 1920 as a result of the deliberations of the Salisbury Committee. The Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 trebled the rental limits of the 1915 Act. Damer details the widespread principled opposition to these Acts and explains how the rent strike progressed in Clydebank both in the courts and through civil disobedience against evictions. The rent strike began in 1920 and
continued through to 1927, with large numbers of Clydebank tenants paying only "standard" rent, that is, at the wartime level. Damer argues that the rent strike was successful on three levels:

"...(a) immediate empirical gains for the Clydebank tenants; (b) immediate and longer term political gains in terms of Parliamentary representation for themselves and the Scottish working class; and (c) longer run effects on the whole issue of the politics of social reproduction of the working class in housing". (4)

Damer's contention is that the Clydebank tenants successfully defended their standard of living during a period of mass unemployment and defeat for the working class; formed a base from which the Clydeside ILP members were able to be elected to Parliament; and prevented the removal of rent control in the 1920s by organising the Rent Strike.

Further Rent Acts were passed in the 1920s and 1930s, each going as far in decontrol as the relation of class and political struggle would allow, and there is some evidence that rent strikes continued to form an important part of working class protest throughout the inter-war period (H.F. Moorhouse et al, 1972). For instance, during the
rent strikes in Stepney and Bethnal Green in London just prior to the second world war, there were 'pitched battles with bailiffs and police with barbed wire barricades and pickets on duty day and night' (P. Piratin, 1978). This rent strike ensured that the state's aim to abolish rent control had to be abandoned until after the war. Indeed the Chamberlain government immediately introduced a new Rent Restriction Act in 1939, which brought almost all private landlord tenancies under control:

"...The Act stopped all forms of decontrol and provided the continuance of the Rent Acts until six months after the date declared by Order in Council to be the end of the "emergency". (5)

This situation continued until the Conservative governments of the 1950s proclaimed their intention of freeing property owners from rent control. As the proceeding discussion will illustrate, it was against this background that the Arden-All Scotland Rent Strike of 1958 began.

The period after the second world war has also witnessed a variety of rent strikes in working class areas of Britain. In 1960 there was a rent strike involving over 8,000 tenants protesting against a differential rent scheme introduced by the local Conservative council in the London
borough of St Pancras (D. Burn, 1972). In Sheffield in 1967 tenants' associations organised rent strikes against the adoption of a rebated rent scheme by the local Labour council (P.A. Baldock, 1971; and S. Lowe, 1986). Between 1968 and 1970 there was a massive rent strike in the East End of London against the Conservative-controlled Greater London Council's proposals to introduce a 'fair rents' system for council housing (H.F. Moorhouse et al, 1972). In 1971 rent strikes were organised in Derry and West Belfast against the introduction of internment without trial in Northern Ireland (E. McAnn, 1992). There is documentary evidence from over eighty individual local authorities of rent strikes by council tenants against the 1972 Housing Finance Act (L. Sklair, 1975). The final wave of rent strikes took place in the early 1980s against the forced increases in rents by a number of local authorities in response to financial cut-backs by central government. While these examples are obviously related to different issues they indicate, by their very diversity, the significance of such a form of protest in the history of working class politics in this country. It is obvious from a reading of the various accounts of these rent strikes that they were not all successful in achieving the objectives which they had set
themselves. However, this does not mean that we should diminish the importance of such issues as certain interpretations attempt to do:

"...there are no examples in the modern period, or even the era of council house tenants' movements, that rent strikes caused anything other than a localised impact...Most of the evidence indicates that the rent strike as a political tactic is extremely difficult to enforce and frequently ends in disarray and confusion". (7)

The confusion is more apparent in the interpretation provided by Lowe than in the history of state rent control and tenants struggles. The rent strikes of the inter-war period ensured that the state's proclaimed intention of 'freeing' property owners from rent control was not to be achieved on any significant scale. It was not until the passing of the 1957 Rent Act, which decontrolled 800,000 tenants immediately and provided that other properties would be decontrolled automatically when there was a change of tenant (known as "creeping decontrol") that this policy progressed with any degree of success. It is the background to this specific piece of legislation which was responsible for the rent strike in Glasgow in 1958 and the 'localised
impact' was regarded as a significant factor in local working class struggle. The fact that this rent-increase strike spread to all areas of Scotland, where the Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA) owned and managed houses, goes some way to disproving Lowe's contention that they remain 'localised' in terms of their impact or that they were difficult to organise if a well organised and active tenants' organisation was present. Therefore, there are three main reasons for including this study of a rent strike in our discussion. Firstly, it provides an account of the first post-war attempt at rent decontrol; secondly, the rent-increase strike was organised by SSHA tenants, and the issues focus on the contradictory nature of the relationship between tenants and different 'social' landlords; and finally, the discussion provides us with additional analysis of the links between the tenants' movement and wider housing struggles in early post-war Glasgow.

3.3 The Landlords Bill

"In housing our first task was to build more homes and it was done— one and a half million new homes in the last five years. As a result of the progress then made we switched the subsidies to special needs such as slum clearance. Now, faced
with the problem of making the best use of the houses we have got, we are tackling rent control". (8)

In the early post war years local authorities and central government concentrated their energies on the rebuilding of Britain's housing stock and little attention was given to rent control policies. However, as the above quotation from Macmillan makes clear, it was not long before the state turned its attention towards such considerations. The context in which this change took place was one where the theme of 'improving living standards is the strongest of the period' (B. Williamson, 1990). It was against this background that the Conservative Party Conference passed a resolution on rent control in 1952, which called for:

"A review of the Rent Restrictions Acts with a view to bringing these Acts into line with modern conditions and remedying the state of affairs which now makes it impossible for owners to carry out repairs". (9)

In response to this pressure from its own supporters the Conservative Government published a White Paper in November 1953 which outlined their housing programme as a whole but which was, in
large part, devoted to the 'problem' of rent control. (10) The White Paper was the forerunner to the Housing Repairs and Rents (Scotland) Act 1954. This Act enabled a landlord, if he was wholly responsible for the repairs to a house, to claim a repairs increase of 40 per cent of the rent of a controlled house. This was preceded in May 1953 by the appointment of a committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Sorn, to review the system of valuation and rating. This reported in September 1954, and was the forerunner to the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956. (11) This Act provided two major changes: firstly, the abolition of 'owners' rates and, secondly, a change in the method of valuation. Despite these changes, landlords, in the main, failed to achieve the increased rents that they hoped for. This was mainly because they refused to spend the necessarily large sums of capital on improvements. Tenants usually carried out the repairs themselves, and landlords had never been interested in doing repairs in any case, as the 1945 Ridley Committee had acknowledged:

"We might say that there is evidence of a tendency among some owners to look upon house property as an investment to give a perpetual
income without as much expenditure on repairs or replacements". (12)

However, the Government used the 1956 Act as an ideal opportunity for raising the whole issue of "low council rents", consciously ignoring the extent to which council tenants were 'subsidising' themselves through rate contributions. The Secretary of State for Scotland conducted this offensive in a series of public speeches and statements, and in circulars to local authorities. One circular, issued in June of 1956, suggested that rent had accounted for 10.5 per cent of average earnings in 1938, but only 4.5 per cent in 1955. The state was urging local authorities to review rent levels on the principle that, subsidies should not be given to 'those who do not need them' and, that no one in 'genuine need of a house should be asked to pay more rent than he (sic) can reasonably afford'. (13) Local authorities were being asked to use the 1956 Act to 'put their rent levels on a more realistic footing' or, more precisely, to increase rents on houses built and tenanted after May 1956. This led to a discrepancy in the assessed rents and the actual rent paid on different houses. Houses built and tenanted before May 1956 had their rents frozen for five years,
when they would then be assessed by the City Assessor who was 'compelled' to base the assessment on rents at 'fair market value'. Houses built and tenanted after May 1956 could have their rentals assessed and increased accordingly. These changes in rent policy were part of an overall strategy by the state to raise rents throughout Scotland.(14)

Therefore, these series of reports and parliamentary Acts were used as a political weapon by the Conservative government to aid private landlords and to force reluctant Labour-controlled authorities to raise council house rents. These deliberations resulted in the passing of the Rent Act, 1957 which was described by one authority on the subject thus:

"This Act introduces what is probably the most extensive system of decontrol in the history of the Rent Acts. In addition to houses in the London area and Scotland with a rateable value exceeding £40, and elsewhere in England and Wales exceeding £30, being taken out of control altogether and provision being made for further decontrol by stages, the Act entitles landlords to claim decontrol of dwellings when they come into possession". (15)
The Act was aimed at ending the security that tenants had enjoyed since the First World War, extending powers of eviction, and allowed for increased rentals in decontrolled houses. At a time when there was a serious shortage of housing in Scotland, with 124,000 on the waiting list in Glasgow alone, this Act decontrolled 60,000 houses. The policy of increasing rents fitted into the dominant ideology of the period, which revolved around the notion that inequality had been eradicated and 'prosperity' achieved. The final piece in the complex legislative jigsaw, the Housing Subsidies (Scotland) Act, had been passed earlier in 1957 almost unnoticed. This Act developed from a report commissioned by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1955. This committee had argued that:

"...local authorities in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland obtained in 1955 about twice the rent income per house which the local authorities in Scotland obtained". (16)

While acknowledging that average incomes in Scotland were 5 to 7 per cent lower than the UK average this committee proposed that rents of local authority houses in Scotland should be increased. This was subsequently written into the Act in the
form of a reduction in rate fund contributions to local authority Housing Revenue Accounts and increased rental charges for tenants. To repeat the main thrust of the argument, this was the era of "you've never had it so good" and working class tenants of local authority housing were being forced by the state to pay a larger proportion of their income on rents. As one councillor in Glasgow put it:

"If people can afford television sets, they can afford to pay rent and rates increases". (17)

3.4 Not A Penny On The Rent

The 1957 Rent Act was opposed by tenants' associations and the labour and trade union movement throughout Britain. In early January 1957 a deputation of 100 women from the Saracen, Craighall and Cowcaddens Tenants' Associations in Glasgow met with Sir Anthony Eden to protest against the implications of the Rent Bill. (18) In late January the National Executive of the Labour Party detailed plans to organise a nation-wide campaign against the Act. (19) In mid-February 1957 over 100 tenants, mainly women, took part in a demonstration in George Square, Glasgow to seek the support of the Labour council in protesting against the Rent Act. (20) In March, 6 people were arrested
at a demonstration organised by the National Association of Tenants' and Residents in Trafalgar Square, London. (21) In October 1957, tenants in Dumfries who were involved in a rent strike, were supported by striking Sanquhar and Kirconnel miners in 'the biggest demonstration held in the South of Scotland for many years'. (22) The simple point being made here is that there was massive opposition throughout the country to the whole idea of rent increases to both private and local authority houses. Both of the previous sections have indicated the peculiar situation pertaining to Scotland, in terms of lower average rentals in the local authority sector and an intensive period of tenants' struggles on the rents issue before the Second World War.

The state was also faced with a particular problem in Glasgow in achieving any increase in rents of local authority houses but, as the previous section indicated, had armed itself with ample legislative support with which to proceed. The Corporation of Glasgow had not increased their rents since August 1938. After complaints by the leader of the Progressive Party on Glasgow Corporation a separate Inquiry, under the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1947, was set up in
1958, within seven weeks of the original complaint. This Inquiry was to investigate whether the Corporation had met with the provisions of section 73[5] of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1950.(23) Local authorities in Scotland in the late 1950s, under the stipulations of the 1950 Act, were required to 'from time to time' review rents and make such changes 'as circumstances may require'. The author of this inquiry, C.J.D. Shaw, took evidence for five days before finally ruling that the Corporation had ignored factors 'essential' to any proper review of rents. Thereafter, Glasgow Corporation was forced into reviewing its rents policy and agreed to raise rents by an average of 2s. 6d. (12½p) in 1959.

Nevertheless, the overall strategy adopted in Scotland was to use the 1957 Housing and Subsidies Act to force local authorities to raise rents, but this was met with opposition throughout the country. However, the SSHA, like local authorities, was obliged by this Act to achieve a 'better balance' between rents and rates by raising the rents. The anomalies between rents of SSHA houses and those of the local authorities had been raised as early as November 1949 by representatives of Glasgow Trades Council.(24) The difference, as one
leading tenant activist of this period pointed out, was that:

"...the SSHA was not an elected body like the council. The Board of Management was appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland, so had no hesitation in informing its tenants of its intentions to raise rents". (25)

The SSHA had reached an informal agreement with Glasgow Corporation in October 1945, not to charge lower rents for houses of a similar size than the Corporation itself. The idea was to achieve parity in rental levels. There was also an agreement that, while the SSHA would build houses, the Corporation would manage them, and that tenants would be nominated by the City Factor, the official charged with maintaining waiting-lists and allocating houses. (26) This relationship was to be fundamentally altered as a result of the SSHA's proposal to increase rents. In April 1957 the Board of Management of the SSHA informed tenants and local authorities that they were considering increasing rents on the houses they owned. Prior to this the SSHA had been obliged to fix rents after negotiations with individual local authorities. Now, with the full authority of the state, it was determined to impose a general rent increase
throughout Scotland. This was met with a widespread protest by tenants of SSHA houses, trade unions and local authorities throughout Scotland, with miners in Kirkaldy, Mid-Lothian and Cumnock threatening strike action if the SSHA went ahead with their proposal. (27) After a thorough review of the situation the Board of Management of the SSHA, on the 9th of January 1958, informed local authorities by letter, and tenants through a press release, that they would be going ahead with the rent increase, which would come into operation in October 1958. The proposal was that the rent increase in any particular house would not exceed 7s. 6d (37\p) except in cases where local authority rents were higher, with a rent rebate scheme for tenants with "household income" of £10. 15s (£10. 75p) a week or less. Tenants claiming a rebate were required to give particulars of their household incomes, which would be 'treated in the strictest confidence'. (28) The rent increase was more than double the increase imposed by Glasgow Corporation a year later. Reflecting the dominant ideology of the 'oversubsidised' council tenant the SSHA justified the proposed rent increase clearly in their press release:
"...the Scottish Special Housing Association point out that at present the average cost of providing and maintaining an Association house (this is the average for all Association houses) is about 30s a week. The average rent, on the other hand, is 6s 7d. a week. This leaves the Exchequer— in other words the taxpayer—to pay 23s 5d.

The Association take the view that tenants who can afford it can properly be expected to pay reasonable rent but they attach great importance also to the principle that no one should be denied a house because he is unable to afford the rent charged". (29)

Ignoring the fact that most council and SSHA tenants contributed to Exchequer funds through both rates and tax payments, the Board of Management of the SSHA were intent on being at the forefront of the Government's plans to reorganise rent structures in Scotland. In Glasgow, the practical effect of this proposal was that existing rents of two-apartment houses would be raised from £15 17s 4d a year, to £30; for three-apartments, from £18 10s 4d to £33; for four-apartments, from £19 11s 8d to £36; and for five-apartments, from £20 15s 4d to £39. (30) There was an immediate reaction from the tenants' movement in Scotland to this proposal to
increase rents and to the rent rebate scheme which was regarded as a 'means test'. The stigma attached to means-tested benefits had not been eradicated in working class consciousness, despite the supposed era of 'prosperity' which they were living through.

At a hastily arranged conference of the Scottish Council of Tenants' Associations (SCTA) on the 12th of January, with 45 delegates present, there were calls for industrial strike action and for tenants to refuse to sign the new missives. (31) The majority of SSHA tenants in Glasgow, amounting to around 4,000 in 1958, had been allocated houses straight from the Corporation waiting list and they held the Corporation responsible for the situation that they were now faced with. As one of the tenants in the Arden scheme described it:

"To use the colloquial term, we had been conned. Because, here we were, we must have had our name down for 7, 8, or 9 years for a local authority house registered with Glasgow Corporation and we were offered an SSHA house. No one in Glasgow Corporation, councillors included, had intimated that there were any basic differences between the actual two tenancies. You had security of tenure we were told, which was largely true, but you were not being controlled by your actual
authority with whom you had registered for years". (32)

These tenants, it seems, were under the impression that by being allocated a house through, and having it factored by, the Corporation that they would remain under the control of a democratically elected local authority, rather than a committee appointed undemocratically by the Secretary of State for Scotland. This was not the case and the tenants, therefore, sought the support of the Corporation in their opposition to these proposals. The Arden tenants' association were the first organisation to indicate the way that they would like the protest to develop:

"This association views with grave concern the SSHA rent scheme, copy of which is in your hands as factors of these houses.

It is our intention to inform Glasgow Corporation that this Association will oppose the adoption of this differential rent proposal and means test with all the means at our disposal.

We trust that when the new missives are to hand that the factors department will refrain from sending these out to the tenants to spare us the trouble of having to return them unsigned". (33)
However, in a manner similar to that adopted over the issue of the sale of the Merrylee houses, the Labour group on Glasgow Corporation, while opposed to the SSHA's proposals, decided against giving the Arden tenants the support they had requested. Instead, the Corporation decided to make its own views on the matter known to the SSHA in a series of letters from the Town Clerk. (34) The essence of their protest was that they might refuse to factor the houses owned by the SSHA in Glasgow if the rent-increase proposals were implemented. They also requested a meeting with the SSHA, and representatives from the Corporation met with the Board of Management of the SSHA on the 10th of March 1958 to express their objections to the increase. They argued that the rentals proposed by the SSHA were almost double the rentals of comparable local authority houses in Glasgow, and, called on the SSHA to co-operate with them in persuading the Government to reduce interest rates and increase subsidies. In response, the SSHA argued that rents would have to be increased even without recent increases in interest rates; that the disparity between the two organisations' rent structures could be reduced if the Corporation were to increase their own rents, and, with a clear
indication that there were wider considerations behind the proposed increase that:

"...the Association feared that if they did not charge rents within limits approved by the Secretary of State for Scotland, there was the danger that Parliament might instruct the Association to cease their operations". (35)

This was no idle threat. The SSHA had to fix rents with regard to the Exchequer subsidies available and, within ranges approved by the Secretary of State for Scotland in agreement with the Treasury. Consequently, after agreeing to give 'careful consideration' to the views expressed by Glasgow Corporation, the SSHA informed all local authorities, on the 20th May 1958, that the rent increase and rebate scheme would come into operation at the beginning of October. The SSHA, 'in order to deflect some of the trouble' it might cause, suggested postponing implementation of the rent increase until 1961. However, the Secretary of State considered this scheme to be 'fair and reasonable', despite his belief that 'there was some danger of rent strikes and industrial unrest'. (36) Therefore, local authorities, acting as factors, were asked to inform tenants by letter of the details of this scheme along with a 'Notice
to Quit', new Missives and a guide to the Rebate Scheme. (37)

While the SSHA had been meeting with local authorities, tenants' associations in Glasgow, and elsewhere in Scotland, were organising their own protests against the rent increase and rent rebate proposals. Throughout February and March of 1958 the S.C.T.A. organised two major conferences and four other meetings of SSHA tenants, led one deputation to the Scottish Office and three others to the Board of Management of the SSHA. (38) On one of these occasions the secretary of SCTA, Joseph Cosgrove, was arrested for 'organising and conducting a procession through certain Edinburgh streets without previous written permission'. Cosgrove was eventually fined £3 for this offence. (39) These deputations, like the one's organised by the local authorities, had little impact on the attitude of the SSHA, or the Secretary of State for Scotland, who were intent on implementing the rent increases and rebate scheme. Tenants' associations, therefore, decided to respond to this intransigence with a refusal to sign the new Missives and with a rent-increase strike. (40) A meeting of delegates from tenants' associations and trade unions, on the 22 of June
1958, agreed to collect the unsigned Missives in order to monitor the extent of support amongst SSHA tenants. (41) Eight days after this conference Glasgow Corporation, in protest at the rent increases, informed the SSHA that they were relinquishing the factoring of SSHA houses, but agreed to issue the Missives. (42) However, the first signs of support for a rent-increase strike came in the Arden housing scheme on the south-west periphery of Glasgow. There had been an active tenants' association in this scheme since at least 1955, and they had amassed a substantial body of support within the scheme as well as raising the necessary funds to organise such a campaign:

"We had the distinct advantage as a tenants' association by our communal activities, on a relatively small scale but no doubt enjoyed communally, of having been in existence for some three or four years in Arden. We had also got together a bank balance of about £600, which was not an inconsiderable sum in 1958. So, it meant that as well as being the largest scheme in Glasgow of SSHA tenants we had the added advantage of having some resources to do something about it. We set up a committee in the summer of 1958, specifically to collect the Missives and monitor..."
support in Arden. We also attracted the support of SSHA tenants in other schemes in Glasgow—Cadder and Toryglen. With 1,400 or so houses in Arden we were the largest SSHA scheme in Glasgow, were active and determined to do something about it. We also attracted the attention politically of certain members of the Communist Party and two schemes in Clydebank—Fairley and Linnvale— and the Scottish Council of Tenants' Associations. As well as being opposed to the rent increase we argued that, for a comparable house, we would accept any increase that Glasgow Corporation agreed on. We met with the Board of Management of the SSHA and, of course, it was entirely fruitless. There was no way we could meet on common ground". (43)

The Arden tenants' association had been active on a number of issues for some years and, with the necessary financial and human resources they had accumulated, were the first tenants' organisation in Scotland to collect the unsigned Missives and organise a rent-increase strike. (44) They organised the rent-increase strike with posters, using a loudspeaker van and through a series of public meetings in the scheme. These meetings, apart from one open-air meeting on the 2nd of July 1958, were held in a local school hall which held a capacity
of 400 and, as some of them were attended by over 1,000 Arden tenants, the tenants' association had to provide a tannoy system to relay the speeches to the audience outside the hall. It was a well organised campaign which managed to gain the support of 95 per cent of Arden tenants who refused to sign the Missives or pay the rent increase. The issue was analysed specifically in class terms during a speech at a public meeting by the chairperson of Arden tenants' association:

"You know perfectly well that we're excluded from indulging in party politics... At the same time, of course, we want to make clear that any authority — be it Glasgow Corporation, be it a central Government of any colour— when they impose any rent increase will be fought to the bitter end. We happen to have a central Government in power just now which is more vicious than any other colour which is liable to come in, and we happen to be concentrating our energies to fighting their policies. Because, it's quite clear that they are the villains of the piece... Glasgow Corporation, should they attempt to impose a rent increase, they will be fought also, as will any Government attempting to lower the standard of living of the
people—most particularly the working class people." (45)

The threat to extend the rent strike to Corporation tenants never materialised. However, in August 1958 the SSHA did give one small concession to the tenants by excluding the 1,700 houses built prior to the war in special areas (known as "distressed areas") from their general rent scheme. (46) The Arden tenants' association had been arguing that the SSHA should only raise rents to comparable levels to those proposed by local authorities. Their strategy was to fight all rent increases but, failing that, to keep rent increases to as low a level as possible. They were supported in this campaign within Arden by the SCTA and invited speakers from Clydebank Town Council. The Arden tenants' association also threatened to put up municipal candidates against the local councillor if he supported the imposition of rent increases and began to discuss the possibility of taking out an Interim Interdict against the SSHA.

