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PhD thesis

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The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and the  
Development of Civil Society: Mazowiecki's  
Poland

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The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and the Development of  
Civil Society: Mazowiecki's Poland.

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## Introduction: Why study 'Mazowiecki's Poland'?

The subject of this thesis is Poland's first post-communist government (September 1989 - December 1990), formed under the premiership of the veteran 'Solidarity' activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki<sup>1</sup>. The threat of economic collapse and social disorder had prompted the communist authorities to grant the non-communist elements organised around the 'Solidarity' movement<sup>2</sup> limited access to the Polish parliament through partially free elections. In June 1989 the results of these elections delivered a fatal blow to communist rule in Poland. 'Solidarity' triumphed in practically all the parliamentary seats the communist authorities had permitted it to contest<sup>3</sup>. Bereft of ideological confidence and Soviet support, the Polish Communist Party<sup>4</sup> rapidly disintegrated and the task of forming an administration fell to 'Solidarity'.

The new government, led by Mazowiecki and dominated by representatives of Solidarity's intellectual elite<sup>5</sup>, was appointed in September 1989. In the months that followed, the new government took advantage of strong social support and popularity to introduce comprehensive political and economic reforms. The reforms introduced irrevocably dismantled the country's disastrous command economy and introduced a radical shift to market based criteria. Although they entailed austerity

for much of Polish society, at least initially, the personal prestige of the new elite and its promise of the future benefits which would flow from the introduction of market rules seemed to guarantee an ongoing state of acquiescence.

The political reform process was admittedly slower but the removal of the last vestiges of communist power from the system progressed steadily. Within nine months the government had taken great strides in ending communist control of the police and military and was tackling the continued influence of the nomenklatura in the state bureaucracy. State control of the media and previous prohibitions on freedom of conscience, association and speech were ended. Completely free parliamentary and presidential elections were planned for the near future. It seemed that for the duration of the transition Poland would be led to a 'Western style' liberal democratic polity and free market economy by a government composed of Solidarity's 'best and brightest'<sup>16</sup>. Apolitical intellectuals would patriotically put the higher needs of the nation before the distractions of everyday political competitiveness. They would be supported in this by the Solidarity movement which would also act as a nursery for fledgling political parties. Over time these organisations would gather the societal support and organisational strength necessary to form a conventional, stable political system.

However by December 1990 the situation had altered radically. The Mazowiecki government, humiliated by the defeat of its Premier in the Presidential elections, was in the process of resigning office. The personal prestige and social authority of the new elite had been severely undermined. The Solidarity movement had been torn apart by deep splits. Polish transition politics had been muddled by a vicious internal struggle. A clutch of small, unstable political organisations appeared to challenge those organisations which had emerged as a result of Solidarity's disintegration. Rather than the controlled, evolutionary transition process envisaged by the Mazowiecki administration at the beginning of 1990, Poland was set to endure a period of political fragmentation and volatility, party disorganisation, personalisation of the political spectrum, voter apathy and societal unrest.

The task of this thesis is to analyse the Mazowiecki government's contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Poland. This issue remains important today for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is still unresolved. The fall of the Mazowiecki government was interpreted by many as a blow to the prospects of democratisation in Poland. Numerous articles analysed the condition of democracy immediately after the Mazowiecki period. Accepted indicators of Western-style liberal democracy (such as a stable, representative party system, balanced state institutions,

the rule of law and popular engagement in politics), often summarised under the slogan of 'civil society', were applied to the Polish case. Most studies stressed the weakness of these institutions and processes<sup>7</sup>. Western analysts who had previously extolled the virtues of the Mazowiecki government reassessed their opinions.<sup>8</sup>

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On the other hand, with the benefit of hindsight, one can appreciate the momentous steps taken by the Mazowiecki government in moving Poland in the direction of liberal democracy. Admittedly, the drama of the early transition period has since been replaced by the more prosaic process of long-term political and economic development. The mixed political fortunes of the heroes of the old anti-communist opposition and the reemergence of their communist foes as an electoral force, under the banner of social democracy, have tended to detract from the significance of that time.

Nevertheless, Mazowiecki's tenure remains of practical and symbolic significance to Poland. Vital decisions were taken concerning the rate of transition from a command to a free market economy, from a mono party to a multi party political system. These choices influence Polish society today<sup>9</sup>. The thesis aims to arrive at a balanced and ultimately favourable judgement

of the Mazowiecki government's contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Poland.

Secondly, recent events in Poland have further focused attention on the Mazowiecki period. In September 1997 Solidarity Election Action (AWS), a coalition of several trade unions, and political and social organisations grouped under the 'Solidarity' banner, gained a surprise victory over the ruling former communists of the Democratic Left Alliance<sup>10</sup> in the general election. This has prompted a re-examination of the 'Solidarity' legacy in Poland. Parallels can immediately be drawn between September 1997 and September 1989 when a Solidarity-based government took over office from the communists. Indeed, some of the members of the first Solidarity government are to be found in the current administration. Leszek Balcerowicz, Finance Minister under the first Solidarity governments and responsible for the initiation of the processes of economic reform, returns to this office and is vice-premier in the new government. Bronislaw Geremek, head of Solidarity's parliamentary caucus under Mazowiecki, is now Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>11</sup>.

Then as now the prospects of democratic stability depend on the Solidarity movement's internal cohesion and its ability to build a lasting coalition with other organisations. The disintegration of the Solidarity camp during the Mazowiecki period, one of the



central subjects of this thesis, can provide useful insights into the politics of contemporary Poland. AWS has formed a coalition with the Freedom Union<sup>13</sup> whose membership includes many of the intellectual luminaries of the old anti communist opposition and Mazowiecki government such as Balcerowicz and Geremek. As we shall see, tensions between Solidarity's trade union and intellectual camps contributed to the fragmentation of the movement under Mazowiecki. One of the central tasks of the current government will be to overcome such strains. For instance, Geremek's appointment as Foreign Minister immediately prompted a vote of no confidence in the government by one of his adversaries from the Mazowiecki period, Jaroslaw Kaczynski<sup>15</sup>. The journalist Janina Paradowska stressed the healing of Solidarity differences that stretch back to the Mazowiecki period as a fundamental and difficult objective for the country's new Premier, Jerzy Buzek<sup>14</sup>.

In April 1998 Solidarity's internal tensions threatened to undermine government unity. Balcerowicz's programme for restructuring the coal industry sparked protests from miners and brought the conflict over the movements party political and trade union identities back to the surface<sup>16</sup>. This clash played a major part in the downfall of the Mazowiecki administration in 1990. The process of ridding the state bureaucracy of former Communist Party members, and bringing those guilty of the worst

excesses under the old regime to account (so-called 'decommunisation') is also salient today. The progress of 'decommunisation' legislation through the Sejm is exacerbating tensions within the Solidarity coalition<sup>16</sup>. Again this issue first arose in the Mazowiecki period during the Presidential campaign of 1990<sup>17</sup>. Other contemporary themes, such as the extent to which the Polish economy should be opened up to the free market and Western firms, the public role of the Catholic Church and attitudes to European integration emerged during the Mazowiecki period. Thus examination of the Mazowiecki administration's grappling with the problems of democratisation can provide useful insights to the ongoing process of democratic consolidation in Poland.

Thirdly, from a wider perspective, Poland's involvement in the process of European integration is inextricably bound to the politics of the early transition period. In 1991 Geremek noted the importance of East Central Europe's transition to the future of the whole continent<sup>18</sup>. Poland is currently seeking European Union membership. Significant steps toward E.U. membership are expected to take place during the tenure of the current government<sup>19</sup>. With a population of 39 million this process will significantly enlarge the organisation and has significant consequences for all member countries. The prospect of Poland's membership depends on the success of reforms initiated during

the Mazowiecki period; political stability and an economy developed enough to become integrated with the E.U. system are basic criteria for inclusion. It is thus distinctly possible that developments in Poland since 1989 will help shape the future of the E.U.<sup>80</sup>

Finally, for political scientists in the West, the early transition period offers the opportunity to observe the construction of democratic political systems almost from scratch. The transition process in Poland threw up questions which are applicable to all countries which aspire to be democratic. What is the role of intellectuals in the transition to democracy? To what extent should the state 'enforce' democratic principles? What combination of central institutions is most appropriate for fostering democracy? What type of party system is most representative of societal interests? Should broad-based 'social movements' be seen as the modern replacement of factional, old-fashioned political organisations? All of these issues are addressed in the course of the thesis.

One must acknowledge that the major themes of this work (the issues raised by the move from communism to democracy) were repeated to varying degrees throughout East Central Europe from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s. As such, the region as a whole

merits the attention of political scientists<sup>21</sup>. As in Poland, intellectuals were prominent in the Czech and Hungarian anti communist movements. These figures also played prominent public roles in the early transition period before experiencing frustration and political marginalisation<sup>22</sup>.

*Agreement re-  
for just for...*

The common activity of East Central European intellectuals was particularly noticeable in the late 1970s when anti communist intellectuals formed broadly similar critiques of Party state system. In Warsaw, Budapest and Prague intellectuals such as Michnik and Kuron, Konrad and Kis and Havel and Kundera called for the peaceful organisation of groups in their societies outwith the control of the communist Party-state (labelled the 'reconstruction of civil society'<sup>23</sup>). However Poland deserves special study for a number of reasons. Firstly, in terms of size, Poland demands attention. With a population of almost forty million (around fifty percent more than the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary combined) the arguments of this work tend to be writ larger in a Polish context. In addition, Poland's location means that it can qualify as the country most representative of the East Central European condition. If the region can be defined as the area between Eastern and Western Europe, between Russia and Germany, then Poland alone fits this criteria perfectly<sup>24</sup>.

Poland's specific characteristics mean that it provides the clearest examples of the themes of this thesis. Although in communist Hungary and Czechoslovakia intellectuals theorised about the reconstruction of civil society they remained largely isolated from their societies. In Poland the circumstances existed for theory to be put into practice. The variety and durability of officially tolerated non-Marxist thought amongst the intelligentsia, the failure of the communists' collectivisation of agriculture, the strength of the Catholic Church and the presence of a large, politicised working class were specific to Poland and laid the foundations for a unique attempt to organise social groups outwith the Party-state<sup>25</sup>.

If the thesis is examining the condition of democratic forces from communist opposition to post-communist consolidation, then the Polish case provides the clearest examples. Polish society was sufficiently mobilised behind the 'democratic opposition' to suggest that the chances of democratic consolidation were best in this country. The fall of the Mazowiecki administration as it attempted to consolidate democracy thus illustrates best the obstacles to this process.

Chapter 1 will examine the theoretical background to the democratisation process. Western style parliamentary democracies

will be seen as the product of a historic process whereby the state becomes responsive to the interests of a loyal, consensual society through the development of 'civil society' as a mediatory realm. The Polish path is then compared and contrasted with developments in the West. The relative absence of a democratic political tradition is explained by reference to the hostile relationship between state and society and the absence of civil society throughout Poland's modern history. A variety of approaches to the study of democratisation are reviewed and the comparative historical approach is chosen as the most appropriate to the Polish case. This approach takes one factor in a given society and examines its interaction with state and society over a given period of time.

As the Mazowiecki government can be seen as a 'government of the intelligentsia' the thesis takes the Polish intelligentsia as a milieu in Poland whose relationship with politics is worthy of particular study. The Polish equivalent of the Western intellectual, the intelligentsia is seen as a milieu which, though it shared the democratic values of its Western counterpart, was inevitably shaped by country's traumatic recent history. It sought to lead an underdeveloped Poland to a modern, democratic future through the instrument of the state. The elitist, statist ethos of the Polish intelligentsia prevented it from performing a truly democratic role in civil society. Indeed its political activities,

which amounted to an attempt to impose its vision of a democratic Poland, actually contributed to the rise of undemocratic forces.

The thesis' choice of the comparative historical approach justifies the decision to elaborate the theoretical context of our study before establishing the historical background. Usually the historical background would be set out at the beginning of the thesis. However, our study treats recent Polish history in a particular and important way: it uses it to trace the evolution of the intelligentsia and its relationship with state and society. This allows us to make connections between the development of the milieu's ethos and the outlook of the Mazowiecki government in 1990. Thus, although some historical background emerges in Chapter 1, it is important to establish the theoretical implications of our examination of the intelligentsia in modern Polish history before embarking on our study of that period.

Chapter 2 will examine the relationship between the intelligentsia and the categories of state and society to show the historical continuity of this ethos. Although massive changes occurred during this period, the intelligentsia's desire for state power and isolation from other social groups is presented as constant. Even in the late communist period, the anti communist intelligentsia's project of the 'reconstruction of civil society' is seen more as a

state focussed strategy than an attempt to fully integrate with Polish society. The chapter is based primarily on secondary sources.

Chapters 3 and 4 will examine the influence of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia on the Mazowiecki government's programme of democratisation. Chapter 3 will study the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and the state. It will contend that the intelligentsia's sense of superiority was reflected in an elitist approach to reform of the state-owned economy and the centralised political system. Although the long-term results of these reforms are generally commendable, in the short-term they ran contrary to the process of democratisation. Polish society was polarised and radicalised in socio economic terms by the Balcerowicz Plan. Moreover the political scene became an arena for internecine battles between intellectual elites for state power. The acrimonious fragmentation of the Solidarity movement is seen as a direct result of these processes.

Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between the Mazowiecki government as 'the intelligentsia in power' and society. It will show that every social group (intelligentsia, workers, peasantry and Catholic Church) held mutually hostile visions of post communist Poland. The social isolation and elitism of the



intelligentsia meant that the Mazowiecki government was unable to reconcile these differences. Not only was this contrary to the development of a unified, democratic political culture, it also resulted in the isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power' from the rest of Polish society. The campaigns and results of the presidential elections of winter 1990 are presented as illustrative of this process. Chapters 3 and 4 are based, first and foremost, on primary sources. Polish newspapers and periodicals from 1989 and 1990 (such as the 'Solidarity' organs 'Gazeta Wyborcza' and 'Tygodnik Solidarnosc' are used. Articles from 'Polityka' are also used extensively. Although this was formerly an organ of the Communist Party, by 1989 it was providing an intelligent, independent commentary on the transition. Official Polish publications and the political memoirs of some of the leading figures (such as Michnik, Kuron and Geremek) are also used to provide insights into the politics of the time. del?

The thesis will conclude that the rule of the 'best and brightest' was not conducive to the establishment of a democratic, civil society. The ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia, though suffused with democratic ideals, also contained an statist, elitist model of political action which, when given free reign in state institutions, is not suitable to the development of democracy in the pluralist, Western sense. However it will identify the steps taken by the 'government of the intelligentsia' in instituting a

democratic political procedures and a liberal economic system more in keeping with developed, Western models. Moreover, the thesis will point to some possible future contributions the Polish intelligentsia can make to the consolidation of democracy. In the long term, in the context of relative economic prosperity and political stability, it can take up positions in civil society akin to those occupied by their Western counterparts. In the short-term, the prospect of Poland's inclusion in the process of European integration perhaps offers one last project for the intelligentsia to play its role in leading Poland to the democratic West.

- 1     see Appendix II p'760.
- 2     see Appendix I p669.
- 3     for detailed results see 'The Political Sphere' Chapter 3 p381.
- 4     PZPR - see Appendix I p691
- 5     see Chapter 4 p482 for details of the Mazowiecki cabinet.
- 6     see Voytek Zubek, 'The Rise and Fall of Poland's Best and Brightest' in Soviet Studies Vol.44 No.4 1992 pp579-608, henceforth Zubek (c).
- 7     "There is now a widespread belief that civil society in post-Communist countries is weak...the weakness of civil society in the region must pose problems for democratization" (Michael Bernhard 'Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Communist Democratization in Poland and Beyond' Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 29 No. 3 1996 p309, henceforth Bernhard (b)).
- 8     For instance, J.F. Brown conceded: "In my earlier book, *Surge to Freedom*, I waxed if not lyrical, then enthusiastic about Poland's new democratic leaders...[the Mazowiecki government] was not only a popular government : it was a good government...it soon turned out to be neither ...its members were not good politicians, least of all the Premier himself" (cited in Alina Mingiu 'Intellectuals as Political Actors in Eastern Europe: The Romanian Case' East European Politics and Society Vol. 10 No. 2 Spring 1996 p336, henceforth Mingiu).

- 9 "During this relatively brief period in office Mazowiecki initiated fundamental changes to inaugurate the process of transforming Poland into a capitalist liberal democracy" (Millard F, The Anatomy of the New Poland Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar 1994 p75).
- 10 SLD - see Appendix I p701
- 11 reported by Janina Paradowska 'A Government for the Times' Polityka 8/11/97 p20, see Appendix II for profiles of these figures.
- 12 UW - see Appendix I p685.
- 13 see Appendix II p750.
- 14 "The most difficult task for the politicians of AWS is reconciling themselves to the thought of a coalition with UW...Bronislaw Geremek symbolises what the AWS finds most difficult to swallow about the UW: the Round Table [negotiations held between Solidarity and Communist Party representatives in Spring 1989], Magdalenka [venue for secret talks between Communist and Solidarity leaders which organised the Round Table - see Chapter 3 p335] and Lay Left [nickname for Warsaw's intellectual milieu which was prominent on the Solidarity side on both occasions]" (Janina Paradowska 'The Threshold of Cabinet' Polityka 1/11/97 p3).
- 15 see 'W kraju' Polityka 25/4/98 p12 and 'Solidarity v Solidarity' Economist 25/4/98 p45.

- 16 "Most members of AWS's junior coalition partner, the pro-market Freedom Union, are queasy about such legislation: their leader, Leszek Balcerowicz, is a former communist too. The AWS is in no mood to let bygones be bygones" 'Poland rootles out its reds' Economist June 27th 1998 p47).
- 17 see 'Electoral Programmes' Chapter 4 p590.
- 18 "The destiny of Europe as a whole is intimately bound up with the East's still unresolved transition from communism to freedom" (Bronislaw Geremek 'Civil Society and the Present Age' 'The Idea of Civil Society National Humanities Center 1992 p11, henceforth Geremek (b).
- 19 Targets for full membership range between the millennium and 2005, see 'Poland Prepares for Europe' Economist 20/9/97 pp25-30).
- 20 As a well-known historian notes: "The success or failure of the post-communist democracies would condition the fate of the European Union" (Norman Davies, Europe: A History Pimlico London 1997 p1128, henceforth Davies (c)).

- 21 James McGregor notes the importance to Western political scientists of the appearance of these 'newly-minted democracies': "Apart from the general question of whether or not political systems in Central and Eastern Europe operate in the same way as they do in the established democracies of the West, the overnight transition of the region offers an almost unlimited supply of research questions that range from the system-specific to all political systems" (James McGregor 'Constitutional Factors in Politics in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe' Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 29 No. 2 1996 p147).
- 22 Adam Michnik, a Polish intellectual prominent in the anti-communist and Mazowiecki periods, noted the common, parabolic journey of intellectuals in East-Central Europe from anti-communist opposition to public office to marginalisation: "Janos Kis [an Hungarian intellectual] has travelled the entire road of the Central European intellectual" Adam Michnik 'Mysli wschonioueuropskiej' Krytyka No 32/33 1990 cited in Adam Michnik, Diabel Naszego Czasu: Publicystka z lat 1985-994 Independent Official Publication Warsaw 1995 p47, henceforth Michnik (k)).
- 23 see Chapter 2 p254.
- 24 "The geopolitical concept of Eastern Europe embraces the countries between Russia and Germany...[But] the only country truly in that unenviable position is Poland" ("Is Poland Really in Central Europe?" East European Reporter 4 No. 2 Spring/Summer 1990 p50).

- 25 The Hungarian intellectual Janos Kis highlights the unique characteristics of the Polish case which made the formation of a mass, anti-communist movement possible by comparing them to their Hungarian equivalents: "Poland periodically witnessed mass working-class action, while the Hungarian workers seemed to be unwilling to engage in large-scale collective protest. In Poland, key groups of the intelligentsia were irreversibly alienated from the regime, while the Hungarian communists seemed to be successful in accommodating the country's intellectuals. In Poland a strong and influential Catholic Church was ready to extend its moral and institutional support to the nascent opposition, while the Hungarian churches were divided and tamed into political docility and so on" (Janos Kis 'Between Reform and Revolution' *East European Politics and Societies* Vol. 12 No. 2 Spring 1998 p383).

## Chapter 1: The Theoretical Context of Democratisation

### Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical context of our examination of the Mazowiecki period. As stated previously, the challenges facing a government as it implements democratic reform in an unstable political context, provide scholars with an opportunity to test their theories against reality. In Mazowiecki's Poland a new political system was being built from scratch. The collapse of communism and the victory of the 'democratic opposition' did not mean that political transition in Poland in the direction of a stable, democratic political system was an inevitable, preordained process. The uncertainty meant that the political system could develop in a variety of ways.

The disintegration of the PZPR removed the basic repository of political power virtually overnight. The political institutions and procedures it left behind did not represent the freely expressed interests of Polish society. A return to the institutions and politics of pre-communist Poland was impossible due to the radical changes which had taken place during the communist-imposed revolution (as we shall see, some forces in Polish society disagreed with this contention). Moreover, the old opposition's fundamental goal of dismantling the communist political system did not



preclude conflicts over how this was to be achieved and what eventual form its replacement would take. Economic crisis and potential social instability, deepened by the initial results of the Balcerowicz Plan<sup>1</sup> meant that this 'grey area' at the centre of Polish political life could be filled by a range of, 'visions', ideologies and systems not all of which espoused democratic politics as accepted in the West<sup>3</sup>.

Nevertheless, the generally accepted faults of communist rule in Poland, identified by the representatives of the anti-communist movement who were now in power, suggested the desired outcome of political change. In reaction to the 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian' communist political system, it was generally agreed that the institutions of Polish state and society, and the relationship between them, had to be remodelled in accordance with liberal-democratic, political processes<sup>3</sup>. When the Mazowiecki government took office on 12 September 1989 this agenda appeared to have priority<sup>4</sup>.

Chapter One will examine the theoretical context of this proposed shift from communist to liberal democratic political systems. It will begin by examining the general characteristics of liberal democracy as practised in the countries of Western Europe and North America. The historical and theoretical development of the

categories of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society' are presented as central to the rise of democracy in the West. The absence of a democratic political tradition in modern Polish history will then be highlighted through comparison of these categories. Next, the various strategies forwarded by theorists of democratisation will be examined. Their applicability to the Polish case will be evaluated before one approach is chosen for the thesis.

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The comparative historical approach to democratisation will be chosen as the main theoretical framework. This approach examines the evolution of categories (such as 'state', 'society', 'civil society' or 'class') over a specific historical period. The thesis takes the Polish intelligentsia class as a vital factor in modern Polish history. As a milieu with a special relationship with the Polish state and a desire to be at the head of societal progress, the role of the intelligentsia in political change in Poland has always been prominent (Chapter 2 examines the experiences of the milieu in modern Polish history). In 1989 the incoming Mazowiecki government, charged with the task of democratisation, was dominated by the milieu<sup>6</sup>. The influence of the intelligentsia on the process of democratisation in the Mazowiecki period is the central topic of the thesis and is dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4.

## 1(a). Democracy in Poland and the West

The term 'liberal democracy' covers a variety of systems with different types of political institutions and procedures. For instance, there are significant constitutional differences amongst the liberal parliamentary democracies of Western Europe and North America.<sup>6</sup> Generally speaking, democracy means rule of the *demos*, the citizen body: the right of all to decide what are matters of common concern. The size of modern nation states has meant that democracy is now indirect, i.e. achieved through the election of representatives. However, such a system ought to strive to respond to the wishes of its citizens as much as possible. Thus the basic aim of a liberal democratic system is the political empowerment (the ability to influence events that concern one) of all of its members, regardless of socio-economic, religious, ethnic or geographical differences.

Liberal democratic systems are commonly associated with the countries of Western Europe and North America and here they emerged as the product of two sets of historical forces: reform of the state and political mobilisation of society. Together, these developments can be equated with the rise of 'civil society'. The following section will outline the historical and theoretical evolution of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society' in Western democracies.

## (i) The Development and Characteristics of Democracy in the West

### Historical Background

The evolution of democracy in Western Europe can be summarised as the gradual recovery by society of some autonomy and the institution of a more balanced relationship with the state. Indeed several scholars have regarded the development of state/society relations towards equilibrium as a defining characteristic of the region. Many Central European writers regard the separation of state and society as a crucial factor in their quest to differentiate Eastern and Western Europe<sup>7</sup>.

The division of state and society in the West came about as a result of several historical processes. The collapse of centralised, authoritarian rule by Imperial Rome fragmented political sovereignty and placed power in several sets of hands. The process of disintegration was strengthened by the separation of the Roman Catholic Church from secular power. State power was thus weakened by the removal of religious authority and societal autonomy was consolidated by the arrival of another potential arena for non-state organisation. In this power vacuum various groups gradually emerged but none achieved real dominance. The rule of the monarchy was constrained by the nobility. Feudal

power in turn relied heavily on maintaining the loyalty of its vassals. To counter this the monarchy tended to encourage the development of autonomous urban centres with which alliances could be formed. As a result, a propertied urban stratum began to emerge which contributed to the general diffraction of power.

For our purposes the major outcome of this period of decentralisation was the increasing awareness in the West of individual worth. This would eventually result in the notion of the 'citizen' who could freely enter or leave associations. The process included the development of 'contractual' relations amongst independent social interests and between society and the state in general. Of course this did not signify that different layers of society enjoyed equal rights and influence. The Lord still held power over his vassals and the King over his Lords, but these powers were accompanied by duties which, due to the absence of complete authority in the centre, had to be fulfilled. For instance, the need for finance in time of war led to the practice of calling assemblies of the Church, nobility and townsmen and a process of negotiation. From these assemblies came a codification of the 'contractual' relationships and the institution of Law which made states rule-bound.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the categories of state and society in the West embark in directions which brought

them into sharp conflict. On the one hand the period saw the expansion and centralisation of state apparatus usually through the rise of absolutist monarchies. Economic growth and urbanisation led to the centre developing larger, more powerful fiscal, administrative and military institutions which threatened the autonomy of society. At the same time urban areas found themselves at the forefront of an expanding economy which now operated on a larger scale than ever before. The nobility, Churchmen and artisans increased their wealth. The desire of these social groups for influence over the state was thus strengthened.

As Western Europe embarked on the building of the modern nation-state, the contractual tradition countered the influence of absolutist tendencies. There were frequent rebellions by the nobility, bourgeoisie and peasantry against the state-builders. As a result the state included some elements of the nobility and bourgeoisie into the military/bureaucratic administration without altering the independent status of these societal groups. Posts in the civil service were often put on sale. Thus although parts of society became involved in the state, these elements were transformed into interested parties. These could eventually build up capital and increase their independence from the centre. The monarchy had apparent sovereignty but its rights could easily be removed by invoking the 'contractual' spirit of the state/society

bond. Basing the exercise of power on the alliance of various interests had important consequences. It obviously encouraged the extension and consolidation of liberties. It also promoted a positive appraisal of pluralism and complexity. The tolerance of pluralism in the West can be contrasted to the absolutist tendencies in the East<sup>8</sup>. In 1990 the difference between the two traditions was evident. The thesis contends that, despite their commitment to Western-style democracy, the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government, in keeping with past incumbents of the Polish state, tended to regard the development of genuine pluralism negatively<sup>9</sup>. *(only apparent - significant - trend)*

The various revolutionary movements in the West in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reaffirmed societal autonomy and signalled the failure of the absolutist state to establish itself. By the twentieth century state and society had evolved into related but independent categories and this relationship provided the base for Western-style liberal democracy. Of course, the relationship between state and society in the West has varied through time and according to local conditions (Gaullist France and Thatcherite Britain can be cited as times when the balance between the two categories fluctuated considerably). However, generally speaking, the relationship has been marked by interdependence. The following sections will

outline the general characteristics and functions of state and society in the West.



## The State

The term 'state' is usually applied to the body of organisations which control the legitimate means of coercion (police, military, tax collectors and law courts) and the legislative and executive centres of government. This reflects the state's two functions of protection and representation of society. In liberal democracies the characteristics and functions of central state institutions have generally been arrived at through the gradual process of consensual political debate involving representatives of the state with the input of independently organised groups in society. The balancing of power between the institutions of government, parliament and the judiciary and the ability of society to gain access to them and hold them to account is vital to the functioning of these systems<sup>10</sup>. Institutionalists thus stress the importance of democratic state institutions in moulding democratic values in the society they govern<sup>11</sup>. We shall return to the institutionalist approach in our application of democratisation theories to post-communist Poland<sup>12</sup>.

Based on this ethos, the characteristics of the representative side of a liberal democratic state ought to include the following: free, fair, competitive elections held at regular intervals, guaranteed individual freedoms (of association, free speech, conscience etc.), the universal rule of law, separation of powers in central state

institutions, independence of the judiciary, equitable distribution of political power between the centre and periphery and a general atmosphere of interaction between the rulers and ruled<sup>13</sup>. Frequently this contract or consensus is codified in a constitution which consolidates the emphasis on the rule of law in liberal democracies.

## Society

Democratic state institutions are only democratic if the society they serve is able and ready to participate in them in an appropriate way. In other words, for democracy to truly function a society must have a democratic 'political culture'. The term 'political culture' is taken to refer to a shared system of values, based on common historical experiences and current status, which informs the political life of societies or groups within society<sup>14</sup>. This argument reverses the contention of institutionalists that democratic structures are central to the development of democracy. Culturalists argue that for democratic institutions to develop the political culture of a society must acquire democratic tendencies<sup>15</sup>. (more info later)

A democratic society adheres to the rights and duties of citizenship. This means that the individual assumes that state institutions are there to serve him or her. Individual or group interests are articulated to the state. Within society these interests can be associated with socio-economic or cultural criteria. Individuals and groups are bound to be affected by state institutions and policies in different ways according to their socio-economic or cultural backgrounds. This introduces the theory of class conflict where clashes between different societal

interests are played out through competition between political parties which represent them. For liberal democracy, the important thing is that a citizens political actions (for instance through voting for a party or membership of a political, economic or cultural association) are based on the premise that, 'win or lose', he or she will abide by the democratic rules of the political game. A defeat for one's political representatives does not remove the legitimacy of the political system. This tolerance of difference amongst different social groups can be contrasted with the 'all or nothing' or 'winner takes all' approach to political power in Poland<sup>16</sup>. For societies to behave in a democratic, tolerant way it is obviously important that the differences between different social forces in terms of economic status, political aims and access to political power are not too great<sup>17</sup>.

## Civil society

Within the simplistic state/society relationship described above one can observe a basic tension between the notions of liberty and equality, both of which are central to democratic values. Liberalism stresses the freedom of an individual to achieve his or her potential in society free from state intervention. State activities should therefore be limited to the guaranteeing of individual freedoms. Equality is concerned with guaranteeing equal opportunities for individuals and groups in society to fulfil their potential. Accordingly, advocates of increased equality, known as communitarians, stress that it is the state's responsibility to ensure that each citizen has the same chance to realise his or her potential<sup>18</sup>.

Debate continues in Western democracies between liberals and communitarians<sup>19</sup> but in these systems the principles of liberalism and equality are both recognised as vital and the tension between them is creative<sup>20</sup>. The arena where the tensions between state and society, equality and liberalism are eased is 'civil society'.

'Civil society' has a notoriously vague pedigree, encompassing economic, political or social emphases according to the orientation of the work that employs it. It is composed of a multitude of civic organisations (local and national, professional and social) which

interact and articulate the interests of society to the state. The state in turn responds to these interests through the activities of balanced, elected central organs of government, an independent judiciary and constitutional procedures. Most observers describe the functioning of civil society in terms of the legally protected interaction between a representative, responsive state and an articulate, loyal society<sup>21</sup>. A civil society, legally guaranteed by the 'social contract' reached between state and society, is thus seen as vital to the development of democracy. Liberal parliamentary democracies are based on the mediatory function of civil society between society and the state<sup>22</sup>.

In general there are three potential bases for civil society: the economy, the state, and society<sup>23</sup>. Each centre has different functions, structures and values. Crudely put, there is a difference between a citizen's affiliation to a professional or trade association and his membership of religious or cultural organisations. The Polish sociologist Wlodimierz Wesolwski introduces three classifications of social ties which correspond approximately to these differences<sup>24</sup>. The 'economistic' strand of civil society theory corresponds with Wesolowski's first category: "associative groups". These organisations are founded and run in a pragmatic manner, according to rational market criteria. Members of such groups are free to enter and leave as they wish. The aims of the group are

set by the members and there is a respect for competitor organisations. In this way a framework is established where conflicting interests can be resolved independently of the state. Though an ideal construct, associative groups are usually identified with professional associations and economic interests. The existence of a free market economy is thus a prerequisite of a democratic, civil society. Non-state economic activities in the private sector where individuals and firms freely compete against each other counters the concentration of economic and therefore political power in the state. Note that this is in keeping with the arguments of advocates of the liberal aspect of democracy.

The state forms the second potential arena for the functioning of civil society. Civil society, while still distinct from the state, must articulate its values and interests in this arena. After all, the state sets the framework within which a civil society can operate. This vision of civil society corresponds with Wesolowski's "communitarian" category which combines societal freedom of access to groups and associations with the surrendering of certain freedoms in the name of universal principles. It thus supports the egalitarian aspect of democracy. Some theorists make a distinction between civil society and political society<sup>25</sup>. For them political society consists of political parties, elections and parliaments. This distinction enables observers to identify when an authoritarian state may allow the economic freedoms of civil society to exist

without granting democratic political freedoms. Although this is a useful distinction I argue that political society is equivalent to the state-centred aspect of civil society<sup>26</sup>.

Another base for civil society is society itself. This emphasises the necessity of truly autonomous, representative social organisations acting as a counter-balance to the state. De Tocqueville's On Democracy In America deals with this theme. The book sees in the concentration of powers in the central state administration the potential for a new type of absolutism, even if it is exercised in 'the name of the people'. Taking into account the rapid rates of industrialisation and urbanisation, de Tocqueville predicts increased state intervention. The construction of the welfare state and nationalised industries concentrate powers in the centre and breeds societal dependence on the state, threatening the autonomy of society.

The antidote to this new despotism lies in the dispersal of political power into many centres. This refers not only to the division of powers among state institutions (executive, legislative and judicial branches) but to the development of civil associations such as local scientific and literary groups, schools, publishers, private industries, municipal associations and religious organisations, which lie beyond the control of the state. Such groups not only represent an institutional barrier to state despotism but educate



society in the ways of peaceful competition and articulation of interests which then could be applied to citizens' democratic activity in state institutions. These types of organisation can correspond approximately with what Wesolowski terms "communal" groups. They are characterised by a higher degree of loyalty to a certain set of values and beliefs. Groups in this category may have a benign, inherently democratic nature in accordance with the view of Paine and de Tocqueville.

However there is also a tendency for anti-state, defensive outlooks to develop, particularly in those based on ethnic, religious or nationalist criteria. Extreme populism, which portrays the supposed will of society, or certain groups in society, as the sole source of political authority, is contrary to the spirit of liberal democracy<sup>27</sup>. As we shall see, the Mazowiecki government found to its cost that these types of social ties within civil society were the first to be developed in post-communist Poland<sup>28</sup>. The purpose of this brief examination of the concept of 'civil society' is to present it as a framework for a mutually beneficial relationship between state and society and a prerequisite for liberal democratic polities<sup>29</sup>. It is the glue which binds state and society, institutionalist and culturalist, elite and mass-based views of democracy. The following section will trace the very different

path followed by the categories of state, society and civil society in Poland.

Why 'state' as?

## (ii) The Polish Path

### Historical background

A Polish geographer, Wacław Nalkowski, described Poland in 1915 as a 'land in-between' Western and Eastern Europe; a transition belt carrying the influences of Western Europe eastward and vice versa<sup>30</sup>. Poland had close economic and cultural links with the West through, for instance, the Baltic trade route. However expansionist Russian influences also played a significant part in shaping the categories of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society' in the country.

While the Western tradition can be summarised as the gradual separation of state and society through society's achievement of autonomy, in the East there was an ongoing fusion of both categories with the unbroken dominance of the state. The divergence of the Eastern and Western models began with the Kievan 'Rus' principality's deliberate choice of the Orthodox religion. The decision was taken to distinguish some Slavic speaking peoples from the Catholic Poles and Hungarians and the Muslims to the South and East. This had the intended effect of setting the East on a different course from that of Western Europe.

The invasion and dominance of the Mongols from the 13th to late 15th century furthered the separation of Eastern and Western traditions and the processes of centralisation in the East . The Mongols did not destroy Russian culture and tradition but Mongol influence replaced Western influence and cut Eastern Europe off from the West. Trade routes with the West collapsed and the division was signified by the decline of Kiev and the rise of the more northerly city of Moscow as Russia's capital. Mongol rule in Russia caused the religious and intellectual upheavals and reawakening of the Renaissance and Reformation in Western Europe to pass Russia by. Instead the experience of Tartar rule instituted the practice of Oriental despotism with a central political ruler exerting supreme authority over all groups and individuals. The collapse of empire and the appearance of a vacuum in the centre which heralded the development of feudalism and the roots of the social contract was filled in the East with processes of centralisation.

For instance, while this stage of development in the West included the separation of Church and state, in the East the process was reversed. Following the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Russia saw herself as the most important repository and guardian of the Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy was established as a basic characteristic of 'Russianness'. The association of national identity and religion reinforced the distinction of language and alphabet

which separated Russia from Western Europe. The conception of Orthodoxy as a national characteristic to be defended also precluded the separation of Church and state which proved so useful to the West in terms of the development of societal autonomy. Instead the tsar commanded the secular and religious devotion of Russian society. As the divinely ordained leader of the Russian nation and its national Church, the tsar in effect was the 'Pope' of the 'Third Rome'. The union of throne and altar in the East was mirrored, to a certain extent, in Poland where the Catholic Church has always sought to play a prominent public role<sup>31</sup>.

Similarly, the Eastern model of the state retained far greater control of the economy. The concentration of authority in the centre included domination of the economic sphere. While in the West economic expansion took place through the activities of a capitalist economy organised under state protectionism, the Russian economy grew through the expansion of the tsarist monopoly of commerce and manufacturing. In this context, the differences between the experience of the Russian boyars and the Western nobility during the construction of absolutist states are striking. In the West society was subordinated to the absolutist state through transforming the nobility into interested parties. In the East society was 'nationalised' by the absolutist state through

the transformation of the boyars into Pomeshchicki. Boyars had owned land and property independently but Pomeshchicki held their lands on condition of service to the expansionist state bureaucracy. Societal autonomy in the East could therefore not be gained through the division of property and wealth amongst different social groups.

In general there was an absence of a 'contractual' arrangement amongst social groups and between state and society because there was no need for one. The authority of the Eastern model of the state was such that it could 'nationalise' rather than 'subordinate' society. The lack of an independent nobility and middle class precluded the formation of a social contract which, in the West, led to the acceptance of plurality and diversity within society. Instead all liberties were subordinated to the 'freedom of the state'<sup>32</sup>.

Poland exhibited a peculiar mix of the Eastern and Western traditions. For instance, up to the eighteenth century it had links with the developing capitalist economy of the West. The Baltic trade route connected Poland with processes in the West and led to the formation of fledgling industrial bases and a rudimentary urban middle class. Paradoxically, Poland's links with early Western capitalism contributed to the long-term entrenchment of

its Eastern characteristics. The fact that Poland was on the periphery of the Western economy weakened the pace of economic development. The West tended to regard the region primarily as a source of agricultural produce to meet the growing demand caused by urbanisation and industrialisation. Poland was encouraged to intensify its agricultural basis and this confirmed the power of the landed gentry in the region at the expense of the urban middle-class.

At the same time the influence of Eastern practices brought about by Russian expansion in Eastern/Central Europe was strong. The decisive element in Russian expansion was the agrarian colonisation and the westward exporting of serfdom. The Russian nobility was forced under the authority of the state to intensify its domination of the peasantry and this practice was matched by the nobility of East/Central Europe. Thus the Western ideas of democracy and individual freedom were confined largely to the ruling class in Poland. The social conditions which had given rise to contractual state/society relations and eventually to civil society in the West were absent.

The Polish Republic of the Gentry ( - 1795) provides a good example of the paradoxical mixture of Eastern and Western models in Poland. The Polish nobility had been the prime benefactors of the grain trade with the West. Under the influence

of the West's anti-absolutist, contractual tendencies the nobility's republic was imbued with a deeply held, idealistic concept of the 'golden liberty'. This laid primary importance on the freedom of each individual nobleman. Under the Republic's law any nobleman could be elected king and any new legislation was subject to a law of individual veto in the legislative body (the Sejm).

However, unlike its equivalents in the West, these democratic freedoms did not refer to wider Polish society. Though largely polonised the Polish nobility was ethnically heterogeneous with Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian elements so Polish 'nationhood' was not regarded in ethnic terms. It was rather shared social privilege that provided the bond uniting members of the 'political nation'. Thus the gentry's idea of the Polish nation did not refer to Polish or non-Polish masses under their dominion. These classes were not considered as countrymen. The peasantry remained enserfed with its concept of the nation limited to local allegiances and devotion to the land it worked. The middle class, which was weak, with unassimilated German and Jewish elements, was also discriminated against by the nobility. The gentry's 'anti-mercantilist' outlook which barred Polish merchants from marketing Polish produce, giving the business to Western merchants, illustrated the exclusion of this group from citizenship in the Polish Republic. Representatives of both peasantry and



middle class were always excluded from the Sejm<sup>33</sup>. Poland's history shaped the characteristics of state and society in the country.

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## The Polish State

A legacy of Poland's history of invasion and domination by foreign powers was the absence of agreement between state and society concerning the balance of central institutions. For nearly two centuries Polish society has been ruled by authoritarian states which rejected the notion of a 'contract' with society. Three of the six constitutions in Polish history (1807, 1815 and 1915) were imposed by alien force (usually with the active participation of a section of the Polish political elite) rather than arrived at through the functioning of the social contract<sup>34</sup>.

The two constitutions introduced during the period of Polish sovereignty between the wars were shaped by the fears and exigencies of the time rather than by political consensus. In 1921 the Sejm, fearing a strong President in the person of Pilsudski, chose a model of parliamentary supremacy. This strictly limited the government's executive functions. When the Parliament fragmented into many bickering parties the weak government and President were unable to act effectively. This prompted Pilsudski's coup d'état. The legacy of this period of party political fragmentation could be detected in transition Poland. Consciousness of Poland's traditional fractious political scene contributed to the debate over the country's post-communist

political institutions. Some called for systemic safeguards to prevent a repeat of the experience of the 1920s while others regarded fractiousness to be inherent in the countries political culture and thus unavoidable<sup>35</sup>. Some political scientists argued that the country's tradition of political diffusion undermined the prospects of attaining stability through a parliamentary model<sup>36</sup>.

In the aftermath of the 1926 coup the constitution veered from extreme parliamentarism to concentrating inordinate power in the hands of the President. Although the revised constitution of 1926 appeared to balance the 1921 version by giving the President the role of arbiter of parliamentary conflicts, in practice the Presidency under Pilsudski undermined the Sejm and limited the rights of opposition parties. In 1935 the shift from a democratic to authoritarian system was formalised by amendments to the constitution. This authoritarian system was characterised by the state's control over a wide range of social activities and the exercise of political power in an authoritarian, arbitrary way rather than through the rule of law<sup>37</sup>.

With the arrival of the People's Republic the absence of an institutional arrangement arrived at by consensus was symbolised and codified by the communists' arbitrary imposition of a new Constitution. State control of society is a tenet of

communism which can be traced as far back as Hegel, a leading influence on Marx. For Hegel the state represented the highest expression of society's rational development. At once part of and removed from society, it was in the best position to judge what was best for society's further progress. Only a supreme public authority could effectively interpret society's conflicts and inequalities to articulate the basic interests of the community as a whole. Society was to be subjected to its control and scrutiny. Marxism also subscribes to the view of the dominant state. The 'Communist Manifesto' identifies the state as a force which enables the ruling class to dominate the rest of society. The object of class and therefore political struggle revolves around the state. According to Marxism the proletariat must seize state power in order to destroy its bourgeoisie apparatus, then in later phases set in motion a radical process which will lead to the destruction of the state itself. Lenin's interpretation of Marxist thought stressed the leading role of the communist party in the seizing state power. State control of society thus became the subject and the object of Marxist-Leninist thought<sup>38</sup>. The Marxist-Leninist approach to state power was evident in the development of the Party-state system in Poland<sup>39</sup>.

The communist Party-state system dominated all organisations of state and society. It inculcated on Polish political leaders an

absolutist approach to power. Responsiveness to feedback from society, the ethos of compromise amongst competing interests and toleration of political opponents - all central to liberal democracy - were devalued. To a degree this lack of toleration was part of pre-communist Poland's political culture. It was manifested in the authoritarian regime of the 1930s. It was also observable in the absolute moral categories of the anti-communist opposition in the 1970s and 1980s. As we shall see, in the early transition period the Mazowiecki government also found it difficult to lose this dogmatic approach to exercising state authority. (a major contention of this thesis is that the Polish intelligentsia's traditional intolerance of the interests of other social groups, while simultaneously espousing democratic values, informed the politics of the transition period).

## Polish society

Polish society has experienced, in the course of the twentieth century, the substantial changes which accompany modernity: industrialisation and urbanisation. However, the development of a democratic political culture associated with the rise of industrial societies in the West has been stunted. The processes of modernisation were led and controlled by a dominant state over a largely helpless and alienated society.

For most of recent Polish history the prevalent political culture in society was that of the peasantry (the numerically dominant stratum in society up to the late communist period). This culture included alienation from central state institutions and hostility to political authority<sup>40</sup>. It tended towards radical populist political activity which runs contrary to the processes associated with liberal democracies<sup>41</sup>. Despite deep hostility to the state peasants tended to accept arbitrary rule and authoritarian leadership. Polish society's countenance of an authoritarian state was manifested in the dominating role played by figures such as Pilsudski during the inter-war period<sup>42</sup>. Such leaders' hands were not to be tied too much by constitutional regulations<sup>43</sup>.

Poland's history of foreign domination and the presence of significant ethnic minorities within the borders of the Second Republic meant that an ethnic form of nationalism was developed across all sectors of Polish society. After decades of exploitation by alien interests the prevailing opinion was that the development of Poland should be carried out in the name of 'true Poles'. The stress on rule by a single, ethnic community obviously undermines the individualist aspect of democratic values and threatens the rights of minorities. Ethnic nationalism contributed to the collapse of democracy during Poland's brief experience of independence between the two world wars<sup>44</sup>. It also emerged as a threat to the Mazowiecki government's project of democratisation in 1990<sup>45</sup>.

The strength of the Catholic Church as a social institution in Poland did not favour the formation of a democratic, 'pluralist' culture. According to the Catholic Church, Polish society had a spiritual, 'organic' unity which could not tolerate divisions and conflicts. Poland's status as a bulwark of Catholicism against the East and the presence of substantial religious minorities within Polish borders up to the Second World War obviously contributed to this version of Catholicism. Those who did not partake in the nation's Catholic identity were regarded as aliens<sup>46</sup>. Polish Catholicism thus tended towards an exclusive vision of Polishness.

This allied it with ethnic nationalism which also saw the nation as an organic entity. The Pole=Catholic equation can be seen as contrary to the development of a democratic political culture and civil society because it does not tolerate the interaction of a plurality of social, religious or ethnic interests. The Catholic Church's association with the authoritarian regime in the inter-war period<sup>47</sup> demonstrates the point. The thesis argues that its limited vision of Polish democracy was apparent in 1990<sup>48</sup>.

Communist rule strengthened the passive, authoritarian strand in the political culture of Polish society. The Party-state's desire to completely subjugate the private life of citizens and restrict or eliminate organisations between the level of state and individual consolidated the culture of dependency on a paternalistic regime.<sup>49</sup>

Communism produced dramatic social changes. Under the communist-led process of industrialisation and urbanisation the urban working class grew in number and significance. However, it would be a mistake to equate this with the modernisation process in the West. The whole process of urbanisation and industrialisation was controlled by the communist state. The formation of a democratic political culture was prevented by several, obvious factors. Firstly the state aimed to intervene in all aspects of Polish life. Poles were not granted the areas of personal



and group autonomy associated with Western liberal democracy. This encouraged normlessness in society with individuals mobilised only in the name of self-preservation. Again this is not in keeping with the participative aspect of liberal democracy. The alternative to normlessness was continued subscription to the value systems of the inter-war period, such as peasant populism or Catholicism. As we have seen, in the Polish context, these had undemocratic tendencies. The decline of the communist economy meant that social mobility declined and inter-class resentments intensified. The situation was exacerbated by the uneven spatial distribution of industrialisation and urbanisation under communism. The urban/rural divide, which undermined the formation of a unified culture in the inter-war period, was maintained<sup>50</sup>.

The late communist period (1968-1989) could be presented as a time of relative social unity. However from the late 1970s onward Polish society had only been able to identify what it was *not* (i.e. communist). The opposition movement concentrated on the organisation of social groups independently of the communist state. Political and economic questions which are vital to the articulation of a democratic political culture were deliberately avoided in the name of anti-communist unity. No consensus was reached over what 'political community' Polish society wanted..

Were the political cultures of the peasantry, urban workers and Catholic Church compatible? Could they be unified under the banner of democracy? Even at the height of opposition activity when Solidarity movement achieved legalisation, theorists inside and outside the movement noted its 'negative unity'<sup>51</sup>. Thus, up to the present period, Polish society's commitment to liberal-democratic values has been weak. Throughout recent history Polish society has been marked by antagonism to the state and deep, hostile cleavages. Both of these characteristics run contrary to the development of a democratic, civil society.

## Civil Society in Poland

In Poland civil society has traditionally been circumscribed by the state's desire to control all aspects of society and society's inability to counter this desire and assert its independence. In partition times the Imperial states denied Polish society any forms of autonomous expression. In the inter-war period the Second Republic's drift towards authoritarianism limited societal freedoms. After the advent of communist rule, the tenet of the 'leading role of the Party' rejected the notion 'contract' between state and society and thus the need for a civil society. If the will of the Party united the interests of state and society what need was there for a realm of mediation between the two categories. The Party represented society and any groups in Polish society organised outwith its aegis were deemed illegal. Thus the absence of a 'Western-type' democratic political system in Poland can be equated with the weakness of civil society in the face of state force. Citizens regarded themselves as passive subjects of the dominant state rather than a collection of participating individuals<sup>52</sup>.

