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EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948

Submitted by

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in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow.

15 May 1994

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to provide an account of the policy-making process in South African education since the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948. The intention will be to a) better understand the nature and extent of the influence of different groups and individuals on the policy-making process, and b) to explain how and why educational change has occurred. Given the very large area of possible research implied by a topic of this nature, the study will concentrate on one area of education policy, namely schooling, although reference will be made to other areas where relevant. Primary sources in the form of policy documents and selected interviews with key policy actors have been used in conjunction with the secondary literature. Chapter one will locate the present study in relation to the existing literature. The chapter will focus on how different scholarly traditions conceptualise the education/society relationship and the nature of educational change. This will provide a necessary basis for the development, in chapter two, of a suitable theoretical framework for this study. An attempt will be made to combine a liberal emphasis on interest group interaction in policy making with a more neo-Marxist concern with how such interactions are linked to wider economic and political interests. Further, an attempt will be made to integrate a structuralist concern with economic and political processes with a post-structuralist emphasis on the discursive construction of policy. Consequently three distinct but related levels of analysis will be developed, each one informing the approach of the remaining chapters. Thus chapter three will use the work of the French Regulation School to analyse the changing relationship between schooling and the accumulation process in the apartheid economy. Also drawing on the work of Gramsci, educational change will be understood as an aspect of a basic contradiction between capitalist accumulation strategies and the hegemonic project of apartheid. Chapters four and five will analyse the specific influences of discourses about culture, nation and 'race' on the policies of the government and of oppositional groupings. It will be demonstrated that racial interpretations have had an independent effect on policy that is related, but cannot be reduced to economic or political interests. The concept of discourse used will draw on the work of Michel Foucault. Finally, chapter six will focus on educational politics during the transition from apartheid to democracy. The chapter will seek to relate Margaret Archer's theories concerning the effects of systems of educational governance on interest group interaction to the South African context. It will be argued that the motives of different policy actors can only be fully understood if these interactions are related to the wider economic, political and discursive influences on policy discussed in earlier chapters.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One: Discourses on Schooling in South Africa</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nationalist/Conservative Tradition</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Liberal Tradition</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Radical/neo-Marxist Tradition</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy research in the Era of Negotiations</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two: Towards a Framework for the Study of Education Policy in South Africa</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing the Three Levels of Analysis</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting for Change in the Policy-Making Process</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Level as a Source of Change</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic Level as a Source of Change</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ideological/Discursive Level as a Source of Change</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Educational State</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three: Education and the Economy in South Africa - a Changing Relationship</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Fordism</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Production Under Racial Fordism</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa's Changing Labour Markets</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling and the Old Correspondence</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes and Effects of Racial Fordism's Organic Crisis</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Production Since 1976</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Markets Since 1976</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling and the New Correspondence</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a Post-Fordist South Africa?</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Change and Emerging Policies From the Democratic Movement</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Four: Education Policy and Changing Discourses on 'Race'

Introduction
Foucault, Discourse and the Study of Racism in South African Education
The Introduction of Apartheid Education - a Study of Parliamentary Debates
Liberalism, Culture and Modernity
- The Education panel - a Liberal Response to Apartheid
- The de Lange Report - Two Traditions Converge
- The Influence of the South African New Right
- Racist Discourses and the Present - the Education Renewal Strategy

Chapter Five: The Racial Interpretations of the Democratic Movement

Introduction
Black Consciousness and Self-Reliance - the Growth and Influence of the BCM
- Steve Biko - "I Write What I Like"
- AZAPO Education Policy
Non-Racialism - the Development of an Educational Ideal
- Opposition to Bantu Education - Z.K. Mathews and the African Education Movement
- People's Education at Home and in Exile
- The Transition to Democracy and the ANC's Policy Framework

Chapter Six: The Politics of Educational Change in Transition

Introduction
Archerian Theory and Education Systems Change
The Use of Archer's Work in South Africa
Structure
Interaction During the Transition
- Interaction Within the State
- Policy Making Within the State
- Interaction Outside of the State - the Struggle for the NETF
- Policy Making in Civil Society
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Walter Humes, for his invaluable help and encouragement in the production of this thesis. In particular, I am grateful for his prompt and efficient response to requests for help, his attention to detail and his sense of humour. I would also like to thank the Canon Collins Trust Fund for Southern Africa for the financial assistance I received from them as well as the moral support they gave me. Needless to say this thesis would not have been possible without their generosity. My colleagues in the Education Policy Unit deserve special mention for their advice, and for giving me the opportunity to complete the thesis at a time when the demands of the transition have been pressing. My family have also been a source of strength and support. Thanks to Mohammed and Clare, Anna-Zohra, Ruweida, Adam and Roy, Haroon and all my family in South Africa and the UK. Thanks especially to Ursilla who has had to put up with bad moods, late nights and one-track conversations, and to my sons, Callum and Samora who have seen less of their father than they ought. Finally, at this time of great hope for a new South Africa, I dedicate this thesis to my comrades in the Democratic Movement who have inspired me with their self-sacrifice and determination not to relent in the struggle for freedom and democracy.
CHAPTER 1
DISCOURSES ON SCHOOLING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

The aims of this introductory chapter are three-fold. Firstly, an attempt will be made to outline the three main traditions in South African educational thought, namely, the nationalist/conservative, the liberal, and the radical/neo-Marxist traditions. This categorisation has already been used by Cross (1986), and, in a slightly different form, by Ashley (1989) in their respective reviews of these traditions.

The second aim of the chapter is to review the major educational literature within each tradition. Recent general reviews of the literature on South African education already exist (Cross, 1986; Tikly, 1990; Nkomo, 1990; Chisholm, 1992). The current review then, will focus only on those aspects that are pertinent for the study as a whole, and, in particular, for the next chapter where a theoretical framework will be outlined. The present chapter then will try to draw out from the general literature the view taken of the relationship between the education system and the wider economic, political and social context, and, the way that the process of educational change is theorised. The particular form of education associated with each tradition will also be discussed.

Finally, the governmental, non-governmental, educational and political institutions associated with intellectual production within each tradition will be introduced at this stage, in order to facilitate a preliminary analysis of the changing relationships between each tradition and the policy-making process.

Regarding the use of the categorisations mentioned above, the following important qualifications are necessary. There is a danger in using categorisations of this sort that the many overlaps between different ideological perspectives are overlooked or at best neglected. There is also a danger that, through over-emphasising the evolution of, and, continuities within traditions, the contradictions and discontinuities within each tradition become subsumed. It is partly for these reasons that each tradition will be discussed in relation to the salient material and historical conditions with which they interact. Following Althusser (1971), it is suggested that whilst ideas have a certain 'relative autonomy', they
also have a material existence, and, it is in the dialectical interaction of ideologies with the material world that contradictions and overlaps become apparent.

The Nationalist/Conservative Tradition

Cross (1986) has distinguished two outstanding trends in the early historiography of the nationalist/conservative tradition; the defence of Afrikaner traditions and values in the face of British anglicization policies; and an effort to reformulate Afrikaner values, beliefs and institutions in accordance with aspirations for an Afrikaner cultural and spiritual renaissance. Organised around the doctrine of Christian National Education (CNE), with its roots in seventeenth-century Dutch educational thought (Muir cited in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 112), these trends culminated in the development of CNE schools between 1902 and 1907, and institutions such as the Institute for Christian National Education (ICNE) formed in 1939.

In 1948, the ICNE published a document outlining CNE principles. The importance of the document is two-fold, for besides setting out what a Christian National education might entail, the document also effectively served as an educational manifesto for the National Party (NP) which swept to victory in the elections of that year. Given the influence the document has had on South African education, and, given that it will serve as an important reference point for this study, a brief **resume** outlining the major points will follow. The document starts with the following observation:

We believe that the teaching and education of the children of white parents should occur on the basis of the life and world view of the parents. For Afrikaans-speaking children this means that they must be educated on the basis of the Christian-National life and world view of our nation. (Quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 120)

Article two provides some insight into the specific meaning given by the document, of the word 'Christian' in CNE, namely that it refers to the Holy Scriptures, and to the teachings of the three Afrikaans churches. It is this view of Christianity that must be entrenched in religious instruction, and, which must further 'determine the spirit and direction of all the other subjects and of the whole school' (cited in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 121). The term 'national' is used in the document to connote 'love of one's own', and this must also become integral to the curriculum and ethos of the school. As far as the curriculum is concerned religious instruction, geography, history and 'civics' (the teaching
of responsibilities towards home, school, society and state) are singled out as being particularly important for the inculcation of CNE values. All teaching should be in the mother-tongue, and the teaching of the mother-tongue must be the most important secular school subject.

The view taken of the child, and of human nature generally is an extremely pessimistic one. Basically, children are viewed as innately sinful and it is only through coming to know Jesus Christ that they may be saved. Consequently there is much emphasis on the 'moulding' and 'formative' functions of education, particularly with regard to Christian National principles, but also, in the old humanist tradition, with regard to the inculcation of an entire cultural tradition. The teacher 'should be a man [sic] of Christian life and world view, without which he is nothing less to us than a deadly danger (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.125). The authority of the teacher is 'borrowed from God', and, consequently, teaching should aim not only at the formation of the child and the welfare of the community, but also at 'the glory of God'. Part of the proper training of teachers must entail instruction in 'scientifically and systematised Christian life and world view; they must be instructed in all the necessary secular sciences, but most particularly in pedagogic science' (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.125).

As far as the control of education is concerned, the document makes clear that there must be no mixed schools. English-speaking whites (the document deals with blacks under a separate section) must have their own mother-tongue schools. In both types of school, however, there must be the right relationship between the three 'upholders of national values', namely the church, the home and the state. The parents, as members of the community, must determine the spirit and direction of the school, and, must establish maintain and control them in collaboration with the state. Whilst the state must take most responsibility for the financing of the school, the parents must contribute towards 'defraying the school's expenses'. The church must keep a watchful eye over the spirit and direction of education, and, via the parents, on the teachers. The church must also financially support needy parents. The state is assigned the role of ensuring that 'school life law is valid and is maintained' but may not decide about the spirit and direction of the school so long as 'judged by the measure of the law of God, it is not damaging or destructive to the state' (Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.124). The state must also be responsible for maintaining 'scientific' and moral standards in the curriculum. Whilst the
school derives its authority from parents, it must also be allowed independently to institute plans for study, teaching methods, and school discipline.

Regarding the education of 'coloureds' and 'natives', the document makes the following brief and general points. Firstly, whilst the education of these two groups is considered to be a subordinate task of the white man, there is an emphasis on the 'trusteeship' of the white man, and, most especially, on the trusteeship of the Boer nation as the 'senior trustee'. Trusteeship implies that the 'coloureds' and 'natives' must be led to their own understanding of Christian and National principles. Separation ('apartheid') must apply, and the mother-tongue must be the medium of instruction for both groups. In the case of the 'natives', however, the two official national languages (English and Afrikaans) must also be taught because they are the 'keys to the cultural loans that are necessary to his [the native's] own cultural progress'. (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.128). Further:

On the grounds of the cultural infancy of the native we believe that it is the right and task of the state, in collaboration with the Christian Protestant churches, to give and control native education and the training of native teaching forces must be undertaken as soon as possible by the native himself, but under the control and guidance of the state. (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.128).

Despite the envisaged role of the state in the education of 'coloureds' and 'natives', the document makes clear that the financing of education in both cases must 'be placed on such a basis that it does not occur to the cost of white education' (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.128).

The extent to which CNE principles have affected educational policy in South Africa has been the subject of three theses by Robertson (1973), Mbere (1979) and Hofmeyr (1982). Many writers within the liberal tradition have also discussed the issue (see for example Malherbe, 1977; Ashley, 1989). The extent of CNE influence on more recent government policy will also be discussed in later chapters of the present study. It is sufficient here to note that since the inauguration of the Bantu Education Act (BEA) in 1953, the influence has been profound. The following salient features of that influence, along with some of the major contradictions associated with it, will be set out in the paragraphs below.

A series of Acts during the 1950's and 1960's saw segregated schooling along CNE lines entrenched with respect to all groups classified by the Population Registration Act,
namely whites, 'coloureds', Indians and Africans, and at all levels of education. The recent 'Clase models' (see chapter three) have, however, begun to allow schools to desegregate, albeit in a highly qualified manner (Metcalfe, 1991), and non-racial private schools are tolerated. The government's recent Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) (DNE, 1991,a) has proposed that 'race' should no longer provide a basis for accommodating diversity. There remains a strong emphasis, however, on 'communities' remaining in control of their children's education. The various ambiguities associated with the word 'community' will be set out below.

Mother-tongue teaching has been strongly encouraged in South African schools. The reimposition of the so-called 50:50 principle on African schools in 1976 (i.e. that half the subjects not taught in the mother-tongue must be taught in either English or Afrikaans) was an important contributing factor to the Soweto uprisings of that year. Given the general lack of resources in African schools, including the number of teachers proficient in three languages, CNE language policy was always a source of frustration and tension. The Education and Training Act of 1979 repealed previous language policy for Africans. Whilst mother-tongue teaching was still mandatory until standard two, the choice of medium of instruction after standard two was left for school boards to decide. The recent Department of National Education's (DNE) proposed Curriculum Model (CM) (DNE, 1991,b) is ambiguous on many aspects of language policy, including the issue of medium of instruction. In a context where many African schools have dropped Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, the suggestion that English, Afrikaans and a local African language should be compulsory, might be interpreted as reimposition of Afrikaans 'by the back door' (Bennell et al, 1992).

The 'formative' nature of the curriculum as envisaged by CNE principles has been, and remains, a major stated educational aim (see DNE, 1991,b). The rise of the new vocationalism, however (see below), would suggest a contradiction between 'old humanist' and 'new vocationalist' approaches to the curriculum. Generally speaking, a highly white-centred and biased approach, associated with the imposition of CNE principles on curricula, has predominated in black and white schools alike (see Ashley, 1989; Taylor and Methula, 1993; Christie, 1991 for example). Given the emphasis in the 1948 CNE document on the importance of religious instruction, civics, geography and history, it is instructive that these subjects have often been regarded as being particularly biased towards
an Afrikaner Nationalist world view.

Much teaching and learning in South African schools, black and white alike, has been characterised by an extremely teacher-centred, authoritarian approach as anticipated by the 1948 document. 'Youth Preparedness' programmes and Veld schools for white youth have also sought to inculcate hierarchical, competitive and militaristic attitudes. They have often amounted to nothing less than attempted indoctrination into the Afrikaner nationalist world view (Christie, 1991).

Despite encountering resistance early on, the state has exercised increasingly centralised control over education in accordance with the view of the role of the state in CNE principles (Ashley, 1989; Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1992), although a regional tier of control remains. Likewise, the role of the churches was subordinated to state and 'community control' when CNE doctrine was imposed on mission schools. 'Community control', however, exercised through school boards, has proved a mixed blessing for the government. Since the BEA was passed in 1953, and, in a context of deepening educational crisis, school boards, in black education at least, have often had an antagonistic rather than a harmonious relationship with the state (Hyslop, 1987). By 1979 school boards for black schools had virtually lost all autonomy. Recent policy pronouncements such as the ERS have tended to stress decentralisation of control within national frameworks (DNE, 1991,a). A fuller account of apartheid governance structures and their influence on the nature of educational change will be given in chapter six.

The 1967 National Education Policy Act which applied CNE doctrine to whites deserves special attention here because it draws attention to two further ambiguities in the CNE tradition relating to the very meanings of the words 'Christian' and 'National'. A compromise was effected via the 1967 Act between the Calvinist doctrines of the three Afrikaans churches, and the more liberal doctrines of the Anglican and Catholic churches such that the term 'Christian' was effectively broadened beyond CNE definitions. The fact that the term 'National' in the title of the Act began to refer to white education as a whole also signalled a change in its usage away from the strict ideological sense with which it was initially associated. Whereas, prior to 1967, the term 'National' was used to connote 'ones own' (as in 'Afrikaner nation' for example), after 1967 it began to signify 'white nation'. This may be explained in the context of the perceived need at the time to broaden the legitimacy of CNE doctrine in the face of growing opposition to the imposition of CNE
principles on the part of English-speaking whites.

In the context of the 1983 constitution, the Department of National Education was set up as a policy-formulating body for all South African education. 'National' is now used to connote what is a 'general' as opposed to an 'own' affair. Afrikaner intellectuals and officials have begun to use the terms 'population group', and, increasingly, 'community', rather than 'nation' as signifiers of cultural identity. This may once again be perceived as an attempt to broaden the legitimacy of educational policy in the context of wide-spread reform, and, more recently, of negotiation. Of crucial importance, however, despite the change in vocabulary, is the extent to which the 'national' principle lives on, albeit under the guise of 'community control'. The question as to whether or not 'community control' is merely a metaphor for the perpetuation of Afrikaner privilege will be taken up in chapter four.

The shift in the usage of the term 'National' in the 1967 Act to encompass whites as a whole, points towards a source of consistent confusion within Afrikaner nationalist thinking, namely the apparent conflation of the terms 'race' and 'culture'. This is demonstrated further in the rhetoric of the terms of reference of the 1949 Eiselen Commission which was set up to make proposals for the education of 'natives'. Specifically, the commission was asked by the government to make plans for 'education for natives as an independent race' taking into account 'their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under ever changing social conditions' (terms of reference for the Eiselen Commission quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.244). In response the commission commented that:

The Bantu child comes to school with a basic physical and psychological endowment which differs so slightly, if at all, from that of the European child that no special provision has to be made in educational theory or basic aims....(Quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.251)

The commissioners go on to add, however, that

...educational practice must recognise that it has to deal with a Bantu child, i.e. a child trained and conditioned in Bantu culture, endowed with a knowledge of a Bantu language and imbued with values, interests and behaviour patterns learned at the knee of a Bantu mother. These facts must dictate to a very large extent the content and methods of his early education. (quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p.251).

It may be deduced from the above quote that the commission envisaged cultural rather than
racial criteria as a basis for segregation and differential treatment. Dubow (1991) has observed that although Afrikaner ideologues have often flirted with biological racism, in constructing an intellectually coherent justification for apartheid, Afrikaner ideologues frequently chose to infer or to suggest biological theories of racial superiority, rather than to assert these openly. Both for pragmatic and doctrinal reasons, the diffuse language of cultural essentialism was preferred to the crude scientific racism of social Darwinism.

(Dubow, 1991, p.1)

Besides highlighting some of the ambiguities and contradictions of emerging CNE discourses, the above discussion also indicates the importance of terms such as 'culture', 'nation', 'race', 'community' etc. in shaping the form and content of educational policy. This is a theme that will be explored in some detail both in terms of governmental discourses, and in terms of the discourses of the Democratic Movement in chapters four and five.

Whereas, until recently, all the costs of white education have been met by the state, black education after the BEA was to be paid for increasingly by black communities themselves in accordance with CNE principles. Africans paid for education by means of taxation, school levies, contributions towards school funds, and the purchasing of text books and stationery. As Malherbe (1977) has pointed out, the decline in quality of bantu education during the 1950's was almost entirely symptomatic of the financial provision made for it. The following tables give an indication of the discrepancies in state funding and teacher:pupil ratios for the different 'races' since 1953.

Table 1: Per Capita Expenditure on Education in Ratio Form. Selected years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>'Coloured'</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>16.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the state has gradually increased its financial contribution to black education, about three times more money continues to be spent at present per white child than per black child (CEPD, 1994). The above figures also indicate the greater costs required just to maintain the privileged provision of white education, buildings and resources. One reason for this is the continuing large discrepancy between teacher/pupil ratios.

Table 2: Teacher/Pupil Ratios, Selected Years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>'Coloured'</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1:57</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1:47</td>
<td>1:29</td>
<td>1:25</td>
<td>1:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1:39</td>
<td>1:22</td>
<td>1:21</td>
<td>1:18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The government's ERS has claimed that the state alone cannot bear the full financial responsibility for education and talks of communities making their own contributions. In relation to the perpetuation of the current status quo, a lot will turn on the meaning that is given to the term 'community' by present and future administrations, and on whether or not effective affirmative action programmes will be implemented, not just in education, but in other areas of social policy as well (see chapters five and six).

Any understanding of the relationship between the institutions of Afrikanerdom and educational policy must start from the premise that Afrikanerdom itself is not a harmonious monolithic entity, nor is it a static one. The existence of three Afrikaner churches in itself suggests a plurality of religious beliefs and affiliations. The proliferation of political parties since the formation of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1970, and the often bitter rivalries between the NP, the HNP, the Conservative Party (CP) and the neo-nazi Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB) further demonstrates a plurality of political and ideological projects and interests. Afrikaner politics has become even more complex during
the transition with a further proliferation of political and paramilitary groupings. The
sometimes open disputes between the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and the NP
since 1948 has also exemplified political rivalries within Afrikanerdom.

The NP itself has been, in fact, an alliance of conflicting class and other interests
(O'Meara 1982). Historically, it has been organised on a federal basis with four
autonomous provincial parties in which the Transvaal and Cape parties have been
particularly influential. Conflicts between the more conservative Transvaal party (based on
an alliance of farmers, workers and the petty bourgeoisie) and the more liberal Cape party
(representing large agricultural companies, finance capital and industry) have been
influential in shaping the direction of the NP as a whole. The opening up of membership
to blacks in the context of the current transition to democracy as well as the demise of the
old provinces has, no doubt, added new dynamics of change to the party.

The formation of a new historical bloc (Gramsci, 1971) signalled by the coming to
d power of the NP in 1948 was associated with the rise to hegemonic status of a clearly
articulated and staunchly conservative Afrikaner nationalism, of which CNE was the
educational component. Apartheid policies were presented as the NP's solution to the
ever-increasing flow of Africans to the urban areas in the context of rapid industrialisation.
Apartheid policies also addressed the threat posed by a growing African nationalism, and
aimed at meeting the needs of the conservative alliance that had voted nationalist. Thus
whilst the 'homelands' policy clearly aimed at reimposing ethnic divisions within the
African population (Molteno, 1984), it also provided a source of cheap, accessible labour
for farmers, and, reduced the threat posed by Africans to white worker's jobs in 'white'
South Africa. The relationship between apartheid's social and economic policies will be
discussed in more detail in chapter three. Understood as part of the hegemonic project of
Afrikaner nationalism then, bantu education with its CNE underpinnings was intended to
'prepare young Africans psycho-ideologically for the position in which the bantustans
placed them physically and politically' (Molteno, 1984, p.93).

Religious and cultural organisations such as the Afrikaanse Kultuurverige (FAK)
(Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations) - a front organisation for the AB
(Malherbe, 1977) played an important part in forging a high degree of consensus within
Afrikanerdom around CNE principles in the period prior to 1948. A large number of
church, women's, students' and youth organisations and associations, not to mention all the
Afrikaner teacher associations were affiliated to FAK. It was the FAK, with the help of the AB's organisational structures that organised the 1939 volkskongress at which the ICNE was set up, and, at which CNE principles with their emotive appeal were endorsed. It was also Professor Van Rooy, chairperson of both the FAK and the AB, who drafted the 1948 CNE document. By 1969, CNE principles still had mass support in Afrikaner ranks, as their overwhelming endorsement at the volkskongress of that year also demonstrated.

The overlap in membership and aims of the AB, FAK, the NP, and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) has provided the political mechanisms and channels for the realisation of CNE principles in education policy. Even by 1973 it was possible for one commentator to make the following observation about the policy-making process:

The DRC provides the "Christian National" basis for the policy; the FAK formulates it in detail; and the National Party applies it, with the Broederbond acting as a catalyst in myriad ways through every stage of the operation. (Robertson, 1973, p.52)

O'Meara (1991) has identified two factors associated with the beginnings of a crisis within Afrikaner hegemony. The declaration of a Republic in 1961 realised a 60-year dream on the part of the NP, but also meant that 'Afrikanerdem no longer had a political definition-the volksbeweging was gone' (O'Meara, 1991, p.1). Secondly, the financial company Sanlam's move into the 'enemy territory' of mining finance in 1963, effectively scuppered the nationalist economic movement set up by the AB, and supported through NP policies. From this point onwards, Afrikaner business began to take an increasingly independent economic and political stance. These developments were associated with the rise of the verligte ('enlightened', 'reformist') base, first in the Cape and then in the Transvaal.

By the late 1970's, the Afrikaner Handels Institut (AHI) (the Afrikaner equivalent of the English speakers Chamber of Industries) was unanimously behind the verligte aim of redefining the Afrikaner nationalist project, and instituting reform. This was in a context of deepening economic recession and worker unrest, and the growing political crisis following the 1976 Soweto uprisings. The intensifying and often bitter conflict between the verligtes and the conservative verkramptes within the AB, the NP and elsewhere culminated in P.W. Botha's rise to the Presidency and the formulation of the government's reformist 'total strategy'. Many verkramptes split from the NP to form the CP. Total strategy was aimed at the creation of the political conditions necessary for economic growth
and national security through the institution of various reforms on the one hand, and, the brutal repression of opposition on the other. Reforms included a change in the labour laws such that independent black trade unions were allowed to emerge, and, the granting of residence rights to a stratum of blacks in previously 'white' South Africa. The de Lange Committee of enquiry into educational provision in South Africa can at least partly be interpreted as the educational component of total strategy (Kallaway et al, 1984).

Changes in the economy during the 1960's and 1970's, associated with a concentration and monopolisation of capital on the one hand, and, a restructuring of capital on the other, led to a massive retrenchment of labour, particularly in agriculture, and, a growing demand on the part of business for a differentiated labour force (Cross, 1986; RESA, 1988,a). This in turn led to a growing call for more emphasis on vocationalism and on skills training, and saw 'manpower issues' (sic) rise to the top of the educational agenda. This provided verligtes and liberals within the de Lange committee with a powerful basis for seeking a new educational mandate, and greater legitimacy for government educational policy. The committee no longer felt tied to the strict imperatives of CNE doctrine.

Of importance here is the role of the semi-autonomous Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) under whose auspices the de Lange Committee was convened. Only some ten years earlier the HSRC had produced a document on differentiated education which had all the hallmarks of a CNE document par excellence (Rose and Tunmer, 1975). Under the leadership of the verligte Johan Garbers during the 1980's, the HSRC has broadened its outlook beyond its Afrikaner nationalist roots, and has become both more bureaucratic and pragmatic in nature (Cloete and Muller, 1991; Chisholm, 1992). Devoid of any overt references to CNE principles, the de Lange report is written in the language of the pragmatic bureaucrat.

It was Garbers move to the newly created Department of National Education (DNE) that facilitated the Committee of Heads of Education Departments (CHED) to draft the ERS (interview with Dr Louw, appendix A). Like the de Lange report, the ERS is written in a pragmatic, technicist style with no explicit reference to CNE values. Indeed, it would appear that whilst large sections of Afrikaner teachers and lower-ranking bureaucrats continue to maintain a conservative position, (interview with Dr Louw, appendix A; interview with Ken Hartshorne, appendix A), high ranking bureaucrats, at least in the
educational sphere, have aligned themselves with de Klerk's reformist strategy.

As long as Afrikaans-speaking universities supplied the state apparatus with its bureaucrats, their educational research has been what Kallaway (1984) describes as 'internal to the policy-making process itself'. In terms of the theoretical elaboration of CNE principles, the work of C.K. Oberholzer in the 1950's and 1960's has been important. Heavily influenced by the European educational theorists M.J. Langeveld and N. Perquin, Oberholzer's work signalled the adoption of a phenomenological mode of analysis by many writers within the nationalist/conservative tradition. This has resulted in the re-writing of Afrikaner nationalist educational theory in a manner that has not altered fundamental principles, but rather the way these principles are expressed (Ashley, 1989). The historical writings of E.G. Pells, J.H. Coetzee, R.M. Ruperti and A.L. Behr all bear the hallmarks of this development. Details of the works of these and other authors need not detain us here. Of importance for this chapter is the broad conception within the nationalist/conservative tradition of the relationship between school and society, and, of the nature of educational change. As will be seen below, the analysis offered by this tradition is both organicist and functionalist in nature. With regards to the relationship between school and society, Ruperti makes the following observations.

As a cultural community (a group sharing more or less the same culture) develops, so various societal relationships, such as state, church and school, come into separate being. Their functioning is interwoven; but each has its own separate duty to perform. It must not only fulfil its own duty, but must refrain from attempting to fulfil that of another. Each has its own field of competence in which it can and must operate and it may not trespass on another's sphere of competence. (Ruperti, 1976, p.3).

The state, conceived as a 'neutral' body that 'acts on behalf of the whole community', is given pride of place in organising and controlling the education system. In accordance with CNE principles, however, the state must not trespass on other 'societal relationships'.

Afrikaner academics generally hold the view that the concept of the 'cultural community' underlies all education systems everywhere. Thus Ruperti, for example, refers to the 'ground motive or spiritual force [which] is the driving power behind all thought and action of an individual or community (Ruperti, 1976, p.5). Besides Christianity, Ruperti also acknowledges that Islam, Buddhism, communism, liberalism etc. also constitute ground motives. Behr takes up this theme in his 'analysis' of educational change.

The driving force that determines the direction and evolution of an educational system is
the spiritual commitment of the people involved....The education system that evolved in
South Africa was shaped largely by the first Europeans who settled here from abroad and
their subsequent history. (Behr, 1978, p.1).

Herein lies the rub, and the theoretical basis for the 'trusteeship' idea latent within CNE,
for writers within this tradition assert that some ground motives, e.g. the Christian one,
are 'stronger and more dynamic' than others, e.g. pagan ones. It follows, then, that
cultural and educational development within African communities has benefited from the
'borrowing' of cultural forms and ground motives from 'advanced' European cultures. In
this way, a whole history of conquest, struggle, and apartheid is mystified.

One further development within education departments of Afrikaans-speaking
universities is of importance here, namely, the development of 'fundamental pedagogics'
(FP). Prior to the development of FP, liberal opponents of CNE theory and practice had
been able to refer to the 'unscientific' nature of CNE theory (see for example the 1971
SPROCAS report cited in Rose and Tunmer, 1975). Indeed, the development of a
'scientific' approach towards pedagogy is anticipated in the 1948 CNE document (see
earlier). The publication of Viljoen and Pienaar's (1971) book Fundamental Pedagogics,
heralded the beginnings of an attempt within this tradition to outline a 'science of
education' based on CNE, positivist, and phenomenological principles.

Analysis and critique of FP has already been provided by Enslin (1984; 1990) and
Morrow (1990), and so a thorough-going analysis and critique will not be attempted here.
In brief, however, FP involves the 'bracketing' of all 'faith superstition, dogma, opinions,
theories and philosophies of life and the world' (Viljoen and Pienaar, 1971, p. 38), in
order to discover the 'universal essences' of education. These essences, however, as a new
knowledge, should be applied by the scientist (pedagogician) into the 'life world of every
day' to enrich the culture of the group to which he/she belongs.

Critics of FP, besides pointing to the rather dubious use of the phenomenological
approach by 'pedagogicians', have focused on the implicit support for the status quo
implicit in FP's methodology itself. By supposedly 'bracketing' (putting to one side) all
extrinsic aims and beliefs in the study of the phenomenon of education, Enslin has shown
how 'the political thus becomes forbidden speech' (Enslin, 1990, p.82). Put bluntly, FP
takes for granted the naturalness and inevitability of different 'life worlds', 'groups', and,
the relationships between them as defined by CNE and apartheid doctrine. Needless to say,
exponents of FP after comparative 'scientific' analysis, have come to the conclusion that it is only Christianity that can provide a sure foundation for the development of an education system.

FP has been widely influential in education departments and teacher training institutions throughout South Africa. It has been an essential ingredient, not only in the training of white teachers, but, (via the black universities established by the 1969 Extension of Universities Act), FP has also been de rigour for black trainee teachers. Indeed, one cannot properly claim to be a 'pedagogue' within these institutions unless one has learnt, accepted and applied FP (Enslin, 1990). What little research has gone on in the underfunded and poorly resourced 'bush' universities (Generally considered to be 'poor off-shoots of Afrikaans-speaking universities' (Chisholm, 1992)), has often involved an acceptance of FP methodologies. Luthuli's work at the University of Zululand is a case in point (Luthuli, 1981; 1982). The prevalence of FP also provides one explanation for the policy approaches of bureaucrats and educationists within the state, the HSRC, and elsewhere. Although developed in an earlier period, FP is entirely compatible with the apolitical and pragmatic approach adopted in official policy formulation since the time of de Lange onwards.

A point that will be taken up in the next section is the impact that neo-liberalism has had, from about the mid-1960's onwards, on some academics associated with the Afrikaans-speaking universities (interview with Dr Louw, appendix A). As will be discussed below, the impact of neo-liberal ideas has generally found expression through various 'think tanks' associated with Afrikaaner universities, rather than in the education departments themselves. The apparent contradictions between a centralised and highly bureaucratised education system developed along CNE lines, and the emphasis within neo-liberal thought on 'rolling back the state' will also be taken up in the next section which will explore the impact of the liberal tradition in general on South African educational policy.

The Liberal Tradition

The term 'liberal' generally has two meanings: Firstly, 'those who give priority to the freedom of the individual and thereby cherish those institutions of bourgeois society - the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free press, freedom of speech and association
and consciousness, etc..., which are supposed to safeguard such freedom'. It is also used in an economic sense, to define those 'who believe in *laissez-faire*, the free interplay of market forces untrammeled by the state' (Legassick quoted in Cross, 1986, p.188). In the specifically South African context, however, the term has taken on a third meaning:

In South Africa 'liberal' too, has acquired another meaning.....that of 'friend of the native'......In this sense, 'liberalism' is, in some sense, identifiable with 'tender-mindedness', or, in the context of the view of South African society and 'native policy'......a force trying, on the one hand, to minimise or disguise the conflictual and coercive aspects of the social structure, and, on the other, to convince selected Africans that grievances they felt could be ameliorated through reforms which liberals could promulgate. (Legassick quoted in Cross, 1986, p.188).

As shall be seen below, the specific configuration of sometimes conflicting ideas held by liberals at any moment in time has often depended on the context in which different groups have found themselves. What shall be referred to as 'traditional' liberal views in South Africa, may, for analytical reasons, be differentiated from the more recent influence of neo-liberalism within Afrikanerdom and elsewhere. Espoused in the writings of Leon Louw, Clem Sunter, Jan Lombard and others, the emergence of neo-liberalism in the South African context may be associated with the rise of the 'New Right' internationally, and in particular with 'Thatcherism' in the United Kingdom, and Reaganism in the 'United States'(see below). Besides the temporal basis for a distinction between 'traditional' and 'neo-liberalism' further differences of emphasis may also be used to distinguish the two. Traditional liberalism in South Africa has always espoused an affinity for *laissez-faire*, but, at the same time has sought to accommodate this affinity with a particular view of the importance of the bourgeois state and its institutions. Neo-liberalism on the other hand, whilst holding firmly to *laissez-faire* principles, has, in the context of the New Right, taken on an extreme libertarian and specifically anti-collectivist/anti-socialist view (through the influence of Hayek and others), in which state bureaucracies are perceived as nothing less than a manifestation of totalitarianism (see Levitas et al, 1986).

Prior to 1948, the liberal tradition had closer links with government policy than did the nationalist/conservative tradition (Chisholm, 1992). Malherbe's early work for the Carnegie Commission into the condition of 'poor whites' in the 1920's is a case in point. The new policies of segregation at the turn of the century, associated, like the 'poor white' problem, with the mining revolution, also aroused liberal concern that individuals should
be recognised on the basis of 'civilisation' rather than 'race'. It was not until the full implications of apartheid policy became evident in the post - 1948 period, however, that liberals seriously began to move beyond a 'separate-but-equal position themselves (Cross, 1986; Cross and Chisholm, 1990).

The emergence of an African proletariat, and the growth of an identifiable, mission-educated black elite in the 1920's and 1930's increased interest in the education of 'natives'. To this end, English - speaking liberal universities began research into social and educational issues pertaining to blacks, research which reinforced liberal activities of the time. The work of scholars such as Malherbe (1925), McKerron (1934) and Brookes (1930) was important in this regard.

Loram's (1917) theory of 'the natives mental apathy' and 'mental arrested development' led some liberals to assert the futility of educating 'natives'. Others, such as Rheinallt-Jones of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), rejected such notions as 'scientific pretensions of racism'. By the 1920's, however, a broad consensus had been reached within liberalism that some form of 'adapted education' with its main aim the provision of agricultural skills for rural life should be provided for blacks. This was linked to the installation of 'some form of political accommodationism' in the emerging black elite, 'linked to alternative political outlets through the rural reserves' (Rich quoted in Cross, 1986, p.191). The emergence of the SAIRR, along with other liberal educational and cultural organisations exemplified further the liberal effort to meet the needs of an African elite and 'effect a compromise between black aspirations, and their own ameliorative goals' (Cross, 1986, p.190).

The victory of the NP in the 1948 elections, and the introduction of apartheid policies saw a radicalisation of liberal attitudes amongst blacks which culminated in the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other organisations during the late 1950's and early 1960's. The introduction of apartheid educational policies also brought a wave of opposition from the SAIRR and other liberal non-governmental organisations, as well as from the English-speaking universities such as the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand. Horrell, Brookes, Macauley and others all expressed concern at the violation of various 'political freedoms' including that of education (see Horrell, 1968 for example). The Extension of Universities Act of 1959, which (rather ironically given its name) prevented admission of blacks to previously 'open universities',
met with token resistance from the universities themselves. This opposition was centred around the issue of 'academic freedom' (Christie, 1991)

In the context of an increasingly hegemonic Afrikaner nationalism, liberalism in South Africa suffered a series of defeats that culminated in the demise of the Liberal Party in 1968. Liberal rhetoric of the time around the issues of multi-ethnic political representation, the amelioration of apartheid in urban areas, the relaxation of influx control and the establishment of a black middle class, was continued by the Progressive Party, which later became the Progressive Federal Party (PFP).

Educational policy research in English-speaking universities during the 1950's and 1960's remained more developed than in their Afrikaans-speaking counterparts, however, 'possibly because of the closer relationship before the advent of the National Party to power of white English-speaking liberals to state power' (Chisholm, 1992). Major works by Malherbe (1977) and Rose and Tunmer (1975) amongst others, complemented by Muriel Horrell's research at the SAIRR, began to open up the field of education to detailed historical study. Whilst constituting an invaluable source of data for educational researchers, these studies also demonstrate the limitations of the liberal tradition in terms of the conception of the relationship between the education system and society at large, and, of educational change. As Kallaway (1984) and other neo-Marxist critics have pointed out, these highly descriptive and interpretive works tend to portray the education system as existing autonomously from wider social, political and economic relations. The view of policy formulation and educational change implicit in the liberal writings on education in the 1960's and 1970's has been described, accurately, as being 'voluntarist' in nature.

Voluntarism in education would be concerned with the 'prescriptive intention' of policy; the intentions and ambitions of actors, stripped of their wider context and location, whether these be those of Verwoerd, the National Party, ANC or PAC. The way policy is formulated reflects conscious intentions; these can be quite easily read off policy statements. Policy and transformation is largely an act of will. The major problem with this approach is that it assumes that great, bad or good men, or individuals make history and policy; that will is simply translated into policy. It assumes an unproblematic relationship between either or both individual will and policy formulation. In this way the complex relationship between different actors at different levels of the economic, political and ideological [formation] is simplified as much as the real constraints in action. (Chisholm, 1992, p.12)
The reports of the University of the Witwatersrand Education Panel (1963;1966), likewise exemplify a voluntarist approach, albeit with a new, and different focus. The reports heralded the assent of 'manpower planning' issues to the top of the educational agenda, and were drafted by liberal educationists such as Malherbe, and businessmen such as Michael O'Dowd of Anglo American. The reports can be perceived as a response to a perceived skills shortage associated with the restructuring of capital mentioned in the last section, and were influenced by the growth of human capital theory. The Education Panel reports ushered in a new era of 'economic liberalism' in South Africa (Cross, 1986). In brief the reports argued that certain apartheid practices were 'dysfunctional' to the needs of the economy and that they should be scrapped. Not only had bantu education failed to provide the skills required for industry, but it had also militated against the promotion of an effective black leadership. Summing up the views of economic liberals at the time (and with the 'separate-but-equal' strand in his thought still evident), Malherbe pointed out that the demands of the economy of South Africa are stronger than the colour bar, with plenty of evidence out of the past to support and, indeed, to prove this view. (Quoted in Cross, 1986, p.192).

As will be recalled from the previous section, the views of the economic liberals began to have a profound impact on verligte Afrikaner thought and were given forceful expression in the de Lange Committee's report. The origins of the 'new vocationalism' expounded by the ERS can also be traced to the economic liberalism of the 1960's (see below).

The Education Panel reports also exemplified the closer proximity of business than of state interests with the English-speaking universities. Since privately funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Urban Foundation and the Mobil Foundation were set up in the wake of 1976, and in the context of 'corporate social responsibility', there has been a lot of coming and going between these NGOs (as well as the SAIRR), and the English-speaking universities. Whilst the Urban Foundation (UF) and other private sector initiatives of the time have been largely concerned with ameliorating the living conditions of blacks in urban areas, the work of the recently-formed Urban Foundation Education Systems and Policy Unit (EDUPOL) has focused on educational policy.

Following the examples of other liberals such as Lee (1990), the work of EDUPOL
to date (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1992; 1993), has been concerned with the governance of education and has drawn on the work of Margaret Archer in the United Kingdom. This work will be discussed in some detail in chapter six as it has been influential in recent debates on a future system of educational governance in South Africa. Besides constituting an advance on earlier voluntarist approaches, liberal theory of this sort also provides a possible point of contact with a 'reformed structuralism' emerging in the radical/neo-Marxist tradition. This point will be addressed more fully in the next chapter. For now the following comments will suffice.

Archer's project has been to develop a macro-sociological approach towards an understanding of the relationships between education systems and the wider societies in which they operate, and towards the nature of educational change. In doing so she attempts to move beyond a purely voluntarist position in which educational policy simply reflects the intentions of policy actors. She does so by describing the structural limitations faced by policy actors of which the 'social distribution of resources and values' and the 'patterning of vested interests in the existing form of education' are important (Archer 1984). In other words, whilst she treats education systems as autonomous sets of institutions, and is primarily concerned with how educational change occurs in relation to their own structural conditions (of which the degree of centralisation is accorded pride of place), she also attempts to explain how external structural relations of 'contradiction and complementarity' impinge upon the policy-making process.

Whilst constituting an advance on previous voluntarist approaches, it will be argued in chapter six that Archer's 'elaborated voluntarism' can still be criticised for failing to provide an account of the broader dynamics of economic and political change within society, and of how educational change relates to these dynamics (Salter and Tapper, 1981). In brief, struggles within the education system remain disarticulated in this approach from broader economic and political struggles. In particular it will be argued that governance structures and the forms of interaction they engender must be located within an of the colonial nature of South African society.

Using Archer's analysis, Buckland and Hofmeyr tend towards an advocacy of the decentralisation of certain control functions in education, but continue to assert the importance of a curtailed central authority in the light of continued inequalities. This view stands in contrast to the more radical forms of neo-liberalism put forward by other private
sector 'think tanks' in recent years.

Interestingly, whilst the UF, the SAIRR, the Mobil Foundation, and liberals associated with the English-speaking universities have generally continued to advocate some future role for the state in terms of affirmative action in a post-apartheid context, the emergence of a specifically anti-state, anti-collectivist, and anti-socialist neo-liberalism, has generally been associated with Afrikaner intellectuals and organisations. Of particular importance here is the work of Andre Spier of SYNCOM, Elisabeth Dostal of the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch, and Leon Louw et al of the Free Market Foundation. These corporately-funded 'think tanks' also grew out of the post-1976 scenario.

The issue of whether or not the neo-liberalism expressed by these groups is indicative of the rise of an identifiable 'New Right' in the South African context (as claimed by Kallaway, 1989; Bennell and Swainson, 1990), along with the reasons for its emergence, will be taken up in more detail in chapter four. For now it is sufficient to point out that South African neo-liberalism has been linked to a nationalist/conservative conception of 'community' and rhetoric about 'standards' both in the writings of the groups mentioned above, and, more implicitly, in government documents such as de Lange and the ERS. Like their British counterparts, South African neo-liberals have been concerned with the 'rolling back of the state', both in terms of the control and the financing of education.

Various schemes ranging from complete privatisation (Davie, 1990,a) to voucher schemes, and the deregulation of certain state functions in education (Spier, 1986) have been suggested to break the 'state monopoly' on educational control and provision, and to provide more 'consumer choice' in a market-oriented system. Likewise, a highly decentralised structure placing much more direct control of education in community hands is advocated. These ideas have had a profound effect on verligte thought. This influence, reflected in the ERS, has grown in appeal in a context where the government has acknowledged its own failure in meeting the financial commitments made by de Klerk's ten-year plan for black education (interview with Dr Stumpf, appendix A). The ERS also follows in the wake of the 1987 Privatisation and Deregulation government White Paper, which, as its name suggests, has inaugurated a programme of selective privatisation and deregulation of state monopolies and services.
The issues of deregulation and decentralisation in education bring to the fore certain contradictions within the liberal tradition. The differing views of the traditional liberals and the neo-liberals on the question of the future role for the state has already been noted, although it is worth emphasising that the difference is only really one of degree. The more extreme views of the neo-liberals aside, there is broad consensus within liberalism on the need for a reduced role for the state in any future educational dispensation. The terms of this consensus, however, remain ambiguous, a point that will be developed in chapter six in relation to a discussion of educational governance.

The desire to maintain and expand the existing educational private sector, on the part of traditional and neo-liberals alike, is rooted, in part at least, in a common concern for greater parental and community 'choice' in education. Traditional liberal opinion has often upheld the right of communities to run culturally distinct private schools on the grounds of 'individual conscience' and 'freedom of association'. This point, however, is generally qualified with the desire that such institutions should not deny access to members of other culturally-defined groups (Ashley, 1989). The neo-liberals, and, importantly the ERS, make no such qualification. Although the ERS states that 'race' shall no longer be a criterion for determining educational provision, the question of whether or not ethnically-defined communities will be able, under ERS proposals, to be selective in their intake remains unaddressed in the document, and unresolved in verligte thought (interview with Dr Stumpf, appendix A).

Traditional liberals have also argued that private schools not only reduce the financial burden of the state in terms of educational provision, but also serve as centres of excellence that may be emulated by other schools. Further, given that, historically, a) English-speaking private schools have often existed outside the sphere of CNE influence, and that; b) the 'open' private schools have recently been engaged in developing curricula approaches more geared to the aim of a non-racial democracy, it is argued that private schools can indeed be a forum for developing 'cultural tolerance and understanding'. Further, from the private school's 'aspiring black middle class recruits may well come the kind of ferment that will help in the process of social change' (Randall quoted in Ashley, 1989). There are clear echoes here of the paternalism of the missionary educator (see Mangan et al, 1989), and, of the earlier liberal desire to ameliorate black demands through the creation of elites. What is significant, however, is the appeal within the above
justifications to what Raymond Williams has described as the 'old humanist' educational tradition (Williams cited in Ball, 1990,a). Typically 'old humanist' goals such as 'autonomy of the individual' and 'education for its own sake' have been supported by traditional liberals in South Africa, and by English-speaking teachers organisations such as the Transvaal Teachers Association (Ashley, 1989).

The rather elitist conception of education associated with the 'old humanist' tradition stands in stark contrast, not only with the radical demands of people's education (see below), but also with the aims of the neo-liberal 'new vocationalists'. Since the economic liberalism of the 1960's, the watchword of those concerned to vocationalise the curriculum has been 'relevance', whether to the 'world of work', or, in verligte thought, to the 'life world' of the individual learner. As in Britain, what makes the 'new vocationalist' approach of the neo-liberals distinctive, is the emphasis on educational technologies (see Spier, 1986 for example), and on the inculcation of entrepreneurial values. The individualistic approach of the neo-liberals and the liberal tradition in general stands in contrast to the collective concerns of the radical/neo-Marxist tradition.

The Radical/neo-Marxist Tradition

Radical responses on the part of blacks to colonial, missionary, and, subsequently, apartheid education have been a consistent feature of South African educational history. Radical responses have often taken the form of boycotts. Indeed, the very first school set up for slaves in the Cape in 1658 lasted only a few weeks as the slaves persisted in running away (Molteno, 1984). Likewise, boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and riots occurred from time to time in teacher training colleges and mission schools such as Kilnerton and Lovedale during the period 1920-1953 (Christie, 1991). Generally speaking, the main sources of grievances were poor food, compulsory manual labour and harsh punishments from teachers, although the relationship between missionary educators and African communities was always somewhat ambivalent. Boycotts were widespread after the passing of the Bantu Education Act, and re-emerged as a major form of protest during the 1980's.

Besides boycotts, alternative forms of schooling also have a long history in South Africa; for example; the American School Movement in the Transkei in the 1920's (Edgar, 1984); the Adult Night School Movement for blacks on the Witwatersrand (Bird, 1984); the non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) schools in the Cape from 1943-1986
(Chisholm, 1991); and the ANC's African Education Movement (AEM) cultural clubs in the 1950's (Lodge, 1984). Although these initiatives often challenged the values and practices of the existing system, they were (with the exception of the NEUM schools). This may be attributed to poor resourcing and the hostile environment in which they had to operate.

In the case of the cultural clubs in particular, however, their short life span can also be attributed to the inability of these institutions to offer certification on a par with state schools. The cultural clubs will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. Of relevance to the argument of the present chapter is that the inability of these institutions to meet their noble objectives can be understood in relation to a naive understanding of the society/school relationship. This was exemplified by the view that the cultural clubs were somehow autonomous from the world of work in which formal certification mattered.

It was not until the 1970s that the emerging Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began to politicise a new generation of blacks through organisations such as the South African Students Organisation (SASO). This followed a lull in political opposition to apartheid in the wake of the banning of the ANC, the PAC and other mass organisations during the 1950's and 1960's. The BCM aimed at fostering pride in black culture, and promoting black self-reliance through literacy campaigns, health projects, community centres, etc. (Christie, 1991). Through the writings and speeches of its leaders, such as Steve Biko, it also developed a sustained critique of all forms of white domination (political, economic, cultural and psychological). The hopelessly underfunded and ideologically loaded system of bantu education was criticised particularly vehemently. The politics and discourses of the BCM will also be discussed in detail in chapter five.

In the context of increasingly austere conditions in the townships, a growth in worker militancy during the early 1970's, and the spur given to South African blacks by the Frelimo victory in Mozambique, the political temperature began to mount. These trends culminated in the Soweto uprising of June 16th 1976, and the subsequent killing of hundreds of unarmed school children by the police. The importance of Soweto in educational terms is not only that student anger was focused on educational issues (in particular the reimposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools), but also that it put students for the first time at the forefront of the broader liberation struggle (RESA, 1988,b). This trend was to continue through the school boycotts of the early, and
mid-1980's. The events of June 1976 also proved to be a watershed in a wider sense, because they prompted the search, on the part of the government and of business, for reformist solutions to a growing political and economic crisis.

It was in this context that radical educationists within the English-speaking universities began a trenchant critique of the dominant nationalist/conservative, and liberal traditions, the essence of which has already been given. Attention also focused on the nature of state policy and reforms; the history of education; the conditions necessary for educational change and democratic transformation; and a critique of the new reformist strategy developed by the de Lange committee. These interests found early expression in the journal Perspectives in Education, and in the collection of essays in Apartheid and Education edited by Peter Kallaway (1984). Although subsequently criticised for, amongst other things, a tendency to reduce an analysis of educational policy to the needs of the economy (Cross, 1986; Chisholm, 1992), Apartheid and Education made important advances on the liberal tradition. Of significance for this chapter is the perceived relationship between the education system and the broader economic, political and ideological context, and the way that educational change is portrayed.

Although many of the contributors were at pains to describe the contradictory nature of education under racial capitalism, these concerns were generally subordinated within a series of overly-pessimistic 'reproduction' theories derived from the work of neo-Marxists such as Althusser and Bowles and Gintis. Thus, the assertion of an inevitable 'correspondence' between the social relations of schooling and the social relations of racial capitalism tended to down-play the importance of human agency (including various interest groups within and outside of the state) in determining education policy, and of resistance to apartheid education (Jurgens, 1988; Tikly, 1990). Further, by affording primacy to the economic, the categories of politics and of ideology as co-determinants in the policy-making process tended to be neglected or even ignored.

The importance of CNE, for example, as a determining factor on NP educational policy was down-played in Apartheid and Education. Thus, Christie and Collins (1984) amongst others, went to some length to stress the benefits of counterposing their 'class analysis' to liberal perspectives that had presented CNE ideology as the determining factor in apartheid education policy. (This must be seen in the context, however, of the felt need to critique a tradition that had not only been found wanting in terms of its own analysis,
but had itself been complicit in segregationist practices in the past). The idea of using a class analysis for the study of education is not at issue here. The concern is that such an analysis should not be at the expense of a complementary consideration of the politics and ideology of education, and of educational change.

A further consequence of economic reductionism, is that racism and sexism, understood here as political and ideological phenomena, tend to be under-theorised in their relationship to educational policy and practice. The down-playing of the importance of racism as a determinant of apartheid education is exemplified by the following assertion by Kallaway:

Bantu education, far from being a unique form of schooling system characterised by racism, is more accurately to be seen as an example of mass education under capitalism.

(Kallaway quoted in Jurgens, 1988, p. 41).

Once again, the issue is not about seeing bantu education as an example of mass education under capitalism. Rather, the concern is that racism, understood as an ideology and as a practice, gets relegated to a poor second place as a determinant of apartheid policy. As Jurgens was later to point out, the danger of class-reductionist views such as the one presented above is that they do not explain how racial or ethnically-defined social relations of production are also crucial to a social system where members of the same class but different national groups can have, in experiential and cultural terms, less in common with each other than members of different classes belonging to the same national group. (Jurgens, 1988, p.41)

Summing up the debate about the usefulness of reproduction theories in the South African context, Molteno argued that

so long as the burden of selection/sorting/examination is placed on schooling in an unequal and class society, then 'reproduction' perspectives must be taken into account....this does not mean that schooling has to do with nothing apart from the role in social reproduction or that schooling plays whatever role it does in this regard because social reproduction requires it to. (Molteno quoted in Cross, 1986, pp. 195-196).

Further, for Molteno, reproduction theory renders any notion of failure inconceivable' since such failure 'must imply the failure on the part of theories of reproduction too'.

What was becoming increasingly clear to Molteno, writing as he was in the context of the school boycotts of the early 1980's, was that bantu education had singularly failed to secure the political and ideological conditions for the effective reproduction of labour power in South Africa. Indeed, boycotting students under the slogan 'liberation first,
education later' became increasingly involved during the 1980's in wider campaigns and protests around the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament in 1983, and in support of an increasingly militant and organised working class (Levin, 1989). Some of their specific demands were for free text books, properly qualified teachers, the abolition of corporal punishment, the ending of sexual harassment of female students, and the official recognition of democratically-elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs).

In the context of an increasingly coercive, centralised and militarised state in which the military, through the National Security Management System, had a direct influence on running education, the issue of control of education (expressed through the demand for SRCs) came to the fore (RESA, 1988,b). By 1985, the ANC which had begun to re-emerge as a political and military force, had made the call to 'render South Africa ungovernable'. Boycotting students (who by this time numbered some 65,000) (RESA, 1988,b) participated in setting up alternative 'organs of people's power' in the form of street committees and people's courts. In August 1985, a state of emergency was declared, and the leading student organisation, the Confederation of South African Students (COSAS), was banned. Student activists were arrested, detained, and many were killed in demonstrations (RESA, 1988,b).

By mid-1985, parents and community leaders had become concerned about the effect that boycotting of schools was having on their children's education. As a consequence, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was formed by parents and others with the intention of encouraging students to go back to school. This was done not only so that they could receive the skills, however rudimentary, that bantu education had to offer, but also, to begin to transform the education system 'from within'. Just as the street committees and people's courts had sought to replace apartheid structures with democratic ones, the NECC's call for 'people's education' was intended to inaugurate the search for more democratic forms of schooling.

Of particular relevance to this chapter is that in outlining what a people's education might entail, the NECC had moved ahead of the academics in going beyond a pessimistic critique to a way forward for education. The 1985 NECC conference declared that people's education is education that:

a) enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares them for participation in a non-racial democratic system;
b) eliminates capitalist norms of competition, individualism, and stunted intellectual development and one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analyses;

c) eliminates illiteracy, ignorance and exploitation of any person by another;

d) equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial, democratic South Africa;

e) enables workers to resist exploitation in their work place. (adapted from RESA, 1988,b)

Although fairly vague, and obviously in need of further elaboration, this initial formulation of people's education was important for two reasons. Firstly, it gave more substance to the clause in the ANC's Freedom Charter which had stated that 'the doors of learning and of culture shall be opened' (ANC, 1955). Secondly, the whole concept of people's education began implicitly to address the theoretical questions of the relationship between schooling and the wider context, and of the nature of educational change in ways that went beyond the 'reproduction' paradigm. Reproduction theories, like the boycott strategies with which they had historically coincided, offered a pessimistic view of the relationship between the education system and the apartheid order by suggesting that schools merely reproduce conditions of oppression and exploitation. People's education, on the other hand, by suggesting the power of interest groups to transform the education system from within, implicitly presents the education system as a contested terrain. Further, by linking the struggle for people's education, both theoretically and practically, with the struggle for a 'non-racial and democratic system', educational change was presented not only as an ideological and political struggle within the education state apparatus, but as one that links up in specific ways with wider struggles. Although, in the face of two successive states of emergency, people's education has been extremely difficult to develop and implement (Nkomo et al, 1990), the efficacy of the NECC's strategy is perhaps best demonstrated by the appropriation of some of the concepts of 'people's education' by the state (see chapter four).

The centrality of educational issues in the broader struggle for national liberation began to excite the interest of not only educational researchers, but well-known academics from the social sciences as a whole. These included the historians Colin Bundy and Bill
Nasson, and the sociologist Jonathan Hyslop. In Britain the influential Marxist scholar, Harold Wolpe, set up the organisation Research and Education in South Africa (RESA) in 1987. The educational research from this source, along with that of Mogubung Nkomo in the USA, began to enrich the literature on South African education. Following on from the people's education initiative, a 'complex contextual' approach towards educational theory in South Africa was developed. Drawing, as it did, on earlier reproduction theories, this approach also sought to assert the importance of human agency as well as structure in educational change (see for example RESA, 1988, a, b & c; Nasson, 1990, a; Hyslop, 1986).

At the risk of over-simplifying a set of complex arguments, the following points are relevant here. Firstly, this approach provides a critique of earlier reproduction theories for conceiving of the education system and of the state itself as monolithic entities (Unterhalter and Wolpe, 1989). The criticism is further advanced by pointing out that reproduction models also tended to perceive the state as unproblematically carrying out 'the will' of capital. Rather, so it is argued, education policy is the outcome of social conflict: 'conflict between and amongst various capitalist interests, various arms of the state, and various forms of expression of the interests of the dominated classes' (Hyslop, 1986, p.1). Struggles over educational policy operate within a terrain of struggle 'where the terrain is defined by internal and external structures and conditions. The structure of the terrain at any one period may serve to facilitate or to retard the demands of the contesting social forces and these demands have different forms in different periods depending on the socio-economic and political conditions.

Thus this terrain is not unchanging, as Kallaway's portrayal suggests' (Unterhalter and Wolpe, 1989, p. 3). The concept of social reproduction through education is defended 'so long as it is understood that education's reproductive role has to be politically constructed and can be destabilised. An educational system's role in social reproduction can collapse, through popular militancy, by a failure to change structures in a way congruent with the changing needs of capital (often because of the bureaucratic inertia of the education system), or because dominant groups within the state apparatuses are linked to ideologies and social forces which are not allied to the dominant factions of capital' (Hyslop, 1986, p. 1).

Approaches involving the kind of complex contextual analysis outlined above have been used to further understanding of the politics of education and of educational change,
by drawing attention to the political forms struggles over education have taken, both within the state and outside of it. This has been important, for example, in the context of the struggles being waged over people's education. As Cross (1991) has correctly pointed out, however, such an approach has tended to concentrate on the political forms struggles have taken rather than on their cultural and ideological content. Thus, for example, whilst Hyslop refers to the role of ideologies in shaping educational policy, there is no account of the ideologies themselves, whether they be concerned with a particular conceptualisation of 'race', or whether they be concerned with a particular set of prescriptions concerning education (CNE is an obvious example here). Drawing on the work of Bonner and Glaser, however, Cross's own recent work has not been focused on the educational policy-making process, but rather, on a sociology of youth subcultures and resistance As such it will not be discussed further here.

What is beginning to emerge in the above discussion, interestingly enough, is the possibility of a certain rapprochement between a liberal pluralist approach with its focus on conflicting interest groups and ideologies within the educational state, and a reformed neo-Marxist approach concerned with relating conflicts within the state to wider social, political and economic conflicts. This point will be taken up in the next chapter.

Given the attempts during the mid- and late-1980's, to effect a synthesis between theory and practice, it is hardly surprising that the question of the role of the intellectuals in the liberation struggle began to take on a certain urgency. Debates over the role of intellectuals were conducted in the journal Perspectives in Education and at the annual Kenton Conference on education, (named after the first place the conference was held). These have both been important forums for the academic Left in South Africa.

In a context where educational struggles 'on the ground' were being led by blacks through organisations such as the NECC, the predominance of white intellectuals on the academic Left (despite the legacy of bantu education), was clearly untenable (Chisholm, 1992). As Ivan Evans (1989) pointed out, white academics, including those on the Left, could have done more to facilitate a greater academic input from black intellectuals. By the late 1980's, however, black scholars such as Saleem Badat, Michael Cross, Nozipho Diseko, Ivan Evans, Jonathan Jansen, George Mashamba, Bill Nason, Mokubung Nkomo and Blade Nzimande had begun to make important contributions to the academic educational debate. Nonetheless, it will be argued in chapter six that blacks remain under-
represented in academic discourses. Similarly, women, and black women in particular, have also very under-represented in educational research. This provides one explanation why there has been little effort to put 'gender on the agenda' of educational policy research (Chisholm, 1992) until very recently.

The debates about the role of intellectuals, and indeed about the whole issue of intellectual production, have taken a new twist of late, through the introduction of post-structuralist forms of analysis (see for example, Muller and Cloete, 1987; Taylor, Muller, Cloete and Narsing, 1989). Put very simply for the purposes of this chapter, changes at the very heart of late capitalism, associated with the information revolution and growth in information technologies, have resulted in an increasing commodification of knowledge (Wexler, 1987). One consequence of this has been that the production of 'truth' and its relationship to forms of power, have become increasingly politicised and contested issues. In this context, academics have begun to examine, through concepts such as 'discourse', the myriad relationships between knowledge and power. Further, academics have also been encouraged to adopt an 'historically reflexive' stance, in order to examine (historically), their own relationship to the means of intellectual production (Wexler, 1987).

Post-structuralism has also been engaged, at the level of epistemology, with a thorough-going critique of all forms of structuralism, including Marxism. The critical potential of structuralism, so it is claimed, is hampered by its own symbiotic relationship to exploitative power relations. This debate will be taken up in the next chapter, where an attempt will be made to utilise certain post-structuralist tools, and in particular, Foucault's concept of 'discourse', in order to elaborate a 'reformed structuralist' approach.

Contradictions within the apartheid structure, and in particular those associated with the continued disenfranchisement of the African majority, came to a head on February 2nd 1990, when de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP etc., and political leaders such as Nelson Mandela were released from prison after many years of incarceration. Unlike Saul on the road to Damascus, however, de Klerk and his verligte cohorts had not undergone any sudden conversion to democratic principles. Rather, they were responding to a growing political crisis and ever-increasing levels of mass action inside the country. They were also responding to an international context which had seen humiliating defeat for the SADF in Angola, the victory of SWAPO in Namibia, and growing international pressure for a negotiated solution to South Africa problems, partly
associated with the end of the cold war.

The so-called 'era of negotiations' has seen many important developments in the educational field, developments which will be more fully discussed in later chapters. In particular chapter six will focus on the politics of educational change during the transition. For now the following points are relevant. By 1989, the NECC had already been approached by the government to offer advice on allocating monies to the resource-starved black education system. Following the unbanning of the ANC, Nelson Mandela led a team of thirty-five delegates to begin to negotiate an end to the education crisis with the government. For the government's part, political stability and a functioning education system were essential for economic growth. For the ANC, there was strong grassroots pressure to begin to redress racial imbalances in education. The formation of the Patriotic Front in 1992 also led to the holding of the National Education Conference in Broederstroom which brought together activists and organisations sympathetic to both the non-racial and black consciousness/Africanist traditions (SACHED, 1992). One outcome of this show of unity was to strengthen the hand of the Democratic Movement in their demands for an end to unilateral restructuring of education by the state and the introduction of a negotiating forum in education. These demands culminated in the setting up of the National Education and Training Forum in August 1993.

It will be argued in chapter four that the government's ERS must be seen as its own contribution to the negotiation process. It was also with a negotiated solution to ending apartheid in mind, that the NECC, in conjunction with the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) launched the National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI) in 1991. Following their release late in 1992, the NEPI reports went on to provide a resource for the development of the ANC's A Policy Framework for Education and Training (CEPD, 1994). The Policy Framework can be understood as the ANC's educational manifesto for the April 1994 elections for a government of national unity.

Policy Research in the Era of Negotiations

Not surprisingly, the era of negotiations turned the attentions of policy researchers within the radical/neo-Marxist tradition away from critique to policy formulation. In this regard, the work of NEPI was of particular importance. Together with the ANC's policy Framework, the main findings of the NEPI reports will be discussed in later chapters. The
task of interpreting The NEPI reports is made difficult by the fact that there are twelve reports altogether, not all of a piece, dealing with the issues of planning systems and structure; human resource development; governance and administration; the curriculum; post-sixteen education; adult education; adult basic education; educare (pre-school education); language; teacher education; library and support services; and a framework report that discusses the NEPI process. Each of the reports was also accompanied by a variety of working papers.

A certain coherence was achieved in the NEPI process, however, through the use of a common set of guiding principles that informed all of the reports. These principles were chosen to reflect the aspirations of the Democratic Movement as a whole. (The term 'Democratic Movement' will be used in this study to refer to the broad range of organisations and individuals who have actively opposed apartheid and European racism). The principles were:

a) **Non-racism** :- the principle that education must move away from its currently racist underpinnings and structure;

b) **Non-sexism** :- the principle that education should work towards the elimination of sexism;

c) **Democracy** :- the principle that all interest groups including parents, teachers, students and workers should actively participate in decision making at all levels of the education system;

d) **Unitary system** :- the principle that the currently fragmented and divided system should be brought together under one department;

e) **Redress** :- the principle that past inequalities in educational provision should be rectified through pro-active intervention and affirmative action.

The NEPI principles together with the core values adopted at the 1992 Broederstroom conference (human dignity, liberty and justice; democracy; equality; and national development) went on to inform the principles underpinning the ANC's Policy Framework. Whereas the NEPI reports were intended to provide policy options, the ANC's policy document presented actual policy proposals. Further, whilst NEPI was ostensibly a project of the NECC, the Policy Framework was produced under the auspices of the semi-autonomous Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD). Both NEPI and the
CEPD received funding from overseas donors although in the case of NEPI much work was also done on a voluntary basis.

Besides NEPI and the Policy Framework, some other work that has emerged during the transition has also concerned itself with post-apartheid education policy (see for example Nkomo et al., 1990; Nasson and Samuel, 1990). Some of this work has sought to build on the post-structuralist emphasis of earlier interventions, and has focused on the relationship between knowledge, power and the curriculum (Jansen et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1993). Some of this work will be referred to in later chapters. Further, as will be discussed in chapter six, some organisations such as COSATU and the South African Democratic Teacher's Union (SADTU) have also become active in policy research and advocacy.

Turning to the present study, although some broad prescriptions will be made concerning the future direction of policy, no attempt will be made to emulate NEPI and the ANC's Policy Framework by trying to produce specific policy proposals or even options. Such an endeavour is beyond the scope of an undertaking such as this. Rather the approach will be primarily theoretical in nature and will aim towards a better understanding of the policy-making process itself. Given the need to produce policies geared towards the reconstruction of education in South Africa, the focus of the present study may seem like something of a luxury. In this regard, Chisholm (1992) has warned policy intellectuals not to abandon the tools of critique and analysis developed in earlier phases of the liberation struggle. Rather, she has argued, policy reconstruction must proceed in the light of continued and sustained critique and analysis if purely pragmatic, apolitical and technicist solutions to South Africa's education crisis are to be avoided. The present study is written in this vein.

Specifically, the aim of the study will be to examine the development of education policy in South Africa since 1948. Particular emphasis will be placed on the questions of which individuals and groups have made particular policies, whose interests these policies have served, and how educational change can be explained. The study will seek to go beyond the approaches outlined in this chapter, and will try to understand policy in relation to economic, political and ideological/discursive levels of analysis. As will be seen in chapter two, this will involve the use of different kinds of theoretical approaches appropriate to each of the levels. A variety of sources have been used for the purposes of
this study. Selected interviews were conducted with leading policy actors. They are included as a separate appendix, along with brief biographical notes about the interviewees. Further discussion concerning the use of interviews and the rationale behind the choice of interviewees will be given in the next chapter. Policy documents and various learning materials have also provided an important primary source of information, especially for the study of changing discourses around 'race' in chapters four and five. The use of these materials will be explained more fully in chapter four. Many of the materials, especially those pertaining to the ANC's cultural clubs and the ANC's school for exiles in Tanzania, have not been used before. Finally, much of the secondary literature reviewed in this chapter has proved an invaluable resource.

In the course of critically engaging with policy discourses, it is inevitable that some ideas/approaches/arguments will be favoured more than others. Indeed, it is one contention of this study that policy analysis can never be neutral. It is worth stating at the outset, then, that although certain qualifications will be made in the remainder of the text, the present author shares a commitment to the five NEPI principles outlined above.
CHAPTER TWO
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

Policy making is often described as the 'authoritative allocation of values' (Kogan, 1975). Disputes within the literature have centred around the questions of how certain values get to be accepted over others and whose interests get served in the process. Pluralists, it will be recalled, tend towards a 'voluntarist' analysis in which policy is understood at the level of the intentions and ambitions of actors stripped of their wider context. Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, have often used structuralist forms of analysis that have tended to marginalise the ideological dimensions of the policy-making process and the role of agency.

In the previous chapter, criticisms were advanced at both the pluralist and the neo-Marxist perspectives in terms of: a) the failure of these approaches to account fully for the relationship between the educational policy-making process and the wider economic, political and ideological context; b) the inability of these approaches to account fully for the complexities of educational change; c) and the increasing irrelevance of these perspectives given the nature of current events in South Africa, and, in South African education in particular.

The aim of this chapter, then, is to outline a theoretical framework for the study of educational policy making in South Africa, that will seek to overcome the limitations of the previous perspectives. In so doing, an attempt will be made to address the pluralist concern with the role of interest groups and ideologies in the policy-making process, along with the neo-Marxist concern with wider economic and political contextualisation.

The analysis presented below will draw quite heavily on recent work on educational policy in England, particularly that of Stephen Ball (1990,a) as presented in his book Politics and Policy Making in Education. Various criticisms of the approach adopted by Ball will, however, be advanced during the course of the chapter, and modifications to his approach will be adopted. Broadfoot (1991) for instance, has pointed out that Ball has
policy making in England since 1976. In the case of the present study then, it is worth making clear that the theoretical approach adopted is intended specifically for an analysis of South African policy making in education since 1948, and has been developed accordingly. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that aspects of what is to follow may not be found relevant for an analysis of alternative conjunctures.

It should also be noted that the theoretical framework below shares some of the apparent 'eclecticism' that characterises Ball's work. Of particular concern to some, may be the attempt to combine the post-structuralist emphasis of Foucault's work with an account of South African society that has its origins in Marxism. Three points are pertinent in this regard. Firstly, following Saunders (1981), it is suggested that it only makes sense to attack the kind of approach adopted here as 'eclectic' 'if one denies the possibility that different kinds of processes may be subject to different kinds of social determinations' (p.310). Thus, whilst Foucault's work may prove an excellent starting point for an analysis of the discursive determination of policy, his work is of more limited value when it comes to an analysis of the economic determinants, in which case the work of the French Regulation School has been found more helpful.

Secondly, the approach adopted below, whilst accepting the above point, will strive towards greater coherence than is the case with Ball's work. A post-structuralist reading of Gramsci will be used in order to provide a consistent theoretical thread running through the analysis of each level.

Finally, it is important to point out that what follows are intended, in the words of Foucault, as

'propositions', 'game openings' where those who are interested are invited to join in: they are not meant as dogmatic assertions to be taken or left en bloc. (Foucault, 1981, p. 4)

In this regard it is also relevant to distinguish between 'master narratives' that attempt to subsume every key point into one totalizing theory, and, 'grand narratives' which, more modestly, simply try to tell a 'Big Story' (Kellner cited in Aranowitz and Giroux, 1991, p.70). This study is intended to fall within the latter category.

Introducing the Three Levels of Analysis

Following Althusser (1969) and Ball (1990,a), the theoretical account presented
below will attempt to explore the social totality and the policy-making process in particular, at three levels of analysis, namely, the economic, political and ideological/discursive. Departing from Althusser, however, each level will be explored using a specific method of analysis: 'reformed structuralist' in the case of the economic and the political; and discursive in the case of the ideological.

Such a framework leads to a dynamic consideration of educational policy in relation to the political and ideological and economic, and the political, ideological and economic in education policy. (Ball, 1990,a, p.9)

Investigation of the economic level will then consider both the funding of education and the relationship between education and productivity. Investigation of the political leads to an account of the forms of governance in education, and the role of interest groups in the policy-making process. Finally, investigation of the ideological level 'leads to consideration of the ways in which education policy is conceived of and discussed - the limits of the possible - and to examination of education's role in transmitting an effective, dominant culture' (Ball, 1990,a, pp. 10-11). Not only is each level considered as a 'source and a resource' for education policy making, but contradictions between levels will be understood as important in initiating change. For example, the economic crisis that arose in South Africa in the early 1970's led many educationists and others to question the relevance of a CNE-based curriculum in the face of a perceived 'skills shortage' (see chapter three).

