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ALEXANDER GRAHAM MARSHALL

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

FACULTY OF ARTS, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

ABSTRACT.

The present thesis aims to examine how the Russian General Staff observed and assessed the Russian Empire's Asiatic frontier during the period of its greatest extent (between 1860 and 1917). By providing an overview of the entire length of the Asiatic frontier it aims to provide an original addition to the existing historiography. Through analysis of the original records of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff it furnishes insight into areas of response by the Russian General Staff towards crisis situations where previously little or no scholarly work has been carried out. Thus, to cite just two examples, the thesis contains the first detailed coverage on the posting of the first Russian military agents to China during the so-called 'Ili Crisis' of 1881, and of the response of the Russian General Staff to the revolt of Ishaq Khan in northern Afghanistan in 1888. These new additions are complemented by detailed analysis of more conventional aspects of the existing historiography. For example, by studying the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 it provides for the first time in English a detailed analysis of the specific difficulties experienced by Tsarist military intelligence in the Far East in the years immediately preceding that conflict.

The overall form of analysis is in the main geographically determined, but with the sections examining individual sections of the Russian Asiatic frontier preceded and followed by more general chapters surveying the development of doctrinal, organizational and ideological currents within the General Staff as a whole at both the beginning and end of the period under review. Chapter one in its first part surveys the development of the General Staff system itself in the Russian army. It provides in addition an analysis of available sources alongside a basic military history of the expansion of Russia's Asiatic frontiers across this period. The first part of chapter two provides an overview of the instruments and ideas that had evolved and that were available to the Russian General Staff in its study Asia on the eve of the major Central Asian conquests of the 1860s. The second section of chapter two analyses how some of these currents, both cultural and doctrinal, intermingled and responded between approximately 1859 and 1873, with the character of Prince Bariatinski, Viceroy of the Caucasus during this period, providing a central focus and case study. Chapter three examines how some of the purely tactical and technical tools employed by the Russian army in its Asiatic conquests evolved over time and again looks at the role of individual
thinkers in this evolutionary process. Chapter four, the main body of the work, in three major sub-sections analyses the fully developed use of all these instruments and trends in the Russian General Staff’s plans and threat-assessments for the three major areas of their Asiatic frontier— the Far East, the Caucasus, and the region of Central Asia-Afghanistan.

The conclusion seeks to contribute a new perspective to current levels of analysis by setting the Tsarist military’s orientalist activities within the context of the current debates regarding European colonialism and the nature of orientalism in general. In doing so it also seeks to draw together the three underlying themes running throughout the work - the development of the General Staff’s analysis of Asia by 1917, the still unresolved conflict of centre-periphery relations that afflicted every aspect of Russian Asiatic policy, and the growing consciousness of a ‘knowledge crisis’ that afflicted the Tsarist General Staff as a whole, a crisis reflected in the press and academic organs of the day. This last phenomenon, along with many of the tools and approaches to tackle it, would form one ofTsarist Russia’s largest legacies to the Soviet Union. The thesis will prove useful to students of military history, Russia-Asia diplomatic relations, and those interested by the development and evolution of the ‘knowledge-state’ between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Above all it seeks to provide a prism through which the reader can appreciate many of the difficulties attached to the development of military intelligence and the modern ‘knowledge economy’, difficulties that continue to afflict many states, not least Russia, even today.
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Afghanistan in the nineteenth century. Source: N. A. Khalfin,'The Rising of Ishaq Khan in Southern

EPIGRAPH.

'If a larger view is taken of what may be termed as 'Greater Central Asia', that is a cultural area distinct from both the Middle East and South Asia, notwithstanding a certain overlapping due to entrenched political borders, then we are confronted with a much larger region, stretching along the southern latitude all the way from Mongolia to the Caspian Sea and eastern Turkey. This Central Asian region is characterised by several centuries of continuity in Islamic cultural ethnic patterns and affinities of the Irano-Turkic and Mongol peoples that spread from Inner Asia to the Mediterranean and from Siberia to the Indian Ocean. The Russian element, first as adventurous Cossack fur hunters and only later as agricultural settlers, began to expand eastward into Siberia behind the Ural barrier from the 16th century onward. Two centuries later the Russian invasion and migration was diverted southward to penetrate the Kirghiz steppe and Turkestan: the *Dar al-Islam* was progressively turned into *Dar al-Barb* (world of war).'

Milan Hauner 'Central Asian Geopolitics in the Last Hundred Years: A Critical Survey from Gorchakov to Gorbachev' *CAS* 8 (1, 1989) p.4.
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND DATES.

Achieving consistency of translation for the variety of place-names and titles employed along the length of the Russian Asiatic frontier is an almost insurmountable task. Where possible I have used the most correct systems of transliteration (always from the Russian) available, even in regard to some well known characters-Vitte rather than the more commonly used Witte for example. In regard to the Turkic place names and minor characters I employ a standard transliteration of terms used in contemporary Russian documents and records, leading to use of 'zh' for example to represent the sound often expressed in an anglicized translation as 'j' (Andizhan=Andijan). I have however made an exception in anglicizing the names of the Russian Emperors in the belief that the proper direct transliterations of their names-Aleksandr, Nikolai- would merely form a distraction for the English-speaking reader. Where a place name in the text has since changed its title, for whatever reason, I retain the spelling and label most commonly employed during the period of study-Tiflis rather than Tbilisi, and Peking rather than modern-day Beijing. As far as dates are concerned, unless indicated otherwise, all dates given in the present thesis conform to the Julian calendar in use in Russia before 1917.
**JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT.**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Central Asian Review</td>
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<td>MAS</td>
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<td>NAA</td>
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SS  Sibirica (The Journal of Siberian Studies)
VA  Vestnik Azii
VE  Vestnik Evropy
VI  Voprosy Istorii
VIR  Voina i Revoliutsiia
VZh  Voennno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal
VMU  Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta (Istoria)
VO  Vostok Orients. Afro-Aziatskie obshestva: Istoria i Sovremennost'
VS  Voennyi Sbornik
INTRODUCTION.

1. The Russian General Staff.

The ideal organization of a General Staff is that all officers should have the same doctrine, and under similar circumstances should all do the same thing. Do not try to find fantastic solutions born of your own imagination, but follow the principles which you have been taught between these walls. The best General Staff that ever existed throughout history was the Prussian General Staff in 1870.

Advice given to Russian Staff officers on graduating from the Nikolaevskaia General Staff Academy, early twentieth century.¹

In the nineteenth century the Russian Empire underwent a period of rapid expansion and change that forced it to assess its Asiatic commitments more intensively than ever before. Whilst the burden of much of this analysis fell upon the Foreign Ministry’s Asiatic Department, creating what many have seen as a division in the very foreign policy making process itself ², the Russian Army also assumed an increased burden in both conquering and policing a new, predominantly Islamic frontier. The institutional fracture apparent in the Foreign Ministry therefore came to be repeated to a certain extent in the army General Staff itself. The work of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff in dealing with these new frontiers forms the focus of the present study.

The General Staff of the Russian Army was a rather late development in the Tsarist military system, but the doctrine and traditions developed by it filtered down into the Soviet General Staff and

¹ General P. A. Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1935) p.52.
² Theodore Taranovski, ‘Institutions, Political Culture, and Foreign Policy in Late Imperial Russia’ in C. Evtukhov, G. Gasparov, A. Ospovat & M. Von Hagen (eds.), Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire. (Moscow: O. G. I. 1997) pp.53-70. Taranovski argues that the Asiatic Department was a ‘stepchild’ of the Foreign Ministry establishment on the basis of the background in ‘European’ diplomacy of many of its leading personnel: p.69, footnote 24. However, certain leading figures within the department did gain their authority on the basis of specifically Asiatic experience. E. P. Kovalevskii had travelled extensively in Siberia, Egypt, China and Central Asia before he became head of department in 1856-61, whilst his successor, N. P. Ignat’ev, had experience both of Central Asia and of Chinese diplomacy by the time he came to office. On the division of late Imperial Russian foreign policy into ‘Germanic/European’ and ‘Asiatic’ schools of thought see Alfred J. Rieber, ‘Persistent factors in Russian foreign policy: an interpretative essay’ in H. Ragsdale (ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993) pp.315-359.
remain a vital part of the Russian military inheritance today. The concept of a staff officer had been known in Russia since at least 1763, but for a long period remained a fairly flexible term, often only applying to a general’s aide or entourage rather than to a trained professional. Yet the need for a large and fairly efficient military administrative system was particularly pressing in the Russian case, since in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars Russia, unlike the other European powers, in effect did not demobilize, but maintained her forces under arms at three times their prewar peacetime size. Nonetheless, not till the foundation of the Nikolaevskai General Staff Academy in 1832 under the auspices of Tsar Nicholas I and Baron A. H. Jomini, one of the foremost military thinkers of the day, did Russia even have an institution for the regularized training of such personnel. Two central models for the creation of such an institution existed; the Prussian Kriegsakademie set up at Berlin in 1810 and the French Ecole Superieur Militaire set up at St. Cyr in 1803. Such academies reflected the increasingly technical and broad-ranging scope of warfare of the day, and aimed both to produce intelligent, vocationally trained officers and to serve as centres for the development of strategic theory. They were motivated by the belief firstly that war was now a specialized profession and secondly that the essentials of war were fundamentally teachable. Analytical history was now ‘to pare out the dead wood of circumstantial phenomenality of past military events to reveal eternally recurring patterns or truths.’ Consequently the first concerted attempts to enunciate the basic principles of war—concentration at the decisive point, economy of force, the superiority of interior over exterior lines of communication—date from this period. This growth in the field of military education was accelerated by the general move in European armies from being long-standing professional bodies to short-term conscript forces capable of rapid wartime expansion via their reserve cadres. Such a move was only possible in Russia following the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and only finally came into force with the Statute on Universal Military Service of 1874. The training of civilians to wartime standards within a relatively short

5 The principles of war most often cited down to the present day are: the offensive, concentration of forces (mass), economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, planning and command. However, the exact number of principles varies according to the writer, Jomini spoke of only 2, Marshal Foch of 4, Clausewitz of 4 rules with 3 general principles of defence, 14 for offence, 8 for troops
period of peacetime service required a well-educated officer corps. So too did the task of analyzing and assessing the increasingly rapid technological developments of the latter part of the nineteenth century, which saw a changeover from muzzle-loading musket to the magazine rifle within the space of a single generation. Within Russia however the General Staff for many years lacked both the prestige associated with other European military staffs and the full strategic planning capability associated in particular with the Prussian model of a ‘capital staff’. Only after the debacle of the Crimean War did the Russian General Staff undergo much-needed reform under War Minister D. A. Miliutin, and only from the 1880s onwards did Staff officers come to assume a distinct professional identity within the army as a whole.6

Miliutin pursued his reforms on the French model, subordinating under the wings of the War Ministry a whole series of separate departments, including the Military-Topographical Department, the Nikolaevskaiia Academy and, eventually, the Inspectorate to form, by 1866, the Main Staff (Glavnyi Shtab). Increasing entrance requirements, by cutting the numerical burden of students on the teaching staff, raised academic standards at the Nikolaevskaiia Academy.7 The merger of the Main Directorate (Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba or GUGSh, created 1863) with the Inspectorate Department of the War Ministry in 1865 created a central directive organ combining the functions of administration and operational planning. This did however create dilemmas of planning and administrative priority that would continue to dog the General Staff for much of the remainder of the nineteenth century. Thus, the war plan for the conflict with Turkey in 1877-78 was the concept not so much of the concentrated analysis of the staff as a whole but of one man, Miliutin’s aide and head of the Military Scientific Committee from 1867, General N. N. Obruchev.8 War planning remained limited by the slow mobilization rate of the Russian Army, railway development being nowhere nearly as advanced as in Prussia, leading to war plans still only being formed in general outline right into the 1880s. In addition Alexander III to some degree reversed the

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7 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.58.

trend towards advancement by merit and educational-based assessment in the army begun by Miliutin by his reversal of policy in the military academies and junkers schools. Civilian instructors were removed from the military academies and academic standards in the junkers schools declined in quality, whilst the teaching of literacy to the common soldier was no longer compulsory. The retention of senior commanders into extreme old age, and a return in emphasis to parade-ground style manoeuvres under Nicholas II all resulted in an officer corps that was still too heterogeneous by the turn of the century to fully meet the challenge of modern warfare.10

The Asiatic Department by 1869 was one of seven branches of the Imperial Main Staff. The other six were the General Staff, the Military-Topographical Section, the Committee for the Movement of Troops and Military Cargoes by Railway (created 1868), the Committee for Preparing Data on the Mobilization of Troops, the Military Scientific Committee and the Military Historical Commission. The shape of the Main Staff was subject to periodic minor reform, much of it a result of the increasingly complex functions undertaken by it in the sphere of logistics and mobilization. In 1875 for example the Mobilization Committee was created to aid the work of the Military-Scientific Committee. In 1892 General-Quartermaster sections were created in the military district staffs of border districts, for the gathering of data regarding both the district itself and the nearest localities in the bordering countries.11 In 1903 the Main Staff was reorganized into five directorates: First Quartermaster General, Second


10 Miliutin’s decision to subordinate the General Staff to the War Ministry has traditionally come under attack by modern historians, both Western and Soviet, who see the development as having perpetuated inefficiencies and hindered an advance towards modern ‘operational art’ in Russia. [Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, p.17; P. A. Zaionchikovskii, Voenny Reformy1860-70 godov v Rossii (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952) p.106] Within a country as large and autocratic as Russia, however, the arrangement undoubtedly possessed some advantages as well, particularly in a period of peacetime administration. In the Soviet period there was a renewed attempt to make the army the ‘school of the nation’. In addition, the mechanization carried out in the first Five-Year Plan from 1928 onwards indicates how administration continued to be centralized, and the army shaped by broad change initiated from the central command across the whole of society. See particularly Mark Von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-1930 (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press 1990) and Lennart Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine. Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925-1941 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 2000).

Quartermaster General, Adjutant General, Military Communications and Military Topography, with the
Asiatic 'section' (otdel) as one half of the two-section First Quartermaster General. This Asiatic section
took on purely administrative responsibility for the Asiatic military districts.\textsuperscript{12} The gaining of intelligence
regarding the military potential of foreign opponents was now assigned the VII\textsuperscript{th} section (Military-
Statistical Study of Foreign States) under the Second Quartermaster-General. This section in 1905 had 17
officers of the General Staff working in it.\textsuperscript{13} However, the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05
saw a further bout of organizational reform. In 1905 the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSh)
gained independence from the old Main Staff and the War Ministry, only to rejoin the War Ministry in
1909.\textsuperscript{14} During this interval a body designated the 'Asiatic Section' remained on the organization of the
Main Staff, but this unit again bore little resemblance administratively to its pre-1903 forebear. Above all,
it lacked almost any intelligence-gathering function, being responsible purely for the bureaucratic
administration of the Asiatic military districts. When Baron Mannerheim was summoned to conduct his
famous two-year intelligence-gathering trip through China in 1906, it was to General Palitsyn, head of
GUGSh, not to the Main Staff, that he reported.\textsuperscript{15} This period marked a brief attempt to create an
independent General Staff on the German model, subordinate directly to the Emperor and responsible
purely for operational planning. The sections responsible for processing intelligence gathered in Asia in this
interim were formed under the Third Over-Quartermaster under the General Quartermaster Directorate.\textsuperscript{16}
In this period the defence of Russia in Asia also filtered into a more general debate about how to formulate a
unified defence policy for Russia as a whole, debate being particularly vigorous during the period of
existence (1906-08) of the State Defence Council under the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Despite its
failure to retain its existence as a separate institution, the GUGSh that re-entered the War Ministry in 1909
retained control over all officers of the General Staff and played a significant role in shaping the Russian
Army that entered the World War, not least \textit{via} continued intelligence-gathering. In particular, the GUGSh

\textsuperscript{12} Menning, \textit{Bayonets before Bullets} p.98; J. D. Hittle, \textit{The Military Staff} p.252.

\textsuperscript{13} A. Iu. Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi

\textsuperscript{14} Menning, \textit{Bayonets before Bullets} p.218. A. Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istoriđ Russkogo General'noho Shtaba' \textit{VZh}
7 (1972) pp.87-9: Due to resistance from the Ministry of Finance only on 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1906 did GUGSh
become an independent operational organ, almost a year after it was first proposed.

\textsuperscript{15} C. G. E. Mannerheim & Count Eric Lewenhaupt, (trans.) \textit{The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim} (New

\textsuperscript{16} Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istoriđ...' \textit{VZh} 7 (1972) pp.87-9.
produced its own *Sbornik* from 1909 onwards presenting all the most important details on the armies and military preparations of the countries of Europe and Asia. From 1911 onwards this published details only on areas where change had occurred since the last issue. Noting this provides a good point on which to review the other sources available on the period.

1.2 **Sources and Personnel.**

In any historical project, the sources available to the researcher are clearly delineated from the outset into primary and secondary material. In relation to the secondary literature on Russian military and diplomatic relations with Asia, work conducted in this field, whilst extensive, is often highly specialized and segregated. Studies of Sino-Russian relations, for example, usually deal only fleetingly with Russian relations with Japan, and practically never at all with Russian involvement in Central Asia. Similarly, only one major study by a trinity of Russian historians deals with Russian expansion into both the Caucasus and Central Asia in this period. One of the purposes of the present work is to present an overview of how the Russian General Staff assessed the whole length of the Asiatic frontier. An approach of this scope is relatively rare and will therefore form an original contribution to the existing historiography.

Within the field in the west, one of the best existing works attempting to present a strategic overview of the Tsarist Empire is that of William C. Fuller Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914*. Without focusing specifically on the field of Russian-Asian relations, Fuller provides an admirable overview of both the strategic concerns of the Tsarist state and the manner in which resources and materiel were mobilized by that state to meet perceived threats. Fuller’s work, along with that of John L. H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, forms the foundation in the modern English-language historiography in terms of providing an overview on the development of the Tsarist army. More recent studies have intensively studied shorter periods of time, often leading to revisionist assessments of the nature of the Tsarist General

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17 A. Kavtaradze, 'Iz Istorii Russkogo General’nogo Shtaba' *VZh* 12 (1974) p.84 Unsurprisingly perhaps, Kavtaradze implies that most emphasis rested on Germany and Austro-Hungary. Certainly according to A. A. Samoilov, a prominent contemporary of this process, the main operational-statistical sections of GUGSh were considered to be those concerned with Germany, France, and Austro-Hungary: Sergeev & Ulunian, *Ne podlezhit' oglaseniiu*. p.22.


Staff itself, but fail to match these earlier works in both chronological breadth and thematic scope. After a long period of neglect therefore, the Tsarist military now has some claim to be one of the better-studied institutions of Tsarist Russia amongst historians, but the performance and attitudes of that army in its Asiatic campaigning remains understudied. The present study sets out to review a shorter time period than either Fuller or Keep, but within the context of a very broad geographical scale.

Tsarist foreign policy, meanwhile, remains probably the best studied aspect of the prewar Russian governmental system in the West, research having been facilitated by open access to late imperial Russian foreign policy documents preserved in both French and American archives. Two excellent thesis dissertations exist on the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, although the department remains a disappointing blank spot in the existing openly printed historiography. A further gap exists in the absence of any satisfactory institutional study of the Russian Foreign Ministry as a whole in the West, although this is partially explained by the fact that many pre-1900 Foreign Ministry documents are only available in Russia, with the concomitant problems of access for western scholars. Western researchers are therefore still reliant on the considerable accomplishments of Russian historiography in this field, including the recently published series A History of Russian Foreign Policy (Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii). Regarding Russian relations with individual Asian states, the western researcher is still best advised meanwhile to consult the numerous Russian document collections and monographs in this field, including for example the two-volume document collection on Russian-Indian relations recently published through the Russian Academy of Science. Far from all of the most valuable Russian research in this field is modern; mention in particular should be made of the Soviet historian A. I. Popov, whose work in the 1920s

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20 The two most outstanding examples of this genre, both using documents preserved in foreign (non-Russian) archives, but reaching rather different conclusions on the driving motivations behind the formation of Tsarist foreign policy, are: David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge, Mass./London, England: Harvard University Press 1992) and D. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan 1983).
and 1930s was in the main concerned with Tsarist Russia's relations with various Asiatic states. Invariably based on impeccable archival research, Popov's numerous articles from this period contain a wealth of data and analysis that remain invaluable to the modern scholar.

Whilst the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry usually receives some brief commentary in western surveys of Tsarist foreign policy, the very existence of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff by contrast has rarely if ever been touched upon. The almost complete absence of any examination in the western or Russian historiography on the existence and purpose of this department means, for example, that one table presented in the following study represents the first time the heads of this institution have ever been chronologically catalogued in any non-contemporary source. Studies of Russian military involvement in Asia meanwhile, both Russian and western, have overwhelmingly focused on battles and campaigns-the Russo-Japanese War in particular-rather than on administrative methods or the development of deep long-term future-orientated strategical thinking in this sphere. The one shining exception to this rule is the Ph.D thesis of E. G. Bilof from 1974, an excellent study incorporating much material from the Sbornik po Azii (on which more in a moment), but limited in chronological scope and lacking important supplementary evidence only now available from work in the Russian central state military-historical archive. Equally, Bilof's work makes no specific analysis of the role of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Indeed, Bilof appears to have been unaware of certain relevant facts regarding the department's role in this sphere-for example that L. N. Sobolev, whom he quotes, was at one point head of this department during his period of study.

Russian primary sources on military policy in Asia across this period, meanwhile, are inevitably shaped by the characteristics and personnel of the Russian governmental administration of the time. Within this period two major strategic conferences were held, one in 1873 and one in 1910, surveying and evaluating the security profile of the Russian Empire. The input of district staffs, military attachés and General Staff officers concerned with Asiatic theatres in these important conferences will form one focus of

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study in the present work. Another will be the output, opinions and role of the leading personnel of the General Staff Asiatic Department and its successors over the whole period 1860-1917 at the central policy-making level. Information on both these topics is in the main to be found in the central state Military-Historical Archive of Russia (Rossiiski gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhirv, hereafter in footnotes RGVIA).

The central state archive in Moscow is not the sole source of Imperial Staff assessments on Asia however. In 1883 the Military-Scientific Committee of the Russian Main Staff decided to publish material on Asia at its disposal gathered by General Staff officers, military agents, and diplomats abroad. This was intended 'to facilitate the study and further examination of our Asiatic districts and in particular China, Japan, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Buhara, Khiva and so on. The resulting Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii (St.Petersburg, 1883-1914), contains the collected studies of staff officers travelling through or residing at consuls within Asiatic countries on the arc stretching from the Caucasus to the Pacific. In addition the Sbornik came to print large amounts of foreign material in Russian translation, mostly from English or German periodicals, concerning the latest political or military events in Asia. Each volume in the series was intended to be ordered along one of two general area divisions, one covering the area from the Caucasus to Central Asia (the areas known as Central Asia and Asia Minor), the other from Central Asia to the Far East (Siberia). Publication was based upon mass of accumulated material, resulting in an irregular publication pattern- from two to eight editions a year in the first few years to a single annual edition by the start of the twentieth century. The last year of publication, 1914, saw publication of the Sbornik's 87th issue. The reports and material contained within each volume in the series are extremely diverse in terms of length, quality and value, and selective quotation from the volumes will inevitably imply a greater sense of order and priority than does in fact actually exist.


27 'The articles vary in importance as they do in caliber. Moreover, an examination of the Sbornik leads to inferences rather than to definite proofs.' Warren B. Walsh, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History.' RR 16 (2, 1957) p.54.
Local governor-generalships in both the Caucasus and Central Asia were themselves prolific producers of analytical and statistical information, thanks in part to the decision made in 1860 to create statistical committees in all the gubernator and oblast 'towns of Russia. In Turkestan alone from 1869 onwards Governor-General Kaufman commissioned a collection of every article relating to Central Asia, which in 10 years had, in 300 issues, catalogued more than 4,000 publications on the region. The Turkestanskii Sbornik however, remains today in its place of origin Tashkent- rather than in a central archive. The same rule also applies, although not invariably, to much of the statistical material produced in the Caucasus and Far Eastern military districts. Vital as such collections are therefore to evaluating the administrative characteristics of Russia's military governors in those provinces, reference to them here will be limited to those reports duplicated for administrative purposes within the central military archive or reported in Russian secondary sources. Finally, use will be made of the prolific military newspaper and journal literature of this period-the Voennyi Sbornik in particular- to try and assess what lessons the army might have been trying to absorb from its Asiatic theatres. Also of particular relevance in this area will be study of the courses run at the Nikolaevskaia Academy by one of Miliutin's chief aides, and professor of military statistics, Lieutenant-General A. I. Maksheev (1828-1891). Inspired by his fourteen-month tour of Turkestan in 1847, Maksheev ran a series of courses at the academy with a strong Asiatic orientation, covering plains warfare, ethnography, statistics, the careers of the great Asiatic commanders, and the political and economic features of China, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Persia. In addition he encouraged the introduction of courses on Arabic, Farsi, Turkish and Tatar, helping institute a cash prize of 1,000 roubles for the graduating officer producing the best Persian manuscript. These courses would be the formative experience of many men that went on to work at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in the 1870s and 1880s.

28 Daniel R. Brower, 'Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan' in D. R. Brower, & E. J. Lazzerini (eds.), Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917. (Indiana: Indiana University Press 1997) p.91 In a similar category is much of the collection of intelligence information relating to countries bordering the Turkestan military district, produced by officers of that district and known under the acronym SKSSTVO (Svedeniia, kasaushchiesia stran, sopredel'nykh s Turkestanskim voennym okrugom).

Before moving on to consider personnel more generally, one final major source of information on Russian General Staff activity in Asia deserves serious attention. This is the work of the Military-Historical Committee of the Russian General Staff to produce an official history of the Russo-Japanese War.30

Beginning its work in 1906 and finished by 1910, the Committee over the course of those four years reviewed 12,000 documents to eventually produce a nine-volume history of the war incorporating 525 maps and plans. This is a serious study of the course of the war on land, which contains a great mass of primary material still valuable to the historian today. Particular use in the present study has been made of the first volume, which covers in minute detail political and military events in the Far East preceding the war itself, including the Japanese and Russian military build-ups and Russian strategic assessments of Japan. Although to some degree inevitably an exercise in exculpation, the official history is unusually honest in its analysis of Russian shortcomings, a product perhaps of the fact that the war was unsuccessful for Russia and clearly contained lessons that needed to be learned.

Utilizing these sources then, the present study aims to analyze and evaluate the character and significance of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff in a period of dramatic expansion and change along Russia's Asiatic frontiers. Within this overall period however three main figures also played a prominent role in Russian Asiatic policy, necessitating repeated reference to their influence and opinions. These figures were Field-Marshal Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, (1815-79) the final conqueror of the Caucasus, General K. P. fon Kaufman, (1818-82), the first Governor-General of Central Asia, and General A. N. Kuropatkin, (1848-1925), at one time a head of the Asiatic Department, War Minister in the period 1897-1904, commander-in-chief in the Russo-Japanese War, and the final Tsarist Governor-General of Central Asia in 1916-17. Each man served to energize and sum up Russian Asiatic policy of his day and played some important though not always explicit role in influencing his successors. Kaufman served under Bariatinskii in the Caucasus, and Kuropatkin received some of his earliest strategic assignments whilst serving on Kaufman's staff in Central Asia. Of them all, Kuropatkin played perhaps the greatest role in analyzing and attempting to assimilate Russia's Asiatic and European strategic commitments, serving in Central Asia, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and on the Main Staff with Obruchev reviewing European

war plans in the 1880s. In this assimilatory role he incorporated both his own Asiatic experience and a
system of comparative analysis available to a man who had both studied other empires deeply and had
actually briefly served in Algeria with the French Saharan corps, becoming an honourary legionary. On his
taking up the post of War Minister, in his own words:

I found many schemes actually in progress, and numerous others-worked
out and marked as urgent- for the execution of which money had not been
available. As there was no co-ordinated programme between the War and Navy
Departments, I was forced to spend my first two years in office in framing an
exhaustive statement for our guidance. In this I traced out and summarized the
achievements of Russian arms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
showed which had been finished and which had been left over for completion
to the twentieth century, and pointed out the sacrifices made by the nation
towards this result. I reviewed the condition of each of our frontiers, indicated
the numbers and organization that would be necessary for the different probable
theatres of war, and estimated the power of offence of our most likely
adversaries. Having thus arrived at some logical conclusions as to what had to be
faced in the coming century, it remained to draw up definite proposals for the
improvements necessary in the organization for war of the army.31

The result of this review, a product of the general trend towards unified military doctrine at the
Staff Academy at the time, was perhaps the largest geostrategic survey of all time.32 The majority of this
analytical work, with accompanying political commentary, was reproduced in Kuropatkin’s immense 3-
volume Zadachi Russkoi Armii produced in St. Petersburg in 1910, and sections were also reproduced in
Kuropatkin’s work on the Russo-Japanese War printed abroad and translated into English by Captain A.B.
Lindsay in 1909. It is a formidable piece of research, invaluable to any student of Russian military history,
and reference to it will be found continually throughout the present study. Kuropatkin in this field was in
many ways only the successor however to General N. N. Obruchev (1830-1904), who guided Russian

31 A. N. Kuropatkin & Capt. A. B. Lindsay (trans.), The Russian Army and the Japanese War Volume 1
strategic policy continuously from 1867 to 1897. Obruchev, as will become evident in the fourth section on strategic planning, was responsible in large part for the stress Tsarist strategy lay upon preparation of the European theatre throughout much of this period. He was also by proxy however responsible for some of the Asiatic war planning that occurred, not least the aforementioned war-planning for the Russo-Turkish conflict of 1877-1878 which saw fighting in both European and Asiatic Turkey.

Also active both professionally and to a lesser degree in terms of lasting literary testament of course were those officers whose knowledge of Asiatic conditions grew out of long-term service experience rather than staff training. Such individuals could come to occupy high positions in the administration, becoming patrons of the generation of trained staff officers who would succeed them (Bariatinskii is the main example here) but many also served all their lives at brigade level or below, continuing to carry out district command functions well into the 1880s. General I. D. Lazarev (1819-1879) is a good example of a product of Russia’s military ‘Asiatic school’ on the ground. An Armenian born in Shusha, Elizavetopol (he visited St. Petersburg for the first time only after the war of 1877-78), he joined the Caucasus Corps at an early age. Showing a talent for languages and native affairs, he became guardian of the infant ruler of Mechtulin in the Caucasus for a period in the 1850s. He then went on to distinguish himself at the siege of Gunib (1859), in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and died whilst on campaign in Central Asia, fighting the Tekke Turkmen of what would shortly become Russia’s Trans-Caspian province. Amongst the natives of the Caucasus he was apparently known as the ‘Bateer-Sardar’ or ‘Warrior Chief.’ Such men were vital component elements of the Russian military’s Asiatic experience.

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32 On the intellectual climate and trends at the Nikolaevskaya Academy at the time see: Van Dyke, *Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914* pp.91-130.
33 Unlike Kuropatkin however, Obruchev was never War Minister- he gained his authority first as head of the Military Scientific Committee and later as Chief of the Main Staff. As Menning points out, Obruchev under P. S. Vannovski (War Minister 1881-1897) was in a difficult position- 'he had access to information and high persons without the full trust and authority necessary to implement measures he deemed appropriate for the army’s continued welfare and development.' Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets.* p.90.
Only one individual of this type left a truly lasting impression of the history of staff thinking towards Asia however, and a profile of Prince Bariatinskii will be presented in the next chapter. 35

1.3 The Asiatic Frontier.

The present study has chosen to encompass such a broad geographical scale for two reasons. Firstly, from the practical perspective, only by dealing with Russian relations with China, Japan, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Turkey can one faithfully claim to represent the work of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff as a whole. It was the labours involved in attempting to balance and assimilate priorities in these strategic regions that gave that General Staff department its distinctive character.

Secondly however, the geographical breadth of the study has been motivated by the author’s personal belief that the very broad responsibilities borne by the Asiatic Department were not simply the product of a convenient bureaucratic coincidence (an aesthetically neat division of ‘Asiatic’ from ‘European’ strategic concerns) but rather reflected existing cultural and political ties across the region. These links significantly bound this area together and continued to be felt as Russian influence expanded in the region. Although not personally a Eurasianist in the classical meaning of the term 36, or even a believer in the dominating importance of geopolitics, the author would agree with David Christian upon the validity of ‘Inner Eurasia’ as a geographical and cultural concept; in short, that:

the entire region can usefully be treated as a single, coherent unit of historical analysis. The geography and ecology of the region have shaped its history from prehistory to the present. They have done so by posing distinctive problems that demanded distinctive solutions. 37

Taking this approach, the present author would of course particularly agree with Professor Christian that these conditions also entail that ‘Inner Eurasia...is a natural unit of military history.’ 38 This area

38 Ibid., p. 5.
incorporated the space occupied by the present-day states of the Russian Federation, the Central Asian states, and Outer Mongolia.

This region was approximately demarcated by the ecological factors of aridity, extreme cold and a continental as opposed to a coastal climate, and by the geographical factors of the Caucasus, Tien-Shan, Pamirs, Altai and Hindu Kush mountain ranges, amongst others, delineating its southern frontier. Commercial trade routes, which also formed the paths taken by invading armies, ran predominantly from east to west. The most significant river systems by contrast run on a north-south axis, flowing into the Baltic and the frozen Arctic Sea. Tributaries of these river systems did however facilitate Russian penetration into Siberia from the sixteenth century onwards, and the Amur River, flowing into the warmer waters of the Pacific, formed an important exception to the general rule. The line of the Ural mountains, the traditional dividing line between Europe and Asia in classical geography, was an arbitrarily selected point given the fact that this range was too insignificant to ever hinder the movement of peoples and cultures across it.39 More significant from a historical perspective was the ecological dividing line between the vast grasslands of the Eurasian steppe, and the more meagre grazing afforded by the soils of Eastern Europe, the effects of which arguably stopped the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. Like the forces of every other nomadic pastoralist empire, the Mongol army was dependent upon the ability of the local terrain to sustain its horses.40

Russia advanced into this region of Inner Eurasia by contrast as a predominantly sedentary society, taking advantage of those technological changes that had tipped the strategic balance between sedentary and nomadic cultures in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Its advance was undeniably influenced by the geographical and climactic factors noted above, but these did not play a pre-determining role. It advanced also as a peripheral power in a coherent geopolitical and ecological cultural system, the military aspect of which had already been felt in Russian experience of the Mongol yoke.41 The unity of this Inner Eurasian geopolitical sphere found expression not only in its earlier

39 M. Bassin, 'Russia between Europe and Asia: the ideological construction of geographical space.' SR 50 (1,1991) pp. 2-3, 6.
40 The absence of traditional pasturage does not, however, appear to have hindered Mongol penetration of China and the Middle East. For a discussion of this point, see: Greg Rogers, 'An examination of historians' explanations for the Mongol withdrawal from East Central Europe' EEQ XXX (1, 1996) pp.3-26.
41 For studies on the major sequence of events in this process that have influenced the present author, see: Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met. The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771.
spasmodic political unification under predominantly nomadic warrior societies-Chinghiz Khan, Tamerlane-but also in centuries of trade links, the most prominent expression of which in the pre-railroad epoch was the famous Silk Road. It was also a sphere defined by the efforts of other empires and civilizational blocks to lock it out using either natural terrain features or artificial constructions such as the Great Wall of China. Developments in one part of the region invariably carried powerful repercussions elsewhere, even where two areas were not directly contiguous. The appearance of the Huns in the west during the 4th century AD, for example, was almost certainly linked to the 1st century AD collapse of the Hsuing-mu Empire in northwestern China and Mongolia. Whilst not seeking to deny that war, famine, civil strife, epidemics and societal collapse isolated whole sections of this geographical region from their neighbours for prolonged periods of time, it is nonetheless sustainable to argue that sufficient trade and cultural links had been created by the time of the major Russian expansion to create a sense of administrative unity, overlap, and continuity in many areas. On advancing into Central Asia in the latter part of the nineteenth century for example, the Russians were designated as representatives of the ‘White Tsar’ (Ak Padishakh) by the locals, or in other words, according to some interpretations, as the politically legitimate successors to the Mongol White Horde (the confederation often referred to in Russian sources as the ‘Golden Horde’). The role performed by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in attempting to monitor this vast region was therefore merely a further symptom of an already inherent, preexistent web of economic, strategic and cultural interconnectedness.

Given this sporadic but significant sense of governmental and cultural continuity within the region of Inner Eurasia, reinforced by centuries of natural trade links, the one obvious anomaly within the Russian

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42 R. G. Landa, Islam v istorii Rossii (Moscow: Izdatel’skaia Firma “Vostochnaiia Literatura” RAN 1995) pp.44, 70. In the earlier period Ivan IV (Ivan Groznyi, or in common Western translation ‘Ivan the Terrible’) was related to Chinghiz Khan, but by the maternal, not the paternal line-i.e. in the Turkic-Mongol tradition he could not be considered the direct descendant of Chinghiz Khan and hence the direct inheritor of his authority. The link carried moral rather than judicial significance. The greatest advocates for the significance of such links were the Eurasianist historians George Vernadsky and N. S. Trubetskoii. See in this connection: N. S. Trubetzkoy, The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity (USA: Ann Arbor 1991).
experience was their expansion beyond the natural borderline of the North Caucasus mountain chain down
towards the unstable border area of the Transcaucus. The Caucasus as a whole had traditionally formed a
border area between empires rather than an integral element of them; local resistance and environmental
conditions had deterred even the Arab conquest. 43 The Caucasus mountain chain differed markedly from
the natural biosphere of the Inner Eurasian plain, the latter being so strongly characterized by the three
dominant terrain elements of forest, tundra and steppe. In contrast to the fur trade of Eastern Siberia, no
natural economic magnet existed here to draw Russian settlers southwards independent of the central
government’s desires. Russian forces became involved in the Transcaucus not from any desire to protect
economic migrants but from a combination of a desire to assist their coreligionists in Georgia alongside
balance-of-power considerations in regard to the European political scene of the day. 44

Russian expansion into Asia therefore, whilst it owed much to the growing technological gap
between Europe and Asia at the time, was also destined to be very much shaped by the enormous individual
difficulties the Russian state faced in subjugating and ruling the Caucasus. The Caucasus in many ways
formed an obstacle to further expansion of a type that other, overseas, empires, did not encounter-hence the
recurrence in Russian strategic thought of the image of the Caucasus as a bridge or window to Asia. 45

Russia underwent the longest sustained struggle for superiority over a foreign, Islamic population
experienced by any European colonizing power-62 years as opposed to the French 26-year war to subjugate
Algeria 46 and the British 42-year experience in achieving military dominance in India (1757-1799). 47

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43 The Arab Empire did however lay the roots for the subsequent Islamization of the North Caucasus: Anna
Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom. The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus
well qualified by practical experience to assess them, see: Lt.-General J. B. Glubb, The Great Arab
Conquests (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1963)

44 Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume 1: Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to
the Mongol Empire pp.4-16 and D. Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: John
see also: M. Khodarkovsky, ‘Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russia in the North

See also below, Section 2.2, views of D. I. Romanovskii.

46 A. N. Kuropatkin, Zadachi Russkoi Armii Tom II. (St. Petersburg: Sklad V. A. Berezovskogo,
Kommissionera voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii 1910) pp.74-5

47 1757 Battle of Plassey, 1799 Battle of Seringapatam and death of Tipu Sultan. The British fought two
further main wars in India, the First and Second Sikh Wars, in the 1840s, but these can be seen as further
wars of annexation rather than as wars to ensure actual military and governmental survival. The Great
Mutiny (1856-) did of course offer a significant challenge to the British system and underlined the need
for governmental reform. However, in no sense did Britain’s conflicts in India in the nineteenth century
extreme duration of this struggle can be attributed both to the skill of the mountaineer resistance, particularly under the Murid Imam Shamil (1796-1871), and to the inadequacies of the Russian army in responding to local terrain, climate and culture. The combination of fanatical Muslim resistance and difficult mountain terrain led Proconsul Ermolov's Chief of Staff, General Vel'iaminov, to liken the Caucasus to a fortress, which had to be closely and carefully invested. 48 Despite this flash of strategic insight in 1828, Russian efforts continued to be hampered by a lack of system and a desire to achieve swift results. The appointment by Nicholas I of Prince M. S. Vorontsov, one of his most trusted advisors, to the new post of Viceroy of the Caucasus with full civil and military authority in 1844 marked the beginning of Russian governmental recognition that the Caucasus required a specialized military and political approach. 49 However Vorontsov's tenure began disastrously with one of the severest defeats to Russian arms, the Dargo Campaign of 1845, in which Russian columns having attacked positions the enemy had already abandoned were continually harassed and sniped at during a long and bloody retreat. 50 Russian

match the sustained intensity of the eighteenth, particularly as European competition within the theatre (the French) was no longer a factor.

48 This expression became famous in subsequent nineteenth-century Russian military literature and was used to describe the 'correct' method of subjugating the Caucasus. Twentieth century scholars have gone on to use it to sum up the Russian approach. See: A. A. Vel'iaminov, 'Sposob uskorit' pokorenie gortsev (Memoria general-leitenant Vel'iaminov, predstavleniaia v 1828-m gody). ' KS 7 (1883), pp.67-77. N. Sh. 'General Vel'iaminov i ego znachenie dla istoriy kavkazskoi voiny.' KS 7 (1883) pp.1-155.

49 In his biography of Vorontsov, L. H. Rhinelander stresses throughout that it was Vorontsov's special relationship of trust to the Tsar that allowed such a significant devolution of power: L. H. Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov. Viceroy to the Tsar. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1990). Moshe Gammer argues however that Vorontsov 'was... well aware that the emperor did not particularly trust him and like him.' Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan. (London: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd. 1994) p.210. Gammer however offers no more details to substantiate this claim.

50 Baddeley, The Conquest of the Caucasus remains a set text on Russian wars in the Caucasus at this time. Moshe Gammer's Muslim Resistance to the Tsar offers a more modern account based on a greater array of sources but remains indebted to the earlier work. For a particular focus on Dargo from the British perspective, see M. Gammer, 'Vorontsov's 1845 Expedition against Shamil: A British Report.' CAS 4 (4,1985) pp.13-33. Amongst Russian accounts of the Caucasus War, undoubtedly two of the most outstanding are also amongst those most recently published. The work of M. M. Bliev and V. V. Degoev, Kavkazskaia Voyna (Moscow: "Roset" 1994) represents the fruits of over ten years of research. The dazzling work of N. I. Pokrovskii meanwhile, Kavkazskie Voiny i Imamat Shamilia (Moscow: Rosspen 2000) is a much older work, dating back in first draft to the 1930s, but not published during Pokrovskii's lifetime due to political considerations. In the Tsarist period the most thorough and detailed account of the conflict was without question that of N. F. Dubrovin: Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze. (St. Petersburg: Tipografia Departament Udelov/ V. A. Berezovskogo/ I. N. Skhorokhodova 1871-86) T.1-6.
losses on this occasion came to 4,000 men, including 3 generals and 200 officers, giving some impression of just how costly this type of warfare could become.  

Amongst the sharpest critics of Russian policy in the Caucasus in the 1840s were D. A. Miliutin, the future Minister of War, and N. N. Murav’ev, the future governor-general of Eastern Siberia. Both men were serving in the Caucasus line at the time. Miliutin stressed that conditions in the Caucasus demanded a tactical emphasis on fortifying heavily contested terrain whilst showing greater political respect for local Muslim customs and rituals. Prince Bariatinskii, a childhood friend of the future Alexander II who on his appointment to Viceroy of the Caucasus in 1856 made Miliutin his Chief of Staff, shared these views. Utilizing his special relationship with the Emperor to the full, Bariatinskii carried out a campaign of military and political reform that within a remarkably short space of time (1856-9) brought victory to Russian arms and the capture of Shamil himself. In the process he influenced both the reforms Miliutin was later to carry out in the army as a whole and a generation of officers looking to further Tsarist expansion in Central Asia. Prominent amongst these officers was D. I. Romanovskii, a general who both wrote on the Caucasus and took part in the early campaigns in Central Asia as a reliable protégé of Miliutin, by then War Minister.

The war in the Caucasus did not end entirely with Shamil’s submission however; resistance in the western half of the theatre continued after Bariatinskii’s departure as Viceroy in 1862, leading eventually to one of the largest exoduses of people to occur before the twentieth century. The vast majority of the Circassian population departed for the Ottoman Empire, to be replaced by Russian settlers, a peace settlement being concluded in 1864. At least 400,000 Circassians, and more than a million individuals in all, departed Russian shores.  

51 Paul B. Henze, ‘Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The 19th Century Resistance of the North Caucasian Mountaineers.’ CAS 2 (1, 1983) p.19. Gammer considers 1843 to have been Shamil’s most effective year of campaigning against the Russians, Shamil having married technology to his own guerrilla tactics to cost the Russians 2, 620 casualties, 27 guns, 2, 152 muskets, 13, 816 shells, 35, 000 bullets, 368 armories and hundreds of horses. Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.146.


raid the Russian border and provide irregular cavalry for Russia’s main enemy, Turkey, particularly in the
war of 1877-78. Visible symbols of this exile could still be seen until very recent times in the Circassian
bodyguard of the royal house of Jordan, who retained their traditional ‘Cossack’ style of dress (the
Cossacks having of course adopted their own uniform from that of their Muslim opponents). Bariatinskii’s
career, meanwhile, was on the wane following Shamîl’s capture; a marriage disapproved of by the court
and the lack of any obvious peacetime post for a soldier who now held the highest military rank in the
Russian empire led to a frustrating limbo in his fortunes. The course of military reform undertaken by
Miliutin after 1862 led to a break between Bariatinskii and Miliutin that eventually became one of the most
infamous and bitter bureaucratic feuds of late nineteenth century Russian history. However, Bariatinskii’s
concerted attack on Miliutin’s reforms at the strategic conference of 1873 led to the defeat of his party.
Most have interpreted this feud as a result of bureaucratic rivalry- Bariatinskii being jealous of Miliutin’s
overarching powers as War Minister. Bariatinskii sought a staff organization on the Prussian model with an
independent Chief of Staff reporting directly to the sovereign- a role for which he himself was the most
obvious suitable candidate. Others have attributed this dispute to personal differences between the two
men.54 Bariatinskii died in 1879 still alienated from the court, having never found another active role to
match that of his period as Viceroy of the Caucasus.

Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Gilles Vinstein, S. E. Wimbush (eds.) Turco-Tatar Past. Soviet Present
Shamîl himself had earlier engaged in population transfers in order to create an area of ‘scorched earth’
between himself and the Russians: Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.150 and Baddeley, The
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus pp.444-45. A Ph.D dedicated to this whole subject, unseen by the
present author at the time of writing, is Marc Pinson, ‘Russian Expulsion of Mountainers from the
Caucasus, 1856-66 and its Historical Background-Demographic Warfare-An Aspect of Ottoman and
Russian Policies, 1854-66.’ Unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University 1970.) See also V. V. Popov,
‘Imperator Aleksandr II: “..delo polnogo zavoevaniia Kavkaza blizko uzhe k okonchaniiu.”’ VIZh 6
(1995) pp.71-77; Alan Fisher, ‘Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire after the Crimean War’
Russia to the Ottoman Empire. A critical analysis of the Great Tatar emigration of 1860-1861’ CMR 41/1

54 Zisserman, Bariatinskii’s biographer, believed the Bariatinskii-Miliutin conflict to be essentially a
personal, not a political issue. A. L. Zisserman, Fel’dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii,
1815-1879. Tom III (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografia, 1890) p.208. The cause of the dispute has also
been dealt with by Rieber in Alfred J. Rieber (ed.), The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to
down on the side of the personal factor in the cause of the feud, arguing that Miliutin’s pursuit of a French
model in his reforms was essentially pragmatic. She also points out that the Russian ‘alternative’ did not
imply an independent Chief-of-Staff at the time of Miliutin’s taking up the post of War Minister. Gudrun
Persson, ‘The Russian Army and Foreign Wars 1859-1871’ Unpub.Ph.D. diss. (London School of
Economics and Political Science, 1999) pp.52-55. See also Menning, Bayonets before Bullets pp.15-16.
Russian infringement on Central Asia had begun seriously in the early 1850s but had been set back by the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{55} In the early 1860s the Russian border was still troubled by raiding parties from the independent khanates of Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, with the occasional abduction of Russian settlers to serve the Central Asian slave trade proving a particular source of aggravation. The decision in February 1863 to close a gap that had developed between the Syr-Darya and West Siberian frontier lines was intended to provide some solution to this problem, in the form of a firm border. However, the actions of a local soldier, Major-General M. G. Cherniaev, in then going on to annex Chimkent and Tashkent, parts of the Kokandian khanate, in 1864 and 1865, respectively, created the conditions for further strategic debate. Though his actions did not meet the complete approval of all his contemporaries, Cherniaev was applauded and urged on by his personal friend at the time, Colonel V. A. Poltoratskii, the latter then serving as the first head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Cherniaev would later invite Poltoratskii to join him and help develop a new administration for the territories he had helped annex.\textsuperscript{56} Although Cherniaev was subsequently relieved of his post as military governor following his failure to take the Bukharan town of Dzhizak, being replaced by D. I. Romanovskii in 1866, a significant section of the Russian policy-making administration, most notably Miliutin himself, now favoured taking a firmer line in Central Asia. Romanovskii continued the conflict with Bukhara begun by Cherniaev, and governmental realization of the need for a more organized administration in this expanding new province of 'Turkestan' led in 1866 to the

Recently David Rich has argued that the Russian Main Staff, whilst French in form, was adopting Prussian methods and becoming an agency of independent command within two decades of its creation. This implies those alleged differences in the Russian staff over 'French' or 'Prussian' systems were a mirage: Rich, \textit{The Tsar's Colonels} p.67. Obruchev's most recent biographer, meanwhile, has attributed the cause of the Bariatinskii-Miliutin feud to changes in Miliutin's own views, implying that Miliutin once in office became overly defensive of his own authority as War Minister. Airapetov, \textit{Zabytaia era "Russkogo Mol'tke"} p.107.

\textsuperscript{55} Although full of lively prejudices and deeply controversial in its own day, M. A. Terent'ev's history of the Russian conquest of Central Asia remains unrivaled up to the present in its depth of detail: M. A. Terent'ev, \textit{Istoriia zavevaniia Srednei Azii s kartami i planami} (St. Petersburg: Tipografia V.V. Komarova 1906) T.1-4. The work of A. G. Serebrennikov meanwhile represents a dense collection of documents on Russian policy in the area compiled on the suggestion of War Minister Kuropatkin. Unfortunately the chronology of the published series only runs up until the mid-1860s., but it remains nonetheless an invaluable source. A. G. Serebrennikov (ed.), \textit{Sbornik materialov dlia istorii zavevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia} (Tashkent: Tipografia Shaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1908-1915) T.1-10. In the Western historiography, see: R. Pierce, \textit{Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule} (Berkeley, California: University of California Press 1960) and D. MacKenzie, \textit{The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev} (Athens: University of Georgia Press 1974). In Russian meanwhile, the modern work of N. A. Khal'pin, \textit{Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii} (60-90-ee gody XIX v.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1965) is essential.

\textsuperscript{56} MacKenzie, \textit{The Lion of Tashkent}. pp.31, 52.
creation of the Steppe Commission. Amongst the members of this body was A. P. Protsenko (1836-19?), an
army officer who would go on to gain the unique distinction of twice serving as head of the Asiatic
Department of the General Staff. Having up until this point been attached as a staff officer to the West
Siberian military district, Protsenko’s service on the Steppe Commission would appear to mark the
beginning of his rise to prominence as one of Russia’s most trusted and experienced officers on Asiatic
affairs. In 1867 as a result of this body’s council the governor-generalship of Turkestan was created, and
the first Governor-General, K. P. fon Kaufman, despatched with extensive civil and military powers much
on the model of Vorontsov and Bariatinskii in the Caucasus. Kaufman concluded the war with Bukhara in
1868, leading to that khanate becoming a protectorate of the Russian Empire, but remained dissatisfied by
his relations with Khiva. A campaign against that khanate however, situated near an oasis within miles of
barren desert, required better lines of communication, and to this end a port at Krasnovodsk on the eastern
bank of the Caspian was built in 1869. This enabled forces from the Caucasus to participate in campaigns
in Central Asia, a situation which caused considerable worry to the British in India, by now concerned at
the growing proximity of the Russian border to northern Afghanistan. Kaufman’s campaign against Khiva
in 1873 resulted in the fall of the city itself and the establishment of that khanate as a second protectorate.
Continued unrest within the Kokand khanate meanwhile, disintegrating internally even before the Russians
arrived, resulted in its complete absorption into Turkestan in 1875, and Kokand vanished from the map.
However the Turkmen of the Akhal-Teke oasis to the south continued to cause concern by their raids, and
the Caucasus command under the Grand Duke Mikhail Nicolaevich undertook its own campaign to
subjugate these traditional tribal nomads. The initial campaign by General Lomakin against Denghil-Tepe
in 1879 (also known by the name of the adjoining fort, Geok-Tepe) resulted in the worst failure Russian
arms encountered in Central Asia, due to an insufficient care for supplies and tactical errors during the
siege. In particular, in the eyes of contemporaries, Lomakin ignored ‘a maxim in Caucasian warfare’—that of
always leaving a line of escape open to a besieged opponent. Russian losses were around 450 men,
Turkmen losses almost 4,000. It was left to one of Kaufman’s most brilliant protégés, General M. D.

58 Marvin, The Eye-Witnesses Account... pp.224, 268-9. The battle was notable for the vast expenditure of
ammunition on the Russian side: two hundred rockets, five hundred shot and shell, and two hundred and
forty six thousand rounds of ball cartridge.
Skobelev, to complete the conquest of Geok-Tepe the following year, in a campaign in which General A. N. Kuropatkin, the future Minister of War, took part as his Chief of Staff. The visit of a deputation of Turkmen elders to the spectacular coronation ceremony of Alexander III in 1883 and the personal efforts of officers Komarov and Alikhanov in negotiations at Merv led to the submission of the remaining Turkmen tribes to the Russian empire without further bloodshed.59

The Anglo-Indian government in British India meanwhile was increasingly concerned by the advancing Russian frontier in Central Asia. Having witnessed the failure of its attempts by political intrigue to form a bastion from the Turkmen tribes to the Russians, Lord Rippon’s Indian administration granted an annual subsidy of 1,200,000 rupees to the Amir of Afghanistan, ‘Abd al-Rahman, to modernize his army and fortify the border of northern Afghanistan. In 1885 the collision of Russian forces under General Komarov with Afghan troops by the river Kushk (cause of the so-called ‘Penjdeh Incident’) formed the last major clash of arms encountered during Russian expansion in Central Asia.

Anglo-Russian political tension in Asia continued however, and across this period three reported troop concentrations in Central Asia caused particular concern. In 1878 three columns had been concentrated in Turkestan by General Kaufman in what was assumed, in the wake of the Stoletov mission to Kabul, to be a prelude to a Russian military advance.60 The British launched the Second Afghan War by way of a preemptive strike, and the Amir they deposed, Shir Ali Khan, sought Russian protection. The British could not settle the country any more than any other invader in its history however, and retired leaving their own representative, ‘Abd al-Rahman, on the throne, subsidizing that ruler in return for controlling Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Ironically ‘Abd al-Rahman was himself originally an agent of Russian foreign policy, having originally entered re-entered Afghanistan after a comfortable 12-year period of residence in Russian-held Samarkand, funded on his return by a Russian subsidy and Russian rifles. His defection once in Afghanistan to the British cause was still bitterly referred to by one Russian as a ‘dark

59 For an official history of these campaigns, see: N. I. Grodekov, Война в Туркмении (T. 1-4) (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. S. Balasheva 1883-4). The best modern summary of this whole process remains M. N. Tikhomirov, Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossi (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1960) but see also M. Saray, The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and Their Incorporation into the Russian Empire (Ankara: Turkish Historical Printing House Society 1989).
60 Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, ‘The Shadow of India in Russian History’ History XIV (1930) p.222
In 1888-89 20,000 troops were reported to be moving in Central Asia in connection with the security crisis created by the Amir (see below) and in 1905 reports of Russian manoeuvres in the aftermath of the Dogger Bank episode again caused alarm in British circles.

In the 1890s Russian influence again stretched forward into the Pamirs, military scouting parties causing further Anglo-Russian diplomatic friction and leading to a further border delimitation in 1895 that granted Russia influence over part of Badakhshan. Here again the military played a significant role in the policy-making process. At a conference on the Pamirs question held in January 1892, Colonel Protsenko, head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff at the time, presented a report arguing Russia's right to extend its influence into the Pamirs region. By the end of the conference however the military were talked down from dispatching significant forces there, limiting themselves to the activity of the aforementioned Cossack mounted patrols whilst keeping a larger force of 400 Cossacks, four guns and a battalion of infantry in reserve. According to the deputy minister of the MID at the time, War Minister Vannovskii complained that the General Staff's Asiatic Department was supporting the Turkestan governor-general in a forward policy against the wishes of the War Ministry as a whole.

Throughout this period however local rulers also played a more significant role than has previously been thought. The whole of north Afghanistan was in fact historically contested terrain between the Bukharan and Afghan ruling dynasties, a contest prone to become three-sided with frequent Persian intervention, as occurred with the invasion of Nadir Shah in the eighteenth century. More recently in regard to the period under present review, in 1818 the Bukharan Emir had again annexed Balkh on the left bank of the Amu-Darya, that town during the reign of the Bukharan Astrakhanid dynasty (1599-1756) having formed the second capital of the Bukharan emirate. Bukharan power retained a purely token local political presence however, and the following seventy years were marked by the gradual conquest and annexation of this northern region by the Afghan Amirs, beginning with the reign of Dost Mohammed onwards. The

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61 P. A. Rittikh, Avganskii Vopros' (voenno-geograficheskii i politicheskii etudy) (St. Petersburg: Tipografia Shtaba Voisk Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga 1905) p.15. For practically the only open discussion of these events from the Tsarist period, see A. A. Semenov, “Begstvo” Abdur-Rakhman-khana iz Tashkenta v Afganistan” in: Kaufmanski Sbornik, izdannyi v pamiat' 25 let', istekshikh so dnia smerti pokoritelia i ustritelia Turkestanskogo kraia General-adjutanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana 1-go. (Moscow: Tipo-litografija T-va I. N. Kushner 1910) pp.100-117.
imperial policies of both Russia and Britain were in many ways shaped by the actions of local rulers pursuing this 'Ancient Supremacy.' This would lead to dramatic population shifts still felt in Central Asian politics today. Britain, pursuing the 'Alexandrine chimera' of a frontier on the Oxus (the ancient name for the Amu-Darya), supported the claims of the Afghan Durrani dynasty under the Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Balkh, or 'Afghan Turkestan.' Historically however the governors of the lands immediately north of the Hindu Kush range were Uzbeks and the population more Uzbek, Tadjik and Turkmen than Afghan. In the 1880s Rahman's state policy of 'Afghanization' of the northern territories via the mass transfer of literally thousands of families created administrative chaos and led directly to the rebellion led by his cousin, and sardar of these territories, Ishaq Khan. Although Ishaq Khan allegedly sought Russian sponsorship—the Russians having already had experience of northern Afghanistan's divided loyalties from General Komarov's dealings with the locals—no solid aid materialized and the revolt was crushed in short order. The purge then carried out under Rahman against the last remnants of the (Uzbek) Chingizid dynasty of Balkh led to thousands dying by torture and execution, and pressure from refugees fleeing this reign of terror fell upon the Russian frontier. The Tsar angrily denied supporting the Amir's rivals while

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64 As well as from their own diplomatic history, the Russians having received a friendly diplomatic greeting from the independent Khan of Balkh as early as the seventeenth century: Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'The Shadow of India...' pp.219-20.
65 George Curzon, later Viceroy of India but at this time travelling through Central Asia, was unable at first to meet Colonel Alikhanov as this officer was engaged in intelligence work in northern Afghanistan. Curzon noted that the Russian press had 'the most exaggerated and fantastic estimates of the Afghan Pretender's chances of success. These reports were so absurdly biased as to leave no doubt, not merely that Is-hak [sic] Khan had the clandestine sympathy of the Russian Government, but that he was publicly regarded as the Russian candidate to the Afghan throne...what I afterward heard at Tashkent made it clear that there was a considerable massing of Russian troops upon the Afghan border, and that a forward movement must even have been contemplated.' G. N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1889) pp.122-4.
accusing Rahman of threatening the whole security of the region, and Britain had to ask the Amir to back
down from any collision with the Russian forces reportedly massing on the border.66

The annexation of part of Badakhshan to Russian influence after 1895 in turn led to equally savage
persecution of the local Isma'ili population by the Bukharan Sunni regime until Russia was driven by a
Pamiri revolt in 1904-5 to assume direct administrative responsibility for this remote region.67 The Isma'ilis
remained a source of concern however in that they owed their allegiance to the Aga Khan, widely seen at
this time as a British puppet. Diplomatically however, European events pushed Britain and Russia into
more or less settling their differences, a course culminating in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907.