Consequently, for many observers and participants, the project of democratisation in Poland was linked to the construction of a Western-style civil society; to create the conditions where the

state would be willing to represent the independently structured interests and values of Polish society and Polish society would be willing to articulate these interests in a peaceful, tolerant way<sup>63</sup>. The anti-communist Polish intelligentsia, which formed the core of the Mazowiecki administration had a particular conception of civil society. An examination of this notion and its effects on democratisation is at the heart of this thesis<sup>64</sup>. *See Ch. 12*

The following section will examine the various theories submitted by contemporary political scientist for analysing and supporting political systems moving towards liberal democracy. Some of these theories stress the modernisation of the economy as a factor in this process, others focus on institutional reform of the state, or democratic mobilisation of society. The thesis' chosen approach to the challenge of democratisation is the comparative historical approach.

### (iii) Theories of Democratisation

As stated the thesis is concerned with examining the consolidation of democracy in post-communist Poland. In terms of methodology it incorporates elements of four theoretical models of democratisation which are currently applied to East-Central Europe: modernisation theories, comparative historical analyses, elite contestation theories and institutional configuration theories<sup>55</sup>. *(See Reisinger 1997, 50-51)*

#### Modernisation Theories

The basic contention of modernisation theories is that societal development in the direction of capitalism is a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic practices. Social scientists such as Seymour Martin Lipset contend that countries with modern societal structures (a strong middle class and urban industrial base, provision of formal education etc.) are more likely to be democratic than others. Conversely, countries outside the group of Western European and North American capitalist economies have experienced democratic politics fleetingly, if at all<sup>56</sup>. Proponents of modernisation theory claim that liberty and equality, as we have seen, fundamental components of democratic politics, are encouraged when a society progresses toward capitalism. Liberty is created primarily through the diffusion of economic power in

capitalism. Economic development relies on the promotion of wealth, health and education. Modern, capitalist economies also require the development of a complex infrastructure and system of communication. All of these processes encourage the diffusion of economic power. With economic power spread throughout society a larger proportion of the population will press for political influence and equality in terms of political power will be encouraged. It becomes much more difficult to concentrate political power in the centre as the pressure for democracy increases.

However the link between equality and capitalist development is problematic. Capitalist economic development, based on a 'laissez-faire' ethos, has an intrinsic, anti-egalitarian character. Economic winners and losers are polarised. To employ the logic of modernisation theory one would conclude that in such a society the more economically developed parts of society would be far better placed to influence politics than their poorer fellow citizens. If the polarisation is so deep, can such a society claim to be democratic? In response modernisation theorists stress the importance of a healthy middle class. This stratum, composed of workers and professionals, if large enough, can play a stabilising role. It spans the gap between the rich and the poor. With its ethos of tolerance, moderation, hard work etc. it contributes to

the development of democratic tendencies in a society's 'political culture'.

Following on from this is the modernisation theorists' contention that a society's political culture can change in the direction of democracy as it advances toward capitalism. It is accepted that a given society's predisposition to democratic politics is decided primarily by its specific history and characteristics. However, as it experiences industrialisation and urbanisation new patterns of economic life heighten peoples' political expectations<sup>57</sup>.

Critics of modernisation theories question the assumption that the relationship between socio-economic development and political change. They point to the emergence of regimes in Europe and South America which, though committed to this type of economic progress, are just as likely to modernise through authoritarian, militaristic methods<sup>58</sup>. Nevertheless, modernisation theories remain influential and provide a useful tool for analysing the Polish transition to democracy. *Evry?*

## Application to Thesis

Modernisation theories are applied in the thesis at different points. Firstly, it is used to explain the weakness of the Polish democratic tradition. The stifling of capitalist development and the frailty of Poland's native middle-class in modern Polish history will be presented as a major factor behind the weakness of democratic values in Polish society's political culture. The failure of democratic politics and the rise of authoritarianism in the inter-war period is presented in this context<sup>59</sup>. The critique of this theory's conflation of economic modernisation and democratisation is supported by Poland's experience of communist rule. On the one hand it could be contended that the communist-led programmes of industrialisation and urbanisation raised expectations and economic ambitions in Polish society. The frustration caused by the blockage of upward social mobility and the disparity between economic status and political freedom in Poland from the 1970s onward can be seen as a contributory factor in the development of the anti-communist movement<sup>60</sup>.

However, this was not comparable with processes which led to the development of liberal democracies in the West. Any aspirations to democratic rights, as understood in the West, were blocked by the communist state. Polish society's aspirations thus tended toward



the material benefits of capitalism and not necessarily the rights and obligations of democratic political cultures<sup>61</sup>.

In the post-communist period the theory holds in so far as Poland, one of the most economically developed countries in communist East-Central Europe was the first country to establish democratic opposition groups and it was here that these groups first made the breakthrough against communist rule. However, the experiences of the Mazowiecki government pose serious questions for modernisation theory. One of the main justifications of the Balcerowicz Plan was to encourage the development of a propertied middle class. The elite of the Mazowiecki government attempted to create a market economy and a liberal democracy at the same time. However the immediate introduction of modern, market values caused widespread austerity which exacerbated the tension between liberty and equality<sup>62</sup>. Poland's weakly developed democratic political culture meant that society's economic frustrations were taken out on the new elite and the central state institutions. The threat posed to democratic consolidation by radical populism and authoritarianism was heightened by economic reform during the Mazowiecki period<sup>63</sup>. Thus modernisation theory provides a useful but inconsistent framework for my examination of the Mazowiecki period.

## Intra-Elite Bargaining

Advocates of this approach stress the importance of political processes at the time of the transition to the consolidation of democracy rather than long-term structural developments. Following on from the model of the origins of democracy produced by Dankwart Rustow in 1970<sup>64</sup>. This approach divides the process into three stages - preparatory, decision and habituation. The emphasis here is on members of political elites arriving at a compromise where a democratic political system is favoured by all sides. The interaction of radical and conservative elements in both regime and opposition camps are seen as central<sup>65</sup>. Consensus can come about amongst these elite elements through pressures on the authoritarian power (economic, political or military). In such a situation members of the authoritarian regime may see the institution of democracy as an attractive alternative. A benefit of this approach is that it provides a framework for study of the catalyst of the democratisation process. While other theories (e.g. modernisation theory and historical analysis) stress long-term structural processes the focus of intra-elite interaction is on the events of the transition itself. This is useful as it questions the structuralists tendency to see in hindsight an inevitability in the process of democratisation (remember that as late as the mid-1980s few theorists predicted the timing and characteristics of transition in East-Central Europe).

Critics of intra-elite bargaining theory contend that it does not pay enough attention to how elite-level processes are shaped by larger parts of the society in which they occur. This criticism is particularly salient in the 'consolidation' phase of democratisation. Intra-elite compromise can only involve the institutional framework of democracy. The design of institutions rather than the representation and settlement of substantive issues is the main goal<sup>66</sup>. By definition a democracy cannot form policies ahead of time, even if there is elite-level consensus on given issues. Thus the question remains whether society will engage in the democratic institutions. This is particularly the case when an authoritarian elite manipulates the institutional agreement in order to guarantee its continued influence in the new, democratic order. Institutions where the old regime still enjoys influence can be tarnished in the eyes of society at large, regardless of how democratic they appear.

#### Application to Thesis

Intra-elite bargaining theories of democratisation offer some insights into the Polish transition. The series of talks held between the reformist elite of the PZPR and the intellectual elite of the Solidarity movement prior to the formal Round Table

agreement can be seen as a classic example of the theory in practice. These negotiations (known as the 'Magdalenka' talks) illustrate how elite-level negotiations led directly to the creation of more democratic political institutions and procedures. At the same time the 'Magdalenka' case highlights the weaknesses of this theory. Representatives of the communist side managed to guarantee their continued influence in the new institutions and this brought the legitimacy of the new system into question during the Mazowiecki period and beyond. Populist forces questioned how representative these institutions were and mobilised forces against the new, democratic order<sup>67</sup>. Moreover, the passage of time, the disintegration of the Communist Party and fresh parliamentary and presidential elections has eroded the remnants of the Magdalenka talks<sup>68</sup>. Thus, again intra-elite bargaining theory provides a useful but limited insight into the process of democratisation in Poland during the Mazowiecki period.

## Constitutional Design

This approach contends that the successful consolidation of democracy relies on the design of political institutions and processes. Features such as the relationship between executive and legislature and the type of electoral system must balance representation of society with effectiveness of government if democracy is to function properly<sup>69</sup>. As with intra-elite bargaining theory, institutionalists can be criticised for assuming that democratic bodies will encourage democratic values in society. If society fails to engage in these processes their democratic credentials will be rendered meaningless<sup>70</sup>.

## Application to Thesis

Institutional design was a central issue of the Mazowiecki period. As we have seen, it was a major part of the 'Magdalenka' and 'Round Table' negotiations between the Communist Party and Solidarity. However the powers of the President and electoral law became salient features of the 'War at the Top' between elite factions of Solidarity, including Mazowiecki and his supporters. The case of presidential powers provides an interesting example of how short-term political ambitions can clash with the attempt to construct a truly democratic institution. The results of the

presidential elections in 1990 , where turn-out was low and the 'maverick' candidate Stan Tyminski received a high proportion of the vote, illustrates how elite level debates over the features of a democratic institution can alienate the society it is supposed to serve and actually weaken democracy<sup>71</sup>.

## Comparative Historical Analysis

The thesis relies most heavily on this approach to studying democratisation. This school of thought concentrates on the interaction of factors (state, society, socio-economic classes etc.) over a period of time within a given society. It thus has obvious affinities with the historical materialist elements of Marxism. Works such as Ruschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' Capitalist Development and Democracy Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1992 have brought comparative historical analysis to a range of countries undergoing democratisation. In each case these works set out to examine the balance of power between state and society: what socio-economic classes exist within society and what kind of relationship do they have with the state? What is the type of economic change under way during the period of study and how is this affecting these relationships?

Critics of this approach note the danger of relying too much on concepts which are not very well defined. Terms such as 'state', 'society' and 'class' encompass a variety of conceptual variations which could threaten the integrity of the work. However by examining state/society and intra-society relations the comparative historical approach combines both mass and elite perspectives (unlike elite-focussed 'institutionalists' and

mass-focussed 'culturalists')<sup>72</sup>. Moreover the study of the historical journey of one particular country is appropriate for examining the continuities and discontinuities of the democratisation process. Thus the thesis contends that it is possible to see in the historical framework the emergence of forces in Poland which coalesced in the project of the 'reconstruction of civil society' and undermined the communist regime. These same elements were prominent in the Mazowiecki period, and many of the successes and failures of the 'democratisation' programme can be explained through reference to them.

Although we have already noted the significance of the experiences of other social groups in Poland (namely the peasantry, Catholic Church and urban workers) to the project of democratisation the thesis concentrates on one of these forces within Polish society in particular: the Polish intelligentsia. This is because it is a milieu which throughout modern Polish history has had a special and influential relationship with state and society. It has always been at the forefront of political events, for instance, at the head of revolutionary or insurrectionary movements. During the Mazowiecki period observers noted that the intellectual leaders of the Polish intelligentsia had once again come to the fore<sup>73</sup>. Representatives of the intelligentsia were therefore at the helm of the Polish state as it faced the task of



democratisation. For this reason the milieu is worthy of particular attention.

The following section will outline the characteristics of the intelligentsia. Its relationship with the categories of state, society and civil society are presented, partly through comparison with the equivalent relationships involving intellectuals in Western parliamentary democracies. The influence of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia on the Mazowiecki government's democratisation project can then be evaluated.

- 1 see Chapter 3 p317.
- 2 This uncertainty led some observers to question the accuracy of the term 'transition' as a description of events in post-communist East-Central Europe (e.g. see G.A. Bryant and E. Mokrzycki eds. 'The New Great Transformation?' Routledge London 1994 p4, henceforth Bryant and Mokrzycki). For them, 'transition' implied a journey to an expected destination, whereas 'transformation' was a more appropriate description of the unpredictable chain of events.
- 3 "After living through four decades of having the technologies of political control that make up liberal democracy dismissed as class oppression, the initial reaction of the post-communists was to introduce systems said to be based on the separation of powers, the rule of law, multi-party democracy and so on" (George Schopflin Politics in Eastern Europe Blackwell 1993 p257, henceforth Schopflin).
- 4 The Premier himself proclaimed "the beginning of Polish democracy" ('A Polish Hell' in Gazeta Wyborcza 2/4/90 p1).
- 5 see 'The Mazowiecki Government as a 'Government of the Intelligentsia' Chapter 1 p82.
- 6 As Frances Millard tells us: "There is no fixed 'essence' of democracy that is attained, consolidated and then maintained forever" (Francis Millard The Anatomy of the New Poland Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar 1994 p50).
- 7 For instance, Szucs regards it as "an original characteristic of the West" (Szucs J, 'Three Historical Regions of Europe' in Keane J ed., Civil Society and the State: New European

Perspectives Verso London 1988 p295). This section relies heavily on Szucs examination of the divergent historical paths of Eastern and Western Europe.

- 8 "The contrast here with the significantly more static Empires of the East is clear, not least in the recognition of complexity as something not to be rejected but as a normal feature of life" (Schopflin p9).
- 9 see 'The Intelligentsia and Political Reform' Chapter 3 p378.
- 10 "Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions" (March J and Olsen J 'The New Institutionalism: Organizations Factors in Political Life' American Political Science Review 78, No. 3 September 1984 p738).
- 11 For instance Schmitter and Karl argue that democratic governments can successfully be instituted without democratic orientations in society (see Phillipe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 'What Democracy Is..and Is Not' Journal of Democracy 2 (3) p75-88).
- 12 see 'Theories of Democratisation' Chapter 1 p66.
- 13 "Democratic institutions can be consolidated only if they offer the politically relevant groups the appropriate channels and incentives to process their demands within the framework of representative institutions" (Adam Przeworski Sustainable Democracy Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1995 p10, henceforth Przeworski (b)).

- 14 Almond and Powell have defined 'political culture' as 'the set of attitudes and beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time' (Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach Boston, Little, Brown 1978, henceforth Almond 1978).
- 15 see for instance Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations Boston, Little, Brown 1963, henceforth Almond 1963.
- 16 see 'Polish Society' Chapter 1 p51.
- 17 Theorists of democratisation through economic modernisation associate this process with the rise of a middle-class, see 'Theories of Democratisation' Chapter 1 p58.
- 18 Wesolowski sums up the opposition thus: "Liberals argue that the state should remain neutral, with respect for individual ideals. Communitarians, on the other hand, say that both voluntary associations and state agencies are obliged to help people in finding the resources for achieving decent lives and social citizenship" (Włodzimierz Wesolowski, 'The Nature of Social Ties' John A. Hall ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison Polity Press Cambridge 1995 p127). See also Robert A. Dahl Democracy and its Critics New Haven: Yale University Press 1989 p311-2.
- 19 For instance, see M. Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982 and M. Walzer Spheres of Justice Basic Books New York 1983.

- 20 "Like beams in an A-frame structure, each supports the other while exerting continual pressure on it" (William R. Reisinger 'Choices Facing the Builders of a Liberal Democracy' Robert D. Grey ed. Democratic Theory and Post-Communist Change Prentice-Hall New Jersey 1997 p41).
- 21 see, for instance Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, 'Civil Society in Poland and Hungary' Soviet Studies Vol. 42 no. 4 1990 p760.
- 22 "The development of a strong and active civil society is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy" (Bill Lomax 'The Strange Death of 'Civil Society' in Post-Communist Hungary Journal of Communist and Transition Politics Vol. 13 No. 1 March 1997 p54, henceforth Lomax).
- 23 see Arato 'A Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980-81' in Telos 1-2 1981 p24, henceforth Arato (a).
- 24 see Wesolwski W 'The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland After Solidarity' in Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison Hall J ed. 1995 Polity, Cambridge 1995 pp 110-135.
- 25 see for instance Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective Princeton University Press 1978.
- 26 see Chapter 3 p349.
- 27 see 'Populism' Chapter 1 p105.
- 28 "It is true that, in the painful revival of civil society, it quickly became obvious that ethnic associations can be

revived far more quickly than any others. The new political parties tend to be relatively small clubs of intellectuals, whereas it is the 'national fronts' which rapidly acquire real and persisting grass roots" (Ernest Gellner 'Nationalism in Eastern Europe' Telos No.189 Sept/Oct 1991 p133).

- 29 "It can be observed that modern democracy only exists in conjunction with civil society, i.e. a sphere of autonomy, situated between the citizens and the state and comprised of a range of associations, organisations, parties, movements, and the like" (Bernhard Wessels, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann 'Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe' 1994 cited in 'Tomas Hellen Shaking Hands with the Past: Origins of the Political Right in Central Europe Helsinki Finish Society of Sciences and Letters 1996 p11, henceforth Hellen).
- 30 see Roman Wapinski 'Kresy: alternatywa czy zaleznosc?' Polska mysl polityczna XIX i XX wieku Vol. 6 1988 p11.
- 31 see 'Polish Society' Chapter 1 p52.
- 32 see Jenő Szucs, 'Three Historical Regions of Europe' in Keane J ed, Civil Society and the State p323.
- 33 "In the tradition of the old Republic, only gentlemen were thought of as Poles" (Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland Vol. II Clarendon Press Oxford 1983 p62, henceforth Davies (b)).

- 34 "For us the constitution was more a privilege granted by the authorities than an act of social contract" (W. Osiatynski 'There is no School for Democracy' *Polityka* 5/5/90 p3).
- 35 "There were widespread feelings that the problems of establishing habits of organised political discipline and developing a viable multi-party system derived in some way from Polish cultural traditions, and that little more might also be expected in the context of post-communist change" (Lewis, P.G. 'Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-communist Poland' in *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 46 No. 5 1994 p780, henceforth Lewis (c)).
- 36 For instance, Tomasz Merta argued that "The classic parliamentary system...cannot be applied in a period of systemic transformation...A dramatic example of where parliamentary supremacy may lead in a country with an underdeveloped tradition of democratic representation is undoubtedly the Polish 'March Constitution' of 1921" (Tomasz Merta 'Which Presidency Does Poland Need?' in *Res Publica* Spring/ Summer 1990 p10).
- 37 see 'The Inter-War State' Chapter 2 p176.
- 38 see Louis Althusser 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in Slavoj Zizek ed. *Mapping Ideology* Verso London 1994 p100.
- 39 see 'The Communist State' Chapter 2 p209.
- 40 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p488.
- 41 see 'Populism' Chapter 1 p105.

- 42 see 'The Inter-War State' Chapter 2 p176.
- 43 "This was a passive, backward political culture which was prone to 'messianic ideas' and 'easy solutions' which would not entail any great deal of rational thought or debate" (Keith Crawford East Central European Politics Today Manchester University Press, Manchester 1996 p24).
- 44 see 'The Intelligentsia in Inter-war Poland' Chapter 2 p190.
- 45 see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity' Chapter 3 p393.
- 46 "Countries that have entrenched traditions of organicist views of the nation, often inspired by Catholicism have an even more powerful impetus to unanimity. If the nation is organism, it is not a body that can breed divisions and conflicts" (Adam Przeworski Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America Cambridge University Press 1991 p92).
- 47 see 'Inter-war Society Chapter 2 p174.
- 48 see 'Mazowiecki Government and Catholic Church' Chapter 4 p513 for further discussion of Polish Catholicism and democracy.
- 49 "In the Polish case these influences of real socialism have been congruent with, and therefore additionally strengthened by, earlier historical experiences. For long periods Polish society...has experienced foreign conquests, defeats, national dependence, loss of sovereignty, imperialist partitions, wars and upheavals. And hence public authorities came to be defined as alien and hostile..." (Piotr Sztompka 'The Intangibles and Imponderables of the



- 50 see 'Polish Society Under Communism' Chapter 2 p215.
- 51 speaking of Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, two of Solidarity's most prominent intellectual advisers, Andrew Arato noted "Both recognise that the present unity of Polish society is a negative one. Agreement concerning what is opposed masks important disagreements and conflicts of interest...With whom is the state to negotiate? Which social units are to be part of the negotiation processes? How are they related to each other?" (Arato (a) p36).
- 52 "Whereas the Western tradition of parliamentary, liberal democracy has always maintained the primacy and authority of civil society in relation with the state, East (and East-Central) European countries have been characterised by a subsuming of the interests of civil society to those of the State" (Adam B. Seligman The Idea of Civil Society Free Press New York 1992 p7).
- 53 "The democratic opposition [in Eastern Europe] argued its commitment to democracy on the grounds that it was seeking to re-establish civil society" (Schopflin p207).
- 54 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and Civil Society' Chapter 1 p128.
- 55 see William M. Reisinger 'Establishing and Strengthening Democracy' in Robert D. Grey ed. Democratic Theory and Post-Communist Change Prentice-Hall New Jersey 1997 p52-74).

- 56 see Seymour Martin Lipset Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1960.
- 57 Inglehart terms this process 'social mobilisation': a more varied and sophisticated society expects more from its polity and this spurs the consolidation of a democratic society (see Ronald Inglehart Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society Princeton University Press Princeton 1990).
- 58 see Guillermo O'Donnell Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in South American Politics Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California 1973 and Larry Diamond 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy' Journal of Democracy 1, 3, Summer 1990 p48-60).
- 59 see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p169.
- 60 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism' Chapter 2 p249.
- 61 see Crawford p87.
- 62 see debates on privatisation and indexation in 'Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p450.
- 63 see Chapter 3 p324.
- 64 'Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model' Comparative Politics 2, 3, April 1970 pp337-63.
- 65 for instance, see Russell Bova 'Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective' World Politics 44, 1 October 1991 pp113-38.

- 66 "What is possible are institutional agreements, that is, compromises about the institutions that shape prior probabilities of the realisation of group-specific interests...The solution to the democratic compromise consists of institutions" (Adam Przeworski 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy' in Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Part III Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1986 pp59-60).
- 67 see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity' Chapter 3 p393.
- 68 "It is true that transitions to democracy often leave institutional traces...But these traces can be gradually wiped away... in Poland, the evolving relations of forces eliminated most of the relics of the Magdalenka pact" (Przeworski (b) p48).
- 69 "Among the most - and arguably *the* most important - of all constitutional choices that have to be made in democracies is the choice of electoral system...and the choice of relationship between the executive and the legislature" (Arend Lijphart 'Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland' Journal of Theoretical Politics 4,2, 1992 p207).
- 70 "In the long-run...the key is whether the institutions that emerge can channel and respond to deeper societal

cleavages" (William R. Reisinger 'Establishing and Strengthening Democracy in Robert D. Grey ed. Democratic Theory and Post-Communist Change Prentice-Hall New Jersey 1997 p'72).

- 71     see 'The Tyminski Phenomenon' Chapter 4 p614.
- 72     "On the face of it, it certainly appears to be the case that a focus on elite dynamics, questions of strategic choice, and elite relations with popular forces and civil society more generally, is likely to be of considerable relevance to the cases of East European democratisation" (Paul G. Lewis 'Theories of Democratisation and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe' Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics Vol. 13 No. 1 March 1997 p17).
- 73     "As with all the momentous events of this century, the intelligentsia and close-knit intellectuals are playing first fiddle in Poland" (Maciej Radziwill 'Intellectuals in Politics in Res Publica 2/1990 p137).

## 1(b) Intellectuals and Intelligentsia

### (i) The Mazowiecki Government as a 'Government of the Intelligentsia'

In the late 1960s and 1970s a group of Warsaw-based journalists, lawyers and academics began to form a critique of communist rule. Disillusioned with the regime's limitation of personal freedoms, they claimed that an essentially Western, democratically-inclined society was being repressed by an alien, authoritarian state. These intellectuals, including Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron and Bronislaw Geremek, became known as the 'Lay Left'<sup>1</sup>. This group formed the core of the intelligentsia's efforts to contribute to the anti-communist movement in Poland. In 1976 it was prominent in the founding of KOR<sup>2</sup>, an organisation which sought to forge links between the dissident intelligentsia and urban workers persecuted by the regime<sup>3</sup>. Throughout the 1980s it exercised significant influence in the underground Solidarity movement. It was also prominent at the Round Table discussions between the regime and the Solidarity movement.

As a result the cadre of the Mazowiecki government and the first post-communist legislature was dominated by representatives of the intelligentsia milieu. A survey of the social origins of the Sejm,

Senate and government under Mazowiecki produced the following results:

#### Social Origins of Sejm Deputies and Senators

Sejm:	Peasant - 37%	Senate:	Peasant - 28%
	Intelligentsia - 37%		Intellig. - 60%
	Workers - 26%		Workers - 12%

Source?

81% of deputies had higher education (an increase of 21% from the previous Sejm) and 83% of Senators had achieved this level. The Sejm was dominated by occupations traditionally associated with the intelligentsia milieu with 77 engineers and technicians, 41 scientists and academics and 36 teachers. Over one quarter of Senators held scientific and academic posts. Seven of the Mazowiecki Cabinet's posts were occupied by academics, three by economists, two by communist generals, three by enterprise managers and one apiece by a theatre director and an independent farmer<sup>4</sup>. According to the weekly newspaper Polityka, of Solidarity's 261 Parliamentary members (161 MPs and 100 Senators) only 10 were working-class and 35 were individual farmers. In contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 lawyers, 20 journalists or columnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 13 health care employees, and one religion teacher. All of these professions were considered part of the intelligentsia<sup>5</sup>. George Schopflin refers to the Mazowiecki government as "the nearest to

a government of philosopher kings witnessed in Europe since the war"<sup>6</sup>.

One can see that the intelligentsia was a particularly influential force in Polish society during the first stages of the democratisation process. It follows that the particular characteristics of the milieu were bound to make their mark on that process. Therefore, for those interested in the democratisation process in Poland, it is essential to examine the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia. What is its relationship with the categories of state, society and civil society? Does it subscribe to Western-style democratic values? What impact does Polish nationalism have on its outlook?. The following section will answer these questions by outlining the defining features of the milieu.

## (ii) Definition of 'Class'

The thesis regards the Polish intelligentsia as a distinct social class or stratum. The term 'intellectual' is applied to someone involved in the creation of ideas, values and critiques. 'Intelligentsia' is applied to the bearers of the knowledge, expertise and motivation necessary to administrate these values<sup>7</sup>. For reasons explained below, the intelligentsia is more observable as a distinct social milieu in Poland than in the West. Therefore, before turning to a closer examination of the intelligentsia it is necessary to give a clearer definition of 'class'.

We have noted the importance of interaction between groups within society to democratisation. Class can be categorised according to economic or social criteria. Marxism firmly equates class with an individual's relationship to the means of production. A person's place in the economy (as a representative of capitalist owners of the means of production or the proletariat whose labour they exploit) defines their class and thus their political behaviour. Political conflict along class lines becomes inevitable because different classes are likely to be treated in different ways by state institutions and policies.

Writers in the Marxist tradition such as Georg Lukacs see the point at which an oppressed class attains 'consciousness' or



understanding of its real condition as the moment when such a political struggle can begin<sup>8</sup>. Usually this struggle is based on competing systems of values and ideas associated with certain classes (in Marxist thought the conservatism of the ruling bourgeoisie is often contrasted with the radicalism of the working class).

However, other theorists see weaknesses in Marx's purely economic notion of class. How can it be applied to those who stand outside production such as those involved in services, communication etc.? In addition, the outlook of classes can incorporate elements drawn from other groups in society. Values such as religion and nationalism can cut across different classes. In the Polish case peasants, workers and intelligentsia shared some elements of these ideological themes. The populist nationalism and Catholic piety of the Polish industrial worker owes much to the fact that he or she tends to hail from a family with a recent peasant past. The point is that differences between these groups in society were not settled only according to economic criteria. Thus social class can be seen as a much more complex category which includes socio-economic status, non-economic issues and family background.

The category of 'class' is losing its relevance when applied to Western liberal democracies which have increasing social mobility and modern notions of universal citizenship<sup>9</sup>. However it is useful when examining transition Poland. Under communist rule the country became an industrial society with relatively clearly defined divisions of labour and ruling and subordinate classes. The importance of the Solidarity Trade Union and the threat of strikes points to the importance of class consciousness and class conflicts in the lead up to the transitions. In 1989 these classes emerged with different visions of post-communist Poland which were informed by different value systems. For instance the industrial workers hoped for a 'workers' democracy' with strong trade unions and workers' councils enjoying significant political influence<sup>10</sup>. The Polish peasantry's demand for special treatment and espousal of conservative social values informed its activities during the transition period<sup>11</sup>. The Catholic Church, though not representative of a particular social milieu in Poland, merits separate consideration as a very powerful force in Polish society. Likewise its approach to the transition period reflected its own world-outlook<sup>12</sup>. As stated previously, the resolution of these visions into a unified political culture was vital for democratisation.

### (iii) Western Intellectuals

The conceptual roots of the Polish intelligentsia can be traced back to the rise of the 'intellectual' in the West, although the category was adapted substantially in the Polish case. An examination of the development and characteristics of the 'intellectual' in the West is thus a necessity when considering the ideological sources of the intelligentsia stratum in Poland. Moreover, such a study enables us to compare both cases and highlight the specificity of the Polish version. The comparison will be based on the relationship of these types with the categories of state, society and civil society which have already been established as vital to the project of democratisation. The unique relationship of the Polish intelligentsia with these categories and the effect this had on democratisation in post-communist Poland will be established.

### Historical Roots

The term 'intellectual' demands careful consideration because it remains a controversial subject<sup>13</sup>: The roots of the intellectual idiom lie in the emancipation of the scientific sphere from Church control, part of the diffusion of power in the West described previously. Intellectuals were freed from obligations to state and

Church authorities and could build strong links with the emerging middle class. This created autonomous centres of learning which aimed at the investigation of the world and the promotion of rational thought, progress and innovation. Rationalism dictated that each individual was born equal. Differences between individuals could be explained through reference to different environments rather than one's niche in the 'divine plan'. The possession of knowledge gave intellectuals the belief that these environments could be altered. The notion that knowledge can be used for the betterment of humanity became a central tenet of the Enlightenment and the intellectual idiom. Thus the initial desire of those concerned with knowledge to defend their autonomy from state or Church was transformed into a universal or total quest for the freedom and progress of all people.

Sociologists and historians, thus, commonly ascribe two distinct meanings to the term 'intellectual'<sup>14</sup>. The first refers to their role as possessors of specialised knowledge and producers of culture. This is the role of the 'expert', 'professional' or 'adviser' who contributes to the system within the limits of his or her specialised field. The second meaning relates to the intellectual's public activity outside his or her area of expertise. Here the intellectual uses the authority, autonomy and expertise associated with his or her profession to influence public opinion or make

judgements on issues and events at a system-wide level. By its nature this second function is teleological: it asks questions of the general pace and direction of systemic change and elucidates different visions of the future<sup>15</sup>. The 'bi-dimensionality' of the idiom produces a particular pattern of relations between the intellectual and the categories of 'state' and 'society'.

### Western intellectuals and the state

As far as the state is concerned intellectuals can be crucial allies or dangerous adversaries. The state relies on intellectuals in their role as professionals or experts for their technical expertise and knowledge. This is particularly the case in an increasingly technological age when policies are made with reference to technical rather than political criteria. On the other hand, as producers and disseminators of cultural values and framers of public opinion intellectuals can be important in providing the state with legitimacy in the eyes of society. This is particularly the case where state/society relations are tense. Communist Poland, as with other East-Central European countries, can be seen as an example of how intellectuals are valued as 'legitimisers' of the state<sup>16</sup>.

On the other hand the intellectual and the state can come into conflict. As a group concerned with the condition and direction of the system as a whole, the role of the intellectual can overlap into the territory of those who wield political power<sup>17</sup>. Both claim supreme authority, one through reference to the divine right of royalty and/or political control of the legitimate means of violence and the other through superior knowledge.

In their role as critics of state power intellectuals may appear weak. The examples of the US during the period of McCarthyism or the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in China illustrate the apparent weakness of intellectuals when faced with an aggressive state. However, if the intellectual is dissatisfied with the state's leadership of systemic change he or she can employ their attributes to oppose it. They can threaten to deny the state their services. This can leave the state bereft of technical expertise and (given the high prestige often accorded intellectuals) legitimacy in the eyes of society. Secondly, as producers of ideas and values, they can formulate ideologies which may foster anti-state forces in society<sup>18</sup>. One of the earliest examples of the tension between intellectual and state was the French Revolution where the attempt was made by intellectuals to transform the relationship between state and society through

reference to an idealised future utopia (i.e. through the force of ideas)<sup>19</sup>.

Generally speaking, the political intervention of Western intellectuals is not designed to win state power, but to redefine it; to secure for themselves and society the autonomy necessary for progress. It is important to stress this separation of intellectual from state in the West because, as we shall see, the relationship between the Polish intelligentsia and the state was very different. In the West, the universal, or 'total' perspective of intellectual work was incompatible with the factionalism associated with the pursuit of political power. Intellectuals refer to 'universal', moral categories which they deal with in their scholarly pursuits and which transcend particular economic or political divisions. Direct political activity threatens the intellectual's identity as a disinterested critic of the status quo<sup>20</sup>. The intellectuals' altruistic, disinterested engagement in politics can be referred to as "the politics of antipolitics" - a phrase which has significant connotations in the activities of dissident intellectuals in communist East-Central Europe<sup>21</sup>. (ref. Gy. Komlos?)

## Western intellectuals and society

As far as society is concerned, the intellectuals are seen as standing apart from society providing a critique of the present and a vision of the future which ought to be aspired to. As producers of culture and ideas they have the potential to elaborate value systems which stimulate and explain societal and systemic change<sup>22</sup>. According to Karl Mannheim the intellectual was distinguished by his or her empathy for circles to which he or she does not belong. The intellectual is vital in articulating the values of different classes and synthesising them into a greater, system-wide totality. With its 'universal' or 'total' perspective the intellectual idiom could overcome the fragmented experiences of different social groups and elaborate an overall, system-wide explanation of societal change<sup>23</sup>. The intellectual's role in society is therefore teleological: he or she formulates systems of ideas which explain social phenomena in terms of a historic journey towards some future utopia. This function is particularly noticeable and vital in times of acute societal transition.

For instance, during the Industrial Revolution in the West intellectuals mobilised their societies behind the project of modernisation. The traumas of transformation from agrarian to mass, industrial practices, from the old culture of insular,



village-level communities to cosmopolitan, rational structures demanded the elaboration of a new way of looking at the world<sup>24</sup>.

The transformation of the peasant into a modern citizen is fraught with dangers because the difference between both categories in terms of life-style and value-systems is so great. Peasant societies can be characterised by three basic criteria: attachment to the land, the importance of the patriarchal family unit and tendency for the village to form the limits of expectations and perception<sup>25</sup>. The farm and the village represent the limit of the peasants social, economic and political ambitions. The farm is regarded by the peasant as God-given property, even if it legally belongs to the landowner or the state. Family structures are closely interwoven with work on the farm. One's position in the family hierarchy tends to decide one's working role. Producing mainly for their own consumption and striving for self-sufficiency makes the family an insular economic structure. The family unit operates, therefore, as an integrative structure in economic as well as a social terms. Consequently individuals are inclined to defer to family norms.

Beyond the family the village serves as an important source of peasant organisation. The appropriation and division of land, marriages and social and religious needs are generally dealt with at village level. A consequence of highly integrated village life is

the perpetuation of a conformist culture where all actions are scrutinised with reference to traditional customs and the will of the community. Events beyond the limits of their village are of little concern to the peasantry.

All of these factors produce a communal, insular and defensive attitude amongst the peasantry. Isolation from the outside world, including the centres of state power, combined with economic exploitation through taxes, rents, interest and unfavourable terms of trade breed a strong sense of injustice and resentment toward urban areas of the country. Despite its numerical importance, in terms of political organisation the peasantry can be generally characterised by its basic weakness. Local loyalties to family, farm and village discourage the formation of nation-wide organisations and leaderships. Rather than concerted political effort to represent their interests at a national level, peasant action tended to take the form of either passive protests (e.g. through restriction of production) or unco-ordinated and often violent rebellions.

Thus the transformation of the peasant with his or her attachment to specific locales and ritualised, communal way of life to a citizen of a complex and occupationally mobile, industrial society is potentially destabilising for the system as a whole. Dislocated rural emigrants can become nostalgic for the

certainties of their rural roots, in time developing an unrealistic image of their qualities<sup>26</sup>.

The roots of nationalism and socialism can be found in the intellectuals' attempts to explain and consolidate the changes associated with the onset of Modernity. The 'nation' can provide a surrogate identity for societies undergoing the dislocation of modernisation and democratisation<sup>27</sup>. In the early nineteenth century the work of philosophers such as Herder, Fichte and Mazzini established the idea of nations as organic, cultural communities rooted in tradition. Nationalism, particularly in times of extreme trauma, tended to stress its communal aspect while modernity was increasingly concerned with the category of the individual. It may seem that the collective aspect of nationalism and its stressing of difference would conflict with the intellectuals' commitment to universal values and the rights of Everyman. However, initially, both perspectives were compatible. Herder and Mazzini stressed that every nation, constituted by a special combination of political, cultural and historic forces, was equal under God<sup>28</sup>. Thus, initially at least, nationalism was an essential part of the creation of a modern, democratic society. Indeed national sentiment continues to be a binding force in Western liberal democracies today. The liberal demand for

individual freedoms from the absolutist state included a call for recognition of national cultures<sup>29</sup>.

Marxism is another example of the intellectuals attempt to provide an ideology for a rapidly modernising society. Historical materialism explains the class origins of industrialisation and urbanisation and points to a future, communist utopia. Indeed, in its Leninist variant Marxism explicitly gives the intellectual the responsibility of raising the consciousness of the proletariat to his or her universal perspective through the leading role of the Communist party<sup>30</sup>. As with nationalism, the development of Marxist ideology in the twentieth century should not divert us from its original attentions to enlighten and develop a transforming society. By emphasising the worth of the growing stratum of industrial workers it contributed to the spread of democratic rights to all parts of society.

The relationship between the intellectual and society raises several important issues. Firstly, there is the question of how far intellectuals should act to ensure that their ideas are put into practice. The autonomy intellectuals won from the state in the West leaves them isolated and marginalised, without the most obvious means of directly implementing their programmes. If they seek to exercise political power through parties, social movements etc., do intellectual's not threaten the idiom's 'apolitical',

disinterested perspective? This was the theme of Benda's The Betrayal of the Intellectuals. Benda divided society into 'lay' people (involved in the practical running of society and the application of thought and science to it) and intellectuals who stood aside from society and were not active in the pursuit of practical, political objectives, but argued for non-immediate, non-material values. The betrayal of the intellectuals came when they participated in everyday political life and sought to link their intellectual activity to political movements.

A tension thus exists between the 'cultural' or 'moral' facet of the intellectuals identity, which is content to issue opinions from outside the political cut and thrust of the day and 'political intellectuals' who attach themselves to various causes and political groups. This tension exists within and between intellectuals<sup>31</sup>.

This tension was particularly apparent in the West in the 1960s and 1970s when the post-war euphoria of patriotism, reconstruction and modernisation had been replaced with the consolidation of state power. Leftist intellectuals in Gaullist France such as Sartre, Althusser and Foucault recognised a crisis of identity in the intellectual idiom. In the post-modern age the universal intellectual, distinguished by a commitment to moral

absolutes and a system-wide perspective, had been replaced by specialists, concerned only with their narrow fields of expertise and tied to the state, industry or academia<sup>32</sup>. The status of concepts like 'truth', 'morality' and 'values' was questioned by relativism.

For these intellectuals the loss of true intellectual autonomy had serious consequences for the condition of civil society. For instance, Althusser argued that the capitalist system in France and world-wide was exercising dominance through control of what he termed Ideological State Apparatuses. These included trade unions, political parties, religious and educational institutions, the media etc. i.e. what this thesis terms civil society<sup>33</sup>. The state imbued civil society with its own values and used them to dominate society.

To counter this trend toward the absorption and/or marginalisation of intellectuals in the face of state power these figures claimed that an alliance directed against the coercive powers of the state could be struck between intellectuals and society. This new political engagement would stress grass-roots involvement rather than elitist, hierarchical, state-focussed procedures of traditional party politics. The traditional distinction between left and right and Marxism's preoccupation with the

basis of economic relations were replaced by a variety of issues: environmentalism, feminism, anti-racism and so. This 'coalition politics' was in keeping with the post-war recognition of the importance of non-class social interests and the challenge posed to Marxists by the example of the Soviet Union. However all issues were connected through reference to their universal, moral and ethical relevance. These new types of social movements tended to articulate interests with a strong moral and ethical content which raises them above the usual level of political debate. They presented themselves as concerned with universal questions. In this, I would argue, they manifested their pedigree as intellectual projects.

Interest in non-Western revolutionary movements such as the Vietnamese FNL was rooted in the sense that such struggles renewed for intellectuals their contact with real and effective social, revolutionary movements. Vigorous efforts were made to break down the existing division between the intellectual and the 'masses'. French Maoists called on all intellectuals to 'dismount from their steeds' and go forth to 'the people': truth and therefore democracy lay with the masses, not with elitist, academic circles or the state<sup>34</sup>.

Intellectuals who decide to become active in the political sphere, whether through traditional political parties or at the head of 'new social movements' face further dilemmas: how to leave the 'ivory tower' of academia and enter the public sphere, how to bridge the gap between theory and practice. After all, the intellectual cannot rely on his own power. By definition he or she is an outsider without a substantial natural constituency. Moreover as an idiom associated with progress and 'futurology' the intellectual cannot refer to long-standing political traditions. The question remains: why should an intellectual be accorded political prestige above, for example, the clergy, army or professional politicians? Political intellectuals thus require an instrument through which ideas can be channelled into concrete, political programmes<sup>35</sup>.

The intellectual attracts such agents by claiming to hold special knowledge and a system-wide perspective which they will share with social groups in order to raise their level of awareness and make them politically stronger. In other words intellectuals demand political authority by claiming to 'know better'<sup>36</sup>. The intellectual designs ideologies which refer to the current situation of a prospective agent (e.g. the workers, the peasants, environmentalists, the 'nation', the 'people' etc.) in the system and how this can be improved.



In terms of instituting liberal democracy there is an obvious danger in the activity of political intellectuals in society<sup>37</sup>. Is the patronage of a social category the result of genuine commitment to the furtherment of that category or the instrumental use of it to raise the marginal intellectual to the head of political parties or social movements? An unelected, intellectual telling 'the people' what is good for them and how to 'get to utopia' is not democratic in the modern sense of the term, regardless of the altruism of the milieu. One can question whether the political intellectual's system-wide perspective, his or her desire to 'synthesise' or 'totalise' the fragmentary consciousness of social groups and the complex of social issues, is not just a reflection of the interests of the intellectuals as a social milieu<sup>38</sup>.

The idea of exercising political power on account of 'knowing better', if successful, can lead to the development of undemocratic polities. Politics made according to the elite's belief in its own superiority rather than through the competition of various social interests is contrary to the development of a democratic system and a healthy civil society. In times of revolution and systemic change the intellectual's universal, moral perspective can grant him or her an important role in pointing out the failures of the present and elucidating a complete vision of the future. However,

if political intellectuals achieve power, the intellectuals' universal perspective and reference to a future utopia can be used to justify policies which in a liberal, democratic society would be subject to lengthy debate (for instance, could the stringent economic policies of the Balcerowicz Plan have been passed in any conditions but the rule of the 'intelligentsia in power?').

Jean-Paul Sartre, a prime example of the politically engaged intellectual, described how the universal perspective of the intellectual, the ability to 'step outside' the competing agendas and sectional interests of society and see the 'big picture', is indispensable for a changing society. Yet he too recognised the potential consequences for democracy when the same, 'total' perspective is employed dogmatically to build a new, 'totalitarian' system<sup>39</sup>.

Nationalism and Marxism provide examples of how authoritarian or totalitarian polities can be developed under the management of alienated intellectuals. One of the starkest illustrations of the consequences when intellectuals apply their totalistic perspective to political power is provided by Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot, educated first in a privileged Cambodian school and then in Paris attempted to radically transform the country's political system and socio-economic structure according to his own

vision. The country was forced back to a rural existence. Though a communist group the programme of the Khmer Rouge was designed to rid the country of corrupting foreign influences and return to the ideal of the peasant-type. Money and private property was abolished, the entire urban population was forcibly removed to the countryside, intellectuals and the middle-classes were wiped out through mass exterminations. The doleful consequences of the Leninist variant of Marxism, where intellectuals granted political authority through their superior knowledge of the class struggle are obvious. Communist countries have experienced authoritarian rule, massive social dislocations and recurrent economic crises in the name of a future utopia as delineated by communist intellectuals. The characteristics of Polish communism in practice are dealt with in the course of the thesis. However it is important to stress that, despite Marxism's essential humanism it can be used by intellectuals to justify the imposition of a coercive ideological tyranny.

Yet another threat to the development of liberal democratic politics when intellectuals aspire to political power is the threat of populism. The rule of intellectuals during a period of systemic trauma can prompt a reaction against the elite and a lurch from authoritarian rule based on the competence of political intellectuals to authoritarian rule based on the supposed will of 'the masses'. Paradoxically, this populist backlash can be led by

other, alienated intellectuals. The following section will briefly outline the characteristics of populism. This is important because in the Polish context populism is anti-intellectual. As we shall see, populist forces emerged with an anti-intellectual agenda during the Mazowiecki government<sup>40</sup>.

## Populism

Populism is a difficult concept to categorise. It can be both a vital element of liberal democracy and one of its most potent enemies. On the one hand populism understood as the influence of popular forces into the political process is essential to the functioning of democracy. Only popular participation in politics make a polity truly democratic. On the other hand, radical populism, which rejects the authority of state institutions and seeks to exercise power through the 'will of the people' is contrary to the functioning of democracies in the modern, liberal sense. The thesis is concerned with the latter version of populism. Radical populism generally arises in conditions of extreme socio-economic flux where the middle strata of society are either missing or too weak. Processes of industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisation lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion between different sectors of society over who the main beneficiaries will be. Such a climate may lead to a desperate struggle between

groups for political power<sup>41</sup>. Analogies with the situation in Poland immediately after the collapse of communist political authority and the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan are obvious<sup>42</sup>.

Although it can be founded on a range of political strands, populism expresses itself in a particular way. Those social groups which feel excluded from the benefits of socio-economic change make reference to the supremacy of the 'will of the people' over every other criteria and particularly over the ruling elite or milieu. The merits of the uncorrupted and straightforward common people are lauded against the sophisticated and self-centred politics practised by professional politicians and their intellectual advisers. The latter are suspected of leading the process of modernisation for their own benefit or for the benefit of interests indifferent to the fate of the 'people'. Thus the theory of a 'conspiracy' against the people is common to populism. The object of this suspicion varies according to the attributes of the ruling elite but anti-intellectual, anti-capitalistic, anti-urban, xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments are common. Thus under populism, society is mobilised as a single entity rather than a plethora of competing but tolerant interests (as in a democratic, civil society). This is usually done through reference to 'basic' categories such as race, class or religion. Members of society who

fall outside these categories are regarded with hostility. It is important to note that intellectuals alienated from the ruling elite can contribute anti-intellectual ideologies to populist movements in order to gain political power for themselves<sup>43</sup>.

Populism can transform the liberal, or civic nationalism described previously into a more exclusive, intolerant variation. The trauma of modernisation can be described as the result of the nation's domination and exploitation by external forces. The historic characteristics of the nation, usually defined in ethnic or religious terms become equated with the 'good society' while the cosmopolitan, individualist attributes of modernity are regarded with hostility. The intellectual with his or her cosmopolitan background and universal perspective is thus portrayed as an enemy of the 'true' nation. The intolerance of social pluralism inherent in this type of nationalism is obviously anathema to the development of a democratic, civil society<sup>44</sup>.

In political terms populism stresses the desirability of a 'direct' relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by the secondary institutions (such as a representative party political spectrum) associated with liberal democracy. According to populism the self-evident will of the majority is better served by this simple relationship between the leader and his or her people.

As such it is generally anti-parliamentary: the legislative branch of government is regarded as a 'talking shop' which obfuscates the basic homogeneity of the 'people' and serves to perpetuate the dominance of corrupt politicians. Instead, an authoritarian relationship between the people and a leader (dictator or President) who can protect common values is preferred. Thus, whereas under democracy society is mobilised to articulate its interests to a responsive state populism mobilises the people against the state which is seen as a centre of authoritarian rule.

In economic terms populism included the paradoxical desire to modernise but avoid the negative consequences of that process. The social dislocation and economic uncertainties of industrialisation and marketisation are to be bypassed and society is to arrive in a modern, prosperous condition unscathed. Stewart refers to this 'Janus quality' which combined the need for economic progress with the desire to preserve the basic values of the traditional culture of society<sup>46</sup>. Thus populism, by wishing to reverse the processes of Modernity, including the establishment of liberal democracy, can be seen as an enemy of progressive intellectuals. Table 1.1 lists the opposing attributes of the populist and modern, intellectual agendas:

Table 1.1: Populism versus Modernism

Populism	Modernism
Particularism	Universalism
Collectivism	Individualism
Culture	Economy
Emotion	Rationality
Solidarity	Competition
Discipline	Autonomy
Clericalism	Secularity
Homogenisation	Pluralisation
State	Market
Central distribution	Laissez-faire

source: based on Shaking Hands with the Past p28.

As we shall see the specific characteristics of Polish populism were evident in early transition period and its emergence threatened the process of democratisation.



Conclusion: the Western intellectual and democratic, civil society

Despite the aforementioned reservations, the separation of intellectual from politician in the West was an important factor in the founding of civil society and the development of democracy. Civil society, as the space where ideas and values were developed, became the realm of free-thinking intellectuals. Disinterested critiques of the exercise of state power could be freely developed there. The state, separate from but connected to civil society, was the realm of politicians. The writings of Antonio Gramsci are instructive in this context. Civil society is separated from the state through Gramsci's distinction between political and ethical values. The exercise of pure political power by the state is regarded as a negative, restricting force. On the other hand the articulation of moral values in civil society can order the exercise of power in a positive way. Gramsci emphasises the distinction between the state and civil society by including them in a series of opposites: force and consent; coercion and persuasion; state and church; political and civil society; politics and morality; law and freedom; order and discipline<sup>46</sup>.

Vital in Gramsci's system was the leading role of the intellectual in civil society. In his writing on hegemony he widens Marx's definition of it as purely political leadership and refers to cultural

authority. Gramsci makes a distinction between the formation of collective will as the goal of political leadership and 'moral and intellectual reform' which is the goal of cultural leadership. While the politicians aim at the formation of a collective will capable of justifying the existing state apparatus, intellectuals attempt, through the elaboration and diffusion of culture, to create social consent prior to the formation of political power. Thus, ideally, intellectuals have a crucial role in a democratic civil society. They shape and guide the diverse interests of society. They also ensure that these are represented at state level without actively seeking control of the state. As we shall see there are significant differences between this model of the Western intellectual idiom and the Polish intelligentsia's relationship with the categories of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society'.