Of crucial importance here is the question of how the relationship between each level is conceived. If a successful *rapprochement* between pluralist and neo-Marxist concerns is to be effected, then of particular importance will be the way the relationship between the economy, and conflicts between interest groups within and outside of the educational state is portrayed. A theoretical account of the nature of the educational state will be given at the end of the chapter. For now it is sufficient to outline in general terms, the relationship between the economic, political and ideological levels of analysis.

Cutting across much of the neo-Marxist literature on education in general is the notion of 'relative autonomy', a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. Each level may, however, be conceived as being relatively autonomous of each other level (only relatively so, since each level is necessarily affected by the specific effects of each other level; they exist only within a unified system, in which case total autonomy clearly becomes impossible. (Saunders, 1981, p.183).
In Ball's usage of the term 'relative autonomy', he uses Hargreave's notion of 'structural limitation' to explain the relationship between the economy and political and ideological structures.

Structural limitation....is especially important for understanding the sense in which economic structures 'ultimately' determine political and ideological structures: economic structures set limits on possible forms of political and ideological structures, and make some of these possible forms more likely than others, but they do not rigidly determine in a mechanistic manner any given form of political and ideological relations. (Hargreaves quoted in Ball, 1990,a, p.13)

The attraction of this definition of 'relative autonomy' for Ball lies in its linkage to a sense of economic delimitation rather than determination. Indeed, the idea of structural limitation is useful to the extent that it facilitates a 'pinning down' of the effects of economic change on political and ideological phenomena within particular conjunctures, without making any general claims concerning the nature of those limitations, claims that would inevitably lead to determinism.

Unfortunately, however, as Gordon (1989) has pointed out, the implication within such accounts (a hang-over from Althusser), that the economy continues to determine the other levels 'in the last instance', perpetuates a deterministic tendency within the literature. The effect is to close off empirical investigation within specific conjunctures of the mutual determinacy of each level on each other level. This leads Gordon to the position of ditching the concept of relative autonomy altogether, a view not taken here. Whilst the idea of economic determination 'in the last instance' is unhelpful for the reasons given above, the idea of autonomous spheres existing in relation to other spheres is useful. As Laclau (1990) has succinctly put it:

If determination was a last instance, it would be incompatible with autonomy, because it would be a relation of omnipotence. But, on the other hand, an absolutely autonomous entity would be one which did not establish an antagonistic relation with anything external to it, since for an antagonism to be possible, a partial efficacy of the two opposing forces is a prerequisite. The autonomy which both of them enjoy will therefore always be relative.

(Laclau, 1990, p.115)

The relationship then, whether antagonistic or otherwise, between different levels cannot be read off from one sphere e.g. the economy, or indeed any other sphere. The relationship and the question of determination, needs to be pinned down empirically with reference to a specific conjuncture. It will be one contention of this study, a theme that will be taken
up in chapter three, that the relative autonomy of the policy-making process from the economy has been subject to changes and redefinitions in the period since 1976.

In doing away with deterministic forms of analysis, it becomes possible to account for the role of human agency and struggle in the policy-making process. In other words, it allows for the theorisation of the multicausality of change. This allows struggles over 'race' and gender to be theorised in relation to the policy-making process. The relationship between 'race' and the policy-making process will be taken up in chapter four.

**Accounting for Change in the Policy-Making Process**

Having seen off determinism, the problem remains of how to account for educational change. Following Ball, three possibilities will be explored in this study; a) that change can be accounted for as a result of political struggles over policy between contesting interest groups; b) that there is some kind of 'correspondence' between education policy and the dynamics of the economy; c) that change can further be accounted for by examining the nature and effects of discourse on the policy-making process. Each of these three possibilities will be further elaborated on below.

**The Political Level as a Source of Change**

In analysing the political level as a source of change, the focus, as mentioned above, will be on 'the formal political and administrative processes of policy making and the struggles and contests between interest groups and parties engaged in the policy process' (Ball, 1990,a, p.15). In his own work, Ball makes use of what he describes as a 'realist/interactive' approach towards understanding the role of agency in educational change. Through the extensive use of interviews, Ball has sought to provide explanations from leading policy actors themselves concerning the nature of educational change, and the reasons why individuals and groups were motivated to behave in particular ways. In choosing to prioritise interviews over a more structural analysis of educational institutions, Ball quotes Bernard Crick who is alleged to have said that 'too much emphasis on political institutions is rather like sex education with too much emphasis on anatomy' (Crick quoted in Ball, 1990,a, p.8)

Dale (1991) has, however, criticised Ball for not making clear the basis for choosing his interviewees. Dale's concern is that 'the theory that generates the selection of
the interviewees is very likely to be confirmed by the accounts those interviewees provide' (p.247). Put another way, 'the specification of agency through selection of particular actors implies already an understanding of structure sufficient to identify particular actors as 'agents' of political or educational change' (p.250). This criticism is not entirely accurate. Indeed, in contrast to Dale's own rather economistic approach towards interpreting educational politics (see the introduction to chapter six), Ball seeks to understand agency not only in terms of what actors themselves say, but against a backdrop of an analysis of 'Fordism' in Britain (see below) and of changing discourses around the meaning and definition of education.

What is missing from Ball's account, however, is an understanding of the role of specifically political structures, i.e. an account of how the system of governance and administration in education influences the ways policy actors interact. This omission closes off a whole area of analysis around the 'openness' or otherwise of decision-making processes in education, and the relationship between governance structures, power, and the political projects of different individuals and groups. Indeed, as other commentators have pointed out, the success of the Tories in Britain in instituting major reforms during the 1980s (the focus of Ball's analysis) can partly be attributed to a dramatic process of centralisation of educational governance. The introduction of a national curriculum and the rise to prominence of the Manpower Services Commission in the field of vocational education are two examples here (Jones, 1989; CCCS, 1991; Tikly, 1991).

The present study, then, in contrast to Ball's work, will provide an account of the effects of governance structures on the ways individuals and groups interact. A theoretical basis for such an approach is given at the end of the present chapter in terms of a discussion of the educational state, and in more detail in chapter six. Importantly, discussion of the political level will not confine itself to interactions within the state, but will also look at the role of different structures and institutions within civil society in influencing change. Thus, for example, the processes around the development of the NEPI reports and of the ANC's Policy Framework will be set against an understanding of which organisations governed the process in question; the access of different organisations to different kinds of power and how this affected their relative influence; and how the policy processes were organised in terms of the division of labour, decision making machinery and overall approach. In such a way the present study will seek to explain the actions of
groups and individuals in terms of economic, discursive and political factors.

One consequence of the above is that interviews have not been used nearly to the same extent as in Ball's work. Given the relative ease of access enjoyed by the present author to the organisations and individuals involved in policy making within the Democratic Movement, the interviews undertaken for the purposes of this study were intended primarily to give an insight into the closed world of policy making within the apartheid state. In all, six interviews with leading bureaucrats and educationalists were conducted during the course of the study, and proved useful not only in providing factual information, but as a means of gaining insight into the ethos of Afrikanerdom and of the state bureaucracies.

In response to Dale's comments on Ball's work, it is helpful to think of the relationship between the choice of interviewees and the information that was gleaned from them as having had a dialectical relationship to the way that economic, political and discursive formations have been conceptualised in this study. In other words, whilst prior understandings of structure have influenced the choice of interviewees and provided an interpretative grid for understanding their responses, the responses themselves have had an impact on the theoretical account of structures. This has especially been the case as far as understanding the educational state is concerned. Further, the information gathered from the interviews has not been taken as 'gospel', but interpreted against relevant primary and secondary sources within the literature.

Finally, Broadfoot (1991) has criticised Ball's choice of interviewees for failing to include practitioners and those at the 'grassroots' of the policy process including parents and students. The implication is that Ball's understanding of policy making does not take into account the distance between policy formulation and policy implementation and the relationship between the two. A further implication is that Ball does not sufficiently address the ways that policies are resisted not only by various interests within the state, but at the 'chalk face' as well. For example, parents and students have resisted aspects of the Tory's reforms in England such as the introduction of attainment tests at various stages of schooling (this has also been the case Scotland). In many instances, this has made the implementation of the tests impossible.

In relation to the last point above, (and in contrast to Ball's work), the present study will seek to examine the ways state policies have been resisted by parents', students' and
teachers' organisations and will look at the means by which alternatives to state education have been developed. In relation to the first point, however, the present study will repeat some of the biases and omissions of Ball's work by focusing on the 'macro' determinants of education policy. This is not to deny the importance of a more 'micro' focus on the implementation of policy in the individual school. Indeed, such an analysis might well complement rather than contradict the approach adopted here. Unfortunately, however, such an undertaking would require more time and research than could be afforded to it in a study of this nature.

The Economic Level as a Source of Change

This section will explore the possibility that there is some kind of 'correspondence' between education and the economy, i.e. 'a relatively stable form of articulation between a distinct form of value production and a distinct form of regulation during a given period of time' (Bonefeld, 1987, p.101). The idea is derived from the work of the French Regulation School which emerged in France during the 1970's. The concern of this school was to develop a theory of capitalist accumulation in order to explain how and why capitalist economies came to be transformed during the course of their development, given the inherent crisis tendencies of the capitalist mode of production. The approach adopted for this study is a variation on that adopted by Gelb et al (1991) for the South African context.

In seeking to explain the transmutability of capitalism, the 'regulation approach' focuses on the ways a 'regime of accumulation' is 'regulated'. A regime of accumulation is described as an historically achieved coherent articulation between a mode of production and a mode of consumption. It refers to a

   systematic mode of distribution and reallocation of the social product, which brought about
   a long-term correspondence between the changing conditions of production.....and the
   changing conditions of final consumption. (Lipietz quoted in Bonefeld, 1987, p.99)

Gelb further introduces the concept of 'growth model' to describe the 'specific expression' of a regime of accumulation within a particular country. The growth model then describes the form of capitalist accumulation within that particular economy, as well as the nature of its insertion into the world economy as a whole (the 'international division of labour'). Thus the concept of 'growth model' is less abstract than that of 'regime of accumulation' and helps to clarify the ambiguity between the international and national
dimensions of accumulation. (Gelb, 1991, p.11).

Whilst the dominant regime of accumulation in Western capitalist economies has, until at least the mid-1970's, been described as 'Fordist' (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Jacques et al, 1989), the growth model peculiar to the South African economy has been described by Gelb as 'racial Fordism'.

A particular regime of accumulation is said to 'correspond' with a particular 'mode of regulation'.

The mode of regulation comprises the complex of social institutions, structures, and implicit norms which act to 'regulate' the behaviour of economic agents....In other words, the mode of regulation comprises the wide range of processes which organise and influence the multi-faceted conflicts amongst classes and amongst other social groups. (Gelb, 1991, p.11)

In such a way, a mode of regulation temporarily manages to resolve the inherent crisis tendencies of capitalism. Capitalism remains, however, an inherently unstable system as accumulation itself transforms over time the nature and composition of the various classes and other social groups. As a result, conflict between classes and between social groups begins to express itself in new ways, beyond the capacities of existing institutions. What is being described here is an 'organic crisis' (Gramsci, 1971) of an 'historical bloc' (see below). As Unterhalter (1990) has warned, however, it is important to point out the political (and, it may be added, ideological) 'moments' of such a crisis if causality is not to be given purely to economic determinants. The crisis can only be resolved by the development of a new mode of regulation.

Many recent theories of the state have drawn on the regulation approach, and, have assigned an important role to the state apparatuses and policies in relation to the development of a new mode of regulation. In this regard it is important to avoid determinism and functionalism, and to see apparatuses themselves as the outcome of complex ideological and political struggles between classes and other social groups (Bonefeld, 1987). The state attempts to resolve organic crises by activating new 'accumulation strategies' and 'hegemonic projects'. 'Accumulation strategies' refer to redefinitions of the basic aspects comprising the growth model or the positing of radical alternatives to this model with the strategic aim of resolving an economic crisis. Accumulation strategies are directly concerned with economic expansion on an international or national scale. They are oriented towards alterations in the relations of production, towards the balance of class forces. (Morris, 1991, p.35)
Hegemonic projects' on the other hand, refer to the construction and maintenance of the social basis of support for a particular form of state. This involves taking account of the balance among all social forces and the mobilisation of support behind a concrete national-popular programme of action. Hegemonic projects are integrally concerned with unifying the nation around broad issues concerned, primarily but not exclusively, with non-economic objectives such as political stability, social reform, and national and military expansion. They are also integrally concerned with who constitutes the nation, and who, in practice or in theory, is excluded from the composition of the 'nation-people'. (Morris, 1991, p.35)

It is possible to conceive of a variety of relationships between accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Often oriented towards different areas of social reality, accumulation strategies may, for example, be contradictory with regard to the constitution of the 'nation-people'. Alternatively, they may be mutually reinforcing and lead to a 'reconstitution of the basis for national support and a new growth path' (Morris, 1991, p.35).

The unity of particular hegemonic projects, accumulation strategies, and a peculiar ensemble of class relations and other social forms over a given period of time, is encapsulated by the Gramscian term 'historical bloc' (Bonefeld, 1987). Given the non-reductive, non-economistic emphasis of this concept with regard to describing the social totality (Tikly, 1990), terms such as 'correspondence' and 'regulation' (see above) take on a broadly descriptive rather than an analytical meaning (Bonefeld, 1987). The term 'correspondence, for example, rather than simply implying a 'functional fit' between social processes (such as education) and the economy, is meant to encompass a range of often contradictory articulations. In this regard, Ball has asked:

how far is it possible to talk of the relationship between education and accumulation? What does education mean in this general sense? Surely we must try to conceive of, and theorise, a variety of relationships, with different educations. These relationships will be more or less direct, or indirect, or mediated, and more or less significant to different regions of education, accepting that different regions of education are more or less strategically important. The unity of education in terms of any particular mode of regulation will, as a result, be partial. (Ball, 1990,a, p.16)

It will be argued in chapter three, for example, that the variety of educations (technical, vocational, academic, non-formal etc.) subsumed under the heading 'apartheid education', have had quite different relationships to the economy, and, in the context of the
organic crisis of apartheid, these relationships are changing. In particular it will be argued that an 'old' form of correspondence between education and apartheid's labour markets is gradually giving way to a 'new' correspondence which has sought to make schooling more relevant to the 'world of work'. It will also be argued that resistance in education has been associated with the development of a 'critical' correspondence between education and racial Fordism. Further, alternative policy proposals for the future will be related to the differing growth paths advocated by the ANC and its allies on the one hand, and the white minority regime on the other.

Allowing for a plurality of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects within a given historical bloc also provides space for a rapprochement between pluralism and reformed structuralism. Such an approach makes it possible to conceptualise conflict between individuals and groups over the future direction of policy. It allows, for example, for a conceptualisation of educational change as

negotiated through conflict between and within bureaucratic, economic and social demands.

In an increasingly complex society, group interests and the ideologies supporting them are experienced chiefly through highly bureaucratised institutions which establish their own logic of development. But nothing is automatic. Changes occur, sometimes accidentally, when the right configuration of feelings, ideologies and power coincide. (Kogan quoted in Ball, 1990,a, p.16)

In brief then, the relationship between economic and educational change must be presented as multi-faceted, highly complex, and often contradictory.

The Ideological/Discursive Level as a Source of Change

The third level at which change will be accounted for is the ideological/discursive. The concept of discourse employed here is derived from the work of Michel Foucault, and is used to designate the conjunction of knowledge on the one hand and power on the other.

Foucault's interest in discourse arose out of an initial interest in knowledge itself. In his early work, his archaeologies, Foucault sought to make clear the rules of what can and cannot be said within a particular discourse at a particular time. These rules include such procedures as prohibition, exclusion, and the opposition between true and false. In discussing how different disciplines are constituted, he demonstrates the ability of knowledge to determine reason, representation and meaning, i.e. the way disciplinary discourses are organised can itself be an act of power defining what can be said as well as
who has the right to speak.

Discourses are, therefore about what can be said and thought as well as the question of who can speak at a particular time and with what authority. 'Discourses embody meaning and social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power relations' (Ball, 1990, a, p.17). They are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.....Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention. (Foucault, 1977, p. 49)

In his genealogies (his later studies of the historical and social conditions of the emergence of discourses and their relationship to institutional powers), Foucault suggests that knowledge and power are inseparable. They are two sides of a single process. Power produces knowledge....Power and knowledge directly imply one another....There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of fields of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations. (Foucault quoted in Kenway, 1990, pp. 173-174).

Policies, as Ball points out embody certain claims to speak with authority, they legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and they privilege certain visions and interests. They are power/knowledge configurations par excellence. (Ball, 1990, a, p.22).

Before proceeding further, it is helpful to first place Foucault's ideas about discourse in relation to other salient features of his work that will be of relevance to this study.

Foucault has stated that his objective has been 'to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects' (Foucault quoted in Rabinow, 1987, p.208). Through his analysis of power-knowledge, Foucault links the emergence of the modern subject with the emergence of the human sciences. It is through the disciplines of the human sciences that inegalitarian 'technologies of power' and 'regimes of truth' are created and perpetuated (despite what any formal system of rights may guarantee).

Foucault's work has dealt with three interconnected modes of objectification of the subject : a) modes of enquiry which take on a 'scientific status'; b) the objectification of subjects by means of 'dividing practices' (the objectification, categorization and hierachization of subjects); c) the ways in which human beings have turned themselves into subjects (Foucault, 1982, p.208). All three of these broad areas of Foucault's work have
a bearing on the present study as will become clear.

Reference was made in chapter 1 to Enslin's (1990) account of the use that has been made of Fundamental Pedagogics for apartheid's own 'dividing practices'. Similarly, reference will be made to the 'scientific' status accorded to official policy documents, and the ways in which this status has been implicated in perpetuating 'race' and class divisions. Finally, in chapters four and five, reference will be made in passing to some of the moral codes and processes of identity formation by which people have defined themselves as subjects.

The objectification of the human body via combinations of knowledge and power has, according to Foucault, resulted in the development of 'disciplinary technologies' as the principal means of social control (as opposed to overt sovereign and legal power). These technologies are evident in institutions such as prisons, schools and asylums, and involve

- the division and distribution of bodies in space, the division of time - and therefore activity
- into periods, the detailed control of activity, and the creation of tactical networks for the efficient deployment of bodies and activities. (Jones, 1990, p.80)

The form of rationality accompanying these disciplinary technologies is interested primarily in efficiency and productivity through a system of 'normalization' (Kenway, 1990). Such normative rationalities displace concerns over value, justice, right and wrong, and are an integral part of state apparatuses such as those mentioned above. Whilst normalizing technologies function to identify deviations from the 'norm', other accompanying technologies provide corrective and disciplinary mechanisms including a vast apparatus for testing and documentation. As governments came to accept increasing responsibility for areas of people's lives, a growing archive, containing intricate statistical details about individuals developed. Thus the 'objective' knowledges gleaned from the application of the human sciences to processes of diagnostic and prognostic assessments, hierachization etc. became part of the 'web of control' of the state bureaucracy (Rabinow, 1987; Kenway 1990; Smart 1985).

Foucault describes this process as a characteristic feature of modern power structures - as an intricate mixture of 'individualizing techniques' and 'totalizing strategies' that work to both 'totalize' and 'individualize' the subject (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1987). According to Foucault, the proliferation of discourses, and the fragmentation of
knowledge during the twentieth century, has seen a concomitant growth in the number of 'specific intellectuals' - the 'expert', the 'specialist' and the 'professional' - who produce, promote and service 'regimes of truth'. Foucault's argument is that every society has its "regime of truth", its own "general politics" of truth' (Foucault quoted in Smart, 1985, pp. 67-68) around which there exists a struggle concerning the status of truth and the role it plays in the socio-economic and political order of things. The specific intellectual, who has a direct and localized relation to 'scientific' knowledge, and who is politicised by involvement in everyday struggles and conflicts over 'truth', can also function counter-hegemonically by attempting to construct a new 'politics of truth'.

Thus knowledge, for Foucault, is not regarded as in itself neutral, true or false. Foucault suspends questions of truth and falsity and examines the institutional field over and through which discourse gains and assigns power and control. (Kenway, 1990, p.175)

Such an examination should aim at revealing how 'forms of rationality' inscribe themselves in practice or systems of practices, and how they suppress a plurality of alternative discourses.

Regimes of truth may also be accompanied by, or be the same thing as, 'regimes of morality' or 'moral technologies' which, like scientific rationalities, claim a superior status, and exercise a relationship of power. Within the field of educational policy making, the imposition of CNE principles can be seen to have incorporated not only 'scientific' rationalities (as, for example, in the case of FP), but also regimes of morality into apartheid education's own regime of truth. Foucault avoids totalizing the concept of rationality, however, preferring instead to talk about particular rationalities in the context of particular institutions.

To conclude the brief resume of Foucault's work, it is important, for the purposes of this study, to point out that, for Foucault, any analysis of power should begin with the 'micro-physics of power' i.e. with localized, specific mechanisms and histories (Kenway, 1990). From here, argues Foucault, analysis should ascend to reveal how these have been colonised, or appropriated, by various forms of macro domination (see below). Connections between forms of power and dominant groups cannot be generalised-they must be reached through analysis (Smart, 1983).

It will be one aim of this study to bring the rich intellectual repertoire provided by Foucault's work to an analysis of the 'politics of truth' surrounding the policy-making
process in South Africa. This will involve pointing to the themes, emphases and omissions of the discursive regime under scrutiny, and exposing some of its governing rules and procedures. In order to incorporate the discursive level, however, and in order to understand its wider implications, some important caveats are necessary. Broadly, these caveats relate to the importance of linking struggles at the discursive level to wider struggles 'in which what is at stake is ultimately quite a lot more than either words or discourses' (Macdonnell, 1986, p.51). They also relate to the issue of effecting some sort of coherence, between disparate theoretical paradigms, within the study as a whole. Following Kenway (1990), it is argued here that while a Foucauldian analysis is useful in the manner outlined above,

it is less so in accounting for the range of 'non-governmental' discourses which, along with institutionalized rationalities, form part of the discursive ensemble of social movements.....and which help to constitute both people and governments as subjects. (p. 176)

Examples of non-governmental discourses that will be discussed in this study are those of NEPI, and the 'free market' think tanks. The organisations and groups associated with these discourses have their own identifiable power - knowledge apparatuses as should have been evident from the preceding chapter. Further,

while certainly recognising the complex array of discourses which make up any 'regime of truth', Foucault is not so helpful as others on the matter of inter-discursivity or on the relationship between discourses and broad intersecting social structures of dominance. (Kenway, 1990, p.176)

It is for this reason that Foucault's work on discourse can be usefully complemented by a particular reading of Gramsci's work on ideology and on hegemony.

The problems associated with seeking to combine the basically post-structuralist Foucauldian problematic with any reading of Gramsci that locates the latter's work within the very episteme (ground-base of knowledge) that post-structuralism seeks to deconstruct, have been highlighted succinctly by Smart (1983). The reading of Gramsci employed here, however, will draw on those non-economistic, non-deterministic interpretations of Gramsci's work advocated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Laclau (1990) and Tikly (1990), amongst others.

Gramsci's focus is wider than that of Foucault. His concern is with the ways in which certain social groups, and, in particular, certain social classes, manage to maintain
and perpetuate their dominance over other social groups. In order to explain this, Gramsci employs the term 'hegemony' to denote the myriad processes by which consent is achieved between groups for any particular social order by means of 'intellectual and moral leadership'. It is by means of hegemony on the one hand, and coercion on the other hand, that social order is maintained.

Implicit in Gramsci's problematic of hegemony is a mode of class analysis that recognises the importance of culture, and emphasises particularly the dynamic and open nature of class formation and class relations. Gramsci refuses to give the economic level sole causal primacy in his analysis, and therefore presents a view of ideology that moves beyond that generally employed within Marxism (see Williams, 1973). Rather than asserting the existence of a pure class ideology, Gramsci sees a universe of different ideological elements from which different classes, and/or social groupings, produce their own ideologies. In Gramsci's view, then,

class hegemony is achieved through ideological struggle on many fronts and it is this that has led a number of social theorists to use Gramsci as a touchstone for theorising the discursive constitution of hegemony - discourse being understood here in a Foucauldian sense. (Kenway, 1990, p.177)

In this view then, discourse becomes a specific form of ideology (Macdonnell, 1986). For Gramsci, the discursive articulation of hegemony becomes a mass educational effort on the part of dominant groups, and ideological struggle is waged throughout the various institutions of the state and civil society towards this end.

Of particular relevance to the South African situation at the present time, is the idea that any hegemonic project must address the question of the people-nation (or in more orthodox Gramscian terms, the 'national popular', i.e. the way that the national identity is defined). This accords with the point made by Laclau (1977) that, given the predominance of the people/state contradiction over the capital/labour contradiction in modern capitalist societies, the 'national popular' becomes the terrain par excellence of ideological struggle.

If the above propositions are put in slightly different terms, then the social field can be seen to be constituted by difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Rather than individual and group identities simply being given by class, it is possible to recognise a plurality of social struggles, whether over 'race', gender or class etc., and therefore a vast plurality of discursive subjects. The political project of any group becomes the discursive articulation
of these different subjectivities around a new hegemonic principle such that new political subjects may be constituted. Given the plurality of often contradictory subject positions within one individual, the constitution of new political subjects is very difficult, and invariably incomplete.

Accordingly, hegemony becomes a 'discourse of discourses' and is defined as the process of constructing politically, the subjectivity of the masses.....the formation of diverse subjects into a collective will. (Kenway, 1990, p.180)

At this point it is worth mentioning a general weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse in relation to the constitution of subjectivities, namely, his failure to explore fully the possibilities for resistance to a dominant discursive formation (Macdonnell, 1986). Pecheux (1982) has outlined three mechanisms by which subjects may be discursively constituted (or, in Althusserian terms, 'interpellated'). The first mechanism is that of 'identification', i.e. consent on the part of 'good subjects' to the ideologies of dominant groups. An example from the field of education might be 'identification' with the major tenets of CNE. 'Counter-identification', on the other hand, involves 'turning back' the meanings 'lived' by 'good subjects'. As Pecheux has suggested, this reversal leaves linguistic traces, e.g. "what you call the oil crisis"; "your social sciences"; "your Christian National Education" etc.

Now, whilst 'identification' and 'counter-identification' are generally supportive of each other in that they do not go beyond either a simple acceptance or rejection of the subject position posited by the dominant discursive formation, the third mechanism, namely, 'disidentification' does represent a challenge to this subject position. 'Disidentification', according to Pecheux, works 'on and against' prevailing practices of ideological subjection, and can be brought about by political and ideological struggles. In terms of the educational example presented above, 'people's education' may be perceived as 'disidentification' with CNE ideology.

It has been argued (MacDonnell, 1986) that in Foucault's work as a whole, there is only a consideration of forms of identification and counter-identification. Further, so it is argued, his failure to identify forms of disidentification can be attributed to his inability to link adequately his ideas about discourses to wider struggles between social groups. Foucault's focus, as has already been suggested, is largely confined to institutions (Macdonnell, 1986).
An important point of convergence, however, between Foucault's work and the reading of Gramsci presented above, lies in similar conceptions of the nature of power implicit in the work of both authors. Foucault takes issue with both the 'economism' of the 'juridical-liberal' conception of power (in which power is understood as a commodity, a right, or a possession), and the traditional Marxist conception in which power is simply a function of class domination (Smart, 1985). For both Foucault and Gramsci, power is seen to exist as a relationship at all points of the social totality (Kenway, 1990). Rather than understanding power to be localised in a central apparatus (e.g. the educational state), and, being imposed from the top down, power for Foucault, like hegemony for Gramsci, is regarded as complex and diffuse. In the discussion of the nature of the educational state presented below, therefore, it is not assumed that either discourses, or hegemonic projects, have their origins exclusively in the state, although the state is certainly considered to be an agent in their formulation and perpetuation.

The Educational State

The view of the state taken here builds on some of the implications of the regulation approach outlined above. In brief, however, the state is most simply conceptualised as a set of publicly-financed state apparatuses (Dale, 1989). Further, the state is identifiable in terms of particular agencies, and in some respects individuals....The state cannot have intentions unless these are expressed in terms of social mechanisms. (Ball, 1990,a, p.19)

With regards to the regulation approach, there is a constant tension between accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects within the state (see above). In more conventional Marxist terms this is analogous to the fundamental contradiction between the role of the capitalist state in supporting and sustaining the accumulation process on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the role of the state as legitimator and reproducer of capitalist social relations (Dale, 1989).

This basic contradiction is writ small in the education system. It can be seen, for example, in the dichotomy between increasing elitism and differentiation in education, and the legitimatory rhetoric of 'equal quality', i.e. between the process and the context of accumulation (see chapter 3). As has already been argued above, however, the educational state is relatively autonomous, and its relationship with capitalism (or even racial capitalism
in the South African context) does not account for everything it does. In this regard it is important to distinguish between government and the rest of the state, i.e. the civil service, the state apparatuses etc. Thus, on the one hand, government will try to keep the resolution of fundamental contradictions with their origins in the capitalist system at the top of any policy agenda. On the other hand, however, what can be achieved through education....is constrained not only by the basic problems confronting it [i.e. problems arising from the nature of the capitalist system], but also by the nature of the apparatus for tackling them - and everything else it does. (Dale, 1989, p.34)

It is those unique aspects of the educational state, i.e. those aspects which serve to define its autonomy, that will be briefly considered below.

It is at this point that the kind of systems analysis developed by Margaret Archer (1979; 1984) becomes useful, and in particular, the implications for educational politics of centralised and decentralised governance structures. As mentioned in chapter one, Archer's work, along with that of her South African importers will be critically discussed in chapter six in relation to South Africa's racially fragmented but highly centralised education system. It will be argued that in the context of apartheid, South Africa's system of governance has influenced forms of interaction quite distinct from those forms found in Archer's European case studies.

A further characteristic of the educational state in South Africa (and, for that matter, all over the world) is the fact that it is organised as a bureaucracy. Discussion of the bureaucratic nature of the educational state, despite the large number of questions this characteristic opens up (Dale, 1989) will, of necessity, have to be limited in this study. Attention will focus on the consequences of the dominance of the bureaucratic form for the kinds of questions and answers it facilitates to the policy issues confronting it.

It will be suggested that the nature of the educational bureaucracy in South Africa is changing as a result of the growing organic crisis of racial capitalism. Weber's ideal type bureaucracy was characterised by the 'maximisation of rationality, specialization, impersonality, hierarchy and accountability, all in the interests of efficiency' (Dale, 1989, p. 34). It will be argued following Therborn, that this ideal type has been supplanted by an increasing emphasis on managerial technology (as exemplified by government commissions into education since de Lange).
Under bureaucracy, the most successful action is that which conforms most closely to established rules and procedures; under managerial technology the effectiveness of the product is the criterion of success. (Dale, 1989, p.35)

This *qualitative* change in emphasis is related to the changing role of the state in the context of the organic crisis of an historical bloc. In Offe's (1984) terms, this has involved a change from 'allocative' state policies (where the state allocates resources and functions which are at its disposal), to 'productive' state policies (where the state actively seeks to remedy actual or perceived threats to the accumulation process). In Offe's view, the ideal type bureaucracy is appropriate to the former type of state activity while the application of predetermined rules through a hierarchical structure of 'neutral' officials is simply insufficient to absorb the decision load implied by productive state activities. (Offe quoted in Dale, 1989, p.35)

Whilst the thrust of change in the bureaucracy may be characterised as a shift towards managerial technology, this is not meant to imply the complete replacement of the 'ideal type'. The two forms of bureaucracy are, rather, perceived to co-exist in shifting combinations.

Having outlined the theoretical approach that will be adopted in this study, the next chapter will focus more directly on one aspect of educational policy, namely, the changing relationship between education and the economy.
CHAPTER THREE

EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of the changing relationship between education and the economy in South Africa. Drawing on, and extending the regulation approach outlined in the previous chapter, it will be argued that education as an aspect of racial Fordism's mode of regulation is in the process of being repositioned and restructured in relation to accumulation.

Central to the account presented below will be the idea that apartheid's 'organic crisis' has provided a powerful repertoire of motives for policy shifts in education, such that educational struggles have themselves played a prominent role in the broader crisis. It will be argued that the central contradiction between education's role in simultaneously securing both the process and the context for accumulation to proceed has been the basis for educational change in relation to the economy. It is intended that the account of economic crisis and change presented below will provide a backdrop against which discursive and political determinants of educational policy may be more fully comprehended in subsequent chapters.

It will be recalled from chapter two that the education/economy relationship will be explored with regard to both the financing of education, and the connection between education and productivity. Accounts of the financing of education will, however, seek to move beyond a purely quantitative analysis to explore the issues of how money has been spent, and by whom. Such and analysis will seek to shed light on the role of different interest groups in determining the direction of educational policy.

Similarly, following on from the theoretical approach of the last chapter, the relationship between education and the world of work will be presented as a multifaceted interplay of different kinds of correspondence between different aspects of education and different areas of the economy. Central to the account of shifting correspondences will be the development of an understanding of the crucial mediating role of labour markets.

The chapter will commence with an account of racial Fordism, and then, of
education's place within racial Fordism's mode of regulation. This will be followed by an analysis of South Africa's organic crisis and the role of education both within the crisis itself, and, as an aspect of the search for a new growth path. The chapter will conclude with a brief consideration of the current direction of educational policy in relation to possible future trends within the economy.

**Racial Fordism**

The account of racial Fordism presented below will draw largely on the recent work of Gelb et al (1991).

From the perspective of regulation theory, the post-war combination of apartheid and import-substitution industrialisation in South Africa can be seen as the defining characteristics of a 'racial Fordist' growth model. Like Fordism in the advanced countries, accumulation in South Africa during this period involved linking the extension of mass production with the extension of mass consumption; in South Africa, however, both production and consumption were racially structured. (Gelb, 1991, p.13).

Before proceeding further, it is important to make some general observations concerning the use of the terms 'Fordism' and 'racial Fordism' in particular. The term 'Fordism' is used to imply the dominance both within a global regime of accumulation, and nationally specific growth paths of the kind of mass production methods pioneered by Henry Ford. The term also denotes, however, a particular form of mass consumption within the framework of a particular mode of regulation. As such, Fordism has entailed the spread of collective bargaining, the institutionalisation of forms of a welfare state, and full employment strategies linked to Keynesian-type economic policies (Hall and Jacques et al, 1989; Harvey, 1989). Considered at an international level, the multinational enterprise became the 'vehicle for the diffusion of technological change across economies, as well as the spread of the 'American way of life'' (Gelb, 1991, p.16). American dominance was further enshrined in the international monetary system and the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944.

Racial Fordism is presented by Gelb et al as a 'mutation' of Fordist production and consumption norms, or, as Lipietz has described it, as an example of 'sub-Fordism'.

...import substitution policies....did result in a real social transformation, and the emergence of a modern working class, modern middle strata and modern industrial capitalism. [The results] might be described as a 'sub-Fordism', as a caricature of Fordism,
or as an attempt to industrialise by using Fordist technology, but without either its social
labour processes or its mass consumption norms. (Lipietz quoted in Gelb, 1991, pp. 15-16).
Indeed, given that Fordist production techniques only became prevalent in South Africa
during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Morris, 1991; Kraak, 1991,a), and, given that a welfare
state has been conspicuous by its absence as far as the black majority of South Africans are
concerned, some have questioned the use of the term 'Fordist' (in however qualified a
form) to denote South Africa’s growth path since the war (Unterhalter, 1990; Kraak,
1991,a&b).

Without wishing to become embroiled in a complex debate, the term 'racial
Fordism' will be used in this study for two main reasons. Firstly, Fordist production
techniques have become increasingly prevalent in the historical bloc considered as a whole,
although they have developed alongside more traditional work processes such as ‘jobbing’.
Similarly, Fordist mass consumption norms have been extended during the historical bloc
as a whole to encompass growing sections of the black population. Secondly, use of the
term ‘racial Fordism’ helps to contextualise South Africa’s growth path within the global
Fordist regime of accumulation. Extending Gelb et al’s analysis further then, the
development of racial Fordism post 1948 has been described as having the following
characteristics.

Verwoerdian apartheid was founded on an accumulation strategy which had two
critical aspects to it, namely, import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) and the reproduction
and exploitation of cheap black labour. Industrialisation policy was based on

- protective tariffs, exchange and import controls governing finance and trade, parastatal
corporations (e.g. ISCOR, SASOL), production of consumer durables for the mainly white
home market, a state-regulated wage bargaining system which excluded Africans and
ensured increasing standards of living mainly for the white population (but also to a more
limited extent for coloureds and Indians), and the export of primary commodities. (Morris,
1991, p.36)

These forms of state intervention aside, there was little effort on the part of the NP
to restructure the process of capitalist production itself as was the case in the South-east
Asian newly industrialised countries for example. In the 1950s the state did intervene,
however, in the supply, reproduction and control of labour with the clear aim of
guaranteeing the perpetuation of capitalist social relations of production. On the one hand
the state maintained a supply of migrant unskilled labour with their roots in the bantustan
system. This labour force was reproduced partly through pre-capitalist social relations and local bantustan state networks. On the other hand, a smaller proletarianised urban black labour force (including migrant labourers for the time they were allowed to stay) was reproduced within tightly-controlled urban townships. An intricate system of influx controls regulated the flow of African workers to the urban industrialised areas.

Control of black workers was further institutionalised through the effective suppression of attempts to unionise African workers and through the separation of Indian and 'coloured' workers from their white counterparts within existing unions. Indian and 'coloured' workers complemented the cheapness of African unskilled and semi-skilled labour by their absorption into craft unions and artisanal occupations, thereby providing skill and flexibility.

Most white, 'coloured' and Indian workers were fully proletarianised, dependent on wages and salaries for their reproduction, and mainly located in the metropolitan areas. They enjoyed an industrial relations system that regularised wages and conditions of service and state-provided social welfare services and subsidisation in the areas of health, housing, education, employment placement and unemployment benefit (although differentially allocated along racial lines).

This section of the labour force formed an integral part of a system of mass production and consumption, particularly in the consumer goods sector, based on the predominant use of machine-paced, semi-skilled labour, which by the late 1960's displayed many of the characteristics of Fordism in advanced capitalist countries. (Morris, 1991, p.38).

The relationship between capital and the state under racial Fordism was (and still is) complex and contradictory. In general the relationship may be described as one of 'distance-dependency' i.e. whilst the state maintained a distance from capitalist enterprises, capital exhibited a dependency on state coercive labour practices and protective barriers against foreign competition. Within this broad framework there were differences, however, between Afrikaner capital on the one hand which had a closer dependency upon, and political allegiance to the state, and English capital, which remained much more autonomous. These divisions were further overlaid by divisions between local capital (both Afrikaner and English), and more internationally-oriented capital (exemplified by Anglo American and Barlow Rand). Whereas, historically, the more internationally-oriented bourgeoisie has been rooted in liberal and free market traditions, more locally-oriented
capital has often supported policies such as neo-protectionism. The political incoherence of capital in South Africa has been reflected within the field of social (including educational) policy as will be seen below.

The accumulation strategy outlined above was tightly interwoven within the hegemonic project of racial domination which 'projected and structured the national-popular interest as a racially defined territorial and social segregation, summed up in the terms 'grand apartheid' and 'petty apartheid'' (Morris, 1991, p. 38). It operated to obstruct the upward mobility of blacks in all spheres, and provided the ideological cement that unified most classes within the enfranchised white population. As will be seen below, however, conflicts did arise within the white power bloc over certain apartheid policies, particularly those pertaining to labour.

As had been the case since the Act of Union in 1910, whites under apartheid continued to be defined as constituting the South African nation and became citizens within a social and political sphere that displayed many of the characteristics of western bourgeois democracies (parliamentary forms, election of political parties, separation of the executive from the legislature etc.). After 1948, the Afrikaner volk was elevated to an even more select status. Struggles within the white 'nation' were therefore largely concerned with the circulation of power, and were confined within parliamentary forms.

Africans, on the other hand, were divided into a multiplicity of ethnically-defined 'nations' each with a particular 'cultural identity' (some real, some artificially created). Africans were granted territorial and political rights within the bantustan 'nation-state'. Although this policy enjoyed highly circumscribed support (chiefly from those classes of Africans who could directly benefit from the limited opportunities for accumulation, corruption, and bureaucratic employment opened up in the bantustans), generally, and for obvious reasons, this narrow definition of 'nation' implied by apartheid policies relied heavily on state coercion of blacks, particularly in the urban areas of 'white' South Africa.

...struggles of the excluded black majority (whatever their content) became immediately politicised as they bounced up against the barriers of political exclusion and repression. Struggles lost their specificity, becoming generalised and potentially explosive since there was no way for them to become institutionally channelled. The national question seemed to permeate all forms of struggle for social, economic and political advancement, resulting in an oscillation towards selective cooptation on the one hand and demands for national liberation on the other. (Morris, 1991, pp. 39-40).
In addition to the characteristics of racial Fordism as outlined by Gelb et al, it is also important to stress the sexist and patriarchal nature of racial Fordism. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the general marginalisation of women in South African society, and the preponderance of issues of ‘race’ and class within the political sphere, the nature and dynamics of women’s oppression under apartheid remain largely unexplored. From the general accounts that do exist, however, it is clear that the experience of sexism and of patriarchy, whilst affecting all women (and men for that matter) has been mediated by both class and ‘race’. In such general accounts, African women, for example, are often described as having to face a triple oppression on account of sex, colour and class (Bernstein, 1978; Cock, 1989). The experience of, say, white middle class women would be different in this regard.

In terms of the regulation approach, accumulation strategies in South Africa as elsewhere have relied on a sexual division of labour. Jacklyn Cock’s excellent study of domestic workers under apartheid (Cock, 1989), for example, has demonstrated the role of African domestic workers in not only reproducing African labour either in the urban areas or the bantustans, but also in reproducing white labour power at their places of work. Besides the reproduction of labour power through the institution of the patriarchal family, South African women, and especially black South African women, have often predominated in the so-called ‘caring professions’ of teaching and nursing (Cock, 1989; Unterhalter, 1991). Gender segmentation of labour markets, as will be shown below, has not only implied the perpetuation of ‘gender-specific’ occupations, but the use of women as cheap labour power given lack of parity in remuneration levels.

Women’s subordination has also fed into, and underpinned, the hegemonic project of racial domination. Cock (1989) again provides an example here in her discussion of the ideological dimensions of domestic work.

Many white South African children are socialised into the dominant ideological order and learn the attitudes and styles of racial domination from relationships with servants, especially ‘nannies’. The converse is equally true in that many black children experience the inequality of apartheid and the anger that it generates through some experience of domestic work. (p. 3).

Further, as the following poignant quote from Albie Sachs would seem to suggest, gender relationships permeate, in their own right, to the very heart of hegemony and coercion in South Africa’s mode of regulation, such that
...to challenge patriarchy, to dispute the idea that men should be the dominant figures in
the family and in society, is to be seen not as fighting against male privilege but as
attempting to destroy African tradition or subvert Afrikaner ideals or undermine civilised
and decent British values. Men are exhorted to express their manhood as powerfully as
possible, which some do by joining the police or the army or vigilante groups and seeing
how many youths they can shoot, whip, teargas, club, or knife, or how many houses they
can burn down or bulldoze, or how many people they can torture into helplessness.
Patriarchy brutalizes men and neutralizes women-across the colour line. (Sachs, 1990, p.
53).

Some of the implications of sexism and patriarchy for the political and discursive
determination of educational policy will be taken up in subsequent chapters.

In relation to the focus of the present chapter, recent accounts of social policy in
Britain have convincingly pointed to the need for an understanding of political economy
that fully integrates the kinds of domestic and other labour typically performed by women
into the broader analysis (see Williams, 1989; Jones, 1989, for example). It is only then,
so it is argued, that the role of education in reproducing these forms of labour power, and,
in reproducing patriarchal/capitalist social relations in general, can be appreciated. Given
the huge gaps in the South African literature in this regard, such an endeavour is clearly
beyond the scope of the current study, but might well provide a fruitful avenue for future
research. A brief account of gender inequalities in relation to labour markets and education
will, however, be given below.

An account of early NP policy in the field of education was provided in chapter
one. Understood as an aspect of mass consumption under racial Fordism, there was, at
least in broad terms, a positive correspondence between CNE-influenced policies and other
aspects of apartheid's mode of regulation. The state intervened strongly in the educational
sphere and, having wrested control of non-white education away from the churches,
proceeded to institute a highly centralised, authoritarian and inequitable system. Racial
differentiation was consolidated and entrenched within the parameters of grand apartheid
with the bantustan system playing an increasingly prominent role in the education of
Africans. Per capita expenditure for each racial group showed marked inequality and
Africans were expected to finance bantu education themselves. Further inequalities in terms
of teacher-pupil ratios, human and capital resources etc. largely sprang from these
disparities in funding (see chapter one). Further, forms of pedagogy and curricula
articulated clearly and unequivocally with the hegemonic project of racial domination, and served to discriminate against girls and women.

This is not to imply a neat functional 'fit', however, between education and racial Fordism's accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Indeed, in the account of the relationship between education and production that follows, the evolution of educational policy since 1948 will be presented as an aspect of contradiction both within and between accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.

**Education and Production Under Racial Fordism**

The relationship between education and capitalist production in South Africa has been multifaceted and complex. Until recently, the dominant paradigm in which the education/productivity relationship was considered was the liberal one, influenced by human capital theory. In this view the development of human capital via education has a beneficial effect on economic development which is itself perceived as a benign and linear process of growth devoid of contradiction. This view, exemplified by the Education Panel reports, and more recently, by the report of the de Lange committee has been supplanted by what might be termed a neo-liberal approach. Here, the essence of capitalist accumulation, and the workings of the 'free market' are still considered to be benign, but, in contrast to human capital theory, increasing levels of education are not seen to 'map onto' economic growth unproblematically. Indeed, many neo-liberals argue that

- education not only failed in advancing socio-economic development in most third world countries, but even contributed to the creation of more problems.....growing unemployment of the educated, growing political radicalisation and instability and, lately, a growing incidence of crime. (Dostal, 1989, p.32)

In this view it is only a specific type of education, involving the development of 'entrepreneurial skills' that can genuinely foster economic development. It will be argued in chapter four that such views have become part of the discursive framework of educational policy makers in South Africa.

The benign view of capitalism and of markets has been challenged by educationists writing within a neo-Marxist framework. As will be recalled from chapter one, the primary function of education in relation to production according to many neo-Marxist interpretations is to be found in the education system's role in the social and economic
reproduction of labour power, and in the legitimation of an inherently unstable, contradictory and exploitative system. Although various critiques of neo-Marxist paradigms were advanced in chapters one and two, the approach of the current chapter starts from the same premise, albeit in a more modified form. In this regard, some further criticisms of neo-Marxist approaches are pertinent here.

Criticising the authors of Apartheid and Education, Hyslop (1986) has pointed out that much of the political economy approach within educational studies has been influenced by an overly simplistic account of early policy towards African labour in the post-1948 period, namely, the Cheap Labour Power Thesis (CLPT) developed by Wolpe, Legassik and others. The CLPT posits that apartheid policies were orientated towards the supply and reproduction of one type of African labour power, namely cheap migrant labour. This thesis has been criticised for failing to take into account the differentiated labour power required by industry, and, the relationship between apartheid policies viz a viz the reproduction of this differentiated labour force. Hyslop argues that rather than viewing bantu education as a monolithic entity geared towards the reproduction of one form of labour, it is more fruitful to look at the ways in which different types and levels of education have been implicated in the reproduction of different forms of labour power. Moving beyond Hyslop's criticism, however, it is argued here that such a broader account must also take cognizance of white, 'coloured' and Indian education as well gender considerations.

The above criticism of the CLPT feeds into a more generalised critique of much of the international literature written within a neo-Marxist framework that focuses on the tendency to regard the school/work relationship as fairly direct and straightforward. Against this view it will be argued below that the education/work relationship is mediated by the presence of a powerful intermediary institution, namely the labour market. Further, much of the neo-Marxist literature, particularly that influenced by Althusser's ISA's essay, has tended to pay attention to education as an aspect of social reproduction at the expense of a consideration of how other factors such as housing, family structures, social control policies etc. also form part of a nexus of regulatory mechanisms involved in social reproduction.

The approach adopted here will go beyond the existing literature, and will attempt to view education as but one aspect of racial Fordism's mode of regulation. This will
entail, firstly, providing an account of the 'correspondence' between education and the needs of the labour market, i.e. the extent to which education produced the necessary skills required by the labour market at any particular time, and the impact of labour markets on education. Secondly, it will involve a consideration of the extent to which education policy 'corresponded' with developments in other areas of social policy and with the hegemonic project of apartheid. Of central importance here, as suggested in chapter two, is the understanding of the term 'correspondence' as implying a complex, and at times contradictory relationship between relatively autonomous parts of the social whole. This point will be taken up again below. It is, however, to an account of the mediating role of labour markets in South Africa that attention will now turn.

**South Africa's Changing Labour Markets**

The account of labour markets presented here draws on recent work by Andre Kraak (1991,a). The labour market can be defined as 'consisting of all those institutions which mediate, effect or determine the purchase and sale of labour power' (Edwards, Reich and Gordon quoted in Kraak, 1991,a). According to Kraak,

> Historically, capitalist labour markets have evolved as sites of intense struggles as both capital and labour have sought institutional and other means to control access to jobs, conditions of work, and remuneration levels. These struggles have given shape to the character of capitalist labour markets. (Kraak, 1991,a, p. 25).

Neo-classical views on the link between labour markets and education are criticised for assuming a) that labour markets are simply a background 'given' to which education must respond; b) that labour markets exert a benign influence on education in that the demands of employment are assumed to be consistent with social and educational objectives; and c) that there exist unproblematic links between education and training, rational employer recruitment practices and improved productivity. The view taken by Kraak on the other hand

> is to argue that capital's demand for labour and its related recruitment and training practices are not always economically rational, nor based solely on the technical requirements of production. There are a whole series of filtering mechanisms and social processes which serve to structure the characteristics of workers required in specific occupational places. (Kraak, 1991,a, p. 26).

Further, the labour market has a negative effect on education creating 'radical
discontinuities between education and occupational systems which are a major limitation upon the effectiveness of educational reforms'. (Moore quoted in Kraak, 1991,a, p. 26). The most serious factor in the perpetuation of these discontinuities is the segmented condition of labour markets under capitalism.

Segmented labour markets may be defined as labour markets that have been divided institutionally into distinct and separate markets. Employers and workers of one market do not compete with employers and workers of another market. Workers in each segment experience distinct processes and outcomes. This structural feature of the capitalist labour market has often been reinforced and sustained by racial, sexual and other forms of social discrimination. (Kraak, 1991,a, pp. 26-27).

Three distinct types of labour market have emerged in all capitalist economies:

a) The secondary market consists of workers who have little protection from wider labour market competition and change and whose jobs entail low skill and low pay work. They lack union rights and can easily be dismissed. Firms on the 'periphery' of the economy, characterised by unstable product demand, low levels of profitability and labour intensive methods of production often give rise to secondary market conditions. In South Africa, this labour market has accounted for 70% of the entire workforce and includes non-unionised unskilled workers, most migrants, most labourers, those employed in the informal sector, and the unemployed. In secondary markets work is organised via the direct and authoritarian control of the supervisor. Most jobs within this labour market segment require no formal education and training, and workers are not rewarded for having academic or technical qualifications.

b) The independent primary market is made up of 'high level manpower' (sic) jobs that are bureaucratically organised and offer long-term employment, job security, clearly defined career paths and relatively high pay. It includes all professionals, technicians, managers, administrators, artisans, higher level supervisors and clerical workers. Independent primary markets are characterised by bureaucratic control which grew out of the need to control the substantial layers of professional, semi-professional and administrative work not directly linked to productive activity which emerged with the rise of monopoly corporations. Bureaucratic control is based upon rules and procedures which seek to habituate workers to company values, and on Taylorist principles which seek to
divide workers across a seemingly endless fragmentation of jobs. Work is bureaucratically stratified via career job ladders, seniority-based pay and promotion systems, and an emphasis on educational credentials which all play an important role in establishing this bureaucratic division of labour. (Kraak, 1991,a, p. 29).

The subordinate primary market includes the jobs of the traditional, unionised industrial working class (e.g. auto workers, steel workers, truckers, harbour and railway workers). In contrast to secondary workers, they benefit from the advantages won through unionised struggle and they enjoy better pay and working conditions. During an economic boom there is long-term employment security and pay rises in this market. During recession, however, these workers are affected by large-scale layoffs. The form of control associated with the subordinate market is 'technical control' which is less authoritarian than simple control, and is established 'via the rhythmic pacing of the mechanised conveyor belt'. Historically in South Africa workers in this segment of the labour market have not required levels of general education above the minimum laid down by employers. They have, however, required specific 'on-the-job' training. Skills training and promotion possibilities are based on seniority within the enterprise.

Labour markets in South Africa have displayed many of the features described above. In the South African context, however, the state has played an important interventionist role in creating racially segmented labour markets. Influx controls, labour bureaus and job reservation policies are examples here.

In the period following 1948 the large secondary labour market was dominated by African migrant workers, and the subordinate primary market by an intermediate strata of white, 'coloured' and Indian semi-skilled workers. Of importance also was a small but growing number of semi-skilled Africans in this segment of the labour market. According to Lewis (1984) by '1948 some two-thirds of semi-skilled jobs were filled by blacks, half of these by Africans' (p.123). It was generally the residents of African townships that provided this kind of labour. The independent primary market has been occupied almost exclusively by whites.

Labour markets in South Africa have also been subject to segmentation along gender lines (Cock, 1990; Unterhalter, 1991; Kraak, 1991,a). In the period following 1948, access to higher level professional occupations such as medicine, law and engineering was
extremely limited for all women in South Africa. Considerable numbers of women of all racial classifications were employed in the low paid professional occupations such as teaching and nursing. Until the 1970's white women accounted for virtually all women in the subordinate primary market, usually as either secretaries, administrators or shop assistants. The vast majority of African women (about 80%) were employed in the secondary labour market. In general, as mentioned above, women have predominated in occupations associated with stereotypical gender roles, and low pay. Where women have performed the same work as men, they have invariably been paid less than men.

During the economic boom of the 1960's the tendency towards the monopolisation of industry (which dated from the 1940's) was intensified and consolidated. Of particular importance was the concentration of capital associated with the taking over, and acquisition of shares in, smaller companies in the non-mining sector (including agriculture) by the large mining companies like Anglo American (RESA, 1988,a). The consequent investment in technology that occurred and the expansion of employment gave rise to calls for an increasingly differentiated black work force. In this context the African, urban, male working class continued to furnish monopoly industries' growing needs for semi-skilled labour. Racial hierarchy within and between segments was maintained, however, by the device of 'floating the colour bar' (Hyslop, 1986; Gelb, 1991). The monopolisation of industry which was further consolidated during the recession of the early 1970's also led to growing demands for black administrative, clerical and technical personnel. Much of the increase in the labour force during this latter period of monopolisation was accounted for by women. It has been suggested that the inability of racial Fordism's mode of regulation to reproduce sufficient labour power to meet changes in the accumulation process during this time was one cause of economic crisis in the early 1970's (Hyslop, 1986). As shall be seen below, this inability had ramifications for the direction of educational policy.

Schooling and the Old Correspondence

It was argued in chapter two that given the multiplicity of relationships between different forms and levels of education on the one hand, and different aspects of accumulation on the other, the unity of education in terms of any particular mode of regulation can only be partial. Any usage of the term 'correspondence' to describe a kind of relationship between education and the economy must, therefore, reflect that complexity.
Education systems like accumulation strategies are themselves the outcome of complex struggles between classes and other groups, so any 'correspondence' that might occur can only be understood in terms of generalised outcomes of such struggles within each relatively autonomous sphere.

It will be argued below that the nature of the correspondence, or kind of relationship between education and the economy has changed fairly dramatically in recent years, i.e. that education has been repositioned and restructured in relation to racial Fordism's mode of regulation. In other words it will be suggested that the nature of education's relative autonomy has been transformed. The seeds of this transformation lie in the breakdown of the form of correspondence prevalent in the period after 1948. It will be recalled from chapter two that this 'old' form of correspondence may be contrasted to a 'new' form, which has begun to manifest itself as an emerging trend since 1976.

It will be further recalled from chapter two that both the old and new forms of correspondence have not been of a piece. Within each broad form of correspondence, different areas of schooling have had different kinds of correspondences with the accumulation process, some positive and some negative. In some respects, the 'old' correspondence associated with the introduction of apartheid education policies during the 1950s, bears similarities to Fritzell's (1987) description of the education/economy relationship in many western European countries during the same period, in which the way schooling was organised was tied relatively harmoniously with accumulation and legitimation. In other words, the way schooling was structured (the forms and processes of education), and the way in which it functioned (the outcomes of education in terms of social and technical reproduction) met the needs of the labour market and legitimated the hegemonic projects of the ruling elites. Positive correspondence entailed a competitive, formal and hierarchical process of schooling in which knowledge and social roles (including those of class, gender and 'race') were fixed. In this positive correspondence teaching was standardised and directed towards formal examinations. This provided the framework for what Offe (1976) has termed the 'achievement principle'.

Fritzell's description of positive correspondence in western European countries clearly bears similarities to the form of schooling introduced under apartheid. It will be argued below that the structure and function of schooling under apartheid also met the needs of the labour market, at least initially. Further, the achievement principle did serve
as an effective legitimatory device for whites and to a lesser extent 'coloureds' and Indians. Moving somewhat beyond Fritzell's analysis, however, the old correspondence can also be understood as having implied a 'negative' relationship between some areas of schooling and the economy. The term 'negative correspondence' will be used in this study to describe those areas of education that have been dysfunctional for accumulation and legitimation. In particular, it will be argued that schooling for Africans became increasingly dysfunctional for accumulation during the 1960s and 1970s. Further, the achievement principle had only a limited impact as far as legitimating separate development was concerned in many black, and especially African communities. Indeed, one theme that will be taken up in chapter five is the extent to which some black-led initiatives such as the ANC's cultural clubs and, especially, the Black Consciousness Movement began to challenge capitalist social relations as part of a wider critique of colonialism.

In the discussion of the fate of the old correspondence given below, therefore, a distinction will be made between schooling for different 'racial groups', and the extent to which schooling for each group corresponded positively or negatively to racial Fordism's mode of regulation. Further, the account of the old correspondence will concentrate on the urban areas of 'white' South Africa, as it is these areas that have been at the hub of economic and political change. Given, however, that the majority of African students are in fact located either in rural 'white' South Africa or in the bantustans, some mention will also be made of these areas.

White education has always demonstrated a strong positive correspondence to the labour market in that the bureaucratic mode of control that gave rise to the independent primary market relies for its very functioning on the legitimatory aspects of the achievement principle. The achievement principle also acted to a lesser extent as a 'rational' basis for the assignment of 'coloureds' and Indians to their places in the labour market, predominantly in the subordinate primary, but also sometimes to the independent primary market. Racial segmentation of labour markets and systematic discrimination against 'coloureds' and Indians in many spheres of life, however, has tended to work against whatever 'legitimacy' may have been gained via education. This fact has been evidenced during the 1980's by the participation of 'coloureds' and Indians in educational and other anti-apartheid struggles.

In terms of reproducing the skills required by industry from the 1940's to the
1960's, the education system was once again fairly successful as far as 'coloureds' and Indians were concerned. Educational prerequisites for the subordinate primary market included four years basic schooling which provided basic literacy, numeracy, a good understanding of the language of the employer (usually Afrikaans or English) and the inculcation of 'work discipline' (Hyslop, 1986). The gradual introduction of compulsory education for 'coloureds' and Indians may be understood in the context of increasing demand for them within the independent primary market as monopolisation of industry proceeded through the 1960's and 1970's. In this regard, it is instructive to note that the percentage of 'coloured' students who reached standard ten (the educational prerequisite for entry into the independent primary market) increased from 5.9% of the 1967-1976 intake, to 10.5% of the 1969-1978 intake. In the case of Indians, the figures for the same years rose from 21.5% to 34.4%, and by a further 14.1% for the 1970-1979 intake, a quite remarkable leap (Pillay, 1990).

It was in bantu education that the biggest contradictions occurred, and in which the seeds of a breakdown of the old correspondence were sown. Put quite simply, the achievement principle had limited legitimacy for Africans in 'white' South Africa, given both the racial segmentation of labour markets, and the chronic under-resourcing of bantu education. As stated earlier, the bantu education system was tightly interwoven with the bantustan system which was itself geared towards the supply of cheap labour and the intended amelioration of African aspirations. It will be recalled from chapter one that the introduction of bantu education was resisted not only by the missionaries and liberals, but by a powerful African nationalism that had yet to be crushed. It would, however, be quite inaccurate to suggest that the achievement principle cut no ice at all amongst Africans. One of the reasons for the breakdown of the ANC-led African Education Movement during the 1950's was the inability of the movement to provide certification on a par with state schools (see chapter five). Further, the rapid increase in student enrolments amongst Africans following the introduction of bantu education can partly be explained in terms of the aspirations of Africans themselves (RESA, 1988,a). Moreover, the introduction of bantustan structures meant openings for some Africans particularly within the civil service. (RESA, 1988,a).

As far as technical reproduction is concerned (i.e. the reproduction of specific skills), Hyslop (1986) has argued that during the 1950's and 1960's, bantu education was
fairly successful in terms of meeting at least the short-term requirements of the labour market. It is Hyslop's argument that bantu education in fact reproduced a variety of low-level skills both for rural agriculture and urban industry. This included a growing emphasis on the four years basic education required for semi-skilled labour. Herein, however, lies the rub.

It was suggested above that the fundamental contradiction in racial Fordism's mode of regulation was between the needs of a changing capitalist economy on the one hand, and the hegemonic project of racial domination on the other. It was also suggested that this basic contradiction was writ small in the education system where it has been manifested as a contradiction between the role of the school in ensuring, simultaneously, both the process (accumulation) and the context (legitimation) for racial Fordism. Whereas during the 1950's there was little conflict of interest between apartheid's economic and ideological goals, by the 1960's, the contradiction was becoming very clear. The important aspects of the development of this contradiction will now be set out for the period under review.

The policies of the NP during the 1950's and 1960's can largely be seen as a response to the urban crisis of the 1940's and 1950's (Molteno, 1984; Chisholm and Cross, 1991; Hyslop, 1986). Grand apartheid was the Nationalist's answer to urban poverty, crime, and growing political militancy. It also served the interests of the white working class who feared competition within labour markets, and of white farmers for whom the bantustan system provided a cheap source of accessible labour power (RESA, 1988,a). Although much of the legislative apparatus for the realisation of grand apartheid was put in place during the 1950's, the Nationalists realised that they could not simply 'wish away' the existing black urban working class. Prior to the banning of the ANC, PAC, SACP and others in the early 1960's, the

period up to 1962 can....be seen as one in which the Nationalists followed a relatively pragmatic attitude towards the urban proletariat, seeking to 'stabilise' it by, on the one hand changing its conditions of social reproduction [exemplified by expansion of urban housing and education programmes], and on the other, crushing its political organisations. There was little indication of outright subordination of the labour needs of urban industry to the NP's long term ideological goals. (Hyslop, 1986, p. 7).

What is being argued is that the whole thrust of urban policy reflected a conscious recognition of urban industry's needs by the NP.

Mass housing schemes were implemented in many areas, and housing policy played
a key role in reorganising the reproduction of labour by differentially allocating migrants to hostels and providing different types of housing for different strata of labour. Urban labour policy also gelled with industry's needs at the time. Flexibility in job reservation policies accorded with industry's desire for semi-skilled African labour, and newly created labour bureaus provided industry with a mechanism for the selection of workers. Section ten of the Urban Areas Act created a 'pecking order' in terms of access to urban employment by creating a degree of job security for urban residents on the one hand, and, on the other hand, creating conditions in which migrant labour could be cheaply supplied for industry's secondary labour market. The Act did this by making permanent urban residence conditional on ten years employment with one employer, or on fifteen years employment with more than one. Migrants were thus ready to accept very poor pay and conditions.

Although there were long term differences of interest between government and employers around the issue of whether Africans would ultimately provide artisans, skilled and clerical labour, this issue did not come to a head until the 1960's. In fact bantu education fitted in well with other aspects of regulation in urban areas.

By bringing the bulk of urban African youth into a few years basic schooling, Bantu education provided a mechanism of social control which could be used to fight the rising tide of crime and political militancy, and at the same time generate a semi-skilled work force. (Hyslop, 1986, p. 10).

In this regard centralisation of control over bantu education helped in effecting a positive correspondence because it facilitated the gearing of education towards the economic imperatives of industry.

The introduction of intelligence tests by the National Bureau of Education in the 1950's (Malherbe, 1977), also assisted employers by providing 'objective' criteria for job allocation. Likewise the fact that the costs of education, like housing, were borne by Africans themselves meant a reduced tax burden for employers. The subsequent underfunding of education was, however, to prove to be a major weakness in the system. The state's policy of financing all future expansion of bantu education from African tax revenues, and the pegging of the state's contribution to R13 million between 1955 and 1972 has been interpreted as a concession by Dr Verwoerd to the extreme right wing of the NP (Hyslop, 1986), although it was clearly in line with CNE principles (see chapter one).
Although in the 1950's underfunding did not directly effect the accumulation process, in the context of the changing labour markets of the 1960's and 1970's, underfunding did become a major concern of employers and liberal politicians.

Education policy post-1948 also articulated well with the interests of farmers. Whilst it is important to recognise a plurality of interests amongst farmers given the variety of production techniques and of social relations on farms (Graaf, 1991), the following general points may be made. Although social relations on farms had taken on capitalist forms in that white farmers owned the means of production and bought black labour power, they also had (and continue to have) 'quasi-feudal' aspects.

The extent of the relationship [between farmers and labourers] is expressed in the servant's dependence or need for such diverse benefits as access to farm schooling for his [sic] children, provision of food, access to land for private cultivation or grazing, and their continued presence on the farm once they are old. Simultaneously, the farmer may have extra-contractual expectations of his servant such as ensuring that the employee's family members make themselves available for work, expectations which he may enforce by virtue of his power to dismiss. Despite the contractual form, the employer can demand and obtain servile demeanour and due deference. (Haysom and Thompson quoted in Christie and Gaganakis, 1989, p. 80).

Devoid of even the meagre protection that was afforded to the urban proletariat, farm workers have been 'generally poorly paid, poorly treated, [expected to] work long hours without rights to holidays, overtime, safe conditions, medical treatment, and in some cases without access to schooling or proper food' (Farm Labour Project quoted in Christie and Gaganakis, 1989, p. 79). The conditions for women labourers have been even worse as they have received lower pay, and mobility has been more difficult. They have often been employed as domestic workers and have been used as casual or seasonal labour, once again at lower rates of pay. Child labour has not been uncommon on farms.

Farm labourers and their families have been tied to farms by a series of regulatory mechanisms that have come about largely as a result of the influence of farmers within the NP. The Land Act of 1913 had already deprived Africans of the possibility of owning land outside of the reserves. The introduction of influx controls, pass laws and labour bureaus had the further effect of making migration to urban areas extremely difficult.

It is in the above context that farm schools must be viewed, and in which education as an aspect of rural apartheid's mode of regulation can be appreciated. There has been no
legal obligation for farmers to provide an education for children of their labourers. Where
a farmer wished to establish a school, he or she (invariably he) had to provide 50% of the
capital outlay with the DBE providing the other 50%. Given the unskilled nature of most
farm labour, the existence of farm schools cannot be attributed to the functional imperatives
of skill provision. Rather, so it is argued,

the partnership of farmers and state enshrines the position of the farmer as benefactor, with
the good of the community at heart, and this illustrates the quasi-feudal form of the relation
between farmers and labourers in the area of educational provision. (emphasis added,
Christie and Gaganakis, 1989, p. 84).

According to Graaf (1991, p. 225), farmers have provided education either out of a sense
of 'Christian and humanistic morality' or out of 'an appreciation of the organisational and
economic rationale of improved labour relations'. Some farmers provide no secondary
schooling at all, and only an estimated 31% of farm children attend farm schools (Farm
Labour Project cited in Christie and Gaganakis, 1989, p. 87). Further, the vast majority
of pupils have been located in the lower reaches of the primary school.

On the part of Africans, attendance at farm schools can be explained by the
occasional provision of food, and by the aspirations of parents, who, despite the limited
possibilities for migration and mobility have aspired for alternative futures for their
children, often in the 'uniformed' professions of nursing and policing (Graaf, 1991).

Besides playing a role in the reproduction of paternalistic social relations on the
farms, farm schools have, so it is argued, also acted at a legitimatory level in relation to
grand apartheid as the regime has been able to present farm schools as examples of
educational facilities in rural areas. In the words of Dr Verwoerd at the time of the passing
of the Bantu Education Act,

The establishment of farm schools has in the past been somewhat neglected, resulting in
the sending of children to town schools and moving of parents into the towns. If
'fundamental' education can also be obtained on the farms the trek from the farms will be

Following the defeat of the African nationalist and working class movements, and
in the context of an economic boom in the 1960s, apartheid ideologues were presented with
a much more congenial atmosphere in which to implement apartheid policies. Steps were
taken to grant 'homelands' self-governing status, influx controls and pass laws were
tightened up, and industry was encouraged to decentralise to the bantustans through a series
of legislative measures. In the short term these policies were reconcilable with the needs of urban industry as there was, as yet, no wholesale attempt to uproot the existing African urban working class. Changes in the labour market during the 1960's, however, meant that a secondary education for Africans was becoming increasingly important to industry as demands for clerical, administrative and skilled Africans increased.

In the bantustans, industry's demands were largely met by a big increase in the money made available for education by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development which started subsidising education in the bantustans in 1960. By 1972 the Department was providing 80% of total expenditure (Malherbe, 1977). The increase in funds meant that by 1975, 62.6% of all primary school enrolments, and 69.6% of secondary school enrolments were in the bantustans (RESA, 1988,a). The emphasis shown by the South African government on education in the bantustans during the 1960's and 1970's also accorded with the desire to produce a civil service, educated in the bantustans, and capable of administrating the 'nation state'.

Within the system as a whole, the slow growth in secondary school enrolments (from 2.94% of the total number of students in 1961 to 4.5% of the total in 1971) meant that the bantu education system was not geared towards industry's long-term needs. Hyslop (1986) has identified five main aspects of the more rigorous application of apartheid in the educational sphere: a) the blocking of secondary school expansion in the urban areas; b) the use of education as a form of influx control preventing families without urban rights from attending schools in the urban areas; c) the strangling of technical education in the urban areas; d) bantustan-based teacher and professional training; e) and, the exclusion of the use of funds from private business by schools. These policies fed into a general malaise within the DBE, itself caused by lack of funds (Hartshorne, 1992) such that expansion of secondary school facilities and improvements in standards were severely limited.

Hyslop goes on to hypothesise that the state's educational policies were in fact largely counter-productive as a form of influx control. Students who did manage to gain access to urban schools or technical education found themselves in a strong position in a labour market that failed to recognise rural or bantustan qualifications. This made the prospect of bantustan education for urban children even more unattractive than it had been previously.

The failure of bantu education to meet the new demands being placed on it by the
monopolisation of industry perpetuated a major conflict within white politics. By 1971, and in the context of a recession, organised business began to take up the liberal themes of the 1960's concerning the underfunding of black education and the growing skills shortage. This coincided with the developing divide between verligtes and verkramptes within the NP associated with urbanisation policy as a whole. The outcome of the increasingly bitter struggle within the NP was a greater accommodation on the part of the NP towards the reality of a permanent urban working class, although this was qualified by a continued commitment to the ideals of grand apartheid. A further outcome was a greater rapprochement between government and business on the skills issue, exemplified by certain policy shifts.

Having conceded the failure of industrial decentralisation policies, the government introduced deregulation measures in 1971 which made it easier for firms to employ cheaper black labour to do jobs traditionally performed by the white working class. This was directly in response to demands by English and Afrikaner capital. In 1972, the government finally conceded that bantu education should be government funded and no longer linked to African taxation. There was a concomitant expansion of secondary and technical education in the urban areas. Government even began to encourage financial contributions from the private sector such as the TEACH fund set up by the Johannesburg Star in 1971. Money for black education began to flood in from industry given the state's new-found commitment to educational expansion in urban areas.

The industrial unrest of 1973 once again raised business fears about the inadequacy of bantu education and led many industrialists towards the liberal view of education as a means to ameliorate worker demands (Hyslop, 1986). It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that it was precisely the complete breakdown in the legitimatory aspects of bantu education, signalled by the Soweto uprising of 1976, that sounded the death knell for positive aspects of the old correspondence remained and played a major role in the developing organic crisis of racial Fordism.

The causes for the Soweto uprising can also be attributed in part to continuing rifts between verligtes and verkramptes. The political cost of economic liberalisation was the granting of greater influence to conservative forces within the cultural sphere. The strict application of the '50:50' language policy (see chapter one) on South African schools was one outcome of this influence, a policy that led directly to the disturbances. The uprising
proved to be a turning point in the fortunes of racial Fordism as will be seen below.

**Causes and Effects of Racial Fordism's Organic Crisis**

After the boom years of the 1960's, the 1970's proved to be a watershed in South Africa's economic and political fortunes. The inextricability of the economic from the political factors in the general crisis is summed up by the Gramscian term 'organic crisis'. The aim of the current section is to chart the development of the crisis in order to provide a context for a discussion of educational reform in the next section.

According to Gelb (1991), the first phase of the crisis which lasted from mid-1974 until 1978 was characterised by recession and the emergence of stagflation internationally in the wake of the oil shock in 1973. Unlike the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia which had developed internationally competitive manufacturing sectors, the weight of the 'racial Fordist' growth model - in relation to both the nature of manufacturing, and state involvement in shaping economic activity - ruled out any dramatic growth in manufacturing exports. (Gelb, 1991, p. 24).

The economy also began to suffer during this period from the effects of rising import costs, and declining balance of payments and foreign exchange levels. The ensuing recessionary conditions and growing unemployment played a contributing role in the Soweto uprisings of 1976. The uprisings in turn exacerbated the economic crisis in the wake of massive outflows of capital from the country.

