
PhD thesis

http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3933/

Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given
The Development of Party Activism in Russia: A Local Perspective

Derek S. Hutcheson, B.A. (Hons.)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy by Research (Ph.D.)

to

The University Of Glasgow,
Department of Politics

October 2001
(Examined 7 December 2001)

© Derek S. Hutcheson, 2001
Abstract

One of the great opportunities afforded to the political scientist since the fall of the Soviet Union has been that of examining politics 'on the ground' in non-metropolitan areas. The current study addresses the development of regional and local political party organisations in post-communist Russia. Focusing on the six movements which won representation in the 1999 election to the State Duma, it uses three case study regions in the middle Volga – the Republic of Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul'yanovsk – to examine party activity at the regional and district levels. Based on extensive fieldwork in Russia, the investigation utilises a broad range of local sources and interviews in its analysis. However, in order to avoid the danger of simply providing an observational study of local politics, wide use is also made of national opinion survey and focus group data.

The study begins by examining the context of party activity in Russia, giving a brief history of the party system and its institutional framework. Thereafter, examination is made of the role of parties in regional and local politics, based mainly on official electoral statistics from 1995-2001. This analysis begins by looking at the Russian Federation's eighty-nine regions in a comparative context, before narrowing the focus to the three case study regions. Parties' activities, and their interactions with the respective political systems in each region, are examined in detail. Thereafter, the functioning of parties at three levels – federal, regional and district – is examined, using both theoretical and empirical methods.

The study goes on to examine the role played by members in Russia's political parties, most specifically at a regional and local level, utilising survey and focus group material (undertaken specifically for this study) to cast new light on the entry patterns, bases of activism, and attitudes of party members in the middle Volga.

Furthermore, parties are examined in the context of the 1999-2001 electoral cycle. This analysis concludes that, in the federal elections, particularly that to the State Duma in December 1999, regional nuances dominated over the national campaign; but that party participation was limited in region-specific elections. It is also seen that parties are increasingly reliant on outside advice and labour to fight election campaigns. With the aid of internal party documents and interviews with key actors, examination is made of the form that this takes, and its effectiveness is measured using empirical data.

The study concludes by setting the findings into a wider context. It is necessary to ask how typical the middle Volga is of Russia as a whole. The final chapter addresses this question, seeking also to establish the place of Russia in the comparative framework of contemporary regime transformation and identifying possible future trajectories of research into local party activism.
Preface

My thanks are due to a number of people for their help and support with the current study during the three years of its preparation. Foremost amongst them is Prof. Stephen White, who, as supervisor, has provided invaluable advice and practical assistance. My thanks are also due to the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow, in particular to Prof. Chris Berry as Head of Department and Dr. Sarah Oates for giving permission to use original survey and focus group data from the ESRC-funded project, ‘Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia’. As Director of the Institute of Central and East European Studies (ICEES), Prof. John Löwenhardt has provided useful counsel on many occasions, for which I am extremely grateful.

The current study is based on extensive fieldwork in Russia, and there are many people to whom I am indebted for their assistance and support during my frequent stays in the country. For their academic and practical assistance, particular thanks are due to Prof. Valentin Bazhanov of Ul’yanovsk State University; Oleg Romanov and Prof. Aleksandr Shestakov of Samara State University; and Dr. Oleg Zaznaev of Kazan’ State University. The assistance rendered by Ol’ga Balashova of the Central Electoral Commission, and various officials from subject and territorial electoral commissions in the Republic of Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul’yanovsk, has also been much appreciated. For other useful advice and practical help, I am grateful to Lyuba Chilikova, Friedrich and Alexandra Demke, Dr. Igor Egorov, Vladimir Kazantsev, Prof. V.N. Konev, Dr. Valentin Mikhailov, Prof. Evgenii Molevich, Prof. Elena Shestopal, Anastasia Tarasevich, and Zalina Karaeva. Thanks are also due to the numerous politicians who met me and particularly to those who granted access to internal party meetings and other activities. They are too numerous to mention individually here, but are listed in the bibliography.

I am also grateful to Prof. Bernd Bonwetsch of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany, for advice on fieldwork.

Financial support, in the form of a research scholarship and fieldwork costs, came from the Economic and Social Research Council, which support I acknowledge with pleasure.

A number of general points should be made about the study:

- The system of Russian transliteration used is that utilised by the Oxford Slavonic Papers, with some minor modifications. Where a non-standard form is in common use (e.g., ‘Yeltsin’ rather than ‘El’tsin’), this is given instead. Words ending ‘и’ or ‘й’ in Russian are transliterated as ‘ii’, except in surnames, when a ‘y’ is used instead (e.g., ‘Grigorii’ rather than ‘Grigory’ but ‘Zhirinovsky’ rather than ‘Zhirinovskii’). Non-English proper names, article and book titles are rendered with the appropriate capitalisation and, where
relevant, any original characters unique to the language in question. The exception is the German letter 'ß', which is transliterated as a double 's' in all cases.

- Authors' names are cited as they appear on the original book or article. As a result, there may be several different formats used for the same author, depending upon which article is quoted (e.g., 'Grigorii Golosov', 'Grigorii V. Golosov' and 'G.V. Golosov'). The status indicated next to the interviewees is that which they had at the time of the interview in question. Thus, for instance, Robert Sadykov of the Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan (CPRT) is described at one point as the secretary of the party's republican committee, and at another as the party's candidate in the Tatar presidential election. Where one person held two offices at the time of the interview (such as in this latter case) the one that is most relevant to the topic under consideration is that cited. Full details of interviewees, and any subsequent changes in status, are given in the bibliography.

- The word 'federal' is used in the study to denote the national political level; 'regional' to denote subject level; and 'local', district level.

- Some studies consider the post-Soviet State Dumas to be a continuation of the pre-1917 ones, and hence designate the first post-Soviet Duma as the fifth convocation, the second as the sixth, and so on. This practice is not adopted in the current study, which treats the Duma elected in 1993 as the first.

- Technically, not all the organisations analysed in the study are parties. Under legislation valid until recently, there was little practical difference between a party, an electoral association or a movement in terms of electoral participation, although issues such as membership rules differed slightly. New legislation on political parties passed in July 2001 and examined in chapter two means that only organisations registered as 'parties' can participate in future elections. For simplicity, the six organisations upon which this study focuses are usually referred to as 'parties' in the text, unless their exact legal status is relevant at the time.

_Derek S. Hutcheson, October 2001_

- A number of articles have been published based on the current study:
# Contents

**ABSTRACT** ..................................................................................................................................................... II

**PREFACE** ......................................................................................................................................................... III

1 **THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY ACTIVISM IN RUSSIA: AN INTRODUCTION** .......... 1

2 **POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA: THE FEDERAL LEVEL** ........................................................ 15

   2.1 **FEDERAL PARTIES: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW** ................................................................. 15

      2.1.1 Reaction to the Old Regime? The Neformaly Period (1986-1991) ................................. 16

      2.1.2 After the Fall of the Regime: Centrifugal Tendencies? (1991-1993) ............................... 19

      2.1.3 Splits, Fusions and Births? The Third Stage of Development (1994-2001) ............... 24

   2.2 **PARTIES IN THE STUDY** ................................................................................................................. 29

   2.3 **THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RUSSIAN PARTY SYSTEM** ....................... 39

3 **PARTIES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL** ....................................................................................................... 50

   3.1 **CANDIDATES AND DEPUTIES** ................................................................................................. 51

   3.2 **ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS** ......................................................................................................... 61

   3.3 **THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN REGIONAL POLITICS: AN OVERALL INDEX** ................. 67

4 **POLITICS AND PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE VOLGA** .............................................................................. 78

   4.1 **TATARSTAN** .................................................................................................................................... 78

      4.1.1 General Political Situation ........................................................................................................ 78

      4.1.2 Parties in Tatarstan ....................................................................................................................... 86

   4.2 **SAMARA** ......................................................................................................................................... 91

      4.2.1 General Political Situation ........................................................................................................ 91

      4.2.2 Parties in Samara .......................................................................................................................... 92

   4.3 **UL’YANOVSK** ................................................................................................................................. 96

      4.3.1 General Political Situation ........................................................................................................ 96

      4.3.2 Parties in Ul’yanovsk ................................................................................................................... 98

5 **PARTY ORGANISATIONS: FEDERAL, REGIONAL, LOCAL** ............................................................. 105

   5.1 **PARTY ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA: THE THEORY** ............................................................ 105

      5.1.1 CPRF ........................................................................................................................................ 107

      5.1.2 LDPR ....................................................................................................................................... 112

      5.1.3 URF ......................................................................................................................................... 114

      5.1.4 Unity ........................................................................................................................................ 117

      5.1.5 Yabloko .................................................................................................................................... 119

      5.1.6 Comparison on Key Points ....................................................................................................... 122

   5.2 **PARTY ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA: THE PRACTICE** ........................................................... 123

      5.2.1 CPRF ........................................................................................................................................ 123

      5.2.2 LDPR ....................................................................................................................................... 130

      5.2.3 URF ......................................................................................................................................... 132

      5.2.4 Unity ........................................................................................................................................ 133

      5.2.5 Yabloko .................................................................................................................................... 136

   5.3 **EVERYDAY PARTY LIFE: SOME CASE STUDIES** ...................................................................... 138

      5.3.1 CPRF ........................................................................................................................................ 138

      5.3.2 Yabloko .................................................................................................................................... 140

6 **THE MEMBERSHIP** ................................................................................................................................. 143

   6.1 **PARTY MEMBERS IN CONTEXT** ................................................................................................. 143

   6.2 **JOINING AND BEING ACTIVE IN THE PARTIES OF THE MIDDLE VOLGA** .................. 151

      6.2.1 The CPRF & URF ...................................................................................................................... 151

      6.2.2 Fatherland/FAR, LDPR, Unity & Yabloko .............................................................................. 164

   6.3 **ATTITUDES OF PARTY MEMBERS** .......................................................................................... 168
Tables and Figures

Table 2.1: Election to the State Duma (First Convocation), December 1993

Table 2.2: Election to the State Duma (Second Convocation), December 1995

Table 2.3: Faction Strengths in State Duma (Number of Deputies), 1995-1999

Table 2.4: Election to the State Duma (Third Convocation), December 1999

Table 2.5: Electorate Characteristics, 1999

Table 2.6: Success of Parties in State Duma elections, 1993-1999

Table 3.1: Party Nominees in Regional Elections, 1995-2001

Table 3.2: Party Victors Regional and Local Elections, 1995-1998

Table 3.3: Sub-regional electoral commission officials from parties

Table 3.4: Electoral Commission Composition (By Party), March 2000

Table 3.5: Rank of Each Subject on the Dependent Variables Examined in Tables 3.1-3.3

Table 3.6: Bivariate Spearman correlations between indicators of party strength

Table 3.7: Indices for Nomination and Election of Party Candidates in Regional and Local Politics

Table 3.8: Summary of Election and Nomination indices (by type of subject)

Table 4.1: Selected Comparative Characteristics of the Three Case Study Regions

Table 4.2: Party election results in the Middle Volga Region, 1993-2000

Table 5.1: Simplified accounts of Samara regional CPRF Committee, 2000

Table 5.2: Rights and Obligations of Party Members – Number of Clauses in Party Statutes

Table 5.3: Party membership figures in the Middle Volga, late 1999

Table 5.4: Frequency of participation

Table 5.5: Indicators of activism and maximum/minimum possible scores

Table 5.6: Mean values (with standard deviations) on motives for activism

Table 5.7: Bivariate Spearman correlations between activism and its bases

Table 5.8: Sympathy to political parties by organisation

Table 5.9: Attitudes towards political leaders

Table 5.10: Ideological attitudes of party members

Table 7.1: Party candidates, 1995 and 1999 State Duma elections

Table 7.2: Comparative shares of vote, party list and SMD contests, 1995 & 1999

Table 7.3: Party-nominated candidates, Middle Volga SMD contests, 1999

Table 7.4: Ratio of SMD-PL support, 1999 State Duma Election

Table 7.5: Regional executive election results (Middle Volga), 2000-2001

Table 7.6: Party support for gubernatorial candidates (middle Volga), 2000-2001

Table 7.7: Party and political system preferences, spring 2001

Table 7.8: Opinions on the role of political parties, spring 2001

Table A.1: Socio-demographic information (CPRF)

Table A.2: Occupational status of members (CPRF)

Table A.3: Socio-demographic information (URF)

Table A.4: Occupational status of members (URF)

Table B.1: Exchange rates, October 1999-September 2001

Figure 2.1: Main Parties, Movements and Blocs, Early 1993

Figure 5.1: Schematic diagram of CPRF structure

Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of LDPR structure

Figure 5.3: Schematic diagram of URF structure

Figure 5.4: Schematic diagram of Unity structure

Figure 5.5: Schematic diagram of Yabloko structure

Figure 5.6: Comparative features of party organisations

Figure 6.1: Activism scales, CPRF & URF members

Figure 7.1: Labour costs, 1999 State Duma election (percentage of total expenditure)

Figure 7.2: Expenditure on advertising and other outlays, 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.3: Expenditure on TV advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.4: Expenditure on radio advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.5: Expenditure on newspaper advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.6: Campaign poster, Yuriy Polyanovsky, 1999 State Duma election, Ul'yanovsk

Figure 7.7: Campaign poster, Aleksandr Kruglikov, 1999 Ul'yanovsk Regional Assembly election

Figure 7.8: Fatherland-All Russia poster, 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.9: Kompromat" posters against Unity, 1999 State Duma election

Figure 7.10: Simbirskie Gubernskie Vesti – a parody of the pre-existing Vedomosti

Figure 8.1: Extent of Support for Party Programme Among Voters for Each Main Party, 1995 State Duma election

Map 4.1: The Middle Volga Area
1 The Development of Party Activism in Russia: An Introduction

The present study seeks to address an underdeveloped field of research – the development of local political party organisations in post-communist Russia. Since the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in late 1991, Russia's party system has had a difficult and turbulent infancy. A great deal of research has been conducted into its development, but one factor has been relatively overlooked – the way in which party activists ‘on the ground’ have contributed towards politics in post-Communist Russia. It is this shortfall that the present study seeks to address.

If democracy is held to be ‘meaningful and extensive competition...through regular, free and fair elections’, as Diamond et al. term it,1 or effective participation and the right to form and join associations, as Dahl stresses, a structured party system usually forms the cornerstone of such a polity. Political parties have commonly been held to provide the linkage between state and society.2 Furthermore, it has been suggested that they have played a large role in the success of previous transformation processes in emerging democracies, not only epitomising pluralist society, but also acting as a means by which organisations acquire legitimacy within that society.3 However, one of the most significant features in the infancy of Russia's post-communist party system has been its degree of fragmentation and the limited territorial penetration of Moscow-centred parties. Arguably this organisational structure has contributed towards a dichotomy between the central organisations and parties in the provinces. To study parties at a federal (i.e., central) level is to miss significant channels of the political decision-making process. This is not to deny the validity of such studies, but rather to suggest that in order to understand the role of parties fully, both macro- and micro-level study is necessary. Thus there is great advantage in looking ‘under the surface’ of the central parties and examining their activities at the

---

One of the central issues of this study is to determine the impact which parties have on local and regional politics, as distinct from federal politics, and to examine the links between these two factors.

Furthermore, the research focuses upon the changing balance between centre and periphery. Contemporary Russia is less centralised than was the USSR, which increases the importance of the regions in the national political process. In general terms, many local politicians have their own power bases, as will be seen in the course of the study. Often, therefore, local politics consists mainly of intra-elite or intra-bureaucratic competition, channelled through personal contact networks. However, there is also growing evidence that through these local networks, national parties are beginning to develop some degree of infrastructure outside the federal capitals. Examination will be made of how these parties are interacting and developing at the local and regional levels, and of the nature of regional accountability to federal party offices. The investigation examines the six movements which won representation in the 1999 election to the State Duma, using part of the middle Volga area – the Republic of Tatarstan and the provinces of Samara and Ul’yanovsk – as case studies.

Although studies dealing directly with the activities of federal parties at the regional and local level have been few in number, a great deal of research has been undertaken already into the emerging party system in Russia and into various tangential issues relating to the present study. Broadly speaking, five key thematic issues relate to the present research: (1) the development of multi-party politics in post-communist Russia; (2) the increasing importance of regional and local actors in Russian politics; (3) the organisational structures of the main political parties, and the links between party bodies at various levels; (4) the individual activism of party members; and (5) the place of Russia in the wider post-communist wave of political transitions.

Following this introduction, chapter two of the present study deals with the emergence of multi-party politics in Russia. It is necessary to remember that multi-partyism has developed as part of a wider phase of political change in the country. The emerging polity has been the subject of a number of studies. These have encompassed...
areas such as liberalisation in the late Soviet period\(^8\) and the nature of the Russian transition.\(^9\) The majority of studies of political parties in Russia have tended to concentrate on parties within the context of the political system, rather than as entities by themselves. Most analyses have fallen into two categories – election-based and party system-based.

Early examples of the former concentrated on the emergence of pluralism in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet periods.\(^10\) As will be seen in chapter two, until 1990 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had a monopoly on political representation in the USSR. After this was removed in March 1990, there was a rapid proliferation of political parties, building upon the first ‘informal’ political associations of the late 1980s and the first multi-candidate elections in 1989-90. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the conflict between the legislative and executive branches of power, the first post-Soviet elections to the State Duma were held in 1993. This led to the first wave of election-based studies.\(^11\) Similar studies were published in the wake of the 1995 State Duma and the 1996 presidential elections.\(^12\) In 1997, a landmark study by

---


White, Rose and McAllister analysed all the late- and post-Soviet federal elections and referenda held until that point.\(^13\) The 1999-2000 electoral cycle gave the impetus to a new raft of studies into the elections and the parties and candidates fighting them.\(^14\)

Party system-based studies have also proliferated. Early studies indicated that the system which was developing was based heavily on personalism, rather than the societal models more established in Western democracies. The profusion of political groupings with no clear pattern was perhaps best expressed in Sakwa's comment that Russia had moved 'from a one-party state to a non-party state'.\(^15\) However, as some degree of consolidation has occurred, several studies have been published focusing on the emerging party system.\(^16\) Generally, the focus has been on the development of parties at a nationwide level, as dependent variables in the context of societal cleavages, voter choice, party behaviour within institutions, and electoral behaviour.\(^17\) This may reflect, in part, the agenda set by literature on Western political parties, but it is notable there has been relatively little research into parties as independent variables.\(^18\) Many of the books which have been published have simply been dictionaries of the parties.\(^19\) A welcome exception is Annette Legutke's recent study of party organisations, based on

\(^{13}\) Stephen White, Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1997).


several of the key parties in the 1995-1999 State Duma, and the present study is also concerned with filling this gap. Chapter two examines the historical development of multi-partyism and introduces the six main political parties in contemporary Russia, which form the case studies for the current research. It then goes on to examine the institutional factors affecting party development, drawing on a number of previous studies, and on primary data sources.

Thereafter, the study moves from the federal picture to the main focus of the present research — parties at the regional and local level. The Russian Federation comprises eighty-nine ‘constituent subjects’ with differing levels of autonomy from the centre. There are five categories of constituent subject — twenty-one republics; six territories (kraya); forty-nine regions (oblasti), one autonomous region (avtonomnaya oblast’); ten autonomous areas (avtonomnye okruga); and two cities of federal standing (Moscow and St. Petersburg). This structure was inherited from the USSR (although four autonomous regions were ‘upgraded’ to republics). Republics have the highest level of autonomy, and exist where a non-Russian ethnic group is in the majority or plurality. Each constituent subject is divided into several districts (raiony), the number of which varies in each region. In other words, government in Russia takes place on three levels: federal (all-Russian), regional/republican (subject-level) and local (district-level). One of the great opportunities opened to the political scientist since the fall of the Soviet Union has been the opportunity to examine politics ‘on the ground’ and in non-metropolitan areas. Previously, such research was limited (although there were a few notable exceptions), but the past decade has seen a profusion of studies concerned with regional and local political developments.

Having said this, there are still relatively few studies focusing specifically on parties and their activities. Of the authors to have examined the topic systematically, Grigorii Golosov and Vladimir Gel’man have been amongst the most prolific in their

---

output, examining regional politics and parties in a number of articles. Another author to have made a noticeable contribution to the genre is Galina Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva. Beside her studies of Russian political parties in general, she has also produced locally-based investigations on politics and parties in the Ural-Volga area, which feature some locations in Samara province, one of the areas used in the present study. In addition to this, she has co-edited a survey of elections and parties in the Russian regions. Ruth Brown completed a survey of party activities in three case study regions in the late perestroika and early post-Soviet periods.

The majority of comparative studies on regional and local party activities have taken an elections-based angle. Thus, following the three federal electoral cycles, there has been a corresponding series of studies examining regional patterns of party support. Those referred to here focus on the comparative literature, but there are

---


studies too numerous to mention of individual regions in election campaigns, some based on authors’ experiences as international election observers.29

Apart from federal election campaigns in the regions, some of the focus of the literature has been on elections at the regional level per se. Thus there have been studies and articles on gubernatorial elections, and elections to regional legislative organs which have included an examination of the roles played by parties in these elections.30 In addition to this, several authors have written articles about the politics of individual case study regions, which, whilst not examining parties per se, at least touch on the regional factors of party competition.

There has also been some research on post-Soviet regional and local government. Whilst this has focused mainly on the processes of local government, some information can be gleaned about the participation of parties. Another ‘growth industry’ has been the study of regional and local elites, touching on the interaction between elites, institutions and parties.31 Furthermore, these works give some


background context to the workings of local political systems, many of which depend more on local factors than on federal parties.

Chapter three examines the degree of party participation in regional and local elections, analysing election results from all but two of the eighty-nine constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. Where it uses quantitative techniques to achieve an overview of the role of parties as a whole in local politics, chapter four focuses in a more qualitative manner on the three regions of the middle Volga which provide the case studies for the remaining chapters. This chapter examines each of the three regions in turn, outlining the general political system in each and the role of parties within them, before investigating the organisational history and strength of the case study parties in each region.

Chapters five to seven examine regional and local party activity thematically. In chapter five, the discussion turns to the party organisations and the interactions between federal, regional and local branches. General theories about centralised control over party decision-making have been advanced since the first studies of party organisations. Almost a century ago, Robert Michels noted that regardless of their initial democratic credentials, mass socialist party organisations appeared always to attain an oligarchical structure, with centripetal tendencies. Writing in the mid-1950s, the pioneering work of Maurice Duverger advanced a number of theories on party organisations, dividing them into cadre and mass parties, and examining the basic building blocks of parties at the regional level. Duverger examined parties with several criteria in mind: strength of articulation (the unity with which party bodies operate); vertical and horizontal linkage; and local, ideological, social and federal centralisation. More recently, Klaus von Beyme analysed the internal workings of Western parties, concluding that members did not participate to any marked degree in internal party decisions; that internal personnel turnover was low; and that candidate selection was, in general, strongly influenced by the higher levels of the party organisation. Nonetheless, he rejected Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ per se. One of the most interesting recent examinations of party organisation theory is that by Angelo Panebianco. Like all the other theories

Omsk, Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan and Orenburg); Kimitaka Matsuzato, ‘Progressive North, Conservative South? Reading the Regional Elite as a Key to Russian Electoral Puzzles’, in Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed.), Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2000), pp.143-76.


discussed here, it is based on Western case studies, but its central premise – that party institutionalisation is dependent on circumstances of party formation – can be hypothesised to have wider validity. For this reason, it serves as the starting point for the analysis in chapter five, which examines the spheres of influence of Russian party organisations at different levels. A theoretical examination of the party statutes is followed by an empirical evaluation of the reality of decision-making, based on observations in the case study regions of the role played by regional and local activists on party decisions. The chapter ends by examining everyday party life in the case study regions.

Chapter six looks at the members and activists of the case study parties. The question of why people become involved in party politics is one which has long fascinated political scientists. Models to explain activism can be divided into three main groups – rational choice models, general incentive models and resource-based models.

The rational choice debate focuses on political activism as an instrumental act. Although much of the literature looks at other aspects of political participation – mainly voting and the spatial alignment of parties – it can be extrapolated to cover party activism. In its simplest form, it is held that individuals decide whether or not to become active on the basis of an objective calculation of costs and benefits concerning their involvement.\(^\text{36}\) This draws on a long line of political and economic philosophy involving such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, who argued with different emphases that individuals should pursue that line of action which results in the greatest individual utility, which in turn should create the maximum collective benefit.\(^\text{37}\) The motivation for involvement is the prospect of personal influence in achieving a collective good or collective agenda – in this case, implementing a party programme – and the costs include time, effort, and commitment to the party. If the net expected benefit of participation is greater than that of non-participation, rational choice theory suggests that the individual will become involved.

A crucial problem with this argument was highlighted in a seminal work by Mancur Olson, who spotted the so-called ‘paradox of participation’.\(^\text{38}\) The chance that an individual party member will affect substantially the party’s chance of electoral

---

success is extremely small. On the other hand, the implementation of the party programme is a pure public good, which means that it will affect all voters whether or not they were active in (or even voted for) the party. Since the rational choice model is based on individual benefits and costs rather than those of a group, any logical calculation will result in the costs of activism outweighing the benefits, making involvement irrational.

Following the publication of Olson’s study it became clear that the pure rational choice model could not explain party activism adequately. Since then, overcoming the ‘paradox of participation’ has become one of the most fiercely debated questions of rational choice theory. 39 Despite elegant theoretical models advanced to overcome the paradox, none has sufficiently bypassed the essential problem that the coefficient of activism is in most cases negative. It was this which prompted the development of ‘selective incentives’ models. Selective incentives are specific private benefits tied to the provision of collective goods, available exclusively to those actors who contribute towards the provision. This does not move the model outside the realms of rational choice, since the central premise is still private, rather than general, benefit.

An early attempt to build on this was Wilson’s study, based on American organisations, in which he hypothesised that such ‘selective incentives’ could be divided into material, solidary and purposive categories. 40 More recent studies of party activism have talked of process, outcome and ideological incentives. 41 Process incentives relate to the pleasure of participation per se. 42 Outcome incentives are the personal benefits which can accrue to party members, such as the possibility of holding public office or of ‘networking’; and ideological incentives include the opportunity to meet fellow ideological ‘soulmates’ and express an ideological affiliation in the same way as a churchgoer can express religious belief.

However, there is still a fundamental flaw in the selective incentive model. Given the focus on self-interest and individual benefit, the logical conclusion is that individuals join political parties because of material or other incentives and are not interested in the party’s policy, since policy falls under the category of a collective

good. Clearly this is absurd, since the main purpose of a political party is to seek office for the implementation of the very collective good which does not feature in the rational choice model. The rational choice model in its present form cannot therefore adequately explain party activism by itself.

For this reason, Whiteley et al. proposed a ‘general incentives’ model, based not on individual but on collective interests. These include altruism (where individuals think not only of individual but of group benefit, and realise that if everybody were to free-ride, the collective benefit would be diminished), and emotional or expressive attachment to the party. (To this can be added charisma-based attraction to the leader.) Other general incentives include social norms (whereby individuals would be motivated to become active if those around them, whose values they respect, and from whom they seek approval, were also active); and the perceived probability of the group/party as a whole being able to achieve its programme.

One qualification to this model should be borne in mind: it focuses considerably more on the benefits of and incentives to involvement than on the costs. This is the major criticism of rational choice-derived models, and is the starting point for an alternative ‘family’ of models of participation: resources-based or ‘civic voluntarism’ models. The basis of these is that that those with the greatest resources, the greatest sense of efficacy, and the greatest involvement in institutions from which the politically active are recruited, will in turn be the most active. It must be remembered that this idea was developed largely in the American and eventually the West European contexts, where recruitment networks are relatively stable. Several aspects are difficult to apply to Russia. The political changes of the last fifteen years have broken up the old recruitment network of CPSU ancillary organisations through which advancement took place. Similarly, the notion of ‘social class’ is an ambiguous one in present-day Russia.

49 Verba et al., Voice and Equality, pp.269-72.
With a small sample size, it is also difficult to control for cross-cutting effects of education, employment and income. Given these limitations, it is the general incentives model forms the basis of chapter six of the present study, which examines motives for joining and becoming active in the case study parties in the middle Volga area. It is based on survey work, extensive interviews and focus groups with party members and leaders, and also examines the attitudes of party members to important political questions and various federal- and local-level politicians. Such data in the Russian context has been very rare hitherto, and although its wider validity is difficult to assess, this chapter provides at least some insight into the mindset of party members.

Chapter seven examines party participation in election campaigns at the regional level. A number of studies of regional election campaigns were mentioned earlier, but the present study seeks to focus on parties as actors in elections, rather than on the elections themselves. The first part of the chapter looks at the participation of parties in the 1999-2001 electoral cycle, examining the links between the parties nationally and regionally. Thereafter, it investigates the professionalisation of election campaigns in Russia and the campaign methodology used – so-called ‘electoral technology’. A vast literature has developed (mainly in Russian) on the subject, but most of it takes the form of instruction manuals for candidates, rather than any attempt to analyse comparatively the approaches of different political actors to the organisation of an election campaign. Chapter seven seeks to redress the balance somewhat, and goes on to examine the ways in which such campaign methodology was visible in federal and local campaign advertising.

The regional and local approach taken by the present study provides a useful prism with which to augment our knowledge of party activities ‘on the ground’. Nonetheless, it is important not to overlook its wider systematic significance. For this reason, the final chapter attempts to establish whether the middle Volga region is typical
of Russia as a whole. This analysis makes use of primary survey data collected immediately after the 1995 and 1999 State Duma elections, and of supplementary data from spring 2001. Furthermore, although the main focus of the present study is on the development of parties in Russia, it is worth bearing in mind that the country is only one of a number in East-Central Europe currently engaged in the process of political transition and party system formation. Drawing on the observations made in comparative analysis of such previous democratic transitions, together with studies of other East-Central European countries over the past decade, the final chapter also attempts to understand the points of similarity between some of these transitions, and the differing trajectories of others. There is of course the danger, highlighted by Fleron, Ahl and Lane, of simply translating theories derived from Western transitions over to the current wave, without taking account of the different circumstances prevailing in East-Central Europe and Russia. However, in the context of the present study, such a

---


comparative analysis lends wider perspective to the regionally-based information available in the middle Volga.

The present study seeks to make a contribution to each of these five genres, and in overall terms, it provides new information on the activities of parties and their members at the regional level. The main emphasis of the study is comparative, examining six party organisations in three locations. The comparisons are sometimes made by party and sometimes by location, depending upon whether inter-regional or inter-party differences are more important in the context of each topic examined. For historical and organisational reasons, more emphasis is placed on certain organisations than others at various points in the discussion.

A study of regional and local party activity cannot be understood fully without examining the context in which such activity take place. It is with this that the study begins.
2 Political Parties in Russia: The Federal Level

Before beginning our investigation into regional party activities, it is necessary to introduce the Russian party system and its actors at the federal level. This will enable us to examine regional and local party activities in subsequent chapters with some knowledge of the context in which these activities take place.

The chapter begins by outlining the development of multi-partyism in Russia. Since the abolition of the one-party system in 1990, numerous parties have been created and disappeared, and the parties which form the basis of the present study have evolved out of this process. This section will concentrate on the overarching issues involved. More specific details will be given in the second section, which introduces the six parties which won representation in the State Duma in 1999 through the party list vote. These form the basis of the present study. The final part of the chapter analyses the institutional framework affecting the development of the parties and the party system—the role afforded to them by the Russian Constitution; the electoral system; and the new legislation on political parties which came into effect in summer 2001.

2.1 Federal Parties: An Historical Overview

Transformation from a one-party to a multi-party political regime is not a new phenomenon. Studies of analogous transformations in other countries, outlined in chapter one, provide a general theoretical framework against which the Russian experience can be measured. The process of party system formation can typically be divided into four main phases. It will be seen in the coming pages that some of these are applicable to the Russian case, but not all:

1) Reaction to the old regime. This may coincide with liberalisation, during which barriers to the development of civil society are lifted. It is typical to find a broad coalition of movements opposed to the previous regime. These ‘antipolitical’ groups are characterised by vague programmes, ‘catch-all’ appeal and a loose organisational structure. The political cleavage is along an anti-regime versus pro-regime axis, and the aim is representation, not power.¹

2) Centrifugal tendencies. After the fall of the authoritarian regime, political alignments are restructured, since the opposition loses the only common factor uniting it. Typically, the number of political groups mushrooms, but most have little

infrastructure. The founding elections test their organisational ability. This stage and the next one take place in the transition phase of transformation, the period between two consolidated regimes.

(3) Splits, fusions and births. The founding elections define the first party system. Thereafter, political alliances are shaped by transformation issues. This period is characterised by frequent coalition-making and breaking, and political parties are founded and disappear regularly. This is due in part to the non-institutionalised nature of the party system, since there are no great costs attached to splitting from a fledgling organisation or merging with an existing one.

(4) Consolidation. Eventually, a stable pattern of inter-party relationships emerges. In much of East-Central Europe, and especially Russia, this may still lie in the future. Pridham suggests that, on average, the crystallisation of party support based on societal cleavages takes two or more elections, although there are indications (as will be seen below) that it is taking longer in the current ‘wave’ of democratisation.

2.1.1 Reaction to the Old Regime? The Neformaly Period (1986-1991)
It was suggested that the first step in a typical evolution is liberalisation, accompanied by a broadly-based front against the old regime which unites many strands of contradictory thought along an anti/pro-regime cleavage.

This is reminiscent of the early stages of the Russian transformation, in which Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of *perestroika* (‘restructuring’) and *glasnost’* (‘openness’) from 1985/6 to 1991 allowed a more open discourse to develop. Initially, these programmes were conceived as a means of increasing responsibility and reducing the ossification of the bureaucratised economic system. Democratic transition theory hypothesises that leaders of authoritarian systems become trapped by liberalisation, unable to return to the *status quo* and unable to use the apparatus to repress the newly-awoken civil society. Arguably this problem affected Gorbachev, who became isolated between conservatives and reformers. By 1990, what had been conceived as a carefully controlled experiment to rejuvenate the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which held a monopoly on representation, had moved from the state to the social realm.

---


Furthermore, Gorbachev’s ‘inveterate tinkering’ with institutions, designed to bolster his own position, generally had unexpected consequences, which in turn led to further ad hoc ‘institutional fixes’.  

The liberalisation phase witnessed the creation of so-called ‘neformaly’ – ‘informals’. Unlike every other organisation hitherto, they were independent of the state and enjoyed no formal legal status. Informals began as discussion clubs in 1986-87, usually with specific local or issue-based agendas, and over time they became increasingly politicised as it became obvious that the reform impetus would have to come from non-Party channels. The process was accelerated in 1989 with the election of a USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Although the electoral process was still weighted strongly in the CPSU’s favour, it represented the first all-Union election in the history of the USSR where some degree of real choice could be exercised by voters.

Furthermore, although 87.6 per cent of elected deputies were CPSU members (an increase over the 1984 figure), some of Party’s nominees suffered spectacular defeats. This particularly affected middle-ranking officials and a even a few higher-ranking ones. Thirty-eight of the 191 CPSU union republic and regional committee secretaries running for election were unsuccessful, including the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Party first secretaries. Almost half of those who faced competition (thirty-two of sixty-five) were defeated. Thirdly, although independent candidates were not allowed officially, voters’ clubs and citizens’ committees succeeded in the selection and election of a small minority of reform-minded individuals. Among those elected was Boris Yeltsin, who was still a member of the CPSU but had been excluded from the list of candidates nominated for the Party’s reserved hundred seats.

Despite the huge proliferation of popular fronts, voters’ clubs, discussion clubs, environmental movements, cultural societies, peace associations, workers’ movements,
and even a network of Afghan war veterans, at the beginning of 1990 the stress still lay on the ne of neformaly. Article six of the 1977 Soviet Constitution described the CPSU as the ‘leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, state and social organisations…armed with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine [and determining] the general perspective of the development of society’. By anointing the Party as the ‘the only organisation privy to the mysteries of the creed’, the Constitution granted the CPSU a monopoly on representation in the Soviet system. Having earlier resisted pressure for change, Gorbachev acknowledged the untenable nature of this monopoly in February 1990, and declared the party ready to ‘renounce any legal and political advantages’. The following month, the Constitution was altered to allow the involvement of other organisations in the administration of public policy. Two weeks later, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was elected, and on this occasion only 3.1 per cent of its territorial deputies were elected unopposed. By late 1990, there were at least 457 political movements in the RSFSR alone. This is consistent with the prediction that liberalising leaders become ‘trapped’ by their own policies.

The wider implications of the first stage of party system evolution in the USSR must be considered. Firstly, the all-Union Congress of People’s Deputies election preceded the legalisation of parties, and the RSFSR election came just two weeks after the changes to the Constitution were made. These elections were therefore not founding elections, even if there was a degree of choice which had not existed before. Secondly, four broad groupings could be observed within the neformaly at this stage: general democrats; socialists; radical anti-communists; and national-patriots. This can be simplified by highlighting the bipolarity between March 1990 and August 1991 along a

---

15 Zakon SSSR ‘Ob uchrezhdennii posta prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR’ (11 March 1990), Pravda, No. 75 (22978), 16 March 1990, pp.2-3.
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) CHAPTER 2

democratic/reactionary axis, mirroring the splits within the Soviet leadership.\textsuperscript{20} Also noticeable is the lack of a political middle,\textsuperscript{21} a trend which was to continue over the following decade. Thirdly, the removal of the CPSU’s leading role simply legalised a pre-existing phenomenon; the mushrooming of political groups began in Russia \textit{before} the fall of the previous regime, rather than after it, as was the case in East-Central Europe.

The extent to which Russia followed the characteristic ‘anti-regime coalition’ model is also debatable. Non-CPSU deputies elected to the 1989 Congress, although limited in number, formed a loosely-based faction called the Inter-regional Group, which provided some framework for co-operation. Combined with the extra-parliamentary Moscow Association of Voters, which comprised several democratic informals, the beginnings of co-ordinated opposition could be seen. The anti-regime coalitions observed in previous transitions and in the East-Central European cases were mirrored to an extent by the creation of ‘Democratic Russia’,\textsuperscript{22} a broad and loose confederation of ‘democrats’, which was increasingly active but riven by factionalism.\textsuperscript{23} In no way could it be compared to the popular fronts in the German Democratic Republic, or to \textit{Solidarity} in Poland, although its existence did allow some form of focus for opposition to the CPSU. By comparison with East-Central Europe, arguably the implosion of the ruling party contributed more as an independent variable to the collapse of the old regime.

2.1.2 After the Fall of the Regime: Centrifugal Tendencies? (1991-1993)

It will be recalled that centrifugal tendencies resulting from the removal of the common opponent typically become more prevalent after the collapse of the regime. Usually these result in a restructuring of political alignments, culminating in the founding election.

The first part of the hypothesis holds true for Russia, but the major difference between it and the concurrent transformations in East-Central Europe was that the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies was elected in 1990, \textit{before} the fall of the regime. It was not until December 1993, two years after the collapse of the USSR, that the first post-Soviet federal election was held. Between late 1991 and October 1993,

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ogonek}, No. 6 (3263), 3-10 February 1990, pp.17-18.
while widespread economic reform was implemented, there was conflict between Yeltsin (who had been elected to the presidency of the RSFSR in June 1991) and the parliament, over which had the overriding authority. By contrast, in most of the simultaneous transformations, the founding election took place within months of the fall of the regime, often with a provisional government in the meantime.

There was, however, a restructuring of political alignments. The polarisation of the party system no longer focused on a democratic/reactionary axis but on a pro-/anti-continuation of the USSR cleavage, and thereafter on attitudes to 'shock therapy'. The unity of the 'democrats' was shattered when the CPSU was removed from power, as predicted by the theory.  

Furthermore, tactical support for reform from nationalists anxious to increase the sovereignty of the RSFSR ended when the USSR collapsed, and in light of the catastrophic economic collapse in 1992, there was a reactivation of nationalist and neo-communist organisations, which together formed an anti-Yeltsin 'red-brown' alliance called the National Salvation Front.

Nonetheless, the long period between the collapse of the USSR and the first election meant that, although the broad communist, democrat and nationalist groups of the transitional party system had begun to form, they had not yet been tested under electoral circumstances. There was a proliferation of divan ('sofa') or 'pseudo'-parties; the right to form organisations did not necessarily imply successful formation. The move from mobilisational to representational politics was a gap not bridged successfully by many organisations. Furthermore, parties played only a minor role in parliament. Although most deputies were affiliated with parliamentary blocs, the Congress of People’s Deputies met only nine times between 1990 and 1993, with everyday matters devolved to the smaller Supreme Soviet. It in turn was controlled by the 35-strong Presidium, chaired by the Speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin’s declaration of himself to be above parties was mirrored by the growing tendency for charismatic, leader-orientated parties (krugovshchina) with weak organisational

---

27 'Sofa' parties were so-called because, it was said, all their members could fit on one sofa.
29 For an account of the evolution of blocs and deputy groups, see Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-90, pp.131-46.
structures. A selection of the most prominent of these is given in figure 2.1, which clearly shows the fragmentation of political forces by 1993.

This vacuum came culminated in the so-called 'October Events'. In late September 1993, Yeltsin disbanded the 1990 Congress of People's Deputies, a move which even he himself acknowledged to be in violation of the Constitution. His 'victory' in the subsequent bloody stand-off in early October set the scene for the country's first post-Soviet election in December of the same year, its first fully open election since 1917. A full description of the voting system can be found elsewhere, and it is analysed later in this chapter. Essentially, it split the new 450-member State

---

31 Polozhenie O federal'nykh organakh vlasti ná perekhodnyi period, Presidential Decree No. 1400 (21 September 1993), Izvestiya, No. 182 (24037), 24 September 1993, p.3; Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 186 (802), 6 October 1993, p.3.
Duma into two halves, with 225 members to be elected from a federal party list, and the remainder by simple plurality in each of 225 single-member district (SMD) constituencies.

It was observed above that the founding election normally filters the number of parties quite considerably. Thirty-five organisations had the right to collect signatures in 1993; twenty-one used it. Only thirteen blocs were registered, but eight of them surmounted the 5 per cent barrier necessary for representation in the party list section of the vote. Whilst still a comparatively high number, it at least allowed a more meaningful analysis of the emerging party system than the 457 movements which had been in existence three years previously. The victorious eight blocs, together with the other four movements which won SMD seats, split into three main groupings: left-communist; centrist/democrat; and the surprisingly strong nationalist-patriotic wing, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). However, more than half the SMD deputies (141 of 225) were elected as independents. The 1993 election was arguably the culmination of the previous period of party building, institutionalising pre-existing political groupings. A summary of the result of the election is shown in table 2.1.

Several commentators noted the weakness of the parties as independent variables. None of the organisations which competed in the SMD part of the election, for instance, fielded candidates in all 225 constituencies. Sakwa argues that internal leadership splits; the emergence of a presidential system of government; the anti-party stance of the Russian population; the absence of social bases for party support; and the regionalised nature of Russian politics all inhibited the emergence of a stable party system at this stage. Most parties were vehicles for their leaders and appeared to exist only nominally as organisations. Furthermore, it was noted that, after the popular participation in the fall of the CPSU, politics was increasingly becoming a game of 'private, top level intrigues' once more.

33 Polozhenie 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1993 godu', Presidential Decree No. 1557 (1 October 1993), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 188 (804), 8 October 1993, pp.3-5.
36 Peter Lentini, 'Electoral Associations and their Programmes', in Lentini (ed.), Elections and Political Order in Russia, p.262.
39 Kommersant-Daily, No. 58 (531), 1 April 1994, p.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>% PR Party List vote</th>
<th>No. of Party List seats</th>
<th>SMD seats</th>
<th>Total seats (PR+SMD)</th>
<th>% of total Duma seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choice of Russia (CR)</td>
<td>15.51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDP)</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party of Russia</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (Yabloko)</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRUC)</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5 per cent party list barrier]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>% PR Party List vote</th>
<th>No. of Party List seats</th>
<th>SMD seats</th>
<th>Total seats (PR+SMD)</th>
<th>% of total Duma seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity and Charity</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Union</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of Russia – New Names</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cedar (Ecological Movement)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against All</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By-elections pending</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Election to the State Duma (First Convocation), December 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>% PR Party List vote</th>
<th>No. of Party List seats</th>
<th>SMD seats</th>
<th>Total seats (PR+SMD)</th>
<th>% of total Duma seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Home is Russia (OHR)</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDP)</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[5 per cent party list barrier]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>% PR Party List vote</th>
<th>No. of Party List seats</th>
<th>SMD seats</th>
<th>Total seats (PR+SMD)</th>
<th>% of total Duma seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party of Russia</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighteen other organisations winning less than 5 per cent in Party List and fewer than 10 SMD seats each</td>
<td>&lt;5.0 each</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45 in total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.3 to 2.0 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against All</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Election to the State Duma (Second Convocation), December 1995

---


2.1.3 Splits, Fusions and Births? The Third Stage of Development (1994-2001)

The theory advanced above highlighted the fact that, in wake of the founding election, the third stage of development typically begins, whereby political alliances are defined in terms of transformation issues, and regular splits, fusions and births are to be observed. In Russia the period following the 1993 election witnessed several such developments. Although there were party factions, the new State Duma in practice worked in fluid blocs rather than parties, which precluded the formation of a stable majority. Outside parliament, the communists became more established organisationally; the nationalist wing became more diverse; and the ‘democrats’ (in the sense of pro-market parties) tried and largely failed to unite. Furthermore, an attempt was made by centrists to build a two-party system from above. This was to be based on a ‘party of power’ (or more technically, ‘movement of power’) called Our Home is Russia (OHR), led by the then prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin; and a centre-left alternative headed by the Speaker of the State Duma, Ivan Rybkin (simply called ‘The Bloc of Ivan Rybkin’).

To aid this, Yeltsin proposed increasing the proportion of SMD deputies relative to party list ones, which was likely to benefit reformist and centrist forces. However, he was forced to backtrack. The experiment to form a ‘two-party of power’ system failed owing to a number of factors, including the absence of a stable middle class upon which to base it; the weakness of the centre-left; and the marginalisation of too many prominent members of the democratic/centrist wing.

December 1995 saw the first ‘normal’ election, the 1993 founding election having been held at the same time as debate over the fundamentals of the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that the 1995 election marked the start of the fourth, consolidatory, phase of party system development. (Indeed, it can be argued that, rather than consolidating, the Russian party system has continued to evolve and has perhaps diverged from the traditional development path.) A vast growth was evident in the number of organisations involved. In total, 273 groups (258 public associations and

---

43 The five leading ‘democratic’ parties – Choice of Russia (CR), Yabloko, The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRUC), Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) and Russian Movement for Democratic Reform (RMDR) – together won 39.70 per cent of the vote in 1993. CR obtained the largest individual share (15.51 per cent). The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won the party list vote with 22.92 per cent – less than the ‘democrats’ combined, but consolidated behind one organisation. [Byulleten’ Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiskoi Federatsii, No. 1 (12), 1994, p.67].
44 Kommersant’-Daily, No. 77 (795), 27 April 1995, p.3. The term ‘party of power’ is common in Russian political discourse. Normally it refers to a party or movement formed to bolster or maintain support for those already in power or those associated with them—in other words, a ‘party of the establishment’.
15 trade unions) were entitled to collect signatures, of which 111 used the right.\textsuperscript{47} Forty-three electoral blocs (some comprising several of the above-mentioned organisations) eventually gained a place on the party list. This was a large increase over the thirteen which had competed in 1993. However, McFaul argues that, despite the proliferation of mini-parties, there was still bipolarity, possibly even greater than before, between pro- and anti-system forces.\textsuperscript{48}

As before, one of the main characteristics was fragmentation: as table 2.2 shows, only four blocs surpassed the 5 per cent barrier, with a few other parties gaining a handful of SMD seats. This left 49.5 per cent of the electorate unrepresented in the Duma, making it the least proportional free election in history.\textsuperscript{49} At the system level, three trends were evident. Firstly, there was a marked rise in the support gained by communist and left-leaning movements.\textsuperscript{50} Together they obtained 32.22 per cent of the vote and controlled almost half the seats in the State Duma, compared to about a fifth at the end of the 1993-1995 parliament.\textsuperscript{51} Secondly, further fragmentation of the 'democratic' wing into eleven separate blocs meant that only one – Yabloko – surmounted the 5 per cent barrier.\textsuperscript{52} Thirdly, the 'party of power' experiment was unsuccessful: OHR came third in the party list (although it came second in terms of seats, since the LDPR won only one SMD mandate), while Ivan Rybkin's bloc disappeared virtually without trace, obtaining just 1.11 per cent of the vote and winning three SMD seats.\textsuperscript{53}

The resultant 1995-1999 Duma was polarised, with contradictory centrifugal and centripetal drives.\textsuperscript{54} The polarisation between pro- and anti-system remained, although arguably the polarisation of Russian politics in more general terms ended with Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 presidential election.\textsuperscript{55} The party system remained volatile, suggesting that it was still far from the stage of consolidated democracy. A comparison of the Duma's composition over the four years of its life (table 2.3) shows some

\textsuperscript{47} Kozlov \textit{et al.}, \textit{Vybory deputatov 1995: Elektoral'na statistika}, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{52} According to the Central Electoral Commission's (CEC) classification, eleven 'democratically-orientated' blocs won a cumulative 20.23 per cent of the vote [Kozlov \textit{et al.}, \textit{Vybory deputatov 1995: Elektoral'na statistika}, p. 242].
considerable variation in party affiliations. The platforms adopted in the 1995 election were not necessarily the factions 'which deputies finally joined, and further faction-switching occurred throughout the legislative period. In total some 160 deputies abandoned their original groups, some doing so three or four times, although part of this can be attributed to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's (CPRF) desire to maintain its 'sister' factions, People's Power and the Agrarians, with the necessary thirty-five members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarians</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Power</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(+46)</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Regions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(+40)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-46</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Faction strengths in State Duma (number of deputies), 1995-1999

Outside parliament, fragmentation, fusion and dissolution continued at a bewildering pace. Various efforts were made by each 'pole' to unite in time for the 1999 election, and, to an extent, this was more successful than in previous electoral cycles. Whilst there was still a multiplicity of parties, it appears that the serious contenders had learned something from their experiences. The electoral law was also modified slightly in response to the 1995 result. Henceforth, if blocs reaching the 5 per cent threshold were cumulatively to win less than fifty per cent of the total vote, those blocs which had obtained over three per cent would be added until the total vote for parties represented

---

came to fifty per cent.\textsuperscript{58} There were also alterations to the income and criminal conviction declarations which had to be made by candidates. The number of movements registering for the right to collect signatures fell from 273 to 139.\textsuperscript{59} Twenty-six parties contested the election, seventeen fewer than in 1995. The fragmentation of the vote also fell. Six parties and electoral blocs surpassed the 5 per cent barrier in the party list section of the vote, supported cumulatively by 81.37 per cent of the electorate.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, no other movements came close to surpassing the 5 per cent barrier, in contrast to 1995 when six had missed the threshold only by a few tenths of a percentage point. The 1999 result is shown in table 2.4.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Party/Bloc & \% PR & No. of & SMD & Total seats & \% of total Duma seats \\
 & Party List & Party List & & (PR+SMD) & \\
vote & seats & & & & \\
\hline
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) & 24.29 & 67 & 46 & 113 & 25.1 \\
Unity & 22.32 & 64 & 9 & 73 & 16.2 \\
Fatherland All-Russia (FAR) & 13.33 & 37 & 31 & 68 & 15.1 \\
Union of Rightist Forces (URF) & 8.52 & 24 & 5 & 29 & 6.4 \\
Yabloko & 5.93 & 16 & 4 & 20 & 4.4 \\
Zhirinovsky's Bloc (LDPR) & 5.98 & 17 & - & 17 & 3.8 \\
[5 per cent party list barrier] & & & & & \\
Our Home is Russia (OHR) & 1.19 & - & 7 & 7 & 1.6 \\
Seven other organisations winning less than 5 per cent in Party List and fewer than 7 SMD seats each & <2 each & - & 9 in total & 9 in total & 0.2-0.4 each \\
Against All & 2.77 & - & - & - & - \\
Independents & - & - & 105 & 105 & 23.3 \\
By-elections pending & - & - & - & - & - \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption*{Table 2.4: Election to the State Duma (Third Convocation), December 1995\textsuperscript{61}}
\end{table}

Is it possible to view the third State Duma election as the beginning of the consolidation stage? Not only did the vast majority of the electorate vote for a relatively small number of blocs, but it was also non-polarised, in contrast to all previous post-Soviet elections. It was still possible to divide parties into groupings – White suggests political

\textsuperscript{58} Federal'nyi zakon 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'no-gо Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 121-F3 (24 June 1999), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 122-123 (2231-2232), 1 July 1999, pp. 9-16 (Pt. 1); ibid., No. 125-126 (2234-2235), 3 July 1999, pp.9-16 (Pt. 2), §80.4. There were further innovations: if the total vote represented still came to less than 50 per cent, the election would be deemed invalid, as it would be if none of the parties won more than 5 per cent of the vote (§80.11). In the event of one bloc obtaining more than 50 per cent of the vote and no other party obtaining more than 5 per cent, the second-placed party would be added to the allocation of seats (§80.5). For a fuller insight into the changes in the legislation, see Stephen White & Ian McAllister, ‘Reforming the Russian Electoral System’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1999), pp.32-40.

\textsuperscript{59} Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 147 (2256), 30 July 1999, p.3.

right, left-centre, orthodox left and nationalist\textsuperscript{62} – but the pro/anti-regime cleavage was no longer salient. Even the CPRF, which in the mid-1990s could have been described as ‘anti-system’, had now become a within-system opposition.\textsuperscript{63}

Nonetheless, it is difficult to accept the 1999 election as the turning point on the road to a consolidated party system. Indeed, it can be viewed as the point at which the Russian party system deviated even further from the traditional path of transformation. In the first place, only three of the six victorious parties and blocs had contested the elections in 1995 or 1993 – evidence not of a consolidating system but of a ‘floating’ one.\textsuperscript{64} Secondly, fusions (manifested in co-operation between Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces (URF), and in an alliance of ‘centrist’ factions in the Duma) and births (such as the founding of the ‘Russia’ movement headed by the Speaker of the State Duma, Gennadii Seleznev) have continued apace since December 1999.\textsuperscript{65}

Thirdly, despite the fact that the Russian party system shows signs of resembling a ‘traditional’ one, with a left, centre and right, the Russian case differs in several respects. The left in Russia is taken up by the communists, not social-democrats; the right is less capital-orientated than normal, and the centrists can only be described thus because they subscribe to neither of these positions.\textsuperscript{66} The newly-rejuvenated centre is in fact loyal to the Kremlin. Indeed, the greater success of the ‘party of power’ project in 1999 has resulted in closer co-operation between the State Duma and the new presidential administration of Vladimir Putin. Sakwa speculates that the party supported by Putin in 1999 – Unity – will become the cornerstone of a hegemonic party system similar to that existing in Mexico until recently.\textsuperscript{67} However, this ignores the fact that Unity plays a supporting role to the president, rather than being the dominant force. Nonetheless, the willingness of the party’s Duma faction to vote in accordance with Putin’s wishes was illustrated in March 2001 by the CPRF’s unsuccessful motion of no confidence in the government. The faction’s then leader, Boris Gryzlov, intimated that he would be prepared to vote against the government even though he supported it, in order to give Putin an excuse to dissolve the State Duma using constitutional powers.

\textsuperscript{61} Compiled from ibid., pp.136-38 & 172.
\textsuperscript{65} Kommersant’-Vlast’, No. 20 (271), 23 May 2000, pp.22-25.
\textsuperscript{66} Mikhail Krasnov, ‘Nashe Delo Pravoe’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 71 (2381), 20 April 2001, p.3.
which are examined later in this chapter. Admittedly, Gryzlov’s decision was later reversed.68

In summary, therefore, the Russian party system has had a long development path since the late 1980s, and comparisons with other transitions reveal both similarities and differences. It is difficult to consider the party system as being consolidated, but it cannot be denied that it has stabilised to some extent compared with the situation prevailing in the early to mid-1990s. Despite the continuing evolution even after the 1999 election, it is now possible to discern key movements and parties which constitute the building blocks of the emerging party system. It is these which will form the basis of this study, and to them that we now turn.

2.2 Parties in the Study
As case studies, the present project will take the six parties and movements which overcame the 5 per cent barrier in the party list section of the 1999 State Duma election. Since they obtained over four-fifths of the vote collectively, it is held that they provide the best available sample for observation. Although the focus of the study is mainly on their local branches, at this stage they are introduced principally from a federal perspective, where possible linking this in with the systematic overview given above. Such introductory profiles have featured in numerous other publications, so at the moment it is intended only to give information relevant to a general understanding of the parties, with more detailed information reserved for later chapters. The parties are listed in rough order of organisational strength and historical longevity.

The aforementioned Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is arguably the strongest political party in contemporary Russia, and considers itself the official successor to the CPSU. It originated as the Communist Party of the RSFSR, formed within the CPSU in June 1990, but it was banned through the decrees of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in August and November 1991 respectively.69 During the ‘vacuum period’ mentioned above, it unravelled into a number of weak and competing groups,70 but in November 1992 a decision of the Constitutional Court paved the way for the formation of a coherent communist organisation once again. The judges of the

---

68 For the original declaration, see Kommersant", No. 40 (2170), 6 March 2001, p.1; Izvestiya, No. 40 (25878), pp.1 & 4; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 48 (2660), p.3; and Parlamentskaya Gazeta, No. 44 (675), 7-15 March 2001, p.2. For the subsequent reversal of the decision, see Kommersant", No. 42 (2172), p.1 and Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 48 (2660), 14 March 2001, p.1.
Court ruled that, whilst Yeltsin’s ban on the CPSU as at the national level was legal, local branches still had the right to undertake their activities. Many (but not all) of the splinter left-wing groups consolidated into the CPRF, which was re-established under the chairmanship of Gennadii Zyuganov in February 1993.

As a party, the CPRF has been more successful in post-Soviet elections than any other, although the marginal role of the State Duma, and the existence since 1999 of a pro-Kremlin majority within it, has meant that electoral success has not translated into major political influence. As table 2.1 shows, the party performed respectably in the 1993 election despite a temporary ban placed on it immediately after the ‘October events’. In 1995 and 1999 it emerged as the largest party in both the party list and SMD contests (see tables 2.2 and 2.4). However, its vote share proved insufficient to win the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, in which Zyuganov was runner-up.

The CPRF commands support in almost all parts of the country, but particularly in the so-called ‘red belt’, which runs across the south of Russia and includes Ul’yanovsk, one of the regions featured in the present study. This strip of ‘red’ regions is less sharply defined than it once was, but CPRF support there in the 1999-2000 elections was still above average. Turovsky suggests that the high proportion of rural and peasant dwellers in these regions predisposes the electorate towards the CPRF and left-leaning organisations. According to an opinion survey carried out just after the 1999 election to the State Duma and summarised in table 2.5, the typical CPRF voter is older than average; a pensioner; and has below average income. He or she is likely to be less well educated than the average voter, and almost twice as likely to have been a member of the CPSU. Confirming Turovsky’s hypothesis, it is noticeable that the CPRF’s support in 1999 came disproportionately from small villages and settlements.

