



University  
of Glasgow

Scott, Elizabeth Mary (1991) *A critical analysis of the Scholia Demosthenica on the First Olynthiac.*

PhD thesis

<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3971/>

Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE *SCHOLIA DEMOSTHENICA*  
ON THE *FIRST OLYNTHIAC***

Submitted by

ELIZABETH MARY SCOTT

in September 1991

for the degree of PhD

following research conducted at

Department of Greek  
University of Glasgow

© ELIZABETH MARY SCOTT 1991

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to Professor MacDowell for his patient support and guidance. His advice and comments have always been constructive, helpful and much appreciated. I should also like to thank him for his assistance in reviewing codex F in Florence on my behalf.

Thanks are also due to Dr Knox for his comments on historical matters and to the secretarial staff of the department for permitting me access to word processing facilities.

I should also like to acknowledge the cooperation of the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris for providing me with a photocopy of codices S and R.

Lastly I should like to thank my family and friends for their support. Above all I owe much to my husband Richard whose forbearance and good humour have been stretched over the last seven years.

## SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

<b>* INTRODUCTION</b>	1-11
RELATION OF THE THESIS TO OTHER WORKS IN THE SAME FIELD	1-3
The Intellectual Background	1
Text	1-2
Studies on the <i>Scholia Demosthenica</i>	2-3
AIMS OF THE THESIS	3
SOURCES AND TREATMENT	4-7
Technical Terms	5-6
Approach to the Analysis of the <i>Scholia Demosthenica</i>	6-7
FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE SCHOLIA	7
WHERE THE STUDIES WERE CARRIED OUT	7-8
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE <i>FIRST OLYNTHIAC</i>	8-9
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION	10-11
<b>* CHAPTER ONE - THE ULPIANI PROLEGOMENA</b>	12-51
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	12
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS	12-37
The Προοίμιον	14-16
The Δεύτερον Προοίμιον	16
The First Αντίθεσις	16-27
a) D1.2-7	18-21
κεφάλαια of D1.2-7	21-22
b) D1.8-11	22-24
κεφάλαια of D1.8-11	24
c) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος D1.12-15	25
κεφάλαια of D1.12-15	25
Alternative Interpretation of D1.2-15	25-27

Conclusion	27
The Second ἀντίθεσις D1.16-20	27-32
κεφάλαια of D1.16-20	31-32
Conclusion	32
The Third Ἀντίθεσις D1.21-23	32-34
κεφάλαια of D1.21-23	33-34
Conclusion	34
The Ἐπιλόγοι D1.24-28	35-37
κεφάλαια in D1.24-28	35-36
Alternative Interpretation of D1.24-28	36-37
Closing Remarks on the <i>First Olynthiac</i>	37
Conclusion about Rhetorical Analysis	37
CONFUSIONS IN ULPYAN'S EXPOSITION	38-39
COMPARABLE PASSAGES	39-44
PARALLELS BETWEEN THE <i>RHETORES GRAECI</i> AND THE <i>ULPYANI PROLEGOMENA</i>	44-46
HISTORICAL INFORMATION IN THE <i>PROLEGOMENA</i>	46-48
CONCLUSION	48
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE	49-51
<b>* CHAPTER TWO - CODEX S</b>	52-83
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	52-53
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS	53-67
Το Προόμιον	53-54
Το Δεύτερον Προόμιον	54-55
D1.3-23	55
The Objections	55-60
Conclusion	65
κεφάλαια in D1.2-23	61
D1.2-18 τὸ συμφέρον	61-63
D1.19-23 τὸ δυνατόν	63-65
Conclusion	65
D1.24-27 προτροπή	65-66
D1.28 ἐπίλογος	66

Conclusion	66-67
LANGUAGE, GRAMMAR AND EXPRESSION	76-73
Λέξις	67-68
Σχήματα	69-71
Lexicographical Scholia	71-72
Syntax and Style	72
Elementary Clarifications	72
Conclusion	73
HISTORICAL INFORMATION	73-79
CONCLUSION	79-80
NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO	81-83
<b>* CHAPTER THREE - CODEX R</b>	84-119A
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	84-86
Codices R and A	84-85
Codices R and Y	85
Codices R and S	85
Conclusion	86
THE UNIFIED COMMENTARY	86-89
Similarity in approach	86
Rhetorical analysis	86-87
Objections	87
Language	87-88
Quotation	88
Historical Information	89
Conclusion	89
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CORE SCHOLIA	89-115
The Προοίμιον - (1c), (1d), (3a), (3b), (3c), (5c) and (5d)	89-94
Δεύτερον Προοίμιον - (11b), (11c), (11d) and (14c)	94-98
D1.3 - (22), (23), (24) and (25)	98-99
D1.3-4 - (26d), (28), (31) and (33a)	99-103

D1.5 - (36b), (37), (39a) and (40a)	103-106
D1.7 - (51a), (53d), (74) and (83b)	106-113
κεφάλαια	113
The Remaining Scholia in R	114-115
<b>CONTRADICTIONS IN R</b>	115-116
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	116-117
<b>NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE</b>	118-119A
<b>* CHAPTER FOUR - CODEX F</b>	119-154
<b>INTRODUCTORY REMARKS</b>	119
<b>E<sup>1</sup></b>	119-125
<b>RHETORICAL ANALYSIS</b>	120-121
<b>HISTORICAL INFORMATION</b>	121-122
<b>LANGUAGE</b>	122-124
Lexicographical Scholia	123
Σχήματα	123-124
Other Linguistic Scholia	124
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	124-125
<b>E<sup>2</sup></b>	125-132
<b>RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AND ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ</b>	126-128
<b>LANGUAGE</b>	128-131
Σχήματα	128-130
Lexicographical comments	131
Other Linguistic Comments	131
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	131-132
<b>E<sup>3</sup></b>	132

E <sup>4</sup>	132-150
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS	133-140
Προοίμιον	133
Δεύτερον Προοίμιον	134
D1.3-15	134-135
D1.16-27	135-139
D1.28	139
Conclusion	139-140
LANGUAGE	140-148
Λέξις	140-145
Σχήματα	145-146
Lexicographical Scholia	147
Grammar	147-148
Conclusion	148
CONCLUSION	150
CONCLUSION ABOUT THE SCHOLIA IN CODEX F	150-151
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR	152-154
<b>* CHAPTER FIVE - CODEX Y</b>	155-160
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	155
THE SCHOLIA	155-158
CONCLUSION	159
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE	160
<b>* CHAPTER SIX - CODEX A</b>	161-165
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	161
A	161-162
A <sup>2</sup>	162-164

Λέξις	162-163
Σχήματα	163
Rhetorical Analysis and Κεφάλαια	163-164
Grammar	164
CONCLUSION	164
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX	165
<b>* CHAPTER SEVEN - CODEX PR</b>	166-170
INTRODUCTION	166
SCHOLIA	166-169
Σχήματα	168
Lexicographical Scholia	168-169
OTHER COMMENTS	169
CONCLUSION	169
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN	170
<b>* CHAPTER EIGHT - CODEX VP</b>	171-176
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	171
VP	171-175
Geography	171
Language	172-173
Lexicographical Scholia	173-174
Grammar and Syntax	174
Rhetorical Analysis and Κεφάλαια	174
CONCLUSION	174-175
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT	176
<b>* CHAPTER NINE -     <i>CODICES SCHOLIORUM ULPIANIORUM</i></b>	177-219
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	177-178

CODEX T	178-201
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS	178-185
Προοίμιον	178-179
Δεύτερον Προοίμιον	179
Κεφάλαια - D1.2-15	179-181
Conclusion	181
Κεφάλαια - D1.16-23	181-184
Κεφάλαια - D1.24-26	184-185
Κεφάλαια - D1.27-28	185
Conclusion	185
LANGUAGE AND EXPRESSION	185-192
Λέξις	188-191
Lexicographical Scholia	191-193
SCHOLIA UNIQUE TO T	192-193
SCHOLIA UNIQUE TO THE <i>CODICES ULPIANI</i>	193-194
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODEX T AND THE <i>CODICES VETUSTISSIMI</i> AND THE <i>CODICES RECENTIORES</i>	194-198
Codices S and R	197-198
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODEX T AND THE <i>ULPIANI PROLEGOMENA</i>	198-201
CODICES BC OB AF VB CA WD AND AC	210-217
Codex Bc and Codex Ob	202-215
Προοίμιον	202
Δεύτερον Προοίμιον	203-204
Κεφάλαια - D1.2-15	204-211
D1.16-23	211-213
D1.23-28	213-215
Codices Af Vb Ca Wd and Ac	215-217

CONCLUSION	217
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE	218-219A
<b>* CHAPTER TEN - SOURCES OF THE SCHOLIA ON THE <i>FIRST OLYNTHIAC</i></b>	220-256A
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	220
TYPES OF COMMENTARY	220-227
Συγγράμματα	220-221
Ὑπομνήματα	221-223
Lossau's Third Type of Commentary	223
Scholia	224
Evidence for Marginal Comments	225-227
Conclusion	227
SPECIFIC SOURCES	227-249
Ulpian	227-230
Zeno	230-233
Zosimos of Askalon	234-237
Menander the Rhetor	237-241
Other Individuals	241-242
Rhetores Graeci	242-245
Lexicographical Scholia	246-247
Historical Sources	247-249
CONCLUSION	249-250
NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN	251-256
<b>* CHAPTER ELEVEN - CONCLUSION</b>	257-266
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS	257-261
Subject Matter	257-258
Systematic Approach	258
Contemporaneity of the Scholia	259
Development of Commentaries	259
Value of the <i>Scholia Demosthenica</i>	259-260
Purpose of the Scholia	260

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS	261-264
VALUE OF THE THESIS	265
FURTHER STUDY	266
<b>* APPENDIX ONE - THE THEORIK FUND</b>	267-287
THE INSTITUTION OF THE THEORIK FUND	267-272
Perikles	267-269
Kleophon	269
Agyrrhios	270-271
Euboulos	271-272
THE PURPOSE OF THE THEORIKON	272-276
COST AND ADMINISTRATION	276-284
LAWS CONNECTED WITH ΤΑ ΘΕΩΡΙΚΑ	280-284
EISPHORA AND ΤΑ ΘΕΩΡΙΚΑ	284-285
SCHOLIA	285-287
NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE	288-290A
<b>* APPENDIX TWO - ATTRIBUTION OF SCHOLIA TO CODEX R</b>	291-293
<b>* APPENDIX THREE - ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΠΟΙΙΑ ΑΝΔ ΗΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ</b>	294-295
<b>* APPENDIX FOUR - STYLISTIC SIMILARITIES BETWEEN MENANDER AND THE <i>SCHOLIA</i> <i>DEMOSTHENICA</i></b>	296-299
<b>* BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	300-311
Primary Sources	300-305
Secondary Sources	306-311

## SUMMARY

The thesis consists of a critical analysis of the *scholia Demosthenica* on the *First Olynthiac*. The merits of the scholia are discussed through an examination of the different traditions of scholia on the speech.

The thesis also contains a discussion of the value of the *prolegomena Ulpiani* and its relationship to the scholia proper. It is apparent that the author of the *prolegomena* was aware of different interpretations of the speech which have, in some cases, been preserved in the scholia.

The sources of the scholia are examined and certain individuals have been identified as possible authors. Of particular interest is the possibility that Menander Rhetor may be the author of a long unified commentary which is found in one codex. The influence of the Alexandrians appears to be less significant than is widely held.

A summary of the development of commentaries and the function of scholia within that tradition is also provided.

The thesis offers a complement to general works on rhetoric. The comments contained in the scholia and *prolegomena* are found to be perceptive and provide a fresh approach to the study of Demosthenes' speeches. There are clear indications that the *scholia Demosthenica* have been undervalued in the past.

## INTRODUCTION

### RELATION OF THE THESIS TO OTHER WORKS IN THE SAME FIELD

#### The Intellectual Background

The starting point for those interested in the history of classical scholarship are the two volumes by Pfeiffer<sup>(1)</sup>. He examines the development of scholarship from classical antiquity down to the Alexandrian period. He picks up the history with the Renaissance. The intervening centuries, which he left uncovered, form the basis for N.G. Wilson's study of the scholars of the Byzantine era<sup>(2)</sup>. He discusses the merits and influences of individuals and schools from the opening centuries A.D. until the fourteenth century. These works give an impression of the place of scholia in the history of classical scholarship and the milieu in which they were produced. Stages in the transmission of texts are discussed by N.G. Wilson<sup>(3)</sup>.

The history of rhetorical theory is discussed in three books by G.A. Kennedy<sup>(4)</sup>, who begins with the origins of Greek rhetorical theory in the fifth century and continues right through to the time of the Christian emperors. The main topic of interest in the *scholia Demosthenica* is the rhetorical arguments in the speeches. Kennedy's approach is to discuss the theory of individuals. His findings are not applied to speeches by classical authors except in so far as these authors are cited as examples by the rhetoricians. The same point must be made about other works in the field of rhetoric and literary criticism. General works on rhetoric<sup>(5)</sup> and the texts of theorists such as Hermogenes, Demetrios, Longinus and Dionysios of Halikarnassos have been analysed and criticised independently<sup>(6)</sup>. No attempt is made to apply their precepts and ideas to the classical authors. This is the value of the *scholia Demosthenica*. We find the practical application of contemporary ideas on rhetoric to the speeches themselves.

The nature of commentaries in antiquity is discussed by M. Lossau<sup>(7)</sup>. He does not look at scholia in particular, but he has many pertinent observations on the form and nature of commentaries at the turn of the millennium. His work is particularly useful in establishing the true influence of the Alexandrians on subsequent generations of scholars. Lossau does not examine the individual merits of the scholia.

#### Text

The text of the *scholia Demosthenica* was first published in 1503 by the Aldine press<sup>(8)</sup>. Other editions are by Morel in 1570, Wolf in 1572, Reiske in 1771 and Sauppe in 1850. The best known edition of the text came in 1851 with Dindorf's edition. This edition has formed the basis for subsequent studies into the scholia. Deficiencies in this edition

were soon noted however. Drerup called attention to Dindorf's failure to distinguish between various hands<sup>(9)</sup>. His assessment of the importance of various codices was also criticised.

Drerup himself has some useful comments about the hands in the various scholia<sup>(10)</sup>. He notes that the contribution of F<sup>4</sup> is closely related to the contribution found in codices T and Bc. He also argues that the contribution of codex R was derived from codices Y, S and A. This view has been upheld by Dilts in his recent edition<sup>(11)</sup>. This thesis uses Dilts' text and sigla. The research has been restricted to those codices which Dilts regards as the most significant.

Dilts notes that groups of speeches reveal distinct traditions of scholia. Thus, the relationship between codices for the scholia on one group of speeches is not necessarily true for any of the other groups. His conclusions are examined in order to see whether the palaeographical arguments, upon which he bases his conclusions, still apply when the contents of the scholia is examined. His generalisations are found to be in need of qualification.

### Studies on the *Scholia Demosthenica*

Studies into the contents of the *scholia Demosthenica* are almost all confined to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most interest has been shown in attempts to identify the sources of the scholia. What this means is that scholars have endeavoured to identify the original author of particular scholia and to identify from this the authorship of the scholia in general. Little is said about the scribes and compilers themselves, and this is not surprising.

Relevant works on possible sources have been submitted by Gudeman, Chapman, Glockner, Nitsche, Oomen, Schunk and Wangrin<sup>(12)</sup>. Their contributions are discussed in the relevant chapters. There are serious flaws in these works. Oomen and Nitsche try to prove that a single scholar was responsible for the majority of the scholia. They succeed in showing that the scholars of their choice are likely sources for some of the scholia, but they move on to generalisations without qualification. Their arguments are not always sound.

Schunk and Wangrin claim to look at the sources of the scholia, but in fact they restrict themselves to lexicography. This is a legitimate field of study but of limited value as far as the *scholia Demosthenica* are concerned. Lexicography forms only a minor topic of interest. Their approach to the subject has been rightly criticised, for they make assumptions without proof to back them. None of these scholars appreciates the complexity of the evolution of the scholia in their present form, even to the extent of ignoring the possibility that several scholars are represented among the scholia.

The summary of Gudeman gives a better impression of the

complexity. He also points out weaknesses in earlier works including those of Nitsche and Oomen. He adopts a conventional view that various authors can be identified in the scholia, but then makes the assumption that the remainder are largely based on the work of the Alexandrians and Didymos in particular. He does not cite evidence for this.

Dindorf's introduction offers some good points about possible authors as cited in the text. He has also included Chapman's analysis of the *Ulpiani prolegomena* which is written with feeling rather than reason.

Scholia in general are used by modern scholars as a historical source. The *scholia Demosthenica*, and the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* in particular, are rightly criticised for the inaccuracies which they contain. Such criticisms encourage the view that scholia are of little value. This criticism is unfair. The *scholia Demosthenica* were not produced as historical commentaries. They ought to be judged as commentaries on the rhetorical arguments present in the speeches.

## AIMS OF THE THESIS

This thesis is the result of a critical analysis of the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* which form approximately one quarter of the *scholia Demosthenica*. It is hoped that it will begin to fill a significant gap in the study of scholia and provide a method for tackling the study of the contents of the remaining *scholia Demosthenica*. The specific aims are as follows :

1. To examine the intrinsic merit of the analysis offered in each codex.
2. To establish whether there is any logic or coherence in the selection of scholia.
3. To examine the relation between traditions of scholia on the basis of the contents rather than on the basis of textual criteria and to test the validity of Dilts' conclusions.
4. To identify, where possible, the original authors of the scholia and examine the assumption that they are based on the work of the Alexandrians.
5. To establish the place of these scholia within the development of commentaries.
6. To conclude whether the *scholia Demosthenica* have any contribution to make to modern scholars of Demosthenes.

## SOURCES AND TREATMENT

The term scholia is imprecise, for all that it tells us about a comment is its location. A false distinction arises between commentaries found outwith the codices and scholia. A scholion can consist of a single word or a lengthy discussion. The term shall be used in the thesis to describe individual scholia and as a general term. The *Ulpiani prolegomena* are not scholia in the conventional sense of the word, but they shall be referred to as scholia in contexts referring to the contents of Dilts' edition.

The term scholiast is even more misleading because it effectively describes three functions : that of original author, that of compiler and that of scribe. A reference to a scholiast can describe any combination of these functions. In order to avoid imprecision and confusion the term scholiast is not used in this thesis. The author of a scholion shall be referred to as such or as the commentator. The compiler is the word for the man who collects the scholia. This may involve summarising existing commentaries or comparing the contributions of different codices. His function is particularly interesting because we can begin to see whether his role is constructive or merely automatic. The least interesting role is performed by the scribe.

The scholia are published in the most convenient and economic form. This is unhelpful for someone who wishes to assess the contribution of individual hands and codices. However, it is too much to expect that the contribution of each codex could be published individually, complete with *apparatus*.

The text of Dilts' edition forms the basis for this study. It is excellent in many ways but there are some problems caused by the format. The number of scholia cannot be counted accurately. Dilts has decided which scholia to include in his edition. In the case of codex R there are marginal scholia which are omitted by Dilts but are printed in the Morel edition of 1572 (13). I am informed by Dilts that this is because he considers them to be by a later hand and of no value. Perhaps it would have been better to have included them in order to give the most accurate picture of the scholia. It is likely that scholia have been omitted from other manuscripts for the same reason.

Sometimes two scholia are joined together in one codex but appear from the contribution of other codices to be two scholia(14). Occasionally Dilts' *apparatus* reveals that one hand offers a version of a scholion which is significantly different, and this ought to have been shown as a separate scholion (15). The exact number of scholia in particular manuscripts will depend on how these problems are resolved. In the thesis the totals are intended as close approximations in order to give an impression of the frequency and distribution of scholia.

Another problem with Dilts' edition concerns codices S and R. Several hands produced scholia in S on the *First Olynthiac*. Drerup notes at least four<sup>(16)</sup>. Neither he, nor Dilts attempt to list systematically which scholia were written by which hand in codex S. That information is necessary in order to assess properly the contribution of S. Instead the hands are referred to collectively as S. The hands in S are particularly difficult to read and I cannot satisfactorily distinguish the hands.

Dilts cites R only where S or A is damaged or no longer extant. A comparison of the scholia in R according to Dindorf, Dilts and my own examination of a photograph of R reveals discrepancies<sup>(17)</sup>. A particular problem is that there are faded scholia in the margin of R which are illegible. Dilts has confirmed their existence for me. A superficial glance suggests that they are not by the same hand which wrote the scholia in the body of the text. Yet Drerup and Dilts state that the same hand in R, barring the occasional later marginal comment, wrote both the text and all the scholia.

### Technical Terms

The authors of the scholia assume some technical knowledge on the part of their audience. The scholia in which the author does not explain the technical terms occur only occasionally and will be explained as required. However, some remarks are necessary about the approach of the commentators. This approach is based on stasis theory whose development is attributed to Hermagoras in the first century B.C.. There is evidence that the method existed in a more rudimentary form before his time<sup>(18)</sup>. The theory was subsequently refined by rhetoricians in the opening centuries A.D. and became the basis for Byzantine literary composition.

The principle behind the theory is straightforward. The basis of an argument is established when there is disagreement. Thus, stasis lies in the tension between different opinions. There are different types of issue. Hermagoras classified them as conjecture, definition, quality and location. Of these the qualitative is of most interest for deliberative oratory. Each branch of oratory has its own particular end. The forensic has justice (τὸ δίκαιον), deliberative oratory has expediency (τὸ συμφέρον) and epideictic has honour (τὸ ἐνδοξόν). Although these ends typify a form of oratory, they are not exclusive to one branch. These qualities had been discussed since the time of Aristotle. They became known as the τελικά κεφάλαια and although there is disagreement about which qualities make up this principal group, the most frequently mentioned are τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δυνατόν, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ νόμιμον and τὸ ἐνδοξόν / τὸ καλόν. Others which are mentioned are τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ ῥάδιον and τὸ ἐκβησόμενον<sup>(19)</sup>.

As well as being the end of the speech, these κεφάλαια became the issues, the essence, of the speech. The authors of the scholia regard τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν as the principal κεφάλαια in the *First Olynthiac*. Stasis is not mentioned. The rhetorical arguments are pointed out but are not classified according to the rules of stasis theory. This is not surprising because the system suits composition of speeches rather than analysis of speeches which were written before the theory was developed in this way. Although the *First Olynthiac* will have been written according to other rules, the scholia still provide a valuable analysis because we know that rhetoric was viewed in terms of κεφάλαια by near contemporaries. The approach in the scholia on Demosthenes is very different from the approach of modern commentators, who analyse deliberative speeches by the same method with which they analyse forensic speeches.

Another feature of the approach in the scholia is that the speech is broken down into a varying number of objections. This approach arises from stasis theory. We therefore find frequent references to λύσις, ἀντίθεσις (and related terms) and κατασκευαί (supporting arguments). The understanding of these terms is generally consistent throughout the scholia, with only slight variations. Sometimes, of course, κεφάλαιον is used in its familiar sense of "summary". The context clarifies the author's meaning.

#### Approach to the Analysis of the Scholia Demosthenica

The codices are analysed individually in this thesis. The order in which they are examined is not indicative of merit. The individual hands are discussed separately and according to topics which are appropriate for each contribution. Occasionally a scholion is difficult to classify. This is particularly true of brief linguistic comments. One version may seem to be a comment about expression while another may seem to be lexicographical<sup>(20)</sup>. I have classified them as seems appropriate in the individual codex. Dilts' sigla are retained. Comments other than my own are attributed to their authors.

A figure in brackets, eg.(13a), represents a scholion according to Dilts' numbering and refers to a scholion on the *First Olynthiac* unless otherwise stated. Square brackets are used for page references in the thesis. References to secondary sources are given in an abbreviated form in the notes. The full reference is to be found in the bibliography. Primary sources are cited by editor and page except for well known sources where the edition is not cited in the notes. The *Rhetores Graeci* is a name which is used of those authors who appear in the volumes of Walz and Spengel<sup>(21)</sup>. Where another edition of an author's text has superseded Walz and Spengel, this will be cited. The author

shall still be referred to as one of the *Rhetores Graeci*.

## FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE SCHOLIA

The scholia on the *First Olynthiac* amount to a quarter of the entire corpus of scholia on Demosthenes. This may be because this speech is the first in the codices and a disproportionate amount of interest was given to it. The speeches which receive most interest come early in the corpus. The popularity of some can be explained by their importance in Demosthenes' career. Biography was pursued enthusiastically in antiquity, and the attention which these speeches received may be related to that.

It may be thought curious that the symbouleutic speeches attracted interest among the Byzantines, because their opportunities for making speeches of this kind were limited. However, rhetoric played a central role in Byzantine society. The conclusion of this thesis shows that original work on the *First Olynthiac* cannot be established with certainty after the sixth century A.D..

The importance of rhetoric was maintained thanks to stasis theory. It was soon realised in the opening centuries A.D. by the Neo-Platonists that the classification and subdivision involved in stasis theory was an excellent preparation for the study of philosophy (22). Rhetorical studies flourished, not, as it turned out, as an end in itself but as a preparation for philosophy. It is notable that Christians studied rhetoric too. Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzos, is cited as a parallel in the scholia and his skills were considered to be on a par with the greatest orators of classical Greece. After the sixth century scholars devoted their energies to the issue of Iconoclasm.

The scholia are to be seen in the context of rhetoric as a preparation for philosophy. They are not, however, polished academic treatises. Many of the comments can be viewed as extracts from lectures, some advanced, others clearly elementary. The scholia form a basic introduction to the rhetorical arguments in the speech.

The renewed interest in the scholia in the fifteenth century can be explained as part of the Italian Renaissance. This interest ensured the survival of several of the codices, because they were acquired by the great libraries of Italy.

## WHERE THE STUDIES WERE CARRIED OUT

The codices themselves offer no clues about where the work of composing or collating scholia was carried out. Research into the sources reveals that Antioch, Athens and Gaza are likely centres, at least for original work. In later centuries these places lost much of

their importance. Constantinople is an obvious location for such work to be carried out ; in fact anywhere where there was a great library. The number of copies and the number of different traditions suggest that study of the scholia was thriving. They had not become established or standardised, as is the case with scholia on Homer and Aristophanes.

### THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE *FIRST OLYNTHIAC* (23)

Philip's power increased rapidly from his accession to the Makedonian throne in 359/8 B.C.. By the time the *First Olynthiac* was delivered in 349 B.C., he had subdued most of northern Greece and had been elected archon of the Thessalian states. He was clearly a formidable force and his success caused some of his allies to doubt whether they would be able to retain their autonomy.

Olynthos, a leading member of the Chalkidic League was one such ally. The alliance had been agreed in 357/6 B.C. after Philip had had notable successes against Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaia. Olynthos agreed not to ally herself with Athens in return for the land of the Potidaians who were sold into slavery. The economic benefits of this alliance must have been very attractive. Olynthos gained territory, peace and freedom to dominate trade in that part of the Aegean.

The reasons for Olynthos' dissatisfaction with the arrangement are not known to us. Perhaps the most important factor was the fear of the consequences if Philip became too powerful. His activity in Thessaly left him in a stronger position than before. In breach of their treaty with Philip, they asked Athens for a peace treaty which was duly granted in 351 B.C.. Philip appears to have tolerated this step but it would not have helped relations between them.

Sometime later two half-brothers of Philip, Arrhidaios and Menelaos, came to Olynthos seeking refuge. They were permitted to stay. The implication of this is that Philip was facing trouble at home and that the Olynthians were sufficiently disaffected to welcome Philip's enemies.

The two half-brothers are the apparent cause of the war between Philip and Olynthos. This may be a genuine reason but strategic considerations will have played a part. Philip could not trust Olynthos not to join the Athenians in an alliance. Together they could have posed a threat. Athens and her allies had successfully thwarted his advance towards Phokis at Thermopylai in 352 B.C..

We hear little from our sources about the war. It appears that Philip did not rush to capture the city. He may have faced other commitments. Athens responded to Olynthos' calls for help by sending a small force under the command of Chares. Trouble in Euboia occupied Athens' attention at this time.

The *First Olynthiac* is not Demosthenes' first attempt to warn the Athenians about what he sees as the danger from Philip. Previous calls for action were made in the *First Philippic*. In the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes calls for two forces to be sent, one to Makedon and one to Olynthos. He was not successful in persuading the Athenians. He was a young man in 349 B.C., just starting his political career, and perhaps his words did not carry weight with the Athenians. The most influential politician in Athens at this time was Euboulos. He advocated caution and was careful to control Athens' finances, lest she become committed to a military adventure she could not afford. The details of Euboulos' policies are not known to us. Subsequent events and the survival of Demosthenes' proposals has rewarded these proposals with undue significance.

In the end a force never reached Olynthos and the city fell. It was razed to the ground and the citizens were sold into slavery.

Four points ought to be borne in mind as we turn to the comments of the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* :

1. The financial position of Athens after numerous military operations, especially in Euboia.
2. The attitude of the Athenians towards Olynthos, given that she had been an ally of Philip.
3. The Athenians' opinion of the threat posed by Philip.
4. The tradition of Athens as a defender of the freedom of Greece.

## NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

- (1) R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship, from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*, Oxford 1968, and *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850*, Oxford 1976.
- (2) N. G. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium*, London 1983.
- (3) N.G. Wilson and L.D. Reynolds, *Scribes and Scholars*, Oxford 1974.
- (4) G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, Princeton 1963, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, Princeton 1972, *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors*, Princeton 1983.
- (5) Works which look at rhetorical theory include R. Volkmann, *Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in Systematischer Übersicht*, Berlin 1872 ; H. Lausberg, *Handbüch der literarischen Rhetorik eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, Munich 1960 ; J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik, Technik und Methode (Handbüch der Altertumswissenschaft II.3*, Munich 1974).
- (6) Works on particular authors include D.A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity*, London 1981 ; G. Lindberg, *Studies in Hermogenes and Eustathios*, Lund 1977 ; G.M.A. Grube, *A Greek Critic : Demetrios on Style*, Toronto 1961 ; S.F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysios of Halicarnassos*, Amsterdam 1969.
- (7) M. Lossau, *Untersuchungen zur antiken Demosthenesexegese (Palingenesia 2)*, Bad Homburg 1974.
- (8) v. (Dilts p.XVI-XVII). For Dindorf v. *Demosthenes*, vols VIII, IX, Oxford 1851 (reprinted New York 1973).
- (9) v. E. Drerup in "Antike Demosthenesausgaben", *Philologus Suppl.* 7, pp.533-588, esp. pp.552-555, 563.
- (10) v. E. Drerup in "Vorläufiger Bericht über eine Studienreise zur Erforschung der Demosthenesüberlieferung", *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen Klasse der kgl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 3 (1902) pp.287-323 and *Philologus* pp558 and 563.
- (11) M. Dilts , *Scholia Demosthenica*, vol. 1 Leipzig 1983. Reviewed by D.M. MacDowell, *JHS* 105 (1985) p188.
- (12) v. *RE* II A1 697-703. For full citations v. Bibliography.
- (13) Dilts (ppXVI-XVII and pXVI n.1)
- (14) Such scholia include (1c), (1d), and (1e); (1e) and (1f); (2a) and (2b); (105a), (105b) and (105c) ; (114a), (114b) and (114c).
- (15) Such scholia include (14c), (115a), (117b) and (125b).
- (16) v. Drerup *SBAW* p.307.
- (17) v. Appendix Four. The photocopy of the manuscript was supplied by the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris.
- (18) v. R. Nadeau, "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek : Hermagoras to Hermogenes", *GRBS* 2 (1959) pp.51-73, "Hermogenes on Stases : A Translation with an Introduction and Notes", *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964) pp.361-424, "Hermogenes on Stock Issues" *Speech Monographs* 28 (1958) pp.59-66. v. also Volkmann *Rhetorik* pp23-33 (stasis) and pp.249-262 (τελικά κεφάλαια)
- (19) v. Apsines (Spengel<sup>2</sup> pp.291-296) ; Hermog. (Rabe pp.28.12, 37.14sq, 52.19sq, 129.13, 132-136) ; Nikolaos Sophistes (Spengel 3 pp.475.30sq, 494.31sq).
- (20) Such scholia include (2a), (2b) and (2c), (21a), (90a), (90b) and (90c) and (98).
- (21) *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. C.Walz vols 1-9, Stuttgart 1832-1836 and *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel vols 1-3, Leipzig 1853-1856.
- (22) v. G. Kustas, "Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric", *Viator* 1 (1970) pp.55-73 and G.A. Kennedy, "Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric", *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980) pp.181-197.

- (23) For the background v. Griffith in *History of Macedonia*, Oxford 1979, vol 2, chpts V-VIII, G.E. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon*, J.R. Ellis, *Philip and Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976. The principal primary source is Diodoros.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE *ULPIANI PROLEGOMENA*

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The authorship of the *prolegomena* is discussed elsewhere<sup>(1)</sup>. Here it will be convenient to refer to the author as Ulpian. This chapter will concentrate on the interpretation of the *First Olynthiac* put forward in the *prolegomena*. The form of the comments in this work is different to that found in the majority of scholia, which offer brief paragraphs or sentences. Even scholia which are long and discursive are generally not as long as the *prolegomena*. Exceptions to this rule are codices such as R and T which intersperse the text with scholia written across the page in continuous passages. The opening two sentences of the *prolegomena* give the impression that the author is going to look at all the *Philippics* (Dilts p.1.3). He then turns his attention to the *First Olynthiac*, and apart from a single reference to the *Second Olynthiac* (Dilts p.11.33)<sup>(2)</sup>, concentrates on this speech alone.

His approach is systematic but somewhat confusing. Ulpian begins with general remarks about the speech as a whole and then examines the speech according to his analysis, in detail and progressively. Unfortunately, he does not always indicate which part of the *First Olynthiac* is being considered, nor does he always indicate which stage in his analysis he has reached. Nevertheless, the *prolegomena* do reveal that there is unity of composition. The components form a coherent structure and there is no evidence of notes by anyone else having been incorporated into the text. Ulpian regards himself as the originator of his interpretation, and this is illustrated most obviously when he dismisses interpretations different from his own (Dilts p.8.3sq, p.8.20sq and p.12.15sq).

#### RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Sandys, in his commentary on this speech, gives the following analysis of the structure <sup>(3)</sup> :

A. προίμιον - 1.1  
Introduction.

B. ἀπόδειξις - 1.2-27  
Discussion.

1. διήγησις - 1.2-15, survey of the situation.
2. πρόθεσις - 1.16-20, practical proposals.
3. πίστεις - 1.21-27, proof of the urgency and

practicality of the orator's proposals.

C. ἐπίλογος - 1.28

Conclusion.

While this seems a satisfactory analysis, Ulpian views the speech very differently. He sees the speech in terms of an answer to three objections which might be levelled at Demosthenes' proposal of Athenian involvement in the dispute between Olynthos and Philip :

A. προοίμιον - 1.1

Introduction.

B. δεύτερον προοίμιον - 1.2

Second introduction.

C. τὸ πρῶτον μέρος τῶν κεφαλαίων - 1.2-15

Demosthenes is answering the objection that the war is not οἰκείος.

D. τὸ δεύτερον μέρος τῶν κεφαλαίων - 1.16-20

Demosthenes is answering an objection about the source of finance for the war.

E. τὸ τρίτον μέρος τῶν κεφαλαίων - 1.21-23

Demosthenes is answering an objection pointing out that Philip is too powerful an adversary.

F. ἐπίλογοι - 1.24-28

Closing remarks.

It will be appreciated that Ulpian's interpretation is less rigid than Sandys', since Ulpian analyses the speech according to the number of objections which are faced, rather than dividing the argument to comply with precepts of structure. However, we know less about the rhetorician's guidelines for symbouleutic speeches than about those for forensic speeches. Symbouleutic speeches served a different purpose and therefore differed in form from forensic speeches. Our ignorance about the former is explained by the fact that there was very little need for this type of speech in Greek society in the centuries A.D..

Ulpian's initial remarks are general and compare Demosthenes' *Philippic* speeches with Thukydeidean demegoric speeches. Ulpian suggests that Demosthenes has modelled these speeches on Thukydidēs. He says that they make similar use of κεφάλαια, ἀντιθεσεις and νοήματα

(Dilts p.1.4-6). He notes that both writers deal with more than one objection in their speeches (Dilts p.1.7 μίαν sc.αντιθεσιν). The κεφάλαια are discussed in greater detail : ἀλλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον πρὸς ὅλον κεφάλαιον καὶ κεφαλαίου δὲ μέρος πρὸς μέρος (Dilts p.1.9-10). He makes many references to τὸ συμφέρον , for example (Dilts p.1.18, 20, 24, p.2.3). There is some indication that τὸ ἀναγκαῖον will be involved, although the sentence in which it occurs is parenthetical and may not refer specifically to the *First Olynthiac* (Dilts p.1.10-12). Throughout the commentary Ulpian points out where τὸ ἀναγκαῖον occurs, but he appears to find that this is secondary to the claims of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν.

τὸ συμφέρον is the basis of the argument that the war is οἰκείος and that it is in Athenian interests to become involved. τὸ δυνατόν concerns the ability of the Athenians to fight Philip successfully and this includes the question of finance. It will be shown that these remarks and comparisons are substantiated (4). τὸ ἀναγκαῖον is not regarded as a τελικόν κεφάλαιον . Ulpian looks closely at the arguments which Demosthenes puts forward and the motivation for using them. Often this involves an appreciation of the psychology of his audience. Ulpian is not interested in grammar, nor has he much to say about the historical background to the speech (5).

Ulpian next announces and summarises Demosthenes' response to each of the three objections. The outline comes at (Dilts p.2.31-3.2). The objections and answers are given as follows :

1. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος (Dilts p.3.3-24).
2. ἀλλά πόυ τὰ χρήματα (Dilts p.3.25-4.13).
3. concerning τὸ δυνατόν Φιλίππου (Dilts p.4.14-21).

Ulpian examines briefly the way in which Demosthenes varies the εἰσαγωγαί (introductions of κεφάλαια, v. Dilts p.5.1,6) of his three forestalling arguments (Dilts p.4.22-5.25). Following these remarks we find Ulpian's detailed comments on the speech.

### The Προόμιον

Ulpian perceives two dominant ἐννοιαι (ideas) in the προόμιον. Firstly, he thinks that Demosthenes is referring to the source of finance for the expedition in the opening sentence of the speech (Dilts p.5.26-6.4). Demosthenes, he argues, seems to have assumed that the war is οἰκείος for Athens because he begins with a secondary point. In fact, Demosthenes has yet to prove that ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος (Dilts

p.5.30).

The second ἐννοία is the statement of his belief that the Athenians accept sound arguments and an invitation for others to give their advice (Dilts p.6.4-13). In making this invitation for others to speak, Demosthenes is insinuating that he is giving the best advice. The invitation is also thought to be an oblique reference to the subject of finance (Dilts p.6.9).

While Ulpian outlines Demosthenes' approach in this προοίμιον correctly, he misinterprets the substance of what Demosthenes has to say. There are two elements in his opening remarks. The first is the indirect manner in which Demosthenes broaches the subject. He arrests the attention of his audience with a statement which is intended to be flattering : ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἄν, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἐλέσθαι νομίζω, εἰ φανερόν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν τῇ πόλει περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε. The effect is to turn the attention of the audience towards themselves, rather than towards the Olynthians. Since he is talking about the benefits of the war to Athens we may suppose that the war is pertinent to the Athenians. Demosthenes does not substantiate this remark, as Ulpian says (Dilts p.5.29-34). Ulpian points out frequently that the speech does not focus on the affairs of the Olynthians (Dilts p.1.12-14, 19-21,22-24, p.2.1-4, p.5.29). Demosthenes is indeed making assumptions in the προοίμιον about Athenian attitudes (Dilts p.5.29-30,31-33), and he tries to catch the attention of the Athenians (Dilts p.1.22-24, p.5.29).

Where Ulpian goes wrong is to suggest that Demosthenes is talking about finance in these lines. Sandys cast doubt on this view which takes τὰ χρηματὰ to be a reference to the source of finance (6). The question of finance is fundamental to this speech and therefore adds point to this initial comment, but it is misguided to read so much into the truism. The first-time listener or reader would not pick up this alleged allusion as they heard or read the προοίμιον. As a critic obviously well read in Demosthenes, Ulpian has permitted his detailed knowledge to convince himself that there is greater significance in Demosthenes' phrases than is actually there. The most important point to take from the opening remarks is the assumption that the Athenians put a high value on advice concerning τὸ συμφέρον. Ulpian is aware of this but does not stress it (Dilts p.6.5).

Hermogenes offers a similar account of D.1.1 (Rabe p.446.11-447.3). He assumes that the comment about ἀντὶ πολλῶν is accepted and that Demosthenes starts from τὰ θεωρικά. However, Hermogenes' interpretation is expressed in different words from Ulpian's. The inclusion of one of the τελικά κεφάλαια in a προοίμιον is thought to be satisfactory by Hermogenes(7). This suggests that there were those who thought that they were not suitable.

The case for the presence of τὸ συμφέρον in the προοίμιον is obvious

from Demosthenes' own words. Ulpian says that τὸ δυνατόν is also involved (Dilts p.6.11), because Demosthenes is calling for the need of money and is insinuating the nature of the better source (Dilts p.6.11-12). If this was Demosthenes' point then τὸ δυνατόν would be present, but the allusion to specific campaign money is mistaken and therefore τὸ δυνατόν is not present.

### The Δεύτερον Προοίμιον

Ulpian mentions a δεύτερον προοίμιον (Dilts p.6.14-19). The second προοίμιον is said to be indicative of τὸ συμφέρον for two reasons. The first reason is because it refers to Athenian honour, ἔνδοξον (8), and the second because Demosthenes is encouraging them to try to re-establish their hegemony of Greece (Dilts p.6.14-17). In the opening words of D.1.2 Demosthenes is clearly ashamed of the Athenian attitude : ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά ... . Ulpian's point about hegemony is less clear cut. Demosthenes is calling for the Athenians to become involved and act on this current opportunity, μόνον οὐχὶ ... ἔστιν. While the phrase εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε does imply necessity, it is far-fetched to find in this an allusion to former hegemony. If this idea was in Demosthenes' mind, he would surely have made it clear.

Ulpian adds that τὸ δυνατόν is present (Dilts p.6.17-18). His justification of this is peculiar. It is the nature of κεφάλαια to be mixed. The προοίμια will be mixed, because they allude to κεφάλαια. It is true that κεφάλαια can overlap. One argument can involve two aspects of κεφάλαια, but that is not to say that more than one κεφάλαιον must be involved. There is no allusion to τὸ δυνατόν in the opening sentence of D.1.2.

We are not told where the second προοίμιον ends. The words τὰ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν λοιπὸν εἰσβολὴν εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἔχει "ἔστι δὲ τά γ' ἔμοι δοκοῦντα", λαβόντα ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχήν (Dilts p.6.19-21) imply that we are moving on to a new section concerning the κεφάλαια.

### The First Ἀντίθεσις. D.1.2-15

The first ἀντίθεσις, according to Ulpian, is ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκεῖος ὁ πόλεμος (Dilts p.3.3-24). The objection which Demosthenes is supposed to be answering in D.1.2-15 is the view that the war between Philip and the Olynthians is of no concern to the Athenians. Clearly neither Demosthenes nor Ulpian is concerned with οἰκεῖα in the sense of kinship or alliance. Such a tie would invite arguments about obligation. Rather

it is something like this : if the results of an external event affect you, then you must have an interest in that event. Therefore the event is οἰκείον.

In his summary (Dilts p.3.3-24) Ulpian divides Demosthenes' answer in two. Firstly, φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία are emphasised (Dilts p.3.4-16). Demosthenes argues that Athenian participation in the war will be the start of Athenian hegemony in Greece once more. Ulpian looks specifically at the sentence in D.1.2 : ὁ μὲν οὖν παρῶν καιρός ... φροντίζετε.

Secondly, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος are emphasised. Demosthenes argues that Philip will attack Athens if Olynthos is not saved. Ulpian does not refer to the text. This division is the result, presumably, of Ulpian's assessment of the principal topics. For these topics occur interspersed throughout Ulpian's defence of his interpretation<sup>(9)</sup>.

We are meant to take his comments as a structural analysis of Demosthenes' handling of the first objection, because we find that φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία are dominant ideas in D.1.2-11, while τὸ ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος are dominant in D.1.12-15.

The εἰσαγωγή of the first objection is as follows : ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, δι' οὗ κατασκευάζει οἰκείον εἶναι τὸν πόλεμον, ὡς προηγούμενον. οὗ προελθόντος καὶ προκεχωρηκυῖων ἤδη τῶν κατασκευῶν, λεληθότως τῆς ἀντιθέσεως καὶ ἀνυπόπτως μνήμην πεποιήται. μετὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις ἀποδείξει ποιήσασθαι τοῦ δεῖν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντέχεσθαι ἐπήγαγε "νῦν γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ὡς Οὐλυθίουσ ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖν." ὃ δοκεῖ ὡσπερ ἀναίρεσιν ἐργάζεσθαι τῆς ἀντιθέσεως (Dilts p.4.24-30) <sup>(10)</sup>. Demosthenes places supporting arguments before the refutation of the objection. These arguments should lead us to believe that the war is οἰκείος (Dilts p.4.24-26). Demosthenes also alludes to the objection, but surreptitiously (Dilts p.4.26). The culmination of these arguments occurs at D.1.7 and the clause νῦν γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν, which is taken as the answer of the objection ὡσπερ ἀναίρεσιν (Dilts p.4.27-29). Demosthenes is exploiting the psychology of his audience. If his supporting arguments have been accepted, then his rebuttal of the objection which follows, is likely to be accepted too. The audience is being conditioned to agree with Demosthenes and, logically, they ought to accept his conclusion (Dilts p.4.30-35) <sup>(11)</sup>.

This interpretation indicates that the lead up to the objection is long. The κεφάλαια begin here too (Dilts p.5.1), but as yet we do not know which κεφάλαια are involved. This account effectively includes the προοίμια as an integral part of Demosthenes' handling of the first objection. In the first προοίμιον Ulpian thinks that secondary points come first and that Demosthenes works from assumptions before proving that the war is οἰκείος. His detailed analysis of the passage (Dilts p.6.20-35), discussed below, offers a similar assessment ; supporting arguments precede the answer to the objection. Although he seems to

think that the objection has been answered in D.1.7 (Dilts p.4.29, p.8.32-33), he says that the subsequent sections, D.1.8-11, also contribute to the same λύσις (answer) : βεβαιοί δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς δευτέρας ἐννοίας τὴν αὐτὴν λύσιν (Dilts p.9.5). We may infer that these sections yield supplementary proofs since the actual refutation appears to be located in D.1.7. Ulpian regards D.1.2-15 as a series of points in favour of the case that the war is οἰκείος. D.1.12-15 form the final section (Dilts p.9.31, p.10.15), and this is dominated by the idea of τὸ ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος.

Ulpian's interpretation of D1.2-11 ought to concentrate on φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία if he is following his earlier summary (Dilts p.3.3-24). The idea of ἡγεμονία is stressed (Dilts p.9.27-30). Ulpian has very little to say specifically about φιλοτιμία. Demosthenes does try to exploit the Athenians' sense of honour and ambition throughout D1.2-11.

The detailed analysis reveals a different emphasis. Ulpian examines D.1.2-11 in two sections, D.1.2-7 and D.1.8-11. In the former he discusses the reliability of the Olynthians and the use of mercenary troops. The latter section examines ἡγεμονία.

It will be convenient to examine Ulpian's interpretation of the answer to the first objection in three sections, D.1.2-7, D.1.8-11 and D.1.12-15.

#### a) D.1.2-7

Ulpian's detailed analysis comes at (Dilts p.6.20sq). In this section we are expecting to find κατασκευαί which culminate in the ἀνάίρεσις of the objection. What he has to say is familiar from his observations about the προοίμια. Demosthenes does not answer the objection about the relevance of the war to Athens at once. This answer would concern τὸ συμφέρον. He is said to begin with τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.6.20, 23). The natural order would be the agreement that the war is οἰκείος, followed by the type of force to be used in that war. Demosthenes has reversed the natural order because he requires his answer to stem from a background of agreement (Dilts p.6.23-26) (12).

In (Dilts p.6.23-7.3) Ulpian simply reiterates his understanding of Demosthenes' approach : he reverses the normal order, wins assent for his secondary points about the type of force and forestalls the objection too. Ulpian is referring to ἔστι δὴ ... πρότερον and his remarks are justified. Demosthenes implies that an Athenian, not a mercenary, force ought to be sent, ἐνθένδε βοηθήσετε D.1.2. He assumes that a force ought to be sent, without having established that the war is necessary.

As we have learned from his summary, Ulpian sees two motives for fighting, φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία. So we ought to find some reference to

them in the detailed discussion of this section. Both have already appeared in his comments on the second προοίμιον (Dilts p.6.14-17), although φιλοτιμία is not mentioned specifically. Ulpian then goes on to look at the reason for sending an embassy to Olynthos.

There seems to have been some doubt in antiquity as to whether or not Demosthenes was proposing that an embassy be sent, as first seems the case in D.1.2. Ulpian dismisses the doubt (Dilts p.7.4-10). He thinks that Demosthenes is obviously calling for an embassy to be sent. The reason is that Philip is capable of deception and may encroach upon Athenian interests (Dilts p.7.10sqq). Ulpian develops this point by showing how it fits in with his interpretation of the objection being answered. Presumably, there were some people who took Demosthenes to mean in D.1.2 that these things should have been done before, but not now. Alternatively, they may have believed that Demosthenes was not making this suggestion seriously. We have no evidence suggesting a way in which they might have substantiated such an opinion. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of Ulpian's support for taking Demosthenes at face value. He might also have cited D.1.24 to support his rebuttal : δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι ... καὶ πρεσβευομένους ἐφ' ἃ δεῖ ... .

A passage which implies φιλοτιμία, comes at (Dilts p.7.17-8.1). Here Ulpian is making some useful comments about the blend of fear and encouragement which Demosthenes employs in D1.2-7. He is using fear to arouse the Athenians to take action and to aspire to their former power.

The objection which Ulpian thinks is being faced in this section of the speech is οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. This is explained in his closing remarks on D.1.2-7 where he says : "νυνὶ γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν" αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῆς ὅτι "ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ἡμῖν ὁ πόλεμος". ἦν οὐκ ἔθηκε δι' ὃ προείπομεν ἐν θεωρήματι, ἵνα μὴ δοκῶν ἢ περὶ ἀμφισβητούμενων μάχεσθαι ἀλλ' ὅτε προὔλαβε τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἔδειξε μὴ ἀπατηθησόμενον τὸν σύμμαχον, ἵνα φαίνωνται μόνον οὐ καὶ εὐξάμενοι συμβῆναι τὸν πόλεμον, τότε οἰκείος αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν ὁμολογουμένως φανήσεσθαι (Dilts p.8.32-9.4). The final phrase of this extract is hard to translate, since the syntax of the final two words is not clear. Wolf was prompted to emend the whole phrase to : ὅτι τε οἰκείος αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν ὁμολογοῦντες (Dilts app.crit. p.9.3-4). The meaning of the text as we have it seems to be that once Demosthenes has shown that the Olynthians will not be deceived and that the Athenians were themselves keen for the Olynthians to make a stand against Philip, the case in favour of οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος will have been made. It is clear from Ulpian's words that the victim of the deception will be the Olynthians and that Philip is responsible for the deceit : ἀλλὰ συνιστᾶς μὴ ἀλωσομένους ταῖς τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ (Dilts p.8.12-13) and also μὴ ἀπατηθησόμενον τὸν σύμμαχον

(Dilts p.9.2). Demosthenes passes no remark to the effect that the Athenians would be taken in by Philip's guile. Such a remark would risk the goodwill of the Athenians which Demosthenes has built up.

The reason why the Olynthians will not be deceived, in Ulpian's opinion, is given at (Dilts p.8.10) : εἰ μόνον οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραγένοιοντο. This remark is repeated at (Dilts p.8.22-26) and begs a question. Why will the embassy prevent the Olynthians being deceived by Philip or led astray ? If the Olynthians were so keen to go to war against Philip<sup>(13)</sup>, then the probability of their being deceived by Philip would be slim, presumably. Ulpian is wilfully ignoring the the inference to be made from four statements in the *First Olynthiac* at this point :

1. δῆλον γάρ ἐστι τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης οὐδ' ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας πολεμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος, D.1.5.

2. καὶ ἴσασι τὰ Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους, D.1.5.

3. καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τυραννίς, D.1.5.

4. νυνὶ γάρ ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ, γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ' ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ταῦτ' ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως, D.1.7.

Each of these statements suggests that Olynthian reliability is not guaranteed. The first statement refers to 357B.C. when Amphipolis fell to Philip (14). After its capture, Olynthos changed her support from Athens to Philip. In this case, so Demosthenes argues, they will not repeat this action. The suggestion underlying his reassurance is that Olynthian loyalty could not be depended upon. In the second statement Demosthenes implies that those who surrendered the two cities to Philip were dealt with harshly. With this precedent in mind, the Olynthians will not change their minds and capitulate to Philip. In the third statement, the truism that tyranny cannot be trusted by a city state implies that the Olynthians will not trust Philip. The appearance of the word ἄπιστον suggests that trustworthiness is the problem which Demosthenes seeks to answer. In the fourth statement Demosthenes argues that the Olynthians will not be σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι, because they are taking action of their own accord and not under pressure from Athens. Once again he is referring to loyalty.

Ulpian says himself : ἔδειξε (sc. Δημοσθένησ) μὴ ἀπατηθῆσόμενον τὸν σύμμαχον (Dilts p.9.2). The ally in question is Olynthos. There seems no need to prove that an ally will not be deceived unless there are some people who think that they will be taken in. This is surely a question of Olynthian reliability, since there is a possibility that the Olynthians will fall for Philip's deception and will choose to switch sides. This is an

argument which invites the objection ἀλλ' ἄπιστοι οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι. Ulpian is ignoring the suggestion of his own statement. We shall return to the form of the objection presently. The objection of other commentators, which Ulpian himself cites, refers to this incident : ἀλλὰ ἄπιστοι γέγονασιν περὶ τὴν πόλιν Ὀλύνθιοι (Dilts p.8.4). The city must be Amphipolis.

Ulpian tries to strengthen his case by comparing this section of the *First Olynthiac* with Thucydides 1.35.5 : ὅπερ πεποίηκε καὶ ὁ Κερκυραῖος παρ' Ἀθηναίοισι δημηγορῶν, ἐν οἷσ φησιν "ὅτι οἱ αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν, ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις, καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάφαι." ἃ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τὸν Κερκυραῖον λέγοντα ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ὁ Δημοσθένης ὑπὲρ Ὀλυνθίων λέγει, συνιστὰς μὴ ἂν ἔτι τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου πανουργίαν ἰσχύσειν πρεσβευσαμένης τῆς πόλεως (Dilts p.8.13-18). It is reasonable to argue that if two parties share one enemy, then they share a common interest. Therefore the activity of the enemy is οἰκεῖον to both parties. But it is illogical to argue, as Ulpian does, that because they share the same enemy one side will not fall for a deceit perpetrated by that enemy. The key to the issue is the reliability of the susceptible party.

Ulpian summarises the key points of the preceding analysis (Dilts p.8.31-9.4). The next section begins with the words βεβαιοῖ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς δευτέρας ἐννοίας τὴν αὐτὴν λύσιν (Dilts p.9.5). Ulpian has not referred to ἡ πρώτη ἐννοία. We know that νυνὶ γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ... is the λύσις (Dilts p.8.32). Therefore ἡ πρώτη ἐννοία will be an argument or idea which leads to this statement. The ἐννοία is as follows : ἀλλ' ὅτε προὔλαβε τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἔδειξε μὴ ἀπατηθησόμενον τὸν σύμμαχον, ἵνα φαίνωνται μόνον οὐ καὶ εὐξάμενοι συμβῆναι τὸν πόλεμον (Dilts p.9.1-3). The clarity of Ulpian's exposition would have been helped greatly if he had labelled this comment ἡ πρώτη ἐννοία.. The logic between the two clauses needs to be explained ; for how can showing that the Olynthians will not be deceived prove that the war is οἰκεῖον. Ulpian speaks about Olynthian history and Athenian attitudes at that time. Previously the Athenians thought that Olynthian affairs affected them. This still holds true. The logic is not sound but this is Ulpian's interpretation.

### Κεφάλαια of D.1.2-7

Ulpian does not identify the κεφάλαια in this section of the speech until he begins his detailed discussion. The second προοίμιον was based on τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.6.14), although τὸ δυνατόν was also thought to be present (Dilts p.6.16-17) (15). ἔστι δὲ τὰ γ' ἐμοὶ marks the beginning of τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.6.20, 25-26), because Demosthenes is speaking about the type of force to be used. This is accurate, but Demosthenes comments are restricted to one sentence.

Ulpian then goes on to argue that Demosthenes is indeed calling for an embassy to be sent (Dilts p.7.4-10). Ulpian argues that one would not be wrong in saying that this concerns τὸ συμφέρον, because Demosthenes is implying that this is the introduction to this κεφάλαιον (Dilts p.7.10-13). Ulpian accepts this but claims that the same points also justify τὸ δυνατόν, and he draws a comparison with Thucydides (Dilts p.7.14-17). This picks up on an observation, which he made in connection with the second προοίμιον, that it is in the nature of κεφάλαια to be mixed (Dilts p.6.19). The frequency of the occurrence of καιρός in the speech is considered to be part of τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.7.31). Demosthenes' encouragement of the Athenians to emulate Philip's attitude combines τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.7.33-8.2).

Ulpian's account of the κεφάλαια goes awry at (Dilts p.8.20-31). Referring to D.1.7, he says that Demosthenes' arguments about the embassy and the deception of the Olynthians in D.1.2-7 are part of τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.8.22-26). Perhaps realising that in the previous paragraph he said that both τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν were involved, he adds : ἐν οἷς ἔλαττον μὲν τὸ συμφέρον, πλέον δὲ τὸ δυνατόν ἐξείργασται (Dilts p.8.26). He follows this with : ἐντεῦθεν μεταβαίνει ἐπ' ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ κεφαλαίου, λέγω τοῦ συμφέροντος συμπλέκων μὲν οὐδὲν ἦττον κἀνταῦθα τὸ δυνατόν ' ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις τὸ δυνατόν ἐπλεόναζε καὶ αὐτοῦ ἦν ὡς προηγούμενον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τὸ μὲν συμφέρον μᾶλλον προηγείται, τὸ δὲ δυνατόν ἔπεται (Dilts p.8.27-31). Throughout his discussion of D.1.2-7 Ulpian has maintained that Demosthenes bases his arguments on a mixture of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν, (Dilts p.7.12-14, 16-17, p.8.1-2, 22). Now at (Dilts p.8.26) he states that τὸ δυνατόν takes precedence over τὸ συμφέρον in D.1.2-7 and this was implied in his earlier comments. He betrays this confusion when he suffixes his comment μεταβαίνει ἐπ' ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ κεφαλαίου with λέγω τοῦ συμφέροντος. Since the precedence of τὸ δυνατόν is discussed in the previous sentence, we expect τὸ αὐτὸ κεφάλαιον to be τὸ δυνατόν. Such confusion may have arisen because of a determination to produce interpretations different from those of his predecessors (Dilts p.7.1-14).

#### b) D.1.8-11

The discussion by Ulpian of D.1.2-7 looked at the question of mercenary troops and the embassy, and rejected the interpretation of the objection which argues that the reliability of the Olynthians is the issue which Demosthenes is handling (16). The ἀναίρεσις of the objection came in D.1.7 with the phrase νυνὶ γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ... . When Ulpian says βεβαιοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς δευτέρας ἐννοίας τὴν αὐτὴν λύσιν (Dilts p.9.5) we may

infer that the next sections of the speech provide proof to support the ἀναίρεσις.

The second ἔννοια is explained in the following sentence : καὶ γὰρ Εὐβοεῦσιν οὐκ οἰκείοις οὖσιν οὐδὲ συμμάχοις βεβοηθήκασιν (Dilts p.9.5-6). This refers to the opening words of D.1.8 : εἰ γάρ, ὅθ' ἤκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες. The argument is that the Athenians helped the Euboians even though they were not entitled to expect help, because they had reneged on an alliance (Dilts p.9.10-12). So the Οἰlynthians, who are former allies of Athens, deserve at least the same response. We are back to the point that the Athenians helped the Olynthians on a previous occasion. Relationships do exist between the various ideas but they are not as well defined as Ulpian's analysis would have us believe.

Ulpian then goes on to look at the example which Demosthenes chooses in D.1.8 (Dilts p.9.11-18). His remarks about the κεφάλαια shall be considered presently. He thinks that the allusions to Pydna and Potidaia are illustrations of other Greek powers pretending to the leadership of Greece (Dilts p.9.15-17). This implies, presumably, that the leadership rightfully belongs to Athens. This is fanciful.

Ulpian then notes how Demosthenes uses a combination of fear and exhortation in his belief that Athenian apathy is the root of Philip's success (Dilts p.9.18-21), because, although Philip is to be feared, the implication is that he will remain powerful only as long as the Athenians do nothing. This tactic is compared with a speech in Thoukydides (Dilts p.9.21)<sup>(17)</sup>. The goodwill of the gods is noted and this is thought to be unexpected, because Demosthenes claims that the disasters in Thrace and the subjugation or change of allegiance of Greek cities in Thrace are indicative of this goodwill (Dilts p.9.23-25).

Both D.1.2-7 and D.1.8-11 are summarised as being a series of arguments that it is possible for the city to take up the leadership again. Although the attitude is wrong now, even if it was not before, the Athenians must recover the hegemony. If the war is about hegemony, then the war is οἰκείος (Dilts p.9.27-30).

It is a valid argument to state that if Demosthenes is talking about hegemony of Greece then what he says is pertinent to the Athenians. At no time does he refer to ἡγεμονία overtly, but he does make his purpose clear in D.1.8-9. He is discussing the problems created by throwing away opportunity. The Athenians look after the safety of the Euboians but not their own, despite all the good opportunities which they have had. This a reference to Athenian interventions in Euboea following the rise of Thebes in the years after the Battle of Leuktra 371 B.C.. He is trying to convince the Athenians that if they changed their attitude, they would be successful. Hegemony might have been an element of that success but Demosthenes does not expand on the nature of the potential success. Since a simple change in attitude by the Athenians would see off Philip,

it can be inferred from Demosthenes' argument that the Athenians are still the most powerful people in Greece. Ulpian is looking for complex arguments at the expense of a straightforward explanation.

Ulpian's analysis of D.1.2-11 is difficult because he does not follow a clear plan. The expectation from his summaries are only partially fulfilled. For example, φιλοτιμία is almost ignored in the detailed discussion. How he arrives at the identification of φιλοτιμία is understandable, but Ulpian does not prove the point himself. He is more competent in explaining the presence of ἡγεμονία. Although it is possible to detect this idea in Demosthenes' words, it is not obvious and we ought to wonder why Demosthenes was not more direct in referring to hegemony. The obvious interpretation of D.1.2-11 is that Demosthenes is frustrated and scared by the attitude of the Athenians. He tries to restore their former assertiveness, so that they will take action and save themselves from Philip. Ulpian is vague about his understanding of the structure. His comments about ἔννοιαι are confusing. A few extra words would have clarified his exposition.

#### Κεφάλαια of D.1.8-11

The κεφάλαια of D.1.8-11 are indicated at (Dilts p.8.27-31). We are to expect a combination of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν, with the former taking precedence. Ulpian confirms this in his discussion of D.1.8-11 (Dilts p.9.7-10). τὸ συμφέρον is said to be the basis for Demosthenes' comments about Athenian attitudes. They are not acting in their best interests and so the remarks concern τὸ συμφέρον. τὸ δυνατόν concerns the remarks about Athenian ability and success in the past. This is satisfactory, but once again Ulpian confuses his account of the κεφάλαια. Demosthenes cites examples when the Athenians failed to help allies who needed their help. Ulpian thinks that τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ δίκαιον could all be involved (Dilts p.9.13-15). The optative αν ειη suggests that Ulpian himself disagrees. Yet a little later, when he is discussing the ability of the Athenians to succeed, Ulpian says : ἐν δὲ τούτοις τὸ συμφέρον προηγείται, τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἔπεται (Dilts p.9.22). The latter phrase must refer to τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ δίκαιον. The indicative suggests that Ulpian does believe that all three κεφάλαια are involved. τὸ δίκαιον is not cited anywhere else in the *prolegomena*. Its presence here is justified. The involvement of Athenian allies implies an element of obligation.

Demosthenes' remarks about the goodwill of the gods is thought to be based on τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.9.26-27). They are indeed pertinent to the ability of the Athenians to act successfully.

### α) τὸ ἀναγκάϊον and φόβος, D.1.12-15

Ulpian identifies two main sections in Demosthenes' answer to the first ἀντίθεσις (Dilts p.3.3-24). The first we have just looked at and concerns φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία. The second stresses τὸ ἀναγκάϊον and φόβος, and refers to D.1.12-15.

In his comments on D.1.2-11 Ulpian pointed out that fear played an important role in Demosthenes' argument (Dilts p.7.17-18, p.9.18-20). There is an element of fear in section D.1.2-11 when Philip's success is stressed. Fear is aroused more directly and with greater force in D.1.12-15.

Ulpian does not give τὸ ἀναγκάϊον and φόβος the parity which is implied in his summary of this section (Dilts p.3.16-21) when he comes to discuss the passage in detail : τὰ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τὸ ἀναγκάϊον ἔχει καὶ τὴν εἰσβολὴν εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τοῦ "εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους" (Dilts p.9.31-32). He argues that three elements, one of which is fear, contribute to τὸ ἀναγκάϊον. We may divide the three as follows :

1. φοβεῖ γὰρ 2. καὶ δείκνυσιν οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων κινδυνεύσοντας 3. καὶ ὅτι ὁδῶ πρόεισιν ὁ Φίλιππος (Dilts p.9.32-10.1).

This is indeed the effect of D.1.12-15 and it illustrates how the war is pertinent to the Athenians, because the results of not becoming involved are bad for Athens. This is Ulpian's conclusion : < ὁ > καλῶς ἄν τις εἴποι τὸ ἀναγκάϊον εἶναι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ οἰκείου εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον (Dilts p.3.23-24).

### κεφάλαια of D.1.12-15

Ulpian's comments on D.1.12-15 are brief and he does not refer to κεφάλαια. Presumably, this section is based on τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν like the other sections. Even if he felt that there was nothing of importance to say about κεφάλαια here, for the sake of clarity and consistency, he ought to have at least mentioned them.

### Alternative Interpretation of D.1.2-15

So far only Ulpian's favoured interpretation of D.1.2-15 has been discussed. In the course of his argument Ulpian devotes much energy to refuting an alternative interpretation of this part of the speech. There was a school of thought, exemplified by Zeno of Kition<sup>(18)</sup>, that the

objection which Demosthenes is seeking to answer is ἀλλ' ἄπιστοι Ὀλύνθιοι. It was argued above, from Demosthenes' own statements, that an objection along these lines was more appropriate to the text than Ulpian's choice of ἀλλ' οὐκ οικειοσ ὁ πόλεμος (19). This is true for D.1.2-7, and the phrase νῦνι γὰρ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ... may be interpreted as the final answer to the objection. The reliability of the Olynthians is examined, particularly in D.1.4-7. However, D.1.8-15 does not seem relevant to the reliability of the Olynthians. As we shall see presently, these sections of the *First Olynthiac* were thought to answer another objection.

Ulpian's dismissal of the ἀπιστοι interpretation is vehement : οὐδαμοῦ δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἐκείνην ὁρῶ τὴν ἀντίθεσιν ἣν εἰώθασι θρυλεῖν ἅπαντες " ἀλλὰ ἄπιστοι γέγονασι περὶ τὴν πόλιν Ὀλύνθιοι " (Dilts p.8.3-4). He gives three grounds for doing so :

1. οὐ διαλύσονται πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον, 2. οὐδὲ προσήσονται τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνου λόγους, 3. οὔτε τὸ ὅτι πιστοὶ ἔσονται συνίστησιν (Dilts p.8.5-6).

There is some justification for these criticisms, since Demosthenes does not discuss the reliability of the Olynthians in the blatant terms desired by Ulpian in order for him to accept the ἀπιστοι interpretation. Ulpian returns to this interpretation at (Dilts p.8.20-21) and repeats his point that the Olynthians will not be deceived if only Athens sends ambassadors (Dilts p.8.22-26, cf p.8.10-12, 17-18, p.9.2). In D.1.4-7 Demosthenes is trying to excuse Olynthian behaviour by saying that this time the circumstances are different.

Ulpian himself may help us to discover how D.1.8-15 was interpreted by those who supported the ἀπιστοι interpretation for D.1.2-7. In his discussion of D.1.12-15 he rejects an explanation which might be proposed for the list of cities in D.1.12-13 : οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀντίθεσιν ἀπαντήσασ, ὡς ἂν οἰηθεῖη τις ὑποκρούων , "καὶ τί ἂν ἡμεῖς βλαβείημεν Ὀλυνθίων ἐαλωκότων ; (Dilts p.10.6-7). Someone, perhaps Zeno, interpreted D.1.12-15 as an answer to the objection "what harm would it do us if Olynthos was captured ?" In D.1.8 the Athenians were warned against repeating the experience of previous occasions. In D.1.9 Demosthenes points to the capture of Pydna, Potidaia, Methone and Pagasai. These towns are the ones mentioned in D.1.12-13. Since the mooted objection in D.1.12-13 questions the harm which will befall Athens should Olynthos fall, it is possible to interpret D.1.8-13 as a long answer to this objection. In D.1.8 Demosthenes clearly establishes that the Olynthians must not be turned away or the Athenians will suffer. In D.1.9-10 we find a plea to the Athenians not to let slip yet another opportunity . In D.1.11 Demosthenes illustrates his claim that the Athenians' control their future with a simile based on those who borrow

money. D.1.8-11 may be interpreted as the preamble to the strong warning which occurs in D.1.12-15.

Ulpian gives his reasons for rejecting this interpretation succinctly :  
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνστησάμενος οἰκείον καταδείξαι τὸν πόλεμον ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτὸ κατασκεύασεν

1. ἀπό τε τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἧς μεταποιεῖσθαι προσήκει τῇ πόλει 2. καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν ἤξειν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσαιεν τοῖς ἔτι λειπομένοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῆς Θράκης. οὐδὲ δὴ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν ποιησόμενος <καθ'> ὑπόνοιαν παρίστησι τὰ συμβησόμενα τῇ πόλει δεινά (Dilts p.10.7-12).

If this alternative objection did cover D.1.8-15, and not simply D.1.12-15, then the first argument refers back to Ulpian's own analysis of D.1.2-11. If the objection only applies to D.1.12-15, then Ulpian's reference to hegemony is confusing, because he disregards his summary of the analysis. The summary stressed ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος at this point in the speech. The case for arguing that ἡγεμονία is used as a motive for taking action in D.1.2-11, as we saw above, is not convincing. His second argument is better. Demosthenes is stressing the necessity of Athenian involvement for their own good. What is necessary for the Athenians can be termed οἰκείον. The case for the interpretation that the objection being answered is τί ἂν ἡμεῖς βλαβείημεν ; is plausible but not as convincing as Ulpian's interpretation. Demosthenes looks at the harm which will befall Athens in D.1.27-28.

We are not informed how those who identified the objection as τί ἂν ἡμεῖς βλαβείημεν ; divided the speech. D.1.2-7 contains no suggestion of this ἀντίθεσις and so it may be that they also advocated the proposition of the previous ἀντίθεσις, ἀλλ' ἄπιστοι οἱ Ὀλύμπιοι.

### Conclusion

Generally, Ulpian presents a plausible interpretation. He appears intolerant of the opinions of other people, failing to acknowledge the validity of their arguments. There are discrepancies between his summary and his detailed account. These cause confusion, but the points are questions of emphasis and do not entail contradiction. The clarity of his exposition is clouded by his practice of restating arguments when they have been made already.

### The Second Ἀντίθεσις, D.1.16-20

The second objection concerns the provision of money : μηδὲ χρήματα ὑπάρχειν πρόχειρα τοῖς στρατευομένοις (Dilts p.2.34). Demosthenes'

approach to the second objection is summarised at (Dilts p.3.25-4.13). The issue is broached ἐξ ἀντιθέσεως (Dilts p.3.25, p.5.1-2). What Ulpian means is that Demosthenes voices an objection to his own argument by querying out loud the relevance of his advice : τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ..., D.1.16. Ulpian takes Demosthenes' case to be that once Euboulos' law governing the theorik money is changed, there will be sufficient funds to finance a campaign against Philip. This may be what Demosthenes has in mind (20). He stresses necessity in order to convince the Athenians of this evidently displeasing fact. An individual levy for one and all is suggested. Ulpian assumes that when Demosthenes says πάντα εἰσφέρειν, D.1.20, he does mean that everyone ought to pay eisphora : φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν εἰσφέρειν ἕκαστον (Dilts p.3.29-31, cf p.11.7-8). If this is correct, then Demosthenes is offering peculiar advice. The theorika were available to all, but eisphora was a tax normally only paid by the richer citizens(21). Demosthenes may be exaggerating for effect. Ulpian says that Demosthenes' purpose is to persuade the Athenians to fight for themselves and that they are given no alternative. His proposal of a double campaign is not serious but a tactic to achieve his purpose (Dilts p.4.9-13, cf p.10.26-29).

Ulpian examines D.1.16-20 in greater detail at (Dilts p.10.15-11.18). His observation that the beginning of D.1.16 marks a transition is sound. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν... introduces Demosthenes' practical advice after the previous sections which give warning about the situation. Sandys called this the πρόθεσις(22). He believes that the advice is genuine, as do all modern scholars. Ulpian's contention is that Demosthenes is concerned only with the question of finance here and that the remarks about the force are not to be taken literally.

Demosthenes divides his case into two aspects. The first is the nature of the force, D.1.17-18 and the second is the provision of finance, D.1.19-20 (Dilts p.10.22-23). Ulpian is also correct to point out that the issue was sensitive and had, therefore, to be handled carefully. Ulpian terms the cautious introduction in D.1.16 a προῖμιον (Dilts p.5.2-6, p.10.20, 24).

The *Rhetores Graeci* discuss προῖμια(23). There are conflicting views as to whether or not there had to be a προῖμιον in every speech, and whether or not it was possible for there to be a multiplicity of προῖμια in one speech(24). According to Ulpian, there is a προῖμιον over half way through the *First Olynthiac*. It performs the function of a προῖμιον. This, at least, finds general agreement among the *Rhetores Graeci*. Firstly, the προῖμιον introduces the topic of the later part of the speech and secondly, prepares the audience for a favourable reception of the forthcoming argument. There is no contradiction between Ulpian's statement that D.1.16 is a προῖμιον and his statement

that the same words are written ἐξ ἀντιθέσεως (Dilts p.3.25, p.5.2-6). Once again Ulpian implies that the προοίμιον forms part of the εἰσαγωγή of the argument<sup>(25)</sup>.

As we have said, Ulpian believes that the proposal of two forces is not Demosthenes' true intention (Dilts p.4.9-13, p.10.26-29). He thinks that Demosthenes is using the proposal as a tactic which involves two elements. Firstly, it is a psychologically effective device to ask for more than you actually want, because that way you are more likely to achieve your real aim. The second element relates to finance. A large force requires greater finance than a small force. The prospect of raising a stiff eisphora is less attractive than sacrificing the theoric money. Ulpian must have been aware that his interpretation required substantiation since he gives two additional reasons for rejecting Demosthenes' ostensible proposal :

1. ἐκ τοῦ μήτε πολύν τινα κινήσαι λόγον, σύστασιν περιέχοντα τοῦ δεῖν ἐκπέμπειν ἑκατέραν 2. ἐκ τοῦ ταχέως ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τῶν χρημάτων δραμεῖν (Dilts p.11.1-3).

So Ulpian argues that Demosthenes fails to give a full account of the force required and he leaves the subject altogether, moving on to the question of finance. His observations are valid but his conclusion is not. Demosthenes' account may be deficient but that does not mean, necessarily, that his proposal is not genuine<sup>(26)</sup>. Moreover, Ulpian ignores the reasons which Demosthenes puts forward for the need for two forces, D.1.17-18. Demosthenes argues that if the Athenians attack Makedonia, then Philip will wait until he has secured Olynthos and will then relieve his own land. If the Athenians only go to Olynthos, he will take confidence from knowing that his base is secure.

The psychology which lies behind Ulpian's interpretation is plausible, but it may be that in this speech details about the force are irrelevant. There is no point in giving a thorough account of the force to be sent unless the Athenians are committed to fighting, and are prepared to fund it. Throughout the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes dwells on the urgency and advantage of siding with the Olynthians against Philip. The climax of this argument is found in D.1.12-15. After this he can capitalise on the emotions which he has aroused, and persuade the Athenians to finance the expedition. At this stage a detailed exposition would be a hindrance. Ulpian may be correct in disregarding the request for two forces as a serious suggestion. The request may be a tactical ploy. Two forces permit Demosthenes to exploit the potential for using antithetical structures<sup>(27)</sup>. Ulpian's account is probably correct. Modern scholars have criticised the sense of Demosthenes' proposal, given Athens' economic position at the time<sup>(28)</sup>.

One reason Ulpian attributes to Demosthenes for proposing a large

force was that a large force implied a large eisphora and that therefore the theorik money, which was the alternative source, would seem a more attractive source of finance (Dilts p.10.30-31). Later he states : ἄξιον δὲ ἐπισημῆνασθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐγγρονίζειν βούλεται τῷ λόγῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων διὰ τὸ δυσχερές, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς μεταβαίνει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν εἰσφορῶν, ἵνα μὴ φαίνεται ἐπιτηδεύων τὴν πρὸς Εὐβουλον μάχην (Dilts p.11.3-6). In this context χρήματα refers to the theorik money. So, according to Ulpian, Demosthenes talks about eisphora instead of τὰ θεωρικά because mention of the latter would cause ill-will on the part of the Athenians. Ulpian returns to his former idea that Demosthenes alludes to both sources but stresses eisphora, in order to compel the Athenians to support the idea of using τὰ θεωρικά (Dilts p.11.6-12). It is paradoxical that the discussion about the less unpleasant proposal, chosen because of hostility towards the more unpleasant option, results in the selection of the more unpleasant option. What Ulpian means is that the theorik fund is popular and politically untouchable and that eisphora is more acceptable. However, when the personal liability involved in levying a large eisphora is considered, then the idea of eisphora becomes even more unpleasant than the idea of surrendering the theorik money. The reason is that people are more likely to surrender the public benefit than suffer personal financial loss<sup>(29)</sup>. This passage is particularly repetitious (Dilts p.10.30-11.12).

Ulpian's remarks on D.1.20 are surprising because he requires the reader to be familiar with technical terms. Hitherto he has favoured pedantic and sometimes repetitious explanation. This next passage also illustrates how Ulpian impairs comprehension by failing to indicate which part of the speech he is referring to : "λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄλλοι πόρους, ὧν ἔλεσθε" ἔστι μὲν ἀνθυποφορά, χρῆ δὲ ἀναφέρειν τὴν προκατασκευὴν ὡς λύσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐννοίαν τοῦ προοιμίου, ἵνα ἐκ συγκρίσεως συμφορώτερος < ὁ > πόρος φαίνεται. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἠξίωσε μηδένα κωλυθῆναι βουλόμενον λέγειν, ἵνα ἢ εἰσήγησις αὐτοῦ ἢ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων βέλτιον ἔχουσα φαίνεται. τέθεικε δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ πλείονα τῆς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ λύσιν (Dilts p.11.13-18).

According to Hermogenes and Dionysios of Halikarnassos, an ἀνθυποφορά answers a question or point supplied either by the orator himself or by someone else. The question or argument is termed a ὑποφορά by Hermogenes and Tiberios<sup>(30)</sup>. In D.1.19 there is an obvious candidate for the ὑποφορά : "τί οὖν ;" σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά ;" At first one might be misled into believing that μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε ... τῶν δεόντων is the answer to this question. Apart from the rhetorical exclamation of indignation, Demosthenes would then be evading an answer to the question. Here he suggests an alternative source of finance, making clear which he prefers himself. The removal of the

theorika is his choice. The ἀνθυποφορά comes instead at the end of D.1.20, as Ulpian points out (Dilts p.11.13-14). Demosthenes neatly avoids the responsibility for the decision about financing the expedition when he says : λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄλλοι πόρους, ὧν ἔλεσθ' ὅστις ὑμῖν συμφέρειν δοκεῖ. This disclaimer would be particularly important if he considered that he was liable to prosecution for making such a proposal.

There is another definition of the term ἀνθυποφορά which is given in (105c) and refers to D.1.4 (Dilts p.36.9-11)<sup>(31)</sup>. It occurs when the objector accepts some of what the speaker says but questions the rest. Ulpian cannot have this definition in mind because the text in D.1.20 does not fit.

Sense ought to be made of Ulpian's comment : χρή δὲ ἀναφέρειν τὴν προκατασκευὴν ὡς λύσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ προοιμίου (Dilts p.11.14-15). According to Hermogenes, προκατασκευή is a declaration about the subject you are going to discuss (Rabe p.126.17sqq). In the text nothing seems to fit this definition. If we take the term literally as "preparation beforehand", then it is an appropriate description of the function of μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε ... τῶν δεόντων, and is the προκατασκευή of the ἀνθυποφορά. It is also to be taken as a λύσις (answer) to the ἔννοια of the προοίμιον. The προοίμιον must be the one which was pointed out in D.1.16 (Dilts p.10.20, 24). The ἔννοια of this προοίμιον is as follows : τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἴσως φῆσαι τισὶν ἂν ῥᾶδιον καὶ παντὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων ὅτι δεῖ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτ' εἶναι συμβούλου, D.1.16. In D.1.16 Demosthenes promises that he will ignore his own safety and give sound advice. Ulpian points out that Demosthenes gives advice about the τρόπος τῆς παρασκευῆς and the πόρος (Dilts p.10.22-23). Therefore μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε ... may be interpreted as supplying advice on the question of πόρος. It satisfies the demand for practical advice posed in the προοίμιον. Although Ulpian's comments are accurate, unnecessary concision obscures his meaning.

### Κεφάλαια of the Second Ἀντίθεσις

In the summary of Demosthenes' treatment of the second ἀντίθεσις, Ulpian calls his approach to persuading the Athenians to favour the use of the theorik money : <τὸ> μέρος περιεκτικὸν μέρος τοῦ δυνατοῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων (Dilts p.4.1-2). Thus D.1.16-20 concerns the ability of the Athenians to fund a campaign. Ulpian stresses finance and not the type of force.

In his detailed discussion we are told that Demosthenes begins with τὸ δυνατόν and this is divided into two topics, the τρόπος τῆς παρασκευῆς and the πόρος τῶν χρημάτων (Dilts p.10.20-23). This analysis is sound but

more complicated than the summary suggested. There is no mention of τὸ συμφέρον.

### Conclusion

Ulpian's analysis of D.1.16-20 is sound. However, there is no difficulty in understanding the *First Olynthiac* at this point. Ulpian demands technical knowledge from his audience. It is noticeable that his understanding of technical terms differs slightly from the understanding found among the *Rhetores Graeci*.

### The Third Ἀντίθεσις, D.1.21-23

Ulpian's discussion of the second ἀντίθεσις was much shorter than his discussion of the first. His comments on the third ἀντίθεσις are briefer still. The objection concerns τοῦ Φιλίππου τὸ δυνατόν. Demosthenes cannot deny that Philip is powerful, so he looks at each element of his power and argues that they are individually weak. He is faced with awkwardness, treachery and weakness (Dilts p.4.17-20). It is difficult to know what τοὺς refers to in this passage. Ulpian does not present the objection in the form of a question and the substance of it rests on the belief that Philip would be too strong for the Athenians to oppose successfully, (Dilts p.4.14-21).

The εἰσαγωγή of the objection is described as follows : ἐξ ἀντιθέσεως φανερώσ καὶ λαμπρῶς εἰσηγμένης (Dilts p.5.6-7). So the third objection is introduced in the form of an objection. Once Demosthenes takes it that the proposal for sending forces have met with acceptance and the sources of finance have been pointed out, he then points out the weaknesses in Philip's position (Dilts p.5.6-25) and indicates an objection with the words φήσκειέ τις ἂν ... . This practice of listing weaknesses is also attributed to Thoukydides and Isokrates in the summary (Dilts p.4.14-21), but Ulpian refrains from elaborating on the comparison of the writers in his detailed discussion (Dilts p.11.19-12.2). He states without referring to the text : προτέθεικε δὲ τὴν λύσιν τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ἢν ἐπεσημήνατο εὐθὺς προελθὼν ἐξ ἀναίρεσεως (Dilts p.11.20-21). The ἀναίρεσις is the answer to the preceding objection about finance. Demosthenes moves on to the next objection immediately, εὐθὺς προελθὼν. Instead of the normal order of an objection followed by the reply or answer, he chooses to place the answer first, προτέθεικε δὲ τὴν λύσιν τῆς ἀντιθέσεως. Ulpian's point is a good one. The usual order would be : someone says X but this is not so. Demosthenes takes a different line : someone would be wrong if they were to say X. He places the refutation before the objection.

Ulpian admires the treatment of the present answer (Dilts p.11.21-22). As he observes, Demosthenes avoids saying that Philip is not φοβερός but indicates instead areas of weakness in his position. The four aspects which Ulpian picks out correspond to Demosthenes' own case :

1. εἰς τὸν καιρὸν δι' ὃν ταραττεται (Dilts p.11.24-25), cf παρὰ γνώμην D.1.21, τὴν ἀκαιρίαν τὴν ἐκείνου καιρὸν ὑμέτερον νομίσαντας D.1.24, 2. εἰς Θετταλούς, τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ συμμάχους, ἀποστατικῶς ἔχοντας (Dilts p.11.25-26), cf τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν ... τούτῳ D.1.22, 3. εἰς ἀπορίαν χρημάτων δι' ἣν οὐχ ἔξει ξένους (Dilts p.11.26), cf ἤκουον δ' ... καταστήσεται D.1.22, 4. εἰς τοὺς ὑπηκόους Ἰλλυριοῦς καὶ Παίονας ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἐλευθερίας (Dilts p.11.26-27), cf ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν ...δούλους εἶναι D.1.23.

Ulpian then reminds us about what he has said about Demosthenes' practice of subdividing a topic : ὥσπερ καὶ προδιαροῦντες τὸν λόγον εἶπομεν (Dilts p.11.27-28). He is referring to (Dilts p.4.17-18) : κατὰ μέρος αὐτὴν (sc. δυναμιν) διελὼν καὶ κατακερματίσας πρὸς μέρος. He goes on to say : τὴν ἐντελεστέραν ἐργασίαν τοῦ κεφαλαίου πρὸς ὀλόκληρον φυλάξας ὑπόθεσιν (Dilts p.11.28-29). This appears to mean that Demosthenes has made an excellent job of defending his hypothesis by full exploitation of the κεφάλαιον, in this case τὸ δυνατόν. Demosthenes has achieved this while dividing up his subject into topics, and there is evident admiration on Ulpian's part, suggesting that such control is not easy.

A final remark on this section concerns the tone of a phrase in the *First Olynthiac* compared with the tone of the *Second Olynthiac* . In D.1.23 Demosthenes makes an aphoristic remark : διόπερ πολλάκις δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τὰγαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι, D.1.23. It is reasonable to detect a patronising tone in these words. They anticipate anyone who might object to the drift of Demosthenes' argument at this point (Dilts p.11.30-12.2). He thinks that Demosthenes is aiming his remarks at a particular type of person, κατα τῶν ἀνοήτων (Dilts p.11.31, p.12.1). In the *Second Olynthiac* , however, Demosthenes speaks in a general way about people who somehow acquire possessions. Unhelpfully, Ulpian does not cite the passage which he has in mind. His point is substantiated by D.2.10 and also D.2.9.

### Κεφάλαια of the Third Ἀντίθεσις

Ulpian does not discuss the κεφάλαια in the brief, detailed discussion of the objection, nor in the summary (Dilts p.4.14-21). In his account of the εἰσαγωγή (Dilts p.5.6-25), Ulpian examines them in detail. However,

what we find is not an account of the κεφάλαια in D.1.21-23 but a good summary of the κεφάλαια in the speech as a whole. This is an inappropriate location for it because he ought to be concentrating on the εἰσαγωγή.

We are told that the third objection is introduced by an objection (Dilts p.5.6-7). Then the digression begins : ἔστι τοίνυν τὰ ἀνωτάτω κεφάλαια τοῦ λόγου δύο, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.5.7-8). Ulpian then goes on to examine τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.5.8-20) and he says : κατασκευάζει δὲ διὰ μὲν τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ μήτε ἀλλότριον εἶναι τὸν πόλεμον μήτε ὑπὲρ μικρῶν (Dilts p.5.8-9). Although the war seems to be about the future of Thrace, in fact it is about Athens, the Athenians, honour and ambition. Demosthenes makes these points using negative as well as positive arguments. He also tries to make the Athenians envious of Philip and ashamed of having let him become so powerful when they have the gods on their side. This is an excellent summary of the points which Ulpian stresses about Demosthenes' approach.

τὸ δυνατόν is summarised at (Dilts p.5.21-25) and Ulpian says : τὸ δὲ δυνατόν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν ἐργασίαν ἔχει ' καὶ γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐξήτασε καὶ τὸ τῶν πολεμίων (Dilts p.5.19-20). It is notable that the two points which τὸ δυνατόν sustains are not the same as the points which τὸ συμφέρον sustains. The phrase ἐφ' ἑκάτερα leads us to expect that they will be. Ulpian changes the emphasis during his remarks about τὸ συμφέρον. He begins to stress emulation of Philip with the words : εἶτα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ζήλου τοῦ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ... (Dilts p.5.15). The relevance of the war is shown by arguments about the provision of troops and finance.

A small point to note is that Ulpian says that the troops and cavalry are agreed upon : ὁμολογουμένων μὲν ὀπλιτῶν, ὁμολογουμένων δὲ ἵππέων (Dilts p.5.21). Then realising, perhaps, that this is inaccurate he adds : διόπερ καὶ ὁ περὶ τούτων ὡς ὁμολογουμένων παρείληπται λόγος (Dilts p.5.23). Demosthenes argues as though the case for sending a force was agreed. There is no agreement about sending a force, let alone what sort.

Ulpian closes these remarks by returning to D.1.21-23 and noting that τὸ δυνατόν Φιλίππου is shown to be made up of several parts which are weak. Thus, the κεφάλαια of D.1.21-23 are analysed as part of an analysis of the whole speech and not in their own right.

### Conclusion

Ulpian's interpretation is accurate. However, this passage in the *First Olynthiac* is straightforward and easy to understand. The discussion is brief and perhaps lack of time prevented Ulpian from elaborating on some of his points, in particular the comparisons of this passage with others. Their inclusion would have aided clarity.

## The Ἐπιλόγοι. D.1.24-28

Ulpius regards δέϊ τοίνυν, D.1.24, as the place where the ἐπίλογος, or rather ἐπιλόγοι begin, (Dilts p.12.3). Among the Rhetores Graeci there is disagreement about the form and number of ἐπιλόγοι. Some specifications do emerge<sup>(32)</sup>. An ἐπίλογος ought to be concise and usually follows the ἀπόδειξις<sup>(33)</sup>. It has three functions. Firstly, it should summarise what has been said. Secondly, it should arouse pity, ἔλεος, for the appropriate party. Thirdly, it ought to exaggerate the case in favour of the speaker and, perhaps, diminish the worth of the opponent's case. These aims are termed αὐξήσις and ταπεινώσις respectively. Aristotle notes that a fourth aim of the ἐπίλογος is for the speaker to endear himself to the audience. In D.1.24-28 these requirements are satisfied. In D.1.24 we find concision in the form of a list. The closing lines are emotive, though perhaps they do not arouse pity. Pity is more appropriate to forensic speeches. The uselessness of looking to the Thessalians and Phokians, D.1.25, and the remarks about shame and the extent of the losses in D.1.27 fulfil the requirements of αὐξήσις. Ulpius states specifically with reference to this section : βουλόμενος αὐξῆσαι δίχα διήρηκεν (Dilts p.12.23). His view that δέϊ τοίνυν , D.1.24, marks the beginning of the ἐπιλόγοι is tenable.

Ulpius's use of the plural ἐπιλόγοι is notable. He clearly believes that there could be more than one ἐπίλογος. In his opinion D.1.24-28 contribute towards the epilogue. There is consensus among the scholia at this point that only D.1.28 or D.1.27-28 form the epilogue : (181), (187a), (187b), (187c) and (187d). Ulpius divides the epilogue section in two, examining a structure based on two κεφάλαια and the respective subdivision of each.

### κεφάλαια in D.1.24-28

Ulpius shows perception and accuracy in his examination of the κεφάλαια in the epilogue, even if his account is not straightforward. He divides the ἐπιλόγοι in two. One part concerns τὸ δυνατόν, the other τὸ συμφέρον. He picks out five aspects which illustrate τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.12.6-10) : καὶ τὸ μὲν δυνατόν

1. ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ κατασκευάζει, 2. ἀπὸ πρεσβείας ... , 3. ἀπὸ στρατιᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξόδου, 4. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀτόπου ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ γνώμης ... , 5. ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης, τῶν ἐκβάτων ἄν.