#### (iv) The Polish Intelligentsia

##### Historical Roots

There are strong historical links between Western intellectuals and their counterparts in Poland.<sup>47</sup> Arnold Toynbee described the intelligentsia developing along the *limen* which runs between East and West, between their own societies and the societies they coveted<sup>48</sup>. The Polish Enlightenment in the second half of the 18th Century established a connection between Polish culture and the contemporary intellectual life of Western Europe - particularly France. As a result names such as Descartes, Newton and Galileo came into cultural circulation and Polish readers became familiar with the writing of Montesque, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot. Links between Polish intellectuals and the West were strengthened by the waves of emigration prompted by the oppressive atmosphere of the partition period. Political émigrés included a high proportion of intellectuals. The Great Emigration of the 1830s included almost the entire political and intellectual elite of the Congress Kingdom of Poland<sup>49</sup>.

These émigrés maintained constant links with intellectuals in Poland and exerted strong influence over the direction of Polish affairs. Davies indicates the importance of this group in forging and preserving the Polish identity<sup>50</sup>. Caught up in the intellectual

and political tumult of the French and American revolutions, the emigration's vision of what Poland represented inevitably adopted Western intellectual characteristics. In the 1840s the émigré Polish Democratic Society (TDP) provided an example of an intelligentsia-led organisation espousing the intellectual cause of democracy and individual freedom from the state. The majority of the group's members were intellectuals<sup>51</sup>. The TDP spoke of a "calling of Poland and its duty toward mankind to carry to the East genuine enlightenment and an understanding of human rights"<sup>52</sup>. In its manifesto, written in 1836, it expressed the belief that only an independent and democratic Poland could fulfil its mission "to break the alliance of absolutism, to destroy its pernicious impact on Western civilisation, to spread democratic ideas among the Slavs and unite them through it"<sup>53</sup>. The thesis argues that the Mazowiecki government's belief that it could construct a parliamentary democracy and free-market system can be at least partially explained as an example of the Polish intelligentsia's idealistic infatuation with Western models<sup>54</sup>.

However, several specific conditions of the Polish situation ensured that the intellectual category developed in a very different way from the Western case. To begin with, at the time of the Polish intelligentsia's emergence in the nineteenth century, the Polish lands were partitioned between the Russian, Prussian

and Austro-Hungarian empires. Moreover, the structure of society in the Polish lands was very different from Western countries. The underdevelopment of the East in comparison with the West was manifested in the persistence of a dominant, peasant society in Poland. The model of the strong state outlined previously concentrated political and economic power in the centre and stilted the development of a robust middle-class. As a result the Polish lands maintained an essentially peasant society up to and beyond the First World War. The peasantry was presided over by a landowning class of Polish nobles who in turn were dominated by the Imperial states which had partitioned Poland.

The intelligentsia was derived from the Polish nobility. The decline of this class during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries coincided with the first wave of urbanisation in the country. Agricultural modernisation and persecution from Imperial forces threatened the privileged social position of the Polish gentry. Nobles pressed the authorities to establish universities and other centres of learning as a way of preserving its unique social status<sup>55</sup>. Sons of the landless gentry moved to the towns and cities and together with some German and Jewish merchants comprised a new urban stratum. In a study of the social composition of the Polish intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, J. Szczepanski offered the following estimate of their origin:

Gentry:	57.1%
Intelligentsia:	23.0%
Bourgeoisie:	9.2%
Petty Bourgeoisie:	6.2%
Peasantry:	4.1%

(J. Szczepanski, 'Materialy do charakterystyki ludzi swiata naukowego w XIX i poczatkach XX' Odmiany czasu terazniejszego 1971 pp50-51). The conditions attendant at the birth of the Polish intelligentsia deeply influenced its ethos and its relationship with the categories of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society'.

## The Polish Intelligentsia and the State

The absence of a native middle-class deeply influenced the character of the Polish intelligentsia. Firstly, it became more politically engaged than its Western counterpart<sup>56</sup>. The nobility was losing its economic strength and the native bourgeoisie was too weak to foster organisations which represented Polish interests. In the absence of these forces the intelligentsia became the stateless nation's informal political leaders. Moreover, in a situation where Polish identity was under mortal threat from Russification and Prussification the importance of culture as a political agent was magnified. The intelligentsia, particularly its intellectual core of writers, artists and philosophers performed the important task of preserving national consciousness. It shaped public opinion through newspapers, literary reviews and formed the leadership of various native political organisations. As such the intelligentsia constituted a 'government of souls' in partitioned Poland<sup>57</sup>.

The Polish intelligentsia differed from its Western counterpart not only in its level of political activity but in the aims of this activity. In short, the Polish intelligentsia did not want to reform state power. It wanted to exercise state power. There were several reasons for this etatism. Firstly, there was no Polish state for the

intelligentsia to reform. Rule was exercised by the foreign, Imperial forces which had partitioned the country. If the milieu wanted to transform Poland it would have to form the state itself<sup>68</sup>.

In the Polish context the intelligentsia's desire for state power included control of the economy. As we have seen, in Eastern Europe economic power, as with political power was concentrated in the hands of the state. The intelligentsia's attitude to the economy was also decided by prejudices and fears inherited from its noble forebears. The Polish nobility had always treated commercial enterprise with disdain. The economic activities of the middle-class which played a fundamental role in the development of civil society in the West, were looked down upon by the upper class in Poland as "below the dignity of a gentleman"<sup>69</sup>. There was no strong middle-class through which property could be diffused and the peasantry was neither willing nor able to accept such responsibility. The state, rather than society was regarded by the intelligentsia as the best instrument to modernise the Polish economy.

Above all, control of the economy was important for intellectuals given the uncertain economic foundations of the milieu. We have noted that the liberalisation of the economy and the development



of a healthy middle class are prerequisites for the development of Western-style liberal democracies. In this context intellectuals are free to perform their role as critics of state power and articulators of different societal interests. However, in Poland this conviction was tempered by a fear that the privileges and status of the intelligentsia would be threatened by economic liberalisation. The experience of material insecurity had been inherited from their forbears in the *déclassé* nobility. The new milieu was aware that the economic value of culture was precarious. Polish intellectuals anxiously looked to the West where the livelihood of their counterparts was increasingly determined by the vagaries of the market<sup>60</sup>.

The thesis contends that the Polish intelligentsia's attitude to the economy was apparent in the communist and Mazowiecki periods. The desire to control the economic sphere in the party-state is a basic tenet of communism, but it was not opposed, even by the dissident intelligentsia, until the last stages of communist rule<sup>61</sup>. Although the neo-liberal aspect of the Balcerowicz Plan introduced by the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990 instituted elements of the free market, it also reflected the desire of the 'intelligentsia in power' to maintain control of the economy in the state. Although in theory, the economy was opened up from state control, in practice the majority of Polish society was unable to take

advantage of liberalisation and the state continued to exercise power over the economic sphere<sup>62</sup>. The Mazowiecki government's controversial policy of 'quasi-privatisation', which gave overall power to state agencies, is illustrative of this approach to economic reform<sup>63</sup>.

The second reason for the etatism of the Polish intelligentsia was that it could not build political links with Polish society in the way its counterparts had in the West. While in the West intellectuals integrated with the growing middle class and based its programmes on a shared desire for political and economic autonomy from the state, in Poland the values of the Enlightenment and modern notions of citizenship were confined to small urban areas and the intelligentsia milieu. In the countryside the peasantry existed in the economic and political subjugation and backwardness of serfdom. There was little or no tradition of individual freedom in the political or economic spheres. The intelligentsia could not rely on the support of the peasantry in its quest for modernisation and societal progress. It needed the instrument of the state to haul Polish society into the modern era of enlightened citizenship<sup>64</sup>. The Polish intelligentsia thus sought to exercise political power through the state.

As a result of the etatism of the intelligentsia, the dangers to democracy when intellectuals covet political power, outlined previously, have repeatedly been demonstrated in Poland. The dogmatism and 'total' perspective of the idiom can run contrary to the aims of liberal democracy. As we shall see, elements of the Polish intelligentsia were attracted to the chauvinistic, nationalist model of an authoritarian state in the inter-war period and then to the communist model of a 'totalitarian' state. The limitation of individual freedoms could be justified with reference to the intelligentsia's vision of a utopian future where Poland was a strong, independent country or a 'workers' paradise'. This was the 'despotism of the enlightened': the self-belief of the milieu that it 'knew best' was apparent<sup>65</sup>.

The Mazowiecki government's project of democratisation was likewise etatist. The thesis will argue that there were several opportunities to include non-intelligentsia elements in the transition process e.g. giving Walesa a prominent political role, tolerating the development of political parties outside the Solidarity movement, including workers representatives in privatisation process, limiting the worst side-effects of the Balcerowicz Plan for the peasantry etc.. The fact that these possibilities were not pursued can be at least partially explained by the etatism of the intelligentsia milieu. Thus we have the paradox of an intelligentsia committed to 'democratisation' but

unwilling to institute the individual political freedoms associated with democracy in practice. The political and economic strictures of the early transition period were justified with reference to a future, democratic utopia<sup>66</sup>.

## The Polish Intelligentsia and Society

From the preceding examination of the Polish intelligentsia's relationship with the state, it follows that the milieu's attitude to society was patronising. The masses lacked the competence or 'civilisation' to be trusted with a leading role. Admitting elements from outside the milieu to its leading political role would be folly. In an edition of the patriotic journal Przegląd Narodowy writers claimed that if the "golden horn" - the symbol of the spiritual leadership of Poland - was placed in the hands of the peasantry the results would be disastrous<sup>67</sup>. Instead, political leadership had to be filled by the enlightened intelligentsia: "the possessors of "aristocratic competence", answering morally for the current and future state of Polish identity<sup>68</sup>. As we shall see, the intelligentsia's disparagement of Polish society's potential to secure democracy was extended to the urban workers when they emerged as an influential stratum<sup>69</sup>.

The ideologies developed by the intelligentsia to attract the support of Polish society reflected the intelligentsia's desire to use groups in Polish society instrumentally to gain state power. Nationalist and socialist intellectuals competed, often fiercely with each other throughout modern Polish history but each concentrated totally on the attainment of state power rather

than the genuine representation of wider social interests. For nationalist intellectuals the demand for political emancipation was inseparable from the demand for a sovereign state. For socialist intellectuals control of the state was a prerequisite for socio-economic transformation<sup>70</sup>. The thesis contends that this patronising attitude was also apparent in the Mazowiecki period. Chapter 4 examines the deteriorating relationship between the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government and society from this standpoint.

The intellectual idiom's self-appointed task of easing the onset of modernity was onerous given the underdevelopment of Polish society in relation to the West. Urban development was sparse and fragmented and much of Polish society remained agrarian up to the communist period<sup>71</sup>. This type of weak development exacerbated the tensions between rural and urban spheres and ensured that the urban/rural divide became a salient fault line in Polish politics up to the Mazowiecki period<sup>72</sup>. The elitism and etatism of the Polish intelligentsia, combined with the socio-economic backwardness of Polish society meant that populism, associated with society's reaction against intelligentsia-led modernisation, was more of a threat in Poland than in the West.

## Populism in Poland

Eastern European populism combines the general attributes outlined previously<sup>73</sup> with certain specific characteristics. Firstly the dominance of the 'peasant-type' in Eastern European populism is apparent. This reflects not only the numerical preponderance of peasants in East European societies but also the traditional equation of the peasant figure with innate spiritual and national values<sup>74</sup>. Emphasis on the peasantry has resulted in the dominance of anti-urban, anti-capitalistic and, most importantly, anti-intellectual currents within populism. In a situation where national sovereignty has been absent for long periods it is understandable that populism refers not only to socio-economic doctrine but also concerns the emancipation of the 'true people' from foreign domination. The place of foreign or 'alien' interests in the conspirational theories of populism is thus strong in Eastern Europe.

Again, Poland shared the general attributes of East European populism with some particular emphases. Polish populism could be traced to the thinking of Roman Dmowski and the National Democratic party (endecja) during the inter-war period<sup>75</sup>. As a traditionally peasant-dominated society its version of populism included anti-capitalist, anti-urban sentiments. As a predominantly Catholic society with an influential, modernising

Jewish minority it included Jews in its list of enemies of the 'people'. As a nation which had experienced long periods of foreign domination it also saw foreign interests as potentially hostile and thus subscribed to a defensive, 'ethnic' version of nationalism. Finally, as a society whose surrogate political elite and main forces of progress and modernity had been drawn from the narrow, urban-based intelligentsia milieu Polish populism was anti-intellectual<sup>76</sup>. Most of these types were blamed by Polish populists for the degeneration of the Second Republic between the wars. The fragmentation of the party system during these years increased the populist assessment of the parliament as an elitist, gentleman's club.

Populist stereotypes were also used to divert criticism from the communist Party-state. At regular intervals during the communist period intellectuals, Jews and foreign agents were presented as the enemies of the 'people'<sup>77</sup>. In this context it is not surprising that the Warsaw-based 'Judaean Communist-intellectual' with shady Western ties was a prominent stereotype in the 1990 version of Polish populism. As we shall see, populist parties such as PC<sup>78</sup> and ZChN<sup>79</sup> and intellectuals such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski<sup>80</sup> opposed to the Mazowiecki government frequently referred to these attributes in their attacks on the 'intelligentsia in power'<sup>81</sup>. In 1990 the attributes of populism in its Polish variation were



listed as follows: "a tendency to unrealistic economic slogans, anti-Semitism, belief in a conspirational version of history and fear of conspiracies, anti-intellectualism and xenophobia"<sup>82</sup>.

The etatism and elitism of the Polish intelligentsia left its ideologies susceptible to populist manipulation by disgruntled intellectuals. For instance the progressive, civic version of nationalism devised by Western intellectuals has constantly been threatened in Poland by its regressive, ethnic variation. In the West nationalism, initially at least, was used as a tool for binding state and society. However, in partitioned and inter-war Poland a patchwork of ethnic minorities struggled against a state whose culture was often at odds with their own. Polish nationalism was used by the intelligentsia to emphasise the differences between the values of Polish society and the values of the state<sup>83</sup>.

This process was obviously not conducive to democratisation. We have noted how liberal nationalism can be transformed into an anti-democratic, ethnic nationalism. Inter-war Poland provides an example of how ethnic, chauvinistic nationalism can halt the democratisation process<sup>84</sup>. In a similar way, the claims of Marxist ideology to protect the people from the ravages of modernisation also fell prey to populism in Poland. The radical, leftist critique of modernisation, founded in anti-capitalist ideas of egalitarianism

and mass participation was transformed into communist totalitarianism in Poland. In Mazowiecki's Poland the appeal of left-wing populism was lost in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the reviled communist regime. However, as we shall see, right-wing, ethnic nationalism provided a viable means for populist parties and intellectuals to build a critique of the Mazowiecki government<sup>85</sup>.

## Conclusion: The Polish Intelligentsia and Civil Society

The specific characteristics of the Polish intelligentsia produced a model quite unlike the Western intellectual idiom. The former had an absolutist, fundamentalist approach to politics which saw no contradiction in the roles of political and cultural leadership. The creative tension between the intellectual and the politician in the West, which helped to strengthen democratic, civil societies, was absent<sup>86</sup>.

Ideological differences have always existed within the intelligentsia. There have been frequent clashes between traditionalists and modernists, nationalists and socialists, lay and Catholic intellectuals etc.. However, whereas in the West these conflicts, based on established social groups, contributed to the plurality of civil society, in Poland they invariably amounted to an "all or nothing" game amongst the intelligentsia where the prize was state power. Despite its credentials, the Polish intelligentsia's intolerance of opposition did not equate their vision of democracy with the consensual, modern version prevalent in the West. In this context it is useful to study the development of a democratic, civil society in three stages: pre-Mazowiecki, Mazowiecki and post-Mazowiecki.

### (1) Pre-Mazowiecki

To deal with the first application, we have already noted that in Poland civil society has traditionally been circumscribed by the state's desire to control all aspects of society. In partition times the Imperial states denied Polish society any forms of autonomous expression. In the inter-war period the Second Republic's drift towards authoritarianism limited societal freedoms. Under Communism no forms of social association or activity were permitted without the control of the state. Thus the absence of a 'Western-type' democratic political system in Poland can be equated with the weakness of civil society in the face of state force<sup>87</sup>.

However 'civil society' in the pre-Mazowiecki period was also a 'leitmotiv' of the anti-communist intelligentsia. Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, intellectuals prominent in the anti-communist organisation KOR set up in the mid-1970s outlined their aim to 'regenerate civil society'. In a 1976 article on opposition strategy Jacek Kuron called for the reconstruction of civil society through the re-establishment of the rule of law, an independent public sphere and freedom of association<sup>88</sup>. Any association or initiative organised outside the control of the Communist Party-state was deemed part of Polish 'civil society'. In the short-term this strategy

was designed to 'fence off' areas of Polish society from the intrusive Communist state. It was hoped that the gradual development of such organisations in an autonomous civil society would offer a practical and ideological challenge to a supposedly totalitarian regime. The zenith of this 'civil society' project was the Solidarity Trade Union's brief experience of autonomy (1980-81)<sup>89</sup>. In the long-term the theoreticians of the concept saw this anti-Communist civil society as a prototype for a future post-communist Poland<sup>90</sup>.

The espousal of 'civil society' by the intellectual leaders of the anti-communist organisations during the late communist period can be seen as the turning point in the Polish intelligentsia's tradition of social isolation. The communist Party-state succeeded in alienating broad sections of Polish society. Political and cultural repression, coupled with the decline of the Polish economy under the tutelage of the 'command system' generated opposition to the regime amongst the peasantry, workers, Catholics and a significant part of the intelligentsia. This paved the way for a unique alliance between previously distant social forces. The banner of 'civil society' overcame traditional barriers and unified Polish society against the communist state. Links were successfully forged between the intelligentsia and the working class and Roman Catholic Church. These unprecedented alliances

paved the way for the emergence of the 'Solidarity' movement as a genuinely cross-class organisation which proved indestructible to the regime.

It is important to stress that in the context of Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, civil society did not correspond with Western models held up by the Polish intelligentsia. The political, social and economic institutions of civil society had evolved in the West through a long term process involving the decentralisation of authority. It was the result of the contract between the State and Society, guaranteeing loyalty to the former and legally guaranteed freedoms to the latter. Neither side of the contract was being honoured in late communist Poland. Rather, the Polish intelligentsia borrowed the concept and adapted its language to suit its own anti-communist aims. Unshackled from ties to the state, dissident intellectuals could freely demonise the communist regime. In the West intellectuals had been vital to the formation of the social contract between state and society on which the institutions of civil society were based. Intellectuals' role as 'guardians' of civil society was instrumental. However in Poland intellectuals championed the cause of civil society as a means of organising society against the state<sup>91</sup>. Thus civil society was not a mediatory realm between the state and society; it referred to society's ability to oppose the communist state. Crucially, the institutions of civil society, made up of a myriad of legal processes,

political groups, social organisations and economic interests whose existence was legally guaranteed by the state, did not exist. Beyond its efficacy as an opposition strategy civil society was a myth, a blueprint for the future<sup>92</sup>. By delineating a utopian vision of a democratic future the 'civil society' project can be seen as a product of the Polish intelligentsia's traditional teleological function<sup>93</sup>.

## (2) Mazowiecki Period

This is the thesis' main period of study. With the collapse of communism and the elevation of Solidarity's dissident intellectuals to political power 'civil society' remained prominent, though in a different form. From being a byword of anti-statist opposition it became a justification for the new incumbents of state office who had delineated the idea in opposition times. 'Civil society' was in power<sup>94</sup>. For the first post-communist leaders of Poland the regime had been overthrown by the democratic instincts of their societies, channelled through the 'reconstruction of civil society'. The aim of their government was the creation of economic and political institutions which would allow the free play of those forces. The features of civil society which had been

organised against the regime in the late communist period had to be granted representation in the state if the democratic project was to be realised. Thus, according to the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government the 'civil society' project of the anti-communist opposition had created a unified, democratic political culture of the type expected in liberal democracies. The deep social cleavages of the pre-communist and communist period described previously had been overcome.

This attitude is symptomatic of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia outlined previously. In Autumn 1989 the 'intelligentsia in power' seemed to assume that the links forged between the intelligentsia and the rest of Polish society during the late communist period were lasting. Solidarity's triumph in the partially free elections of 1989 was not regarded by its intelligentsia leaders purely as Polish society's unequivocal rejection of the communist regime. Rather, it was seen as the ratification of some form of social contract between Polish society and the intelligentsia, which had for so long been an unofficial 'government of souls' but which was now exercising real state power. The intelligentsia was convinced that the informal understanding achieved in opposition times would suffice<sup>95</sup>.



The Mazowiecki government and its supporters assumed that it could open up space in society and that this space would be filled with individuals willing and able to follow its lead and exercise the rights and responsibilities of modern citizenship. The freedoms and liberties associated with 'civil society' in the West were to be introduced immediately. The state was to be 'rolled back'. It was to give up its control of economic, social and political spheres and civil society, was to assert its autonomy and fill the gap in a supportive way. The economy was freed from state control by the Balcerowicz Plan's immediate introduction of market conditions. Citizens would now be able to pursue their economic interests without undue state interference. In reality, the economic backwardness of the majority of Polish society in 1990 meant that the state would continue to control the economic sphere, suiting the etatism of the 'intelligentsia in power'.

The Solidarity movement was central to this vision of civil society. To the Polish intelligentsia it represented Polish society's willingness to get behind the intelligentsia's project of democratisation. It was to be a source of consensus and non-confrontation<sup>96</sup>. For the duration of the transition period at least the important role of party politics in civil society was to be subsumed by the 'Solidarity ethos' of cross-class, nation-wide alliances. From this idealistic point of view Polish society was undivided, consensus could be reached over the most important

matters. If there was no significant ideological differences between sectors of Polish society then there was little need for a traditional party political spectrum. The Solidarity social movement could instead express the unity of Polish civil society in a non-political way. It is worth noting that this approach had much in common with post-Marxist writers such as Habermas. They also perceive civil society as an arena where overarching unity could be expressed on the bases of morality and ethics rather than the site of conflict between different social interests. Critiques of the post-Marxist conception of civil society stress its tendency to conceive society as a single entity<sup>97</sup>. It could be argued that this vision of a unified, civil society where broad social movements could replace traditional, partisan politics is applicable to developed western democracies where economic and cultural cleavages are not deep. However, I believe that this takes an idealistic vision of Western societies. ✓

What is certain is that such a vision clashed with the realities of early transition. Deep cleavages existed within society and between society and the state. Industrial workers and peasants were neither willing nor able to exist without the level of state support they had become accustomed to during the communist period. The Balcerowicz Plan which opened up the economy immediately left these classes in a state of austerity and uncertainty. These parts of Polish society were in no position to

take advantage of the liberalised sector of the economy and it was idealistic to expect them to passively accept this situation. The balance between the democratic values of equality and liberty was firmly weighted in favour of the latter.

This battle of endangered social classes and institutions for political and economic influence in the new Poland meant that the Mazowiecki government inherited a potential social and political explosion in 1989. The future character of the Polish nation was being shaped and these groups, though bereft of specific programmes, had their own visions of an independent Poland. They stressed their own histories of anti-communist activity and demanded a place at the nation's helm at this crucial time<sup>98</sup>.

Each social group emerged with different visions of Polish civil society and the basic values which should be enshrined in the new constitution. These divergent and competing cultures had to be integrated into a democratic political culture before the creation of nation-wide social movements could be contemplated<sup>99</sup>. The Solidarity movement, valued so highly by the Mazowiecki government as an expression of the unity of Polish society, was in fact a bone of contention between its constituent parts. As we shall see, the Solidarity tradition meant different things to the

intelligentsia, industrial workers and the Catholic Church. Their versions of the role the organisation should play in the transition period varied accordingly<sup>100</sup>.

The intelligentsia won political authority by becoming spokespersons for its unique version of 'civil society' which contained several possible meanings, and excluded many significant questions from its conceptualisation. The development of post-communist civil society was affected by the way the intelligentsia in power attempted to define and control it. The renewal of traditional prejudices between the intelligentsia and other social groups was particularly salient in this context. The intelligentsia's essentially negative assessment of Polish society's democratic tendencies convinced it that its vision of a democratic, civil society was the best, indeed the only, one for the country to follow. The Mazowiecki government's refusal to tolerate the different political cultures of other sections of Polish society, explained by the aforementioned characteristics of the Polish intelligentsia, spurred the development of radical populism and political instability<sup>101</sup>.

During the Mazowiecki period 'civil society' can thus be seen as the 'totalising' instrument of the intelligentsia in power: as the last hope for intellectuals to play the heroic Enlightenment role of

agents of universal values<sup>102</sup>. Diversity, the essence of civil society, was seen as threatening to social solidarity and the 'intelligentsia in power' referred instead to the fragile, artificial consensus created by a common, communist enemy which was no longer there. This approach simultaneously represents the desire of the Polish intelligentsia to lead Polish society to utopia and the elitism and social alienation of the milieu<sup>103</sup>.

The Mazowiecki government's version of 'civil society' was condemned with some justification in Poland and beyond as a project designed to elevate a narrow social group to political power<sup>104</sup>. The rise of populism (fed by the frustrations of the social forces mentioned above and encouraged by disgruntled intellectuals who also held an etatist agenda), the subsequent fall of the Mazowiecki government, and the advent of a period of political instability and public apathy were equated with the defeat of the forces of 'civil society' and 'democracy'. The blame for all of this was placed firmly at the feet of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The depth of the conflicts which plagued the Mazowiecki period and undermined the process of democratisation could have been avoided if it had been sympathetic to the condition of other parts of society<sup>105</sup>. The Mazowiecki administration's haughty treatment of the industrial workers in general and their main representative Lech Walesa in particular demonstrated this

indifference<sup>106</sup>. Polish intellectuals were thus criticised for their elitist version of civil society<sup>107</sup>. The apparent abandonment of the 'uncultured masses' on whom they had relied in communist times was decried as a new betrayal of the intellectuals<sup>108</sup>.

Thus the second application of 'civil society', understood in the narrow sense as a project of the dissident Polish intelligentsia, is essential to understanding the politics of the early transition period. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the increasingly fraught relations of the Mazowiecki government and society and differences between the intelligentsia and other classes within society itself in this context. The disintegration of Solidarity and the defeat of Mazowiecki in the presidential elections of 1990 can be seen as the inevitable unravelling of the myth of civil society created by the 'intelligentsia in power'.

### (3) Post-Mazowiecki

As we have seen, the elitist ethos of the 'intelligentsia in power', demonstrated by its attachment to its particular version of 'civil society', unnecessarily deepened the polarisation of Polish society during 1990 and hampered the emergence of a unified, democratic

political culture. However, in terms of establishing the institutional framework for the gradual development of civil society the Mazowiecki government accomplished much. While institutional liberalisation of the state and market arenas of civil society could be achieved relatively quickly, inculcating democratic values in the political culture of Polish society was more problematic. The depth of societal cleavages bequeathed by communist rule was apparent. The trauma of transition to a market economy immediately deepened economic disequilibria in Polish society<sup>109</sup> and made it impossible to balance the values of liberty and equality in the short term at least<sup>110</sup>. All of this prevented the formation of a unified, democratic political culture in Mazowiecki's Poland. However, according to Dahrendorf, the crucial period of institutional politics was the first six months of the transition<sup>111</sup>. During this period the social prestige of the Mazowiecki government allowed it to set in place the fundamentals of Poland's transition and these were shaped by the intelligentsia's admiration of Western systems. The development of a Western-style parliamentary democracy and an efficient free-market economy are difficult, long-term process but they were set in motion at a time when the 'intelligentsia in power' enjoyed sufficient social support or 'capital'<sup>112</sup>. Poland's current political and economic stability can thus be traced back to the Polish intelligentsia's influence in the Mazowiecki government. Only with the passage of time have the benefits of the Mazowiecki

government's initiatives become apparent. After all, it is only through time that the institutions and procedures of a democratic polity develop.

After the fall of Mazowiecki, intellectuals associated with the anti-communist civil society project appeared to acknowledge this fact and the consequences this held for them as would-be politicians. As a traditionally revolutionary milieu the intelligentsia rose to prominence in the heat of the anti-communist struggle and their version of 'civil society' provided an effective ideology to unify Polish society against the communist state. However their elitist, utopian ethos is not suited to the prosaic process of every day politics and the ongoing competition of various interests within a democratic civil society<sup>113</sup>. It is arguable that the return of intellectuals to their traditional role as autonomous critics of the status quo is conducive, indeed necessary to the further development of civil society. The idealism and zeal of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia and its 'totalising' perspective marks it as a revolutionary political force. In a situation where Polish society needed to be mobilised against the state the characteristics of the milieu were vital. However for the consolidation of liberal democracy (understood as the conflation of the interests of a responsive state and articulate society in a 'civil society') these attributes become disadvantageous. For the long term



development of civil society it is perhaps more appropriate for the milieu to revert to a more oblique, critical role.

As stated previously, the chosen methodology of the thesis is the comparative historical approach. The contention of this thesis is that the historical journey of the Polish intelligentsia provides a useful framework for evaluating the Mazowiecki government's project of democratisation. Therefore a general examination of the development of the milieu in twentieth century Poland is a necessary prelude to an examination of the Mazowiecki period. Chapter 2 will argue that, although the intelligentsia underwent massive changes along with the rest of Polish society in the inter-war and communist periods, the main attributes of the milieu outlined in this chapter were still evident. The ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia; its attitude to state, society, civil society and democracy was carried over into the Mazowiecki period.

- 1 see Appendix II p735
- 2 see Appendix I p666
- 3 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism'  
Chapter 2 p241.
- 4 see Paul Lewis 'Non-Competitive Elections and Regime  
Change: Poland 1989' Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 43 No.1  
January 1990 p100-101, henceforth Lewis (a).
- 5 see Marek Henzler 'They Won the Primary Elections'  
Polityka 27/5/89 p1.
- 6 Schopflin p272.
- 7 see Ibid. p29.
- 8 see Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness London:  
Merlin 1971 p204.
- 9 "The fact that OECD societies today are given so many  
names, post-industrial and risk-prone, anomic and perhaps  
even classless, only serves to demonstrate the  
embarrassment of applying it to old, yet still important  
categories like power and class" Ralf Dahrendorf 'The Open  
Society and Its Fears' After 1989: Morals, Revolution and  
Civil Society London Macmillan 1997 p15, henceforth  
Dahrendorf (b).
- 10 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter  
4 p450.

- 11 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry'  
Chapter 4 p488.
- 12 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Catholic Church'  
Chapter 4 p513.
- 13 "There are no uncontentious criteria for what it is to be an intellectual: a term that is at once appraisive and descriptive, and a classic instance of a fundamentally disputed category" (Sunil Khilnani Arguing Revolution Yale University Press London 1993 p11, henceforth Khilnani).
- 14 see, for instance, Bourdieu P 'The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of the Intellectuals in the Modern World' Telos No.81 Fall 1989 pp99-110.
- 15 Levy summarises the intellectual's 'bi-dimensionality' thus:  
"In the first case the intellectual speaks from a position authorised by his possession of specialised knowledge. In the second, possession of such knowledge is almost incidental and what counts is a presumed ability, supposedly born of engagement in intellectual activities, in estimating the long-term results of a multiple of originally distinct actions...which its practitioners call 'futuresology'" (David J. Levy, 'Politics, technology and the responsibility of intellectuals' in Ian MacLean, Alan Montefiore, Peter Winch eds. The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990 p123, henceforth Maclean).
- 16 - see Chapter 2 p232

- 17 Weber notes: "a close connection between the prestige of culture and the prestige of power" (Gerth H.H. and Wright Mills C, Max Weber: Essays in Sociology New York 1946 p176).
- 18 Lipset and Dobson summarise the armoury of the intellectuals in their critical relationship with the state in these terms: "The sanctions which they possess are principally three: power derived from the threat of withholding needed services, influence derived from its possession of high prestige and value commitments generated through the elaboration of ideology" (Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Dobson 'The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union' Daedalus Summer 1972 p175).
- 19 see Zygmunt Bauman 'Intellectuals in East-Central Europe: Continuity and Change' East European Politics and Societies Vol.1 No.2 Spring 1987 p167, henceforth Bauman (a).
- 20 "Writers, artists and scholars asserted themselves as intellectuals with a specific kind of authority based on belonging to the relatively autonomous worlds of art, science and literature, and of virtue, disinterest and competence associated with this autonomy" (Bourdieu p99).
- 21 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p254.
- 22 "intellectuals have the potential for the "restructuring" of man's conception of himself and his society" (Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Dobson 'The Intellectual as Critic

and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union' Daedalus Summer 1972 p175).

- 23 see Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture London: Routledge & Keegan Paul 1956 p118.
- 24 see John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State Manchester: Manchester University Press p30.
- 25 see Shanin T, ed. Peasants and Peasant Societies Penguin, Hammondsworth 1971 p15, henceforth Shanin.
- 26 "'Urbanisation' is the smooth-sounding term for what is often an agonising process, during which rural emigrants look backwards as much as forwards, and pass from the remembrance to the often elaborate re-invention of the worlds they have lost" (Tom Nairn 'Cleaning Up' London Review of Books 3/10/96 p11).
- 27 In modernising societies Gellner sees the necessity of "a shared, standardised, politically underwritten 'national' culture" (Ernest Gellner 'Reply To Critics' New Left Review No. 221 Jan/Feb 1997 p84, see also Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism Blackwell, Oxford, 1983 and Karl Deutsch Nationalism and Social Communication, An Enquiry into the Foundations of Modernity Cambridge 1953).
- 28 Herder felt that "the perfection of the national group is the means of attaining perfection of the individual and humanity at large" (Quoted in F.M. Russell Theories of International Relations New York 1936 p218).

- 29 "The claim for greater liberties for the individual... and the claim for greater equality of cultures could be presented together" (Ernest Gellner 'The Importance of Being Modular' in John A. Hall ed. *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* Polity Press Cambridge 1995 p46).
- 30 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period Chapter 2 p237.
- 31 "There seems to be a traditional hostility between both [the 'political' and 'cultural'] camps. The first charges the second with hypocrisy, duplicity, exclusivity and 'intellectualism'; the second charges the first with betrayal, disloyalty to those values adherence to which determines an intellectual's identity" (Jerzy Szacki 'Intellectuals Between Politics and Culture' in MacLean p229).
- 32 see Michel Foucault, 'Truth and Power' trans. by Colin Gordon in Power/Knowledge New York: Pantheon 1980 pp109-33.
- 33 see Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)' in Slavoj Zizek ed. *Mapping Ideology* p110.
- 34 "For the intellectual, the masses are the future, and to unite with them is to discover the road to genuine democracy" (*Cahiers proletariens* 1971 p61 quoted in Khilnani p143).
- 35 This is what Gouldner terms "shopping for an agent" (Alvin W. Gouldner, *Against Fragmentation: The Origins of Marxism*

and the Sociology of Intellectuals Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985 p22).

- 36 "The solution that suggests itself is for him to present himself as someone who knows or can do better, that is to appeal to a truth which he alone possesses" (Szacki 'Intellectuals Between Politics and Culture' p239).
- 37 "If the promotion of democracy and tolerance are principles for which the intellectual would act, his fidelity to those principles may, if performed imprudently, aid and abet that authoritarian intolerance he seeks to oppose" (John Michael, The Intellectual in Uncivil Society' Telos No.88 Summer 1991 p152).
- 38 "Isn't the interest in totality just another interest?" (Terry Eagleton 'Ideology and its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism' in Slavoj Zizek ed. Mapping Ideology Verso London 1995 p193).
- 39 "When a society loses its ideology and system of values as a result of a great upheaval...it often happens that it will - almost without being aware of it - expect its intellectuals to liquidate the old system and recreate a new one. Yet, of course, its intellectuals will not be content simply to replace an outworn ideology with another, just as particularist, that merely facilitates the reconstruction of the same society as before. They will attempt to abolish all ideology and to define the historical ends of the exploited classes" (Jean-Paul Sartre Between Existentialism and Marxism London 1974 p227).
- 40 see Chapter 3 p394.

- 41 "Populism emerges as a response to the problems posed by modernisation and its consequences. These problems are most importantly those of economic development and political authority" (Stewart A in Ionescu G and Gellner E eds. *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* Garden City Press 1969 p180, henceforth Ionescu and Gellner).
- 42 see 'Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan' Chapter 3 p317.
- 43 the rise of Jaroslaw Kaczynski - see Appendix II p-747 in Mazowiecki's Poland can be seen as a prime example of this.
- 44 "Such nationalism can strengthen, create or subvert states; whatever the case, its characteristic practices make it opposed to civil society" (John A. Hall 'In Search of Civil Society' *Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison* Polity Cambridge 1995 p12).
- 45 see Ionescu and Gellner p186.
- 46 see Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed A Hoare and G Nowell-Smith, London 1971 p376.
- 47 "More than the West imagines, the intellectuals of the East look to the West for *something* [his italics]" (Czeslaw Milosz *The Captive Mind* Penguin Harmondsworth 1980 p37).
- 48 They are a "transformer class...captivated planets of a pirate sun" (A.J. Toynbee *A Study of History* vol. 5 Oxford University Press, Oxford 1960 p154).
- 49 Nearly a half of this group (45.4%) was acquiring education or had occupations typical of the intelligentsia. Students



were the largest group (330 persons), then came teachers (140), school pupils (119), engineers and architects (60), physicians (54), writers (39), artists (38) and clergymen (16). (Nowak J, 'The Elitism of Polish 1831 Émigrés' Polish Western Affairs 2/93 p84). On the basis of this evidence Nowak concludes that "Intelligentsia of nobility stock predominated in the social structure of the Great Emigration" (Ibid. p84).

- 50 "They led the nation from afar" (Davies (b) p276).
- 51 see S Kalemka, Wielka Emigracja a Polskie uchodźstwo 1831-62 Warsaw 1972 p225.
- 52 Cited in Roman Wapinski, Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX wieku Vol.6 p91.
- 53 quoted in Manfred Kridl, Wladyslaw Malinowski, Jozef Wittlin 'For Your Freedom and Ours': Polish Progressive Spirit Through the Ages New York 1943 p81.
- 54 for instance, see 'The Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform Chapter 3 p307.
- 55 "For the intelligentsia education is not a means to achieve personal success but rather a personal asset which sets the individual apart and gives him access to a higher social sphere....Its easy enough to trace a parallel to the ancient tradition that went with the bestowal of a title of nobility" (Hertz A, 'The Case of an Eastern European Intelligentsia' Journal of East European Affairs 11,1, Jan-Apr 1951).

- 56 "Travelling east, the intellectual idiom grew in its political dimension" (Bauman (a) p168).
- 57 "When the political and economic helm [of the Polish nation] found itself in foreign hands, culture was the only agent of national cohesion. From this arose the leading role of distinguished poets, novelists, painters, composers and educated specialists and officials" (Walery Namiotkiewicz, 'Inteligencja polska, wczoraj i jutro' Miesiecznik Literacki May 1969 p116).
- 58 "Having been always concerned with the state as the source and the authority behind the law, and hence behind social change, in its eastbound journey the [intellectual] idiom gradually raised its aspirations from a mere advisory role to the level of legislation itself" (Bauman (a) p168).
- 59 see M.H. Bernhard, 'Barriers to Further Economic Change in Poland' in Studies in Comparative Communism Vol.XXIII Nos. 3/4 Autumn/Winter 1990 p328, henceforth Bernhard (a).
- 60 "Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals" (Czeslaw Milosz The Captive Mind Penguin Harmondsworth 1980 p38). The historian Kiniewicz talks of "the *inteligent* opposing the world of philistines" (S. Kiniewicz Historia Polski 1875-1918 Warsaw: PWN, 1969 p318-19).
- 61 see "The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period" Chapter 2 p260.

- 62 see 'The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and Economic Reform'  
Chapter 3 p304.
- 63 see 'Privatisation' Chapter 4 p468.
- 64 "The dilemma of the Central European Intelligentsia...rested on the discrepancy between its identification with Western civilisation and culture and their problematic introduction into a backward social and economic structure...Hence the origins of the intelligentsia's love affair with the state, which was thought to be the only possible guarantor of the nation's survival and the sole force capable of bringing the nation into European modernity" (Jacques Rupnik The Other Europe London: Wieden and Nicholson 1989 p12).
- 65 "Proselytism, moral mission and cultural crusade, the universal features of the intellectual mode as born and shaped in the course of the "civilizing process", were hence mingled in the East with the search not so much for an enlightened despot, but for the despotism of the enlightened. For quite a large section of the intelligentsia the take-over of state power...came to be paramount means to an end..." (Bauman (a) p174).
- 66 as we shall see, this approach was particularly evident in the Mazowiecki government's presentation of economic and political reform. See, for instance, Chapter 3 p307.
- 67 "Despite its willingness for public service, it would not know how to deal with it. It would lose it in the pursuit of "a feathered cap" and in giving in to this natural inclination the whole naiveté of romanticism would be revealed,

parading as the decorative peasant armed with his scythe.."  
(Z. Balicki 'Złoty rog' Przegląd Narodowy 1912 p134).

- 68 see M. Graszewicz and J Kolbuszewski (eds.) Kultura, literatura, folklor Wrocław 1988 p306.
- 69 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p187.
- 70 "Both nationalism and socialism...had a strong etatist content. Nationalism moved from culture to politics, from the mere defence of language and tradition to the assertion of historical and political rights which became identified with a claim to statehood. Socialism, strongly influenced by Lassalle and Marx, saw the conquest of the state as the key to the transformation of the social and economic system" (Jacques Rupnik 'The Other Europe London: Wieden and Nicholson 1989 p13).
- 71 see 'Inter-War Society' Chapter 2 p166.
- 72 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p488.
- 73 see 'Populism' Chapter 1 p105.
- 74 "Somewhere at the back of the populist mind-set is the ideal of the self-reliant, largely autarkic peasant family, which is the repository of the finest values of the nation" (Schopflin p295).
- 75 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p190.

- 76 "Unlike the intellectual who writes about populism, the peasant is less concerned with his perfect populist image than with a full stomach...Because of the dire need to survive, the peasant is naturally anti-intellectual; intellectual pursuits are a luxury he cannot afford. Because populism is practised by peasants, populism is anti-intellectual" (Olga Narkiewicz, *The Green Flag: Polish Populist Politics 1867-1970* London, Croom Helm, 1976 p273).
- 77 e.g. workers versus intelligentsia in 1968 - see 'Polish Society Under Communism' Chapter 2 p181.
- 78 see Appendix I p680.
- 79 see Appendix I p722.
- 80 see Appendix II p747.
- 81 see 'Anti-Semitism in the Presidential Campaign' Chapter 4 p595.
- 82 see Krzysztof Mroziejewicz 'Temptation' Polityka 7/7/90 p11.
- 83 "The Poles...belong to a community which has acquired its modern sense in active opposition to the policies of the states in which they lived" (Davies (b) p11).
- 84 see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p190.
- 85 see Chapter 3 p394.
- 86 Bauman describes the Polish intelligentsia model as "absolutist, fundamentalist, and totalistic in its long-term aspirations and middle-range program. The intellectual idiom as embraced in the East knew no division of labour between

political and cultural leaders, between body politic and "civil society", between rights of the legislator and the duties of spiritual leadership" (Bauman (a) p168).

- 87 see 'Civil Society in Poland' Chapter 1 p55.
- 88 see 'Pour une Plateforme unique de l'Opposition' in La Pologne, cited in Arato 1981 p28.
- 89 "The concept of civil society, understood as a program of resistance to communism, first appeared in Poland during the late 1970s and early 1980s, primarily in conjunction with the Solidarity movement" (Bronislaw Geremek 'Civil Society and the Present Age' The Idea of Civil Society National Humanities Center 1992).
- 90 One of the main architects of the project, Bronislaw Geremek stated: "we believed that the civil society we were forming in the midst of our struggle against communism would prove a strong buttress upon which a future democratic order could lean after the collapse of authoritarian power" (Ibid.).
- 91 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p255.
- 92 "Even when we said that we had a civil society, it was only directed at some demand for the future, being a metaphor which helped illustrate the fact that, even in a Communist state, we still had areas of independence" (Jerzy Szacki 'The Dreams and Realities of Polish Democracy' in Res Publica 5/91 p10).
- 93 In 1991 Geremek conceded: "The civil society of 1980 was the projection into the future of a vision that rested upon an

awesome emotional unity" (Bronislaw Geremek 'Civil Society and the Present Age' The Idea of Civil Society National Humanities Center 1992).

- 94 "From being a banner of the opposition...the term [civil society] became, with the fall of the Communist regime, a legitimising device for the new government. The quest for the realisation of civil society was, it was argued, fulfilled...civil society was realised in - the new state apparatus" (Adam B. Seligman The Idea of Civil Society Free Press New York 1992 p7).
- 95 Zubek notes that the new elite was confident that a "new social contract between the society's vast masses and its 'best and brightest' would ensure the maintenance of social peace for an indefinite period of time" (V. Zubek, 'Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition' Problems of Communism January-April 1991 p76).
- 96 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 p381.
- 97 "Civil society, then, is constituted by identity rather than difference, by unity rather than diversity. In the end in this line of argument, there is only one new social movement (internally differentiated), one collective identity and one lifeworld that nests within it sub-lifeworlds that differ only at the margins" (Hudson Meadwell 'Post-Marxism, No Friend of Civil Society' in Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison Hall J ed. 1995 Polity, Cambridge 1995 p193).
- 98 Irena Grudzinska Gross notes: "The very authorship of revolution is discussed now, and when the question is asked - who did it - several new contestants appear" (I. Grudzinska

Gross, 'Post-Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of Polish History' in *East European Politics and Societies* Vol.6 No.2 Spring 1992 p146).

- 99 "The central problem of democratic politics in modern society is to maintain the diversity within civil society while creating some measures of unity or bindingness, of political authority: *E pluribus unum*. This problem is more easily solved in political systems whose underlying diversity remains one of interests: it becomes more difficult when values or cultural models must also be mediated (C. Offe, 'Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements Since the 1960s' in Ch.S. Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 p65).
- 100 see Introduction to Chapter 4 p444.
- 101 "By not broadening political activities to include the organisation of social interests on behalf of a liberal or civic collective identity, the door was left open for competing elites with different collective identities to engage the population, and subsequently to achieve the electoral successes..." (Arista Maria Cirtautas 'In pursuit of the democratic interest: the institutionalization of parties and interests in Eastern Europe' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p53).
- 102 see John Michael, 'The Intellectual in Uncivil Society' *Telos* No.8 Summer 1991 p144
- 103 "It is only because of the previous acceptance of theories which implied that society was completely dominated by the state that intellectuals could respond with the proposition that in the late twentieth century there can be such a thing



as an 'autonomous' civil society distinct from the state" (C.M. Hann 'Second Economy and Civil Society' in C.M. Hann ed. Market Economy and Civil Society in Hungary Frank Cass London 1990 p31, henceforth Hann).

- 104 "From civil society we get at best an ideology that is, in addition, limited to a very small circle of people who regard themselves as our future political system...the utopia of civil society is a reading-room utopia for a relatively narrow group of our society" (Jerzy Szacki 'The Dreams and Realities of Polish Democracy' in Res Publica 5/91 p10).
- 105 "We can imagine a scenario in which intellectuals and politicians could see, even if only in outline, the shape workers' interests would take in the market economy and were able to propose ways of protecting those interests" (Wlodzimierz Wesolowski 'The Nature of Social Ties' in John A. Hall ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison Polity Press Oxford 1995 p119).
- 106 see 'The Walesa Factor' Chapter 4 p480 and Appendix II p764 for profile.
- 107 "Intellectuals are falling into another kind of elitism...by failing to notice the material and social conditions experienced by the mass of worker-citizens" (C.M. Hann 'Second Economy and Civil Society' in Hann p32).
- 108 "In many respects, the failure to develop and strengthen civil initiatives and popular participation - the failure to create an active and independent civil society - represents a new, post-Communist 'betrayal of the intellectuals' (Lomax p42).
- 109 see Table 3.6 Chapter 3 p323.

- 110 for debate over liberty and equality during Mazowiecki period see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p463.
- 111 see Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe Chatto and Windus 1990 p93, henceforth Dahrendorf (a).
- 112 see Bronislaw Geremek 'Civil Society and the Present Age' The Idea of Civil Society National Humanities Center 1992.
- 113 Bronislaw Geremek admitted: "Democracies are built only over time, through the forming and functioning of democratic institutions; through peaceful competition among political parties; through the existence of independent means of mass communication; through successive free elections and changes of government and finally through the growth of a democratic political culture...In retrospect, it is apparent to me that we were trying to change hard realities with mere words" (Bronislaw Geremek 'Civil Society and the Present Age' The Idea of Civil Society National Humanities Center 1992). In 1991 his colleague Adam Michnik concluded: "The time for people like me to engage in politics has come to an end" ('The Three Cards Game: An Interview with Adam Michnik' in Polityka 1/6/91).

## Chapter 2: The Intelligentsia in Modern Polish History

### Introduction

The purpose of the following chapter is to illustrate the continuity of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia in recent Polish history. The chapter contends that the attitude of the milieu to state, society and the development of a democratic, civil society remained quite constant up to the Mazowiecki period. This will demonstrate that seeing the Mazowiecki administration as a 'government of the intelligentsia' is a useful way of evaluating its project of democratisation in 1990.

The chapter is split into examinations of the historical journey of the milieu through the inter-war and communist periods. These two episodes witnessed far-reaching national and social transformations in which the intelligentsia was inevitably caught up. Both periods saw the expansion of the state bureaucracy, industrialisation and urbanisation. In the inter-war period (1918-1939) the ex-nobility intelligentsia, grounded in the humanities at odds with but reliant on the Imperialist state was joined by a more professional, technical cadre of 'white-collar workers' (bureaucrats, engineers, managers etc.) which included members with peasant or working-class origins. This new

intelligentsia was professionally committed to the state bureaucracy. These developments increased the confusion and controversy surrounding the term 'intelligentsia'.

In the early communist period (1946-68) the size, composition and expected function of the intelligentsia were subjected to further, massive changes. At the outset of communist rule the existing intelligentsia was repressed and purged. More recruits from the workers and peasants swelled the next generation of the milieu. This milieu was expected to legitimise the communist regime in the eyes of Polish society. In the late communist period (1968-89) parts of the intelligentsia began to disengage from the state and form a sustained critique of communist power. Eventually this category was able to form alliances with other anti-communist sectors of Polish society and form, in the 'Solidarity' movement a force which played a major role in the fall of the regime and the rise of the Mazowiecki government.