The Russian army had gained extensive experience in conquering and ruling Asiatic possessions
by the turn of the century therefore, though its policies were to be severely challenged by the Central Asian
revolt of 1916. Expansion in both the Caucasus and Central Asia was complemented by the gaining of new
commitments in the Far East, where the combined efforts of Governor-General N. N. Murav'ev and N. P.
Ignat'ev, the Russian diplomatic envoy to Peking, led to the Russian border with China moving
dramatically southward to the Amur river. Here Russia absorbed several hundred thousand square miles of
new territory, gaining a riverine boundary that led to the sea and antagonizing China just as she was slowly
beginning to emerge from over a decade of civil war. The development of a Russian rail route across
Siberia by the 1890s, and in particular the creation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, a Russian railway line
crossing Chinese Manchuria along a strip of land demarcated as extraterritorial, would raise the prospect
before long of Russia potentially annexing the whole of northern Manchuria. What lessons therefore, both
tactical and strategic, did the army and the General Staff's Asiatic Department in particular learn and seek
to re-apply from this whole experience? To what extent were Russia's European and Asiatic military
commitments balanced by the Russian army and how far did the army's involvement and activities in these
regions contribute to geographical and scientific knowledge as a whole? Only a detailed study of the Tsarist

66 Lee, 'The Ancient Supremacy' p.564 The abuses of Rahman's reign carried out in the name of 'state
modernization' were justified by Rahman by reference to his favourite historical character, Peter the Great.
Lee, by far the foremost recent chronicler of this period, has summed up Rahman's state policies generally
as more 'garrotte and stick' than 'carrot and stick': Lee, 'The Ancient Supremacy' p.526.
67 L. N. Khariukov, Anglo-Russkoe Sopernichestvo v Tsentral'noi Azii i Ismailizm. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
Bukhara i zapadnyi Pamir v kontse XIX veka) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury 1958) pp.105-
126.
army's Asiatic experience and the response of staff officers to it can answer such questions. The administrative and analytical tools available to the Russian state on the eve of its Central Asian conquests form the substance of the next chapter.
2. THE GRAND STRATEGY OF EXPANSION, 1714-1885.

2.1 Ideas, Institutions and Personnel

The three years in the Staff College were one uninterrupted string of examinations: solving of tactical problems, mapping, sketching, etc. The things one was supposed to know and remember were appalling; all the details of the important battles, from Alexander the Great's campaigns to the modern wars, all the organisation of the different European armies, etc. But the worst were statistics.¹

Until the nineteenth century, Russian strategic planning towards the East, both military and administrative, lacked any outstanding proponents or sponsors within Russian governmental policymaking. The reasons for this were twofold. First, there was still the absolute dominance of the ruling monarch in decision-making, a position not significantly challenged till the 1860s. Thus, the expeditions mounted by Peter the Great to the Aral and Caspian Seas and the disastrous expedition to Khiva in 1714-17 came about, it has been suggested, largely through the personal interest of the Tsar as a mercantilist in exploration and expanding trade.² Such interest could wax and wane fairly rapidly, as it did after Peter's death, though it could prove temporarily very influential. As late as 1801 Russian troops could still be dispatched on a suicidal mission to invade India purely on the personal whim of Paul I.³

The second factor restricting the capacity of Asiatic interests to create a fracture in strategic decision making was the presence of unified strategic councils, in which the interests and advice of the various military and diplomatic groups of the administration were regularly reconciled in a single body.

¹ Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer p.48.
³ For a summary of these events using contemporary records, see: Lt. Colonel Batorskii, 'Proekt ekspeditsii v Indiiu, predlozhennykh' Napoleonom Bonaparte imperatoram Pavlu i Aleksandru I v 1800 i v 1807-1808 godakh.' SGTSMA XXIII (1886) pp.1-104.
Such emergency conferences were a vital factor in Russia’s eighteenth-century imperial successes. These two conditions-Tsar and konferentsia- served, in practice, to concentrate government attention and military affairs to the west, to the absorption of Poland and the Ukraine, and Paul’s schemes on India were in fact a good indicator of that particular monarch’s own madness, the cause of his subsequent assassination.

Below the level of strategic decision-making however, Peter’s incursions to the East, however militarily disastrous, did start a trend towards oriental studies (vostokovedenie) in Russian cultural circles, and V.V. Bartol’d (1869-1930), perhaps the greatest Russian exponent of this science, dated its beginnings to this period. In particular it was from this time, through the journeys of Russian travellers, the Russo-Turkish wars, the Persian expedition of 1721-22 and the mediation of Russian envoys that Russia began to acquire a significant stock of manuscripts in eastern languages, many kept in Peter’s ‘Room of Rarities.’ However, Peter’s interest in eastern affairs grew out not so much through Muscovy’s traditional links to Muslim states as through his own ‘Westernization’ project for Russia- ‘Peter tried to understand the Orient in terms of Western Europe’. Through the efforts of scholars such as Professor Georg-Iakob Ker (1692-1740) and Vasilii Kirillovich Trediakovskii (1703-69) Russia by mid-century had translations of many important eastern texts, including the Koran, either from the original or from other (European) translations. Ker sought the creation of an Asiatic Academy, a theme to be taken up, again unsuccessfully, by future Minister of Education S. S. Uvarov in 1810. Ker wanted academy-trained orientalists to be part of every Russian mission to both the East and Europe, to acquire manuscripts. He linked the proposal to create the academy with a plan for the Russian conquest of Turkey and Central Asia- an early indication of how the Russian quest for knowledge and rationalization of the unknown often tied itself to military instruments for its attainment. Peter’s reign also saw the extension of Russian contacts further east, the dispatch of two or

4 B.V. Lunin, Sredniaia Azia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii (Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo “NAUKA” Uzbekskoi SSR 1965) p.69
6 Lunin, Sredniaia Azia v dorevoliutsionnom i Sovetskom vostokovedenii, pp.69-71.
three monks to China in 1716 to learn the Chinese and Mongolian languages laying the basis for a permanent Russian religious mission in Peking that was also active in scholarly work.7

Following Peter’s death Russian policy towards the East became more static, the reigns of Anna Ivanovna and her successor Elizabeth Petrovna being chiefly marked by Christianization campaigns run through the ‘Commissions of the Newly-Baptized.’ The rule of Catherine the Great however saw a policy of more liberal re-engagement with the East allied to a period of renewed imperial expansion. Catherine’s general policies, in contrast to Peter’s, saw a redevelopment of the older Muscovite policy of a ‘special approach’ to the East. Catherine herself saw the eastern half of her empire as a distinct area, requiring a different political and administrative approach. Fascinated by the reports of local governors on native customs and habits, reports themselves part of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment’s fascination with the discovery of the ‘other’, Catherine sought to incorporate her eastern empire not through expulsions and war but through an intimate knowledge of local conditions and trade. As a result, she famously embarked on a mosque-building program, seeking to replace local tribal loyalties with a wider community loyalty to Islam.8 Her 1773 Edict of Religious Tolerance, recognizing Islam and allowing the free practice of certain essential religious rites, set a standard in Russian-Muslim relations that succeeding regimes would respond to with varying degrees of compliance. In 1787 the Empress directed the Academy of Science to print a complete Arabic text of the Koran, an edition reprinted in 1789, 1790, 1793, 1796 and 1798. By the first half of the nineteenth century the number of Korans produced from Russian presses ran into the thousands, achieving a wide distribution not only within the Russian Empire but also across the Muslim world as a whole.9 In 1788 Catherine also established the first Muslim religious administration at Ufa and in 1794 a further ‘muftiat’ was organized in the Crimea. Montesquieu’s belief that peoples were shaped by local conditions, requiring accommodation by the central regime, though not shared by all Enlightenment figures, would continue to filter through to those Russian nineteenth-century bodies attempting to rule and

7 Frye, ‘Oriental Studies in Russia’ p.35. It was one of the members of this Ecclesiastical Mission, the Archimandrite Palladi, who was eventually responsible in the nineteenth century for developing the Cyrillic-Chinese transliteration system still in use today. For details on the development of Russian Sinology, see: D. Wolff, To the Harbin Station. The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1999) pp.146-167, 181-190.
9 Landa, Islam v istorii Rossi p.135.
master the East. Most notably this would influence the Imperial Geographical Society and the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. This trend underwent a subtle shift however; from Catherine's day, when the Muslim birthrate was seen as advantageous to the Russian Empire, to the last decades of the nineteenth century when the large Muslim population came to be regarded as a threatening, potentially subversive force. In short, there occurred a shift in the psychological undercurrent from rationalist self-confident expansionism to a form of strategic paranoia.

One of the most prominent early nineteenth century bureaucrats following the Catherinian line of flexible integration was Mikhail Speranskii, who played a large role in attempting to integrate Russia's Asiatic possessions via a unified legal code. Speranskii, from 1819 to 1822 responsible for the administration of Siberia, and seated on the Asiatic Committee formed in 1820, incorporated into his law codification the Kazakh customary law, or Adat, contained in Khan Tauke's Jhety Jharga. Speranskii's reform of 1822 marked a significant new level of Russian incursion into the Kazakh nomadic way of life, attempting to both accommodate and alter that system. The Adat law was maintained in adjudicating disputes but Speranskii divided the Kazakh territory up into new administrative districts and attempted to encourage the Kazakhs to become sedentary farmers via land incentives. This attempt however created difficulties that foreshadowed the later Russian experience in Central Asia; the new administrative divisions creating chaos along the traditional migration routes whilst Russian maintenance of local sultan-administrators bred corruption and local resistance.11 Speranskii's policy of trying to strike an administrative balance of regulation with rather restricted intervention in Siberia has been judged 'moderately successful' by later historians, but attempts to pursue a similar policy in the Caucasus, Finland

10 This committee, formed to deal with relations with the Khan of Khiva and the Kazakhs, and chaired by the director of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department held session frequently between 1820 and 1824, ceasing to meet after 1847 with the subjugation of the Kazakhs. Edward Allworth, 'Encounter.' in E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview. Third Edition (USA: Duke University Press 1994) pp.55-56.

11 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. (Stanford, California: Hoover Press 1987) pp.15, 58-62 and see also Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors pp.73-92. The attempt to provide a codification of local law was never completed, Nicholas I being unwilling to accommodate cultural traditions differing widely from Russia's, particularly in the case of Poland. On Speranskii and the law codification see: Marc Raeff, Michael Speransky. Statesman of Imperial Russia. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1957) pp.320-44 and his earlier Siberia and the Reforms of 1822 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1956). Like Ermolov in the Caucasus, Speranskii later came under suspicion in that many of his co-workers proved to be Decembrists.
and Central Asia were to prove more problematic.\textsuperscript{12} At a deeper level however Speranskii’s statute of 1822 served to permanently encode in fixed judicial terms the demarcation in terms of rights and privileges between the ‘inorodtsy’ or non-Russians and the ‘natural’ (prirodnye) inhabitants of the empire. Nationalities in the former category thereafter came to be regarded by some through the same type of lens with which contemporary Europeans looked at ‘Asiatics’ as a whole. The inorodtsy became an object of considerable scientific and ethnographic curiosity, their study as a distinct group by organizations like the Imperial Geographical Society and the Russian General Staff now sanctioned and given further impetus by their legally distinct status within the empire. Speranskii’s statute therefore marked a fault-line in the longer term between the pre-modern and modern Russian visions of the imperial space.\textsuperscript{13}

At the same time, an informal series of contacts between court and army formed a group increasingly advocating a firmer Russian policy in the East generally. Minister of Internal Affairs L. A. Perovskii for example, an important early patron of the generation of bureaucrats who would reform the Russian state in the 1860s, long expressed concern over the vulnerability of the eastern borderlands whilst his younger half-brother, General V. A. Perovskii, carried out Russian Central Asian policy on the ground itself from the governor-generalship of Orenburg. This relationship undoubtedly led to the Minister arranging for one of his recruits, the young vostokoved V. V. Grigor’ev (1818-1881) to serve in Orenburg under his brother from 1851 onwards in a series of posts. These ranged from organizer of the campaign chancellory for the Kokandian campaign of 1853 to chairman of the Orenburg border commission.\textsuperscript{14} This would be a fair exchange, since Lev Perovskii’s closest assistant, the philologist V. I. Dal’, had entered his service after having first served under his younger brother during the Khivan campaign of 1839-40.\textsuperscript{15} Such

\textsuperscript{13} Kappeler & Clayton (trans.), \textit{The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History.} pp.170-1. The law codification marked the culmination of an increasingly complex process by the modern state to classify the difference between ‘self’ and ‘other’ by a barrage of physical, spiritual, verbal and observational tests: how a nationality ate, how they smelt, physical appearance, their attitude to sexual relations and so on. On the situation before 1822, see: Yuri Slezkine, ‘Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity’ in Brower & Lazzerini (eds.), \textit{Russia’s Orient} pp. 27-57.
\textsuperscript{14} For a highly intelligent analysis of Grigor’ev’s mission, set within the framework of modern-day ‘Orientalist’ discourse, see: Nathaniel Knight, ‘Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?’ \textit{SR} 59 (1, 2000) pp.74-100. A debate on Knight’s arguments can be found in the journal \textit{Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History} under the heading ‘Orientalism and Russia’: \textit{Kritika} 1 (4, 2000) pp.691-727.
\textsuperscript{15} W. Bruce Lincoln, \textit{In the Vanguard of Reform. Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861.} (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982) p.87.
arrangements indicate the increasingly sophisticated network between specialist governmental, military and academic institutions in Russian Asiatic affairs of this period. Grigor'ev himself would later cite the 1820s as marking a crucial positive turning point in the development of Russian vostokovedenie and Russian knowledge of the East in general.16 The key members of the group supporting such developments at a governmental level in the Nicholaevan era (1825-1855), advocates of an active policy in both Central Asia and the Far East, were the Perovskii brothers, Minister for State Properties Pavel Kiselev, and the future head of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, E. P. Kovalevskii. This group was united in general by a vision of a reformed, rejuvenated Russia, and along the road to this goal, in their eyes, a turn away from Europe towards Russia’s ‘natural’ sphere of influence in Asia played a large part.17

The start of the nineteenth century had seen the establishment of a number of Asiatic-orientated bureaucratic institutes who were to become competitors for resources with more Western-orientated departments as the eighteenth-century legacy of strategic conferences was subsumed to bureaucratic interdepartmental rivalry from Alexander II’s reign onwards. Prominent amongst these developments was the granting of total autonomy in 1819 to what had already become a separate department of the old college (ministry) of Foreign Affairs in 1797, the Asiatic Department. This innovation was designed to help provide a unified administration for Russia’s Asiatic possessions, its immediate predecessor having neither the cadres, the money nor the experience to deal with Russia’s growing involvement in the Near and Middle East.18 As well as dealing with mountaineer affairs in the Caucasus and handling correspondence regarding relations with the Kazakh Hordes, this department also took under its wing the Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking. Such a state of affairs regarding China continued until the formalization of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations in 1861, after which the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission assumed the purely religious function its title implied.19 Sections within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this period also

handled the enciphering of correspondence and code-breaking, a task that included the encoding of correspondence regarding eastern affairs and Central Asia. This reflected the Foreign Ministry’s continued dominance in the intelligence field in the first half of the nineteenth century, although by the 1840s the War Ministry was also beginning to develop its own codes. By its very nature, being a gathering centre of orientalists, cartographers, linguists and diplomats, the Asiatic Department of the MID was destined to be an important player in Russian eastern policy, as well as an ambiguous partner to the European-orientated Russian foreign policy establishment. R. R. Rosen, a Russian diplomat of the period, opined that:

the Asiatic Department... was considered, from the social point of view, inferior to the Chancellory [but]... the Balkan Peninsula and Egypt, as well as the whole American continent belonged to the domain of this department whose very name seemed to indicate... that after all Asia was considered or instinctively felt to be the real and most important field for all the activity of Russia’s foreign policy.

Given this viewpoint, it is unsurprising that Rosen himself, as a graduate of the Asiatic Department, would later come to embody some of the conflicts of interests that members of this establishment could have with the main Chancellory. In his memoirs, written after 1917, he recalled that, for him, from an early age:

two convictions were formed in my mind: first, that the expansion of the Russian Empire on the Continent of Europe had reached its extreme limit ...and secondly, that the true interests of Russia lay in the development of her Siberian Empire and her possessions in Central Asia.

The Asiatic Department of the MID was not the only section of that ministry concerned with the study of the East by the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1823 the Academic Department of Eastern

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21 R. R. Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy Vol.1 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1922) p.18. See also however the recollections of A. D. Kalmykov, who recalled that members of the Turkish and Balkan sections within the department ‘...considered themselves part of European diplomacy and looked down on us who transacted the correspondence within the far away regions of Asia.’ A. D. Kalmykov [Kalmykov], Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat. Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1971) p.19.
Languages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, its first director, G. M. Vlangali (1781-1834), being an expert in the Persian and Turkish languages who had earlier (from 1820) served as first translator to the High Commander in Georgia, General A. P. Ermolov.23

The first half of the nineteenth century saw a period of great organization and cataloguing of eastern texts through the emergence of new university institutions. Amongst the most important were the Asiatic Museum established by S. S. Uvarov in 1818, based on Tsar Peter’s ‘Room of Rarities’ and headed by the Near Eastern expert Kh. D. Fren (1781-1851), the Eastern Department of St. Petersburg University (est.1819), and the Lazarevskii Institute (est. 1815-16) in Moscow. The last was originally a private school for Armenians that came to be used for the language training of government officials serving in the Transcaucasus. It was also the school at which I. A. Zinov’ev (1835-1917), a future head of the Foreign Ministry’s Asiatic Department, received his first training. All of these developments, a product of the new university statute of 1804, marked a significant step forward, both in organization and scientific training, in the practice of vostokovedenie as a Russian academic science.24 Academic knowledge continued to advance hand-in-hand with Russian arms, the fall of Ardebil to Russian forces in 1828 for instance leading to the valuable library in the mosque of that town being sent to St. Petersburg. The famous vostokoved Senkovskii had already written a memorandum forwarded to Count Paskevich suggesting that such ancient manuscripts be part of the war indemnity from the Persians.25 A proposal by Professor Fren that Arabic, Persian and Turkish manuscripts also be collected from captured Turkish towns led to an equally rich harvest of academic material being gained through the assistance of the military arm the following year, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.26

26 M. R. Ryzhenkov, ‘Rol’ voennogo vedomstva Rossii v razvitiu otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia v XIX-nachale XX vv. (Opyt istochnikovedcheskogo issledovanii dokumentov Tsentral’nogo gosudarstvennogo voenn-istoricheskogo arkhiva SSSR)’ Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk SSSR 1990) p.95. Although inevitably not fully
Russian interest in eastern studies ran parallel with a growing interest in anthropological expeditions and the discovery of 'lost civilizations' by Europeans in general, important discoveries being made in Egypt, Java and Turkey in the same period. In the process of what one scholar has termed the 'Oriental Renaissance' of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Russia played a fully active role. Scientific excitement was mirrored by a cultural growth within the contemporary 'Romantic' genre literature in which writers like Goethe and Herder presented the Orient as the exotic and mysterious source of all human knowledge. When the future Russian Minister of Education S. S. Uvarov drew up his proposal for the establishment of an Oriental Academy in St. Petersburg in 1810, Goethe was amongst its most enthusiastic backers. Uvarov himself, proposing the Academy as one means to make Russia 'the mediatrix between European civilization and Asian wisdom', lavished praise on the work of European scholars, including the Calcutta Society, German Biblical scholars and the translators of Sanskrit, and made clear that he shared their view that the Orient was 'the cradle of all civilization in the universe.' A similar desire to celebrate Russia's unique geopolitical position by the acquisition and categorization of its rich cultural, ethnographic and archaeological inheritance within a single scientific framework lay behind the calls for a 'national museum' that were voiced a few years later. The motivation behind these proposals was both patriotic (in the Imperial sense) and cosmopolitan; the petitioners were non-Russians working in the Russian bureaucracy, who envisaged a Russian national museum emerging in parallel to a similar pan-European trend in the development of such institutions elsewhere. The French fashion in this period for all things Chinese meanwhile, reflected in the term chinoiserie, had its natural Russian counterpart in the elite infatuation with kitaishchina. When this European intellectual movement began to move from seeing the Orient in general as Herder's 'soil of God' towards a position of contempt towards societies so clearly stagnant and decayed, many Russians also followed this trend. Nonetheless, in the process Russia gained

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30 Bassin, Imperial Visions pp.49-52.
an academic infrastructure of considerable intellectual standing, whilst Russia's unique position between Europe and Asia often led Russian Orientalism to pursue unique cultural courses differing from the general European trend. By the mid-1850s, university institutions in Russia with chairs in eastern studies, increasingly clustered around St.Petersburg itself, were recognized as leaders in their field not only at home, but also worldwide.

At the same time, the Russian General Staff, developing its own 'culture of knowledge' by the 1830s, based on a drive to quantify and objectify the surrounding world, effectively divided its scientific attention between Europe and Asia, many officers undertaking travels to the East to expand geographical knowledge. The first officially recorded activity by Russian staff officers operating in an intelligence-gathering capacity in Asia dates to 1792, when staff officers accompanied the diplomatic mission of M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov to Constantinople, gathering and developing materials still used decades later in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. An important early role in Staff activities in Asia was played by the institution of the Quartermaster service, 19 of the 175 members of this force on the 1st July 1805 serving in the Transcaucasia, Orenburg and the Far East. Russian staff officers of the cartographical section conducted a topographical sketch of the Transcaucasia in 1801-3, whilst staff officers conducted field trips in Kazakhstan in 1803-4 and accompanied the diplomatic mission of Iu. A. Golovin to China in 1805-7. Continued geographical and cultural ignorance played a large role however in Russian military errors and reverses during the first Russo-Turkish and Russo-Iranian wars of the nineteenth century (1806-1812 and 1804-1813, respectively).

Undoubtedly the single most important figure in raising the level of the staff's geographical knowledge and scientific capability was the honourary father of the Russian General Staff, Prince Petr Mikhailovich Volkonskii (1776-1852). A veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and arguably one of the major organizers of victory in the campaigns of 1812-14, Volkonskii’s impact on the Russian staff began with his appointment to the Quartermaster section in 1810. In that year on the proposal of the Prince there was established a Staff of the Chancellory of the General-Quartermaster, with a corresponding attached library

31 On the manner in which the writings of several Russian orientalists differed from the stereotype of this science created by Edward Said, see: Nathaniel Knight, 'Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?" pp.88-97.
32 N. P. Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaba Tom I. 1698-1825 (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia 1883) pp.120-121
and a significant collection of astronomical and mathematical instruments. Appointed Chief of the Main Staff of His Imperial Highness in 1815, Volkonskii's seven-year reign in that post would have its most lasting testament with the creation in 1822 of the Corps of Military Topographers. This innovation served to put the practice of military topography on a fully scientific basis for the first time and created a cadre system designed to avoid the delays in topographical work due to lack of trained personnel that had been experienced in the past. A guide by the director of the Corps, F. F. Shubert, published in 1826-7, testified to the new level of organization in the conduct of such work, containing amongst other things a complete collection of all astronomical points calculated up until that period in the Russian Empire. In 1818, meanwhile, Prince Volkonskii charged K. F. Tol', the Quartermaster-General of the Main Staff, to compose a comprehensive collection of information about the fortifications and armed forces of all the major European states, including Turkey. The consequence of this was a series of important intelligence-gathering trips by Russian officers to Constantinople and Asia Minor, including significant work by Adjutant-General P. D. Kiselev (the future Minister for State Properties) and Count F. F. Berg, the positive results of which were reflected in Russia's war against Turkey in 1828-29. This tradition of closer study of the Near East was continued by M. P. Vronchenko, an outstanding linguist and member of the Quartermaster section of the General Staff who during his three-year appointment to the consulate in Smyrna in the 1830s studied the country in depth and logged 100 new points of astronomical observation. A brief alliance with Turkey in this period also expanded the interests of the Russian General Staff beyond their traditional geographic sphere, Russian Staff officers visiting Syria and Palestine to map the country and follow the progress of the contemporary Egyptian revolt under Mohammed-Ali. What was most striking about the activities of the General Staff overall meanwhile was not merely the new level of organization gradually being acquired in its study of Asia, but the qualitative difference between that

35 B. M. Dantsig, Bizhnii Vostok v Rosskoi nauke i literature (Dookaabr'ski period) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1973) p.148.
36 However, on continued flaws in the Russian military machine exposed by this conflict, see in particular: Frederick W. Kagan, The Military Reforms of Nicholas I. The Origins of the Modern Russian Army pp.102-31.
37 M. R. Ryzhenkov & I. M. Smilianskaia, Siria, Livon i Palestina v opisaniakh rossissikh puteshchestvennikov, konsul'skikh i voennykh obzorakh pervoi poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo
knowledge and what was known before. This held true even regarding territories with which Russia had been territorially contiguous for centuries. In 1832 A. I. Levshin, developing a new map from the recent topographical surveys of Russian officers in the Kazakh steppe, commented that the new data now emerging demonstrated that all previous maps of that territory, with one individual and recent exception, contained significant faults and even completely inaccurate details. Mountains had been shown in the past where it was now clear there were plains, lakes where there was no water, and even rivers flowing in the wrong direction. Thus the 1820s marked as much a fundamental turning-point in the knowledge possessed by the Tsarist military of the East as they did for Russia’s other departments of state.

The increasing activation of Tsarist foreign policy in the Near and Middle East and the accompanying build-up of increasingly experienced and specialized cadres of staff officers was reflected most strongly in the career of I. F. Blaramberg (1800-1878), an officer who in effect spent his entire career engaged in the study of Asiatic states. Having served in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, Blaramberg went on to work in the Caucasus Corps, later composing a major military-statistical portrait of that area of the Empire. Appointed in 1837 as military advisor to the consulate of Major-General Simonich in Persia, Blaramberg witnessed the Persian siege of Herat in 1838 at first hand, and during his period of service there dispatched numerous reports back to the General Staff in St. Petersburg on contemporary conditions in Persia and Afghanistan. This culminated in his massive 1841 statistical portrait of Persia, covering nearly every aspect of the contemporary life of that state. Transferred to the Orenburg corps under General Perovskii in 1840, he went on to direct the first siege of Ak-Mechet’ in 1852 before returning to St. Petersburg and being made head of the Military-Topographical Department, going on to become head of the Corps of Military Topographers in 1866.

By the start of the 1840s therefore the Russian General Staff had already evolved a highly developed tradition of staff work and topographical studies within the often-in hospitable environment of Inner Asia. The scientific structure under which these missions carried out their tasks became fully

38 Soplenkov, Doroga v Arzrum: rossiiskaya obshchestvennaya mysl’ o Vostoke (pervaia polovina XIX veka). p.16.
developed under D. A. Miliutin, the future Minister of War, who created the Staff Academy's Department of Military Statistics almost single-handed in 1846-7. Miliutin's efforts would help to see the initiation of a programme in 1847 that two decades later resulted in the first military-statistical portrait of the entire Russian Empire.  

A personal proponent of the statistical method, Miliutin's later service as Chief of Staff in the Caucasus would be marked by the belief that 'without knowledge, control was impossible.' Like Speranski before him therefore, Miliutin and his followers saw in the enumeration, quantification and statistical rationalization of scientific data a means to harmonize and administer the Russian Empire. In the period immediately following the Crimean War, it was recognized that Russian statistical data and intelligence gathering was in a state of chaos-a victim of the same crisis of management organization that gripped the rest of the Russian bureaucracy. Data about the availability and quantity of Russia's basic resources was often lacking, and data was not collected or analyzed with a view to its intrinsic value but simply gathered in without prioritization, resulting in repetition of effort and a dangerous level of strategic ignorance. From the beginning of Alexander II's reign onwards, reform proposals led to statistical data being published and hence opened to critical examination (glasnost'). This marked the military's recognition, shared with the rest of the Russian bureaucracy, that expertise was only useful if information was freely available. Within the field of the General Staff's burgeoning interest in Asiatic studies, a policy of glasnost' had particular significance in that previous travellers accounts were now open for officers like Baron Mannerheim to consult before they undertook their own trips. This helped them review the level of previously gained knowledge and suggested new avenues for investigation, making intelligence-gathering missions generally more effective, though the growing burden of reading soon became too much for any one individual and made some consequent repetition of effort, though reduced to a bare minimum.

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43 On the heights of bureaucratic inefficiency visible within the civilian ministries for much of the first half of the nineteenth century see in particular: Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform pp.19-25.  
inevitable. 45 A similar discipline dominated the contemporaneously-blooming sciences of map-making and botany- 'observed data are not complete until they are reconstituted within the archive of knowledge.' 46

On Miliutin's detachment to the Caucasus in 1856 the course in Military Statistics at the General Staff Academy was taken over by two of his protégés, Lt.-Colonel A. I. Maksheev and Guards Captain N. N. Obruchev. 47 Maksheev taught that section of the course related to the statistical study of Russia itself whilst Obruchev dealt with foreign, primarily Western European states. Maksheev's experiences in the statistics course led him in the 1860s to present reform proposals on the manner in which Russia's statistical data was collected. His policy, largely accepted and followed thereafter, by setting fixed parameters according to function on necessary information, rationalized the chaotic gathering process of the past into a pattern the staff would continue to pursue well into the 1880s. 48 At the same time, the introduction from 1865-66 of cartography lectures into the general curriculum for staff candidates (previously only compulsory for students of the geodesic section) meant that all graduates were better equipped, at least in theory, to carry out the type of work Maksheev's new parameters demanded. However, Maksheev also petitioned for an expanded section within the course on Russia's Asiatic possessions, and began giving lectures on Russia's relations with the Central Asian states from 1865 onwards. To aid this effort, Maksheev was commandeered to the Turkestan military district for six months study in 1867. 49 Maksheev's proposal to then form a new academy course covering the military history, ethnography, statistics and economies of China, the Central Asian khanates, Persia and Afghanistan was...

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45 This crisis of information management, in which volume of information threatens to overwhelm coherent rationalization, continues to affect many bureaucracies today, the transfer of recording methods from paper to computer data having destroyed or at least disturbed the prioritization systems developed by most professions since the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, at the military level, the development of 'Information Technology'- systems for aiding rapid command decision given the new data processing burdens modern warfare imposes- are creating what some have seen as a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). Analysis of the 'staff revolution' in Europe in the nineteenth century poses a question mark over how innovative this new development really is however. For a survey, see: Jacob W. Kipp, 'The Contours of Future Armed Conflict and their Interpreter: Implications for National and International Security Policy' in: General Makhmut Gareev, If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1998) pp.1-45.


rejected by the Academy, fearful of the burden of teaching such a vast new mass of information which would only prove useful in the activities of a minority of officers. The need to bolster teaching on Asiatic countries at the Academy was recognized however, and to this end a separate course of non-obligatory lectures was instituted from 1875. Invited to give these was Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov (1832-1901), a full member of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society who had already from 1870 delivered a series of non-obligatory lectures at the Academy on the military forces of China and Japan and the military significance of Russia’s Asiatic frontiers. Veniukov was well qualified to speak on these matters, having joined and worked alongside Murav’ev-Amurskii in the Far East as soon as he graduated from the Staff Academy in 1856 and having gone on under the patronage of Miliutin to visit both China and Japan personally. In his memoirs Veniukov made clear that the first lectures were given largely as a means to help him out of serious financial difficulties, but remarked that they were well attended, and included some adjutant-generals in the audience.

As implied above, the input of the cadres built up by these new military and university institutions was complemented by the efforts of the Imperial Geographical Society, (IRGO, est. 1845) which despite an official non-political stance often sponsored missions to investigate strategic questions as much as to expand geographical knowledge. The influence of the military upon the Geographical Society was strong from the very outset. Two of its founding members, F. F. Berg and M. P. Vronchenko, had first honed their geographical skills, as we have seen, in military service, whilst D. A. Miliutin, the future Minister of War, served on the Society’s governing council between 1849 and 1852. In the keynote address that inaugurated the very opening of the society in 1845, Admiral Litke cited the Topographical Department of the General Staff and the Naval Ministry’s Hydrological Department as natural partners in the society’s activities. A key early mission of the Geographical Society was to improve the scientific community’s geographical and cultural knowledge of Asia, based initially upon a drive to republish and supplement (and, implicitly, to improve upon) the work already done by the famous German scientist Carl Ritter. This early interest did

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50 Glinoetskii, Istoricheskii Ocherk Nikolaeovskoi Akademii General'nogo Shtaba, p.274.  
53 P.P. Semenov [Tian-Shanskii], Istoriia poluvekovoi deiatel’nosti Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva 1845-1895 Chast’ 1 Otdel I, II & III (St.Petersburg: Tipografi V. Bezobrazova i Komp. 1896) pp.88-92. On the impact of European science upon Russian geographical and
not abate with that task complete, and the Geographical Society’s most famous later beneficiary, General Przeval’skii, could rest assured that:

as long as Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky [sic] was at the Imperial Geographic Society and Milyutin [sic] at the Ministry of War, [he] got whatever he asked for.54

The Imperial Geographical Society also served as a tool through which the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry spread its influence, several important individuals such as E. P. Kovalevskii, Baron Osten-Saken and N. V. Khanykov serving as members of both institutions.55 The role of the Naval Ministry and its head, the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, in reinvigorating the very principle of empire through the dispatch of ethnographic missions in the 1850s, served as an important precursor to these later combined War Ministry-Geographical Society missions.56 Not least, they set the precedent for military-civil cooperation in the working of empire which some imperial servitors, notably General Kaufman, would seek to build upon and encourage. The end result of these cross-disciplinary developments would be a new branch of military science itself, a branch that General Andrei Evgen’evich Snesarev (1865-1937) would pass on to the Soviets under the title ‘Military Geography.’ Snesarev saw in this branch of the military art four main areas of study:

(1) Territory (On a broad scale, including climate)

(2) Population (Ethno-demographic and socio-political analysis)

(3) Means of war (the economy of the country and its links with the world economy.)

(4) Armed forces.57

56 Catherine B. Clay, ‘Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862’ SR 54, (1, 1995) pp.45-62. The Imperial Geographical Society served as an important gathering point for a generation of liberals, many of whom were to go on to shape policy in the period of the Great Reforms. Studies of its personnel and influence are made in Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform pp.91-101. A less often noted but equally important relative of the IRGO was the Russian Archeological Society (RAO), established in 1846 in St. Petersburg.
57 A. M. Riazchikov, ‘A. E. Snesarev kak geograf.’ In: V. V. Balabushevich & Grigory C. Kotovsky, (eds.) Andrei Evgen’evich Snesarev. (Zhizn’ i Nauchnaia Deiatel’nost) (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “NAUKA” Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury 1973) p.80. This definition of ‘Military Geography’ corresponds almost exactly to the modern understanding of ‘Military Intelligence.’ For biographical details on Snesarev,
Area studies based on these principles would blossom during the latter nineteenth century on Russia’s new territories in the East as Russia pursued, in parallel with other empires of the day, the ‘scientific and rational construction of space’. With their fascination with statistics, charts, and minute analysis, many of these texts in fact read eerily like later Communist works—an indication of just one of the levels of continuity apparent between many aspects of the Tsarist and Soviet military systems.

Undoubtedly the most important military department coordinating the efforts of this new generation of statisticians, geographers, translators and ethnographers, however, was the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. In 1856 there had been created a temporary section, or committee, for dealing with the affairs of the Caucasus army, the independent Orenburg and Siberian corps, and the forces deployed in Eastern Siberia. In 1863 a permanent organization, the Asiatic Department, replaced this temporary section within the General Staff. This department was charged with the military-political administration of the Caucasus, the Orenburg krai, Western and Eastern Siberia, control over the movement and reinforcement of all forces dispositioned there, and all proposals relating to the development of forts and lines of communication within those districts. The department took its position in the command structure for much of this period from the reforms carried out by Miliutin in 1862-7 of the Main Staff, and lasted in this basic form until 1903. Until the full establishment of the Asiatic Department alongside the Military-Scientific Section in 1863, intelligence collection in Russia had traditionally been laid at the door of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the Tsar’s ‘Instructions to Agents dispatched abroad’ of June 1856 had already effected some change in this direction. Like the Military-Scientific Section, the Asiatic Department underwent several name changes over the years (from chast’ to otdel to deloproizvodstvo), none of which marked any significant alteration in its basic form or function. Unlike the Military-Scientific Section, the precise parameters of the Asiatic Department’s intelligence-gathering activities were never defined by statute. Headed by a Colonel or a Lieutenant General, the Asiatic

58 Edney, Mapping An Empire p.36. See also pp.1-36 on imperialism and geographical studies as a tool of control.
60 M. Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaiia II (Moscow: Izdatel’skii dom "Russkaia razvedka" 1998) (Kniga I.) pp.55-59. The dispatch of military agents abroad by Russia actually dated back
Department came to be concerned with almost every aspect of the military’s relationship with the Muslim peoples of the East, from the gathering of military intelligence to the regulation of trips abroad by Muslims, including the monitoring of pilgrimages to Mecca and other countries. As a consequence of the empire’s growth the department’s responsibilities continually expanded, a new statute of 1886 setting out a more extended range of functions than the statute of 1869, with a slightly increased workforce, and a report of 1894 marking a further expansion again. Each expansion reinforced the position of the Asiatic Department as a distinct branch of the central intelligence network. Its activities were regulated alongside and to some degree shared with the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. While the General Staff department was concerned both with internal order and external war planning and intelligence, however, the Foreign Ministry section was concerned purely with foreign, predominantly Balkan, affairs. Consuls of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry might still be tasked with gathering military intelligence were a military agent not specifically present, and individual agents might help coordinate Asiatic opinion with the military’s campaigns. The most outstanding example of the latter case were the actions of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department representative in Persia, Zinov’ev, in gaining Persian logistical support for Skobelev’s 1880-81 campaign against the Turkmen. In a similar way, the reports of the military department’s foreign attachés were often shared with the Foreign Ministry, officer’s reports on local events and their assessments of foreign governmental personnel, in particular, often proving of wider general diplomatic value. However, the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department lost ground to the War Ministry in areas where the Russian Army was actively advancing, so that by 1873, for example, the Foreign Ministry to the 1830s, but was dogged by bureaucratic difficulties; see also Persson, ‘The Russian Army and Foreign Wars 1859-1871’ pp.61-7.


62 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga I.) pp.70-1.

63 Ritchie, ‘The Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander II.’ p.391

64 Ibid., pp.185,425. Zinov’ev was also crucial in persuading the Russian government of the need to launch the expedition; in this he was strongly supported by the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, Viceroy of the Caucasus. See Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914 A Study in Imperialism (NY:...
Asiatic Department virtually ceased to have responsibility for the peoples of Central Asia. In turn, and in natural consequence, the War Ministry then became engaged in almost constant bureaucratic conflict with the Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) over the correct administration of what were meant in effect to be integral parts of the Russian Empire. The refusal of General Kaufman to allow the establishment of a Muslim muftiat in Russian Turkestan, for example, was linked at least in part to the fact that such institutions in Ufa and the Transcaucasus served in practice as tendrils of MVD influence.

Furthermore, the Asiatic Department of the General Staff and the Military-Scientific Committee took administrative responsibility for the cadres of ‘officer-orientalists’ who did so much of the military’s analytical work on the East. A particularly significant facet in this regard of course was the selection and posting by the Military-Scientific Committee of formal ‘military agents’ to consulates abroad, a practice used by the Russian General Staff in Europe and Asia alike. The number of military agents disposed of by the War Ministry rose across this period, from only four in 1856 (only one of whom, Staff-Captain Frankini in Istanbul, could be considered to work in an ‘Asiatic’ country) to over fifteen, including aides, in Europe and the Balkans alone by 1914. A statute of 1864 finally gave military agents an officially sanctioned position within Russian embassies abroad, with all the diplomatic rights and privileges, including diplomatic immunity, that came with that status. The Russian Staff often attempted to gain information through both ‘secret’ and ‘open’ military agents, the former being officers officially retired from the military service and appointed to secretarial posts in foreign consulates, the latter retaining their official military position within foreign consulates. However, the use of ‘secret’ military agents proved problematic. Aside from the security difficulty attendant upon appointing apparently over-qualified men to fairly low consular posts, the ‘secret’ military agents often had an acrimonious relationship with their official ‘public’ counterparts. The ‘secret’ military agent appointed in 1896 to China for instance, Colonel Desino, lacked even desultory diplomatic cover due to his aide being an active army officer, and had a poor relationship with the official military agent there, Colonel K. I. Vogak. The situation was only finally

Yale University Press 1968) p.58. Zinov’ev went on to become head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department.


resolved by Desino’s promotion to being the second ‘public’ military agent to Shanghai in 1899.\(^\text{68}\) At the same time, when discussing these military agents, it is necessary to remember that officers so assigned received no special training in covert intelligence work, such a course only being established at the Staff Academy after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. One contemporary recalled that until then at the Academy secret intelligence had been regarded as a rather ‘dirty’ occupation, the province of undercover policemen and other ‘shady characters.’ \(^\text{69}\) Post-1905 attempts to lay a greater burden of responsibility upon the military agents in terms of covert intelligence gathering led to protests amongst some of the leading military agents of the day, several complaining that they were too closely watched in their country of placement to carry out such tasks. However, the lack of any General Staff cadres to supplement their work by operating covertly in foreign countries led to the main burden of such work continuing to be laid upon the military agents despite their complaints.\(^\text{70}\)

An important additional element in this form of work of course was the degree of linguistic training given Russian officers in oriental languages across this period. The opening of the Nepliuevskii military college in Orenburg in 1825 marked the first establishment of a medium-level military-scientific establishment for the teaching of eastern languages in Russia. In this institution there was taught the Tatar, Arabic and Persian languages, but the number of graduates was relatively small and the effect felt only at a local level. The teaching of languages at the General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg in the first half of the nineteenth century, meanwhile, was of a poor quality and overwhelmingly European-orientated, although the future War Minister D. A. Miliutin did recall that some of his classmates studied eastern languages in their spare time.\(^\text{71}\) In 1849 the War Ministry finally investigated the possibility of introducing eastern languages into the curriculum of the Staff Academy and consulted the former professor of the Eastern Department of St. Petersburg university, O. I. Senkovskii, on the issue. Senkovskii drew up a programme for a three-and-a-half year academy course in Arabic, Persian and Turkic-Ottoman, whilst A. I. Maksheev,

\(^{67}\) Sergeev & Ulunian, *Ne podlezhit' oglaszeniu* p.44.
\(^{68}\) Alekseev, *Voennaia Razvedka Rossi* (Kniga I.) pp.90-4.
\(^{69}\) I.V. Derevianko, ‘Russkaia agenturnaia razvedka v 1902-1905gg.’ *VIZh* 5 (1989) p.76. The view was that of Major-General A. A. Ignat’ev. For a similar appraisal, see: Polovtsoff [Polovtsov], *Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer* p.55.
\(^{70}\) Shelukhin, ‘Razvedyvatel’nye оргy в структуре выщего военного управления Российскoй империи начaла XX вeka (1906-1914gg.)’ pp.27-28.
recently returned from Central Asia, helped institute a cash prize for the officer-graduate producing the best Persian manuscript.\textsuperscript{72} A series of 63 lectures given at the Staff Academy in 1853-54 (on the eve of the Crimean War) in the Turkish language by the equally distinguished orientalist Professor A. K. Kazem-Bek did not improve the overall situation, which was only eased in the wake of the Miliutin reforms of the 1860s. The education officers received at the Nikolaevskaya Academy of the Imperial General Staff, including (for some) courses in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Tatari, then came to be supplemented by language courses through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, courses at the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, or studies in Tashkent itself. Officers completing the course begun with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1883 onwards and covering the Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Tatar languages had to serve for at least four and a half years in either the Turkestan or Caucasus military districts. Between 1886 and 1898 this programme produced 55 linguistically trained officers. Specialist schools in Urga and Kul’dzha (though at the latter only in the period 1880-1896) served to further train officers in Chinese.\textsuperscript{13} In 1897 the staff of the Turkestan military district began running a course on Urdu, in which outstanding officers were sent to India to perfect their mastery of the language. On this foundation there was formed in 1908 the Tashkent officers’ school, in which apart from languages there was also studied history, geography and military statistics. Sixty-six officers finished the course on Urdu run between 1897 and 1909. Over time, the English, Persian, Uzbek, Afghan and Chinese languages were also taught through this institution, alongside instruction on Muslim law.\textsuperscript{14} From 1906 onwards meanwhile, around 20 officers graduated annually from the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, trained in the Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian, Manchurian, French and English languages. Established in 1899, the Eastern Institute was an academic institution that accepted four, six, and eventually eight officer-students each semester in return for a significant subsidy from the War Ministry. In addition the army or the consular service took four to eight students from the Institute annually to carry out fieldwork. Practical experience showed this system to have positive, although

\textsuperscript{72} RGVIA F.544 Op.1 D.321 dl.12-23ob.  
\textsuperscript{74} Shastitko (ed.), \textit{Russko-Indiiske Otmosheniia v XIX v}. p.331 footnote 1, p.334 footnote 5; N. A. Khalfin & P. M. Shastitko (eds.), \textit{Rossiia i Indiia} (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “NAUKA” Glavaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi
strictly limited, results. Eight of the eleven interpreters in Japanese available to the Russian army during the war of 1904-05 were graduates of the Eastern Institute. It was recognized after the war however that this number of interpreters had proven grossly inadequate for the sheer scale of the task facing them.

Furthermore, the General Staff remained dissatisfied by the quality of student being produced from Vladivostok, GUGSh noting in 1909 that officer graduates were knowledgeable only in language theory and were insufficiently versed in practical communication. Although efforts in this direction increased to meet a growing need across this period therefore, such efforts remained very much on an ad hoc basis with continual financial restraints. Typical in this regard were the details behind the courses begun for officers through the Foreign Ministry after 1883.

M. A. Gazamov, responding to the petition of a particular officer to enroll in the Academic Department, had first raised the issue of running oriental language courses for officers with the War Ministry as early as 1881. The concept was welcomed and developed by the Military-Scientific Committee. A statute on this issue was then formulated and subsequently approved, but the War Ministry’s lack of funds to recompense the language professors for their work led to the act being delayed. Only Gazamov’s notifying the War Ministry in 1883 that his employees were willing to offer their services free of charge for this task led to the courses then being initiated, and even then initially only for Guards officers. Problems then developed over finding suitable places for graduates of this three-year course, officers finding the training they had received inadequate for the understanding of local dialects and being overwhelmed by the bureaucratic tasks they were asked to perform. Appointments to be military agents abroad were the exception to the rule, many graduates having to be content with lowly pristav positions in local governmental administrations. The lack of prestige and social advantage attached to such a career necessitated the introduction in 1885 of a statute compelling graduates to work in the Asiatic districts for the fixed period outlined above.

The inadequacy of such ad hoc arrangements in the eastern-language training of Russian officers became evident to all both during the Russian military intervention in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900


75 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2) p.46.

and with even more serious consequences during the course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The lack of officer-interpreters in this field became a minor public scandal after the latter conflict, openly discussed in the press, and led to concerted attempts by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff to introduce for the first time a unified programme of language training across Russia’s Asiatic military districts. The course and consequence of these efforts at reform will be more fully discussed in chapter five of this work, in the context of the general crisis of confidence that seized Russian military \textit{vostokovedenie} in this later period.

Such therefore were the material and intellectual foundations upon which the Asiatic Department of the General Staff could draw. A tabular breakdown of the General Staff Department’s structure and personnel is given on pages 52-56. Reports to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff took three general forms:

(1) Travellers and ethnographers’ accounts based on the discipline of ‘Military Geography.’ The majority of such reports are contained in the 87-volume \textit{Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii} (St.Petersburg, 1883-1914), printed through the Military-Scientific Committee, and with each edition marked ‘secret.’ Typical are the reports of Przheval’skii who, on the basis of his extensive journeys in Mongolia, Manchuria and Siberia made recommendations on potential routes of attack in the event of war with China.

(2) Military-Historical Descriptions (\textit{Opisaniia}). The Russian Asiatic expert, General Ivanin (1801-73), recommended studying the campaigns of past conquerors in Asia-Tamerlane, Nadir Shah, Chinghiz Khan—with a view to learning lessons for the contemporary situation.\textsuperscript{78} Such studies therefore aimed not only at general education but also at studying lines of march, sources of supply, and the psychology of the participants. The study carried out for example

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.} pp.194-195.

\textsuperscript{78} C. Bellamy, ‘Heirs of Genghis Khan: The Influence of the Tartar-Mongols on the Imperial Russian and Soviet Armies.’ \textit{RUSI}, 128 (1983) pp.57-8. Contrary to Chris Bellamy’s implication in this article, study of Asiatic commanders by the Russian General Staff did predate Ivanin’s comments- the courses run by Lieutenant-Colonel Maksheev from the 1860s at the Nikolaevskaja Academy for instance.
in 1817 by Lieutenant Enegol'm on Persia 'from Kira to Alexander of Macedon' focused on the geographical aspects of that theatre and the character of the Persian/Iranian army.  

(3) Political/Cultural Portraits. Understanding the growth and pattern of both foreign and internal religious movements and sects formed an important part of the Asiatic Department's work in monitoring the internal order of their Islamic borderlands.

The General Staff's Asiatic Department coordinated its efforts with the Chancellery of the Military-Scientific Committee, the War Ministry (naturally), and with the Chief of Police and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The MVD in particular helped collate summaries of the foreign press related to Asiatic affairs, ranging from newspaper articles to the latest books.

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79 Nebrenchin, 'Musul'manskii Vostok i...'VZh 4, (1995) p.41; Kim & Shastitko (eds.), Istoriia Otechestvennogo Vostokovedeniia do serediny XIX veka pp.175-6. It must be borne in mind that at this time the belief that national psychological characteristics were unchanging over time was the ruling orthodoxy.

### Heads of Asiatic Department, Russian General Staff to 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heads of Department</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. A. Poltoratskii</td>
<td>1863-1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. P. Protsenko</td>
<td>1868-1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. N. Kuropatkin</td>
<td>1878-1879</td>
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<tr>
<td>L. N. Sobolev</td>
<td>1879-1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. I. Ivanov</td>
<td>1882-1887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. F. Kostenko</td>
<td>1887-1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. P. Protsenko</td>
<td>1891-1898</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. V. Putiata</td>
<td>1898-1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. V. Vasil’ev</td>
<td>1902-1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. V. Tseil’</td>
<td>1906-1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. M. Manakin</td>
<td>1913-1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A. A. Davletshin</td>
<td>1917-1918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Military Agents in Asia, 1860-1914.\textsuperscript{82}

Not shown: military agents in Korea. Also not shown-secret agents serving in the Transcaucasus under diplomatic cover and agents in Persia. Naval agents are not shown since they came under the jurisdiction of the Naval Ministry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt.-General V. A. Frankini</td>
<td>1856-1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General A. S. Zelenyi</td>
<td>1872-1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel V. N. Filippov</td>
<td>1880-1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel N. N. Peshkov</td>
<td>1886-1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Peshkov; arrival of aide Lt.Colonel V. N. Shebeko</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Peshkov &amp; Shebeko</td>
<td>1897-1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel E. Kh. Kalnin</td>
<td>1899-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Kalnin &amp; aide Lt. Colonel M. N. Leont'ev</td>
<td>1900-1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (later Major-General) Kalnin</td>
<td>1902-1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel A. P. Alekseev</td>
<td>1904-1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel (later Major-General) I. A. Khol'msen.</td>
<td>1906-1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General M. N. Leont'ev</td>
<td>1913-1914</td>
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<tr>
<th>China</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt.-Col. Bodisko</td>
<td>1880-1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel N. Ia. Shneur</td>
<td>1883-1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel D. V. Putiata</td>
<td>1886-1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel K. I. Vogak</td>
<td>1892-1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel K. I. Vogak, military agent in</td>
<td>1893-1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>China and Japan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel K. I. Vogak, military agent in</td>
<td>1896-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vogak; arrival of Colonel K. N. Desino as official aide.</td>
<td>1900-1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. I. Vogak &amp; K. N. Desino</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vogak &amp; Desino; arrival of Colonel F. E. Ogorodnikov</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. E. Ogorodnikov; K. N. Desino, aide.</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogorodnikov &amp; Desino; arrival of aide Captain S. V. Afanas’ev</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogorodnikov &amp; Afanas’ev. Desino leaves; arrival of aide, Colonel Val’ter.</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure of Ogorodnikov; arrival as military agent of Colonel L. G. Kornilov</td>
<td>1908-1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kornilov, Afanas’ev &amp; Val’ter.</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kornilov &amp; Val’ter, Afanas’ev leaves; arrival as aide Captain V. V. Blonskii</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kornilov leaves; Val’ter made military agent, Blonskii and Lt.-Colonel A. M. Nikolaev, aides.</td>
<td>1912-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (later Major-General) Val’ter, with aides: Blonskii, Nikolaev.</td>
<td>1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Val’ter and Blonskii. Nikolaev leaves; arrival as aide of Lt-Colonel A. A. Tatarinov</td>
<td>1914</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel K. I. Vogak; served</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simultaneously in China (See above).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure of Vogak; arrival of</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel N. I. Ianzhul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel N. I. Ianzhul</td>
<td>1897-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel G. M. Vannovskii</td>
<td>1900-1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel V. K. Samoilov; Returned</td>
<td>1903-1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905; returned 1906-mad Colonel.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel V. K. Samoilov; aide</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel B. A. Semenov</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel Samoilov; aide Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>1908-1912.</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. M. Morel'</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**STRUCTURE**

The Asiatic Department of the General Staff was comprised for most of its existence of three general sections. The first two sections dealt directly with the Asiatic military districts. The third section was concerned with the problems of Russian military action in Asia, military statistical work and the funding of agents and exploratory missions abroad. The Department, according to a report of 1894, was comprised of one chief, three desk heads, four aides, two bureaucrats and a ‘topographical officer’. Financial constraints meant that officers placed on special detachment from the Main Staff often supplemented the work of these men outwith the general expansions to the department noted above.

In 1903 the department was reorganized on the basis of the burden of work it was now undertaking. Whilst the second section continued to manage the Near East and Persia and subsections dealt with China, Japan and India, a new fourth Section was created on the Caucasus and Turkestan. This year saw a division in the Asiatic Department’s traditional functions, intelligence-gathering on all foreign countries now being assigned to the VIIth Section of the Second Quartermaster-General. Subsequent military reforms served to increase this centralization process in intelligence operations.
During the existence of the GUGSh of 1905-1909 there occurred for the first time a bureaucratic divide in the procedures of gathering and processing intelligence. Intelligence acquisition on foreign countries was assigned to the 5th (Intelligence) Department of the 1st Quartermaster-General and was conducted under General Staff Colonel N. A. Monkevits. Analysis of incoming information by contrast was farmed out to the second and third Quartermaster-Generals, desks under the 3rd Quartermaster-General handling Asiatic countries. On the return of the GUGSh to the War Ministry in 1908-09 this division continued, a special 'Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence' section remaining in place, whilst the 2nd Quartermaster-General section after September 1st 1910 maintained a processing role in studying 'questions on Asiatic theatres of operation and the forces and means of Asiatic states.' With minor changes that had no effect on the General Staff's analysis of Asiatic states, it was with this structure that the Russian army entered the First World War.

The actions of this emerging network of official departments were supplemented in the early 1860s by the individual enthusiasms of officers produced by service in the Caucasus, men whose voices continued to be heard and respected in eastern affairs until around the mid-1870s. It was the input of these men that inspired a new round of geopolitical debate on the role and tasks facing Russia in Asia during and immediately following her period of major expansion in Central Asia, and that served too to maintain the impetus of Russian military studies of Asia begun in the 1820s. The Caucasus had served as a theatre in which deliberately to 'blood' young officers of the then still-nascent Russian General Staff, it being the only military district where combat could be guaranteed in 'peacetime', and Nicholas I dispatched officers there with this specific intent from the 1830s onwards. As a result of Nicholas' injunction of 1836, combined with a natural wave of volunteers, there were never less than 25-33 officers of the General Staff.

83 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossi ot Riurika do Nikolaia II (Kniga I.) p.71.
84 Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914gg.)' p.18.
serving in the Caucasus at any one time between 1833 and 1855. Much of the work of these officers was in statistical, ethnographic and topographical work, often attended by extreme risk.\textsuperscript{87} The expedition of Baron Tornau to the Black Sea coast in 1836 for instance resulted in his being captured by a Kabardian prince and held to ransom. On another occasion, a survey party sent to work in the Kuban region under cover of being a convoy was repeatedly attacked by mountaineers; one topographer was wounded by a bullet in the chest, several Cossacks were killed, and the plane-table and topographical instruments were themselves badly damaged by the mountaineers' swords, a vivid expression of local feeling against the scientific instruments that sought to encompass them. Another survey party in Avaria in 1838 led by Lt.-Colonel Berengeim of the General Staff was completely wiped out by mountaineer attack. Awards for such work were correspondingly high. Baron Tornau, a typical example, on his release from captivity was given promotion, the order of St Vladimir Fourth Class, and a 4,000 rouble monetary grant. The culmination of this scientific enterprise by the General Staff came in 1854 with the formation of an independent military-topographical section attached to the Caucasus Corps. This section had at its disposal both geodesic instruments, an archive of maps and plans, and the use of Tiflis' magnetic observatory and the stations under its jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{88} Whilst many officers still sought relocation to the Caucasus inspired by the romantic tales of Lermontov, Pushkin and Bestuzhev-Marlinsky therefore\textsuperscript{89}, a significant by-product of the Caucasus experience was a small cadre of staff officers inclined not only to take their profession seriously, but with a specific interest in Asiatic imperial affairs. Although the General Staff's official historian may have lamented that the experience of officers in the Caucasus failed to translate into reforms in the wider army, unlike the French officer corps in Algeria, the input of these staff officers did play a role in ultimately shortening the conflict.\textsuperscript{90} Officers in the Caucasus and later Central Asian corps in addition soon came to have their own distinct identity within the army and to form distinct lobby groups. This was

\textsuperscript{86} Glinoetskii, \textit{Istoria Russkogo General’nogo Shtaba} Tom II. pp.200-1.

\textsuperscript{87} For a review of the literary legacy of some of these expeditions, see: Pokrovskii, \textit{Kavkazkie Voyny i Imamat Shamilia} pp.41-53. For an individual example of their work, see: Polkovnik Rakint, "‘Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk khristianstva kavkazskikh gortsev so vremen Sv. Apostolov do XIX v.’" (Publikatsiiia V. A. Zakharova)” in: I. A. Nastenko (ed.), \textit{Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva} 2 (150) (Moscow: Russkaia Panorama 2000) pp.15-38.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Istoricheskii Ocherk deiatel’nosti Korpusa Voennykh Topografov. 1822-1872} p.196.

\textsuperscript{89} Zisserman, Bariatinskii’s biographer, left an account of his own entry into the Caucasus Corps citing the inspiration of these very writers, for details and the more general literary/Romantic background see: Susan Layton, \textit{Russian Literature and Empire. Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy}. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) p.127.
exacerbated by the tendency of officers in these theatres to make their career there, leaving only to retire or take promotion to the War Ministry. The most prominent graduates of the Caucasus school were destined to be at the forefront of imperial strategic decision making in the second half of the nineteenth century; they included D. A. Miliutin himself, K. P. von Kaufman, N. N. Murav’ev (later Murav’ev-Amurskii), and D. I. Romanovskii. The bonds forged between individuals in the Caucasus would often be preserved long into later life in often very diverse state service, through both informal communication and social events like the ‘Caucasus evenings’ held in St.Petersburg in the early 1860s. These latter events were attended by, amongst others, Romanovskii and War Minister Miliutin. Undoubtedly the father figure of this whole school, however, was the final conqueror of the Caucasus, Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii.

2.2 Expanding into Muslim Asia: Prince Bariatinskii and the Geopolitical Debate, 1856-1873.

The figure of Prince Bariatinskii proves a difficult one to fully encompass in the present study; he deserves, indeed, an individual biographical study of his own. This difficulty is created, on the one hand, by the very scope of his personality itself; on the other, by the undeniable seesaw of his own career, from being both popular and influential at court and in the army, to falling out of favour by the very early 1860s. However, Bariatinskii’s influence not only on the military thinking but also on the cultural mindset of Russia’s succeeding generation of imperialists was profound. Whilst the emphasis here will be on his strategic influence therefore, it is necessary also to note in passing his personal influence on the Slavophile movement within the army.