The style of presentation is reminiscent of that sometimes found among the *Rhetores Graeci*<sup>(34)</sup>. These points which he has listed are substantiated in the text of the speech at D.1.24. Since they concern Athens' ability to take the field, he thinks that Demosthenes is arguing about τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.12.6-10).

Ulpian says that τὸ συμφέρον is divided in two. Demosthenes compares two possible scenarios for the conduct of the war, a) τοῦ τε ἐπὶ Θράκης (Dilts p.12.11) and b) < καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς > (Dilts app.crit.p.12.11-12). Wolfs' emendation must be correct because there is nothing to correspond to τε. He is referring to D.1.25-27. Ulpian then digresses and refutes an alternative interpretation of this section (Dilts p.12.15-17), which we will come to presently. He clarifies his own interpretation of the ἐπιλόγοι : ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν κατεσκεύασε προσήκειν τῇ πόλει τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ διὰ τοῦ δευτέρου < παρέστησεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν > ἂν ἔλθῃν τὸν Φίλιππον λαβόντα τὴν Ὀλυνθον, εἰκότως κἀνταῦθα ἐπιλογιζόμενος τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμνήσθη (Dilts p.12.17-20). ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν refers to the main body of the speech. He picks out two important aspects of τὸ συμφέρον, προσηκει πόλει and the inevitability of Philip's attack which Demosthenes has discussed there. In the ἐπιλόγοι D.1.25-27 is the part which deals with το συμφερον, and we are reminded of the two important points. What some regard as an objection Ulpian regards as the ἔννοια ἐπιλογικῆ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου (Dilts p.12.17).

Ulpian adds that Demosthenes wishes to stress what the Athenians will suffer should the war come to Attica (Dilts p.12.22-23) and this is divided in two : εἰς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον (Dilts p.12.24). The former refers to the demands produced by an Athenian army in the field and the latter refers to the havoc caused by the enemy if they fight on Athenian soil (Dilts p.12.25-29). This is a good analysis of D.1.25-27, for although Demosthenes mentions the war in Thrace he concentrates on the consequences of war in Attica. Demosthenes ends the speech with a plea to everyone to take their place in the campaign.

### Alternative Interpretation of D.1.24-28

Ulpian is at variance with another school of thought over the interpretation of the closing sections of the speech. The repudiated interpretation is attributed to Zeno. Ulpian states in remarks referring to D.1.25 : οὗ γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀντίθεσιν δεῖ τὴν ἔννοιαν τὴν ἀπὸ γνώμης τοῦ Φιλίππου, ὡς περὶ δὲ Ζήνωνος εὐήθως ὑπέιληφεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ ἔννοια ἐπιλογικῆ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου (Dilts p.12.15-17). Therefore Zeno thought that D.1.25-27 formed an answer to an objection. Ulpian believes that this is naive. He does not tell us what the supposed objection is. The speech itself gives us both the objection and the answer with the words : τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει

δεῦρο βαδίζειν ; ... ἀλλ', ὧ τᾶν, οὐχὶ βουλήσεται, D.1.26. Ulpian is rejecting an obvious interpretation of the text.

We may presume that Zeno was among those who contended that the ἐπίλογος did not come until D.1.28. It is unfortunate that Ulpian does not give any reason to show how Zeno's view is misguided. The objection in D.1.26 is incidental to the flow of the passage and Demosthenes does not dwell on the objection at length. Ulpian's interpretation has the advantage that these brief comments are fitted into a structure which covers D.1.24-26 as a whole.

### Closing Remarks on the *First Olynthiac*

Ulpian's final remarks are peculiar (Dilts p.13.1-6). We might have expected a rounded assessment of the speech, underlining the most important aspects of his interpretation. Instead, the *prolegomena* end abruptly. He says : ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν μεταχείρισιν θεωρεῖν καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν (Dilts p.13.1). The justification of this comment is based on the definitions of συμβουλή, προτροπή and παράνεσις. The differences between them are not related to the text properly. He suggests that the speech is a combination of συμβουλή and προτροπή. This is a fair comment, albeit a generalisation. The introduction of παράνεσις at the end is unexpected. It may be significant that παράνεσις is given no definite article, whereas the definite article is given to both συμβουλή and προτροπή. Possibly this indicates that the phrase is someone's marginal note which has been added to the text by mistake.

The abrupt ending may be explained if we assume that the *prolegomena* form a lecture. Alternatively, the remainder of the *prolegomena* may have been lost. This explanation assumes that the codices which offer the *prolegomena* offer versions derived from a single, damaged archetype. However, it may be that in Ulpian's day a rounded analysis was not expected.

### Conclusion About Rhetorical Analysis

Ulpian gives a plausible and thorough account of his rhetorical analysis of the *First Olynthiac*. He looks for an underlying structure and finds one which emanates from the text itself and is not imposed rigidly upon it. The development according to objections allows greater flexibility for the speaker. Zeno and the others appear to judge a remark within a narrow context. A virtue of Ulpian's approach is his ability to look beyond the immediate context of a remark and relate it to the underlying structure.

His identification and justification of the three objections is plausible. However, in the case of the first objection, which deals with

the relevance of the war, some of his comments have been found to be the result of a thorough acquaintance with the speech and would not strike the audience the first time they heard the speech. Nevertheless, his belief that D.1.2-15 deals with the relevance of the war is persuasive, even if one or two of his arguments are unsound. His identification of the other two objections about the source of finance in D.1.16-20 and about Philip's power in D.1.21-23 raises no problems. His intolerance of alternative interpretations is unfair since they too offer plausible accounts. His treatment of the κεφάλαια is also convincing, although he has occasionally become confused.

### CONFUSIONS IN ULPIAN'S EXPOSITION

Ulpian sometimes befuddles his account by allowing himself a lax style. He is particularly prone to confused repetition. Good examples concern κεφάλαια. When he is talking about the κεφάλαια in D.1.2-7 (Dilts p.7.4-8.31) he seems to realise that he is contradicting himself and endeavours to explain himself<sup>(35)</sup>. Another example is the unexpected inclusion of τὸ δίκαιον among the main κεφάλαια in this speech at D.1.8-15 (Dilts p.9.13-14, 22)<sup>(36)</sup>.

Another confusion occurs between (Dilts p.4.29) and (Dilts p.8.30-9.4). In the former passage Ulpian is commenting on the phrase νυνὶ γὰρ ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ..., D.1.7. He says that Demosthenes is using these words ὥσπερ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἀντιθέσεως. In the second passage Ulpian states quite clearly that this phrase ἐστὶν ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀντιθέσεως. Both ἀναίρεσις and λύσις imply that the objection has been answered. Therefore it is misleading of Ulpian to say ὥσπερ ἀναίρεσιν, as though Demosthenes' words were not in fact the answer to the objection, and then to continue by saying that these words do form the answer. From the vehemence with which the second passage is expressed we may assume that Ulpian's true opinion is found there.

Ulpian twice dismisses the view that Demosthenes is endeavouring to answer the objection ἀλλ' ἀπιστοὶ οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι in (Dilts p.8.3sq) and (Dilts p.8.20sq). The second refutation follows soon after the first. Although the passages are not incompatible, an explanation is required to account for the repetition. After the first refutation, Ulpian goes on to give his understanding of the reason why an embassy was to be sent. He believes that Demosthenes is trying to prove that the Olynthians will not be deceived by Philip, whose efforts will be in vain. Ulpian draws a comparison with Thucydides (Dilts p.8.14). Perhaps he has been so carried away with his parallel example that he feels he must recapitulate in order to remind himself or his audience where he is in his discussion. Although Ulpian has not lost control of his material, he is less decisive than we should prefer.

Repetitions are a feature of his style. The following provide useful examples : the reference to hegemony of Greece, (Dilts p.3.6-7) and (Dilts p.3.15-16) ; Demosthenes' approach in D.1.2-7 (Dilts p.6.14-35) (37) ; the combined use of praise and fear, (Dilts p.7.21-22) and (Dilts p.7.26-27).

## COMPARABLE PASSAGES

Ulpian compares the *First Olynthiac* several times with other speeches and other works. The authors involved are Thucydides, Isocrates, Homer and Demosthenes himself.

Ulpian opens the *prolegomena* with a comparison between the attitude adopted by Demosthenes towards his audience and the speakers in Thucydides 3.9-14 and 1.32-36. He says : ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν προσώπων, οἷς συνίστασθαι βούλεται, φανερώς ἐνδείκνυται ποιούμενος ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀκροατῶν (Dilts p.1.12-14). In a summary of the two passages which he has selected for comparison he adds : ὁ μὲν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καταφεύγων διὰ συμμαχίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀφιστάμενος πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν τοσούτον δοκοῦσι ποιῆσθαι τοὺς λόγους ὅσον ὑπὲρ τοῦ συμφέροντος τῶν ἀκροωμένων (Dilts p.1.14-18). In Thucydides, 3.9-14, the Lesbians follow a long justification of their secession from the Athenians with two sections, 13 and 14, which concentrate on the benefit of the Lesbian's action to the Spartans. Demosthenes makes it clear in the προοίμιον that he is going to discuss the benefits of participation for the Athenians, even though he is giving advice which will help the Olynthians. Ulpian's parallel is valid. In Thucydides 1.32-36 the Korkyrans claim : πολλὰ δέ ... τὰ συμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, 1.35.5. This is also a true parallel since both the Korkyrans and Demosthenes are concerned primarily with τὸ συμφέρον.

Ulpian cites Thucydides 1.68-71 in reference to D.1.2-8 (Dilts p.3.19-24). In this section of the *prolegomena* Ulpian is discovering the answer to the objection ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. He believes that he has found two arguments in Demosthenes which he also finds in Thucydides. The first is : εἰ μέλει τῇ πόλει τοῦ προεστάναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ καιρὸς ὃ διδοῦσιν ἄλλοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῇ πόλει (Dilts p.3.15-16). The second is : συνιστὰς ἐξήκοντα ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν Φίλιππον, εἰ μὴ Ὀλύθιοι σώζονται (Dilts p.3.17-18). This argument uses fear to increase conviction

In Thucydides' speech we find points where parallels may be drawn with the *First Olynthiac* : Athenian policy is systematic, 1.68.3 ; the Spartans themselves are responsible for this situation, 1.69.1 ; the Spartans were known as liberators of Greece, 1.69.1 ; Athenian methods are systematic, 1.69.3 ; there is vulnerability in Athenian ranks, 1.69.5 ; the Athenians are incapable of remaining inactive, 1.70.9.

Demosthenes implies that Philip's approach is systematic, D.1.12-15; he holds the Athenians responsible for the situation in which they find themselves, D.1.8-9 ; he implies that Athens is the only force capable of putting a stop to Philip, D.1.8-9 ; Philip is not as invulnerable as he seems, D.1.23-24 ; Philip is incapable of remaining inactive, D.1.23-26. The purpose of the *First Olynthiac* is to goad the Athenians into action. The same is true for the Spartans in Thoukydides' speech. In so doing, weaknesses in character of the audience and their actions are criticised and they are held responsible for their present difficulties. The aggressors, Philip and the Athenians, are portrayed as dynamic and worthy of emulation in their respective speeches.

There is a further reference to Thoukydides 1.68-71 when Ulpian examines D.1.2-8 in detail. The similarity is outlined as follows : ἐν οἷσ γὰρ ἐπιτιμᾶ, ἐν τούτοις ἐπαινεῖ πάλιν καὶ παραμίγνυσι ταῖς μέμφεσι τὸ ἐγκώμιον καὶ φοβεῖ καὶ προτρέπει καὶ ἐπαινεῖ καὶ μέμφεται, διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν δημηγορίαν προτάσσω (Dilts p.7.24-27). Thoukydides contrasts the personalities and methods of the Spartans and the Athenians. He reveals that the latter have a restless efficiency which encourages success, whereas the Spartans are criticised for hesitancy. They are advised that if they emulate the Athenians and become involved, then the threat of Athens will diminish.

In the *First Olynthiac* , D.1.2-8, Philip is praised for his attitude and the Athenians are encouraged to follow his example. Athenian indolence is held responsible for the present plight, D.1.9-11, and it is suggested that their participation would halt Philip. Weaknesses are shown in Philip's apparent strength, D.1.23-24. Ulpian's comparison is a good one. The passage is mentioned again in (Dilts p.9.21) where Ulpian is summarising D.1.2-11.

Ulpian returns to Thoukydides 1.68-71. When discussing D.1.12-13, he refers to 1.69.3 : φοβεῖ γὰρ καὶ δείκνυσιν οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων κινδυνεύσοντασ καὶ ὅτι ὀδῶ πρόεισιν ὁ Φίλιππος, ὡς περ καὶ Θουκυδίδης πεποίηκεν ἐν τῇ δημηγορίᾳ τῶν Κορινθίων (Dilts p.9.32-10.3). The parallel is sound. His quotation from Thoukydides is in fact a paraphrase : καὶ ἴσμεν οἷα ὀδῶ χωροῦσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλασ (Dilts p.10.3-4). Thoukydides says : καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οἷα ὀδῶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ' ὀλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλασ, 1.69.3. It appears that Ulpian did not have a text of Thoukydides before him and is quoting from memory.

In the course of his rejection of the ἄπιστοι interpretation, Ulpian refers to Thoukydides 1.35.5. He puts his case as follows : ὅπερ πεποίηκε καὶ ὁ Κερκυραῖος παρ' Ἀθηναίοισ δημηγορῶν, ἐν οἷσ φησιν "ὅτι οἱ αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν, ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις, καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἄσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἱκανοὶ τοὺσ μεταστάντασ βλάφαι " ἃ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τὸν Κερκυραῖον λέγοντα ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ, τὰντα αὐτοσ ὁ Δημοσθένης ὑπὲρ Ὀλυνθίων λέγει, συνιστασ μὴ ἂν ἔτι τὴν

τοῦ Φιλίππου πανουργίαν ἰσχύσειν πρεσβευσαμένησ τῆσ πόλεωσ (Dilts p.8.14-21) The quotation from Thoukydides is almost exact. Even though both Demosthenes and Thoukydides argue that there is a common enemy, the conclusion which Ulpian draws still begs the question of Olynthian reliability<sup>(38)</sup>.

There are two extremely brief references to Thoukydides' Σικελικαὶ δημηγορίαι and Isokrates' *Panegyrikos* (Dilts p.4.16). These come during a summary of the third objection. There are four speeches in Thoukydides Book 7, but there is no similarity between them and the *First Olynthiac*. In Book 6 there are eight speeches. Two of these bear a marked resemblance to the *First Olynthiac*. The second speech of Nikias, 6.20-23, which is delivered in light of Athenian favour for an expedition, reveals similar methods to those which Demosthenes employs, D.1.16-18. Thoukydides remarks at 6.24.1 : ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα εἶπε, νομίζων τοὺσ Ἀθηναίους τῶ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ἀποτρέφειν ἢ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μάλιστα οὕτωσ ἀσφαλῶσ ἐκπλεῦσαι. This passage is relevant to Ulpian's interpretation of the second objection and, in particular, his view that Demosthenes deliberately exaggerates the size of the force required (Dilts p.4.9-13, p.10.26-29). It is not relevant to the third objection about Philip's power. The role and argument of Hermokrates before the Syrakusans offer a better parallel for Demosthenes' treatment of the third objection. Both Hermokrates, 6.35.2, and Demosthenes hold a minority opinion.

The former uses the following elements in his argument ; certainty that the Athenians will invade, 6.33.2-3 ; likelihood of Sikilian success, 6.33.4 ; Athenian success in the past was due to the failure of others, 6.33.5 ; the necessity of sending ambassadors to invite alliances, 6.34.1 ; a prompt confrontation would cause the Athenians to think twice, 6.34.4 ; problems which the Athenians face in pursuing a campaign, 6.34.5-7 ; the past record of the Syrakusans has encouraged the Athenians to believe that that victory is easy , so they will not expect prompt action, 6.34.8.

In the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes implies that the invasion is certain, D.1.12-14, 26 ; Athens will be successful if only she participates in the war, D.1.8-10; Philip's success in the past is not the result of his own ability, D.1.8-10, 23 ; embassies should be sent to make alliances, D.1.2, 24 ; a prompt confrontation by Athens would cause Philip to think twice, D.1.24 ; Philip faces problems in maintaining supplies, D.1.22 ; Athenian behaviour in the past has encouraged Philip, so he will not be expecting a prompt response this time, D.1.8-9, 21. Demosthenes may be borrowing ideas from Thoukydides, as Ulpian says : κατακερματίσασ πρὸσ μέρος (Dilts p.4.18). However, there may have been a standard approach for persuading a weak force to face a stronger one.

Ulpian's reference to the *Panegyrikos* is also justified. We find there reversal of fortune, the rise of the opposition and the

responsibility given to the Athenians themselves, *Paneg.* 120, 137. In the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes holds the Athenians responsible for their present situation, D.1.8-15. However, Ulpian is not comparing the *Panegyrikos* with this section of the *First Olynthiac*. Other points which are made in the *Panegyrikos* are as follows; the King of Persia is powerful but not without problems, and an interpretation which suggests otherwise is dismissed, *Paneg.* 138-139; trouble spots for the king, *Paneg.* 140-142; examples of those who have fought and won, and examples of those who capitulated and suffered, *Paneg.* 154; victory for the Athenians is assured if only they take part, *Paneg.* 162.

In the *First Olynthiac* the reason for Philip's power is attributed to the indolence of the Athenians and so the responsibility is theirs, D.1.8-15; Philip's problems are examined and trouble spots are listed, D.1.21-24; examples of those who capitulated and suffered are given, D.1.5-6.

There is a possible verbal parallel between *Paneg.* 160 and D.1.2. In the former Isokrates says: ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ πολλὰ λίαν εἶναι τὰ παρακελεύόμενα πολεμῆν αὐτοῖς, μάλιστα δ' ὁ παρῶν καιρός, οὗ σαφέστερον<sup>οὐδέν</sup> ὄν οὐκ ἀφετέον. This is similar to Demosthenes' words: ὁ μὲν οὖν παρῶν καιρός, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφείσθαι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῶν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν ... . Another parallel occurs between *Paneg.* 184 and D.1.5. Isokrates says: οὐκ ἐπὶ τοὺς καὶ φύσει πολεμίους καὶ πατρικούς ἐχθρούς. Demosthenes says: ἀλλ' ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ... ἀπίστον, οἴμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τυραννίς. The similarity is in ideas rather than in the words used. A straightforward resemblance concerns the listing of participants and the expectation that the audience, in both cases the Athenians, should take part themselves, *Paneg.* 185 and D.1.2, 28. We may safely assume that Demosthenes knew the *Panegyrikos* and so, the similarity may be more than coincidental<sup>(39)</sup>. Ulpian has good reason to draw a parallel between these two speeches. He does not, however, make much of the similarities<sup>(40)</sup>.

A further comparison may be made with the *Second Olynthiac*, D.2.18-19. Here the lifestyle of the Makedonians is attacked as degenerate, and it is suggested that this renders them ineffectual. This is precisely Isokrates' point concerning the Persians, *Paneg.* 145-147, 150, 152.

Ulpian cites two consecutive passages from Homer *Iliad* Book 2 (Dilts p.2.15). In lines 284-332 Odysseus is exhorting unwilling Akhaians to listen to the messages sent to them by the gods which promise success. His plea is that they should take the present opportunity. In lines 337-368 Nestor addresses the same audience. He reminds them of the promises which they made to the Atreidai. The parallel is sound. In D.1.7 Demosthenes reminds his audience of their

fervent support in the past. He makes no mention of promises. It is Ulpian who makes this inference (Dilts p.2.20-21). He also compares D.1.10 with these lines. Both passages mention god-sent opportunities. The *Iliad* stresses oracular communication but the role of the gods in both is similar.

Ulpian notes that it is Demosthenic practice to commence as though his premise were agreed, whereas he has yet to prove it. He draws a parallel with D.18.5-7 (Dilts p.6.1). He says of the προίμιον of the *First Olynthiac* : ὡς γὰρ ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ ὅτι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος, οὕτω τὸν περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ποιεῖται λόγον (Dilts p.5.30-31) About D.18.5-7 he says : μηδέπω γὰρ συστήσασ πότερον αὐτὸν ἢ Κτησιφῶντα ἀπολογήσασθαι δεῖ, συναρπάσασ τοῦτο ὡς ὁμολογούμενον ἀξιοῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ καθ' ἣν βούλεται τάξιν προάγειν τὸν λόγον (Dilts p.6.1-4). In D.18.1-4 Demosthenes asks the jury to revere the gods. He promises that what he is about to say will be unpleasant but that his motives are honourable. He asks them to treat each speaker according to his worth. In D.18.5-7 he flatters his audience. He claims that his defence is just and trusts that they will obey the laws and give him an equitable hearing. It would seem that the similarity lies with the inference that Demosthenes' case is true and will be seen to be so. The duty and ability of the jury are stressed. In both speeches Demosthenes is trying to influence their opinion before he starts his argument. By encouraging others to speak Demosthenes shows fair play and magnanimity.

Ulpian believes that these passages are similar because Demosthenes is requesting approval for the order of arguments within his speech (τάξις). This is the case in D.18. Demosthenes remarks that the jury had to swear oaths to the effect that they would give both parties a fair hearing because the prosecution had the advantage of speaking first. The prosecutor could arrange his topics as he thought fit and the defence was obliged to follow. Demosthenes seems to be declaring that he is not taking his cue from Aiskhines. The *First Olynthiac* is not a forensic speech and Demosthenes makes no request for their indulgence towards the τάξις. Such similarity as there is, is probably nothing more than a standard method of introduction. One function of the προίμιον was to win over the audience.

Ulpian notes that Demosthenes is making the point in D.1.21 that lasting success is built upon good foundations, and so Philip's success is temporary. Demosthenes is thought to be aiming his comments at a particular group, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνοήτων (Dilts p.11.31, cf p.12.1), and that he qualifies his generalisation by adding πολλάκις and δοκεῖ (Dilts p.12.2). Ulpian compares this with the *Second Olynthiac* where he claims : καθολικώτερον εἴρηται καὶ ἀποφαντικώτερον (Dilts p.11.33). Unfortunately he does not pick out the passage he has in mind. However, D.2.9 and especially D.2.10 are suitable passages and the comparison is sound.

## Conclusion

The passages which Ulpian has quoted do share ideas with the *First Olynthiac*. The quotations are not always exact. It may be that Ulpian is working from memory. It is notable that he does not make any distinction in genre. The speeches of historians and poets are as useful as the "authentic" speeches of the orators. In two cases, where he refers to D.18 and Thucydides 1.35.5, there are similarities with the *First Olynthiac* but not those stated by Ulpian and are, therefore, inappropriate as they stand. The parallels may or may not have been first observed by Ulpian. It is reasonable to suppose, judging by the detail which is included in Ulpian's idiosyncratic arguments, that they are original to Ulpian, even if the passages were compared by other scholars.

### PARALLELS BETWEEN THE RHETORES GRAECI AND THE *ULPIANI PROLEGOMENA*

The interests of the *Rhetores Graeci* are varied. There are a few passages where the *First Olynthiac* is cited to illustrate their point. Many of these are concerned with σχήματα but there are some which bear comparison with Ulpian's remarks in the *prolegomena*.

One important passage is found in Apsines and it appears to lend support to the ἀπίστοι interpretation which Ulpian rejects. Apsines is also a figure of the third century A.D.<sup>(41)</sup>. In reference to D.1.5-6 Apsines explains : ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ μὴ θέντες ἀντίθεσιν τὰς λύσεις αὐτῆς τίθεμεν. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἢ πάνυ βαρύνῃ ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀντίθεσις ἐκ προφανοῦς τεθεῖσα καὶ δέῃ αὐτὴν προανελεῖν λεληθότως, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθιακῶν πεποιήκεν ὁ Δημοσθένης. τίς γὰρ ἦν πάνυ βαρύνουσα αὐτὸν ἀντίθεσις ; ὅτι ἀπίστοι ἡμῖν Ὀλύνθιοι. τοῦτο τοίνυν μὴ θεῖς ἐκ προφανοῦς λέλυκε λεληθότως "πρὸς δὲ τὰς καταλλαγὰς, ἃς ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσαιτ' ἄσμενος πρὸς Ὀλυνθίουσ, ἐναντίως ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τύραννος Φίλιππος καὶ ὄλεθρος φύσει τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις, καὶ ὑπὲρ μεγάλων Ὀλυνθίοισ ὁ κίνδυνος, εἰ πεισθήσονται." καὶ ἐκ παραδείγματος "καὶ ἴσασι, ἃ τε Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε." ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐστὶ συστατικὰ τοῦ πιστοῦσ μὲν ἡμῖν μένειν, ἀπίστουσ δὲ τῷ Φιλίππῳ. ὄρα, πῶσ μὴ θεῖς τὴν ἀντίθεσιν τὰς λύσεις αὐτῆς τέθεικεν (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.264.19-265.10). The importance of this passage lies in the sensible and valid case which it presents in favour of the interpretation that Demosthenes is answering an objection in D.1.2-7 about the reliability of the Olynthians. Ulpian is dismissive of those who do hold to this interpretation. His use of θρυλοῦν implies that it is ridiculous to do so (Dilts p.8.3-4, 20-21). Apsines reveals that a near contemporary of Ulpian had a valid case. Ulpian's reaction to this alternative interpretation betrays intolerance and arrogance.

Hermogenes shows an interest in the προοίμιον of the *First Olynthiac*. He says : ἐν δὲ τοῖς Οὐλυθιακοῖς Δημοσθενῆς τῷ πρῶτῳ λόγῳ, χρώμενος κοινῶ διανοήματι, τῷ ἀντὶ πολλῶν χρημάτων αὐτοῦς αἰρησεσθαι τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον οὐ χρήται τῆ ὁμολογίᾳ τῆς κοινότητος, διότι πανουργῶν χρήται, καὶ παραλείπει τὴν ὁμολογίαν. προκατασκευάζει δὲ διὰ τοῦ προοιμίου τὰ θεωρικὰ χρήματα δεῖν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς στρατιώταις ... κοινῶ χρησαμενος διανοήματι καὶ λαθῶν ὁμολογῶντας ὕστερον αὐτοῦς ἀναμιμνήσκει ἀρνεῖσθαι, αἰσχυνομένουσ περὶ τῶν θεωρικῶν χρημάτων ... ἔθος δὲ Δημοσθένους ἔστιν ὅταν τι διοικήσῃται ἑαυτῷ χρήσιμον, μὴ πρότερον ἀφιστασθαι, πρὶν ἢ ἐπισφραγίσῃται (Rabe p.446.11-25)<sup>(42)</sup>. There is common ground here with Ulpian (Dilts p.5.26-6.13) because they share an interest in τὸ συμφέρον ; the προοίμιον is a forewarning (προκατασκευή) of the question of the theorika ; Demosthenes' practice in τάξις is considered ; both assume that Demosthenes proceeds as though his opening remarks had met with approval, although he has yet to justify them. Perhaps Ulpian had been educated in the tradition of Hermogenes, but it is also possible that they reached these conclusions independently of one another.

John the Sikeliot makes a similar comment about an allusion to the theorika in D.1.1 (Walz 6 p.193. 28sqg). Since he is a writer of the eleventh century A.D., he is likely to have been influenced by one of the earlier writers<sup>(43)</sup>. The same may be said about the twelfth-century writer Gregory of Korinth (Walz 7.2 p.1317.7-1318.9) <sup>(44)</sup> .

The *Scholia ad Aphthonium* examine D.1.25-26 where Demosthenes lists the terrible results of Athenian failure to halt Philip : τὸ δὲ συμφέρον διττῶς κατασκευάσομεν ' τί ποιῶσιν ἡμῖν καὶ τί μὴ ποιῶσι συμβήσεται ' στοχαστικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐργασία' τετραχῶς γίνεταί ἡ τοῦ χρησίμου καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἐξέτασις, τί συμβήσεται γινομένου τοῦ πράγματος, τετραχῆ διαιρετεον ' ἐροῦμεν γὰρ, εἰ τόδε τι ποιήσομεν τυχόν, εἰ ἐλοίμεθα τόδε, περὶ οὗ ἡ βουλὴ, οἷον συμμαχεῖσαι εἰ τύχη Ὀλυθίοις, τὰ ὄντα ἀγαθὰ παραμενεῖ, ἐλευθερία, ἀσφάλεια, καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα προσγενήσεται, δόξα, σύμμαχοι, χρημάτων πρόσοδοι, τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμονία ' καὶ πάλιν ἂν τύχη κακῶς ἡ πόλις πράξασα, ἐκ τῆς τῶν καλῶν ἀπαλλάξεωσ τὸ συνοῖσον κατασκευάσομεν ' λέγοντες, ὅτι τόδε ποιῶντες τὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων μὲν ἀδοξίαν ἀποτριψόμεθα, χρημάτων ἔνδειαν, συμμαχῶν ἀπορίαν, ἐχθρῶν ἰσχὺν, φαῦλον δὲ οὐδὲν εἰς τὸ μέλλον κτήσομεθα ' τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα οὐ προσέεται, οἷον ἀπὸ ἐχθρῶν ἠττηθῆναι, συμμαχῶν ἀπορηῖσαι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἐναντία καλοῦνται τὰ καὶ ἀντίθετα καλούμενα, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου παραδείγματος ' ναι φήσιν, ἀλλὰ χαλεπωτέραν ἔξει τιμωρίαν παραχρῆμα πεσῶν ' ἐναντία δὲ εἴρηται, ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ κατηγοροῦντι φέρονται (Walz 2 p.679.17).

Ulpian offers an analysis which is broadly similar (Dilts p.12.3-31)<sup>(45)</sup>. Both believe that τὸ συμφέρον is divided in two (Dilts p.2.10-11). However, this is an obvious interpretation of Demosthenes

here. Ulpian subdivides one aspect of τὸ συμφέρον in two again (Dilts p.12.22-23), whereas the author of the scholia on Aphthonios divides the passage into four, each part examining a different scenario.

Markellinos<sup>(46)</sup> compares Demosthenes with Thukydidēs. He compares D.1.25 with the Korkyran speech, 1.32-36, making some general remarks about the similarity in their public speeches (Walz 4 p.759sqq). While Ulpian does not make this particular comparison, he does agree over the general similarities and admires the technique of both authors. A further investigation of other Demosthenic speeches which Markellinos cites as parallels might give some indication of the originality of his comments.

Syrianos<sup>(47)</sup> offers a peculiar echo of Ulpian : διαφέρει δὲ συμβουλή προτροπῆς, ὅνπερ τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος – ὅλον μὲν γὰρ τι ἢ συμβουλή, μέρος δὲ ἢ προτροπή – καὶ τῶ τὸ μὲν περιέχειν, τὸ δὲ περιεχέσθαι. ἔτι διαφέρει παραίνεσις συμβουλήσ τῶ τὴν μὲν συμβουλήν περὶ ἐνοῦσ γίνεσθαι πράγματος, τὴν δὲ παραίνεσιν περὶ πλειόνων, καὶ τῶ τὴν μὲν συμβουλήν πρὸς πράξιν τινα τῶν ἔξωθεν γίνεσθαι - πότερον ἄξιον ἔστι τόδε < τι > πράττειν ἢ μὴ - τὴν δὲ παραίνεσιν πρὸς ἥθουσ εὐρυθμίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ τῶ τὴν μὲν παραίνεσιν πρὸς ἕνα γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ συμβουλήν πρὸς πολλούσ, καὶ ἢ μὲν συμβουλή ἀντιλογία ἐπιδέχεται, οἷον "χρὴ βοηθεῖν Ὀλυνθίοισ". ἢ δὲ παραίνεσις οὐ, οἷον "χρὴ τὸ θεῖον σέβειν γονεῖσ τιμᾶν", (Rabe vol.II p.192.1-14). According to Syrianos, συμβουλή is advice concerning the event in question as a whole. προτροπή is a piece of advice relating to an element of the event. παραίνεσις is a truism or general piece of advice. Ulpian expresses similar definitions in different words : ἢ μὲν συμβουλή λόγος ἔστιν ὑποθετικὸς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ δὲ προτροπή λόγος προάγων ἐφ' ὁμολογουμένασ τὰσ πράξεισ, παραίνεσις δὲ λόγος ὑποθετικὸς καὶ περιεκτικὸς τοῦ τρόπου τῶν πράξεων (Dilts p.13.4-6). The peculiar addition of παραίνεσις has been mentioned before<sup>(48)</sup>. Someone acquainted with the passage in Syrianos may have added the definition of παραίνεσις as a marginal note, which was later included in the text of the *prolegomena*. This combination of words is distinctive given the context in which they are found. They do not seem to occur anywhere else among the *Rhetores Graeci* although there are parallels in the scholia<sup>(49)</sup>. There may have been a source common to Syrianos and Ulpian or the relationship may be closer.

The closest similarities occur between Syrianos and the *prolegomena* and the *Scholia ad Aphthonium* and the *prolegomena*. Apsines provides evidence that alternative interpretations were offered at the time of Ulpian. A common educational background probably explains the similarity in approach and ideas.

## HISTORICAL INFORMATION IN THE *PROLEGOMENA*

Ulpian takes no interest in historical information. Places or events are only mentioned if they have had an effect on Demosthenes' treatment of his argument. For example, Ulpian gives us no background information about Pydna and Amphipolis which Demosthenes refers to in D.1.4-5. Ulpian's discussion (Dilts p.7.22-23) makes it clear that he regards these places, which he does not refer to by name, as elements in Demosthenes' argument, and sees their value in terms of fear and expediency.

Another example is the allusion to Euboia in D.1.8. Ulpian praises the choice of example and comments on the ideas present within it (Dilts p.9.11-13). He does not, however, give us an account of the campaign. Ulpian seems to reveal some background knowledge on one point, since Demosthenes makes no remark to the effect that the Euboians were οὐκ οἰκείοι οὐδὲ συμμάχοι (cf Dilts p.9.6). It is possible that Ulpian is reading this conclusion into Demosthenes' non-committal remarks.

Towards the end, Ulpian comments on the cities which Philip has captured : τοῦ Χαλκιδικοῦ γὰρ ἀπολωλότος γένουσι καὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πόλεων ἡρημένων, τίνες ἔσονται λοιπὸν ἐμποδῶν (Dilts p.12.20-22). The source for this remark is surely the *Third Philippic* : Ὀλυνθον μὲν δὴ καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Ἀπολωνίαν καὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ Θράκης ἔω, ἅς ἅπασα οὕτως ὠμῶς ἀνήρηκεν ὥστε μηδ' εἰ πάποτ' ὠκλήθησαν προσελθόντ' εἶναι ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν, D.9.26<sup>(50)</sup>.

When we come to consider his reflections on Euboulos and finance, it seems more likely that Ulpian was using his knowledge of the Demosthenic corpus in forming his observations about the *First Olynthiac* itself. He is sure that Demosthenes' concern about finance and his tact when discussing τὰ στρατιωτικά, D.1.19-20, allude to Euboulos and τὰ θεωρικά (Dilts p.11.5-12). This is a reasonable assumption<sup>(51)</sup>. Ulpian's information probably comes from D.3, 10, 11, 13 and 59.

His regard for historical events as evidence for rhetorical argument is also found in his comments on Thucydides' public speeches. He gives only a word or two about the context of the speech which he is discussing. This is the case for Thucydides 1.68-71 (Dilts p.7.24). This passage cited for the same section of the *First Olynthiac* in (23) which is offered in codex R<sup>(52)</sup>. The latter explains the similarities in greater detail than Ulpian, whose interest is in the psychological effects of the speeches. The author of the scholion explains the background to the Korinthian's speech. Neither endeavours to draw parallels between diverse historical periods in the manner of Plutarch in his *Lives*, and their remarks are incidental to their main interests.

## Conclusion

We find no historical information in the *prolegomena* which cannot be found in Demosthenes' speeches. The historical background does not

interest Ulpian. We may conclude from this either that he assumed his audience was familiar with the period and needed no information, or else, that he regarded such information as irrelevant to a rhetorical exegesis. The latter is far more probable.

## CONCLUSION

The *prolegomena* are useful and valuable. Ulpian has been working systematically with the text of the *First Olynthiac*. By and large, he is consistent and he never loses control of his material. He does not always offer the most probable interpretation but his views are always worth consideration. His division of the speech into ἀντιθεσεις differs from the structure modern scholars usually look for. This is the result of assuming that structure of forensic speeches is also used for demagogic speeches. Ulpian's exposition is not always lucid and repetitions often cloud, rather than aid clarity.

Ulpian's comparison of the *First Olynthiac* with other passages and authors are apt and illuminating. The authors whom he mentions, Thucydides, Isokrates, Demosthenes and Homer, formed the core of the educational curriculum. He is particularly interested in κεφάλαια and Demosthenes' manipulation of his audience when he is answering the objections. Apsines reveals that an analysis of hidden objections was a familiar approach in the opening centuries A.D..

The *prolegomena* are unusual in form. Among the *Rhetores Graeci*, Syrianos comes closest to analysing a speech by looking for the structure and thereafter drawing comparisons. Other writers are discussing aspects of rhetoric which they illustrate with examples drawn from the classical authors.

The evidence for Ulpian's life (53) suggests that he was a teacher of rhetoric, and the form of the *prolegomena* prompts the idea that they form a lecture. Part of their value is that they represent a form of scholarship which has not otherwise been preserved from this period. Confusions, repetitions and the comparative lack of attention given to the closing sections of the speech are explained if the *prolegomena* do form a lecture and not a polished treatise.

Ulpian reveals his personality, unlike the *Rhetores Graeci*. He is decisive, sometimes arrogant, and intolerant of opinions which conflict with his own. This, and the coherence of the *prolegomena* suggests that they are largely original and not based on the work of another scholar. His comments provide a useful commentary which offers modern scholars a different way of approaching Demosthenes.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE

- (1) For the authorship of the *prolegomena* v. Sources [pp.227sqq].
- (2) v. Ulpian [p.43].
- (3) v. Sandys, *Olynthiacs* pp.LII- LIV.
- (4) v. Ulpian [pp.21-22, 24, 25, 31, 33-34, 35-36].
- (5) For what historical information there is v. Ulpian [p.46].
- (6) v. Sandys *Olynthiacs* n.1.
- (7) Hermogenes mentions τὸ νόμιμον, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ ἔνδοξον as the τελικὰ κεφάλαια (Rabe pp.52.19sqq). He does not mention τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
- (8) Ulpian does not regard τὸ ἔνδοξον as a τελικὸν κεφάλαιον, cf n.7 above.
- (9) eg. ἡγεμονία - (Dilts p.6.15-16, p.9.5-30, p.10.9) ; φιλοτιμία - (Dilts p.6.15, p.7.17-8.1, p.9.18) ; ἀναγκαῖον - (Dilts p.4.35, p.9.29) ; φόβος - (Dilts p.7.17sqq, p.8.7, 9).
- (10) Note that Ulpian's version of the text is slightly different from the OCT text which offers νυνι. Either Ulpian is consulting a different text or he is quoting from memory.
- (11) cf (Dilts p.8.33-9.1).
- (12) cf n. 11.
- (13) v. (Dilts p.8.24-25) : μηδ' ἂν δυνήσεσθαι Φίλιππον παραλῦσαί τι τῆσ ἐκείνων σπουδῆσ ....
- (14) v. Diod. 16.8 and Sandys, *Olynthiacs* n.65 , who refers to *CIG* no. 2008.
- (15) v. [p.16].
- (16) v. [p.18-21].
- (17) v. [pp.39sqq] for Ulpian's references to this speech.
- (18) v.(36b) in R (Dilts p.24.32-38). Also v. the comments on Apsines [p.45].
- (19) v. [p.20].
- (20) v. Appendix One [pp.280sqq].
- (21) v. Appendix One [pp.284-285].
- (22) v. [p.12].
- (23) v. Anaximenes 29.1 ; Anonymous Seguerianos (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.357sqq, nos 26-29) ; Aristotle *Rhet* 1414b 19sqq.
- (24) v. Anonymous Seguerianos (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.360, no.37-39) ; Apsines (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.219.21-220.8)
- (25) v. [p.17].
- (26) v. D.4.16sqq (351 B.C.) and D.3.6 (349 B.C.). cf also Cawkwell, "Olynthus" p.136.
- (27) In D.1.16-17 the passage is constructed from parallel clauses ; μεν/δε twice, τε/και supported by syntactically similar sentences beginning εἶτε/εἶτε.
- (28) For criticism of Demosthenes' policy v. Cawkwell, "Olynthus" pp.135-140, *Philip* pp.86-88, "Eubulus" p.67 ; Ellis, *Philip* p.97. Cf Jaeger, *Demosthenes* chapt. VI.
- (29) v. Appendix One [pp.284-285].
- (30) v. Hermogenes (Rabe p.133.25sqq, esp. p.134.1) ; D.H. *Dem* 54, esp. πυνθάνεται γὰρ, εἴτ' ἀνθυποφέρει ... ; Tiberios (only ὑπόφορα) (Ball. p.37, no.39).
- (31) v. S [p.58].
- (32) v. Apsines (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.296sqq) ; Anonymous Seguerianos gives various accounts (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.387sqq) ; Aristotle *Rhet* 1419b 10sqq.
- (33) This structure is influenced by forensic oratory.
- (34) v. Apsines (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.295sqq).
- (35) v. [pp.21-22].
- (36) v. [p.24].
- (37) The repetition is described [p.18].

- (38) v. [pp.20-21].
- (39) The *Panegyrikos* was published in 380 B.C., whereas the *First Olynthiac* was produced in 349 B.C.. Therefore the former, as a celebrated speech, must have been familiar to Demosthenes. v. Sandys, *Isokrates* pp.XLII-XLIII ; Philost VS 505 where he terms the *Panegyrikos* κάλλιστος λόγων.
- (40) Sandys, *Isokrates* n.55 thinks that there is a close resemblance between the *Panegyrikos* and the Funeral Oration of Lysias. If there is such a similarity, then there may have been a tradition of exploiting ideas from earlier speeches.
- (41) v. *RE* 2 277
- (42) The *Methodos Deinotetos*, from which this passage comes, is probably not by Hermogenes, v. *RE* 8 872-873 , Kennedy, *Christian* p.102 n.42.
- (43) John the Sikeliot is also known as John Doxopatres, v. *RE* 5 1611.
- (44) v. *RE* 7.2 1848.
- (45) v. [pp.35-36].
- (46) v. *RE* 14.2 1450, no.49.
- (47) v. *RE* 4A2 1728.
- (48) v. [p.37].
- (49) v.(164a) in S [pp.65-66]. This scholion is also found in R F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* .
- (50) Sandys refers to thirty-two cities as well *Olynthiacs* p.LXVIII. According to D.9.26, thirty-five cities were involved, unless Demosthenes includes the three which he names among the thirty-two.
- (51) v. Appendix One [pp.280sqq].
- (52) v. R (23) [pp.98-99].
- (53) v. Sources [pp.227-230].

**Blank Page**

## CHAPTER TWO

### CODEx S

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Codex S dates to the ninth century, but the scholia are much later. According to Dilts (Dilts p.VII) and Drerup<sup>(1)</sup>, there are various hands which contribute scholia on the *First Olynthiac* and these date to the thirteenth century. Dilts chooses to refer to them collectively as S<sup>2</sup> in order to distinguish them from S<sup>ma</sup>, a tenth or eleventh-century hand. Drerup does not identify which scholia are by which hand. Since S<sup>ma</sup> makes no contribution to the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, Dilts refers to these hands simply as S.

I endeavoured to identify which scholia were written by which hand from a photograph of S, but the quality of the reproduction and the nature of the hands prevented me from distinguishing different hands in all but a few cases. Dilts is confident that no purpose is served in distinguishing them. He may be correct, but it would be useful to determine which hands wrote which scholia, in order to examine the various groups of scholia in S and their sources. It must therefore be remembered, when referring to the scholia on this speech by S, that they are not produced by the same hand. Observations which I have made about the general character of the scholia in S would need to be revised if it turned out that particular hands favoured a certain topic.

Eighty-two scholia are offered by S on the *First Olynthiac*<sup>(2)</sup>. Of these, forty-two are also found in codex F. Nineteen are shared with F<sup>1</sup> and eighteen with F<sup>4</sup>. Four are shared with F<sup>2</sup> and one with F<sup>3</sup>. Twenty-six of the scholia are offered by the *codices Ulpiani*. The scholia in codex S have little in common with codices A, vp and Pr. S also offers a few unique scholia. There is an important link with codex R and this relationship will be discussed in the next chapter, including the contents of lost bifolia which were suggested by Drerup<sup>(3)</sup>.

The comments occur consistently throughout the speech. On average there are three separate scholia on each section. However, in five sections, D.1.1, 2, 8, 9 and 20, there are at least six notes<sup>(4)</sup>. Sections D.1.7,10,16 and 17 do not elicit comment. (60b) refers to both D.1.9 and D.1.10. This feature is found elsewhere among the scholia. For example (124) refers to D.1.19-23 and (174) covers D.1.24-25. As a rule, however, the notes concentrate on a short passage.

This collection of scholia is progressive. There are few repetitions and inconsistencies. Unlike the *Ulpiani prolegomena*, which form the cohesive unity of a discussion, these comments form a type of work which we would recognise as a commentary on a text. Various aspects are examined as they occur in the text, and no attempt is made to group

topics together. No overall structure for the speech is outlined. The subject matter is varied. Historical background, language, syntax, the purpose of particular statements and the prevalent κεφάλαια are all discussed, but none takes precedence. Some of the notes are brief and pithy, (1a), (21a), (93b), (112), while others are longer, but both concentrate on one aspect. The remarks about historical background only consider this topic, (41a), (151). There are many notes which deal with more than one topic.

## RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

We are not offered an overall analysis of the *First Olynthiac*, but it is possible to elicit from the scholia a consistent interpretation of the structural elements of the speech :

A. προοίμιον – D.1.1

B. δεύτερον προοίμιον – D.1.2 ... τρόπον πρὸς αὐτά

C. τὰ κεφάλαια – D.1.2 ἐστὶ δὴ ... – 23

1. τὸ συμφέρον D.1.2-18

2. τὸ δυνατόν D.1.19-23

D. προτροπή – D.1.24-27

E. ἐπίλογος – D.1.28

This analysis is broadly similar to Ulpiān's<sup>(5)</sup>. The κεφάλαια are divided differently in the main section of the speech and instead of ἐπίλογοι we find that the same sections of the speech are divided into προτροπή and ἐπίλογος.

### Τὸ Προοίμιον

There are eight scholia concerned with the opening lines of the *First Olynthiac*, two of which deal with language<sup>(6)</sup>. They are not contradictory and yet lack any suggestion of cohesion. The interpretation is generally correct. In (1a) we are told that the subject of the speech is not broached directly. In (4) we find the reason for Demosthenes' reference to τὰ χρήματα and τὸ συμφέρον. It should be noted that the author is concerned with the immediate effect on the audience and is non-committal about a reference to the theoric money, unlike other commentators<sup>(7)</sup>. In (5a) it is pointed out that Demosthenes does not add supporting arguments to his

opening statement, because this remark is taken as a truism. In (6) reference is made to the ill-will which Demosthenes avoids by issuing an invitation for others to speak.

A longer note, (9a), is misguided. Two points are made about the effect of Demosthenes' words at this point : ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω. Firstly, Demosthenes is said to be saying that it is good fortune (τύχη) that someone will come forward to speak, and therefore the Athenians should feel that they themselves are εὐτυχεῖς. Secondly, the author thinks that Demosthenes is trying to convey the impression that he is speaking on the spur of the moment, inspired by current events. This too should fill the Athenians with a sense of their own εὐτυχία. A better notion is that Demosthenes is pretending to extemporise and affects deprecating magnanimity.

The same conclusion is reached in (8) as in (9a) ; that Demosthenes is affecting to speak off the cuff. The author develops this idea from a consideration of the verb λάβοιτε. He believes that the optative should be read as an indicative. In fact λάβοιτε may be the result of the usual construction. The optative is more remote and Demosthenes could have been more positive and used the future. (8) and (9a) offer different explanations of the same point and that is why they look as though they were written by different people<sup>(8)</sup>.

### Τὸ Δεύτερον Προοίμιον

In (11a) we are told : δεύτερον προοίμιον, σύντομον καὶ τοῦτο ὁμοίως τῷ πρώτῳ διὰ τὴν χρείαν τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦ κατεπείγοντος πρὸς βοήθειαν. None of the scholia on the first προοίμιον informed us that it was condensed, let alone the reasons for it. This scholion may prove to be by a different author from the man who wrote scholia on the first προοίμιον. It is possible that a single author preferred to delay this comment about the first προοίμιον until this point. Summary of a preceding section occurs at the beginning of some scholia<sup>(9)</sup>.

In (13a) we find a phrase which also occurs in the *Ulpiani prolegomena* : εἰ μέλει τῇ πόλει τοῦ προεστάναι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας. The text in the *prolegomena* reads : εἰ μέλει τῇ πόλει τοῦ προεστάναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ καιρὸς ὃ διδοῦς πάλιν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῇ πόλει (Dilts p.3.15-16). The fact that ἡγεμονία, an important aspect in Ulpian's discussion, is not mentioned elsewhere in the scholia of S seems to rule out the possibility that the phrasing is simply coincidental. This scholion may be evidence of yet another hand. In (13b) we are pithily informed that εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ... is the κατασκευὴ of the second προοίμιον. The conclusion of this προοίμιον is indicated with equal brevity in (14a). These notes are progressive but there is reason to suppose that we are dealing with more

than one hand, assuming that individual commentators will be consistent.

### D.1.3-23

The scholia on this section of the speech produce an unusual impression of the *First Olynthiac*. In the *Ulpiani prolegomena* the body of the speech was analysed in three sections which were interpreted as the respective answers to three objections<sup>(10)</sup>. The authors of the scholia in S appear not to look beyond the immediate word or argument in order to establish Demosthenes' underlying purpose in the *First Olynthiac*. The result of this is that Demosthenes' argument maeanders.

### The Objections

Every reference to objections occurs in the section D.1.3-23. There are twelve relevant scholia. Not only does the author assess the use of objections in the *First Olynthiac* differently from Ulpian, but his understanding of the terminology differs too. Ulpian uses the word ἀντίθεσις generally to mean "objection"<sup>(11)</sup>. In codex S the term acquires a specific meaning and this is distinct from similar terms.

Such distinctions are, presumably, only discussed when the commentator feels that the terms are confusing. In (105c) the author is defining ἀνθυποφορά. He states : ἀντιπίπτον μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὅταν οἶδεν ὡς ὅτι μέλλει αὐτῷ τι ἀντιπεσεῖν ὡς ἄτοπον τι λέγοντι, καὶ ἐπανορθώσεται αὐτὸ ἀπροσποιήτως ὡσπερ καὶ λεληθότως. ἀνθυποφορὰ δὲ, ὅταν μέρος μὲν ὡσπερ καταδέχεται τοῦ λεγομένου ὁ ἀκροατῆς, ἀμφιβάλλη δὲ περὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ... ἀντίθεσις δὲ ὅταν ἀπὸ τινος κεφαλαίου ὀρμάται, οἷον ἀπὸ δικαίου ἢ συμφέροντος ἢ τινος τῶν τοιούτων ... (Dilts p.36.7-11, 14-15). Terms were used without explanation the scholia preceding (105c), terms have been used without explanation. Assuming that the author of this scholion has made a contribution on the earlier part of the speech, there must be a reason why he chooses to discuss these terms in detail here. He says that an ἀντιπίπτον is an objection which the orator spots himself and forestalls discreetly, so that the weakness will not be exploited. ἀνθυποφορά is a case where an objector agrees with part of what the orator has said, but is dubious about the remainder. ἀντίθεσις is an objection which arises from a κεφάλαιον. Presumably it would be signified by the use of the neuter singular, as for example δίκαιόν ἐστιν . This type of objection seems to be concerned with fundamentals.

Among the *Rhetores Graeci* the most common definitons of ἀντίθεσις and τὸ ἀντίθετον describe what we should regard as antithetical clauses. It is used mainly of a statement by the speaker which contradicts that of the opponent (about X, you say Y , I say Z)<sup>(12)</sup>. Hermogenes promises to

discuss ἀντίθεσις at length in the Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος (Rabe p.238.6-15), but that work as we have it is probably not by Hermogenes<sup>(13)</sup>. In the work of that name only τὸ ἀντίθετον is discussed (Rabe p.431.16sq), and in the sense of antithetical clauses. Hermogenes also uses ἀντίθεσις as a term for agreeing that one has committed a wrong, but with justification (Rabe p.38.16-18). He does not regard ἀνθυποφορά as an objection, but as an answer to an objection called a ὑποφορά (Rabe p.134.1-4). The ὑποφορά is an objection which interrupts the flow of the speech and is delivered in the voice of the opponent.

Apsines regards ἀντίθεσις as a challenge or objection to your opponent's argument which demands proof or shows that their case cannot be so (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.360-361). From what is said there is scope for confusion with other terms such as ὑποφορά and ἀνθυποφορά.

Although Apsines' understanding of ἀντίθεσις comes close to the definition in (105c), there are no distinctions along the lines put forward in that scholion. If the author of the scholion is not confused, the author is employing terms in an unusual and specific way. Among the eleven other examples there is no inconsistency in terminology. This suggests that they are by the same author as (105c).

Most of the objections are described as ἀντιπίπτοντα. We cannot tell whether the compiler or author was primarily interested in this type of objection, or whether every objection which he has spotted just happens to be of this type. An examination of the instances in detail will illustrate the point that the author tends to ignore Demosthenes' purpose in the long arguments which he presents.

In D.1.5 there is an allusion to the fate of the Amphipolitans, καὶ ἴσασιν ἅ τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ..., which is said by the author of (40a) to have been prompted by the possibility that someone might have said, in response to Demosthenes' assertion that the Olynthians are dedicated to this war against Philip : εἰκὸς μὲν τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους μὴ πιστεύειν αὐτῷ μηδέ βουλήσεσθαι προέσθαι ἑαυτοὺς αὐτῷ. τί οὖν ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες προδόται παρὰ τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις οἵτινες βουλήσονται προδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ; (Dilts p.26.4-6). This interpretation is plausible. The dismissal by Demosthenes of the possibility of betrayal by a small group of Olynthians could well be the reason for including the example of the Amphipolitans<sup>(14)</sup>.

In (54) the term ἔλυσε (Dilts p.29.28) indicates that the author is referring to an objection of some kind. He calls the problem τὸ δοκῶν ἐπαχθέσ. There is a weakness in Demosthenes' argument, and therefore it is an ἀντιπίπτον. Demosthenes has been berating the Athenians for failing to give assistance when Amphipolitan ambassadors requested help on the return of the Athenians from a campaign in Euboeia, 357 B.C.<sup>(15)</sup>. The objection is this : ἀλλ' ἐπαχθέσ ἦν, ὃ Δημόσθενης, ὑπόγυον ἐκ στρατηγίας

ἤκοντασ εἰσ ἕτερον πάλιν ἐξιέναι πόλεμον (Dilts p.29.26-27). The answer relies on semantics. The commentator says : μὴ γὰρ κινδυνεύειν ὑμᾶσ ἐκέλευον ἢ πολεμεῖν, ἀλλὰ πλεῦσαι καὶ παραλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑτοιμον καιρὸν καὶ ἀκίνδυνον αὐτοῦσ ἐκκαλούμενοσ, ὅ γε "πλεῦσαι" λέγων καὶ "παραλαβεῖν" (Dilts p.29.28-31). By saying πλεῦσαι and παραλαβεῖν, the envoys are not requesting Athenian participation in an arduous campaign. The commentator supposes, probably correctly, that the envoys did not use these words. He infers that Demosthenes must be answering an objection about a request for a substantial expedition. Demosthenes' choice of words implies a slight effort, but the force which he proposes, D.1.16-18 and 28, is a large commitment. The dominant idea in D.1.8-10 is the attitude of the Athenians, and the point is being made that very little effort would have been rewarded with success.

(60b) covers D.1.9-10. The author thinks that two objections are being answered here. The first is as follows : ἀρ' οὖν, ὦ Δημόσθενεσ, καθ' ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων εἶδει πολεμεῖν καὶ οὕτωσ εἶ φιλοπόλεμοσ ; (Dilts p.30.13-15). The idea for this objection seems to have been prompted by the list of cities which Demosthenes gives in order to exemplify places which were threatened and captured by Philip, while the Athenians stood by. The objector accuses Demosthenes of being bellicose, because he is calling for so many campaigns. This accusation has been forestalled, so the commentator says, by the remark that only one campaign would have been required to deal with Philip (Dilts p.30.15-17). This interpretation is possible but misguided. In D.1.9-10 Demosthenes is not saying that they should have fought several campaigns, but that any one of the opportunities would have sufficed. The purpose of listing the cities is to emphasise just how many chances have been lost. There is no need to look for hidden objections in order to understand why Demosthenes emphasises ἐνι.

The second ἀντιπίπτον is this : λέγεις οὖν ἡμῖν ἰσχυρὸν τὸν Φίλιππον τοσαῦτα προειληφότα (Dilts p.30.17-18)<sup>(16)</sup>. The objector is concerned that Philip is being portrayed as an able individual. The comparison between Philip's present position and his earlier situation shows that Philip's success still leaves him inferior to the Athenians. This approach is said to counter the objection (Dilts p.30.18-21). Demosthenes is also thought to stress the Athenians' own responsibility for their predicament, and thereby control over Philip's future. This interpretation is plausible but there is no need to see an objection in order to account for Demosthenes' remarks. Athenian responsibility and their ability to control events form the corner stone of Demosthenes' endeavour to persuade the Athenians to become involved. In D.1.9-10 he is showing them that it is possible for them to face Philip and win. Indeed he speaks as though this outcome were inevitable. Therefore the stress on Athenian responsibility and Philip's relative strength is not a rhetorical trick in order to avoid an

awkward objection. It is fundamental to his argument.

The author of (70) sees an objection, presumably an ἀντιπίπτον judging by its form, which is prompted by Demosthenes' statement in D.1.9 that the present opportunity has come to the city of its own accord. The objection is this : καὶ τί δύναται τοσοῦτον, ὃ Δημόσθενες ; (Dilts p.31.26-27). The answer is said to be the comment in D.1.9 : ὅς (sc. καιρός) οὐδενός ἐστὶν ἐλάττων τῶν προτέρων ἐκείνων. It seems unnecessary to see an objection here. νῦν δὲ καιρός ἤκει τις ... simply announces that an opportunity has arisen. This follows easily from the remarks about wasted opportunities and the potential success of one intervention.

(70) and (72) are curiously independent of one another. It is possible that (72) is a paraphrase of (70), since the same point is made and there are verbal similarities between the two scholia. In (72) we find the phrase τῶν ἤδη ἀπολωλότων (Dilts p.32.7), and in (70) ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀπολομένους (Dilts p.31.27). The wording of (72) (Dilts p.32.8-9) appears to rephrase a sentence in (70) (Dilts p.31.23-25, 27). These scholia are likely to have been written by different hands in S.

In D.1.12 Demosthenes uses an indirect rhetorical question to declare that Philip will attack Athens : φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ τί τὸ κωλύον ἐστὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται. The author of (92a) believes that this prompts an ἀντιπίπτον : ἄδηλον εἶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὀρμήσει (Dilts p.34.24). The commentator correctly observes Demosthenes' subtlety in making his point (Dilts p.34.24-25). However, he fails to analyse the method in detail and does not note the insistent tone or the effect of the list. It is possible that Demosthenes is countering this objection at this point in the speech, but we may assume that it is not foremost in his mind, because he tackles this objection directly in D.1.26. Demosthenes' aim is to rid the Athenians of their apathy. Urgency, induced by the inevitability of the attack, forms a climax to D.1.8-12 which should leave an audience in a receptive frame of mind for the solid proposals which follow.

In (105c) different types of objection are discussed<sup>(17)</sup>. D.1.14 is thought to herald an ἀνθυποφορά. This is an objection in which part of the speaker's case is accepted but the remainder is not. In this case the ἀνθυποφορά is the question which Demosthenes' himself states : τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν ; The commentator rephrases it thus : ὥσπερ τινος λέγοντος ὅτι "καλῶς μὲν λέγεις ταῦτα περὶ Φιλίππου, ἀκάίρως δὲ ' οὐ γὰρ εἰσηλθεὶς καταλέγειν ἡμῖν τὰ Φιλίππου, ἀλλὰ τί δεῖ περὶ Ὀλυνθίων ποιῆσαι" (Dilts p.36.11-13). If we accept the commentator's definition, the ἀνθυποφορά is identified correctly, but the observation merely restates the obvious. Demosthenes' own response touches upon the unprofitability of the wasted opportunities and Philip's meddlesome nature. He concludes with a warning about the consequences of not taking part. This makes the commentator's summary of the reply feeble though accurate : ἐπάγει ὅτι καὶ

ταῦτα χρήσιμά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν ὑπόθεσιν (Dilts p.36.13-14).

In D.1.15 Demosthenes poses an exclamatory question : πρὸς θεῶν, τίς οὕτως εὐήθησ' ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρ' ἕξοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν ; He adds that if this happens the consequences will be terrible, because the Athenians will not face Philip resolutely. The author of (112) interprets Demosthenes' remarks as a counter to the ἀντιπίπτον : κἂν ἔλθῃ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς Φίλιππος, σεμνυνοῦμεθα τότε. His interpretation is valid. Demosthenes wishes to eliminate any trace of complacency on the part of the Athenians.

The term λῦσις in (129) identifies an objection whose type is not stated. In this respect it is similar to (54)<sup>(18)</sup>. There is a further coincidence, because both examples view the resolution of the problems in semantics. Demosthenes states the objection himself in D.1.19 : τί οὖν ; ἂν τις εἴποι, "σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά ;" The commentator supposes that Demosthenes is careful not to use the term γράφω, favouring συμβουλεύω instead. Demosthenes uses the word ἡγοῦμαι, so συμβουλεύω is probably a paraphrase, as it is unlikely that the commentator had a different text. Ulpian offers a more convincing interpretation (Dilts p.11.13-18)<sup>(19)</sup>. Demosthenes is avoiding the objection that he is not giving them practical advice as he should be doing. Because Demosthenes' handling of the objection is subtle, the temptation to look at semantics is understandable. It is to Ulpian's credit that he has looked beyond the immediate context. If the meaning of words had been important, Demosthenes might have drawn attention to this.

At D.1.21 there is a clear transition in the speech, from practical advice to a consideration of Philip's strength as an enemy. The author of (140c) says : ἤρξατο δὲ τοῦ κεφαλαίου λαβὼν ὥσπερ ἀντίθεσιν ' "ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ καλῶς αὐτῷ κατασκευασμένων τῶν πραγμάτων." διέσυρε μὲν καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ θέσει τὴν ἀντίθεσιν (Dilts p.41.34-36). The commentator does not misinterpret the obvious. For in the same sentence in which Demosthenes states the objection he also dismisses it : οὔτε γάρ, ὥς δοκεῖ καὶ φήσειέ τις ἂν μὴ σκοπῶν ἀκριβῶς ... . Since the commentator says ὥσπερ ἀντίθεσιν, we may infer that this example is not a true ἀντίθεσις. The form of the neuter singular χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν seems appropriate. An ἀντίθεσις was said in (105c) to arise ἀπὸ κεφαλαίου (Dilts p.36.14-19). The objection was one of principle. Since χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ is a matter of practicality rather than principle, the objection could not properly be identified as an ἀντίθεσις, despite the form in which it is presented. τὸ χαλεπὸν may have been regarded as subordinate to the τελικά κεφάλαια. Nevertheless, the commentator's remarks are pertinent.

A second objection is discussed in (140c) (Dilts p.42.6-13). Demosthenes is striving to show in D1.21-23 that Philip's position is not

as secure as it might appear at first. The commentator points out a possible objection to Demosthenes' argument : λεγόντων γὰρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι "πόλεμον οὐκ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, εἰ μὴ καλῶς εἶχεν αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν " (Dilts p.42.6-8). He also notes that Demosthenes' response is a paradox (Dilts p.42.10-11). If Philip had thought that he would have had to fight he would not have gone to war. The commentator's interpretation of this apparent paradox is plausible : παραδόξου δὲ οὕσης τῆς λύσεως, ὅτι ἐπὶ πόλεμον τοσοῦτον ἐξιὼν οὐ προσεδόκα μαχήσεσθαι, τὴν θεραπείαν αὐτῆς ἐξ ἔθους ἐποιήσατο. προσεδόκα γὰρ ἐφόδου μόνης αὐτῷ δεήσειν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων (Dilts p.42.10-13). It was not in Philip's character to fight unless the odds were favourable. The expectation of a difficult conflict after so many easy victories is a sound reason for refusing to fight. Of course, in Philip's case this is purely a rhetorical argument.

Demosthenes points out in D.1.23 that the Paionians and Illyrians will not remain quiet for long under Philip's rule because, they are accustomed to freedom and autonomy. The author of (157) feels that there is a weakness in this argument : πολλοὶ καὶ παρὰ συνήθειαν δουλωθέντες ἔστερξαν καὶ βέβαιοι τοῖς κρατοῦσιν ἔμειναν (Dilts p.44.9-10). In order to counter the argument that many people have become accustomed to slavery, Demosthenes proceeds to denigrate Philip's character. A subject is less likely to acquiesce to such an individual. Demosthenes is said to feel that this point has not been made clearly enough. Therefore, he adds weight to it by using an oath in combination with a truism : καὶ μὰ Δι' οὐδὲν ἄπιστον ἴσως '. The commentator feels that the presence of ἴσως in the statement which confirms the oath reveals that Demosthenes thinks his argument is weak. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this observation. He may mean that the oath does not, by itself, distract the audience from the weakness. The presence of ἴσως makes a distracting digression easier, because it invites opinion. This interpretation is plausible, but perhaps this passage is only an instance of the special use of νῆ Δία or μὰ Δία, common in Demosthenes, to introduce a new speaker in a hypothetical dialogue. Here Demosthenes is replying to ἄνθρωπος ὑβριστής, ὥς φασιν. Another instance is at the end of D.1.19<sup>(20)</sup>.

(159c) is unlikely to have come from the same author as (157). The author points out that κατακόμειν implies a notion of servility. Given that Demosthenes is speaking about one set of people obeying another, this verb is the obvious word to use. The author of (157) has written in terms of servility and so a further comment about this matter is unnecessary. (157) and (159c) may prove to have been written by different hands in S.

## Conclusion

The majority of these scholia are probably the product of one mind. The approach and terminology are consistent. The form and content of (54) and (129) are too similar to be coincidental. Some of the instances give plausible interpretations, (112) and (157), while others are less persuasive, (54), (60b), (70) and (129). They examine minor developments in the *First Olynthiac*, and in particular how Demosthenes overcomes flaws in his arguments. Unlike Ulpian's ἀντιθέσεις, the ἀντιπίπτοντα do not form the *raison d'être* of the speech, prompting fundamental arguments.

## Κεφάλαια in D.1.2-23

Remarks are made about the κεφάλαια in the scholia, but these are not associated with any underlying arguments. Sometimes the κεφάλαιον is merely noted, (15b) and (124) and at others it is examined in detail, (33c) and (140c). κεφάλαια are noted consistently, but the degree of analysis varies. D.1.19-23 is discussed thoroughly, while in the remainder the κεφάλαια are simply pointed out. These remarks occur in discussions about different aspects of Demosthenes' argument in a particular passage. We may conclude from these observations that most of the scholia in S are by the same author. Coincidence seems too improbable as the explanation for the consistency in approach.

## D.1.2-18 - τὸ συμφέρον

ἔστι δὲ τά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, D.1.2, is said to mark the ἀρχὴ τῶν κεφαλαίων in (15b). There is no summary of the ensuing sections of the speech. The clue to the understanding of the κεφάλαια comes in (33c) : καθήρηκε τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πανουργίᾳ δέδωκεν, ὥσ πεπλέχθαι τὸ νόημα τῷ τε συμφέροντι καὶ τῷ δυνατῷ, προηγουμένου τοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅτι οὐδέποτε διαλλαγῆσονται πρὸς αὐτὸν Ὀλύνθιοι' ᾧ δὲ συναποδείκνυται ὅτι καὶ ταπεινὸς ὁ Φίλιππος (Dilts p.24.18-22). Here the commentator is summarising D.1.4-5. His observations are justified. There are no comments among the scholia of S which conflict with this statement. In (33a) there are comments about τὸ λυσιτελοῦν (Dilts p.24.14). It is not unreasonable to interpret τὸ λυσιτελοῦν as a near synonym for τὸ συμφέρον.

(33b) is a brief comment which points out that Demosthenes tries to shame the Athenians into taking up the campaign, by making them jealous. Rivalry of one's enemies is inherent. (33c) sums up the effect of D.1.3-4 by saying that Philip's success relies only on his πανουργία. The commentator also points out that because the Olynthians will not be

reconciled with Philip, Demosthenes has expressed an idea based on τὸ συμφέρον. He adds that τὸ δυνατόν is present, though of less importance than τὸ συμφέρον. This scholion repeats what was said about the benefits involved (Dilts p.24.14-15), but it is a little odd that (33a) refers to τὸ λυσιτελοῦν (Dilts p.24.14), whereas (33c) refers to τὸ συμφέρον. No justification has been given for τὸ δυνατόν in this part of the speech. Such repetitions or minor inconsistencies were found in the *Ulpiani prolegomena*, and so it is possible that the same commentator wrote (33a), (33b) and (33c). However, codex R contains only (33a) and it may prove that this scholion in S is written by a different hand from the other two.

In (44b) we find the phrase τὸ δοκοῦν λυσιτελεῖν (Dilts p.26.30) in connection with D.1.6. In D.1.7 Demosthenes makes a specific reference to τὸ συμφέρον : καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. In (52a), which covers D.1.7-8, we find no mention of κεφάλαια, but in (59a) there is the phrase : τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ Φιλίππου δείκνυσιν (Dilts p.30.3-4). This suggests that the commentator perceives τὸ δυνατόν in D.1.8.

τὸ δυνατόν is mentioned in both (60b) and (70), which refer to D.1.9. The opening sentence of (70) reads as follows : πάλιν ἀυξήσας τὸν Φίλιππον εὐθὺς εἰς παραμυθίαν ἐμνημόνευσε τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ, τὸ δυνατόν ὡς περ ἀύξων τῶν Ἀθηναίων (Dilts p.31.23-25). In (60b) we find : καὶ δίδωσιν οὐ τὴν τύχην αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς Φιλίππου δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ' εἰ γὰρ ἠύξθη διὰ τούτους, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ καταλύσαι τὴν βώμην τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ (Dilts p.30.28-30). Although both passages refer to the same argument, they are not repeating one another. They refer to separate, though adjacent passages. The beginning of (70) summarises the earlier lines, probably because there are intervening scholia on different topics, (67a) and (69). Perhaps these two scholia are written by a different hand from (60b) and (70) and were added to the margin first. Both (60b) and (70) refer to the phrase ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ (Dilts p.30.15, p.31.29). In (60b) this phrase is seen as an answer to ἀν' ἀντιπίπτων. In (70) it is cited in connection with a different ἀντιπίπτων. Since the value of ὁ παρὼν καιρός could be questioned, Demosthenes is said to qualify it by adding the phrase οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐλάττων τῶν προτέρων ἐκείνων. The commentator justifies his interpretation by arguing that because Demosthenes has already said that one campaign was enough, the value of ὁ παρὼν καιρός is clarified. (60b) and (70) are complementary.

At the beginning of D.1.14 Demosthenes has to answer a question about his purpose in making his remarks. His answer reflects upon the preceding sections, including D.1.10-13 which is not examined for κεφάλαια. The answer is summarised in (105c) as follows : ἐπάγει ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα χρήσιμά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν ὑπόθεσιν (Dilts p.36.13-14). The

commentator thinks that τὸ συμφέρον is foremost in Demosthenes' mind. The word which Demosthenes uses is ἄλυσιτελέσ.

Very little is said about D.1.15-18. D.1.15 consists of a metaphor and, perhaps, is not fruitful for κεφάλαια. τὸ δυνατόν in (123a) is simply used in the sense of the ability of the Olynthians to hold out. D.1.16-18 ought to attract comment because Demosthenes is giving practical advice. D.1.16 forms a clear transition in the speech, and Ulpian thought it was important for κεφάλαια (21). In (123a) τὸ δυνατόν is simply used in the sense of the ability of the Olynthians to hold out.

#### D.1.19-23 - τὸ δυνατόν

D.1.19-23 is dominated by τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον. In (124) it is stated : μετέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον. μερίζει δὲ τοῦτο εἰς δύο, εἷς τε χρημάτων εὐπορίαν καὶ ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν (Dilts p.39.22-23). There are several references to τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον in D.1.2-18, but we may assume that it is not thought to be the primary κεφάλαιον. There is no contradiction, therefore, in saying that Demosthenes moves on to deal with τὸ δυνατόν in D.1.19.

Bearing in mind Ulpian's analysis of the *First Olynthiac* (22), we may be surprised at the division of the speech by this commentator. He does not find a unified section from D.1.16-20, subdivided into an examination of the type of force required, D.1.16-18, and an examination of the provision of finance, D.1.19-20. D.1.15-20 is largely ignored in the contribution of S. According to (124), the division is as follows : χρημάτων εὐπορία, D.1.19-20, and ἀνδρῶν δύναμις, D.1.21sq. It might appear to us that ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν applies to D.1.15-18 which examines the type of force to be sent.

The group of scholia (140a), (140b) and (140c) create some problems. (140c) begins : πληρώσας τὸ ἐν μέρος τοῦ δυνατοῦ, τουτέστι τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ διαλεχθεὶς περὶ χρημάτων καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ μνησθεὶς, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος ἐλήλυθε τὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ, ὅπερ ἐκ παντὸσ μέρος ἐξήτασεν εἰκότως, ἐπειδὴ πολλὴν ἔχει παρὰ τοῖσ Ἀθηναίοισ ὑπόνοιαν ὡσ ἰσχυροσ ὁ Φίλιπποσ (Dilts p.41.30-34). (140c) corresponds with (124). In the former, the first part of τὸ δυνατόν is called τὸ τῆς πόλεως. The explanation for this, διαλεχθεὶς περὶ χρημάτων καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ μνησθεὶς, refers to D.1.19-20. In (124) the first part of τὸ δυνατόν is said to refer to χρημάτων εὐπορίαν and this corresponds to D.1.19-20. In (140c) the second part of τὸ δυνατόν is referred to as τὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ in, and specifically the Athenian belief that Philip is strong. This assessment of D.1.21-23 is sound. However, it is less easy to understand why the same section of the *First Olynthiac* is said in (124) to refer to ἀνδρῶν δύναμις in. No explanation is forthcoming from the remainder of (140c). We shall return to this point presently.

There is a remarkable similarity between (140a) and the beginning of (140c). (140a) reads : πληρώσας τὸ ἐν μέρος τοῦ δυνατοῦ, τουτέστι τὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἐντέυθεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος ἐλήλυθε τὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ (Dilts p.41.24-25). It is identical to the opening sentence of (140c), except for the account of the aspects covered in τὸ τῆς πόλεως which is found in (140c) and not found in (140a). The text of (140a) continues : μὴ ἔχων γὰρ δεῖξαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους δυνατούς, καθὸ πολλὰ ἀπώλεσαν, τεχνικῶσ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πειράται κατασκευάσαι ὅτι δύναται τὴν Φιλίππου δύναμιν καθαιρεῖν (Dilts p.41.26-28). Although it is more natural to take ἀνδρῶν δύναμις as the type of force required, these words may be taken as an attempt to explain why it is correct to identify τὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνοσ with ἀνδρῶν δύναμις in (124). Demosthenes is discussing Philip's power in D.1.21-23, but in so doing, he does indeed show that the Athenians have the ability to beat him. It is not Philip himself but the Athenians who concern Demosthenes.

The verbal identity between (140a) and (140c) is unlikely to be mere coincidence. They offer compatible interpretations of D.1.21-23 which take slightly different lines. The words in (140c) ὅπερ ἐκ παντὸσ μέρουσ ἐξήτασεν εἰκότως, ἐπειδὴ πολλὴν ἔχει παρὰ τοῖσ Ἀθηναίοισ ὑπόνοιαν ὡσ ἰσχυρόσ ὁ Φίλιπποσ (Dilts p.41.32-34), effectively convey the same idea as in (140a), τεχνικῶσ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (Dilts p.41.27). We may conclude that (140a) gives us a general summary of Demosthenes' approach and purpose in D.1.21-23, as well as apparently justifying the label ἀνδρῶν δύναμις. In (140c) the passage is analysed in detail. If it were not for the identical phrases at the beginning of these two scholia, we should regard (140a) and (140c) as complementary.

If we assume that (140a) is the original, then (140c) could be the work of a later commentator who was interested in different aspects but who chose to follow the format of (140a). This explanation is unlikely. (140c) ties in closely with the idea of ἀντιπίπτοντα which are examined throughout the speech. Since (140c) by itself gives similar information to the combination of (124) and (140a), it is possible that these scholia are not written by the same author who wrote (140c). They may be a different version of the same scholion. Their inclusion is perhaps explained by a desire to point out the beginning of τὸ δυνατόν distinctly. This gains credence from the fact that (124) and (140a) are found in other codices, F<sup>4</sup>, T, Bc, Af, Vb and Wd. They do not offer (140c) Codex R on the other hand offers (140c) but neither (124) nor (140a). This might indicate that (140c) comes from a different source from the other two scholia. The hands look similar in the photography of S, but I cannot be certain. It is possible that the scribe started in the margin ,(140a), but then decided that there was insufficient room and began afresh in the margin at the top of the page, (140c). Only a precise account of the hands in codex S will answer this question.

The problem is complicated by (140b) which gives superfluous information, given the presence of the scholia mentioned above. It reads : τὸ δεύτερον μέρος τοῦ δυνατοῦ (Dilts p.41.29). Since (140a) and (140c) refer to τὸ ἕν μέρος (Dilts p.41.24, 30), the information in (140b) is unnecessary. Repetition is not characteristic of the scholia in S. It is possible that (140b) is meant as a kind of heading for the next section of the speech. It is apparent from the photograph that (140b) is written in paler ink than (140a) and (140c). Therefore that scholion is probably not written by the same hand as the other two. The end of the section of the *First Olynthiac* which deals with κεφάλαια is probably indicated by (164a) as we shall see.

### Conclusion

It is not surprising that τὸ συμφέρον is favoured in D.1.2-18 as the primary κεφάλαιον and τὸ δυνατόν as the secondary. Demosthenes underlined the importance of τὸ συμφέρον in the first προόμιον and the author of (4) did not overlook this point (Dilts p.17.20-22). Demosthenes makes repeated references to τὸ συμφέρον and similar terms<sup>(23)</sup>. τὸ δυνατόν is easily justified too, although it is odd that D.1.15-18 is ignored. It is odd that the term τὸ συμφέρον is not used more often in the scholia. Without (33c) we should be in some doubt about the understanding of the κεφάλαια in D.1.2-18. As it is, the comments about this section of the speech are consistent with one another, but an overall analysis, such as we find for D.1.19-23, is lacking.

There is an imbalance in the thoroughness of the examination of the κεφάλαια. This could be coincidence, or else suggests that one commentator was responsible for most of the scholia in S. Another possible explanation is that a compiler was careful in his selection of comments to be included.

### D.1.24-27 - προτροπή

The discussion of προτροπή is introduced abruptly in codex S in scholion (164a). A glance at Dilts' *apparatus* (Dilts p.44.33) reveals that the other codices which offer this scholion, F<sup>4</sup>, T, Bc, Vb, Wd, have an introductory sentence : πληρώσασ τὴν ἐξέτασιν τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ σαθρὸν πανταχόθεν ἀποδείξασ τὸν Φίλιππον εἰς προτροπὴν μετήλθεν. This sentence is absent in codices S and R. The inclusion of this comment in S would complement what is said elsewhere about τὸ δυνατόν. As it stands, S is left without an important comment about the structure of the speech. The omission may be a genuine mistake. It is not likely that D.1.24-27 form part of τὸ δυνατόν μέρος. The remainder of (164a) deals with

προτροπή and not τὸ δυνατόν.

The author of this scholion defines the difference between προτροπή, συμβουλή and παραίνεσις. The definitions are quite different from those offered by Ulpian and Syrianos<sup>(24)</sup>. Ulpian picked out the scope of advice as the distinguishing feature. In (164a) the distinction turns on whether the aim and method of action are already agreed. Therefore συμβουλή is distinguished as advice in a situation where the desired goal is disputed, as is the manner by which the benefits will be achieved (Dilts p.45.2-6). In προτροπή, however, both the goal and the means of achieving it are obvious (Dilts p.45.4-5). παραίνεσις is said to combine aspects of both συμβουλή and προτροπή (Dilts p.45.6-7). It is closer to συμβουλή, because both set out to explain the manner of achieving the goal (Dilts p.45.7-9). This definition is inadequate. Moreover, such phrases as συμβουλευτικὰ ἐν προτροπῇ and τὸναντίον ἐν συμβουλῇ προτρεπτικά invite confusion (Dilts p.45.11).<sup>1</sup>

Ulpian's definitions were sound and plausible in the context of the *First Olynthiac*. The commentator states in this scholion : οὐδεὶς γὰρ προτρέπων ἐπιτίθεται καὶ τὸν τρόπον δι' οὗ κρατῆσαι δυνατόν (Dilts p.45.5-6). At first sight, Demosthenes' words in D.1.24-27 do not seem to suit this qualification, because Demosthenes is still advocating warfare in Thrace instead of Attica. If τρόπος implies more specific advice, relating to leadership and troop numbers or something of this kind, then the information which we are given in D.1.24-27 can be interpreted as the benefit and not the method of attaining it. The commentator would, in this case, be correct after all. Syrianos' definitions are different yet again.

It is very curious that Ulpian and the commentator in (164a) choose to digress at this point, in order to differentiate the same three terms and produce dissimilar definitions. Since digressions of this type occur elsewhere in the scholia on S<sup>(25)</sup>, the same author may be at work in S and the decision to define these three terms may be independent of Ulpian. Of course, if this comment was written before the *prolegomena* it may have influenced Ulpian's decision to digress.

### D.1.28 - ἐπίλογος

The only comment in S about the ἐπίλογος is the one-word comment (187d) which indicates that it begins at D.1.28.

### Conclusion

Barring a few repetitions, the scholia about the structure of the speech and Demosthenes' arguments appear to be progressive. This

suggests either that most of the scholia are written by the same commentator, or that the compiler of the scholia in S was careful to produce a consistent commentary. The former explanation is the more likely one, but until it is shown which scholia were produced by which hand in codex S this hypothesis cannot be proven.

There are no inconsistencies. There are recurring areas of interest such as ἀντιπίπτοντα and κεφάλαια. The comments are sensible, although instances have been pointed out where the commentator has failed to read a particular passage in the context of a broader argument.

## LANGUAGE, GRAMMAR AND EXPRESSION

The scholia in codex S reveal a marked interest in aspects of language. For all but one section of the speech covered by the scholia, D.1.15, there is at least one note which comes under this heading. Sometimes the comment is found in a brief, self-contained note, as for example (93b) and (150a), but often this topic is incorporated into longer scholia which examine more than one aspect, as for example (33a) and (60a).

### Λέξις

The most frequent type of comment concerns λέξις, or the use of particular words or phrases in their context. The value of individual comments is variable. For example, in (2a) we are told that Demosthenes has emphasised ὑμᾶς in the opening sentence of the *First Olynthiac*. This is improbable. Tiberios believes that ἔμφασις is a way of saying something without stating your point directly<sup>(26)</sup>. Tryphon says that ἔμφασις is λέξις where the nuance of a word specifies meaning<sup>(27)</sup>. Quintilian distinguishes these two definitions (*de inst.* 8.3.83-85). There are words which amplify meaning in context and talk around the point, making the meaning absolutely clear nonetheless. Perhaps what the author of (2a) means is that when Demosthenes says ὑμᾶς what he means is "you, the great Athenian people". This explanation seems unlikely. Perhaps the author of (2a) regards ἔμφασις as we would if we had to guess its meaning; that is, he believes it means "stress" or "emphasis". However, ὑμᾶς in this passage is not emphasised. The word neither heads nor closes a phrase, which are the best positions for emphasis.

(26c) is a straightforward comment that Demosthenes employs understatement in the phrase παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων, D.1.3, and that τι stands for μέγα. The observation is valid.

As part of a longer comment, (33a), the commentator examines the nuance of expression in D.1.4. Paraphrasing Demosthenes, he says : πλεονεκτεῖ γάρ, φησιν, ὁ Φίλιππος τῷ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων. οὐκ

εἶπε "κατορθοῦν καὶ νικᾶν" ἀλλὰ "πράττειν". τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάντως νίκη, ἀλλὰ τὴν παρασκευὴν καὶ τὸ ὄξυ τῶν ἔργων δεικνύει ' ὅπερ ἦττον λυπεῖ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (Dilts p.24.9-13). Demosthenes chooses to convey Philip's industry rather than his success. Success may be inferred but to have said so outright would have been too demoralising.

In (52a) Demosthenes is thought to be indicating that the position of the Athenians is a piece of good luck and he calls the opportunity a εὐτυχία. παραπεπτωκότα, D.1.8, does suggest a chance happening and one can only throw away (ἀφείναι) what one already has.

The author of (60a) argues that Demosthenes produces the lists of places in D.1.9 without conjunctions because he wishes to avoid making Philip appear too powerful. The word order of the sentence is also thought to minimise Philip's standing. Demosthenes does not list every place which was captured for the same reason. This refers to τᾶλλα. The commentator discounts the silly reason that Demosthenes did not want his speech to be too long. However, he does not explain how the effect works. The same example is found among the *Rhetores Graeci*, although their observations are not those of the author of (60a)<sup>(28)</sup>.

In (60b) the commentator digresses from his long discussion of D.1.9-10 to talk about the effect of saying ἐχρώμεθα τῷ Φιλίππῳ (Dilts p.30.21-24). He says that the verb implies that Philip is ταπεινός. This may be so, but the commentator's justification of it is as follows : διὸ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις χρῆσθαι λέγομεν ὅτι τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν ὑπουργοῦσιν (Dilts p.30.23-24). If we use χρῆσθαι in connection with Philip with a derogatory result, then we would effectively be guilty of being no less insulting when we use the same word of our friends. If the commentator is to be consistent in his argument, then this must be so. It may be that the commentator does not think of ταπεινός as a derogatory term and that a friend is someone who does what we want them to do, τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν ὑπουργοῦσιν (Dilts p.30.24).

In some of the scholia which have just been discussed arguments are put forward to justify the observations. Other scholia give simple assertions. In (122a) we find a straightforward comment about ὑπομείνας in D.1.18. The commentator puts it as follows : ὑπομείναι γὰρ λέγομεν ἐπὶ τοῦ καρτερεῖν, ὅταν ἴδωμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάσχοντα (Dilts p.39.6-7). The idea of standing by and protecting is present in the verb ὑπομένω and in the context of the speech the idea is appropriate.

(123a) notes that Demosthenes is arguing with the words περιέσται τῷ χρόνῳ that the Olynthians have the strength to hold out. He is implying that the capture of Olynthos will not be easy, unlike the capture of the other cities which Demosthenes has mentioned in D.1.12.

In (150a) we find a comment about the inclusion of the word κομιδῆ in connection with Theban untrustworthiness in D.1.22. It is said to

intensify this aspect of their character.

### Σχήματα

σχήματα are pointed out frequently in the scholia in S. They are noted without explanation, implying that the readership was expected to be familiar with these terms. While such consistency might imply that only one commentator is at work, the practice might have been standard. Again the identification of hands with scholia would clarify the question.

In (1a) the commentator suggests that there is more than one instance in the *First Olynthiac* where Demosthenes employs ὑπόληφισ (supposition) in his argument. This term is not used again in S. The unique reference might invite speculation that it is a stray observation, but there are three scholia, (5a), (89) and (92a), which point out this feature using other terminology : κατασκευὴν ὡς ὁμολογημένην (Dilts p.17.23-24), κατεσκεύασεν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον (Dilts p.34.6), εἴληφεν ὁμολογουμένην πρότασιν (Dilts p.34.21-22).

The first part of (27a) comments on Demosthenes' assertion in D.1.4 : οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεικῶς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουθ' ὄδυσμαχωτατόν ἐστι τῶν Φιλίππου πραγμάτων, καὶ βέλτιστον ὑμῖν. The commentator rightly points out that this statement is paradoxical, because it contends that the thing which is hardest to fight against is also the best thing for the Athenians. He gives an alternative name to this figure of speech, τροπή (Dilts p.23.12). This is odd. Among the *Rhetores Graeci*, and Hermogenes in particular, τροπή is defined as metaphor<sup>(29)</sup>. It is not included among the σχήματα. There are three possible explanations. The word may be a gloss of some kind which has crept into the text. A copyist may have made a mistake or the author understood something else by the term, assuming that he is using the term correctly.

In D.1.12 Demosthenes says of Philip : τί τὸ κωλύον ἔτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται ; The commentator in (93b) thinks that this is an example of the figure of speech called ἀποσιώπησις, because presumably ὅποι βούλεται conceals the true destination. Another scholion, (14c) which is not offered by S, looks at the difference between ἀποσιώπησις and ὑποσιώπησις<sup>(30)</sup>. The evidence suggests that ἀποσιώπησις occurs when you refuse to discuss anything unpleasant, whereas ὑποσιώπησις occurs when you refuse to say something unpleasant, but hint at it so strongly that there is no doubt what you are getting at. The codices are divided about the example in D.1.12 but the majority choose ὑποσιώπησις. It seems certain that a mistake has occurred in S. This supposition is supported by another example in D.1.19. All the codices, bar S, choose ὑποσιώπησις. In Dilt's *apparatus* we find that S, (125b), reads ἀποσιώπησις. Scribal error may be responsible for the mistakes in (93b) and (125b), or the author

may have been genuinely confused.

A good example of παράλειψις, whereby you pretend to omit information and in so doing give out the information, is noted in D.1.13 by the author of (104). Demosthenes is discussing the campaigns in Illyria and Paionia by saying that he will not discuss them. παράλειψις is discussed among the *Rhetores Graeci*<sup>(31)</sup>. The example is obvious because Demosthenes uses the word παραλείπω.

According to the *Rhetores Graeci*, τὸ σχῆμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ is a figure of speech in which one word is common to two phrases but is omitted in one of them<sup>(32)</sup>. An example is pointed out in (109) : εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν ὥσ' αἰεὶ τι μείζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δεῖ πράττειν ἐγνωκὼς ἔσται, ἡμεῖς δ' ὥσ' οὐδενὸς ἀντιληπτέον ἐρρωμένωσ τῶν πραγμάτων ..., D.1.14. According to the commentator, we have to understand the word ἀνεγνωκότες, an intense form of the verb γινώσκω, in the second clause. He is wrong to suggest that Demosthenes has ἀνεγνωκότες in mind, since this compound virtually always means "read" in Attic. We should understand instead simply ἐγνωκότες.

Another example is pointed out in (192b). At the beginning of D.1.28 Demosthenes says : πάντα δὴ ταῦτα δεῖ συνιδόντας ἅπαντας βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν ἐκεῖσε τὸν πόλεμον, ... . He then goes on to list those who should participate, including τοὺς λέγοντας. The commentator suggests that we should understand τοὺς λέγοντας δεῖν βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν ἐκεῖ τὸν πόλεμον. This suggestion is mistaken. Demosthenes surely means everyone who comes forward to speak and not just those who advocate involvement in the war. His list is made up of general classes of people. This is how the author of (192a), also in S, understands Demosthenes' words. The author of (192b) is being too subtle. If he were correct, Demosthenes would be attempting to avoid ill-will by saying that he is prepared to act upon his own advice.

Metaphor and simile are noted on three occasions. In D.1.3 the phrase τρέπηται καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι is thought to be taken from the language used of tearing limbs apart, according to the author of (26b). The suggestion is plausible. A violent metaphor suggests the unity of the Olynthians with the Athenians. The commentator in (89) rightly takes the phrase ἀδοξίαν ἀποτριψόμεθα, D.1.11, as a metaphor from cleansing filthy bodies.

Two scholia in S look at the financial simile in D.1.15. The author of (114a) is not the author of (114b). In (114a) the ἀρχαῖα which Demosthenes mentions in his simile are thought to be ἐνέχυρα (securities) upon which a loan is raised. In (114b) the ἀρχαῖα are identified as κεφάλαια (capital). Clearly there is a contradiction between these scholia.

The opening phrase of (114b) implies that there was some doubt about the correct interpretation of the simile : τινὲσ δὲ ἐξηγοῦνται (Dilts p.37.11). The author does not reveal which interpretation he favours,

either that implicit in (114a) or this one. He explains that some people believe that the simile is not about those who borrow money but about those who lend it (Dilts p.37.11-12). These people further argue that the passive form of δανείζω was often used by the Athenians to mean "lend" (Dilts p.37.12-13). The simile states that once debtors default, the creditors lose both the interest and the capital sum lent. This interpretation cannot be correct because only the active form of δανείζω means "lend"<sup>(33)</sup>.

The author of (114a) has understood the simile correctly. What Demosthenes is saying is that those who borrow money at high rates of interest, survive for a while but eventually lose the security upon which the loan was raised<sup>(34)</sup>.