Throughout modern Polish history the changes wrought on the intelligentsia milieu were reflected in the variety of prefixes bestowed on it: 'old', 'true', 'pseudo' or 'working', 'dissident'.

However my definition of 'intelligentsia' refers to the survival of the ethos established by the traditional Polish intelligentsia into contemporary times. The unique system of values of the old stratum outlined in Chapter 1 - alienation from state and society,

a dogmatic approach to politics and preoccupation with the exercise of political power despite attachment to an utopian vision of democracy and patriotism - provided a framework for successive generations of educated Poles who were dissatisfied with the Polish state and the lot of their compatriots<sup>3</sup>.

In the midst of the Mazowiecki government's term in office Henryk Domanski presented a contemporary account of the functions of the intelligentsia as they stood in 1990. It confirmed that the attributes of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: etatism, sense of mission and social leadership, were still exerting influence over its contemporary equivalent. Around 90% of the intelligentsia regarded as its duty, besides the realisation of its own narrow, professional interests, the fulfilment of training, educational, cultural and leadership functions for Polish society. These functions, in the opinion of members of this layer, included spiritual and intellectual leadership, the creation and dissemination of culture, the propagation of community norms, behaviour patterns and opinions, and also the development of the arts and technology, in compliance with the forces of economic progress<sup>4</sup>. Thus Chapter 2 will concentrate on the political context of the intelligentsia's historical development. Its relationship with state, society and civil society is regarded as crucial to understanding the politics of democratisation during the Mazowiecki period.

## 2(a) The Intelligentsia in Inter-War Poland

### Introduction

Developments in Poland in the years between the two world wars are of significance to those interested in the Mazowiecki period for several reasons. In 1990 many parties were at pains to stress the continuity between pre-WWII and post-communist organisations. This applied to parties from all sides of the political spectrum. For instance the programmatic declaration of the reactivated Polish Peasant Party<sup>4</sup> stated: "The politics of the Peasant movement have existed uninterrupted for practically one hundred years"<sup>5</sup>. Likewise the re-emergent Polish Socialist Party<sup>6</sup> asserted that it was "The depository of the continuous tradition of democratic, independent socialists"<sup>7</sup>. The political climate of the Second Republic is worth examining because it must have shaped the traditions to which these parties laid claim in 1990.

In addition, if the major task of this work is to trace the Mazowiecki government's project of democratisation then the Second Republic represents an important period. The advent of independence was accompanied by significant social and economic changes and a general expectancy in Poland and abroad that Western-style liberal democracy could be instituted<sup>8</sup>. These sentiments were echoed in the aspirations and delusions of the

Mazowiecki government as it took office in 1989-90<sup>9</sup>.

Independence offered various social groups the chance to institutionalise different visions of Poland developed in the partition and war years. Just as in the period 1989-90 social groups such as the Catholic Church, the workers, the peasants and a nascent middle-class and the political organisations which represented them, championed their role in the struggle for independence and claimed the major say in the shaping of the new Republic.

The evolution of the inter-war Polish intelligentsia is worthy of particular attention because it was during this period that one would expect the milieu to develop along more 'Western' lines. If the leaders of the anti-communist movement and the Mazowiecki government referred to Poland's tradition of 'civil society' then it was in the period 1918-39 that it would have been most evident. Ideally the period should have seen a rapprochement between the intelligentsia and the rest of Polish society as the former was freed of the responsibilities of their 'mission' of leading national resistance. A healthy middle-class would offer professional opportunities to the intelligentsia which would then integrate more fully with society. Through this it would gain the autonomy from the state necessary to play the mediating role fulfilled by intellectuals in the West, contributing to the democratisation of the region.

However the period was marked by social unrest, economic crisis and a process of political fragmentation which led to the decline of democracy and the rise of authoritarian rule. I will contend that the economic and political climate of the time was not conducive to the development of a stable civil society. Caught up in the profound political and social changes of the time the internal turmoil of the intelligentsia contributed to the degeneration of state/society relations in the Second Republic. Rather than mediating between both categories, the intelligentsia became engaged in a struggle for state power amongst themselves and with other social groups. Again one can see a parallel in the intelligentsia's identity crisis in transition Poland and the effect this had on the prospects for the development of a stable parliamentary democracy and market economy.

Any evaluation of the development of the intelligentsia in the inter-war period must take into account the traumatic changes in state and society which occurred during these years. The following section will establish this context.



(i) Background to the Intelligentsia's Development in Inter-war Period

Inter-war Society

In social terms Poland remained a largely backward agrarian country with around 64% of the people earning a living from the land. Subsistence agriculture was still common and the fragmentation of peasant holdings continued. With a rapidly growing population the problem of surplus agricultural population was serious. Land reform remained a major problem of the inter-war period. Table 2.1 illustrates how the growth of industry and attendant urbanisation in specific locales did not change Poland's fundamentally agricultural character<sup>10</sup>.

Table 2.1: Percentage of Population Living in Villages in Poland in the Years 1870-1931 According to Provinces.

Provinces	Year			
	1870	1900	1921	1931
		Village-dwelling Population		
Western	79	74	73	65
Central	83	81	70	67
Southern	84	82	80	78
Eastern	91	92	89	86

Source: Rosset E, *Demografi Polski* p203.

In spite of the largely agrarian economy, the emancipation of the peasantry meant that, from the second half of the nineteenth century onward, there was increased mobility from the countryside into the industrial towns. By the time of the Second Republic the Polish industrial sector had grown significantly. By 1931 12.7% of the population of the Second Republic was dependent on industrial employment<sup>11</sup>. Zarnowski, in his sociological study of the Second Republic, estimated that by 1938 almost one-third of the population was working-class<sup>12</sup>. This process was nowhere near as strong as its counterpart in the countries of Western Europe, where the industrial revolution had occurred one hundred years earlier, but it made a significant impact in certain areas. The disjointed, fragmented process of industrialisation was another legacy of the partition period, where different areas had developed different types of economy. Table 2.2 illustrates the fact that the process of urbanisation varied in timing and intensity throughout partitioned Poland and the Second Republic.


Table 2.2: Percentage of Population Living in Towns in Poland in the Years 1870-1931 according to Provinces.

Province	Year			
	1870	1900	1921	1931
Western	21	26	27	35
Central	17	19	30	33
Southern	16	18	20	22
Eastern	9	8	11	14

Source: Rosset E Demografi Polski p203

The Polish middle class remained weak. We have already noted how the conditions of the Gentry Republic had allowed the nobility to repress the development of a native middle class<sup>13</sup>. After the economic and political repression of the partition and W.W.I only the state was capable of leading economic development. Any figures relating to the development of the Polish middle class up to the beginning of W.W.II pay testament to its numerical insignificance in comparison both to other social groups in Polish society. Even in 1931 when the Polish middle-class was in a period of relative growth, the combined numbers of capitalists, landlords and petty bourgeoisie and their dependants amounted to only 10.7% of the Polish population<sup>14</sup>. Diagram 2.3 summarises this social structure of inter-war Poland:

Diagram 2.3: Polish Social Groups (1921-31)



Source: Norman Davies, *Heart Of Europe: A Short History of Poland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1986 p199

Thus during the inter-war period Polish society could be described as generally underdeveloped and agrarian with pockets of uneven industrial and urban growth. The economic underdevelopment and fragmentation of Polish society represented major obstacles to the democratisation process. On the one hand the peasant majority of society remained in the 'pre-Modern' stage of development which political theorists associate with an absence of democratic aspirations. On the other hand there were areas of Poland where the processes of Modernity had taken root and which were undergoing the trauma of industrialisation and urbanisation. The rural/urban divide which remained a feature of Polish politics up to the Mazowiecki period had its roots in this

uneven process of modernisation<sup>15</sup>. Fragmented development of this type precluded the formation of a unified political culture which is vital to the achievement of liberal democracy. Instead, each social group tended to have its own value system and vision of the newly independent state and tended to be intolerant of the others.

The situation was exacerbated by the 'nationality issue'. Obviously, in a country which has just regained statehood after one century of repression, nationalism was high on the political agenda of almost all social groups. Political organisations of all types gave priority to national unity. Each stressed the continuity of their patriotic pre-independence activities and the politics of the new Poland. The national cause remained more important than the representation of various social interests<sup>16</sup>. For instance the peasant leader Wincenty Witos claimed that "Poland fell as a state of the nobility...Poland rises again as a state of the peasantry and as such can and must survive"<sup>17</sup>.

The Right-wing National Democrats (endecja) likewise stressed the continuity between its pre-war policies and politics in independent Poland. According to them, independence had been built on the preservation of their vision of Polish identity: "the principles which gave the nation the strength...to regain independence...have not ceased to be correct...They represent the

most valuable ideological legacy that we are introducing into the independent state. The all-Polish principles continue to be as obligatory in independent Poland as they were during our enslavement..."<sup>18</sup>.

The Left, under the leadership of Jozef Pilsudski was also more concerned with the defence of the new state than with the representation of the working class. It shared with the *endecja* a belief that Poland was a 'great nation' and that guaranteeing this status was the first priority of the independent Republic. For Pilsudski, the main task of his generation was "to turn the wheel of history so that Poland could become the greatest power in the east not only militarily but culturally"<sup>19</sup>. In a similar way, in post-communist Poland groups from across the political spectrum laid claim to the national heritage<sup>20</sup>.

The mosaic of ethnic identities within the borders of the new Poland gave nationalism even more salience. In Poland, Catholic Polish speakers represented around two-thirds of the population. Ethnic minorities in inter-war Poland included nationalities with which Poles felt aggrieved for either past conflicts and conquests (e.g. Ukrainians, Germans and Russians) or long-term cultural or religious animosities (e.g. Jews). Table 2.4 illustrates the ethnic diversity of inter-war Poland.

Table 2.4: Ethnic Composition of Inter-War Poland

	1921 census (Nationality %)	1931 census (Ethnicity %)
Polish	69.2	69.8
Ukrainian and Ruthenian	14.3	13.9
Byelorussian	3.9	3.1
'Local' ( <i>tutejsi</i> )	0.2	2.2
Jewish (Hebrew and Yiddish)	7.8	8.6
<i>Mosaic faith</i>	10.5	9.8
German	3.9	2.3
Lithuanian	0.3	0.3
Russian	0.2	0.4
Czech	0.1	0.1
Other	0.1	0.2
Total Population	27,176,717	31,915,779

Source: Rothschild, Joseph East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, A History of East Central Europe Vol. IX Seattle University of Washington Press, cited in Tomas Hellen Shaking Hands with the Past: Origins of the Political Right in Central Europe Helsinki Finish Society of Sciences and Letters 1996 p64).

These groups had varying degrees of national consciousness and some were keen to press their own national interests in independent Poland. Tensions were raised by the overlap of ethnic and economic categories. For instance, the vast majority of the working class in the Second Republic was of Polish origin<sup>21</sup>. However German, Russian and Jewish elements were much more prominent in the managerial class. There were no substantial capitalists of native Polish origin. Instead this role was filled by

foreigners, particularly Germans and Western Europeans<sup>22</sup>. Thus economic aspirations were combined with nationalist sentiment: the economy had to be controlled for the benefit of one ethnic group at the expense of another. The rural/urban divide, mentioned previously, was deepened by the common perception of urban areas dominated by 'alien' elements such as Germans and Jews exploiting the Polish 'folk-masses' of rural areas (again this nationalist feature of the urban/rural divide was apparent in 1990)<sup>23</sup>.

The recent recovery of sovereignty, the mosaic of ethnic identities and the overlap of economic and ethnic categories guaranteed that the 'National Question' was the major dynamic of the inter-war period. We shall return to nationalist ideology in inter-war Poland later in this chapter. For now it is important to note that nationalist sentiment contributed to political fragmentation and radicalisation rather than the integration and stability of Polish society<sup>24</sup>.

During the inter-war period the desire of the Catholic Church, always an important social institution in Poland, to play a prominent public role, deepened the cleavages in Polish society. The Church saw the Catholic faith as of prime importance in preserving national identity. The precarious condition of Polish



sovereignty in the inter-war period necessitated the institution of a national, Catholic state as a guarantor of Polish independence. The old formula of 'Pole=Catholic'<sup>25</sup> received fresh ~~impetus~~ in the nationalist atmosphere and ethnic diversity of inter-war Poland. Being a practising Catholic became at least as important as appreciating Polish language and culture - if you were not a good Catholic you were not a good Pole. Some of the most extreme policies of the 1930s such as the boycotts against Jewish businesses and active discrimination against Jews in University and the free professions were tacitly supported by some Church elements. Polish Jews would face either economic ruination or large-scale emigration. This would serve the economic interests of the ethnic Polish middle-class and the desire of the Church for religious homogeneity in Poland.

In general, the Church's stance ran contrary to the development of a modern, pluralist democracy. It created deep divides in inter-war Polish society. Substantial sections of Polish society were alienated by the Church. Enemies were made of Jews, Orthodox Russians and Protestant Germans but a significant amount of ethnic Poles, particularly those amongst the liberal intelligentsia, were also disillusioned<sup>26</sup>.

The fragmentation and radicalisation of Polish society along socio-economic, ethnic and religious lines did not bode well for the

development of democracy in inter-war Poland. As we have seen, political theorists see the creation of a unified political culture committed to consensus and tolerant of a plurality of social interests as central to the establishment of liberal democracy<sup>27</sup>.

The lack of consensus was reflected in the kaleidoscope of political parties, trade unions and interest groups which sprung up with the advent of independence. The four main political camps of the time - nationalists, socialists, peasants and Christian Democrats - were all split according to the cleavages outlined above. In 1926 there were 26 Polish and 33 ethnic minority parties, of which 31 were represented in the Sejm. Up to that year Poland was governed by a series of coalitions which were unable to reach internal equilibrium, let alone develop a tolerant, unified political culture. One of the most revealing episodes of this period was the assassination of the Republic's first democratically-elected President, Gabriel Narutowicz. He was regarded as the candidate of the Left and the national minorities. His election was denounced by the Right as a fraudulent conspiracy of Jews and other national minorities. The political situation became increasingly violent and culminated in the assassination of Narutowicz by a nationalist fanatic on December 16th 1922.

## The Inter-War State

At the outset of the inter-war period Poland's commitment to developing Western-style democracy was illustrated by the adoption of a constitution modelled on the French Third Republic. The most important element in the new political system was the parliament (Sejm), elected by universal suffrage with proportional representation. It could question the activities of Ministries and compel members of the government to resign. It had the right of veto over many of the most important economic and military matters. The powers of the Senate and President were much more limited. However, for several reasons, this commitment to parliamentary democracy in theory was not carried out in practice.

The fundamental problem was that the new, democratic state was the only agent capable of instigating progress in inter-war Poland. The condition of Poland was such that the state was obliged to perform the tasks accorded to autonomous social spheres in Western liberal democracies. The national economy, split between the divergent structures of the old partitioning powers demanded a strong central agency if they were to be integrated. The fragmentation and polarisation of society, reflected in the chaos of the party political scene, likewise demanded a strong political centre. In addition, the statesmen of the period, though for the

most part self-declared democrats, had little understanding of or patience with democracy in practice. The legacy of the political culture of the partition period was evident. Manoeuvring between elites marked the politics of the time rather than the representation of popular forces<sup>28</sup>. The fragmentation and radicalisation of Mazowiecki's Poland mirrored the inter-war political scene. In 1990 the existence of deep social cleavages which the political system could not synthesise was a major obstacle to democratisation<sup>29</sup>.

In 1926 the military leader and moderate socialist Jozef Pilsudki led a coup d'état to put an end to the squabbling of the various coalitions. This effectively ended the Second Republic's experiment with parliamentary democracy. Though the facade of democratic politics was maintained Pilsudki's rule deteriorated into a military dictatorship; the 'Sanacja' ('Purification') regime. Opposition politicians were arrested and their organisations repressed. The decline was accelerated by the leader's death and the succession of the 'government of the generals' which became increasingly chauvinistic and authoritarian and anti-Semitic. More repressive policies were introduced against the national minorities and the Jewish population. A series of strikes by workers and peasants and demonstrations by minorities illustrated the breakdown of state/society relations. In 1936 there

were 2,056 strikes involving 675,000 workers (there were 808,400 workers in medium and large-scale enterprises in 1938) and 22,016 farmers with the loss of four million man hours<sup>30</sup>. Thus from the 1930s onward the Polish industrial working class had discovered the efficacy of collective action<sup>31</sup>. This is important because these types of organised worker protests were to play a prominent role in Polish political life. In 1956 they contributed to the reform of the Party-state<sup>32</sup>. In the 1970s they laid part of the foundation for the creation of Solidarity<sup>33</sup>. In the late 1980s the fear of radical worker protests prompted the Round Table Talks between the regime and Solidarity and thus hastened the demise of communist rule. Finally, in Mazowiecki's Poland, increased worker unrest unambiguously signalled the deterioration in the relationship between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the industrial working class<sup>34</sup>. As far as the inter-war period is concerned, worker and peasant unrest signalled the accelerated decline in inter-society and state/society relations after the death of Pilsudski<sup>35</sup>.

## Democratic Civil Society in Inter-War Poland

In Chapter One we established civil society as a realm where the freely expressed interests of a society are articulated and transmitted to a responsive state. As such we equated a functioning civil society with the development of democratic political values and procedures<sup>66</sup>. This model of civil society did not exist in inter-war Poland. Polish society was deeply split by cleavages which precluded the development of a tolerant, unified political culture. The Polish state maintained many of the features of patronage or authoritarianism associated with the old partitioning powers. It regarded Polish society as incapable of progressing or even surviving by itself and refused to grant the economic, social and political autonomies associated with the development of civil society in the West<sup>67</sup>.

Given this background the role of the Polish intelligentsia was vital. We have established Western intellectuals as the pivotal figures in the creation of a democratic, civil society. By formulating critiques of state power and mobilising society behind the formation of a unified, democratic political culture they are seen as agents of Modernity and democracy<sup>68</sup>. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the Polish intelligentsia would be heavily involved in the projects of democratisation and modernisation in the inter-war period. The following section will

contend that the involvement of the Polish intelligentsia, with its traditional attributes, in the politics of the inter-war period contributed to the failure of these projects.

## (ii) The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period

Despite its democratic credentials and admiration of Western political models, the Polish intelligentsia did not act as a mediator between state and society in inter-war Poland. Rather it contributed to the polarisation of society, the strengthening of authoritarian rule and the disintegration of state/society relations during the period. This was the result of the milieu's inclusion in the far-reaching socio-economic changes of the time. It was also a consequence of the 'totalist' and 'etatist' attributes of the milieu. In this respect the experiences of the Polish intelligentsia in the inter-war period presaged the difficulties faced by the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990.

The most profound change experienced by the intelligentsia in the inter-war period was the large increase in its membership. Governmental, economic, educational and cultural institutions proliferated in the wake of independence and made an enlarged educated stratum a necessity. It has been estimated that in 1931 there were in Poland around 665,000 non-manual workers of various types, making up 24.6% of all those employed in the national economy. In his study of the period Zarnowski estimated the total membership of the intelligentsia to be 1.4 million<sup>39</sup>. In the period 1918-1938, about 140,000 persons graduated from the secondary schools and about 85,000 of those went on to get



diplomas of higher education<sup>40</sup>. The increased size of the intelligentsia altered its social composition, with the lower social classes gaining greater representation. Thus in 1935 13.4% of university students came from the peasantry and 19.5% from the lower middle-class<sup>41</sup>.

This new, educated stratum also differed from the traditional intelligentsia in the role it was expected to play. Loyalty to the new state was now of utmost importance. The intelligentsia was expected to play a different role, not as social leaders, but as functionaries of the state<sup>42</sup>. To illustrate the change in function, the historian Janusz Zarnoski compared two definitions of the milieu from the beginning and the end of the inter-war period. He first cites Stefan Zeromski's definition from 1919 which stressed the role of the intelligentsia as a leading force in political life: "The member of the intelligentsia is a lover of public issues, inspirer...of the defence of all layers and oppressed classes, an altruist, a man of creativity in both extremely conservative and most progressive programmes, of all National Democratic, social-democratic and Polish Socialist Party programmes, an amateur who stands behind the oppressed workers...". He next cites the sociologist Jozef Chalasiński's definition from 1936 which portrays the intelligentsia as servants of the state: "The intelligentsia - that is the satellites of the propertied and political elite"<sup>43</sup>. Thus for Zarnowski one of the fundamental differences between the

intelligentsia of the inter-war period and its predecessor was the involvement of a significant part of it in the state bureaucracy.

Given that the ability to formulate a critique of state power was one of the fundamental attributes of Western intellectuals and the Polish intelligentsia, the new stratum's bureaucratic ties to the state raised serious questions of identity - could this new educated stratum be regarded as an intelligentsia at all?<sup>44</sup> In this context it may prove illuminating to introduce the observations made by Octavio Paz on the role of the Mexican intelligentsia in its revolution of 1910-1917. The experiences of the Mexican intelligentsia are comparable to the identity-crisis of the Polish intelligentsia in the inter-war period. They also touch on some of the difficulties faced by the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990. Paz explains how, after playing an important role in mobilising the people in the revolution, the Mexican intelligentsia had to turn its hand to statecraft, turning their hands to law, economics, administration etc.. This immediately triggered a period of soul-searching amongst the milieu: "Within a short time the country possessed a considerable group of technicians and experts...However their situation is extremely difficult...they have lost their independence and their criticism has become excessively diluted, out of prudence or Machiavellism. The Mexican intelligentsia as a whole has not been able to use the weapons of

the intellectual - criticism, examination, judgement - or has not learned how to wield them effectively"<sup>45</sup>.

Again the political engagement of the intelligentsias of Mexico and Poland can be contrasted with the autonomy and critical distance of their idealised Western counterparts: "This situation is very different from that of the European intellectual. In Europe and the United States, the intellectual has been deprived of power. He lives in exile, so far as the state is concerned, and wields his power from outside the government, with criticism as his principle mission. In Mexico the intellectual's mission is political action. The Mexican intelligentsia has not only served its country, it has also defended it, honestly and effectively. But in so doing, has it not ceased to be an intelligentsia? That is, has it not renounced its proper role as the critical conscience of its people?"<sup>46</sup>

The turmoil of the Polish intelligentsia was worsened by the character of the state which was demanding its loyalty. Although proximity to state power suited the traditional etatism of the milieu this was always justified in the name of initiating social progress and leading society toward a modern, democratic future. The chauvinism of the military dictatorship, which steadily alienated national minorities and the Jews, made this stance increasingly untenable.

The Polish intelligentsia was thus left with a clear choice: service to an authoritarian state which demanded complete obedience or activity amongst the alienated and radical sections of Polish society. In this way we can see the advent of a split between that part of a new, conservative intelligentsia tied to the state and the old, liberal intelligentsia committed to social leadership. Indeed Zarnowski goes so far as to give separate estimates of the numbers of 'real' intelligentsia and others in non-manual occupations

	The 'Real' Intelligentsia	White-collar workers
1921	210,000	315,000
1931	250,000	460,000
1939	300,000	500,000

Source: J. Zarnowski Spoleczenstwo drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1918-1939 (PWN 1973).

It is important to stress that those members of the intelligentsia who subscribed to the old values of liberalism and love of freedom nevertheless also maintained an etatist, 'totalist' attitude to politics. Members of the intelligentsia were prominent in the political scene of the new Republic. In her study of 1082 full

professors in the inter-war period Dorota Mycielska established that at least 10% took an active part in political life as presidents, prime ministers, ministers, members of parliament or senators. Pilsudski himself had an honorary doctorate from the University of Warsaw and his brother Bronislaw was a respected scientist<sup>47</sup>. Representatives of the milieu formed the leadership of most political parties of the period<sup>48</sup>.

However, the leadership style of these activists reflected the elitism and etatism of the milieu. For instance, the alienation of the Polish peasantry from the urban intelligentsia was noticeable when the former eventually became more politically organised. The rural/urban divide led to a gulf in aspirations between the intelligentsia which wanted to lead the peasant organisations and the peasants who were divided amongst themselves. The intelligentsia, no matter how 'democratic' their programmes appeared, continued to regard the peasantry as second class citizens at best. The alliance was to be uneven, with the intelligentsia performing the leading function. The attitude of the intelligentsia to peasant politics was superior and paternalistic. The following quote from the National Democrat K.S. Frycz exemplifies the intelligentsia's approach: "It is often forgotten that the peasant will always be the source of national strength, yet a passive source, requiring leadership and protection. The peasant can strengthen the intelligentsia...but he will never be able to

assume leadership because then he would cease to be a peasant"<sup>49</sup>. The gulf in understanding between the intelligentsia and the peasantry was to become a prominent cleavage in the Mazowiecki period. This had serious consequences for the Mazowiecki government<sup>50</sup>.

Similarly, the Polish intelligentsia's involvement in socialist programmes was different to that of Western intellectuals. The social concern of the Polish intelligentsia certainly found common cause in socialist philosophy. However the elitist element of the milieu was attracted to the hegemonic role allocated to intellectuals under Marxist philosophy. As we have seen the Polish intelligentsia regarded itself as the social group destined to lead because it alone contained the necessary knowledge and expertise. The milieu's new knowledge of the class struggle and the task of awakening the political awareness of the proletariat, given to intellectuals by Marxist philosophy, fitted well into this general outlook and added to the Polish intelligentsia's sense of superiority. The expanding urban working class was losing its attachment to traditional, peasant-based sources of leadership and authority were being broken down. It therefore represented a force in society through which the intelligentsia could introduce its own agenda which had more to do with didactic, theoretical socialism than true worker-based action. In effect the workers

were patronised by the intelligentsia in the same way the peasants had been. We shall see that the special role accorded intellectuals by Marxism also attracted the milieu in the communist period<sup>b1</sup>.

In 1990 Kazimierz Korab described how social concern and Leftist thought became synthesised with the elitist ethos of the Polish intelligentsia and its self-appointed mission as leaders of Polish society: "Leftist thought has become widespread amongst European intellectuals over the last two hundred years, based on the conviction that, through intellect, knowledge and technology one can order and transform the people. In this way the French and Russian Revolutions provided philosophies. In academic circles a utopian, Marxist view emerged. After all, in its didactic approach Marxism attempted to seize systemic and general control, unity and equality were placed in the same category. It is thus wrong to identify the Left with the workers - the Left has an intelligentsia rather than working class pedigree. The Left thinks in the manner of Central European intellectuals. The issue of the workers arose only in relation to introducing concepts to society"<sup>b2</sup>. The intelligentsia's patronising approach to the industrial working class was echoed in the deterioration of the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and representatives of the workers in 1990<sup>b3</sup>.

This section has illustrated the intelligentsia's patronage of the peasantry and working class in the inter-war period. As with the intellectuals of Western Europe the Polish intelligentsia sincerely wished to help both these social groups progress. However they were unable to forge links strong enough to facilitate this process. The elitist, etatist outlook of the Polish intelligentsia played a significant part in this<sup>54</sup>. Thus the behaviour of the intelligentsia contributed to the fragmentation and radicalisation of Polish politics in the inter-war period. Political parties tended to be elitist, intelligentsia-led clubs engaged in a divisive battle for state power. Politics was presented as an 'all or nothing' game engaged in by those members of the intelligentsia who believed they knew best how to modernise Poland<sup>55</sup>. Obvious parallels can be drawn with the disintegration of Solidarity's parliamentary representation into competing intellectual clubs and the fragmentation of the political scene in 1990<sup>56</sup>.

An examination of Polish nationalism in the inter-war period illustrates the radicalism of the milieu. As we have seen, nationalism provided a useful but sensitive tool in the armoury of the progressive intelligentsia. It helped soothe the traumas attendant upon a modernising society but in the hands of disaffected intellectuals could reverse this process<sup>57</sup>. In inter-war Poland the radicalism and internal divisions of the intelligentsia



was reflected in the emergence of two directly opposed versions of Polish nationalism. These competing visions were associated with the two main political personalities of the period - Roman Dmowski and Jozef Pilsudski.

Roman Dmowski's philosophy, associated with the various National Democratic organisations (endecja), was concerned with the concept of the nation as a distinct ethnic community whose right to existence superseded the individual rights of any of the individuals it was composed at any given time. Dmowski's goal was to transform the Polish people into a modern community based on the masses of Polish society. Thus ethnic, linguistic and religious criteria were vital<sup>68</sup>. This type of nationalism was supported by the Catholic Church for obvious reasons. It also found favour with elements of the young intelligentsia whose prospects of employment were threatened by the overproduction of graduates. The high representation of Jewish students at university increased these frustrations and attracted them to Dmowski's ethnic nationalism.

However this form of nationalism was obviously not conducive to the development of liberal democracy as it was intolerant of religious and ethnic minorities. If implemented, one third of Poland's citizens would have their civil rights severely diminished. In the second half of the 1930s the chauvinist 'Sanacja' regime

began to adopt some of the most illiberal features of Dmowski's nationalism such as anti-Semitic discrimination.

Pilsudski's vision of the Polish nation was based on the old, multi-ethnic republic of Poland-Lithuania. Polish identity was more a matter of subscribing to a common set of values and ideals than ethnic roots. In this it was more 'Western' than Dmowski's version. However, Pilsudski's nationalism was also undemocratic. Those who did not live up to Polish ideals and values, as interpreted by Pilsudski and his followers, were likely to find themselves excluded from political power. Pilsudski saw his 'Sanacja' military regime which took office after his coup d'etat as a 'purifying' force in Polish politics. These versions of Polish nationalism were intolerant of each other.

The involvement of the Pole=Catholic equation in the rise of Dmowski's intolerant version of nationalism increased the radicalism and fragmentation of the intelligentsia. The liberal core of the milieu came into direct conflict with the Catholic Church and its supporters over the nature of the reborn Polish state. Both groups regarded themselves as the important factors behind the survival of Polish identity in partition times. Both deigned to lead Polish society through reference to an 'other-worldly' realm; either the Kingdom of God or the Utopia of Reason. Consequently both felt that they should play the leading role in shaping

sovereign Poland. The liberal intelligentsia rejected the idea of a 'Catholic state'. As the repository of Poland's Western-oriented traditions of democracy, pluralism and liberalism it supported the 'laification' of public institutions, the clear separation of Church from State along western lines. These views found support amongst national and religious minorities such as the Jews, Protestant Germans and Uniate Ukrainians who felt threatened by the special status of the Catholic Church in Poland. The intelligentsia was thus split according to clerical and anti-clerical outlook<sup>59</sup>. The division between the liberal intelligentsia and those who sought a greater public role for the Catholic Church in public life for political reasons was resurrected in 1990. This cleavage proved particularly damaging to the 'intelligentsia in power'<sup>60</sup>.

The intelligentsia was thus split radically. Czeslaw Milosz<sup>61</sup> witnessed the ideological polarisation of the milieu in the inter-war period between the right wing followers of Dmowski's chauvinistic brand of Catholic-nationalism and the elitist, socialist followers of Pilsudski. The clash between these visions was played out again between the followers of Mazowiecki and Walesa in the presidential campaigns of 1990<sup>62</sup>. Thus nationalist ideology did not provide a framework for the integration of Polish society behind the project of democratisation and modernisation. In the hands of

the intelligentsia it became a divisive force. Both versions were intolerant of each other. Moreover, both in application limited the societal freedoms associated with liberal democracy. Both versions of Polish nationalism could be detected in 1990 where the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government advocated Pilsudski's multi-ethnic but elitist vision of Poland's part of a brotherhood of nations and its opponents supported Dmowski's narrow, chauvinistic definition. Again the clash between these visions did not encourage the development of democracy<sup>65</sup>.

As noted previously, the radicalisation of the Polish intelligentsia in the inter-war period was deepened by the impoverishment of the milieu. The expansion of the education system led to an overproduction of highly qualified graduates and a shortage of posts for them. Moreover, intellectuals who had been accustomed to being the 'voice of the nation' in the partition period<sup>64</sup> were now forced to compete for an audience. Culture was now a commodity and writers realised that they were now addressing a shrinking public. They keenly felt the paradox that in their own free country they were more alienated from the people than those writers of the previous century who could not be read openly. The difficulties faced by intellectuals accustomed to playing an important societal role through the political worth of

their creations when confronted with the vagaries and whims of the market were also apparent in 1990<sup>64</sup>.

In conclusion we can see that the Polish intelligentsia in the inter-war period was unable to halt the erosion of its dream of liberal democracy and the breakdown of relations between state and society. Rather than acting as a mediating force between the two camps the intelligentsia found itself split between them along professional and ideological lines. As such it contributed to the situation where state and society opposed each other and society itself was split by deep cleavages. A democratic, civil society was unlikely to develop in these conditions. As we shall see, the themes which have emerged from our study of the intelligentsia during the Second Republic can be compared to the state of affairs in Mazowiecki's Poland.

The intelligentsia's experience of the brief period of independence between the two world wars was chastening. Sovereignty, the longed for panacea, had failed to solve Poland's political, social and economic problems. The milieu sensed this failure more than other social groups as it felt it had invested most in the project of national emancipation. Its worst fears over Polish society's undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies were confirmed.

Moreover the intelligentsia's inability to counter these trends alone was demonstrated. After 1935 the political activity of intellectuals became more and more oppositional. The Democratic Party, founded in 1938, united intellectuals of all political shades in opposition to the regime. It was popularly known as 'The Party of the Progressive Intelligentsia'. However, by that time the dreams of democracy attendant at the birth of the Second Republic had long since evaporated. The experiences of the intelligentsia in the inter-war period informed its future tactics; notably its willingness to associate with the communist system and its attempts to forge links with the Church and the working-class in the 1970s<sup>66</sup>.

All of these processes came to a halt with the outbreak of the Second World War. The Nazis were aware of the intelligentsia's leading role in Polish society and the extermination of the milieu was a declared aim<sup>67</sup>. Estimates of the losses suffered by the intelligentsia during W.W.II vary but all agree that they were particularly severe. Duraczynski estimates that Poland lost 45% of her doctors, 57% of her lawyers, 15% of her teachers, 40% of university professors, almost 50% of qualified engineers and 30% of technologists and technicians during the war<sup>68</sup>.

Nevertheless the patriotism and sense of mission of the surviving intelligentsia was reinforced by their own suffering and the

national 'martyrdom'. The intelligentsia reverted to its role of informal leaders of society and achieved a level of integration with the masses which had perhaps eluded them during the Second Republic. The tradition of creating underground structures at times of national crisis, begun in the period of the partitions, was continued. By 1942, most faculties of the universities of Krakow, Warsaw, Wilno and Lwow were holding classes and giving examinations in private dwellings<sup>69</sup>. Several prominent members of the intelligentsia, who played leading role in the anti-communist movement and the Mazowiecki government were educated in 'underground universities' as the war raged. These included Jan Jozef Lipski (the co-founder of KOR), and Bronislaw Geremek (leader of Solidarity's Parliamentary representation during the Mazowiecki period<sup>70</sup>). The tradition of the 'Flying University' was resurrected by these intellectuals during the 1970s where it became an important part of the anti-communist opposition's attempt to 'reconstruct civil society'<sup>71</sup>. Thus, paradoxically, Nazi occupation replenished some of the intelligentsia's moral authority and standing in Polish society<sup>72</sup>. As a result the intelligentsia played a major part in preserving Polish national identity during those years of subjugation and persecution<sup>73</sup>.

- 1 see Adam Podgorecki 'An Inflammatory Revolution' The Polish Sociological Bulletin No.2 1992 p133.
- 2 "In spite of the withering away of the status system on which the concept of the intelligentsia was originally based, the past has survived, it seems in more than one respect; not only has the designation of intelligentsia remained, but many cultural traits and collective images of the old intelligentsia have been preserved" (Maria Hirszowicz 'Intelligentsia Versus Bureaucracy? The Revival of a Myth in Poland' Soviet Studies vol. XXX, no.3 July 1978 p343, henceforth Hirszowicz).
- 3 "The roots of these attitudes have to be located in the traditional struggles for independence and the leading role of the intelligentsia in the rebuilding of Polish statehood" (H. Domanski, 'The Condition of the Middle Class' Polityka 5/5/90 p5).
- 4 PSL - see Appendix I p704.
- 5 cited in Inka Slodkowska, Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.1 PAN Warsaw 1995 p34, henceforth Slodkowska.
- 6 PPS see Appendix I p709.
- 7 cited in Slodkowska p74.
- 8 "The democratically-inclined leaders of the new states...firmly believed that the introduction of Western-style political systems would almost automatically produce Western-style societies: stable, democratic, prosperous" ( Hellen p62).
- 9 see 'The Theoretical Context of Democratisation' Chapter 1 p22.



- 10 Edward Rosset informs us that "The pre-industrial stage, as indicated by the proportion of the population living in villages (80 - 100%) could still be found in Poland in the 1920s and even in the 1930s; it can still be observed in the provinces of the South and East" (Rosset E, Demografia Polski: stan, rozmieszczenie i struktura ludności Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1975 p203).
- 11 see Davies, N, God's Playground p197, henceforth Davies (b).
- 12 Zarnowski J, Spoleczeństwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej Warsaw 1973 p191, henceforth Zarnowski.
- 13 see 'The Polish Path' Chapter 1 p45.
- 14 see M. Anasz and W. Wesolowski 'Przemiany struktury społecznej w ZSSR i Polsce' in M.W. Rutkiewicz et al. eds. Przemiany struktury społecznej w ZSSR i Polsce Warsaw 1976 p46.
- 15 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p500.
- 16 "The political stance of the leading circles was unashamedly nationalist. 'Polishness' became the touchstone of respectability. The dominant parties of the Constitutional period - the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), PSL (Polish Peasant Movement) and the National Democrats (endecja) all shared the concern for national unity..." ( Davies (b) p404).
- 17 cited in A Belcikowska Stronnictwa i związki polityczne w polsce Warsaw 1935 p16.
- 18 cited in Ibid. pp81-83.

- 19 Piotr S. Wandycz "Poland's Place in Europe in the Concepts of Pilsudski and Dmowski" *East European Politics and Societies* Vol.4 No.3 Fall 1990 p460.
- 20 in their own ways the radical KPN, clerical ZChN, peasant PSL, populist PC and liberal ROAD all claimed to represent the 'national tradition' (see Appendix I for ideological roots).
- 21 Zarnowski estimated that 82.6% of the industrial work-force were Poles (Zarnowski p191).
- 22 "The bulk of the workers in the first instance were docile, submissive peasants...but foremen and management were Germans.." (R.F. Leslie The History of Poland Since 1863 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1980 p45, henceforth Leslie).
- 23 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p509.
- 24 "The emphasis on...*national* character could only exacerbate internal conflicts and weaken its [the state's] real cohesion" (Piotr S. Wandycz 'Poland's Place in Europe in the Concepts of Pilsudski and Dmowski' *East European Politics and Societies* Vol.4 No.3 Fall 1990 p467).
- 25 see 'Polish Society' Chapter 1 p53.
- 26 Adam Michnik describes the split between in the inter-war years as one between the "'radical Pole' equipped with secular ethics" and the 'Catholic Pole' who seemed to be in opposition with his responsibility towards God and Fatherland" (A Michnik, Kosciol, Lewica: Dialog Paris: Institute Literacki 1977 p90).

- 27 see 'Development and Characteristics of Democracy in the West: Society' Chapter 1 p28.
- 28 see Hellen p67.
- 29 see Chapter 3 p324.
- 30 see George Kolankiewicz, 'The Polish Industrial Manual Working Class' in David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, Social Groups in Polish Society London: Macmillan 1973 p89, henceforth Lane and Kolankiewicz.
- 31 "There existed in Poland a sector of the industrial proletariat which was both aware of its collective interests and was experienced in their articulation" (Ibid, p89).
- 32 see Chapter 2 p240.
- 33 see Chapter 2 p247.
- 34 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p450.
- 35 "[the death of Pilsudski] signalled a further degeneration of the regime into increased military control, increased inter-communal conflict with stepped up persecution of the minorities, and stalled land reform" (Hellen p81).
- 36 see 'Civil Society' Chapter 1 p34.
- 37 "From the outset the East European modernizers were involved in a contradiction, that of having to construct civil society from above. In the event this proved impossible...Whenever society moved to fulfil the role that modernity assigned to it, the state proved unwilling to relinquish the power it had assumed to carry out modernization" (Schopflin p14).

- 38 see 'Western Intellectuals' Chapter 1 p88.
- 39 see Zarnowski p191.
- 40 see Szczepanski J "The Polish Intelligentsia Past and Present" World Politics 14 1961-62 p411.
- 41 see Ibid. p411.
- 42 "The bourgeois-noble state had a marked disregard for the intelligentsia stratum, which was unceremoniously allocated an ideologically and culturally menial role" (Walery Namiotkiewicz 'Inteligencja polska wczoraj i dzis' Miesiecznik Literackie May 1969 p90, henceforth Namiotkiewicz).
- 43 Both cited in Ibid. p120.
- 44 "Among the upper intelligentsia many had secured, and many more aspired to bureaucratic posts, and in this way became very dependent on the 'ruling clique'. Therefore, while claiming its 'exalted position as an elite', the intelligentsia became exposed to political corruption and to servility and lost much of its independence and dignity" (Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland Between the Wars Columbia University Press New York 1977 p128).
- 45 Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude London Penguin 1985 p157.
- 46 Ibid. p159.
- 47 see Dorota Mycielska, 'Postawy polityczne profesorow wyszych uczelni w dwudziestoleciu miedzy wojennym'

Inteligencja polska XIX i XX wieku Warsaw: PAN Instytut Historii; PWN 1985 p293-335.

- 48 "The emergence of mass political movements (the workers' and peasants' movements ...gave the socially concerned intelligentsia great opportunities to continue its role of transmitting culture..." (Namiotkiewicz p96). Szczepanski agrees that they "provided political parties with ideologists, journalists, propagandists, activists etc." (Szczepanski J World Politics 14 1961-62 p412).
- 49 Cited in J. Chalasiński and J Ulatowski, Przeszłość i Przyszłość Inteligencji Polskiej Rome 1947 p10.
- 50 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p500.
- 51 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period' Chapter 2 p236.
- 52 Kazimierz Korab 'The Left and Right Camps of Solidarity' Tygodnik Solidarność 3/8/90 p15.
- 53 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p450.
- 54 "Having its roots in the aristocracy and gentry, the intelligentsia believed that it was ordained to rule Poland because it alone had the necessary prerequisites of leadership. It was not really interested in acquiring the support of workers and peasants, both of whom it considered inferior" (K.S Frycz, cited in J Chalasiński and J Ulatowski Przeszłość i Przyszłość Inteligencji Polskiej Rome 1947 p11).

- 55 "What was important about this generation...was its hatred of party politics and its lack of constructiveness: once they had power they did not know what to do with it" (Mingiu p336).
- 56 see The Disintegration of OKP Chapter 3 p407.
- 57 see 'Western Intellectuals and Society' Chapter 1 p93.
- 58 "Dmowski wanted to speed up this [modernisation] process, increasingly determined by ethnic, linguistic and religious criteria of "Polishness" (Wandycz P.S. 'Poland's Place in Europe in the Concepts of Pilsudski and Dmowski' East European Politics and Societies Vol.4 No.3 Fall 1990 p454)
- 59 "Anticlericalism is not a phenomenon which is emerging in Poland for the first time. Anticlericalism existed before the war - it was related to the leftist camp, with the Polish Socialist Party, with liberal intelligentsia groups concentrated around such periodicals as "Wiadomosc Literackie" (Adam Michnik 'A Religious State or Individual Belief?' Krytyka No.38 1992 p1).
- 60 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Church' Chapter 4 p513.
- 61 see Appendix II p756.
- 62 see Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind p144.
- 63 see 'Comparison of the Mazowiecki and Walesa Campaigns Chapter 4 p605.
- 64 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 p116.
- 65 see 'The Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform' Chapter 3 p309.

- 66 Jacob Lestchinsky notes the intelligentsia's feeling of helplessness: "The Polish intelligentsia, more than any other section of the people, bore the onus of forging the identity of the newly created state and therefore sensed most keenly the disillusionment. It felt most tragically the poverty and insignificance of the available material and spiritual forces in comparison with the enormous tasks which history had set before the new Poland" (Jacob Lestchinsky "The Anti-Jewish Program: Tsarist Russia, the Third Reich and the Independent Poland" Jewish Social Studies No.3 April 1941 p155).
- 67 "During W.W.II the losses of the Polish intelligentsia in the general martyrdom of the nation were greater than in other classes. The occupying authorities knew that they would succeed in controlling the masses only by completely exterminating the educated people and destroying the charismatic stratum of the nation" (Alexander Gella "The Life and Death of the Old Polish Intelligentsia" in Slavic Review Vol.30 1971 p22, henceforth Gella).
- 68 see E. Duraczynski Wojna i okupacja wrzesien 1939 - kweicien 1943 Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna 1974 p58.
- 69 see Marian Walczak Szkolnictwo wyzsze i nauka polska w latach wojny i okupacji, 1939-45 Wroclaw 1978, cited in John Connelly 'Foundations for Reconstructing Elites: Communist Higher Education Policies in the Czech Lands, East Germany and Poland, 1945-48 East European Politics and Societies Vol.10 No.3 Fall 1996 p384, henceforth Connelly.
- 70 see Appendix II p747 and p737.

- 71 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism' Chapter 2  
p254.
- 72 Though decimated, the Polish professoriates actually emerged  
strengthened from the war. Their leading and well-known  
role in opposition gave them moral capital" (Connelly p385).
- 73 "It was German policy to drive a wedge between the  
intelligentsia and the masses in town and country, but their  
efforts failed. In the face of German brutality and  
exploitation the Poles maintained a national solidarity...The  
Germans were to complain that it was impossible to subdue  
the Poles because of their 'fanatical faith' in the  
'resurrection of Poland'" (Leslie p218).



## 2(b) The Intelligentsia Under Communism

### Introduction

An examination of the experiences of the Polish intelligentsia under communism is vital to understanding the politics of the Mazowiecki period. The roots of the Mazowiecki government are found here. Prominent members of the Mazowiecki administration first emerged in the late communist period as dissident intellectuals with the project of rebuilding a democratic, civil society. As with the inter-war period the communist era witnessed substantial socio-economic changes in terms of urbanisation, industrialisation and modernisation. We would therefore expect the intelligentsia to be prominent at the forefront of these processes. However, there are obvious differences between the development of the milieu in the inter-war and communist years. The regnant political culture under communism had none of the liberal democratic aspirations of the Second Republic. The will of the communist Party-state was the dominant political force in communist Poland. The characteristics of the communist system will be presented as inimical to the interests of a 'civil society' of the type identified with Western democracies earlier.

This section is thus concerned not with the role of the intelligentsia in the process of democratisation but with its part

in the imposition, maintenance and eventual disintegration of authoritarian, communist rule. The experience of the Polish intelligentsia under communism will be examined in two parts: Early Communist (1945-68) and Late Communist (1968-1989). The first part asks how the supposedly liberal intelligentsia adapted to authoritarian rule? This is important to our understanding of the intelligentsia's relationship to state, society and civil society: was the traditional etatism of the milieu actually suited to the party-state model? The intelligentsia's involvement with the construction of this system will be explained as a consequence of the legacy of the inter-war and war years but also through reference to its traditional ethos which urged it on to state power because it 'knew best'. If this is so, does it partially explain the desire of the Mazowiecki administration to maintain a government of exclusively the 'best and brightest'?

The second part will examine the intelligentsia's involvement in the emergence of the anti-communist opposition. The period of opposition building from 1968 onward is viewed as an unprecedented period in the history of the milieu. After the communist regime's persecution of protesting students and intellectuals in 1968 the milieu moved its focus from state to society. Links were forged with previously distant social forces such as the industrial workers and the Catholic Church. The alliance, in the form of the 'Solidarity' movement, proved

indestructible to the communist state. However, the anti-communist intelligentsia announcement of the rebirth of civil society was mistaken. The opposition movement was held together by opposition to the communist state alone. The long-term cleavages of these groups, outlined previously, were not resolved. A unified political culture and a responsive state, prerequisites for the development of a democratic, civil society in Western liberal democracies, were not present in late communist Poland. Instead artificial societal unity was achieved in opposition to a hostile state. Thus, once again, the intelligentsia contributed to the polarisation of state and society in Poland. Although it had turned from state to society it maintained its approach to politics as an 'all or nothing' game for state power. This myth of civil society was carried by dissident intellectuals into office under Mazowiecki where it contributed to a fresh polarisation of state and society in 1990.

Once again, before examining the development of the intelligentsia in communist Poland, it is necessary to establish the socio-economic context. As with the inter-war period this is done through an examination of the categories of state, society and civil society.

## (i) Background to the Communist Period

### The Communist State

Under communism the state completely overwhelmed the autonomous inclinations of Polish society and Polish national identity was subsumed by the weight of the Soviet Empire. The communist theory of the 'leading role of the Party' meant that it saw the state as the sole representative of the interests of Polish society. As the Communist Party (PZPR) dominated both state and society there was no need for a 'contract' between them.

Legal and constitutional bodies, vital in guaranteeing the rights of individuals and groups in democratic civil societies, were remodelled along Soviet lines. Poland's bicameral system of government with upper and lower Parliamentary bodies (the Senate and the Sejm) was abandoned. Supreme authority was formally invested in the legislative body of the 460 - member Sejm which was elected every four years by universal suffrage (communist control of the electoral process guaranteed its control of this body). Executive authority was exercised by the Council of Ministers which, along with the President and his Council of State and the Supreme board of Control were appointed by the Sejm.

The Supreme Court, officially made up of independent judges appointed by the Council of State, represented the judicial branch.

However in practice, all of these institutions were instruments of the Communist Party. The communist system reflected the tenets of 'democratic centralism' where political power was exercised by the Party and particularly its Political Bureau and First Secretary. All appointments and directives affecting central state institutions were controlled by corresponding Party organisations. Thus legislative power was concentrated in the hands of a small Party elite.

A democratic electoral system and a representative party-political spectrum are vital channels between the state and society in functioning democracies. They simultaneously check the activities of the state and encourage the articulation of social interests<sup>1</sup>. In communist Poland these institutions were destroyed. The communist government's repeated promise of free, democratic elections was never fulfilled. The formation of new parties was prohibited and the communists set about subordinating the existing ones to themselves. The Polish Peasant Party and the Polish Socialist Party were, in turn, persecuted, infiltrated by , split and subsumed by the Communists. The pro-Communist ZSL<sup>2</sup> became the only officially recognised representative of the peasantry and the PPS was merged with the PPR to become the

pro-Moscow Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR)<sup>3</sup>. The peasant leader Mikolajczyk and the socialist leader Gomulka were removed from public life. When elections were held in January 1947 the grossly falsified official results gave over 80% of the vote to the government's "democratic block". The PZPR was joined in government by the ZSL and the SD; (a party purporting to represent the interests of independent urban craftsmen but committed to the objectives of the PZPR). Thus the governing coalition was merely a facade. Both satellite parties membership shrank. None of their members held high office and neither party had an independent say in political processes<sup>4</sup>.