Ideologically, there are three distinct tendencies within the party: (1) orthodox Marxist-Leninist revivalists; (2) Marxist reformers/social democrats; and (3) nationalist-
patriots. Zyuganov and many of the party leaders exemplify the third category, laying emphasis on the 'great power' status of Russia and downplaying the party's traditional Marxist heritage.\(^77\) The first tendency, whilst thought to be shared by the majority of members, is very weakly represented at the leadership level. Reformers include such figures as Gennadii Seleznev, the aforementioned Speaker of the State Duma. These different strands of opinion highlight the paradox facing the CPRF as the dominant bloc of the left opposition. It unites sometimes contradictory ideological strands, but cannot move towards the centre without risking the loss of potential supporters to the smaller, hard-line communist parties which did not join it in 1993.\(^78\) The party was in outright opposition to Yeltsin, but despite occasional sharp condemnation of Putin's 'anti-people regime', its position has generally been that 'if his actions are correct, we will support him. If they are useless, we will criticise him strongly'.\(^79\)

The organisational structure and membership of the CPRF and other parties are dealt with in considerable detail in chapters five and six. At this stage it is necessary to note simply that the highest permanent party body is the central committee, of which Zyuganov is chairman, and that each of the regional committees is led by a first and second secretary. The party claims 540,000 members, although there are suggestions that this includes pensioners who have long since stopped paying membership dues, making the real number of paid-up members closer to 320,000.\(^80\)

Within the systematic analysis presented above, the CPRF is the mainstay of the 'traditional left'. Increasingly, though, it is facing internal crises, caused by the juxtaposition of its essentially anti-system ideology and its long-term within-system opposition. This has led to tensions between those who see this compromising the party's aims and others who see it as the way to achieve these aims, a dilemma faced by the communist parties of Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, it faces the problem that Putin's strategy of strengthening the state and protecting the national interests of Russia has echoes of its own rhetoric, leaving it, in the words of one commentator, 'politically unemployed'.\(^81\)

\(^80\) I.N. Barygin et al., *Politicheskie partii, dvizheniya i organizatsii sovremennoi Rossii na rubezhe vekov* (St. Petersburg: Academy of Political Science, 1999), p.91.
\(^81\) Vek, No. 33 (449), 24-31 August 2001, p.4.
Second to the CPRF in organisational terms, if not in representation, is the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by (and essentially the party of) the flamboyant Vladimir Zhirinovsky. As will be seen in chapter five, it is largely structured around him. Founded before the break-up of the Soviet Union, it held its first congress on 31 March 1990 and initially was called the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSU). As tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 indicate, the LDPR’s greatest success came in the party list vote in 1993, which it won unexpectedly. Since then its support has roughly halved at every subsequent election. Zhirinovsky won just 2.7 per cent of the vote in the 2000 presidential election, a tenth of the support enjoyed by the party in 1993. It is also worth noting that the LDPR’s representation has come almost exclusively from the party list section of the Duma vote; only a handful of its deputies (and none at all in 1999) have been elected in SMD constituencies.

It is difficult to talk of LDPR ‘strongholds’ any longer, but traditionally the party has done best in the northern and eastern peripheries. The data in table 2.5 indicate that LDPR voters are twice as likely to be male than female, younger than average, generally poorly educated and less religious than the voters of other parties. Like the CPRF, its support is stronger in rural areas than towns, with two-fifths of its (more limited) support coming from small settlements.

Despite its name, the LDPR has not advocated liberalism, but rather imperialism, nationalism, and protectionism. It supported the August 1991 coup attempt, and although it has moved towards the centre, Zhirinovsky has been prodigious in his output of pamphlets proclaiming the ‘great patriotism’ of the party. Amongst other infamous pronouncements, he has advocated the expansion of Russia’s borders to the point where ‘the Indian Ocean washes the shores of Russia’. (Having said this, he has not been as consistent as is supposed: in March 1990, he wrote that the party was in favour of foreign investment, foreign labour, and imports ‘without limits’.) Politically, a skilful course has been charted between government and opposition. Although the LDPR often votes with the government/‘party of power’, Zhirinovsky styles himself as an opposition politician. Bills put forward by the party

---

86 For example, when the motion of no confidence in the Kasparov government was tabled in March 2001, Zhirinovsky announced that the LDPR would vote whichever way the Unity faction voted [Kommersant’, No 40 (2170), 6 March 2001, p.1].
Table 2.5: Electorate characteristics, 1999 (percentage of party total unless otherwise indicated)\(^87\)

often have an extremist or flippant nature (such as that to legalise polygamy in October 2000\(^88\)), which arguably is aimed at maintaining this anti-system image whilst continuing to vote with pro-system parties.

Organisationally the party is seen as the second strongest in Russia, although it now has the smallest faction in the State Duma. In late 1999 it claimed in election advertising to have ‘over 800,000 members’,\(^89\) but this figure should be treated with extreme scepticism. Researchers at the Academy of Political Science in St. Petersburg

---

\(^{87}\) Except where indicated, the figures refer to the percentage of each party’s voters falling into the respective categories. The parties are treated as a discrete entities. For example, 39.2 per cent of CPRF voters in the survey lived in villages of fewer than 10,000 Inhabitants, compared with just 8.2 per cent of Yabloko voters. The totals in each sub-section may be slightly more or less than 100 per cent, depending on rounding. Survey data come from the New Russia Barometer VIII, collected by VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the Investigation of Public Opinion) on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, N=1,940. (Used here with permission.)

\(^{88}\) ‘Pensioners’ are defined as those listing this as their main occupation, with no other sources of income. ‘Non-religious’ voters are those who indicated that they attend religious services less than once a year.


\(^{89}\) Narodnaya Gazeta (Ul’yanovsk), No. 272-74 (1816-18), 8 December 1999, Special publication, p.3.
estimated the LDPR’s membership at the time to be a more modest 18,000-20,000, forty times less. Nonetheless, this implies an average of 250 activists in each of the 80 regions where it claims to have a branch, suggesting that its claim to have an infrastructure in the majority of Russian regions is justified.

In systematic terms, it is the strongest of the nationalist parties, which as a group have declined since their mid-1990s peak. In contrast to the splits and fusions observed amongst other sectors, however, the LDPR has remained relatively unaffected by the ‘growing pains’ of the Russian party system. Analysis of table 2.3 (in the previous section) shows that the LDPR faction had the most stable membership in the second State Duma. Furthermore, it came second only to the CPRF in terms of party discipline, with an average of 85 per cent unity in Duma voting behaviour (compared with 86.5 per cent for the CPRF and between 68.1 and 78.5 per cent for all other factions).

The third longest-standing party (technically, ‘association’) is Yabloko, the only one besides the CPRF and LDPR to have sat in all three post-Soviet State Dumas. It was founded in the course of the 1993 election campaign by Grigorii Yavlinsky (a co-author of the stillborn ‘500 Days’ economic plan, which sought to effect a rapid transition from state to market economy), Yurii Boldyrev (a member of the presidential administration, who later split from the organisation) and Vladimir Lukin (former Russian ambassador to the USA). The title ‘Yabloko’ came from an amalgamation of their surnames, but is coincidentally the Russian word for ‘apple’, which has become the party symbol. The organisation has positioned itself as a democratic opposition party, in opposition to the Yeltsin regime and critical of Putin’s. Unlike other opposition parties, it is on the liberal-right wing of Russian politics, aiming to construct a ‘socially orientated market economy’ and a healthy civil society.

In the electoral arena Yabloko has never performed spectacularly, but has managed to consolidate its position, obtaining the support of a consistent (if slowly declining) 6-7 per cent of the electorate, as tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 show. Yavlinsky has had similar shares of the vote in presidential contests, winning 7.34 per cent in 1996 and 5.93 per cent in 2000. This suggests that the Yabloko electorate is small but stable. It has traditionally garnered most of its votes in large cities and been weak in rural

90 Barygin et al., Politicheskie partii, p.97.
92 V.V. Zhirinovsky, LDPR v Gosudarstvennoi Dume (1994-1999 na) (Moscow: Galleriya, 1999), p.3.
93 Golovlev & Nefedova, Gosudarstvennaya Dumu vtorogo sozyva, p.86.
districts. Indeed, table 2.5 indicates that less than a tenth of its support in 1999 came from rural settlements with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, while the percentage of its voters resident in cities of over one million inhabitants was twice as high as that of the electorate as a whole. Linked to this is the fact that its voters were considerably better educated than average: a fifth had a higher education degree, compared to 12.2 per cent on average. The party thus appeals most to the better educated with above average income in large cities. Whether its weak rural infrastructure is a cause or an effect of this is a topic which will be addressed more fully in later chapters.

Organisationally, Yabloko is much weaker than the CPRF and LDPR, but arguably stronger than any other political organisation in Russia. It was estimated in 1999 to have around 5-6,000 full members in fifty-seven of the eighty-nine Russian regions, although reports of the ninth congress in October 2000 indicated that there were by then 67 regional organisations. (As will be seen in chapter six, Yabloko has a very strict definition of what constitutes a member.) Its party structure is very weak in rural areas, but strong in some of the more reform-minded towns such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Co-operation with the Union of Rightist Forces (URF) has been developed tentatively since the 1999 election. There is now considerable cross-party consultation between the two organisations, including joint candidate lists at local level, and a co-ordinating council. Nonetheless, the prospect of a full union of the two organisations is considered unlikely, and deeper amalgamation which would impinge upon the party's independent identity has been resisted by Yavlinsky.

The Union of Rightist Forces (URF), formed in September 1999, came into existence in response to the collapse of the 'old right', which had formed the backbone of the government from 1992 until the financial crash of August 1998. Its aim was to consolidate the fragmented movements of the liberal-right (those which in the early 1990s styled themselves as the 'democrats'). Its formation owed much to the organisational skills of Anatolii Chubais, and it comprised three main organisational strands: the 'Right Cause' coalition, which included, among others, former prime minister Egor Gaidar's Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) party and smaller organisations such as Boris Nemtsov's 'Young Russia' and Irina Khakamada's 'Common Cause'; the 'New Force' movement, headed by another former prime

---

96 Barygin et al., Politicheskie partii, p.110.
97 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 95 (2405), 30 May 2001, p.3.
101 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 105 (2415), 14 June 2001, pp.1-2; ibid., No. 112 (2422), 23 June 2001, p.3.
minister, Sergei Kirienko; and ‘Voice of Russia’, headed by Samara Governor Konstantin Titov. After its unexpected success in the 1999 election, arguably aided by Putin’s tentative endorsement, it weathered several crises over the following eighteen months, including a change of leader and internal factionalism. In May 2001, the constituent movements dissolved themselves and a unified party structure was established. The internal balance of power arising from this is examined in more detail in chapter five.

Like Yabloko, the URF’s main support in 1999 came from the large cities and reform-orientated regions – Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Nizhnii Novgorod and Sverdlovsk. This is confirmed by the survey data in table 2.5. URF voters are also well educated and even more likely than Yabloko’s to be of above-average income. Where its voter profile differs from that of Yabloko is in the age and gender of its voters; the average URF voter in 1999 was eight years younger than a Yabloko one, and more likely to be female. There are differences in the political outlook of the two organisations also: the URF has generally been more been more supportive of Putin and the government than has Yabloko.

Like the URF, Unity was formed just before the 1999 State Duma election, with more explicit backing from Putin. It forms the linchpin of his plans for a three-party system with a ‘party of power’ in the centre. It will be recalled that mid-1990s experiment to form a party system from above was singularly unsuccessful, but Unity’s success in the 1999 election suggested that it had perhaps filled this gap more successfully than its predecessors had. Its creation was a response to the failure of attempts in mid-1999 to form an alliance between the former ‘party of power’, Our Home is Russia (OHR), and other rightist forces. A new movement - the Interregional Movement of Unity – or ‘The Bear’ as it was sometimes known in reference to its acronym in Russian (Medved’) – was formed by the Kremlin and sympathetic governors, and was headed by the Minister for Emergency Affairs, Sergei Shoigu. Alongside him on the party list were Aleksandr Karelin, a three-time Olympic and nine-time world champion in Greco-Roman wrestling, and Aleksandr Gurov, former head of the organised crime department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Despite its late start and weak infrastructure, the movement did unexpectedly well in the 1999 State Duma Election. As was seen in table 2.4, it came within a
percentage point of the victorious CPRF in the party list, bolstered by the support of Vladimir Putin and favourable coverage on state television. Following its 1999 success and Putin’s election as president in March 2000, efforts began almost immediately to consolidate the structure and transform the movement into a party, which culminated in its first congress on 27 May 2000. The party structure also incorporated the organisations of OHR and All Russia, which had until this point enjoyed separate but relatively unsuccessful existences.

Geographically, it did particularly well in 1999 in the north-west and north-east of Russia. Turovsky calls this the ‘bear belt’, contrasting it to the ‘red belt’ in the south. Of the six parties that passed the 5 per cent barrier, Unity’s support was the most evenly distributed throughout the country. Table 2.5 indicates that the residential profile of Unity voters was close to that of the CPRF and LDPR, insofar as the majority of the movement’s support in 1999 came from rural settlements and small towns. Indeed, it is striking that the profile of Unity’s electorate was virtually identical to that of the average voter. Perhaps because of its short pre-election life and the lack of a clearly defined programme, Unity gathered support from all sectors of the electorate, thus giving Unity voters an average aggregate profile.

The party has tried to avoid ideology, basing its programme on vague principles such as the strengthening of vertical power; social, economic and political partnership; a normal social sphere; and protection from criminality. If it has any ideology, it is ‘centrism’. The party’s first year was eventful, including criticism that the organisation was not developing sufficiently quickly, and question marks over the wisdom of having a party leader who did not sit in the State Duma. There were several internal party rows, and in some regions two or more rival branches were formed. Since the spring of 2001, efforts have been made to amalgamate with other organisations – firstly through the consolidation of a centrist bloc in the State Duma, and secondly, through a

105 Edinstvo: Byulleten’ partiinoi zhizni, No. 1, August 2000.
107 Its ten strongest results accounted for just 27.21 per cent of its total vote, compared to 28.05 per cent for the LDPR, 32.1 per cent for the CPRF, 45.91 per cent for Yabloko, 46.09 per cent for the URF, and 62.52 per cent for Fatherland-All Russia. The ten largest regions of Russia comprise 35.4 per cent of its population. Figures above 35.4 per cent indicate that a party’s vote was disproportionately concentrated in a narrow group of regions; scores below indicate that its support was more evenly spread [Kozlov & Oreshkin (eds.), Vybory deputatov 1999: Elektronnaya statistika, p.209].
109 Izvestiya, No. 203 (25795), 26 October 2000, p.3; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 228 (2290), 1 December 2000, p.3.
110 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 206 (2268), 31 October 2000, p.3.
union with the Fatherland and All-Russia organisations (profiled below). The indications are, however, that these moves are tactical and lack real substance. It remains to be seen whether Unity will suffer the same fate as its forebears in the ‘party of power’ mode. As mentioned earlier, one major difference between it and its predecessors is that Putin is considerably more interested in having party support than was Yeltsin. At Unity’s founding congress, he said that the construction of an effective party system was something he considered to be ‘one of [his] most important tasks’, and expressed the hope that the party would be a strong force which would avoid the mistake of becoming too remote from society.\textsuperscript{112}

The final movement included in the study is the now virtually defunct Fatherland (All-Russia) movement (FAR). At one point FAR was perceived as the most likely bloc to win the 1999 State Duma Election and propel its leader, Evgenii Primakov, towards the Russian presidency in 2000. Ultimately, this project failed.

The Fatherland movement, headed by Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and founded officially on 12 December 1998, had its roots in the leftist opposition groups of the Russian Movement for New Socialism and the Union of People’s Power and Labour.\textsuperscript{113} After the 1998 financial crisis, Luzhkov had emerged as a federal-level politician, and managed to amalgamate these smaller oppositionist elements, with the support of ten regional governors and ex-government officials such as Yeltsin’s former press secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky and the former interior minister Anatolii Kulikov.\textsuperscript{114} In the course of 1999 Luzhkov gradually distanced himself from the Kremlin, to which he had previously been loyal but by which he was now perceived as a threat.\textsuperscript{115} His coalition was broadened by an alliance with the regionally-based All Russia movement in August 1999 (forming the Fatherland-All Russia – FAR – bloc), and still further by the subsequent incorporation of the Agrarian Party.\textsuperscript{116} Crucially, the popular former prime minister Evgenii Primakov was persuaded to lead the movement, which was by then considered the pre-election favourite.\textsuperscript{117}

However, a combination of poor organisation, the unexpected rise of Putin, and sustained media bombardment meant that FAR obtained just 13.33 per cent of the vote.

\textsuperscript{112} Edinstvo: Byulleten’ partiinoi zhizni, No. 1, August 2000, pp.3-4.
\textsuperscript{113} Barygin \textit{et al.}, Politicheskie partii, p.170.
\textsuperscript{115} When it became clear that All Russia wished to ally itself with Luzhkov, Yeltsin warned that ‘Shaimiev should not get involved there, and I shall tell him about it’. \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta}, No. 79 (1895), 30 April 1999, p.3.
\textsuperscript{117} Izvestiya, No. 152 (25497), 18 August 1999, p.1.
and came third. Its support was restricted mainly to regions where its leaders enjoyed control of local resources, such as Moscow, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, St. Petersburg and Dagestan. Table 2.5 reveals that FAR voters had a unique profile. Three-quarters of the party’s supporters lived in settlements of fewer than 10,000 voters or in large cities of over one million inhabitants. Arguably this indicates the mixture of areas under its leaders’ control – the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, together with the national republics, where electoral support for the local establishment traditionally has been very high among rural voters.

Within three days of the election, All Russia had pulled out of the alliance and Primakov’s presidential chances were damaged beyond repair. Since the bloc had been constructed as a springboard to propel its leaders (initially Luzhkov but eventually Primakov) to the presidency, it found itself without a role. Based, as it was, mainly on gubernatorial resources, most of these governors ‘jumped ship’ once it became clear that Putin would be the next president. Thereafter, its organisation existed virtually in name only outside the State Duma. As mentioned above, in April 2001 it announced tentative plans to unite with its former opponent, Unity, and to join with other ‘centrist’ factions in the State Duma in a co-ordinating council. In September 2001, Primakov stepped down from the leadership of the FAR State Duma faction, to be replaced by Vyacheslav Volodin, and three months later, at the beginning of December, Fatherland, Unity and the remains of All-Russia formed a joint organisation provisionally entitled ‘United Russia’ (Edinaya Rossiya).

In this brief introduction to the six main parties, the focus has been on the federal level; subsequent chapters will make examine activities regionally and locally. The discussion now turns to the institutional framework in which the parties operate.

2.3 The Institutional Framework of the Russian Party System

The first section of this chapter showed that the Russian party system has not consolidated in the manner of those in East-Central Europe, but rather, has remained ‘floating’ and ill-defined. The foregoing discussion examined the key actors in the system. This final part seeks to examine the role that parties play within the federal

---

120 Izvestiya, No. 69 (25907), 18 April 2001, p.4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 68 (2378), 17 April 2001, p.3.
121 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 171 (2783), 4 September 2001, p.2; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 163 (2473), 4 September 2001, p.2.
political system of Russia by examining the institutions within which party competition takes place. Primarily, the focus will be on three aspects of the polity: the constitutional arrangement of power, the electoral system, and the legislation affecting political parties.

Traditionally, the main arena in which parties act is the legislature. The Russian parliament, known as the Federal Assembly, has powers determined by the 1993 Constitution. Its bicameral design consists of the Federal Council, which represents the executive and legislative bodies of the eighty-nine regions; and the State Duma, which consists of 450 deputies elected by popular vote (§95). This separates out the centre-periphery and left-right cleavages that conditioned political debate at the time of its formation.123 The Duma has a number of responsibilities, including the approval of the president’s nominations for the posts of chairman of the government (hereafter referred to as the prime minister) and of the Central Bank (§103). It has the power to initiate legislation (as do the president, the Federal Council, the government, regional legislatures and courts (§104)), and is responsible for its adoption (§105.1), subject to the ratification of the Federal Council (§106). The State Duma can also express a vote of no confidence in the government (§117) and can impeach the president for high treason, subject to the agreement of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and a two-thirds majority of both chambers of parliament (§93).

However, it can be argued that the balance of power between the legislature and executive lies in the latter’s favour. The president is the head of state and guarantor of the constitution (§80.1-2), and responsible for nominating the prime minister to the State Duma for approval. Furthermore, he (or she) is responsible for heading the Security Council, determining the war doctrine of the country, and for appointing military heads (§83), in addition to being supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces (§87.1) with the right to declare martial law in the event of outside aggression (§87.2). Other powers include the initiation of legislation, the calling of referenda, and the issuing of decrees which do not contradict the Constitution or federal law (§§84 & 90). Furthermore, the president holds powers that in many cases counterbalance those that the State Duma has over him. For example, in the event that a vote of no confidence is expressed in the government twice within three months, the president can announce either the resignation of the government or, alternatively, the dissolution of the Duma itself (§117.3). If a confidence motion initiated by the prime minister and the

---

122 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 336 (2536), 4 December 2001, p.2.
government is defeated, the same decision is made within seven days (§117.4). Similarly, although the president’s nomination of the prime minister is conditional on the Duma’s approval, he may simply make the appointment and dissolve the Duma if the latter rejects his nominees three times in a row (§111.4). Legislation approved by the Federal Assembly must be signed by the president before it can become law (§107.1). The president can refuse to do so, as Yeltsin did with over a quarter of bills (28.2 per cent) emanating from the second State Duma. This decision can only be reversed by a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Meanwhile, the strict separation of powers between the executive and the legislature is emphasised by the fact that deputies of the State Duma are banned from holding government office (§97.3).

This has led many commentators to speculate that the Russian party system is weak because of the lack of influence of the State Duma, and the lack of constructive relations between it and the executive. However, Chaisty and Gleisner argue that the second Duma was a self-confident legislature which acquired characteristics of stable parliamentary government, even suggesting that it did not make full use of the powers at its disposal. Remington’s more empirical examination of the three parliaments which existed during Yeltsin’s presidency (the RSFSR Supreme Soviet until 1993, and thereafter the first and second State Dumas) shows that the real influence of the legislature has grown over time. Whereas Yeltsin’s major reforms between 1991 and 1993 were enacted mainly by decree, by the late 1990s the number of decrees per year had fallen behind the number of laws, and they had a far more routine character. This suggests that he saw the need to compromise rather than confront the parliament, and to legislate through parliamentary channels. Secondly, during the life of the second Duma,
the ratio of bills signed by the president to those passed by parliament (68.9 per cent) was higher than that of bills passed to bills considered initially (60.0 per cent). This shows that the Duma’s internal bargaining process was more likely to halt a bill’s passage than the presidential veto, once again pointing to a less dominant executive than has commonly been depicted. Between January 2000 and July 2001, this trend continued: the Duma passed 37 per cent of laws considered, and 84.1 per cent of the bills passed were signed by Putin.\textsuperscript{129} In other words, if a law succeeds in passing through the legislature, there is a high chance that the president will approve it.

Further analysis shows that deputies of the State Duma proposed 50 per cent of all legislation considered in the 1995-1999 period. This was two and a half times more than government initiated (20 per cent), and even further ahead of the constituent subjects of the Federation, the Federal Council, the president, or the courts (15 per cent, 9 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively).\textsuperscript{130} Legislation sponsored by the government and president was more likely to be considered,\textsuperscript{131} but these statistics once again prove that there was less conflict between the executive and the legislature than is commonly supposed, a tendency also observed by Steinsdorff.\textsuperscript{132}

The Duma has used its other powers extensively. Given Yeltsin’s eventual propensity for replacing his prime minister every few months, the 1995-1999 Duma had to approve no fewer than five. On two occasions, agreement came only on the third attempt — potentially leading to the dissolution of the State Duma, in accordance with §111.4 of the Constitution. The Duma eventually approved Kirienko’s candidature in April 1998 rather than risking this, but it was Yeltsin who was forced to compromise after the 1998 financial crisis by eventually proposing Evgenii Primakov rather than his preferred nominee, Viktor Chernomyrdin. Once again, this points to the fact that the Duma is sometimes able to exercise real influence in the Russian political system, and that, despite the brinkmanship which surrounded these appointments, both president and parliament are prepared to compromise when necessary.

Thus, although the Duma is less powerful than most legislatures in East-Central Europe, it is not without influence, as the above examples have shown. That the Duma as a collective body is a serious actor in the political system does not necessarily imply

\textsuperscript{129} Data on the 2000 and spring 2001 activities of the State Duma can, at the time of writing, be found under ‘http://www.duma.gov.ru/lawstat/table.php?type=soziv&soziv=3’.

\textsuperscript{130} Golovlev & Nefedova, Gosudarstvennaya Duma vtorogo sozva, p.85.

\textsuperscript{131} 48.1 per cent of bills proposed by deputies over the period were examined, compared to 78.4 per cent and 80.5 per cent of presidential or governmental initiatives respectively [Statisticheskie zakonodatel’noe deyatelnosti Gosudarstvennoi Dumy vtorogo sozva (1996-99) (Moscow, 2000), pp.6-8, cited in Remington, The Russian Parliament 1989-99, p.222].

that parties *per se* are important, though. A substantial number of deputies are not linked to any party. Furthermore, the separation of powers detailed in §97.3 of the Constitution means that a deputy of the State Duma cannot serve in government without first relinquishing his or her seat in the legislature. Thus elections to the State Duma do not have a direct bearing on the government’s composition and there is more incentive institutionally to criticise than to coalesce - the sort of ‘irresponsible opposition’ referred to by Sartori.\(^{133}\) Potentially, this also leaves room for ‘bosses’ and clientelistic arrangements to permeate the political process at the expense of party politics.\(^{134}\)

These limitations would lead us to expect weak factional cohesion in the Duma. Deputies who do not have to take direct responsibility for their actions (and who, in the case of SMD deputies, owe their loyalties to local sponsors and their own electorate) appear to have little incentive to follow the party line. In fact, empirical studies reveal mixed findings on this matter. Given that only the leaders of factions and deputy groups sit on the Council of the Duma (the legislature’s agenda-setting body), it is argued that deputies gain influence through faction or group membership. Shevchenko and Golosov find that, ‘in spite of the Duma’s limited powers, legislative parties do influence deputy behaviour’, particularly with regard to asking questions in parliament.\(^{135}\) Haspel *et al.* conclude that, in the 1993-95 Duma, party-connected factions (especially those with an extra-parliamentary organisation) were more cohesive in their voting behaviour than were deputy groups (which comprised mainly independently-elected SMD deputies).\(^{136}\) Legutke finds the same when she analyses the patterns from 19,938 votes (including procedural votes) from the second State Duma.\(^{137}\) She also observes that parties close to the government (such as OHR) were less cohesive than those opposed to it, and that factions generally voted with greater unity in cases where the vote was on legislation previously vetoed by the Federation Council or president. Overall, the factions in the State Duma varied from being relatively cohesive, in the case of the CPRF, to fairly loose, in the case of the independent deputy groups. This suggests that it is not only the constitutional balance of power which has affected

---

DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001)

The institutionalisation of parties in the Duma, but also the electoral system. It is to this that our attention now turns.

The effects of the electoral system on party development have been analysed in considerable detail by Moser, so only a few key points will be made here. As has been mentioned already, since 1993 Russia has used a mixed system to choose its deputies. Half the 450-strong State Duma is chosen by a majoritarian system to choose its deputies. Half the 450-strong State Duma is chosen by a majoritarian system and the other half by a proportional federal party list, with the requirement that parties obtain over 5 per cent of the vote before they gain representation. Unlike the similar system used in Germany, there is no connection between the two, effectively splitting elections to the State Duma into two separate campaigns (as will be seen in chapter seven). A few minor alterations were made to the details before the 1995 and 1999 elections, but the fundamentals of the original system have been retained.

When it was designed, the theory was that this mixed, unconnected system would encourage the development of parties. By allocating half the seats to parties, the embryonic party system would be nurtured, but given parties’ weakness at the time, an element of direct representation through the SMD mandates was also included. Arguably, however, the electoral system has actually inhibited the development of a stable party system. As the first section of this chapter showed, there has been a succession of transient ‘parties of the Garden Ring’. As table 2.6 shows, in 1995 and 1999 there were so many contenders that it would have been possible theoretically for the election to have taken place with no parties overcoming the 5 per cent barrier. The prevalence of splinter parties can be attributed to several features of the electoral system. Firstly, the federal party list section favours movements which can rely on a solid and widely-spread electoral base, whereas the plurality system encourages the proliferation of small, personality-based parties, making the two parts of the system inherently contradictory. An ambitious politician has more to gain by forming an electoral bloc and obtaining the attendant benefits of state subsidy and free airtime to

---


141 V.E. Chirkin, ‘Kakaya izbiratel'naia sistema nuzhna Rossii? ’, Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, No. 2 (2000), p.38. (The Garden Ring is one of the central ring roads in Moscow, inside which the buildings of most state and political institutions are located.)

142 G.V. Golosov, Partiinye sistemy Rossi i stran vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 1999), pp.78-79
support an SMD campaign than he or she has by being included far down an established party’s list. This acts as a disincentive towards consolidation, since such candidates would lose publicity, influence and resources by joining forces with one of the larger parties or running as independents. As table 2.6 shows, more parties won representation (at least nominally) through the SMD system than the party list in 1995 and 1999. Indeed, if these SMD deputies are counted as representing their party, the number of parties left completely unrepresented in the Duma of those on the ballot paper falls substantially, and the number of voters ‘represented’ in the second Duma jumps from just over half to nearly 87 per cent. This is not a fair comparison, since SMD deputies represent only their constituents and not all those who voted for their party list, but it serves to illustrate the way in which the electoral system encourages the formation of pseudo-parties to further the interests of their leaders.

The second, closely-related element of the electoral system that has inhibited the consolidation of parties is that Duma elections are scheduled to take place six months before the more important presidential ones. As a result, politicians intending to put themselves forward for election to the presidency can use the State Duma election as a ‘primary’ to establish their level of support and raise their profile, for which it is useful to be a party leader. In the 1999-2000 cycle, for example, Primakov’s leadership of FAR served this purpose, ultimately without success. The different electoral system used in the presidential campaign (whereby the leading two candidates go forward to a second round in which the ‘winner takes all’) means that it is necessary to reach beyond party boundaries and construct the broadest possible coalition for victory. 143 This has contradictory effects. Moser argues that the presidential electoral system creates consolidation, whereas the two-system, single-round parliamentary one encourages fragmentation. Between December 1995 and June 1996, for instance, there was considerable consolidation of the vote, which he attributes to the effect of the electoral system. 144 On the other hand, by reaching outside party boundaries, the institutional arrangements surrounding the elections can once again be seen minimising the importance of parties.

A third effect of the electoral system has been the incentive for parties to coalesce before elections and split back into component parts afterwards. It was noted in the first section of this chapter that the period 1993-1999 was characterised by

---


144 Moser, Unexpected Outcomes, pp.95-112.
constant births, splits and fusions. One notable phenomenon in the 1999 election, based on the lessons learned from the previous one, was the attempt by some small parties to consolidate into pre-election alliances, in an attempt to combine their small percentages of the vote to overcome the 5 per cent barrier. Many of the coalitions unravelled quickly once representation was secured in the Duma. The Agrarians did particularly well using this tactic, splitting themselves between the FAR and CPRF lists and reforming as an agro-industrial group in the new Duma.

Fourthly, the unconnected nature of the two systems means that the SMD and party list campaigns are effectively separate from each other. This will be examined more closely in chapter seven, but at this stage it is necessary to note Moser's observation that, with the exception of the CPRF, most parties do well either in the party list (such as the LDPR) or in the SMD districts (such as the Agrarians in 1995 or OHR in 1999) but not both. As a result, the mixed electoral system has actually

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative party list percentage to parties winning &gt;5% of vote</td>
<td>87.06</td>
<td>50.50</td>
<td>81.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative party list percentage to parties winning &lt;5% of vote but one or more SMD seats</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>36.43</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative percentage to parties with at least one deputy in Duma either from party list or SMD seat</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>86.93</td>
<td>86.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of parties winning &gt;5% of party list vote</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties winning &lt;5% of party list vote but at least one SMD seat</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of parties completely unrepresented</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total parties standing for election</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of SMD seats won by parties obtaining &lt;5% of party list vote</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6: Success of parties in State Duma elections, 1993-1999


produced a more fragmented parliament than would either of the systems which constitute it if used exclusively.\textsuperscript{146}

All in all, the electoral system has had significant effects on the development of parties in Russia. It is of course arguable that, without the party list vote, the development of parties would have been even more fragmented. On the other hand, it may be that an election based on SMD contests alone would have forced parties to develop infrastructures sooner, since they would not have been able to rely on central organisations. It appears, however, that although there has been some evidence of consolidation recently, the current system has resulted in the proliferation of poorly-institutionalised parties, the majority of which have failed to win representation and disappeared as fast as they appeared.

The centrifugal effects of the electoral law may to some extent be counterbalanced by the new law ‘On Political Parties’, which was signed by Putin in July 2001 after a five-month passage through the State Duma.\textsuperscript{147} It replaces the less stringent 1995 law ‘On Public Associations’ as the regulatory document for parties’ activities.\textsuperscript{148} The avowed aim of the new law, in keeping with Putin’s desire for stronger parties, is to reduce the number of ‘societies of gardeners and stamp collectors’ offering themselves for election, and allow only serious parties with nationwide infrastructures to participate.\textsuperscript{149}

A number of provisions in the law are designed to reduce the number of registered parties. In the first instance parties can now only be all-Russian; interregional and regional movements or parties are no longer allowed. Secondly, much greater territorial penetration is required than previously. A party must now have a minimum of 10,000 members, and branches of one hundred or more members in at least half the eighty-nine constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. Any further regional branches may not have fewer than fifty members (§3.2). From the tentative membership figures given in the previous section, it will be seen that only the CPRF, LDPR and possibly Unity can fulfil these requirements without a struggle at the time of writing, although it is likely that a number of other organisations will be able to increase their membership figures sufficiently to register under the new rules by the July 2003 deadline. Thirdly, the ‘registration body’ has extensive powers of supervision: parties

\textsuperscript{145} Sources: as tables 2.1-2.4.
\textsuperscript{146} ibid., p.43.
\textsuperscript{147} Federal’nyi zakon ‘O politicheskikh partiakh’, Law No. 95-F3 (11 July 2001), Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii, No. 6 (120), 2001, pp.5-35.
\textsuperscript{148} Federal’nyi zakon ‘Ob obschestvennykh ob’edineniyakh’, Law No. 82-F3 (19 May 1995), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 100 (1211), 25 May 1995, pp.4-5.
\textsuperscript{149} Kommersant’, No. 167 (2052), 8 September 2000, p.2.
are obliged to allow observation of their meetings and to submit extensive information annually on their membership, activities, programme and statutes (§§21.4 & 27.1). Failure to abide by the rules, or contravention of any federal laws, can result in the suspension or even dissolution of a party (§§39-45), although there are exceptions for parties which have already won representation in the State Duma.

If the plans of the law's authors come to pass, there should also be fewer organisations on the ballot paper in future. Not only should the requirements outlined above reduce the number of registered parties, but henceforth no public organisations other than parties will be permitted to stand for election. Thus divan movements will no longer be able to participate. Moreover, parties which fail to participate in elections over a five-year period will be liquidated by the Supreme Court (§37.2). 'Participation' is defined as the nomination and participation of candidates from the party, either independently or as part of an electoral bloc, in one of the following:

- Party list in a State Duma election.
- Not less than 5 per cent of SMD seats in a State Duma Election (with the present electoral system, this means at least 12 SMD candidates).
- Presidential election.
- Gubernatorial (or equivalent) elections in not less than 10 per cent of the constituent subjects of the Russian Federation.
- Elections to at least 20 per cent of the constituent subject legislatures.

This clause was one of the most fiercely debated during the bill's passage. In its final form it is considerably watered-down from Putin's original version, which proposed that all the above criteria, rather than just one of them, should be fulfilled to avoid liquidation. However, no change was made in the final draft to the requirement that candidates be nominated and registered before they are considered to have participated. This is a controversial wording, since parties have control only over the nomination of candidates; registration lies in the hands of electoral commissions. It is feared that this could be used as the pretext for removing an unwanted party from the party system, by refusing it registration on a technicality and subsequently claiming that it has failed to participate. There is also a danger that 'commercial parties' will be registered specifically to lend support to independent candidates in need of a party affiliation. (Ironically, this was pointed out to the author by the LDPR, which used exactly this method in 1999 to register for the State Duma election.150)

150 Interview, Stanislav Mikhailovich Zhebrovsky, LDPR central apparatus, Moscow, 28 February 2001. When its initial application for the 1999 State Duma election was rejected, the LDPR reconstituted itself on the basis of two obscure but formally registered sister organisations.
The final major innovation in the new party law is the change to the rules on funding. Not only does the law stipulate the types and maximum amounts of permissible donations (§30), but it also introduces considerable innovations in the disbursal of state subventions to parties. Previously, electoral associations in State Duma elections, and candidates in presidential ones, were given a state subsidy in advance, which had to be paid back if they received less than 2 per cent of the vote.151 Henceforth, parties which win more than 3 per cent of the vote in State Duma or presidential elections, or 12 SMD seats, will be paid a more substantial subvention from the state budget. This will be paid retrospectively and thereafter annually, at the rate 0.005 minimum wage units per vote obtained in the last State Duma election, with a once-off payment calculated on the same basis for a presidential election (§33.6). Whereas previously it was in an organisation's interest to register its own electoral list and receive an equal amount to all other participants, the new system means that parties which can consolidate their vote will obtain a higher subvention. Curiously, though, this principle is reversed for electoral blocs consisting of more than one party, where the payment is divided equally among the participants (§§33.7-8). Although the amounts involved are relatively small compared to the budgets which parties spent in the 1999 election, it perhaps points to an embryonic cartelisation of the party system.152

Overall, the examination of parties at the federal level in this chapter has provided a mixed picture of their role in the contemporary Russian political system. On the one hand, it has been seen that the party system has not thus far consolidated, a result of both situational and institutional factors. There has been a multiplicity of ‘Potemkin parties’ in place of real links between state and society. On the other, the greater concentration of the vote in 1999, together with Putin's explicit call for stronger parties and the legislation passed in the summer of 2001 to regulate their activity, suggests that, even if the ‘floating’ party system is not showing signs of anchoring, it may at least drift may more slowly in the years to come. In order to examine the central question of this study – how are parties developing as organisations? – it is necessary to delve beneath the surface and examine parties at the sub-federal level. It is to this that the remainder of the study is devoted.

151 In 1999-2000, these amounted to 220,000 roubles for list parties (1999) and 400,000 roubles for presidential candidates (2000) – c.$8,300 and $14,000 respectively at the times of the elections. Sixteen blocs which received less than 2 per cent of the vote in 1999 failed to pay this money back, and could not be found by the Central Electoral Commission after the election [Izvestiya, No. 71 (25906), 20 April 2001, p.3].
3 Parties at the Regional Level

The previous chapter dealt mainly with political parties at the all-Russian level; the present one seeks to move beyond this, delving deeper into the role played by parties outside the federal centres. This serves as a short introduction to the remainder of the study, which uses three case study regions in the middle Volga to analyse the activity of parties at the regional and local levels.

In the Soviet period, regional CPSU first secretaries were appointed directly from Moscow and often had no real link with the regions which they led. The first direct elections to the posts came in 1990-91, when the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) were elected, followed by the presidents of the newly-sovereign national republics (hitherto Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs)). Foremost amongst them was Tatarstan, one of the case study regions. However, following the August 1991 coup attempt, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies imposed a moratorium on further elections, except in those republics where elections had already been called.1 Yeltsin instead appointed heads of administration in fifty-five constituent subjects, sometimes known as 'governors', by decree. Eight elections were held in 1993 (most of which resulted in the rejection of Yeltsin's appointees), but another moratorium was declared after the euphemistically-named 'October events'. Only one further region (Irkutsk) had a gubernatorial election before August 1995. Finally, gubernatorial elections began in earnest, and there was a wave of them between 1996 and 1998, followed by a second cycle from 1998 to 2001. Given the different starting dates and terms of office, there are a number of exceptions to this timetable, but elections to regional executive posts now proceed on a regular basis.

This is also the case for regional legislatures, although this came about through a different course of events. From late 1991, the large regional soviets elected the previous year were augmented by 'small soviets' chosen from within the regional bodies' ranks, which met more frequently to take day-to-day decisions.2 Following the 'October events' and the ratification of the new power structure embodied in the Constitution, these were replaced by smaller regional legislatures elected for a two-year term. Not all of these elections took place within the required timespan. In

Ul’yanovsk, which was the extreme case, the elections to the regional legislature were postponed until December 1995. Many also succeeded in extending the initial two-year term without new elections. Consequently, the legislatures of twenty-nine constituent subjects were already in their third term in mid-2001, and the remainder in their second.

At the district level, the development of local self-government organs has been covered extensively elsewhere. Initially they were regulated by the law ‘On Self-Government’ passed in July 1991, but this system proved short-lived and ineffectual against the background of political conflict and ‘dual power’. Since 1993 a complicated system of local self-government has evolved, varying from region to region. There are different legislative organs involved, including councils for towns, municipalities, districts, rural areas, and ‘settlements of an urban type’. In some cases two or three levels of local self-government co-exist, whereas in other regions local self-government is not practised universally. Taking all levels into account, in 1999 there were 13,669 local self-government units across the Russian Federation.

Elections at the regional and local levels give some indication of parties’ territorial penetration. Analysis is made below of their role in eighty-seven regions – all constituent subjects of the Russian Federation except Chechnya and Ingushetiya. The timescales of the elections examined differ slightly owing to the constraints of available statistics. The regional legislative and district-level elections examined took place between 1995 and 1998, whereas statistics for gubernatorial elections are the most recent from each region, up to and including that in Primor’e, which was completed on 17 June 2001.

3.1 Candidates and Deputies
The most basic measure of party activity is the percentage of candidates nominated by parties in elections. The first two columns of table 3.1 express the number of candidates nominated by parties and electoral associations (federal and regional

---

4 Mildner, Lokale Politik und Verwaltung, pp.97-118; Kirkov, 'Local Self-Government', p.44.
5 Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya, p.9.
6 See the note at the end of the present chapter for full details of the sources and figures used.
7 The terms 'gubernatorial' and 'governor' are used to denote the executive head of a subject of the Russian Federation, although the post has different names in some regions - president, chairman of the government, head of the regional administration, etc.
organisations) as a percentage of the total number of candidates standing for legislative and gubernatorial office. The third column adds gubernatorial candidates who intimated a clear party affiliation but were not nominated by a party.⁸

A number of observations can be made about these figures. Firstly, the number of party candidates is, in absolute terms, fairly small. Only one in five candidates to regional legislatures was nominated by parties or electoral associations. The figure is even lower for gubernatorial elections, in which parties nominated fewer than one in ten candidates. In the majority of cases, the candidate list included no party representatives at all.

The lower participation of parties in gubernatorial elections could be due to two factors: the time difference in the data, and the electoral systems used in the different types of election. Sixty-three of the gubernatorial elections included in the table have taken place since the end of 1998, the point at which the data included on legislative elections end. It could be hypothesised that the reduced participation of parties in gubernatorial elections reflects declining party activism over time, a question which is impossible to answer until the new CEC election handbooks are published in late 2001. Only in ten of the fifty-one gubernatorial elections held between January 2000 and June 2001 were there party-nominated candidates, in contrast to twenty-four of the thirty-seven elections in table 3.1 held before this. However, a recently published analysis shows that the proportions of party-affiliated deputies elected in legislative elections and of party-nominated candidates in gubernatorial elections actually increased in the first six months of 2001 compared with the same period in 2000.⁹ Thus the data provide a mixed picture. On the one hand, parties are indubitably even less active in candidate nomination than they were in the late 1990s, but the current trend seems to have an upward, rather than downward, trajectory.

A second explanation may lie in the electoral system. In chapter two it was seen that the majoritarian system used in the presidential election forces candidates to draw support from as broad a base as possible, acting as a disincentive to party nominees, who are likely to be constrained by the electoral limits of their party’s

---

⁸ Often a party announces that it 'supports' a candidate who has no official connection with the party. In other cases, candidates who are clearly associated with a party are nominated independently (such as Zhirinovsky in the May 1999 Belgorod gubernatorial election). To avoid ambiguity, only candidates who were actually nominated by a party or electoral association are included in the tables as 'party candidates'. 'Party-affiliated' candidates are those nominated by a party plus those who included a clear party affiliation in their biographical information. Candidates nominated independently and showing no clear affiliation in their biographical information are not included even if they had the nominal 'support' of a party.

⁹ Party deputies increased from 7.8 per cent to 11.0 per cent of the total; gubernatorial candidates rose 4.7 per cent to 6.6 per cent [A.I. Tur & A.S. Novikov, 'Ob uchastii politicheskikh obshchestvennykh ob"edinenii v regionalnykh izbiratel'nykh kampaniyakh v pervom polugodiil 2001 godu', Vestnik Tsentral'nogo Izbiratel'nol Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp.60-64].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>1 Adygeya</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>2 Altai Republic</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>3 Bashkortostan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>4 Buryatiya</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>5 Dagestan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>6 Ingushetia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>7 Kab-Balkariya</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>8 Kalmykia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>9 Kar-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>10 Kareliya</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>11 Komi</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>12 Marii El</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>13 Mordovia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>14 Sakha (Yakutia)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>15 Northern Oseliya</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>16 Tatarstan</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>17 Tyva</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>18 Udmurtiya</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>19 Khakasiya</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>20 Chechnya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>21 Chuvashiya</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>22 Altai Krai</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>23 Krasnodar</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>24 Krasnorsk</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>25 Primorie</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>26 Stavropol'</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>27 Khabarovsk</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>28 Amur</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>29 Arkhangelsk</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>30 Astrakhan</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>31 Belgorod</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>32 Bryansk</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>33 Vladimir</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>34 Volgograd</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>35 Vologda</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>36 Voronezh</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>37 Ivanovo</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>38 Irkutsk</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>39 Kaliningrad</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>40 Kaluga</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>41 Kamchatka</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>42 Kemerovo</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>43 Kirov</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>44 Kostroma</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>45 Kurgan</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>46 Kursk</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 (pt. 1): Party nominees in regional elections, 1995-2001 (as percentage of total candidates)\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Regions descriptions: Rp = Republic; T = Territory (krai); Pr = Province (oblast); C = Federal City; APr = Autonomous Province (Avtonomnaya oblast) and AA = Autonomous Area (avtonomnyi okrug)
Table 3.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>47 Leningrad</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>48 Lipetsk</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>49 Magadan</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>50 Moscow Province</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>51 Murmansk</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>52 Nizhni Novgorod</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>53 Novgorod</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>54 Novosibirsk</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>55 Omsk</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>56 Orenburg</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>57 Orel</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>58 Penza</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>59 Perm'</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>60 Pskov</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>61 Rostov</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>62 Ryazan</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>63 Samara</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>64 Saratov</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>65 Sakhalin</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>66 Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>67 Smolensk</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>68 Tambov</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>69 Tver</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>70 Tomsk</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>71 Tula</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>72 Tyumen'</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>73 Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>74 Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>75 Chita</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>76 Yaroslavl'</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>77 Moscow City</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>78 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(APr)</td>
<td>79 Jewish APr</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>80 Aga-Buryat AA</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>81 Komi-Perm AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>82 Koryak AA</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>83 Nenets AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>84 Taimyr AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>85 Ust'-Orda AA</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>86 Khanty-Mansi AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>87 Chukotka AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>88 Evenki AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>89 Yamal-Nenets AA</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MEAN (per region)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>22.0</th>
<th>9.7</th>
<th>15.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S.D.</strong></td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIAN</strong></td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be hypothesised that the principles behind regional executive and legislative elections are similar to those underlying the presidential and State Duma elections. It is difficult to test this hypothesis directly, but a number of indicators of the electoral system were compared with the proportion of party-nominated and affiliated candidates. All elections proceeded on some kind of majoritarian rather than proportional principle, but whereas in forty-seven regions it was necessary for the winner to obtain the absolute majority of votes in the first round or face a second round run-off, the winning candidate needed to obtain only a plurality in twenty-eight. (Data from the other regions were unavailable.) Other variables included the minimum turnout figure (usually 25 per cent or 50 per cent of the electorate, except Kostroma and Tambov provinces, which had minimum turnout requirements of 30 and 35 per cent respectively); and the term of office once elected, which was 4 years in seventy-three regions, 5 years in ten regions, and 7 years in the Republic of Kalmykiya. When a correlation analysis was run between these factors and the share of party candidates, very weak and non-significant correlations were found. One other indicator did yield a weak but significant correlation, namely the factor of high competition to the incumbent governor. In other words, the regional political landscape plays more of a role in the variation in party candidate nomination than the electoral systems used.

It is worth noting the relative strengths of individual parties at the candidate nomination stage, since it gives some indication of their territorial penetration. Of the six case study parties, the CPRF, LDPR and Yabloko nominated the most candidates to gubernatorial elections, with seventeen, seven and five respectively. Local and miscellaneous federal parties accounted for eight and eleven candidates in turn. The weakest parties in terms of candidate nomination were Fatherland/FAR, the URF and Unity, which nominated only one candidate each. This cannot be attributed just to their late formation, since sixty of the gubernatorial elections listed took place on the same day as, or after, the 1999 State Duma election. Nonetheless, even the most active party, the CPRF, participated directly in fewer than a fifth of gubernatorial campaigns.

---

12 Regions were coded according to the following scheme:
(a) Incumbent governor did not stand for re-election (11 cases) = code 0.
(b) Incumbent stood again and was defeated (21 cases) = code 1.
(c) Incumbent retained his post (54 cases) = code 2.
A value of 1 was taken to indicate high competition, and a value of 2, low competition. The eleven regions where the incumbent had not stood (code 0) were excluded. A correlation analysis of the remaining regions yielded a Spearman correlation between competition and the proportion of party-affiliated candidates of -0.232, significant at the p<0.05 level. This means that parties were slightly more likely to support a candidate where there was a chance of ousting the incumbent governor.
Whereas the data on candidate nomination give some indication of party activity, it is only through the successful election of these candidates that parties can actually participate in the decision-making process. Table 3.2 gives some indication of the effectiveness of party nominations, and also extends the analysis to the district level. It lists the number of party representatives in three types of elected body – regional legislatures, local soviets and heads of local self-government units. Before analysing these figures, it is worth pointing out that gubernatorial elections are not included in this table because only in two of the eighty-nine regions – Ivanovo and Smolensk – were party-nominated (CPRF) governors elected. Between October 1995 and March 1997, the corresponding figure was ten, although only one of these came from a federal party. This does not necessarily tell the full story, however, since many governors have allied themselves with parties throughout the post-Soviet period, mainly the ‘parties of power’ – Choice of Russia (CR), Our Home is Russia (OHR), Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) and now Unity,\(^\text{13}\) and a number are close to the CPRF. In 1996-97 the CPRF tried to draw together various allies in the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (PPUR), with a view to opposing Yeltsin’s appointees in the first full cycle of gubernatorial elections. The indications are, though, that the governors, rather than the parties, have been the dominant actors in such relationships. Governors tend to affiliate with parties once already in power, rather than come to power through them. The PPUR mainly endorsed pro-communist candidates who would have been standing anyway, or the candidate who looked most likely to defeat the incumbent, whether he or she was a communist or not.\(^\text{14}\) Similarly, none of the twenty-six victorious governors which Unity claimed to have supported in 2000 were actually nominated by the party.\(^\text{15}\) Overall, therefore, gubernatorial politics are overwhelmingly non-partisan.

To return to table 3.2, a higher level of party success is evident in elections to regional legislatures. However, party deputies still accounted for only a fifth of regional legislators between 1995 and 1998, with seventeen assemblies completely non-partisan. Golosov argues that this comparatively low figure is attributable to the administrative support typically offered by governors to local notables in order that the deputy corpus is loyal to them personally rather than any outside organisation.\(^\text{16}\) That voters will heed the advice of their regional leaders seems to be confirmed by a recent survey, in which

\(^{13}\) Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, Andrei Ryabov & Elizabeth Reisch (eds.), Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Election (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999), pp.146-47.


\(^{16}\) Golosov, ‘Gubernatory i partiinaya politika’, p.100.
38.9 per cent of those questioned said that ‘the regional leader’s support in favour of a candidate in the elections would be a decisive factor’, compared with, 25.5 per cent who said it would not and 32.5 per cent who found it hard to say. 17

Only in seven regional parliaments was the proportion of party candidates (including local parties) greater than that of independents. The relatively high party participation in Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk and Tyva was facilitated by the use of partly proportional electoral systems, although similar innovations in Saratov and Mari El resulted only in political fragmentation. Sverdlovsk is one of the few areas in Russia which has developed an indigenous party system of its own. Gel’man and Golosov argue that this is because the intra-elite conflict has been fought in the electoral arena, with parties as weapons in the battle. 18 Another innovation among the most party-orientated regions is the system of deputy rotation, which is used in Sverdlovsk and Volgograd. However, Vologda also uses the rotation system, but ranks just fifty-eighth out of eighty-five regions in terms of party members in its legislature. This suggests that deputy rotation is not, per se, a factor in the high party representation.

It is seen that, in general, party involvement in regional legislatures was relatively low in the period under investigation. However, Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva argues that, notwithstanding, their role was greater in the second electoral cycle than in the first, since parties other than the CPRF largely ignored regional-level elections before 1995. 19 Golosov provides a fuller analysis of the above results than space permits here, and concludes through the use of regression analysis that parties are more active regionally where there is intra-elite conflict fought through electoral means, a high degree of party institutionalisation, and favourable electoral rules.

Although the mean proportion of deputies elected was virtually the same as the mean proportion of candidates overall, this disguises the fact that parties enjoyed varying degrees of success in converting candidates into seats. If the proportion of party deputies elected (%PD) is compared to the proportion of party candidates

17 'Building a New Democracy?': Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia: survey conducted by Russian Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with permission), question K. 23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regional Deputies Elected from Parties (%)</th>
<th>Local Soviet Deputies Elected from Parties (%)</th>
<th>Heads of Local Self-Government Units from Parties (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 1</td>
<td>Adygeya</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 2</td>
<td>Altai Republic</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 3</td>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 4</td>
<td>Buryatiya</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 5</td>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 6</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 7</td>
<td>Kab-Balkariya</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 8</td>
<td>Kalmykiya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 9</td>
<td>Kar-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 10</td>
<td>Kareliya</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 11</td>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 12</td>
<td>Mari El</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 13</td>
<td>Mordoviya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 14</td>
<td>Sakha (Yakutiya)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 15</td>
<td>Northern Osetiya</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 16</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 17</td>
<td>Tyva</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 18</td>
<td>Udmurtiya</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 19</td>
<td>Khakasiya</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 20</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp) 21</td>
<td>Chuvashiya</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 22</td>
<td>Altai Krai</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 23</td>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 24</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 25</td>
<td>Primo'ere</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 26</td>
<td>Stavropol'</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T) 27</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 28</td>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 29</td>
<td>Arkhangelsk</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 30</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 31</td>
<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 32</td>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 33</td>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 34</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 35</td>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 36</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 37</td>
<td>Ivanovo</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 38</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 39</td>
<td>Kalingrad</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 40</td>
<td>Kaluga</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 41</td>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 42</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 43</td>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 44</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 45</td>
<td>Kurgan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 46</td>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.2 (pt. 1): Party victors regional and local elections, 1995-1998 (as percentage of total elected)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regional Deputies Elected from Parties (%)</th>
<th>Local Soviet Deputies Elected from Parties</th>
<th>Heads of Local Self-Government Units from Parties (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>47 Leningrad</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>48 Lipetsk</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>49 Magadan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>50 Moscow Province</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>51 Murmansk</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>52 Nizhnii Novgorod</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>53 Novgorod</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>54 Novosibirsk</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>55 Omsk</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>56 Orenburg</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>57 Orel</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>58 Penza</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>59 Perm'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>60 Pskov</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>61 Rostov</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>62 Ryazan</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>63 Samara</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>64 Saratov</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>65 Sakhalin</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>66 Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>67 Smolensk</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>68 Tambov</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>69 Tver</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>70 Tomsk</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>71 Tula</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>72 Tyumen'</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>73 Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>74 Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>75 Chita</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>76 Yaroslavl'</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>77 Moscow City</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(APr)</td>
<td>79 Jewish APr</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>80 Aga-Buryat AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>81 Komi-Permyat AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>82 Koryak AA</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>83 Nenets AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>84 Taimyr AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>85 Ust'-Ord AA</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>87 Chukotka AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>88 Evenki AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>89 Yamal-Nenets AA</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEAN (per subject)</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
candidates nominated (%PC), it is found that parties enjoyed their highest relative success in Volgograd, where the ratio of deputies to candidates (%PD/%PC) was 3.08. To put it another way, parties nominated about a fifth of candidates there but emerged with three-fifths of the seats. In total, parties were disproportionately successful in thirty regions (%PD/%PC>1), whereas in forty-seven, the composition of the legislature was proportionately less partisan than the candidate list had been (%PD/%PC<1). Six regions were particularly successful for party deputies relative to their share of the candidate lists (%PD/%PC>1.5): Stavropol' (2.35), Krasnodar (2.22), St. Petersburg (2.09), Voronezh (1.61), Omsk (1.58) and Kursk (1.55). The area in which parties were least successful was Novgorod, where they nominated almost a third of candidates and won no seats. With lower initial numbers of party candidates than in Novgorod, no party candidates won election in Primor'e, Kostroma, Magadan, Perm', Chelyabinsk, Chita and or Aga-Buryat Autonomous Area also.

If the figures are disaggregated, it is found that it was once again the CPRF which was best represented in regional legislatures after the 1995-98 electoral cycle, winning representation in thirty-eight regions. Its local allies (a throwback to the 1991-1993 period outlined in chapter two, when the party was banned and a number of splinter communist organisations were established) won representation in a further sixteen. In ten legislatures it or its allies won a third or more of the seats available, and in Volgograd and Kemerovo they actually held an overall majority. OHR, then the 'party of power', succeeded in just twelve regions, while Yabloko gained a foothold in ten, doing especially well in Kamchatka, where it won more than a fifth of seats. The LDPR fared less well, winning its highest proportion of seats (11.5 per cent) in Kareliya and gaining representation only in another four regions. Other parties – both region-specific and miscellaneous federal organisations – won seats in a total of forty regions.

It must be borne in mind that these figures refer to 1995-98, and thus the picture will have changed somewhat in the intervening period. At the end of 2000, the CPRF claimed to have a total of 1,240 deputies (including those from the PPUR), and Unity, 183. This compares with a total of 3,831 deputies across all constituent subjects of the Federation (including, where present, upper chambers). Once again, however, it is not known how many of these deputies were actually elected in the name of the parties they claimed to represent, and how many aligned afterwards.

---

21 At the time of writing, a list of legislative organs was listed on the Central Electoral Commission internet site under 'www.fci.ru/elections/0_4_0.htm'.

60
Moving on to the local elections, it is noticeable immediately that parties have been considerably less well-represented at this level. By late 1998, just one in twenty local soviet deputies and one in forty local self-government unit heads was a party representative. However, in a few regions – most notably Kemerovo, St. Petersburg, Smolensk and Pskov – the proportion was much higher. At the opposite end of the scale, there were thirty-four regions – mainly republics and autonomous areas – where there was no party representation at all at the local government level. A similar picture can be discerned from in the third column of the table, with a handful of regions returning ten to twenty-five per cent of their heads of local self-government units from parties, but the majority returning none.

There are a number of reasons why this should be the case, but two are particularly important. On the supply side, chapter two showed that the parties have largely been constructed on a ‘top-down’ principle. As a result, local self-government units, being furthest from the federal centre in both constitutional and geographical terms, are least likely to show evidence of party activity. On the demand side, local voters seem more likely to vote for a local notable than for a candidate representing an outside party. Compared with the 3.1 per cent of deputies elected from parties, many more – 24.9 per cent – were the managers of businesses and state enterprises. (The subject with the highest proportion of enterprise managers amongst its local deputies was one of the case study regions, Ul’yanovsk, where 86.5 per cent fell into this category.)

Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the data on candidates and deputies. Firstly, party participation in regional-level elections is relatively low by any indicator, except in a few cases. Secondly, within the limited levels of participation indicated, parties are more active in legislative than gubernatorial contests. Thirdly, the long-established parties have been more active in gubernatorial elections than the newly-formed movements. Fourthly, the success of parties in converting candidates into seats also varies between regions.