### Lexicographical Scholia

There are eight notes which are lexicographical in scope. They tend to be very brief. In the case of (16), (27a), (50) and (132a) similar entries are found in the lexicon of Hesychios and in Byzantine lexica, such as the *Souda*, the *Etymologicum Magnum* and the *Zonarae Lexicon*. The examples occur no more frequently in one lexicon than in another. The question arises whether the scholia are later than the various lexica. We may suppose that the scholia are older and that they contributed to the later lexica, but it is possible that the scholia derived from earlier lexica, such as the lexicon of Hesychios, and have had no direct influence upon the contents of the extant lexica.

In the case of (132a), which refers to D.1.20, there seems to be no direct connection with the extant lexica. The scholion says : σύνταξις ἔστι δύο πραγμάτων ὡς περ ἔνωσις ' εἰώθασι δ' οἱ παλαιοί, ἐπειδάν τι ἄσαφές νομίζωσι λέγειν, διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς αὐτὸ λύειν, ὡς περ καὶ ὁ ποιητής ' εἰπὼν γὰρ (E586) "κύμβαχος" ἐπήγαγεν "ἐπὶ βρεχμόν τε καὶ ὤμουσ" ' καὶ πάλιν εἰπὼν (Λ 547) "ἐντροπαλιζόμενος" ἔφη "γόνυ γουνὸς ἀμείβων". οὕτω καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰπὼν "σύνταξις" ἐπήγαγε τὸ "λαμβάνειν καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα" (Dilts p.40.29-34). Thus σύνταξις joins together two acts to form one movement or activity. The lexicon of Photios, Bachmann's *Anecdota Graeca*, the *Souda*, the *Etymologicum Magnum* and the *Zonarae Lexicon* offer the same example from the *First Olynthiac*. This scholion, by offering examples not found in these lexica, suggests that it is complete in itself. It is still possible, however, that an earlier lexicon may have had more examples than these later lexica which the author of (132a) cannot have consulted.

Four other scholia offer a similar type of information. In (2c) we find νομίζω] ἀντὶ τοῦ κρίνω καὶ πιστεύω ; in (21a) < ὡς ἔστι > ] τὸ "ὡς" ἀντὶ τοῦ "καὶ γὰρ" ; in (56) κελεύοντες] προτρεπόμενοι ; and in (193a) < εὐθυναί >] αἱ βᾶσανοι. With the exception of (193a), these scholia offer observations which the commentator could have made himself and which need not have

originated from lexicographers. Pollux does, however, use the verbs *κελεύοντες* and *προτρεπόμενοι* of exhorting dogs, V 85.

*εὐθυναί* is the name given to the investigation of an individual following their year in office in Athens. *βάσανοι* refers to the practice of accepting evidence as true only if extracted under torture. Only slaves could be tortured<sup>(35)</sup>. The identification then of these two terms in (193a) requires explanation. The law differed in different cities. *βάσανος* can also be a more general word for "test" and this is probably what the commentator means. He is not thinking of, and perhaps does not know, the special Attic use.

There are numerous examples throughout the scholia in S where the commentator digresses in order to clarify the difference between similar terms. (50), (105c), (132) and (164a) provide good examples.

### Syntax and Style

Syntax is examined twice, in (8) and (105a). The mood of the verb *λάβοιτε* is interpreted in the former as indicative<sup>(36)</sup>. In (105a) the commentator points out alternative punctuation for the opening sentence of D.1.14. He does not tell us which text he prefers. This is unfortunate because an explanation from him might help us to understand this scholion better. It is difficult to interpret because the exact sense of *ἐπιφέρουσι* is not clear. His remarks suggest that there is a different manuscript tradition which omits the phrase *ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν*.

(174) is an unusual scholion because it is the only comment to mention style. It points to the rapid series of question and answer in D.1.25-26 and asserts that this produces *γοργότης*, or vigour, in the speech. This meaning of *γοργότης* is in line with Hermogenes' understanding of the term (Rabe p.312sq).

### Elementary Clarifications

In scholia such as (4), (19), (135), (137a), (137b), (167), (169a), (176), (182) and (192a) the commentator clarifies points in the text of the speech. Some state the obvious, as is the case with (176) which comments that the subject of *οὐχὶ βουλήσεται* in D.1.26 is Philip. Others are pernickety. The author of (135) comments that Demosthenes leaves out a phrase in D.1.20 after the words *εἰς τὰς ἑορτάς: λειπόμενον, εἰ μὴ βούλεσθε ἀποδοῦναι τὰ χρήματα τοῖς στρατιώταις*. Occasionally the comment is incorrect, as in (4) where we are told that the relative *ὧν* in D.1.1 refers to *τὰ χρήματα* and *τὸ συμφέρον*. *περὶ ὧν* really refers to the current relationship between Olynthos, Athens and Philip. Curiously, most of the observations of this type occur in the last eight sections of the speech.

## Conclusion

The comments on language, syntax and expression are generally sound, though some seem unnecessary because they point out the obvious. There is no problem of inconsistency in interpretation among these scholia. The most puzzling comments concern σχήματα because unusual interpretations have been given.

## HISTORICAL INFORMATION

There are ten scholia which include comments about the historical background to the *First Olynthiac*. Most of these scholia deal solely with this topic and this may suggest that they come from a different source to the ones dealing with rhetoric and language. (40a) is the exception, because it looks at rhetoric as well, albeit briefly (Dilts p.26.3-5).

(151) is a long scholion which highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the approach of the commentators in the scholia to historical matters. The scholion is prompted by Demosthenes' remarks in D.1.22. The commentator makes several points about the history of the Aleuadai. Aleuas was, or claimed to be, a descendant of Herakles (Dilts p.43.4-5)<sup>(37)</sup>. We do not know whether he was a historical persona or an eponymous hero. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence naming him as a tyrant in Thessaly and testifying that his descendants, the Aleuadai, continued the tyranny. The author of (151) simply calls him tyrant over the Thessalians (Dilts p.43.5), but his tyranny was based in the city of Larissa.

The commentator observes that the Thessalians were not trusted, and offers two possible reasons for this ; the story of Jason the mythical hero who deserted Medea, and the desertion of the Athenians by the Thessalian cavalry in the course of a battle in the Peloponnesian War (Dilts p.43.10-13). Both are plausible explanations.

The commentator refers to Thoukydides 1.107.7 in support of his alternative explanation (Dilts p.43.13). The appropriate passage reads : ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, οἳ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. This is a reference to the Battle of Tanagra, 457 B.C. and, in context, is a passing remark which Thoukydides does not dwell upon. Clearly the author of (151) is referring to this event. He is vague about which war saw this event take place. He says : ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέμῳ (Dilts p.43.12). This phrase should surely refer to the Great Peloponnesian War, 431-404 B.C., but the event took place during the First Peloponnesian War, 461-446 B.C.. There seems to have been no standard nomenclature for the wars in the fifth century B.C.. However, it would appear that the events of 466 - 404 B.C. were not

regarded as a single war<sup>(38)</sup>.

The same passage is quoted in Aillios Aristeides, in the course of a speech set in dramatic time following the announcement of Thessalian victory at Leuktra, 371 B.C.. He refers obliquely to Thoukydides' comment : ἔστιν ἀκούειν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, ὡς Θετταλοὶ ποτε δεῦρ' ἐλθόντες ἱππῆς κατὰ συμμαχίαν μετέστησαν παρὰ τὴν μάχην ὡς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (Lenz 1.4 p.729.8-10). There is, however, no verbal similarity between the scholion and this passage in Aristeides. Clearly in late antiquity the desertion at Tanagra was a standard example of Thessalian untrustworthiness.

There is strong evidence for the proverbial treachery of the Thessalians <sup>(39)</sup> and in particular there was ill-will about their role in the war with Persia<sup>(40)</sup>. Perhaps the true origin of Thessalian untrustworthiness is Demosthenes' opinion of the Thessalians throughout their dealings with Philip and Athens. In D.23.112 he leaves the audience in no doubt : ὑμεῖς μὲν ... οὐδένα προὔδωκατε πρόποτε τῶν φίλων, Θετταλοὶ δ' οὐδένα πωποθ' ὄντιν' οὔ. Demosthenes is thinking of contemporary events both in this speech and in the *First Olynthiac*. Since both Demosthenes and Thoukydides were read at school, Thessalian untrustworthiness would have been proverbial in later generations, if not in Demosthenes' own time.

The author of (151) states that the Thessalians could no longer endure the tyranny of the Aleuadai and invited Philip to join them in their fight against the tyrants. As a reward for expelling the Aleuadai, the Thessalians gave him Pagasai and the money from harbour and market dues (Dilts p.43.6-10). He adds that as a favour to the Thessalians Philip subdued the land of Magnesia, of the same name as the city, because the Magnetes had revolted from the Thessalians. Moreover, Philip founded a garrison in the city of the Magnetes, ostensibly as a precaution against a second revolt, but in fact as a garrison against the Thessalians themselves. The Thessalians were aware of this and prevented him from building: ἐκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τειχίζειν (Dilts p.43.14-19).

The exact number of interventions by Philip in Thessaly is unclear<sup>(41)</sup>. Polyainos remarks that there were many : ἀεὶ προσεβοήθει τοῖς καλοῦσι, 4.2.19. Griffith discusses the matter in detail and concludes that there were, perhaps, as many as four interventions in the years prior to Philip's election as archon of the Thessalians in 352 B.C.<sup>(42)</sup>. These occurred in 358 B.C.<sup>(43)</sup>, 356/5 B.C.<sup>(44)</sup>, 353 B.C.<sup>(45)</sup> and 352 B.C.<sup>(46)</sup>.

The Thessalian League was made up from the cities of Thessaly, but such an association encouraged the rival ambitions of the leading cities. Pherai and Larissa were the two cities which seem to have vied with one another for dominance. There is evidence to suggest that Philip was friendly with the Aleuadai of Larissa<sup>(47)</sup>. On the occasion of his intervention in 358 B.C., and perhaps also in 356/5 B.C., the Aleuadai

invited him to give assistance against the tyrants of Pherai. Even in 353 and 352 B.C. there is no reason to believe that the Larissans were not his allies. The Pheraians supported the ambitions of Phokis in the Sacred War, unlike other Thessalian cities, and consequently fought alongside the Phokian general, Onomarkhos, in the battles against Philip. Philip laid siege to Pherai and captured it in 352 B.C.. He allowed the tyrants Lykophron and Peitholaos safe passage out of Thessaly (48).

So the author of (151) is wrong when he says that Philip expelled the Aleuadae. The explanation for this might be that he is confusing the events of the 350s B.C. with a later incident. The sources tell us about one occasion when Philip was required to intervene and expel a tyranny of the Aleuadae in 344 B.C.(49), six years after the *First Olynthiac* was delivered. Demosthenes cannot be referring to the events surrounding this expulsion in the *First Olynthiac*. Indeed, Philip would not need to be invited to deal with the Aleuadae at this date because he had by this time been elected archon, though admittedly we do not know how the relationship between archon and Thessalians worked.

After capturing Pherai, Philip took Pagasai(50) and married a noble woman, Nikesipolis of Pherai(51). Griffith argues that as a result of his success in ridding Thessaly of the tyrants of Pherai and defeating the Phokians on behalf of the Thessalian League, Philip was elected archon of the Thessalians(52). Among the privileges may have been the allocation to him of certain taxes. From Demosthenes' words, D.1.22, it would appear that these included harbour and market dues. Thus the commentator is correct, in a sense, to say that Philip was rewarded with these taxes (Dilts p.43.8-10). It seems that he also controlled Pagasai, the important port of Pherai, although the implication of the commentator's words is that Philip was given Pagasai rather than captured it (Dilts p.43.9).

The observations about Magnesia are misleading. Magnesia was probably part of the spoils of war against Pherai, and its acquisition by Philip ought not to be seen as a separate event. Therefore its capture can hardly be regarded as a special favour to the Thessalians (Dilts p.43.15). The commentator suggests that the territory of Magnesia was in revolt. It may have been under Pheraian control and therefore the enemy of the Thessalian League. Philip is said here to have established a garrison (φρούριον) in the city of the Magnetes (Dilts p.43.16-17). His remark that there was a city of the same name as the territory (Dilts p.43.14-15) should be taken as an aside and not as the identification of the Magnetes' city as Magnesia. There was no city of that name in the land of Magnesia.

Clearly the Thessalians felt uneasy about the garrison, suspecting that it gave Philip power against them. Hence the commentator's view, perhaps true, that Philip alleged that the purpose of the garrison was to subdue Magnesia. He adds that the Thessalians prevented him from τειχίζειν (Dilts p.43.18-19). His meaning is unclear but clearly echoes

Demosthenes' own words : Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασι τειχίζειν, D.1.22. If Philip had already founded a garrison there (Dilts p.43.16-17), perhaps they mean that no additional fortifications were allowed. If the reference is to the construction of walls around the city, he ought to have written περιτειχίζειν. It is possible that the reference is not to the garrison in the city but to the land itself. This seems the most likely explanation, but the phrase is vague.

Sandys compares the commentator's remark, which agrees with Demosthenes in D.1.22, with the *Second Olynthiac* : καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσιν ἐφημισμένοι Παγασᾶς ἀπαιτεῖν καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιῆσθαι, D.2.11<sup>(53)</sup>. Quoting Grote, he contends that the latter is a more precise statement about what actually happened. The author of (151) is taking Demosthenes at his word. Sandys argues that the Thessalians may have objected to Philip's action in Magnesia but did not prevent him from fortifying the place. For it was not until 346 B.C. that Philip surrendered Magnesia<sup>(54)</sup>.

Most of the information in (151) could be compiled from a thorough acquaintance with Demosthenes. His remarks about the origin of the Thessalians' reputation for untrustworthiness reveal that other sources whether, primary or secondary, have been consulted. His most serious failing is to confuse the relative dates of Philip's interventions. He is also willing to accept Demosthenes' statement at face value, without thinking about the effect which particular phrases have in context.

(40a) and (41a) refer to Demosthenes' remark in D.1.5 : καὶ ἴσασιν ἂν τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους. In (40a) Philip's reason for slaying those who opened the gates of Amphipolis to him is "quoted" : εἰ τῶν ἰδίων πολιτῶν οὐκ ἐφείσασθε, πόσῳ γε πλεον οὐ μέλλετε περὶ ἐμὲ ὕστερον τοιοῦτοι γενήσεσθαι ; (Dilts p.26.9-10). We have no reason to doubt the implication of Demosthenes' statement, to the effect that those who betrayed the city to Philip did not receive the reward they expected. The commentator offers a plausible account. It would not be surprising if apocryphal stories grew up to illustrate Philip's character. Nevertheless, there is evidence that Philip treated his enemies well<sup>(55)</sup> but this was not always the case<sup>(56)</sup>. Polybios remonstrates with Demosthenes for branding those who accepted Philip as traitors, Polybios 18.14. Perhaps all that Demosthenes means is that Amphipolis is now enslaved, contrary to the expectations of the supporters of Philip.

In (41a) the fate of Pydna is discussed. The moral of the example is the same as in the case of Amphipolis. The commentator tells us : εἶθ' ὕστερον γνόντες ὅτι οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν φείσαιτο, ἔφυγον ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀμύντιον ἱερὸν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ' κολακεύοντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν πατέρα πρῶην οἱ Πυδναῖοι ἱερὸν αὐτοῦ ἐποίησαν ' ὅμως οὐδ' ἐκείσε καταφυγόντων ἐφείσατο, ἀλλ' ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὄρκους ἐπὶ τῷ μηδὲν ποιῆσαι ἐξεληθόντας ἀνείλε (Dilts p.26.15-19).

Aristeides gives us a similar story : οὐτε γὰρ τῆσ ἀξίασ τῆσ ὑμετέρασ τοὺσ ἕξω θαυμάζειν, οὐθ' ὑπερβάλλοισθ' ἂν Ἀμφιπολίτασ καὶ Πυδναίουσ, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἔθουον ὡσ θεῶ, οἱ δὲ τοῦ πατρός αὐτοῦ νεῶν εἶχον δεικνύναι. ἀλλ' ὅμωσ τοὺσ μὲν ἐξέβαλε, ἥνίκ' αὐτῶν ἦν διακορήσ, τοὺσ δ' ἀπέσφαττειν ἐν τῷ νεῷ τοῦ πατρός, ὁμνύσ ἔτι, καὶ τὰσ σπονδάσ αἱ σφαγαὶ κατελάμβανον ... (Lenz 1.4 p.632.9-14). We do not know Aristeides' source for the detail in his speech but we may suppose that he has not invented it. There are several points of coincidence with (41a). Both refer to worship of Philip at Pydna and Amphipolis. He is talking about affairs between Thebes and Athens in 340/39 B.C.. Therefore Aristeides lends weight to the probability that there was a hieron at Pydna<sup>(57)</sup>.

Another coincidence is that Philip committed murder despite his sworn oath. In Aristeides' version Philip committed sacrilege by killing the people, perhaps Pydnans, inside a shrine. According to (41a), he did not commit sacrilege but used deceit to achieve his nefarious end. Thus we have evidence that stories of this kind were circulating about Philip. Although there are similarities with Aristeides' version, there are also significant differences. Therefore (41a) is independent of Aristeides. Unfortunately we cannot tell whether the author of the scholion or Aristeides is giving the more accurate account or which is earlier.

There are three scholia in codex S which refer to the financing of the campaign, (44b), (131a) and (135). (44b) refers to D.1.6 and a large section of this comment has been obliterated (Dilts app. crit. p.27.1). This includes the explicit reference to the theorik money. The loss is accidental and not the result of emendation. Therefore we can assume that S said the same as R says. The author believes that Demosthenes is proposing that the theorik money be used for financing the campaign. In (131a) the author refers to D.1.20 and the dissipation of the stratiotik money (Dilts p.40.23). He does not explain where the finance will be found instead. If the same man is the author of (44b) and (131a), then the source of finance will be the theorik money. In (135) reference is made to the stratiotik money but no mention is made of the theorik money (Dilts p.41.5-6). Therefore the only positive statement about the theorik money occurs in (44b). It is a little odd that the scholia in S have so little to say about the theorik money.

In (53c) we find background information about Demosthenes' reference to Euboia in D.1.8. He tells us a little about the result of the Battle of Leuktra and the ensuing hostility between Thebes and Athens. He adds that when the Athenians returned from Euboia they found ambassadors from Amphipolis waiting for them (Dilts p.29.4-7), requesting Athenian assistance against Philip. Much of this information could be gathered from reading Demosthenes himself. He makes numerous references to the participants and the victory of Thebes at Leuktra in 371 B.C.<sup>(58)</sup>. Demosthenes also mentions the successful Athenian campaign in

Euboia in 357 B.C. when they wrested power from Thebes<sup>(59)</sup>. The author of (53c), not Demosthenes, brings these two events into an almost causal relationship. Success against the Lakedaimonians may have allowed Thebes to dominate Greece and to take the opportunity for gaining ground in Euboia in the end. In no way can the sequence of events be as precipitated as the commentator suggests (Dilts p.28.32). If Thebes proceeded to Euboia εὐθύς following the Battle of Leuktra, it took Athens another fourteen years before Athens made her move in 357B.C.. Perhaps what the author means is that the Athenians then act swiftly when invited, ie 357 B.C.<sup>(60)</sup>. In the same year, Demosthenes tells us that Hierax and Stratokles came to Athens from Amphipolis asking for help. Presumably the author of (53c) has not considered the dates in relation to one another. Furthermore there is evidence from Xenophon that the Euboians were working alongside the Thebans in 370 B.C. and 362 B.C., Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23, 7.5.4.

The anecdote about the number of Theban dead (Dilts p.29.2-4) and their removal from the field may be a stereotype story. The request for truce is the standard mark of the concession of victory to the opponent.

Amphipolis was colonised by Athens in 437-6 B.C.<sup>(61)</sup>. So the author of (55) is correct to say that Amphipolis was a κτήμα of Athens. The city was named previously in D.1.5, but this remark from the commentator is no doubt prompted as an explanation of the phrase ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

(184) is an unusual comment because it stipulates the cost of the war in Amphipolis, which is mentioned frequently in the *First Olynthiac*. The cost is put at χίλια διακόσια τάλαντα, twelve hundred talents. It remains to be seen where this figure has come from and whether it is a realistic figure<sup>(62)</sup>.

Finally, (98) gives geographical rather than historical information, but the contents reveal that the author was paying attention to the events. For he observes that according to the chronological list which Demosthenes gives in D.1.12, Philip had to retrace his steps from Thessaly to Thrace. Thus the author is familiar with the geography of Greece. If he was a Greek himself then this is not surprising. He is picturing Philip's movements.

### Conclusion

The serious errors which have been found in the scholia concerning the historical background of *the First Olynthiac*, reduce the value of the material. However, some of what is said is unfamiliar to us. Demosthenes, Thucydides and Aiskhines are likely to have been the main sources but clearly other sources which are no longer extant have been consulted<sup>(63)</sup>. This is the case in the anecdotes about Philip. The detail in the scholia reveals that the author was concerned to amplify the

background. There are no inconsistencies between these scholia. They may have been written by the same author. The comparative silence about the theoric money might suggest that the author or the compiler of these historical notes was more interested in accounting for the current situation than in giving later generations information about domestic finance. The comments reveal no political or historical attitudes.

## CONCLUSION

The approach of the scholia to the *First Olynthiac* is creditable. The authors or compilers have ensured that they are coherent and progressive. Despite a few passages which seem repetitious<sup>(64)</sup>, there is no serious impediment to the hypothesis that many of these scholia were written by the same man. An analysis of which scholia, especially those dealing with the rhetorical analysis, were written by which hand is required. It has already been noted that (60b) and (70), (157) and (159c) and one or more of (140a), (140b) and (140c) are direct evidence of the various hands which added scholia to the codex. Should it prove that some of these scholia were produced by the same hand, then we would have to suppose that they are curiously independent of one another. Similar conclusions may be drawn from a comparison of (137a) and (137b), (157) and (159c), and (192a) and (192b).

None of the topics of interest dominates the others. The degree of analysis sometimes changes as is the case with κεφάλαια but no topic is neglected for long. The overall impression of this collection of scholia is that they form what we would regard as a conventional form of commentary. However, these comments are perhaps less continuous and comprehensive than we should expect a commentary to be. The quality of the material varies but the interpretation is never absurd. A serious flaw is that a point is examined within a very narrow context and is not related to the rest of the speech.

Where we do find clues about the underlying structure, it differs significantly from Ulpian's interpretation. The singular similarity found in (13a) and also the coincidence in contents of (164a) highlight the difference between these scholia and the *prolegomena*. There is no reason to believe that any of the commentators in S were aware of the *prolegomena*. The apparent independence from Ulpian is valuable. We can begin to appreciate the range of scholarship. The comments are written confidently but a strong personality is lacking. Perhaps this is the result of being excerpted.

The commentators may be professional rhetoricians or teachers. This work may be intended for schools. Quotations from Demosthenes, Thucydides and Homer are not surprising since these authors were read

in school<sup>(65)</sup>. There are several instances where the scholia in S have a surprising meaning for technical terms. For example ἐμφασίς in (2a), ἀνθυποφορά in (105c), προτροπή in (164a) and τροπή in (27a). The distinctive use of technical terms separates the author from Hermogenes. Ailios Aristeides produces similar stories but there are significant differences between them. Perhaps the number of similarities between just one speech of Aristeides and these scholia suggests that either the commentator, or his source, had access to the speech but somehow the stories were altered slightly. The sources of this codex are discussed in a later chapter.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO

- (1) v. Drerup, *SBAW* p.307.
- (2) v. Introduction [p.4] for comment about the number of scholia.
- (3) v. R [p.106].
- (4) D.1.1 : 8 ; D.1.2 ; 7 ; D.1.8 : 8 ; D.1.9 : 6 ; D.1.20 : 6.
- (5) v. Ulpian [p.13].
- (6) (1a), (4), (5a), (6), (8) and (9a). (2a) and (2c) look at language.
- (7) v. Ulpian [p.15] and (1c) found in F Y vp<sup>2</sup> R.
- (8) cf (33a-c) [pp.61-62], (44b) and (52a) [p.62] and (140a), (140b) and (140c) [pp.63-65]. Also v. (60b) and (70) [p.62] and (157) and (159c) [p.60].
- (9) (52a), (70) and (140c).
- (10) v. n.5 above.
- (11) cf Ulpian (Dilts p.4.22-24). Here he is discussing the different εἰσαγωγαί of the three objections. He says that the first is not by ἀντίθεσις. Elsewhere in referring to the same section of the speech (Dilts p.4.26, p.8.20) he talks about the ἀντιθεσις, meaning the objection.
- (12) v. Anax. 1435b27 (ἀντίθετον) ; Arist. *Rhet.* 1410a22sq (ἀντίθεσις) ; Hermog. (Rabe p238.11-15) (ἀντίθεσις), (Rabe p.431) (ἀντίθετον).
- (13) v. Ulpian [n.42].
- (14) In (52a) the author believes that Demosthenes is showing that the Olynthians will be reliable allies : συστήσασ τὴν γνώμην τῶν Ὀλυνθίων καὶ βεβαίους συμμάχους ἀποδείξασ (Dilts p.28.19-20).
- (15) v. Cawkwell, "Olynthus" pp.127-130 ; Brunt, "Euboea" pp.247-251 ; Carter, "Euboea" pp.418-429 ; Parke, "Euboea" pp.246-252.
- (16) In Dilts' edition this is a statement not a question. As an objection, it is more likely to be a question. Dilts' text may be wrong.
- (17) cf (105c) on [p55].
- (18) cf (54) on [p.56].
- (19) v. Ulpian [p.30].
- (20) Thanks are due to Professor MacDowell for pointing out the use of this phrase to me.
- (21) v. Ulpian [pp.31-32].
- (22) v. Ulpian [pp.27sq].
- (23) D.1.1 - συμφέρον ; D.1.7 - συμφέροι ; D.1.4 - ἀλυσιτελέσ. Also D.1.2, 24 - καιρόν as a beneficial opportunity.
- (24) v. (Dilts p.13.2-6) and also Ulpian [pp.37] ; Syrianos (Rabe p.192.1-14).
- (25) (60b) and (105c).
- (26) Tib. (Ball. p.19 no.14) illustrates his definition with an example from D.1.12 : τί τὸ κωλύον ἐτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται ; . Demosthenes makes his answer clear without saying it aloud.
- (27) Tryphon (Spengel 3 p.199.15) : the use of a compound verb such as καταβαίνω can suggest falling from a great height.
- (28) Hermog. (Rabe p.426.10-427.10) ; Greg. of Corinth (Walz 7.2 p.1216.19sq).
- (29) Hermog. (Rabe p.199) ; Anon. in Inv. (Walz 7.2 p.848) ; cf Tryphon (Spengel 3 p.191).
- (30) (14c) in F<sup>4</sup> R *codd Ulp* , v. R [p.97].
- (31) v. Hermog. (Rabe pp.419-421) ; Alexander Noumenios (Spengel 3 p.23) ; Phoibammon (Spengel 3 p.51.14) ; Tiberios (Ball. p.10 no.5).
- (32) Phoibammon (Spengel 3 p.46.3) ; Tiberios (Ball. p.36 no.37).
- (33) The active and passive forms are opposed in D.35.11 : ἀποδώσουσιν οἱ δανεισάμενοι

- τοῖς δανείσασι τὸ γινόμενον ἀργύριον. v.also D.34.26.
- (34) Sandys, *Olynthiacs* n.139.
- (35) D.M. MacDowell, *Law* pp.245-247 nn. 560-563.
- (36) v. [p.70-71].
- (37) Pindar *Pyth* . X 1-5 :  
 >Ολβία Λακεδαιμων,  
 ... μάκαιρα Θεσσαλία . πατρὸς δ' ἀμφοτέραισ ἐξ ἑνός,  
 ἀριστομάχου γένος Ἡρακλέος βασιλεύει.  
 τί κομπέω παρὰ καιρόν ; ἀλλά με Πυθῶ  
 τε καὶ τὸ Πελινναῖον ἀπύει  
 >Αλεύα τε παῖδες, ...  
 Also, *schol ad* >Αλεύα τε παῖδες, (Drachmann vol 2 p.242 8a). Also *RE* 1 1372 and Polyainos 8.44.
- (38) v. G. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* , London 1972, pp.294-295.
- (39) Schol ad Aristoph. *Plut.* 521; Zenobios 4.29, (*CPG* vol 1) ; D.23.112 : Eurip. frag. 422.
- (40) Herod. 7.172, 174, 9.1 cf 9.58. v. also Westlake, "Medism" pp.12-24.
- (41) The essential reading for this topic is Griffith in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* vol II , Oxford 1979, chapters V-VIII ; G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* , London 1978 ; J.R. Ellis, *Philip and Macedonian Imperialism* , London 1976 ; H.D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* , Groningen 1969, chpt VIII ; G. Cawkwell, "The Defence of Olynthus", *CQ* 56 N.S. 12 (1962) ; N.G.L. Hammond "Chronology of the Sacred War", *JHS* 57 (1937) p44sq ; G.T. Griffith, "Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly (358-352 B.C.)", *CQ* N.S. 20 (1970) pp.67-80 ; C. Ehrhardt, "Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Interventions in Thessaly", *CQ* (1967) N.S. 17 pp.296-301.
- (42) Griffith, *Macedonia* chpt. VI, pp.218-230
- (43) Griffith, *Macedonia* p.225-227 ; Justin. 7.6.6-9 ; Satyros *FHG* vol III p.161 . Also v. Plut. *Alex* 10.1sq., Diod.16.14.1-2 and Theopompos *FGH* 115 Fr 35.
- (44) v. Griffith, *Macedonia* pp.227-229 ; Diod.16.14.1.
- (45) v. Diod.16.33.4, 34.1, 35.1-2 ; D.23.183 ; Polyainos 2.38.2, 4.2.20-22.
- (46) Diod.16.35.3-6. v. also D.1.21-22 ; Justin 8.2.1 ; Diod. 16.33.4, 35.1. 354 B.C. is rejected in articles v. Griffith "Early Interventions".
- (47) His elder brother Alexander and Thessaly, v. Diod.15.61.2sq, 67.3sq ; Plut *Pelop* 26. Kineas : Theopompos *FGH* 115 Fr 35.
- (48) v. Diod. 16.37.3, cf 39.3.
- (49) v. Polyainos 4.2.11 ; D.18.48 ; Diod.16.69.8.
- (50) v. D.1.9 ; Diod.16.31.6.
- (51) v. Satyros *FHG* vol III p.161 ; Steph. Byz. s.v. Θεσσαλονική.
- (52) v. Griffith, *Macedonia* pp.285-295 ; Justin 8.2.1 ; interpretation of Isok. 5.20 ; D.1.21.22 ; also D.6.22 which refers to 344 B.C. and corroborated by Justin 11.3.2 on Alexander.
- (53) Sandys *Olynthiacs* n.201.
- (54) v. D.6.22.
- (55) Compare the fate of Lasthenes who betrayed Olynthos (348 B.C.), D.19.265, Diod. 16.53.2, and those of Peitholaos and Lycophron (352 B.C.). v. also n. (48) above.
- (56) Compare the fate of the "Temple Robbers" at Krokos Plain (352 B.C.), Diod. 16.35.4-6 and those of Triikka and Pharkedon, Diod.18.56.5, Polyain. 4.2.18 and Theopompos *FGH* 115 Fr. 82.
- (57) v. Hammond, "Philip's tomb" p.333, refers to this passage. Excavations at Vergina have produced further evidence that Makedonian kings received divine honours after their death, if not when they were alive.

- (58) v. D.3.23, 18.98.
- (59) v. D.4.17.
- (60) v. Aiskh. 3.85, 8.74-75 for swiftness.
- (61) v. Thouk. 4.102-108, 5.6-11 ; Aiskh. 2.c.31.
- (62) 1500 talents are mentioned in Aiskh. 2.71 in connection with Amphipolis, but the parallel is not the same.
- (63) v. Sources [pp.247-249].
- (64) (33a), (33b) and (33c) and (140a), (140b) and (140c).
- (65) Thoukydides : (151) ; Homer : (132a) ; Demosthenes : (114a).

## CHAPTER THREE

### CODEX R

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

There is considerable difficulty in establishing which scholia are found in codex R. Drerup indicates that the contribution of R derives from S, A and Y and he criticises Dindorf for giving R so much significance in his edition<sup>(1)</sup>. Dilts comments that R has been copied from A<sup>1</sup> and S and need only be cited when the old manuscripts have suffered damage or have lost entire scholia<sup>(2)</sup>. Accordingly, R is only cited occasionally in his edition. He says that both the scholia and the text of the speeches were written by the same hand which is dated to the fourteenth century (Dilts p.IX). In fact, a photograph of R reveals that there are a few additional scholia by a later hand which Dilts disregards, because he thinks they are of no value. These scholia are printed in the Morel edition of 1572<sup>(3)</sup>. It would have been more satisfactory if he had included these scholia in his edition. It is not clear from Dilts' comments whether we are to suppose that many of the scholia found only in R were originally in S, Y and A.

Dindorf cites codex R through out his edition and this, at least, gives a clearer picture of the scholia which the codex contains. In addition, I have examined a photograph of codex R. Dilts states that the scholia and the speech are written by the same hand, barring the few later scholia which he disregards. The quality of the script is good and, notably, the comments are written across the page interspersed with passages from the speech. However, there are also comments written in the margin which are faded and appear to be written in different ink. Dilts generously identified some of these marginal scholia for me<sup>(4)</sup>. Despite the location of these scholia and the different shade of ink, we are still to suppose that these scholia are still by the same hand. Appendix Two is a table showing the scholia in R according to Dilts, Dindorf and my identifications of the scholia<sup>(5)</sup>.

#### Codices R and A

Drerup does not provide details about the relationship between R and A. Dilts interpretation is unsatisfactory : *ad. or. 1-4 R etiam ex A<sup>1</sup> descriptus antequam ff. 3-12 perdita sunt. his in casibus et quando R singularia scholia praebet codicem R citavi* (Dilts p.XI n.1). A<sup>1</sup> offers

three scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, (71b), (108) and (116). When these are cross checked with Dindorf and the photograph of R, only (116) is common to both codices. Further comparison between A<sup>1</sup> and R in D.2-4 might confirm Dilts' interpretation. He has argued that R is derived from A, as far as the comments on D.24 are concerned, but such a relationship need not be the same for the *First Olynthiac* (6).

### Codices R and Y

Codex Y is mutilated and offers only five scholia on the opening section of the speech. The contribution of R is very similar, but it does not offer all the scholia in Y, and those which it does are significantly different versions. This relationship might apply to other speeches. Y is the exemplar of the *codices Ulpiani* and so, where these codices are cited, there ought to be a high correlation between R and them, if the hypothesis is correct. In fact, although they share many scholia, they also hold many independently of one another.

### Codices R and S

Drerup argued that R was copied from a descendant of S or from S itself, as well as from Y and A<sup>(7)</sup>. Various hands are responsible for the scholia in S and Drerup believes that the scribe of R merely copied from the hands which he calls 1, 3, 4<sup>a</sup> and 4<sup>b</sup>. There is a substantial number of mostly discursive scholia which are found only in R and not in S. These correspond to (1c), (3a), (3b), (3c), (5c), (5d), (11b), (11c), (11d), (14c), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26a), (26d), (28), (29), (31), (36b), (37), (39a), (51a), (53d), (71c), (74), (75a), (75b), (83b), (92b), (93a), (94), (119a) in Dilts' edition. Drerup records four instances corresponding to (51a), (53d), (74) and (83b) in codex S where hand 4<sup>a</sup> has written ζήτει εἰς τὸ δίφυλλον τὸ σημεῖον or a similar phrase in place of the scholion. These are detailed scholia which are unique to R. Drerup concludes that when hand 4<sup>a</sup> found that he had insufficient room for his scholia in the crowded margins of codex S, he filled an extra bifolium with his comments. When R was produced the information was preserved from the bifolium which was lost some time later.

This accounts satisfactorily for four of the unique scholia of codex R. We cannot tell if all the unique scholia in R are likely to have been taken from comments by 4<sup>a</sup> which are now lost.

## Conclusion

Dilts' and Drerup's interpretation is plausible. However, there is good reason to think that the scholia which are offered uniquely by R form part of a commentary, the remainder of which is found in the scholia common to S and R. R provides us with a fuller version of this commentary than S. My hypothesis is that there is a core of scholia which form a unified commentary. If this is so, then the importance of codex R is greater than is now suggested, because it does contain all the core scholia, whereas we cannot be certain that S contained all of these scholia. The influence of codices Y and A on codex R for the *First Olynthiac* appears to be insignificant.

### THE UNIFIED COMMENTARY

#### Similarity in Approach

There are general reasons for arguing that there is a core of scholia, all of which are found in R and only some in S, as far as we can be certain, which form a unified commentary. The scholia which are shared by S and R shall be termed SR. The scholia which are unique to R shall be referred to simply as R and the scholia unique to S shall be referred to as S. The scholia which make up the contribution of codex R are frequently long and discursive and they give a progressive analysis of the speech, almost phrase by phrase. While basic elements of the structure, such as the προοίμιον and the ἐπίλογος, are pointed out, no underlying structure is developed in the manner of Ulpian in the *prolegomena*. The scholia which are unique to R reveal an interest in λέξις and offer detailed discussions about the psychological effect which Demosthenes aims to achieve. These interests are also typical of the SR scholia<sup>(8)</sup>.

#### Rhetorical Analysis

Although it is difficult to establish which scholia exactly are contained in R, it seems that the rhetorical analysis of the speech in codex R differs slightly from the analysis in codex S<sup>(9)</sup>. The structure of the speech, according to the contribution of R, may be discerned as follows :

##### A. προοίμιον - D.1.1

- B. δεύτερον προοίμιον - D.1.2, ἔστι δὴ
- C. τὰ κεφάλαια - D.1.2-23
  - a) τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν - D.1.2-17
  - b) τὸ δυνατόν - D.1.18-23
- D. προτροπή - D.1.24-27
- E. ἐπίλογος - D.1.28

This analysis is fundamentally the same as the analysis in codex S. The main difference concerns the transition of κεφάλαια. In S the transition occurs between D.1.18 and 19, whereas R identifies the transition between D.1.17 and 18. This and other slight differences shall be examined presently.

### Objections

The similarity in approach to the speech between the SR scholia and the scholia unique to R is well illustrated by their interest in objections, and specifically ἀντιπίπτοντα. Whereas Ulpian interpreted the *First Olynthiac* as the response to three fundamental objections to Demosthenes' supposed proposition, the SR scholia ignore the underlying structure of the speech. The same is true of the unique scholia in R. They examine the text in detail, in order to identify and discuss minor specific objections which could, if not anticipated, prove to be a weakness in Demosthenes' argument. In SR, (105c) differentiates three types of objection, and the ἀντιπίπτοντα in the scholia unique to R fit the definition. In R we find remarks in (1c) which corroborate this definition : ἀναιρεθέντων γὰρ τῶν ἀντιπιπτόντων καὶ τῶν ὑφορμούντων ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν ἀκροατῶν ῥᾶον ὑποδέχεται τὸ λοιπὸν τὰ μηδεμίαν ἀντίρρησιν ἐπιδεχόμενα (Dilts p.14.13-15). There are several other references to ἀντιπίπτοντα in the scholia unique to R : ἀντιπιπτόντων in (1c) (Dilts p.14.8), ἀντέπιπτε δὲ αὐτῷ (26d) (Dilts p.22.33), ἀντιπίπτοντος λύσις and ἀντιπίπτον ὑποτεμνόμενος in (36b) (Dilts pp.24.32, 25.4), ἀνιτλέγειν in (51a) (Dilts p.27.27) and τὸ ἀντιπίπτον in (74) (Dilts p.32.18,19). The validity of these analyses will be considered later in the detailed discussion of R.

### Language

The nuance of a particular word or expression is sometimes involved in countering objections in scholia which are unique to R, as

for example τὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων, (26d), and δὲ πάντες ἐθρύλουν (51a). The significance of a single phrase is an important element in discussions about λέξις. The effect of a phrase in its particular context is examined for example, in the cases of πολλῶν χρημάτων and νομίζω (1d) (Dilts p.15.1-5, 6), εἰ φανερόν γένοιτο, (3a), (Dilts p.17.3sq), προθύμως, (5d), (Dilts p.17.34) and ὑμῖν ἐκείνων, (11d) (Dilts p.19.34) and ἡμεῖς. This type of comment is also found in SR scholia<sup>(10)</sup>.

SR scholia offer few references to σχήματα<sup>(11)</sup>, though S itself offers many. There are several examples in the scholia unique to R. The example of παρὰ προσδοκίαν in D.1.4 provides us with evidence of a plurality of sources. (28) and (29) in R point out the same example, although in slightly different terminology. The repetition in R is superfluous and suggests that more than one source has been consulted.

In SR there are digressions in order to differentiate terms<sup>(12)</sup>. The scholia unique to R also contain such digressions. Three of them concern σχήματα. (11b) and (11c) look at προσωποποιία and ἠθοποιία and (14c) looks at ὑποσιώπησις and ἀποσιώπησις. These last two terms caused confusion in the scholia in S<sup>(13)</sup>. If the errors cannot be attributed to carelessness, then it is possible that the relevant notes were written by a hand other than the one which produced the long, discursive scholia. (5d), which is unique to R, differentiates δέοντα and πρέποντα (Dilts p.18.16).

### Quotation

Both SR scholia and scholia unique to R make use of quotations from other speeches in Demosthenes and from works of other authors. They offer fourteen examples between them, the majority of which occur in scholia unique to R<sup>(14)</sup>. All of these quotations or references are to authors of classical Greece. There is one reference in R to late antiquity, because a remark is directed at Zeno of Kition, (36b) (Dilts p.24.36). Demosthenes and Thucydides are mentioned together in (1c) (Dilts p.14.10). The following passages in Demosthenes are quoted in scholia in R : D.20.11, (1d) (Dilts p.14.20), D.13.10, (1d) (Dilts p.15.2), an unidentified speech is referred to in (1d) (Dilts p.15.1), D.18.3, (14c) (Dilts p.20.24), D.18.205, (39a) (Dilts p.25.26) and D.18.99, (53d) (Dilts p.29.12). There is one quotation from each of the following authors : Isokrates 4.3, (3a) (Dilts p.17.3), Homer *Iliad* 4.437, (51a) (Dilts p.28.2) and, unusually, Aristotle frag. 135, (53d) (Dilts p.29.22). There is also a reference to Thucydides 1.68-71 in (23) (Dilts p.22.8).

## Historical Background

R offers (36b) in addition to the SR scholia which deal with the historical background<sup>(15)</sup>. The author of this scholion purports to give the real reason why Philip went to war with the Olynthians. The Olynthians refused to give up Philip's brothers who had taken up residence in Olynthos<sup>(16)</sup>. This type of background information is unusual among the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*. Only Y offers a similar interest and this seems confined to (1f), since the apographs of Y, which is mutilated, do not reveal an interest in this topic in the rest of the speech.

## Conclusion

It is clear that the general approach of the SR scholia and the scholia unique to R is the same. The next stage in this chapter will examine the scholia in R, including many of the SR scholia, in groups. The aim will be to show that there is unity between the SR scholia and the scholia unique to R, and to establish whether there are sufficient links between the scholia of SR scholia and scholia unique to R, which may or may not have been found in S, to suggest that they are part of a unified commentary.

## DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CORE SCHOLIA

### The Προοίμιον - (1c), (1d), (3a), (3b), (3c), (5c) and (5d).

Demosthenes is said to produce a μέτριον καὶ ἐπεικὲς ἦθος in his language, (1c) (Dilts p.14.7) and this makes the listener well-disposed towards him. ἦθος is difficult to translate, but the author is arguing that the language which Demosthenes uses presents him as a reasonable and moderate character. This is said to appeal to the Athenians. This is a fair observation but the only example which the author picks out is the use of νομίζω in place of πέπεισμαι<sup>(17)</sup>.

The author examines Demosthenic and Thoukydidean practice with regard to προοίμια. He says that they not only introduce κεφάλαια which are favourable to their case (Dilts p.14.11), but they also deal with

points which might otherwise have caused them problems : τὰ δοκοῦντα λυπεῖν αὐτοὺς (Dilts app.crit. p.14.11-12). He elaborates on the second point, explaining that once an audience is convinced that possible objections have been removed, then the remainder of the speech will admit of no objections or counter-arguments (Dilts p.14.13-15).

In the μὲν / δὲ construction which follows (Dilts p.14.15-18) the μὲν clause (Dilts p.14.15-16) identifies the κεφάλαια as τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν<sup>(18)</sup>. The δε clause (Dilts p.14.17) identifies as a possible objection the problem of suggesting that the theorik money should be used to finance the campaign. This is the reason why Demosthenes entices the Athenians into despising money. The author does not explain at this point why the objection is removed if the Athenians think lightly of money, but this point is dealt with in (1d) (Dilts p.14.25-15.5).

(1d) follows on continuously after (1c) and compares Demosthenes' approach to the προοίμιον in this speech with that in D.20.11. The contents picks up what was said in (1c). The author's comparison is a good one. The passage to which he refers in D.20 concerns an incident when the Thirty borrowed money from the Spartans. Demosthenes makes the point that Athenians put moral principle, in this case keeping their word, above financial gain.

The author then proceeds to analyse the προοίμιον phrase by phrase (Dilts p.14.25sqq). His interest lies in the effect of language and, in particular, in the the words πολλῶν and νομίζω. These words are also discussed in (1e), which is found in F<sup>4</sup>, Y and vp<sup>2</sup> and is an abbreviated form of (1d) <sup>(19)</sup>.

What R contains and the abbreviated version omits are phrases which would indicate that (1d) is part of a long discussion : ἔλθωμεν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ προοίμιον ἄνωθεν (Dilts p.14.25). Furthermore, there are comparisons drawn between this speech and other works by Demosthenes. D.20.11 has already been mentioned. The other two comparisons refer to the use of πολλῶν. The first is made with περὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν (Dilts p.15.1) which is unidentifiable to us. The second refers to the following passage in the speech *On the Syntaxis*, delivered in 353 B.C. : ἐρῶ ... ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων τούτων ἁπάντων, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδεὶς μέμνηται, τοῖν δυοῖν δ' ὀβολοῖν ἅπαντες. καίτοι τοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πλείονος ἢ δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, τᾶλλα δὲ μετὰ τούτων ὧν εἶπον τῶν βασιλέως ἀξι' ἔστι χρημάτων ..., D.13.10. Demosthenes goes on to list the city, tribute and so forth. Demosthenes is arguing that a two obol fee for some service is trivial in comparison with questions about

economic and strategic policy. D13.10 may even be a reference to the theorikon<sup>(20)</sup>. He phrases his argument in such a way that those who concern themselves with trivial details, as he sees them, must be considered worthless themselves. His ploy is to divert the discussion from the subject of obols to important issues.

The author of (1d) summarises D.13.10, to the effect that those who bother themselves about a pittance are themselves worth only a pittance (Dilts p.15.2-3). He continues : διὰ τοῦτο νῦν μεθ' ὑπερβολῆς εἰσήγαγεν ὅτι, εἰ πολλῶν χρημάτων σύνηθεσ ὑμῖν καταφρονεῖν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον τῶν ὀλίγων τούτων ἄξιον παριδεῖν ; (Dilts p.15.3-5). Thus, Demosthenes is thought to be developing the same line as in D.13.10 but he has magnified the monetary value. In this way he exalts the value of τὸ συμφέρον. Instead of arguing, as he did before that the discussion of a small amount was itself trivial, he is arguing that bothering themselves about a large sum of money (the cost of financing the expedition) is insignificant, compared with the advantage which will accrue to the city. The author of (1d) is basically correct. Demosthenes is talking about relative values between things which are trivial, important and fundamental in D.13.10 and D.1.1. The specific relevance of πολλῶν χρημάτων to the cost of financing the campaign is, however, dubious.

In (3a), (3b) and (3c) we seem to be given three possible interpretations of the words εἰ φανερόν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν ..., because they are introduced with καὶ ἄλλως (Dilts p.17.11, 15). (3a) leads us into a digression, which contrasts the way in which Isokrates and Demosthenes announce that what they are about to say is the truth. Isokrates says in 4.3 : ἤκω συμβουλεύσων περί τε τοῦ πολέμου <τοῦ> πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους. The arrogance and grandiosity of this promise must be what prompts the author of (3a) to say that this introduction befits a σοφιστήσ. Such bold statements are not considered necessarily undesirable by the author. He makes allowance for Isokrates' statement, because of the attitude of the Athenian people at the time the speech was delivered.

On the other hand, Demosthenes' self-effacement, καθ' ὑποτίμησιν (Dilts p.17.9) is the mark of a πολιτικὸς ῥητῶρ (Dilts p.17.5). Presumably, the optative phrase εἰ φανερόν γένοιτο creates this effect in place of the indicative φανερόν ἐστίν.

The author of (3a) has a second point to make. He argues that Demosthenes refers to the Athenians' benefit rather than the Olynthians' because the Athenians will then be more likely to choose τὸ

συμφέρον over the cost of their involvement. It is correct that Demosthenes frames his argument in such a way as to appeal to the Athenians.

The presence of καὶ ἄλλως in the text of (3b) (Dilts p.17.11) suggests that it gives a different interpretation of the same passage which was examined in (3a). This is not, in fact, what has happened. (3b) develops the closing idea of (3a), which concerns the emphasis on Athenian fortunes. The author says that if Demosthenes wins the goodwill of the Athenians, by talking about them instead of the Olynthians, they will become more amenable to accepting his propositions in the speech. There is a clear implication that Olynthian conduct was open to censure, ὡς διαβεβλημένον (Dilts p.17.14), and that Demosthenes chooses not to mention it. If this is so, then the author of (3b) adheres to Zeno's belief that one of the serious objections to Demosthenes' case is ἄλλ' ἄπιστοι οἱ Ολύνθιοι (21). It is possible that a compiler of scholia regarded (3b) as an alternative interpretation.

(3c) seems to offer an alternative interpretation (Dilts p.17.15) but, in fact, it develops the closing idea in (3b). The author says that because the Athenians have been eager for hostilities to occur between Philip and the Olynthians, they will be glad that Demosthenes is talking in defence of the Olynthians, who meet with their approval. This observation cannot arise naturally from D.1.1, and has been attracted to its present position in the codex by the presence of (3b). The comment would be better placed at D.1.7, in connection with νυνὶ γάρ ὃ πάντες ἐθύλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ ..., since the author says that the Athenians have been keen to establish war between the Olynthians and Philip for a long time (Dilts p.17.16). In its present position (3c) renders D.1.1-7, superfluous because the author claims that the Athenians will be delighted to hear what Demosthenes has to say in defence of the Olynthians. A compiler of these scholia may be using καὶ ἄλλως to indicate different sources, without any significance for their contents. However, it would seem that καὶ ἄλλως in this case does not indicate alternative interpretations at all. According to LSJ καὶ ἄλλως can mean "and besides" (22). This would suit the development of ideas very well.

In (5c) we are told that Demosthenes now moves on to a second idea : μετήλθεν ἐφ' ἑτέραν ἐννοιαν, τὴν πρώτην ἀφείσ' ἀκατάσκευον . αἴτιον δὲ τούτου τὸ τῆσ' προτάσεως ἔνδοξον (Dilts p.17.27-28). The author then digresses to talk about ἐνδοξοὶ προτάσεις, or truisms, in general. (5c) is effectively another comment about the phrase ἀντὶ πολλῶν, and we

ought to regard these opening words as the first ἔννοια.

The author suggests that such statements may be found ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας (Dilts p.17.31-32). The next phrase, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων, is probably an afterthought, since it spoils the construction of the sentence.

The sudden appearance of ἕτερον (Dilts p.17.27) need not mean that (5c) is by a different author from the man who wrote (1c). There is another example of a scholion in R in which the opening remarks summarise the preceding section<sup>(23)</sup>.

(5d) returns to the particular passage under scrutiny, by reiterating the summary in (5c) : λαβὼν οὖν καὶ νῦν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον τὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἕτερον ἐπάγει νόημα (Dilts p.17.33). The second νόημα is this : προσήκει προθύμως ἐθέλιν ἀκούειν (Dilts p.17.34). What follows is, in effect, a detailed argument against the notion that Demosthenes is pretending to extemporise. The author's case relies on the nuance of particular words : ἐν ᾧ γὰρ πάντως ἀκούειν αὐτοὺς πείθει τῶν συμβουλευόντων, ἐν τούτῳ δείκνυσιν ὅτι μόνος αὐτὸς εὗρηκε τὸ συμφέρον. εἶτα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν προσέθηκεν ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἦν Δημοσθένης συμβουλεύων ' "οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἶ τι χρήσιμον ἔσκεμμένος ἦκει τις" ' ἔσκεμαι μὲν τὸ συμφέρον ' εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σκεφασμένους εἰπεῖν τι δέοι, οὐ παραιτήσομαι (Dilts p.17.35-18.2). The author goes on to give a detailed justification of his view. He argues that those who have not considered the matter closely give inferior advice to someone who has (Dilts p.18.4). Demosthenes has given a lot of time to the subject (Dilts p.18.5). This is plausible but speculative . The author thinks that χρήσιμον and ἀκούσαντες λάβοιτε imply that Demosthenes' advice is tantamount to ἄρπαγμα and λῆμμα. The link between them and advice is that both result in the accretion of benefit and profit (Dilts p.18.6-9).

In turning to those who do speak *ex tempore* , the author says : διὰ τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἀνείλε τὸ βέβαιον ("νομίζω" γὰρ φησι) ... (Dilts p.18.10-11). This reference to ὑπόληψις, or supposition, picks up the first comment found in SR, (1a) : καὶ ἔστι πρῶτος τόπος τῶν ἐξ ὑπολήψεως<sup>(24)</sup>. This observation about νομίζω is compatible with (1d) where the author says that νομίζω is a tactful way of avoiding being over-assertive. The idea of doubt is present in both. The commentator must know that ὑπολαμβάνω is the word in Demosthenes' text since he has just quoted it (Dilts p.18.10). So, probably, νομίζω is meant as an interpretation rather than a quotation.

Demosthenes disparages the benefit which extemporizing speakers

yield (Dilts p.18.11-12). Three reasons are given. Demosthenes puts down anything they might say to τύχη rather than to the abilities of the speakers (Dilts p.18.12-13, 18). The commentator continues : εἶτα κὰν ἐπέλθῃ τισίν ,οὐ πάντως, ἀλλὰ "πολλά" (Dilts p.18.13-14). πολλά is less comprehensive than πάντως. Therefore the chances of such a person having something useful to say are more remote. Thirdly, the commentator says : καὶ ταῦτα οὐ προδήλωσ εἶπε συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ "τῶν δέοντων". He explains that δέοντα covers many aspects including τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.18.15-17. Thus δέοντα is a very general term and gives the speakers much scope. However, Demosthenes is concerned only with the limited area of τὸ συμφέρον.

The plausibility of this argument rests upon the vocabulary which implies vagueness, for example ὑπολαμβάνω and ἐνίοις. πολλά in place of πάντως is less convincing. πολλά is less comprehensive than πάντως but Demosthenes could have said τινα if he wished to be vague. The author may well be correct to argue that the scope of δέοντα extends beyond what is merely συμφέρον. Therefore a speaker making points which are δέοντα need not be discussing τὸ συμφέρον, which is the issue which Demosthenes regards as fundamental.

The commentator recapitulates (Dilts p.18.18-25), remarking again that the ἐννοίαι of the προοίμιον are related, and that Demosthenes speaks as though his initial proposition is accepted by the time he reaches the end of the προοίμιον. The fundamental point of this scholion, that Demosthenes is disparaging towards those who extemporise, conflicts with (9a) which is an SR scholion<sup>(25)</sup>. The author of (9a) thinks that Demosthenes is trying to convey the impression that he is extemporising.

In (1c) the προοίμιον is discussed in terms of λύσις, ἀντιπίπτον and κεφάλαια, and in (5d) it is expressed in terms of ἐννοίαι. There is no incompatibility here, nor indeed overlap, in the lines which are discussed. The author of both could be the same man. If so, the analysis which he is producing, is thorough.

#### Δεύτερον Προοίμιον - (11b), (11c), (11d) and (14c)

There seems no impediment to the supposition that the same author wrote (11b), (11c) and (11d). προσωποποιία is examined in (11b), and (11c) gives a general survey of the second προοίμιον. A detailed discussion of the second προοίμιον follows in (11d).

The consensus among the *Rhetores Graeci* about προσωποποιία seems to be that it is a term used when an inanimate object is given a voice<sup>(26)</sup>. This is what is understood in (11b), and in (11d) καιρός is taken metaphorically. The first mention in (11b) (Dilts p.19.29-31) can be interpreted either as a man or as an opportunity. (11d) continues : ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ἐπέγνω τὸν καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ δυνατόν ἦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀναλαβεῖν τὰ πράγματα (Dilts p.19.32-33). It is clear that the author understands καιρός as referring to opportunity. This is indeed the obvious way to take Demosthenes' words.

A problem occurs when we come to examine (11c). In (11b) the commentator differentiates between prosaic and poetic προσωποποιία. Of the latter he says : ἐκεῖνοι μὲν αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ποιούσι φθεγγόμενον ἢ τι ἕτερον οἷς οὐ μέτεστι φωνῆς (Dilts p.19.22-23). Clearly, inanimate objects speak for themselves in poetic προσωποποιία. Of non-poetic προσωποποιία the commentator says : ὁ μὲντοι ῥήτωρ τὴν ἐκείνου φωνὴν ὑποκρίνεται τὸ πιθανὸν τῷ λόγῳ κατασκευάζων (Dilts p.19.23-24). Thus, in prosaic προσωποποιία the speaker imagines what an inanimate object would say. The precise definition of προσωποποιία is open to many interpretations, as the *Rhetores Graeci* illustrate. This definition seems reasonable.

The opening statement of (11c) is as follows : δύναται δὲ τὸ τῆς ἠθοποιίας ἐνφυχότερον ἅμα καὶ ἐναργέστερον ἀποφαίνειν τὸν λόγον (Dilts p.19.24-25). The change in terminology must be accounted for. Either the commentator thinks that ἠθοποιία is a name for prosaic προσωποποιία, in which case the terminology is peculiar and the phrase in (11b) ὡς περ ἐκ προσωποποιίας (Dilts p.19.21) means that καιρός is not an example of προσωποποιία, or, which is more likely, the commentator uses ἠθοποιία as a general term for the creation of characters within a speech or poem, and that προσωποποιία is used mostly in connection with inanimate objects.

(11c) begins with a remark about the effect of creating characters in speeches. The purpose of the second προοίμιον is to indicate the scope of Demosthenes' remarks, to establish that Demosthenes' opinion is of long standing and to remind the Athenians that they must become involved themselves (Dilts p.19.27-28).

There is a strong echo between (1c) and (11c), because both discuss the aims of the first and second προοίμια respectively in general terms, before the subsequent scholia provide the detailed examination. The phrase ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δεύτερον προοίμιον ἠθικὸν ὁμοίως καὶ

πραγματικόν in (11c) (Dilts p.19.26) echoes similar phrases in (1c) (Dilts p.14.8-9). The notion expressed in (11c), that Demosthenes' opinion is well established, conforms with the opinion expressed in (5d), that Demosthenes is not extemporising.

The author of (11d) attempts to justify the interpretation that τὰ πραγμάτα in the phrase τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων refers to τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πραγμάτα. If Demosthenes had meant the affairs of Olynthos, he would have simply said τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν τούτων. His reason for justifying this statement does not follow logically : ἤρμοττε γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ δεικτικόν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ νῦν ἐνέστηκεν (Dilts p.19.35-20.1). Some comment is needed on what the author means by τὸ δεικτικόν. Neither ἐκείνων nor τούτων has the deictic suffix -ι, yet both alike are demonstrative pronouns. So why does he regard τούτων as deictic and not ἐκείνων ? He may be taking the words as temporal, thinking that τούτων must refer to something in the present and ἐκείνων to something past. He believes that ἐκείνων is an allusion to τὴν παλαιὰν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἡγεμονίαν (Dilts p.18.1-2). Therefore he may indeed be taking the words as temporal. He is surely wrong ; really ἐκείνων means "at a distance from here" spatially, i.e. at Olynthos, not in Athens. It is interesting that he sees a reference to hegemony here, but this interpretation is highly allusive and does not follow the simple interpretation of the text.

The commentator thinks that the phrase εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε is added in order to enforce the allusion to former Athenian prosperity and former hegemony over many people (Dilts p.20.1-2). There is a logic to this. The notion of safety entails its counterpart danger. When Athens was prosperous and in control of an empire, there was no danger. The commentator notes that this phrase has been added without substantiation : διὸ καὶ ἐπήγαγεν ὡς ὁμολογούμενον (Dilts p.20.2). However, the point could not be substantiated if it was not being made at all. The obvious way to take Demosthenes' words is to regard them as emphatic : "you must take action, we are in danger." Demosthenes is appealing to self-interest.

The final part of the scholion is straightforward (Dilts p.20.4-7). The author points out that Demosthenes uses ὑποσιώπησις in order to issue the Athenians with a subtle but unmistakable rebuke about their attitude. This must refer to ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα ... . This scholion does not add to the points stated briefly in (11c) that Demosthenes' opinion is of long standing and that the Athenians themselves must become involved. Only Demosthenes' σκέφισις is explored in detail (Dilts

p.19.29).

(14c) concentrates on the example of ὑποσιώπησις which occurs in D.1.2. Inevitably, it appears to repeat what has been said in (11d) about Demosthenes' desire to reproach the Athenians in a suitable manner (Dilts p.20.4-7). (14c) is a digression, such as we find elsewhere in R<sup>(27)</sup>, which looks at the intention and purpose behind ὑποσιώπησις. He does this by distinguishing it from ἀποσιώπησις, for which he draws a straightforward example from D.18.3. τρόπον πρὸς αὐτά ... is thought to mark the end of the προόμιον and εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ... is the κατασκευή (Dilts p.20.25-27). The absence of an ordinal number with the προόμιον is not proof of a different author and does not indicate that someone thought that the first προόμιον continued thus far. The argument which this comment sustains is as follows : "put a high value on advice, and listen to me if you are concerned about your safety." The label given to εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας is unexpected, because it does not seem related to anything said in (11d).

A photograph of codex R reveals that R contains (Dilts p.20.16 τοῦτο -26 προόμιον) and that there is a gap before we find (Dilts p.20.26 κατασκευῆς-fin.). Therefore, it is possible that the latter remark is not by the same author as the author of the core scholia in R and has been introduced into the text at some stage in transmission. The initial remark about the significance of ἡμεῖς (Dilts p.20.15-16) is not apparent in the text. This means that the version of (14c) in codex R is closer to the comment of Menander, as quoted by Gregory <sup>(28)</sup>, than the version in the *codices Ulpiani* which offer the full version, as printed in Dilts's edition. Their version may be a compilation of two or three separate scholia.

The main section of (14c) is almost certainly written by Menander Rhetor<sup>(29)</sup>. There is a chance that Menander is the author of other scholia in R which we have no means of identifying. It is possible that he is the author of the core of scholia which forms a unified commentary on the *First Olynthiac*, but there are two points against this hypothesis. The first is the more important and concerns the location of (14c) in codex R. It appears between (23) and (24). As we shall see, these two scholia, together with (22) and (25), form a cohesive quartet of scholia, which look at consecutive clauses and phrases from the end of D.1.2 to the beginning of D.1.3. (14c) looks at ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.2 and comments on the rhetorical structure in this section. It is difficult to explain why the sequence of scholia would be like this, unless (14c) is an extraneous scholion incorporated,

inappropriately, into the text at this point.

The second impediment is that the term κατασκευή is strange because it is not related to anything said in (11d), but this is less of a problem.

### D.1.3 - (22), (23), (24) and (25)

(22) opens with remarks pertinent to the whole of D.1.2-3 : τὰ μὲν ὄντα φοβερὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου σεσιώπηκε, τουτέστι τὴν δύναμιν, τοὺς στρατιώτας, τὸν δὲ τρόπον εἶναί φησι φοβερόν, οὗ καὶ ῥαδίως περιγενέσθαι δύναται (Dilts p.21.30-32). The author then concentrates on the phrase μὴ πανούργου ὄν, arguing that this phrase has two functions. Firstly, it diminishes Philip's apparent forcefulness (Dilts p.21.33) and, secondly, it gives the reason for voting for an embassy (Dilts p.21.33). Only the first aspect is examined in this scholion. Demosthenes calls Philip πανούργου. This is a κακία which verges towards σοφία (Dilts p.21.34-22.1). The commentator cites Odysseus as a parallel, because he is called σοφός for his use of tricks and deceit. Demosthenes mentions πανουργία here because it is ἄδοξον, and deliberately avoids using the word σοφία because it is ἐνδοξον (Dilts p.22.1-3). The result is that Philip remains κάκοσ.

(23) examines the next phrase in D.1.2 : καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρῆσθαι. The commentator remarks that this phrase appears to be an encomium of Philip, but he adds : οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ὕβριν παρέστησεν ἢ προκειμένη λέξις (Dilts p.22.6). The phrase ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο implies that the same person wrote (22) and (23). He argues that the preceding reference to πανουργία puts the notion of δεινότης in an unfortunate light. We appear to have a contradiction here. In (22) the absence of a complimentary term (σοφία) is thought to emphasise the force of κακία. In (23) the presence of a complimentary term (δεινός) carries no weight against the strength of πανουργία. However, the two are easily reconciled. There is a fundamental difference between the adjectives σοφός and δεινός. The former is always complimentary, so the commentator thinks. His point is based on the understanding that δεινός is an ambiguous word, cf the English "clever." Most often it will be taken in a favourable sense, but in this case, because the preceding word πανούργου is unfavourable, δεινός is to be taken in an unfavourable way. Therefore, the author of (22) and (23) may still be the same person.

The commentator in (23) concludes by drawing a comparison between this passage and Thoukydides 1.68-71 (Dilts p.22.7-12). In the latter the Corinthians are said to have frightened the Lakedaimonians into co-operating with them, by pointing out the attitude of the Athenians rather than the Athenians' material superiority. This is not, however, an example of the creation of an unfavourable impression by a pejorative term preceding a favourable one, which is what (23) is explaining. It is an example of what is mentioned in (22) (Dilts p.21.30-32), where Demosthenes is said to concentrate on character rather than material advantage.

(24) deals with the next clause in the speech. Demosthenes is saying that yielding sometimes and making threats at others is the mark of a man who is not stable. He adds that such a man is to be believed when he is making threats. The commentator says : δι' ὧν γὰρ εἴκει, διὰ τούτων καὶ ἀπειλῶν ἀξιόπιστος ' δεῖ γὰρ, ἐξ ὧν αὐτῷ σύνοιδεν, ἐκ τούτων ἑκάτερα πράττειν. καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἐν οἷς ἐλαττούμενος αἰσθάνεται ἀπειλεῖ, εἴκει δ' ἐν οἷς ἑαυτὸν πλεονεκτοῦντα γινώσκει (Dilts p.22.15-18). While it is true that Demosthenes represents Philip as a Protean figure, he gives no suggestions for Philip's motivation, nor that Philip uses the same reasons for performing contrary actions.

The opening phrase of (25) reveals that it is probably by the same author as the rest of these scholia : ἔστι μὲν καὶ τοῦτο πανούργου τὸ διαβάλλειν (Dilts p.22.19). It continues the theme of stressing Philip's πανουργία. The commentator rightly associates slander with πανουργία in his ensuing discussion, but suggests that Demosthenes is denying that the city is vulnerable to slander (Dilts p.22.20). This is a subjective comment. In the context of this speech, Demosthenes is saying that the Athenians are open to accusations. In choosing the verb διαβάλλω, Demosthenes is not being impartial towards Philip. However, this does not occur overtly. This is not the same as saying, as the commentator does (Dilts p.22.20), that Philip's accusations are groundless. Indeed, this is not what Demosthenes is implying. The rest of this scholion (Dilts p.22.21-fin.) correctly interprets the other reason for the reference to slander. Demosthenes hopes that, by threatening their self-esteem, the Athenians will make sure that Philip cannot use their absence from Olynthos as an excuse for slanderous accusations.

D.1.3-4 - (26d), (28), (31) and (33a)

(26d) comments on the argument presented by Demosthenes in D.1.3, and concentrates, in particular, on the final phrase of this scholion : τρέφεται καὶ παρασπάσηταί τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων. The author says : διὰ τῆς πανουργίας καὶ τῆς δεινότητος ἐφόβησε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (Dilts p.22.32). The reference to δεινότης does not affect the discussion about the κακία of Philip in (22) and (23) above. Philip's cleverness creates fear in others towards him and not his moral standing.

The author adds that Demosthenes is aware that he might be presenting Philip as invincible, and so, as a means of anticipating this weakness, Demosthenes includes the phrase τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων and the comment about the embassy (Dilts p.23.2). This seems plausible. The commentator shows considerable interest in the phrase and develops it : τὸ δὲ "τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων" διπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ μέσον ἐσιώπησεν ὅπερ ἦν τὸ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ' ἴσως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αἰνίττεται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὅτι μόνησ ὑμῖν ἐξόδου χρεῖα καὶ τοῦ πλεῦσαι (Dilts p.23.3-6). The reference of διπλοῦν and μέσον ἐσιώπησεν is not clear. It appears, however, that the words refer firstly to any matters which have a bearing on the hegemony of Greece, and, secondly, the extent of the force required. Demosthenes does not mention either going to war or the dangers involved. The commentator argues that Demosthenes cannot be referring to the Olynthians : εἰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν Ὀλυνθιακῶν πραγμάτων ἔλεγεν, εἶπεν ἂν φρούριον ἢ πόλισμα μικρόν (Dilts p.23.7-8).

The commentator's phrasing is difficult here, and the interpretation conjectural. In the context of the speech, Demosthenes is using a vague phrase which may, or may not, conceal an allusion to the hegemony of Greece. He must surely be referring to Olynthos and Philips' influence in that territory.

Both in expression and in ideas, this scholion is similar to (11d) (30), where the author argues, with equally little success, that the word ἐκείνων in D.1.2 cannot refer to the Olynthians. Both think that the phrase εἶπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ..., D.1.2, contains an allusion to hegemony (Dilts p.23.8-11, cf p.20.1-3).

The opening remark of (28) is as follows : φοβήσασ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τῆς Φιλίππου πανουργίας καὶ δυσκαταγώνιστον αὐτὸν καταστήσασ παραμυθεῖται πάλιν αὐτοὺς διὰ τούτων ὧν ἐφόβησε (Dilts p.23.15-17). The first part of the sentence, as far as καταστήσασ, summarises D.1.3, and the second part clarifies that τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων begins Demosthenes' παραμυθία of the Athenians. Thus, the encouragement begins in mid-sentence. These lines effectively summarise the main points of (26d). The commentator continues by saying that

Demosthenes makes a paradoxical statement (Dilts p.23.18). The paradox is that the difficulty in fighting Philip is beneficial to the Athenians. The commentator rightly adds that this statement requires justification (Dilts p.23.18). The paradox is described as follows : δύο δὲ ὄντων τοῦ τε δύσμαχον εἶναι τὸν Φίλιππον διὰ τὴν πανουργίαν καὶ τοῦ λυσιτελεῖν τοῦτο τῇ πόλει, πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἀπήντησεν (Dilts p.23.19-21). Demosthenes wishes to argue that Philip is δύσμαχος in order to scare the Athenians, and he wishes to emphasise the reasons for Philip's success, in order that the Athenians might emulate him (Dilts p.23.23-27). This encouragement is termed προτροπή (Dilts p.23.24).

At the end of (28) (Dilts p.23.27-29) the commentator mentions Philip's successes and also the point that the Athenians are being encouraged not to employ mercenaries. This is surely a reference to D.1.6 and the words καὶ αὐτοὺς ... ἐλλείποντας. That is to say, (28) is a summary of D.1.3-6.

(31) deals with λέξις and picks out details in Demosthenes' choice of words which suggest that the Athenian people will be impelled to emulation. The commentator says that Philip is called a δεσπότης because the Athenians want to be δεσποταί too. He goes on to say that ταμίας is an oblique allusion to the theorik money : αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ταμίαι γενήσεσθε τῶν χρημάτων καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ διαρπάσει (Dilts p.24.5-6). This comment begs a question about the administration of this fund and it is clear in the commentator's mind that the Athenians have no influence in its use. Actually the officers were elected<sup>(31)</sup>. The phrase οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ διαρπάσει is ambiguous. The author does not make clear whether the Athenians would want to hold on to the theorik money, in which case Demosthenes would be damaging his own case, or whether the Athenians will have total control over the use of the fund without impediment. The latter would signify that the Athenians were then free to make what use of the fund they wished.

(33a) is an SR scholion and opens with a familiar form of comment : πάλιν αὐτοὺς φοβήσασ δι' ὧν πράττει Φίλιππος, παραμυθεῖται διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων (Dilts p.24.8-9). In (28) we are told that Demosthenes was going to emphasise Philip's fighting ability in order to scare the Athenians, and is also going to encourage them, paradoxically, because of the benefit which would result from Philip's prowess.

The fuller account in (33a) (Dilts p.24.9-14) suggests that we are being give the details which back up the generalisations given in (28) about D.1.4. There are three reasons for thinking that this is so. Firstly, Philip's activities and his industry are pointed out, paying

particular attention to Demosthenes' choice of vocabulary (Dilts p.24.9-12). This corresponds to the idea in (28) that Demosthenes wants to make sure that the Athenians are scared (Dilts p.23.23). Secondly, the commentator in (33a) briefly mentions that even as Demosthenes is stressing that Philip is δύσμαχος, he is giving προτροπή (Dilts p.24.12-14). Since the commentator does not explore this interpretation, it seems likely that he is simply summarising the detailed case which was set out in (28) (Dilts p.23.23-27). Further comment is unnecessary. The third reason is that (33a) ends as follows : τὸ δὲ λυσιτελοῦν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα δείκνυσιν ' οὐ γὰρ πεισθήσονται τῷ Φιλίππῳ διαλλαγὰς προτείνοντι ' πάλαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ πανούργον ἴσασιν (Dilts p.24.14-16). This comment is linked with (28) because in the latter we are told that the paradox Demosthenes had to justify τὸ λυσιτελεῖν τῇ πόλει (cf Dilts p.23.20-21), but we are not given any further explanation. In (33a) the benefit is identified as Philip's long history of πανουργία which will prevent the Olynthians from accepting his offers of reconciliation. In (28) gives no details about τὸ λυσιτελεῖν.

It seems likely that (26d), (28) and (33a) form part of a continuous methodical interpretation. If the evidence which binds them is not sufficient proof of single authorship, then we have to conclude that a compiler has taken remarkable care to assimilate compatible scholia. (31) looks at λέξις and does not contradict anything we find in the other three scholia, but, other than a reference to envy (Dilts p.24.3), there are no strong points of similarity between it and the other scholia. Indeed, it may be that it is not by the same author, because it alludes to the paradox again.

Codex S offers two additional scholia, (33b) and (33c)<sup>(32)</sup>. The former looks at Demosthenes' understanding of human psychology. Its absence from R is not important. The absence of (33c) is more significant since in its summary of the effect of D.1.3-4 would have provided a comment of a type common in R, i.e. summary followed by detailed analysis. The closing remark about Philip's ταπεινότης (Dilts p.24.22) ties in with (60b) in SR, which looks at this quality in detail (Dilts p.30.20-24)<sup>(33)</sup>. There is a minor inconsistency in terminology. (33c) uses the term τὸ συμφέρον, whereas (28) and (33a) refer to τὸ λυσιτελοῦν. It is possible, though of course speculative, that (33c) was omitted from R by accident. Dindorf attributes both (33b) and (33c) to R, but they do not appear in the photograph.

Among the other scholia which look at this section of the speech there is further evidence of a plurality of sources. παρὰ προσδοκίαν more than once. Each example uses slightly different terminology (28)

and (29). Dilts attributes (29) to R, although it is not visible in my photograph of the text. I assume that he is correct. (31) has also been mentioned above. This repetition involves a minor point and does not affect the hypothesis that the long, discursive scholia in R form part of a unified commentary.

D.1.5 - (36b), (37), (39a) and (40a)

(36b) falls into two parts. The first (Dilts p.24.32-38) identifies an ἀντιπίπτον and comments on an alternative interpretation. The second part (Dilts p.24.38-25.5) purports to give the real cause of the hostility between Philip and Olynthos. The author of (36b) thinks that the objection which Demosthenes is countering has resulted from the emphasis which Demosthenes has laid upon Philip's cunning. This ties in with the previous comments in R. Demosthenes has stated that the Olynthians will not join Philip and that this is the benefit of Philip's πανουργία. This is a bold statement and it provokes an objection : ἀλλὰ πανούργος ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ῥαδίως πείθει τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους (Dilts p.24.32-33). The author takes the emphasis which Demosthenes places on the danger in which the Olynthians find themselves to be a sufficient answer to the objection. In this scholion the justification is not analysed in detail.

The commentator dismisses an interpretation, which he attributes to Zeno, that the objection is ἀλλ' ἀπίστοι οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι. Ulpian also rejects this interpretation although he does not name Zeno in connection with it<sup>(34)</sup>. Ulpian thinks that the objection which is being faced is ἀλλ' οὐκ οἴκειος ὁ πόλεμος (Dilts p.8.33). (36b) is giving a third interpretation (Dilts p.24.37-38). This third interpretation is attractive because Demosthenes talks about Philip's character and his πανουργία in particular. It could be argued, however, that the answer contains the clue about the nature of the objection and Demosthenes does dwell on Olynthian conduct in the past.

The second part of (36b) suggests that the true cause of the war between Olynthos and Philip was that the Olynthians would not hand over Philip's brother who was living in Olynthos. We do have evidence that two of Philip's half-brothers lived in Olynthos and that their relationship was not fraternal<sup>(35)</sup>, but strategic interests will also have played a part in prompting the hostility. Philip's strategic designs are a more likely explanation. It is suggested that Demosthenes has not referred to the true cause of the war because he would then have had to deal with the following objection : ἀλλ'

ἔξεστι τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ἀποδοῦναι τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι τοῦ πολέμου (Dilts p.25.4-5). Even if the commentator were correct about the facts surrounding the origin of the war between Philip and the Olynthians, this proposal is highly speculative. Arguments *e silentio* are inappropriate here.

(37) consists of a series of comments which refer to ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ ... ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος, D.1.5. The commentator's opinion is that Demosthenes refers to an occasion when Olynthos revolted from Athens<sup>(36)</sup> but that the choice of words expressing this throws a favourable light upon the incident, because the Olynthians were fighting for their freedom : σιωπήσασ δὲ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῷ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐνδόξω παραμυθεῖται τὸ πταῖσμα (Dilts p.25.10-11). He goes on, though : "ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους" (Dilts p.25.13-14). Either the commentator is thinking about the events of 353B.C. when Amphipolis revolted from Athens and Olynthus did nothing, or he is thinking of the Archidamian war. He also suggests that Demosthenes is playing down the significance of that event because he dismisses it as ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας. This is plausible as an interpretation of the detail. However, it does not answer the objection favoured in (36b), and the author almost contradicts himself when he gives the reason for Demosthenes' remarks about Olynthian conduct in the past : ὡς μηδένα λόγον ἔχειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἐγκλήμασι μνησικακεῖν (Dilts p.25.15-16). Demosthenes would surely not have referred to Olynthian unreliability in the past unless Olynthian conduct was an issue which he had to face. (37) is consistent with Zeno's interpretation of the objection.

The points which (36b) and (37) make are different, but not incompatible, since (36b) is about the present war and (37) about a past one.

Three topics receive attention in (39a). The author starts by looking at the choice of words which Demosthenes makes when referring to the danger which confronts the Olynthians. This expands on the claim made in (36b) that Demosthenes answers the objection ἀλλ' ῥαδίως .. by concentrating on the danger which the Olynthians face. Pathos is increased, so the commentator thinks, by using both ἀνάστασις and ἀνδραποδισμός (Dilts p.25.22-24). A parallel example is drawn from D.18.205 where an appeal to πατρίσ is considered more emotive than an appeal to one's parents (Dilts p.25.22-27). The quotation is a paraphrase (Dilts app.crit. p.25.26-27).

The second point which is made in (39a) is that the examples of the fates of Amphipolis and Pydna are sufficient proof of Demosthenes'

claim that the Olynthians know what danger they are in. The lesson from the example is this : Ἀμφιπολίται καὶ Πυδναῖοι διδάσκουσι αὐτοὺς ὅπως χρήται Φίλιππος τοῖς πιστεύουσιν (Dilts p.25.29-30). Although this scholion contains no allusion to an ἀντιπίπτον explicitly, this remark signifies that the author is interested in showing that the Olynthians will not trust Philip. A connection between (36b) and (39a) seems more probable.

The third point concerns the generalisation about the inherent hostility between democracy and tyranny which Demosthenes makes next. A few words are made about the persuasiveness of generalisations following concrete examples (Dilts p.25.31-35).

There is a verbal similarity between (36b) and (39a) which lends weight to the probability that they are by the same author. In (36b) we find τὸν λογισμὸν and τοὺς ἄγαν ἀνοήτους (Dilts p.24.33). In (39a) we find τοῖς ἀνοήτοις λογισμὸν (Dilts p.25.29).

The relationship between (37) and (39a) is similar to that between (37) and (36b). In favour of unity is that (37) refers to the text up to πολεμοῦσιν and (39a) starts with the very next phrase.

When we come to examine how the contribution of the SR scholia fits in with the scholia unique to R we encounter a problem. (40a) refers to the phrase καὶ ἴσασιν ἂν τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ..., D.1.5, and the commentator thinks that Demosthenes faces an ἀντιπίπτον : "εἰκόσ μὲν τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους μὴ πιστεύειν αὐτῷ μηδὲ βουλήσεσθαι προέσθαι ἑαυτοὺς αὐτῷ. τι οὖν, ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες προδότες παρὰ τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις οἵτινες βουλήσονται προδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ; " (Dilts p.26.4-6). The commentator then goes on to describe the fate of the Amphipolitans and "quotes" Philip's words as he slew the handful of traitors. This provides an attractive analysis of Demosthenes' remarks. It is compatible with (36b), and particularly in its favour is the detail of historical or quasi-historical background which echoes the approach in (36b).

The main problem lies between (40a) and (39a). (40a) covers part of the same passage as (39a). Perhaps the commentator wished to pursue the example of Amphipolis further. The author of (40a) regards καὶ ἴσασιν ... as the answer to an ἀντιπίπτον. In (39a) these same words are thought to sustain Demosthenes' answer to the objection about Philip's cunning. The commentator says in (39a) : ἀπὸ παραδειγμάτων ἐπάγει τὴν πίστιν (Dilts p.25.28). The objection is virtually the same for (39a) and (40a) ; that is that the Olynthians will trust Philip and he will easily persuade them. They are compatible with one another. What is awkward is that (40a) returns to the objection again. This

discrepancy does not amount to a contradiction.

With a degree of special pleading (36b), (37), (39a) and (40a) could belong to a single commentary written by the same commentator. Even if the special pleading is not accepted, we have a group of scholia which offer a very similar interpretation of the same sections of the *First Olynthiac*.

The reason why Dilts cites R for scholion (44b) is that some lines are illegible in S (Dilts app.crit. p.27.1-7). The subject matter deals with D.1.6 from ταῦτ' οὖν onwards. It dovetails with (39a) and (40a) because these two scholia conclude at the phrase χώραν ἐχῶσι. The details of the scholion are discussed elsewhere<sup>(37)</sup>, but it is worth noting that the commentator thinks that the theorik fund is being proposed by Demosthenes as the source of finance. λέξις is examined in connection with the presentation of Demosthenes' plea. The introductory comment in this scholion sums up the argument in D.1.4-5 : δείξασ ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸ δοκοῦν λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ καταστήσασ αὐτοῦς πρὸς τὸ εὐθυμότερον ... (Dilts p.26.30-31). This scholion is compatible with the other comments on this part of the speech. Demosthenes' remarks which are given as an answer to an objection, form a digression in the structure of the speech as a whole.

#### D.1.7 - (51a), (53d), (74) and (83b)

These are the four scholia which were contained in the lost bifolium according to Drerup<sup>(38)</sup>. They refer to D.1.7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively. D.1.9 is covered by (60a) and (60b) in the SR scholia. Taken together they form the long discursive scholia which characterise the core scholia. Several scholia are offered by SR for D.1.7-11. They are (52a), (53a), (53c), (54), (69) and (70). The lengths vary. The margins in codex S are crowded at this point and this explains the need for bifolia. However, it does not explain why (60b) which is a long scholion, was included in the margin. It would be helpful to know whether the same hand wrote (60b) and the references to the bifolium.

The form and content of the four scholia encourage the conclusion that Drerup's interpretation is correct. They also offer indications that they were written by the commentator who wrote the core scholia. The approach to the analysis of the speech is familiar. Usually a summary of the passage under scrutiny is given and a detailed analysis follows. Characteristic interests are objections, λέξις and comparison with other passages.

The striking thing about (51a) is that it consists of a string of imaginary objections which Demosthenes is allegedly rebutting in D.1.7. The commentator points out that the phrase δὲ πάντες ἐθύλουν obviates potential objections (Dilts p.27.26-28.4). Firstly, the verb implies that the Olynthians were keen and on Demosthenes' side. Secondly, no-one can say that they have now changed their minds, since there had been public clamour for support. The latter point is illogical. Changed circumstances can lead to the rejection of a policy once enthusiastically received (39). Curiously, the author does not use the term ἀντιπίπτων. Instead he uses the phrase : τὰς προφάσεις τῶν βουλομένων ἀντιλέγειν (Dilts p.27.26-27). He draws a parallel with Homer *Iliad* 4.437.

The commentator notes another phrase in the same sentence : καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι, D.1.7. He says that these words are an effective counter to an objection which accepts the idea of a war between Olynthos and Philip, but questions the way in which it broke out (Dilts p.28.4-8). Demosthenes' remarks about the benefit of an Olynthian decision which is uninfluenced by the Athenians is seen as proof of Demosthenes' answer. In (39a) and (40a) the commentator notes that Demosthenes' initial statement was accepted but not wholeheartedly. In (51a) we find a refinement.

A third potential objection is that unreliable individuals might betray the city (Dilts p.28.8-9). The commentator argues that the inclusion of ἰσως by Demosthenes adds conviction : διαλεκτικῶς σφόδρα καὶ ἀκριβῶς. καὶ πιθανὸν τὸν λόγον ἐποίησε καὶ τοὺς Ὀλυνηθίους συνέστησε μὴ ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐνδοιασμὸν τὴν γνώμην αὐτῶν ἐκθέμενος (Dilts p.28.9-11). By keeping his argument to a tone of conversation and refusing to give a serious proof, Demosthenes is persuasive. A plausible opinion which is not subject to the rigours of logic can be more persuasive than a logical proof in certain circumstances. Demosthenes' opinion is mooted by the word ἰσως and his contention that allies are better for having made an alliance of their own accord is plausible. The commentator notes the effect : πρόδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μάτην πολεμοῦνται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βεβαίαν ἔχουσι τὴν ἔχθραν (Dilts p.28.14-15).

The next comment (52a), which is one of the SR scholia, sums up D.1.7 : συστήσας τὴν γνώμην τῶν Ὀλυνηθίων καὶ βεβαίους συμμάχους ἀποδείξας ... (Dilts p.28.19-20)<sup>(40)</sup>. The interpretation agrees with that of (51a) (cf Dilts p.28.19-20). Another SR scholion, (53a), gives a summary of D.1.8, saying that Demosthenes is going to goad them with the memory of how they lost out, by failing to take up previous opportunities.

(53c) looks at the sentence beginning εἰ γὰρ ... and gives a reasonably accurate sketch of the historical background to the reference to Euboea (41).

(53d) in R refers to the same sentence, and it examines the effect of this example in context. The commentator remarks that both Demosthenes and Thucydides make a lot of ground in brief remarks such as this. It should be noted that the author of (1c) refers to these two authors together and in a similar context (Dilts p.14.10).

The commentator sets out his points with clarity. Firstly, the example is said to be οἰκειότατον, because the Athenians are being reminded about how once they managed to overlook the wrong done to them by the Euboians (Dilts p.29.9-14). He quotes from D.18.99 in connection with this. His concluding point is made with a curious paraphrase : οὐκὸν μηδὲ Ὀλυνθίοισι μνησικακήσητε γούν, εἴ τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξήμαρτον (Dilts p.29.13-14). A comment such as this could find a place in an argument supporting Zeno's interpretation of D.1.2-7; that is that the Olynthians have a reputation for being untrustworthy among the Athenians. However, in the context of this scholion, the remark is less significant although striking. The commentator's words could easily have been influenced by the form of the quotation which precedes them : "οὐδ' ὦν ὑπὸ Θεμισώνοσ καὶ Θεωδώρου περὶ Ἄρωπὸν ἡδίκησθ' ἀνεμνήσθητε ", D.18.99. Moreover, an allusion to Olynthian untrustworthiness or wrongs is forced here, if we look at what Demosthenes says himself in the passage in the *First Olynthiac*. He begins a new topic at D.1.8. The argument concerns the inconstancy of Athenians' attitude and how failure to act has caused them problems. Obviously, he is encouraging the Athenians to draw a parallel between conduct in the past and present conduct. This will affect how the Olynthians are perceived, but Demosthenes finished his discussion of Olynthian behaviour in D.1.7. Here he is looking at Athenian behaviour.

A second point is that this example is thought to be a reminder of previous success. It might give the Athenians the confidence to go out again (Dilts p.29.14-17).

The third point is similar. The Athenians are reminded about a battle in which the mere sight of them gave them victory (Dilts p.29.17-20). The commentator reveals that he has knowledge about the historical background to the speech which is not to be had from reading only this speech, but I have not been able to determine which event he has in mind. The final point which is made, is that Demosthenes includes himself among the number of those who marched. This is a technique for increasing his persuasiveness (Dilts

p.29.20-25). The commentator develops this observation by quoting from Aristotle, who says that the adviser ought to show himself to be willing to take part in what he is proposing, because people are more ready to be persuaded by someone whom they perceive to be willing to share their burden<sup>(42)</sup>. Although this scholion is the only source for the fragment, there is no reason to doubt that it has been attributed to Aristotle correctly. The point which is being made is common sense.

The commentator's observations are lucid and plausible. It is difficult to assess what sort of allusions would be conjured up in the mind of a contemporary Greek, hearing about the events in the past in Euboeia. Many individuals may have picked up only one or two of the connotations.

There is a verbal similarity between (53d) and (1c) in the phrase τεχνικῶς σφόδρα (Dilts p.29.21 cf p.14.12). (51a) and (1c) offer combinations of adverbs ; διαλεκτικῶς σφόδρα καὶ ἀκριβῶς (Dilts p.28.9-10) and τεχνικῶς σφόδρα καὶ δεινῶς (Dilts p.14.12). While little weight ought to be given to the significance of these verbal similarities by themselves, in conjunction with the similarity in approach in these scholia, these phrases would seem to sustain the view that the same author wrote (1c), (51a) and (53d).

(51a) and (53d) are compatible with (54) which is contributed by SR. This scholion argues that the effect of the words πλεῖν καὶ παραλαμβάνειν is to obviate an objection : ἀλλ' ἐπαχθεὶς ἦν , ὃ Δημόσθενης, ὑπόγυον ἐκ στρατηγίας ἤκοντα εἰς ἕτερον πάλιν ἐξιέναι πόλεμον (Dilts p.29.26-27). (54) precedes (53c) in codex R. It is a little odd, perhaps, that (53c) does not mention the objection, but concentrates on the effect of the example. Strictly this is a different point.

(54) includes the phrase ἔλυσε τὸ δοκοῦν ἐπαχθεὶς (Dilts p.29.28). Similar phrases, which feature the substantive use of the participle of δοκεῖ, occur in (1c) (Dilts p.14.11-12) and (44b) (Dilts p.26.30). The significance of these verbal echoes is slight, but nonetheless useful for arguing that there is a unified commentary written by a single author.

The SR scholia reveal that Demosthenes is thought to switch from praise of Philip to exhortation of the Athenians in D.1.8-9<sup>(43)</sup>. We find familiar phrases such as παροξύναι βουλόμενος in (53a) (Dilts p.28.25), τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ Φιλίππου δείκνυσιν in (59a) (Dilts p.30.3-4), οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αὖξει τὸ δυνατόν τῶν Ἀθηναίων in (60b) (Dilts p.30.11-12), πάλιν αὖξήσας τὸν Φίλιππον εὐθύς εἰς παραμυθίαν ἐμνημόνευσε ... τὸ δυνατόν ὡςπερ αὖξων τῶν Ἀθηναίων in (70) (Dilts p.31.23-25) and ἀθυμίας αὐτοῦς

πληρώσασ ... πάλιν παρεμυθήσατο in (72) (Dilts p.32.7-8)(44).