The atmosphere of repression was not limited to central political organs. Trade unions, the army, local administrations, the judiciary, industrial enterprises, co-operative groups and social organisations (including the Catholic church) were subject to intense scrutiny by the state's greatly expanded social apparatus. All had to either allow themselves to be controlled by the Party-state or face the prospect of repression.

In the economic sphere the situation was similar. The Soviet-type economy, rooted in Marxist ideology, was based on the idea that there was a 'collective social interest' that the communist party could establish, represent and protect. The party-state took on the role of 'economic planner' and intervened directly in all economic

matters on behalf of society. In 1948 the State Commission for Economic Planning was instituted and it had a direct say in the economic development of the whole country. The Party-state had acquired control of the commanding heights of the economy. It is important to note that throughout the communist period state repression of society waxed and waned continuously. Particularly after the death of Stalin, the state's control over political, social and economic life was relaxed somewhat. However the 'leading role of the party', the central justification for the rule of the party-state remained till the fall of the system.

## Society


The end of the Second World War saw radical changes in Polish society. The Potsdam agreement between the Great Powers had a far-reaching effect on Polish society. The country's new borders and the migration of millions of people led to the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state. Unlike the inter-war period Poland was now ethnically Polish and predominantly Catholic. In the Second Republic national minorities had accounted for 10 million of the population, but they now numbered only 500,000<sup>5</sup>. Ethnic tensions which had contributed to the collapse of the democratisation process in the inter-war years were eased. It might have been expected that an ethnically homogeneous society would foster the formation of a unified 'national' culture, which is vital to the development of modern democracy. However, as we shall see, homogeneity did not contribute to the development of democracy in communist Poland. Authoritarian rule dominated and manipulated social and ethnic cleavages whether real or imagined for its own purposes and intolerant nationalism was still in evidence<sup>6</sup>.

The advent of communist rule also heralded massive changes in social structure. The ravages of the war combined with the



communist party's political commitment to the development of heavy industry, part of its ideological commitment to the industrial working-class, led to a radical programme of industrialisation and urbanisation. These processes changed Polish society from being predominantly rural to urban in the space of two or three decades. After 45 years of communist rule the proportion of people living in urban areas had increased from 31.8% in 1946 to 61.7% in 1992<sup>7</sup>. Diagram 2.5 shows the composition of Polish society under communism. A comparison with the inter-war period<sup>8</sup> shows the significant growth of the working-class, the peasantry's loss of dominance and the continued underdevelopment of the bourgeoisie:

Diagram 2.5: Social Structure of Poland in 1970



Source: M. Anazs and W. Wesolowski *Przemiany struktury społecznej w ZSRR i Polsce* Warsaw 1976 p46)

It is important to note that this process of industrialisation followed a particular regional pattern. Pre-war industrial areas were developed further. In addition, the western part of the country, inherited from Germany after W.W.II, became the most urbanised. On the other hand central and eastern parts remained largely rural. Thus the traditional urban/rural divide survived into the communist period. Indeed, as we shall see, urban/rural tensions were exacerbated by the communists' coercive attempt to collectivise agriculture.

The experience of the industrial workers during the communist period was generally negative. In economic terms the new industrial working class was initially satisfied. Most of the milieu were ex-peasants with memories of the hardships of life in rural Poland. The guarantee of basic wages and amenities represented progress. However, as time went on, the expectations of the industrial workers increased. Primitive working conditions, strict work-place discipline and inadequate housing were increasingly seen as a cause for protest. Above all, the inadequacies of the command system<sup>9</sup> were reflected in the lives of the worker through 'labour hoarding', corruption and a general pattern of declining standards of living punctuated with economic crises. The peasant background of the milieu was apparent in its political activism which vacillated between alienated passivity and radicalism<sup>10</sup>.

Of course, passivity was encouraged by the party-state which sought to limit the political activism of all sectors of society. Workers had no control over their work and had no independent trade unions or councils. The consequence of this was that when the industrial workforce did become politically active it tended to take a radical, populist form. Absenteeism, poor standards of work and illegal activities on the black market, characteristic of the industrial workers for most of the communist period, at times degenerated into the violent protests. In 1968, under the manipulation of the regime worker dissatisfaction was channelled into populist anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism<sup>11</sup>. However the anti-statist tendencies of worker protest became increasingly organised (e.g. 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980). This process culminated in the founding of the ten million-strong, non-state Solidarity Trade Union in 1980<sup>12</sup>.

The peasantry also had varying fortunes under communism. The traditional urban/rural divide in Poland was deepened by the communist party-state's attitude to the peasants. While the worker was accorded a special role in Marxist ideology, the peasant was expected to disappear with the fulfilment of the communist project. Marx had explicitly condemned the backwardness of the peasantry<sup>13</sup>. The party-state's aim was to homogenise society and this entailed addressing the differences

summarised by the urban/rural divide. The idiosyncrasies of the peasant way of life were to be ended. Moreover, the agricultural sector had to support the process of rapid industrialisation through increased production. All of these goals were to be achieved by the state's coercive programme of collectivisation.

However, the strong resistance of the Polish peasant landholders ended the collectivisation programme in the 1950s. In economic terms the peasantry initially suffered under state discrimination. Economic plans stipulated unrealistically high levels of agricultural production while the state channelled what little investment there was into the small proportion of collectivised farms. The prices the state paid for agricultural produce were set way below the costs of production. However, from the 1970s onward the general shortage of foodstuffs in the Soviet Union improved the position of the peasantry. In the early 1980s farmers' income increased and the agricultural sector expanded. Some observers have concluded that the peasantry actually benefited more than the workers under communism<sup>14</sup>.

The improved economic condition of the peasantry was illustrated in its increased political influence. The party-state formally recognised the right of the private farmer to property and discrimination against the peasantry in comparison to the workers was ended. However, the political victories of the

communist period were victories for the independence of the peasantry, for the continued isolation of the peasantry from the state and the rest of society. In other countries of Soviet Eastern Europe successful collectivisation forged links with the sector and the state and began to span the urban/rural divide<sup>15</sup>. In Poland the peasantry remained fiercely independent and tied to the backward economic and social values of the milieu<sup>16</sup>. The isolation of the Polish peasantry from the state and the rest of Polish society was apparent in the development of an autonomous, 'Rural Solidarity' opposition movement and in the deterioration of the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and the peasantry in 1990<sup>17</sup>.

The middle-stratum of Polish society was hardest hit by communist rule. The remnants of the middle-class were seen as enemies of the party-state. Its economic bases could pose a threat to the exercise of complete power by the communists and were treated accordingly. Private enterprises were liquidated or pushed underground into the 'second economy' or 'black market'. Over time the decline of the command economy meant that the private sector, in its restricted official and unofficial forms, played an increasingly important part in the Polish economy. In the conditions of insufficient production the private sector became strong. This was marked in the regime's gradual concession of limited freedoms to petty entrepreneurs in the late communist

period. Nevertheless these concessions were piecemeal and , until the final years of communist rule, private enterprise was severely restricted<sup>18</sup>.

The Catholic Church was regarded as a threat to the communist state in theoretical and practical terms. Organised religion, founded on extra-temporal authority, was a threat to the hegemony of the Party and a distraction from the socialist struggle. On a practical level the communists were aware of the Polish Church's social authority and its links with Polish identity. They regarded the Church as a potential source of non-state, anti-Russian programmes. Consequently the initial communist approach to the Church involved taking measures to curtail its influence in Polish society in the short-term and the long-term. Church possessions were appropriated by the state. Its welfare and charity organisation, 'Caritas' was taken over by a Party-affiliated group. The state also reserved the right to approve ecclesiastical appointments. Catholic publications were strictly censored. Religious instruction in schools was ended and prison chaplains removed from prisons, hospitals and army units.

The PAX organisation of 'patriotic' priests who were willing to collaborate with the authorities and support its policies was formed to confuse the Catholic laity. In 1952 a group of its members, including its leader Boleslaw Piasecki who had links

with pre-war fascist organisations, were admitted as deputies to the Sejm.

Despite these efforts the communist state realised that, even if the formal political influence of the Church could be curbed, its social authority could not be easily undermined. The movement of the Polish borders to the West after the W.W.II settlements meant that, uniquely in Eastern Europe, the Polish nation was to a great religiously homogeneous. In 1931 Catholics represented around 65% of the population, in 1946, 96.6%<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, the communist persecution of the Church meant that the old Pole=Catholic formula could be revived. In the Second Republic this equation had been used as a weapon against the country's significant ethnic minorities<sup>20</sup>. Communist repression meant that in a religiously homogeneous society the stereotype could be used as a weapon against the atheistic, 'Russian' state<sup>21</sup>. Perversely, communist repression tended to strengthen the position of the Church in Polish society<sup>22</sup>. The election of the Pole Karol Wojtyla to the papacy in 1978, a source of great national pride, strengthened these processes and firmly associated the Catholic Church with patriotism. Statistical evidence shows the strength of Catholicism in communist Poland. Even at the Church's lowest ebb in the 1960s 2/3 of the population were practicing Catholics. In the 1980s 90% of Poles declared themselves believers<sup>23</sup>.

It is important to stress that the Church's opposition to communism did not automatically mean support for liberal democracy. Under communism the public role of the church was strengthened and the authority of the hierarchy was also increased. Both of these trends ran contrary to processes in the democratic West. Church patronage depended on obedience to the hierarchy's line<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, the adaptation of the Pole=Catholic myth continued the intolerant, illiberal aspect of Polish Catholicism into the communist period. For instance, the anti-Semitism of the inter-war version of the Pole=Catholic stereotype was reinforced by the appearance of its antithesis, the 'Zydokomuna' (Jewish-Communist). This form of anti-Semitism was evident in the Mazowiecki period where it was used as a weapon against the intellectual supporters of the government during the Presidential campaign<sup>25</sup>.

The strength of the Church as a social institution resulted in several concessions from the party-state. In 1956 religious education was returned to schools. Repression of Catholic intellectuals was eased and some (known as the 'Znak' group) even allowed limited representation in the Sejm. Some Catholic publications resumed activity. Nevertheless the basic antagonism of Church and state remained. Occasional compromises between the two did not alter this. After the partial rapprochement of 1956 the fundamental conflict was illustrated by several incidents



of state repression. For instance, in the 1956 thaw religious education made a brief return to the school curriculum. However the "Law on the Development of the Education System" of July 15th 1961 definitively removed religious instruction from schools. It stated the need to develop a "scientific world view" with the school as a "secular institution"<sup>26</sup>. As we shall see the issue of religious education was revived as a bone of contention between church and state during the Mazowiecki period<sup>27</sup>.

Under communism the Catholic Church was a unifying force in Polish society and it provided an alternative value system to the party-state's. However, it maintained the Pole=Catholic equation which had undermined the development of liberal democracy in inter-war Poland. Moreover, it unified Polish society against the state. Again this type of mobilisation, though understandable in communist Poland, is not conducive to the development of democracy. The clash between the Mazowiecki government and the Church in 1990 can be understood in this context<sup>28</sup>.

Thus in communist Poland, it was impossible for society to develop a democratic culture despite the fact that it experienced, at least partially, the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation associated with the rise of democracy in the West. These processes were party-state led. Its agenda did not include the fostering of

modern, democratic ideas of citizenship. Social atomisation was the party-state's objective. Society had to be prevented from organising itself in any way, lest this threatened the monopoly of power. This had obvious effects on Polish society's political culture. The party-state attempted to remove the 'bourgeois' (authoritarian and hierarchical) norms and values governing social organisation in the pre-communist period. However, nothing was offered in their place apart from passive obedience to the dictates of a new type of regime. By the 1960s any support Soviet ideology held for Polish society had been lost. Only the demobilising fears of economic chaos and Soviet intervention were offered by the regime as a justification for its rule. Polish society was expected to drift passively along without subscribing to any values except self-preservation.

The only alternative value-systems were the remnants of the inter-war period, such as populism and Catholicism which, as we have seen, were not conducive to the development of a unified, democratic political culture. Indeed the communist regime occasionally mobilised these values to deflect criticism back on society. This was the case in 1968 when the anti-intelligentsia and anti-Semitic elements of Polish populism were successfully mobilised against the dissident intelligentsia<sup>29</sup>.

The result was normlessness or *anomie*. When a society's 'normal' ways of being and doing are continually blocked by the political order a gap emerges between public and private, state and society spheres. This can be manifested in negligence, absenteeism or reluctance to take responsibility in state-owned enterprises in contrast with the diligence, discipline and initiative apparent in non-state activities. Most importantly for those interested in democratisation and political culture, individuals refuse to express their interests and values through state structures<sup>50</sup>.

The chances of forming a democratic political culture in communist Poland were lessened by the persistence of very deep social cleavages. As we have seen, the rise of democracy in the West is associated with the development of a consensual, tolerant relations between different sections of society. Although Marxist-Leninist ideology claimed for the Party the role of leading the people to a classless society, in practice, communist rule deepened existing social cleavages. For instance, the uneven spatial distribution of urban and industrial development maintained the traditional urban/rural divide. Moreover, the Warsaw government's coercive attempts to collectivise agriculture alienated the peasantry from the urban-based social groups. The ease with which the Party-state could mobilise one section of

Polish society against another in times of unrest suggested the depth of the divisions<sup>81</sup>.

The formation of a unified political culture was further hampered by the decline of social mobility during the communist period. Originally the processes of modernisation included the promotion of workers or peasants to higher status roles in the Party-state system as part of the 'new intelligentsia'. However by the 1960s and 1970s these channels of social mobility began to close. The communist elite strove to protect its status and guarantee its privileges for its children, usually through domination of the educational system. The 'best and brightest' of the working class and peasantry found their ambitions frustrated and inter-class differentials and resentments intensified. In short, society remained alienated from the state and prone to radical internal cleavages.

## Civil society

Civil society, understood by this thesis to include the development of disparate but consensual society-based organisations outwith state control, did not formally exist in communist Poland. The Party and the force of communist ideology, rather than the structures of civil society sought to fill the gap between the individual and the state<sup>52</sup>.

If we recall the three spheres of Western civil society introduced previously (state, society and economy<sup>53</sup>), the difference is clear. The state's legal and constitutional bodies, vital in guaranteeing the rights of individuals were remodelled along authoritarian Soviet lines. Intermediate organisations, central to the functioning of the 'communitarian' aspect of civil society in the West were repressed. Political parties, trade unions, the army, local administrations, the judiciary, industrial enterprises, co-operative groups and social organisations were subject to intense scrutiny by the state's greatly expanded social apparatus. All had to either allow themselves to be controlled by the Party-state or face the prospect of repression.

In the economic sphere private property, one of the bases of societal autonomy and thus of civil society, was prohibited for most of the communist period<sup>54</sup>.

Once again one is entitled to ask what role the intelligentsia played in the radical social transformations of the communist period. As the representatives of Modernity the industrialisation and urbanisation of Poland were welcomed by the milieu. However as advocates of Western ideals of modern citizenship it would be expected to struggle against the party-state's destruction of civil society. The following section will contend that the ethos of the milieu with its 'totalistic' and 'etatist' approach to political activity played a part in the construction of communist rule. Eventually state repression disillusioned a significant section of the intelligentsia. Dissidents began the construction of an anti-communist movement based on the 'reconstruction of civil society'. This represented a unique departure for the milieu. Social change was to be attempted through society itself. Non-state initiatives were to be fostered, most notably through the Solidarity movement. However the overriding purpose of the project was opposition to the state. Civil society, understood as a pluralist, mediating realm between state and society did not exist. Instead the project represented the intelligentsia's attempt to wrest control of society from the state. The ethos of the institutions of 'civil society' in late communist Poland, including Solidarity, was delineated by the dissident intelligentsia. As such the project maintained the milieu's 'totalist' perspective and desire for power. The project may have been described as 'antipolitical'

by dissident intellectuals but the organisation of non-state initiatives under communism offered a political challenge to the regime. The intelligentsia's tendency to see state/society relations as antagonistic was thus maintained and this had serious consequences for the Mazowiecki government.

## (ii) The Intelligentsia under Communism

The experiences of the intelligentsia under communism can be divided into two parts: 1945-68 and 1968-89. In the context of the thesis, 1968 can be seen as a watershed. Up until then the bulk of the intelligentsia seemed convinced that its 'mission' for the modernisation and democratisation of Poland could be carried out through the party-state, to which the majority of its members had been subordinated. However the violent conflict between the state authorities and protesting students and lecturers in 1968 proved to be a turning point. It was a clear sign of the estrangement of a significant section of the intelligentsia from the regime. As such it can be regarded as a founding moment for the 'anti-communist 'civil society' project<sup>38</sup>.



## The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period (1945-1968).

As the communists set about constructing the model of a dominant party-state one might have expected the intelligentsia to resist the process. After all, the milieu traditionally saw itself as Polish society's leading exponent of democratic values. However, the involvement of the Polish intelligentsia with communism was such that in 1990, just as the intellectual luminaries of the Solidarity movement were at the zenith of their social popularity, the intelligentsia as a social category was tainted in the eyes of other groups by its association with the old regime<sup>56</sup>. Moreover, many of those same luminaries, now the Government's most prominent members and supporters, such as Bronislaw Geremek, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron (the 'Lay Left') had at one time been personally linked with communism<sup>57</sup>. As we shall see, in transition times the government's opponents exploited this aspect of new elite's biographies to claim that communists still exerted influence in state institutions<sup>58</sup>. This section will contend that the intelligentsia's association with communism in the early communist period was the result of significant changes in its composition and function. However, it will argue that the milieu's traditional desire to lead Polish society through the instrument of the state was also important.

The intelligentsia experienced significant changes in composition and function under communism. It had been severely depleted during W.W.II and the communist elite needed a class of managers and experts to staff the expanding bureaucracy and oversee the planned industrialisation of the country. The state administration provided at least 100,000 new positions for educated people. It sought to replenish the educated ranks of the nation by expanding educational opportunities considerably. The amount of time required for winning degrees was reduced, fields of expertise for degrees were narrowed, evening schools for working people were opened and the number of technical colleges increased. In 1945-49 55,980 people enrolled in higher education. Five years later there were 125,096<sup>39</sup>. In comparison the number of graduates from the inter-war period was around 85,000<sup>40</sup>.

Emphasis was placed on practical and technical subjects rather than the traditional humanities associated with the education of the traditional Polish intelligentsia.. Since the early 1950s between 1/3 and 2/5 of students in higher education were in technical studies<sup>41</sup>. The participation of youths from working-class or peasant origins was encouraged. Between 1945 and 1962, of the 300,000 graduates produced by the higher education system, 55% were of worker or peasant origin, compared to 15% in the 1930s and 50% in 1984<sup>42</sup>.

The purpose of these changes was twofold: to staff the enlarged communist Party-state and economy with bureaucrats, managers and technical professionals and to create a 'new intelligentsia' which was ideologically and professionally tied to the communist regime. This new milieu would help to legitimise communist rule in the eyes of society. The influx of graduates with a technical education, from non-intelligentsia social backgrounds, owing their allegiance to the Party would undermine the ethos of the traditional milieu<sup>43</sup>. As we have seen, the old intelligentsia's emphasis on the humanities encouraged the feeling of obligation to serve society as a whole. This was obviously contrary to the communists' desire to be the sole representative of society. The rise of a new, technical stratum committed to its own, narrow fields of expertise would diminish the intelligentsia's system-wide perspective and decrease its threat to the party-state<sup>44</sup>.

At this point it is important to note that, in comparison to other East-Central European countries experiencing communist take-overs at the time, Poland's system of higher education mounted strong resistance to the regime's directives. Chapter 2 noted that underground universities had been a focus of patriotic resistance to the Nazis<sup>45</sup>. In the immediate post-war period the communists also encountered opposition from the University. There was difficulty recruiting fiercely independent professors who had rallied to the defence of the nation during the war to

the communist cause<sup>46</sup>. Initially at least, the communist desire to alter the social composition of students in higher education was also successfully countered. Table 2.5 shows that, although the proportion of students of worker and peasant origins increased between the mid-1930s and late 1940s, representatives of the intelligentsia milieu remained the dominant social category in Polish universities.

Table 2.6: Social Origin of Freshmen in Polish Universities

Social Origin	1935/36 (in %)	1947/48 (in %)
Workers	9.9	22
Peasants	11.7	19.7
Intelligentsia	38.2	45.6
Free Professions, Craftsmen, Entrepreneurs	40.2	12.7

source: 'Skład społeczny studentów I roku szkół wyższych w/g wydziałów w porównaniu ze stanem przewojennym 1935/6'  
Archiwum Akt Nowych KC PZPR MO/2879 cited in Donnelly p387

The traditional weakness of Marxism in Polish intelligentsia circles, the stratum's general antipathy towards Russia and the old commitment to independent thinking all contributed to the determination of academia to resist communist directives. The strength of this ethos was such that students from non-intelligentsia backgrounds were often assimilated<sup>47</sup>. Although

in the long term the decrees of the regime took effect, particularly through the force of the Stalinist state, the University remained a base for the independent-minded intelligentsia. The protests made by the Warsaw University lecturers Kuron and Modzelewski in 1965<sup>43</sup> and the student demonstrations of 1968<sup>43</sup> should be seen in this context.

Nevertheless radical changes in the size and function of the milieu took place under communism. By 1967 40% of those students attending full time higher education were of peasant or manual worker social origins<sup>50</sup>. The party-state adopted a carrot and stick approach to the intelligentsia: loyalty was rewarded with increased professional opportunities while the traditional intelligentsia's tendency to produce critique of state power was repressed. In a newspaper article from 1990 entitled the Warsaw-based intellectual Andrzej Grzegorzczak offered an apologia for the intelligentsia's involvement in the construction of the party-state in terms of the professional opportunities it offered<sup>51</sup>.

Thus, in a manner reminiscent of the inter-war period, it became necessary to distinguish between a new, technical class, ideologically and professionally committed to the state and those amongst the educated who maintained the traditional intelligentsia's faculty for critical thinking. The heirs of the

traditional Polish intelligentsia were found in professions associated with the humanities. The new, 'technical' intelligentsia, increasingly subdivided according to area of expertise, had an interest in maintaining the stability of the bureaucracy which employed them. Thus, although at times it may have felt uneasy about the nature of communist rule, it was tied to the party-state. On the other hand the 'creative' intelligentsia (writers, thinkers, academics etc.), the traditional core of the intelligentsia, required autonomy from the state to perform its function of serving society by creating values, generating ideas and forming a critique of the present in order to produce a vision of the future.

The boundary between these two types of intelligentsia was hazy in communist Poland. It did not run strictly according to party membership or profession. Representatives of what we could term the 'real' intelligentsia were found in a variety of positions with a wide range of professional and ideological backgrounds. For instance, members of the Catholic intelligentsia (e.g. Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Stanislaw Stomma), particularly after the thawing of Stalinism, followed an avowedly independent line in their publications, in meetings of Catholic Intellectual Clubs and in the activities of the 'Znak' group in the Sejm. They believed that participation in state institutions, even if one rejected their fundamental principles, was the best way of assuring progressive change<sup>12</sup>. On the fringes of the communist cultural and

educational establishment left-wing intellectuals such as Bronislaw Geremek and Jacek Kuron maintained the 'free-thinking', critical outlook of the traditional milieu.

Despite this distinction, both the technical and creative strands of the milieu were involved in the construction of the communist system after WWII. While the new, technical intelligentsia's involvement can be explained by its ideological and professional commitment to the party-state, the 'critical' or 'real' intelligentsia's association with communism is more problematic. There were several reasons for the involvement of the heirs of the traditional Polish intelligentsia in the consolidation of communist rule. Firstly, it is important to note the weakened condition of the 'real' intelligentsia in the early communist period. As we have seen, the ranks of the old intelligentsia stratum had been depleted during WWII. The Stalinist campaign of repression, coercion and indoctrination aimed at the remnants of this stratum weakened its ability to produce an effective critique of the party-state even more.

However, importantly for this thesis, the continued influence of the traditional attributes of the milieu - the feeling of inhabiting a superior sphere in society, the resultant sense of obligation to use this position for the betterment of that society, and the conviction that the best way of achieving this was through the

instrument of the state - was also apparent in the 'real' intelligentsia's initial acceptance of communist rule. Communism was itself an intellectual construct<sup>53</sup>. As such it carried many of the traditional attributes of the intelligentsia, albeit in extreme form. In theory the communist revolution relied heavily on the political intervention of the intelligentsia. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, society was confused by its fragmented, limited experience but the intellectual had the sound, 'total' knowledge of historical processes. Thus, under communism, the revolutionary intellectual was given the political power necessary to lead the unenlightened masses to the utopian future of rational, communism. This suited the social superiority and sense of mission associated with the traditional milieu<sup>54</sup>. The unity of cultural, spiritual leadership and political power, a long-held desire of the Polish intelligentsia, was satisfied, in theory at least, by communism<sup>55</sup>.

When Polish intellectuals surveyed the decline of the Second Republic (a process they felt at least partially responsible for) and the war-ravaged condition of Poland, its desire to play a radical, leading role in the reconstruction of the country is understandable<sup>56</sup>.



Moreover, the patriotism of the milieu was attracted by the communist project. Communist ideologues such as Jakob Berman were careful to present the communist-led regeneration of Poland as a patriotic mission. Unlike the case of the partitioning powers of the 19th century or the Nazi occupiers, the communist regime could, at least formally, be presented as Polish. The task of building the communist system could thus be presented as a service to the nation. In a speech in 1947 Berman assigned this task to the intelligentsia<sup>57</sup>. Thus a significant part of the post-war intelligentsia which still subscribed to the free-thinking, critical outlook of the milieu was attracted by the patriotic, revolutionary, leading role apparently accorded to it by communism<sup>58</sup>.

The intelligentsia was not blind to the illiberal aspects of communist rule, particularly in its Stalinist form. However the injustices suffered by Polish society could be justified by reference to the teleological aspect of communist ideology and the intelligentsia ethos. The present may be bad, but today's suffering will guarantee a better future. In his review of the intelligentsia's association with communism Grzegorzcyk talks of "The conviction that compulsion can be turned to the good and therefore outlive the costs of force"<sup>59</sup>. This outlook is reminiscent of the approach of

the 'intelligentsia in power' to the austerities caused by the Balcerowicz Plan in 1990<sup>60</sup>.

As a result, the Polish intelligentsia maintained its preoccupation with state power even as that state was building its dominance over society. As the conditions for the development of a democratic, civil society were removed, the intelligentsia, regarded as vital in the creation of this realm (through mobilising and integrating society and forming an autonomous critique of the state) was subsumed into the dominant culture of the party-state. 'The events of 1956 support this assertion. By the mid-1950s all sectors of Polish society were aware of the limitations placed on them by the party-state in its Stalinist form. The workers and peasants were increasingly burdened by the structural inadequacies of the command economy and the project of collectivisation. The creative intelligentsia was itself increasingly frustrated by Stalinist censorship. The autonomy needed to perform its functions was denied under Stalinism. Writers and artists who had accommodated to the communist system were nevertheless aware that being forced to follow the state line endangered their status as cultural and spiritual leaders of the nation<sup>61</sup>.

Societal frustrations with the Stalinist state culminated in the rebellion of 1956. 'The workers' riot in Poznan sparked the mushrooming of workers' councils all over Poland. Peasants disbanded collectivised farms. Intellectuals formed discussion clubs throughout the country and filled the media with new, diverse forms of criticism. However, the intelligentsia, the self-styled leaders of Polish society, did not move to integrate these protests into a unified articulation of the values of Polish society. Each social group, including the intelligentsia, acted independently of the others<sup>62</sup>. The intelligentsia's main concern remained its relationship with the party-state and how this could be revised. 'The demands of other social groups were ignored or even opposed as retrograde, populist or Catholic-obscurantist. As with the communists, the intellectuals continued to see Polish society as a dangerous void; as nothing without their guidance<sup>63</sup>.

For instance, the revisionist intelligentsia opposed Gomulka's acceptance of the Catholic Church's demand for the return of religious education to schools in the wake of 1956<sup>64</sup>. This conflict was unresolved and religious education proved to be a 'watershed' issue in the deterioration of the relationship between the Church and the 'intelligentsia in power'<sup>65</sup>. Adam Michnik describes the intelligentsia's continued fascination with state institutions during this period: "In analysing 1956 one sees that we did not adequately uncover the mechanism of Stalinist power, and

publicise what was disclosed in police activities, public trials, injustice, the collectivisation of agriculture, the dictatorship of the Party over society...we blamed the men when we should have blamed the institution"<sup>66</sup>.

## The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism (1968-89)

The period from the mid-1960s to the collapse of communist rule in 1989 represents a unique chapter in Polish history. These years witnessed the coalescence of broad sections of Polish society under the banner of anti-communism. The process culminated in the founding and legalisation in 1980 of 'Solidarity' Trade Union as a non-state, cross-class movement. Although outlawed at the end of 1981, Solidarity continued to exist as an underground group and as a potent symbol of anti-communism in Poland and East-Central Europe. Its success as the figurehead of non-communist organisations was a contributory factor to the collapse of the regimes across the region. Solidarity's importance is demonstrated by its dominance of the politics of the early transition period and its continued relevance in Poland today.

The late communist period also represented an unprecedented period in the history of the Polish intelligentsia. The 'Solidarity experience' represented a turning-point in its relations with the rest of Polish society. The attention of the milieu turned from the project of state reform to building an alliance with workers, peasants and the Catholic Church. In 1976 a group of intellectuals founded the Committee in Defence of Workers (KOR<sup>67</sup>). This move was the most obvious sign of the intelligentsia's attempt to bridge the traditional gap between itself and the rest of Polish society<sup>68</sup>.

The core of this group, drawn from the traditional, creative intelligentsia milieu, was determined to help workers and their families persecuted by the authorities in the 1976 strikes. According to a founder and historian of KOR its antecedents could be found in largely Warsaw-based, Catholic, independent and 'revisionist' intellectual clubs<sup>69</sup>. In the years that followed KOR expanded its membership and activities in an attempt to support Polish society as a whole. Unprecedented alliances were built between the secular and independent, Catholic intelligentsia and consequently between the anti-communist movement and the Church<sup>70</sup>. This alliance between the intelligentsia, the workers and the Catholic Church is credited with the rise of 'Solidarity' as an organised, mass movement opposing the communist party-state<sup>71</sup>.

There is still much debate over the link between the activities of anti-communist intellectuals and the rise of the independent Trade Union 'Solidarity' in 1980. For many of the intellectuals involved the link was direct and causal. According to them intellectuals had acted in a way reminiscent of Marxist theory: they had 'raised the consciousness' of protesting workers, giving them the direction and articulation necessary to make a significant political impact<sup>72</sup>. On the other hand, some observers contend that the industrial workers were already politicised in 1970 and the input of intellectuals was peripheral<sup>73</sup>. This debate

over the origins and orientation of Solidarity became salient in the movement's identity crisis in 1990<sup>74</sup>.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this section, it is important to note that intellectuals and the intelligentsia, whether as leaders or advisers to labour leaders were influential in the formation and development of the 'Solidarity' movement. This was particularly the case after Martial Law when the labour side of the organisation was subjected to more severe repression than the movements intelligentsia-based elements<sup>75</sup>. What cannot be denied is that the late communist period witnessed a unique change in focus for the Polish intelligentsia. Its vision of a future Poland ruled according to rational, democratic principles was to be brought closer not through the instrument of the state but through the mobilisation of society<sup>76</sup>.

Anti-communist intellectuals and Western observers hailed this unique period in Polish society as the foundation of a democratic 'civil society'<sup>77</sup>. However, this section will contend that, despite this change of focus from state to society, the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia was evident in the late communist period. The milieu continued to see the categories of 'state' and 'society' as single, competing entities. Civil society, understood as a realm where a plurality of interests could be articulated to a responsive state did not exist. The intelligentsia's commitment to Polish

society was the result of its awareness that it could lead a broad, anti-state front constructed in society. Thus society was still not understood as a source of various competing but equally valid interests, as in the West, but as a single, unified body which could be defined by the intelligentsia only with reference to anti-communism.

There was no reconciliation of long-term state/society and inter-societal cleavages into a unified, democratic political culture. The heated debates, political fragmentation and the fall of the 'intelligentsia in power' in the Mazowiecki period were a direct result of the unravelling of the intelligentsia's 'mythic' civil society and the birth pangs of a 'real' civil society. The image of unity between intelligentsia, worker and Church-based elements of the opposition, displayed in the late communist period, masked competing visions of Poland's future. As we have seen, these social groups had always been involved in internal and external rivalries which had continued despite the facade of harmony constructed from 1976 onward. The Mazowiecki government's transition programme triggered the disclosure of these conflicting agendas. The failure of the 'government of the intelligentsia' to cope with these processes explains its downfall. After the resignation of the Mazowiecki administration Adam Michnik mourned what he regarded as the democratisation process' best chance. Having identified the unity between worker - claimant,



Catholic - traditional and intelligentsia - democratic strands of Polish political life as the reason for Solidarity's success and the best means for ensuring a successful transition, he notes the demise of the alliance in post-communist Poland<sup>178</sup>.

The section will first explain the causes of the intelligentsia's shift from the state to society. The party-state's alienation of broad sections of Polish society is regarded as the prime reason, rather than a 'damascene' conversion of the intelligentsia to the merits of the worker, Church or peasant agendas. It will explain that the intelligentsia decided that the state was unreformable, and that the opportunity was there to build alliances within society. However, these alliance were not built on the reconciliation of 'bread and butter' disputes between intellectuals, workers and Catholics. They were built to offer an intellectual challenge to the state. By fostering non-state organisations, antithetical to a communist party-state, the opposition intelligentsia showed that its cultural power could challenge the political power of the state. The anti-communist intelligentsia thus moved from mainly leftist opposition to a more centrist road and attempted to mould the opposition to suit its agenda.

We have already noted the declining relationship between the party-state and broad sections of Polish society. In the 1970s

dissatisfaction and frustration turned to alienation. 'The Gierek regime's continued policy of under-pricing agricultural products and setting unrealistic production targets confirmed the peasantry's estrangement'<sup>49</sup>. The threat of food shortages illustrated the potential anti-systemic, political strength of the peasantry.

Relations between the Catholic Church and the party-state followed a similar pattern. As we have seen, after the thaw of 1956 the party-state began to remove several of the concessions granted to the Church. The election and visit of Pope John Paul II in the late 1970s confirmed Catholicism's strength in Polish society and its association with Polish patriotism and anti-communism. The Pope's visit proceeded without any contribution from the party-state and thus provided a practical example of the potential of non-state organisation.

The decline of the command economy under Gierek guaranteed the alienation of the industrial workers from the regime. The workers' protests in 1956 did little to alter their lack of power in the work-place, where the Party managers exercised control<sup>50</sup>. The workers' fortunes thus remained dependent on the performance of the state economy which could be characterised by gradual decline, punctuated by periods of crises. In the 1970s Gierek's programme of economic modernisation, financed by Western

credits, proved disastrous. Massive loans accumulated while the command economy soaked up finances into politically motivated, wasteful schemes or corrupt enterprises<sup>81</sup>.

The resulting economic crises were marked with radical protests by the industrial working class. In 1970, 1976 and 1980 food price rises prompted organised demonstrations and strikes which threatened to paralyse the economy and prompt country-wide chaos. From 1970 onward these involved demands for independent trade union representation - a sign that workers were looking beyond the narrow economic concerns of wage and price levels to systemic matters<sup>82</sup>. These were met with immediate concessions by the state in the form of leadership changes or the rescinding of price increases. The industrial working class had proven to itself and to the intelligentsia its potential as an anti-state force<sup>83</sup>. This realisation was fundamental to the founding of Solidarity. Thus, during the 1970s the activities of the party-state alienated major sections of Polish society<sup>84</sup>. The awareness of the potential for the development of a broad anti-communist front in society, spurred the intelligentsia's involvement in the alliance-building of the period.

In the late communist period the Polish intelligentsia was itself becoming alienated from the party-state. This process can be applied to both the new 'professional' or 'technical' category and

the traditional 'creative' intelligentsia. On the one hand, the professionals, tied ideologically and professionally to the state, were frustrated by declining opportunities for career advancement and the interference of the Party in economic matters as the command system deteriorated. Representatives of the intelligentsia had penetrated the highest levels of the bureaucracy and become part of the ruling class<sup>85</sup>.

However, by the 1970s the ruling class had constructed the conditions for the reproduction of its status. The allocation of school places and jobs were controlled by the ruling elite for its own benefit. Observers talked of the appearance of a 'new class', a 'Red bourgeoisie', a 'priviligentsia'<sup>86</sup>. This, in combination with the general decline of the economy led to decreased social mobility<sup>87</sup> and the build up of frustration amongst educated Poles. The 'new' intelligentsia's commitment to the Party-state relied heavily on the system's ability to provide a relatively rewarding career rather than sincere subscription to communist ideology<sup>88</sup>. When this was lost the commitment of this category to the regime decreased.

More importantly for this thesis, during the 1970s any links between the old, 'creative' intelligentsia and the state were finally severed. The alienation was the result of awareness that Poland was heading in the wrong political and economic direction and

that the intelligentsia, the traditional guide and leader of Polish society, was powerless to halt these processes. The programme of de-ideologisation mounted by Gomulka after 1956 obviously threatened the status of the traditional intelligentsia whose basic function was to stimulate and explain social progress through reference to value-systems and ideas. The call to get rich in the short-term and ignore the pressing, national questions posed by the political and economic injustices of 'People's Poland' was antithetical to the democratic and patriotic aspects of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia<sup>89</sup>.

Poland had always had a revolutionary 'destiny' or 'mission': defender of the 'Western tradition', agent of 'civilisation', martyr to aggressive neighbouring countries, model 'People's Republic' etc.. The absence of such a destiny in 1960s Poland prompted speculation on the future development of Polish society, a task traditionally assigned to the intelligentsia<sup>90</sup>. Continued state censorship meant that the Polish intelligentsia was unable to explore these issues and perform this role as critics of the present and heralds of the future just when their country needed it most.

In March 1964 the so-called 'Letter of '34', signed by a group of intellectuals and writers protested over the cultural effect of censorship. Those Party members who had signed were expelled from the PZPR. At the end of 1965 two junior lecturers at

Warsaw University, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, were imprisoned after their neo-Marxist critique of Polish Communism was published. Their identification of a basic clash between the working-class and the state bureaucracy was an explicit signal of the intelligentsia's growing alienation from the Party-state.

The party-state's alternative to de-ideologisation was even worse. A group of veterans from the Party's war-time military organisations, led by Mieczyslaw Moczar (Minister for the Interior from 1964) and known as the 'Partisans', condemned Gomulka's attempt to 'depoliticise' Poland for encouraging apathy and passivity in Polish society. The 'Partisans' sought to revive Poland's romantic, military tradition as a means of reinvigorating society's commitment to the party-state and enhancing their own positions within it<sup>91</sup>.

To this end it drew on the narrow, defensive backward-looking version of Polish nationalism which we have already identified as an enemy of the progressive intelligentsia. The Partisans highlighted the heroic part played by the Polish communist resistance during WWII. Its exploits were contrasted with the attitudes of the revisionist intelligentsia which was condemned as pro-Western, Jewish and unpatriotic. The Partisan's resurrection of Poland's insurrectionary past emphasised to the intelligentsia

how far removed their vision of Poland from the reality of the 'People's Poland'. As such it triggered the intelligentsia's latent patriotism. The classical, Romantic tradition within the intelligentsia and Polish society as a whole included anti-Russian elements. By attempting to use nationalism to mobilise society behind the party-state, the Partisans risked referring to it in People's Poland the Partisans drew attention to Soviet domination over the life of the nation and risked the revival of anti-Russian sentiment amongst that milieu which traditionally led the struggle against Russian aggression<sup>92</sup>.

The most obvious manifestation of the breakdown in relations between the communist state and the reformist Polish intelligentsia was the banning of Adam Mickiewicz's political and patriotic play "Dziady" in 1968. This led to student demonstrations centred around Warsaw University which were brutally put down by the police. Some workers were mobilised against the students and intellectuals by the Partisan's populist, anti-Semitic portrayal of the demonstrations. Lecturers and intellectuals who had supported the student demonstrations were arrested or expelled from the University and/or the Party. Universities and institutions of higher education throughout the country staged demonstrations in sympathy. In the opinion of many observers

and participants these events represented a turning-point in the relationship between the intelligentsia and the communist state<sup>93</sup>.

Finally, intellectual currents on the international scene during the 1960s influenced the attitude of the Polish intelligentsia. As we have seen, throughout the 1960s intellectuals in the West questioned their functions. The increasing professional specialisation of the idiom and its subordination to the state, industry or the university was criticised.<sup>94</sup> Intellectuals changed their focus to grass-roots political activities through the fostering of 'new social movements'. These efforts were reflected in the 'events' of May 1968 when student unrest escalated into a general strike. Thus in the West, the source of the modern notion of the intellectual, the model was being redefined to function in a closer alliance with the masses. This occurred just as the Polish intelligentsia was turning its attention from state to society. French intellectuals saw a revolutionary link between these processes<sup>95</sup>. There was likewise support of events in France amongst the Polish intelligentsia. When students and academics organised themselves in Warsaw in 1968 they did so in solidarity with their French counterparts<sup>96</sup>.

For all these reasons, sections of the 'creative' intelligentsia previously content to pursue their 'mission' of leading societal



progress in Poland through the party-state as either mainly communist 'revisionists' (e.g. Kolakowski, Michnik and Kuron) or Catholic 'neo-positivists' (such as Mazowiecki and Stomma) turned to society. The project presented to society was labelled 'the reconstruction of civil society'<sup>97</sup>. Within KOR Michnik and Kuron developed a program where organising assistance for persecuted sections of society could be extended into a network of society based organisations determined to guarantee civil rights. The formation of non-state associations, underground publishing and education (notably the revival of the war-time 'Flying University') etc. would create 'spaces' where individual and group rights could be defended. The ultimate goal was the democratisation of Poland but in the mean-time society had to concentrate on carving out pockets of autonomy from the state<sup>98</sup>.

In the introduction to the thesis we noted how broadly similar projects emerged amongst opposition groups throughout communist East-Central Europe<sup>99</sup>. Each attempted to develop a realm where people could pursue their interests without interference from the Party-state. This realm, variously described as the 'second society', the 'parallel polis' and so on could be based on private economic activity (in the 'second economy' or black market), opposition political activity in the underground or participation in non-political associations. It thus approximated

what this thesis terms 'civil society': the mediatory realm between rulers and ruled.

Vaclav Havel, Gyorgy Konrad and Janos Kis formulated society-based programmes and presented them as 'antipolitical'. Signatories of Czechoslovakia's Charter '77 declared their intention "to give up 'politics'" and Konrad stated "The most effective way to influence policy is by changing a society's customary thinking patterns and tacit compacts"<sup>100</sup>. This broad similarity can be explained by several factors. Communist rule in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia encouraged political passivity. At best membership of the Communist Party offered the chance of professional advancement. Independent political representation was forbidden. This reduced the importance of the public sphere for all but a minority of Party leaders and apparatchiks. The existence on the one hand of an impervious public sphere and a largely normless private sphere in these countries (to different degrees) was conducive to the development of strategies aimed at the regeneration of society. As a reaction to the party-state's obsession with 'total' political power the opposition rejected the quest for formal political power and concentrated on society. In this sense, the programme for the regeneration of civil society in East-Central Europe was anti-political.

However, the strategy was two-pronged<sup>101</sup>. It was both a reaction to communist authoritarianism and a manifestation of the political influence of intellectuals in the opposition. We have established the characteristics of intellectuals' involvement in politics<sup>102</sup>. They demur at the factionalism and narrowness of everyday politics and instead refer to universal truths and moral absolutes. In the West in the 1960s and 1970s this approach was manifested in the growth of cross-class 'new social movements' based on issues such as environmentalism and feminism which have universal applications.

In East-Central Europe intellectuals theorised about the development of similar organisations based on support for basic human rights and freedoms. The mixing of the ethical and the political marked out the opposition movements of communist East-Central Europe as the constructs of political intellectuals<sup>103</sup>. The political component of this approach was different from Western social movements in its aims. Attempting to foster non-state organisations in a communist system explicitly challenged the foundations of the state itself. While in the West social movements sought to increase the power of social categories within the state, in East-Central Europe hoped to offer a long term critique of state power. This was in keeping with the etatism of the intellectual idiom in the East-Central European case.

As we shall see, the consequences of this 'antipolitical' philosophy for the politics of the transition was ambiguous. On the one hand it contributed to the collapse of the communist system and spurred the development of institutional change. However, it is fair to say that the first aim of the strategy, to address the 'normlessness' of these communist societies and inculcate democratic values was not significantly altered by the 'antipolitical' strategy. Democratic political cultures can only develop beyond a rudimentary stage through time and in the presence of democratic state institutions. A healthy civil society is independent of the state but has strong links with it. The essence of the 'civil society project' was its determination to exist in isolation from the communist state. Beyond anti-communism and a vague commitment to 'democracy' and human rights this 'civil society project' could not develop a consensual model of state/society relations for the post-communist period.

East-Central European sociologists such as Hankiss noted the absence of unified cultures for the post-communist period<sup>104</sup>.

What's more, the political success of the anti-communist movements instantly removed a vital factor in the development of such a paradigm: the autonomous intellectual. This had negative consequences for the early transition period where societal frustrations were articulated in an incoherent, populist way.

As we have noted, the Polish case for the 'antipolitical reconstruction of civil society' was envied throughout East-Central Europe for its potential to move out from purely intellectual circles and involve large sections of society in the project<sup>105</sup>. The most obvious manifestation of the project was the Solidarity movement. It may be imagined that in Poland there would be a greater chance of developing a genuinely unified political culture that spanned all sections of society and would be robust enough to survive the early transition period. However, as we shall see, Solidarity experienced the same damaging fissures as opposition movements throughout the region. Indeed the disintegration of anti-communist unity was perhaps made more acrimonious in Poland by the variety of unresolved differences in its broad social base.

Beyond basic commitment to anti-communism and civil rights, there were many differences within the opposition intelligentsia and between the intelligentsia and other social groups in Poland. For instance, did the commitment to civil freedoms refer to freedom for the Catholic identity of Polish society to be expressed or for the acceptance of freedom of conscience for all beliefs? This issue caused deep splits within the opposition intelligentsia and between the Church hierarchy and KOR. The revisionist intellectuals of the 'Lay Left' and some of the liberal, Catholic

intellectuals of the 'Znak' circle supported religious tolerance and a secular, civil society. The reconciliation of these two intelligentsia strands was vital for the alliance-building process of the anti-communist opposition. Adam Michnik, a representative of the secular Left saw the moderation and toleration of the liberal Catholic intelligentsia, personified by Tadeusz Mazowiecki as of fundamental importance<sup>105</sup>.

The alliance between the Church and the intelligentsia in the late communist period was vital to the development of the opposition. The Church with its institutional autonomy and independent outlook provided the anti-communist movement with moral authority from the pulpit and practical sanctuary<sup>107</sup>. It provided an umbrella, uniting and protecting all those with broadly anti-communist views throughout the Martial Law period<sup>108</sup>.

The Church's vital role continued up to the transition period. Two representatives of the Church hierarchy, Father Bronislaw Dembowski and Father Alojzy Orszulik, were present at the Round Table talks<sup>109</sup>. At the partially free elections of June 1989 the Church was a vital source of moral and practical support for Solidarity candidates. Studies showed a strong correlation between the number of clergy in a local community and the share of votes won by a Solidarity candidate<sup>110</sup>.

On the other hand the lay intelligentsia's relationship with the Catholic hierarchy and loyal Catholic intellectuals was only as strong as anti-communist sentiment allowed. Kosela's study of the June 1989 elections revealed that the roots of electoral success lay in the willingness of communities to mobilise in the name of anti-communism<sup>111</sup>. There was no resolution of the long-term differences between the lay intelligentsia and the Catholic Church<sup>112</sup>.

Clerical and nationalist intellectuals continued to espouse the Pole=Catholic formula and believed that Poland's Catholicism should be emphasised. The formation of the more nationalist and Catholic opposition group ROPCiO<sup>113</sup> as a rival opposition organisation to KOR illustrated the depth of this cleavage<sup>114</sup>. Linked to the dispute was the Nationalists and Catholics suspicion of the communist background of the 'revisionists'. For instance the dispute in KOR between Antoni Macierewicz and Jacek Kuron was caused partly by the former's feeling that Kuron was too willing to compromise with the regime. According to Kuron the right wing of the anti-communist opposition believed that "those who had a hand in [communism] are alien to Polishness, do not understand the nation and its culture...and that the anti-totalitarian resistance must be based on the national

tradition rooted in Catholicism. It is only a small step from this to the conclusion that only those who grew from that tradition are able to lead opposition"<sup>115</sup>.

In the Mazowiecki period these related cleavages came fully to the surface in the conflict between the Catholic hierarchy and the Mazowiecki government<sup>116</sup>. It was also evident in the formation of Catholic-Nationalist parties such as ZChN<sup>117</sup> which were hostile to the Mazowiecki government. Finally it was apparent in the presidential campaign where the Mazowiecki camp's refusal to lead a programme of radical decommunisation was seen by its opponents as an illustration of the ex-revisionist intelligentsia's continued links with the old regime<sup>118</sup>.

In economic terms significant deep cleavages also existed within the anti-communist intelligentsia and between the intelligentsia and the industrial workers. Did economic freedom from the party-state refer to the freedom of workers to have a say in the running of their enterprises in accordance with social justice? This could be achieved through workers' councils and stronger trade unions. Or, did it refer to the freedom for all citizens to pursue their economic goals without state interference? These freedoms are usually associated with elements of a free market economy. Initially the core of the opposition intelligentsia was committed to workers' rights<sup>119</sup>. However, through time parts of



the milieu began to change their orientation towards liberal economics. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the ongoing disintegration of the Polish economy under the tenets of the command system did much to undermine the reputation of left-wing economics in Polish intellectual circles in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the overriding goal of the Polish intelligentsia was freedom and democracy for all Poles, not just workers. Logically this could be achieved best by reducing the power of the state in all spheres, including the economy. Related to this was the elitism of the Polish intelligentsia. As we have seen, the traditional Polish intelligentsia had a tendency to treat the radicalism of the working-class as an instrument to further its own 'universal' or 'total' agenda<sup>120</sup>.