3.2 Electoral Commissions
Thus far we have examined party participation only in terms of candidate nomination and election. However, parties also have role to play in the control of elections, through their involvement in electoral commissions. According to federal legislation, at least a third of subject, territorial and precinct electoral commissions should comprise

---

22 Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya, p.31.
representatives of parties represented in the State Duma and in regional legislatures. This legislation was introduced about halfway through the period under examination.

At the end of 1998 there were 6,492 municipal, 4,999 territorial, 18,841 constituency and 85,264 precinct electoral commissions in total, comprising a cumulative 888,116 members with voting rights.\(^\text{24}\) (Territorial and precinct electoral commissions will hereafter be referred to as ‘TECs’ and ‘PECs’ respectively.) Just 6.5 per cent of the total were from parties and electoral blocs. This is well below the figure of 33.3 per cent set out in the legislation. The first column of table 3.3 lists the cumulative number of sub-regional (i.e., municipal, TEC and PEC) officials from the four Duma parties in 1998, expressed as a percentage of members of these electoral commissions. From this it can be seen that party participation varied between regions. In a few – Voronezh, Bryansk, Orel and Amur and Krasnoyarsk – parties nominated a significant proportion of electoral commission members. On the other hand, these five were the exceptions: in no other region was the percentage of party electoral commission members with voting rights above ten per cent.

The second column of the table shows the same indicator in March 2000. It is noticeable that the party representation on electoral commissions was considerably higher in general by 2000 than in 1998. Nonetheless, the two figures are not directly comparable, since the 1998 figure refers to local self-government elections, whereas the 2000 figure relates to the electoral commissions which administered the Russian presidential election. (A direct comparison will not be possible until the publication of the latest CEC handbook on local self-government.) Moreover, the composition of the State Duma changed following the December 1999 election, such that six parties, rather than four, were entitled to representation.

Surprisingly, it is the Jewish Autonomous Province, rather than any of the oblasti, which emerges at the top of the list for representation of the six State Duma parties on its sub-regional electoral commissions. It is followed by the Republics of Kareliya and Chuvashiya, and the regions of Rostov and Bryansk. The table shows only an aggregate figure for all sub-regional electoral commissions, but a more detailed examination of the figures (not shown here) shows that the six Duma parties

---

\(^{23}\) Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendumе grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 124-F3 (19 September 1997). (Alterations on 30 March 1999 (No. 55-F3), published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 April 1999; further alterations on 10 July 2001 (No. 89-F3) published in Vestnik Tsentr'al'noogo Izбирatel'nogo Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp.3-5.) Full text, excluding the latter minor alterations, contained in Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendumе grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (Moscow, Yurisprudentsiya, 1999), ISBN 23-1-23.2

\(^{24}\) Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya, p.90.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Adygeya</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Altai Republic</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Buryatiya</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kab-Balkariya</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kalmykiya</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kar-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kareliya</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Mari EI</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Mordoviya</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Sakha (Yakutiya)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Northern Osetiya</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Tyva</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Udmurtiya</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Khakasiya</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Chuvashiya</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Altai Krai</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Primor'e</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Stavropol'</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Arkhangel'sk</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Ivanovo</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kaluga</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kurgan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 (pt. 1): Sub-regional electoral commission officials from parties (as percentage of total officials)
## Table 3.3 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 47 Leningrad</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 48 Lipetsk</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 49 Magadan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 50 Moscow Province</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 51 Murmansk</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 52 Nizhniy Novgorod</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 53 Novgorod</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 54 Novosibirsk</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 55 Omsk</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 56 Orenburg</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 57 Orel</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 58 Penza</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 59 Perm'</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 60 Pskov</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 61 Rostov</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 62 Ryazan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 63 Samara</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 64 Saratov</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 65 Sakhalin</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 66 Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 67 Smolensk</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 68 Tambov</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 69 Tver</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 70 Tomsk</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 71 Tula</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 72 Tyumen'</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 73 Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 74 Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 75 Chita</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr) 76 Yaroslavl'</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 77 Moscow City</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) 78 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(APr) 79 Jewish APr</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 80 Aga-Buryat AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 81 Komi-Permyat AA</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 82 Koryak AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 83 Nenets AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 84 Taimyr AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 85 Ust'-Orda AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 87 Chukotka AA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 88 Evenki AA</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA) 89 Yamal-Nenets AA</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accounted for 23.38 per cent of voting TEC members, but only 14.86 per cent of PEC members. This once again shows that parties are less active at lower levels of government and administration.

Only the case study parties are included in these figures, but in order to assess the effectiveness of parties and electoral blocs in general, it is necessary to include local and other electoral blocs. This provides a guide as to whether the mandatory one third of commission members came from these organisations. This information is given in the third column, which expresses the proportion of voting members from all categories of party and political organisation entitled to representation. As can be seen, only in four of the eighty-nine constituent subjects did the proportion of electoral commission members representing public organisations total more than a third, although it was close (between 30 and 33.3 per cent) in a further nine. However, nearly three years after the requirement was introduced, the vast majority of constituent subjects of Russia still failed to provide adequate representation for parties and public organisations on electoral commissions in the 2000 presidential election. This impression is reinforced by examining the information in the final column of table 3.3, which shows the percentage of territorial electoral commissions in each subject which failed to meet the 'one third' requirement. In three republics, two provinces and three autonomous areas, no electoral commissions at all had the necessary party representation. Although these were the extreme cases, there were no regions where the stipulation was met universally. It is not known whether this reflects parties' inability to nominate representatives, or the electoral commissions' unwillingness to co-opt them.

Having established that parties are under-represented overall, it is worthwhile examining the 'density' of party electoral commission members, which can give a further indication of parties' territorial penetration. In 1998, the CPRF was left unrepresented in eighteen constituent subjects. This compared favourably with the other three parties represented in the Duma at the time: the LDPR had no members in thirty-one constituent subjects; OHR in thirty-seven; and Yabloko, forty-nine. The CPRF was also consistently better represented than the other three federal parties even where all had nominated representatives. This, of course, allowed it greater scope to watch over the electoral process, and was indicative once again of its better infrastructure.

In 2000, the six parties had representation in most regions (although the inclusion of the URF, LDPR and Yabloko was somewhat patchy in the republics and autonomous areas). Perhaps a more useful indicator, therefore, is to examine the proportions of electoral commission members from the six parties, relative to each other. Table 3.4 shows the absolute number of TEC and PEC members from each party, and expresses this as a total of the combined number from all six. As has been the case in all variables examined so far, the CPRF was the most active in nominating electoral commission members, accounting for more than a third of the total nominees from the State Duma parties. Surprisingly, Unity actually had a higher proportion of members on precinct commissions than on territorial ones, contrary to what might have been expected from an organisation which was still in its embryonic stages. This may be due to the administrative factor: in regions where the governor was favourable to Putin, it would not have been too difficult to co-opt local people loyal to the administration to serve as Unity electoral commission members. Even so, the CPRF still had twice as many PEC members as Unity. It is notable that the URF had very few representatives on electoral commissions. If it is assumed that the law was followed and that no more than one representative from each party was included on any individual electoral commission, the URF managed to cover fewer than a tenth of TECs (239 of 2,737 in the country as a whole) and less than one in twenty PECs (4,464 of 94,503). This points once more to its weak organisational capacity.

This brief examination of electoral commission data indicates two facts: firstly, parties are still somewhat under-represented on electoral commissions, either due to their own inability to nominate members for every electoral commission or the unwillingness of authorities to accommodate them; and the CPRF is consistently the best represented organisation at both the district and local polling station level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Territorial Electoral Commission members</th>
<th>% of Total Party TEC members</th>
<th>Precinct Electoral Commission Members</th>
<th>% of Total Party PEC members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>43,038</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21,296</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12,984</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>22,660</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12,837</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (Party Members)</td>
<td>5,619</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117,279</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (All Electoral Commission Members)</td>
<td>24,036</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>789,070</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Electoral commission composition (by party), March 2000
3.3 The Role of Parties in Regional Politics: An Overall Index

This final part of the chapter tries to draw together the various indicators of parties' territorial penetration into an overall assessment of party activity in the eighty-nine regions of Russia. Table 3.5 shows the rank of each region on the various indicators examined in the preceding sections. In all cases, '1' denotes the region where party activity is highest, and the remainder are listed in descending order.

There is a vast amount of information contained in table 3.5, and it may be helpful to point out the overarching trend. It will be seen that there are few regions which have been consistently favourable for parties at both the regional and local level. For instance, whereas the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnoyarsk territory rank near the top of the list in terms of regional-level indicators, local (i.e., district level) party activity has been fairly low in these areas. The reverse is true in Krasnodar Territory, which scores highly on local indicators but not particularly so on regional ones.

Table 3.5 allows easy cross-referencing of regions and allows us to determine the 'party profile' of each subject of the Russian Federation, but it is not possible to discern from this information alone how the various indicators inter-relate. For this reason, a bivariate correlation analysis was run on the seven variables, the results of which are shown in table 3.6. This yields some interesting results. Despite varying levels of party candidates relative to seats, examined in the first section of this chapter, it can be seen that there is a strong and significant relationship between the number of party candidates and party deputies in regional legislatures (RLC/RLD). Furthermore, there is a weaker but still significant correlation between the proportion of party candidates in legislative and gubernatorial elections (RLC/RGC & RGA). Presence in regional legislatures is seen to be a significant predictor of presence in local soviets and party heads of municipal local self-government units (RLD/LSGD & LSMF), suggesting that a strong network of local organisations can translate into strength at the regional level. Interestingly, this regional-local relationship is slightly stronger than that between the two local factors themselves. There is, however, no significant relationship between the proportion of party-nominated and supported candidates in gubernatorial elections and representation in local soviets or heads of local self-government units, indicating that the gubernatorial and district spheres are quite separate, despite earlier observations about elite links. One very interesting fact to come out of table 3.6 is that the best predictor of party strength on electoral commissions (EC) is the number of party heads of local self-government units (H LGU), rather than party members in
Table 3.5 (pt. 1): Rank of each subject on the dependent variables examined in tables 3.1-3.326

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Adygheya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7=</td>
<td>11=</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Altai Republic</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>75=</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Buryatiya</td>
<td>78=</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>78=</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Ingushetiya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kab-Balkariya</td>
<td>49=</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
<td>75=</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kar-Cherkessiya</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46=</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Kareliya</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5=</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53=</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Mari El</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Mordovia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Sakha (Yakutia)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Northern Osetiya</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49=</td>
<td>5=</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Tyva</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3=</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Udmurtiya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Khakassia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rp)</td>
<td>Chuvashiya</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Altai Krai</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7=</td>
<td>11=</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>11=</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Primor'e</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Stavropol'</td>
<td>49=</td>
<td>14=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>41=</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>78=</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Arkhangel'sk</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>30=</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43=</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Ivanovo</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70=</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62=</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kaluga</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69=</td>
<td>35=</td>
<td>50=</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 Key to headings (party share of the total): RLC = Regional legislature candidates; RLD = Regional legislature deputies; RGC = Party-nominated regional gubernatorial candidates; RGA = Party-affiliated regional gubernatorial candidates; LSGD = Deputies in local soviets; HLGU = Heads of local self-government units; EC = Electoral commission members
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>45 Kurgan</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>46 Kursk</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>47 Leningrad</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>48 Lipetsk</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>49 Magadan</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>50 Moscow Province</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>51 Murmansk</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>52 Nizhni Novgorod</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>53 Novgorod</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>54 Novosibirsk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>55 Omsk</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>56 Orenburg</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>57 Orel</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>58 Penza</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>59 Perm'</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>60 Pskov</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>61 Rostov</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>62 Ryazan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>63 Samara</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>64 Saratov</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>65 Sakhalin</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>66 Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>67 Smolensk</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>68 Tambov</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>69 Tver</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>70 Tomsk</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>71 Tula</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>72 Tyumen'</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>73 Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>74 Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>75 Chita</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>76 Yaroslavl'</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>77 Moscow City</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>78 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(APr)</td>
<td>79 Jewish APr</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>80 Aga-Buryat AA</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>81 Komi-Permyat AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>82 Koryak AA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>83 Nenets AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>84 Taimyr AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>85 Ust'-Orda AA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>87 Chukotka AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>88 Evenki AA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>89 Yamal-Nenets AA</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
local soviets or even regional assemblies (LSGD & RLD). This gives some tentative indication that the factor of 'administrative resources' may contribute to party strength even at the very lowest level.

Having examined the links between the factors, it is time to establish some kind of hierarchy of regions in terms of party involvement in politics. One way of doing this is to use the scores on each indicator and arrange them in order. The top quartiles for each indicator are given a score of one, and indices constructed for the degree of party nomination and election. (The methodology for calculating this is given in footnote 29, but in essence, constituent subjects scoring a '4' on party nomination or a '3' for the election scale are those where party activity has been greatest.) Having two separate indices is preferable to having a single one combining all the factors, which would obscure the differentiation of areas where high party activity had not necessarily translated into electoral success, and vice versa. Admittedly, by excluding three-quarters of the regions from each measure, the indices are better for establishing the areas in which parties have been most active than those in which they have been inactive. The results for each region are shown in table 3.7, and the overall picture is summarised in table 3.8. The latter shows that republics, in general, have achieved higher scores in the nomination scale than the election scale. This is indicative of the fact that parties are active, but generally not very successful, there. Similarly, most of the autonomous areas fail to score highly on either scale, while more than half the provinces come into the top quartile on at least one of the variables in each index.

According to these indicators, the areas in which parties have most consistently nominated candidates and electoral officials are Adygeya, Bryansk and Ivanovo, which score '4' on the candidate nomination scale. Closely behind, with scores of '3', are Kareliya, Northern Osetiya, Tyva, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Astrakhan, Kaliningrad, Kamchatka and Tula. In terms of electing party representatives, the leading regions are Krasnodar, Belgorod, Kamchatka, Kemerovo, Omsk and Smolensk. No regions achieved the highest score on both indices, but if the combinations of high scores on both indices are calculated on a descending basis, the constituent subjects which come out the most consistently favourable to party participation are Krasnodar, Kamchatka, Krasnoyarsk, Bryansk, Adygeya, Udmurtiya, Ivanovo, Sverdlovsk and Smolensk. These names will be familiar to the reader, since they have featured extensively throughout the chapter.
Table 3.6: Bivariate Spearman correlations between indicators of party strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RLC</th>
<th>RLD</th>
<th>RGC</th>
<th>RGA</th>
<th>LSGD</th>
<th>HLGU</th>
<th>EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.794**</td>
<td>.291**</td>
<td>.302**</td>
<td>.384**</td>
<td>.462**</td>
<td>.244*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.291**</td>
<td>.243*</td>
<td>.289*</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>.509*</td>
<td>.602*</td>
<td>.384**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.302**</td>
<td>.289**</td>
<td>.824**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.276*</td>
<td>.240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.384**</td>
<td>.509**</td>
<td>.059**</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.486**</td>
<td>.376**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.462**</td>
<td>.602**</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.276*</td>
<td>.486**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.469**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.244*</td>
<td>.384**</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.240**</td>
<td>.376**</td>
<td>.469**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in general the role of parties in regional and local level parties appears to be small, this does not invalidate the central purpose of this study, namely, the study of regional activities and activists. In the first instance, parties themselves are striving to expand their infrastructures. The CPRF talks continually (in similar style to the CPSU) of the need to *ukrepet' partiyu*, or strengthen the party. The efforts of Unity and the URF to increase territorial penetration suggest that parties would like to participate more, not less, in sub-federal politics. Secondly, despite the observation that parties nominated fewer candidates after the 1999 election than before it, Luchterhandt-Mikhaleva argues that the role of parties in the consolidation of power has increased, rather than decreased, over time. Thirdly, despite their numerically small participation in regional-level politics, federal parties do play at least a nominal role in the legislative and occasionally the executive systems of most regions, as seen from the figures in the tables. Furthermore, they have branches in most regions, even if these are not always particularly strong.

Therefore there is merit in examining parties' activities in more detail. In a comparative macro-analysis, the foregoing analysis has attempted to examine the role of parties in all Russian regions except Chechnya and Ingushetiya. It has been seen that

---

27 **= Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed), and *= Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). Key to headings (party share of the total, in all cases): RLC = Regional legislature candidates; RLD = Regional legislature deputies; RGC = Party-nominated regional gubernatorial candidates; RGA = Party-affiliated regional gubernatorial candidates; LSGD = Deputies in local soviets; HLGU = Heads of local governments; EC = Executive.
different political circumstances in each region have resulted in diverse regional party systems. Since it is impossible to analyse each of the eighty-nine regions fully, however, the remainder of the study uses three regions of the middle Volga as case studies. It is to this that the discussion now turns.

local self-government units; EC = Electoral commission members (1998 figure used, since it corresponds more closely to the time-frame and election type contained in the other data).

Type | Region | Nomination Index | Election Index
--- | --- | --- | ---
(Rp) 1 | Adygeya | 4 | 2
(Rp) 2 | Altai Republic | 1 | 0
(Rp) 3 | Bashkortostan | 0 | 0
(Rp) 4 | Buryatiya | 0 | 0
(Rp) 5 | Dagestan | 0 | 0
(Rp) 6 | Ingushetiya | 1 | 0
(Rp) 7 | Kab-Balkariya | 2 | 0
(Rp) 8 | Kalmykiya | 0 | 0
(Rp) 9 | Kar-Cherkessiya | 2 | 0
(Rp) 10 | Kareliya | 3 | 1
(Rp) 11 | Komi | 1 | 0
(Rp) 12 | Marii El | 0 | 0
(Rp) 13 | Mordoviya | 0 | 0
(Rp) 14 | Sakha (Yakutiya) | 0 | 0
(Rp) 15 | Northern Osetiya | 3 | 0
(Rp) 16 | Tatarstan | 2 | 0
(Rp) 17 | Tyva | 3 | 1
(Rp) 18 | Udmurtiya | 2 | 2
(Rp) 19 | Khakasiya | 0 | 0
(Rp) 20 | Chechnya | 2 | 0
(Rp) 21 | Chuvashiya | 0 | 0
(T) 22 | Altai Krai | 2 | 1
(T) 23 | Krasnodar | 3 | 3
(T) 24 | Krasnoyarsk | 3 | 2
(T) 25 | Primor'e | 1 | 0
(T) 26 | Stavropol' | 0 | 1
(T) 27 | Khabarovsk | 0 | 1
(Pr) 28 | Amur | 1 | 0
(Pr) 29 | Arkhangel'sk | 0 | 0
(Pr) 30 | Astrakhan | 3 | 0
(Pr) 31 | Belgorod | 0 | 0
(Pr) 32 | Bryansk | 4 | 2
(Pr) 33 | Vladimir | 0 | 0
(Pr) 34 | Volgograd | 0 | 0
(Pr) 35 | Volgoda | 0 | 0
(Pr) 36 | Voronezh | 1 | 1
(Pr) 37 | Ivanovo | 4 | 2
(Pr) 38 | Irkutsk | 0 | 0
(Pr) 39 | Kaliningrad | 3 | 1
(Pr) 40 | Kaluga | 1 | 2
(Pr) 41 | Kamchatka | 3 | 3
(Pr) 42 | Kemerovo | 1 | 3
(Pr) 43 | Kirov | 0 | 1
(Pr) 44 | Kostroma | 1 | 0
(Pr) 45 | Kurgan | 1 | 0
(Pr) 46 | Kursk | 0 | 0

Table 3.7 (pt. 1): Indices for nomination and election of party candidates in regional and local politics

Party nomination scale is calculated by allocating a score of '1' to regions in which the percentage of party involvement is in the top quartile for each of (a) party-nominated regional legislature candidates, (b) party-affiliated gubernatorial candidates, (c) electoral commission members 1998 and (d) electoral commission members 2000. Constituent subjects not falling within the top quartile receive a score of '0'.

73
Table 3.7 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Nomination Index</th>
<th>Election Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>47 Leningrad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>48 Lipetsk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>49 Magadan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>50 Moscow Province</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>51 Murmansk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>52 Nizhnii Novgorod</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>53 Novgorod</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>54 Novosibirsk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>55 Omsk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>56 Orenburg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>57 Orel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>58 Penza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>59 Perm’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>60 Pskov</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>61 Rostov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>62 Ryazan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>63 Samara</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>64 Saratov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>65 Sakhalin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>66 Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>67 Smolensk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>68 Tambov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>69 Tver</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>70 Tomsk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>71 Tula</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>72 Tyumen’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>73 Ulyanovsk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>74 Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>75 Chita</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pr)</td>
<td>76 Yaroslavl’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>77 Moscow City</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>78 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(APr)</td>
<td>79 Jewish APr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>80 Aga-Buryat AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>81 Komi-Permyat AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>82 Koryak AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>83 Nenets AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>84 Taimyr AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>85 Ust’-Orda AA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>86 Khanty-Mansiisk AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>87 Chukotka AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>88 Evenki AA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AA)</td>
<td>89 Yamal-Nenets AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scores are aggregated to form a scale running from 0 to 4, in which constituent subjects with the greatest consistent proportion of party candidates score highest. ‘Party election scale’ is calculated on the same basis for party proportions of (a) regional legislature deputies, (b) local soviet deputies, and (c) heads of local self-government units. This scale runs from 0 to 3.
### Table 3.8: Summary of election and nomination indices (by type of subject)\(^{30}\)

**Election Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Federal City</th>
<th>Aut. Region</th>
<th>Aut. Areas</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nomination Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Federal City</th>
<th>Aut. Region</th>
<th>Aut. Areas</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{30}\) Chechnya and Ingushetia are excluded from these figures.
Notes to the sources for tables 3.1-3.8

The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) published a series of books examining the 1995-1998 electoral cycle at the regional and local levels:

(a) P. A. Goryunov et al., Formirovanie organov mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1995-1998 (Moscow: CEC/Ves' Mir, 1999)

(b) V. N. Kozlov, D. B. Oreshkin, & A. N. Plate (eds.), Vybory glav izpolnitel'noi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1995-97: Elektoral'naya statistika (Moscow: CEC/Ves' Mir, 1997)

(c) V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds.), Vybory v zakonodatel'nye (predstavlitel'nye) organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1995-1997 (Moscow: CEC/Ves' Mir, 1998)

These covered, respectively, (a) local self-government elections from 1995 to late 1998; (b) gubernatorial elections from October 1995 to March 1997; and (c) regional legislative elections from January 1995 to December 1997. At the time of writing, new versions of these books have not yet been published, although they are expected in late 2001. The information in this chapter is thus compiled from a number of sources.

The simplest compilation was for local self-government, all of which figures came from handbook (c), pp.58-59, 63-90 and 189-90, except where otherwise indicated.


Gubernatorial elections are easier to analyse, since the CEC internet site (www.fci.ru) gives comprehensive results for gubernatorial contests since the beginning of 1999. The tables in this chapter contain data based on the most recent gubernatorial election in each subject, as of 1 June 2001. Of the eighty-nine regions, the data for sixty-five were taken directly from the CEC internet site, and a further six, which were held before March 1997, are contained in CEC handbook (c). This leaves 19 gubernatorial elections — those which took place between March 1997 and January 1999 — for which no official data are available at the time of writing from accessible CEC sources. Information on them was gleaned from a variety of sources and databases: 'www.panorama.ru' for the Republics of Altai, Komi and Chuvashiya and the

Despite efforts made to cross-reference data, the lack of one uniform source inevitably means that a few minor errors may have slipped into the figures listed. Obviously it is far from ideal that data should be drawn from such a wide variety of (non-permanent) sources, although this was considered preferable to the use of data which are several years out of date. It is to be hoped that the publication of updated CEC handbooks at the end of 2001 will enable a more comprehensive analysis of the most recent electoral cycle and minimise the potential for error.
4 Politics and Parties in the Middle Volga

Having examined the role of parties across all eighty-nine regions of Russia, the remainder of the study is devoted to three regions in particular, in which party activities and organisations will be examined in some detail. Subsequent chapters will look at aspects of organisational structure, membership, and electioneering. The present one begins by assessing the political landscape and the strength of parties in the three neighbouring case study regions of Tatarstan, Samara and Ul'yanovsk. Despite their geographical proximity along the River Volga, shown in map 4.1, each of the three has quite different political characteristics. Together they account for about 6 per cent of Russia’s total population and just under 1 per cent of the country’s area.

The chapter is divided into three sections, examining each of the regions in turn. Each section begins by analysing the general political situation in the area concerned, allowing subsequent information to be understood in context. Comparative indicators for the three regions are given in tables 4.1 and 4.2, which outline basic characteristics and the electoral records of the six parties in each region.

4.1 Tatarstan

4.1.1 General Political Situation
The Republic of Tatarstan is one of the twenty-one national republics mentioned in chapter three, and is located about 800 kilometres east of Moscow. It is heavily industrialised and oil-rich, which is reflected in the predominance of petrochemical and machine engineering. This also allows the Republic’s government to subsidise the local economy, as in Soviet times. The capital of Tatarstan, Kazan’, was the centre of a Khanate until 1552, when the area was conquered by Russia and incorporated gradually into the Empire. In the Soviet Union Tatarstan had the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), which preserved national identity, an issue which was to become salient in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The post-Soviet history of Tatarstan can be divided into roughly four periods. The first came at the time of the collapse of the USSR. A symptom of the disintegration of the Soviet system was the ‘parade of sovereignties’, in which several of the ASSRs questioned to what extent they really were autonomous and demanded to be treated as equals of the union republics. On 30 August 1990, the Tatar Supreme Soviet issued a

---

Map 4.1: The middle Volga case study regions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Tatarstan</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Ul'yanovsk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of which - Rural (per cent)</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban (per cent)</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>67,838</td>
<td>53,600</td>
<td>37,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city (population)</td>
<td>Kazan' (1,080,061)</td>
<td>Samara (1,164,800)</td>
<td>Ul'yanovsk (692,400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second city (population)</td>
<td>Naberezhnye Chelny (528,287)</td>
<td>Tol'yatti (728,500)</td>
<td>Dimitrovgrad (136,700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians (percentage of total population)</td>
<td>43.3 (48.5% Tatar)</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per capita income, roubles</td>
<td>1,817 (75.8%)</td>
<td>2,683 (111.9%)</td>
<td>1,290 (53.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(as percentage of Russian average)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of minimum nutrition 'basket' (roubles)</td>
<td>643 (35.4%)</td>
<td>808 (30.0%)</td>
<td>603 (46.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(proportion of average per capita income)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Selected comparative characteristics of the three case study regions

---

3 Demograficheskii ezhegodnik (statisticheskii sbornik) (Samara: Goskomstat Samara, 1999), pp.5-19; TACIS Briefing Document No. 11, 17 March 2000
5 The population of Ul’yanovsk province had fallen to 1,453,400 by January 2001. [Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Ul’yanovskoi oblasti yanvar’ 2001 g., p.126.
6 The latest statistics available indicate that the balance has changed to 51.1 per cent Tatar and 41.3 per cent Russian. [Respublika Tatarstan v tsifrakh, p. 20]. At the time of the 1989 census, only 32 per cent of the total Tatar population in Russia (1,765,404 of 5,522,096) lived in the Tatar ASSR itself [National’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991), pp.28 & 38].
7 Figures given for November 2000, when the Russian average was 2,398 roubles [Nekotorye pokazateli Ul’yanovskoi oblasti v svyazhi s regionami Privozhskogo federal’nogo okruga i Rossiiskoi Federatsii za yanvar’-dekabr’ 2000 goda (Ul’yanovsk: Goskomstat Ul’yanovsk, 2001), p.34]. One dollar equalled 27.82 roubles on 1 November 2000 (see appendix B).
8 ibid., p.27.
Table 4.2: Party election results in the middle Volga region, 1993-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF: RF</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>32.03/40.3</td>
<td>24.29</td>
<td>29.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF: Tat.</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>15.52</td>
<td>38.1/32.1</td>
<td>18.02</td>
<td>19.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF: Sam.</td>
<td>16.44</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>35.17/42.69</td>
<td>26.13</td>
<td>29.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF: Ul.</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>37.16</td>
<td>45.83/56.28</td>
<td>33.03</td>
<td>38.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR: RF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR: Tat.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR: Sam.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR: Ul.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR: RF</td>
<td>22.92</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR: Tat.</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR: Sam.</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR: Ul.</td>
<td>24.57</td>
<td>13.26</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF: RF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF: Tat.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF: Sam.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF: Ul.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity: RF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>(52.94)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity: Tat.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>(68.76)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity: Sam.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.98</td>
<td>(40.86)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity: Ul.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.92</td>
<td>(47.45)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko: RF</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko: Tat.</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko: Sam.</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko: Ul.</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Declaration intimating that 'the land, what is below it, the natural riches and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR [were] without exception the property of its people'. Tatarstan boycotted the June 1991 Russian presidential election and instead held its own, in which Mintimer Shaimiev, hitherto the first secretary of the republican CPSU organisation and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR, was elected unopposed.

The second period extended from 1992 to 1994, when, following the collapse of the USSR, Tatarstan strove to become an associated rather than full member of the

---

9 Gennadii Zyuganov, Grigorii Yavlinsky and Vladimir Zhirinovsky are treated in the table as the candidates from the CPRF, Yabloko and LDPR respectively, although, technically, Zyuganov was nominated by an initiative group and not the party. In 2000, both Zyuganov and Yavlinsky were nominated by initiative groups, but are included as CPRF and Yabloko candidates respectively. Unity did not have a candidate of its own in 2000, but given the very close links between the party and Putin, the figures given here are those for him, since these provide the best comparative figure.


11 'Deklaratsiya o gosudarstvennom suverenitete Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki', 30 August 1990.
Russian Federation. It held a vaguely-worded referendum on sovereignty in March 1992,\(^\text{12}\) and, along with Chechnya, refused to sign the Federation Treaty. The Republic’s new constitution, passed in November 1992 (more than a year before that of the Russian Federation), declared Tatar law ‘the highest authority on the territory of Tatarstan’, except where this broke international agreements.\(^\text{13}\) Relations with the centre were tense,\(^\text{14}\) and resolved only by a treaty between the two parties in February 1994.\(^\text{15}\) The consensus is that this treaty was more to Russia’s than Tatarstan’s advantage,\(^\text{16}\) but the significance of a country signing a treaty with part of itself should not be overlooked.

Thus began a third, relatively stable period of Tatar-Russian relations, which lasted until the resignation of Boris Yeltsin as Russian president at the end of 1999. During this period Shaimiev was re-elected unopposed in March 1996 with over 97 per cent of the vote, and in the Russian presidential election three months later, albeit under questionable circumstances, Yeltsin won in the Republic.\(^\text{17}\)

Since Vladimir Putin’s accession to power, a fourth phase has begun, in which the question of asymmetrical centre-periphery relations has become salient once more. The legitimacy of Tatarstan’s claim to sovereignty has been questioned,\(^\text{18}\) and several other contradictions between the Tatar and Russian constitutions and laws have been

---

\(^{12}\) The referendum asked ‘Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of international law building its relations with Russia and the republics and states on the basis of equal treaties?’. On an 81.7 per cent turnout, 61.4 per cent endorsed the statement and 37.2 per cent voted against it. However, it was defeated in Kazan’ and in five of the districts where ethnic Russians were in the majority. [U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on the Tatarstan Referendum on Sovereignty: Kazan’ and Pestretsky (1992), pp.4 & 10].


\(^{15}\) Dogovor Rossiskoi Federatsii I Respubliki Tatarstan ‘O razgraničeskii predmetov vedeniya i vzaimnom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennii vlasti Rossiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennii vlasti Respubliki Tatarstan’ (15 February 1994), Rossiskaya Gazeta, No. 33 (890), 18 February 1994, p.5.


\(^{18}\) ‘Opredelienie Konstitucionnogo sudova RF’, No. 92-0 (27 June 2000), Kazanskoe Vremya, No. 34 (264), 7-13 September 2000, pp.6-7.
A number of changes were effected in December 2000 which brought Tatarstan partly into conformity with the Russian Federation, but at the time of writing not all of these anomalies have been resolved. Thus Tatarstan is a particularly interesting region to study at the present time.

A number of features have characterised post-Soviet Tatarstan. Most commentators point to the almost absolute concentration of power in the hands of President Shaimiev’s elite. Although Tatarstan is, on paper, a democratic presidential-parliamentary republic, arguably the reality is somewhat different. Farukshin highlights several authoritarian tendencies: the strength of the executive at the expense of a compliant legislature; the presence of dominant actors and elites; the strength of informal ties over institutional frameworks; and the ineffectiveness of elections as a means of regime change.

To examine these in turn, it is certainly true that the power structure of Tatarstan is very strongly vertical and presidential, since its constitution fails to proscribe the simultaneous execution of executive and legislative power. The heads of the sixty-three administrations (forty-three rural districts, thirteen cities and seven districts of Kazan’) are appointed and dismissed by the president, subject to the approval of the local council. (In several cases, the same person heads the town and district administrations, such that there are only fifty-two people filling sixty-three posts.) The heads of administration chair the local councils, effectively policing themselves. Furthermore, not only do they mix executive and legislative duties at the district level, but they also sit in the Tatar parliament, the State Council. This is a 130-member unicameral body divided into sixty-three administrative-territorial and sixty-seven territorial seats. Just as the first secretaries of CPSU district committees were expected to sit in the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR before 1991, so the administrative-territorial seats are used, de facto, to secure the representation of heads of administration in the State Council. A head of administration thus combines three

21 ‘Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan’, §111.3.
23 Law No. 2244-XII (29 November 1994), Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan’: Ofitsial’noe Izdanie VST), No. 12 (1994), §158; alterations in Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Kazan’: Ofitsial’noe Izdanie GST), No. 8 (1999), §657, pp.44-75; and ibid., No. 2 (2000), §44, pp.70-71, p.5. [Division of seats mentioned in §13 of the law].
roles: district executive leader, district legislature chairman, and republican-level legislator. The result of this is a complex constitutional web – the blurring of the divide between executive and legislative power and the breakdown of any checks and balances. Both in theory and in practice, power lies with a small elite loyal to the president.

The State Council is little more than a 'rubber-stamp' parliament – oversized relative to the population, part-time, and consisting of legislators mainly dependent on Shaimiev. Technically, its approval is necessary for the president’s nominations to several posts: prime minister; head of the (Tatar) Central Electoral Commission and head of the National Bank; chairman of the Constitutional Court; and procurator. Given its loyalty to Shaimiev, this approval is usually a formality. Local soviets are also very weak. It was noted in chapter three that the strength of local self-government varies across regions, and in Tatarstan only thirty-one of 949 soviets have computers and three have access to a fax machine. Approximately 95 per cent of the soviets are in rural districts.

The presence of dominant elites and informal ties were two of the other authoritarian tendencies observed by Farukshin. Commentators have noted the way in which a narrow elite has controlled politics through the control of resources, initially co-opting the nationalism issue for the consolidation of power. Although the nationalist phase has now subsided to some extent, it is noticeable that the elite has been 'Tatarised'. Ethnic Tatars comprise 73 per cent of the membership of the current State Council and comprised 72 per cent of the previous one, compared with around 50 per cent of the population. Farukshin calculates that the elite in Tatarstan consists of approximately 100 people, mainly involved in agricultural industry and of ethnic Tatar origin. Furthermore, he suggests that the economic elite is not independent of the political elite, but rather, related to it, a result of the controlled privatisation which took place in the Republic. The strength of this elite was shown in the 1999 election to the State Council, when Shaimiev’s list of preferred candidates to the State Council became known. Of the 123 deputies who were elected at the time, 107 had been on the list,
which consisted overwhelmingly of heads of administration and industrial leaders, including the directors of several prominent oil and gas companies. 29

Finally, the limited effectiveness of elections as an instrument of regime change was noted by Farukshin, and it is worth recording that there have been frequent allegations of fraud in Tatarstan's post-Soviet election history. 30 Most notoriously, the 1996 Russian presidential election witnessed massive swings away from Zyuganov and towards Yeltsin between the two rounds. 31 A continued phenomenon has been the fact that, in Shaimiev's words, 'how we orientate the electorate is how they vote'. 32 Aside from alleged irregularities, Tatarstan's electoral legislation has contained a number of discrepancies with its federal counterpart, such as allowing elections with only one candidate (until 2001); 33 continuing the Soviet practice of negative rather than positive voting (until 1999); 34 and the naming of the Tatar Central Electoral Commission chairman by the president, rather than having him/her elected by his/her peers. 35 Heads of administration are also responsible for nominating half of their local Territorial Electoral Commissions (TEC) in Tatar presidential elections. 36 The vertical chain of

29 Comparison of Shaimiev's list, as published in Vechemyaya Kazan', No. 204 (1895), 22 December 1999, p.2, with final election results in Fomin et al., Vybor narodnykh deputatov Respubliki Tatarstan.
31 The opposition also alleges that, between the polling station results and the official figures, Zyuganov 'lost' 13,804 votes and Yeltsin 'gained' 46,450 in the first round, through the statistical manipulation of results protocols by electoral commissions. This is impossible to verify independently, but even the official figures contained some curious anomalies: between the two rounds, Zyuganov's support actually fell by 81,669 votes while Yeltsin's rose by 507,940. In some of the rural parts of the Republic there were even more spectacular reversals: the 24,000 voters of Bavly (Bavlinskii) district, for instance, supported Zyuganov by 45.28 to 31.06 per cent on 16 June, but only 5.86 per cent voted for him on 3 July, compared with 89.31 per cent for Yeltsin! [Kozlov et al., Vybor Prezidenta 1996: Elektoral'naya statistika, pp.179, 183, 188-189.]
33 Under Russian federal law an election is invalid if there is only one candidate [Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izбирatel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendumme grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Law No. 124-F3 (19 September 1997). (Alterations on 30 March 1999 (No. 55-F3), published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 5 April 1999; further alterations on 10 July 2001 (No. 89-F3) published in Vestnik Tsentral'nogo izbiratel'nogo Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp.3-5. ] Full text, excluding the latter minor alterations, contained in Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izбирatel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendumme grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (Moscow, Yurisprundsntsa, 1999), §32.14.
34 Zakon Respublikii Tatarstan 'O vyborakh Presidenta Respublikii Tatarstan' (9 December 1995), Special publication (Kazan', 1996), §45, p.33.
35 Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan', §111.8.
dependence means that electoral commissions will by definition be loyal to the sitting president. Similarly, the equal right to vote promised in the Tatar Constitution is more equal in some cases than in others, since the ‘administrative-territorial’ constituencies range in size from 7,558 to 820,390 voters! (This has the effect of overweighting the rural parts of the Republic – which routinely record turnouts and regime support levels of over 95 per cent – at the expense of the urban ones.) Finally, the Constitution has been open to manipulation for electoral ends: since 1992, the supposed ‘framework document’ of the Republic has been altered seven times. For example, following Shaimiev’s election to a second term in 1996 at the age of fifty-nine, the constitutional restrictions upon presidents serving more than two consecutive terms or being aged over sixty were removed. Similarly, when the decision was taken to move the State Council election forward from March 2000 to December 1999, §68 of the Constitution was altered to allow the State Council to ‘alter the date of the election [from its fixed five-year term], but not by more than four months’. The process of ad hoc alterations to the basic rules shows once again the strength of the incumbent regime and the manner in which it defines the political framework on its own terms. Shaimiev won re-election for a third term in March 2001, with nearly 80 per cent of the vote.

4.1.2 Parties in Tatarstan
On the indicators given in chapter three, Tatarstan comes quite far up the list in terms of candidate nomination. However, it will be seen that on all indicators of party candidates who are elected, the Republic is almost at the bottom. This gives a reasonable summary of the participation of parties in the political life of Tatarstan. Non-regime parties are numerous and active, but achieve very little. Apart from the strength of the Shaimiev regime, parties themselves are poorly organised and financed, and lack leaders who are known outside their own circles.

Whilst they are virtually excluded from power, however, many organisations exist, including branches of the six case study parties examined in chapter two. At the aggregate level, Tatarstan has a peculiar party system consisting of both federal and regional organisations, arguably not much further developed than those of the late

---

37 'Konstitutsiya Respublika Tatarstan', §69; Fomin et al., Vybory narodnykh deputatov Respubliki Tatarstan, p.3; Lev Ovrutsky, Shaimiev: real'nyi i virtual'nyi (Kazan'/Ioshkar-Ola: Maksim, 2000), pp.274-85.
Soviet period. Numerous splinter movements exist which have long since ceased to play a meaningful role at the federal level.

Parties in the Republic can be divided into the ‘party of power’ and parties of the opposition. The Tatar elite has generally been supportive of the federal ‘party of power’, in whatever form it has taken, and has participated in Our Home is Russia (OHR), Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) and Unity. At the regional level it has set up an organisation called ‘Tatarstan – New Century’, led by the former Tatar prime minister and now Speaker of the State Council, Farid Mukhametshin. As with the federal ‘parties of power’, these movements have been supported by those already in power, rather than used as a vehicle to come to power.

The opposition parties fall into three categories: ‘democrats’ (in the late Soviet sense of the word); communists; and Tatar nationalists. However, these diverse ideological groupings work together against the common opponent of the incumbent regime, again echoing the late 1980s Soviet picture. They are drawn together in two organisations – Equal Rights and Legality (henceforth RiZ), which unites the ‘democratic federalist’ movements that favour a broadly free-market approach and are against Tatar independence; and a larger umbrella movement called ‘The Round Table of Tatarstan’. The latter brings together seventeen organisations of all sorts, including RiZ and the communists. Although some of them border on the ridiculous and are not so much divan as kreslo parties, it is highly unusual for party activists from opposite poles of the ideological spectrum to co-operate so closely. As well as regular meetings with each other, they have organised specific publicity-seeking acts, such as a hunger strike in summer 1999 against Tatar electoral legislation, and a common statement alleging falsification in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, which was sent to all major news

---

40 It has been the custom in this study to use anglicised abbreviations for parties, which in this case would be ERL. However, except on official documents, the movement, called Ravnopravie i Zakonnost' in Russian, is largely known as ‘RiZ’ (pronounced ‘Rees’) and hence this acronym will be used in any subsequent references.

41 RiZ Council, Konseptsiya devatel'nosti s 1998 do 2001 gg. (Kazan': RiZ, 1998). The participating parties include Yabloko and Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) together with less well-known organisations such as the Union of Realists, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Russian People's Party.

42 They are: the Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan (the republican branch of the CPRF); RiZ; the regional branches of the Social Democratic Party, Working Russia, Movement in Support of the Army, Democratic Choice of Russia, The Russian All-People's Union, The Union of Communist Youth of the Russian Federation and the All-Russian Assembly of Officers; the Tatar movements Omel, Soglasie, Ittifak, Milli Medzhlis and the Bolshevik Communist Party of Republic of Tatarstan; the Association of Russian Scientists of a Socialist Orientation; the Association of Enlightenment and Education of the General School; and the Trade Union 'Protection' of the Kazan' linen factory (Slovo Kommunista, No. 4 (60), May 2000, p.3).

43 Kreslo = 'armchair'. (cf. Chapter 2, footnote 27).

agencies. Whilst these actions have not been particularly productive, they do at least point to the presence of party actors.

The discussion now turns to the individual branches of the case study parties, in alphabetical order. The CPRF in Tatarstan is known as the ‘Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan’ (CPRT). The use of ‘Republic of Tatarstan’ in the branch’s name is not merely cosmetic, but rather reflects the history of the organisation, which only became part of the all-Russian Communist Party in 1997. The roots of the Tatar party lie in Yeltsin’s ban on the CPSU in 1991. At the end of the year, the remnants of the Party, together with other communist splinter movements, regrouped under the title of the Organisation of Communists in the Republic of Tatarstan (OCRT), which was registered in February 1992, claiming approximately five thousand members. It declared itself the successor party to the CPSU in the Republic, and began a legal fight to recover its predecessor’s property.

In late 1993 it was re-registered as the Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan (CPRT), and over the following three years it had various forays into the electoral arena. Although it boycotted the 1993 State Duma election, the comparative success of the then-unrelated CPRF prompted it to participate in future campaigns. In 1995 it split its support between the CPRF and the more radical ‘Communists – Working Russia – For the Soviet Union’ bloc, which between them put up candidates in all five single-member districts. It also ran Zyuganov’s presidential campaign in 1996. At the republican level, four deputies were elected (out of 51 candidates in 130 seats) to the State Council in March 1995.

At this point the CPRT still existed as an independent entity. However, since 1993 there had been increasing co-operation between the two organisations, and Aleksandr Saly, the Tatar communists’ chairman, was part of the CPRF faction in the State Duma. In February 1997 third congress of the Tatar party decided to join the CPRF as an ‘independent organisation with its own constitution and programme’, which provoked a split within the ranks. A rival organisation was formed in the Republic, and there were power struggles within district committees as to which organisation to support. The breakaway group, which calls itself the Bolshevik Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan, is now by far the weaker of the two, and the officially-

45 Slovo Kommunista, No. 4 (60), May 2000, p.3.
48 Terent’eva et al., Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Respubliki Tatarstan, pp.87-88.
affiliated branch, which was re-registered in its new form on 25 March 1998, is used for further analysis. It is structured on the administrative basis of the Republic, with branches in virtually every district of Tatarstan. Given the way in which the old CPSU elite, including Shaimiev, moved effortlessly into power, the CPRT party claims to have few representatives at the leadership level who were high-ranking members of the Soviet Party in the Republic. It publishes a small-scale newspaper, *Slovo Kommunista*, with a print run of 2,500 copies. Through its constitutional status within the CPRF it retains the right to issue its own programme, which it did in the 1999 State Duma election.

The CPRT is the strongest party both in the Round Table alliance and, numerically at least, in the Republic as a whole. Nonetheless, the weak opposition it can provide is shown by its allegations of falsification after every election. After both the 2000 Russian and 2001 Tatar presidential elections, it made sweeping allegations, the most serious of which were that 2.7 million extra ballot papers had been printed and that its observers had been prevented from getting to polling stations. If true, these would constitute significant violations of the electoral law. However, it could provide virtually no evidence or specific details for verification purposes. At best, this points to poor documentation and training of observers – a fact that was acknowledged internally at a post-election plenary session in May 2000. Indeed, after the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, the CPRT was singled out for criticism by Zyuganov in his speech to the party congress in December 2000.

FAR’s involvement in Tatar politics was brief but extensive, since Shaimiev was one of the leaders of the All Russia movement. Only two other constituent subjects of the Russian Federation (Ingushetiya and Moscow city) recorded better electoral results for the movement, which is attributable in a large part to the Tatar president’s support. It will be seen from table 4.2 that two in five Tatar voters voted for it in 1999, and in the rural districts this figure was considerably higher. In its purest form, this attests to the power of administrative resources, in the sense outlined above. However, FAR’s regional leadership also pointed to the importance of trade unions and to the regional ‘Tatarstan – New Century’ movement, which allowed it territorial penetration.

---

49 Interview, Robert Garipovich Sadykov, Secretary, republican committee, CPRT, 17 November 1999.
50 *Slovo Kommunista*, No. 9 (55), November 1999, p.3.
51 In October 2000 the party reported 15,000 members, although not all of these were active [*Vremya i Den’gi*, No. 200 (928), 24 October 2000, p.2].
52 Press Conference by Robert Garipovich Sadykov & Aleksandr Ivanovich Saly, Candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Tatarstan and First Secretary, CPRT, respectively, 26 March 2001.
53 Plenary session, republican committee, CPRT, 27 May 2000, attended by the author.
throughout the Republic.\(^55\) As mentioned in chapter two, All Russia pulled out of the alliance with Fatherland immediately after the election, eventually joining Unity. The influence of the 'party of power' was used to great effect in the March 2000 presidential election, when there was a substantial re-orientation of the electorate towards Putin, as table 4.2 shows.

The LDPR plays no meaningful role in the Republic's politics. Whilst it has had a branch in Tatarstan since May 1993, it undertakes its activities virtually in isolation from the wider political sphere. According to the branch co-ordinator, it has thirty-eight sub-branches, with separate youth and women’s sections. The LDPR has had poor electoral results in Tatarstan, and in republican-level elections it has performed even less spectacularly. The party participated only informally in the 1995 State Council election (since it did not have republican status), and put forward just three candidates in 130 constituencies in 1999. They obtained an average of 3.4 per cent of the vote and occupied sixth, seventh and eighth place (in all cases case out of eight) respectively.\(^56\) Furthermore, the LDPR does not participate in any of the alliances or umbrella groups, citing a ‘constructive relationship with the powers that be’.\(^57\)

The Union of Rightist Forces (URF) also has a weak presence in Tatarstan. A small branch was set up in the course of the 1999 State Duma election, headed by Andrei Tat’yanichikov, who came last in his single-member district (SMD) battle. However, Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) which, as chapter two highlighted, forms much of the organisational base for the URF, has been more active. From 1994-95, one of its members was elected as SMD deputy to the State Duma from Kazan’ city, and in the 1990-95 Tatar State Council (then called the Supreme Soviet) its deputies were active members of the RiZ fraction. Indeed, whereas in the rest of Russia it is only after several years of in-fighting that the fragmented ‘democrats’ have come together, in Tatarstan the process was reversed. The leaders of both DCR and Yabloko were cooperating within RiZ before they formed the individual branches of the federal parties, and have never ceased to do so. Indeed, one of Yabloko’s leaders in Tatarstan argued that ‘RiZ is a real political force in Tatarstan; Yabloko gains influence only as part of it’.\(^58\)

The formation of Unity in Tatarstan has been closely linked to the incumbent regime, although the party maintains that conditions are ‘not especially favourable’ for

---

\(^55\) Interview, Anatolii Alekseevich Fomin, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan FAR, 21 December 1999.
\(^56\) Fomin et al., Vybory narodnykh deputatov Respubliki Tatarstan, pp.83, 128 & 136.
\(^57\) Interview, Viktor Vladimirovich Sedinin, Co-ordinator, Tatarstan LDPR, 26 May 2000.
\(^58\) Interview, Anatolii Ivanovich Perov, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 24 March 2001 (attended also by a member of staff from the American Embassy to the Russian Federation).
it, given the affiliation of most heads of administration to the ‘Tatarstan – New Century’ movement.\(^{59}\) This is to ignore the considerable personnel overlap between the two organisations, however. Unity’s first chairman in the Republic was the rector of the Kazan’ State Energy University, Yuriy Nazmeev, who became a ‘territorial’ member of the State Council through a by-election in March 2001. Shaimiev gave Putin his full support in March 2001, and Mukhametshin was elected to the party’s observation council at its inaugural conference. Unity also offered explicit endorsement of Shaimiev’s re-election campaign in March 2001.\(^{60}\) As in many regions in Russia, its hurried formation in the run-up to the 1999 State Duma election was to a large extent based on the Ministry for Emergency Affairs (MEA), many employees of which left their posts to take up professional posts with Unity.\(^{61}\) At the beginning of 2001 it claimed to have branches in fifty-two districts of the Republic and to have 5,000 card-carrying members – neither of which would be possible in Tatarstan without the support of the regime.

### 4.2 Samara

#### 4.2.1 General Political Situation

To the south of Tatarstan lies the province of Samara (known in the Soviet period as Kuibyshev), which is one of the ‘hubs’ of the middle Volga. As the comparative data in table 4.1 show, it is somewhat unusual for a Russian region, insofar as its second city – the factory town of Tol’yatti, home of the automotive giant AvtoVAZ – is also large, and is powerful independently of Samara city. Of the three case study regions, Samara also has the highest proportion of Russians within its borders, although it is also home to Chuvash, Mordovans, Tatars, Ukrainians and various other nationalities.

Economically, it is one of the most advanced regions of Russia, having followed a more liberal economic policy in the post-Soviet period than most. As a result of foreign inward investment and growth, Samara accounted for 3.7 per cent of Russian industrial output in August 1999, but only 2.2 per cent of its population and 0.3 per cent of its territory. Average per capita income in November 2000 was twelve per cent above the Russian average and the highest in the Mid-Volga Federal District.\(^{62}\)

Unlike the other two regions under investigation, Samara experienced a change of top personnel in the late Soviet period, which propelled former middle-ranking

---


\(^{60}\) Respublika Tatarstan, No. 36 (24333), 22 February 2001, p.2.

\(^{61}\) Interview, Valerii Vladimirovich Shlychkov, Member of the political council, Tatarstan Unity, 24 July 2000.
officials into office. In October 1990 all secretaries of the CPSU regional committee and two-thirds of the executive members were replaced from within, but a more radical change came after the August 1991 coup attempt. The person who benefited most was Konstantin Titov, chairman of the Samara city soviet. He sensed the direction of the political tide and persuaded the soviet to pass a resolution opposing the coup, which contrasted with the prevarication of the regional soviet. After this, Yeltsin appointed him as head of the regional administration, a post he has held ever since.

If Titov is an economic liberal, however, he has been no less adept than other governors at building a power base. He has proved particularly astute at 'staying on the crest of a wave' and sensing the direction in which the political tide is running. After leaving the CPSU, he allied himself in succession (and sometimes simultaneously) with Rutskoi's 'Free Russia' party, the Movement for Democratic Reforms, DCR, and OHR, of which he was vice-chairman. As OHR's fortunes waned, he established the Voice of Russia movement in 1998, and through this became chairman of the political council of the URF, which, as was observed in the chapter two, gained more momentum than was expected in the 1999 State Duma campaign. He then used an unsuccessful (Russian) presidential election campaign as the pretext to resign, bringing the gubernatorial election forward from December to July 2000 and winning in the first round. In both 1994 and 1997, he succeeded in creating a largely loyal regional legislature, using similar techniques to those of many other governors, as outlined in chapter three.

4.2.2 Parties in Samara

The involvement of parties in Samara has been two-sided. On the one hand, as was discussed in the previous section, the 'party of power' has always played a role in the region. Unlike Shaimiev, under whose auspices a series of region-specific organisations have been formed, Titov has always been involved at the top of federal parties. As table 4.2 shows, this influence had an effect in 1999, when the URF in Samara won its best result in Russia, 22.13 per cent. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether this can be construed as evidence of a strong party system. Quantitatively, parties have not played a particularly large role in the organs of regional government, as the previous chapter showed. Only in terms of party participation in local self-government, in which it comes ninth out of eighty-six regions, does Samara stand out from the pattern.

62 Nekotorye pokazateli Ul'yanovskoi oblasti 2000, p.34.
Secondly, the URF’s 1999 result can be seen as support for Titov rather than the party, as shown by the presidential election and gubernatorial elections three and six months later. The fact that Titov has changed his allegiance several times and remained successful suggests that administrative resources contributed much to the success of the URF. Thirdly, in the July 2000 gubernatorial election, no party nominated its own candidate, preferring instead to support those nominated independently, which can be construed as further evidence of a weak party system.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that parties have organisations and undertake activities. The CPRF claims to have branches in twenty-two of Samara region’s forty-seven districts, with a mainly elderly membership. Like his counterparts in Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk, Valentin Romanov, the first secretary of the regional CPRF branch, is a deputy of the State Duma. (Moreover, he is there by virtue of a victory in a single-member district, rather than from the party list.) In 1996, Romanov fought – and came second in – the gubernatorial election. In 2000 the party did not field its own candidate, but rather supported a non-party candidate, Viktor Tarkhov, who had served as chairman of the regional soviet when Romanov was CPSU first secretary in 1990-91.

This illustrates the two strands within the Samara CPRF – a moderate one led by Romanov, and a more militant one which supports the controversial former general, Al’bert Makashov, who also sits on the party’s central committee. Makashov was previously a deputy of the State Duma and shot to prominence as a result of anti-Semitic comments in 1998. He was disqualified from the 1999 State Duma election hours before polling day, and failed to collect sufficient signatures to stand in the 2000 gubernatorial election, despite (or perhaps because of) the support of the CPRF. Similarly, the CPRF supported the legal fight against his 1999 disqualification, despite the fact that he had actually been nominated by the Movement in Support of the Army.

In terms of societal penetration, Samara has never been part of the ‘red belt’, but has nonetheless returned solid results for the CPRF. Since January 1993 the party has

---

67 Interview, Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, 1 December 1999.
68 Samarskie Obozrenie, No. 51 (194), 20 December 1999, p.4.
69 Votzhskaya Kommuna, No. 83-84 (24240-41), 31 May 2000, p.1. There were rumours that the anti-Makashov group within the Samara regional CPRF (among whom Romanov is reportedly counted) had deliberately failed to collect sufficient signatures, in order to ensure that the party’s name would not be associated with the former general. Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 22 (218), 5 June 2000, p.4.
70 For details of this legal saga, see Samarskaya Gazeta, No. 26 (1872), 19 February 2000, p.1; Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 16 (211), 17 April 2000, p.4; ibid., No. 29 (224), 10 July 2000, p.3; ibid., No. 37 (232), 4 September 2000, p.5.
also had its own small-circulation newspaper, *Trudovaya Samara*, which is available at many kiosks around Samara city and by subscription in the rural districts.

FAR’s existence in Samara region was as short-lived as elsewhere, and even less successful than most. A month before the election, its own monitoring suggested that it could expect approximately 20 per cent of the vote in Samara city;\(^\text{71}\) in fact it obtained just 5.56 per cent. In the region as a whole it failed even to cross the five per cent threshold. The Fatherland movement was established in the province in December 1998, and at its peak had a representative in every district of Samara. It was headed by the director of the Samara printing house (*Dom Pechati*). In the course of the 1999 State Duma election campaign there was a power struggle between the Samara regional and Tol’yatti city branches.\(^\text{72}\) However, the issue was largely academic after the election, when the alliance split up and the movement effectively ceased to exist.

The LDPR branch in Samara, by the admission of its chairman, is not the strongest in Russia, either in terms of organisation or in terms of support. At the time of the State Duma election in 1999, though, it had co-ordinators in all forty-seven districts of Samara province.\(^\text{73}\) In the federal elections it worked in support of Zhirinovsky and the party as a whole. In gubernatorial elections, it supported Konstantin Titov in both 1996 and 2000, despite criticism of him in between.\(^\text{74}\) It also preferred to support non-party candidates in the 2000 election to the city Duma, rather than nominating its own.

The history of the URF in Samara is closely related to Titov’s political activities. At the time of the 1999 State Duma election, the Samara branch of the URF was actually that of ‘Voice of Russia’ campaigning on the former’s behalf. The connection between ‘Voice of Russia’ and the URF was Titov himself, who cited the need to build up a strong alliance of parties with common ideological interests.\(^\text{75}\) (A few months later, however, he ignored his own advice and moved his affiliation elsewhere.) The URF had one of the strongest campaigns of parties in Samara, mainly thanks to him. He was particularly active in promoting the bloc, both directly – by travelling around five neighbouring regions in the course of the election campaign – and indirectly, by emphasising new laws which increased the pension co-efficient in the province.\(^\text{76}\)

\(^{71}\) ‘Rezultaty monitoringa gorodskoi shhtab’: Survey data shown to the author during interview with Lyudmila Alekseevna Kurgan, Press Secretary, Samara regional FAR, 30 November 1999.

\(^{72}\) Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 50 (193), 14 December 1998, p.5.

\(^{73}\) Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999; Author’s photograph of party branch map on wall of Samara LDPR headquarters.

\(^{74}\) Co-ordinating council of Samara regional LDPR, ‘Obrashchenie koordinatsionnogo soveta Samarskoj oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR k chlenam LDPR i vsem izbiratelyam, rasdelyayushchim idei partii’, Protocol No. 6, 25 June 2000.

\(^{75}\) Interview, Evgenii Vasil’evich Blikov, Deputy Chief of Staff, Samara city URF, 1 December 1999; R.A. Zvyagels’kyi, ‘Konstantin Titov: Soyuz vo blago Rossii’, Rossiiskii Advokat, No. 6 (1999), pp.2-5.

fact that a large part of the regional media was governor-controlled also proved a great boon to the URF. Three days before the election, for instance, the entire front page of *Samarskie Izvestiya* featured an advertisement for the URF, followed by a ‘vox pop’ of voters entitled, ‘Why I support Titov’. This was followed on the next page by an article and photograph about the governor meeting young voters in Tol’yatti. Through Chubais’ influence, commercial support from the Samara energy companies was forthcoming.