Bariatinskii’s Slavophile tendencies emerged most strongly during the Polish crisis of the 1860s, but he also had a direct personal influence on the individual who would later emerge as the army’s most ardent Slavophile campaigner, General Cherniaev. Slavophilism would in fact continue to prove a potent

90 Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo General'nogo Shtaba Tom II. pp.200-4.
ingredient in the New Russian Imperialism of the late nineteenth century, as the figures of Generals
Skobelev, Fadeev and Е. P. Kovalevskii also demonstrate. Fascination with the East amongst Slavophiles
eventually mutated to produce an ideological movement, the Vostokniki, some of whose members and
supporters, Prince Ukhtomskii and Minister of Finance S. Iu. Vitte in particular, were actually to briefly
guide Russian state policy in the 1890s and early 1900s.

Bariatinskii's key significance to the Russian school of eastern strategy lies, however, in two
aspects: in his personal actions in the Caucasus and in the influence he had on the small cadre of officers he
gathered around himself there. Bariatinskii was an individual possessing, as one scholar recently put it, 'a
penchant for promoting the most diverse strategic, diplomatic, domestic and foreign policy projects.'
Whilst the wildness of some of these schemes was undoubtedly one factor in his later fall from favour,
during his period as Viceroy of the Caucasus he was also responsible for inspiring a generation of soldiers
with a vision of Russia's potential in the East in a way very few others had.

Perhaps one of Bariatinskii’s most distinctive traits was his ability to see both the Caucasus and
Central Asia as part of a united strategic sphere demanding special interest and care. Thus he was among
the first to see a link between Russian reverses in the Black Sea and Britain's position in India— that 'the
road to Constantinople lay through Herat.'

Whilst this would become an article of faith with Russia's eastern strategic school in later years,
culminating in a number of offensive plans based upon this principle in 1878, Bariatinskii's earliest plans
were actually defensive. The Crimean War had created a paradigm that was to guide Russian strategic

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around the same time that General Е. P. Kovalevskii, head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department
(1856-61) was advocating expansion in Central Asia, he was attempting to recruit Ivan Aksakov to produce a
Pan-Slavic journal: M. B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism, 1856-1870 (NY: Columbia
University Press 1956) pp.115, 120-1. Chris Bellamy makes the point that Slavophilism could encourage
study of Russia's Asiatic heritage in military works since this experience formed part of Russia's unique

95 On the Vostokniki see A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 with special emphasis on
the causes of the Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press 1958)
pp.41-50 and David Schimmelpennick Van der Oye, 'The Asianist Vision of Prince Ukhtomskii' in
Evtuhov, Gasparov, Ospovat, & Von Hagen (eds.), Kazan, Moscow, St.Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the
Russian Empire pp.188-202. The latter article is based in part on Van der Oye's comprehensive thesis on the
vostokniki, which significantly increases existing knowledge on the subject: "Ex Oriente Lux"

96 V. G. Chernukha, 'Imperator Aleksandr II i fel’dmarshal kniaz' A. I. Bariatinskii' in A. A. Fursenko
(ed.), Rossiia v XIX-XX v. Sbornik statei k 70-letiu so dnia rozhdeniia Rafaila Sholomovicha Ganelina
(St.Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo "Dmitri Bulanin" 1998) p.113
policy till 1870, that of a naval coalition attacking Russia on its coastal borderlands. This posed as grave a threat in Asia as in the Baltic and Black Sea.98 Indeed, the Crimean War had seen small-scale but significant action by an Anglo-French naval force bombarding the Russian port of Petropavlovsk-na-Kamchatke in the Far East.99 Fearing a British strike from the East in 1856, Bariatinskii recommended establishing friendly relations with the Turkmen, opening relations with the rulers of Central Asia generally, building observation points on the Caspian and renewing relations with Persia.100 To help accomplish these schemes he recommended dispatching a military-scientific mission to the Central Asian khanates to gather information—the genesis of the Ignat’ev Mission of 1858.101 Ignat’ev’s mission was destined to be one of three intelligence ‘probes’ deployed by the War Ministry with the aid of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Geographic Society in 1856-58, the other two being the trip of N.V.Khanykov to Iran and Herat and that of the Kazakh explorer Captain Chokan Valikhanov to Kashgar. However Ignat’ev in particular, brought to the Tsar’s attention by Bariatinskii, was to become one of the major inheritors of Bariatinskii’s eastern legacy. As head of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry he and War Minister D. A. Miliutin were to oversee the first stages of the later annexation of Central Asia, a movement for which Ignat’ev was an impassioned proponent.102

Bariatinskii also initiated in 1857 some of the first actual staff feasibility studies on Russian strategy in the East, utilizing the talents of two staff officers of the Caucasus military district—Lieutenant-General A. A. Neverovskii (1818-64) and Major General E. I. Chirikov (1805-62), whilst Lieutenant-General S. A. Khrulev (1807-70) also contributed an independent study on his own initiative. These men were characteristic of the types of staff officer interested in Asiatic affairs who would go on to typify

100 Zisserman, Fel’dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich ’ Bariatinskii Tom II pp.120-121. A similar fear of British designs lay behind the slightly earlier urgings of Murav’ev-Amurskii to pursue a more active policy in Siberia: S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals. China, Russia and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe 1996) pp.36-9
personnel at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Neverovskii, a staff graduate of 1838, had served in the Caucasus in 1840-45, taking part in many expeditions and going on to publish in the ‘Military Journal’ articles such as ‘A Historical View on Dagestan’ and ‘On the Beginning of Unrest in Northern and Central Dagestan’. Chirikov was a staff officer equally experienced in Asiatic affairs, having served in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29 and mediated in delimiting the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian borders in 1848 and 1856-58. Khrulev meanwhile had directed the siege and storm of the Kokandian fort of Ak-Mechet’ (renamed Perovskii) in 1853 and had served in the Caucasus Corps since 1856.

Neverovskii wrote a cautious presentation on a possible Russian expedition to India, urging that the Russians must determine whether they wished to conquer the country or merely drive the English out. He set out four preconditions he regarded as essential, including a Persian alliance and the certainty that war would not erupt in Europe. Only exceptional circumstances, such as an uprising against the English, could justify so risky a venture as a Russian advance on India. Chirikov, dividing Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia into three categories-political, commercial and military- concluded that an armed collision was unlikely, although in that event he foresaw Kokand as a supply area and Bukhara as a forward base for Russian forces. The creation of a Caspian flotilla capable of landing Russian troops on the Persian bank, perhaps at Astrabad, (present-day Gorgan) could have important political effects in terms of securing Persia’s loyalty. Examining at the same time the situation in the Persian Gulf, Chirikov again recommended political over military measures- manipulating American and French interests in the region for instance- to forestall English goals of local hegemony. In particular he recommended the patronage of Muslim pilgrims from the Transcaucasus as a possible means for the Russian military to gain intelligence agents in Baghdad, Bushire, Shiraz and Mohammer.103 Khrulev’s memorandum meanwhile, submitted independently during the course of the Crimean War itself, and largely reiterated during the Polish crisis of 1863, remained the most visionary. He outlined a march from Astrakhan to Peshawar and Atok that would take either 82 or 109 days depending on the precise route of advance, through either Khiva or Persia, respectively.104

104 Ibid., pp.128-35. Khrulev made reference to the plans of Napoleon, who had set himself the even more radical timetable of a 55-day march.
These early staff studies on Russian strategy in the East initiated by Bariatinskii were decisively rejected by the Foreign Ministry and War Minister N. O. Sukhozanet. The latter in particular wrote a lengthy report to the Tsar on the impracticality of a Russian expedition to India, particularly given Russia’s parlous financial condition. In this memorandum he portrayed Britain as an all-powerful manipulator, infinitely capable of avoiding battle whilst buying off Persia, Turkey and Afghan tribesmen till the moment came when they could fall on the weakened Russian armies, taking advantage of their over-extended supply line. Even a limited expedition to seize Herat, in his view, could not really promise decisive political results in Russia’s favour. He recommended measures closer to home, including the stockpiling of Astrakhan and Baku with military supplies and the more rapid rearmament of the Caucasus corps with rifled carbines and percussion arms as a means of attaining security in the East. In particular he recommended the creation of a general reserve in the Volga area, composed of the VIth and IVth army corps, a strategic theme the General Staff would return to in 1910. The rapid dispatch of these forces in wartime he assigned to river traffic rather than to rail lines however, and to this end he also urged an increase in military and commercial traffic on the Volga river and Caspian Sea. Though prone to exaggeration and displaying shortcomings in geographical knowledge, these studies indicate that Russian staff officers had begun to seriously consider the geopolitical significance and difficulties of their Asiatic frontiers long before the full conquest of Central Asia was even undertaken. In this regard, as in so much else, the Crimean War served to sound a strategic warning for Russia’s policy-forming elites, and Bariatinskii led the way in highlighting the dangers that had emerged and focusing attention on corrective measures.

Bariatinskii’s influence was not merely strategic however, but administrative. Another officer who served under him and who went on to serve in Central Asia was D. I. Romanovskii. The two had initially met in 1847, when Romanovskii came to the Caucasus to gain combat experience prior to his enlisting at the Staff Academy. Later, Bariatinskii would visit Romanovskii at the academy to discuss with him his own ideas on warfare in the Caucasus, comparing the Prince’s plans with the lectures on the Caucasus that

105 Ibid., pp.94-100
106 Milan Hauner, What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: Unwin Hyman 1990) p.79
Romanovskii was then receiving at the academy from D. A. Miliutin. Romanovskii’s service in the Caucasus gave him opportunity to observe strategy being made there at the highest level, and some indication of the confidences he was let into is evident in a letter Bariatinskii sent to Miliutin in 1856:

I dispatch to you, by way of a plenipotentiary envoy, Captain Romanovskii, to pass to me and receive from you explanations, which might escape or be difficult to express on the page; he is to me a person I can trust and I dare to think that he might manage to win your trust as well.\(^\text{108}\)

On writing his lectures on warfare in the Caucasus in 1860, Romanovskii praised Bariatinskii as the only commander to have grasped the torch of understanding dropped since the death of Vel’iaminov- the only general to see the Caucasus as essentially an administrative problem akin to a siege.\(^\text{109}\) These lectures were based in part both upon Romanovskii’s first-hand observations of the Caucasus and upon personal talks he had had with Shamil, the defeated rebel leader, when Romanovskii was head of the General Staff’s temporary Asiatic Department in 1859.\(^\text{110}\) Romanovskii’s lectures, which in the new-found spirit of the times aspired to be a ‘military-statistical portrait’\(^\text{111}\), with accompanying emphasis on geography and ethnography, shared Bariatinskii’s view on Russia’s future in the East:

If Peter the Great founded St. Petersburg to break through a window through which Russia could look at Europe, then in our time by pacifying the Caucasus we break through a window for the whole of Western Asia, for Persia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, sunk in an age of torpor.\(^\text{112}\)

In writing his lectures then, Romanovskii was striving very much to formulate a strategic paradigm from the Caucasus experience that might be usefully applied as Russia sought to expand its

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\(^\text{108}\) Zisserman, *Fel’dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich’ Bariatinskii*, Tom II p.105


\(^\text{110}\) Romanovskii, ‘General Fel’dmarshal kniaz Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 1815-1879’ p.286.

\(^\text{111}\) Romanovskii, *Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. Publichnyia lektsii* p.2

\(^\text{112}\) *Ibid.*, p.48 A similar metaphor was used around this period for Governor-General Murav’ev’s seizure of the Amur; see Bassin, *Imperial Visions* pp.158-9.
influence over other Muslim lands. Bariatinskii’s strength as Viceroy in the Caucasus lay in the fact that he was the first commander-in-chief there to have spent all his previous campaigning years in the Caucasus. He brought to the job a wealth of tactical and cultural experience which the likes of Paskevich and Vorontsov lacked, and was welcomed by officers and soldiers of the Caucasus Corps as one of their own. 113

Between them, Bariatinskii and Miliutin rearranged the Caucasus military system on a more logical supply and command pattern of military districts- a pattern Miliutin would repeat of course in his later, wider reform of the Russian Empire. Such a pattern reinforced the distinction of the Caucasus and Central Asian armies from the metropole- Bariatinskii establishing in law what Vorontsov had already achieved in theory, that the Caucasus demanded an ‘independent high command.’114 The military district system sanctioned local staff networks to supplement the St.Petersburg centre with their own expertise, a system unlikely to have been formally instituted had not Bariatinskii proven its worth in defeating Shamil. Miliutin himself went on to acknowledge in his memoirs the importance of the Caucasus experience on his own later development of the concept.115 In the words of one recent scholar, there grew up out of the Caucasus experience a military staff system across the empire with ‘its own geography of talent, which complemented its emerging culture of talent.’116 Stress upon individual drill and training in the Caucasus Corps including fencing, gymnastics, literacy and arithmetic produced a crack force that Miliutin, again, would try to reproduce in his later wider reform of the army.

This remarkable burst of administrative effort was reinforced by the emphasis Bariatinskii placed upon accurate analysis of the social problem of the Caucasus, best demonstrated in his report ‘on the internal condition of the Caucasus.’117 Having attributed the strength of Shamil’s revolt to the Russians’ initial misunderstanding of the balance between clan and clergy, Shariat and Adat law, Bariatinskii proposed that the creation of long-term peace in the Caucasus would rest on separating civil from spiritual society, so weakening the temporal powers of the Muslim clergy. This would turn the people gradually towards embracing the legal civic role of Russian nationality whilst- and this was a pet project of Bariatinskii’s- a reinvigorated Armenian Christian church would gradually take the place of the Islamic

113 Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. pp.407-8
114 Ibid., p.407-8
115 Zakharov (ed.), Vospominaniiia General-Fel’dmarshala Grafa Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina 1860-1862 p.266
116 Rich, The Tsar’s Colonels p.71
faith in people’s spiritual lives. Whilst containing elements that were Bariatinskii’s own, this formula foreshadowed Kaufman’s later policy of officially ignoring the Muslim religion in Central Asia rather than directly intervening, and marked a stark contrast from the spasmodic attempts at forced conversion attempted by the Russian state in the Muslim borderlands in the past.\(^{118}\) This policy of attempting to create what Romanovskii termed a ‘modus vivendi’ of imperial accommodation with the local Muslim population would become the governing policy of the Asiatic Department in subsequent years. Bariatinskii’s belief that in supporting local nobility the Russians had driven the population into the hands of the fanatical clergy would prove a particularly influential point of view just a few years later. That later period saw the formulation and introduction of what one scholar has termed ‘citizenship strategy’ in the eastern borderlands during the Great Reforms. In this reform Miliutin, amongst others, would support a direct break from traditional Russian military-political policy in the past. From now on along its Asiatic frontiers the Tsarist administration would desist from issuing medals and awards to traditional tribal nobility, favouring instead the establishment of new institutions of self-government and reformed courts. It is difficult to interpret this new policy instituted from 1868 onwards as anything other than a direct legacy of Russia’s Caucasus experience.\(^{119}\)

The lessons Romanovskii himself drew from Bariatinskii’s campaign were that subjugation of Muslim lands should rest on clearly attainable military goals appropriate to a strategic siege in conjunction with conciliatory political measures. These measures would be designed to avoid local unrest and at the same time to create new bonds of civic loyalty to Russia. Examining the results of the recent revolt by the ‘unwarlike’ Indian people against the British, Romanovskii pointed out that the use of measures of ‘excessive constriction’ in the Caucasus, so much more warlike and inaccessible, would lead to a ‘war of annihilation’ which ‘would demand sacrifices that Russia in its present condition could barely sustain.’\(^{120}\) Romanovskii also came to actually apply some of the administrative experience of the Caucasus during his own period of command in Central Asia, guided by his mentor during that later period, War Minister D. A.

\(^{117}\) Zisserman, *Fel’dmarshalkniiaz’ AleksandrIvanovich’ Bariatinskii*, Tom.II pp.277-9

\(^{118}\) In the Caucasus War, the Russian administration in the past had also however attempted to utilize the Muslim clergy against Shamil. See for example: L. Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii. Ocherki* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Antireligioznoe izdatel’stvo 1936) pp.26-7.

\(^{119}\) Dov Yaroshevski, ‘Empire and Citizenship’ in: Brower & Lazzerini (eds.), *Russia’s Orient* pp.69-70. Yaroshevski does not establish the link with Bariatinskii’s views, although he does mention Miliutin.

\(^{120}\) Romanovskii, *Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina*, p.366
Miliutin. Utilizing Bariatinskii’s actions in the Caucasus as his model, Romanovskii reinforced and reorganized the power of native courts (mekhkettas) in order to challenge and undermine the power of the traditional Muslim clergy.\textsuperscript{121}

The mekhkettas is a useful symbol of how the Russian Army attempted to understand and adopt local customs and then apply them across a broad scale. Such secular courts had first spread with the Arab Empire, but with its passing had steadily lost ground and influence to the Islamic clergy. Seeking any traditional civil structure that would undermine the clergy’s dominance, Russian forces in the Caucasus had first re-instituted these courts during the reign of Ermolov, but it took the efforts of Bariatinskii to get them enough funding to escape charges of corruption and abuse of power. Bariatinskii had consciously based his actions here both upon the precedent earlier set by Ermolov and upon the use made by the French of similar institutions in Algeria.\textsuperscript{122} Study of the French experience for comparison was by no means a novel approach on Bariatinskii’s part. As early as the 1840s the head of the Caucasus Committee had drawn up for Nicholas I a comparative study of Russian and French administrative policies in the Caucasus and Algeria, respectively.\textsuperscript{123} Once they had earned a reputation for fairness meanwhile, demand for the courts Bariatinskii promoted in the Caucasus in this later period spread enormously, creating an active counterbalance to the rougher justice of Shamil’s naibs. With Miliutin’s support, Romanovskii promoted the use of such courts in Central Asia on the same principle, and instituted two parallel systems, one for the urban Sarts based on Shariat and Adat laws, and one for the less deeply indoctrinated nomad population based largely on traditional custom. Members of the court were elected, disputed decisions were to be referred to the Russian governor-general, whilst in the Tashkent mekhkettas there was to be one ‘indispensable’ member- the kazi, or traditional judge. Within the Central Asian context however, as later

\textsuperscript{122} ‘Thus, this peculiarity is used both by us in the Caucasus and by the French in Algeria.’ - Romanovskii, ‘General Fel’dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaiia voina. 1815-1879’ p.283.
critics have noted, the Russian adoption of such institutions in practice had as much a disruptive as placatory effect. The formal election of kazis replaced the older system of having these men appointed by khans, and led to governmental corruption in consequence. Local unrest led to the mekhketta system being abandoned and contributed indirectly to Romanovskii’s replacement as the local commander-in-chief. Nonetheless the principle of legislative toleration for local law and custom continued to be practised by the Russian army in its Asiatic military districts and other spheres of influence in Asia, notably in Manchuria.

The Caucasus War, therefore, had a deep and long-lasting influence upon Russia’s succeeding generation of Asiatic experts in both geopolitical and administrative terms. Administratively, it firmly embedded in the Russian military consciousness an undoubtedly already latent respect for, and abiding fears regarding, ‘Muslim fanaticism.’ In strategic terms meanwhile, with a few notable exceptions such as Lomakin’s 1879 expedition to Geok-Tepe, the Russians in this latter period deployed their troops to attainable goals, aiming at the type of gradual strategic envelopment advocated by Vel’iaminov and Romanovskii. This was a policy guided not only by the Caucasus experience but also by the simultaneous steppe expeditions of the 1840s and 50s. The desert proved as unforgiving as mountain terrain to attempts to fight lightning campaigns, as Perovskii’s 1839 expedition against Khiva demonstrated. Russian thinkers came to lay stress on the virtues of this firm but gradualist approach by comparing it favourably to the British policy on the North-West Frontier of India; to many Russians it became another symbol of their greater understanding and superiority in dealings with Asians.

124 Seymour Becker, ‘The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences.’ In H. Malik (ed.), Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1994) p.27. Count Pahlen, author of the largest Tsarist report on the administration in Turkestan, felt the attempt to undermine the force of the Shariat by deference to ‘local custom’ was misguided in that the absence of just such ‘local custom’ amongst the natives merely allowed native judges to follow their own arbitrary will: D. S. M. Williams, ‘Native Courts in Tsarist Central Asia’ CAR XIV(1,1966) p.10.
125 Quested, ‘Matey’ Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917 p.115.
followed, in fact, that some scholars both then and since attributed the conquest of Central Asia to a
deliberate geostrategic masterplan—distinctive, four-stage pincer movement. 127

Geopoliticians have always been eager to attribute Russia with Machiavellian cunning on the
southern frontier ever since the myth of 'Peter the Great's Testament' first gained currency. In actual fact,
the seemingly calculated logic of Russian expansion in Central Asia arose from divergent factors. The
majority of the participants in the conquest did have experience in 'Asiatic' or steppe warfare, so therefore
we can say that their actions were to a degree coordinated simply by virtue of common training and the
aforementioned 'Caucasus legacy'. This was evident in the preference for limited, fixed objectives and
close tactical formations discussed in the next chapter, alongside the administrative preferences towards
subjugated peoples that we have already noted. The generals operated with the explicit support of Miliutin
and the War Ministry, often against the advice of the Foreign Ministry and its Asiatic Department, creating
an understandable image of deliberate diplomatic duplicity in the eyes of foreign observers. 128 On the other
hand, the early stages of the conquest were carried out under the influence of individuals, most notably the
impetuous General Cherniaev, going beyond the remit of their instructions.

Having said all this, military insubordination should not be interpreted as the sole driving force
behind every movement in Central Asia however; on the contrary, after 1865-66 it often served as a
convenient cover for the Russian government. 129 The overriding factor in Russian policy was therefore
opportunism, at both the strategic and operational levels. In geopolitical terms, the shape of this pincer
movement was formed at least in part not by strategic harmony but by competition within the 'Asiatic'

127 See for instance John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World pp. 130-33. Much geopolitical
theory on this matter is merely a slightly revised version of the thought of late Victorian strategic thinkers
in British India such as Sir Henry Rawlinson, who saw Russia as gradually advancing by strategic parallels
against India rather as an army would tactically invest a fort. In this matter Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky gave
the soundest rebuff to such concepts over sixty years ago. '...had the Russian government possessed
the faculty for overcoming so easily all the moral and material frictions resulting from the difficult art
of governing, and had it been capable of carrying out so vast a scheme in so clockwise a manner, it would by
now have ruled the world.' However, 'Such romantic generalizations have an appeal for certain minds.'
Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'The Shadow of India...', p. 225

128 Ignat'ev's successor as Head of the Foreign Ministry Asiatic Department, P. N. Stremoukhov (served
1864-75) was opposed to a specifically military conquest of Central Asia, preferring the route of
commercial expansion. Miliutin overruled him, though his pet project for establishing a base at
Krasnovodsk was accepted: Ritchie, 'The Asiatic Department...' pp. 324-8 and D. Mackenzie, 'The
Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85' in M. Rywkin (ed.), Russian Colonial Expansion to

129 Hauner, What is Asia to Us? p. 45. E. L. Crean, 'The Governor-Generalship of Turkestan under K. P.
von Kaufmann, 1867-1887.' Unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Yale University 1970) p. 23
army—by the efforts of Caucasus forces to earn glory in Trans-Caspia equal to that attained by General Kaufman’s forces in the north of the country. Caucasus generals like Ermolov had expressed a strong strategic interest in the eastern bank of the Caspian since the 1820s.\textsuperscript{130} This process resulted in the anomaly that until 1899 the Trans-Caspian \textit{oblast’} formed part of the Caucasus Military District. The conquest came about then from a combination of coordinated plans—the conquest of Khiva, for instance, being in the end a significant operational achievement—and the unplanned factors of rivalry and personal ambition. Although the geopolitical advantages of expansion to the East had been understood by Bariatinskii and officers of the Russian General Staff before the 1860s, the conquest \textit{itself} did not unfold in the ways they had foreseen or recommended.\textsuperscript{131} Noting these factors does not invalidate the general conclusion that a distinct ‘Asiatic lobby’ of military and diplomatic personnel was now a genuine influence in Russian policy making. The form this lobby group took was especially marked in Central Asia during the governor-generalship of K. P. fon Kaufman, himself an enthusiastic patron of scientists and Asiatic experts.\textsuperscript{132}

General Kaufman, like Romanovskii before him, was an officer with Caucasus experience (in Kaufman’s case, thirteen years), who had worked closely with Bariatinskii there. Indeed, either he or his brother had been part of the special corps of liaison officers—referred to by Bariatinskii as ‘otbornye’, implying a hand picked elite—that kept the Prince in contact with the actions of his local commanders.\textsuperscript{133} Kaufman went on in the 1860s to help Miliutin implement the military district system across the empire. As Governor-General in Central Asia Kaufman gathered around himself a group of Asiatic experts, some military and some civilian, who were tasked with studying the strategic, ethnographic, geographic and statistical aspects of the Turkestan theatre. During Kaufman’s reign this came to include both academic personnel and officers working for the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, marking the crossover from enthusiasts to deliberately trained military professionals in this sphere. The overall increase of General Staff-trained officers serving on the Asiatic frontiers was noted by the Staff Academy’s official historian,

\textsuperscript{130} Kiniapina, Bliev & Degoev, \textit{Kavkaz i Sredniaia Azia vo vneshnei politike Rossii (Vtoraia polovina XVIII-80-e gody XIXv.)} pp. 221-226.

\textsuperscript{131} Bariatinskii for example had advocated a railway linking the Aral and Caspian Seas. On such projects, alongside their commercial implications, see: Khalfin, \textit{Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossi} (60-90-e gody XIVv.) pp. 88-101.

\textsuperscript{132} At the end of the 1860s for example Kaufman invited the Russian ‘Society for the Lovers of Natural Science’ to send experts to study his newly-conquered region: A. P. Fedchenko, \textit{Puteshestvie v Turkestan} (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo geograficheskoi literatury 1950) p.9.

\textsuperscript{133} Zisserman, \textit{Fel’dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich’ Bariatinskii}, Tom.II. p.214
particularly after Alexander II allowed officers of the Caucasus military-political administration to enroll in the General Staff after 1865. Some of these men however, such as for example A. N. Kuropatkin, were also protégés of men like Kaufman, marking the complicated line between growing professionalism and the continuing importance of patronage networks characteristic of most modernizing armies of the time.

The discord the Asiatic lobby had displayed during the conquest of Central Asia did not bode well for their future work together however, in contrast to the ‘Western’ strategic lobby for whom the menace of Germany after 1870 became an unchallenged strategic orthodoxy, favouring unified effort. In the end only the Far East or Turkey would come to pose a similar focus to Russia’s school of Eastern strategists, and even here a firm commitment to either one or the other created a clear divergence of strategic interests. Before going on to consider the wider strategic commitments examined and undertaken by this new generation of Asiatic experts however, a look at the tactical level—the tools through which any proposed strategic plan had to operate—seems appropriate. Such a tactical study forms the substance of the next chapter.

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3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF EXPANSION, 1714-1885.

Asiatic crowds may inconvenience us, but they cannot hinder us in the accomplishment of our designs. We have reached the stage in which, with judicious and systematic action possessing artillery and ammunition beyond the proportions needed in European warfare we can strike with effect in the open field and in the mountains. In a word, with our present experience...there is no Asia capable of preventing us carrying out the broadest strategical designs which we might conceive.

General Skobelev, 1877.

The armies that Russia sent to conquer, guard and govern its Asiatic frontiers in the nineteenth century were often both metaphorically and literally armies of exile. Throughout much of the period under review, the rail network in the Asiatic provinces was even weaker than in European Russia, if not entirely non-existent. Consequently much of the tactics and strategy developed by the armies on the Asiatic frontiers aimed at achieving the greatest results with the least possible numbers. In Central Asia even in 1875, reinforcements might take a year to arrive, marching on foot, and War Minister Miliutin noted in his diary that assigning reinforcements there could prove a pointless exercise, since they might easily arrive too late to be effective. Such conditions lay behind the extensive civil and military powers granted Governor-General Kaufman during his reign there. A degree of administrative autonomy proved the most logical option in the Caucasus, on the other hand, due not so much to long lines of communication as to the sheer complexity of governing the local multi-ethnic community.

Although Russia’s Asiatic frontier by the end of the nineteenth century was governed by climactic extremes— from Adzharia in the south-west Caucasus, the warmest part of the Russian Empire, to the frozen Siberian taiga of the Far East— in general the border terrain could best be summed up by the terms mountain and steppe. Mountainous terrain limited lines of approach, whilst the steppe was dominated by

1 H. Sutherland Edwards, Russian Projects Against India. From the Czar Peter to General Skobelev. (London: Remington & Co. Publishers 1885) p.284.

2 Zaionchkovskii (ed.), Bnevlik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1875 T.1 p.86
the opposite characteristic- complete freedom of movement, restricted only by the great aridity of the land and the extent and capacity of local water resources. In general, geographic differences on either side of the border were nowhere so dramatic that analysis of past difficulties would have been fruitless in the formation of future war planning. Nonetheless the explorer Mikhail Veniukov complained that mountain and steppe warfare was comparatively ignored by the Russian tacticians of his day, despite the fact that 'both these types of warfare in Russia's borders are continual.' Veniukov credited A. I. Maksheev with producing the first work on steppe tactics in both his lectures to the Staff Academy and in an entry on the subject in the Military-Encyclopedic Lexicon. Veniukov's own article on the subject was intended to widen debate on the area in Russian military circles, but in the years that followed, commentary on the type of warfare Russia encountered on its Asiatic frontiers remained comparatively scanty, easily dwarfed by coverage of contemporary European military developments. The general balance of interest at the Russian General Staff Academy is reflected in a catalogue of that Academy's library from 1879, when the library is recorded as containing 3297 books. Under the category of 'wars in Asia from ancient times to the present era' the library had 100 works in various languages. This collection included diverse and often instructive material, such as an 1800 account of the English war in India against Tipu Sultan, a study of British operations in the Maharatta War of 1817-19, General Wolseley's account of war in China in 1860 and Kaye's history of the First Anglo-Afghan War. That collection was dwarfed however by the section in the library of holdings on 'wars in Europe from the Classical period to the present' which contained 2313 works. On the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 alone the library contained 296 works- i.e. there were more than twice as many works on that one war alone as there were works on wars in Asia. Against this background, undoubtedly the two foremost campaigners within Russian military circles for greater study of steppe campaigns and Asiatic warfare were Lt.-Colonel A. I. Maksheev and General M. I. Ivanin.

Both of these men were veterans of Russian warfare in the steppe in the 1830s-40s who had risen to serve in prominent posts by the time of Russia's major expansion in Central Asia in the 1860s and

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4 M. Veniukov, 'Zametki o stepnykh' pohakhakh v Srednei Azii' VS XVI (1860) p.269-70.

1870s. Of the two, Maksheev had the greater claim to be influential given his holding of a teaching post in later life at the Nikolaevskaiia Staff Academy. The single overriding principle that both Ivanin and Maksheev strove to inculcate in their listeners and readers was that Asiatic warfare demanded special techniques and careful study. Although heat, aridity and disease posed major obstacles to the movement of large bodies of troops in Asia, study of the campaigns of past conquerors-Chinghiz Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir Shah-proved that these obstacles were far from insurmountable. In his study of General V. A. Perovskii’s Khivan campaign of 1839 (in which he participated), Ivanin pointed out at the outset that the purely seasonal factor of winter in the steppe should not be considered the sole overriding explanation for the failure of the expedition. As evidence he reminded his readers that both Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane had campaigned successfully in the steppe in wintertime in the past. Ivanin attributed the failure of the Russian campaign primarily to disorganization and corruption in Perovskii’s own supply train, a fact that again pointed indirectly to the need to study and organize for such campaigns more seriously and scientifically.

The greatest scientific legacy Ivanin would himself leave was destined to be a comprehensive study of the campaigns and military tactics of Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane. Based both upon eastern texts and the works of leading orientalists of the day, this work included campaign maps and diagrams of Mongol and Timurid battle-drill, and came to be published posthumously by the Russian General Staff. In their activities both Ivanin and Maksheev also played some small role as progenitors of a school demanding the creation of a distinct and uniquely ‘Russian’ military art. As Maksheev wrote to a friend in 1858:

To me it seems that one of the main insufficiencies of our academy comprises this, that it takes on entirely military science from the West and does not direct sufficient attention to the peculiarities of our own Russian historical experience and mission. The academy talks a great deal, for example, about Turenne and Montecuccoli and so on and, if I am not mistaken, not one word is said about Chinghiz-Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir-Shah and others, and particularly about Ermak, at a time when for a long

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7 M. I. Ivanin, *O voennom iskustve i zavoevaniakh’ Mongol-Tatar i Sredne-Aziatskikh narodov pri Chingis-khane i Tamerlane.* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Tovarishchestva “obshchestvennaia pol’za” 1875)
time we have not fought on the model of Montecuccoli and are regularly continuing the business of Ermak. They say, that in the actions of the Asiatic commanders and our Cossack-heroes, conquering Siberia, there is no military art, no science. This is true, according to the model of German systemization and dogmatic infallibility, so current amongst us in the last war (in 1855)—there is none really, but there is a science, lively and practical, which is experienced in Asia by those who are successful participants in our movement to the East. 8

Maksheev and Ivanin were destined to be the leaders of a very small sect in Russian military-philosophical thought however. In the development of a school of ‘Russian’ military art that grew apace at the Staff Academy in the 1890s the role of steppe warfare would play no real part, overshadowed by memories of the military glories associated with Suvorov, the cult of the bayonet, and the war of 1812. 9 Nonetheless a study of the output of academy pupils during Maksheev’s main period of employment there would suggest that his efforts in transmitting his personal concerns to his listeners was not entirely fruitless.

In 1855 it was decided that officers enrolled in the Academy, aside from their course work, be asked to compose annually presentations on military-scientific themes. In 1860 the Academy resolved to assess these presentations on a scale of marks, the authors having to defend their works publicly before an examining board much in the manner of a viva for modern-day postgraduate students at any major university. At the same time it was decided to print collections of the best such presentations for the benefit of the wider military public. Maksheev served as editor on the first collection, a study of actions in the Transcaucasian theatre during the Crimean war. More unusual however was a piece contained in the collection published the following year, a detailed study by Lt. Khakovskii on the seventeenth-century wars of Bogdan Khmel’nitskii against the Crimean Tatars. This study was accompanied by detailed diagrams of the make-up and deployment formations of the Tatar forces, thus giving a full overview of traditional nomad tactics. Khakovskii justified his unusual choice of subject on two main grounds, both of which

8 A. I. Maksheev, Puteshestviia po Kirgizskim Stepiam i Turkestanskому Kraiu (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografia (v zdaniu Glavnogo Shtaba) 1896) p.2.
9 On the formation of this intellectual current in the Staff Academy, see: P. A. Zhilina (ed.), Russkaia Voennaia Mysl’ konets XIX-nachalo XXv. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “NAUKA” 1982) pp.147-189.
echoed Maksheev’s concerns. Firstly, the tactics employed by the study’s main protagonist, Khmel’nitskii, differed significantly from those employed in the rest of western Europe of the time, but were no less effective for all that. The Ukrainian commander’s tactics were an entirely original, home-grown phenomenon through which he had nevertheless gained significant victories over the Polish forces, and this despite the latter being seen by contemporaries at the time as no less militarily advanced than those of Gustav Adolphus. Study of such phenomena demonstrated therefore that the ‘Russian’ school of military art was in no way inferior to its European counterpart, and need not slavishly borrow from the West.

Secondly, study of Khmel’nitskii’s campaigns against the Tatars could in Khakovskii’s view carry over a direct practical application for the present—

allowing into our tactics a section on mountain warfare, we must not forget

that war in the steppe has its own characteristic peculiarities...It will not be superfluous to study wars conducted in the steppes.10

Such declarations indicate that Maksheev’s urging the study of relevant past campaigns against Asiatic opponents in order to prepare directly for the present was therefore not falling entirely on deaf ears.

A lively interest in geographical conditions in Asia and European methods of colonial rule there would inform all of Maksheev’s work meanwhile, including his trips abroad to Algeria and Egypt.11 As early as 1856 Maksheev wrote a study of steppe warfare for the leading Russian military gazette of the day, striving to draw lessons from ‘my own personal observations and experiences.’ This study covered nearly every aspect of warfare in Russia’s Central Asian theatres, from transport to fortifications, whilst also pointing the reader in the direction of Ivanin’s earlier writings on Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane. In short, a full ten years before the period of major expansion by Russian forces in Central Asia even began, Maksheev was already seeking to establish an organized and systematic method for studying warfare in such theatres.12 Much of what follows therefore owes a large debt both to his own works and to those of a

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11 Maksheev, Puteshestviia po Kirgizskim Stepam i Turkestanerem Kraiu pp.2-3.
12 A. I. Maksheev, Stepanye Pokhody (Iz No.19-go i 20-go “Russkogo Invalida” 1856) (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia 1856).
tiny band of followers who categorized lessons from combat in Central Asia retrospectively after the major period of expansion there.

Most of the conflicts Russia fought in expanding its Asiatic frontier fell under the contemporary category of 'small wars' (*malye voiny*). This was a term well understood in Russia, an officer of the General Staff having produced a work of that title as early as 1850.13 Russia had enormous experience of fighting partisan conflicts ranging from its conflicts with Poland to border clashes with the Chinese stretching back to the sixteenth century. Nonetheless the majority of analysis on this subject concentrated on irregular warfare within the context of larger, regular-style conflict (such as the *Franc-Tireurs* of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870). Such operations were of great interest to the Russian General Staff since, based both on study of the cavalry raids of the American Civil War and on the writings of the famous Russian partisan leader Denis Davydov from 1812, their war plans for Europe for much of this period were orientated upon a partisan-style cavalry raid upon the German rail network. Planning for partisan-style actions also played a role in Russian war planning for the Far East, particularly during the Russo-Japanese War. On that occasion, the Russians planned to utilize 'partisan detachments' of 200 officers and men each to operate in the Japanese rear in the event of a Japanese breakthrough in the Primor'e military district. This overall emphasis meant that Russian experience in actually *combating* irregular opponents received by contrast relatively meagre attention.

Given these proclivities, what characteristics *did* the Russian army therefore exhibit in the realm of tactics during its campaigns in Asia? Great distance and isolation could breed suspicion and distrust between periphery and metropole in the Russian Empire, just as it did in other, overseas empires. This alienation often expressed itself in direct visual and cultural terms. Early on in the Caucasus, the arrival of the new Viceroy, Vorontsov, brought at the same time a shining collection of staff-officers from St. Petersburg, whose expensive, inappropriate uniforms and refined manners contrasted sharply with the hardened, practical and more ragged Caucasus Corps.14 This same feature was visible later in Central Asia, where the group of young officers out to gain rapid promotion from attending a single campaign were

contemptuously referred to as *fazanii* ['pheasants'] by the long-suffering Turkestantsy.\(^\text{15}\) For its part, the metropolitan army held officers who had gained all their experience and promotion fighting in Central Asia in low regard, wondering what possible virtue could be attached to defeating the 'nightgowns'.

General Kuropatkin, himself of course a 'Turkestanets', felt that Central Asian officers had a closer bond to their men than the regular line officer, due to the greater call for sanitation precautions and the need to use every available blade and bayonet in battle.\(^\text{16}\) Conditions in the Caucasus in the early part of the century were even more primitive, the Caucasus Corps becoming renowned for dividing its time between warfare, agriculture, and building its own accommodation on the ground, with a self-sufficiency ethic that recalled the Roman legions.\(^\text{17}\) Yet not everybody saw the administrative independence developed by the armies in the borderlands as a benefit. General M. I. Dragomirov felt that Central Asia was a 'vast factory for upstarts' where 'technique [had] been spoiled by the experience of small expeditions'. The very virtues noted by Kuropatkin regarding the predominant importance of sanitation were viewed by Dragomirov as vices, leading Dragomirov to fear the results should these officers encounter a tactically more imposing foe.\(^\text{18}\) For the same reason a Russian officer confided to the English newspaper correspondent David Ker that:

> Turkestan is to us what Algeria has been in France- a kind of training school for more serious work. A good many of our young officers will learn their first lessons [here]... and will be all the better for it; but taken all together Asiatic warfare is hardly a good school for European soldiers.\(^\text{19}\)

The Russian Asiatic experience did however produce a generation of soldier-ethnographers and geographers- Komarov, Kostenko, Sobolev, Maksheev, Kuropatkin, Przheval'skii, Veniuakov- whose expertise and career path lay precisely in this very area of Asiatic warfare.

Like most armies of the period, the Russian army never codified its Asiatic experience, partly from the difficulty of collating first principles from widely differing local conditions, partly from the

\(^{15}\) Marvin, *The Eye-Witness Account of the Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turcomans* pp.167,294

\(^{16}\) Kuropatkin, *Zadachi...* Tom.II p.143

\(^{17}\) Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* pp.127-8

\(^{18}\) Van Dyke, *Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914* p.137.

\(^{19}\) Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan* pp.76-7.
already-noted predominance given to European warfare throughout this period. Maksheev himself assigned the crucial learning curve in the Russian army's tackling of steppe warfare to the period 1847-63, a perhaps natural preference given that his own period of active military service in Central Asia dated from that time. Maksheev appears to have felt that the efforts of his own generation in mapping and studying conditions in Central Asia, laying down the roots of later victories, had been overshadowed by the more superficially spectacular (in terms of both political excitement and territorial gains) campaigns of 1865-73. During his trip to Central Asia in 1867 to prepare a new series of lectures for the Staff Academy, Maksheev's hottest and most bitter argument with Kaufman concerned the neglect shown by the latter toward a local memorial commemorating those who had fallen in the Ak-Mechet' campaign of 1853. His emotional commitment to his own generation's achievements aside, Maksheev's argument for the campaigns of 1847-63 as a turning point in tactical training had a serious factual foundation. In the aftermath of the failed Khivan campaign of 1839-40, which was carried out in winter explicitly on the belief that the steppe was impassable in summertime, the Orenburg and West Siberian forces had entirely altered their approach, and set about finding out how to march in the hot dry desert conditions of the Kazakh steppe. From 1847 onwards annual campaigns were conducted along the Syr-Darya in place of the infrequent and unfocused probing expeditions of the past, and through this punishing regimen of regular campaigning seasons there was accumulated a large body of hard practical experience by the local unit commanders. General V. A. Obruchev, head of the Orenburg krai and a distant relative of the future Chief of the General Staff, drew up a regulation for steppe expeditions that allowed his men to march in shirtsleeve order, carrying only a musket and a bag of ammunition across the shoulder. Their greatcoats and satchels were carried on carts or across artillery gun carriages and the men were allowed to march freely, without observing the rigid marching-step associated with the 'paradomania' that elsewhere characterized

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Nicholas I's army. Obruchev's successor, Perovskii, improved matters yet further by agreeing to all suggestions regarding the reform of unit transport that were brought before him based on the experience and lessons of previous campaigning seasons. In this way the capacity of the future Turkestan forces to endure and even march great distances across the steppe in the height of summer increased rapidly.\textsuperscript{22}

A further factor in the Russian development of steppe warfare was of course the evolution of certain distinctive tactical forms.\textsuperscript{23} A prominent substitute for numbers early on became the triumvirate of mass, discipline and manoeuvre. Russian armies in both the Caucasus and Central Asia demonstrated a clear preference for solid formations in the face of their more mobile opponents. This approach was not without its critics, particularly in the Caucasus, where Russian columns were often a perfect target for Chechen marksmen. It was an inheritance from Russia's eighteenth-century wars with the Turks, the Russians having adopted squares as a means of repulsing their more numerous opponents, and also perhaps a legacy of the amalgamation of the Ukrainian land militia with the regular army and the methods developed by the former for dealing with Tatar raiding parties.\textsuperscript{24}

In the Caucasus, the Russian forces perfected the technique of 'carrying the column in a box' as the only way to avoid defeat in detail\textsuperscript{25}; during his campaign against the Turkmen in Central Asia, General Skobelev insisted that 'The main principle of Asiatic tactics is to observe close formations.'\textsuperscript{26} Skobelev saw the discipline of the close formation as Suvorov had, as being in itself a force multiplier; in this respect, he insisted that in Turkestan conditions even a company was the equivalent of a 'moving Strasbourg.'\textsuperscript{27} Other men whose tactics in Central Asia were drawn directly from the Caucasus experience supported his views on the advantages of discipline and organization. General Komarov, advancing on Merv in 1884, confided to one of his fellow officers that he felt little to fear:

\textsuperscript{21}Maksheev, 'Prebyvanie v Vernom i vstrecha kaufman (iz chetvertogo puteshestviia v 1867 A. I. Maksheev) p.648.
\textsuperscript{22}A. I. Maksheev, Istoriceshkii Obzor Turkestana i nastupatel'nogo dvizheniia v nei russkikh (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografia (v zdaniii Glavnogo shtaba) 1890) pp.171-218.
\textsuperscript{23}On the British counter-case, see again: Moreman, The Army in India pp.1-30.
\textsuperscript{24}For a discussion of the development of the square and the Russian Asiatic military experience see: Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 pp.161-64
\textsuperscript{25}Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, pp.269-70. The vulnerability of these dense columns in the Caucasus was mitigated to some extent by the use of sharpshooter companies who served as a security cordon around them. In the dense forests of Chechnia however such sharpshooter groups were often ambushed and overwhelmed, hence the reason why eradication of the forests formed such an important part of Russian tactical policy in the Caucasus throughout this period.
\textsuperscript{26}'O.K.', Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause (London: Longmans Green & Co. 1883) p.201.
from his wide acquaintance with local customs and native warfare, 
gained by him in the Caucasus... these robber-tribes have no organized 
commissariat and cannot remain concentrated in one spot for any length 
of time. 

During his converging advance on Khiva, General Kaufman’s columns marched without any 
continuous defended lines of communication, moving rather like ships at sea, a policy which preserved his 
own numbers but made life distinctly precarious for newspaper correspondents attempting to catch up with 
his troops.

In Central Asia expeditionary columns, designed to ward of attack from all sides, became a 
tactical commonplace (see diagrams overleaf). The advance guard marched within view of the main 
column, in contrast to normal European military practice. Immediately behind it came a sapper company, 
for the clearing of the route and the repair or even construction of roads and bridges. On all sides of the 
main column marched pickets of infantry or Cossacks, all defending the transport upon which Asiatic 
warfare depended, local resources being either meagre or non-existent. 

Nighttime bivouac camps were 
similarly disposed to form defensive fields of fire, the transport being wheeled round to form a natural fort 
(vagenburg) on the steppe. Russian writers explicitly compared such formations and modes of fighting to 
those developed and used by the French in Algeria.

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27 Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars... p.72
29 The news correspondent MacGahan set off to meet Kaufman armed with two shotguns, three revolvers, one double-barreled rifle, a Winchester rifle, and 'a few knives and sabres.' J. A. MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva. Fourth Edition (London: Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington 1876) p.30
Чертеж нормального расположения войск на бивак в среднеазиатских войнах

Source: Kostenko, Turkestan's Krai. Опыт военно-статистического охоронения. "Endpapers."
The raising of transport was a prodigious effort, the Khivan expedition of 1839-40 demanding for instance over 10,000 camels, whilst its 1873 successor demanded for one detachment alone over 8,800 camels.31 Such demands created dissatisfaction amongst the local population having to provide both camels and camel guides (lauchi), whilst also alerting Russia’s opponents of the onset of a Russian expedition. It was for these reasons that General Ivanin recommended in 1873 the formation of a permanent camel transport service on the model of the French in Algeria or the British in India.32 The expense of a large corps could be avoided if even a cadre system were to be set up in peacetime to avoid the disruption caused by creating a camel transport on the outset of war. Kuropatkin, a young officer at the time who had made a trip to Algeria in 1875, also spoke out in favour of the establishment of such a system on the basis of his own observation of it in practice at the French forward fort of Laguat.33 It might be especially helpful, he hypothesized, at a forward post like Petro-Aleksandrovsk, which was required to constantly dispatch flying columns against raids of the predatory Turkmen. Ivanin’s proposals, submitted to the Military-Scientific Committee of the General Staff and the Turkestan district staff, were rejected on the grounds that Russian expeditionary columns had to be routinely larger than anything used by the French in Algeria. The camel transport question was laid aside, eventually overtaken by the appearance of railroads in Central Asia. The only progressive reform made was that noted by L. F. Kostenko, that camels were better hired on the more expensive contract rather than warrant system, since this ensured that both healthier camels and more experienced camel leaders were provided.34 Russian interest in the transport methods of the other European powers in their colonies continued however, the Sbornik... po Azii of 1885 containing a translation of a work on military transport by the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of London. This study reviewed British experience in this field gained during both the Abyssinian campaign of 1867-68 and the Second Afghan War of 1878-1880.35

The burden borne by all this precious transport was of course overwhelmingly devoted to the maintenance of the soldier himself, local conditions being too poor to sustain large bodies of troops. Even in areas where the local soil was not completely barren, the restrictions and expense of local production

31 Ibid., p.130.
32 Ibid. p.130. For details on Ivanin see also Bellamy, ‘Heirs of Genghis Khan...’ pp.57-8.
33 Kapitan A. N. Kuropatkin, Alzheria (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia V. A. Poletiki 1877) p.309.
could still act as a limitation on the size of force that could be deployed there. Veniukov noted that in the Amur region in the Far East the price for every type of local bread actually rose continuously between 1866 and 1869 due to the still low level of local agriculture. The majority of supplies had to be carried therefore, a situation that continued everywhere until the gradual introduction of the railway. Few studies of steppe warfare were complete without a listing of the rations- dried rusks, meat, dried cabbage, oats, brick tea, salt, sugar, biscuits- regarded as essential to the maintenance of the Russian fighting man. The pepper and vinegar issued troops to ward off fever in the damp subtropical conditions of the Black Sea coast were regarded as potentially harmful irritants in the dry conditions of the steppe. Tinned conserves, the lifestuff of the colonial soldier by the turn of the century, were still too unreliable at the time of the major Russian expansion in Central Asia to be recommended except in case of dire necessity for flying columns. The British experiment in Abyssinia with large mobile field ovens to produce fresh bread was noted with interest by the Russians, but rejected on the grounds of both expense and practicality. Rusks remained cheaper than bread, and the field ovens had proven so cumbersome that only pack-elephants could move them in the field. Alcohol was regarded as an extremely useful stimulant in hot, arid conditions, and just as the French soldier had his absinthe and the British trooper his rum ration, so the Russian was issued a wine portion to sustain him. Since, however, 'immoderate application' of such spirits in these conditions was held to cause 'derangement of mind, complete paralysis and sometimes... instantaneous death' the portion was reduced across the period, from over a cup a day at the time of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasski’s expedition to Khiva in 1717 to around four half-cups a month by 1873. The use of alcohol as a stimulant was gradually replaced by the greater application of tea, introduced as a regular ration in 1871. The small scientific parties that scouted Russia’s Asiatic borderlands of course experienced all the same problems that affected large expeditionary columns even more intensely. Amongst the many other scientific legacies left by Major-General N. M. Przheval’skii from his expeditions in Central Asia was a guide for his fellow General Staff officers and successors as to how best to travel in such country. Przheval’skii recalled that on

36 M. I. Veniukov, Opyt Voenogo Obozreniia Russkikh 'Granits' v Azii Vypusk. I. (St. Petersburg: Tipografia V.Bezobrazov i Komp.1873) p.139.
37 Veniukov, 'Zametki o stepnykh' pokhodakh v Srednei Azii' p.280-1.
38 V. Potto, 'O Stepnykh' pokhodakh' (Publichnyia lektssii, chitannia pri Orenburgskom’ iunerskom’ uchilishche, v. 1872) VS 5 (1873) p.31
his fourth expedition the party departed bearing, amongst other rations, 24 bottles of cognac, 12 jars of pickles, 25-30 small bottles of cranberry extract, 15-20 cans of condensed milk and 140 cans of sardines and other preserved fish. Alongside a catalogue of the instruments required for such reconnaissance work, including thermometers, binoculars, hypsometers, a compass, a good chronometer and a quantity of mercury, Przheval'skii noted that he provisioned his parties heavily with weaponry, each man bearing a Berdan infantry rifle and a Smith & Wesson revolver with 500 rounds of ammunition per rifle. All such precautions, as he pointed out, were conditioned by the fact that 'the handful of men that is an expedition, flung into the depths of Asiatic deserts, is more isolated than a boat at sea from the rest of the world.' These conditions also justified in his opinion the entirely military character of such enterprises, with Cossacks and Russian regular troops complementing each other's abilities.40

If local conditions made life difficult for infantry, they were even harder upon cavalry. Throughout this period the only form of cavalry Russia deployed along her Asiatic frontiers were the Cossacks, who in many areas closer approximated irregular forces rather than regular, disciplined troops. The Cossack served the dual function of both soldier and military settler, the later role being seen as a vital one by many administrators along Russia's Asiatic frontier for much of this period. Both M. N. Annenkov, commander of the Siberian Corps in 1853, in his review of the Semirech'e region in that year and A. I. Bariatinskii, viceroy in the Caucasus in 1858, stressed the importance of military settlements in pacifying these distant, restless frontiers. Cossack settlements in the Caucasus after 1850 were supplemented by groups of retired, married, soldiers with 15 years' service in the Caucasus Corps, and by large groups of 'undesirable elements'-religious schismatics like the Dukhobors and Molokans. As late as 1874 meanwhile Alexander II authorized the despatch of 100 Cossack families of the West Siberian forces to settle the crucial strategic region with China around Lake Zaisan and Kuchum.41 Nonetheless Russian Asiatic administrators throughout much of the latter nineteenth century expressed grave doubts over the continued utility of Cossacks, in direct contrast to Western observers who saw the Cossacks as the uniquely advantageous aspect of the Russian imperial system. General Vel'tiaminov had complained of the poor impact made by the Cossacks against Shamil's men in the Caucasus, attributing the superior horsemanship and

39 Ibid., p.31-2.
40 N. M. Przheval'skii, 'Kak put'eshhestvovat' po Tsentral'noi Azii' SGTSMA XXXII (1888) pp.145-163.
swordsmanship of the Murids to the fact that they were not required to divide their time between military training and agriculture as the Cossacks were. In one of his many analyses of the Caucasus as a young officer, D. A. Miliutin admitted that Cossack settlement near tribal areas seemed the only sure method of interdicting mountaineer raiding parties, but felt that the Cossacks' own 'carelessness' rendered them less than wholly efficient in such work. Later, as War Minister, Miliutin almost immediately used the opportunity to come forward with proposals to reduce the size of the Cossack service. The Cossacks, he believed, were useful as irregular cavalry but defeated the main purpose of their existence in that even though they partially equipped themselves they were costly rather than economic to maintain. Only the renewed need for a large body of cavalry on the western frontier to meet the perceived growing menace of Germany persuaded Miliutin, by expediency, of the need to retain a system of universal military service amongst the Cossack voiskos.

Poor Cossack tactical performance was repeated on other stretches of the Asiatic frontier. In Central Asia Cossack forces were no match for the Turkmen in individual combat and, being outnumbered, often dismounted to engage their opponents with gunfire rather than launch the traditional sabre charges of the past, mirroring the experience of contemporary European soldiers in other parts of Asia. Skobelev forbade his cavalry to attack unshaken Turkmen horse and ordered rigid formation discipline, to the extent of knee-to-knee charges, to make up for the Cossack's deficiency in single combat. These orders were striking enough to elicit surprised comment from at least one British contemporary then engaged in a study of irregular warfare.

In contemporary European eyes the epitome of the Russian Asiatic character therefore, in Russian eyes the Cossack was ironically often not 'savage' enough. Equally problematical, though less often stated in official accounts, was the question of the Cossacks' reliability and political loyalty. One recent study of the Terek Cossacks in the North Caucasus identifies a continuous incidence of Cossack defections and

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43 Starapuu, 'Kavkazskii Vopros vo vzgladakh i deiatel'nosti D.A.Miliutina.' p.84. Miliutin did however attribute this quality to the Russian people as a whole, underlining his general criticism at the time that Russian policy in the Caucasus lacked method.
46 'O.K.' Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause p.203.
desertions, some Cossacks repeatedly changing loyalties between mountaineer rebels and the Russian
government to the extent of even changing religious faith. Cossack settlements traded continually with their
supposed Muslim enemies and relied upon the mountaineers for the best weapons, cloaks and horses. Upon
the conclusion of hostilities with Shamíl, the Russian War Ministry eventually had to issue an amnesty to
no fewer than 642 lower ranks that had joined the mountaineer cause. 48 Reviewing the Russian forces that
would be available for a campaign against China meanwhile, General Przheval’skii felt that the Cossack
troops formed by far the weakest element of Russian forces on this section of the frontier, for moral and
cultural as much as for technical reasons. Przheval’skii felt that

not one of the Cossack forces [available] can satisfy the demands of
wartime. Such a sorrowful phenomenon is caused by the complete
absence over years (even centuries in the case of the Siberians) of
military training and by the very poor composition of the officer corps.

Highly critical reports on the firearms drill conducted amongst the Amur Cossack forces in both 1882 and
1899 suggests that Przheval’skii’s criticisms were far from unfounded. 49 The horrifying conclusion
Przheval’skii reached on reviewing Cossack settlements on this frontier was that:

we do not influence Asiatics by our culture, but the other way about.
The Cossacks adopt the language and customs of their inorodets
neighbours...the Cossack parades in Chinese clothes, speaks in Mongol or
Kirghiz; everywhere is preferred tea and the milk-beer [kumus] of the nomad.
Even the physique of our Cossack degenerates and more frequently resembles
the appearance of his neighbour. 50

Such local conditions were inimical to a Russian General Staff that saw itself as the proponent of a
‘civilizing’ mission in Asia. Consequently, after 1864 the Cossacks were increasingly sidelined, their
former political and cultural role on the Asiatic frontier now taken up by the Russian regular army and by
the department specifically charged with regulating relations there, the Asiatic Department of the General

47 Callwell, Small Wars pp.414-15.
48 Thomas M. Barrett, At the Edge of Empire. The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-
Staff. In Central Asia, General Kaufman set the new trend in colonization by his explicit preference for Russian civilian settlers as opposed to the Cossack settlements of the past. The Cossacks themselves were either increasingly 'regularized' into the wider army, or co-opted to provide escorts for the new generation of scientific explorers charged with monitoring the Russian Asiatic frontier. This latter task proved to be the last sphere in which the Cossacks' traditional linguistic and cultural versatility continued to prove useful. By the time he came to deliver his lectures at the Staff Academy in 1871, Veniukov would emphasize to his listeners the strictly auxiliary role of the Cossacks in preserving Russia's Asiatic frontiers, the basic security there resting, as he stressed, on the 'regular forces, namely the line battalions.' In the Russian Far East meanwhile, whilst the size of the Cossack forces by both peace and wartime establishment continued to increase across the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the start of the twentieth century the proportion of Cossack to regular forces in the region was nearing the balance pertaining everywhere else in the empire.