Traditional prejudices against the populist, short sighted tendencies of the work-force suggested that the universality and rationality of neo-liberal economics was a better model for the intelligentsia to espouse. After all this was the system preferred by the western liberal democracies the intelligentsia idealised. According to David Ost even left-wing intellectuals such as Michnik were sceptical about the efficacy of workers' participation because too many seemed susceptible to demagoguery. Such intellectuals embraced private property because maintenance of state property gave the state too much power. Distrust of workers reflected a belief that since rational, universal

values were not likely to win majorities in a post-communist future, the rational-legal rules central to a modern society could only be introduced by intellectuals<sup>121</sup>.

This attitude was particularly apparent in the Martial Law period where state repression was seen as a direct result of the radicalism of the Solidarity Trade Union and the workers' susceptibility to populism. Liberal economic circles such as 'Głos' and the 'Young Poland Movement' emerged to criticise the model of state socialism and militant worker activism<sup>122</sup>. Finally, the regimes of the 1980s renewed their efforts to win over parts of the intelligentsia, particularly the technical or managerial sections, through 'professionalisation'. This time the chance to improve their economic status was offered through expansion of the private sector<sup>123</sup>.

Therefore deep splits existed between liberal and leftist members of the anti-communist intelligentsia. They were also apparent in the relationship between the intelligentsia and worker strands in the opposition movement as a whole<sup>124</sup>. This split was manifested in the tension between KOR members and the radical worker activists of the Coastal Free Trade Unions such as Anna Walentynowicz. There were increasingly volatile clashes between those who wanted the Solidarity Trade Union to be based primarily on worker enterprises and regional associations rather

in the intelligentsia-dominated national leadership based in Warsaw. The fear that the direction of the movement was being decided by distant intellectual elites in secret, conspirational negotiations with the regime, as we have seen a classic populist attack on intellectuals in politics<sup>125</sup>, was apparent. For instance, the Solidarity activist Jadwiga Staniszkis voiced concerns over the influence exerted by Warsaw-based intellectuals or 'experts' over the movement as a whole<sup>126</sup>. In Mazowiecki's Poland the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan which entailed severe austerity for most of the work-force brought these tensions fully to the surface. Issues such as privatisation, wage indexation and the role of the workers' leader Lech Walesa accelerated the disintegration of Solidarity along intelligentsia/worker lines<sup>127</sup>. Populists applied similar arguments over the secrecy surrounding the 'Magdalenka' negotiations between Solidarity intellectuals and the regime to build opposition to the Mazowiecki government<sup>128</sup>.

Thus, in the conventional sense, the programme formulated by the intelligentsia was 'antipolitical'. Economic and political issues central to the development of a clearly defined political spectrum were suppressed, albeit with increasing difficulty. However, the ultimate aim of the anti-communist movement was to challenge the state. In the context of communist rule, any groups organised outwith the aegis of the party-state were intrinsically political,

even if they claimed otherwise. Adam Michnik's theory of "New Evolutionism" explained the 'civil society' project in terms of the opposition between an evil, totalitarian state and a good, democratically inclined society<sup>129</sup>. Although the 'civil society' project was presented by its creators as a radical departure in recent Polish history it was based on established elements of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: the concern with moral purity, the preoccupation with the character of power and the rejection of divisive, bread and butter issues in the name of societal unity. An educated elite was attempting to mobilise Polish society against the state in the name of patriotic and egalitarian ideals. The only difference was that communist rule had succeeded in alienating broad sections of Polish society and giving the impression that society was fluid and eager to be reshaped in the image of the intelligentsia.

It may have appeared that the Solidarity experience had bridged the gap between intelligentsia and society in Poland indefinitely. However, the rapprochement must be seen as a temporary consequence of communist repression<sup>130</sup>. Michnik outlined the didactic rather than integrative approach of the opposition intelligentsia: "The program for evolution ought to be addressed to an independent public, not totalitarian power. Such a program should give directives to the people on how to behave, not to

powers on how to reform themselves. Nothing instructs the authorities better than pressure from below"<sup>131</sup>.

In conclusion the 'civil society' project was clearly a product of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. The age-old tension between state and society, political and cultural power, was being played out in a new context. A democratic civil society did not exist. The articulation of political values remained limited to often personalised conflicts between intellectual elites or the intolerant competition of social categories within the opposition. The state remained unresponsive and hostile; the target of the intelligentsia's activities and their ultimate goal.

## Conclusion to Chapter 2

Throughout the twentieth century the Polish intelligentsia, along with the rest of Polish society, was subject to far-reaching changes. In socio-economic terms, the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation led to the expansion of the milieu and the widening of its class bases. In political terms the period witnessed massive changes and traumas. The Polish state was dominated by military and communist regimes with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Each system had its own vision of the part the intelligentsia should play within it. This was usually a subservient one. However, despite these transformations the traditional ethos of the milieu remained evident. The elitist, statist belief that it alone was qualified to oversee the economic and political modernisation of Poland was never completely extinguished. Whenever the direction of the state diverged significantly from the intelligentsia's vision of the 'Polish path', significant sections of the milieu voiced their dissatisfaction in a characteristic way. The intelligentsia had to show 'the people' what was best for them and this required political power. Thus in the radical struggles of the inter-war period, the 'revisionism' of the early communist period and the 'civil society project' of the late communist period the political activity of the intelligentsia was centred on a usually acrimonious, elite-level discourse on the characteristics of state power. Polish society was not encouraged to develop a tolerant,

democratic political culture. Instead the intelligentsia attempted to mobilise it behind various revolutionary programmes.

The political activities of the intelligentsia thus contributed to Poland's tradition of authoritarian states and radical, fragmented society. In the late communist period the intelligentsia as a revolutionary class contributed to the mobilisation of Polish society against communist rule. As such it played a part in the advent of the post-communist programme of democratisation. However, as we shall see, the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia was evident in the approach of the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1989-90. The state alone was seen as an instrument for change and society as a single, passive entity to be moulded by the 'intelligentsia in power'. This approach had a negative influence on the development of a democratic civil society in the Mazowiecki period and on the fortunes of the government. Chapters 3 and 4 will maintain the framework introduced above. Chapter 3 will examine the influence of the intelligentsia ethos on the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and state power. Chapter 4 will study the relationship between the 'intelligentsia in power' and Polish society in the Mazowiecki period. Consequently the Mazowiecki administration's contribution to the development of a democratic, civil society in post-communist Poland can be evaluated.

- 1 see 'Weakness of the Party Political Scene' Chapter 3 p349.
- 2 see Appendix I p704.
- 3 see Appendix I p709.
- 4 "For all intents and purposes Poland became a one-party state" (Leslie p298).
- 5 see Leslie p285.
- 6 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia in the Late Communist period' Chapter 2 p251.
- 7 "The process of socialist industrialisation and accompanying urbanisation changed Polish society from a rural to an urban one at least in numerical terms" (Grzegorz Weclawowicz Contemporary Poland: Space and Society London UCL Press 1996 p70, henceforth Weclawowicz).
- 8 see 'Inter-War Society' Diagram 2.3 Chapter 2 pl69.
- 9 see 'The Legacy of the Command Economy' Chapter 3 p295.
- 10 "They were physically in urban areas, but their values were those of the countryside - distrust of the state, ignorance, quiescence, no tradition of demanding rights, of acting as a citizen.." (Schopflin pl50).
- 11 "In Soviet-type systems as elsewhere, workers typically resent intellectuals' arrogance and privilege, while intellectuals often distrust workers' fundamentalist or populist politics. The communist authorities have exploited this distrust in their effort to quell any kind of unified opposition to them" (Michael D. Kennedy 'The intelligentsia in the constitution of civil societies and post-communist regimes in Hungary and Poland' Theory and Society 21 1992 p39, henceforth Kennedy (b)).



- 12 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p242.
- 13 "...the conservative peasant; not the peasant who strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the small-holding, but rather the peasant who wants to consolidate this holding, not the country folk who, linked up with the towns, wants to overthrow the old order through their own energies, but, on the contrary, those who in stupefied seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small-holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of the empire. It represents not the enlightenment, but the superstition of the peasant; not his judgement but his prejudice; not his future but his past..." (Karl Marx *The Class Struggles in France 1848-50* cited in Shanin p231).
- 14 see J. Wilkin 'Private agriculture and socialism: the Polish experience' in R. Clark (ed) Poland: the Economy in the 1980s Harlow, England, Longman 1989).
- 15 see Schopflin p151.
- 16 see 'Polish Society' Chapter 1 p51.
- 17 "Despite being politically successful in their struggle with the communist regime, peasants in Poland remained socially and economically backward, and unprepared for the introduction of market economics after 1989" (Weclawowicz p43, see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p488).
- 18 "Until the 1980s the communist elite viewed [petty entrepreneurs] as class enemies of the socialist system...while socialist development was to supplant these groups, the

system had also taken the appropriate bureaucratic, legalistic measures to hasten the withering away of these sectors" (Voytek Zubek 'The Polish Communist Elite and the Petty Entrepreneurs' East European Quarterly XVV, No. 3 September 1991 p339).

- 19 see Davis (b) p224.
- 20 see 'Inter-War Society' Chapter 2 p174.
- 21 "In Poland after W.W.II the world observed the significant modification of this myth, adapting itself to reduced possibilities, but providing a comprehensive strategy for defence against Communist ideology by setting it against the essentially Polish and Catholic" (Z. Zielinski, 'Mit 'Polak-Katolik' in W. Wrzesinski ed. Polskie Mity Polityczne XIX i XX Wieku Wroclaw: Wroclaw University Press 1994 p117).
- 22 "The introduction of these measures did not produce a collapse in belief on a massive scale, what's more, it indirectly contributed to the consolidation of religiosity understood as 'the national belief'" (Fr Janusz Marianski 'Czy kosciol katolicki w polsce jest sila polityczna?' in K. Palecki ed. Elity polityczne w polsce 1992 p213).
- 23 see 'Kosciol katolicki w polsce 1918-90' Rocznik statystyczny 1991 p246.
- 24 "Unity was not always understood as 'unity in diversity' but uniformity in word and deed, and obedience to the hierarchy" (Fr Wladyslaw Piwowarski 'Rola kosciola

hierarchicznego w przemianach społeczno-politycznych' in K. Palecki ed. *Elity polityczne w Polsce* p208).

- 25 see 'Anti-Semitism in the Presidential Elections' Chapter 4 p594.
- 26 see A. Sabbat-Swidlicki 'Bishops Call for Return of Religious Education in Schools' in *RFE/RL*, Vol.1 No.23 8/6/90 p35.
- 27 see 'The Return of Religious Education' Chapter 4 p524.
- 28 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Church' Chapter 4 p513.
- 29 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia in the Late Communist period' Chapter 2 p252.
- 30 Polish sociologists such as Podgorecki among others noted the emergence of this phenomenon: "The state of social warpiness is this peculiar situation when the target of activity, due to its changeability, discordance, and cancelling of validity by norms detected against themselves was transformed into a state of constant rejection of all possible rules" (Adam Podgorecki, *Sociotechnika* Warsaw PWN 1972 p54).
- 31 "The nature of communist rule ensured that society remained fragmented and that there was only a minimum of communication laterally between different social groups and that as far as possible power flows should go from the top down and thereby keep society divided" (Schöpflin p171).
- 32 "In theory and in practice the Soviet-type one-party system excludes any independent civil society. Its existence is

contradictory to the system's organizational principle"  
(Janina Frentzel Zagorska 'Civil Society in Poland and  
Hungary' Soviet Studies Vol.42 No.4 1990 p760).

- 33 see 'Civil Society in the West' Chapter 1 p34.
- 34 Arato describes how the imposition of the communist system in Eastern Europe capped the potential political, economic and social sources of civil society: "There the social, economic and cultural primacy of the prerogative state meant that the parameters of civil society were non-existent: the system of needs (excluded by the imperative control plan), the institution of laws (excluded by the idea of substantive justice), the system of plurality (excluded by the one-party monopoly) and the system of publics (excluded by the idea of absolute knowledge)" (Arato, 1981 p26).
- 35 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p252.
- 36 "The intelligentsia...has had a very complex life story. Some achieved their goals to a certain degree through winding roads. Since Martial Law the view has persisted that "collaboration" tarnished only those who legitimised the actions of the authorities after 13th December 1981, but the so-called electorate has a better memory. It has not forgotten the last fifty tears when several parts of the intelligentsia offered support to the new system..." (Zdislaw Pietrasik 'Themes from the Marriage' Polityka 28/7/90 p1).
- 37 see Appendix II p735.
- 38 see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity' Chapter 3 p394.

- 39 see J. Tymowski Organizacja Szkolnictwa Wyszego w Polsce Warsaw PWN 1980 p55.
- 40 Jan Szczepanski 'Early Stages of Socialist Industrialisation and Changes in Social Class Structure' in K Slomczynski and T Krauze eds. Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland White Plains, New York: Sharpe 1978 p27.
- 41 see Tymowski p96.
- 42 see J Hryniewicz 'Ruchliwosc spoleczna w polsce w latach 1948-58' Przeglad Socjologiczny Vol. 35 cited in G. Kolankiewicz and Paul G. Lewis, Poland: Politics, Economics and Society London: Pinter 1988 p54.
- 43 "The idea of a people's intelligentsia assumed that it is a stratum of highly qualified workers performing tasks and ideologically tied to the party. It was hypothesised that members of the intelligentsia should be recruited from the labouring classes, for then they would have a natural tendency to accept an ideology expressing the true interests of these classes and thus would identify their life goals with those of the socialist system" (J. Szczepanski Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland p27).
- 44 "The graduates of these [post-war technical] colleges, because they lacked formal, higher education, were not members of the intelligentsia proper. They were expected to join the ranks of the intelligentsia whilst remaining ideologically aligned" (Kolankiewicz p184).
- 45 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p196.

- 46 "These professors possessed great self-assurance deriving from their leading role in war-time conspiracy. Far from being able to reconstitute the old, the PPR [post-war pro-Soviet Polish Communist Party] could hardly determine the shape of the new" (Connelly p386).
- 47 "The Polish [Communist] Party's strategy of "exploiting" the old intelligentsia in order to train younger generations could not succeed. Polish Communists indeed managed to bring large numbers of worker and peasant students to university. But once they entered the university milieu, these students were lost to the Party. That milieu had not been transformed; its standards and norms were in place" (Connelly p388).
- 48 see Chapter 2 p250.
- 49 see Chapter 2 p252.
- 50 see Kolakiewicz p183.
- 51 "A widening field of activity was the main attraction drawing many intellectuals to the Party" (A. Grzegorzcyk 'Mistakes and Failures' Polityka 20/1/90 p3).
- 52 This attitude was termed 'neo-positivist' - see Kennedy (b) p71.
- 53 "Intellectuals played a decisive role in overthrowing communist rule in Eastern Europe in 1989. There is a certain justice in this because communism itself was created by intellectuals" (David Chiot, 'Post-communist Eastern Europe: A Survey of Opinion' East European Politics and Societies Vol.4 No.2 Spring 1992 p167).

- 54 "There was a feeling of belonging to the elite, the taste of power, the joy of participation in a chosen group that was arbitrarily reshaping society..." (Hirszowicz p347).
- 55 "The most seminal of the intellectual camps in the East, the Marxist, the Bolshevik, the Communist, was certainly the most radical, but not necessarily an idiosyncratic or freak expression of this intellectual spirit" (Bauman (a) p167).
- 56 Stanislaw Baranczak talks of "the powerful sense of guilt that pervaded the intellectual community in the post-war years (intellectuals saw themselves as the previously privileged and trusted elite which had in fact contributed to the collapse of the inter-war state)" (Stanislaw Baranczak 'The Polish Intellectual' *Salmagundi* 70-71 (1986-87) p224). Czeslaw Milosz describes the desire of intellectuals in post-war Poland for the type of radical, 'total' change offered by communism: "the state of things inclined me towards left-wing ideas...only men true to a socialist program would be capable of abolishing the injustices of the past, and rebuilding the economy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe" Czeslaw Milosz *The Captive Mind* Penguin Harmondsworth 1980 Preface viii).
- 57 "The historic leap which will raise the material and cultural level of the whole nation, increasing the qualitative weight of Poland in Europe" (J. Berman 'Zagadnienie pracy partyjny wsrod inteligencji' Nowe Drogi No.2 March 1947 pp136-144).
- 58 Baranczak summarises the affinity between the Polish intelligentsia and communism in these terms:  
"...[communism] could lure many intellectuals into collaboration on the strength of its patriotic slogans

appealing to the widely felt need for national unity...the oppressive features of the post-war political system were justified in the eyes of many intellectuals by its "revolutionary" character; the imposition of communism was thus interpreted as a necessary social change" (Baranczak p224).

- 59 A. Grzegorzcyk 'Mistakes and Failures' Polityka 20/1/90 p3.
- 60 see 'The Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform Chapter 3 p307.
- 61 "Writers on state salaries become a new type of state official, producing many tons of spoilage...Officials never hold the reins of the 'government of souls" (Gella p24).
- 62 "These groups were...acting autonomously...there was no co-operation across strata" (Michael D Kennedy Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-Type Society Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991 p27, henceforth Kennedy (a)). Walter Connor agrees that "In 1956, each group contributed to the upheaval of the Polish October, but in different and uncoordinated ways" (W Connor 'Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?' Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1980 p4).
- 63 "During the 1950s and 1960s various forms and levels of opposition coexisted without any affinity and often in outright hostility. On the one hand was the spontaneous popular resistance rooted in religious faith and tradition and relying on the Church and family; on the other hand were the intellectuals' actions which were becoming increasingly critical of the regime, but were also at best distrustful of the "primitive" masses and "obscurantist" Polish Catholicism (A. Smolar and P. Kende, The Role of



Opposition Groups on the Eve of Democratization in Poland and Hungary 1987-88 1988 p8)

- 64 "The return of religious education was met on the pages of the revisionist press e.g. 'Po Prostu' with articles attacking the intolerance of the Catholic catechism.." (Michnik (a) p46).
- 65 see 'The Return of Religious Education' Chapter 4 p524.
- 66 Adam Michnik 'What we want to do and what we can do' Telos No.47 Spring 1981 p68, henceforth Michnik (b).
- 67 see Appendix I p666.
- 68 "The year 1976 brought an even more far-reaching attempt at healing the rift that had separated intellectuals from other social strata" (Baranczak p225).
- 69 "In the beginning the KOR circle was composed exclusively of members from the intelligentsia..." (Jan Jozef Lipski KOR: A History of the Workers' Defence Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 University of California Press London 1985 p22, henceforth Lipski).
- 70 "The activities of Catholic representatives, press and clubs prepared the ground for the co-operation between the secular democratic opposition and the Church" (Arato (a) p41).
- 71 "Solidarity was an alliance of all classes in Polish civil society against the state" (Kennedy (b) p39).
- 72 "The success of the strikes in 1980 was possible thanks to the functioning of a political strategy worked out in the

KOR epoch" (Adam Michnik Letters From Prison trans. by Maya Latynski Berkeley: University of California Press 1985 p147, henceforth Michnik (c)).

- 73 e.g. see Roman Laba The Roots of Solidarity Princeton, Princeton University Press 1991.
- 74 see Introduction to Chapter 4 p443.
- 75 "Solidarity became elite...the class base moved from workers to intelligentsia" (Kennedy (b) p46).
- 76 "In the summer of 1980, the Polish intellectual accepted the superiority of the people" (Andrzej Kijowski, 'Co sie zmieni...' Arka 1-9 Krakow 1983-4 pp131-142).
- 77 see below p254.
- 78 "One can clearly see how the worker - claimant current turned to populism, how the Catholic - traditional current degenerated into nationalism, treating the Church and religious values instrumentally, and finally how the intelligentsia - democratic current was sentenced to exclusivism and marginalization" (Adam Michnik 'The Devil of Our Times' Krytyka No.37 1991 p5).
- 79 "[Gierek's] alienation of the peasantry proved to be another major error, in that the agricultural sector, at the constant depression of procurement prices and other forms of harassment, began to produce for subsistence only" (Schopflin p183)
- 80 "The events of October...resulted in greater power for management but had very little consequence for the industrial worker in terms of direct control over his work

situation (George Kolankiewicz, 'The Polish Industrial Manual Working Class' in Lane and Kolankiewicz p119).

- 81 see 'The Legacy of the Command Economy' Chapter 3 p295.
- 82 see Roman Laba Roots of Solidarity, A Political Sociology of Poland's Working Class Democratisation 1991 p157.
- 83 Adam Michnik agreed that "In 1970 it was clear to everyone that it was not economic leadership that was being questioned, but rather power and its ways of communicating with society" (Michnik (b) p70).
- 84 "[Gierek] carefully alienated one group after another...Every major social group found itself with strong reasons for dissociating itself from the system" (Schopflin p183).
- 85 see Hirszowicz p354.
- 86 see God's Playground p598.
- 87 see 'Communist Society' Chapter 2 p225.
- 88 "The party had in fact attracted the technical intelligentsia, but many who joined were passive members or regarded the party as an aid to their professional duties" (Lane and Kolankiewicz p231).
- 89 "'Work hard' they said to the people: 'Get rich' they said to the leaders. At that time there were no longer debates about Marxism or Communism, only discussions about productivity" (Michnik (b) p71).
- 90 "We have come to a point beyond which the classics of Marxism-Leninism had to stop their reflections. As futurologists they were unable to go any further. And now

the question what to do with that system, how to develop it has to be answered" (Literatura 1974 no. 49 p4 cited in Hirsizowicz p35'7).

- 91 see Z. Zaluski The Polish Seven Deadly Sins Warsaw 1962.
- 92 A commentator of the time warned: "Reviving the tradition might overcome political apathy, but only at the price of awakening their aspirations for complete independence from the Soviet Union..." (Adam Bromke 'History and Politics in Poland' Problems of Communism 15,5 Sep/Oct 1966 p71).
- 93 "They destroyed any lingering hopes for revisionism among the intelligentsia as the means toward the humanisation of communism" (Kennedy (a) p32). Adam Michnik who was one of the student protesters expelled from Warsaw University agreed: "I think it was then that the umbilical cord linking intellectuals and many young to the Party was cut" (Michnik (b) p70).
- 94 see 'Western Intellectuals and Society' Chapter 1 p98.
- 95 "A revolution in Paris would very shortly bring chain reactions in Western Europe (Rome, Athens, Madrid etc.) as well as in Eastern Europe (Warsaw)" (A Glucksmann, 'Strategy and Revolution in France 1968' New Left Review no.52 1968 pp67-121).
- 96 "Michnik and other young, future KOR radicals participated in a student movement that saw itself far more in solidarity with students in the West than with workers in the East" (David Ost 'The Crisis of Liberalism in Poland' Telos No.89 Fall 1991 p91, henceforth Ost).

- 97 "1968 marks the end of revisionism and the rebirth of civil society" (Rudolf Tokes *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London: John Hopkins University Press 1979 p60).
- 98 "People band together for specific, not general tasks. And at the moment we can introduce neither independence nor parliamentary democracy. In the meantime the mass movement has to undertake concrete social problems and create realistic chances for their immediate resolution" (Jacek Kuron *Polityka i odpowiedzialnosc* London: Aneks 1984 p70).
- 99 see 'Introduction' p9.
- 100 see Georgy Konrad *Antipolitics* London: Quarter 1984 pl1.
- 101 see Schopflin p207.
- 102 see Chapter 1 p92.
- 103 Michnik stated "Politics and ethics belong to different worlds. Yet we, the men and women of the anti-totalitarian opposition movements have a different view of politics and our participation in it...Thus there was created the political idea of building civil societies outside the totalitarian state...What George Konrad has called antipolitical politics, what Vaclav Havel has described as politics based on the power of the powerless" (Michnik (c) pl47).
- 104 see E. Hankiss 'In Search of Paradigm' *Daedalus* Winter, 1990 pp183-214.
- 105 see Introduction pl0.
- 106 For Adam Michnik, Mazowiecki was "the type of person who crossed boundaries. The boundary between the authorities and the Church, between the Church and the lay

intelligentsia, between the official sphere and the democratic opposition" (Adam Michnik *Takie czasy... rzecz o kompromisie* London, Aneks, 1986 p32).

- 107 "The Catholic Church endorsed Solidarity's general ideology and played a vital role in making available its tremendous material resources to help meet the organizational needs of the movement" (Voytek Zubek 'The Threshold of Poland's 'Transition: 1989 Electoral Campaign as the Last Act of a United Solidarity' *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XXXIV, No.4 December 1991 p357).
- 108 "Today in Poland, only the church lives an authentically free life under the tolerance of the authorities. December 1981 further strengthened the influence and authority of the church, along with its potential for focusing social energies...the church unites, integrates and offers the possibility of an authentic and open social life to many people. The church often donates its organisational, housing and other facilities for social, educational and cultural work (Lipski p464).
- 109 see 'Participants at the Round Table Talks' RFE/RL Situation Report 3/3/89 p22.
- 110 see Krzysztof Kosela 'The Polish Catholic Church and the Elections of 1989', *Religion in Communist Lands* 18, 2 Summer 1990 p135, henceforth Kosela.
- 111 see Ibid. p135.
- 112 "Only communist totalitarianism, and the consciousness that common values were being threatened led to an eventual rapprochement" (Kosciol, Lewica, Dialog p90).

- 113 see Appendix I p668.
- 114 "ROPCiO willingly proclaimed its Catholicism...while KOR was in this respect a coalition...of people with a variety of philosophies" (Lipski p122).
- 115 Jacek Kuron Gwiedziny Czas: "wiary i winy" dalszy ciąg Tom II Wspomien London: Aneks 1991 p92.
- 116 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Catholic Church Chapter 4 p513.
- 117 see Appendix I p722.
- 118 see Chapter 4 p591.
- 119 "KOR emerged from a moral impulse. Our complex, especially for the intellectuals, was that in December 1970, when the workers' blood was being spilled, the intellectuals remained silent...we had already betrayed the workers once, and we could not do it a second time" (Adam Michnik 'Pewien Polski Etos...Rozmowa Dany Cohn-Bendita z Adamem Michnikiem' Kontakt 7/8 July/August 1988 p43).
- 120 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p187.
- 121 see Ost p88.
- 122 Piotr Wierbicki, a columnist for Tygodnik Powszechny was a representative of this strand: "Poles must...decide what they want. Whether to fumble blindly with the detonator of revolution and believe that once the masses go out in the streets all problems will be over...or to concentrate potential energy, reason and political strength on making more room

for free enterprise, private business and freedom" (Piotr Wierbicki 'Czas wyboru' Glos No.3 December 1986 p49).

- 123 "The regime...facilitated the promotion of a new patriotic politics [amongst the intelligentsia and others], based on the spirit of entrepreneurialism. Although its promoters included several former worker activists, this agenda was also anti-worker, arguing that the solution for Poland's dilemmas lies in the promotion of a free-market economy" (Kennedy (b) p36).
- 124 "The weakening, erosion of the opposition especially among the workers seems to be accompanied by a widening of the gap between, very generally speaking, the workers and the intelligentsia" (A. Smolar The Role of Opposition on the Eve of Democratization 1987-88 1989 p40).
- 125 see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 pl24.
- 126 "The right to make compromises ought to lie with KKP [Solidarity's National Commission of Understanding dominated by intellectuals] as a whole after consultation with MKZs [Solidarity's Inter-factory Committees organised on a regional basis] and not with narrow working groups which are often more than half composed of non-elected persons (experts)...KKP needs to create a permanent group to contact Parliament (so that contact will not be confined to secret 'diplomacy' by experts...There are more and more doubts about the role of experts and an anti-intellectual mood is appearing" (Jadwiga Staniszkis 'O niedemokratycznych tendencjach w Solidarnosci' Robotnik, 74 20/3/81).



- 127 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p463.
- 128 see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity' Chapter 3 p394.
- 129 "Civil society as a project was born in Central Europe in answer to the despicable omnipotence of the totalitarian state. It was a project of emancipation, spiritual, cultural, social and political" (Adam Michnik 'Pulapka nacjonalizmu' Gazeta Wyborcza 10/2/90 pl).
- 130 "If one looks closer, the rapprochement between the intellectuals and the rest of Polish society can be seen as what it really is - as, briefly speaking, a positive side-effect of an otherwise utterly negative situation" (Baranczak p226).
- 131 Michnik (c) pl44.

## Chapter 3 The Mazowiecki Government and the State

### Introduction

Chapter 1 established the relationship between the intellectual and the state as vital to the development of democracy. As autonomous critics of political power they help maintain civil society as a realm where the interests of societal values are articulated to a responsive state<sup>1</sup>. We identified the intelligentsia as a milieu in Polish society which has a special relationship with state power. The universal, 'totalist' perspective which the intellectual idiom employs (thanks to its superior knowledge) to criticise and reform state power is combined in the Polish case with a desire to exercise that power<sup>2</sup>.

In Chapter 2 this relationship was examined in modern Polish history. The inter-war and communist periods were marked by the intelligentsia's preoccupation with state power, either as incumbents or alienated outsiders. The discourse tended to be concerned with which strand of the intelligentsia should control the state in order to lead Polish society to a better future, rather than how the state could be reformed to grant different forces in Polish society a greater say<sup>3</sup>. The collapse of communist rule and the rise of the Solidarity movement to a position of political dominance gave the Polish intelligentsia an unprecedented

opportunity to finally unify the categories of knowledge and culture in the state. The intelligentsia dominated Solidarity and representatives of the milieu took up the most prominent state positions in post-communist Poland<sup>4</sup>.

This chapter will contend that, although the circumstances of transition Poland suggested a strengthening of state power, the statist, 'totalist' ethos of the Polish intelligentsia was an especially salient factor as the Mazowiecki government approached economic and political reform. In theory both the economic and political spheres were liberalised by the 'intelligentsia in power' from state control. This was in keeping with the declared aim of the new elite to institute a market economy and parliamentary democracy in Poland. However, at the same time, prominent intellectuals in the new elite argued that until Polish society could fulfil the rights and duties of modern citizenship, the state ought to maintain control of the transition process. Consequently, transition was presented as an elite-level, intelligentsia led process and society was expected to act as a homogeneous, passive entity. This was an unrealistic proposition, given the deep socio-economic cleavages within Polish society and the ideological cleavages within the intelligentsia milieu itself.

The Mazowiecki government's programme deepened these cleavages in the short-term at least. Its economic reforms

heightened socio-economic disparities in Poland and its political reforms alienated certain strands of the intelligentsia who could draw on societal frustrations to further their own statist ambitions. As a result, the politics of the Mazowiecki period was marked by the acrimonious battle of intelligentsia elites for state power. This is, of course, inimical to the development of a consensual, civil society and a representative, democratic system.

Chapter 3 will examine the relationship between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the state in this context. The government's approach to reform of the state economy and the centralised political system will be seen as the result of a number of factors (including the legacy of communism and the necessities of the transition period). However the influence of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia will be presented as a vital factor behind the elite-level approach to economic liberalisation and democratisation. The short-term consequences of this approach, in terms of the rise of populism and the fragmentation and instability of the political scene will be shown as contrary to the development of a representative democracy and Western-style civil society. They will also be seen as a threat to the political reign of the 'best and brightest'.

### 3(a) The Economic Sphere

#### Introduction

Before addressing the major themes of this work, namely political and social developments during the Mazowiecki government's time in office, one has to pay heed to the economic context. I agree with Norman Davies that in explaining the systemic changes in Poland one should give primacy to the political over the economic sphere. Although one can point to the influence of the communist regime's economic mistakes in the radicalisation of the anti-communist opposition, the reasons these mistakes were made lie in the realm of ideological constraints and political manoeuvring<sup>5</sup>.

Nevertheless, recent history illustrates the particularly symbiotic relationship between political ferment and economic crisis in Poland. In recent Polish history the most profound social and political events have been stimulated by the communist regime's economic policies. The explosions of societal anger which occurred in 1970, 1976 and 1980 were all sparked by one of the perennial problems in centrally-planned economies - price distortions<sup>6</sup>.

Moreover the state of the Polish economy in 1989 made economic reform one of the most pressing and difficult tasks for the Mazowiecki government. Much of it's subsequent troubles

involved the defence of its economic reforms against social and political groups. For these reasons economic analysis plays an essential part in our study of the transition period.

The Mazowiecki government had an onerous task in reforming the state-owned economy. It was in a state of collapse and required immediate and drastic reform. However, the pace and direction of economic reform remained contentious issues. On the one hand, the state was expected to encourage the modernisation of the economy. This entailed a willingness to surrender areas of competence to the private sphere, in keeping with the practice of developed market economies in the West. As we have seen, the development of a propertied middle-class is one of the bases for the development of civil society and democracy<sup>7</sup>.

On the other hand the Polish state, after forty years of communism was expected to maintain its obligation to society in terms of guaranteed employment, welfare and subsidies. As a government exercising power under the auspices of the Solidarity trade union, the Mazowiecki administration was seen by many as representative of working-class interests. Workers expected to be the main beneficiaries of economic reform. After the experience of communism they were well aware of the potency of organised, anti-state protest should these expectations be disappointed.

In effect, the Mazowiecki government faced a choice between gradual and radical economic reform: "There are essentially two strategies that the Polish government can adopt: to try to transform the economy at a stroke or to push through structural reforms at a somewhat slower but nevertheless resolute pace"<sup>8</sup>. Gradually introducing the elements of a market-based economy (such as private property, the end of government subsidies to industry, freeing prices) would protect Polish society from some of the side-effects of too rapid system change. This in turn would help maintain public support for the Mazowiecki government and its general democratisation programme. On the other hand, one could argue that gradual reform could needlessly lengthen the trauma of transition and ultimately harm the prospects of achieving an efficient market economy.

The other choice was so-called 'shock therapy' which would involve the introduction of most of the basic features of a functioning market economy virtually overnight. This option promised a shortening of the transition period and, so the logic ran, the prospect of the benefits of a market economy becoming apparent sooner rather than later. This approach would obviously subject large parts of Polish society, including the workers, to immediate austerity and threaten society's support for the Mazowiecki government.

The government chose the radical approach to economic reform through the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990. Although the choice can be explained by a number of factors (the plight of the Polish economy, the general rejection of leftist economic theory and piecemeal reform and the influence of Western institutions), the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia was especially important. The elitism and social isolation of the milieu was evident in its underestimation of the short-term effects of 'shock therapy' on the workers and peasants.

We have also noted the intelligentsia's attachment to rational systems, especially those of Western origin, and this was how the neo-liberal programme was packaged. Moreover, the radical approach also favoured the statism of the milieu. In the long-term marketisation of the economy would reduce the role of the state. However, the rapid introduction of market rules on a society that was largely unprepared to take advantage of them meant that the state would continue to play a leading role in the economic sphere (especially in comparison with corporatist or neo-corporatist options which would give worker or peasant representatives more of a say).

The consequence of this approach was that the development of the economic aspect of a democratic, civil society was impossible in the short-term at least. Social inequalities were exacerbated by



the Balcerowicz Plan. The majority of citizens had neither the capital nor the expertise to develop private enterprise. What was worse, the new economic elite consisted mainly of former communists who had transferred state-owned property into their own hands and thus had assets to develop. The Balcerowicz Plan thus contributed to the polarisation of society and the development of populist, anti-state organisations.

The section will proceed as follows: the factors behind the need for drastic economic reform (including the deficiencies of the command system) will be outlined. The influence of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia is regarded as central. The contents of the Balcerowicz Plan will then be presented. Finally the results of the Balcerowicz Plan in the short and long-term and their influence on the development of a democratic, civil society will be evaluated.

## (i) Reasons Behind the Radical Approach to Economic Reform

### The Legacy of the Command Economy

The fundamental flaws of the command system (mostly concerned with the unrealistic assumption that the operations of a complex economy could be controlled, planned and directed from the centre) were manifested in Poland in several ways. The communists' determination to develop heavy industry - in keeping with an ideological commitment to the industrial working-class - skewed the allocation of resources in favour of this sector. Heavy industries (such as steel, coal etc.) were over-developed at the expense of other parts of the economy, notably agriculture and service sectors. Poland was something of an exception in communist East-Central Europe. Its traditionally large and influential agricultural sector meant that, uniquely in communist Eastern Europe, its farm sector managed to retain some degree of economic independence from the state. However, as with the other non-heavy industrial sectors of the economy it was neglected by the communists (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Comparative Structure of Employment, 1988, in %)

Country	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Services
Poland	27.8	28.2	7.9	36
Hungary	17	32.5	5.2	45.3
Czechoslovakia	10.1	36.5	9.3	44.1
Austria	7.8	28.9	8.5	54.8
Netherlands	4.6	19.7	6.5	69.1
Japan	7.2	24.6	9.4	58.7
Germany	3.7	33.5	6.7	56.1
Sweden	5	22.7	6	66.4
United States	2.8	19.9	6.5	70.7

Source: GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny 1992 p484 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Labour Force Statistics (Paris OECD 1991).

This problem was exacerbated by the obligations of membership of Comecon. The industrial structure of member countries was geared to the needs of the Soviet Union as a whole rather than domestic requirements. In the early years this entailed the Soviet Union's maximum exploitation of raw, heavy materials in member countries. As a result the range, quality and availability of products on the native market was poor. It must also be noted that large-scale industrialisation led to massive pollution.

Competition for preferential treatment under the Plan encouraged enterprises to 'hoard' resources. Uncertainties over

supply encouraged enterprise managers to stockpile raw materials. There was also hoarding of labour. Larger firms with bigger work-forces were usually granted greater status by the Plan and they stood more chance of gaining support for further development. Unemployment in was illegal in communist Poland but labour hoarding and disguised unemployment were pervasive, accounting for at least 25% of the country's work-force, and perhaps as much as 50-60%<sup>9</sup>.

The official absence of unemployment, labour hoarding and poor working conditions led to poor worker discipline. Efforts to bolster worker productivity were undermined by the wage scales mandated by central planners. Wage differentials based on professional qualifications and educational achievements were far narrower than in the West. They also suffered in comparison to some of Poland's eastern bloc neighbours. In the 1980's the average wages of non-manual workers in Poland were only 1.05 times higher than the earnings of manual workers. In the West a typical ratio was 1.45 and in Hungary the ratio was roughly 1.13 - well above Poland<sup>10</sup>. Absenteeism and idleness led to low levels of production. Workers' lack of commitment to their enterprises and the disorganisation caused by hoarding contributed to the development of a black market or second economy with its own, often inordinately inflated, prices. This added to the inefficiency of the official economy.

From the 1970s onward changes in the global economy made the defects of the command system even more noticeable. In the non-communist global economy lighter industries such as electronics, with new products, and those with flexible enterprise structures in which innovation and research was central, emerged as the motor of growth. The performance of the Polish command economy, with cumbersome bureaucracy and inordinate concentration on heavy industries which required large amounts of raw materials and labour, looked increasingly out-dated. (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Resource Intensity of East European CPEs and Industrialised West European Market Economies: Energy and Steel 1970-80)

Countries	Energy intensity in 1979 in kg of coal equivalent consumption per 1000 US dollars of GDP	Steel intensity in 1980 in kg of steel consumption per 1000 US dollars of GDP
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**East European CPE's**

Poland	1,515	135
Bulgaria	1,464	87
Czechoslovakia	1,290	132
Hungary	1,058	88
GDR	1,356	88
Soviet Union	1,490	135
Total, unweighted (6)	1,363	111


**West European Market  
Economies**

Austria	603	39
Belgium	619	36
Denmark	502	30
Finland	767	40
France	502	42
FRG	565	52
Italy	655	79
Norway	1,114	38
Sweden	713	44
Switzerland	371	26
United Kingdom	820	38
Total, unweighted (11)	660	42

Source: GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny 1992 p484 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Labour Force Statistics (Paris OECD 1991).

The command system was designed to expand heavy industry but the bureaucracy involved was too unwieldy to make the type of rapid, innovative decisions required to develop lighter, modern industries<sup>11</sup>. In the 1970s Poland ploughed money, usually borrowed from the West, into industries to make up for this inability to innovate. However the money was either wasted or absorbed by the dominant heavy industrial sector which wielded most political influence. This trend was exemplified by the economic policies of the Gierek regime in the 1970s. The only lasting feature of this process was serious indebtedness to the West (see Table 3.3)

Table 3.3: Polish International Debt 1990



Source: Economist 13/1/90 p28

The scale of Poland's debt burden and the negative influence of debt repayments on any attempts to develop the domestic

economy were obvious<sup>12</sup>. Thus the theoretical and practical deficiencies of the command system in the Polish case, apparent from the outset, became increasingly noticeable during the late communist period. These weaknesses resulted in a pattern of general economic decline punctuated with periods of deep crisis<sup>13</sup>.

The party-state's refusal to contemplate systemic reform of the command economy doomed attempts to halt economic decline. The founding of the command system on the central tenets of communist ideology, including the 'leading role of the Party', meant that no comprehensive reform of the economy could be undertaken without challenging the guiding principles of the entire party-state.

Piecemeal reform efforts in the 1980s by the Jaruzelski, Messner and Rakowski regimes actually contributed to the crisis. For instance some prices were freed in the hope that they find more realistic, market levels and end the pricing disparities which were seriously impairing central planners decisions. However these moves merely provoked demands by the work-force for increased wages. Fearing social unrest the communists consistently submitted to these demands. This fuelled galloping inflation (see Table 3.4) and contributed to the collapse of the government's budgetary discipline.



Other measures, such as 'nomenklatura privatisation' whereby communist managers were allowed to transfer their firms into private enterprises were received equally badly by the workers and Polish society in general<sup>14</sup>. In general the reformist elements of the regimes in the 1980s were trapped in a vicious circle: on the one hand they recognised the need to reform the economy in the direction of market-based criteria, on the other hand they were constrained by the presence of a radically politicised work-force which resisted and by the party-state's refusal to contemplate far-reaching reform, lest it spark political liberalisation. The end result was a piecemeal approach which worsened the economic and political climate<sup>15</sup>.

Table 3.4: Polish Inflation Explodes - Prices of Selected Goods  
1983-1989 (Zloty).

Commodity	December 1983	December 1988	December 1989
Bread	16	50	120
Milk	14.5	39	1070
Sugar	41	165	2850
Beef (w/bone)	180	400	5850
Vodka (0.5l)	670	1950	13050
Coffee (100g)	320	@800	3400
Daily paper	5	15	180
Refrigerator	17200	33-129000	640000
Fiat 126p (FSO)	250,000	1000000	12000000
\$1.00 (market)	660	3400	8-10000
Average Monthly Wage	20005	52600	622000

Source: compiled from Polityka 6/1/90 by MH Bernhard 'Barriers to Further Political and Economic Change in Poland' Studies in Comparative Communism Vol XXIII Nos 3/4 1990 p325

At the end of the 1980s, after four decades of a centrally planned system, Poland was left in a state of economic crisis.

Commentators stressed the atmosphere of impending calamity rampant in the country at the end of the 1980s: massive debt, the crumbling infrastructure, the problem of severe pollution etc. were bringing the country to the brink of disaster. The gravity of Poland's plight was symbolically marked when, at the beginning of

1990, the United Nations changed the country's economic status from Group B (developed) to Group C (developing)<sup>16</sup>.

The scale of the communists' failure also guaranteed the societal rejection of any economic strategies which were recognisably left-wing. The general mood in Polish society at the time of the transition precluded the introduction of any programmes of economic reform which displayed the slogans and trappings of socialist thinking<sup>17</sup>. However, Polish society's rejection of the Left had more to do with the language of the Left than with concrete programmes or policies. Most workers continued to demand the type of state policies associated with leftist ideology<sup>18</sup>.

## The Role of the West

Western governments and financial institutions also pressed the Mazowiecki government for a radical, pro-market reform package. In the wake of the Round Table and the partially free elections of summer 1989, Poland was targeted by several foreign aid and loan programmes. The EC contributed to a 'Currency Stabilisation Fund' aimed at bolstering confidence among bankers and foreign investors. Its provision was co-ordinated with the IMF which itself agreed a loan deal with the Mazowiecki government in early January 1990. The IMF agreement involved a \$725 million bridging loan by the US and the Basle-based Bank for International Settlements. A further \$1.67 billion worth of loans was scheduled for disbursement over the following eighteen months. The European Community, aiming to stimulate an economic boom in Central Europe set up the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and approved further grants and food aid for Poland..

One of the obvious costs of this help was acceptance, for the foreseeable future at least, that the tight fiscal and monetarist policies of Western institutions would play a large part in guiding Poland's domestic economic programmes. The Mazowiecki government was clearly aware that an agreement with the IMF was a precondition for substantive Western support. The IMF's

Managing Director described relations with the Polish government as having entered an "intense", "more direct" phase<sup>19</sup>.

However, recent studies of the role of Western financial institutions in the formulation of economic policy in post-communist Poland suggest that their input was not necessarily decisive<sup>20</sup>. The IMF was found to be more tolerant of budget deficits and inflation rates than may be imagined. Western institutions were thus influential, but they did not dominate the will of the Mazowiecki government when it came to economic reform<sup>21</sup>.

## (ii) The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and Economic Reform

All of these factors notwithstanding, I would argue that a major influence behind the Mazowiecki administration's choice of a radical course of economic reform was the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. Neo-liberal economics attracted the 'intelligentsia in power' in a number of ways. Firstly, it was commonly seen as a Western system, supported by Western institutions and economists. We have noted the intelligentsia's idealistic attachment to Western practices<sup>83</sup>. In 1990 the logic that Poland's 'return to the West' would be facilitated by the immediate introduction of a Western-type economic system was prevalent<sup>83</sup>.

The strategy of 'shock therapy' was also redolent of the utopianism of the intelligentsia milieu<sup>84</sup>. The plan's advocates repeatedly justified the initial austerity engendered by a rapid shift to market condition through reference to a future, capitalist paradise. Jeffrey Sachs, one of the main architects of the Plan, initially envisioned the period of austerity lasting only six months to a year<sup>85</sup>.

The technocratic aspect of the neo-liberal approach to economic reform was also attractive to the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. We have already noted the dogmatic, patronising

relationship between the milieu and the rest of Polish society<sup>26</sup>. In effect, the details of economic reform were presented as the result of rational, scientific processes which were beyond the understanding of Polish society and outside the scope of political cut and thrust. The government of the 'best and brightest' was building a market economy and Polish society had merely to follow its lead. Quotes from government circles were suffused with scientific or surgical imagery<sup>27</sup>. Emphasis on the technical expertise of the 'intelligentsia in power', on the fact that it 'knew better', substituted for any attempt to build a political package for the reforms<sup>28</sup>. Jacek Kuron, the Minister for Labour at the time, has referred to the Mazowiecki administration's failure to mobilise Polish society behind its programme of economic reform<sup>29</sup>.

The Polish intelligentsia's 'totalist' perspective was, therefore, revealed in its chosen method of economic reform. Although in theory the economy was being opened up, for the time being only the "intelligentsia in power" could lead the process of economic liberalisation. Society was regarded as a single, passive entity to be modelled in accordance with the milieu's own enlightened values. We have already noted the intelligentsia's move in the 1980s from leftist to centrist political outlooks in keeping with its vision of itself as a 'national' intelligentsia. Thus economic reform was to be carried out for the benefit of society as a whole. One must bear in

mind the social isolation and elitism of the Polish intelligentsia. The worst effects of its economic reform programme were visited on sectors of Polish society which were distant from the intelligentsia circles of Warsaw and Cracow<sup>30</sup>.

The idealistic, technical approach of the 'intelligentsia in power' to economic reform is further illustrated by its failure to fully appreciate the consequences of unrestrained marketisation for the social status of the intelligentsia milieu itself. The intelligentsia's ambivalent approach to the market was outlined in Chapter 1<sup>31</sup>. On the one hand, economic liberalisation and the development of a healthy middle class are accepted foundations for the rise of democracy and Western-style civil societies. In this situation Western-style intellectuals can play the role of critics of state power and interpreters of societal values<sup>32</sup>.

For the Polish intelligentsia, the fall of communism meant, first and foremost, the end of state censorship. However, liberalisation brought certain disadvantages. Under communism, culture was given privileged status. The party-state was conscious of the political power of culture as a potential ally or enemy. Hence the creative intelligentsia and his or her works were accorded special attention. Special status was accorded to creative intellectuals either as privileged, subsidised apologists for the party-state or as



impoverished but lionised champions of a persecuted society. In the market conditions of post-communist Poland culture became a commodity just like any other. The creative intelligentsia faced the prospect of competing amongst itself and with Western imports for a market. This may be comparable with the situation of Western intellectuals, but in the West there are established markets for cultural producers and consumers, based on the middle-classes. In transition Poland such markets did not exist<sup>33</sup>.

Creative intellectuals faced the levelling down of artistic merit in keeping with the poor quality, mass-produced works flooding the country from the West. The intelligentsia, perhaps expecting to be greeted by an informed, cultivated audience, was disappointed<sup>34</sup>. The discomfiture of the creative intelligentsia with the tastes of the Polish public is an indication of the radically different visions of post-communist Poland held by different groups in Polish society<sup>35</sup>. Calls from creative intellectuals for greater state intervention to offset the effects of marketisation can be interpreted as an indication of the financial plight of the stratum in post-communist times and as a nostalgic longing for the days when the state guaranteed them a privileged social position. In this sense they illustrate the etatism of the milieu<sup>36</sup>.

In a manner reminiscent of the inter-war period<sup>37</sup> the onset of democracy, independence and marketisation initiated far-reaching

changes within the Polish intelligentsia. Initially neo-liberal, monetarist policies suited the technocratic and creative strands of the intelligentsia. The expertise of the former guaranteed it a leading role in the new circumstances, while, as we have seen, the 'total' or 'anti-political' perspective of the latter was attracted to neo-liberalism<sup>38</sup>. However, over time the professional, technical strata of the milieu assumed new importance in a context where economists and lawyers are required for the modernisation of the country. Financial experts such as Leszek Balcerowicz who had been relatively obscure figures working in universities and research institutes in the communist period, became the new elite of the intelligentsia<sup>39</sup>.

The importance of the creative intellectual's role as guardian of Polish culture would be reduced now that culture was no longer seen as the prime vehicle of political expression. The Balcerowicz Plan posed serious questions for the intelligentsia. If it forsook its traditional concentration on serious issues and questions to pursue a more commercially viable route it would forfeit the right to perform the basic, teleological role of the traditional milieu. The intelligentsia's traditional function as guardian of Polish identity was largely based on its appreciation of Polish culture and history. It was therefore possible that it would cease to be an 'intelligentsia' in the Polish or East Central European sense of the term. The observations of Octavio Paz on the identity crisis of the

Mexican intelligentsia when confronted with the task of rebuilding the state and the economy are pertinent in the context of Mazowiecki's Poland<sup>40</sup>. The identity crisis of the Polish intelligentsia in capitalism is ongoing<sup>41</sup>. Thus the economic reforms of the Balcerowicz Plan reflected the elitist, dogmatic, 'totalist' ethos of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The following section will present the detail of the Plan and evaluate its contribution to the development of a democratic, civil society under the aegis of the Mazowiecki government.