As mentioned above, however, the URF’s success was really the party projection of Titov’s personal support, as was shown in the Russian presidential election in March 2000. The presidential campaign also led to a split between Titov and the URF, since the party centrally preferred to support Vladimir Putin rather than its own member (an endorsement which was rewarded when Kirienko became the presidential representative for the mid-Volga region). Just three months after the Duma election, the URF branch in Samara was said to be ‘de facto non-existent’. In the autumn of 2000 Titov effected another of his frequent changes of allegiance, becoming leader of the Russian Party of Social Democrats (RPSD). At the same time, the URF elected a collegial leadership team of three in the province, reflecting the splits within the organisation. By March 2001 the prospects of the URF in Samara were considered slim, with little likelihood of repeating its success in the next State Duma election.

The fortunes of Unity and Yabloko in Samara region have some parallels, since both have been riven by factionalism between their Samara city and Tol’yatti branches. Unity was formed just before the 1999 election, and achieved a respectable if unspectacular result. Its strong point was in Tol’yatti, probably related to the fact that the directors of the AvtoVAZ plant were involved with the bloc. After the election, the party’s development in Samara region took on farcical proportions. Ironically, given its name, various competing branches were formed. There was a race between the mayor of Samara city, Georgii Limansky, and Viktor Kadannikov, the director of Tol’yatti’s AvtoVAZ plant (and a former deputy prime minister of Russia) to establish the official branch in the province. Within the Tol’yatti organisation there was also infighting.

---

79 Interview, Evgenii Vasil’evich Blikov, (Former) Deputy Chief of Staff, Samara city URF, 14 March 2000.
81 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 11 (259), 12 March 2001, p.4.
83 Samarskie Izvestiya, No. 33 (2424), 22 February 2000, p.3.
84 Tol’yattinsko Obozrenie, No. 27 (140), 13 March 2000, p.2.
and by the autumn there was new regional leader – Yurii Sevost’yanov, the former chairman of the Novokuibyshevsk CPSU town committee. Compounding the impression of chaos, his position was reportedly under threat from Gennadii Zvyagin, the director of the ‘Samaratransgaz’ company and former head of OHR in the province, who had been one of the candidates in the July 2000 gubernatorial election. By the start of 2001 the matter had finally been resolved, with Sevost’yanov remaining chairman of the Samara political council and Zvyagin becoming deputy chairman of the mid-Volga interregional co-ordinating council. This saga illustrates the connections between business and politics in Samara province, and the desire among the business elite for political leverage.

Like Unity’s, Yabloko’s branch in Samara has been riven by factionalism and not particularly successful electorally. The party has branches only in the main urban centres of the region – Samara city, Tol’yatti, Novokuibyshevsk and Syzran’ – and there has been a struggle for control between the Samara city and Tol’yatti branches since early 1999. The infighting is best exemplified by decision of the Samara city branch to support Titov in the 2000 gubernatorial election, which it announced at the same time as the chairman of the Samara regional organisation was sitting in a joint press conference with Titov’s main rival, the aforementioned Tarkhov! Similarly, the ‘old’ leaders attempted to form their own breakaway branch, ultimately unsuccessfully, in the autumn of 2000. Even the party headquarters in Moscow is pessimistic about the chances of Yabloko in Samara, citing the fact that Titov attracts the traditional Yabloko voters in any case, and the various branches are incapable of working together.

4.3 Ul’yanovsk

4.3.1 General Political Situation

Ul’yanovsk province is located between Tatarstan and Samara, and is smaller than its neighbours. It is also the least successful economically and least influential politically. Nonetheless, its role in the country’s history has been significant. It was established in 1648 (first called Sinbirsk and thereafter Simbirsk), and was the birthplace of several well-known writers and poets, such as Karamzin and Goncharov. Its most famous resident was Lenin, who was born there in April 1870. The city was renamed after him (using his real surname of Ul’yanov) in 1924.

85 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 37 (232), 4 September 2000, p.5.
87 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 27 (222), 26 June 2000, p.4.
88 ibid., No. 44 (239), 23 October 2000, p.5; ibid., No. 49 (244), 27 November 2000, p.5.
Administratively, it was not until 1943 that Ul’yanovsk became a separate region. Its industrial base developed relatively late (previously it had been the rural part of the Kuibyshev province), but in the late Soviet period large automobile and aircraft factories were built. These contributed to the rapid growth of Ul’yanovsk city. Economically it is in the lower half of Russia’s regions: as can be seen from table 4.1, the typical per capita income in November 2000 was almost half the Russian average.

Of the three areas in the study, Ul’yanovsk is the only one to have seen a change of executive leader in the past ten years. Like Tatarstan, some accusations have been made of authoritarian tendencies in the province, but the defeat of the incumbent governor Yurii Goryachev in December 2000 shows that the regime lacked one of the key features of authoritarianism listed by Farukshin. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Ul’yanovsk under Goryachev followed a generally conservative path by comparison with many other regions of Russia, even being described by one author as the ‘North Korea of the Volga’. It witnessed little turnover in the ruling elite and slow economic reform. The so-called ‘Ul’yanovsk model’ involved slow privatisation, attempts at agricultural autarky, and the retention of price controls well into the 1990s (in some cases, even until Goryachev left office). He was already first secretary of the CPSU regional committee (obkom) before its dissolution, and was appointed governor in January 1992, despite Yeltsin’s initial attempts to remove him. Subsequently he was re-elected in 1996. Many other members of the 1990s Ul’yanovsk elite were in influential CPSU posts before the dissolution of the Party.

Ul’yanovsk was one of the last regions of Russia to elect a legislature or approve a regional statute, since the electoral system proposed for a March 1994 legislative election was declared unconstitutional and Goryachev ruled for nearly two years without any legislative check. This led not only to the eventual dominance of the executive but also to the construction of a regime centred on Goryachev himself. Although the regional assembly (Zakonodatel’noe Sobranie) was officially ‘the only...
law-making body’ in the region, Goryachev occasionally published decrees which were treated as law. The regional administration also had actual or de facto editorial control over all local TV channels and a significant portion of the local press. Nevertheless, opposition to Goryachev, whilst limited in its ability to gain access to electronic media, was at least visible, unlike in Tatarstan. It was expressed most notably in frequent conflicts between the regional and Ul’yanovsk city administration. By 2000 a state of political war existed between the two, leaving parts of the city without hot water for nearly three months. During this period the city administration posted notices at the entrance to every block of flats blaming the energy crisis squarely on the regional administration. Opposition to Goryachev was also expressed in two newspapers, Simbirskie Gubernskie Vedomosti and Simbirskii Kur’er.

In general, the length of the governor’s tenure and ruling style meant that the political polarity of Ul’yanovsk region revolved around his establishment; politicians tended either to work together with or to stand in outright opposition to him. This theme will be a recurring one as the political process is examined. Within the region pro-Goryachev forces were seemingly predominant, but ultimately it was an outsider, Vladimir Shamanov, who removed him from office. Shamanov is a former army general and hero of the Chechen war, and since coming to office in January 2001 he has effected major personnel changes. Both he and his vice-governors are politically inexperienced, however, and it remains to be seen what effect this will have on the region in the longer term.

### 4.3.2 Parties in Ul’yanovsk

The figures in the previous chapter showed that parties have also played a relatively limited role in Ul’yanovsk, but again, this does not tell the full story. Although there is neither the diversity of regional-level organisations that exists in Tatarstan nor the active party-building efforts of Titov in Samara, thirty-one separate party branches and organisations were registered at the Ul’yanovsk branch of the Ministry of Justice as of August 1999.

Shamanov’s election as governor is likely to change the balance of party power in Ul’yanovsk. Goryachev made an attempt in the latter part of his rule to form a
regional party called the Ul’yanovsk Union of Patriots (UUP). This was set up in November 1998 and aimed ‘to unite all people who, through actions and not words, want[ed] to revive the Russian spirit and morals, strengthen the economic power of the country and of Ul’yanovsk province, and to establish a socially just society, in which the interests of the individual are in harmony with those of society and state’. The UUP was apparently aimed at neutralising the threat from the CPRF, but it did not participate in the federal or even regional elections directly. It commanded background influence, though, given that the governor, the Speaker of the regional assembly, and some heads and deputy heads of administration headed it. Before the State Duma election in 1999 it instructed its supporters to vote for ‘parties of a left orientation... and not for the reformers who destroyed our country’. It was rather vague as to which left-orientated parties it had in mind, given the lack of co-operation between the Goryachev’s administration and the Ul’yanovsk branch of the CPRF.

Overall, the role of parties in Ul’yanovsk politics is greater than it is in Tatarstan, although the executive remains outside the party system. In general, as can be seen from the election results in table 4.2, the province has been a communist and conservative stronghold, with reform-orientated parties generally receiving below-average support.

As the birthplace of Lenin and one of the ‘red belt’ regions of Russia, Ul’yanovsk has a relatively strong CPRF branch. The CPRF was established in the province in 1993 with about six to nine hundred members, a number of whom had continued to conduct their activities clandestinely after Yeltsin’s ban on the CPSU. Membership peaked at around four thousand in 1996, but shortly before the State Duma election in 1999 was reported to have fallen to about half that. Not all of these are active, of course, but it does give the party a solid infrastructure throughout the province, with a reported twenty-seven district committees and an average of five to fifteen active members in each. The party also publishes a regional newspaper, Levyi Marsh, which is widely available.

97 Obshchestvenno-gosudarstvennyi tsentr politologii i dukhovnoi kultury pri administratsii Ul'yanovskoi oblasti, Informatsionnyi Byulleten', No. 11 (15) (1998), p.6
100 Focus group conducted by the author, Ul'yanovsk regional CPRF, 13 June 2000.
Electorally, as table 4.2 shows, the Ul'yanovsk CPRF has done better than the party's all-Russian average, and at the regional level it has been played a visible role. In the 1995-1999 regional assembly it had eight deputies and its own faction. Furthermore, the party's first secretary in the province, Aleksandr Kruglikov, was runner-up to Goryachev in the 1996 gubernatorial election. The CPRF in Ul'yanovsk was less successful in the 1999-2001 electoral cycle, however. It emerged (by its own calculations) with three seats (out of twenty-five) in the regional legislature; one seat (out of fifteen) in the Ul'yanovsk city Duma; one head of administration (out of twenty); and twenty local soviet deputies around the province (out of 259). When 'party support' is added (the vagueness of which concept was discussed in the previous chapter), it claims to have contributed to the election of nine deputies of the regional assembly and six in the city Duma. Obviously, however, it is difficult to assess how much of a role the CPRF's support actually played, especially since one of the victorious deputies also received 'support' from Yabloko, the CPRF's ideological opposite.

In the regional power struggle, the party was one of Goryachev's most vocal critics, and supported Shamanov's gubernatorial election campaign after its own candidate had been refused registration. It claims that its relationship with the new governor is constructive, but it is notable that, despite its support, it has received no significant posts in his administration.

Like its counterparts elsewhere, FAR's branch in Ul'yanovsk was a short-lived phenomenon. It would be more precise to describe it as the Fatherland branch, since the alliance with All-Russia was not mirrored locally. It was established in December 1998 on the basis of the Union of Labour (Soyuz Truda), the pre-existing political wing of the trade union movement. Its leader was the vice-chairman of the Ul'yanovsk regional trade union federation, and was moderately anti-Goryachev. The governor and his then ally Sergei Ryabukhin, the Speaker of the regional assembly, tried to force the branch to reregister and install as leader Yurii Stozharov, a prominent local hotel director. The latter was subsequently expelled from the movement's ranks. Fatherland's organisation in Ul'yanovsk was 'virtual': its headquarters had a staff of just five, and there was rarely much activity there. It claimed to have signed up 6,000 supporters by...

---

102 Levyi Marsh, No. 3 (64), March 2000, p.2.
105 Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 146 (1519), 23 September 1999, p.3.
the time of the election,\textsuperscript{106} but few were to be seen in person. The movement’s weakness was even more evident after the election, when the organisation folded and at least two of its staff were to be found working for the newly-established Unity branch.

The LDPR, like the CPRF, has some kind of recognisable structure, territorial penetration and high reported membership figures in the province. Just before the 1999 election it claimed 8,012 card-carrying members in more than twenty branches.\textsuperscript{107} The majority of these were active only sporadically (barriers to entry of the LDPR are very low), but it was claimed that the party had a staff of approximately 120 across the province – seven in the central headquarters in Ul’yanovsk, and five to seven in each of the district branches, who presumably were not active constantly, but formed the basis of a working infrastructure. In the course of the 1999-2000 election cycle the party was very active, and many young members were also seen in the party headquarters undertaking electioneering activities with the regional leaders. The regional leadership claimed at the time that the Ul’yanovsk LDPR branch was among the top ten in Russia in terms of activity and organisational strength.

However, a dramatic change of fortune affected it after Shamanov’s election. In Goryachev’s time the party’s regional ideological head presented several television and radio programmes every week. By November 1999 he claimed the ‘LDPR helpline’ which he ran as a spin-off from this had been contacted by 3,762 people and resolved problems for 1,192 of them.\textsuperscript{108} The key lay in constructive relations with Goryachev. Following Shamanov’s victory in the 2000 gubernatorial election, the new governor criticised this relationship, and a local newspaper published a \textit{kompromat} (‘compromising material’) document alleging that Goryachev had paid a moderate sum of money from public funds to the LDPR ideologist, as a ‘birthday present’.\textsuperscript{109} The television programme was discontinued by the television company. The wider significance from the LDPR’s point of view was that it lost valuable exposure in the media, and secondly, that an internal political battle ensued, with the central apparatus trying to dissociate itself from its regional ideologist.\textsuperscript{110} Regardless of the exact nuances of the argument, the end effect was that the LDPR lost considerable influence with Goryachev’s defeat.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Sharegin, Press Secretary, Ul’yanovsk regional Fatherland, 28 October 1999.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ul’yanovskaya Pravda}, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p.2. The party’s ideological head claimed in a subsequent interview with the author that there were 9,723 card-carrying members [Interview, Yurii Vladimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul’yanovsk regional LDPR, 23 June 2000].
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ul’yanovskaya Pravda}, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p.2.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Simbirskii Kur'er}, No. 18 (1795), 6 February 2001, p.3.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview, Stanislav Mikhailovich Zhebrovsky, LDPR central apparatus, Moscow, 28 February 2001.
The evolution of the URF in Ul’yanovsk has been complicated, insofar as it has had two separate branches competing to become the official one. The roots of this lie in the fact that the URF began life as an electoral bloc incorporating many smaller organisations. A by-product of this was that, for the 1999 election, there was a URF branch, headed by a prominent local businessman, Isaak Grinberg; and a pre-existing DCR branch which was headed by another successful businessman and a former Speaker of the city soviet, Nikolai Povtarev. Grinberg was a supporter of Goryachev’s, Povtarev an opponent. In the 1999 campaign, it was the former’s branch which was recognised by Moscow, but in the longer-term power struggle, Povtarev’s emerged as the official party organisation in the province. A tentative common front with Yabloko was formed for the December city Duma elections, but this came to an end shortly afterwards.

The Ul’yanovsk branch of Unity, as in many other regions, has been the scene of a battle between local elites. It began the 1999 State Duma election campaign with virtually no organisation in Ul’yanovsk province, but had picked up momentum by polling day. As in Tatarstan, Unity’s campaign was organised mainly by district staff from the Ministry of Emergency Affairs, and it claimed to be stronger in the rural districts rather than the city of Ul’yanovsk itself. It was only after the election that its structure began to become formalised, however. During the gubernatorial election campaign in late 2000 it became apparent that many key personnel were supporters of Goryachev, and there was a split over whom to support in the gubernatorial election. The central party endorsed Shamanov, but only a minority of the regional branch’s political council accepted this position. After the election it was noticeable that the new governor was able to consolidate his position within the organisation. Those within Unity who had supported Shamanov were rewarded with prestigious posts, and the rector of Ul’yanovsk State University, a strong ally (at least for the time being), became the new leader of the regional branch. The ‘party of power’ factor was also evident at Unity’s regional conference in March 2001: Shamanov gave a speech, and the

111 Telephone discussion with Aleksandr Kobyakov, Head of Regional Affairs, DCR, Moscow, 1 February 2000.
113 Interview, Viktor Nikolaevich Zhilyakov, Secretary, Ul’yanovsk regional URF, 6 March 2001.
117 ibid., No. 36 (1813), 13 March 2001, p.3.
new mayor of Ul’yanovsk city, Pavel Romanenko, was elected onto the political council of the branch. Additionally, fifteen heads of administration had joined the party’s ranks by May 2001. The deputy leader sought to emphasise, rather than play down, the importance of ‘administrative resources’ in party construction. His reasoning was that the heads of administration had a vested interest in their own re-election, and if they created a party infrastructure in their districts, they would in the process strengthen their own local power bases.

Yabloko’s organisation in Ul’yanovsk is small and its influence minimal. In April 2000 it had thirty-eight fully-fledged members, although just under a year later it claimed to have increased this to about seventy. Its organisation is concentrated in the city of Ul’yanovsk, since it considers it uneconomical to establish branches in rural districts with its limited financial resources. Having said this, it does have a handful of activists scattered around the smaller towns and larger villages of the province, and some analysis of the work of the party’s activists in the town of Sengilei, some seventy kilometres south of Ul’yanovsk city, is given in the following chapter.

As mentioned earlier, Yabloko worked together with the URF in Ul’yanovsk to support a common list of candidates in the 2000 city Duma election. It did not nominate candidates in the February 2001 by-elections but officially lent its support to four, of whom two were elected. (As noted already, the CPRF also claimed to have supported one of them, suggesting that in fact neither party actually played a decisive role in her success.) Such co-operation is now at an end; the lack of internal discipline in the URF, together with Povtarev’s reported breach of a mutual neutrality agreement in the Goryachev-Shamanov contest, has apparently made further joint work impossible from Yabloko’s point of view.

In relation to the local powers, the party has long existed somewhat detached from the regional political battle. It supported Goryachev in the 1996 gubernatorial election, but seemingly more out of a desire to prevent the victory of the CPRF’s Kruglikov, who was more ideologically unacceptable. Once Goryachev had secured the governorship once more, its regional chairman received a curious post as a ‘representative of the governor in Ul’yanovsk province’. In 2000 the party supported

---

120 Interview, Aleksandr Landau, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters, 28 April 2000; Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kisilitsa, Chairman, Ul’yanovsk regional Yabloko, 5 March 2001. 121 Ibid., 26 October 1999 & 16 April 2000.
neither of the two leading candidates. Within a couple of months of Shamanov's inauguration, it was already critical of his actions, but relatively powerless to oppose.

In summary, it can be seen that the three areas chosen for the study have both similarities and differences. On the one hand, a common factor is the strength of executive over legislative branches of power; the personal influence of the governors/president; and the way in which elites have moved to maintain their power. On the other hand, the regions also have quite marked differences. There is the strongly presidential and national Tatar Republic; the hitherto conservative Ul'yanovsk; and the reformist Samara. As such, the three locations provide an excellent basis for empirical research, being geographically close but politically diverse.

In terms of party organisations, it is striking how many parties have had more than one rival branch in each location at a given time. It is common even in Western democracies to find party branches in which there are schisms and internal rivalries, but the key word is 'internal'. Such competition is for control of the already established resources of the party branches. In about a third of the cases examined in this chapter, rival branch leaders have attempted to outmanoeuvre their opponents by bypassing them altogether. Rather than take control of the regional branch's resources, they have simply formed a new branch.

This comparative analysis of the three case studies regions and the role of the six parties within them has provided some insight into the differing contexts of politics in the middle Volga area. The remaining chapters look at particular aspects of the parties' existence and activism, beginning with an examination of their internal decision-making structures.
5 Party Organisations: Federal, Regional, Local

The discussion now turns to a thematic examination of party activity in the middle Volga, which will be the subject of this and the following two chapters. Before analysing the role, motives and attitudes of members in chapter six, and regional party election campaigns in chapter seven, it is necessary to examine Russian political parties as federal, regional and local organisations.

The first part of the present chapter examines the formal structures and jurisdictions of party organs at different levels. This is based on an analysis of the respective party statutes. Thereafter, using observations and interviews with key actors, the theory will be compared with the practice, comparing the reality of decision-making in the middle Volga organisations with the theoretical procedures outlined in the opening section. Finally, the activities of the lowest-level party branches will be examined, using examples from the case study regions.

5.1 Party Organisations in Russia: The Theory

There have been numerous examinations of party organisation and structure. The seminal works of Michels, Duverger and von Beyme were mentioned in chapter one, but as mentioned there, one of the more interesting analyses of party organisations in recent years has been the institutional approach proposed by Panebianco. Whilst it utilises a very small number of West European case studies, Panebianco’s underlying idea seems to have universal significance: ‘Every organisation bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which moulded the association’. His ‘genetic’ model of organisation hypothesises that party structures derive from the circumstances surrounding their creation – whether they were formed by territorial penetration or diffusion; whether they were legitimated internally or by an outside sponsor; and whether or not the initial leader was charismatic. This is compared to the degree of institutionalisation, defined by two measures: the autonomy of a party relative to its environment, and its degree of ‘systemness’ (organisational cohesion). In Panebianco’s typology, parties formed by diffusion or externally legitimated are more weakly institutionalised than those formed by penetration and internally legitimated. In this latter case, he argues, there is a more

---

1 Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.50. (Territorial penetration occurs when the central apparatus of the party controls the development of the peripheral branches; territorial diffusion is the opposite, whereby locally-created associations are later incorporated into the national organisation.)
centralised organisational structure and greater loyalty to the party rather than to a sponsor.

Applying this to contemporary Russian parties appears fraught with difficulty: the theory is based on Western case studies and has been criticised for being too theoretical even in these cases. Multi-partism did not exist in Russia when the model was conceived. Nevertheless, the idea that structure derives from formative pressures seems eminently logical. A number of hypotheses to examine this can be tested against the structures of Russian parties. If Russian parties were indeed influenced by the circumstances of their formation, an impact could be assumed from factors such as attitudes towards the CPSU; internal fusions and splits; and relations with the current ‘party of power’. For example, since the CPRF views itself as the successor organisation to the CPSU, some kind of organisational continuity with its predecessor could be expected. Numerically, the LDPR is the second most developed party organisation, yet it is essentially a ‘charismatic’ party, which, based on the Weberian notion that charisma and bureaucratisation are inherently antithetical, should fail to institutionalise. Is the LDPR an exception, or a ‘Potemkin party’ behind whose façade lies a purely formal organisation? The URF was formed from a union of diverse groupings from the centre-right wing of Russian politics. Is it similar in structure to the federated parties cited by Panebianco? Does the support of governors and senior politicians for Unity have the same effect as an external sponsor in the traditional sense?

In order to test these hypotheses, the organisational structures of the CPRF, LDPR, URF, Unity and Yabloko are examined, on the basis of the respective party statutes. The statutes define the rules of the party, the relationships between different party organs, and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the regional and local organisations. Before continuing, it is worth noting that the 1995 law ‘On Public Associations’ has hitherto regulated party structures. It stated the highest ruling organ of a public organisation was its congress or conference, which was to elect a collegial permanent ruling body. This is reiterated in the new law ‘On Political Parties’,

---

3 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.66. [Panebianco does concede that, in the event of their institutionalisation, charismatic parties tend to retain their centralised internal authority pattern, but states that this is very rare.]
4 Fatherland has been excluded, since, at the time of writing, it was a movement. Thus it is not directly comparable with the other five case study organisations, which are parties (see Chapter 2).
5 A thematic comparison of the statutes of the leading 1995-1999 parties is made in Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001), pp.84-108. The stress in the current study is less on the statutes themselves than on the party structures.
examined in chapter two. Parties have responded to these basic requirements in different ways, however, and apart from these two common factors (congress and collegial ruling body) their structures vary quite considerably.

5.1.1 CPRF

The CPRF claims to ‘continue the activities of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR’ (the Russian Communist Party founded in 1990 within the CPSU). As mentioned above, this would lead us to expect a degree of organisational continuity between it and its predecessors.

The history and functioning of the CPSU in its latter years has been discussed in several volumes. One of the central principles of the Party was ‘democratic centralism’. At its simplest, this was the idea that ‘free discussion takes place at the base before the decisions are taken, in order to enlighten the centre, but...the strictest of discipline is observed by all after the decision has been reached’. As enshrined in the CPSU’s statute, it had five elements: (1) the election of Party bodies from the lowest to the highest; (2) periodic reports of lower bodies to higher ones; (3) strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority; (4) the obligatory nature of decisions of higher bodies for lower ones; and (5) the personal responsibility of Party members to fulfil their duties and party assignments. In practice, centralism dominated over democracy. Congresses took the form of rallies, and censure generally came from above rather than below. Gorbachev admitted at the XIX Party conference in 1988, and again at the XVIII congress in 1990, that ‘democratic centralism’ had become ‘bureaucratic centralism’. A new CPSU statute adopted at the congress removed all but the vaguest reference to the principle. Nonetheless, the CPRF has

---

8 References to articles in the CPRF statute are taken from the version passed at the V congress of the CPRF, 23 May 1998: Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii “Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Moscow: Informpechat’, 1999).
11 Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz utverzhden XXVII s”ezdom KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), §19. For an outline of the historical context and development of democratic centralism, both in the USSR and elsewhere, see Michael Waller, Democratic Centralism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981).
13 Pravda, No. 181 (25533), 29 June 1988, p.6; M.S. Gorbachev, ‘Politicheskii otchet tsentral’nogo komiteta KPSS XXVIII s”ezdu KPSS I zadachi parti’, in Materialy XXVIII s”ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyunya (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), p.47.
14 ‘Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuz utverzhden XXVIII s”ezdom KPSS’, in Materialy XXVIII s”ezda KPSS, pp.108-27, §6. For the background to the XVIII Congress in 1990, see John
DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001)  
CHAPTER 5

retained democratic centralism as its main organisational framework, and defines it in 
fairly similar terms to that of the pre-1990 CPSU, with a couple of additional references 
to openness and freedom of criticism (§11, CPRF statute). Thus, at the basic level, 
some degree of organisational continuity can be seen already.

As to the structure of the CPRF, it is not dissimilar to a slightly modified version 
of a union republic CPSU organisation. Like the CPSU, and in accordance with the 
law, the highest CPRF body is the congress, which meets at least once every three years 
(§27), in contrast to every five in the CPSU. In practice, six congresses took place 
between 1993 and 2000.\footnote{The official number of CPRF congresses held so far is 
one greater than the actual number. The refounding congress in 1993 was designated as 
the second, to emphasise continuity with the CP RSFSR congress in 1990.} The congress is responsible for matters relating to changes in 
the statutes; setting out the party strategy and programme; choosing candidates for 
federal-level elections; and assessing the work of the central committee and auditing 
commission (§28). Congress delegates are chosen in the same ‘bottom to top’ manner 
as that practised by the CPSU, whereby conferences and meetings elected 
representatives to the next highest level. Between congresses, the highest body of the 
CPSU was the central committee, which by 1986 consisted of 477 members.\footnote{Hill 
& Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, p.64.} Similarly, the central committee of the CPRF, chaired by Gennadii Zyuganov, is the 
persistent inter-congress ruling body (§30), and after the VII party congress in 
December 2000, it consisted of 159 members.

The CPRF’s central committee meets in plenary session at least once every four 
months (§31), and between meetings, entrusts its duties to the presidium of the central 
committee, which consists of the chairman, first deputy chairman, vice-chairmen, and 
ordinary members of the presidium (currently numbering seventeen).\footnote{Pravda, 
No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp.1 & 5.} It also chooses a 
secretariat, led directly by the central committee chairman, for the implementation of 
decisions. In practice, the presidium is the highest permanent body in the party.

At the regional and local level, the CPRF also differs from its predecessor. This 
was a conscious decision made when drafting the party statute, which sought to learn 
from the mistakes of the CPSU and prevent the party becoming hostage to its central 
organs.\footnote{Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder/Oxford: 
Westview, 1997), p.52.} At the lowest level are over 17,200 pervichnyi branches, or primary party

---

Gooding, 'The XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Perspective', Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), 
pp.237-53; Ronald J. Hill, Stephen White & Jyrki livonen, 'Profile: The Twenty-Eighth CPSU Congress', 
Party in Disarray: The XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Basingstoke: St. 
**Key to Party Structure Diagrams**

- Delegates elected to body at end of arrow
- Body at head of arrow elected by body at foot of arrow
- Body at foot of arrow sends decisions to body at head of arrow for approval
- Body at foot of arrow reports back to body at head of arrow
- Body at foot of arrow answerable to body at head of arrow
- Body at foot of arrow appoints body/person at head of arrow
- Body at foot of arrow issues instructions for compulsory execution by body at head of arrow
- Person or members at foot of arrow has/have voting rights in body at head of arrow
- Body at foot of arrow forms body at head of arrow

PPO
GO
Co-ord. Council

Primary Party Organisation
Group organisation (LDPR)
Co-ordinating Council

**N.B.** In order to make the diagrams comprehensible and avoid an excess profusion of arrows, some degree of simplification has been necessary. As a result, the auditing commissions have been excluded from the schematic models in the following pages. In general, each organisation has an auditing commission at the federal and regional (and sometimes, local) level, which is charged with ensuring that party business is conducted in accordance with party rules.
organisations (PPOs).\textsuperscript{19} Although Hill and Frank pointed out that it was impossible to talk of a ‘typical’ PPO in the CPSU,\textsuperscript{20} they were viewed (at least until the new statute of 1990) as fundamental organs of propaganda in the workplace (§52 of CPSU statute). They were to form the ‘political nucleus of a work collective, [conducting] activities in the midst of the working people, [rallying] them round the Party, [organising] them to fulfil the tasks of the communist construction, and [participating] actively in the implementation of the Party’s personnel policy’ (§58). The CPRF, as a party of opposition rather than power, views its PPOs as little more than the lowest tier of party organisation, formed ‘on a territorial principle where not less than three members of the party decide to assemble’ (§13, CPRF statute). The tasks detailed for the PPOs are unremarkable administrative activities. A PPO should meet at least every three months, and can elect a secretary, bureau, committee and auditing commission, depending upon its size (§14). In terms of decision-making, ‘decisions of PPOs, consistent with the requirements of the CPRF programme and statute, cannot be overturned by a higher party organ, except for decisions relating to personnel’ (§13).

PPOs together form district organisations, of which there are a total of 2,305, which in turn form regional ones (§18). The latter are allowed to ‘decide independently on all questions with the exception of those within the competence of the supreme and central organs of the party’. They are also given the right to adopt their own programmes and statutes, so long as these do not contradict the federal ones (§19). In order better to facilitate horizontal communication between regional organisations within one area (for example, all the party organisations in the middle Volga), they are also allowed to form co-ordinating councils.

This is shown diagramatically in figure 5.1, which shows the ‘bottom-up’ system of delegation and the ‘top down’ system of decision implementation. The chain of election from PPO to presidium takes place by a very indirect route, involving four levels of internal delegation. It is worth noting also that the CPRF was formed by territorial diffusion rather than penetration. After the Constitutional Court decided that the ban on the CPSU did not apply to the PPOs of the CP RSFSR (noted in chapter two), it was through them that delegates were elected for the ‘refounding’ congress in 1993. In Panebianco’s terms, parties formed by territorial diffusion are characterised by weak institutionalisation, yet the CPRF is the strongest party in Russia. Nonetheless, the party’s peculiar status as the successor organisation to what was effectively an

\textsuperscript{19} Pravda, Special publication for the VII congress of the CPRF, 2-3 December 2000, p.1.
\textsuperscript{20} Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, p.54.
appendage of the state could not have been foreseen by Panebianco's schema. It should be noted that the CPRF is also more collegial than most other parties in Russia, focusing more on the party than on the leader, and this may also be a legacy of the past.

5.1.2 LDPR

If the CPRF's organisational structure is characterised by collegial decision-making, the LDPR tends far more towards the personal authority of the party leader. Of the five parties in the study, it is the LDPR which has the most vertical and centralised decision-making process. Like all the other parties, its congress is technically the highest decision-making body (§5.1). Delegates are chosen by the regional party organisations. Between sessions (it meets at least once every three years, although, in reality, approximately once a year) it delegates its responsibilities to the supreme council, which discusses party-related questions and personnel decisions.

In the theoretical design of the party, the main instruments of power reside with the leader and the supreme council. The party leader (or 'chairman of the party' as described in the statute) is elected for a period of six years – three times as long as the other main parties. He (or, theoretically, she) determines the ideological, strategic and tactical direction of the party, and chairs the supreme council and the central committee. His powers of appointment are considerable: he names his vice-chairmen; the head of the central apparatus; the editor-in-chief of party publications; and a shadow cabinet. He also has the power to confirm, name or remove the leaders of regional organisations, and can relieve heads of town and district organisations of their duties (§6.3). Moreover, the central apparatus of the party is the 'executive organ of the leader' (§6.6).

The collegial bodies of the LDPR also work on a 'top-down' principle. Whereas the 157-member CPRF central committee elects the smaller presidium, in the LDPR it is the supreme council (with 13 members in 199822) which confirms the members of the 289-member central council and decides upon its agenda (§6.5).

In other words, the autonomy of regional organisations is severely limited. Regional conferences, which should take place at least annually, are limited to 'discussing' the candidature of a regional co-ordinator for 'examination' by the supreme council; the final decision, as mentioned above, lies with the party leader (§5.9). Even the organisation of a regional conference must be agreed with the central apparatus of

---

21 References to articles in the LDPR statute are taken from the version passed at the VIII congress of the LDPR, 25 April 1998: 'Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii" (LDPR)', in Programma i Ustav Liberal'no-Demokraticheskoi Partii Rossii (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), pp.69-79.

Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of LDPR structure
the party, which is responsible for overseeing that the rules are observed (§5.5-5.6). At district level a similar situation exists: conferences of district and town organisations must be overseen by the regional co-ordinating council.

Figure 5.2 perhaps gives some indication as to how the paradox between charismatic leadership and institutionalisation has been resolved. Although the LDPR appeared to confound the theories of Weber and Panebianco that charisma and bureaucratisation are inherently antithetical, it can be seen that the LDPR’s structure still focuses very much on the leader and on a small caucus loyal to him. Although there are regional and local conferences, the party statute makes it clear where the balance of power lies: ‘decisions of the supreme council must be fulfilled by all party organisations and members, regardless of the posts they hold within the party’ (§6.4). The party organisation was formed by territorial penetration, and thus appears to be the apparatus of Zhirinovsky rather than an independent organisation in its own right.

5.1.3 URF

The URF, formed as it was out of several organisations, makes an interesting case study. By contrast with the CPRF and LDPR statutes, which are relatively broad in their definitions, the URF’s lays out the party structure in minute detail, with numerous sub-clauses.

Once again the highest party organ is the congress, which has exclusive jurisdiction over statutes, programmatic decisions, and party reorganisation. It has to be convened at least biennially (§16.4). Between congresses, no single body has jurisdiction over decision-making.

Rather than a single leader, there are several co-leaders (§18)24 and two collegial ruling bodies – the federal political council (FPC) and the party council. The former currently has thirty-two members. Its chairman is elected by congress from among the co-leaders, and is responsible for co-ordinating their activities. Effectively he (or she) is the public leader of the party. The FPC meets at least monthly (§17.3) and is responsible for budgetary matters; the appointment and supervision of ancillary bodies; and decisions about regional branches (§17.5). Its primary ancillary body is the executive committee, which is responsible for implementing the decisions of the leading party organs (§22), and forming a party apparatus (§22.5). In addition to this, the FPC

23 References to articles in the URF statute are taken from the version passed at the founding congress of the URF, 26 May 2001, 'Ustav obshcherosissiokoi politicheskoii obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Soyuz Pravykh Sil"', [www.sps.ru/spfs/280501/spsustavall]. [The party headquarters in Moscow was unable to provide a printed edition of this.]

24 The number is not defined in the statute. The founding congress in May 2001 decided that there should be eight, but only five were chosen at the time [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 94 (2404), 29 May 2001, p.8].
Figure 5.3: Schematic diagram of URF structure
also appoints a 'creative council' and a 'Commission for the Resolution of Internal Party Disputes' (§§17.5.14; 24 and 25). To ensure a separation of powers, members of the latter cannot hold simultaneous office in any elected bodies of the party, nor its executive or apparatus.

The party council is the secondary ruling body. It is a larger body, consisting of the FPC members as well as all the co-leaders; the chairman of the executive committee; URF State Duma deputies; and a delegate from each regional branch. This provision is crucial to the internal structure of the party, as will be seen in the following section. The party council can 'examine any question in the competence of the FPC' (§20.1.6).

At the regional level, a similar pattern of checks and balances exists. A regional conference, which elects delegates to the federal congress at the same time as enacting the decisions of the previous one (§29.6.1), elects a political council and auditing committee, together with a regional chairman and deputy chairmen. This means that the chairman is not dependent on the political council for his or her position, but is elected directly. The regional branch is established by the FPC, just as district branches and PPOs are formed by the regional political council and district political councils respectively (§27). In other words, although the URF's initial formation was through the amalgamation of pre-existing groups, future expansion has to take the form of territorial penetration from above. Various decisions can be taken only with the agreement of the central organs, such as the appointment of a regional executive director or committee (§32). District branches are structured almost as microcosms of regional ones, with district meetings electing political councils and executive committees. They are answerable to the regional political council.

This complicated system is depicted in simplified form in figure 5.3. In Panebianco's framework, the URF would be an internally-legitimated party formed through diffusion of existing groups. In such cases, the level of institutionalisation is likely to be weak, since each of the various groups within the coalition has an effective power of veto over the others.25 This is borne out in practice; the URF has developed a complex system of checks and balances to prevent any component organisation from becoming dominant in the unified structure. Similarly, lines of accountability to the centre limit the powers of the regional branches. Compromises such as these are apparent throughout the URF statute, and the full circumstances of them will be examined in the second section of this chapter.

---

25 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.65.
5.1.4 Unity

Like the URF, Unity is not so much a ‘genetic’ party as a synthetic one, established hurriedly and on pre-existing outside structures. Technically it was formed by diffusion, insofar as each region chose delegates for a founding conference, but in practice it was created through strong centre-down penetration using administrative resources, which in Panebianco’s terms may point to the presence of an outside sponsor. Of the five parties here, it is perhaps the most obvious example of one in which initial circumstances have influenced its structure. As in the URF, the responsibilities of each organ within the party are laid out in considerable detail in the statute.

Its leading organs are the congress, political council, presidium and central executive committee. The congress meets at least every two years (§7.1), and elects the party leader; the political council and its chairman; the central executive committee; and the observation council.

The role defined for the party leader shows the impact of formation upon organisation. In an unusual arrangement, the party leader need not be a member of the party (§7.2.2), and does not sit on any of its ruling organs (§7.2.4). This is to accommodate the fact that the party’s first (and current, at the time of writing) leader, Sergei Shoigu, was a government minister, and therefore not allowed to participate in party affairs.

The inter-congress management of the party is undertaken by the political council, which meets twice a year (§7.3.1). Between meetings, a presidium (elected by the political council and chaired by the same person) decides on ‘the most important questions’ (§7.4.1), and between presidium meetings the central executive committee (also elected by the congress) is the permanent ruling body (§7.6). There is some cross-over of personnel, insofar as the chairman of the central executive committee sits on the political council and its presidium, and vice-versa (§§7.3.3 and 7.6.2). The hierarchy is expected to toe the party line: members of the political council can remove their colleagues for violation of the party statute, failure to implement decisions of the leading party organs, or signs of independence (§7.3.9), pending confirmation by the following congress.

In terms of vertical centre-regional links, the centre has considerable control over the regions. Decisions of higher party organs are compulsory for lower ones (§6.7). Regional organisations are answerable to the central executive committee.

References to articles in the Unity statute are taken from the version passed at the founding congress of Unity, 27 May 2000, Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii partii “Edinstvo” (Moscow: Edinstvo, 2000).
Figure 5.4: Schematic diagram of Unity structure
(§6.3.20), and are required to inform higher party bodies of their activities (§6.5). The presidium can remove a regional leader if he or she fails to implement its decisions (§6.3.16), and the formation of regional organisations falls under the jurisdiction of the (federal) political council (§7.3.7). Regional conferences can be attended by virtually all members of the federal hierarchy, who have voting rights (§6.3.7). Despite the apparent checks and balances shown in figure 5.4, the party structure thus is weighted in favour of the centre at the expense of the regions, and the regional branches in turn have more power than their district branches.

As mentioned earlier, the support of elites for the ‘party of power’ could be interpreted as the presence of an outside sponsor. In Panebianco’s model, the party would be expected to institutionalise weakly. Given that it was founded as a party only in mid-2000, it is perhaps too soon to say whether this will be the case, but it is worth noting that previous ‘parties of power’ have experienced exactly this problem. Our Home is Russia – the remnants of which were incorporated into Unity – failed to develop a comprehensive grass-root structure, and collapsed once the outside sponsor (Chernomyrdin’s government) fell from power. Similarly, Fatherland’s support from governors and trades unions moved elsewhere when it failed to win the 1999 State Duma election, rendering the movement virtually defunct. It was to avoid such a fate that Unity transformed itself into a party so quickly and imposed such centralised discipline. However, it remains to be seen whether, in so doing, it will be rendered itself too inflexible to adapt to change.

5.1.5 Yabloko27

Of the five parties under examination, Yabloko has perhaps the least well-defined lines of demarcation between different bodies. This is perhaps a legacy of its early organisational formation at the regional level, which involved a diverse selection of pre-existing regional movements and branches from other parties affiliating as collective members.28 Indeed, in contrast to the elaborate prescription of the URF’s and Unity’s sub-federal organisations, only in the very latest (1999) draft of Yabloko’s statute has there been any detailed mention of regional or district branches at all.

The highest ruling body of a regional branch is the conference, called at least annually (§4.2.1). It takes decisions about the regional statute (§4.2.7); the regional

27 References to articles in the Yabloko statute are taken from the version passed at the VII congress of Yabloko, 28 August 1999, ‘Ustav obscherosiiskoi politcheskoj obschestvennoj organizatsii “Ob’edinenie Yabloko”’, www.yabloko.ru/Union STAT 99.htm. [As with the URF, the party headquarters in Moscow was unable to provide a printed edition.]
28 Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland, p.89.
Figure 5.5: Schematic diagram of Yabloko structure
programme; the selection of candidates for public office; and the election of the regional leadership (§4.2.1.2). The rules governing the inter-conference management of regional branches are considerably less strictly defined than for other parties. There is but one article on the matter, which states simply that ‘in the period between conferences the leadership of the regional branch is the responsibility of the permanent ruling bodies (bureau, political council, etc.)’ (§4.2.4). A few procedural details are included, but the duties of these bodies at the regional level are imprecisely defined. Similarly, the only mention of district organisations in the statute is with regard to the nomination of candidates for local elections, which must be done in agreement with the regional branch and the bureau of the party’s central council (§4.5).

The party structure at the federal level is laid out in somewhat more detail, but is also comparatively uncomplicated. The congress meets at least every second year and brings together delegates from regional organisations (§4.8). It elects the chairman of the association (i.e., party leader); the central council; and the auditing commission (§§4.9.3-4.9.5). The association chairman chairs both the central council and the bureau, the latter being elected by the former from its own ranks. The chairman/leader has more power than in some of the other parties: he represents the party in negotiations; makes agreements and manages party funds; delegates tasks to members of the association; and makes the final decisions on personnel for the party apparatus (§4.16). Members of the central council and auditing commission can attend meetings of the bureau, with consultative voting rights (§4.14).

Various vertical links exist too: reorganisation or liquidation of regional branches must be agreed with the central council (§4.2.1.2), and decisions on candidate adoption should be cleared with the bureau (§§4.4-5). Regional organisations are allowed to ally themselves with other electoral blocs at election time only with the agreement of higher party organs (§4.6).

As noted above, the system of checks and balances appears to be less stringent overall than in some of the other parties. On the other hand, the personal role of the leader is greater than in the CPRF, URF and Unity. This paradox may be attributed to two factors: firstly, Yabloko terms itself an association, and hence the links between different parts of the organisation are likely to be looser than in the more strictly disciplined atmosphere of Unity or the more complicated alliance that is the URF. Secondly, despite its liberal image and rhetoric, it should not be forgotten that Yabloko was originally formed as the ‘Yavlinsky-Lukin-Boldyrev bloc’ and thus the personal role of the leaders was a focal point from the start. In practice, the images of Yabloko
and Yavlinsky are closely intertwined. Yet it is not a charismatic party, since its original leadership comprised a *troika* rather than Yavlinsky alone, and Lukin is still involved. Furthermore, its formation has been by a mixture of territorial penetration and diffusion. In this respect it is difficult to characterise the party in Panebianco’s terms.

### 5.1.6 Comparison on Key Points

The foregoing examples have concentrated on the relationships between different party bodies and their control over one another. However, the party statutes also lay down various procedural guidelines, which are summarised in figure 5.6. One factor which is hardly mentioned in the party statutes is the relationship between the party organisation and the party in office, especially in the State Duma. In three cases – the CPRF, URF and Yabloko – the Duma faction is led by the party organisation leader; in the LDPR’s and Unity’s, they are not. However, this does change the impression of the LDPR as a charismatic party, since the fraction leader is his son.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>URF</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meets at least every</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinarily called by</td>
<td>Central committee, central auditing commission or 1/3 of members</td>
<td>Leader, supreme council or 1/3 of organisations</td>
<td>Federal political council, auditing commission, or 1/3 of regional branches</td>
<td>Political council, central auditing commission or 1/3 of organisations</td>
<td>Central council, auditing commission, or 1/3 of regional branches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>URF</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Term of Office</td>
<td>Until next congress</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected directly by Congress?</td>
<td>No – from within central committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – out of co-leaders</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leader = State Duma leader?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (but party leader’s son)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Leaders</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>URF</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointed by</td>
<td>Regional conference</td>
<td>Party leader</td>
<td>Regional conference</td>
<td>Regional conference</td>
<td>Regional conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable to higher level?</td>
<td>Yes – must inform federal level</td>
<td>Yes – can be removed by party leader</td>
<td>Executive chairman must be approved by central exec.</td>
<td>Yes – can be removed by presidium or by regional conference</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5.6: Comparative features of party organisations*
Examination of the key organisational features has shown that some of the hypotheses based on Panebianco’s model hold true in Russia, but not all. The CPRF was seen to exhibit exactly the opposite features of institutionalisation from those expected. The LDPR appeared to confound Panebianco’s theory, but closer examination revealed that it is, in reality, an institutionalised structure wholly dependent on the leader. Thus it cannot be argued that the party is strongly institutionalised, even if it has a comprehensive network of branches. The URF confirmed the theory that a party formed by the amalgamation of pre-existing movements results in a less centralised structure. On paper, Unity appears better institutionalised than might be expected, but it is too soon to say whether this will be replicated in reality, and the precedents from analogous experiments suggest that Panebianco’s theory may yet hold true. Yabloko appeared to confound the typology. Overall, though, the validity of the hypotheses advanced earlier is reasonably high. Given that it was not conceived with any notion of Russian multi-partism, this suggests that Panebianco’s framework may offer some universal explanatory power.

Nonetheless, this first section has examined only the theoretical institutionalisation of the parties. The next part looks at the practice.

5.2 Party Organisations in Russia: The Practice
One of Panebianco’s criteria of institutionalisation is the extent to which there is a correspondence between the statutory norms and the actual power structure of a party.29 Do the actual relationships between centre and periphery vary from those laid out in the statutes? To answer this question, it is necessary to move beyond the theory and observe the way in which parties function ‘on the ground’. The following section presents a fuller picture of the reality of centre-periphery relations in the five parties, based mainly on observations in Moscow and the case study regions between October 1999 and May 2001, and also on internal party literature.

5.2.1 CPRF
It will be recalled that the democratic centralism of the CPRF creates an indirect chain of election to the party congress in Moscow and a information ‘transmission belt’ back down to the regional and district level. How this works in practice can be seen from events in Ul’yanovsk surrounding the VII congress of the CPRF in early December 2000. The arrangements began in the summer, when representatives of the PPOs came together to hold meetings at district level. These meetings elected the district party

---

29 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.59.
committees (raikoms) — each about ten strong — and delegates to the regional conference, on the basis of one delegate for every ten members. That conference, which took place in the autumn of 2000, then elected the regional committee (obkom) and five delegates to attend the party congress. The delegates did not make public speeches in Moscow, but the concerns of the Ul'yanovsk organisation were printed in Pravda, the party’s newspaper. Aleksandr Kruglikov, the first secretary, reported on the congress to the Ul’yanovsk regional committee plenary session in late January 2001. The members of the committee relayed this to their respective district party meetings in February, a process in which the five delegates who had actually attended the congress also participated. This procedure is broadly as laid out in the statute, but the above information perhaps places the rules and regulations in context.

Two other tenets of democratic centralism listed in the party statute are the necessity for lower party bodies to report to higher ones, and the obligatory implementation of decisions from a higher party level. The necessity of implementing instructions from the central committee has been emphasised by regional leaders at party meetings attended by the author. Nonetheless, communication is not always as formal as that laid out in the statute. The first secretaries of all three CPRF regional organisations in the study are members of the both the State Duma and the central committee. Thus they are well-placed to elucidate the latest position of the centre when they spend their customary week per month at home. Furthermore, visits from central committee personnel provide feedback in both directions. When one of the secretaries of the central committee, Nikolai Bindyukov, visited Ul’yanovsk for the 130th anniversary of Lenin’s birth (22 April 2000), he met various activists informally when a wreath was being laid on the city’s main statute of Lenin, and thereafter held formal meetings. It was maintained that there been a ‘constructive discussion’: he had criticised the regional branch for insufficient attention to the development of a youth section, and they in turn had voiced grievances about the CPRF’s and Zyuganov’s recent electoral campaigns. As a result, he claimed, both sides were better informed.

---

31 The concerns highlighted were: (1) 'The central committee pays little attention to the theory of the development of the communist movement and the war of class in contemporary society' and (2) 'The central committee fights poorly for the honour and dignity of the party and of communists. It is essential to work out a method of countering attacks on communists and the CPRF'. [Pravda, Special publication for the VII congress of the CPRF, December 2000, p.iii].
33 ibid., No. 3 (64), March 2001, p.2.
Accountability of the regions to the centre does exist, therefore, but is less rigid than may be inferred from the party statute alone.

Another of the provisions included in the party statute is the right of free criticism, which is used frequently both in an upward and downward direction. Leaders often make public criticism of their subordinates. In his speech to the December 2000 congress, Zyuganov said that ‘where there is little party work, the results are modest in the extreme. The populations of these areas do not come to [us]. It is necessary to improve the activities of [10 named, along with their chairmen] regional committees.’ Regional leaders also criticise district organisation committees in front of their colleagues. At the plenary session of the CPRT republican committee in May 2000, the first secretary of the committee, Aleksandr Saly, reproached various activists by name, accusing them of elevating personal ambition over party obligations and failing to appear at meetings. Similarly, in his speech to the Ul’yanovsk regional committee plenary session on 27 January 2001, Kruglikov was critical of six district organisations in which, he claimed, ‘there had been no positive progress for years’. Representatives of lower party organs are equally vocal about their superiors. A transcript of the meeting from 27 January 2001 reveals, amongst others, the following comments:

‘The regional organisation was not prepared for the elections. We needed...[its] support. Then there would have been a different result in Novospasskoe district.’ [The Novospasskoe district organisation was one of those criticised by Kruglikov, cited above.]

‘As far as the agreement [to support gubernatorial candidate] Shamanov was concerned, it should have been done openly and directly at a conference. It was cowardice to do otherwise!’

‘Today’s speech by [Kruglikov] was...a good one. But I should qualify this. Kruglikov needs to spend more time here in his region. There’s plenty to do at home!’

‘We haven’t been informed about the congress. We haven’t been told anything concrete about work in the rural districts. That’s not right!’

---

34 Interview, Nikolai Gavrilovich Bindyukov, Secretary for International Relations, CPRF central committee, 26 April 2000.
35 G.A. Zyuganov, Politicheskii otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPRF VII S’ezdu: Doklad Predsedatelya TsK KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p.44.
36 Author’s notes from plenary session of republican committee, CPRT, 27 May 2000.
'The most important problem is [the lack of] young members. Sporadic
initiatives are not enough. The regional committee has no systematic ideas
for working with youth.'

A similar picture has emerged at other CPRF meetings attended. At the aforementioned
CPRT session, strong criticism of the party's election strategy in Tatarstan was voiced,
with one speaker even calling for a vote on Saly's continued leadership. It may appear
counterproductive to encourage constant criticism, yet this criticism is sometimes
heedled. In his closing remarks, Saly launched an equally strong personal attack on this
member, but did not reject one of his proposals regarding internal organisation, which
he promised to bring up at the next executive meeting. In Ul'yanovsk, Kruglikov took
account of the various accusations levelled at him, rejecting those he felt unjustified and
qualifying others. These responses indicate that, whilst such internal criticisms may
generate more heat than light, they can also act as a useful forum for exchange of ideas
inside the party, allowing it to provide a more unified external position and leading to a
more lively internal party community.

Hill and Frank noted that the upward channels of communication in the CPSU
were relatively undeveloped, since argument with superiors was considered subversive
and usually proved detrimental to the critic's career. Given that the CPRF is simply
one political party of many, and that career advancement no longer depends upon it
(except for the few who desire a political career within its ranks), it is perhaps inevitable
that criticism will be less muted. Furthermore, the majority of CPRF activists in these
regions serve the party out of belief in its ideas and are in any case too old to progress
beyond the district or regional level (as will be seen in the next chapter). Thus they are
more willing to criticise what they see as ideological or political mistakes than were
career-orientated CPSU members. The extent to which critics' views are in fact raised
at the highest level is, of course, not known, but through their central committee
membership all three first secretaries are well-placed to relay the views of their regional
organisations back up the 'transmission belt'. They are also free to ignore dissenting
voices within their own organisations.

A key area in which the centre-region relationship can be determined is the
matter of candidate selection. The statute states that the congress chooses candidates for
federal elections (§28). However, the process is somewhat more complicated than this.
For the State Duma elections, in accordance with the electoral law, the party list is
divided into a central list and various regional groupings. A special 'personnel

38 Hill & Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, p.84.
commission' of the central committee determines the order of the central list. For the regional lists, every organisation proposes candidates, which are vetted by the commission. The regional leaders in each area meet to establish the order of candidates who pass the vetting process, and the lists are then approved or amended by the commission. The central committee must approve the entire list before putting it to congress for the final adoption. According to Bindyukov, in 1999 the third-placed candidate on the list – Aman Tuleev – was replaced by Vasili Starodubtsev through this process, since the former’s loyalty was in question. (Had he resigned from the leading troika he would have rendered the CPRF ineligible to stand for election.) The majority of candidates on the central list in 1999 were not actually party members, suggesting that, in Panebianco’s terms, there was less autonomy vis-à-vis the external environment than might be expected from the strongest party in contemporary Russia.

As regards single-member district (SMD) candidates, regional organisations are encouraged to nominate party members, failing which, non-members who are close ideologically to the party. In the event that no suitable candidate is found, the regional organisation either proposes that its voters support one of the other registered candidates or else encourages them to vote ‘against all’, as happened in Samara constituency 152 in the 1999 State Duma election (see chapter four). According to Bindyukov, the party supported forty-six non-party candidates in 1999.

In regional elections, the main initiative appears to lie with the regional organisation itself. In by-elections to Ul’yanovsk’s legislative assembly in June 2000, the leadership of the regional committee approached a non-party aviation director to be its candidate in one seat. When he agreed, the executive officers and the regional committee discussed the matter before the relevant district committee adopted him. In the July 2000 gubernatorial election in Samara, one of the advisers to Viktor Tarkhov, 39 Interview, Nikolai Gavrilovich Bindyukov, Secretary for International Relations, CPRF central committee, 26 April 2000; Federal’nyi zakon ‘O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Law No. 121-F3 (24 June 1999), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 122-123 (2231-2232), 1 July 1999, pp.9-16 (Pt. 1); ibid., No. 125-126 (2234-2235), 3 July 1999, pp.9-16 (Pt. 2), §51.11. This provision has since been removed from the legislation for State Duma elections [Federal’nyi Zakon ‘O vnesenii izmeneniya v punkt 11 stat’i 51 Federal’nogo zakona “O vyborakh deputatov gosudarstvennoi Dumy Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’, Law No. 35-F3 (12 April 2001), Vedomosti Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 12 (245), 21 April 2001, §575, p.23.]

the candidate whom the CPRF was supporting, claimed that the central organs of the party did not want to risk being associated with someone who was almost certain to lose, and had left the regional organisation to shoulder the responsibility.\textsuperscript{42} This could not be confirmed directly with the party.

The final aspect of centre-regional relations requiring examination is the financial relationship between the two levels. Are regional organisations dependent on the centre for subsidy, or are they self-supporting? Unsurprisingly, parties in general (not just the CPRF) are very reluctant to divulge information on their financial affairs, although it should be easier to obtain information in future with the introduction of the new law ‘On Political Parties’, which forces parties to operate more openly in this respect. Nonetheless, some fragmentary data are available. The statute states that the party’s income should come from membership fees, charitable donations, party fund-raising events, commercial ventures, and vaguely-defined ‘other non-illegal revenues’. The membership fee should amount to 1 per cent of a member’s income, except for pensioners and students, for whom the figure is 0.5 per cent. (In Ul’yanovsk, students apparently pay nothing.\textsuperscript{43}) The income from membership fees is divided 20-60-20 per cent respectively among the relevant PPO, the regional committee, and the central committee in Moscow (§39, CPRF statute).

Bearing this in mind, some simplified accounts are available for the Samara regional organisation in 2000, as shown in table 5.1. These data raise almost as many questions as they answer. For example, it is not known whether the membership fees listed amount to the total collected in the region, or the 60 per cent that had been allocated to the regional organisation. In the first scenario, 29,984 roubles (=c.\$1,035) would have been kept by the PPOs and the same amount sent to Moscow. In the second, the PPOs and the centre would each have received 46,620 roubles (=c.\$1,660), with a total membership fee income of 233,200 roubles (=c.\$8,320). Assuming that the party’s claim of 4,000 members in the region is correct, this would amount to a mean of 35 roubles or 58 roubles per member, depending upon which estimate is used. In either event, 85.5 per cent of the regional party’s income in 2000 came from membership fees. It is not known whether the remainder came from regional donations or from a central

\textsuperscript{42} Interview, Aleksandr Pavlovich Ovchinnikov, Assistant to Viktor Tarkhov (Candidate to the governorship of Samara province), 3 July 2000.
Table 5.1: Simplified accounts of Samara regional CPRF committee, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Planned (Roubles)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Actual (Roubles)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>183,500</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>163,689</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which from membership fees</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>139,920</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Planned (Roubles)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Actual (Roubles)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Committee</td>
<td>44,800</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>42,701</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire of room in Public Political Centre building</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12,712</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform. centre</td>
<td>35,900</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>35,673</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass-political work</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>17,575</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy of party organisations</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6,817</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised expenditure</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing Commission</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>47,500</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>183,500</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>164,430</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

subsidy, but it is clear that the regional organisation was broadly self-financing in 2000. The planned income forecast suggests, though, that membership fee collection was less efficient than the regional committee had predicted 'at the start of the year, with a shortfall of 31,080 roubles (=c.$1,110), or approximately a fifth of the intended figure. This was balanced by reduced expenditure, but still meant that fees provided less than the anticipated 93.2 per cent of income.