However, Glasgow Corporation refused to support the protest organised by the Arden tenants, and other tenants' associations in Glasgow, on the grounds that they had no control over the SSHA rent proposals. In addition, the Corporation also
suggested that they could not re-house tenants evicted by the SSHA. (47) This was in sharp contrast to the response of some other local authorities in Scotland. Midlothian County Council, for example, sought out an Interim Interdict to prevent the SSHA from increasing the rents. This action was rejected in a judgement by Lord Patrick in the Court of Session in mid-September. (48) The SSHA immediately leafleted local tenants informing them of the legal judgement and asking them to pay the rent increase.

However, as 1958 advanced the dispute widened and by September there were still 20,000 of the 38,000 Missives not returned to the SSHA. Tenants from Bathgate, Boness, Cumnock, Kirkaldy, Oakley and many other towns in Scotland joined in the rent-increase strike. On the 22nd of September, three days after the result of the Midlothian case was announced, around 1,000 tenants from all over Scotland returned thousands of unsigned Missives to the SSHA headquarters in Edinburgh. The SCTA, who had organised this demonstration, also announced that they were considering raising an action for Interdict preventing the SSHA from increasing their rents. (49) Questioning the legitimacy of the widespread support for the rent-increase strike, and using the rhetoric of Cold War ideology, Sir
Ronald Thomson, chairperson of the SSHA, had earlier argued that 'communist agitators had been misleading the tenants'. Thompson also indicated that the SSHA would only use eviction proceedings against tenants as 'a last resort' (50). In any case, the SSHA proceeded to implement the rent increase and rent rebate scheme from the 1st of October 1958 with the full support of the state:

"...Mr Nixon Brown, the Under-Secretary of State, told Council that they 'were fulfilling a national duty in introducing the new rent scheme, including the rebate scheme. He assured the Council of Management that Ministers were wholeheartedly behind the Association in the matter and would give all possible support'. (51)

By November the SSHA were issuing notices to tenants to end the rent strike and pay the new increase along with arrears. They also threatened tenants with legal action if they failed to abide by these notices. However, the initial move by the Arden tenants was now spreading to most areas of Scotland where the SSHA owned houses.

The support for the rent-increase strike remained solid in most areas and the campaign was now being co-ordinated by the SCTA. The rent strike continued along similar lines to those already
described into 1959, and the SCTA were responsible for organising most of the activities that tenants' associations were involved in. The policy of the SCTA was similar to that of the Arden tenants' association; to oppose the SSHA proposals through a rent-increase strike and the return of unsigned Missives. However, the SCTA were not only the representative organisation for all Scottish tenants' groups, but were more explicit about the political nature of the campaign against the SSHA.

The majority of the Executive Committee of the SCTA were active in trade unions, some were active in the Labour Party and number of its leading spokespersons were active in the Communist Party—mainly in Glasgow. The latter of this group were continuing the early post-war Communist Party tradition of agitation around issues of reproduction—housing in particular—alongside trade union activity in the factories and the shipyards. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the leading figures in this organisation were men, reflecting the patriarchal structure of the labour market in Glasgow in the 1950s. Their strategy in opposing the SSHA proposals was also conducted along traditional lines. They sought the support of Labour MPs, Labour controlled local
authorities and the trade union's. They also organised deputations and demonstrations to the SSHA headquarters in Edinburgh and argued for local authorities to take up 'test cases' through the courts against the SSHA. Despite the fact that around 10,000 of the SSHA houses were tenanted by miners, there is little evidence that union support went beyond the passing of resolutions in support of the tenants at union branch meetings. Scottish Labour MPs merely offered to act as intermediaries between the SCTA and SSHA. The most successful aspect to the SCTA campaign, aside from gathering widespread support amongst tenants, was in their ability not only to attain the support of individual Labour councillors, but convincing Midlothian County Council to mount a legal challenge to the SSHA in the courts.

As indicated earlier, however, the Midlothian case failed in the courts and provided the SSHA with the legal backing for the rent increase that they were confident of achieving all along. The SSHA were also confident that this result in the courts would bring the rent strike to a successful conclusion. As the rent-increase strike moved into 1959 the effects of the Midlothian result on
tenants' association's ability to sustain a campaign began to come under scrutiny internally.

At a meeting of the SCTA in Glasgow in January 1959, with 510 delegates in attendance, it was reported that most local authorities had decided against taking any further action against the SSHA after the Midlothian result and that the rent strike was losing support in some areas, with many tenants worried about the arrears that they were building up. (52) The delegates decided to gather information about the extent of support for continuing with the rent strike, called on Labour councillors and MPs to support their campaign, but, crucially, indicated that they would be willing to meet with the Management Committee of the SSHA to discuss the situation. This was an implicit indication that the membership of the SCTA were beginning to doubt the possibility of the rent strike being successful. The SSHA, having won the legal battle, showed little sign of being willing to compromise and ignored the appeals for negotiations:

"Mr Finlay Hart reported that deputation to Edinburgh had failed to arrange a meeting with SSHA Management Committee, but in a phone conversation with Mr Halley, Mr Halley had suggested that any
proposals we had to make should be submitted in writing which would be placed before the Committee. Mr Halley stated he had been instructed he had to meet no one, neither tenants or local authorities in this particular dispute". (53)

Tenants' associations throughout Scotland were indicating to the SCTA that support for the rent strike was still being supported by between 60 and 75 per cent of tenants in the majority of areas. Despite these claims the SSHA obviously felt that they had won the struggle with the "test case" in Midlothian and intended to wait on individual tenants to pay the increase, with a little added encouragement by threatening court action. While the SSHAs were conducting legal action against individual tenants they certainly had no intention of meeting with representatives of the SCTA to discuss any compromise on the rent increase.

The SCTA persisted with the rent strike through the early months of 1959. They continued to seek the assistance of Scottish Labour MPs to open negotiations with the SSHAs, a move which the MPs agreed to. (54) It was at this stage that the SSHAs decided to take the initiative and prosecute individual tenants for rent arrears. Seven actions were defended by individual tenants' associations
but the SCTA, with the monetary support being partly provided by the Arden tenants, decided to employ a solicitor to defend a Kirkaldy tenant in a 'test case' in the Sheriff Court. The tenant in this case had built up arrears of rent previous to the rent strike and the SCTA fought the case on a legal technicality related to the validity or otherwise of the 'Notice to Quit' issued by the SSHA. The nature of this case indicates that the SCTA were making a desperate attempt to provide tenants on rent strike with a legal victory which, in reality, had no real hope of success. (55) While the SCTA continued to emphasise the centrality of the rent increase, the lengthy legal wrangle diverted attention from the main issue and concentrated their own resources on defending the Kirkaldy case. Scottish Labour MPs were also urging all SSHA tenants, even before the Kirkaldy case had been heard in court, to abandon the rent strike and start paying the increase. The Kirkaldy case led to disputes within the SCTA and, inevitably ended in a legal judgement in favour of the SSHA. (56) The SSHA issued notices to tenants to start paying up arrears and began taking court action against any tenant who was in arrears to the extent of £10 or
more. To the consternation of the SCTA there was still no space for negotiations:

"...We have always maintained and still do that a meeting between the two parties, with give and take on both sides, could resolve this dispute without further recourse to the courts....Even in a major war there are armistice talks and a peace treaty but it seems that only unconditional surrender will satisfy the general staff of then SSHA..."(57)

At the same time, the SCTA were considering an appeal against the Kirkaldy decision and urging tenants to continue with the rent strike. The Kirkaldy appeal never materialised, but the rent strike continued right through to 1960. In April 1960 there were 1,254 tenants in houses under the management of the SSHA still on rent strike—most of them in Glasgow—and a further sixteen tenants in SSHA houses factored by local authorities.(58) The majority of those still refusing to pay the rent increase in Glasgow were tenants in the Arden scheme where the rent strike began. The Arden tenants' association provided the funding for the last legal 'test case' against the SSHA by a tenant in the Cadder housing scheme in Glasgow. This case resulted from the SSHA raising an action against
one tenant- Mr James W. Maxwell- in respect of unpaid arrears amounting to £9, 13s. 1d. The case, based on a legal technicality relating to the 'Notice to Quit', was heard in the Small Debt Court before being transferred to the Sheriff Court in Glasgow, where sheriff Norman L. Walker ruled in favour of the SSHA. The tenant appealed against this ruling and, unusually for debts of under £50, the case went forward to the Court of Session in Edinburgh where Lord Guthrie held the appeal to be 'competent, but quoad ultra refused the appeal' (59)

To all intents and purposes this was the end of the rent strike, aptly summed up by one leading activist:

"It died a death. It's just like the flower, it blooms, it blossoms, it shows it's nice colours but it's got to die sometime and it died and that was it" (60)

Some individual tenants continued to refuse to pay the rent increase right up until October 1960. The majority, however, had begun paying the increase after the decision in the Court of Session. The SSHA began seeking revenge against many of the activists involved in this rent strike, by forcing them to pay the rent arrears accumulated at £1 per week, with threats of further legal
action if they refused. (61) However, for those involved in the rent strike, the final outcome was not viewed as a total failure:

"It really wakened up the Labour Party, indicating what actual obstruction could be made by tenants when they made up their minds to do something about it. It was a partial success. The effect on the Labour Party was to pay a bit more interest in tenants' affairs, because it acted as an impetus and encouragement to the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations. It was pleasant to do, it was a lot of hard work, it was encouraging and very pleasing to put a tap under local politicians and under a bureaucratic incompetent organisation, as the SSHA was then. They paid more attention to repairs, there was more contact, there was more attempts to do something, whereas previously they just sat back and acted as a sort of organ of landlord Government". (62)

3.5. Conclusion

The rent strike under discussion in this chapter was an important event in the history of the post-War tenants' movement and housing struggles in Glasgow, and in Scotland generally. While it obviously ended with the main objectives of the Arden tenants' association being defeated in
the courts, it was not a total failure. In a similar vein to Lowe (1983), Saunders (1981) suggests that "urban struggles" are 'typically fragmented, localised, strategically limited and politically isolated'. (63)

The Arden and all-Scotland rent strike lasted for two years, was sustained through a well-coordinated and collective campaign which went beyond any reasonable notion of the 'local' arena and had far-reaching strategic goals in mind; the implications of which the SSHA and the state were well aware of. The fact that the rent strike remained 'politically isolated' (in the limited sense that Saunders employs the term) was not the fault of the Arden tenants or the SCTA. The tenant activists, if not all those participating in the rent strike, analysed the issue of rent increases specifically in class terms and fully expected support from the wider organised labour movement. The real failure was in the inability of the Labour MPs and the trade union leadership to fully comprehend the nature of the issues that the tenants were fighting on. The governing ideology of this leadership, and in particular its attachment to paternalism, ensured that it would adopt an ambivalent attitude and approach to the demands of
the rent strikers (see R. Miliband, 1973 for a full analysis of the characteristics of this ideology). However, the rent strike ensured that most Scottish local authorities terminated the factoring of SSHA houses. To sustain a rent strike for two years, against the prevailing mood of 'affluence' and 'privatism', is no small achievement and was regarded by at least some of those involved as a 'partial victory'. Nevertheless, the longer term implications for tenants' associations and housing struggles in Glasgow were significant.

The Merrylee campaign against the sale of council houses had ensured that the provision of council housing would continue in Glasgow. This campaign, as outlined in chapter two, took place against the early post-War mood for social improvement. In this context, tenants' associations combined with trade unions, the Communist Party and elements within the Labour Party to prevent the sale of the Merrylee houses. The Arden and all-Scotland rent strike, in stark comparison, took place during a period when it was alleged that social inequality, if not eradicated, had diminished substantially, partly through the creation of 'full employment'. For the majority of Glasgow's working class the prospect of living in
new housing schemes was certainly regarded as a significant improvement. The state, exploiting this new situation and the ideology of the 'affluent worker', was intent on using the SSHA in Scotland to force the cost of these improvements onto the working class through rent increases. On the other hand, the Arden tenants rejected the ideology of the 'affluent worker' and organised the rent strike accordingly. In a period when industrial disputes were sparse and the climate of the Cold War was dominant, it is all the more surprising that the Arden tenants and the SCTA were able to sustain the rent strike for so long. The fact that they were eventually defeated in the courts was, perhaps, inevitable and the main weakness in their campaign was the failure to organise any coherent form of direct action alongside the rent strike and the legal battle.

This failing had as much to do with structural factors as any organisational failings on the part of those involved in the rent strike. The imposition of rent increases was taking place at the same time as the majority of Glasgow's working class were being moved to the peripheral schemes or the 'New Towns'. As chapter four makes clear, the original tenants in the peripheral schemes had a
number of major problems to deal with when they moved into their new houses and it was some years before tenants' associations consolidated their position amongst tenants. Therefore, the majority of the tenants of Corporation houses were hardly in an ideal position to organise a rent strike. Had a rent strike amongst Corporation tenants materialised at the same time as the one conducted by SSHA tenants, then the challenge to the state may have been more successful. However, as in the case of trade union support, this never occurred.

The fact that the wider labour movement never mobilised support behind the rent strike had more important implications for tenants' future struggles in the city.

Despite the fact that some of the leading activists in the rent strike were also active in trade unions and, more importantly, the Communist Party they failed to attract significant support from these organisations. The Communist Party had been active on housing issues throughout the war and in the early post-War years, with some success. By the 1950s most of their attention was placed on industrial issues with a corresponding decline in activity around housing issues. The eventual defeat of the rent strike in the courts had an impact on
the political strategy of the Communist Party in Glasgow. While individual party members continued to play an active role in tenants' associations, this was the last occasion in which the Communist Party played any significant role in tenant politics in the city. The Labour Party continued to consolidate their position in the organs of the local state and gave tenants' associations little recognition. The debate on working class housing, and particularly rents, was put at the back of the political agenda for the time being. As the following chapters will show, however, it was not the end of the tenants' movement or, indeed, of housing struggles.
CHAPTER THREE

NOTES

1. H.F. Moorhouse et al. (1972) pp151-152.

2. D. Englander (1983). A.D. Heskin (1983) has provided a similar account of the tenants' movement in America during the same period covered by Englander.

3. S. Damer (1980). p103. While attention has obviously been focused on Glasgow during this period there were rent strikes throughout Scotland, England and Wales during 1915. See Ann and Vincent Flynn (1978). p33.


6. These rent-increase strikes remain undocumented. The author was personally involved in organising a rent strike in Dumbarton during this period. From contacts made at a rally in London, attended by around 50 Labour MPs, it was obvious that there were sporadic rent strikes throughout the country including Clydebank, Glasgow, London, Sheffield and Walsall.


11. Scottish Home Department (1954). This report was followed by the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act which became law on the 2nd August 1956.


17. Councillor McKinlay, (Drumchapel ward), quoted in the Drumchapel Tenant, 1-3-57. Held in the Broady Collection, University of Glasgow Library.
AM 20. The theme of the 'affluent council tenant' was also taken up in a Conservative Party Broadcast on the 7th of May 1958. This broadcast contrasted life in Drumchapel, with parked cars in the street and some families with income above £4,000 a year, with life for the poor tenants of private landlords in the city. The images portrayed in this broadcast was one of squalor and decay in private rented accommodation in the inner urban areas with one of a consumer heaven of the isolated multiappliance home in new council housing on the city's periphery. See report in the Glasgow Herald, 8-5-58.

18. Glasgow Herald 9-1-57.
21. Glasgow Herald 18-3-57. This demonstration was addressed by Aneurin Bevan.
22. See the Glasgow Herald 30-9-57, 10-10-57 and 17-10-57
23. Department of Health for Scotland (1958). Shaw later became better known as Lord Kilbrandon. Witnesses to this inquiry included tenants' associations, trade unions and the Communist Party (Glasgow Committee). They were opposed by
residents' associations, ratepayers, the West of Scotland Liberal Federation, the Association of Owner Occupiers and the infamous Glasgow Property Owners' and Factors Association. Correspondence relating to the Corporation's view on this Inquiry can be found in SRA: DTC 8/20/47.


25. Finlay Hart. 60 Exiting Years. p121. Manuscript copy held in Clydebank District Library. Ref: 92 HAR L.C. Thanks to Pat Malcolm for allowing me to peruse this and other material donated by Finlay Hart. Finlay Hart was a life-long active Communist, trade unionist and tenant activist on Clydeside in the post-war years and played a central role in the rent-increase strike under discussion in this chapter.


28. Details outlined in a letter from SSHA to local authorities, dated 9-1-58 and in Press Release of
same date. Documents Held in Finlay Hart Collection, No 25.


31. Minutes of a Special Conference, on Sunday 12th January 1958, re: the proposed "New Rent Scheme" which is to be imposed on tenants of SSHA houses. Document held in Finlay Hart Collection, No 25.

32. Interview with Mr Chas Watters, chairperson of Arden Tenants' Association in 1958, 14-3-89. A special thanks is due to Mr Watters for bringing this campaign to my attention and for providing me with tapes of public meetings held in Arden in 1958.


34. See documents in SRA: DTC 8/20/2, and DTC 8/20/56/1.

35. Meeting between representatives from Glasgow Corporation and SSHA in Edinburgh, 10th March 1958.
Other local authorities had gone further in their protest than Glasgow Corporation. Saltcoats had, without success, requested that the SSHA sell their houses to the local authority. Clydebank Town Council convened a conference, with 40 representatives from local authorities in attendance. Some of these authorities had already decided not to send the Missives out to tenants and had refused to factor SSHA houses. Two of these authorities, Musselburgh and Kirkaldy had also sought legal advice and were intending to take out an Interim Interdict against the SSHA. See Precis of Proceedings of Conference held in Clydebank, on Wednesday, 25th June 1958.