The state responded initially to the Soweto uprisings using the tried and trusted means of repression and the banning of people and organisations. In the context of deepening economic recession, however, there was further monopolisation and concentration of capital in the large mining houses, the Cape agribusiness companies, and a few large manufacturing and retail conglomerates (RESA, 1988,a). A large-scale removal of farm workers to the bantustans resulted in massive unemployment in these areas. Unskilled workers also experienced a drop in wages and overtime possibilities. This last factor, coupled with the growth of trade union organisation, led to an increase in worker militancy that was expressed in the large number of strikes that took place during 1980/81. From 1976 onwards it became clear to many within the state and the private sector that the nature of the organic crisis required a more thoroughgoing reform of apartheid.
In short, the crisis, and the attendant popular struggles of the 1980's brought to the fore the need for the dominant classes to confront the problems of both growth and a new resolution of the national question. The discourse of the dominant classes became permeated with attempted solutions to these problems. Phrases like 'new national unity', 'redistribution for political stability', 'addressing social, economic and political grievances', 'reconciliation', and 'building a new nation' abounded. (Morris, 1991, p. 42).

As Morris (1991) has pointed out, the ensuing process of state-initiated reform was basically composed of three elements which achieved their individual significance according to the particular phase of the reform process. These three elements were; a) the limited democratisation (opening up) of ideological and political life; b) the de-racialisation/re-racialisation of social and political life (see below); and, the partial and selective 'redistribution' of social resources towards the black majority. Both repression and reform were facilitated by an increasing centralisation and militarisation of state power following the accession of P.W. Botha to the state presidency.

The first reform phase was inaugurated by the setting up of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions at the end of the 1970's to look into the questions of urbanisation and labour relations with respect to Africans. The de Lange investigation into education can also be seen as an aspect of this part of the first reform phase which is often referred to in the literature as 'total strategy' (Moss, 1982; Kallaway et al, 1984). The thrust of the Wiehahn and Riekert initiatives was to create further differentiation between protected 'insiders' who would be granted residential rights in the townships, and rural 'outsiders' who would be confined to the bantustans. 'Insiders' would supply industry with semi-skilled and skilled labour, and would be allowed to increase their bargaining position via trade union structures. Rural 'outsiders' on the other hand would be excluded from urban labour markets and denied trade union rights. The urban labour force would, in time, become further differentiated as the effects of economic gains and upward occupational mobility took hold. The 'insiders' would also, so it was hoped, increase the consumer market for manufactured goods. Urban residents would 'benefit' from a limited decentralisation of social services to township councils with a minority of elected members.

These limited reforms took place against the backdrop of an equally limited redefinition of the national question heralded by the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament in 1983, and the highly circumscribed representation of 'coloureds' and Indians within state structures that this entailed. In brief, the first reform phase was characterised
by an attempt by the state to deal with South Africa's organic crisis within the logic of racial Fordism's growth path. The reforms as a whole remained premised on the belief that the bantustans could be 'sealed off' from urban areas. Such a view failed to take cognizance of the growing integration of the bantustans in the national economy exemplified by the massive system of commuter migration to metropolitan areas and the proliferation of informal settlements on the perimeters of the townships (Hindson, 1991).

The hegemonic project of tri-cameralism similarly represented a mere tinkering with the foundations of Verwoerdian apartheid. Africans remained territorially and politically excluded from any conception of the South African 'nation'. The reforms thus simply exacerbated the central contradictions of racial Fordism, and far from ensuring political stability and economic growth, had the effect of generating growing militancy and resistance on the part of blacks. The trade union reforms, for example, further encouraged the emergence of strong, politicised trade unions (a process that had begun in the early 1970s). Similarly, the opening up of political space, however limited, through the creation of the town councils and the tri-cameral parliament contributed to the growth of mass community-based organisations committed to resisting rent and other service charge increases in the townships. These organisations also focused attention through their campaigns on the continued exclusion of Africans from the political sphere. In the context of mass insurrection, the re-emergence of the ANC as a political force, and the inception of organs of 'people's power' in the townships during the mid-1980's, it became very obvious that the first reform phase had failed.

Capital for its part continued to display political incoherence. Caught as it was in its distance-dependency relationship with the state, it concentrated its own reform efforts on socio-economic intervention under the banner of 'corporate social responsibility'. By the mid-1980's, however, the more internationally-oriented sections of capital began to call for the inauguration of what amounted to a new accumulation strategy based on 'positive urbanisation'. This strategy envisaged the abolition of influx controls, the acceptance of African urbanisation, expansion of the urban reserve army of labour, and, the concomitant decrease in pressure from unionised workers for wage increases. The Urban Foundation coordinated and led a well-directed campaign against the pass laws. Despite increasing instances of business leaders meeting with the ANC in exile, however, capital was unable to articulate an alternative hegemonic project to resolve the national question and 'retreated
in its fear of the excesses of the township struggles into the comfort of the state protective security barrier' (Morris, 1991, p. 49).

It was a dualistic response on the part of the state to the insurrectionary period of 1985/6 that heralded the beginnings of the second reform phase. In brief, this reform phase was characterised by the putting into place of a new accumulation strategy, but the continued failure, on the part of the government and capital, to formulate an effective solution to the national question.

The first aspect of state action in this phase involved the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP) turning its back on the Riekert agenda and taking up the idea of 'positive urbanisation' advocated by the Urban Foundation. The government policy of 'orderly urbanisation' involved the abolition of pass laws and influx control, thereby escaping from the premises of territorial segregation which had ensnared the first reform phase. In contrast to Riekert's differentiation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', it sought instead to increase differentiation within a 'racially revised social and spatial framework' by upgrading existing townships for Africans who could afford them, and making allowances for the proliferation of informal settlements on the peripheries for the lower strata of the black working class and the unemployed.

Social boundaries were redrawn further with the ending of petty apartheid-an aspect of de-racialisation. This was accompanied, however, by a contradictory process of re-racialisation in the more sensitive spheres including health and education. Re-racialisation involved privatisation.

Privatisation allows for the incorporation of those racially excluded or discriminated against by downgrading the state-provided social welfare function for the poor sections of the 'nation' whilst simultaneously redirecting all other more affluent strata into privatised social services. In this way the incorporation of blacks into the same urbanised social sphere as whites could occur without presenting the state with requirements for massive expenditure increases in order to meet the new demands on state-provided collective consumption. (Morris, 1991, p. 52).

Privatisation in this sense was especially evident in health, but, as will be discussed below, was also evident in education. Both deregulation in urbanisation policy and privatisation in social welfare policy accorded with the advocacy of 'free market' solutions on the part of all sections of capital, and exemplified a growing affinity towards these 'solutions' by the state. As far as dealing with the political issues associated with a
resolution of the national question, however, business placed its trust in the second aspect of government reform in this phase, namely the containment of 'people's power' via a state of emergency declared in 1985.

Containment of popular uprising was coordinated by the 'securocrats' of the National Security Management System (NSMS) under Magnus Malan. Joint Management Councils (JMC's) coordinated both security and the redistribution of welfare provision in many spheres including education, targeting in particular those areas most associated with political militancy. In this way it was hoped that political tensions could be diffused without a thoroughgoing revision of the national question.

The lack of success of the NSMS in containing popular revolt, however, paved the way at the end of the 1980's for the third and final stage of reform associated with the coming to power of F.W. de Klerk, and the ascent of neo-liberal thought to the very heart of a reconstituted NP ideology. The third reform phase was not only a response to international developments associated with the end of the 'cold war' and South Africa's military defeats in Angola, but was also prompted by economic factors that included rising unemployment, the re-scheduling of foreign debt, increasing economic isolation as sanctions began to bite, and fluctuations in the price of gold. As outlined in chapter one, the stage was set for de Klerk's February 2nd speech, and the consequent release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of political organisations including the ANC, the SACP and the PAC. The government committed itself to negotiations for a new constitution based on universal franchise, whilst simultaneously sticking to the economic strategy of privatisation, deregulation and free marketeerism.

In brief, what is emerging from the NP, the Democratic Party, and large sections of capital at present is the basis for a new growth model that Gelb et al have dubbed the '50% solution' because, like Thatcherism in the UK, it is based on a 'two-nation' as opposed to a 'one-nation' strategy. In essence it involves a solution to the economic crisis that focuses on growth rather than on redistribution. Growth, so it is claimed, will be achieved through the rapid inflow of foreign investment following a political settlement, and the reduction of state intervention in the economy in order to allow the 'free market' to dictate. Redistribution will, so it is claimed, follow as a 'trickle-down' effect. Needless to say, such an approach would exacerbate the already obvious effects of growing differentiation. Blacks at the upper end of the occupational ladder, including those in
commerce, the professions, management, trade, the supervisory working class, and to a lesser extent, the better-paid strata of the semi-skilled working class, would all (differentially) benefit from such a dispensation. The rest, including the growing ranks of the unemployed and others on the periphery of the economy would be left to fend for themselves. Thus political accommodation for this latter group would not entail economic entitlement.

Education and Production Since 1976

It will be recalled that in the old form of correspondence, the structure and the function of schooling were tied to the needs of production through a specific mode of organisation centred around the achievement principle. Apartheid's deepening organic crisis, however, has resulted in a new emphasis on crisis management on the part of the state and sections of capital. In educational terms this has involved the introduction of policies that have had the effect of introducing a new kind of correspondence between education and the economy. This 'new' correspondence has been concerned with the elimination of negative tendencies within the old correspondence that had begun to pose a threat to the basic commodity form. In brief, the introduction of the new correspondence has involved new emphases on vocationalism; privatisation; the 'de-racialisation and re-racialisation' of education; a reworking of the relationship between gender and education; increasing differentiation in education; and, a process of 'marketisation'.

Before elaborating on these developments, it is important to point out that it will not be argued that the old form of correspondence has simply given way to the new form. In important ways the new correspondence provides continuity on the old form. A strict, hierarchical and academically-oriented system centred around the matric examination continues to form the basis for schooling for most children in South Africa. What will be described below as the new correspondence refers to the introduction of certain policy shifts and trends, some of them well-established, and some still in their infancy. These trends have been associated with changes in the mode of regulation and, as discussed above, with the adoption of a new growth path by the present government. This process is itself incomplete, and, given the likelihood of an ANC-led government committed to a different growth path in the near future, may never be completed. The question of the future direction of these trends in the context of a government of national unity will be
taken up at the end of the chapter. Finally, like the old form of correspondence, the new form subsumes a variety of positive and negative correspondences between different areas of schooling and the accumulation process.

a) Vocationalism.

The idea that skills training has an ideological as well as a functional role in relation to production is not a new one. Chisholm (1984), Muller (1987) and Kraak (1989) have all observed within the 'skills shortage' rhetoric of the late 1970's and early 1980's the desire on the part of capital to 'redefine' skills in terms of producing a more 'disciplined' but 'fragmented' workforce. This desire began to take on a new urgency, however, in the context of deepening organic crisis and the possibility of further restructuring within the production process itself. Growing levels of youth unemployment, and the phenomenon of the 'lost generation' (young people who missed out on schooling as a direct result of education struggles during the 1980's), has also raised the possibility that vocationalism might be used, as in Britain, for the preparation of significant numbers of young people 'for a status somewhere between work and non-work' (Pollard et al., 1988, p. 5) and as a form of social control.

Business and government redefinitions of the skills issue have also taken on a new significance in light of the increasing lead the private sector has been expected to take in providing vocational education for secondary school students, the growing influence of organised business within the policy-making process itself, and the increasing uptake of vocational themes in official policy pronouncements from de Lange to the ERS.

Kraak (1991,c) has given examples of several schemes aimed at adult workers that realise the aims of the new correspondence very clearly. These include the '6-M' course of the National Productivity Institute and the University of South Africa's Achievement Training Programme. Both courses attempt to achieve worker understanding of the nature of business. They contain the message that what is good for the business is good for the workers as well, and stress the benefits of punctuality, efficiency and hard work.

Although similar school-based programmes are rare, the Junior Achievement Programme of the Wits Business School and the Urban Foundation provides one example. Children are selected from schools around Johannesburg and Soweto and put into non-racial teams. They then engage in a training game, the aim of which is to establish a profitable
management. It is hoped that the children will subsequently develop entrepreneurial attitudes and skills. Further, both the 'basic education' proposed by de Lange and the 'general formative' education proposed by the CM make numerous references to the kinds of social skills associated with the development of the 'good worker'.

b) Privatisation.

The increasing involvement of the private sector both in policy formulation and in the provision of education is one aspect of an increasing trend towards privatisation in education. Kallaway (1989) has argued that a process of privatisation in education is underway in South Africa involving not only a greater role for the private sector, but increased state support for private schools, and moves to make education for all 'race' groups more dependent on parental support. To these examples may be added the tendering out of certain functions (such as the repair of school buildings and management training courses) to private interests.

Enslin (1991) has questioned Kallaway's assertion that a process of privatisation in education is underway, basing her argument on the limited degree to which the above factors have been implemented. This is not a view shared here. In brief, the problem with Enslin's argument is that it is based on quantitative accounts of increased state funding for education, and a view that significant say in policy has not yet been ceded to the private sector. By providing a 'snapshot' account of the current degree of private sector involvement, Enslin misses the point that privatisation, whilst certainly not an all-pervasive phenomenon, is best understood as a developing trend. It is best exemplified by the recent shifts towards model C schools (see below).

Privatisation in education has been associated with a redefinition of the relationship between the 'public' and the 'private' spheres in the provision of social welfare. Schools are being progressively moved from the orbit of the state to the realm of what Gramsci refers to as 'civil society' (Tikly, 1990; Muller, 1989). It will be argued in chapter six that this phenomenon has implications for the control of education.

c) De-racialisation and Re-racialisation.

Privatisation, as implied above, has been associated with a process of de-racialisation and re-racialisation of education. Government policy pronouncements have
increasingly been moving towards the idea that 'race' should not be used as a basis for differentiation in education. Increasing privatisation, however, has implied in education, as in health, a move towards differential treatment of students according to the ability of different communities to finance their children's education. Needless to say, this policy shift will have the effect, especially in the absence of substantial affirmative action programmes, of perpetuating the status quo for the majority of black people.

d) Gender and Education.

The new correspondence has also entailed a reworking of the relationship between gender and education. The language of 'equal opportunities' has been extended in policy pronouncements and formulations from de Lange onwards to include gender. Given the total silence on gender issues generally, however, and the high degree of sexism within the education system, such language remains tokenistic to say the least.

In South Africa, girls of all races have generally been channelled into gender-specific career paths, or have been expected to perform the same work as men for lower rates of pay (Unterhalter, 1991). As Morrell's (1992) recent work implies, this may be an aspect of labour markets impacting negatively on the aspirations of young women and girls. Future research into educational factors associated with the above phenomena might fruitfully take cognizance of the following general features of the education system (Unterhalter, 1991; Morrell, 1992): sexist curricula, teaching and assessment practices; gender differentiation in subject choice; a lack of single-sex schools, especially in black education; a school ethos that reinforces sexist attitudes and fails to combat sexual harassment of girls; broader sexist and patriarchal practices and attitudes within society and within the family impacting negatively within the school; and the under-representation of women teachers in positions of seniority and in certain subject areas. The very presence of the language of 'equal opportunities', however, may reflect a growing awareness amongst male policy makers (who constitute the vast majority) of the increasing importance of women in the workforce.

In Britain, Jones (1989) has associated the development of 'equal opportunities' rhetoric within the new vocationalism with similar increases in women's participation in the workforce. Courses such as TVEI, for example, have sometimes questioned the channelling of girls into gender-specific career paths. He goes on to argue, however, that
in the absence of an analysis of the nature and role of women's contribution to the economy and to society, and of those practices within the various institutions of capitalist society that serve to perpetuate an inequitable sexual division of labour, the language of 'equal opportunities' remains tokenistic, and geared at an ideological level towards the exclusion of critical tendencies.

Given the general silence on gender issues in South Africa within policy discourses, it is hard to move beyond conjecture and to ascertain the future direction the new correspondence might take in relation to women and girls. What is evident in documents such as de Lange are the references to the importance of the family for the nurturing and socialisation of the child. One is led to expect that the underlying view of the family implicit in official pronouncements is essentially a patriarchal one in which women are accorded the primary child-rearing function. If this is the case then it does not seem unreasonable to consider the possibility that girls are being prepared for a dual repertoire of domestic and wage labour-hardly a new experience for many South African women.

e) Differentiation

A further trend in the nature and direction of policy is the tendency towards greater differentiation within and between schools. The growth in the private school sector is one example here, as is the development of technical and vocationally-oriented high schools that have been set up either by the DET or the private sector following recommendations in the de Lange report and the 1983 White Paper. It will be argued below that proposals within the ERS to extend 'community control' of schools will have the effect of creating further differentiation within the state sector resulting from differences in the extent to which communities will be able to resource their schools. From de Lange through to the ERS, there have been growing calls for a more highly differentiated curriculum within schools and the 'canalising' of students either towards more vocationally-oriented or more academically-oriented curricula from a young age (DNE, 1991,b). Differentiation is generally legitimised in terms of making schooling more relevant to the world of work, or to the 'life world' of the learner.

As Gramsci (1971) pointed out in relation to the vocational emphasis of the Gentile reforms in Italy, the ideological intent behind the appearance of 'relevance' is to deny the children of the working class the kind of academic knowledge that would enable them to
develop a critical awareness of their future role within the workforce and within society as a whole (see also Tikly, 1990). This is not to imply that all forms of differentiation are unacceptable. It will be argued below that the ANC's recent proposals would also entail differentiation, but after ten years of basic, general education for all, and with the caveat that learning opportunities should be made available to adult workers on a life-long basis.

f) Marketisation.

The term 'marketisation' is used here to refer to the introduction of market forces into education. It is perhaps the over-arching aspect of the new correspondence. It is exemplified clearly in the proposals in the ERS concerning privatisation, and the marketing of curriculum packages and teaching aids in white education (Shalem, 1990). It is also exemplified by suggestions in the ERS concerning the future employment and remuneration of teachers. The ERS suggests a break with the fixed salary structure of the past based on qualifications and years of teaching experience. In its place the ERS suggests:

A differentiated salary structure reflecting market forces in terms of supply and demand, the possibility of educators obtaining additional income from education related activities, the subvention of salaries by communities and the possibility of a cash allocation for achievement recognition and also for qualified teachers in respect of additional qualifications achieved, in place of the present practice of a notch increment on the salary scale. (ERS, 1991, p. 71).

As with the introduction of 'payment by results' for teachers in Britain, the effect of such a differentiated salary structure would be to introduce competition not just between teachers within a particular school, but also between different schools as they vie for the best teachers. In such a competition the poorer schools would loose out as better teachers are attracted elsewhere (Ball, 1990,a). In the South African context it would be schools in black areas that would loose out if such a scheme were to be implemented, as they are generally the worst off financially.

Having described in broad terms the nature of the new correspondence, an attempt will now be made to explain its development in terms of the broader analysis of South Africa's organic crisis presented earlier. As already suggested, the development of the new correspondence is related to the changing nature of South Africa's labour markets since 1976.
Labour Markets Since 1976

Further monopolisation of industry during the recession following the advent of economic crisis in 1973 resulted in new demands for skilled labour. Unlike previous periods, however, there was a retrenchment of unskilled and semi-skilled labour resulting in high levels of unemployment, particularly in agriculture. This period also saw a dramatic increase in the employment of women, particularly as cheap labour in the agricultural and service sectors (Cock, 1989), although to a lesser extent in the primary and subordinate primary markets. Whereas in 1960, women constituted 23.1% of the workforce, by 1980 the figure had risen to 32.4%.

In relation to the supposed 'skills shortage', it is instructive that between 1977 and 1985, the peak number of vacancies was only 3.3% in high level and middle level categories (Kraak, 1989; RESA, 1988,a). This statistic has led some commentators to argue that talk of a skills shortage was partly a 'smokescreen' behind which cheaper black labour could be brought in to replace white labour in the context of the further liberalisation of labour laws and practices (Chisholm, 1984). The broader emerging ideological character of the skills debate has already been discussed above. From 1983 onwards, the familiar demand for skilled labour by business subsided as the recession bit deeper.

Despite the lifting of official regulations and policies that have instituted segmentation, labour markets remain highly segmented along 'race' and gender lines (Kraak, 1991,a). Racist and sexist employment and promotion practices, and attitudes amongst white workers (especially those in middle management and the working class) have worked against any radical restructuring. 'Black advancement' programmes instituted as part of corporate 'social responsibility' have led to only limited improvements (Swainson, 1989).

Schooling and the New Correspondence

Educational reforms will be discussed in relation to the three reform phases outlined during the discussion of South Africa's organic crisis. Educational reform during the first reform phase (1976-1985/6) was characterised by a dual repertoire of coercive measures on the part of the state, and attempts at legitimating the education system but within the confines of already existing structures. Coercive measures included the banning of student organisations such as SASO and SASM, the arrest of thousands of students and teachers
and their subsequent imprisonment and often torture (this period saw the extension of police powers such that the period for which a person could be detained without trial rose from 90 to 180 days). Protests on the part of students were broken up by police using dogs, guns and tear gas. Students continued to lose their lives. The state responded to the school boycotts of the early 1980's using similarly repressive measures (RESA, 1988,b).

In the period immediately following the Soweto uprisings, the DBE changed its name to the DET, and Africans began to be referred to as 'blacks' rather than as 'bantus'. In 1978 and 1979 key features of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 were replaced by new legislation. Education policy was no longer to be decided solely in parliament but by the Minister for Education and Training in consultation with an advisory council for education. Community schools erected by local African communities and managed by school boards and committees could be taken over by the Minister and converted into state schools as in fact happened. Continued inequalities in financial provision aside, this can be understood as a limited attempt to extend Fordist welfare practices to the black community. Local management of schools was replaced by consultation. From 1979 all teachers were employed directly by the DET which also paid their salaries. Teachers were also subject to a new code of conduct including a disciplinary code. Syllabuses taught and examinations set also came under the direct control of the Minister. These changes partly reflected the failure of school boards as hegemonic instruments of the state (Hyslop, 1987).

State expenditure on African education also increased dramatically during this period from R160.2 million in 1975 to R533.6 million in 1985 (RESA, 1988,a - figures use constant 1975 value of the Rand). The amount of money spent on African education as a proportion of total government spending also increased from 3.1% in 1975 to 5.8% in 1985 (RESA, 1988,a). Much of this money went into the continued expansion of secondary school education. Enrolments for Africans increased from 318,500 in 1975 to 1,192,900 in 1985 (RESA, 1988,a). This dramatic increase included an increase in the percentage of female students during the same period from 39.5% of all students to 54.5%. The 1979 Act also made provision for the free supply of text books to schools in response to long standing grievances.

Expansion of secondary education can be seen as a legitimatory effort not only in terms of meeting the aspirations of parents and students, but also in relation to the rest of 'total strategy', i.e.
....to create a larger skilled, professional and managerial class of Africans both inside and outside the bantustans with a stake in the apartheid system, a class which, it was believed, would be more politically compliant and which would assist in imposing political order. (RESA, 1988,a, p. 4).

As this statement implies, expansion must also be seen in terms of changes in the labour market. Increases in female enrolments can also be at least partly explained in relation to the increase in numbers of women in all sections of the labour market, although more research needs to be done in this respect (Unterhalter, 1991).

Of relevance for the emerging black middle class was the wave of integration within private schools under the auspices of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) and the Headmasters' Conference (HMC) between 1976 and 1986 (Muller, 1990). This was in open defiance of state policy which through the mechanism of subsidising private schools registered with a particular ethnic education department, had attempted to enforce segregation in the private sector. Moves towards integration can be seen as an autonomous response to educational crisis in 1976, although it did fit in rather neatly with the goals of total strategy.

In this regard it is interesting that whilst on the one hand the conservative Transvaal Education Department had threatened the defiant 'open schools' with closure, there was also a small amendment to the law in 1977 by which private schools could admit black pupils in cases of exceptional merit 'in consultation with provincial authorities and the schools concerned' (SAIRR quoted in Pampallis, 1990). This amendment to the law paralleled similar moves in the universities, as did the moves to introduce 'racial quotas' for private schools in the early 1980's. Of greater long-term significance was the tacit support for the integration of private schools given by the de Lange Report. In this period then, the idea of de-racialisation/re-racialisation within the broader framework of privatisation began to make some impact albeit outside of the state system.

The setting up of the de Lange committee to investigate all aspects of education in South Africa in 1979 can be seen as an extension of earlier reforms and as an aspect of the search by the government for meeting the needs of legitimation and accumulation via education. A more detailed account of the committee's workings and findings will be given in subsequent chapters. For now the following points are of relevance here.

The setting up of the de Lange committee can in itself be seen as a legitimatory
exercise, i.e. as a typical response by any government to a crisis. Importantly, the committee was requested by government to investigate, a) how 'equal quality' of education could be applied for all population groups, and, b) how education might be brought more in line with the 'manpower needs of the country'. When the committee reported in 1981, its response in broad terms may be summarised as follows. There was a basic 'fudging' of the issue of 'equal quality' that reflected a plurality of viewpoints within the committee itself (see chapter six), and made a plurality of readings of the recommendations possible. Thus the government was able to cast its own response (in the form of the 1983 White Paper) within the broader framework of tri-cameralism. The rather ambiguous call within the de Lange report for one education department for all population groups was interpreted by the White Paper as a department (now the DNE) to administer 'general affairs'. 'Own affairs' continued to be handled by segregated education departments. Even in the de Lange Report 'equal quality' was never meant as 'equality', but rather euphemistically as 'equality-in-the-light-of-justice'. Within tri-cameralism's regime of truth this entailed increasing the funding for black education within a basically inequitable and segregated system.

The committee's response to the 'manpower'(sic) question demonstrated the extent of the inroads of the new correspondence at least within the thinking of members of the committee. The new correspondence was implicit in the calls for 'differentiated' education, which was to entail state funding of academically-oriented education for a minority, and the private sector taking on responsibility for the funding of vocationally-oriented education for the majority at the secondary level. As mentioned earlier, differentiation also meant 'canalisation' of students from the primary phase onwards. Calls for increased support for private schools were also made. Many commentators (see Kallaway et al, 1984; Nasson, 1990,b, for example) have made the mistake, however, of treating the de Lange proposals as if they were already policy. In fact the 1983 White Paper, whilst accepting in principle the idea of a more vocationally-oriented education for the majority made the following qualifications reflecting perhaps the continued entrenchment of CNE old humanist-type values within government.

All learners are given education with the purpose of guiding them towards good citizenship, enabling them to make a productive contribution to the economic life of the country and to fit into ordered society as well-adjusted and civilised people. Education should contribute
to the moulding of people into civilised citizens and can never be one-sidedly directed at
the needs of the working world. (South African Government, 1983, p.34).

Since 1983 government departments have made very little progress in implementing
'career-oriented' educational programmes (Van Zyl, 1991). Similarly, besides a few
vocationally-oriented schools established by the DET and the private sector, differentiation
on the scale anticipated by de Lange has not yet occurred. Lack of implementation of the
de Lange and White paper proposals serves to illustrate an important aspect of policy
studies, namely, the distance between policy formulation and policy implementation.

Indeed reforms during the first reform phase can be seen more as an attempt to
shore up the old form of correspondence rather than as a radical restructuring in terms of
the new form, albeit within a slightly changed conception of the nation state. The failure
of the de Lange Report, and more especially, the 1983 White Paper to move beyond the
confines of tri-cameralism and racial Fordism's mode of regulation meant that whatever
'solution' was found to the problem of securing the conditions for accumulation via
education, these solutions would inevitably come up against the brick wall of a deepening
legitimation crisis. Early formulations of 'equal quality' then, cut little ice amongst the
oppressed majority and educational struggles intensified in the mid-1980's.

An account of the school boycotts has already been given in chapter one. The
boycotts were met by repression on the part of the state and were a major factor in the
imposition of a state of emergency in 1985. The DET closed many schools, students were
harassed, arrested and detained and their major organisation, the Congress of South African
Students (COSAS) was banned. The increasing presence of the military in schools became
the focus for opposition, and many students began adopting the political culture of the ANC
(singing freedom songs, flying ANC flags, wearing Khaki uniforms and brandishing replica
guns at protests and funerals) (Levin, 1989). Concern about the detrimental educational
effects of boycotting led many parents and community leaders to call for an end to the
boycotts. This concern resulted in the setting up of the NECC in 1985 (see chapter one)
with the aim of urging students to return to school. The hope was, as will be recalled, that
the education system might begin to be transformed from within.

The emphasis within 'people's education' on eliminating 'capitalist norms of
competition, individualism, and stunted intellectual development' and of encouraging
'collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and
analysis' was an example of the growing negative correspondence between sections of black schooling and the commodity form. The response of the government to the education crisis and to people's education was exemplified by the announcement in 1986 by F.W. de Klerk (the then Minister for National Education) of a 'ten year plan' to bring about parity within existing departments. The plan was based on an overall increase of 4.1% in educational spending per annum and would concentrate on reducing pupil/teacher ratios and improving teacher qualifications in black education (Dispatch, 17/4/86). The DET also began to make available more free text books and stationary in direct response to student demands. Low rates of economic growth and the introduction of monetarist policies during the second reform phase, however, actually resulted in a decrease in real terms in educational expenditure and the shelving of the ten year plan in 1989 (DNE, 1991,a).

Whilst the state remained entrenched in the ideological and political quagmire of 'own' and 'general' affairs, the private sector might best be described as the pioneers of negative correspondence within the first reform phase. Indeed the escalating involvement of the business community in educational affairs has already been described as being in itself an aspect of the new correspondence.

The private sector responded to the educational crisis of 1976 in two ways (Hartshorne, 1987). Firstly, it increased its provision for education in terms of pre-1976 forms i.e. by emphasising bursaries for secondary school and other students and by financing educational facilities such as buildings, furniture, equipment and books. Secondly, however, the private sector began to show more of a coordinated response to the crisis, heralded by the Sullivan Code of Conduct for firms operating in South Africa and the setting up of the Urban Foundation in 1977.

The educational content of 'social responsibility' meant, up until 1983, an emphasis on a) short-term programmes, particularly those involving mathematics, science and technical education at secondary level; b) remedial programmes aimed at assisting individual students; and c) technical skills programmes with an immediate relationship to 'manpower needs'. The Science Education Project sponsored by Mobil and based at the University of Cape Town (UCT) and the Molteno language Project based at Rhodes University represented the only significant attempts at longer-term projects during the period. Although initiatives such as the Science Education Project introduced certain 'student-centred' approaches, they remained geared towards the formal academic
curriculum. Prior to 1983, educational intervention by the private sector must, in the main, be seen in terms of the rhetoric of 'skills shortage', and, within the broader legitimatory rhetoric of 'social responsibility', aimed at economic growth through political stability. Business financing of education under 'social responsibility' was increased following the Amendment to the Income Tax Act in 1981/2 which made business donations to educational charities and trusts tax-deductible (Swainson, 1989).

Seldom did business seek any fundamental reform to the educational structure itself (Hartshorne, 1987; Swainson, 1989). Thus at the Carlton and Good Hope conferences (of 1979 and 1981 respectively) involving representatives from business and government, business pushed the 'skills shortage' message and accepted the recommendations on career education put forward by de Lange. In contrast the de Lange proposals that recommended the introduction of one education department did not receive much enthusiastic backing, a fact that must be seen against the backdrop of capital's tacit support for tri-cameralism.

As the disinvestment movement gathered ground in Europe and the USA, attention began to focus on the political as well as the social responsibilities of companies operating in South Africa.

In this kind of context doubts began to arise amongst the more perceptive and sensitive private sector interests as to the effectiveness and relevance of what they were doing in the area of educational intervention, particularly in the light of the vastly increased level of funding of programmes since 1976. (Hartshorne, 1987, p. 42).

Three reports emerged in 1983/4 which signalled a change in thinking amongst large sections of capital. These were the reports of the Sullivan signatories education task force, the 1984 Urban Foundation report, and a report by the Centre for Extra-Mural Studies of UCT on the progress of the Science Education Project. Hartshorne (1987) has summarised the major findings of the reports taken together.

In terms of the criteria for private sector involvement in education, the reports stressed that programmes should be concerned with the quality of education and should contribute to equality of opportunity; should be innovative in nature with built-in assessment procedures; should be regarded as a priority with the client 'community'; should offer an alternative approach that is relevant to the goals of social change and 'economic justice' in a post-apartheid South Africa.

In terms of strategies, the reports collectively stressed the need to work for:
cooperative action within the private sector and within the community concerned; independence of action in relation to the education department concerned (so that sponsors were not seen as 'agents of the system'); structural change via the influencing of educational policy at all levels; professional credibility for programmes. The extent to which criteria and strategies were actually implemented varied greatly (Hartshorne, 1987) once again reflecting the distance between policy intentions and outcomes.

The reports did, however, signal a new united front on the part of large sections of business around the need to institute more far-reaching change within education, and to become more pro-active in relation to influencing a government that remained frustratingly recalcitrant as far as meaningful reform was concerned. As Gavin Relly of Anglo American prepared to meet the ANC in exile, corporate interests in the field of education had already begun the search for a de-racialisation and depoliticisation of education. This quest, however, did not as yet have the makings of a coherent hegemonic project within the educational domain, reflecting capital's general lack of vision in this regard during the first reform phase. Any inroads that capital could make in terms of influencing policy also relied increasingly on the legitimation that could be achieved in the eyes of an increasingly active and organised black educational movement. The adoption by the NECC of the people's education proposals with their specifically anti-capitalist flavour gave an added sense of urgency to the private sector's involvement in education.

The strategic goal on the part of capital of becoming more pro-active in the field of educational policy was also unrealisable in the second reform phase (1986-1990). Firstly, given the increasing militarisation of the state and the paramount need for crisis management, the state was itself noticeably lacking in innovation for much of the time, relying for limited legitimation on the ten year plan and the channelling of funds to the 'trouble spots' through the JMC's. During this period capital used the mechanism of the JMC's to channel its own funds into education (Swainson, 1989). A related stumbling block for business was the lack of a suitable forum outside of the NSMS through which policy could be influenced.

In the context of an increasingly influential neo-liberal ideology within business and the state, however, various free market think tanks such as Andre Spier's SYNCOM, Leon Louw's Free Market Foundation, and the Institute for Futures Research based at the University of Stellenbosch began to formulate their own solutions to the educational crisis.
The discursive framework developed by these sources will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Of relevance here is the extent to which these documents exemplified a shift towards the new correspondence. In this respect the following points may be made about the documents taken as a whole:

a) they advocated vocationalism and the ideological view of 'skills training' outlined above, with particular emphasis on entrepreneurial skills;

b) they also advocated privatisation with a strong emphasis on 'community control' of education and the limiting of state influence in education as in other spheres. Various 'voucher schemes' were touted, and deregulation was advocated;

c) as in other spheres of social welfare provision, re-racialisation was to occur within the proposed framework;

d) taken as a whole the documents basically advocated the marketisation of education.

Besides being preoccupied with crisis management, any attempt at restructuring within education on the part of the state would have met with stiff opposition from the white right, as well as from a large conservative element within the educational bureaucracy (see chapter six). Although by the late 1980's the state's new urbanisation policy was in place ministers continued to stand steadfast on the question of desegregation of state schools. One exception was in the case of Indian schools which were allowed to desegregate in 1986 (Carrim, 1992). It was only within the sphere of private education that the state began to make cautious moves towards integration. In 1986, the Private Schools Act made it easier for 'white' private schools to integrate by allowing these schools to re-register with the 'white' department provided they had a simple majority (51%) of white pupils. In some ways this was simply admitting the inevitable for 84% of the 170 English language private schools in South Africa were already admitting black pupils by 1986 (Muller, 1990).

Of greater numerical significance as far as Africans are concerned was the proliferation of black private schools mainly in Johannesburg from 1986 onwards. Whilst in 1976 only an extremely small number of Africans attended private schools, by 1988 30,887 were doing so, and of these 24,515 were in black private schools (Muller, 1990). Indeed, this is probably a vast underestimate as the official figures only include those schools registered with the DET. Often subject to attack in the press, and labelled as 'fly-by-night schools' or 'street academies', many of them have been unable to met the
criteria for registration. What is interesting is the general failure on the part of government to act against schools that do not register. This failure must be seen not only against the backdrop of the policy of orderly urbanisation, but also against the overcrowding and poor conditions in state schools. In summary, the inroads of the new correspondence in the second reform phase largely centred around the related themes of privatisation and de-racialisation/re-racialisation.

Several factors were associated with the direction of educational policy in the third reform phase (1990-1994). Firstly, and most obviously, South Africa had entered the era of negotiations. This has led some commentators to argue that the ERS must be viewed as the states agenda for negotiations in education (Bennell et al, 1992). Given recent developments, however, it will be argued that the ERS has, in fact, served as a blueprint for subsequent developments that have accorded with the regime's new accumulation strategy and hegemonic project.

The immediate factors that brought about reform during the third reform phase were in fact largely demographic in origin, although profoundly political in their wider ramifications. Between 1986 and 1991 there was a 87% increase in the surplus of places in white schools resulting from a fall in the birth rate and changing demographic patterns in the inner city areas and some suburbs (Metcalfe, 1991). In total there were 287,387 'wasted places' in white schools, of which roughly half were in secondary schools. Threats to close white schools from the late 1980's resulted in increasing resistance from the All Schools for All People Campaign, an organisation affiliated to the NECC and related campaigns (see chapter 6). In the context of 'orderly urbanisation', the growth of so-called 'grey areas' in the inner cities and serious overcrowding in black education, Piet Clase, the Minister for white education was finally forced to move on the issue, and, in September 1990 what became known as the 'Clase models' were introduced. The models were aimed at facilitating limited integration.

For each of the three models it was stipulated that the total number of white children must be at least 51% of the whole, and for the management committee of a school to opt for any of the models it would first require 72% parental support in a poll involving at least 80% of all parents. As for the three models, model A was a full privatisation route in which the management committee would basically buy the school 'lock, stock and barrel' from the department; model B offered the possibility of a school becoming a fully funded
and desegregated state school in which the management committee could set and control admissions policies; and model C offered a semi-privatisation route by which the school would become state-aided but would be the property of the management committee which would itself have some members appointed by the state.

By the beginning of 1991, 209 (8% of the 2,537 white schools in South Africa) had adopted one of the Clase models. Interestingly in terms of what was to follow, 98% of these schools had opted for model B, the non-privatisation route. This phenomenon makes sense if the history of free compulsory education for whites is taken into account, and given the added administrative complexities involved in models A and C (Metcalfe, 1991). At the end of 1991, the government relented further on the desegregation issue by introducing the model D option which was basically the same as model B barring the need for racial quotas. By the end of 1992, 11 schools had opted for model D.

Before turning to examine the fate of model B schools, it is first instructive to consider the relationship between the new correspondence and the ERS and CM. The ERS and CM will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters. Unlike the de Lange report which met with considerable resistance within the state bureaucracy, the ERS and CM were essentially the product of one state department, namely the DNE. Its external conditions of existence have already been noted at least in relation to the proposed growth path of the government. Its internal conditions of existence included the rise of F.W. de Klerk to the state presidency and the movement of Johanne Garbers from the HSRC to the DNE. The first draft of the ERS was released in 1991 as a discussion document and the final version was only released in 1993. In the process some alterations were made to original policy positions. Although, for the purposes of exposition reference will be made to both versions, attention will focus on the policies contained in the revised document. A full account of the development of the ERS is given in chapter six.

The ERS and CM documents are both shrouded in a profound sense of economic crisis. Reference is made at the beginning of the ERS to the failure of the ten year plan due to lack of economic growth, and the states commitment to 'curtail public expenditure'. It is this sense of economic gloom that provides the framework and much of the vocabulary for the suggestions in the document. In brief, the new correspondence is implicated most strongly in the following aspects of the ERS and CM.

Vocational aims are accorded a high status in both documents. Mention has already
been made of the envisaged nature of 'general formative education'. 'Technology' and
'Lifestyle Education' intended for the primary and junior secondary schools not only stress
general skills (specific 'task-oriented' skills are left for on-the-job training) but also the
development of 'attitudes' and 'applicable norms and values' related to the world of work.
Indeed identification of potential school leavers at the end of the primary school should,
according to the CM, not only take place by means of scholastic testing, but also with
reference to the 'aptitudes, abilities and interests' of the pupils. Vocationalism is also
realised in proposals to channel students into either vocationally-oriented or
'generally-oriented' (academically-oriented) fields of study in the senior secondary phase
depending on their aptitudes and competencies. A vocationally-oriented future is anticipated
for the majority.

Privatisation is implicit in the ERS document in several ways. Firstly, the ERS
(DNE, 1992) states that the first nine years of schooling should be compulsory and 95%
funded by the state, and that the post-compulsory phase would be 50% state-funded.
Although the introduction of any amount of compulsory education for Africans marks a
break with the past, parents would still have to 'make a contribution' to the education of
their children. Although the ERS doesn't state how much financial support should be given
by parents, the outcome will be that schools will be able to set fees. Proposed School
Management Councils would also have responsibility for provision and/or financing of
services such as water and electricity, minor capital works and maintenance costs. The ERS
also suggests that besides establishing type A funds which will be made up of state
contributions, type B funds should also be established

for the purposes of managing all funds generated by the school itself. Contributions to type
B funds should qualify for some form of tax relief for donors to such funds at all levels of

Clearly the ERS leaves the door open for greater private sector funding, and, concomitantly
perhaps, greater private sector say in the running of the school. Such a reading of the ERS
would accord with the desire stated elsewhere in the document to give the private sector,
through the newly formed Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC), a say in the content
of the curriculum and education policy as a whole.

The ERS makes it clear that 'race' should no longer be used as a basis for
differentiation in education. Re-racialisation, as has been argued earlier, will take place
according to the ability of different individuals and communities to pay for their education, at least in the secondary phase. As Bennell et al (1992) point out, the introduction of school fees will discriminate against the poor in general, and consequently blacks. The rural poor in particular would suffer given the current lack of rural secondary education anyway, a concern that is not reflected in the ERS. Like the vast majority of government policy statements on education in the past, the ERS makes no direct reference to the rural areas at all. The negative impact of labour markets on the aspirations of the poor and particularly the rural poor, might mean that a secondary education for their children will be seen as a wasted investment.

An interesting feature of the re-racialisation process which is emerging following the introduction of the Clase models is that having empowered Managing Committees with the right to set admission procedures, competency in English and age of students have often been adopted as criteria for admission. These measures have discriminated against African students. Statements within the ERS to the effect that schools will be allowed to maintain the ethos (religious, linguistic and cultural) of the school would no doubt further strengthen the hand of Governing Committees (or Governing Councils in the language of the ERS) to implement discriminatory mechanisms for admission (this point will also be taken up in some detail in chapter four).

The ERS and CM make no mention of gender issues beyond the standard commitment to 'equality of opportunity'. Proposals for 'technology' as a field of study in the CM seem to suggest that subjects in which gender differentiation have been most obvious such as woodwork and home economics will be subsumed into an integrated programme. The implications here for female students are as yet unclear, however, given the sketchy nature of the proposals. There is no conscious desire expressed within the ERS to combat gender differentiation in other subjects such as science and mathematics. Regarding secondary education in general, there is a danger that the continued presence of gender segmentation in labour markets will impact negatively on female enrolments in secondary education following any introduction of fees.

It was suggested earlier that the proposals in the ERS concerning a new salary structure for teachers can be understood as an example of marketisation in education, and would prejudice less well-off schools. There is also a very real danger, implicit in the ERS's advocacy of model C-type privatisation options, that children of the better off from
all communities will increasingly be sent to 'good' schools taking with them any financial contributions their parents might otherwise have made to other schools. If state subsidies to schools are also made on a per capita basis, as suggested in the ERS, then the creation of a multi-tier system with 'sink schools' in the poorer areas would seem like an inevitable consequence of the ERS's proposals.

Finally, the extent to which the thinking behind the ERS has informed government restructuring of education during the transition is exemplified by a consideration of the fate of model B schools. In February 1992, the government announced that unless parents specifically voted against it, all status quo and model B schools would be converted to semi-privatised model C schools within six months. By May 1992, 2044 schools had become model C schools and fewer than 100 schools had opted to retain the status quo or model B status. This was partly because the announcement made it clear that funding levels for all state and state-aided schools would remain the same. Since there was a significant cut in the education budget, this would have resulted in the elimination of over 11,000 teaching posts unless schools opted for model C status and could therefore devote their entire budgetary allocation to staffing posts. (NEPI, 1992,a, p. 22).

A further consequence of the above is that model C schools have had to increase their fees by roughly 100%, i.e. from R420-R650 per year to R1,200-R1,500 in order to maintain their previous staffing levels.

Policy development was not confined in the third reform phase to the current government. As mentioned in chapter one, the NEPI reports and the ANC's Policy Framework have emerged from the Democratic Movement during the same period. Given that these documents have been developed in relation to an alternative growth path to that advocated by the government, they will be considered at the end of the chapter after a discussion of possible future developments and trends in racial Fordism.

Towards a Post-Fordist South Africa?

It has been suggested in this chapter that educational reform has articulated with changes in the accumulation strategy adopted by the Nationalist government. Negative economic growth, the introduction of monetarist policies, and a movement towards increasing privatisation of social welfare have begun to alter the ways education is financed and consumed. Further, increasing differentiation within the labour force, associated most
recently with 'orderly urbanisation', have been reflected in increasing differentiation within education. The question remains, however, as to whether these changes are in themselves aspects of a more fundamental restructuring of economic, political and social life often associated in the literature with a global shift towards 'post-Fordism' (Hall and Jacques et al, 1989) or 'flexible accumulation' (Harvey, 1989).

The development of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation internationally is associated with the global crisis of Fordism exposed by the oil shock of 1973. The crisis of Fordism has had three main aspects, namely; a lack of production flexibility resulting in a saturation in the world market for standardised commodities in the early 1970's; a rigidity in labour markets with organised craft workers resisting any variation in the skilling and allocation of labour; and commitments to social spending that proved increasingly difficult to maintain given falling levels of economic growth (Kraak, 1991,a).

Post-Fordism is associated with the technological revolution that has been taking place since the 1970's. In the economic sphere post-Fordism has entailed greater integration of world markets, and a shift within national economies away from manufacturing and towards the service sector. The introduction of computer-based technologies has introduced greater flexibility in production, and have heralded a change in emphasis 'from scale to scope, and from cost to quality' (Murray, 1989, p. 47) i.e. from mass-produced consumer goods to a plurality of high-quality products. 'Japanisation' of production methods has relied upon the participation of a skilled workforce in innovation and change. For those workers engaged in these new forms of production there has been an increase in job security and benefits. Post-Fordism has also been associated with greater differentiation within labour markets, with those workers engaged in new production methods constituting a smaller 'core', and those on the outside, a larger 'periphery'. Women have increasingly occupied low-paid, insecure and temporary positions within the periphery.

Post-Fordism has also been identified with the formation of new modes of regulation in advanced capitalist countries that has been described as a decline in the scope and effectivity of collective bargaining; a shift from private to individualised forms of welfare consumption; a decreased role of the state in securing traditional social-democratic, or inclusive national, objectives; a growing polarisation of the population along occupational, regional, ethnic and gender lines; and the consolidation of exclusionary, or two nations, forms of mass integration. (Jessop cited in Ball, 1990,a, p. 125).
There is currently much debate within the literature concerning the extent to which post-Fordism has superseded Fordism globally, and indeed, as to whether the trends attributed to post-Fordism signify more than simply a partial and epiphenomenal development within certain areas of capitalism. The extent to which South Africa may be regarded as post-Fordist is further circumscribed by the late and partial development of Fordism, itself associated with South Africa's peculiar position within the Fordist regime of accumulation. Analyses of post-Fordism have, typically, focused on developments within advanced western capitalist economies, at the expense of a fuller analysis of the implications of global shifts in production methods and markets for the Third World. It remains difficult, therefore, to develop analysis beyond conjecture. Given these qualifications, however, the following observations are of relevance.

Although it is clear that aspects of a post-Fordist mode of regulation are already rooted in current government policy, and accord with the '50% solution' outlined earlier, these have not as yet been based upon significant economic change. Although there has been greater differentiation between a 'core' and a 'periphery' workforce, the introduction of post-Fordist production methods in South Africa has been described as a 'slow drift and uncoordinated move to the new technologies' (Van Holdt cited in Kraak, 1991a, p. 75). Amongst the more significant barriers on the spread of post-Fordism in South Africa are the racial division of labour; the lack of indigenous research and development infrastructure compounded by the high cost of imported technology; the massive power of monopoly capital over technological innovation; and, the short-sightedness of capital in general. According to Kraak,

All in all, it would seem as if South African employers are choosing neo-Fordist applications of the new technologies to deskill work and intensify the production process. The taylorist and fordist foundation of South African work have not been undermined by the limited application of the new technologies and work methods. (Kraak, 1991a, p. 75).

**Economic Change and Emerging Policies From the Democratic Movement**

It is against the above account of economic change that the emerging policies from the Democratic Movement (DM) must be considered. In particular, attention will focus on some of the policy options contained in the NEPI reports, as well as the proposals put forward by the ANC's Policy Framework (PF). The above documents were, however,
developed in relation to a different growth path from that advocated by the government. In particular, the PF explicitly locates itself in terms of the ANC alliance's recent Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994). Before proceeding further, therefore, it is first of all necessary to briefly consider the economic proposals emerging from the DM.

The ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance's growth model is based on 'growth through redistribution' themes. These themes have found expression not only in the National Economic Forum (a recently-established 'negotiating' forum concerned with economic issues) but also in the RDP. Centred around the principle of 'nation-building' the RDP argues that sustainable growth can only be achieved if it is linked to a process of national development and reconstruction. This in turn would involve the freeing of human potential that was stifled by apartheid through the re-distribution of basic goods and services including electricity, water, housing, health care and education. Education and training, and basic education in particular, are accorded a high priority in terms of promoting democratic citizenship and economic growth. Discriminatory practices in employment and in social welfare would be abolished. It would also involve job creation through the introduction of public works programmes. In this model, a central role is accorded to the state providing an essential counterweight to corporate intransigence in shifting the focus of economic development. Although central planning is not envisaged, sectoral planning would be used to help shape the activities of economic agents. Such an approach would necessarily require the cooperation of business, but with the promise of enhanced conditions for growth, at least in the long-term. Such an approach would form the basis for a 'one-nation' strategy.

As far as the introduction of post-Fordist technologies, the response from the DM has been ambivalent. During the early 1990s some sections of the DM, including COSATU began to argue that the introduction of post-Fordist technologies opens up possibilities for greater democratisation of the work place, i.e. that 'Japanisation' of production methods would involve greater worker participation in innovation and decision-making (Kraak, 1991,a&b; NEPI, 1992,b). Other commentators such as Kraak (1991,a&b), however, have pointed out that this is not necessarily the case and that the form that post-Fordist production methods might take, democratic or otherwise, will depend on the future balance of forces between organised labour and capital.

Although the RDP makes a strong commitment to democratising the economic
sphere, it does not relate this explicitly to the introduction of new technologies. It does, nonetheless, welcome the possibilities for increased productivity that the new technologies might bring. This can be understood in terms of the emphasis within the document on increasing exports of manufactured goods (a reversal of the current emphasis on import-substitution policies). Finally, the RDP commits an ANC-led government to the development of resource-based industries such as mining, agriculture and fisheries. This related to South Africa's position within the world economy as an exporter of primary commodities and stands in contrast to the direction of post-Fordist change in advanced capitalist countries. Clearly then, a move to a post-Fordist growth path is not a priority for the RDP.

Similarly, many of the policies of the RDP stand in contrast to the post-Fordist mode of regulation as it has developed elsewhere. Thus, unlike the description of post-Fordism given above, the RDP argues for an interventionist state, the extension of welfare provision, and an increase in worker's rights to collective bargaining. Further, the strong emphasis on the empowerment of previously marginalised groups such as blacks, women, the rural poor etc. through redistributive strategies and job creation programmes, is more reminiscent of Keynesianism than post-Fordism.

In chapter five it will be argued that the view of economic and social development in both the RDP and the PF is in fact complex and contradictory. It will be suggested, for example, that besides the emphasis on 'collective' development of various groups, there is also a commitment to more liberal notions of development. In this latter conception, empowerment simply entails removing formal discriminatory laws and practices in order to create 'equality of opportunity' for individuals within the confines of existing institutions and social relations. Some of the emerging education policies from the DM are examples here. In this sense, then, NEPI and the PF can be understood to provide continuity on certain aspects of the existing mode of regulation. The contradictory nature of the documents in relation to the present mode of regulation can best be demonstrated through a discussion of the relationship between emerging policies from the DM and the policies associated above with the 'new' correspondence.

The PF makes a clear break with the authoritarian, hierarchical and exam-centred practices that have informed both the old and new correspondences. Thus, the PF calls for democratic participation of students and teachers in decision-making (see chapter
six) and for the development of critical thinking and analysis. Further, instead of the current matric examination around which the content of schooling has been largely organised, the PF proposes a mixed economy of assessment procedures, including continual assessment, within the framework of a new qualifications structure.

Central to the document is the plan to accredit adult education and school-based education within one qualifications structure. This structure would be controlled by a single, national qualifications authority. Vocational and academic subjects would be accorded equivalent status within such a structure and 'prior learning and experience' would be taken into account along with formal qualifications in admittance procedures to higher levels of education. The aim of the above policies would be to ensure lifelong access to educational opportunities and mobility between different areas of education e.g. adult basic and general education).

Understood as an aspect of the DM's proposed growth path, the policies concerning a new certification system can be interpreted as implying the deepening and extension of the legitimatory aspects of the achievement principle. It would seek to broaden the scope of those who have a stake in the education system beyond the minority currently catered for by the matric examination. In such a way, the system would positively correspond with the extension of basic services by the state under a new mode of regulation.

The proposals concerning the school curriculum in the PF builds on suggestions in the NEPI Curriculum and Human Resources Development reports (NEPI, 1992,c&b). The proposals can be understood as part of a broader redefinition of the academic/vocational divide in South Africa. Rather than have academic and vocational streams during the compulsory stage of schooling, the PF recommends the introduction of a national core curriculum leading to a common General Education Certificate. According to the PF such a curriculum would

provide a general education based on the integration of academic and vocational skills. The curriculum would not differentiate between academic and vocational subjects. In all subjects students would be sensitised to the world of work. The Provision of general education is premised on the understanding that it better prepares individuals to adapt to the needs of a changing and dynamic economy and society. (CEPD, 1994, p. 69).

Similarly, the curriculum in the post-compulsory senior secondary phase would involve a compulsory core of general subjects with a choice between vocational and academic options organised on a 'modular' basis. These subjects would carry equal weight in relation to a
common Further Education Certificate at the end of the senior secondary phase. Such an approach would allow for the integration of modules taken as part of adult education programmes to be integrated into the same certification process.

Many of the ideas behind the proposed curriculum and qualifications framework have come from COSATU and were given earlier expression in the ANC and COSATU's *A Framework for Lifelong Learning* (ANC/COSATU, 1993). The ANC and COSATU hope that, taken as a whole, the plans to integrate education and training on a lifelong basis will provide the necessary basis for greater innovation, flexibility and democratisation of the production process. The above proposals have drawn on international evidence that has linked technological innovation in other parts of the world not to the narrow vocationalism of de Lange and the ERS, but to a broad general education for all (CEPD, 1994; NEPI, 1992,b; Kraak, 1991,a).

The idea of providing for a lifelong process of learning is justified by the ANC and COSATU on the grounds that it will provide workers with the chance for greater mobility within and between occupations, and will also facilitate technological innovation. In these respects, there is a clear correspondence between these proposals and the changes to the mode of regulation suggested by the RDP. The idea of lifelong learning, however, can also be seen to correspond with COSATU's earlier preference for post-Fordist production methods. These methods have particularly been associated with a process of continual upgrading and adapting of worker's skills.

In this regard, the NEPI *Human Resources Development* report (1992,b) has sounded a note of caution concerning the alliances ambivalent position on post-Fordist production methods. Whilst the report acknowledges that lifelong learning will facilitate greater worker mobility and will meet the needs of an export-led manufacturing policy, it will not necessarily promote work-place democracy. For this to occur, so it is argued, changes are needed in the production process itself. In other words, without a clear commitment to a particular kind of production process, (such as a democratically-defined post-Fordism), the ANC and COSATU's proposals would not necessarily correspond with the idea of a more democratic and participative mode of regulation.

It is the emerging proposals from the DM concerning the financing of education that represent the most obvious area of contradiction in relation to other features of the RDP, and provide a degree of continuity on the current mode of regulation. In contrast to past
practices, the PF promises ten years of free and compulsory education for all, i.e. to the end of the junior secondary phase. (This also differs from the commitment in the ERS for nine years compulsory schooling, 95% funded by the state). The PF also suggests that the budget should prioritise the upgrading of black education which was neglected in the past. In these respects the ANC's proposals clearly relate to the general extension of basic services suggested by the RDP, and to the principle of redress contained in the document. Education will, however, have to compete with other areas of the budget for state funds. Indeed, like the ERS there is a recognition in the PF that the current levels of government expenditure on education (estimated at one fifth of total government spending) is high by international standards and has probably reached its ceiling.

Funds for basic education are to be made available through savings in other areas of the budget such as higher education, and from a rationalisation of the nineteen education departments involved in the administration of the old system. These savings on their own, however, are unlikely to be sufficient for the expansion of schooling envisaged by the PF. It is for this reason that the NEPI Planning, Systems and Structure report (NEPI, 1992,d) recommended the maintenance of state-aided schools (such as model C schools) albeit in qualified form. It is suggested that although these more privileged schools will be able to set fees, they will not be allowed to discriminate on the basis of 'race' or language proficiency as is currently the case. They would also have to increase their enrolments and class sizes in order to reduce per capita expenditure by the state. The funds saved from these privileged schools would then be channelled into township and rural schools.

Although these proposals would allow for the upgrading of black education, they would also mean that currently privileged schools would be able to maintain their status. In this case high school fees rather than 'race' or similar criteria would be used as a means of exclusion. The PF repeats the NEPI suggestions, although it refers to currently white schools increasing their dependence on 'other sources of finance' rather than school fees per se. It is hard to envisage, however, what form 'other sources of finance' might take besides school fees (it would be unlikely, for example, that donations of various kinds would be able to match the revenues currently raised through fees). It would appear that South Africa could be heading for a similar 'historic compromise' to that effected in Zimbabwe. Even after the transition to democracy in that country, previously white schools were effectively allowed to keep their elite character through the setting of prohibitive fees
(Dorsey, 1989). It is instructive to note that encouraging a system of state-aided schools that set fees does not exhaust the possibilities for supplementing state expenditure on education. Other forms of finance such as a system of means-related educational levies administered by a local authority, for example, might turn out to be more suitable for the equitable channelling of funds to different schools, and would render the setting of prohibitive fees unnecessary. More research is needed in this respect, however, as a matter of urgency.

NEPI and the PF remain generally non-committal on the related question of the future of private schools. On the one hand private schools are sometimes considered elitist institutions in the discourses of the DM (NEPI, 1992,d). On the other hand, non-racial private schools have in the past been the only available site for the development of non-racial curricula and teaching practices. This has given them a certain strategic importance for initiatives such as people's education (Muller, 1989; Alexander, 1990). Further, some leaders and ordinary participants in the DM also send their children to private schools. As far as the PF is concerned, whilst model A schools will be scrapped, state subsidisation of other private schools will simply be 'brought under review'. Given the influence of the private school lobby as well as the factors mentioned above, however, it is likely that private schools will be allowed to continue as normal. Finally, the PF makes allowance for private sector representation in various areas of governance and provision, a point that will be taken up in chapter six. In contrast to the ERS, however, this representation is qualified by an equally strong emphasis on the inclusion of organised labour.

The maintenance of a privileged state-aided and private sector would also have implications for the re-racialisation of schooling. As with the current situation in model C schools, a minority of middle class blacks would be able to attend state-aided schools, but the majority of blacks would continue to be excluded on financial grounds. The NEPI reports and the PF also commit a new government to challenging racist and sexist practices in schools. Affirmative action programmes would be applied to black and women teachers and administrators. Further, the PF proposes that the current gender biases in the curriculum should be tackled and that girls should be actively encouraged to pursue areas of the curriculum such as maths and science that have previously been male-dominated. Many of these issues will be taken up in later chapters and will not be dealt with here.

Of relevance to this chapter is the extent to which efforts to implement affirmative
action and to transform the racist and sexist nature of schooling will involve a complementary effort to transform other aspects of the existing mode of regulation. Unless educational interventions are linked to a more thorough-going effort in the economy, they will be hollow, and will simply serve a legitimatory function for a system that remains fundamentally inequitable. As the experience of many developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated, educational reform would not in itself be enough to bring about greater equality in employment opportunities (Graham-Brown, 1991). Further, segmented labour markets would continue to exert a negative influence on the career choices of youngsters.

The RDP offers two solutions towards changing labour markets. On the one hand it talks of ensuring an end to discriminatory practices in employment and promotion opportunities. On the other hand it talks of a more radical process empowering the 'historically oppressed, particularly the workers and women and their organisations, by encouraging broader participation in decisions about the economy in both the private and public sectors' (ANC, 1994, p. 79). From the point of view of labour market reform, both approaches are by no means mutually exclusive. If, however, policies aimed at group empowerment do not succeed in achieving their goals (for whatever reason), or are achieved only after many years, then the creation of formal 'equality of opportunity' in employment would not in itself alter fundamental inequalities in society. Labour markets would continue to reflect those inequalities and provide continuity on the existing mode of regulation.

For the most part, the policies contained in NEPI and the PF would have the effect of reducing differentiation within and between schools. The exception here would be state-aided and private schools which would continue as centres of middle class privilege. As mentioned above, the effects of the new curriculum policies would be to allow differentiation in terms of academic and vocational subject choices after the junior secondary phase, but with the caveat that learners would be able to revert to alternative choices as adults. Further, all schools, including private schools, would be obliged to teach the national curriculum.

From what has been discussed above it is unclear as to what overall effect the policies of NEPI and the PF would have on marketisation in education. Much will depend on the extent to which the private and state-aided sectors are allowed to grow. A further
aspect of marketisation in the PF concerns the production of learning materials such as textbooks. It is proposed that although learning materials will be vetted by the proposed National Institute for Curriculum Development to ensure their suitability for a new system, their production should be left to the private sector. One implication of this might be, however, that minority subjects and minority languages are not catered for because they are unprofitable. This would prove a point of contradiction with the ANC's language policies (see chapter five). The suggestion, on the other hand, that teachers ought to be employees of provincial government rather than individual schools (with the exception of private schools and possibly state-aided schools as well), will mean that they will not be subjected to 'market forces' in the way that the ERS suggests. Once again DM policies would provide some continuity on existing arrangements and trends.

The above account of emerging policies from the DM has focused on NEPI and the PF. It will be recalled, however, that the DM consists of a variety of ideological and political tendencies. Thus although the above proposals are representative of mainstream thinking within the DM, they do not reflect all opinions. The fuller account of different strands of thought within the DM will be given in chapter five where the educational ideas of different organisations and groupings will be found to be complex and contradictory. Further, chapter six will explore the very different influences of different groupings within the DM on the evolution of policy initiatives such as NEPI and the PF.

In conclusion to this chapter, however, it is worth briefly considering the relationship between the RDP and socialist ideas. This is important because for many years the ANC alliance was committed to the construction of a socialist system as an alternative to capitalism and socialist ideas have had widespread currency amongst the economically and politically disenfranchised black majority (see chapter five). Whilst some on the Left (such as some of the small Trotskyist groupings) have labelled the ANC alliances programme somewhat predictably as a 'sell-out to capitalism' the dominant position emerging from the alliance itself is simply that there is no alternative to capitalism, at least for the present. Given the complete collapse of the East European socialist systems, based on central planning, COSATU's view, and the view shared here, is that 'socialism' needs to be redefined in the context of a rapidly changing global economic and political landscape. An earlier economic policy document from COSATU written in 1991 simply defines 'socialism' as 'providing a good quality of life, democratic control of how decisions
are made, and forms of ownership that serve working class interests' (COSATU Economic Policy document quoted in Kraak, 1991,a, p. 78). There is, according to COSATU, room for significant advancements for working class interests within the 'contested terrain' of capitalist institutions. Education would be one such institution.

From the point of view of this study, COSATU's views concerning how working class interests might best be advanced in the present conjuncture are realistic given the current global and national hegemony of the capitalist system, and the international crisis of socialism. Extending the arguments made above concerning reform of labour markets, however, the deepening of democracy within the economic sphere implied by COSATU's definition of socialism will involve more than simply tinkering with discriminatory laws. Rather, it will involve a radical reading of the RDP in which reconstruction and development are linked first and foremost to the economic and political empowerment of historically oppressed groups. Further, although education can, as one aspect of a mode of regulation, play an important role in realising change, efforts to transform education must be linked to similar efforts to transform the labour market and the other institutions of racial Fordism.

Finally, it has been one aspect of the description of racial Fordism given above that working class and other struggles in South Africa have been permeated by the over-arching fight against apartheid, racism and colonialism. Educational struggles are no exception. In the next chapter, then, attention will turn to a more detailed consideration of the hegemonic project of apartheid and racial domination, and the role that concepts such as 'race', nation and culture have played in shaping educational policy.
CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATION POLICY AND CHANGING DISCOURSES ON 'RACE'

Introduction

The approach of the previous two chapters has essentially been a materialist one in the sense that the focus of the discussion was the changing relationship between education and the economy. It will be recalled from chapter two, however, that political and discursive practices also help to shape policy in a way that is irreducible simply to developments within the economy. Rather than assume the primacy of any one level of analysis (economic, political or discursive) it was suggested that it is the interaction between each level that provides the dynamic for change. The following two chapters will, therefore, seek to build on and complement the arguments of preceding chapters by focusing on the ways in which discursive practices have shaped the nature and direction of education policy.

In particular, the aim of this and the next chapter will be to consider the extent to which discourses around 'race' as well as the related concepts of 'nation' and 'culture' have organised policy discourse more generally, and have provided the vocabulary and the motives for the struggles of various groups over policy. In this chapter it is those racist discourses that have legitimated the educational privilege of white South Africans of European decent that will be analysed, whilst in the next chapter attention will turn to oppositional discourses that have sought to redefine the educational debate around the concepts of 'black consciousness' and 'non-racialism'.

The decision to choose discourses around 'race' as the object of analyses should be obvious in the South African context where 'race' has been something of an obsession for white (and consequently black) South Africans since the arrival of Europeans in 1652. By focusing on racist discourses the intention is also to contribute towards the development of an understanding of racism as an autonomous object of social analysis within the field of education, and its relationship to other discourses such as those around class and gender (although it should be pointed out that the analysis presented below cannot be seen as a substitute for research into gender and class discourses in their own right).
Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to locate the current chapter more clearly within the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, and in particular to Foucault's concept of discourse as well as his broader problematic. It is also important to consider briefly the approach of the current chapter towards an understanding of racism in South African education in relation to previous analyses of racism. The chapter will commence, therefore, with a more detailed consideration of these issues from which it will be possible to explain more clearly the way in which the chapter will proceed.

Foucault, Discourse and the Study of Racism in South African Education

Within the nationalist/conservative tradition, 'race' is perceived as a fundamental difference between peoples which has been either divinely ordained, or is the result of different 'evolutionary paths'. The trusteeship status of whites in relation to blacks, and the assumed superiority of the 'white race' is similarly taken as a given. Other aspects of difference such as cultural differences are seen as basically related and rooted in biological difference, although in the context of a global questioning of biological assumptions concerning 'race', segregation and inequality are generally legitimated in cultural terms. Given the starting points of nationalist/conservative views on 'race', the term 'racism' (where it is used to denote socially produced inequality) has very little meaning within the discourse, except perhaps in more recent times when sections of the white right have perceived themselves to be at the receiving end of it. As far as mainstream opinion within this tradition is concerned, however, there has been a significant blurring of the distinctions between this and the liberal tradition.

Generally speaking it has been the imperatives of capitalist growth and of economic integration rather than biological and theological assumptions that have most obviously structured liberal discourses around 'race' and racism. From this perspective the priority has always been to 'modernise' 'backward' cultures in accordance with the needs of a developing economy, a theme that has been taken up more recently by 

verligte Afrikaners,

neo-liberals and the South African 'New Right'. For many liberals apartheid policies concerning 'race' have been perceived as a hindrance to capitalist development. 'Racism' or 'colour prejudice' is ultimately perceived, however, as an irrational attribute of individuals that can be overcome through contact between 'races' and cultures. It is at this point that biological assumptions and cultural essentialism continue to play an important
role for liberals in defining the 'terms of engagement' around which integration should occur. Egalitarian arguments concerning 'freedom of association' are commonly used to justify integrationist policies that effectively preserve white privilege as will be argued below.

The emerging radical/neo-Marxist tradition was quick to point to the weaknesses and limitations of liberal discourses concerning 'race' and racism. Rather than counterpose the 'rationality' of the capitalist system with the 'irrationality' of apartheid, Marxists argued that the capitalist system was itself irrational and contradictory (see for example Kallaway et al, 1984). Against the idea that racism can be ultimately attributed to 'prejudiced individuals' Marxists argued that it should be understood as a structural feature of South African capitalism that should itself be understood primarily in class terms.

As some critics have recently pointed out (Jansen et al, 1991), however, the emphasis on class analysis within the radical/neo-Marxist tradition has resulted in a neglect of racism as an autonomous object of social and educational enquiry. Their own work has attempted to elucidate the ways in which educational institutions, disciplines and knowledge itself have been sites of racial oppression and of black resistance. Unfortunately this work fails to develop a theoretical account of racism, or indeed of discourse and of the nature of knowledge, reflecting instead a variety of approaches that remain implicit and difficult to engage with in a direct way.

Similarly, whilst Cross and Chisholm's (1990) work on the origins of segregated schooling in South Africa has attempted to provide a non-reductionist account of the role of racist ideology in the development of segregationist discourses and has been a useful resource for the present chapter, it also fails to clarify its theoretical understanding of racism as a social phenomenon. Their approach seems to owe more of a debt to that adopted by O'Meara (see below) than to recent developments in the literature on 'race'.

More sophisticated Marxist interpretations within the broad South African literature have attempted to afford racism a degree of 'relative autonomy'. In the case of O'Meara's (1983) study of the relationship between capitalism and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, racism was understood as a relatively autonomous ideology that served the interests of an alliance of class factions within the state and capital. In the case of Wolpe's more recent work (e.g. Wolpe, 1988,a), it is argued that the question of the causal primacy of class or racial domination can only be answered with reference to a structural analysis of the
economic and political conjuncture at any point in time. Both approaches, however, remain ultimately economistic and class reductionist. In the case of O'Meara, the Althusserian interpretation of ideology leads to the determinacy of the economic 'in the last instance'. Wolpe's work is similarly informed by the view that

from a Marxist standpoint, the indispensable starting point for an analysis of a capitalist social formation... [is]... the concept of capital accumulation and the corresponding concept of the relations between capital and labour' (Wolpe, 1988, a, p. 50).

The problem for Marxists in relation to the issue of economism and class reductionism has been summed up by Stuart Hall:

When we leave the terrain of "determinations", we desert, not just this or that stage in Marx's thought, but his whole problematic. (Hall, 1977, p. 52).

From the perspective of this study there are several problems with the Marxist approach towards a study of racism, both in South Africa and more generally. As many commentators in Britain and elsewhere have pointed out, preoccupation with class has resulted not only in the under-theorisation of racism as a social phenomenon, but has also sometimes had a disempowering effect on the autonomous struggles of black people against racism through its insistence on the primacy of class struggle (see for example CCCS, 1982; Gilroy, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Thus whilst writers such as O'Meara and Wolpe suggest a degree of autonomy for racism, there is very little effort to give theoretical content to its dynamics, meanings and effects. Further, in the South African context, many Marxists were dismissive of the Black Consciousness Movement in the 1970s and 1980s partly because its exponents focused on racial domination rather than class oppression in their politics and discourses (Jansen, 1991).

The most systematic, up to date and thorough Marxist work on racism is to be found in the work of the British sociologist Robert Miles (Miles, 1989). Although his work has also been criticised for its class reductionism (Wetherell and Potter, 1992), Miles does attempt to provide a detailed historical and theoretical account of racism. Miles defines racism as attributing:

meanings to certain phenotypical and/or genetic characteristics of human beings in such a way as to create a system of categorisation, and by attributing additional (negatively evaluated) characteristics to the people sorted into those categories. This process of signification is therefore the basis for the creation of a hierarchy of groups, and for establishing criteria by which to include and exclude groups of people in the process of
allocating resources and services. (Miles, 1989, p. 3)

The definition of racism as a process of categorisation accords with Wolpe's (1988,a) definition of 'race' as a form of social categorisation 'which employs biological terms to define social not biological groups' (Wolpe, 1988,a, p. 2). Taken together, Mile's and Wolpe's accounts demonstrate further characteristic weaknesses of the Marxist approach towards racism.

As many commentators have pointed out (Hall, 1980; Barker, 1981; Donald and Rattansi et al, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) there are dangers in attributing a universal form to the discourses and practices of racism. Firstly, the ways in which racist practices are discursively legitimated has changed over time. It is becoming increasingly uncommon for biologically essentialist arguments to be used as a basis for unequal treatment of individuals and groups. The so-called 'new racism' which has emerged in many western countries during the 1980s (Barker, 1981) is based not on ideas of innate biological superiority, but rather on the supposed incompatibility of cultural traditions. As will be argued below, South Africa is no exception in this regard. Indeed, cultural as opposed to biological accounts of difference have been evident in South Africa since the 1930s (Dubow, 1986; Cross and Chisholm, 1990). It is therefore limiting to define racism solely in relation to biological essentialism.

There is a further danger in attributing a fixed meaning to racism in that the differential experiences of different groups of people who have been on the receiving end of racism tends to get lost. It is clear for example that the experiences of black South Africans differs in important respects from the experiences of say black British groups. Further, as will be argued below, even within the period under review in the South African context, the experiences of different non-European groups under apartheid has also been different. Too much gets lost from the analysis by assuming that racism has a universal form and structure.

It is common within the Marxist tradition to counterpose the falsity of racist ideology with the 'truth' of science (hence Wolpe's insistence that 'biological' categories are not genuinely biological at all but are in fact 'social' categories). With reference to the work of population geneticists in challenging the assumptions of scientific racism in the post World War Two period, Miles argues that
'race' grounded in the idea of fixed typologies and based upon certain phenotypical features such as skin colour and skull shape does not have any scientific meaning or utility. Moreover, it was concluded that there is no causal relationship between physical or genetic characteristics and cultural characteristics. (Miles, 1989, p. 37).