On the expenditure side, it can be seen that roughly a quarter of expenditure was on the work of the regional committee itself, and about a tenth on dissemination of the party message among the ‘masses’. There are a couple of unclear references, however: it is assumed that ‘subsidy of party organisations’ refers to a downward dispersal of funds to the district committees and PPOs, but this is not explicit. Also, it is not obvious whether ‘inform. centre’ refers to the dissemination of information or to the money spent on keeping the central party organs informed of developments in the region. Just under a third of the total expenditure is unaccounted for in the data available.

In Ul’yanovsk, the party accounts are not available publicly, but a speech by Kruglikov in January 2001 revealed that the Ul’yanovsk branch was commended by the central committee for contributing 57,000 roubles to the central party coffers the

---

44 Trudovaya Samara, No. 3 (231), 7 February 2001, p.2. Taking the exchange rate on the first day of every month in 2000 gives a mean exchange rate of just over $1=28.00 roubles for the year. Thus the total budget was around $5,850.
previous year, exceeding its target by a factor of 6.7. Details of the CPRT’s financial affairs are unavailable. From those few details elaborated upon here, it seems that relatively strong party organisations such as those in Samara and Ul’yanovsk are broadly self-financing from membership fees. Undoubtedly, financial independence strengthens their positions relative to the centre.

5.2.2 LDPR
The first section of this chapter showed that the LDPR is the most leader-dominated of the parties under observation. This seems to be replicated in reality. At the party’s V congress in April 1994, Zhirinovsky was confirmed as leader until 2004 – an unprecedented term. Zhirinovsky is the sole formulator of party ideology, and produces copious quantities of literature expounding upon his political views. Indeed, he has suggested that ‘by the quantity and quality of [his] published works’ he should be compared with Lenin, whose output he has apparently now overtaken. Zhirinovsky’s views on party organisation are laid out in one of these tracts:

‘An important organisational principle for the LDPR is that of wide-ranging party democracy. […] All members of the LDPR are entitled to full access to party conferences. […] At conferences there should be three delegates from every lower party organisation.’

This wide-ranging democracy only goes so far, however!...

‘No conference at regional or town level should take place without the agreement of the centre. For holding non-sanctioned conferences, the co-ordinator will immediately be removed from his party leadership position and excluded from the party. If a co-ordinator violates party discipline so crudely, he’s either a renegade or a crackpot. Such independence needs to be treated as an act of direct sabotage.’

For the application of this rule in practice, one need look no further than Ul’yanovsk, where three regional co-ordinators were appointed and relieved of their posts in the eighteen-month period from October 1999 to March 2000. In Samara, a similar situation existed in 1998. For other disciplinary problems, Zhirinovsky recommends that a team of three – a member of the central party apparatus, the ‘curator’ for the

---

48 V.V. Zhirinovsky, 10 let LDPR 1989-1999 (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), pp.54-55.
49 ibid., pp. 55-56.
particular area, and a deputy of the State Duma from the LDPR – should travel to the region to resolve the matters.

Nevertheless, communication is not always in the form of a directive from above. When the regional co-ordinating council in Samara decided to support Titov in the 2000 gubernatorial election, it was required by party rules to inform the central apparatus and obtain its approval. According to the LDPR’s co-ordinator there, agreement was given relatively easily, since the regional branch was adjudged to know the situation better than the centre.\textsuperscript{50} The converse is also true, however. As was noted in the previous chapter, in Ul’yanovsk a prominent party office-bearer who supported Goryachev’s re-election bid without authorisation was quickly relieved of his post.

The LDPR can be viewed as a propaganda machine, organised from the centre outwards, rather than a political party in the normal sense. In an internal party brochure for district committee chairmen, branches are depicted as the foundation of a centralised system of information dissemination. For example, when pickets are being organised, district organisations should use only slogans recommended by the central apparatus, and should not criticise the government or president, since that is the prerogative of the party leader. Furthermore, they are encouraged to hold sanctioned pickets, agreeing with the district administration to meet at the same time and place each week. Non-sanctioned pickets should last ‘15-20 minutes, or until the militia arrive’. If activists are arrested, they are encouraged to pay any fine necessary, keep the receipt, and obtain a refund from the party.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, the relationship with district leaders should be pragmatic, rather than ideological:

‘If the leader of the party organisation has a good relationship with the administration, the party is highly successful in elections, and vice versa. […] In relations with the administration, skilful use can be made of disagreements between different power structures and personnel. It is also necessary to have concrete information [on them]… and use it for our purposes. […] At election time… it is worth supporting the existing head of administration if he has a better or equal chance relative to other candidates.’\textsuperscript{52}

As seen in chapter four, this is exactly what happened in Samara, when the LDPR backed Titov’s gubernatorial campaign, despite earlier having criticised the way he ruled the province. The central apparatus also plays a large role in other aspects of propaganda dissemination: it can provide texts for local newspapers, pay for editorial

\textsuperscript{50} Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 4 July 2000.
\textsuperscript{51} Lopatin (ed.), Metodika raboty raionoi organizatsii LDPR, pp.36-39.
space, rent premises, and send party literature and videos. It also invites local party officials to Moscow training schools to brief them on effective campaigning (except in the far east regions, where it is cheaper for the central apparatus personnel to go there); organises trips to the regions by central party officials; and is in frequent contact with them by fax and telephone. 53

5.2.3 URF

As was seen earlier, the URF structure features many checks and balances. It was hypothesised that this is because of the compromises necessary to unite numerous disparate organisations. Although it is very early in the life of the new party, this appears to have been borne out at the founding congress. Gaidar issued an ultimatum that his contingent would vote against the new statute unless the party council was granted the power to examine issues within the jurisdiction of the FPC, a position from which Khakamada and Kirienko dissented. Despite the fact that the congress had already rejected the proposal, ultimately the measure was approved. 54 This significantly strengthened Gaidar's position within the party, since most of the regional organisations were based on the old Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR) infrastructure. Through their representation on the party council, these regional organisations effectively were given a veto on decisions of the FPC. Similarly, the congress decided that party members need not fulfil party directives if they disagreed with them personally, which marks a significant departure from the strong party discipline observed in the other parties. This has led to speculation that Nemtsov will be leader of the party in the formal sense only. 55

At the regional level, conflict over the balance of power between the different organisations was seen also in Samara region, where there was a battle over whether the Voice of Russia movement should have more places on the co-ordinating council than the other participants. 56 The author's observations in Ul'yanovsk took place mainly from October 1999 to summer 2000, when the regional branch was undergoing the turbulent birth process outlined in the previous chapter. At that stage the split was not about the balance of power between organisations, but rather over which of the Grinberg and Povtarev branches was the legitimate one. At two conferences of the Povtarev-led organisation in May and June 2000, a minority of three or four delegates –
allied to Grinberg – raised objections to every motion, and managed to cause sufficient confusion to postpone the election of the political council by three months. Nonetheless, Povtarev proved adept at controlling the agenda in other respects, as was clear when delegates were elected to a conference in Moscow. The two nominees favoured by the leader (himself and the chairman of the youth section) were proposed as a slate, with no opportunity given to nominate any other candidates, and the motion was approved overwhelmingly. The situation since the founding party congress in May 2001 may have changed somewhat, although the latest information obtained is that there is still factionalism within the branch.

In terms of centre-regional links, day-to-day contact is maintained mainly by e-mail and the internet. The URF, as a party of younger members with more links to the business class, is more prepared to embrace new technology than the more established parties. Although the financial relationship between the two levels is not known in any great detail, until January 2001 the regional organisation existed on the basis of private sponsorship, mainly from Povtarev himself. According to the regional staff, since January 2001 there has been a subsidy from Moscow, but of modest proportions, and local finance is still the main means of support.

The amalgamation of the various URF participants into one organisation will undoubtedly alter the balance of power within the party. At the moment it is possible only to utilise past experience as a guide to future events. Furthermore, in some cases the party structure exists more in theory than in practice; in many areas the URF’s territorial penetration is limited to the regional centre, with little in the way of organisation in rural areas. Only in the fullness of time will it be possible to establish with any certainty the true relationships and power balance between the centre and the regional organisations.

5.2.4 Unity

As laid out in the statute and outlined in section 5.1.4, the structure of Unity seems to give priority to the central organs and rely on decisions from them to be implemented by regional organisations. The fact that the party is still in the early stages of construction means that its first priority is actually to form the organs which are listed in the party statute, not all of which (especially at the local level) exist. At the end of 2000 the party newsletter conceded that the party faction in the State Duma was its most well-
organised body, and that the priority for 2001 was ‘the completion of fundamental party construction’. 59

Since December 2000 there has been a ‘commission for the realisation of the party programme and projects’. Through its planning, the regional activities of the Unity branches are prescribed by the centre, divided into three categories: party construction, economic development, and intervention in the social sphere. Thus, for 2001, the central organs were charged with forming a ‘supreme party school’ to train highly-qualified personnel; creating an ‘electoral technology’ centre (see chapter seven for analysis of ‘electoral technology’); and convening co-ordinating councils for party supporters. Responsibilities of regional and local organisations included the formation of 10-12,000 PPOs (well over one hundred each); setting up public reception centres in each locality; forming youth branches; creating inter-regional centres for party construction; and forming deputy factions in regional legislatures, ‘for the implementation of a unitary party policy centrally and locally’. In the social sphere the party had plans to initiate two hundred studentships, start its own sports club, and support the publication of a series of books on Russian history, amongst other things. 60 One social project was realised in summer 2001, when the party funded the rebuilding of a school which had been damaged by flooding in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 61

The extent to which the party was formed by territorial penetration rather than diffusion could be seen in Ul’yanovsk. In preparation for the founding congress of the party in May 2000, the regional branches held conferences to elect their delegates. At the Ul’yanovsk conference, the chairman briefed district leaders and informed them that he was required to send a list of 1,870 members to Moscow by the following week. They were thus instructed to sign up members to bring the regional branch up to this quota, but were warned to ensure that there were no convicted criminals on the list and to enrol young people so that the regional organisation could form a youth section. Thus, although the total number of members was similar to that of the CPRF on paper, it can be seen that they were recruited in a haphazard manner simply to fulfil a directive from above. The conference itself was convened as a ratification exercise rather than to engender debate – the key decisions had been taken beforehand by the regional political council, and were put to the conference for approval. Any objections were suppressed, and the delegates for the all-Russian congress were proposed as a slate, rather than

61 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 130 (2440), 19 July 2001, p.3.
individually, in order to prevent any objections to individual members of the list. This seems to be a characteristic of the party. A congress in July 2001 to approve the union of Unity and Fatherland lasted all of forty-five minutes, and was likened to a fitness class by one reporter present, in that ‘delegates raised their arms aloft, stood up, sat down, raised their arms aloft, and so on.’

The rules concerning centre-regional discipline were demonstrated with the Ul'yanovsk branch’s refusal to support Vladimir Shamanov for the governorship, disregarding the guidance of the central organs. As was seen in the previous chapter, this led to the demotion of the then leadership and a personnel overhaul after the new governor’s successful election.

Little is known about Unity’s financial affairs. However, it seems unlikely that the party can survive on membership fees alone, which amount to just a few roubles per member per quarter. In its post-registration guise, the Ul’yanovsk branch claimed in May 2001 to have seven hundred members and to charge them two roubles per quarter in membership fees – giving it an income of 466 roubles per month (just over $16 at the time) from this source. However, given the links with administrative heads in Ul’yanovsk, it is likely that administrative resources play a role in financing the organisation in the province. It has been suggested the Samara branch is funded by members of the Samara business elite; as was noted in chapter four, the deputy chairman of the mid-Volga interregional co-ordinating council, Gennadii Zvyagin, is the director of ‘Samaratransgaz’.

Of course, the extent of central control should not be exaggerated. In the first instance, although the tasks facing the regional branches are set out by the centre, their execution depends on local politics. Secondly, the presence of heads of administration and businessmen means that regional branches have their own internal power structures. Given that many of those involved have been active in ‘previous parties of power’, there is a basis for arguing that their primary loyalty is to their own elite group, rather than to the party. However, on the evidence presented here it appears that the party is hierarchically structured, with directives emanating from the centre to the regions, and regional decisions resting with small elites in regional centres. None of the internal

62 Author’s notes, Ul’yanovsk regional Unity conference, 16 May 2000.
64 Interview, Valerii Vladimirovich Nefedkin, First Deputy Chairman, executive committee, Ul’yanovsk regional Unity, 24 May 2001. The figures named by the local leadership are inconsistent with those laid out in the party newsletter [Edinstvo: Byulleten’ partinoi zhizni, No. 2 (9) (2001), p.11], which put membership fees for the first half of 2001 at 50 roubles per quarter and 20 roubles for those on low incomes, with a 100 rouble joining fee (10 roubles for low-income members). Membership fees are examined in more detail in chapter six.
65 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 37 (232), 4 September 2000, p.5; ibid., No. 41 (236), 2 October 2000, p.4.
debate characteristic of CPRF meetings was observed at meetings of Unity attended by
the author.

5.2.5 Yabloko
Section 5.1.5 suggested that Yabloko had been formed by a mixture of territorial
penetration and diffusion, and had only a weakly institutionalised sub-federal
organisation. It was also noted that the role of its leader appeared to be greater than in
most other parties.

This latter fact has been a source of tension within the leading organs of the
party. One of the senior members of the thirteen-member party bureau, Vyacheslav
Igrunov, has argued that the leadership is overly concentrated on Yavlinsky, and that
some responsibilities should be more evenly distributed amongst the leading personnel
of the party.\(^{66}\) The IX party congress in October 2000 took several decisions relating to
leadership, including the enlargement of the central council (from forty-one to sixty
members), and the replacement of the three vice-chairmen positions with one vice-
chairman and a five secretaries, each responsible for a different sphere of party work.
Thus the observations based on the statute appear to have attracted criticism in reality.

As to the sub-federal structure of the party, it was noted in chapter four that
Yabloko has organisations in all three regions in the case study, albeit of differing
strengths. At the central level, Yabloko’s central apparatus divides Russia into various
overarching districts. (Ul’yanovsk and Samara are grouped together with Astrakhan,
Volgograd, Saratov, Penza and Kalmykiya to form a Lower Volga district.) It assigns a
curator to each district, who co-ordinates relations between the regional branches and
the central organs of the party. There are frequent meetings between the regional
chairmen and their respective district curators, taking place both locally and in Moscow.
The Tatar branch claims to speak to Moscow personnel approximately twice per
month.\(^{67}\) Co-ordination takes the form not only of vertical one-to-one meetings, but
also of horizontal co-ordination between the chairmen of the various regions within the
district.

The vicissitudes of the Samara regional branch, highlighted in chapter four, give
some illustration of the centre-regional spheres of influence. When one conflict relating
to re-registration and exclusion of members could not be resolved locally, the party’s
central auditing commission was brought in to examine the question. On the other

\(^{66}\) Kommersant’, No. 208 (2003), 4 November 2000, p.2; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 169 (2479), 12
\(^{67}\) Interview, Anatoliy Ivanovich Perov, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 23 May 2000.
hand, the exclusion of a former regional leader was a decision taken at the regional level alone – enacted by the regional conference on the initiative of the regional political council. In Tatarstan there are few problems of internal party co-ordination, since the Yabloko branch consists of only a dozen or so people, and, as noted in the previous chapter, the party’s identity is effectively submerged in that of RIZ.

Financial links between the centre and the regions are unclear. The Lower Volga curator in Moscow said that, in general, the central apparatus encourages branches to raise money locally where possible, but that the centre also helps local organisations where necessary. (He cited an example of legal fees in a fight over party literature in Saratov.) However, no specific details about the three case study branches were provided. According to Yabloko’s deputy chairman in Tatarstan, the organisation is run on a very low budget, since Moscow does not consider the Republic a priority, and firms that donate money to the party are prone to intimidation by tax inspectors. Various members of the Ul’yanovsk organisation have alluded to ‘money from Moscow’ funding the main part of the association’s activities, but have been no more specific.

Finally, candidate selection in regional elections is a matter for the regional organisations themselves, with the agreement of the centre, as laid out in §4.4 of the party statute. In the 1999 State Duma election regional party organisations were allowed to nominate their own SMD candidates, and, according to the district curator, the central apparatus intervened only in controversial cases. In Ul’yanovsk the party put up one candidate out of a possible two, who had long been active in the party – Anatolii Nechaev, the former (and later re-instated) regional chairman. Nechaev’s campaign was firmly identified with Yabloko. In Samara the party took the opposite approach, nominating just one candidate in five constituencies (although it had planned to field two more, who failed to collect enough signatures) and supporting independent candidates in the others. According to the campaign organiser, agreements were reached between the candidates and the party after registration. By supporting non-member candidates, however, the party faced a problem of loyalty. One former candidate re-emerged a few months later as a leading participant in the newly-formed Unity branch. In Tatarstan it nominated two candidates out of five, one of whom was the editor of an opposition newspaper. However, the regional chairman claimed that the

66 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 49 (244), 27 November 2000, p.5.
69 Interview, Aleksandr Landau, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters, 28 April 2000.
70 Interview, Irina Anatol’evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000.
choices had been imposed centrally: the candidates lived in Tatarstan, but were not members of the party or chosen by the regional organisation.

It was observed in the first part of this chapter that Yabloko was the party with the least well-defined structure on paper. It can be seen from this overview that such diversity also exists at the regional level. The organisations are small in membership terms, but various factions can exist even in such a small group. Indeed, the fact that decisions are restricted to such small cadres may actively encourage such factionalism, since it is easier to influence fellow members in a tightly-knit group than in mass organisation.

5.3 Everyday Party Life: Some Case Studies
Party life involves more than conferences and choosing personnel. With the aid of some selected case studies, the final section of this chapter aims to give an indication of the activities undertaken by party branches at the local level. It is not intended to be a full and comprehensive examination of party meetings in every party in every location. Rather it seeks to give a flavour of the everyday life of the parties by providing a few snapshots of the middle Volga branches of the CPRF and Yabloko.71

5.3.1 CPRF
The CPRF in all three locations has a full and active party life that continues between elections. As the only party with a pre-1991 heritage (albeit of a radically different form), many members have known each other for years, if not decades, and meet regularly. The CPRT in Kazan', for instance, has meetings in some capacity almost every day. A group of older members meets regularly every Monday lunchtime in a public hall, essentially in a social capacity. Regular meetings of the heads of PPOs and district branches in Kazan' take place in the party's modestly-sized headquarters, which lies near the city centre and serves as the hub of the party's activities. It is also used as the CPRT's public office where ordinary citizens are able to pick up party literature. Volunteers keep the building staffed at most times of the day and early evening. Once a month an information evening, open to all members, is held at the Lenin House Museum. (This is the building in which Lenin lived from 1888 to 1889.) Usually it is the secretaries who chair the meetings, since Saly is often in Moscow on State Duma business. The evening begins with a short talk on some general topic, such as local geology, with the opportunity for questions afterwards. There, the chairman and

71 The author attended more local meetings of these two parties than any other, and thus they have been selected for this section. Meetings of the other three parties were observed during fieldwork for the current study, but mostly at the regional rather than district level.
leading committee members comment on the current Russian political situation, and inform members about the party’s activities nationally and locally. Thereafter there is a chance for discussion, and the meeting closes, lasting approximately two hours.\textsuperscript{72}

In Samara the party has two bases – an administrative headquarters where Romanov works and a room in the Samara Public Political Centre, a building shared with other organisations. The latter is used as a public office, and the room is staffed by retired party volunteers. It also has small offices in other parts of the region. For instance, in the Soviet-built oil town of Novokuibyshevsk (population approximately 117,000) the party has premises just off the main street, but they are not open all the time.

According to the Samara branch’s report to the VII party congress in December 2000, one of the activities it undertakes is the formation of political clubs, which are run by two of the branches in Samara city. The emphasis is on discussion of politics and ideology rather than on party business. One of Romanov’s contributions in 2000 was a talk about life in the State Duma, and other meetings included discussions on the works of Lenin, with contributions from several academics. The meetings are open to the public, should they be desirous of participation.\textsuperscript{73} Of course, there is a secondary purpose to these clubs, which is to motivate members and increase the solidary incentives to participation.

Party life in Ul’yanovsk is no less varied. The regional headquarters is a small building near the city centre with symbolic significance – it was used as a planning centre during the Revolution. Maintaining the Soviet tradition, a notice-board in the street features display copies of the latest editions of Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya and the locally-produced party newspaper, Levyi Marsh. The regional headquarters is also the public office, once again staffed by volunteers on a rota basis. All four party district branches of Ul’yanovsk city are based there, meeting once a month to collect membership fees and plan activities.\textsuperscript{74} On symbolic communist days – such as Lenin’s birthday (22 April), International Workers’ Day (1 May) and the anniversary of the October Revolution (7 November), members of the party congregate on Lenin Square, opposite the regional administration building, to lay a wreath on the statue there. Bearing in mind that Lenin was born a few hundred metres from the square in question, the Ul’yanovsk party places particular emphasis on these commemorations.

\textsuperscript{72} Author’s notes from one such meeting attended 25 May 2000, and discussions with various party members in the course of the week surrounding it.
\textsuperscript{73} Iz opyta raboty regionalnykh i mestnykh organizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), pp.73-75.
\textsuperscript{74} Interview, Valentina Petrovna Popova, Secretary, Zasviyaga district CPRF committee, Ul’yanovsk city, 12 March 2001.
Although this is just an overview of the many activities which the party organises, it can be seen that the CPRF has a lively internal life. Ironically – given that the monolithic nature of the CPSU was arguably one of the factors contributing to its downfall – the CPRF is the party which appears to have the most vigorous internal debates and diverse range of activities in the contemporary Russian political scene.

5.3.2 Yabloko

Yabloko’s territorial penetration is not as great as that of the CPRF, as has been seen in previous chapters. Nonetheless, in Ul’yanovsk the party has a number of small sub-branches which organise their own activities.

Its regional headquarters is located in a slightly dilapidated hotel near the city centre, a building shared with the LDPR, the youth branch of Unity, some small-scale local newspapers, and the occasional guest. (The city’s hotels, most of which were built around the massive Lenin Memorial Complex in the late 1960s, now lie virtually empty apart from such offices.75) This is the usual meeting point for party members, and is manned two or three days per week by the regional chairman or his deputies. During busy periods (e.g., election campaigns) the party employs a press secretary who is based there.

Two parts of the Ul’yanovsk structure merit special attention – the youth section and the rural branches. The youth section has existed sporadically since the 1996 presidential elections, but only one of the original members is still active. It has tended to exist de facto around election periods and de jure at other times. It was reactivated in October 1999 in preparation for the State Duma and presidential campaigns, bringing together approximately twenty young people who had contacted the party. The leader was a 21-year old student of economics at Ul’yanovsk State University, and most of the new members were also studying. The group’s activities were both social and political: occasionally meetings were held simply for the purpose of allowing the members to become acquainted, but they also met on several evenings to collect signatures in support of Yabloko candidates. In keeping with the party name, they launched a publicity stunt on the 7 November October Revolution anniversary, buying a supply of apples and delivering them to hospital patients. (There was some discussion at the planning meeting as to whether this was viable financially; it was suggested that potatoes might be more economical, but this seemed to defeat the propaganda value

---

75 One such hotel, threatened with privatisation in 2000, sought to justify its existence by stating, seemingly without irony, that ‘since 1986 there have been 116 favourable comments in our hotel guest book, including some from foreign tourists’ [Simbirskii Kur’er, No. 63 (1640), 27 April 2000, p.4].
attached to the party’s name, and one perceptive member pointed out that a hospital patient would have limited use for a raw potato in any case.)

Members of the youth movement participated in party activities at both the regional and federal levels. Regionally, two members represented the youth branch on the regional political council. At a regional conference in June 2001, both were re-elected to the nine-member body. The group established links with Yabloko youth organisations in neighbouring regions, although this came about through direct contact rather than through the party structure. The leader travelled to Moscow in November 1999 to participate in the first national conference of Young Yabloko, at which the party’s youth programme was drawn up. The national Young Yabloko structure holds periodic seminars and an annual ‘party school’, in which a couple of members from the Ul’yanovsk branch have participated. Most members drifted away when the electoral cycle drew to a close after the gubernatorial election, although it is likely that it will again be activated in the approach to the 2003-4 electoral cycle.76

It will be recalled from chapter four that Yabloko’s sub-regional infrastructure in the middle Volga is very weak. However, there are a few small groups of activists scattered around the region, usually in single figures. One such branch is in Sengilei, a small town of approximately 9,000 inhabitants seventy kilometres south of Ul’yanovsk city. It consists of three or four activists (all of whom are teachers in the main village school), together with a few sympathisers - a couple of librarians and a pharmacist - who help out at election times. The regional Yabloko leaders travel to Sengilei periodically, meeting the activists either in one of their homes or in a spare classroom of the school. This gives an opportunity to hand over leaflets and party literature, which can be distributed in small quantities around the town, and it also allows the regional leaders to update the Sengilei activists on the activities of the party.

The Sengilei ‘proto-branch’ is one of a few in the region. Although the regional leaders consider it uneconomical to travel extensively to rural districts, there is a growing realisation that local soviet elections provide the most cost-effective method of gaining elected representation at the grass-roots level. However, two factors militate against the strong development of Yabloko in such districts: the local media situation, coupled with fear of involvement. Independent political information is hard to find outside urban centres; in many districts and villages, the only newspapers available are those published by the district or regional administration, and the local state television

76 All information about the Ul’yanovsk regional Yabloko youth section based on notes from meetings attended and conversations with members, October 1999-July 2001.
channels are also under the administration's control. Private television channels often suffer from poor reception, given that broadcast signals are several times weaker than those for the state channels. Were Yabloko to have a strong organisation like the CPRF, it could overcome this problem by relying on local activists. However, it is caught in the 'catch-22' situation of being unable to recruit new members because the activist base which could undertake this recruitment is so small in the first place. The second inhibiting factor is fear: in a small settlement where most people know each other and the head of administration is not sympathetic to the Yabloko cause, people are reluctant to express their sympathies. According to the organiser of the Sengilei group, one teacher who was involved in the group was invited to tender her resignation from the school, although this could not be verified. With only two schools in the town and high unemployment, it can be understood why even those sympathetic to the cause would be unwilling to choose politics over their livelihoods, and this is likely to be replicated in many other villages across Russia. Yabloko will face a continuing struggle to build an effective sub-national organisation.

The aim of this chapter has been to examine the functioning of parties in Russia at three levels: federal, regional and district. It has used three methods to do this: firstly, a theoretical examination of the party structures based on their rules and statutes; secondly, a comparison of these rules and statutes with the reality of party decision-making; and thirdly, a less formal, more anecdotal approach based on various observations of local branches in the middle Volga area. It has been seen that the five parties examined vary in terms of their degree of institutionalisation, organisation and centralisation. The CPRF and LDPR have the most well-developed organisations, yet have markedly differing levels of internal debate and autonomy. On the other hand, the URF and Yabloko are at the opposite extreme, lacking strong regional organisations but allowing those that exist more freedom to operate. Unity is somewhere in between, with strong party discipline but, thus far, only a limited party organisation over which to exert it, and displaying features of administrative resources in its construction.

To examine party organisations, however, we must examine one of the mainstays of these organisations: party members. It is to this that the discussion now turns.

---

77 Information on Sengilei branch from meeting of the group attended by the author on 14 March 2001 and an interview with the leading activist, Vladimir Nidreevich Milhikov, a German language teacher at School No. 1.
6 The Membership

The present chapter continues the discussion of parties in the middle Volga by moving from the party organisations to one of the basic building blocks of party organisations: members and activists.

It will be shown that parties both obtain benefits and incur costs from having members. The first section of the chapter will examine the context of party membership in Russia. Clearly the Russian concept of party membership differs somewhat from that in the West, and even between parties. This section compares the rights and obligations of members in each party and tries to determine the importance of members to each party.

The rest of the chapter is based on empirical data collected in the middle Volga area in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle. The middle section of the chapter looks at why members join parties and become active in politics, and examines the bases of activism. The final section of the chapter seeks to delve deeper into the political mindset of party activists, examining their attitudes to other political parties, prominent politicians and their ideological beliefs.

6.1 Party Members in Context

When analysing the historical development of parties in established democracies, Maurice Duverger pointed out that the concept of ‘membership’ is somewhat ambiguous, and peculiar to each party. At the simplest level, he argued, ‘members’ can be seen as adherents within an organisation, distinguished from supporters, who remain outside.

Party members can bring several benefits to a party. Firstly, they can confer legitimacy on a party organisation by countering the impression of a nomenklatura-based or professionalised organisation. Secondly, members provide ‘outreach benefits’, whereby members, as ‘ambassadors in the community’, influence the views of their peers. Thirdly, a large membership decreases the reliance of party organisations on paid ‘agitators’ and enables them to use their own supporters, thus providing labour benefits. Greater penetration means greater evidence with which to corroborate official results; this in turn means a greater opportunity to ensure that the party’s vote is

---

correctly attributed. (The use of hired ‘agitators’ in election campaigns is discussed more fully in chapter seven.) Fourthly, members may provide recruitment benefits to the party, by providing a network of contacts which can bring others into the party fold, and by reinforcing the legitimacy benefits mentioned above, which may also overcome the new member’s fear of joining a small organisation. Some parallel may be seen with Kuran’s theory of revolution, which hypothesises that in revolutions there is a ‘bandwagon effect’ as more people become involved.³ Fifthly, members can provide linkage and innovation benefits. Not only do they act as ‘ambassadors in the community’, as mentioned above, but through party communication channels they can act as a source of new ideas and sounding board.⁴ Finally, there may be financial benefits in having a large membership, through the payment of membership fees.

However, with these benefits to parties come the attendant costs of ‘servicing’ a large membership. Foremost among these are programmatic costs and opportunity costs. According to May’s so-called ‘special law of curvilinear disparity’, middle-level activists within a party tend to be more ideologically extreme than the party leadership or inactive members, and, especially, the electorate as a whole.⁵ Whether or not this actually is the case in Russia, it can be seen that, theoretically at least, it reduces the party leadership’s ability to influence the direction of the party and could result in its losing support. The second main drawback of maintaining a membership is the opportunity cost to the party. The necessity to communicate with members, together with the time spent holding meetings, needs to be balanced against the potential benefits resulting from them.

Scarrow suggests that the result of this calculus of membership utility determines a party’s desire to have members and the form of that membership.⁶ Where the party considers members beneficial primarily to confer legitimacy on the organisation, a larger and more passive membership will be desired and barriers to membership (which increase the cost of membership to the individual member) will be lower. If, on the other hand, the party primarily wants members for the outreach benefits which they provide, a more active membership will be required and hence the party may impose higher barriers to entry to guard against ‘free riders’. The smaller the group, the more likely is each member to consider his or her action pivotal to its

⁴ Scarrow, Parties and their Members, p.44.
success. As a result, it is possible that the differences in membership figures between parties are partly attributable to the institutional design of the party organisations themselves.

The starting point of an examination of party membership in Russia is §23 of the new law ‘On Political Parties’. This stipulates that party membership is open to all Russian citizens aged over eighteen (except those deemed incapable by a court), but not to foreigners or individuals without citizenship. Membership is voluntary and individual, and members have rights and obligations. An individual can be a member of only one party, and of only one regional branch of that party. Parties cannot restrict membership on the grounds of profession, social standing, race, nationality or religion; and party membership cannot serve as grounds for the restriction of an individual’s rights.

At the time of writing, this legislation has not yet been incorporated fully into the parties’ statutes, which remain orientated towards the previous law ‘On Public Organisations’. (This allowed collective membership as well as individual, and, in principle, allowed foreign citizens to join parties.) Such changes will be made in due course, but an indication of the role of members in the parties hitherto can be gained from these statutes. Not only do they prescribe the organisational structure of the parties, as seen in chapter five, but also lay out the basis of party membership.

It is worth noting that the URF, Unity and Yabloko differentiate between ‘supporters’ – who are less formally attached to the organisation – and ‘members’. No such distinction is made by the CPRF and LDPR. In accordance with the legislation (both current and previous), each party has to have a section in its statute on the rights and obligations of members. An examination of their nature, shown in table 6.1, gives some indication of the differing roles of members within each party. In each case, the numbers in the table reflect the number of clauses in the party statute devoted to each topic.

---

## Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>URF</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be elected to party body</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support in election to elected state office</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party support if elected to executive power</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding higher level party organs to account</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in discussions on party business</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticise party organs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold simultaneous membership of other movements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from party (legal, moral, general)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave party at any time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choose own form of participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represent party if entrusted by leadership</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not implement decisions with which member disagrees in principle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Rights and obligations of party members – number of clauses in party statutes

It should be pointed out that these rights and obligations are theoretical and may differ in reality. For example, even if the CPRF statute does not pledge its members support in standing for elected office, in practice this usually does occur. However, it is not guaranteed by simple membership of the party alone. Perhaps the most significant categories are the ones relating to participation in party discussions and the ability to hold party organs to account, where it will be seen that the CPRF has the highest number of rules guaranteeing these rights and the LDPR the least. Similarly, in the field of party discipline, only the CPRF statute explicitly allows members to criticise any organ or member. (This is carried over from the CPSU.) As noted in chapter five, however, the URF has an innovative clause allowing members not to implement decisions with which they personally disagree, so long as they do not impede the implementation of the decision by others. The other three parties specifically try to minimise internal revolt in their rules by including clauses on not criticising, discrediting or impeding party activities. The CPRF also allows members to join other associations and movements that do not contradict its own programme, presumably to
allow members to belong to bodies such as the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (PPUR) alliance of left-wing and ‘patriotic’ parties. This may have to be revised in light of the new legislation. The LDPR, URF and Unity explicitly forbid simultaneous membership of other public political movements or associations in their statutes.

Although based only on party rules, this preliminary analysis reinforces the conclusion of the previous chapter that the CPRF is the party most open to internal debate, and which most directly encourages the contributions of members to discussion of party business. By contrast, the LDPR appears least receptive to the views of its members, with the other three parties somewhere in between these two extremes.

Various barriers to entry are mentioned in the party statutes. The procedures for joining vary. The greatest barrier to entry exists in Yabloko, which operates a ‘candidate membership’ scheme. Before admitting applicants to full membership of the association, Yabloko requires its members to serve a six to twelve month ‘candidate’ period in a similar manner to the CPSU in Soviet times. Full membership must be approved by a regional conference of members. This is very restrictive, requiring candidates to be active for a year before admitting them, and basing the decision on observed past behaviour. It allows more direct control of the membership by the regional leaders, since membership numbers are small and it is far easier to organise co-ordinated action in favour of or against somebody’s membership application. This exclusivity in turn enables the admission of only those new members who are loyal to the views of the existing ones. Nonetheless, with the new law ‘On Political Parties’, the need for Yabloko to meet the minimum nationwide membership requirement of 10,000 may result in the distinction between candidate and full membership being abolished. This could change the balance of power within branches.

The CPRF operates an analogous but less restrictive version of this system. Applicants need to be recommended by two existing party members of at least one year’s standing, and the application must be accepted by a meeting of the primary party organisation (PPO) to which he or she is applying. This restricts membership to those who know existing members of the party, reducing the risk of ‘hijack’ by outsiders and increasing the likelihood that members will be loyal.

Financial barriers to entry exist in the CPRF, LDPR, Unity and URF, in the form of membership fees. These were touched upon in the previous chapter, in the context of parties’ financial affairs. The membership fees of the URF are not fixed in the statute;

---

9 A broadly similar system was used in the CPSU until 1990, although the applicant had to be recommended by three members of at least five years’ standing.
they are determined by the federal political council. As mentioned already, the CPRF charges each member 1 per cent of his or her income, with reductions for students and pensioners. However, there have been reports that, in reality, it charges these on a voluntary basis. The LDPR also charges 1 per cent of income, with no concessionary rates mentioned in the statute. Unity's membership fee is based on the minimum wage unit (300 roubles from 1 July 2001). It charges a joining fee of 50 per cent of the minimum wage, and a quarterly fee of 25 per cent. Comparison between the two systems is difficult, since it depends on the individual member's income whether a Unity member pays more or less than one in the CPRF or LDPR.

In terms of membership structure, the LDPR would appear to conform most closely to Scarrow's 'legitimacy-seeking' model, whereas Yabloko follows the more purposive and exclusive one. Although the CPRF has arguably been more successful in attracting a large membership than the LDPR, it seems that the latter is more interested in having relatively inactive members at any cost, whereas the CPRF tries to be slightly more discerning as to whom it allows into the fold. At the other extreme, the Yabloko example shows that the party itself does not particularly desire a large and active membership, but is more content with a small cadre-based one.

These hypotheses are borne out when membership numbers in the three case study regions are considered. Adding the membership figures given in chapter two for each party suggests that party membership in Russia as a whole lies at between 0.37 per cent and 0.81 per cent of the electorate, depending upon which estimates are used. In the case study regions, the percentage of party members is slightly higher than the federal average, at least according to the parties' own claims. Around the time of the 1999 State Duma Election, the parties claimed the totals shown in table 6.2.

These figures should be treated with some scepticism, since they are the claims of the parties themselves rather than any independent measure. Nonetheless, since the figures claimed by the parties nationally are likely to be inflated as well, it does give some basic indication that the level of individual party membership in the three case study areas seems to be no lower than elsewhere in Russia, and may even be higher.

---

11 For those on incomes below 2,000 roubles, or about $70, per month, these rates are 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Proposed changes to this would abolish the joining fee and levy a flat 20 per cent per quarter fee (1 per cent for low earners) [Edinstvo: Byulleten' partiinoi zhizni, No. 2 (9) (2001), p.11].
Although there was some analysis of the CPSU membership in its heyday and latter stages, there has been very little research on the membership of contemporary Russian parties. Exact details of the composition of parties' membership are extremely difficult to obtain, since the organisations are reluctant to divulge much information and, in many cases, have not analysed it themselves. Some fragmentary details are available, however. There has been considerable turnover in the CPRF’s leadership organs: of the 412 members of the CPSU’s 1990 central committee (of whom about 350 were from the RSFSR), only fifteen were still present in the central committee of the CPRF elected at the VII congress of the CPRF in December 2000. At that latter congress, it was reported that 99 per cent of the members of regional committees had higher education (although this seems inordinately high, and suggests that the definition of ‘higher education’ was interpreted liberally). In age composition, 8 per cent of regional committee members were under the age of thirty; 45 per cent, thirty to fifty; and 47 per cent over fifty.

12 These figures are the parties' own claims, based mainly on interviews with party personnel in each region in the course of the 1999 election campaign. Notes: (a) CPRT: This was the figure claimed by the CPRT leadership in February 1998, as recorded in I. V. Terent’eva, R. Yu. Belyakov & M. F. Safirov, Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Respubliki Tatarstan (Kazan', 1999), p.69. At its congress in October 2000, the party claimed a lower membership figure of 15,000, as reported in Vremya i Den'gi, No. 200 (928), 24 October 2000, p.2; (b) LDPR Ul'yanovsk figure from election advertisement in Ul'yanovskaya Pravda, No. 199 (21024), 18 November 1999, p.2; (c) In the case of FAR, 'members' are perhaps better described as 'supporters'; (d) Electorate figures are those on 19 December 1999, as listed in V. N. Kozlov & D. B. Oreshkin (eds.), V cborv deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'no Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1999: Elektoral'na a statistika (Moscow: CECNes' Mir, 2000), pp.36-38.


14 Comparison of 'Sostav Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Sovuza, izbranno XXVIII s'ezdom partii', in Materialy XXVIII s'ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), pp.195-199 with Pravda, No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp.1 & 5.

15 Pravda, No. 141 (28253), 5-6 December 2000, pp.1-3.
Regional and local level data are even more difficult to obtain. Of the case study parties in the middle Volga, only the LDPR in Samara and the CPRT in Tatarstan had any idea at all about the composition of their membership, and for the most part the information available was piecemeal. The age distributions given for these two party branches are given in table 6.3, although direct comparison is not possible since they refer to different times and places. It is notable, however, that the CPRT membership was predominantly elderly in the mid-1990s, whereas the LDPR in Samara had a substantially larger proportion of members under the age of thirty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>CPRT Tatarstan, 1994</th>
<th>CPRT Tatarstan, 1997</th>
<th>LDPR Samara, 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 years</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-50 years</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50 years</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6.3: Age distribution of members/delegates, 1994-1999 (per cent)*

Given the patchy and very much incomplete data available on the membership itself, empirical evidence was collected in the three regions in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle on the membership and its interests. This took the forms of questionnaire work, interviews and focus groups. Although, ultimately, fewer samples were obtained than had been hoped for, the evidence nonetheless provides a new perspective on the activities and interests of party members in the mid-Volga region. It is this which is used as the basis of the remainder of this chapter.

An eight-page questionnaire was undertaken at three conferences – two of the CPRT/CPRF (one in Tatarstan and one in Ul’yanovsk) and one of the URF (in Ul’yanovsk). In each case, the conference was attended by delegates from across the region, and it was felt that, though small in number, they would be representative of the parties’ activists in the region as a whole. Unfortunately the survey could not be undertaken at any conferences in Samara, for a variety of logistical reasons, although some of the interviews used as qualitative evidence derive from the province.

The conferences in question were those of the biannual plenary session of the CPRT republican committee on 27 May 2000 (N=21); the second conference of the Ul’yanovsk regional URF branch, held on 24 June 2000 (N=57), and a meeting of the CPRF Ul’yanovsk town and district branch committee in early July 2000 (N=22).

---

16 Data on the CPRT are taken from party congresses held in 1994 and 1997, reported in Terent’eva et al., *Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Respubliki Tatarstan*, pp.81-87. Data on the LDPR are from an interview with Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999. Other data were given to the author in this interview, such as occupational status and education, but the figures totalled considerably more than 100 per cent! Thus they are not recounted here.
Owing to the numerous practical difficulties involved and the infrequency of such conferences, the sample composition differed slightly in each case; the former two were representative samples of regional branches, whilst the latter was a more locally-based group. Furthermore, the small sample sizes render any extra-regional extrapolation highly inadvisable, and thus the responses should not necessarily be taken to reflect those of the party membership as a whole. Nonetheless, containing as they do the most influential and active members in each of the respective party branches, it can be assumed that the internal validity of the sample is reasonably high. Whilst the analysis below may not reflect the views of the entire party membership, it does represent the views of the party 'notables' in the case study regions.

The full methodology, socio-demographic composition of the samples, and the questionnaire itself, appear in appendix A. In essence, the sample of the CPRF in Tatarstan (which will be referred to in the analysis by its proper title of the CPRT) consisted mainly of members of the republican committee, whereas the Ul'yanovsk CPRF sample had a higher proportion of 'rank and file' members. Both of these samples had a predominance of older male members. By contrast, the URF sample was overwhelmingly young, with the majority of respondents aged below thirty and a relatively even male/female split.

The analysis below will focus on three main factors: why members joined, why they became active, and their political attitudes. In the former two cases, the CPRF and URF responses will be compared and contrasted, and then the same questions analysed for the other parties on the basis of more qualitative evidence.

6.2 Joining and Being Active in the Parties of the Middle Volga

6.2.1 The CPRF & URF
The survey featured several questions about how members had joined the party. These included when they had joined and started participating; whether they had earlier been members of the CPSU; what had motivated them to join the party; who or what had influenced their decision to join; whether they had joined on their own initiative or had been invited to join; and how strongly they identified with the party.

Among the CPRF sample there was a very high prevalence of former CPSU members: around three-quarters of respondents (76.7 per cent) had possessed a CPSU party card, the proportion virtually uniform between Tatarstan (76.2 per cent) and Ul'yanovsk (77.3 per cent). Two of the questions asked members when they had become active and when they had joined the party. Most CPRF members who had been
active in the Soviet period gave the date of their first involvement with the CPSU. In itself this indicates that CPRF members view the party quite clearly as the successor to the CPSU, and do not consider the two as separate entities.

In view of this, with a few exceptions it is possible to see the long-standing nature of most members' involvement. Some 16.3 per cent of the CPRF respondents in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk joined the CPSU in the Stalin period before 1953; 14 per cent in the Khrushchev period (1954-1964); 23.3 per cent during Brezhnev's rule; 7 per cent between Brezhnev's death in 1982 and Gorbachev's accession in 1985; and 2.3 per cent during perestroika (1985-91). 32.6 per cent gave their starting date as post-Soviet, i.e., since 1991. This includes those who had understood the question to refer to the CPRF alone. Once the figures are disaggregated, 20.6 per cent of members started to participate for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the remaining 12 per cent were previous members of the CPSU but did not give a starting date. The remaining respondents did not answer. Members are thus either long-standing or relatively recent. The majority became active either before Brezhnev's death or directly with the CPRF in its present form.

By contrast, 91.2 per cent of URF members questioned had not been members of the CPSU. In many cases this can be attributed simply to the fact that most were too young. Only 29.1 per cent of the sample were aged above twenty in 1991, the year in which the CPSU was banned. Nonetheless, even amongst the third of the sample old enough to have participated in Party or at least Komsomol (Young Communist) activities, only a minority of activists had done so or was prepared to admit to it. In other words, as might be expected, they came from a different political milieu from the loyal communists who had retained their membership after the CPSU ban was lifted. As a new organisation, the majority of URF members had only become active within the year preceding the survey (1999-2000). However, a small minority of respondents (10.9 per cent) had been active in the URF's predecessors, such as Democratic Russia, Choice of Russia (CR) and Democratic Choice of Russia (DCR). This suggests that the hard core of long-term active 'democrats' (in the early 1990s sense of the word) were joined by a large wave of new recruits in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle.

Another question asked what had motivated members to join the party. A number of closed categories were given, together with the option of specifying any other motives not listed. Respondents were able to give as many answers as applied, and once again, notable differences existed between the two organisations, as table 6.4 shows.
### Table 6.4: Motives for joining party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>CPRF (%) (N=43)</th>
<th>URF (%) (N=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a more just society</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To initiate reforms which will raise the standard of living</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assist the party reach power</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal of the party programme</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The necessity of opposing the government</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have influence on local politics</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have influence on federal politics</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessity of opposing other parties</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party's position on a particular issue</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority of party leader</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that the CPRF membership, as might be expected of a long-established party, was very much more attracted by programmatic and ideological incentives than by anything else. The vast majority claimed to have joined with the thought of building a more just society – one of the central tenets of communist ideology. The next most frequently cited answers related also to the programmatic side: encouraging reforms to improve the standard of living; the party programme itself; and the desire to help the party into power.

The URF respondents also cited a more just society and reform as their two most important reasons for joining, although their responses were the opposite way around, showing that the URF members lent more weight to economic questions. It must also be assumed that the URF members’ interpretation of economic reform differed from the CPRF’s, since the latter party’s leadership has for years been critical of the sort of market economics preached by the former. Nonetheless, the fact that the URF membership was concerned above all by market reform is consistent with the party programme, since it is dominated by economic policies. Interestingly, though, fewer joined the URF than the CPRF on the basis of the programme per se.

Whilst URF members seemed more concerned about economic reform, they seemed less concerned about the party actually achieving it, as shown by the markedly smaller proportion of URF members than CPRF ones citing ‘assisting the party into power’ as one their objectives. Nonetheless, since the URF is less likely to come into power on the basis of its electoral results alone (although its links with the federal

---

17 The CPRF sample has been treated as an aggregate. Answers are arranged in descending order of the CPRF frequencies, in order better to facilitate comparison between the two parties. The question wording was ‘What motivated you to join the party?’ and the above categories were given. Respondents could also enter their own category under ‘other’.

18 URF party programme: *Pravvi Manifest* (Moscow: SPS, 1999).
executive are closer than those of the CPRF), this may contribute to the lower priority attributed to this objective.

The authority of the party leader was cited by more URF members than CPRF ones, albeit not by many in either case. However, this also reflects the differing organisational strengths and histories of the two parties. The CPRF is in effect a long-established organisation which would exist irrespective of its leader, whereas, at the time of the survey, the URF was a new alliance which owed much to the efforts of several individuals such as Sergei Kirienko, Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada and Anatolii Chubais. Just as interesting are the differing perspectives of the two organisations' memberships with regard to the local and federal political spheres. Whereas the number of CPRF members citing influence on federal and local politics as a motive for joining was broadly similar, a desire for local-level political influence was cited by a fifth of URF respondents, and federal politics by virtually none. This suggests that the Ul'yanovsk activists of the URF were more concerned about playing a role in the local political battle against the then governor than about the nationwide picture. The local-federal difference is possibly attributable also to the vast age difference between the two parties’ memberships. Since many of the URF activists were still students at university and in their early twenties, it could be assumed that their perspectives would be more narrowly focused than those of the CPRF activists, many of whom had been active in politics since the time of Stalin and Khrushchev.

Moving on to the question of what exactly prompted members to join, the responses to this question are listed in table 6.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>CPRF (%) (N=43)</th>
<th>URF (%) (N=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal party press</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work colleagues</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and acquaintances</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local party press</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election literature</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television advertisement for party</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: Triggers to membership

Of the standard answers, the fact that the federal party press and the influence of work colleagues were given as the most popular replies by CPRF respondents is significant. In the Soviet period, the state-controlled newspapers (such as Komsomol'skaya Pravda,

---

19 The question was 'Who or what in particular persuaded you to join the party?'. The list in table 6.5 was given, with the option of entering another category under 'other'.

154
aimed at youth; and *Trud*, aimed at workers) were one of the main methods of propagating the Party's message. Similarly, trade union cells in the workplace formed a major component of the CPSU structure. Thus it is interesting to note that these were two of the most influential factors in persuading members to join, even if the numbers involved are small, accounting for about a fifth of respondents. However, even more noteworthy is the diversity of answers under the category of 'other'. Twenty-six of the forty-three CPRF respondents (ten in Tatarstan and fifteen in Ul'yanovsk) annotated the 'other' category in this question. Of them, twelve (27.9 per cent of respondents) wrote 'conviction' (*ubezhdienie*) as their main reason for joining the party. This implies a greater degree of belief in the party ideals than simple agreement with the party programme. These members seem to have joined the party in the same way as a religious person joins the church. Various other responses were given, including foreign policy (NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, and a reaction to Gorbachev's signing of arms limitation treaties); the political situation in the region and country; and the re-creation of a great Russia. In other words, most of the additional reasons for joining related to either conviction about the party's ideals or conviction about Russia's role in the world.

The URF picture differed markedly from that of the CPRF. It is unsurprising that the party press should be a less commonly cited trigger for joining than amongst the CPRF respondents. The former's newspaper (*Demokraticheskii Vybor*) is read only by a narrow party-based readership, in contrast to the CPRF's widely-available *Pravda, Pravda Rossii, Sovetskaya Rossiya* and local newspapers, which are available at every street corner of Ul'yanovsk and Kazan'. Nor is it surprising that local party press should be cited by virtually nobody, since the URF has no paper of its own in Ul'yanovsk. What is significant, however, is the prevalence of two answers: television advertising and, especially, persuasion from friends and acquaintances.20 The URF carried out an aggressive and patently youth-orientated television marketing campaign at the federal level during the election to the State Duma of December 1999. This appears to have attracted a substantial number of new members. More impressive still, however, is the fact that about three-fifths of URF members cited persuasion from friends as the trigger which brought them into the party. This is backed up by the evidence from the question asking about members' first contact with the organisation, to

---

20 A far smaller proportion of URF respondents - eight of the fifty-seven (14 per cent) - added a response to the list given. Of these, three spoke of the need to improve the living standard of Russians; two cited conviction (one pro-liberal, one anti-communist); one spoke of the need for youth influence in politics; one cited local political change; and the final one had come into the URF simply by being a member of DCR already.
which 70.2 per cent of URF respondents replied that they had been invited to join by other members. This suggests that the recruitment benefits of an expanding membership – whereby those already inside the party can bring acquaintances into the fold – did have some influence in building up the URF’s membership in Ul’yanovsk.

The opposite was true in the case of the CPRF, with 90.7 per cent of respondents claiming that they had joined the party on their own initiative. This would certainly tie in with the answers given to the question of what motivated members to join, which showed that work colleagues, friends and family had influenced only a small minority of members. This should be seen in the context of the huge Soviet socialisation structure, whereby most members presumably came into the CPSU through the Komsomol (Young Communists). Whereas the CPRF seems to be a party of ‘self-starters’, the URF appears to rely more on social networks as a means to recruitment. One notable way that this was achieved was through Ul’yanovsk State University, where a number of new members were recruited through their student circles in the first few months of 2000.

What is interesting is the effect that this has on the identification of members with the organisation. In response to the question ‘How close is your relationship with the party?’, about three in five (61.9 per cent) CPRF members indicated a ‘very strong’ attachment, and a further 28.6 per cent a ‘relatively strong’ one. Less than ten per cent of respondents considered themselves to have a weak or non-existent attachment to the party. By contrast, the URF members identified weakly with the organisation. Only 19.3 per cent of respondents indicated a ‘very strong’ attachment and 21.1 per cent a ‘relatively strong’ one. The plurality (38.6 per cent) indicated a ‘relatively weak’ attachment, while one in five (21.1 per cent) declared no identification with the party at all. This means that the majority of URF members identified only tenuously with the party, and may mean that the wave of members brought in through social network recruitment may not be as loyal to the party’s cause as the self-motivating, long-standing members of the CPRF.

A diverse picture builds up, therefore, of two quite distinct types of membership: loyal communists of many years’ standing, most of whom were already members of the CPSU and the vast majority of whom seemingly joined on their own initiative; and a more detached URF membership which identifies weakly with the party and joined in response to social group networks and television advertising. This must be qualified by recalling the CPRF’s requirement that new members need to be recommended by two existing members of more than a year’s standing. This places some institutional weight
on the social network method of recruitment, but does not necessarily imply that the referee need invite the prospective member to join, rather than the prospective member requesting a party acquaintance to recommend him or her. The institutional barriers to entry in the case of the URF are virtually non-existent, and the result, as can be seen, has been a rapid growth of weakly attached members.

A CPRF focus group undertaken in Ul'yanovsk underlined some of the themes which were apparent from the questionnaire results. Interviews were undertaken with members of three political generations, in order better to understand the differences between younger members, who were not well represented in the survey, and the older ones. With regard to joining, the largest difference was in the degree of self-initiative involved. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the older members had begun participating, exposure to party activities was very easy owing to the Komsomol. The oldest member interviewed, who was the CPRF's representative on the Ul'yanovsk regional electoral commission at the time of the interview, started her active involvement in the early 1950s by becoming a member of the district and city Komsomol committees. Gradually she became more involved until being recommended in 1960 for candidate membership of the CPSU. The middle-aged member made the point that it was impossible to imagine life without the Komsomol, since it was normal to be a member. Her initial enthusiasm was fired by involvement in the construction of the Lenin Memorial Complex in Ul'yanovsk in time for the hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970. While active in the Komsomol she became involved in Party work more generally and joined the CPSU. The main reasons for involvement given by members in the quantitative analysis — the desire to build a just society and belief in the system — were both evident in her memories of this period:

'When we were building the Lenin Memorial, everybody believed in constructing a Communist future. They believed in their motherland, in their government. (...) Lenin showed the way, and we were building towards it: a wonderful future, an enlightened communist society. We believed in what we were doing.'

The belief in a just society as a motive for joining the CPSU was also mirrored in her reflections on the Komsomol itself:

21 The focus group was undertaken at the Ul'yanovsk regional CPRF headquarters on 13 June 2000. Present were five members from three different generations: female, 63 years, began participating in Komsomol in 1951, joined CPSU in 1961; female, 53 years, began participating in mid-1960s; male, 27 years, began participating in late 1990s; male, 25 years, began participating in late 1990s; and male, 21 years, began participating in late 1990s, joined January 2000). Although the interviews took place on party premises, they were conducted without any senior members of the regional party organisation present.
‘The Komsomol was a wonderful organisation. It helped to develop the correct societal attitude: first you think of your country, then you think of yourself. It taught you feelings of responsibility and gave you a sense of closeness to your comrades and friends. My work in the institute [as a teacher] was made much easier because everybody learned to help each other through the Komsomol.’

By contrast, younger members who have joined since the collapse of the USSR (although few in number) have faced a quite different scenario. The nationwide CPSU socialisation structure is gone, and a greater degree of self-initiative is required to join the CPRF. Nonetheless, there is one common link between those interviewed from the older and younger generations: family ties with the party. The oldest interviewee was one of a family of thirteen, all of whom were active in the CPSU. Her father was active in the Revolution of 1917, and apparently at one point met Lenin himself. (It was not clear whether this was during the Revolution or when both were children in Ul’yanovsk — or Simbirsk, as it was then called.) Whilst this family participation may not have been unusual in the 1950s, those who had become involved in the past few years also had similar stories of past family activity in the party. Indeed, one (the twenty-one year old male) said that he had disagreed with his father initially and participated for three months in one of the splinter ‘liberal’ movements, before coming to realise that in his heart he was really a communist like his father.

With the aid of the more qualitative data gained from these interviews, therefore, it is possible to see one of the reasons for the strong organisational base enjoyed by the CPRF in the middle Volga and, indeed, the country as a whole: the legacy of the Soviet period. Since it is the successor party to the CPSU, which enjoyed extreme societal penetration, the CPRF’s members seemingly have a strong belief in the ideology of the party. As such, there is a deep-seated loyalty to its ideals, which has built up over as much as sixty years of active involvement. Since none of the other parties in present-day Russia has anything like this socialisation and time advantage, it is possible to understand why the CPRF is the party with the strongest organisation.

The middle section of the questionnaire attempted to measure the various motivating factors contributing to members’ activism. The development of models of participation was outlined in the first chapter of the study. Based to some extent on the methodology employed in Whiteley et al.’s studies of British party activism, modified slightly to fit the Russian context, it was hypothesised that that activism (Ai) is a

---

function of a calculation of the cost and benefits of involvement; a consideration of the incentive value of selective benefits (tangible and intangible) deriving from involvement; and non-individual and non-rational general incentives to involvement, such as the prevalence of social norms and potential cognitive attachment to the party.

A battery of questions was used in the questionnaire to measure these (see appendix A for details of the questions and how they were scored), using Likert scales. The indicators are outlined in table 6.6, together with the maximum and minimum possible scores using the coding employed. In all cases, the larger and more positive the score, the more the respondent agreed/had participated/felt they could influence politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Max. Score</th>
<th>Min. Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A_i</td>
<td>Activism, based on activity</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_i</td>
<td>Perceived personal influence on implementation of programme</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Personal utility derived from implementation of programme</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_i</td>
<td>Individual cost of activism (positive score implies high cost)</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(O)_i</td>
<td>Selective outcome incentives – individual outcomes deriving from involvement, e.g., obtaining elected office or personal advancement through party membership</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(P)_i</td>
<td>Selective process incentives – pleasure obtained from participation in party activities</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A_l</td>
<td>Altruistic motives for activism</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E_l</td>
<td>Expressive attachment to party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1_l</td>
<td>Social norms (family)</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2_l</td>
<td>Social norms (friends &amp; colleagues)</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3_l</td>
<td>Social norms (colleagues)</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_l</td>
<td>Charismatic attraction to the party leader</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_g</td>
<td>Perceived group influence on implementation of programme</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: Indicators of activism and maximum/minimum possible scores

There were two measures the actual level of activism of this in the questionnaire: a self-assessed evaluation of the amount of time spent on party activities, and a more detailed scale where members indicated how often they had participated in specific activities. On the first measure, the results obtained from the three samples were as listed in table 6.7.

The difference between the CPRF samples can be attributed once again to the fact that the Tatarstan sample contained more leaders and the Ul’yanovsk one more rank-and-file activists. However, more significant is the difference between the CPRF and URF samples in general. Whereas the CPRF sample tended towards being active at least weekly, and in the majority of cases practically every day, the URF sample
showed the exact opposite, with 69 per cent of the sample hardly or only occasionally active.

This view is reinforced when the second measure of activism is examined, based on the actual activities undertaken. The maximum score was 40 and the minimum, 10. (See appendix A for further details.) The CPRF samples in Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk had respective means of 28.83 (standard deviation = 5.34) and 33.19 (S.D = 3.49). By contrast, the mean activism value of the URF was considerably lower, at 15.68 (S.D. = 5.67), not much higher than the minimum score.