D.1.10-11 forms a self-contained argument to the effect that past failures have been the fault of Athenian attitude and that the gods still favour the Athenians, even though they do not recognise divine goodwill. (74) and (83b) examine these two sections in detail. In (74) the commentator believes that Demosthenes' remarks in D.1.10 are paradoxical. The phrase παράδοξον τὸ νόημα (Dilts p.32.11) is also used in (28) (Dilts p.23.18), in reference to D.1.4. παράδοξον is used in the SR scholion (140c) (Dilts p.42.10). Demosthenes' words are paraphrased in (74) : πολλὰ γὰρ, φησι, παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀγαθὰ πεπόνθαμεν, καίτοι μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν αἰσθησιν εἰληφότος τοῦ δήμου (Dilts p.32.12-13). This refers to Demosthenes' words as far as καταστάσ. He is indeed faced with a paradox. If the gods have given so many services to the Athenians, then Demosthenes has to account for the lack of perceptible benefit. The commentator continues : εἶπων δὲ "τῶν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπεργμένων ἡμῖν μεγάλην ἔχειν αὐτοῖς χάριν", τὸ μὲν εὐθύς κατασκευάζειν πρόσαντες καὶ βίαιον ἐνόμισε, προσθεῖς δὲ ὅτι πολλὰ πεπόνθαμεν ἀγαθὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὸ ἀντιπίπτον ἔθηκεν ὅτι "καίτοι πολλῶν ἀφηρέθημεν". καὶ τοῦτο λυεῖ πρότερον εἰκότως (Dilts p.32.15-19). Demosthenes thinks that the justification of his claim would be difficult to produce immediately : πρόσαντες καὶ βίαιον. Instead, he turns to an objection : "καίτοι πολλῶν ἀφηρέθημεν". This paraphrases Demosthenes' own words : καίπερ οὐκ ἔχόντων ὡς δεῖ πολλῶν. ἀντιπίπτον is used in the same sense as the definition which is given in the SR scholion (105c).

The scholion continues : ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀνηρέθη τὸ ἀντιπίπτον εὐκολώτερον παραδέξονται καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τεθειῶσαν πρόφασιν "κακῶς μὲν ἔχει πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων αἴτιοι ῥαθυμήσαντες" (Dilts p.32.19-21). Once Demosthenes has answered the objection, then the Athenians will give his justification of this claim about the gods (πρόφασιν) a better reception. The answer to the objection is this : "if things are in a bad way, our indolence is responsible". Demosthenes' own words are put into a μὲν/δε construction. The μὲν clause provides the answer to the objection and the second returns to the subject of the goodwill of the gods. The commentator is correct. Demosthenes links the answer to an objection with his justification about the gods, because he uses an antithetical construction. If the first part is accepted, then the second is more likely to be accepted too. The commentator rightly notes that Demosthenes has returned to his original claim : λύσασ δὲ τὸ ἀντιπίπτον ἐπὶ τὴν πρότασιν πάλιν ἀνέδραμεν, ὅτι εὐνοῦς ἡμῖν ὁ θεός (Dilts

p.32.27).

The commentator makes a few more points in (74). Demosthenes is thought to mention a δίκαιος λογιστής because his own case will sound more persuasive if it does not appear to come from him (Dilts p.32.12-15). Nevertheless, the commentator agrees that Demosthenes himself is the δίκαιος λογιστής, although he pretends otherwise (Dilts p.32.23). He adds that the persona of an independent assessor is conditioned by the fact that Demosthenes shapes his accusation against the Athenians in a form requiring judgement (Dilts p.32.22-24). This is a peculiar argument. One could equally say that Demosthenes wants an independent persona to phrase his argument for him, and that was why he turned to a legal framework. A more likely explanation is that Demosthenes wishes to elevate the tone of his speech and to underline the gravity of his accusation. Therefore, he chooses metaphorical language, taken from lawcourts.

The commentator also argues that Demosthenes weakens the image of Philip as a powerful man when he presents this paradox, because he implies that only the absence of people to prevent Philip brought about the latter's success (Dilts p.32.24-26).

The scholion closes with a brief word about κεφάλαια (Dilts p.32.28-30). τὸ συμφέρον is preferred, because negligence is detrimental to Athenian interests, and τὸ δυνατόν is also applicable, because Demosthenes implies that success lies in Athenian hands. This scholion gives a good example of the two κεφάλαια combined. In (1c) we are told that this speech is made up from both (Dilts p.14.15-16).

(74) is lucid and the author is in control of his argument, even though he is explaining something difficult and probably confusing. However, we have yet to hear how Demosthenes sustains his statement that the gods are interested in the Athenians. (83b) fulfils this requirement.

The opening sentence of (83b) confirms the link between it and (74) : βούλεται ἐκ παραδείγματος πιστώσασθαι τὴν πρόφασιν ὅτι εὖνους ἡμῖν οἱ κρείττους (Dilts p.33.18-19). In (74) the πρότασις is εὖνους ἡμῖν ὁ θεός (Dilts p.32.27) and the πρόφασις is the justification of this claim. The difference in terminology is explained as scribal error.

The commentator explains in (83b) why Demosthenes chooses to prove his statement by analogy with finance. He argues that Demosthenes' idea that the gods are well-disposed (τὸ πρότερον ἐνθύμημα Dilts p.33.19) is peculiar to Demosthenes and difficult for the audience to accept at once (Dilts p.33.20). The analogy is found to have

aspects. The first two combine to make the example easier to understand. Subdivision and truism do aid comprehension (μερικόν and γνώριμον Dilts p.33.21). The third aspect is as follows : ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ βιάζεται τὴν ἀθεΐαν (Dilts p.33.22). The commentator means that Demosthenes is arguing against atheism. Demosthenes maintains that the gods do help the Athenians, even though the Athenians do not realise it.

The following is a translation of the commentators analysis : "for he says that those who have opportunities are like those who have money, both when they first get it and while they are in possession of it, because they lose them in the same way. But a man who does not make use of an opportunity, does not have a good thing then lose it ; he has the power to acquire it and neglects to do so. Having and losing is indeed worthy of blame ; but not having the power to obtain, one would reckon to be chance and bad luck" (Dilts p.33.22-27). This does convey what Demosthenes says but makes heavy weather of it, because the commentator's Greek is difficult. Demosthenes puts his point forward with much greater clarity.

Demosthenes' point lies in how much gratitude is given by those who have had opportunity to τύχη, or by analogy the gods. This vital aspect has been overlooked by the commentator. He speaks of losing what you have or keeping it in terms of good and bad (κατηγορία ἀληθῶς ἀξιον Dilts p.33.26). This is odd because χάρις, or respect of the gods, seemed to have been acknowledged in ἀθεΐα. The commentator does not stress χάρις to the gods and the latter's εὐνοία which are very important to Demosthenes. It is easy to conclude from Demosthenes' analogy that the gods are εὐνοοῦσ, but the analysis in (83b) does not mention this. Therefore, although the commentator is logical, he obscures the point of the analogy. He claims that the analogy proves the moot point, which it does in fact, but he himself does not justify his own statement. He is wrong when he says that the opportunities sent by the gods, which Demosthenes refers to in D.1.10, are opportunities for making money : ὡς τοῦτον ὄντα καιρὸν τοῦ χρήματα κτήσασθαι (Dilts p.33.29-30). Demosthenes is not being specific, and indeed, making money would only be one aspect of the successful use of god-sent opportunity.

Despite the weakness in this scholion, an attempt is made to explain how Demosthenes justifies his assertion that the gods are well-intentioned towards the Athenians. Since it fulfils a need set out in (74), and also uses similar terminology, it seems likely that the author of (74) and (83b) is one person.

Drerup's account of the bifolium is probably correct. The four scholia make up a neat and consistent analysis when taken with the SR scholia. Moreover, these scholia give strong indications, both in general approach and in verbal similarities, of being by the same author as other scholia in R.

### Κεφάλαια

My discussion of the comments in S about κεφάλαια revealed that the speech is divided into two main sections<sup>(45)</sup>. D.1.2-18 are based on a mixture of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν. The former takes precedence. D.1.19-23 are thought to be based on τὸ δυνατόν. There are a few points to note about the contribution of S. The identification of the κεφάλαια in D.1.2-15 is based mainly on (33c) which is not found in R. D.1.15-18 receives surprisingly little comment, given that Demosthenes is talking about the nature of the force to be sent. There is some difficulty in reconciling the interpretation of τὸ δυνατόν given in (124) with that given in (140c). (140a), (140b) and (140c) are curiously repetitious.

The contribution of R supplements the information we are given. (1c) notes that the main κεφάλαια of this speech are τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν<sup>(46)</sup>. We are told about τὸ λυσιτελοῦν (presumably a synonym for τὸ συμφέρον) and τὸ δυνατόν in SR scholia (33a), (44b), (60b) and (70). A notable absence is that of (33c). Other scholia which refer to τὸ συμφέρον in R are (5c) (Dilts p.17.29), (5d) (Dilts p.17.36, p.18.2, 22). (11d) refers to τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.19.31-32) as does (74).

(119a) notes that D.1.17 and the discussion about the type of force concerns τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.38.31). This suggests that the transition to τὸ δυνατόν as the dominant κεφάλαιον takes place at D.1.17. However, R also contains (124) which states clearly that the transition occurs at D.1.19. If these two scholia are by the same author, then (119a) is another comment about τὸ δυνατόν in the section dominated by τὸ συμφέρον. Alternatively, these scholia are by different authors and produce an inconsistency in R.

The additional scholia improve the discussion of D.1.2-15 and the absence of (33c) does not affect the interpretation of κεφάλαια seriously. The contribution on the latter stages of the speech are the same as those of S. The inclusion of (119a) can be explained without assuming a significant difference between S and R.

## The Remaining Scholia in R

The remaining scholia in R may be dealt with briefly. (2a) notes the end of the προοίμιον and appears from a photograph of the text to have been added later.

(26a), (26b) and (26c) look at different interpretations of the metaphorical use of language which the impression of Olynthian steadfastness in D.1.3. While the attraction of these scholia to a compiler may have been the linguistic content, the idea of Olynthian reliability is consistent with the interpretation offered in R. The content of the scholion is not inconsistent with the interpretation offered in R.

(75a) paraphrases Demosthenes and points out that κριτήσ is an alternative to λογιστήσ. (75b) is lexicographical and gives κριτήσ and ἐξεταστήσ as alternatives to λογιστήσ. It is probable that these two scholia are by different authors<sup>(47)</sup>. (74) and (83b) are consecutive in the text of R. (75b) precedes them.

(92a) is an SR scholion which contains a discussion about an ἀντιπίπτον which Demosthenes is answering by the use of the phrase φρασάτω τισ ἔμοι τί τὸ κωλύον ; , D.1.12<sup>(48)</sup>.

(92b) comments on the effect of ἔμοι in the same phrase which is examined in (92a). It is thought that it increases Demosthenes' credibility as a patriot, since he is offering a personal challenge to anyone who is prepared to contradict him. (92a) and (92b) are making different points.

(93a) points out the use of ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.12. The phrase πάλιν τῆ ὑποσιωπήσει χρησάμενος (Dilts app.crit. p.34.28) makes it likely that there will be a counterpart to this scholion among the previous comments. (11d) and (14c) look at this σχῆμα with reference to D.1.2. Both of these scholia are long whereas (93a) is composed of one short sentence. S does not offer (93a) but (93b) and is the only codex to do so. This unique scholion wrongly identifies the σχῆμα as ἀποσιώπησις<sup>(49)</sup>.

(94) examines the effect of listing the places which Philip captured, D.1.12, in two ways. The author looks at the effect asyndeton would have produced and secondly, the actual effect created by Demosthenes' use of conjunctions. He argues that Demosthenes reflects the nature of an event in his language. If he had used asyndeton in listing the places he would have been implying speed (Dilts p.35.2-5). As the passage stands the inclusion of conjunctions

gives the impression of slow, steady and unhurried progress (Dilts p.34.32-35.1, 6-8). This interpretation is only valid if we suppose that Demosthenes wished to scare the people into action by impressing upon them the inevitability of attack. Read out loud the listener would surely get an impression of speed. Fear is certainly Demosthenes' objective in this part of the speech. The author also suggests that this list reveals the weakness in Philip's affairs (Dilts p.34.35-35.1) but this is surely wrong. The author is not taking into account the context in which the list appears, nor does he substantiate his claim about Philip's weakness. This is the topic discussed by Demosthenes in D.21-24.

The absence of (140a) and (140b) avoids a problem of repetition which occurred in S<sup>(50)</sup>.

### CONTRADICTIONS IN CODEX R

Although the aim of this chapter has been to show that there is a core of scholia which were written by the same author and which is retained in R in its fuller form, not all the scholia in R are compatible with one another.

The contradiction between (5d) and (9a) is irreconcilable. The author of (5d) argues that there is ample evidence from the language of D.1.1 to show that Demosthenes is not extemporising, but has considered the problem for a long time. The SR scholion (9a) argues that the effect which Demosthenes wishes to achieve in D.1.1, is to appear to be speaking off the cuff. Therefore these scholia were not written by the same author. It is likely that (5d) is one of the core scholia. Both scholia appear in the main text of R <sup>(51)</sup>.

(60a) is an SR scholion which says that the list of places in D.1.9 is produced without conjunctions because Demosthenes wishes to avoid making Philip appear too powerful<sup>(52)</sup>. (94) comments on a list of places in D.1.12 and argues that the inclusion of conjunctions is the result of Demosthenes' wish not to make Philip appear too powerful. The absence of conjunctions in D.1.12 would have the effect of increasing Demosthenes' stature, if we follow the author's argument through. There is no reason to prefer one or other of them as part of the core of scholia.

The possibility of inconsistency between (119a) and (124), concerning the transition to τὸ δυνατόν has been discussed above <sup>(53)</sup>.

Odd cases of superfluous repetition and contradictions are evidence that there is a plurality of sources supplying scholia in R. This is hardly surprising. However, it ought to be noted that the

scholia involved are almost all insignificant and none affects the analysis of the core of scholia.

## CONCLUSION

Codex R offers a compilation of scholia, but there is a core which may well have come from a unified commentary, possibly by Menander Rhetor. The version is fuller than the one found in S. The grounds upon which this hypothesis is based are the similarities in approach found in these scholia and the compatibility of their analyses. The progressive examination of the text, almost phrase by phrase, is also helpful in arguing for this hypothesis. Odd details of vocabulary have also been cited as evidence. If the hypothesis correct, then the value of codex R is increased, because it contains the fuller form of the commentary. At the moment the influence of stemmatic relationships leads to a bias against the merits of R. Even if the hypothesis of a single author is rejected, R contains a collection of scholia which has been compiled with astonishing care.

Drerup's theory about the bifolium which contained the four scholia (51a), (53d), (74) and (83d) is probably correct. If his theory can be extended to cover the remaining scholia which are unique to R, or which form part of the core scholia, it is possible that S originally held all the core scholia both in the codex itself and in bifolia. According to this interpretation the stemmatic relationship, as illustrated by Dilts, is unaffected.

The fact remains that evidence is only cited for the four scholia. If these were the only scholia to appear in bifolia in S, then we have to account for the remaining core scholia in R. Clearly it is improbable that R was copied from S in these circumstances. It may be that the relation between R and S is not as Dilts suggests, but that they are *gemelli*. The influence of Y and A, as far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned, is unimportant.

Should the hypothesis be found to lack conviction, then the importance of R remains high. We have to admire the remarkable skill of a compiler who managed to assimilate scholia, written by an unspecified number of authors which offer such a compatible and unanimous interpretation of the speech. This achievement is not affected by the accepted stemmatic relationship between R and S.

Whether the scholia offered by R are written by one author or several, the value of R is not diminished greatly, because it offers a commentary of the *First Olynthiac* of a very high quality. The codex may not be as old as that of S but in terms of quality it is as

commendable, and in terms of quality and thoroughness, excels the older codex. If more information is forth-coming about the various hands at work in S, answers might be found for some of these problems. As it stands, the full offering from R is highly commendable and is on a par with the *Ulpiani prolegomena* .

## NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE

- (1) v. Drerup *Philologus* p.558, *SBAW* p.308.
- (2) v. (Dilts p.XI n.1). Also v. Dilts *Prometheus* 3, pp.208-210.
- (3) v. (Dilts p.XVII).
- (4) (4), (75a), (89), (119a), (122a), (123a), (124), (129), (131a), (135), (137a), (157), (156a) (abbreviated version v. Dindorf p.65 n.8), (164a), (192a) and (192b).
- (5) v. Appendix Two [pp.291-293].
- (6) v. Dilts, *Prometheus* 3.
- (7) v. Drerup v n.1 above.
- (8) v. S [pp.67-68].
- (9) v. S [p.53].
- (10) Countering objections, eg. (60b), S [p.57] and (122a), S [p.68]. Nuance of a phrase or word : eg. (26c), (33a), (52a), (60a), (60b), (122a), S [pp.67-68]. In R eg. (39a), [pp.104-105] and (44b), R [p.106].
- (11) v. S (1a) and (192b) [pp.69-70].
- (12) Differentiating terms v. (60b), S [p.68], (105c), S [p.55] and (164a), S [pp.65-66].
- (13) v. (93b) and (125b), S [p.69]. These scholia do not appear in R, although Dindorf attributes (125b) to R.
- (14) In addition to these quotations, SR offers three examples. Homer is mentioned twice in (132a), *Iliad* E 586 and Λ 547, S [p.71], and Thoukydides 1.107 is mentioned in (151), S [p.73].
- (15) v. (151), S [p.73], (40a) and (41a), S [pp.76-77], (44b), (53c) and (131a), S [p.77].
- (16) v. Justin. 8.3.10 and also Griffith, *Macedonia* pp.699-701.
- (17) v. (1d) (Dilts p.15.5-8).
- (18) The question of κεφάλαια is not straightforward. In Y we are told : τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον πλέκεται ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος κεφαλαίου καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ ' καὶ γὰρ ὁ σύμπας λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προῆκται (Dilts p.14.15-16). From the *apparatus* (Dilts p.14.15) we find that R reads : τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον καὶ δυνατοῦ κεφαλαίου πεπλεκται ' καὶ γὰρ ὁ σύμπας λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προῆκται. Given that the phrase καὶ δυνατοῦ implies that τὸ δυνατόν is not the only κεφάλαιον and that τῶν αὐτῶν clearly requires an antecedent, we may conclude that the scribe of R has omitted συμφεροῦ or something similar.
- (19) cf Y [p.156].
- (20) v. Appendix One [p.286].
- (21) v. Ulpian [pp.25-27] and below (36b) [p.103]
- (22) v. LSJ ἄλλωσ I. 2.
- (23) eg. (140c). Cf summaries given at the beginning of scholia : (28) summarising D.1.3-6, R [p.100], (44b) summarising D.1.4-5, R [p.106] and (52a) summarising D.1.7, R [p.107].
- (24) v. S [p.69].
- (25) v. S [p.54]. The position of (9a) in R is different from its position in codex S. The order of scholia in R is (3c), (9a), (5c) and (5d). I cannot see a lemma in the photograph. By position the scholion refers to the words ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ' οὕτως .... In S, according to Dilts's lemma, the scholion is prompted by the word ὑπολαμβάνω. Both positions are satisfactory. From ὅτε τοίνυν on, Demosthenes is dealing with the subject of those people who come forward to speak. (9a) in R gives a general summary, and (5c) and (5d) deal with specific points.
- (26) v. Appendix Three [pp.294-295].
- (27) (60b), (105c) and (164a). These are SR scholia.

- (29) v. n.28 above.
- (30) v. R [p.96].
- (31) v. Appendix One [p.278].
- (32) v. S [pp.61-62].
- (33) v. S [p.68].
- (34) v. Ulpian [pp.25-27].
- (35) v. n.(16) above.
- (36) τὸ συμμαχικόν (Dilts p.25.8) suggests the Social War of 357-355 B.C., during which Amphipolis was captured and Olynthos allied herself to Athens. For references to these event v. D.22.14, Diod. 16.8.2-3 and Diod. 7.3-4, 16.21.1, 15.3, 19, 26.
- (37) v. S [p.77].
- (38) v. above R [p.85].
- (39) An obvious example is the attitude of the Athenians towards Mytilene in 428 B.C.
- (40) v. S [p.68].
- (41) v. S [p.77].
- (42) Aristotle frag. 135.
- (43) v. For additional comments on (53a), (59a), (60b), (70) and (72) see S [pp.57-58, 62].
- (44) (72) is not visible in my photograph of the text, but it is attributed to R by Dindorf and Dilts (Dilts app.crit. p.32.9).
- (45) v. S [pp.61-65].
- (46) v.n.18 above.
- (47) For authorship of lexicographical scholia in general v. Sources [pp.246-247].
- (48) v. S [p.58].
- (49) v. S [p.69].
- (50) v. S [pp.63-65].
- (51) v.n.25 above.
- (52) v. S [p.68].
- (53) v. R [p.113].

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CODEX F

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Dilts has identified five hands in his examination of the scholia in the tenth-century codex F (Dilts p.VII) . He dates F<sup>1</sup> and F<sup>2</sup> to this century as well. He has tentatively attributed the next two hands, F<sup>3</sup> and F<sup>4</sup>, to the eleventh century. He points out, however, that Drerup attributes them to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively (1). Avezzù does not distinguish between F<sup>3</sup> and F<sup>4</sup>(2) and refers simply to F<sup>3</sup>. Dilts' opinion will be accepted here. The fifth hand, F<sup>5</sup>, is dated to the fourteenth or fifteenth century, but Dilts has omitted the scholia written by this hand from his edition, because he feels that their contribution is negligible. They shall be ignored in this chapter.

The main topics of interest in these scholia are language and rhetorical analysis. The emphasis varies from hand to hand and it will be shown that the scholia have not been picked at random. There are no serious inconsistencies in the analysis of the *First Olynthiac* but there is good reason to believe that several sources were consulted.

The hands which contribute scholia to F provide some of the oldest scholia we have on Demosthenes. Drerup argued that F is one of the sources for scholia in codex S(3).

#### F<sup>1</sup>

There are twenty-nine separate scholia in this hand. Three additional scholia are pointed out by Dilts in the *apparatus* (4). The problems posed by these three examples will be dealt with presently. The majority of the scholia occur for sections D.1.1-13. With a few exceptions, (26a), (27a) and (40a), each scholion examines only one topic. They tend to be brief and only about a quarter could be described as discursive, eg. (8), (26a), (40a), (41a), (53c), (101) and (132a). The remainder point out the feature of interest without further explanation.

The compiler of F<sup>1</sup> may be working from an archetype of S since it shares a high proportion of scholia with S. Alternatively, F<sup>1</sup> may be a source for S. This relationship is not so marked with codex R. Nineteen of the twenty-nine scholia in F<sup>1</sup> also occur in S. Notably, F<sup>1</sup> shares five scholia concerned with the historical background with S and R(5).

## RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Just over a quarter of the scholia contain observations which are pertinent to the rhetorical analysis of the speech. All of these comments are brief. The structure of the *First Olynthiac* can be sketched out as follows :

A. προίμιον - D.1.1

B. δεύτερον προίμιον - D.1.2 ... τρόπον πρὸς αὐτά

C. κεφάλαια - D.1.2 ἔστι δὴ ...

D. ἐπίλογος - D.1.28

The analysis is basic and ignores developments within the majority of the speech, D.1.2-27. Moreover the first six sections of the speech receive almost all the scholia offered by F<sup>1</sup>. The comments on D.1.1-16 produce inconsistencies. In (11a) the second προίμιον is said to be as concise as the first ; that is about one section long. (15a) and (15b) point out the beginning of κεφάλαια and τὸ συμφέρον is identified. According to the author of (42a) Demosthenes rounds off some examples in D.1.5 which he has just given, and these are called τὰ μερικὰ παραδείγματα (Dilts p.26.21). The lemma indicates that these examples are thought to end at the phrase καὶ ὅλωσ' ἄπιστον οἶμαι, D.1.5. There is a transition at this point in Demosthenes' argument. If (42a) is complementary to (15a) and (15b), then we have to conclude that these examples are part of arguments based on τὸ συμφέρον.

According to (44a), which looks at the very next phrase in the *First Olynthiac*, ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγνωκότασ ..., D1.6 is the κατασκευή of the second προίμιον. It seems odd that the supporting arguments for the second προίμιον should come so late if the entire προίμιον is meant to be concise as (11a) states. Even if we accept this peculiarity, or regard (11a) as having been written by a different author, there would appear to be no clear distinction between the second προίμιον and the κεφάλαια.

It is not clear how ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγνωκότασ ..., D.1.6, can be the supporting argument for Demosthenes' opening claim in D.1.2. These words are hortative. Demosthenes' words in D.1.2-5 form the supporting argument because they explain why the moment is opportune.

(44a) may be in the wrong position, despite the lemma. It marks the end of the κατασκευή. (13b) in codex S, which offers the same comment as (44a), is positioned appropriately at εἴπερ ὑπὲρ ...<sup>(6)</sup>. This explanation has the advantage that the interpretation of F<sup>1</sup> does not contradict

those of all the other commentaries.

Even if we can interpret the information in F<sup>1</sup> to give a consistent analysis, there is no doubt that the notes have been assimilated from various sources. The contribution of F<sup>1</sup> is similar to that of S at this point in the speech, but there are differences in interpretation. In S ἀντιπίπτοντα are important. In F<sup>1</sup> there are only two references. (40a) concerns Philip's treatment of the Amphipolitans. The introductory remark says that καὶ ἴσασιν ..., D.1.5, is an answer to an objection. It is possible that the scholion was included because of the historical information and that the introductory remark is incidental.

The second reference to ἀντιπίπτον is to be found in Dilts' *apparatus* (Dilts p.24.32) where F<sup>1</sup> reads ἀντιπίπτοντος λύσις as a comment on the beginning of D.1.5. In codex R this phrase introduces a long explanation of the objection and contains an argument against the ἀπίστοι interpretation<sup>(7)</sup>.

Apart from (15a) and (15b), there is only one other reference to κεφάλαια in F<sup>1</sup>. (5d) is one of the core scholia unique to codex R and it looks at the προίμιον. An extract from (5d) is found, without any apparent connection with the rest of the scholia in F<sup>1</sup>: δέοντα γὰρ καλούμεν οὐ τὰ συμφέροντα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα (Dilts p.18.15-16). This remark forms a parenthesis in the long version of (5d) found in R. The reason for the extract and its connection with codex R are mysterious. The presence of the connective particle γὰρ in F<sup>1</sup> suggests that this scholion is not complete in itself and was originally part of a longer comment. This extract may have been included in the text of F<sup>1</sup> because it is similar to the form of lexicographical scholia which F<sup>1</sup> offers<sup>(8)</sup>. This scholion is difficult to classify.

(187b) points out the ἐπίλογος at the beginning of D.1.28.

As far as rhetorical analysis is concerned, the compiler of this set of scholia offers a very basic framework and is clearly not particularly interested in this aspect of the *First Olynthiac*. The remarks which are produced are mere annotations.

## HISTORICAL INFORMATION

F<sup>1</sup> offers some but not all of the comments dealing with historical information which are found in S and R. It omits those referring to the theorik money, (44b), (131a) and (135), and the scholion about the Aleuadai, (151). Of those which do occur, (40a) gives a plausible and perhaps apocryphal account of Philip's attitude towards those

Amphipolitans who betrayed their city to him ; (41a) tells a similar story about the Pydnans ; (53c) gives a long account of the affairs of Euboea ; (55) notes that Amphipolis was a κτήμα of Athens ; (98) pictures Philip's movements across Greece<sup>(9)</sup>. The *apparatus* shows that in (98) S reads ἐπέστρεφε whereas F<sup>1</sup> reads ὑπέστρεφεν (Dilts p.35.14). The difference in vocabulary is probably not significant.

The absence of the other scholia in F<sup>1</sup> might lead us to suppose that the historical scholia in S and R come from different sources. This may be so, but, alternatively, the omissions may be accidental. The contribution of F<sup>1</sup> concentrates on the first half of the speech and perhaps the compiler was not interested in these comments about the later sections of the speech.

F<sup>1</sup> offers a unique scholion on this topic. It is to be found in the *apparatus* : βασιλεὺς μακεδόνων οὗτος (Dilts app.crit. p.35.22). This refers to Demosthenes' reference to Arybbas in D.1.13. Arybbas was the King of Molossos and Thesprotos which belonged to Epiros in the north-west of Greece<sup>(10)</sup>. This area could arguably be called Makedonia but Makedon itself is further to the east. Therefore the author of this comment is mistaken in calling Arybbas the King of the Makedonians. This was Philip's position. If the author is referring to Makedonia as a region and not to Makedon itself, his identification is very vague.

## LANGUAGE

This is the only aspect which receives continuous attention, since scholia are found on sections D.1.1-4, 6, 8-10, 13, 18-20. However, λέξις, σχήματα and lexicography are not given equal weight. Of some sixteen scholia relevant to this topic, just over half come under the category of lexicography. All bar two, (75b) and (122b), are found in S and only one scholion of this type which is found in S, (193a), does not also occur in F<sup>1</sup>. R shares less linguistic scholia with F<sup>1</sup>, though they do share (75b). Therefore the relationship between F<sup>1</sup> and S is closer than the relationship between F<sup>1</sup> and R. F<sup>1</sup> offers only one scholion about λέξις which is the most frequent type of linguistic comment found in S. F<sup>1</sup> shows equally little interest in σχήματα.

The incidence of linguistic scholia shared between F<sup>1</sup> and S suggests that the lexicographic scholia in S were not written by the same person as the author of the other linguistic scholia in S. This largely depends on which hand in S wrote which scholia. It is also possible that the compiler of F<sup>1</sup> was only interested in lexicography and an exemplar of F<sup>1</sup>

and S comments on additional topics.

### Lexicographical Scholia

Two scholia, (2c) and (21a), look at νομίζω and ὥσ respectively, but the examples do not appear to be found in the lexica themselves<sup>(11)</sup>. Five of the scholia give examples where similar entries are found in the lexica, (16), (27a), (50), (56) and (132a). All of these are shared with S. (132a) is also found in R<sup>(12)</sup>.

(75b) is one of two lexicographical scholia which F<sup>1</sup> contains independently of S and it gives alternatives to λογιστής : κριτής and ἔξεταστής. The entry in the *Souda* and the lexica by Hesychios and Photios is as follows : λογιστής] κριτής, δοκιμαστής, ἔξεταστής<sup>(13)</sup>. Again it is difficult to establish the relationship between the scholion and the lexica, since the scholion may predate fifth-century Hesychios. In the other scholion, (122b), χειρώσεται is given as a synonym or explanation for παραστήσεται in D.1.18 (Dilts app.crit.p.39.9). Pollux associates these words, 9.141. 1.169.

It seems probable that the majority of these lexicographical scholia come from the same source as the compiler of S consulted, assuming of course that the same hand in S has written the scholia.

### Σχήματα

There are a few scholia concerning σχήματα in F<sup>1</sup> which are also found in S. In two of them there are significant differences in the reading of the text. (27a) points out an instance of paradox in D.1.4. There is indeed a paradox in Demosthenes' argument at this point, but the author of the scholion does not explain it himself<sup>(14)</sup>. According to the *apparatus* (Dilts p.23.12), F<sup>1</sup> omits the phrase τροπή ἢ. In so doing, F<sup>1</sup> eliminates the difficulty in understanding this note as a whole. τροπή does not seem to mean paradox among the *Rhetores Graeci*. The most probable explanation is that τροπή ἢ was a gloss which entered the tradition of S.

Dilts is imprudent in saying that F<sup>1</sup> and S share (125b) since the *apparatus* clearly shows that F<sup>1</sup> reads ὑποσιώπησις while S reads ἀποσιώπησις<sup>(15)</sup>. The majority of commentators agree with the interpretation in F<sup>1</sup>, which indicates ὑποσιώπησις clearly and accurately in (14b), (67b) and here. In each case the figure is noted without explanation. This suggests that the author assumed that his readership

was familiar with this term.

The version of (14b), which points out ὑποσιώπησις, is unique to F<sup>1</sup>. Demosthenes states : ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι δοκοῦμεν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς αὐτά, D.1.2. He is expressing his disapproval and criticising the attitude of the Athenians. This scholion also points out the συμπεράσμα τῶν προοιμίου. This is very similar to (14a) in S : συμπεράσμα τῶν προοιμίου τὸ "ἡμεῖς δέ". This is either a coincidence or else F<sup>1</sup> has merged two comments. S has no comment about the figure here.

(67b) points out another example of ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.9. Demosthenes' words τὰ δὲ μέλλοντ' αὐτόματ' οἰόμενοι σχήσειν καλῶς suggest his disapproval of the attitude of the Athenians and also hints at the nature of this attitude.

Curiously, F<sup>1</sup> omits the most obvious example of ὑποσιώπησις which other codices point out, (93a) which refers to D.1.12<sup>(16)</sup>.

παράλειψις is another figure pointed out by F<sup>1</sup> and S in (104). It occurs in D.1.13 and, as in the other examples of σχήματα, the feature is noted without explanation<sup>(17)</sup>.

Metaphor is considered once in F<sup>1</sup>. The author of (26a) thinks that the phrase τρέφεται καὶ παρασπάσηταί, D.1.3, comes from the language of supplication. The contribution of S, (26b), argues that the phrase comes from the idea of tearing bodies apart, in order to show the unity of the Olynthians<sup>(18)</sup>. Both accounts are plausible, though the view of S is more vivid.

### Other Linguistic Comments

The author of (137b) comments on Demosthenes' phrase : δεῖ δὲ χρημάτων, D.1.20. He says : τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον εἶπεν ' ἄει γὰρ χρημάτων δεῖται ὁ πόλεμος <sup>(19)</sup>. This comment is sound.

(8) comments on the mood of λάβοιτε in D.1.1. It is also found in S <sup>(20)</sup>.

### CONCLUSION

The scholia in F<sup>1</sup> are very brief except for those on the subject of the historical background. It is highly improbable that a single author wrote all the scholia in F<sup>1</sup> and so a compiler must have been at work. No personality is revealed, either of the author of the comments or of the compiler.

Language is the main interest, followed by historical information. No positive effort seems to have been made to reconcile inconsistencies in the structural analysis. After the opening section of the speech, the topic is not pursued and the two references to an ἀντιπίπτοντα stand out for this reason. Individually, the notes are sound and the inconsistencies occur within groups of scholia.

The examination of the speech is not thorough, because D.1.14-17 and 21-27 elicit no response. D.1.1-13 is examined in greater detail than the remainder of the speech which does attract comment.

The majority of the scholia in F<sup>1</sup> seem to emanate from the same source as some of the comments in S. F<sup>1</sup> may have had a direct influence on S, though perhaps only on the contribution of one hand in that codex.

The most striking scholia which are shared concern lexicography and the historical background. F<sup>1</sup> does reveal independence from S in the matter of λέξις and σχήματα. The three scholia which are pointed out in Dilts' *apparatus*, (5d), (36b) and (103), are difficult to categorise. The contribution is useful but not worthy of much attention because of the lack of detail and the fact that most of these scholia occur in other codices often as part of a longer commentary.

## F<sup>2</sup>

Although both F<sup>1</sup> and F<sup>2</sup> are tenth-century hands and the scholia from F<sup>2</sup> precede the first scholion of F<sup>1</sup> in Dilts' edition, Dilts argues that the scholia of F<sup>2</sup> are chronologically later than those of F<sup>1</sup> (21). Support for this view is found in the spread of the scholia in F<sup>2</sup>. Thirteen out of a total of nineteen comments occur in sections of the *First Olynthiac* which are not covered by F<sup>1</sup>; that is D.1.11,16,21,23-27. It can be argued from this that F<sup>2</sup> is concentrating on the second half of the speech and that the compiler may have been interested in extending the coverage found in F<sup>1</sup>.

Eleven of the scholia in F<sup>2</sup> are shared with members of the *codices Ulpiani* (22), which date from the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (23). However, some, if not all of these scholia, will have been found in the ninth-century codex Y, because Y is an archetype of the *codices Ulpiani*. However it would appear that F<sup>2</sup> has little in common with Y itself, because where Y is extant only one scholion is shared with F<sup>2</sup>. This is part of (1c) which shows evidence of having been broken up into smaller sections. Therefore it is likely that most of these eleven scholia entered the *codices Ulpiani* after they were copied

from Y or an apograph of Y.

## RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AND ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ

Eight scholia are pertinent to the rhetorical analysis of the *First Olynthiac*. These comments show no obvious sign of having been included as a complement to the analysis offered by F<sup>1</sup>. Indeed (181) contradicts F<sup>1</sup> about the place where the ἐπίλογος begins. The compiler seems to have taken care in the choice of scholia, but he is unlikely to have been the author because observations are not usually followed up.

The author of (1a) tells us that Demosthenes starts the προοίμιον indirectly, ἐκ πλαγίου, by praising the audience. This is noted as the first instance of ὑπόληψις (supposition). There are no further allusions to this in F<sup>2</sup>, and so unless we assume that the author's technique does not involve corroboration of his comments, it must be concluded that this is an isolated comment (24). Its attraction for the compiler of F<sup>2</sup> may be the subject matter, because the contribution reveals a particular interest in language.

The author of (1b) tells us that the προοίμιον is brief because of the urgency of the issue. This is a plausible suggestion. The end of the προοίμιον is not indicated, though it may be inferred from (15c) which notes ἔστι δὲ ..., D.1.2, as the ἀρχὴ καὶ εἰσβολὴ τοῦ συμφέροντος. (1b) may have been included because of (11a) in F<sup>1</sup> which says : δεύτερον προοίμιον, σύντομον καὶ τοῦτο ὁμοίως τῷ πρώτῳ διὰ τὴν χρείαν τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦ κατεπεύγοντος πρὸς βοήθειαν. (1b) repeats the reason for the brevity. (15c) tells that the κεφάλαια begin as do (15a) and (15b) in F<sup>1</sup>. The compiler of F<sup>2</sup> is perhaps endeavouring to produce a more rounded commentary but is not prepared to remove all repetitions.

The section of (1c) which is offered by F<sup>2</sup> (Dilts p.14.6 ἦθικόν - 12 θεραπεύειν) gives us a good general account of Demosthenes' approach to the προοίμιον. Firstly the author notes that Demosthenes' argument is calculated to make his audience affable. He comes across as reasonable and moderate. Following the *apparatus*, the text in F<sup>2</sup> reads : ἡ δὲ λύσις τῶν ἀντιπιδόντων καὶ ἡ σπερματικὴ τῶν κεφαλαίων ἐπαγωγὴ πραγματικὸν ποιεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ' ἴδιον γὰρ τοῦ ῥήτορος μὴ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν συναγωνιζομένων αὐτοῖς κεφαλαίων ποιεῖσθαι τὰ προοίμια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐφορμῶντα αὐτῷ εὐθύς ἐν ἀρχῇ θεραπεύειν (Dilts app.crit.p.14.8-12)(25). The προοίμιον is not merely ornamental. Demosthenes introduces κεφάλαια and begins to answer objections. The *apparatus* indicates a version of the text which makes

no comparison between Thoukydides and Demosthenes. The compiler does not relate this generalisation to the *First Olynthiac*. So we are not told which κεφάλαια are present nor why they are helpful or problematic<sup>(26)</sup>.

F<sup>2</sup>, like F<sup>1</sup>, only shows a passing interest in κεφάλαια. There are a handful of scholia which are relevant, but no thorough discussion is forthcoming. (15c) indicates the beginning of τὸ συμφέρον at ἔστι δὴ ... , D.1.2. No substantiation is given. The next reference to κεφάλαια comes in (117a) which, alluding to D.1.16, notes τὸ δικάϊον. Therefore D.1.2-15 concentrate on τὸ συμφέρον.

(117a) notes an instance of ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου in D.1.16. The author of (105c), which is offered by F<sup>4</sup>, S, R and the *codices Ulpiani* tells us that an ἀντίθεσις is an objection based on a principle and may be presented in the *persona* of the objector<sup>(27)</sup>. At the beginning of D.1.16, Demosthenes does express an objection to his case.

This objection is the argument that it is easy to find fault but an adviser should give practical advice. The author of (117a) thinks the basis for the argument is that it is not right for Demosthenes to carry on in this fashion unless he is going to give sound advice. No justification is given for this interpretation. It is plausible but restricts itself to the immediate context. Ulpian, on the other hand, looks beyond the immediate context and argues that τὸ δυνατόν is the basis of the objection<sup>(28)</sup>, because all of D.1.16-24 is taken up with arguments showing how the Athenians will be able to succeed. No other reference is made by F<sup>2</sup> to κεφάλαια until D.1.25 and so we have to assume that D.1.16-25 is based on τὸ δικάϊον.

The author of (172b) thinks that the beginning of D.1.25 is the μετάβασις ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. The reason for this choice is apparent because Demosthenes is arguing that the war ought to be fought outside Attica, D.1.25-27. Some of the *Rhetores Graeci* do not regard τὸ ἀναγκαῖον as one of the τελικά κεφάλαια<sup>(29)</sup>.

The final section of the speech, ὁ ἐπίλογος, is pointed out by (181). Therefore τὸ ἀναγκαῖον only lasts from D.1.25-26 and appears to end with the words προσδεῖν ἡγοῦμαι. This is unsatisfactory because εἰ γὰρ ..., D.1.27, forms part of Demosthenes' case against fighting Philip in Attica.

According to F<sup>1</sup> the ἐπίλογος begins at D.1.28. The choice of D.1.27 as the beginning of the ἐπίλογος seems highly improbable; not only does it contradict the interpretation of (187b) in F<sup>1</sup>, but it also creates a

transition in the structure of the speech right in the middle of Demosthenes' argument in favour of taking the war to Philip. (181) may be meant as a general heading. If this is not the case, then F<sup>2</sup> is giving us a most unsatisfactory comment.

There are no serious contradictions of F<sup>1</sup> in the rhetorical analysis offered by F<sup>2</sup>. (15c) and (181) are careless repetitions of scholia in F<sup>1</sup>. The remarks are compatible with those found in F<sup>1</sup> and although they are simple observations, they do serve to fill out the meagre interest in rhetorical analysis shown by F<sup>1</sup>. The contribution is not significantly similar to those found in the other codices. The combined analysis is still inadequate, however, as an account of the structure of the speech.

## LANGUAGE

The majority of the twelve scholia which concern linguistic aspects of the *First Olynthiac* look at σχήματα. This was the second interest of F<sup>1</sup> in this area. On the other hand, only one lexicographical comment occurs in F<sup>2</sup>, (179). This was the most frequent type of linguistic comment in F<sup>1</sup>. As in the case of the rhetorical analysis, so here it appears that F<sup>2</sup> is consulting sources independent from those of S and F<sup>1</sup>.

### Σχήματα

In (1a) the commentator makes the valid point that Demosthenes makes assumptions throughout the *First Olynthiac*. No other examples are pointed out by F<sup>2</sup>, even in different terminology<sup>(30)</sup>.

(15c) is made up from two comments. The second refers to the beginning of τὸ συμφέρον. The first points out an example of γνώμησ ἀπόφασισ. This phrase has two meanings. The first is the expression of an opinion in a negative form and the second is an assertion<sup>(31)</sup>. If the author is using the phrase in the first sense then he is commenting on Demosthenes' words οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα μοί δοκοῦμεν ... and means that he does not know what he thinks about the Athenians' attitude and does not approve of it. The other commentators on these words interpret them as an example of ὑποσιώπησις. In the other sense of the phrase the author will be referring to the words ἔστι δὲ τὰ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα which is Demosthenes' statement of his own opinion of the situation. This contrasts the previous sentence in which Demosthenes complains about Athenian

indecisiveness. The second sense of the phrase is the more likely here because the example which illustrates it is more satisfactory than the example illustrating the first sense of the phrase.

Two scholia in F<sup>2</sup> look at ἀντιστροφή. (36a) refers to D.1.5 and states : ἀντιστροφή ' εἶτα ἐπάγει τὴν αἰτίαν. The second example is pointed out in (84) and refers to the words ἄν μὲν γάρ, ὅς' ἄν τις λάβῃ ..., D.1.11. According to the *Rhetores Graeci* ἀντιστροφή is a σχῆμα in which one word ends successive cola. Hermogenes and an anonymous writer on figures quote this passage as an example of ἀντιστροφή<sup>(32)</sup>. Their text reads the words τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν at the end of successive cola. There is no incidence of ἀντιστροφή in the OCT text as it stands, but the *apparatus* gives the variant τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν. Our commentators are dealing with what appears to be an old version of the text.

(36a) seems to have been included despite the contribution of F<sup>1</sup> at this point. What F<sup>2</sup> terms the αἰτία, F<sup>1</sup> calls the answer to an objection<sup>(33)</sup>.

(77a) points out an example of παρίσωσις κατ' ἐπεμβολήν. παρίσωσις concerns parallel structures which involve equal numbers of syllables. An anonymous writer on figures reveals that the number need not be exact<sup>(34)</sup>. The parallel may occur at the beginning or end of a sentence. There are various forms of παρίσωσις. The one which concerns this example is parallelism in construction in which the writer tries to produce a pattern in his diction. The term παρίσωσις κατ' ἐπεμβολήν is so-called because the parallelism is interrupted by a parenthesis. Hermogenes and the anonymous writer cite D.1.12 as their example. The parallel clauses are τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόλλα ἀπολωλέκεναι ... θεῖη δικαίως (33 syllables) and τὸ δὲ μήτε πάλαι τοῦτο πεπονθέναι ... ἔγωγε θεῖην (30 syllables). The parenthesis, or ἐπεμβολήν, interrupts the second of these clauses : πεφηνέναι τέ τινα ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων ἀντίρροπον, ἂν βουλώμεθα χρῆσθαι. The author of (77a) points out what appears to be a standard example of παρίσωσις κατ' ἐπεμβολήν.

In (83a) the commentator correctly observes that Demosthenes offers an analogy (παραβολή) in D.1.11, starting with the words ἀλλ' οἶμαι. The same passage is called a παράδειγμα in (83b) which is offered by R<sup>(35)</sup>. These two terms are distinguished by the *Rhetores Graeci* and there are different views about the difference. Some think that παραβολή is an example using action and παράδειγμα is an example involving people<sup>(36)</sup>. Others stress that παραβολή is a timeless analogy whereas παράδειγμα involves an historical event and therefore involves

precedent<sup>(37)</sup>. The example in D.1.11 is not a precedent and therefore may be called a παραβολή. The author of (83b) may favour the former view, that παράδειγμα involves people.

According to the *Rhetores Graeci* ἐπιτίμησις is a rebuke, with a positive purpose, directed at someone's attitude, and this rebuke is often emphasised in the phrasing<sup>(38)</sup>. (170a) points out a good example in D1.24 beginning εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε ... .

In (161b) and (171) deal with examples of περίοδος in D.1.23 and D.1.24 respectively. Dilts points out in his footnotes that both examples are found among the *Rhetores Graeci*,<sup>(39)</sup>. Aristeides refers to D.1.23 : καὶ τὸ γνωμολογεῖν δὲ τῆς σεμνότητος ἐστὶν οἷον "τὸ γὰρ εὖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνοήτοις γίνεται", (Schmid p.12.8-10). The author of (161b) rightly calls this passage an example of a γνωμικὴ περίοδος. The comment in the *First Olynthiac* is a truism and is also contained within a period ; that is a thought complete in itself and sandwiched between the subject and the verb. Since Aristeides himself is not speaking in the context of περίοδοι, the similarity between this passage and (161b) is probably coincidental.

Both Hermogenes (Rabe p.180.7-11) and the author of (171) cite εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε ... τολμήσετε ; as an example of μονόκωλος περίοδος. The example is μονόκωλος because the sentences produce a precise and complete aphorism. What suggests a very close connection between (171) and Hermogenes is the similarity in definitions. Hermogenes defines the μονόκωλος περίοδος by saying : ἡ δίανοια αὐτῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους τῷ ὑπερβατῷ οὕτω σχηματισθεῖσα σχοινοτενῶς διείληπται (Rabe p.180.8-9). In (171) we find : ἔστι δὲ μονόκωλος σχοινοτενῆς περίοδος ἐν ὑπερβατῷ σχηματισθεῖσα . It seems likely that Hermogenes' definition is being paraphrased.

All the examples of σχήματα are labelled without further explanation. There is a notable similarity between the comments in (36a), (84), (77a) and (171). It is curious that Hermogenes cites the same examples as the authors of these scholia. They may have been taken from Hermogenes or we may be dealing with standard examples. Unlike the contribution of R and S, F<sup>2</sup> reveals a conventional understanding of technical terms. The σχήματα are different from those noted in F<sup>1</sup>. This suggests that the compiler of F<sup>2</sup> was trying to add to the existing comments in codex F.

## Lexicographical Comments

(90a) and (179) are lexicographical comments, though it is difficult to classify the former since comparable scholia, (89) in S and (90b) in the *codices Ulpiani* refer specifically to the use of metaphorical language in D.1.11 and are, therefore, not lexicographical comments. (90a) gives us two synonyms for ἀποτριφόμεθα : οἷονεὶ ἔκκαθάρωμεν καὶ ἀποπλύνωμεν. In the *Pollucis Onomasticon*, 1.183, ἔκκαθάρειν and καταπλύνειν are associated as words which are used of cleaning the head. Therefore (90a) may be regarded as a form of lexicographical comment.

In (179) there is a slight textual problem because in Dilts' text the lemma reads ἐγκαλεῖ (Dilts p.47.9). The OCT text reads : εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀνοιαν ὀφλισκάνων ὅμως ἐκλαλεῖ, ταῦτα δυνηθεῖς μὴ πράξει, D.1.26. This is a contrast between idle threats and real action. This is probably a scribal error if it is not a misprint. I cannot find a comparable entry in the lexica.

Both of the lexicographical scholia are sensible and add to the marked interest of F<sup>1</sup> in this topic.

## Other Linguistic Comments

(148b) is the solitary comment on λέξις in the contribution of F<sup>2</sup>. The author comments on D1.21 : πράγματι ἀντὶ προσώπου ἐχρήσατο. Demosthenes uses the phrase τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν instead of οἱ Θετταλοί. This is a sound observation but no opinion is forthcoming about the purpose of doing this (40).

(174) and (184) are unusual because they refer to distinctive and unusual subjects for these scholia, style and money. Both are shared with S (41).

## CONCLUSION

Dilts is correct to take F<sup>2</sup> as literally the second hand involved with the scholia in the codex. The interests and approach are parallel to those in F<sup>1</sup> and the compiler of F<sup>2</sup> seems to be filling gaps in the commentary offered by his predecessor. In particular F<sup>2</sup> offers comments on the latter section of the speech. The method of F<sup>2</sup> is unsatisfactory but its merit rests with the validity of most of its comments and its apparent independence from the sources of F<sup>1</sup>. The comments on σχήματα may have been taken from the *Rhetores Graeci* or

else the examples are conventional. There is no indication that F<sup>2</sup> has influence either S or R<sup>(42)</sup>. I shall return to the connection between the *codices Ulpiani* and F<sup>2</sup> in the chapter on those codices <sup>(43)</sup>.

### F<sup>3</sup>

Dilts identifies F<sup>3</sup> as an eleventh-century hand although Avezzù does not distinguish between F<sup>3</sup> and F<sup>4</sup><sup>(44)</sup>. Only one scholion is offered by this hand on the *First Olynthiac*, (9a), and this note is also found in codices S and R<sup>(45)</sup>. There is good reason to think that S, R and F<sup>3</sup> were consulting the same source. In the *apparatus*, (Dilts p.19.6), we see that S reads ἀσκεπτι λέγεσθαι γενέσθαι and F<sup>3</sup> reads ἀσκεπτι γενέσθαι λέγεσθαι. The extra words are written above the line of the text or in the margin. Either the compilers were consulting the same difficult archetype and made their own decision about the correct reading, or else they were working from one source which gave the alternative readings which the compilers preserved. Both readings are acceptable and make good sense.

(9a) supplements the extensive number of scholia on the προίμιον which are found in codex F so far. The effect of the digression in the προίμιον is examined to see how the audience will receive Demosthenes.

It is very curious that F<sup>3</sup> offers only one scholion, and the reason for the selection of this particular comment is impossible to discern. Perhaps a reader was comparing F with an exemplar of S or R, and realised that this comment was absent from F. The possibility that Avezzù is correct and that F<sup>3</sup> is the same hand as F<sup>4</sup> is not assisted by the fact that nearly all the scholia in F<sup>4</sup> also occur in the *codices Ulpiani*. Those which do not are insignificant. (9a) is more substantial and does not occur in that group of codices.

### F<sup>4</sup>

There are some seventy-two scholia by this eleventh-century hand<sup>(46)</sup>, and they are given for every section of the speech except D.1.5 and D.1.10. The result of this is that the entire speech is covered by the contribution of codex F. Notably, there are only fifteen scholia for the first eight sections of the speech. This supports the evidence from the contents of the scholia of F<sup>4</sup> that the compiler is endeavouring to broaden the scope of the comments in codex F. Space may have been a factor. Professor MacDowell, who has seen this codex, informs me that

the margins are fairly full but not completely so. There would have been room for comments of ten or twenty words at quite a few points, but it would have been hard to fit in longer comments.

The majority of the scholia in F<sup>4</sup> are concerned with language, and in particular the psychological effect which Demosthenes achieves by careful phrasing of his argument. Over half the scholia in F<sup>4</sup> contribute to the topic of λέξις, and a third refer to other aspects of language. Four scholia deal with the historical background and fifteen refer to the rhetorical analysis of the speech. The length of note varies, but in general they are long. This is notably so with comments which deal with λέξις.

## RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

### Προοίμιον

F<sup>4</sup> has only one contribution to make about the προοίμιον as far as rhetorical analysis is concerned. This is part of the long cohesive scholion (1c)<sup>(47)</sup>. F<sup>4</sup> offers (Dilts p.14.15-fin). Two points are made. Firstly the commentator claims that the προοίμιον, as indeed the *First Olynthiac* as a whole, is composed from arguments based on τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν. He does not explain how τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν work in the προοίμιον. His second point, albeit misguided, is that the reference to money in the προοίμιον is preparatory to Demosthenes' later discussion about finance, and in particular the tricky subject of the theorik money. This note complements the initial comment about the προοίμιον offered by F<sup>2</sup>, (1c) (Dilts p.14.6-12). It refers to the κεφάλαια mentioned by F<sup>2</sup><sup>(48)</sup>. My analysis of codex Y<sup>(49)</sup> suggests that the original scholion was broken down into small scholia and this is why the contribution of codex F is in the form it is. It is asking a lot of coincidence to suppose that these two sections came into F accidentally. The compiler of F<sup>4</sup> probably had the full form of (1c) before him. This means that the formation of scholia in F<sup>4</sup> is eleventh century. The combined contribution of F<sup>2</sup> and F<sup>4</sup> produce a scholion almost identical to the full version. What is omitted are a few phrases which are explanatory rather than factual (Dilts p.14.12 τεχνικῶς - 15 ἐπιδεχόμενα). This version is closest to that offered by codex Y (Dilts app.crit. p.14.6). (1e) looks at the effect of νομίζω and is also found in codex Y<sup>(50)</sup>.

## Δεύτερον Προοίμιον

(11b) discusses the δεύτερον προοίμιον. The first two hands in F produce notes which indicate the presence of a second προοίμιον but do not discuss it<sup>(51)</sup>. The author looks at the purpose of καιρός in D.1.2 and defines προσωποποιία. The linguistic information may have been what attracted the compiler to this note. (11b) is one of the core scholia in R<sup>(52)</sup>.

### D.1.3-15

Very little is said by F<sup>4</sup> about the rhetorical structure of D.1.3-15. Passing reference is made to arguments which Demosthenes puts forward but no underlying structure is defined. In (1c) it is noted that the whole speech is made up from arguments based on τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ συμφέρον. Perhaps we are to assume that these two κεφάλαια are present in D.1.3-15.

F<sup>4</sup> in conjunction with the *codices Ulpiani* offers an abbreviated version of (51a) (Dilts app.crit. p.28.15). The *apparatus* shows that the scholion does not end in mid-sentence but contains the paraphrase : τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐθρῦλλον δύναται (Dilts p.28.1)<sup>(53)</sup>. The opening lines which remain tell us that the phrase ὃ πάντες ἐθρῦλλον, D.1.7, blocks any opportunity for people to object to Demosthenes' opinion. The remainder of the scholion as found in R is made up from a series of imagined objections and Demosthenes' answers to them. The reason for the abbreviated form is uncertain. The peculiarity of (51a) is strong evidence that F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* share the same tradition of scholia, although there is a slight difference in the versions which they offer (Dilts app.crit. p.27.30). It is not clear why the scholion was abbreviated.

(51a) and (52a) contain an analysis of D.1.2-8 which is consistent. They stress the reliability of the Olynthians in their hostility towards Philip. The interpretation fits in with the comment in F<sup>1</sup>, (26a), which also remarks on τὸ βέβαιον. (52a) mentions βεβαίους συμμάχους too (Dilts p.28.19-20)<sup>(54)</sup>.

The primary interest of (51a) and (52a) is the effect of language in context. This is true even of the abbreviated form of (51a) (Dilts p.27.26-28.1 δύναται). λέξις appears to be the reason why these two scholia were included in F<sup>4</sup>.

Even less is made of D.1.9-15. (64) offers a brief explanation of

Demosthenes' phrase ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, D.1.9. F<sup>4</sup> also offers (105c) which is the scholion which defines ἀντιπίπτον as the subtle anticipation of an objection by the speaker. This example suits the definition : καὶ πῶς ἡδυνάμην τοσοῦτοις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βοηθήσαι ; (Dilts p.31.1-2). Demosthenes is not saying that they should have fought several campaigns, but that any one of the opportunities would have sufficed. The interpretation is plausible. This interpretation follows the same lines as (60b) (Dilts p.30.13-16) which is offered by S and R<sup>(55)</sup>.

Another ἀντιπίπτον is pointed out at the beginning of D.1.14 in (105c). The example is good because Demosthenes himself reveals that there are some people who might doubt the relevance of what he has been saying<sup>(56)</sup>.

### D.1.16-27

From D.1.16 onwards there is a significant change in detail which is offered about the rhetorical analysis. Ulpian points out that D.1.16 marks a transition in the speech which hitherto had examined arguments based on a blend of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.10.15sqg)<sup>(57)</sup>. Of D.1.16 Ulpian says : προοιμιάζεται λοιπόν περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πάλιν τῆς πόλεως (Dilts p.10.20-21). He then divides the προοίμιον into four topics. (117c) also points out a προοίμιον and it is noted that Demosthenes uses a blend of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν : τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος ἐξ οὗ λέγων ἐπαύσατο, λέγω δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος, τὸ δὲ ἐνθύμημα καὶ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ δυνατοῦ (Dilts p.38.3-5). The word λέγω should be noted. This is the only example in F<sup>4</sup> where a scholion is personalised. As a result, the remark may be an excerpt from a commentary similar to the *Ulpiani prolegomena* where the personality of the author is conveyed in the text. The appearance of the terms ἐνθύμημα and ἐπαγωγή warrants further comment. This is the first appearance of these technical terms among the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*. Clearly the author expects his audience to be familiar with the terms, since he neither defines the terms, nor points out which words in the speech he is discussing. This is even more unusual because in other scholia the distinction between terms is of great interest, (11b), (105c) and (164a). While the author of the note seems clear in his own mind what he is discussing, the clarity of his observation belies some difficulty in its application to the text.

The *Rhetores Graeci* are not unanimous about the meaning of ἐνθύμημα<sup>(58)</sup>. It appears that ἐνθύμημα is a syllogism where individuals are left to deduce the conclusion for themselves. In ἐπαγωγή

every step is spelt out. It is possible that the author of (117c) has another meaning in mind, but his failure to explain what he means forces us to rely on conjecture. The scholion covers all of D.1.16-18.

The ἐνθύμημα is Demosthenes' explanation in D.1.16 about why people are hesitant to speak before the Athenian people ; a) many people dare not speak because of the Athenians' attitude, b) he dares to speak. We are left to conclude that Demosthenes is brave and that he must have something worth saying. The ἐπαγωγή is Demosthenes' argument in favour of sending two forces, φημί δὲ διχῆ ... . At the end of his argument he states : δεῖ δὲ πολλὴν καὶ διχῆ τὴν βοήθειαν εἶναι, D.1.18. The argument put forward is complete. The author of (117c) is giving us a sophisticated and valid interpretation, but is demanding of his audience.

The author says that this section of the speech is a mixture of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.38.1-2). The reason is that Demosthenes is moving on to τὸ δυνατόν but does not wish the transition to be abrupt. Since Demosthenes refers to τὸ συμφέρον in D.1.16 that would seem to be the basis of the ἐνθύμημα and not τὸ δυνατόν as the author of the scholion suggests (Dilts p.38.5). The ἐπαγωγή is more obviously concerned with τὸ δυνατόν because Demosthenes argues for the potential success of two forces.

The author then goes on to discuss the difference between structural προίμια and προίμια of κεφάλαια (Dilts p.38.6sqg). Structural προίμια are said to have the function of giving the scope of the speech and introducing the topics which will be dealt with severally throughout the speech. Of the προίμια of κεφάλαια he says : τὰ δὲ τῶν κεφαλαίων αὐτὰ μόνα θεραπεύει τὰ λυποῦντα τὸ κεφάλαιον (Dilts p.38.8-9). The occurrence of an αντιθεσις in this type of προίμιον is therefore not surprising. There is no contradiction between (117c) and (1c) here. (1c) talks about the προίμιον at the beginning of the whole speech.

The author then points out that Demosthenes is using ἐπιτίμησις and that this conforms to τὸ συμφέρον because its purpose is ultimately beneficial (Dilts p.38.11-14)<sup>(59)</sup>. Unlike λοιδορία, it is constructive and suited to the man who has the best interests of his audience at heart. In this context ἐπιτίμησις refers to D.1.16, and so we have further support for the idea suggested above that the ἐνθύμημα is argued ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

The interpretation offered is not the same as Ulpian's but is perhaps the work of someone whose approach was similar<sup>(60)</sup>. It would also suit the analysis offered in S and R<sup>(61)</sup>. Significantly, perhaps, the

contribution of these codices on this part of Demosthenes' speech is sparse. The personal tone and detailed approach are unusual for F<sup>4</sup>. Obviously the contribution of F<sup>4</sup> is a compilation. Perhaps the attraction of (117c) for the compiler was the differentiation of types of προοίμια.

The inclusion of (117d) increases the likelihood that (117c) is an extract from a discussion of the *prolegomena* type and it suggests that the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> was trying to find alternative interpretations. This is shown by ἄλλωσ (Dilts p.38.16) which was a conventional way among scholars of signifying an alternative interpretation. In (117d) we are told : ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου, οἷον "ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖσ, ᾧ Δημόσθενεσ, μόνον ἐπιτιμῶν ἡμῖν, ὅπερ παντὸσ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, οὗ μέντοι συμβουλεύων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτοροσ" (Dilts p.38.16-18). The example of ἀντίθεσις suits the definition given in (105c).

The presence of this scholion was possibly prompted by (117a), offered by F<sup>2</sup>, in which it is stated that D1.16 is an ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου. (117d) justifies this observation. The scholion in F<sup>4</sup> does give a valid interpretation of how the objection could be said to arise ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου. However, in the context of D.1.16 τὸ συμφέρον is more appropriate. The objection is that it is all very well for Demosthenes to go on as he is doing, but his words are not doing the people any good.

The second part of (117d) offers a plausible interpretation of D.1.16. The author observes that Demosthenes digresses before confronting the actual objection (Dilts p.38.18-20) with what amounts to an apology for those in his position who have to confront the unjust ire of the Athenians. The author correctly explains that the effect is to prejudice the audience in favour of Demosthenes' ensuing advice.

The comment in (119a) is straightforward and says that a discussion about the type of force concerns τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον. This scholion complements (117d) since the latter deals with D.1.16 while (119a) looks at D.1.17-18.

(123b) also refers to τὸ δυνατόν Ὀλυνθίσισ (Dilts p.39.21). (124) produces an inconsistency within the scholia in F<sup>4</sup> because it says : μετέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον. If (124) were complementary to the preceding scholia it would have been more accurate to have said τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ δυνατοῦ. (124) divides τὸ δυνατόν in two sections, corresponding to D.1.19-20 and D.1.21-23<sup>(62)</sup>. The two parts of τὸ δυνατόν are, according to (124), a) χρημάτων εὐπορία and b) ἀνδρῶν δύναμισ. In (140a) these sections are termed a) τὸ τῆσ πόλεωσ and b) τὸ

τοῦ Μακεδόνος. Although they appear inconsistent these two scholia can be reconciled<sup>(63)</sup>.

The author of (164a) says that D.1.24 marks the end of the ἐξέτασις τοῦ δυνατοῦ (Dilts p.44.33). This scholion complements (140a). However, these opening remarks are missing from the version found in S and R (Dilts app.crit. p.44.33) F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* may offer the complete version of the scholion or else two scholia were combined. D.1.24 marks the beginning of προτροπή and the attraction of (164a) for the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> may rest with the differentiation of terms within this scholion<sup>(64)</sup>.

(172a) raises problems. In F<sup>4</sup> it reads : αὐτὸ τὸ δυναστὸν (lege δυνατὸν) ἀπλῶς καὶ τὸ ῥάδιον εἴληφεν ' ὅπερ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ νῦν ἐξετάζεσθαί φαμεν. ... (Dilts app.crit.p.46.17). This comment is surprising in the light of (164a) in which we are led to expect that D.1.23 ends the examination of τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.44.33). These scholia may be cited as evidence of a plurality of sources in F<sup>4</sup>.

The *codices Ulpiani* contain this scholion but the first statement is quite different : ὥσπερ τὸ συμφέρον εἰς δύο τέμνεσθαί φαμεν, εἷς τε αὐτὸ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν εἰς τε αὐτὸ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπλῶς καὶ τὸ ῥάδιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ' ὅπερ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ νῦν ἐξετάζεσθαί φαμεν ... (Dilts p.46.17-20). This is the only example where F<sup>4</sup> offers a scholion significantly different from the *codices Ulpiani*. From words such as ὥσπερ, οὕτω καὶ and φάμεν, it appears that the later codices contain a note which is written by one person. It is also possible that the version in F<sup>4</sup> is the original and that this was expanded in later manuscripts.

The version in the later codices suggests that τὸ συμφέρον has been discussed in detail, and although there is room for doubt, it implies that τὸ δυνατόν is not dominant in the sections preceding D.1.25. The version in F<sup>4</sup> loses the reference to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Its absence is perhaps accidental. The latter part of (172a) justifies τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ ῥάδιον (Dilts p.46.20-22), and the final phrase justifies the idea of necessity.

The absence of the opening lines of (172a), which refer to previous discussions, avoids inconsistency in F<sup>4</sup>. F<sup>2</sup> refers to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον in (172b) and perhaps the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> was attracted to (172a) for this reason. But if he has, we must ask why he has omitted the reference to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον in his version.

(175a) is a brief and technical comment on the beginning of D.1.26 : ἀνθυποφορὰ στοχαστικὴ ἦν λύει ἐκ τεκμηρίων. According to Hermogenes an

ἀνθυποφορά is the outright denial of a proposition or hypothesis (Rabe p.134.1-4) . We find a very good example in D.1.26 : ἀν δ' ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβη, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν ; The denial follows after a few lines : ἀλλ' ὧ τᾶν οὐχὶ βουλήσεται. This example suits Hermogenes' definition and is also compatible with the definition put forward in (105c). Demosthenes is effectively saying : I agree that no-one could stop Philip from coming here, but I do not think he will come.

### D1.28

(187a) comments about epilogues : ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος κεφαλαίου τοὺς ἐπιλόγους εἴληψε ' δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν αἰεὶ καὶ τῶν συνεκτικῶν τὰς ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους λαμβάνειν. This sounds like a general comment about Demosthenes' treatment of the epilogue in other speeches, and therefore, complements the brief remark offered by F<sup>1</sup> in (187b), which marks the epilogue at D.1.28. It is possible, though unlikely, that the author of this scholion uses the plural ἐπίλογοι in the same way as Ulpian, who thinks that D.1.24-28 formed οἱ ἐπίλογοι (Dilts p.12.3-4).

### Conclusion

The addition of the scholia on rhetorical analysis by F<sup>4</sup> transforms the value of the analysis offered in codex F from a scrappy and unsubstantial collection of remarks into a largely consistent and progressive discussion, where many claims are given supporting arguments.

The analysis is more like that offered by S and R compared with Ulpian's interpretation. D.1.2-15 receives only cursory treatment in comparison with the interest shown in τὸ δυνατόν in D.1.16-23. The analysis of D.1.24-28 is also similar to that found in S and R. There is evidence that F<sup>4</sup> is taken from a number of sources. The compiler does not choose between alternative interpretations of the same passage.

The purpose of the compiler seems to be to offer alternative interpretations, without producing a definitive analysis. It is also clear that the comments which are selected are not contradictory, except in detail, and that they offer a similar approach in their interpretation of the *First Olynthiac* .

The selection of scholia may have been determined by lack of space near the beginning of the codex or by a desire to broaden the scope of F.

It should be noted that all of the scholia which touch upon rhetorical analysis also occur in the *codices Ulpiani*. Many of these scholia also look at aspects of language and this may have made them attractive to the compiler. The nature of the relationship between the *codices Ulpiani* and F<sup>4</sup> is discussed in a later chapter.

It looks as though the compilation in F<sup>4</sup> was added to the codex in the eleventh century. This is based on an explanation for the parts of (1c) which appear in F<sup>2</sup> and F<sup>4</sup>. Since F<sup>4</sup> follows the tradition of the *codices Ulpiani* closely, I can see no reason for the absence of the first part of (1c) except for the influence of F<sup>2</sup>.

## LANGUAGE

There are some sixty-two scholia which are pertinent to these topics. Half deal with aspects of λέξις, ten with σχήματα, four with grammar and one with lexicography. Many of the scholia have been discussed elsewhere.

### Λέξις

The concentration of scholia concerned with λέξις can be cited as evidence of one purpose of the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> which is to make up for deficiencies in the scope of previous scholia in codex F. Language is important in the previous contributions, but λέξις received relatively little attention (65). There are many examples which merit discussion.

(1e) is almost certainly an abbreviated version of scholion (1d) (66). (1e) follows on directly after (1c) in F<sup>4</sup>, according to Dilts' annotation (Dilts p.14.19).

The contents of (1e) refers to the presence of hyperbole in the phrase πολλῶν χρημάτων and develops the suggestion in (1c) that the theorik money is a problem which Demosthenes has to tackle. Here we discover why this problem is eased if the Athenians learn to disregard money.

(1e) also looks at Demosthenes' choice of νομίζω in D.1.1. The author argues that νομίζω is tactful (ἡθικόν) and invites assent, whereas πέπεισμαι is an expression of conviction and invites dissent (Dilts p.15.11-13). This argument is not convincing because it is not clear that these words do have this effect. If πέπεισμαι, however, means "I have been won over" rather than "I am convinced", then the comment is more justifiable. πέπεισμαι then implies that there is a divergence of

opinion and the audience may wonder about the alternative. νομίζω does not have this connotation.

(2b) makes a different point about the same word νομίζω, without explaining why Demosthenes favours this particular word here. The author explains that words like νομίζω and δοκεῖν occur in statements of fact where there is no doubt, as well as in cases where the speaker is giving his own opinion in a matter where there is room for doubt.

It is likely that (1e) and (2b) are by different authors. The author of (1e) stresses the softening effect, κατὰ ἔνδοιασμόν (Dilts p.15.5), of νομίζω whereas the author of (2b) stresses the element of veracity. Moreover, the version in F<sup>4</sup> reads ἄλλωσ at the beginning of (2b). It is unlikely that the same author is examining different aspects of the same word, and does so in a continuous comment. Codex Y offers (1e) followed by a long scholion, (1f), before offering (2a). The second part of (2b) looks at ἔμφασισ<sup>(67)</sup>. This scholion offers exactly the same information as (2a). The difference between them is that they reverse the order of the two pieces of information. Therefore (2b) is likely to be a composite scholion. The part which contains the phrase ἐν τοῖσ Ἰσοκρατικοῖσ (Dilts p.16.28) may have been written originally by the fourth-century scholar Zosimos of Askalon<sup>(68)</sup>.

The compiler of F<sup>4</sup> may have been attracted to (2b) by the presence of (2c), offered by F<sup>1</sup>. It is lexicographic in form and lacking explanation. The difference between the treatment in (2b) and (2c) illustrates the difficulty in deciding what type of scholion we are dealing with.

A similar situation is encountered between (49) and (50). (50) in F<sup>1</sup> comments on the phrase οὐδὲ γὰρ λόγος οὐδὲ σκήφισ : λόγος ἢ ἀπολογία, σκήφισ δὲ ἢ πρόφασισ. (49) in F<sup>4</sup> comments on μηδὲν ἐλλείποντας : εἰ συμβῆ ἤτηθηναὶ αὐτούσ, ἔχη ἀπολογίαν τὸ ἐλλείφαί τινα ὧν συνεβούλευσεν. The word ἀπολογία may have prompted the inclusion of the scholion in F<sup>4</sup><sup>(69)</sup>.

F<sup>1</sup> offers a brief scholion, (67b), which indicates ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.9. In (67a) we find an explanation of the example. Demosthenes is criticising the Athenians' attitude through the phrase τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα αὐτόματα. These words suggest the type of attitude which is causing Athens trouble. This scholion is difficult to categorise as it may be interpreted both as a comment about λέξις and σχήματα.

(72) is a straightforward observation that Demosthenes disheartens the Athenians in D.1.9 with the list of captured places, but encourages them again with the prospect of another opportunity for success<sup>(70)</sup>.

(99) offers a straightforward analysis of Demosthenes' choice of words in D.1.13. The effect of saying *πάλιν ῥαίισασ* instead of *ὑγιάνασ* does indeed stress how active Philip is and how unwilling to give up any opportunity. This is another example of a quasi-lexicographical comment.

The author of (111) points out that Demosthenes takes an abstract subject in D.1.5, *ὁ πόλεμος*, instead of a personal one, *οἱ πολέμιοι*. He further remarks that Thoukydides is inclined to use the personal in place of abstract and vice versa, but no examples are given. The effect is to give a speech *καινοπρέπεια* (novelty). The author also compliments Demosthenes on the clever use of a question (Dilts p.37.1-3) : *τίς οὕτως εἰρήθησ ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ ... D.1.5*. This effectively stifles anyone who did want to object, because of the implication of Demosthenes' words.

(115a) notes that the word *ἔρραθυμηκότεσ*, D.1.15, is more evocative than *ἡμεληκότεσ* because the former reveals to the audience something about the degree and manner of their negligence. There is a second part to this scholion. We are to understand the word *τόκῳ* in the phrase *ἐπὶ πολλῶ*. This is an elementary clarification.

(119b) contains an interpretation of D.1.18-19 which is also found in the *Ulpiani prolegomena* ; that is that Demosthenes is not genuinely calling for two forced to be sent. Ulpian explores the idea more fully<sup>(71)</sup>. The argument in this scholion is plausible nonetheless : *ἐπεὶ δὲ οἶδε τοὺσ Ἀθηναίουσ πολλῆ δεδουλωμένουσ ῥαθυμία, προτείνει αὐτοῖσ δύο βοηθείασ, ἵνα καὶ τὴν μίαν ποιήσωσιν* (Dilts p.39.1-3).

In (123b) it is noted that Demosthenes stresses how quickly Philip captured cities, D.1.8-12, and therefore demonstrates the perilous situation which faces Olynthos. When Demosthenes says *τῷ χρόνῳ περιέσται*, D.1.18, he is thought to be forming evidence in favour of *τὸ δυνατὸν Ὀλυνθίοισ* (Dilts p.39.21). S and R offer a very similar scholion, (123a)<sup>(72)</sup>. If these scholia are not adapted from one another then they are likely to be paraphrases of the same source since there are strong verbal similarities. : *εἰς χερῆ* (Dilts p.39.17, 19), *τῶν ἄνω πόλεων* (Dilts p.39.17-18, 19) and *τὸ δυνατὸν Ὀλυνθίοισ πραγματευόμενος* (Dilts p.39.16, 21).

(126a) tells us that the compound verb *ἀποδώσετε*, D.1.19, conveys the idea that the money did not belong to the Athenians themselves but that it belonged to the soldiers. This is why Demosthenes does not use the simple verb *δώσετε*. This is a valid point. *ἀποδώσετε*, "give back", is the reverse of *λαμβάνετε* in the previous sentence. Whether or not

στρατιωτικά is correctly read in the text of Demosthenes, his point is that the money is really public money which ought to be available for military purposes and should not be distributed to the Athenians individually. The *codices Ulpiani* offer (126b) which makes a similar point.

In (127) the author discusses the nuances of the verb προσδει and ἐνδεῖ in D.1.19 and why Demosthenes uses first one, then the other. The explanation is perceptive. He argues that ἐνδεῖ implies total deficiency whereas προσδεῖ suggests that the deficiency is only partial. If the Athenians use the theorik money then they will not require further funding, but if they do not use the theorik money then there will be insufficient funds. The author of (127) adds that Demosthenes corrects himself for emphasis (Dilts p.40.11-13). The Athenians have little choice. They have to use the theorik money or do nothing.

(150b) notes the effect of the word κομιδῆ in D.1.22 : ἀνξισίς ἐστὶν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου. What the author means is that Demosthenes has made a general statement about Theban treachery instead of restricting their treachery to Philip. However, the commentator does not conclude what effect this has in Demosthenes' argument. (150a) in S offers a very similar observation, except that the author explains that the purpose is to increase the untrustworthiness of the Thebans<sup>(73)</sup>.

(153) is a brief scholion on D.1.22 which also comments on the effect of a particular word, and in this case the effect is explained. The author argues that the effect of saying τινῶν instead of τινὸς in a phrase such as ἤκουον δ' ἐγὼ γέ τινῶν is to make the information seem more reliable. This is because it is coming from several sources. (153) is one of the few scholia unique to F<sup>4</sup><sup>(74)</sup>.

In D.1.22-23 Demosthenes lists the places which create weakness in Philip's power. The author of (156a) believes that Demosthenes wants to show that barbarians as well as Greeks are causing problems. Hence, Demosthenes refers to Paionia and Illyria. The scholion continues : καὶ δι' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς λέξεως εὐτέλισε τὴν δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ εἶπε πληθυντικῶς, ἀλλ' ἐνικῶς "Παίονα καὶ Ἰλλυρίον" (Dilts p.43.33-44.2). No explanation is given as to why the singular is more disparaging than the plural. Perhaps it is the impression that a single entity can test Philip, let alone hordes. Alternatively the use of the singular makes it sound as if Philip only has one or two supporters from Illyria and Paionia, not a whole army. But, if so, the point is not a good one.

(156b), which is found in S, makes the same point about Demosthenes' desire to include the barbarians. The wording in S is very

similar to that in (156a) (Dilts p.43.2-34). The phrasing of the subsequent comment in (156a) suggests that it is a fuller version of the scholion, and that (156b) may be abbreviated.

A similar relationship seems to exist between (159c), which is found in S, and (159a) in F<sup>4</sup>. The latter offers a full account of the nuance of the verb κατακούειν in D.1.23. The former gives the bare essentials<sup>(75)</sup>, suggesting that the same source has been consulted but that the introductory remarks have been omitted. Both scholia contain the following definition of κατακούειν : πάνυ ἀκούειν, ὥστε καὶ δούλους νομιζεσθαι (Dilts p.44.20-21, 23). Demosthenes is speaking in the context of the free and the enslaved. The simple verb alone would be inappropriate because Demosthenes is talking about a group of people obeying another group, not listening to them. The author is placing too much significance on the compound. It is the natural choice, given the context. Perhaps his remarks are aimed at elementary students.

(170c) is an unusual scholion because the author affects not to understand the text and proceeds to instruct his audience on the method which will clarify the ambiguity. D.1.24 reads as follows : εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε, εἰ μὴδ' ἅ παθοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ δύναιτ' ἐκεῖνος, ταῦτα ποιῆσαι καιρὸν ἔχοντες οὐ τολμήσετε ; The author of the scholion alleges that it is unclear whether ταῦτα ποιῆσαι is to be taken with Philip or the Athenians. He suggests rearranging the sentence by reversing the phrases. The result is as follows : οὐ τολμήσετε καιρὸν ἔχοντες ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἅ παθοῖτ' ἄν εἰ δύναιτο ἐκεῖνος ; (Dilts p.46.12-13). The ambiguity is now resolved according to the author. Certainly his version is clearer than Demosthenes', but punctuation of the text would have forestalled the problem in the first place. However, punctuation was erratic for many centuries. Its absence in this particular passage would not necessarily mean that the whole text contained none. This comment may be an endeavour to explain a genuine problem or may come from an elementary lecture.

(183) may shed some light on the society to which its author belonged. He finds significance in Demosthenes' reference to τοὺς γεωργοῦντας, D.1.27 : οὐχ ἅπλωσ τοὺς σκάπτοντας τὴν γῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κεκτημένους τοὺς ἀγρούς (Dilts p.47.16-17). The distinction between propertied farmers as opposed to farm workers may not have arisen for Demosthenes' audience, since farmers owned their land and were citizens. Farm workers were slaves and therefore ineligible for military service. However, there were free farm labourers in Demosthenes' time<sup>(76)</sup>, though doubtless fewer than in later times.

(190b) points out that τὸς δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ is a periphrastic phrase meaning τὸς νεωτέρους.

The remarks offered by F<sup>4</sup> are generally perceptive and often justifiable. The psychological effect often rests on the nuance of a particular word. Instances have been noted where F<sup>4</sup> offers a very similar scholion to S. The inclusion or absence of explanation decides whether a scholion is to be categorised as lexicographic or as relevant to λέξις. The differences between the scholia offered by F<sup>4</sup> and S suggest that their relationship is not direct. More importantly, nearly all the scholia found in F<sup>4</sup> also occur in the *codices Ulpiani*. The relationship between them will be discussed presently<sup>(77)</sup>. Instances also occur where a cursory remark offered by F<sup>1</sup> seems to prompt further explanation from F<sup>4</sup>.

### Σχηματα

(11b) offers a brief account of prosaic and poetic προσωποποιία. This scholion is also found in R and the *codices Ulpiani*. (11b) in R is one of three scholia which look at this σχῆμα<sup>(78)</sup>. F<sup>4</sup> contains only (11b) and thus leaves the metaphorical use of καιρός in D.1.2 undefined, because according to (Dilts p.19.29-31) καιρός can be interpreted either as a man or as an opportunity. The uncertainty is cleared up in (11d) but F<sup>4</sup> does not contain this scholion.

(14c) and (93a) are discussed fully in the chapter on codex R<sup>(79)</sup>. They look at the use of ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.2 and D.1.12 respectively. Menander Rhetor is probably the author of (14c)<sup>(80)</sup>.

(14c) deals with similar material offered in (14a) in F<sup>1</sup> but more comprehensively. The unexplained identification of ὑποσιώπησις in (14a) warrants the extensive comment in (14c).

In (93a) the author correctly points out that Demosthenes uses ὑποσιώπησις when he says ὅποι βούλεται, D.1.12. Athens is the destination. The inclusion of πάλιν in this scholion (Dilts p.34.28) may indicate that (93a) and (14c) are by the same author. There is no similar scholion at this point from the previous contributors to F.

There are two brief references to metaphor. In D.1.3 Demosthenes uses the words τρέφεται καὶ παρασπάσεται τι. (26b) contains the suggestion that the metaphor is psychological. Codex S offers this scholion too but lacks the word ἦ at the beginning (Dilts a.p.crit.p.22.28). R and the *codices Ulpiani* contain (26a) and (26b)

which offer alternative interpretations of the metaphor linked by η. F<sup>1</sup> contains (26a) and F<sup>4</sup> (26b). Perhaps the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> omitted the first choice since it was already present. In (26a) the metaphor is thought to be connected with supplication.

The author of (90c) takes the metaphor suggested by the word ἀποτριφόμεθα, D.1.11, from the cleansing of dirty clothing. The inspiration for the compiler to include this comment may have been the scholion in F<sup>2</sup>, (90a) : ὅτιονεὶ ἐκκαθάρωμεν καὶ ἀποπλύνωμεν. The comment in (90c) explains the synonyms. Although this scholion is unique to F<sup>4</sup>, the *codices Ulpiani* contain a scholion which makes the same point<sup>(81)</sup>.

There are three scholia in F<sup>4</sup> which reveal the authors' understanding of the financial simile in D.1.15. They are (114a), (114c) and (115b)<sup>(82)</sup>. A fourth scholion, (115a), concerns λέξις and has no bearing on the interpretation of the simile. It is important to note that (114c) gives the same information which is found in (114b). This scholion is offered by S, vp and the *codices Ulpiani*. The version in (114b) is not as elliptical as the version in (114c). Either could be the older version but perhaps it is more probable that F<sup>4</sup> offers the later version. (114a) offers the correct interpretation. The simile is about those who borrow money.. (114b) and (114c) wrongly state that the simile is about those who lend money. The author of (115b) follows the mistaken interpretation of (114b) since he uses the term κεφάλαιον, "capital", and not ἐνέχυρα, "security". The author of (114b) is probably also the author of (115b). The compiler of these scholia expresses no opinion about which interpretation he prefers.

The comments on σχήματα are sensible and show signs of having been prompted by a desire to give a fuller explanation than is found in the existing scholia. On the other hand almost all of these scholia are found in the *codices Ulpiani*. The nature of the relationship between them may affect the conclusion about the purpose of the compiler of F<sup>4</sup>. there is evidence among these scholia, as in the case of metaphor and simile, that various sources are being consulted. The most important feature of these scholia is that (114c) gives us a clue as to the identity of the author.

## Lexicographical Scholia

It is not always easy to identify lexicographical scholia. The author's point may not be clear when he fails to explain himself. (5d) for example is lexicographical in form, but because it is an extract from a longer scholion it cannot be properly classified as such. There are two scholia in F<sup>4</sup> which are almost certainly intended as lexicographical notes.

(120) points out that ὀκνῶ is used instead of φοβοῦμαι in the phrase ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ἡμῖν ἢ στρατεία γένηται, D.1.18. This sense of the word is supported by an entry in the *Pollucis Onomasticon*, 5.122, which dates from the second century A.D.. In the later *Etymologicum Magnum* the entry includes the following sentence: καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν δευτέρῳ Φιλιππικῶν τὸ ὀκνεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ φοβοῦμαι εἶπε καὶ δέδοικα, 620.48. If the *Second Philippic* refers to the speech we call by that name then the relevant passage may occur in D.6.3 with the phrase ἀπέχθειαν ὀκνοῦντες. The reference could of course be to the *First Olynthiac* since it was the second of the group of speeches to be delivered<sup>(83)</sup>.

The *Souda* quotes the same example as the author of (120), O 116. Relevant entries are also found in the lexica of Hesychios, 748 (Latte), and Zonaras, 1440. There is also an entry in Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca*, 285.5. I have suggested that the contribution of F<sup>4</sup> was compiled in the eleventh century. It is possible that the compiler consulted lexica, though other collections of scholia are a more probable source.

(175b) looks at the phrase ὦ τᾶν in D.1.26: τὸ δὲ "ὦ τᾶν" δύο μέρη λόγου εἰσὶν, ὦ καὶ ἐτᾶν, ὃ ἔστιν ὦ ἐταῖρε. The detailed philological study which this question requires is outwith the scope of this thesis. However, it should be noted that various writers in antiquity comment on the derivation of this word. Apollonios Dyskolos, *Adv* 159.11, offers a resume of prevalent views including that of Didymos. Apollodoros favours Didymos' interpretation and this seems close to the view expressed in (175b). Other accounts are found in the *Scholia ad Lucianum*, 91.18, and the *Etymologicum Magnum*, 825.11. However none of these sources appears to have provided the version in (175b).

## Grammar

(97) is a comment on the phrase Θεταλίᾱσ ἐπέβη, D.1.12. The author looks at the case with which a compound verb ἐπιβαίνω is constructed; that is with the genitive. Two compound verbs involving the prefix ἐμ,

ἐπεμβάινω and ἔμβατεύω, take the dative. The author of the scholion is not wrong, but, according to Liddell and Scott<sup>(84)</sup>, both compounds are constructed with the genitive and the dative. ἐπεμβάινω with the genitive is considered poetic.

(121) points out that Demosthenes' grammar in the phrase μάταιος ἡ στρατεία, D.1.18, is Attic. This is an adjective of two terminations though this is not always so according to Liddell and Scott<sup>(85)</sup>. Another example is found at D.9.69 : μάταιος ἡ σπουδή.

συνάρασθαι is the aorist middle of συναίρω. Only Attic, according to Liddell and Scott<sup>(86)</sup>, constructs this verb with the accusative in addition to the genitive and dative. The dative, however, does not appear to be common among the prose writers of the classical period. The author of (166a) may be used to the practice of a later period. He thinks that the prefix συν adds the nuance of coming to grips with events. This is a valid interpretation.

(195b) points out that in the final statement χρηστὰ δ'εἶη παντὸς εἴνεκα, the iota in the final word indicates the idea of poetic language. There is doubt whether Demosthenes used the form εἴνεκα or ἔνεκα or both<sup>(87)</sup>. The manuscripts usually give ε-, sometimes ει-. Blass emended most instances to ει- because he believed that Demosthenes avoided successions of short syllables. The only value of (195b) is that it shows that already in the time of the author of this scholion, whenever that was, the manuscripts did not usually give ει- in the text of Demosthenes but did give it at D.1.28.

### Conclusion

This set of scholia may be by the same author since the Attic seems to interest him. If the author is drawing from more material than is available to us now, his judgement may well be superior to ours. Nevertheless, the significance of individual words and phrases seem to be overrated. All of these scholia are shared with the *codices Ulpiani* .

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There are four scholia in F<sup>4</sup> which are concerned with the historical background. (1c) offers the misguided opinion that the reference to money in the προίμιον is an allusion to the source of funding for the proposed campaign. There is no specific discussion in F<sup>4</sup> about the sources of finance, but in (127) which examines the nuances of

προδείσθαι and ἐνδείσθαι in D.1.19, there are two direct references to the theorik money (Dilts p.40.12, 13).

F<sup>1</sup> offers a brief comment identifying Arybbas, D.1.13 : βασιλεὺς μακεδόνων οὗτος. The scholion offered by F<sup>4</sup>, (103), appears to expand on this : ὁ δὲ ἀρύμβασ (sic) βασιλεὺς ἦν Μολοσσῶν, Ὀλυμπιάδος δὲ τῆς τοῦ Φιλίππου γυναικὸς θεῖος (Dilts app.crit. p.35.22-23). This information is substantiated in our sources<sup>(88)</sup>. The most comprehensive account is found in Justin's epitome of Trogus Pompeius : *sed nec a proximis manus abstinet ; siquidem Arrybam regem Epiri, uxori suae Olympiadi artissima cognatione iunctum, pellere regno statuit ...* , 8.6.4. The conclusion drawn about Philip's character is the same as that found in (103). Since Trogus had access to Greek historians now lost, including Theopompos<sup>(89)</sup>, it may be that this scholion is derived from a similar source.

One may infer from Demosthenes' comment in D.1.13 that there was conflict between Philip and Arybbas. The year in question is probably 351/0 B.C.<sup>(90)</sup>. The purpose in mentioning Arybbas is unlikely to be for the reason suggested by the author of (103). If Demosthenes wished to denigrate Philip's character by pointing out that Philip attacked members of his own family, he would surely have mentioned the family tie openly.

Demosthenes' reference to Pagasai and Magnesia in D.1.22 is picked up by the author of (151). This is the long scholion which alludes to the Aleuadai<sup>(91)</sup>. The information is partially correct and partially confused. It is an unusual scholion to find in F<sup>4</sup> because of the attention which is paid to the historical background. There is no linguistic content.

### Conclusion

Thanks to the efforts of the compiler of F<sup>4</sup>, the only difference between codices S and R and the total contribution of F in terms of historical background is that the former refers to the theorik money more often, and in different scholia from F. However none of these codices contains a scholion which looks at the question of finance in detail. Demosthenes is assumed to be referring to the theorik money. This interpretation does not seem to have been disputed. The original source for these comments, if we regard (103) as typical, are early and are perhaps written by historians such as Theopompos within a few years of the events themselves. If this is so then the confusions are surprising.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout this analysis instances have been pointed out where F<sup>4</sup> seems to offer a paraphrase of another scholion. The *apparatus* in Dilts' edition reveals that either the scribe was careless or else was copying from a predecessor who was careless. There are examples where F<sup>4</sup> offers a different phrase from the readings in other codices (Dilts p.14.17, p.27.30-28.1, p.28.26, p.44.19-20, p.27.21, p.40.10-11), and also where the word order is altered (Dilts p.27.29 ἀλλὰ - 28.1 Φιλίππῳ, p.28.26 ἐζημ - καιροῖς, p.44.19, p.44.19-20) Words are also missed out at (Dilts p.35.3, p.46.17-19, p.47.10, p.48.20). There are also several instances where the omission of a phrase renders the scholion ungrammatical (Dilts p.15.10, p.19.23, p.37.27, p.40.9). The scribe does seem careless at times but some of the omissions are valuable since they hint at the way in which the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* were compiled.

There appears at first sight to be a method behind the selection of scholia in F<sup>4</sup>. The compilers endeavoured to strengthen deficiencies in the existing scholia. This may be an overstatement. Many of the scholia contain a remark which is pertinent to the topic of language. The linguistic content may have been the spur for the inclusion of scholia which also examine the rhetorical structure of the speech.

A multiplicity of sources is evident as we can tell from references to works by Homer, (51a), Thoukydides, (111) as well as other commentaries, (2b), (117c) and (172b). Alternative interpretations are sometimes marked, (2b), (26b) and (114c), No preference is expressed. My interpretation of (1c) suggests that F<sup>4</sup> was compiled in the eleventh century.