Document held in SRA: DTC 8/20/56/1.


37. Letter from D.H. Halley, secretary of SSHA, to Town Clerk, Glasgow Corporation, dated 20th May 1958. Document held in SRA: DTC 8/20/56/1


39. See report in the Glasgow Herald, 7-5-58. A woman activist from Kirkaldy was also charged with unlawfully collecting money for SCTA on this
occasion. Joseph Cosgrove died in April 1959 in the middle of the struggle against the SSHA.

40. See report of SCTA meeting in the Glasgow Herald 26-5-58.

41. See report in the Glasgow Herald, 23-6-58.

42. Letter from Town Clerk to SSHA, dated 30-6-58. Document held in SRA: DTC 8/20/56/1. Another 12 local authorities decided to stop factoring SSHA houses, but also refused to co-operate in sending out the Missives.

43. Interview with Mr Chas Watters. See note 32.

44. The Arden tenants' association was involved in a wide range of activities prior to the rent-increase strike. Their main activity prior to 1958 was a campaign to get a footbridge built across a railway- or, as they preferred to call it: 'the Puggy'. See documents in SRA: DTC 8/20/2.

45. Mr Chas Watters, chairperson of Arden tenants' association, speaking at public meeting July 1958. Taped copies of meeting in my possession.

46. See report in The Scotsman, 22-8-58. These houses had been built by the original Association-The Scottish Special Areas Housing Association—before it became known as the SSHA in 1937. See T.
Begg (1987) for the official, and uncritical, history of the SSHA.


48. See report in Glasgow Herald, 20-9-58. West Lothian, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire County Council's had also sought legal advice regarding raising an action against the SSHA.

49. See report in Glasgow Herald, 22-9-58.

50. See report in Glasgow Herald, 5-9-58.


52. Minute of SSHA Tenants All Scottish Conference, convened by Scottish Council of Tenants' Associations, held in Woodside Halls, Glasgow: Sunday, 18th January, 1959. Document held in Finlay Hart collection.

53. Minutes of SCTA extended committee meeting, held in Woodside Halls, Glasgow, 1st February 1959.

54. Letter from Tom Oswald MP to SCTA, dated 2n February 1959. Document held in Finlay Hart collection.

55. The tenant involved in this case had been served the 'Notice to Quit' for rent arrears on 1st
July 1958, three months before the rent increase. The legal technicality related to whether the SSHA lawyer had "signed" the Notice to Quit. Therefore, the tenant had been in arrears before the rent increase had been imposed and was not the ideal one in which to challenge the validity of the SSHA case. The fact that earlier rent strikes had been prolonged through rulings about legal technicalities is, perhaps, the only reason that the SCTA were optimistic of winning in this instance. See S. Damer, 1985 for account of legal wrangles during the Clydebank rent strike.

56. The disputes within the SCTA were voiced at a meeting on Sunday the 26th April, 1959. Document held in Finlay Hart collection. The judgement in the Kirkaldy case came on 3rd June 1959: Sheriff Court of Fife and Kinross at Kirkaldy, SSHA against William Sommerville.


59. Court of Session Report, No 45, July 14th 1960, SSHA Ltd, Pursuers (Respondents), James W. Maxwell, Defender (Appellant). Quoad ultra: "used in the written pleadings of an action to indicate the

60. Taped interview with Mr Chas Watters, 14-3-89.


62. Taped interview with Mr Chas Watters, 14-3-89.

CHAPTER FOUR

TENANTS' ASSOCIATIONS IN CASTLEMILK

4.1 Introduction

In order to assess some of the changes that have taken place in the tenants' movement in the post-War period this chapter provides a discussion of the development of tenants' associations in Castlemilk, a large peripheral housing scheme located on the south-east edge of the city. As the discussion in chapter one has shown, the four major peripheral housing schemes were built as a result of the post-War restructuring of Glasgow's labour and housing markets. They were regarded at the time as providing a solution to Glasgow's housing 'problem'. In the process the needs of the original tenants were never seriously considered, by a Labour Party that had become anchored within the local state (M. Savage, 1989). A consideration of how tenants in one scheme responded to this situation advances our understanding of the post-War tenants' movement. However, this is not the only reason for choosing one of the peripheral schemes as a case study. In the 1980s the local authority peripheral housing schemes in Scotland have become the focal point of state urban and
social policy initiatives. In 1988 Castlemilk, along with Wester Hailes (Edinburgh), Whitfield (Dundee), Ferguslie Park (Paisley), was selected by the Scottish Office as one of the areas for a 'major' urban regeneration initiative: New Life for Urban Scotland (Scottish Office, 1988). Castlemilk, therefore, provides a good example of how tenants' associations have responded to the activities of the state throughout this period. Some commentators leave little scope for such an analysis:

"...In the new Glasgow these estates are simply peripheral to requirements and stand like monuments to an age-old problem that has never gone away." (1)

The age-old problem is the creation of a cordon sanitaire between the middle class and the increasingly marginalised reservoirs of the socially and economically disadvantaged. This is apparent in contemporary Glasgow, where the attempt has been made to separate the poor in the peripheral housing schemes from the symbolic city of corporate and cultural development, so that they do not impinge upon the plans of the image makers: a late-twentieth century Glaswegian version of the 'Gold Coast and the Slum'? This has been an aspect of city life intermittently since the building of the ancient cities of Athens and Rome, which were
above all else 'fortifications against hostile strangers' (J. Raban, 1974). A newer version is evident in Glasgow in the 1980s where the plans of the state make explicit reference to city centre developments within the context of a "walled city" (see Scottish Development Agency, 1986). As in the past, however, there are those who are willing to challenge this 'tale of two cities' and have organised collectively to raise their own questions— from 'inside the whale'— about the quality of the environment in which they live and its relationship to the city and society as a whole.

By concentrating on one of the largest peripheral housing schemes in Glasgow, Castlemilk, this chapter will be looking at the extent to which council tenants' organisations responded to living on the edge of the city. Castlemilk is not an amorphous mass, despite the fact that it is similar in size of population to the town of Perth. It is a location where a section of the working class live and struggle with the social economic forces that shape all of our lives, many of them undoubtedly living in conditions of severe poverty.

If we consider various indicators describing social conditions it could be argued that
Castlemilk is in permanent recession. In March 1989(2) 2,547 Castlemilk residents were registered as unemployed. This represented an overall unemployment rate of 22.8 per cent, compared with 17.1 per cent in Glasgow District and 12.6 per cent in Strathclyde Region, with some parts of the scheme suffering much higher unemployment rates. These figures exclude people involved in a range of temporary "employment" schemes, those aged 55-plus who have been unemployed for over two years and the many women who have absolutely nothing to gain from "signing on". Male unemployment was particularly high, standing at 30.9 per cent, compared with 23.1 per cent in Glasgow and 15.9 per cent in Strathclyde. The proportion of men unemployed for over a year was around 55 per cent and 1 in 5 of the male unemployed in Castlemilk were part of what is known as the very long term unemployed (five years or more). While, on the surface, female unemployment—standing at 10.5 per cent in March 1989—may seem less severe it is probable that there are significant numbers of women unregistered, reflecting the administration of the benefit system. In 1987,(3) 55 per cent of Castlemilk pupils left school without any O grade or Higher qualifications. Only 0.9 per cent owned
their own homes compared with approximately 30 per cent for Glasgow and over 44 per cent for Scotland. 68 per cent of primary schoolchildren (compared with 47 per cent in Glasgow City) were recieving free school meals. In June 1990 7,136 of tenants (70.2 per cent) in Castlemilk were in receipt of housing benefit(4). 3,528 of these tenants were on income support, a reliance upon state support which indicates the prevalence of low income levels within the scheme. Castlemilk is one of the many areas in the Clydeside conurbation which have been designated an 'Area for Priority Treatment' by Strathclyde Regional Council. The Social Work Department estimated that 80 per cent of their cases in Castlemilk were poverty related. Put bluntly, the residents of Castlemilk have been the victims of specifically acute and relentless problems originating from the transformation that British capitalism has undergone in the last decade, and represent what some writers have perniciously described as "underclass" communities (see, for instance, R. Dahrendorf, 1987).

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1980s the peripheral estates have increasingly become a 'problem' for the state with a corresponding increase in the activity of policy
makers and 'poverty professionals' in these areas (see G.C. Mooney, 1988). At all levels of
government in Scotland, from the Scottish Office to
Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District Council's
the problems facing the peripheral estates have, in
recent years, received increasing attention.

However, what is often forgotten in accounts of
peripheral estates, and other council housing
schemes, is that the people who live there have
formed their own organisations to promote their own
case for better facilities and conditions across a
wide range of services. It is these concrete
everyday practices which have led to the growth of
what Williams (1977) referred to as a 'structure of
feeling' in places like Castlemilk. The settings in
which social relations are constituted are
significant physical contexts for action which
provide important definitions of 'problems' from
the inside. The activities of tenants' associations
are diversified and, as the discussion of the
'community studies' literature in the introductory
chapter indicated, in some respects, this will be
as a result of certain factors at particular times
in the life of the scheme. Tenants' associations
may be regarded, as many commentators have
suggested, as disparate and defensive organisations
which arise in reaction to very specific situations and for limited moments in time. It has also been suggested that these organisations rarely outlast the particular issue which led to their development (J. Cowley, 1979 and S. Lowe, 1986) This is only partially true, and the evidence from Castlemilk suggests that people's involvement in tenants' associations can continue for a long number of years and for various reasons. The Castlemilk tenants' association, for instance, has been in existence since 1955 to the present day, and there is at least one person who has remained active throughout these years and many others who have been active intermittently. While tenants' associations may not attain the same level of combination in defence of common interests of, for example, Trade Unions, they can play a significant part in developing a critical consciousness on a particular issue or the general situation of tenants which enhances the potential for 'community' solidarity and co-operation. Operating in a political environment that provides them with little representative input to the system, tenants' associations can also challenge the decisions that affect them which are made by 'urban gatekeepers', including housing officials, councillors,
government civil servants and so forth. They do not necessarily accept the 'peripheralised' position that dominant ideology places them in and can rebel against the rules and authorities associated with their everyday activities. In short, they are struggling over the massive imbalance of power, resources, and contested images of the city in order to make it more humane. It is a classic example of the often well-camouflaged 'struggle for hegemony' (A. Gramsci, 1971).

It is with these issues that this chapter will be concerned. The first section will provide a brief account of the development and housing characteristics of the Castlemilk scheme. Then there will be a discussion of the formation of tenants' organisations in the early years of the scheme. This will be followed with a discussion of some more contemporary developments and a general discussion of the nature of tenants' associations in Castlemilk and their relationship with the local state and other external social objects.

4.2 Background: Garden Suburb or Concrete Jungle?

Castlemilk is one of Glasgow's four major peripheral council housing schemes, situated on the slopes of the Cathkin Braes 4 miles South of the
city centre and 2 miles from the 'New Town' of East Kilbride. The scheme currently covers 820 acres, of which 40 per cent is open space, including 83 acres of 'amenity' woodlands. Castlemilk was developed within a relatively short period during the 1950s, accommodating families displaced from the inner urban areas through the post-war re-structuring of Glasgow's labour and housing markets. The Corporation bought the 1500 acre estate of Castlemilk in 1935 from the Stewart family and the name originated from land owned by them in Dumfriesshire. (5) The area at the time was almost totally rural and agricultural.

The appearance of what could be characterised as a system of urban and regional planning in post-war Britain was to have some impact on debates about the development of Castlemilk. This came in the form of the Clyde Valley Planning Committee (1949). These planners, the 'Evangelistic Bureaucrats' (J.G. Davies, 1972), had originally advocated the retention of Castlemilk for the preservation of a wide 'green belt'. Besides being concerned with the whole question of the economic and physical restructuring of the Clydeside conurbation, the Clyde Valley planners reflected the new trend in planning with respect to their
prime concern with comprehensive land use planning (see P. Hall, 1986. p322). Their plan envisaged reducing Glasgow's population by 250,000 and moving them to New and Expanded Towns outside the city boundaries. This led to bitter disputes between the Scottish Office and Glasgow Corporation (see, for instance, T. Brennan 1959; G.C. Mooney 1988; and S. Damer 1990). Part of the planners' concern was to create 'neighbourhood units' which would be large enough to 'provide diversity of population and a full range of social, recreational and educational facilities', and small enough to 'encourage acquaintanceship'. Their concerns in this regard were set out clearly in the main report:

"...in spite of much lip-service to community planning principles and the recognition that housing to be really good must be related to social needs, industry and recreation; that the group, the neighbourhood, matter no less than the house; that size of town and pride in numbers are less important than welfare of population, there are signs throughout the Country and especially in this Region, of forgetfulness of the community while concentrating upon multiplicity of houses." (6)

The concept of 'neighbourhood units' had its origins in the work of the proponents of Garden
City town planning perspectives (P. Hall, 1988). The ideology that lay behind the concept was to provide for greater social integration, in a similar manner to Octavia Hill's ideas for the provision of 'Community Centres' (see chapter one). Despite these concerns the Corporation Housing Committee convinced the Department of Health that the estate was urgently required for the building of houses. Therefore, in anticipation of building houses on the Castlemilk estate, notice was given to the nine farmers in the area to terminate their tenancies in 1946. The Corporation's initial plans for Castlemilk envisaged the building of 10,206 houses. However, the Secretary of State for Scotland, taking into account the Clyde Valley Plan, attempted to restrict the development to 5,400 houses in order to preserve a 'green belt' between Castlemilk and the New Town of East Kilbride. The Housing Committee of the Corporation, acutely aware of the pressure by working class organisations throughout the city for increased provision of housing, objected to these restrictions, aptly summed up by the then convener of the housing committee:

"...They were determined to pursue their protest to the utmost, that if necessary they would appeal
to the city's Members of Parliament, and promote public demonstrations. He complained that the restrictions would hamper the local authority in getting on with the rehousing which was so urgently necessary to remove slum conditions in the city."(7)

The Corporation eventually convinced the government of the necessity of their case and building work began in 1953, with plans for 8,305 houses, developed in five sections at an estimated cost of £16m. By 1959, when a decision was made to build twenty-storey blocks of flats on the highest part of the scheme (Mitchelhill), the amount of dwelling-houses in the scheme had risen to around 10,000. An urban/rural image was still maintained, with the woodlands, the sloping hillsides and the retention of Windlaw Farm on the southern edge of the estate. It was this latter aspect, perhaps, which led one early commentator to refer to Castlemilk in glowing terms:

"It is a quiet, residential area which reflects in miniature the improving standards of the nation as a whole, and is a complete success both for the tenants who have integrated to produce such an area
and for the authorities who have finally learned from their mistakes." (8)

The idea that the residents of Castlemilk had 'never had it so good' was only partially true. They may have escaped from the overcrowded and dank inner urban tenemental slums, but they were forgotten people deprived of basic services. The planning and building of Castlemilk was totally unco-ordinated and the provision of social services, industry and other amenities was non-existent. Schoolchildren from Castlemilk, and the other three major peripheral schemes, were being bussed into schools in the older urban areas throughout the late-1950s. Despite the fact that the Corporation intended building Castlemilk as a township, with 5 'neighbourhood units', it was a high-density residential area where you could not even get a haircut without travelling into the city centre.

Being built in the 'mass modernist' ('Fordist') era of housing production, the houses in Castlemilk represented the repetitive uniformity associated with the flatted public estates of modern mass housing provision. The 'brutal reduction in standards' (S. Merrett, 1979) meant that such housing was of low quality. The architecture and
street layouts were monotonous in the extreme and the large backland areas between houses were like a wilderness enclosed by brick boxes. 83 per cent, (7,910. 1988 figures), of the houses are in 3 or 4 storey tenemental blocks and 9 per cent, (1,061. 1988 figures), in multi-storey blocks. 89 per cent, (8,439. 1988 figures), of the houses have 3 or 4 apartments and the tenement flats were built to the 'T' design, with a large verandah at the front of most houses. (9)

Until 1988, when 1,076 houses were sold to the S.S.H.A. (now Scottish Homes), the District Council was the principal landlord in Castlemilk, owning all but 36 properties of the scheme's housing stock. Owner occupation has grown marginally from 0.4 per cent in 1986 to 1.0 per cent in 1989, representing a total of 99 houses bought under the 'Right to Buy' legislation. In recent years the District Council in an attempt to change the tenure and management structures, and obviously in recognition of the fact that tenure change through the 'Right to Buy' was a slow process in Castlemilk, has also transferred some housing stock to four par-value co-operatives and housing associations. By 1990 1,863 houses, amounting to 19.3 per cent of the total stock, had moved over to
other forms of 'social renting' organisations, including Scottish Homes. (10) One of these, Castlemilk East Housing Co-operative, as well as providing 'high quality' houses for rent, has already completed the first 'improvement for sale' project in Castlemilk, selling 20 properties in the process, at prices ranging from £17,500 for a 2-apartment flat to £25,000 for a 4-apartment flat. (11)

In the 1950s, when Castlemilk was built, all that concerned the Corporation was their preoccupation with the numbers game: 'to build the maximum number of houses in the shortest possible time'. To achieve this programme, the housing department encouraged and pressurised building workers to increase production by the clever ploy of exhibiting charts at each housing development site revealing the position of the different trades 'in their execution of their contribution to the set programme'. (12) The short-term political aim of increasing house production, alongside the economic re-structuring of the Clydeside economy, led to the building of peripheral housing schemes with little variety in house types, a bureaucratised system of management, in an austere atmosphere with no social or community facilities for the people who came to
live there. In short, the wider needs of the tenants were never considered an important factor in the building of schemes like Castlemilk. There was certainly no consultation with potential tenants over the planning of Castlemilk. There is no doubt that there was an administrative need, as well as political pressure from working class organisations in Glasgow, for a massive house building programme. However, while the 1946 Housing Act made provision for long-term subsidies, facilities for the improvement of older housing, powers to acquire inner city sites and build high-rise housing etc, savings were made in the building of these estates by curtailing additional facilities which were necessary for basic social life. Welfare capitalism may have been willing to provide the funds to build houses for the workers, it was not going to underwrite social life. It should be borne in mind that Castlemilk was the largest municipal housing scheme in Glasgow and in 1971, the peak year, a population of 33,875 were housed there, all paying rent to the Corporation. In 1981 the four major peripheral schemes in Glasgow each had populations of over 30,000. The combined population of these four schemes-
Castlemilk, Drumchapel, Easterhouse and Pollok—was 160,000. (Census, 1981)

It is only now, in the late-1980s and early-1990s, that the state's attention has turned to the 'needs of the community' in schemes like Castlemilk, despite the fact that their deterioration had been identified in official reports in the early 1970s. (13) A number of 'comprehensive' and 'partnership' initiatives to foster urban regeneration have emerged in recent years, and Castlemilk has been one of the areas selected for special attention in this respect. These holistic strategies have attempted to encourage the active involvement of the 'local community' in neighbourhood renewal, particularly in a housing context. As this is likely to have a substantial effect on the nature of tenants' organisations it is essential that we return to a discussion of these issues in the latter part of this chapter. However, this chapter is intended to tell the story from the other side—'from the bottom up'—because, 'community' concern with issues which effect the tenants in Castlemilk are not a new phenomenon. We need to understand the nature of the lived experience of the tenants of Castlemilk historically and in relation to the
local state if we are to have a proper understanding of tenants' associations in large peripheral housing schemes.