### (iii) The Balcerowicz Plan - Liberalism with an iron glove

The programme of economic reform introduced by the first post-communist administration became known as 'The Balcerowicz Plan', after the Mazowiecki government's deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz<sup>42</sup>. His Finance Department worked in consultation with Jeffrey Sachs, a professor of economics at Harvard who had advised Latin American governments. The programme introduced on January the 1st 1990 had four simultaneous aims designed to facilitate a transformation from the command system to the market:

#### Free Prices

Price distortions created by the command system were ended immediately by allowing prices to find market-based levels which realistically reflected the balance of demand and supply. Price controls were to be lifted, subsidies reduced or eliminated, and the economy opened up to international trade. Most commodity prices (about 87% with the exception of energy prices, housing prices and a few others) were freed from administrative control. The zloty was to be made "internally convertible". This meant that both individuals and firms could exchange zloties within Poland for any Western currency but the zloty was not tradable outside Poland.

## Encourage Private Sector

Restrictions on private economic activity were eliminated. New commercial laws were to be enacted. Company laws would allow for the easy establishment of new enterprises. A Western style tax system was introduced with tax and VAT. Various licensing restrictions applied at the time to international trade and domestic investment were also to be eliminated.

## Reform State-owned Sector

State enterprises were disciplined. Part of this process clearly involved trimming their number through privatisation . However, for the time being, the government did not go beyond laying the foundations for some form of privatisation process to be set in motion at an unspecified date. In addition, state-owned enterprises were to be subjected to real market disciplines. This would be achieved by allowing private firms and importers to provide real competition, eliminating the bias previously shown by central government to state enterprises in the form of subsidies, cheap credits and tax concessions. The halting of state sector borrowing based on central government guarantees would also contribute to the process. Anti-trust laws were to be introduced in order to fragment industrial giants which dominated their fields and the government's new-found willingness to declare loss-making enterprises bankrupt would also ensure a more level playing field.

### Arrest Inflation Rate

The final, and at the time most pressing, part of the Balcerowicz Plan dealt with the need to halt accelerating inflation. This was to be realised mainly through strict fiscal and monetary policies. State spending on investment, grants for industries and subsidies for consumers were drastically reduced as the new government made a concerted bid to lower the state's budget deficit. To this end the level of government subsidies was to be reduced significantly. The communist practice of indexing workers' wages to the level of inflation was to be curtailed as part of the push for fiscal control. Wastefulness was to be avoided as the reduced level of credit was to be dispensed on a purely economic basis, without traditional pro-state sector prejudices.

### Long-term Results of the Balcerowicz Plan

Many of the most significant results of the plan can best be viewed through retrospective comparison on a larger time-scale (see Table 3.5). After the initial shock of the early transition period one can see a gradual stabilisation in most economic indicators. In the long term the Balcerowicz Plan achievements were commendable and they succeeded in ensuring that the defining characteristics of the communist command system were irrevocably replaced. It introduced full and maintained current

account convertibility of the zloty. Significant increases in convertible currency exports and a trade surplus were also achieved. In addition import liberalisation was initiated and this was responsible for an incomparably better supply system. For the first time since the Second World War a demand barrier or 'buyer's market' emerged. rocketing inflation, after initial acceleration, was arrested and the budget deficit successfully attacked. Industrial output gradually recovered and the rate of unemployment stabilised somewhat. The command economy's concentration on resource-intensive heavy industries was replaced by emphasis on modern, light industries.

Table 3.5 - Poland's Economy 1989-97

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
% 'real' change GDP	-0.2	-12	-7	2.6	3.8	5.2	7.0	6.1	6.9
Inflation	251	586	70	43	35	32	28	20	15
Unemployment	0	6.5	12.2	14.3	16.4	16	14.9	13.2	10.5
Real Earnings	n.a.	-24.4	-0.3	-2.7	-2.9	0.5	3	5.7	6.1

Source: Official Polish statistics. ?

## Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan

The results of the Balcerowicz Plan in the long-term were commendable. However for the purpose of this thesis - an evaluation of the democratisation process under Mazowiecki - the short-term results are more important. In this respect, the social costs of the Balcerowicz Plan were worse than anticipated and they had a fundamental, negative effect on the tenure of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The main outcomes of the Balcerowicz Plan during the Mazowiecki period were:

### Accelerating Inflation

One of the most obvious results of the Balcerowicz Plan in its initial stages was the accelerating rate of inflation which shot up radically at the start of 1990 and remained at a high and persistent level relative to developed market economies (79% in January, 24% in February and 4-5% per month from then on<sup>43</sup>). Price rises were much greater than the government expected. For instance, the government spokesperson Malgorzata Niezabitowska predicted a rise of 45% during January. In fact prices rose by, on average, 60% in the first half of the month<sup>44</sup>. The cost of hot water rose by 400%, gas by 250%, electricity by 300%, rail-fares



by 250%, gasoline by 100%, bread by 38%, ham by 55% and tractors by 104%<sup>45</sup>. This was a direct result of the liberalisation of prices which had been kept artificially low by the communists.

#### Fall in industrial production

Another immediate side-effect was the surprisingly steep fall in industrial production. During the first few months of the Plan there was a sharp drop in industrial production, much more than decision makers and analysts had expected. In the first quarter of 1990 production in the state industries fell by around 24% in comparison with the last quarter of 1989 and by 30% in comparison to the first quarter of 1989<sup>46</sup>. In the consumer industries it fell by around 40% and in the light industries by around 30%. This was due to price liberalisation of the pricing system in an economy still dominated by the state.

Most state-owned enterprises had to contend with sharp cost increases from devaluation, customs duties, the new taxes and high interest rates. These costs were passed directly on to the customer in the form of higher prices. In early 1990 prices of consumer goods were increased by 80% or more. Being sure that competitive cheaper imports would not appear on the market for three to four months, the enterprises raised their prices often by as much as 100%. This prices 'shock' led to a sharp fall in demand. Monopolistic producers reacted to this by making cuts in

production and then by cutting back on labour in order to maintain high prices. Agriculture was particularly hard hit by the fall in consumer demand. Agricultural prices declined as demand fell and imported Western foodstuffs appeared for the first time in Poland. Prices reached an unprecedented low just as the cost of materials needed for agricultural production reached a higher, market-determined value. In the food industry production fell by 40% in comparison with the previous year<sup>47</sup>.

### Unemployment

As enterprises shed the excess work-force built up under communism the unemployment rate exceeded the government's predictions. Speaking in the Sejm, Jacek Kuron, the Minister for Labour and Social Policy initially estimated a minimum of 400,000<sup>48</sup>. However, he soon conceded that unemployment could exceed 1,000,000<sup>49</sup>. The unemployment rate rose from 0.3% or 56,000 people in January 1990 to 3.1% at the end of June and 6.1% by December<sup>50</sup>. About 30% of them were unskilled workers and 107,000 were recent school graduates seeking their first jobs. While this may sound low by UK standards, where unemployment hovered at 2-3 million each year, in Poland it was a huge shock to leap from zero unemployment to one million in a few months. The government was aware of the unexpected severity of the rise and quickly altered its predictions. In fact the number of unemployed reached 1.1 million or 6.1% of the work-force by the

end of 1990, three times higher than had been originally forecast. Of course the number of people out of work was bound to rise as before the advent of the Mazowiecki government unemployment had not officially existed. However the abruptness of the rise was seen by some as a deficiency of the Plan<sup>51</sup>.

#### Fall in real wages

The workers' plight was worsened by the Mazowiecki government's wages policy. While Balcerowicz had freed most price controls and allowed them to find a real market level, wages were controlled to aid the attack on inflation and help control the budgetary deficit. Pay rises were limited and if any firm broke the limit it faced severe taxation (the so-called 'popiwek' tax). The communist practice of indexing the wages of all the workers to the rate of inflation was ended. This, it was thought, would give enterprises an incentive to shed labour and increase wage differentiation and so encourage productivity. It was hoped that enterprises would therefore strive to retain their better workers. Liberalisation of prices combined with strict wage policies caused an immediate and dramatic decline in real wage levels when the Plan was introduced. Indeed in January alone real wages fell by around 40% in comparison to December 1989. As we have seen, at the same time inflation rocketed to nearly 80%. Again this was a

more extreme reaction than government economists had predicted<sup>52</sup>.

### Sluggish privatisation

Privatisation proceeded more slowly than expected. This was due to the intensely political nature of the issue. By the time the Sejm approved the first privatisation law in 1990, 15 proposals had been under discussion<sup>53</sup>.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, although the long-term effects of the Balcerowicz Plan were beneficial for the Polish economy and thus for the development of a democratic, civil society its influence on state/society relations during the Mazowiecki period was negative. The 'intelligentsia in power' looked on society as a single, malleable entity; ready to be transformed by the dictates of the 'best and brightest'. This was in keeping with its traditional elitist ethos. However all social groups, workers, peasants and the intelligentsia itself, had experienced specific changes under communist rule<sup>54</sup>. Each group came into the transition period with specific expectations and visions of post-communist Poland

The Balcerowicz Plan initiated further, dramatic changes in Poland's social structure. The industrial workers, peasantry and intelligentsia were faced with economic challenges by the emerging market system. The introduction of free market conditions and privatisation threatened the future of workers in heavily subsidised, state-owned industries. Likewise the peasantry, so long used to state intervention to guarantee cost and price levels, would now have to compete according to real market conditions and in competition with international producers<sup>65</sup>. The intelligentsia itself faced an identity crisis with the 'marketisation of culture'.

Table 3.6 gives some impression of the socio-economic flux experienced in Poland during the transition. The standard of living of social and occupational groups, measured in terms of income, material possessions and cultural levels, changed considerably over the period. Most improvement was noted in those socio-occupational categories which aspired to form the new middle class. On the other hand the situation of manual categories, particularly workers and peasants, below the national average before the transition, had worsened (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Evolution of income, material and cultural position of households 1987-93

Socio-occupational categories	1987 (a)	1993 (a)	1987 (b)	1993 (b)	1987 (c)	1993 (c)
Managers and higher state admin. officials	145	317	43.8	76.9	259	298
Non-technical intelligentsia	145	226	56.7	74.4	251	907
Engineers	123	134	47.4	76	304	542
Technicians	104	101	37.9	65	191	294
Middle-grade clerks	112	129	43.9	68.8	241	325
Lower-grade clerks	103	105	39.9	63.7	146	182
Businessmen	146	144	52.4	77	173	271
Employed in sales and service	98	91	34.6	62.8	105	247
Foremen	100	85	28.6	50.8	344	243
Skilled workers	95	79	28.3	55.5	83	84
Unskilled workers	91	68	21.9	45.6	47	65
Manual workers in service	80	63	25.6	45.8	67	62
Employed in farming	77	58	21	50.1	48	75
Farm owners	88	57	22.1	40.1	48	68

(a) Monthly family income per person, in relation to national average.

(b) Material positions as a percentage of possession of seven goods in household.

(c) Number of books in household

source: Grzegorz Weclawowicz Contemporary Poland: Space and Society UCL 1996 p95.

One can see that inequalities in Polish society increased dramatically during the Mazowiecki period. The economic, material and cultural differences between high status groups such as managers, intelligentsia and entrepreneurs and low status groups such as unskilled workers and farm workers was much larger than in the 1970s. In a condition of such disequilibria, the chances of creating a unified commitment to democratic political procedures is weakened. Social groups who feel discriminated against are unlikely to accept the legitimacy of existing state/society relationships even if they have the appearance of democracy. The liberal side of democracy may be satisfied by introducing market mechanisms but the inequality introduced severely tests democracy's commitment to equality. Much of the struggle between the Mazowiecki workers and the industrial workers revolved around this issue<sup>66</sup>. Indeed such an attitude can give rise to anti-democratic tendencies<sup>67</sup>.

It is important to note that, despite the universal application of reforms introduced as part of the first phase of the Balcerowicz Plan, regional variations and the urban/rural divide were widened. The economic transition produced major changes in the national labour market. Provinces in the northern part of the country reported the greatest decline in the labour force. This primarily stemmed from the collapse of collectivised farming. Equally worrying in this region was the erosion of the non-agricultural labour market as, for instance, the construction sector contracted. The lowest unemployment rates were found in regions with large urban centres and richer, more internally differentiated economic structures such as Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan and Katowice. Moreover, regional disparities in terms of the profile of the labour force were intensified by the immobility of the population.

Each region also varied in terms of potential for developing a private sector. Most privately-run businesses and therefore most private sector employees are concentrated in regions with large urban centres. Generally the smallest number of private businesses were to be found in the less developed regions of eastern Poland.

Although potential foreign investment was primarily guided by the attraction of individual enterprises it too displayed regional



patterns. The Warsaw metropolitan area was decidedly preferred by foreign investors. By April 1994 the Warsaw province accounted for nearly 40% of all foreign capital investment in Poland<sup>58</sup>. It should be noted that regions in the west of the country were more likely to benefit from foreign investment than those in the East. The former was bordered by an economically strong Germany while the latter had much weaker immediate neighbours.

On the basis of the criteria detailed above Golebiowski makes useful classification of the Polish territories in terms of economic potential<sup>59</sup>. His scheme approximately matches the boundaries of the traditional Polish regions. The first group is described as "backward". It is characterised by a low level of social and economic development and agriculture is dominant. It also has an underdeveloped infrastructure and a relatively low-skilled labour force. This group has the country's slowest private sector growth and attracts little interest from foreign investors. Such areas are to be found in north-eastern and eastern Poland.

The next category was identified with the old industrial areas of Silesia such as Katowice and Walbrzych. It was characterised by a dominant industry and relatively underdeveloped services. It's industrial structure was undiversified and dominated by traditional practices and raw materials which could run out at

any time. This category also suffered from the environmental degradation which accompanies heavy industry on this scale.

Finally areas linked with the country's largest urban centres such as Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan, Wroclaw and Gdansk led the way in economic reforms. This group had extensive links with the outside world and a highly skilled, diverse labour force. They were home to an active entrepreneurial class and the country's most sophisticated business environment. This category had the lowest unemployment and was expected to profit most from the transition. Moreover, it was the home of the Polish intelligentsia. Thus, immediately after the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan, socio-economic tensions were exacerbated by regional disparities and the intensification of the urban/rural divide.

The Mazowiecki government's failure to address the social consequences of the Balcerowicz reform - its insistence on seeing the process as a technical, apolitical exercise, in keeping with the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia - exacerbated the situation. Rather than the development of consensual relationships between different social forces and the state, fundamental to the development of a unified democratic culture and civil society, the scene was set for the deterioration of relationships between social groups and between society and the state. The following section will deal with the Mazowiecki

government's performance in the area of political reform. Again it will argue that the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia was apparent in the administration's approach and that, in the short-term at least, it had a negative influence on the development of a democratic civil society.

- 1 see 'Western Intellectuals and Civil Society' Chapter 1 p110.
- 2 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 p116.
- 3 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p186 and 'The Polish Intelligentsia Under Early Communism' Chapter 2 p236.
- 4 see 'The Mazowiecki Government as a Government of the Intelligentsia' Chapter 2 p82.
- 5 see Davies Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986 p417, henceforth Davies (a).
- 6 see Chapter 2 p247.
- 7 see 'Theories of Democratisation' Chapter 1 p59.
- 8 Vlad Sobell 'The IMF's Pivotal Role in Transforming Poland's Economy' RFE/RI, Background Report 10/10/89 p5.
- 9 see Marek Gora and Michal Rutowski 'The Demand for Labour and the Disguised Unemployment in Poland in the 1980s' Communist Economies Vol.2, No.3 1989 pp325-333.
- 10 Kramer concludes, "The lack of sufficient wage differentials precluded one of the key potential motivations of an otherwise uninspired labour force." (M. Kramer, Polish Workers and the Post-communist Transition, 1989-1993' Communist and Post Communist Societies Vol.28 No.1 March 1995 p78).
- 11 "They turn out too large an assortment of products...in too small production runs, with outdated technology and using too many material inputs and factors of production" (Jan

Winiecki 'Are Soviet-Type Economies Entering an Era of Long-Term Decline?' Soviet Studies Vol. XXXVIII no.3 July 1986 p329).

- 12 "Poland has borrowed some \$48 billion from the West, has paid off some \$39 billion and still has a total debt of some \$41 billion (Peter Gowran 'The Pressure on Eastern Europe' New Left Review No.182 Jul/Aug 1990 p69).
- 13 "As a general comment on the causes of decline...we may say that changes in economic and technological trends in the world economy since the early 1970s, and policy decisions by centrally planned economies themselves, have either exacerbated the negative effects of long-standing weakness of soviet-type economies or reduced the few advantages they possessed" (Winiecki p331).
- 14 see the controversy surrounding the privatisation issue in 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p468.
- 15 As Milanowic says of the Messner regime's attempt at economic reform: "These measures were the direct antithesis of the avowed aim of economic liberalisation. The government was yet again obliged to move in a vicious circle: starting with piecemeal liberalisation that should have been a prelude to a comprehensive liberalisation, it was led by events to a position where it needed to reassert it's role in the hope of reversing negative trends in the economy, and thus undermining the original intent of the reform" (Branko Milanowic 'Poland's Quest for Economic Stabilisation, 1988-91: Interaction of Political Economy and Economics' Soviet Studies Vol. 44 No. 3 1992 p514).

- 16 reported in Tygodnik Solidarnosc 2/2/90.
- 17 "Practically everyone is renouncing everything that is associated with the Left: socialism, collectivism, planning etc. - ideas derived from the compromised communist system" (Jozef Lipiec 'Who Overthrew Real Socialism?' Polityka 25/8/90 p3).
- 18 see 'Crisis and Leftist Ideology During the Transition' Chapter 4 p455.
- 19 see Vlad Sobell 'The IMF's Pivotal Role in Transforming Poland's Economy' RFE/RL Background Report 10/10/89 p4.
- 20 for instance, see Stanislaw Gomulka 'The Role of International Financial Institutions: the Polish and Russian Experiences 1984-94' Journal of Comparative Economics 19, 2, 1995.
- 21 "The IMF played a key role in policy formulation...but not as the villain of the piece, insisting on and pushing through deflationary policies on an unwilling local policy-making elite...in fact...when policy views differed, the Fund would normally bow to the case argued locally" (George Blazycha and Ryszard Rapacki 'Continuity and Change in Polish Economic Policy: The Impact of the 1993 Election' Europe-Asia Studies Vol.48 No.1 1996 p85).
- 22 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia' Chapter 1 p112.
- 23 "It seems to me here that the models [of rapid liberalisation]...are misconceived, and the utopian elements in them are naive and dangerous. They depend upon a

highly unrealistic contrasting of the pluralist West with the uniform, totalitarian East" (C.M. Hann 'The Second Economy and Civil Society' in Hann p31).

- 24 Bryant talks of the "utopianism behind the application of neo-liberal economics to East-Central Europe" Christopher G.A. Bryant 'Economic utopianism and sociological realism: Strategies for transformation in East-Central Europe' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p59.
- 25 "Though some costs were inevitable, Sachs argued that the benefits of this drastic programme would accrue quickly and visibly. It would entail a period of wildly fluctuating prices, but shortages on the market would be remedied, inflation would be eliminated completely, and the standard of living would begin to improve, all in the course of six months" (see 'Weekly Record of Events' RFE 12/9/89 p40).
- 26 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and Society' Chapter 1 pl22.
- 27 on the eve of the programme's introduction Balcerowicz warned that "The Polish economy is deathly ill. An operation is necessary, a deep surgical incision to remove the inflation that is devastating the economy." (Balcerowicz quoted on Radio Warsaw 15/12/89).
- 28 "No attempt was made to explain its consequences to the people. Instead the impression was given that apolitical experts were masterminding a process, which, however painful at the time, would quickly enable Poland to close the gap with the market economies of Western Europe. The 'return to Europe' was assured" (G.A. Bryant, 'Economic utopianism and sociological realism' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p68).

- 29 "Moving from a system of central management to the market economy must be , especially initially, managed by the authorities and state administration. But at the same time, building the institutions of the economy must be a social process. Neither the government nor Solidarity MPs developed such a programme. Instead, the government appealed for patience, which meant: we will do it for you, you need only wait" (Jacek Kuron 'A Republic for Everyone?' *Zycie Gospodarcze* 22/5/94).
- 30 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 p116.
- 31 "Only a polity with a strong bourgeoisie can provide the economic and political space within which intellectuals can exercise their critical function" (Schopflin p273).
- 32 "The impoverished post-communist countries, with small and insecure hates bourgeoisies, have no artistic market read to absorb anything rising above the level of customarily acceptable" (Zygmunt Bauman 'After the patronage state: A model in search of class interests' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p29).
- 33 "If economic reform is going to make state socialism 'a paradise for the new bourgeoisie' then some intellectuals may prefer their old bureaucratic allies" (Hann p32).
- 34 a theme explored in detail in Chapter 4.
- 35 Czech intellectuals' request for government subsidies in 1991 were interpreted in this way by the philosopher Vaclav Belohradsky: "The waiting of post-communist intellectuals for the favours of a good master proves that they find it easier to sell spiritual values to a political power than to the



readers. This preference for a dialogue with power over that with consumers is demonstrated in plaintive calls for state subsidies in culture" (cited in Igor Hajek 'Czech Culture in the Cauldron' *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 46 No.1 1994 p136).

- 36     see 'The Intelligentsia in Inter-war Poland' Chapter 2 p182.
- 37     "No-one, nowhere, should be able to escape the effects of fiscal discipline or monetary reform. This political project forms the basis of the coalition between the politocracy [creative intellectuals] and the managers. Both envision an 'anti-political' politics, in which society will be ruled by 'civil' monetary methods of the hated 'politicking' of the communist period" (Gil Fyal, Ivan Szelenyi, Eleanor Townsley 'The Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism' *New Left Review* No.222 March/April 1997 p74).
- 38     "The most powerful people of the post-communist era are bank managers, managers of investment funds, experts in the Ministry of Finance, IMF and World Bank advisers, and experts working for foreign and international financial agencies" (Ibid. p73).
- 39     see 'The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period' Chapter 2 p183.
- 40     see Conclusion to thesis.
- 41     see Appendix II p750.
- 42     see Soldaczuk J 'Poland's Economic Situation and Foreign Economic Relations' *The International and the Polish Economy in 1993 and 1994* Foreign Trade Institute Warsaw

1992 p87 and 'So far, so impressive in Poland' in The Economist April 1 1990.

- 43 see 'Economic Progress Report' RFE Vol.1 No.5 2/2/90 p57.
- 44 see 'Price Hikes' RFE/RL Weekly Record of Events Vol.1 No.3 19/1/90 p45.
- 45 see Soldaczuk p87.
- 46 see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p500.
- 47 quoted in Gazeta Wybrzeza 10/1/90.
- 48 see Roman Stefanowski 'The Unemployment Problem' RFE/RL Vol.1 No.8 23/2/90 p16.
- 49 see Soldaczuk p37.
- 50 see 'Unemployment Figures' RFE Vol.1 No.36 4/9/90 p45.
- 51 for an examination of the controversy over indexation, see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p464.
- 52 for controversy surrounding the issue, see 'Mazowiecki Government and the Workers' Chapter 4 p468.
- 53 "Workers as a class benefited from forced industrialization, farmers from the economy of shortages which guaranteed unlimited demand for food irrespective of quality, intellectuals from the patronage of the state and the 'soft financing' of science, culture, etc., and the hounded private sector from the lack of competition and the second economy" (E. Mokrzycki 'Eastern Europe After Communism', Telos no.90 1991 p135).

- 54 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry'  
Chapter 4 p488.
- 55 see 'The Crisis in Leftist Ideology During the Transition'  
Chapter 4 p455.
- 56 "Income differentials between those who have access to  
goods and marketable skills and those who do not are  
growing rapidly. Unlike in the recent past, Poland is rapidly  
becoming a country of poor and rich, a situation that could  
contribute to political polarisation along class lines. Such  
conditions give more credence to demagogues...and increases  
the probability that social conflicts will turn violent"  
(Bernhard (a) p329).
- 57 see J Golebiowski ed. Transforming the Polish Economy  
Warsaw: Warsaw School of Economics, Faculty of Foreign  
Trade 1993 p211.
- 58 see Ibid. p211.

### 3(b) The Political Sphere

#### Introduction

A democratic political system was the declared aim of the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990<sup>1</sup>. According to <sup>the</sup> our thesis the development of democracy involves the reformation and reconciliation of state and society through the development of civil society<sup>2</sup>. On the one hand it is necessary to reform state institutions to make them representative and responsive to the interests of society. On the other hand society must be mobilised to participate in politics in a tolerant, democratic manner.

In this context, the challenge for the leaders who came to power in 1989 was substantial. The Mazowiecki government inherited state institutions which had been moulded in accordance with the desire of the party-state to completely dominate society. The majority of Polish society had long been alienated from these institutions. Moreover Polish society's traditional political culture was characterised by radicalism and fragmentation, neither of which was conducive to the development of democratic values. Finally, it is important to note that the democratisation process ran in tandem with the Balcerowicz programme of radical economic reform, which, as we have seen deepened state/society and inter-society divisions during the Mazowiecki period..

Observers described the challenges of democratisation in transition from communism in terms of bridging these divisions<sup>3</sup>.

Chapter 1 examined some of the approaches designed to spur and explain democratic reform. These included some which emphasised the manipulation of state institutions as a means of inculcating democratic values and others which stressed the importance of developing a democratic political culture at mass, society level. The conclusion reached was that a successful democratisation process must balance both elite and mass perspectives in a civil society<sup>4</sup>. At the outset of the transition observers described the task facing the Mazowiecki government as it attempted democratisation in these terms; as a choice between different models of mass-elite relations<sup>5</sup>.

This section will argue that the Mazowiecki government's approach to democratisation concentrated almost exclusively on elite-level politics. This can be explained by several factors: the desperate need for reform of the remnants of the communist party-state system and the need for a strong state in the face of the social flux, economic austerity and political fragmentation of early transition Poland. However this section contends that prominent amongst these reasons was the influence of the etatist, elitist ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia on the Mazowiecki government. This factor led to the government's

failure to pay heed to the social aspect of its political reforms. The resultant isolation of state from society was inimical to the development of a democratic, civil society. The political sphere became an arena for quarrelling intellectual elites. This spurred the development of populist forces which undermined the democratisation process and challenged the rule of the 'best and brightest'.

The section will proceed as follows. Firstly, the condition of state institutions as the Mazowiecki government took office are presented as a partial explanation of the etatism of the administration. However the influence of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia on the political philosophy of the Mazowiecki government is then presented as a major reason for its etatist, 'totalist' approach to democratisation. The Mazowiecki government's attempt to stifle the development of political alternatives, through its vision of the 'Solidarity' social movement, is presented as symptomatic of this approach. The battle for political power became an elite-level discourse carried out between different intelligentsia strands. Society at large was seen as a passive, homogeneous entity, there to be led by the intelligentsia towards a democratic, utopian future.

The existence of deep political divisions within the intelligentsia, obvious throughout recent Polish history, were apparent in the

nascent political spectrum and within the Solidarity movement. Failure to take these differences into account explains the rise of anti-intellectual populism and the acrimonious fragmentation of the Solidarity movement. The stage was set for the end of the democratisation experiment under the 'intelligentsia in power'.


## (i) Factors Behind the Etatism Approach to Political Reform

### Disorganisation of State Institutions

In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communist power in 1989 the Mazowiecki government was forced to operate in a state arena which did not yet reflect the democratically expressed interests of Polish society. The new model of central state institutions drawn up at the Round Table talks reformed the system and introduced a formal separation of legislative, executive and judicial branches (see Diagram 3.7).



Diagram 3.7: State institutions in Poland 1990



However the true status and functions of the most important organs were distorted by the Round Table process. The aim of the agreement hammered out between the communists and the Solidarity-led opposition was to guarantee the regime control over

the country while granting Solidarity an opportunity to enter official political institutions. The system formulated at the Round Table talks could be regarded as the outcome of a series of bargains and trade-offs reached between the communist regime and the Solidarity movement<sup>6</sup>. The constitutional arrangement arrived at was, therefore, not the product of the consensual interplay between a responsive state and the freely articulated interests of Polish society. It was the result of negotiations between the elite of a reluctant regime and the elite of a movement whose unity could only be guaranteed in opposition to that regime<sup>7</sup>.

Many organs of political power became hybrids, existing in a 'grey area' between the communist past and the democratic future. The 460 member Sejm remained the 'highest organ of the state'. It could pass legislation with a simple majority with at least half of the total number of MPs present. It chose members of the Constitutional Tribunal. It had formal authority over the Supreme Court and the Cabinet Office. However 65% of seats in the Sejm were conceded to PZPR and its satellite parties. All 100 seats of the reconstituted Senate were to be subject to completely free general elections. For the opposition side at the Round Table the Senate was to be a Solidarity-based counterbalance to the communist-dominated Sejm<sup>8</sup>.

However the Senate had limited legislative initiative. Legislation passed by the Sejm could be amended or rejected by the Senate. For the Senate's rejection of legislation to be overturned the Sejm required a majority vote with at least half of its members present. Special legislation such as budget proposals or systemic transformations in the socio-economic sphere required a 2/3 majority in the Sejm if the Senate's decisions were to be rejected. The manipulation of the Presidency at the Round Table was one of the most obvious examples of this bargaining process. The communist desire to ratify far-reaching powers for a President who was expected to be communist (he would be the appointment of the communist-dominated Sejm) clashed with Solidarity's demands that Presidential powers be limited. This resulted in the confusion of the powers and functions of the office<sup>9</sup>.

Thus at the outset of the transition the roles of the most important political institutions and their relationships with each other were still not decided by state/society consensus. Could Poles be expected to participate in institutions which most still associated with the authoritarian, communist era? There was plenty of evidence concerning the depth of Polish society's alienation from public life in 1989-90. At a time when the euphoria of the collapse of communism could have been expected to spur political mobilisation voter participation remained low. Turn-out for the June 1989 elections was expected to be high,

given the fact that they amounted to a plebiscite against communist rule. In the event these expectations proved unrealistic<sup>10</sup>. A downward trend in turn-out levels was observed throughout the Mazowiecki period. A senatorial by-election in October 1989 attracted a vote of 15%<sup>11</sup> and 42% of those eligible voted in the local elections of Spring 1990<sup>12</sup>.

The situation was also reflected in levels of confidence in public institutions during the early transition period. The trust of Polish society in public organs increased substantially when the Mazowiecki government took office in September 1989. Institutions previously led by the discredited communist regime were now under the influence of the heroes of the anti-Communist opposition. Polls of the time reported a rise of 15 percentage points in public confidence in the Government between May and October 1989, 10 points for the Sejm and 5 points for Solidarity<sup>13</sup>. However the frailty of this confidence was revealed as the economic rigours and political frustrations of the reform process developed (see Table 3.8).

Table 3.8: Public Confidence in Institutions - 1990

	January	February	March	April	May	July
<b>Sejm</b>						
Approved	79.2%	74.5%	73.1%	66.8%	62.9%	59.5%
Disapproved	9.9	14.5	14.5	15.9	19	25
<b>Senate</b>						
Approved	75.9	68.7	66.4	64.2	62.2	58.6
Disapproved	11	13.4	17.5	14	17.7	
<b>Gov't</b>						
Approved	75	73.9	67.3	64	62.4	55.9
Disapproved	1.9	14.2	17.4	19.1	19.5	
<b>Military</b>						
Approved	55.4	58.7	58.5	50.8	54.6	56.5
Disapproved	15.7	14.7	17.7	14.6	12.3	
<b>Church</b>						
Approved	84.5	80.5	83.4	79.2	78.8	75.8
Disapproved	6.7	11.8	9.6	8.8	11.9	14.5
<b>Trade Un's</b>						
Approved	37.5	41.2	38.2	31	31.9	28.2
Disapproved	31.4	30.3	31.5	30.5	32.1	
<b>Solidarity</b>						
Approved	74.4	70.8	65.9	61.3	58.8	53.9
Disapproved	9.4	14.2	19.3	17.3	20.8	
<b>Police</b>						
Approved	32.4	30.6	26	30.5	30.2	36.4
Disapproved	38	47.8	50.6	40.3	29.2	

Sources: Centre for Public Opinion Research reported in Rzeczpospolita 25/7/90 and Polityka 30/6/90).

Such data paid testament to the poorly developed relationship between Polish society and public institutions and to the need for the latter to become much more representative if a democratic political system was to develop. Thus Polish citizens as well as the state had to redefine their roles under democracy. The authoritarian and communist political culture of hostility to and dependency on the state had to be replaced by civic obligations and participation in public life<sup>14</sup>.

The particular demands of the transition period including the reform of these institutions, complicated the effort to institute a liberal democratic state. On the one hand, a democracy is expected to limit the role of the state. On the other hand the demands of transition, including institutional reform, suggested an intensification of state powers in the short-term at least<sup>15</sup>.

Clearly the structure, personnel and functions of the state would have to be completely redefined if Poland was to progress toward liberal democracy. In short, it would have to become more responsive to and representative of society. This entailed the state's withdrawal from parts of economic, social and political life. However, almost everything in the political traditions of the Polish state pointed in the opposite direction. The traditional ethos of the intelligentsia milieu whose representatives now dominated

state institutions was part of these traditions. We have established etatism as a basic element of this ethos<sup>16</sup>. It was based on the belief that representatives of the milieu 'knew best' how to lead the processes of modernisation and that society was incapable of leading itself.

## Weakness of the Party Political Scene

The etatism of the Mazowiecki government could also be justified by reference to the poor condition of the country's political organisations. Not only were state institutions disorganised and unresponsive, society itself was unable to articulate its interests efficiently to them through political parties. Our study of the party political scene will illustrate the lack of a unified, representative political culture. Although Solidarity, as the main arena for political developments in 1989-90, is the major focus of this thesis, an examination of the party political scene can also serve as a guide to the different ideological currents that were quickening beneath the surface of Solidarity unity. Some of these currents were to become prominent in the disintegration of the movement and the rise of radical, populist alternatives to Mazowiecki.

Political parties are a central component of civil societies and have a vital role to play in the consolidation of democracy<sup>17</sup>. They serve as instruments of popular mobilisation and citizen participation at election times. They integrate and organise groups within society that have similar values, interests and goals. Their potential election allows them to act as checks to those exercising political power. Parties act as a vital source of organisational support once a government takes office<sup>18</sup>. They are



also central to the process of political recruitment. Leaders of state usually achieve their position through membership of parties. A party system which guarantees all sections of the citizenry some representation in the central state institutions is a vital defence against potentially destabilising social unrest.

By acting as links between the independently structured interests of social groups and the centres of state power, political parties are vital for the functioning of a consensual, civil society. There has been much debate over the location of parties within the state/civil society framework. Are they instruments of social representation and therefore an integral part of civil society or part of the process of government and therefore an instrument of the state? Although the thesis includes political parties in its examination of the evolution of the state under Mazowiecki, a party system is a vital component of both state and civil society. It helps ensure the articulation of social interests and the functioning of central institutions according to established conventions<sup>19</sup>.

The consolidation of political parties in Western democracies relies on a number of factors: the existence of a cohesive structure based on a recognised social constituency, the availability of a sponsoring institution to lend legitimacy to the organisation and

the presence of a strong party elite. Electoral laws and parliamentary rules also play a role.

In comparison to the West Poland has a tradition of poorly developed party political organisations. During the country's brief experience of parliamentary democracy the party system had consisted of multifarious, small intellectual elites with little or no territorial organisation.

Under communism political parties served as instruments for the perpetuation of Communist Party control of Polish society rather than as means of articulating the interests of social constituencies to a responsive state. Up to the transition Poland had been ruled by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR<sup>20</sup>). This organisation was the product of the forced merger of the pro-communist Polish Workers' Party (PPR) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS<sup>21</sup>), which had by then been broken by communist infiltration and persecution. In keeping with communist ideology the PZPR was seen as the sole representative of the interests of the Polish proletariat.

Other groups represented social interests which were now either defunct or contrary to the objectives of communism. As a result the communist Party-state only tolerated the existence of

symbolic and subservient political organisations. The appearance of what was in practice a political monopoly was softened by the inclusion of these 'satellite' organisations, the United Peasant Party (ZSL<sup>22</sup>) which purported to serve farmers' interests and the Democratic Party (SD<sup>23</sup>), in a completely unequal coalition with the PZPR.

After the political thaw of 1956 another loyal organisation the Christian Social Association (ChSS) was permitted Parliamentary representation along with a more independent group of Catholic intellectuals, ZNAK. While ChSS diligently pursued the Communist line, ZNAK remained independent and at times verged on open opposition. Nevertheless, after the rigged elections of 1947, all trace of independent political parties, excepting the above, disappeared under the total domination of the PZPR. Thus in Polish history the political party, or political society had not been an ally but an enemy of civil society. As primarily elite-focused institutions or instruments of the state they contributed to the frustration of Polish society's attempts to articulate its interests.

The collapse of the communist regime cleared the path for the organisation of political parties along more representative, democratic lines. However, there were several obstacles to this process. The potential sources of political organisation each had their own weaknesses in terms of the criteria outlined above. At

the outset of the transition there were three potential sources of political organisation: the communist, non-Solidarity and Solidarity opposition movements. The fate of the Solidarity movement, the dominant political force of the Mazowiecki period (though one with its own weaknesses) is dealt with separately later on<sup>24</sup>. The other two camps, though they varied considerably in terms of legitimacy, territorial organisation and elite level influence were not in a position to foster truly representative political parties during this time.

### The Communists

In Autumn 1989 the communist camp appeared strong in terms of organisational framework, institutional base and leadership. The PZPR and its satellite parties the ZSL and SD retained substantial apparatus at central and local levels, an established press, funds and property. Its cadre dominated local government and central state institutions (65% of Sejm seats, the key Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence - which were held by Czeslaw Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki - and the Presidential office - occupied by Wojciech Jaruzelski). The elite of the communist movement represented the only truly experienced political leadership in the country at that time.

In reality, the political condition of the communists in the aftermath of the disastrous results of the June 1989 elections was very different. Communism was held responsible by Polish society for the dire state of the economy and the abuse of political power over the previous four decades. It was regarded as an alien ideology whose system had been imposed by force. The struggle to distance themselves from the past and forge a fresh ideology contributed to an identity-crisis in the communist camp and the disintegration of the PZPR. Any advantages the camp held in terms of infrastructure, institutional representation and elite experience were negated in the struggle by different forces and personalities for influence in the process of re-invention. Kiszczak, Siwicki and Jaruzelski followed the Solidarity government's general line before the popular mood removed them from public office in Summer 1990.

Within the Sejm dictated by the partially free elections of June 1989 the communist camp quickly conceded its advantages. The PZPR's old allies were either in a state of decline (e.g. PAX, the Christian Social Union and the Polish-Catholic Union) or were forming links with the Solidarity camp and desperately trying to dissociate themselves from their heritage (e.g. Polish Peasant Party 'Rebirth', the Labour Party). The PZPR's own parliamentary caucus was also disintegrating. Former PZPR MP's formed the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left under the leadership

of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. It resisted political marginalisation, but the factionalism which accompanied the PZPR's attempt to transform itself into 'a new party of the Left' rendered its parliamentary representation impotent. A PZPR plenum at the beginning of 1990 revealed the level of fragmentation taking place. A party survey revealed that 200 proposals had been received by the party's Central Congress Commission for consideration. Committee spokesman Jan Biszytga identified 32 different political platforms and Aleksander Kwasniewski told reporters that his sub-committee had received 70 suggestions for the party's new name<sup>25</sup>.

From the June elections of 1989 to the end of the year the PZPR's parliamentary caucus (KP PZPR), with 173 members under the leadership of Marian Orzechowski maintained unity. However decomposition commenced in the new year and by Summer 1990 there were four different parliamentary groups with roots in the PZPR. These were:

1. The Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left (KP LD).  
Formed 31/1/90. 110 members under the leadership of  
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

2. The Parliamentary Club of the Social-Democratic Union (KP PUS). Formed 2/3/90. 44 members under leadership of Wiesława Ziolkowska.

3. The Club of Independent MPs (KP N). Formed 1/2/90. 9 members under Marian Czerwinski.

4. The Club of Veteran MPs. 8 members. Led by Zbigniew Puzewiczsee Diagram 3.9

Diagram 3.9: Decomposition of PZPR Parliamentary Caucus

Autumn 1989	Winter 1989	Spring 1990	Summer 1990
KP PZPR	KP PZPR	KP LD KP PUS KP N	KP W KP LD KP PUS KP N

source: compiled from Inka Slodkowska, Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.1 PAN Warsaw 1995 ppXIV - XVI).

The main party political offshoot of the PZPR, the Social Democracy of the Republic Of Poland (SdRP<sup>26</sup>) led by Aleksander Kwasniewski<sup>27</sup>, renounced and reversed many of the fundamental policies of the communist past and projected itself as part of the Western European, social-democratic current. In its founding

document, published in February 1990, it announced itself in favour of 'civil society', elements of a free-market economy and a multi-party system. Observers of the political scene noted the process of disintegration and re-invention occurring in the communist camp during 1989/90<sup>28</sup>. Nevertheless they also saw that the ex-communists still held political ambitions<sup>29</sup>.

In conclusion the communist camp could not be looked upon as a source of stable, democratic political organisations during the early transition period. The presence of an experienced elite, extensive property (although a Sejm bill of November 1990 transferred most of these assets to the state on the grounds that they had been acquired illegally) and continued influence in government suggested the strength of the post-communist camp. This potential was eventually confirmed by the victory of the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance - SLD - under Kwasniewski in the parliamentary elections of 1993.

However in 1990 the disintegration and internal ideological manoeuvring contributed to the fragmentation and obfuscation of the Polish political spectrum. The emergence of offshoots of the PZPR into post-communist times under the banner of social democracy skewed the political spectrum by making other emergent parties reluctant to be associated with the Left. The group could play a potentially significant role in the legislative



process<sup>30</sup> but, for the time being, it was not in a position to take advantage of its superior infrastructure, experience and resources. It must be noted that the institutional disintegration of the PZPR could either hand legislative authority to a unified Solidarity or provide an incentive for political competition in the Solidarity camp.

## The Non-Solidarity Opposition: The 'Salon of the Rejected'

In 1989 the political strength of the non-Solidarity former opposition was ambiguous. In terms of territorial organisation, leadership and access to institutions the camp was weak. However its potential political influence was significant. It included organisations which had split from KOR<sup>31</sup> and mainstream Solidarity during the communist period and those which had remained outside the KOR/Solidarity line from the outset. Almost all could be characterised as Right wing in opposition to the 'Lay Left' intellectuals who formed the elite of KOR and subsequently Solidarity.

In 1990 the only emerging party from outside the communist tradition which openly declared itself as left-wing was the reactivated Polish Socialist Party. It faced several obstacles to organising itself as a mass party. As a party of nostalgia it had to confront the difficulty of appealing to contemporary Poland while basing itself on a model which had been frozen in the 1940s. Moreover the PPS had traditionally been dominated by an elite, émigré core and had never developed a mass support. Above all the PPS had problems in coming to terms with the damage done to left-wing ideology by communist rule. Sharing the same part of the political spectrum with the successor parties of the PZPR

which had persecuted Polish socialists for so long was intolerable to elements of this current. All of these difficulties were reflected in numerous internal splits and in its low membership and poor electoral performances.

Apart from the PPS the most important emergent parties of the early transition period could be classed as Rightist. Unlike the secular, social-democratic or Marxist backgrounds of the Lay Left, the neo-liberal, Catholic, patriotic and radically anti-communist ethos of the non-Solidarity camp found its inspiration largely in the traditions of the Right.

The political weakness of the Right in 1989 was the result of traditional characteristics, communist repression and exclusion from Solidarity-dominated centres of political power in the early transition period. The Polish Right was traditionally poorly organised. The founder and editor of the émigré journal "Kultura", Jerzy Giedroyc, has pointed to the paradox that Poland is a conservative, Catholic, 'right-wing' society ruled by a small, leftist elite<sup>32</sup>.

The Polish Left had the urban working class as a clearly defined social constituency and the close-knit, left-wing intelligentsia as a source of political leadership. Marxism and social democracy gave

the Polish Left well-defined ideologies on which to base its organisations. Under communism the Left dominated the central political institutions and the reformist wing of the PZPR eventually provided an institutional base of support to leftist opposition to the regime.

The Polish Right was less certain of its potential constituency. Its various strands appealed to broad sections of Polish society but in a politically ill-defined way. Reference was made to the destiny of the Polish nation and the Polish people but in a country so long partitioned and dominated by powerful neighbours these concepts were vague and meant different things to different social categories and geographical regions<sup>33</sup>. Right-wing ideology in Poland can be divided into four strands: neo-liberal economic, Christian Democratic, radical-independent and Catholic-Nationalist<sup>34</sup>. Each of these had their own drawbacks when it came to political organisation in 1990.

### Neo-liberals

The 'economic' Right was forward-looking and ideologically close to what could be represented as Western neo-liberalism. It had gained momentum from the beginning of the 1980s with the experiences of some Polish economists who had studied and

lectured in the West. It also drew strength from the general awareness in Poland of the challenge being offered to the Left in Western Europe by representatives of the New Right such as the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. Liberal economic thought does not have deep roots in the Polish tradition due to the underdevelopment of a native middle class, the natural constituency for this strand in the West.

However, as we have seen, after the introduction of Martial Law some Poles looked to the dire condition of their own economy and found the New Right's critique of Left-wing economics applicable. Poland's economic plight had been caused by the imposition of the Communist command system. The Solidarity Trade Union's demands for worker rights had only made matters worse. Representatives of the neo-liberal Right looked to reform Poland's economy without challenging the PZPR's basic hold on political power<sup>36</sup>. They supported the radical, 'laissez-faire' concepts of neo-liberalism: "initiative, enterprise and a sense of competition"<sup>36</sup>. They stressed that state institutions should regulate but not control society and the market.

In 1990 the 'economistic' Right saw one of the major tasks of the day as guiding society away from the dependence of communist times, and if this entailed a period of synthetic political consensus while a competitive market was established, then so be it<sup>37</sup>.

This strand was represented by groups such as the Union of Real Politics (UPR<sup>38</sup>) and the Gdansk Social and Economic Society "Liberals' Congress". These groups called for the immediate introduction of a completely free market economy, privatisation as quickly as possible, curbing of trade union power and the end of welfare provisions. Despite the weak traditions of liberal economic thought in Poland and the underdevelopment of the Polish middle-class this strand benefited from the emergence, at the start of the transition, of a general pro-market consensus in Polish society. The remains of the planned economy had to be dismantled and replaced by what is normally considered to be a 'free market economy'. Mazowiecki's Finance Minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, was obviously influenced by neo-liberal ideas as his Plan for economic reform illustrated.

As the transition proceeded, a major drawback for this group in terms of political organisation emerged. The beneficiaries of the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by the Mazowiecki government were popularly conceived to be ex-communist enterprise managers who had acquired private property through the Rakowski administration's controversial 'nomenklatura privatisation' and rapacious Western firms who were stripping Poland of its best financial assets. This strand's essentially negative attitude to 'Solidarity', trade unions and social welfare undermined its popularity. Polish society's appreciation of the

benefits of unbridled capitalism was mixed with an expectation of strong worker representation and basic welfare provisions.

Indeed, the most vociferous critics of neo-liberalism were the more nationalist elements of the Polish Right itself (see below). This contributed to the fragmentation of the Right.

### Christian Democrats

This strand could be described as more Centrist than Rightist. Its roots lay in the founding of the Christian Democratic Movement (*chadecja*) in 1902. It was the Catholic Church's response to the rising popularity of socialism amongst industrial workers. It became very popular and was particularly strong in Silesia. Its policies were informed by an emphasis on Catholic social teaching. Thus while favouring features of the market system such as privatisation as important to individual dignity it also advocated state and social ownership, social services and welfare to protect all members of society. Although the *chadecja* movement had a strong tradition to refer to in 1990, it faced several obstacles when it came to political organisation. Any party planning to utilise the strand's tradition would necessarily be a 'nostalgia party'. The *chadecja* strand had been broken in 1946 by communist repression and continuity was impossible.

The reactivated Labour Party (SP) which attempted this move faced such difficulties. Its programmes were dominated by those of its pre-WWII ancestor and it openly called for discussions over what a Christian-Democratic movement amounted to in transition Poland. Representatives of the liberal, Catholic milieu were prominent during the transition. The ZNAK movement with several dozen Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) and the influential Tygodnik Powszechny played an important role in shaping political opinion. Moreover individuals such as the Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Speaker of the Senate Andrzej Stelmachowski hailed from this milieu. However the ZNAK strand had been founded on the desire of moderate Catholic intellectuals to find a pragmatic *modus vivendi* with the communist regime<sup>59</sup>. In 1990 this commitment to a non-political approach to Poland's problems continued. These luminaries were therefore not committed to organising an explicitly Christian Democratic party in 1990.

#### National-Catholics

This strand shared some of the economic Right's characteristics but with more religious (i.e. Catholic) or nationalist orientations. It drew on the traditions of the historic National Democratic Party (*endecja*) which, with its guiding light Roman Dmowski, dominated the Polish Right from the beginning of the 20th



century until the Second World War<sup>40</sup>. The most significant point of departure between the liberal-economic and national-conservative strands concerned Poland's relationship with the West. Although in favour of basing systemic (especially economic) change on the experiences of other countries, this strand was conscious of specifically 'Polish' factors, in keeping with Dmowski's defensive, insular attitude to international relations. Instead of advocating the direct transferral of liberal economic practices from the West it stressed the need to adapt these systems to the unique cultural characteristics of the Polish condition. Any policies emanating from this strand would be based on the native Polish tradition and on an awareness of Polish history<sup>41</sup>.

Several organisations of this strand could be traced to the split in the late 1970s between representatives of the Lay Left such as Michnik and Kuron and National-Catholic intellectuals such as Antoni Macierewicz in KOR<sup>42</sup>. This had led to the creation of ROPCiO<sup>43</sup> as a rival opposition organisation with a more nationalist, Catholic character<sup>44</sup>. ROPCiO in turn produced organisations such as The Young Poland Movement, The Political Club "Order and Freedom", The Political Society Young Poland and the Political Club "Freedom and Solidarity".