A further characteristic of Russia's 'Asiatic' theatres of war, and another mark of the Russian preference for deliberation, was the reliance their forces came to put upon siege tactics and the taking of fixed positions. Siege conflicts met the question of how to bring Russian and Asiatic troops to a point of direct contact and make Russian technological superiority decisively felt. Paskevich's masterful wars against the Turks and Persians in 1827-29 were marked by an almost eighteenth-century dedication to the importance of siege and supply. During the war with Shamil, siege techniques proved an important factor in the taking of the Murids' numerous auls [mountain villages]. Shamil learnt to respond to siege rapidly, demanding corresponding countermeasures. Low sheltered positions were built by the mountaineers, less vulnerable to artillery fire than the high towers of the past, and on occasion whole villages were turned into deathtraps for the Russian troops. At the same time, following the siege of Akhulgo in 1839, Shamil actively sought to avoid being himself trapped within a besieged area, and the Russians did not again catch him in such a fixed position until Gunib in 1859. In the later conquest of Central Asia, the whole conquest came to turn on the taking of fixed positions and local capitals. The taking of capitals, of course, led local

50 N. M. Przheval'skii, 'O vozmozhnosti voine s Kitaem' SGTSMA I (1883) pp.299-300.
51 M. Veniukov, 'Obshchii obzor postepennogo razhirenia russkikh predelov' v Azii i sposobov' oborony ich.' VS 2 (1872) pp.211-212. (Emphasis in the original.)
52 Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom dal' nem vostoke v XVII-XIX v. pp.82-91.
53 Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar p.97
elites and nobility to fall into Russian hands, leading to more rapid subjugation of the surrounding
countryside by means of 'indirect' rule. Sieges in Central Asian warfare were very much more haphazard
affairs than in the Caucasus of course, due to the generally much lower quality of local resistance. 54
Realization of the inadequacy of Central Asian fortifications led to the abandonment of the painstaking
investments of the 1850s for a policy, under Cherniaev, of direct escalade of the city walls. This approach
led to comparatively high casualties however, and was itself later replaced by a system of always creating a
breach in the walls for a storming party using closely positioned artillery. 55 In the most fiercely contested
and closely-studied Central Asian siege of the period, that of Geok-Tepe, General Skobelev went to the
extent of digging parallel approach trench lines and mining under the walls to achieve success. Colonel C.
E. Callwell picked up on the importance Russians attached to the taking of the fixed position in Asiatic
warfare in his advice to colonial officers on the importance of solid objectives. Callwell praised the
Russians in that:

They compassed the downfall of the khanates [of Central Asia] by
gradually absorbing the cities...the capture of one city was generally
held sufficient for a year, but it thereupon became a Russian city.
Such is the military history of the conquest of Central Asia. It is a
record of war in which desultory operations were throughout
conspicuous by their absence. 56

Technological superiority proved vital in these direct battlefield encounters with Asiatic
opponents, and Russia, much like the other European powers, at times found its Asiatic provinces a useful
testing ground for the latest equipment in a period of unprecedented technological change. During the
1820s in the Caucasus, before Shamil acquired cannon and trained personnel to serve them, General
Ermolov boasted that Russian guns so overawed the naive mountaineers that the expenditure of a few token
rounds assured peace in the camps at night. 57 As early as the 1850s Prince A. I. Bariatinskii was requesting
the latest rifled carbines for his troops to compete with the weapons of the mountaineers, some of which

54 To the extent where General Cherniaev could take Tashkent, a city of 30,000 inhabitants, with just 1,
951 men and twelve guns in 1865.
55 Kostenko, Turkestanski Krai. Opyt 'voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Tom III p.288
56 Callwell, Small Wars. p.37
57 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, p.107-8, 125.
came from the British. Contemporaries, rightly or wrongly, attributed much of the final success in the Caucasus to the new issue of rifled weaponry. Whilst the very earliest campaigns in Central Asia were notable for the significant results achieved with equipment which by European standards was outdated, the later conquests were all achieved by troops equipped in the most scientific manner then available, including the machine gun and the hand grenade. Rifled cannon, in particular, made a quicker job of destroying the clay fortifications of Central Asia than the smoothbores of the past. The Russians used rocket batteries from an early stage in their Central Asian flying columns, these being both powerful and lighter to transport than conventional guns, and particularly effective in shattering the attack of Asiatic cavalry. Consequently most writers agreed that a rocket battery should accompany even the smallest Russian detachment. Mounted rocket companies also added to the effectiveness of the Cossacks. General Romanovskii attributed the victory of Irdzhur (1866) to the power of the Russian cavalry's organic firepower:

For the first time in Central Asia our Cossacks moved in formation and in mass as a regular cavalry with its own artillery and rocket launchers.

General Skobelev, another firm believer in the power of artillery to terrify Orientals, utilized petroleum-filled shells in his siege of Geok-Tepe as a form of primitive prototype napalm bombardment. In studying the use of artillery in this theatre, Skobelev claimed that Asiatics judged the size of an enemy army from the number of field-guns it deployed. By this measure therefore the presence of a large artillery train accompanying Russian forces in Central Asia was bound to have a particularly devastating moral effect.

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58 One of the earliest childhood memories of the Russian diplomat A. D. Kalmykov was being shown a pistol captured from a North Caucasus mountaineer and bearing the maker's stamp 'Birmingham' on the barrel. Kalmykov [Kalmykov], *Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat* p.3.

59 Moshe Gammer has argued that the influence of rifles was overrated, and political developments the more significant factor, the mountaineers having proved highly adaptable to new techniques used against them in the past. Both Bariatinskii and his subordinates praised the rifle highly in their reports to the Tsar. Russian experience in the Caucasus probably did reinforce the perception created in the Crimea that the whole army now needed this new weaponry. See Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar* pp.286-90 and Zisserman, *Fel’dmarshal’ kniaz’ Aleksandr’ Ivanovich’ Bariatinskii* Tom.III pp.309-10. See also: V. G...n., 'O vvedenii nareznogo oruzhiia v Kavkazskoi Armii' *VS* 6 (1859) pp.171-6. This experienced Caucasus campaigner actually opposed the full introduction of rifles in the Caucasus on the grounds of the training complications they would introduce. Also, in dense woods, where in his view rapidity of fire was of more import than accuracy, the musket was equal to the rifle.

60 E. U., 'Stepnaia voina v Turkestanskom krae' *VS* 7 (1880) pp. 91-3

61 Veniukov, 'Zametki o stepnykh' pokhodakh v Srednei Azii' p.285

upon the natives. 63 Whether correct or not, such views and the actual practical experience of campaigns in Asia further underlined for the Russians the importance of artillery, an arm which, as many foreign observers across the centuries have noted, always formed one of the largest and best-organized branches of the Russian armed forces.

Scientific methods, therefore, interacted with a Russian concern to maintain prestige and inflict a cult of fear upon their opponents- the view that ‘Asiatics react only to material force’ being one commonly held at the time. 64 In this respect Russian reliance on making warfare dramatically and with maximum destruction was not mere grandstanding but had actual psychological effect- one British observer reported Turkmen cowering on hearing a military band playing at a Russian ceremonial opening. The last occasion they had heard such a noise was during the storm of Geok-Tepe five years before. 65 The Russians were quite conscious of the effect of their methods and of the importance of display, of banners and flags, in keeping Asiatics in awe of the ‘White Tsar.’ State Councilor Vainberg wrote in 1878:

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the parade to the history of the domination of Russian arms and intelligentsia in Central Asia. 66

Another British commentator of the early twentieth century noted that:

It may be gathered... that Russia’s position and prestige amongst her Central Asian subjects rank very high and go far to consolidate her position there. 67

The demands of the Central Asian and Caucasus corps for the latest equipment and other resources had of course wider strategic consequences. As late as the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Caucasus Corps was the only army group outside the elite Corps of Guards to be completely issued with the new Berdan No.2 rifle, perhaps the most elegant weapon ever made, and at that time the best Russian troops had

63 N. I. Grodekov, Voina v Turkmenii (T.3) p.199.
65 Curzon, Russia in Central Asia p.84.
ever received. With its metallic cartridges and bolt-action system, the American Berdan design, in the words of one study, inaugurated 'the beginning of the era of high-power small bore rifles with great range and accuracy and relatively flat trajectory.' It was also symbolic of the benefits Russian weapons technology gained at this time from a unique period of cross-fertilization with the American small arms industry and the accompanying acquisition of the new machine-making tools that were revolutionizing the whole arms market in this period. The Berdan rifle itself was praised by a future participant in the Russian annexation of Khiva, and in Russian hands saw its first active service in Turkestan in 1870. Exactly a year later the Russian government acquired four hundred examples of another type of American weapon destined to later prove useful in Central Asia, with a license to manufacture more, namely the Gatling machine gun.

In Central Asia, meanwhile, whilst the commitment of army personnel represented only a relatively small fraction of the army's whole throughout this period- certainly compared to the Polish theatre- it remained a far higher military commitment, per head of local population, than the British had in India at the time. The Russians remained haunted by the Caucasus experience, where Shamil's revolt had only finally been ended by the commitment of nearly 300,000 men, and garrisoned their Asiatic frontiers comparatively heavily in consequence. The strategic debates created by these circumstances will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The final most obvious tactic of the Caucasus and Central Asian army corps, and one connected to the interest in capitals mentioned above, was their tendency to adopt political measures towards the local population, to attempt to gain the aid of local elites and special interest groups. As Romanovskii wrote of the Caucasus:

if it is difficult to imagine the subjugation of the Caucasus without the

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70 MacKenzie, "The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85" p.231
71 General Sherman, visiting Russia in 1872, remarked of the Caucasus: '...in the case of a European war, she [Russia] could not withdraw these forces, as the natives would surely rise.' Norman E. Saul, *Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867-1914* (Kansas: University of Kansas 1996), p.74 cited by Persson, 'The Russian Army and Foreign Wars..' p.148.
use of arms, it is also not easy to imagine when its subjugation could
have been completed if our actions were based solely on arms.72

The record of the latter campaigns in the Caucasus was carried on into Central Asia. Samarkand was
surrendered without a battle in 1868 in part through the diplomatic efforts of the Jewish and merchant
community within the city walls;73 Andizhan fell in 1875 not only to force of arms, but from the
dissatisfaction of the local religious authorities with the Russians’ main opponent.74 The Russian attempt to
advance their cause through colonial ‘subalterns’, whilst it had its most spectacular example in the Russian
treatment of Shamil’s eldest son, Dzhemmal-Eddin, (captured at the age of four and given a Russian
military education), was repeated in the later subjugation of Central Asia. This period offers two
particularly striking examples of the virtues and dangers of such a policy. Lt.-General Alikhanov-Avarskaii
(1846-1907), the first governor-general of Merv, was a Lesghian born in Dagestan, allegedly to a father
who had fought the Russians in the Caucasus War. His Muslim background later rendered him perfect for
conducting reconnaissance work for the Russian General Staff in Central Asia, where he played a key role
in the annexation of Merv. Returning to the Caucasus in 1890, he went on to become closely associated
with the policies of the Viceroy, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, in repressing the local revolutionary
movement. Becoming one of the most hated symbols of the Tsarist autocracy, this Muslim officer was the
victim of at least two assassination attempts by terrorist bombs, of which the second in 1907 succeeded in
its goal.75

For every loyal servant and ally of the Russian state like Alikhanov however, there was a Mussa
Kundukhov to demonstrate the dangers of such a policy. Kundukhov, an Ossetian promoted to the rank of
Major-General in the Russian service, managed to persuade the commander of the Terek oblast’, Loris-
Melikov, to let him organize the emigration of almost five thousand Muslim villagers from the north

72 Romanovskii, Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia Voina. p.366
73 D. N. Logofet, ‘Zavoevanie Srednei Azii’ in: Istoria Russkoi armii i flota vol.12 (Moscow: Tipografia
Russkogo Tovarishchestvo “Obozrenie” 1913) p.87
75 ‘Alikhanov-Avarskaii’ in K. I.Velichko, V. F Novitskii, etc. (eds.), Voennaia Entsiklopediia (1911)
pp.330-332. As if to stress the complexity of loyalties within this family, Alikhanov’s brother, himself a
Tsarist officer, died during the course of a Muslim uprising in the Caucasus following the Russian Civil
War, perishing whilst fighting alongside the Muslim resistance against the Bolshevik forces. See: M. B.
Broxup, ‘The Last Ghazawat: The 1920-1921 Uprising’ in Marie Bennigen Broxup & A. Avtorkhanov,
(eds.), The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian advance towards the Muslim World. (London: Hurst &
Caucasus to Turkey in 1865. Subsequently however Kundukhov himself defected to the Turks, leading a mountaineer contingent against the Russians in the war of 1877-78. Individual failures like this did not undermine Russian belief in the value of recruiting local elites however. Perhaps the ultimate irony came at the end of the period, when it fell to a Muslim officer serving in the Russian General Staff, Colonel Abdul Aziz Davletshin, to oversee the running-down of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff.

By the latter nineteenth century therefore, many of the problems hindering Russian military success in the steppe and other Asiatic theatres in the past—tenuous supply lines, barren local conditions, climactic extremes and the difficulty of how to conduct war against tribal populations—had been analysed and steadily overcome. Such an achievement came about both through a practical learning process acquired over decades and to a lesser extent through analysis by some staff officers of the difficulties encountered both by past military commanders and by other colonial powers operating in similar theatres of war. In their tactics and approach to subjugating and ruling their respective spheres, the Russian armies of the Caucasus and Central Asia shared many similarities, a fact no doubt connected to the tendency of personnel from one theatre to serve in the other. In their longer-term approach to ruling and administering these territories and defending them, however, the Russian colonial army and its staff mechanism proved to be an equally fruitful source of strategy.

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77 For details, see the chapter marked 'Conclusion.'

By the time the Russian Army had completed the majority of its conquests in Central Asia, with a sound though by no means entirely satisfactory border with Afghanistan by 1885, it had come to inherit, as Bariatinskii had foreseen, a unified strategic sphere stretching from the Black Sea to Herat. This sphere, united as it was by its geopolitical position and the common Islamic faith of its inhabitants, overlapped two further spheres. In the western, Caucasus theatre, the continual threat of war with Turkey threatened also to draw in the European powers, as was underlined by the Berlin Congress of 1878. Turkey was seen further as an external sponsor to possible internal instability in the Caucasus, much as British influence was feared in northern Afghanistan, both situations requiring constant political and military intelligence. To the East, the Central Asian theatre, by virtue of its unstable border with China, overlapped its area of responsibility with the Far Eastern theatre. Thereby, as late as 1910, Kuropatkin continued to view a possible war with China or Japan as a joint planning priority of the Central Asian and Siberian forces. However, for much of this period, war planning upon the Asiatic frontier was not a high priority with the Tsarist General Staff, being overshadowed by European concerns.

As a result of the strategic conference of 1873 (the prelude to the introduction of Universal Military Service in Russia), Russian war plans for Europe were largely defensive for most of this period, with stress laid upon fortification of the vulnerable Polish salient. Fuller has argued along with many others that the conference of 1873 was vital in creating a 'Eurocentric' approach in the Russian War Ministry, since analysis on a technical rather than a political level indicated that Germany and Austria-Hungary were the main threats to Russia's national security:

It did not matter whether Berlin or Vienna was currently planning a war against Russia or not. The fact was...they had the power to defeat Russia. The consequences of a potential defeat in Central Europe were particularly grave because if Russia lost there it might lose everywhere.²

This was certainly the view of General N. N. Obruchev, Russia's leading strategist of the period, who in 1885 in response to a letter of Alexander III wrote a memorandum, The Basic Historical Missions of

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¹ Kuropatkin Zadachi.. Tom II pp.146-7
Russia, which was to guide state security policy for the next ten years. It amounted in the main to a summary of the views that Obruchev himself had held and promoted since at least 1864. In it, he compared Russia to a comet, with a still underdeveloped European core and 'a horrifying Asiatic tail, stretching from Tiflis to Vladivostok' that drained away much-needed material and moral strength. In order to pursue a policy reflecting Russia's true priorities, he consistently argued his own view of the basic missions facing the Russian state-a framework within which 'the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia... are only adjuncts, having a point only until [there is established] a living and whole strictly national Russian body.

Consequently, our first concern must be to stand firm in Europe. Obruchev identified the two main dilemmas facing Russian security policy to be the Polish and Eastern Questions-'only for the Bosphorus and Carpathian Rus could Russian blood be unconditionally shed. It was as a direct consequence of such thinking that between 1881 and 1894 over 45 percent of the Russian peacetime army were concentrated in the Western provinces, placed there to compensate for the superior mobilization rates of the German and Austro-Hungarian forces. \(6\) Russia after 1880 pursued a twin offence-defence strategy in Europe, planning to attack Austria whilst defending against Germany. The offensives planned in Asia may therefore be seen as a way of more rapidly staving off the danger of joint commitment were a crisis to simultaneously develop in Europe, where the defensive position was considered much more grave for most of this period.\(^7\) How this viewpoint came to change, at first gradually and then, after the Russo-Japanese War, dramatically, and the role of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in that change, forms the theme of the following three sections.

\[2\] [Emphasis added] Fuller, *Strategy and Power* pp.297-8

\[3\] Airapetov, *Zabytaia xar'era "Russkogo Mol'tke"* pp.246-252.


\[5\] Ibid, p.265.

\[6\] William C. Fuller 'The Russian Empire' in Ernest R. May (ed.), *Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (NJ: Princeton University Press 1984) p.109. On the manner in which these dispositions affected army morale, see also Fuller's later work *Civil-Military Conflict* p.15.

\[7\] One of the best surveys of Tsarist planning for European warfare remains A. M. Zaionchkovskii's *Podgotovka Rossii k Mirovoi Voine (Planovoy voine)* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo 1926). Norman Stone's *The Eastern Front 1914-1917* (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1975) is still the best English-language account of Russia's experience in the First World War. Stone is particularly damming of the Tsarist army's views on fortification and cavalry. See also N. Stone, 'The Historical Background of the Red Army' in J. Erickson & E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), *Soviet Military Power and Performance* (London:
4.1 China, Europe, and the ‘Yellow Peril’.

The threat to Central Asia from Chinese aggression in the late nineteenth century was interlinked with the policies of the Siberian Governor-General, N. N. Murav’ev-Amurskii (1809-1881), in the Far East. The diplomatic history of Sino-Russian relations has had many commentators in the past, and any summary here will be restricted to the immediate security implications. Murav’ev-Amurskii was a relative outsider in the school of Russian military Asiatic experts in the nineteenth century. He had served long enough in the Caucasus in the 1840s to appreciate the Russian Army’s poor understanding of the Muslim community there, but being viewed as something of a maverick, was reduced to transmitting his own plans for subjugating the Caucasus via his brother in the hope they would somehow gain official attention in St. Petersburg. Before long however he was transferred to the Far East, where by virtue of a series of remarkable diplomatic treaties with China between 1858 and 1864 he and N. P. Ignat’ev, the Russian diplomatic agent in Peking, rapidly annexed to Russia around 665,000 square miles of territory.

Murav’ev’s approach to maintaining this theatre remained defiantly unorthodox however, as almost alone amongst late nineteenth century Russian administrators he maintained a faith in the virtues of the traditional Cossack-colonist. The results of his policies were to do much to discredit this policy of settlement on the Asiatic frontier. Murav’ev dispersed the Amur Cossack Host in a manner designed more for symbolic than practical effect, and communication lines remained grossly inadequate. Plans to turn the Amur river line into a self-sufficient grain basin came to grief upon the actualities of the local climate, and raids in the 1860s by Chinese bandit gangs (the Manza population forming ‘Hunhoses’) exposed the vulnerability of...
the Cossack perimeter defence. Przheval'skii's visit to one Trans-Baikal Cossack settlement in the late 1860s filled him with disgust—he found a settlement in decay, dank with 'filth, hunger and paupery.'  

The Cossacks' weaponry was in many cases inferior even to that wielded by the Manza raiders. When the Russian geographer M. I. Veniukov wrote his work on Russia's Asiatic frontiers, based upon lectures given at the Russian Staff Academy, and itself intended to educate the General Staff officer on the geography and strategic points of Asiatic Russia, he made it clear that he regarded the Far East as the most vulnerable sector of Russia's frontier. So great did he feel this danger to be that he devoted a special section in his work to Manchuria, writing that 'Manchuria is not a neighbour like other Central Asian lands; from here one can expect great danger.'

Most appalling to Veniukov in 1873 was the unfortified state of the Far East; a situation he blamed both on Russian financial constraints after the Crimean War and, explicitly, upon the vacillation of local commanders in selecting strategic strong points. Local forces, meanwhile, performed more manual labour than they did military training, and Veniukov considered the local dismounted Cossack forces practically untrained. The existence of a single land communication line with European Russia, the Amur and Ussuri river lines, which also formed the state frontiers, and the lack of any lines of retreat to the north, meant that a Chinese army based on the Lesser Khingan range only had to march a few miles north to cut off the Amur krai entirely from Russia itself. To counter this threat, Veniukov urged the maintenance of screw-propeller ships on the Amur and the establishment of larger military depots with a central, stone-fortified depot at Khabarovsk.

Veniukov's views did not meet complete agreement within Russian governmental circles, Veniukov himself noted in his memoirs that diplomats of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department considered him an alarmist. The chief of staff of Western Siberia meanwhile, General I. F. Babkov, had

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16 Veniukov, *Iz Vospominaniia.* T.2 p.145. Veniukov had a particularly acrimonious relationship with the director of the Asiatic Department of the MID, Stremoukhov, whom he labelled 'a fop' who 'always damaged the Russian cause' (*Ibid.* pp.162, 168.)
suffered the criticism of Veniukov, Poltoratskii and others in the 1860s over the form of the western frontier he had helped demarcate with China in 1864-8 through the treaty of Chuguchak (also known as the Treaty of Tarbagatai). As both a staff officer and head of the West Siberian branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, Babkov clearly felt that both his professional and scientific capabilities were under attack, and later devoted the greater part of his unfinished memoirs to a scathing rebuttal of his critics. In particular, writing from the hindsight of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, following which Russia came to politically and militarily dominate Manchuria, Babkov confidently asserted that '...the Chinese danger threatening our settlements in the Ussuri krai and Vladivostok itself, of which Veniukov scared the public, in reality does not exist and, as we see, was not observed before.'

Veniukov's views nonetheless reflected genuine concerns at the time, and these perceived failings in the Far East came to have increased relevance in the period after 1870 when the possibility of conflict with China at some future date grew, a possibility heightened by General Kaufman's actions in the Ili Crisis (1871-81). By the 1880s Russia was engaged in urgent reinforcement of the Far Eastern theatre, issuing the troops there with rapid-fire rifles and the latest steel long-range ordnance alongside a significant increase in their numerical strength. This policy cost the overstretched Tsarist exchequer over eleven and a half million rubles. Administrative reform that was aimed at strengthening Russia's position in the Far East also resulted in the creation of the Primur military district with its own governor-generalship, wielding extensive military and administrative powers, in 1884. The first Governor-General, Baron Korf, immediately upon arrival set about a study of the readiness of the newly created district in regard to the military front of Mongolia and Manchuria. This military buildup continued at the turn of the century-between 1892 and 1903 Russia's military strength east of Lake Baikal increased from 23 to 89 battalions, from 13 to 35 squadrons and from 8 to 25 batteries. This process was accompanied by a degree of engineer work in the proposed theatre of military operations itself. Vladivostok, which until 1882

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comprised no more than an earthen field battery system, saw the setting up of new coastal batteries and an inland field fortification system during the Anglo-Russian war scare of 1885, and work was begun on a road network both to these fortifications and in the Ussuri krai generally. However these defences continued to be recognized as severely deficient as late as 1895. The comparison in terms of the time, money and labour expended upon fortification of the Far East compared with the crucial strategic triangle in European Russia of the Warsaw, Novogorgevsk and Zerghze forts, covering the railway network of the forward European theatre, was stark.21

The cause of dispute with China, aside from the large annexations made by Murav’ev and Ignat’ev (‘unequal treaties’ which continue to aggravate Sino-Russian relations even today), rested with Kaufman’s annexation of the Ili Valley in northeastern Turkestan in 1871. Although officially a response to the treatment meted out a Russian emissary by the Taranchi Sultan Adil-Ogly, this was clearly a move to implicitly threaten the autonomous state in neighbouring Kashgaria set up by Yakub Bek in the period 1866-1877, a Bukharan adventurer who had already faced the Russians at Tashkent. It created the ‘Kul’dzha Question’ that continued to sporadically disturb the Asiatic Department for many years.

Unlike the majority of the Chinese Empire, the population of north western Sinkiang (as it was called after 1884-the Chinese ‘New Kingdom’) were predominantly Muslim, with all the potential problems of coreligious fraternity with Central Asian Muslims that condition implied. Russian concerns were heightened in the 1860s when the Dungan uprising led to the Chinese losing control of Chinese Turkestan and created the prospect of an independent Muslim state bordering the Russian domain in Turkestan. Russia viewed Yakub Bek, who had moved in and gradually become the dominant figure in this province in the wake of the Muslim uprising against the Chinese, with particular suspicion as a potential alternative centre of power and pawn of Britain.22

In 1875 rumours reached State Councilor Vainberg of a potential alliance between the Emir of Bukhara and Yakub Bek, thereby threatening earlier hopes that a weak Muslim buffer state to the east

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20 Hauner, *What is Asia to Us?* p.82.
would act as a counterbalance to Russia's restless protectorates in Central Asia. Captain A. N. Kuropatkin, a young officer on Kaufman's staff at the time, was dispatched in 1876 to gain all the political and military intelligence he could whilst delimiting the Fergana-Kashgar border. Kuropatkin's work supplemented that of three earlier Russian missions, those of Captain Reintal (1870, 1875) and General Staff officer and official emissary Baron A. V. Kaul'bars (1872). These missions in turn supplemented earlier work by both the Kazakh explorer Captain Chokan Valikhanov, who had recommended Kashgaria's annexation as a protectorate, and by Poltoratskii and Vieniukov. Kuropatkin's journey involved a trip of 2,000 miles through Kashgaria, mapping the country and making observations of its geography, industry, ethnic balance and military forces. The party was even accompanied by a naturalist, A. I. Vil'kins (1845-1892), to make scientific observations. For this work, Kuropatkin was awarded the Imperial Geographical Society's small gold medal. The Kashgarian army was of interest since it was on the receiving end of a number of European armaments as a consequence of Anglo-Russian rivalry to gain influence in the region, and consequently presented a good example of an Asiatic army in a period of transition. Yakub Bek's army bore an integrated character that was both unique and characteristic of the region, a traditional crossroads of invading armies and clashing cultural influences. Within it coexisted the traditional structure of a Muslim army alongside elements of Chinese military organization and Turkish and European military technique. In equipment it bore Bukharan and Afghan arms, Chinese pikes and tafjury and, latterly, European percussion arms and artillery. The troops disposed of by Yakub Bek failed to impress Kuropatkin however-most were still armed with crude, semi-rifled muzzle-loading muskets and discipline was weak, with the army only able to manoeuvre in square. The field artillery consisted of one battery of muzzle-loaders and one of 3-pound breech-loading Indian mountain guns, but the breech mechanisms on five of the latter were broken at the time of Kuropatkin's visit. Kuropatkin's account of the parades he witnessed, with cavalrmen

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falling off their horses and the flintlock-armed infantrymen scattering powder across the parade ground as they fired blindly by volley, suggested a low level of general discipline. Local fortifications also presented no significant obstacles, being thinly walled, many of them overlooked by higher points, lacking glacis and possessing only rudimentary artillery.\textsuperscript{26} Kuropatkin's review served to correct earlier Russian impressions that, as a consequence of new armaments and a degree of European-style training, Yakub Bek's army would present a more formidable force than those encountered in either Khiva or Bukhara. In 1876 the Russian authorities in Turkestan learnt via Staff Captain Pevtsov, then accompanying a trade convoy in Mongolia and Dzhungaria, of the advance of a Chinese army some 42,000 strong, divided into three corps, towards Dzhungaria on a mission to re-conquer China's western provinces.\textsuperscript{27} By 1877 Yakub Bek was dead, possibly by his own hand, Sinkiang had been reconquered by the Chinese army, and the Russian and Chinese empires were once more face-to-face in Central Asia. The question of the Russians then returning the Ili district to China, a province officially annexed on China's behalf, thereafter became a source of diplomatic conflict between the two states.\textsuperscript{28}

Kuropatkin, as head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in 1878, recommended that the Chinese pay ten million pounds in gold as compensation for the Russian occupation of Ili, with the money being put towards construction of the Siberian railroad that was already under discussion at this time.\textsuperscript{29} Following an initial diplomatic parley relations grew tense however, and war seemed imminent, the Russians fortifying the Barokhorinski ridge. It was this state of affairs that caused Przheval'skii to draw up the bare outline of a war plan for operations against China, a plan to receive many supplements in following years.\textsuperscript{30} This officer's qualifications for such a role were considerable. In his lifetime Major-General N. M. Przheval'skii (1839-1888) gained fame across the length and breadth of the Russian Empire

\textsuperscript{27} V. S. Kadnikov, ‘Iz istorii kul'dzhinskogo voprosa’ IV CXXIV (1911) p.898.
\textsuperscript{28} The two best existing studies of this diplomatic crisis are Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis. A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965) and, more recently, and based on new archival research: A. D. Voskressenskii, Diplomaticheskaiia istoriia russko-kiatskogo Sankt-Peterburgskogo dogovora 1881 goda (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi myśli 1995).
\textsuperscript{29} Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War pp.92-3
by his series of four daring expeditions undertaken through Mongolia and Inner Asia between 1870 and 1885, fulfilling tasks that were at once related both to the development of geographic knowledge and to military intelligence. The last chapter of his final book contained a series of considerations on war with China that were based on his own earlier reports to the Russian General Staff and in particular on his input at an 1886 conference assessing the security of Russia’s Far Eastern frontiers.

A tactical offensive movement often characterized Russian war plans on the Asiatic frontiers, even where the overall strategic plan was defensive. This was due not only to the contemporary cult for offensive action common to European armies as a whole, but also from the specific experience of the Asiatic corps of the psychological power of even small active expeditionary columns. There was much fear too, of the effects on ‘Asiatic’ popular opinion were the Russian army seen as purely reactive, not aggressive. There was also the tactical reason that troops on the ground were in practice often too few in number to assume an effective active defence- Kuropatkin claimed that Kaufman chose the offensive against Bukhara in 1868 for this very reason. It is understandable then, that although Russia strategically was only concerned at the time with the defensive goal of retaining the Ili Valley in the event of war with China in 1880, the ‘Ili Battle Plan’ drawn up by the staff of the Turkestan military district opted for the offensive in that:

generally, in all Asiatic wars the best method of operations against the enemy consists in hurrying him into an encounter and in defeating him before [he enters] into our boundaries, because the approach of an enemy towards our territory can have a bad influence on the minds of the indigenous population.

The plan, which would have been discharged by one of Kaufman’s most trusted subordinates, General G. A. Kolpakovskii, in the event of a diplomatic break, envisaged a main attack out of the Kul’dzha region.

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30 For Przheval’skii’s first war plan against China, see ‘O vozmozhnoi voine s Kitaem’ SGTSMA I (1883), pp.293-306.
32 Kuropatkin, Zadachi... Tom.II p.101
34 Kolpakovskii, Gerasim Alekseevich (1819-1896) Organizer of the Semirech’e Cossack forces. Military service began at 16, at 21 participated in action in the Caucasus, going on the serve in Moldavia, Hungary
through the Talkin and Achal gorges down onto the old Chinese Imperial road to Dzhin-ho and Shikho. A subsidiary group was to be concentrated in the Fergana oblast for operations against Kashgaria itself consisting of 16 companies, 11 sotnias, 22 guns, 8 rocket-carriages and 4 mortars. This force concentration, which British observers considered rather inadequate to take on the troops of the talented Chinese general Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-85), was to have its overall effect bolstered by the actions of the Russian Far Eastern fleet and by a partisan detachment of the West Siberian military district. This latter group, composed of 12 Cossack sotnias, 4 guns, and 8 rocket batteries, was to march from Zaisanskii post southwards into the Chinese rear, wreaking havoc amongst their supply and transport columns. Snow on the mountain passes meant that the timing of the offensive was crucial, with May the optimum month-earlier, and the Semirech’e forces could not cross the passes, leaving the Chinese to tackle the Siberian troops in their rear unmolested. Any later and Chinese forces falling back from the advance in the west would envelop and destroy these same Siberian troops. In the event the war plans came to nothing. Russia was overstretched by her Balkan commitment and the Chinese army was something of an unknown quantity to the Russians at the time- a situation that staff studies in the next ten years did much to correct. The greater bulk of the Russian forces in Turkestan in 1878-9 were concentrated not on the eastern border with China, but on the border of Afghanistan, ready to pose a political threat to British rule in India. Despite later claims by one prominent Tsarist historian that the Russian troop concentration that did occur served to bring the Chinese to their senses, the overall outcome of the Ili Crisis was something of a diplomatic reverse for Russia and a vivid demonstration of just how unprepared this frontier was for warfare against a major opponent. What information the Russian General Staff did possess in the period 1880-81 inspired caution rather than boundless optimism, despite Przheval’skiĭ’s personal contempt for the military capability of the Chinese. On the ground, Governor-General Kaufman frankly confessed his own ignorance regarding the capabilities of the Chinese army, complaining that what information he did receive from so-called experts was contradictory, and pointing to supply difficulties and the need to significantly

and Central Asia. A frequent substitute for Kaufman in times of illness, Governor-General of the Steppe following the administrative reorganization of Turkestan after 1882. ‘... a typical representative of the Turkestan forces, having spent all his life in steppe expeditions.’ Logofet, ‘Zaveovanie Srednei Azii’ p.108

35 Bilof, ‘The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East.’ p.183

36 Hsu, The Iii Crisis p.100 and Terent’ev, Istoriia Zavoevenia Sredniei Azii Tom III p.256.


disperse his own detachments in conducting a campaign against the Chinese. 39 On the 20th October 1880 meanwhile L. N. Sobolev, Kuropatkin's successor as head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, wrote a report on military considerations in the event of war with China that incorporated a short review of the wars of the British and French with the Chinese in 1857-60. This report dwelt gloomily on the difficulties presented the Russians by such an operation. It estimated that the conquest of Western China would take two years, years in which Russian Turkestan, still only recently conquered, would be left in a dangerously undermanned state. Maintaining a fresh division in Turkestan for two years to cover all eventualities would add 6,000,000 roubles to an already expensive campaign plan, with no guarantee meanwhile that the occupation of Western China would compel the Peking government to sue for peace. This latter goal would only be achieved by a direct naval operation against Peking itself, an operation that, when the British and French employed it against a Chinese army still completely unmodernized, had even then required 20,000 troops and a large fleet of over 300 ships. A Russian operation of such a type would involve drawing troops away from the European theatre and an expense of 30,000,000 or perhaps even 300,000,000 roubles. Given these considerations, Sobolev wrote that for Russia in its present condition war with China presented a 'calamitous' prospect and advised that 'all possible measures' should be pursued in order to 'with honour' avoid such a conflict. 40

Though the Ili Crisis was settled diplomatically, staff officers based in the region or travelling through it regularly, like Przheval'skii, continued to advise on war plans. The main area of debate in this early period centred on whether to attack the Chinese heartland through Mongolia or Manchuria. Przheval'skii soon became a stern advocate of the Mongolian option, pointing out that possession of Urga would carry both strategic and moral significance, the town being considered by Mongolian Buddhists the second most holy city after Lhasa itself. 41 The Manchurian theatre of operations gained precedence over time however in Russian strategic thought due to evidence of its richer resource base. 42 The extent to which

39 Kadnikov, 'Iz istorii kul'dzhinskogo voprosa' p.903.
42 Bilof, 'The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East.' pp.98-147, 165-8. The main area of dispute lay as to which theatre presented the best environmental conditions for a Russian advance; Manchuria was well provisioned but conditions could be severe, with flooding, marshes, and plagues of horse flies. In addition too great an advance from this base would expose a weak supply line between the Ussuri oblast' and European Russia, and Russian columns could fall victim to partisan attacks. The Mongolians by contrast were seen as being friendly to the Russians. Mongolia offered the shortest direct
Russia took steps to correct its previous ignorance of China evoked the rather paranoid respect of one prominent Russophobe at the turn of the century:

From 1881 till 1895, Russia devoted her utmost energies to the gaining [of] information respecting China. Surveying parties were despatched in all directions. Scientific observers, always protected by Cossack escorts, were despatched to various parts of the empire, until her geographers knew more of the physical features of China, and her military surveyors more of her strategic possibilities, than the Chinese themselves. In these respects Russia has beaten the record. Her knowledge of China is more complete and more reliable than that possessed by any other country... 43

This expansion of effort by the Russian General Staff had both a public and a private face in that nearly all the officers involved were also members of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society. Russian science was blessed at this time by an outstanding trinity of military vostokovedy, all of whom were to varying degrees disciples of Przheval'skii. The names of M. V. Pevtsov (1843-1902), V. I. Roborovskii (1856-1910) and P. K. Kozlov (1863-1935) would come to be indelibly linked, like Przheval'skii, with a golden age of Russian scientific and ethnographic exploration in Inner Asia. 44 All made their reports both in public session to the Geographical Society and in private to the Russian General Staff, with Pevtsov for example also being appointed on the 10th March 1887 as a desk-head in the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. 45 During this period military officers also frequently accompanied what were ostensibly

route to Peking but scarcity of resources, most particularly water, would require Russian troops to move in split detachments, and deep gorges and walled towns further along the route could slow columns already severely taxed by a long desert march. The Soviets were forced to consider many of the same type of problems when planning their offensive against the Japanese in 1945. They opted for a combined assault through both Mongolia and Manchuria, using Mongolian cavalry in a special horse-mechanized group to pass through the Gobi Desert; Alvin D. Cook, Nomohhan. Japan Against Russia, 1939. (California: Stanford Press 1990) pp.1033-74 and LTC David Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 (Pt. Leavenworth, Kansas: Leavenworth Papers No.8 1985)


civilian expeditions, whilst the Russian academic community through the IRGO also volunteered its aid. The Russian geographer and ethnographer G. N. Potanin (1835-1920), whose name was destined to be preserved for posterity by a glacier in the remote Altai mountains, conducted many trips in the Far East in this period, encompassing northern China, eastern Tibet, central Mongolia (1884-86, 1892-93) and Manchuria (1899). These journeys furnished much information that was also of interest to the Russian War Ministry. During his first expedition in south-east Asia in 1877-78 meanwhile, Potanin had also been accompanied by Staff-Captain P. A. Rafailov of the Topographical Corps, who composed a map on a one inch-to-fifty-verst scale of north-western Mongolia as a result of the expedition.

This increased emphasis on the Far East by the General Staff’s Asiatic Department was further reflected in the Kotsebu Commission of 1881’s considerations on the reorganization of the central organs of the War Ministry. The Commission proposed a much greater focus on intelligence gathering in the Far East for the Asiatic Department than that originally outlined in the statute of 1867. Financial considerations in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 meant that the Kotsebu Commission’s proposals were not realized however, and the Commission’s recommendations, which would have led to the creation of a truly independent intelligence arm within the General Staff, were set aside until the issue was again raised in 1903.46 In 1886 the General Staff’s Asiatic Department was finally expanded in view of its rapidly increasing responsibilities, but this marked a change in budget and an increase in personnel rather than a fundamental reorientation.

China continued to be considered a dangerous force on the grounds of the sheer quantity of its population. The colonization programme begun in northern Manchuria was considered particularly threatening, there being thirty times more Chinese colonists there than there were Russians in the neighbouring Amur and Primor’e oblasts in 1882-90.47 Writing an advisory note to the Main Staff in this period, Asiatic expert L. N. Sobolev opined that along the whole Asiatic border, only China ‘under certain political conditions, independently and directly, could threaten our interests and position in Asia’.48

48 L. N. Sobolev, ‘Oborona russko-kitaiskoi granitsy’ quoted in Bilof, ‘The Imperial Russian General Staff and China in the Far East’ p.149
According to calculations by officers of the Amur district, it would take eighteen months for Russian troops in route march to reach the Primor'e oblast; calculations like these lay behind the laying of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1891-1904, the purpose of which was largely strategic. From the second half of the 1880s onwards Russia's Minister of Communications, K. N. Pos'et, until then almost a lone advocate for the building of a Trans-Siberian line, gained a powerful governmental ally in the person of War Minister P. S. Vannovskii, himself influenced by the concerns expressed by his Far Eastern Governor-Generals. The task of geographically delimiting the best route for such a line, much of it across great tracts of Asia largely unstudied and unmapped in the modern sense, was assigned to the Corps of Military Topographers, the only government department with the expertise to take on such a role. Between 1896 and 1903 officers of the Russian Topographical Corps in Manchuria fixed over 200 astronomic and geodesic points, helping produce a new map of Asiatic Russia on a scale of 100 versts to an inch, a new map of the southern border strip of Asiatic Russia, a map of the Far East (10 versts to the inch) and a map of the Liaotung peninsula. In 1900 however, in a move later destined to have painful political and military repercussions, a proposal by the head of the Priamur district's topographical section, Colonel M. P. Polianovskii, to conduct an extensive topographical survey of northern Manchuria, was rejected by the Russian Main Staff on financial grounds, the project requiring 115 men and an expenditure of 600,000 roubles.

Unlike many 'Asiatics', the Chinese army itself, in either attack or defence, could not be too easily dismissed. Hesitant modernization and a complicated organizational structure made the Chinese army difficult to assess. The army at this time consisted of three types of troops—local militia, the Chinese army (the so-called 'Green Standard' forces), and the 'Eight-Banner' troops, the latter of which had brought the

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50 V. V. Gushkov & A. A. Sharavin, Na karte General'nogo Shtaba-Man 'chzhurii. (Moscow: Institut politicheskogo i voennogo analiza 2000) pp.235-243. Towards the end of this period there was compiled a literary memorial to this expansion of effort by the military topographical department. See: M. N. Levitskii (ed.), V trushchobakh Man 'chzhurii i nashikh vostochnykh okrain. 'Sbornik ocherkov, raskazov i vospominanii Voennykh Topografov. (Odessa: Tipo-litografia Shtaba Okruga 1910).


52 For a brief survey of this important period of Chinese military history, the reader is advised to consult the work of David B. Ralston: Importing the European Army. The Introduction of European Military
Manchu dynasty to power in the seventeenth century and consequently occupied a hereditary, privileged position within the Chinese state. The majority of the Eight-Banner troops were deployed in Manchuria, the ruling dynasty's heartland, and formed the most technologically backward section of the Chinese army, being armed with arrows, spears, swords, and worthless matchlock muskets. Their reform would not be significantly noticeable until after 1905, when a new wave of military reforms was instituted in China.53 Within the militia and the so-called 'Green Standard' forces however the story was rather different. During the course of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), the militias of Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang had proven the only effective forces in combating the Taiping troops. The effectiveness of these militias was in large part based both upon their own organization and discipline, including a ban on opium smoking, and upon the use to a limited degree of Western technology. These militia armies remained standing forces, though in reduced numbers, after the rebellion, and their leaders important proponents of military modernization in China. The infantry of Li Hung-chang's army when he was governor of Chihli, for example, came in the main to be armed with the Mauser 71 rifle, a weapon that would become amongst the most common of modern arms in Chinese service in subsequent years. Their artillery comprised Krupp guns of German make, and German instructors trained the troops in Prussian drill. After 1885, on the suggestion of General Gordon of Khartoum fame, two military academies were set up, whilst a handful of Chinese officers began to be sent abroad to study. The reorganization of sections of the Green Standard troops into so-called 'Disciplined Forces' also represented an attempt to transfer the virtues of the Taiping-era militia forces to the larger Chinese army. Modernization remained painfully slow however, the Japanese General Staff estimating in 1895 that only three-fifths of the Chinese troops mobilized against them had some type of firearm, many carrying only a pike, spear or sword.54 Complicating the question of assessment further was the fact that until the start of the twentieth century, military reform was uneven, dependent on the whim (and level of corruption) of local governor-generals. Initially the balance of modern arms in China lay in Russia's favour, China having devoted most attention to its coastal defences following the repeated trauma of foreign intervention from that direction in the

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53 'Reorganizatsii vos'mi-znamennykh' voisk' (Pa-Tsi)' SGTSMA LXXXV (1912) pp.89-152.
earlier part of the century.55 One Russian military traveller in the first half of the 1880s noted that the degree of advanced military technology in China appeared to vary depending on the distance from the northern frontier. In Urga matchlock muskets were still to be found, in Kalgan percussion arms were stored in the arsenal and in Peking and the southern ports the Chinese forces bore breech-loading Sniders.56

Assessment of China and the Chinese army in Russian eyes was of course the direct responsibility of the Russian military agent in China, an innovation in Sino-Russian relations that had been introduced during the height of the Ili Crisis in 1879-1880. On the 8th March 1880 the military commander of the East Siberian military district reported to the Main Staff that the Chinese counted on having 10,000 armed troops in Manchuria in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. It was resolved in the light of this and other reports to dispatch two officers of the General Staff to China via Europe to judge the extent of the Chinese military build-up from a review of the arms orders received in European capitals and observation of Chinese forces at first-hand.57 The Main Staff proceeded to launch an intelligence operation that remains impressive today by its scale, range, and depth of coordination. The two officers selected for the principal task were General Staff Lt. Colonel Shneur and Staff Captain (soon Lt. Colonel) Bodisko. These two officers were to make a grand tour of Europe, gathering information on Chinese arms orders, Shneur being assigned the southern half of Europe and Bodisko the north. Meeting up in Britain, they were then to go to America, to investigate the possibility of supplying the Primor’e military district by sea from that country (an obvious stopgap solution to the supply problem given the non-existence at the time of the Trans-Siberian railway). Their final destination would be China itself. The two officers were to be assisted by agents of the Russian Foreign Ministry throughout, the Foreign Ministry promising the Military-Scientific Committee the aid of its consulates in London, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, the Hague, Brussels, Tokyo, Paris, Washington and Peking.58 These plans underwent some slight alteration at the outset, Bodisko being sent directly on to America and then to China ‘where the most rapid presence of our officer was recognized...as

56 ‘Zapiska o Kitae Praporoschchika 2 Vostochnogo Sibirskogo Strelkovogo batalliona Shulyngina’ SGTSMA VII (1884) p.122.
an urgent necessity’ and Shneur being left to work in Europe alone. 59 The consequence of these actions was the receipt of a constant stream of detailed reports to the Military-Scientific Committee (and passed on from there to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff) throughout the latter half of 1880 on the state of Chinese military modernization. On the 28th July/9th August for instance, the military agent in Berlin reported the purchase of 6, 000 Snider carbines, 4, 000 Vittena rifles, 3, 000 Peabody-Martins, 2, 000 old Remington rifles, and the order of around 15, 000 Mausers, all destined for China. These orders, with the exception of the Mausers, produced through the Dreyse factory, were made with Hamburg firms who operated without any degree of quality control, and the arms were old, cheap, and in a bad state of repair. 60 The consul in Antwerp on the 19th September meanwhile reported the timetables of all vessels sailing from Antwerp to China with their accompanying loads of arms and military materials, and the General-Consulate in San Francisco on the 8th/20th October gave a detailed breakdown of all ships sailing to China between January and September of that year with a precise enumeration of all the boxes of rifles and ammunition that they bore. 61 Based on his review of arms orders in Europe, Shneur estimated that in the spring of 1881 China would dispose of in the region of 260, 260 rifles of modern make, the majority of them (94, 500) Mausers, alongside modern artillery and torpedoes. 62 He also dismissed the possibility of supplying the Primor’e district by engaging in contracts with American shipping firms, the terms of trade he was offered by American merchants being nearly twice as unfavourable as those he received in Europe. 63

Once he reached China Shneur met up with Bodisko and awaited new instructions, the Ili Crisis having passed its most critical stage. Shneur was eventually instructed to return to Russia via India, investigating en route the impression made by Russia’s latest successes in Central Asia upon the Indian population, whilst Bodisko stayed on as the official military agent in China. 64 He had been active there whilst Shneur travelled through Europe, one of his first reports, passed on to the chief of staff of the Turkestan military district on the 26th May 1881, being concerned with the number, type and disposition of

58 Ibid., dl.20-200b.
61 Ibid., dl.38-410b, 57-570b.
63 Ibid., dl.3.
64 The section of Shneur’s trip relating to his journey through India can be found printed in: Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiske Otnosheniia v XIXv. pp. 251-55.
heavy artillery pieces in Western China. Short periods of service and excessively large spheres of responsibility meant that neither Bodisko nor his successor, Shneur, proved fully effective as military agents in China however, Shneur for example being tasked during his term of office (in addition to his primary responsibility) with providing data on both Korea and Japan. Only the arrival of D. V. Putiata in 1886 for a relatively long period of service served to put the role of military agent in China on a satisfactory basis. Putiata himself was destined to spend most of his career engaged in the study of Asiatic states, having come up through the ranks from the Turkestan military district and served as assistant head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department immediately before his appointment to China. After his service in China he would continue to be attached as a desk-head to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, being appointed military adviser to the Korean government in 1896 before eventually becoming head of the Asiatic Department in 1898 - 1902. This career path made his views on the Far East in general far more influential over the long term than those of his predecessors.

Putiata’s reports to the General Staff after 1886 kept it updated on the latest developments in Chinese military organization and secured his place as the Russian staff’s leading expert on the history and military potential of that country, despite the fact he himself did not speak Chinese. His standing was not unchallenged by the academic community however, particularly when Putiata ventured publicly outside study of the purely military sphere. His 1895 book on the history, religion, economy, culture and armed forces of China came in for a blistering critique from the leading Russian vostokoved of the day, Dmitri Pozdneev, who attacked nearly every aspect of the work, from its faulty transliteration system to its presentation of Chinese Buddhism. Pozdneev attributed these errors chiefly to the sheer scope of the programme Putiata set himself, a task he was ‘completely unable to fulfill.’ Nonetheless Pozdneev did not criticize Putiata’s analysis of Chinese army, recognizing that in this area Putiata was a well-qualified judge. The chief characteristics of Putiata’s reports to the General Staff, meanwhile, were his steady focus on the efforts at reform and military reinforcement undertaken by the Chinese in Manchuria and a consequent stress upon this area as the most crucial section of the long Russo-Chinese frontier.

65 RGVIA F.1396 Op.2 D.127. dl.4-5ob.
In 1885 the Chinese formed in the three provinces of Manchuria troops of what Putiata termed 'auxiliary contingents', that is to say combined arms detachments (infantry, cavalry, artillery) in the main towns of each province. These formations were significantly better armed, trained, and led than standard Chinese troops, the infantry bearing Mausers, the cavalry Winchester carbines and the artillery Krupp field guns. Observing the manoeuvres of the Mukden detachment of these forces in 1888, Putiata opined that under the leadership of knowledgeable officers and with improved training these forces could soon master European tactics. In addition the Chinese undertook for the first time attempts to create a modern fortification system in Manchuria, three forts being constructed at Ekho (north of Ninguta), San-hsing and Khun-ch' un, and attention being paid to the improvement of communication routes in this area. The disposition of these forts was designed to cover China from the side of the Russian South Ussuri krai. Of this group of fortifications only those at Khun-ch' un resembled anything more than earthen fortified camps however. Even the Khun-ch' un forts, consisting of oval earthen walls with rondels mounting 15cm. Krupp cannon, (see overleaf) shared the faults of their brethren elsewhere in being poorly constructed and dominated by neighbouring heights. Putiata reported that the Krupp guns, recently installed, were already rusted beyond use by neglect and that their gun carriages were stored, disassembled, in great disorder. The local brigades at Khun-ch' un were relatively well-armed and disciplined, the troops bearing Winchester, Remington and Hotchkiss rifles, and a special officer being appointed to oversee cleaning and maintenance of the arms. Faulty mainsprings in the majority of these repeating weapons made firing

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70 Ibid., pp.89-91.
practice extremely inaccurate however. Nonetheless Putiata felt that the measures China had taken ‘must arouse suspicion regarding the true intentions of the Chinese in the Manchurian region.

A review of the whole length of the Russo-Chinese frontier in a topographical regard led Putiata to emphasize the dominating strategic importance of Manchuria. With the exception of the border region in the Ili district, he felt China could not be seriously threatened in the west, although local unrest would probably require a Russian occupation along the lines of 1871 in the event of renewed hostilities of any kind. In regard to Mongolia, he utilized personal study of Russian steppe operations in Turkestan, the campaigns of Chinghiz Khan, and the Chinese invasion of Mongolia in 1696 to argue that Mongolia presented an obstacle to military movement from either side. In Turkestan, steppe wells could not support the provision of over 270-300 men in 24 hours; wells in Mongolia must be expected to reproduce this performance. At the same time each column could not be expected to advance at more than 30 versts a day, a standard set by the cavalry raids of Chinghiz Khan. The Chinese operations of 1696 meanwhile best illustrated the difficulties that would be presented to movement in that country by a large, modern army. On that occasion a sizable Chinese force had covered 2/3 of the distance from Peking to the Russian border in 72 days, including 26 days of rest, and had repeatedly almost been overwhelmed by both the natural elements and local resistance. Such figures supported Putiata’s contention that forces of the requisite size for serious military operations (circa 100,000 men) could not traverse the area between eastern Mongolia and the Russian border in less than 104 days or, in other words, three-and-a-half months. These conditions in Mongolia and Sinkiang, and Chinese military reinforcement in the Manchurian theatre, rendered inescapable in his view, ‘the overwhelming importance, in a military regard, of the extreme eastern section of the Russo-Chinese frontier.’ Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Putiata admitted, demonstrated the bankruptcy of many of the military measures the Chinese had

74 Ibid., p.265
undertaken in Manchuria, but 'it does not exclude the reality of their former intentions', implying that Russia must maintain a policy of strict vigilance in this area.\footnote{Ibid., p.265.} Through the study and reports of the Russian military agent on the ground therefore, amongst other factors, Manchuria came to dominate the strategic thought of the Russian General Staff in regard to China. However the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the corresponding question of organizing a Russian expeditionary force to Peking still came as a surprise to some elements within the General Staff. As General Rediger, the future War Minister, at this time serving in the War Ministry Chancellory, recalled:

Nobody in St.Petersburg thought seriously about war in the Far East; war with China appeared simply inconceivable since, ever since the time of Przheval’ski, we had maintained the conviction that one battalion could go through the whole of China. Therefore mobilization was prepared only as a precaution, in the assumption that this work, properly speaking, was pointless; the very quality of the Siberian forces was seen as doubtful, since the Siberians from time immemorial had not participated in any military actions.\footnote{Rediger, \textit{Istoriia Moei Zhizni. Vospominaniia Voennogo Ministra} T.1 p.316.}

Rediger’s comments must be treated with caution. As he himself admitted, he spent the great majority of his service in a section of the General Staff that played no part in war-planning or strategic mobilization—therefore his knowledge of the ‘strategic mindset’ of the General Staff was almost inevitably bound to be quite limited.\footnote{Ibid., p.357.} That not all within the Russian General Staff necessarily shared this attitude regarding China, or Przheval’ski’s personal contempt for the Chinese army, is evident in the already-noted moves towards strategic reinforcement taken in the Far East and the concerns expressed by officers like L. N. Sobolev. Nonetheless, Rediger’s comments probably \textit{do} reflect a collective disparaging attitude that existed in the General Staff \textit{as a whole} towards the potential threat of China before 1900.\footnote{On Russian attitudes to the Boxer Rebellion, see: David Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, ‘Russia’s ambivalent response to the Boxers.’ \textit{CMLR} 41 (1, 2000) pp.57-78 and Malozemoff, \textit{Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904} pp.124-44.}
The question of a potential invasion of Western China as a secondary theatre of military operations continued to fascinate the Russian General Staff meanwhile, the Ili and Kashgaria districts being subjected to further surveys by officers of the Turkestan military district in 1899-1900. One side-effect of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was a dramatic weakening of Chinese forces in her western borderlands, one third of China's best troops in the region being despatched back to the capital to meet that crisis. These forces had still not returned in 1900 when news of a possible imminent break with one or more of the Western great powers reached Urumchi from Peking by telegraph. A side-effect of this chain of events was the increased difficulty the local Chinese authorities faced in dealing with even minor uprisings such as that of the Dungans in 1899, that rebellion having compelled them to hastily form a local militia. To add to these difficulties, an anti-Ch'ing secret society was uncovered in the military forces disposed of in Sinkiang, leading to the removal and arrest of the heads of two local lianza detachments. In Kashgar the Chinese authorities attempted to respond to the worsening security scenario by the conduct of military drill and training exercises, the issue of 1, 300 Mauser magazine rifles and the expulsion of around 2, 000 of the most destitute and politically unreliable elements from the town into villages in the surrounding countryside. In July anti-Russian demonstrations by Chinese-Manchu settlers in the Kul'dzha region posed such a threat to the Russian consulate and merchant community there that Russian troops in neighbouring Turkestan began to mobilize and concentrate on the Semirech'e border, a move sufficient to provoke the Chinese to take rapid measures to calm the situation. Russian military analysis was carried out against the backdrop of this period of renewed unrest and administrative instability.  

Appointed to assess Kashgaria in 1899 was Lt-Colonel Lavr Kornilov, later to serve as military agent in China before rising to national prominence in the revolutionary events of 1917. Although Kornilov estimated there were now enough breech-loading rifles in the region for the Chinese on the outbreak of war to be entirely armed with Mausers, he still considered the defensive capacity of the country to be very low. General Staff Lt-Colonel Fedorov of the Turkestan military district simultaneously studied the Ili region in both a military, geographic and ethnographic regard, his review emphasizing in its conclusions the advantages to be gained

79 'Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polezheniia v zapadnom' Kitae (Kashgarii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 1900' Dobavlenie k sbornik materialov po Azii No. 7 (1902) p.54-59.
80 Podpolkovnik Kornilov, Kashgaria ili vostochnyi Turkestan'. Opyt voenno-statisticheskago opisaniia (Tashkent: Tipografia Shtaba Turkestanskago Voennago Okruga 1903) p.382.
from again occupying the region in the near future. The Russian General Staff rejected the idea of re-annexing the Ili district however as a goal hardly imminently attainable given the existence of tasks of a much more immediately urgent and pressing character.\(^81\) The General Staff concluded generally that Chinese difficulties in Sinkiang, outside of mistakes made in Chinese administrative policy, were symptomatic of a more general Islamic militancy also experienced by the Russians in the 1898 Andizhan uprising in Central Asia. In particular, the presence in Kashgaria of suspected Turkish or Afghan political agents was taken as indicative of ‘...the presence of certain secret and still elusive links gradually arising amongst followers of the Sunni branch of Islam, not only in various countries but also across various parts of the globe.’\(^82\)

Assessment of China’s western provinces in the light of the new wave of military reforms instituted in the country was also of course the task of Baron C.G.E. Mannerheim, the future president of Finland, during his famous trip through the country in 1906-08.\(^83\) Mannerheim found the new wave of reforms only beginning to touch the Chinese troops in the western provinces. In particular he, like many observers, felt that the Chinese army’s greatest continuing weakness was the lack of a fully trained and professional officer corps. The Chinese performed their new drill manuals, which consisted in the main of high-speed formation marching, dazzlingly well, but demonstrated no knowledge of extended order or tactical use of ground. Armament, which Kornilov noted in Kashgaria in 1899 to vary between muzzle-loaders, Winchesters, and Mauser 71-84 rifles, amongst others, remainedcripplingly diverse at the time of Mannerheim’s visit, complicating tremendously the question of supply. In addition the railway network spreading in the Chinese central provinces in this period had yet to reach these outer borderlands.

Reflecting the consensus within the Russian General Staff of the time, Mannerheim felt that Manchuria would be the main theatre of war in any future conflict. Nonetheless, considering all the logistical and

\(^{81}\) GSh Podpolkovnik Fedorov ‘Kratkii voenno-statisticheskii obzor’ Iliiskago kraia’ Dobavlenie k sbornik materialov po Azii No. 7 (1902) pp.160-1 and ‘Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polozhenia v zapadnom’ Kitae (Kashgarii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 1900’ p.74.

\(^{82}\) ‘Kratkii Ocherk sovremennago polozhenia v zapadnom’ Kitae (Kashgarii i Chzhungarii) k 20 Dekabria 1900’ p.77.

\(^{83}\) Polkovnik Baron Mannergeim, ‘Predvaritel’niy otchet o poedzke, predpriniatoi po Vysochaishemu povelieniu cherez Kitaiskii Turkestan i severnyia provintsii Kitaiia v gorod Pekin’, v 1906-7, i 8 gg.’ SGTMSA LXXXI (1909). For a study of the scientific results of this expedition, including Mannerheim’s collection of 1370 photographs, see: P. Kossikallio & A. Lehmskallio (eds.), C. G. Mannerheim in Central Asia 1906-1908 (Helsinki: National Board of Antiquities 1999).
technical failings outlined above, he urged the staff to take advantage of China’s weaknesses in Sinkiang to annex the western provinces as a political trophy at peace negotiations in any future war. Essential to success above all was the seizure of the central military depot at Urumchi. Kashgaria to the south could by contrast be practically ignored, since the scattered Chinese garrison forces there would be pinned down in monitoring the local Muslim population. A cavalry detachment with horse artillery and machine guns, debouching from the Tokcs and Yulduz valleys, and seizing the towns of Karashar, Khami and Barkul, would put the camel route from Gul-Khua-Chen to Guchen in Russian hands, effectively cutting off the western provinces from China as a whole. Mannerheim again identified May to September as the optimum period for such an attack over the mountain crossings. Any further advance from the west beyond the operation outlined above, Mannerheim saw as attended by ever-increasing difficulties due to stretches of desert, dense woods and mountainous districts, not to mention the number of forces needed to secure an ever-extending communication line. A direct advance towards the capital from Manchuria could moreover achieve similar final results quicker and easier. Much less exertion would be needed, on the other hand, according to Mannerheim, to arm and train some of the dissatisfied local elements in Gansu province—primarily the Dungans. The Japanese, he noted, would not be squeamish about using such means, any more than the French in Indo-China.84

A similar interest in the loyalties of the local populations in the Chinese western provinces was part of the motivation behind the trip of R. A. Syrtlanov in the year following Mannerheim’s expedition. Ravil’ Shakh-Aidarovich Syrtlanov was the senior adjutant on the staff of the Turkestan military district at this time, and was therefore charged with intelligence-collection in neighbouring countries.85 Officially undertaken as a supplement to the work of the recently deceased B. V. Dolbezhev, an outstanding student of the Eastern Faculty of St. Petersburg university and an expert on the Mongolian language, Syrtlanov’s 1909 study considered the loyalties of two prominent tribal border groupings, the Mongols and the Kirghiz.86

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85 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2.) p.502.
A crucial role in these later intelligence expeditions was also of course the monitoring of Japanese penetration into China. One cannot analyze the Russian staff's assessment of China after 1904 without taking into account the impact and consequences of the Russo-Japanese War, a war which had caught Russia's intelligence community apparently crucially under-prepared.