4.3 Moving Up The 'Milk: The 1950s

Castlemilk, as we have noted, was one of the massive housing schemes which were developed on the fringes of Glasgow in the post-war years. The pioneer tenants had come from all over the city to live in Castlemilk, with a sizable proportion from the old south-side, and came from all sectors of the manual working class with a sprinkling of 'white-collar' workers. (14) In some cases, during the period of "Comprehensive Redevelopment", whole closes of tenants were moved from the Gorbals or Govan into a new close in Castlemilk. After being accepted as a tenant in Castlemilk the actual house an individual was placed in often depended on a lottery, where names were drawn out of a hat- a ballot organised under the auspices of a Housing Department Clerk/Selector. (15) Many of these tenants were previously either technically homeless or living in overcrowded accommodation. We have already referred to this situation in earlier chapters, but it is important to remind ourselves
of the significance of this transformation for the first tenants in Castlemilk:

"...I stayed with my father in Springfield Road and it was a room-and-kitchen we were in, we were on the waiting list but there were no houses. We lived there until around, one of my boys would be coming up for fourteen and the other one would be eleven or so when we came up to Castlemilk." (16)

or:

"It [the old East-end] was extremely poor, life was very very difficult, and most people lived in sub-let houses. You were sub-let from the tenant who the factor knew about, so to speak, and it took you a wee while for to get to become a tenant in a house and they were usually jist room-and-kitchens with outside toilets. When you became the tenant you were the tenant, that was your house even if it was only a room-and-kitchen. Part of your house was sub-let, you probably had a room in someone's house no matter how many of a family you had. Now my mother brought up six of us in a small room-and-kitchen, not much bigger than this bloomin livin room o' mine....in Wallace Street. We stayed there until my mother got a house up in Househillwood,
and we moved from a room-and-kitchen to a four-apartment, which was like heaven to us."(17)

In many cases these people had to eat, sleep and live in one room, share an outside toilet with 20 or more neighbours and, for the women, it was a full day's work to do the washing at the 'steamie' (the Corporation-run communal Wash-house). Not surprisingly, then, when the original tenants moved into Castlemilk they were highly impressed by their new houses and the new living conditions this offered, notwithstanding the fact that their rent had increased from around £1-7/- (£1.35p) to £8 a quarter. Nevertheless, the combination of increased rent, social isolation and additional transport costs led a few tenants to return to their old areas:

"When people came to Castlemilk, there was a tremendous change to their lives. Some people couldn't take the shock. Others couldn't afford it. We were like early settlers. We needed an extra wage for bus-fares to get to visit our families, who were all away in another part of town."(18)

However, those who did stay, while appreciating their new homes, soon realised that there were no support services or community facilities, apart
from the provision of a hut in Dougrie Terrace where rents could be paid. No buses came into Castlemilk, the nearest one stopped at the back gate of Kings Park on the outer edges of the scheme. There was nothing except houses—no major roads, no shops, no schools, no doctors, no cinemas, no cafes, no pubs, no bingo halls, no bookies etc:

"When ah moved up, once we got the flitting over with and moved into the house, everything was all jist new, the hoose wis lovely, and then ah sat back and said "what have ah done here?" Because where ah lived a' jist ran doon tae the bottom o' the street and ah had the Dairy, the Grocer, the Butcher, everything at ma hand and ah came up here and all ah seen was green fields and nothing else. There wisnae any shops when we came up, we had tae depend on vans coming up to the scheme, the grocer van an' that...ah mean that's 32 year we're in this scheme and that's us jist got our Health Centre, we've fought for that for years an' aw'."(19)

The deficiencies of economic and town planning were not the only obstacles that these original tenants faced when they moved in. In a situation, similar to that identified by Elias and Scotson (1965), the residents of the nearby private housing
estates of Croftfoot and Cathcart were deeply perturbed about the possibility of people from the 'notorious' Gorbals living in close proximity to their salubrious middle class social world:

"When Castlemilk was built the people in Cathcart threw their hands up in horror. They said, "oh we'll get pubs and what have ye". You see Cathcart was dry. So we had a referendum and 93 per cent of the people in Castlemilk voted dry, much to the relief of the people of Cathcart." (20)

Their relief was shortlived. There is hardly a copy of the Minutes of the Cathcart Ward Committee from 1955 onwards in which Castlemilk does not feature on the agenda, on most occasions to raise disapproval about the behaviour of its residents:

"A complaint was made that following the occupation of houses in Castlemilk numerous depredations have occurred in Croftfoot gardens. Flowers have been destroyed and coal stolen. Young children have been hawking papers on Sundays in the avenues. Whilst appreciating the police have a difficult task it was agreed that a letter be sent to the corporation on the matter." (21)

Within weeks an additional police constable was allocated to the Cathcart district to cope with
these misdemeanours, supposedly carried out by Castlemilk residents. The 'established' residents of Croftfoot and Cathcart were clearly intent on maintaining the collaboration of the local state in protecting their 'higher social status' from these 'outsiders'. The new tenants in Castlemilk had no similar organisation to speak out on their behalf about the situation that they found themselves in. However, they were not slow in responding collectively to the problems which they faced and a vigorous communal life developed. The fact that there were no other facilities available meant that the Churches, of all denominations, were in a predominant position in the early years of the scheme. The Church of Scotland used to hold Sunday services in a workman's hut and the Catholic Church held a Daily Mass in a converted tenement flat before proper churches were opened in 1959. It was through the churches that much of the early social life in the scheme was organised. The Church of Scotland, for instance, ran dances, bus runs, concert parties as well as more obvious aspects like the Women's Guild, Sunday schools, "mother and young wife's groups", Boys Brigade, Girl Guides and Brownies. Many people who were not members of these churches, perhaps because there were no obvious
alternatives, took part in these events. Even the American missionaries, the Mormons, made an unsuccessful attempt to open a church in the late 1950s. Castlemilk also had five Orange Lodges by the early 1960s. Indeed two of these lodges, the Castlemilk Truth Defenders LOL No 108 and the Castlemilk Sisters of Truth LLOL No 108, made their own small piece of history when the banners of the male and female lodges were unfurled simultaneously, the first time this had ever occurred in Scotland. However, none of these, or other similar organisations, had the ability or, perhaps, the inclination to bring people together to strive for improved conditions for all the tenants of Castlemilk. The campaigns for increased and better facilities only really began when the first tenants' association was formed after an inaugural meeting in August 1955. The first AGM of the tenants' association was held on the 31st of October 1955, with around 200 tenants attending, and 5 office bearers and 30 members of a Management Committee were elected. The tenants' association normally held their weekly meetings in a workman's hut in Dougrie Road, and sometimes held their management committee meetings in people's houses. This tenants' association was much more
responsive to the developing needs of Castlemilk's growing population than any other organisation in the scheme. A variety of social networks led to the development of tenants' associations particularly, if surprisingly, communal garden-digging:

"One wonderful thing we got here. When we came up here there was quite a number of people got together and said "well look we'll need to try and make something of this", and people started gettin into maybe wee groups and starting to talk. We had no hall, so we had to get an old hut at the back there. Two or three of us got together like, through different organisations, jist ordinary tenants and spoke about things, through the gardening club. We started a gardening club, and of course people all wanted a garden at that time...it was something new because they came from a part of the city where there were no gardens...We had a horticultural club for many years and it done very well because that got a group of people who were interested in trying to better things....people respected each other, there was very little vandalism...there was this great feeling of companionship, comradeship....There was this wonderful feeling of "this is a house and we're going to try and do something about it". There was
a great feeling amongst people to try and better their position. We then set about discovering there was nae buses, so we fought to get buses, then we also discovered the things that you do have, and they're getting worse now than ever, namely District council, Strathclyde Region, councillors and so on will not move unless you get in. So at that time we then went into Cathcart Ward Committee, the Tenants' Association nominated people..."(24)

It was from this word-of-mouth communication, mainly amongst the men in the scheme, that the Castlemilk Tenants' Association was formed in 1955, and almost everyone then living in the scheme joined the association. The tenants' association produced a membership book, whose publication was paid for by advertisements. This was then sold throughout the scheme for five shillings (5p), which was regarded as a yearly subscription for each individual member. People had moved from other areas of the city and were determined to join in any campaign to fight for the provision of adequate facilities in a new scheme. This self-organised and self-supporting tenants' association, which is still in existence today, sought to represent the interests of all the tenants in Castlemilk, in the
context where the building of new houses was expanding. As well as providing a social focus for tenants in a new scheme, the tenants' association gave effective expression to tenants perspectives and criticisms through their dealings with the Corporation and other authorities. The main objectives of the tenants' association were set out in the membership handbook:

"a) To safeguard the interests of the residents of the Castlemilk scheme.

b) To enlighten tenants on local and National legislation which effects them.

c) To promote such activities as may be deemed advisable to foster the social and educational life of the Community." (25)

This was an organic collective movement of tenants which had issued from within the community, not simply from choice but from need. The new tenants were responding to the difficulties associated with adjusting to life in a desolate, monotonous and isolated wilderness. While they may not have developed a collective consciousness at this stage, they fully involved themselves in building a social life in the scheme, running Christmas parties for children and old age
pensioners, organising cake and candy sales to gain financial independence for the tenants' association, and so forth. They had not moved from 'a people-centred to a house-centred existence' (M. Young and P. Willmott, 1957, p154). They had carried and modified the culture which they had developed over many years in the older parts of the city to the new schemes. Culture, in this context, is the response of a people to the environment they live in. As such, this included every aspect of their lives - the way they work, shop, eat, cohabit, play. It was the totality of their response to the situation they were living in which is being referred to here and not culture in any exclusive or elitist artistic, literary or musical context. This political culture, in the broadest sense of the term, was wedded to the tenants' association and, through active experience, enabled them to raise issues about the quality of life which they were expected to accept in a new housing scheme.

It is important to acknowledge at this stage that, the political culture that developed in Castlemilk was somewhat different from that which arose in Pollok, another post-war peripheral housing scheme. While the tenants' associations, in both Castlemilk and Pollok, claimed to be 'non-
political' (in the sense that they were not affiliated to any political party) the links with formal political parties was more apparent in Pollok in the early years than was the case in Castlemilk. (see M. Broady and J. Mack, 1960; and G.C. Mooney 1988 for a discussion of Pollok). It is difficult at this distance in time to ascertain why this was the case, but it probably derives in part from the later development in Castlemilk of political organisations, particularly the Labour Party and Communist Party branches. Castlemilk, partly because of the scheme's close proximity to middle class Cathcart, was represented by a Conservative M.P. until the mid-1980s.

The main priorities for the Castlemilk tenants' association in the late 1950s and early 1960s were the campaigns for the provision of schools and buses, the lack of which had added to the feelings of remoteness for the new tenants. The reasons for this are rather obvious. Most of the children in Castlemilk were being bussed into the city centre schools, which was costing the Corporation around £30,000 a week in the 1950s. (26) Public transport was also a necessity for a population with low car ownership. People had to travel into the city centre for shopping, most of
the men continued to be employed in the traditional manufacturing industries in other areas of the city, as far away as Springburn and Bridgeton. On their return from the shipyards and engineering works in the evening they probably passed many of the women of Castlemilk who were travelling into the city centre to clean the offices and shops. It is not surprising, therefore, that inadequate transport and the complete lack of other social facilities were seen as a major priority by members of the tenants association. Durant had recognised the importance of the wider provision of support services in such locations in her study of Watling in the inter-war years:

"There are many objections to banishing the poor to the outskirts of the city. Their poverty makes it particularly difficult for them to develop a new community under conditions so different from those of the central areas. Moreover, poorer districts, if not contiguous with shopping and amusement centre, supported by other sections of the community, suffer serious curtailment of their facilities for recreation and their sources of mental stimulation. A sense of restlessness and frustration results." (27)
The new tenants in Castlemilk, while restless and frustrated, had no particular difficulty in developing a new 'community'. While sociologists, in the post-war years, were showing renewed concern about the apparent 'loss of community' these tenants were combining together to fight for the facilities which were indispensable to a full 'community' life. Through a shared experience and common adversity they established their own associational networks to campaign for improved transport services, schools and, later on, industry. The campaigns for schools and transport facilities started with letters being written to the appropriate authorities. When this tactic was met with little success the tenants' association held public meetings on the issue and demanded the support of local councillors. By the late 1950s the Corporation had responded by providing a bus service for the scheme and schools were opened up—Glenwood Secondary and St Margaret Mary's Secondary were the first schools. While the Corporation may always have intended building schools in Castlemilk, it was only through the urgings and the united action of the tenants' association that the process was speeded up.
After this initial 'settling-in' period the tenants' association turned their attention to other aspects of scheme life and the activities of other social agencies. In 1960 they formed an action committee to protest against the Revaluation and Rating Bill, successfully protested against a 6s 6d increase levied by the Gas Board on meters and, in 1961, they ensured that the Corporation filled in part of Castlemilk pond. (28) This latter aspect was no small achievement, as four Castlemilk children had drowned in this pond by 1966. These, apparently, unglamorous functional changes in the activities of the tenants' association are not really that surprising. The Castlemilk tenants' association was formed in order to deal with all complaints about the scheme which the state, through its planners and architects, was responsible for creating.

However, from a perusal of the annual reports of the Castlemilk tenants' association, it is obvious that they were also consciously aware of the fact that, through a shared class position, they would have to organise collectively to protect the interests of all tenants against attempts by state agencies to reduce their standard of living still further. (29) The psychic support obtained
from living with others similarly placed has always been important to the continuance of tenants' associations in Castlemilk, and other housing schemes. The everyday experience of living in a new housing scheme had generated a form of consciousness— a counter-hegemony— which rejected 'possessive individualism' (C.B. MacPherson, 1962) and a form of political action which was intended to 'rouse the masses from passivity' (A. Gramsci, 1971, p429). It was in the 1960s and 1970s that this common consciousness in the social base of the Castlemilk tenants' association came under sustained pressure with attempts to absorb it into reactionary populism.

4.4 From Peripheral Paradise To 'Problem Estate': 1960–1980

"What's Wrong With Housing Schemes?" (Glasgow Evening Citizen, February 8th-13th 1960)

"The Bitter Wind In The New Scheme" (Glasgow Evening Citizen, March 22nd 1960)

"Castlemilk Folk Jealous of Schemes Good Name" (Rutherglen Reformer, 26-4-63)

"Unrest in the New Housing Estates" (Glasgow Herald, 8-3-66)
"The Crisis of Confidence That Has Hit Castlemilk" (Rutherglen Reformer, 2-6-66)

"Castlemilk at the Crossroads" (Glasgow Herald, 22-8-66)

The headlines say it all! By the early 1960s Glasgow's post-war peripheral housing schemes, and Castlemilk in particular, were now being seen as 'problem estates'. Damer (1989) has traced the genesis of the ideology behind this term historically in relation to working class neighbourhoods, and provides a thorough critique of the existing ideology and literature at the same time. In the early 1960s, in reference to Castlemilk, it was the 'problem tenant' which the media, housing officials and reactionary politicians - the 'traditional intellectuals' - used as a representation of the demise of the scheme. In March 1962 the Progressive councillor for the Cathcart Ward, Mr Edward M. Taylor, moved a motion in the Corporation aimed at segregating 'bad tenants' in Glasgow's housing schemes, as follows:

"That it be remitted to the Property Management Committee to consider and report on steps which can be taken to protect corporation tenants from the anti-social behaviour of the small minority of
tenants who cause damage to corporation and tenants property and considerable annoyance to their neighbours and other tenants by their general conduct."(30)

Taylor justified this approach by selecting out a small minority of tenants who "by their very conduct, their use of threats, violence, vandalism, foul language, their drunkeness and bestiality made it impossible for their neighbours to lead a decent life untroubled by fear, violence and abuse."(31) So, in language reminiscent of Dickens, Taylor was proposing to segregate these 'anti-social tenants' in property owned by the Corporation in the depopulated 'low amenity' central areas of the city which were being "comprehensively redeveloped" at this time. These tenants, it was proposed, would serve a probationary period of six months in enclaves away from housing areas under the watchful eye of the Resident Factors, the 'Green Ladies' and the local police force. If they proved themselves worthy and socially responsible after this period they would be returned to 'normal housing', which was a return to notions first mooted in Glasgow a century earlier.

It should be remembered that Castlemilk was a heterogeneous scheme, containing tenants from all
sectors of the working class—Shipwrights, Leather Tanners, Platers, Dockers, Clerks, Plumbers, Labourers and so forth. (32) Taylor was attempting to portray a 'small minority' of the Castlemilk residents as a homogenous 'problem' phenomenon and was selecting them out for a "new get-tough policy" of re-education. There may have been pragmatic reasons for Taylor raising this issue at this point, but the fact that he had represented the Cathcart Ward for the Progressives/Conservatives on the Corporation for a number of years and, was seeking selection as a parliamentary candidate on the basis of the new ward boundaries which brought Castlemilk into the existing Cathcart Ward for the first time, suggests that there may have been more obvious political reasons behind the move. If he, and more importantly the Progressive/Conservative party, was to continue to be elected in this area he would have to make some impression on the new 'respectable' tenants in Castlemilk.

Activists in the Castlemilk tenants' association, and tenants generally, were concerned at the existence of noisy tenants, tenants who never kept the close or garden tidy, vandalism etc. (33) Taylor, and the Progressive/Conservative party, were able to successfully exploit this for
years, remaining in office representing the Cathcart [37th] Ward almost undisturbed from 1949 to 1973. (34) It was in his interest, and that of his party's, to identify what he saw as 'respectable' working class tenants who might vote for the Conservatives. However, the activists in the Castlemilk tenants' association were not willing to accept that this phenomenon—the 'problem tenant'—was unique to Castlemilk, was characteristic of the scheme as a whole or could be solved through segregation. There were, it has to be admitted, clear contradictions in their response to Taylor's proposals. The secretary of the Castlemilk tenants' association, Mr William Monaghan, referred to Taylor's suggestions in March 1962 as "cockeyed" and suggested that segregation was a "dirty word", but went on to say that:

"...I believe that the proper way to tackle this thing is to give greater powers to the local factors. We should try to reform these people. But after they have been warned three or four times, the local factors should have the powers to evict them..." (35)

By calling for these powers to be conferred to the Resident Factors, the secretary of the tenants' association was implicitly supporting the idea of
segregating tenants, though in a less draconian way. There were other tenants, while in agreement with some of what Taylor said, who argued that the great majority of tenants in Castlemilk, and other schemes, were "decent, law abiding citizens". The local probation officer had also suggested that, "delinquency figures in Castlemilk are extremely good compared with other housing schemes". (36) However, Taylor and the representatives of the local state were intent on amplifying and exploiting the existence of a small minority of "problem tenants" through mystification. In the following years a severe ideological drive was made to make these divisions between "respectable" and "untouchable" tenants, a breach which has a long historical trajectory, (see, for instance, C.S. Loch; 1883; S. Webb and B. Webb, 1929; G. Stedman-Jones 1983; and, for a local representative, A.K. Chalmers and J. Mann 1933), the main exemplary of the "problem" in Castlemilk. The significance of such a resolute strategy was to present the "respectables" with a formulation of the "problem tenant" which they could recognise, and allow the state to intervene unhindered by protestation— or be confronted with a 'war of position' on the part of the tenants' association. The purpose of this
ideology was to ensure that this "small minority" of tenants could not undermine the traditional social and authority relations, cultural patterns and lifestyles which were regarded as appropriate for "respectable" tenants. Friend and Metcalf have noted the importance of this ideological deception in another context:

"...Although such a division has always existed, it has assumed different significance at different points in time. This has happened when the uneven development of the capitalist economy has swollen or reduced the numbers living on the margins of society and as the interaction of uneven development and the changing balance of class forces has acted either to unite or fragment the working class as a whole."

The fragmentation of tenants in Castlemilk was at the root of Taylor's ideological onslaught. The Corporation endorsed these views in 1962/63 with a scheme to evict tenants who failed to meet the required standards of tidy gardens, closes etc, set by the housing department. A number of tenant activists objected to Castlemilk being selected out for this 'pilot project' and demanded an apology from the Corporation. However, their attempts at presenting a positive image of the scheme were
limited through their partial acceptance of Taylor's definition of the "problem". The root cause of most of the untidy gardens, for instance, was not the fault of "problem tenants", but the fact that many of them had been given the impossible task of cultivating vast wastelands. The Corporation had avoided all responsibility for this through the creation of a reputation which had little basis in reality and a victim-blaming ideology aimed at a "small minority" of Castlemilk tenants.