It should be stated that the important work of the population geneticists is not being called into dispute here. Indeed, as a rhetorical device, the success of their endeavours has been evident from the extent to which it has become uncommon and even embarrassing, (with notable exceptions) to express racist views premised on biological arguments. From the perspective of this study, however, the Marxist counterposing of science with ideology assumes that science itself is a neutral terrain that can furnish us with 'truths' about a pre-given reality. In contrast to this view, it is argued here that science itself is a contested terrain as recent attempts to revive scientific racism show (Grant, 1991). There is no guarantee that the dominant view of science concerning the 'falsity' of 'race' might not once again change.

At a general epistemological level, both liberal and Marxist accounts share the common assumption that racist discourses reflect some pre-given reality. Put simply, for liberals this reality lies in the psychological processes of the prejudiced mind, whilst for Marxists it lies in the way the mode of production and corresponding social relations are organised. In contrast to this position, the approach taken here is to start from an understanding of the constitutive role of discourses. In other words, rather than understand how discourses reflect a pre-given reality, the focus is rather on the way reality and subjectivities are discursively constructed and given meaning. The consequences of this approach will now be briefly spelled out.

What is meant by the idea that discourse is constitutive of social reality is simply that accounts of objects have the effect of constructing objects in certain ways, and that the meanings we attach to objects are context bound. To use Laclau's (1990) example,

If I kick a spherical object in the street or if I kick a ball in a football match, the physical fact is the same, but its meaning is different. The object is a football only to the extent that it establishes a system of relations with other objects, and these relations are not given by the mere referential materiality of the objects, but are, rather, socially constructed. This systematic set of relations is what we call discourse. (Laclau, 1990, p. 100).

The view that outside of discourse, (including the discourses of the natural and social sciences) there, is no 'versionless reality' has led Wetherell and Potter (1992) to argue that
whilst some 'versions of reality may be infinitely preferable to others, and should be argued for and pushed forward whenever possible' (p. 62), anti-racist practice should be 'distinguished by its politics and values not by its epistemology' (p. 68).

Accepting the constitutive nature of discourse does not imply that there is nothing but discourse. With reference to Foucault's work, Barrett (1991) has made a useful distinction between the discursive and the extradiscursive by which she means 'a whole play of economic, political and social changes' (p. 130). It is not being suggested in the context of the present discussion of racism that the problem is simply one of accounts or words. Racism is manifested through physical violence, material disadvantage, and differential access to power and opportunities as well. It is still the case, however, that the ways in which these phenomena are given meaning is the outcome of discursive struggle and of which version of events becomes dominant.

Thus in important ways, the old commitment of attempting to locate discourses within a historical, economic and political context remains crucial. Indeed the aim of the previous chapter was precisely that - to provide a version of the material aspects of racism in education within an account of racial Fordism. As already stated, however, the emphasis in this chapter is on the ways in which differing accounts of 'race' and of the social whole have actively shaped education policy. In this respect it is worth pointing out that not all versions of reality are ideological in nature. Whilst it has been argued that there are problems associated with counterposing ideology to 'truth', it is assumed for the purposes of this study that an account may be designated as 'ideological' where it is implicated in the legitimation of oppressive power relations. Thus, for Wetherell and Potter there is no contradiction between a view of discourse as constitutive and a view of discourse as ideological - where the commitment to studying ideology is also a commitment to the critique of some positions, some of the ways in which power is exercised and some forms of argumentative practice. (p. 68).

One advantage of the approach outlined above is that it facilitates a flexible definition of racist discourse. For example, by not fixing the content of racist discourse to, say, a process of categorisation based on biological assumptions, it becomes possible to explore the ways in which such assumptions may be appropriated for an anti-racist project. In South Africa, African protests against the expropriation of land by Europeans have sometimes rested on notions such as ancestral rights, notions that rely on an essentialist
view of 'blood' and 'kinship' relationships. Similarly, there is nothing innately racist about culturally essentialist arguments. Steve Biko's (1978) assertion of the positive attributes of African cultures used culturally essentialist arguments concerning the collective (as opposed to individualistic) nature of African society to effect. Recognising the flexibility of language use, however, does not preclude the possibility of pointing out that some forms of argument, (biologically essentialist ones are an example here), are implicated in racist discourses more than anti-racist ones.

Relating discourse use to specific contexts further facilitates an exploration of the changing nature of racist discourse in different places and at different points in time, as well as its varied and contradictory effects. For the purposes of the current study and drawing on the definition outlined in Wetherell and Potter's (1992) study of racism in New Zealand, racist discourse will be defined as discourse (of whatever content) which has the effect of establishing, sustaining and reinforcing oppressive power relationships between those defined in the South African context, as blacks or non-Europeans and those defined as whites or Europeans.

As mentioned above, besides being constitutive of social reality, discourses are also understood to be constitutive of group and individual subjectivities/identities. One aim of this chapter will be to examine the ways racist discourses in education have worked partly through the construction of categories of 'self' and of 'the Other', which have been important for the legitimation of an unequal educational dispensation. In so doing attention will be drawn to the relationship between white South African definitions of the Other and those attributable to colonial discourse as well as more recent international development paradigms.

Foucault's work on subjectivity has been found wanting in the sense that he under-theorised the way individuals and groups may resist the subject positions assigned to them by discourse through a process of disidentification (MacDonnell, 1986). Indeed, one consequence of Foucault's anti-humanism has been a reluctance to theorise human agency (Barrett, 1991). Much more so than is the case with Foucault's work, the emphasis here will be on language use or the ways in which individuals and groups are not only constituted in discourse but use discourse in order to legitimate certain interests and power relationships. As Hall (1988) has pointed out this mode of analysis involves a commitment to walking forwards whilst looking backwards - to recognising simultaneously the
constitution of groups and groups as constitutive. It involves not only a concern with *deconstruction* but with *reconstruction* as well.

In order to facilitate an examination of the rhetorical use of racist language in different contexts, the term 'interpretative repertoire' will be used in addition to the concept of discourse. The term interpretative repertoire will be used to denote 'broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). It will be argued that repertoires around apartheid, 'race' and *volk* have been supplanted by new themes organised around 'culture and modernity'.

Having outlined the strengths and weaknesses of the Foucauldian concept of discourse for the present study, attention will now briefly turn to some general points concerning the relationship between the analysis presented here and Foucault's broader problematic. In relation to Foucault's methodology, the analysis presented below will be both *archaeological* and *genealogical* in nature. It will be archaeological in the sense that the analysis will be concerned with the historical emergence of discourses around 'race' and education and some of the events, discursive and otherwise, that made this emergence possible. In this respect the important role of the disciplines and in particular theology, anthropology and natural science in providing a discursive resource and precondition for the development of apartheid policy will be discussed. The aim will also be to move beyond a Foucauldian concern with the disciplinary context, however, to examine the role of non-institutional discourses such as those of political and other groupings in the elaboration of education policy. International discourses on the relationship between education and development have also been important in this regard.

The study will be genealogical in the sense that some attention will be paid to the relationship between educational discourses and certain forms of power. Foucault defined discourse as knowledge/power.

> Power produces knowledge....Power and knowledge directly imply one another.....There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of fields of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations.


Foucault related the emergence of disciplines and discourses that have as their focus the regulation and improvement of the human body (psychiatry, sexuality, medicine,
criminology, education etc.) with the development of a certain kind of 'bio-power', or power over life. Through a process of objectification, classification, hierarchisation and normalisation a whole 'politics of truth' has emerged around the human body and the population as a whole which has had the effect of rendering bodies politically docile and economically useful (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1979).

Within the educational literature a recent collection of essays has sought to apply a genealogical approach to the study of education (Ball et al, 1990). Jones' contribution, for example sought to trace the 'Genealogy of the Urban Schoolteacher' in nineteenth century England. As a study of the way in which educational discourses of the time, forms of pedagogy, teacher training and institutional arrangements meshed with the sheer austerity of the urban environment to produce quite contradictory (and unenviable) subject positions for the urban schoolteacher, Jones' analysis throws up many interesting parallels and starting points for a similar analysis of the position of teachers in black education in South Africa. Unfortunately, such an endeavour is beyond the scope of the present study. In the South African context, however, Enslin (1990) has sought to show how Fundamental Pedagogics and its sub-disciplines have worked to discursively exclude and prohibit the realm of the political from teacher education in South Africa. In relation to the present study it will be argued that the emergence of certain discourses such as those concerned with 'management' and 'efficiency' in education can be understood as a form of bio-power over educators not only in South Africa, but in the South generally.

During the course of researching the present chapter it has become increasingly obvious that by far the biggest problem associated with the use of a Foucauldian perspective in the South African context is the eurocentric nature of Foucault's work itself. As Edward Said has observed:

he [Foucault] does not seem interested in the fact that history is not a homogenous French speaking territory....He seems unaware of the extent to which the ideas of discourse and discipline are assertively European and how.....discipline was also used to administer, study and reconstruct - then subsequently to occupy, rule and exploit - almost the whole of the non-European world. (Said quoted in Barrett, 1991, p. 152)

It may be added that Foucault, along with most European scholars, also fails to acknowledge the debt that European enlightenment thought owes to black cultures and civilisations both past and present. Foucault's eurocentricism had the following implications for the development of this chapter.
The first set of problems are to do with Foucault's conception of power. Foucault contrasted the 'positive power' of the disciplines i.e. the power to shape and mould the human body and the population as a whole, with 'negative' or sovereign power, i.e. the kind of power that is possessed by specific groups and which is associated with repression, coercion, torture and the taking of life. He advised analysis of the former kind of power. Even in the French context, however, it is far from clear that physical violence and coercion have ceased to play an important role for the state and other groups in relation to both domestic and foreign affairs (one need look no further than the experience of Algerians and people of Algerian descent both in Algeria and in France).

In the South African context it is of course absurd and politically very dangerous to ignore the role of negative power in the history of educational struggles. In this sense then the focus in this chapter on the positive power of discourses is intended to complement analyses that have focused on the negative, coercive power of the state and of ruling groups. One way of making the connection between the two forms of power is to understand how the hegemony exercised by different groups is discursively constructed.

The second set of problems relates to Foucault's strong anti-humanist position. He rejected the idea of a universal 'human nature', and of the thinking, rational, 'transcendental', Cartesian subject as the source and origin of discourse, preferring instead to think of subjectivities as being discursively constructed. In the context of his studies of the human sciences, he further pointed to the ways in which western humanism has indirectly constituted itself through 'the exclusion of some others: criminals, mad people and so on' (Foucault quoted in Barrett, 1991, p. 146). As Fanon, Said, de Beauvoir and many others have pointed out, however, any study of western humanism would be totally incomplete without an account of the ways that the 'subject' of much humanist discourse - the white middle class, European male - has also been defined in relation not only to the racial or cultural 'Other' but to women as well. Foucault's work does not generally acknowledge the significance of these latter exclusions for the form and content of much of western thought.

As Barrett has pointed out, however, a rejection of the ways in which the white, male, bourgeois subject has been universalised and taken as typical should not lead us to a subsequent rejection of the category of 'the subject' altogether. Such a rejection, as already suggested, leads to a neglect of agency and resistance in the work of anti-humanists
such as Althusser and Foucault. Further, such a rejection is in itself eurocentric, as it assumes the universality of 'liberal' humanist values. In this regard Barrett has asked,

How does one apply an anti-humanist position to South African politics, where the strongest card the black majority has to play, in the politico-moral arena, is an argument based on 'human rights' and 'equality' and other equally liberal humanist ideas? (Barrett, 1991, p. 93).

There is the further danger of over-simplification in the universalisation of a critique of western humanism. Humanism is not of a piece. Reference will be made in this chapter to two general forms western humanism has taken in recent South African history, associated with Afrikaners on the one hand and English-speaking whites on the other. This categorisation is itself broad and does not exhaust the scope, depth and internal contradictions of the humanist influence. Further, an uncritical anti-humanist approach denies the possibility that a progressive humanism might be defined such that 'our common humanity is less a heritage than a goal, and...will be defined, in its "essential diversity", by all or by none' (Mulhern quoted in Barrett, 1991, p. 94). This is indeed congruent with Frantz Fanon's vision of a 'new humanism' (Young, 1992) defined by its rejection of the oppressive and stunted forms that have emerged in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts.

Before proceeding further, some general comments regarding the way the chapter will proceed will be made. In the course of researching the chapter, certain events and documents were chosen as a focus for analysis. These were selected on the basis of the importance that was attached to them either by interviewees, or in the literature more broadly. The passing of various apartheid education acts (all related to schooling) between 1953 and 1967 has been taken as signifying one event, namely the institutionalisation of apartheid policy in law. Other texts considered include the influential Education Panel reports, the de Lange report, the literature of the various neo-liberal think tanks, and the ERS.

Each text was then considered in relation to both the economic/political context, and the discursive context with which it was associated. The consideration of the discursive framework involved a look at both the disciplinary background, i.e. the ways in which educational discourses were influenced by developments within academic subjects, and the extra-disciplinary context i.e. the impact of influential, non-academic discourses concerned with 'race' and education both at home and internationally.
Each text was then analyzed using the ways in which it employed the terms 'race', 'culture' and 'nation' as a starting point. It was found that these discursive elements were often arranged in distinct ways such that they formed a definite repertoire of meanings and motives around which policy discourses were organised. For the purposes of the present study, attention was paid to the ways that different interpretative repertoires implied a particular view of development and of social change; suggested a certain relationship between education and development; and constructed subject positions from which derive further prescriptions and implications for education. The central concern here was to explore the ways that racist discourses have shaped education policy, and sought to define relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans. Finally, the analysis of interpretative repertoires was related back to the economic and political context in order to examine the rhetorical function of repertoires, i.e. the ways in which certain versions of reality were used to justify unequal power relationships and educational opportunities between whites and blacks.

The Introduction of Apartheid Education: a Study of Parliamentary Debates

The introduction of apartheid education policy was symbolised by the report of the Eiselen Commission and the passing of the various apartheid education acts during the 1950s and 1960s. The report, as well as parliamentary debates around the Bantu, Coloured, Indian and National (white) Education Acts of 1953, 1963, 1965 and 1967 respectively, provided most of the raw material for the analysis presented below. Each act sought to institutionalise Christian National Education (CNE) principles and to bring education for each 'population group' under central control (Christie, 1991).

Many of the speeches in parliament and ensuing debates were concerned with the issue of control over education. Central to the hegemonic project of the National Party (NP) at the time was the creation of an Afrikaner Republic (O'Meara, 1991), a project which came to fruition in 1961. The liberal United Party opposed centralisation with their own vision of a federalist future for South Africa, (a position that verligte Afrikaners were later to adopt), and feared that the acts would signal further erosion of regional authority. Liberal speeches in parliament about control of education articulated with the broader concerns of English-speaking whites around the issue of Afrikaner hegemony in the cultural and political spheres. Discourses about 'race', 'nation' and 'culture' constituted a focal
point around which issues of control were contested, and drew heavily on discursive resources in both the formal disciplinary domain and the domain of everyday language and literature, the media etc.

In the 1950s and 1960s 'scientific' forms of rationality formed an interpretative grid around which norms concerning the ways individuals and groups may be classified and what might constitute a 'correct' policy were defined. In the course of debating policy, it was not uncommon for the 'scientific' status of a particular report or statement (e.g. that of the Eiselen commission) to be used as a touchstone for the overall status of a particular policy. Although there were disagreements over the scientific status of texts, and the extent to which individuals were considered 'expert' in their 'scientific' pronouncements, the dominant view of education was summed up by one member when he stated that:

Education has become a science just like psychology on which the Minister is an authority.

Education is a science just like the technical sciences. (Hansard, 1953, p. 651).

Recourse to arguments concerning the 'scientific' correctness of policies and pronouncements has, of course, been used as a rhetorical device by politicians of differing political persuasions the world over. In the South African context, a shared commitment to forms of scientific rationality has provided a necessary meeting point for Afrikaner nationalists and English speaking liberals in the policy arena as will be discussed below in relation to the de Lange report. Having said this, however, it is important to point out that at the time of the introduction of the apartheid education acts, Afrikaner nationalist intellectuals had a different relationship to scientific forms of rationality compared to that of the English-speaking liberal tradition.

Although Afrikaner intellectuals did make an input into the development of eugenics and social Darwinism in South Africa (Dubow, 1991), apartheid ideologues were much more obviously influenced by theologians and anthropologists than by geneticists. Scientific racism did play a role, however, as part of the general ether out of which apartheid was conceived and legitimated. For example, many leading Afrikaner intellectuals, including Eiselen and Verwoerd himself studied in Germany in the 1930s where, largely as a result of the discursive effects of scientific racism, white supremacy was simply assumed (O'Meara, 1983; Dubow, 1991; Gordon, 1991). The use of scientific racism as a legitimation of apartheid in the elaboration of apartheid policies in the 1930s and 1940s was offset by a number of factors, however. These included a distrust of secular humanism on
the part of leading Afrikaner theologians, the equating of secular humanism with the English-speaking liberal tradition, and more latterly the growing unacceptability of biologically racist arguments within the international arena (Dubow, 1991).

For these reasons it was much more common for apartheid to be legitimated on theological grounds. As Dubow, O'Meara and others have pointed out, Kuyperian Calvinism and German National Socialism provided the inspiration for the development of a conception of the volk or 'nation' as a divinely ordained organic entity, each with its own 'genius' or soul. Afrikaner nationalist intellectuals liked to counterpose the emphasis on the collective inherent in the concept of volk to the individualism of liberal discourse. Volk was also synonymous with 'race', and constituted the fundamental basis for differences between peoples including cultural differences. The idea of 'race', 'nation' and 'culture' as 'functionally inter-dependant variables' with fluid boundaries between them (Dubow, 1991) meant that the burden of explaining difference did not have to rest on 'race' alone. Both 'race' as a basis for difference (biological essentialism') and 'culture' as a basis for difference (cultural essentialism) could be used as a discursive resource in the legitimation of apartheid, and indeed it was the latter that predominated. Although theological accounts allowed for a conception of nations as being equal (a point often made by apologists for apartheid), the strong and lingering influence of the German missionary tradition continued to project a vision of the divine mission of the white nation in Africa, and of the trusteeship status of Afrikaners.

Gordon (1991) has provided a fascinating account of the role of Afrikaner anthropology or volkekunde in the development of apartheid ideology. Under the tutelage of influential anthropologists such as Eiselen, young academics from 'poor white' backgrounds developed volkekunde at the universities of Stellenbosch and Pretoria during the 1950s and 1960s. These 'organic intellectuals' of Afrikaner nationalism sought to counterpose the liberal claims of the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) concerning racial equality with their own culturally and biologically essentialist view of difference. Although they were more influential in the legal sphere than in the educational one their ideas concerning the need for separate development certainly influenced the nature and direction of education policy (Eiselen's personal influence underlines this point).

For many Afrikaner nationalists the 'court of last appeal' as far as the legitimation of apartheid is concerned lies in the historical experience of Afrikaners themselves. Here
popular literature and the media have played an important role in building up a mythological and glorious past for the Afrikaner nation, and of their divine mission in Africa. Important elements in these narratives include the Great Trek, the triumph over the Zulu army at Blood River, and resistance to the British during the Boer Wars. Afrikaners have often portrayed themselves 'in terms of an encapsulated seventeenth-century Calvinist community struggling to fulfil a divine mission in the isolated wastes of a hostile frontier' (Dubow, 1991, p. 16). (Revisionist accounts, however, have emphasised that far from being the self perception of the boers at the time, this view of Afrikaner history was first attributed to the Scottish explorer David Livingstone, and was only later taken up by Afrikaner nationalism). Apartheid has, nevertheless, often been interpreted as an aspect of the struggle for survival of the numerically outnumbered Afrikaner.

Discourses concerned with 'race' often articulated strongly with discourses around gender and sexuality in the development of apartheid policies (Dubow, 1991; Hyslop, 1993). The idea that Africans are endowed with an uncommonly strong sex drive and are prone to promiscuity has been a consistent theme in European representations of the African Other (see for example Miles, 1989). Such representations worked with fears around miscegenation and concerns to preserve racial purity to provide powerful motives for segregation in all spheres including education. In the context of separate development, female teachers and mothers were often accorded an important nurturing role in relation to culture (e.g. Verwoerd quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 265; the Eiselen Report quoted in Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 251).

The construction of the concepts of 'race', 'nation' and 'culture' around the central metaphor of *volk* provided an interpretative repertoire that was at once contradictory and a source of strength. Put simply, the notion of white supremacy clearly contradicts the idea that nations were created 'separate but equal'. Understood as a source of strength, however, apartheid discourses were able to tap into a variety of cultural and biological arguments depending on the context and the audience.

In general terms, and in relation to the nationalist vision of development and of social change, the Afrikaner nationalist concept of *volk* leads directly to the view that the white race should maintain its purity and that each nation should develop according to its own 'spirit' and position within the divine order of things under the guidance of whites, and in particular, Afrikaners. As a vision of racial segregation, apartheid policies
articulated with different kinds of segregationist discourses in the USA, Britain and elsewhere at the time.

As far as the educational discourses of the National Party are concerned, the construction of 'race', nation and culture in relation to volk had the following implications. Firstly, essential differences between races were perceived as a potential source of conflict, and a \textit{prima facie} reason why education should be segregated. The policy of making each racial group finance its own education was justified, for example, with reference to the positive impact this policy would have in reducing resentment and racial tension (Hansard, 1963, pp. 1927-8). Clearly, such a policy also ensured the maintenance of white privilege in education. Similarly, the policy of giving non-Europeans an education different from that received by Europeans was justified on the basis that it would improve 'race relations' by removing false expectations on the part of Africans about their future role in 'European society' (Hansard, 1953, p. 3576).

Secondly, viewing culture through the lens of volk also directly implies a different kind of education for each group. Here the contradiction between the idea of trusteeship and of separate but equal nations is evident. Whilst it was maintained in the NP discourses that each group should have control over its own education, especially at community level, the nature of that control was itself defined by whites, as were decisions concerning the content of the education delivered e.g. that it should have a Christian National character. Afrikaner nationalist prescriptions concerning the education of other groups varied, however, depending on the ways that group identities were constructed and the ways in which relationships between Afrikaners and other groups were defined in discourse.

Educational prescriptions for the 'Native' were structured by a variety of concerns. These concerns were neatly summed up by one NP spokesperson on education:

the fundamental idea will be that functionally the Native must fill a role in the community
different to that of the European, and in the second place, that the Native has a different
cultural background from the white man, and in the third place that the Native must fit into
his own type of community, a different type of community to that of the European.
(Hansard, 1953, p. 3613).

It is interesting to note in relation to current usages of the term, the flexibility of the word 'community' in NP discourse, and the different images that it conjures up. The first usage of the term in the above quote conjures up a landscape that is defined and controlled by whites. In this sense, 'community' operates as a euphemism for 'white South Africa', and
it designates a space in which limited integration occurs, but very much on terms laid down by whites. The second usage of the word conjures up an altogether different image, namely of a different geographical location for each 'nation' characterised chiefly by its differences with the European community.

The economic roles envisaged for Africans in the 'European community' by the NP have been discussed in chapter three. Basically, discourses around separate development entailed that although 'Natives' would eventually achieve economic 'independence' through the reserves, they would still be required to perform certain tasks in the 'European' economy. The educational implications that arose from this, it will be recalled, were training in basic skills, the inculcation of certain attitudes, mother tongue education and proficiency in English and Afrikaans. The construction of 'culture' in NP discourse, however, made quite different demands on the education system, demands that cannot be explained simply in relation to economic considerations.

Afrikaner nationalists liked to contrast their concern with preserving the cultural essence of different nations, however, with the liberal view of 'modernisation'. According to one nationalist MP, 'the drama in the decline of Bantu culture' in the context of urbanisation resulted in

> two schools of thought, firstly the idea that Bantu culture is inferior and should be allowed to disappear gradually and secondly the conviction that although the old traditional forms of Bantu culture are no longer effective in present circumstances, they nevertheless contain the germ from which modern Bantu culture can develop, a culture which can fully satisfy the aspirations of the Bantu and meet the demands of the modern world. (Hansard, 1953, p. 4071.)

Both these schools of thought find echoes in a number of colonial experiences. The doctrine of 'fatal impact' i.e. of the inevitability of the 'extinction' of 'primitive' cultures in the face of superior western ones dates back to Victorian racial interpretations. Similarly, the Afrikaner nationalist emphasis on cultural preservation smacks of 'culture as therapy' discourses in New Zealand and elsewhere (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). In the hands of European colonists, a return to traditional cultures by the Native is presented as the 'solution' to the problems of urbanisation, the smashing of indigenous social structures, and youth alienation. It has the legitimatory effect of locating the 'problem' not in the imposition of colonial/capitalist relations, but as an aspect of the Natives' psychological malaise.
For Afrikaner nationalists, a European education inevitably led to the alienation of young Africans from their nation and culture, and importantly, from traditional forms of authority.

Natives are being taught to despise everything that is their own. They are taught to despise their parents, who are said to "live like savages"; they are taught to despise their people; they are taught to despise their chief;.....If a young Native no longer has any respect for his chief.....if he no longer has any respect for that leader, how can he have respect for the White man's police? (Hansard, 1953 p. 4060).

The cooption of traditional leadership structures as a form of social control is, of course, not unique to the hegemonic project of Afrikaner nationalism. In the rural areas, and particularly in the bantustans, 'traditional leaders' have played a prominent role in educational governance, and often resisted moves to democratise education during the youth struggles of the 1980s (Kgobe, 1993). Of central importance for the preservation of a culture was the principle of mother tongue education. The Afrikaners own experience in relation to the suppression of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction under the British played an important discursive role in the adoption of this policy by the Institute for Christian National Education during the 1930's (Christie, 1991).

Finally the trusteeship role of Afrikaners led to the definition of African culture as being in an infantile and child-like state. This implied not only a Christianising and civilising mission for the white race (hence the stress on Christian education), but also the need to prescribe to 'Natives' about what was best for them. With regard to the desire on the part of Africans to learn in English, it was stated that,

...to deprive the Bantu of the mother-tongue medium simply because in their childish simplicity and foolishness they desire it would be a great injustice to the Bantu. (Hansard, 1953, p. 4072)

Despite the claims of Afrikaner nationalists concerning the separate but equal status of nations and of cultures, there is a strong sense in which they held up European culture as an example towards which other cultures must aspire. In a particularly revealing extract concerning the merits of using Afrikaans as a medium of instruction for Africans along with their mother tongue, 'literary achievement' in general is equated with literary achievement in Afrikaans (Hansard, 1953, p. 4075).

Would the Bantu perhaps have a better chance if he were to accept Afrikaans as his medium of expression?....We shall have to see how the Bantu develop further and whether
their literary production will improve. (Hansard, 1953, p. 4075).

Afrikaner nationalist prescriptions for the education of so-called 'coloureds' was informed by slightly different concerns from those to do with Africans. In the context of racial Fordism, 'coloureds' were expected to receive an education that would equip them as artisans in 'white South Africa', albeit in 'certain selected activities' (Hansard, 1963, p. 1759). In relation to grand apartheid, and under the trusteeship of the more 'mature' white race, the 'coloured' population was expected to eventually return to the south of the country.

I wish to plead that when this national group, the Coloureds, have reached maturity, we shall use this educational policy [the Coloured Education Act] to attract the Coloured people back to the south, to their own area from which they come. (Hansard, 1963, p. 2171).

The closeness of the 'coloured' community in religious and linguistic terms to the Afrikaners was a source of ambiguity and contradiction for Afrikaner nationalists. Occasionally, this relationship allowed 'coloureds' to come in for limited praise, for example in relation to the number of literary works they had produced in Afrikaans (Hansard, 1953, pp. 4074-5). For the most part, however, cultural similarities proved to be something of an embarrassment for Afrikaners, as it interfered with their usage of culturally essentialist arguments to justify difference.

We acknowledge the Coloureds as a western group but not as part of our nation. (Hansard, 1963, p. 1762)

In order to distance themselves from their 'younger siblings' it became necessary to resort to crude biological racism. In explaining the biological origins of 'coloureds', it is notable how white complicity in the 'creation' of the 'coloureds' is underplayed.

There are five components which can be mentioned from whom they have descended. The first is the hottentots, secondly there are the Bushmen; and thirdly the slaves, then a few drops of white blood and subsequently Bantu blood. The coloured people have developed from those five component parts and they are not peculiar to those groups. It is not in the least peculiar to the White or the Native as such. (Hansard, 1963, p. 2169, my emphasis).

In the 'logic' of apartheid discourse, the 'newness' of the 'coloured' nation further implied an immaturity in cultural terms (Hansard, 1965, p. 4449), a conclusion that was not drawn in relation to Afrikaners themselves who had also been newly 'created' from Dutch, German and French 'stock'. In brief, the following educational dispensation was envisaged for the 'coloureds':

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139
We must ensure that they are taught patriotism under their syllabus. Their characters must be built; they must develop national pride and self-respect. That should be nurtured from the cradle. They must love that which is their own, and they must know and realise that they are a group peculiar to itself. They should be given Christian national education.... (Hansard, 1963, p. 2171).

The subject position ascribed to Indians in apartheid discourse at the time of the Indian Education Act started from the premise that Indians were reluctantly accepted as residents in South Africa, but not as citizens. As O'Meara (1983) and others have pointed out, anti-Indian sentiments on the part of whites was related to their position as traders, a position that threatened white traders, and from the strong anti-apartheid stance of the Indian government.

Now that we are all convinced that repatriation is impossible because India and Pakistan do not want our Indians, and because our Indians are satisfied that they are better off under Verwoerd than under Shastri, it is necessary to make room for them in South Africa as a permanent part of the population, and we are making rapid progress in this regard. (Hansard, 1967, pp. 4493-4).

Further,

Now that we have accepted the Indian community *nolens volens* as a permanent part of the population of South Africa, we must evolve a plan for the peaceful and happy co-existence of this racial group with the rest of the South African population. (Hansard, 1967, p. 4495).

This of course meant above all else segregation on the grounds of extreme cultural difference, even when compared to the 'Bantu'.

...the Indians are a group which is as far or even further removed from the white man's culture, language and so forth, as the Bantu. In other words, any arguments advanced in favour of the take-over of Bantu education will apply even more strongly in the case of Indian education, because we and the Bantu do have a common fatherland and the Bantu do stand closer to the White man in certain other respects such as religion. (Hansard, 1967, p. 5118).

The fact that the Indian community is itself characterised by a good deal of linguistic and religious diversity was a point neatly side-stepped by NP members of parliament. With reference to the policy pursued under provincial administration, of educating 'coloureds' and Indians together, one MP had this to say:

They have put the Indian with the Coloured which has not been right because that has placed the Coloured in a disadvantageous position. Because he is a nation with young
culture he cannot compete with a race with an old culture. (Hansard, 1967, p. 4449).

Indeed, the 'Indian' comes in for a certain amount of praise compared to other groups as far as culture is concerned.

The Indian has a centuries old culture behind him, whereas the Coloured race has not even been in existence for one century. I have the greatest respect for the culture of the Indian. His culture is older than the culture of that hon. member and of mine, and that Indian has to build on that culture of the past. (Hansard, 1967, p. 4447).

When describing Indian culture as 'oriental', however, (Hansard, 1967, p. 4493) there are clear reminders of the mystique that has been projected onto 'oriental' cultures in European discourses more generally (Said, 1978). In the discourses of the NP Indian culture was something old and mysterious, something to be preserved for its antique value, but something ultimately unsuitable for modern times. This is reminiscent of some Pakeha constructions of Maori culture, a construction that Wetherell and Potter have described as 'culture as heritage'. Such a construction is useful for colonists as the 'emphasis on the archaic and on the 'pure' culture of the past neatly separates culture from politics' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 129). A consideration of Indians as an 'ethnic group' becomes segregated from a consideration of their systematic exclusion and oppression as a minority in South Africa.

The contradictions evident in the Afrikaner nationalist construction of the 'Indian' become apparent in relation to the type of education they prescribed for them. Having argued for the complete segregation of Indians on cultural grounds, nationalist MPs had to deal with the point raised by the opposition that India itself had adopted a western style education. Oblivious to the huge contradictions involved, one NP member suggested

This simply proves that a Western system of education can be applied in India, which is hundreds of miles away from Europe. Why then cannot it also be applied here in our country by the Department of Indian Affairs? If the Indians in India can orientate their education along Western lines it will be far easier for us to apply our own principles, our Western principles, throughout as far as Indian education in our own country is concerned. (Hansard, 1967, p. 4521).

Similarly, having asserted the essential homogeneity of the Indian nation, it had to be conceded that it is not possible to 'make use of the mother-tongue medium of instruction because of the fact that there are too many dialects....the medium of instruction, as far as the Indians are concerned, will be one of the official languages...' (Hansard, 1967, pp.
In the case of Indians, biological essentialism rather than arguments based on culture proved most important in justifying segregated education for the Indian 'race', once again demonstrating the flexibility of racist language use. The apparent lack of will to carry through apartheid policies even in terms of their own logic may be a product of the view of Indians as temporary and unwelcome sojourners in South Africa.

In the ascribing of various subject positions to other nations, Afrikaner nationalists often found time to congratulate themselves as white Afrikaners on their achievements and cultural advancement in the face of adversity. Such self-congratulation was often implicit in prescriptions for the non-European Other, as exemplified in the following passage:

They must become productive as the White man has become productive, only through bitter experience and years of effort in helping himself, economically and educationally.

(Hansard, 1953, p. 4071).

It is clear from much that has already been said that Afrikaner nationalist discourse also defined itself in relation to and set itself against the 'liberalistically inclined' educational discourses of the parliamentary opposition, and English-speaking South Africans more generally. In the context of the National Education Policy Act of 1967, this meant separate education for English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites.

As suggested in chapter one, the ambiguity in the use of the term 'national' in this act was once again a source of contradiction and a discursive advantage for Afrikaner nationalism. It was contradictory in the sense that a distinction between the Afrikaner and English-speaking nations continued to be made on cultural grounds, whereas the use of the term in the title of the act referred to the white 'race' in general. Depending on how the term was related to other discursive elements, however, and considered as a source of strength, it could refer either to the triumph of the Afrikaner nation in as much as it enshrined and projected Christian national principles, or it could be interpreted in an inclusive way, signifying the inclusion of all whites within the white South African nation. In the context of the parliamentary debates around the act, it was the latter use that predominated and was employed to allay liberal fears concerning Afrikaner hegemony. More generally, the new usage of the term 'national' also marked the beginnings of a rupture in the broader Afrikaner nationalist project, coinciding as it did with important changes within the NP and the economy outlined in previous chapters.
In the course of studying Afrikaner nationalist discourses on education, it became increasingly clear that certain discursive moves were often made to good rhetorical effect in defence of apartheid policies. Firstly, it was very common, in the absence of black voices in parliament, to use statements from Africans, 'coloureds' and Indians to back up this or that policy being enacted on their behalf. For example, in attacking the alienating effects of liberal missionary education, one nationalist MP made use of the following quote from an African to back up his case:

The curriculum had little to do with our own history and customs. We were fed stories of English heroes and English traditions. The first biography I learned was Lord Nelson. I mocked my father's religion as "heathen" thinking this was inferior to the white man's. It will take decades, perhaps a century, to re-educate the African into holding a proper balance between his culture and that of the West. He has been terribly mis-educated. (Ojike quoted in Hansard, 1953, p. 3613).

The above quote also exemplifies another common discursive move used by Afrikaner nationalists, i.e. to use arguments against eurocentricism as a defence of segregated education. Afrikaner experiences in relation to British Anglicization policies are also employed to similar effect. Further, like all of the racist discourses that have been studied in this chapter, there is often recourse made to principles of justice and fairness in the legitimation of white supremacy: It is only 'fair' that all races should be entitled to their own education in their mother tongue; it is only 'just' that whites should not have to foot the bill for the education of non-Europeans; every nation has the 'right' to self-determination etc. This is a common feature of racist discourses in other parts of the world (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).

Finally, a very common discursive strategy used in parliamentary debates was to justify segregationist policies with reference to other countries. The USA, Switzerland, Canada, Israel and even Britain ('apartheid' between English and Scots) were commonly used as examples. The effect of such a move is to normalise the premises of apartheid policy, namely that cultural and biological difference inevitably demands segregationist policies. Such a move also separates off culturally essentialist policies from a consideration of the different economic and political histories of these countries.

By way of a brief conclusion to this section it is worth summarising the major legitimatory functions of the racist discourses described above. Firstly, the discourses around education fed into and gave shape to the entire hegemonic project of grand
apartheid and racial Fordism. They did so by articulating a vision of an educational system that, at least in the early days of apartheid, did not contradict the needs of the economy and the cause of white supremacy. Secondly, Afrikaner nationalist discourses on education served to legitimate centralised control of education, itself an aspect of Afrikaner hegemony.

Liberalism, Culture and Modernity

The aim of the last section was to try and give some content to the hegemonic project of apartheid with specific reference to 'race' and education policy. One aspect of the broader organic crisis of apartheid has been, however, the rise to hegemonic status of different racial interpretations that owe more of a dept to the English-speaking liberal tradition rather than to Afrikaner nationalism. It will be argued in this section that a new interpretative repertoire that is organised around 'culture and modernity' themes has been taken up and reinterpreted not just by liberals but by neo-liberals and verligte Afrikanerdom. This may in turn be understood in relation to the uptake by the NP of liberal themes more generally such as a belief in the 'free market' and in a federalist future. In the context of the chapter as a whole, the development of the 'culture and modernity' repertoire is important because it provides the discursive framework for the government's ERS, a point that will be taken up in the next section.

In brief, it will be argued that discourses around 'culture and modernity' have projected a vision of the 'modern' as a set of economic and social institutions and arrangements. In these discourses, the imperatives of economic growth and development provide a goal towards which all groups that constitute a nation ought to aspire and cohere. In this sense cultural pluralism is celebrated as a positive and enriching force. Within this broader vision, however, difference based on the extent to which different groups measure up to the modern ideal is re-asserted. Whereas modernity is often understood to be synonymous with European culture, this is not necessarily the case with non-European groups. African culture in particular is often constructed as being deficient in relation to the demands of the modern world. Although culturally essentialist arguments and assumptions are generally used to explain difference, biologically essentialist ones are also used. The educational policy implications of the above have been, broadly speaking, an emphasis on a closer articulation between education and the economy, and the preservation
of white educational privilege through the re-assertion of cultural difference, 'community control' of education and the introduction of new discriminatory mechanisms such as those that operate in model C schools presently.

These general themes have not remained static, however, and have changed in form and content. Thus although all of the texts studied related culture and modernity themes to an account of a perceived crisis in apartheid education, and although they all served to legitimate white privilege in education, they did so in different ways depending on the groups with which they have been associated as well as the socio-historical and discursive contexts in which they have been articulated.

As far as the socio-historical context is concerned, the Education Panel reports (1963; 1966), represented the first systematic response by white liberal intellectuals such as E.G. Malherbe as well as business people such as Michael O'Dowd of Anglo-American to apartheid education policies. Although the reports consciously focused on the growing disjuncture between education and a rapidly developing economy in the 1960s, taken together they also represented something of a liberal manifesto on 'race', education and development.

The de Lange report (HSRC, 1981) on the other hand provided its own account of culture and modernity within the context of deepening economic malaise and political crisis, and as an aspect of the government's reformist 'total strategy' (Moss, 1980; Kallaway et al, 1984). As such it brought English and Afrikaans-speaking traditions together within the same investigation, and further provided the basis for the insertion of education into the framework of the 1983 constitution based on the principles of 'general' and 'own' affairs. Unlike the other texts discussed in this section, the de Lange investigation also included a few blacks on the team. As will be argued below, this had implications for the construction of the Other in the report.

As the political and economic crisis deepened throughout the 1980s, prominent Afrikaner and English-speaking intellectuals began to articulate a new educational vision based on neo-liberal or 'free market' principles that was to influence the course of government policy. Neo-liberalism may be distinguished from traditional or 'old humanist' concerns. For neo-liberals freedom of choice, individualism, competition etc. take on a new weight in relation to traditional liberal concerns around equality of opportunity, welfare rights etc. In educational terms, the 'subject' of neo-liberal discourses is the individualistic
entrepreneur rather than the more rounded product of a traditional old humanist education.

Although many texts are available as examples of this new vision, the work of Andre Spier for SYNCOM and Elizabeth Dostal for the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch have been chosen for analyses. Both these authors have, arguably, had more influence than others - Spier was asked to submit a report for the de Lange investigation whilst the Institute for Futures Research has had close links with policy makers (Bennell and Swainson, 1990). Further, the work of these authors is more worked out than the overtly rhetorical work of others such as Davies (1990), Vorhies and Grant (1990) or Markman and Vorhies (1990).

The 1980s saw the emergence of the New Right internationally as a potent ideological and political force. Whether or not the work of Dostal, Spier et al can be described as falling within New Right discourses internationally is, however, ambiguous. Levitas (1986), following Hall and others has defined New Right discourses as consisting of two strands that she has called 'neo-liberalism' (a belief in the free market) and 'neo-conservatism' (a concern with traditional values). Although there has certainly been an uptake of free market themes by liberals and verligtes alike, these have been more obviously linked to a reformist project in the South African context rather than a restorationist one. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the term 'New Right' will be used interchangeably with the term 'neo-liberal'.

Turning to the discursive context in which culture and modernity themes were elaborated, all the texts examined made recourse to 'scientific' forms of rationality either to provide a 'rational' basis for their arguments in general, or to legitimate difference through recourse to scientific racism. The Education Panel reports make more claims concerning the 'objective' and 'scientific' status of statements than was usually the case in Afrikaner nationalist discourses of the time, reflecting the stronger influence of secular humanism within the English-speaking liberal tradition (Dubow, 1986). Further, many liberal intellectuals including the influential educationist E. G. Malherbe had been actively involved in scientific racism, in Malherbe's case in 'proving' the intellectual inferiority of the African adolescent as compared to the white adolescent (Malherbe, 1977).

Many of the liberal speeches in parliament, and many liberal publications such as those emanating from the SAIRR around the time of the introduction of apartheid policies are shot through with biologically essentialist assumptions. The following is one example,
and is drawn from an article by a liberal anthropologist writing in an SAIRR publication. It will be noted that fear of miscegenation was not confined to Afrikaner nationalists. The different human races, though they are but varieties of one human species, the species *homo sapiens*, nevertheless have been evolved through long processes of human history and it is unnecessary heedlessly to destroy their individuality until we know more of what racial inheritance involves. (Hoernle, 1948, p. 90).

In the case of the de Lange report, however, a new and shared commitment to scientific forms of rationality provided a necessary starting point and precondition for the coming together of two humanist traditions, and the uptake of culture and modernity themes by *verligte* Afrikaners. As Cloete and Muller (1991) have pointed out, one aspect of total strategy was the adoption of a new *South African Plan for the Human Sciences* (HSRC, 1980) by which reform initiatives could be given a 'scientific basis'. This signalled a new 'open' approach towards the social sciences on the part of Afrikaner intellectuals such that provision was made for

the various scientific frames of reference, cultures, ideologies, philosophies and views of the researchers in order to facilitate the necessary verification of findings. (HSRC, 1980, p. 9).

In practical terms scientific 'verification' now involved taking cognizance of methodologies from the English-speaking social sciences canon, a move finally institutionalised by the merging of the English-speaking National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) and the Afrikaner-dominated HSRC in 1985. In disciplinary terms this involved a convergence between a hermeneutical, continental tradition associated with Afrikaner social scientific research, and a positivist approach associated with the British and American traditions. In this respect the de Lange investigation, conducted under the auspices of the HSRC was important as it signified the coming together of disparate intellectual traditions as part of a wider bud to increase the legitimacy of the HSRC. This credibility had been noticeably lacking prior to 1979 (Cloete and Muller, 1991).

As it transpired, the common commitment to a 'scientific' investigation proved more rhetorical than real. The report of the main committee failed to outline the methodologies employed in the course of the investigation, and indeed it is difficult to identify any clear 'method' at all. Rather, as Buckland (1982) has pointed out, the report was couched in a distinctly atheoretical and 'technicist' style, in which the search for immediate solutions to the education crisis provided much of the vocabulary and many of the motives for the
report. Although such an approach probably owes more to positivism than to hermeneutics, its adoption and rise to hegemonic status during the 1980s marks a disjuncture or rupture with the past as represented by both traditions. The current uptake of 'management' approaches by the government may be understood as filling the vacuum left by the demise of traditional approaches, and as extending the logic of de Lange's technicism, supported by the growth of 'management studies' as a discipline (see below).

In relation to the de Lange report, the term 'scientific' was used simply to indicate a broadening of participation, and the abandoning of narrow 'ideological approaches' (interview with Mrs Smith, appendix A). Thus although claims concerning the 'scientific' status of the report continued to play an important legitimatory role, the coming together of the liberal and Afrikaner nationalist traditions is more obvious in terms of what was actually suggested, and in relation to the principles adopted than in terms of the methodology employed.

At the heart of the educational prescriptions of all the culture and modernity discourses discussed in this study there are certain assumptions concerning the nature of human 'intelligence'. In South Africa, the liberal debate as to whether differences in abilities between Europeans and non-Europeans are the result of genetic or environmental factors goes back to the early decades of the century (Cross, 1986). The South African debate has articulated with developments within international discourses on the nature and causes of differences in 'intelligence' between 'races', classes and sexes. The educational historian, Brian Simon (1978) has provided an excellent account of these international developments.

From the 1920s and 1930s the work of psychometrists such as Cyril Burt provided a 'scientific' explanation for perceived differences in 'intelligence' between different classes. This work legitimated segregationist policies along class lines in England, institutionalised in the 1944 Education Act. By the 1960s, however, the imperatives of technological advancement along with a growing belief in the influence of environmental factors in determining the performance of children at school led to remedial programmes in Britain and the US designed to compensate for environmental disadvantage and in so doing increase the pool of ability within the country as a whole. It was as part of a right-wing response to these developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the likes of Jensen and Eysenck attempted to re-assert the importance of genetic factors in accounting
for differences in 'intelligence' between 'races' and classes. In Britain their work was taken up by the Black Paperites who in turn informed the New Right call for a return to selection.

In South Africa, liberals such as E. G. Malherbe along with institutions such as the HSRC have been actively involved in intelligence testing (Malherbe, 1977). Although all of the culture and modernity discourses considered in this study remained ambiguous as to the relative influence of biological as opposed to environmental factors in determining the educational disadvantage of particular groups, there was broad consensus on the need for remedial action to counter environmental/genetic deficiencies. In general terms the intelligence testers have furnished a whole 'regime of truth' around the idea that children and adults may be categorised and hierarchised in relation to a measurable quantity, namely 'intelligence', and that this quantity provides an 'objective' basis for understanding differences between individuals and groups.

All of the texts that employed culture and modernity themes articulated strongly with a new set of disciplines that emerged internationally during the 1950s and 1960s that loosely fell under the heading 'development studies'. These new disciplines along with the institutions with which they were associated (the World Bank, UNESCO, institutions of higher education, non-governmental organisations etc.) came to exercise a form of bio-power over whole populations through their influence on policies aimed at countries of the South. Along with the human capital theorists of development economics (of whom Theodore Schultz was a leading example), all of the texts studied assumed the 'rationality' of the (western) capitalist system. At the level of epistemology, human capital theorists assumed that both the economy and economic agents may be subject to statistical measurement and analysis, and that capitalist development is a simple linear process with predictable outcomes (Fagerlind and Saha, 1982).

The panel reports more obviously reflected, however, the discourses of the sociologists of development, and in particular the modernisation theorists. Modernisation theory assumes that in order for a country to become 'modern', it must be composed of a modern population, meaning modern values, beliefs and behaviour. The modernity thesis is nicely summed up by Inkeles and Smith.

Mounting evidence suggests that it is impossible for a state to move into the twentieth century if its people continue to live in an earlier era. A modern nation needs participating
citizens, men and women who take an active interest in public affairs and who exercise their rights and perform their duties as members of a community larger than that of the kinship network and the immediate geographical locality. Modern institutions need individuals who can keep to fixed schedules, observe abstract rules, make judgements on the basis of objective evidence, and follow authorities legitimated not by traditional or religious sanctions but by technical competence. The complex production tasks of the industrial order, which are the basis of modern social systems, also make their demands. Workers must be able to expect both an elaborate division of labour and the need to coordinate their activities with a large number of others in the work force. (Inkeles and Smith, 1974, pp. 3-4).

Modernisation discourses have not remained static. The form and emphasis that has been given to each of the elements 'nation', 'institutions' and 'industrial order' has changed over time and geographical location. The above account presents a distinctly Keynesian and Fordist picture of modernity in line with the characterisation of modernity made within some of the broader 'post-modern' literature (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Jacques et al, 1989). In many western countries - the template for defining 'the modern' in modernisation theory - the idea of an active citizenry has been superseded by a conception of the population as consumers. Similarly, as far as institutions are concerned, bureaucratic forms of organisation have given way to the adoption of 'business principles' and a concern with 'management' although a commitment to 'technical competence' remains. Finally, the 'industrial order' has been transformed by revolutions in technology with subsequent demands for a flexible, rather than a specialised, workforce.

South Africa's relationship to these broad patterns of change has been complex and contradictory. Generally speaking, however, elements of the 'post-modern' vision have been articulated in more recent educational discourses such as those of the ERS. Examples here include an emphasis on entrepreneurial skills, the creation of a flexible work force, management, and the privatisation of education. By far the largest contradiction between the above account of modernity and the ones discussed below, however, relates to the construction of the 'modern nation' based on one person one vote.

**The Education Panel - a Liberal Response to Apartheid Education**

For the Education Panellists, 'rational' economic concerns and integration into the world economy were apparently given precedence over cultural difference, and were
considered to be a force for national unity. This implied a 'tolerant' approach towards different cultures (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 55). Indeed, culture and modernity discourses even allow for the celebration of cultural difference.

...contact and healthy friction between cultures is a powerful stimulus to every kind of creative effort, and throughout human history both spiritual and material progress have been most rapid where this stimulus has been present. (Education Panel, 1963, p. 56).

In South African liberal discourses such as those of the Education Panel, the modern conception of 'nation' has until fairly recently, been circumscribed by the absence of a commitment to the universal franchise. At the time of the Education Panel reports, the liberal vision of the modern was still so structured by white supremacist concerns that it remained impossible to articulate a democratic dispensation for all.

In brief the construction of 'nation' in culture and modernity discourses has had the following ideological effects. Firstly, by presenting economic concerns as the primary national goal it becomes easier to avoid the thorny issue of the political dimensions of nationhood such as the universal franchise. Secondly, the assumption, implicit in the discourses, that capitalist economic development benefits all cultures and groups does not take account of the way whites have not only directed economic policy but have empowered themselves economically at the expense of blacks. Finally, the projection of a multicultural ideal belies the racist nature of the discourses themselves and the ways in which they have sought to entrench white educational privilege.

Having created the impression of formally equal cultural groups united around a common national interest, the Education Panel reports then re-assert difference between groups by making recourse to both biologically and culturally essentialist arguments. Although the reports were written much more from a culturally as opposed to a biologically essentialist view-point, the lingering influence of biological essentialism was evident in the labelling of groups in racial terms, e.g. the 'Jewish race' (Education Panel, 1963, p. 55). The influence was also evident in the use of evolutionanry metaphors to describe the 'cultural' and 'social' evolution of non-European groups (Education Panel, 1963, p. 55).

It is claimed in culture and modernity discourses that not all groups have the same relationship to the modern ideal as others. There is often the underlying assumption in European discourses, that modernity is synonymous with European economic, political and cultural arrangements. These assumptions are evident throughout the reports of the
Education Panel. Of importance here is the use of the term 'culture' as a floating signifier. Whereas 'culture' encompasses all aspects of the modern in relation to Europeans, in relation to non-European cultures it refers only to a few traditions, customs and languages that have not become outmoded by the forces of social and economic change.

The portrayal of the non-European Other in the discourses of the panel revolved around the extent to which different cultures were integrated into the national economy on the one hand, and culturally assimilated into the values and institutions of modernity (read western culture) on the other. 'Primitive' cultures were characterised in the report as ones in which 'economic skills and the basis for social adjustment are an integral part of the culture'. Modern circumstances, however,

have made necessary a distinction between these different aspects, because economic skills have an international character as well as requiring an adaptability and a willingness to change which are foreign to the institutions which express the culture of the group. (Education Panel, 1963, p. 54).

According to the panel

....it may sometimes be necessary to compel the abandonment or modification of certain customs, though.....the importance of this exception in South Africa to-day is slight. It obviously has no application to the White, Coloured or Indian groups, and the Bantu too have already reached a level of cultural evolution where it can have relevance only to a few isolated backward communities (Education Panel, 1963, p.

For the Education Panel it was no good forcing the abandonment of 'savage customs'. Rather, they would disappear 'in the course of natural social evolution' (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 55). In contrast to the 'authoritarian' approach of the Afrikaners, English-speaking liberals liked to believe that non-Europeans would inevitably recognise the superiority of western notions of modernity and seek to mimic them. This would continue to involve, however, a largely educational modernisation effort directed by whites such that 'all children of all races without exception must receive at least some formal education' (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 17).

In South Africa as in many other parts of the world, a western education became the panacea for development in liberal discourses of the 1960s and 1970s, and the means by which 'backward' groups may improve themselves and become 'modern'. In the discourses of the Education Panel, education must aim at equipping individuals to perform a useful economic role. This did not, however, 'relate only to vocational education in the
strict sense, as a certain level of general education (including 'economics education') is essential before people can be satisfactorily trained for certain occupations' (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 16). Further, a general education would also ensure 'the promotion of a sufficient degree of social adjustment' such that people will be so adequately equipped to live amongst the complexities and pressures of modern society that they will not fall into delinquency or mental illness. This involves inter alia, the need to equip individuals with an adequate moral and ethical system. (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 17).

In contrast to CNE, the Education Panel advocated a secular approach towards moral education (at least within the state system) based on European liberal educational models, and geared towards 'self-discipline, responsibility and co-operation, and generally sound character development in all the teaching, and in the whole tone, spirit and organisation of the school' (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 44). The emphasis on moral education must be understood as part of the liberal response to urbanisation, rapid social change and increases in personal freedom resulting from a breakdown in traditional authority structures. (Wits Education Panel, 1963, pp. 33-39). It applied 'pre-eminently to the least well equipped of the Non-Whites, because of the exceptionally great gap between their rural traditions and the requirements of modern urban life' (Wits Education Panel, 1963, p. 46).

For the Education Panel then, the causes of the perceived breakdown in the African social fabric were to be located in the 'backwardness' of African culture and as an aspect of the psychological malaise of Africans themselves rather than in relation to, say, the imposition of capitalist and colonial social relations. The panellists remained undecided as to the relative importance of genetic as opposed to environmental factors in explaining the social disadvantage and low intelligence scores of blacks as compared to whites (Wits Education Panel, 1966, p. 110) As was the case in Britain and America during the 1960s, however, South African liberal discourses envisaged an important remedial role for education in this regard.

Cultural and racial differences were still seen by the Education Panel as an inevitable 'problem' in both general and educational terms.

....South Africa has problems which are peculiar to itself arising out of its character as a country of many racial, language and cultural groups. (Education Panel, 1963, p. 54).
In the discourses of many liberals at the time, the supposed inevitability of racial and cultural conflict was used to justify social segregation. Thus in the panel reports it was suggested that local authority boundaries for the decentralized administration of education should be drawn so as not to encourage 'oppression of minorities' within these boundaries (Wits Education Panel, 1963, pp. 58-9). This suggestion is not far removed from contemporary 'federalist' options being mooted by those who wish to divide the country into ethnically and racially defined units, nor from the views of the ERS concerning 'community control' of education. Similarly, each cultural group should have control over the medium of instruction in their schools under their control (although there is the underlying assumption in the report that English is the language most closely associated with modernity).

As was the case with Afrikaner nationalist discourses, examples from other countries were used to support claims concerning the inevitability of inter-cultural/racial conflict, whilst side-stepping the issue of the broader context in which such conflict arises. Further, many liberal discourses also coopted and mobilised black opinion to support liberal policies and view of the Other even though this was not the case with the panel reports specifically. As one liberal MP put it

Nobody is more conscious of the fact that they are backward and poor, than members of the Native population themselves. (Hansard, 1953, p. 3623)

Liberals even went so far as to claim that they represented the views of non-Europeans in parliament (Hansard, 1953, p. 3619). In brief, liberal culture and modernity themes provided liberals with the discursive resource to counterpoise their vision of economic integration and social segregation with the apartheid policy of separate development.

The de Lange Report - Two Traditions Converge

The de Lange report attempted to develop the stunted conception of the modern nation outlined by the Education Panel. Although there was no commitment to the universal franchise, the report does talk about

The cultivation of positive civil attitudes, i.e. to equip educational clients with knowledge regarding the history, geography, fauna and flora, system of government, etc. of the country, as well as with the problems and challenges facing society. (HSRC, 1981, p. 208).

The report also went further than the Education Panel in projecting a multi-cultural as opposed to an assimilationist message such that the religious pluralism of the population
was acknowledged, as was 'the right to develop an indigenous language of South Africa as the medium of instruction' (HSRC, 1981, p. 143). Further, as an educational aim, the report recommended the inculcation of 'a sense of social responsibility which can promote mutual respect, trust and cooperation between individuals and groups' (HSRC, 1981, p. 208). In such a way the de Lange report sought to balance the 'common' national identity with an understanding and respect for what is 'diverse'.

The report of the main committee goes out of its way to state that 'race' should not be used as a basis for differentiation, and inequality of treatment in education. There is more than a hint, however, of social Darwinist thought in the following passage. With reference to the ways in which inequalities along the lines of 'race, colour, creed or sex' may be addressed, the report remains decidedly ambiguous as to whether such inequalities are genetically or environmentally determined.

> the principle of justice requires that sound educational strategies be devised to compensate for genetic or environmental disadvantages in the system of educational provision. (HSRC, 1981, p. 214)

Further, the report affirms the legitimacy of racial classification through its unqualified use of racially defined categories. There is, however, the emergence in the report of new forms of 'sanitary coding' evidenced by the use of the terms 'population group' and 'community' to replace overtly racial categories. Nonetheless, the reiteration of biologically essentialist themes remained important in the context of both the report itself, and its eventual insertion into the framework of 'general' and 'own' affairs via the 1984 Education Act.

Interpretations of 'culture' in the report demonstrated a reworking of 'culture and modernity' themes in relation to new discourses that sought to redefine class subjectivities and identities in the context of total strategy. Indeed, one of the broader goals of total strategy was to create a new black middle class to act as a buffer against radical demands for change (Moss, 1980; RESA, 1988; Kallaway et al, 1984). For the largely middle class and multi-racial investigating team, representations of the Other generally focused on a multi-racial working class. The team also took up, and adapted, human capital and modernisation themes in their vision of what 'development' might entail. This adaptation took place in the context of a decline during the 1970s and 1980s of the view that education alone provided the panacea for development (Graham-Brown, 1991). By the 1980s, such a view had been supplanted within international discourses on education and development.
by vocational themes. As the de Lange report put it, a *certain kind* of education was required involving the learning of 'modern science, technology and management skills'.

South Africa is a developing country that is changing more rapidly than most developed countries. Modern science, technology and management skills, which are the most powerful resources that man has ever had at his disposal to enable him to change his environment, are not yet the cultural assets of significant sectors of all our population groups. (HSRC, 1981, p. 31).

In relation to the newly-defined Other, the educational implications of the above were, as is well known, a new emphasis on vocational or 'career-oriented' education. For the majority of the population, black and white, the 'development of innovative and adaptive abilities with regard to the demands of cultural change' were presented by the report as being synonymous with the ability to 'adjust to new situations, to cultivate a productivity-oriented ethic of work, and to master new technological knowledge' (HSRC, 1981, p. 208). One ideological effect of the above is to create the impression of a labour market unrestricted by racial, sexual and class segmentation into which all children formally have equal access. In contrast, the children of the white and black middle class would receive a private, traditional education.

Having constructed a new multi-racial and working class Other, and having asserted the formally equal relationship of cultures in terms of a revised modernist ideal, the report then proceeded to define a new basis for differentiation between Europeans and non-Europeans based on apparently contradictory principles. On the one hand, as has been seen, the report continued to use biologically essentialist language and assumptions. On the other hand, however, the de Lange report goes further than the Education Panel in asserting cultural differences as a basis for differentiation.

Like the Education Panel, the report suggests that some cultures are more in need of improvement than others with regard to the acquisition of science, technology and management skills, since 'this knowledge is often not related to the field of experience of a child from a more traditional culture' (HSRC, 1981, p. 32). It is likely to be African cultures that are being referred to here because the report then goes on to identify 'memorization instead of the development of insight' as an educational characteristic of such cultures, a characteristic normally attributed to African education. Indeed it has been in African education that the biggest effort has been made to vocationalise the curriculum (Van Zyl, 1991). It is interesting to note in relation to the rhetorical use of the term, the
way that culture rather than, say, high teacher/pupil ratios, is singled out as the cause for an over-emphasis on rote learning.

It is in relation to the curriculum, medium of instruction and religion that the de Lange report most clearly advocated culture as a basis for differentiation.

In a country such as South Africa with its heterogeneous cultural and social values it would be unfair to reform the education system to the extent that cultural and social community values are excluded from the content and presentation of the curriculum. (HSRC, 1981, p. 213).

Similarly, as far as the medium of instruction was concerned, the report advocated the right of parents to choose the medium of instruction for their children.

The report, therefore, provided continuity on, and further developed the idea of a decentralised and community controlled system of schooling described by the Education Panel, 'community' being defined here in cultural terms. As a discursive resource the term 'community' has been very useful for European educational discourses. It can be used to signify both a racially and a culturally defined group identity, thereby acting as a mediatory term between biologically and culturally essentialist accounts. Without making it obvious it builds on past discursive achievements that have defined communities in racial and cultural terms, and allows both to be tapped as a discursive resource depending on the context. 'Community' also has an aura of niceness about it, of people living together in harmony. It covers over the untidy business of the Group Areas Act by creating the impression of a harmless and natural state of affairs. Importantly, the term also provides a common starting point for a shared nationalist and liberal educational vision.

The images conjured up by the use of the term 'community' in the report also articulated strongly with that projected by Progressive Federal Party (PFP) discourses at the time, once again exemplifying the hegemony of liberal constructions of culture. Two distinct educational communities were envisaged, one revolving around the private 'non-racial' school, and the other revolving around the neighbourhood state school. According to one PFP spokesperson, the role of the desegregated private school would be to provide an opportunity for black and white children to 'develop understanding of one another, to cooperate with one another and to remove prejudice and distrust between the various groups' (Hansard, 1984, p. 8116). Further,
...once it has been proved that one can open schools without damaging the security of any group or undermining the identity of any group, we can move forward with the process.

(Hansard, 1984, p. 8116).

In brief, the vision of the non-racial private school differed very little from the situation pertaining at the time in such schools, where children of the black middle class were assimilated into the traditional liberal academic approach.

The image of the proposed government state school, or neighbourhood school, was informed by the following concerns.

...in an open society children have the right to attend neighbourhood schools and educational institutions paid for or subsidised by public funds irrespective of race or religion....in any neighbourhood in South Africa all the people living within that neighbourhood should be entitled to allow their children to attend the nearest school to where they live, if they so wish. (Hansard, 1984, p. 8119).

The strong claim to liberal and egalitarian values in the above speech exemplifies, once again, both the flexibility of language use, and the ways in which egalitarian arguments are used to justify racist policies. In the South African context, the Group Areas Act has ensured that, for the most part, neighbourhoods continue to be racially defined. For the PFP, a commitment to freedom of association actually implied that

...we are opposed to the sort of system that one had in America where there was unacceptable and forced integration such as the bussing policy. (Hansard, 1984, p. 8119).

The image of the educational community that was beginning to emerge around the time of de Lange, and which de Lange fed into, was one that continued to be controlled and defined by whites. This vision, reproduced in the ERS, is of a predominantly white neighbourhood into which a few blacks have moved. It anticipates a model C-type of dispensation in which blacks are admitted to white schools provided they are proficient in either English or Afrikaans, that they are prepared to accept the dominant values of the school, and that they live within the catchment area. Opposition to 'forced integration' allows admissions procedures and decisions concerning the running of the school to remain in the hands of whites. In model C schools, integration has meant, in effect, assimilation.

Whether in relation to a federalist future or a new educational dispensation, 'culture and modernity' discourses are designed to allay white fears about being 'swamped' by different cultural groups and about 'standards'. The construction also serves to legitimate white privilege. Having achieved a position of economic dominance and comfort within
racial Fordism, the new cultural essentialism allows whites to keep that position and to only allow blacks into their community and schools on terms set by whites. For the new black middle class, assimilation into white middle class culture offers a passport to success not only within a 'new South Africa' but within a world dominated by western values.

The Influence of the South African New Right

The discourses of the South African New Right provided a third and more worked out version of 'culture and modernity' themes. Of relevance here is the more clearly defined vision of 'the nation' that began to emerge in these discourses, although one that remained severely limited by the absence of a commitment to one person one vote. This new vision involved a subtle shift from that projected by the Education Panel and De Lange reports.

Firstly, in common with these earlier discourses, the concept of nation is still very much seen through the perspective of culture and in relation to modernisation. As was discussed above, these past accounts had projected a view of a common culture defined in relation to rights and duties of citizens (however circumscribed and underdeveloped this notion remained in the South African context). In the discourses of the New Right, however, this definition was supplanted by the idea of a national culture defined in overtly political terms as a loyalty to the capitalist system. Both nazism and socialism were put forward by Spier as examples of 'foreign lifestyles' that should be alien to South African culture. One way of interpreting the New Right discourse is to understand it as projecting a national corporate identity for South Africa (Said cited in Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Through a common commitment to capitalism and assisted by the development of entrepreneurial skills, non-Europeans were being invited to join the South African 'firm'.

Spier used the following quote from Eynsenck as a means for re-asserting difference.

Recognition of man's biological nature and genetically determined inequality inevitably associated with his derivation, is an absolutely necessary beginning for any attempt to use the methods of science and reason in an effort to save ourselves from the very real dangers that confront us. (Eynsenck quoted in Spier, 1981, pp. 17-18).

This observation led Spier to assert that
One moral consequence is that the ruling power elite, which determines the structures of society, carries a heavy responsibility to adjust the mal-equipped to an environment which is not of their choice. (Spier, 1981, p. 18).

Biological essentialism, therefore, played an important part in Spier's uptake of modernisation and 'white man's burden' themes.

Dostal's concern on the other hand was with how 'different cultural contexts seem to foster different ways of perceiving reality, of being inspired, and relating to it' (Dostal, 1989, p. 64). Providing her own reading of Inkeles and Smith she defined 'modernisation' as follows:

...an openness to new experiences, a readiness to accept new social relationships, roles and authority structures, democratic behaviour, an emphasis on efficiency, time, planning, control (as opposed to fatalism), educational and occupational advancement, individualism and human dignity. (Dostal, 1989, p. 31).

Following in the footsteps of the Education Panel and de Lange reports, Dostal identifies Africans as being in particular need of modernisation.

Dostal used two theories to demonstrate the innate cultural backwardness of Africans. Firstly, she made a distinction between 'right' and 'left-sided' thinking. Right-sided thinking accounts for 'logical, rational and analytical thought'. A sense of time, scientific ability and speech are governed by the right hemisphere of the brain. In contrast, she described left-sided thinking as 'patterned, integrated, holistic and relational'. The left hemisphere is responsible for attributes such as musical ability, body awareness and the recognition of patterned wholes like faces. 'It may have a dreamlike quality and is not bound by Aristotelian logic, the linearity of time or the causality of events' (55). Whereas western, industrial culture is equated with right-sided thinking, African culture is equated with left-sided thinking.

Dostal further distinguished between a 'homogenistic' and a 'heterogenistic mindscape'. The former separates 'the self from the world, the inside from the outside, space from mass, and they focus on singular functions and opposites'. Heterogenistic types, on the other hand, are contextual and 'emphasize continuity between self and the world, inside and outside, space and mass' (64). Whereas western culture and scientific reasoning are equated with homogenistic thinking, African culture is heterogenistic in nature. Both Dostal and Spier drew similar conclusions from their respective analyses.
It has been suggested that some cultures (including African culture) display values which are incompatible with scientific thought and modern economic and technological development. (Dostal, 1989, p. 65).

...the ethics of Western industrial society are not unquestionably acceptable nor digestible to African culture. (Spier, 1981, p. 7)

Scientific racism played a useful ideological role in the arguments of both Dostal and Spier. Firstly, Dostal's account in particular reinforced long standing stereotypes about Africans including the view that they have innate musical ability and a poor sense of time/punctuality. Secondly, the above construction allowed western 'civilisation' to come in for a good deal of praise, not only in relation to scientific achievement, but also in relation to attitudes and values (including, even 'personal integrity', p. 64). Thirdly, the above account provided a simple explanation for the phenomenon of 'underdevelopment' without having to deal with the historical legacy of colonialism and the systematic underdevelopment of Africa by Europeans (Rodney, 1972). Fourthly, by equating scientific achievement with western culture, the role of blacks in the development of science and technology was denied, as was the debt that western science owes to its predecessors and contemporaries in Africa, the middle east, China and elsewhere. Finally, Dostal's portrayal of African culture as being antithetical to Aristotelian logic provides a convenient explanation their involvement in 'irrational' activities such as educational struggles and mass action.

Dostal and Spier did make certain qualifications to their argument so as not to appear racist. Both suggested that aspects of African culture might in fact turn out to be useful for modernisation. For Spier,

In the restructuring of our society, in which education can take a lead, it may be wise to consider which values in the African heritage can make a contribution. (Spier, 1981, p. 7)

Dostal developed the idea further. She suggested that the Japanese are also 'left-sided' thinkers and 'heterogenist'. She provided an account of the success of the Japanese modernisation project in these terms.

Based on the vision of 'Japanese spirit with Western ability'.....the Japanese encountered Western knowledge, organisational structures and processes and integrated them with or adapted them to the values, norms and traditions of their own culture. (Dostal, 1989, p. 68).

Dostal then went on to suggest that
It is often suggested that the essence of the 'African spirit' is a community and context orientation. As in the case of Japan, this dimension could provide the motivation and social organisation for a development path appropriate to South Africa. It may even prove superior to the motivation and social organisation underlying Western industrial culture. (Dostal, 1989, p. 68).

Once again, the above quote reinforces racist stereotypes. Whereas Europeans have 'scientific ability', Africans have 'community spirit'. Further, by creating the impression that development simply involves marrying two cultural traditions ('mutual enculturation' as Dostal puts it), Dostal avoided the tricky question of who holds economic power, and which group/s determine economic change.

Besides facilitating a process of 'mutual enculturation', education should, according to Dostal and Spier, also be 'relevant'. Following a trajectory laid down in the de Lange report, both authors asserted the importance of science and technology in the curriculum for the majority, and a move away from academic bias. In concert with vocationalist discourses from Britain, the USA and elsewhere, they further emphasised the importance of 'entrepreneurial skills'. In relation to the latter, African culture was once again found wanting, this time because it was held accountable for rote-learning in African schools (another feature in common with the de Lange report), a process antithetical to the development of entrepreneurial skills. Apportioning blame to African cultures for the practice of rote learning neatly side-steps the issue of how forms of pedagogy have developed in relation to the colonial context and a dire lack of resources in black schools.

Although Dostal's account tried to give the impression of equality and of the mutual enhancement of cultures (a move common to all the culture and modernity accounts discussed so far), she quickly qualified this claim. Rather than have European culture 'swamped' by African culture, the process of mutual enculturation must involve Africans and Europeans coming together in the educational context 'in more or less equal proportions' (Dostal, 1989, p. 67). The process of 'Africanisation' would thereby be avoided.

The vision of the educational community projected by both Spier and Dostal took up aspects of that developed in the de Lange report and the liberal discourses of the early 1980s. It was also located further along the model C and ERS road. In tune with de Lange and the PFP, Spier and Dostal envisaged private schools as a suitable venue for mutual enculturation. Similarly, the principle of 'parental choice' was used as a rhetorical device.
to entrench the current privileges of white communities. Dostal and Spier added a further exclusionary mechanism in their suggestions, however, through the advocacy of the introduction of user fees in currently white schools. Here the influence of New Right discourses about privatisation are evident.

Like the de Lange report, the South African New Right sought to redefine the European relationship to the Other within a fundamentally restructured terrain. In the case of de Lange this redefinition took place in the context of total strategy, and of 'own' and 'general' affairs. New Right discourses, on the other hand, articulated strongly with the introduction of neo-liberal policies in the economy and within social welfare. By projecting entrepreneurialism as the national identity, Dostal, Spier et al firmly located themselves within the ranks of those who have sought to make South Africa 'safe for capitalism' (Chisholm, 1991). Within this context 'multiculturalism has become the preferred capitalist strategy for dealing with ethnic groups and for the 'servicing of diversity' (Kalantzis cited in Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 138). Neo-liberal education policies also played their part in the restructuring of white/black relationships. Vocationalism, as has been discussed in relation to de Lange impacts most strongly on the black working class. Similarly, privatisation has played a part in reinforcing ethnic boundaries in the imagined educational communities of European discourse.

**Racist Discourses and the Present - the Education Renewal Strategy**

When attempting to write a 'history of the present', Foucault has urged us to look for beginnings rather than origins. Instead of locating the nature of the present in the workings of the economy, the achievements of great men and women, or even in the inspiration of a divine creator, we are implored rather to search for the contingent, the hidden and neglected events and narratives that make the present understandable. The aim of this chapter has been to uncover the discursive beginnings of the ERS and the *Curriculum Model* (CM). In so doing, it has been found prudent to examine not one, but several starting points. It will be argued that the ERS mixes and repositions many of the discursive elements from the texts examined so far in relation to the formation of new alliances and new hegemonic projects within the white power block.

The context in which the ERS/CM emerged, included the failure of de Klerk's ten year plan for education, the unbanning of the liberation movements, economic crisis, and
the advent of the era of negotiations. Understood politically, it is suggested that the taking up of liberal and neo-liberal conceptions of culture by the ERS is an aspect of the uptake of liberal themes more generally by verligte Afrikanerdom. The ERS openly acknowledges its support for both the free market and a devolved federalist structure of government.