## CONCLUSION ABOUT THE SCHOLIA IN CODEX F

The loss of codex F would not affect the corpus of scholia on the *First Olynthiac* seriously. Most of the scholia occur in other codices. Those which do not are trivial. The principal interest is in language. Each hand favours a different aspect. There appears to have been a conscious effort on the part of the compilers to make up for the deficiencies of previous contributors. This may be so but it also may be coincidence. The absence of comments by F<sup>4</sup> on the beginning of the speech may be because of lack of space. The contribution of F<sup>4</sup> may have been compiled in the eleventh century. There is a very close

relationship between  $F^4$  and the *codices Ulpiani*. If codex F has been a source for this group of codices then the hypothesis about the purpose of the compilers is tenable. This hypothesis cannot hold if only  $F^4$  or an exemplar thereof was the source for then the compiler would have had no idea what the previous hands in F would produce.  $F^1$  may have been a source for some of the scholia in codex S, but I do not know whether this is true for more than one hand. There is no evident link between the other hands in F and S. Therefore Drerup's suggestion that F is a source for the latter requires qualification. There is a strong relationship between  $F^4$  and the *codices Ulpiani* and I shall return to this presently.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER FOUR

- (1) v. Drerup, *Philologus* p.561sqq.
- (2) v. Avezzù, *BPEC* p.58.
- (3) v. Drerup *Philologus* esp. pp.534 and 563.
- (4) (5d), (Dilts p.18.15-16) ; (36b), (Dilts p.24.32) ; (103), (Dilts p.35.22).
- (5) S (40a), (41a), (53c), (55), (98) v. [pp.76-78].
- (6) S [p.54]
- (7) R (36b) v. [pp.103-104].
- (8) cf F [p.123].
- (9) v. n. 5 above.
- (10) Plut. *Pyrrh.* 1.1-7, Paus.1.11.1-3 ; Just.7.6.11-12. Also v. *RE* 2 1495.
- (11) S [p.71] and cf (21b) in Bc Ob (21b) [p.205].
- (12) S [pp.71-72].
- (13) *Souda* Λ 653 ; Photios 392 ; Hesychios 605 (Latte).
- (14) S [p.69].
- (15) S [p.69].
- (16) v. n.15 above. cf R [p.114].
- (17) S [p.70] .
- (18) S [p.70]. R contains both (26a) and (26b) [p.114]
- (19) S [p.72].
- (20) S [p.72].
- (21) v. (Dilts p.VIII) and "Marcianus" , cf Avezzù p.58.
- (22) (1a), (1b), (1c), (15c), (90a), (148b), (170a), (171), (172b), (181), (184)
- (23) (Dilts pp.IX-XI).
- (24) cf S [p.69].
- (25) Although F<sup>2</sup> reads τὰ ἐφορμοῦντα αὐτῶ (Dilts app.crit. p.14.11-12), in the previous line it reads αὐτοῖς (Dilts app.crit. p.14.11), apparently having τοῦ ῥήτορος as its antecedent. This anacolouthon makes it probable that Δημοσθένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου, not ῥήτορος, was the original reading from which F<sup>2</sup> has departed.
- (26) cf R [pp.89-90]. For the rest of (1c) F<sup>4</sup> [p.133].
- (27) S [p.58].
- (28) Ulpian [pp.31sqq].
- (29) Introduction [p.5].
- (30) S [p.69].
- (31) v. Ps.Hermog. *Meth.Dein.* 35 (Rabe p.455) and LSJ ἀπόφασις A and B. cf T 128b [p.190]
- (32) v. Alexander Noumenios (Spengel 3 p.29.26) ; Tiberios (Ball. p.31 no.30) ; Hermogenes (Rabe p.303.6sqq, esp.16-19) ; Anon. de fig. (Spengel 3 p.132.11-15).
- (33) F<sup>1</sup> [p.121].
- (34) Hermog. (Rabe p.300.7-15) ; Anon. de fig. (Spengel 3 p.131sqq, esp. p.132.25-133.5).
- (35) R [p.111].
- (36) Nik. Soph. (Spengel 3 p.462.15sqq following Aphthonios. cf Aphthonios (Rabe p.6.3-12) and (Spengel 2 p.24.20-30), (Rabe p.9.12-10.2) and (Spengel 2 p.27.3-17).
- (37) Minukian (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.342.13sqq) ; Rufus (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.405.15-27).
- (38) Alexander Noumenios (Spengel 3 p.40.21-31) ; Tiberios (Ball. p.9 no.4).
- (39) Dilts refers to Aristides (Schmid 12.9) in reference to (Dilts p.44.29) and to Hermogenes (Rabe p.180.7) in reference to (Dilts p.46.15). Note that there is a misprint in Dilts' footnote.

- (40) cf (148a) and (148b) in *codd. Ulp.* [p.190-191].
- (41) S (174) [p.72] and (184) [p.78].
- (42) Compare F<sup>1</sup> and S [p.125].
- (43) *codd. Ulp.* [pp.194-197].
- (44) v. n.2 above.
- (45) S [p.54] and R [p.94].
- (46) For the age of hands see F [p.119].
- (47) R [pp.89-90].
- (48) F [pp.126-127].
- (49) Y [ pp.155sq] and also R [pp89sq]. (1c) and (1d) form part of a continuous commentary.
- (50) Y [p.156].
- (51) F<sup>1</sup> (11a) [p.120] cf F<sup>2</sup> [p.126].
- (52) R [pp.94-95].
- (53) R [p.107] and *codd Ulp* [p.180].
- (54) R [p.107] and Ulpian who denies that reliability is an issue [pp.19-21].
- (55) S [p.57].
- (56) S [p.58].
- (57) Ulpian [p.31].
- (58) v. Demetrios (Spengel 3 p.268.15-269.16) and Hermog. (Rabe p.151). Hermogenes admits to offering a slightly different definition (Rabe p.126.11). For the difference between ἐνθύμημα and ἐπαγωγή v. Minukian (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.343).
- (59) v. n. (38) above.
- (60) Ulpian [pp.27-32].
- (61) S [p.63] and R [p.113].
- (62) S [p.64] and R [p.113].
- (63) S [pp.63-64].
- (64) S [pp.65-66].
- (65) (137b) in F<sup>1</sup>, v. [p.124], (148b) in F<sup>2</sup>, v. [p.131].
- (66) For (1d) R [p.90].
- (67) (2a) in S [p.67].
- (68) Sources [pp.234-237].
- (69) (50) in S [p.71].
- (70) Also S [p.58].
- (71) Ulpian's comment at (Dilts p.10.15) and [p.29].
- (72) S (123a) [p.68]
- (73) S [p.68]
- (74) Other unique scholia are (87), (120) and (121).
- (75) S (159c) [p.60].
- (76) Plato *Euthyph* . 4c.
- (77) *codd Ulp* [pp.194-197].
- (78) R [pp.94-95].
- (79) R (93a) [p.114] and (14c) [p.97].
- (80) Sources [pp.237-241].
- (81) (90b) in *codd. Ulp.* [p.193].
- (82) S [pp.70-71].
- (83) v. Eucken *MH* . where the order of the speeches is I, II, III. cf Ellis *Historia* where the order is II, I, III.
- (84) LSJ sv. ἐπεμβαίνω I.II and ἐμβατεύω I.
- (85) LSJ sv. μάταιος.
- (86) LSJ sv. συναείρω II.
- (87) Professor MacDowell pointed this out.
- (88) v. n. (10) above.
- (89) v. RE 21.2 2300.
- (90) v. Ellis *Macedonian*, pp.90-91.

(91) S [pp.73-76].

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CODEX Y

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Codex Y was produced in the ninth or tenth century and is in poor condition (Dilts p.VIII, and n.2). Dilts discerns two hands. Y<sup>1</sup> is the older hand and has written speeches D.7.19 - D.26 and D.59 - D.61, with scholia for several of them. The other scribe, Y<sup>2</sup>, is slightly later. He was responsible for copying *Lives* of Demosthenes by Zosimos and other, anonymous writers, some of Libanios' synopses of the speech and scholia to the *First Olynthiac* from the beginning until (5c) ὅτε τοίνυν<sup>2</sup> on D.1.1<sup>(1)</sup>. Dindorf points out that the folia which contained the text of the first six speeches have fallen out but that it is not clear from what he says which scribe produced this lost text (Dindorf vol VIII p.VI). Wilson suggests that it will have been the same man as the scribe of the scholia. Following Dilts' practice, Y<sup>2</sup> shall be referred to simply as Y.

This codex offers a title : σχόλια εἰς πρῶτον λόγον τῶν Ὀλυνθιακῶν (Dilts app.crit. p.14.1). This could easily be the scribe's own contribution. Dilts considers this codex to be the exemplar for what he term the *codices Ulpiani* , T Bc Af Vb Wd, and also an exemplar for R<sup>(2)</sup>. Where Y is extant, it is cited in place of the *codices Ulpiani* (Dilts p.XI). The extant scholia in Y which concern the *First Olynthiac* are confined to the προίμιον. There are five in all, (1c), (1e), (1f), (2a) and (5c). Although any generalisations we might make about the nature of the scholia offered by Y on the *First Olynthiac* are necessarily based on limited information, it is worth indicating two features about them. Firstly, these scholia are comparatively long and discursive. Secondly, the compiler of the scholia may have endeavoured to collect alternative interpretations.

#### THE SCHOLIA

(1c) has already been already discussed<sup>(3)</sup>. It forms a cohesive scholion. The version in Y is a little different from the version in R. The scholion is prefaced with the remark : ἠθικὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ πραγματικὸν τὸ προίμιον (Dilts app.crit. p.14. 6)<sup>(4)</sup>. This does not affect the meaning of the scholion since ἠθος and τὸ πραγματικόν are mentioned again. A second difference is that Y reads ἀντιπίπτειν αὐτοῖς instead of λυπεῖν αὐτοὺς (Dilts app.crit. p.14.12). Thirdly, τὸ συμφέρον is mentioned (Dilts p.14.15).

The main points to remember about the contents of (1c) is that the

προοίμιον is ἠθικόν, tactful, because of the λέξις (Dilts p.14.7-8) and also πραγματικόν because objections are answered and the κεφάλαια are introduced (Dilts p.14.8-9). A particular difficulty which is thought to be handled in the προοίμιον is the problem of the theorik money and the κεφάλαια are identified as τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν. Although the allusion to the theorik money in Demosthenes' words about money is unlikely, the rest of the interpretation is sound.

The comments made in the chapter on codex R about subsequent allusions to ἦθος and the theorik money in (1d) are no less appropriate for Y. (1e) which is found in Y, is an abbreviated form of (1d)<sup>(5)</sup>. The author examines hyperbole in the phrase πολλῶν χρημάτων and, notably, develops the suggestion in (1c) that the theorik money is the cause of a potential objection. The second part of (1e) (Dilts p.15.11-13) echoes points which are made in (1c) (Dilts p.14.6-8). Here we find an example of language rendering the audience benevolent towards Demosthenes because of the quality of ἦθος which it produces.

The compiler of the scholia in Y seems to have been particularly interested in a reference to money in the opening sentence of the speech. In (1f) three possible explanations of this reference are given without the author of the scholion claiming responsibility for any of them. The first two (Dilts p.15.17 and 22) are rejected out of hand and the third (Dilts p.15.24) which wins the authors approval, is discussed at length. This long scholion ends with an account of the institution of the theorik fund (Dilts p.16.8-21).

The three possibilities are discussed methodically in order to find out why Demosthenes employs a comparison between χρήματα and τὸ συμφέρον. The first interpretation is that it is because Demosthenes wishes to forestall the suspicion that he has been bribed by the Olynthians to speak on their behalf (Dilts p.15.17-19), that he argues : προκριτέον τῶν χρημάτων τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.15.20). The author regards this as ingenious but erroneous, because Demosthenes does not state that he himself puts money second, but that the Athenian people do this. We must deduce therefore that there cannot be an accusation of bribery against Demosthenes because he does not defend himself.

The second suggestion, that the suspicion of being bribed by the Persians induced Demosthenes to make this speech, is rejected still more briefly. It is open to the same refutation as the first (Dilts p.15.22-24).

The third possibility is that Demosthenes wishes to make sure that the audience is well-disposed towards giving up money to obtain other advantages from the very beginning, because he will be discussing the unpleasant topic of εἰσφορα later on in the speech (Dilts p.15.24-26). This receives approbation from the author : ἥ δὲ ἀληθεστέρα αἰτία ἐστὶν αὕτη (Dilts p.15.27). Bearing in mind Ulpian's

arrogant dismissal of alternative interpretations (Dilts pp.8.3, 12.16), the attitude of this scholar is almost humble. It is peculiar that the interpretation which he himself favours is attributed to ἄλλοι (Dilts p.15.24), and that he does not credit himself with good judgement. The interpretation which is accepted here does not contradict the interpretation of (1e). They discern the same purpose but express it differently. It seems likely that the author of (1e) and (1f) are different. Moreover, the suggestions in (1f) are attributed to people other than the author of the scholion whereas in (1e), and indeed in (1c), we have no reason to suppose that the author of the scholion is not presenting his own ideas.

The purpose of the comparison between τὸ συμφέρον and χρήματα is examined in detail (Dilts p.15.27-16.7). The argument is as follows : the Athenians have recently (ἐναγχος Dilts p.15.28) declared that a sum of money is to be used for theorik purposes. Each citizen was given two obols, one so that he could buy food, the other so that he could pay the ἀρχιτεκτων of the theatre. Demosthenes wished that this sum of money be made over to a stratotik fund since war with Philip had now started (νῦν Dilts p.15.32). Demosthenes wished to avoid antagonising the Athenians at once by suggesting that they should be deprived of their two obols. In the προοίμιον he demurs from saying this openly, but the suggestion is present in his comparison of τὸ συμφέρον and χρήματα. If he gets them to agree that τὸ συμφέρον is preferable to a large sum of money, then it will obviously be preferred to a small sum.

The author shows signs of having read ahead in the text when he notes that Demosthenes is going to mention εἰσφορά (Dilts p.15.24). This refers to D.1.20. The author does not question the implication of Demosthenes' phrase πάντα εἰσφέρειν (6).

A similar point can be made about (Dilts p.15.32) where the author says that Demosthenes will ask for the theorik money to be converted to a stratotik purpose. This again refers to D.1.20. The author seems to think that the theorik money had previously been stratotik : πάλιν αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι στρατιωτικά (Dilts p.16.14). No explanation of this interpretation is given.

The author goes wrong at (Dilts p.15.32-33) : νῦν κατέλαβεν ὁ πόλεμος. He assumes that the hostility between Philip and Athens is recent. However, the fall of Amphipolis in 357B.C. marks the outbreak of the war and the *First Olynthiac* was delivered in 349B.C.. The use of νῦν is inaccurate.

This scholion is the unique source of an alternative explanation of the purpose of the two-obol distribution. Other sources regard them purely as an entrance fee. This scholion notes that one obol was intended as a meal subsidy and that the other was an entrance fee. The

latter was intended as a form of subsidy for the construction of a stone theatre in Athens (Dilts p.15.29-32). This is not consistent with an account of the reason for the introduction of the two-obol distribution given in the same scholion ; namely an attempt to reduce overcrowding.(Dilts p.16.9-12) (7). The author notes that everyone received the two obols but he does not consider whether this included women or not (8).

The institution of the theorikon is attributed to Perikles (Dilts p.16.9sq). This view appears to have been widespread in late antiquity, although it is mistaken (9). Plutarch or Libanios may have been the source of this information.

The author implies that the money from the fund was to come from revenue (Dilts p.16.12) but does not explain what kind of revenue.

He notes that there was a law concerning the theorikon which was introduced by Euboulos and that the penalty for breach was death (Dilts p.16.15). He observes that the law was introduced after Apollodoros' involvement with the theorik money. The author is trying to rearrange the chronology of events in order to produce a clear account(10).

The comments in (1f) raise several problems in their interpretation of events. The author's approach is not satisfactory because he does not consider the implication of his comments. This scholion is nevertheless valuable because it offers unusual interpretations.

(2a) is a two part scholion which looks at the effect of νομίζω in the context of D.1.1 and also ἔμφασισ. In the discussion of (2b) in F<sup>4</sup> which offers the same two pieces of information in reverse order, it was argued that the author of (1e) could not have been the author of this scholion(11). Nor does (2a) have an affinity with (1f). In the latter Demosthenes is "quoted" : ὅμως τοῦτο πιστεύω ποιεῖν (Dilts p.15.22). The absence of πιστεύω is significant according to the author of (2a). Therefore if one author wrote both (1f) and (2a), he could be accused of carelessness.

(2a) is also of interest because it forms part of the evidence which suggests that Zosimos of Askalon wrote some of the *scholia Demosthenica* (12).

Although (5c) would appear to refer to ὅτε τῶν, in fact it contains a summary of the opening words of the προοίμιον(13). The author says : μετῆλθεν ἐφ' ἑτέραν ἔννοιαν, τὴν πρώτην ἀφείσ' ἀκατάσκευον ' αἶτον δὲ τούτου τὸ τῆσ' προτάσεως ἔνδοξον (Dilts p.17.27-28). He then digresses to talk about ἔνδοξοι προτάσεις or truisms in general. After this scholion several folia are missing from Y. It is no doubt correct to suppose that the *codices Ulpiani* can give us some idea about what those missing folia contained.

## CONCLUSION

Y offers a range of interpretations which are concerned exclusively with the opening clause of the speech. There is strong evidence for a plurality of sources but also consistency in the favoured interpretation. The compilation gives a valuable discussions about the theorik money even if their historical accuracy is questionable. The contribution is important as the unique source for some pieces of information. The possibility that Zosimos of Askalon wrote at least one of the extant scholia is a rare positive suggestion of authorship amid the mass of unattributable scholia. The loss of the remainder of the scholia in Y is to be regretted. However, the likelihood that the *codices Ulpiani* contain scholia which came from Y before the loss occurred, means that the loss is not too serious. Unfortunately we cannot tell which scholia in the *codices Ulpiani* came from codex Y and which came from other sources. The relationship of Y to other codices is discussed in a later chapter<sup>(14)</sup>.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER FIVE

- (1) N.G. Wilson, *CQ* 10 pp.200-202, points out that there are three hands altogether in Y.
- (2) v. R [p.85].
- (3) v. R [pp.89sqq].
- (4) Given that this scholion examines τὸ πραγματικόν and τὸ ἠθικόν, Wolf's emendation of παθητικόν must be correct.
- (5) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.133].
- (6) v. Appendix One [p.284].
- (7) v. Appendix One [pp.275sqq].
- (8) v. Appendix One [p.277].
- (9) v. Appendix One [p.267-269].
- (10) v. Appendix One [pp.285-6].
- (11) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.141].
- (12) v. Sources [pp.234-7].
- (13) v. R [pp.92-93].
- (14) v. F<sup>4</sup> [pp.144-5] and also R [p.85] and vp<sup>2</sup> [p.171].

## CHAPTER SIX

### CODEX A

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Dilts has identified three hands in this tenth-century codex (Dilts p.VIII). The first, A<sup>1</sup> or A as it shall be referred to here, wrote much of the text and a few scholia. A<sup>2</sup> is a fifteenth-century hand responsible for a few folia and considerably more scholia than A offers. A<sup>2</sup> produced D.1.11 τῶν θεῶν χρηστὸν - *fin* (1). The third hand A<sup>3</sup> is twelfth or thirteenth century and does not concern us in this speech.

#### A

A offers three scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, two of which are unique. (71b) comments on the punctuation of the text at D.1.9. Clearly there was doubt about whether the division of the group of words νυνὶ δὲ καιρὸς ἦκει τισ οὗτος ὁ τῶν Ὀλυνηθίων ... is to be taken as one sentence or as two, punctuating between τισ and οὗτος. In (71a) we have a scholion offered by F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani*, which comments succinctly upon the two interpretations. Either τισ is interrogative and οὗτος begins the answer, or τισ is enclitic and is the antecedent of οὗτος.

In (71b) we are told that there are three explanations. The first possibility is that τισ enclitic. The second is that it is interrogative and this produces two variants. The first variant is that the Athenians ask Demosthenes νυνὶ γὰρ καιρὸς ἦκει τισ ; and οὗτος ... is the answer. Unfortunately the scholion ends here and so we do not learn what the second variant is and whether it forms the third possible interpretation of this text. οἱ μὲν (Dilts p.32.3) does not receive a corresponding οἱ δὲ. The third possibility is, perhaps, that Demosthenes poses the question himself. The form of this scholion is lucid and methodical but the abrupt ending renders it unsatisfactory. The fault may be with the scribe or with an exemplar.

(108) is a lexicographical scholion which comments that φιλοπραγμοσύνη, D.1.14, means σπουδὴ καὶ πλεονεξία.

(116) which is also found in F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani*, comments perceptively on Demosthenes' understanding of psychology in a phrase such as εἰς ἀναγκὴν ἐλθῶμεν, D.1.15 : σύνηθεσ τῷ ῥήτορι τῶν μὲν λυπηρῶν καὶ αὐτὸν μετέχοντα δεικνύναι, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὴν πείραν ὀλόκληρον ἀπονέμειν τῷ δήμῳ (Dilts p.37.25-27). The purpose is to win the goodwill of the audience, by showing that he is industrious and dutiful without benefit

to himself. The reasoning behind this comment is sound but it remains to be seen whether this generalisation holds true for the Demosthenic corpus. While the author gives the impression of having first hand knowledge, it could simply be orthodoxy.

Dilts attributes (108) and (116) to A but the reason is not clear. A<sup>2</sup> is extant at this point but A is not.

These scholia offer sensible interpretations but they are of no great moment. What prompted the compiler to include them is obscure. Dilts suggests that R is copied from A and that the former offers some scholia now lost from A<sup>(2)</sup>. However, he does not state which scholia he has in mind or, indeed, whether or not the *First Olynthiac* is relevant to this observation.

## A<sup>2</sup>

A<sup>2</sup>, the fifteenth century hand, offers twelve scholia between D.1.11 and D.1.28 inclusively. This reflects the portion of the text which it contains. The majority deal with language and expression. There appears to be a very close relationship with the scholia in F, especially F<sup>4</sup>, and also with the *codices Ulpiani*. Only one of the scholia in A<sup>2</sup> lacks a counterpart in F, and that is (167). For the most part A<sup>2</sup> and one of the hands in F offer the same scholion as in (90a), (92b), (93a), (94), (115a), (117a), (119a), (175a) and (187a). Occasionally the same point is made in different terms and hence in Dilts edition some are regarded as separate scholia, as for example in the cases of (166a) and (166b) and (125a) and (125c). With the exception of (94), all the scholia are brief. They all have a counterpart in codex T, except for (117).

Some of these scholia have already been analysed in the discussion on F. It is unlikely that the compiler of A<sup>2</sup> was doing anything more ambitious than copying whichever notes accompanied the text.

## λέξις

(92b) comments on the effect of ἐμοί in the phrase φρασάτω τισ ἐμοὶ τί τὸ κωλύον ἐστ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται, D.1.12<sup>(3)</sup>. (115a) comments on the word ἐρραθυμηκότες, D.1.15<sup>(4)</sup>. The *apparatus* (Dilts p.37.21) reveals that A<sup>2</sup> does not offer the second part of this scholion concerning the phrase ἐπὶ πολλῶ. (94) is longer than any other scholion offered by A<sup>2</sup>. The author looks at the effect of asyndeton would have had in D.1.12 as well as the actual effect of the conjunctions<sup>(5)</sup>.

In D.1.24 Demosthenes calls for ambassadors to be sent wherever necessary. (167) clarifies ἐφ' ἃ δεῖ as an allusion to informing those

who are ignorant about Philip to distrust him, and secondly to goading into action those who know him but are frightened<sup>(6)</sup>.

### σχηματα

In (90a) two synonyms are given for the verb ἀποτριφώμεθα, D.1.11. The author is clearly aware that Demosthenes is using metaphorical language although there is no explicit reference to μεταφορά as we find in other scholia at this point<sup>(7)</sup>.

In (93a) it is stated : τῆ ὑποσιωπήσει καὶ πάλιν χρησάμενος (Dilts p.34.28-29). Although A<sup>2</sup> points out the figure later in D.1.19, (125a), there is no earlier mention. A close relationship between A<sup>2</sup> and F<sup>4</sup> is then put in doubt because the latter also offers (14c) which is a longer scholion distinguishing ἀποσιώπησις from ὑποσιώπησις. However, A<sup>2</sup> is mutilated at this point so the difference may not be significant.

The second example in A<sup>2</sup> is (125a). This is a unique version of the comment but F<sup>1</sup> and S make the same observation in different terms that ὡς βούλεσθε λαμβάνετε, D.1.19, is an enigmatic allusion to the Athenians' practice of using the money for visual entertainments<sup>(8)</sup>.

### Rhetorical Analysis and κεφάλαια

(117a) is a brief comment which informs us that there is an ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου at the beginning of D.1.16<sup>(9)</sup>. κεφάλαια are also mentioned in (119a) in which we are told that Demosthenes has based his argument on τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον in D.1.17 because he is giving us an account of the practical measures which will secure victory for the Athenians. This seems satisfactory in itself but does suggest that the compiler of A<sup>2</sup> is guilty of inconsistency. The objection is based on τὸ δικάιον and yet the passage is said to continue with τὸ δυνατόν. These scholia can only be consistent if we suppose that the objection is delivered but Demosthenes does not answer it. Since Demosthenes himself introduced the objection we have all the more reason to expect him to answer it. (117a) and (119a) probably emanate from different sources<sup>(10)</sup>.

ἀνθυποφορά is spotted in D.1.26. (175a) gives a crisp comment on this : ἀνθυποφορά στοχαστικὴ ἣν λύει ἐκ τεκμηρίων. This scholion is also found in F<sup>4</sup> <sup>(11)</sup>. Although there is some doubt about the meaning of ἀνθυποφορά which the author has in mind, we saw that this example suits both possibilities <sup>(12)</sup>.

(187a) reads as follows in A<sup>2</sup> : ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος ' δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν συνεκτικῶν αἰεὶ καὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν τὰς ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις λαμβάνειν (Dilts app.crit. p.47.22-24). This seems to have been abbreviated from the

slightly longer version in F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani*, which referred to ἐπιλόγοι. This comment need not necessarily indicate that the author believes that the epilogue of the *First Olynthiac* begins at D.1.28 but it would be odd if this were not so. This is a sensible comment on ἐπιλόγοι in general.

### Grammar

(166b) offers us an abbreviated version of a scholion found in F<sup>4</sup>, (166a), in which it is pointed out that the middle of συναειρω takes the accusative in Attic<sup>(13)</sup>. This implies that in other dialects the dative is normally used.

### CONCLUSION

The comments offered by A<sup>2</sup> are sound. Language is the primary interest and the occasional references to κεφάλαια reveal the lack of continuity in the analysis or compilation. It is possible that A<sup>2</sup>, F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* share a common source. Given that F<sup>4</sup> is eleventh century and the *codices Ulpiani* are thirteenth to fifteenth century, the link is probably not direct. There is no evidence that A and R have any common source as far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned. There is no reason to think that the compiler of the scholia written by A<sup>2</sup> was aware of the previous contribution in the codex. Overall the contribution of codex A to our understanding of the *First Olynthiac* is negligible.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX

- (1) v. Canfora *Inventario* p.45.
- (2) (Dilts p.XI n.1), cf R [pp.84-85] and Drerup *SBAW* p.308 and *Philologus* p.558.
- (3) v. R [p.114]
- (4) (115a) in F<sup>4</sup> [p.142].
- (5) R (94) [p.114].
- (6) v. Also found in S [p.72].
- (7) cf S (89) [pp.69-70], codd. Ulp. (90b) [pp.193-194], F<sup>4</sup> (90c) [p.146], F<sup>2</sup> [p.131] but here it is lexicographical.
- (8) F<sup>1</sup> [p.123], S (125b) [p.69], codd. Ulp. (125c) and (125e) [p.217].
- (9) (117d) F<sup>4</sup> [p.137], T [pp.181-2], F<sup>2</sup> (117a) [p.127].
- (10) *codd Ulp* [pp.182-3]
- (11) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.138].
- (12) For Hermogenes and ἀνθυποφορά (105c) see S[p.55] and n.11 above.
- (13) F<sup>4</sup> [p.148]

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CODEX PR

#### INTRODUCTION

The contribution of Pr is trivial and highlights the success and merit of the contributions of the majority of codices to our understanding of the *First Olynthiac*. It is a fourteenth-century codex<sup>(1)</sup>. The text of the speech and the scholia are written in the same hand. Although this codex includes the *Ulpiani prolegomena*, this work has not had any influence on the scholia which Pr offers.

#### SCHOLIA

There are some fifty-eight scholia which occur in all but six sections of the speech<sup>(2)</sup>. The frequency of the scholia ranges from one per section, D.1.1, 12, 14-16 and 19, to seven, D.1.21. All the scholia are brief. The purpose of these comments is not evident. The majority of them simply rephrase Demosthenes' own words or else specify a vague reference in the text. Most of these comments seem trivial or pedantic because they add nothing to our understanding of the speech, and the author often explains what is self-evident from the context of the speech. This collection of scholia may comprise an elementary commentary for a beginner or for someone totally unfamiliar with the background to the speech. Alternatively, they may represent an exercise whereby the same point is to be reiterated but in different words.

The following are particularly good examples of an allusion being clarified : (10), (12b), (17), (59b), (63), (73), (79), (110), (142), (144), (145), (147b), (149), (154) and (165). In (17) for example, the author identifies the destination of the campaign which is referred to in D.1.2, as εἰς τὴν Ὀλυνθον. This is self-evident in the context of this speech. (63) points out that Philip is responsible for the sieges of the towns mentioned in D1.9. (165) identifies the specific form of ἀκαιρία in D.1.24 which is evident in the context of Demosthenes' remarks. The precise reference of scholia in Pr is sometimes obscured by the absence of lemmata.

Demosthenes' words are rephrased in (39b), (78), (88), (155), (156c) and (162). Rephrasing is always done *in voce Demosthenis*, suggesting that they were written by the same author. The phrase ἀλλ' ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος, D.1.5, is rephrased as ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀνάστατον ὑπὸ τούτου γενέσθαι τὴν σφῶν πόλιν καὶ δούλους αὐτοῦ (Dilts p.25.36-26.1). Demosthenes' phrase is quite intelligible. In (162) we find that Demosthenes' aphorism about the difficulty of

holding on to what one has acquired, D.1.23, provokes the following remark : ἤγουν τηρῆσαι ὡσαύτως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς κακίαν. Again the meaning is clear from Demosthenes' own words.

Sometimes a phrase is expanded, as for example in (18), (76a), (85a), (85b), (136c), (146) and (160). In D.1.11 Demosthenes uses a simile about those who borrow money. (85a) and (85b) add two suitable phrases : ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον which emphasises the aphoristic quality in the simile while allowing for exceptions and ὡς περ ἡμεῖς which indicates that the Athenians find themselves in the same position as those who borrow money. These phrases are apt but superfluous. (136c) adds to Demosthenes' remark in D.1.20 that the Athenians must make whatever contribution is necessary : εἰ μὴ τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικὰ ποιήσετε. This phrase is superfluous in the context of Demosthenes' remarks though accurate. In D.1.23 Demosthenes says καὶ μὰ Δί' οὐδὲν ἄπιστον ἴσως. (160) adds a predicate : αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Again this is suitable but unnecessary.

There is consistency in the type of comment in Pr and in the form in which they occur. ἤγουν is a favoured introductory particle, occurring seven times<sup>(3)</sup>. There are also a few peculiarities.

(39b) has been examined above in connection with rephrasing Demosthenes' words. The second part of this scholion (Dilts p.26.1) introduces the subject of κεφάλαια and observes that when Demosthenes speaks in terms of ruin and slavery in D.1.5, he is employing τὸ οἰκεῖον συμφέρον in the hope of encouraging the Athenians to do as he advises. This is the only scholion in Pr which refers to κεφάλαια. It also refers to Demosthenes in the third person. Therefore the author of this scholion is unlikely to be the same person who wrote the majority of the scholia in Pr. The interpretation is reminiscent of Ulpian's interpretation<sup>(4)</sup> although we cannot, of course, tell whether this scholion predates the *prolegomena* or whether there is any tie between them.

(133) refers to D.1.20 and rephrases ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ... εἰς τὰς ἑορτάς. The form of the scholion is striking : νῦν γὰρ εἰς θέας λαμβάνοντες οὐ δέοντως λαμβάνετε ' εἰς δὲ τὸ στρατεύειν δοθέντα δέοντως δοθήσεται. The phrases are antithetical in meaning and parallel in structure. The alliteration is remarkable, especially if we suppose that the authors of late antiquity or later are primarily interested in observing features of Attic Greek and emulating the style of the classical period. Repetition of the participle in the main verb and repetition of δέοντως in both phrases is striking.

(193b) also takes an unusual form although less striking than the previous example. The aim of the author is to define εὐθυναί, D.1.28 : ἀπολογία καὶ κρίσεις φανεραὶ καὶ κάλλιστα. The position of adjectives is

unusual for prose and attracts emphasis to them. Although ἀπολογία καὶ κρίσεις forms a sound definition of εὐθυναί, the adjectives are unexpected. φανερός in the sense of "public" raises no problem but the inclusion of κάλλιστος does not seem warranted by the context.

This scholion could also be taken as a lexicographical comment although the inclusion of adjectives makes this unlikely. Similar entries are not found in the lexica.

### σχήματα

σχήματα also interest the compiler of Pr. There are four relevant scholia. These may be dealt with briefly since most of them are familiar. (27b) points out the occurrence of παρὰ προσδοκίαν in D.1.4<sup>(5)</sup>. (125d) correctly points out an example of ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.19<sup>(6)</sup>.

The remaining scholia on this topic are more interesting. (77b) points out that D.1.10 we have παρίσωσις κατὰ κῶλον. This is the only scholion to refer to this particular form of the σχῆμα. F<sup>2</sup> and v<sup>p</sup> call the same phrases παρίσωσις κατ' ἐπεμβολήν (77a)<sup>(7)</sup>. παρίσωσις κατὰ κῶλον means that a series of κῶλα have an equal number of syllables : τὸ λαβεῖν οὖν τὰ διδόμενα / ὁμολογῶν ἔννομον εἶναι / τὸ χάριν τοῦ τῶν ἀποδοῦναι / παρανόμων γραφή . Unless the author has a different text before him, this interpretation does not work. It is possible that he has in mind the same phrases as the author of (77a), but he ought, as the latter does, to have pointed out the parenthesis which disrupts the παρίσωσις.

(93c) points out an example of ἀποσιώπησις in D.1.12. However, according to what we find among the *Rhetores Graeci*, the σχῆμα should be ὑποσιώπησις<sup>(8)</sup>. The σχῆμα is identified correctly in (125d) and so the fault here may rest with scribal error. The same mistake was made in codex S, (93b)<sup>(9)</sup>, but we have no reason to suppose that there is a source common to S and Pr.

Pr offers nothing new about σχήματα in this speech, apart from the unusual classification of παρίσωσις. We may surmise that the identification of these σχήματα was standard. Pr represents a different tradition from the other codices because the wording of the scholia is different, even though the same point is being made.

### Lexicographical Scholia

(132b) is a single word scholion which mentions ἔνωσις in D.1.20. In (132a) in F<sup>1</sup> and S, a synonym σύνταξις is discussed at some length<sup>(10)</sup>. Lexica give ἔνωσις as a synonym or perhaps definition of

σύνταξις.

(193b) could be regarded as lexicographical.

## OTHER COMMENTS

Three more scholia warrant attention and these are probably by the same author. In D.1.4 Demosthenes remarks that Philip has a great advantage in the war because he can act quickly and exploit any opportunities which present themselves. In (34) we find : ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῷ μὲν ἀρέσει ὁ πόλεμος, τῷ δὲ οὐκ ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς, εἰς ὧν, ἥνικα ἂν βουλευθῆ πολεμεῖν, οὐδένα τὸν ἐναντιούμενον ἔχει. This gives the explanation of why Philip has the advantage and the Athenians are impeded. We can deduce nothing about the constitutional system under which the author lived since he explains the response of both systems.

(42b) explains a difference between democracy and monarchy. The author observes with reference to D.1.5 that democracies and tyrannies inevitably do not trust one another : ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστιν ἅι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄρχοντα ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔστι δημοκρατία, ἣ δὲ μοναρχίαν ἐπαγγέλλεται. In effect this scholion defines the word democracy. This would be unnecessary for an audience which lived in a democracy. However, we cannot pinpoint a probable date for the composition of this scholion because democracies did not flourish in the days of Hellenistic kings nor in the Roman and Byzantine empires. If the comment is aimed at an elementary level, then the remarks about democracy would not imply that the author did not live in a democracy himself.

(106) offers a single-word scholion to identify ἀνθυποφορά in D.1.14<sup>(11)</sup>. Most of the other codices offer the long scholion (105c).

## CONCLUSION

The scholia which Pr offers are mostly elementary but do occasionally yield a scholion of interest, (34), (42b) and (77b). An interest in language and expression is consistent. We have no reason to suppose more than a couple of sources. Pr acts as a standard by which to judge the contribution of other codices. The latter stand out for their detailed and sophisticated analysis. The main value of Pr is the inclusion of the *Ulpiani prolegomena* and the title.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER SEVEN

- (1) (Dilts p.IX).
- (2) D.1.3, 7, 13, 17, 18 and 26.
- (3) (20), (39b), (78), (142), (154), (162) and (192a).
- (4) Ulpian on οὐκ οἰκέϊοσ [pp.16sqq].
- (5) (27a) in F<sup>1</sup> [p.123] and S [p.69].
- (6) (125b) in F<sup>1</sup> [p.123] and (125a) and (125e) in *codd Ulp* [p.217].
- (7) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.129], vp [p.172]. The example comes from Hermogenes, ed.Walz VII p.710. He divides the phrases as shown. An Anonymous writer, Walz VII p.640, inserts the word κόμμα at the beginning of the fourth phrase. This results in an equal number of syllables. This writer divides the sentence between εἶναι and τὸ χάριτι.
- (8) Discussed in S [p.69].
- (9) As n.8.
- (10) v. F<sup>1</sup> [p.123] and S [p.71].
- (11) See S [p.55] for discussion. vp also offers (106) [p.173].


## CHAPTER EIGHT

### CODEX VP


#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

vp is an eleventh-century codex and Dilts believes that the same hand wrote the text of the speeches and scholia (Dilts pp.VIII - IX). Dilts places vp<sup>2</sup> in the thirteenth century. vp offers twenty-two scholia in just over half the sections of the speech. Only one scholion, (41b), is offered before D.1.9. It is peculiar that no comment is made on the opening sections of the speech and this may be the reason for the contribution which vp<sup>2</sup> offers. vp<sup>2</sup> offers the same five scholia which are found in codex Y<sup>(1)</sup>. This cannot be purely coincidental. The compiler of vp<sup>2</sup> must have been consulting Y in its mutilated state. Dilts' stemma (Dilts p.XII) therefore requires a slight emendation.

From :



To :



There is no need to examine these scholia again. They do offer an instructive contrast with vp which only offers very brief notes, sometimes consisting of a single word.

VP

#### Geography

vp offers scholia on language, rhetorical analysis and geography. Seven scholia which are found between sections D.1.5 and D.1.13 are distinctive both in form and subject matter. In each case a place name or ethnic name is explained by a single word. All the scholia, bar (41b), are unique to vp. This scholion is also found in Pr.

According to Diller<sup>(2)</sup> the desire of the Byzantines to produce classical Greek, even at the cost of clarity, necessitated the production of μετονομασία of places, countries and nations. He has assembled four lists which he refers to as A, B, C and D. These date from the twelfth to seventeenth century. Although they are connected, the precise relationship is unclear. It can be said, however, that A is

not the original list.

The form of the scholia in vp indicates that their purpose is similar to that of the lists. Since vp is an eleventh-century hand, they cannot have been copied from the extant lists. Diller assumes that these scholia contributed towards the compilation of the lists but it is also possible that the scholia were extracted from earlier lists. These may have been Byzantine or possibly Hellenistic. Sources for lists could have been historians such as Prokopios or geographers such as Pausanias.

(41b), (61) and (95) all identify Pydna with Kitros. This identification is also found in the lists<sup>(3)</sup>. Strabo or a later commentator on him substantiates this remark, VII frag. 22<sup>(4)</sup>. (62) and (96) identify Potidaia with Kassandraia. Again, the lists offer this identification<sup>(5)</sup>, but the version in the scholion is unique. The identification is correct since this town was founded on the site of Potidaia by Kassander in 316 B.C.<sup>(6)</sup>. Strabo mentions the new name of Potidaia in VII frag. 25<sup>(7)</sup>.

(100) links the Illyrians with the Dyrrakhenians. The lists equate Epidamnos with Dyrrakhion. Strabo tells us this too, VII 5.8. Epidamnos is in Illyria. Therefore the author of (100) is identifying the people of a territory with the people of one town within that area.

(102) links the Paionians with the Οὐγγροί. The lists associate the Οὐγγροί with their former name Gepidai<sup>(8)</sup>. Prokopios of Kaesarea links the Gepidai to Sirmion which is to the north-west of Greece<sup>(9)</sup>. Sirmion is not in the territory of Paionia although the direction is similar. In this example the author seems to have made a mistake. With this exception, the identifications are correct.

The author of these scholia is perhaps the same man. He may have inserted the name which was more familiar to him. It is possible that he was consulting primary sources such as Strabo but equally he may have referred to contemporary lists. The compiler has not been systematic since not every place name is identified although alternative names appear in the lists<sup>(10)</sup>. The repetition of Kitros and Kassandraia is unnecessary.

### Language

In common with the remaining contribution of vp, the twelve scholia on language are brief. (77a) points out an example of παρίσῳσις in D.1.10<sup>(11)</sup>. vp also offers (80) on this passage and this scholion is unique. It informs us that there is an example of ἐπίκρισις in D.1.10. What this means is that Demosthenes is making an overt judgement about the current Athenian position<sup>(12)</sup>. Demosthenes draws a distinction which he frames in a μὲν / δε construction. Athenian losses in war are attributable to their negligence but the worst has been

escaped hitherto. The second clause qualifies the first. Demosthenes is making a distinction between destruction and survival. (77a) and (80) make separate points but are compatible with one another.

(84) and (161b) are similar in that both are found in F<sup>2</sup> and both point out σχήματα, ἀντιστροφή and περίοδος respectively, which are pointed out twice by F<sup>2</sup> (13). In the case of (84) the validity of the observation depends upon the text. (36a) does not occur in vp. (161b) points out a good example of γνωμική περίοδος in D.1.23. It is probably a coincidence that the same example is also selected by Aillios Aristeides, *Rh.* 12.8 (Schmid). In F<sup>2</sup> (171) is the second reference to this σχημα and it is not found in vp.

(104) is straightforward and points out an obvious example of παράλειψις at the end of D.1.13. This example has been discussed in connection with S and F<sup>1</sup>(14).

(106) is a scholion consisting of a single word and it is shared with Pr. It offers a striking contrast to (105c), in F<sup>4</sup>, S, T, Bc, Af, Vb and Wd, which takes great trouble to define ἀνθυποφορά (15). Although the author provides us with no clue as to what is meant, the most likely interpretation is that ἀνθυποφορά is taken in the same sense as (105c). The beginning of D.1.14 can be interpreted as the general acceptance of an argument but with an objection to part of it.

(114a) and (114b) cover familiar ground (16). (114a) gives us an interpretation of the simile in D.1.15. The author incorrectly takes the comparison to be with people who lend money. (114b) gives an alternative interpretation that the simile is with those who borrow money. This view is clearly designated as an alternative : τινὲς δ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν δανειζομένων ... (Dilts app.crit. p37.11). The compiler draws no conclusions. It seems that (114b) is an abbreviation of a longer scholion but the omissions do not affect the interpretation (Dilts app.crit. p.37.11-13).

This group of scholia offers an unusual choice of σχήματα. It is likely that the compiler was aware of alternative interpretations. The selection suggests a link with F<sup>2</sup> or one of F<sup>2</sup>'s sources, particularly because of περίοδος, παρίσσωσις and ἀντιστροφή. These are distinctive because the older hands do not refer to them.

### Lexicographical Scholia

This is the second linguistic interest of vp. (75b) gives κριτήσ as an alternative to λογιστήσ (Dilts app.crit. p.32.34) (17), (117b) gives ὀνειδίξειν as an alternative for ἐπιτιμᾶν (Dilts app.crit. p.37.30) (18) and (122b) gives χειρώσεται as an alternative to παραστήσεται (Dilts app.crit.p.39.9) (19). In all three examples the apparatus reveals that

vp offers a version which is found in expanded form in other codices. This may be coincidence, there are other instances where vp offers a shorter version of scholia<sup>(20)</sup>.

### Grammar and Syntax

The text of (166c) is not clear but this unique scholion appears to be concerned about the case which συνάρασθαι, D.1.24, takes. This may be inferred from the second part which states : τὸ ἀναλαμβάνειν αἰτιατικῆ (Dilts p.45.20). Its subject matter is the same as in (166a) and (166b)<sup>(21)</sup>.

### Rhetorical Analysis and κεφάλαια

There are three scholia which deal with these aspects. (140b) points out τὸ δεύτερον μέρος τοῦ δυνατοῦ in D.1.21<sup>(22)</sup>. This scholion may be a heading. However, it is the only scholion in vp which mentions κεφάλαια. Therefore in the context of vp this scholion is extraordinary.

(181) and (187b) provide the only comments on the rhetorical structure of the speech by pointing out the ἐπίλογος. (181) appears to indicate the ἐπίλογος at εἰ γὰρ υμασ ..., D.1.27. (187b) points out the ἐπίλογος at the beginning of D.1.28. Clearly there is a contradiction. It may be that the first comment is a mistake which is corrected by (187b)<sup>(23)</sup>. F<sup>1</sup> and vp are both credited with (187b), but the *apparatus* (Dilts p.47.25) reveals that they are in fact distinct scholia. Therefore vp has written ἐπίλογος twice.

### CONCLUSION

The scholia offered by vp and vp<sup>2</sup> are curious. vp contains unusual remarks about place names which may have provided Byzantine compilers of μετονομασίαι with information. The author of these seven scholia is likely to be one man. The linguistic scholia in vp tend to follow F<sup>2</sup> but the relationship is not very close unless we suppose that F<sup>2</sup> had multiple sources, one of which was shared by vp.

vp<sup>2</sup> surely had a copy of codex Y before it in a mutilated state. The contrast in form and subject matter is marked. The form of the scholia in vp<sup>2</sup> is characterised by the detailed discussion and the subject matter, primarily rhetorical analysis and κεφάλαια. We cannot say that the compiler of vp<sup>2</sup> was intending to broaden the interests of vp nor that his purpose was to concentrate on the beginning of the speech. The scholia in Y deal with the opening clause of the speech and nothing else. Therefore the subject matter may have been irrelevant in

the decision to include these five scholia in the codex.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER EIGHT

- (1) (1c), (1e), (1f), (2a) and (5c).
- (2) v. Diller *BZ* pp.27-42.
- (3) A7, B51, C29.
- (4) Müller and Dübner take this comment to be the work of a later excerptor, v. vol II p.894 of their edition of Strabo.
- (5) B41, C30.
- (6) v. *RE* Supp. 10 628.
- (7) v. *Chrest* VII 72 = p. 579 in Müller.
- (8) A17, B36.
- (9) Prokop. vol 3 *Anec.* 18.6.
- (10) eg. Euboia - ὁ Εὐριππος B49, C35 and Amphipolis - ἡ νῦν Χρυσίπολις B18.
- (11) v. F [ p.129].
- (12) v. Hermogenes (Rabe p.13.5sqq). ἐπίκρισις is not given as a σχῆμα.
- (13) For ἀντιστροφή v. F<sup>2</sup> (84) [p.129], for περίοδος v. F<sup>2</sup> (161b) [p.130].
- (14) v. S [p.70] and F<sup>1</sup> (104) [p.124].
- (15) v. S [p.55] for discussion of (105c)
- (16) v. S [p.70], F<sup>4</sup> [p.146].
- (17) v. F<sup>1</sup> [ p.123].
- (18) Also shown by T [p.192].
- (19) v. F<sup>1</sup> [p.123] and *codd. Ulp.* [p.192].
- (20) eg. (114b) and (161b).
- (21) For (166a) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.148] and for (166b) v. A<sup>2</sup> [p.164].
- (22) v. S [p.65].
- (23) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.121] and *codd. Ulp.* [12].

## CHAPTER NINE

### CODICES SCHOLIORUM ULPIANEORUM

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The group of codices which form the subject of this chapter, T Ac Wb Bc Ob Af Vb Ca and Wd, were produced between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. The name *codices scholiorum Ulpianeorum* has arisen because of the authorship which some of the codices allege at the beginning of their remarks : Οὐλιπιανοῦ ῥήτορος προλεγόμενα εἰς τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν καὶ Φιλιππικὸν λόγον<sup>(1)</sup> ; Οὐλιπιανοῦ σχόλια εἰς τὸν πρῶτον Ὀλυνθιακὸν τοῦ Δημοσθένους, g<sup>(2)</sup> . Bc offers something similar to the title in g<sup>(3)</sup>.

The *editio princeps* of 1503 of the *scholia demosthenica* is taken from the *codices Ulpiani* and hence, the name became conventional (Dilts p.XVI). However, this appellation is misleading. This chapter will reveal that both in form and content, it is highly improbable that the author of the *prolegomena* is also the author of the scholia offered in these codices in all but a very few instances. Moreover, it would be surprising if he were. The *prolegomena* give a comprehensive account of the rhetorical analysis of the *First Olynthiac* . It would be odd, if having done that, Ulpian went back to the beginning again.

The scholia look at aspects of language for the most part, an aspect largely ignored by Ulpian, but there are still many references to rhetorical analysis. The question of the authorship of the scholia in the *codices Ulpiani* shall be left for the chapter on sources<sup>(4)</sup>. These codices are closely related because of the similarity in the scholia which they offer, but it is best to disregard any significance implied by the collective name. Its benefit is convenience.

Dilts has studied these codices and the stemmatic relationship between them<sup>(5)</sup>. The ones which are cited above are those which he considers to be of most value in establishing the text. He has also looked at the relationship between this recension and the tradition offered by the *codices vetustissimi* for D.1, 3 and 4 in comparison with the recension for D.24. His conclusion is that " contrary to the closed tradition established for *scholia Ulpiani* on *Demosthenis in Timocratem* , (Or. 24), MSS. of *scholia Ulpiani* on the *Olynthiacs* and the *First Philippic* contain readings and scholia from independent recensions. ... Clearly the MSS. considered here reflect a stage in the text tradition of Demosthenic scholia in which interest in comparing *Vorlagen* for scholia on orations at the beginning of the corpus was greater than for subsequent orations". In the same article Dilts points out that the *codices Ulpiani* notably contain scholia from codex Y. This

relationship is effectively assumed when Dilts says that he does not cite the *codices Ulpiani* where Y is extant (Dilts p.XI). Therefore the contribution attributed to Y is not to be overlooked in assessing the *codices Ulpiani*. However, it is apparent that these codices contain additional scholia, as for example (1a) and (5b). The relationship of the *codices Ulpiani*, particularly T, to the *codices vetustissimi* will be discussed in due course<sup>(6)</sup>.

## CODEX T

There are two reasons why this is the principal codex in the group. Firstly, it is the oldest, belonging to the thirteenth century, and secondly, it contains the most number of scholia. Dilts refers to two hands, both of which are thirteenth-century (Dilts p.X). T<sup>1</sup> wrote the first four speeches, complete with scholia, and T<sup>2</sup> wrote out the *prolegomena Ulpiani* and another fourteen speeches, also with scholia. Dilts points out (Dilts p.X), that the beginning and the end of the *prolegomena* are missing. This is easily explained by the loss of a single folium from the beginning and the end of the first codex of T. Following Dilts' practice, T shall stand for T<sup>1</sup>.

T offers over one hundred scholia and these cover every section of the speech. On average there are four scholia per section. They are mostly short, (9b), (38a), (155a) and (115b), but sometimes long, discursive scholia are found, (14c), (105c) and (164a). Aspects of language form the primary interest of the scholia in T, but, perhaps, it would be useful to examine first the rhetorical analysis of the *First Olynthiac* as found in T.

## RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

Twenty-eight scholia are pertinent to the subject of rhetorical analysis. Frequent allusions to structure occur in scholia which also deal with aspects of language. It is possible to deduce a coherent outline of the basic structure of the speech from the information we are given.

### Προοίμιον

(1a) tells us that Demosthenes approaches his subject indirectly in the προοίμιον by making a supposition<sup>(7)</sup>.

There are four main points in (1c) about the *First Olynthiac* as a whole. Firstly, we are led to expect objections, ἀντιπίπτοντα, in the speech (Dilts p.14.8). Secondly, we ought to find references in later comments to τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.14.15-16). Thirdly, the

theorik money is a problem which Demosthenes will encounter (Dilts p.14.17). Finally, the language which Demosthenes uses is said to be ἠθικόν (8). The commentator does not follow up these points satisfactorily in T.

(5b) which is only found in T, Vb and Wd is problematic. It says simply : ἡ κατασκευὴ τοῦ προοιμίου κατὰ ἀποσιώπησιν ' οὐ γὰρ ἐρρήθη. The other commentators agree about Demosthenes' failure to justify his assertion that the Athenians prefer τὸ συμφέρον to money. Indeed, in (5c) which is also found in T presumably we are told : τὴν πρώτην (sc. ἔννοιαν) ἀφείσ ἀκατάσκευον (Dilts p.17.27).

(5b) is wrongheaded because of the misuse of the term ἀποσιώπησις. This term applies when the writer does not state an allusion overtly but his point is clear from what he does say. In this case the commentator assumes that because the statement Demosthenes makes is unsupported he is using ἀποσιώπησις.

The *apparatus* at (Dilts p.18.15-16) reveals that the sentence δέοντα γὰρ καλοῦμεν οὐ τὰ συμφέροντα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα is found in the *codices Ulpiani*. It is an extract from a longer passage which is found in R as (5d). The word γὰρ indicates that it has been taken out of context. This scholion does not affect the interpretation of κεφάλαια by T because it simply defines terms.

### Τὸ Δεύτερον Προοίμιον

(11b) informs us that ὁ μὲν ... καιρός marks the beginning of the second προοίμιον and that it corresponds to the first. The primary concern of the commentator is the definition of προσωποποιία. The next relevant scholion is (14c) which refers to ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ... αὐτα and says : εἴη ἂν οὖν τοῦτο τὸ κῶλον συμπέρασμα τοῦ προοιμίου, κατασκευῆς οὐσης τῆς "εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν" (Dilts p.20.25-26). We have not been told what, exactly, the supporting argument is thought to sustain. Perhaps it is this : "put a high value on advice and listen to me if you are concerned about your safety. T tells us nothing about the opinion offered by ὁ καιρός. This is in contrast to R where we find all of these scholia, plus several others, which discuss the question in detail(9). It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reason for the inclusion of (11b) and (14c) is their linguistic, not rhetorical, content.

### Κεφάλαια. D.1.2-15.

From (1c) we expect to find reference to τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν. In (15c) we find that Demosthenes' personal opinion (ἔστι δὲ ... ) forms

the ἀρχὴ καὶ εἰσβολὴ τοῦ συμφέροντος. Ensuing comments are remarkably vague about κεφάλαια, but it is reasonable to suppose that D.1.16 marks the transition from το συμφερον to τὸ δυνατόν. Apart from a paucity of comment about τὸ συμφέρον in D.1.2-15, T also proves unsatisfactory in dealing with the movement of Demosthenes' argument. For example, (26a) is a comment on D.1.3 and contains the sentence : τὸ βέβαιον τῶν Ὀλυνθίων ἐδήλωσεν (Dilts p.22.25). There is no further comment in T which explains why Demosthenes should wish to stress Olynthian reliability. Perhaps the attraction of this note for the compiler is its observation of metaphoric language.

(42a), which comments on D.1.5, explains that the μερικὰ παραδείγματα are rounded off with a gnomic statement<sup>(10)</sup>. Demosthenes has indeed given Amphipolis and Pydna as examples when he comes to explain why the Olynthians will not accept Philip's attempts at reconciliation. We are not given any further information about these examples, either specifying what they are examples of or giving reasons for their inclusion.

The *codices Ulpiani* share an abbreviated version of (51a) with F<sup>4</sup>. The few remaining lines tell us that the phrase ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν, D.1.7, answers anyone who might object to what Demosthenes has been saying.

(51b) is striking. The author identifies νυνὶ γάρ, ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν ..., D.1.7, as the answer to the following objection : οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. The echo of Ulpian's interpretation of this passage is obvious. This scholion will be discussed presently in a comparison of codex T and the prolegomena<sup>(11)</sup>. However, one thing is clear. This scholion is inconsistent with (26a) and (52a) and therefore, is evidence of a plurality of sources. It is consistent with remarks made in (51a) about ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν but is repetitious since both refer to the effect of these words. Therefore they are probably by different authors. In (51b) Demosthenes is paraphrased and in (51a) Demosthenes is quoted.

In (52a) we are reminded that Demosthenes has proven that the Olynthians are reliable allies (Dilts p.28.19) and that now he is out to show that the Athenians have before them an excellent opportunity. (52a) is at least consistent with (26a) but no reason is given for the necessity of establishing that the Olynthians will be reliable allies. The second part of this scholion deals with the nuance in the participle παραπεπτωκότα<sup>(12)</sup>. The linguistic content may have attracted the compiler.

(64) on the other hand deals only with rhetorical analysis. We are told that the phrase ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, D.1.9, answers an objection about whether Demosthenes is seriously suggesting that the Athenians should have become involved on every occasion when Philip attacked a

northern city. Demosthenes does indeed argue, as the commentator says, that one campaign would have sufficed. This is the first instance in which a scholion in T refers specifically to ἀντιπίπτον.

In (91) we find a brief scholion which is unique to T. It tells us that at D.1.12 : ἐντεῦθεν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ δὲ κατασκευὴ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος. This is unexpected because although we have been told about τὸ συμφέρον in (1c) and (15c), we have been given no indication about the presence of τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. The author does not elaborate on his comment. In fact, the assessment he gives of D.1.12-13 is apt. Demosthenes represents Philip as an unrelenting force who captures one city after another. Nothing, not even ill health, stands in his way. τὸ ἀναγκαῖον is a good assessment because there is an apparent implication that Athens will soon be in line for Philip's attentions. The interpretation is similar to the analysis offered by Ulpian at this point<sup>(13)</sup>. It is harder to see how τὸ συμφέρον fits this interpretation. We ought to assume that these developments are ἄσύμφορα for the Athenians because everything has turned to Philip's advantage.

Finally, (105c) differentiates between ἀνθυποφορά, ἀντιπίπτον and ἀντίθεσις. Differentiation of technical terms may be the reason why it is included in the collection of T.

### Conclusion

The comments on rhetorical analysis in this section of the speech are notable for three things. Firstly, there are very few references to τὸ συμφέρον which was said in (1c) to characterise this part of the *First Olynthiac*. Much the same could be said of τὸ δυνατόν which we were also told in (1c) occurred throughout the speech. Secondly, the difference in terminology, when the remarks are made about objections, amounts to inconsistency ((51a) - ἀντιλέγειν, (51b) - ἀντίθεσις and (64) - ἀντιπίπτον). The analysis found in T fails to tackle the objection being faced by Demosthenes in D.1.2-7 adequately. Finally, the compiler's interest in λέξις and language dominates scholia which refer to rhetorical analysis with only one or two exceptions. The obvious conclusion to draw from these points is that the scholia in T were compiled primarily in order to examine linguistic aspects.

### Τὸ Δυνατόν D.1.16-23.

This section is handled more fully than the previous section of the speech, but the analysis produces inconsistencies. There are five scholia which comment on the rhetorical structure of the speech from D.1.16 to D.1.19, (117c), (117d), (117e), (119a) and (124). All bar

(117e) are found in F<sup>4</sup> and they have been discussed already<sup>(14)</sup>. It will be useful to give a brief summary of these scholia. In (117c) we are told that D.1.16 marks the beginning of the προίμιον of τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον and that it contains a mixture of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν. This scholion also discusses the differences between structural προίμια and the προίμια of κεφάλαια (Dilts p.38.6-10) and also distinguishes ἐπίτιμησις from λοιδορία (Dilts p.38.11-15). The author analyses what follows in terms of ἐνθύμημα and ἔπαγωγὴ (Dilts p.38.4-5). In the discussion of F<sup>4</sup> it was concluded that the author is referring to D.1.16-18.

There are four points to bear in mind from what (117c) says. Firstly, the objection which opens D.1.16 is called an ἀντίθεσις and it is based on τὸ συμφέρον (Dilts p.38.4, 9). Secondly, it is possible that this scholion contradicts (1c) where ἀντιπίπτοντα were found in the προίμιον. However, in (117c) we are not actually told that objections cannot be met in structural προίμια, only that in the προίμια of κεφάλαια only objections which affect κεφάλαια may be raised (Dilts p.38.8-9). Thirdly, the analysis which it offers is not the same as Ulpian's, but perhaps is the work of someone whose approach was similar<sup>(15)</sup>. Finally and more importantly, we can infer that τὸ δυνατόν ought properly to start at D.1.19 following the προίμιον.

(117d) informs us that D.1.16 forms an ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικάιου. The ἀντίθεσις accords with the definition in (105c) which is offered in T. We may infer from this scholion that D.1.16 forms a digression and that D.1.17 forms the beginning of Demosthenes' answer to the objection. Demosthenes should be giving good advice and not criticising. This interpretation is plausible but improbable. The account of the digression is very similar to that which Ulpian gives (Dilts p.10.23-31), but here there is no mention of προίμια nor τὸ δυνατόν<sup>(16)</sup>. The version in F<sup>4</sup> is slightly different because the scholion is preceded by the word ἄλλως (Dilts p.38.16).

(119a) comments in effect on D.1.17-18 and says quite simply that τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον is necessarily involved where the discussion concerns τρόπος τῆς βοηθείας. It is δίκαιον for Demosthenes to speak about what it is δυνατόν for the Athenians to do. The scholion is compatible with (117c), (117d) and especially with (117e) which is discussed below since τὸ δυνατόν is mentioned in that scholion in connection with D.1.17-18.

(124) is also brief and the analysis which it offers divides D.1.19-23 in two. D.1.19-20 examines χρημάτων εὐπορία and D.1.21-23 discusses ἀνδρῶν δύναμις. These were said to be two aspects of τὸ δυνατόν. It can be appreciated that (124) appears to complement the

comments found in (117c) where τὸ δυνατόν proper seems to begin at D.1.19.

The presence of (117e) in T causes a problem. The notation used by Dilts seems to indicate that in T and Bc (117e) follows on directly after (117d). It cannot be that they were composed by the same author because they are inconsistent. Since (117d) has discussed D.1.16 in detail, we expect the ensuing comments to look at Demosthenes' answer to the ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου. The author of (117e) gives us, instead, another variant interpretation of this section of the speech, D.1.16-19. We are told that at D.1.16 the προοίμιον of τὸ δυνατόν κεφάλαιον begins and that the κεφάλαιον is divided in two ; παρασκευῆ τοῦ στρατεύματος and χρημάτων πόρος.

(117e) does show more affinity with the approach of (117c) since both refer to προοίμια, and τὸ δυνατόν is thought to be involved. The division into ἐνθύμημα and ἐπαγωγή is unique to (117c). It is also worth noting that in (117e) the interpretation is attributed to οἱ ἐξηγηταί (Dilts p.38.24), whereas in (117c) the comments are given in the first person (Dilts p.38.4). There is one further difference. In (117e) the author remarks that commentators say that a προοίμιον of a κεφάλαιον gives the speech an agonistic quality. He then quotes from Isokrates 6.1 in which the speaker voices the objections which his audience might have concerning the speaker's motives for addressing them. This is, however, a structural προοίμιον and so the author of (117e) cannot be aware of the distinctions which were made in (117c). If he had, he would not have chosen the example from Isokrates. We may conclude that T is providing us with a third interpretation of this passage.

(117e) and (119a) clearly cover the same ground and (119a) is superfluous where (117e) exists. (124) is also by a different author because the scope of (117e) and (124) overlap in sections D.1.19-20, where the latter indicates that τὸ δυνατόν commences.

The interpretation offered by (117e) is very close to that offered by Ulpian. It is possible that Ulpian is one of the commentators who are referred to obliquely by the author as οἱ ἐξηγηταί. It is further possible that the author of (117c) is also included when the author of (117e) says : φασὶν οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ὡς κείμενον ἐν μέσῳ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο το προοίμιον διὰ τοῦτο εἰσηκται καὶ ἐναγώνιον ἴν' ἔχη τι καὶ ἀγῶνος (Dilts p.38.24-25). This echoes the sentence in (117c) : τὸ γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγῳ κεῖσθαι πεποίηκε τι καὶ ἐναγώνιον ἔχειν (Dilts p.38.10-11).

There does seem to be a curious relationship between T and S or R at this point, D1.16-18. S offers three scholia, (140a), (140b) and (140c). (140a) appears to be an abbreviated form of (140c), and together with (140b), produces an uncharacteristic repetition in this codex. R on the other hand contains only (140c) which gives the most

intelligible account. In T we find two scholia, (140a) and (140d), which are written as one continuous scholion according to Dilts' annotation. What is most curious is that (140d) paraphrases part of (140c) (Dilts p.42.6-12). The information given to us by T is that Demosthenes answers an objection in D.1.21 which he puts himself : "Philip would not attack unless all was well for him." This objection is answered paradoxically, by arguing that Philip would not fight if he was expecting a confrontation. It is more likely that the longer scholion, (140c), was abbreviated than to suppose that someone thought to expand a concise scholion.

In (164a) the end of the examination of τὸ δυνατόν is noted, although curiously the relevant lines are missing from the version in S (Dilts app.crit. p.44.33). While the collection of scholia in T leave us in no doubt that D.1.16-23 consists of arguments based on τὸ δυνατόν, it appears that we are being offered alternative interpretations. If so, this is not surprising given that codex Y appears to offer alternative interpretations too.

#### D.1.24-26 - Προτροπή

(164a), which tells us that the end of the examination of τὸ δυνατόν has been reached, also tells us that D.1.24 marks the beginning of προτροπή. The details of this scholion are familiar<sup>(17)</sup>. An examination of the *apparatus* (Dilts p.45.5-9, 11-12) reveals that T and other codices contain a discussion about προτροπή and συμβουλή, whereas S also considers παραίνεσις. The reason for the difference is far from clear.

(172a) discusses τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ συμφέρον and raises more problems. The text is different from the version in F<sup>4</sup>. The comment is particularly surprising in the light of (164a) where we were led to expect that D.1.23 ended the examination of τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.44.33). Nevertheless, it may be that the author is not talking about the major arguments, but rather the principle upon which the προτροπή is based.

From words such as ὡςπερ and οὕτω καὶ it appears that the later codices, the *codices Ulpiani*, contain the fuller version of the note. However, the inclusion of (172a) creates an inconsistency in these codices. τὸ συμφέρον has not been discussed in the detail suggested by this scholion. In (1c), (15c) and (91) there are references to τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἀναγκάϊον but this is only substantiated in T. The remaining *codices Ulpiani* do not contain any reference to τὸ ἀναγκάϊον. The account in T is itself hardly satisfactory. Moreover, the author of (172a) implies that τὸ δυνατόν was not present in the sections preceding D.1.25. We have just seen that τὸ δυνατόν was considered to

be the principle of argument ending at D.1.24. In subsequent notes we ought to find evidence of τὸ δυνατόν, τὸ ῥάδιον and τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Of these three, only the last is mentioned.

(172b) which says simply μετάβασις ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, is superfluous since the author of (172a) has just told us that this is going to be examined here by Demosthenes. The lack of any other comments on this subject suggests that a compiler has been very selective or careless.

(175a) is brief and to the point. Demosthenes comment ἀλλ' ὦ τᾶν ... is an ἀνθυποφορὰ στοχαστικὴ ἣν λύει ἕκ τεκμηρίων. This is a satisfactory observation<sup>(18)</sup>.

### D.1.27-28 - Ἐπίλογος

The interpretation of the closing part of the speech is complicated by (181) which indicates in one word that D.1.27 marks the beginning of the ἐπίλογος. This is improbable and the scholion must be misplaced. The correct interpretation should leave us with προτροπή, D.1.24-27, and ἐπίλογος, D.1.28. (187a) gives a general comment that Demosthenes bases ἐπιλόγοι on τὸ συμφέρον. From this we may deduce that this ἐπίλογος is also based on τὸ συμφέρον.

### Conclusion

The interpretation of the rhetorical structure of the speech by the compiler of T falls into two main sections : D.1.1-15 where comments are relatively few and inadequate when they do occur, and D.1.16-28 for which many comments are produced but comments which are inconsistent with one another and produce alternative interpretations. If we compare this set of scholia with the collections found in the *codices vetustissimi* and the *codices recentiores* then the confusion caused by assembling scholia from various sources contrasts with the general unity of the other codices. The exception is codex Y which is, after all, an exemplar of the *codices Ulpiani* . It will be remembered that Y appeared to favour the assimilation of alternative interpretations culled from earlier commentators.

### LANGUAGE AND EXPRESSION

Σχήματα form an important aspect of the interest which is shown by the compiler of T in language. Often the figure is identified as such, but sometimes the nature of the comment makes it clear what the author has in mind. Most of the relevant scholia have been discussed in connection with other codices as for example ὑπόληψις in

(1a), προσωποποιία in (11b) and παραπροσδοκίαν in (29). Nevertheless some familiar scholia take on a new significance in the context of T.

In (26a) and (26b) the metaphor which is suggested by τρέφεται and παρασπάσεται in D.1.3 is proposed. In the former the suggestion is made that the verbs are appropriate to bodies being torn away from an altar. The purpose of the metaphor is to illustrate the steadfastness (βεβαίον) of the Olynthians. In (26b) the verbs are thought to be apposite to the description of bodies being torn limb from limb. The purpose is to show the unity of the Olynthians. T appears to be offering us an alternative interpretation without making a judgement about them.

(90a) and (90b) also deal with metaphor. (90a) gives two synonyms for ἀποτριφώμεθα, one of which is ἔκκαθάρωμεν. (90b) tells us that the language here arises from the metaphor of cleansing stained clothing. It would be unlikely that the same author would have written both of them (90b) appears to be a fuller version of (90c) which is contributed by F<sup>4</sup>.

(114a), (114b) and (115b) give various versions of the financial simile in D.1.15. These have already been discussed in detail<sup>(19)</sup>. Again, the plurality of sources for the scholia is evident, although it should be remembered that there could have been several stages in the process of compilation. The author of (114a) is not the author of (114b) and (115b).

(170a), (170b) and (171) provide a curious example of repetition. Hermogenes cites εἶτα οὐκ ἀσχύνεσθε ... τολμήσετε twice. On the first occasion it is used as an example of ἐπιτιμητικὴ περίοδος τῶν σχήμασι and on the second as an example of a μονόκωλος περίοδος<sup>(20)</sup>. The author of the scholion seems to be paraphrasing Hermogenes' second definition. In his footnote Dilts refers the reader to this passage in connection with (170b) and not (171). However, the reference to ἐπιτιμητικὴ in (170b) increases its similarity to the first citation in Hermogenes. There is no need for both scholia here.

The *apparatus* in (Dilts p.46.4) reveals that (171) in the *codices Ulpiani* is followed by (170a) which simply points out the σχῆμα ἐπιτίμησις. This information supplements (171). The combined information is the same as that in (170b).

The most frequently mentioned σχήματα in T are ὑποσιώπησις and ἀποσιώπησις. (5b) is likely to be wrong-headed or else misplaced. (14c) gives the long discussion about the difference between these two terms. (93a) and (125c) both point out ὑποσιώπησις in D.1.12 and 19 respectively. The *codices Ulpiani* alone offer the last two scholia. It is notable that these scholia observe that the figure is being employed again, (Dilts πάλιν pp.34.28, 39.28), which suggests that

either the same author wrote (14c), (93a) and (125c) or else a later commentator or compiler read (14c) and spotted further examples.

Some of the scholia which T offers on this topic are unique. (5b), (125c) and (170b) have been mentioned already. (122d) passes the following comment on D.1.18 : ὑπόθεσις καὶ ἀναπλήρωσις τὸ σχῆμα ἔστι δὲ τῆς εὐκρινείας. Hermogenes discusses εὐκρινεία at length and it is translated in L.S.J. as limpidity in style<sup>(21)</sup>. Hermogenes is looking at various ways in which points can be set out in order to produce clarity. Such things are lists (firstly ..., secondly ..., thirdly ...), establishing relationships between information (not only X, but also Y) and generally subordinating ideas into a symmetrical framework. Although Demosthenes is said to employ this technique, he favours it less than in Isokrates does. The example quoted in this scholion seems satisfactory. However, Demosthenes is speaking hypothetically because he is envisaging the possible outcome of taking military action against Philip. He also gives a full account of both possible outcomes. This scholion is similar to (122e) in Bc<sup>(22)</sup>.

(134) says briefly of D.1.20 : πραγμάτων παρένθεσις. The Rhetores Graeci are unhelpful in establishing just what is meant by παρένθεσις<sup>(23)</sup>. Usually it means what we should mean by parenthesis. The clause ὑμεῖς δ' οὕτω ... could be taken as a parenthesis because Demosthenes turns to comment on Athenian behaviour and then returns to his proposals in the next sentence (ἔστι δὲ λοιπόν ..). However, the long sentence which contains the "parenthesis" is written within the framework of an antithetical construction (μὲν / δὲ). Therefore the clause ὑμεῖς δὲ ... is expected. (134) is an unsatisfactory comment.

(164b) is found in T and Bc. we are told that a παραβολὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου is found at the end of D.1.24. παραβολή and παραδείγμα receive much interest among the Rhetores Graeci who endeavour to distinguish them<sup>(24)</sup>. It seems that an example is termed a παραβολή when the reader is invited to emulate action or an attitude. The activity is analogous to the one which the reader must undertake or avoid but the circumstances or events are different. A παραδείγμα is an example of the events in which the same action or circumstances are being faced again, albeit by a different group of people. The analogy which Demosthenes presents is one of the difference in attitude between the Athenians and Philip given a favourable opportunity to attack. This can be called a παραβολή because it gives a hypothetical example by guessing what Philip's actions will be, and also because the circumstances are not the same but reversed. Philip is looking to attack Athens while the Athenians await a chance to attack Philip. The phrase ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου implies that both have a favourable opportunity.

## Conclusion

The majority of the scholia dealing with σχήματα are straightforward. The ones which are unique to T and, or the other *codices Ulpiani* are unusual. They do not select clear examples from the *First Olynthiac*. These scholia confirm that T has been compiled from a plurality of sources without an attempt to create a homogeneous collection.

## Λεξι

Well over half the scholia which are found in T make a contribution to this aspect of language. Since many of these scholia have been discussed in previous chapters, there is no need to examine them again. There are, however, some eighteen scholia which are found only in the *codices Ulpiani*.

(9b) is a comment on the phrase τῆσ ὑμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω, D.1.1. Demosthenes is said to be referring to Athenian good luck here because he wishes to accustom the Athenians to hearing that they can be successful. This anticipates a later stage in the speech when Demosthenes calls Philip powerful because of his good luck. The commentator does not clarify the relation between these two statements. Perhaps what he means is that Demosthenes does not want the Athenians to be demoralised when they have to face facts about Philip. Therefore the initial encouragement prepares them for what is to follow. The commentator also fails to point out where Demosthenes attributes Philip's success to good luck. Two passages are possible, D.1.8-10 or D.1.23-27. The commentator has shown that he has not approached D.1.1 blinkered but has taken note of further developments. However, the phrase should be taken in context. The disingenuous gesture of magnanimity portrayed by Demosthenes at D1.1 forestalls any suggestion that he will not listen to what others have to say. Demosthenes is not arguing that the Athenians are also capable of doing what is called for.

(12a) is more straightforward. The commentator elaborates on the words ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖσ, D.1.3, in order to clarify the points of reference. From what the commentator says, he has made the correct interpretation; that is that ὑμῖν refers to the Athenians and ἐκείνων to the affairs of the Olynthians.

In (38a) we find an expansion of the phrase ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης, D.1.5, to the effect that δόξα concerns defeat or victory for the Olynthians. This is an accurate remark but Demosthenes' comment is not hard to understand.

(43a) is also a comment on D.1.5. The author observes with

reference to the phrase  $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu$  ὄμορον χώραν ἔχωσιν, that closely proximity produces quarrels and accusations.

(48) is a good comment of its type. The author, commenting on the phrase  $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma$  ἐξιόντας, D.1.6, rightly concludes that the nuance of  $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma$  is that the Athenians ought to take the field themselves and not rely on mercenaries.

(51b) is an important scholion for demonstrating the plurality for the scholia in T. The author says that Demosthenes has anticipated anyone arguing that the Athenians were never in favour of the Olynthians' cause with the inclusion of the phrase  $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$  πάντες ἐθρύλουν, D.1.7. It has already been noted that the rhetorical analysis offered by this note is inconsistent with the view put forward in (52a)<sup>(25)</sup>.

In (122c) the commentator explains the first alternative for the deployment of a force against Philip, D.1.18. Clearly he felt that there was a problem in the text because he prefaces his remarks  $\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$  δὲ ἐνταῦθα ... (Dilts p.39.10). It is difficult to see how the text may have been punctuated in such a way as to obscure the meaning.

In (128a) the author identifies  $\sigma\grave{\upsilon}$  γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά ; D.1.20 as an ἀνθυποφορά in D.1.19. It is prompted no doubt by Demosthenes' proposal for financing the expedition, and seems incompatible with the definition of the term in (105c) because there is no evidence here that the imaginary speaker agrees with anything which Demosthenes is saying. The commentator probably takes it in the sense in which Hermogenes uses the term, an outright denial or objection to an initial statement by a careful choice of vocabulary. Demosthenes uses the verb συμβουλεύω ( a synonym of ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν which is what we have in the text) instead of γράφω. It remains a moot point whether Demosthenes could have recourse to such a solution. It would seem weak on the face of it. Ulpian's interpretation (Dilts p.11.5sq) is more convincing ; that is that Demosthenes evades answering the question.

There are other scholia in which semantics are regarded as the answer to an objection as for example (54) and (129). The latter is significant because the same point is made which is made in (128a) but with two differences. Firstly, the lemma for (129) indicates D.1.20, whereas the lemma for (128a) indicates D.1.19. This does not affect the validity of the comment because the objection and answer straddle both sections. Secondly, the language and thoroughness of the comments are contrasting. (129) is a brief and simple statement, whereas (128a) is longer and is given in the persona of whoever is speaking. It should be noted that S also reads συμβουλεύω, instead of ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν (Dilts p.40.16,19). (128a) is also notable for its reference to the theorik money, which Demosthenes does not mention overtly, and to Euboulos (Dilts p.40.16,17). This interpretation of the theorik

money and Euboulos' involvement is similar to Ulpian's interpretation. This may have been the conventional opinion about the finance.

(128b) is a simple scholion which informs us that the clause τί οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι ... is a γνώμη ἀποφαντική. The commentator takes the clause as a categorical statement of an opinion and not as a question. It is highly likely that this scholion which is unique to T, comes from a different source from (128a). However, it is not logically necessary that an objection should be a question.

(130) gives a summary of Demosthenes' words in D.1.20. The author points out that Demosthenes is being longwinded when all he is saying is that he proposes that the money be spent on the soldiers, while the Athenians propose to spend it on festivals. This is accurate but, as in the case of (38a), unnecessary.

In (136a) the commentator needlessly explains that Demosthenes is giving the Athenians a choice in D.1.20. Either they must pay the money back to the soldiers or else levy an eisphora from their personal wealth (Dilts p.41.8-9, τῶν ἰδίων οὐσιῶν). The commentator does not find anything unusual in Demosthenes' statement by asking why he appears to think that the removal of a subsidy would be more popular than an extra selective tax. Either the commentator knew more about the background than we do and found Demosthenes' statement acceptable, or else he was not interested in identifying such problems<sup>(26)</sup>.

(141) also rephrases Demosthenes' words. The author picks up on the paradox which Demosthenes presents in D.1.21, and, in particular, the phrase οὔτε γὰρ ὡς δοκεῖ. The comment offers nothing of value to the reader.

(147a) also rephrases Demosthenes' words in D.1.21. When the latter explains that Philip would not have attacked Olynthos if he thought that he would actually have to fight, he points out that Philip was actually deceived into action on this occasion : κατὰ δέφευσται. The commentator writes this phrase as : καὶ εἶτα δέφευσται (Dilts p.42.27). He explains that Philip was deceived by his expectations and that the Olynthians were actually prepared to fight. This scholion is curiously independent of (140d) which looks at the rhetorical analysis of the speech and understands Demosthenes' words<sup>(27)</sup>.

In (148a) the commentator notes that Demosthenes avoids using a personal subject. In this example Demosthenes chooses an abstract subject, τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν πράγματα, instead of a personal one such as οἱ Θετταλοί. Demosthenes does not use the word πράγματα in D.1.21. The purpose, so we are told, is to allow Demosthenes to mention ἀπιστία and show that the Thessalians will always typify this quality. However, there seems to be no reason why Demosthenes could not have had a personal subject and also discussed ἀπιστία. As Demosthenes is

wishing to imply that Thessalian interests and attitudes are causing Philip problems, the abstract phrase is more appropriate because it covers more than the personal phrase οἱ Θεσσαλοί.

We are told in (148b) which refers to D.1.21 : πράγματι ἀντὶ προσώπου ἐχρήσατο. If this remark was incorporated into (148a), we would then have a form of scholion similar to that found in (111) which is found in F<sup>4</sup> as well as the *codices Ulpiani*. Both would then point out the unusual feature of Demosthenes' language ( Dilts p.36.28 ἀντὶ προσώπου πράγμα) with reference to the speech followed by the purpose of the feature (Dilts p.36.31sq cf p.42.31). The resemblance would be closer if (148b) preceded (148a). The similarity may be coincidental or indicative of a common author.

In (158) we find the commentator making an inference about the Paionians from what Demosthenes says in D.1.23. His remarks about their preference for autonomy is thought to conceal the fact that previously they were ruled by a king. This observation does not require any background knowledge although it is historically correct<sup>(28)</sup>.

The comment at (159b) points out the obvious. When Demosthenes refers to ἀνθρώπος ὑβριστής in D.1.23, he is talking about Philip.

In D.1.24 Demosthenes makes a remark about what Philip would do if he were in Philip's position. The author of (168a) explains precisely what the imagined circumstances would be ; that is had Philip the wealth of the Athenians and a common border war. This scholion is unnecessary.

(177) on D.1.26 informs us that εἰ ἂν νῦν alludes to τὸ ἐλθεῖν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς. This is correct but not hard to gather from the text.

### Conclusion

Most of the scholia which deal with λέξις are straightforward. This has been the case with all the codices. Many of them seem unnecessary since they rephrase Demosthenes' own words or explain the obvious. However, this may reveal a possible purpose for this type of scholion. They may represent a form of exercise rather than an attempt at analysis. This would, presumably, be particularly applicable to less advanced students. These scholia have also hinted at of a plurality of sources.

### Lexicographical Scholia

In contrast to the high number of scholia which embrace the topic of expression, there are only a handful of scholia in T which are relevant to lexicography. All but one of these has been mentioned before. (1e) and (2a) both discuss the choice of verb νομίζω in D.1.1.

They look at the word from different aspects and it was concluded that they probably originate from different sources<sup>(29)</sup>. As far as T is concerned, they offer alternative interpretations which are offered without judgement.

Understatement in D.1.3 is the subject of (90a). (117b) is an extremely brief scholion. *vp* offers *ὄνειδίζειν* as a synonym for *ἐπιτιμᾶν* in D.1.16. T adds an adverb to this to produce *ὄνειδίζειν μεταληπτικῶς*, but this does not affect the point of the scholion. (122b) gives *χειρώσεται* as a synonym or explanation for *παραστήσεται*. (175b) is a scholion which is essentially philological. (190a) is the only lexicographical scholion found in the *codices Ulpiani* and not the *codices vetustissimi*. We are told that *τοὺς δ' ἐν ἡλικία*, D.1.28, could otherwise be rendered *τοὺς νεωτέρους*. The author adds that youthfulness is characteristic of the young because our capabilities in our earlier years are greater.

The lexicographical scholia which are offered by T are not distinguished not are they typical of the form of lexicographical scholia. Codex S contains many more scholia which are similar in form to the entries in the lexica.

#### SCHOLIA UNIQUE TO T

There are six scholia which are found only in T. (51b) was mentioned in connection with rhetorical analysis. It may have been taken from the *Ulpiani prolegomena*. (52b) points out at D.1.8 Demosthenes' practice of giving exhortation after proof. Unfortunately no other evidence is given to sustain this view. (91) concerns rhetorical analysis and is the scholion which surprisingly points out *το αναγκαιον*. (128b) is a very brief note which labels *τί οὖν ἄν τις εἶποι ...*, D.1.19, as *ἡ γνώμη ἀποφαντική*. (134) is also very brief. It says simply with reference to D.1.20 : *πραγμάτων παρένθεσις*. (158) gives an explanation of the phrase *ἐλευθέρους ἢ δούλους*, D.1.23, by pointing out that the people to whom Demosthenes refers, were previously ruled by a king and were subject to him.

One other scholion, (122d), is attributed solely to T. This scholion has been mentioned in connection with D.1.28 and discussed *εὐκρινεία*. However, this scholion bears a very close resemblance to (122e) which is found in Bc. These similarities will be discussed in the section of this chapter on Bc.

#### Conclusion

The scholia unique to T are short and vary in subject matter. They provide evidence for a plurality of sources, for example (51b) and (91),

and they are also noteworthy because of the problems of interpretation which they present.

### SCHOLIA UNIQUE TO THE *CODICES ULPIANI*

There are several scholia which are unique to some or all of the *codices Ulpiani* in conjunction with T. Many of them have been discussed already. The majority of them, sixteen, concern aspects of expression, particularly by rephrasing Demosthenes' words : (9b), (12a), (38a), (43a), (67c), (122c), (130), (136a), (138), (141), (147a), (148a), (159b), (168a) and (177). These give satisfactory observations.

(138) has not been mentioned before and is a rather odd comment. Demosthenes says at D.1.20 : δέῃ δὲ χρημάτων, καὶ ἄνευ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι γενέσθαι τῶν δέοντων. The commentator thinks that Demosthenes' statement could be misinterpreted or objected to : εἴποι ἄν τις ' τί οὖν ; καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐχεσθαι δεόμεθα χρημάτων ἢ ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ; His point is that Demosthenes is talking specifically about financing the campaign and related matters. He is not saying that money is necessary for all things. οὐδὲν specifies the campaign. Demosthenes' meaning is clear in the context of D.1.20. It may be significant that the commentator chooses prayer and good behaviour as examples of things which can be achieved without money. These examples would be more natural for a Christian than a pagan.

A few of the scholia which are found only in the *codices Ulpiani* in conjunction with T look at σχήματα : (125c), (164b) and (170b). Rhetorical analysis is examined three times : (5b), (117c) and (128a). Curiously the first two are scholia whose presence among the scholia in T produce inconsistencies in the rhetorical account.

One further scholion (82) looks at the grammar of the adjective ἀντίρροπον in D.1.10, which the commentator says takes the genitive, whereas ἰσόρροπον takes the dative. The examples given by LSJ confirm this<sup>(30)</sup>.

(35b), (90b), (126b), (140d) and (190a) all all credited as being individual scholia to this group of codices in Dilts' edition. However, they all find a counterpart in another scholion, either because one appears to be an abbreviation of the other, or else because two scholia produce a significantly similar account.

There are two differences between (35b) and (35a), which is found in F<sup>4</sup>. The authors are explaining Demosthenes' phrase ἐναντίως ἔχει, D.1.4. The first is that although the same words are used, they are phrased slightly differently. The meaning remains the same. The second is that (35b) offers additional information at the end : εἶτα ἐπάγει τὴν αἰτίαν. However, it may be significant that F<sup>2</sup> offers this

piece of information as part of (36a).

In (90b) the metaphor in D.1.11 is identified. (90c) which occurs in F<sup>4</sup> gives the same definition but in a slightly different form.

(126b) find a counterpart in (126a), again found in F<sup>4</sup>. Both explore the significance of the verb ἀποδώσετε in D.1.19. (126b) gives a slightly longer version of (126a) using different phrases but making the same point. The first sentence in both contains the same words in a different order (Dilts p.40.3, 5). In the version in T we are given a general definition of the verb ἀποδίδομι and this is related to the specific context of D.1.19. In F<sup>4</sup> the general definition is not found.

(140d) and (140c), which is found in S, have already been mentioned in connection with the rhetorical analysis. There it is suggested that (140d) is a paraphrase of part of (140c) (Dilts p.40.6 κατὰ τὴν λύσιν - 12 ἐποιήσατο).

In (190a) T again offers the longer version of a scholion which occurs in F<sup>4</sup>, (190b). The same point is made in both about the phrase τοὺς δ' ἐν ἡλικία in almost identical phrases.

It is surely significant that in four of these examples F<sup>4</sup> contributes the similar scholion. There are other examples of scholia which are found in other recensions and which find a counterpart in the *codices Ulpiani*. For example (66) appears to an abbreviates form of (60b) which is found in S. (114b) is found in vp and S and is echoed by (114c) which F<sup>4</sup> offers. Similar examples are (123a) found in the *codices Ulpiani* and F<sup>4</sup> and (123b) found in S and the same applies to (159a) and (159c) respectively.

It is possible that many of the scholia unique to the *codices Ulpiani* come from a single author, but the echoes which are provided in other scholia suggests that we have the results of compilation. The value of the comments themselves is not great since most are elementary.

#### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODEX T AND THE *CODICES VETUSTISSIMI* AND THE *CODICES RECENTIORES*

The only codices which concern us here are Y, S, F and R. It must be remembered that the date of the codices does not necessarily correspond to the same century as the scholia were added in the margins. for this reason it is more appropriate to examine the relationship of T, thirteenth century, with firstly Y, then F, S and finally R.

Dilts explains that T is derived from the ninth-century codex Y. Where Y is extant he quotes from that codex : *reliqua scholia forsitan de foliis deperditis codicis Y derivata sunt* (Dilts p.XI). However, it seems more than likely that T contains more than just scholia from Y

because (1a), for example, is not found in Y although this codex is extant at this point.





Three hands in F are relevant. F<sup>1</sup>, a tenth-century hand, offers twenty-nine scholia but only four are common to F<sup>1</sup> and T : (26a), (42a), (101) and (122b). These concern language mostly. F<sup>2</sup> is also a tenth-century hand and there are ten scholia common to it and T : (1a), (1c) (partially), (15c), (90a), (148b), (170a), (171), (172b), (181) and (184). There are a variety of topics. The most significant of them is (1c) and we shall return to this scholion.

We can conclude that F<sup>1</sup> has little in common with T and the *codices Ulpiani*. Where Y is extant only one scholion is shared with F<sup>2</sup> and that is part of (1c). It is possible that most, if not all, of these scholia came into the collection now found in T after the ninth century. It is unlikely that F<sup>2</sup> was the direct source for these scholia in the *codices Ulpiani* because we would then have to account for the absence of other F<sup>2</sup>-scholia in T. Moreover, it is suggested in the chapter on codex F that F<sup>2</sup> appeared to have compiled scholia with the aim of supplementing the contribution of F<sup>1</sup> (31).

A striking relationship exists between T and F<sup>4</sup>. They share fifty-nine scholia according to Dilts' numbering and in at least six cases F<sup>4</sup> offers scholia which are remarkably similar to scholia which are attributed separately to T : (2a) and (2b), (35a) and (35b), (90c) and (90b), (114b) and (114c), (126a) and (126b) and (150b) and (150c). The relationship is strengthened by two unusual scholia. Both F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani*, including T, contain an abbreviated form of (51a) (Dilts p.27.26-28.1 δύναται). An abbreviated version of (60b), found in codex S, is contained in these codices in scholion (66) (Dilts p.30.21 σημαντικώτατον-24 ὑπουργούσιν).

F<sup>4</sup> predates T by two centuries and therefore the scribe of F<sup>4</sup> cannot have copied from T itself. If T had been copied directly from F<sup>4</sup> we should have to explain why the texts of F<sup>4</sup> and T are so different, while the texts of Y and T are so similar. We also have to explain why T contains more scholia than F<sup>4</sup>, some of which occur in Y, (1f) and (5c), and also why the contribution of previous hands in codex F did not attract the compiler of T. A direct relationship between F<sup>4</sup> and T is improbable and we must think of other possible relationships.

The following possibilities are based on Dilts' understanding of the textual relationship between the *codices Ulpiani* (Dilts p.XII):



1.  $F^4$  and T are gemelli. Dilts suggests that T is an apograph of t which is itself an apograph of Y.

2.  $F^4$  is an apograph of the exemplar of Af which is itself an apograph of Y. Gemellus of Af etc.

3.  $F^4$  is an apograph of Y.

4.  $F^4$  and Y have a common exemplar.

There are six scholia which are found in  $F^4$  but not in T : (72), (87), (120), (121), (153) and (192a). These are elementary comments and their omission does not create an important difference between  $F^4$  and T.

There are numerous scholia unique to T and some which T only shares with others of the *codices Ulpiani*. Most of these concern aspects of language. Two significant exceptions are (1f) and (5c). These are two scholia which we know are in Y, and therefore their absence in  $F^4$  must be explained if  $F^4$  is based on an apograph of Y. (1f) is the long, discursive scholion about the theorik money and (5c) is a fairly long scholion about προτάσεις. Professor MacDowell has examined the codex containing F and informs me that the margins could hold a few comments of 10-20 words. Lack of space seems to be the most probable explanation for the absence of these two scholia from the contribution of  $F^4$ .