While this strategy was not totally successful, this event shows that a reactionary ideology can meet with some elements of "common-sense" and provide the state with the legitimating tactics necessary for the policing of working class neighbourhoods. The real policing of Castlemilk tenants was for non-payment of rent, as a former Resident Factor for Castlemilk suggested:

"If I sent a rent collector up a certain close on a Monday to collect rent arrears, by the Wednesday or Thursday everybody in that street who was in arrears would have been down at the office to clear their debt, as they knew the way that I operated was to collect the arrears for a whole street at a time. This saved any embarrassment with
their neighbours. In 1975 there were 8 supervisors in Castlemilk, now there are 20 and they are not doing the job as good as fewer people were." (39)

Between 1968 and 1979, (excluding figures for 1975), 1,118 Castlemilk tenants had absconded without paying rent and 228 were evicted for non-payment of rent. (40) This autocratic style of housing management was used as an additional mechanism to fragment the tenants in Castlemilk. By the mid-1960s, the period when poverty was 'rediscovered' on a national scale, an increasing number of probation officers, child care officers, health visitors and school welfare officers were employed in Castlemilk, and 'family casework units' were set-up. This was the era when the first flourishings of 'Community Development' came to the fore following the publication of a series of reports on 'urban deprivation': Milner-Holland, Ingelby, Plowden, Seebohm et al. These 'new professionals of deprivation' (CDP, 1976) assumed that it was certain individuals who were responsible, indeed caused, the 'urban deprivation'. This was certainly the case in Castlemilk, and other council housing schemes in Glasgow, where the "problems" were being laid
squarely at the door of a certain category of family:

"The majority of Glasgow's 140,000 municipal tenants are stable, efficient families whose life and work makes a positive contribution to society, but a small number beset by ignorance and hopelessness fall into a feckless or anti-social way of life". (41)

The state's purpose in moving these 'street-level bureaucrats' (M. Lipsky, 1980) into Castlemilk was not to deal with the root causes of poverty, (the unacknowledged reality hidden behind phrases like 'urban deprivation), but to separate out a certain section of the population for re-moralization, to provide the "respectable" tenants with a role-model to avoid and to deflect attention away from the palpable alienation which Castlemilk's tenants had lived with for more than ten years. The "culture of poverty" thesis which was inherent in this kind of interpretation of events has long been recognised for failing to take into account the impact of wider social and economic structures (see, for instance, R. Holman, 1978; and S. Damer, 1989). Hidden behind this dramatization were a number of serious problems which could not be blamed on individual families or
"problem tenants". There were only two factories in Castlemilk, Miller Textiles Ltd and Wallace and Cameron Ltd, who employed around 400 workers between them. As we have already seen, there were no tea-rooms or cafes, no pubs, no cinema and no betting shop, though bets were collected illegally round the doors. For a scheme which had a large number of young children there was no such thing as an adventure playground. It is hardly surprising, that after a period of ten years without such essential recreational facilities, that certain problems would arise or that children would seek out other forms of activity, such as vandalism, which would cause consternation amongst tenants. The Castlemilk tenants' association had been arguing since its inception that, the failure to provide even the simplest amenities or recreational facilities would have adverse effects in building a full 'community' life, as their chairperson stated in 1960:

"There is a need for more social and recreational amenities in the scheme and I am inaugurating a campaign to speed up the provision of playing fields, tennis courts, bowling greens and football pitches. Castlemilk with a population of 36,000 people still has none of the above
facilities. This situation must be remedied and your support will be appreciated." (42)

The local state did not recognise the full significance of these claims until the isolation and boredom of living in such a wilderness (aptly summed up by locals as the 'Ponderosa') led 3,000 tenants to seek a transfer out of the scheme in 1966/7. It was estimated that 90 per cent of these tenants had lived in Castlemilk for ten years. The alienation which the Castlemilk tenants association had fought against from the beginning was now being defined as a management problem.

It was at this stage that the tenants' association themselves began to recognise the full significance, and practical effects, of the stigma which was being attached to Castlemilk through the pernicious and arbitrary ideology advocated by Taylor. The chairperson of the Castlemilk tenants' association, through the urgings of many tenants, challenged a local councillor to a public debate on the viability of creating "Ghettos for bad tenants", a challenge which was never met. (43) The tenants' association argued that segregation would lead to more trouble in the long-term and was incapable of dealing with the underlying problems in Castlemilk. Nevertheless, the issue of
segregating "anti-social" tenants re-emerged at various points throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, until the housing department moved 'action teams' into the peripheral schemes. These action teams, which were to have "special knowledge of planning, landscaping, and social work" (or, street-fighting, house-clearing and snooping) were intended to deal specifically with "anti-social" tenants. The cost of improvement and repairs in these schemes was increasing on a yearly basis, for instance, from £2.5m in 1970 to £3.6m in 1971. The strategy that the local state chose to deal with this problem was "Community Development", a policy which has been exposed by Cockburn thus:

"This then was the community package. It did not cost much money. It was not a substitute policy in housing, health, education or any of the other servicing tasks of the local state. It was a series of research and development exercises, intended to get better value for the money local authorities spend each year. Corporate management had concentrated on the internal management structures of councils. The central state's 'community package' was to make good its shortcomings—first by reviving, renewing, reproducing the relations of
authority; second by concentrating on implementing policies; third by providing the sources of information about the working class needed by management."

The tenants' association's response, while contradictory, challenged the notion that a "small minority" of tenants could be held responsible for the problems which faced tenants in Castlemilk during this period. Increasingly their concerns focussed on issues which could not be laid at the door of 'problem' tenants and new associations were formed to deal with them, though the Castlemilk tenants' association was still regarded as the main representative body for tenants and acted as a federation. For instance, in July 1967, 14 feet long cracks began to appear in the brickwork of the "showpiece" Dougrie Heights multi-storey flats. The Dougrie Place Tenants' Association was formed spontaneously and successfully campaigned to have the flats repaired, at one stage threatening to withhold their rent unless repairs were carried out. The shopping centre, which the Castlemilk tenants' association had campaigned long and hard for, was opened in the summer of 1966 and the Community Centre was opened in December. Other, smaller scale, campaigns continued - petitions
for footpaths, zebra crossings and seats for old age pensioners throughout the scheme, protests over inadequate refuse collection, opposition to children being transferred to city centre schools (again!), meetings with the local housing manager to discuss repairs and other complaints, and, with an increasing number of children in Glasgow, and in Castlemilk, identified by the Health Authority as suffering from rickets the Castlemilk tenants' association mounted a campaign against cuts in subsidies for school meals. (48)

Despite these problems, by the end of the 1960s Castlemilk was being regularly referred to as a "showpiece" estate, particularly when compared with the much more serious image problems which Easterhouse was experiencing in this period (see G. Armstrong & M. Wilson. 1973). In 1969 Teddy Taylor was referring to 'No Crisis at Castlemilk' (49) and, in 1975, could write an article praising the scheme and its inhabitants, with the giveaway title of 'Things are Looking up in a Much Better Castlemilk' (50) If Castlemilk was going to be portrayed as a success in comparison to other peripheral schemes, despite the tenants' associations evidence to the contrary, Taylor was making it clear that this was largely due to the
policies he and his party had been advocating for a number of years.

In the early 1970s a number of factors combined to alter the direction of the Castlemilk tenants' association. By this stage political party branches had been formed, and a number of people involved in socialist and labour politics, mainly Communist Party members, became active in the tenants' association. While the key offices in the tenants' association had previously been occupied by men a woman was elected chairperson for the first time, reversing the trend of 'women in the seats and men on the platform'. Two local 'community' newspapers were published—Castlemilk Press and Castlemilk Today. These papers sold over 2,000 copies each month and provided the tenants' association with a focus to circulate knowledge about their activities to a wider audience. These changes coincided with the introduction of the Housing (Finance Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1972. (see GCTA chapter). The Castlemilk Rents Action Committee was formed, through the Castlemilk tenants' association, in the latter part of 1972 to support the Labour controlled Glasgow Corporation's initial refusal to implement this Act. The purpose of this organisation was to mobilise as many tenants as
possible through a wide-based organisation of tenants' associations, labour organisations and any other social organisations in the scheme, and to join with other organisations in the city who were campaigning against this Act. Attendance at public meetings of the Action Committee was as high as 400, whereas the average attendance at meetings of the tenants' association was around 30. They were attempting to protect the living standards of all tenants in Castlemilk and developed a vigorous protest, including a rent-increase strike:

"When the Corporation gave in, they held a 500 strong protest meeting, and called for the increase to be withheld. For 6 months they kept up a campaign of leafletting, street meetings with loudspeakers, sales of Scottish Tenant, and a 2-month picket of the factors' office. The campaign failed to create mass rent withholding, but it put the issue right at the centre of people's minds, and showed the possibilities there are in the idea of co-ordinated local action." (51)

Despite the fact that the wider agitation against this Act failed in its objective the important factor, in this context, is that it was the first time that the Castlemilk tenants' association had been involved in a campaign of
direct action. Through the influx of new members, and the raising of a critical consciousness, the tenants' association were becoming aware of the implications that policies imposed by the central state could have for tenants in their locality. They had also created a model of protest which would be utilised in future activities in Castlemilk. They may not have achieved, and it was never their intention to in any case, 'structural transformation' (M. Castells, 1977), but they were successful in more broadly defined terms. As Fireman and Gamson (1979) make clear, the simple act of engaging in ongoing struggle educates people in the dynamics of struggle, leadership and power, all of which are significant achievements for opposition groupings. One example of this "pedagogic" lesson occurred in 1976 when, against the wishes of their local councillor Pat Lally, over 50 Castlemilk tenants marched into the City Chambers with placards and banners to protest against proposals to form a 10-member Community Council in Castlemilk. (52) Another, more significant, example of direct action took place in 1983 when a fire broke out on the ground floor of tenement flats in Scarrel Drive and three families had to be rescued by the Fire Brigade. (53) After
spending some time in Glasgow's Homeless Persons Unit the housing department insisted that the families return to their homes. Believing that the fire had been started by a petrol bomb, and that the houses were uninhabitable, the families refused to return to this part of the scheme:

"Rumours that we are asking for areas such as Fernhill, Carmunnock and Blairbeth are ridiculous. We have actually applied for vacant housing in Ardencaig Road and that isn't exactly Buckingham Palace but it is away from Scarrel Road and that is all we are asking for." (54)

The housing department, however, were refusing to accept that the tenants had a suitable case for re-housing and insisted that they return to their former homes. The three families, along with others supporting them, organised a 'sit-in' in the Castlemilk office of the housing department. This occupation lasted for over a week and 48 arrests were made. The same 12 people were arrested on three separate occasions, firstly for trespass and on the last occasion for 'Breach of the Peace'. On the evening before their court appearance the charges were dropped for no apparent reason, other than the state wanting to avert a potentially controversial confrontation with these tenants.
However, the tenants continued to campaign for re-housing and erected tents and a caravan outside the local housing office, protests to the Director of Housing and councillors were organised, and eventually negotiations with local housing management staff were held. Through these various tactics, and with the support of many other tenants in Castlemilk, the families were eventually re-housed six weeks after the fire in Scarrel Drive and four weeks after their 'sit-in' began.

The main point about this event is that a reasonable request for re-housing was met with, at the very least, insensitivity by housing management and local councillors and by the repressive use of arrest and harassment by the police force. These tactics were obviously intended to structure the context of the tenants' interaction with the agencies of the local state through the more routinized forms of social control which the state had become accustomed to utilizing. This is similar to the general tendencies with regard to state reaction to opposition organisations that Oberschall (1979) identified. Oberschall argues that the state's initial reaction to opposition groupings is to 'persuade them to take part in routine political transactions'. If this strategy
fails the state concentrates on the immediate problem of social control, and this is mostly dealt with by means of repression. However, this was a group of tenants who were not willing accomplices to incorporation or open to policies of potential 'conflict resolution'. In Dearlove's (1974) terms they were an 'unhelpful group' and they were determined to use every tactic, including direct action, to convince all representatives of the local state apparatus of the legitimacy of their case. These tenants were, following Gramsci again, 'organic intellectuals' of the working class whose purpose was to formalize and guide the emotions of people who were attempting to overcome experience of powerlessness and alienation. The outcome of this short struggle was a small but important victory for these tenants.

However, Castlemilk was now faced with a number of wider problems which would have to be addressed in the 1980s. The local press, politicians and the housing management department were now referring to Glasgow's peripheral housing schemes as "no-go areas", with Castlemilk, Drumchapel, Easterhouse and Pollok top of the list. In 1985 the Council, acting in the role of colonial administrator, set up an "early warning system" to alert housing and
social work officials of "imminent dangers" in the peripheral schemes. (55) The 1981 Census had indicated that Castlemilk's population had dropped from 36,951 in 1971 to 28,855 in 1981 and Strathclyde Regional Council had estimated that this would be down to 23,400 by 1986. It was, perhaps, inevitable that these factors—alongside the increases in unemployment levels, inadequate transport services and problems arising from the design of the housing in Castlemilk—would evoke some kind of sustained response from the state. The jargon which accompanied the subsequent response was "New Life for Castlemilk", at a campaign launch in November 1986. (56) We need now to turn our attention to an analysis of what this "new life" will have to offer the tenants of Castlemilk.

4.5 The Re-Structuring of a Housing Scheme: Castlemilk in the 80s

"Peripheral estates are in very low demand and pressure for transfers out is high. A large scale exodus of population has only been avoided through the shortage of public and affordable private housing in other areas. It is clear that these estates must continue to house large populations for many years to come and that fundamental changes are necessary to create viable communities and
avoid an irreversible decline into ghettos of the poor and unemployed." (57)

The Grieve Inquiry into Housing in Glasgow (1986) made it evident that a plan for 'Gilding The Ghetto' was required to prevent the further decline in popularity of Glasgow's four main peripheral housing schemes. This is what really lies behind the promotion of schemes for 'tenant participation'. The Grieve Inquiry also recommended that the District Council should transfer up to 50 per cent of the peripheral estate housing stock (25 per cent of Glasgow's total stock of council houses) to Housing Associations, housing co-operatives and to home ownership. The 'residualisation of council housing' in Glasgow was to be reversed through adopting the dominant perspective on housing tenure development which has existed in Britain since the early 1980s in both political and academic circles (see, for instance, P. Saunders, 1990). It is, principally, these powerful ideological, and practical, changes that has led Glasgow District Council to retreat into a more fragmented, more market-oriented form of intervention in housing development— or as some writers would prefer 'post-modernist' (See S. Smith & A. Kearns, 1990) Nevertheless, while the above quotation makes it
clear that housing tenure development is one important factor in the emerging strategies, it also alludes to the existence of an implicit agenda to alter the class composition of those tenants who will live in the peripheral schemes in the future. The likely success, or otherwise, of this strategy to promote an enterprise culture will be more apparent, at least in the short-term, in Castlemilk where the Grieve recommendations have been incorporated into the wider plans of the District Council, Strathclyde Regional Council and the Scottish Office-through 'New Life for Urban Scotland'. (hereafter 'New Life').

One important factor, among many, which concerns tenants' associations in Castlemilk is the proposal to transfer large sections of the public sector housing stock to other forms of tenure. The strategy favoured by the state, at both Scottish Office and Glasgow District Council (GDC) level, is to have at least 20 per cent owner occupation, 30 per cent in co-operatives, housing associations or Scottish Homes and 50 per cent in District Council ownership by the end of the 1990s. While it is too soon to assess whether these plans will be translated into reality some of the early indications suggest that the aspirations of
Castlemilk's tenants have been disregarded in favour of the central objectives of the state's own stratagem. The structural and locational problems which the people of Castlemilk are faced with in the late-1980s and early-1990s have already been referred to in an earlier section of this chapter. The economic and social despair attached to these problems are also all too apparent. However, according to some influential right-wing ideologues, estates such as Castlemilk can encourage even more sinister characteristics:

"...a culture of dependence, recreating many of the problems of the inner cities, compounded by an absence of natural social cohesion and of physical amenity, in a totally, but badly, planned environment". (58)

This ideology was incorporated, in part, into the government's plans to "regenerate" Castlemilk, as set out in 'New Life', and approved in a subsequent report by GDC. (59) Drawing on previous urban policy initiatives, and in particular the GEAR project in Glasgow's East End, both of these reports are full of jargonised keywords which are reminiscent of the ideology behind the 'neighbourhood unit' era: e.g. "integrated strategy", "encouraging diversification on a multi-
agency basis", "engender a sense of place", "to turn Castlemilk into a suburban town with its own distinct identity" etc. Both of these reports set out a variety of social, environmental, economic and housing objectives which were regarded as essential catalysts for the regeneration of Castlemilk. These objectives are to be achieved through, the now familiar, public-private sector 'partnership' which had been embraced in previous urban policy initiatives (see M. Carley, 1990) The fact that there was to be little new financial input from government suggested that encouraging private sector investment would be crucial to the success of this strategy. However an important new element in the 'partnership' approach as formulated in 'New Life' was in reversing the so-called 'dependency' culture by the principle of:

"...helping residents take more responsibility in various ways for their communities, of full involvement of the private sector, and of partnership between different public bodies and the private sector." (60)

The 'community' was now being regarded as a crucial symbolic 'partner' in the process of urban regeneration, reflecting the new wave of interest in 'active citizenship' (see J. M. Barbalet, 1988).
This strategy manifested itself when the Castlemilk Strategy Report (1989) was published, and referred to one of Castlemilk's strengths as 'its strong and caring community spirit'. The report outlined 13 objectives for the Castlemilk strategy, including, 'stabilising the population at 20,000', to 'increase the prosperity of the residents of Castlemilk', to 'retain and attract economically active residents to Castlemilk', and 'to maximise community involvement in the design and delivery of all renewal programmes for Castlemilk'.

It is difficult to imagine how some these objectives will be achieved without a transformation in the social character of the residents who will live in Castlemilk in the future. For instance, in April 1989 rents in Glasgow rose by £3.37 per week to an average of £24.55, a rise of 16 per cent. The introduction of the Poll tax, housing benefit cuts and the social fund have all had a deleterious impact on an already impoverished 'community'. These factors were clearly identified in the Castlemilk 'community's' own response, through the Umbrella Steering Group, to 'New Life':

"All those consulted say they would prefer better public services for all to greater wealth for a few, and would like priority to be given to
the sick, the handicapped, children, the elderly and those in greatest need.... We would not consider the physical improvement of the housing stock, with it subsequently changing hands and bringing in better-off people to be an improvement. We are talking about the people of Castlemilk and not a geographical area... it is strongly felt by the community that the most pressing problem in Castlemilk is poverty and the resulting powerlessness of the people over the things that determine their lives...". (62)

This organisation, representing all 'community' groups in Castlemilk, was attempting to address the major concerns from the point of view of the many people in Castlemilk who regard the 'Partnership' strategy as a threat rather than an advantage to the existing residents. They are particularly concerned about the government's motives in taking increased control over policy developments, especially through Scottish Homes, with the corresponding demise in the role of GDC. They are also totally apathetic about the increasing influence of the private sector in developments in Castlemilk, and the long-term impact this is likely to have for the quality of life of the present population. For Castlemilk is now recognised,
correctly, as being a near-perfect urban location with the sweeping hills, the relatively clean air, and the easy access, for those who afford it, to both Glasgow city centre and the nearby countryside. The state's strategy is to make the necessary changes to the environment and housing which will appeal to a more secure and mobile labour force who will then be willing to move to such a location. The free-market philosophy and the political ideology associated with it has few, if any, adherents amongst Castlemilk's 'community' groups. If anything, their views in this respect had become hardened through experience when they produced an up-dated response to the 'Partnership' proposals in 1989:

"...the Partnership Strategy pays lip service to the idea of 'developing community involvement' and 'building on existing developments', but it does not in practice entrust the future of Castlemilk to its own people". (63) [their emphasis].