Underestimation of Japan was to prove one of the most significant intelligence failures of the General Staff, with costly military and political consequences. However, as the cause and course of the war is traditionally blamed on the influence of a court clique—that group led by Bezobrazov—the culpability of the military has rarely been independently examined.\(^{87}\) It is therefore perhaps worthwhile to review how this intelligence failure came about, particularly as this underestimation is traditionally attributed purely to racism on the Russians' part. The overall failure of Russian intelligence towards Japan is the more striking since war with Japan by 1904-1905 was far from unexpected. It is true that initially the Japanese armed forces had not been regarded as a significant threat. Until 1875 in fact, as George Lensen has shown, harmony and warmth characterized Russo-Japanese relations.\(^{88}\) Typical were the lectures of Veniukov to the Staff Academy in 1871 which, whilst they noted the pace of Japanese military modernization since 1868, went on to consider the threat other countries posed to Japan rather than any threat Japan might pose them.\(^{89}\) In part also the Russian General Staff, in common with many other European powers before 1894, simply considered China a more significant regional power. Thus a special edition of the General Staff's Sbornik...po Azii from the early 1880s on the armed forces of China and Japan devoted 169 pages to the former and only 16 pages to the latter.\(^{90}\) However, Japan was kept under close observation following the Triple Intervention of 1895, and a special committee of the Naval Ministry in that year actually noted that Japan's accelerated shipbuilding programme, designed to outpace the completion of the Trans-Siberian

\(^{87}\) For a concise summary of the competing Russian state concerns in the Far East in this period, see: McDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914* pp. 9-75.


\(^{89}\) M. I. Veniukov, 'O sovremennom sostoiании voennykh' sil' i sredstv' Iaponii i Kseatia po dannym' 1869-1870 godov,' VSS 8 (1871) pp.239-243. Veniukov concluded that only Britain, as a major naval power in the region, could threaten Japan.

\(^{90}\) David H. Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, 'Russian Military Intelligence on the Manchurian Front, 1904-05' *Intelligence and National Security* XI (1, 1996) p.25.
railroad, made conflict in the period 1903-1906 a real possibility. The Triple Intervention itself involved a significant degree of strategic work on the part of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff, Russia being the power able to most directly threaten the Japanese forces deployed in Manchuria. Thus 1895-96 saw the first development of a strategic warplan for conflict with Japan, the mobilization to a wartime footing of the Priamur military district, the despatch of reinforcements from European Russia, and the upgrading of Vladivostok from a grade three to a grade two military fortification. In the wake of demobilization following the end of the immediate war scare it was resolved to increase the military forces permanently stationed in all of the Siberian military districts. General Staff Lt.-Colonel Strel'bitskii conducted a reconnaissance of the route between Hailar and Tsitsikar in late 1894, a route which, although the probable operational line of the Trans-Baikal and West Siberian military forces in the event of hostilities, the Asiatic Department noted had until then been completely unstudied. Captain Manakin meanwhile, a future head of the Asiatic Department, conducted a reconnaissance between Mergen and the Russian border town of Blagoveshchensk two years later. At the same time the reports of Colonel K. I. Vogak, the Russian military agent in the Far East during the immediate prelude and course of the Sino-Japanese conflict, conveyed almost with awe the level of efficiency and training visible within the Japanese armed forces. Noting that during the course of one attack on a Chinese redoubt a Japanese brigade caught in a crossfire continued on to its allotted position despite losses in the leading companies of 100% of its officers and 75% of its lower ranks, Vogak concluded that this army now easily compared with that of any European force and undoubtedly formed the strongest military body in the Far East. Its sole remaining weakness lay in the capabilities of its higher commanders, former samurai not fully trained in modern military thought, and this defect would be eradicated over time by the natural processes of retirement and the promotion of younger officers.

Colonel Putiata meanwhile, by now serving as a desk-head with the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, took the opportunity of the clear turning-point of 1895 to write a detailed report on proposed policies to secure Russia's future position in the Far East. As the base of this programme he took it as axiomatic that:

91 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 1.) pp. 77-78.
the probable consequence of the presently proceeding events will
be a still greater development of the armed forces in the neighbouring
with us Asiatic states. 94

China, he noted, had spent the last thirty years buying new arms, hiring European military instructors,
building new fortresses and constructing arsenals. This policy however, due to the arbitrariness of its
execution in the provinces, had failed to create either a modern army or a real fleet, and China had 'been in
need of a lesson to convince it of its mistakes.' Consequently, he continued:

If China is now conscious that it lies upon it to fundamentally
alter its military system... then through its material means it
will become a more threatening neighbour than it was up until
the present time.

Japan meanwhile had, he believed, been left unsatisfied by its war with China, a war in which there was no
military glory, and '...it is natural to expect that later on there will arise the need [for it] to find new laurels
in a war with a more suitable opponent, in another nearby theatre of military action, such as is presented by
our Pacific coast.' 95

In consequence Putiata urged a whole series of measures to improve Russia's position in the Far
East, including encouraging the activities of missionaries, increasing the number of posts occupied by
Russians in the Chinese customs service, and creating separate military agents for China and Japan. This
latter suggestion was carried out the following year, when Colonel Vogak, military agent for China and
Japan since 1893, became responsible for military intelligence in China alone and Colonel N. I. Ianzhul
was appointed the first independent military agent in Japan. Putiata appears to have underestimated the
difficulties of intelligence collection in Japan however, writing that since Japan had a well-developed
communication system and an open press, intelligence collection there could be assigned to one man
'without special harm to the affair.' Intelligence collection in China he saw as altogether more difficult due
to poor communications, traditional Chinese secretiveness, and the extreme poverty of published
information, and for this country he argued that having military agents in place in at least three distinct

93 Russko-Japonskaia Voina 1904-1905gg. Rabota Voenno-Istoricheskii Komissii po opisaniiu Russko-
regions would be a necessity in the near future. At the same time as Putiata wrote his report, General Obruchev expressed his own views as a traditionalist ‘Western’ on the implications of the Sino-Japanese War. Acknowledging the strategic advantage that could be gained in the annexation to Russia of northern Manchuria, thereby shortening the land frontier from 3, 185 to around 1, 400-1, 600 versts, Obruchev deprecated achieving this goal through conflict, particularly with Japan. Russia had sufficient enemies in Europe and Central Asia, he wrote, without creating a new foe in an opponent with a 40-million strong population, a powerful fleet, and a well organized army. By implication therefore, Russia’s strategic priorities should remain concentrated upon the security of the Western frontier. However, although his estimation of the difficulties that would be presented in fighting a war with Japan proved prescient, Obruchev’s remarks also displayed a distinct lack of understanding regarding what the local Chinese or Japanese response would be to even such ‘peaceful’ annexations as he proposed. This indicated a certain degree of ignorance in regard to the true diplomatic situation in the Far East. Obruchev’s proposals for a Russo-Japanese rapprochement were rejected and Russian foreign policy in 1895 followed the line of intervention advocated by Finance Minister Sergei Vitte and supported by War Minister Vannovskii.

Despite Obruchev’s personal orientation, a growing sense of the Japanese menace in this area came to impinge in almost every regard upon the strategic issue with China. Russia’s military agents in China, more effective in intelligence terms than their counterparts in Japan, reported after 1898 a continuous stream of Sino-Japanese military exchanges as Japan sought to become the sole foreign mentor of Chinese military reform. This process, interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion, continued and even increased after that event, Japanese arms proving cheaper than their European competitors. Most troubling to the Russian General Staff were Colonel Vogak’s reports that, despite Chinese official denials, Japanese military instructors and spies were now also operating in the northern regions of China, Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. The Russian navy’s strategic ‘game’ of 1903 was specifically based on the possibility of a war between Russia and Japan, and even included, in an eerie premonition, the premise of conflict.

95 Ibid., dl.11.
96 Ibid., dl.13-13ob. This change regarding the number of military agents in China was shortly to be carried out, again indicating Putiata’s level of influence in such matters.
97 Ibid., dl.4ob-8. Paine, Imperial Rivals p.183.
erupting without an official declaration of war. Nonetheless, reorganizations in the intelligence service, disagreements over proposed war plans, and deficiencies in the very process of intelligence gathering itself served to hinder the Russian Staff on the eve of war with Japan. A reorganization of the General Staff in 1903, as previously noted, assigned intelligence collection in foreign countries to the VIIth Section of the Second Quartermaster Directorate, leaving the Asiatic Department with jurisdiction over the purely Russian territories (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia). In addition, in 1903 Bezobrazov persuaded the Tsar to form a special Viceroyship of the Far East under Admiral Alekseev. The Viceroy’s special conference (soveshchanie) then took charge of Russian military preparations in the Far East, reducing War Minister Kuropatkin and the Russian Main Staff to an advisory capacity. In particular, this meant that the reports of Russian military agents in the Far East were now sent directly to the Viceroy. This divided authority was to continue to have a deleterious effect during much of the course of the subsequent conflict.

The Russian military agent in Tokyo from 1903 onwards, Colonel V. K. Samoilov, after an uncertain start, actually provided sound, accurate reports on the Japanese military buildup, largely through collaborating with other foreign intelligence agents in that country. This cooperation continued during the course of the war itself, one of the most able agents of the Tsarist intelligence service being the French journalist Bale, an individual fluent in Japanese. In the naval sphere the Russian naval agent in the Far East since 1900, Lieutenant A. I. Rusin, likewise held the military capacity of the Japanese battlefleet in a far higher regard than many of his contemporaries. One of the few to assess Japanese intentions correctly, Rusin’s reports served at least to convince Admiral Alekseev, the new Viceroy in the Far East, of the inevitability of war with Japan.¹⁰⁰ For the Russian army however, Samoilov marked a late breakthrough in intelligence about Japan, the General Staff having been persistently dissatisfied by the quantity and quality of information provided by his immediate predecessor G. M. Vannovskii, a relation of the former War Minister, who served as military agent in Tokyo between 1898 and 1902.¹⁰¹ Vannovskii’s own immediate predecessor, Ianzhul, attributed much of this comparative failure by Russia’s military agents in Japan to the

¹⁰⁰ Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy V.1, pp.212-13 and Gushkov & Sharavin, Na karte General’nogo Shtaba-Man’chzhuriia p.57.
lack of reliable interpreters. Russian military agents were not trained in Japanese, and local interpreters were unreliable, compelling the military agent either to dispatch indiscriminately any secret documents that fell into his hands on the long journey to St. Petersburg to be translated, or to abstain from attempting to gather such documents altogether.

Perhaps even more serious however in terms of the formation of Russia’s strategic view of Japan between 1895 and 1904 was the marked change in Vannovskii’s own views toward the Japanese army compared with those of his predecessors. Vogak’s successor to the post in 1896, Colonel Ianzhul, whilst somewhat critical of the Japanese army’s high command, cavalry and artillery, nevertheless still felt that in training, equipment and mobility this army could compare favourably with that of any European power. One of Vannovskii’s first reports however, written whilst he was still in St. Petersburg, marked a dramatic turnaround from these previous assessments. This report claimed that it would be decades, perhaps centuries, before the Japanese army acquired the moral foundation to compete on an equal footing militarily with ‘even the weakest’ of the European powers. Apparently unconscious of the parallel that could be made with Russia, he noted that the army would only reach even this low stage if the Japanese nation as a whole were able to endure ‘the internal disorder that proceeds from too rapid an influx of ideas foreign to its historical and cultural existence.’ This report met high level approval, War Minister Kuropatkin noting with satisfaction in the margin:

I read this. The enthusiasm of our former military agents towards the Japanese army is ended. This view is sober.102

Vannovskii’s views towards the Japanese army grew if anything even more critical as he gained greater opportunities to observe it in action. His assessment of the 1901 military manoeuvres in Japan, taken together with data on the performance of the Japanese in China in 1900, concluded by remarking that the infantry were poorly trained tactically and physically weak, the artillery poorly commanded and almost immobile, and the cavalry ineffective in every regard. Against such an army, he wrote, a strong cavalry detachment provisioned with artillery and acting in a partisan-style action could operate with certainty of a decisive success. These views were corroborated and further elaborated in the highly critical comments of

the Chief of Staff of the 1st East Siberian corps, Major-General Ivanov, another spectator at the 1901 Japanese manoeuvres. Less critical was Captain Gorskii of the 10th East Siberian rifle regiment, also present, who observed that European observers at these manoeuvres divided generally into two groups—those who were highly critical, and those more cautious in their assessments. To the latter group appertained the German contingent; they admired in particular the level of discipline the Japanese displayed. The General Staff in St. Petersburg treated the varied assessments it received with caution. Major-General Zhilinskii, head of the Quartermaster-General section of the Main Staff, noting that Ivanov exhibited a clear prejudice against the Japanese army, was of the view that:

There is no doubt that the Japanese army in every regard is still very far from perfection and can in no way compare with the main European armies and in particular with our own. Nonetheless it would appear... desirable to be more impartial, without any bias in evaluating the military capability and training of our probable opponent.103

Over the course of the next few years however, Vannovskii as military agent continued to stress what he saw as weaknesses in the Japanese army and state, including mutinies in the fleet, widespread corruption, and the demise of a whole battalion of Japanese infantry from cold and starvation whilst on manoeuvres abroad in January 1902. This latter event, Vannovskii was convinced, demonstrated the incapability as yet of the Japanese army to mount a winter campaign in regions of north-east Asia where that season was climactically much more severe than in northern Japan. In terms of shaping strategic perspectives on Japan therefore, the period Vannovskii spent in office as military agent in Tokyo marked a critical, and in retrospect deeply harmful interlude between the respect in which that army was held by Vogak and Ianzhul and the urgent, last-minute warnings of Samoilov. Probably the most famous consequence of these shortcomings of Russian military intelligence on the ground was the erroneous pre-war Russian estimates of the size of the Japanese army. These estimates set the size of that force at some 200,000 men when its real strength closer approximated 600,000 under arms.104 The situation was further complicated by the views of the War Minister himself, A. N. Kuropatkin famously visiting the Far East on

103 Ibid., p.441.
the very eve of war in 1903.105 The Far East as a whole was not high on the agenda of Kuropatkin’s strategic priorities at this time; as he confided to Vogak during his visit to Japan:

Russia and the Imperial throne is threatened from the West, and not from the East...Wilhelm and all of Germany is glad at each new expenditure of Russia in the Far East for, weakening ourselves in the west, we also gradually lose the right of Russia to a voice in European affairs, befitting Russia as a great European, and not an Asiatic, power.106

Kuropatkin returned to report that Russia could rest secure in the safety of the Priamur district and Port Arthur, and of the 130 million roubles allotted the War Ministry in 1904-09 for fortifying the Far Eastern border, only 9 million was released for improvements in Nikolaevsk, Port Arthur, Vladivostok and Pos’et. Kuropatkin also took the opportunity of his visit to the Far East to form and deliver his own verdict on the Japanese army. Amongst the factors Kuropatkin felt contributed to the inability of this army to participate in modern war was the absence amongst their officers and soldiers of any religious feeling- ‘without religion, without faith in providence, an individual might bear the casualties and losses of the heavy test of war, but the mass will not.’ Such an evaluation only served to underline Kuropatkin’s basic scholastic ignorance regarding Japan however, since the Japanese state religion-Shinto Buddhism- was in fact an intrinsic ideological element behind Japanese militarism right up until 1945.107

Even improved efficiency at the lower-intelligence gathering levels was not sufficient therefore to shift the accretions of arrogance and lethargy that had gathered at the very highest levels of the Russian government, not least with the Tsar himself, who personally and most famously regarded the Japanese as no more than trained monkeys. The General Staff itself on the eve of war prepared a report to the Tsar based on the collected information of their agents in Japan, China and Korea, setting out in fine detail the accelerated pace of Japan’s training and mobilization over 1903. Despite the submission of this report to the Tsar approximately a month before war began, no complimentary intensified preparations took place on the Russian side. Literally a day before the outbreak of hostilities, on the 26th January/8th February 1904,

105 The flawed assumptions made by Kuropatkin on this trip later formed one of the major charges of blame levelled by Finance Minister Vitte over the mishandling and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in the messy post-war period of mutual recriminations within Tsarist governmental circles.


107 Ibid., pp.60-1.
there crossed Kuropatkin's desk in St. Petersburg for his signature a report that accurately outlined Japanese strategic intentions almost exactly as they were subsequently played out in the war itself. It predicted the campaign beginning by an attack on the Russian fleet to gain command of the sea, an invasion of southern Manchuria, and the cutting-off and rapid siege of Port Arthur. Kuropatkin signed the document but noted that it remained a series of educated suppositions, not backed by covertly-obtained documentary evidence. Thus, even this did not inspire the Russian General Staff to order the majority of its forces in the Far East into a state of war readiness, nor to set about more general mobilization measures.108 Grulev, a General Staff officer who participated in many scientific expeditions in the Far East in this period, helping select the site for the Russian town of Kharbin in 1895, later complained in his memoirs that officers who had visited Japan and strove to warn of the Japanese military build-up, like Samoilov and Agapeev, were reprimanded for 'timidity before the enemy.' Grulev himself suffered similar reprimands from his superiors on the eve of war for attempting to give, as he saw it, a more realistic picture of Japan's military strength.109

An overall survey therefore suggests that, despite the chaos caused by last minute reorganizations of administrative structure and previous weaknesses, the relevant sections of the Russian General Staff itself were, on the very eve of war, actually providing detailed and accurate information. However, the placing of more active and effective military agents in both Japan and Korea on the eve of war was no substitute for the absence of a broad, well-organized agent network in these countries. Moreover, the Russian intelligence system then broke down rapidly upon the actual onset of hostilities in the theatre of war itself, emphasizing the fragility of what had been created. Intelligence reports initially only reached the army staff through the staff of the Far Eastern Viceroy. The secret agents deployed by the intelligence chief of the Manchurian army staff to Japan and Korea had to dispatch their reports by a roundabout route through Europe. The officer assigned organization of the Manchurian army's long-range intelligence, Major-General V. A. Kosagovskii, had such fractious relations with the Quartermaster-General, Major-General V. I. Kharkevich, that he later confided to his diary that by the end he felt like strangling the latter.

As a result of these and other factors, delay, administrative discord, general disorganization, and an overall

108 Alekseev, Voennnaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 1.) pp.164-5.
failure at the tactical level characterized Russian military intelligence throughout the war.110 Battlefield
defeats exacerbated these difficulties. After the battle of Mukden, during the Russian retreat, the Japanese
captured Russian field staff documents that compromised several agents of Russian intelligence working in
Japan and Korea. In addition, after that battle, the recruitment of Chinese agents by the Russian field
intelligence sections, always difficult and unsatisfactory before, became practically impossible, not least
due to the severe punishments the Japanese always inflicted on any Chinese caught in the act of espionage.
The Russian army’s gradual retreat into northern Manchuria also placed it in the difficult position of falling
back into territory for which it lacked adequate maps, largely as a consequence of the official rejection that
had met Colonel Polianovskii’s proposal in 1900. In the immediate pre-war period the smallest scale maps
suitable for tactical actions covered the Liaotung peninsula and part of southern Manchuria. This was a
situation the War Ministry considered perfectly appropriate given that their 1903 war plan envisaged
playing for time whilst concentrating forces along the southern end of the Chinese Eastern Railroad before
moving to a counter-attack and, ultimately, invading Japan itself. No fall back to positions further north had
been envisaged. In the meantime, money allotted for increasing the number of maps and distributing
topographical materials to the troops had only been assigned three months before the very outbreak of
hostilities. The dispatch of maps to the troops was frequently dilatory, whilst materials already at the
disposal of the General Staff were underdeveloped and often published too late to be useful. In 1903 the
head of the Corps of Military Topographers, Lt.-General N. D. Artamonov, generalizing from his own and
other topographers experiences in the Russo-Turkish war twenty-five years earlier, had recommended the
creation of a full topographical section to accompany the field staff of the active army. On the outbreak of
hostilities Kuropatkin had ignored such advice, relying instead only a ludicrously inadequate number of
topographers attached to his own army staff and those of each individual corps.111 As a consequence the
despacht of trained staff officers who could have fulfilled more vital tasks on the military front into the
countryside instead, to draw up maps of the surrounding area, formed a recurring theme in many officers’
postwar memoirs, fostering the later myth that the Russian War Ministry had entirely neglected to study the

110 I. V. Derevianko, ‘Russkaia razvedka i kontrrazvedka v voine 1904-1905gg’ in: Tainy Russko-Iaponskoi
Far Eastern theatre of military operations in the pre-war period. In actual fact of course, as should be already evident from the foregoing, the General Staff's greatest problem was the rational organization and effective utilization of materials and information that were already in principle at its disposal. Perhaps most devastating and unexpected of all however was the effectiveness of Japan's own intelligence service, which spread its net to Europe, funding the leaders of the Polish, Finnish and Russian revolutionary movements. The Japanese devoted no less than 1 million yen (35 million of today's dollars) to this cause. At the general level, the Japanese outspent the Russians in the area of intelligence acquisition. Before the war, the Russian Main Staff assigned 56, 000 roubles annually to intelligence work, to be distributed amongst district staffs, each district receiving between 4-12, 000 roubles. The only exception to this financial pattern was, as we shall see in the next section, the Caucasus. The Japanese, by contrast, on the run-up to war, devoted (in Russian terms) around 12 million roubles gold to the cause of intelligence. As a result the superiority of the Japanese intelligence service throughout the conflict contributed significantly to Japan's final victory. Thereafter, in logical consequence, the improvement of its intelligence-gathering capabilities in Asia became one of the major tasks facing the Russian General Staff in its post-war reforms.

Nowhere was the psychological impact of the Russo-Japanese War more evident subsequently than in the writings of Kuropatkin, the former Russian commander-in-chief in that war. In the massive strategic review undertaken on his taking up the post of War Minister in 1898, Kuropatkin had originally adjudged Russia's frontiers for the twentieth century to be generally satisfactory. In this he had for example rejected the opinions of other Russian Asiatic experts, L. N. Sobolev amongst them, that the Hindu Kush would form a more natural border than the Amu-Darya to Central Asia. His general model for potential future conflict followed that of his former chief, N. N. Obruchev, envisaging defensive wars in the West.

112 On these 'blanks on the map' in wartime, see for example: Polovtsoff, [Polovtsov] Glory and Downfall. Reminiscences of a Russian General Staff Officer pp.66-7.
115 A. N. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War pp.64-5. However, Kuropatkin's account of his generally pacific attitude towards Russia's Asiatic borders is flatly contradicted by the deeply biased memoirs of Count Vitte, who claimed not without foundation that at the time of the Boxer Rebellion
and Far East whilst retaining a limited offensive capacity in Central Asia. Such a viewpoint led him to support the Foreign Minister, M. N. Murav'ev, in a policy of passivity rather than of territorial aggrandizement at the turn of the century when the possibility was raised of taking advantage of Britain's entanglement in the Boer War. By 1910 however Kuropatkin had come to foresee a century in which the subjugated Asiatic races would rise up against their European masters. A review of the European experience in other parts of Asia and Africa - the Anglo-Boer war, the triumph of the Abyssinians over the Italians - convinced Kuropatkin that Asiatics would increasingly challenge their masters, using the 'armed fruits' of European culture against them, in the coming century. This would assume particular importance since in the twentieth century the value of Asiatic markets would increase - external trade from China alone in the past fifty years had risen more than ten times, to say nothing of the consumer power of the Chinese population. As a result of what Kuropatkin saw as the growing threat of costly Asiatic insurrection, the Central Asian situation had already grown more complicated:

Now, instead of the five or six battalions with which we conquered the country, we have two whole army corps in Turkestan.

The danger of such insurrection meant that the Turkestan forces should pursue their traditional strategic policy -

the best means of action will be, as in the past, an attack against those preparing to invade, in order to smash them before they enter our territory.

Kuropatkin had used his influence during his term as War Minister to push forward strategic improvements in Russia's Asiatic military districts, such as construction of the Orenburg to Tashkent rail line, a link he saw as a strategic necessity. These facts indicate a desire on Kuropatkin's part even before the Japanese debacle to more seriously consider Russia's Asiatic frontiers, an area in which this former

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Kuropatkin wanted to seize Manchuria and create 'a second Bukhara.' Clubb, China and Russia. The "Great Game" pp.125-8.

116 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.117.

117 A. Popov & M. Pokrovskii, (eds.) "Tsarskaia diplomatiia o zadachakh Rossii na Vostok v 1900g." KA 5 (18,1926) pp. 4-25.

118 Kuropatkin, Zadachi. Tom.III p.253

119 Ibid., p.253

120 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War p.87

121 Kuropatkin, Zadachi Tom.II p.144
head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department had never lost interest even whilst serving under the European-orientated Obruchev. Indeed, Obruchev’s most recent biographer has written that:

For Obruchev, Turkestan and China did not signify anything, and for people like Kuropatkin—everything. 122

Indeed, in the eyes of some officers, Kuropatkin’s greatest weakness was that he never ceased to be a ‘Turkestanets’ in terms of both clan allegiance and, in their view, mental development. 123 It was perhaps for these underlying psychological reasons (sensing how others perceived him) that in the run-up to the Russo-Japanese War Kuropatkin had in effect acted as a ‘Westerner’, arguing that the Eastern frontier was a distinct second priority compared to the menace of Germany.

Kuropatkin by 1910 however foresaw a new century in which European world hegemony would be increasingly challenged— he predicted for instance that Japan and America would between themselves divide up the Pacific, closing out Europe from the enormous commercial market on both shores. 124 A particularly large threat in this regard was what Kuropatkin defined as the ‘yellow peril’, a fear greatly inspired of course by the Russo-Japanese War, and which had not played so great a role in the thinking behind his original review of 1898-1900. 125 China and Japan, Kuropatkin now warned, could each field armies of several millions, with the Chinese army now going through a period of considerable military reform via German instructors; Chinese children practised European military evolutions on the streets and the motto ‘China for the Chinese’ was on everybody’s lips. 126 In this oncoming conflict the role of the Muslim in his eyes was ambiguous (zagadochno); were the ‘yellow races’ to win the first battles he might well side with them, resulting in two enemies to every one European. 127 To meet this threat in the coming century, Kuropatkin in 1910 was urging the creation of a European union, enabling Russia to redirect forces from its western frontiers. A particular pet project was unification of English and Russian railway lines in Central Asia, an issue that dated back in Russian thought to the 1870s. By 1910 however, this

122 Airapetov, Zabytaia kar’era “Russkogo Mol’tke” p.270.
123 Van Dyke, Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 p.137
124 Kuropatkin, Zadachi. Tom.III p.254
125 For this turnaround in the thought of Kuropatkin and others, from ‘Westerners’ to ‘Easterners’, see Fuller, Strategy and Power p.424. The reader will note however in the foregoing some ambiguity expressed as to whether the issue was ever so black-and-white insofar as Kuropatkin was concerned.
127 Ibid., p.255.
would be 'a union of two peoples of the white race against the encroaching danger from the oncoming awakening of the yellow races.'128

In the area Kuropatkin had studied as a young officer, Kashgaria, he reckoned only the local Dungans might now provide assistance to Russia in the event of a conflict, the other local races in the contested border area- Kirghiz, Taranchi (Uigurs), and Kashgartsy- having effectively been subordinated by the Chinese. He particularly feared the political influence of Chinese-Kirghiz on Russia's own Kirghiz in the event of an invasion through the Dzhungarian Gate.129 Kuropatkin felt that to meet this threat Russia had to revitalize and utilize its own immense natural and spiritual resources; a policy best summed up by the motto Kuropatkin proposed for the twentieth century, which headed all three volumes of his main literary work of the period: 'Russia for the Russians' (Rossiia dlia russkikh).130 The estimates of the famous scientist Mendeleev on Russian population growth in the twentieth century gave Kuropatkin some hope that Russia could eventually secure its Far Eastern possessions through colonization.131 In the meantime however, not sharing Przheval'ski's high estimate of the Mongol character, he recommended in 1913 a realignment of the Russo-Chinese border to recreate a barren strip of influence between the two empires on the 'natural' border of the Gobi Desert.132

This emphasis in Kuropatkin's writing after 1905 on the new threat from the East was to a certain extent reflected in the more general military literature of the day.133 The Voennyi Sbornik for 1911 contained 8 articles on the armed forces of China and Japan, not counting traveller's accounts and reminiscences. To take a representative cross-section from the period before the Russo-Japanese War in the same category, the Voennyi Sbornik for 1902, 1897, and 1891 had no such articles, and the same journal for 1886 just one.

Kuropatkin's reconsideration of the 'Kuld'zha Question' in the first decades of the twentieth century also reflected contemporary military developments, most particularly renewed Sino-Russian

128 Kuropatkin, Zadachi.. Tom.II p.147
130 The phrase was taken from Alexander III.
132 Kuropatkin, Russko-Kitaiskii Vopros' pp.174-84.
133 For a review of the more paranoid views regarding the safety of the Far East expressed in the Russian press of the period, see: E. J. Harrison, Peace or War East of Baikal? (Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh Ltd. 1910) pp.212-47. Harrison himself believed these fears to be exaggerated.
tension over Chinese attempts to re-negotiate the St.Petersburg agreement of 1881.¹³⁴ In 1911 during 'manoeuvres' Russian troops again crossed into Sinkiang and in 1912 again moved into the Kuld'zha area, though the Foreign Minister overruled proposals to reoccupy the whole Ili District. Military planning for full-scale operations in Western China was marred by disagreements between GUGSh and the Omsk and Turkestan district staffs, but amongst the most ardent advocates of a forward movement at this time was the Turkestan Governor-General Samsonov. Samsonov warned that while Ili remained in the hands of the Chinese, they possessed an 'open door' for action against the Russian town of Vernyi. A Russian occupation of the district on the other hand would be an advance to a 'natural frontier line' and would push the Chinese concentration area back on Urumchi, from where Chinese forces would have to operate across a broad strip of desert.¹³⁵ Thus, just a few years before the outbreak of the First World War, the strategic debates first raised during the 'Ili Crisis' some decades earlier were suddenly reignited.

Another direct outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, meanwhile, was a renewed interest by the General Staff in Mongolia, culminating in Outer Mongolia becoming a Russian protectorate in 1911-12.¹³⁶ In the aftermath of the battle of Mukden, rumours had reached the Russians of a Japanese turning movement through Mongolia allegedly involving 20,000 men with artillery. The Russian staff then discovered that it lacked the topographical and statistical data necessary to judge whether such a flanking movement was possible, or even likely. This in itself was an indirect comment on the level of organization of the Russian field staff in that war, since Staff officers like Pevtsov, Przheval'skii and others had reported extensively on Mongolia in the past. Consequently a series of expeditions were despatched in 1905 throughout the country led by Staff-Captain Guberskii, Staff-Captain Rossov, and the commercial agent of the Manchurian army, Mr. Gromov. These expeditions reported that there were no Japanese forces in the country other than a group of Japanese officers allegedly directing a band of hunhoses. They also made reports on various routes, concluding that Mongolia was too barren for the movement of so large a


¹³⁶ On this issue, see for example: Alpo Juntunen, 'The influence of railway construction in Mongolia: the shift from Chinese to Russian/Soviet protection' JTH 12 (2, 1991) p.175. I am most grateful to Dr.
detachment as had been reported, and established diplomatic relations with Mongolian tribal leaders.\textsuperscript{137}

These trips and one by Life-Guard Hussar Lieutenant Kushelev in 1911 laid the strategic groundwork for the later Mongolian-Russian \textit{rapprochement}.\textsuperscript{138} Kushelev’s work in particular was later openly printed and circulated, ensuring it a wider readership than that traditionally associated with the General Staff’s \textit{Sbornik..po Azii}.\textsuperscript{139} One significant aspect of these officers’ later activities was the manner in which they ‘re-envisioned’ Mongolia in geographical terms in order to make political engagement in this country seem a pressing necessity. This was a familiar pattern, repeating in reverse the manner in which the Amur had earlier been ‘envisaged’ by Russian governmental personnel in the first half of the century. That river had at first been seen as a ‘Russian Mississippi’ and was then later downgraded as geographical reality intervened upon illusion. Clearly if the Russian General Staff were now interested in Mongolia, it could not be perceived as the strategic wasteland pictured earlier by Putiata. Kushelev did most amongst military officers in altering the popular perception of Mongolia, writing that Mongolia had been considered a buffer state in view of its large expanses of ‘shifting sands, wild mountains, [being] deprived of irrigation, communication routes and means of subsistence…and being generally completely unsuitable for settlement by a cultured […] population, and equally not fit as a theatre of military action…’ This perception, Kushelev attempted to persuade his military and governmental readers, had now been proven wrong—‘for the past few years there has been emerging completely different information.’ The Chinese were advancing in a ‘great wave’ to colonize the country, revealing the whole territory of Mongolia to be not unfertile but, ‘on the contrary [agriculturally] rich’, facilitating the approach of a ‘yellow peril’ towards the Russian border.\textsuperscript{140}

Furthermore the whole country was naturally passable for the movement of large bodies of troops, particularly cavalry and mechanized transport. This was particularly important in view of the strategic

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\textsuperscript{135} Juntunen for his help and hospitality during my stay in Helsinki. For details on Tsarist policy regarding Mongolia, see: A. L. Popov, ‘Tsarskaia Rossiia i Mongoliia v 1913-1914gg.’ \textit{KA} 37 (1929) pp.3-68.


\textsuperscript{139} Ju. Kushelev, \textit{Mongoliia i Mongol’skii vopros} (St.Petersburg: Russkaia Skoropechatnia 1912) On the problems associated with the labeling of reports in the \textit{Sbornik..po Azii ‘secret’}, see contemporary complaints in, for example: RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4273 dl.10. These complaints are confirmed by my own experience of handling copies of the \textit{Sbornik} in Helsinki, where very often whole sections in preserved editions were found with their pages uncut—exciting for a researcher, but troubling for a General Staff seeking to expand its membership’s knowledge of Asia!

\textsuperscript{140} Kushelev, ‘Otchet o poezdke s voenno-nauchnoiu tsel’iu v Mongoliu’ pp.287-88.
consideration pointed out by both Kushelev and (separately) by General Staff Colonel V. F. Novitskii in a survey of Eastern Mongolia conducted in 1906—namely, that with the loss of a Russian presence in southern Manchuria, the shortest possible route from the Russian border to Peking now ran through Mongolia. In response to all these considerations, Kushelev urged a forward movement in Mongolia and the Ili district by Russia. This scheme included the construction of a strategic railroad linking Trans-Baikal to Kiakhta, Urga, and eventually Kalgan, together with exploitation of the cotton market in Ili in order ‘to be saved from the cotton yoke of America’, and making use of the ‘indisputably rich’ mineral reserves in the mountains of the area—‘everywhere there are signs of gold’. Kushelev’s own fantasies aside, Russian actions in general were also guided by an awareness of Japanese competition in the same region. Mongol petitioners for Russian aid explicitly threatened to turn to the Japanese for arms in the event of a Russian refusal. In early 1907 the Russian government learnt via their leading sinologist, Dmitri Pozdneev, of the formation in Tokyo of a new society seeking to increase the influence of Japanese Buddhism amongst the Mongol Lamaist branch of that faith. Russian intelligence feared the spread of the new ‘Pan-Asian’ propaganda in the region, permeating Mongolia and percolating through the border to influence Russia’s own Buriat subjects in the Trans-Baikal region. Such fears were fortified by military intelligence reports in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of Japanese agents in Outer Mongolia who were particularly intensive in studying routes leading to Trans-Baikal. By 1913, in response to such pressures, the Russians had trained a Mongolian Brigade equipped with rifles and machine guns and commanded by a Russian officer appointed by the War Ministry. In a pact with Russia, China recognized the ‘autonomy’ of Outer Mongolia shortly thereafter.

The Russo-Japanese War instituted a series of strategic reforms within the Russian state that also generally came to reflect Kuropatkin’s publicly expressed fears and a policy of strategic retrenchment in the East. One consequence of the war, a result of a desire to improve intelligence operations in future, was the creation of permanent intelligence staffs within the local military districts in 1906. In 1908 and 1910, for the more successful coordination of central and local intelligence organs, conferences were held

142 Kushelev, ‘Otech ot poezdkie s voenno-nauchnoiu tsel’iu v Mongoliiu’ pp.299-300. 
bringing together the senior adjutants of the intelligence organs of the military districts. The 1908 conference, held in Kiev, involved the intelligence staffs of those districts whose concerns encompassed the Western frontier, whilst the 1910 conference brought together those staffs directly concerned with intelligence operations in the East. Heading this latter conference was General Staff Colonel Oskar Karlovich Enkel’, head of the 5th (Far Eastern) operational desk of the 3rd Quartermaster-General section (Asiatic fronts) of GUGSh, the organization which sent him to the Far East at the start of 1910. Enkel’ returned with a bulky report regarding the intelligence operations of the military district staffs, military agents and secret agents in the region, with accompanying recommendations for future improvements.144 That same year the Governor-General of the Priamur military district, Unterberger, was granted expanded legal powers in the field of counter-espionage.145

A further result of the Russo-Japanese War was increased expenditure upon intelligence operations by the General Staff generally. In 1906-1909 the General Staff received annually for ‘secret’ (intelligence) expenditures 344, 140 roubles, compared to the pre-war figure of 56, 920 roubles. In 1909 a State Duma-voted supplement increased this expenditure to around half a million roubles, and in 1910 the War Ministry managed to obtain a further increase again that brought the figure on intelligence expenditure to 1, 947, 850 roubles. A final financial boost in 1914 to the western military districts in particular meant that state expenditure on military intelligence between the start of the century and the First World War rose by 2000%. Most striking across the whole period however was the manner in which these increased sums continued until 1914 to be inadequate.146 The Far East did benefit however from application of these increased sums, to the extent of there being some divergence from Russia’s traditional strategic interests. As late as 1913, out of the total intelligence budget, 311, 600 roubles were devoted to intelligence operations in the East, compared to 203, 600 roubles in the West.147

A 1909 report by GUGSh highlighted the need to direct all efforts towards raising the ‘till now very scanty’ level of knowledge regarding Japan as a potential opponent and about the Far Eastern theatre of war generally. The main means towards fulfilling these goals the Russian General Staff saw as the

144 Shelukhin, ‘Razvedyvatel’nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914 gg.)’ p.19; Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2.) p.140.
145 Harrison, Peace or War East of Baikal? pp.242-3.
creation of an efficient agent network, the most notable oversight in Russian pre-war military policy in the region. The Russian military agent in Tokyo, Colonel Samoilov, on returning to his post in 1906, reported almost immediately that intelligence collection directly under the eyes of the Japanese authorities remained as difficult as ever, and for this reason he advocated in 1908 the establishment of a bureau outside the country for directing intelligence. At the end of 1909 the Main Directorate of the General Staff concurred with this suggestion, and in 1911 laid upon the shoulders of the assistant military agent in Shanghai, Lt.-Col. Colonel Nikolaev, the task of organizing an agent network- No. 31- which conducted intelligence in Japan. This network remained in existence at considerable expense (35,000 roubles annually) until 1914, when the General Staff finally transferred the greater burden of its intelligence-gathering activities to the European frontier.\(^{148}\)

The General Staff undertook on an equally ambitious scale the preparation of material on the potential future theatre of military operations. Up until this time the largest single source of information on the Far East in Russian was the two volume work on Manchuria of the distinguished Russian sinologist Dmitri Pozdneev (Putiat'a's sharp critic). This major work was prepared in the 1890s on the explicit instructions and with the backing of the Finance Minister, Sergei Vitte. At that time the Russian War Ministry lacked any statistical compilation on the region that was remotely comparable in scale.\(^{149}\) This enterprise demonstrated explicitly both the predominant influence in that period of the Finance Ministry in the Far East, and also the williness of Vitte in poaching experts to serve his own cause. In the same period, Vitte had also lured away from the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry to serve under his own wing as an agent of the Russo-Chinese bank the Russian diplomat D. D. Pokotilov. The Foreign Ministry's loss was Vitte's gain, as Kalmykov, a diplomat serving in the department in that period, characterized Pokotilov and P. M. Lessar as the only two officials of the MID's Asiatic Department 'who knew and understood the East.'\(^{150}\) The immediate prelude to the Russo-Japanese War had marked the passing of the Vitte period of patronage in Far Eastern affairs however, and in its aftermath the need for the Russian General Staff to have its own independent body of knowledge and statistical data on the region became obvious. An attempt

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\(^{147}\) Alekseev, *Voennaia Razvedka Rossii* (Kniga 2.) p.41.
\(^{148}\) Ibid., pp.109-27.
to answer this need was thereafter expressed in the production of nine very large volumes of statistics
entitled simply 'The Far East', and produced through the Main Directorate of the General Staff in 1911.151

The Russo-Japanese war had inflicted enormous material losses in terms of transports, guns and
other equipment upon the Russian army, losses disproportionate to the actual number of troops engaged.
Internal insurrection had further undermined the morale of the army. Consequently only in 1910 did the
Russian General Staff again feel capable of formulating a complete war plan and mobilization schedule
based upon planned and existing technical capacity.152 This plan was the first in Russian imperial history
that developed full mobilization schedules for combat on the entire Eurasian continent, again reflecting the
General Staff's new sense of vulnerability in Asia. The 1910 war plan developed mobilization schedules
that in various scenarios envisioned the dispatch of significant forces from European Russia to the Asiatic
frontier. It made provision for war against China, Japan, China and Japan in alliance, war in the Caucasus,
and war in Turkestan, whilst at the same time continuing to provision for the traditional European threat.153
This schedule marked a complete break from the General Staff's war plans of the past, where the European
theatre (Poland) had traditionally been subject to the most detailed mobilization planning and the Asiatic
theatres, if considered at all, were allotted only contingency schedules using purely local forces.
Accustomed to analyze threats by the study of facts rather than diplomatic promises, the Russian military
were generally unplacated by the assurances of their diplomatic counterparts that the 1907 Anglo-Russian
Convention and later agreements with Japan had effectively neutralized the threat from that direction. More
pertinent from their perspective was the prospect that in any future conflict in the Far East the Japanese
would deploy an army 1.5 times bigger than that encountered in the conflict of 1904-05 (475 as opposed to
300 battalions), with those forces rearmed, re-equipped, and well-trained.154 In addition the course of
military modernization in China had now also to be considered. The survey conducted by the Main
Directorate of the General Staff in 1909 of the Chinese armed forces noted the remarkable advances in
modernization made there over the preceding five years, already visible from the Chinese manoeuvres of
1905 and 1906. New European-style formations had been adopted and moves towards a standardization of

150 Kalmykow [Kalmykov], Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat p.25.
151 Dal'nii Vostok Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nego Shtaba (9 vols.) (St.Petersburg: A.Benke 1911)
152 General Lu. N. Danilov, Rossiia v mirovoi voine 1914-1915gg. (Berlin: Knigoizdatel'stvo "Slovo" 1924)
p.32.
153 Ia. Ia. Alksnis, 'Nachal'nyi period voiny (stat'ia pervaja)' VIR 9 (5,1929) p.10
arms taken in the form of the 1888 model Mauser infantry rifle and Japanese and German field guns of 75mm calibre. This study concluded that '...this army in and of itself cannot [any longer] be ignored and the more so in joint action with the army of another strong power.' Russian war planning in 1910 would make abundantly clear whom the General Staff saw as most likely to comprise this other 'strong power.'

The effective destruction of the Russian Far Eastern fleet during the war of 1904-05 meanwhile made the building-up of Russian land forces in the Far East, to the point where they could independently conduct a prolonged defensive struggle, a strategic priority. A forward movement might best achieve security in this new situation, and late in 1910 War Minister Sukhomlinov recommended to the Council of Ministers the annexation of northern Manchuria to Russia 'on strategic grounds.' At the same time, Russian diplomatic circles for their part increasingly toyed with the prospect of a complete physical division of Manchuria between Russia and Japan, as had been provisionally arranged in a secret clause of the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907. A special session of the Council of Ministers on 19th November/2nd December 1910 under the chairmanship of P.A. Stolypin reviewed the whole Manchurian issue. Examining what was regarded as a hostile policy by China in the area of Manchuria under Russian influence- mistreatment of Russian subjects, increased Chinese colonization, and the sudden appearance of Chinese vessels on the Amur-the conference concluded that with Japanese aid the 'Manchurian question' should be resolved by annexation. Thus the higher leadership of the Tsarist state in 1910 accepted in principle the decision to annex northern Manchuria to Russia, thereby 'straightening' the line of the Sino-Russian frontier. Differences between the War and Foreign Ministries over Tsarist policy in the Far East therefore were more over means rather than ends; in agenda both departments were now essentially pursuing a 'forward policy'. Acting Foreign Minister A. A. Neratov objected to War Minister Sukhomlinov's proposal to increase the number of Russian forces guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway on the grounds that the preliminary diplomatic groundwork had yet to be laid by his department, i.e. consultation with the Japanese. At the November 1910 conference the Foreign Ministry had settled

155 Vooruzhennyia Sily Kitaia (Po dannym k 1 Ianvarya 1909 goda) Izdanie Glavnogo Upravleniia General’no go Shtaba (Po chastii 3-go Ober-Kvartirmeistera) (St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografia (v izdanii Glavnogo Shtaba) 1909) p.85.
156 Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931 p.102.
however upon the need to take a ‘firmer tone’ with China in future, and permitted the consideration, in case of need, of an actual military attack on China. Diplomatic attempts by the Russian Foreign Ministry to reach an agreement with the Japanese on the division of Manchuria over the following years were hindered of course largely by the unwillingness of either side to be the actual initiator in this process.

The possibility of redistributing Russia’s reserves from their traditional concentration points- the Vil’na, Warsaw and Kiev military districts- to a more central area, the Volga region, had first been raised by the Chief of the General Staff, General Palitsyn, in 1907. In a 1908 report Palitsyn and Major-General M. V. Alekseev, in addition to noting the traditional threats of Germany and Austro-Hungary, noted darkly the emergence in the Far East of ‘young, warlike, energetic powers, thirsting... for [future] conquests.’ The only resolution to this dilemma as they saw it was that, in future, Russia should prepare for a war on two fronts. Palitsyn’s own perspective on strategic threats to Russia during his term of office as both Chief of Staff and head of GUGSh was unconventional, at least when compared to the decades-old focus on Poland first instituted under Obruchev. In a note to Stolypin from 1908 expressing concern over the security of St. Petersburg given the changing balance of power amongst the Scandinavian states, Palitsyn also added that although the threat to Russia’s Pacific coast presented a less immediate danger to Russia’s national interests, additional fortification to Vladivostok should now take priority over fortification in the Western European theatre. As early as September 1905 Palitsyn had presented a project to the Tsar in the presence of War Minister Rediger that sought to take measures in the event of a renewed outbreak of hostilities with Japan. This project foresaw the creation of two armies, one in Trans-Baikal and one in the Priamur military district, both to be transported by railroad to Kharbin from where they would engage the Japanese in Manchuria. Rediger objected to the proposal on the grounds that it would strip the Priamur region of its defences, where the garrison of Blagoveshchensk in particular anchored the Russian centre. The plan was approved. but Rediger used his financial powers as War Minister to hinder the fulfillment of its implications, in particular the transformation of Kharbin from a civilian town into an enormous military arsenal. Nonetheless fears regarding the Far East remained. Palitsyn continued to pursue his Far Eastern

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159 Fuller, Strategy and Power pp.423-6.
160 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2.) pp.11-12.
war plan until his fall from power in 1908, and War Minister Sukhomlinov produced a report in 1909 that
differed in only minor details from Palitsyn’s and Alekseev’s 1908 analysis. In a report delivered to the
Council of Ministers in April of that year, Sukhomlinov outlined to the assembled members the military
might of Japan and declared that it would be impossible in future to concentrate the whole strength of
Russia’s military forces on the western frontiers. In the meantime, Sukhomlinov’s own visit to the Far
East persuaded him of the need to upgrade Vladivostok from a grade two to a grade one military
fortification, a reform that the Tsar himself fully approved of.

These concerns were reflected even more strongly in the work of military commanders and
statisticians on the spot. Amongst the most distinguished Russian military students of the Far East was V.
K. Arsen’ev (1872-1930), a man whose career, like that of Kozlov, was destined to span both the Tsarist
and Soviet epochs. Inspired by a love of nature and exploration in his youth by reading the works of
Przheval’skii and Pevtsov, and as a young soldier by access to the Sbornik po Azii, Arsen’ev had achieved
his life’s ambition in 1897 when he was transferred to the 8th East Siberian line battalion. From this posting
he had almost immediately embarked on a series of increasingly large scientific expeditions into the dense
forests and taiga of the Russian Far East, invariably accompanied after 1902 by his faithful native guide,
Dersu Uzala. His reports on the archaeological remains of local tribal cultures soon attracted the interest of
the local Priamur section of the IRGO, several members of which were General Staff officers, and this
organization funded his main expeditions in the period from 1901 to 1911. These expeditions provided the
material for his comprehensive military-statistical study of the Ussuri krai, published in 1912 by the
Priamur military district staff. Covering the geology, fauna, climate, lines of communication, economy,
local population and the degree of Russian colonization in the krai, this study was specifically orientated
around illustrating the dominant characteristics of the district and how they would affect any fighting in the
event of a Japanese invasion. Arsen’ev’s study survives as solid evidence of the seriousness with which
just such a prospect was regarded by the Tsarist Staff’s military-scientific arm in the aftermath of the 1904-
05 conflict, particularly in the Far East.

164 For a standard biography, see: N. K. Kabanov, V. K. Arsen’ev. Puteshestvennik i naturalist 1872-1930
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytatelei prirody 1947).
165 V. K. Arsen’ev, Kраткий военно-географический и военно-статистический очерк Уссурийского края.
1901-1911 (Khabarovsk: Tipografiia Shtaba Priamurskogo voennogo okruga 1912).
In December 1906 Arsen’ev’s foremost sponsor, the Governor-General of the Priamur military district, P. F. Unterberger, wrote to the Council of Ministers urging the military reinforcement of the Far East alongside increased civilian settlement.\footnote{Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2.) pp.14-15; Grigortsevich, Dal’nevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav v 1906-1917gg. pp.259, 110-11.} Earlier that same year, the newly-created State Defence Council had ordered the construction of bases in the Ussuri, Trans-Baikal and Siberian military districts to maintain troops concentrated there, and instructed the Chief of the General Staff to look into improving communication routes in the region, including the creation of an Amur flotilla and the building of an Amur railway. The construction of the latter soon became of overriding concern, since without it, a future Japanese attack could easily seize the Chinese Eastern Railroad and cut off Vladivostok and Khabarovsk from Russia as a whole, paving the way for a policy of conquest and annexation. War Minister Rediger supported Governor-General Unterberger on the need to construct the Amur railroad, writing to Stolypin that to delay construction by even one year would be highly dangerous and that delay from financial considerations could result in the loss of the whole Primor’e krai.\footnote{Grigortsevich, Dal’nevostochnaia politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav v 1906-1917gg p.116.} Stolypin went on to explicitly use the ‘yellow peril’ analogy to push through the necessary monetary grant for the construction of the Amur railway in the State Duma.\footnote{Wolff, To the Harbin Station p.158.} Strategic concern for Russia’s position in the Far East would lead to the building of this railway through some of the most difficult terrain in the world, the work finally being completed in 1916 at a total cost to the state of some 400 million roubles. Military considerations dominated the construction, the line being built ten to eighty miles from the borderline, a distance considered sufficient to protect the track from enemy interdiction whilst retaining a reasonably short deployment time for troops transported along this route. In pursuing this policy the option of utilizing a railroad deployed further northward in order to facilitate the civilian colonization of the krai was deliberately rejected.\footnote{Steven G. Marks, ‘The Burden of the Far East: the Amur Railroad Question in Russia, 1906-1916.’ SS 1: 1 (1993/94) pp.15-18.} Moreover, in direct contrast to the policy pursued earlier with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and in a move reflecting the mood of the times, the ‘yellow races’ were specifically
excluded from participating as cheap labour in the construction of the Amur line, Russian workers being imported instead at considerable expense.\textsuperscript{170}

The 1910 strategic war planning meanwhile reflected the importance of defending the existing Chinese Eastern Railway, with a special district being set up in the Kazan okrug to reinforce the Central Asian and Siberian fronts and allocated by War Minister Sukhomlinov 320 battalions, most transferred from the Western frontier. Eight corps and three rifle brigades were set aside in the borders of European Russia and the North Caucasus as a general reserve in the event of fighting breaking out independently on the Asiatic fronts.\textsuperscript{171} The most famous consequence of this strategic realignment of reserves was the dismemberment of Russia's traditional fortress system in the West. Forts like Ivanogorod which had screened Russian Poland for decades were now abandoned, only Novogeorgievsk being left intact, to hold out 'to the last cartridge and rusk' against an invader. As a consequence of the destruction of the old fortification line and the incompleteness of the new one, Russia would go to war in the west in 1914 with no fully organized defensive system.\textsuperscript{172} The after effects of this redeployment and the strategic uncertainty it created regarding the true value of Russia's western fortifications was to be most painfully felt during the Great Retreat of 1915.

In May 1910 Sukhomlinov wrote to the commanders of the Priamur, Omsk and Irkutsk military districts ordering them to present their considerations on the latest mobilization schedule for war in the Far East, informing them that 'we need now to consider China [with Japan]...which in recent years has significantly improved its military forces.'\textsuperscript{173} This mobilization schedule foresaw the creation of three significant armies to fight a Japanese opponent or a Sino-Japanese military alliance. The so-called 1\textsuperscript{st} Trans-Baikal army, formed from the forces of the Irkutsk military district, was to advance into Manchuria to cover the Chinese Eastern railway, deploying between Kharbin and Tsitsikar. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Trans-Baikal armies were to be commanded by the heads of the Moscow and Kazan military districts.

\textsuperscript{171} Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Podgotovka...} pp.112-16; Fuller, \textit{Strategy and Power} pp.423-32.
\textsuperscript{172} V. A. Melikov, \textit{Strategicheskoe razvertyvanie (Po opytu pervoi imperialisticheskoi voiny 1914-1918gg. i grazhdanskoj voiny v SSR)}. T.I. \textit{Pervaia Imperialisticheskai Voina 1914-1918gg} (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel'stvo Narkomata Oborony Soiuza SSR 1939) pp.215-228. For different strategic reasons the Soviet Union would eerily repeat this situation in 1939-41.
respectively. As these districts also had a role to play in the event of war breaking out on the western frontier, the 1910 mobilization schedule therefore required those district commanders to be ready to deploy either east or west. The 2nd Trans-Baikal army from Kazan was to be formed of the XVIth, Vth, VIIth and VIIIth army corps, Siberian cavalry regiments and the Irkutsk cavalry division, plus automobile, aeroplane and auxiliary sections, in all 152 battalions, 76 squadrons, 596 guns, 26 engineer companies and an engineer park. This force was to begin movement to the Far East at the end of the second month of mobilization. The 3rd Trans-Baikal army was to comprise the XIIIth army corps, IIIrd Caucasus army corps, the XXIth and Ird army corps, the Ural Cossack division, automobile and auxiliary elements- in all 136 battalions, 68 squadrons, 540 guns, 29 engineer companies and one engineer park. This was to begin movement to the Far East at the end of the fifth month of mobilization. This planning schedule, and the role allotted in it to the XVIth corps, would appear to fully confirm the claim of the late Russian military historian, A. A. Kersnovskii, that Sukhomlinov’s creation in Kazan of two new corps-the XVIth and XXIVth- was designed not to put Russian army organization on a territorial basis (an explanation which he contemptuously commented only laymen believed) but to have a reserve ready in the event of an outbreak of war with Turkey or Japan. Defence of the Chinese Eastern Railway, meanwhile, also hinged upon the construction of new fortifications there. On the basis of reports from General Evert, commander of the Irkutsk military district, the Russian War Minister resolved in 1913 that a new round of fortification along this line was a necessity. Following an initial scheme to set up a series of temporary defences, a programme to construct permanent fortifications at a projected cost to the state of 1,200,000 roubles was soon adopted. This sum did not include the cost of guns, machine-guns and searchlights. Informed by the Assistant War Minister of ‘the extraordinary significance of the Chinese Eastern railway as a strategic line’, the Council of Ministers after some deliberation in 1913-14 approved the carrying out of this work.

174 Ibid., dl.49-51.
175 Ibid., dl.46.
176 A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia Russkoi armii. T.3 (Moscow: “Golos” 1993) pp.137-8. In addition Kersnovskii believed that Stolypin had sought to have army corps deployed in Russia’s central provinces in order to put down the threat of internal rebellion. The territorial explanation for these new deployments has however been the one adopted even by some modern historians: Menning. Bayonets before Bullets pp.222-226. I believe I have now proved that other considerations were also at play.
Such Russian measures at military reinforcement as did occur in the Far East in the meantime served as grist to the mill for the more militant circles in the Japanese government, leading to a worsening of relations on the immediate eve of war in 1914. There was published in Japan a series of articles and books across 1913-14 speculating on the imminence of the next Russo-Japanese War, a war which Baron Motono, the Japanese consul to St. Petersburg, informed Russia’s military attaché Samoilov in Tokyo would be fought by the Japanese ‘to the last drop of blood.’

Although some of the thinking behind this strategic retrenchment and redeployment came to be rejected by the General Staff after 1912, there was insufficient time to prevent its actual practical effects—a slowdown in concentration times in the West— from being felt in 1914. Moreover, at least one prominent official within the Russian bureaucracy was still arguing the implications of 1910 on the very eve of the First World War. The famous Durnovo Memorandum of February 1914 argued for an alliance with Germany rather than England on the basis that a European war would be disastrous for Russia. This argument was specifically predicated upon the thesis that Russia’s most natural strategic objectives were the Pamirs, Persia, Kuld’zha, Kashgaria, and Mongolia—areas where international friction was created by England, not Germany.

4.2 The Caucasus

The other area most immediately and directly threatened on the Asiatic frontier, and therefore of direct relevance to the Asiatic Department of the General Staff and the war planning of this period, was the Caucasus and the Russian-Turkish border. Of Russia’s six wars in the nineteenth century, five were fought over issues stemming from Balkan politics, each war seeing activity on the Russo-Turkish border. In contrast to China, Russia had direct experience of fighting Turkey in this theatre stretching back into the eighteenth century, and the geography of the immediate border region had become well known since the consolidation of the Transcaucasus in 1828. War planning in this area was directly affected by the actual

179 Fuller, Strategy and Power, p. 444-5. Reconsideration was brought about by disagreements within the Russian General staff, but the French response to the Russian war plan of 1910 and its implicit 'retreat from Europe' was also extremely negative. On this, see: Pertti Luntinen, French Information on the Russian War Plans 1880-1914. (Helsinki: SHS 1984) pp. 120-6.
180 Several studies exist of Durnovo and this well-known memorandum. See for example: M. Aldanov, 'P. N. Durnovo, Prophet of War and Revolution.' RR 2 (1942) pp. 31-45, and Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War pp. 77-81.
course of military events in this period as well, the retention of Kars, Ardahan and Batum following the war of 1877-78 forming an important counterbalance to the Turkish border base at Erzerum. Within the later period the most obvious overall change in the local balance of power lay in the inability of Persia to any longer present a military threat to Russia. A study conducted by staff officers of the Caucasus military district in 1889 stated at the outset that a conflict with Persia in future was only foreseeable were Persia drawn into an international alliance against Russia by the ‘money, glorious promises, and threats’ of other hostile powers. This study then concluded that even in that event the sudden appearance of a Russian detachment at Tabriz, just beyond the line of the Russo-Persian border, would serve to drive Persia out of the war. The forces involved on the Russian side for such an operation would be minimal-six to eight infantry battalions and a brigade of cavalry-sufficient to deliver the strategic equivalent of a bloody nose.182

An intelligence trip by officers of the Caucasus military district conducted in the Russo-Persian border region ten years later reported that the local Persian forces devoted more time to attempting to avert imminent starvation than to military drill and training. For their often antiquated and defective rifles the individual Persian footsoldiers were issued just five cartridges for self-defence and received no instruction in firing, whilst being simultaneously financially cheated by the officers who were allocated the funds for feeding and maintaining them. Morale and espirit d’ecorps were therefore non-existent.183 Such considerations, alongside the fact that Russia increasingly held political influence in the Persian capital through the institution of the Persian Cossack Brigade after 1879, meant that Turkey and internal insurrection formed the main remaining threats to Russian power in the Transcaucasus.