Relationships 1., 2. and 3. all take  $F^4$  to be an apograph of Y (either directly or indirectly). The quality of the text can only be explained by assuming that the scribe was exceptionally careless. In the case of

relationships 1. and 2., we know that the apograph had a text similar to the text in Y. The text of T is closer to that of Y as is the textual tradition of Af etc. If a lack of space in the margin of F is not accepted as the explanation for the absence of (1f) and (5c), we have to assume that the scribe of F<sup>4</sup>, for some reason unknown to us, decided to omit them.

The best interpretation of the relationship is given in 4.. The difference in the text can be understood if we suppose that an exemplar common to F<sup>4</sup> and Y was difficult to read. We can understand why the interpretation of Y continued throughout the *codices Ulpiani* and why the interpretation of F<sup>4</sup> is independent of it. The scholia in Y and the *codices Ulpiani* will have entered the tradition of Y from other sources. I have argued already that (1f) has little in common with other scholia in Y<sup>(32)</sup>.

It seems likely that F<sup>4</sup> is offering a set of comments which were put together before the ninth century. If so, my suggestion in the chapter on F that the compiler of F<sup>4</sup> was taking note of what he found in codex F is unlikely. It may be coincidence that F<sup>4</sup> looks at λέξις in detail and takes less interest in lexicography and σχήματα than the previous compilers of F. We do, however, have good reason to believe that the scribe F<sup>4</sup> was copying from an exemplar which contained a full version of (1c) and sensibly omitted what F<sup>2</sup> had already written. The lines which are omitted altogether (Dilts p.14.12 τεχνικῶσ - 15 ἐπιδεχόμενα) do not affect the meaning of the scholion.

### Codices S and R

The scholia in codices S and R form, for the most part, a tradition independent of the scholia found in the other codices. In particular, there are some indications that a core of these discursive scholia form part of a unified commentary. That said, the *codices Ulpiani* share scholia with S and R or else offer counterparts. T and S (independent of R) share : (6), (105a), (114a), (114b), (122a), (124), (131a), (137a), (167), (178), (180), (182), (184). The majority of these look at language. (124) is an awkward scholion whose presence in discussions of κεφάλαια causes problems. There are textual variants between S and the *codices Ulpiani* : (114a) (Dilts app.crit. p.37.8), (122a) (Dilts app.crit. p.39.6), (124) (Dilts app.crit. p.39.22), (131a) (Dilts app.crit. p.40.24), (167) (Dilts app.crit. p.45.22, 23), (178) (Dilts app.crit. p.47.3, 8) and (180) (Dilts app.crit. p.47.10).

T shares some scholia with R independent of S : (1c), (1d), (5c), (11b), (14c), (26a), (51a), (94) and (29), (75a), (92b) and (93a). The last four are attributed to R by Dilts but I cannot see them in my photograph of R. The counterpart of (1d) is (1e) in the *codices Ulpiani*.

Apart from (1c) the appearance of all these scholia in T can be explained by the linguistic interest shown in these scholia. (11b), (14c) and (51a) offer definitions. There are textual variants between the *codices Ulpiani* and R : (1c) (Dilts app.crit. p.14.6), (51a) (Dilts p.28.15) and (94) app.crit. p.35.7).

Scholia in T are found in both S and R : (1a), (26c), (52a), (60a), (105c), (151), (164a), (2a), (19), (26b), (53a) and (140a). According to Dilts, (140a) is shared with S but it does repeat the opening lines of (140c) which is offered by R. It is also a scholion in which language has no part. Where S, R and T offer the same scholion there are instances where T offers a slightly different version. In (2a) T offers a longer scholion (Dilts app.crit. p.16.24). (19) provides a similar example (Dilts app.crit. p.21.17). In (52a) T offers a slightly shorter version (Dilts app.crit. p.28.22). In (164a) T offers introductory remarks missing in S and R (Dilts app. crit. p.44.33) but omits the remarks found in S and R about παραίνεσις and a couple of other phrases (Dilts app.crit. p.45.5, 9, 11). In (178) T offers phrases which S omits (Dilts app.crit. p.47.4). ( I cannot tell whether anything is extant in R).

Clearly the *codices Ulpiani* represent a different tradition from R and S. The best explanation accounting for the presence of shared scholia in this form is to suppose that we are dealing with sources of the *codices Ulpiani* which predate Y in the ninth century. Most contamination and the establishment of versions probably took place then rather than later.

#### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CODEX T AND THE *ULPIANI PROLEGOMENA*

There are fundamental differences in the approach and scope of codex T and the *Ulpiani prolegomena* . The scholia in T deal mainly with language and expression. Ulpian's primary concern is the rhetorical analysis of the speech. The form of the comments is also different. In the *prolegomena* we have a long, cohesive and detailed discussion, whereas the individual scholia in T are brief and reveal that the compiler consulted a plurality of sources. However, it seems likely that Ulpian himself or someone who adopted similar views provided material for the compilation of scholia in T.

Both Ulpian and the compiler of T reveal a general interest in the theoric money. Both see the reference to χρήματα in D.1.1 as an oblique allusion to the problem of financing the campaign (Dilts p.14.17 cf p.6.10-13). In (1f) we are given a long account about the theoric funds and its origins. Both Ulpian and T name Euboulos as the individual responsible for introducing a law about the theoric money which is troubling Demosthenes in this speech : (128a) and (Dilts p.11.3-12). In

this speech Demosthenes refers neither to the theorik money nor to Euboulos overtly. However, none of the codices offers an interpretation to conflict with this view. Therefore it may have been generally accepted in antiquity.

The analysis of the προίμιον is the same as that offered in R. While it appears to agree superficially with the analysis put forward by Ulpian, there are important differences between what is said by Ulpian and what is said in R and the *codices Ulpiani*.

In codex R one of the major differences between its contribution and the *prolegomena* is that Ulpian believes that the main objection which Demosthenes faces in D.1.2-7 is the question ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. Dilts points out the obvious echo of this statement by T in (51b). This scholion gives a good summary of remarks made by Ulpian (Dilts p.8.32-9.4). It is tempting to believe that the scholion in T is based on this passage in Ulpian. On the other hand, this is the only scholion which supports Ulpian's interpretation outright. In (26a) and (52a) we find comments about τὸ βέβαιον τῶν Ὀλυνθίων. There would be no need to refer to Olynthian reliability unless this was a problem. Therefore T offers an inconsistent interpretation about the purpose of the opening few sections of the *First Olynthiac*.

The next echo of the *prolegomena* comes in (91) where we find this comment on D.1.12 : ἐντεῦθεν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ δὲ κατασκευὴ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος. This remark about κεφάλαια is totally unexpected in T. The value of this interpretation has been discussed above<sup>(33)</sup> but it is worth noting that Ulpian's interpretation of this passage is very similar. He tells us that εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα is the beginning of τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (Dilts p.9.31). The previous section, D.1.8-11, was said to be based on a mixture of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν (Dilts p.9.26). Ulpian thinks that τὸ συμφέρον is also present in D.1.12-15 (Dilts p.10.15), but this remark is a summary. Only τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν are mentioned. Ulpian fails to mention τὸ ἀναγκαῖον although he implies that it was the κεφάλαιον of D.1.12-15. This is another clear echo which fails to stand up to scrutiny.

Now in T we are told that the whole speech is made up from both τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δυνατόν but the subsequent scholia in T up to this section are very vague about κεφάλαια.

(117c) points out that D.1.16 is the προίμιον of τὸ δυνατόν and discusses προίμια of κεφάλαια. Internal προίμια are mentioned in the *Ulpiani prolegomena* (Dilts p.10.15-11.12). The analysis of (117c) considers D.1.16-18 in terms of ἐνθύμημα and ἐπαγωγή. Ulpian discusses all of D.1.16-20 and does not refer to these terms.

The information in (117d) falls into two parts. The first identifies an ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου (Dilts p.38.16-18). The second

part (Dilts p.38.18-20) argues that the λύσις is delayed while Demosthenes makes a brief digression. The purpose of this is to set the audience on his side before proceeding. Although the author of (117d) does not mention προσίμια, his interpretation of the digression is the same as that accepted by Ulpian (Dilts p.38.23-31).

(117e) offers a third interpretation of this passage. It contains the strongest echoes of Ulpian. We are told that at D.1.16 we have : προσίμια εἰς τὸ τοῦ δυνατοῦ κεφάλαιον (Dilts p.38.22). The plural is not a problem. We are told that this divided : ὅπερ τέμνεται εἰς δύο, εἰς τε τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ εἰς χρημάτων πόρον (Dilts p.10.22-23). The reason which is put forward in (117e) for using this type of προσιμιον is that it lends an agonistic air to the argument and also reveals the speaker's confidence in his words. Ulpian on the other hand, argues that the προσίμιον is used here because the speaker is in difficulties and needs to take care (Dilts p.10.23-26). These scholia are not contradictory but comment on different aspects of a similar point.

All three interpretations of D.1.16 echo Ulpian but all three also make slightly different points. It may be best to suppose that what we find here are either common ideas or else interpretations which have been influenced by, or indeed have themselves influenced the *Ulpiani prolegomena*.

In (119b) the author remarks : ἐπεὶ δὲ οἶδε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλῇ δεδουλωμένους ῥαθυμία, προτείνει αὐτοῖς δύο βοηθείας, ἵνα κὰν τὴν μίαν ποιήσωσιν. This echoes Ulpian's belief that although Demosthenes proposes two forces he does not expect nor indeed wish more than one to be sent (Dilts p.10.26-29). Since this interpretation does not take Demosthenes at face value it may be that (119b) is based on Ulpian's interpretation.

Ulpian closes his discussion with a few words about the difference between προτροπή, συμβουλή and παραίνεσις, (Dilts p.13.2-6).

(164a) also defines προτροπή and συμβουλή<sup>(34)</sup>. These definitions differ from those given by Ulpian. It is also worth noting that in T a specific section, D.1.24-27, is termed προτροπή and D.1.28 forms an ἐπίλογος. In Ulpian D.1.24-28 is called ἐπιλόγοι (Dilts p.12.5).

## Conclusion

It is quite clear that despite the echoes, it is unlikely that the scholia in T have been seriously influenced by the *Ulpiani prolegomena*, although they share similar ideas. They probably reflect a general background of interpretations which borrowed elements from various commentators. It should be remembered that although codex T contains most of the text of the *prolegomena* it would appear that


they were added after the scholia to the *First Olynthiac* had been written and therefore their presence cannot have affected the production of scholia in T on this speech (Dilts p.X).

#### CODICES Bc, Ob, Af, Vb, Ca, Wd AND Ac

It is appropriate to say a few words about the remaining *codices Ulpiani* which will be discussed in this chapter.

Bc is a fourteenth-century codex which contains the *Ulpiani prolegomena* and a selection of speeches including the *First Olynthiac* complete with scholia (Dilts p.X). Dilts has concluded that T and Bc are apographs of the same exemplar which he refers to as lost codex t<sup>(35)</sup>. Dilts cites the fifteenth-century codex Ob whenever it is necessary to correct mistakes in Bc (Dilts p.X).

In a recent article<sup>(36)</sup>, Dilts discusses a family of seventeen manuscripts. He considers four of these, Af, Vb, Ca and Wd, to be the most valuable for editing the scholia. They date to the fourteenth century, although Af may be slightly earlier. He points out that Wd contains the most complete text of the *scholia Ulpiani*. Since both T and Bc contain more scholia it must be wondered what the criterion is for *scholia Ulpiani* to be so named. I have already suggested that this term is in fact convenient but misleading<sup>(37)</sup>. Dilts would appear to regard scholia which occur only in T and Bc as contamination. He observes that otherwise this group of four codices share readings variously with F A and T Bc in D.1.1-4. They also offer some unique scholia and unique readings.. He argues that Ca is independent from Wd and that Af and Vb represent a third lost exemplar. He has constructed the following simplified stemma for the *scholia Ulpiani* on D.1.1-4 :



Dilts does refer to the relationship between the *codices vetustissimi* and the *codices Ulpiani* in his introduction : *codex vetustissimus Y scholia ad primam orationem (ab init. ad scholium 1.1, 5c στε τοιυυυ) continet. scholorum haec brevis collectio occurrit in codicibus vetustissimis F A S vp et in Ulpianeis T Bc Af Vb Ca Wd qui dissimiles vetustissimis eosdem errores atque codex Y et alios*

*errores separativos contribuunt. qua re Ulpianei codices non citati sunt, dum scholia communia codici Y praebent* (Dilts p.XI). As far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned *haec brevis collectio* must refer to the five scholia which remain in Y : (1c), (1e), (1f), (2a) and (5c). There are sufficient differences in the text between the versions offered in the *codices vetustissimi* and in codex Y to infer that the text offered by Y is independent.  $\nu\rho^2$  is the exception since this hand has undoubtedly copied the mutilated remains of Y.

Even where Y is not extant, it can be inferred from Dilts' prefatory remarks that the scholia which were once contained in Y and are now found in the *codices Ulpiani*, whichever scholia they might be, are not directly influenced by the *codices vetustissimi*. However, Dilts' remarks about the stemmatic relationship of the *codices Ulpiani* does suggest that Ca Af Vb Wd, at least, are influenced indirectly by these codices. As we shall see presently, Bc appears to have had access to some unique material which originates outwith any of the recensions examined so far.

Ac and Wb are *gemelli* of the fifteenth century. In his preface Dilts says : *complures codices de T derivati sunt, cum his et codici T eadem pars prolegomenorum Ulpiani desit* (Dilts p.X). Ac and Wb are the two codices from this group which Dilts thinks are of most use. It is odd that in his footnote he refers to his article in *TAPA* (38). In this article Dilts does discuss this group of codices, but he does not show there that they are derived from T for the *First Olynthiac*. The relationship is examined for a different speech, D.24. His conclusion is that these codices derive from a lost exemplar, codex v, which, in turn, derives from lost codex t. Codex t is thought by Dilts to be the exemplar of T and Bc. Dilts accepts the stemmatic relationship for D.24 as the relationship for D.1.

### Codex Bc (and Codex Ob)

There are nineteen scholia which are found only in Bc, and therefore Ob. One scholion, (24), is found only in Bc Ob and R. Several of these provide unusual or important interpretations of the *First Olynthiac*. There is probably significance in the incidence of these unique scholia. Fifteen of them occur within sections D.1.1-15.

### Προοίμιον

Two points arise from the first προοίμιον. The first is that Bc heads its collection of scholia with the phrase : ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐξηγήσεως (Dilts app.crit. p.14.1. The second is that Bc is one of the codices which offers an extract from Menander Rhetor as quoted by Gregory of Corinth.

## Δεύτερον Προόμιον

The account of the δεύτερον προόμιον in T is unsatisfactory. The combination of (11b) and (14c) reveals little about the substance of what Demosthenes says and concentrates instead on the figures of speech involved. By contrast (14d) gives a detailed and methodical account of the δεύτερον προόμιον. It is said to contain the account of two answers to the first ἀντιθεσις which Demosthenes has to face (Dilts p.20.28-29). The objection is identified as οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. The two answers are as follows : ἀπὸ τε τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου τοῦ Φιλίππου (Dilts p.20.30-31). The author then proceeds to point out the phrases in Demosthenes which correspond to this division. Firstly he says : λέγων τὴν πρότασιν τὸ "ἀντιληπτέον τῶν παλαιῶν πραγμάτων" ἡγουν τῶν εὐδαιμόνων, τὴν ἐκ τῆς φιλοτιμίας λύσιν ὅσον ἐγχωρεῖ τῷ προομιῷ ἐργάζεται (Dilts p.21.1-3). The commentator believes that Demosthenes' argument is that the war does concern the Athenians because they ought to take part in affairs as they used to with much success. From the words παλαιῶν and εὐδαιμόνων the commentator is interpreting πραγμάτων as reference to former Athenian superiority and hegemony. It may not be accidental that Bc omits (12a) which identified πραγμάτων, correctly in fact, as a reference to the Olynthians.

Leaving the answer based on φιλοτιμία, the commentator now identifies the phrases in Demosthenes which answer the objection on the ground of φόβος : καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον κατασκευάζων τὴν πρότασιν, τὴν δευτέραν προανακρούεται λύσιν εἰπὼν "εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας φροντίζετε," ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ φόβου (Dilts p.21.3-5). Thus, the phrase εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας φροντίζετε, which paraphrases Demosthenes' own words, has two functions. It supports the initial plea by Demosthenes for the Athenians to become involved by portraying their involvement as admirable. One's safety is indeed a laudable motive for many actions. The second function is to provide a second answer to the objection about the relevance of the war to the Athenians. The phrase does contain the notion of fear because the inference can be made that the Athenians will be in danger if they do not become involved. The interpretation found in (14d) is neat.

Even though the reference of πραγμάτων has been taken wrongly, the interpretation given in (14d) is well argued. Within the context of the remaining scholia which are offered in T and Bc it serves to explain the purpose of the second προόμιον. It also offers a valuable piece of rhetorical analysis for D.1.2-7 as a whole. There is an obvious echo of Ulpian in its identification of the objection as ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ

πόλεμος<sup>(39)</sup>. It is curious that Bc omits (51b) which favours this ἀντίθεσις too. Perhaps, it was deemed superfluous, or else the commentator thought that Demosthenes had given a suitable answer already.

The *apparatus* on (14c) (Dilts p.20.26) reveals that Bc omits the phrase κατασκευῆς οὐσίας τῆς "εἶπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν from the end of this scholion. Certainly the omission avoids repetition with (14d). The latter scholion does, however, seem to contradict (26a) and (52a) where the remarks about Olynthian reliability were thought to conceal the identity of the objection as ἀλλ' ἀπιστοὶ οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι or something similar<sup>(40)</sup>.

Ulpian's detailed discussion of the second προοίμιον concentrates on κεφάλαια (Dilts p.6.14-7.3), and also looks at structural aspects of rhetorical analysis. (14d) does not mention κεφάλαια. The comments which interpret πραγμάτων as a reference to former hegemony (Dilts p.6.14-17) echo Ulpian. In his summary Ulpian tells us that the objection ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος is answered in two ways (διχόθεν δείκνυσιν Dilts p.3.4). The first answer concerns φιλοτιμία and ἡγεμονία (Dilts p.3.4, 7, 15) and the second is based on τὸ ἀναγκαῖον and φόβος (Dilts p.3.16-17). While the version in (14d) does not refer to κεφάλαια, nor gives such a full explanation as Ulpian, the fundamental analysis is the same. Coincidence seems unlikely. Either it has been written by Ulpian in an amended form for another purpose, or it derives from someone who had studied Ulpian's work and made notes from him.

### Κεφάλαια D.1.2-15

Codex T is unusually reticent about κεφάλαια in D.1.2-15, but τὸ συμφέρον appears to be the principal κεφάλαιον, (15c). τὸ ἀναγκαῖον is allegedly involved too at D.1.12, (91). Inadequate accounts are given about the structure of Demosthenes' argument and his purpose. Scholia such as (26a), (52a), (42a), (51a) and (51b) prompt more questions than they answer. By contrast, Bc examines the κεφάλαια of this passage in detail, although without the same degree of thoroughness which typifies the *Ulpiani prolegomena* and codex R.

(15d) is brief. The author observes that once ὁ καιρός has spoken, Demosthenes' own opinion seems to be a reasonable account (εὐλόγως). This scholion might have explained why his opinion seems reasonable. It is "reasonable" because it supports the important statement by ὁ καιρός and not "reasonable" because he contrasts a sound opinion with foolishness. The author of (15d) does not reveal whether he takes ὁ καιρός as a real person, or, figuratively, as an opportunity.

Although Bc is the exemplar of Ob, according to Dilts, they offer

slightly different versions in (21b), which refers to D.1.3. The first part of (21b) in Bc looks at the particle ὡς in the phrase ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος (Dilts p.21.23-24). The author argues that it is equivalent to the positive combination of particles καὶ γὰρ. He quotes a similar example of this use of ὡς by ὁ θεολόγος. This is the appellation of Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzos, who lived in the fourth century and was esteemed for his mastery of the Greek language, on a level with Demosthenes and Thucydides<sup>(41)</sup>. The observation about the particles is reasonable. Both phrases may be used to link supporting statements to the main statement (for in fact / because). The nuance is slightly different.

The following part of the scholion (Dilts p.21.24-29) in Bc's version argues that Demosthenes does not state the objection which he faces in D.1.13, but hints at it by means of his answer. The objection, in the commentator's view is this : ἀλλὰ ἄπιστοι ἐγγόνεισαν περὶ τὴν πόλιν Ὀλύνθιοι (Dilts p.21.25). He goes on to explain (Dilts p.21.26-29) that Demosthenes says that it is feared that the Olynthians will be tricked into abandoning the Athenians if they join them in an alliance. Past experience forms the ground for this fear. Demosthenes endeavours to reject the objection by arguing that Olynthian conduct on the previous occasion was pardonable. This is a good analysis of D.1.3-5, but the commentator does not go on to explain why the Olynthians will not be deceived this time.

Ob gives a slightly different version. The beginning of the scholion reads : τὸ "ὡς" ἔστιν ἀντὶ τοῦ "καὶ γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος" (Dilts app.crit. p.21.23 το -24 κρείττων). The point is the same but the reference to Gregory is lost. The opening words of Ob are almost the same as the brief scholion in F<sup>1</sup> and S, (21a), which makes the same point.

The presence of (21b) is an obvious contradiction of (14d) which favours Ulpian's assessment of this passage in the *First Olynthiac*. The interpretation found in (21b) is that which is attributed to Zeno by Ulpian, with the support of (36b) in R (Dilts p.24.36-37). It is perhaps significant that Ulpian words "Zeno's" objection in the same manner as the author of (21b). (21b) is compatible with (26a) and (52a) which allude to Olynthian reliability.

The next contribution from Bc is also concerned with D.1.3. (24) is one of the core scholia and discusses λέξις. Briefly, the author argues that Philip is unreliable because he swithers from threats to offers of reconciliation. He adds, paraphrasing Demosthenes, that when Philip threatens he should be believed, but not when he is being submissive. There is a substantial difference in the text offered by R and Bc (in conjunction with Ob). Bc reads : πῶς ἀξιόπιστος ὁ Φίλιππος. τὸ γὰρ εἴκειν καὶ ἀπειλεῖν αὐτοῖς οὐ βεβαίου τινός. πῶς οὖν ἔστι, φησὶν, "ἀξιόπιστος"

ἀπειλῶν "εἰκότως" ' δι' ὧν γὰρ εἴκει, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀπειλῶν ἀξιόπιστος ' δοκεῖ γὰρ, ἐξ ὧν αὐτῶ συννοιδεν, ἐκ τούτων ἑκάτερα πράττειν. ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις εἰκῶν οὕτως ἀπειλῶν ἐν ἑκατέροις ἀξιόπιστος (Dilts app.crit. p.22.13-18). The meaning is not affected. Clearly, Bc and R have a common source but the relationship between them is not direct.

Moving on to D.1.4, an unusual coincidence between Bc and R is also suggested by (30). Here we are told briefly that when Demosthenes shows how industrious and opportunistic Philip is, he is thereby suggesting that the Athenians should emulate him. Thus, we find that the same words effectively cause fear and encouragement. This scholion stands close comparison with (28) in codex R (Dilts p.23.23-25), because the form of expression is very similar. In (30) we have : δι' ὧν φοβεῖ, διὰ τούτων καὶ παραμυθεῖται. οὐκ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖν ἀπέχεται τῆσ προτροπῆσ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν τοῦ Φιλίππου καθίστησι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. In (28) we find : οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖν ἀπέχεται τῆσ προτροπῆσ, ἀλλὰ δι' ὧν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Φίλιππον, διὰ τούτων εἰς ζῆλον αὐτοῦσ καθίστησι ' (Dilts p.23.23-25). A little earlier in this scholion there are the words : παραμυθεῖται πάλιν αὐτοῦσ διὰ τούτων ὧν ἐφόβησε (Dilts p.23.16-17). The similarity to the first passage is striking. However, it is possible that the nature of the material prompts similar forms of remarks. Ulpian also remarks : εἶτα, δι' ὧν φοβεῖ, διὰ τούτων καὶ παραμυθεῖται πάλιν (Dilts p.7.21-22).

The author of (38b) endeavours to explain the reference in the phrase ὑπὲρ μέρους χῶρασ, D.1.5. He takes it to be an allusion to a time when the Olynthians fought Athens over Amphipolis. The accuracy of this claim has still to be verified.

(40b) is an unusual comment because of the terminology used. Nothing quite like it is found elsewhere among the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*. Referring to the the word καὶ ἴσασιν ἅ τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ... in D.1.5, the author says : ἐκ παραδείγματος ὅπερ ἐστὶ δραστικὴ πίστισ καλεῖται δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ τοῦσ φιλοσόφουσ ἐπαγωγῆ. Presumably the author means that an example is similar to an ἐπαγωγῆ because an argument may be deduced from an example. Further work needs to be done to find out what, exactly, the author means by δραστικὴ πίστισ and ἐπαγωγῆ. It will also be profitable to examine the difference between philosophical and rhetorical ἐπαγωγαί. Only then can the worth of this scholion be assessed. However, it is clear that the author has a grasp of technical terms and seems confident.

(44c) is another brief scholion. It points out at the beginning of D.1.6 : μετὰ τὰσ πίστεισ καὶ τὰσ προτροπάσ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ Δημοσθένουσ τε καὶ Θουκυδίδου. The absence of a main verb is unfortunate, but it is most probable that the καὶ is to be understood as emphatic and that the commentator is pointing out that Demosthenes and Thoukydides are wont to move from proofs to exhortation. The comment is satisfactory

in the context of D.1.16. T alone offers (52b) in connection with D.1.8<sup>(42)</sup>. The author says there : ἴδιον Δημοσθένους μετὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν προτρέπειν. Clearly, both scholia are making the same point. Both are equally valid at the point at which they are made ; therefore, neither is misplaced. Ulpian remarks about Demosthenic and Thoukydidean practice at this point in the speech, though he prefers to comment on the movement from fear to exhortation (Dilts p.7.20-24). There is no reason to suppose that there is any link between these three comments. They illustrate what appears to be a common approach.

φημὶ δεῖν ἐθελῆσαι ..., D.1.6, prompts a brief comment in (46) : μέρος τοῦ συμφέροντος ἔχον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν ἐπόμενον. No further explanation is given to justify this observation, but it is valid. Demosthenes is telling the Athenians that they ought to act for their own protection. This clearly involves τὸ συμφέρον. The reference to the source of finance for the campaign takes care of τὸ δυνατόν. None of the other codices give much thought to κεφάλαια at this point. This scholion complies with the general remarks made about κεφάλαια in (1c) (Dilts p.14.15-16). Ulpian reveals a deep interest in κεφάλαια, and the phrases which he uses are similar to those which we find in (46), although they are not identical (Dilts p.7.30-8.3, p.8.26-31).

(47) tells us : μετὰ τὸν φόβον μνημονεύει καὶ τῶν χρημάτων. The element of fear is suggested in the phrase εἶπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν, D.1.6. Demosthenes has been exhorting the Athenians to participate and this phrase contains undertones of urgency. This scholion is compatible with (44c), which suggests that D.1.6 marked the beginning of προτροπή. All of D.1.6 is directed towards exhortation of the Athenians and there is no reason why an element of fear should not be part of this encouragement. Bc is discussing almost every phrase in D.1.5-6, taking into account the additional scholia which are shared with T, (38b), (42a), (43a), (45a) and (48).

The next scholion which is unique to Bc does not occur until D.1.9 where we are told in (65) : ὅτε ἠύξησε τὸν Φίλιππον, τότε κατέβαλεν οἶον ἐπὶ παρὰ τὰ νῦν ἐστὶ ταπεινός. This is a perspicacious comment about Demosthenes' skill in toppling Philip from his estimable position, which Demosthenes himself has helped to create. For when Demosthenes says that if the Athenians had acted more quickly ῥάονι καὶ πολὺ ταπεινότερῳ νῦν ἂν ἐχρώμεθα τῷ Φιλίππῳ, he is implying that Philip is actually ταπεινός now. Clearly, the commentator believes that ταπεινότης is a quality which is harmful to Philip's standing. This same point is made in codices S and R<sup>(43)</sup> but the wording is different. It is curious that the account in S continues (Dilts p.30.21, σημαντικώτατον) with a few remarks about the effect of the verb ἐχρώμεθα. The next scholion found in Bc, (66), paraphrases part of (60b)

(Dilts p.30.21-24)(44).

(77c) which comments on D.1.10, falls into two parts. The author says : ἔλυσε τὸ ἀντιπίπτον "καίτοι πολλῶν ἀφηρέθημεν", τοῦτο δὲ διὰ μέσων (Dilts p.33.6-7). This statement is ambiguous, for it is not clear whether τοῦτο refers to the objection or the answer to the objection. An ἀντιπίπτον, according to the author of (105c), is an objection which the speaker anticipates. Demosthenes' phrase καίπερ οὐκ ἔχόντων ὡς δεῖ πολλῶν (cf the commentator's καίτοι πολλῶν ἀφηρέθημεν) does qualify his statement that the Athenians have received many benefits from the gods. The objection is really this : "we have not received many benefits from the gods". The commentator continues : ἔκτοτε κατασκευάζει "τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολωλέκεναι". Demosthenes' words explain why the benefits are few. The key point is that the objection is phrased in such a way as to rebutt the objection itself.

The interpretation of D.1.10 coincides with the approach found in codex R, (74), where we are told : πρὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὸ ἀντιπίπτον ἔθηκεν ὅτι "καίτοι πολλῶν ἀφηρέθημεν" καὶ τοῦτο λύει πρότερον εἰκότως. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀνηρέθη τὸ ἀντιπίπτον, εὐκολώτερον παραδέχονται καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τεθείσαν πρόφασιν : "κακῶς μὲν ἔχει πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων αἴτιοι ῥαθυμήσαντες" (Dilts p.32.18-21). An objection is stated and answered according to R between Demosthenes' statement, i.e. διὰ μέσων, parenthetically(45). διὰ μέσων in Bc could mean parenthetically in mid-sentence. Not only is the approach the same but also the wording of the objection adopted in both scholia. τοῦτο refers to the objection and also the answer to the objection. It is possible that (77c) is giving a precis of (74). This is not the first time that Bc contains a version of a scholion found in R.

In the second part of (77c) the commentator gives a parallel example of this structure of argument from Isokrates 10.17 : "τοῦ μὲν ἐπίπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε, τὴν δὲ περίβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν" ἐπήγαγεν (Dilts p.33.7-9). The example is not explained. The quotation should be an example of a statement which supports the rejection of an objection, i.e. an anticipated objection. By answering the objection you anticipate it.

The quotation is taken from Isokrates *Helen* and it will be useful to quote the relevant passage in full. At this point Isokrates is explaining that Zeus wished to honour the children of Alcmene and Leda ,and that he honoured Helen more than Herakles : τῷ μὲν ἰσχυρὸν ἔδωκεν, ἢ βία τῶν ἄλλων κρατεῖν δύναται, τῇ δὲ κάλλος ἀπένειμεν, ὃ καὶ τῆς ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἄρχειν πέφυκεν. Isokrates then goes on to say : εἰδὼς δὲ τὰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ τὰς λαμπρότητας οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν πολέμων καὶ τῶν ἀγῶνων γινομένας, βουλόμενος αὐτῶν μὴ μόνον τὰ σώματα εἰς θεοῦς ἀναγαγεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς δόξας ἀειμνήστους καταλιπεῖν, τοῦ μὲν ἐπίπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν

βίον κατέστησε, τῆς δὲ περίβλεπτον καὶ περίμαχτην τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησεν. The most appropriate objection would be one which will require Isokrates to explain why Herakles and Helen led such difficult lives, despite the honour which Zeus paid them. εἰδῶς ... καταλιπεῖν can be taken as the acknowledgement of the objection, but the way in which it is expressed makes it clear that Isokrates' thesis can still stand. τοῦ μὲν ἐπίπονον ... ἐποίησεν certainly does sustain the rejection of the objection's validity. Two parallel statements can be produced from Demosthenes and Isokrates along the commentator's terms. In Demosthenes we find : the gods are good (thesis), even though it does not look that way (anticipated objection) ; our misfortunes are our own fault (sustaining argument). In Isokrates we have : Zeus honoured Herakles and Helen (thesis), but he deliberately gave them a tough life (anticipated objection), because a hard life is essential for heroic people (sustaining argument). The commentator's interpretation is good, but he does not help his audience to understand what he means, by quoting the parallel phrases in Demosthenes.

At the beginning of D.1.14 Demosthenes introduces an objection to his line of argument from an imaginary speaker. In (105c) this technique was termed ἀνθυποφορὰ because the objector only objects to part of what Demosthenes says. In D.1.14 the questioner wonders about the relevance of Demosthenes' arguments. Bc offers (105b) in addition to (105c). (105b) gives a general comment about Demosthenes' practice in such circumstances : διττῶς εὐρήται παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ γὰρ πλάττει τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα ὡς ἐνταῦθα, ἢ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸς ἐρωτᾷ (Dilts p.35.28-29). The commentator goes on to give an example of the sort of remark Demosthenes would give if he asked himself the question : τίνοσ οὖν ἔνεκα τὰντα λέγω ; (Dilts p.36.1).

The commentator also points out that the choice between these two methods is not haphazard. He explains first why Demosthenes would ask himself the question ; ὅτε κατεπέισθη δίολου βλέπει τὸν ἀκούοντα. σιγῶντος ἐκείνου, ἵνα μὴ δόξη ἀπαντᾶν, ἑαυτὸν ἐρωτᾷ καὶ ὠφελῆι τὸν σιγῶντα ἀκούοντα (Dilts p.36.2-4). Thus, there are two reasons. Demosthenes is confident of his argument. The listener will agree with him and will not voice any objection. In case Demosthenes seems then to question the listener's silent assent, he poses the question himself and does not upset the listener. While confidence seems to be a good reason for introducing an objection oneself, it seems peculiar that an objection has to be raised whether the listener agrees or not, as though it was customary for an objection to be raised.

The reason for the other method is given as follows : ὅτε δὲ ἔτι οὐ πείθεται ὁ ἀκούων, πλάττει τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα ὡς ἐνταῦθα (Dilts p.36.4). It is reasonable to conjecture that, whenever Demosthenes creates an imaginary speaker, he is voicing genuine opinions or doubts which his

audience might have. It would be unwise to accept the commentator's opinion as a hard and fast rule, because it is easy to envisage a circumstance in which Demosthenes might choose one of these methods for a reason more fitting to the other. In such matters the choice is still not haphazard but is made through the skill and experience of the speaker.

(105b) is compatible with (105c) because the former looks at the methods of handling an objection, whereas the latter looks at the various types of objections. They are still likely to have come from separate sources, since it is odd that (105b) makes no mention of ἀνθυποφορά and could be referring to any type of objection.

(107) concerns λέξις in D.1.14 : διὰ τῶν συνεχῶν ῥημάτων δηλοῖ τὴν τοῦ νοῦς ἐκείνων ἀργείαν. Demosthenes follows the question which begins D.1.14 with a comparison, which contrasts the failure of the Athenians' approach with the success of Philip's. This remark is compatible with either (105b) or (105c). The commentator is also interested in the word ἀλυσιτελέσ. He correctly observes (Dilts p.36.22-23) that Demosthenes has chosen the negative form of the adjective in reference to Philip. He gives two possible reasons for this, but does not form a judgement. The first possibility is that the Athenians were well aware that their attitude was beneficial to Philip, and therefore, presumably, Demosthenes did not have to state the obvious. The second reason put forward is that Demosthenes did not have the temerity to say that their attitude benefitted Philip. Neither of these reasons seems quite satisfactory. Surely, the most effective method of persuading the Athenians to change their attitude, which is Demosthenes' aim, is to argue that their present attitude is harmful to them.

(113) also deals with λέξις ; this is in connection with D.1.15. The commentator suggests that the position of the word δέδοικα in the phrase δέδοικ' ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι has an effect on the word ἄνδρες. It is as though Demosthenes is saying ᾧ ἀνδρείοι by means of word association. This is a fanciful suggestion. The phrase ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι breaks up the clause and helps to stress δέδοικ' and μὴ αὐτόν . The phrase is so common that it is dubious whether the words within it could be exploited in this way.

This is the last of the unique contributions from Bc on this section of the speech. The contribution in D.1.2-15 helps to make up for some of the deficiencies in codex T. The analysis of the rhetorical structure is by no means thorough, but it is an improvement on T. Bc also seems to produce scholia which offer similar ideas to those found in some of the scholia in R. However, it is extremely unlikely that the relationship is direct. There are also cases where Bc echoes Ulpian, as in (14d). It is difficult to explain where the compiler of Bc has found

this information. It is possible that Bc has fresh sources, or that T has omitted some scholia which were found in lost codex t. The former seems more likely.

### D.1.16-23

The analysis of D.1.16-23 in codex T in terms of rhetorical structure contrasts the paucity of this type of comment on D.1.2-15. The comments on τὸ δυνατόν are contradictory in places and provide firm evidence of a plurality of sources<sup>(46)</sup>. It will not be necessary to summarise the rhetorical analysis here, because Bc offers only one scholion on this subject at this point.

D.1.21 was thought to mark the beginning of the second element of το δυνατόν, (140a). This section looks at Philip and argues that he is not as powerful as he appears. In Bc and T this scholion is followed by (140d), a likely paraphrase of (140c). It says : λύσις τῆς Ἀθηναίων ὑπονοίας ὡς "οὐκ ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους πόλεμον, εἰ μὴ καλῶς εἶχεν αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα", αὐτὸς δὲ βιαίως ἀναστρέφας ἔλυσεν ὡς "οὐκ ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμον", εἰ προσεδόκησε μαχήσεσθαι ἢ τὴν δὲ θεραπείαν τῆς παραδόξου λύσεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐποίησατο (Dilts p.42.6-12).

(140e), which is unique to Bc, is brief and pithy : ἡ δευτέρα ἄρνησις μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς ἄνω καὶ κατασκευαστικῆ καὶ λύσις τοῦ ἀντιπίπτοντος ἢ "καὶ πῶς <ἂν> ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμον ; ". Although we have to understand εἰ μὴ καλῶς εἶχεν αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα, the supposed objection agrees with the one put forward in (140d). Two denials are implied in this comment. The first denial must be what is meant by τῆς ἄνω and probably the view that all is well with Philip : οὔτε γάρ, ὡς δοκεῖ ... παρόντ' ἔχει. The second denial must refer to οὔτ' ἂν ἐξήνεγκε ... δεήσειν αὐτόν.

This denial has two functions. Firstly, it is μέρος τῆς ἄνω. The second denial also denies that all is well with Philip. The statement that Philip would not attack, unless he met no resistance, implies that all is not well with him. Therefore, the commentator is correct. In this way the second denial can be described as κατασκευαστικῆ. This is not a distinct function but effectively qualifies μέρος. The second function of the second denial is that it is a λύσις of the objection πῶς ἂν ἐξήνεγκε ... . The paradoxical statement about Philip does indeed reject this suggestion..

(140e) offers a similar interpretation to that found in (140d). In this scholion, however, the structure is more sophisticated. It seems clear that these two scholia emanate from different sources. The paradox is not, after all, hard to spot. The compiler of Bc is offering a variation of a familiar interpretation. A phrase such as τῆς ἄνω suggests that a remark may have been made about the first denial.

There are three further scholia to consider in connection with D.1.16-23. (122e) is credited uniquely to Bc in Dilt's edition. However, it is curiously similar to (122d), a scholion unique to T. The latter reads : ὑπόθεσις καὶ ἀναπλήρωσις τὸ σχῆμα ' ἔστι δὲ τῆς εὐκρινείας. (122e) reads : ἀπὸ θεῶν καὶ συμπλήρωμα τὸ σχῆμα, ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς εὐκρινείας. Both label the same passage in D.1.18 as an example of εὐκρίνεια. The form of the comment and the order of the words is the same. If we allow that ἀναπλήρωσις and συμπλήρωμα are synonymous, then the only significant difference between the two scholia lies in the identification of the σχῆμα as ὑπόθεσις in (122d) and ἀπὸ θεῶν. If θεῶν in the plural can mean "contemplation"<sup>(47)</sup> then the commentator is giving a plausible explanation for what Demosthenes is doing in D.1.18. He could be said to be contemplating the possibilities of two strategies against Philip. This interpretation is not inconsistent with the idea of ὑπόθεσις in (122d), if this word is taken to mean "supposition. A simpler interpretation is that ἀπὸ θεῶν is a textual corruption of ὑπόθεσις. There can be no doubt that the similarity between these two scholia is more than mere coincidence. However, it is impossible to judge whether one is a paraphrase of the other, or which is closer to the original.

(139) is a straightforward scholion which deals with λέξις in D.1.20 and, in particular, the clause : λέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἄλλοι πόρους. The commentator observes that an inference can be made from what Demosthenes says. Those who are not proposing alternative methods of finance agree with Demosthenes' proposal (Dilts p.41.20-21). This is a good point, but the commentator appears to lack confidence in it, because he follows this remark with a less specific inference (ἦγουν ὅτι, Dilts p.41.21), namely that it is clear that money is required to set matters straight (Dilts p.41.21-22). The commentator goes on to note Demosthenes' purpose in leaving the Athenians a choice. This superficial gesture of magnanimity implies that Demosthenes has every confidence in his plan and that the Athenians will therefore be persuaded by this tacit confidence.

(152) is another unusual scholion. It deals with ἦκουον δ' ἐγώ γε τινῶν ..., D.1.22, in which Demosthenes says that he has heard a rumour about a Thessalian refusal to pay Philip harbour and market dues. The commentator rightly calls this a σόφισμά (Dilts p.43.20). This is the only occurrence of this word among the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, even though there are many occasions when Demosthenes is being devious. The commentator remarks that it is typical of Demosthenes to justify a statement with the backing of unnamed sources. He goes on to note the difference between citing an individual, but unnamed source, and several unnamed sources : εἰ μὲν παρεισάγει ἄοριστον πρόσωπον

καὶ τοῦτο ἐνικόν, συνιστᾶ αὐτὸ καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε, ὡς ἐν τῷ κατ' Ἀνδροτίωνος, ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐχ οἴου τε φεύδεσθαι ' εἰ δὲ πληθυντικῶς, θαρρεῖ τῷ πληθυσμῷ ' ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπωσιν αὐτῷ " ἀλλὰ φεύδονται σε " , λέγει καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἐκείνων κατασκευὴν καθ' ἣν ἄξιοι ἂν εἶεν πιστεύεσθαι (Dilts p.43.22-26)(48). What the commentator is saying is this : "if he introduces an unidentified character and that in the singular, he strengthens it as much as possible, as in the speech against Androtion, "a man and not capable of lying", but if in the plural , he takes confidence from its being plural". Whether singular or plural, there is a weakness in using unattributable hearsay. Therefore, Demosthenes seeks to strengthen it. In the case of several sources one can see that that would bolster Demosthenes' case. Being extra cautious, he adds something to the effect that what is said is common knowledge. The commentator's interpretation is plausible.

Although Bc does not produce many unique scholia in this section, the form and detail of those which are present is striking.

#### D.1.24-28

The extra scholia offered by Bc do not solve the problems which T yielded in its comments on the closing sections of the speech(49). In particular, Bc does not offer complementary scholia to (172a) in the preceding sections. Such a scholion which is invited by the form of the opening remark of (172a). The only significant difference between rhetorical analysis by T and Bc, respectively, is that the latter omits (181), which is the scholion which states erroneously that the ἐπίλογος begins in the middle of D.1.27. In Bc the beginning of the ἐπίλογος at D.1.28 is to be inferred from (187a), a scholion which is offered by several codices and which comments on Demosthenes' practice in ἐπιλόγοι.

The author of (189) is interested in three groups which Demosthenes calls upon to participate in facing Philip. The commentator suggests that Demosthenes concentrates on one aspect which characterises the groups respectively : ἀπό τε τύχης τοὺς εὐπόρους, ἀπό τε τῆς ἡλικίας τοὺς νέους, ἀπό τε τέχνης τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας εἴληψε ἐπὶ τῷ παροξυσμῷ τῶν ἐπιλόγων (Dilts p.47.29-48.1). The commentator explains that the benefit to be gained by each of these three groups is emphasised in respect of a particular quality. Thus, the wealthy will be ensuring a prosperous future, presumably with this small investment, and the young will gain invaluable experience of military matters, and the orators will derive benefit, by supporting this action, because this experience will enable them to face their εὐθυναὶ without fear. The Athenians will be better judges of their performance because of this experience (Dilts p.48.1-5). The

commentator is rephrasing Demosthenes' own remarks in D.1.28.

The author observes that although Demosthenes seems to be emphasising the benefit to orators or politicians, what he is saying is not in fact beneficial in their case. He does not explain why Demosthenes' words are detrimental. He does say, however, that Demosthenes extricates himself from trouble with some subtlety (Dilts p.48.6). He is himself included in the number of politicians who will have to undergo εὐθυναί. By arguing that participation in this campaign will enable politicians to face their εὐθυναί without fear, the deduction can be made that Demosthenes will have nothing to fear. Therefore, his advice must be good. The commentator has observed that of all the groups and all the benefits, Demosthenes has chosen to emphasise the εὐθυναί of office-bearers, but that the advantage is actually illusory. The examination was not actually easier, but Demosthenes wishes to put forward a psychological argument. If we accept the commentator's interpretation, then we have to assume that Demosthenes himself was in office and that he was expecting to face a εὐθυναί.

Once again the contribution of Bc is remarkable. It is characteristic of the scholia unique to Bc that they produce unconventional or provocative interpretations. However, this is not true of the scholia which are found in T but not in Bc. Bc omits sixteen scholia which are found in T. the majority of these are insignificant : (82), (97), (177b), (128b), (134), (148b), (158), (186) and (195b). The remainder warrant attention.

(5b) is a curious omission since it is also offered by Vb and Wd. Its absence is advantageous, because this scholion gives an erroneous interpretation of ἀποσιώπησις in D.1.1.

The omission of (12a) may be significant. In the former, πραγμάτων, D.1.12, is clearly identified as a reference to Olynthian affairs. In (14d), which is unique to Bc and Ob. πραγμάτων is thought to refer to past success and hegemony (Dilts p.1.2).

The absence of (51b) , as we have seen already, may be explicable<sup>(50)</sup>. This is the scholion unique to T which identifies the objection which Demosthenes faces in D.1.2-7 as ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείος ὁ πόλεμος. However, (14d) in Bc not only points out this very objection in D.1.12 but discusses it in detail. It is possible that the compiler thought that (51b) was superfluous.

T gives an inadequate account of κεφάλαια in D.1.2-15. (91) offers a single and unsubstantiated remark about τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Bc does not contain this comment. The omission of (147a) avoids needless repetition about the paradox of Demosthenes' case, D.1.21, which is also stated in (140d) (Dilts p.42.16-17).

(181) indicates that the ἐπίλογος begins in the middle of D.1.27.

This is surely wrong. In Bc the beginning of the ἐπίλογος is noted incidentally in a comment on Demosthenes' approach to ἐπιλόγοι, (187a). It would have been more satisfactory had (181) been moved to the appropriate position. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the compiler of Bc sought to remove this inaccuracy. The absence of (181) may be coincidence.

The final omission may not, in fact, be an omission at all. Dilts credits T with (122d), which indicates εὐκρίνεια in D.118. (122e) in Bc is very similar and they probably offer different versions of the same scholion.

In conclusion, the majority of the omissions are not significant. However, Bc does seem to have avoided some of the glaring anomalies which occur in T. This may be attributed either to a conscious effort by the compiler of Bc to avoid such pitfalls or to accident. It is very unlikely that Bc had access to a tradition of ancient scholia independent of T ; thus the scholia found only in Bc can be attributed to a Byzantine scholar.

#### CODICES Af, Vb, Ca, Wd AND Ac

Codices Af Vb Ca and Wd are considered by Dilts to be the best out of a group of seventeen codices, and that they represent the tradition of three lost exemplars<sup>(51)</sup>. Although Ca is credited with being independent from Af Vb and Wd, it is quoted only once for the *First Olynthiac*. It is not clear why this should be.

Af and Vb are said to represent another exemplar and the pattern of omissions of scholia which are found in T bears this out. The omission of (5b) in Af removes an inconsistency in the interpretation of the opening sections of the speech. The absence of (117c) means that Af lacks comments about the "third" προοίμιον at D.1.16. Instead, Af takes D.1.16 as the beginning of an ἀντίθεσις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου, (117d). Thus, Af contains <sup>fewer</sup> inconsistencies than T. Given that the compilers of the *codices Ulpiani* have been eclectic, this type of omission may signify the care taken by a compiler, or nothing more than coincidence.

Having said that Af contains less problems, the loss of (164a) impairs the quality of the commentary in Af. We are not told when the κεφάλαιον τὸ δυνατόν ends and are left to suppose that it extends from D.1.16-27. It is possible, though unlikely, that the compilers believed that τὸ δυνατόν is the key topic in all of these sections.

Other omissions mostly concern aspects of language. The absence of definitions is striking. (164a) is a case in point. Also in (11b) there are remarks about προσωποποιία and remarks about ἀποσιώπησις and ὑποσιώπησις in (14c) are lost too. Other omissions include comments which deal with the significance of asyndeton, (94),

explanations of Demosthenes' meaning, (9b), (136a) and (136b), the history of the Aleuadai, (151), the σχῆμα ἐπιτίμησις, (170a), περίοδος λέξις, (183), the cost of the war, (184) and lexicography, (186).

Vb reveals a similar pattern where (5b), (14c), (82), (183), (184) and (186) are omitted. (117c) and (164a) are present. Vb also omits (12a) which identifies πραγμάτων, D.1.2, as a reference to Olynthian affairs. The omissions are minor.

Wd is closer to the tradition of T and Bc, since it shares scholia with T and Bc which the other two members of the group do not contain. The omissions are similar to the omissions in Vb : (5b), (12a), (14c), (82), (97), (183), (184) and (186). Since these are omitted in more than one of this group of codices, it is probable that none of their exemplars contained them.

These lesser codices also provide us with three scholia which are independent of T and Y. (1b) is found in F<sup>2</sup> as well. It contains the comment that the προοίμιον is concise because of the urgency of the matter. (1b) is found in Vb and Wd. (7) is unique to Af, Vb, Wd and Ca. the commentator refers to οὐ γὰρ μόνον ..., D.1.1, and says : συμπλεκτικὸν τῆς περιβολῆς. According to the *Rhetores Graeci* περιβολή is an expansion or amplification of one's theme<sup>(52)</sup>. The commentator's example is well chosen, because the words οὐ γὰρ μόνον ... are not directly connected to Demosthenes' thesis. They do, however, form a digression which gives him a chance to expand on the idea of the Athenians as good listeners. This digression helps to set the tone and character of the speech. (150c), contained in Af, Vb and Wd, offers a familiar comment about the effect of the word κομιδῆ in D.1.22. However, the wording is different from (150a) in S and (150b) in F<sup>4</sup> which offer a very similar comment.

The position of Ac within the stemma of codices is a little unclear, although Dilts appears to favour the idea that it is an apograph of T. It is cited three times. All three comments are unique, (43b), (53b) and (125e). They produce entries similar to comments found in the *Rhetores Graeci*.

(43b) refers to D.1.5 and says : ἐκ τῶν τριῶν περιστατικῶν, προσώπου, τρόπου καὶ τόπου ' τρόπου διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα, προσώπου διὰ τὸν Φίλιππον, τόπου διὰ τὸ ὄμορον. περίστασις is contrasted with θέσις by the *Rhetores Graeci*<sup>(53)</sup>. It refers to problems or questions which are fixed in time, or else are performed by particular individuals for particular reasons. θέσις typifies a general or universal question unrestricted by particulars. The observation of the author of (43b) is appropriate.

(53b) picks out two figures of speech at the beginning of D.1.8. The first is σχῆμα κατὰ συστροφὴν τὸ καὶ ἐμπερίβολον. Hermogenes makes the following remark : καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ κατὰ συστροφὴν λεγόμενον σχῆμα

σφόδρα ἔμπερίβολον, οἷον "εἰ γὰρ ὄθ' ἤκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες" καὶ τὰ ἕξῃς (Rabe p.294)<sup>(54)</sup>. ἔμπερίβολον is a form of parenthesis. (Hermog. Rabe p.281). συστροφή is a stylistic term meaning "concision". The use of parenthesis or subordinate ideas produces more complex, yet concise, prose. It is possible that the author of (53b) took his information from Hermogenes. The author's point strengthens the answer of the objection. The Euboians are not οἰκείοι and have revolted. This is wrong. Demosthenes is not talking about Euboia but Olynthos. The interpretation is confused but notably Ulpianic. Asyndeton does not occur until D.1.9 where other scholia note it.

At the end of D.1.19 we find an example of ὑποσιώπησις in the phrase ὡς βούλεσθε ... λαμβάνετ $\epsilon$ . It is noted by the other *codices Ulpiani* in (125c)<sup>(55)</sup>. The author of (125e) notes it as well but has other points to make about the effect of ὑποσιώπησις : πολὺ τὸ ἐνδιάθετον ἐνταῦθα διὰ τὴν ὑποσιώπησιν καὶ ἐπιδιόρθωσιν. ἐπιδιόρθωσις is the practice of excusing a slander after it has been made, or else correcting yourself in order to strengthen your point<sup>(56)</sup>. Demosthenes does correct himself in the phrase μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε when he is denying that he wishes the theoric money to be stratiotik. Both of these points produce a sense of spontaneity <sup>(57)</sup>. From this remark we may gather that the author realises that Demosthenes is not speaking *ex tempore* but is reading a prepared speech<sup>(58)</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

The outstanding characteristic of this group of codices is that the scholia which they contain do not form a unified interpretation. Eclecticism is obvious. Inconsistent interpretations are proof enough that the *codices scholiorum Ulpianeorum* are misnamed. Indeed, the influence of Ulpian appears to be slight overall. This inconsistency serves to highlight the unity of codices such as S and R.

Language and expression provide an important topic which attracts a rich source of varied interpretations. Some of these are provocative or offer obscure, if not erroneous, accounts.

There is an evident link between all the *codices Ulpiani* is intricate and puzzling. The relationship between the codices warrant further scrutiny.

The scholia which are unique to T are sometimes trivial and occasionally lead to inconsistencies. What is perhaps more significant is that all of the unique scholia in Bc occur in D.1.2-15 where T's contribution is weak, especially in terms of rhetorical analysis. Bc has had unusual sources. One important aspect in a study of the *codices Ulpiani* is that their contribution, unlike the contribution of other codices, creates more questions than it answers.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER NINE

- (1) Pr is not one of the *codices scholiorum Ulpianeorum* but it does provide evidence in support of g and Bc that Ulpian wrote the *prolegomena*.
- (2) g is the putative exemplar of Vf and Fd. See Dilts *TAPA* 105 (1975) pp37-39. Vf and Fd do not offer scholia on the *First Olynthiac* but do offer the *prolegomena*. It is odd then that the discussion is called *σχόλια*. cf. Sources n.26.
- (3) It is surely the contribution of Bc (Dilts p1.1 app.crit.) supported by T which leads to the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* being considered to be the work of Ulpian since they contain the *prolegomena* and scholia.
- (4) Discussed generally throughout the chapter on Sources but esp. [pp.234-237].
- (5) Dilts *TAPA* 105 1975 pp.35-50.
- (6) See T [pp.194-198].
- (7) (1a) F<sup>2</sup> [p.126].
- (8) The emendation Dilts (p.14.6 app.crit) must be correct because the scholion discusses ἦθος Dilts (p.14.7) and not πάθος.
- (9) (11c), (11d) and (14c) in R [pp.94-98].
- (10) Dilts' reference to Hermogenes and the *Prolegomena Sylloge* (Dilts (p.26.21) seems to be inaccurate.
- (11) (51b) in T [p.199].
- (12) v. Dilts (p.28.21 app.crit.).
- (13) Ulpian [pp.25-27] and Dilts (p.32.34sqq).
- (14) (117c), (117d), (119a) and (124) in F<sup>4</sup> [pp.136-137].
- (15) Ulpian [pp.27-32].
- (16) Ulpian [p.31].
- (17) S [pp.65-66].
- (18) F<sup>4</sup> [p.138].
- (19) F<sup>4</sup> [p.146].
- (20) F<sup>2</sup> [p.130].
- (21) Hermogenes *Inv* 4.3 Rabe p.(178.10-14) and (p.180.10).
- (22) Bc [p.212].
- (23) Joseph of Rhakendytos, Walz III (p.567.9), regards it as the insertion of a vowel between the first and last syllable in such a way that it does not create a new syllable. He gives the following examples : πνέοντες πνεῖλοντες ; ξένος ξεῖνος ; ἐλήλυθεν ἐλήλουθεν. The definition is appropriate for this passage. For the sense 'parenthesis' see Hermogenes Rabe (p.305) and Quintilian *Inst* 9.3.23.
- (24) Minucian Spengel <sup>2</sup> (p.342.14) , Rufus Spengel <sup>2</sup> (p.405, p.468) , Aphthonios Spengel <sup>2</sup> (p.27.3) and Herodian Spengel <sup>3</sup> (p.104.1).
- (25) v. [p.180].
- (26) Theorik [p.284] on (136a) and (136b).
- (27) v. [p.184].
- (28) For kings of Paionia v. Diod. Sic. 16.4.2, 16.22.3 and 20.19.1.
- (29) F<sup>4</sup> [pp.140-141].
- (30) LSJ ἀντίρροπον and ἰσόρροπον 2.
- (31) F<sup>2</sup> [p.131].
- (32) Y [p.157].
- (33) T [p.181].
- (34) S [pp.65-66] and Dilts *TAPA* loc.cit..
- (35) Dilts *TAPA* 105 1975 pp.39-41 and *GRBS* loc cit p.55n.4.
- (36) Dilts *GRBS* loc.cit. pp.55-67.
- (37) T [p.177].
- (38) Dilts (p.X n.2).
- (39) Ulpian [pp.16-18].
- (40) T [p.180].

- (41) *RE* 7.2 1859.
- (42) T [p.192].
- (43) S [p.57].
- (44) S [p.57].
- (45) R [p.110].
- (46) T [pp.181-184].
- (47) LSJ θεα I 1b.
- (48) The apparatus Dilts (p.43.26) reveals that Bc omits the examples, which are found in Ob, of phrases which Demosthenes might use to lend credibility to his claims. It is possible that the scribe of Ob added the remarks himself.
- (49) T [pp.184-185].
- (50) For (51b) causing inconsistency in interpretation T [p.199, p.204].
- (51) v. Dilts' articles per n.35. For (7a) in Ca v. T [p.216].
- (52) Hermogenes Rabe (p.277.24sq) and Anonymous Scholiast Walz VII<sup>2</sup> (p.1017).
- (53) Aphthonios Rabe (p.49.24), Hermogenes Rabe (p.140.16) and Menander Walz IX (p.209).
- (54) See also Anonymous Spengel 3 (p.130).
- (55) v. T [p.186].
- (56) Hermogenes Rabe *Id* 2.7, Alexander Spengel 3 (p.15.5), Zonaios Spengel 3 (p.161.15), Herodian Spengel 3 (p.95.30), Anonymous Spengel 3 (p.142.22) and Phoibammon Spengel 3 (p.51.6)
- (57) Hermogenes Rabe *Id* I 2.7, Walz III (p.336) and Walz VIII (p.635).
- (58) cf Discussion in S [p.54].

## CHAPTER TEN

### THE SOURCES OF THE SCHOLIA ON THE *FIRST OLYNTHIAC*

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Analysis of the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* has shown that there are three basic types. The first is the long and discursive comment which forms part of a unified commentary. The discussion concentrates on the structure and argumentation of the speech. The comments are intelligent and reveal that the authors have a sound knowledge of stasis theory which formed the fundamental approach to rhetoric from the time of Hermagoras in the first century B.C. onward. Codex R offers scholia of this type<sup>(1)</sup>.

The second type of scholion combines long and short comments which provide internal evidence of having been gathered from a plurality of sources. The topics are similar to those found in the long discursive scholia, but aspects such as lexicography and historical background receive significantly more attention than in the long discursive scholia. Codex F offers a typical collection of this type of scholion, and these are the commonest form of scholia on Greek prose authors.

These first two types may be regarded as systematic running commentaries. This cannot be said of the third type of scholion found in connection with the *First Olynthiac*. These scholia are very short, often no more than a single word, and occurring only occasionally in the margin of the text. Codex Pr offers good examples.

It is pertinent to consider the sort of commentaries which were in existence in antiquity and to ask whether they might have provided a model for the *scholia Demosthenica* on the *First Olynthiac*.

#### TYPES OF COMMENTARY

##### συγγράμματα

Fragments of a commentary on Demosthenes' *Philippics* 9,10,11, and 13 were found at the end of the nineteenth century<sup>(2)</sup>. A subscription attributing it to Didymos has been accepted. The papyrus itself dates to the first century A.D.. It has been suggested that it contains a series of lecture notes based on Didymos' work, or else is a poor copy of the original<sup>(3)</sup>.

The commentary was a σύγγραμμα, a treatise on a theme rather than a running commentary on a single text<sup>(4)</sup>. Hence several texts

may be cited within a short space, as is the case here. Lemmata were used because these works were produced on a separate manuscript from the one containing the text. The aspects which interest Didymos in this σύγγραμμα are lexicography, authenticity, dating, and historical background<sup>(5)</sup>. If there was a unifying theme in this commentary in the manner of περι literature it has not been identified. The subscription Περι Δημοσθενους does not tell us about the nature of the contents. Individual speeches are, however, handled in insufficient detail for the observations to be regarded as running commentaries. Therefore the form of this material is different from that of the *scholia Demosthenica*. The absence of comments about rhetoric, even in these few fragments, makes it unlikely that the contents of this commentary had much influence on the *scholia Demosthenica*.

### ὑπόμνηματα

Didymos is known to have produced a type of commentary called a ὑπόμνημα and some of these discussed speeches by Demosthenes<sup>(6)</sup>. The ὑπόμνημα is a running commentary produced on a separate roll from the text but to be used in conjunction with it. The term is associated with notes and it seems likely that the ὑπόμνημα consisted of a series of individual notes on diverse topics<sup>(7)</sup>. If this is so, then a ὑπόμνημα was similar to our modern commentaries. The main difference indeed between a ὑπόμνημα and scholia is location<sup>(8)</sup>.

Didymos was primarily a compiler. For reasons which are not altogether clear, he endeavoured to epitomise the vast volume of material available in the library of Alexandria<sup>(9)</sup>. We cannot know which comments Didymos may have made himself. If he was not the author of a comment himself, then he can only be regarded as a stage in the transmission of information. The original source is lost. However this fact does not preclude him from being a source for compilers of scholia or other scholars. His principal interest was philology. This subject interested some of the compilers of the *scholia Demosthenica* in the guise of lexicography. Didymos' work may have had some influence on them, either directly or indirectly. However, the lack of evidence connecting Didymos with an interest in rhetoric should be borne in mind by those who consider Didymos' work to be an integral part of the *scholia Demosthenica* <sup>(10)</sup>. Rhetorical theory is fundamental to the character of the *scholia Demosthenica*, particularly the long discursive scholia.

Although the influence of Didymos on the *scholia Demosthenica* is limited, there remains the possibility that some of his near contemporaries were also working on Demosthenes and may have counted rhetoric among their interests. A likely candidate is Kaikilios

of Kaleakte<sup>(11)</sup>. He had an interest in stylistics and there is evidence that he wrote about authenticity and historical background as well. More significantly, Quintilian and Syrianos associate him with rhetoric, and in particular stasis theory<sup>(12)</sup>. He is a more probable source for the *scholia Demosthenica* than Didymos and his comments about authenticity are acknowledged in a scholion on the *Second Olynthiac* <sup>(13)</sup>. There is, however, no evidence that he wrote a running commentary on the speeches of Demosthenes.

Dionysios of Halikarnassos is mentioned in the *scholia Demosthenica*, but his interests and approach are very different to the character of the extant scholia<sup>(14)</sup>. Hermagoras has been mentioned already but we cannot say that his work on stasis theory extended to running commentaries on speeches by Demosthenes.

It is a feature of the *scholia Demosthenica* that sources are usually referred to anonymously as *τινες* or *οἱ προ ἡμῶν* or some other such phrase. Yet of those who are named nearly all belong to the centuries A.D.. The exceptions are mainly historians<sup>(15)</sup>. Two papyrus fragments do provide valuable information about *ὑπομνήματα* in the Alexandrian period. One is Aristarkhos' commentary on Herodotos <sup>(16)</sup>. The other is a fragment of a commentary on Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias* <sup>(17)</sup>. This fragment is of special significance because it contains the earliest example of rhetorical exegesis about a speech by Demosthenes, as well as remarks about grammar.

The papyrus itself dates to the first century A.D., but the lost original upon which it is based, has been dated to the late first century B.C.. The original author knew about stasis theory and the approach to the analysis of the speech is similar to that found in Hermogenes and the *scholia Demosthenica* <sup>(18)</sup>. Both Didymos and Kaikilios are criticised but the point at issue is linguistic. We cannot tell whether the author was consulting *ὑπομνήματα* or *συγγράμματα*. Whatever disparaging remarks this papyrus has attracted, it still furnishes good evidence for rhetorical analysis of Demosthenes' speeches in the late first century B.C.. It therefore weakens a conventional view that prose was not studied in Alexandria and is, perhaps, an argument in favour of rhetorical studies there too<sup>(19)</sup>. It is reasonable to assume that D.21 was not the only speech to receive such attention.

Not all work produced in the first century A.D. was copied from material written in the previous century. There is a papyrus fragment which is part of a commentary on Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristokrates* <sup>(20)</sup>. It deals with rhetorical analysis as well as grammar and historical background. The original work post-dates Didymos and was written in the first century A.D.. This papyrus predates Hermogenes, who belongs to the second century A.D., and is

further evidence that stasis theory, which is mentioned in the fragment, is part of a conventional approach to rhetorical analysis.

Lossau, in his assessment of the value of this fragment, argues that it provides us with evidence about the influence of the Alexandrians on later generations and about the development of the form which comments take in the *scholia Demosthenica* in particular. The scholia are part of a tradition of exegesis, but the significance which Lossau ventures to attribute to the contents of introductory remarks should be viewed with some doubt (21). The function of an introduction to a commentary which deals with rhetorical analysis and is based on stasis theory, will very probably have encouraged similarity.

Another fragment from the first century A.D. deals with D.19(22). The remains of this commentary are scant and brief. Seven remarks cover D.19.40-155. The contents consist of elementary clarifications of the text, grammar, historical background, vocabulary and elementary rhetoric. This suggests that these comments form part of a school lecture. Two of the comments reveal a surprising degree of agreement with the scholia(23). It cannot be established whether this is mere coincidence or else evidence for an indirect link between the two. The former is probably correct. Both of these fragments may be regarded as the successors of the exegetical works on Demosthenes which originated, very probably, in the time of Didymos.

### Lossau's Third Type of Commentary

Lossau argues that a third type of commentary existed in the opening centuries A.D., in addition to the ὑπομνήματα and the συγγράμματα (24). The commentary is distinguished from the others because the text and comment are combined on the same page, whereas ὑπομνήματα and συγγράμματα are written on a separate roll. He cites two papyri as evidence : P.S.I. 6.721, which was written in the second century A.D. and refers to D.51.8, and the P.Oxy. 15.1811, which was written in the third century A.D. and deals with D.24. Both offer variants on vocabulary, factual background and other explanations, but they cannot be described as systematic. Lossau does not put a name to this third type of commentary, but their similarity to scholia, especially the type offered in Codex Pr, is obvious. If the manuscript in which they were found was a codex of the Middle Ages, there would be no hesitation in calling them scholia. Therefore Lossau's third type of commentary is not distinctive and should be regarded as a collection of casual jottings similar to a type of scholion found in one or two of the codices containing *scholia Demosthenica*.

## Scholia

In the ancient world a scholion was an erudite comment on a passage<sup>(25)</sup>. There is a strong association between scholia and teaching. Collections of scholia and ὑπομνήματα are similar. They consist of notes, often brief, which comment on topics of a speech as they arise. The collected scholia in codices F and T are very like ὑπομνήματα. Both ὑπομνήματα and the type of scholia found in Codices F and T are similar to what we understand by a commentary. Therefore scholia are not to be distinguished from ὑπομνήματα by contents.

The scholia and ὑπομνήματα are different from commentaries like the *Ulpiani prolegomena* or the unified collection of scholia found in codex R. Moreover the detail in the *prolegomena* and in the comments in codex R makes it inappropriate to regard these commentaries as a form of συγγράμματα. It would be rash to assume that this form of long discursive commentary was not written before the time of Ulpian in the third century, but the form is distinctive and the *Ulpiani prolegomena* and scholia, especially in codex R, provide us with an early example of the type<sup>(26)</sup>.

It may be significant that the authors of the *scholia Demosthenica* on the *First Olynthiac*, at least, do not use the term ὑπομνήματα. Other interpretations are identified by means of general phrases such as τινες, οἱ προ ημῶν and so on. The phrase οἱ ἐξηγῆται is the nearest we find to a definition of the form of commentaries to which the author of a comment is referring<sup>(27)</sup>. Even so, there is no certainty that the commentaries to which the author refers are the same type as his own. For example, when Ulpian upbraids Zeno we do not know whether the latter's comments were contained in a work of the same type as the *prolegomena*.

Scholia cannot be distinguished from ὑπομνήματα on the ground that the former are compilations. Not all manuscripts contain compilations and, indeed, it is difficult to judge whether the ὑπομνήματα were the result of a single monograph or the result of a combination of several monographs.

The only factor which distinguishes ὑπομνήματα from scholia is simply location. A ὑπόμνημα was written on a separate manuscript. Once it had been transferred into a manuscript containing the text, it would be called, by modern authorities, scholia. It is not hard to understand why the two terms ὑπόμνημα and scholia became interchangeable. The origin of the scholia is determined, not by contents, but by the transference of a ὑπόμνημα into the margin of a text.

## Evidence for Marginal Comments

Lossau's third type of commentary provides evidence of elementary scholia in the first century A.D.<sup>(28)</sup>. These notes, however, are scant and do not amount to a systematic commentary. There is no evidence that copious notes were produced in the margins until the Byzantine Renaissance in the ninth century A.D.. This has encouraged the argument that the work of compiling the scholia did not take place until this late date<sup>(29)</sup>. Support for this argument is paleographical. The uncial hands of late antiquity were too large to permit extensive annotation in the margins. The development of the minuscule hand changed that.

This generalisation has been weakened. Firstly, a number of works have been found which contain numerous scholia<sup>(30)</sup>. Moreover, there are examples of manuscripts dating from the fourth to seventeenth centuries which have unusually wide margins, inviting the speculation that they were produced in order to facilitate marginal comments<sup>(31)</sup>. Another point against the generalisation is that examples of tiny uncials have been found and these are small enough to have been used, hypothetically, to write out marginal scholia<sup>(32)</sup>. The dates of all these manuscripts in the third to eighth centuries A.D. means that the paleographical argument in support of the view that marginal scholia were compiled in the ninth century A.D. is weak.

Let us suppose, however, that this generalisation is true despite the paleographical possibilities. We have to assume that the ὑπομνήματα survived until the ninth century, either in their original form or else by transmission in copies. It is highly improbable that the original ὑπομνήματα of the opening century A.D. would have survived for so long, because of the papyrus upon which they were written. Wilson's study into the contents of Byzantine libraries has produced no evidence of very old commentaries of the sort required by this argument<sup>(33)</sup>. The survival of ὑπομνήματα by means of codex is possible, although we have to assume that they had survived for more than five hundred years<sup>(34)</sup>. If this period is too long, we must assume that copies were made throughout the centuries. Certainly Photios who lived in the ninth century claimed to have an extensive library and this might be cited in favour of the survival of old books until the ninth century<sup>(35)</sup>.

There seems little likelihood that the ὑπομνήματα could have remained uncontaminated for five centuries or more. Some process of amalgamation is probable whether from one ὑπόμνημα to another or from ὑπομνήματα into a text. The ὑπομνήματα were compiled for practical reasons and it seems unlikely that the teachers who used these commentaries along side texts did not jot down a few ideas.

There is firm evidence that some ὑπομνήματα were compilations : πρὸς διαφορὰ ἀντίγραφα παραγέγραπται ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσίου ὑπομνήματος ὀλοσχερῶς καὶ τῶν μικτῶν, *scholia ad Eurip. Orest* (36). The relationship between codex R and codex S can be interpreted along similar lines. Codex R contains a fuller version of the text which codex S offers in snippets.

There is further evidence that commentaries could be produced from existing interpretations. Catena is the name given to a running commentary on a book of scripture(37). Its inventor is traditionally thought to be Prokopios of Gaza who explains his method in compiling his work : ἤδη μὲν καὶ πρότερον Θεοῦ τὸ δύνασθαι χορηγήσαντος τὰς καταβεβλημένας ἐκ τῶν Πατέρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὴν Ὀκτάτευχον ἐξηγήσεις συνελεξάμεθα, ἐξ ὑπομνημάτων καὶ διαφόρων λόγων ταύτας ἐρανισάμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰς ῥήσεις αὐτὰς τῶν ἐκθεμένων αὐτολεξεῖ ἐξεθέμεθα, εἴτε σύμφωνοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐτύγχανον εἴτε καὶ μὴ, καὶ πρὸς πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν τὸ σύγγραμμα παρατείνεται, συνείδον νῦν πρὸς μέτρον εὐσταλῆς συνελεῖν τὴν γραφήν(38). Since this sort of work was produced for theological studies it would seem likely that similar books were produced on rhetoric, as the schools of rhetoric were still flourishing in the fourth century A.D..

Authorities are usually named in catenae and usually not in scholia. The significance of this may not be great, since even Didymos did not always name his sources. Perhaps sources were named when they were known and if the author had a particular source in mind. Anonymity is explicable when the source is unknown or the author is thinking of a line of approach rather than an individual. The similarity between the catena and the scholia compiled from several sources is apparent, but the nature of any relationship between them is unclear. It has been thought that the catena was the model for the scholia(39). However, there is reason to doubt this theory.

The use of the word ἄλλως to make the transition from one interpretation to another seems to be a feature of Prokopios' method(40). This practice also occurs in the *scholia Demosthenica*. At first sight this would appear to strengthen the likelihood that the catena inspired the form of scholia because the scholiasts borrowed Prokopios' technique. The Latin equivalent, *aliter*, which serves the same purpose in Latin scholia, is not unusual in work dated to the fourth century A.D.(41). It is possible that the Latin scholars influenced their Greek counterparts, but even so, we cannot say that Prokopios was the first to adopt the practice. The use of ἄλλως in other types of Greek scholarship to indicate a different interpretation or theory in the centuries before Prokopios does imply that he was not being significantly innovative(42).

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Prokopios' catenae were transferred into the margins of a text, although later catenae of the

ninth century were transferred. What the development of the catena does show is that there is a strong possibility that ὑπομνήματα were being produced on classical authors by epitomisers in the third or fourth centuries.

### Conclusion

There remains only a possibility that compiled scholia were based upon the catena. If this is true, there is no reason to suppose that the compilation was introduced into the margin as late as the ninth century. There are no firm grounds for rejecting the supposition that the process of epitomising and copying ὑπομνήματα into codices, and then transferring the resulting works into the margin of a text, was gradual. Arguably, there was no particular century when the scholia were being produced but it does seem that the Byzantine Renaissance of the ninth century saw the greatest number of scholia being compiled in one text.

### SPECIFIC SOURCES

The identity of editors or compilers who transferred the separate commentaries into the margins of texts is unknown. Nor can we tell how many times a set of scholia has been subject to the work of the compiler before reaching the final form in the extant manuscripts. Codex F has been worked upon by five scribes but we cannot tell whether the scribes themselves were the authors of the scholia. They may well have been. We do not know what their sources were for the scholia which they selected. Codices R and Pr were probably subject to less phases of authorship since both contain very few scholia which could not be attributed to a single author. Therefore the examination of sources will concentrate on those individuals whose works might have provided the source material for writers and compilers of scholia.

### Ulpian

We should have no reason for associating Ulpian with the *prolegomena* were it not for four codices, Pr, Uf, Fd and Bc. A fifth codex, T, contains the text but omits the title. Little is known about Ulpian. In the *Souda* there are four entries under this name but there is unanimous agreement about which entry refers to the supposed author of the *prolegomena* : Οὐλπιανὸς Ἀντιοχεὺς τῆς Συρίας, σοφιστὴς, παιδεύσας πρότερον εἰς Ἐμεσαν, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βασιλέα Κωνσταντῖνον χρόνοις. λόγους διαφόρους, μελέτας, διαλέξεις καὶ ἄλλα τινα (43). From this we gather that Ulpian lived at the time of Constantine the Great A.D.

274-337. We also have a direct reference from Eunapios in the course of his account of the life of Proharesios : καὶ πρὸς τὸν Οὐλπιανὸν κρατοῦντα τῆς Ἀντιοχείας ἐπὶ λόγοις ὡσθέϊς, καὶ παρελθὼν εὐθὺς ἀνὰ τοὺς πρώτους ἦν (44). Proharesios visited Ulpian as a young man. Eunapios tells us that Proharesios was eighty-seven in A.D.362(45). Thus Eunapios' evidence affirms the floruit of Ulpian given by the *Souda*.

There is also the evidence of Libanios. Although he does not name Ulpian as his teacher, Schemmel has argued convincingly that several references to a head of the school of rhetoric at Antioch where Libanios studied, do indeed refer to Ulpian(46). In the following passage, Libanios is referring to two successors of Aidesios who headed the school in the late third century : ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐνταῦθα με βούλει μεμνήσθαι ; οὐκ οὖν ὑγιαίνων μὲν Αἰδεσιος τὰς φρένας ὄχετο, ταῦτ' οὖν ἐπὶ ἑρξεν τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνου(47). Further on Libanios says : ὧν ἐγὼ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τὸν ἴσον βεβιώκα χρόνον καὶ οἶδά γε θρηνήσασ αὐτόν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους, νέος τῶν ἐκείνου ῥευμάτων ἀποστερούμενος(48). In a note in his edition Foerster thought that Libanios was alluding to Zenobios, his predecessor as head of the school. Libanios mentions that he wrote a funeral oration for him(49). Libanios, however, was forty when Zenobios died in A.D.354 and it seems improbable that he would have referred to himself at that time as νέος(50).

Schemmel cites another passage in which Libanios speaks of the death of a much lamented teacher : κινεῖντο δὲ θανάτῳ σβεθέντος τοῦ ῥεύματος, τοῦτ' οὖν ἀθλίου. ποθῶν μὲν τίνυν τῶ οὐκέτι ὄντα, χρώμενος δὲ τοῖς οὐδοῖς(51). Schemmel believes that Libanios is referring to Ulpian. Libanios was about fifteen when this man died(52), and so this passage appears to be alluding to the same incident as in the previous passage which concerned the death of one of Aidesios' successors. Ulpian's death may be dated to circa A.D.329 since Libanios was born in A.D.314.

Yet another passage in Libanios may be cited in support of this date for Ulpian's floruit : Οὐλπιανῶν μὲν ἑταῖρος, πατήρ δὲ ἡμέτερον ἑταίρων(53). Libanios is talking about the jurist Makedonios who came to prominence during the reign of the Emperor Julian, A.D.360-363. Therefore it is likely that he was a companion or pupil of Ulpian in his youth.

It seems probable then that the first of Aidesios' successors was Ulpian who headed the school until A.D.329. His successor was Zenobios who died in A.D.354. Schemmel might also have cited a passage from Libanios' autobiography which suggests that that he had no reason to like Zenobios(54). Therefore he may not have felt the genuine sorrow for Zenobios which he says he felt for the death of his teacher.

Schemmel also makes a conjecture about the birth-place of Ulpian. In the following passage Libanios mentions two heads of the school,

the first from Askalon, the second also from Palestine : ἔτι τοίνυν προσήκει με φανῆναι καὶ περὶ τοὺς διδασκάλους βέλτιστον γεγενημένον. οὐκ οὖν ὁ μὲν Ἀσκαλωνίτης ... ὁ τοίνυν ἐκείνου τεθνεῶτος ἐκδεξάμενος τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἦν μὲν ἐκ Παλαιστίνης καὶ αὐτός ..(55). Schemmel concludes that Ulpian is the man who came from Askalon since Zenobios was not the immediate successor of Aidesios. Schemmel is taking the two heads mentioned in this passage as the same two men mentioned in the other passages. The *Souda* does not present any impediment to this conjecture, since the entry states only that Ulpian taught at Emesa and Antioch, not where he was born. We may conclude that Ulpian was a prominent teacher of rhetoric, probably in the period A.D.274-329, possibly at Emesa and certainly at Antioch.

The form and content of the *prolegomena* themselves are no impediment to the probability that they were written by Ulpian. They consist of a systematic analysis of the *First Olynthiac* and include references to comparable passages in Demosthenes, Thukydides, Isokrates and Homer. Since Ulpian was a teacher, presumably of advanced pupils, it is reasonable to see the *prolegomena* as a lecture. In the manner of lectures throughout history, the opening sections of the speech, D.1.1-11, are examined in greater detail than the remainder, D.1.12-28. A time limitation would easily account for the somewhat cursory examination of the final seventeen chapters.

It may be significant that only the more recent codices, dating from the thirteenth century, contain the *prolegomena*. Ulpian's work may have been unavailable in earlier centuries when other codices were produced. His work may have been preserved in separate manuscripts from the text of Demosthenes.

An objection was raised against Ulpian's authorship. This view was put forward by Chapman and followed by Dindorf<sup>(56)</sup>. His case relies on the identity of Zeno who is mentioned in an unfavourable light towards the end of the *prolegomena* (Dilts p.12.16). Chapman's case will be examined presently.

Ulpian's influence on the remaining scholia on the *First Olynthiac* is minimal. It would be most peculiar if Ulpian completed the detailed discussion contained in the *prolegomena* only to begin again. Moreover, there is evidence of interpretations quite opposed to Ulpian's, notably in codex R. The occurrence of an observation in the *codices Ulpiani* very similar to Ulpian's own and an apparent quotation from the *prolegomena* in codex S serve to highlight the difference between the *prolegomena* and the rest of the *scholia Demosthenica* (57).

There is reason to suggest that other works by Ulpian may be contained within the corpus. Dindorf notes that the scholia on speeches 10, 11 and 13-17 are similar to the *prolegomena* in form and approach<sup>(58)</sup>. Certainly Zeno is no friend of the author of the

discursive account on D.10<sup>(59)</sup>. Analysis of these speeches might produce evidence to support this plausible conjecture.

### Zeno

The name Zeno is common in antiquity as a glance at the *Real-Encyclopadie* reveals<sup>(60)</sup>. As the Zeno mentioned by the author of the *prolegomena* (Dilts p.12.16) wrote about Demosthenes, the following entry in the *Souda* probably identifies him : Ζήνων - Κιτεύς. εἰ δὲ ῥήτωρ τις ἦν ἢ φιλόσοφος, ἄδηλον. ἔγραψε Περὶ στάσεων, Περὶ σχημάτων, Ἐπόμνημα εἰς Ξενοφῶντα, εἰς Λυσίαν, εἰς Δημοσθένην, Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων<sup>(61)</sup>.

The corpus of work attributed to Zeno here suggests the subject matter of a grammarian or rhetorician. The uncertainty in the *Souda* about Zeno's occupation can easily be explained. If φιλόσοφος is used in the sense of a man interested in sophistry, then his interests may well have covered the same ground as the rhetor's. If, however, φιλόσοφος is used in the sense of philosopher, then the entry immediately before the one cited above could have confused the man compiling the entry about our Zeno. The preceding entry concerns Zeno of Kition, the philosopher who founded the Stoic school in the third century B.C.. Someone glancing at the entry below may have recognized the name and confused this citizen of Kition with his illustrious namesake. Any gloss to the effect that our man might have been a philosopher could have become incorporated into the text. This error is even more likely if it occurred before the *Souda* was compiled in the tenth century.

Dindorf points out an alternative reading of the text of the *Souda*. It has been suggested that Κιτεύς should read Μυνδίος<sup>(62)</sup>. The reading is tenuous evidence for the identification of the individual named by the author of the *prolegomena* with the grammarian Zeno of Myndos who is mentioned by Stephanos of Byzantium<sup>(63)</sup>. There is no evidence that Zeno of Myndos wrote about Demosthenes.

Chapman accepts the reading Κιτεύς and this is the reading accepted here. He relies on three pieces of evidence to support his view that Zeno of Kitium, alluded to in the *prolegomena*, lived after Ulpian and that therefore the *prolegomena* cannot have been written by Ulpian<sup>(64)</sup>.

His first piece of evidence comes from Eunapios : ἰατροὶ δὲ κατὰ τούτους ἠκμαζον τοὺς χρόνους, Ζήνων τε ὁ Κύπριος, διδασκαλίαν τε πολυῦμνητον συστησάμενος ἀλλ' ἐπέβαλε τοῖς χρόνοις Ἰουλιανῶ τῷ σοφιστῇ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνον, κατὰ τοὺς Προαιρεσίου χρόνους, οἱ διάδοχοι Ζήνωνος. ἄμφω δὲ ὁ Ζήνων ἐξήσκητο λέγειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἰατρικὴν. τῶν δὲ ὀνομαστῶν ὁμιλητῶν αὐτοῦ διαλαχόντες, οἱ μὲν τὸ ἕτερον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω, κατελείφθησαν ἑκράτουν δὲ ὁμῶς καὶ καθῶς τις ἐκκληρονόμησεν ἔργου τε καὶ λόγου<sup>(65)</sup>.

Chapman identifies Zeno the doctor with the rhetorician mentioned in the *prolegomena*. He believes that the doctor's floruit comes during the reign of Emperor Julian, A.D.360-363, since Eunapios was talking about ὁ δὲ ἀτοκράτωρ Ἰουλιανός in the previous passage. Chapman therefore assumes that κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους refers to the same period.

Dindorf explains why Chapman is incorrect in his identification of Zeno of Kypros with Zeno in the *prolegomena*: *erravit vero Chapmannus in eo quod Zenonem illum Citio quae Cypri urbs est, oriundum eundem esse sibi persuasit atque Zenonem Cyprium, clari nominis medicum Iuliani Augusti aetate, male intellectis Eunapii de eo verbis ἄμφω δὲ ὁ Ζήνων ἐξήσκητο, λέγειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἰατρικὴν. quae non significant, quod vult Chapmannus, rhetorem eum fuisse et medicum, sed hoc potius, parem in eo fuisse facultatem artis medicae et docendae et exercendae* (66). It is worth noting that ἰατρικὴν is the object of λέγειν. Eunapios simply uses the word ῥητορικὴ in a passage where he is referring to rhetoric(67). This suggests that Eunapios does not use λέγειν in the context of rhetoric.

There is also evidence to suggest that Chapman is wrong to assume that Zeno the doctor flourished during the reign of Julian. Eunapios states that Proharesios was a pupil of Ulpian and subsequently associated with Julian the Sophist in Athens(68). This would place them in the period A.D.274-329 according to Schemmel's argument. We know that Eunapios was sixteen when Proharesios was eighty-seven(69). Eunapios was born in A.D.346, and so Proharesios was eighty-seven in A.D.362. Another passage in Eunapios confirms that Proharesios was alive during the reign of Julian(70), but it is important to remember that he was a very old man. Chapman believes that Zeno the doctor was alive during Julian's reign too, based on Eunapios' phrase κατὰ τούτους ... τοὺς χρόνους. However, it is highly improbable that Eunapios should then go on to say that Zeno's successors, οἱ διάδοχοι Ζήνωνος, were contemporaries of Proharesios. Zeno must have died before A.D.367, the year of Proharesios' death, for Chapman's theory to hold.

Proharesios left Ulpian and went to Julian the Sophist. The obvious inference is that Julian the Sophist belongs to the beginning of the fourth century. According to Eunapios, Zeno the doctor ἐπέβαλε τοῖς χρόνοις Ἰουλιανῶ τῷ Σοφιστῇ. Taking into account that Zeno lived on into the period of Julian the Sophist and that the former's successors were contemporaries of Proharesios, we may conclude that Zeno the doctor also lived at the beginning of the fourth century. The phrase κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους is misleading, because in context it seems to refer to the reign of Julian. Eunapios may actually mean a more general period, the time when the great men of learning were alive. Therefore, even if

Chapman's identification of Zeno in the *prolegomena* with Zeno the doctor was correct, chronologically it is possible for Ulpian to have referred to him.

Chapman's second piece of evidence against Ulpian's authorship again deals with Zeno<sup>(71)</sup>. A minor Latin rhetor called Sulpitius Victor cites Zeno as his mentor : *contuli in ordinem ea quae fere de oratoria arte traduntur secundum institutum magistrorum meorum, Zenonis praecepta maxime persecutus, ita tamen ut ex arbitrio meo aliquae praeterirem pleraque ordine immutato referrem nonnulla ex aliis quae necessaria videbantur insererem* (72). Although we do not know how much of Sulpitius Victor's discussion is based on Zeno and which parts are his own invention, Zeno appears to have been interested in *στάσεις*<sup>(73)</sup>. This tallies with the entry in the *Souda* .

Chapman assumes that *magistrorum meorum* refers to Sulpitius Victor's personal teachers. Since Sulpitius is a writer of the late fourth century Chapman concludes : *claritur igitur Zeno circa ann. 350 immo 340* (74) . As he takes Ulpian's floruit to be circa A.D.293, he argues that the *prolegomena* cannot be referring to a Zeno known to Ulpian. However, the phrase *magistrorum meorum* need not refer to Sulpitius' contemporaries. As a parallel, another of these minor Latin rhetors, Aquila Romanus, based his work largely on Alexander Noumenios. The former is a figure of the third century , the latter of the early second<sup>(75)</sup>. There is no reason why Sulpitios Victor should not adhere to ideas held by a contemporary of Ulpian or indeed someone earlier.

Chapman's third argument is that the *Souda* fails to credit Ulpian with the *prolegomena* : *unde suspicari saltem licet, Suidam nullas istius modi ἐξηγήσεις aut vidisse aut inaudivisse, alioqui certe vix opus tam insigne praeteritum* (76). There are two answers to this. Firstly, the unreliability of the *Souda* renders such an omission as this insignificant. Secondly, the survival of the *prolegomena* to the eighteenth century may also allow them an importance unwarranted in the centuries soon after the piece was written. This would be particularly likely if the *prolegomena* form a lecture.

Chapman's case against Ulpian's authorship does not stand inspection. However, we must consider whether there is evidence of a Zeno who satisfies the profile set out in the *Souda* and who was a contemporary of Ulpian or perhaps even earlier.

Philostratos mentions Zeno while discussing the youth of Antipater the Sophist : *ἀκροάσαμενος δὲ καὶ Ζήνωνος τοῦ Ἀθηναίου τὸ περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀκριβὲς ἐκείνου ἔμαθεν*<sup>(77)</sup>. The *τέχνη* is of course rhetoric. The adjective *Ἀθηναίος* is discussed by Gartner<sup>(78)</sup>. It may refer to a period when Zeno taught at Athens after leaving Kition. This passage dates Zeno to the late second and early third centuries.

The author of the Anonymous Seguerianos refers to a rhetorician called Zeno twice<sup>(79)</sup>. In the first passage the author is citing the definition of διήγησις as found in certain authors. He refers to Neokles, Theodoros, Alexander Noumenios and Zeno. The second passage is concerned with παραδείγματα. Here the author cites Neokles, Alexander, Zeno and Harpokration. The most probable identification of these writers yields a group belonging to the first and second centuries<sup>(80)</sup>. Since Zeno is mentioned in conjunction with them, it seems reasonable to assume that he too belongs to this period. The two examples which the author looks at concern διήγησις and ἐπιχέρηματα respectively. Therefore the Zeno cited in the Anonymous Seguerianos suits the profile in the *Souda*.

John Doxopatros expresses the following opinion about Zeno : ὁ δὲ Ζήνων δικάζεσθαι μόνον εἶδωσ, ῥήτωρ ἦκουε<sup>(81)</sup>. If this does refer to Zeno of Kition, it does not help us to give him a date. However, Syrianos may give a chronological order for three great writers on rhetoric as follows : Ζήνων δὲ καὶ Ἑρμογένησ καὶ Μητροφάνησ προτάττουσι τῶν στάσεων τὸν στοχασμόν<sup>(82)</sup>. If the list is chronological, then Zeno of Kition was an older contemporary of Hermogenes of Tarsos.

The scholia themselves contain four references to Zeno, presumably the same man in each case. Two of these we have come across before, Ulpian's comment, (Dilts p.12.16), and the equally dismissive comment at the beginning of a commentary on the *First Philippic*, (Dilts p.143.24). This comment associates Zeno with Alexander again and also with Dioskoros who is otherwise unknown. The two other citations refer to Zeno's opinion only to dismiss it, albeit politely. The first occurs in codex R and refers to D.1.5 (Dilts p.24.36). This scholion forms part of the unified commentary in R and therefore we have two authors who do not accept Zeno's interpretation, Ulpian and the author of the commentary in R. The second refers to D.20.44 (Dindorf p.484.1). At this stage it is unclear whether the author of this scholion could be Ulpian, the author of the core scholia or another scholar. We have in these references evidence that Zeno of Kition wrote about the speeches of Demosthenes along similar lines to the extant scholia. Moreover he may have been a contemporary of those scholars whose work is extant, an important consideration in dating the scholia. Despite his potential as a source, we cannot attribute any specific scholion to him although some may well be taken from his works as he was clearly an eminent rhetorician of his day.