One way of gauging the accuracy of these feelings is through a brief analysis of the experience of tenants' associations in recent years, as it is in terms of housing developments that the proposed changes have had the most obvious
impact in both a physical and social sense. Before
the 'Partnership' was set up the Castlemilk office
of the Housing Department had its own 'tenant
participation' policy in operation. One high-
priority area where 'tenant participation' was
regarded as important by the Housing Department was
in capital projects. These have generally been
'Community Renewal Projects'—small scale, high-
cost improvement projects in 'key' locations. The
finance for these projects comes from a massive
£140m which GDC borrowed through a 'Covenant
Scheme' with four major overseas banks. (64) In 1989
GDC allocated £2.8m from the community renewal
budget to modernise 92 houses in Castlemilk. Other
areas in the scheme have undergone Community
Renewal Feasibility Studies, which are more wider
in scope but with the same intention of redesign
and stock transfer. In carrying out these
programmes the local housing department established
a 'liason group' of tenants in each area identified
for 'community renewal', whether a tenants'
association existed or not. The purpose of these
liason groups are:

"...to work with the Housing Department,
architects and, on occasion, contractors, to draw
up the proposals of each project and to monitor the
implementation of the job. One of the principal tasks of each group has been to draw up the management agreement for the project." (65)

This is the rhetoric, the reality has been somewhat different. The majority of tenants in Castlemilk have had very little, if any, say in which areas should be selected out for community renewal projects. This has led to major disagreements about the priorities of the housing department in selecting out 'high profile' areas of the scheme for renewal. The majority of tenants believe, rightly or wrongly, that there is a 'hidden agenda' to modernise the houses in the main thoroughfares to attract private investment into the scheme for other purposes. Even in these areas, where the influence of Alice Coleman's 'design disadvantage' theories are apparent, there is clear evidence that the priorities of the tenants have been overlooked. (66) For instance, a group of tenants in Dougrie Road who were involved in 'participating' in one of the first 'community renewal' projects in Castlemilk informed both the housing department and the architects involved that they would prefer not to have their verandah's removed. While they agreed that something required to be done about the dampness which resulted from
this design feature of their houses, they were adamant that the verandah should remain. The tenants argued that, on the rare occasions that the sun shone on Castlemilk, the verandah's were the only place where they could enjoy the event in comfort. It was one of the things that they did enjoy about their houses. Nevertheless, using all the professional jargon and experience that they had, the 'community' architects and the housing officials involved convinced the tenants that there was no alternative. The resulting 'postmodernist' facade which replaced the verandah's, while very 'pretty', turned out to be a disaster. The windows opened out into mid-air and could not be cleaned without tenants risking life and limb. The result of this 'participation' exercise was that, in ignoring the wishes of the tenants who had many years experience of living in these houses, the housing department was left with the option of employing a window cleaning firm at a cost of around £250,000 for three years or re-modernising the renovated buildings at a cost of £450,000. They chose the latter course, after vigorous campaigning by the tenants involved. The original idea of 'tenant participation' as formulated by the cognoscenti within the housing department was
merely decorative and it was not until the tenants in this area threatened legal action, publicised their complaints through the press and commissioned their own independent report on the safety aspects of the windows, that their viewpoint was taken seriously.

There have also been a number of tenants' groups which have developed as a result of a lack of any clear commitment to improve the houses in their immediate area. The reasoning behind the formation of these new tenants' organisations points towards a total disregard for the housing department's 'participation' game:

"A public meeting has been called for September (1990), to try to find out from the Housing Department and local councillor what plans they have for our area, as they refer to a 'Glenacre Strategy' which the tenants know nothing about."

"Tenants were fed up being left in the dark about issues which were vital to their way of life." (67) (their emphasis).

Given the limitations on funding for improvement projects it is understandable that this situation would occur. Most of the houses in
Castlemilk have never had any major repairs carried out on them since they were built, and the tenants are deeply concerned, to say the least, about dampness, rotten window frames, faulty electrical wiring, etc. There is also the added factor that the investment which is available is being targeted at certain areas, leaving some parts of the scheme derelict. One example of this trend is in the Birgidale Area situated in the South West of the scheme, where the Dale Tenants' Association was formed in November 1988. The members of this association were concerned that their area, covering 384 houses, had not been identified for renewal. In 1990 they conducted a "door-to-door" survey of the area from which a report on the conditions of the housing and the environment was compiled. The survey found that 79 per cent of the houses had dampness, 95 per cent had water penetration through windows, 93 per cent of households considered backcourts a health risk and 80 per cent of tenants did not find heating adequate. This report, along with a separate independent technical report by the Technical Services Agency, was presented to a public meeting on the 3rd of October 1990. The Director of Housing had initially agreed to attend this meeting but
withdrew at a late stage. The housing department, showing their concern with this matter, sent along a development manager who informed the tenants that they need not have carried out the survey as they (the housing department) were fully aware of the problems. This development worker also informed the tenants that the shortage of investment had led them to adopt an area-by-area approach to renewal, and that Birgidale was a number of years down the priority list for improvement. A speaker from the Right to Warmth campaign group, Professor Tom Markus, argued that the tenants were right to carry out their own survey and suggested that tenants should proceed through the courts on individual dampness cases, and could consider mounting a political campaign, including rent strikes, to achieve their objectives. At the end of this meeting the chairperson of the tenants' association outlined the legitimacy of their case and, in the process of a critical denunciation of the overall strategy of the housing department and other agencies in Castlemilk, suggested that their campaign to have their housing improved was only beginning. Whether this campaign will be successful is too early to say. However, this example does reveal that the 'participation' approach has little
to do with responding to the interests and concerns of tenants and more to do with manipulating their concerns about lack of control over resources into support for a management strategy which has already been decided elsewhere. This example also indicates that there are some tenants' associations in Castlemilk who are not willing to passively accept this hierarchical and coercive form of 'participation' but are developing their own self-organised alternatives to the state's own strategy.

Two further examples of large-scale changes to housing in Castlemilk supports the contention that the views of the tenants' associations are all but disregarded in the overall strategies of the state's attempt to 'regenerate' the scheme. In December 1989 the S.S.H.A., (now Scottish Homes), with the support of the Scottish Office made a bid to purchase 1,075 council houses in Castlemilk from GDC involving a £2m transfer fee. The proposal came with a promise of a £15m injection of funds for renovation and upgrading of the stock. (68) GDC supported this asset-stripping operation, partly because they had no funds for investing in this housing themselves but no doubt because it also reflected their own agreed policy for stock transfer. A public meeting was hastily arranged to
discuss these proposals and the tenants were left in little doubt that the only way that their houses would be improved would be to accept the transfer. A meeting to discuss the proposals was held a few days before Christmas with around 500 tenants in attendance. This meeting was to be part of a 'consultation' process. However, having sensed the mood of the meeting, a proposal to transfer the stock was moved by the local councillor and was approved on a "show of hands". The transfer went ahead and Scottish Homes set-up a locally-based management team. The fact that this was similar in structure to a Housing Association should have been enough warning to the tenants about the implicit purposes for the transfer. Within weeks of the transfer taking place the tenants were informed that the promised investment would only take place if they agreed to form themselves into a housing co-operative or Housing Association to take responsibility for the management of the houses. Given the fact that they had never expressed a wish to do this having no previous experience of management, and there had been no indication of such an option prior to the transfer, the tenants in this area resisted being forced into accepting such responsibility. The alternative which was then
offered to the tenants was to agree to sell off a large part of the housing stock, once it had become vacant, to the private sector. The reality is that this whole area of the scheme has been identified by GDC and the 'partnership initiative' for private development. The problem was in getting tenants in the area to agree to it. Through a series of very astute manoeuvres the state had left these tenants with little alternative. Over a period of 2½ years the tenants in this area had been manipulated into a situation which they had feared was at the base of the initial proposals for the transfer. Notwithstanding these pressures, these tenants set up their own tenants' group to resist any attempts to rehouse them in other parts of Castlemilk and to oppose the sale of the houses to private developers. However, in September 1990 GDC forced through the sale of 612 houses in this part of the scheme to Miller Homes, who are also building 58 new houses in the area for private sale.

Another group of tenants in the Windlaw area of the scheme are faced with a similar dilemma. The SSHA ([Scottish Homes]), took over these properties from GDC in December 1987. After similar promises to refurbish their houses, Scottish Homes management in the area pursued a policy of offering
the tenants the option of a housing co-operative as an alternative to waiting 10 years for work to be carried out.

The Ardmaliesh/Stravanan Tenants' Action Group was formed in response to these tactics. This group negotiated for months with Scottish Homes to find out details about plans for their area, to no avail. They argued for more investment to be put into the houses by Scottish Homes and against housing associations being involved. In April 1990, having no success through consultations, they organised a protest march through the area and presented a petition to the local Scottish Homes project manager. They were escorted round the scheme by four uniformed officers of the local police force who, presumably to legitimise their being there at all, informed the tenants' representatives that they had "reason to believe" that Militant may 'exploit' their protest march. [Note: This march was held three days after the anti-poll tax "riot" in Trafalgar Square]. Such a ludicrous suggestion was made to look farcical when the local management team of Scottish Homes greeted the tenants at the end of the march with cups of tea and biscuits. They also presented waiting journalists, which this researcher was mistaken
for, with a prepared press statement on the outcome of the meeting which they had yet to conduct with tenants' representatives. It was a useful insight into the machinations of the housing bureaucracy which these tenants were faced with. Like the campaign referred to earlier, these tenants have only begun their fight to have their own views taken into consideration in the plans to 'regenerate' Castlemilk. The important point is that these tenants are not 'participating' in the plans for their areas, but are being forced, manipulated and coerced into accepting plans which have already been made, and which represent the dominant ideology, by the representatives of the state at both local and national level. If their resistance to these plans are to be successful, on their own terms, then it seems that they will require to be better co-ordinated and fight on a wider collective basis, both within Castlemilk (where there were 25 tenants' associations in 1990) and in co-operation with other tenants' organisations who face similar problems.

4.6 Conclusion

Much of what has been recounted in this chapter may not seem particularly important to those urban researchers with more interest in large-scale
social change. It is, nevertheless, vital to understand how people at the 'social base', (Pickvance, 1977), have responded to the changes in their material living conditions, and the range of resources which they have created themselves to meet these challenges, if we are to have a thorough understanding of class struggle in contemporary Britain. The evidence presented in this chapter supports the general thrust of Byrne and Parsons earlier study of a similar 'residualised' estate on North Tyneside:

"...for those without work, common spatial location in reproduction is serving as the basis for collective action. That is why the ghetto, a mechanism for division, is contradictorily a source of class action". (69)

One common factor in the experience of the original tenants who moved into Castlemilk in the 1950s and those who are faced with the state's plans for re-structuring in the late 1980s and early 1990s is that their own expressed needs have, at least, been treated with indifference or, at worst, almost totally disregarded. In the 1950s there was an obvious need in Glasgow for more housing developments and, as my own oral evidence suggests, the new houses in Castlemilk were a dream
come true for many of the young couples who flitted from the inner urban slums. However, their aspirations for a better standard of living extended to the provision of other social facilities and, as they had not been consulted on any of these issues, they had to mobilise their own resources to ensure that the state provided adequate schools and other social services. It is this latter common factor, collective mobilisation, which the tenants in Castlemilk have maintained over the years and continues to be organised in a variety of forms. In a situation of such adversity and alienation it is a credit to their fortitude and determination that they have so resolutely opposed the full plethora of state agencies on behalf of working class tenants throughout this period.
CHAPTER FOUR

NOTES


4. Glasgow City Housing. The figures apply to all claims made through the Castlemilk housing office.


7. Councillor James McInnes, Convenor of the Housing Committee of Glasgow Corporation, quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 17-5-47.


9. City Housing.

10. Figures from City Housing and Scottish Homes.

11. Figures from Castlemilk East Housing Cooperative.

13. See, for instance, Corporation of Glasgow, Planning Department (1973) 'Social Deprivation in Glasgow'. April.


17. Mrs C. Castlemilk tenant since 1957. Taped interview 19-4-90.


20. Taped interview with Mrs C. 19-4-90.


23. Interview with Mr M. 6-8-91.

24. Mr Mc. Taped interview 19-4-90.

25. Castlemilk Tenants' Association (1960) Membership and Year Book to March, 1960. Thanks to Mr David McWhinnie for providing me with this and other information. A special thanks is also due to John Wilson of C.H.I.P. who provided me with information and assistance relating to many aspects of this chapter.

26. T. Brennan (1959). p40. The figure of £30,000 is for all four peripheral schemes combined.


28. Rutherglen Reformer, 18-11-1960 and 3-2-1961. On one occasion, after a child was rescued from the Pond, Teddy Taylor made a special trip by air from London to argue for immediate action to have the area made safe. See Glasgow Herald 5-4-60.


30. Rutherglen Reformer, 9-3-62.

32. Evidence available in Castlemilk Draft Rolls, see footnote 12.

33. See Rutherglen Reformer 16-3-62.

34. The Progressive/Conservative party were in control of the Cathcart [37th] Municipal Ward from 1949-1973 with the exception of three brief periods in 1962, 1971 and 1972, when Labour were in control. See F.W.S. Craig. (1984).

35. Mr William Monaghan, secretary of Castlemilk Tenants' Association, quoted in the Rutherglen Reformer 16-3-62.

36. Mr John McLaughlan, probation officer in Castlemilk, quoted in the Rutherglen Reformer, 8-11-63.


38. See the Rutherglen Reformer 26-4-63.


40. Figures derived from Corporation of Glasgow Housing Department Annual Reports from 1968 to 1979. The figures for 1975 have still to be added.
41. Glasgow Herald, 8-3-66.


44. Glasgow Herald 5th March 1971.


46. See the Rutherglen Reformer, 1-6-67; 11-5-67; 15-6-67; and 20-7-67.

47. See Rutherglen Reformer 1-6-67. This includes a report on evidence of increase of Rickets in Glasgow.

48. See Glasgow Herald 28-7-67. In this report Sir David Cuthbertson, honorary Research Fellow in Pathological Biochemistry at Glasgow University and Glasgow Royal Infirmary, suggested that rickets or "Glasgow legs" was caused by an absence of fresh air and sunlight.

50. Edward Taylor, M.P.'Things are Looking up in a Much Better Castlemilk', Rutherglen Reformer 6-8-75.


52. Rutherglen Reformer, 19-5-76.


54. Joanne Coyle, One of the tenants involved, quoted in the Rutherglen Reformer 6-5-83.

55. See the Evening Times, 4-9-85.

56. See 'Go For Business', November 1986. p3. This is a newspaper published by Glasgow Opportunities, a conglomoration of representatives from the local bourgeoisie.


67. Just two of the responses to a survey carried out in August 1990.


CHAPTER FIVE

THE GLASGOW COUNCIL OF TENANTS' ASSOCIATIONS

5.1 Introduction

"Glasgow Restores Space Heating, Tenants Legal Action". (Glasgow Herald 18th July 1951).

"12 Tenement Families Defy Eviction". (Evening Citizen 11th January 1960).

"Tenants in High Flats Protest About Rats". (Glasgow Herald 16th June 1971).

"Tenants Besiege Housing Offices". (Glasgow Herald 10th April 1972).

"Tenants Seek a Showdown". (Evening Times 24th April 1985).


"Tenants Focus on Flat Roofs as Cause of Health Problems". (Glasgow Herald 9th August 1989).

The preceding chapters of this thesis have indicated the diverse nature of tenants' campaigns and housing struggles that have prevailed in post-War Glasgow. The selection of quotations at the beginning of this chapter, culled from a pile of similar newscuttings going
back many years, adds to this impression through a concise representation of the extent of tenant activities over a lengthy period. Other studies have revealed the important struggles of tenants' groups in Pollok in the 1950s, Maryhill in the 1960s, in the Gorbals/Hutchesontown areas of the city in the 1970s and in Blackhill in the 1970s (see M. Broady and J. Mack, 1960; R. Bryant, 1979; S. Jacobs, 1976; and T. Martin, 1982).

Many of these struggles have been related to specific issues or been organised within particular locations within the city. However, throughout their history, Glasgow's public sector tenants have not only organised tenants' organisations in particular areas, but have developed a wider federation of tenants' groups to campaign around issues of concern to all tenants in the city. Indeed, as the argument presented in chapter three acknowledged, struggles over working class housing issues have often involved organisation at a national level through the SCTA. The SCTA was founded in Scotland in 1948 on the initiative of the Communist Party with a similar organisation, the National Association of Tenants and Residents.
(NATR), being formed in England in the same year (see L. Sklair, 1975). A national organisation of Scottish tenants' associations has existed throughout most of the post-War years, with the SCTA changing its name to the Scottish Tenants' Organisation in 1980. The tendency, however, has been for this organisation only to become functional when the circumstances necessitated a response at a national level. Particular examples of this form of activity have been the campaigns against the 1957 Rent Act and the 1972 Housing Finance Act. For various reasons it has been difficult to sustain such an organisation over a lengthy period and its impact has been limited as a result (see R. Goodlad, 1988). In contrast, the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations (GCTA) has continued to exist, in various forms, since its inception in 1926 and has been involved in many campaigns over the years, including some of those already referred to in earlier chapters. (1)

In the 1980s the GCTA has played a significant role in the development of tenant politics in the city and, as the discussion in chapter one indicated, in fostering a "co-operative relationship" with the housing
management department and the Labour controlled City Council. Therefore, rather than provide a full historical analysis of the genesis of the GCTA, the main focus of this chapter will be on these recent developments, as this constitutes GCTA's most influential phase. The discussion will also provide a useful insight into the nature of the contemporary tenants' movement in Glasgow in relation to wider issues already raised in chapters one and four. However, the discussion does require a brief historical outline of the growth of this type of organisation within Glasgow, if only to challenge the image of demands for 'tenant participation' as a recent phenomenon and allow us to locate the developments of the 1980s in a wider analysis.

5.2 Organising From Below

The existence of independent working class organisations around housing and other social policy initiatives can be traced back to late nineteenth century Glasgow, with the rise of Tenants' Defence Associations, the Glasgow Women's Housing Association and wider bodies like the Glasgow workers' Municipal Committee (see J. Melling, 1983). More significantly, in
the present context, was the attempt to control the activities of local government through Glasgow's municipal Ward Committees. These were self-constituted committees, which were nominally independent of political parties. (2) All municipal electors in a given ward could vote and stand for nomination to these committees. The earliest recorded reference to Ward Committees in Glasgow is that of Gorbals Ward Committee in 1860. (3) An early view of their functions was provided by Bell and Paton in their study of Glasgow's municipal administration:

"A voluntary body, the special functions of which are to deal with candidates for office, and, in a minor degree, with the elected and sitting representatives of the wards.... The Ward Committees, consisting of men who take a lively interest in their own district, discharge also, for the present, the useful function of drawing the attention of the Council to the wants and aspirations of their locality, to the slights and neglect under which it suffers patiently, and to its demands for a fair share of such good things as it is in the power of the council to distribute". (4)
While Bell and Paton regarded the Ward Committees as essentially non-political organisations, having no direct association with any political parties, they recognised that some of them would attempt to influence the political direction of the Corporation:

"It now and again happens that the ambition of the Ward Committee soars higher, and they aspire to become a power superior to the Council, to guide their deliberations, and to direct members how they should act and vote. With this high purpose in view a kind of official recognition has now and again been demanded. The right of the Ward Committee to be supplied with Council Minutes and official documents has been asserted; but although semi-official and social recognition of their value and services have been freely accorded, the Council has wisely and steadily declined to recognise the claim of such committees officially to discuss their undertakings and to direct their policy". (5)

This has been a recurring and controversial theme throughout the history of local based, independent 'non-political' organisations and their relationship with the local state (see,
for example, C. Cockburn, 1977). However, as Melling noted, in the early part of this century the I.L.P. in Glasgow made a bid for control of local government by the 'colonisation' of the Ward Committees. The I.L.P. certainly recognised the potential for raising concerns about housing conditions, education and the administration of public relief through the auspices of the Ward Committees. (6) Nevertheless, for most of their history, the majority of the Ward Committees seem to have been aligned with conservative elements in Glasgow politics, including the Citizens' Union, the Moderate Party and the Progressive Party, some of whose elected representatives were nominated by certain Ward Committees. (7) One reason for this is probably related to the shift in I.L.P. strategy towards more direct involvement with tenants' associations in the inter-War years. The need for more organised tenants' associations was identified by a leading figure in the I.L.P., councillor Paddy Dollan, in 1925:

"The individual tenant is too weak to obtain justice, by his own efforts, in the matter of repairs, amenities, and charges. If the tenants were organised, they would be able to meet the
organised factors and negotiate agreements, which might be observed by both parties. The formation of tenants' associations should be encouraged, with a view to obtaining reasonable observance of laws intended to benefit and protect householders, and also for the purpose of maintaining a constant interest in the need for the greater production of improved housing at lower rents". (8)

While Dollan was obviously concerned with the position of tenants of private landlords, the first council schemes, built under the 1919 and 1924 Housing Acts, had been tenanted and tenants' associations had been formed in some of these areas. (9) Within a year of Dollan's report being published the GCTA was formed, to co-ordinate the activities of the tenants' associations that had been founded in the new schemes. The objectives of the organisation were clearly set out in their constitution:

"a) To secure co-operation between the affiliated associations;

b) To create and encourage social and educational facilities within the housing schemes in Glasgow;
c) To provide means of organisation, information, assistance and protection to the associations and members appertaining to house occupancy and civic responsibilities thereto". (10)

The GCTA also declared itself to be a 'non-political and non-sectarian' organisation open to all tenants within the city boundaries. Given the nature of housing conditions and political culture in Glasgow the GCTA could not remain divorced from political issues for very long. In the inter-War years, in addition to housing issues, the GCTA became closely involved with campaigns organised by the N.U.W.M. and the I.L.P. (11) Initially they were a small organisation, dependent on the commitment of a few individuals to build up their membership:

"We spread through speaking in all areas. In the main it wis jist sporadic, wi groups forming from one close to another and wi all the tenants getting involved in it. We would go along and speak and set up a committee of 10 or 12 from each street and invite two delegates along to our meetings. We were small, but effective and militant". (12)
Through this kind of organisation, and with the subsequent increase in the number of Corporation housing schemes, there were over 30 separate tenants' associations affiliated to the GCTA by 1939. They continued this kind of organising in the early post-War years when the building of new council housing schemes offered the opportunity for expansion. The organisation was maintained through membership fees and the organising of jumble-sales, raffles, house-socials and donations.