In addition to being more closely attached to the party, therefore, CPRF members were considerably more active within it. To some extent this may be attributed to length of membership. Nonetheless, the finding reinforces the impression gained so far that the CPRF is the party with the firmest base of activists. This difference is clearly seen in figure 6.1, where the CPRF activism scale as a whole is superimposed upon that of the URF. The clustering of the two samples at opposite ends of the scale is obvious.

Table 6.7: Frequency of participation (percentage of activists)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of participation</th>
<th>CPRF Tat (%) (N=21)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (%) (N=22)</th>
<th>URF Ul. (%) (N=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardly ever</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to twice weekly</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practically every day</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 The question was ‘How often do you undertake work for the party?’ . The five categories listed above were given as possible answers.
1999-2000 electoral cycle, at federal, regional or local district level. Amongst the CPRF members, fifteen of the twenty-one respondents in Tatarstan had been candidates (71.4 per cent), compared with five of twenty-two (21.7 per cent) in Ul’yanovsk. The impression of the more active, party office-holding and elected office-seeking members of the Tatarstan sample is thus reinforced. (This is not to say, of course, that the membership as whole in Tatarstan is necessarily any more office-seeking, but rather to point out that the sample taken at the Tatarstan regional committee conference was more orientated in this direction than the Ul’yanovsk town and district conference attendees.) By contrast, only three of the fifty-seven URF members sampled (5.3 per cent) had stood for elected office in the previous two years. Arguably this is because the party did not field as many candidates as the CPRF per se, and also that many of them were too young either to hold elected office or even to think about it.

The scores obtained on the remaining measures (listed in table 6.6) are shown in table 6.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>CPRT Tat. (S.D.)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (S.D.)</th>
<th>URF (S.D.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A_1</td>
<td>33.19 (3.49)</td>
<td>28.45 (6.35)</td>
<td>15.68 (5.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_1</td>
<td>34.62 (3.62)</td>
<td>34.92 (7.08)</td>
<td>26.80 (6.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>9.25 (2.80)</td>
<td>7.05 (3.17)</td>
<td>5.58 (3.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_1</td>
<td>-2.44 (3.79)</td>
<td>-0.86 (2.63)</td>
<td>0.21 (2.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(O)_2</td>
<td>2.79 (2.33)</td>
<td>-0.60 (3.42)</td>
<td>-0.10 (2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(P)_3</td>
<td>4.88 (1.73)</td>
<td>5.56 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.71 (2.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A_l</td>
<td>5.53 (0.80)</td>
<td>5.70 (0.80)</td>
<td>3.54 (2.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1_1</td>
<td>4.21 (1.63)</td>
<td>4.60 (1.90)</td>
<td>2.69 (2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2_1</td>
<td>3.77 (1.79)</td>
<td>5.33 (1.32)</td>
<td>2.85 (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3_1</td>
<td>2.69 (2.43)</td>
<td>5.00 (1.41)</td>
<td>2.95 (2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_h</td>
<td>9.50 (1.97)</td>
<td>10.73 (2.09)</td>
<td>6.11 (3.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_T</td>
<td>2.93 (1.94)</td>
<td>4.39 (1.91)</td>
<td>2.08 (2.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: Mean values (with standard deviations) on motives for activism [See table 6.6 for key]

Once again, care should be taken not to infer too much from these scores, given the small CPRF sample sizes, but nonetheless some trends can be seen. The first and most obvious point is that on virtually every variable, the URF score was considerably lower than the CPRF one. This reinforces the impression that the former's members are less attached to the organisation than the latter's. URF members found themselves less in agreement with the party programme (B), obtaining fewer process incentives (S(P)_3), less congruent with the views of their friends, family and colleagues (N1-3), and more perceptive of the costs of activism (C_i). They were also notably less enamoured of Boris Nemtsov's qualities as party leader than were the CPRF members of Gennadii
Zyuganov’s. On a scale of −12 to +12 (where −12 indicated the most dissatisfaction with the personal qualities of the leader and +12 the maximum admiration), not one CPRF member assigned Zyuganov a score of less than +5. By contrast, approximately a third (31.1 per cent) of URF members who answered the question gave Nemtsov a rating of less than +5, and two of the respondents even assigned him a negative score.

A few results deserve special attention. The sense of personal efficacy (P_i) displayed by the CPRF members was not very different from their activism scores (which were calculated on the same basis). This means that there was a rough correspondence between how influential CPRF members felt and how active they were. However, in the case of the URF there was a wide discrepancy (P_i = 26.80 compared with A_i = 15.68). This suggests that URF members actually felt considerably more efficacious than their actions would suggest, which in turn means that the lack of activism is not explicable solely by a lack of perceived influence. Another interesting point is that the mean selective outcome variable (S(O)_i) was positive (+2.79) in the case of the Tatarstan CPRT, but negative for both the Ul’yanovsk CPRF and the Ul’yanovsk URF (-0.60 and -0.10 respectively). Without a corresponding sample of Tatarstan URF members (which was not possible for the simple reason that they did not exist), it is difficult to know if this is a geographical factor or a party one. On the one hand it is noticeable that both Ul’yanovsk samples had negative scores, but it can be hypothesised that this is simply due to the sample composition. The Ul’yanovsk CPRF activists surveyed may have had less ambition to become deputies or regional committee members than their counterparts in Tatarstan ones, who were more senior in terms of party office held. The URF sample contained many students who would not yet be thinking of running for elected office.

Another striking figure is the high mean score for group efficacy (P_g) among the Ul’yanovsk CPRF compared with the Tatarstan CPRT group. At first glance this may be explained by the fact that the CPRF in Ul’yanovsk, whilst not included in the regional power elite (and being a strong opponent of the then governor), had some representation in the legislative assembly and the mayor’s office, and was perceived as the most influential political party in one of Russia’s ‘red cities’. By contrast, the CPRT, whilst the largest political party and the linchpin of opposition in Tatarstan, is very much outside any kind of power loop, and members may feel that its opposition is relatively futile against the republican power structure. Nonetheless, there was no significant difference in the statistical sense between the Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk samples, so it is possible that this is simply an anomaly caused by the small sample size.
A correlation analysis between the activism variable and the above-listed indicators was run, in order to make some tentative attempt to establish the most salient factors motivating activism in the two parties. The CPRF sample was examined as a whole, since the sample sizes would have been in the region of twenty, arguably too small for establishing any meaningful relationship between two factors. The total CPRF sample was thus N=43, and for the URF, N=57. Whilst these are still small samples, they represent the majority of the highest decision-making members in both the Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk town CPRF organisations, and the majority of activists per se in the case of the URF. Thus the findings, while tentative and arguably of little external validity, should once again possess reasonable internal validity. The correlations are shown in table 6.9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>URF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pi</td>
<td>0.583*</td>
<td>0.343*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.378*</td>
<td>0.286*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.362**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(Oi)</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.395**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S(Pi)</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.332*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.436**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHi</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>-0.482**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9: Bivariate Spearman correlations between activism (Ai) and its bases

It can be seen that the factors with which there is a significant correlation differ between the two organisations. Strong correlations were found in the CPRF sample with three variables: personal efficacy (Pi), collective benefits (B) and selective outcome incentives. The first two are shared with the URF, the members of which otherwise based their activism on social norms (N1 & N2), leadership charisma, and negatively upon the costs of activism and expressive attachment to the party. (These latter correlations imply that those who find party activity most costly in terms of time and energy are conversely the most active, and that those who are less attached to the party undertake more activities for it.)

In more straightforward terms, the CPRF results suggest that the party’s members were motivated strongly by the sense of having influence in politics through

---

24 **= Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed); *= Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). No asterisks means that no significant correlation was found.
their involvement. Furthermore, there were links to the party programme, suggesting a strong attachment to the party's ideals. The possibility of obtaining elected or party office also seems to be a motivating factor, although more in Tatarstan than in Ul'yanovsk.

Like the CPRF, URF members appear to feel efficacious and be more active if they agree with the party programme, although less so than CPRF members. The high correlation between URF activism and family and friendship social norms is perhaps the most interesting result in the above table. This reinforces the conclusion drawn earlier that members had been introduced to the URF by family and especially friends. Despite lower mean scores than the CPRF's for the social norms variables, it seems that where friends of URF members were sympathetic to the cause, they themselves tended to be more active, presumably because there was less risk of being perceived as going against the views of the peer group. A negative correlation was observed between the expressive attachment variable and activism. More surprising still was the negative correlation between the cost variable and activism. Finally, the high correlation between charisma-based attraction to the leader and activism suggests that members were more likely to be active if they found Nemtsov likeable as party leader.

6.2.2 Fatherland/FAR, LDPR, Unity & Yabloko

Whilst the data available on joining is most complete for the CPRF and URF, nonetheless it is possible to construct in a more skeletal form the recruitment patterns of the other parties, based on party documents and various discussions and observations made by the author in the course of the 1999-2000 electoral cycle.

In alphabetical order, little is known about the individual activists of Fatherland/FAR. All three branches indicated high 'membership' figures, but these members were at best informal supporters. Each received a membership card, and was asked upon joining about their previous experience and participation intentions, presumably with a view towards enlisting their labour in the election campaign. In Samara, Fatherland claimed that its membership was drawn partly from ex-CPRF and Yabloko sympathisers, and partly from previously unattached people. There were few ex-OHR members, who seemingly tended to participate more in Unity than in Fatherland. As mentioned in chapter four, in none of the three regions was there much evidence of the claimed membership, and the effective collapse of the organisation

---

25 Fatherland membership application form: 'Samarskoe regional'noe otdelenie Obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii "Otechestvo" (materialy) (Samara: Otechestvo, 1999), p.54.
immediately after the State Duma Election in 1999 suggests that, whatever the incentives to participation offered by the movement, they were insufficient.

The leadership of the LDPR in all three regions claimed that, in the main, members came to them and signed up. Whilst the claimed figures given earlier suggest some kind of mass membership, in reality it seems unlikely that people would simply walk in to their offices and apply for membership, especially since their Samara and Kazan' headquarters are in fairly remote suburbs of the cities. A discussion with some of the members of the Ul'yanovsk LDPR youth movement indicated that social ties were once again a significant trigger. Most members of the youth movement had become active only in the few months preceding the 1999 State Duma and regional elections, and most seemed to have joined through word of mouth. One (a twenty-year old female) said:

'Maxim is my friend and he was involved, so he introduced me to it. It makes life more interesting. Most of us join because we have friends who are already involved. Nobody really knows about it otherwise.'

It is also worth noting that the party leadership in Ul'yanovsk concentrated its recruitment on workers and young people, freely admitting that few intelligentsia were interested in the party.

The party leadership in Ul'yanovsk was keen to stress two factors which kept members interested in the party. These were the charismatic attraction of Zhirinovsky himself (‘our superstar…’) and the social life of the party. In addition to political activities, the party organised various events for its women’s and youth movements, and even claimed to run a farm in one of the districts of Ul'yanovsk region. The Samara and Tatarstan branches claimed to organise sports camps for youth members, and the Samara co-ordinator showed the author photographs of one such camp. Whilst the extent of these extra-political activities may be exaggerated, it does appear that the LDPR places some emphasis on the provision of process incentives (S(P)), coupled with charisma-based (CH) and expressive attachment (E) to Zhirinovsky, in order to motivate its members. At a higher level, it can be argued that the relatively high number of paid appointments within the party (as was noted in chapter four, in Ul'yanovsk there are 120 people throughout the region who receive at least an

26 Discussion with members of the youth section, Ul'yanovsk regional LDPR, 28 October 1999.
27 Interview, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Petrov, Co-ordinator, Ul'yanovsk regional LDPR, 24 November 1999.
29 Molodezhnaya Gazeta, No. 30 (135), 28 July 2000, p.3.
honorarium for their work) may give some kind of outcome incentive \((S(O)_i)\) to the most active members.

Owing to various cancelled conferences, no opportunity was given to conduct the survey amongst the wider membership of Unity. However, the three senior leaders completed a questionnaire, and combined with their comments in interviews, it is possible at least to give some indication of the views of these leaders. The chairman in Ul'yanovsk had worked as a political commissar in the army, and then as a teacher in military and military-political academies. He served in this capacity in the German Democratic Republic. Since the early 1990s he had been the leader of the Ul'yanovsk city civil defence staff. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he cited his main interest in Unity as 'the party's [or movement's, until May 2000] position on Russian power and international authority', and 'Belief in the necessity of resurrecting Russia's government and state'. This reflected both his military background and continued belief in the ideology of the CPSU. He described himself as being 'definitely still a socialist'. The deputy leader also had a military and Party background, having served as a political commissar on the border of Afghanistan. The third leader cited the 'necessity of supporting the policies of the government' and 'building up the Unity bloc as a political force' as his main reasons for becoming involved.

From discussions with these leaders, it seems that their involvement was to some extent motivated by selective outcome incentives \((S(O)_i)\). This is to be expected in the 'party of power'. A further tendency was that most of those encountered in the Unity offices had been strongly active in the CPSU and often referred positively to that period, suggesting that there was some kind of social network of ex-CPSU middle-level leaders within the local leadership.

In section 6.1, Yabloko's complicated two-tier membership scheme was examined and it was seen that this constricts membership deliberately. Given the very small membership of each region, it might be expected that social ties would be more prevalent than any other factor in explaining their recruitment. Nonetheless, interviews undertaken with members of the Yabloko youth movement in Ul'yanovsk indicate that in some cases personal initiative was the key:\(^{32}\) Two of the most active members of the youth movement began their involvement in the previous election cycle of 1995-96, when they alone approached the fledgling Yabloko from a school 'political club'.

---

\(^{31}\) Interview, Igor Petrovich Churbanov, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk regional Unity, 12 May 2000.

\(^{32}\) Notes from meetings attended and conversations with members, October 1999-July 2001, plus: Interview, Svetlana Ovchinnikova, Chair, Ul'yanovsk regional Young Yabloko, 21 January 2000; Interviews with two members of Ul'yanovsk regional Young Yabloko (both male, 23 years), 20 June 2000.
(Most of their politically-orientated classmates joined the LDPR and a couple went to the CPRF.) Their reasoning was that there were only five serious political organisations at the time: the CPRF, LDPR, DCR, Our Home is Russia (OHR), and Yabloko. They ruled out the CPRF and LDPR; saw OHR as too nomenklatura-based; and DCR as 'a dying organisation'. This left Yabloko. Similarly, they viewed Yavlinsky as 'the only normal person leading a political party'. Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and Chernomyrdin were described by them as being 'of the 1970s, not the 1990s', 'a clown' and 'somebody who had difficulties with the Russian language' respectively. Whilst this may exaggeration the reality somewhat, it nonetheless shows that the perception of the party and its leadership was important in their decision to approach Yabloko. Whilst conceding that Yabloko had its weaknesses, they argued that the party’s programme was the most coherent of the non-communist or nationalist parties, and this had attracted them. One of them reasoned that in general the party operates almost in its own niche, independent of the politics of power, and often takes a different position on issues from any other political organisation. In his opinion, many of its members had joined for specifically this reason.

The most significant point is that their interest in politics pre-dated that of their involvement with the party. At school they had discussed the most recent developments with their history teacher at the beginning of each lesson. Their participation also went beyond the party; one had worked as an assistant to a(n independent) deputy of the regional assembly. He argued that if people wanted influence in local politics, they had to work with non-party candidates, since 'politics and Yabloko are virtually independent of each other'. This shows that he did not join the party for the selective outcome incentive of political influence, but rather to express agreement with the party’s overall principles.

The chair of the Yabloko youth organisation in Ul'yanovsk also approached the party on her own initiative, having become interested in the run-up to the 1999 elections. She was asked if she would be willing to re-launch the youth branch of the party (examined in section 5.3 of the present study). Most of the new recruits were not known to her personally, indicating the presence of a more 'self-starters' in the ranks.

In the main party branch, the chairman admitted to having been an active member of the Komsomol and the CPSU, and suggested that it would require one more generational change before non-CPSU people would run the 'liberal' parties.33 His involvement in Yabloko was self-initiated, and he had been active since 1995, working

33 Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitza, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk regional Yabloko, 20 July 2000.
full time for the party (as an assistant to one of their State Duma deputies) since August 1999. The party’s press secretary in Ul’yanovsk had been invited to join by the local leadership, and had been introduced through friends. Indications from one or two members, who asked not to be named, were that full membership of the organisation locally depended more on whether applicants were well-known to senior leadership than on their behaviour during the candidate membership period. This would perhaps point more to the importance once again of social ties, as with the URF.

In Tatarstan the picture is complicated somewhat by the particular political circumstances in the Republic. As explained in chapter four, the small membership of Yabloko met each other through the Ravnopravie i Zakonnost’ (RiZ) organisation, before Yabloko was even formed. Recruitment in the normal sense of the word does not exist, but the small caucus whose involvement stemmed from RiZ represents the interests of Yabloko in the Republic. However, since cross-party co-operation still impinges upon their individual activities, it is perhaps more accurate to ask why they entered politics rather than why they joined Yabloko. The party’s deputy chairman in Tatarstan wrote on his questionnaire, ‘I was a citizen without rights’, and discussion with him indicated that his and his colleagues’ political involvement was in opposition to the system – initially that of the CPSU, and then to the Tatar authorities (virtually the same people post-1991).

As to what kept members involved once the initial contact had been made, these interviews indicated that perhaps the ‘discussion club’ structure of the party fostered two motives for continued activism – social networks (Ni) and selective process incentives (S(P)). Clearly outcome incentives in the case of Yabloko are minimal, given how far the party is from power. Nonetheless, the political co-ordinator of the Samara town branch felt that many of her colleagues had joined because they were interested in politics but knew of no alternative means of participating. Once inside the party fold, however, she claimed that politics was ‘like a narcotic’, rather dramatically terming party membership as being ‘the communion of man and politics’.

6.3 Attitudes of Party Members
The final part of the questionnaire examined party members’ attitudes towards other political parties, political leaders, and local politicians. Furthermore, the activists’

34 Interview, Irina Anatol’evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000.
ideological views were tested. (Because the analysis in the coming pages is based on the questionnaire, only the CPRF and URF can be covered by it.)

Respondents were asked to give an indication of their sympathy or antipathy towards the six organisations which won representation in the 1999 State Duma election, on scale of -3 (maximum antipathy) to +3 (maximum sympathy). The means and standard deviations are shown in table 6.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>CPRT Tat. (S.D.)</th>
<th>CPRF UI. (S.D.)</th>
<th>URF (S.D.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>+2.89 (0.32)</td>
<td>+3.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-1.74 (1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>-2.16 (0.96)</td>
<td>-2.39 (1.14)</td>
<td>+0.26 (1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>-2.47 (0.90)</td>
<td>-3.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-1.72 (1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF</td>
<td>-2.84 (0.50)</td>
<td>-2.75 (0.91)</td>
<td>2.50 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>-2.37 (1.07)</td>
<td>-2.75 (0.72)</td>
<td>+0.30 (1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>-2.42 (1.02)</td>
<td>-2.75 (0.64)</td>
<td>+0.94 (1.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.10: Sympathy to political parties by organisation

CPRF members were far more unequivocal in their opinions than those of the URF. All respondents in the Ul'yanovsk CPRF, without exception, gave their sympathies towards the CPRF and LDPR as +3 and -3 respectively. In general, most CPRF respondents placed their sympathies towards the extremes of the scale (+/-2 or +/-3). By contrast, URF members tended to stay close to the centre. Admittedly, the URF is in less of an ideological ‘niche’ than the CPRF, which may account for the more sympathetic attitudes towards Unity and Yabloko exhibited by URF members. Nonetheless, it is notable that CPRF members had a considerably lower opinion of the URF than the other way round, which suggests that the equivocation may be more structural than situational. In essence, CPRF members can be seen as having a strong sympathy with their own party and a complete dislike of all the others, whereas URF members are less clear-cut in their attitudes. Indeed, there was one URF respondent who indicated greater sympathy with the LDPR than with his own party!

Moving on to attitudes towards national party leaders and other important politicians, the mean scores and standard deviations are recorded in table 6.11. It is interesting to note the different evaluations of parties and their respective leaders. In all three cases, the LDPR was viewed with much the same level of antipathy as Zhirinovsky himself. There was also little difference between evaluations of the CPRF and Zyuganov, although URF members seemingly disliked Zyuganov slightly more.

35 The wording of the question was ‘Please indicate your sympathy to the following parties and movements (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know enough about the party to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank’
than his party. However, the 'Primakov phenomenon' is apparent in attitudes towards FAR. The Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk CPRF respondents were only slightly less antipathetic to Fatherland/FAR than to the other parties, but they viewed Primakov in a far less negative light than they did FAR. This suggests that perhaps Primakov's image as a solid elder statesman, combining distinguished service to the CPSU with close involvement in the 1990s polity, has had some influence on CPRF members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>CPRT Tat. (S.D.)</th>
<th>CPRF UI. (S.D.)</th>
<th>URF (S.D.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Kirienko (URF)</td>
<td>-2.53 (0.96)</td>
<td>-2.81 (0.60)</td>
<td>+2.00 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Primakov (FAR)</td>
<td>-0.63 (1.57)</td>
<td>-0.72 (1.99)</td>
<td>+0.43 (1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Shoigu (Unity)</td>
<td>-2.05 (1.22)</td>
<td>-1.90 (1.77)</td>
<td>+0.19 (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Yavlinsky (Yabloko)</td>
<td>-2.53 (0.77)</td>
<td>-2.57 (0.87)</td>
<td>+0.52 (1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Zhirinovsky (LDPR)</td>
<td>-2.37 (1.12)</td>
<td>+2.05 (0.60)</td>
<td>-1.57 (1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Zyuganov (CPRF)</td>
<td>+2.79 (0.42)</td>
<td>+2.95 (0.22)</td>
<td>-2.11 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Putin (President)</td>
<td>-1.79 (1.55)</td>
<td>-2.30 (1.30)</td>
<td>+1.42 (1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Seleznev (Duma Speaker - CPRF)</td>
<td>+2.16 (0.90)</td>
<td>+2.43 (0.93)</td>
<td>-0.40 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Stroev (Federation Council Speaker)</td>
<td>+0.42 (1.22)</td>
<td>+0.16 (1.50)</td>
<td>-0.24 (1.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.11: Attitudes towards political leaders

Moving away from the party leaders, CPRF members' views on the three non-party politicians were broadly in line with what might be expected. Gennadii Seleznev, the Speaker of the State Duma, was elected as a deputy on the CPRF party list, and this is reflected in the strong sympathy of the CPRF members towards him. Interestingly, the URF sample was broadly neutral in its attitude to Seleznev, with 78.2 per cent of the sample giving him a score between -1 and +1 (including 41.8 per cent who gave him a rating of zero). Despite the row between the URF and CPRF regarding his election, it seems that the URF members in Ul'yanovsk did not have particularly strong feelings on the matter. Egor Stroev, the speaker of the Federation Council, was seen by all three samples in much the same light, the majority clustering around the zero score. Reactions to Putin, whose inauguration had taken place just a few weeks before the survey was conducted, varied. The CPRF samples both gave him negative scores, although they viewed him slightly less negatively than they did other party leaders, whereas the URF, which had supported him in the presidential election, gave him a positive evaluation. In general, the responses show once again the divergent political

---

36 The exact wording of the question was 'Please indicate your sympathy to the following state, society and party leaders (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know sufficient about the party to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank'.
cultures of the two organisations: with the exception of their evaluations of Primakov and Stroev, CPRF members were generally polarised, whereas the URF members' views were more equivocal.

The final part of the political sympathy questions referred to local figures in the regions. As a result, no cross-sample comparison is possible between the two CPRF samples, since they evaluated different people. The Tatar CPRT sample gave generally negative evaluations to figures associated with Shaimiev's administration. Shaimiev himself had a mean score of -2.47 (Standard Deviation = 1.17), and the Speaker of the Tatar State Council, Farid Mukhametshin, scored -1.41 (S.D.=1.87). The four members of the State Duma elected with Shaimiev's support - S.M. Akhmetkhanov, O.V. Morozov, F.Sh. Safiullin, and F.G. Ziyatdinoiva - obtained mean scores of -2.31 (S.D. =1.11), -2.47 (S.D.=1.02), -1.44 (S.D.=1.58), and -1.94 (S.D.=1.18) respectively. By contrast, S.P. Shashurin, an opponent of the Tatar president's had a mean sympathy score of -0.42 (S.D.=1.98); and liberal politicians from RiZ, who co-operate with the CPRT in the 'Round Table' discussions, were viewed more sympathetically by the latter's members than any of the federal-level 'liberal' parties or leaders. Il'dus Sultanov and Il'dus Salakhov, RiZ's two most senior leaders, were attributed mean sympathy scores of 0.00 (S.D. 1.35) and 0.07 (S.D. 1.55) respectively. In other words, the attitudes of CPRT activists to those who are ideological opponents but tactical allies is one of toleration, with neither antipathy nor warm sympathy being displayed. Unsurprisingly, the first secretary of the CPRT, Aleksandr Saly, was viewed with almost as much approval as Zyuganov, with a mean score of +2.61 (S.D 0.78).

In Ul'yanovsk, the two organisations’ members were united on one thing: their opposition to the governor, Yurii Goryachev. The CPRF activists gave him a mean score of -2.05 (S.D. 1.96) and the URF ones a score of -2.52 (S.D. 0.90). Unusually, the CPRF members were slightly more equivocal in this case than the URF, with 15 per cent of the sample giving him a positive evaluation compared with only 2 per cent of the URF respondents. Nonetheless, the picture in both cases was one of overwhelming hostility to the Goryachev.

In keeping with the pattern, the CPRF respondents gave all the local politicians listed (i.e., the local leaders of each party, the governor, the Speaker of the regional legislative assembly and the Ul'yanovsk's two members of the State Duma) a strongly negative rating. Everybody received a mean score below -2, apart from Aleksandr Kruglikov (the CPRF first secretary) and Oleg Kazarov (deputy mayor, and former member of the State Duma from the CPRF), who received strong positive ratings of
2.76 (S.D. 0.85) and 2.38 (S.D. 1.12) respectively. The URF sample also evaluated all of the listed local politicians negatively, but only Goryachev was given a mean score of less than −1.24, indicating once again the less polarised attitudes of the URF group. Interestingly, the main competitor to form the URF branch in Ul’yanovsk, Isaak Grinberg, had a mean score of −1.04 (S.D. 1.74), virtually the same as that of the CPRF and LDPR leaders. Despite his being of similar ideological persuasion, therefore, there was evidence that his independent efforts were not appreciated.

On the final question of ideology, questions were included to measure the members’ ideological congruence with the party. Four scales were used: state/private; individualist/collectivist; free market/protectionist; and Westernist/Slavophile. The mean scores were as shown in table 6.12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CPRT Tat. (S.D.)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>CPRF Uly. (S.D.)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>URF (S.D.)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State/Private</td>
<td>-1.31 (1.14)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-1.81 (0.75)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+1.19 (1.16)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualist/Collectivist</td>
<td>+1.44 (0.73)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+1.94 (0.25)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-0.10 (1.57)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free trade/Protectionist</td>
<td>0.94 (1.20)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+1.44 (1.36)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-0.42 (1.49)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westernist/Slavophile</td>
<td>+1.88 (0.33)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+0.26 (1.54)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12: Ideological attitudes of party members

From the party programmes it may be hypothesised that CPRF members would tend to favour state ownership, state social security and protectionism, and be strongly Slavophile. By contrast, the URF members might be expected to be strongly in favour of private ownership and social security, a liberal trade policy and Westernisation. However, this is not always borne out. In the case of the CPRF, the hypothesised tendencies were observed, and again the Ul’yanovsk CPRF activists tended more strongly towards the extremes than the Tatarstan sample.

However, the URF sample deviated from the expected positions quite dramatically. The large standard deviations are indicative of a wide spread of answers, but overall, whilst favouring private ownership over that of the state, the members’ views on social security were broadly neutral, rather than strongly in favour of private pensions like the party leadership. Similarly, although tending slightly more towards a liberal trade policy than towards protectionism, the tendency was not very strong.

---

The wording of the questions used to test these scales is to be found in question 8 of questionnaire (see appendix A). In all cases the positive-negative axis runs in the direction of the variable description: e.g., in the first variable, a negative score indicates an orientation towards state ownership, whereas a positive one indicates that the respondents favour private ownership.
When a breakdown is analysed, 54 per cent of URF respondents tended either strongly or to some extent towards liberalism, compared with 30 per cent who favoured protectionism and 16 per cent who were neutral. In other words, a substantial minority did not favour a liberal trade policy or had no firm view on the matter, despite its being a central plank of the URF platform.

Finally, one of the main tenets of the URF programme – Westernisation – was not shared by the Ul’yanovsk membership, which actually had a mean score slightly biased towards Slavophilism. Half of respondents indicated positive (Slavophile) scores, compared with just 32 per cent who tended towards Westernisation and 18 per cent who were neutral. Nonetheless, three-fifths of the pro-Slavophile respondents (fifteen of the twenty-five) were in favour of developing links with the EU and OSCE, indicating that their policy preferences were pragmatic.

Taken together, these findings indicate that there was some degree of ideological incongruence between the URF members in Ul’yanovsk and the federal leadership of the organisation. At the Ul’yanovsk level at least, the party’s platform was not necessarily shared with much enthusiasm by the membership. Interestingly, however, this deviation was exactly the opposite of that hypothesised by May’s law, insofar as the middle-level activists were not in fact more ideologically extreme than the leadership but less so. The CPRF respondents seemed to be more in agreement with the fundamentals of the party ideology, but once again they disproved May’s hypothesis, since it was the lower-level activists of Ul’yanovsk who were more extreme than the middle-level ones of Tatarstan.

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine more fully the role played by members in Russia’s political parties, most specifically at a regional level. It has looked at the utility of members from the perspective of the parties, examining both the advantages and disadvantages of a large membership, and has used empirical evidence to cast new light on the entry patterns and motivating factors for party activism in the middle Volga. It has furthermore examined the political attitudes of members, examining both their sympathies towards other parties and their ideological beliefs. In conclusion, two things are apparent: firstly, there are very diverse reasons for entry into, and participation in, political activity; and secondly, it appears that the strongest party organisationally – the CPRF – is also the party with the most loyal membership.
Parties and Elections in the Middle Volga

One of the key aims of a political party in any country is to win representation through elected office. It has been seen already that many parties in Russia have existed solely for this purpose, most of which disappeared as fast as they were formed. As chapter two suggested, the advent of the law ‘On Political Parties’ means that participation in future elections will increasingly involve party affiliation. Thus it is worth examining how parties have participated in elections hitherto. The present chapter seeks to explore in more detail the anatomy of election campaigning at the regional level, once again on the basis of the three case study regions in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle.

The analysis takes in several aspects of the campaign. The first part of the chapter looks at organisational questions relating to the elections. It shows that, in the election to the State Duma, single-member district (SMD) and party list campaigns were fought relatively autonomously from each other, and in the former, local political factors took precedence over national party organisations. It goes on to examine the 2000 presidential election, and also the way in which parties participated in gubernatorial and regional presidential elections. Section 7.2 examines the campaign methodology – or, as it is called in Russian, ‘electoral technology’ – which the parties used to develop their images and discredit their opponents. This section notes the increasing professionalisation of Russian elections. The final part of the chapter seeks to give a flavour of the advertising used by parties in the 1999 State Duma election, examining both direct advertising (i.e., posters and leaflets) and the coverage of parties in the electronic and printed media.

7.1 Parties and Elections: Organisational Questions

7.1.1 State Duma Election, 19 December 1999

Two main questions will inform the following analysis. Firstly, to what extent are the SMD and party list campaigns linked at an organisational and campaign level? Secondly, is it possible to discern regional nuances in federal parties’ campaigns?

Most analysis of Duma elections has focused on the party list results, since they are more accessible, yet in chapter two it was seen that the SMD seats were often won by non-party candidates. Munro and Rose argue the SMD vote gives a better indication of party preference, since voters have a choice between party-affiliated and unaffiliated
candidates and often choose the latter. Arguably this over-simplifies the matter somewhat. At least in the middle Volga, voter choice in SMD contests appears to have been made on the basis of the candidates themselves and their local affiliations, rather than on which party they represented, as will be shown below.

However, before examining this, it is worth noting that parties themselves appeared to place less emphasis on the SMD contests. As table 7.1 indicates, neither in 1995 nor 1999 did any party have candidates in the maximum possible 225 (224 in 1999) constituencies. On both occasions the LDPR came closest, nominating candidates in every seat in 1995 and 216 seats in 1999, but only in 184 and 95 respectively did it manage to register successfully. In 1999 the CPRF registered the highest number - 129 (57.6 per cent of the maximum possible) out of its original 140 nominees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1995 Registered</th>
<th>1995 Seats Won</th>
<th>% Winners</th>
<th>1999 Registered</th>
<th>1999 Seats Won</th>
<th>% Winners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Party candidates, 1995 and 1999 State Duma elections

Comparison of the results for the main parties in the SMD and party list constituencies shows the lack of correlation between the two halves of the election. If the SMD and party list votes were closely related, it could be expected that vote shares would be relatively similar in the two sections of the vote. Table 7.2 disproves this hypothesis. The ratio of the two results (= parties’ SMD mean share per seat contested, divided by their total party list vote) shows considerable variations for every party. Our Home is

---

2 In 1999 no election was held for the Chechen SMD seat (No. 31), which was filled in a later by-election.
3 In 1999, 'Zhurinovskiy's Bloc' did not nominate candidates; all were registered in the name of the LDPR.
Russia (OHR) failed to obtain any representation through the party list in 1999, but obtained a respectable share of the vote in the SMD constituencies it contested, and FAR was considerably more successful, relatively speaking, in SMD districts than in the federal list. The reverse was true for the LDPR and Unity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>24.29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Comparative shares of vote, party list and SMD contests, 1995 & 1999

Tables 7.1 and 7.2 give the first indications of differences in the two parts of the vote. Some of the parties ‘pick and choose’ the constituencies in which they are best-placed to obtain a good result. In 1999 the CPRF registered candidates mainly in the ‘red belt’, but largely ignored Siberia (except the southern parts) and the central belt between Moscow and Ekaterinburg. As a result it maintained virtually the same share of the vote in the two parts of the election, despite the fact that it faced competition from independent candidates. The relative success of Yabloko in 1995 and FAR and OHR in 1999 points to the same phenomenon. The success of the latter two movements in 1999 may also have been due to the endorsement of many of their SMD candidates by regional notables. (Such was the case, arguably, in Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk.) The opposite tactic was adopted by the LDPR, which nominated candidates even where it had little chance of success. The party’s poor SMD results suggest that its manifesto is relatively unappealing to voters when not elucidated by Zhirinovsky himself.

The lack of connection between the two parts of the vote is consistent with McAllister and White’s finding that nearly two-fifths of voters in 1995 engaged in

---

‘ticket-splitting’, mainly owing to weak partisanship. It is also consistent with the mood of Russians in a spring 2001 survey. Voters were asked what difference it would make to their voting intention if a hypothetical candidate were nominated by a party. They appeared to attach relatively little weight to the matter: 21.5 per cent thought that they would support the candidate; 11.7 per cent said they would not support him or her; and the remainder said it would make no difference or that it was hard to say.

Federal electoral statistics suggest, therefore, that there is little consistency between voting behaviour in the two parts of the vote, a conclusion shared by Moser’s study of the 1993 and 1995 election results. However, these aggregate figures may mask other, underlying phenomena which give a better indication of federal-regional and SMD-party list bifurcation. This can be established by turning to the case study regions, where there were a total of twelve constituencies in 1995 and 1999: five each in Tatarstan and Samara, and two in Ul’yanovsk. Before going any further, it is necessary to give the names of candidates nominated by the case study parties in each of these constituencies in 1999, since reference will be made to some of them in the subsequent discussion. These are shown in table 7.3. It can be seen from this that the parties’ patchy record of candidate nomination was mirrored in the middle Volga regions. The CPRF nominated the most (10) candidates, supporting closely allied figures in the other two. Table 7.3 also shows that, by and large, parties nominated the fewest candidates in the regions where they had the weakest infrastructures, indicating their limited ability to organise election campaigns ‘on the ground’. (The exception is the URF in Samara, which was virtually Titov’s personal organisation. The governor favoured candidates in the other constituencies with whom official URF candidates did not compete.)

Whereas at the federal level it was possible only to examine the mean share of the vote per seat contested, a constituency-level analysis allows direct comparison, since the ballots were cast simultaneously. Table 7.4 (1999 results) shows that only in five cases out of thirty-two did the candidate and their party have vote totals within 10 per cent of each other. Most candidates received less support than their parties, sometimes by a factor of two or three. In a few cases, the converse was true. (Among the main parties, the most notable manifestation was in constituency 180, where FAR’s Anatolii Golubkov won 47.14 per cent while his bloc languished on 8.44 per cent. Beyond the

---

six case study parties, Sergei Shashurin, the winner in constituency 26 who was nominated by the Russian All-People's Union, won 21.08 per cent compared with his party’s 1.62 per cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seat</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>FAR</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>URF</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Against all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Party-nominated candidates, middle Volga SMD contests, 1999

Table 7.4: Ratio of SMD: PL support, 1999 State Duma Election

9 Constituencies 22-26 are in Tatarstan; 151-55 in Samara province; and 180-81 in Ul'yanovsk province. ‘NC’ in the table indicates the number of candidates in total. Figures in parenthesis refer to the position occupied by the candidate. Names in bold type indicate that the candidate won in that constituency.

10 The ratios are calculated using the following formula: Ratio = Votes for SMD candidate/Votes for candidate’s party in federal list ballot. A value of 1 would mean that the candidate and the party obtained the same number of votes. Values above 1 indicate that the candidate obtained more votes than their party, and the reverse is true for values below 1. A shaded box indicates a case in which the candidate won fewer than two-thirds of their party’s vote; boxes with double borders show where the candidate obtained more than half as many votes again.
At a quantitative level, it seems safe to conclude that the SMD and party-list contests are to a large extent unconnected but concurrent elections. Qualitative examination of the actual campaigns is necessary to see if this dichotomy is reflected in the parties' campaign strategies.

At least in the three case study regions, the personal was elevated over the political in the 1999 State Duma contest. The main factor in the SMD contests was not party affiliation but rather the candidates’ attitude towards the regional governor/president. Regardless of their party affiliation, nine of the twelve victorious candidates were prominent supporters of their respective regional executive leader and had been endorsed by them. Only Shashurin in Tatarstan (constituency 26) and Romanov in Samara (constituency 151) could be counted as victorious ‘opposition’ candidates.

In Tatarstan the key aspect of the election was the ‘party of power’ around Shaimiev, which was also fighting the elections to the Tatar State Council. As was mentioned in chapter four, the administrative apparatus in Tatarstan has been able to ‘orientate’ the electorate in virtually every post-Soviet election, and all efforts were geared towards obtaining the maximum support for the ‘power bloc’. In this case it included FAR, which obtained its third best result in the country. Indeed, Tatarstan alone contributed nearly a tenth of FAR’s total vote nationwide, although it comprised only 2.49 per cent of the Russian electorate.11

In terms of campaign organisation, FAR was based on the Tatar trade union structure, which, together with the territorial penetration of ‘Tatarstan – New Century’, allowed it to mobilise the electorate virtually everywhere in the Republic, as noted in chapter four.12 The primary loyalty was to the ruling ‘clan’ rather than FAR, as witnessed by the speedy reorientation towards Putin after the election. The CPRF’s campaign in Tatarstan was run from the CPRT headquarters, which was used also as the base for the SMD candidates. It put most of its efforts into the State Duma rather than Tatar State Council campaign, since it felt it was unlikely to succeed in the latter anyway.13 Yabloko adopted the opposite approach, working together with the other organisations in the RiZ alliance to concentrate on extensive observation of several constituencies in the State Council election.14 As noted in chapter five, it claimed that

---

12 Interview, Anatolii Alekseevich Fomin, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan FAR, 21 December 1999.
13 Interview, Robert Garipovich Sadykov, Secretary, republican committee, CPRT, 17 November 1999.
14 Interview, Il'dus Il'yasovich Salakhov, Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko, 23 December 1999.
its SMD candidates were imposed centrally. The LDPR and Unity, meanwhile, had fairly quiet campaigns in the Republic.

The influence of gubernatorial sponsorship was seen also in Samara, which was the only region of Russia where the URF was the 'party of power', and was the scene of its best result. In contrast to the URF's urban-based electorate in Russia as a whole, its strongest support came in the peripheral districts of the region, indicating the link between URF support and loyalty to Titov. In the SMD campaign, Titov supported three of the five candidates elected, including Vladimir Mokryi, the vice-governor of the region. Mokryi used his position to chair meetings, representing Titov in an official capacity rather than as a candidate. The CPRF alleged that this was against the election law. Certainly, there was a fine line between the two capacities, and it cannot be denied that his post was useful. Vera Lekareva, the victor in constituency 152, was officially a URF candidate, but the fact that she had been an OHR candidate in 1995 showed that her primary loyalty was to Titov rather than her new bloc. 'Administrative resources', in the form of the electoral commission's decision to exclude the CPRF-supported Al'bert Makashov just days before the election, was also claimed to have played a role in her victory.

On the other hand, some link between the federal and regional campaigns was seen in the visits of most of the serious party leaders: Gennadii Zyuganov on 10-11 November; Grigorii Yavlinsky on 18 November; Sergei Shoigu, Aleksandr Karelin and Aleksandr Gurov on 22 November; and Sergei Yastrzhembsky from FAR on 7 December. Titov also received support for the URF from the visits of Irina Khakamada for a youth concert on 5 November (part of the party's 'You're right!' campaign), and of Anatolii Chubais on 3 December. Organisationally, the main parties fought relatively active campaigns. The CPRF divided its resources between the SMD and party list votes, going as far as to set up a separate headquarters for each. The SMD campaigns were organised exclusively by the regional branch of the party,

16 Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, 13 March 2000.
17 Samarskoe Obozrenie, No. 51 (194), 20 December 1999, p.4. Analysis of the district-level party list and SMD statistics suggests that contest between Lekareva and Makashov may have been decided in the former's favor even had both been in the race, as the present author suggests in Derek S. Hutcheson, 'Vybor 1999 goda v Gosudarsvennuyu Dumu RF: Samarskaya oblast', Vestnik Samarskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, No. 3 (17) (2000), pp.26-37.
21 Demokratičeskii Vybor, No. 44 (172), 11-17 November 1999, p.3
whereas the party list headquarters largely distributed materials from Moscow. One interesting nuance of the CPRF's campaign was its co-operation with the Agrarians (such as supporting the latter's SMD candidate in constituency 154) when the Agrarian Party nationally had been included in the FAR list.\textsuperscript{22} The LDPR's SMD campaigns were organised from its regional headquarters, but the co-ordinator claimed to be putting more effort into the party list campaign, since its candidates were considered unlikely to win.\textsuperscript{23} Yabloko's strategy of backing independent candidates – usually businessmen wishing to obtain political influence – was mentioned in chapter five, and this was also adopted by FAR, which had a very weak organisation in Samara province. One of the advantages it afforded was that it saved them having to divert their limited resources into the SMD campaign, although the connections with 'their' candidates were in some cases so tenuous that the tactic brought little other benefit.\textsuperscript{24}

In Ul'yanovsk, Goryachev did not support any party. Perhaps because of this, the election campaign focused almost exclusively on the SMD campaign and largely ignored the party list vote. The polarisation of politics in Ul'yanovsk mentioned in chapter four was seen in the 1999 campaign, which acted almost as a primary for the gubernatorial contest a year later. Goryachev lent his support – and the consequent infrastructural and administrative advantages this implied – to the two ultimately victorious candidates, Anatolii Golubkov (FAR) and Vadim Orlov (Independent). At the other 'pole' were Aleksandr Kruglikov and Oleg Kazarov, both from the CPRF (Kruglikov has featured already in these pages); and Yurii Polyanskov, the rector of Ul'yanovsk State University. The three of them were considered at the time to be the main potential opponents to Governor Goryachev. Much of the SMD campaign focused on these five candidates. The administration-controlled press and the local state television channel attacked Kruglikov, Kazarov and Polyanskov relentlessly, especially on financial matters. Golubkov and Orlov received similar treatment in the opposition press. In this fight, party allegiance played little or no role. The rivalry between Kruglikov, Kazarov and Goryachev may have been partly related to the fact that they were from the CPRF, which was opposed to Goryachev and had supported the mayor of Ul'yanovsk city in the latter's fight with the governor. However, it was mainly a personal, rather than ideological, battle, since the two communists had their own political support bases which threatened to undercut Goryachev's. The personalised

\textsuperscript{22} Interview, Valerii Mikhailovich Klochkov, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF, 1 December 1999.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 29 November 1999.
\textsuperscript{24} Badovsky, 'Samarskaya Oblast', p.242.
nature of the battle is also seen from the fact that Golubkov and Polyanskov were both FAR candidates, yet stood on opposite sides of the gubernatorial divide.

The party list campaign played very much a secondary role in Ul’yanovsk. Kazarov’s and Kruglikov’s campaigns were administered by the CPRF, just as the lower-key SMD campaigns of the LDPR and Yabloko were based in their respective headquarters. However, FAR’s organisation was at best a pragmatic alliance of otherwise unconnected actors, with Polyanskov’s, Golubkov’s and FAR’s campaign teams all separate. Apart from a couple of mentions in the bloc’s newly established local newspaper (which survived about three months into 2000 before being discontinued), the two SMD candidates fought their own campaigns. Golubkov’s connection with FAR came through his membership of the central council of the Agrarian Party, which was included in the alliance for the election. After election to the State Duma, he joined the Agro-Industrial deputy group rather than FAR’s.\textsuperscript{25} Polyanskov’s candidature was even more pragmatic. According to internal campaign documents shown to the author, FAR felt that association with a well-known pillar of the Ul’yanovsk community would improve its standing locally,\textsuperscript{26} while he may have considered association with the then quite popular FAR alliance as a stepping stone towards a possible bid for the governorship a year later. The relationship was tactical rather than ideological, and ultimately neither side’s expectations were fulfilled. His third place ended any hope of winning the governorship, although he has since forged close links with the man who defeated Goryachev ultimately, Vladimir Shamanov.

The regional elections need to be considered in the context of the election campaign. Of the 150 candidates registered for the regional legislative assembly election, the CPRF had seventeen (although in total it supported twenty-three); Fatherland, nine; the LDPR, four; Yabloko, three; and OHR, one.\textsuperscript{27} Once again this shows the limited impact of parties on the campaign; in total these account for just over a fifth of the total candidates in the twenty-five constituencies. Each of the parties had different priorities in the three (single-member, party list and regional) ballots. The CPRF aimed for the election of Kazarov and Kruglikov as SMD deputies, a high

\textsuperscript{26} Based on two private briefing papers given to the author: (1) ‘Regional’noe issledovanie vozdeistviya spiskov kandidatov dvizheniya ‘Otechestvo’ na osnovanii fokusirovannykh gruppovikh interv’yu v g. Ul’yanovske’, August 1999; (2) Strategy document, October 1999.
\textsuperscript{27} Levyi Marsh, December 1999, Special edition (This had a circulation of 50,000, compared to the usual 10,000).
percentage in the party list, and a significant fraction of deputies in the regional parliament. The LDPR did not expect to do well in either the SMD or regional elections, but put up candidates in an effort to mobilise the electorate for the party list, which it considered more important. FAR aimed to use the election to establish itself as a realistic actor in Ul’yanovsk politics. Yabloko focused its more limited resources on the regional election campaign, putting up a candidate in the Duma election more for show than with any realistic hope of success.

Three conclusions can be drawn from these strategies. First, even in the supposedly ‘federal’ section of the election, there was still considerable regional variation in the campaign methods employed. Second, the regional election had cross-cutting effects on campaign for the national parliament. Finally, these party strategies were very much a side issue compared with the single-member elections.

7.1.2 Presidential Election, 26 March 2000

Parties’ official role in the presidential election of March 2000 was minimal. Only Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR) and Ella Pamfilova (For Citizens’ Dignity) were nominated by parties, with the other nine from ‘initiative groups’. However, as is so often the case, the reality differed somewhat from the official picture. The CPRF and Yabloko formed the organisational backbone of Zyuganov’s and Yavlinsky’s campaigns, while the recently-formed Unity movement was involved in Putin’s, even if its state of organisational flux meant it did not play the leading role.

In the three case study regions most of the regional party leaders were appointed representatives of the candidates. The tone of the election in Tatarstan was set when Shaimiev declared on the NTV television channel on 11 January – more than two months before the election – that ‘Putin [was] the choice of the citizens of Tatarstan’. This is not the place to air the various allegations of fraud and electoral corruption, but it is worth noting that Tatarstan’s turnout and Putin’s share of the vote were the fourth highest out of eighty-nine Russian subjects, and it was the location of eight of his top ten district results (out of 2,748). In Nurlat district he won 97.8 per cent of the vote on a 98.8 per cent turnout. This came about despite the result of the State Duma election three months earlier, in which the Putin-supported Unity had come a poor third

29 Interview with Yurii Vladimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul’yanovsk LDPR, 24 November 1999.
30 Interview with Valerii Mikhailovich Sharegin, Press Secretary, Ul’yanovsk regional Fatherland, 28 October 1999.; Fatherland strategy document given to the author at this meeting.
in the Republic! The campaign in Tatarstan was co-ordinated by Marat Bariev, the chairman of Tatarstan’s State Committee for Youth Affairs. Unity was one of the organisations involved, but it was not the only one. The main support for Putin’s campaign in Tatarstan came directly from the regime itself, rather than the pro-Putin party. The massive administrative resources devoted to FAR in the Duma election were directed towards Putin in the presidential one. This was demonstrated not only in extremely favourable coverage given to the acting president in the government-loyal press, but also in little details, such as the fact that advertisements for Putin were found in all administration buildings visited by international observers. Putin paid a visit to Kazan just a few days before the election.

As to the other candidates, the CPRT ran Zyuganov’s campaign and formed the mainstay of his election observers, and the same can be said of Zhirinovsky and the LDPR, whose campaign in Tatarstan was enlivened by a visit from the candidate himself. Yavlinsky’s republican headquarters was run by Il’dus Salakhov, the republican chairman of Yabloko. In this instance, however, Yabloko and RIZ did not share a common platform; the latter supported Putin, on the basis that he might bring pressure to bear on Shaimiev from above.

The electoral situation in Samara was complicated somewhat by the fact that Titov was one of the candidates. His campaign was run not by the URF, which declined to support his bid and instead came out in Putin’s favour, but rather by the Voice of Russia movement which he had founded two years previously. It was led from Moscow, but the Samara branch was one of the strongest, with thirty-seven branches in the region – one in almost every district. Although it was his home province, however, Titov obtained less than half Putin’s support (20.22 per cent compared with 40.82 per cent). Given the numerous rival Unity branches in existence at the time, Putin’s Samara campaign was also a non-party affair, even if the various warring Unity factions participated in the main framework sponsored by the Siberian Aluminium company. According to a consultant who worked on the campaign team, in most regions Putin’s campaign was led by politically inexperienced business leaders aiming to further their business interests, with advisers acting as ‘grey cardinals’ behind the scenes.

---

36 ibid., No. 6-7 (734-35), 14 January 2000, p.2; ibid., No. 52 (780), 22 March 2000, p.2.
37 Interview, Evgenii Vasil’evich Blikov, Samara city branch, Titov campaign, 14 March 2000.
As in Tatarstan, the CPRF and Yabloko de facto ran Zyuganov’s and Yavlinsky’s campaigns, although technically the appointed representatives were working for the candidates rather than the party.\(^{38}\) The LDPR was responsible for Zhirinovsky’s campaign, although according to its regional co-ordinator, it simply took orders from Moscow, since the party was particularly anxious to be free from accusations of law-breaking following the legal fight for Zhirinovsky’s registration.\(^{39}\) On election day there was little evidence on the ground of any LDPR or Yabloko activity; in most of the polling stations visited by OSCE observers, only Putin’s, Zyuganov’s and Titov’s observers were encountered.\(^{40}\)

In Ul’yanovsk the situation was much the same as in the other two regions. Unity participated, but as in the neighbouring regions, the Putin campaign was led by non-party figures (in this case the presidential representative, Valerii Sychev).\(^{41}\) Like their counterparts in Tatarstan and Samara, the CPRF and Yabloko took charge of the Zyuganov and Yavlinsky campaigns respectively, but there were a couple of innovations from the LDPR and the URF. In breach of the normal party discipline, the LDPR’s ideological head publicly backed Putin as his second choice, calling on voters to vote for the other ‘V.V.’ (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin) if they were not voting for the LDPR’s ‘V.V.’ (Vladimir Vol’fovich Zhirinovsky).\(^{42}\) Similarly, the URF’s national decision to back Putin, taken near the end of the campaign, was pre-empted in Ul’yanovsk by the Povtarev URF branch, which declared its support at the outset.\(^{43}\) Administrative support was less of a factor than it had been in December and than in the neighbouring regions, but Goryachev declared his sympathy for Putin and hence favourable coverage for the acting president was engendered in the governor-controlled press. As to visits by the leading candidates, ultimately only Zhirinovsky was in Ul’yanovsk,\(^{44}\) although there were constant rumours that Putin might come to the region.

This short analysis of the 2000 presidential campaign shows that parties were actively involved, even if their role was officially masked. However, it will also be noted that Putin’s campaign was not based on parties, but on prominent local enterprises or administrative resources.

---

\(^{38}\) Interview, Irina Anatol’evna Skupova, Chair, Samara city Yabloko, 15 March 2000.

\(^{39}\) Interview, Viktor Ivanovich Chasovskikh, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR, 15 March 2000.

\(^{40}\) Author’s notes from observations as part of an OSCE/ODIHR delegation, Samara province, 23-28 March 2000.

\(^{41}\) Interview, Andrei Alekseevich Gurin, Deputy Chairman, Ul’yanovsk regional Unity, 21 April 2000.

\(^{42}\) Interview with Yuriii Vladimirovich Kogan, Ideological Head, Ul’yanovsk regional LDPR, 23 June 2000.

\(^{43}\) Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 7 (1584), 18 January 2000, p.1.

\(^{44}\) ibid., No. 42 (1619), 21 March 2000, p.1.
7.1.3 Regional Gubernatorial/Presidential Elections

It was noted in chapter three that parties generally play little part in candidate nomination for regional executive elections. The case study areas have been no exception. Parties nominated just two of the combined fifteen candidates in the gubernatorial (presidential, in the case of Tatarstan) elections between July 2000 and March 2001. Both were in Tatarstan; one was secretary of the CPRT, and the other was nominated by the RiZ movement rather than a federal party. It would perhaps be useful to summarise the results of the elections before going any further. This is done in table 7.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tatarstan</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Ul’yanovsk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 M.Sh. Shaimiev - 79.52%</td>
<td>K.A. Titov - 53.25%</td>
<td>V.A. Shamanov - 56.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 S.P. Shashurin - 5.78%</td>
<td>V.A. Tarkhov -29.23%</td>
<td>Yu.F. Goryachev - 23.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 I.D. Grachev - 5.47%</td>
<td>G.M. Zvyagin - 9.08%</td>
<td>S.N. Ryabukhin - 11.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 R.G. Sadykov - 4.43%</td>
<td><em>Against All</em> - 4.46%</td>
<td><em>Against All</em> - 3.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 <em>Against All</em> - 2.81%</td>
<td>S.V. Nikitin - 1.96%</td>
<td>V.T. Denisov - 1.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 A.S. Federov - 0.49%</td>
<td>Yu.S. Edrikov - 0.40%</td>
<td>I.A. Polyakov - 1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>2,139,734 (79.30%)</td>
<td>1,116,910 (45.07%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5: Regional executive election results (middle Volga), 2000-2001

Although they did not nominate many of the candidates, what role did parties play in the elections? At one end of the scale, the CPRT was completely involved in Sadykov’s campaign, organising his visits, meetings and distribution of advertising materials. It brought in several senior personnel and claimed to have every polling station in the Republic covered with observers. RiZ formed the mainstay of Grachev’s campaign, but focused its efforts mainly on Kazan’ city, where a handful of by-elections to the State Council were taking place concurrently.

46 Incumbents in bold type; party candidates underlined. The results are taken from: ‘Itogi golosovaniya po vyboram Prezidenta Respubliki Tatarstan 25 marta 2001 goda’, faxed to the author by the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan, 29 March 2001; ‘Itogi vyborov gubernatora Samarskoi oblasti i vyborov organy mestnogo samoupravleniya 2 lyulya 2000 goda’, Administratsiya Samarskoi oblasti: Gubemskaya informatsionnyi byulleten’ g. Samara, No. 7 (69) (2000), pp.56-57; and ‘Protokol izbiratel’noi komissii Ul’yanovskoi oblasti o rezultatach vyborov Gubernatora Tatarstan 25 marta 2001 goda’, pp.1-2. The percentages given are the shares of the vote calculated by the respective subject electoral commissions. In Tatarstan and Samara this is on the basis of the number of ballot papers found in the ballot boxes, while in Ul’yanovsk, it is a percentage of the number of ballot papers given out.
47 Interview, Robert Sadykov & Aleksandr Saly, Candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Tatarstan and First Secretary, CPRT, respectively, 23 March 2001. In the seven polling stations visited by the author, only five CPRT observers were found.
No other parties nominated candidates, but the various branches generally took a position on the election and announced their ‘support’ for one of the candidates. Their affiliations are listed in table 7.6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tatarstan</th>
<th>Samara</th>
<th>Ul’yanovsk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPRF Sadykov</td>
<td>Tarkhov</td>
<td>Shamanov</td>
<td>Goryachev (Local public leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR Shaimiev</td>
<td>Titov</td>
<td>Shamanov</td>
<td>Shamanov (National org.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF Shaimiev</td>
<td>(Titov)</td>
<td>Zvyagin</td>
<td>Goryachev (Local branch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity Shaimiev</td>
<td>Zvyagin</td>
<td>Shamanov</td>
<td>Shamanov (national org. &amp; eventual position)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>Grachev (nominated by RiZ, of which Yabloko a member)</td>
<td>Titov (Samara city branch)</td>
<td>Ryabukhin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Party support for gubernatorial candidates (middle Volga), 2000-2001

‘Support’ ranged from simple declarations to active participation. In Samara the CPRF was involved in Tarkhov’s campaign. Similarly, as noted in chapter four, the LPDR played a role in Titov’s; the party’s regional co-ordinator was an appointed representative, and was charged with mobilising the party’s support. The decision-making power lay with Titov’s own advisers, but district LDPR co-ordinators worked together with his campaign team and undertook a number of joint electioneering activities. Similarly, the CPRF in Ul’yanovsk reached an agreement with Shamanov after its own candidate (Kazarov) was refused registration, and claimed to have mobilised its activists for the eventual victor. It was also suggested in the regional press that the URF’s regional leader had contributed to Shamanov’s campaign fund. However, after the election Shamanov’s administration was keen to play down the role played by any of the parties, proffering the suggestion that they were keen to side with the winner for potential patronage benefits.

---

48 Bold type = candidate nominated by that party.


50 Interview, Viktor Mikhailovich Shlyushenkov, Assistant to A.L. Kruglikov (CPRF Duma Deputy), 6 March 2001.

51 Interview, Tat’yana Mikhailovna Gantimirova, Press Secretary to Vladimir Shamanov, Governor of Ul’yanovsk region, 13 March 2001.
At the other extreme were declarations of support which had no further impact on the campaign, such as the affiliations of Yabloko. In the first instance its infrastructure and support levels were insignificant when set alongside the campaign resources available to the candidates. Secondly, in some cases (such as in Samara – see chapter four) the party could not even agree within itself on which candidate to support. The reasoning behind Yabloko’s support in Ul’yanovsk for Ryabukhin was that he represented the ‘third way’ between Shamanov and Goryachev, who epitomised the polarity of regional politics. The result showed that Ryabukhin’s support base was not particularly strong, but it is unlikely that the tentative support of Yabloko, an organisation with fewer than a hundred members scattered around the province, made any significant difference to a candidate who was at the time Speaker of the region’s legislative assembly. Unity’s support was also of little practical use to the candidates. According to one of the leading sociologists in Samara, Zvyagin’s opinion poll ratings actually fell after the party backed him. (No causal relationship is implied, but it is clear that Unity’s support provided no additional impetus to his campaign.) In Ul’yanovsk the national party’s decision to support Shamanov caused a split in the regional organisation, as was seen in chapter four. The strength of the regime in Tatarstan meant that Unity was more likely to gain by supporting Shaimiev than the other way round.