## Zosimos of Askalon

Codex Y contains a *Life* of Demosthenes which is headed : ΖΩΣΙΜΟΥ ΑΣΚΑΛΩΝΙΤΟΥ ΕΙΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΗΝ . ΒΙΟΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΟΥΣ (83). In this *Life* we find the following comment about Demosthenes : ῥητορικῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμήσας ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν Καλλιστράτου τοῦ ῥήτορος ῥητορευόντος τε καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος Ἰσαίῳ ἐφοίτα ... (84). In codex A there is a remark about Kallistratos who is mentioned in D.24.135 : ἦν γὰρ ἐπιδεικτικὸς σφόδρα ὁ Καλλίστρατος. ὅθεν καὶ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπιδεικνυμένου ὁ Δημοσθένης εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἦλθε λόγων, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τῷ βίῳ αὐτοῦ (Dindorf p.785.21-23). The two passages invite the reasonable inference that the same man wrote them and that this man may be identified as Zosimos of Askalon (85).

There is another similar remark in the scholion on D.19.297 : ὁ Καλλίστρατος τῶν πάντων δεινῶν ἦν ῥητόρων , ὅς καὶ ἐφυγαδύθη διὰ τὴν δεινότητα, οὗ καὶ ἀκούσας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπεθύμησε καὶ μετελθεῖν τὴν τέχνην (Dindorf p.445.3-5). The codices which offer this comment are A, R, and T. This scholion might be attributable to Zosimos, or more probably is a well known fact about Demosthenes. Nevertheless the relationship between the two passages cited above is surely more than mere coincidence.

There is another link between the *Life* and the *scholia Demosthenica*. The *Life* begins with these words : δευτέρῳ λοιπὸν ἐπιβῆναι τῷ Παιανιεῖ καιρῶς (86). This is taken to mean that Zosimos has discussed Isokrates, who was traditionally the first of the ten great orators, and now turns to Demosthenes, who takes second place on the list. This passage suggests that Zosimos took an interest in Isokrates as well. In the scholia on the opening section of the *First Olynthiac* we find the following comment in Y, vp<sup>2</sup> and F<sup>4</sup> : τὸ δὲ "νομίζω", ὡς ἦδη ἐν τοῖς Ἰσοκρατικοῖς εἴρηται ... (87). So perhaps this scholion is also by Zosimos.

The *Souda* contains the following entry : Ζώσιμος – Γαζαῖος ἢ Ἀσκαλωνίτης, σοφιστής, κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους Ἀναστασίου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἔγραφε λέξιν ῥητορικὴν κατὰ στοιχεῖον καὶ ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὸν Δημοσθένην καὶ εἰς τὸν Λυσίαν (88). This suggests a connection between Zosimos and a commentary on Demosthenes. The absence of a reference to Isokrates should not be regarded as evidence that Zosimos was not interested in Isokrates. There is no other evidence linking him with a rhetorical lexicon (89) and there are no scholia on Lysias.

The choice of epithet in the *Souda*'s entry is puzzling. This has given rise to various interpretations (90). Either we are dealing with one individual or two. The matter is complicated by a reference in George Kedrenos who says that a writer called Zosimos of Gaza was

executed by the emperor Zeno in A.D. 477<sup>(91)</sup>. This cannot be the same man mentioned in the *Souda* who lived during the reign of Anastasios, A.D. 491-518. There are those who believe that Zosimos of Askalon has no connection with Gaza at all and that the reference in the *Souda* is a confusing mistake, prompted by the fate of his namesake<sup>(92)</sup>. Others try to make sense of the entry. Rabe suggested that Zosimos of Askalon taught at Gaza<sup>(93)</sup>. He takes into account examples in the *Souda* where the epithet is no guarantee of birth-place. The connection with Gaza is attractive because Zosimos would then be linked to the era of Prokopios of Gaza when the catena was developed<sup>(94)</sup>.

John Tzetzes produced the following lines :

πρὸ Ἑρμογένουσ ἔγραφαν καὶ ἄλλοι γὰρ ἰδέασ,  
 αὐτὸσ ὁ Διονύσιος, σὺν ᾧ καὶ Βασιλίσκος,  
 καὶ Ζήνων δὲ καὶ Ζώσιμος ἄνηρ Ἀσκαλωνίτησ,  
 καὶ σὺν ἐκείνοισ ἕτεροι, ὧν περ ἔω τὰσ κλήσεισ<sup>(95)</sup>.

His chronology may be wayward but he does provide evidence that Zosimos of Askalon was an eminent rhetorician. The connection with Gaza remains tentative. Because there was a rhetorician of the same name in Gaza, we cannot be sure whether or not he wrote well known works. The two epithets have caused confusion, and so it is now conventional to attribute works by Zosimos of Askalon and Zosimos of Gaza to the same man. He shall take the former epithet here<sup>(96)</sup>.

The link between Zosimos and Demosthenic scholarship seems certain. The next stage is to assess how much of the extant corpus of scholia is the work of Zosimos. Dindorf followed Dobree in thinking that his contribution was small on the grounds that the style and content of the *Life* are jejune and that he had neither the intellect nor the learning to have played a major role in the history of the scholia<sup>(97)</sup>. This is hardly convincing evidence.

A more thorough approach was taken by Oomen who used stylistic evidence as the basis for his argument that Zosimos wrote many of the *scholia Demosthenica* as well as commentaries on Isokrates, Aiskhines and Thoukydides<sup>(98)</sup>. Doubt has been cast on his far reaching conclusion that evidence of Zosimos' work is apparent in the scholia on all of these writers<sup>(99)</sup>.

Oomen's approach is flawed. He detects the hand of Zosimos whenever particular stylistic features occur, without taking into account the possible effect of different traditions of interpretation on any given speech. He also admits that the stylistic peculiarities which interest him also occur in other writers, Syrianos for example<sup>(100)</sup>. He still argues that the incidence within the the scholia makes them more likely to have been written by Zosimos, simply because they occur in the *Life* which we can attribute to him. However the evidence

which he cites can be used to support the supposition that these peculiarities are a form of jargon frequent in scholia of all centuries.

The phrases which interest him in particular are ἴστέον ὅτι, λέγομεν ὅτι and cognates, ζητήσαιεν ἄν τις, ἄξιον with the infinitive and ὥσ ὅτι. From the examples which Oomen gives from the *scholia Demosthenica*, it is clear that he has considered only the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* and the speech *Against Timokrates*. His choice was influenced, presumably, by the presence of the scholia which refer to other works by Zosimos among the scholia on these speeches. However, he does not make this point clear in his conclusions. Nor does he appear to have looked for examples of each type in the two speeches. Examples occur at the following places : ἴστέον ὅτι : D.1, (Dilts p.16.8, p.38.11, p.38.18, p.45.2 (but v. app.crit.)). I have also found (Dilts p.47.29). D.24, (Dindorf p.735.15, p.742.21, p.743.22, p.748.9, p.751.25, p.753.18, p.774.11, p.783.16, p.786.3, p.790.23, p.791.4, p.791.8, p.792.12, p.805.10). λέγομεν ὅτι and cognates : D.1, (Dilts p.15.21, p.16.3, p.17.3, p.18.23, p.23.1, p.23.17, p.30.24 = p.31.10, p.32.9, p.35.23, p.40.9, p.41.14, p.42.6, p.47.6, p.48.2,5. In D.24 I have found (Dindorf p.732.30, p.734.9, p.739.9, p.744.4, p.746.4, p.750.6, p.758.8, p.758.13, p.765.11, p.768.8, p.794.20). ζητήσαιεν ἄν τις : D.1, none. D.24, (Dindorf p.729.13, p.746.3, p.789.11, p.794.17, p.799.8). ἄξιον and infinitive : D.1, I have found an example on (Dilts p.15.5). D.24, (Dindorf p.744.3, p.749.18, p.775.22, p.795.33). ὥσ ὅτι : D.1, (Dilts p.31.2) and I have found (Dilts p.36.8). D.24, (Dindorf p.743.22, p.771.25). The distribution of the phrase λέγομεν ὅτι among the codices on the *First Olynthiac* reveals that it occurs independently in R, Bc, Ob and also F<sup>4</sup>, T, Bc, Af, Vb and Wd which offer closely related sets of scholia. Perhaps a little more significant is the incidence of ἴστέον ὅτι in which two of the five cases occur in F<sup>4</sup>, T, Bc, Af, Vb and Wd (Dilts p.38.11, p.38.18). In my analysis of this group of codices I have argued that F<sup>4</sup> possibly comes from a lost exemplar of Υ(101). Υ of course is the exemplar for T, Bc and the other *codices Ulpiani*. Both F<sup>4</sup> and Υ contain the remark alluding to the previous work by Zosimos on Isokrates, (2a) and (2b). Therefore it is possible that F<sup>4</sup> and T preserve elements from a ὑπόμνημα by Zosimos. If the entry is correct and Zosimos did produce a lexicon, the concentration on language in the scholia shared between F<sup>4</sup> and T is appropriate.

As for the incidence in the speech *Against Timokrates*, codex A has the highest count. Codex A contains the scholion which alludes to a *Life* of Demosthenes, (Dindorf, p.785.21-23). Thirteen of the fourteen instances of ἴστέον ὅτι, (not Dindorf, p.735.15), seven of the eleven instances which I have found of λέγομεν ὅτι and its cognates, (not Dindorf, p.732.30, p.746.4, p.758.8, p.765.11) and the only two

examples of ὥσ' ὅτι form a significant contribution. This codex also has scholia with a prominent interest in language. Therefore codex A on D.24 may contain elements from a ὑπόμνημα by Zosimos of Askalon. Further work is required to establish whether the content of codex A permits us to say that the scholia which it offers were written by one man.

The work which Oomen has done, does support the view that Zosimos has made a significant contribution to the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* and the speech *Against Timokrates*. Of course, this depends on accepting that the references in the scholia do allude to other work by Zosimos. Given that he is a person who probably did produce commentaries on Demosthenes, the hypothesis is possible. Unless the scholia in which these stylistic peculiarities occur are found in one tradition of scholia for a given speech, and that tradition shows internal evidence of unity, the attribution of scholia to Zosimos is inappropriate.

Oomen is also confident that Zosimos was the last redactor of the scholia as well as a commentator in his own right<sup>(102)</sup>. This assertion has no foundation except for a superscription to the *prolegomena* of Athanasios which reads : ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ Α ΖΩΣΙΜΟΣ Ο ΘΕΩΝΟΣ ΔΙΩΡΘΩΣΑΤΟ ΜΑΘΗΤΗΣ ΤΑ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΩΤΑΤΑ<sup>(103)</sup>. If this does allude to Zosimos of Askalon it is only evidence that he edited Athanasios. The desire to find a central redactor for the Demosthenic scholia as was the case for Aristophanes, Euripides and Homer, is no substitute for evidence. The allusion here to Zosimos of Askalon is attractive because he is named as a pupil of Theon. We know of a sophist of that name who lived during the reign of the emperor Zeno, in the generation before Zosimos' floruit<sup>(104)</sup>.

### Menander the Rhetor

Scholion (14c) provides us with a clue about the original author of the core scholia in codex R . The majority of the scholion is almost identical to a passage in Gregory of Korinth's commentary on Hermogenes, as Dilts points out in his footnote. The passage reads as follows : Μένανδρος ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπιμερίζων τοὺς Ὀλυνθιακοὺς λόγους τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα ὑποσιώπησιν κέκληκε λέγων οὕτω ' τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα, ἢ περιπλοκὴ δηλαδὴ, ὑποσιώπησις λέγεται, ὅταν μέλλῃ τις ἐπιφέρειν τραχὺ τι καὶ λοιδορίας ἐχόμενον, μὴ βούλοιο δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ληπηρὸν τῷ ἀκούοντι, δι' αἰνιγμάτων δὲ αὐτὰ σημαίνει ' οἷον ὅταν ἴδωμεν τινα ἐπὶ ξένην πεμφθέντα πόλιν, ὥστε ἀναγνώσκων, καὶ μὴ ἀναγνώσκοντα, ἀλλὰ μέθαις τε καὶ κύβοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε σχολάζοντα ' εἶτα βουλόμενοι αὐτῷ ἐγκαλεῖν, διὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαχθεσ ὑποσιωπῶμεν ταῦτα ἅ ποιεῖ, δι' ἑτέρων δὲ ῥημάτων αὐτὰ αἰνιττώμεθα, λέγοντες

ὅτι ὁ μὲν σοὺς πατὴρ ἐπέμφε σε ὥστε ἀναγνώσκειν, σὺ δὲ, οὐκ ἴσμεν, τί ἐστίν, ὃ  
 τι ποιεῖς' οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα βουλόμενος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν καιρὸς πάντα ποιεῖ,  
 παροξύνων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμεῖς δὲ ῥάθυμοῦμεν καὶ οὐ  
 προσέχομεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ θέαισ τε καὶ τρυφαῖσ σχολάζομεν ὑπεσιώπησε μὲν  
 τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δυσχερὲς, ἐπήγαγε δὲ, οὐκ οἶδ' ὄν τινά μοι τρόπον ἔχειν δοκοῦμεν  
 πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὑποσιώπησις ἀποσιωπήσεως, τῷ μὲν  
 ἀποσιώπησιν παντελῶς ἀποσιωπᾶν, καὶ μηδὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων λέγει τὸ  
 ἐπιφερόμενον, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ τόπῳ, ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου' καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν,  
 οὐ βούλομαι δὲ δυσχερὲς εἶπειν, τὴν δὲ ὑποσιώπησιν αἰνίττεσθαι τι τῶν ἐνταῦθα  
 ' ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Μένανδρος<sup>(105)</sup>. There are slight discrepancies between  
 this passage and the scholion in vocabulary, mood and phrasing. The  
 material in common is slightly more than Dilts suggests. Differences  
 may be explained by supposing that the compiler was working on a  
 different text from Gregory, or else the transcription in either was  
 casual. Gregory's version includes an example of ὑποσιώπησις which is  
 absent from the scholion. Perhaps this is a gloss which entered the  
 text. Its absence from (14c) does not affect the unity.

The passage in the scholia cannot be taken from Gregory because  
 he lived in the twelfth century and the earliest hand to include this  
 scholion, F<sup>4</sup>, is dated to the eleventh century. Moreover, Gregory says  
 that he is quoting from Menander the Rhetor. His floruit is the third  
 century A.D.. Therefore it seems possible that Menander was the  
 author of the core scholia in R.

We have ample evidence that Menander wrote commentaries on  
 Demosthenes, besides the evidence of Gregory of Korinth :

1. ταῦτα καὶ Μένανδρος φησι διαίρων τὸν κατ' Ἀνδροτιῶνος, Max. Plan.  
 (Walz 5 p.514 n. 23).

2. περὶ τούτου ὁ ῥήτωρ Μένανδρος ἐν τῇ διαίρεσει τοῦ κατὰ Τιμοκράτους  
 ἀκριβέστερον ἐτεχνολόγησεν, Anon. Scholia ad Inv (Walz 7 p.1079 n.21).

3. ὅπου γε καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν ὑπομνήματι τοῦ ῥήτορος τὸν παραπρεσβείας  
 λόγον ἐμπίπτοντα στοχασμὸν ἐτόλμησεν ἀποφῆνασθαι, Anon. Scholia ad  
 Stas. (Walz 7 p.374.13).

4. Μένανδρος δὲ ἐμπίπτοντα φησιν. εἴληπται δὲ ἐκ διαβολῆς τὸ προοίμιον,  
 Scholion on D.19.1 (Dindorf p.334.5).

5. ἐντεῦθεν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου ἀντίθεσις ἥτις καταγίνεται καθαρῶς εἰς  
 τὴν καταδρομὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀνδροτιῶνα, ἣν ἐφησεν ὁ Μένανδρος δευτέραν  
 εἶναι ὑπόθεσιν, Scholion on D24.111 (Dindorf p.774.31).

6. Μενάνδρου ' προκατασκευῆ. Ἀσκληπιῶν ' προκατασκευῆς δίκην  
 διενκρινεῖ τὰ ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει ζητούμενα, Scholion on D.19.4 (Dindorf  
 p.341.2)<sup>(106)</sup>.

Nitsche wished to argue that almost the entire corpus of scholia  
 on Demosthenes derived from Menander's commentaries<sup>(107)</sup>.  
 Although he promised to prove that Menander was responsible for the

majority of the scholia by analysis of the scholia themselves<sup>(108)</sup>, I can find no trace of any such analysis. He does list some verbal similarities but not in sufficient detail to be regarded as sufficient proof<sup>(109)</sup>.

The primary purpose of Nitsche's treatise is to argue that two tracts on the topic of epideictic rhetoric, both of which are usually attributed to Menander, are the work of two men. Genethlios wrote the first, Menander the second, based on his interpretation of the superscript to the tracts<sup>(110)</sup>.

Bursian on the other hand, takes Menander to be the author of the first tract and attributes the second to some unknown writer<sup>(111)</sup>. He argues that the author of the second piece came from Alexandria in the Troad. Since Menander came from Laodikia on the River Lykos, he is not the author of the second treatise. Nitsche argues that the reference is to the home of the addressee of the tract and this interpretation has been accepted by the most recent editors of the treatises<sup>(112)</sup>. Nitsche puts forward a strong case that the two tracts were written by different people. Russell and Wilson admit that Nitsche is probably correct, but point out that verbal differences may also be interpreted as the development of an individual's style over a number of years<sup>(113)</sup>. There are also differences of opinion between the treatises which are subject to a similar caveat. Conspicuous references to desert in the first treatise are more appropriate for Genethlios who came from the desert city of Petra<sup>(114)</sup>.

If we accept the identification of Menander as the author of the second treatise, we may now consider whether there are verbal similarities between it and the *scholia Demosthenica*, in particular the core scholia in R. Nitsche lists examples of words which are found in the second treatise and the *scholia Demosthenica* but not in the first treatises<sup>(115)</sup>.

On close inspection, a remarkable pattern emerges from the examples cited. When these examples are checked against the speeches and manuscripts in which they occur, we find that they are almost exclusively in manuscripts T (Paris gr 2940), C (Paris gr 2946) and V (the Aldine edition of 1503)<sup>(116)</sup>. The *First* and *Second Olynthiacs* provide an exception. Here nearly all the examples occur in codices R and S. Nitsche's stylistic evidence seems to support the external evidence that Menander is the author of many of the scholia in R, and partly in S. Assuming that Nitsche has taken into account the scholia on all the speeches, there is a possibility that Menander wrote some of the scholia for D.1, 2, 4, 10, 13,14, and 18-24.

The words which attract Nitsche's attention in the second tract occur with sufficient frequency in that text to add weight to his

argument about their connection with the scholia. The following are examples of the most frequently occurring examples : οἱ κρείττονες 369.5, 370.23, 377.2, 381.22, 395.9, 407.21, τὰ ἐξάριετα 382.17, 394.11, 394.24, 411.1, 412.12, 440.20, σύμπας 387.14, 388.15, 395.22, 422.9, 443.28.

It is also remarkable that the phrases in the scholia which Oomen suggested were written by Zosimos (ζητήσασιν ἄν τις, ἴσμεν ὅτι, ἄξιον with the infinitive and ὡς ὅτι) do not feature in the second tract.

We have other evidence, as stated above, that Menander wrote about the *Olynthiacs*, the *Embassy*, *Against Androtion* and *Against Timokrates*, all of which contain scholia of stylistic interest. Most of the scholia on these speeches appear to be similar in form to the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, as many of them are long and discursive. Further research may reveal whether individual manuscript traditions for each of the sets of scholia on the speeches could be unified commentaries of the type found in codex R. This research may also produce evidence of further similarities of style, vocabulary or content between codex R on the *First Olynthiac* and particular manuscript traditions on other speeches.

Nitsche's theory is not given the credit it deserves, because he concentrates solely on establishing Menander as the source for a substantial portion of the scholia. While it is true that his claims for Menander's contribution are exaggerated, there is a strong possibility that Menander did write commentaries on the speeches of Demosthenes. They may have been in the form of lectures, and some of these may have provided source material for the compilers of scholia. The passage in Gregory of Korinth, which Nitsche appears to have overlooked, supports the stylistic argument. The identification of the core scholia in R as the work of Menander would be important, since very little of his work remains, despite his eminence as a rhetorician.

I have argued that Menander is likely to have been a source for the scholia in R. Obviously there is a possibility that the scholia contained in R are, as they stand, Menander's commentary. This may be true, but then we have to explain why some scholia appear in the margin. As the text and scholia are interspersed and are written by the same hand, it seems odd that some of the commentary appears in the margins. Perhaps the scribe simply forgot to include them and then was forced to place them in the margins.

A further mystery is the displacement of scholion (14c) so that the commentary loses its logical sequence. Normally one might argue that this is proof of a plurality of sources but in the case of codex R there does seem to be evidence of unity between individual scholia.

In conclusion, we can say that Menander was a source for the compiler of R, but that the number of scholia which have been taken from him depends on whether or not the curious textual problems in

the codex signify a plurality of sources or simple carelessness. Caution advises us not to claim too much for Menander the Rhetor.

### Other Individuals

Ulpian, Zosimos and Menander are three scholars whose work has been considered to have been important source material for the compilers of scholia, especially for comments on the *First Olynthiac*. The case for Ulpian is the strongest but there are good reasons to suppose that the other two were consulted. Quotations from Menander in the scholia mean that he was almost certainly consulted, even if the amount of his work preserved in the corpus is unclear.

Sources are not named in the scholia as a general rule. The most frequent references are to unnamed writers, οἱ ἄλλοι or τινες. This type of comment could refer merely to another line of interpretation rather than any particular writer whom the original author has in mind. Fortunately this rule is not hard and fast and there are a few references to authors whose work was available in some form.

Zeno of Kition is such a figure. Cited along with him are Alexander Noumenios and Dioskoros who is otherwise unknown<sup>(117)</sup>. Genethlios, whom we have come across before, is another possible candidate<sup>(118)</sup>. A rhetor called Epiphanius is mentioned in connection with Genethlios<sup>(119)</sup>. We cannot be certain that they wrote ὑπομνήματα or lectures on Demosthenes of a similar type to the analyses found in the corpus. Rhetorical commentaries on Demosthenes were probably written by Asklepios and Aspasio of Byblos<sup>(120)</sup>. The latter is a figure of the second century A.D.. Both are cited in the *scholia Demosthenica*.

Reference is made to Athanasios (Dindorf p.771.28) as the author of a comparable passage. Oomen attributes this scholion to Zosimos because it includes the phrase ὡς οἴτι. Athanasios is fourth-century and Zosimos is fifth-century. Therefore, Zosimos could be the author of this scholion. We have just seen that the superscription to the text of the *prolegomena* of Athanasios mentions Zosimos' name.

Apsines, Hermogenes and Metrophanes all wrote about rhetoric and are cited in the corpus<sup>(121)</sup>. It is possible that they wrote ὑπομνήματα on Demosthenes, but since they are interested in stasis theory, comment of theirs which used examples from Demosthenes, could easily have been incorporated into a rhetorical commentary on Demosthenes. Out of context it is a problem deciding whether the quote comes from a commentary or a general treatise. The influence of the *Rhetores Graeci* will be considered in more detail below.

Dionysios of Halikarnassos and Kaikilios are cited as authorities on the order of the speeches<sup>(122)</sup>. As a grammarian, Kaikilios may

have had more influence than Dionysios whose stylistic interests are quite unlike the topics which preoccupy the writers of these comments. A shadowy figure called John of Athens is cited<sup>(123)</sup>. He appears to have been interested in language. Julian the Sophist was also interested in language<sup>(124)</sup>. It is unclear whether the reference to Julian is to the contemporary of Proharesios. Influence in matters of language may have come from the *Rhetores Graeci*.

There are a great many writers, some of whom may not even be known to us, who are also possible sources for the compilers of scholia. We know, for example, that Apollonides of Nikaia in the first century A.D. and Gymnasion of Sidon in the fourth wrote commentaries of some kind on Demosthenes<sup>(125)</sup>. The loss of so much material has, perhaps, given too much significance to the works which remain.

The latest figure to be mentioned is Gregory Bishop of Nazianzos in the fourth century<sup>(126)</sup>. He appears to be cited as a speech writer, much as they cite Thoukydides, rather than as a source. His appearance is a useful *terminus post quem* for the production of those scholia in which his name appears.

All the writers cited date from the first century A.D. down to the fourth. There is no direct evidence that Hellenistic writers such as Didymos have had much influence on the scholia, except as founders of a tradition of scholarship. Indeed there seem to have been more than enough scholars working in the early centuries A.D. to have produced the source material for the compilers of scholia. The lively debate which appears from the discussions, is an argument in favour of this supposition. Rhetorical studies, with its own eminent specialists, was thriving.

### Rhetores Graeci

The term *Rhetores Graeci* covers those writers and works contained in the volumes of Walz and Spengel. There are several hundred years represented in them, from Aristotle to Gregory of Korinth. Many of the works are anonymous. The date of a work is crucial in deciding the direction of influence. For example, Gregory of Korinth will not have influenced the scholia in codex R<sup>(127)</sup>. This particular example reveals that there need not be any direct influence. Rather, both reflect a common source which is no longer extant.

There is, however, much common ground between the *Rhetores Graeci* and the scholia. This is the result of a traditional approach to the teaching of rhetoric. This approach is based on stasis theory which was developed over many generations but is most often attributed to Hermagoras in the second century B.C.. Throughout the scholia and the *Rhetores Graeci* we find references to κεφάλαια which are an important aspect of stasis theory. Imitation formed a major

part of learning at all levels, from relatively straightforward exercises to the complexities of writing Demosthenic speeches. The same authors were studied throughout the Greek world and during the Second Sophistic, a plethora of rhetorical manuals were produced for the purpose of education. Some, such as works by Hermogenes and Aphthonios became standard texts. These are often over-sophisticated but this is not surprising for technical manuals.

We find not only explanations of stasis but also of language. Figures of speech and structure are discussed in detail. Sometimes it is evident that there were stock examples, as we shall see below. In many cases the observations in the scholia and the technical vocabulary used do not mean that there is a direct link between them and the *Rhetores Graeci*.

Advanced pupils studied with eminent teachers in the major cities such as Athens or Antioch. From Eunapios' *Lives of the Sophists* it is clear that pupils frequently moved from one teacher to another. Influence was no doubt strongest from the teachers rather from handbooks. Clearly, there was a lively debate between strong minded rivals. The differences between schools, such as we find between Ulpian and Zeno, often arise from the interpretation of the issue or stasis of the speech and not from the approach to the analysis itself.

The commentaries in the scholia do expect some understanding of the rhetorical terms, but sometimes terms are elucidated ; for example, the difference between ἀνθυποφορά, ἀντίθεσις and ἀντιπίπτου(128). The emphasis of the commentaries is different from that of the handbooks. Therefore anyone wishing to analyse the issues which prompted the speech, should not turn to the handbooks for help. Other collections of scholia, in codices F and S for example, reveal more interest in language. There is more likelihood that the *Rhetores Graeci* were of value as source material. Indeed there may have existed commentaries written by some of the *Rhetores Graeci* which did examine either the stasis or the language of individual speeches in greater detail.

Hermogenes is named most frequently as a source in the *scholia Demosthenica*, though a total of seventeen mentions does not compare well with the numerous references to unspecified commentators. Only Hermogenes and Zeno(129) are mentioned in connection with the *First Olynthiac*. In order to find out whether there is more influence from the *Rhetores Graeci* than an individual reference to Hermogenes would imply, examples from the *First Olynthiac* quoted by the *Rhetores Graeci* may be compared with the observations in the scholia. The passages are discussed in detail in the relevant chapters, but a resume will help to establish the extent of the influence of the *Rhetores Graeci*.

There is some suggestion of close links. An example of παρίσωσις

in D.1.10 is noted in (77a), offered by F<sup>2</sup>(130). This example is used by Hermogenes (Rabe p.300) and an anonymous writer (Walz 3 p.710.7). The example may have been familiar to the compiler or else one of the *Rhetores Graeci* was consulted. An example of γνωμικὴ περίοδος is pointed out in (161b), offered by F<sup>2</sup>(131). This agrees with an observation of Aristeides (Schmid p.12.8-10). More certain is the link between (171), offered by F<sup>2</sup>, T, Bc, Vb, Wd and Hermogenes (Rabe p.178)(132). The author paraphrases Hermogenes' words. Moreover, this example of μονόκωλος περίοδος produces the only direct quote from Hermogenes in the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*, (170b) from T Bc(133). Hermogenes notes two examples of περιβολή (Rabe p.296), one referring to D.1.1, the other to D.1.8. These examples are pointed out by Af, Vb, Ca and Wd in (7)(134) and by Ac in (53b)(135), respectively.

In F<sup>2</sup> we find two examples of ἀντιστροφή, one in D.1.4, (36a), and the other in D1.11, (84),(136). Both examples are produced by an anonymous writer on figures (Walz 8 p.640.7-18). The instance of παράλειψις in D.1.3 is noted by F<sup>1</sup>, vp and S in (104), and also by an Aristeides (Walz 9 p.371)(137). Since the text of Demosthenes reads παραλείπω ... at this point, the observation is more likely to be coincidental. The similarity between (14c) and Gregory of Corinth (Walz 7.2 p.1184) serves as a warning against assuming direct links between scholia and extant works(138).

The preceding examples could be coincidental. Even the case of the μονόκωλος περίοδος need not mean that the author consulted Hermogenes himself. He could be consulting a lost commentary whose author had read Hermogenes. There are examples taken from the *First Olynthiac* which appear to be classic of their type. D.1.8 : εἰ γὰρ ... Εὐβοεῦσι ... looks to be the standard example of παράδειγμα. It is mentioned in (53d) by R(139), an anonymous writer (Walz 6 p.38.4sqq), twice in *prolegomena* (Walz 7 p.14,16) and by Apsines (Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.289.21). The asyndeton which is noted by S, R and the *codices Ulpiani* in (60a) seems to be a common example(140). It is cited by Hermogenes (Rabe p.426) and Gregory of Corinth (Walz 7 p.1216) .

We know that Gregory of Corinth consulted Menander Rhetor. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising to find that many of the examples from the *First Olynthiac* which Gregory cites show some affinity with scholia in R. The asyndeton in (60b) is one instance. We also find a reference to καθολικοὶ λόγοι in Gregory (Walz 7 p.1148) reflected in (157), καθολικῶς τῆι γνώμηι τὴν πρότασιν ἐβεβαίωσε. They offer similar interpretations of the προοίμιον, with references to Demosthenes reproaching his audience and covert allusions to the theorik money, (1c) and (Walz 7 p.1198,1317), and (5d) and (Walz 7 p.1319). However, the view that Demosthenes is alluding to the

theorik money in the προίμιον is common, Hermogenes (Walz 3 p.435), and John the Sikeliot (Walz 6 p.193).

The *scholia ad Aphthonium* (Walz 2 p.679) and Ulpian<sup>(141)</sup> offer a similar account of the κεφάλαια on D.1.25-26. This may reflect a tradition, since a similar approach is found in (172a), F<sup>4</sup>, the *codices Ulpiani* and Syrianos (Walz 4 p.739).

In general the use of technical vocabulary in the scholia is in accordance with the definitions in the *Rhetores Graeci*. There are exceptions. The definition of προσωποποιΐα in (11b), offered by R, F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* was found to be distinctive<sup>(142)</sup>. Alexander, Apsines and Phoibammon refer to this passage as an example but their definitions are different. The distinction between ἀνθυποφορά, ἀντίθεσις and ἀντιπίπτον is covered in (105c), offered by S, R, F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* <sup>(143)</sup>. The rest of the scholia in these codices comply with the meaning given here. However, this meaning is different from Hermogenes' (Spengel 3 p.207). These terms may be used to describe a single example. Ulpian uses the word ἀντίθεσις as a general term. There are two meanings of ἐμφασίς given by the *Rhetores Graeci*, Tiberios (Spengel 3 p.65), Tryphon (Spengel 3 p. 199), but neither suits the example cited by S and R in (2a).

Apsines seems to support the ἄπιστοι theory in a rare allusion to the stasis of the *First Olynthiac* by the *Rhetores Graeci*. This theory holds that the issue of this part of the speech is that the Olynthians would be untrustworthy allies (Spengel 1 p.362-363). This clashes with the interpretation favoured by Ulpian<sup>(144)</sup>.

Bearing in mind the possibilities of coincidence, conventional examples and the role of works which are no longer extant, the influence of the *Rhetores Graeci* upon the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* is limited. Influence is more likely to have occurred for matters of language rather than the issues underlying a particular speech. The commentators on the *First Olynthiac*, particularly the writers of unified commentaries, did not produce the form of analysis which they did by consulting the works contained in the works now referred to collectively as the *Rhetores Graeci*. F<sup>2</sup>, which shows a principal interest in language, offers examples which come closest to revealing direct influence. Codex R is the most independent, defining terms distinctively. The apparent independence of the scholia is exciting, because it means that the form of analysis is unique. But for the scholia we should not have detailed analyses of the issues underlying specific speeches from late antiquity.

## Lexicographical Sources

Lexicographical scholia form a minor section within the topics covered by the scholia on the *First Olynthiac*. There are only seventeen examples of different cases which may be listed under this heading<sup>(145)</sup>. Sometimes more than one scholion offers a similar example<sup>(146)</sup>. Nine of these examples occur in F<sup>1</sup><sup>(147)</sup>, many of which are also found in S<sup>(148)</sup>. Both offer one or two examples independently. Other contributions come from F<sup>4</sup><sup>(149)</sup>, vp<sup>(150)</sup>, and the *codices Ulpiani*<sup>(151)</sup>. These are all hands which were found to be particularly interested in language. Lexicographical comments are simply one aspect of that subject. The unified commentaries found in R and the *prolegomena* reveal almost no interest in this type of comment<sup>(152)</sup>.

There is no reason to believe that the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* are unrepresentative of scholia on the remaining speeches. However, great interest has been shown in the lexicographical scholia by scholars at the end of the last century. Some of these works have been unavailable to me, but from references in other authors it is possible to gain an impression of their purpose. Wangrin sought to show that lexica by Ailius Dionysios and Pausanias were used extensively by the compilers of scholia on Demosthenes<sup>(153)</sup>. His argument rests on the assumption that these two authors were consulted by Photios for his lexicon. Similarities between Photios and the *scholia Demosthenica* are taken to mean that the compilers consulted the same sources as Photios, namely Ailius Dionysios and Pausanias. Wangrin takes no account of the other sources available both to the compilers and to Photios, nor does he consider the possibility of coincidence. Cohn dismantles Wangrin's case in his review of the latter's piece.

More acceptance has been found for the theory of Schunk's that Didymos, Diogenes and Harpokration were sources<sup>(154)</sup>. Oomen is inclined to agree with him and Gudeman favours the influence of Didymos through Harpokration, although the presence of the other later traditions is not denied. There is no doubt that the Alexandrians produced lexica. The principle of Ἐξ Ὀμήρου σαφηνίζειν presupposes a considerable knowledge about the vocabulary of particular authors<sup>(155)</sup>.

The lexicographers were also at work during the Second Sophistic. Their inheritance from Alexandria probably provided them with their material. The purpose of this chapter is to decide where the compilers found their information. Perhaps they too could consult Alexandrian work, but it is also likely that they consulted special lexica. There is evidence that lexica were produced for particular speeches by

Demosthenes<sup>(156)</sup>. The influence of Didymos is perhaps indirect.

The inclusion of lexicographical scholia is not systematic. We cannot tell why some words are discussed and not others. It is possible for example, that no lexica were consulted at all and that ὑπομνήματα or teachers provided the source. Lexicographical scholia are, by their very nature, more likely to have been glosses which are then incorporated into the tradition.

I looked at seventeen examples in the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* and compared them with entries in the following lexica : Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca*, *Etymologicum Magnum*, *Souda* and the works by Harpokration, Hesychios, Photios, Pollux and Zonaras. The *Souda* contains the most relevant entries, but only seven. The number in Photios, five, is far from providing evidence that Aillios Dionysios and Pausanias were consulted. The correlation between scholia and lexica appears random. Out of eight lexica, six mention (120), five mention (132a), five mention (175) and eight mention (193a). At the other end of the scale, (1e), (21), (108), (117b) and (179) find no comparable entries at all.

The greatest similarity occurs as the result of brevity, as for example in the case of (120), (75b) and (193a). The precise relationship between lexica and scholia cannot be determined. The question arises whether the scholia are older than the various lexica which were mostly compiled from earlier works. It does appear that there is no strong tie between these scholia and the lexica. There is sufficient variety between them for this conclusion to be drawn. There has been just criticism that the research into the sources has been restricted to lexicography<sup>(157)</sup> which is, after all, of minor interest to the compilers of scholia on Demosthenes.

### Historical Sources

Even though rhetoric is the main interest of the commentators, some explanations are required in order to clarify allusions in Demosthenes for readers who are living several hundred years after the events described in the speeches. The most frequent comment on the background to the *First Olynthiac* concerns the function of the theorik fund. All the major codices contain scholia which refer to this<sup>(158)</sup>. The historical background is otherwise ignored except for comments by F<sup>1</sup>, F<sup>4</sup>, and especially S and R<sup>(159)</sup>. The topics covered are in no way systematic or exhaustive. For example, the events in Thessaly's past prompt a long discussion, (151), whereas the events surrounding Philip's attack on Olynthus are passed over with little or no comment.

The value of the scholia on historical matters is mixed. Sometimes the comment offers an unusual account, such as the

remarks about Philip's father, (40a), (41a), and the comment about the cost of the war (184). There appears to be no sensitivity to chronology as the various accounts of the theoric fund have revealed. The account of the events in Thessaly is confused<sup>(160)</sup>. The commentators do not address themselves to questions of strategy or purpose. In short, these scholia are no more than representatives of the standard of historiography of their day. Given that the function of these commentaries is not to give an accurate and lucid account of historical events, the criticisms are perhaps unfair. This failing should not prove prejudicial in an impartial assessment of the value of the scholia.

The scholia themselves give little information about the source of the material. There are vague references to anonymous sources, ἄλλοι δὲ λέγουσιν (Dilts p.15.22), ἄλλοι δὲ φασιν (Dilts p.15.24). Plutarch offers a version of the institution of the fund similar to that found in Y, (1f), but these versions are probably not related<sup>(161)</sup>. The usual practice is to produce the statement without reference to sources. S and R are the most consistent in offering scholia on historical topics.

Historical sources are mentioned in the scholia on other speeches in the corpus. There are references to Theopompos, Philokhoros and Ephoros<sup>(162)</sup>. These writers are commonly known as the Atthidographers. In the scholia, we find no reference to this collective such as οἱ τὴν Ἀτθίδαν <sup>συγγραφεῖς</sup>. Even though these sources are named, we cannot define the relationship between the original piece of historiography and its appearance in the scholia. Information could have been transmitted through epitomes or else in the commentaries of earlier writers. There is no point of reference for the identification of the entry of a particular historical comment into the scholia corpus. Comments on speeches other than the *First Olynthiac* are combined with comments on rhetoric. The commentators have no interest in dates. This is one of the features of the Atthidographers' approach to historiography. The relative chronology does not attract comment. It is improbable that the compilers of scholia or commentators were consulting copies of the original works. The absence of dates in these scholia suggests that the Atthidographers were not consulted directly<sup>(163)</sup>.

An obvious source of information are the classical prose authors themselves. There are many examples throughout the *scholia Demosthenica* where we find detailed knowledge about other works. Parallels are most often drawn with other speeches by Demosthenes himself but Thoukydides is frequently mentioned too. Examples of this were discussed in connection with Ulpian<sup>(164)</sup>.

There are a few other examples where a passage is cited as a historical rather than rhetorical reference. In (1a) on D.2.1, the

chronology of the *Philippics* is discussed. The argument includes a reference to D.1. The speech *Against Timokrates* is cited where the topic is Athenian counting systems, (Dindorf p.368.2) on D.19.60. In the same speech, there is a reference to a letter, D.19.161, which the commentator relates to D.18, (Dindorf p.412.13). Events relating to treaties with Alexander are cited from D.7 and D.17 in a scholion on D.17.1 itself, (Dilts 2a). A contest is viewed from the point of two speeches D.20 and D.22. The scholion refers to D.20.1, (Dindorf p.455.10). Reference is made to other speeches by Demosthenes in a comment on the Dionysia, (Dindorf p.546.10) on D.21.18. Similarly, a comment on the Panathenaia refers to D.22, (Dindorf p.782.20) on D.24.125.

There are a few examples of Thoukydides being consulted in this way. Most notably, the author of (151) on the *First Olynthiac* refers to Thoukydides 1.107 in the discussion of Thessalian treachery. In (114) on D.3.24 a fact is noted as being mentioned by Thukydides 2.36.

Earlier ὑπομνήματα and teachers were probably the greatest influence on those writing commentaries or scholia. Perhaps their own observations and learning prompted some of the comments.

## CONCLUSION

There is more to be said about the sources of the scholia than is at first apparent. The identity of the compilers themselves remains obscure, but the material from which the extant scholia have been produced yield several clues. We know the names of likely individuals and sometimes we can even try to identify the author of a particular tradition. However, very little may be stated with certainty. The authorship of the *prolegomena* is attributed to Ulpian only in the superscription of four codices. The case for Menander as the author of the core scholia in R is plausible, but depends on accepting favourable explanations for the textual problems in R. There are so many scholars whose work is now lost that the significance of the extant works is exaggerated.

Some of the traditions may have been established early, not long after the source material was produced. Codex R suits this idea. Other traditions may have been established over centuries. Codex F, with five separate hands, is more likely to have been of this type.

No direct influence from Alexandria is proven. The tradition of the Alexandrian scholars is indeed an influence but this is only indirect. There is no evidence that the *scholia Demosthenica* contain lost works by Didymos. The evidence, such as there is, points to a later period, the first to fifth centuries A.D., as the era when commentaries were being written. The milieu of the Second Sophistic could easily have seen the production of works which now appear in the scholia. There

is ample evidence of work on rhetoric and aspects of language.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER TEN

- (1) Dindorf fails to take account of codex R when he refers to long, discursive scholia (vol VIII p.XI).
- (2) P.Berol. 9780 edited and discussed by Diels and Schubart "Didymus" and also by Pearson and Stephens in their edition. See also Gudeman in *RE* 2A1 628 and *RE* 5 445-472 ; Lossau *Palingenesia* chpt. III sections 1, 2b, and 3-6.
- (3) v. Diels and Schubart "Didymus" pp.XV-XX for the discussion about whether the commentary is an excerpt or not, and pp.XXI-XXXII for the rejection of the view that the commentary consists of notes taken in class.
- (4) For the meaning v. Xen. *Mem* 2.1.21, Plat. *Laws* 810b, Isok. 2.7, 42, Galen 15.909, 16.532, 543 and 811, *schol ad Illiad* B 111. See also Diels and Schubart "Didymus" p.XVIII ; Lossau *Palingenesia* p.93 n.84 ; Leo *NGGW* 1904 pp.254-261 esp. p258sq. Leo thinks that it a biographical/historical introduction to the speeches. For the titles of συγγράμματα v. Gudeman *RE* 2A1 628 ; Pfeiffer *History of Classical Scholarship*, pp.213-214.
- (5) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.86sq on lexicography, p.91sq on historical background, p.95sq on dating, p.107sq on authenticity. Pearson and Stephens, *Didymus* p.VII, stress Didymos' interest in historiography.
- (6) v. Harpokration s.v. ἐνθρυπα, s.v. δεκατεύειν. The references in these two entries refer to D.18 and D.22 respectively. See also Harpokration s.v. γαμηλια which links Didymos with ὑπομνήματα on Demosthenes and Isaios ; cf scholia ad D.3.5. (43a)(Dilts p.88.19) ; Lossau *Palingenesia* p.143-144.
- (7) For the meaning v. D.49.30, 28.6, Diod.1.4, Arkhytas ap. D.L. 8.80, *schol. ad Illiad* B 420. See also *schol. ad Illiad* B 111, Galen 16 532, 543 and 811 where ὑπομνήματα and συγγράμματα are distinguished and esp. Galen 15.1 where the same work is called a σύγγραμμα and a ὑπόμνημα.
- (8) v. below [p.224].
- (9) v. White *Aristophanes* p.XXXVI.
- (10) Lossau *Palingenesia* pp.31-36, 60, 62-65 and 123, argues that there is a strong influence of the Peripatetics on the contents of the *scholia Demosthenica*. Philology and biography were their main interests. Hence Didymos falls under their influence. As far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned, that influence is indirect and limited. Gudeman, *RE* 2A1 699, points out that the scholia are influenced by a tradition of philology associated with the Peripatetics. However, proof is required to substantiate his view that the *scholia Demosthenica* , stripped of their remarks taken from lexica and rhetorical manuals, are fundamentally the product of a ὑπόμνημα by Didymos.
- (11) v. *RE* 3 1174.
- (12) v. Quint. 3.1.16, 3.6.48, 5.10.7 and also Syrianos (Rabe vol 2 p.11.9).
- (13) v. *schol. ad* D.2.1 (1a) (Dilts p.49.5).
- (14) v. *schol. ad* D.2.1 (1a) (Dilts p.49.2). Also v. *schol. ad* D.4.30 (90a)(Dilts p.117.30), *schol. ad* D.21.111 (Dindorf p.604.21).
- (15) For example, Philokhoros v. *schol. ad* D.2.1 (1c)(Dilts p.51.23); Theopompos v. *schol. ad* D.2.6 (50c)(Dilts p.61.12), *schol. ad* D.2.17 (116b)(Dilts p.69.24).
- (16) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.34 ; Diels and Schubart "Didymus" p.XLI ; *Pap. Amh.* II Nr XII ; Stark *AUS* pp.31-49 esp.pp39-43.
- (17) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.119sq. The contents of this papyrus is criticized by van Leuwen. For this article and others on the papyrus v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.113 n.135.
- (18) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* pp.113-119. The stasis of the speech appears to have been taken the same way in this papyrus and in the *scholia Demosthenica* . v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.113. n.138 for references.
- (19) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.66 n.3 for a bibliography of prose at Alexandria, and

- ibid. p.111.130 for a bibliography of rhetoric at Alexandria.
- (20) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.130sq; Hubbell YCS pp.181-193.
- (21) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* pp.130-138, esp. p.137 where Lossau admits that the similarity in the way in which the scholia and the papyrus begin their commentaries, especially regarding stasis, is not surprising.
- (22) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.139sq; *P.Rain.* NS I Nr XXV.
- (23) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.140. He compares page3v on D.19.47 with (Dindorf p.363.25) and page5r on D.19.156 with (Dindorf p.411.1).
- (24) v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.126 n.176. It is unclear why Lossau thinks that these comments find no parallel in the *scholia demosthenica*.
- (25) For meaning v. Galen vol 18.2 847 ; Cicero *Ep. ad Attic* 16.7.3 ; *Souda* s.v. σχόλια where σχόλια is synonymous with ὑπόμνημα. Also v. *Souda* s.v. σχολειον ; Gudeman *RE* 2A1 628-630. LSJ derive σχολεῖον from σχολή, q.v. II.
- (26) v. *Prolegomenon Sylloge* Rabe for examples ; Kennedy *Philosophy and Rhetoric* p.189sq. *Prolegomena* usually contained definitions of rhetoric or else formed an introduction to the handbooks used in schools. It is curious that the *Ulpiani prolegomena* are so-called.
- (27) For example (Dilts p.7.6, p.8.21, p.38.24, p.143.3 and p.154.4) and (Dindorf p.693.31, p.786.16 and p.792.8). nb. There are two cases where reference is made to ὑπομνήματα : οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδηλον τοῖς φιλομαθέσιν ἐξ ὧν ἀνεγνώκασιν ὑπομνημάτων (2)(Dilts p.195.3) on D.17.1 in codices g T : εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες τῶν ὑπομνηματιστῶν ... (48)(Dilts p.206.22) on D.18.14 in codex A.
- (28) v. [p.223] above.
- (29) v. Zuntz, *Euripides*, pp.272-275 and also *Aristophanes* pp.64-110.
- (30) v. White *Aristophanes* p.LV sqq, cites manuscripts dating from the second to the seventh centuries A.D. including the well known papyrus of Kallimakhos, P.Oxy. 2258. Also v. Wilson *GRBS* (1971) pp.557-559.
- (31) v. Wilson *CQ* (1967) pp.247-249 and *GRBS* (1971)pp.557-559.
- (32) v. Wilson *CR* (1977) p.271.
- (33) v. Wilson *GRBS* (1967) pp.53-80.
- (34) i.e. from the fourth and fifth centuries when catenae were produced. v. below [p.226].
- (35) v. Wilson on Photios' *Bibliotheca in Byzantium* p.93-111.
- (36) v. *schol. ad Eur. Orest.* line 241.
- (37) v. Wilson *CQ* (1967) pp.252-254.
- (38) Prokopios *Patrol. Graeca* 87. 21 part 1 - 24.
- (39) v. Zuntz *Euripides* p.275.
- (40) For the incidence of ἄλλωσ in Prokopios v. Wilson *CQ* (1967) p.253-4.
- (41) v. Wilson *CQ* (1967) pp.249-251. He refers to Donatus and St Jerome.
- (42) v. Wilson *CQ* (1967) pp.251-252.
- (43) v. *Souda* O 912.
- (44) Eunap. V.S. 487, ed. Wright.
- (45) Eunap. V.S. 485.
- (46) F. Schemmel *Wochenschrift* col 188sq.
- (47) Liban. vol I p.289.14.
- (48) Liban. vol I p.289.19.
- (49) Liban. vol I p.134.3-15.
- (50) Libanios was born in A.D. 314, v. *RE* 12.2 2486.
- (51) Liban. vol I p.84.4-7.
- (52) Liban. vol I p.82.6, cf n.vol I p.289.14.
- (53) Liban. epp.1353, vol XI p.402.
- (54) v. n. (49) above cf vol I p.132.7sq.
- (55) Liban. vol III p.231.23-232.16.
- (56) *Chapmanni Commentatio de Ulpiano* in (Dindorf vol VIII p.XXIV-XLVII). Also v. ibid. p.XI.

- (57) v. (13a) in S [p.54] and *codd Ulp* [pp.198-200].
- (58) (Dindorf vol VIII p.XI).
- (59) (Dilts p.143.24-28).
- (60) *RE* 10A Nr 9 140.
- (61) *Souda* ζ 81.
- (62) (Dindorf vol VII p.XIX n.X). The suggestion was made by Bernhardt.
- (63) Steph. Byz. s.v. Μύνδοσ. Diogenes Laertios, VII 35, lists eight Zenos, one of whom is a grammarian who also wrote epigrams. No date is given.
- (64) Chapmann (Dindorf pp.XXVIII-XXXI).
- (65) Eunap. V.S. 497.
- (66) (Dindorf p.XIX).
- (67) Eunap. V.S. 482.
- (68) Eunap. V.S. 487 : καὶ πρὸς τὸν Οὐλπιανὸν κρατοῦντα τῆσ Ἀντιοχείας ἐπὶ λόγοισ ὠσθείσ, καὶ παρελθών, εὐθύσ ἀνὰ τοὺσ πρώτουσ ἦν. καὶ χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον ὁμιλήσασ ἐκείνω, συνέτεινεν ἐπὶ τὰσ Ἀθήνας καὶ τὸν Ἰουλιανὸν σφοδρῶσ ... .
- (69) v. n. 45 above.
- (70) Eunap.V.S. 493.
- (71) v. Chapmann (Dindorf p.XXIX).
- (72) v. *RLM* , p.313.3sqg.
- (73) v. *RLM* p.325, 338.29 339.1.
- (74) Chapman (Dindorf p.XXX) cites as evidence Rufinus *de compositione et metris orat.* . The passage he quotes comes from *RLM* p.581.15-19). For Sulpitius Victor v.*RE* 4A1 873.
- (75) Aquila Romanus in *RE* 2 315, Alexander Noumenios *RE* 1 1456.
- (76) Chapmann (Dindorf p.XXV).
- (77) Philos. V.S. 607. Antipater was born in Hierapolis and died circa A.D. 212, v. *RE* 1 Nr 29 2517.
- (78) v. *RE* 10A 141.
- (79) v. Spengel<sup>2</sup> p.362.19 and p.380.9.
- (80) Neokles, first or second century A.D., v. *RE* 16.2 Nr 6 2416 ; Theodoros of Gadara, first century B.C. or first century A.D., v. *RE* 5A2 1847 ; Alexander Noumenios, early second century A.D., v. *RE* 1 1456 ; Harpokration, circa second century A.D., v. *RE* 7.2 Nr 5 2412.
- (81) *Rhetores Graeci* , ed. Walz vol 6 p.21.3.
- (82) Syrianos (Rabe vol I p.13.9, vol II p.60.11-12). For another reference to Zeno v. below [p.235] and John Tzetzes n.95 below.
- (83) Text in (Dindorf vol VIII pp.18-22).
- (84) v. (Dindorf p.19.15-16).
- (85) v. (Dindorf vol VIII p.XII-XIII).
- (86) v. n. 83.
- (87) (2a) and (2b) in Dilts. Note that codex S does not offer this comment according to the *apparatus* (Dilts p.19.24). Dobrée's emendation of συγκριτικοῖσ ἢ σωκρατικοῖσ is surely correct.
- (88) v. *Souda* ζ 169.
- (89) Labbaeus, quoted by Taylor, thought that there was a lexicon by Zosimos on Demosthenes' *Philippic* speeches in the Vatican library, v. Taylor in (Dindorf vol VIII p.XXI). If there ever was, it is no longer extant.
- (90) v. the summary by Gärtner in *RE* 10A 790-791. Also Oomen, *Zosimo* p.58.
- (91) Georg. Kedren, ed. Bekker vol I p.622. Zonaras tells the same story without naming the individuals involved, Büttnerwobst 2.25sqg.
- (92) v. Gärtner *RE* 10A for references.
- (93) Rabe , *Prol Syll.* p.LVIII n.1.
- (94) v. [p.226].
- (95) v. *schol. in Hermogenem ap. Cramer Anec. Oxon.* vol 4 p.126.
- (96) Gärtner lists examples of confusion, *RE* 10 A 791.

- (97) v. (Dindorf vol VIII p.XIII).
- (98) v. n.(90) above.
- (99) v. Gudeman's review of Oomen in *PW* 609-620. He modifies his enthusiasm for Zosimos outlined in his article on scholia in *RE* 2A1 701. Gärtner, *RE* 10A 792-794, is also sceptical about Oomen's conclusions.
- (100) v. Oomen *Zosimos* pp.27-28.
- (101) v. T [p.197].
- (102) Oomen *Zosimo* p.45. A view supported by Nitsche, "Menandros", p.11. Gudeman accepts the possibility, *RE* 2A1 700-701, as does Gärtner *RE* 10A 792.
- (103) v. Rabe *Prol. Syll.* Nr12 p.171.
- (104) v. *RE* 5A2 2054 Nr 8.
- (105) Gregory of Korinth (Walz 7.2 p.1184.13-1185.4).
- (106) Additional references to his work ; *schol. anonym, ad Hermog.* (Walz 7.1 p.248.8) ; Anonymous (Walz 3 p.572.24). there are two references in the scholia to Menander, on D.19.114 (Dindorf p.392.4). Also v. app.crit. on D.21.133 (Dindorf p.618.6). More references may be found in *Menander Rhetor*, edd. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, Oxford 1981, pp.XXXIV-XXXVI.
- (107) Nitsche "Menander" pp.3-4.
- (108) Nitsche "Menander" p.11 : *Den Beweis für SD. muss ich aber für einen andern Ort aufsparen, wo ich ihn liefern werde aus deren Zergliederung unter Heranziehung der aus Menandros Kommentar zu Demosthenes in den griechischen Rhetoren erhaltenen Bruchstücke .*
- (109) v. Nitsche "Menander" pp.6-7. The words are λοιπόν =deinceps, οἱ κρείττονες, σύμπας, δλόκληρος, κατ' ἀρχάς, τὰ ἐξάίρετα, ἄθροως, κατεπίγω, τὸ ὅτι, ἐπισφραγίζομαι, τὸ δοκεῖν and παρομαριεῖν.
- (110) v. "Menander" pp.8-9. Also v. *RE* 7.1 1134.
- (111) v. Bursian, *Abhandlungen* pp.1-152.
- (112) Russell and Wilson *Menander* pp.XXXVI-XL.
- (113) Russell and Wilson *Menander* p.XXXVIII.
- (114) *RE* 7.1 1134.
- (115) v. n. 109 above.
- (116) V denotes the Aldine edition of the scholia. Dilts refers to T but not C (= Paris gr. 2946). C is closely related to T, v. (Dindorf vol VIII pp.VIII-IX).
- (117) v. (Dilts p.143.24) in g T Bc Fj. Alexander is also mentioned in (Dindorf vol IX p.468.10). Further information on him is to be found in *RE* 1 1456.
- (118) v. [p.239]. Genethlios is cited in (Dilts pp.203.20, 212.29, Dindorf vol VIII pp.338.3, 406.17, vol IX p.664.27). For further information v. *RE* 7.1 1134.
- (119) v. (Dilts p.203.20, also p.134.3). He is a shadowy figure and may have come from Petra, v. *RE* 6.1 195 Nrs. 7-10.
- (120) For Asklepios v. (Dindorf vol VIII pp.341.2, 392.5, 397.11 and also Dilts p.106.1). He is mentioned in conjunction with Menander Rhetor. They may have been near contemporaries. For further information v. *RE* 2 1698 Nr.7. For Aspasio of Byblos v. (Dindorf vol IX p.460.11). For further information v.*RE* 2 1723 Nr.3. This is the generally accepted identification. However, a rhetorician called Aspasio of Tyre, *RE* 2 1722 Nr.1, cannot be ruled out altogether.
- (121) For Apsines v. (Dindorf vol IX p.460.11) where he is mentioned in the same sentence as Aspasio. For further information v. *RE* 2 277. For Hermogenes v. (Dilts pp.46.5, 105.29, 128.3, 134.31, 216.3, 228.5, 228.10 and Dindorf vol VIII pp. 372.1, 375.17, 387.29. 389.29, 389.17, 390.28, vol IX pp.531.5, 646.27, 711.4, 760.21, 813.12). For further information v. *RE* 8.1 865 Nr.22. For Metrophanes v. (Dindorf vol IX pp.550.3, 10, 760.21.) For further information v. *RE* 15.2 1491 Nr.4.
- (122) For Dionysios of Halikarnassos v. (Dilts pp.49.3, 117.23 and Dindorf vol IX

- p.604.21). For Kaikilios v. (Dilts p.49.5).
- (123) v. (Dilts p.54.4).
- (124) v.(Dilts p.111.14). cf above [p.231]. v. also Chapmann (Dindorf section 6).
- (125) For Apollonides of Nikaia v. *RE* 2 120 Nr.29. For Gymnasion of Sidon v. *Souda* Γ481 and *RE* 7.2 2026.
- (126) v. (Dilts pp.52.1, 126.35, 202.24 and Dindorf vol VIII pp. 430.29, vol IX p.480.15, 761.10).
- (127) v. above [p.237].
- (128) v. below [p. 245 ].
- (129) Hermogenes in (170b). Zeno who is not one of the *Rhetores Graeci* is mentioned by Ulpian (Dilts p.12.16) and in codex R again in (36b).
- (130) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.129].
- (131) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.130].
- (132) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.130] and T [p.186].
- (133) v. T [p.186].
- (134) v. *codices Ulpiani* [p.216].
- (135) v. *codices Ulpiani* [p.216].
- (136) v. F<sup>2</sup> [p.129]. (84) is also found in vp.
- (137) v. S [p.70].
- (138) v.above [p.237].
- (139) v. R [p.108].
- (140) v. S [p.68].
- (141) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.138] and Ulpian [p.45].
- (142) v. R [p.95].
- (143) v. S [p.55].
- (144) v. Ulpian [p.44].
- (145) (2c), (16), (21a), (27a), (50), (56), (75b), (90a), (108), (117b), (120), (122b), (132a), (175b), (179), (186), (193a).
- (146) eg (2c) = (1e) and (2a); (21a) = (21b); (132a) = (132b) =(1d) (Dilts p.15.6), (1e) (Dilts p.15.11), (21b) (Dilts p.21.23).
- (147) v. F<sup>1</sup> [p.123].
- (148) v. S [pp.71-72].
- (149) v. F<sup>4</sup> [p.147].
- (150) v. vp [p.173].
- (151) v. *codices Ulpiani* [pp.191-192].
- (152) The exception is (75b) in R and this is a faded marginal note.
- (153) A. Wangrin, *Quaestiones de scholiorum Demosthenicorum fontibus, pars prior : De Harpocrate et Aelio Dionysio Pausaniaque atticistis* , Diss. Halis Saxonum 1883, reviewed by L. Cohn *Philologische Anzeiger* XV 1885 pp.44-58, esp. pp.55-58. Wangrin applies the method which Freyer used in connection with the origin of the scholia on Aiskhines, T. Freyer "*Quaestiones de scholiorum Aeschineorum fontibus*", *Leipziger Studien zur klassischen Philologie* 5 (1882) pp.239-388. G. Wentzel, "*Zu den atticistischen Glossen des Photios* ", *Hermes* 30 (1895) pp.367-384, draws a similar conclusion about the influence of Aelios Dionysos on the scholia on Thoukydides. For further criticisms of this approach v. Gudeman in *RE* 2AS 680sq, Lippold in *RE* 18.4 2410.
- (154) W. Schunk, *De scholiorum in Demosthenis orationes XVIII, XIX, XXI fontibus disputatio critica* , Progr. Coburg 1879. For his conclusions v. Oomen *Zosimo* p.46. Gudeman *RE* 2AS does not discuss lexicographical scholia in detail but does favour the influence of Harpokraton for disseminating the material in Didymos.
- (155) Lossau *Palingenesia* p.95.
- (156) Fragments of a lexicon on the Meidias speech, Wessely *Stud. z. Pal. u. Pap.* IV (1905) pp.111-113 and a lexicon on the speech against Aristokrates, Blass

- Hermes* pp.148-163, Diels and Schubart *Didymus* pp.78-82.
- (157) v. S. Gloeckner, "*Quaestiones Rhetoricae*", *Breslauer philologische Abhandlungen* 8 (1901) p.96 n.1. On pp.96-98 Gloeckner notes examples of correlation between the *scholia demosthenica* and Hermogenes and Minukian. Also v. Lossau *Palingenesia* p.144.
- (158) v. Theorik [pp.285-287].
- (159) v. F<sup>1</sup> [pp.121-122], F<sup>4</sup> [pp.148-149], S [pp.73-79]. As the contribution of R mirrors that of S, it was not discussed in detail in the chapter on R.
- (160) v. S [pp.73-79].
- (161) Plut. *Perik* . 9.
- (162) Theopompos v. (Dilts p.61.12) on D.2.6, (Dilts p.69.24) on D.2.17, (Dilts p.132.17) on D.7.39, (Dilts p.137.12) on D.8.43. Philokhoros v. (Dilts p.51.23) on D.2.1, (Dilts p.487.1) on D.20.52.
- (163) cf scholia on Aiskhines where dates occur.
- (164) v. Ulpian [pp.39-42].

## CHAPTER ELEVEN CONCLUSION

### GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

#### Subject Matter

The authors and compilers of the scholia on the *First Olynthiac* are remarkably consistent in their approach. There is little variation in the subjects which interest them. The rhetorical analysis of the speech and aspects of language receive the most attention. The historical background of the speech and lexicography attract the majority of the remaining comments. A few comments are made about style, etymology and geography.

Ulpian and the other authors employ similar terminology. Terms such as ἀντίθεσις, ἀντιπίπτον and κεφάλαια are used in a similar way. We might expect this similarity, given that the authors are discussing one topic. However, there appears to be more significance because the *Rhetores Graeci* do not always use the same terms in the same way as the authors of the scholia. There are no references to anticipated objections for example. Moreover, there are two approaches to rhetorical interpretation ; that of the commentators on individual speeches and that of the writers of rhetorical handbooks. They share a common fundamental approach, but thereafter their approaches are different. I have found little evidence to suggest that the writers of rhetorical handbooks also wrote scholia. Apsines is a possible exception.

The handbooks take the elements of stasis and subdivide them into a sophisticated system. The authors of the scholia adopt the familiar approach of stasis theory, but the sophisticated classification is absent. The reason for this may be that general rhetorical handbooks did not cover the same ground as commentaries on individual speeches. The difference is explained either by a difference in discipline or by a difference in generation to which the author belonged.

There are clear ties between the scholia and the *Rhetores Graeci* in the case of language. Examples of figures of speech, cited by the authors of scholia are sometimes apparent quotations from Hermogenes or others of the *Rhetores Graeci*. Such quotations provide a useful *terminus post quem* for the composition of these individual scholia. They also counter the view that the scholia are based on the scholarship of Alexandria. With a few exceptions, it is impossible to determine whether the relationship between the scholia and the *Rhetores Graeci* is direct. Many of the handbooks produced by the *Rhetores Graeci* were used in schools and it is apparent that there

were stock examples of some linguistic features.

The historical content of the scholia is rightly criticised, but the critics do not make allowances for the fact that the *scholia Demosthenica* are not historical commentaries. The failings of the authors of these scholia are the failings of the age. The source of the information which we do find is likely to have been other speeches as well as epitomised versions of the Attidographers.

It is harder to draw conclusions about the comments on lexicography. This type of scholion could have entered the tradition at almost any stage in the transmission. The brevity of these scholia makes them characterless. No single lexicon is favoured over another by the contribution of a codex. These scholia may have provided source material for later lexica, or may be extracts from lexica which are no longer extant. Both interpretations are valid, but I would suggest that the *scholia Demosthenica* have little to offer the compilers of lexica.

### Systematic Approach

The approach of the authors and compilers of the scholia, with significant exceptions, is to comment on a feature as it occurs in the speech. Thus, the comments are not subdivided into categories and discussed topic by topic. We are not given the underlying structure of the speech apart from a basic analysis of the rhetorical structure. This approach is contrasted with Ulpian's which outlines the structure of the speech at the beginning of the discussion. Ulpian then follows this structure in the detailed analysis. Ulpian reveals more obvious control of his material. The speech is analysed almost phrase by phrase. A useful contrast are the contributions of codices A and Pr in which there is no explanation for the appearance of a particular comment.

The opinions put forward in the scholia of the major traditions are sensible and sometimes the collection as a whole reveals a degree of coherence. The prime example is the case of codex R where I have argued that there is a core of scholia in that codex which appear to have been written by the same person. Internal consistency suggests one of two things ; either that the collection is based on a work by an individual scholar, or that the compilers of scholia have a positive role. These alternatives are not exclusive. Surprisingly few contradictions occur in the traditions. Most of these occur in the *codices Ulpiani* and are the result of an apparent attempt to produce alternative interpretations of the same passage. If the scholia were simply a random collection we would expect inconsistencies and lack of coherence. My attempts to discern the unity of a collection of scholia do not deny the complexity of the accumulation of scholia in

the codices. Unity is unexpected.

### Contemporaneity of the Scholia

The similarity in subject matter, terminology and approach in the major collections of scholia suggests that they may be contemporaneous. There are more specific points which strengthen this suggestion. Comments in one tradition sometimes echo those of another. An obvious example is the reference to Zeno of Kition by Ulpian and the author of (36b) in codex R and the references to the *απιστοι* interpretation. In the chapter on sources I concluded that the names of scholars who are mentioned in the scholia belong to the first six centuries A.D. . Gregory of Nazianzos is the latest figure to be mentioned. No other individual can be identified after this period. There is evidence that Zosimos worked on at least two of the speeches, including the *First Olynthiac* . How much of his and other named scholars' work is present depends on interpretation and conjecture. Solid proof is absent. It cannot be denied that study of rhetoric was thriving at this period. The composition of the scholia may belong to the second to sixth centuries but the period of compilation is another matter. It is surprising to be able to be so specific.

### Development of Commentaries

When the lectures or commentaries were written they were produced separately from the text. These commentaries were known as *ὑπομνήματα*. It is possible that the transfer of *ὑπομνήματα* into the margins of texts, where they became known as scholia could certainly have been taking place by the sixth century. The compilation date is difficult to ascertain because there may have been several phases of transmission. It is unlikely that the transfer began after the era of Iconoclasm because of the perishability of the materials upon which the *ὑπομνήματα* were written. It is also impossible to state where any manuscript was produced, though Constantinople, Gaza and Antioch are likely candidates. In fact anywhere where there was a large library is a possibility. Therefore the scholia play a significant part in the development in the preservation of commentaries.

### Value of the Scholia Demosthenica

We have very little scholarly comment from antiquity. So from the point of view of those interested in the history of scholarship, the *scholia Demosthenica* provide valuable evidence of thriving and

competent scholarship. They are particularly important for evidence of Menander and Zosimos of Askalon.

The scholia are also valuable for modern scholars of Demosthenes. They were written by people for whom rhetoric was important and practical. Therefore their interpretation of Demosthenes' arguments ought to be informed. More importantly, Aristotle's approach to rhetoric is broadly similar to that of the authors of the scholia. The ideas which underlie stasis theory are common to both. So even though the rhetoric of the opening centuries A.D. is highly developed and we have no reason to suppose that Demosthenes wrote according to these precepts, we do have some idea of what contemporaries might have made of his speeches : that is an assessment of Demosthenes on his own terms. This is particularly important because modern scholars treat the deliberative speeches as though they were forensic speeches and analyse accordingly. The flexibility of the approach of the commentators in the scholia is attractive.

### Purpose of the Scholia

There are two questions to be answered. Why was rhetoric studied in the second to sixth centuries A.D. ? Why was there interest in compiling scholia in the centuries thereafter ?

The *Ulpiani prolegomena* have the feel of a lecture to advanced students of rhetoric. Points to note are the hurried conclusion and the personality of the author. Other commentaries, such as those found in codex R and the *codices Ulpiani* lack personality and it may be that they represent written commentaries. I have also noted examples of comments which are so elementary that we feel we are dealing with elementary tuition. *vp* is a special case, because it contains extracts from Byzantine geographical lists and are a later development.

The reason for instruction in rhetoric was not an end in itself, because the opportunity for delivering speeches became increasingly limited throughout the Byzantine era. We ought to be grateful to the philosophers if rhetoric was indeed taught as an introduction to the disciplines of Neo-platonism. The scholia in general serve this purpose well. They offer informed and interesting analyses of the *First Olynthiac*.

The issue of Iconoclasm in the seventh century provides a possible explanation of the reason why named scholars belong to the preceding centuries. The renewed interest thereafter is harder to account for. Clearly the preparation for Neo-platonism would still be valid. There may have been no great figures in the field of rhetoric after the sixth century. The *codices* which are dated to the fourteenth century and later are probably the result of the interest of the Italian Renaissance.

There will surely have been some original work at this period but it seems to have been relatively insignificant. The Byzantine geographic lists are one such example. Perhaps more compilation took place at this time.

### SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

Dilts' stemma for the relation between the scholia on speeches D.1-4 is based on textual criteria and is basically correct. My studies have been limited to the *First Olynthiac* whereas Dilts' account is based on his understanding of the relation between the scholia traditions on these four speeches. His conclusions may be true for the group as a whole, but, as far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned his stemma requires refinement. It is peculiar, however, that he arranges the stemma according to the age of the codex in which the scholia appear and not according to the date of the hand which wrote the scholia. The age of the codex is irrelevant. It is also odd that he does not distinguish hands.

I shall summarise my main conclusions about each collection of scholia and then produce a stemma giving a more precise, though not definitive, picture of the relationship.

The *prolegomena Ulpiani* are curiously named since they do not seem to form an introduction at all. They form a cohesive lecture on the *First Olynthiac*. There is no good reason to deny the suggestion of the codices that the author is Ulpian of Antioch. He has control of his material but is confusing at times. He demands a technical knowledge of his students and reveals a strong personality in his comments.

The important problem with codex S is that Dilts does not identify which hand produced which scholia. Drerup identifies at least four hands. Therefore the validity of my conclusions depends on this information. Some hands in S are closely related to codex R. They may be *gemelli*, though R gives a fuller version of what I have called the core scholia. The margins are very crowded in S and additional comments were written in a bifolium which is now lost. F<sup>1</sup> and S, perhaps a single hand, seem to have had a common source. The contribution of S contains a few contradictions.

Codex R has been undervalued by Dilts and Drerup because it contains information found in older collections. It is a well produced codex and therefore a careful collection of scholia is offered. If it is a *gemellus* of S, R may contain an older version of the text. An examination of the material reveals that it has several unique scholia which together with other scholia found in R and other codices, forms a cohesive commentary. This commentary may have been produced in the second to third centuries because Zeno of Kition is mentioned and

because there is some evidence that the core scholia may have been written by Menander Rhetor. His authorship depends on how certain anomalies in the order of the scholia in R are explained. Obviously it would be important if Menander did prove to be the author, because we have very little of the work of this renowned scholar. It was the view of Nitsche that Menander was responsible for the majority of the scholia. This claim is exaggerated but ought not to be dismissed too quickly.

Codex F contains a collection of scholia on the *First Olynthiac* by four hands. The distribution of scholia and subject matter by the individual hands encourages the view that the compilers of these scholia were aware of the previous material. F<sup>1</sup> offers material found in S and there may be a tie between them, perhaps a common source. F<sup>2</sup> offers more or less independent information. F<sup>3</sup> is peculiar because it offers only one comment. F<sup>4</sup> bears a remarkable similarity to the contribution of the *codices Ulpiani*. If it proves that F<sup>4</sup> and the *codices Ulpiani* are directly related, then my comments about compilers taking note of the previous comments in F are weakened. However, a direct relationship is unlikely because of the quality of the text in F<sup>4</sup>. Coincidence is then an explanation. It is possible that F<sup>4</sup> was compiled in the eleventh century. The total contribution of F is not significant, since most of the scholia found in F are also found in other codices.

Codex Y is mutilated and therefore of limited value. What there is casts doubt on the view expressed by Dilts and Drerup that Y influenced codex R, since scholia extant in Y are not found in R. Y is the exemplar of the *codices Ulpiani*.

Codex vp ought to be considered in conjunction with codex Y. The first hand produced the geographical lists. The second hand vp<sup>2</sup> provides a copy of the mutilated version of Y. Therefore we know that vp<sup>2</sup> must have consulted Y after the ninth century.

Codex A offers comments by two hands which are of little consequence, though they serve to counter the suggestion of Drerup and Dilts that A influenced S and R, at least as far as the *First Olynthiac* is concerned.


The *codices Ulpiani* are misnamed because it is unlikely that they could have been written by Ulpian. T, Vb and Wd are the closest of the group. F<sup>4</sup> is very similar to them and they may share a common source. While Y was their exemplar they contain scholia which are not found in the extant version of Y. Therefore some compilation took place after the ninth century.

Their inclusion does not form a coherent whole. There are examples where alternative interpretations are offered without judgement between them. This can produce inconsistencies.

Bc and Ob offer unusual interpretations which are unique to them. Curiously these cover sections of the speech where T, Vb and Wd are weak. These codices raise more questions than they answer.

Pr provides a useful contrast to most of the older traditions. It offers occasional elementary clarifications. It is, therefore, of limited value to scholars except as a contrast to the other traditions and because it contains the title of the *prolegomena* .

Revised Stemma for the Scholia on the *First Olynthiac*



## VALUE OF THE THESIS

I have attempted to define for the first time what is meant by the terms scholia and scholiast and have concluded that the terms are misleading if they are not given a precise meaning.

The thesis sets a framework for future study of the scholia which avoids the failings of previous studies ; specifically the concentration on minor topics.

I have assessed the varying merits of the traditions of scholia and the relative merits of each.

The thesis demonstrates the usefulness of the Demosthenic scholia for modern scholars. They are particularly valuable because they provide assessment by rhetoricians of deliberative speeches.

Demosthenic scholia provide a contrast to scholia on Aristophanes and Homer.

I have tried to demonstrate how scholia fit into the development of commentaries.

This thesis also works towards an identification of the sources of the scholia. It provides a clearer picture about the development of the traditions of scholia.

I have found evidence to suggest that the sources are not Alexandrian, as is widely thought. Of more significance is the possible identification of Menander Rhetor as the author of the core scholia in R. There are also indications that Zosimos of Askalon, Zeno of Kition and Ulpian of Antioch are other probable sources.

The conclusions which have been reached, especially with regard to the sources, are reasonable but they are based on probabilities. They need not be accepted but they form a plausible interpretation of the information we have.

Overall the thesis forms a complement to general works on the subject of Greek rhetoric and the beginning of specialised study.

## FURTHER STUDY

The following areas require further research as a result of this thesis:-

The hands in codex S require examination by palaeographers in order to test the validity of the conclusions in the thesis.

Further research of my own is required to examine D.2-4 in order to discover whether Dilts' interpretation is correct or whether any of the refinements proposed in the thesis hold.

I also propose to examine the remaining Demosthenic scholia by individual hands to see whether particular compilers have special interests.

I also intend to test for unified commentaries, especially D.10 for an Ulpianic commentary and codex A in D.23 as a work by Zosimos of Askalon, and to look for further evidence of Menander in the contribution of codex R.

General testing of the conclusions in this thesis regarding subject matter, approach and authorship would be welcome.

## APPENDIX ONE

### THE THEORIK FUND

#### THE INSTITUTION OF THE THEORIK FUND

Throughout this appendix it will be important to bear in mind the distinction between the terms theorikon, theorika and theorik fund. The theorikon shall be used as the term for the two-obol dole, which formed a specific part of the expenditure on public events. This general expenditure shall be termed theorika. The term theorik fund applies to the money available for such expenditure.

#### Perikles

The institution of the theorikon is attributed to Perikles by Plutarch in the following passage : ... τούτοις ὁ Περικλῆς καταδημαγωγούμενος τρέπεται πρὸς τὴν τῶν δημοσίων διανομήν, συμβουλευσάντος αὐτῷ <Δάμωνος τοῦ> Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἰθηθεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἰστόρηκε. καὶ ταχὺ θεωρικῶις καὶ δικαστικῶις λήμμασιν ἄλλαις τε μισθοφοραῖς καὶ χορηγίαις συνδεκάσας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐχρήτο ..., *Per.* 9. This attribution has been accepted by many scholars<sup>(1)</sup>. Modern scholars have, however, paid more attention to Aristotle's comments in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, which was discovered at the end of the nineteenth century.

Plutarch is quoting, evidently, from *Ath. Pol.* 27.4. Aristotle associates Perikles with jury pay and other unspecified misthophorai, but he says nothing about theorik money. Moreover, he discusses theorik money in some detail later on in this work, *Ath. Pol.* 43.1, 47.2, but he does not credit anyone with the institution either of the specific two-obol distribution or of a fund. This point should be remembered because some commentators argue *e silentio* that Aristotle would have passed some comment if Perikles had instituted the distribution or the theorik fund<sup>(2)</sup>.

It has also been suggested that Philokhoros could have called Perikles the founder of the theorikon in the third book of his *Atthis*. This conjecture is based on Harpokration's comments about the theorikon : ... Φιλόχορος δὲ ἐν τῇ γ τῆς Ἀτθίδος φησὶ "τὸ δὲ θεωρικὸν ἦν τὸ πρῶτον νομισθὲν δραχμὴ τῆς θέας, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔλαβε" καὶ τὰ ἔξης ..., Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά <sup>(3)</sup>. There are three arguments against this interpretation. The first concerns the accuracy of the text and has been put forward recently by Ruschenbusch, who based his argument on Beloch and Jacoby<sup>(4)</sup>. They believe that the book number is incorrect.

The letter Γ is found in the manuscripts. Book three of Philokhoros' *Atthis* covered the period 683 or 594 B.C. to 462 B.C.<sup>(5)</sup>. However, Γ

could easily be a corruption for E or F . If this is so, then Philokhoros may have referred to the origin of the name theorikon in book five, which covered 403 to 360 B.C., or in book six, which covered 359 to 322 (or 318) B.C.<sup>(6)</sup>. In these books Philokhoros is not speaking in the context of Perikleian Athens

A second objection casts doubt on the passage as specific evidence. There is no guarantee that Philokhoros has only discussed those matters which arose in the period under examination. It is possible that he could digress and mention something relevant but of another period.

A third objection arises from the context in which Harpokration quotes Philokhoros and was pointed out by Cawkwell<sup>(7)</sup>. Harpokration tells us in the preceding sentence that Agyrrhios initiated the theorikon<sup>(8)</sup>. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Philokhoros attributed its institution to Perikles, unless Harpokration had reason to reject this view.

Taken together these arguments provide solid grounds for finding fault with scholars who attribute something to Philokhoros, as quoted by Harpokration, which he probably did not say. Therefore, Philokhoros ought to be cited with care as a witness about the originator of the theorik fund or the distributions.

There are other reasons for being sceptical about Plutarch's attribution of the institution of the theorikon to Perikles. There is no mention of the theorikon in extant comedies written at the time of the Peloponnesian War. It may be significant that money for jury service and attendance at the assembly are mentioned<sup>(9)</sup>. Early comedy is political and so probability increases the likelihood that the theorik money would have been mentioned, if it had been a Perikleian institution. It does seem more than fortuitous that not a single reference to this practice occurs. Later comedy of the fourth century B.C. does not mention the theorik money even though it certainly did exist. Fourth-century comedy is social and so the theorik money was not a likely topic.

It is not surprising that Plutarch formed this notion about Perikles. For him, Perikles was the founder of a welfare state and so, in the absence of any other information about its institution, Plutarch could easily have attributed the foundation of the theorikon to Perikles<sup>(10)</sup>. It is now generally accepted that Perikles did not found the theorikon. Buchanan takes the view that even if this is so Perikles is responsible for creating an atmosphere in Athens where handouts were expected<sup>(11)</sup>. Thoukydides and the "Old Oligarch" point to sacrifices being provided by the state for the poor<sup>(12)</sup>.

Plutarch also mentions demagogues in general as practising this type of distribution : οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ... ὡς τὸν δῆμον εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρικὰ

καὶ κατασκευὰς ἀγαλμάτων καὶ ἱερῶν προαγαγόντες, *Aristeides* 24.5. Van Ooteghem interpreted this passage as a hint that Perikles did not found the theorik fund but some other demagogue in later years<sup>(13)</sup>. This would be to accuse Plutarch of an unlikely change in his attitude. Buchanan admits that where Perikles is concerned theorika is a misnomer, though it is understandable why later generations might have viewed the expenditure which was made for public events in the fifth century as theorik<sup>(14)</sup>. It is important, however, to bear in mind the distinction between general expenditure and the institution of a regular two obol dole. It is this largesse which concerns Plutarch and not general expense.

The remaining evidence in favour of associating Perikles with the institution of the theorikon is not likely to be independent. The phrase διανεμειν το θεωρικον in Lukian, *Timon*. 49, refers to another period in its dramatic setting in the Periklean age<sup>(15)</sup>. Plutarch may have been his source. A scholion on Aeschines 3.24 is clear, but again his independence is doubtful: χρήματα θεωρικὰ Ἀθηναῖοι διενείμαντο πρῶτον δραχμὴν ἑκάστωι Περικλέουσ εἰσηγησαμένου ... . The independence of the scholion on D.1.1 is similarly doubtful : ἴστέον δὲ ὅτι τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα τὰ δημόσια θεωρικὰ ἐποίησεν ἕξ ἀρχῆς ὁ Περικλῆς δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην (Dilts p.16.8-9).

### Kleophon

Kleophon is another name which some commentators have linked to the institution of the theorikon<sup>(16)</sup>. He exercised power from 410 B.C. and instituted the diobelia according to Aristotle : Κλεοφῶν ὁ λυροποιός, ὃς καὶ τὴν διωβελίαν ἐπόρισε πρῶτος, *Ath.Pol.* 28.3. Although no writer in antiquity associated Kleophon with the theorikon, the identification of the two obol theorik dole with the diobelia has led to this inference. Van Ooteghem argued that the diobelia was a short term form of poor relief which Kleophon introduced <sup>towards</sup> the end of the Peloponnesian War, because of the hardships caused by the long conflict<sup>(17)</sup>. The general economic position at this period makes it very unlikely that Kleophon would have introduced the theorikon on top of poor relief<sup>(18)</sup>. Those who do support the identification of diobelia with the theorikon cite sources which refer to a two obol payment. There were many payments involving two obols, but the connection with the theorikon is not evident in each case. The diobelia is not mentioned<sup>(19)</sup>.

## Agyrrhios

There are two main pieces of evidence linking Agyrrhios with the theorikon. The first is direct and has been mentioned already. This is the passage in Harpokration, s.v. Θεωρικά, which says : θεωρικὰ ἦν τινὰ ἐν κοινῶ χρήματα , ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως προσόδων συναγόμενα ' ταῦτα δὲ πρότερον μὲν εἰς τὰς τοῦ πολέμου χρείας ἐφυλάττετο καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο στρατιωτικά, ὕστερον δὲ κατετίθετο εἰς τε τὰς δημοσίας κατασκευὰς καὶ διανομὰς, ὧν πρῶτος ἦρξατο Ἀγύρριος ὁ δημαγωγός. Since Harpokration then goes on to mention what Philokhoros says about the origin of the name theorikon, it seems that Philokhoros was not his source for Agyrrhios' name. Harpokration is talking about the institution of theorika rather than the two-obol dole. It is also important to note that he mentions a sum of money which was used for military purposes and was later used for theorik purposes.

Van Ooteghem rejected the possibility that Agyrrhios was the founder for similar reasons to those which he adduced in rejecting the suggestion that Perikles founded the theorikon ; that is silence from Aristotle and comedy. He also proposed financial hardship as a reason why the theorikon was unlikely to have been founded in the late fifth or early fourth century<sup>(20)</sup>. There is no documentary evidence supporting its existence before the fourth century.

Ruschenbusch also rejects Agyrrhios as a possible founder, basing his argument on the text of Harpokration's quotation from Philokhoros. If Γ should read F, then Philokhoros is referring to the theorikon in the period 359-322 B.C.<sup>(21)</sup>. Agyrrhios' floruit occurs in the first quarter of the fourth century<sup>(22)</sup>. Although Ruschenbusch concedes the possibility that Γ should read E, he fails to follow it up<sup>(23)</sup>. If Harpokration is quoting from this book, book five, then Philokhoros is discussing the years 404-360 B.C., when Agyrrhios' influence was at its peak. The possibility also remains that Philokhoros is digressing and that the reference to the theorikon belongs to another period.

The second piece of evidence comes from Zenobios *Prov.* 3.271 : ἐπὶ Διοφάντου τὸ θεωρικὸν ἐγένετο. This entry is also found in Hesychios, s.v. δραχμὴ χαλάζωσα, and in the *Souda* , s.v. Δ1491. Diophantos is identified as the eponymous archon for 395-394 B.C.<sup>(24)</sup>. There is widespread agreement that the sources are muddling the archon with a state benefactor of the same name who was a contemporary of Euboulos<sup>(25)</sup>. The scholion on Aeschines 3.24 makes reference to the latter individual : πολλὰ ἅμα χρήματα διενείμαντο ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ θεωρικοῦ προφάσει , τὰ μὲν Διοφάντου , τὰ δὲ Εὐβούλου διανεμόντος ... . It is possible, though unlikely, that the theorikon was instituted during the archonship of 395-394 B.C. and that this individual just happens to

share the same name.

Cawkwell relates Harpokration's reference to Agyrrhios to the introduction of pay for attendance at the assembly<sup>(26)</sup>. Harpokration is simply muddled. The inclusion of Agyrrhios' name may be a gloss because the *Souda*, which contains the same entry, s.v. θ 219, omits the reference to Agyrrhios. Another explanation may be that Agyrrhios was the first to use part of the military fund for public festivals but that the institution of the regular two obol dole did not take place until later.

### Euboulos

With the evidence so far proving inconclusive, there remains one more name to consider, Euboulos. Justin, the epitomiser of Trogus Pompeius, refers to theorik money in all but name. Speaking of events following the death of Epaminondas in 362 B.C., he says : *non ut olim in classem exercitus sed in dies festos apparatuque ludorum reditus publicos effundunt ... Tunc vectigal publicum, quo antea milites et remiges alebantur, cum urbano populo dividi coeptum* , 6.9.3-5. This is surely the same practice to which Harpokration is referring in connection with Agyrrhios<sup>(27)</sup>. Kahrstedt and van Ooteghem favour this later date, but are not prepared to say who they think was responsible for this institution<sup>(28)</sup>.

Euboulos is an obvious candidate since his name is associated strongly with the theorikon. One source is Philinos. Harpokration, s.v. Θεωρικά, gives Philinos' account of the origin of the name θεωρικόν as an alternative to that given by Philokhoros : Φιλῖνος δὲ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σοφοκλέους καὶ Εὐριπίδου εἰκόνασ περὶ Εὐβούλου λέγων φησὶν "ἐκλήθη δὲ θεωρικόν, ὅτι τῶν Διονυσίων ὑπογύων ὄντων διένειμεν Εὐβουλος εἰς τὴν θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἑορτάζωσι καὶ τῆσ θεωρίας μηδεὶσ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολείπηται δι' ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων." Philinos should be a reliable source, if quoted correctly, because he was a near contemporary of Euboulos<sup>(29)</sup>. Unless the theorikon acquired its name late, and there seems no good reason to think so, Philinos is saying that Euboulos began the theorikon in its best known form.

There is other evidence which supports this interpretation. This is the corrected version of the text in Harpokration whereby Γ ought to read F, thus connecting the origin of the theorikon, or at least its name, to the period of Euboulos' influence<sup>(30)</sup>. Philokhoros' account that the name originated from the purpose of the money, δραχμὴ τῆσ θέασ, is entirely compatible with Philinos' version.

There is another relevant entry in Harpokration, s.v. Εὐβουλος, which quotes from Theopompos : ὅτι δὴ δημαγωγὸσ ἦν ἐπιθανέστατοσ,

ἐπιμελήσ τε καὶ φιλόπονος, ἀργυρίον τε συχνὸν πορίζων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διένειμε, διὸ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῆς τούτου πολιτείας ἀνδροτάτην καὶ ῥαθυμοτάτην συνέβη γένεσθαι, Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ ι' τῶν Φιλιππικῶν<sup>(31)</sup>. Ruschenbusch believes that Theopompos holds Euboulos responsible for the institution<sup>(32)</sup>. This interpretation is persuasive, because διένειμε (aorist) implies that Euboulos proposed the distribution. The aorist can hardly mean "continued to distribute". Philinos, as quoted by Harpokration, also uses the aorist in connection with Euboulos and the theorik money (διένειμε Εὐβουλος).

If we assume that Trogus Pompeius consulted the Atthidographers as a source<sup>(33)</sup>, then it seems reasonable to conclude that a date for the foundation of the theorikon is indeed *post* 360 B.C.. Kahrstedt suggests that the passage in Justin may be an oblique allusion to a law introduced by Diophantos of Sphettos, Euboulos' colleague<sup>(34)</sup>. Cawkwell prefers a date later than 362 B.C. for the institution of the theorikon, on the ground that Athens was in no position financially to pay for distributions because of the war. Thus Cawkwell tentatively suggests that Euboulos was its creator<sup>(35)</sup>. There is no doubt in the mind of Ruschenbusch that Euboulos instituted the theorik fund. He stresses not only the emendation of the fragment of Philokhoros but also Philinos' account<sup>(36)</sup>. Euboulos does seem to be the best candidate for the founder of the two obol dole. He may have introduced the term θεωρικά which covers other kinds of public expenses<sup>(37)</sup>. However, this is not to say that other politicians did not use public money to finance public entertainments. The development of the use of public money for public events accounts for the silence of our sources about the institution of the theorika and the fund. No one man was responsible for its creation, but Euboulos seems to have instituted the specific two-obol theorik distribution.

## THE PURPOSE OF THE THEORIKON

Contemporary evidence is vague about the purpose of Euboulos' two obol dole. Philokhoros, as quoted by Harpokration, calls it δραχμὴ τῆς θεᾶς, and Philinos' says this of the purpose : ἵνα πάντες ἑορτάζωσι καὶ τῆς θεωρίας μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολείπηται δι' ασθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων<sup>(38)</sup>. The evidence of late antiquity is decisive. Libanios gives the clearest statement, *Hypoth ad D.1, 4.* : οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὠνητοῦς ἐποιήσαντο τοὺς τόπους, καὶ ἕκαστον ἔδει διδόναι δύο ὀβολοὺς καὶ καταβαλόντα θεᾶν ἔχειν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν οἱ πένητες λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἀναλώματι, ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου λαμβάνειν ἕκαστον ἐτάχθη τοὺς δύο ὀβολοὺς. Similar accounts are found in the *Souda*, s.v. θ 218, 220, and in scholion (1f) we find the following variant : ὥστε λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν

τῆ πόλει δύο ὀβολούς, ἵνα τὸν μὲν κατάσχη εἰς ἰδίαν τροφήν, τὸν δὲ ἄλλον παρέχειν ἔχῃσι τῷ ἀρχιτέκτονι τοῦ θεάτρου ... (Dilts p.15.28-30). In this version one obol is given as an entrance payment and the other is intended to subsidise the cost of a meal.

There is some evidence from the fourth century that entrance fees were paid. Demosthenes protests that if he had not seen to it that Philip's ambassadors should be given seats of honour, they would have watched the play from the two obol seats : ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἐθεώρουν, D.18.28. This event took place in 346 B.C. However, the specific meaning of ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν is not made clear. He might be meaning seats which cost two obols or he might mean among the subsidised seats.