In 1949 the GCTA, with its background firmly in the politics of the I.L.P., came into conflict with the SCTA over combined involvement in various campaigns and refused to send a delegate to meetings of the SCTA. This dispute seems to have been related to the differing political orientations of both organisations and to the fact that they were competing for membership within the city. However, by the mid-1950s both organisations were working jointly against rent-increases and, in particular, against the 1957 Rent Act. (13) Between them they were able to organise demonstrations with around 4,000 representatives from tenants' associations and trade unions against the Rent Act. (14) In
March 1957 the GCTA organised a meeting on Health and Housing, with a speaker from the Socialist Medical Association, with 160 tenants' associations and 57 Shop Stewards in attendance. (15) The GCTA delegates also gave their support to the People's Housing Charter at a conference of the NATR in April 1957. (16) Attendance at GCTA meetings in the 1950s and early-1960s, including the AGM's which were held in Ayr and Helensburgh, ranged from 26 to 80. The major issue for tenants' associations during this period, as emphasised in chapter three, was undoubtedly rents and this was reflected in the numbers attending particular meetings of the GCTA. (17)

While the GCTA was attempting to gain the support of additional affiliated tenants' associations in the post-War housing schemes, as well as campaigning on other housing issues, it was mainly through the issue of rents that they attempted to influence Corporation policy. Indeed, another major campaign that the GCTA organised was against the 1972 Housing Finance Act. (18) They organised meetings and demonstrations against this Act and, with tenants' associations in various schemes,
organised a partial rent strike for a period of three or four months. As the GCTA campaign literature of the period indicates, they expected the Labour controlled Corporation to form the main opposition to this legislation. (19) However, like so many other Labour local authorities, Glasgow Corporation eventually decided to implement this Act and began victimising council tenants who had withheld rent (see L. Sklair, 1975). The fear amongst tenants of accumulating debts and the fear of eviction, particularly as it would entail a long struggle against this Act, may have played a part in the demise in support for the rent strike in this case. By placing their reliance on the support of the Labour group in the Corporation to oppose the 1972 Act, the GCTA were unprepared for any alternative strategy when this opposition collapsed in the face of legal action by the state. Inevitably, when the Corporation decided to implement the Act, the GCTA's own campaign also collapsed.

The history of the GCTA up to the early 1970s suggests that, while officially a 'non-political' organisation, they were fully aware of the political nature of housing issues and
organised campaigns which were explicitly political in nature. They may have been unable to achieve as much political change with regard to Corporation policy as they might have wished. However, they realised that, even for 'non-political' organisations, the struggle for the improvement in the living conditions for Glasgow's council tenants required an organisational strategy which derived from a political analysis of housing conditions.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the GCTA went through a period of decline in the 1970s. Some members suggested that the organisation was not being utilised in the way that it should have been, with tenants' representatives using meetings to raise individual housing complaints and a general reduction in membership involvement ensued. Whatever the reasons, the GCTA was failing to attract the support of most of the tenants' associations in the city and was facing a number of new challenges on the housing front.

5.3. Taking the Politics Out of Housing Issues

In 1980 a survey by the Scottish Consumer Council revealed that there were 223 known tenants' associations in Glasgow. Of these 223,
only 38 were affiliated to the GCTA. (21) However, membership decline was not the only, nor the main, problem facing the GCTA. In addition to the internal organisational problems of the early 1980s, the nature of change which the GCTA were facing was shaped as much, if not more, by external political processes. In particular, like most other tenants' organisations, the GCTA were forced to respond to the new direction in housing policy that emerged under the Thatcher government's of the 1980s. Moreover, GDC had to develop new management techniques, if they were to retain the majority of their tenants in the face of these changes. It was the combination of these factors which led to a new phase of development for the GCTA in the early 1980s.

The practical politics of the "new right's" anti-local authority ideological drive of the 1980s and, particularly, the restructuring of housing tenure and the various measures to take the direct responsibility for housing provision away from local authorities, raised serious questions about the future of council housing. The 'residualisation' of council housing also became apparent in a Glasgow context— where 53
per cent of Glaswegians were still housed by the council— with over 70 per cent of council tenants in receipt of housing benefit and with a Labour controlled City Council committed to transferring a substantial proportion of its housing stock to 'alternative' landlords (see Sir R. Grieve, 1986 and City of Glasgow District Council, 1989). Inevitably, given the level of attacks on council housing—including higher rents and cash discounts to induce tenants to exercise the 'right-to-buy'—this period also witnessed an unprecedented focus on the management of local authority housing with a paradoxical increase in 'tenants rights' (see, for instance, City Housing Research Group, 1981; A. Coleman, 1985; P. Malpass, 1991; and A. Power, 1987). However, this critical attitude to local authority housing management had already been a concern of the state under the previous Labour government, as indicated in a Scottish Development Department consultation paper in the late 1970s:

"The Secretary of State believes that many tenants have a contribution to make to the management of public sector housing both at the scheme level and in relation to new policies for
each district...Some authorities have gone a considerable way towards giving their tenants more say and the Secretary of State would wish other authorities to do the same....One possible approach would be the establishment of a central committee in each authority's area, representing all their tenants, which would be consulted by them on questions of housing management policy". (22)

The plans contained in this document came to be known as the "Tenants Charter", and the first Thatcher government inherited this commitment to improved "tenants' rights". Under the provisions of the Tenants Rights Etc (Scotland) Act 1980 tenants were, for the first time, given security of tenure, the right to a written tenancy agreement and new rights in connection with council house allocation procedures. Curiously, given the fact that the idea of a "Tenants Charter" had emanated from within the Scottish Office, there was no provision in the Scottish legislation for local authorities to consult tenants on housing management proposals equivalent to that included in the English and Welsh statutes, other than on rent increases (see R. Edwards, 1986). However, a number of
local authorities, including Glasgow, were looking for ways to improve the quality of their relationship with council tenants (or, as the new housing management jargon euphemistically refers to them: "customers") at both a political and managerial level. As chapter one indicated, the GCTA were regarded as the most representative city-wide organisation of tenants and were selected to play a strategic role in the development of the policy relating to 'tenant participation'. The reason that the GCTA were chosen for this purpose, as opposed to any other federated organisation of tenants, was made at a political level within the Council:

"C.J.: Why were the GCTA chosen as the organisation best equipped to represent tenants?

P.L.: Well, it was an organisation that collectively sought to organise the tenants' movement throughout the city, in the sense that the problems that exist only vary in degree between one area and another, not in content. The objective was to give them a greater influence and a voice in dealing with the Council on a daily basis".(23)

The Labour leadership on the council, in an attempt to 'manage the crisis in council
housing' (Audit Commission, 1986), began to consult with the GCTA on a regular basis in the early 1980s. As the discussion in chapter one indicated, the background to these changes in administrative behaviour can be located in Labour's loss of political control of the council in the late 1970s. It was in this context, that policies relating to 'tenant participation' and decentralisation of services attracted the attention of leading Labour politicians. Or, as one 'key' political figure described the situation:

"C.J What were the main reasons behind the development of policies of decentralisation of services in the late 1970s?

J. McF. In 1977 we had an election which resulted in a hung council and we lost a lot of the old guard from the Labour Group...we lost 25 in all and that left behind people that were a lot younger...Because we were in a hung situation new ideas were probably easier to talk about. The Labour Group had an awful shock and we realised that our policies in the past had not been getting through to folk....I'm convinced that if we hadn't experienced the
election defeat change would have been much, much slower."(24)

Despite the loss of some of the 'old guard', policies relating to decentralisation of services and 'tenant participation' were treated with some scepticism within the Labour Group that was re-elected in 1980. While some of the more progressive members in the Labour Group felt that tenants had a perfect right to a say in housing issues that affected them, there were still some who were opposed to any consultation with groups like the GCTA. The consultative structures for 'tenant participation' were, apparently, set up after acrimonious debate within the Labour Group with many still opposed to allowing the GCTA to have any influence on decision making.(25) However, in the view of the fact that Labour had suffered a recent major electoral defeat, the 'young turks' eventually convinced their colleagues of the necessity for change.

For a political administration which had previously paid little attention to the concerns of the tenants' movement in the city and which was more used to Stabian's organisational methods, this subtle shift in tactics served a
number of useful and inter-related purposes. Firstly, at a time when there was a possibility of conflict around housing issues re-emerging in Glasgow, in response to a whole series of attacks associated with the Thatcher Government's recapitalisation of housing, it brought a weakened tenants' movement within the structures of the local state. This gave the GCTA the impression that they were growing in influence and would be able to have some impact on the direction of housing policy in the city. It also allowed the new Labour administration to argue that they had learned the lessons of the 1977 municipal elections and were responding to the needs of people in the housing schemes. In addition, by providing the GCTA with more information on the nature of the problems facing the Council, it allowed the Stabians, rightly, to lay the blame for the situation on the Thatcher Government but also excused them from adopting an alternative strategy for the city's council tenants or any sustained opposition to policies which both GDC and the GCTA were opposed to in principle.

It is worthwhile acknowledging the fact that the GCTA had been calling for negotiations with
GDC on a new tenancy agreement since 1978 (see T. Mason, 1991). When GDC finally agreed to these invitations for negotiations the resulting policy of 'tenant participation' proved, at least in the short-term, to have greater benefits for the political administration and housing management than any that would accrue to council tenants. The root cause of the unequal relationship which developed was the ability of GDC to exploit the vagueness inherent in the notion of 'tenant participation'. Edwards, in a review of the work of TPAS, suggested that 'tenant participation' is about power:

"Where the power lies, where it should lie, who wields it and how: these kinds of issues are the meat of any serious debate about tenant involvement in decision-making. They provoke fierce arguments fuelled by fiercer prejudices. They are the root cause of all the inevitable conflicts between tenant and landlord. Recognising the nature of power is the key to interpreting the arguments and conflicts: understanding it is the first towards ending it". (27)

The policy of 'tenant participation' that emerged in Glasgow, with the support of TPAS,
GDC and the GCTA, managed to mystify the nature of power in the overall pursuit of consensus solutions at a management level. In the process, political issues were relegated to mere background phenomena, outwith the negotiating principles of 'tenant participation'. The important strategic decisions on the direction of housing policy at a local level, in reaction to the changing dominant agenda of the Thatcher government, remained in the control of the Stabians. However, it does not necessarily follow that this situation will remain stable or that conflict over certain decisions have not, or will not in the future, arise.

Therefore, in presenting this argument it is essential to acknowledge that these developments reveal a number of potential contradictions for the local state which structuralist accounts tend to ignore. (see, for instance, C.Cockburn, 1977; and London Weekend Return Group, 1980). The change in housing management ideology, which 'tenant participation' necessarily entails, opens up avenues that were previously blocked. This allows tenants' organisations, like the GCTA, to apply pressure on the local state for increased resources, better standards of service
and so forth. The success of such organisations are potentially greater than that of the Ward Committees, discussed earlier. For, the GCTA are not only an 'independent non-political' organisation but, crucially, are now in control of their own substantial independent funding and resources. In addition, the change in housing management ideology and the introduction of decentralised consultation procedures also requires recruitment of a new strata of 'poverty professionals' within the structure of housing management—CDOs, TPOs etc. These workers can often identify with the interests of tenants as opposed to those of the local bureaucracy. People in these sorts of jobs, as Byrne rightly acknowledged, have two ways to go:

"...One is to become like the bureaucrats who run the system in places like Soweto. The other is to identify with those whom they serve..." (28)

A brief discussion of how these contradictions have worked out in relation to the GCTA will be the focus of the concluding section of this chapter.

5.4 In Or Against The State?
The leading activists in the GCTA, with years of involvement in Labour movement politics in Glasgow, are clearly aware of the contradictory nature of their relationship with GDC. They have welcomed the recent changes within the Council and the housing management department towards their own organisation. At the same time they are also wary of becoming the junior partner in corporate-style decision making. These issues were clearly identified by the chairperson of the GCTA, and are worth quoting in full:

"Under Frances Hamilton most of our time was spent on administration and trying to raise funds. But, Frances got GDC to recognise that GCTA was there. So, we got a £5,000 grant, which was a pittance, and our own premises. We began to get into the City Chambers and be heard more, and they even allowed us to speak to the full Council when a rent increase was being discussed. We were allowed to speak to the full meeting every year opposing the increase and giving our own ideas how it should be opposed...So, over the years it began to get better and some of the progressive members of the Council began to realise that the tenants,
as customers, should have a wee bit more say. I've a funny feeling, however, that in the background that councillors are looking to the GCTA as a body, in some instances, for rubber stamping something they say, which I'm opposed to. Therefore, I try to make it quite clear that as long as I am chairman I'm no here for to rubber stamp anything that happens in GDC and some o' the councillors are no happy aboot that. That's why funding is so important. The more funding that comes into GCTA the more we will become a very independent body. We should have a good healthy tension between us...We don't want to get sucked into the bureaucracy of the GDC, we want to remain independent". (29)

Under this kind of analysis, the GCTA do not adhere to any simple notion of a 'helpful' or 'un-helpful' organisation that GDC can negotiate with. (see J. Dearlove, 1974). They entered negotiations with GDC on a number of issues with a clear understanding of the inequality inherent in such an arrangement. The initial intention, as far as the GCTA were concerned, seems to have been to be 'helpful' when they were satisfied with GDC policy, but to retain the option of being 'un-helpful' if the occasion demanded it.
This was a precarious strategy for the GCTA to adopt, in relation to the entrenched political and ideological power of the local state, especially a local state that remained in the control of the Stabians.

Apart from attempting, unsuccessfully, to influence GDC's rent policy through continuous negotiations, the first major joint-initiative between GDC and the GCTA was the negotiations surrounding a new tenancy agreement—the 'tenants lease'. The circumstances surrounding these negotiations began when GDC circulated a consultative draft of proposals for a new tenancy agreement in April 1982. This document sought to reduce the Council's existing maintenance responsibilities under the guise of improving "tenants rights". When tenants' associations throughout the city objected to these proposals the GCTA were invited, with the support of TPAS workers, to scrutinize the lease and provide workable alternatives. The GCTA organised meetings with tenants' associations throughout the city over a two month period to discuss their objections, set up a special working party to prepare a response and reported back to further meetings of tenants' groups.
throughout the city. This process resulted in the GCTA submitting amendments to GDC's original proposals followed by three months of negotiations. The resulting tenants lease which was agreed between the GCTA and GDC was, inevitably, a compromise. GCTA managed to get a strict 24 hour time limit on emergency repairs accepted, but failed to get a legally binding commitment to fixed timescales for certain repairs included in the lease. (30) The apparent success of these negotiations have been widely acclaimed as unique and, at least one of those close to the process has suggested that it was the potential power which tenants' associations possessed which made this possible:

"It was the only example I can think of where genuine negotiations took place, comparable to trade union/management disputes in the workplace. The tenants actually had power, they had demonstrable power. They had means to create so much havoc by campaigning for tenants not to sign the lease...If the Council hadn't reacted in a reasonably conciliatory manner and offered a negotiated process there would have been a great big messy public row". (31)
While not wishing to question the potential power that GCTA certainly had in this instance, it is difficult to imagine how it could have been adequately mobilised around the issue of individual "tenants rights" such as those incorporated into the tenants lease. By the middle of 1985 only 70 per cent of tenants had returned their agreements and, of those returned, only 60 per cent were filled in correctly (T. Mason, 1991). Perhaps the most significant outcome of the negotiations on the tenants lease was the setting up of a joint appeal tribunal to deal with voluntary referrals of disputes under the new lease. These tribunals were intended to deal with individual tenants cases through an informal method which prevents the possibility of legal action against GDC. The tribunals were to consist of one GCTA representative, one councillor and one 'independent' member. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade little progress had been made:

"For a long time the GCTA has worked for the establishment of the Arbitration Tribunal system. I am pleased to report that this has been achieved but regret that as yet it is not fully operational, in that, it is not being
fully utilised by tenants. Leaflets and posters have now been distributed by the tribunal and we would now propose to run a series of half day seminars for tenant representatives on the tribunal system. Seminars have already taken place for E.C. members of the tribunal. To date only two cases have been heard". (32)

Therefore, even on the level of individual tenants rights, the tribunals have given tenants and the GCTA little influence over events. As the quotation just cited indicates, only two cases had been taken to a tribunal by May 1990. One of these cases related to dampness and led to a discussion on the viability of the tribunal system at a monthly meeting of the GCTA. The tenant was informed, in a manner equivalent to that which existed before the advent of tribunals, that the Council was short of finance to deal with such complaints and until central government made such funding available the dampness could not be treated. While some members of the GCTA considered withdrawing from the tribunal system as a result of this example, they were persuaded by the TPO to continue to participate:
"Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Despite this example, progress can be made with the tribunals. A lot of people would be happy to see you pull out. Don't give them the pleasure". (33)

The role of this 'poverty professional' is, clearly, to bring the GCTA and the housing management department into a closer working relationship where co-operation is assumed to be working and conflict is never a possibility. By advocating a partnership between the GCTA and the Council, the TPO has played a central role, with the support of other organisations like TPAS, in moving the GCTA towards a more developmental role which is supportive of policies adopted by GDC and implemented by housing management. The strategy seems to be to bring the GCTA into, but not fully part of and certainly not against, the local state. This is one 'poverty professional' who would be immediately recognised by the administrators of Soweto.

The GCTA have taken part in a number of consultative forums organised through the auspices of the TPO. Apart from the yearly ritual of 'consultation' on rent increases, the
GCTA have attempted to influence housing policy through co-opted membership of various Council sub-committees: the Working Group on Co-operatives and Participation and the Tenant Participation Management Committee. The title of the latter committee was, revealingly, changed in 1990 to the Committee on Tenant Participation and Tenure Development, clearly reflecting the Council's priority of disposing of around 40,000 council houses in the city by the year 2000. These committees met intermittently throughout the 1980s, though there is little evidence of the GCTA having any substantial impact on the overall housing policy of GDC. This is understandable given the fact that the meetings are intended to mystify power through reverting to "negotiations". The concise Oxford dictionary definition of negotiation is: 'to confer with another with a view to compromise or agreement'. The overwhelming professional advice that the GCTA have received in this respect has always been to be prepared to compromise otherwise, it is argued, there is no point in entering negotiations with GDC. At no point, during the period of this research, have any of the 'poverty professionals' advising the GCTA suggested that GDC should compromise or that the
GCTA may adopt a more conflictual strategy. Indeed, when the secretary of the GCTA used a platform at the AGM in 1990 to mount a scathing attack on GDC's over-enthusiastic promotion of "alternative tenures" the TPO suggested that, if there was no apology forthcoming, then he would recommend that the housing department (and therefore the Council) should withdraw their support to the GCTA. (34) Within two months the secretary of the GCTA was removed from office. The evidence from other tenants' associations throughout the city suggests that they were, in fact, being advised by the housing department that moving over to an "alternative landlord" offered the only viable option for the future. Ironically, this policy to change the structure of housing tenure in the city had met with the approval of the GCTA in February 1990 (see City Housing, 1990c).