That foreign opponents might try to incite internal revolt in the Caucasus to coincide with external difficulties was not mere speculation, but something the Russian Staff had acute experience of both from the exploits of the British adventurer David Urquhart in the late 1830s and more directly from Turkish

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policy in 1877-78. The extremely broken nature of the mountain country, with a population still largely tribal, dictated that large armies were restricted to certain lines of approach, whilst the open sea coast left open the possibility of a desant or combined-arms operation by either side. These were all conditions quite different, as Zaionchkovskii noted, from those likely to be encountered in the European theatre. The nationalities problem in the area, with the corresponding difficulties of carrying out warfare with a significant 'political element', in turn demanded officers acquainted with local customs and beliefs. In contrast to the other theatres under its consideration, the Asiatic Department could count on a considerable degree of support from the War Ministry as a whole in regard to safeguarding the Caucasus since, as we saw at the start of this chapter, Obruchev considered the Bosphorus to be one of Russia's vital strategic interests. In later years the Bosphorus became for Obruchev, in Vitte's phrase, his 'idée fixe.' Faced towards the end of his career with a young emperor fascinated by Far Eastern affairs, Obruchev merely tailored his arguments to present seizure of the Bosphorus as the natural solution to all of Russia's security problems, including the Far East. This consensus within the Russian General Staff that in any future conflict, in one way or another, Turkey would prove to be one of the most likely major opponents was reflected in the expenditure for intelligence gathering allotted the Caucasus military district throughout this period. In stark contrast to its less fortunate frontier counterparts elsewhere, and as a consequence of the Tsar's personal resolution in 1895, the Caucasus district staff until 1905 were annually assigned 56,890 roubles for intelligence acquisition in Asiatic Turkey-more than all the other district staffs put together. During the bout of increased intelligence expenditure that followed the Russo-Japanese War the Caucasus retained this relatively privileged position in annual expenditures, the district staff being allotted in January

184 In 1877-78 the Turks had undertaken an amphibious operation, seeking to land 2-3,000 Circassians and Abkhazes with 30,000 rifles to arm the local population and create an uprising. Tiflis was hindered from immediately dispatching reserves to meet the threat by fear of a rising in Chechnia and Dagestan, a fear justified in Chechnia by the actions of one Haji Ali Bey in declaring himself Imam. Henze, 'Fire and Sword.' p.35 and N.V. Skritskii, 'Napravno gortsy zhvali Turok' IVZh 4 (1995) pp.46-51. For a review of Western diplomacy during the period of the earlier Caucasus War see: Polkovnik V.V. Popov, 'Voiny na Kavkaze i zapadneveuropeiske tsivilizatory' IVZh 4 (1997) pp.60-70 and G.H. Bolsover, 'David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833-37' JMH 8 (1936) pp.444-467.

185 Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka, p.27.

186 'Sostav naselenia v Armenii i v Zakavkaz'ee, vrazhdebnii gospodstvuiuschchim natsional'nom, mog vnesti v voennye operatsii v bol'shoi doze politicheskii element. Kharacter vsego teatra...daval vozmozhnost' razviti v bol shikh razmerakh maluiu voinnu.' Ibid., p.28.

187 Airapetov, Zabytaya kar era 'Russkogo Mol'tke' pp.274-5.

188 Derevianko, 'Russkaia agenturnaia razvedka v 1902-1905gg.' p.76; Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 1.) p.145
1914 the sum of 65,000 roubles for intelligence collection—still more than any of the other individual military districts, even those on the western border, for that year.\textsuperscript{189}

The special position given the Caucasus was evident from the very beginning of the post-reform period in the 1860s. The Caucasus was the one major military district outside the European theatre to be closely examined in the great strategic review of 1873. The Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich then predicted that the local population would rebel on the outbreak of war and recommended a strategic offensive to offset this—again reflecting the general approach of Staff officers that only an offensive strategy was appropriate in Asiatic theatres. The lines of attack selected in 1873 were directed at Kars, Erzerum and the Saganulskii pass—points that would dominate both planning and action in 1877-78 and for many years afterward. In the Caucasus the traditional moral arguments for an offensive were reinforced by the great difficulty of carrying out a defensive on the ground itself—the wide mountain ranges, however inaccessible, demanded large and widely scattered bodies of men to be defended adequately. The strategic planning for the conflict of 1877-78 in both Europe and Asia was the work of the ubiquitous Obruchev. As both the planning and course of this war has received close analysis in the recent Russian and English-language historiography however, the details will not be related at great length here, particularly as the overwhelming emphasis of much of this planning lay on the Balkan theatre.\textsuperscript{190}

Changes in Balkan politics following the war of 1877-78 increasingly denied Russia the opportunity of an attack against Turkey through the European theatre, and staff planning correspondingly switched to investigating the possibility of a naval descent on the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{191} The Turks had fortified this approach to Constantinople in the period 1765-1795 with the assistance of French engineers, and these fortifications had been periodically updated ever since. Plans in this direction were worked out throughout the reign of Alexander III, but the concept did predate his reign, Obruchev having made a personal reconnaissance of potential landing sites in 1873 or 1874. In the early 1870s Mikhail Veniukov, having increasingly fractious relations both with the head of the Geographical Society and with his direct superior

\textsuperscript{189} Alekseev, \textit{Voennaia Razvedka Rossii} (Kniga 2) p.511.
\textsuperscript{190} Undoubtedly the most detailed recent work on war planning for the conflict of 1877-78 is that of David Rich, \textit{The Tsar's Colonels} pp.115-148.
\textsuperscript{191} Obruchev was scathingly critical in the aforementioned memorandum of 1885 of what he saw as the petty rivalries and ingratitude of the Balkan states; a primary reason, as he saw it, to launch a naval rather than a land-borne assault in future: Zolotarev, \textit{Voennaia Bezopasnost' Otechestva (Istoriko-pravovoe issledovanie)} pp.260-2.
at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, A. P. Protsenko, and increasingly disillusioned by the General Staff in general, asked for a two month leave to visit Karlsbad and Turkey. Part of the inspiration for the trip came from rumours circling in the General Staff at the time that war with Turkey was imminent. Lt.-Colonel Bobrikov, the member of the Military-Scientific Committee directly concerned with the study of Turkey, declared that the Serbs would probably initiate this conflict and that Russia would then send a 40,000-strong corps through Austria to fight the Turks. Veniukov harboured the personal belief that the greatest damage could be inflicted on Turkey by a blow through the Asiatic rather than the European theatre, but felt he lacked the first-hand knowledge to convincingly substantiate his views before his colleagues. Unexpectedly given a 2,700 rouble monetary grant for his leave, Veniukov made a circular trip across the length of the Ottoman Empire, beginning from Vienna and ending in the Russian Caucasus, making notes on the country's geographic, ethnographic and economic characteristics as he went. One major consequence of this trip was a specific plan of the Bosphorus contributed to the *Voennyi Sbornik* in 1874. Veniukov considered the Bosphorus fortifications outdated, floating gun batteries being able to achieve the same goal, but admitted their utility in giving the Turkish fleet freedom of action. Like subsequent observers however, he noted these fortifications' vulnerability to being turned from the rear by landward-based forces and their often-restricted field of fire due to embrasured gun positions.

In 1882 Alexander III resolved to revitalize the Black Sea fleet, changing the local balance of power and giving Russian war planning in this area serious intent. In December of that same year in connection with the English occupation of Egypt the Russian consul in Constantinople, A. I. Nelidov, wrote Alexander the first of a series of famous notes recommending Russia occupy the Bosphorus Straits. The Paris peace agreement of 1856 neutralizing the Black Sea had hindered Russian naval construction in the region for decades meanwhile, leaving Russia without a serious ocean-going fleet during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In a desperate bid to secure the Caucasus and Crimean coasts the Naval Ministry in 1871-76 had commissioned the construction of two monstrous floating gun platforms, the 'Popovki' (so-called after the initiator of their construction, Admiral A. A. Popov) whose design originated in a Glasgow

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shipyard. With poor manoeuvrability as a result of their circular design, the Popovki were built at considerable expense to the state and soon proved almost criminally, comically useless. Able only to fire in volleys, since a single shot could send them into an uncontrolled turning circle, full-scale charges for their shells were forbidden since practice-firing with such rounds had already resulted in damage to the plating of their hulls and upper superstructure.\textsuperscript{195}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Russian coastal defence in the Black Sea in the 1870s: The 'Popovki'. Source: A. B. Shirokorad}
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\textit{Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg.} p.515.

\textsuperscript{195} A. B. Shirokorad, \textit{Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg.} (Moscow/Minsk: “Kharvest-Act” 2000)
Naval design after 1882 in the wake of deneutralization of the Black Sea banished the memory of such horrors and produced unique designs specifically created for offensive action in the Bosphorus Straits. Between 1883 and 1893 four mighty vessels, three with names evoking past Russian victories over the Turks—the ‘Catherine II’, ‘Chesma’ and ‘Sinop’—were commissioned and brought into service, each bearing six powerful 305mm cannon positioned in three mountings, two at the front and one at the rear. Deploying therefore four rather than the more normal two forward-firing main guns, these vessels were battering rams of the artillery age, designed not to conduct the broadsides normally associated with open-sea naval combat but to blast their way through the narrow gates of the Turkish Straits and to obliterate any fleet contesting their passage.  

On the offensive in the Black Sea, 1880s. The gun layout of the ‘Sinop’. Source: A. B. Shurokora

Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918gg. p.588.

In connection with developing war plans for the Bosphorus, a special commission was set up in the Odessa military district in 1885 to study the problem, and it was with the goal of gathering more information on potential landing sites and coastal defences that A. N. Kuropatkin was dispatched in 1886 undercover on a secret intelligence mission, coordinated with the Russian military agent in Constantinople, Major-General Filippov. Kuropatkin felt that the Turkish coastal defences presented no particular difficulties at that time; the main batteries on both banks could be knocked out by naval gunfire and the coast itself, whilst wild and presenting significant logistical difficulties, offered opportunities for creating successive defensive positions to the Russian landing forces. That same year, undoubtedly as a result of his joint work with Kuropatkin, Filippov presented a strategic overview of the Bosphorus coast that practically

pp. 512-14.

196 Ibid., p. 588.

laid out in black-and-white how a Russian *desant* could be undertaken in this theatre.\textsuperscript{198} The planning for such a *desant* at the time was unusual, since it amounted in effect to a seize-and-hold operation. By gaining the heights of the mountain-chain of the Istrandzh-dag above the Turkish capital, the main watershed of the region, and by fortifying selected plateaus, the Russians hoped to seize Constantinople’s water supply and place the town effectively in a state of siege. The contemporary problems of how to conduct a combined-arms offensive would therefore be almost entirely avoided, since almost as soon as they disembarked the Russians would be constructing a commanding entrenched position. Filippov considered the Turkish forces to be in a worse condition for combat in 1886 than they had been in 1877-78, with the regular army (Nizam) no longer meeting in their training camps and the Turkish reserve being practically untrained. The Russians by contrast, in his view, presently possessed significant technical advantages in the form of the latest naval mines, electric searchlights, telephones and telegraphic equipment. Therefore any Russian expeditionary corps should be provided with these means in abundance, in particular to assure communication and mutual support between the forces landed on both banks of the Straits. Naval mines would hinder either Turkish or foreign naval intervention whilst searchlights would halt any Turkish attempts at nighttime counterattacks, thereby facilitating the success of a potential strategic *coup de main*.\textsuperscript{199}

Kuropatkin returned to Sevastopol in April-May 1886 where the Tsar was reviewing the latest Russian fortifications and oversaw the first Russian experiments with underwater craft. These vessels were small and apparently submerged and surfaced with some difficulty. Kuropatkin later speculated that what the Tsar saw convinced him of Russia’s poor preparedness for carrying out *desant* operations on the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{200} Training for such an operation reached its height in the late 1880s however; in 1885, 1891 and 1893 practice *desanty* were conducted around Odessa, in 1886 in the southwest Crimea, in 1887 and 1892 around Sevastopol, in 1893 around Ochakov and in 1890 around Sudak. These operations typically

\textsuperscript{198} Major-Gen. Filippov, *Strategicheskoe opisanie Bosfora* (St.Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia v zdanii Glavnogo Shtaba 1886). For a history of the meaning of *desant* operations in Russian military thought, including the actual naval *desant* operations carried out across the Black Sea in 1916, which owed at least something to these pre-war military preparations, see: Peter Vigor ‘The ‘Forward Reach’ of the Soviet Armed Forces: Seaborne and Airborne Landings’ in Erickson & Feuchtwanger (eds.), *Soviet Military Power and Performance* pp.183-212.

\textsuperscript{199} Filippov, *Strategicheskoe opisanie Bosfora* p.85.

\textsuperscript{200} Kuropatkin, ‘Razvedyvatel’naia missiia v Turtsii’, pp.76-77.
involved the disembarkation of 3-4.5 battalions of infantry, 0.5-1 squadron of cavalry, and 4-8 guns. In connection with these plans there was created in Odessa in 1886 a top-secret 'special supply' of heavy artillery pieces (6 and 12-inch guns) for transport and emplacement on both banks of the Bosphorus where they were intended to consolidate Russian gains. Numbering 78 guns in 1894, this stockpile were supplemented over the following years by the addition of twenty-four Maxim machine guns, fifty 6-inch guns of various descriptions and ten 57mm Nordenfeldt guns, with the whole being serviced by a special reserve of 7000 troops. From the mid-1890s onwards this 'special supply' began to carry in addition a new series of 9-inch light mortars. Easily transportable, the limited range of only 3km on these mortars made them unsuitable for conventional operations but perfect for the narrow Straits, where from coastal positions their 140kg vertical-trajectory shells would easily penetrate the decks of the latest warships in any incoming British fleet. From 1895 it was decided in addition not to store this special artillery reserve any longer in coastal warehouses, but to have it based on the transport ships ready for immediate movement.

Although Turkey devoted most of her resources in this period to the fortification of the Dardanelles, chastened by the British fleet's bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, awareness of Russian intentions led to naval mines being deployed in the Bosphorus after 1895. Russian planning in this direction probably came nearest to fulfillment in 1896-7; on that occasion commanders were actually assigned to conduct such an enterprise and plans worked out for a deception operation to cover Russian movements. The fleet commander had at his disposal the Catherine II, Sinop and Chesma along with an array of minelayers and torpedo boats. Armenian massacres in the Turkish capital provided the incentive for foreign intervention and Nelidov, still the Russian consul in Constantinople at the time, travelled to St.Petersburg in November 1896 to press the case for a desant. In this Nelidov was also taking advantage of the sudden and recent death of Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, which had created a temporary power-vacuum in the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry. A desant on the Bosphorus was averted however when the Main Staff calculated that it lacked the naval assets to transport more than 20,000 men in a two-week period. These numbers were judged insufficient to achieve the fait accompli demanded by the tense

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201 Airapetov, Zabytaia kar'era "Russkogo Mol'tke" p.253.
203 V. Khvostov, 'Problemy zakhvata Bosfora v 90-kh godakh XIX veka' M 10 (1930) pp.110-11.
international environment of the time. Perhaps even more persuasive however was the distinct coolness shown towards such an enterprise by Russia’s major ally of the period, France. Not being officially informed, the French nevertheless heard rumours of Nelidov’s project. The French at the time managed 60% of the Ottoman Empire’s state debt and had large investments in Turkish railroads and industry; correspondingly, they had little interest in seeing the Ottoman Empire divided and dismantled as Nelidov’s scheme implied. Their expressed resistance as much as technical considerations led to Nelidov’s project being discreetly shelved, to the disappointment of Obruchev and War Minister Vannovskii but much to the relief of Count Vitte.

An inquiry by the Foreign Minister on the occasion of the Boer War in 1900 revealed conflicting strategic intentions regarding Russia’s proper missions along the southern frontier. Whilst Navy Minister Tyrtov remained unenthusiastic about the prospect of seizing the Bosphorus, preferring to see Russia’s naval position consolidated in the Far East, War Minister Kuropatkin, undoubtedly reflecting the influence of his former mentor, Obruchev, saw seizure of the Bosphorus as the most important task facing Russia in the twentieth century. Despite Admiral Tyrtov’s reservations, by the turn of the century war plans on the Bosphorus had assumed significant dimensions. In 1903 it was considered that on the ninth day after mobilization (M+9) Russia could have concentrated in its Black Sea ports the designated ground forces-four and a half infantry and one and a quarter cavalry divisions. By the eleventh day (M+11) these troops could begin disembarking in the Bosphorus, and 170,000 men might be gathered in the Bosphorus by day nineteen (M+19). Turkey by contrast would be in a position to dispatch no more than 215,000 men by the sixteenth day (M+16) to meet the threat, 60 per cent of them redeployed with insignificant trained cadres. The main problem lay not in the military planning, but in the intervention of the other great powers again seen as inevitable at some point after war was declared.

The course and immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 inaugurated a period of flux and change in the planning for a Bosphorus desant. The immediate effect of the conflict with Japan was to almost completely destroy Russia’s war-fighting capability in the Black Sea, since the ‘special

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204 Fuller, Strategy and Power pp.367-72.
205 Popov & Pokrovskii (eds.), ‘Tsarskaia dipliomatia o zadachakh Rossii na Vostok v 1900g.’ KA 5 (18,1926) pp.18-22
206 The Turkish first-line reserve forces, as opposed to the regular peacetime army (Nizam) which had replaced the janissaries after 1828.
supply' in Odessa was stripped back to help equip Russian forces fighting in the Far East. It was with this in mind that War Minister Rediger at the end of 1907 recommended to the State Defence Council the dissolution of the Odessa naval battalion- with the loss of so many other resources, this was effectively a force now devoid of a strategic role. The Tsar rejected this suggestion however, whilst the concept of an operation on the Bosphorus continued to have its defenders, most notably in Chief of the General Staff Palitsyn and Foreign Minister Izvol'skii. Izvol'skii in particular gave a new impetus to thinking behind this direction given his own apparent delusion that the recent Anglo-Russian agreement ensured that for the first time for several generations the British would not contest a Russian intervention in the Straits. The whole of the Foreign Ministry in the meantime shared the premonition that 'the sick man of Europe' (Turkey) was now about to succumb to his long-term 'illness'. The Russian Foreign Minister's personal interest in Near Eastern affairs would of course ultimately culminate, ironically, not in the fall of the Ottoman Empire but in the destruction of his own career. Palitsyn's interest meanwhile stemmed from concern over recent Turko-Persian border clashes, and at the start of 1908 he urged military preparations in readiness for an open break with Turkey. Rediger, never one of Palitsyn's defenders, later opined in his memoirs that the Chief of Staff dreamed of deliberately inciting a war between Russia and Turkey. Whilst most of Palitsyn's focus centred on reinforcing the Caucasus military district, these plans did incorporate an aspect encompassing a Bosphorus expedition, since Palitsyn felt it would be useless for Russia to acquire more territory in Asia Minor. For him, only possession of the Bosphorus presented an object of vital strategic interest. Nonetheless Palitsyn also confessed to his French counterparts around this time that he saw a Bosphorus expedition as a rather 'chimerical' project, for all the staff planning involved, a response which perhaps reveals some underlying confusion or internal doubts in his own thinking.

Under these influences strategic planning for the Black Sea revived, but with new variations on the old theme. In particular the Chief of the General Staff instructed the Third Over-Quartermaster Section (Asiatic Fronts) to prepare plans for possible desanty on the coast of Asia Minor. Schemes for such an operation, with one corps being landed between Trebizond and the line Sivas-Samsun to assist the main efforts of the Caucasus Army, were accordingly presented in October 1908. Such a plan possessed the

207 Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka... pp.48-9.
merit not only of potentially gaining operational surprise, but also of relieving the severe mobilization pressure that would be exerted on the Transcaucausus railway. A conference was also held on the same theme under Major-General Skerskii, now head of GUGSh's Third Over-Quartermaster Section, but before that an assistant desk-head at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff (1896-1900). This conference considered the whole desant issue afresh and revealed divergent views between the army and naval General Staffs. Whilst the navy saw its main role as the blocking of the Straits, the army sought the seizure of Constantinople, a desant on Trebizond, and foresaw a possible fleet action with the Turkish or even Austrian navies-tasks for which the navy complained it was completely unprepared and lacked the resources. 211 A series of conferences held in 1911 helped iron out these disagreements to a pessimistic conclusion-that an assault on the Bosphorus was at present impossible and a series of desanty on the Black Sea coast at best doubtful. In accordance with these conclusions Sukhomlinov obtained Nicholas II’s approval to the final dispersion of the ‘special supply’ in Odessa. Nonetheless successive Near Eastern crises meant that the Bosphorus question continued to be revived until the outbreak of the First World War, but with little in practical technical terms being done to reverse the decay that had eaten into these preparations after 1904-05. A practice mobilization by the new head of the Odessa military district in 1911 revealed drastic shortcomings that highlighted the continued gap between the General Staff’s paper planning and reality. Of the forces mobilized, the first-line troops lacked 40% of their machine-gun complement, 15% of their cartridges and had no high-explosive shells whatsoever for their light artillery pieces. Second-line troops lacked their machine-guns and small arms ammunition altogether. The district commander grimly concluded that the VIIth army of which these units in theory formed the main part in practice did not exist—a damning indictment that the Tsar underlined eight times in the subsequent report. 212

A renewed inquiry by the Foreign Minister in 1912 meanwhile, inspired by the contemporary Turkish-Italian conflict, revealed it would take two weeks to transfer two corps from the Odessa military district to Constantinople—a time period still too slow to be considered a surprise attack. 213 At the same time, the report of the Russian military agent in Constantinople, Colonel Khol’msen, sounded the most pessimistic

212 Ibid. p.68-9.
note yet about a proposed desant operation on the Bosphorus succeeding. A strengthened Turkish fleet meant that Turkey would soon be able to contest Russian supremacy on the Black Sea, whilst Turkey’s modernized rail network meant that Russian landing forces, even if successful on the first day, would soon face an overwhelming superiority in enemy numbers. Examining the landing sites on the European and Asiatic shores proposed by his predecessors, and by Filippov in particular, Khol’msen concluded that any attempt to seize these sites now under present conditions was simply untenable. The traditional logistical difficulties aside- including steep, rocky, wooded ground that would involve manhandling the artillery into position- military technology in general had changed. The improved range and accuracy of artillery meant that the Turks could now not only enfilade but strike into the very rear of the proposed landing positions, creating the potential for a military disaster.214 The extremely able Russian naval agent in Constantinople in this period, Captain A. N. Shcheglov (1875-1953), shared this pessimism on the potential for a successful desant operation.215 These views on the ground were reinforced by those of War Minister Sukhomlinov, who as an observer had been unimpressed by the Black Sea war game of 1903, and who sent his representative to talk down Russian diplomats’ enthusiasm for seizing the Bosphorus when the issue was again raised at the start of 1914.216 At a conference in February 1914 the Quartermaster-General of the General Staff, Danilov, deprecated action against the Turkish Straits as a strategic distraction from war in the West against Germany and Austro-Hungary. That same year Admiral A. I. Rusin, the former naval agent to Japan and now head of the Naval General Staff, opined to his superior that Russia would not be ready for war in the Black Sea until after 1917.217 These considerations rendered stillborn plans evolved the previous year by the chief operations officer of the Black Sea fleet, Captain Ivan Kononov. Kononov’s plans if accepted would have resulted in effect in a full-scale revival of technical preparations for a Bosphorus desant. Alongside a risky transfer of two warships from the Baltic to the Black Sea fleet, Kononov proposed the creation of a specially trained ‘Landing Corps’ equipped with light artillery, and the use of armoured floating gun platforms to suppress Turkish coastal defences. His scheme gained some

216 V. Sukhomlinov, Vospominaninia (Berlin: Russkoe Universal’noe Izdatel’stvo 1924) pp.198-200.
support in both naval and diplomatic circles but was sidelined by the February conference in 1914. Shcheglov himself was appalled by Kononov's ideas, and in their later years of post-war exile abroad, debate between the two over the scheme's relative merits raged in the pages of the Russian émigré press.\(^ {218} \)

Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the Tsarist state, after thirty years intelligence work on the problem, became much more cautious about seizing the Bosphorus, paving the way for the disastrous Allied attempt to seize the initiative and resolve the same type of problem at the Dardanelles.

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As changing evaluations of the possibility of a naval desant demonstrate, assessment of the threat of Turkey could often only be evaluated by the actions of agents of the Russian General Staff on the ground. Of particular importance of course was the condition of the Turkish army and the degree of political infiltration Turkey achieved in the Caucasus in peacetime given opportunities like the regular haj of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and other holy sites. The Caucasus was the largest source of Muslim pilgrimage within the Russian Empire in this period. In tandem with dramatic change in the Turkish state itself throughout this period, which appeared to make Turkey itself more militarily effective, fear of Islamic political movements, in particular Pan-Islamic threats, became of increasing concern to the Russian General Staff. The position Russia inherited in the North Caucasus after 1859 was in many ways unique, since Shamil had created the primitive outlines of an entire state system- the Imamate- to pursue his decades-long struggle against the Russians. This essentially theocratic system had its own bureaucratic hierarchy, taxation system, and local government organization and, of course, disposed of trained military forces.\(^ {219} \) It was this system the Russians had had to dismantle, adopt, and build upon in setting up their own administration after 1859, whilst being continually conscious of the contested legitimacy of the Russian model offered by local memory of Shamil's long reign. In principle the Russian state in the aftermath of the mass migrations of the early 1860s pursued the same policy in the Caucasus as it did in Central Asia and elsewhere in the latter nineteenth century, namely, attempting to create a social sphere of 'imperial citizenship'. For the mountaineers, this involved a special form of military-political rule (voenno-narodnoe upravlenie); for the Transcaucasus, the establishment of Russian-appointed local institutions, such as

separate Sunni and Shi'i religious boards in 1872. In practice, in parallel with this programme, the Russian General Staff was compelled to maintain a position of perpetual, expensive orientalist vigilance over the Sufi Islamic sects of the North Caucasus, which were officially banned. From the very start of the nineteenth century, the North Caucasus had been distinguished by the fact that the great burden of Russia’s ethnographic and statistical material on the krai had been achieved almost wholly through the military arm to the near-exclusion of the civilian, a consequence of the almost continuous warfare occurring in the region. In the aftermath of Shamíl’s surrender and the settlement of 1864 this situation was moderated but not dramatically altered. Indeed, one of the most distinguished scholars on the local Caucasus dialects, Baron Petr Karlovich Uslar (1816-1875) began his career as a General Staff officer, being entrusted by the High Command of the Caucasus Army in 1858 to write a history of the region from the time of Alexander of Macedon. With the coming of peace Uslar continued his scientific activities in the region till his death, becoming involved both with creating alphabets and primers on the local languages and with promoting programmes of secular education. These schemes proposed to draw the mountaineers away from traditional forms of religious scholastic education in the Arabic language to secular education, first in their own native dialects and ultimately in Russian. ‘Literacy in ones’ [own] language’-Uslar proclaimed-‘ is the first step to enlightenment.’

Schemes like Uslar’s fell to the consideration of the new structures of military administration created by Bariatiniskii in the Caucasus, all of which corresponded regularly with the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. The main burden of this task locally fell upon the special Caucasus Mountaineer Administration (Kavkazskoe gorskoe upravlenie). Bariatiniskii’s successor after 1863 as Viceroy in the Caucasus was the mediocre Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, but the latter was able to rely to a considerable extent upon talented subordinates, including Lt.-General D. S. Starosel’skii (1832-1884). In 1864 Starosel’skii, also a member of the Caucasus branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, was
appointed head of the Mountaineer Administration. He thereafter spearheaded efforts at building up the Caucasus district staff’s knowledge of local institutions and customs, and to this end, amongst other endeavours, he commissioned the short-lived journal ‘A Collection of Information about the Caucasus Mountaineers’ (Sbornik svedenii o kavkazskikh gortsakh). Amongst the largest tasks facing the officers of the Mountaineer Administration, one that they carried out in painstaking detail, was the recording and categorization of the mountaineer’s system of adat laws, the customs by which they were to be ruled. In performing this ritual the General Staff corps involved functioned in effect as social anthropologists, setting down a system of laws for which by and large no written record had existed up until then.

One of the most significant legacies of Shamil’s rule meanwhile was the continuing employment by the Russians of his naibs (subordinate commanders) within the framework of the Mountaineer Administration. To begin with the Tsarist administration took what might be termed a liberal approach to the employment of these local administrators. Instructions from both the Tsar and Viceroy decreed that local mountaineers were to be preferred to the appointment of Russian officers or representatives of the Cossack forces to such posts, whilst the number of naibs employed should be maintained or even increased, but never allowed to drop from their pre-conquest level. Changing administrative policies under Alexander III which sought to bring local institutions into line with general Russian law, combined with disillusion following the revolt of 1877-78 (in which many naibs assisted the mountaineer rebels) led to a change in governmental attitudes however. The number of naibs was reduced and the recruitment of ‘natives’ for such posts discouraged, until finally in 1899 the existence of such an institution was abolished altogether, replaced by a Russian-style equivalent. 222 Alexander III’s reign was also marked by the abolition in 1882 of two institutions which had traditionally symbolized the Caucasus’s specialized administrative status, namely the local Viceroyship and the Caucasus Committee, the latter of which since its creation in 1839 had formed part of the State Council. The general effect of these changing policies across this period however was actually a sharpening of local tensions, precipitating the re-appointment of a Viceroy to the Caucasus, Vorontsov-Dashkov, on the 26th February 1905. Whatever the other merits of the Mountaineer Administration meanwhile, it did little towards pacifying the traditionally warlike North Caucasus

mountaineers. Between 1859 and 1877 there were 18 different revolts in Dagestan alone. One of the largest of those risings, that in Unkratil' in 1871, ended with the arrest of around 1,500 people who were sent to Temir-Khan-Shura for re-location to Russia.\(^{223}\) The revolt of 1877 presented a particular crisis to the security arms of the Russian state, since the punitive re-location of approximately 5,000 mostly Dagestani mountaineers to Saratov province in the Russian interior created particular logistic and administrative difficulties. Re-located mountaineers refused to take up farming or to utilize their state-sponsored and erected mosques, nor did they adopt the normal administrative practices employed in villages in central Russia. Evidence of such ingrained stubbornness and a corresponding and alarming rise in the (essentially self-inflicted) death-rate from illness and starvation forced the Russian state to admit defeat; in 1883 what was left of this exiled mountaineer community was permitted to return to Dagestan.\(^{224}\)

It was against this institutional and ideological background that the Tsarist military attempted to monitor the security of the Caucasus and its neighbouring regions. On the orders of the Asiatic Department in 1884, the staff of the Caucasus military district prepared a report on the annual pilgrimages made by the natives of the Caucasus, detailing their numbers, ethnic makeup and the routes used, whilst suggesting ways individuals might be used as intelligence agents.\(^{225}\) Security concerns in this direction increased with the development of Pan-Islamic trends in Turkey and military and political changes in Asia Minor. From the mid 1880s onwards the Russian Main Staff received regular reports both from its agent in Constantinople and officers of the Caucasus district staff on proposed and actual military reforms in the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic border districts. Such considerations included, for example, the installation of Krupp artillery pieces on raised rotary platforms at Trebizond, projects for new railway lines in Anatolia, and a new round of fortification to strengthen Erzerum.\(^{226}\) In 1898 Staff-Captain Davletshin, a future head of the Asiatic Department, accompanied the annual \(hajj\) of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, reporting on the geographical division of the Hejaz, the number and makeup of the Turkish forces disposed there, and the ethnic composition of and point of origin of Russian pilgrims. Davletshin was particularly concerned to discover whether the \(hajj\) had any political significance in terms of unifying Muslims of various

\(^{223}\) A. I. Ivanov, 'Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Chechne i Dagestane v 60-70-kh gg. XIX v.' \(Istoričeskije Zapiski\) 12 (1941) pp.184-5.

\(^{224}\) Austin Lee Jersild, 'Imperial Russification: Dagestani mountaineers in Russian exile, 1877-83.' \(CAS\) 19 (1, 2000) pp.5-16.

\(^{225}\) RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.15552 dl.5-8.
nationalities, but reported that no such merger was observable, and that on the *hajj* 'even our Kirghiz and Tatars do not want to know one another.'227 The General Staff remained unplacated regarding the potential political dangers from this direction however and at the turn of the century the Caucasus military district staff began a robust campaign to gain more military agents in the sensitive Transcaucasus border region. In particular in October 1903 the Caucasus staff petitioned for the appointment of military vice consuls in Bitlis and Diarbekir alongside a military agent in Mosul to cover the Turkish VI corps in Mesopotamia. The latter was a region that, with the building of the Baghdad railway, appeared set to gain increased strategic significance.228 In support of their demand for permanent military agents in these regions in place of temporarily commandeered officers, the district staff submitted in 1904 the report of Staff-Captain Shelkovnikov, recently returned from an intelligence-gathering operation in Mesopotamia. Shelkovnikov pointed out that the standard cover given on such operations - that of being attached to various Russian archaeological or geographical societies - was rapidly wearing thin in this particular region. During Shelkovnikov's own trip, only the fact that he had himself graduated from the archaeological institute in St.Petersburg and therefore had some knowledge of Babylonian-Assyrian cultures prevented him from being exposed when in the presence of 'real' German and American archaeologists near Baghdad. Shelkovnikov was therefore an ardent advocate for new methods of providing cover; if the setting up of permanent military agents in the region were financially impossible, then officers on temporary *komandirovkas* should be given the more believable cover of being temporarily-attached bureaucrats to local consulates of the Russian MID.229 The result of all these suggestions however was only the development of a bitter paper war between the War Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MID objected strongly to the possibility of replacing diplomatic consuls by military men. As Lamsdorff rather primly responded in March 1904:

> it is essential that our consular institutions, even if allowing into their composition military secretaries, are CONSULATES and not merely military intelligence networks. This holds true in particular regarding the

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228 RGVIA F.846 Op.4 D.42 dl.13-14ob.
229 Ibid., dl.44-45.
towns of Tabriz, Erzerum, Bitlis and Baiazet; the political significance of the last three is rising as they now appear in recent years as centres of the developing Armenian movement.230

The Foreign Minister gave rather grudging consent meanwhile to the principle of providing diplomatic cover for officers on komandirovka in the area, but insisted his Ministry be appraised of every detail of the proposed missions, down to their period abroad and the very subject of their investigation. This bureaucratic war of words burst into life again following the Russo-Japanese War, in large part as a consequence of the War Ministry gaining in 1907 the right to have its personnel serve in an expanded series of consular posts in the Near and Middle East. The performance of military personnel in these positions led to urgent petitions from the Foreign Ministry to have these posts returned to its jurisdiction. In 1908 for example, the MID consul in Damascus used the occasion of Shelkonikov's departure from the post of vice-consul in Hami to deliver a stinging and detailed diatribe against the practice of using military men in such posts.231 The presence of such officers, meanwhile, allowed the Russian General Staff to investigate strategic horizons previously closed to them. The Russian General Staff had learnt of Arab uprisings in the Ottoman Empire from their agents in Constantinople during the period 1901-06, and in 1906 GUGSh asked Shelkovnikov to assess the possibility of creating a Bedouin uprising in the event of a Russian war with Turkey. Shelkovnikov reported that unfortunately the Bedouin had no mental conception of Russia, their political outlook being restricted to Britain and France and their attitude to a conflict between Russia and Turkey being one of indifference. Given their numbers and the quantity of arms amongst them, the Arabs could nevertheless prove useful allies, but the main question in that event would be one of money - an assessment with which the British officers T. E. Lawrence and General Allenby some years later would undoubtedly have concurred.232

Intelligence operations continued to be further circumscribed by financial restrictions, as may be seen from the following examples. Undoubtedly one of the Russian General Staff's leading military experts on contemporary political conditions in the Transcaucasus border region was Lt.-General P. I. Aver’ianov (1867-1929). A secretary at the strategic listening post of the Russian consulate in Erzerum from 1901 to

230 Ibid., dl.63-66.
231 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossii (Kniga 2) p.81.
1905, Aver’ianov would go on during the First World War to become Chief of the General Staff in 1916. Under the Kerenskii government in 1917 he would occupy simultaneously the posts of Commissar in Turkish Armenia, Head of Supply for the Caucasus front and commander-in-chief of the Caucasus military district. The collapse of the Caucasus front that same year saw him leave Georgia to follow the path taken by many émigrés-journeying from the Crimea to Constantinople and thereafter to Yugoslavia, exiled from Russia for the remaining years of his life. Therefore the great majority of his active service career was spent directly or indirectly on affairs related to the Caucasus. At the turn of the century, whilst still a Staff Captain, Aver’ianov had been charged by the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus military district, Major-General N. N. Beliavskii, with drawing up a military-historical portrait of Russian relations with the Kurds during her wars with Turkey and Persia for the past hundred years. This work, incorporating in its appendixes a wealth of documents drawn from the Caucasus district staff’s own archives, concluded that the political significance of the Kurds in the border zones in a potential future conflict situation was set to increase. From the beginning of the 1890s the Ottoman government had introduced into Eastern Anatolia a new military organization, the Hamidi, units of Kurdish irregular cavalry initially utilized to help suppress the local Armenian movement. The Hamidi militias were also intended to perform an intelligence and scouting function as units attached to the regular Ottoman army in the event of full-scale conflict on the border. Within a very short space of time however the Hamidi came to be viewed with considerable suspicion by their Ottoman masters, and it was here that Aver’ianov saw an opportunity for Russian political influence in the region. In 1908, by now serving in GUGSh as a full Colonel of the General Staff, Aver’ianov returned in one of his reports to the possibility of drawing the Kurdish population onto the Russian side in the event of a future war. The Hamidi were badly paid and poorly maintained; a well-salaried Kurdish militia serving on Russian territory could therefore be counted upon to have a significant influence on their Ottoman counterparts across the border. Aver’ianov’s report met with initial approval and a scheme was developed for the formation of a Kurdish militia within the Russian border in peacetime

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233 I owe these biographical details quite by chance to a short biography attached to one of Aver’ianov’s post-war writings: ‘Diktator Kryma. Ocherk o generale Slashcheve, sostavlennyi v 1929g. generalom Aver’ianovym po vospominaniam polkovnika V. F. Frolova i kapitana A. A. fon-Dreiera (Publikatsiia L. Petrusheva)” in: Neizvestnaiia Rossia XX vek III (Moscow: “Istoricheskoe nasledie” 1993) pp.85-106.

suitable for future expansion in wartime. The Caucasus military district staff drew up a list of families, the heads of whom it would be essential to draw into the service, branches of these Kurdish families already served administratively on both sides of the Russian-Ottoman frontier. It was proposed to form two Kurdish sotnias attached to the Caucasus Cossack Divisions and a Kurdish mounted platoon attached to the Viceroy’s convoy. However at the beginning of May the War Minister abruptly brought an end to the discussion over the development of these formations in peacetime, citing their expense.\(^{236}\)

In 1908 the staff of the Caucasus military district also responded to a request of the Main Directorate of the General Staff to present a plan on the organization of intelligence in Turkey in wartime. Here again the district staff were relying on Aver’ianov’s expertise, utilizing a plan he had first drawn up in 1903. This scheme hinged on being able to despatch into Asiatic Turkey officers trained in the relevant languages and able to pass for Turks or Tatars. It demanded an expansion of the presently existing peacetime intelligence organization in Asiatic Turkey, requiring in addition to current annual expenditures an annual boost of 18,400 roubles and a one-off supplement of 20,000 roubles. Even then positive results were not expected to be forthcoming until two or three years had elapsed.\(^{237}\) Financial constraints again made these plans unrealistic. Even in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War and the increased intelligence expenditures it brought about, as we have seen, the Caucasus military district benefited only marginally, retaining but not substantially improving its already privileged position in this regard. Not even a modified scheme by the Chief of the General Staff, Palitsyn, involving the despatch of just 2-4 officers into Asiatic Turkey at an expense of 12,000 roubles annually was fulfilled.\(^{238}\)

The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War was seen however as presenting a renewed danger to the Caucasus theatre in the eyes of the newly arrived Viceroy, Vorontsov-Dashkov. Following his arrival on the scene and actions in dealing with the internal revolutionary insurrections of 1905, Vorontsov-Dashkov presented a nightmare picture to the Tsar of a district he claimed to be even more poorly prepared for war than the Far East had been. He identified shortages in the supply, communications and medical systems and urged a more rapid rearmament of the artillery, particularly the mountain guns. Even the fortresses, he claimed, could not perform their allotted role due to shortages in men and equipment, and only a

\(^{236}\) Ibid., dl.27-28.  
reinforcement of troops from the Russian interior would avert disaster at the outset of a war he now feared was imminent. A further element in Vorontsov-Dashkov’s reports were calls for a greater level of autonomy to be granted the work of local administration in the Caucasus, a full return in effect to the old Viceregal system. Such a system would help meet, he felt, both the rising social and political tension in the Transcaucasus so recently experienced in the local ‘Armenian-Tatar war’ and the perceived failings of the Mountaineer Administration in the North Caucasus. The latter system, he wrote in a brochure in 1907, by placing the bureaucratic reins of government in the hands of military officers and by allowing the local peoples to regulate themselves by their traditional adat laws, now answered ‘neither the general tasks of the state, nor the needs of the population.’ Vorontsov-Dashkov’s critique of the Mountaineer Administration mirrored growing criticism in the contemporary press, although on slightly different grounds. One correspondent in particular attributed continued unrest in the North Caucasus to the poor quality of administrative personnel, corruption, and lack of faith by the locals in the court system, which was itself hampered by a lack of reliable interpreters. The result, he wrote, was ever-growing levels of crime and repeated skirmishes between the army and local populace that threatened at times to break out into full-scale partisan warfare. In promoting greater decentralization Vorontsov-Dashkov also attempted to manipulate of course his special relationship with Nicholas II. In 1908 War Minister Rediger reprimanded the Count for conducting Caucasus affairs through a private correspondence with the Tsar, reminding him that:

in matters of military administration the Caucasus is in no way
distinct from other military districts...To allow another order of things
would signify allowing the violation of the army’s unity.

Nonetheless the present situation was widely seen as unsatisfactory and change was on the wind. In April 1908 Stolypin confided to assistant War Minister Polivanov that in the event of Vorontsov-Dashkov leaving his post, administrative reform might be undertaken to divide the Caucasus into two new and

238 Alekseev, Voennaia Razvedka Rossi (Kniga 2) p.260.
242 Rediger, Istoritia Moei Zhizni. Vospominaniia Voennogo Ministra T.II p.199
distinct sections, north and south.\textsuperscript{243} Just as in neighbouring Turkestan however, major administrative reform was destined to be delayed until the outbreak of war in 1914 rendered all further thinking in this direction irrelevant.

In the meantime, whilst there was undoubtedly an element of exaggeration in the Viceroy’s reports to advance his own cause, particularly as regards the Turks’ supposed crushing superiority, the military agent at Constantinople reported to the General Staff that the Turks were definitely manoeuvring for a superior strategic position in the Transcaucasus. In particular, they were seeking to eliminate the possibility of a Russian advance on Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf in the event of a war. The 1908 report of General M.V. Alekseev of the General Staff, soon to be Chief of Staff (and, effectively, commander-in-chief) of the wartime Russian army, and heavily involved at this time in calls for a scheme of national defence, confirms an escalating fear towards Turkey in General Staff thinking after 1905.\textsuperscript{244} Alekseev warned that Turkish army reform (changing to a three-year rotation system) and German plans for a Berlin to Baghdad railway made the position in the Caucasus no less threatening than in Europe. In response he urged creating a broader railway network, with a line through the main Caucasus range connecting Tiflis with the Russian interior, a line from Borzhum to Kars, and a further line in the Tiflis-Kars-Erevan area for forward concentration of forces and lateral communication on the Caucasus front.\textsuperscript{245} He also recommended strengthening Kars, a strategic fortification the General Staff recognized to be quite outdated by the turn of the century, by building strong points on its approaches. In the event only Alekseev’s railway recommendations were to be in any way fulfilled by the outbreak of war, the Russian rail net in the Caucasus undergoing considerable improvement in 1912 whilst Kars remained neglected, continuing to lack both mortars and heavy ordnance.

The need for a new strategic railroad in the Caucasus had long been recognized. At the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 a railroad had only existed between Tiflis and Poti, and only in the years following that war had a line been constructed linking the railhead at Tiflis with European Russia through Elizavetpol, Baku, Petrovsk and Vladikavkaz. This line was extremely circuitous however-eight times longer than a direct line between Vladikavkaz and Tiflis- and the need for a new railroad across the main

\textsuperscript{244} Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka. pp.78-80. See also Fuller, Strategy and Power p.436
Caucasus range had been acknowledged in a special session of the Council of Ministers in 1894. In a report to Stolypin in November 1910 War Minister Sukhomlinov urged redoubled efforts in this direction, pointing to Turkish efforts to improve their own road and rail communications. Also significant was the fact that Ottoman Empire was able to concentrate forces on the Transcaucasus border several times exceeding the number of forces that could be maintained in the Caucasus military district in peacetime. This made maintaining Russian superiority in the speed of initial mobilization and a secure deployment of troops from European Russia a strategic priority. In addition to a line crossing the main Caucasus range Sukhomlinov therefore reiterated calls for additional lines along the Kars-Borzhum and Kars-Sarykamysh axes of advance.

In the meantime, Colonel Khol’msen in Constantinople presented regular reports to the General Staff stressing the importance the Turkish government, in the aftermath of the Young Turks’ consolidation of power in 1909, were now putting on intelligence activities in the Caucasus. The Turkish War Minister’s correspondence with the Grand Vizier, to which Khol’msen had access, showed that the War Ministry had approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer several consular posts to military officers, these posts being on the Black Sea coast and in Kars. Khol’msen also noted that Turkestan and the Caucasus were now being ‘inundated’ with Pan-Islamic printed material. In addition the Turks had organized their own counter-espionage service in Constantinople, forcing Khol’msen himself to operate with greater caution. The military agent urged the Russians to organize a counter-espionage service on Turkish territory in response, a task he proposed be laid upon the civilian political police (the Okhrana) rather than on the already overworked consular service. Traditional service rivalries between the MVD and the War Ministry prevented such proposals being clearly implemented however, whilst Khol’msen’s own reading of events was challenged by the official Russian ambassador in Constantinople, and former political agent to Bukhara, N.V.Charykov. Whilst Khol’msen interpreted Turkish military reform as directed against Russia, Charykov interpreted these reforms as being directed against Greece and Bulgaria. Only in the autumn of 1911 meanwhile did the War Ministry satisfy its domestic needs by establishing independent counter-

246 RGVIA F.2000 Op.1 d.3871 dl.8
intelligence sections in the Petersburg, Vil'na, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Caucasus, Omsk, Irkutsk, Priamur and Turkestan military districts. 

In 1910 meanwhile, in accordance with its new mobilization schedule, the General Staff worked out four war plan variants for possible combat on the Turkish-Transcaucasian border. The first foresaw a war with Turkey alone, the second a war with Turkey as a member of a hostile coalition, the third a war which Turkey did not enter till some point after other powers had already begun hostilities (as actually occurred in 1914). The fourth variant covered, which obviously carried no direct combat implications for the Caucasus, foresaw Turkey maintaining its neutrality in a general conflict. The worst variant was correctly seen to be the third one, a war in which the Caucasus forces would be hard pressed to meet both internal and external threats having already dispatched half their strength to the European front.

In both the first two variants Russian forces were initially to pursue offensive action, the main striking force being concentrated on the crucial Kars-Erzerum axis whilst a large force of cavalry was to gather in the Erevan sector on the Russian left for flanking and security duties. The cavalry and other troops were to debouch onto the Bayazet and Alashker plains and cut off Erzerum from Turkish forces marching up from the south. Subsequently they were to dispatch a strong detachment to the Alla-Dag and Sharian-Dag ranges to raise the local population against the Turks and carry out other important intelligence tasks. In the first variant the Caucasus forces could look to a reinforcement from European Russia of four corps, facilitating a general advance into Anatolia, the main operational base of the Turkish army. In the second these reinforcements would not be forthcoming, and the possibility of a change from an initial offensive to a defensive was taken into account, the Caucasus forces being instructed to secure defensive positions appropriate to small forces.

As the war actually developed along the third variant in 1914, most of these plans were at first thrown into disarray by the Turkish offensive, and the only reserve upon which the Caucasus corps could draw was the 2nd Turkestan corps. Comparing the planning for the European and Caucasian fronts however, Zaionchkovskii commented favourably on the clear operational goals the Caucasus corps had been set, which he compared in glowing terms to the very general and almost aimless disposition given the European forces.

249 Gilensen, "'Osinye Gnezda" pod konsul'skoi kryshei' pp.53-54. On the travails of organizing a counter-intelligence service, see also: Shelukhin, 'Razvedyvatel'nye organy v strukture vysshego voennogo upravleniia rossiiskoi imperii nachala XX veka (1906-1914 gg.)' pp. 21-23.
forces by the staff planning of 1910. Possibly he also saw in the Caucasus army, where operational clarity made a virtue of small numbers in a complicated political situation, a model for the early Soviet army. His final comment was particularly revealing on the European/Asiatic division in strategic planning:

The Caucasus and European theatres present a case, not only in regard to preparatory work but also in the character of conducting war when it occurred, where it is almost as if there were two different armies and two different general staffs. 250

4.3 Afghanistan and the British Fear.

Probably the theatre dealt with by the Asiatic Department of the General Staff that drew the greatest attention and coverage in the West was that of India and Afghanistan. It was fear of a Russian invasion of India that dominated most Western analysis of Russian campaigns and war-planning in Asia, and that sent the journalist Charles Marvin to specifically question the head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, L. N. Sobolev, over Russian intentions in 1882. Following the initial investigations of Bariatinskii’s staff, which amounted to little more than strategic speculations, Russian war planning for the Indian and Afghan theatres became much more detailed following the conquest of Central Asia itself as a consequence of the natural increase in geographical knowledge. This had particular relevance in the sphere of river borne transport, which had played a prominent place in Russian thinking towards Central Asia since the time of Peter the Great. Many Russian strategic thinkers up until the conquest of Central Asia had theorized as to the use that could be made of the Amu and Syr-Darya rivers with their accompanying inland seas, the Caspian and Aral, as communication routes for consolidation and further expansion. The strategic plans of Khrulev in 1863 for instance had been tied up with his own plans for a commercial venture, envisaging a river and rail network based around a commercial colony in Balkhan bay on the eastern bank of the Caspian. This route he prophesied would overtake in speed of delivery contemporary commerce routes across the Suez isthmus or round the Cape of Good Hope, underlining how many Russian thinkers continued to tie together military strategy and commercial exploitation. However, with the conquest of Central Asia the limitations of riverine transport, and the consequent need for railways, became fully apparent, thanks in large part to the statistical-geographical work carried out by one of Governor-General

250 Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka., p.338.
Kaufman's most efficient servitors, and a future head of the General Staff's Asiatic Department, Colonel L. F. Kostenko.\footnote{Kostenko produced two major works on Central Asia; his earlier \textit{Sredniaia Azia i vodvorenie v nei Russkoi grazhdanstvennosti} (St.Petersburg: Tipografia v. Bezobrazova i komp., 1871) examined the value of Central Asia as a market for Russian goods and remained hopeful about the possibilities of the Central Asian rivers, whilst noting their difficulties. His more comprehensive three-volume \textit{Turkestanskii krai. Opyt voenno-statisticheskogo obozreniia} of 1880, performed as closely as possible to the outlines of the Military-Scientific Committee of the General Staff (Tom I, p.ii), remains the key text to communication routes in Turkestan in the period. The whole of the second volume was dedicated to this topic, and stresses overland routes.} The Amu-Darya is prone to unexpected and dramatic shifts of course due to moving sandbanks and erosion whilst the Syr Darya is not navigable due to braiding of its channels and shallow waters in its lower reaches. In addition sections of both rivers freeze in winter and dry out in the summer. Attempts to use these rivers as strategic lines of communication were to prove as doomed as earlier attempts in the 1850s to create a substantial Aral Sea fleet, which similarly founded on local environmental conditions.\footnote{Crean, 'The Governor-Generalship of Turkestan under K. P. von Kaufmann, 1867-1887.' pp.25-6; Marvin, \textit{The Russian Advance Toward India} p.295.} General Kaufman emerged a firm advocate from the very beginning for the importance of railway construction in Central Asia, pointing out that it had taken the War Ministry ten months in 1868 to reinforce Central Asia to meet the Muslim revolt there.\footnote{Shastitko (ed.), \textit{Russko-Indiiskie Otnosheniia v XIX v} pp.160-1.} The strong case he built up may have rested partly on his own natural inclinations, being an engineer by original training, and partly from contemporary conceptions that technological penetration would lead to the more rapid 'civilization' of unstable borderlands. Bariatinskii had been a supporter of railway penetration in the Caucasus for the same reason, and Finance Minister Sergei Vitte, nephew of the famous Caucasus general R. A. Fadeev, later came to apply some of the same thinking to Siberia. Russian thinking on this issue also fitted into the general European intellectual current of the time. Kaufman supported railway construction both from the point of view of security and from its commercial advantages, but never lived to see the full network he advocated built. Before 1880 Russia did not have a single railway line in Asia in contrast to the 15,000km of track in British India, a situation gradually corrected by construction of the Trans-Caspian line in 1880-1888.\footnote{Hauner, \textit{What is Asia to Us?} p.99.} The Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich (1850-1918), a graduate of the General Staff Academy, conducted three expeditions in the period 1877-79 to determine the optimum route for a Central Asian railway, but not till 1905 was his recommendation of a line via Orenburg to Tashkent constructed. The
ultimate goal of railway development in Asia, the linkage of the Central Asian and Trans-Siberian lines, although proposed in the Tsarist period, had to wait till Soviet times for its full accomplishment.

The conquest of Central Asia also had the natural consequence of bringing Russia into more direct diplomatic contact with Afghanistan and India. These contacts soon emphasized to the Russian General Staff the cultural and political fluidity of the area they had come to inherit. As early as 1867, Lt.-Colonel Abramov at Iany Kurgan near Samarkand encountered an envoy from the ruler of Indor in India. This man, after an arduous and eventful two-year trip, bore with him offers of support from that ruler in the event of a Russian invasion of India. The Russians did not take this declaration, written rather dramatically in invisible ink, very seriously since it lacked specifics and appeared to be based mainly on rumours circulating in India about Russian conquests. Nevertheless, although the military governor of Turkestan refused to open diplomatic relations, the event was noted at the time for its political interest. The activity of adventurers like Ramchandr Baladzhi and Iskander-Khan also had the effect of somewhat increasing Russian knowledge of the area. Such contacts were particularly important given the exceptional constriction the General Staff suffered throughout the period on this frontier, that of not having a military agent in the neighbouring state available to provide on-the-spot information.

The presence of Afghan refugees in Central Asia was a commonplace by the time of Russia’s arrival in the area, many Afghans fleeing the civil strife that had swallowed their own country in 1863-68. A great number of these refugees joined the armies of the Central Asian rulers, and Afghan mercenaries fought alongside the Emir of Bukhara’s subjects during the Russian siege of Tashkent in 1865. Iskander-Khan, grandson of Dost Mohammed and nephew of Shir Ali Khan, both Amirs of Afghanistan in their time, had fled to Bukhara and then Turkestan after 1866. In 1868 the Afghan émigré fighting detachment he led joined forces with the Russians, and Iskander-Khan himself enlisted in the Russian service, being made a Lt.-Colonel. Taught the Russian language in Tashkent by M. A. Terent’ev, it was not long before, in response to his own petition, the young Afghan sardar departed for St. Petersburg to receive a proper

255 Lt.-General Aleksandr Konstantinovich Abramov, (1836-86) Participant in conquest of Central Asia, from 1868 head of the Zeravshan okrug and from 1877 head of Fergana oblast’. Member of the IRGO and, as an amateur vostokoved, indirect discoverer of the valuable Koran Osman. This was later returned to Central Asia by the early Soviet government as a propaganda gesture.


military education. Requests by Governor-General Kaufman to the Amir Shir Ali to allow this young
Afghan to return to his homeland were met by a cool diplomatic silence. The Amir had good cause to be
suspicious of a potential rival to the throne who now possessed the benefits of a Russian military education.
Dissatisfied with what he saw as the Tsarist government’s passivity, Iskander-Khan tendered his
resignation in 1871 despite the protests of both Kaufman and War Minister Miliutin, and sought
employment in Britain. There he was to be equally disappointed in attempts to gain support for his personal
cause, and after travelling to Turkey during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, he settled in Persia.

Another Afghan who found refuge in Russian Turkestan in this period, one destined for a much
more prestigious fate, was of course the future Amir 'Abd al-Rahman. Interviewed in 1870 by L. N.
Sobolev, Rahman related details both on the route of his flight from Afghanistan and on the armed forces of
Bukhara and Afghanistan (repaying in the process the distinct coldness shown towards him by the Emir of
Bukhara). Rahman estimated the size of the Afghan army at that time at around 40,000 men and informed
the Russians of English encouragement to Afghan expansionism in the contested border area between the
Bukharan and Afghan realms.258

Ramchandr Baladzhi, meanwhile, was a European-educated Indian who claimed to be a nephew of
the famous Indian Mutiny rebel Nana Sahib and who spent the latter half of his own life trying to gain
support to liberate his homeland. Arriving in St. Petersburg from Europe in 1878, Baladzhi soon made a
useful series of political and social contacts, and at the special petition of the leading vostokoved V. V.
Grigor’ev he accompanied the Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich on his third research trip through
Central Asia in 1879. The Grand Duke enthusiastically thanked Grigor’ev for proposing Baladzhi as a
travelling companion, emphasizing his value in reconnaissance of routes for the war against the English in
India that was ‘inevitable.’259 The Indian was recalled from the Grand Duke’s party however due to
suspicions in higher quarters about his character and his ‘bad influence’ on the Grand Duke.260 On his
return, L. N. Sobolev, head of the Asiatic Department, questioned the Indian, who reported that a Sikh envoy

260 In later years the Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich became the black sheep of the Romanov family,
continually involved in scandals and afflicted by what most contemporaries interpreted as mental illness.
As a result Central Asia became his place of permanent exile from the royal court, and there he rapidly
he claimed to have met whilst in Central Asia, one Charen-Singh, promised the support of around 300,000 armed men if Russia invaded India.

Baladzhi provided the General Staff with much general information, some of it useful and some of it of negligible value, the latter based on misconstrued notions of the kin-relationships of the Indian princely states. He was considered useful enough to be granted the sum of 400 roubles to help him out of his immediate financial difficulties, and efforts were made to recruit him to the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. He was to be placed at the disposal of General Skobelev for relations with the Turkmen and Iskander-Khan, the latter then residing in Persia. Unhappy at the lack of positive commitments from his interviews with Russian War and Foreign Ministry officials however, Baladzhi left for Persia. There he aided for a while in Japanese-Persian diplomatic negotiations, writing later from Baghdad to inform his St.Petersburg mentors that he would render them no further aid. In September 1880 Sobolev reported such difficulties with the Indian as an agent that the decision was ultimately taken to discontinue his subsidy and sever all communication with him. A last ill-fated attempt by Baladzhi to gain credit with the Russian authorities by participating in General Skobelev’s expedition against the Turkmen ended catastrophically. Skobelev regarded the Indian as a potential English spy and confined him to work in the Russian transport column. Disillusioned by both his own treatment and by the brutality of the Russian military campaign, Baladzhi attempted to leave for Herat but was arrested by the Russians and sent, first to Baku and then on to Moscow, the decision ultimately being taken to expel him, penniless, from the country. Contact was subsequently entirely discontinued.

Sikh offers of support came again first-hand in 1879 meanwhile from Baba Ram Singh, the head of the Sikh Namdkhari sect in India then in exile in Rangoon, this time predicated upon the prophecy of a local guru that English rule in the Punjab would only last 34 years. The Russians were promised the support of 315,000 Sikhs should they invade. The envoy, a certain Charn Singh, was questioned by Lt.-Colonel Korolk’ov of the General Staff serving in Zeravshan okrug, but returned to his home in October 1878
without contact being renewed. War planning was aided and affected by all these developments, the
Russians carrying out their first exercise in serious war planning for the Central Asian theatre during the
diplomatic crisis of 1878.