Like all the other documents studied so far, the ERS/CM also makes claims to 'neutrality' despite its partisan party political nature. Like de Lange, the 'scientific' nature of the exercise is asserted in the extent to which different political view-points are encapsulated in the document (interview with Mrs Smith, appendix A). In this sense the ERS/CM is a prisoner of its own form of rationality, as it continues to exclude the views of the Democratic Movement, even after the unbanning of the ANC, PAC etc. As one senior architect of the ERS/CM put it

When we conceived of the ERS we grappled with this issue of how do you obtain legitimacy, and I realise that this is probably the biggest problem of the ERS is its legitimacy [sic]. (Interview with Dr Stumpf, appendix A, p. 109).

Lack of legitimacy in the sense of the views represented had the following implications. Some of the language of the Democratic Movement is selectively coopted into the document. Thus some of the demands that had arisen during the education struggles of the 1980s e.g. for a non-racial and non-sexist education system are carefully incorporated into the document, but within terms previously defined by its authors. The ERS goes further than de Lange in asserting not only that 'race should not feature in structuring the provision of education' (DNE, 1992, p. 16), but that the 'education dispensation' should aim at the 'elimination of discrimination on the grounds of race, colour and gender' (17). The ERS/CM even goes so far as using the term 'non-racial' (16). These goals remain unconvincing, however, in the absence of any strategy for achieving them, curricular or otherwise. Further, it will be argued below that the ERS/CM actually entrenches white privilege through its construction of culture and of difference.

In the absence of 'legitimacy', the ERS/CM must look elsewhere for a scientific basis. Its claims to 'neutrality' are premised on a new type of 'scientific rationality', namely, that associated with 'management' and subjects such as 'management studies'. The sub-title of the ERS is 'Management Solutions for Education in South Africa'. In managerialism, the criteria for asserting the 'truth' lies not so much in the 'objective' findings of dispassionate academic endeavour, but rather in the success or failure of
pragmatic 'solutions' to educational problems. As such the ERS takes up and further develops the technicism of de Lange (albeit within the new framework of managerialism).

Managerialism is also associated with the increasing corporatisation of knowledge itself under late twentieth century capitalism (Cloete and Muller, 1991), exemplified by the semi-privatisation of research organisations such as the HSRC, corporate funding of research and growing links between the government and private sector in undertakings such as the ERS. In this context, corporate management techniques have been transferred to the public sector. Increasingly teachers, particularly in black schools, are being subjected to management training courses, and the educational bureaucracy is constantly being rationalised along managerialist lines (Chetty et al, 1993). The rhetorical nature of much of the managerialist discourse in South African education is, however, demonstrated by the unwillingness of the government to address issues of resources and of management capacity, especially in the Department of Education and Training and in the education departments of the TBVC territories (Mc Lennan, 1993).

Ball (1990, b) has described the new emphasis on management as the introduction of a new kind of 'moral technology', designed to produce the 'efficient' teacher.

Management is a theoretical and practical technology of rationality geared to efficiency, practicality and control....it embodies a clear empiricist-rationalist epistemology. Organizational control and individual action are subsumed within a technical perspective. A view that contends that social life can be mastered scientifically and can be understood and organized according to law-like generalizations. The selection of appropriate courses of action rests upon and is limited to the expertise of those, the managers, who possess appropriate scientific knowledge and training. It is thus a closed system which separates policy from execution, and reserves policy making to those designated and trained in its techniques. Furthermore, it presents itself as an objective, technically neutral mechanism, dedicated only to greater efficiency: the one best method. (Ball, 1990, b, p. 157).

Ball counterposes managerialism to other, more professional/collegial forms of organising schools and making decisions. He then goes on to add that management is an 'imperialistic discourse' i.e. one that asserts its superiority by setting itself against irrationality and chaos. As the 'linguistic antithesis of crisis' managerialist discourse has an important disciplinary role to play in South African education, just as it did in 1980s Britain (Ball, 1990, b).

He also links the emergence of management as a new disciplinary technology to school effectiveness studies which have similarly identified the individual teacher or school
as the 'problem' to be addressed. Although they have had a fairly limited influence in South Africa to date, school effectiveness studies have directly influenced the ERS in some of the claims that are made e.g. the World Bank's claims relating class size to educational performance (DNE, 1992, p. 6), and in terms of an overall approach e.g. in the use of computer modelling techniques to find the most 'cost-effective' and 'efficient' funding formula for education. As an example of the application of economic principles to education, school effectiveness studies also have an important ideological and rhetorical role to play in the context of transition and crisis.

Based on apparently sophisticated statistical techniques, school effectiveness studies make strong claims to objectivity and neutrality. For example, many studies claim to be able to statistically make allowances for the home background of the child, in order to isolate in-school factors that affect achievement. Further, both management and school effectiveness studies are based on behaviourist assumptions, i.e. that human behaviour, such as educational achievement or the efficiency of a teacher, can be modified by manipulating variables in the immediate environment. They work from a view of human nature as a quantity that can be measured, categorised and improved. Through organisations such as the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), school effectiveness studies are increasingly being applied to the South. Here they have become important for the neo-liberal project of organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, by shifting attention towards the efficacy of individuals and schools, and away from broader political issues such as cuts in welfare spending and the introduction of monetarist policies.

As Samoff (1992) has argued, school effectiveness studies feed into a new form of modernisation theory....

....which insists now, as it did 30 years ago, that the causes of Africa's problems are to be found within Africa: its people, resources, capital, skills, psychological orientation, child-rearing practices, and more....Just as poverty is to be explained by the characteristics and (in)abilities of the poor, so the explanation of problems of African education are to be found within and around African schools. (Samoff, 1992, p. 70).

Further, as Mangaliso (1991) has pointed out, current theories and practices of management in South Africa are unequivocally eurocentric in their nature, values and assumptions. The question as to whether management and school effectiveness studies may be appropriated towards progressive ends (as Mangaliso suggests in the case of
management) will be further explored in the next chapter. In constructing its own interpretative repertoire around the culture and modernity theme, the ERS/CM may be located within the new international discourse. It should also be seen, however, as building on, and drawing together, discursive elements from the repertoires discussed so far in the chapter within the broader context of negotiations.

The vision of a nation in the ERS/CM anticipates the introduction of the universal franchise in its discussion and advocacy of a devolved federal structure (see chapter two of the ERS, DNE, 1992 pp. 15-25). Further, the CM talks of 'the education of learners towards responsible and full citizenship' (DNE, 1991,b, p. 12), and even of national curriculum frameworks. In defining the national identity, the ERS/CM draws upon neo-liberal themes in its advocacy of the free market and its emphasis on the development of entrepreneurial skills. This is tempered, however, by more traditional liberal concerns with the rights and duties of citizens. Taking up a theme that started with the Education Panel reports, the ERS/CM also celebrates cultural pluralism within this conception of nation as a political and corporate entity.

The long shadow of 'race' and of biological determinism remains in the ERS/CM, as a basis for reasserting difference. This is exemplified, not only by the unqualified use of the term 'race' itself, but also by the assumption of the inevitability of 'race barriers' (DNE, 1992, p. 15). The ERS/CM marks a new stage in the sanitization of racist discourses, however, through its almost total reliance on the term 'community' to do the ideological and discursive work of biologically essentialist accounts. As was the case with de Lange, the term provides an important bridge between biologically and culturally framed accounts, and a point of convergence for both nationalist and liberal traditions. In the ERS, however, the rhetorical role of this term has been extended further than in de Lange.

What sets the ERS/CM apart from previous constructions of culture and modernity is its self-conscious insertion into the 'development' paradigm. According to the ERS, South Africa's population encompasses both developed and developing communities. (DNE, 1992, p. 9)

Here the term 'community' provides an important bridge not just between white South African accounts of difference, but between 'apartheid-speak' and modern development paradigms. By identifying South Africa's problems as arising from having both developed and developing communities, the ERS/CM discourse has the effect of normalising South
Africa's educational problems. The crisis in black education may be presented as just another example of underdevelopment. School effectiveness studies and the rationale on which they are based play an important role here as they provide a series of norms (concerning for example teacher/pupil ratios, the importance of text books or of prioritising basic education etc.) against which black education may be considered in relation to other developing countries. This reveals a further ideological effect of the whole school effectiveness paradigm, namely, the way in which research results from different contexts become aggregated at an international level. This in turn results in the formulation of policy prescriptions that do not take cognizance of the varied socio-historical experiences of the countries under question.

Whereas in the de Lange report, some whites were included in the category of those requiring modernisation (albeit in a qualified form), in the ERS/CM this is not the case. The term 'developing communities' is used almost exclusively to refer to Africans. Without appearing racist, therefore, the ERS is able to refer to the inadequacies and short-comings of Africans as an aspect of their status as a developing community. Whites, on the other hand, are clearly identified as belonging to the developed world. The ideological work done here is to locate black and white South Africans differentially within a 'new world order' characterised by growing inequalities between the predominantly white North and the predominantly black South. This is in anticipation of South Africa's full reintegration into the world economy.

All this has implications for the perceived role of education in development. The CM takes up vocationalist themes, although in a more worked out way than either de Lange or the New Right. There is scope for the majority to pursue either a vocational or a vocationally-oriented education in the secondary school, and in reality, given the current situation in black schools, these are likely to be black (Bennell et al., 1991). There is, however, also scope for a broader education than normally implied by vocationalism within the fairly flexible curriculum frameworks. This may be understood in relation to the increasing need, not only for narrow skills, but for a flexible workforce. It may be, in other words, an aspect of the emergence of post-Fordist technologies alongside older ones. Arguably, however, those with an academic education (who are in effect likely to be white) will be in a better position in the post-Fordist market place than those with a vocational one. Finally, the ERS/CM advocate the development of entrepreneurial skills.
Cultural essentialism continues to play an important role in the ERS/CM as a means of differentiating between groups. For example the ERS argues for cultural groups to have control over their own education in the following terms.

In a region that accommodates a single homogenous cultural group, the devolution of power to a regional authority level could still be acceptable up to a point, since such an authority would be representative of the cultural group concerned. In South Africa, however, we find a different situation. The pattern of interwoven occupation of regions encountered in South Africa brings about a need for a stronger say in the affairs of their schools and other educational institutions among the people at a lower level of the community. (DNE, 1992, p. 23).

Having established the 'community' as being essentially ethnically defined, the ERS/CM then proceeds to shore up white privilege using a variety of mechanisms from the discourses discussed so far. From de Lange comes the idea of community control over medium of instruction and over aspects of the curriculum (in the ERS/CM this is to occur within national frameworks). From the New Right and organisations such as the World Bank, the idea of setting fees, and from model C schools themselves, the idea of community control over admissions to the school. The ERS also mobilises arguments concerning 'standards' to preserve the status quo in white schools (DNE, 1992, p. 12). Once again the ERS/CM justifies its position in relation to egalitarian arguments.

Nationally recognised and educationally relevant basic human rights such as mother tongue education, freedom of religion and the practice and transmission of an own culture. Freedom of association must consequently form the cornerstone of the new education system. (DNE, 1992, p. 17).

In terms of creating subject positions, the discourses of the ERS/CM continue to implicitly celebrate the achievements of white European culture as an aspect of the vision of modernity in the documents. In these discourses, however, whites also become guardians and owners of a new cultural attribute, namely a 'culture of learning'. This is not, according to the ERS, also the case with African culture.

Unfortunately establishing such a culture of learning in the developing sectors of our society has of late been severely hampered by disturbances and disruptions in the schools in these communities....Even more disturbing, however, is the initiating role many Black teachers have played in organising school and class boycotts in 1990... (DNE, 1992, p. 7).

The above account builds on previous discourses, from Afrikaner nationalist and liberal ones through those of the New Right, to project an image of African culture as
irrational and prone to chaos. As such it continues to redefine political struggles over education as an aspect of cultural delinquency. It is also cooptive in the sense that the question of restoring a 'culture of learning' in black schools is high up on the agenda of the Democratic Movement.

The rhetorical role of the discourses of the ERS/CM may be summarised as follows. Firstly, the discourses provide a link between the racism of indigenous Europeans, and new development paradigms that serve to legitimate inequality between North and South. Secondly, the ERS/CM projects different subject positions for whites and blacks in relation to this international order, reflecting its ideological role in relation to the preservation of white educational and economic privilege in South Africa.

The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the extent to which education policy in South Africa has been, and continues to be shaped, by racist discourses. These discourses have operated to preserve the educational privilege of whites at the expense of blacks. They have not remained the same, however, and have evolved in relation to changing material and discursive contexts. In so doing, they have redefined the European relationship to the Other.

European racism has always been resisted in South Africa as elsewhere. It is also the case, however, that European accounts of difference have informed, and have been informed by, the racial interpretations of black South Africans. It is towards a consideration of the racial interpretations of the Democratic Movement in education that the next chapter will turn.
CHAPTER 5
THE RACIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Introduction

This chapter will examine the racial interpretations that have emerged from predominantly black groupings during the course of the struggle against apartheid and European racism. As was the case with the last chapter, the central focus will be on the ways that anti-racist discourses have shaped educational policy. Two broad streams of black thought have been identified during the course of analysis, each of them representing a different form of African humanism. In other words, like the two forms of European humanism discussed in the last chapter, each stream of thought contains assumptions both overt and implicit concerning human nature (and in particular the importance of 'race' as an essential human characteristic). Further, each one discursively constructs subject positions for different individuals and groups, whether around 'race', a national identity, culture, class, gender etc. often with implications for the role of these groups (and of human agency in general) in political change. Finally, both streams have also drawn inspiration from aspects of both Christian liberal humanist thought and African humanism as exemplified by the writings of Kaunda, Nyrere and others.

Unlike the two forms of European humanism discussed in the last chapter, however, there is no correlation between the two forms and any linguistic or religious grouping. Rather, Gerhart (1978) has described these two streams of African thought in terms of their respective responses to the Christian liberal frame of reference in the post-war period. She has differentiated between an orthodox African nationalist stream on the one hand, and a more liberally inclined 'multi-racialist' (or non-racialist) stream on the other which has mixed African nationalism with liberalism. Included in the former category of 'rebels' are individuals such as Mda, Sobukwe and Biko along with organisations such as the PAC and Black Consciousness. For Gerhart the 'realist' multi-racialists include the ANC and other members of the congress alliance.

Whilst going some way towards representing the ideological differences within the African nationalist movement in the 1940s and 1950s, Gerhart's typology tends to
underplay the deepening gulf between the ANC and South African liberalism especially since the banning of the organisation in 1960, the subsequent turn to armed struggle and the growing influence of Marxist thought within the organisation from the 1950s onwards. Further, such a typology runs the risk of portraying black thought merely as a response to terms of reference defined solely by whites. Although it will be argued that there has been a good deal of interpenetration of racial interpretations, language and images across the political spectrum in South Africa, this has certainly not been a simple process of white action and black response. It will be demonstrated that black groups opposed to apartheid have structured and positioned different elements in their racial interpretations, drawn from a variety of sources, in order to legitimate their own counter-hegemonic projects.

In keeping with the approach of the study so far, each form of African humanism will be identified with the interpretative repertoire that it has employed to account for 'culture', 'nation' and 'race'. The first repertoire to be considered has been called 'black consciousness' with reference to the major political tendency with which the repertoire has been associated in the period under review. Important characteristics of this repertoire, include an essentialist view of 'race' and culture together with an organicist conception of nation that has identified Africa as belonging to Africans. It is also clearly marked out by its insistence on black self-reliance and consciousness raising as a means of shaking off the shackles of hundreds of years of enforced inferiority under colonialism. In this repertoire whites are generally perceived as part of the 'problem' in the struggle for national liberation rather than as potential allies.

The second repertoire has been dubbed 'non-racialism' and has proved to be by far the most dominant counter-hegemonic interpretation. Indeed, as a repertoire it has already reached near hegemonic status not only amongst blacks but throughout the body politic as a whole in South Africa. It is characterised by a vision of a united South Africa in which all South Africans enjoy common citizenship, rights and opportunities regardless of 'race', culture or gender. 'Non-racialist' discourses have identified the apartheid government along with white supremacists and their collaborators as the enemy of national liberation rather than whites per se. Needless to say the categories outlined above represent broad generalisations. In reality there has been a good deal of overlap between the two repertoires both at the level of policy and at the level of individual beliefs and commitments. Further, it is an aspect of the approach adopted in this and the last chapter that interpretative
repertoires are not ahistorical. They may change fairly radically in form and content according to the material and discursive contexts in which they arise and the organisations and interests with which they are associated.

As was the case in the previous chapter, the texts analysed below have been organised around events that have been considered important in the development of resistance to apartheid education and the quest for alternatives. These events include (in chronological order); initial resistance to bantu education and the formation of the Africa Education Movement; the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960s and 1970s and its subsequent influence on the educational policies of the Azanian People’s Organization in the early 1980s; the emergence and development of the concept of 'people's education' both at home and in exile during the mid-1980s; and the development of ANC education policy since its unbanning in 1990. Further in keeping with the previous chapter, each text has been put into a material (economic and political) as well as a broad discursive context before being interrogated in terms of the interpretative repertoire employed, the subject positions constructed, the vision of development thrown up by each repertoire and the ensuing implications for education policy.

This chapter will be presented in accordance with the interpretative repertoire employed. Unlike the previous chapter, however, the material presented below does not lend itself to a neat chronological account of the development of different repertoires. Black consciousness only reappeared in the late 1960s/early 1970s as an important influence on education whilst non-racialism has been an aspect of black political discourse since the beginning of the apartheid era. What follows then must be read against the broad history sketched in previous chapters.

Black Consciousness and Self-reliance - the Growth and Influence of the BCM.

The major event considered in this section is the emergence and rise of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), its influence on educational discourses of the time, and its continued influence on the educational policy of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) in the early 1980s. The texts considered in relation to these events include a collection of writings by the black consciousness leader Steve Biko entitled I Write What I Like (Biko, 1978), other articles from early editions of the SASO Newsletter along with the 1984 AZAPO education policy (AZAPO, 1991). These texts represent different stages
In the elaboration of black consciousness thought and of its implications for education. In terms of the accounts that are given of culture, nation and 'race' it will be argued that both sets of texts also provide continuity on themes expressed by Africanists within the ANC during the 1940s and 1950s as well as by the founders of the PAC following its break with the ANC in 1959. It is the more immediate and profound contemporary relevance of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and of AZAPO on educational politics and thinking, however, that has singled out the ideas of these organisations for study.

The political and economic contexts and events that gave birth to the BCM in the late 1960s have been discussed in previous chapters. They have also been extensively dealt with elsewhere (see for example Biko, 1978; Christie, 1991; Gerhart, 1988; Davies et al, 1988; Pityana et al, 1991). A brief history of the BCM and its offshoots is in order, however, in order to contextualise what follows. It will be recalled that the BCM emerged into the political vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960. The following decade had also seen the more rigid application of apartheid policies in a climate of economic growth. The wars of liberation being waged elsewhere in Southern Africa had gathered momentum and important advances had been made by African Americans in the US in their struggle for civil rights in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Black consciousness as a philosophy had its beginnings in the student movement of the late 1960s and developed as part of a critique by some black students of the white-dominated and liberal National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). The critique focused on the forms of 'integration' and of 'non-racialism' adopted by white NUSAS members which often amounted to the attempted assimilation of blacks into a world view and set of priorities defined by whites and in a discursive space controlled by them. It was charged that despite the sometimes radical posturing of white liberal students, it was highly unlikely that they would seek to change a system defined by racial inequality and out of which they (the whites) could only gain. Biko provided a powerful critique of 'multiracial' organisations along the following lines:

...the black-white circles are almost always a creation of white liberals. As a testimony to their claim of complete identification with the blacks, they call a few "intelligent and articulate" blacks to "come around for tea at home", where all present ask themselves the same old hackneyed question "how can we bring about change in South Africa?" The more such tea-parties one calls the more of a liberal he is and the freer he shall feel from the guilt that harnesses and binds his conscience. Hence he moves around his white circles -
whites-only hotels, beaches, restaurants and cinemas - with a lighter load, feeling that he is not like the others. (Biko, 1978, p. 22).

Blacks on the other hand, as victims of oppression

...have been made to feel inferior for so long that for them it is comforting to drink tea, wine or beer with whites who seem to treat them as equals. This serves to boost up their own ego to the extent of making them feel slightly superior to those blacks who do not get similar treatment from whites. These are the sort of blacks who are a danger to their community. Instead of directing themselves at their black brothers and looking at their common problems from a common platform they choose to sing out their lamentations to an apparently sympathetic audience that has become proficient in saying the chorus of "shame!". (Biko, 1978, pp. 23-24).

The solution as far as Biko and his contemporaries was concerned was an emphasis on black self-reliance (the term 'black' was used to encompass Africans, Indians and 'coloureds') and to this end the South African Students' Society (SASO) was formed in 1969 with a blacks only membership. Like his Africanist predecessors in the ANC and later the PAC, Biko emphasised the psychological aspects of oppression and argued the case for consciousness-raising amongst blacks to counter-act the inferiority complexes created by apartheid and colonialism.

It was only in 1972 that SASO decided to move outside of its intellectual student base and to begin to engage with community politics. The Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) was established as a general political wing of the BCM in order to inculcate black pride and self-help, along with Black Community Programmes. In the face of police repression of BC organisations, however, oppositional activity was largely confined to the cultural spheres and to the development of a black theology (Gerhart, 1978).

On the economic front the BCM spawned the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU) in 1973 following the Durban workers strikes, and influenced the development of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC), an organisation comprised of African capital, during the 1970s (Davies et al, 1988). BC also encouraged the emergence of several business cooperatives and a strategy of bulk buying amongst black communities. In the face of increasing police hostility, however, the BCM found it much easier to organise within the academy and amongst the clergy than within the black communities themselves. Further, many older blacks were wary of the new BCM fearing an early and disastrous clash with the authorities. For this generation painful memories of
the Sharpville massacre and of the state repression that followed urged caution. Thus although there was probably fairly wide-spread support amongst blacks for BC ideas (Gerhart, 1978), BC organisations never achieved large memberships in the townships and rural areas.

The BCM experienced since its inception a contradictory relationship with the state. The emergence of SASO was at first mistakenly greeted by the state as a manifestation of separate development. There is also some evidence that the security forces also provided tacit support for some BC activities for similar reasons (Frederikse, 1990). SASO was even granted a measure of official recognition on black campuses. Collaborators with the regime such as Kwazulu's Mangosutho Buthelezi also felt confident in taking up BC themes leading to a sharp debate within the organisation over the role of those who had opted to 'work within the system'. Even following the banning of BC organisations in 1977 attempts were still being made by various imperialist interests to turn it into a so-called 'third force' in opposition to the ANC and PAC (Davies et al, 1988).

As the organisation became more radical and its influence grew, however, the state became less tolerant of it and began to ban and harass BC leaders from 1973 onwards. The Federal Theological Seminary in Alice, a strong centre of BC thought, was closed by the government in 1974-5. Whereas at first many BC supporters were suspicious of all 'foreign ideologies' including Marxism and maintained that 'race' rather than class provided the fundamental contradiction in the colonial context, by 1976 SASO had begun a trenchant critique of the black middle class and capitalist interests arguing that 'this black middle class aligns itself with imperialism' (SASO quoted in Davies et al, 1988), and simply wanted to replace white exploitation of blacks with black exploitation of blacks.

On the educational front BC began to recruit school student sympathisers and activists from 1972 onwards resulting in the formation of the South African Students' Movement (SASM). This militant section of the BCM focused on the injustices of bantu education and the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. It will be recalled that protests around these issues led directly to the Soweto uprisings in 1976. The Black Parents' Association (BPA) was formed in the wake of the uprisings as a forum for parental concern over educational issues. Also following the uprisings many SASM students and BCM activists fled the country and joined the ANC (and to a lesser extent the PAC) in exile. Eighteen BC organisations and many BC leaders were banned in October 1977.
Steve Biko was killed whilst in police custody a month before the bannings.

AZAPO was formed in 1978 to fill the leadership gap in the BCM left by the bannings. The executive committee was detained soon afterwards, however, and AZAPO only really got off the ground in 1979. Like the BCM, the AZAPO leadership was drawn largely from the urban petty bourgeoisie and its influence has been greater than its small membership would suggest. The expressed aims of AZAPO were to 'conscientise black workers through Black Consciousness; to work for an education system which 'responds creatively' to the needs of the people; to interpret religion 'as a liberatory philosophy relevant to black struggle'; to expose the exploitative and repressive apartheid system; and to work for black unity and the 'just distribution of wealth and power to all' (Davies et al, 1988).

In pursuit of these aims AZAPO became involved, during the early 1980s, in supporting strikes, rent and bus boycotts as well as organising commemorative events around important dates in the history of the liberation struggle and leading boycotts of visiting sports teams. In so doing AZAPO hoped to correct the mistakes of the previous BCM by taking BC to the black masses. AZAPO continued to stick to the BC line on the exclusion of whites from the struggle. On the question of class, however, AZAPO arrived at what can only be described as an uneasy compromise between early BC positions and a Marxist analysis by arguing that all blacks were oppressed workers and that all whites were capitalist exploiters. This position has been subsequently criticised by former BC organisations and in 1982 both the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) broke ranks with AZAPO and proclaimed allegiance to the Freedom Charter, an uncompromising class analysis and to non-racialism. For many of the post-1976 youth, BC had served its purpose and the time had come to move on. These developments coincided with the re-emergence of the ANC as an ideological and political force in South Africa from the late 1970s onwards (Frederikse, 1990).

Having outlined the political events associated with the emergence of the BCM, attention will now turn to the discursive context. In contrast to the development of 'non-racialism' since 1948 (see below) the beginnings of 'BC' as an interpretative repertoire were marked by a mistrust of western forms of scientific rationality. Biko quoted with approval the following passage from the writings of the Zambian President, Kenneth
Kaunda concerning the relationship between western science, aggression and individualism:

The Westerner has an aggressive mentality. When he sees a problem he will not rest until he has formulated some solution to it. He cannot live with contradictory ideas in his mind....he is vigorously scientific in rejecting solutions for which there is no basis in logic. He draws a sharp line between the natural and the super-natural, the rational and non-rational, and more often than not, he dismisses the supernatural and non-rational as superstition......

He goes on to assert that

Africans being pre-scientific people do not recognise any conceptual cleavage between the natural and the supernatural. They experience a situation rather than face a problem. By this I mean that they allow both the rational and non-rational elements to make an impact upon them, and any action they may take could be described more as a response of the total personality to the situation than the result of some mental exercise. (Kaunda quoted in Biko, 1978, p.44).

Clearly the above account overlaps with European interpretations concerning the essential human nature of Africans and westerners discussed in the last chapter. This and related areas of convergence will be taken up below. Of concern here is the scepticism evident in the above account towards western scientific thinking. According to Biko (who was a medical student) 'in spite of my belief in the strong need for scientific experimentation I cannot help feeling that more time should be spent in teaching man and man to live together....' (Biko, 1978, p. 44). Even when BC began to incorporate a class analysis in the late 1970s culminating in AZAPO's attempt to reconcile 'race' with class, it was the 'humanistic' aspects of the Marxist tradition (revolving around concepts such as 'alienation') rather than the claims of 'scientific socialism' that exerted more of an influence.

In place of strong claims to 'objectivity' and to 'scientific reasoning' and 'evidence' then that have characterised European racial interpretations, (especially in the liberal tradition), it was the growing body of political literature from Africa and black America on colonialism and racism that formed the discursive backdrop against which BC developed in its early years. Many of these discourses involved a much more 'open' set of rules and procedures than those employed by scientific and social scientific research. To the extent, however, that different texts came to inform the political orthodoxies of SASO and the BCM concerning human nature and the human condition; contained implicit criteria for judging right from wrong; categorised and hierarchised individuals and groups; and utilised
their own subtle technologies of power through the formation and organisation of emotional responses, they might also be described as furnishing a 'regime of truth'. With reference to the intellectual activities of SASO, Gerhart has remarked that 'never had such a deliberate and thorough-going effort been made to borrow and to selectively adapt foreign ideas in order to influence black thinking' (Gerhart, 1978, p. 273).

Influential writings from the African continent included Cheikh Ante Diop and Leopold Senghor on Negritude, Kenneth Kaunda on African socialism, and, most importantly, Julius Nyerere on self-reliance and ujamaa or African socialism. Nyerere's 1967 *Arusha Declaration* on Self-reliance stated:

> We have been oppressed a great deal; we have been exploited a great deal; and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to us being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution - a revolution that brings to an end our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, oppressed or humiliated. (Nyerere quoted in Gerhart, 1978, p. 247).

For Pityana, another leading light in the BCM the message of the declaration was clear, BLACK MAN YOU ARE ON YOUR OWN (Pityana quoted in Gerhart, 1978, p. 247).

Halisi has located BC historically with the development of New Left critical theory during the 1960s and 1970s. Halisi argues that in 'the South African case, Biko saw that aspects of liberalism, Marxism, and even African nationalism could uncritically function to defend the *status quo* or to define liberation in a way that obscured the political and psychological dynamics of racial oppression' (Halisi, 1991, p. 109). BC thus made recourse to that literature that had informed the New Left stress on psychology and culture. Important writers here included Franz Fanon, Aime Cesaire, Malcolm X, Mao Zedong, Antonio Gramsci and Amilcar Cabral. As an aspect of the New Left critique of existing ideologies internationally, BC was treated with a good deal of scepticism by the guardians of more orthodox theoretical approaches within the liberation movements. In June 1972, Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, did not consider the BCM an organisational challenge but candidly remarked that 'Black Consciousness posed a tremendous threat at the theoretical level only' (Tambo quoted in Halisi, 1991, p. 102).

Particularly influential to the young intellectuals of SASO were the writings of the Algerian-born psychiatrist Franz Fanon which had become available in South Africa by 1968 (Gerhart, 1978). Most widely read was *The Wretched of the Earth* in which Fanon discusses the psychological effects of colonialism for coloniser and colonised. Of particular
relevance for exponents of BC was Fanon's cynical views on political morality in the colonial context, which he insists are determined by the coloniser purely out of self interest. Biko makes precisely the same point in his trenchant critique of liberal values in 'Black Souls in White Skins' (Biko, 1978). Of further relevance for BC was Fanon's argument that racial conflict would have to become polarised before revolutionary change would become possible, and his rejection of gradualistic solutions. Also the deep mistrust of the black bourgeoisie expressed by Fanon in his work clearly spoke to later developments in BC thinking outlined above. Finally, Fanon's advocacy of revolutionary violence as one way of healing the psyche of the colonised anticipated AZAPO's eventual turn to armed struggle.

The black go-it-alone position of BC also articulated with the positions being put forward by black power activists in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice, the Autobiography of Malcolm X, Black Power by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton and the writings of James Cone on black theology all provided a discursive resource for the elaboration of BC and provoked considerable discussion in BC training seminars around the relevance of the black American experience for South Africa (Gerhart, 1978). In this respect it was generally accepted that whilst blacks in America could never really hope to establish a new social order on their own, this was not the case in South Africa where blacks outnumbered whites. Nonetheless, the identification of a white power structure as the main enemy along with white racism provided a common starting point for international comparisons as did the need to assert the black personality and culture.

Indeed, the term 'black' along with associated terms such as 'black is beautiful' had their beginnings in America. For the emergent BCM the term 'non-white' in apartheid-speak represented a negation - an identity by default. The term 'black' on the other hand was seen as a positive assertion of a common political identity for all those who had been at the receiving end of white racism. Further, if one's relationship to the white power structure was the real determinant of blackness, then Indians and 'coloureds' could also be considered black (see below). Given that the relatively light-skinned Malcolm X could be a leading exponent of the black cause, then political commitment rather than pigmentation was the real issue at stake. According to Biko, 'Being black is not a matter of pigmentation - being black is a reflection of a mental attitude'(Biko, 1978, p. 48). On the other hand,
the term 'non-white' could still be used to describe all those who accepted their subservient position within the power structure, joined the police force or security branch and continued to call white people 'Baas'. Slowly the influence of these new racial interpretations began to diffuse outside the ranks of SASO. By 1971 NUSAS had begun to use the term, and they were followed in 1972 by the Rand Daily Mail (Gerhart, 1978). It will be recalled that the government began to use the term to refer to Africans in the wake of the Soweto uprisings.

If political writings from the African diaspora began to exert their own 'regime of truth' within the collective black psyche, then black theology can be understood as having made a contribution towards a new 'regime of morality'. Indeed the strong links between theologians and political radicals within BC has already been indicated above. The nature and purpose of black theology is summed up in the following passage from Biko,

The bible must continually be shown to have something to say to the black man to keep him going in his long journey towards realisation of the self. This is the message implicit in 'black theology'. Black theology seeks to do away with spiritual poverty of the black people. It seeks to demonstrate the absurdity of the assumption by whites that 'ancestor worship' was necessarily a superstition and that Christianity is a scientific religion. While basing itself on the Christian message, black theology seeks to show that Christianity is an adaptable religion that fits in with the cultural situation of the people to whom it is imparted. Black theology seeks to depict Jesus as a fighting God who saw the exchange of Roman money - the oppressor's coinage - in His father's temple as so sacrilegious that it merited a violent reaction from Him - the Son of Man. (Biko, 1978, pp. 31-2).

As far as explicitly educational discourses are concerned, the writings of Paulo Freire were extremely influential for both SASO and later, for AZAPO. An undated SASO document believed to be an early leadership training manual (SASO, undated) presents Freire's ideas in some depth for analysis and discussion. Further, the AZAPO educational policy makes explicit reference to Freire's most important theoretical positions (AZAPO, 1991). According to Prinsloo (1991) the appeal of Freire's work in the South African context lies not only in the extent to which he provided alternative theoretical approaches to pedagogy, but also in the concrete prescriptions he laid out for educators engaged in 'education for liberation'.

For BC activists, Freire's work fitted in nicely with their own emphasis on developing black self-reliance. Of particular influence was Freire's conviction that learners
must be treated fundamentally as critical 'subjects' with the ability to engage with and transform their environments rather than simply as 'objects' into which prior knowledge may be deposited; that education must start from a critical understanding of the cultural environment of the learner and must involve a two-way interaction between learners and educators such that the educators also learn from the learners; that through self-expression and a critical engagement with the world learners may realise themselves as full, 'liberated' and self-reliant human beings rather than hollow receptacles reliant on others for guidance and direction.

Finally, BC activists began to construct their own narratives through writings, poetry, theatre, art and songs of the achievements of past black civilisations and cultures using as their resource a growing body of revisionist history (both oral and written). Although never fully developed, there are traces in the work of Biko and others of a narrative providing an account of the achievements and struggles of the African people (and blacks in general) against the colonial settlers, and of heroic figures in that struggle such as Shaka, Moshoeshoe and Hintsa (famous leaders of the Zulus, Basotho and Tswana respectively) (see for example Biko, 1978, p. 70). The role of other black historical figures in the anti-colonial struggle, such as Ghandi, was also acknowledged.

The BCM constructed its own version of the role of the ANC and the PAC in the struggle for black liberation to date, and of the relationship between these organisations and the BCM. This effort was seriously circumscribed, however, by the bans that had been imposed on these organisations and the danger of being accused of propagating the ideas of banned organisations and individuals (an accusation that became ever more frequently levelled at the BCM by the government during the 1970s). According to Biko, 'People like Mandela, Sobukwe, Kathrada, M.D. Naidoo and many others will also have a place of honour in our minds as true leaders of the people' (Biko, 1978, p. 37) (all these people were imprisoned or exiled leaders of the congress alliance except for Sobukwe who headed the PAC prior to his own imprisonment).

In brief, whilst SASO applauded the alliance that the ANC had struck with Indians and 'coloureds' and recognised the role of many congress alliance leaders in the struggle for black emancipation, it remained critical of the ANC's non-racialist perspective. In contrast SASO shared many of the views of the PAC, particularly on the question of non-cooperation with whites and viewed the break with non-racialism by the founders of the
PAC as the first stirrings of BC (Biko, 1978, p. 253). SASO did, however, distance itself from the hasty tactics and shabby organisation of the PAC in the period immediately following the Sharpville massacre, and in particular from the abortive Poqo uprising which culminated in the crushing of black resistance by the security forces (Gerhart, 1978). The lesson to be learnt from these heroic failures was that a more patient approach was required involving the laying of a firm psychological foundation amongst blacks for an as yet unforeseen time in the future when conditions would permit a confrontation with authority.

For the AZAPO leadership the rebellious mood of the mid-1980s provided such a situation and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (AZANLA), the armed wing of the BCM, was launched.

*Steve Biko -  "I Write What I Like"*

Although published in 1978, a year after Biko's untimely death, *I Write What I Like* is in fact a compilation of writings from the early 1970s that were taken largely from the SASO Newsletter. As such they represent earlier constructions and racial interpretations of the BCM. The writings of Steve Biko and his BC colleagues portray 'culture', 'nation' and 'race' as being organically interwoven in an Africanist tradition that dates back, depending on one's analysis, to the mid-nineteenth century wars of white conquest (Gerhart, 1978) or to the 1919 constitution of the ANC (Walshe, 1971). This tradition was given a boost within the ANC during the 1940s with the formation of a militant Congress Youth League under Anton Lembede (Walshe, 1971; Gerhart, 1978) before becoming the official policy of the PAC after its formation in 1959. Africanism claims that Africa belongs to Africans, defined as a racial and cultural group, by right of first possession and because they constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

In the South African context this translates into what Gerhart (1978) has described as an orthodox African nationalism, i.e. that South Africa is essentially an African 'nation'. It should be noted that the conception of 'nation' at work here is closer to the 'modern' conception of a geographically defined nation state discussed in the last chapter than to the *volkish* version of the Afrikaner nationalists despite the equation in Africanist discourses of nation with culture and 'race'. The related concept of Pan-Africanism looks outwards from the national context to a future in which all Africans unite in what the former Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, once described as a United States of Africa. Biko,
however, tended to confine his deliberations to the South African context.

There is little to suggest in the writings of Biko that he or his BC contemporaries regarded 'race' as signifying any profound biological difference between individuals and groups. Indeed, although Biko did occasionally use the word in an unqualified way, he actually preferred labels such as 'black people' or the 'white man' instead of, say, the 'black race' (women of whatever colour appear to have had a very marginal place in Biko's thinking if his writing is anything to go by). Further, in his antipathy towards western scientific thought, Biko may be interpreted as having taken a swipe at the entire lexicon of scientific racism. With reference to one exponent of scientific racism at the time, Biko remarked

Now we can listen to the Barnett Potters concluding with apparent glee and with a sense of sadistic triumph that the fault with the black man is to be found in his genes, and we can watch the rest of the white society echoing 'amen', and still not be moved to the reacting type of anger. (Biko, 1978, p. 72).

For Biko 'race' if it had any biological meaning at all boiled down simply to the question of skin pigmentation and other superficial phenotypical attributes. Of far greater concern to Biko was coming to terms with 'race' as a construction of White Racism, and its role in defining the position of individuals and groups within the white power structure. Thus although Biko often made reference to 'race' and 'colour' as important political determinants (see for example the discussion of 'race' and class below) he clearly regarded 'race' as a signifier, in the colonial context, of cultural and political identity. Indeed, the adoption of the term 'black' as a term with its meaning of status-more-than-colour further underlines his desire to transcend biological definitions with political ones.

Biko's work was, however, strongly culturally essentialist in three important respects. Firstly, 'culture' was perceived to be the most important determinant of social reality, social change and identity. Consequently, and secondly, the cultural sphere was considered to be the most important area for political intervention by BC. Thirdly, Biko's work also projected different cultures as possessing distinct attributes which define them in relation to other cultures. Biko in fact developed quite a sophisticated account of the dynamic nature of 'cultures', and African culture in particular, preferring to think of different cultures as evolving and 'colliding' rather than as being hermetically 'sealed off'. Biko provided his own definition of 'enculturation' which, in contrast to the account
provided by Dostal (see last chapter) placed the concept into an historical understanding of colonial oppression.

Since that unfortunate date - 1652 - we have been experiencing a process of acculturation. It is perhaps presumptuous to call it "acculturation" because this term implies a fusion of different cultures. In our case this fusion has been extremely one-sided...the Anglo-Boer culture was the more powerful culture in almost all facets. This is where the African began to lose a grip on himself and his surroundings. (Biko, 1978, pp. 40-1).

In contrast to some of the European accounts, African culture was not simply equated with a few old customs and traditions but was a dynamic entity best understood historically. Nonetheless, Biko does make a case for African culture possessing a set of fundamental attributes.

I am against the belief that African culture is time-bound, the notion that with the conquest of the African all his culture was obliterated. I am also against the belief that when one talks about African culture one is necessarily talking of the pre-Van Ribeek culture. Obviously the African culture has had to sustain severe blows and may have been battered nearly out of shape by the belligerent cultures it collided with, yet in essence even today one can easily find the fundamental aspects of the pure African culture in the present day African. Hence in taking a look at African culture I am going to refer as well to what I have termed the modern African culture. (Biko, 1978, p. 41).

It is in 'Some African Cultural Concepts' (Biko, 1978) that a comparison between western and African cultures was most fully developed. Amongst the positive attributes that Biko identified as being present in African culture were its 'man-centredness' and communality expressed in communal work; an emphasis on group conversation, music and songs; communal ownership of land and property; and a desire to share. Traditional villages were, according to Biko, designed to suit the needs of a 'community-based and man-centred society' (Biko, 1978, p. 43). Further, African's are, according to Biko, a deeply religious people. Unlike westerners, however, they do not feel the need to set aside special times for prayer as religion 'was manifest in our daily lives'. African religions, as Biko also pointed out, had no place for the concept of hell and eternal damnation. According to Biko,

It was the missionaries who confused our people with their new religion. By some strange logic, they argued that theirs was a scientific religion and ours was mere superstition...They further went on to preach a theology of the existence of hell, scaring our fathers and mothers with stories about burning in eternal flames and gnashing of teeth.
and grinding of bone. This cold cruel religion was strange to us but our fore-fathers were sufficiently scared of the unknown impending anger to believe that it was worth a try. Down went our cultural values! (Biko, 1978, p. 45).

In contrast to Africans, westerners were depicted as being cold, unfriendly and highly individualistic. He went on to qualify this sentiment by asserting that

Sure there are a few good whites just as much as there are a few bad blacks. However what we are concerned with here is group attitudes and group politics. The exception does not make a lie of the rule - it merely substantiates it. (Biko, 1978, p. 51).

As already mentioned, Biko identified 'White Racism' as being the 'fundamental problem' in South Africa, and indeed in the world at large (Biko, 1978, pp. 50-1), and clearly identified it with western culture and a propensity for aggression. Biko made the point several times that the perpetuation of White Racism was, and continued to be, premised on violence and fear.

...the Anglo-Boer culture had all the trappings of a colonialist culture and therefore was heavily equipped for conquest (Biko, 1978, p. 41).

Biko certainly defined whites as constituting the Other from an African point of view, sometimes describing them as a 'clique of foreigners' (Biko, 1978, p. 27). To the consternation of some white liberals and radicals who also opposed apartheid, whites were also to have no place in the struggle for black liberation. If whites had any role at all, it was to engage with their own racism as a group and to 'get their house in order'. In adopting these positions Biko was remaining true to central tenets of Africanist thought as it had manifested itself in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent. The ANC Youth League manifesto of 1944 had argued, for example, that Africans must free themselves for 'to trust to the mere good grace of the white man will not free him as no nation can free an oppressed group other than that group itself" (Quoted in Walshe, 1971, p. 335).

Against the inevitable charges, emanating from liberal/radical circles, of 'black racism', Biko pointed out that black self-determination was a response to White Racism, and that racism, by definition, presupposed an unequal power relationship between white and black. From this perspective blacks could not be racist against whites in the South African context (Biko, 1978, p. 25). Further, Biko was careful to point out that he was not making the case for separation on the grounds of cultural difference as he was 'sufficiently proud to believe that under a normal situation, Africans can comfortably stay with people of other cultures and be able to contribute to the joint cultures of the communities they
have joined' (p. 45).

Indians and 'coloureds' on the other hand were accepted into BC organisations on the grounds that as fellow victims of White Racism, and to the extent that they chose to identify with the black cause, they too could be considered black. Indeed, at the level of culture, 'coloureds' and particularly Indians also came in for praise in the writings of Biko, especially regarding the communality of Indian cultures (p. 30) and the proud history of struggle and passive resistance exemplified by the Ghanaian tradition in South Africa (p. 29). This acceptance was in part attributable to the American example and the influence of the new conception of 'black'. It also had a precedent in the Africanist tradition within South Africa.

The Africanist-leaning Programme of Action of the ANC Youth League produced in 1949 identified 'coloureds' as being amongst the 'original children of Africa' and Indians as an oppressed group despite some earlier hostility towards Indians within the League (Walshe, 1971, pp. 353-4). Two years earlier the Dadoo-Xuma pact had cemented relationships between the Indian Congress and the ANC, and both organisations expressed common abhorrence first at the nationalist victory of 1948 and then at the violence and rioting between Africans and Indians in Durban in 1949. Similarly, although there had been some suspicion concerning Indians expressed by some of the original founders of the PAC such as Robert Sobukwe, the organisation did eventually open its membership to Indians and 'coloureds' (Gerhart, 1978). Biko's own position regarding the need for black unity was tempered by a realistic appraisal of the effects that apartheid had on encouraging suspicion and mistrust between black groups. It will be noted that Biko stopped short of locating 'mistrust' as an aspect of racism between black groups.

Coloureds despise Africans because they, (the former) by their proximity to the Africans, may lose the chances of assimilation into the white world. Africans despise the coloureds and the Indians for a variety of reasons. Indians not only despise the Africans but in many instances also exploit the Africans in job and shop situations. (Biko, 1978, p. 52).

Biko also remained realistic about the potentially destructive role that blacks, such as Chief Buthelezi in KwaZulu, members of the Urban Bantu Councils and others might play in the quest for black unity. Of particular concern was the 'capitulation' of the likes of Buthelezi and other 'homeland' leaders to the 'ethnic' divisions constructed by the architects of apartheid (Biko, 1978, p. 35). Just as Chief Moshoeshoe and, later, the
founders of the ANC had striven for an all-embracing African unity as a means to confront the European enemy, for Biko and SASO the goal of black unity implied the rejection of ethnic categories and divisions. It also led to a rejection of those 'non-whites' who did not identify with their blackness and who collaborated with whites.

Biko's insistence on the need for black unity tied in with his whole conception of social reality, social development and social change. Firstly, Biko was adamant on 'race' rather than class being the fundamental cause of black people's oppression both in South Africa and throughout the 'Third World'.

It should therefore be accepted that an analysis of our situation in terms of one's colour at once takes care of the greatest single determinant for political action - i.e. colour - while also validly describing the blacks as the only real workers in South Africa.....the greatest anti-black feeling is to be found amongst the very poor whites whom the Class Theory calls upon to be with black workers in the struggle for emancipation. This is the kind of twisted logic that the Black Consciousness approach seeks to eradicate. (Biko, 1978, p. 50).

Making use of a dialectical approach, Biko went on to argue that,

...since the thesis is a white racism there can only be one valid antithesis i.e. a solid black unity to counterbalance the scale. If South Africa is to be a land where black and white live together in harmony without fear of group exploitation, it is only when these two opposites have interplayed and produced a viable synthesis of ideas and a modus vivendi. (Biko, 1978, p. 51).

Thus Biko's vision of a future South Africa, like that of his Africanist forbears in the ANC Youth League and later the PAC did consider the white (and Indian) presence to be a permanent one on the African continent. This was in contrast to the earlier manifestations of Africanism, and especially the Garveyite influence of the 1920s, whose adherents had recommended 'hurl the Whiteman to the sea' (Gerhart, 1978, p. 72; Walshe, 1971).

What then did Biko and his SASO contemporaries envisage to be the economic, political and cultural basis for a future integrated South Africa? For Biko the answers to these questions were intimately bound up with one another. From his culturally essentialist starting point comes the view that a future South Africa should take its direction from factors inherent in African culture. Politically this corresponds to the concept of 'majority rule', i.e. to the idea, shared by Biko's Africanist predecessors, that South Africa's political future must be determined by the African majority. As a concept it differs from the view
of democracy associated with non-racialism which has historically emphasised the protection of 'minority rights' and representation of all groups in the decision-making process (Gerhart, 1978).

At a cultural level, 'integration' would necessarily imply the dominance of the values shared by the African majority, although there would be room for difference.

.....one cannot escape the fact that the culture shared by the majority group in any given society must ultimately determine the broad direction taken by the joint culture of that society. This need not cramp the style of those who feel differently but on the whole, a country in Africa, in which the majority of the people are African must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style. (Biko, 1978, p. 24).

Following in the lines of Africanists at home, and African socialists such as Nyrere elsewhere, Biko asserted that a future South African economy based on African values would inevitably lean towards socialism. This idea, based on the 'communality' of African culture was only really elaborated on, however, in the 'black communalism' programme adopted by the Black People's Convention in 1976 (Davies et al, 1988).

This modified version of traditional African economic life was essentially a programme for a mixed economy with some state regulation of key sectors. The state would govern the use of land, set up communal villages and rent land to private farmers and other institutions. Some centralised planning would be instituted, 'strategic industries' and 'major corporations' would fall under state regulation. Private undertakings would also be encouraged. Trade unions would be recognised on a 'craft basis'. (Davies et al, 1988, p. 306).

A vision of the future political and economic shape of South Africa, however, remained embryonic in the early days of SASO and in the writings of Biko. Instead the emphasis was very much on an 'orientation towards the present' (Gerhart, 1978). The BCM therefore concerned itself with the more immediate tasks of raising black consciousness and self pride as a basis for future change. As has been discussed above this involved an emphasis on culture, and above all a mass educational effort through student seminars, theatre, art and other cultural activities.

Biko's ideas concerning schooling were generally framed in terms of a very broad critique of apartheid practices and rarely sought to provide coherent alternatives in the form of policy prescriptions. The SASO newsletters from the early 1970s are similarly devoid of in depth analyses of schooling except for one article on the role of the black teacher. It was not until the formulation of the AZAPO education policy in 1984 that any real
substance was given to BC educational ideas. It is, however, possible to identify certain themes and approaches from early BC writings that continue to influence contemporary educational debates. In a discussion of the attitudes of many rural Africans towards education at the time Biko made the following observations,

They [rural Africans] see education as the quickest way of destroying the substance of the African culture. They complain bitterly of the disruption in the life pattern, non-observation of customs, and constant derision from the non-conformists whenever any of them go through school.... How can an African avoid losing respect for his tradition when in school his whole cultural background is summed up in one word: barbarism? (Biko, 1978, p. 70).

And again in another passage,

No wonder the African child learns to hate his heritage in his days at school. So negative is the image presented to him that he tends to find solace only in close identification with the white society. (Biko, 1978, p. 29).

For Biko the answer to the alienation and sense of inferiority induced by bantu education lay, in the first instance, in a more general reassessment of African history.

No doubt, therefore, part of the approach envisaged in bringing about "black consciousness" has to be directed to the past, to seek to rewrite the history of the black man and to reproduce in it the heroes who form the core of the African background. To the extent that a vast literature about Ghandi in South Africa is accumulating it can be said that the Indian community already has started in this direction. But only scant attention is paid to African heroes. A people without a positive history is like a vehicle without an engine. Their emotions cannot be controlled and channelled in a recognisable direction. They always live in the shadow of a more successful society. (Biko, 1978, pp. 29-30).

In a Newsletter editorial entitled 'The Role of the Black teacher in the Community' (SASO, 1972) this theme was elaborated upon in relation to schooling. Black teachers were urged to 'become the guiding light in the search for BLACK TRUTH' (p. 17). Whilst it was argued that truth was relative and that 'NO ONE HAS THE MONOPOLY OF TRUTH' a black truth must suit

our needs, aspirations and goals best; irrespective of it being right or wrong in the eyes of others; irrespective of our philosophy being fallible or infallible. (SASO, 1972, p. 17).

Although brief reference was made in the article to the inadequacies of the bantu education system as a whole in terms of resources etc., it was the attitude of teachers which was singled out as the main obstacle to the development of a 'new truth'. It was argued that in a cycle of fear, learners are forced into submission by black teachers who in turn are kept
in line by black inspectors. At the heart of this regime of fear lie the white inspectorate
who impose their wishes on everybody else. In this fashion black teachers 'wittingly or
unwittingly, become instruments of violence against black people' (p. 17).

Black teachers were enjoined in the article to break out of this cycle and to begin
to serve their own communities and the goal of black self-reliance. They should do this,
so it was suggested, by employing subjects such as 'creative writing' in which pupils may
begin to develop a critical awareness of themselves and of their environments, and feel able
to contest the knowledge that they are taught. With clear indications of a strong Freirien
influence, teachers were urged to become facilitators in a dialogue that would result in the
black student's being empowered to effect change in their communities.

Before turning to a broad critique of BC discourses from a contemporary point of
view, it is important to emphasise the role of BC in the anti-racist discourses of the time.
Firstly, the relative neglect of schooling as an area for analysis and intervention in the
SASO Newsletters reflected the origins of BC in the universities, and the subsequent
preoccupation with student politics. Further, the rise of BC also coincided with a rupture
in the 'historical memory' of those involved in struggle against apartheid education caused
by the banning of the liberation movements. It was not until the mid-1980s that the
Democratic Movement was able to resurrect and engage with the precedents set by earlier
interventions such as those of the African Education Movement.

Nonetheless, as a discourse of its time BC was fairly successful in the early days
at organising black opposition to apartheid around the BC hegemonic project. Despite a
certain ambivalence from sections of the Indian and 'coloured' communities concerning the
use of the term 'black' to include them (Gerhart, 1978), many Indians and 'coloureds' were
mobilised around BC themes. The early BC emphasis on the present and on cultural as
opposed to economic and political issues made it possible to mobilise a range of class and
other interests under the BC umbrella from black business people to 'homeland' leaders
such as Gatsha Buthelezi. For those blacks prepared to work within apartheid's institutions,
a commitment to African cultural values could actually be understood as a career asset. As
BC increasingly aligned itself with a socialist developmental path, however, and became
more radical in its political goals, it became more difficult to hold this alliance together.

Of central importance to the whole BC project, and what sets it apart from the non-
racial tradition, is the emphasis on the role of language, education, the media, arts and
culture in the construction of individual and group identities. In the language of contemporary social theory, the efficacy of BC can be understood to have lain in the extent to which Biko and his colleagues engaged with racism as a discursive phenomenon and 'deconstructed' the racist discourses of the time. Further, whereas the non-racial tradition has tended to concentrate on the set of legal and political rules and institutions that have guaranteed white supremacy, BC has emphasised the psycho-cultural aspects of racism, or as one commentator has suggested 'the pathology of racism in South Africa' (Halisi, 1991, p. 102). Through asserting the relativity of 'truth' BC discourses also effectively challenged the essentialism of liberal and Marxist analyses with regard to their conceptualisations of the black struggle, thus creating space for autonomous black analyses and interventions at a time when blacks had been politically marginalised.

Despite a certain overlap in educational themes, BC provided quite a distinct focus from that of the non-racial tradition as it has developed since the 1950s. Educational struggles within the non-racial tradition have increasingly tended to focus on questions of access, quality and equalisation of educational opportunities. This contrasts with the almost exclusive focus within the BC tradition on questions primarily concerned with culture, identity and the curriculum. Thus whereas the mobilisation of populist historical narratives has been a feature of all the hegemonic projects considered in this study, in the hands of the BCM they take on a central and primary significance. Further, it is no coincidence given the continued influence of BC ideas on a new generation of black youth that language issues provided the focus and spark for the Soweto uprisings (the centrality of this issue is a phenomenon that Marxist accounts have found difficult to explain). Biko's contribution to contemporary educational debates then lies in the extent to which he provided a language and an approach with which to begin to engage with issues around 'race', culture and identity.

When considered in relation to subsequent events and more recent educational debates, however, BC may be found wanting in a number of ways. Indeed, AZAPO have only gone some of the way towards addressing these shortcomings as they are related to areas of contradiction within BC racial interpretations as a whole. The aim here will be to outline in very general (and not necessarily educational) terms some of the shortcomings of early BC discourses on 'race'. This discussion will then provide the necessary basis for a consideration of AZAPO's more explicitly educational discourses which will be set out
Having provided a basis for deconstructing white racist discourses, BC intellectuals failed to follow the logic of their own arguments and critically examine the constructed nature of their own accounts. Rather than present 'culture' as a category constantly open to interpretation and reinterpretation by competing groups and interests (even amongst 'blacks'), BC discourses simply sought to counterpose new 'black truths' to old 'white truths'. Thus interpretations of African and black culture that were themselves historically contingent and the product of a select group of predominantly male students became reified as the basis for a new cultural essentialism. It is this essentialism that lies at the heart of the contradictions within BC.

Firstly, by privileging culture, other determinants of identity such as class, gender, age, sexuality etc were marginalised. The experience of black women within the BCM seems to have been a contradictory one at best. On the one hand BC provided a political outlet and an assertion of black identity that some black women seem to have found important and empowering (Ramphele, 1991). On the other hand, however, most of the BC leadership were male and there was little in Biko's or indeed SASO's thinking that spoke to the experiences of black women as a distinct group. Indeed, in adopting an uncritical attitude towards African cultures, BC discourses effectively closed off any consideration of the changing role of women in those cultures. For an organisation that put so much store by the role of language in oppression, it adopted a remarkably uncritical attitude towards its own use of language in relation to gender (although one not untypical of the times). One might be forgiven, after having read Biko's work, for thinking that the world was and always had been inhabited solely by men. As such BC effectively provided continuity on European discourses and interpretations.

BC also excluded progressive whites from its activities at the price of demobilising a group that had begun to play a significant role in the anti-apartheid struggle during the 1950s and earlier, and who brought with them access to resources that SASO simply did not have. Such was the price of the insistence on black self reliance, a price that subsequent generations of black youth were reluctant or unwilling to pay. Finally, for many ordinary blacks living in the townships and rural areas, BC with its emphasis on issues of culture and identity must have seemed a bit on the abstract side when considered next to the more pressing, material issues thrown up by day to day life. As such BC can be considered very
much a product of student politics with a following that largely reflected its origins.

SASO's outright rejection of a class analysis probably had the biggest implications for its conceptualisation of culture and identity. It also led to quite contradictory positions. On the one hand, as has been discussed above, SASO thought of blacks as constituting a distinct class separate from, say, the white working class. At one and the same time, however, SASO began to develop during the 1970s a critical perspective towards sections of the black community who were collaborating with the regime. Without resort to a sophisticated class analysis, however, SASO were without the theoretical resources to differentiate between competing interests within the black community. This actually allowed sections of the black middle class, notably within the business community, to use BC as a means of advancing their own interests in the context of 'total strategy' and the government's policy of increasing class divisions amongst blacks (Davies et al, 1988).

It has also been argued that BC's lack of emphasis on class and class struggle contributed towards the weakness and lack of militancy of the BC trade union BAWU (Davies et al, 1988). Especially in the period before SASO's 'turn to the community' in 1972, the SASO leadership also appears to have shown a certain insensitivity regarding their own class position in relation to the black majority. There is, for example, little self reflection on the issues of how SASO came to be defining black culture and experience at that particular historical moment, and the implications that this might have for the version of reality they were offering.

The focus on culture can further be understood as having led to an almost exclusive and naive emphasis on the individual teacher in his or her classroom as the focus and lever for educational change. There was a distinct lack of consideration within early BC discourses of the economic, legal and political determinants of apartheid education. Unsurprisingly, therefore, these areas were not prioritised for intervention. The emphasis on the individual teacher is complemented by Biko's concern with the black individual and group psyche and the question of a 'positive self image'. It will be argued that Biko's approach towards the 'psychological' level, like his understanding of racist discourse, pointed in the right direction but failed to adequately follow through the logic of its own conclusions.

As has been shown above, Biko sought to draw attention to the important role of
the historical narrative in individual and group identity formation. It will be recalled that Biko commented that a 'people without a positive history is like a vehicle without an engine'. From the perspective adopted in this study, such an insight is to be welcomed because it draws attention to the ways in which individual and group identities are discursively constituted. This is in contrast to those approaches within social psychology that relate the causes and effects of racism to psychological acts of cognition, emotion or motivation within both individual and group psyches (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Rather than starting from an essentialist view of what the individual 'psyche' entails, the approach favoured here assumes that

the identity and forms of subjectivity which become instantiated in discourse at any given moment should be seen as a sedimentation of past discursive practices. A sense of identity and subjectivity is constructed from the interpretative resources - the stories and narratives of identity - which are available, in circulation, in our culture. This subjectivity is also constrained, of course, by other social practices. Some accounts of self are more readily available to some than others. (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 78).

The main advantages of such an approach lies in the way that it breaks down the dichotomy between the 'individual' and the 'social' and allows for an understanding of how 'individual' and group actions are embedded in wider discursive and social practices. Further, such an approach also facilitates an appreciation of the contradictory nature of subjectivities in relation to racist discourse. One theme of the last chapter, for example, was the way in which racist discourses are often accompanied by appeals to egalitarianism and fair play and sometimes even to a 'rejection' of racism. Racist discourses also work in relation to other types of discourses that define subjectivities, such as those around class, gender and sexuality, in a variety of different and sometimes contradictory ways depending on the context.

Clearly this account of identity formation as an open, fluid and flexible process militates against a simplistic view of 'the black personality' as postulated in some BC discourses. As has already been suggested, the term 'black' was constructed to encompass a variety of classes and other groups. Although many of these groups have been successfully mobilised around a common black identity in the past, they also represent a variety of often conflicting interests. Further, the relationship of each of these groups to racist discourses is not uniform but mediated by gender, class, sexuality, age etc. Indeed, the analysis presented in the previous chapter would suggest the existence of a plurality of
different racisms involving different constructions of social reality and of subjectivities.

It would also seem overly simplistic to speak of one 'black response' to racism as was the case with Biko's conception of a negative self image. Maureen Stone has made a strong case in the American context against the notion that blacks necessarily have a negative self image as a result of white racism, arguing that many blacks have access to cultural resources from which they derive a good deal of self pride (Stone, 1981). Biko's own history pays testimony to the fact that even during the darkest days of oppression under apartheid, blacks never completely succumbed to the inferior status imposed on them by whites. Further, as Sibisi has pointed out, Biko himself was aware that 'the rural, "traditional" African may have a different consciousness of the self, one largely unaffected by the influences that have impinged so greatly upon the more educated, Westernised urban dweller' (Sibisi, 1991, p. 134).

The tendency to oversimplify the black response to racism led directly to the espousal of equally simplistic solutions, namely the counterposing of a 'white' truth with a 'black' one. If a poor self image was the result of white historical narratives and accounts of social reality, then the solution for Biko and his colleagues was to provide their own versions. Unfortunately, Biko's own accounts of culture were both selective and exclusionary in important ways, and tended to forestall any ongoing debates about different kinds of black identities under apartheid. Further, the emphasis on a positive self image reinforces the tendency to see the individual classroom as the focus for educational change. According to SASO, and following Freire, it was the job of teachers to lead their charges towards a more critical understanding of their oppressive situation and ultimately empower them to change their environment.

What such an approach fails to engage with, and this is a criticism that has also been levelled at Freire's work (Prinsloo, 1991), is the complex relationship between knowledge and power in the capitalist/colonial situation. Both SASO and Freire did not seem much interested in formal schooling as a site of struggle except, in the case of SASO, in whatever gaps could be found in the formal curriculum for 'creative writing' and similar consciousness-raising exercises. The content of the rest of the school curriculum, and indeed the role of the school as a powerful social institution was not problematised from a transformative perspective. Some of these issues will be developed further below.

SASO's cultural reductionism provides a further source of contradiction when
considered against the hegemonic projects of grand and petty apartheid. As has been suggested above, BC discourses did go some way towards rejecting 'race' as a basis for differentiation. They continued, however, to use definitions and categories from the very repertoire that they set out to oppose. This was most obvious in the uncritical use of the four racial categories operative under apartheid. In brief, BC's critique of biological essentialism remained implicit rather than explicit and recourse to biological categories can be seen to contradict the overall BC emphasis on cultural difference.

Firstly, it is highly problematic to argue that the four racial groups constitute distinct cultural entities. By conflating 'race' and culture, important differences within racially defined groups are missed. This tendency is reinforced by an uncritical and simplistic use of the term 'black' which can reduce the totality of black experiences to a simple opposition to racism. At the political level, the advantages of different approaches that have aimed at mobilising distinct religious, language and other groupings within the black community around issues that directly speak to their experiences as well as to the broad anti-apartheid struggle have become increasingly clear in recent times. This latter approach was adopted by the UDF during the 1980s, for example, to some effect.

Secondly, the unproblematic use of racial categories made it easier for BC ideas concerning the cultural attributes of different groups to become co-opted into racist discourses such as those of Dostal. There is very little to distinguish Biko's and Dostal's portrayal of all Africans as a basically unscientific people except perhaps in the extent to which they were considered capable of becoming scientific. Biko and Dostal both related the propensity for scientific enquiry to 'mind sets' associated with European and African cultures. Whereas Biko's analysis tended to project a slightly more dynamic view of cultures, however, in which lack of scientific education was also related to the colonial legacy and the paucity of bantu education, Dostal's vision of African culture is more time bound and immutable. Nonetheless, by a sleight of hand Dostal was able to turn Biko's critique of 'enculturation' under colonialism into her own case for 'mutual enculturation'(see last chapter). Thus whereas Biko understood future integration of cultures to be essentially a process led by the majority group (a reversal of enculturation under colonialism), Dostal argued that integration should only occur when Europeans and blacks are represented in equal numbers.

To the extent, however, that both writers construct 'culture' as a neatly defined and
discrete entity they both miss the extent to which different 'cultural' groups have mixed and repositioned elements from other contexts. Nowhere is this more true than in the case of science where developments in western science during the enlightenment borrowed heavily from Arabic, Chinese, Indian and indeed African ideas and approaches dating back to ancient times (see Mears, 1986; Bernal, 1987).

This is not only the case with science but with other cultural attributes from the arts and music to the social sciences. Indeed Biko's terms of reference in his writings as well as the very language used (English) militate against the strong culturally essentialist claims that he makes. At the heart of Biko's ideas concerning the uniqueness of African culture is its supposed 'man-centredness' (sic). He even goes so far as to claim that the major contribution that African culture can make is in giving future civilisations a more 'human face'. Such an interpretation flies in the face of post-colonial history, however, where in the broader context of neo-colonialism, yesterdays victims have often become tommorrows executioners. Further, to claim that African cultural values inevitably lead to a socialist dispensation is highly dubious. From the perspective of the 1990s a culturally essentialist argument would have to reach precisely the opposite conclusion given the capitalist developmental paths adopted by most African countries.

By way of a summary and with reference to Pecheaux's categorisation of the ways in which individuals and groups respond to their interpellation by various discourses (outlined in chapter two), the following observations may be made concerning the relationship between BC and European discourses. BC's accounts contain elements of identification, mis-identification and counter-identification all at once. There is an identification with many of the terms of reference of European accounts including those around racial and gender categories. There is also a mis-identification or simple rejection of racist language and practice and particularly the inferior status with which black identities are imbued by European racist accounts. There is also a counter-identification struggling to emerge from BC discourses that seeks to assert a positive image of black cultures (albeit problematically), and an alternative future vision based on humanist principles and free of exploitation under racial capitalism.
AZAPO Education Policy

Many aspects of the BC interpretative repertoire as used by AZAPO differ only slightly from that adopted by SASO. Only a few minor developments, therefore, need be mentioned here. To the earlier BC concept of nation, AZAPO added the term 'Azania' as an 'indigenous' alternative to 'South Africa'. The precise origins of the term are shrouded in uncertainty, but it appears to have its beginnings not in Africa, but as a Greek form of the Persian word Zanj-bar (Zanzibar) meaning 'land of the blacks' (Saunders, 1983; Branford, 1991). It is the word's association with the East African slave trade that has been particularly influential in deterring the ANC and other charterist organisations from adopting it.

The term 'Azanian people' was apparently used to include whites, although, as the meaning of the word suggests, it also served to underline the blackness of the population as a whole. Further, in the discourses of AZAPO, the pan-Africanist vision was more fully developed than was the case with earlier BC discourses. AZAPO also located Azania more clearly as a non-aligned member of the international community and as the potential ally of other countries who have suffered under European colonialism in the developing world (AZAPO, 1991).

The discourses of AZAPO remained culturally essentialist in two important respects. Firstly, to the extent that 'politics, economics and culture are inextricably tied up' (AZAPO, 1991, p. 228) capitalism and apartheid were considered to be aspects of western culture. Secondly, the liberation of blacks from colonial oppression was understood to involve, in the first instance, a reaffirmation of black culture and the 'cultural personality' (AZAPO, 1991, p. 237). What emerged from the 1984 policy statement were two much clearer conceptions of culture than had been projected by earlier BC discourses. They correspond to the two major meanings ascribed to the term in the history of western thought as characterised by Raymond Williams (1983), namely culture as a complete 'way of life', and culture as a set of customs, institutions and traditions. It was the first sense that predominated, however, in the discourses of AZAPO. They also took their analysis of culture further than was the case with SASO. Reaffirming black cultures would involve emphasising the positive and negative aspects as well as presenting an historical account of cultural change.
Culture, like history, must be considered an expanding, flexible and developing phenomenon.... Culture does not warrant indiscriminate compliments e.g. a 'back to Africa' or 'back to nature' approach.... No cultural values must be blindly accepted without critically examining them and eliminating regressive or potentially regressive elements. (AZAPO, 1991, p. 236).

The policy statement also took a much more obviously critical position towards the term 'race' than had been the case with Biko and SASO. This was exemplified in the qualified usage of the term as a basis for social categorisation (AZAPO, 1991, p. 222; p. 223). Further, apartheid's racial categories were not used as a signifier of distinct cultural identities in South Africa as was the case with the SASO usage. The term 'black', however, was still used in a political sense to signify all those who had been at the receiving end of European racism both in Azania and throughout the world. In the South African context the terms white and black were also clearly linked to a class identity. Whites represented the ruling class who were also said to constitute part of the 'Western power elite' (AZAPO, 1991, p. 224). Blacks were identified as constituting the working class including those 'non-white' collaborators with the colonial power.

Racism was still identified as being the major 'problem' in the South African context. In the discourses of AZAPO racism was characterised as a set of institutional arrangements organised by the white ruling class in order to secure their own power. This kind of 'institutionalised racism' was exemplified by the education system. We are conscious of the fact that the means of communication and education are owned and controlled by the ruling class in order to promote, perpetuate, sustain and maintain its self-interest. (AZAPO, 1991, p. 222).

According to AZAPO racism also involved the undermining and destruction of black cultural norms and values which in turn resulted in the de-humanisation of the black personality and the inculcation of a negative self-image amongst blacks. Through promoting white culture, the education system was complicit in assimilating blacks through a process of enculturation into white values and norms including those of capitalism and racism, and inducing superiority/inferiority complexes within whites and blacks respectively. Once again it was the psycho-cultural aspects of racism that were of primary concern for AZAPO and which constituted the principal area for intervention.

Development, therefore entailed in these discourses an emphasis on consciousness-raising amongst blacks and the inculcation of a critical awareness of the effects of racism
and capitalism on the black personality. Only then could blacks cease to be alienated from their own culture, retrieve their full humanity and develop the collective sense of self pride necessary for the revolutionary destruction of the white power structure. Of importance as far as an understanding of AZAPO's views on social change are concerned is the idea that a collective vision of the future must be built before revolution is possible.

The dominant ideas of the new society will be those of the liberated oppressed: more specifically those of the black working class. These ideas will not arise phoenix-like from the ruins of the oppressive society but will grow, as they grow even now, as the liberatory struggle gains momentum. (AZAPO, 1991, p. 233).

For AZAPO then, a future society would be based on the values of the black working class and would inevitably be socialist. Politically this would entail the introduction of a constituent assembly and the decentralisation of decision-making (including that over education) to localities. AZAPO went further than earlier BC discourses by linking the ultimate success of a 'black cultural renaissance' to a transformation of existing economic, political and institutional arrangements.

As was the case with SASO the two main areas covered by the AZAPO education policy were those of the curriculum and of culture. It is further indicative of AZAPO's approach that they rejected a simple process of 'Africanisation' as a means of bringing about educational change.

Africanisation or blackenising of the personnel in the economic and other social institutions will not give expression to the black personality. (AZAPO, 1991, p. 236).

Rather, they went on to argue, the emphasis should lie on the development of an anti-racist education.

Our concern is not centrally with multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-racial or non-racial education but with anti-racist education (which by its very nature would include the study of various cultures). (AZAPO, 1991, p. 236).

The precise nature of anti-racist education as envisaged by AZAPO was never precisely defined. Given their views on development, however, it would seem to have entailed the following. In the first instance it would involve developing amongst all students a critical awareness of the institutional and psychological dimensions of European racism, and providing an account of black cultures and civilisations that included positive as well as negative aspects. It would also aim to 'promote and create programmes to combat prejudice'. Once again the writings of Paulo Freire had a direct influence on the
development of these ideas (AZAPO, 1991, p. 230). This educational effort would then lay the foundation for a genuine transformation of the institutions at the level of values and principles, and not just simply personnel. In a new system all 'racial, ethnic, class and sex discrimination' would be abolished. Further, anti-racist education would necessarily involve the re-education of existing elites.

The cultural alienation of the elite amongst the oppressed who are the victims of what is referred to as false consciousness, by virtue of their colonial mentality, superiority complex, and their relatively favoured economic position, necessitates that they be reconverted to black culture. They must rid themselves of cultural values based on racist and capitalist motives. They must embrace the cultural values of the indigenous people. (AZAPO, 1991, p. 229).

In keeping with the writings of Nyrere amongst others, the development of a national culture was to be one task of the new anti-racist school curriculum. This would inevitably involve a selection of the best attributes of all cultures in Azania but with a necessary emphasis on African culture, traditions and values. Curricula would be made more relevant to the life worlds and needs of the learners rather than simply serve the interests of an elite. All subjects including the natural sciences would be given a more 'human' face through a consideration of the social and political aspects of scientific enquiry. Once again subjects such as history, along with English literature, would become important vehicles for new interpretations of Azanian history and of black cultures. English would be used as a lingua franca although African languages would also be developed. The choice of English as a national language reflected the desire to transcend 'tribalism' and 'ethnic' boundaries, and to provide an easy link between Azania and the rest of the world. The new curricula would also seek to meet the human resource needs of a transformed economy. Active citizenship would be encouraged through education, and realised in a practical way through pupil government of schools.