To summarise, it has been seen that parties have played various roles in the electoral cycle of 1999-2001. Parties’ campaigns at the regional level were often the result of pragmatism rather than ideology, and their participation was mainly restricted to federal-level campaigns. Within the framework of this, however, it has been seen that considerable local nuances existed in strategy even in these federal campaigns, with regional political alliances sometimes taking precedence over internal party discipline.

7.2 ‘Electoral Technology’
The first section of the chapter concentrated on the regional aspects of party organisation, and focused on the extent to which parties acted independently of their central party strategy. However, how is the party strategy formulated in Russian elections? To a large extent, an exclusive focus on party organisations misses one of the major phenomena of the recent cycle of Russian elections - the exponential increase in professional political consultants. Panebianco touched upon the professionalisation
of the party apparatus, but the political professional involved in Russian election campaigns is even less attached to the party for which he or she works than the staff professional envisaged by Panebianco. Whereas in the early 1990s elections took place on the basis of volunteer cadres, a decade later successful campaigns could hardly be waged without expert advice and paid labour. As the value of achieving political office has increased (State Duma deputies, for instance, gain a flat in Moscow and immunity from prosecution), so also have the lengths to which candidates are prepared to go to win it.

The political consultant has two tasks: to promote a positive image for his or her candidate, and to damage opponents' reputations. The campaign methodology used to do this – in Russian, ‘electoral technology’ (izbiratel'naya tekhnologiya) – is explained in the manuals referred to in chapter one. The ‘dirty’ campaign at the federal level in the 1999-2000 electoral cycle stemmed mainly from the Kremlin battle against Luzhkov and Primakov to disable their potential bids for the Russian presidency. The steps taken by the two sides – and the extensive media wars – are dealt with in some detail elsewhere. Of interest here is the use that political parties made of ‘electoral technology’ in their own activities, at both federal and local levels. Based on internal party literature and observations in the case study regions, section 7.2.1 examines the uses to which it was put in the 1999-2001 electoral cycle.

7.2.1 The Professionalisation of Elections
Although parties in general try to attribute their electoral campaigns to their own strategists, all of them use professional political consultants to a greater or lesser extent. The CPRF apparently makes the least use of outside advice, especially in the regions. At the other end of the scale, Unity, the URF and FAR did not exist six months before the election, yet they went on to take over two-fifths of the vote among them, based mainly on image creation. Beside Russian consultants, both Yabloko and the URF are said to receive advice from Western organisations such as the American National Democratic Institute and British parties. According to consultants who claim to have

56 Interview, Raymond Sontag, National Democratic Institute, Moscow, 1 March 2001; Discussion with Fyodor Borisov, Chairman, DCR Youth Section, 6 June 1998.
worked with him, Zhirinovsky’s image as a political clown is not accidental, but a calculated tactic.\textsuperscript{57} He himself says that image-makers have no effect on him.\textsuperscript{58}

Parties are loath to admit the presence of these consultants, and the official financial accounts from the 1999 State Duma election obscure their role, as figure 7.1 shows. They show the amounts spent on consultants to vary between zero, in the case of the LDPR, and 420,778 roubles (c.$15,900) in the URF’s – vanishingly small figures considering the degree of information warfare involved. One consultant interviewed by the author claimed to have been paid approximately $5,000 by FAR to work in Orenburg region, a sum almost five times more than the bloc claimed to have spent on consultancy fees across Russia. The same person was able to give a detailed description of the means by which parties and candidates routinely circumvent the rules on campaign funds (through direct payments from sponsors before the election campaign begins, receipts for reduced amounts, and so forth), and thus is almost certain that such techniques were used by the parties’ consultants to obscure their own role.

![Figure 7.1: Labour costs, 1999 State Duma election (percentage of total expenditure)](https://example.com/figure7.png)

Professionalisation has also taken place at grassroots level. As chapter six noted, parties often employ paid labour to distribute literature and posters. (Generally speaking, this is less prevalent in the CPRF and LDPR, but even the CPRF listed the occasional payment to individuals for election work in its 1999 accounts.\textsuperscript{60}) Within the case study regions, discussions with URF and FAR staff elicited confirmation of this, while the Samara Yabloko organisation denied it, a statement that became less convincing when

\textsuperscript{57} Interviews with Moscow-based political consultants from (1) The Public Centre for Political Consulting and Electoral Technology, and (2) Gruppa A-Z Consulting.

\textsuperscript{58} Vek, No. 33 (449), 24-31 August 2001, p.4.

somebody came to collect their payment in the course of the author’s interview! In the official accounts of the election, Unity emerges as the organisation which made the most use of outside labour and resources. In Tatarstan it employed the movement ‘Reforms: New Course’, paying it 204,000 roubles (c.$7,700) to undertake its campaign; in Samara, it engaged the ‘Chernobyl Union’ for 91,555 roubles (c.$3,450); and in Ul’yanovsk, a payment of 74,158 roubles ($2,800) was made to a company called ‘SOM’, which appears to have been linked to the Ministry for Internal Affairs. 61

7.2.2 Campaigning Techniques
The manuals on ‘electoral technology’ give detailed instructions on how to organise a campaign. Essentially, it involves several stages: strategic planning; the formation a campaign team; the collection of signatures, advertising and image-making; and the observation of the election procedures. Each of these component parts cannot be analysed in detail here, but it is worth examining the ways in which different parties undertake the task.

Perhaps the most traditional in its approach to leafleting and canvassing is the CPRF. An account of the work of so-called ‘agitbrigades’ (campaign groups) in Samara region was given at the party’s December 2000 congress. One such group – that of the Lenin district branch in the city of Samara – was built around the political club mentioned in chapter five. Apparently it consisted of around twenty-five activists divided into groups of six or seven people. They travelled around the city of Samara in cars equipped with megaphones, stopping off to distribute leaflets in parks and markets, and claimed to have handed out 11,600 leaflets during the State Duma campaign and 25,200 during the presidential one. One enthusiastic member of the group was commended for taking part in twenty-five of the twenty-nine trips around Samara, and the driver of the car was given special mention. 62

Instructions issued to LDPR activists are altogether more radical. A handbook sent out to regional organisations before the 1999-2000 elections contains information on numerous aspects of psychological manipulation and sabotage, including the dissemination of false rumours and the vandalising of property. It is perhaps worth examining some of the advice in the party’s campaign manual, since it reveals a considerable amount about campaigning techniques it used in the elections. 63

61 ibid, pp.300, 302 & 307.
According to the guide, an election should be divided into four stages. The first involves the formation of the campaign team and the collection of signatures. The second sees the introduction of the party and candidate to the public consciousness, while the third entails the manipulation of public opinion. The final stage takes place around the election itself, aiming to maximise the party's support on polling day.

Foremost among the campaign techniques is the organisation of regional and local pickets in the LDPR's support. Supporters can be gathered together with the aim of showing how popular the party and its candidates are. A number of helpful guidelines are included:

- Participants should be sober, well-dressed, and cheerful; enthusiastic and not contemptuous-looking.
- People with physical deformities, including missing front teeth, should not be seen participating.
- Leaflets can be given to anybody, but booklets should only be given to intelligent-looking members of the crowd.
- Drunks and tramps should not be given party materials.
- If any comment is made about the personal qualities of the local candidate, the worthiness of Zhirinovsky as a party leader should be emphasised.
- A large turnout – and press coverage – should be encouraged by spreading rumours that Zhirinovsky or one of the party’s State Duma deputies will be attending, even when they will not.

The next stage of the campaign – the emotional stage – is the point at which image-making and psychological techniques are brought into play extensively. The aim is to start artificial conflicts with opponents. This should be achieved by introducing 'not entirely truthful and not properly verified information' into the public realm, a task accomplished by:

- passing information to trusted journalists;
- leaking information from reliable sources to the press and to other parties ('they will do the rest', the manual assures organisers);
- giving out 'not entirely true' information on live television (allowing no chance to edit it out);
- organising a group of the 'most responsible LDPR members in the constituency' to carry out rumour campaigns. They should be split into small groups and go around railway stations, public transport, shops and public banyas (baths), engaging voters in casual conversation and
introducing false information about opponents. ‘The main principle is: the more unbelievable the rumour, the quicker people will believe it.’

Regional advertising should also make use of emotive slogans and themes: ‘Your choice will decide the fate of Russia’, ‘Now or never’, and so on. Debates with opponents should be sparing in their mention of the party programme, but extensive in their emotional content, pointing out that the LDPR ‘feels the pain of Russia and the tragedy of its people’. Discrediting opponents is the main task at this stage, and the final method of doing so is through anonymous leaflets with no imprint (which was made illegal by the election legislation of 1999-2000). Similarly, activists are encouraged not to tear down the posters of opponents, but to vandalise them ‘creatively’.

The LDPR’s tactics varied from region to region, but since this was the methodology advocated by the central apparatus, it is likely that such tactics were virtually universal. In Ul’yanovsk the party’s television slots were also used to disseminate the party message and to discredit opponents, although the close links between Goryachev and the LDPR’s presenter meant that these programmes were often used in the regional fight against the governor’s, rather than the party’s, opponents. On one occasion, Kruglikov (CPRF) took the LDPR’s representative to court for libel arising from a comment made on the programme, and was awarded 5,000 roubles.64

However, it is clear from election results that the LDPR’s campaign tactics are becoming increasingly ineffective on every successive occasion. As seen in chapter two, Zhirinovsky’s support in 2000 was about a tenth of that obtained by the party in 1993.

What of the other parties contesting the 1999 election? Although FAR’s own ‘electoral technology’ manual was not available for inspection, that of its sister organisation ‘Tatarstan – New Century’, was.65 It was considerably more circumspect than the LDPR’s in its guidelines to activists, containing practical advice about the day-to-day activities of the campaign: how to collect signatures, distribute leaflets, canvass, and so on. Material from FAR itself gave information on both positive and negative campaigning.66 Its pamphlets for activists ranged from fairly formal documents on the

---

64 Iz opyta raboty regional’nykh i mestnykh organizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000), p.44.
66 Fatherland-All Russia, Chem my otlichayemsa ot drugikh (Moscow: IM-Inform, 1999); Fatherland, Pozitsi ‘Otechestva’ po aktual’nym voprosam obschestvennoi zhizni (Moscow: IM-Inform, 1999); Fatherland, ‘Metodicheskie materialy’ (Kazan’: 1999); Legal Department, Fatherland, ‘Pamyatka po provedeniyu predvybornoi agitatsii (sic.) v period izbiratel’noi kampanii po vyboram deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii tret’evo sozyva’, November 1999.
legal background to the election, to more propaganda-orientated material for regional organisers to use in their own publications. These included sheets of arguments to use against rival parties, calling the CPRF the ‘party of red directors’ and accusing it of ‘not wanting to fight seriously for power’; and designating Yabloko ‘decorative opposition’, accusing Yavlinsky of being in the pocket of the West.\textsuperscript{67} One of the common themes of the party’s internal literature was its refusal to believe that its poll ratings were really as low as they were being reported. Various briefings tried to point out that statistical manipulation was taking place to boost the ‘mythological’ ratings of Unity.\textsuperscript{68} In one example, a six-point difference between FAR and Unity was considered to show a real lead for FAR of 0.6 per cent, since the margin of error (+/-3.8 per cent) was supposedly subtracted from FAR’s rating and added to Unity’s. (The author missed the irony of his own statistical error, however, since this would actually have given FAR a 1.6 per cent lead.)\textsuperscript{69} Whether these optimistic reports were a refusal to believe that the bloc’s position had eroded to the extent that it had, or whether it was an attempt to shore up the morale of regional branches, denial did not help; FAR came ten points behind Unity on polling day.

After the election the URF was quick to criticise the use of ‘dirty technology’ by governors, which, it claimed, had been used to falsify the election results.\textsuperscript{70} Nonetheless, it had admitted earlier the necessity of ‘electoral technology’ in the sense of propaganda and marketing,\textsuperscript{71} and made effective use of it with its aggressive and youth-orientated advertising, as will be seen below. One of the key tasks facing the URF was the formation at the regional level of an alliance which had been initiated centrally.

Unity’s marketing strategy was extremely effective. As has been seen, the campaigns regionally relied mainly on instructions from Moscow. Unity made extremely good use of the ‘technology’ at its disposal. However, as the experiences of ‘previous parties of power’ showed, media resources alone were not enough to guarantee Unity’s success. It managed to present itself as a fresh force, mobilising

\textsuperscript{67} Fatherland-All Russia, ‘Yabloko kak ono est’, \textit{V bloknot agitatoru}, No. 17; ‘KPRF kak ona est’, ibid., No. 18.
\textsuperscript{69} Fatherland-All Russia, ‘Malen’kie sekrety vysokikh reitingov (iz praktiki televedushchikh)’, \textit{V bloknot aktivistu}, No. 69.
\textsuperscript{70} Demokraticheskii Vybor, No. 2 (182), 13-19 January 2000, p.4.
\textsuperscript{71} ibid., No. 20 (148), 27 May-2 June 1999, p.5.
apolitical voters and tapping into the national consciousness through the use of the Russian bear in the movement’s name and logo.\(^{72}\)

Yabloko claimed publicly to eschew the ‘dirty technology’ of electioneering. It published a couple of pamphlets outlining its ideas for improving electoral legislation (co-authored by Viktor Sheinis, who had drafted the original electoral law in 1993), although these brochures somewhat suggestively gave fairly detailed examples of the kind of actions which its activists were to oppose.\(^{73}\) It was notable, however, that after Yabloko’s lacklustre Duma campaign, Yavlinsky’s presidential one tried to identify his image more closely with patriotism and the Russian flag. This was almost certainly the result of a review of the strategy adopted the previous December.

This section has concentrated on the increasing use of professional advisers in Russian electoral politics and in the various techniques used by them to disseminate the parties’ messages and discredit their opponents. The final section of the chapter examines one of the main areas in which consultants’ advice can be useful – the design and concept of advertising, and the regional variations in it, in the 1999 State Duma election.

### 7.3 Political Advertisements

Four types of advertising were involved in 1999: mass media (television and radio) slots; printed advertisements in the press; posters; and leaflets. Although the previous section suggested that official electoral fund statistics should be treated with some scepticism, they indicate that advertising accounted for just over three-quarters (75.7 per cent) of total expenditure by the twenty-six parties and blocs. Among the case study parties the figure was even higher, at 83.1 per cent. This masks significant variations between the parties: the CPRF and FAR spent almost their entire budgets on advertising, while the two newest parties, the URF and Unity, spent the least, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of their total budgets. (As seen above, remuneration for labour and consultants took up a larger percentage of their budgets.) Figure 7.2 gives some indication of parties’ budgets and the relative weight they placed on each form of advertising:

---


\(^{73}\) O. Kayunov, V. Lysenko & V. Sheinis, Sdelaem vybory chestnymi! (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999); Viktor Sheinis, Za chestnye vybory (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999). One technique is worth mentioning, since it occurred in Ulyanovsk: the nomination of candidates with the same name as a popular one (Sheinis, p.61). In 1995 the movement ‘My Fatherland’ nominated a candidate in Ulyanovsk constituency 180 called Yuriy Goryachev. The person in question was not the governor, but a previously unelected company director who lived in Moscow. He came a respectable third, with 17.14 per cent of the vote. Analogous ‘imitation’ candidates have been reported in other elections.
It can be seen that the highest outlay in all cases was on television advertising, as in 1995 and 1993. The CPRF, continuing its previous trend, ran less paid television advertising than its rivals, but even it spent nearly half its budget on such advertisements. This is understandable, given that survey evidence suggests national television to have been relied upon most for information on the election. Of those who voted in 1999, 50.7 per cent cited national television as their most important source of information, and a further 2.4 per cent, local television. Amongst voters for the six parties that gained Duma representation, these figures were slightly higher still. Nonetheless, it seems that voters paid more attention to news bulletins and current affairs programmes than anything else: more than half (55 per cent) claimed to have been uninfluenced by free advertising, and 71.5 per cent were uninfluenced by paid advertisements. Despite this, parties still went to considerable lengths to screen them.

---

In accordance with §56 of the electoral law, they (and SMD candidates) were given extensive free time on state television channels for four weeks prior to polling day, at various times of the day. Additionally, each channel held two or three debates between the candidates. Parties were also allocated several slots on state radio and on state radio. Supplementary to their free entitlement, they could purchase paid advertising time (which accounts for the main part of the budgets highlighted above).

Examination of a sample of the free advertising screened throughout the election campaign shows a number of trends relating to the 'technology' of advertising. Advertising slots were analysed on four criteria: the location, the main protagonist, the number of times the party logo featured, and whether or not the electoral bloc number was included.

In terms of location, four of the thirteen were recorded entirely in the standard 'Election-99' studio, and five were done in the parties' own studios or offices. The remaining four were recorded 'out and about', involving montages of the party leaders meeting voters or undertaking their work, and occasional 'vox populi' interviews of voters. Some (including those of the URF and CPRF) used a standard opening and closing montage in more than one of their advertisements, with different studio-based footage in between. Unity's main advertisement featured no studio footage and practically no words (23 November, 1233-1238 hours, ORT; 26 November, 1220-1225 hours, ORT), instead showing Shoigu, Karelin and Gurov in action, accompanied by pop music. Only at the end was there any talking, with three slogans ('Russia needs honesty; Russia needs strength; Russia needs to be saved'). It was an excellent example of image-making, containing virtually no concrete ideas but creating the effect of a dynamic new force.

In terms of personnel involved, in a little over half (seven of thirteen cases) the main party leader featured, this being defined as the first person on the central party list. The remaining six split evenly into three categories: one of the leading troika apart from the leader; all three of the troika together; and people completely outside the troika. (They were the film director Stanislav Govorukhin for FAR (26 November, 1236-1241 hours, ORT) and the Yabloko deputy Tat'yana Yarygina (8 December, 1235-1240 hours, ORT).) Interestingly, the early morning debates (ORT, 0740-0800 hours) hardly

---

78 The election advertising of the six case study parties, screened on ORT between 1215 and 1245 hours on weekdays from 22 November to 17 December, was examined. Taking account of repeated advertisements and one missing day's material in the original recordings, this gives a sample of thirteen advertisements.
never featured the party's leading candidates, the only exceptions being Gurov and Zhirinovsky. Other than that, fairly unknown characters participated in them.

The party number on the ballot paper was mentioned in five cases, while the party logo featured on average 2.31 times in course of the five-minute slots. Party logo appearances ranged from FAR's, in which the main speaker was always dwarfed by a background featuring the party symbol, to six advertisements — mainly those in the 'Election-99' studio — in which it was not shown at all.

Paid advertising varied in length and content. In the week before polling day, a number of five-second advertisements were shown. Of the party leaders, Zhirinovsky was the most ubiquitous, featuring in every advertisement for the LDPR/Zhirinovsky bloc, and becoming something of a chat show regular on ORT's 'Good Morning' TV programme. Amongst other things, he shared his showering habits with viewers and gave them advice on body odour and how to lose weight (23 November, 0846-0852 hours, ORT).

At the regional level, parties had even more opportunity to publicise themselves. Voters were able to view not only the thrice-daily diet of advertising on the federal channels, but also local campaigning carried by the respective GTRK (State Radio and Television Company — controlled by the regional administrations) channels. GTRK 'Volga' (Ul'yanovsk), for instance, broadcast 50-minute election programmes on its television and radio stations every weekday evening between 19 November and 17 December. Over the four weeks, the fifteen parties which took up the right received fourteen minutes of free airtime and a further optional twenty-five paid minutes (thirty on the radio), while SMD candidates each received seven free and thirteen optional minutes. In Samara, the parties each had one 13-minute slot; and SMD candidates, a single 4-minute advertisement.

The GTRK channels offered facilities for editing and preparing regional advertisements — at a price. GTRK 'Tatarstan' charged anything from 3000 roubles (c.$115) for a 24-second direct appeal to voters to 225,000 roubles (c.$8,500) for a 45-minute programme. Prices for screening paid advertisements ranged from $1.50 per second in the early morning to $16 per second after the regional news at 2030 hours. Thus it can be seen why television advertising made such a substantial impact upon the parties' budgets, since these were only the rates of a regional television company.

81 Respublika Tatarstan, No. 179 (23956), 4 September 1999, p.2. The screening prices were quoted in 'universal units', a euphemism for dollars.
Analysis of the details of the case study parties’ accounts from the 1999 election show that they spent a combined total of 968,374 roubles (c.$36,550) on television and radio advertising in the case study regions. This constitutes 44.5 per cent of their total expenditure there. (The remainder comprised newspaper advertising, hire of premises, payments for election services, consultation fees and a large print-run of Yabloko newspapers, presumably for distribution throughout Russia.) Most of this (911,124 roubles) was spent on television. The distribution of expenditure on electronic media is shown in figures 7.3 and 7.4.

![Figure 7.3: Expenditure on TV advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election](image)

![Figure 7.4: Expenditure on radio advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election](image)

It has already been seen that election funds accounts can easily obscure the true picture. Moreover, the focus here is on a microstudy of three regions, and the data may not be representative of all eighty-eight. Thus we should be wary of drawing too many conclusions from these figures. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, of the case study regions, advertising expenditure on the ‘electronic media’ was highest in Samara, perhaps reflecting its more prosperous economic situation and the higher profile that the party list campaign enjoyed there by comparison with its neighbours. Furthermore,

---

82 All information in figures 7.3-7.5 compiled from the official record of electoral fund transactions published in *Vestnik Tsentral’noi izboratel’noi Komissii*, No. 12 (102) (2000). Every payment listed to organisations and companies in the three case study regions is included.
Yabloko and the URF appear to have been more enthusiastic about advertising on local radio than their competitors, while FAR and Unity placed more emphasis on local television advertising - at least in the middle Volga.

As to editorial content, parties generally used locally-prepared - and often comparatively amateurish-looking - advertisements, sometimes including clips from national advertising. For example, the first television advert of the CPRF in Ul'yanovsk (22 November, 1900-1914 hours) consisted of one of its local officials sitting in the GTRK 'Volga' studio talking directly to the camera, interspersed with excerpts from the advertisements used in the national campaign featuring Zyuganov and the party logo. The LDPR/Zhirinovsky Bloc's first slot (23 November 1999, 1858-1912 hours) began with Zhirinovsky talking directly to the camera for five minutes (recorded in Moscow) and was completed by the party's local ideological head. Similarly, FAR's first broadcast (10 December 1999, 1855-1909 hours) consisted of a studio discussion between two of its local leaders and the head of the youth section, followed by an appeal to voters by Luzhkov, copied from the five-minute national advertisement.

In Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk (but not Samara, which has a different electoral cycle), advertising for the State Duma election was preceded by that for the regional parliamentary elections. In addition to this there was the daily barrage on the all-Russian channels, quite literally morning, noon and night. It is difficult to quantify the effect that this constant advertising bombardment had in assisting voters to decide. The lady who confessed in all seriousness to the author that 'it was much easier to decide in the old days - there was only one candidate then' cannot have been alone in this opinion.

Newspaper advertising followed a similar pattern. State-financed newspapers were obliged by §55.1 of the election law to carry free advertisements in the same way as the state television channels. Federally, this included the Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Parlamentskaya Gazeta.\(^3\) However, the regional press was arguably of considerably more importance to parties. Whereas the state television channels had almost universal penetration, the readership of federal newspapers was and remains limited outside Moscow, as chapter five noted. (In Ul'yanovsk at the time of the election, Izvestiya sold fewer than 1,000 copies per day compared with 76,000 for the leading regional newspaper.) In the three case study regions, free advertising was carried by the official publications of the regional administrations (republican government, in the case of Tatarstan) almost every day for four weeks before the election campaign. Each party or

\(^{3}\) Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 162 (2271), 20 August 1999, pp.8-9.
candidate received an equal amount of advertising space, although the editorial stances of the newspapers placed in jeopardy this apparent impartiality.

Some indication of the centralised nature of the advertising strategy can be gleaned from the fact that almost all the main parties’ free advertisements in regional newspapers were Moscow-produced, or at least based on Moscow-produced texts. Only the LDPR in Ul’yanovsk made any substantial attempt to tailor its party list advertising to the locality, giving a brief history of the local branch and the times of its television programmes. A handful of others mentioned their local candidates in passing and gave the telephone number of the regional headquarters, but otherwise used Moscow-approved wordings. Most of the advertisements were positive, consisting mainly of dense text introducing the party, its leaders and programme. Only FAR in Samara used the free slots to indulge in mud-slinging, accusing Sergei Shoigu of fighting his election campaign on state money which would otherwise be going ‘to give a refugee from Chechnya a bit of bread and some warm clothes’.

In addition to the free advertisements, parties also bought some paid advertising space. Payments by the six case study organisations to regional newspapers totalled 173,648 roubles (c.$6,550) in the three regions under observation. A breakdown of this is given in figure 7.5.

![Figure 7.5: Expenditure on newspaper advertising (middle Volga), 1999 State Duma election](image)

Sometimes, advertisements were indicated with a small footnote stating that the article had been paid for from the electoral fund of the party concerned. Nonetheless, there were signs that a number of articles were not the work of the editorial staff, even where no attribution was given. For example, in Ul’yanovsk, where no payments to local

---

84 Advertisements used in the analysis are those published for the case study parties in the four weeks prior to polling day by Respublika Tatarstan (Tatarstan); Volzhskaya Kommuna and Samarskie Izvestiya (Samara); and Narodnaya Gazeta and Ul’yanovskaya Pravda (Ul’yanovsk).


86 Samarskie Izvestiya, No. 238 (2381), 17 December 1999, p.11.

87 Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii, No. 12 (102) (2000).
newspapers from FAR are recorded, an identical article about Primakov’s seventieth birthday, headed ‘The Primakov Phenomenon’, appeared in two different newspapers, neither of which carried any indication that the article had come from an outside source. Michel Tatu’s survey of the media in Samara noted that ‘many indirect advertisements were paid off the record to newspapers and presented as normal pieces’, and Steele noted a similar phenomenon in federal press coverage of the election. According to one of the political consultants interviewed (who worked on Putin’s presidential campaign in Samara), it is fairly common practice for sponsors to buy editorial space before the election campaign begins, so that the payment does not go through the election account of the party or candidate. Pre-prepared material is given to the editors of the newspapers, who adjust it into the ‘house style’ and print it as normal.

The final two types of advertising were leaflets and posters. Colton’s survey material shows that, in the 1995 and 1996 elections, approximately half of voters had received some kind of campaign literature or leaflet from parties or candidates, and in 1999, considerable efforts went into the production of a new raft of publicity material. Parties were to an extent constrained by their logos and their past, such as the CPRF, which, unsurprisingly, used mainly red in its posters. FAR’s image was arguably the most colourful, and its logo – which combined the symbols of Fatherland and All-Russia – featured a rainbow-filled map of Russia. Much of its literature was printed with dark blue backgrounds and yellow borders, the same colours as the LDPR used. Analysts suggest blue to be associated with ‘truth and strong belief’. The URF made a very clear attempt to link into the ‘democratic’ credentials of its constituent organisations by using the red, white and blue of the Russian flag – a symbol in the early 1990s of the fight against communism – and it also had a dynamic and fashionable logo in the same colours. Yabloko’s materials were considerably less colourful than their counterparts, printed mainly in black and white. After the election this was cited by at least one regional Yabloko leader as a contributory factor to the association’s relative failure, since its grey literature created the impression of a lifeless campaign and failed to distinguish it from other parties. What coloured materials it did produce were mainly apple green, which was associated with the party’s name and also with coolness.

---

88 Simbirskie Izvestiya, No. 27, 28 October 1999, p.3; Simbirskii Kur'er, No. 167-68 (1540-41), 30 October 1999, p.4.
89 Michel Tatu, ‘Samara’, in EIM, Monitoring the Media Coverage, p.59.
93 Interview, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kislitsa, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk Yabloko, 18 April 2000.
and cleanliness. Since Yabloko has long tried to remain above the fray and depict itself with ‘clean hands’ in the political fight, presumably this was not accidental.

One of most common themes was promotion of the party’s main personalities rather than its programme. The leading troikas featured on FAR’s and Unity’s posters, although the former’s was criticised for ‘resembling a family snapshot’, showing Primakov seemingly with his eyes shut.\(^\text{94}\) Often Primakov and Luzhkov featured on the posters of SMD candidates from FAR, especially in Moscow. The former was still seen as an asset, despite the attacks on his reputation, and candidates were keen to be associated with him. Polyanskov in Ul’yanovsk and Mukhametshin in Tatarstan (the Speaker of the State Council and head of ‘Tatarstan – New Century’) were no exceptions. FAR did attempt to use non-leader orientated posters, featuring the slogan ‘Judge us by our actions’ (literally, ‘Believe only in deeds’), which tied in with its television advertisements.

The party leader theme was used by Unity to promote the ‘fresh faces’ of its campaign. In the early stages the URF also placed billboard advertisements featuring individual portraits of its three leaders, linked to the party’s campaign for a referendum about integration with Belarus. Near the end of the campaign it capitalised on Putin’s tentative endorsement with a poster saying, ‘The New Generation: Putin for President, Kirienko in the Duma’. (This was also the theme of its final television advertisements).

Yabloko had fewer billboard advertisements but pasted somewhat unmemorable A3-sized black and white posters at tram stops, with pictures of Yavlinsky and Stepashin, the slogan ‘Honesty in Power; Order in the Country’, and a small party logo in the corner. The LDPR’s main billboard poster was blue and yellow and stated simply ‘Zhirinovsky’s Bloc is the LDPR’, in order to mobilise its core supporters under the party’s temporary title and associate the LDPR ‘brand’ with it. This slogan also appeared on most of its literature. (There was a brief hiatus in early December when the LDPR was re-registered separately from the Zhirinovsky Bloc, but eventually it was de-registered again.) The CPRF had few billboard-sized posters, and virtually eschewed the personality angle in its advertising. Instead, it placed thousands of A6-sized stickers with the victory symbol from the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) - which was the party’s logo for the 1999 campaign - at tram stops, on trams, on walls and lampposts, and anywhere else possible.

From the regional perspective, most of the party posters in the case study regions were the federal ones pasted in prominent advertising sites. Regional variations

\(^{94}\) Lisovsky & Evstaf’ev, \textit{Izbiratel’nye tekhnologii}, p.289; Author’s photograph of poster.
came mainly in the posters of SMD candidates. Some displayed their party affiliation prominently, while others did not. Polyanskov's Primakov poster (figure 7.6) was an interesting example, since he tried to associate himself with the positive aspects of the party affiliation (Primakov's support), whilst neglecting to mention explicitly that he was standing on behalf of FAR. The Primakov-Mukhametshin poster mentioned above gives an example of some of the overlap in poster campaigns between regional and federal elections. Another, more modest, example of this overlap was one of Kruglikov's posters in Ul'yanovsk region (figure 7.7), which linked all three elections - the federal list, SMD and regional assembly. His poster for the regional election not only managed to mention his candidature to the State Duma, but also featured a large number twenty in the background - the CPRF's number on the State Duma ballot paper, which, technically, was entirely unconnected with the election for which the poster was produced. Kruglikov's poster showed another trait of local CPRF advertising which was noticeable in all three regions at various elections throughout the 1999-2001 electoral cycle: the tendency to clutter up posters with huge amounts of very small text which took several minutes to read. This may have meant that those who read them received far more information than did the voters of other parties, but it also rendered them less eye-catching.

Each party had various leaflets, both at national and, in some cases, at local level. There were different types - presentational, informational, biographical, invitations, and the so-called 'VIP support' leaflet, which showed that well-known figures were supporting the party. (The URF in Ul'yanovsk used this, advertising support from the intellectual elite of the city.) Leaflets took many forms, from professionally-printed colour ones produced in Moscow and sent to the regions, to scratchily photocopied A4 sheets. The CPRF was the most prolific in its output of regional-specific leaflets, while FAR's literature depended on the strength of its organisation. In Samara, most of its advertising material was Moscow-designed; in Ul'yanovsk it produced its own short-lived, small-circulation newspaper; and in Tatarstan it effectively took over the Kazanskoe Vremya newspaper (through its 'Tatarstan - New Century' daughter organisation), and increased circulation from a few thousand to more than half a million copies per week.

---

Figure 7.6: Campaign poster, Yuri Polyanskov, 1999 State Duma Election, U'yanovsk

Figure 7.7: Campaign poster, Aleksandr Kruglikov, 1999 U'yanovsk regional assembly election

Figure 7.8: Fatherland-All Russia poster, 1999 State Duma Election
Other key themes of the election literature included emphasis on the parties' numbers on the ballot paper (epitomised by FAR's 'Vote for No. 19 on 19 December 1999' slogan – see figure 7.8) and the prevalence of credit card-sized leaflets for voters to put in their wallets. Useful information – such as a calendar or (in Moscow) a map of the metro system – was printed on one side so that it would be kept, and parties' details were on the other. As well as leaflets, electoral blocs also produced souvenirs, including pens, badges, notebooks, caps and plastic bags. FAR was particularly keen on these, and there was hardly an office in Kazan', Samara or Ul'yanovsk which did not feature some of its stationery by the end of the campaign.

At a more general level, advertisements could be used for purposes less innocent than their apparent ones. A couple of examples appeared in Ul'yanovsk towards the end of the campaign (figure 7.9). The first was designed to look like a Unity advert, featuring the party's logo and the 'No. 14' electoral number. It consisted of a half-page picture of the media oligarch Boris Berezovsky with the slogan, 'Unity: Vote for my Bears'. (This makes no sense in English, but was a word play on the two names of the organisation.) The second featured Berezovsky, Boris Yeltsin and Tat'yan D'yachenko (Yeltsin's daughter), who epitomised Yeltsin's political and personal 'family', with the slogan, 'We're voting for Unity – come and join us!'. These attempts at impersonation were relatively amateurish and probably inflicted little damage. However, a similar tactic was used in Ul'yanovsk by one of the regional newspapers, Simbirskie Gubernskie Vesti, a pro-Goryachev publication which was established just before the election. It parodied Simbirskie Gubernskie Vedomostl, a sensationalist, antigubernatorial production (see figure 7.10). Throughout the campaign it ran frequent stories attaching (often untrue) scandals to Kazarov, Kruglikov and Polyanskov, despite the fact that it was not registered for political advertising. The clear aim was to confuse voters.

To what extent were parties' efforts to produce advertising justified by their results? It was seen earlier that the majority of voters claimed that advertisements made little difference to their voting behaviour. Some more qualitative data is available from a series of twenty-four focus groups held in spring 2000, which examined voters' attitudes towards television advertising and newspaper coverage.96 These covered both

---

96 Data from the project 'Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia' (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with permission). Twenty-four focus groups were conducted by Russian Research Ltd. in Moscow, Ul'yanovsk city and a village near Voronezh in March and April 2000. There were typically eight participants in each group, with a total of 191 participants. In each location there were four groups before the presidential election, divided by age, and an additional four afterwards. Topics raised included all aspects of media coverage of the elections, focusing to a large extent on the
Figure 7.9: ‘Kompromat’ posters against Unity, 1999 State Duma Election

Figure 7.10: Simbirskie Gubernskie Vesti – a parody of the pre-existing Vedomosti

Since the focus of this study is party activity, however, only the views on party advertisements are included here.
the Duma election, which has been the main focus here, and also the presidential one. From the perspective of the present study, the results from Ul’yanovsk are obviously of most interest, but it is worth contrasting the reactions engendered by the parties’ advertisements in each location. In Moscow, comments tended to be made either to the effect that the advertisements had been professionally produced and worth watching, or else a fairly pragmatic decision had been taken to ignore them (e.g., ‘Either they should improve the standard of the adverts or simply abolish them’; ‘it seemed clear that fundamentally there were two candidates, so I didn’t bother to watch all the advertisements’). In the rural location near Voronezh, voters appeared to have paid more attention to the advertisements – almost all the comments included fairly detailed descriptions of their contents. However, more confusion or boredom with the campaign was expressed there (e.g., ‘I simply want an end to it all’; ‘I tend to turn off the TV for the campaign stuff’; ‘The leaflets, the fliers, the television adverts....are all interesting, but there are simply too many candidates’.) There was also some scepticism about political advertisements in general (e.g., ‘We just don’t need advertisements’; ‘I believe the television news but not the advertisements’; ‘I don’t agree with the concept of advertising’). Ul’yanovsk residents appear to have reacted most to the advertising, both positively and negatively. Several thought that the long-term effect of advertisements on voters could be significant, and a couple had been moved by particular advertisements’ messages. One participant commented that the ‘round table’ debates had been particularly useful. (He may have been referring to the local round tables rather than the national ones; GTRK ‘Volga’ held several debates with all the candidates for the SMD constituencies.) The majority of the negative comments tended towards the opinion that they had not paid much attention to the television advertising of parties and candidates.

Regarding the press, Ul’yanovsk respondents confirmed the earlier observation that the regional press took precedence over the federal editions. A number of comments were made to the effect that ‘it’s interesting to know what’s going on in Moscow, but it’s much more important to know what’s happening here, under our local boss.’ A couple of participants preferred the newspaper advertisements to television ones, saying that ‘it was easier to judge’ the veracity of their contents.

On balance, therefore, it seems that voters viewed political advertising in 1999-2000 with some scepticism, although some were more interested in it than the majority. The question must be asked, therefore: why did parties invest so much time and money in their national and local advertising campaigns when most voters claim to have
ignored their rallying calls? Perhaps there are two reasons. Firstly, with such a large number of parties and candidates, name and image recognition was all-important. Although perhaps not a representative sample, in some of the villages visited by the author, ballots were cast (publicly!) on the spur of the moment, mainly for the first party or candidate whose name the apolitical voter recognised. Even if more sophisticated members of the electorate balanced up the information available and tried to ignore advertising, simple name recognition may have given parties some votes from less politicised voters which they would otherwise have failed to win.

Secondly, although the focus group respondents spoke of the surfeit of information and claimed to have ignored the advertisements, it was notable that every group made comments on Zhirinovsky’s advertisements and media appearances. Admittedly, Zhirinovsky and his colleagues were valued more as entertainers than as politicians, but the fact that a response was engendered at all means that the money spent on advertising was not simply wasted. It also suggests that it was not the advertisements *per se* which led voters to switch their television sets off or throw leaflets away, but rather the fact that most of the parties’ advertisements were unmemorable in every way and indistinguishable from their competitors’.

In conclusion, the foregoing discussion has examined parties in the context of the 1999-2001 electoral cycle, using the party-based State Duma campaign most extensively in its illustrations. In everyday organisational terms, regional nuances in the federal election dominated over the national campaign, but in terms of overall party strategy, the converse was true. It has been seen also that parties were increasingly reliant on outside advice and labour to fight election campaigns. This advice focused mainly on image creation, which meant that, at least in the federal elections, there was little regional variation in advertising strategies. Where particular regional advertising materials were created, they supplemented rather than replaced those emanating from the centre. The
receptiveness of the electorate to these advertisements varied according to location, however.

The time has now come to examine Russian parties in a more general context. Are the observations from the middle Volga typical of the country as a whole? And how representative is Russia of other transition regimes and the place of parties within them? This is the subject of the final chapter.
Russian Party Development in Perspective

The previous four chapters have examined various aspects of party activity in the middle Volga area. Beginning with an outline of parties' organisational strengths, examination has been made of other aspects of their activities: internal decision-making; everyday party life; the role and attitudes of the membership; and their participation in the election campaigns of 1999-2001. The main focus has been empirical, with micro-level examination of three neighbouring non-metropolitan regions. This has created the opportunity to examine in great detail the interactions of regional organisations with their environments, with each other, and with their higher party organs.

However, by focusing so narrowly on one area of Russia (albeit one which accounts for about six per cent of the Russian population, as was seen in chapter four), there is a danger of over-concentrating on local activism and ignoring its wider significance. This final chapter will attempt to remedy this shortcoming by looking at the broader issues relating to the topic of party development and organisation. Through the use of primary survey data, some analysis will be made of the context of party activities within Russia as a whole, making comparisons, where pertinent, with the middle Volga area. Thereafter, the contrasts and similarities of developments in other parts of post-Soviet Europe will be made. Finally, the discussion will turn to questions of longer-term significance: do 'parties' exist in Russia in their commonly understood sense? How do local party activities in the country fit into the broader comparative framework? And what areas require further research?

8.1 Parties and their Environment

The study has concentrated on the activities of parties and their electoral participation, mainly at the local and regional levels. It is necessary, however, to examine the context in which parties operate, and their place in the public mind. The question of how voters relate to parties and electoral blocs has been the subject of much of the party-based literature on Russia mentioned in chapter one, especially that based on survey material. Whilst many of these have dealt with voting behaviour at particular elections, the more significant additions to the genre have attempted to set the nascent attitudes of Russian voters towards parties into a wider context.¹

By early 2000, there seemed to be little doubt of citizens’ commitment to democracy per se. The New Russia Barometer VIII survey asked voters to class the present system and their ideal system on a dictatorship-democracy scale running from one to ten.\(^2\) Whilst the question did not define precisely what was meant by ‘dictatorship’ and ‘democracy’, it can be held that the suggestion of a more open and accountable system is implicit in the latter, given the juxtaposition of ‘dictatorship’ at the opposite end of the scale. All age categories categorised the present system around the mid-point of the scale, suggesting that they agreed with Urban et al.’s conclusion that Russia is ‘neither a democracy nor a dictatorship’.\(^3\) However, seven-tenths of respondents placed their ‘desired’ system closer to the democracy end of the scale than their evaluation of the present one, and nearly half (47.4 per cent) desired a system placed between eight and ten on the scale, closest to ‘democracy’. This suggests that there is an underlying level of support for democracy as a principle, coupled with a recognition that the present political system is far from the democratic ideal.

Having said this, more recent survey data, which asked about voters’ attitudes in a more qualitative manner, paint a slightly different picture. The majority of respondents (51.9 per cent) claimed to be ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ interested in politics.\(^4\) Virtually the same proportion agreed with the statement that ‘Russia is not ready for democracy’ (51.1 per cent), compared with just 14.5 per cent who disagreed.\(^5\) Furthermore, when the question of the system which voters desired was framed not in numerical scales but in concrete examples – the Soviet system, the present system, or ‘Western-style’ democracy – more respondents favoured the former (29.7 per cent) than the latter two (18.2 and 16.4 per cent respectively).\(^6\) However, this varied with age: support for the Soviet system was highest among older voters, and Western-style democracy was favoured most by younger generations.

---

\(^2\) Survey data come from the New Russia Barometer VIII, collected by VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the Investigation of Public Opinion) on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, N=1,940. (Used here with permission, and hereafter referred to as ’2000 NRB VIII survey’.) Questions C.6 and C.7 asked respondents, ‘Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. (a) Where would you place our country at the present time? (b) And where would you personally like our country to be placed?’.


\(^4\) ‘Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia’; survey conducted by Russian Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133; used here with permission), question I.1. [Hereafter referred to as ’2001 Russian Research survey’.]


\(^6\) Ibid., question K.8: ‘Which of the political systems listed below would be the most suited to Russia?’ The possible answers were, ‘The Soviet system, as it existed before perestroika’; ‘The political system which exists today’; ‘Western-style democracy’; ‘Other (please specify)’; and ‘Difficult to say’. The plurality found it hard to answer or refused to do so (31.5 per cent).
Overall, then, it appears that Russians have mixed feelings about the desirability of 'democracy' in its most general sense. But how does a country that for so long existed with just one party relate to the multiplicity of parties which now exists? Again, recent data are mixed. In the 2000 survey, only 8.5 per cent felt that parties were not very important or unimportant for democracy. These figures were broadly similar across the age ranges. The results from this question suggest that, in principle, the typical post-Soviet voter accepts the need for parties in the political process, and accepts the necessity of choice in democratic elections. Nonetheless, the more detailed data available from the later survey indicate some nuances in this support. As table 8.1 shows, whilst the majority supports multi-partyism, many voters would prefer fewer parties. Opinions on this matter seem to a large extent to be conditioned by attitudes to the political system: Soviet nostalgists are overwhelmingly in favour of a one-party system, whereas a majority of those who favour Western-style democracy also favour multi-partyism. (There is a curious group of pro-Western democracy advocates – 12.8 per cent of the sample – which paradoxically fails to see the need for parties at all.) This is consistent with survey findings from the past few years, in which Russians have opined that the number of parties in their present system is too large.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favoured Party System</th>
<th>Favoured Political System</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Hard to say</th>
<th>Rather not say</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet system</td>
<td>Present System</td>
<td>Western Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party system</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present multi-party system</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party with fewer parties</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it hard to say</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would rather not say</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: Party and political system preferences, spring 2001 (per cent).

In general, therefore, the survey data paint a complex picture of attitudes towards parties and the political system, but suggest a consensus that multi-partyism is desirable in principle. Despite this, there is little trust in the actual institutions of the multi-party

---

7 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C.6b: 'The word 'democracy' has many different meanings; this card gives some of them. For each, please say whether you think democracy is...'. A list of possible criteria for democracy was given, including 'a choice of candidates and parties at each election'. Five answers were possible: (i) Essential; (ii) Important but not essential; (iii) Not very important; (iv) Unimportant; or (v) Don't know/difficult to say.

8 Colton, Transitional Citizens, pp.107-09.
system. Three-quarters of respondents in 2000 indicated that they had little or no trust in political parties; less than one in ten (9.1 per cent) held the opposite view.¹⁰ This was mirrored the following year (although interestingly, the confidence of respondents in the middle Volga region in parties was somewhat higher than in Russia as a whole).¹¹ When examined more qualitatively, table 8.2 shows that voters have a fairly cynical attitude to parties and the role which they play in politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of Parties</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Middle Volga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To reflect the views of normal people</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine the national political course of the country</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To support the financial interests of their leaders</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To satisfy the personal ambitions of politicians</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say/Won't say</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: Opinions on the role of political parties, spring 2001¹²

Despite the fact that chapter two showed the State Duma (the arena in which the most institutionalised form of party activity occurs) to be the dominant force in the initiation of legislation, most voters still see parties as vehicles for their leaders' personal and financial ambitions. This ties in with some of the observations made in the previous few chapters about the personalised nature of party politics in Russia.

The question of whether voters have any cognitive attachment to the movements and parties of post-Soviet Russia has been the subject of much of the survey-based literature. This has shown that, at the basic level, most voters were able to recognise the main parties in the mid-1990s, although such party recognition was at a rate lower than in the more established party systems of the East-Central Europe.¹³ Indeed, in the 'floating' party system that has developed in Russia, parties themselves

---

¹⁰ 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C.12: 'To what extent do you trust the political parties to look after your interests? Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating no trust at all and 7 for great trust.' The scores were then aggregated, with scores of 1-3 indicating a lack of trust, 5-7 indicating trust, and 4 as a neutral point.
¹¹ 2001 Russian Research survey, question F.1: 'To what extent do you trust the following institutions? The possible answers were 'Trust fully', 'Trust to a large degree', 'Do not trust very much', 'Do not trust at all', 'Difficult to say'. The proportion of respondents expressing full or considerable confidence in the political parties was 14.3 per cent in the middle Volga, compared with 10.9 per cent in the country as a whole.
¹² ibid., question K.15: 'What is the role of political parties in contemporary Russia?'. One answer was possible out of those listed in the table.
have been transient, rather than voter choice *per se*.\(^{14}\) Even if a voter held a general ideological preference throughout the 1990s, the parties advocating that ideology changed between elections, and thus it was not possible for long-term ‘partisan identity’ to form in the traditional *American Voter* or Butlerian sense.\(^{15}\) Nonetheless, some commentators have noted evidence of proto-partisanship, or, as Colton terms it, ‘transitional partisanship’.\(^{16}\) Early surveys indicated that, although ‘identification with a party’ was a concept with which only a minority of the population could associate, CPRF voters did have a greater cognitive attachment to ‘their’ party than most. Miller *et al.* argued that, with this exception, party identification and partisanship were closely bound to admiration for the leader, while Colton, who had the advantage of a panel survey, found that only nine per cent of voters remained stable in their claimed partisan identity between 1995 and 1996.\(^{17}\)

Primary survey data from the mid-1990s is available for the present study, collected in the week following the 1995 State Duma election. It did not contain a specific question about party identification, but it is possible to discern the strength of voters’ support for the parties for which they had cast their ballots a week earlier. Consistent with the findings of other research, this indicates that the CPRF had a more loyal and partisan support base than any other party or bloc, even at this relatively early stage in the development of the party system. Figure 8.1 shows that the overwhelming majority of voters for the four parties which won representation through the party list (and for two other main parties which were competing in their second election – DCR and Women of Russia) supported the programme of ‘their’ party. However, the number giving unconditional support was considerably higher in the case of the CPRF than its competitors. Even if this does not provide proof of partisan identification *per se*, it does show that CPRF voters’ ideals were most congruent with those of the party for which they voted.

Moving on four years, the proportion of voters claiming to ‘identify’ with a party after the 1999 State Duma election was an amazingly high 48.6 per cent.\(^{18}\) About two-fifths of them (40.9 per cent) claimed that this was a ‘strong’ identity, although both the

---


\(^{18}\) 2000 NRB VIII survey, question D.1. The question was ‘Do you identify with any political party?’. The possible answers were ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

215
Figure 8.1: Extent of support for party programme among voters for each main party, 1995 State Duma Election

Proportion and the strength of the identity increased with age, presumably involving some cross-cutting effect with elderly communist attachment. (The survey did not ask voters with which party they identified, only if they considered themselves to have a partisan identity. However, if it is assumed that they identified with the party for which they voted, then the CPRF, together with the LDPR, once again came out at the top of the list. This suggests that the greater strength of identity with them may be the result of their more distinct ideological niches.) However, given that the survey was conducted just weeks after the State Duma election, it seems likely that ‘identifying with’ was synonymous in the respondents’ minds with ‘voting for’. Perhaps the spring 2001 survey is more representative of the true picture, conducted as it was with no major federal elections in the offing. In this, 27.1 per cent of respondents said that there was a party closer to them than any other. Of this group, just under half (46.3 per cent) named the CPRF and about a fifth (21.5 per cent), Unity. Of the identifiers, the strength of partisanship was roughly equal between the two main parties, but on average, weaker among the other parties. Of the partisan identifiers, 57.8 and 53.4 per

---

19 Data taken from a national representative survey conducted for the University of Glasgow by VTsIOM, 20-26 December 1995, N=1,568, Q.20: ‘To what extent do you support the programme and slogans of the party for which you voted in the State Duma election?’. The possible answers were: (1) ‘Completely and unconditionally’; (2) ‘Fundamentally, but with some qualifications’; (3) ‘Not completely, but it is better than the others’; (4) ‘I know little about the programme of the party’; and (5) ‘Difficult to answer’. The wording of the question is not ideal, but the first three categories form a basic Likert scale, with the final two as discrete categories. Thus the figures shown in figure 8.1 use these first three categories, classifying (1) as complete support; (2) as qualified support and (3) as tentative support. The remaining voters are considered to be unattached.

20 ibid., question D.2. The question was ‘If YES [to question D.1], do you identify strongly, somewhat or only a little?’.

21 2001 Russian Research Survey, question K.12: ‘Is there a party which is closer to you than any of the others?’ The possible answers were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’. Respondents answering ‘yes’ were
cent of CPRF and Unity identifiers respectively claimed to support the party 'completely'. By contrast, on average only 33.1 per cent of identifiers with other parties claimed the same level of attachment. In the middle Volga region, the strength of attachment was slightly lower overall, and the difference between the two main parties and their rivals more pronounced. Whether this reflects the fact that Unity is succeeding where previous 'parties of power' have failed, or whether it reflects once again the transient nature of partisanship in Russia, will only be discernible in the next electoral cycle.

The purpose of this brief examination of survey material has not been to provide comprehensive statistical analysis or build models of causality, but rather to set the position of parties into some kind of wider context. It has been seen that, with the possible exception of slightly weaker partisanship, middle Volga voters are broadly representative of the country as a whole. The contradictions of the party system are reflected in public attitudes towards parties. On the one hand, trust in political parties is very low; on the other, a significant proportion of the electorate claims to identify with one of them, and from a normative point of view most voters support a political system which includes multi-partyism. However, these contradictions give a tentative indication that, whilst parties play a role in politics, they are not in any sense the articulators of social interests that they are considered to be in more traditional political systems, and nor are they seen as such.

8.2 The Middle Volga in Comparative Perspective

It is also possible to examine the experiences of political scientists and commentators who have examined party activity in other Russian regions and in neighbouring and analogous transformation countries, with a view to establishing in a different way the context of party development in the middle Volga area. Owing to patchy coverage of research into party organisations in the regions (as highlighted in chapter one), this is a necessarily ad hoc affair. Most of the research conducted elsewhere has focused on elections rather than parties per se, and has pointed to the limited role that parties play in the regions – comparable with the observations made in this study. The role of parties in regional politics was examined more thoroughly in chapter three, where, it will be recalled, the case study regions were found to be middle-ranking to low-ranking asked two supplementary questions: which party was closest to them, and to what extent do they supported it. The answers were 'completely', 'partly', 'to an insignificant degree', and 'difficult to say'.

22 In the middle Volga, 48.5 and 44.4 per cent of CPRF and Unity identifiers respectively claimed to support the party 'completely', compared with 17.2 per cent of identifiers with other parties. The number of Unity identifiers was also lower, at 12.7 per cent of those claiming an identity of some description.
subjects on the indicators examined. Gel'man and Golosov's study of Sverdlovsk, mentioned in that chapter, suggested that the use of parties as instruments in elite competition in the region had played a part in this. In the three case study regions used for the present research, parties and politics exist in their own environments; elite competition has been seen to take place largely outside the party sphere.\(^{23}\)

How, though, does Russia's party organisational development compare with that in other Central and East European states undergoing transformation? There are various methodological advantages to making such a comparison. Since the transitions in the states of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union began at roughly the same time, we can observe whether their subsequent paths have been parallel or divergent. Moreover, the starting point in all cases was one-party communist rule, with close Soviet connections. On the other hand, we should be wary of making direct comparison without considering the complex historical and ethnic differences between these countries. Without wishing to over-generalise, some states of Central Europe have distinct legacies which differentiate them from their 'transition' neighbours. The forty-year period of communist rule pales into insignificance when compared to the tenth century origins of Hungary and Poland, for instance. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Central European transitions, as in the post-War and Southern European examples, have often involved re-democratisation. Over half the countries of Europe have now experienced some kind of interruption between their first and current experiences of democracy.\(^{24}\) By contrast, in the countries of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic Republics), previous experience of democracy was minimal. Although it is perhaps a cliché to talk of 'a thousand years of autocracy', it is seems fair to say that there is little democratic tradition upon which to build.\(^{25}\) Russia's pre-1990 experience of multi-party parliamentary politics was limited to the weakly-institutionalised and short-lived State Duma of 1906-1917.\(^{26}\) Similarly, until the collapse of the USSR, Belarus had existed as an independent entity only on one brief occasion; and Ukrainian identity was submerged from 1667 onwards when it was partitioned between the Russian Empire and Poland. Thus, although the starting point

---

of the 1989-91 transitions – one-party communist rule – was universal, both the experience of communism and the pre-communist histories of the political systems involved varied substantially.

There are studies too numerous to mention of the post-communist political development of Central and Eastern Europe, some of which were outlined in the introductory chapter of this study. These highlight the fact that, in many of the central European states (at least in those in the vanguard, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), more traditional party landscapes have been established. Juchler points out that a ‘swinging pendulum’ has resulted in power in the 1990s alternating between opposing political forces, whereas in the presidential democracies of the former USSR, power at all levels generally has been retained by incumbents or their chosen successors.27 The more stable party systems in Central Europe may be the result of the necessity for parties to take responsibility for their actions, given that parliamentary government results in them holding the reins of power.

The development paths of these party systems also appear to have been more typical of ‘standard’ transitions than has the Russian example. The four phases of post-communist East-Central European political change, as identified by Lewis – the formation of pro/anti-communist alliances (1989-91); founding elections which resulted in fragmentation of these broad alliances (1992-94); the return of ex-communist ruling parties (1994-1997); and the emergence of semi-consolidated party systems – correspond closely to the four-stage transition model outlined in chapter two.28 The more advanced cases have developed recognisable right, left and central wings, at least on an ideological-cultural level. The dominant cleavage has been social-democratic/liberal, rather than the continuing communist/anti-communist battles of the Yeltsin years or the emergent ‘party of power’/non-party of power’ features of the present Russian polity.

Moving from the party system as a whole to one sector in particular, much research has been on successor parties (i.e., the parties which are the direct descendants of the former ruling communist parties). Ishiyama has attempted to tie together the questions of organisational form and the successor parties’ role in the transition to democracy (including the CPRF),29 while Ziblatt, Mayer, Perottino and Wilson,

amongst others, have looked at examples of ex-communist parties in eastern Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Ukraine. These studies have highlighted the divergent fates of ex-communist ruling parties in the post-communist era. Ishiyama's studies suggest that form of the exit from communism in 1988-91 appears to have affected the success of successor parties. He finds a statistical correlation between the degree of inter-elite bargaining in the early stages of transition and the strength of the successor parties. He also concludes that successor parties which exhibit few mass-like tendencies and which enjoyed electoral success early in the transition are most likely to have supporters who are satisfied with democracy, while those parties excluded from power (such as the CPRF) have support based on the 'losers' from the transition process. Similarities can be seen in Ziblatt's observation that ex-communist parties which are able to capture the centre-left social-democratic ground are most likely to return to power, whereas those which play a marginal role in emergent political systems are more likely to become 'leftist-retreatist' organisations. For example, in eastern Germany, the Party of Democratic Socialism as generally been unable to encroach upon the centre ground occupied by the Social Democratic Party (although it has done increasingly well in elections in eastern Germany, passing the 5 per cent barrier necessary for representation from the proportional representation part of the vote in the 1998 Bundestag election). Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia falls into the 'unreformed' communist category and has been unable to break out of an electoral ghetto, although it has consolidated its position with the pro-communist section of the electorate.

On these criteria, the evidence which has been presented in this study tends to suggest that the CPRF is closer to the second model, being a marginal force seeking to cater to the disaffected and nostalgic. Nonetheless, its situation differs from those of its Central European colleagues. As the largest party in a fragmented party system, its marginalisation stems not from being eclipsed by a social democratic mainstream party (which does not exist in the Russian context), but rather from the relative unimportance of parties in the political system as a whole, as shown in chapter two.