In some ways the GCTA were forced into accepting the strategy offered by the TPO and TPAS. Both the TPO and TPAS had been working with the GCTA throughout the 1980s and were regarded as "experts" on housing issues and, more specifically, 'tenant participation'. Faced with the extensive and interminable
alterations to housing policy, these 'street level bureaucrats' were strategically placed to move the GCTA in the direction of consensual 'participation' schemes rather than in conflictual political action. Operating as 'traditional intellectuals' their role was, to draw on an analogy from Gramsci, to weaken the progressive potential of the GCTA by means of a "passive revolution". (35) What this suggests is, that the housing management department and the Stabians within the Council might grant certain demands (more 'participation', representation on committee's etc) to avoid any conflict, on the other hand, the GCTA might find itself in practice (though not necessarily in theory) accepting its impotence and might be politically integrated into the structures of the local state. This is, indeed, what has happened to the GCTA in recent years.

The annual general meetings of the GCTA in 1989 and 1990 were attended by 300 and 350 delegates respectively. While these AGM's offered the opportunity to mobilise tenants' associations throughout the city through developing their own strategies, in opposition to those of GDC, they were organised on the
basis of impressing councillors and the housing management department of the 'representativeness' of the GCTA. There was little opportunity to discuss the overall policies which the GCTA could adopt as a basis for campaigning, and these events turned into social gatherings with a civic reception provided by GDC. The monthly meetings of the GCTA between January 1989 and June 1990 were attended by an average of 35 delegates representing around 25 different tenants' associations from across the city. Therefore, the work of the GCTA, including attendance at the numerous sub-committee's of the Council, was being carried out by a small, but enthusiastic, executive committee. These same people were also involved in their own tenants' associations. Inevitably, perhaps, these monthly meetings concentrated to a certain extent on the administrative functions of the GCTA as an organisation. The GCTA were certainly involved in wider issues affecting the city's tenants, including the Anti-Poll Tax campaign and opposition to Scottish Homes. However, by concentrating, in the main, on issues relating to 'participation' with GDC and improving the organisations own developmental role, with the
support of the TPO and TPAS, the GCTA failed to provide an adequate alternative strategy for the city's tenants. They have had very little impact on the Council's policy of housing stock disposal, Community Renewal or the role of Scottish Homes and private developers in the housing schemes. For these reasons many tenants' associations, like those in Castlemilk, have refused to co-operate with the GCTA and have prevented them from having any influence at a local level. By mid-1990 there were around 450 tenants' associations in Glasgow, but only 138 of them were affiliated to the GCTA. By concentrating their efforts on playing the 'participation' game they have, to some extent, become isolated from the issues raised by tenants' associations in many schemes in the city. This situation has also led to a number of unsuccessful attempts to form an alternative city-wide tenants' federation, under the banner of the Community Renewal Action Group (C.R.A.G.), in recent years. These criticisms have led to claims that the GCTA have been incorporated into the structures of the local state. This view is expressed by a number of tenants' associations and at least one Community Council in the city. Ironically, it is a view
that is accepted, for different reasons, by the arch-Stabian leader of GDC:

"C.J. What is your impression of the GCTA?

P.L. The clear picture emerging is that they are becoming more aware of the problems that the council faces, and they are becoming more and more responsible in dealing with their own problems. They realise that resources are limited and they work with us in seeking to expand those resources by pressure on the Government etc. They are better able, more effectively, to represent the interests of tenants on a collective basis as a consequence of a greater ability to deal with information and greater access to information". (36)

For the time being, at least, the GCTA seem to have met with the criteria of a 'helpful group'. My own impression, after studying the activities of the GCTA for over one year, is that this is a fairly accurate assessment of how the organisation has progressed in recent years. However, it is also a static description. Throughout the 1980s the GCTA were confronted with a wide array of changes in housing policy imposed by central government and accepted by the Stabian leadership within the local state.
Given the fact that they were also confronted with internal organisational problems it was, perhaps, inevitable that they would seek a dialogue with a Labour council which claimed to be seeking to defend local democracy and develop new styles of housing management. There was no effective political alternative in a city where, apart from three brief periods, Labour had been in control of the Council since 1933. The historical connections between the GCTA and reformist Labour politicians went back to the inter-War years. The strong cultural and political identification between the tenants' movement and wider labour politics in the city meant that the process of corporate incorporation was easier to attain against the background of attacks on council housing. However, it does not necessarily follow that this situation will continue.

The GCTA now have ten years of experience of the inability, or unwillingness, of local Labour politicians to challenge the hegemony of Conservative housing policy as it affects the city's tenants. They have also attained a greater knowledge of housing issues, accumulated sufficient communicative and negotiation skills,
are now independently funded and resourced and capable of building a base around an alternative tenants strategy for housing in Glasgow. The contradictions of being in and against the state could also expand the options of mounting a challenge to the local state's acceptance of the dominant agenda in housing over the past decade. It is these "resources of hope" which could lead to the emergence of a new and more vigorous tenants' movement or, as Raymond Williams said in a similar context:

"...the mounting internal and external pressures on the present structures of British society make it likely that the changes will have to be lived rather than only debated..." (37)

The "battles to be fought" could yet see the development of a working class counter-hegemonic struggle similar to that which developed in Glasgow in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and again in the early post-War years.
CHAPTER FIVE

NOTES

1. The GCTA is not the only federated body of tenants' associations in Glasgow. Other examples are the Drumchapel and Anniesland Residents' Executive, the Easterhouse Executive, and the Cambuslang Combine of tenants' associations. However, while these organisations bring together groups within a specific area the GCTA covers the whole city and is recognised by many tenants' groups and the City Council as the main federated body of tenants in the city. The GCTA were involved in the campaign against the sale of the Merrylee houses (discussed in chapter two) and the Arden rent-increase strike-(discussed in chapter three). However, they played a minor role in comparison to the SCTA in the latter campaign and to the Joint Committee in the former.

2. Ward Committees were accorded certain privileges by the Corporation. They had the right to hold 12 meetings a year in a municipal hall free of charge and received a small financial allowance from the Common Good fund for working expenses. They also received copies of the Corporation minutes. (see M. Broady and
J. Mack, 1960. p159-160). In this sense, they can be seen as an early precursor of Community Councils. Records of various Ward Committees are lodged in S.R.A.: TD90; TD200/157; TD411; TD455; TD491; TD472; and TD542/10.


4. J. Bell and J. Paton. (1896). pp66-67. One of the authors of this study, Sir James Bell, was also Lord Provost of Glasgow at the time it was published.


7. See M. Broady and J. Mack. (1960) for a full discussion of these issues.

8. **Report of the Committee on the Rent Restriction Acts, 1924-25.** Cmnd. 2423. p17. Dollan, who, later became Lord Provost of Glasgow, produced a Minority Report to this committee, which was published by the I.L.P. in 1925 under the title of 'The Clyde Rent War'.

Association was founded in November 1925 but, as Damer has argued, had; "...distanced itself from the ILP-dominated city-wide Federation of (Council) Tenants' Associations, claiming that '...we were non-Party and non-sectarian.' The Minutes of the Association are emblematic of the middle-class, Parliamentary, and somewhat pompous manner in which the Mosspark tenants conducted their public business as a pressure-group." S. Damer, (1991) p13 of Appendix II. Therefore, in contrast to most other tenants' associations in the city, this was one tenants' association which used the term 'non-political' to totally distance themselves from Labour politics.


11. Interview with John Lyons, 2-10-1990. John Lyons has been a member of GCTA since 1930 and was elected as its Honorary President in 1988.


13. See M. Broady and J. Mack, (1960). p193, for a discussion of the dispute between the GCTA and the SCTA. Broady and Mack's account, which lacks any detailed supportive evidence, is full of
Cold War rhetoric with Communist takeovers of the tenants' associations and 'fellow travellers' to be found everywhere. They regarded tenants' associations as being the most influential Communist Party 'front organisation' at local community level. This was based on their own acceptance of a survey of Communist 'front organisations' made by the Industrial Research and Information Services Ltd (1957) The Communist Solar System. Apparently, the publication of their own study was blocked after threats of legal action relating to inaccuracies contained in the text.


16. See The Drumchapel Tenant, April 1957. Broady Collection F21. Amongst other things, this Charter called for the 'natural right for all to a dwelling; good repair and adequate size of houses; absolute security of tenure for tenants; rents (in all types of ownership) to be on a national unified scale; landlords' power to distrain on goods, and to evict, to be abolished; and the creation of local Housing
Tribunals for settlement of all disputes and to assist tenants to maintain their rights.


18. Unfortunately, I have been unable to trace sufficient documentation of the work of the GCTA for the period from the 1960s to the early 1980s. Part of the reason for this is that two of the leading figures in the GCTA—Frances Hamilton and Iris McDonald—had died during the 1980s and they were the only ones who would have been able to assist me in tracing this material. As these two individuals kept the GCTA going through this period their contribution to the discussion in this chapter would have been invaluable. These two women contributed a large part of their lives to the tenants' movement in Glasgow, and it is unfortunate that there is no existing documentation to record their contribution along with the role of GCTA during an important period for Glasgow's tenants. Along with Bobby Alexander and John Lyons, they were the main individuals who kept the GCTA going in the 1970s.

19. Leaflet publicising demonstration against the Rent Act, September 17th 1972. Thanks to
John Lyons for providing me with this leaflet and other information. Also, see report of one of these demonstrations in the Glasgow Herald, 15-11-72. The only local authority in Scotland which went to any great lengths to oppose the 1972 Act was Clydebank Town Council, with 15 Labour, 3 Communist and 2 SNP councillors. However, even with the recent experience of the UCS work-in behind them, the councillors in Clydebank agreed to implement the Act after being fined £5,000 in the Court of Session.

20. Interview with Bobby Alexander, chairperson of GCTA, 30-6-89. Bobby Alexander was taken to his first tenants' association meeting at the age of 10 by his mother. He has been involved in most of the post-War housing campaigns in Glasgow.

21. Scottish Consumer Council (1980), pp3 and 53. The author of this report wrongly suggests that the GCTA has only been in existence since the 1950s. Curiously the GCTA held its 50th anniversary conference on the 21st May 1989, 13 years after the actual anniversary of its foundation year of 1926.

22. Scottish Development Department (1979), pl. This consultation document was issued in January
1979, four months before the defeat of the Labour Government in the general election.


26. The concept Stabian is drawn from Tariq Ali's use of the term, which he uses to describe a particular form of individual political behaviour and type of political organisation:


For an account of how this type of political beast developed in Glasgow see Damer, (1990) chapter 6.


29. Interview with Bobby Alexander, 30th June 1989.

30. Most of the material relating to negotiations on the 'Tenants Lease' are drawn from a series of files held by GCTA, held under The Working Party on Consultation on the Tenants Lease.


32. Secretary's Report to GCTA Annual General Meeting, 27th May 1990.

33. Research notes taken at monthly meeting of GCTA, 28th April 1990. While conducting this research Barry Docherty, the TPO in Glasgow's housing department, was the only person who refused to be interviewed or to co-operate with the researcher. Any references to the work of the TPO have, unfortunately, depended on analysis of official documents and observation of his activities during monthly and annual general meetings of the GCTA.

34. The TPO asked officials of the GCTA, in my presence, for time to make an official response to the secretary's statement which he considered to be totally inaccurate. It was only after this
opportunity had been refused that the TPO responded with a threat to withdraw support from the GCTA. The secretary of the GCTA, Martin Lee, was out-voted as secretary for reasons which were, apparently, unconnected to this event.

35. See A. Gramsci (1971), pp106-114 on the concept of "passive revolution".


6.1 Introduction

"The capitalist mode of production forces a separation between working and living at the same time as it reintegrates them in complex ways. The superficial appearance of conflict in contemporary urban-industrial society suggests that there is indeed a dichotomy between struggles in the workplace and in the living place and that each kind of struggle is fought according to different principles and rules...." (1)

The genesis of the argument presented in this dissertation is that the dichotomy identified by Harvey is indeed superficial. For instance, in the offices of the Castlemilk Housing Involvement Project (C.H.I.P.) in 1990 there were posters on every wall declaring: "Poverty is the Real Issue". The activists in the Castlemilk tenants' movement who use this resource centre have placed these posters to serve as a constant reminder that, while their main purpose is involvement in campaigns relating to housing provision, the overall position that they find themselves in results from their structural location as part of the 'social proletariat' in an urban area that is
suffering from the consequences of uneven development. (2) It is a clear acknowledgement that, while they may not be able to act in circumstances of their own choosing, they do act in terms of an evaluation of their position as part of a 'peripheralised' population in a 'deprived' area which is characterised by an overwhelmingly working class social and cultural milieu. The point is, that they are not the helpless and passive victims of structural circumstances that is implied in "new right" notions about "subsidy junkies" or that contained in recent sociological discussions of the "underclass" (see Adam Smith Institute, 1988; K. Auletta, 1982; and R. Dahrendorf, 1987). They are active social agents involved in a collective practice, which is expressed through political action around issues of social reproduction. This is not an adoption of a 'romantic' perspective to working class housing struggles. As we saw in chapters four and five, resistance, just like hegemony, is often fragmented and fractured. An acceptance that such divisions exist, and always have existed, in working class areas does not detract from the very real contribution of council tenants' organisations to working class culture and progressive political mobilisation in
particular 'localities'. The "battles that have been fought" are important avenues of experience within working class areas of urban Britain which deserve more recognition by urban sociologists, not less.

The activities of tenants' associations in places like Castlemilk may be organised around specific 'neighbourhood issues', but they are regarded by those involved as a mere semblance of more fundamental conflicts within contemporary ('disorganized') capitalist society. Recent studies within social science, and sociology in particular, have emphasised the importance of studying localities and local social processes (see, for instance, D. Byrne, 1989; P. Cooke, 1990; P. Dickens et al, 1985; and J. Urry, 1987). This study has been concerned with tracing the development of the tenants' movement and housing struggles in one particular 'locality', Glasgow, in the post-War years and relating this to the wider processes that have shaped these struggles. An understanding of these wider socio-economic and cultural processes has also required that they be contextualised in a historical framework for, as Elliot and McCrone suggest, a basis for
understanding collective action in urban research means:

"...that it should be historically informed, sensitive to the processes that have shaped urban institutions, urban environments and the ideologies and actions of particular social groups. We need historical awareness because our task is to explore change and conflict and cohesion in the city. It is essential, when considering institutions—the frameworks of local government or health or housing or welfare agencies—to appreciate that the liberties or rights that they confer have been won by struggle. They were not bestowed by benevolent rulers but ceded gradually and grudgingly by local and national elites confronted by sections of the citizenry anxious to secure for themselves some say in decision-making, some improvement in their material circumstances, some basis for fuller citizenship..." (3)

In the concluding section of this dissertation we will examine the processes which have shaped the tenants' movement and housing struggles in post-War Glasgow.

6.2 The Social Significance of Housing Struggles
The discussion contained in chapters one and two indicated that post-War Glasgow has been beset by a 'housing problem' of considerable proportions. In his study of 'urban social movements', Lowe (1986) suggests that "there is little evidence of militant tenants' action in the 1950s". (4) Similarly, in relation to Glasgow, Butt (1978) has argued that the early housing struggles associated with "Red Clydeside" had all but disappeared in the 1940s and 1950s. (5) However, the re-discovery of important early post-War housing struggles contained in chapters two and three suggest that, rather than constituting a period of quiescence, there existed particular forms of 'urban protest' that were determined by social relations amongst the working class in Glasgow. The squatters' movement, the Merrylee campaign and the Arden All-Scotland Rent-Strike drew on the cultural traditions of Glasgow's working class to organise effective campaigns around housing conditions and housing provision (see S. Damer 1980 and 1990; J. Melling, 1983; and J. Smith, 1984; for details of this tradition). The recognition of the significance of these links between social processes within particular
'localities' at any given time have been made cogently by Urry:

"...space per se has no general effects...it only has effect because the social objects in question possess particular characteristics, namely, different causal powers. Such powers may or may not manifest themselves in empirical events—whether they do or not depends upon the relationship in time-space established with other objects. These effects thus stem not from the 'contingent' relations between phenomena in time-space but from the internal structures of different social objects, objects which possess different causal powers..." (6)

In the 1940s and early-1950s Glasgow, partly as a result of temporary War-time expansion, was still a major industrial centre. In February of 1947, for instance, there were still 23 shipyards in operation on the Clyde. There was a shop stewards' movement based in the shipyards and other manufacturing industries (including those in J.G. Weir's involved in the Merrylee campaign), which was largely under the influence of a Communist Party leadership. The Labour Party had been in power in Glasgow from 1933 and had consolidated this power within the organs of the
local state. However, the housing conditions that prevailed were, quite simply, appalling. The response of the organic intellectuals amongst Glasgow's working class was to organise families of squatters to put pressure on the local state for increased house-building and to successfully oppose the proposed sale of council houses. At this stage the Labour Party was seen as part of the solution to the 'housing problem' in Glasgow, in the sense that they were regarded as a viable agent for pursuing change through the local state by means of external pressure. These campaigns involved both men and women with a high degree of consciousness and militancy, organised in tenants' associations, union branches and various socialist organisations, and who regarded the politics of reproduction as significant an arena for struggle as those relating to production relations. They were not merely 'consumption-based' political actions but, rather, part of the overall struggle of the working class for social improvement, and analysed as such by its organic intellectuals.

But while these events were taking place Glasgow was also going through a process of restructuring of both its housing and labour markets, as the discussion in chapters one and
four made clear. Part of the outcome of this process was the dispersal of large sections of Glasgow's working class to peripheral housing schemes on the fringes of the city. Initially, as the discussion in chapter four emphasized, the tenants' associations that developed in the early years of the Castlemilk scheme concerned themselves with the shortcomings of service provision. Such campaigns entailed a critique of the local state and, in the process, the Labour Party, which had been seen as a solution to the 'housing problem' in earlier campaigns, now became part of the 'problem'. This process has continued in Castlemilk throughout the post-War years, and has become exacerbated with the impact of the 'residualization' of council housing and G.D.C.'s passive acceptance of central Government strategies for the scheme and its inhabitants. Castlemilk, like many other housing schemes in Glasgow and elsewhere, has become increasingly a residential locale for semi-and unskilled workers as well as the mass of the unemployed. This aspect of the development of council housing is well documented in housing literature. However, none of this literature attempts to explain the response of council tenants to these structural and ideological changes which have practical
implications for the mobilisation of housing struggles. Therefore, the discussion of tenants' associations and housing struggles in Castlemilk, despite the demise of links to work-based labour organisations, provides an insight into the persistence of 'communities of resistance' within 'peripheralized' neighbourhoods.

G. D. C., in response to the potentials of such resistance and in order to manage the social and economic reproduction of Glasgow's working class (including the reserve army of labour in the peripheral schemes), has developed specific forms of urban management: 'community development' and 'tenant participation'. As the discussion in chapter five revealed, this 'ideology of participationism' (K. Coit, 1978) is aimed at integrating one of the leading sections of the contemporary tenants' movement in the city behind the dominant strand of housing policy being pursued by the local state. However, this discussion also rejected functionalist accounts of the local state (C. Cockburn, 1977). Such accounts are a-historical and consequently ignore the ways in which the working class have been able to capture and direct local state institutions for their own benefit. To re-emphasize the point made
at the end of chapter five, the strategy of 'tenant participation' as it has evolved in Glasgow is potentially fragile and open to conflict. It is, as Raymond Williams said in another context, based on:

"...an alliance of negatives, the priority being to unite against an immediate evil rather than concentrating upon the development of a truly popular programme with mass support from below". (8)

The history of "battles fought" in the sphere of reproduction by Glasgow's organic intellectuals documented in this dissertation suggests that, class struggle and conflict over housing could re-emerge to become a central focus of 'urban' politics in the 1990s and beyond.
CHAPTER SIX

NOTES


2. G.C Mooney (1988) has produce a seminal account of the economic and political processes which have created underdevelopment in the Pollok housing scheme in Glasgow. The comparisons with Castlemilk are obvious from details on pages 306-7 of this thesis. Also, see D. S. Byrne and D. Parson, (1983) on the use of the concept of 'social proletariat'.


ABBREVIATIONS


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