Action in Central Asia in the event of a break with England during the Balkan crisis was the
subject of a special meeting of the Tsar, War Minister and the Asiatic Governor-Generals, amongst others,
on the 8th April 1878. Here various suggestions were considered. Baron Tornau, a member of the State
Council, recommended the acquisition of Persian Astrabad [present-day Gorgan] in return for territory
Persia would acquire by Russia’s deal with Turkey at San Stefano. Such a deal, and the consequent gaining
of Persia as a diplomatic ally, was decisively rejected by the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Asiatic
Department, N. K. Giers, who pointed out that England was in a position to strike immediate and direct
blows at Persia in the event of such an alliance. In Giers’ view, Persia could prove substantially more
useful to the Russian cause as an officially neutral state. Governor-General fon Kaufman, meanwhile,
saw a demonstration in Central Asia as the best means to affect Britain politically in India. For this he
recommended the dispatch of two (in practice, later three) columns, one through Bukhara to around the
town of Shirabad and the second, composed of forces of the Caucasus military district, towards Merv. The
Orenburg Governor-General, Kryzhanovskii, was extremely pessimistic about such a demonstration
achieving anything significant; only an invasion force of around 150,000 men advancing toward Herat
would influence British policy in his view. Given the poverty of communications and the immense fiscal
and military resources such a plan would require, this scheme must have appeared clearly impracticable at
the time. Kryzhanovskii was suggesting by proxy in fact that Russia lay in no position to offer any
immediate threat to England in the East. Kryzhanovskii’s opposition to Kaufman’s proposals may in part
have been influenced by professional jealousy, Kryzhanovskii having originally coveted Kaufman’s role as

263 Shastitko (ed.), Russko-Indiiskie Otmoshenija v XIX, pp.243-44. It is unclear from the sources whether
this Cham-Singh was the same ‘Charen-Singh’ Baladzhi claims to have met, but the laws of probability
make this highly likely.
264 Giers probably had in mind the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57, which had been directly motivated by
earlier British fears of Russian manipulation of Persian policy. N. K. Giers has been credited in the past
with helping to ‘tame’ the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry; in 1875-1882 he was joint head of
both the Chancellory and the Asiatic section. See: Robert M. Slusser ‘The Role of the Foreign Ministry’ in
Ivo J. Lederer (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press 1962) pp.204-5. For a balanced view of Giers’ influence, see also: Ritchie ‘The
Asiatic Department during the reign of Alexander II.’ p.342 and Koot ‘The Asiatic Department of the
governor-general in Turkestan. The council resolved to carry out a demonstration along the lines suggested by fon Kaufman, although it rejected Kaufman’s request for an increase in the permanent forces stationed in Turkestan on the grounds of expense. The Caucasus and Turkestan columns were to coordinate with one another by flying column or other means if possible and an ambassador was to be dispatched to the Amir of Afghanistan to assure him this movement implied no hostile intent towards him. This latter consideration resulted in the Stoletov Mission to Kabul, probably the most famous outcome of this session, and the root cause of the subsequent Anglo-Afghan war.265 General Stoletov himself was selected as an officer well acquainted with the customs and habits of the East, knowing the Persian language and having founded the town of Krasnovodsk on the eastern bank of the Caspian in 1869.

During this period, unsurprisingly, the General Staff intensified its military-statistical work by covert missions in the Afghan and Persian theatres and studies of communication routes, seeking to bolster the unreliable knowledge provided by adventurers like Iskander-Khan and Baladzhi. This effort foreshadowed similar developments in British India, the British rapidly increasing their intelligence activity in the aftermath of the Second Afghan War with the creation of the Intelligence Department.266 Both the Russians and the British sought, in particular, to expand their network of agents in the sensitive border regions, the British for instance by establishing a permanent consul at Mashad in 1885 obtaining an agent network, the so-called ‘C’ and ‘D’ agencies, that had native emissaries in Russian Samarkand and Sarrakhs.267 On the Russian side, Colonel Matveev of the General Staff conducted an extensive reconnaissance through the Bukharan and Afghan realms in 1877, concluding that the Kabul plain would be the site of any future large-scale Anglo-Russian conflict. This mission made use of the warmer diplomatic relations existing at that point between Shir Ali’s government and the Russian Tsar, a window of opportunity that would not pertain in future. Matveev was tasked to investigate not only the shortest possible route between Russian Turkestan and the Indian border, but also to pursue a range of political and scientific questions. These included assessing the mood of the local tribal populations towards Russia

alongside determining the heights of the local mountain ranges and the positioning of key geographical points in what was still at this time a very understudied region. For this reason a civilian astronomer, Shvartz, who at that time was filling the post of director at Tashkent observatory, accompanied the mission. However the onset of winter and the opening of Anglo-Afghan hostilities, as Matveev himself admitted, left these tasks only half-completed. Investigating the existing pack-roads in northern Afghanistan and eastern Bukhara, Matveev gave an assessment of which routes would be most suitable for the movement of artillery and military transport. As the best route (from Hissar to Balkh) passed through a near-waterless desert, Matveev supplemented this study with reports on the shortest routes to nearby water resources such as the Amu-Darya. He noted the suspicion with which his party were regarded by their Afghan escorts, many of whom suspected the Russians of being covert propagandists for the rival to the Afghan throne, ‘Abd al-Rahman, who was then of course still living in Russian-held Samarkand. The Afghan army itself Matveev felt to be fairly well equipped and disciplined, particularly in comparison to its Bukharan counterpart, where troops often paraded with muskets lacking locks or even trigger mechanisms. Afghan regular troops by contrast bore smooth-bore percussion arms of British make and drill was carried out according to British manuals, the instructions being translated into Afghan or Persian. In a passage that might have been expected to dissuade the Soviet invaders of 1979 had they read it, Matveev noted the Afghans’ natural warlike spirit and that ‘despite their lack of moral training, the Afghan forces possess a good military spirit and are always ready to meet an enemy no matter from what side he comes from.’

Areas like Kafiristan south of the Hindu Kush had also, he noted, conspicuously foiled the efforts of conquerors throughout history, from Alexander of Macedon to Tamerlane to Nadir Shah. The tribal populations of these areas could deploy significant numbers of irregular warriors- the area of settlement around the left bank of the river Swat alone allegedly disposing of around 30,000 riflemen. Such figures, Matveev noted, ‘even if exaggerated, testify...to the significant, although scattered, military forces of Afghanistan.’ Matveev concluded his study with a strategic review of possible theatres of Anglo-Russian conflict in the region. This pointed out that the Turkestan forces acting on their own could only undertake

269 Ibid., p.43.
270 Ibid., pp.44-50.
action of a limited and purely demonstrative character, with their very furthest reach a possible advance through mountainous Badakhshan across the Baraghil pass and down to the headwaters of the river Indus. Such considerations undoubtedly influenced General Kaufman’s very conservative proposals in April the following year and contrast dramatically with English fears in the same period that the Russians intended a full-scale invasion of India.

Herat itself was also the subject of a visit by Colonel Grodekov, a talented linguist and ethnographer, in 1878, under very different political circumstances and with a very different outlook from Matveev’s mission. In Grodekov’s own words, this mission was undertaken when Kaufman had already gathered the Turkestan forces on the Bukharan border, ready ‘to move south to the borders of Afghanistan and further if circumstances demanded it.’\(^{271}\) Grodekov was amongst the first to advocate the division of Afghanistan, with the special region of Afghan Turkestan being turned into a Russian protectorate. He pointed out that the second largest khanate in the region, that of Maimana, had only been subjugated by the Afghan central government under Shir Ali three years previously. The local Uzbek population in northern Afghanistan suffered the oppression of high taxes with no access to arms or positions of authority, and during his own trip in the region Grodekov witnessed Afghan soldiers filling their leisure time by beating Uzbeks with whips in the streets. As a consequence, according to Grodekov’s account, the whole of the local Uzbek population anxiously awaited a Russian advance southward, having heard tales of the fairness and justice of Russian rule from Central Asian Muslims on pilgrimage every April to Ali’s tomb in Mazar-i-Sharif.\(^{272}\) The Afghan army itself Grodekov felt to be composed of good-quality material, but the infantry in particular was, he argued, actually hampered by their drill-manuals based on English models, which Grodekov regarded as ill-suited to the Afghan character. British influence in equipment and training extended as far as belt-buckles and other fittings bought in India and consequently bearing such incongruous mottoes as ‘1st Regiment Bengal Light Cavalry’ and ‘God Save the Queen’\(^ {273}\). Grodekov’s survey included a review of routes to Herat and advocated the use of special transport carts to move artillery in the region. Such carts had first been utilized by the Russians in the Fergana valley in 1877, serving as an indication of the Russian army’s growing expertise in steppe and mountain warfare. He also


\(^{272}\) Ibid., pp.63-4.
noted that several local nationalities, such as the Hazzaris and Jamshanids, would probably aid a Russian advance on Herat. The Hazzaris had already, uninvited, assisted the Russians in their local campaigns against the Tekke Turkmen.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.105.}

At the same time, during the height of the Second Afghan War, Governor-General fon Kaufman elected to despatch to Bukhara a man ‘well acquainted with native languages and customs’, Captain G. A. Arendarenko, for the gaining of political intelligence regarding Bukhara and northern Afghanistan.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.97.} Arendarenko, later the primary candidate for the role of political agent in Bukhara in 1886 (a post ultimately taken up by N. V. Charykov of the Foreign Ministry), was a man fully experienced in local administration in Turkestan. His journal reports were read by Kaufman and members of the Turkestan administration and passed on to the War Ministry and the MID, and formed a vital source of intelligence at this time on the Central Asian border region of the Russian Empire.

The ultimate result of Russian military preparations and intelligence probes across the Turkestan border in 1877-78 was in the end however to emphasize to the Russians how much knowledge they still lacked on the region. It led in addition to calls to hasten the absorption of the Turkmen lands into the Russian Empire in order to gain a secure transport corridor. In particular, in 1879, Colonel Petrusevich, recently returned from Khorassan and drawing up a military-statistical portrait of that region for subsequent boundary negotiations, lamented the low general level of Russian knowledge regarding the East. Russian efforts in his view came off particularly badly in comparison with those of her ‘natural enemy in the East’, England. Despite the great distance of North Persia from Peshawur, for example, British travellers like Butler and Baker had provided the Anglo-Indian authorities with extensive data on that region. Russia by contrast was in the main compelled to continue to employ data first gathered by the Khanykov expedition twenty years before. He therefore argued that Russia urgently needed to become acquainted both with the tribes and territory between Herat, Kabul and the Indian border, whilst also maintaining a net of military agents in Persia (where up until now she had deployed only diplomatic representatives) alongside a military
agent in Afghanistan. Four years after his 1878 study meanwhile, Grodekov wrote a supplementary note, reviewing routes running between Russia's now newly-founded Trans-Caspian province and Herat. This review began by admitting that when Kaufman had gathered his columns on the border in 1878, the Russian high command knew nothing of the country through which they may have had to pass, nor of the nationalities they would meet there. As a result of subsequent events, Grodekov felt that the experience of 1878 had demonstrated the fact that 'the heroic period of Turkestan...is now ended.' Hopes to use the Turkestan theatre as a base from which to menace India had foundered upon the lack of geographical exits the region provided; consequently the onus for providing this advantage now fell upon the Trans-Caspian region. Grodekov's critique reflected a new swing in Russian strategic policy in the region as greater and greater attention was now devoted to penetrating Afghanistan from the west, i.e. from the new railheads available in the Trans-Caspian province. In this same period the Russian General Staff worked up its most detailed warplan yet for the Central Asian theatre. In a war with England alone, the premise of this plan began, 'in view of our comparatively weak fleet in the Baltic, White Sea and Eastern Ocean, we must go on the offensive in Central Asia.' This plan foresaw three distinct stages to such an operation: the occupation of Afghan Turkestan and Herat, the occupation of part or all of Afghanistan with a concentration of forces on the Indian border, and an invasion of India. Despite this ambitious outline the detailed development and working-up of such a scheme then extended only as far as its initial stage, i.e. the occupation of Herat and northern Afghanistan. Moreover the warplan admitted that given 'the very modest and fragmentary information' available regarding the political mood in Afghanistan and India, the frequent declarations of support received from the local populations by the Russians in the past had to be treated with the greatest caution: We can only count on this, that hatred towards us is less strong than hatred towards the English and that we, even unloved, are respected. This plan hinged upon the creation of two operational groups, one on the Amu-Darya and the other, and main striking force, in Trans-Caspia. This latter grouping, initially comprising 12.5 battalions, 24 guns and

278 RGVIA F.402 Op.2 D.34 d.1
18 sotnias, was to receive reinforcements from European Russia and move on Herat. The war-plan
contained appendices regarding maintaining the health of troops in desert conditions, taking into account in
passing British experience in both Africa and Egypt. In addition to this was attached a detailed scheme for
the siege of Herat itself using the incremental approach of parallel trenches dug by engineer forces over
successive nights in cooperation with heavy artillery fire, with accompanying diagrams of that city’s
medieval walls and gates. 280

In its general pursuit of knowledge on the region in this period meanwhile the General Staff did
not neglect to also use academic instruments. Professor Ivan Pavlovich Minaev (1840-1890), a senior
lecturer in Sanskrit literature at St. Petersburg university, carried out three research trips to India in the
period 1874-1886. As one of Russia’s leading Indologists, Minaev was deeply involved in helping resolve
Russian Asiatic policy throughout this period, studying contemporary events alongside the ancient history
of his area of expertise. Recent archival evidence has demonstrated however that this undertaking also
included previously unsuspected links with the Russian War Ministry. After his trip to India in 1880
Minaev met repeatedly with both L. N. Sobolev of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department and with Chief
of the General Staff N. N. Obruchev, whilst Governor-General Kaufman had already consulted him about
the Indian Namdhari sect in connection with the Charn Singh mission of 1878. 281 General Kaufman
attempted to get one of the topographers on his military staff to accompany Minaev on his first trip to make
surveys around Peshwar, the major town beyond the Khyber Pass. The Military-Scientific Committee of
the Main Staff, meanwhile, communicated to Minaev questions on a series of points it would be militarily
valuable to learn more answers to. These included the attitude of the Sikh states, in view of the envoys
recently received in Turkestan and information gained by General Stoletov in Kabul, the situation in the
north-east (Burma and Assam), and the stance of India’s other native rulers, in particular the sovereigns of
Gwailor and Indor. Although Minaev provided the staff with little information of long-term value, he did
provide insights into some of the difficulties facing English rule in India, including the unwillingness of
Indian troops to fight in Europe, and the complaints and unrest caused by the tax burden and the unpopular
Afghan war. Minaev was himself under observation by the British authorities during the duration of his

279 Ibid., dl.2-3.
280 Ibid., dl.35-91.
second stay, and he urged on Obruchev the need to form a large network of ‘unofficial’ (i.e. secret) agents to obtain information in future. On his third trip in 1885-86, Minaev was accompanied by Captain A. Timler of the Russian army, of whom he formed a low general opinion, the most common expression used with regard to this officer in Minaev’s diary being durak (fool). Timler himself observed the manoeuvres then being conducted in the Anglo-Indian army, and reported on the same, writing articles later published in the Voennyi Sbornik. Minaev himself was a pessimist on the chances of any Russian expedition to India succeeding, and to his diary confided his horror that in conversation with staff officers like Obruchev such a prospect was raised even theoretically. The main goal set Minaev during his trips to India was not the gathering of strategic information but the evaluation of the Indian nationalist movement and any aid it might render the Russians in the event of Russian pressure in this direction. Unimpressed by the Anglicized leaders of the newly-formed Indian National Congress however, Minaev recommended that the Russians count on nothing from the Indian intelligentsia.

Undoubtedly the most aggressive Russian strategist with regard to a possible invasion of India in this period was L. N. Sobolev (1844-1913). He was the aforementioned head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department at the time of Charles Marvin’s visit and a full member of the Imperial Geographical Society, having already received the coveted gold medal for his statistical work in the Zeravshan okrug. Sobolev had a reputation as Russia’s most experienced man on Anglo-Afghan affairs, writing a long commentary on the course of events as they occurred during the Second Afghan War in the pages of the Russkii Invalid. This work was later reflected in a book, entitled ‘A Page from the History of the Eastern Question: the Anglo-Afghan feud. In an addendum to the work he listed various plans for Russian invasions of India, including those of Napoleon and Paul I, and gave a brief historical account of all past invasions of that country from Kira and the Mongols to Nadir Shah. This obsession of Sobolev’s with previous invasions of India probably reached its zenith in 1886-1888, years which saw the publication in the Voennyi Sbornik of

282 Russko-Indiiskie Otnoshenia v XIX v. pp.181-98, 263-4
284 Ibid., pp.113-14.
285 L. N. Sobolev, Stranitsa iz istorii vostochnogo voprosa. Anglo-Afganskaia rasprava. (ocherkt voiny 1879-1880) (St. Petersburg: Tipografia ‘Russkaia Skoropechatnia’ 1885) This work was a very mixed compilation of material, consisting in the main of recitations of the telegraphic correspondence of the
a fifteen-part series by him on the past conquerors of India. During his time in Central Asia before joining the General Staff, Sobolev had also of course become acquainted whilst in Samarkand with 'Abd al-Rahman, the man who would later replace Shir Ali as Amir of Afghanistan. His views on the topic were shaped therefore both by intense study of the contemporary situation and of its historical aspect; as he told Charles Marvin on his visit to the War Ministry:

if Nadir Shah could march from Askabad [sic] to Bokhara [sic] on the one side, and to Meshed, Herat, and Candahar [sic] on the other, we could do the same.287

These views Sobolev expounded more fully both in his book on the Anglo-Afghan war and in a pamphlet at the turn of the century entitled 'Would a Russian expedition to India be possible?' In this latter publication Sobolev continued to espouse the conviction that, based on historical experience, such an expedition was possible—though not necessarily desirable. Perhaps unsurprisingly given that he also briefly served as minister-president for the Russian-backed Bulgarian government, Sobolev set settlement of the Black Sea line of influence as the key to Anglo-Russian harmony in the rest of Asia—'the weaker...English rule in India...the more compliant they will be in Europe.'289

Marvin encountered profound disagreement with Sobolev's plans amongst some of his most prominent contemporaries however. Grodekov, who as we have seen personally visited Herat in 1878, and who later became a Governor-General in both Central Asia and the Far East, in particular questioned Sobolev's true grasp of local conditions:

Soboleff [sic] has never served in any campaign in Central Asia. He does not know what warfare in Central Asia is. He lived for a time at

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English authorities alongside newspaper reports and descriptions of the key actions—Maiwand and the Kabul to Kandahar march.


288 L. N. Sobolev, Vozmozhen-li pokhod Russkikh v Indiiu? (Moscow: Tipografiia Okruzhnago Shtaba 1901)

289 Ibid., p.23 For details of Sobolev's appointment in the Bulgarian administration see: John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World pp.142-3, M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question p.229, Firuz Kazemzadeh, 'Russia and the Middle East' in Ivo J. Lederer, (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective pp.495-96. Future Minister of War A. F. Rediger left a useful account of his own service in the Bulgarian administration, mentioning Sobolev's policies whilst he was there: Rediger,
Samarcand, [sic] but Samarcand is a town, and a journey thither alone
in a carriage is very different from a march with an army on foot. He
regards the subject more from a civilian than a military point of view.

[At Geok Tepe]..we killed 20,000 camels during that campaign, in which
only 5,000 troops were engaged. We should need a good 300,000 men to
invade India, and where could we obtain the transport and supplies for
such a number? Rest assured that a Russian invasion of India is an
impossibility.290

If the question of a full invasion of India was a source of contention within Russian staff circles
however, the other factor in the Central Asian equation, namely the need to have knowledge of northern
Afghanistan in order to facilitate (in the event of a diplomatic break) an invasion of that sector of the
country, remained an accepted strategic constant. It was the northern Afghan theatre that the General Staff
saw as the main intended target, following traditional principles of always conducting an offensive in Asia
rather than awaiting attack, in the event of any future clash between either Afghanistan and Russia or an
Afghan-British coalition and Russia. This was spelt out in staff writings on the subject as late as 1903, the
strategic plans on that occasion envisaging four-fifths of a proposed assault force moving from Merv on
Herat whilst the remaining troops in two groups moved to encircle Mazar-i-Sharif.291 Later diplomatic
considerations only served to intensify the General Staff’s need to acquire knowledge regarding the region.
The Franco-Russian agreement of 1900-01 provided that in the event of Britain fighting France alone,
Russia would undertake to concentrate 300-350,000 troops on her Afghan border to menace the British
position in India. In the event of Britain attacking Russia, France was to reciprocate by entering the English
Channel and threatening a naval desant on the British coast of 100-150,000 men.292 In practice of course
either operation would have been attended by considerable difficulty. The concentration of these 300,000
men on the Afghan border, which Grodekov in 1882, as we have seen, regarded as impossible given the

Istoriia Moei Zhizni. T.1 pp. 120-156. Sobolev also left his own, tendentious, account of his experience in
290 Marvin, The Russian Advance Toward India p.152
291 Ia. A. Karamov, ‘Granitsa s Afganistanom v kontse XIX-nachale XXv. v voenno-strategicheskikh
292 A.V. Ignat’ev ‘Politika v Evrope, na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke’ in: Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossi
T.2 p.95
limitations of animal transport, appeared more feasible in this later period given the slow egress of railways across Central Asia. Nonetheless in its private considerations the Russian General Staff remained considerably more conservative over the number of troops it could realistically concentrate and deploy in this region than they were in mutual security pacts with their French counterparts. Moreover the Russian General Staff's own knowledge of northern Afghanistan had only began to acquire satisfactory dimensions during the course of the Anglo-Russian war scare of 1885.

In 1885 the military commander in Turkestan, Governor-General Rozenbakh, had successfully petitioned in March for a 10,000 rouble monetary grant for conducting intelligence operations in the border regions, with a further grant of 5,000 roubles being assigned in December that same year.293 Amongst the results of these awards was the despatch of an intelligence agent from Tashkent into Afghan Turkestan in March. This agent commented upon the difficulties presented by work in ‘Abd al-Rahman’s security state; in all the major towns he found himself detained and questioned on arrival. He reported the population of Mazar-i-Sharif, who were in the main Afghan, Uzbek and Tadjik, to be anti-Russian. In the event of a Russian invasion there would be a national uprising and all would fight. The Afghans themselves however were not loved in many areas, in part due to the large tax burden imposed on this region, in part from their habits and the difficulty of communication, particularly between Afghans and Turkmen. This correspondent reckoned there to be 8,500 infantry, 3,800 cavalry, 2 heavy and 26 light guns in the whole of northern Afghanistan at that time.294 The collected data gained by the Turkestan military district in this period was amalgamated into a massive military-statistical portrait of the region by Staff-Captain Trusov of the Turkestan military district. This study covered everything from a general geographical review to studies of the agricultural productivity, mineral wealth, administration, taxation system and tribal composition of northern Afghanistan. As an individual work it probably represented the Tsarist General Staff’s greatest and most comprehensive intelligence achievement on the region and was to remain unmatched in scale thereafter.295 In the aftermath of this tense period of relations, the financial resources allocated for studying northern Afghanistan were reduced, whilst ‘Abd al-Rahman’s ever-tightening security state made the gaining of such data increasingly complex. Such information as was obtained was therefore often limited to

294 Ibid. dl.21-34.
geographical descriptions or brief outlines of local political events. In 1893 for example the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara felt compelled to apologize to the Turkestan Chancellory for the low quantity and quality of data it had managed to collect on the region, blaming

the very difficult and unsuitable circumstances attending its acquisition,
since the vigilant patrols of Afghan border guards...deprived us of the chance to despatch intelligence agents well-acquainted with local conditions...and thus we had to be satisfied as far as possible with the interrogation of caravans and individuals arriving from Kabul and Char-vilayet. 296

The porous nature of the Russo-Afghan border and the potential threat from Afghanistan were also of concern to the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff. The Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman saw in the Afghan regular army a major bulwark for his state policies as a whole, and his reign witnessed several innovations in Afghan military organization. These included the acquisition of heavy artillery and mountain guns and the creation of supply bases at important strategic points around the country alongside an army transport park. In addition to this, and in opposition to the council of his own advisors, the Amir in 1895 introduced a more regulated recruitment system to facilitate the creation of a larger standing army with a trained reserve. 297 Islam meanwhile formed one of the central ideological bastions that the Amir utilized to support his state policies, and to this end during his reign he also directed the composition of two religious books, with a large publication run, advocating the importance of jihad (holy war) against the infidel. Staff Captain Lavr Kornilov during one of his intelligence missions in the northern Afghan regions in the late 1890s obtained a copy of one of these tracts for the Turkestan military district staff, a translation being made under the direction of famed local academic N. P. Ostroumov and passed on to the Russian War Ministry. 298 Such phenomena only served to fan the Russian General Staff’s fears that the Amir in a Russo-Afghan conflict would seek to raise Russia’s own Central Asian Muslim population against them. On the Russian side of the border meanwhile, the Amu-Darya and Transcaspian frontier guards late on into the period deployed barely one man per kilometre of border, with intervals of 90 versts between frontier posts.

along one recorded section. In 1900 O. V. Putiata, by then the head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department, calculated that, under existing conditions, military mobilization in Turkestan would be prolonged and inadequate. Forces north of the Amu-Darya would mobilize in 48 days and the forces disposed in Semirech’e would take even longer—82 days. Moreover, taking into account that one-third of the forces disposed of in Turkestan would have to remain behind to secure railheads and internal security, the Turkestan military district could only dispose of 40,000 men and 100 guns on the field of battle against a potential opponent. Putiata saw these figures as clearly insufficient given the threat of a ‘warlike Afghanistan’ and the ‘fanatical Muslim population’ of the Turkestan military district.299 For this reason, taking advantage of a sympathetic War Minister, border garrisons such as Kushk were built up and fortified at the turn of the century. Alongside this, measures were taken to increase the carrying capacity of the Trans-Caspian railroad, enabling the more rapid deployment of the 2nd Caucasus Army Corps to the Afghan border in case of need, and steps were taken to introduce the system of divisional organization to the Turkestan brigades. Whilst the cavalry were to be somewhat reduced, the Turkestan district was henceforward to deploy 70,000 as opposed to 50,000 infantry and 184 as opposed to 114 artillery pieces.300 Fears about the porousness of this border were not misplaced; within the early Soviet period an almost identical initial correlation of border troops to frontier allowed roving bands of basmachi to operate between Afghanistan and Central Asia with relative impunity.301

The immediate security of the border region with Afghan Turkestan was also the sphere that exercised the Asiatic Department of the General Staff greatest politically, the most important event following the disappointments experienced with Iskander-Khan and ‘Abd al-Rahman in the 1870s being the revolt of Ishaq Khan in 1888. This revolt was again intimately connected to the ethnic makeup of Afghan Turkestan itself, the Hazzaris and Jamshamids alongside Central Asian Uzbek, Tadjik and Turkmen elements forming ‘the Achilles heel of Afghan despotism’. Accordingly such elements could potentially advance the Russian cause in the event of an invasion. Envoys from these tribal elements had met up with Prince Dondukov-Korsakov during the visit of the latter to Merv in 1885, although the Russians ignored

300 Ibid., dl.39.
their declarations of devotion on that occasion. Later attempts in the early 1890s by these tribes to find safety on Russian territory from the persecution of 'Abd al-Rahman met refusal from the Russian authorities, anxious to maintain as good relations as possible with 'the Iron Amir'. However, undoubtedly the most important event in relation to these tribal groupings' attraction toward Russia was the revolt of Ishaq Khan in 1888. Traditional Soviet studies of this event have emphasized the Tsarist government's unwillingness to become in the least way involved with this rebellion. However, this has always left open the question, as one more recent study has pointed out, of why Ishaq Khan's envoy, Ahmed Khan, remained in Russian Turkestan for over three months, and what role Russian envoys did play in the revolt. The picture that emerges from the archival evidence is of a division within Tsarist policymaking bodies on the issue, with Foreign Ministry 'doves' very much attempting to rein in the more hawkish War Ministry.

On the 31st July 1888 a new envoy from Ishaq Khan arrived in Russian Turkestan requesting aid for the sardar's revolt against 'Abd al-Rahman in the form of rifles, ammunition and, if possible, Russian forces. The policy debate this then provoked in Russian governmental circles highlighted internal divisions from the very first. On the 12th August Major-General Kostenko, head of the General Staff's Asiatic Department, declared himself in favour of supporting Ishaq Khan's cause by covertly supplying him with arms whilst publicly maintaining Russia's recently-concluded diplomatic agreement with England. Kostenko noted that:

Such a form of action is practiced in Europe quite frequently, and in Asia is applied nearly always. [...] If Ishak [sic] Khan is triumphant he will place relations regarding us in the same state as that in which now exists the Bukharan and Khivan khans. And this will be quite natural, since through both geographical, ethnographic and historical conditions Char-vilayet comprises one whole with the territory of the Bukharan

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302 A. S. 'Stranitsa iz istorii nashe politiki v srednei azii' VE 3 (1908) pp.685-98.
304 Lee, The 'Ancient Supremacy' p.502
Such a course of action was firmly supported by the General Staff’s reigning Anglo-Afghan expert, L. N. Sobolev, who in a report five days earlier had advocated the despatch of both arms and Muslim officers to aid Ishaq Khan. Northern Afghanistan, he pointed out, was populated primarily by Uzbeks and Tadjiks, ‘who were and always will be enemies of the Afghans.’ However, both the Russian political agent in Bukhara, N. V. Charykov, and his superior at the MID, Foreign Minister N. K. Giers, were opponents from the very first to the idea of supporting this local uprising. On the 7th August the War Minister, P. S. Vannovskii, wrote to the Tsar that he had been advised by persons ‘serving in Asia’ that to react ‘indifferently’ to Ishaq Khan’s rebellion could seriously damage Russian prestige in Asia, and he therefore officially proposed supplying the sardar with rifles and ammunition. Alexander III rejected the War Minister’s suggestion however, declaring Ishaq Khan’s revolt a ‘domestic affair’ in which Russian intervention was unnecessary. The desires of the War Ministry were further frustrated at a special conference held on the 17th August, a session at which the War Minister, Foreign Minister, the head of the MID’s Asiatic Department and the head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Department, Kostenko, were all present. At this session a serious blow was struck the War Ministry’s cause by the attitude of I. A. Zinov’ev, head of the Asiatic Department of the MID, who deprecated giving assistance to Ishaq Khan, a character ‘about whom we have only very insufficient information.’ This statement appears to contrast sharply with views that Zinov’ev had been expressing only a few days earlier. When one also takes into account the fact that Zinov’ev traditionally allied with the military over their policies in Central Asia, one may hypothesize that he had been pressurized by his superior, Giers, into presenting a united MID front against the War Ministry’s plans. Despite the protests of Vannovskii and Kostenko that the secret despatch of arms to Ishaq Khan would carry no risk of longer-term strategic complications, the resolution of the conference settled upon merely reinforcing the border garrison of Kerki. This setback to the General Staff’s desires in the region effectively ended their window of opportunity; on the 14th September Ishaq Khan’s forces were routed by those of ‘Abd-al Rahman, and the defeated Afghan sardar fled northwards.

305 RGVIA F.846 Op.2 D.51 dl.66-68.
306 Ibid., dl.70.
across the border. He was destined to spend the remaining years of his life in exile in Russian Turkestan on a comfortable pension provided by the Russian War Ministry. Repercussions from this affair were long-lasting. The Asiatic Department of the General Staff kept a special copy of the minutes from the August conference in a part of its own files reserved for matters of special instructional importance and value, thus commemorating this bureaucratic defeat in the department’s institutional memory. That resentment regarding this may have been long-running was reflected by the fact that War Minister Kuropatkin in his strategic review of 1900 felt compelled to outline specific arguments against the annexation of northern Afghanistan. Kuropatkin’s arguments were a near-explicit riposte to those raised by Kostenko and Sobolev over a decade earlier. In particular, Kuropatkin wrote:

in moving our frontier up to the edge of the Hindu Kush, we should

be forced to take over tribes of Afghan descent, and yet at the same
time exclude some non-Afghan races kindred to those we had already
taken over. Where the inhabitants of the valleys are peasants, Uzbegs
[sic], and Tajiks, they would probably submit to us without opposition, but

the hillmen, even those of non-Afghan descent, would fight fiercely for

their liberty. Even after conquering them, we, like the British in India
today, would have no peace. [...] Finally, it must be remembered that

the people of Afghan Turkestan and Herat, who now look on us as their

liberators from Afghan oppression, might, when taken over, change their

feeling toward us. The consequence would be that, instead of keeping

neighbours well disposed towards us, and ready to assist us when called

upon, we should be acquiring fresh responsibilities in the shape of

discontented subjects, who would require military garrisons for their

control.310

The resolution upon a policy of non-intervention in northern Afghanistan decided upon in 1888

and underlined by Kuropatkin’s analysis twelve years later marked the last time an extension of Russian

310 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War Volume 1 pp.64-5.
political and military influence in Central Asia southward to the line of the Hindu Kush was seriously posited. Just as in the other theatres under its direct consideration however, the Asiatic Department by the turn of the century was also becoming increasingly concerned over the internal stability of its Central Asian possessions.

Perhaps the most prominent governor-general in Central Asia following Kaufman’s death in 1882 was Sergei Mikhailovich Dukhovskoi. A staff graduate of 1862 and a Caucasus veteran, Dukhovskoi served as governor general of the Amur Province before taking up his post in Turkestan in 1898 in the wake of the Andizhan uprising. Like Kaufman, Kostenko and so many others therefore, he had spent most of his service in one way or another upon the Asiatic frontiers. Yet in the aftermath of the Andizhan revolt he, as Kuropatkin later would, lost faith in the stability of the rationalist project proposed by General Kaufman in Central Asia. Like other Tsarist administrators before him, he viewed Islam in Central Asia from the perspective of his Caucasus experience; consequently he saw Sufi Islamic sects as the greatest threat to Russian colonial rule. To further ignore Islam, trusting in its natural decay was, he wrote, impossible; sterner measures were required.311

Undoubtedly the most ambitious scheme in regard to the declared need for increased monitoring of the population of Turkestan, however, was the proposal of Governor-General Mishchenko. On the 14th of March 1909, this Turkestan Governor-General presented a detailed, top secret report to the War Minister, which included a review of relations between the natives and the Russian governing administration in Turkestan over the preceding forty years.312 This review focused specifically on the sporadic and failed attempts of previous Governor-Generals- Kaufman, Cherniaev, Dukhovskoi- to create language schools and the accompanying cadres of officials closely acquainted with the languages and customs of the natives of Turkestan. The basis for Mishchenko’s own proposals were founded in the work of one of his most recent predecessors, Lt.-General Subbotich, who in 1906 had set up a special commission to study in depth the need for officials to be acquainted with local languages in the region. The work of the commission had led to a lively exchange of opinions in the Turkestan press, including the locally printed Turkestanskii Vedomosti, and members of the academic Orientalist community had been

drawn into the debate. The most interesting articles were subsequently gathered by the administration of the krai and published in collected form as a booklet.\textsuperscript{313} The language schools that had been opened by Subbotich had to be closed following his departure however, and the proposals by both himself and his successor, Grodekov, to make knowledge of the local languages a compulsory facet of service in the Turkestan administration encountered resistance from the War Ministry. However, the 'awakening' of the Muslim East begun by the Russo-Japanese War made the need for such schools now, in Mishchenko’s eyes, a pressing necessity. As evidence of the political developments he spoke of, including the penetration of Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian ideas into Turkestan, he enclosed with his report an intercepted letter from a member of the Young Turk Foreign Ministry to a native of the Fergana oblast’. As a result of what he described as these ‘new influences, new currents in the local Muslim world’, Mishchenko formed his own special commission of representatives of the Turkestan administration to develop the appropriate corresponding political measures. All the members of this commission agreed upon the need to organize a wide and systematic intelligence network amongst the local Muslim population, periodically drawing up reports on the position and mood of contemporary Islam. Observation would be carried out in the large towns and settlements, ‘the centres of the economic and spiritual interests of the Muslim population.’ To coordinate this gathered intelligence it was proposed to hold periodic conferences of the main personnel involved- chiefs of district staffs, diplomatic bureaucrats and heads of Okhrana sections, under the chairmanship of the Turkestan Governor-General’s aide. As a natural accompaniment to this programme it was proposed to institute courses of vostokovedenie and language studies to raise the knowledge of members of the local uezd administrations, along the lines of the project developed in 1906.\textsuperscript{314} The total number of agents hypothesized in the detailed plan that accompanied Mishchenko’s report was 18, spread out across the Turkestan military district, their wages calculated at 50 roubles a month, in all 1080 roubles a year. Since the head of the local Okhrana section was already overburdened and would lack both the language skills and orientalist training necessary to process the reports of these native agents, it was proposed to set up a new post of assistant to the Okhrana section to handle this task. This was foreseen as a

\textsuperscript{313} Sbornik materialov po voprosu ob izuchenii tuzemnykh iazykov sluzhavshchimi po voenno-narodnomu upravleniyu Turkestanskogo Kraia (Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga 1906)

\textsuperscript{314} RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.3772 dl.5ob-7ob.
job for a man well acquainted with the Turkic and Persian dialects, on a salary of ‘not less’ than 2000 roubles a year.315

Mishchenko’s proposals filtered into a general governmental review of the whole of the Turkestan administration being conducted at this time, his entire report being passed along on the 7th April 1909 to Senator K. K. Palen, the individual charged with reviewing the local administration in Turkestan and drawing up reform proposals.316 Ironically, one of the products of Palen’s own investigations was to be the retirement of Mishchenko himself, outraged over the departure of individuals close to him who had become tainted by the scandal of administrative corruption that the Palen commission exposed in Turkestan. In August of that same year Samsonov, Mishchenko’s successor as Governor-General, wrote to War Minister Sukhomlinov pointing to reports from his secret emissary in the Emirate of Bukhara on the penetration of revolutionary propaganda into the madrasas of the area, and asking that Mishchenko’s programme of political surveillance be rapidly implemented.317 The following year however the Asiatic Section of the Main Staff informed the Turkestan administration that Mishchenko’s proposals would now be considered and conclusions implemented only as part of the whole Palen commission review. In practice, although this was unforeseeable at the time, this meant that no new measures were undertaken before the First World War intervened.318 In 1909 Samsonov on his own initiative proposed to re-invigorate the all-round scientific study of Turkestan, an ambition expressed during the following year in a series of circulars and printed programmes. This initiative planned the organized study of Turkestan in a statistical, ethnographic and anthropological regard, with the study of local languages and religion being assigned to the field of anthropology. These ambitions got no further than a series of conferences and projects however, with very little concrete being achieved. In 1913 one Russian writer gloomily concluded that after nearly half a century of Russian rule in the region, ‘the internal life of the native Muslim population and every aspect of their spiritual lives, flowing from centuries of Islam, still remains till the present moment very little known by us.’319

315 Ibid., dl.21-22.
316 Ibid., dl.34.
317 Ibid., dl.44ob-59ob.
318 Ibid., dl.67-67ob.
The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War also produced several outbursts about the dangerously poor quality of intelligence collection along the Central Asian border, just as it did in other Asiatic districts. In the years immediately preceding that war, the interest of the Russian General Staff in regard to India had received fresh impetus due to the English alliance with Japan and the final resolution of the question of establishing a Russian consulate in India. In 1895 Obruchev had informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that:

in view of the growing might of Japan and the absence in India of Russian representatives, it is proposed to despatch there from time to time young officers, giving them prolonged leave for this purpose with retention of all the privileges of active service.\textsuperscript{320}

The majority of officers who performed this work in the course of the following ten years were, naturally enough, men attached to the Turkestan military district. An interesting sidelight on the strategic mindset behind these missions is given by the memoirs of General Grulev, a Russian staff officer serving in the Tashkent military district in this period. Already a source of suspicion for some in the Russian army at the time through his Jewish background, Grulev made himself even less popular through his insistence that any thought of Russia presenting a threat to India was simply nonsensical. Grulev presented these views at a strategic conference in the 1890s and was even thanked by Colonel Iudenich, the future Chief of Staff of the Caucasus military district, then serving in Turkestan, for his frankness. Grulev nonetheless felt that one result of his forthrightness was his being overlooked a few years later when the question came up of dispatching officers to India, his place being taken instead by a 'notorious drunkard, who squandered his fare even before he left Tashkent.'\textsuperscript{321} Grulev was clearly felt to be insufficiently hawkish to perform the strategic missions laid upon this band of officers, and he later opined that only military failure in the Far East 'sobered up' the General Staff regarding what could be realistically accomplished in Asia as a whole.

The question of establishing a Russian consulate in India, meanwhile, dated back as far as 1875, when this proposal was first raised in exchange for a British consulate at Tiflis. The issue made no progress over the course of the next twenty years, till in 1898 repeated Russian diplomatic pressure on London

\textsuperscript{320} A. Popov, 'Angliiskaia Politika v Indii i Russko-Indiiske otnoshenia v 1897-1905gg.' KA XIX (1926) p.59.

\textsuperscript{321} Grulev', Zapiski general-evreia pp.215-216.
finally secured a breakthrough when the British government gave its agreement in principle to the establishment of such a consulate at Bombay. Attempts by the British government to secure additional advantages on its side in the form of additional consulates in Irkutsk and Samarkand delayed matters further however. Only in 1899 did the Russians receive a note giving formal agreement to the establishment of their consulate in Bombay, and only in 1905 did the British concede the granting of the title ‘General’ to this institution.\(^322\) No Russian military agent was appointed however, and close British surveillance of the consulate’s members inevitably meant that they were still able to do very little in the form of real intelligence work. The Foreign Ministry issued the first Russian consul in Bombay, V. O. Klemm, highly detailed secret instructions. These highlighted the importance of gaining information of a military character, including the number of forces disposed of in India, the defensive means of the country, and the positions of railroads and fortresses. In this the ministry was guided by a series of instructions prepared by War Minister Kuropatkin on the responsibilities of a secret military agent in India. In November 1901 however Klemm reported almost insuperable difficulties in recruiting agents and gaining accurate intelligence; servants watched and reported on the movements of every member of the consulate and the consular mail regularly bore the marks of having been tampered with before arrival. As a result Klemm had come to the conclusion that only indirect routes of gaining political and military intelligence through third parties stood any chance of success. Meanwhile even Klemm’s attempts to move freely around the country in response to the changing seasons raised British suspicions and increased diplomatic tensions.\(^323\) The situation for visiting Russian officers was no easier. Lt.-Colonel Lavr Kornilov visited India in 1904. His name being already known to the English authorities from his travels in Khorassan and Kashgar, Kornilov suffered the misfortune of being identified almost immediately on the steamer out from Egypt by a party of British officers and was thereafter unable to travel incognito. Although treated with outward hospitality by the military authorities upon arrival in India, Kornilov was closely watched by the civilian police and suffered the indignity of having his suitcases robbed of photographs and notebooks during his stay in Peshawer, an act almost undoubtedly conducted by agents of Anglo-Indian intelligence.\(^324\)


This continued frustration in the gaining of accurate intelligence in the region was reflected in the renewed bout of introspection over intelligence matters that occurred in Russian military circles during and after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1905 in one polemical work, Staff-Captain P. A. Rittikh emphasized the new importance given to intelligence by the Russian General Staff by particular reference to Afghanistan:

The main principle of the military preparity of a state is its knowledge of neighbouring states. In this regard in Turkestan we turn out to be, as in Manchuria, completely bankrupt, since we do not know Afghanistan and India and we do not want to know them.  

Rittikh urged several reforms, including the creation of more schools on eastern languages for Russian officers and the greater use of ‘the native element’ in intelligence work. For the language schools he recommended the model he had seen used by the British in India, namely voluntary schools in which officers nonetheless received a monetary supplement for attendance. To highlight the value to be given by native agents, he pointed out the great service recently rendered the Russian Geographical Society by Tsybikov, a trained Buriat Mongol, who had recently returned from a trip to Lhasa in Tibet with more information than had been gained by Nikolai Przheval’skii in his whole lifetime. Tsybikov’s abilities were so great that he subsequently went on to become a lecturer at the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok.

Undoubtedly the individual most qualified to be critical however was Rittikh’s close friend, who helped him write his work and to whom Rittikh’s own book was dedicated, Captain A. E. Snesarev. A dazzling combination of military theorist, linguist, statistician, mathematician, geographer, philosopher and orientalist, Snesarev saw the ultimate resolution to tension in Central Asian politics as social revolution in India itself. One of the select group of Russian Staff officers who actually visited India from the 1890s onwards under Obручев’s programme, Snesarev’s massive two-volume study of the Indian north-west frontier established him as the leading Russian military Indologist of his or perhaps any generation. In one of his most famous books from 1906, Snesarev laid bare in almost Marxist terms what he saw as the

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325 P. A. Rittikh, Avganskii Vopros’ p.82.(Emphasis in the original)
326 As interest in his field of study has grown recently, Tsybikov’s collected works have been reprinted: Tsybikov, Izbrannie trudi v dvukh tomakh. (Novosibirsk: “NAUKA” Sibirskoe otdelenie 1991).
social and economic corruption of the British regime in India, based on observations made during his own visit there. Believing in the imminence of revolt in this country, he urged:

...it is impossible to look upon [India] as a theatre of secondary significance- it must have the same right to our attention [now] as have, for example, our western theatres.\footnote{A. E. Snesarev, \textit{Indiia kak glavnyi faktor v sredne-aziatskom vopros}. (St.Petersburg: Tipografiia A. S. Suvorin 1906) p.173.}

After a long apprenticeship serving in the Turkestan military district, working in particular in the Pamirs mountain detachment, Snesarev had an opportunity to make his views more widely felt when he joined the Main Staff and GUGSh in 1905-1910. His work in this regard was inaugurated in August 1905 in a devastating critique delivered to the General Staff on the level of Russian intelligence operations regarding Afghanistan up until this period. In his view, despite the fact that Russia had held its present frontiers in Central Asia for over 20 years, and in some areas for over 40, 'our information about neighbouring countries and especially about Afghanistan is weak in the extreme.'\footnote{RGVIA F.2000 Op.1 D.969 dl.100-100ob.} The majority of information at the Staff’s disposal was often unreliable or simply antiquated-amongst sources of practical military information there existed little to supplement the studies of Grodekov and Matveev, conducted almost thirty years before. Not only was there a lack of raw data to formulate campaign plans for that country, there was no data to draw up even general sketches and dispositions. As a consequence ‘all our plans and intentions as soon as they cross the state frontier are suspended in the air and scarcely sound.’\footnote{Ibid., dl.102} Snesarev ascribed this weakness to both general and particular causes and drew up a programme of proposed measures to correct this system. Amongst the general causes he highlighted a traditional Russian disregard of the importance of accurate military intelligence, the consequences of which were now being painfully felt to ‘a fatal degree in the present [Russo-Japanese] war.’ The consequence of this was a lack of system in the organization of intelligence and this was then expressed in the particular factors of disarray in the intelligence system of the Turkestan military district. This assertion was then backed by use of devastating examples of neglect that Snesarev had observed during his own period of service there.
To take just one example, one of the heads of the Pamirs mountain detachment had for a whole year confined his reports to the movement of two Afghan horsemen along the Pianzhu river and to an outbreak of epileptic sickness. Moreover there was no allocation of areas of study to the heads of district detachments, resulting in wasteful administrative overlap. Snesarev pointed out to his superiors that intelligence collection in Asia was quantitatively different from intelligence gathering in Europe—that in the absence of printed statistical material and even astronomically determined points, in Asia it was necessary 'to study everything and to study broadly.' The programme of change he advocated included making the military agent in London a General Staff officer acquainted with Central Asia; establishing a programme of intelligence training and a stricter allocation of intelligence tasks in Turkestan; and having a network of trained and experienced agents living permanently in the population centres of neighbouring states.\(^{331}\)

Both political and financial circumstances conspired over the course of the following years to leave Snesarev's programme largely unrealized, although some change was effected in regards to the post of military agent in London. In September 1905, just a month after Snesarev’s report, Palitsyn wrote to Major-General K. I. Vogak, the military agent in London, reprimanding him for concentrating primarily on political events in the British capital to the detriment of military intelligence. Palitsyn reminded Vogak that the primary task of the military agent in London was to assess the military capability of Britain at home and in its colonies, 'particularly in the presently-important Central Asian theatre'.\(^{332}\) In October 1910 War Minister Sukhomlinov successfully petitioned that the Russian military agent in London, by then Lt.-General N. S. Ermolov, be permitted to visit India the following year for the gathering of information on the state of the country and the condition of the Anglo-Indian army. The open nature of this trip meant that the British authorities in India were able to dictate Ermolov's movements and meetings, but he was nonetheless able to gain much valuable information, and copies of his report were passed on to the Tsar, the Foreign Ministry, the Turkestan military district, the Russian consulate in Calcutta, and the Intendance and Engineer Directorates.\(^{333}\) In 1909 meanwhile the staff of the Turkestan military district had come to the conclusion that the carrying out of deep intelligence in Afghanistan could only be conducted by individuals possessing an excellent knowledge of the native languages and customs and themselves able to pass for

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\(^{331}\) Ibid., dl.104ob-107ob.

\(^{332}\) Sergeev & Ulunian, Ne podlezhit' oglasjeniiu p.57.
natives. Such an assessment ruled out the use of Russian officers. Officers of the 'native type' were most suitable and to this end there was selected a Tatar officer, Lieutenant Chanyshev of the 1st Turkestan rifle regiment. Chanyshev was to be despatched under the cover of being a pilgrim to Mecca for a four-month reconnaissance, at a cost to the state of 2,500-3,000 roubles. In this role Chanyshev went on to visit both Turkey and Afghanistan in 1910, providing valuable information on the town of Maimana in northern Afghanistan in particular. He noted that the modernized Afghan army still lagged far behind European standards, but that in the event of an invasion the Afghans would destroy all wells in an invaders' path, attack his rear, engage in night attacks, and generally 'trouble him all the time.' The expense of Chanyshev's mission however, and the difficulty of finding officers for such enterprises in future meant that this highly productive exercise appears never to have been repeated by the Turkestan military district before the outbreak of war in 1914.\(^\text{334}\) In the meantime, the setting up of an effective agent net in northern Afghanistan to provide continuous strategic intelligence was destined to remain as elusive a goal as ever.

Continued concern regarding the internal situation both in Turkestan and on the Russo-Afghan border, meanwhile, prompted further efforts to increase the efficiency of the forces disposed of in the Turkestan military district that continued right up to the eve of the First World War. Here again the Russo-Japanese war acted as the incentive in this area, the Anglo-Japanese alliance creating, as Obruchev had foreseen, a unified security threat to Russia's land frontiers east of the Caspian. Heightened Anglo-Afghan tensions coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war and led to the Amir of Afghanistan taking measures to increase the size and military capacity of his forces. It was initially unclear to Russian intelligence against whom these measures were immediately directed, whilst it was also simultaneously evident that the English strove in every way to aid their Japanese ally by applying pressure on Russian Central Asia. Amongst British demands to the Afghan Amir was a re-positioning of the Durand line (the territorial border between India and Afghanistan) and the deployment of Anglo-Indian forces to northern Afghanistan, around Balkh and Mazar-i-Sharif. As one direct consequence, Russia's Turkestan battalions remained locked in Central Asia, unable to be re-deployed to the Far East. The Asiatic Department of the

\(^{333}\) M. T. Kozhekina, "'Dlia Anglii...nesomnennno vygodnee...imet' sosedom velikuiu derzhavnuiu Rossiiu" razvedyvatel'i noii missii general-leitenanta N. S. Ermolova v Indiiu v 1911 godu.' \textit{VIZh} 4 (2000) pp. 3-11. \(^{334}\) F.2000 Op.1 D.3721 dl.1-60 and Alekseev, \textit{Voennaia Razvedka Rossi} (Kniga 2) p.156. Alekseev was unable to find the reports Chanyshev delivered as a consequence of this mission in the archives, and was therefore unable to comment on its effectiveness as I have done.
General Staff suspected the Anglo-Indian army of intending to penetrate Tibet and Western China, suspicions apparently confirmed by Youngusband's occupation of Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, on the 4th August 1904. In response to heightened tensions in the region the Turkestan forces during the course of the war with Japan were boosted by the addition of artillery elements despatched from Moscow and by the employment of troops due for demobilization whose discharge was delayed. In June 1905 the Russian Foreign Ministry insisted on the need to increase the size of Russian forces in Central Asia in order to have there 'an army completely organized in a military regard. [ready to] rebuff the English. On the 18th July 1905 the Chief of the General Staff, General Palitsyn, presented a project to the State Defence Council to reinforce the military forces in Turkestan in readiness for a rapid strike on Herat. Part of the incentive for the plan undoubtedly came from a certain Colonel Polivanov, who had just returned from India and bore witness to the reformation of the Anglo-Indian army being conducted there under Kitchener. Rediger, the newly-appointed War Minister, disapproved of the plan, feeling that it would merely alert the English to reinforce Herat, and that money would be better spent creating new forces in Turkestan on a peacetime footing, ready armed and equipped for the exigencies of mountain warfare. Rediger was overruled in the Council, but used his financial powers as War Minister to delay the fulfillment of Palitsyn's project. The question of improving the forces in Turkestan in a technical regard continued to occupy the General Staff however. In 1909 the head of the Turkestan military district informed War Minister Sukhomlinov that, on the basis of a war game run the previous winter by Mishchenko, the railroad forces should be retained in Turkestan in order secure a reasonable deployment time in the event of an advance on Herat. In August 1910 in response to injunctions from the Main Directorate of the General Staff on increasing the military capability of the Turkestan army, plans were outlined for building a railroad to Termez and unifying the Tashkent line through Vernyi and Semipalatinsk with the Trans-Siberian line. Amongst the technical

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335 The history of Anglo-Russian intrigues over Tibet has recently produced an extensive number of new works, the revelations of which can obviously not all be detailed here. Strong representative examples of this new genre are: John Snelling, Buddhism in Russia. The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa's emissary to the Tsar (Shaftesbury: Element Books Ltd. 1993) and Tatiana Shaumian, Tibet. The Great Game and Tsarist Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000)
recommendations was the distribution to the forces in the district of light automobile companies, dirigibles and fixed balloons in order to maintain communications and conduct reconnaissance along the strategic Kabul-Kandahar line of advance. Amongst the other options and requirements under discussion was the need for bridging material at Termez in order to be able to rapidly span and cross the Amu-Darya into Afghanistan in the event of mobilization. To meet this need there was raised the possibility of gaining this bridging material from the old Novogeorgievsk fort in the Warsaw military district, where it was laid aside for spanning the Danube. Thus this appears to form another striking example of a case where defences in the West were being stripped back, at least in part, with a view to reinforcing Russia’s southern and eastern borders. Another recommendation that was actually followed through in 1913 was the reallocation of artillery resources in the district. Light field guns were reduced from 104 tubes to 72, whilst mountain guns were increased from 24 to 72 pieces and six new mortar batteries were added. The latter were regarded as particularly important assets since, in the event of a march into Afghanistan, the Turkestan army would encounter clay fortifications, against which the direct fire of field guns was proven to be highly ineffective. One witness to these increasing efforts at professionalization within the Turkestan forces was the future Chief of the Soviet General staff, Boris Shaposhnikov. On his departure from his first military home, the 1st Turkestan rifle battalion, for the Nikolaevskia Staff Academy in 1907, Shaposhnikov had been only the third officer in the whole history of his unit since its formation in 1867 to apply for this distinction—the first having been Kuropatkin in 1871. The unit he left held staff officers in low esteem and did little in the way of effective peacetime military training beyond diligent rifle practice and long and rapid route marches—a tradition of the Turkestan rifle units. Yet on his return in 1910 Shaposhnikov noted an entirely different military atmosphere on this southern section of Russia’s Asiatic frontier. The ‘old Turkestan atmosphere’ in the life of the regiment had vanished, and there was now nothing to distinguish it from an ordinary infantry unit, whilst the new Governor-General, Samsonov, was conducting war game manoeuvres between Russian and ‘Afghan’ forces with a view to practical training for war. These trends were reflected in a summary by a Russian officer writing in 1913, reviewing three-and-a-half centuries of Russian expansion across the steppe. Examining the condition of Turkestan’s neighbours, he

341 Ibid., dl.207-213ob.
outlined a picture where 'normal' relations were still far from being obtained; Kashgaria remained disturbed, England remained a 'sabre-rattling rival' in India despite the alliance against Germany and, most of all, Afghanistan remained a 'nest of various harmful for us and alarmist movements' - a centre of Muslim fanaticism, and more recently 'a shelter for German military instructors from the Turkish army, dreaming of turning Afghanistan into a new Japan for us [Russia] with lightning - fast military progress...’ All these trends had compelled the transformation of Russian Turkestan into a 'first-class' military front, and the army there had been reformed in line with the general changes brought through in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War. Until the very eve of the First World War therefore the Russian forces in Turkestan, as elsewhere in Asia, continued to be maintained and even improved in both quantity, quality and efficiency in response to a strategic situation that was perceived in the eyes of many in the General Staff to be increasingly dangerous.

5. THE LAST DAYS OF THE ASIATIC DEPARTMENT.

It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first and to wait for disaster to discuss the matter.

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, Section 78, p.52.¹

5.1 LANGUAGE TRAINING AND THE IMPERIAL CRISIS, 1910-1914

By the end of the Tsarist period, the study of the East by the Russian military had passed through a distinctive period of evolution, in which Tsarist officers and administrators strove to categorize and scientifically encompass an area stretching from the Black Sea to the Pacific. In strategic terms this period embraced a natural overarching strategic trend, from the initial military and political expansion of Russia in Asia, to consolidation and reinforcement, to increasing worries over the defence of these attained goals by the eve of the First World War. Across this period, in regard to what one may term the development of Russian military vostokovedenie, it is probably easiest to see the evolution of this branch of Russian military art in three distinct generational stages, each stage being characterized by the contribution of certain outstanding individuals.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, under the sponsorship of Nicholas I, the Russian military, and its General Staff structure in particular, began to come to terms with the difficult task of conquering and administering the Caucasus and assessing Russia's expanding sphere of influence in the Near East and Central Asia. This period was marked by the creation of essential institutional structures such as the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Corps of Military Topographers, and also by the contribution of outstanding individuals such as I. F. Blaramberg, D. A. Miliutin, N. N. Murav'ev-Karskii and A. I. Maksheev. The contributions of these men, in particular the formation in the 1840s by D. A. Miliutin of the discipline of 'military statistics' alongside the lectures at the Nikolaevskaja General Staff Academy by A. I. Maksheev on steppe warfare in the 1860s, were to have a great influence

on subsequent generations of Russian military explorers and geographers in Asia. Of this generation, the one individual wielding the single greatest long-term influence was undoubtedly D. A. Miliutin himself, through his membership of the Imperial Geographical Society, his service as Chief of Staff in the Caucasus, and his later contribution as War Minister during the period of major Russian expansion in Central Asia. Given this background, it is entirely understandable that, upon his retirement as War Minister, Miliutin was at one point briefly considered for the role of Viceroy of the Caucasus.

In the aftermath of the Crimean War of 1853-56, Russian military vostokovedenie entered its second and most active stage, with dramatic physical expansion in Central Asia and the Far East being accompanied and facilitated by the creation for the first time of a centralized military institutional structure for these areas, the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. This department was charged with the defence, administration and strategic coordination of Russia's Asiatic military districts. Its specialized status was reflected in the fact that the heads of this department after 1886 had to be men having had direct military experience of service in one of the Asiatic military districts. Following service in this post it also became customary for former heads of the Asiatic Department to serve as Governor-Generals in one of these districts, further prolonging the influence of these men in this sphere. Thus Protsenko on his first retirement from the post in 1878 governed in both the Semipalatinsk and Turgai ooblats, and upon leaving the Asiatic Department in 1887 G. I. Ivanin became military governor in Semirech'e. For his own part, D. V. Putiata after leaving the department in 1902 became military governor of the Amur ooblast and Ataman of the Amur Cossack forces. In terms of specialized personnel in the field, this period was marked by a dazzling array of talent, particularly in Central Asia-the names of N. M. Przheval'skii, P. K. Kozlov and M. V. Pevtsov being linked not merely with the military but with scientific achievements of the highest calibre. This period was also marked by repeated attempts to form a sufficient number of language schools producing linguistically trained officers to serve in the Asiatic military districts, through institutions such as the Academic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Tashkent officers' school.

By the turn of the century the extent to which the military had become an accepted facet of the Russian scientific enterprise in the study of the East was reflected by the presence of military men on the governing boards and membership lists of the most prominent Orientalist organizations of the day. Both

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Chief of the General Staff F. F. Palitsyn and War Minister A. N. Kuropatkin were members of the Society for Vostokovedenie (from 1910 the ‘Imperial’ Society for Vostokovedenie- *Imператорское Общество Востоковедения* Vostokovedenia), created on private initiative but with the support of Minister of Finance S. Iu. Vitte in 1900. The goals of this society were ‘to spread amongst eastern peoples an exact and correct knowledge of Russia, and also to acquaint Russian society with the material needs and spiritual life of the East.’ The chairman of the scientific section of the society was Professor A. M. Pozdneev, director of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, and amongst the society’s most active members was A. E. Snesarev. The emphasis of the society lay in the practical study of the East with a view to facilitating Imperial Russia’s military-political missions in that sphere of the world. In 1911 for example the Interior Ministry organized courses of Islamic study through the society, the goal being to produce personnel capable of serving in a bureaucratic regard amongst the Empire’s Muslim population.