Studies of the internal life of parties have been rarer than those of party systems, but a few articles have touched upon this topic. Van Biezen's examination of internal party power in 'new' democracies — based on two examples from the Southern European transitions (Spain and Portugal) with two in East-Central Europe (Hungary and the Czech Republic) — suggests that a small caucus at the central level holds the main balance of power in most new party organisations. Chapter six of the present study showed that the dominant institution in most of the Russian parties was also the central apparatus or leadership. Chapter seven examined the increasing professionalisation of electioneering and party politics and concluded that it had played a significant role in the success of some parties — especially that of Unity. Aleks Szczerbiak's examination of the 1997 Polish parliamentary elections show that such professionalisation occurred there also, but that there was suspicion of excessive involvement by consultants and that the long-term prospects of professionals replacing bureaucrats within party organisations are limited. Szczerbiak has also examined the 'nuts and bolts' of Polish organisations quantitatively, analysing how many offices, telephone lines, premises, and staff each party has. He finds in Poland what the present study has shown in Russia: few parties exhibit 'mass' characteristics, and most have poor territorial penetration. The exceptions are the successor parties, which, like the CPRF, have more developed infrastructures but still contain only a small proportion of the party's supporters. 31

8.3 Broader Issues: The Present Study and Future Research

The study has examined party activities at the micro-level, but in this final chapter it must be asked whether this constitutes evidence of parties' existence in the traditional sense. To a large extent this depends on the definition of a 'party'. If parties are understood, at the most basic level, as organisations which put themselves forward for election (Epstein's definition32), then their existence is indisputable. Organisations have been promoting candidates in elections throughout the post-Soviet period, albeit with limited success in the majority of cases. However, in the legal sense, it has been seen that the existence of parties in Russia has been less long-standing. Hitherto organisations and parties have possessed equal rights of candidate nomination, and as has been seen, only two of the six case study organisations could accurately be

described as 'parties' prior to the 1999 State Duma election (although for semantic simplicity, generally they have been referred to as such throughout this study).

In the theoretical perspective, the existence of parties also depends upon the definition used. The main ideal-type models - cadre, mass, catch-all, electoral-professional, cartel - propose different roles for parties relative to state and society. Since they are based on Western development paths, however, their explanatory relevance to the latest 'wave' of democratisation appears in some cases to be limited. The debate on this is covered elsewhere, and it is not intended to recount the full nuances of it here.\(^3\) However, it is worth bearing in mind that even in their 'home' Western contexts, some of these models now appear less comprehensive than once appeared to be the case; and secondly, that parties in the current transition arguably display characteristics of all the ideal types, sometimes in hybrid form. As chapter five showed, the CPRF (like other successor parties in East-Central Europe) comes closest to the 'mass' party ideal, representing a reasonably-sized and specific societal group with a developed infrastructure and non-personalised nature. However, it is the only party which fits this description. The LDPR appears superficially to have mass organisation characteristics, but, as was seen in the study, this is a veneer which covers a highly-personalised and charismatically-based organisation. Yabloko's lack of an organisation places it more in the category of an electoral-professional or at least cadre party, operating within a closed environment and without the need for a mass organisation for decision-making or interest articulation. Unity's (and Fatherland's) broad-based appeal with little specific ideology has echoes of the catch-all party. The generally narrow boundary between party actors and the state, and the wide gulf between parties and society (as shown by survey evidence) is suggestive of a cartel party system, an impression reinforced by the state subventions offered by the new law 'On Political Parties'. Nonetheless, one of the main characteristics of such a cartel - a fixed set of actors working to exclude newcomers - is lacking completely in Russia, where only three parties/associations have managed to win representation in every post-Soviet election. Thus it can be seen that Russian parties cross the boundaries between different ideal types, as indeed do those in East-Central Europe. The linear development of the party system along the West European path appears unlikely to occur in the current transition.

\(^3\) Two of the most recent examples from a wide selection of studies comparing Western ideal types with emergent Russian and East-Central European examples are Annette Legutke, Die Organisation der Parteien in Russland (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001) and Paul G. Lewis, 'Conclusion', in Lewis (ed.), Party Development: The First Decade, pp.199-211.
Are parties therefore relevant in contemporary Russia? This study has not assumed *a priori* that they play a central role in politics at either the federal or regional level. The statistical evidence presented in chapter three, for instance, showed that they have a minor part in regional-level elections, flourishing only in a few exceptional provinces such as Sverdlovsk. Rather, it has been seen that local connections, patronage and elite connections have played a far greater role in the election of representatives in the executive and legislative spheres. As chapter seven showed, the general academic focus on the party list section of elections to the State Duma misses the variegated and diverse experiences from single member districts, in which local factors apparently predominate over central party structures. Nonetheless, Putin's attempts to create a three-pole party system, together with new legislation on political parties and his various pronouncements on the subject, suggest that he views the formation of a stable party system as a priority. Parties still provide a useful framework for managing political competition. It seems unlikely that the Russian party system will come to resemble one in which parties act as the genuine articulators of citizens' interests, but this is not always the case even in the more established democracies.

The stipulation, seen in chapter two, that in future parties must have branches in more than half the subjects of the Russian Federation, with not less than one hundred members in each, is a clear attempt to promote the diversification of Moscow-centric parties into genuinely all-Russian ones, and to force regional-specific organisations either to build a federal infrastructure or to disappear. It will not be possible to discern the success of this venture for a few years, but it can only increase the relevance of investigation into local party organisations as they expand and develop.

The present investigation, by examining parties both at election time and afterwards, has sought begin filling this gap in our knowledge. Although it was seen in chapters four to seven that these local organisations are sometimes more virtual than real, undeniably party communities do exist. The examination of the everyday life of the parties in chapter five showed that, even if numbers are small, members meet regularly, take decisions, and attempt (with varying degrees of success) to gain a foothold in local politics. Similarly, the local survey material and focus group material, discussed at some length in chapter six, gave some indication of the work undertaken by these activists at the regional and local levels, and of the motives for their involvement. Although the methodological difficulties involved made extrapolation of the results on the wider party community inadvisable, it was found that CPRF members were more active, and more ideologically congruent with the party, than those of 'liberal' parties.
Rational choice theory, which forms the core of the selective incentives model, had some explanatory relevance, but social networks appeared to be a major factor determining entry to and activism in the main parties.

Overall, the present study has sought to develop our understanding of political parties in Russia by examining them from a primarily non-federal perspective and trying, where possible, to view them comparatively and to highlight the regional- and party-specific factors affecting their existence. Within the confines of these pages, however, it has been impossible to touch on all issues or expand upon all topics at length. There are a number of subjects which have a bearing on the present study and which deserve further investigation. These pages have contained more empirical research than theory, given the unprecedented opportunities available to collect information 'at the coal face' in three under-researched regions. However, as time goes on and the party system begins to consolidate, new opportunities will open up to discuss the place of parties in the wider political system of Russia more theoretically.

At the level of party organisations, more research is needed on individual party activism, analogous to the studies by Whiteley et al. in Britain or of Susan Scarrow in Germany. The present study has made a start in this respect, and within the finite resources and time available for the research, it has provided a first insight into the activities and attitudes of party members. The benefits of conducting a national party survey of party members would be enormous, providing as it would a research resource considerably richer than the limited pilot conducted for the present study. The methodological problems which would be involved in conducting a national party survey are enormous, however. (See appendix A for an indication of the logistical difficulties encountered even in three case study regions.) An alternative technique would be to include questions in national representative surveys of the population as a whole, in which approximately 1 per cent of respondents could be expected to be party members. Nonetheless, for a representative number of party members to be included, the sample size would require to be several times larger than those of current surveys.

Perhaps the greatest potential for future research is in the electoral realm. Hitherto, research has focused mainly on electoral behaviour and its effect on party development. In other words, the emphasis has been on the effect that demand (the electorate) has had on subsequent supply (parties). Arguably there is a need for more research examining the converse effect, i.e., how parties' strategies affect voting behaviour in the first place. The success in 1999 of Unity, URF and FAR (although the latter underachieved relative to its expectations) and the election of a president who had
been virtually unknown six months prior his victory, points to the growing importance of electoral strategy as an independent variable. Chapter seven began a study of this by providing some insight into the techniques used to manipulate public opinion and the rationale behind political advertising. However, there are broader aspects to the question of campaign professionalisation which move beyond parties per se and relate to the ongoing transition. ‘Democracy’ is a many-faceted concept, which depends not only on a country’s theoretical but also its practical commitment to liberal principles such as freedom of expression, constraints on power, civil society and equality before the law. The question of where Russia lies on Diamond’s scale of liberal, electoral, and pseudo-democracy deserves further investigation.  

Russia’s status as the largest country in the world and a former superpower makes the outcome of the transition uniquely important. On the one hand, it has very comprehensive electoral laws, regular multi-candidate elections and a constitutional split between executive and legislative branches of power (albeit weighted heavily in favour of the former, as was seen in chapter two). Paradoxically, though, citizens claim to feel less influential than in the one-party system of the Soviet Union. The New Russia Barometer VIII survey cited earlier shows that the balance of voters feels less (33 per cent) or no more (48 per cent) influential than before perestroika. The juxtaposition of theoretical democratisation with a lower sense of political efficacy may lead to the conclusion that Russia tends more towards the electoral than the liberal type of democracy, or as Shevtsova has described it, that Russia is a ‘constitutional electoral autocracy’. In this model, elections can be seen primarily as a means of legitimising power rather than choosing representatives. Furthermore, although international observers have generally declared the elections to be relatively free and fair, there have been continual qualifications to this through allegations of falsification or manipulation, combined with observations of strong media bias.

The detachment of the citizenry from politics, combined with professionalisation of electioneering and the media, should provide huge potential for future research into democratic development and ‘good governance’ in contemporary Russia. Building on the issues raised in chapter seven, there is a need to analyse in more detail the form of democracy emerging in the Russian Federation, especially at the local level. This would fit into the wider comparative framework on the evolution of new democracies.

---

35 2000 NRB VIII survey, question C.4c.
and how information and communication technologies are affecting democratic practice and participation. Such research should be of interest not just to the political science community, but also to international organisations such as the OSCE and European Union. The short-term nature of election observation carried out by these bodies means that it is possible to observe only the technical implementation of voting procedure on election day, with only a few observers present in the weeks prior to the election. This runs the risk of missing underlying and subtler indicators which give a better idea of the fairness and openness of the electoral process.

A final area of necessary future comparative research is the extent to which it is valid to analyse the Russian party system with Western-derived theories. There is a prevailing assumption in academic research that advanced Western-style democracies represent the effective ‘end point’ of political development, and that polities in transition represent a state of arrested development on the road towards this. In fact, however, such developed democracies are in the minority, and it is to be questioned exactly how relevant Western-derived theories actually are. To some extent the present study has continued the previous trend, including in its analysis the application of various long-standing theories of party organisation and activism, but there is a need for future research to focus on the ways in which the current wave of democratisation and party development may differ from analogous developments in the past, and in what ways the Russian experience is unique.

Thus, as Russia’s post-Soviet political development approaches the end of its first decade, new and interesting trajectories in research continue to evolve.
Appendix A

In order to examine in more detail the membership of the middle Volga party branches, empirical data was collected in May and June 2000 in the form of a questionnaire examining motives for party activism and the attitudes of party members. The questionnaire is appended. In addition to this, two focus groups were held in Ul'yanovsk in June 2000 – one with the CPRF and one with Yabloko – examining the same questions. These data were supplemented by informal contact over a number of months with party activists, ranging from individual discussions to attendance at meetings and conferences.

A.1 Choosing the Samples
The rationale of the questionnaire itself is explained below. Ultimately it was conducted in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk regions, among four of the case study parties: the CPRF, Unity, Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces (URF). Individual negotiations were required with each of the branches in the three locations under investigation, and the majority of those approached agreed in principle. The exceptions were the CPRF in Samara, which refused, and the LDPR in Samara, which agreed initially but subsequently reversed the decision, citing party discipline. A number of branches were not approached to undertake the questionnaire – all three branches of Fatherland, and the Tatarstan and Samara branches of URF, which existed in name only; and the Tatarstan and Samara branches of Unity, with which contact was established too late to undertake the survey. This left nine branches out of a potential eighteen which declared themselves willing to participate.

The samples were based on participants in conferences held by the parties. Questionnaires were given to every attender at the conferences and collected in again at the end from those willing to respond. In many cases the conferences were scheduled and postponed several times, not taking place before the author left Russia. However, as noted in chapter six, three such ‘conference samples’ were obtained: the biannual plenary session of the CPRT republican committee on 27 May 2000 (N=21); the second conference of the Ul'yanovsk regional URF branch, held on 24 June 2000 (N=57), and a meeting of the CPRF Ul'yanovsk town and district branch committee in early July 2000 (N=22). In addition to these, a number of questionnaires were completed by the leaders of the Ul'yanovsk branch of Unity, and by Yabloko staff in Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk. These samples were too small to be analysed statistically, but reflecting as they did the opinions of the most influential members of the respective branches, they were worth treating as ‘informant’ information of a more qualitative kind.

The remaining party branches which had agreed in principle to participate were not sampled, owing to the postponement of promised conferences or meetings. The Tatarstan and Ul'yanovsk branches of the LDPR had undertaken to complete the surveys at their respective
co-ordinating councils, but these were not held at the planned times; the Ul'yanovsk branch of Unity was expected to hold a founding conference after the party's registration, but this was postponed several times; and the Samara branch of Yabloko had also expected a conference at the end of May, but this was postponed indefinitely. These postponements indicate some of the difficulties involved in the organisation of such a survey. Although the final sample sizes were considerably smaller and more narrowly based than anticipated, it is possible to view the data obtained as the basis for tentative conclusions and further analysis which would not have existed at all otherwise.

A.2 Composition of the samples
As seen in chapter six, it is very difficult to know the parameters of parties' membership. Given the nature of the conferences, it was assumed that the delegates present represented a cross-section of the most active members. Some degree of self-selection was involved, insofar as only those who took the trouble to fill in the questionnaire were included in the final sample. At the CPRF/CPRT conferences, the response rate was around 50 per cent; in the case of the URF, it was approximately 57 per cent. Based on the author's observation of the conferences, however, the respondents appeared to be roughly proportionate to the delegates at the conference as a whole in terms of age and gender.

The socio-economic characteristics of the CPRF samples are shown in tables A.1 and A.2. The membership was overwhelmingly male-dominated, at least at the level of active participation in meetings. The age structure of the respondents confirms the general hypothesis that the CPRF membership is predominantly elderly, although this appears to be greater in the Ul'yanovsk sample. Four-fifths of the Tatarstan sample were members of either their local district committee or the Republic committee; by contrast, the same proportion in the Ul'yanovsk sample were not. Whilst it would be erroneous to derive a firm conclusion on this, given the different exogenous circumstances, it seems to be the case that the leadership is marginally younger than the rank-and-file membership. It is worth noting that today's middle-aged leaders would have been in their thirties and early forties at the start of the perestroika period, and thus have been seen as the next generation of CPSU leaders. It seems that, with the CPSU gone, many have still found a role in the revived CPRF. This may also be the reason for the greater prevalence of higher education amongst the Tatar sample, with the vast majority falling into the graduate category. It is also reflected in the higher vocational qualifications of the group. The Tatar sample - drawn as it was at a conference of the CPRT republican committee - was above all a sample of local leaders, compared to the Ul'yanovsk sample of local activists. This allows interesting comparisons between leadership and activists to be made, taking into account the qualifying factor of geography.

The mean monthly income per family member of CPRF activists interviewed was 940.76 roubles (S.D.=474.37) in Tatarstan and 790.48 roubles (S.D.=474.37) in Ul'yanovsk-
about $33 and $28 at the time. The medians were lower, at 750 roubles ($26.50) in Tatarstan and 650 roubles ($23) in Ul'yanovsk.

Marked differences can be observed between the CPRF and URF samples in terms of their socio-demographic composition, as tables A.3 and A.4 show. Whereas the CPRF groups were male-dominated, the URF one was more evenly split. It also had a markedly different age profile: three-fifths of URF activists present at the conference were under the age of twenty-five. The reason for this is the very conscious effort made by the URF in Ul'yanovsk to recruit young members. The prevalence of students meant that many fell into the 'incomplete higher education' category. The majority of people present at the conference were rank-and-file members, with a few who were on district or regional committees.

Mean monthly income per family member was 1,181.76 roubles (S.D. = 920.74) and mean last monthly income, 1,575 roubles (S.D. = 2,310.43), these sums being equal to about $42 and $56 respectively. This latter figure is something of a statistical anomaly caused by the highest-earning member, who had enjoyed an income of RUR10,000 ($264) the previous month. As a result, the median income – 950 roubles (about $33) – perhaps gives a better indication. These figures are marginally higher than the CPRF equivalents, but not substantially so, and are still below the average income of the region as a whole. Of course, using monetary incomes as an indicator has its limitations, since it ignores problems such as irregular payment and the use of other resources (e.g., family allotments) which may distort the picture. Nonetheless, since the primary focus of the study is party activism rather than living standards, which are covered by other surveys, this question does at least give some basic indication of differing standards of living among party members.
### The CPRF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPRF Tat (N=21)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (N=22)</th>
<th>CPRF Total (N=43)</th>
<th>CPRF Tat (%)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (%)</th>
<th>CPRF Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete middle education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle specialised education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete higher education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee member (District)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee member (Region/Republic)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table A.1: Socio-demographic information (CPRF)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPRF Tat (N)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (N)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CPRF Tat. (%)</th>
<th>CPRF Ul. (%)</th>
<th>CPRF Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager (&gt; 10 employees)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager (&lt; 10 employees)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly qualified specialist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle specialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly qualified worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp. unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table A.2: Occupational status of members (CPRF)*
### The URF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The URF</th>
<th>N (=57)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete middle education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle education</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle specialised education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete higher education</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Membership Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership Status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee member (District)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee member (Region/Republic)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table A.3: Socio-demographic information (URF)*

### Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>N (Total=57)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager (&gt; 10 employees)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager (&lt;10 employees)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly qualified specialist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle specialist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security service worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table A.4: Occupational status of members (URF)*
A.3 The Questionnaire

Respondents completed a 24-question, eight-page questionnaire on the motives for and extent of their party activism over the previous two years. A full copy of the questionnaire is included at the end. The aim of the questionnaire was to examine quantitatively the indicators of activism introduced in chapter six. A number of questions utilised Likert scales. Over the space of three months - from February to May 2000 - the design was refined in response to discussions with local sociologists and political experts, until a draft was ready to be used in pilot interviews. A number of these pilot interviews were conducted in order to establish that the questionnaire was clear in its design and tapped the aspects of activism which it was designed to examine. In general it was found that this was the case, although in response to these discussions with party activists themselves, a number of minor alterations were made before the collection of data began.

The questionnaire was divided into five sections: 1) how members became active within the party; 2) the extent of their activism; 3) the motives for their activism; 4) their political attitudes and sympathies; and 5) socio-demographic information.

The first section related to their joining the party. Questions 1 and 2 (hereafter 'Q.1' etc.) established when they first participated and when they joined, which in the legal sense in Russia can be two different questions. Yabloko’s ‘candidate membership’, for instance, means that there is necessarily a gap of at least six months between the two dates. A supplementary question (Q.2b) asked if the member had been a member of the CPSU, in order to see the generational turnover between Soviet and post-Soviet politics. There was a small difference in the wording of Q.2a in the case of Unity, since as a newly-established party, the answers to this question would have been identical for every member. Instead, Q.2a asked whether the respondent had previously been a member of any other party, and if so, which one. This was in order to see the extent to which Unity, as a ‘party of power’, had been constructed on the foundations of previous such organisations, although the small number of questionnaires completed by Unity members in the end rendered left this intention unfulfilled. (The standard question was used in the URF survey, although it was also new. As a union of pre-existing parties, it was qualitatively different from Unity, which was established with no direct ‘ancestors’.)

Q.3 and Q.4 related to how and why members joined. Q.5 asked whether they approached the party or the party approached them, in order to assess the extent to which the party was a self-perpetuating ‘political club’, or populated by people displaying self-initiative and conscious choice. The final question of this section, Q.6, measured the factor of expressive attachment to the party (Eₐ) by asking respondents about the strength of their identity with it.

The second section related to party work. Q.7 tried to establish the frequency with which members participated in party activities, a measure of Aᵢ. The original version of this question asked respondents to classify this in terms of hours per month. In the process of
redrafting, this was replaced by the scale given here. Whilst less precise in itself, was felt to be
easier to understand and more likely to elicit accurate answers than one in which members were
required to reconstruct quantitatively their activity more than a year prior to filling in the
questionnaire. As a result, the final version used the scale given here.

Q. 8 aimed to measure the ideological attachment (I,) which the respondent had to his or
her party. Once again, the wording of this question required substantial thought, since various
ideological terms have different meanings in the Russian context from those of established
democracies. In the British context, Whiteley et al. used a nine-point left-right scale, asking
respondents to place their own ideological position relative to other members on this scale.
However, in Russia, the concepts of 'left' and 'right' mean virtually nothing, and as a result,
such a scale would be of little practical use. An early draft of the questionnaire attempted to
substitute the left-right scale with a scale running 'liberal, democrat, liberal-democrat, social-
democrat, patriot-communist, patriot anti-communist, nationalist ('Russia for Russians'),
nationalist ('construction of a unified Slavic government'), in an attempt to have some kind of
linear scale. However, even this was felt to have little meaning, and pilot interviews indicated
three further problems - namely, that it was difficult to choose only one position on this scale;
that Unity, which considered itself to be centrist, was not represented on it; and thirdly, one of
the potential participants was called the 'Liberal Democratic Party', and as a result, members of
the LDPR were likely to choose the category 'liberal-democrat' even though the ideology of the
LDPR is anti-liberal in its more traditional sense. As a result, a completely different approach
was utilised in the final draft, asking respondents to pick one of five points on four scales
measuring aspects of ideology - state/private; individualist/collectivist; liberal/protectionist; and
especially relevant to the Russian context, Westernist/Slavophile. This had two advantages. It
allowed the respondents' ideology to be compared to the parties' on a multi-axis scale (reducing
the unidimensionality of the question), and also allowed contrasts between the spatial positions
of activists of different parties to be analysed. Furthermore, similar questions have been used in
nationwide representative surveys, allowing some degree of comparison between the views of
party members and voters. (This was not done in chapter six because of the small sample sizes,
but in principle it would have been possible had the scope of the survey been greater.)

Q. 9 and Q. 10 related to the extent of activism A,, asking respondents to indicate the
frequency with which they participated in various party activities. Once again, the list had to be
constructed to take account of the activities of Russian parties, which differ from Western ones,
e.g., the collection of signatures in support of a candidate and working in an polling station as
an observer.

The third section of the questionnaire was headed 'Activities of the party', but was in
fact designed to tap a number of the motives for party activism. The first - Q.11 - attempted to

\footnote{1 For an analysis of the terms 'left' and 'right' in Russia, see Timothy J. Colton, 'Ideology and Russian
Mass Politics: Uses of the Left-Right Continuum' in Matthew Wyman, Stephen White & Sarah Oates,
Elections and Voters in Post-Communist Russia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp.167-189.}
tap social norms $N_i$. This measured the extent to which joining a party was congruent with or incongruent to the social environment of the member. This is particularly important in the Russian context, since social relations have changed considerably in the last few years. On the one hand, many Russians are apolitical and anti-party, as the survey data used in chapter eight showed; on the other, being a member of a party, or, more accurately, The Party, was a common occurrence in the Soviet Union. For this reason, the question was expanded somewhat from the original version, which simply asked if the respondent's 'relations, friends and colleagues' would agree with the statements given. It was decided to include three scales - one for each of these groups ($N_1$, $N_2$, and $N_3$), since it was quite conceivable that there might be conflicting social pulls between the home and work environments. Highest scores went to those who agreed with the first and third statements and disagreed with the second. A score of on each of the three indicators of $+6$ indicated high congruence with the social environment, and $-6$ complete incongruence.

Q. 12 was one of the most complex, aiming to measure five indicators of activism - Altruism ($A_i$), Group influence ($P_g$), selective outcome incentives ($S(O)_i$), selective process incentives ($S(P)_i$), and the costs of involvement ($C_i$). Additive Likert scales were used, with three statements on each indicator with which the respondent had to agree or disagree. These were mixed in a random order to prevent rote responding, and in some cases (as indicated) the scoring was negative, meaning that by disagreeing with the statement, the respondent was in fact indicating a positive answer. (For example, if the respondent disagreed with the statement in Q.12.7 - 'The party leadership does not pay attention to the opinions of ordinary members' - this meant that they considered party members to be capable of influencing that party leadership and thus contributed a positive score to the $P_g$ indicator.) On each scale there was a maximum score of $+6$ and a minimum of $-6$. Q.13 attempted to tap personal efficacy ($P_i$), by listing the same list of activities detailed in Q.9 and Q.10 and asking the extent to which the member thought they could influence politics personally.

The fourth section aimed to measure a number of other factors. Q.14 was a question about the party leader (changed to the name of the relevant leader for each party), and gave six scales relating to aspects of his personality with an additive Likert scale. The purpose of this was to examine the social-psychological factor of charisma-based attraction to the leader ($C_{II}$). Positive answers indicated a positive assessment of his personality, and vice versa. The maximum score was $+12$ and the minimum, $-12$.

Q.15 related to collective benefits ($B_i$) - the implementation of the party programme - using the same principle of an additive Likert scale. As a result, the wording of this question differed between each party, but was constructed in each case according to the following criteria:

a) Eight statements were included - four congruent and four incongruent with the views of the party as expounded in the party programme. Some policies advocated in the party
programme did not perhaps conform to the stereotypes (such as CPRF support for small business) but the basis of the questions was either to agree or disagree directly with the policy advocated in the programmes.²

b) Since the economy and the question of Russia’s security were the two issues that dominated the party programmes, these were given more weight, with three statements each. The remaining two were related to the party’s position on the constitutional balance of power in the Russian Federation and an aspect of social policy.

c) The exact criteria used for the eight statements were: monetary policy, property laws, business policy, the army, foreign relations, the near abroad, the constitution, and social policy.

d) Every alternate statement was scored positively and negatively, in order to prevent rote responding.

Maximum agreement with the party programme would result in a score of +16; complete disagreement would result in a score of -16.

Q.16 and Q.17 related to political sympathies. These two questions were not directly connected to the model, but were included in an attempt to measure the spatial distance between parties. They allowed measurement, for instance, of whether the antipathy of the communists towards the liberal parties was greater than to the LDPR, or vice versa; or whether members of URF were antipathetic or sympathetic to the party’s closest political neighbours. A non-additive Likert Scale was used with discrete categories. Statements 17.1 to 17.9 referred to federal politicians - the leaders of the six blocs which won seats in the State Duma Election in December 1999 (including Sergei Kirienko, who stood down just as the questionnaire was printed), together with the Speakers of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, and Putin, as president. The second half of the list featured local figures - members of the State Duma, leaders of each of the main parties, the governor, and the speaker of the local parliament. This list differed between the two cities, but was constructed on similar principles in each case.

The final part of the questionnaire related to demographic information - gender, age, education, income, place of residence, and occupation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY ACTIVISM IN RUSSIA: Regional Aspects

In connection with a joint Russian-British research project, we invite you to complete the following questionnaire. To answer, it is in most cases sufficient to circle the answer which most closely reflects your own opinion. In some cases you will be invited to write your answer in the space provided. The questionnaire is anonymous. Your individual answers will not be revealed. The results of the survey as a whole will be analysed.

When you have completed the questionnaire, please return it to the person who gave it to you, or send it by post to P.O. Box 1803, 432063, Ul'yanovsk-63 [DSH’s address in Ul'yanovsk].

[Annotations in square brackets are for the reader's interest, indicating the factor measured by the question and the methodology used to score it. Where the question varied between parties, all variants are included with suitable annotation to indicate where this has occurred. These annotations were not present on the original questionnaire. The spacing varies slightly from the original.]

A) Joining the Party

1. When did you begin participating in party activities? Year__________

2. A) When did you join the party? Year__________  
   B) Were you previously a member of the CPSU?  
      2.1 Yes  
      2.2 No

3. What motivated you to join the party? (It is possible to give several answers):

   3.1 The authority of the party leader
   3.2 The necessity of opposing the government’s policies
   3.3 The necessity of opposing other parties
   3.4 The construction of a more just society
   3.5 The attractiveness of the party programme
   3.6 To have influence on local politics
   3.7 To have influence on federal politics
   3.8 To assist the party into power
   3.9 To initiate reforms which will raise the standard of living
   3.10 In response to the party’s position on a particular issue. (On what issue? Please write in____________________)
   3.11 Other reason? Please write in____________________

4. Who or what in particular persuaded you to join the party? (It is possible to circle several answers):

   4.1 Federal party press
   4.2 Local party press
   4.3 Election literature
   4.4 Television advertisement for party
   4.5 Work colleagues
   4.6 Friends and acquaintances
   4.7 Relatives
   4.8 Something else? Please write in____________________
5. How did you get in touch with the party initially? (Please choose one answer):

5.1 I approached the party on my own initiative
5.2 I was invited to join the party by its members
5.3 Other? Please write in____________________

6. [E: scored 1-2-3-4] How closely do you identify with the party? (Please choose one answer):

6.1 Very strongly
6.2 Relatively strongly
6.3 Relatively weakly
6.4 Very weakly/Not at all

B) Working for the Party

7. [A] How often do you undertake work for the party? (Please choose one answer):

7.1 Hardly ever
7.2 From time to time
7.3 Weekly
7.4 Up to twice weekly
7.5 Practically every day

8. [I] Which of the two statements in each case is closest to your own beliefs? (Please choose one point on the scale for each set of statements):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statement 1</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Statement 2</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>State ownership is the best means of developing business.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td>Business works best in private hands.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>People are best to take care of their own welfare.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td>The state should be answerable for the welfare of everybody.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>It should be possible to import goods from other countries freely if people wish to buy them.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td>There should be strict controls on the importation of foreign goods in order to protect our own industry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Our country should develop like Western countries.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td>Our country should develop in accordance with its own traditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Have you been a candidate on behalf of the party at town, regional or federal level over the past year or two?

9.1 Yes
9.2 No
10. [A. Scored 1-2-3-4] How often over the past two years have you participated in the following party activities? (Please tick only one box per question):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.1 Paying membership fees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2 Donating money to the party (besides membership fees)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3 Delivering leaflets or literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4 Attending party meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5 Collecting signatures in support of a party candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.7 Canvassing voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8 Working at the party headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.9 Working at a polling station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10 Other (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B) Party Activities

For the following block of questions, please use the scale below:
-2 Disagree Strongly
-1 Partly Disagree
0 Difficult to say (Neither agree nor disagree)
+1 Partly Agree
+2 Agree Strongly

11. How would your relatives, friends and colleagues answer the following questions (Please choose one answer for each statement):

[N1.] RELATIVES

11.1 [N1.] Party members are, on the whole, respected in the region

11.2 [N1.] Many party members seem to be extremists

11.3 [N1.] People can influence politics if they are prepared to participate

Disagree...Agree
-2 -1 0 +1 +2

[N2.] FRIENDS

11.4 [N2.] Party members are, on the whole, respected in the region

11.5 [N2.] Many party members seem to be extremists

11.6 [N2.] People can influence politics if they are prepared to participate

Disagree...Agree
-2 -1 0 +1 +2

[N3.] COLLEAGUES

11.7 [N3.] Party members are, on the whole, respected in the region

11.8 [N3.] Many party members seem to be extremists

11.9 [N3.] People can influence politics if they are prepared to participate

Disagree...Agree
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
12. How effective do you think working for the party can be? Please answer the following questions, choosing one answer to each statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.1 If party members are active, they can change Russia.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2 The local party organisation has had a noticeable effect on our region.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3 The number of paid party staff should be increased, even if it involves using up resources.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.4 For the party to be successful, every member should contribute the maximum possible.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.5 Party work can sometimes be boring.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.6 I would like to become a member of the party staff.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7 The party leadership does not pay attention to the opinions of ordinary members.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.8 Attending party meetings after a working day is tiring.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.9 Party activity during election periods is interesting.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.10 I would like to become a Deputy.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.11 If a person is dissatisfied with the policy of the government, he should try to change this through party activism.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.12 The best way to be knowledgeable about politics is to become a member or activist of a party.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.13 Party work often reduces time spent with friends and family.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.14 In order to develop democracy effectively, every citizen should participate in politics.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.15 Membership of the party is a good way to meet interesting people.</td>
<td>-2 -1 0 +1 +2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. In your opinion, to what extent can you influence politics personally by participating in the following party activities? Please choose one answer for each statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a small extent</th>
<th>Hardly at all</th>
<th>Difficult to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.1 Paying membership fees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2 Donating money to the party (besides membership fees)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3 Delivering leaflets or literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.4 Attending party meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5 Collecting signatures in support of a party candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.7 Canvassing voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.8 Working at the party headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.9 Working at a polling station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.10 Stand as a party candidate (town, regional or federal election)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.11 Other (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C) Political Sympathy

14. [CH] What are your general impressions of the party leader, G.A. Zyuganov (CPRF)/B.E. Nemtsov (URF)/S.K Shoigu (Unity)/G.A. Yavlinsky (Yabloko)? Please choose one answer for each option:

14.1 Lazy -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Energetic
14.2 Unwise -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Wise
14.3 Not likeable -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Likeable
14.4 Indecisive -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Decisive
14.5 One of ‘them’ -2 -1 0 +1 +2 One of ‘us’
14.6 Achieves results -2 -1 0 +1 +2 Does not achieve results

15. [B] Do you agree with the following statements? Please choose one answer which corresponds most closely to your own opinion:

[B] 15.1 (CPRF) The state should play a large role in the national economy. Disagree...Agree -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.2 Property should be state-owned only (including land). -2 -1 0 +1 +2
[B] 15.3 It is necessary to stimulate small and medium-sized businesses. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.4 There should not be a union of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
[B] 15.5 A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the development of relations with China, India and the Arab world. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.6 Russia should remove its military presence from CIS countries. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
[B] 15.7 The Russian state is the main guarantor of social justice. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.8 The Russian constitution is a guarantor of political stability. -2 -1 0 +1 +2

-------------------------- (URF) --------------------------
[B] 15.1 In Russia it is necessary to strengthen budget discipline. Disagree...Agree -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.2 The state should play a large role in the national economy. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
[B] 15.3 The rights of private property (including land ownership) are not sufficiently protected in Russia. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
- [B] 15.4 It is necessary to introduce a protectionist trade policy to protect Russian goods from foreign competition. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
[B] 15.5 A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the development of relations with Europe and European institutions such as the EU, and the OSCE. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
Russia should increase her stock of military weapons.  

Russian should change over to a system of private pensions.  

Human rights are sufficiently protected in Russia.

---

(Unity)

It is necessary to stimulate small and medium-sized businesses.  
The state should not play a large role in the national economy.  
Tax reform should benefit pensioners especially.  
The use of the army in the Chechen conflict is unnecessary.  
A priority of Russian foreign policy should be to balance East and West.  
Russia should remove her military presence from CIS countries.  
The Russian state is the main guarantor of social justice.  
It is necessary to increase the power of governors.

---

(Yabloko)

In Russia it is necessary to strengthen budget discipline.  
The rights of private property (including land ownership) are already sufficiently protected in Russia.  
It is necessary to stimulate small and medium-sized businesses.  
Russia should not change over to a professional army.  
A priority of Russian foreign policy should be the development of relations with Europe and European institutions such as the EU and the OSCE.  
Russia should remove its military presence from CIS countries.  
No less than 4 per cent of the national budget should be invested in science.  
It is necessary to increase the power of governors.
### 16. Please indicate your sympathy to the following parties and movements (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know enough about the party to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank:

[Listed in Russian Alphabetical Order]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Party/Movement</th>
<th>Antipathy</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>Fatherland</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>Union of Right Forces</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 17. Please indicate your sympathy to the following state, societal and party leaders (-3 maximum antipathy, +3 maximum sympathy). If you cannot decide or do not know enough about the person to decide, it is possible to leave an answer blank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Antipathy</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>V.V. Zhirinovsky</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>G.A. Zyuganov</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>S.V. Kirienko</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>E.M. Primakov</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>V.V. Putin</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>G.N. Seleznev</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>E.S. Stroev</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>S.K. Shoigu</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>G.A. Yavlinsky</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ulyanovsk)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Antipathy</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>A.I. Golubkov [S. Duma.]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>Yu.F. Goryachev [Governor]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>I.P. Grinberg [Rival URF]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.13</td>
<td>O.V. Kazarov [CPRF]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>N.N. Kistitsa [Yabloko]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>Yu.V. Kogan [LDPR]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.16</td>
<td>A.L. Kruglikov [CPRF/S. Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.17</td>
<td>V.I. Orlov [S. Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>S.N. Ryabukhin [Speaker, regional assembly]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.19</td>
<td>I.P. Churbanov [Unity]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tatarstan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Antipathy</th>
<th>Sympathy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>S.M. Akhmetkanov [S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>F.G. Ziyatdinova [S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>O.V. Morozov [S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.13</td>
<td>F.Kh. Mukhametshin [Speaker, State Council]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.15</td>
<td>A.I. Saly [CPRF/S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.16</td>
<td>F.Sh. Safiullin [S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.17</td>
<td>V.V. Sedinin [LDPR]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>I.T. Sultanov [Riz]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.19</td>
<td>M.Sh. Shaimiev [President]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>S.P. Shashurin [S.Duma]</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E) Please tell us a few details about yourself

18. Your sex:
   18.1 Male
   18.2 Female

19. Year of Birth __________

20. Your education:
   20.1 Incomplete middle education
   20.2 Middle Education
   20.3 Middle Specialised
   20.4 Incomplete Higher
   20.5 Higher

21. What income does each member of your family receive in an average month? __________ roubles

22. What income did each member of your family receive LAST month? __________ roubles

23. Where do you live?
   23.1 Regional/Republican centre [i.e., Ul'yanovsk/Kazan'/(Samara)]
   23.2 District Centre
   23.3 Village

24. In what category would you place your main occupation? (Please give only one answer):
   24.1 Manager/owner of a business or organisation with over 10 employees
   24.2 Manager/owner of a business or organisation with fewer than 10 employees
   24.3 Highly qualified specialist (e.g., lawyer, doctor, teacher etc.)
   24.4 Middle-level specialist (e.g., accountant, administrator etc.)
   24.5 Non-qualified service sector worker
   24.6 Foreman/team leader
   24.7 Highly-qualified manual worker
   24.8 Qualified manual worker
   24.9 Non-qualified manual worker
   24.10 Farmer
   24.11 Agricultural worker
   24.12 Security service worker
   24.13 On military service
   24.14 Policeman/Militia worker
   24.15 Student
   24.16 Temporarily unemployed
   24.17 Have never worked
   24.18 Pensioner
   24.19 Other? ___________________________

25. Party Membership Status:
   25.1 Member
   25.2 Committee Member – district level
   25.3 Committee Member – regional/republican level
   25.4 Other? ___________________________

We thank you for your participation in the survey and wish you every success!
Appendix B

Exchange rates
Throughout this study, prices given in roubles are converted into dollars at the approximate exchange rate prevailing at the time. The Russian Central Bank exchange rates printed in the Rossiiskaya Gazeta in the first edition each month between October 1999 and September 2001 are listed below. For calculations relating to the State Duma election of December 1999, the nominal exchange rate of $1=26.5 roubles has been used, and for the presidential election of March 2001, $1=28.60 roubles. These were the approximate midpoints in the exchange rates during the campaigns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>$1=</th>
<th>£1=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1999</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>41.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1999</td>
<td>26.07</td>
<td>42.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
<td>26.53</td>
<td>42.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2000</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>44.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2000</td>
<td>28.55</td>
<td>46.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2000</td>
<td>28.65</td>
<td>45.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2000</td>
<td>28.60</td>
<td>45.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>28.38</td>
<td>44.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2000</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>42.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2000</td>
<td>28.05</td>
<td>42.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2000</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>41.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2000</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>40.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2000</td>
<td>27.76</td>
<td>40.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2000</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>40.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2000</td>
<td>27.89</td>
<td>39.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2001</td>
<td>28.16</td>
<td>42.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2001</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>41.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2001</td>
<td>28.62</td>
<td>41.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2001</td>
<td>28.77</td>
<td>40.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001</td>
<td>28.88</td>
<td>41.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2001</td>
<td>29.14</td>
<td>41.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2001</td>
<td>29.16</td>
<td>41.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2001</td>
<td>29.32</td>
<td>42.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>42.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.1: Exchange rates, October 1999-September 2001
Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSR</td>
<td>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Central Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC RT</td>
<td>Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP RSFSR</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRT</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Republic of Tatarstan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Choice of Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Congress of Russian Communities*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>Democratic Choice of Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Fatherland All-Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>Federal Political Council (URF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPSU</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Ministry of Emergency Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRT</td>
<td>Organisation of Communists in the Republic of Tatarstan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Our Home is Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>Precinct Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Primary Party Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPUR</td>
<td>Popular Patriotic Union of Russia*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRUC</td>
<td>Party of Russian Unity and Accord*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RiZ</td>
<td>Ravnopravie i Zakonnost' ('Equal Rights and Legality' – Tatarstan movement)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMDR</td>
<td>Russian Movement for Democratic Reform*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPSD</td>
<td>Russian Party of Social Democrats*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Single Member District (State Duma elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Territorial Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URF</td>
<td>Union of Rightist Forces*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ul’yanovsk Union of Patriots*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Party, movement or bloc
Bibliography

In the following, an underlined reference denotes a book or self-contained pamphlet; italics signify a newspaper or periodical; and references with neither are usually official documents printed on individual sheets of paper (such as party briefing sheets).

As has been the practice throughout, authors are listed in the form of the original article or book, thus occasionally leading to different spellings or details for the same author. Monographs are listed before edited works.

(1) Newspapers and Periodicals

Administratsiya Samarskoi oblasti: Gubernskaya informationnyi byulleten' g. Samara (Samara)
Argumenty i fakty
Byulleten' Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii
Informatsionnyi Byulleten' Zakonodatel'nogo Sobraniya Ul'yanovskoi Oblasti (Ul'yanovsk)
Itogi
Izбирател' Tatarstana (Tatarstan)
Izvestiya
Kommersant'-Daily (now titled simply 'Kommersant')
Kommersant'-Vlast
Molodezhnaya Gazeta (Ul'yanovsk)
The Moscow Times
Narodnaya Gazeta (Ul'yanovsk)
Nedelya
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Obshchaya Gazeta
Ogonek
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
Pravda
Respublika Tatarstan (Tatarstan)
RFE/RL Newsline
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
Rossiiskie Vesti
Samarskaya Gazeta (Samara)
Samarskie Izvestiya (Samara)
Samarskoe Obozrenie (Samara)
Simbirskie Gubernskie Vedomosti (Ul'yanovsk)
Simbirskie Gubernskie Vesti (Ul'yanovsk)
Simbirskie Izvestiya (Ul'yanovsk)
Simbirskii Kur'er (Ul'yanovsk)
Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiskoi Federatsii
Sovetskaya Bashkiriya (Bashkortostan)
TACIS Briefing Documents
Tol'yattinskoie Obozrenie (Samara)
Ul'yanskaya Pravda (Ul'yanovsk)
Vechernaya Kazan' (Tatarstan)
Vedomosti Federal'noho Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii
Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Tatarstana (Tatarstan)
Vedomosti S'ezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR
Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarstana (Tatarstan)

(2) Interviews

Listed in alphabetical order. Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of interviews undertaken with each individual in the course of the study.

* = cited in the text.

Aksenova, Ekaterina Nikolaevna, Press Secretary, Ul'yanovsk regional URF (Grinberg branch); later, Assistant Press Secretary to Vladimir Shamanov, Governor of Ul'yanovsk region (3).

*Bindyukov, Nikolai Gavrilovich, Secretary for International Relations, CPRF central committee (1).

*Blikov, Evgenii Vasil'evich, Deputy Chief of Staff, Samara city URF (2).

*Borisov, Fyodor, Chairman, DCR Youth Section (1).

*Chasovskikh, Viktor Ivanovich, Co-ordinator, Samara regional LDPR (3).

*Churbanov, Igor Petrovich, Chairman, Ul'yanovsk regional Unity (2).

Egorov, Igor Igorovich, Director, Mid-Volga Scientific Centre (2). 

Egorova, Tat'yana Petrovna, Secretary, Ul'yanovsk regional Fatherland (1).

Faskhutdinov, Ibragim Kanaseevich, Member of the Bureau, Ul'yanovsk regional CPRF (1).

*Fomin, Anatoliy Alekseevich, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan FAR; later Chairman, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tatarstan (CEC RT) (2).

*Gantimirova, Tat'yana Mikhailovna, Press Secretary to Vladimir Shamanov, Governor of Ul'yanovsk region (1).
Grachev, Ivan Dmitrevich, Candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Tatarstan, March 2001; Deputy of the State Duma (1).

Gurin, Andrei Alekseevich, Deputy Chairman, Ul’yanovsk regional Unity (2).

Kazarov, Oleg Vladimirovich, Former Deputy of the State Duma, Deputy Mayor of Ul’yanovsk, and Second Secretary of the Ul’yanovsk CPSU regional committee (1).

Khusnutdinov, Nail’ Kadyrovich, Chairman of Executive Committee, ‘Tatarstan – New Century’; later, Deputy of the State Duma (1).

*Kislitsa, Nikolai Nikolaevich, Chairman, Ul’yanovsk regional Yabloko (5).

Kletskin, Mikhail Vasil’evich, Candidate from CPRF, Samara town duma election, July 2000 (1).

*Klochkov, Valerii Mikhailovich, Second Secretary, Samara regional CPRF (2)

*Kolyaev, Aleksandr, Head of Regional Affairs, DCR, Moscow (1) [by telephone].

*Kogan, Yuriii Vladimirovich, Ideological Head, Ul’yanovsk regional LDPR (6).

Kovel’, Vyacheslav, Deputy Governor, Ul’yanovsk province (1).

Kruglikov, Aleksandr Leonidovich, First Secretary, Ul’yanovsk regional CPRF; CPRF State Duma Deputy (1).

*Kurgan, Lyudmila Alekseevna, Press Secretary, Samara regional FAR (1).

*Landau, Aleksandr, Lower Volga District Curator, Yabloko central headquarters (1).

*Milhikov, Vladimir Nidreevich, Leading Yabloko activist, Sengilei town, Ul’yanovsk region (1).

*Molevich, Prof. Evgenii Fomich, Head of Sociology Department, Samara State University (2).

Nefedkin, Valerii Vladimirovich, First Deputy Chairman, executive committee, Ul’yanovsk regional Unity (1).

*Ovchinnikov, Aleksandr Pavlovich, Assistant to Viktor Tarkhov (Candidate to the governorship of Samara province) (1).

*Ovchinnikova, Svetlana, Chair, Ul’yanovsk regional Young Yabloko (1).

*Perov, Anatolii Ivanovich, Deputy Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko; Legal Adviser, RIZ (2).

*Petrov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Co-ordinator, Ul’yanovsk regional LDPR (1).

Polyakov, Igor Anatol’evich, Secretary, Election branch of Vladimir Putin, Ul’yanovsk region (2).

*Popova, Valentina Petrovna, Secretary, Zasviyaga district CPRF committee, Ul’yanovsk city (1).

Rautkin, Sergei, Chairman, Ul’yanovsk regional LDPR (youth branch) (1).

Sachkova, Lidia Nikolaevna, Secretary, Ul’yanovsk Regional Electoral Commission (1).

*Sadykov, Robert Garipovich, Secretary, republican committee, CPRT; later, Candidate to the presidency of the Republic of Tatarstan (5).

*Salakhov, Il’dus Il’yasovich, Chairman, Tatarstan Yabloko (1).

*Saly, Aleksandr Ivanovich, First Secretary, CPRT; Chairman of the State Duma Commission for the Study of Electoral Legislation and the Preparation of Execution of Elections and Referenda in the Russian Federation (2).

*Sedinin, Viktor Vladimirovich, Co-ordinator, Tatarstan LDPR (1).

*Sharegin, Valerii Mikhailovich, Press Secretary, Ul’yanovsk regional Fatherland (3).

*Shlyekhov, Valerii Vladimirovich, Member of the political council, Tatarstan Unity (1).
In addition to the interviews listed here:

- Two non-attributable interviews with Moscow-based political consultants from (1) The Public Centre for Political Consulting and Electoral Technology, and (2) Gruppa A-Z Consulting.
- Two focus groups in Ul’yanovsk – CPRF and Yabloko members.
- Informal contact with the above-listed and their colleagues throughout the period of study.

(3) All-Russian Survey & Empirical Data (used with permission)

National representative survey conducted for the University of Glasgow by VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the Investigation of Public Opinion), 20-26 December 1995, N=1,568.

New Russia Barometer VIII, collected by VTsIOM on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, N=1,940.

‘Building a New Democracy?: Television, Citizens and Voting in Russia': survey conducted by Russian Research, fieldwork 11-26 April 2001, N=2,000 (funded by ESRC Grant R000223133). [Also twenty-four focus groups from the same project – conducted in Moscow, Ul’yanovsk city, and a village near Voronezh.]
(4) Publications and Declarations of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC) and its Regional Branches

(4.1) Handbooks to Federal Elections
Listed chronologically. The handbook to the 2000 presidential election was edited by a 36-member 'avtorskii kollektiv'.


(4.2) Central Electoral Commission of the Republic Tatarstan


(4.3) Samara Regional Electoral Commission
(4.4) **UL’YANOVSK REGIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION**


(5) **Laws and Official Documents Cited**

*Listed chronologically.*

(5.1) **ALL-UNION/ALL-RUSSIAN**


Zakon SSSR ‘Ob uchrezhdenii posta prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR’ (11 March 1990), Pravda, No. 75 (22978), 16 March 1990, pp.2-3.

Polozenie ‘O federal’nykh organakh vlasti na perekhodnyi period’, Presidential Decree No. 1400 (21 September 1993), Izvestiya, No. 182 (24037), 24 September 1993, p.3; Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 186 (802), 6 October 1993, p.3.

Polozenie ‘O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1993 godu’, Presidential Decree No. 1557 (1 October 1993), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 188 (804), 8 October 1993, pp.3-5.


Federal’nyi zakon ‘Ob obshchestvennykh ob”edineniyakh’, Law No. 82-F3 (19 May 1995), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, No. 100 (1211), 25 May 1995, pp.4-5.


(Alterations on 30 March 1999 (No. 55-F3), published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 6 April 1999; further alterations on 10 July 2001 (No. 89-F3) published in Vestnik Tsentral’nogo Izbiratel’noi Komissii, No. 6 (120) (2001), pp.3-5.) Full text, excluding the latter minor
alterations, contained in Federal’nyi zakon ‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Moscow, Yurisprudentsiya, 1999).


Federal’nyi zakon ‘O politicheskikh partiyakh’, Law No. 95-F3 (11 July 2001), Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii, No. 6 (120), 2001, pp.5-35.

(5.2) REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN


‘Opravlenie Konstitutionnogo suda RF’, No. 92-0 (27 June 2000), Kazansko Vremya, No. 34 (264), 7-13 September 2000, pp.6-7.


(5.3) UL’YANOVSK PROVINCE

(6) Publications of the State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat)
Listed chronologically.

(6.1) ALL-UNION/ALL-RUSSIAN
National’nyi sostav naseleniya RSFSR (Moscow: Goskomstat RSFSR, 1990)
National’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991)
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1997)
Rossiya v tsifrakh: Kratkii statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1998)
Rossiya ‘99: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1999)

(6.2) REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN
Respublika Tatarstan v tsifrakh: Statisticheskii sbornik (Kazan’: Goskomstat RT, 1999).

(6.3) SAMARA PROVINCE
Demograficheskii ezhegodnik (statisticheskii sbornik) (Samara: Goskomstat Samara, 1998).
(6.4) **UL'YANOVSK PROVINCE**


Nekotorye pokazateli Ul'yanovskoi oblasti v sravnenii s regionami Privolzhskogo federal'nogo okruga i Rossiiskoi Federatsii za yanvar'-dekabr' 2000 goda (Ul'yanovsk: Goskomstat Ul'yanovsk, 2001).

Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozenie Ul'yanovskoe oblasti yanvar' 2001 g. (Ul'yanovsk: Goskomstat Ul'yanovsk, 2001).

(7) **Party Literature and Documents Cited**

*Note: Some party documents cited in the text were published in the party periodicals and newspapers, and are not listed individually.*

(7.1) **CPSU**

➤ **Statute:**

*Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Sovuz utverzhden XXVII s"ezdom KPSS* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986).


➤ **Programme:**


➤ **Speeches:**


Gorbachev, M.S., 'Politicheskii otchet tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVIII s"ezdu KPSS i zadachi partii', in *Materialy XXVIII s"ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Sovuza* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), p.47.

➤ **Miscellaneous:**

(7.2) CPRF

> Statute:

Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obshchestvennoi organizatsii “Kommunisticheskaya
Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Moscow: Informpechat’, 1999).

> Programme:

Putem sozdaniya: Osnovnye napravleniya ekonomicheskoi programmy narodno-
patrioticheskikh sil. (Moscow: ITRK, 2000).

> Party Newspapers and Periodicals:

Pravda
Pravda Rossi
Sovetskaya Rossiya
Slovo Kommunista (Tatarstan)
Trudovaya Samara (Samara)
Levyi Marsh (Ul’yanovsk)

> Speeches:

Zyuganov, G.A., Politicheskii otchet Tsentral’nogo Komitet a KPRF VII S”ezdu: Doklad
Predsedatelya TsK KPRF Gennadiya Zyuganova 2 dekabrya 2000 goda (Moscow: ITRK,
2000).

> Miscellaneous:

Iz opyta raboty regional’nykh i mestnykh organizatsii KPRF (Moscow: ITRK, 2000).

(7.3) FATHERLAND/FAR

> Newspapers and Periodicals:

V bloknot agitatoru
Vestnik ‘Otechestva’
Den’ Otechestva v Ul’yanovske (Ul’yanovsk)

> Miscellaneous:

Fatherland, ‘Metodicheskie materialy’ (Kazan’: 1999).
Fatherland, Pozitsii ‘Otechestva’ po aktual’nym voprosam obshchestvennoi zhizni (Moscow:
IM-Inform, 1999).
Fatherland-All Russia, Chem my otlichаемся от drugikh (Moscow: IM-Inform, 1999).
Fatherland-All Russia, ‘Sotsiologicheskii daidzhest’, given to author by Ul’yanovsk
Fatherland, 10 December 1999.

Legal Department, Fatherland, ‘Pamyatka po provedeniyu predvybornoi agiatatsii (sic.) v
period izbiratel’noi kampanii po vyorom deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy
rekomendatsii po provedeniyu izbiratel’nykh kampanii (Kazan’: TNV, 1999). (Tatarstan)
‘Samarskoe regional’noe otdelenie Obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obschestvennoi
organizatsii “Otechestvo” (materialy)’ (Samara: Otechestvo, 1999). (Samara)
‘Regional’noe issledovanie vozdeistviya spiskov kandidatov dvizheniya ‘Otechestvo’ na
osnovanii foksirovannykh gruppovykh interv’y v g. Ul’yanovsk’, August 1999.
(Ul’yanovsk)

(7.4) LDPR
➢ Statute:
‘Ustav Liberal’no-Democraticheskoi partii Rossii s popravkami, utverzhdennymi V s”ezdom 2
aprelya 1994 g.’, in V. Pribylovsky & M. Reitblat, Parlamentskie partii Rossii: Istoriya,
ustavy, sostav rukovodyashchikh organov (Moscow: Panorama, 1995), pp.53-56.
‘Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obschestvennoi organizatsii “Liberal’no-
Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossi’ (LDPR)’, in Programma i ustav Liberal’no-
Demokraticheskoi Partii Rossi (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), pp.69-79.

➢ Programme:
Programma i ustav Liberal’no-Democraticheskoi Partii Rossi (Moscow: LDPR, 1999).

➢ Miscellaneous:
LDPR Central Apparatus, Metodicheskie ukazaniya po podgotovke i provedeniyu kampanii
po vyboram v Gosudarstvennymu Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii i
Zhirlinovsky, V.V., Poslednii brosok na yug (Moscow: LDPR, 1996).
Zhirlinovsky, V.V., 10 let LDPR 1989-1999 (Moscow: LDPR, 1999).
Zhirlinovsky, V.V., Politicheskaya klassika (Moscow: LDPR, 1999), Vol. 27.
Co-ordinating council of Samara regional LDPR, ‘Obrashchenie koordinatsionnogo soveta
Samarskoi oblastnoi organizatsii LDPR k chlenam LDPR i vsem izbiratelyam,
rasdelyayushchim idei partii’, Protocol No. 6, 25 June 2000 (Samara).
(7.5) URF

➢ Statute:
‘Ustav obshcherossiiskii politicheskoi obschestvennoi organizatsii “Soyuz Pravykh Sil”’,
‘www.sps.ru/sps/280501spsustavall’ [No published version available].

➢ Programme:
URF party programme: Pravyi Manifest (Moscow: SPS, 1999).

➢ Newspapers and Periodicals:
Demokraticheskii Vybor

➢ Miscellaneous:

(7.6) UNITY

➢ Statute:
Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obschestvennoi organizatsii partii “Edinstvo” (Moscow: Edinstvo, 2000).

➢ Newspapers and Periodicals:
Edinstvo: Byulleten’ partiinoi zhizni
Ulyanovskoe Edinstvo (Ulyanovsk)

(7.7) YABLOKO

➢ Statute:
‘Ustav obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi obschestvennoi organisatsii “Ob”edinenie Yabloko”’,

➢ Programme:

➢ Miscellaneous:
Kayunov, O.; Lysenko, V. & Sheinis, V., Sdelаем выборы честными! (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999).
Sheinis, Viktor, Za chestnye wybory (Moscow: EpiTsentr, 1999).
(8) Secondary Sources


Berezkina, Ol'ga, Kak stat' deputatom ili prodat' sebya nano iteskom n (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Bukovskogo, 1997).


Beyme, Klaus von, Political Parties in Western Democracies (Aldershot: Gower, 1985).


Diamond, Larry; Linz, Juan & Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2nd ed., 1995).


Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F.; Chu, Yun-han & Tien, Hung-mao (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F.; Chu, Yun-han & Tien, Hung-mao (eds.), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).


Fadeev, V.I., Territorial'naya organizatsiya mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: INION-RAN, 1996).


Il’yasov, Farkhad, Politicheskii marketing (Moscow: IMA-Press, 2000).


Kaz’min, V.N., Ot pravozashchitnogo dvizheniya k mnogopartiinosti v Rossii (1965-1996 gg.) (Kemero: Kemerovo State University, 1997).


Lyzlov, V.E., Pobeda, tol'ko pobeda! (Moscow: PAIMS, 1999).


McFaul, Michael; Petrov, Nikolai & Ryabov, Andrei (eds.), Rossiya nakanunie dumsikh vyborov 1999 goda (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999).


McFaul, Michael; Petrov, Nikolai; Ryabov, Andrei & Reisch, Elizabeth (eds.), Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections (Moscow: Carnegie, 1999).


Matsuzato, Kimitaka, 'Progressive North, Conservative South? Reading the Regional Elite as a Key to Russian Electoral Puzzles', in Kimitaka Matsuzato (ed.), *Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World* (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2000), pp.143-76.


Mustafin, M.R. & Khuzeev, P.G., Vse o Tatarstane (Kazan': Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'许vo, 1994).


Pashentsev, E.N., Oppozitsionye partii i dvizheniya sovremennoi Rossi (Moscow: Informpechat’, 1998).


Rudinsky, F.M., *Delo KPSS v Konstitutsionnom Sude* (Moscow: Bylina, 1999).


Terent’eva, I.V.; Belyakov, R.Yu. & Safirov, M.F., Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Respubliki Tatarstan (Kazan': 1999).


DEREK S. HUTCHESON (2001) tuunru. w, v


Tsuladze, Avtandil, Formirovanie imidzha politika v Rossii (Moscow: Universitet, 1999).

Tsuladze, Avtandil, Politicheskie manipulyatsii ili pokorenie tolp (Moscow: Universitet, 1999).

Tsuladze, Avtandil, Bolshaya manipulyativnaya igra (Moscow: Algoritm, 2000).


Urban, Joan Barth & Solovei, Valerii D., Russia's Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder/Oxford: Westview, 1997).


White, Stephen; Pravda, Alex and Gitelman, Zvi (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

White, Stephen; Pravda, Alex and Gitelman, Zvi (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 5 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).


Whiteley, Paul; Seyd, Patrick & Richardson, Jeremy, True Blues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).


Yeltsin, Boris, Zapisz prezidenta (Moscow: Ogonek, 1994).