A consideration of AZAPO's education policies affords the opportunity of providing a more focused critique of the educational implications of the BC interpretative repertoire as it has developed since the early 1970s. As was the case with earlier BC discourses, most of the criticisms considered below relate to AZAPO's continued cultural essentialism. As mentioned above, however, although AZAPO gave culture a causal primacy, their view of culture was more critical and dynamic than was the case with earlier BC discourses. In terms of their prescriptions regarding a new curriculum this entailed a necessary selection
of positive cultural aspects from the cultures of all 'social groups' from which a new 'living' culture could be created. It also entailed the rejection of 'regressive' aspects of different cultures.

On the face of it, such an approach allows space for a much more fluid and flexible view of cultural identities through the curriculum. It facilitates, for example, an interrogation of different cultures from feminist perspectives. Indeed the AZAPO document explicitly referred to the need to eliminate discrimination based on sex. This tendency was counteracted, however, by a continued homogenisation of groups into the categories 'black' and 'white' and the use of these categories as fundamental markers of cultural difference. In this respect the importation of a 'class' analysis into the BC paradigm did not help. By conflating 'race' and class identities, different class positions within the black population were subsumed under the term 'black working class'. Similarly, such an approach failed to acknowledge AZAPO's own class origins predominantly within the ranks of the urban petty bourgeoisie (Davies et al, 1988).

It might be argued, however, that AZAPO's emphasis on democratic control of institutions goes some way towards addressing the problems of agency thrown up by earlier BC discourses. AZAPO were at pains to stress that any educational future cannot be defined and led by an elite group of professionals. Rather, new aims for education must come from the people themselves and should be elaborated upon by a constituent assembly. According to AZAPO 'Leadership should be like a froth on a wave, dependent on the wave, which represents the people, forever moving forward renascent' (AZAPO, 1991, p. 231). Despite AZAPO's flamboyant use of imagery, however, the precise nature of the relationship between leaders and masses remained rather vague, as did the relationship between AZAPO and the overall BC project. There is always the lingering suspicion that they perceived themselves as the 'vanguard' of the revolution and in a particularly privileged position to espouse the views of the black working class despite their own class origins.

AZAPO also exhibited that leap of faith characteristic of many Marxist accounts of social change, and completely unfounded in historical experience, that socialist values are the necessary property of the working class. When conflated with the view that African culture is necessarily socialistic in orientation the outcome is a powerful cocktail of half-baked assertions.
From the perspective of this study, however, and in spite of the above criticisms, the basic idea of democratising education is to be welcomed. If education is to project a humanist vision, which inevitably it must, then that vision must be as democratically defined and as inclusive as possible. Indeed, AZAPO's proposals concerning a constituent assembly and pupil participation in school governance anticipated ideas that were to be more widely discussed in subsequent years. Nonetheless, it will be argued in the next chapter that together with the ANC's proposals for democratising education, there remains much to be said in practical and political terms about how the policy-making process may be more fully democratised.

Besides addressing issues around the opening up of institutional and political arrangements, the AZAPO document also went a little way towards addressing issues concerned with the economic empowerment of blacks by mentioning that students ought to be equipped for their 'future occupational roles'. This point was never fully developed, however, and tended to stand in contradiction to rather than complement the main thrust of the document which remained firmly focused on cultural and psychological liberation, as a necessary basis for structural change. One important aspect of this latter emphasis was the proposal to make education 'revolutionary' (at least initially). What this implied for AZAPO, was an immediate concern in the curriculum with a reinterpretation of black culture and history and making subjects more immediately relevant to the students and to the needs of 'black communities'. It also implied 'the study of current social problems to the end that the student may thereby be prepared to grapple with the realities of modern life and to participate intelligently in the reconstruction of society' (AZAPO 1991, p. 234).

It has already been argued in relation to Biko's work that by emphasising 'psychological' liberation within the individual classroom, important aspects of the relationship between knowledge and power were being overlooked. It is worth elaborating on this point in relation to education and the theoretical approach adopted in this study. It will be recalled that for Foucault, knowledge and power were inseparable and were indeed two sides of the same coin. The power that Foucault had in mind was the 'positive' power of the disciplines over the human body and indeed over entire populations.

From a Foucauldian perspective then, and in agreement with BC ideas, there is certainly a case to be made for encouraging amongst students a critical reflection on different disciplines within the curriculum and their accompanying forms of rationality. In
particular, Foucault was concerned with the 'dubious' sciences - those disciplines which have as their object the human body. In this regard, social Darwinism, eugenics and population genetics would seem to be ideal candidates for critical analysis and reflection, perhaps as a component of a secondary school science course. Just as Foucault was interested in the emergence of the 'subject' of psychiatry, criminology, etc. (the mental patient, the criminal and so on), an analysis of social Darwinism would concern itself with the emergence of the 'racial' subject and the discursive and non-discursive conditions that made this possible. Similarly, a study of different kinds of historical narratives would betray underlying assumptions about individuals and groups.

It will be recalled that science and history provided important rationale for apartheid's dividing practices, and indeed for resistance against them. Attention could be drawn to the linkages between certain disciplines and various social hegemonies. Such an approach would obviously highlight the contested nature of the various disciplines and lead students away from a naive belief in the 'objectivity' of different subjects. Rather than simply counterpose one 'truth' to another (as in BC discourses), it would in fact problematise the whole notion of different truths in relation to power. Further, such an approach would not, and indeed could not, preclude the teacher from taking a moral and political stand on the question of 'race', as even if neutrality were desirable, it would be impossible to maintain.

Engaging with the positive power of the disciplines, however, is only one aspect of the knowledge/power relationship. Having directed attention towards the way that different technologies of power within the various disciplines become colonised by various social hegemonies, the question of the 'negative' power, exercised by some social groups over others becomes of salient importance. It is at this point that theoretically the anti-racist enterprise suggested here parts company with Foucault and engages instead with Gramsci's educational ideas. It is also at this point that the BC/Freirien problematic is to be found particularly constraining. An application of Gramsci's educational ideas to education in South Africa has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Tikly, 1990). Only a few important points need be considered here.

Gramsci rejected approaches to education that sought to make erudite knowledge more 'relevant' to the life-world of the child. Rather than water down the academic curriculum to bring it more in line with the supposed 'interests' of the individual child,
Gramsci argued for exactly the opposite, namely a 'disinterested' approach. He understood that there was a necessary gap between the hegemonic forms of knowledge that had developed under the bourgeoisie, and the home culture of the students, especially those from working class and peasant backgrounds (nowhere is this more the case than in many parts of South Africa). The educational task for Gramsci lay in imparting the 'baggage' of the academic curriculum to as many such children as possible. Only then could a new generation hope to put that 'baggage in order' in terms of their own interests, needs and aspirations as a group (Gramsci, 1971). Not only was the authority of dominant forms of knowledge recognised by Gramsci, but so was the authority of the teacher. He recognised that whilst there was a place and a need for experimentation and critical reflection in education (especially in the latter years), and that the teacher had to try to provide a bridge between the cultures of home and school, schooling must also necessarily involve an authoritarian element, including rote learning.

Clearly this perspective differs in crucial respects from the 'revolutionary' educational ideas of AZAPO. If a new generation of black youth are to be genuinely empowered, then the emphasis from a Gramscian perspective must lie fairly and squarely on the imparting of basic skills and facts, approaches and procedures of academic knowledge as it is currently organised. Indeed, it is foolhardy to believe that the school curriculum can be a possible site for the wholesale appropriation and transformation of subjects such as science and technology, for example, by those seeking to gear such subjects more towards the 'interests' of the historically marginalised (e.g. by emphasising vocationalism and basic skills training). Taylor et al (1989) have drawn attention to the 'curriculum chain' or the complex linkages between the content of the school curriculum and the social production of knowledge in society at large. Their analysis demonstrates the extent to which the school curriculum is heavily determined by the production and canonization of hegemonic knowledge in social, political and academic institutional sites far away from the school itself. It is suggested here that the school curriculum will only become more 'relevant' to the needs of ordinary people once political, economic and developmental priorities become more relevant to those needs.

Such a perspective does not rule out the possibility for progressive intervention in the school curriculum, however. After all the curriculum is not just 'given' by processes of canonization and legitimation elsewhere, but is the product of choice and contestation
within and between different kinds of hegemonic knowledge, about what ought to be included and how that material should be taught. There is no contradiction between recognising the importance of imparting hegemonic forms of knowledge whilst at one and the same time developing an anti-racist approach understood from the perspective of this chapter. There are, for example, many texts by African and other black authors that have been accepted into the canons of English literature. There is also a growing body of revisionist history, facts and approaches from which history syllabi appropriate for a democratic South Africa might be developed. African art and music have often set important precedents and standards for the development of these fields internationally. Further, there is much that can be said about the debt that 'western' science and mathematics owes to black civilisations and cultures and individuals both past and present as has been suggested above. An archaeological approach towards all the disciplines would, no doubt, reveal a similar story (clearly this would involve going further back than the beginning of the European enlightenment as was the case with Foucault).

It has been argued that South Africa is experiencing a time of immense upheaval and organic crisis. Racial, cultural and national identities are being drastically renegotiated and redefined within this context. Racist discourses continue to be mobilised to shore up white privileges and black anger and resentment after three hundred years of colonial oppression and in the face of continuing inequalities is a phenomenon that will need to be engaged with. Biko also pointed to some of the divisions that apartheid has encouraged between black groups. Although white racism has been the focus of this study, further research is needed on these dynamics in a changing context. Further, there is no guarantee that a new South African national identity will not be defined partly through the exclusion of immigrants from the poorer front line states. Increases in unemployment and new commitments to put South Africans back to work could make immigration a big issue in the 1990s.

In a highly influential intervention in the anti-racist debate in Britain, Stuart Hall has suggested that the role of social sciences in engaging with 'race' should be one of 'deconstructing the obvious' (Hall, 1981). He argues that it is no good teachers trying to ignore issues of 'race', because as part of the 'common sense' assumptions and beliefs within society at large, racism is an ever-present reality in the classroom situation. There is a vast international literature on strategies for engaging with racism in the classroom that
might usefully inform the development of indigenous approaches. Following Hall, there is certainly a need for treating 'race' as more than just a set of prejudicial attitudes and psychological responses. Racial accounts need to be historicised and understood in terms of the way they articulate with economic, legal and political factors but not so that racism is understood simply as a reflex of those factors.

Sibisi has pointed to some of the appalling scars that have been left on black families and individuals as a result of the migrant labour system, police brutality and torture, and participation by children in acts of violence associated with the anti-apartheid struggle (Sibisi 1991). Education has a very important role to play here not only through helping victims of violence to discursively engage with the causes of that violence but to genuinely empower them through education to make a better life for themselves, their families and their communities.

In summary to this section then, the legacy of BC has been an emphasis on the role of language, culture and the curriculum as a vehicle for challenging racism. Although fault has been found with many aspects of the BC repertoire and approach, it has been argued that this emphasis might fruitfully be pursued in the development of a contemporary anti-racist education. The concerns of BC stand in contrast in important respects to those of the non-racial tradition which will be the focus of the next section.

Non-Racialism - the Development of an Educational Ideal

The events considered in this section were chosen for their significance in the development of the most dominant interpretative repertoire to have emerged from the broad anti-apartheid forces. The first event to be considered is the initiation of the search for alternatives to apartheid education in the form of the African Education Movement (AEM) and the ANC's cultural clubs. The texts considered in relation to this event include speeches by prominent ANC leaders and learning materials prepared specially for the clubs. The second event to be discussed is the development of people's education both at home and in exile at the ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO). Relevant documents for consideration here once again include speeches by prominent leaders such as Zwelakhe Sisulu of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), resolutions from NECC conferences and the ANC's education policy written in exile. The final event for
consideration is the development of the recent ANC Policy Framework document (CEPD, 1994) written in the context of the transition to democracy. The NEPI reports have not been included for analysis in this section because of the similarities between its racial interpretations to those of the historically more significant Policy Framework. It is worth briefly recapping some of the major economic and political developments surrounding each of these events starting with the birth of the cultural clubs in 1955.

Mention has already been made in previous chapters of African opposition to the introduction of apartheid laws including the Bantu Education Act. Long before the content of the act was known the ANC passed various resolutions condemning the take-over of African education by the Native Affairs Department (Feit, 1967). In this they were joined by some of the churches and missionaries who had up until then been responsible for running many schools for African children (Huddleston, 1956). ANC opposition to the act following its implementation in 1954, and in particular the decision to boycott schools was, however, characterised by a good deal of uncertainty and contestation within the organisation. Whilst the militant Youth League favoured the boycotting strategy, more senior members of the ANC urged caution (Karis, Carter and Gerhart, 1977; Lodge, 1984). When boycotts did eventually get under way in April 1955 they were concentrated on the East Rand, the Eastern Cape urban centres and black rural communities. At the height of the boycott some 10,000 children were involved and faced expulsion from school. Despite threats to expel boycotting children by the Minister for Native Affairs, 7,000 children did not return to school by the ultimatum date of the 25th April and were subsequently expelled.

In response to political demand, the ANC together with the churches and the Congress of Democrats (an organisation for white opponents of apartheid) set up the African Education Movement (AEM) on the 23rd of May, 1955. It was chaired by Trevor Huddleston. The initial aims of the AEM were all concerned with providing educational alternatives for boycotting children and included the establishment of private schools; setting up cultural clubs in the townships; and encouraging education at home. In effect the cultural clubs became the AEM's main pre-occupation. Although some of the clubs persisted for over a year, they eventually failed largely because they were not allowed to teach children in a formal sense and could, therefore, not compete with government schools. Opposition to bantu education was part of the broader resist apartheid campaign
and was articulated to the hegemonic project of creating equal rights of citizenship for all within a non-racial democratic South Africa.

The context for the emergence of people's education in South Africa has been fairly comprehensively dealt with in earlier chapters. It will be recalled that the setting up of first the Soweto Parent's Crisis Committee and then the National Education Crisis Committee was a response on the part of concerned parents to the ongoing strategy of boycotting schools under the slogan 'liberation first, education later' and to the continuing failure of the state and private sectors reform initiatives within black education. It also coincided with the continuing rise of the UDF, the imposition of a state of emergency and a call by the ANC in exile to change strategies from a focus on 'ungovernability' to one of setting up organs of 'people's power'. People's education can be understood as the educational component of this strategy. As mentioned in the previous section, many black youth had moved back into the non-racial fold during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a phenomenon that coincided with the re-emergence of the ANC as a political and military force. Political developments were also fuelled by deepening economic crisis, recession and growing unemployment.

In exile, the response of the ANC to the Soweto uprisings was the establishment in 1979 of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Morogoro, Tanzania to cater for the many young people who had fled South Africa. The school was built on land donated by the Tanzanian government and included a nursery, primary and secondary schools as well as a vocational training centre in Dakawa, a farm and workshops. SOMAFCO and Dakawa were staffed not only by South Africans but by volunteers from all over the world. The projects were also financed and resourced by sympathetic governments including Holland, the Scandinavian countries, the USSR and many Eastern bloc countries. The aims of the college were not only to provide education for those students whose schooling had been disrupted in South Africa, but also to begin to develop a cadre of people suitably educated for the reconstruction of South African society in the post-liberation phase. Finally, SOMAFCO was conceptualised as a site for the development of possible alternatives to apartheid education.

The ANC's Policy Framework document has only recently been finalised. A full account of the political process involved in its production will be given in the next chapter. Prepared by the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD), the document sets out
a framework for education and training that represents in effect the ANC's manifesto for education. The document is the result of many months of consultation with educational stakeholders, the private sector and unions. The document has been developed in the context of South Africa's transition to democracy, i.e. in the political space opened up by the unbanning of political organisations in 1990, continuing economic recession and, internationally, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern block governments.

The discursive context for the development of the non-racial repertoire in education is multiple and varied. If one were to isolate a single text that has had more influence on the development of non-racialism than any other, then it would have to be the Freedom Charter drawn up at the Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955, and subsequently accepted as the basis for the ANC programme a year later. Such has been its influence that the term 'charterist' has been used as a signifier for all those who rally around the concept of non-racialism. In very basic terms the Charter set out a vision of a future South Africa that belongs to all South Africans regardless of 'colour, race, sex or belief' (ANC, 1955). It argued that all South Africans should enjoy equal democratic and human rights such as the right to vote, equality before the law and an end to discrimination in any form. The Charter also argued for the extension of rights to free and compulsory education, housing, employment, job security etc to all South Africans. The Charter also proclaimed that 'the land should be shared amongst those who work it' and that 'the people shall share in the country's wealth' (including the mineral wealth).

As a document that set out a clear humanist vision, the Charter perhaps comes closer than any other document considered in this study to the ideal of representing a world view that is based on the will of a broadly representative sample of the population of South Africa. The organisers of the Kliptown conference travelled the length and breadth of the country and spared no effort in canvassing the opinions of South Africans from all walks of life. Nonetheless, the Charter like all texts ultimately represents one reading of social reality, in this case that of the organisers and participants in the Kliptown conference. As such it may also be understood as a sedimentation of other discourses that exerted a strong influence on the ANC.

Firstly, Christianity continued to organise the thoughts and sense of morality of many Congress members. Many Congress leaders had attended missionary schools, and Christian ideas had by then become deeply ingrained in African thought over a number of
generations. Although there had been a growing antipathy towards European missionaries within the ANC during the 1940s and 1950s, those missionaries such as Trevor Huddleston who were prepared to work within the parameters set by black-led organisations continued to project a more acceptable face of European Christianity. In particular the Christian message of the 'brotherhood of man' (sic) provided a powerful motive for the acceptance of non-racialism (Walshe, 1971).

Liberalism also continued to have an important influence within Congress and this was clearly expressed in the Freedom Charter. Firstly, the Congress remained, during most of the 1950s, committed to reform rather than to revolution. Secondly, many members of Congress shared the liberal belief in the inevitability of economic integration, but, unlike most white liberals of the time, followed this to its non-racial conclusions. Thirdly, the Charter reflects the continuing belief within Congress in liberal, democratic institutions such as the rule of law, a democratically elected government etc. (Gerhart, 1978).

The belief in liberal institutions was reinforced by the hegemony of liberal discourses and institutions over large parts of the world after the Second World War. For example, the ANC increasingly drew on the United Nations as a source of moral support from the late 1940s onwards. Of equal significance was the use made by Congress of the United Nations Charter for Human Rights as a discursive resource in the struggle against apartheid. In 1952 an ANC memorandum declared the intention of Congress to see the provisions of the Human Rights Charter extended to all 'within our lifetime' (Walshe, 1971, p. 331).

A belief in liberal institutions was further exemplified by the extent to which the ANC considered the black American struggle for civil rights within the framework of the American constitution as a precedent for South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, in important respects, the recent uptake of 'affirmative action' discourses in the ANC’s 1988 constitutional guidelines and in subsequent documents provides continuity with this earlier American influence. 'Affirmative action', understood as a floating signifier, has been used to mean different things by different groups and individuals both in South Africa and in the United States. It will be argued below that there is a tension in ANC discourses, inherited from the US experience, between affirmative action understood as a fairly minor alteration of employment practices and laws, and affirmative action understood as a broader process of social change and empowerment of disadvantaged groups.
The liberal influence on Congress during the 1950s was further exemplified by the use of the term 'racialism'. Within liberal discourses of the time, racialism was used to describe a set of prejudiced attitudes held by whites towards blacks. Discriminatory laws and practices were understood to stem from these attitudes (see for example Wolpe, 1970). The term racialism also had a good deal of international currency at the time, and was in common usage in Britain and elsewhere. Partly under the influence of writers such as Stokely Carmichael in the United States, the use of the term racialism to describe institutionalised forms of discrimination has been superseded by the term 'racism'. In the writings of Sivanandan in Britain, for example, the term racialism was also used during the 1970s (with increasing infrequency) in the more limited sense of a set of prejudiced attitudes (Miles, 1989). Although the term racism has been increasingly used by both the BCM and non-racialists, the term racialism (and its opposite - non-racialism) have persisted in the South African context for reasons that will be suggested below.

As far as the disciplinary context for the emergence of AEM discourses was concerned, liberal anthropological and historical sources and procedures were important resources for the development of learning materials for the cultural clubs. This had important repercussions for the racial interpretations provided in the texts. Although the texts attempted to challenge the negative image of blacks presented in bantu education syllabi, they did so very much within a set of racial assumptions and terminology that worked within the grain of European racism. Although there is no doubt that European racial interpretations certainly influenced the discourses of the ANC and other black organisations, the degree of insensitivity to racist language and stereotypes within the texts does suggest that the majority of the authors were probably white. The fact that the AEM branches were based in the white suburbs of Johannesburg and the Eastern Province (AEM memorandum, undated), and that the white Congress of Democrats played a significant role in the AEM (Lodge, 1984) tends to support this view. Further, liberal and Marxist development paradigms are much more evident in these discourses than in African ones of the time. (It is not being suggested here that all whites are necessarily racist but that, in experiential terms, whites have had a different relationship to racist discourses and practices than blacks under apartheid and this has often shaped their responses accordingly).

'Progressive' educators in the liberal mould such as John Dewey provided a further disciplinary context for educationists within the ANC. Dewey's emphasis on education for
democratic citizenship, and on the importance of teaching tolerance had a particular resonance for critics of authoritarian approaches in African education. Professor Z.K. Mathews, a prominent academic and ANC member, quoted the following passage from Dewey with approval in 1951.

What are our schools doing to cultivate, not merely passive toleration that will put up with people of different racial birth or different coloured skin, but what are our schools doing positively and aggressively and constructively to cultivate understanding and goodwill to democratic society?...After all the cause of democracy is the moral cause of dignity and the worth of the individual. Through mutual respect, mutual toleration, give and take, the probing of experiences it is ultimately the only method by which we all are engaged, whether we want to be or not, the greatest experiment of humanity - that of living together in ways in which the life of each of us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others. (Quoted in Mathews, 1951, p. 5).

From the perspective of this study there are many problems with the liberal approach to education as constructed by Dewey. Many of these criticisms are not dissimilar to those advanced in relation to Freire's work and the educational ideas of the BCM.

As mentioned in the last section, Africanist thought was very influential, particularly within the Youth League, during the 1940s and, to a decreasing extent, in the period before the breakaway of the PAC in 1959. Africanism continued to exert an influence within Congress, however, as the following call for black self-reliance made by ANC President Oliver Tambo in 1971 pays testimony to.

.....the black people of racist South Africa must recognise that freedom for South Africa, no less for them as the most exploited, will come only when they rise as a solid black mass - rising from under the heel of the oppressor and storming across the colour barriers to the citadels of political and economic power....Let us therefore be explicit. Power to the people means in fact, power to the black people....Let the black seize by force what is theirs by right of birth, and use it for the benefit of all, including those from whom it has been taken. (Tambo quoted in Mzala, 1988, p. 40).

Some of the speeches of ANC leaders such as the one by Z.K. Mathews, also contain many references to the importance of black self-reliance and self pride. Like Tambo's speech above as well as many of the Africanist discourses considered in the study so far, these speeches stopped short of simply proclaiming 'Africa for Africans', and projected instead the ultimate goal of a South Africa that belongs to all. Despite the Africanist
emphasis on black self-reliance, non-racialists believed in working with whites to achieve their political objectives. One important point of conflict between orthodox Africanists and non-racialists within the ANC during the 1940s and 1950s was the growing influence of communists in the Congress movement.

The Marxist influence on Congress began to assert itself more obviously during the 1950s. Importantly, the Marxist emphasis on class and class struggle tended to reinforce the non-racialism of the ANC. Indeed the absence of the colour bar in the USSR was often used as a rallying call for socialists within the SACP and the ANC (Walshe, 1971). The Marxist influence also proved to be an important factor in bringing together the ANC and the Indian Congress as part of a common commitment to mass action. By the 1950s, however, there remained much suspicion and antipathy towards communism within the ANC. It was only during the 1960s and 1970s that the Marxist influence really began to gain ground over liberal discourses. An important landmark in this shift of emphasis was the acceptance of the theories of 'colonialism of a special type' and of two-stagism as part of the ANC's strategy and tactics at the Morogoro consultative conference of 1969. These theories were strongly influenced by SACP thinking at the time. Because these shifts signified a change in developmental goals they will be considered further below.

The growing influence of Marxist discourses also had an impact on the educational theory of the liberation movement. The Freedom Charter had basically advocated the extension of a liberal humanist education to all, based on principles of free and compulsory schooling and meritocracy. Against liberal interpretations, Marxists argued that the school could never be a neutral and meritocratic institution in capitalist societies (Kallaway et al, 1984). The new Marxist influences shifted the focus of debate in quite contradictory ways. On the one hand, the ANC in exile became quite heavily influenced by educational ideas from the Soviet Union which were principally concerned with the creation of the new 'Soviet man'(sic) (Grant, 1979). These themes had been taken up in other contexts by revolutionaries inspired by the Soviet experience such as FRELIMO in Mozambique. Such a character is 'someone with a working-class consciousness and a scientific, materialist and dialectical outlook, fully devoted to the creation of a new collective society' (Cross, 1993, p. 77).

On the other hand, there emerged during the early 1980s in South Africa, a neo-Marxist educational approach which had more in common with Althusser's and Bowles and
Gintis' critique of capitalism than with the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on socialist reconstruction in the USSR (see chapter one). Consequently the neo-Marxist/radical tradition focused on education as a reproducer of inequitable capitalist relations rather than as a potentially transformative set of institutions. As was discussed in earlier chapters, this approach was quickly superseded by the advent of people's education.

Picking up the 'progressive' mantle, Paulo Freire's work also continued to exercise considerable influence amongst exponents of people's education in the 1980s (Prinsloo, 1991). Freire's work provides a certain continuity on Dewey's ideas in that both are interested in education for democracy, and on centring the educational experience around the life world of the learner. The more obviously humanistic and Hegelian strain in Freire's work stands in stark contrast to the rigid economism of the 'scientific socialist' influence.

The influence of liberalism and particularly of Marxist discourses has meant that forms of scientific rationality have been much more important in non-racial interpretations than was the case with BC ones. Indeed, whereas BC discourses projected a certain hostility towards 'western' science, non-racialism has consistently used 'scientific' analyses and their implications in the development and legitimation of the non-racial hegemonic project. Many Marxist accounts argue that the laws of motion of history are scientifically understandable and predictable. As was the case with other discourses considered in this study, 'scientific' rationality provides an interpretative grid, norms and 'truths' through which history, and indeed human existence as a whole may be understood. For Foucault, Marxism provided another step in the objectification (and hence control) of the subject in western thought through its classification and hierarchisation of individuals as economic subjects. Of more significance for this study, however, is the effect that the privileging of class above all else had on the anti-racist struggle.

In the context of the collapse of 'scientific socialism' in Eastern Europe, however, and of the international hegemony of rampant free marketeerism, other 'scientific' discourses began to exert a growing influence on the non-racial tradition in the transition to democracy. In educational debates, the World Bank and 'school effectiveness studies' have had an impact on the discourses of the ANC as well as on the authors of the ERS. The question as to whether the ANC's own appropriation of these discourses and the focus on 'quality' as opposed simply to cost-effectiveness may be considered progressive will be taken up below. The influence of school effectiveness studies is also an aspect of the
broader disciplinary impact of the economics of education, which, like 'scientific socialism' also seeks to understand human beings as rational economic agents. Finally, the Framework document has also been influenced by Kraak's and COSATU's own interventions into the political economy of education in the form of their work on labour markets discussed in earlier chapters.

Opposition to Bantu Education: Z.K. Mathews and the African Education Movement

The texts considered here include a speech believed to have been delivered in 1951 by Professor Z.K. Mathews, a leading figure in the ANC. Although the speech was made before the passing of the Bantu Education Act in 1953, it has been chosen because it represents one of the few worked out positions on education by a Congress leader. Further, it exemplifies very well the range of discursive influences on the racial interpretations of the ANC during the early 1950s. This text has been complemented by a consideration of some of the educational materials produced by the AEM for use in the cultural clubs. As mentioned above, in these texts some aspects of European racial interpretations were closely articulated with liberal and Marxist conceptions of development. The materials provide an account in story form (formal lessons were prohibited by law) of the history of each of the 'races' in South Africa. Thus there are narratives covering the origins of the Bushmen, Hottentots, Africans, Europeans, Muslims etc. Some of the materials also deal with topics such as 'Stories From the Sciences' and 'The Story of Russia'.

The construction of 'race' in both the discourses of the AEM and in the speech by Z.K. Mathews have many of the characteristics of Afrikaner nationalist (and indeed liberal) interpretations of the time. As such they signify an intermediary stage in the development of the racial interpretations of the Education Panel reports from earlier Afrikaner and liberal discourses. 'Race', nation and culture are organically interwoven with fluid boundaries between them. In other words each 'race' considered in the discourses represents a discrete cultural and national group. The texts of the AEM follow the logic of 'race' essentialism albeit without recourse to the legitimation of scientific racism.

Thus Africans as a 'race' are good at singing (AEM, 1955,a, p. 5), Arab Muslims were a 'clever race'(AEM, 1955,b, p. 3), Hottentots were a 'cleverer race' than the Bushmen (AEM, 1955,c, p. 2) and so on. Further, the story of South Africa is presented very much as a series of violent and, one might believe, inevitable clashes between
different 'races' over land, property and resources. Finally, in 'explaining' the origins of the 'coloured people', the assumption is made that white men only slept with black women because there were not enough white women to go around (AEM, 1955,d, p. 1), thereby implying the 'unnaturalness' of miscegenation between the 'races'. In the case of the speech by Z.K. Mathews, 'race' essentialism is exemplified not through the use of stereotypes, but by use of the term 'race-pride' to refer to the development of a collective consciousness amongst Africans (Mathews, 1951, p. 2).

In the discourses of the AEM, 'culture' provides a means by which different 'races' may be measured up against the bench mark of 'civilisation'. In this respect the discourses are also strongly culturally essentialist. Generally speaking the degree to which different cultures were considered 'civilised' hung on the extent to which they had developed their means of production, harnessed the forces of nature and evolved related superstructural institutions (especially 'democratic' ones) in comparison with other cultures of the time. Here the Marxist influence is clear. The Soviet Union was described as an 'interesting' and 'new' civilisation (AEM, 1955,e), but other European countries were also equated with the modern civilised ideal.

Different 'races' and cultures came in for varying amounts of praise in relation to modern civilised norms. Thus although South African Europeans were considered civilised in relation to scientific advancement and the development of productive forces, the Hottentots could have given 'some "civilised" races a few lessons in the meaning of freedom and democracy' (AEM, 1955,c, p. 3). Thus Hottentots, together with Bushmen and Africans were congratulated in these discourses on their communal ownership of land and democratic decision-making processes. As with Marx's analysis of 'primitive communism', however, it was pointed out that they could not simply return to these old ways. As far as Muslims were concerned, they were perceived to have a mixed relationship with civilisation. On the one hand,

The Arab Muslims were very clever in many ways. They had the brains to invent much that is studied at our colleges - algebra, astronomy, and also medicine. They knew how to perform operations on sick people very skilfully, and even to deaden their senses while doing them. (AEM, 1955,b, p. 3).

On the other hand, however,
Moslem women remain backward in most of their [Muslim] countries; their only duty is to look after the men - and children, of course. One reason why the lands under that faith are not more advanced today is the backward state of the women; few have been to school or learned the new ways of our time. (AEM, 1955,b, p. 1).

Space does not allow for a full deconstruction of the above stereotypes of Islam, and indeed of Arabs. The conflation of a religion (Islam) with a 'race' (Arabs) and with a fixed set of patriarchal practices certainly does not lead towards a historical understanding of the changing and diverse roles of women in Islam in different countries and cultural contexts. The following quote from a Congress of Democrats memorandum on the cultural clubs also underlines the point made by black feminists such as Carby (1982), Yuval-Davis (1992) and Kabbani (1989), namely that whilst Muslim women have themselves taken a stand against patriarchy, there is a good deal of hypocrisy in European accounts of women's roles in Islam. Referring to club activities, the memorandum states that

Girls should be educated as homemakers, and possibly sympathetic housewives would offer their kitchens for simple group demonstrations in cooking. (Congress of Democrats, 1955, p. 2).

For Z.K. Mathews much more so than in the discourses of the AEM, the idea of culture constituting a racial characteristic was superseded by an understanding of culture as a national attribute. Thus Mathews talked in glowing terms of the contributions that 'coloured' and 'negro' Americans had made to the American way of life citing the likes of Paul Robeson and Jesse Owens as examples (Mathews, 1951, p. 3). Mathews also, however, clearly thought of liberal democratic institutions and Christian values as goals to strive for. (Mathews was, in fact a committed Christian and a firm believer in the idea of the inevitability of economic integration and racial interdependence in South Africa) (Walshe, 1971). Thus at one point Mathews laments 'we are told that we are inferior, that we are too uncivilised to understand Christianity, let alone Democracy' (Mathews, 1951, p. 2)

Whereas for Mathews the term 'nation' was constructed in the modernist sense, in the discourses of the AEM the term was still used interchangeably with the narrower conception associated with 'race' (see for example AEM, 1955,a, p. 7). The AEM was not alone in this. There is a definite ambiguity on this score in the Freedom Charter and in many other ANC documents of the time. One proclamation in the Charter, for example, asserts that 'All national groups shall have equal rights' and 'there shall be equal status in
the bodies of the state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races' (ANC, 1955). Clearly both definitions of 'nation' might have applied here.

For many communists within the Congress of Democrats (formed after the banning of the Communist party), the ambiguity in the term 'nation' had also been present in Stalin's 1913 definition in which he asserted that 'a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin quoted in Mzala, 1988, p. 34). The implications in 1932 of Stalin's thesis for South Africa as far as the Comintern was concerned implied

Complete and immediate national independence for the people of South Africa. For the right of the Zulu, Basuto, etc., nations to form their own independent republics. For the voluntary uniting of the African nations in a federation of Independent native Republics, the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government. Full guarantee of the rights of all national minorities, for the coloured, Indian and white toiling masses. (Quoted in Slovo, 1988, p. 143).

Understood as a floating signifier then, 'nation' can be interpreted to have had the same 'bridging function' in terms of locating a cultural group or groups within a geographical area as was the case with Afrikaner nationalist discourses.

For all the discourses studied the chief obstacle to national unity (in the modern sense) lay in the hearts and minds of whites i.e. racialism and racial discrimination were products of prejudiced beliefs and attitudes. In describing the reasons for the 'gap', for example, between Europeans and Africans, the AEM materials had the following to say,

The reason why the gap, though slowly getting narrower, still exists after so many years is simply that, except for a few missionaries and teachers, the more advanced race had no wish to help the backward one to cross it. (AEM, 1955,a, p. 7).

The above also had clear implications for the view of development taken in the AEM discourses i.e. development involved a process led by whites in order to benefit blacks. For many liberal whites, as has been discussed in the last chapter, this entailed a capitalist modernisation project. The difference, however, between the liberal views of development expressed by supporters of the AEM and mainstream liberal opinion lay in the latter's continued belief in social segregation.

For Marxists development also involved a modernisation project but in this case a socialist one. As Midgley (1984) and others have pointed out, Marx understood colonialism
to be progressive in the sense that it involved the spread of the more advanced capitalist mode of production, a necessary precondition in Marx's view for the development of socialism. Members of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) (as it was known before 1953) had been guided by the 1928 pronouncement by the Comintern that the struggle in South Africa should aim first at the establishment of a Black ('Native') Republic as a stepping stone towards a worker's state. Although in the 1920s and 1930s this would have entailed the Communist Party supporting a struggle essentially along Africanist lines, by the 1950s the Communist Party sought to reassert the class component of the national liberation struggle (Walsh, 1971). This in turn meant that the national movements would have to be led under the firm guidance of the Party towards the interests of the workers and peasants. The slogan of non-racialism became, in this context, a very important aspect of the Party's challenge to what it perceived as a narrow African chauvinism within Congress. It also served to justify and legitimate the Party's own 'vanguard' position in relation to the struggle of the workers.

The discourses of Mathews, and indeed of the ANC as a whole at that time, however, reveal a different agenda, and one still very much influenced by Africanist as well as Christian liberal thought. In his speech Mathews outlined three basic steps towards the ideal of a united South Africa, namely, the inculcation of 'race-pride' amongst Africans, followed by the development of black unity amongst all 'non-Europeans' (Mathews, 1951, p. 3). This would then provide a necessary precondition for establishing equality with whites.

I think it follows quite naturally that once we non-whites in this country stand together, we will have to learn to stand shoulder to shoulder with the white man, and what is more we shall have to help him to stand shoulder to shoulder with us. (Mathews, 1951, p. 3).

Unlike the more Eurocentric discourses of white liberals then, Mathews envisaged a development process focused on, and essentially led by blacks. If non-racialism was to become a reality, then much of the responsibility for its advancement lay on the shoulders of 'non-Europeans'. For Mathews and the vast majority of ANC members at the time, non-racialism implied equality of opportunity within a welfare state not dissimilar to that introduced in Britain by the Labour government after the second World War (Walsh, 1971). In terms of the economic analysis presented earlier in the thesis, non-racialism meant the extension of the welfare provisions of racial Fordism to the population as a
whole. In contrast to the *laissez-faire* of South African liberalism the ANC envisaged a strong role for the state in creating equality of opportunity. Most members, however, did not advocate the extreme state centralisation characteristic of the USSR.

It is worth noting at this stage that the view of the Other and the subject positions constructed in the above discourses were both contradictory and complex. Although all the discourses were moving towards a conception of an inclusive South African identity, the predominantly liberal conception of non-racialism definitely points towards 'prejudiced' whites (and blacks for that matter) as the Other. This was to have substantially shifted by the 1980s as shall be discussed below. At the same time the learning materials of the AEM reflect many stereotypes of the Other that have a long pedigree in European thought. Partly, no doubt, as a result of the lingering influence of the culturally essentialist view of nation put forward by Stalin, European racial interpretations became closely articulated with a materialist understanding of cultural difference. Thus the 'backwardness' of the African 'race' was explained as follows:

As long as people can go on in the same way without working too hard or suffering too much, there is little reason why they should even think of changing their manner of living. Existence in Africa on a low standard has always been fairly easy, because of the ease with which crops can be grown, the small need for shelter against bad weather, and the abundance of game. (AEM, 1955, a, p. 7).

With reference to the 'advancement' of Europeans, however, the materials had the following to say:

...in some other parts of the world, especially those with a long, cold winter, people were forced to improve their means of shelter and getting food, if they were not to die out altogether. So, very slowly and gradually, here and there, clever men and women of different nations invented ways of making life easier. These inventions were copied by different nations... (AEM, 1955, a, p. 7).

Now a materialist account of human progress and development may, from the perspective of this study, provide one valuable approach towards an understanding of social change. What is at issue here, however, is the way in which such accounts worked within a racially defined framework. Understood as a source of strength, the conflation of materialist and racial accounts provided a certain legitimacy for materialist approaches, especially amongst whites. Understood as a source of contradiction, however, the racial and cultural essentialism of European descriptions of the Other clash with the more Marxist
emphasis on the material world as the most basic and profound determinant of social change and group identity, namely class.

Similarly, as has been discussed, liberal accounts of racial difference and cultural 'backwardness' also contradicted the liberal emphasis on economic integration and capitalist development as a goal that was ultimately achievable by all South Africans. For whites within the non-racial tradition, and to a greater extent than in other European discourses of the time, it was developmental goals that triumphed over racial bigotry and stereotypes such that,

...Africans are no different from other peoples in intelligence and ability to learn....Even if the old people had no desire to change, the younger ones and especially the children, would quickly take to the new knowledge if it was offered to them. (AEM, 1955,a, p. 7).

What then was the role of education in relation to development in the non-racial discourses of the 1950s? For the most part, the preoccupation with liberal values and institutions led to a view within Congress (and one certainly shared by its liberal sympathisers) that liberal humanist education must be extended to Africans. In 1953, President of the Transvaal ANC, Nelson Mandela criticised the Bantu Education Act because 'African education would be taken out of the hands of people [liberal missionaries] who taught equality between black and white'. He went on to say

we declare our firm belief in the principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has the right to education; that education shall be directed to the full development of human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among the nations, racial or religious groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.(Mandela, 1977, p. 110).

Like many exponents of BC, Mathews emphasised the role of the black teacher in shaping the future for Africans. For Mathews, the emphasis lay in the role of education in inculcating 'race-pride' through presenting a positive image of black achievements. It also involved making 'our little ones realise that they were created by the same God who gave life to the white child. That they too were made in His image, and that in His eyes they are not, and never will be inferior' (Mathews, 1951, p. 3). Mathews then went on to recite William Blake's "Little Black Boy":

My mother bore me in the southern wilds
And I am black, but, oh, my soul is white.
White as an angel is the English child;
But I am black as if bereaved of light. (Quoted in Mathews, 1951, p. 3).

The choice of this poem as one example of materials to use to build a positive self image amongst black students (Mathews does provide other, less controversial examples) serves to demonstrate the gap between Mathews' version of Africanism and that developed by Biko and black theologians two decades later. BC, with its greater emphasis on the language of oppression would have no doubt pointed to the implicit construction in Blake's poem of 'white' as a virtuous colour and of black as a negative and somehow incomplete colour. (It would indeed have been ironic if Biko's polemic against white liberals who professed to support the black struggle entitled 'Black souls in white skins' were to have been inspired by the same source).

Mathews also believed in the role of education in relation to developing a common South African identity based on an appreciation of different cultures.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this matter of impressing upon our children that they are South Africans is a matter of great importance and something that we cannot neglect. Let us take here the question of language, which is one of the cornerstones of national pride in any country. You come across many people who sneer at Afrikaans and refuse to speak it...Afrikaans is by no means the property of the Afrikaner. It belongs to us as well - it is, and should be, part of the make-up of every South African. (Mathews, 1951, p. 4).

Above all else, Mathews believed that education must promote tolerance between all South Africans.

Ladies and Gentlemen, if the teacher teaches all these things and does not teach TOLERANCE then he is heading in a dangerous direction....we dare not sow the seeds for a repetition of the arrogant tyranny which is now stalking our fair land. If we do, then we will be more guilty than those poor miserable people who are sitting in parliament, basking in self-admiration, yet preparing their own destruction. (Mathews, 1951, p. 5).

In effect the speeches by Mandela and Mathews prefigured the Freedom Charter which called for an end to the colour bar in education; the sharing of all the cultural treasures of mankind (sic); free, compulsory and universal schooling; access to higher education based on merit; a mass adult literacy campaign; and the inculcation in children of affective goals such as 'human brotherhood, liberty and peace'. Their thinking also provided some continuity on earlier formulations of ANC policy. In the early 1920s Congress leaders had argued for a 'free, compulsory and public system of native education' modelled along western lines (Walsh, 1971, p. 79). In 1943 the ANC had demanded that education become the full responsibility of the state and based on per capita funding with
the ultimate goal of free and compulsory education until the age of sixteen. The immediate goal was primary schooling for all and, according to the Youth League, one hundred per cent literacy (Walsh, 1971).

There were also discontinuities with earlier policies which had not demanded an end to the colour bar. Further, in the early 1940s Mathews had himself argued not simply for 'western education', but for a 'reconstruction of our own experience in the light of the past experiences of our fathers, our neighbours, other races and of mankind everywhere' (quoted in Walsh, 1971, p. 150). This theme, along with the other more Africanist aspects of Mathews' thought were to be taken up in later years by the BCM. Non-racialist discourses, on the other hand, increasingly focused on issues of equality of opportunity within a liberal humanist framework. Thus, by 1955 the AEM had little in the way of Congress ideas concerning issues of culture and the curriculum on which to draw.

Central to the approach of the AEM was an underlying conception of scientific rationality and objectivity that was typical of liberal humanist disciplines at the time. One example of this is the weight that was attached in the AEM materials to western science and the 'scientific method'. In keeping with the modernisation projects of both liberals and Marxists, the achievements of 'modern' science were counterposed to the 'superstitions' of traditional African remedies and approaches. Thus in 'The Story of the Sciences' (AEM, 1955, f), no attempt was made to qualify the 'success' of western scientific approaches, or the 'failure' of 'Witchdoctors remedies'. Neither was there any effort to present the historical linkages between, or specific contexts within which different approaches towards understanding and intervening in the natural world evolved. The result is an unqualified eulogisation of western science and a subsequent denigration of alternative approaches. Further, the development of 'western' science in the context of the European enlightenment is depicted as a whites-only affair in which black scientists have played little or no part. The discourses of the AEM contrast with the speech by Mathews in which he specifically points to the contributions of various black scientists such as Dr. Percy Julian (Mathews, 1951, p. 3).

In a revealing article in one of the AEM newsletters entitled 'Stop Falsifying History' (AEM, 1956), a leading historian of the time, C.T. Gordon, gave his views concerning the nature of history as a discipline. Arguing against the syllabi drawn up by government departments, Gordon claimed that
History is a study of the facts, arrived at by objective research. And such facts rarely, if ever, reveal any man as flawless; the facts are in most cases available, and it is time that a summary of the whole truth, rather than a judicious selection of those aspects of it which suited the prejudices of the frontier community, was placed before our school children (Quoted in AEM, 1956, pp. 1-2).

Clearly, given what has already been said about the content of AEM discourses, and from the perspective of this study, it is once again apparent that an unqualified commitment to 'science' and to 'objective facts' is not a sufficient condition for the development of anti-racist approaches, and may indeed be counter-productive. Imbuing non-racialist discourses with claims to objectivity, however, can be understood as having served to legitimise not only non-racialist positions, but liberal and Marxist modernisation projects as well.

Similarly, it was argued that the emphasis on the role of the teacher and on changing individual psychological outlooks and attitudes leads towards a limiting, and ultimately unsatisfactory approach towards anti-racist education. The same criticisms may also be levelled at the approach advocated by Mathews. In this case, however, the affective goal to be achieved was the inculcation of 'tolerance' in children. Now whilst this may be a noble goal (depending on how the term is constructed and the discursive context in which it is operative), in the hands of liberals it can lead to a naive belief in the 'equality' of all 'cultures' and discourses. Being open to a plurality of opinions and world views does not guarantee that the connections between different kinds of discourses and different kinds of power will be interrogated. It has been one objective of this study to try and connect the emergence of various racial interpretations in education, for example, with different social hegemonies that have certainly not enjoyed the same access to power and privilege as some liberal discourses might suggest.

For Dewey (and hence Mathews), 'tolerance' was a necessary corollary and precondition for the development of democracy, understood as equal rights within a liberal democratic framework. From the perspective of this study there are two problems with this approach. Firstly, Marxist, feminist and anti-racist accounts have long argued that 'democratic' institutions within capitalist, patriarchal and colonialist societies, inevitably tend to favour dominant groups who have more access to formal power and resources. Secondly, from a Foucauldian perspective, it will be recalled from chapter two that the issue is not so much one of what formal rights are guaranteed by law. Instead it is the 'regime of truth' which operates
'between the lines' of formal rights that is of concern. This was not a concern for either Dewey or Mathews.

To acknowledge Foucault's critique of the limits of legal/political power, however, and to take cognisance of the ways in which such power becomes distorted in capitalist societies does not preclude an acceptance of the need for laws and rules which clearly demarcate the rights and duties of citizens in any society. In terms of the struggle against racism, particularly in the South African context, the extension of 'liberal' rights such as the right to free assembly, to free speech and, not least, the right to vote to all South Africans, can only be understood as a major (and long overdue) advance. To the extent that non-racialism has been about promoting equality of opportunity within a mixed economy and liberal democratic norms and institutions, the ANC and its allies can be understood to be on the threshold of an important victory. One might ask, however, how and to what extent the provisions of the Freedom Charter have formed a basis for an anti-racist educational approach for the ANC and its allies over the years. This issue will be taken up below in relation to the ANC's recent Policy Framework and the process of desegregating schools.

As far as both Dewey and the AEM activists were concerned, non-racial education was to be based on a child-centred approach. In the case of the cultural clubs, a pedagogical commitment to child-centred approaches was reinforced by the fact that it was illegal to operate a formal school other than those controlled by the government, and so the clubs were organised on an informal basis. According to the AEM,

The group leader must be a democratic 'leader' in the best sense of the word - not a dictator.....What is required is for her to present the material as attractively as possible, perhaps make a few suggestions, and then for a time, to retreat into the background and watch what the children do with it. Only if the children ask for advice or help should she give it....Trust the children - let them take responsibility for themselves - that is the way to produce men and women and not sheep. (AEM, 1955,g, pp. 1-2).

Thus, as far as political education was concerned, another memo suggested that the Freedom Charter should be taught to the children as they understand it. Care should be taken not to offend parents, the Charter not to be imposed on the people. (AEM, 1955,h, p. 1).

A critique of child-centred approaches advocated by BC discourses has already been given from a Gramscian perspective. In relation to the BC emphasis on curricular issues
it was argued that the BCM tended to overlook the necessary authority of the formal curriculum. Given the emphasis in non-racial discourses on the legal and political aspects of education, it is possible to advance the same critique but in relation to the necessary authority of rules and regulations governing the provision and delivery of education. From an anti-racist perspective it would seem naive to expect non-racial attitudes and practices to simply 'spring' from the children themselves. Given the levels of racism within society at large, it is equally short-sighted to imagine that any group of children (or teachers for that matter) ought to be 'trusted' not to be racist, or in relation to the predominantly black club members, to have an understanding of racism in South Africa such as that contained in the Freedom Charter.

Without the backing of clear procedures concerning how to engage with and handle racist incidents in the classroom or playground, there is no guarantee that incidents of racial harassment would be dealt with effectively. The same could be said for strategies aimed at dealing with the repercussions of racist discourses and practices in society at large as they manifest themselves in the responses of black children to the learning environment. Further, there are clear limits to how far the Freedom Charter actually went in terms of prescribing strategies for tackling racism. Thus whilst the Freedom Charter did call for an end to the 'colour bar' in education, there was no engagement with some of the uglier realities (racial harassment, alienation of black youth etc) that have actually occurred in integrated schools (see Freer et al, 1992; Carrim, 1992 for example). At one level this was hardly surprising as desegregation remained a distant dream for the activists of the AEM. In the 1990s, however, such considerations gain increasing importance.

In summary to this section it is worth restating the main discursive achievements of non-racialism in the discourses of the ANC and AEM during the 1950s. Firstly, non-racialism proved to be a unifying discourse and was successful in rallying support from a variety of sources. Secondly, non-racialism allowed for the articulation of a number of visions of development within a set of racial interpretations that focused on individual prejudice as the main obstacle to progressive social change.
People's Education at Home and in Exile

The texts considered in this section were taken from non-racial discourses developed both in South Africa and by the ANC in exile. The term 'people's education' will be used to describe educational discourses developed in both contexts. The texts from inside the country were largely drawn from the Second National Consultative Conference of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) held in 1986. Those chosen from outside the country include the ANC's education policy adopted in 1978 (ANC, 1978) in Morogoro, Tanzania along with syllabi and learning materials from the ANC school, SOMAFCO. The policy document was written in anticipation of the setting up of SOMAFCO, and appears to have had little influence inside the country.

By the time of the people's education discourses, the term 'nation' had long since become the dominant unit of analysis and signifier of identity. Of most significance in this shift was the assertion in the Freedom Charter that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people' (ANC, 1955). The shift was also marked by the rise to prominence of 'the national question' as the interpretative framework for theoretical debates within the ANC/SACP alliance from the 1960s onwards (see below). Summing up the vision of a future South African nation implicit in these debates, Jordan stated:

So, then, although coming from two different directions - one nationalist, one Marxist-socialist - the two component parts of the national liberation movement converge in the end under the conception of who constitutes a nation to whom sovereignty in a democratic society should be assigned. That definition precludes designation of race and ethnicity. In the words of President Oliver Tambo: 'One country, one people, one government, a government of the people of South Africa'. It is towards this end that we are struggling. (Jordan, 1988, p. 124).

In the discourses of the ANC/SACP alliance at the time then, 'culture' as a concept remained muted and generally subordinated to the idea of a common South African citizenship and identity. In these discourses, 'culture' is perceived as synonymous with 'ethnicity', i.e. as a set of linguistic and religious attributes with perhaps a few customs thrown in. It certainly does not take on the status of a 'whole way of life' as in previous discourses. The subordination of culture and ethnicity to a national identity was explained in political terms by the prominent ANC and SACP member, Joe Slovo (the ANC opened its membership to all South Africans in 1969).
In summary, it could be said that the historic process of spreading a national (as opposed to ethnic or tribal) consciousness and the national consolidation of existing state entities is, in the modern African era, generally a weapon of liberation and social advance. Conversely, the emphasis on regional and cultural exceptionalism (including claims to secession of ethnic regions from existing state entities) is generally designed to serve both internal and international reaction and is, in most cases, an instrument of colonial, neo-colonial or minority domination. (Slovo, 1988, p. 145).

Of relevance to current debates concerning cultural diversity and education, however, is the qualification made by Slovo (in accordance with the support for cultural diversity in the Freedom Charter) that 'The struggle for national cohesion in multi-ethnic communities does not imply the imposition of cultural uniformity' (p. 145). Nonetheless, it was a vision of national cultural identity that overwhelmingly predominated in non-racial discourses of the time.

For Marxists such as Slovo within the alliance, a rethinking had also been going on concerning Stalin's conflation of national and cultural identities. According to Slovo, the post-Leninist tendency gave pride of place to cultural-linguistic (or ethnic) factors at the expense of a class approach. It infected some of our own earlier debates on the national question and came dangerously close to providing (albeit unintentionally) a rationale for ethnic separatism. (Slovo, 1988, p. 143).

Importantly then, for many alliance members whether in the ANC or SACP (by the 1980s there was a good deal of overlap of membership between the two organisations), class together with nationality became the most significant marker of group and individual identity.

The dominance of class and national identity also tended to reinforce the non-racialism of the alliance. According to Pallo Jordan (a leading intellectual in the ANC), the nation 'is not defined by skin colour or racial designation' (Jordan, 1988, p. 118). Although there was certainly a denial of 'race' as a plausible basis for asserting difference, there remained a certain ambiguity concerning the status of the term as a basis for understanding difference. In contrast to earlier AEM discourses, 'race' was not used to designate fundamental human difference and as a basis for social change and development (class having priority in this regard). The term continued to be used in an unqualified way, however, that ultimately failed to engage with the relevance of 'race' understood as a biological category.
Rather, 'race' served simply as a signifier of social identity under apartheid, being generally understood as the modality within which class relationships had developed in the colonial context. By the time of the adoption of the ANC's Strategy and Tactics at the 1969 Consultative conference (also held in Morogoro, Tanzania), the relationship between 'race' and class was explained in terms of the theory of 'colonialism of a special type' in which it was argued that the white colonisers occupied the same geographical space as the black colonised in the context of capitalist social relations.

On one level, that of 'white South Africa', there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of industrial monopolies and the merging of industrial and financial capital....But on another level, that of 'Non-White South Africa', there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all democratic rights and political domination....(ANC 'Strategy and Tactics in the South African Revolution' quoted in Wolpe, 1988,b, p. 62).

Thus, according to one prominent speaker at the 1986 NECC conference capitalist social relations provide 'the principal determining contradiction' in South Africa, whilst the national oppression of blacks by whites is described simply as 'a dominant contradiction' (Mkatshwa, 1991, p. 240).

The privileging of class had the discursive effect of closing off discussion around racism, its meaning and its operations. Within this discursive vacuum the term 'racialism' continued to play a role as signifying a set of attitudes and discriminatory laws and practices inimicable to the achievement of equality of opportunity within a democracy. Thus although the emerging constructions of 'racism' from the USA and elsewhere attempted to break with the old liberal meanings and definitions, the term was simply adopted into the non-racial lexicon as a straight replacement for 'racialism' without any profound change in meaning or status.

The theory of 'colonialism of a special type' led to the acceptance by the ANC of the 'two-stage' theory of change - a reworking of the Comintern's Black Republic Thesis. Once again, the national liberation of the African majority was seen as a necessary prerequisite for more profound transformation along socialist lines.

The main content of the present stage of the South African revolution is the national liberation of the largest and most oppressed group - the African people...The national character of the struggle must therefore dominate our approach. But it is a national struggle which....is happening in a new type of world....a world in which the horizons liberated
from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful - economic emancipation....Thus, our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressed people to gain ascendency so that they can replace the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass. (ANC Strategy and Tactics Quoted in Pomeroy, 1988, p. 13).

The view of social change embodied in this statement involved a negotiation of quite complex, and contradictory, subject positions. Firstly, the subject of people's education discourse, namely 'the people', were defined in broad terms by the UDF as follows:

The people's camp is made up of the overwhelming majority of South Africans - the black working class, the rural masses, the black petit bourgeoisie (traders), and black middle strata (clerks, teachers, nurses, intellectuals). The people's camp also includes several thousand whites who stand shoulder to shoulder in struggle with the majority. (Quoted in Mashamba, 1990, p. 5).

Following on from the Freedom Charter, the 'enemy camp' was not defined simply as whites. Indeed, as Meli (1988) pointed out, the identification of the government as 'the enemy' in the Charter reflected a desire to encourage whites not to identify with the Pretoria regime. The Other of non-racial discourses also included those 'committed racists' who would voluntarily exclude themselves from any non-racial definition of 'the nation' (Jordan, 1988, p. 118).

Within these broad parameters, however, certain groups were identified as being particularly oppressed. Thus whilst these discourses constructed all 'blacks' as being victims of apartheid, regardless of class, this was considered to be particularly true of the black working class. This in turn led to the view that the black workers ought to take a leading position in social change. Although the majority of South African women were understood in these discourses to carry a 'triple oppression' related to their colour, class and sex, it is both ironic and a source of contradiction, that they were not identified in non-racial discourses as having a vanguard role within the black working class.

The above construction of 'the people' and of social change led to two quite different approaches towards people's education at home and in exile. Each approach was tempered by the specificity of the material and discursive contexts. In exile, the aims of the ANC education policy were formulated as follows:
1. To prepare cadres to serve the national liberation struggle of the people of South Africa in the phase of struggle for seizure of political power and the post-liberation phase.

2. To produce such cadres as will be able to serve the society in all spheres i.e. political, economic socio-cultural, educational and scientific. Priorities will be dictated by the needs of the liberatory struggle in the pre and post liberation periods. (ANC, 1978, p. 1).

As a policy statement, the 1978 document provided continuity on earlier non-racial educational discourses through emphasising issues of mass accessibility.

The ANC educational programme, as an ongoing process, shall cater for both young and old irrespective of race, colour, sex, or creed. (ANC, 1978, p. 2)

The document also extended the emphasis on the politics of educational provision by calling for the democratisation of education, i.e. 'the participation of students, teachers and the community in all educational activities' (p. 2).

Further in keeping with earlier non-racial discourses, the policy statement did not engage in any depth with issues of culture, identity and the curriculum. Thus although the document called for the production of a 'new type of South African', this point was not developed in curricular terms beyond the assertion that

The ANC programme shall draw on the most advanced scientific knowledge and progressive cultural activities of the people of South Africa and the world. (p. 2).

The statement did not go as far even as Mathews' concern with the question of who ought to define a new curriculum. The curriculum that did emerge in reality at SOMAFCO, however, was very much in keeping with developments in the non-racial interpretative repertoire outlined above. As such it focused on class and national identities.

Class identity and the inculcation of a 'proletarian consciousness and world view' was emphasised in SOMAFCO, especially in the later years, through the teaching of a subject called 'Development of Societies'. The aims of the syllabus were as follows:

1. To introduce students to an integrated and consistent scientific world outlook.

2. To provide students with the analytical tools with which to comprehend the development of societies, world revolutionary processes, and in particular to help students locate the South African struggle in the context of the world transition from Capitalism to Socialism.

In Foucauldian terms the Development of Societies course and its emphasis on 'scientific' materialist discourses can be understood to have aimed towards the production of the 'class subject' and 'revolutionary cadre'. Through recourse to scientific forms of rationality as a legitimation for the production of such a subject, however, the materialist world view was presented as the 'truth' and counterposed to the 'ideological' approaches of 'unscientific', 'bourgeois' accounts. Thus without denying the importance of materialist and 'class' accounts, such discourse is the antithesis of creative and critical thinking. Further, from the perspective of this study such an approach does not allow for a consideration of other dynamics involved in social change, such as those around 'race' and gender.

In relation to the national identity of the 'new South African', the construction of 'nation' in the non-racial repertoire and the Freedom Charter provided an important discursive resource around which much teaching and learning went on, both formal and informal. In important ways, it was the commitment to non-racialism that defined the specific ethos of SOMAFCO and provided a hegemonic principle around which all members of the SOMAFCO community could adhere, regardless of their other beliefs.

In curricular terms, the nationalism of non-racial discourses translated into a reworking of history syllabi at all levels of the school. Much emphasis was given to 'exposing' the distortions of South African history syllabi and to providing alternative accounts. Pampallis' history textbook, recently released in South Africa, but originally written for SOMAFCO typifies the approach adopted (Pampallis, 1991). What was striking about the book was its adherence to the liberal humanist 'objective' approach towards history discussed in relation to the AEM. Thus although the book certainly does provide an alternative historical narrative of relevance to the struggle for national liberation, little or no attempt was made to problematise the constructed nature of all historical narratives, and the social processes involved therein.

The limitations of non-racialism from an anti-racist perspective were also evident in the approach adopted towards other areas of the curriculum at SOMAFCO. With the exception of the subjects mentioned above, most of the other syllabi in the secondary school were determined to a large measure by the strictures of the Cambridge Overseas Examinations Board. Even within this tight framework, however, no systematic and coordinated attempt was made to develop anti-racist strategies along the lines suggested in
earlier sections. Nor was there any attempt to develop collective procedures for engaging with racist (or sexist) discourses and practices as they arose in the school from time to time.

Finally, the subordination of 'culture' to secular, national goals in the non-racial repertoire led to a relative neglect of certain 'cultural' issues in the curriculum. There was little in the way of religious education, nor was there much experimentation or development of effective language strategies around, for example, 'phased bilingualism'. Although use of English was justified on account of its hegemonic status as an international language, and also partly as a result of a lack of qualified educators, there was little language support to back up this policy. Outside of school, however, cultural activities were encouraged in the form of dancing, music and drama and many of the South African languages were spoken informally.

Inside South Africa, people's education also emphasised issues of access (people's education was intended for all South Africans); provision (e.g. of text books); and democracy (exemplified by the demand for democratically elected SRCs) (NECC, 1991). The relative neglect of issues around culture and the curriculum in non-racial discourses was reinforced by the difficulties involved in producing such materials during the state of emergency. Similarly, the stronger emphasis on developing 'critical thinking and analysis' in the discourses of the NECC must be understood in relation to different circumstances. Firstly, material conditions called for a greater emphasis on oppositional (deconstructive and critical) approaches as opposed to reconstructive ones. Secondly, the discursive legacy of BC and the continuing influence of educators like Paulo Freire were much stronger inside the country than for those in exile.

Like the SOMAFCO experience, the class nature of the struggle and identities was emphasised. The resolutions on people's education stated, for example, that people's education was education that

eliminates capitalist norms of competition, individualism and stunted intellectual development, and replaces it with one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis;

and,

enables workers to resist exploitation at their workplace. (NECC, 1991, p. 253).
People's education discourses attempted to construct a national identity through calling for education that equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial democratic South Africa. (NECC, 1991, p. 253).

In his keynote address to the conference Smangaliso Mkatshwa also suggested that 'it might be worthwhile considering programmes of education through the Freedom Charter' (Mkatshwa, 1991, p. 247). Once again, the linguistic, cultural and anti-racist implications for the development of non-racial approaches were not given any content. Ironically, intellectuals such as Mkatshwa were aware of the importance of the curriculum. As a direct result of his own analysis of previous attempts at alternative education (which included the ANC's cultural clubs) he arrived precisely at the conclusion that the 'What these examples point to, is the importance of the curriculum in any alternative programme' (p. 246). Similarly, in rejecting bantu education, Zwelakhe Sisulu stated that 'We are no longer demanding the same education as whites, since this is education for domination' (Sisulu, 1991, p. 266). It has been the argument so far, however, that despite the will to develop alternatives, the non-racial tradition has lacked the conceptual apparatus as well as the means to do so.

One of the few interventions into the curriculum which did materialise was, once again, a history text book. Interestingly, and in contrast to the SOMAFCO approach, this book entitled What is History? (NECC, 1987) emphasised research procedures and methodology. Through providing a variety of historical sources largely drawn from the day to day experiences of Africans and the anti-apartheid struggle, What is History? encouraged students to engage critically with primary and secondary sources of evidence in order to construct their own historical narratives (the approach borrowed heavily from that used by the English Schools Council 'History Alive' series). Further, students were encouraged to interrogate different historical narratives in order to ascertain who had written them, and whose interests they served. The following passage exemplifies the book's approach.

You have just seen how people choose what evidence is important. Perhaps other groups have chosen different evidence. In many ways your choice probably reflects your economic and social position in society. Historians consciously select (or choose) what they want to study in the past. Their own position in society influences what they regard as important
events and people. (NECC, 1987, p. 34).

Now from the point of view of this study, there is clearly much to commend the above approach. It not only encourages a critical engagement with the social construction of knowledge but begins to suggest the relationship between certain kinds of knowledge and economic and political power. Typically, however, the book does not engage with 'race' and racism as a social and discursive phenomenon, leaving the racial constructions of some of the passages, as well as those of the students, unchallenged.

Further, returning to some of the theoretical points made in the last chapter, whilst the book is generally quite good at deconstruction (given the above qualification), it does not fare so well when it comes to reconstruction. There is no guarantee that after the students have completed their analysis of various historical narratives and practised making their own, that they will be any closer to the body of revisionist, erudite history which clearly informed the authors of the book. Once again, however, practical circumstances also served to underline these weaknesses. The book could only realistically hope to form part of a school history course that remained otherwise dominated by traditional syllabi and approaches.

In summary, non-racialism as it developed during the 1980s in the discourses of people's education continued to unite and legitimate both nationalist and socialist concerns. The fact that, as a repertoire, non-racialism was able to accommodate the growing Marxist influence within charterist organisations demonstrates the flexibility of the repertoire and its usefulness in terms of interpelling a range of actors around the anti-apartheid hegemonic project. In the context of the transition to democracy, however, and of the growing emphasis on the reconstruction of education the limitations of non-racialism from an anti-racist perspective have become increasingly clear.

The Transition to Democracy and the ANC's Policy Framework

The central text considered in this section is the ANC's A Policy Framework for Education and Training (CEPD, 1994) which will be refereed to as the PF. The PF has already been considered in relation to the economy in earlier chapters, and so it will be the racial interpretations that will be subject to scrutiny here. The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (ANC, 1994) (RDP) of which the PF is an integral part has also
been an important resource. The RDP sets out the ANC's vision for an integrated approach towards economic and other developmental objectives which essentially form the backbone of the organisation's election programme. Both documents are still in draft form and have yet to be fully ratified by the ANC membership and other organisations within the alliance. The essential features and arguments of each document, however, are likely to stay the same.

It will be argued that the interpretative repertoire around 'race' in the PF mixes and repositions earlier accounts within the non-racial repertoire, and indeed from contemporary European accounts such as those associated with the ERS. In placing a vision of a non-racial 'nation' centre-stage, however, the PF provides continuity on earlier ANC discourses. Indeed, in the context of the collapse of 'scientific socialism' as a system of thought, a new conception of 'nation-building' can be understood to have occupied the vacuum left by the increasing historical irrelevancy of the 'two stage' theory.

The vision of the nation is a modern one involving an all-embracing notion of citizenship, defined geographical boundaries, a mixed economy and liberal democratic laws and institutions. The RDP clearly located South Africa as a major player in Southern African politics and as a member of the world community of nations (given the lifting of sanctions etc.). The vision therefore builds on previous non-racial accounts. The vision has also been modified, however, in the context of negotiations by the uptake of regionalism and a limited federalism. Despite the best efforts of the ANC, there is a possibility that this regionalism may, in places, become ethnically defined. In the case of regions such as Kwazulu/Natal, however, the extent to which cultural apartheid will prevail will depend upon the outcomes of regional and national elections and changes in the balance of political forces.

With regard to the constructions of 'culture' in current ANC discourses, all the versions from earlier accounts are present. Thus although culture as a national attribute and marker of identity remains prominent, there are also several references to culture as a set of 'ethnic' attributes, customs, religions etc. The re-emergence of 'ethnicity' in the ANC lexicon has been both partial and contradictory. In important ways the experiences of apartheid's cultural racism and the narrow, stultifying and exclusionary 'ethnicities' that it fostered have reinforced the desire to emphasise national democratic identities. This tendency was reinforced by the hegemony of the 'class subject' in the discourses of the
democratic movement during the 1970s and 1980s. There has always been, however, a vision of ethnicity and of cultural-linguistic groups in ANC discourses which has suggested a more open, fluid and flexible construction of difference than has been the case with the cultural essentialism of European accounts. The Freedom Charter contains such a vision. Unfortunately, however, these embryonic conceptions of a unity in diversity have lacked theoretical and practical elaboration.

One consequence of the marginalisation of the politics of ethnicity and of difference in ANC discourses has been the granting of discursive space and policy concessions to the right in this regard. It will be argued below that aspects of the ANC's PF have allowed reactionary whites to build new barricades around their schools under a narrow cultural conservatism. Not everything, however, has gone the right's way in this regard. There has been, in the process of policy formation, the development of new policies aimed at creating unity from diversity, and at limiting the preservation of white power and privilege. Important examples here include not only an end to the colour bar but aspects of the ANC's language policy and affirmative action goals. These policies, however, remain open to contestation, and are in important ways, circumscribed by the continuing limitations of non-racialism as a discourse.

One example here involves the problematic use of 'race' in some contemporary ANC discourses. The continued ambiguity of the meaning of 'race' is exemplified by phrases such as 'there shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race and colour' (CEPD, 1994, p. 27). The tacit distinction that is drawn here between 'race' on the one hand, and 'colour' on the other, suggests that 'race' continues to have a meaning greater than phenotypical characteristics or even just as a signifier of oppression under apartheid. To the extent that it builds on earlier European constructions, 'race' here can be understood as a floating signifier and bridge between contemporary ANC and government accounts. It allows for the easier appropriation of non-racial themes and language by the authors of the ERS and the government in the development of their own hegemonic project.

Nonetheless, it is 'race' as a signifier of group identities under apartheid that remains the dominant construction in ANC discourses. In this regard the PF makes many references to the terms 'white' and 'black' as markers of political identity in the old order. Indeed, the present study has also had recourse to these terms. In important ways, this polarity continues to provide a good deal of explanatory power in terms of understanding
how racism has operated in the South African situation. Criticisms have also been advanced, however, at those accounts that have treated the white/black dichotomy as the fundamental dichotomy at the expense of homogenising diverse experiences of racism. A similar criticism can be made of contemporary ANC discourses and is reinforced by a continued lack of conceptual clarity around the meaning, causes and effects of racism. The policy implications of this lack of clarity are to be found in the vague prescriptions regarding redress and affirmative action. It is far from clear, given the diverse forms that European racism has taken, that all black groups need to be 'affirmed' in the same way.

As suggested above, the conception of development contained in the above repertoire revolves around the concept of 'nation-building'. According to the RDP, nation-building involves an 'integrated and sustainable programme' that must be 'people-driven', i.e.

The RDP is focused on our people's most immediate needs. Regardless of race or sex, be they rural or urban, the people of South Africa must shape their own future. Development is not about delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing empowerment. (ANC, 1994, p. 2).

The RDP further seeks to link economic growth with a process of redistribution through the provision of basic needs and infrastructure to previously neglected areas; the deepening of democracy within the state and civil society; and an emphasis on human resource development. Clearly education is understood to play an important role here.

Unlike European ideas about 'development', it is not envisaged that the process ought to be led by whites, but rather by the people as a whole. In important ways the discourses of the RDP build on Africanist notions of self-reliance which envisage a grassroots approach towards development. 'The people' in these discourses, however, are constructed in a variety of ways. Firstly, the strong emphasis on creating equality of opportunity within a mixed economy speaks to liberal constructions of the entrepreneurial individual. Development here involves the unleashing of human potential through the scrapping of discriminatory laws and practices. Gilroy (1992) has drawn attention in the British context to the similarities between some conceptions of black self-reliance and the 'Thatcherite' virtues of economic betterment through thrift, hard work and individual disciplines.

Secondly, however, there is an equally strong emphasis on empowering groups of
people in the RDP and PF. Here, the notion of self-reliance articulates more strongly with the emphasis on the collective and on community development in BC discourses. Group identities are, however, defined in terms of 'race', 'ethnicity', gender, class, the urban/rural divide, age, disability and so on. In important ways then, ANC discourses have shifted towards a better understanding of different forms of oppression and markers of identity besides those associated just with 'race' and class. Unfortunately, however, the dynamics and inter-relationships between these different forms, as has been discussed in relation to 'race', have not been theoretically elaborated upon.

The tensions between individualistic and collective views of development are crystallised most sharply in the debates around affirmative action (AA) in the South African context. Singh (1993) has differentiated between two basic approaches to AA, namely a 'minimalist' and a 'maximalist' approach, each associated with different interest groups. She has summarised the two positions as follows:

**Minimalist positions on affirmative action involve some version of the company view.....advancement for some individuals of discriminated groups within existing or modified structures and relations. Such a view will be located within an acceptance of the wide-ranging constitutional, legal and political changes that will occur in South Africa and will, in fact, be an interpretation and application of those changes. The maximalist position encompasses some version of the union view - widespread restructuring involving an improvement in the life conditions and opportunities of the majority as well as more inclusive decision-making.** (Singh, 1993, p. 3).

In the case of the United States where AA discourses originated, it was a minimalist conception that predominated (Alkalimat, 1993). The RDP and PF in fact make use of both conceptions of AA and attempt to strike a balance between the two. It will be argued, however, that in terms of educational access and provision as well as the curriculum, it is a minimalist position that is emerging most strongly.

In the discourses of the RDP and PF, education is understood to have the following broad functions in relation to development. Firstly, it is argued that education and training 'are fundamental levers through which we can change the structure of the labour market and thus achieve the highest levels of participation by citizens in the productive life of our society' (CEPD, 1994 p. 30). In this sense, education is understood to have an equalising role to play in terms of creating job opportunities and promoting economic growth. Education is also understood to have a critical role to play in encouraging active citizenship
and deepening democracy.