Two passages in Theophrastos are also pertinent. In the first he says : καὶ ἐν θαύμασι δὲ τοὺς χαλκοῦς ἐκλέγειν καθ' ἕκαστον παριῶν καὶ μάχεσθαι τούτοις τοῖς τὸ σύμβολον φέρουσι καὶ προῖκα θεωρεῖν ἀξιοῦσι, *Char.* 6.4. Theophrastos is talking about a token which would enable individuals to watch an entertainers show free of charge. The nature of the entertainment is unclear. We should, however, be wary of applying the same approach to major religious festivals. The second passage gives firmer evidence : καὶ ξένοις δὲ αὐτοῦ θέαν ἀγοράσασ μὴ δοῦσ τὸ μέρος θεωρεῖν, ἄγειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγόν , *Char.* 9.5. This is certainly suggestive of payment, but we are not informed what sort of event is being attended. The notion of successive days need not necessarily imply a festival, nor is it clear whether Theophrastos is referring to developments which took place towards the end of the fourth or the beginning of the third century B.C..

There is inscriptional evidence from the Peiraiæus that entrance money was paid : [κατάβαλλειν δὲ τοὺς ἦκον]τασ θεωρεῖν ἀργύριο[ν τὸ τέταγμένον πλὴν ὀπό]σοις οἱ δημόται προ[εδρίαν δεδώκασιν εἰς τὰς θεάσ ...], *I.G.* II<sup>2</sup> 1176, 2-4. This inscription is dated to circa 360 B.C. Although the management of a small theatre in the Peiraiæus may not be considered apt evidence for the practice in Athens, particularly at the Theatre of Dionysos, it does show that entrance money was a contemporary practice.

According to Pickard-Cambridge the question of the existence and use of tickets in Athens requires re-examination. He points to articles in which surviving objects have been claimed to be theatre tickets but whose identification is often dubious<sup>(39)</sup>. The problem of distribution adds to the doubt about their existence. There is evidence that the two obol theorik dole was distributed in the demes<sup>(40)</sup>. It is improbable that tickets were also available here, because of the inefficiency inherent in such a system. There is no point in handing over two obols in order for them to be handed straight back, in exchange for tickets. Simpler would be to distribute tickets instead of money. Yet tickets

would have to have been available from other sources for those people, perhaps the well-to-do, who preferred not to accept this subsidy<sup>(41)</sup>. This touches upon the difficult question of who attended the performances ; whether women and metics were permitted to attend. It has been argued that there was insufficient space at the entrance to a theatre to sell tickets at the door<sup>(42)</sup>. Modern commentators may have erroneously inferred the existence of tickets from allusions to entrance money. The silence of comedy on this matter is curious but probably insignificant. None of the sources mentions tickets specifically.

Another inscription deals with the account of a theatre in Akharnai and is dated to the end of the fourth century B.C. : ... τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἑκά[στον τὸν ταμί]αν καὶ τὸν δῆμαρχ[ον οἱ ἂν ἀεὶ ἀρ]χῶσιν : Δ Δ : δραχμὰς [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀργυ]ρίου τοῦ ἐγλεγομέ[νου ἐκ τοῦ θε]άτρου ..., *I.G.* II<sup>2</sup> 1206.2-5. Either this money has come from a lessee of the theatre or else from entrance money. A choice is difficult and invites the question about the need for entrance money.

The sources from late antiquity agree that a nominal entrance fee was introduced in order to alleviate problems caused by overcrowding. Libanios offers a typical account : οὐκ ὄντος τὸ παλαιὸν θεάτρου λιθίνου παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ξυλίνων συμπηγνυμένων ἰκρίων, καὶ πάντων καταλαμβάνειν τόπον σπευδόντων, πλήγαι τ' ἐγίνοντο καὶ πού καὶ τραύματα. τοῦτο κωλύσαι βουλευθέντες οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὠνητοῦς ἐποιήσαντο τοὺς τόπους ..., *Hypoth. ad D.I* , 4 <sup>(43)</sup>. Yet the contemporary sources say nothing about entrance fees, let alone the reasons for introducing them. The account given by Libanios and the others may be a story invented to account for the introduction of a supposed entrance fee. The problems created by inadequate facilities may be based on a historical event in the early fifth century B.C., when part of the theatre may have collapsed. There is some archaeological evidence which can be adduced in support of this theory<sup>(44)</sup>. Thus, the account of the introduction of entrance fees is possible and has been accepted by some commentators<sup>(45)</sup>.

It is appropriate to ask what happened to the money which was paid over as the entrance fee, supposing there was one. One possibility is that all the money was returned to the city coffers<sup>(46)</sup>. This is unacceptable. Tokens would have been just as effective as an entrance fee and reduced costs through less wastage. Some of those who received the dole may not have turned up at the event. There would have been no reason for Demosthenes' ire at this distribution if it consisted of an enclosed flow of money which required little additional expense after the initial outlay. Libanios' position is unclear. Although he makes reference to the absence of a stone theatre, he does not say whether the entrance money was an attempt to reduce overcrowding, and thus prevent further accidents, or whether

the entrance money was meant to subsidise the construction of a new theatre.

Another possibility is that entrance money was paid to the lessee of the theatre who had been granted the contract to run and care for the theatre. There is some inscriptional evidence to back this up, from which Pickard-Cambridge concludes that "in the early fourth century B.C. the deme handed over the theatres to contractors who assumed responsibility of providing seating and appear to have collected the fees for admission, though towards the end of the century we find an ἀρχιτέκτων in charge"<sup>(47)</sup>. Demosthenes makes reference to the ἀρχιτέκτων : ἢ θέαν μὴ κατανεῖμαι τὸν ἀρχιτεκτον' αὐτοῖσ κελεύσαι ; , D.18.28. There seems evidence that the ἀρχιτέκτων was the individual responsible for the running of the theatre, and perhaps in Athens, as in the Peiraios, he was contracted to do the job under a lease. The only way he could recoup his expenses was by collecting entrance money. But we cannot be certain that this was the system in Athens and, if so, at which periods. The practice may have been different for different festivals.

The author of (1f) is thinking along the lines of payment to an ἀρχιτέκτων (Dilts p.15.28-31). He regards one obol as a form of subsidy to an architect in order to build a stone theatre. A subsidy of this kind is anachronistic<sup>(48)</sup>. Besides which, it would be a very long time before sufficient money was raised. The remark about a stone theatre looks as though it may be a gloss which has entered the text at some point during transmission of the scholion. If this is so, then the original commentator is conflating the idea of an entrance fee and a meal subsidy, and would be the only account where the money paid as an entrance fee was one obol. This is the only source which makes a direct reference to a meal subsidy. The contemporary account of Philinos is compatible both with the idea of an entrance fee and with a meal subsidy.

There are those who have picked up on the commentator's account and hold that one obol was for food and that the other was paid as an entrance fee which then returned to the state treasury<sup>(49)</sup>. Such an interpretation places too much weight on the authenticity of a solitary source from late antiquity and makes assumptions about the duty of the ἀρχιτέκτων which appear to go against extant inscriptional evidence.

The evidence is not conclusive, but there seems to be reason to believe that entrance money was paid in order to attend a performance in the theatre even in the 340s B.C.. There is no contemporary evidence to link the two obol theorik dole with this entrance money, and even less to point to the use of tickets. The sources fail to inform us which events they have in mind. For example, a two obol entrance fee may

have been required for all events and only a few of these were subsidised. There could have been a division between religious and non-religious performances. Many of the performances were connected to religious festivals and to our minds it would seem strange to charge people for attending this act of worship. Our attitudes might be very different from the Athenians' of course. A third possibility is that an entrance fee was payable at all events, but that the theorik dole was intended simply as a meal subsidy. A fourth, and more satisfactory interpretation, is to suppose that the two-obol largesse was handed out on the occasion of festivals, but did not match a specific purpose. The recipients could do with it what they wished. The modern Christmas bonus is a useful analogy. The contemporary evidence of Philinos accords with an unspecified purpose. The identification of the theorik dole as entrance money is understood if there happened to be a theatre entrance fee of two obols.

### COST AND ADMINISTRATION

The two obol dole seems to have been restricted to the celebration of the Dionysia at first. This is implied by Philinos' remarks, because, having talked about the institution of the theorik dole during the Dionysia, he goes on to say : ἄλλοτε μέντοι ἄλλως ὤρισθη τὸ διδόμενον εἰς τε τὰς θεῆας καὶ εἰς τὰς θυσίας καὶ εἰς τὰς εἰσορτίας ...<sup>(50)</sup>. The sources which define the theorikon as δραχμη τῆς θεῆας are perhaps thinking that it was given out three times during the Dionysia<sup>(51)</sup>. There is support for the view that theorik money was given out at other times<sup>(52)</sup>. This passage from the *Souda* is a good example : ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλα θεωρικά, ἃ διενέμετο ἐν ταῖς εἰσορτίαις ἢ πόλιν, θ 220. One such occasion was the Great Panathenaia, as Demosthenes tells us : καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἦκε Παναθηναίων ὄντων τῶν μεγάλων τῆ διαδόσει πρὸς τὸ θεωρικόν, D.44.37. There are some commentators who reject the possibility that the theorik distributions were connected with more than a dole given out during festivals<sup>(53)</sup>. There is evidence that there was more to theorik expenditure<sup>(54)</sup>.

The theorik distributions were held to be of great political importance. Plutarch quotes the demagogue Demades who was active in the second half of the fourth century B.C.<sup>(55)</sup> : κόλλαν ὀνομαζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας, *Mor.* 1011B. This is an extravagant assessment of the theorik distributions, especially if they were concerned with a two obol dole a few times a year. It is possible that the political importance of the distribution exceeded its value in terms of cost. However, the importance attached to the theorik money suggests that there was more to it than two-obol distributions.

The financial cost to Athens of the two-obol distributions has elicited varying estimates from commentators. These range from 15

talents or less, according to Jones and Kahrstedt, or as much as 90 talents according to Buchanan and Boeckh<sup>(56)</sup>. The two factors which determine the amount are the number of recipients and the number of occasions when the subsidy was paid. Let us suppose that all the citizens of Athens received the dole, regardless of whether they attended the theatre or not. A recent argument puts forward an adult male population of 30,000<sup>(57)</sup>. This figure is higher than other estimates, and so will give the maximum amount payable. When the subsidy is only paid for three days during the Dionysia, the cost to the city is 5 talents. If we suppose that the subsidy was paid on some 30 occasions, which is a reasonable guess, the cost to Athens is 50 talents. This amount does not seem to warrant the attention which Demosthenes gave to it.

As a comparison, Demosthenes details the cost of the campaign which he is proposing in the *First Philippic*, D.4.28, and this amounts to 92 talents. It is difficult to understand why Demosthenes implies that the cessation of theorik payments would yield sufficient money to finance a double campaign, D.1.17-20. The amount of money involved must have been greater than the 50 talents, unless we agree with Jones that Demosthenes was concerned by the principle of doles and not the sums of money involved<sup>(58)</sup>. However, Demosthenes was in charge of the theorik fund himself in 337 B.C.<sup>(59)</sup>, and since the post was elective, Demosthenes was probably not morally opposed to the theorikon. One way of arguing for a high amount of money is to suppose that the theorik dole was not restricted to adult men but was given to every freeborn inhabitant of Athens to include women. This approach would certainly support the possibility of very large sums of money but would grant women recognition unusual in Athens. The alternative is to suppose that the two-obol dole was only part of an institution which came to be known as the theorika.

There is one passage which suggests that the scope of the theorika was wider. Aiskhines, 3.24-26, argues that Demosthenes should not have received honours before he had completed a εὐθυνα for at least one of his two posts. The two offices which Demosthenes held in 337/6 B.C. are given as follows : ἄρχων μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν ἀρχήν, ἄρχων δὲ τὴν τῶν τειχοποιῶν, Aiskh.3.24. Within a few sentences Aiskhines describes these two offices as follows : Κτησιφῶν δὲ Δημοσθένην τὸν συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς Ἀθήνησιν ἀρχὰς ἀρχοντα οὐκ ὤκνησε γράφαι στεφανῶσαι, Aiskh. 3.26. This is a surprising exaggeration. From the intervening sentences the theorik official emerges as an individual with various responsibilities : πρότερον μὲν τοίνυν, ὧ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀντιγραφῆς ἦν χειροτονητὸς τῆ πόλει, ὅς καθ' ἑκάστην <τὴν> πρυτανείαν ἀπελογίζετο τὰς προσόδους τῷ δήμῳ ' διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Εὐβουλον γεγομένην πίστιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κέχειροτονημένοι ἦρχον μὲν, πρὶν ἢ τὸν Φηγήμονος

νόμον γενέσθαι, τὴν τοῦ ἀντιγραφέως ἀρχήν, ἦρχον δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν, καὶ νεωρίων ἦρχον, καὶ σκευοθήκην ὠκοδόμουν, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ὄδοποιοί, καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν ὅλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως, Aiskh. 3.25(60). It is important to note that the building of dockyards and an arsenal are included among the functions. The date of the law of Hegemon is uncertain but clearly it post-dates Demosthenes' term of office, because he is regarded as being in the same position as Euboulos and his successors(61).

Hegemon's law must have affected the duties of the theorik officer and Rhodes suggests that it may have been at this time that a single officer was replaced by a board(62). The sources of late antiquity may be based on this passage in Aiskhines, and they agree in alluding to an individual(63). There is no reference to a board. In the 320s B.C. the office was collegiate(64). On the other hand, Cawkwell believes that the creation of a theorik commission was Euboulos' achievement. He regards the phrase οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι, Aiskh. 3.25, as evidence of this, whereas Rhodes argues that it could refer to Euboulos' successors(65). They are also divided over the implication of an inscription which is dated to the 340s B.C. and tells us that Ktesiphon was ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικόν(66). This document relates to the βουλή and Cawkwell believes that Ktesiphon was named because he was the theorik official particularly associated with the βουλή. The more obvious way to interpret this inscription is to follow Rhodes and conclude that Ktesiphon was named because he was the only theorik official.

A curious feature about this post is that it was elective. Aristotle comments on three officials who were elected : τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἀπάσας ποιοῦσι κληρωτὰς πλὴν ταμίου στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν καὶ τοῦ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητοῦ. ταῦτα δὲ χειροτονοῦσιν, καὶ οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἀρχουσιν ἐκ Παναθηναίων εἰς Παναθήναια. χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπάσας, *Ath. Pol.* 43.1(67). The period of office which the officials served has received much attention. Some people have taken the phrase ἐκ Παναθηναίων εἰς Παναθηναίων to mean that the officials served for a period of four years corresponding to the cycle of the Great Panathenaia(68). This view has been maintained recently by Davison whose main argument is that when Aristotle talks about the athlothetae who administered the Great Panathenaia, *Ath. Pol.* 60.1-3, he uses the simple form Παναθήναια, instead of including the words τὰ μέγαρα(69). However, because duties of the athlothetai concerned the quadrennial Great Panathenaia, it is natural that he held office for four years and that Aristotle could refer to Παναθήναια in this context without any confusion arising.

Rhodes follows Ferguson in his survey of the pertinent discussions

and puts forward a convincing case in favour of supposing that the phrase ἐκ Παναθηναίων εἰς Παναθήναια takes its meaning from the context<sup>(70)</sup>. They believe that the phrase is not the only consideration in determining the period of office. They are sceptical that these three offices were unique in lasting for a period of four years unlike every other civil office and for no apparent reason. The case of the length of the office of the athlothetai provides an apt comparison. There is reason to believe that the other two offices, ὁ ταμίασ στρατιωτικῶν and ὁ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής, only lasted a year. This would make the theorik official even more unusual. All that Aristotle is trying to say is that these three officers were exceptional in that their year of office was defined by the Panathenaia, which took place on the 28th Hekatombaion, and not by the first day of the Hekatombaion, when other offices commenced.

Problems concerned with the methods of financing the theorikon also imply that the fund was more than simply the two obol dole. Many modern commentators have thought that the theorik money was found from the surpluses left over from the cost of public administration<sup>(71)</sup>. Therefore the amount of money available for theorik distributions would vary from year to year. Buchanan supposed that those in charge of revenue estimated the surpluses from the individual allocations for the coming year and based the distribution on this figure<sup>(72)</sup>. One might argue that if the treasury officials could estimate what needed to be spent, in order to calculate the surplus, there would be no need to continue over-estimating the actual allowance required.

The notion of a fluctuating sum provoked the argument put forward by de Ste Croix and by Cawkwell, that there was no reason to suppose that the official of the theorik money controlled no more money than he distributed<sup>(73)</sup>. They suggest that considerable sums of money had been amassed over the years and that the level of distributions was not dependent on the amount of surplus. This explanation is plausible, but one must accept that the theorik fund was unusual in that it alone could carry over surpluses. Such a unique position could underlie the political importance of the fund.

The distinction between theorik distributions and the theorik fund has been seen as an artifice. In a recent article, Hansen has put forward the case that the evidence about Athenian financial administration does not suggest a system in which money was carried forward from year to year, nor one in which the concept of budgeting for the forthcoming year was adopted<sup>(74)</sup>. Indeed it would be peculiar if the theorik fund was the only treasury which was permitted to carry over surpluses. This must have been the case if de Ste Croix is correct. This interpretation could be true. However, the usual

Athenian practice was to finance regular expenses with an annual allowance from the revenue. It seems, at least in Euboulos' day, that the surpluses from one year were allocated to the theorik fund. This interpretation allows for a regular contribution of varying amount and for the possibility that the sums involved were very large. It would be curious if the theorik fund was financed solely by surpluses and did not receive an annual allowance.

The political importance of the theorik fund is clear. The post of supervising magistrate was elective. At first an individual was in charge but after the law of Hegemon was passed a commission oversaw the fund. It is particularly important to note the scope of the theorik magistrate's duties from the time of Euboulos until the law of Hegemon. Aiskhines tells us quite clearly that the theorik magistrates were in charge of dockyards and were building an arsenal amongst other duties. Harpokration and other sources mention that money which was originally allocated for military purposes later became theorik. It is possible that these are, in fact, references to a period when the theorik magistrate took over the responsibility for the building of dockyards and the arsenal. The theorik fund was initially connected with festivals as the name suggests, and it is difficult to see how the dockyards and arsenal fell under its auspices, unless we suppose that these duties were originally the responsibility of the stratotik magistrates and that Euboulos transferred the responsibility in order to weaken the budget for military adventures.

The funding is less clear-cut. At the time of the *First Olynthiac* the theorik fund will have received an annual allocation. It is likely that this amount was supplemented by surpluses from other expenditure. Perhaps this fund could carry over surpluses from year to year. More may be learned about the finance of the fund from laws connected with its administration.

#### LAWS CONNECTED WITH ΤΑ ΘΕΩΡΙΚΑ

The significance of the theorika is reflected in the legislation connected with it. Evidence for these laws is to be found in D.1, 3, 13, [D]59 and numerous scholia. The *First Olynthiac* furnishes us with the most direct indication of a law : 'τί οὖν ;' ἄν τις εἴποι 'σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά ;' μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, D.1.19. The sources interpret this to mean that Demosthenes is not willing to make an overt proposal that τὰ θεωρικά become τὰ στρατιωτικά, though that is what he is implying. He is at pains to differentiate between γράφω and συμβουλεύω.

Commentators from late antiquity onwards have seen in this a law which prevented anyone from proposing that τὰ θεωρικά become τὰ στρατιωτικά. Libanios tells us that anyone who did so was liable to be

sentenced to death : θάνατον ἀπειλοῦντα τῷ γράφαντι μετατεθῆναι ταῦτ' εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν τάξιν καὶ γενέσθαι στρατιωτικά, *Hypoth. ad D.1*, 5. The author of scholion (1f) on the *First Olynthiac* informs us that Euboulos was responsible for this law : ... βουλόμενος Εὐβουλος ὁ πολιτευόμενος δημαγωγὸς ὃν πλείονα εὐνοίαν ἐπισπάσασθαι τοῦ δήμου πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἔγραφε νόμον τὸν κελεύοντα θανάτῳ ζημιούσθαι εἰ τις ἐπιχειροίη μεταποιεῖν τὰ θεωρικὰ στρατιωτικά, (Dilts p.16.14-17). Other scholia support the view that Demosthenes was inhibited by a law of Euboulos<sup>(75)</sup>.

Our sources tell us that the law prevented the transfer of theorik money to the stratiotik fund. They also imply that this transfer involved the return of funds which were originally earmarked as stratiotik : ταῦτα δὲ πρότερον μὲν εἰς τὰς τοῦ πολέμου χρείας ἐφυλάττετο καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο στρατιωτικά, ὕστερον δὲ κατετίθετο εἰς τὰς τε τὰς δημοσίας κατασκευὰς καὶ διανομὰς, Harp. s.v. θεωρικά ; ἐπειδήπερ χρήματα ἔχοντες στρατιωτικά οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνάγχος αὐτὰ πεποιήκασιν θεωρικά ... εἶτα βουλόμενος ὁ Δημοσθένης ταῦτα μεταβαλεῖν εἰς στρατιωτικά, (1f) (Dilts p.15.27-32) ; εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τοῖς στρατευμένοις ἀποδώσετε, D.1.19<sup>(76)</sup>. The use of μεταποιεῖν in (1f) (Dilts p.16.17) may also be indicative of a transfer. The question remains about the specific money which these passages are referring to. One possibility is that the whole of the stratiotik fund had been given over for theorik purposes<sup>(77)</sup>. Even allowing for financing campaigns by other means, such as σύνταξις, εἰσφορά or ἐπίδοσις, we should be wary of supposing that the Athenians were without any public allowance for military purposes in the middle of the fourth century B.C..

The sources do not explain what they mean, exactly, by τὰ θεωρικά. It is possible that Demosthenes is talking about surpluses and not theorika in D.1.19. He suggests that surpluses should be allocated to the stratiotik fund and not, presumably, to the theorik fund. There are two problems with this interpretation. The first is that there is reason to believe that in 349 B.C. when the *First Olynthiac* was delivered, there was a law which permitted surpluses to be allocated to the stratiotik fund in the event of war. This law is discussed below. Therefore, Demosthenes' reticence is peculiar. His careful use of vocabulary suggests that he does not wish to propose something illegal. The second reason to doubt that Demosthenes is referring to surpluses is that the amounts of money may not have been sufficient to finance a full-scale campaign.

The alternative interpretation is to suppose that Demosthenes is proposing to re-allocate part of the annual allowance to the stratiotik fund. It is clear from Aiskhines that the theorik magistrates had functions which appear to be more appropriate for a military budget. What Demosthenes is proposing is an increase in the military budget,

perhaps to its full strength<sup>(78)</sup>. Arguably, he is not opposed to the theorika as such, but to the stranglehold of the magistrate of the theorika and the use of the city's money and the ban on military use. This interpretation suits what the sources say about money which was formerly stratiotik becoming theorik. Euboulos would appear to be behind a law which prevented the transfer of theorik money to the stratiotik fund. The severity of the penalty is surely an indication of the sums involved in the theorik fund. This law must have been in force by 353 B.C., because of the dates when the *First Olynthiac* and the speech *On the Syntaxeis* were delivered<sup>(79)</sup>. The intention behind the law is a desire to thwart the temptation to commit Athens to a military adventure which she could not afford.

We know of a second law concerning the theorik money : ἔγραφε φήσιμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος βουλευῶν καὶ ἐξήνεγκε προβούλευμα εἰς τὸν δῆμον, λέγον διαχειροτονῆσαι τὸν δῆμον εἴτε δοκεῖ τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι εἴτε θεωρικά, κελεύοντων μὲν τῶν νόμων, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι, [D] 59.4. The circumstance of this passage relates to a proposal by Apollodoros in 348 B.C. before the ekklesia, that the people should take a vote on whether or not to discuss the allocation of the surpluses ; specifically whether they should be used for military purposes. The people appear to have supported this proposal and it was agreed in the ensuing discussion that the surpluses should be allocated to the stratiotik fund : γενομένης γὰρ τῆς διαχειροτονίας, οὐδεὶς ἀντεχειροτόνησεν ὡς οὐ δεῖ τοῖς χρήμασι τούτοις στρατιωτικοῖς χρῆσθαι, [D] 59.5. Apollodoros was, however, subsequently prosecuted successfully by Stephanos for having introduced a γραφή παρανόμων. The reason which the speaker Theomnestos puts forward as the ground is that Apollodoros was a debtor to the state and therefore barred from introducing legislation. Apollodoros was fined one talent<sup>(80)</sup>.

Many commentators believe that Demosthenes and Apollodoros were confronted by the same law, that is a law of Euboulos concerning the theorik money which included the death penalty. This is a law which prohibited the transference of money from the theorik fund to the stratiotik. This interpretation raises certain problems. Apollodoros was fined only one talent although the death penalty was stipulated. Libanios states quite clearly that there was to be no transference of money to the stratiotik fund, whereas Apollodoros refers to a law whereby surpluses may be allocated to the stratiotik fund. Theomnestos says that Apollodoros was convicted on a technicality and no reference is made to the substance of his proposal being illegal. Finally, what provoked Apollodoros to embark on this course of action when Demosthenes so clearly refused to do so ?

Scholars in antiquity were puzzled too and the solution offered by

the author of (1f) is a rearrangement of the chronology of events. Thus Apollodoros' decree provokes Euboulos into proposing the law prohibiting the transference of funds on pain of death, and thereafter Demosthenes is hamstrung. Some modern commentators have accepted this interpretation without taking into account that Demosthenes' hesitancy dates from 351 B.C. and that Apollodoros was prosecuted in 348 B.C.<sup>(81)</sup>.

This distortion of chronology quite rightly provokes objection. Cawkwell sought to explain the discrepancies by reinterpreting [D] 59.4<sup>(82)</sup>. He argues that Apollodoros was being deliberately misleading about the state of affairs, and that there was no such law governing surpluses to the effect that surpluses could be stratiotik in time of war. He adds that even if there had been such a law, it had existed only in the period before Euboulos introduced his law prohibiting the transference of funds. This is an unsound approach to interpreting evidence. Apollodoros would have been liable to more serious charges for lying. Cawkwell argues that the alleged charge of being a debtor to the state is a clumsy attempt by Theomnestos to conceal the fact that the proposal was in substance unconstitutional<sup>(83)</sup>. It may be that Cawkwell is correct in thinking that the proposal was unconstitutional, but not for the reason which he gives<sup>(84)</sup>. We do not know what that reason is and it is possible that the term γραφή παρανόμων is incorrect.

Hansen developed the idea, first put forward by Kahrstedt, that the law concerning the theorik money which Apollodoros was interested in was not the same as the law which inhibited Demosthenes. He argued persuasively that there are no contradictions between our sources<sup>(85)</sup>.

If Apollodoros had been interested in the same law which hampered Demosthenes in 349 B.C., we should have to account for the fact that it took Demosthenes another ten years before the law was finally changed in 339/8 B.C.<sup>(86)</sup>. This despite the indifference of the people towards it in 348 B.C.. It is important to realise that Demosthenes is talking about the transference of money from one fund to another. A considerable sum of money was probably involved. The surpluses were entirely different. The amount of money would vary from year to year. It would seem that it had become customary, if not legally binding, for the surpluses to be paid into the theorik fund, with the proviso that in time of war surpluses would go to the stratiotik fund instead. In 348 B.C. the Athenians were indeed at war and therefore Apollodoros' proposal was appropriate<sup>(87)</sup>. Hansen notes that Apollodoros' decree concerned a discussion about whether to oppose the stricture of the law and was not an open discussion about what to do with the surpluses<sup>(88)</sup>.

It is also important to realise that Demosthenes did not abolish

the theorik fund in 339/8 B.C.. Philokhoros, as quoted by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, tells us about the event : ταῦτα γράφασ κατὰ Θεόφραστον ἄρχοντα γεγονέναι, τῶι μετ' ἐκείνον ἐνιαυτῶι τὰ πραχθέντα μετὰ τὴν λύσιν τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπὶ Λυσιμαχίδου ἄρχοντος διεξέρχεται. θήσω δὲ καὶ τούτων [αὐτῶν] τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ' << Λυσιμαχίδης Ἀχαρνεύς ' ἐπὶ τούτου τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ περὶ τοὺς νεωσοίκους καὶ τὴν σκευοθήκην ἀνεβάλλοντο διὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἐφηφίσαντο πάντ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά, Δημοσθένους γράφαντος. Φιλίππου δὲ καταλαβόντος Ἐλάτεια καὶ Κυτίνον καὶ πρέσβεις πέμφαντος εἰς Θήβας, Θετταλῶν, Αἰνιάνων, Αἰτωλῶν, Δολόπων, Φθιωτῶν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πρέσβεις ἀποστειλάντων τοὺς περὶ Δημοσθένη. τούτοις συμμαχεῖν ἐφηφίσαντο >> D.H. *ad Amm*1.11 (Philokh. *FGH* 328 Frag. 56a). It is possible that Demosthenes is proposing the same implementation of the law as Apollodoros, but it is unlikely. The implication of these words, together with the passage in Aiskhines, is that Demosthenes is proposing that part of the theorik budget be used for military purposes, specifically those monies which were spent on the dockyards and the arsenal.

The following year Demosthenes was in charge of the theorik fund.

It is not likely, as Kahrstedt suggests, that Demosthenes wanted all of the theorik fund to be used for military purposes for just one year<sup>(89)</sup>. This is not what Demosthenes implies in his use of the word ἀποδώσετε, D.1.19, unless we assume that there was no longer a stratiotik fund and that the theorik fund had acquired it all.

## EISPHORA AND TA ΘΕΩΡΙΚΑ

Demosthenes remarks that if the Athenians will not finance a campaign by tapping the theorik fund then : ἔστι δὲ λοιπόν, οἶμαι, πάντα εἰσφέρειν, ἂν πολλῶν δέη, πολλά, ἂν ὀλίγων, ὀλίγα, D.1.20. From the tone of the speech at this point, he is assuming that the Athenians will prefer to use the theorik fund if faced with this choice. This is odd, because eisphora was a selective tax and the theorikon involved loss to everyone<sup>(90)</sup>. We might assume, therefore, that the majority of people would choose the selective tax since they would not have to pay it.

Furthermore, we have to account for Demosthenes' phrase πάντα εἰσφέρειν. The authors of the scholia certainly take him literally<sup>(91)</sup>, and yet it is probable that he is exaggerating for rhetorical effect. Alternatively, Demosthenes could be correct to use the word πάντα if the ekklesia was 'packed' with those wealthy people who would have to pay the eisphora. This is a dubious proposition. It is possible that the Athenians were unwilling for personal taxes to be levied, whether or not they were liable individually. There is some evidence in support of this<sup>(92)</sup>.

Rhetorical effect is the most plausible explanation. Demosthenes is not talking about the relatively small amount of money involved in a two-obol distribution, though he emphasises the unproductive aspect of the expenditure. He is talking about a large sum of money which had been transferred from the stratiotik fund into the theorik fund, probably by Euboulos. In this case the equivalent eisphora would be huge. Evidence shows that eisphora brought in only small amounts<sup>(93)</sup>. Demosthenes wishes to fund a double campaign. The only way to raise such a sum without bankrupting individuals would be, so Demosthenes suggests, to extend the liability for payment to cover everyone. Demosthenes is giving them no choice.

## SCHOLIA

There are numerous references to the theorik money in the scholia. All the important traditions note that Demosthenes is alluding to the theorik money in the *First Olynthiac*, even though he himself does not mention it specifically. Any commentator who was acquainted with the other Demosthenic speeches, notably the *Third Olynthiac* and *On the Syntaxis*, would spot this allusion.

Ulpian is positive that Demosthenes' tactful handling of the question of finance, especially in D.1.19-20, concerns Euboulos and the theorik money (Dilts p.11.5-12). Ulpian also finds an allusion to finance and, therefore, the theorik money in the προίμιον (Dilts p.5.26-6.13). It has already been noted that he takes Demosthenes to mean that everyone will have to pay eisphora (Dilts p.3.29-31).

The contribution of the author of (1f) is familiar. This is a long scholion which discusses the reason for the remark about τὰ χρήματα in D.1.1. One possibility is that Demosthenes has been accused of being bribed by the King of Persia (Dilts p.15.22-23). This account might have been inspired by the *Fourth Philippic* delivered in 341 B.C., in which Demosthenes proposes seeking help from the King of Persia. Alternatively, the remark might be a means of preparing the audience for the tricky subject of eisphora (Dilts p.15.24-26). The explanation favoured by the commentator is that χρήματα is an allusion to the theorik money. This interpretation prompts a long discussion (Dilts p.15.27-16.21).

Several of the points arising from this discussion have been mentioned already<sup>(94)</sup>, and the main defect has been outlined by Cawkwell<sup>(95)</sup>. The commentator or his source, has muddled the chronology of events in the mid-fourth century B.C. in order to account for Demosthenes' hesitancy in challenging the theorik law. Cawkwell is along the correct lines but has failed to discern two separate laws. This scholion is the only source which diverges from the idea of a two obol entrance fee. Instead, one obol is paid for admittance and one

obol supplements the cost of a meal (Dilts p.15.29-31). However, the commentator is wrong to imply that the state was subsidising the construction of a stone theatre by means of this single obol (Dilts p.15.30-31).

The commentator is also mistaken in ascribing the institution of the theorikon to Perikles. The reason which the commentator gives for Perikles doing this is the exploitation of the problem of overcrowding at the theatre in order to promote his popularity (Dilts p.16.8-13). He has probably based his account on Plutarch, Libanios or another source. This sort of account was obviously widely accepted in late antiquity.

Scholion (1c) also tells us that D.1.1 alludes to the theorik money (Dilts p.14.17sqq). Scholia (126a) and (126b) look at the significance of the compound in ἀποδώσετε. (127) (Dilts p.40.12,13) and (128a) note that the remarks about finance in D.1.19-20 concern the theorik money. (44b) notes that Demosthenes' remark about eisphora in D.1.6 is a tactic which he employs in order to persuade the Athenians to choose the theorik money as the source of finance (Dilts p.27.6-8). There is no reason to suppose that any of these scholia have had an influence on any other. The interpretations which they offer appear to be conventional<sup>(96)</sup>.

In the *Third Olynthiac*, delivered a little later in 349B.C., Demosthenes speaks openly of emending a law concerning the theorik money, D.3.11, 19, and 31. Not surprisingly then the commentators on the *Third Olynthiac* echo these sentiments. References to the theorikon or Euboulos occur in (1g), (24b), (73), (80), (90a), (103), (109), (126), (151a), (158), (162), (163) and (170). Two points arise from the remainder. In (67) the commentator argues that there were not many laws concerning the theorikon as Demosthenes suggests, D.3.10-11. Demosthenes deliberately muddles νομοι with φηφισματα in order not to seem to be opposing Euboulos alone but all the nomothetai (Dilts p.91. 16-20)<sup>(97)</sup>. The author makes a second interesting point : εἰ μὲν τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆ θεωρία ἐδίδοσαν οἷστον ἂν ἦν ' νῦν δὲ τὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τοῖς θεωροῦσι νέμουσιν' (Dilts p.91.15-16). The author feels that Demosthenes has no moral objection to theorik distributions. This interpretation supports the view that only part of the theorik funds came from money originally designated for military purposes. (154a) and (154c) also argue that the principle of theorik distributions is not an issue. Demosthenes, so they say, simply wants them to limit the misthophorai which they take in time of war<sup>(98)</sup>.

The *Fourth Philippic* is particularly interesting, because Demosthenes argues that the theorik money should not be tapped in order to finance military campaigns but that the Athenians should look to the King of Persia for financial assistance. This speech is dated to 341 B.C. and yet in the preceding years Demosthenes appeared

antagonistic towards the theoric fund. In 339 B.C. he advocates the use of theoric funds for military purposes. This apparent inconsistency in attitude has encouraged speculation about the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic* which had arisen because this speech, uniquely in the Demosthenic corpus, is composed of passages found in other speeches<sup>(99)</sup>.

If we suppose that the speech is genuine, then there are three possible reasons for the inconsistency. Demosthenes' change of heart could have been a temporary brain-storm. Alternatively, he might have felt that the King of Persia provided the only solution, given the Athenians' obvious unwillingness to relinquish any of the theoric money or to pay an eisphora. Thirdly, Demosthenes could be trying to deceive the Athenians. In comparison with the option of seeking assistance from the King of Persia, any other means of payment seemed preferable.

There are three exceptionally long, discursive scholia which refer in part to this question ; (1) (Dilts p.144.17-29), (5) (Dilts p.147.8-15) and (9) (Dilts p.153.10-154.5). A detailed study of the scholia on this speech will reveal whether they are all part of one discussion. Certainly there is no inconsistency in the substance of these three parts. The commentator feels that Demosthenes' plea for an embassy to the King of Persia is quite authentic. Clearly some of his predecessors found difficulty with this interpretation and the commentator dismisses their concerns about the theoric money as misplaced.

The scholia on the speech *On the Syntaxis* consist almost exclusively of one long discussion. Remarkably, the author has recognised that D.13 must have been delivered before any of the *Philippics*, including the *Olynthiacs*. It has been dated to 353/2 B.C.. There are frequent references to Euboulos' responsibility for having made stratiotik money theoric (Dilts p.163.2-12, 17-27, 167.10-18).

A poor sense of chronology is the worst fault of the commentators in the scholia and yet the author of the remarks mentioned above is attentive. Perhaps it would be accurate to say that the commentators themselves represent conventional interpretations. But here, the author of the scholia on the *Fourth Philippic* proves an obvious exception. The commentators cannot be trusted absolutely but they are frequently accurate, if only by luck, and do offer valuable ideas about the interpretation of primary sources.

## NOTES ON THE THEORIK FUND

- (1) J.J.Buchanan, *Theorika*, New York 1962, p.29 n.1 lists Boeckh, Fickelsherer, Motzki, Francotte, Schwahn, Busolt and Swoboda.
- (2) v. van Ooteghem, "Demosthene et le Theoricon", *Études Classiques* 1 (1932), pp 390-1 and cf Buchanan loc.cit. pp30-31.
- (3) = Philokhoros *FGH* 328 Fr 33.
- (4) E.Ruschenbusch, "Die Einfuhrung des Theorikon", *ZPE* 36 (1979), pp306-307. The conjecture about Philokhoros is supported by Schwahn, Busolt and Swoboda ; for references v. Buchanan loc. cit. p.51 n.1.
- (5) v. Jacoby *FGH* III Suppl. I, pp.249-255 and cf pp.103-106.
- (6) v. n. 4 and n. 5.
- (7) Cawkwell, "Eubulus", *JHS* 83 (1963) pp.47-67, p.55 n.53.
- (8) This suggestion is discussed on [pp.270-271] below.
- (9) For assembly pay v. Aristoph. *Ekkli* 183-188, 292, 296-9, 309-310, 380, 392, *Wasps* 594-594. For jury pay v. *Wasps* 690-695, *Knights* 50-51.
- (10) Ruschenbusch loc.cit. p.308 : *Fur Plutarch ist Perikles der Begrunder des Wohlfahrtsstaates* . v. also Plut. *Per.* 9sq. It has been pointed out that Plato *Gorgias* 515e was also a starting point for Plutarch's interpretation : ταντὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποικηκέναι Ἀθηναίουσ ἀργούσ καὶ δειλούσ καὶ λάλουσ καὶ φιλαργύρουσ εἰσ μισθοφορίαν πρώτον καταστήσαντα ... ὦ Σώκρατες. However, there is no reason to associate this with anything other than pay for jury service, v. Buchanan loc.cit. p.30 and *Ath. Pol.* 27.4.
- (11) Buchanan loc.cit. pp.31-35. Also Plut. *Per.* 9sq.
- (12) Thouk. 2.38.1, Ps. Xen *Const.Ath.* 2.9.
- (13) van Ooteghem loc.cit. p.391.
- (14) Buchanan loc.cit. p.33 n.2.
- (15) v. Delz, *Lukians Kenntnis der Athenischen Antiquitäten*, Freiburg 1950 p.17, cited by Buchanan loc.cit. p.30 n.2, cf p.90 n.2.
- (16) For references v. van Ooteghem loc.cit. p.394 n.2, and Buchanan loc.cit. p.35 n.2.
- (17) Also van Ooteghem loc.cit. pp.393-395.
- (18) For the state of the economy v. n. 20 below for van Ooteghem and n.35 for Cawkwell.
- (19) v. Buchanan loc.cit. pp.35-36 ; D.18.28, 13.9-10 and *Arist.Pol* 1267<sup>b</sup>1sq. Meiggs and Lewis *Greek Historical Inscriptions* no.84 lines 22-23 and the comment p.260. cf the joke about this in Aristoph. *Frogs* 139-142.
- (20) van Ooteghem loc.cit. pp.396-7 and cf Buchanan loc.cit. pp.49-50 rejecting van Ooteghem's view. Buchanan favours Agyrrhios as the founder.
- (21) v. n.4 and n. 5.
- (22) v. *RE* 1 914.
- (23) v. Ruschenbusch loc.cit. p.306.
- (24) v. Diod. 14.82.1, Paus. 8.45.4.
- (25) Buchanan favours the earlier date, loc.cit. p.51 n.2. Most commentators disagree and favour a later date. Beloch *GG* III p.343 n.2, van Ooteghem loc.cit. p.398 n.5, Cawkwell loc.cit p.48 and Ruschenbusch loc.cit. p.306.
- (26) v. Cawkwell loc.cit.p.55.
- (27) Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά.
- (28) Kahrstedt, "Demosthenes und die Theorika", *Nachrichten Gesellschaft Wiss. Gottingen, Philol. Hist. Kl.*, 2 (1929) pp.156-163, p.157 and van Ooteghem loc.cit. pp.397-8.
- (29) v. *RE* 19.2, 2175.
- (30) v. [p.267].
- (31) = *FGH* Theopompos *FGH* 115 Fr 99.

- (32) v. Ruschenbusch, loc.cit. p.306. For Philinos v. [p271 ].
- (33) Timagenes of Alexandria was his main source, and the former had access, presumably, to the works of the Atthidographers in the libraries of Alexandria. v. also *RE* 21.2, 2300 and esp. 2307.
- (34) Kahrstedt loc.cit. p.157.
- (35) Cawkwell loc.cit. p.55.
- (36) Ruschenbusch loc.cit. p.306.
- (37) v. Harpocration s.v. θεωρικά – κατασκευὰς, διανομὰς.
- (38) v. Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά.
- (39) Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*<sup>2</sup> pp.270-2 and p.270 n.5 for a list of the pertinent articles.
- (40) v. D.44.37, Hyper. 1.26. Lukian mistakenly suggests the tribes, *Timon* 49, cf Buchanan loc.cit. p.90 n.2 and p.91.
- (41) Inference from D.21.203 that not everyone accepted the money. For evidence that foreigners could purchase tickets v. D.18.28.
- (42) v. Kahrstedt loc.cit. p.158.
- (43) v. *Souda* θ 218, 220 and scholion (1f) for similar accounts.
- (44) v. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens*, Oxford 1946, pp.12-15.
- (45) v. Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*, Oxford 1898, p.368sqq.
- (46) v. Kahrstedt loc.cit. p.158.
- (47) Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals*, pp.46-47, 266. For inscriptional evidence from the Peiraios v. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 456 32-33 (307/306 B.C.), *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1176.2-4 (circa 360 B.C.). For Athens v. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 466 lines 52-53 (307/306 B.C.), 500 lines 33-36 (302/301 B.C.), 512 lines 7-8 (late fourth century), *SEG* XIV (1957) 65 lines 42-44 (271-270 B.C.), *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 792 lines 8-9 (230 B.C.).
- (48) Thanks are due to Professor MacDowell for this observation.
- (49) v. Kahrstedt loc.cit pp.158, 160.
- (50) v. Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά.
- (51) Philokhoros *FGH* 328 Fr 33 (Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά), Hesychios and the *Souda* s.v. δραχμή χαλάζωσα. Whether or not the festival itself lasted longer v. Pickard-Cambridge *Dramatic Festivals*<sup>2</sup> pp.63-67.
- (52) Harpocration. loc.cit. ὕστερον (also *Souda* θ 218, 219), Harpocration. s.v. Εὐβουλος (Theopompos *FGH* 115 Fr 99), *schol. ad Aiskh.* 3.24.
- (53) Cawkwell loc.cit. p.53 n.43.
- (54) v. [pp.280-284].
- (55) v. *RE* 4, 2703.
- (56) A.H.M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy*, Oxford 1957, pp.33-35. Also, Kahrstedt loc.cit. pp.159-160 ; Buchanan (following Boeckh) loc.cit. p.88.
- (57) M.H.Hansen, *Demography and Democracy : The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C.*, Herning 1986, pp.65-69.
- (58) Jones loc.cit. p.34 but cf. Hyper 1.13; [pp.285-7].
- (59) Aiskhines 3.24.
- (60) v. Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά: ὕστερον δὲ κατετίθετο εἰς τε τὰς δημοσίας κατασκευὰς καὶ διανομὰς. κατασκευὰς need not refer exclusively to religious events. There is an inference in Deinarkhos that the money was not spent on military affairs at all. D13.30 refers to public works rather than a military purpose. v. also Aiskh. 3.24-26.
- (61) Gwatkin and Shuckburgh, following Boeckh, favour 330 B.C. in their commentary. Cawkwell loc.cit. p.54 n.48 prefers 335-334 B.C.
- (62) P.J.Rhodes. *The Athenian Boule* p.235.
- (63) eg. Harp. s.v. Θεωρικά = *Souda* θ 219 : ἀρχή τις ; *Souda* θ 218 : τὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ

- ἔφεστηκότα θεωρικὸν ἀρχὴν ἔλεγον ἀρχεῖν; *Souda* θ 220 : ὁ τῶν ἐπιμελούμενων.
- (64) Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.1, 47.2.
- (65) Cawkwell loc.cit. pp.47 n.4, 55. cf Rhodes loc.cit. p.235 and also Buchanan loc.cit. pp.57-60 and de Ste Croix, *CR* N.S. 14 (1964) pp.190-191.
- (66) *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 223 C5.
- (67) v. also Aiskh. 3.24-26.
- (68) v. Buchanan loc.cit. pp.57-59, esp. p.58 n.3. Also v. van Ooteghem loc.cit. p.399 and Andreades, *History of Greek Public Finance*, pp.374, 376 n.5.
- (69) v. Davison, "Notes on the Panathenaia", *JHS* 78 (1958) pp.23, 31-33. cf F.W. Mitchel, *TAPA* 93 1962 pp.220-221 and nn. 19, 20. v. also Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London 1911, pp.474-475.
- (70) v. Rhodes loc.cit. pp.235-240.
- (71) Based on [D] 59.4 : τὰ περίοντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως.
- (72) v. Buchanan loc.cit. pp.88-90.
- (73) de Ste Croix loc.cit. p.191 and Cawkwell loc.cit. p.56.
- (74) Hansen, *GRBS* 17 1976 pp.241-242.
- (75) v. [pp.285-287].
- (76) v. also (67) on D.3.11 which is discussed on [p.286].
- (77) This is the view of Brun, *Eisphora, Syntaxis, Stratiotika*, p.173 : *Mais puisque ces fonds, quoique portant vocables différents, étaient en réalité identiques, il n'y a pas lieu d'imaginer, sous l'administration d'Eubule, deux trésoreries séparées.*
- (78) This is Hansen's conclusion in *GRBS* loc.cit. p.244.
- (79) *First Olynthiac* 349 B.C. and *Syntaxis* 353 B.C..
- (80) [D] 59.4. Hansen *GRBS* loc.cit. p.236 n.10. For fuller details about the procedures v. Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.*, esp. p.34 cat.18 and MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* pp.48-50.
- (81) Buchanan loc.cit. pp.60-62. Also v. Glotz "Demosthene et les finances atheniennes de 346 a 339", *Revue Historique* 170 1932 p.392.
- (82) Cawkwell loc.cit. pp.59-61.
- (83) Cawkwell loc.cit. p.58.
- (84) Hansen, *GRBS* loc.cit. p.240 n.18 and *Sovereignty* loc.cit. p.34 cat.18, argues that Apollodoros may have been at fault for suggesting that the decision rested with the people.
- (85) v. Kahrstedt loc.cit. p.161 and n.84 above.
- (86) D.H. *ad. Amm.* 11 (Philokhoros *FGH* 328 Fr 56a) and cf Sopater in Walz 5 p.181.
- (87) v. Cawkwell loc.cit. pp.59-60 and n.76 ; Rhodes loc.cit. p.105 n.4.
- (88) Hansen loc.cit. p.245 n.27.
- (89) cf Kahrstedt loc.cit. p.162 and probably Brun v. n.77.
- (90) Thomsen, *Eisphora* pp.195-196 ; Brun loc.cit. pp. 15-22.
- (91) v. (136a) on [pp.190, 285].
- (92) v. Isok. 7.51 ; Xen. *Rev* 6.1 ; D.21.203.
- (93) v. Cawkwell, *Mnemosyne* 15 1962 p.380 says that eisphorai did not much exceed 300 Talents in twenty years and refers to D.22.44.
- (94) v. [pp.275, 281].
- (95) Cawkwell *JHS* loc.cit. pp.59-61.
- (96) cf [Hermog.] (Rabe p.446.11-447.3) who comes to very similar conclusions about the προίμιον and states that χρήματα refers to τὰ θεωρικά unlike Ulpian whose identification is found by inference from (Dilts p.5.26-6.13, p.11.5-12).
- (97) cf (1g) on D.3.1 : εἰ χρὴ λῦσαι τοὺς νόμους τοὺς θεωρικούς, (Dilts p.82.22-23).
- (98) v. D.3.33sqq.
- (99) v. Buchanan loc.cit. p.67 n.1 defends the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*, cf

D.M. MacDowell in *CR* 20 (1970) p.321.

## APPENDIX TWO

This table shows the scholia which are attributed to R by Dindorf, Dilts and my own identification from a photograph of R.

+ indicates my own identification

++ indicates Dilts' confirmation (v. R [p.84])

	Dilts (refs to Scholion no.)	Dindorf (refs to page no.)	Photograph	
D1.1	(1a) S	29.1 RS	+	
	(1c) R	29.5 R	+	
	(1d) R	as (1c)	+	
	(2a)	33.20 YTCV	+	
	(2b)	as (2a)	+	
	(3a)	34.4 R	+	
	(3b)	as (3a)	+	
	(3c)	as (3a)	+	
	(5a)	34.26	+	
	(5c) R	34.29 R	+	
	(5d) R	35.3 R	+	
	(9a) S	36.17 RS	+	
	D1.2	(11b) R	37.5 R	+
		(11c) R	37.13 R	+
(11d) R		37.18 R	+	
(14c) R		38.11 R	+	
(19) S		39.9 S	+	
D1.3	(22) R	39.16 R	+	
	(23) R	39.25 R	+	
	(24) R	40.4 R	+	
	(25) R	40.10 R	+	
	(26a) R	40.17 R	+	
	(26b) S	40.20 S	+	
	(26c) S	40.21 RS	+	
	(26d) R	40.23 R	+	
	(28) R	41.13 R	+	
D1.4	(29) R	41.9 R		
	(31) R	42.2 R	+	
	(33a) S	42.10 RS	+	
	(33b) S	42.19 RS		
	(33c) S	42.22 RS		
D1.5	(36b) R	42.34 R	+	
	(37) R	43.12 R	+	
	(39a) R	43.24 R	+	
	(40a) S	44.17 RS	+	
	(41a) S	44.26 RS	+	

	Dilts	Dindorf	Photo
D1.6	(44b) SR	45.15 RS	+
D1.7	(51a) R	46.10 R	+
D1.8	(52a) S	47.13 RS	+
	(53a) S		+
	(53c) S	47.24 R	+
	(53d) R	48.7 R	+
	(54) S	48.26 RS	+
	(55) S	49.4 RS	
	(57) S	49.6 RS	
	(59a) S	49.12 RS	
	(60a) S	49.17 RS	+
	(60b) S	as (60a)	+
	(67a) S	50.23 RS	
	(69) S	51.3 RS	+
	(70) S	as (69)	+
	(71c) R		+
	(72) S	51.23 RS	
D1.10	(74) R	52.2 R	+
	(75a) R	52.24 R	++
	(75b) R	52.26 R	+
D1.11	(83b) R	53.5 R	+
	(89) S	53.26 RS	++
D1.12	(92a) S	54.8 RS	+
	(92b) R	52.19 RS	
	(93a) R	54.21 R	
	(94) R	54.24 R	+
D1.14	(105c) S	56.3 RS	+
	(109) S	57.7 RS	
D1.15	(112) S	57.17 RS	+
	(114a) S	57.19 RS	
	(114b) S	as (114a)	
	(116) neither	58.8 R	
D1.17	(119a) R	59.18 R	++
D1.18	(122a) S	59.26 RS	++
	(123a) S	60.8 RS	++
D1.19	(124) S	60.14 RS	++
	(125b) S	60.18 RS	
D1.20	(129) S	61.11 RS	++
	(131a) S	61.15 RS	++
	(132a) S	61.19 RS	+
	(135) S	62.4 R	++
	(137a) S	62.11 RS	++
D1.21	(140c) S	62.25 RS	+

	Dilts	Dindorf	Photo
D1.22	(151) S	64.13 RS	+
	(156b) S	65 n.8 RS	++
D.1.23	(157)	65.12 RS	++
D.1.24	(164a) S	66.15 RS	+
	(167) S	67.12 R	
	(169a) S	68.3 RS	
D1.26	(178) S	69.7 RS	
D1.27	(180) S	69.13 RS	
D1.28	(192a) S	70.13 RS	++
	(192b) R	70.14 RS	++

Additional scholia found in codex S and not in R (nD indicates that the scholion is not attributed to S by Dindorf) :

(4), (6), (8), (11a), (13a), (13b), (14a), (15b), (16), (21a), (27a), (33a), (33b), (50)nD, (55), (57), (59a), (67a), (72), (92b), (93b), (98), (104), (109), (114a), (114b), (125b), (137b), (140a), (140b)nD, (150a), (159c)nD, (169a), (174), (176)nD, (178), (180), (182), (184), (187d)nD and (193a).

## APPENDIX THREE

### ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΠΟΙΪΑ AND ἩΘΟΠΟΙΪΑ

Aphthonios believes that ἡθοποιΐα is the impersonation of the ἦθος of the character at hand (Rabe p.34sqq). He states : καὶ ἡθοποιΐα μὲν ἢ γνώριμον ἔχουσα πρόσωπον, πλαττομένη δὲ μόνον τὸ ἦθος (Rabe p.34.5-6). The distinction for Aphthonios lies in the aspects which are portrayed.

Theon holds that προσωποποιΐα is what someone would say in a given situation (Spengel 2 p.115.11sqq), giving the character appropriate words (Spengel 2 p.117.6).

Nikolaos Sophistes discusses the question at length and he remarks : ἡθοποιΐα ἐστὶ λόγος ἀρμόζων τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπειδὴ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ πρὸς ὃν λέγει (Spengel 3 p.489.7). In his opinion προσωποποιΐα is very similar and there are various ideas about the differences (Spengel 3 pp.488.25-491.13). He gives two versions. Firstly, the school of thought which holds : οἱ μὲν γὰρ προσωποποιΐαν αὐτὴν ἐκάλεσαν τὴν ἔχουσαν ὠρισμένα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα, ἡθοποιΐαν δὲ τὴν πανταχόθεν ἀναπλαττομένην, ἣν καὶ ῥῆσιν καλοῦσι (Spengel 3 p.489.26-30). The second view, which Nikolaos himself supports, is as follows : εἰσὶ δὲ, οἱ καὶ κάλλιστον ἔδοξαν, ἡθοποιΐα μὲν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὠρισμένων προσώπων, προσωποποιΐα δέ, ἐν ἣ καὶ πρόσωπα πλαττομεν καὶ περιτίθεμεν αὐτοῖς λόγους (Spengel 3 p.489.30-490.1). He comments that this is a poetic practice since they make lifeless objects speak.

Alexander Noumenios (Spengel 3 p.19.15-17) and, similarly, Phoibammon (Spengel 3 p.52.14) state : ἡ προσωποποιΐα δὲ ἐστὶ προσώπου διάπλασις ἥτοι τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ γενομένου πώποτε ἢ γενομένου μὲν οὐκ ἔτι δὲ ὄντος. They cite the example of Demosthenes D.1.2 saying : οὐχ ὑφεστηκὸς γὰρ τὸ πρόσωπον τὸν καιρὸν αὐτὸν εἰσάγει.

Zonaios and an anonymous writer on σχήματα state : ἡθοποιΐα, ὅταν λόγους παρατιθῶμεν ἀφύχοις πράγμασιν (Spengel 3 p.162.22 and Spengel 3 p.177.1). They give the example of speaking wood. As for προσωποποιΐα, they say : προσωποποιΐα, προσώπου διάπλασις ἢ μὴ γενομένου, ἢ γενομένου μὲν οὐκέτι δὲ ὄντος (Spengel 3 p.162.25-26, p.177.8-10).

By contrast, another anonymous writer on tropes (Spengel 3 p.212.14) and Gregory Choiboskos (Spengel 3 p.254.14) argue that it is in προσωποποιΐα in which words are given to inanimate objects.

Hermogenes states that ἡθοποιΐα is the imitation of a character involved in your story (Rabe p.20.9sqq). He gives the example of Andromache talking to Hector. προσωποποιΐα, on the other hand, occurs when πράγματι περιτιθῶμεν πρόσωπον. Another form is εἰδωλοποιΐα which

he says occurs ὅταν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι λόγους περιάπτωμεν.

Alexander later mentions ἡθοποιία : ὅταν ὑπάρχοντα πρόσωπα τιθέντες λόγους τινὰς αὐτοῖς περιτιθῶμεν πρὸς τὸ πιστοτέρους αὐτοὺς δόξαι εἶναι ἢ εἰ αὐτὸι ἐλέγομεν αὐτούς (Spengel 3 p.21.24).

While the *Rhetores Graeci* seem to agree that ἡθοποιία and προσωποποιία differ, they do not appear to agree on the nature of that difference. There seem to be two views.

προσωποποιία implies giving words to inanimate objects, whereas ἡθοποιία implies giving suitable words to the characters involved. This is the line taken by Hermogenes, Nikolaos Sophistes, Gregory Choïroboskos, Alexander and an anonymous writer on tropes.

Alternatively, προσωποποιία implies definite characters and characters involved in the case at hand. ἡθοποιία can occur in various circumstances and is less specific than προσωποποιία. This is the line taken by Aphthonios, Theon and Nicolaos in the opinion which he rejects.

However, Alexander, Phoibammon, Zonaios and an anonymous writer on σχήματα propose that προσωποποιία is the creation of characters either dead or imaginary (cf εἰδωλοποιία in Hermogenes Rabe p.20.15). This could be reconciled with the two interpretations given above. Zonaios and the anonymous writer on σχήματα, however, seem to contradict the consensus view when they claim that words given to inanimate objects in ἡθοποιία.

### Conclusion

In drawing conclusions we may suppose that ἡθοποιία is the creation of a character in order to make a passage more vivid. It is distinct because it gives suitable words to a character or type of character involved. προσωποποιία seems to involve, at times, the use of imaginary or deceased personae and the characterisation of inanimate objects. προσωποποιία is a more poetic form.

APPENDIX FOUR

NITSCHKE AND MENANDER

Nitsche argues that there are stylistic similarities between Menander, whom he supposes to be the author of treatise II and the scholia demosthenica.

Dindorf	Demosthenes	Codd	Dindorf	Demosthenes	Codd
οἱ κρείττους					
49.23	D1.(11.17)	HRS	51.10	D1.(11.25)	RS
52.3	D1.(11.28)	R	53.6	D1.(12.8)	HR
71.22	D2.(18.5)	RS	75.13	D2.(18.4)	HRS
81.3	D2.(19.99)	BTCV	101.1	D2.(23.22)	BRSTCV
102.24	D2.(24.10)	RS	104.4	D2.(24.18)	RS
267.20	D18.(228.13)	TCV	375.3	D19.(363.10)	TCV
600.7	D21.(584.21)	TCV	714.28	D23.(639.21)	TCV
λοιπὸν = deinceps					
30.3	D1.(9.1)	R	31.9	D1.(9.1)	YTCV
33.8	D1.(9.1)	YV	49.15	D1.(11.16)	HRS
53.29	D1.(12.19)	HRS	73.14	D2.(18.5)	RS
81.26	D2.(19.17)	BRS	99.23	D2.(23.19)	STCV
167.14	D6.(66.12)	AHR	198.23	D10.(134.5)	TCV
201.4,9	D10.(134.5)	TCV	204.6,10	D10.(134.5)	TV
216.20	D13.(166.1)	TCV	221.8	D13.(166.1)	TCV
229.16	D14.(178.24)	TCV	233.9	D14.(178.1)	TCV
238.18	D15.(193.14)	TCV	250.2	D16.(204.23)	TCV
252.3	D16.(204.23)	TCV	253.12,27	D16.(209.24)	TCV
271.7	D18.(230.18)	TCV	274.9	D18.(233.13)	TCV
289.27	D18.(250.3)	TCV	295.13	D18.(258.10)	TCV
301.18	D18.(264.27)	TCV	302.24	D18.(267.9)	TCV
310.21	D18.(272.10)	TCV	340.10	D19.(342.11)	BFRSYTCV
364.15	D19.(356.26)	TCV	368.4,6	D19.(359.29)	AV
373.24	D19.(361.26)	AV	375.15	D19.(363.27)	P
385.28	D19.(372.22)	TCV	386.17	D19.(372.27)	TCV
387.16	D19.(373.22)	TCV	396.4	D19.(378.5)	TCV
398.14	D19.(379.22)	AV	400.24	D19.(381.16)	TCV
402.4	D19.(382.15)	TCV	417.23	D19.(396.26)	BFSYP
437.10	D19.(419.21)	TCV	451.21	D19.(444.11)	TCV
452.28	D19.(446.26)	TCV	454.23	D19.(450.17)	BFRSYP
477.6	D20.(466.21)	TCV	480.22	D20.(469.4)	TCV
526.2	D20.(505.2)	TCV	528.19	D20.(506.25)	TCV
535.7,8	D21.(575.14)	TCV	542.3	D21.(518.23)	BFRSYTCV
556.22	D21.(527.13)	TCV	558.8	D21.(528.12)	TCV
564.27	D21.(533.13)	TCV	571.12	D21.(537.3)	TCV
575.18,22	D21.(539.14)	TCV	581.8	D21.(540.26)	BY
583.7	D21.(541.23)	TCV	593.24	D21.(546.27)	TCV
595.24	D21.(547.25)	TCV	598.2,18	D21.(548.9,12)	TCV

612.11 D21.(555.2) TCV  
 628.20 D21.(564.27) TCV  
 645.2 D21.(574.28) TCV  
 666.12 D22.(594.22) FLYTP  
 674.21 D22.(596.8) TCV  
 687.22 D22.(602.17) TCV  
 690.21 D22.(690.1) RS  
 715.1 D23.(641.1) TCV  
 720.21 D23.(658.2) TCV  
 725.21 D23.(685.6) TCV  
 727.25 D23.(670.17) TCV  
 758.2 D24.(721.23) RY  
 778.5 D24.(736.6) AV  
 787.26 D24.(745.9) RYS

621.18 D21.(547.25) TCV  
 635.6 D21.(568.14) TCV  
 648.17 D21.(577.12) TCV  
 671.29 D22.(595.23) TCV  
 675.1 D22.(596.23) TCV  
 689.18 D22.(603.17) TCV  
 691.26 D22.(604.18) AR  
 716.23 D23.(649.29) TCV  
 722.23 D23.(667.22) TCV  
 726.15 D23.(685.19) TCV  
 757.25 D24.(721.16) TCV  
 773.13 D24.(734.5) RY  
 787.8 D24.(743.21) AV  
 804.29 D24.(764.20) TCV

σύμπαρ

30.4 D1.(9.1) R  
 71.18 D2.(18.5) RS  
 192.13 D10.(131.1) TCV  
 207.16 D10.(134.5) TV  
 222.27 D13.(166.1) TCV  
 238.22 D15.(193.14) TCV  
 4227.3 D19.(403.11) TCV  
 434.5 D19.(415.5) TCV  
 543.14 D21.(518.27) TCV  
 615.12 D21.(556.18) BSY  
 632.31 D21.(566.29) TCV  
 686.2 D22.(601.27) TCV  
 701.17 D22.(611.9) TCV  
 746.14 D24.(711.1) RY

31.11 D1.(9.1) YTCV  
 165.11 D5.(62.18) FP  
 197.4 D10.(134.5) TCV  
 216.16 D13.(166.1) TCV  
 227.13 D14.(178.24) TCV  
 422.1 D19.(401.17) TCV  
 432.15 D19.(414.1) TCV  
 497.1 D20.(483.15) TCV  
 549.4 D21.(522.14) TCV  
 628.12 D21.(564.21) TCV  
 654.19 D21.(580.11) TCV  
 691.19 D22.(604.13) TCV  
 723.17 D23.(667.22) TCV

ὀλόκληρος

58.9 D1.(13.25) ABHRTV  
 537.18 D21.(576.3) TCV  
 579.21 D21.(540.16) TCV  
 598.9 D21.(548.12) BY  
 613.24,26 D21.(556.6) TCV

87.7 D2.(20.18) BHRSTCV  
 555.18 D21.(525.22) TCV  
 587.10,11 D21.(542.24) TCV  
 613.11 D21.(555.27) TCV  
 749.5 D24.(713.9) RY

κατεπέιγω

37.4 D1.(9.10) BS  
 289.20 D18.(249.14) TCV  
 710.20 D23.(623.5) TCV

229.11 D14.(178.24) TCV  
 317.17 D19.(378.26) BY

τὸ ὅτι

116.14 D3.(29.5) B  
 151.10 D4.(43.24) TCFV  
 673.22 D22.(595.27) S

117.5 D3.(29.9) TCV  
 346.12 D19.(344.3) TCV

ἐπισφραγίσθωμαι

45.7 D1.(10.20) BEV  
 233.4 D14.(178.24) TCV

116.8 D3.(29.3) BTCV  
 340.9 D19.(342.11) BFRSYTCV

485.20,25	D20.(471.20)	TCV	544.25	D21.(519.9)	TCV
721.27	D23.(664.18)	TCV			
τὸ δοκεῖν					
130.8	D3.(35.3)	BP	201.11	D10.(134.5)	TCV
228.4	D14.(178.24)	TCV	526.7	D20.(505.22)	TCV
680.22	D22.(599.23)	TCV	720.11	D23.(657.2)	TCV
παρομοιεῖν					
682.22	D22.(601.4)	TCV			
συμπαρομ.					
199.14	D10.(134.5)	TCV			
ἐφομ.					
774.4	D24.(734.5)	RY	776.5	D24.(735.16)	TCV
ἐλεεινολογεῖσθαι / ἐλεεινολογία					
373.10	D19.(361.24)	TCV	727.27	D23.(670.17)	TCV
800.23	D24.(761.11)	TCV			
ἢ ἐνεγκοῦσα / τῆς ἐνεγκαμένης / τῆ θρεψαμένη					
280.15	D18.(241.21)	TCV	648.18	D21.(557.12)	TCV
137.20	D3.(38.9)	TCV	291.13	D18.(252.27)	TCV
447.21	D19.(438.17)	TCV			
ἐάν					
282.1	D18.(242.13)	AFTP	394.27	D19.(377.11)	ART
396.5	D19.(378.5)	TCV	424.27	D19.(402.22)	AYTCV
443.1	D19.(434.2)	TCV	585.27	D21.(542.13)	TCV
κατ' ἀρχάς					
59.13	D1.(13.26)	T	243.10	D15.(196.23)	TCV
515.1	D20.(496.22)	TCV	517.18	D20.(498.25)	TCV
662.23	D22.(592)	A	674.6	D22.(595.27)	TCV
691.17	D22.(604.13)	TCV	708.8	D23.(621.1)	TCV
τὰ ἐξάιρετα / ἐξαιρέτως					
70.10	D1.(17.111)	CV	137.24	D3.(38.9)	BP
235.13	D15.(190.1)	FYV			
ἀθεόως					
528.13	D20.(506.22)	TCV	610.27	D21.(553.18)	TCV
619.2	D21.(559.5)	TCV	649.5	D21.(578.5)	TCV
ποῖος = τίς					
388.29	D19.(373.22)	TCV	476.4	D20.(466.7)	TCV
485.2	D20.(471.7)	TCV	536.2	D21.(515.18)	TCV
573.26	D21.(537.29)	TCV	600.8	D21.(548.26)	TCV
625.17	D21.(562.19)	TCV	627.14	D21.(563.6)	TCV
657.8	D21.(581.7)	TCV	707.1	D23.(621.1)	TCV

736.7 D24.(701.17) Y  
745.13 D24.(708.22) AV  
794.17 D24.(750.2) AV

737.6 D24.(701.23) ATCV  
789.11 D24.(745.12) AV

Nitsche says that the same is true of δυσχερής, δυσχερκίνω,  
ἐπιπλῶς, δῆθεν, τέως, περιτίθμι, ἐπεξελαύνειν, οὐδέμην  
and οὔτε μὴν.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### PRIMARY SOURCES

#### Authors

- Aiskhines - *Aeschinis Orationes*, ed. F. Blass, Leipzig 1896.
- Alexander
- Noumenios - *Rhetores Graeci*, edd. L. Spengel and C. Hammer, Leipzig 1856, p.1sqq.
- Anaximenes - *Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica*, ed. M. Fuhrmann, Leipzig 1966.
- Anon. de Fig. - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p.110sqq.
- Anon de Fig. - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p.171sqq.
- Anon. de Inv. - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 7.2, ed. C. Walz p.697sqq.
- Anon de Rhet. - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 6, ed. Walz, p.33sqq.
- Anon de Trop. - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p.207sqq.
- Anon περῑ τελειου  
λογου - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Walz, p.570sqq.
- Anonymous
- Seguerianos - *Rhetores Graeci*, edd. L. Spengel and C. Hammer, Leipzig 1894 pp.352sqq (cited as Spengel<sup>2</sup>).
- Aphthonios - *Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1926.
- Apollonios
- Dyskolos - *Apollonii Dyskoli quae supersunt*, in *Grammatici Graeci*, edd. R. Schneider and G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1878-1910
- Apsines - *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel and C. Hammer, Leipzig 1894, p.217sqq. (cited as Spengel<sup>2</sup>)
- Ailios
- Aristeides - *P. Aelii Aristidis opera quae exstant omnia*, edd. F. Lenz and C. Behr, Lugduni Batavorum 1976.
- *Aristidis qui feruntur Libri Rhetorici II*, ed. W. Schmid, Leipzig 1926.
- *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 9, ed. C. Walz, p.341sqq.
- Aristophanes - *Ekklesiasusae*, ed R.G. Ussher, Oxford 1973.
- *Wasps*, ed. D.M. MacDowell, Oxford 1971.
- *Knights*, ed. Coulon, Paris 1923.
- *Frogs* ed. V. Coulon, Paris 1928.
- Aristotle - *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, ed. R. Kassel, Berlin / New York 1976.
- *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*, ed. V. Rose, Leipzig 1886.
- *Athenaia Politeia*, ed. F.G. Kenyon, Oxford 1920.
- *Aristotle's Politics*, W.D. Ross, Oxford 1957.

- Cicero - *Epistulae ad Atticum, M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae*, vol.II.2, ed. L. Purser, Oxford 1918.
- Deinarkhos - *Dinarchus : Orationes cum fragmentis*, ed. N. Conomis, Leipzig 1975.
- Demetrios - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p.259sqq.
- Demosthenes - *Opera Demosthenis*, ed. S. Butcher, Oxford 1903-1931.
- Didymos - *Kommentar zu Demosthenes*, edd. M. Diels and W. Schubart, *Berliner Klassikertexte* 1, Berlin 1904.
- *Didymi in Demosthenem Commenta*, edd. L. Pearson and S. Stephen, Stuttgart 1983.
- Diodoros - *Diodori Siculi Bibliotheca Historica*, ed. I. Bekker, Leipzig 1853.
- Diogenes
- Laertios - *Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum*, vol II, ed. H.S. Long, Oxford 1964.
- Dionysos of Halikarnassos - *Dionysii Halicarnasei opuscula*, vol I, edd. H. Usener and L. Radermacher, Leipzig 1899.
- Eunapios - *Philostratus and Eunapius. The Lives of the Sophists*, ed. W.C. Wright, London/New York 1922.
- Euripides - *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, edd. A. Nauck and B. Snell, Hildesheim 1964.
- Galen - *Medicorum Graecorum Opera*, vols. 15 and 16, ed. K. Kuh, Leipzig 1828-29.
- George
- Kedrenos - *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, vols 34-35, ed. I. Bekker, Bonn 1838-1839.
- Gregory
- Choiroboskos- *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p.244sqq.
- Gregory of Korinth - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 7.2, ed. C. Walz, p.1090sqq.
- Hermogenes - *Hermogenis Opera*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1913.
- Herodotos - *Herodoti Historiae*, ed. K. Hude, Oxford 1927.
- Homer - *Homeris Opera*, edd. D. Monro and T. Allen, Oxford 1902-1912.
- Hyperides - *Hyperidis Orationes Sex*, edd. F. Blass and C. Jensen, Leipzig 1917.
- Isokrates - *Isocratis Orationes*, edd. G. Benseler and F. Blass, Leipzig 1913.
- John Doxopatos- *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 2, ed. C. Walz, p.69sqq.
- John the Sikeliot- *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 6, ed. C. Walz, p.56sqq.
- John Tzetzes - *Anecdota Graeca*, vol IV, ed. J.A. Cramer, Oxford 1837.
- Justinus - *M. Iuniani Iustini Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi*, ed. O. Seel, Leipzig 1935.

- Libanios - *Libanii Opera*, ed. R. Foerster, Leipzig 1903-1923.
- Lukian - *Luciani Samosatensis Opera*, ed. G. Jacobitz, Leipzig 1864.
- Markellinos - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 4, ed. C. Walz, p.  
Maximus
- Planudes - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 5, ed. C. Walz, p.212sqq.
- Minukian - *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Spengel, p.340sqq (cited as Spengel<sup>2</sup>).
- Nikolaos
- Sophistes - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. L. Spengel, p.449sqq.
- Pausanias - *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*, vols I-IV, ed. M. Rocha-Pereira, Leipzig 1973.
- Philinos - *FGH* vol 2 174.
- Philokhoros - *FGH* vol 3 B 328.
- Philostratos - *Philostratos and Eunapius. The Lives of the Sophists*, ed. W.C. Wright, London/New York 1922.
- Phoibammon - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. L. Spengel p.44sqq.
- Pindar - *Pindari Carmina*, edd. B. Snell and H. Maehler, Leipzig 1971-75.
- Plato - *Platonis Opera*, vol. V, ed. J. Burnett, Oxford 1899.
- Plutarch - *Vitae Parallelae*, ed. K. Ziegler, Leipzig 1957-1980.  
- *Plutarchus : Moralia*, edd. C. Hubert and H. Drexler, Leipzig 1959.
- Polyainos - *Strategematon Libri VIII*, edd. E. Woelfflin and I. Melber, Stuttgart 1970.
- Prokopios - *Patrologia Graeca*, ed. J.P. Migne, Paris 1865.
- Prolegomenon*
- Sylloge* - *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1936.
- Ps-Xenophon - "Old Oligarch", ed. G. Bowersock *HSCP* (1966) 71 pp.33-55.
- Quintilian - *M. Fabii Quintilianis institutionis oratoriae*, ed. M. Winterbottom, Oxford 1970.
- Rufinus - *Rhetores Latini Minores*, p. 575sqq, ed. K. Halm, Leipzig 1863.
- Rufus - *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Spengel, p.399sqq (cited as Spengel<sup>2</sup>).
- Satyros - *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (FHG), ed K. Muller, Paris 1849.
- Scholia ad
- Aphthonium - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 2, ed. C. Walz, p.1sqq.
- Scholia anon ad
- Hermog. - *Rhetores Graeci* vol 7.1, ed. Walz, p.104sqq.
- Sopater - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 5, ed. C. Walz p.1sqq.
- Sulpitius
- Victor - *Rhetores Latini Minores*, p.313sqq, ed. K. Halm,

- Leipzig 1863.
- Syrianos - *Syriani in Hermogenem Commentaria*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1892 (two volumes in one).
- Theon - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 2, ed. Spengel, p59sqq.
- Theophrastos - *The Characters of Theophrastos*, ed. J.M. Edmonds London 1929.
- Theopompos - *FGH* vol 2 B 115.
- Thoukydides- *Thucydide* , Livre I, ed. J. de Romilly, Paris 1958 ; Livre II rd. J. de Romilly, Paris 1962 ; Livre III, edd. R.Weil and J. de Romilly, Paris 1967 ; Livres IV et V, ed. J. de Romilly, Paris 1970 ; Livre VI et VII, edd. L. Bodin and J. de Romilly, Paris 1970.
- Tiberios - *Tiberii de fuguris Demosthenicis*, ed. G. Ballaira, Rome 1968.
- Tryphon - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. L. Spengel p.
- Xenophon - *Xenophontis Opera*, vol.II, ed. E. Marchant, Oxford 1900.
- Zenobios - *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum* vol I, edd. E. von Leutsch and Schneidewinn, Hildesheim 1958.
- Zonaios - *Rhetores Graeci*, vol 3, ed. Spengel, p161sqq.
- Zosimos of Askalon - *Life of Demosthenes* , (Dindorf vol VIII pp.18-22).
- Zonaras - *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae* , vols 41-42.2, edd. T. Buttner-Wobst, M. Piner, Bonn 1841-1897.

Scholia (excluding works found in the Rhetores Graeci )

- Aiskhines - *Aeschinis Orationes*, ed. F. Schultz, Leipzig 1865.
- Aristophanes - *Scholia graeca in Aristophanem*, ed. F. Dubner, Paris 1855.
- Demosthenes - *Scholia Demosthenica*, vols I-II, ed. M.R. Dilts, Leipzig 1983-86.  
- *Demosthenes*, vols VIII and IX , ed. W. Dindorf, Oxford 1851 (reprinted New York 1973).
- Euripides - *Scholia in Euripidem* , vol. I, ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin 1887.
- Homer - *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* , ed. H. Erbse, Berlin 1969.
- Lucian - *Scholia in Lucianum*, ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1906.
- Pindar - *Scholia vetera in Pindari Carmina* , vol2, ed. A. Drachmann, Leipzig 1910.

## Lexica

- Bachmann - *Anecdota Graeca Oxoniensis*  
Bekker - *Anecdota Graeca*  
Cramer - *Anecdota Graeca Oxoniensis 1835-1837.*  
*Etymologicum  
Magnum* - ed. T. Gaisford, Oxford 1848.  
Harpokration - *Harpocratonis Lexicon in decem oratores atticos*, ed. W. Dindorf, Oxford 1853.  
Hesykhios - *Hesyhii Alexandrini Lexicon* , ed. M. Schmidt, Ienae 1858-64; K.Latte, Hauniae 1953-66.  
Photios - *Photii Lexicon* , ed. R. Porson I-II, Leipzig 1823.  
- *Photii Patriarchae Lexicon*, ed. C. Theodoridis, vol I A-D, Berlin / New York 1982.  
Pollux - *Pollucis Onomasticon* , ed. E. Bethe I-III, Leipzig 1900-37.  
Souda - *Suidae Lexicon* , ed. A. Adler I-V, Leipzig 1928-38.  
Stephanos of Byzantium - *Stephani Byzantii Ethnicorum quae supersunt*, ed. A. Meinecke, Berlin 1849.  
Zenobios- *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum*, ed. E.L. von Leutsch, Hildesheim 1958.  
Zonaras - *Io. Zonarae Lexicon* , ed. I.A.H. Tittmann I-II, Leipzig 1808.

## Other

- CIG* - *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. A. Boeckh, Berlin 1828-1877.  
*FGH* - *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby, Berlin 1923-1958.  
*FHG* - *Fragmenta Historicum Graecorum*, ed. K. Muller Paris 1849.  
*GHI* - *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, edd. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, Oxford 1969.  
*IG* - *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin 1873- .  
*LSJ* - *A Greek-English Lexicon*, edd. H.G. Liddell and H. Stuart Jones, 9th ed. Oxford 1940.  
*Pap. Amh.* - *The Amherst Papyri*, ed. B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, London 1901.  
*P.Rain* - *Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der Nationalbibliothek in Wien (Papyrus Erherzog Rainer)*, N.S. I Nr XXV, Vienna 1932, ed. H. Gerstinger.

- PSI - *Papiri greci e latini (Pubblicazioni della Societa italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto)* Florence 1912.
- SEG - *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, Leiden 1923- .

## SECONDARY SOURCES

- Andreades, A.M.,  
Finance - *History of Greek Public Finance*, Harvard 1933.
- Avezzu, G.,  
BPEC - "Gli scholi Demosthenici e l'*Epitafio* di Lisia nel ms Marc. gr 416", *BPEC* NS 27 (1979) pp.51-67.
- Beloch, J.,  
GG - *Griechische Geschichte*, Strassburg 1912-1927.
- Blass, F.,  
*Hermes* - "Neue Papyrusfragmente in aegyptischen Museum zu Berlin", *Hermes* 17 (1882) pp.148-163.
- Bonner, S.F.  
- *The Literary Treatises of Dionysios of Halicarnassos*, Amsterdam 1969.
- Brun, P.,  
*Eisphora* - *Eisphora, Syntaxis, Stratiotika*, Paris 1983.
- Brunt, P.A.,  
"Euboea" - "Euboea in the Time of Philip II", *CQ* 63 (1969) N.S. 19, pp.245-265.
- Buchanan, J.J.,  
*Theorika* - *Theorika*, New York 1962.
- Bursian, C.,  
*Abhand.* - *Abhandlungen der phil-philol. Klass. der bayerisch. Akad. d. Wiss.* 16.3 (1882) pp.1-152.
- Canfora, L.,  
*Inventario* - *Inventario dei manoscritti greci di Demostene*, Padua 1968.
- Carter, J.M.,  
"Euboea" - "Athens, Euboea and Olynthus", *Historia* 20 (1971), pp.418-429.
- Cawkwell, G.,  
"Olynthus" - "The Defence of Olynthus", *CQ* 56 (1962) N.S. 12. pp.122-140.
- "Stratiotic" - "Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Funds", *Mnemosyne* 15 (1962), pp.377-383.
- "Eubulus" - "Eubulus", *JHS* 83 (1963) pp.47-67.
- Philip* - *Philip of Macedon*, London 1978.
- Chapman, J.,  
- *Chapmanni Commentatio de Ulpiano*, printed in

- Dindorf's edition of the scholia vol. VIII pp.XXIV-XLVII.
- Cohn, L.,  
*PA* - (review of Wangrin *Quaestiones*) *Philologische Anzeiger* XV 1885 pp.44-58.
- Davison, J.A.,  
*JHS* - "Notes on the Panathenaea", *JHS* 78 (1958), pp.23-41.
- Delz,  
*Lukians* - *Lukians Kenntnis der Athenischen Antiquitäten*, Freiburg 1950.
- de Ste Croix, G.M.,  
 - (review of Buchanan *Theorika*) *Classical Review* NS 14 Nr 22 (1964) pp.190-191.
- Peloponnesian* - *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London 1972.
- Dilts, M.R.,  
*GRBS* - "Manuscripts of *Scholia Ulpiani* on Demosthenes' Orations 1,3 and 4" *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 20 (1979) pp.55-67.
- "Marcianus"- "Demosthenic scholia in Marcianus gr 416 and Monacensis gr 85", *Studia Codicologica*, ed. K. Treu, (*Texte u. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* 124), Berlin 1977, pp.151-158.
- Prometheus* - "Apographs of lost codex r for *Demosthenis in Timocratem*", *Prometheus* 3 (1977), pp.204-210.
- TAPA* - "The Manuscript Tradition of the *Scholia Ulpiani* on Demosthenes *in Timocratem*" *TAPA* 105 (1975) pp.35-50.
- Diller, A.,  
*BZ* - "Byzantine Lists of Old and New Geographical Names" *Byzantium Zeitschrift* 63 (1970) pp.27-42.
- Drerup, E.,  
*SBAW* - "Vorläufiger Bericht über eine Studienreise zur Erforschung der Demosthenesüberlieferung", *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen Klasse der kgl Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 3 (1902), pp.287-323.
- Philologus* - "Antike Demosthenesausgaben", *Philologus* 1899 Suppl. 7 pp.533-588.
- Ehrhardt, C.,  
 "Philip" - "Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Interventions in Thessaly", *CQ* (1967) N.S. 17, pp.296-301.
- Ellis, J.R.,  
*Historia* - "The Order of the Olynthiacs", *Historia* 16 (1967)

- pp.108-111.
- Philip* - *Philip and Macedonian Imperialism* , London 1976.
- Eucken,C.,  
*MH* - "Reihenfolge und Zweck der olynthischen Reden",  
*Museum Helveticum* 41 (1984), pp.193-208.
- Ferguson, W.S.,  
*Hellenistic* - *Hellenistic Athens*, London 1911.
- Freyer, T.,  
"Quaestiones" - "Quaestiones de scholiorum Aeschineorum fontibus",  
*Leipziger Studien z. klass. Philologie* 5 (1882)  
pp.239-388.
- Gärtner  
*RE* 10A - *RE* 10A 792 -794
- Gloeckner, S.,  
"Quaestiones" - Quaestiones Rhetoricae". *Breslauer philologische  
Abhandlungen* 8 (1901) pp.96-98.
- Glitz, G.,  
"Finances"- "Demosthene et les finances atheniennes de 346 a  
339", *Revue Historique* 170 (1932), pp.165-186.
- Griffith, G.T.,  
*Macedonia* - *History of Macedonia*, vol II Oxford 1979 (with N.G.  
Hammond).
- "Early  
Interventions" - "Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly  
(358-352 B.C.)", *CQ* (1970) N.S. 20, pp.67-80.
- Grube,G.M.A.  
- *A Greek Critic : Demetrios on Style*, Toronto 1961.
- Gudeman, A.,  
*PW* - (review of Oomen Zosimo ) *Philologische  
Wochenschrift* 47 (1927) cols 609-620.
- RE* 2A1 - *RE* 2A1 625-705, *Scholien*  
697-703 *Demosthenesscholien* .
- RE* 5 - *RE* 5 445-472 *Didymos*.
- Gwatkin, T.,  
*Aeschines* - *Aeshines in Ctesiphonta*, London 1890 (commentary  
with E.S. Shuckburgh).
- Haigh, A.E.,  
*Theatre* - *The Attic Theatre*, 2nd ed. Oxford 1898.
- Hammond, N.G.L.,  
"Sacred War" - "Chronology of the Sacred War", *JHS* 57 (1937),  
pp.44-
- "Philip's Tomb" - "Philip's Tomb in Historical Context", *GRBS* 19  
(1978), pp.331-356.
- Macedonia* - *A History of Macedonia*, vol II, Oxford 1979 (with G.T.  
Griffith).

- Hansen, M.H.,  
*Sovereignty* - *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C.*, Odense 1974.
- GRBS - "The theoretic fund and the graphe paranomon against Apollodorus", *GRBS* 17 (1976) pp.235-246.
- Demography* - *Democracy and Demography*, Herning 1986.
- Hubble, H.M.,  
 YCS - "A Papyrus Commentary on Demosthenes", *YCS* 15 (1957) pp.181-193.
- Hunt, A.S.,  
*Pap. Amh.* - (with B.P.Grenfell) *The Amherst Papyri*, London 1901.
- Jaeger, W.,  
*Demosthenes* - *Demosthenes - The Origin and Growth of his Policy*, Cambridge 1938.
- Jones, A.H.M.,  
*Democracy* - *Athenian Democracy*, Oxford 1957.
- Kahrstedt, U.,  
 "Theorika" - "Demosthenes und die Theorika", *Nachrichten Gesellschaft Wiss. Gottingen Philol. Hist. Klasse* 2 (1929), pp.156-163.
- Kennedy, G.A.,  
*Persuasion* - *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, Princeton 1963.  
*Roman* - *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, Princeton 1972.  
*Christian* - *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors*, Princeton 1983.
- Philosophy and Rhetoric* - "Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric", *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13 (1980) pp.181-197.
- Kustas, G.  
*Viator* - "Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric", *Viator* I (1970) pp.55-73.
- Lausberg, H.  
*Rhetorik* - *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, Munich 1960.
- Leo, F.,  
 NGGW - "Didymos περι Δημοσθενους", *Nachrichten von der konigl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften phil-hist. Kl.* (1904), pp.254-261.
- Lindberg, G.  
 - *Studies in Hermogenes and Eustathios*, Lund 1977.
- Lossau, M.,  
*Palingenesia* - *Untersuchungen zur antiken Demosthenesexegese, Palingenesia II*, Bad Homburg 1964.

- MacDowell, D.M.,  
*Law* - *The Law in Classical Athens*, London 1978.  
*CR* - *Classical Review* 20 (1970) p.321.  
*JHS* - Review of Dilts' edition in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 105 (1985) p.188.
- Martin, J.,  
 - *Antike Rhetorik, Technik und Methode, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft* II.3, Munich 1974.
- Mitchel, F.W.,  
*TAPA* - "Demades of Paeonia and IG<sup>2</sup> 1493, 1494 and 1495", *TAPA* 93 (1962), pp.213-229.
- Nadeau, R.,  
*GRBS* - "Classical Systems of Stases in Greek : Hermagoras to Hermogenes", *GRBS* 2 (1959) pp.51-73.  
*SM* (1964) - "Hermogenes on Stases : A Translation with an Introduction and Notes", *Speech Monographs* 31 (1964) pp.361-424.  
*SM* (1958) - "Hermogenes on Stock Issues", *Speech Monographs* 25 (1958) pp.59-66.
- Nitsche, F.W.,  
 "Menander" - "Der Rhetor Menandros und die Scholien zu Demosthenes", Progr. Leibniz Gymnasium, Berlin 1883.
- Oomen, G.,  
*Zosimo* - *De Zosimo Ascalonita atque Marcellino*, Monasterii Westfalorum 1926.
- Parke, H.W.,  
 "Euboea" - "Athens and Euboea 349-8", *JHS* 49 (1929), pp.246-252.
- Pickard-Cambridge  
*Dionysus* - *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens*, Oxford 1946.  
*Festivals* - *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, 2nd ed Oxford 1968.
- Pfeiffer, R.,  
*Scholarship* - *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*, Oxford 1968.  
 1300-1850 - *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300-1850*, Oxford 1976.
- RE* - *Paulys Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1893-1978.
- Reynolds, L.D.,  
*Scribes and Scholars* - (with N.G. Wilson) *Scribes and Scholars*, Oxford 1974.
- Rhodes, P.J.,  
*Boule* - *The Athenian Boule*, Oxford 1972.

- Ruschenbusch, E.,  
 "Theorikon" - "Die Einfuhrung des Theorikon", *ZPE* 36 (1979), pp.303-308.
- Russell, D.A.,  
 - *Criticism in Antiquity*, London 1981.  
 Menander - *Menander Rhetor*, Oxford 1981 (with N.G. Wilson).  
 Sandys, J.E.,  
 Olynthiacs - *The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes*, London 1910.  
 Isokrates - *Isocratis ad Demonicum et Panegyricus*, London 1899.
- Schemmel, F.,  
 Wochenschrift - "Zu Libanios", *Wochenschrift fur klassische Philologie*, (1917) Nr 8 coll. 188-191.
- Schunk, W.,  
 Scholiorum - *De scholiorum in Demosthenis orationes XVIII, XIX, XXI fontibus disputatio critica*, Progr. Coburg 1879.
- Shuckburgh, E.S.,  
 Aeschines - *Aeschines in Ctesiphonta* (commentary with T. Gwatkin), London 1890.
- Stark, R.,  
 AUS - "Textgeschichtliche und literaturkritische Folgerungen aus neueren Papyri", *Annales Universitatis Saraviensis (Philosophie)* VIII (1959) pp.31-49.
- Thomsen, R.,  
 Eisphora - *Eisphora*, Copenhagen 1964.
- Van Ooteghem, J.,  
 "Theorikon" - "Demosthene et le Theorikon", *Etudes Classiques* 1 (1932), pp.388-407.
- Volkman, R.,  
 Rhetorik - *Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in Systematischer Übersicht*, Berlin 1872.
- Wangrin A.,  
 Quaestiones - *Quaestiones de scholiorum Aeschineorum fontibus, pars prior : De Harpocrate et Aelio Dionysio Pausaniaque atticistis*, Diss. Halis. Saxonum 1883.
- Wentzel, G.,  
 Hermes - "Zu den atticistischen Glossen des Photios", *Hermes* 30 (1895), pp.367-384.
- Wessely,  
 Studien - *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde* IV (1905) pp.111-113.
- Westlake, H.D.,  
 "Medism" - "The Medism of Thessaly", *JHS* 56 (1936), pp.12-24.

- Thessaly* - *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* , Groningen 1969.  
 White, J.W.,  
*Aristophanes* - *The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*,  
 London/Boston 1914.
- Wilson, N.G.,  
*Byzantium* - *Scholars of Byzantium* , London 1983.  
*CQ* (1967) - "A Chapter in the History of Scholia", *CQ* 61 (1967)  
 N.S. 17 Nr 2 pp.244-256.  
*CR* (1977) - (reviewing Zuntz' *Aristophanes*) *CR* 91 (1977) N.S.  
 27 p.271.  
*GRBS* (1967) - "The Libraries of the Byzantine World", *GRBS* 8  
 (1967) Nr 1 pp.53-80.  
*GRBS* (1971) - "Two Notes on Byzantine Scholarship", *GRBS* 12  
 (1971) Nr 4 pp.557-560.
- Menander* - *Menander Rhetor*, Oxford 1981 (with D.A. Russell).  
*Scribes and*  
*Scholars* - (with Reynolds) *Scribes and Scholars*, Oxford 1974.  
 Zuntz, G.,  
*Aristophanes* - *Die Aristophanes-Scholien der Papyri* , Berlin 1975.  
*Euripides* - *An Inquiry into the Transmission of the Plays of*  
*Euripides*, Cambridge 1965.