Another society raised at the time and notable for its emphasis on the ‘practical’ study of the East was the Russian Committee for Studying Central and Eastern Asia, created in connection with International Congresses of Orientalists held in Rome (1899) and Hamburg (1902). In 1903 the Head of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, F. V. Vasil’ev, was appointed by Kuropatkin the War Ministry’s representative to this body, again reflecting the extent of the War Ministry’s involvement in this sphere by the turn of the century.

One final indication of the closeness of the military’s involvement with the scientific community by the turn of the century was the degree to which events and activities in one field could carry professional consequences in the other. M. I. Veniukov, the Russian officer most famous for his explorations of the Far East, served in the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in the early 1870s. There his work consisted of developing strategic and statistical portraits of Khorassan, Afghan Turkestan, and India and delivering articles on recent events in Asia to the official War Ministry journal, the *Russkii Invalid*. However he suffered strained relations with his direct superior, A. P. Protsenko, who, according to Veniukov, feared that the latter would replace him as head of the department or even worse become a governor-general in one of the Asiatic military districts before Protsenko did. As a result his chief began a whispering campaign

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3 Dantsig, *Blizhniy Vostok v Russkom nauke i literature* pp.280-81.
against Veniukov, alleging amongst other things that he worked for the Cherniaev newspaper *Russki Mir*, a paper that took a strong anti-Miliutin line. However, Veniukov did not see this rivalry as the crucial factor that effectively destroyed his career and that would lead to his departure for Paris in 1877 to become a writer for the émigré press. The key turning point in Veniukov's account was the hostility he encountered in the society of which he was also contemporaneously a member, that is to say the Russian Imperial Geographical Society. According to Veniukov, during his period as secretary of that society, a dispute with leading figures in that group, including Semenov Tian-Shanski, led to the creation of a fatal degree of ill-will against him. As a consequence the Chief of the Main Staff, General Obruchev, informed Veniukov that his 'behaviour' in the Geographical Society had had a very unfavourable effect on his future fate, i.e. his future opportunities of military promotion. In short, links between the General Staff and the scientific community were so close by the second half of the nineteenth century that disagreements in one sphere could affect the other, and actually have a detrimental effect upon one's whole career.\(^5\)

The strain of administering this vast territory in this second period took its toll on the personnel of the General Staff's Asiatic Department more generally however. Writing in 1895, the head of the department, A. P. Protsenko, noted that recent political complications-the Pamirs question and, in particular, Sino-Japanese relations- had increased the workload of the department, and petitioned for an increase in personnel. Correspondence on purely military matters, he noted, comprised barely half the total correspondence running through the department, compared to extensive communication on political, financial and legal matters relating to local administration in the military districts. As a consequence the personnel of the Asiatic Department of that time- one desk head and two assistants- had laid upon each of them an extremely heavy and diverse workload, frequently requiring the men to work late into the evening and during their holidays.\(^6\) On one staff officer alone, Protsenko recorded, there had recently been laid responsibility for all the correspondence regarding the Turkestan and Omsk military districts, all extraordinary correspondence of a political and financial character related to the Afghan and Chinese frontiers, and all correspondence regarding imperial relations with the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. On

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\(^5\) Veniukov, *Iz Vospominanii* T.2 pp.187-88. In overall terms, a similar interconnectedness, both structural and ideological, was visible in many Western societies engaged in imperialism in the period, although often conditioned by particular events in each country. See for example: D. V. McKay, 'Colonialism in the French Geographical Movement, 1871-1881.' *Geographical Review* 33 (1943) pp.214-232.

\(^6\) RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.1831 dl.6-6ob.
another unnamed officer there was laid all correspondence related to the Priamur and Irkutsk military districts, military reinforcement of the Far East, and also all correspondence on the administration of forces of the Trans-Caspian military district, including that district's relations to Persia. On this latter luckless individual there had also been laid, through force of necessity, correspondence regarding the administration of the Kars and Dagestan military districts and the mountaineer population of the North Caucasus- another distinct and entirely discrete set of political and administrative responsibilities. Taking into account the calculation that the physical volume of correspondence passing through the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in 1886 (when it was last reformed) amounted to 2240 pages, and in 1895 to 4097, and it is easy to see why Protsenko felt his men were becoming overburdened.7

It was this sense of imperial overstretch which was to become the dominant concern during the final period of Tsarist military involvement in Asia between 1895 and 1917, and which was to be the predominant theme and topic of criticism of the third generation of military vostokovedy. Perhaps the most vocal member of this latter group would be A. E. Snesarev. This imperial crisis was to continue till the downfall of the Tsarist empire, its implications being taken up, confronted and transformed by its Soviet successor.

The most obvious open expression of this phenomenon, particularly in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, was the debate conducted both in public and private on the language training of Russian soldiers and other officials serving in Asiatic countries. A prominent voice in this debate was that of the young orientalist V. V. Bartol'd, who in 1905 began to deliver for the first time a series of lectures in a groundbreaking area of historiographical research, 'The History of Asian studies in Europe and Russia' (Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii). These lectures amounted to a scathing criticism of the level of Russian understanding and knowledge of the East, and although the role of the Tsarist military was not particularly highlighted, it also included specific criticisms of their role and aptitude in this area. Amongst the criticisms Bartol'd levelled both here and elsewhere was the accusation that only a handful of officers in Tsarist Central Asia were acquainted with the local languages and that the War Ministry was dilatory in the publication of educational material on eastern countries. Enthusiasm for studying the krai in a scientific regard had not outlasted the initial period of military expansion there, and 'scientific tasks set nearly half a

7 Ibid., dl.6-7.
Of Russian vostokovedenie in general Bartol’d famously concluded that Russian science had preferred to utilize foreign (European) texts rather than the rich resources directly at its disposal both within the Empire and along its borders. This charge was a particularly sensitive one to make of course. The whole course of the development of eastern studies in Russia, both military and civilian, had been marked since the late 1840s by a passionate drive to make this a ‘Russian’ science and banish the ghosts of the German and French scholastic influences that served as midwives at its birth. As early as 1838, driven by a desire to establish Russia’s uniqueness and cultural distinctiveness (samobytnost’), the leading Russian orientalist V. V. Grigor’ev had written that:

The best means to counteract the influence of the west is to rely on the study of the east.9

This process involved both great verbal rhetoric on the part of many of Russia’s orientalists and the actual physical removal of reminders of this inheritance, such as the purge of Germanically-named scholars from the governing board of the Imperial Geographical Society in the 1850s. These men had come to be regarded by Semenov Tian-Shanskii, amongst others, as a ‘collection of German teachers, who kept the Society in its outgrown, and in spirit foreign, swaddling clothes.’10 Bartol’d was now in 1905 saying in effect that Russia had scorned its unique cultural inheritance and missed the opportunity that gave to surpass others in the field of oriental studies-Russia had once again proven itself ‘backward’ in comparison to, or at least no better than, Europe. In this field, as in so many others, Russian ideologues had sought a means to surpass the West. Bartol’d’s criticism was now implying that they had failed, and that the Russian army, as part of this system, shared in that failure.

In the Soviet period Bartol’d was to posthumously become the ‘grand old man’ of Russian Central Asian studies and this 1905 lecture series the touchstone of both Russian and Western assessments of the development of Russian vostokovedenie.11 In the process however Bartol’d’s arguments perhaps inevitably became a matter of faith and comparatively few set this lecture series within the context of its time. Yet in

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8 V. V. Bartol’d, Sochinenia IX (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “NAUKA” Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi literatury 1977) p.525.
10 Bassin, Imperial Visions pp.95-6.
11 To the extent that Bartol’d’s work formed the essential point of reference even for those who disagreed with aspects of his argument. See for example: V. A. Romodin, ‘Iz istorii izucheniia afgantsev i
many ways Bartol’d’s diatribe was a classic product of a fierce debate occurring within Russian military and academic circles at the time in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, Bartol’d was scarcely an impartial, Olympian academic observer in this debate. As a member of both the Imperial Society of Vostokovedenie and the Russian Committee for Studying Central and Eastern Asia he had had opportunity to become acquainted at first hand with the representatives of the military, foreign-policy and financial institutions of the Russian state engaged in study of the East. His editorship of the first society’s journal, The World of Islam (Mir Islama), ended in a feud with the head of the Russian Interior Ministry over the high scholastic tone he gave that publication, and his removal from that post, to be replaced by D. M. Pozdneev. Pozdneev, a former head of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, rapidly moved the subject matter of the journal from academic research to practical, political goals, with the publication of articles on matters that were at the time of most direct concern to the Russian War, Foreign and Finance Ministries. Pan-Islam, Pan-Turkism and the scholastic training of young Muslims in the Russian Empire thereafter dominated the journal’s pages. Bartol’d’s lecture series therefore probably reflected in part the bitterness of an earnest, highly gifted young man towards the Russian governmental establishment. More than this however, his comments reflected a general sense of malaise and unease at the time amongst the Russian intellectual establishment, shocked into retrospective analysis by the impact of military defeat in the East. Criticisms similar to Bartol’d’s flourished in the contemporary press and, in one prominent instance, provoked the irritated response of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff itself.

Fairly representative in this regard was an article in The Herald of Asia (Vestnik Azii), the journal of the Society of Russian Orientalists based in Kharbin and dating from June 1910. Taking as its starting point the need to have large numbers of Chinese and Japanese interpreters which had been highlighted by the Russo-Japanese War, and also the contemporaneous debate being conducted in the Turkestanskii Vedomosti on language training, this article went on to propose a wide ranging programme of reforms. These included the setting up of compulsory programmes of language training for all Russian officials.
serving in the Asiatic military districts, and for those serving in border districts, a compulsory requirement to know the language of the neighbouring state. In addition the author saw a need to require a basic knowledge of Muslim and customary law; and for those persons working in eastern states, knowledge of the history, geography, and the military and political order of the state they served in. Workers in this field should be given one year to become acquainted with their area of service and a second year to brush up both their grasp of the literary and local languages; the minimum knowledge required being an ability to check translations. Testing commissions should be set up to regulate both entrants into the Russian service in these areas and the line of promotion. Only such measures, in the author’s opinion, would effectively diffuse a knowledge of eastern languages amongst Russia’s administrative personnel.14

The debate on language training raged at somewhere near its fiercest, as has already been implied, in the Turkestan military district, in part as a natural consequence of efforts sponsored by the local administration itself to investigate the issue. A particular source of acrimony here was the work of one Colonel Iagello, head of the Tashkent officers’ school and author of a Persian-Arabic-Russian dictionary. In the course of a general debate over the quality of language courses run through the Tashkent school, Iagello’s own qualifications and expertise came under increasing attack, both in the pages of the locally-printed Turkestanskii Vedomosti and in the wider military and civilian press.15 It was the input of an orientalist to the Novoe Vremia (The New Times) in December 1910 that finally provoked the wrathful response of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff however. In a piece apocalyptically entitled ‘Do we know the East?’ the anonymous author launched a scathing attack on the level of Iagello’s scholarship. Quoting the opinion of Fozi-Khuri, a student of the Lazarevskii Institute, that anyone wishing to learn Persian through Iagello’s dictionary would only be wasting their time, the author went on to cite the opinion of F. E. Korsh, a teacher at the aforementioned institute, that the dictionary in inexperienced hands could prove ‘positively harmful’ in its influence. In conclusion the author wondered whether it would not be better for the War Ministry to lean on the expertise of the Russian academic community rather than funding such efforts as Iagello’s dictionary, which had become the object of such criticism.16 This article

14 Ibid., pp.140-41.
evoked a detailed response by an unnamed worker within the General Staff's Asiatic Department. In January 1911 this individual launched an impassioned defence of Lagello's work, bringing to the cause of the defence two very large volumes recently published in London on the organization of oriental studies in England.\textsuperscript{17} Given that the London commission was highly complimentary on the level of oriental studies within the Russian army, the author asked, how could one explain the discrepancy between this opinion held abroad and that held at home by the Russian academic community? The author concluded, unsurprisingly, that the latter were holding unrealistically high expectations and charged the anonymous author of the article in the \textit{Novoe Vremia} (whom the writer suspected to be 'a person well known to us', namely Professor A. Khashchab, lecturer in Arabic at St. Petersburg university) to be more exact in sourcing the criticisms he so freely quoted. Impartial observation would, over time, this officer was convinced, lead to a more moderate opinion on Colonel Lagello and his dictionary than that currently being expressed in the Russian press.\textsuperscript{18}

These debates in the press of course both fed and fueled a debate occurring in the General Staff itself over the system of training for officers in eastern languages in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war. On 27\textsuperscript{th} October 1907 GUGSh initiated a commission to investigate the setting up of a new programme of language training in this field. After a year, in November 1908, the membership of the commission was widened and A. Z. Myshlaevskii, the Chief of the General Staff, appointed its chairman. The commission’s membership comprised some of the General Staff’s most distinguished personnel in the field of Asiatic affairs. These included A. E. Snesarev, S. V. Tseil', (head of the Asiatic Department at the time), and Colonel A. G. Tumanskii, graduate of the Eastern languages school of the MID and author of a major scholarly work on Islamic Baha’i sects in Central Asia. A significant part of the commission’s work was to review the manner in which eastern languages were studied in other armies- A. E. Snesarev using his expertise on India for example to present a report on language studies amongst officers of the Anglo-Indian army.\textsuperscript{19} Unsurprisingly the representatives of the military districts presented different preferred schemes for the future training of officers in eastern languages. The Priamur military district proposed a system of a two-year \textit{komandirovka} of the relevant officers abroad, preceded by a brief six-month course at a special

\textsuperscript{17} RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.5011 dl.1-2
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., dl.3-6.
\textsuperscript{19} RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.3723 dl.7-9, 93-97ob.
preparatory school in the military district itself. The Caucasus military district staff, daunted by the expense and risk of despatching officers abroad, sought almost the direct opposite - a two-year training course with the local staff followed by the gaining of experience in dialects by trips within the bounds of the military district. The Turkestan district staff opted for a midway line, with a two-year course of theoretical training in winter being complemented by summer komandirovkas of the relevant officers to regions both in-district and abroad for four months each year. In the event it was the proposals of the Priamur military district that gained approval. It was furthermore agreed that the setting up of language schools in the local military districts should be accompanied by the closing down of the language courses for officers run through the Eastern Institute and the MID which had until now proven so unsatisfactory. The linguistic training schools thereafter set up in the Priamur, Turkestan and Caucasus military districts were to take in students on the basis of exams in Russian, the French or English languages, geography, the modern history of the relevant Asiatic states, and topography. Emphasis was placed, at the end of completing their training abroad, on officers' ability to translate from books and papers on primarily military themes. Tiflis and Tashkent were to enroll five officers annually and Vladivostok twelve, reflecting the General Staff's strategic priorities at this time on the Asiatic frontier. Officer graduates would gain the rank of interpreter with the right to increased pay conditional upon serving in the eastern military districts. Finally the whole programme, developed by the commission over the course of 1910 and introduced by statute on 21st July 1911, was to come under review again after two years in order to judge what progress had been made on the basis of the experience of the 'first wave' of graduates. Accordingly, in 1913, the Asiatic military districts began to report back on what effect this new system of training had had.

Feedback from the military districts in 1913 about the new courses, which, after a relatively short period of theoretical training involved such a long period of essentially independent practical study abroad, was generally highly positive, but carried an undercurrent of recognition that still more needed to be done. The Chief of Staff of the Priamur military district noted a need to expand the qualifications for entry to the district language schools, in order to ensure that matriculating students had a full grasp of the geography

20 Ibid., dl.80ob-81ob.
22 Ibid., pp.14, 24-5.
and history of neighbouring Asiatic states. He also advocated increasing the period of officers’ 
komandirovka abroad from two to three years to help perfect their ability to read handwritten documents, a 
notable shortcoming in the present batch of graduates.\(^{23}\) The need to introduce the teaching of Chinese into 
the school of the Tashkent military district, with the corresponding establishment of a fixed teaching post in 
this discipline at that district school was also highlighted. The Main Staff acknowledged these reservations, 
being advised by experts that the reading and writing of the Chinese and Japanese languages presented 
special difficulties compared to Near Eastern dialects. In November 1913 it was also agreed to set about the 
'second part' of the task facing the Russian General Staff in this sphere, namely the need to produce not 
just competent linguists (which could be broadly satisfied by the 1911 statute) but to have at the Staff’s 
disposal ‘Officer-Vostochniks’ - men acquainted not just with the languages, but with the history, 
geography, religion, and political position of Asiatic states, upon whom could be laid ‘more difficult tasks 
according to their specialties.’ For this, three alternatives of further training for the best graduates of the 
present system were proposed. The most outstanding officer-translators should either undergo 
supplementary courses through the Eastern Institute and the Academic Department of the MID, or be 
enrolled in the Eastern Practical Academy in St. Petersburg, or be sent abroad for a further two years. The 
head of the Asiatic Department at the time, S. V. Tseil’, asked on 12\(^{25}\) November 1913 for a new 
conference to be held to discuss this issue.\(^{24}\) The replacement of Tseil’ by Manakin as head of the Asiatic 
Department of the General Staff in December 1913 delayed the formation of this commission, and in June 
1914 GUGSh raised objections to some of the proposed changes to the existing statute presented by the 
Asiatic Department, worried that some of their implications would attract adverse attention from the State 
Duma. Finally of course, the outbreak of the First World War permanently suspended any further 
discussion of the question.\(^{25}\) With the declaration of mobilization in Russia the foreign komandirovka of 
officers from the district schools was ended, the schools themselves were closed down, and officers were 
recalled to their respective units.\(^{26}\) Thus in language training, as in so much else, the General Staff found its

\(^{23}\) RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4273 dl.1-1ob, 120. 
\(^{24}\) Ibid. dl.8-9. 
\(^{25}\) Ibid., dl.26, 154-155. 
\(^{26}\) RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4006 “a”, dl.119.
attempts to be militarily better prepared for managing its geostrategic position on the Eurasian continent cruelly interrupted by its oldest nightmare, the eruption of hostilities on the western frontier.

The question of language training for officers in the Asiatic military districts raised its head once more during the actual course of the war itself, but again outside events- revolution and civil war-were destined to interrupt any proposed resolution. On the 14th July 1917 the Chief of Staff of the Siberian military district received a telegram from OGENKVAR (the Quartermaster-General Section of GUGSh responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence operations) proposing to expand and reorganize intelligence operations in the Far East and requesting local input in this process. The aim was to create a better agent network in the region ‘in the event of complications in the East.’ The Russian military position in the Far East in general had notably weakened during the course of the war itself as a consequence of the despatch of all railways guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway to the German front in 1915, their replacements being youths and elderly reservists armed with outdated equipment. In addition Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations had notably deteriorated from their prewar position. The Omsk head of staff responded positively the next day, pointing to the rising level of Chinese emigration to the district-‘...before the war it was difficult to find one or two Chinese in the town of Omsk and now they appear in the town and surrounding area in their thousands’-as one factor in making the re-organization of the local counter-intelligence arm a pressing necessity. This officer concluded that:

The contemporary political situation and all the developments and complications of life both in our East and the neighbouring Chinese and Japanese realms urgently demands the existence of officer-vostochniks attached to the staffs of the Asiatic military districts, including Omsk.

Given political developments in the region over the course of the following twenty-five years, this plea would prove prescient. In August 1917 OGENKVAR announced the organization of a special conference to develop and work out a plan for organizing military intelligence in the region. Intelligence representatives from the staffs of the Far Eastern military districts were duly invited to attend the conference in Petrograd that September. At this conference the representatives of the Priamur military

27 Quested, 'Matey' Imperialists? The Tsarist Russians in Manchuria 1895-1917 p.249.
29 Ibid., dl.143
district presented a proposed statute for ‘officer-vostochniks’ worked out by the district staff. This statute envisaged the opening of a special military section in the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, where officers would enroll to undergo courses on the military geography, history and military organization of countries in the Far East. A five-year course was envisaged, with four years to be spent in the Institute and the fifth on a foreign komandirovka to a country of special study for perfection in its language. In the opinion of the district staff, such a programme would correct the shortcomings that had been observed in the pre-war training programmes and would provide the men, in the now familiar cry, regarded as essential in intelligence work; men ‘versatile in understanding the whole structure of life of the enemy, his language, customs, and so on.’ This was particularly important in the Far East, where ‘the future for us, after the end of the war, is pregnant with events, and these far from good for us [daleko ne v nashu pol’zu].’ The subliminal aim of this programme was also, of course, to reforge the special relationship that had always existed between the Russian military in the Far East and the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, a link that had been sharply broken by the language training statute of 1910-11. As the most organized presentation, the Priamur staff’s proposal met general approval, aside from the inevitable disputes amongst the district staffs as to who should be the greatest beneficiaries of this new array of talent graduating from Vladivostok. Revolution prevented the General Staff from implementing its plans however, and it was left to the Tsarist government’s Soviet successor to create training programmes and dispositions appropriate to the newly emerging situation in the Far East.

The pre-war debates on eastern language programmes, meanwhile, formed practically the last major administrative responsibility of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. Increasingly shorn of strategic responsibility following the reorganization of the central military administration in 1903 and the creation of GUGSh in 1905, the Asiatic Department spent its last remaining years overseeing the development of language programmes and the day-to-day administration of the Asiatic military districts, including most importantly the proposed overhaul of the military administration in Russian Turkestan. Symbolic of this change was the alteration in wording of the department’s responsibilities in 1906 from dealing simply and broadly with ‘military-political questions’ to ‘political questions having links with

30 Ibid., dl.172.
31 Ibid., dl.179
administrative affairs and military-civil administration.\textsuperscript{32} Such an order of things took some time to settle-in December 1906 Palitsyn complained that political information regarding Persia and India was still being routinely sent to the Asiatic Department of the Main Staff, for whom it could now have only 'theoretical interest', rather than to the new formation of GUGSh.\textsuperscript{33} Once settled however, this trend was not reversed.

At the start of 1914 the head of the Asiatic Department, M. M. Manakin, made one last, doomed plea for his department to be expanded. Pointing to the enormous bureaucratic burden created by reviewing the legislative proposals for a new administration in Turkestan, Manakin claimed that only by chance was the Asiatic Department able to handle this task-i.e. only the fact that it presently had on its establishment exceptionally long-serving, experienced personnel enabled it to tackle the issues the new legislative proposals raised. That this happy situation arose by accident pointed to the need to expand the number of personnel permanently serving on the department. Manakin asked for two assistant desk-heads and an assistant secretary to be added to the existing establishment of one head of department, three desk-heads, one assistant desk-head and one secretary.\textsuperscript{34} This would ease the burden of work on the department, which presently involved, amongst other things, the head of the department in 1913 having had to participate in no less than 20 governmental commissions and committees on Asiatic affairs.\textsuperscript{35} A special deloproizvodstvo should be set up in the Asiatic Department purely for tackling the issue of the new Turkestan statute and a commission set up to oversee the implementation of the project. On the 19\textsuperscript{th} June 1914 however Manakin was informed that it had been decided to set aside his proposal 'until such a time when the [military] establishment generally will be reviewed.'\textsuperscript{36} As a result here too the plans of the General Staff's Asiatic personnel were never to reach full fruition, interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914.

Over the course of the subsequent World War the establishment of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff itself withered on the vine as a natural consequence of the concentration of all material and human resources upon the western frontier. By 1915 four men had already left the department, leaving just two men to handle the administration and forcing the temporary head of the department at that time,

\textsuperscript{32} RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.3811 dl.3ob-4.
\textsuperscript{34} RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4343 dl.2-7.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., dl.8-9.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., dl.14.
Davletshin, to petition the War Ministry for replacements, one of whom came from the Foreign Ministry. Question marks over the future existence of the department itself also served to heighten the difficulties the department experienced in wartime in maintaining sufficient personnel on its establishment. In 1917 the staff of the Caucasus military district offered the Asiatic Department the services of a certain Colonel Smirnov, one of its personnel, as a desk-head with the department. Smirnov possessed excellent qualifications for the role, having served in peacetime as a tutor to the young Shah of Persia and during the course of the war itself having conducted political work amongst the Kurdish population as well as service in the intelligence and counter-intelligence section of the Caucasus army. Davletshin, by now full head of department, was forced to turn down the offer of his services however, 'in view of the proposed-in-the-near-future abolition of this section [i.e. the Asiatic Department] and the transfer of its affairs to the Interior Ministry.' In 1918 the last head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff, Colonel Abdul Aziz Abdulich Davletshin, watched over the winding down of the department and the retiral of its personnel for family or medical reasons. The last communication passing through the department from the Narkom on military affairs dated from 28th September 1918.

5.2 CONCLUSION. THE MYOPIC GUARD: THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF AND THE 'KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY'.

The period from 1906 to 1917 marked in many ways the culmination of the strategic and doctrinal debates created by the expansion of the Russian Empire's Asiatic frontiers in the nineteenth century, and this was reflected in the role and position of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff. In the course of this expansion the Russian Empire continued to differ markedly from other imperial powers in two obvious regards. Firstly, in that, with the exception of Sakhalin Island, this empire was geographically contiguous with the core area; and secondly, in that the Russian administration never possessed a 'Colonial Office' in the manner of other European empires for administering their ' Asiatic' territories. Instead it had by the end of its existence developed distinct subsections within its main ministries for the administration of these frontiers, in the form of the Asiatic Departments of the General Staff and Foreign Ministry. The integrated nature of these departments within their larger bureaucratic units made the conciliation of agreed strategic

37 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4347 dl.49.
38 Ibid., dl.84-87.
39 Ibid., dl.190.
missions a continual headache and placed Russia in a unique strategic position by 1914. Natural conflicts of interest were liable to be aggravated and further complicated by the patrimonial nature of Russian government, in which each ministry competed for the attention of the Tsar. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, for example, there is good reason to argue that Tsarist foreign policy in the Far East was more the product of internecine conflict between the War, Foreign and Finance ministries than anything else. In this period calls grew in the Russian press for the creation of a ministry tasked with overseeing and ordering the economic and social life of the Russian border districts, but these calls were destined to be unfulfilled. One prominent consequence of this situation was, as one commentator noted, that an extremely heavy administrative burden fell upon the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, imposing a wide range of tasks for which ‘the competence of this department is not always sufficient.’

Much the same criticism could be (and was) made of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff.

At the same time these ‘Asiatic Departments’, at least on the surface, performed a panoptic surveillance function akin to that attributed by Foucault to the modern state in general (the so-called ‘panoptic guard’ of Jeremy Bentham’s ideal prison, itself in part inspired by Bentham’s own tour of the Russia of Nicholas I) and by Edward Said to western orientalist societies in particular. Here at least the Russian General Staff’s preoccupation with the gathering and assimilation of statistical information seems superficially to conform to the modern vision of the performance of Western European governments in general in regard to their colonial theatres:

colonialism was itself a cultural project of control. Colonial knowledge both

enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge

was what colonialism was all about.

This was certainly the view at the time of some Tsarist administrators, who viewed their empire in specifically comparative terms alongside the policies and methods pursued by other imperial systems. On departing for Siberia in 1819 Speranskii had gone armed with the wisdom imparted by Dominique de

Pradt’s treatise *Des colonies*. This advised the would-be colonial legislator to create laws appropriate to the spiritual and intellectual needs of the subject peoples. As a clear example of the dangers inherent in ignoring this Enlightenment principle, de Pradt pointed to the disaster of Spanish colonial policy in the Americas. Parallels were even more tempting of course for those who actually travelled abroad. On his visit to North Africa, made with specifically comparative intent, the future head of the Russian General Staff’s Asiatic Department, L. F. Kostenko, noted with surprise that the French government ‘reiterates those mistakes practiced by us in the last and at the start of the present century’—namely the bolstering of Islam by the sponsoring of mosques and other religious institutions. This was all the more surprising since ‘the French clergy is famous from time immemorial by their missionary zeal.’ Russian policy he felt to be clearly superior by its evolution to its present policy of ‘indifference’ (ravnodushia i indeferentizma) regarding Islam.

Some contemporaries saw the Asiatic Department of the General Staff within this general pan-European imperial framework, as a panoptic instrument of enlightened control and governance. Visiting the department in 1882, the journalist Charles Marvin was unimpressed by the ‘rabbit-warren’ of rooms in the upper storeys of the War Ministry, the ‘bare, cheerless walls’ and the ‘ordinary-looking’ room that was L. N. Sobolev’s office, but concluded however that:

> the world is governed by men, not by habitations. England, in all likelihood, would gladly part with the grand and imposing public office in Downing Street, if she could get in return a powerful and consistent foreign policy [*sic*], such as is pursued by the political officials in one shabby wing of the General Staff office at St. Petersburg, and supported by the military officials in the other.

This myth of the omnipotence of the imperial department head, suspended above a hidden web of knowledge more relevant than material institutions, rather like the millionaire financier of Joseph Conrad’s

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46 Marvin, *The Russian Advance Toward India* p.76
Nostromo- 'cobwebbed aloft by the radiation of telegraph wires'-was just that, a myth.\textsuperscript{47} The reality reflected all the frictions and local misunderstandings one would expect from the administration of an enormous land frontier. One individual particularly disenchanted with the directions given from the centre in this period was the Chief of Staff for Western Siberia, General I. F. Babkov. Babkov’s case is particularly poignant and instructive since he began his career as an element of centralist control, one of a generation of academy-trained officers who took up field commands in regions where in the past the presence of staff officers was not traditional. As a representative of the St.Petersburg centre, Babkov’s early career was blighted by fractious relations with local military officialdom. Yet long service on the frontier soon converted Babkov to the efficacy of regionalist solutions. In his memoirs, looking back over his lengthy career, he blamed the complexities of Sino-Russian relations in the 1870s upon the fact that:

we had at that time an excessively centralized [authority], as in St. Petersburg was concentrated even the smallest springs of the state mechanism. Plans were not developed in places where they would be put into action, but in St.Petersburg chancellories and special commissions.\textsuperscript{48}

In this unmistakable attack upon his superiors at the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, Babkov quoted in his support the view of Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, governor-general of the Caucasus. The governor-general expressed the opinion that the history of the war against Shamil proved that when local affairs were left in the hands of local men, matters prospered, whilst directives and the intervention of representatives from the centre invariably led to disaster. The lessons for Babkov was clear- that given ‘the rapidly changing events of a political character’ characteristic of Asiatic states, a devolution of political and administrative responsibilities was a necessity.

Such tensions expressed by those involved in the very heart of the machine serve to indicate that the Asiatic Department of the General Staff was very far from the smoothly functioning and omnipotent state mechanism seen by outsiders like Charles Marvin. By the end of the period under study, calls were growing, as we have seen, for the abolition of the Asiatic Department altogether. One prominent voice in


\textsuperscript{48} Babkov, \textit{Vospominaniiia o moei službe v zapadnoi Sibiri 1859-1875g. Razgranichenie s zapadnym Kitaem 1869g}. p.533.
these debates was that of Vasilii Fedorovich Novitskii (1869-1929). A graduate of the Staff Academy (class of 1892-5), Novitskii’s military service led him to become acquainted at first hand with practically all of Russia’s Asiatic concerns. Fulfilling part of his early service as commander of a Turkestan rifle battalion, and commandeered for eight months study to British India in 1898, Novitskii went on to serve as a staff officer to a West Siberian Cossack brigade. With this unit he participated in the 1900 intervention in China before, after a short term in the Main Staff, joining the 2nd Manchurian Army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Post-war service then saw him conduct military-scientific expeditions in both Mongolia and Manchuria, whilst his pre-war journeys in the Bukharan and Pamir mountain regions facilitated his 1910 study of the Afghan theatre of military operations. Yet as a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War and a prominent contributor to the military press of the day, Novitskii was not merely a typical product of Russia’s Asiatic military districts, but also part of a new generation of ‘Young Turks’ who advocated dramatic military and economic reform in the years leading up to the First World War. Like so many others in this category, he would later join the Soviet side in the Russian Civil War and go on to serve in the Red Army Staff Academy of the 1920s. He likewise shared with many others of his generation an impatience regarding the many ancillary functions that had been laid upon the Russian War Ministry as a consequence of the Miliutin reforms of the 1860s, and these views he expressed in a prominent work of 1909 advocating fundamental reform in the War Ministry. Supporting the return of GUGSh to the War Ministry, Novitskii advocated the removal of all those administrative accessories that detracted from the General Staff’s ability to plan for war itself. These included the Cossack administration, which was largely involved in land and economic questions, the Military-Medical Institute, with a view to transferring its functions to a civilian institution where they belonged, and the Topographical Department. With regard to the latter, Novitskii wanted the Topographical division removed from the War Ministry’s remit as its work was of empire-wide, rather than purely military, relevance. Undoubtedly one of his most dramatic proposals however was the removal of Central Asia from being the responsibility of the General Staff’s Asiatic Section, since he felt

50 Polkovnik (GS) V. F. Novitskii, Voenno-Geograficheskii Ocherk Afganskoe Teatra voennikh deistvii s podrobnym obzorom operatsionnykh putei, vedushchikh cherez Afganistan (St. Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia (v zdaniu Glavnogo Shtaba) 1910)
that the head and bureaucrats of that section were insufficiently qualified to handle the complex legal, financial and economic questions involved in governing that region. Since this area formed the last major area of responsibility for the General Staff’s Asiatic Section, Novitskii’s proposals in practice implied the abolition of that department. His views suggest in general that for many younger officers engaged on the Asiatic frontier, the very existence of that department after 1905 was simply no longer seen as relevant or meaningful. Moreover, such views during this later period enjoyed a degree of high-level support. As early as 1906 War Minister Rediger declared to the Council of Ministers the desirability of turning Turkestan over to a civilian administration, a declaration that encouraged the appointment of the Palen commission two years later. To his uncomprehending governor-general in Turkestan, Mishchenko, Rediger explained that he knew nothing of the administration of Turkestan, and was consequently forced to conduct matters according to the prompting of Colonel Tseil’, head of the General Staff’s Asiatic Section. In what may be read either as a self-deprecating comment or as a veiled criticism of Tseil’, Rediger explained that he therefore wanted to end this ‘abnormal’ situation and to ‘put the matter into competent hands.’ The Palen report itself favoured a greater measure of civil (as opposed to military) administration in Turkestan, but as we have seen from the foregoing chapter, nothing was done in practice before the outbreak of war in 1914. Governor-General Samsonov himself favoured a greater devolution of power, with more responsibility given to the local commander, thus mirroring calls heard from the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Vorontsov-Dashkov, in the same period. However, at an inter-departmental conference on the subject in 1911 under the chairmanship of State Inspector P. A. Kharitov, it was resolved to reject Samsonov’s pleas to expand his powers on the grounds that this would lead to the separation of the region from the rest of the Empire. Dilemmas of regionalization versus centralization would remain unresolved therefore before the outbreak of war in 1914.

Across the great majority of this period, several factors had hindered the Russian General Staff from obtaining a full and correct panoptic knowledge of its Asiatic frontiers and their immediate neighbouring states. Amongst these factors, undoubtedly the two greatest were financial and organizational.

During the period of office of War Minister Vannovskii (1881-1897) the Russian armed forces budget was cut to a barely sustainable minimum, the effects of which were felt at every level of military infrastructure. With large expenditures reserved for the complex process of complete re-armament, such as those linked with the introduction of the Mosin-Nagant magazine rifle in the 1890s, the drive for savings at every level was reflected and typified in the position of the regimental artel'. The artel', a form of soldiers workshop, took responsibility for putting together and maintaining uniforms in the Russian army, the War Ministry finding it cheaper to issue raw materials rather than complete tailored uniforms to the forces under its command. As a result many soldiers marched to war against Japan in 1904 in ill-fitting boots and with inadequate greatcoats. The considerable expense attendant on Russia in staying in the late nineteenth-century European arms race meanwhile formed at least one of the reasons for Nicholas II calling for the Hague Peace Conference of 1899. The astringency attending such efforts at military economy undoubtedly carried over some side-benefits as well, in terms of developing a certain sense of economy, a hatred of waste, and in cultivating the reputation for robustness and durability associated both with Russian weaponry and the Russian soldier in general. Russian officers took pride in the fact that their troops remained in vigorous and robust health despite a basic and monotonous diet of tea, bread, biscuits and cabbage soup. Indeed, it was believed such a regime increased their men's stamina and hardiness for the harsh test of war. The performance of Russian soldiers throughout history demonstrated that such beliefs were not entirely unfounded. Nonetheless in other areas this drive for economy undoubtedly carried dire consequences. Nowhere was this more evident than in the field of military intelligence, always a poor candidate for state investment given the inability to deliver an immediate, visible and reliable return. In the second half of the nineteenth century the expanding nature of the modern battlefield placed a premium on the ability to generate real-time and accurate strategic and operational intelligence, both in peace and in time of war. Yet the Russian military budget made no allowance for such factors, and only in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 did the inadequacy of allotting a mere 56,920 roubles annually to the cause of intelligence across the Russian Empire become evident to the War Ministry. Such practical drawbacks contrasted dramatically with the often highly developed intellectual dialogue within the General Staff itself, illustrating a classic military dilemma between theory and performance. The scientific structures and methods of analysis inculcated into General Staff thinking by men like Miliutin and
Maksheev had become undermined by the parsimony of a military administration which could not even afford to give its men properly-fitting boots.

The second factor obstructing the most effective use of even these limited resources was organizational. Unlike the Military-Scientific Committee, with its clear linear responsibility for managing the correspondence of Russia's military agents abroad, the role of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff in intelligence gathering was never clearly defined or demarcated. By statute it had if anything a dual function, given that its responsibilities involved the monitoring of events in regions bordering Russia's Asiatic frontier alongside the internal administration of Russia's Asiatic military districts. In practice, as might have been expected, attention to intelligence concerns was often sacrificed on the altar of daily military administration, with A. P. Protsenko noting in 1895, as we have seen, that over half the correspondence of his department did not relate to military matters at all. These twin factors of tight financial restraints alongside a less than coherent organizational system meant that despite the presence of talented and often outstanding individuals working on its Asiatic frontiers, military scholars like Przheval'skii and Kozlov, the Russian General Staff was not able to deal with its numerous responsibilities across the southern frontier in what would nowadays be termed a 'joined-up' fashion. Russia went to war with Japan in 1904 armed with inadequate maps, with a poor cultural knowledge of its opponent, and with a critical lack of reliable interpreters, and all this despite numerous military-scientific expeditions in the region in the past, military agents in the relevant countries, and a military presence in the Far East dating back several decades. A significant and understudied aspect of Russia's post-war military reforms was therefore aimed at directing a more organized, better funded, and single-minded gaze at Russia's Asiatic responsibilities. The reduction of the Asiatic Department's responsibilities after 1903 reflected not any diminished importance being assigned to the administration of these frontiers but rather the increasing military commitments these districts demanded. Such commitments could only be handled by a large central military administration containing several desks for both the collection and processing of military intelligence, a need that the organization known under the acronym of GUGSh largely provided after 1905. The reunification of GUGSh with the Main Staff in 1909 ended significant areas of administrative overlap between the two organizations and created a central administration capable of planning for the next major conflict in both a doctrinal and technical regard. It was these developments that simultaneously undermined
the relevance, in the eyes of many younger officers like Novitskii, of retaining the old Asiatic Section at all. Nonetheless even here the former contradictions were far from completely eradicated, since the Asiatic Section, as we have seen, retained responsibility for organizing the training of officers in eastern languages, training that obviously qualified them to perform an intelligence role in the East alongside everyday administrative duties. Right up until the end of its existence meanwhile the Asiatic Section continued to be headed by men-Manakin, Davletshin- who had risen to prominence in their early careers as intelligence-gathering agents both within and beyond Russia’s Asiatic frontiers.

In some ways of course this ‘knowledge panic’ that afflicted the Russian General Staff in the wake of its defeat in the Far East- expressed in its concern over lack of cadres, native intermediaries, basic statistical data and translators- was far from exceptional. Indeed, ironically, it was again typical of and paralleled the other imperial, knowledge-based colonial systems of its day. What was striking however was the scale and urgency of the concern in the Russian case given again the indivisibility of its European and Asiatic strategic concerns; strategic balance and accurate information for Russia were peculiarly vital.

In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War the Russian military and the state in general was left with a whole raft of organizational and administrative reforms regarding Turkestan, the Caucasus, and the Far East, few of which had time to fully evolve before the outbreak of a new and wider war. Whether the Russian state could have properly developed its administrative and strategic policies in Asia had war not interrupted in 1914 therefore remains one of the most intriguing ‘what if’ questions of modern history.

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Changing institutions aside, the organized study of the East by the Russian General Staff left long legacies in other areas as well. In particular, the Russian General Staff did on occasion apply the tool of military statistics to practical policy goals in some of the panoptic forms envisaged by Foucault and Said-as Peter Holquist has recently argued:

Military statistics was an applied science in the most direct sense of the term. To a significant degree what was known by the Imperial government about its subjects, i.e. their numbers, where they lived, and even their health,

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54 For a useful survey of the same phenomenon in the British case, see: C. A. Bayly, ‘Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India.’ MAs 27 (1, 1993) pp.3-43.
it learned from military statistics. 55

The creation of psychogenetic group identifications fostered by military statistics undoubtedly paved the way for the sometimes extremely brutal manner in dealing with ethnic groups that the Tsarist Government pursued in both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in 1914-17. During the course of its dealing with the Central Asian rebellion of 1916 for example, the Turkestan administration under Kuropatkin targeted an entire ethnic group, the Kirghiz, and exiled many of them en masse across the border to China. This group had been singled out as early as 1910 by General Staff Captain Fedorov of the Turkestan military district as a politically unreliable element given their retention of a strong (and hence culturally impenetrable) internal clan structure. Fedorov had advocated increased Russian colonization as a means to balance the native element and assure security in the sensitive Semirech’e border region with China. 56 Kuropatkin in 1916 therefore was in many ways only acting out political strategies for which the intellectual groundwork had already been paved in the past by generations of Russian staff officers conducting military-scientific expeditions to analyze the ethnographic and political balance of Russia’s Asiatic borderlands. Nor was the Tsarist government alone in this trend towards scientifically-justified ‘population policy’, the German government pursuing policies in Eastern Europe in the same period that may have been inculcated and fostered by earlier German administrative practice in Africa. 57 In the immediate pre-war period of course, the British administration in India, by their extensive support for the Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman in defence of their so-called ‘scientific’ frontier in Afghanistan, also backed a policy that amounted in effect to organized genocide against the nationalities of northern Afghanistan.

It is furthermore undeniably true that in the development and deployment of knowledge-based systems of control and administration, the Russian War Ministry in the Tsarist period played an

exceptionally significant role. Within Tsarist Russia generally, science rapidly became an institutionalized occupation, a state of affairs that the Soviet Union would inherit. The emphasis upon knowledge for military needs was reflected in the development, before World War I, of a map of the Asiatic border zone on thirty-two sheets (scale 1 inch: 40 verst) and a military road map of Asiatic Russia (1 inch: 50 verst).

Civilian-sponsored geographical programmes by contrast, such as the cadastral survey begun in 1765, took a significantly longer period to carry out with, in the case of the cadastral project, the task uncompleted till 1915.58 The importance the Russian military attached to rendering Asia knowable was further reflected by the distribution of topographical officers within the Asiatic border zones. In 1866, following the precedent set by the establishment of an independent topographical section for the Caucasus Corps in 1854, D.A.Miliutin directed that four of the new military districts-Orenburg, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Turkestan- be allotted topographical sections of 20-40 men each as opposed to the 2-4 topographers attached to the military district staffs elsewhere.59 Nonetheless practical problems remain with applying the post-modern ‘orientalist’ model to the Tsarist bureaucracy and strategic thinking as a whole. As we have already seen, the Tsarist government’s capacity to convert knowledge into power was severely restricted by both economic and practical restrictions, i.e. by the sheer burden of the cataloguing and monitoring of archival knowledge. The fundamental inescapable fact of the unwieldy nature and inefficiency of the central bureaucratic institutions, so familiar a theme to students of Russian Imperial history, held as true here as it did elsewhere. It should be noted however that this represented a rather different problem than that posited by Edward Said for European orientalism as a whole. In Said’s view orientalism was in effect a ‘representation’ of the ‘true’ Orient that was inextricably bound up within the parameters of an avaricious European colonialism. According to this theory, all forms of orientalism, whatever their claims, were directed only at continually re-evoking and re-emphasizing ‘the chasm between intelligent, logical and mentally disciplined Europeans and ‘Orientals,’ whose minds are so disorganized that they cannot even walk on a paved road.60 European orientalists were incapable of perceiving or representing the ‘true’ patterns of cultural development in the East because they were imperialists enraptured by this dichotomy.

and because, at a deeper level, in Said's view, all forms of representation are inevitably bound to be forms of misrepresentation. Within the framework of Russian military vostokovedenie this claim begins to look rather peculiar. Although inevitably bound by professional requirements to study the past to a certain degree, military vostokoveds were primarily concerned with the contemporary situation in Asiatic states. Had they begun with the cultural precept that the nature of the Orient was unchanging and backward, this region by definition could never have been perceived as forming any type of security threat. In reality, by contrast, it was the military's perception of the very real cultural and technological changes occurring in Asia that led them, in the Russian case, to devote increasing amounts of attention to the region. This would suggest that Said's thesis of an instinctively racialist and blinkered orientalism, to the extent that it is compatible with reality at all, remains entirely inapplicable to the forms of analysis deployed by the Russian military with regard to the East. It was the very consciousness of the fact that the East was changing, and awareness of the poverty of its instruments to monitor this development, which caused increasing levels of concern in the Tsarist military's policy-forming departments. If military analysts were often inclined to associate these technological changes with aggressive intentions in formulae that carried racist overtones (the so-called 'yellow peril' threat of the 1905-1910 period), then this was probably no more than a by-product of the Hegelian and atavistic world-view which dominated all strategic thought at the time and which applied as much in Europe as in Asia.

Throughout all this later period meanwhile the increased strategic significance assigned to the Asiatic frontiers is the most striking (and most overlooked) factor of Tsarist military policy in the immediate prewar period. Whilst Tsarist generals were understandably anxious in their postwar memoirs to assert that Russian prewar military policy remained firmly fixed on the menace of Germany, the actual technical and strategic changes of the 1905-1914 period—the running down of fortifications in the West alongside the construction of new fortifications and major rail links in both the Caucasus, Turkestan and the Far East—presented a rather different picture. In the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Palitsyn and the State Defence Council drew up a series of measures and plans for the reinforcement of both Central Asia and the Russian Far East. War Minister Rediger opposed these measures and used his financial powers to delay their implementation, but his successor, Sukhomlinov, proved more disposed towards such a re-orientation of resources. The cost and effort involved in these changing dispositions was
neither cheap nor undertaken lightly. State finances in this later period came under the scrutiny of the State Duma as well as the Tsar and were truly 'political' questions in the modern sense of the term.61 The ultimate cost of the Amur Railroad alone-400 million roubles- came at a time when the annual expenditure of the Russian state budget amounted to less than three billion roubles.62 Such redispositions can only have been undertaken therefore because a majority within the Tsarist governmental system, including its military wing, saw them as highly necessary. In short, on the eve of the First World War itself the Russian Empire felt increasingly threatened along its Asiatic frontier in both a strategic, political and economic regard. In the words of one scholar who has studied this phenomenon from an economic perspective, this undoubtedly 'contributed to the atmosphere of general crisis for the [T]sarist regime in July 1914.'63 It did not, to say the least, facilitate the formulation of a unified strategic response. In the words of another economic historian:

In practice, this meant a desperate attempt to maintain adequate troops in readiness for an offensive against both Germany and Austro-Hungary, without ignoring the defence of Russia’s borders in the Far East and in Central Asia. As if this was not enough, the Tsar insisted that Russia be provided with a fleet that had an offensive as well as defensive capability.64

Tsarist Russia’s Asiatic concerns were also played out at a wider level of policy debate after 1905 on the whole future of Russian strategy across Eurasia, a debate that exposed fundamentally opposing views and beliefs. Proponents of the political alliance with Japan sought thereby to gain a free hand for Russia in the Balkans and Near East. Those who believed in the inevitability of a new war with Japan by contrast argued for an alliance with America and a settlement of affairs with Germany and Austro-Hungary, leaving the strategic ‘rear’ of Europe secure in order to prepare for renewed conflict in the Far East.65 These debates played themselves out within the academic and orientalist societies of the day of which so many military and diplomatic personnel were by now members. At a sitting of the Society for Vostokovedenie in May 1910 the retired General K. I. Druzhinin presented a paper arguing for 'transferring

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61 For a short summary of the powers of the Duma in this later period, see: Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* pp.50-4.
63 Derek W. Spring, ‘Russian Imperialism in Asia in 1914’ *CMRS XX* (1979) p.305
the centre of gravity of state defence’ to the Trans-Baikal region. This was to involve building up the railway net there, setting up field fortifications and concentrating troops. These preparations were to be complemented by the formation of a diplomatic anti-Japanese alliance with America and, potentially, England. Such measures, he suggested, would help prepare for a sharp preemptive strike against both Japan and China in the very near future. This paper drew support from prominent members of the society, including Colonel A. E. Snesarev and the Sinologist Dmitri Pozdnov. Such supporters of a re-orientation of strategic resources on Asia were therefore by proxy ‘Germanophile’, a charge levelled against Snesarev in 1907 when it was suspected that the newspaper he ran, running critical pieces on the recent agreement with Japan, had German financial backing. Druzhinin’s 1910 presentation was however criticized and voted down by the majority of the Society, including former Chief of the General Staff Palitsyn, who despite his own anti-Japanese inclinations (he was an opponent of the 1907 Anglo-Russian and associated Russo-Japanese conventions) found such a plan too radical and in his view too unrealistic for even his own tastes. Probably the greatest opponents of any redispersion of strategic resources however (and even of such changes as did occur) were individuals within the Russian Foreign Ministry, and in particular Foreign Minister Izvol’skii. In a confidential letter to a colleague in 1906, Izvol’skii lamented that the Russian General Staff, in his view:

have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing; they talk of Seistan, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean &c. exactly as the talk used to be before the Japanese war, of Manchuria, Korea, and the Pacific Ocean. Probably the greatest opponents of any redispersion of strategic resources however (and even of such changes as did occur) were individuals within the Russian Foreign Ministry, and in particular Foreign Minister Izvol’skii. In a confidential letter to a colleague in 1906, Izvol’skii lamented that the Russian General Staff, in his view:

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Debate on these issues both in private and in the press led to Izvol’skii’s successor, Sazonov, making the famous statement to the State Duma in 1912 that:

one must not forget... that Russia is a European power, that the state was formed not on the banks of the Black Irtych but on the banks of the Dnieper and of the river Moskva.

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66 Polivanov, *Iz dnevnikov i vospominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916g* p.88.
The growing importance attached to the Asiatic frontier by the Russian military in this later period was shaped by factors that were as much psychological as physical. The southern frontier by the end of the Tsarist period was seen implicitly in the eyes of many Tsarist officers as part of a long single 'causal chain', in which events in one theatre would carry inevitable political repercussions elsewhere along the line. During his term in office as Governor-General in Turkestan in the 1890s, General Dukhovskoi for example had speculated over possible explosive links between the rising tide of Pan-Islamic propaganda and recent political events in China. Dukhovskoi felt in general that Europeans must expect in the coming century the declaration of a universal Muslim *gazavat*, (holy war, *jihad*), an event in which Russia, by the nature of its geographical position, would be at the epicentre. In particular however, he warned that in the event of even minor military reverses in a potential Sino-Russian conflict, Muslims could be inspired by the Chinese example to pursue a policy of *revanchism*. Even the slightest military setback might therefore spark political instability right along the frontier line. In this regard Russian military expansion actually reinforced the intrinsic unity of Inner Eurasia discussed at the very start of this work. The railway and the telegraph—ironically the very tools of modern imperial expansion—replaced the horseman and the caravan and surpassed them to such an extent that political repercussions at one end of the region such as the Russo-Japanese War could now be felt at the other in a matter of weeks rather than years. The political causative chain felt in this region in the past, in for example the movement of the Huns westward as a result of political developments in north-west China, would now express itself again in the modern period in months rather than centuries. The southern frontier towards the end of this period was correspondingly under political pressure from both ends of the line— from political developments in Turkey after 1909 and from the evidence of Japanese and Chinese modernization after 1904-05. Central Asia formed the natural crux, the region where the crosshairs of these two influences, as it were, met, and where the third and unique

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70 RGVIA F.400 Op.1 D.4984 di.5-7ob.
71 A similar Russian view of the southern frontier as a region posing significant overlapping political and military dangers, specifically through the culturally introverted nature of Islam, can be found even in recent analyses. See for example: Victor Spolnikov, 'Impact of Afghanistan’s War on the Former Soviet Republics of Central Asia' in H. Malik (ed.), *Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects* pp.95-116. A former Major-General of the Soviet KGB, Spolnikov is now a scholar of the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow. Consequently his appreciation is based on access to past studies made by the KGB on the failure of party structures in Soviet Central Asia to replace the pre-existing Islamic order.
problem of Anglo-Russian tension over Afghanistan creating a complicating factor that correspondingly came under increasing pressure for political resolution.

Whilst they did not necessarily conform to the patterns of Said's 'Orientalism' meanwhile, the forms and methods of thought developed by the Tsarist military and academic community outlived the Tsarist regime itself and went on to have a significant impact upon early Soviet modes of government. On the one hand this was simply a matter of a chronological continuity of personnel — of individuals who had begun their careers under the Tsars going on to spend their last years serving under Stalin. On the other hand this continuity was also in some regard scientific and ideological. For many, assuming they survived both war and revolution, 1917 marked less of a change or turning-point in the nature of their careers or even their thinking than it may outwardly appear. In the immediate course and aftermath of the Civil War, Russia's new rulers found themselves in a terrifying state of strategic and scientific ignorance. In 1919 one official of the Commissariat of Nationalities noted to his superiors that the only things known about the natives of the Trans-Baikal region, the Buriat and Enisei Tunguz, was that they were Mongols, Lamaists (they were in fact neither) and that they were 'quite wild, and that is about it.' As late as 1926 delegates at a session of the Central Executive Committee warned that 'it would be difficult to maintain power' in the non-Russian provinces if local administrators did not learn more about their charges. The only immediate solution to these enormous tasks facing the Soviet government, in every field, was the employment of Tsarist-era bureaucratic, academic, and administrative personnel. In the Far East, the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok continued to train translators in its 'practical programme' for the pursuance of the Soviet regime's political goals in China. The eminent Tsarist sinologist Dmitri Pozdnocv helped set up language programmes in the Red Army, a contribution that did not spare the octogenarian from summary state execution in 1937 on the charge of being a Japanese spy. The legacy of the practical courses developed in the Russian Far East since 1899 was destined to have a deep and long-lasting impact on the evolution and course of Soviet Sinology.

In the field of exploration, both P. K. Kozlov and V. K. Arsen'ev would continue their scientific researches into the Soviet epoch, although the latter had a particularly uneasy relationship with the ruling

72 Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors p.139.
regime. Narrowly dissuaded in the 1920s from dedicating one of his works to his former patron and mentor, the exiled Unterberger, in all likelihood only his sudden death in 1930 spared Arsen’ev from the later purges. His wife was less fortunate. Kozlov meanwhile dedicated his last active explorations to the study of the field first opened up by his patron and mentor, Przhval’skii, with expeditions in Mongolia and a further unsuccessful attempt to penetrate Tibet.

At a wider level, the committees formed by the Tsarist government in wartime for assessing the internal structure of the Tsarist Empire went on to become the most direct outward expressions of scientific continuity into the Soviet regime. The collection of scientists, ethnographers and statisticians assembled under the Committee for the Studying of Natural Industrial Resources formed in 1915 (KEPS for short) and the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Population of Russia and the Borderlands (or, confusingly, KIPS, formed in February 1917) would both go on to serve the Soviet government. For both committees their primary task would remain the problem of the gathering and assimilation of knowledge and its practical application. The papers delivered by A. E. Snesarev at these gatherings in the immediate postwar years reflected a continued dissatisfaction with the level of knowledge available to the central government (the ‘knowledge crisis’) that Snesarev had already identified and expressed under the Tsars.

At the first all-Russia conference of scientific societies for the study of local areas in December 1921, Snesarev pointed out that data regarding even the most basic facts about Asiatic states, such as climate, population density and social movement, all too often remained conjectural or non-existent.75 He further lamented that the careers of the great Asiatic commanders, such as Timur and Chinghiz Khan (men whose achievements in his own view surpassed those of Frederick the Great, Turmec, Gustavus Adolphus and Eugene of Savoy) were still ignored or, worse, slandered and misunderstood by the arrogance of European science and historiography. He assured his listeners however that:

In the matter of scorn or arrogance towards Asiatics we [Russians] are much less culpable than Europe.76

The position of Russia geographically would make her play a large role in the resolution of all Asiatic political questions generally, whilst the special position of the Russian Far East as a buffer in the

74 Wolff, To the Harbin Station p.175 and John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East pp.222-223.
76 Ibid., pp.101-2.
emerging struggle between Europe and the ‘yellow peril’ demanded particular attention. These were themes and issues that had already evolved latently in the Tsarist period; Snesarev was but one lightning rod of such concerns to the new Soviet order. Andrei Evgen’evich had joined the Red Army in 1918 and became head of the General Staff Academy in 1919-21 before retiring and becoming rector and professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies from 1921 to 1930.

Delivering a series of lectures at the Staff Academy on the discipline of ‘Military Geography’ (a direct outgrowth of Miliutin’s old course on ‘Military Statistics’), Snesarev supplemented his lecture series with a military-statistical portrait of the one country he had felt in the Tsarist period to be most understudied, namely Afghanistan. This study warned that the invasion of Afghanistan would present a nightmare scenario for a Soviet army, fighting in difficult territory against a fanatical population.

Snesarev’s activities at the Staff Academy meanwhile overlapped with the opening of a faculty of Oriental languages for Russian staff officers and students of the Foreign Ministry. One of the first entrants to this course, who enrolled to study the Persian, Hindustani and Arabic languages in addition to his normal military studies, still recalled the inspiring inaugural address given by Snesarev at the opening of this institute decades later:

‘I am myself’ he said ‘going to conduct the course in the military geography of Sinkiang, Tibet, Pamir, northwest India, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Persia, whose roads I have travelled many times on foot. I have lived with the native peoples in these countries and spoken their languages. I shall tell you all you need to know about these countries as Soviet General Staff officers and diplomats.’

This witness, who after service in Turkestan against the basmachi later transferred to the diplomatic corps, noted the enormous impact that the oriental institute under Snesarev’s guidance played in building up the Soviet Union’s cadres in Asia. Within five years, he estimated, more than three-quarters of the Soviet diplomatic and consular corps in the Near and Middle East were his fellow-graduates, including the...

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Russian ambassadors to Persia and Japan and the Russian minister in Arabia, not to mention 'a score of young generals who later served as advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek or as military attachés in the countries of Asia.' Measured by any scale therefore, Snesarev's role in preparing the Soviet Union to tackle the problems of military vostokovedenie that he had already witnessed and experienced under the Tsars was immense.

Snesarev spent much of the 1920s engaged on his life's work, a multi-volume study of India. This enterprise, of which only the first part was ever printed in Snesarev's lifetime, he stated in a foreword he intended for use by students both of the Orientalist Institute and of the Eastern Faculty of the General Staff's Military Academy, indicating that even here he saw an overlap between general academic concerns and those of military science. Arrested in 1930 like so many other voenspetsy on unsubstantiated charges, he was released in 1934 without rehabilitation and with his health ruined, to die in 1937. Whilst the tradition of military vostokovedenie developed in the Tsarist period may have undergone some surface adjustment in the Soviet era therefore, its traditions and challenges alongside its actual practitioners remained an important element in the development of Soviet military thought up until at least 1937. The very framework of analysis meanwhile- the application of geographical and ethno-social knowledge to state-centred political goals, the rigid institutionalization of science- remained the same. Moreover, dilemmas of regionalization versus centralization became, if anything, even more painful, particularly during the time of the purges that engulfed Snesarev. For the Soviet army therefore, here as in so much else, the legacy of the Tsarist Imperial General staff in the field of oriental studies was destined to remain not a matter of nostalgia but of necessity.

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80 Prof. A. E. Snesarev, Indiia (Strana i narod) Vypusk 1. Fizicheskaia Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Institutа Vostokovedeniа 1926). The second half of this enormous work was recently published posthumously: A. E. Snesarev, Etnograficheskaia Indiia (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury 1981).
81 On the voenspetsy in general, those officers who transferred directly from the Tsarist to the Soviet armed forces, the definitive work is: A. G. Kavtaradze, Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov 1917-1920gg. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "NAUKA" 1988)
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F.444  Arabia and Syria
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F.451  Japan
F.483  Central Asia
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Map 1. General geographical scheme
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