With regard to the construction of the education/economy relationship, the ANC reproduces the tension between individual and group empowerment. By having recourse to two quite distinct academic interpretations of the relationship, the PF contains in effect at least two differing accounts of the role of education in terms of economic growth, and of economic agents. The first, and most dominant account, is similar in important respects to the one employed in earlier chapters of this study. Drawing on the work of Kraak and others, the PF projects a vision of education and of labour markets as sites for competing hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. This is exemplified in the PF by the relationship that is drawn between apartheid education and racially segmented labour markets, and by the view in the RDP that active intervention in both education and the labour market will be necessary to ensure redress. Various groups are identified as candidates for such affirmative action.

The second construction is associated with the influence of the economics of education with its neo-classical bias. It starts from a functionalist understanding of the education system, labour markets, and indeed markets in general as essentially neutral and equitable mechanisms for the just distribution of goods and services. From this human capital point of view it is only the existence of 'irrational' discriminatory laws that have prevented education from operating meritocratically. The subjects of these discourses are 'rational' individual producers and consumers of services formally equal to compete for positions within the labour market. This position is exemplified in the PF by the assumption (not repeated in the RDP) that a meritocratic education system on its own can bring about changes in the labour market. It is also exemplified by the construction of learners, particularly in the post-compulsory phase, as consumers of educational services and the idea that appropriate 'pricing is needed where there are substantial private benefits of education or training' (CEPD, 1994, p. 45). Unlike more neo-liberal arguments, however, the charging of user fees is normally qualified in ANC discourses with reference to the need to make these fees means-related.

In true social democratic style, the PF attempts to strike a balance between individualistic and collectivist discourses. It is asserted for example, that one of the values of a new educational system should be
The reconciliation of liberty, equality and justice, so that citizens' freedom of choice is exercised within a social and national context of equality of opportunity and the redress of imbalances. (CEPD, 1994, p. 3).

Understood as a source of strength, the eclecticism of the PF can be seen to speak to the world views and concerns of both the left and the right. It is able, for example, to connect with neo-liberal concerns about 'efficiency' and 'cost-effectiveness' in the delivery of education. The emphasis within non-racial discourses on simply removing 'irrational' impediments to individual progress has also facilitated the co-option of non-racial themes into documents such as the ERS. Understood as a source of contradiction, the PF can be interpreted as legitimating the preservation of aspects of white privilege despite its apparent commitment to redress.

This is most clearly demonstrated in the plans for Model C (state-aided) and private schools contained in the PF, and outlined in chapter one. Put simply, the idea is to get the parents of children in currently privileged schools to pay more, through user fees, for their child's education. Increases in enrolments would further reduce government per capita subsidies for these schools (which are typically more expensive to maintain than township schools). The funds saved from the implementation of these measures would then be channelled into upgrading township and rural schools. Now, whilst on the face of it such a policy would seem to encourage a maximalist approach towards AA, it can also be seen to result in the preservation of white privilege. Thus although currently advantaged schools would no longer be able to discriminate on the grounds of 'race' or language proficiency, they would effectively be able to exclude the poor through the imposition of user fees. The result is, therefore, nearer to the minimalist position to AA which would simply imply 'equality of opportunity' within the educational market place.

Similarly, the PF in accordance with the interim constitution for South Africa, guarantees the right of communities to 'establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on common culture, language or religion provided there shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race or colour' (CEPD, 1994, p. 27). Although there is no guarantee that these private schools would receive state subsidisation, they would continue to serve as bastions of white and middle class privilege. These issues will be further explored in the last chapter.

Discourses concerned with the redress of imbalances in educational provision
through improvements in the quality of township schools are also contradictory in their meanings and implications. The PF would appear to have appropriated the language and methodologies of school effectiveness studies for the purposes of AA. Besides the clear influence of school effectiveness studies in the PF itself, individual policy analysts at the ANC's Centre for Educational Policy Development (CEPD) have been actively promoting their own views concerning effective schools. In contrast to the narrow World Bank focus on efficiency and cost-effectiveness, ANC discourses argue that efficiency can only be achieved through improvements in the 'quality' of educational provision (Hlophe, 1993).

It is argued in the PF, for example, that in accordance with international evidence, ten years of free and compulsory education ought to be extended to all children. It is also argued that increases in the resourcing levels of township and rural schools, along with more effective teacher training can lead to qualitative changes in the effectiveness of schools, and that these improvements will increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the system. Further, in the hands of the ANC, managerialist discourses focus not so much on controlling teachers, but rather on more collegial and democratic forms of governance in which teacher support and staff development services play a central role. Finally, the PF consciously asserts the need for political rather than technical solutions to educational issues and crises as a basis for cutting down on disruption, inculcating a culture of learning and improving the efficiency of the educational system generally. In a turnabout from more usual applications of managerialist discourses, the entrenchment of teachers' right to strike and to collective bargaining, along with the fuller democratisation of education are considered important mechanisms for ensuring stability in the system.

The adoption of school effectiveness language and approaches not only demonstrates the contested nature of the studies themselves, but also of the underlying forms of 'scientific' rationality that they employ. It demonstrates the point that there is nothing innately ideological in the use of statistics. Unfortunately, however, CEPD discourses such as those of Hlophe do not attempt to engage with the epistemological status of the statistical methods used in school effectiveness studies, the underlying assumptions and often large margins of error (Samoff, 1993). Nor do these discourses interrogate the way in which similar methodologies may become hooked up with quite different ideological and political projects. The result is simply the counterposing of one 'truth' about school effectiveness with another. One implication is that there is no guarantee that a new government might
not once again employ school effectiveness studies to discipline teachers and justify cuts in educational expenditure. It is not being argued here that quantitative research methodologies have no place in educational research. All that is being said is that a healthy dose of scepticism ought to be employed when considering the truth claims of such approaches.

Typically, issues to do with racism, culture, identity and the curriculum are much more underdeveloped in the PF than those concerned with access and provision. The danger here is that a failure to engage more fully with curricular issues in the near future might well allow the right wing room to assert their own brand of cultural essentialism and narrow vocationalism. At present the emphasis on a broadly-based curriculum with vocational concerns integrated within an academic framework reflects the strong influence of COSATU (see chapter four). Such an approach allows for both black and white youth to receive a broadly-based education within a common qualifications structure during the compulsory phase of schooling. In the absence of substantial restructuring in labour markets and in the way work is organised, however, differentiation in the post-compulsory phase is still likely to reflect continuing racial, gender and class segmentations. Further, if white schools are allowed to maintain their privilege, they will inevitably remain the best institutions for preparation for tertiary education. Equally there would be pressure on predominantly black schools to vocationalise, and for the majority of black students to pursue vocational courses in the post-compulsory phase.

In keeping with the vision of the nation in ANC discourses, the PF argues that

> The education process shall aim at the development of a national democratic culture, with respect for the value of our people's diverse cultural and linguistic traditions, and shall encourage peace, justice, tolerance and stability in our communities and nation. (CEPD, 1994, p. 4).

This conception of the democratic nation remains unsubstantiated in curricular terms. The meaning of 'national democratic culture' remains abstract and open to contestation.

The account makes room for both versions of 'nation-building' discussed above. On the one hand it implies a role for education in relation to nation-building that differs only by degree from that contained in the ERS, i.e. an entrepreneurial society based on self-reliance but in which equality of opportunity allows for free competition for goods and services. On the other hand, however, the PF allows for a vision of education in relation
to the 'maximalist' redistribution of goods and services and a redefinition of citizenship implied by a deepening of democratic participation in decision-making. Significantly in terms of the arguments of this chapter, although the second version predominates within both the PF and the RDP, the few prescriptions that are made concerning a future non-racial education have more in keeping with the first version.

For example, the PF expounds the 'multicultural message' of equality of opportunity, tolerance and peace. In the context of international shifts in racial discourses as well as those of the ERS and South African New Right, multiculturalism is most closely associated with a 'free market' approach towards handling difference. Further, the explicit references that are made to AA refer only to the minimalist concern with the appointment of senior managers (CEPD, 1994, p. 9). From the point of view of this study, it is an anti-racist approach can best connect with the second vision of nation-building in the PF and to a maximalist approach towards AA in education. Only a thorough reworking of dominant conceptions of the curriculum and pedagogy along the lines mentioned earlier in the chapter can seek to challenge European hegemony at the level of cultural and identity politics. Here there is room for a rapprochement between some BC concerns and approaches and those that have traditionally preoccupied the ANC.

Together with the ERS, the PF also proposes the development of national curriculum frameworks that make allowances for regional and local variations. Interestingly, however, whereas the ERS justifies such a policy on the basis of preserving diversity, for the ANC the issue is one of promoting

unity in diversity through a flexible framework which allows for the accommodation of cultural, provincial and local differences in needs. (CEPD, 1994, p. 69).

There is a need, however, to analyse carefully the boundaries and limitations of local control over the curriculum in relation to a national qualifications structure and curriculum framework to prevent the process leading to the privileging of some regions, and schools. If a future non-racial curriculum fails to adopt an anti-racist approach and simply continues to reflect its present Eurocentric bias, then clearly any region or institution that also reflects a Eurocentric bias will necessarily be at an advantage.

The emerging language policy also needs to be closely interrogated from an anti-racist perspective. In the past English has been put forward by African nationalists as a suitable lingua franca for a new South Africa on the grounds that it has the potential to
unify the nation and because of its international currency. Thus English was the proposed medium of instruction in AZAPO discourses and was actually employed as such in the cultural clubs and at SOMAFCO. Once again it has been prompting from the right with their concerns about the future of Afrikaans and other languages that has partly accounted for the ANC's own more recent interventions in this area (although it will be recalled that language was an issue for some Congress members such as Z.K. Mathews). The re-emergence of language issues can also be located within the new emphases on ethnicity generally both in South Africa and internationally (Hall, 1992).

Future language policy, according to the PF, is to be based on the principle of multilingualism and on the idea that all South African children should be given access to, and expected to learn, at least two South African languages throughout the period of compulsory schooling. In accordance with the ANC's general language policy, language in education policy is to be based on the concept of 'choice' and on 'The necessity to promote and develop South African languages that were previously disadvantaged and neglected' (CEPD, 1994, p. 63). Eleven national languages are recognised as potential medium of instruction languages (Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu). Other languages including Indian languages are to be promoted as school subjects.

Language policy in individual schools should, according to the PF, be based on one of three options: a) a language of wider communication, such as English, with a phased bilingualism approach characterising the early years; b) using the home language of the majority of learners in a particular institution, or where this may be discriminatory, two home languages; c) using different languages to teach different subjects. No learner is to be refused admission to any school in the early years of schooling on the grounds of lack of proficiency in the medium of instruction. Language support services are to be developed to promote the necessary proficiency. Language in education will be an aspect of the work of the national and regional Institutes for Curriculum Development.

In important ways the ANC's language in education policy can be understood as an example of how a more pro-active intervention into cultural issues is able to set the policy agenda in accordance with the ANC's own hegemonic project. Rather than mother tongue instruction being used as a means of both denying blacks access to English and keeping blacks out of model C schools, the ANC's policies seek to affirm African languages whilst
at the same time giving all children the chance to become proficient in English. By emphasising 'choice' the ANC has also effectively appropriated a common rallying call for the right, expressed in the ERS as a commitment to 'freedom of association'. The extent to which the policy accords with the second notion of nation-building above, and with a maximalist approach towards AA, however, rests quite heavily on the extent to which personnel and resources can be mobilised to support the development of previously neglected languages, and produce the necessary learning materials in a plurality of languages. Here the proposals to leave text book production to the free market (put forward in the chapter in the PF on educational publishing) exemplifies some of the latent tensions in the document. For there is no guarantee that publishers will be prepared to produce texts for some of the minority languages if it will not be profitable to do so. Further, if the necessary learning support is not there, then learners being taught in other languages besides English will continue to be denied access to dominant forms of knowledge, especially in maths and science (Greenstein et al, 1994).

In conclusion, despite some areas of concern, there is potential for progressive, anti-racist intervention in the present policy milieu. Non-racialism as a discourse has proved to be flexible and adaptable to a variety of concerns and interests. In this regard the strong recommendations in the PF and RDP concerning the democratisation of the curriculum process afford the best chance in the history of South African education of defining a common humanist vision in which neglected concerns around 'race', gender, class, sexuality, age etc. find true expression in curricular terms. It is towards such a consideration of the politics of educational change during the transition that the final chapter shall turn.
CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN TRANSITION

Introduction

This concluding chapter will focus on the present and attention will turn to an understanding of the political level as a source of educational change during the transition to a democratic, national system. In particular this chapter will look at the role of different interest groups in the development of policy both inside and outside of the state, and the related issue of the governance and control of education.

In previous chapters the role of agency has been discussed but in relation to economic and discursive changes. In this chapter pride of place will be given to the goals and actions of groups and individuals and to political processes and institutions. In so doing, however, the chapter will attempt a rapprochement between pluralist and other approaches adopted in the study through a reworking of Margaret Archer's theories concerning the emergence and development of educational systems. At the theoretical level it involves a consideration of Archer's proposition that the structure of the educational system has its own autonomous effect on the nature of educational interactions.

Using Archer's work as a reference point for this study is particularly appropriate given that recent influential contributions to the debate on educational governance have also had recourse to her work, albeit problematically. Before turning to a critical engagement with some of this work it is first of all necessary to provide a brief summary of Archer's work.

Archerian Theory and Education Systems Change

The attraction of Archer's work for educationists is that it provides a theoretical and comparative perspective on the political processes specifically concerned with education systems change. According to Archer her 'macro-sociological' approach involves two interrelated elements:

On the one hand, complex kinds of social interaction the result of which is the emergence of particular forms of education, in this case the state system; on the other, complex types of social and educational structures which shape the context in which interaction and change
occur. (Archer, 1984, p. 3)

Archer's emphasis on social structures places her work in contrast to the exclusive focus on actor's interactions which is characteristic of the work of methodological individualists in the field of policy studies (Archer, 1984; Mc Pherson and Raab, 1988). Her work also stands in contrast to the kind of pluralist approach adopted by Maurice Kogan (1978) in the English tradition and by many liberal educationists in South Africa (see chapter one). These latter accounts have often been good at describing educational change, but have generally failed adequately to explain such change (Hargreaves, 1983; Mc Pherson and Raab, 1988; Ball, 1990,a). This is partly accounted for by the separation that is made in these analyses between the state on the one hand and struggles within civil society on the other.

In contrast to pluralists, neo-Marxists have often provided powerful and theoretically elaborated accounts of educational change, but at a broad societal level that has tended to miss the specificities of interactions within the educational state itself. Dale's (1989) attempt to provide a theoretical perspective on the state in educational policy can be understood as a belated attempt by the western neo-Marxist tradition to provide such specificity. Indeed some of his insights were used in chapter three where an attempt was made to link educational reform to economic change. In the context of this chapter, however, the neo-Marxist emphasis on the state as a legitimator and reproducer of capitalist class relations does not provide a sufficiently flexible framework for a study of group interactions that are not specifically organised around economic interests.

In terms of the coherence of this study as a whole, it is instructive that Dale himself has acknowledged the importance of an Archerian-type analysis as a complement to his own approach, although he never puts this insight into practice (Dale, 1989). Archer's work in fact lends itself to a variety of interpretations and may be articulated with different political and theoretical approaches, as will be made clear during the course of this chapter. Indeed Archer herself has argued in relation to her work that as 'a specialist theory which is strictly about educational change it may....be consistent with one or more social theories' (Archer, 1979, p. 84).

This is not to imply an implicit theoretical and political 'neutrality' in Archer's work. It will be argued that Archer's approach in fact contains a methodological bias that lends itself more to the liberal project than to the approach adopted in this study. Indeed
it has been necessary to quite drastically restructure the Archerian discourse for the purposes of this chapter and the theoretical starting points used here. Further, although her broad framework has been found useful, her exclusive focus on European educational systems has meant that many of her generalisations concerning systems change simply do not apply in the South African context.

Archer presents her work in a way that is congruent with her methodological perspective. She describes two broad cycles of educational change, each with three stages. The first stage of the first cycle involves a description of educational structures attendant in her countries of analysis (England, France, Russia and Denmark) prior to the development of state education systems (SESs). The next stage then looks at the way that different kinds of educational structures conditioned (rather than determined) the kinds of educational interactions that took place in these systems. The third stage of the first cycle (which is also the beginning of the next) is concerned with structural elaboration i.e. patterns of change involving the creation of new structures that have come about as a result of prior interactions. The cycle is then repeated but this time it is the structures of the new SESs, the forms of educational interaction that they condition and the resulting patterns of structural elaboration that are analysed.

It is Archer's contention that in her four countries of analysis the structure of educational systems prior to the advent of SESs could all be described as being mono-integrated, i.e. as being owned and controlled by one institution only in the social structure. In the case of Archer's four case studies, this institution was the church, although she does acknowledge that in other countries such as Japan, the privileged institution was the political elite.

Archer then describes the responses of other groups with a potential interest in education in terms of whether they were advanced or obstructed by the definition of education preferred by the dominant group. In this respect other institutions are categorised as being either neutral, adventitious beneficiaries or obstructed institutions. The responses of other institutions to the exclusive ownership of education were themselves dependant on a variety of factors. Firstly, the educational structure itself limited the possibilities for educational interaction. Mono-integration could only be challenged by means of competition between the dominant group and the assertive group. In France, for example, the bourgeoisie restricted the educational activities of the church through legislative means. In
England on the other hand, different institutions began to substitute existing institutions with alternative ones.

Secondly, the success of the assertive group was also dependant on: its bargaining power (its strength in numbers and organisation); its ideological cohesiveness (i.e. the development of a critique of existing arrangements, the ability to legitimate the oppositional project and the ability to formulate educational alternatives); and, the assertive group's access to political and economic resources. The outcome of competition was the development of multi-integrated state systems. Although these systems were financed largely by the state, the definition of education (its aims, goals and methods) were in keeping with a multiplicity of institutions within society. Importantly, Archer claims that centralised systems such as those of France and Russia came about as a result of restrictive strategies. Decentralised systems on the other hand had substitutive origins.

The centralised and decentralised systems in turn have continued to condition the nature of educational interaction in them. In general Archer argues that negotiation rather than competition characterises educational transactions in SESs due to the impracticality of restrictive and substitutive strategies on the one hand, and the possibilities for negotiation opened up by the fact of state ownership of education on the other. Importantly, however, Archer does maintain that competitive strategies might still apply in some situations such as in revolutionary Russia.

Making use of exchange theory Archer identifies three kinds of change mechanisms relevant to SESs. The first is internal initiation which involves the 'exchange of expertise for financial resources and legal rights on favourable terms' (1984, p. 122). It is used as a mechanism of change by different parts of the educational profession including teachers, academics and bureaucrats. It involves the development of innovative strategies and new methodologies which subsequently become diffused throughout the system. The second mechanism, external transaction is usually instigated from outside the system by groups seeking new or additional educational services. Private sector funding in exchange for a certain kind of skills training is an example here. External transaction involves 'the successful exchange of financial resources for expert services' (1984, p. 123).

Archer's last change mechanism, political manipulation, is the most ambiguous of the three. Defined simply enough as 'the exchange of power resources for expert services' (1984, p. 123), Archer in fact uses the term to refer to different forms of political activity.
On the one hand political manipulation is used to refer to the activities 'of those groups which dominate the central or local decision-making arenas using their official powers to extract the educational services desired and to preclude undesirable outputs' (1979, p. 242). On the other hand political manipulation is described as 'the principal resort of those who have no other means of gaining satisfaction for their educational demands despite the fact that they may also be the least successful at manipulating the political machine' (1979, p. 242).

The latter definition of political manipulation has led the exponents of Archer's work in the South African context to include student and teacher boycotts, strikes and mass protests as examples. Although these forms of pressure on policy are acknowledged in Archer's work, she in fact distinguishes such forms of 'militant action' (1979, p. 383) or 'direct action' (1979, p. 556) from more moderate kinds of lobbying, negotiations and persuasion, or at least treats them as a special type of political manipulation. Archer's own ambiguous use of 'political manipulation' has been one causal factor in the misappropriation of her work by South African liberals.

Having identified various kinds of change mechanisms in general, Archer then proceeds to differentiate between the kinds of strategies common in centralised and decentralised systems. The structure of decentralised systems encourages the use of all three strategies. The relative success of each, however, depends upon the access dissatisfied interest groups have to three kinds of resources, namely, political power, wealth and expertise. In contrast, the concentration of decision-making structures in centralised systems militates against the use of internal initiation and external transaction due to the lack of autonomy of the system from the political centre. In this context political manipulation becomes the predominant form of educational change for all groups.

The success of political manipulation in decentralised systems, however, depends in turn upon a variable outside of the education system per se, namely upon the oneness of the political centre. In other words, the success of political manipulation depends upon the extent to which different interest groups have access to, and can make use of the main organs of government. In this regard Archer distinguishes between three kinds of political centre:

a) In the case of an impenetrable political centre 'only sub-sections of the governing elite will be able to negotiate educational demands by political manipulation'.


b) In the case of a semi-permeable political centre 'sub-sections of the governing elite, together with government supporters, will be able to negotiate educational demands'.

c) In the case of an accessible political centre 'governmental opponents, too, will be able to negotiate educational demands' (1984, p. 133). This leads to a proliferation of interest groups intent on changing policy.

The final stage of Archer's cycle, 'structural elaboration', is equally contingent on the prior structure of the system. In decentralised systems the effects of a multiplicity of change mechanisms operating at a variety of levels (national, regional, local, institutional etc.) lead to a constant process of incremental change. Alternatively, in the centralised system political pressure tends to build up until legislative change is eventually forced through. Archer describes this as a stop-go pattern of change. Archer also argues that the centralised and decentralised systems that she has studied are gradually developing countervailing tendencies, i.e. are becoming more decentralised and centralised respectively. According to Archer this phenomenon suggests that the current cycle of change is incomplete. Finally, despite the fact that systems do change, it is one of Archer's important contentions that the basic structures of centralised and decentralised systems are remarkably durable. In the next section attention will turn to the use that has been made of Archer's in recent debates on educational governance in South Africa.

The Use of Archer's Work in South Africa

The two main importers of Archer's ideas into South Africa have both been associated at different times with the Urban Foundation. Robin Lee (formally of the Urban Foundation) was the first to apply Archer's ideas to the South African context (Lee, 1990) in a paper written for the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Policy Studies. Entitled No Coups d'Etat in Education Policy, Lee uses the paper to castigate educationists and education theory in general for having 'little to say that is helpful about how to change education policy and education systems' (Lee, 1990, p. 2). In a veiled reference to the exponents of people's education Lee goes on to add that 'the idealised demands of another system are simply opposed to the present system and demands made that one be changed to the other' (p. 2). In contrast Lee uses Archer's work (incorrectly so it will be argued)
to attempt to describe the education system in Archerian terms, and to argue for a negotiated transition to a new system of governance.

This was followed by Buckland and Hofmeyr's interventions into the governance debate. As employees of the Urban Foundation's Education Policy and Systems Change Unit (EDUPOL) they have used Archer's work to develop their 'system perspective' on a post-apartheid governance structure. This perspective receives its most detailed exposition in a paper written for EDUPOL entitled *Education Governance in South Africa* (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993). The system perspective also constituted one of the two main 'options' for a future governance system contained in the NEPI *Governance and Administration* report. Strangely, although Buckland and Hofmeyr have clearly borrowed many ideas, phrases and even paragraphs from Lee's original piece, the obvious debt of the latter to the former is not acknowledged. One result of Buckland and Hofmeyr's usage of Lee is that many of the errors in Lee's work are repeated in theirs. Like Lee, Buckland and Hofmeyr use Archer's work to describe the education system since 1948, and to argue for a negotiated transition to a new system of governance. Unlike Lee, however, they also seek to develop concrete proposals concerning what a new governance system might look like.

Buckland and Hofmeyr describe the South African education system as follows:

> The present state system of education can best be described as a system of systems, linked together not by any broad educational vision but by the ideology of apartheid. However, the origins of the system lie in the establishment of the first state system in 1910, when education for whites was structured along broadly federal lines, with the union government having responsibility only for 'higher education', while responsibility for the rest of education was devolved to the provinces. State systems for other race groups [sic] were only established under the apartheid government when education for Africans was brought under central government control. (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 11).

They go on to argue that having inherited a decentralised system, the NP then went on to pursue a policy of strong centralisation albeit with some decentralising tendencies of late.

Buckland and Hofmeyr together with Lee then proceed to describe educational interactions since 1948. They argue that between 1948 and 1976 (or in the case of Lee between 1948 and 1976-1978) the political centre was impenetrable in Archerian terms. Since then, so it is argued, became semi-permeable until 1990 when it became fully permeable. Consequently, the period 1948-1976/78 was characterised, according to the authors, by a rejection of all attempts at educational change except for change that was
instigated within the NP itself. After 1976/78, the government 'began to develop internal divisions and to succumb politically to pressures. Thus some policy demands from outside government began to exert an effect' (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 19). The de Lange investigation along with the increasing numbers of external transactions between the private sector, NGOs and the education system are given as examples of this new oneness. The advent of the open political centre has resulted, according to Lee and Buckland and Hofmeyr, in a proliferation of interest groups and a new willingness on the part of the state to negotiate change. It is not, however, the fact of limited negotiations to date that concern the authors so much as the possibilities that they perceive to have opened up for a stepping up of the negotiations process in the near future as shall be discussed below.

Both sets of authors also use Archer's work to make predictions concerning the durability and persistence of existing governance structures and the concomitant need for phased, gradual change. In the case of Buckland and Hofmeyr these predictions are used to support their own propositions concerning a new governance system based on a mixture of centralisation and decentralisation (some of these proposals will be dealt with more concretely in the final section of the chapter).

On the face of it, Buckland and Hofmeyr's and Lee's work appears to provide a fairly sophisticated analysis of systems change as well as the theoretical underpinnings on which to base a new system of governance. It will be argued, however, that although some parts of their work are of use in describing the present system of governance, it is found wanting in terms of explaining the origins of the present system and the nature of educational change since 1948. These shortcomings in turn render their use of Archer's work as a peg onto which to hang their own predictions and prescriptions highly problematic. In the paragraphs that follow it will also be argued that the inappropriate use of Archer is compounded by aspects of the Archerian project itself. An attempt will then be made to recast Archer's theories in terms of the approach of the present study.

From the perspective of this study, Buckland and Hofmeyr are wrong on two important scores about the origins of the state education system in South Africa. This may be understood in relation to a certain ambiguity in the way Archer herself defines SESs as well as reflecting an implicit eurocentricism on the part of her South African exponents. It will be recalled that Archer distinguishes between the multi-integrated nature of SESs and the mono-integrated nature of preceding structures. In these terms Buckland and Hofmeyr
are incorrect to argue that the origins of the system date back to the Act of Union in 1910. A look at the historical literature on the origins of the education system in South Africa would suggest that state-controlled multi-integrated systems in the Archerian sense in fact date back to the early nineteenth century (Keto, 1990; Malherbe, 1925; McKerron, 1934). Thus each province imported (wholly or partially) educational models from Europe that already showed signs of multi-integration in terms of the definition of education. Further, these systems were largely owned and controlled by the provincial state.

Elsewhere, however, Archer also defines state systems as

a nation-wide and differentiated collection of institutions devoted to formal education, whose overall control and supervision is at least partly governmental, and whose component parts and processes are related to each other (Archer, 1984, p. 19).

Implicit in the work of Archer then is a view of SESs as being national in character. Although she never seeks to problematise this aspect of SESs in her work, it is clear from her own accounts that in the countries that she studied, SESs evolved as an aspect of the development of the modern nation state. Now for the purposes of comparison between her various European countries this fact is perhaps of more limited significance. In the colonial context, however, where struggles over the meaning of 'nation' have been a major explanatory factor at the heart of political, economic and educational change, the definition of SESs in relation to the 'nation' takes on a whole new meaning.

Indeed, in the South African colonial context, educational change can only be fully grasped in relation to struggles over the constitution of national identity. Thus the historical literature reveals that education in the provinces and in the African territories since the arrival of the Europeans in 1952 has been marked by struggles between national groups defined in terms of the 'Afrikaner nation', the 'English nation', the various 'Bantu nations' etc. over the ownership, control and definition of education (see particularly Keto, 1990). The 1910 Act did not resolve these conflicts between the 'white nations', as evidenced most dramatically by the aggressive reassertion of an Afrikaner Christian National Education during the 1930s. The 1967 'National' Education Act did, however, represent a new rapprochement between Afrikaners and English speakers, albeit more on Afrikaner terms (see chapters one and four).

Of greater contemporary significance is the argument of previous chapters that educational struggles have increasingly centred around those included and those excluded
from the developing 'white nation', especially in the period since 1948. Hence the eurocentric nature of Buckland and Hofmeyr's claims concerning the 'origins' of the present system, for in terms of the increasingly hegemonic 'non-racial' definition of the nation, a truly national education system has yet to emerge.

The glaring dissimilarities between Archer's European examples and the South African case probably prevented Buckland and Hofmeyr from attempting to explain the structure of the system that emerged in 1910 in terms of substitutive or restrictive strategies. Indeed, (ironically in terms of their attempt to apply Archer's work to South Africa) the description of the system that they do provide is one of the more useful parts of their paper as a whole and has been used as a basis for the description given below.

In describing the forms of educational interaction since 1948, however, Buckland and Hofmeyr together with Lee once again combine a problematic use of Archer with eurocentric assumptions by describing the penetrability of the political centre from a white perspective. It will be recalled that these authors portray the period 1948-1976 as having been characterised by an impenetrable political centre in which the polity was only accessible to the political elite. It is implied, in other words, that blacks and whites outside of the NP were excluded from educational policy making. The view taken here, however, is that whilst the polity was certainly impenetrable to blacks, this was not necessarily the case for liberal whites. Liberals, for example, had representation on the Education Advisory Council during the 1960s which played an important role in formulating the 1967 National Education Policy Act (Malherbe, 1977). It was partly as a result of this representation that although a CNE vision predominated in the Act, in discursive terms it allowed a good deal of flexibility around the terms 'Christian' and 'national' (see chapter four). As far as whites are concerned, therefore, it is more accurate to describe the polity during this period as being semi-permeable.

It will further be recalled from chapter three that since 1976 the polity has become more penetrable to whites, notably the business community. Not only did business have representation on the President's Council, but there was a sharp increase in external transactions between private interests and the education system, as Buckland et al point out. This accords with Buckland et al's description of a semi-permeable polity. The same level of oneness was not displayed towards blacks, however, except for a small minority who opted to 'work within the system'. Events such as the introduction of the Tri-cameral
parliament in 1983, Buthelezi's Natal/Kwazulu indaba in 1985 (Tikly, 1990), and the inclusion of some blacks in the de Lange investigation all provide instances of 'negotiations' involving blacks. For the vast majority of blacks who rejected apartheid institutions, however, and for their leaders (many of whom were incarcerated or in exile), the political centre remained distinctly impenetrable during this period.

Since February 2nd 1990, the polity has become more accessible to blacks, but only by degree. In the context of negotiations over a new political dispensation previously banned political parties have been involved in forums such as CODESA and the more recent multi-party talks in thrashing out a new constitution. It is only with the advent of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) late in 1993 though that black groupings have gained access to actual state power in however circumscribed a form. Developments within education have followed a similar course. Up until the advent of the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) in August of 1993, the state alone was responsible for all educational decision-making, a point that will be taken up below. It is only in this limited sense then that the polity can be understood as having become 'open' to black opposition groups since 1990.

In describing educational transactions in the above context Buckland and Hofmeyr (but not Lee) are forced to acknowledge that 'the distorting effects of apartheid have altered the basic form of the transactions Archer describes' (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 22), and that 'confrontation has led to spates of boycotts, riots, strikes, repression, detention, bannings, violence and deaths since 1976' (p. 29). These observations do not prevent them, however, from continuing to try and interpret educational change since 1976 in terms of negotiation. It was argued earlier in relation to Archer's work that the forms of mass action and repression described by Buckland and Hofmeyr do not fit easily into Archer's idea of negotiation, except in extreme cases. It will be further argued below that whilst negotiations in the Archerian sense have characterised educational transactions since 1948 it is also necessary to introduce alternative change mechanisms into the analysis of the South African context.

Finally, Buckland and Hofmeyr along with Lee seek to derive predictions concerning the future of educational change from Archer's work. The attempt to uncritically apply law-like generalisations from Archer's work to the South African context is not helped by Archer's own epistemological position and her claims to have found
'objective' rules governing educational change (although, as will be discussed below, she does qualify the use of her 'findings' in the colonial situation). From the perspective of this study such claims to objectivity are problematic in themselves, and, in the case of Archer's studies, mask a bias towards liberal politics. Related to the above is the high level of generality in which she couches her writing and a tendency to abstraction that misses the nuances and inconsistencies of educational change that a more specific analysis might reveal (King, 1979). The tendency to over-generalise her ideas concerning the nature of centralised and decentralised systems has made the application of her work even in European countries such as Scotland problematic (McPherson and Raab, 1988).

Some of the 'predictions' made by Buckland et al are in fact accurate descriptions of recent developments. Examples here include the proliferation of interest groups since the advent of political negotiations and developing tendencies towards decentralisation. Although Buckland et al are quick to point to these phenomena as 'proving' the relevance of Archer's theories for South Africa, given the gross contextual differences outlined above it is impossible to attribute these phenomena to the same causality with any certainty. Further, although there may be features in common with Archer's European examples such as a high degree of centralisation and, in more recent times, a gradual opening of the political centre, the forms that these phenomena have taken are linked to developments that are specific to South Africa, as will be shown below.

Of greater significance as far as the political project of South African liberalism is concerned are two of Buckland et al's other assumptions concerning the future of educational change. Firstly, they use Archer's theories not only to portray negotiations as the prevalent method of educational change since 1948, but also to assert the necessity for negotiations in the future. Thus, according to Buckland and Hofmeyr,

> Archer's central idea that negotiation is the most important process of education change in state education systems has been accepted by most political groups in South Africa. There is an understanding that no group will get precisely what it wants and all groups have something to lose by the total collapse of the system (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 21).

Similarly, Lee argues that

> The state of education demands that all avenues available be used to achieve swift, negotiated and fundamental change in both policy and system. Interest groups in South Africa tend to have hammered away at the single path of political manipulation, only stumbling occasionally into one of the two other strategies [i.e. internal initiation and

The fact that a large section of the Democratic Movement has committed itself to political negotiations as Buckland and Hofmeyr suggest is not being brought into question. It will be argued here, however, that it is one particular conception of negotiations and the negotiations process that the authors wish to promote and encourage. One interpretation of the above quotes is that the authors wish to counterpose the previous use of mass action with the possibilities opened up for new kinds of political manipulation, external transaction and internal initiation. There is a sense in which an Archerian analysis is used by Buckland et al to present a vision of 'normality' against which the anomalies of the South African situation may be judged. It is a further aspect of the authors' eurocentricism that they assume the 'normality' of change mechanisms derived from Archer's European examples. Such an analysis also allows the authors to subtly discipline the Democratic Movement for continuing to use mass action, and for failing to engage with the state in a 'normal' manner.

The strong emphasis on 'negotiations' as defined by Archer may be understood as reflecting the private sector's long-standing goal of achieving political stability in South Africa (see chapter three). It will be recalled that all three authors have worked at one time or another for the Urban Foundation which has been the vanguard of corporate 'social responsibility'. In making their own proposals for a future system of governance, for example, Buckland and Hofmeyr state their commitment to 'the avoidance of endless contestations over education governance in the future' (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 59).

Archer's use of the term 'negotiation' itself works within the grain of the liberal project and a belief in consensus politics. By having recourse to exchange theory to explain the motives of different policy actors, Archer in fact projects a particular vision of 'human nature' that many liberals find attractive. In brief, exchange theory rests on the assumption that individuals and groups enter into transactions for the achievement of their own interests (as defined by themselves) (Archer, 1979). Now the above idea could be interpreted in a variety of ways. Archer's own understanding of 'self interest', however, as her discussions of educational transactions reveal, focuses on an understanding of the 'profit motive' as the principal motivating force. In this conception individuals and groups enter into transactions in order to bring immediate increases either to their material wealth or to their power and
status.

Now such motives no doubt go some way towards explaining individual and group behaviour in a society structured by capitalist and colonial relations. It is also true, however, that they by no means exhaust all the possible reasons why people act in particular ways. It will be argued below that in the South African context, any understanding of 'self interest' must take into account how individual and group interests become articulated with broader struggles for fundamental social change. The above comments feed into a general criticism of Archer's work from the British context (itself hardly a revolutionary situation). It is argued in relation to Archer that

The political dimension of the change process has to be placed within its social context in order to understand the form that it assumes (Salter and Tapper, 1981, p. 28).

A further consequence of the above conception of negotiations is that it can work to 'sanitise' the historical role of the private sector in the apartheid system. The role of the private sector is presented in the accounts of Buckland et al as having revolved around a series of external transactions. From this it would be easy to assume that these transactions have simply involved, say, the exchange of private funding for a new emphasis within the system on skills training to meet capital's needs. Such an interpretation would certainly gel with Archer's own understanding of external transactions. An alternative view, however, and one favoured here, would also seek to locate private sector involvement in education in terms of growing international pressures for economic sanctions and a bid by local and, particularly, international capital to legitimate their continued involvement in the apartheid system through schemes such as corporate social responsibility.

A final point concerning Archer's conception of negotiations is that it rather limits the applicability of the three change mechanisms to an understanding of the educational state. Indeed Archer has defined external transaction, political manipulation and internal initiation in a way that closes off discussion of policy-making and educational politics in civil society. Particularly during the current transition, however, civil society has become an increasingly important site for policy development, as NEPI and the ANC's Policy Framework exemplify. It is important then also to think of change mechanisms in relation to interactions outside of the educational state.

Another 'prediction' that Buckland et al make concerning the apparent 'durability' of governance structures also has an ideological dimension. Following Archer they wish
to assert the 'durability' and 'persistence' of existing governance structures. In the case of Buckland et al they use this assertion to back up their own views concerning the need for a gradual and phased approach to systems change. They also use it as a justification for their own proposals concerning a new system of governance, which they argue should, like the old system, continue to mix aspects of centralisation and decentralisation. The idea that existing governance structures tend to persist is also part of the 'common sense' of much of the literature on the decentralisation debate. As such it will be discussed in the final section.

In terms of the present theoretical debate, the idea of the persistence of structures is important because it speaks to concerns raised in chapter two concerning the relative autonomy of structures. It is central to the Archerian project that she seeks to examine the autonomous effects of structures on subsequent educational interactions. It is the view taken here, however, that too much emphasis on this concern results in governance structures being given a determinism of their own that is insufficiently qualified with respect to specific historical conjunctures. The case of England is relevant here. It is instructive that Archer completed her study of the decentralised English system in 1979, the year that the Tories under Margaret Thatcher came to power. Some political commentators have dated the end of the post-war social democratic 'settlement' in British politics to this time (see Hall et al, 1989, for example).

In educational terms 1979 certainly saw the beginning of the end for the old 'partnership' between central government, local authorities and the teaching profession as the conservative revolution took hold (Tikly, 1991; Jones, 1989). The revolution reached its height with the 1988 Education Reform Act (Ball, 1990). In brief, within the space of a few years the power of local authorities and the autonomy of the teaching profession had been seriously undermined and an increasingly centralised system put in its place, exemplified by a new national curriculum and the ascendancy of the National Manpower Commission in the field of vocational education. Of importance for the discussion here is the observation that far from representing 'incremental change', the 1988 Act in England and Wales can better be understood as a major departure and rupture from a previously highly decentralised system. In this sense Archer may have been unduly influenced by the historical conjuncture she was writing in and the post-war settlement.

If the idea of the persistence of governance structures is problematic in the English
context, this is even more the case in relation to South African education. Having argued that the NP pursued a policy of strong centralisation (to good effect) in South African education, it is a source of contradiction for Buckland et al that they still wish to assert Archer's law-like generalisations. The contradiction is aggravated by some of Buckland et al's own prescriptions concerning a new system which, as shall be discussed later, in fact represent a radical departure from existing arrangements.

Given the above it must be asked why Buckland et al put such emphasis on the persistence of structures. There are several possible explanations. Firstly, although the use of Archer's predictions contradicts some of their own ideas for a future system, it can also be understood to support some of their other, more conservative views. In a response to the ANC's Policy Framework, for example, Buckland et al argue for the retention of state-aided and private schools (EDUPOL, 1994). At a more general level, Buckland et al's use of Archer also corresponds with their proposed balance between centralised and decentralised structures in a new arrangement, thereby providing continuity to existing arrangements. As a discursive ploy, the use of Archer by Buckland et al represents both a source of strength and a source of contradiction. It can also be understood as an attempt to provide theoretical legitimacy for their own work, which is otherwise quite technicist in nature.

From the above critique of Buckland et al it is clear that any attempt to apply Archer's ideas to the South African context must start from an appreciation of the specificities of the South African context. Ironically, given the above critique, Buckland and Hofmeyr at one point acknowledge that a question must be raised concerning the 'applicability' of Archer's work to South Africa which includes 'strong components of a developing country' (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 7). They never follow this insight through though, preferring to highlight only those aspects of Archer's work that support their own analysis. Indeed, they appear not to have taken cognisance of Archer's own reservations about the wider applicability of her work. Archer argues, for example, that her theoretical account of educational systems is confined to countries where it cannot be attributed to external intervention via conquest, colonisation or territorial redistribution. (Archer, 1984, p. 18)

She goes on to argue that although her approach cannot give a full account of educational change in colonised countries,
it is indispensable for a full account. The additional problems surrounding retention, rejection or adoption of externally imposed educational systems warrant a study in their own right. (Archer, 1984, p. 18)

Unfortunately space does not allow for a comprehensive uptake of Archer's challenge. Rather, the focus here will be on two aspects of the South African education system that mark it out from Archer's European examples, namely the coexistence of negotiations with a particular form of competition, and the predominance since 1976 of additional mechanisms of educational change besides those suggested by Archer.

It has already been argued in relation to the historical literature that educational struggles have often centred around the ownership and definition of education by various 'national' groups. It would, therefore, seem entirely appropriate in the South African colonial context to describe these struggles as an aspect of a form of educational competition. Unlike Archer's case studies, however, this competition has not been between different institutions within one nation, but rather between groups either included or excluded from the definition of the nation dominant at any point in history.

Thus, with the possible exception of the province of Natal (which enjoyed relative stability in this respect), educational struggles in the other provinces for the better part of the nineteenth century have largely been between Afrikaners and English speakers over issues such as the medium of instruction in schools and the imposition of anglicization policies by the British (Keto, 1990; Malherbe, 1925). In the Cape this led to Afrikaners attempting to set up their own schools through a process of substitution, whereas in other areas such as the Transvaal, restrictive strategies were applied during times of conflict with the British. Similarly, in the African territories during the same period there was competition between African chiefs and missionaries over the existence of missionary schools with chiefs attempting to restrict the activities of missionaries during times of conflict between Africans and Europeans.

Turning to the period under review, on coming to power in 1948 the NP lost little time in restricting the activities of the missionaries and African nationalists in the educational sphere. Similarly, the various school boycotts along with the people's education campaigns may be interpreted as an attempt by blacks to restrict the activities of the state, albeit from a position of 'people's power' rather than through legislative authority.

Clearly, however, restrictive and substitutive strategies cannot in themselves
encompass the range of oppositional activities and state responses characteristic of educational change since 1976. It is necessary, rather, to add two more change mechanisms associated with competition in the South African situation, namely, 'mass action' and 'state coercion'. The former has encompassed boycotts, strikes, demonstrations, stay-aways, and occasionally more violent means such as the burning of schools and government offices. The latter has encompassed the occupation of schools by the police and army, arrests, detentions and sometimes even torture and murder. Both these change mechanisms have involved methods not officially sanctioned by the political leadership of the dominant and assertive groups although they have been used nonetheless.

It will be recalled that for Archer the success of the assertive or dominant group in the context of competition is dependant upon the possession of bargaining power, the extent of ideological cohesiveness and access to political power and resources. In terms of the theoretical approach adopted in this study, these attributes translate into: a) political power i.e. strength in numbers and organisation together with the ability to either use or challenge formal legal and political rules and institutions in the interests of a particular hegemonic project. Typically, challenging state power has involved a mixture of constitutional and non-constitutional means; b) discursive power i.e. the ability to interpellate either the dominant or assertive group around a particular hegemonic project, educational critique or set of alternative policies as well as the ability to legitimate that project and to define the educational debate as a whole within the broader milieu; and, economic power i.e. access to material resources along with economic bargaining power defined by the relationship of the dominant or assertive group to the means of production, the ability to call strikes and stay-aways etc.

Defining the three different types of power in this way also links educational interest groups more directly to wider social hegemonies and the distribution of power within society at large. In the period under review, the assertive group may be defined broadly as those organisations with a stake in education organised around either the 'non-racial' or 'black consciousness/Africanist' repertoires. The dominant group, on the other hand, has been largely organised around either 'apartheid' or 'culture and modernity themes' (see chapters four and five). This is not an exhaustive categorisation. Some organisations such as Inkatha do not fit easily into either camp and have mixed and repositioned discursive elements from both traditions around their own political projects. Essentially, however, in
educational terms, Inkatha together with the white right wing have not been pro-active in education policy. Rather they have taken up a conservative agenda aimed at the preservation of the status quo. In the case of Inkatha this has involved a broader defence of the KwaZulu homeland as a whole including its present education system.

The above account of competition is not meant to suggest that negotiations have not also characterised educational change. 'Negotiations' in the context of this study will be used to refer to the various transactions between different interest groups within and between the assertive and dominant camps, that have been organised around more particularist interests. It has already been argued that negotiations have characterised transactions within the white power block and sometimes included some black individuals and organisations. Since 1989 the government has increasingly been engaged in negotiations with organisations from the assertive camp such as the NECC over issues pertaining to the education crisis. Negotiations have also characterised interactions within the assertive block as will also be demonstrated below. Finally, transactions between the assertive and dominant camps as a whole have increasingly used the methods of negotiation. Given the above suggestion it is important to define quite carefully the changing relationship between competition and negotiation in the period under review. Before doing that, however, it is first of all necessary to redefine negotiations in a way that is more congruent with the rest of the study.

As argued earlier, it is necessary to relate educational negotiations more clearly to wider social hegemonies. This does not involve doing away with Archer's three forms of negotiation, namely, internal initiation, external transaction and political manipulation. These forms go some way towards describing different kinds of transactions within the educational state. However, whereas internal initiation can only be understood in relation to the actions of professionals within the state system, political manipulation and external transaction may also be used to describe politics and policy-making in civil society. In this case, however, the focus of these transactions is not the central government or the education system itself, but rather whichever institution or organisation is at the centre of the policy-making process in question. Further, use of these terms should not be allowed to obscure the highly complex and context-specific ways in which individuals and groups interact. It has already been argued with regard to political manipulation, for example, that the term is used to encompass a range of political strategies. In the account of educational
interaction given below then, these terms will only be used sparingly and with caution.

Redefining negotiations does involve a reinterpretation of the motivation and the means by which different groups achieve their goals. It is inadequate simply to assume the motivations behind different transactions from taking at face value what individuals and groups define as their own 'self interest' as Archer suggests. The discussion above concerning the motivations of the private sector are a case in point. Indeed, by making use of exchange theory, Archer herself implicitly asserts her own view of why actors behave in particular ways.

It is impossible to specify in a law-like manner what motivates policy actors to act in the way that they do. Although it has been suggested during the course of this study that economic, political and discursive phenomena do provide powerful motivations for groups and individuals in the policy arena, this is not to imply that actions can be 'read off' from a prior understanding of the economic, political and discursive levels. Rather, motivations must be understood as multi-causal and constantly related back to the specific conjuncture in which they operate. As will be seen in relation to policy making in the state and civil society, for example, the nature of the specific task around which different groups have interacted also provides motivations for groups to interact in specific ways. Thus although reference will be made to the analysis of the economic, discursive and political levels given during the course of the study as a whole, ultimately it is only one amongst several possible 'readings' of individual and group behaviour that will be given below.

Similarly, it is impossible to predict the success of different interest groups in negotiations (or in competition for that matter) simply from an understanding of the different kinds of resources that they have at their disposal. There are always unpredictable circumstances and quirks of fate which make such predictions uncertain at best. The slaying of the SACP national chairperson, Chris Hani in April 1993 for example, gave unexpected impetus to negotiations in all spheres including educational negotiations, and strengthened the hand of the Democratic Movement in its calls for the establishment of the National Education and Training Forum as a means to diffuse further conflict. An understanding of the nature of the negotiating power possessed by different interest groups, however, does provide an invaluable starting-point for explaining the success or failure of particular groups in negotiations.

It will be recalled that for Archer, the success of different actors in achieving their
goals is dependant on their access to three different kinds of resources relevant to different kinds of transactions, namely political power (political manipulation), financial resources (external transactions) and expertise (internal initiation). Once again, in the context of this study, these 'resources' can be understood to correspond to the three types of power mentioned above, namely economic, political and discursive power. Political and economic power are essentially the same as in the competitive context, except that in the context of negotiations they are much more likely to be exercised by constitutional means and without resort to mass action. Discursive power in the context of internal initiation, however, not only refers to the ability to influence the policy debate, but also refers to the expertise of the teaching profession, i.e. the level of qualifications of the teaching profession and the ability of teachers to intervene in and change the discourses of schooling.

The major difference between these forms of power in relation to negotiations on the one hand and competition on the other lies in the context in which the power is exercised. Thus, in the case of negotiations all three types of power tend to be used to make 'concessions to allies' and 'compromises with opponents' (Archer, 1984, p. 2) within a shared conception of the 'nation' and of starting principles concerning the ownership and definition of education. In the case of the Democratic Movement and the government, this has involved a shared commitment to one, 'non-racial' department of education in which the state takes primary responsibility for educational provision. In contrast, it is precisely these issues that have lain at the heart of competitive struggles to date.

It is also important to understand the use of negotiating powers in terms of their location within the broader competitive struggle. For example, it will be argued below that in relation to policy making within the state, the successful use of the three different kinds of power by different interest groups is relative to the broader project of domination i.e. to the economic, political and discursive significance of any particular interest group to the goals and aspirations of the dominant group as a whole. The same is true of the influence of interest groups in the development of policy within the assertive camp. The political power of individual interest groups, for example, is given by their strategic, political significance to the broader assertive project. Further, when explaining the interaction of interest groups between the dominant and assertive camps (for example the recent negotiations between SADTU and the DET over pay and retrenchments), the success of any group is contingent on their use of the three types of power not just in relation to
the competitive struggle but in terms of the power of that group within the new discursive space opened up by the broader process of negotiations. Thus, SADTU's bargaining power is no longer just related to its location within the assertive camp but is now also related to its political, economic and discursive impact within society at large and in relation to a new state in the making, symbolised by the setting up of the NETF.

Another consequence of the recasting of Archer's theoretical framework is that different change mechanisms can no longer be simply equated with one form of power. Once again using SADTU as an example, the union have recently managed to negotiate a new form of teacher appraisal with the DET (Chisholm and Kgobe, 1993) via a form of political manipulation. This has involved not only the use of SADTU's political power, but also their new-found discursive power in the field of policy advocacy achieved through the collaboration of the union with the Wits EPU. Also, it is inaccurate only to think of different forms of power being 'exchanged' with each other as is the case with Archer's three resources.

When considering competing hegemonic projects and on-going struggles between educational interest groups it is often more appropriate to think in terms of victories and defeats as well as in terms of bargains struck. Thus the recent recognition of organisations allied with the Democratic Movement by the state represented the culmination of years of struggle and the capitulation of a government in deep crisis rather than a bargain struck with political opponents. In this context, negotiations can be understood as one form that educational struggles can take rather than an end in themselves. In brief, usage of the term 'negotiation' should not obscure the fact that conflict as well as consensus continue to drive educational change.

Finally, it is necessary to spell out more clearly the relationship between competition and negotiation in the period under review. Some of the differences between the two forms of educational struggle have already been alluded to above in terms of the way these struggles are defined, the way that power is deployed, and the different change mechanisms associated with each. There are obviously also overlaps between each. For example, the success of the assertive project has rested largely on the extent to which aspects of assertion have become the content of the more particularist concerns of student's, teacher's, parent's organisations amongst others. Similarly, struggles within the assertive and dominant camps have also influenced the way the overall hegemonic project has been
defined. Thus it has been largely due to the struggles of women as a specific interest group within the Democratic Movement in recent years that 'non-sexism' now features as an aspect of the broader assertive project.

Of particular relevance for the transition is the observation that the relationship between competition and negotiation has always been a changing one, and continues to be so. There is an element of truth in Buckland et al's argument concerning the increasing relevance of negotiations for all policy actors. There is a real sense in which the forces of assertion in education led by the NECC and increasingly the ANC have come to use change mechanisms more associated with negotiation since February 2nd 1990. It is no longer in the political interests of the Democratic Movement or educational interest groups in general to use non-constitutional means now that they too have a stake in the new interim constitution.

Further, it will be argued below that the assertive project itself is in the process of being redefined and at this point its future direction is unclear. Similarly the assertive alliance, i.e. those interest groups organised around the assertive project, is showing signs of growing internal conflict as differences in the particularist interests of teachers, students, workers and others come increasingly to the fore. Political developments have also opened up new opportunities for interest groups to put forward their concerns on the national stage and not just within the context of assertion or domination.

This does not mean, however, the end of educational struggles and the dawning of a new era of consensus politics as Buckland et al also imply. Mass action (although increasingly within legal limits) has continued to play a role in educational change even during the transition and will no doubt continue to feature in any new dispensation. Further, any future system of educational governance is likely to remain hotly contested.

Given the nature of the above critique and reconceptualisation of the work of Archer and her South African exponents, it is worth at this point taking stock of the extent to which the original Archerian project will continue to inform the remainder of this chapter. The above recasting of Archer's work is intended to provide a set of analytical tools and concepts with which to provide a better description of educational politics during the transition. In this respect Archer's sequence of structure, interaction and structural elaboration has been found useful for presenting the dynamics of change in a logical fashion and will be used below.
Reconsidering 'competition' and 'negotiation' as well as the change mechanisms associated with these terms within the broader theoretical framework of the study as a whole is also intended to provide some explanatory power concerning the direction political events have taken both within the state and within civil society. Unlike Archer and her South African importers, however, this explanation is not considered a sufficient basis on which to base any hard and fast predictions for the future, although some indications concerning possible future developments will be given from time to time.

A further casualty of the reappraisal of Archer is the attempt to understand the autonomous effects of structures in a deterministic way. It will be recalled from chapter two that in relation to this study, the relative autonomy of structures, i.e. those aspects of educational interaction that are directly attributable to the prior influence of structures, can only be given in relation to an analysis of specific historical, economic, political and discursive conjuncture with which the structure articulates. It is this approach that will characterise the discussion of centralisation and decentralisation below. Finally, an Archerian framework will be considered along with other conceptualisations of the educational state such as those given in chapter two.

Structure

The structure of the modern South African education system in relation to centralisation/decentralisation has been adequately described elsewhere (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993; Fehnel et al, 1993; EDUPOL, 1993; Taylor and Methula, 1993). It is only necessary, therefore, to outline the main characteristics of the system. Figure 1 opposite presents the system in the form of an organogram. Buckland and Hofmeyr (1993) have described the system as follows:

In all there are nineteen departments with fifteen Ministers, sitting in fourteen cabinets and controlling fifteen different budgets in terms of at least twelve different Education Acts and a maze of regulations. This proliferation of departments has aggravated the problem of bureaucratization with its attendant evils of poor communication, wastage of funds, inefficiency, inflexibility and conservatism. (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 12)

It has been an aspect of government control over the nineteen departments of education that finance and the budgetary process have been highly centralised (EDUPOL, 1993). The education budget is fixed through a process of top-level negotiation between the DNE and the Department of State Expenditure. The money allocated to education in
Diagram 1: The South African Education System

RSA "GENERAL AFFAIRS" CABINET

3 TRICAMERAL COUNCILS OF MINISTERS

2 "GENERAL AFFAIRS" DEPTS.

6 SGT CABINETS

4 TBVC SYSTEMS

4 TBVC Cabinets

Transkei Dept
Bophuthatswana Dept
Venda Dept
Ciskei Dept

Gazankulu Dept
KaNgwane Dept
KwaNdebele Dept
KwaZulu Dept
Lebowa Dept
Qwa Qwa Dept

DET
Dept. of Educ. & Train.
(8 Regions)

DNE
Dept. of Nat. Educ.

DEC
House of Del

DEC
House of Reps

DEC
House of Ass

TVI Dept
OFN Dept
Natal Dept
Cape Dept

Source: Adapted From Fehmi et al (1994)

(4+2m pupils)

(4+3m pupils)

(4+2m pupils)

(4+2m pupils)
South Africa and the self-governing territories is then divided up through a process of bargaining between the 'big five' ministries (each of the 'own affairs' Ministries, the DET and the DNE). They are guided in this process by the South African National Education Policy (SANEP). The bargaining takes place within the Committee of Education Ministers (CEM) and the Committee of Heads of Education Departments (CHED), the policy-making arm of the DNE. The TBVC states each bargain separately for their overall budget with the South African Department of finance. Monies are then allocated to education by the TBVC cabinets.

Despite the high level of centralisation of finance, there is no body with overall control over the various education departments at the national level. In terms of the 1985 constitution, the Ministry of National Education is charged with 'general' policy in the RSA including norms and standards for financing of education salaries and conditions of service of teachers, and norms and standards for syllabi and examinations.

Strong centralisation is found on the next level down from the national. Many key policy areas such as teacher training and employment, curricula, examinations (within national frameworks) and school organisation and construction are centralised at this level. In relation to policy making, although some departments have advisory bodies for this purpose, they in fact play a minimal role in the process. 'The result is that policy, beyond allocation of funds, tends to be formulated and implemented by bureaucrats within the system, with little public access to the process' (Fehnel et al, 1993, p. 25). Recent efforts to decentralise control in some departments have not led to a widening of access to the policy making process. The process remains 'top down' with policies being implemented on the basis of ex post facto consultation. The introduction of the Clase models in the Department of Education and Culture, House of Assembly (DEC HOA) is a case in point (see chapter three). The development of the ERS represents a slight departure from previous practices as will be discussed below.

Another aspect of centralised control in the present system is the absence of politically accountable officials. As Buckland and Hofmeyr (1993) have pointed out, the first politically accountable person is the minister in Pretoria or the homeland capital. Officials are accountable upwards to their political masters rather than downwards to the users of the system. In the black departments in particular, accountability is further circumscribed by a general lack of legitimacy amongst the constituencies they are supposed
to serve. Lack of accountability has encouraged a high incidence of scandal and corruption in the various departments (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993; Taylor and Methula, 1993; Interview with Dr Louw, appendix A). Further, a local level of governance has been noticeable by its absence and there has been no effective school governance under apartheid (CEPD, 1994).

In discussing the extent of decentralisation, some authors (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993; Sayed, 1992) have found it useful to use Rondinelli et al's (1987) typology of different kinds of decentralisation. Each kind has been present in the South African context.

a) **Privatisation** involves the transfer of ownership, control and financial responsibility for education to the private sector or community-based organisations. The Clase models are recent examples of privatisation.

b) **Deregulation** can sometimes (but not necessarily) lead to the entry of alternative groups to the state in the provision of education. The work of the private sector and NGOs since 1976 are examples here.

c) **Deconcentration** simply means the transfer of administrative offices to regions or to communities. Deconcentration has been exemplified by the recent limited shift of financial responsibilities to each of the seven regions covered by the DET. This has not resulted, however, in any noticeable opening up of the department to outside interests.

d) **Delegation** involves a shift of power from the centre to other semi-autonomous bodies. It has been evident in the farming out of research responsibilities to the HSRC as was the case with the de Lange investigation. It has also been evident in the channelling of government funds from the upgrading of black education through the Independent Development Trust (IDT). The allocation of limited powers to advisory bodies established in terms of the 1984 Education Act such as the South African Council for education (SACE), the Advisory Council for Universities and Technikons (AUT), and the Council for Education and Training (CET) has also involved delegation.

e) **Devolution** involves the transfer of responsibility for educational provision to regional administrations or local government. In 'white' education, devolution of power to the provinces in terms of the 1910 settlement has been gradually eroded, most significantly by the 1967 National Education Policy Act. More recently, the
1988 Education Affairs Act relegated the provincial departments to regional departments. In practice, however, each province/region has maintained a good deal of autonomy in important respects including areas such as finance and curriculum. Just as it is possible to identify reasons for the centralised nature of the system, it is also possible to offer some explanations concerning the decentralising tendencies described above. In chapter three, for example, privatisation in education was linked to a wider process of privatisation of social services as an aspect of desegregation. It is also helpful to think of some of the other forms of decentralisation as an aspect of what Weiler (1993) describes as 'compensatory legitimation', i.e. as an effort by the state to improve the legitimacy of the system through appearing to make it more accessible to interest groups outside of the state. In many cases this kind of decentralisation is more rhetorical than real. Both the deconcentration of power in the DET to lower administrative units and the creation of the IDT can be understood as attempts by the state to secure greater legitimacy for the system.

Interaction During the Transition

Interaction Within the State

Besides facilitating increasing access of previously excluded groups to decision-making, the gradual opening up of the political centre since the 1960s, first to whites and then to blacks, has also been associated with deepening divisions within the governing elite. In earlier chapters this division has been attributed to tensions between verligtes and verkramptes. This tension has been exacerbated during the transition and has been evident within the educational bureaucracy. The transition has also been characterised by increasing rivalries between the various fiefdoms that make up the educational state as the old hierarchy has been challenged. Tension has also been heightened by growing job insecurities, particularly amongst the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Before turning to look at these developing tensions, it is first of all necessary to provide some kind of picture of the current bureaucracy. This is especially the case given that existing civil servants have been guaranteed their jobs under a new administration, and will be required to play a part in implementing new policies.
Taken as a whole, the current bureaucracy has the following characteristics. Altogether there are about 11,200 bureaucrats working within the various departments. This comprises about 3.5% of all education personnel. The vast majority (in the order of 10,000) perform supervisory and clerical functions. There are 1,500 in middle management and 65 at executive level. Figures for the public sector as a whole (including the TBVC states) reveal that 50% are Africans, 36% are white, 12% are 'coloureds', and 3% are Indian. Blacks, however, typically occupy only 4.5% of the top posts and Africans in particular just 0.6% (McLennan, 1993). Finally, whilst females make up the majority of clerical and supervisory staff, they are a minority in middle management and completely unrepresented at the executive level.

Fehnel et al (1993) have made the following observations concerning the education bureaucracy. The executive level falls under the Commission for Administration which is the career civil service system rather than the professional educational structure. The significance of this is that whilst many executives are career educationists, it has been possible to move people from outside the educational sphere into influential positions as political necessity dictates. The appointment of Johan Garbers to the DNE in 1989 from the HSRC is a case in point. It was Garbers who provided the political stimulus for the launch of the ERS.

Within the middle management levels of the DEC HOA, DEC HOR (House of Representatives) and the DEC HOD (House of Delegates) (the white, 'coloured' and Indian 'own affairs' departments respectively), there have been growing retrenchment pressures as a result of rationalisation. In the case of the DEC HOA, similar pressures have arisen as a result of the introduction of model C schools which has meant the removal of bureaucratic posts concerned with school provisioning. It is, however, the supervisory level that is generally considered the most conflict-riddled tier. This is as a result of insufficient staffing, issues of legitimacy which restrict access of inspectors to black schools and recent redefinitions of the role of the inspectorate (Fehnel et al, 1993). Finally, the clerical and administrative structure is also subject to civil service authorities rather than to the educational bureaucracies they serve. This raises questions concerning the institutional loyalty of this strata to a new educational dispensation. School-based clerical staff are very thin on the ground in the DET, the TBVC departments and the self-governing territories.

The bureaucracy is also highly politicised. Traditionally membership of the
Afrikaner Broederbond has been almost a *sine qua non* for senior positions within the state apparatus (Malherbe, 1977; O' Meara, 1991). Although the significance of the Broederbond has declined since the Botha era, it is unclear even to this day what influence it continues to exert within the educational state. The politicisation of the top echelons is best exemplified by the fact that the ERS is almost universally assumed to be the educational manifesto of the NP. The most conservative members of the bureaucracy, however, are to be found amongst the lower ranks of the DEC HOA in areas such as the Orange Free State and the Transvaal (interview with Mrs Smith, appendix A).

The politicisation of the bureaucracy, and the influence of the secretive Broederbond seriously circumscribes the extent to which the bureaucracy can be said to conform to Weber's 'ideal type' (see chapter two). Thus although the bureaucracy has been characterised by bureaucratic forms of control, rationality and rule-following (Taylor and Methula, 1993) and has also been a major employer within the bureaucratically-styled 'independent primary market' (see chapter three), its very composition reflects racist and sexist norms and practices which, in a more 'ideal typical' scenario, might be considered 'irrational' in Weberian terms. The political bias of the bureaucracy and its concomitant legitimacy problems within black communities may be understood to have accelerated the trend away from bureaucratic rationality towards 'managerial technology'.

It has been argued in chapter four that a turn towards 'scientific' managerialist discourses can be understood as a rhetorical device to provide a new kind of legitimacy for the state. The shift towards managerial technology has been exemplified by the establishment of various technical committees within the bureaucracy which are intended to rationalise and coordinate educational activities (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993). The shift has also been demonstrated by the more directive approach to education policy on the part of the DNE in which senior bureaucrats have actively sought to intervene in the organic crisis besetting South Africa's schooling system. Whereas under bureaucratic rationality such actions would be judged in relation to rules and procedures, under managerial technology, the new benchmark of success is the 'product' itself (in this case the ERS) in achieving its ameliorative goals.

In effecting change the DNE can be understood to be the reformist wing of the government in education. This has been facilitated by the policy making powers afforded to it in terms of the 1984 Education Act. In recent years the DNE has been attempting to
increase its influence by making use of these powers (Taylor and Methula, 1993). In the curriculum field, for example, the DNE has slowly been positioning itself through a series of working papers and reports, to usurp the current monopoly over all curricula enjoyed by the four provinces/regions of the DEC HOA. This process culminated in the production of the Curriculum Model (CM). The DNE was also associated with de Klerk's Ten Year Plan, the development of the ERS and, more recently, the establishment of the Education Coordination Service to oversee the integration of the various departments into one national department. The fact that the DNE does not directly control any schools or teachers has made it possible for it to keep its 'hands clean' of the messy history of educational confrontation during the 1980s.

The rise of the DNE has also witnessed the decline of the DEC HOA which as the 'white' department has historically enjoyed a good deal of power and influence in areas such as finance and the curriculum. As far as the curriculum is concerned, it has been the syllabi developed within the provincial/regional departments that have formed the substantial basis for syllabi in other departments (Taylor and Methula, 1993). With regards to finance, it has generally been the informal negotiations between the DNE and the DEC HOA that have determined the allocation of educational funds to all the departments despite the supposed 'equality' of the 'big five' Ministries (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993).

The DEC HOA has been brought into line in terms of the new hierarchy by means of some clever pieces of political manipulation. Firstly, Piet Marais (previously Minister of Manpower) was given the portfolio of both the DNE and the DEC HOA by the cabinet in 1992. This move neatly short-circuited the continued need for negotiations between the departments. Marais was subsequently able to push through the move towards model C without the kind of Ministerial resistance that might have otherwise come from the DEC HOA.

It is also instructive to note that the ERS has been developed under the auspices of the CEM and of CHED (DNE, 1991,a). In other words, the major reform initiatives of the state have sought to include the senior bureaucrats from all departments and the respective Ministers in the process. More recently, Marais was also given a new portfolio on top of his existing two, this time as Minister for Educational Coordination. As the Minister in charge of the new Education Coordination Service, Marais lost little time in appointing Huw Davies, formally a senior figure within the DEC HOA, to lead the service. The
inclusion of senior bureaucrats from the DEC HOA and other departments in the change process may be interpreted as a strategy of cooption with the effect of diffusing opposition to change at least at executive level. It is at the lower levels, however, that the tensions of the transition are already manifesting themselves the most, and it is these tensions that must be addressed if bureaucratic opposition to change is to be avoided.

**Policy Making Within the State - the Development of the ERS**

The development of the ERS provided continuity and discontinuity on previous policy-making endeavours by the state. Like previous initiatives it was characterised by a highly centralised and top down approach. In 1990 the CEM requested the CHED to instigate the ERS. The reasons for this move have been given in earlier chapters in terms of the failure of the Ten Year Plan, the deepening education crisis, and the imminent transition to a post-apartheid dispensation. By locating the policy-making process within the DNE, the CEM was assured of their own reformist vision dominating the process.

The ERS process also represented a step back from the more decentralised approach of the de Lange investigation. Under the semi-autonomous auspices of the HSRC, the de Lange investigation had at least included liberal critics of the system such as Franklin Sonn (who subsequently joined the ANC) and Ken Hartshorne (who went on to participate in NEPI). Further, groups outside of the White power block such as Franklin Sonn's 'coloured' Union of Teacher's Associations of South Africa (UTASA) were instrumental in getting the investigation off the ground. As one of the few examples of negotiations between the government and black interest groups before 1990, it was UTASA's meeting with President Botha to discuss the deepening crisis in black education that contributed towards the president's decision to call for the investigation. Ironically, it may have been the commission's 'radical' proposals such as the establishment of one education department that led to the Botha government's decision to locate its future reform programme under the tighter supervision of the new DNE.

Within the DNE the structures of existing legislation and procedures governing the policy-making process had their own autonomous impact on the development of the ERS. CHED appointed members to the various working groups in terms of the provisions of the 1984 Act. Besides the inclusion of the various departments, the Act also made statutory provision for participation by different advisory bodies concerned with education at all
levels. Of significance as far as policy for schooling was concerned was the mandatory inclusion of the Teachers' Federal Council (TFC). Like the other advisory bodies, the TFC was created by the state (Hartshorne, 1992) and included white teachers' organisations such as the Transvaal Onderwyserwereniging (TO), the South African Teachers' Union (SATU), and the South African Association for Technical and Vocational Education (SAATVE).

Besides the limited participation allowed for by legislation, CHED made little effort at wider inclusion in the working groups. The exception here, interestingly enough, was the inclusion of the Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC) in the integrating committee (DNE, 1991,a) which was set up to produce the final report from the findings of the various working groups. As far as broader consultation was concerned, the Minister of National Education made a slight break with the past by asking for submissions concerning what the ERS ought to investigate at the beginning of the process. Comments on the first draft were also called for and collated by the HSRC before an extended integrating committee produced the final version of the ERS in late 1992.

In terms of the theoretical approach outlined earlier, the ERS process can be understood as a final effort to consolidate the bargaining power of the dominant group prior to the onset of negotiations, and to gain legitimacy for the reformist project. Understood as an aspect of competition between the dominant and assertive groups, the ERS successfully brought together large sections of Afrikaner nationalist and liberal support around a shared conception of 'community control', and achieved the tacit support of organised business in the process (exemplified by the participation of PRISEC in the production of the ERS). The ERS continued to alienate the white right, however, who opposed the idea of a single education department and the limited integration implied by the Clase models and the ERS itself.

Further, the ERS was not successful at gaining legitimacy for its project outside of the dominant group. Members of the assertive group were excluded from the working groups for structural reasons. Given, however, that the inclusion of PRISEC was non-mandatory, it would seem fair to conclude that the political will did not exist within the state at that point for the inclusion of the Democratic Movement. Further, although the inclusion of the Democratic Movement would have enhanced the legitimacy of the project, it would have also meant a radical shift in the balance of power within the ERS process and jeopardised the reformist vision. Finally, given the stage that the competitive struggle had
reached by 1990/1, members of the Democratic Movement could not be seen to be involved in a process over which they had no control. Subsequently no submissions were received from the Democratic Movement (interview with Dr Stumpf, appendix A).

It is against the imperatives of the broader hegemonic project that negotiations over the form and content of the ERS within the dominant group must be seen. Firstly, the DNE was in a strong political position to spearhead the ERS process on account of the powers vested in it by previous legislation. This power was exemplified by the ability of the DNE to coopt the heads of other departments to its project. It was also exemplified by the ability to exclude, both in terms of representation and at the level of discourse, those organisations and views that might threaten the reformist vision. The white right and the Democratic Movement are examples here. Secondly, the DNE had the human and financial resources to undertake the ERS. Finally, the DNE maintained its discursive power over the ERS process through strength in numbers on the various working groups and on the integrating committee. The DNE was also able to mobilise another important knowledge/power apparatus behind the project in the form of the HSRC.

Other education departments effectively towed the line, reflecting their much weaker negotiating strength. It is important at this point to distinguish between the executive representatives of the various departments and the departments themselves. For whereas the departments were effectively written out of existence by the commitment to one national department in the ERS and the end of 'racially-based' education, their senior representatives probably stood to gain significantly in career terms from participation in the process. The negotiating powers of the various departments were not of a piece, however. The historically stronger discursive resources of the DEC HOA, particularly in relation to the formulation of curriculum policy were reflected in the insistence of the ERS that the current 'curriculum in South African schools' does, 'in many respects, meet the current requirements' (DNE, 1992, p. 47).

The white teaching profession in the form of the TFC can be interpreted as having lost out quite badly on account of a weak negotiating position. Whereas the TO in particular had previously had quite a lot of influence in government circles as ostensibly an Afrikaner organisation, in terms of the new reformist project this was no longer the case. Over the years the TFC had won a good deal of autonomy for itself including responsibility for setting norms and standards for the profession and for registering white
teachers (this contrasts to the position in the DET, for example, where these functions remain departmental responsibilities) (van Schalkwyk, 1988). In calling for the establishment of a new Professional Council for Education for all teachers, however, the ERS effectively put paid to the TFC's privileged position.

In contrast the private sector is of central strategic importance for the success of the free market ideas and new accumulation strategies of Afrikaner nationalism. PRISEC was therefore in a strong negotiating position within the ERS process. It will be recalled from chapter three that PRISEC's influence was exemplified by a new emphasis on vocationalism and entrepreneurialism in the ERS.

Interactions Outside of the State - the Struggle for the NETF

The next two sections will focus on the activities of the Democratic Movement (DM) in the field of education policy with particular reference to the non-racial tradition. The decision to focus on this tradition revolves around the fact that to date it has given rise to the most pro-active and widely known policy initiatives outside of the state. Thus although the Africanist/Black Consciousness tradition continues to influence education policy, it has not been able to mount an initiative on the scale of NEPI or the ANC's Policy Framework for reasons that will become clear below. Further, other political actors such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and the white right wing have only been involved in the policy debate through efforts to resist changes to the present status quo. Inkatha's recalcitrant position in relation to the broader political negotiations process has had some impact on education policy, however, as shall be discussed below.

It will be argued in this section that the struggles on the part of the DM to end unilateral educational restructuring by the state and set up the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) have involved aspects of competition and negotiation. It will be argued that both mass action and political manipulation have played important and interrelated roles in securing victory for the DM. Many of the events leading up to the establishment of the NETF have been recorded elsewhere (Pillay, 1992; CEPD, 1993; Chisholm and Kgobe, 1993; Motala and Tikly, 1993; Greenstein and Mkwanazi, 1994). It is only necessary here to provide a summary of the main points as they relate to the theoretical argument.
Prior to 1990 attempts at negotiation with the state were generally unsuccessful. Apart from one or two isolated incidences of negotiation such as the cooperation between the NECC and the government on ways to allocate funds for the upgrading of black education, mass action rather than political manipulation characterised educational interactions. Following his release from prison, however, and in the context of broader negotiations, Mandela called on all students to return to school. The call was only partially heeded. Mandela also led an education delegation consisting of twenty-six educationists from the broad DM to meet with de Klerk in order to discuss the education crisis, which had once again been brought to the fore with the release of yet more appalling matric results from the DET. The specific demands of the delegation included the setting up of an emergency fund to address backlogs in black education; broadening access to under-utilised resources in white schools and in higher education; the timeous delivery of textbooks to black schools; and, the efficient administration of supplementary examinations.

A joint working group (JWG) was established to look into the above issues. Although the report of the group addressed many of the concerns raised, the government failed to act on any of them besides a bland promise to increase expenditure in black education. John Samuel, head of the ANC education desk, summed up the weaknesses of the JWG as follows. Firstly, the status of the group in relation to influencing state policy was unclear from the start. Secondly, there had been a lack of consultation between the JWG and grassroots organisations such as COSAS and SASCO such that suspicions were raised in these quarters about deals being struck in secret. Finally, because some organisations such as the PAC were not included in the JWG, the government (showing an uncharacteristic concern with participation in policy making) was able to claim that the group was not representative enough.

The meeting of the Patriotic Front in October 1991 succeeded in bringing together charterist and Africanist organisations for the first time during the transition in order to increase the negotiating power of the DM. This meeting led directly to calls for the establishment of an educational Patriotic Front. A National Education Conference (NEC) was planned to try and achieve consensus within the DM on: a) the principles and values that ought to underpin a new system of education and training; b) a code of conduct for students, parents and teachers; c) joint strategies and campaigns to address the education crisis; d) and, mechanisms for engaging the state in the short term. The conference was
eventually held in May 1992 in Broederstroom and was attended by all members of the Patriotic Front except for the PAC who decided not to attend. Many representatives from civil society were also present including educational NGOs, church bodies, private schools, the Urban Foundation and others. Despite the absence of the PAC the conference was representative of a wide range of interests.

Although consensus was reached on the first three areas of concern, the issue of how to engage the state proved more tricky. Whereas the ANC and its allies were committed to negotiating with the state in the form of an education and training forum, other groups such as AZAPO were against this strategy. AZAPO argued that negotiations such as those taking place at CODESA, as well as the proposed education and training forum, would simply serve to give the state undeserved legitimacy. In the end the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance's greater negotiating power ensured that the compromise that was struck went more their way. It was agreed that the NEC would commit itself to a forum, but outside of CODESA. It was also agreed, however, that mass campaigns would be launched around issues of unilateral restructuring by the state, access to underutilised resources in white education and recognition of democratic organisations such as SADTU, SRCs and PTSAs. It was intended that these campaigns would bolster the NEC's side in negotiations with the state.

The success of the NEC in consolidating the political power of the DM made any government claims concerning unrepresentativeness untenable. After several phone calls and meetings between the NEC standing committee and the DNE, the DNE finally agreed to the establishment of a forum late in 1992 and the first exploratory meetings were held in January 1993. It is interesting in relation to how the forum actually developed to consider briefly the main points of agreement and disagreement during the initial meetings. As a result of the meeting it was agreed that the crisis in education could only be resolved by the creation of one, non-racial, national department; that the government would cease to unilaterally restructure the system; that the ERS could not serve as a blueprint for the future; and, that a negotiating body should be set up for education and training. Points of disagreement included the name of the body with government preferring 'council' to 'forum'; the fact that the NEC wanted organisations and government departments to be directly represented whilst the government wanted participation by prominent individuals; the NEC's view that the forum should be constituted by means of a founding agreement.
and should itself decide on its terms of reference. The government wanted the body appointed by the Minister in charge of the transition and the terms of reference decided by the DNE.

Despite the agreements reached, the government continued to restructure the system unilaterally and in April 1993 President de Klerk announced the launch of the Education Coordination Service (ECS). Whilst the government dragged its feet, the ECS began the task of rationalising the various departmental structures, raising fears that they were seeking to pre-empt whatever restructuring plan would come out of negotiations. By early 1993, however, the political stakes were too high for either side to withdraw completely from a commitment to negotiate.

Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly clear to the NEC standing committee that a 'commitment to fostering the teaching and learning process' would increase its own 'moral authority in making demands on government to resolve crisis issues' (CEPD, 1993, p.7). With education being used as a political football, the NEC had to take a lead in restoring a 'culture of learning' in schools. In terms of the approach of this chapter, this realisation by the NEC can be understood as signifying a shift within the broader assertive project from using mass action to achieve its goals towards a new emphasis on mechanisms more associated with negotiation (and political manipulation in particular). It was with some trepidation then that the NEC responded to a new round of mass action amongst teachers and students.

After several days of action and a national strike, SADTU, the first national, non-racial teachers union, finally won recognition from the DET in August 1992. Buoyed up by their success, SADTU decided to challenge the state further, this time over retrenchments and pension issues within the DEC HOR. At the beginning of 1993 COSAS also embarked on a campaign against the recent increase in the entrance fee for the matric examination (Tikly, 1993). The fact that the government had acted unilaterally in all the above cases also became a major grievance for SADTU and COSAS. In this sense, both organisations continued to articulate their demands in terms of the broader assertive project. The actions of the teachers and students, however, proved to be both a source of strength and a source of contradiction for the changing assertive project.

Understood as a source of contradiction the continued use of mass action by members of the assertive alliance stood in contrast to the new emphasis on negotiated
change. The gradual change in tactics was vindicated by increasingly hostile media coverage and a dwindling of support for the teachers' demands amongst parents and students. The teachers' action alienated other members of the NEC such as AZAPO who have always been opposed to the disruption of black education, and even caused conflict within the NECC with COSAS also opposing the strike tactic. With an election becoming ever more imminent, the teacher's strike, along with COSAS's own demonstrations and protests, met with a luke-warm response from the ANC (although the organisation continued to issue statements in support of teacher and student demands). In terms of the theoretical points made at the beginning of the chapter, the high incidence of mass action during the early part of 1993 also served to demonstrate the growing tensions between the assertive project as a whole and the particularist demands of various interest groups within the assertive alliance. This tension was further exemplified when, in May 1993, the NECC threatened to occupy white schools if the government did not give in to the demand for a negotiating forum. Once again the response of the ANC was luke-warm.

Understood as a source of strength, the actions of the NECC, SADTU and COSAS can be seen to have been instrumental in putting the negotiating forum issue high up on the political agenda. The NECC threat prompted another high-powered intervention by Mandela and other ANC leaders who met with de Klerk and his Ministers in May. As a result of the meeting the government suspended the exam fees and agreed to the immediate establishment of a negotiating forum. This change in heart must also be seen in relation to the gathering momentum of the multi-party talks, and the eagerness of all parties to be seen to be doing something about the education crisis. It must also be seen in relation to the growing hegemony of the ANC alliance within the broader negotiations process. As the senior partners in the assertive alliance in education, the fate of the assertive project has increasingly followed the fortunes of the ANC in these negotiations. This point will be taken up below.

The way the NETF has been set up has demonstrated the shift in the balance of forces between the assertive and dominant camps. The name of the forum itself exemplifies this shift. So does the fact that it was constituted by means of a founding agreement, that it has representatives from interest groups rather than prominent individuals sitting on it, and that it has chosen its own terms of reference. On each earlier point of disagreement between the government and the NEC the NEC view has predominated. Further, the NETF
is not intended to co-manage the system, but rather to form 'sufficient consensus' around issues. According to Bernard Louw of the DNE, the state would be 'honour bound' to implement decisions taken in the forum (cited in Motala and Tikly, 1993).

With regard to its terms of reference the NETF has been concerned with the resolution of immediate crisis issues, the restructuring of education and training to create an acceptable national system, and the development of a policy framework for a new integrated national education and training system. One of the NETF's first successes was to broker a settlement between SADTU and the DEC HOR over teacher retrenchments, thereby breaking a deadlock that had lasted for several months. The NETF has also succeeded in resolving the exam fees problem. On the longer term issues, however, the forum has been less effective, and there have been accusations that the government has been withholding vital information from the various working groups (Greenstein and Mkwanazi, 1994). As far as the civil service are concerned, this lack of cooperation may be a taste of things to come.

The future of the NETF is unclear at this stage. Its fate will depend upon the new balance of forces in a government of national unity, and the use value of such a forum for the new administration. The private sector through PRISEC has expressed the hope that the forum will continue for the foreseeable future, reflecting their desire for educational stability. The NP has also said that it would like the forum to continue for two to three years. As likely junior partners in a new government, the possibilities for influencing policy through the NETF might turn out to be increasingly in their interests. The NEC, on the other hand, has not committed itself to the continuation of the NETF after the April 1994 elections. A democratically elected government might not consider it necessary to gain legitimacy through an inclusive body such as the NETF. On the other hand, such a forum might be helpful in any future contest with the bureaucracy (Greenstein and Mkwanazi, 1994).

Policy-Making in Civil Society

The aim of this section will be to consider the policy-making process in civil society using the framework developed earlier in the chapter. The development of two major policy initiatives by the DM, namely NEPI and the ANC's Policy Framework (PF), will be discussed. In some respects the two processes were continuous. In terms of the
theoretical approach outlined at the beginning of the chapter, this section will not only explore the negotiating strengths of the various contributors to the policy process, but will also seek to examine the influence of the structure of the policy-making process in civil society. A fairly detailed account of the NEPI process already exists in the Framework Document (NEPI, 1992) which provides valuable insights into the workings and the politics of the investigation. This section will seek to build critically on those insights.

a) The National Education Policy Initiative

It has been argued, particularly in chapter one, that the demands of the transition began to put new pressures on educationists to begin to move from a position of critique to one of policy formulation. In other words, the nature of the assertive project in education began to require an effort to provide what Archer has described as 'ideological cohesiveness' within the DM, involving not only critique, but also the legitimation of the assertive project itself, and the welding of the assertive alliance around a new vision of educational change. The NECC had the necessary political power and was in a good strategic position to undertake this task on account of its legitimacy and support outside of the state, and its 'neutral' position as a non-political party. The organisation’s discursive power had already been demonstrated by the extent to which it had defined the counter-hegemonic project in education during the 1980s in terms of 'people's education'. Finally, in terms of economic power, the NECC not only enjoyed the backing of COSATU who had adopted 'people's education' as an aspect of worker's struggles, but was able to mobilise the support of international donor agencies behind the NEPI project.

For many overseas donors, 'capacity building' has been the watchword for intervention in African education for most of the 1980s (King, 1991; Chisholm, 1991). According to King capacity building involves the pursuit of excellence, the development of policy analysis skills, the restructuring of public sector institutional management and, importantly, the strengthening of organisations outside of the state and in civil society. One of the largest foreign donors to the NEPI project was INTERFUND (a consortium of largely European donors) who had the following to say about its motivations for involvement in South Africa:

Through its development assistance programme in South Africa INTERFUND seeks to empower communities disadvantaged by the social and political injustices of apartheid, by
promoting greater access to opportunity, resources and skills. In so doing, INTERFUND aims to contribute to the building of a non-racial, non-sexist democracy founded on a strong civil society and a respect for human rights. (INTERFUND, 1992, p. 1).

A consideration of the clear commitment to some of the leading principles of the DM by donor agencies such as INTERFUND is beyond the scope of this study. It is, arguably, related to the internal politics of the donor community and the politics of international relations. It is also related to the solidarity work undertaken by the ANC in particular during the long years of exile.

At the discursive level other international agencies such as the World Bank have had an influence on education policy completely out of proportion to the funding that they have actually given to education (King, 1991). The Bank's own efforts at policy research have been intimately related to their quest for efficient and affordable schooling in the developing world during the 1980s, and the global hegemony of neo-liberal economic policies. Their influence has often been related to their linking of educational prescriptions to financial loans to governments. This linking together with the Bank's reliance on scholarship from the North has often engendered opposition from intellectuals in the South. These dynamics were evident in NEPI where research from the Bank was often treated with ambivalence at best. In the case of South Africa, the Bank's educational prescriptions have not been tied to conditions and negotiations concerning loans, thus reducing its economic power in relation to educational negotiations.

The fact that the NECC assumed a central role in the NEPI process had its own structural effects. Firstly, participation was biased towards those charterist organisations and individuals who were affiliated to or had prior links with the NECC. Thus no Africanist/Black Consciousness organisations took part. Secondly, despite a commitment to combine academic with activist input in NEPI, the process was biased towards academic control. This can be explained not only in terms of the academic demands of the NEPI exercise itself, but also as a result of a historical division of labour within the NECC between academics and activists in the field of policy.

This division of labour dates back to the establishment of the Education Policy Units (EPUs) in 1987 (NEPI, 1992,e). The aim of the EPUs was to develop policy to help operationalise the concept of people's education within an academic context. Although the EPUs have attempted with some success to build capacity amongst groups historically
excluded from policy work such as blacks and women, they continue to be dominated, especially at senior levels by white, male academics. The location of the first EPU's in the historically 'white' Universities of the Witwatersrand and of Natal tended to exacerbate the distance between academics and activists. Further, the establishment of the Education Development Trust (EDT) in 1988 to oversee the channelling of funds from donors to bursary programmes served to separate off the 'programme' work of the NECC from the political work (NEPI, 1992,e). The division of labour was also influenced by the arrest of NECC leaders and restrictions on the organisation during the late 1980s as well as by the preference of foreign donors for capacity-building projects such as the EPU's. Although the 'experts' involved in development work for the NECC remained upwardly accountable to the NECC leadership, the chains of accountability to the grassroots organisations were long.

The historical links between the EPU's and the NECC, however, guaranteed them a prominent role in NEPI from the time the project was conceived of in the first half of 1990. Other academics got involved through a process of networking in which the twelve group convenors were given autonomy to appoint the research groups by the NEPI executive committee. The strategic significance of academics as an interest group lies in the history of strong ties between progressive academics and the NECC dating back to the 1985 Consultative Conference on People's Education (see chapter three) and the founding of the EPU's. Academics were also of strategic importance as a discursive resource given the need to imbue the emerging policy discourse with the legitimacy of academic credibility. The political imperatives and discourses of affirmative action, however, placed black and women researchers in a more strategically important position than others in relation to NEPI. It will be argued below, however, that the NEPI process was found wanting as an exercise in affirmative action.

On the positive side, the academic bias of NEPI was demonstrated by the extent to which the twelve research groups did manage to engage with the vast literature on education and development in South Africa and in comparative perspective. It was also demonstrated by the theoretical coherence running through the reports as a whole. On the more negative side, the academic bias underlines some of the observations made in chapter one and elsewhere in the present study concerning academic discourse on education in South Africa. In particular, and with reference to the Governance and Administration
report (NEPI, 1992,a), there was a general failure to address issues of gender and 'race' in relation to governance. This point will be developed below. Further, there was an over-representation of liberal opinion in some of the proposals concerning governance (both in the above report and in the report on Planning, Systems and Structure) (NEPI, 1992,d) when considered in relation to the extent of liberal opinion in the DM as a whole. Examples of the liberal influence include Donaldson's ideas concerning the future of state-aided schools discussed in chapters three and five, and the work of Buckland and Hofmeyr discussed above.

The academic bias of NEPI, and the negative response to this bias from within the NECC and its affiliates had led, by June 1991, to calls for a restructuring of the links between 'experts' and the grassroots. It is important to remember in this regard that democratic participation in educational decision-making has long been a theme of non-racial discourses including those of people's education. Thus, it was not the fact of academic participation that was at issue in the discussions around NEPI or, for that matter, the academic content of the reports. Rather, discontent centred around the lack of participation in, and control over the process by the grassroots affiliates of the NECC. In the words of one commentator, the nature of the NEPI project required a balance between 'an emphasis on the democratic process and consultation on the one hand, and the need for expertise and the constraints of time on the other' (Young, 1993, p. 191). Structurally, the NECC sought to negotiate this tension by putting mechanisms in place aimed at making the research process more politically accountable.

Firstly, the Principles and Framework Committee of NEPI set about the task of distilling the five governing principles behind NEPI ('non-racism', 'non-sexism', 'democracy', 'a united system' and 'redress') from a historical study of the demands and principles of the DM. This was intended as a substitute for the failed initiative to develop an 'education charter' by means of a popular campaign. Secondly, various kinds of 'consultative forums' were established that involved, a) consultation between NEPI researchers and other researchers not involved in the process; b) direct representation of political organisations such as lecturers and students unions, COSATU and the ANC in the NEPI research groups; c) direct representation of political organisations on the NEPI executive committee; d) and a plan to establish 'People's Education Conventions' at local, regional and national levels for consultation and the dissemination of research findings.
Finally, in February 1992, the NEPI groups were made directly accountable to the Patriotic Front in order to prepare briefing papers for short-term negotiations with the state. Before turning to a consideration of some of the criticisms that were made concerning the effectiveness of the above mechanisms, attention will turn to a brief consideration of the relative influence of other interest groups besides academics in the NEPI process. Firstly, given the location of NEPI within the non-racial tradition, only the ANC, of all the political parties, was formally represented in the various NEPI committees. As the spearhead of the liberation movement, and as the likely senior partner in any new government, the ANC was of clear strategic importance for the assertive project in education. Similarly, for the ANC, the need to begin to develop policy in all areas was becoming more intense as the prospect of state power loomed ever larger. Besides formal representation, NEPI also enjoyed the support of many ANC-aligned academics who were often in important positions within the research groups. The strong discursive power of the ANC was reflected not only in the five guiding principles, but through the predominance of language and ideas from the non-racial tradition.

As a co-partner in the ANC-led alliance, COSATU was in a similar strategic position to the ANC. Further, it will be recalled from chapter five that non-racial discourses have often placed the concerns of workers centre stage in the broader liberation struggle. The NEPI exercise also afforded COSATU, as the largest trade union confederation, the opportunity to put issues pertaining to the education of workers high up on the emerging policy agenda. Since 1990, COSATU and some of its affiliates (particularly the metal workers union, NUMSA) have been developing their research capacity towards this end. The fruits of these endeavours are evident in the strong emphasis in the reports as a whole on training and adult basic education (see in particular NEPI, 1992,f; NEPI, 1992,b). With specific reference to governance, COSATU's strong support for an integrated system of education and training is reflected in the ideas concerning integration of governance structures dealing with education and training. Of particular importance for schooling is the idea in the Curriculum report (NEPI, 1992,c) of a common qualifications authority to cover certification in both general education and adult education (see chapter three).

In contrast to the above groups, the private sector through PRISEC was not officially represented on NEPI structures. This was despite the fact of the growing strategic
importance of this interest group for the Democratic Movement. In the context of a 
commitment to a mixed economy, the support of the private sector for the developmental 
goals of the DM had long been recognised (indeed, it will be recalled from chapter three 
that meetings between organised business and the ANC in exile date back to the mid-
1980s). It has been argued that some of the collective fears and concerns of the private 
sector did find expression in NEPI through the participation of EDUPOL. With a long 
history of contacts with academics associated with the DM, Peter Buckland and Jane 
Hofmeyr of EDUPOL were able to establish themselves in the NEPI working group on 
governance where they were able to deploy their experience in policy advocacy effectively.

As Buckland and Hofmeyr (1993) along with Lee (1990) have pointed out, the 
illegitimacy of the apartheid state in the eyes of many donors resulted in a proliferation of 
educational NGOs as a means of channelling money to black education. By the time of 
NEPI, however, these NGOs did not have any collective voice. Despite their potential 
importance to the DM as a source of funds and expertise then, their participation in NEPI 
was piecemeal and ad hoc and came about as a result of informal networking rather than 
as a result of formal representation. Although NGOs were included in some of the groups, 
particularly those concerned with literacy, educare and teacher training, they had no 
discernible impact on governance proposals.

Importantly, teachers, students and parents were represented in the NEPI structures. 
In the case of parents they were represented indirectly through the NECC. The various 
national, regional and local consultative forums were also intended as another point of 
contact with parents, and they were arguably the most seriously affected group by the 
organisational failure of these forums. Teachers and students were represented on NEPI 
committees by SADTU and COSAS respectively. All these interest groups are given 
important strategic positions in relation to the assertive struggle in the discourses of the 
NECC. Indeed, the NECC was formed specifically to address the concerns of these groups. 
It is instructive, therefore, that of all the interest groups that participated in NEPI, their 
voice was perhaps the least heard. Thus although in terms of governance proposals, PTSAs 
actually take centre stage in the 'school governance perspective' (see below), this is more 
as a result of the historic significance of these structures than as a result of pressure from 
students, parents and teachers in NEPI. This view is supported by the fact that many of the 
particularist concerns of these interest groups (pay and conditions of service of teachers,
ending corporal punishment and sexual harassment of students, and making schools more accountable to parents) were not given serious consideration in the NEPI reports.

In the case of parents, the lack of articulation of their concerns can be attributed not only to the failure of the consultative forums but also to the weak and sporadic organisation of PTSAs, the only other collective forum for parents within the NECC. Importantly, however, parents, along with teachers and students, lacked the necessary discursive power to make their concerns felt. Thus despite the strategic significance of these groups, the absence of policy advocacy skills seriously circumscribed the nature of the input they could make.

Like the NEPI process, the critical interchange that followed the production of the reports was largely confined to academic journals such as Perspectives in Education and Transformation. This reflected not only the academic bias of the reports themselves, but also the failure of the consultative forums to disseminate the research findings more broadly. Only those criticisms that relate to the NEPI process will be discussed here. Firstly, some critiques of NEPI focused on the extent to which the process realised the goals of affirmative action. The NEPI Framework Report itself provided some figures on the participation of blacks and of women. Whereas blacks constitute 12% of academic staff in South African universities generally, and women 29%, in NEPI the figures were 38.2% and 54.0% respectively.

For Gaine and Prinsloo (1993), however, these figures masked a more hidden process in which white, male researchers tended to undertake the more challenging tasks of conceptualisation of the research exercise and writing up the final reports, whilst black and female researchers generally undertook the less demanding work of literature reviews, organising consultative forums and other administrative duties. Gaine and Prinsloo also correctly point out that the marginalisation of black researchers was also related to the centring of the exercise within the historically 'white' universities. The failure to include more academics from the historically 'black' universities can also be understood to have contributed to a neglect of rural education given the location of many of these universities in rural areas. Finally, Anne-Marie Wolpe has criticised NEPI for failing 'so abysmally to address one of its five guiding principles', namely that of non-sexism (Wolpe, 1993, p. 209).

Usefully, however, in terms of the future direction of exercises such as NEPI, both
sets of authors then proceeded to provide suggestions as to how such a situation might be avoided in the future. For Gaine and Prinsloo, the solution to the marginalisation of black and women researchers lay in a more self-conscious and open process of identifying the skills and training needs of different researchers in relation to the task at hand and the time limits imposed. For Wolpe, the issue was one of defining much more clearly the nature of women's oppression in South Africa (beyond simply stating non-sexism as a principle), as a basis for more effectively engaging with gender issues as part of any research agenda.

Other criticisms of the NEPI process emphasised the failure of the process to properly use educational practitioners as a resource in the development of policy (Young, 1993). As a result of the neglect of practitioners in the process, it was argued that NEPI was more likely to 'appeal to policy-makers and academics than to teachers and students' (Robinson, 1993, p. 27). These sentiments clearly relate to similar arguments made above concerning the academic bias of the process. On a slightly different note, Appel (1993) has argued that the failure to successfully team up academics with activists in the interests of policy development was not just a result of organisational errors. Rather, the problem lay in the nature of the task itself and the mutual incompatibility of academic and policy discourses. Whereas academic work is to do with defining 'criteria of truth', policy-making is a political social practice. It is not concerned.....with the truth or otherwise of any activity or statement, but with its political usefulness' (Appel, 1993, p. 230).

Now, from the point of view of this study there is a problem with the 'essentialist' approach towards discourse as understood by Appel. Rather than having immutable qualities and outcomes, different discursive practices in fact mix and reposition elements from a variety of discourses in relation to the broader context. Thus whilst it has been argued in chapter one that academic discourses on education, particularly within the dominant liberal tradition, have often been apolitical in nature, and that policy interventions have often been technicist and atheoretical, this cannot simply be attributed to the nature of these discourses themselves. One contribution of the emerging neo-Marxist approach towards academic and policy work during the 1970s and 1980s was to emphasise the fundamentally political nature of any quest for the 'truth' and to recommend a theoretically informed approach towards policy. In important respects, and despite its many weaknesses, NEPI went some way towards realising these insights. As a discourse it does not fit easily into either a traditional academic or policy mode and its usefulness is exemplified by the
extent to which some of the options went on to inform the ANC's Policy Framework.

Similarly, the PF is itself not a typical policy document in that it clearly locates itself within a political frame of reference, and in terms of the broader Reconstruction and Development Programme. As essentially an educational manifesto for the ANC, however, the PF is more concerned with political imperatives than theoretical niceties. Thus although it draws on a plurality of theoretical approaches (see chapter five), its proposals on governance already reflect a series of compromises between the positions and approaches of various policy actors.

b) The ANC's Policy Framework

The NEPI reports were released in early 1993. The fact that they were released at the same time as the ERS, however, underlined the need on the part of the Democratic Movement to translate the NEPI policy options into a coherent policy framework. Within the DM the ANC was in the best strategic position to undertake this task as the largest and most influential member of the Patriotic Front. Discursively, many ANC members had benefitted from the NEPI process and were in a stronger position than intellectuals from other organisations within the Patriotic Front to undertake the task of developing policy. As the likely majority party in any transitional government, and as a result of years of solidarity work overseas, the ANC was also in an advantageous position in terms of attracting foreign funding. The increasing strategic importance of the ANC in terms of the assertive project in education has coincided with a deepening crisis within the NECC symptomatised by the disarray of PTSAs, and growing disaffection between various interest groups within the organisation. The ascendancy of the ANC has been recently symbolised by the move of the national chairperson of the NECC, James Maseko, to the CEPD and his inclusion on the ANC's election list. It will be argued below that these changes must be understood in the context of a realignment in the assertive camp, and of a redefinition of the assertive project.

The demands of donor politics, however, still implied that funding ought not to be channelled directly to the ANC for fear of political repercussions. It was partly for this reason, as well as the continuing need to forge solidarity between the assertive block as a whole, that the ANC set up the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) late in 1992. The centre received funding from the Canadian-based International Development
Research Centre (IDRC). Headed by Trevor Coombe, a South African who had been seconded by the ANC from Sussex University in England, the CEPD saw itself as 'a professionally autonomous institution, providing independent, rigorous and well-researched policy support to the democratic movement in the education and training sector during the period of transition' (quoted in Chisholm and Kgobe, 1993). To date, however, the CEPD has been exclusively concerned with the development of the PF which was released in January 1994, and subsequently, with formulating an implementation plan for the PF.

The complete hegemony of the ANC alliance in the CEPD has obviously structured the nature of participation in the policy-making process. Whereas the Patriotic Front through the NEC continues to operate in the context of the NETF, charterist organisations have dominated the PF project. Outside of the party political domain, on the other hand, the CEPD has actively sought to include all the major stakeholders in education including students, teachers, the private sector, organised labour, state officials and various NGOs. It remains the case, however, that ANC structures will have the final say in adopting the PF as official ANC policy. As was the case with NEPI, the CEPD can be understood to have had to negotiate a tension between the needs for efficiency and expertise in the face of pressing time constraints on the one hand, and the historic demand for democratic participation in decision making within the DM on the other. As will be discussed below, as far as some groups were concerned, democracy was the loser in the process.

The PF process has been highly centralised even compared to NEPI. Firstly, the development of the PF was facilitated by a series of workshops around the structure and system of schooling, integration of education and training, rural education, language policy, teachers, finance and the bureaucracy, science and technology education and post-secondary education. Most of these workshops were held in Johannesburg and were by invitation only. Membership of the various groups was not as open as in NEPI, and there was little effort to extend participation beyond those included in the workshops. The fact that the CEPD has been staffed by educationists from the DM has, however, ensured a continuity of the various networks that were built up during the NEPI process. These have proved important in the way different workshops have been organised around different areas of policy. Secondly, the CEPD had exclusive control over conceptualising the task ahead. The agenda for the various workshops was set in advance in all cases with background papers and reading materials commissioned by the CEPD. Finally, the writing up of the PF
remained the responsibility of a relatively small group of people within the CEPD.

Given the centrality of political imperatives in the PF project, the inclusion and exclusion of groups and interests in the PF process must be understood as part of an ongoing political process of forming new political alliances around the assertive project as defined by the CEPD and strengthening that project. Of some importance in this regard were the EPUs. Besides being reliable political allies on account of their past links with the DM and the large proportion of ANC-aligned staff they employ, the EPUs have also accumulated experience in policy advocacy from the NEPI process and before. They could therefore be relied upon to produce background documentation for the various workshops as well as to perform some of the editing and compilation duties associated with the PF. This provided more time for CEPD members to pursue the political tasks of networking, public speaking and fund-raising. Given the deepening crisis within the NECC, the CEPD offered the EPUs a financial lifeline in return for their services, and a more certain future at least in the short term.

The composition of the CEPD and the EPUs ensured a continued bias towards the participation of academics in the PF process. In this case, however, the nature of the task ensured that the PF was written in the more precise language of policy intentions rather than in the more theoretical language of the NEPI options. Nonetheless, the continued academic bias was reflected in the 'race' and gender composition of the various workshops as well as by the continued over-representation of liberal opinion when set against the DM as a whole. This is exemplified by the uptake of a minimalist conception of affirmative action in the PF (see chapter five) and of liberal themes concerning the financing and governance of education (see below).

Much more so than in NEPI, however, COSATU exerted a powerful influence over the PF. Politically, COSATU's influence can be attributed to the fact that they are an election ally of the ANC, and that they are of major strategic importance as far as the realisation of the RDP is concerned. Discursively, COSATU was already in a strong position on account of having worked with the ANC in the post-NEPI period on the Framework for Lifelong Learning (ANC/COSATU, 1993), in which a common vision of a lifelong and integrated system of education and training was further elaborated upon. Indeed it is this vision that lies at the heart of the PF. In terms of the PF's proposals on governance, the influence of this dual endeavour is reflected in recommendations for
integrated governance structures for education and training at national and provincial level encompassing curriculum and certification.

The private sector, particularly in the form of EDUPOL, also deepened their links with the ANC through active participation in the PF process. Their previous work for NEPI put them in good stead to co-host the workshop on the bureaucracy and finance with the CEPD. They also provided the background research for this workshop and were able to mobilise the financial and discursive resources of the World Bank towards this end. CEPD collaboration with EDUPOL must be seen in relation to the earlier discussion on the changing strategic importance of the private sector generally for the ANC. It must also be seen in relation to the resources they were able to offer both for the PF and in the future. It is instructive, however, in terms of the relative influence of EDUPOL that their proposals on a future system of governance were almost completely ignored in favour of COSATU's and the ANC's own proposals.

As was the case with NEPI, the limited and piecemeal participation by NGOs in the PF process reflected their lack of a collective political voice and policy advocacy capacity. Indeed the strategic importance of NGOs for the CEPD and the ANC generally is ambiguous. On the one hand the PF acknowledges NGOs as potential 'partners' in the provision of education, particularly as far as adult education, educare and teacher training are concerned. On the other hand, although it is never officially acknowledged in ANC discourses, NGOs may prove to be an unwelcome source of competition for a future government as far as attracting foreign funding is concerned.

The two chapters in the PF dealing with teachers reflects a growing recognition of the strategic importance of this sector in realising the goals of the PF on the part of the CEPD. The attention given to teachers' concerns also exemplifies the importance for interest groups of developing policy positions informed by research. Since 1992, SADTU has been working with the Wits EPU on developing policies concerned with teacher appraisal. Many of these policies appear in the PF. Other important aspects of teacher autonomy such as the right to strike and to participate in collective bargaining are also present in the document. Teachers are further identified as important participants in governance structures at all levels.

The collective voice of parents and students appears to have waned further as a result of the crisis within the NECC and the collapse of PTSAs. Although the legacy of the
assertive project to date and the historical demands of these constituencies continues to leave an imprint on the PF, these constituencies have been unable to articulate their demands in relation to a changing context. Thus the school boards proposed by the PF have more in common with governing bodies in the English system than the vision of PTSAs as organs of people's power put forward in DM discourses during the 1980s. The powers of students and parents in these new structures also remain unspecified. It is unclear how parents and particularly students organisations such as COSAS will respond to these proposals.

Representatives from the existing bureaucracy were also included in some of the workshops, notably around issues of reconstruction of the system and finance. Given that existing bureaucrats have been guaranteed their jobs in terms of the interim constitution, winning them over to the PF project is clearly of crucial strategic importance. It is instructive to note that cooperation to date has been both partial and confined to the senior levels, especially in the more progressive DNE. It is also instructive to note that the PF identifies the need to restructure the existing bureaucracy as one of the incumbent government's most urgent tasks (CEPD, 1994).

Finally, both the PF and NEPI have been characterised by the absence of certain potential interest groups from the process. Examples here include interest groups concerned with rural education and the education of learners with special needs. Unlike other interest groups their marginalisation is not as a result of a process of exclusion (whether tacit or overt), but is directly related to their lack of a political voice at a national or provincial level. Where these groups have been represented, it is usually by one of the many NGOs working in these areas. These small organisations cannot be regarded as carrying the same political significance as a national organisation might. Thus although chapters are devoted in the PF to schooling in rural areas and to learners with special needs, it is unclear to what extent they represent the collective aspirations of these groups or are simply the result of the strategic need on the part of the CEPD to accommodate as many 'interests' (and gain as much support) as possible.

It is worth reflecting briefly at this point on the extent to which the PF process took cognisance of the criticisms levelled at NEPI. Firstly, although the PF process was not intended as an exercise in affirmative action in the way NEPI portrayed itself to be, it remains the case that no attempt was made to train black and women researchers. The
exception here was in the EPUs where research trainees were included in the PF process. The demands of the situation did mean that more practitioners including bureaucrats and teachers were involved in the process. They were, however, largely confined to those areas that directly affected them. Thus, for example, the collective input of teachers was confined to issues to do with employment and conditions of service. Consequently, other areas such as the curriculum and certification did not directly benefit from such an input, although these areas are also of profound relevance to teachers.

Criticisms concerning the closed nature of the PF process were forthcoming from an NECC conference held in January 1994 that included grassroots organisations such as SADTU, COSAS and SASCO. Once again these criticisms focused on the 'expert-led' nature of the PF process and the lack of accountability of 'experts' to the DM. Further, in a critique remarkably similar to that levelled at NEPI, Wolpe (1994) has again argued that the process would have been better informed by a more careful understanding of issues relating to gender.

At the time of writing, an implementation plan for the PF is being formulated. Once again, a severe time limit of one month is likely to seriously circumscribe the possibilities for democratic participation. Perhaps inevitably, the new process is also showing signs of being highly centralised with task teams for each area covered in the PF being appointed by the CEPD. By way of concession to the NECC and its affiliates, however, the CEPD has promised an inclusive review conference for the end of the process. Perhaps by way of a response to some of the criticisms of the PF process, a gender 'cross-coordination' team including Anne-Marie Wolpe and Linda Chisholm has been set up to ensure the various task teams take gender considerations into account. Although not representative of any particular women's organisation, the formation of the gender team can be understood as signifying the growing discursive power of women within the DM.

**Structural Elaboration**

This section will deal with the last stage in Archer's cycle of educational change, i.e. the ways in which governance structures become elaborated as a result of prior interest group interaction. In terms of the period being investigated in this study, the present process of interaction has yet to result in the elaboration of a new education system. It is, therefore, impossible to test empirically Archer's ideas concerning the nature of change in
centralised and decentralised systems in the South African context. What it is possible to do, however, is to critically engage with some of the emerging discourses on a future system of governance at a theoretical level.

In undertaking such a task, no attempt will be made to provide a blueprint for a future system of governance. Such an endeavour is beyond the scope of this study. Specific policies (or policy options in the case of NEPI) must inevitably emerge as a result of struggles and interactions within the state and civil society. The aim here will be to contribute towards the development of a conceptual framework within which to consider some of the issues involved in restructuring the present system. The argument presented below will attempt to build on, and go beyond some of the existing approaches, specifically those outlined in the NEPI Governance and Administration report (NEPI, 1992,a). This analysis will then provide a basis for interpreting some of the governance proposals contained in the ERS and especially the PF.

Like the NEPI reports, the discussion that follows will not attempt to be neutral, but will be informed by some of the political and theoretical concerns that have emerged from the study as a whole. Any discussion of a future system must also inevitably be guided by an overall analysis of the possible direction of educational change. Before proceeding further, therefore, such an analysis will be given in terms of the discussion of competition and negotiation given at the beginning of the chapter.

The starting-point for such a discussion is a consideration of the changing relationship between competition and negotiation during the transition and in the period after the April election. As far as the assertive project is concerned, it was suggested earlier that both the content of the project, the change mechanisms associated with it and the nature of the assertive alliance are in flux. In the 1980s the assertive alliance was led by the NECC and was predominantly held together by the discourses of people's education. Mass action played a crucial role in propelling change. Since the beginning of the transition period, however, the ANC has increasingly assumed a leadership role in the assertive struggle. In this context first the NEPI reports and then the PF have become the clearest and most well-known expression of the assertive project. Although both mass action and negotiations have played a role in bringing about change, negotiations with the dominant block have increasingly become the most popular strategy in the assertive struggle.

The future of the assertive project is, however, unclear at this stage. Its future can
be understood to depend upon two interrelated factors, namely the way the project is defined after the election of a democratic government of national unity, and the support that can continue to be mobilised for it. In other countries in Southern Africa and elsewhere, education has often been considered important by transitional governments in the post-colonial phase as a means of challenging the vested interests of national elites and neo-colonial relations more generally (Carnoy and Samoff, 1990). In the context of South Africa's transition it has been argued that policies currently emerging from the dominant camp, if implemented, would have the effect of perpetuating inequalities associated with apartheid education and capitalist/colonial relations, albeit in more subtle form, through a variety of mechanisms e.g. the perpetuation of model C-type options, the use of language and curricula policies to maintain privilege, increasing differentiation and a narrow vocationalism etc.

Although it is likely that the ANC will be the senior partner in a new government of national unity as well as in many of the new provinces, it is unclear at this stage what concessions might be made to the old dominant block as the struggle over a new system intensifies. Indeed, it has been argued in the last chapter that some readings of the PF in fact lend themselves to some of the dangers mentioned above. Further, important concessions designed to get the Inkatha Freedom Party into the election have already been made. Whereas previous drafts of the interim constitution described education as a 'concurrent' function of national and provincial government (i.e. that provinces may set policies within national frameworks), the latest draft gives the provinces substantial powers over education policy that can only be challenged by a national government under very specific conditions. Although the new constitution remains vague and has yet to be tested in the courts, the ANC will have to reassess its plans concerning a nationally-led process of educational renewal and redress given these developments. From the point of view of this study then, there will still be a need for some sort of assertive project even after the elections.

The PF in fact contains two extreme scenarios concerning the future of the assertive project. In terms of the discussion of affirmative action in the last chapter, a 'minimalist' reading of the PF would imply an end to the assertive project once equality of educational opportunity had been achieved in terms of the new constitution. A 'maximalist' reading, on the other hand, would imply an on-going struggle against vested privilege in education
linked to a broader process of economic and political empowerment of those groups who have been marginalised under capitalist/colonial relationships. It is impossible to predict how the assertive project will be defined in the future. Any new definition will be the outcome of competitive struggles and struggles within the assertive camp itself. Neither of these extremes exhaust the possible ways assertion might be defined in the future.

As far as this study is concerned, however, it is the latter definition that most clearly reflects some of the views, both implicit and explicit, concerning the future of educational change that have been made during the course of this study (although a minimalist and a maximalist approach are by no means mutually exclusive). It is worth then briefly recapping some of the policy directions that, from the point of view of this study, ought to be incorporated into the assertive project in the future.

Returning to the discussion of the education/economy relationship given in chapter three, the assertive project as envisaged here would aim at creating a 'positive correspondence' between education and some of the more radical proposals in the RDP. More concretely this would involve linking the provision of a sound general education for all (incorporating both academic and vocational concerns) to interventionist policies aimed at transforming the class, 'race' and gender biases of South Africa's labour markets. It would also involve challenging the trend towards privatisation and marketisation in education which, so it has been argued, have also been associated with the preservation of white and middle-class privilege. As far as the arguments presented in chapters four and five are concerned, a future assertive project ought to also seek to challenge racism (and other forms of discrimination) at the discursive level through a process of pro-active intervention in the curriculum and the opening up of policy discourse to previously marginalised groups.

The transition has also seen a proliferation of interest groups within the assertive camp, organised around more particularist concerns. This can be understood as an aspect of the general shift towards negotiations. The future of the assertive project will depend upon the extent to which such a project continues to be perceived by different groups to speak to their interests and the nature of the political alliances that can be formed around assertive themes. It has been argued in chapter five that the exclusion of certain interests, such as those around gender, from both the black consciousness and non-racial repertoires has been a source of weakness and contradiction. The proliferation of different interest
groups around issues such as gender, sexuality, disability, the environment etc. might prove then to be a source of strength to the assertive project in the future if these concerns can be successfully linked to the process of transforming current colonial and capitalist relationships.

The opening up of the political centre also provides an opportunity for previously marginalised groups to find expression for their concerns not just within the assertive camp, but on the national stage and in terms of the new constitution and bill of rights. From the point of view of this study this development is to be welcomed because it is a step towards the ideal discussed in the last chapter of creating a 'common humanist vision' as a basis for future education policy. Before proceeding further, it is important to discuss what is meant by this idea in political terms.

The use of the term 'common humanist vision' is not meant to imply a utopian vision of a harmonious future based on a 'rational' and shared conception of human nature, national development or the common good. It is not even supposed to imply a shift towards 'consensus politics'. Education policy, like every other sphere, will continue to be marked by struggles between very different ideas concerning the meaning and definition of education in relation to concepts such as human nature, culture, nation, 'race', community, development etc, related to quite different economic and political interests. Rather, the term is simply supposed to imply the inclusion of previously marginalised groups in the policy-making process.

The inclusion of such groups will not in itself ensure the success of some of the policy positions taken in this study and summarised above. In contrast to some Marxist and other approaches described in the last chapter, progressive and egalitarian ideas are not the necessary property of any particular class or racial group. The assertive project, as defined here, will have to be fought for and its value to different groups will have to be proved rather than assumed. The inclusion of previously marginalised groups is justified here in terms of democratic principles and the ideas of democratic governance that have been at the heart of the assertive struggle to date. Further, the idea of a more inclusive policy process does not imply treating all groups equally. Some groups, particularly within the dominant camp, are already at an advantage in terms of their relationship to economic, political and discursive power. One theme of this section will be to consider ways of empowering those groups who have been at the receiving end of inegalitarian apartheid
policies including black people, women, workers, rural dwellers, the gay community etc. It is against the above ideas concerning the future of assertion and negotiation that the approaches towards educational governance given below will be assessed.

**The Structure of Educational Governance and the Centralisation/Decentralisation Debate**

Proposals concerning educational governance in South Africa and elsewhere are often made in terms of the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy. Both the ERS and Buckland and Hofmeyr's (1993) 'systems perspective' are examples here. Space does not allow for a full consideration of the considerable international literature on the topic although reference will be made to some of this work where relevant. Further, three recent reviews have already considered the literature on centralisation/decentralisation from a South African perspective (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993; Sayed, 1992; Samoff and Jansen, 1991).

The ERS consciously locates itself within the international debate on centralisation and decentralisation. In keeping with recent trends within that literature over the last decade or so, the ERS advocates a decentralised approach on the grounds of *efficiency* and *democracy* (Samoff and Jansen, 1991; Sayed, 1992). Thus the ERS argues that although the new education model must emphasise oneness or commonality, care will have to be exercised that this emphasis does not lead to unchecked and stifling autocracy in education at the central level. Together with the accommodation of diversity, allowance will have to be made for decentralised control to eliminate bureaucratic inertia and to encourage community involvement (emphasis added, DNE, 1991, a, p. 22).

As the more recent literature has pointed out, however, there is no absolute value in centralised or decentralised control as far as efficiency and democracy are concerned (Samoff and Jansen, 1991; Sayed, 1992; Cummings et al, 1992).

Although Buckland and Hofmeyr (1993) also locate themselves within the centralisation/decentralisation debate, they arrive at a similar conclusion from their own review of the literature. In keeping with the view taken here, they argue that for the authors of the ERS decentralisation can be understood as a mechanism for preserving Afrikaner privilege.

Ironically, whereas once Afrikaner interests were best served by a centralised state, in a future of power-sharing there is a new realisation that decentralisation would better serve their interests (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1993, p. 22).
Similarly, Samoff and Jansen argue that
decentralisation fails in South Africa precisely because it mobilises ethnicity, tribe, and race
as the framework for local government (Samoff and Jansen, 1991, p. 17).

Further, as Sayed (1992) has pointed out, decentralisation in the hands of the authors of
the ERS has also been used to legitimate the privatisation of education. Despite the
apparent political neutrality and technical approach of the ERS, decentralisation is used to
mask the ideological nature of policies.

In keeping with the more recent literature, Buckland and Hofmeyr also point out
that understanding governance simply in terms of centralisation or decentralisation is too
simplistic (although they do not attempt to reconcile this insight with their use of Archer's
work). Rather, so they argue, it is more fruitful to think in terms of specific powers and
functions associated with educational governance in relation to a multi-tier system. When
considered in this light, so it is argued, most systems are in fact a mixture of centralisation
and decentralisation anyway.

Buckland and Hofmeyr in fact provide quite a sophisticated account of how systems
change might be brought about. In contrast to the ERS, they use Archer's ideas to assert
the independent influence of ideology on governance structures. Having pointed to the
effects of apartheid ideology on the present system, they then go on to assert the
importance of arriving at a shared set of principles on which to base a future system
through a process of negotiation. The principles which they themselves suggest are: a
commitment to a core set of values, e.g. a democratic, open, accountable, efficient,
responsive, and equitable system; the principle of inclusiveness; the principle of
subsidiarity, i.e. 'that decisions are taken at a level as close to the people directly affected
by that decision as is compatible with efficient and effective administration' (p. 63); the
need for a coherent national system; the principle of differentiated policy functions, i.e.
formulation, adoption etc.; the principle of different policy rights concerning decision-
making, consultation and access to information; and the principle of allocating resources
where decision-making power has also been allocated.

Also in contrast to the ERS they argue for a mixed system of governance. On the
one hand they recognise the symbolic significance of a unified and national system of
governance and the role that central authorities might play in driving reform and bringing
about a more equitable system. On the other hand, however, they also assert the importance of decentralisation in order to facilitate the use of external transactions and internal initiation as future change mechanisms and to ensure efficiency and democracy. They call for powers to be divided up between the national, regional (provincial), local and institutional levels.

Further, they make a clear distinction between policy formulation, adoption, implementation and monitoring at each level, with different mechanisms for accountability and participation. Thus policy formulation should, according to Buckland and Hofmeyr, be carried out by consultative bodies representative of a range of stakeholders; adoption ought to be the prerogative of politically accountable authorities at each level; implementation ought to be the responsibility of the administrative machinery; and monitoring ought to be undertaken by a separate administrative structure accountable to the national assembly. Finally, Buckland and Hofmeyr suggest that the above procedures may be used as a basis for designing a 'policy matrix' (of which they give their own example) in which specific policy functions may be designated to particular levels and structures.

Buckland and Hofmeyr's ideas concerning systems change have been outlined in some detail because they speak to one of the central theoretical concerns of this chapter, namely the extent of the relative autonomy of governance structures from wider social processes and relations. Understood as a technical exercise, their ideas have much to commend them. They are presented in a logical sequence that suggests a clear political process by which systems change may be negotiated. Considered in relation to the needs of the assertive project as defined in this study, however, their proposals are also problematic and insufficient (similar arguments to those presented below might also apply to the more particularist projects of different interest groups).

Firstly, having pointed to the effect of apartheid ideology on the present system of governance, Buckland and Hofmeyr fail to unpack the ideological nature of their own approach. In seeking to replace apartheid ideology with a shared set of principles on which to build a new system, the process they advocate can be understood to speak to capital's need for political stability during the transition. From the point of view of assertion, however, whilst a negotiated solution is also desirable, it is imperative to link principles and structures associated with a new system of governance much more clearly to wider social interests. This can be demonstrated with reference to some of the principles
suggested by Buckland and Hofmeyr.

In terms of the assertive project the principles of subsidiarity and resource-based authority, for example, need to be quite heavily qualified with reference to the nature of the decisions and resources delegated to particular levels, and on the way each level is defined. When seen in relation to the broader ERS project, both these principles can be seen to correspond with the idea of an ethnically-based system of 'community control' of schools and the setting of school fees. On the other hand, both these principles can also be seen to correspond with the historic demands of the NECC for control of schools by PTSAs. Similarly, it might be argued that a local level of governance (in between the institutional and regional/provincial levels) might serve the interests of redress through the equitable redistribution of resources to schools in the locality. On the other hand, however, if demography of local authorities remain as they are at present (i.e. racially based), such a delegation of responsibility and resources might continue to serve the interests of domination.

To move to another example, the principle of differentiated policy functions can only be judged from the point of view of assertion in terms of a prior understanding of which specific groups and interests ought to be included in the execution of the policy functions in question. Such an understanding would then have to assess whether the balance of forces in those sections of the system charged with particular policy functions (i.e. the bureaucracy, the polity and the consultative forums) were favourable to the assertive project before policy functions were designated. Finally, the idea of differentiated policy rights only becomes meaningful in terms of an understanding of not only what the rights are, but who the rights ought to apply to. Such rights might, on reflection, be considered important for entrenching the achievements of the assertive project to date and indeed of various marginalised groups. They could, for example, be used as a basis for building a programme of affirmative action by ensuring participation in the policy process of those who have been historically excluded. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that such rights might not continue to favour dominant groups.

In brief, although Buckland and Hofmeyr's approach has its merits as a technical exercise, from the point of view of this study it is essential to link their proposals more clearly to the needs of the assertive project. In particular, it is imperative before entering into negotiations around a new set of principles and structures to be very clear about which
groups in particular ought to be empowered and what system of governance would be most suitable towards that end. In terms of Buckland and Hofmeyr's use of Archer, it has already been argued that it is impossible to predict from her European examples what kind of system will emerge in a new dispensation in South Africa and the kinds of interaction such a system might engender. With regard to the arguments above, the question of the possible benefits of centralised and decentralised control must be treated with flexibility and in relation to the more significant issue of which groups and interests will stand to gain from a new system.

As mentioned earlier Buckland and Hofmeyr also use Archer to argue that the centralised and decentralised aspects of the current system are likely to persist and to call for a gradual process of change. A critique of their use of Archer has already been given. Of concern here, however, is the frequency with which these assertions are also made in the broader literature on governance, most of which is based on case studies in the South (Cummings et al, 1992). Buckland and Hofmeyr also refer to this literature to support their arguments. Of crucial importance here is the context of these studies, and the nature of the changes that were attempted.

The vast majority of these studies have been associated with the recent trend in decentralisation, led by the World Bank (Buckland and Hofmeyr, 1992; Samoff and Jansen, 1991). In these studies, and at the risk of over-simplification, the central concern has been the efficacy or otherwise of policies aimed at the decentralisation of financial responsibility for education in developing countries and slimming down the central bureaucracy in the interests of 'efficiency'. Most of the obstacles that have been encountered have arisen as a result of communities lacking the capacity for decision-making and demanding more control over education in keeping with their new financial responsibilities, and opposition from a bureaucracy with vested interests in the centralised system.

The second set of literature which concerns itself with the apparent persistence of structures is more progressive in origin. It is concerned with the frequency with which new administrations in the transition from a colonial or capitalist system in the South tend to maintain centralised systems of governance despite an apparent commitment to democratic participation in decision-making (see Carnoy and Samoff, 1990; Taylor and Methula, 1993; NEPI, 1992,a, for example). In this case the obstacle to systems change is the perceived need for state-driven reform during the transition.
Given the vast disparities in the nature of the problems faced with regard to introducing new structures, the literature draws attention to the need to specify quite carefully the particular aspect of the governance structure that requires modification. Different aspects of a new system will require different strategies for their implementation and will encounter different kinds of obstacles. Thus changing the curriculum is likely to encounter particular difficulties associated, for example, with the long cycles involved in schooling, the need for teacher training around the new curriculum and the need to produce suitable learning materials. The process is also likely to meet with resistance from practitioners who are used to the old system, those responsible for designing the old curriculum and for producing materials etc. Changing the basis on which a system is financed, on the other hand, may not take such a long time and will encounter different types of opposition. The introduction of the Clase models, for example, took only about two years and encountered opposition not from practitioners so much as from bureaucrats whose jobs were threatened and from parents who were used to a free education service.

Secondly, the broader political context is also central to education systems change. There may well be a huge difference, for example, between the support received for a World Bank sponsored shift to community financing of education and privatisation in a particular country, and the actions of a democratically elected government pursuing a decentralisation strategy that enjoys popular support. Further, with reference to the experience of other countries in transition from colonialism, it is important to recognise that South Africa’s transition is very different. Unlike other countries in Southern Africa like Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, for example, South Africa’s transition to democracy is occurring in a national and global context in which one-party centralised control enjoys dwindling support. The interim constitution guarantees that policy will be contested at a variety of levels by a multiplicity of actors. Without wishing to labour the point further, therefore, it is unhelpful simply to speak in terms of the persistence of structures without more clearly specifying which structures one is talking about and in what context.

This does not mean that South Africa has little to learn from the international experience. There may well be relevant examples of systems change that might inform our own transition including issues of finance, curriculum, restructuring of the bureaucracy etc. An exploration of comparative themes is beyond the scope of this study. As far as the
future of the assertive project as described above is concerned, however, Zimbabwe's transition provides one good example of what kind of comparative research might be appropriate. In a spirit of compromise, and in order to stem white emigration, Zimbabwe's transitional authorities allowed the continuation of state-aided and private schools along the lines of the Clase models. This has subsequently led to a perpetuation of elitism and inequality along 'race' and class lines despite an increase in access to basic education and a commitment to egalitarian policies elsewhere in the social sector (Dorsey, 1989; Cummings et al, 1992). There may well be lessons for South Africa here concerning the difficulties of implementing egalitarian reform if elitist forms of education are allowed to persist. There may also be political lessons too concerning ways of challenging the vested power of dominant groups in education.

Given the arguments above, however, comparative analysis can be no substitute for careful monitoring and research into ways of implementing reform in the South African context. One suitable area for such research may be the current bureaucracy. Given its 'race' and gender composition, its political affiliations and its approaches towards decision-making there is a clear need for research into ways of re-orientating and restructuring the bureaucracy. Recent research into these issues has concentrated on the training needs of different levels of the bureaucracy (Fehnel et al, 1993) and has ignored the political issue of how to win the cooperation of bureaucrats in order to implement a new system.

By way of a summary to the above discussion of the centralisation/decentralisation debate the following points are worth reiterating. Firstly, there is a general tendency within this literature to divorce structures from wider social hegemonies and interests. Thus whilst some of the more sophisticated accounts such as that given by Buckland and Hofmeyr provide a good technical guide to systems change, from the point of view of assertion it is necessary first to place the question of governance within a political frame of reference. Importantly, this should involve a consideration of who ought to benefit from a new system and how this might be achieved. The above has implications for a consideration of the relative autonomy of governance structures. Just as existing structures bear the imprint of apartheid, so future structures can only be put in place in relation to a broader political and educational vision. Further, there is nothing absolute about existing structures. Rather than assume they will persist into the future it is more helpful to think in terms of the problems that may be encountered in changing specific aspects of the structure. Finally, it is
impossible to determine in advance the effects of new structures on forms of interaction and so a new system must be informed by on-going research and monitoring and a degree of flexibility in implementing such structures.

*Specifying who Rules - the State or Civil Society?*

So far discussion has focused on one of the two options in the NEPI *Governance and Administration* document concerning a future system of governance. This has been because, like the present study, the authors of the 'systems perspective' have attempted to apply an Archerian framework to the South African context. The other approach contained in the NEPI report, however, namely the 'school governance perspective', is also worth considering from the point of view of this chapter. Unlike its counterpart, the school governance perspective seeks to link a future system of governance to wider political concerns and in particular the role of the state and of civil society in policy-making.

The theoretical basis for the school governance perspective lies in recent developments in social theory in Europe, exemplified by the writings of Mouffe et al (1992) and Hall and Jacques et al (1989) amongst others. Of particular interest to South African academics has been the suggestion in these writings that the contemporary project of the Left should lie in the deepening and extension of liberal democracy in the field of civil society. It is argued that in the aftermath of the failure of Soviet-style centralised planning, and in the context of the general crisis of Marxism and of class-based politics, the current 'hope' for the Left lies in the struggles of the various 'social movements' such as those organised around feminist, green and gay rights and anti-racist issues. The importance of these struggles, so it is argued, lies in the extent to which they seek to redefine the boundaries of liberal democracy through extending the rights and powers of marginalised groups. These organisations of civil society are also considered to have an important watchdog role to play in relation to the state.

Given the highly authoritarian and centralised nature of the apartheid state since 1948, the idea of a strong and vibrant civil society in the post-liberation phase has an obvious attraction for those on the South African Left. Carrim and Sayed (1993), for example, see the struggle for the democratic transformation of education as an example of a social movement, and the NECC as an important actor in such a movement. Sayed and the other architects of the school governance perspective see organisations of civil society
such as SADTU, COSAS and the NECC as having a crucial watchdog role to play in educational governance. Thus although a central state would drive reform, organisations of civil society would be able to actively participate in the policy process through a series of 'policy forums' at the national, regional (provincial), local and institutional levels. Indeed, as the name would suggest, it is the example of PTSAs located in civil society that has inspired the school governance perspective. Besides debating education policy in policy forums, organisations of civil society would also be involved in planning and implementing policy at the national and institutional levels by means of representation on governance structures.

From the point of view of this study, some aspects of the school governance perspective are attractive. By making use of the civil society approach, the authors seek to highlight the role of members of the assertive alliance as it is presently constituted in educational governance, namely SADTU, COSAS and the NECC. Also, in contrast to Buckland and Hofmeyr's emphasis on consensus, they argue that educational policy is contested, a view that is shared here. Further, the authors of the school governance perspective argue that whilst any system of governance cannot in itself guarantee the equal participation of different groups, the existence of policy forums at least renders power relations visible and transparent. They are thus in accord with the idea, expressed above, that a new system of educational governance cannot be divorced from an understanding of wider inequalities in society.

In order to incorporate aspects of the school governance perspective into the framework of the present chapter, however, it is necessary to rework some of its underlying assumptions and arguments. To begin with, the idea that the educational struggles of the 1980s can be considered as a social movement is inaccurate. As Nzimande and Sikhosana (1992) have argued, the label of 'social movement' is entirely inappropriate for describing the forms of struggle that the NECC undertook during the 1980s. Rather than operating as a 'pressure group' like the social movements in Europe and elsewhere, the demands of the colonial situation meant that educational struggles were part of a revolutionary movement for the destruction of the apartheid state and the achievement of people's power.

In terms of the analysis given in this chapter, Nzimande and Sikhosana's argument certainly corresponds to the description of educational struggles as an aspect of
competition. It has also been argued, however, that educational transactions are increasingly taking the form of negotiations. In this context, and in sympathy with Carrim and Sayed (1993), it is perhaps becoming increasingly relevant to talk of the assertive project as a social movement in education. From the point of view of this study, however, the assertive project is not currently being led by the NECC, but rather by the ANC. Importantly, although the ANC as a political party/liberation movement is located in civil society, it will also in the near future occupy state power. This has implications for the use of the civil society approach in the context of South Africa's transition because it also draws attention to the important role of the state in realising the goals of assertion.

The importance of the state in relation to assertion may be argued for as follows. Firstly, at a theoretical level, Nzimande and Sikhosana (1992) have pointed out that some exponents of the civil society approach use Gramsci's work to argue that civil society is the main arena for struggles for hegemony. It has been argued elsewhere, however (Tikly, 1990), that in terms of Gramsci's ideas, both the state and civil society can be considered important sites for hegemonic struggles over education policy. Secondly, there is the obvious point (but one not properly engaged with by the school governance perspective) that although the education system is partly controlled by sections of civil society such as churches, private educational trusts, affluent individuals, companies, NGOs etc. in terms of the funding and control of education, it is primarily a state institution and is likely to remain that way. Thirdly, as some of the more recent literature around the civil society approach points out (Walzer, 1992), civil society is itself not of a piece and an interventionist state is required to redress the inequalities that characterise society at large. In the context of South Africa's transition, this point needs to be writ bold. In brief it is a false dichotomy as far as the assertive project is concerned to set civil society against the state.

Although the school governance perspective does acknowledge the importance of the state in driving reform, this is generally a point of contradiction as far as the authors' use of the civil society approach is concerned. Consequently, they do not properly draw out the implications of this argument for their own proposals. There is no discussion, for example, of how organisations such as the ANC can also be considered as sites of contestation over education policy. Further, there is no consideration of the state itself as a contested terrain. Besides the different types of policy forums that could act as an
interface between the state and civil society, democratic elections also provide an opportunity for making governments at various levels accountable to the people.

Further, there is a tacit assumption in the school governance perspective that the organisations that are clearly favoured by the authors of the perspective will hold the reins of power both within the state and within civil society. Thus it is assumed that COSAS, SADTU and the NECC will be the most powerful players from civil society in a future system of governance. It is also more implicitly assumed that the ANC will hold state power. These assumptions are, however, in need of serious qualification. From a contemporary perspective, the future of the NECC is unclear at present and SADTU and COSAS will necessarily have to compete with a whole range of other interests in civil society such as organised business and labour, other teachers unions etc. Further, although the ANC is very likely to be the main player in a new government of national unity, its power and policies will be contested by other parties at the national, provincial and local levels.

The above argument serves to underline the point that both civil society and the state are not of a piece. From the point of view of assertion as defined in this study it is necessary to specify which organisations ought to be empowered by a new system of governance. Finally, although the school governance perspective acknowledges the influence of inequalities in wider society in relation to participation in the governance process, it does not address possible mechanisms by which marginalised groups might be empowered to participate.

There are no quick and easy solutions to this problem. In the previous section it was pointed out that some interest groups do not even have the necessary political representation to put forward their concerns at a national or even a provincial level. Clearly, the question of empowerment in relation to educational governance is inseparable from a broader process of empowerment of particular groups. This relates to the point made in chapter five, namely that affirmative action in education ought to be linked to a maximalist interpretation of the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme.

It was also suggested in the last section in relation to the NEPI and PF processes that participation in policy discourse is also helped by the development of capacity in policy advocacy and analysis. Indeed many of SADTU's recent successes at the negotiating table may be attributed to the fact that they were able to develop such capacity through their
cooperation with the Wits EPU. Other groups might be encouraged to pursue a similar course, and in so doing build on NEPI experience by finding new ways of combining academic and political concerns without the constraints of time and on a smaller scale.

There are also possibilities for affirmative action opened up by the governance process itself. Greenstein (1994) has suggested three different approaches towards empowering women in the governance process that may also be relevant to other groups. The first two can be understood as minimalist approaches, whilst the last one is more radical in nature and corresponds to a maximalist approach. Firstly, Greenstein suggests that legislation might be passed to ensure equality of opportunity in employment practices for women in the educational bureaucracy. Secondly, he suggests that training programmes aimed at challenging sexist practices within the bureaucracy ought to be instituted. Thirdly, and more radically, he suggests that the ethos of the governance process could be changed to make it more 'user friendly' to women and women's concerns (e.g. by making it more participatory and non-authoritarian), and that the locus of decision-making power could be shifted to sites where women are, e.g. to civics rather than education authorities and to parent and teacher organisations rather than principals and bureaucrats, etc. None of these proposals are mutually exclusive.

In summary, although the school governance perspective speaks to some of the concerns of this chapter, its emphasis on the future role of civil society needs to be complemented by an understanding of the role of state power in governance, and by a consideration of ways of empowering specific groups. Once these qualifications have been made, however, the emphasis of this perspective on broader political processes within the state and civil society can be understood to complement the technical competence of the systems perspective.

The ANC's Proposals Concerning Educational Governance

Unlike the ERS and the NEPI options discussed above, the PF does not locate itself in relation to any particular debate on educational governance. It does, however, share many of the strengths and weaknesses of the above approaches and these will be outlined below. Understood as a technical exercise, the PF has many of the characteristics of the systems perspective. To begin with it sets itself against a critique of existing structures much along the lines of the one presented in this chapter, although not in so much detail.
Then it outlines a set of principles to inform a new system of governance. These principles include a commitment to non-racial values; the principle of subsidiarity; the principle of inclusiveness; and the principle of oneness and accountability. Elsewhere in the document there is also a proposal for an educational bill of rights similar to the idea of policy rights suggested in the systems perspective. Next, the PF separates out different policy functions (formulation, adoption, implementation and monitoring) and assigns different policy functions and powers to national, provincial, local and institutional levels. The PF also states, like the system perspective, that systems change will take time.

Unlike the systems perspective, however, the PF commits itself not only to certain principles but to a specific world view, namely non-racialism. It also puts its own proposals in terms of the historic demands by the democratic movement for democratic participation in educational governance, and for PTSAs. The PF goes further than the systems perspective by qualifying some of its principles in relation to the non-racial project. Thus as far as the principle of subsidiarity is concerned, the PF makes it clear that powers will only be delegated to lower levels of the system within national frameworks.

From the point of view of assertion as defined in this study this is important because the ANC is likely to be in control at the national level. With regard to the local level, the PF does not state that existing local authorities must be redefined on a non-racial basis. It does suggest, however, that this level may operate only by delegation from the provincial level. This reduces the chance that local authorities in previously 'white' areas will be able to challenge national policies concerning admissions to schools, redress etc. as the ANC is also likely to be in control of many of the provinces. Further, as far as assigning powers to the institutional level is concerned, whilst acknowledging the importance of strong institutional governance, the PF also makes certain qualifications concerning discrimination on the basis of 'race' and language (see chapter five).

Unfortunately the PF is less clear on the question of who ought to participate in a new system of governance. It does identify certain constituencies in a broad sense such as parents, teachers, students, disabled people, organised labour and business, but it does not commit itself to any particular organisations. This has implications for some of the principles and structures endorsed by the PF. Thus, although an educational bill of rights (like the policy rights suggested by the systems perspective) might turn out to favour the assertive project, this cannot be assumed. Similarly, the assignment of policy functions and
powers to various levels is of limited meaning outside of a specification of who exactly should benefit from them. At the national and provincial levels where the ANC can itself expect a good deal of control this omission is not so serious. At other levels, however, it leaves uncertain the question of who will carry the assertive project forward. Given the need to win broad support for the PF at this stage of the transition (immediately before the elections), the omission of specific proposals concerning who should participate in various structures can be understood as a coy move. This omission will have to be rectified, however, when the implementation plan is finally drawn up.

The suggestion in the PF that educational change will take time can also be interpreted as a political move intended to diffuse false expectations on the part of the ANC's constituency. Rather than simply asserting that structures will persist, however, the PF goes on to outline areas for intervention in the next five years, including a reorientation of the bureaucracy, the introduction of ten years free and compulsory education and the introduction of a new curriculum and certification system. As far as the future of private and state-aided schools are concerned, the PF only promises to review their status and to implement changes after a process of negotiation with these institutions. Once again it has been left up to those involved in designing an implementation plan for the PF to work out the mechanisms for realising these objectives and putting in place the necessary governance structures.

With reference to the comments that have been made above concerning the school governance perspective, the PF seeks to strike a balance between the state and civil society. On the one hand it suggests an important role for the central state, and to a lesser extent the provincial legislatures (although this is likely to change in relation to the latest interim constitution) in developing new policies and frameworks. On the other hand, it suggests a variety of mechanisms for making governance structures accountable to civil society. Examples here include statutory councils and boards at the national and provincial levels to facilitate stakeholder participation in areas such as the curriculum, employment and conditions of service of educational personnel, general education, educare, training etc.

Authorities at the national, provincial and local levels responsible for the adoption and implementation of policy should also, according to the PF, be politically accountable to their electorate. The PF also calls for the establishment within the bureaucracy of a 'quality assurance system including the monitoring of redress' (CEPD, 1994, p. 25). It is
not clear, however, how such a system might be constituted and who will participate in, and run the system. Once again, as far as the assertive project is concerned, these proposals will only have real meaning when specific stakeholders have been identified, and the political balance of forces at each of the levels of governance has been determined after elections.

Finally, as mentioned in chapter five, the PF does not commit itself to a programme of affirmative action beyond a minimalist concern to include more women and blacks in the senior levels of the bureaucracy. It does, however, propose that capacity should be built amongst parents, students and teachers to enable these groups to effectively participate in institutional governance. This commitment is not extended towards other interest groups.

By way of a summary, the PF does manage to marry many of the good points of both the systems and school governance perspectives. The failure to identify particular organisations for inclusion in the various governance structures, on the other hand, and the absence of mechanisms aimed at empowering specific groups remains a source of weakness for the assertive project as defined by this study. Importantly, the PF does leave the door open for a good deal of contestation over educational governance in the future. This is a challenge that should be welcomed by all groups interested in progressive educational change.

**Conclusion**

**By way of conclusion to the study as a whole the following general observations are relevant.** South African education is currently undergoing a process of change unparalleled in the history of the country. The onset of a united, non-racial and democratic system is the culmination of years of struggle by those, both black and white, who have been inspired by the vision of an end to apartheid and the stunted system of education that it spawned. It is worth reflecting that this struggle has not been without its costs in lives, suffering and wasted human potential.

The aim of this study has been to strive towards a better understanding of education under apartheid and in the transition, as one small contribution towards the development of a new system. The study has been based on the belief that something as complex as educational policy cannot be grasped through recourse to one 'meta-narrative'. Consequently, a variety of theoretical approaches have been used. It is hoped, however,
that the use of key concepts such as hegemony and discourse, has provided coherence to the work as a whole.

Recognising the complexity of the policy-making process is also to acknowledge that a study of this nature cannot possibly hope to capture the full picture. References have been made throughout the text concerning areas that deserve a more thorough treatment. The role of discourses around gender in determining policy and the legacy of schooling in the various 'homelands' are two examples here. The challenges of the transition also throw up a research agenda as suggested in this chapter. There is a need to develop the capacity, and ascertain the educational needs of previously marginalised groups, including women and rural dwellers.

Importantly, there is also a need to complement the 'macro' approach of this study with a 'micro' analysis of the impact of policy at the institutional level. This study has only given one side of a complex interaction in which practitioners, students and parents mediate, resist and modify the policies handed down from above. Finally, the completion of this thesis coincides with the week of one of the most momentous events in the history of South Africa, namely, the first democratic election ever held in the country. For educationists this should serve to underline the point that the most important tasks of reconstruction and development still lie before us.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

AA  Affirmative Action
AB  Afrikaner Broederbond
AEM  African Education Movement
AHl  Afrikaner Handels Institut
ANC  African National Congress
AUT  Advisory Council on Universities and Technikons
AWB  Afrikaner Weerstands beweging
AZANLA  Azanian People's National Liberation Army
AZAPO  Azanian People's Organisation
AZASO  Azanian Students' Organisation
BAWU  Black Allied Workers Union
BC  Black Consciousness
BCM  Black Consciousness Movement
BEA  Bantu Education Act
BPA  Black Parents' Association
BPC  Black People's Convention
CCCS  Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
CEM  Committee of Education Ministers
CET  Council for Education and Training
CHED  Committee of Heads of Education Departments
CLPT  Cheap Labour Power Thesis
CM  Curriculum Model
CNE  Christian National Education
CODESA  Congress for a Democratic South Africa
COSAS  Congress of South African Students
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP  Conservative Party
CPSA  Communist Party of South Africa
DCDP  Department of Constitutional and Development Planning
DEC HOA  Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly)
DEC HOD  Department of Education and Culture (House of Delegates)
DEC HOR  Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives)
DET  Department of Education and Training
DM  Democratic Movement
DNE  Department of National Education
DRC  Dutch Reformed Church
EDUPOl  Education Policy and Systems Change Unit
EPU  Education Policy Unit
ERS  Education Renewal Strategy
FAK  Afrikaanse Kultuurverlage (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations)
FEDSAW  Federation of South African Women
FP  Fundamental Pedagogics
FRELIMO  Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>HIID</td>
<td>Harvard Institute for International Development</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
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<td>HMC</td>
<td>Head Masters' Conference</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party</td>
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<td>ICNE</td>
<td>Institute for Christian National Education</td>
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<td>IDAF</td>
<td>International Defence And Aid Fund For Southern Africa</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<td>IDT</td>
<td>Independant Development Trust</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import-Substitution Industrialisation</td>
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<td>Joint Working Group</td>
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<td>National Security Management System</td>
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<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania</td>
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<td>Policy Framework for Education and Training</td>
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<td>Parent, Teacher, Student Association</td>
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<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>South African Association for Technical and Vocational Education</td>
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<td>SACBC</td>
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<td>SACE</td>
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<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SADTU</td>
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<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute for Race Relations</td>
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<td>SANEP</td>
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<td>SATU</td>
<td>South African Teachers' Union</td>
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<td>State Education System</td>
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<td>Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student's Representative Council</td>
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<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Council</td>
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<td>TFC</td>
<td>Teachers Federal Council</td>
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Technical and Vocational Education Initiative
Urban Foundation
United States Agency for International Development
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