In October 1989 some of these groups united to form the Christian National Union (ZChN<sup>45</sup>). Hostility to the old 'Lay Left' group which formed the intellectual leadership of KOR and 'Solidarity' was apparent in ZChN policies. It called for the dissolution of the Lay Left-dominated OKP and the encouragement of parties with an anti-Communist pedigree. It also wanted the importance of the Catholic faith to Polish identity to be reflected in the new Constitution, institutions and legislation. Representatives of this milieu exercised some political influence. Alexander Hall, leader of The Political Society Young Poland was Minister for Contact with Political Parties in the Mazowiecki Cabinet. However, the 'Lay Left' was influential in the Mazowiecki government and parliament and the fact that the leaders of the National-Catholic strand had distanced themselves from the Lay Left in opposition times meant that they were now peripheral in terms of access to political power.

With its conservative social teaching and links to Poland's sense of national identity the Catholic Church provided an obvious source of support for this strand. It gave this strand a philosophical framework<sup>46</sup>. It also offered institutional support. Nevertheless the support of the Catholic Church was not necessarily helpful when it came to political organisation. Unity was strengthened by the Church's internal hierarchy and during communist repression it provided this strand with spiritual and practical sanctuary.

However, although the Church represents an important public institution in Poland it does not offer direct access to formal political power. Under communism the pragmatic outlook of the Church precluded direct political activity<sup>47</sup>.

However, as we shall see, conflict between the Church and the Mazowiecki government and the increased political involvement of the former in 1990 raised the political influence of the National/Catholic strand<sup>48</sup>. Parts of the agrarian political movement such as ZSL and PSL could also be included in the non-Solidarity camp. In 1989-90 it was a potentially significant political movement with a rich tradition, sizeable constituency, established political structures, and an experienced political elite. However the influence of the peasant movement was undermined by its traditional insularity and internal quarrels caused by the communists' creation of its own peasant organisation<sup>49</sup>.

### Pro-independence Radicals

The radical Right consisted of several small but potentially significant groups which put the achievement of Polish sovereignty above all political priorities. Poland's past suffering and its present ills were the result of foreign domination and the only remedy was full Polish sovereignty. The strand was part of a long tradition of nationalist insurrectionary organisations which

included 18th century groups and the pre-war Sanacja movement<sup>50</sup>. The strand virulently opposed communism as an instrument of Russian domination and was critical of the Solidarity movement's 'conciliatory' approach to the regime. It rejected the Round Table process and subsequently criticised the continued communist presence in the Sejm and the government and the tolerance of the nomenklatura under Mazowiecki. It thus refused to recognise the Mazowiecki administration as Poland's first sovereign government of the post-communist period. By its very nature and aims this strand was ill-equipped to form mass political organisations. Based underground and relentlessly persecuted by the communist authorities the radical Right's rejection of the Round Table process also resulted in its absence from the centres of political power in the early transition period. It did have some centres of support in areas traditionally associated with strong resistance to communism. Its chief representatives were "Fighting Solidarity" and the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN<sup>51</sup>), dominated by the personality of Leszek Moczulski<sup>52</sup>.

In summary, the non-Solidarity opposition in 1989 consisted of several, poorly integrated organisations; unsure of their popular bases, led by a diffuse, ideologically confused elite and absent from the central institutions of political power<sup>53</sup>.

## Categorisation of Parties

The existence of different factions within these emergent political organisations whose values appeared to overlap with groups in other parties increased the fragmentation and complexity of the political scene during this period.<sup>54</sup> Within each organisation it was possible to identify neo-liberal economists and state interventionists, reformers and populists, clerical and anti-clerical factions. As a result of this ideological and organisational vagueness observers categorised parties through other criteria. For instance Gebethner and Jasiewicz placed emergent parties or 'quasi-parties' into groups according to their antecedents rather than their current political views. These were as follows:

1. Post-Solidarity parties: PC, ROAD, and PSL 'Solidarity'.
2. Post-PZPR parties: SdRP, PUS, PSI, SD (and the less important PAX, UChS and PZKS).
3. Historic or Nostalgic Parties: SP, SN and PPS.
4. Radical New Parties: KPN, ZChN, UPR

However there was evidence that the emergent party spectrum could be grouped according to political issues, albeit in an inconclusive way. In April 1990 a questionnaire was given by the newspaper 'Polityka' to the leaders of various political groups

"concerning their responses to the most important political, social and economic issues"<sup>55</sup>. The questionnaire is worthy of close attention for two reasons. Firstly the questions give an insight into the important issues of 1990. Secondly, the answers challenge that traditional ideological divisions were obsolete. These differences did exist. Although the nascent political spectrum was not the best framework in which they could be perceived, it still hinted at ideological variations.

State intervention in the economy, the balance of central state institutions and Church/State relations all became watershed issues in the differentiation of the intelligentsia, Church, worker and peasant visions of Polish civil society. The Polish political scientist Krzysztof Palacki confirms the pertinence of the 'Polityka' questionnaire by introducing a very similar set of criteria in his attempt to differentiate political organisations according to ideology. His categories are as follows<sup>56</sup>:

1. The Economic Criteria - The duration and pace of state intervention in the economic sphere, privatisation and reprivatization of industries and banks, restructuring of the economic sector, the battle with inflation, unemployment, restructuring of agriculture sector according to farmers' models, social welfare and social services, openings to foreign competition.

2. The Political Criteria - The Relations between the executive and legislature, the role of the judiciary in the state.

3. The Cultural Criteria - Whether to refer to civil society or the nation, the correct model for European integration, the relationship with national traditions, the role of the Church with the State, the role of the State in relation to morality and religious belief.

Before examining the responses to the Polityka questionnaire certain qualifications must be made. As noted previously communist rule had distorted many of the labels and ideals of the Left in the eyes of Poles and this had skewed the political spectrum. Fledgling political organisations were understandably wary of associating themselves with the Left, even if their policies inevitably placed them in that part of the spectrum. It was also common for parties to brand rivals as left-wing in order to undermine their social popularity. One must also bear in mind that the value of certain criteria in terms of characterising parties was variable. For instance the cultural criteria would be of more importance in describing the ZChN whose main aim was pushing for an increased public role for the Catholic Church whereas the economic criteria was more important to the neo-liberal objectives of UPR<sup>57</sup>. These qualifications notwithstanding, the political questionnaire threw up some


interesting results for those concerned with the politics of the early transition period. Despite the events of the communist era and the fluidity of the situation at that time, the overwhelming majority of respondents thought that the traditional political divisions were still relevant. In the four criteria selected by the questionnaire and displayed in Diagram 3.10 one can see that parties which declared themselves to be close together on the traditional Left/Centre/Right spectrum for the most part grouped together according to the criteria. It is also worth noting that the tendency of the Polish Right to espouse clerical and authoritarian values is also consistently illustrated in the questionnaire (see Diagram 3.10).

Thus political differences, obvious in the anti-communist movement of the 1970s and 1980s were observable in the nascent party political scene in 1990. For a more detailed presentation of the development of parties and their political programmes refer to Appendix I. Nevertheless, in summary the extra-Solidarity party political scene in 1990 was fragmented, unstable and unrepresentative. It's condition suggested to the 'intelligentsia in power' that civil society ought to be nurtured through the structures of Solidarity.




Diagram 3.10: Polish Political Spectrum 1990


1. Declared Position on Traditional Spectrum




2. Economic Criterion; Position on Economic Policy  
(Too Much/Too Little State Intervention)



3. Political Criterion; Parliamentary/Presidential



4. Cultural Criterion: Attitude to Church/State Relation



based on 'Polish Political Panorama' Polityka 28/7/90

## (ii) The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and Political Reform

The weakness of state institutions and the party political spectrum could, and were, seen as justifications for the concentration of state powers at the onset of the Mazowiecki period (see below p378). However the influence of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia was a significant factor in this process. In Chapter 1 we established the Polish intelligentsia as a milieu which combined the 'totalist' perspective of the intellectual idiom with a desire to direct the whole of Polish society through dogmatic use of the state. The elitism of the milieu urged it to concentrate political power in its own hands because Polish society could not be expected to lead itself in the direction of modernity<sup>88</sup>. This approach was observed in the role of the intelligentsia in the fragmentation and decline of the parliamentary democracy of the Second Republic and in the establishment of the communist party-state. In 1990 this approach to power was apparent in the political philosophy of the intelligentsia in power: Polish society was in no condition to develop democracy, thus democratic values had to be imposed on it by the milieu through the state.

The work of Adam Michnik, a prominent member of the Warsaw-based 'Lay Left' milieu which this thesis identifies with

the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia, was illustrative of this approach. Michnik was an MP in the Mazowiecki period, and widely seen as an influential member of the new elite<sup>59</sup>. According to him the intelligentsia's commitment to liberal, democratic values was joined in the anti-communist opposition by anti-democratic agendas<sup>60</sup>.

As the cement of anti-communism which had bound the intelligentsia to previously distant sections of Polish society disappeared with the regime the supporters of the 'intelligentsia in power' feared that the emergence of undemocratic forces within Polish society would threaten the authority of the Mazowiecki government and its 'mission' to introduce democracy to the nation. If pro-Mazowiecki government unity was to be preserved then another cement, another 'enemy', had to be found<sup>61</sup>.

The new 'enemy' identified was as much an indicator of the Mazowiecki government's intelligentsia pedigree as an appraisal of the potential threats to the introduction of a democratic civil society in Poland. In place of the old "us and them" divide Michnik suggested an "us and it" dialectic; it being Polish society's ever-present potential to slip into populist or authoritarian ways. Thus in 1989-90 the intelligentsia's negative attitude to and

alienation from the rest of Polish society re emerged after the unprecedented societal unity of the late communist period<sup>62</sup>.

The fears of the 'intelligentsia in power' were heightened by its decision to give priority to the reform of the economy along liberal, pro-market lines as a vital step in the journey to the democratic West. The government feared that the social groups affected most severely by the trauma of economic transition had their own, less 'enlightened' visions of the reform process and that denying them a say could risk the emergence of authoritarian tendencies<sup>63</sup>.

Bronislaw Geremek<sup>64</sup> the Warsaw-based intellectual and leader of Solidarity's parliamentary representation (OKP<sup>65</sup>) regularly expressed the intelligentsia's fears over Polish society's anti-democratic tendencies in the atmosphere of painful transition<sup>66</sup>. The 'intelligentsia in power' proclaimed the democratisation of Polish politics just as it had heralded the liberalisation of the economic sphere through the Balcerowicz Plan. However, just as the new elite held on to economic power on account of the underdevelopment of the Polish economy, so political power was to remain with the state because it judged the Polish political system as too immature and undemocratic.

Jerzy Turowicz, a prominent Catholic intellectual and supporter of the Mazowiecki government warned that the immediate development of political parties could lead to political crisis: "It threatens to destabilise the present political balance, to weaken the emerging democracy. Nobody denies [new parties] the right to participation in public life, but they need to acquire a following first. Mazowiecki's government should be given time to carry out its programme in peace"<sup>67</sup>. This strategy enjoyed the explicit support of the Mazowiecki government. Indeed at a meeting called to discuss reform of the OKP the Premier himself stated: "I wish to confide in you my big worry: please don't let this beginning of Polish democracy into hell, the Polish hell of quarrels, rivalries and fights". Quarrels, rivalries and fights are part and parcel of the democratic political process and the desire of the Mazowiecki government to quell them betrayed its idealistic, intellectual character.

Thus the intelligentsia, as Poland's foremost exponents of democracy, would retain political control for the time being. Just as in the inter-war and communist periods, the development of political parties were seen as a threat to, rather than prerequisites of, democracy. The Mazowiecki government could thus be seen as the 1990 version of the 'despotism of the enlightened'<sup>68</sup>. The Solidarity movement was central to the plans

of the 'intelligentsia in power' to maintain political control of the transition process.

## The Mazowiecki Government and 'Solidarity'.

Of all the potential sources of political legitimacy in early transition Poland the Solidarity movement was best qualified. In 1990 it operated both as a powerful symbol of national unity and as the dominant political organisation in Polish society. In symbolic terms Solidarity was credited, in Poland and elsewhere, with a vital role in the overthrow of Communism in East-Central Europe<sup>69</sup>. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the old regime Solidarity's image as the hammer of East-Central European communism was powerful. Even after the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan and its associated economic strictures, over 50% of Poles still express trust in and support for Solidarity<sup>70</sup>.

In organisational terms Solidarity's status was ambiguous. It was famous world-wide as a trade union but in reality this side of the organisation had not recovered from the depredations of the Martial Law period. In 1990 available information provided tangible evidence of the decline. Polls taken by CBOS at the end of June 1990 showed that 35% of the respondents were "indifferent" to the fortunes of the movement and 10% considered themselves against Solidarity. Union activism was also at a very low ebb. At its peak in 1980 around ten million people belonged to the union. By June 1989 less than two million were paying their union

dues<sup>71</sup>. In comparison the leader of the post-PZPR union OPZZ, Alfred Miodowicz, claimed to have 6.5 million members at the end of 1989<sup>72</sup>. In 1990 there were widespread reports of factories not electing delegates, delegates failing to arrive at meetings and failures to elect factory commissioners<sup>73</sup>. A poll taken in late 1989 and reported in *Tygodnik Solidarnosc* showed that there was no Solidarity presence in over 40% of the factories canvassed<sup>74</sup>.

Solidarity's status as a political organisation was also open to competing interpretations. In the aftermath of its decisive victory in the semi-free elections of June 1989, Solidarity seemed to be in a dominant position. It had organised a network of local organisations (the Citizens' Committees) to help run its campaign for the June 1989 elections. The movement had over 1,000 branches in most Polish towns and the number of activists was estimated as between 90,000 and 100,000<sup>75</sup>. Solidarity's comprehensive victory in the June 1989 elections - where it won all but one of the 161 contested seats in the Sejm and all but one of the seats in the Senate - paid testament to the efficacy of its political machine.

However, closer analysis suggested that Solidarity's political power was less overwhelming than the election results implied. Although a turn-out of 62% was comparable to those for elections in developed liberal democracies in the West, it was lower than the



66% turnout for the Sejm elections of autumn 1985 (as estimated by Solidarity activists). Given the unprecedented nature of the 1989 election, in terms of the level of free choice and the amount of campaigning allowed, the turnout was low. The obvious conclusion is that Polish society's support for Solidarity was not total. Sociologists discovered a strong correlation between those who had expressed support for Solidarity throughout the Martial Law period and those who voted for the movement in June 1989. Parts of Polish society outside the Solidarity tradition, associated mostly with economically underdeveloped and socially fragmented regions, remained largely outside of politics<sup>76</sup>. Observers of the election explained that Polish society, in the grip of economic recession, was more concerned with survival than political participation. Moreover, it was sceptical of what Solidarity could do to improve the situation<sup>77</sup>. The fact that the standard of living of the majority of Polish society was set to worsen considerably with the launch of the Balcerowicz Plan is salient in this context. Solidarity's political standing was bound to suffer with the introduction of the plan under the auspices of a 'Solidarity government'.

In terms of institutional support the Solidarity movement appeared to have a dominant position. Besides the obvious assistance provided by society-based institutions such as the Solidarity Trade Union and the Catholic Church, the movement

had made significant inroads into state bodies after the 1989 elections. Although the key Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence (which were still held by the ex-Communists Czesław Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki) the Mazowiecki government was dominated by Solidarity members (the premiership and 10 of the 20 government posts went to 'Solidarity' members with the PZPR gaining 6, and its former satellites ZSL and SD two apiece). With the fragmentation of the communist caucus in the Sejm, Solidarity's parliamentary representation (OKP) became the dominant force in the lower house. The Senate, which had been freely elected in June 1989, was virtually filled by Solidarity members.

Moreover it counted amongst its leadership national figures such as Walesa, Mazowiecki and Geremek who had gained political experience in the detailed negotiations of the Round Table. The Solidarity elite enjoyed significant approval amongst society as the heroes of the struggle against communism (see Table 3.11).

Table 3.11: Trust in Selected Public Figures in Summer 1990 (in %)

Selected Public Figs.	Definitely Yes	I should say Yes	I should say No	Definitely No	Hard to Say	Don't Know Person
Cardinal J. Glemp	54.2	37.1	2.5	1.4	2.4	1.1
T. Mazowiecki	41.1	46.3	5.2	1.5	4.5	1
L. Walesa	34.3	48.3	11.6	4.9	7.9	1.2
B. Geremek	19.7	42.6	10.7	5.3	12.2	9.1
A. Stelmachowski	16.4	40.1	6	1.6	15.1	20.1
E. Letowska	14.2	32.3	7.5	2.9	15.9	26.3
J. Kuron	12.6	46.1	19.2	8.2	10.7	12.1
T. Balcerowicz	11.6	42.9	16.9	8.7	14.9	4.7
W. Jaruzelski	11.6	28.2	24.1	20.1	15.1	0.5
M. Kozakiewicz	7.8	46.2	10.7	2.7	16.5	15.4
R. Bartoszcze	3.6	21.5	11.8	2.4	22.4	38
L. Moczulski	3.4	17.2	14.7	14.2	20.1	29.7
A. Kwasniewski	2.4	17.4	19	19.9	18.3	25.5
J. Korwin-Mikke	1.2	7.7	8	9.9	12.8	59.2

Source: 'Poles' opinions - Summer 1990' published in S. Gebethner and K. Jasiewicz, *Dlaczego Tak Głosowano* PAN Warsaw 1993 p33).

Months after the introduction of the Balcerowicz reforms public confidence in the leaders of the Solidarity movement and in the elite of the 'Solidarity government' (Mazowiecki, Walesa, Geremek, Stelmachowski, Letowska, Kuron, Balcerowicz) was apparent (despite mixed political fortunes in the intervening years some of these individuals remain extremely popular in Poland)<sup>78</sup>. In comparison the old communist elite (Jaruzelski, Kwasniewski) was compromised in the eyes of Polish society and the leaders of nascent Right-wing political forces (Bartoszcze, Korwin-Mikke) were simply not yet recognised as figures of national significance. For a more detailed political biographies of some of these figures see Appendix II.

In summary, Solidarity's symbolic importance, institutional support, organisational penetration at grass-roots and leadership credibility placed it in a dominant political position in 1990. The fragmented, weakly developed party political spectrum could not compete with Solidarity's political strength and popular support<sup>79</sup>.

For the 'intelligentsia in power' the Solidarity movement represented the best opportunity to carry out its elitist version of state-led democratic transition. The 'Solidarity ethos' espoused by the Mazowiecki government and its supporters stressed the movement's roots as a collective, national community. The political unity of Solidarity, rather than its diverse social constituents, was stressed<sup>80</sup>. This mirrored the intelligentsia's view of itself as a national emanation and its desire to continue to address society as a single, politically homogeneous entity. The assumption was that just as all 'good Poles' had united in Solidarity behind the intelligentsia's articulation of anti-communist feeling so they would remain together behind the version of the reform process espoused by the 'intelligentsia in power'.

This was the 'civil society' envisioned by the intelligentsia: a society willing to accept the rule of its most enlightened citizens as they moved the country towards democracy. Observers noted how the general elitism of the Mazowiecki administration, which excluded non-intelligentsia reform programmes, was altering the essence of the Solidarity movement from social activism to etatism<sup>81</sup>.

This vision of Solidarity as a representative of the collective identity of Polish society and its unity behind the intelligentsia

took a specific, practical form. The Mazowiecki government and its supporters in the intelligentsia sought to harness its emotional and institutional force by transforming it into a social movement or an American-style 'super party'. Adam Michnik regularly argued that Solidarity as a Trade Union was simply not enough in transition times and that it ought to act as a political supporter of the new government in its struggle to institute a democratic, civil society<sup>82</sup>.

The case of the American system was cited as an example of the party politics favoured by the Mazowiecki government's intellectual support. Senator Andrzej Celinski (Warsaw intellectual and ex KOR member) envisaged the development of an American-style two party system in the form of Solidarity and a reformed remnant of the Communist Party<sup>83</sup>. Asked if he saw the American model as appropriate to Polish circumstances, Zbigniew Bujak, a prominent member of Solidarity's intelligentsia cadre, concurred<sup>84</sup>.

What the social movement and mass party models have in common is that they eschew exclusive identification with one social group or class or one geographical region. Instead they tend towards coalitions of interests and representation of a number of social groups and regional interests through reference to very general and moralistic categories. Thus such an

organisation suited the 'totalist', 'nation-wide' perspective of the intelligentsia. We have already noted the attraction of Western political intellectuals to the 'new social model' as a means of reasserting their identity<sup>85</sup>. At this point it is interesting to note that in 1990 the equivalents of the 'intelligentsia in power' in Hungary and Czechoslovakia exhibited similar attitudes to the political sphere. Organisations such as the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum in Hungary and the Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia lacked significant social constituencies and were dominated by intellectuals. However each was infused with the tendency to address the nation as a whole, to reject the efficacy of pressing political issues and conduct discourses on a lofty, moral plane. As we shall see, the acrimonious disintegration of these groups was mirrored in the fragmentation of Solidarity.

Solidarity's national and local structures were central to the intelligentsia's plans to create a 'catch-all' party or social movement. With the disintegration of the communist caucus in parliament, Solidarity's Parliamentary Club (OKP) held the initiative in the legislature and it was to act as the intellectual head of the movement. All members of the OKP entered Parliament after the June 1989 elections, when they stood under the Solidarity list personally sanctioned by Lech Walesa and his

intellectual advisers. The OKP had a high intelligentsia representation<sup>86</sup>.

At local level Solidarity's citizens' committees also had an important part to play. These committees were formed after an appeal by the National Citizens' Committee to the public to help run the campaign for the June 1989 elections. Typically citizens' committee members were veteran Solidarity activists and local notables drawn from the intelligentsia milieu<sup>87</sup>. Solidarity's overwhelming victory in the June 1989 elections demonstrated the political effectiveness of the committees and in the local elections of May 1990 the citizens' committees again demonstrated their ability to rally support for the Solidarity cause. As the grass-roots of the movement, these territorial organisations would provide the key to those intelligentsia elements who wanted to transform Solidarity into a nation-wide, pro-Mazowiecki social movement.

The main author of the intelligentsia's plan was Henryk Wujec. Wujec was secretary of the "Citizens' Committee of Solidarity" or "Citizens' Committee by Lech Walesa" (KO<sup>88</sup>), the now largely defunct group of intellectuals appointed by Walesa to advise Solidarity's labour leaders in the Round Table process. Wujec wanted to formalise links between this national body and its territorial equivalents. He envisaged a federal structure involving



representatives from each province and a secretariat headed by the pro-Mazowiecki leader of the Warsaw citizens' committee, Zbigniew Bujak<sup>89</sup>. In effect this would institutionalise the intelligentsia's leadership of a national, civic organisation. It would support the reform programme introduced by the government of the 'best and brightest' and act as a central component of the intelligentsia-led development of democracy by fiat.

The intelligentsia's elitist vision of political transition was also reflected in its favoured option for electoral law. Solidarity's intellectual leadership, which dominated its parliamentary representation, advocated a straight majority or 'first past the post system'. This was based on the electoral formula of the June 1989 elections which had served Solidarity's interests so well. The option would have denied access to the Sejm for emerging parties which at that time had not mustered widespread support. It would have guaranteed parliamentary dominance to those MPs elected in June 1989 under the aegis of Solidarity. Thus, while the weak condition of state institutions and the party system were reasons for the concentration of state power under Mazowiecki, the elitist, etatist ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia played a significant part. Determination to concentrate power in intelligentsia hands through the instrument of Solidarity was evident.

Once again, before examining the short-term consequences of the Mazowiecki government's approach to political reform one must acknowledge its long term achievements. Critics point to the high turn-over rate of administrations since the Mazowiecki period as evidence of the weakness and instability of Polish democracy. However, despite several changes in government, the basic rules of democratic politics have been followed. The imminent prospect of Poland's involvement in the process of European integration pays testament to the current stability of the political scene. Given the social explosion inherited by the Mazowiecki government in 1989 the achievement of the Mazowiecki government in paving the way for this democratisation process is significant.

In the short-term, the consequences of the elitist approach of the 'intelligentsia in power' to political reform were negative. While in times of revolution society could be mobilised in a unified way through reference to national, universal or moral criteria, the establishment of a democratic, civil society requires the recognition of social plurality and diversity. As we have seen, deep political and socio-economic cleavages were ever-present in inter-war and communist Poland. Differences within the intelligentsia and between the milieu and other sections in Polish

society were apparent even during Polish society's period of greatest unity in the 1970s and 1980s<sup>90</sup>.

In 1990 the emergent party political scene suggested the depth of social cleavages and introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan deepened them in the short-term at least. The attempt by the 'intelligentsia in power' to stifle the expression of these differences was contrary to the development of a modern, democratic civil society and illustrative of the milieu's elitist, idealistic vision of Polish democracy. What was worse, the attempt by the Mazowiecki government to stifle the development of political parties, in the context of radical socio-economic flux led to the rise of populist, anti-intellectual forces in Mazowiecki's Poland and the disintegration of Solidarity. Intellectuals disillusioned with the pace and direction of Mazowiecki's reforms and the role allocated to them in the new circumstances began to form a populist critique of the 'intelligentsia in power'. Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski, Gdansk-based intellectuals who were hostile to the political domination of the Warsaw-based Lay Left emerged to lead an anti-Mazowiecki campaign.

### (iii) The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity

In chapter one populism was presented as a backlash to the intellectualised processes of modernisation. Usually mobilised by alienated intellectuals they contrast the characteristics of progress (urbanisation, secularisation, economic liberalisation, parliamentary democracy etc.) with a nostalgic evocation of past certainties (usually based on conservative rural values such as conservatism, religious piety, ethnicity etc.). Each brand of populism is characterised through opposition to the forces leading the process of modernisation in a given society. Thus in Poland populism tended to include anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic elements<sup>91</sup>.

In 1990 the conservatism and traditionalism of Polish and East European populism could not be compared with conservative political forces in Western Europe. In the West those seeking to include and defend moral and cultural values did so within the framework of modernity. Traditional categories of religion and nationhood were supplemented by the modern, liberal economic ideals of individual initiative, free enterprise and limited government. In Eastern Europe the modernised strain of conservatism did not take root. The values of populism were largely frozen in the 1940s with the political repression which accompanied the advent of communist rule. Thus in 1990 Polish

populists harked back to the pre-communist period. Communism was regarded as an imposed, alien system which had stifled the expression of true Polish values. It is important to note that using pre-WWII history as a template for transition Poland ignored the massive socio-economic changes which occurred under communism: the end of rural overpopulation, the growth of the urban, industrial workforce and the spread of industrial working methods. Conceptions of citizenship, democracy and capitalism have undergone profound changes in general since 1945 and Poles are conscious of these developments<sup>92</sup>.

In the context of the transition period Polish populism thus stressed the importance of identifying and protecting Poland's traditional identity as revealed by the interests of the majority of Poles. All vestiges of the 'alien' communist interlude had to be removed immediately. This included a call for fresh parliamentary and presidential elections. The new state had to be shaped with the traditional vision of the Polish community in mind. The new Constitution had to enshrine the values of a traditionally Catholic society. Politically, populists looked for a presidential rather than parliamentary system of government<sup>93</sup>. This reflected the populist desire for 'direct' contact between political leaders and the people. A powerful Sejm was seen as an unrepresentative, unnecessary impediment, especially in its 'contractual' condition following the Round Table agreement between the communists and Solidarity.

The 'Janus' quality of economic populism was also apparent. The need for modernisation and economic improvement was clear to all. This obviously involved rationalisation and the introduction of some free-market or neo-liberal ideals. However Poles had to be protected from the worst consequences of economic transition. The state was expected to intervene to this end. The political and economic motives of foreign interests were viewed with suspicion. Western models were unrealistic guides for transition Poland. They had taken decades to evolve and could not be transplanted in toto to Poland. Instead, Poland's own resources and traditions were to be nurtured. Polish firms had to be protected from the forces of international capitalism which would strip them of what assets they had. According to populists the father of the Balcerowicz Plan was the bureaucracy of the IMF (albeit with the assistance of professors with good Polish names) and the mother was the Lay left which was intent on preserving the old regime's economic privileges (e.g. through tolerating the practice of 'nomenklatura privatisation'). Between them the government and the West had deepened the nation's economic plight<sup>94</sup>.

The complete collapse of communist power, dominance of the government and Parliament by Solidarity's intellectual elite which refused to support the development of political pluralism, and the growing awareness of the social and cultural costs of

transition spurred the emergence of populism. Opposition to the Mazowiecki government unified under a radical, populist banner by taking political advantage of its exclusion from central state institutions.

The Mazowiecki Government's strategy was interpreted by populists as an attempt by a narrow, disinterested and 'not quite Polish' elite to consolidate power and introduce reform for its own benefit. Central to this argument was the perception of the Round Table (at which non-intelligentsia elements exerted peripheral influence only) as the outcome of a secret bargain between related communist and Solidarity intellectual elites<sup>96</sup>.

The 'Magdalenka' talks consisted of preliminary discussions held between Government, Solidarity and Church representatives to prepare the way for the wider Round Table talks. The presence of radical elements within both communist and Solidarity camps meant that these talks had to be carried out in secrecy<sup>96</sup>.

The suspicion and anger of the emergent, populist Right were aroused by the secrecy surrounding these meetings and the social and political background of the participants.

Critics of the 'Magdalenka' pointed to the social and ideological background of the Solidarity representation which, they claimed,

more closely resembled its communist counterparts than the Solidarity movement on whose behalf it was supposed to act. Though labour leaders Walesa, Gil and Frasnyniuk were present, the Solidarity-opposition representation at Magdalenka was largely drawn from the intelligentsia. Well known members of Warsaw's Lay Left intellectual elite such as Geremek, Kuron and Michnik were prominent at the talks and they had also been associated with the party and the communist system in the past.

During the discussions the government showed it was aware of the close comparisons being drawn between the status and political outlook of both sides and the difficulties this could cause within the Solidarity camp. Indeed it was prepared to use the threat of intra-Solidarity strife on this theme to its advantage. At one point in the talks the Solidarity side, traditionally hostile to its communist trade union rival, demanded that the OPZZ<sup>97</sup> be banned from the Round Table. Government representative Andrzej Gdula replied, "If we close the possibility of the OPZZ's participation at the Round Table, the accusation will be repeated that the government elite has reached an understanding with the Solidarity elite behind the backs of the working class"<sup>98</sup>.

Subsequently delegates from the OPZZ were invited to the Round Table. At the talks the OPZZ took the opportunity to cite itself as the true representative of the working class, which had been abandoned by the Solidarity elite. In his opening speech at the



Round table OPZZ leader Alfred Miodowicz warned that "We must not delegate our thinking to the privileged few"<sup>99</sup>.

It should be noted that the Jewish origins of prominent Solidarity negotiators such as Michnik and Kuron at the 'Magdalenka' suited Polish populism's traditional stereotype of an 'outsider' or 'enemy of the people'<sup>100</sup>. Moreover the fact that both communist and Solidarity elites hailed largely from a Warsaw background fuelled traditional Warsaw/provinces resentments. The suspicions of those groups denied access to the Magdalenka and Round Table were heightened by the subsequent success of these meetings as a nursery for the political elite of Poland. In the Spring of 1989 the "Citizens' Committee by Lech Walesa" published a book called "Who's Who" containing pictures, biographies and declarations of the people who made up the 'opposition-Solidarity side' at the Round Table talks. In June 1990 its successor was published and some journalists suggested that it should be entitled "Who Became Whom?"<sup>101</sup>.

Of the 247 opposition-Solidarity participants at the Round Table talks 28 became MPs and 35 Senators: One in four became members of the OKP. Besides the Premier one could find seven Ministers derived from the Round Table team: J. Ambroziak, A. Balazs, A. Hall, J. Kuron, A. Paszynski, H. Samsonowicz and W.

Trzeciakowski. The Round Table also provided 14 Secretaries and Under-secretaries of State.

More than 10 people from the Round Table took up influential positions in the mass media. This group included D. Fikus and J. Moskwa who took charge of "Rzeczpospolita", A. Michnik and H. Luczywo who became editors of "Gazeta Wyborcza" and M. Ilowiecki who became head of the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP). The recruitment of Poland's elite from the Round Table continued well into the transition. In 1992 an article in Tygodnik Powszechny highlighted how the Round Table had proven to be a "royal road" to the highest political positions: "So far [in the first half of 1992] that representation has had drawn from its ranks a President of the Republic, two Premiers, 13 Ministers, 5 secretaries of State, a spokesman for citizens' rights, a high Chief Justice, a head of the State's Electoral Commission, two heads of the Chief Board of Supervision and dozens of future parliamentarians"<sup>102</sup>.

Given these factors it was easy to interpret the Magdalenka process as constituting some form of 'deal' between the intellectual leaders of Solidarity and the intelligentsia-based elite of the PZPR. Even the government sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis complained about the new elite's exclusiveness<sup>103</sup>. One of the most vociferous critics of the 'Magdalenka' was Jaroslaw Kaczynski<sup>104</sup>, a founder of the Centre Alliance (PC<sup>105</sup>). Throughout 1990 he

claimed that secret understandings had been made at Magdalenka, even though his twin brother Lech, who had attended the discussions, denied this assertion. By 1994 he had conceded that no deals had been formally struck but maintained that a secret agenda had been present. According to him the communists had used the Magdalenka to guarantee their own survival, safe in the knowledge that their financial interests would be looked after and that their current elite (e.g. Kwasniewski) was young enough to revive its political fortunes in the future. Kaczynski even claimed that Kwasniewski and Adam Michnik had their own little Round Table in August 1989 where Michnik had told the communist that there had to be a 'party of the brightest', in which a place would be found for him<sup>106</sup>.

The accuracy of such anecdotes is open to question but one should not underestimate the potency of this anti-intelligentsia, populist interpretation of the Magdalenka and Round Table processes. Four years later anti-communists continued to view the Magdalenka as a place where "open communists (Kiszczyk, Jaruzelski, Ciosek) reached an understanding with their own agents and crypto-communists (Michnik, Kuron, Geremek) in order to hold on to power, rob Poland, and cheat true Poles and patriots (Morawiecki, Jurczyk, Gwiazda)"<sup>107</sup>.

By denying significant strands of the intelligentsia access to the arena where the future shape of Poland was being decided, even after the collapse of communist power, the Lay Left made a virtue of their political opponents' non-institutional character and gave them a potent, populist cause. Consequently parties which emerged on the political scene in the early transition period contained elements of the radical populist agenda outlined here.

In the state of economic austerity and political uncertainty of early transition Poland the emergence of various radical, populist Right-wing organisations outside the main arena of political power was potentially destabilising for the Mazowiecki government. These parties clearly regarded the intelligentsia cadre of the new elite as unrepresentative of and unsympathetic toward the interests of Polish society<sup>108</sup>. Anti-intelligentsia, anti-capitalist, anti-Semitic, anti-urban sentiments, when given political form obviously undermined the authority of the Mazowiecki government and threatened political instability.

More seriously for the future of the Mazowiecki government, populist, anti-intellectual currents were observable within the Solidarity movement itself. Despite its resources and the intelligentsia's emphasis on unity, the Solidarity movement's ability to foster consensus was severely hampered by the

emergence of deep internal crisis at the start of the transition. Under communism the movement had been seen by the opposition as the guardian of Polish civil society and its democratic aspirations. Consequently the debate over what civil society and democracy amounted to in transition Poland was inextricably linked to Solidarity's own identity<sup>109</sup>.

Solidarity's internal differences, amongst its intelligentsia cadre and between its different social constituents, had been evident from the movement's inception and they had continued to influence the movement's activities throughout the 1980s<sup>110</sup>. However Solidarity's primary function as an anti-communist force guaranteed unity<sup>111</sup>.

The conditions of post-communist Poland were not conducive to this type of unity. The common, communist foe was in disarray, the rigours of the Balcerowicz Plan were making themselves felt and the battle in Polish society for a say in the transition process was beginning. Despite the assumptions of the Solidarity-based intelligentsia the flux of the early transition period was bound to overwhelm the fixed formula of Solidarity's anti-communist past<sup>112</sup>.

The struggle which ensued was fought on personal and institutional terms and the 'Solidarity' movements advantages in terms of the prestige of its leaders and its institutional bases were severely affected<sup>113</sup>.

In December 1989 the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan was marked by a Solidarity conference, designed to demonstrate the movement's unity and bolster government support from all sections of Polish society. However, before the 'Forum on the Solidarity Ethos' commenced, observers noted the competing elites within the movement. The journalist Piotr Wierbicki wrote an influential article on intra-Solidarity politics. He identified three groups within the movement, the 'Family', the 'Retinue' and the 'Court' which can be related to the competing agendas just outlined earlier<sup>114</sup>.

Within Solidarity the intelligentsia strand was espoused by 'The Family': (the close-knit, ex KOR intellectuals of the Warsaw-based 'Lay Left') and 'The Retinue' (the provincial, liberal-Catholic intelligentsia-based group concentrated around Prime Minister Mazowiecki). As we have seen, during the late communist period differences between these strands had been overcome. The 'Lay Left' abandoned its commitment to Marxian economics and adopted the neo-liberal approach of the provincial milieu. The

secular Warsaw group had also been attracted to the moderate, tolerant Catholicism of Mazowiecki's group.

The cadre of the Mazowiecki administration and the new parliament was dominated by this alliance. Alexander Hall (moderate nationalist and Minister of Contact with Political Parties), Leszek Balcerowicz and Tadeusz Skryjczyk (neo-liberals and Ministers of Finance and Industry respectively) and Andrzej Stelmachowski (Christian democrat and Speaker in the Senate) were all members of the Mazowiecki circle. Jacek Kuron (Minister of Labour and member of Sejm Commissions for Administration and Foreign Affairs), Bronislaw Geremek (Chairman of the Sejm Commissions on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution and Chairman of the OKP and Adam Michnik (Member of Sejm Commissions on Culture and Mass Media, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution) were the most prominent members of the 'Lay Left'. In "Tygodnik Solidarnosc" Jadwiga Staniszkis argued that the Mazowiecki government contained the influence of both 'The Family' and 'The Retinue'<sup>115</sup>.

Wierbicki himself subscribed to the populist vision of Polish democracy. His book of 1985 "Thoughts of an Old-fashioned Pole" acclaimed Dmowski's brand of Polish nationalism (the title echoes Dmowski's seminal work "Thoughts of an Up-to-date Pole") and advocated the elevation of Lech Walesa to a semi-dictatorial role<sup>116</sup>.

Wierbicki's populism could be related to one of the groups he identified within Solidarity in late 1989 - 'The Court'. He associated this group with Lech Walesa and his followers. Although the outlook of this group was initially limited to the political ambitions of its chief, Walesa's importance as symbol and leader of the working class and his attachment to conservative elements in the Catholic Church placed his camp in the populist tradition. The main press organ of this group was the Solidarity trade union weekly "Tygodnik Solidarnosc". The newspaper had been edited by Mazowiecki until his appointment as Premier. The editorial staff was subsequently changed by Walesa himself. He filled it with many of his own supporters, such as the Gdansk-based intellectual Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who felt excluded from the closely-knit Warsaw milieu which was influential in the Mazowiecki administration.

As the new government's tenure proceeded "Tygodnik Solidarnosc" developed a populist, anti-intellectual critique of its approach to the transition. The new administration and its supporters were criticised as being elitist, lacking trust in society's common sense, having an undemocratic relationship with the majority of society. Wojciech Sadurski noted the emergence of the populist vision in the newspaper<sup>117</sup>. Throughout 1990 it presented the populist programme as an alternative to the policies of the Mazowiecki government. Articles were marked with the demand for an



immediate reckoning with ex-communists, the rejection of the logic of the Round Table agreement and the call for completely free presidential and parliamentary elections as a means of bringing all Polish society into the transition process<sup>118</sup>.

As far as the Solidarity movement itself was concerned, the populist line of the 'Court' emphasised its role as a defender of the workers' interests. The perception of the Mazowiecki administration as a 'Solidarity government' increased the danger of the movement's structures and symbolism being subjugated to the political line of the new elite. Thus a significant part of Polish society, the Solidarity-oriented workers, would have their independent input into the transition process severely curtailed. This was occurring at a time when Balcerowicz's reforms of the economy were causing particular suffering amongst the workers; when workers' interests ought to be asserted most forcefully. Tensions between these groups within Solidarity eventually led to open conflicts which pulled the movement's structures apart.

## Conflict Over OKP

The conflict between elitist and populist forces within Solidarity was reflected in the movement's Parliamentary representation. Solidarity's intellectual elite had set great store in preserving pro-reform unity within the OKP with the hope that it would become a leading component of a Solidarity-based social movement<sup>119</sup>. However tensions were apparent in the body from the outset. Though the Presidium of the OKP was dominated by the social elite of the Warsaw-based intelligentsia (including such figures as Geremek, Henryk Wujec, Hanna Suchocka and Andrzej Stelmachowski) its membership was politically heterogeneous. It included prominent leaders of different groups and interests. New political parties had emerged just prior to the June 1989 election, including some whose members had been active under the auspices of Solidarity from the outset<sup>120</sup>. It also consisted of people who had little or nothing to do with the Solidarity movement during opposition times but now recognised the opportunity to gain a seat in Parliament.

As conflicts intensified the populists saw the Sejm as a vital foothold in a political arena which was otherwise dominated by a Warsaw coterie of intellectuals. The attitude of MP Jan Lopuszanski exemplifies the emergence of political opposition to

the pro-unity OKP leadership. Although elected under the auspices of the Solidarity movement, he was a member of the Christian-National Union (ZChN) which espoused a Right-wing national/clerical programme. With other ZChN MP's Stefan Niesiolowski and Marek Jurek<sup>121</sup>, Lopuszanski formed a party lobby. Although unable to formally represent their party in Parliament because they were not elected as its members, they expressed the ZChN's line in debates and voting, often in opposition to the OKP majority (c.f. abortion and religious education issues). Lopuszanski stated that, although not acting in the name of the party, he would represent it in elections<sup>122</sup>. He also pressed for a formal split of the OKP into separate party organisations free from the OKP whip.

Before examining the emergence of organisations within the OKP an important distinction ought to be made between OKP 'groups' and 'circles' (in Polish 'kolo'). The 'group' had "a lobbying character"<sup>123</sup>. Its duty was to raise problems at the OKP forum which, in the view of its members, had been forgotten about in the club or to which the Presidium had devoted too little space. On the other hand, 'circles' were explicitly political<sup>124</sup>. Membership of groups and circles did not have a separate character within the framework of the OKP. One could belong to the 'Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests' which voiced its interests in the

context of OKP policy and be a member of a political 'circle' such as PC which pursued an independent line. In the second half of 1990 the increased importance of political differences meant that membership of a given OKP 'group' yielded to membership of a political 'circle' and the significance of the 'group' diminished. Although groups were not formally disbanded, their duties and functions were taken over by circles (see Diagram 3.12).

When it came to identifying groups and circles in the OKP Lopuszanski provides a useful introduction<sup>125</sup>. The first he identifies is the main intelligentsia strand which continued to espouse the unity of the 'Solidarity ethos'. This group comprised around seventy to seventy-five members, led by the intellectual luminaries of the Lay Left.

The next group was the "so-called Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests". It was a trade union body which took its lead from the socialist strand of leftist philosophy. It was founded on 8th December 1989 with around twenty members including Jan Jozef Lipski, chairman of the Polish Socialist Party. Although initially it did not stress its independence from the OKP, its clashes with the Mazowiecki government over the workers' suffering under the rigours of economic reform (c.f. indexation and privatisation debates) contributed to disunity. Generally speaking, the lobby took upon itself to represent in Parliament

the interests of employees, to warn of the social dangers of Minister Balcerowicz's reform and to advocate some corrections of the Plan<sup>126</sup>.

Linked to this group was a more informal tendency described by Lopuszanski as the "workers' self-management group". This was formed to lobby for 'worker-owned' version of privatisation. The group was led by MPs Andrzej Milkowski and Jerzy Dynier. Its alliance with the Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests during the privatisation debate was formidable<sup>127</sup>.

The largest formal group within the OKP was the Farming Section which was formed in July 1989 with 52 members. It drafted a programme of agricultural policies to use as a platform in parliament. Initially the Farming Section was relatively acquiescent and supportive of OKP unity. Its party base was weak. The Solidarity peasant organisations were obedient to the Mazowiecki government, communist organisations were attempting to rid themselves of a compromised past, and new or reactivated movements still establishing themselves. However the conflict which arose between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the peasantry accelerated the politicisation of the peasantry and this was reflected in the OKP by the emergence of various circles. The PSL 'Solidarity' circle formed 28/9/89, the PSL circle formed 29/9/89 with eight members under the leadership of Roman

Bartoszcze and the circle NSZZ RI 'Solidarity' was established 6/11/90. The complete separation of the Bartoszcze's PSL circle from the OKP in early 1990 was seen as particularly significant<sup>128</sup>.

On 5th April 1990 a group calling itself the Democratic Christians emerged in the OKP. It had 44 MPs including Michal Chalonski and Pawel Laczkowski. It espoused a moderately liberal economic programme. Although it stressed its support for OKP unity it was the first OKP group to forbid its members to join other OKP organisations. As such the appearance of this new group split existing structures within the OKP<sup>129</sup>.


Lopuszanski's own group, linked to the radically Catholic ZChN formed a circle in 26th September 1990 and the MP described the motivation behind this move in terms of opposing the tactics of the Lay Left which was controlling the OKP leadership. He explained that the actions of his circle reflected a "coherent policy and a fiercely independent, Right-wing line"<sup>130</sup>. In the same article Lopuszanski vows that he and his colleagues would never allow an alliance between the "Reds and the Pinks" i.e. between the former communists and the social democrats of the Lay Left<sup>131</sup>.

The ZChN circle was among the more vehement opponents of the Lay Left's appeal to OKP unity but a survey carried out in Spring

1990 illustrated the general conflict within the OKP between the desire for unity and rapidly intensifying consciousness of political differences. On the one hand 91% of the OKP membership supported Mazowiecki and 80% advocated continued co-operation with the wider Solidarity movement. However, at the same time, awareness of political rivalries was illustrated by the 57% who were against writing a common OKP manifesto<sup>132</sup>.

Indeed, at a meeting of the caucus on 28th February 1990 several Sejm deputies and Senators presented the idea of transforming the OKP into a federation of different political options or associations<sup>133</sup>. The emergence of groups and circles and subsequent disintegration of OKP unity in the period 1989-90 is presented in Diagram 3.12.

Diagram 3.12: Disintegration of the OKP in 1990



source: Based on information in Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.1. ppXIV -XVI.



## Conflict Over the Citizens' Committees

Another sign of inter-elite Solidarity strife was the Walesa faction's move to block the intelligentsia's plans to transform the local citizens' committees into a pro-Mazowiecki social movement<sup>134</sup>. Walesa removed the pro-Mazowiecki intellectual Wujec from the national Committee and replaced him with the union activist Zdislaw Najder. Najder called a meeting of local citizens' committee representatives on the day before the vote on the intelligentsia's option. At the first meeting Walesa criticised what he saw as a "new, Solidarity-imposed monopoly" and proposed a looser alliance of committees without a permanent executive. The committees, still clinging to the non-ideological ethos of the past and wary of the Warsaw elite's plans for centralisation supported Walesa. In the long-term this decision marginalised the committees.

As we have seen, the Solidarity ethos to which they clung was in the process of collapse. Moreover, the prominent part played by the committees on the local scene came to an end with the emergence of democratic politics at this level following the local elections of May 1990<sup>135</sup>.

## Formation of Centre Alliance and ROAD

The disintegration of the Solidarity movement within and without the Sejm was formalised by the founding of the Centre Alliance (PC) by twin brothers Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski. Throughout the Winter of 1989-90 Jaroslaw Kaczynski sought to organise the all of the OKP forces opposing the creation of a unified pro-government force into some form of loose coalition. Those largely right of centre political groups identified previously as unhappy with their peripheral role in the transition process were targeted. The populist accusation that the new (Lay Left) elite was exercising exclusive power in a similar manner to and on behalf of the old regime was frequently cited in this process. The pace and direction of economic reform were seen as evidence of the new elite's links with the old regime<sup>136</sup>.

Throughout Spring 1990 Kaczynski's group gained momentum. Though generally Rightist in orientation it amounted to an anti-government political coalition; loosely binding a variety of groups rather than attempting to represent a particular interest group or specific ideology. In this it can be seen as typical of the political intellectual's preferred form of organisation. The obvious difference between the ruling intellectual elite and PC was that Kaczynski was mobilising society behind an ideology which looked back to a past, pre-communist utopia rather than a future,

post-communist one. Kaczynski and other leaders of the group made it clear that they would accept representatives of all orientations so long as they were committed to a pragmatic approach to issues. It therefore appeared to exist merely to mount a challenge to the political domination of the 'Lay Left'.

It included a number of independent organisations such as Solidarity's peasant organisation, PSL Solidarity, which had been frustrated by its lack of representation in government. It also included a group within the Christian Democratic Labour party headed by Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, the Liberal Democratic Congress and much of the Democratic Party. By April 1990 some 68 members of Parliament (around one quarter of the OKP) were associated with the organisation. Many local citizens committees' activists joined its ranks after the disbanding of these structures. Centre Alliance became the main supporter of Walesa's presidential candidacy<sup>187</sup>.

The Lay Left and Mazowiecki camps responded to the Centre Alliance by forming the Citizens' Movement for Democratic Action (ROAD<sup>188</sup>). Its membership included prominent members of the Lay Left such as Geremek, Michnik and Kuron and pro-Mazowiecki government representatives of Solidarity's regional and territorial structures. As with PC, affiliation to the Mazowiecki administration rather than specific political orientations was the organising principle. ROAD soon became

closely involved in Mazowiecki's candidacy for the office of president and the organisation's policy platform is best examined in the context of the campaign<sup>139</sup>.

Observers summarised the conflict between the two post-Solidarity organisations along the intelligentsia/rest of society, liberal democracy/populism dualities established above<sup>140</sup>. On the one hand ROAD represented the interests of the intelligentsia which, from its strongholds in Government and parliament, was set on dictating an evolutionary reform process. Towards this pole were drawn a significant section of the intelligentsia.<sup>141</sup>

On the other hand the PC represented the Right which felt marginalised from centres of political power and espoused a more 'populist' approach to the reform. Its constituency was what Jacek Kuron referred to as the 'salon of the rejected'<sup>142</sup>. It appealed to social forces which were unhappy with the reform process and was "focused more on the mood of the masses...the workers in bankrupt enterprises, office-workers threatened with lay-offs, maybe the young for whom there is no work"<sup>143</sup>. Zygmunt Bauman describes the elite/mass polarisation occurring in Solidarity at the time: "Intellectuals (whether in or out of ministerial office) are fast returning to their usual complaints against witless and mindless 'masses' unable to see what is good for them, while the 'masses' are back to their habitual half-wary,

half-derisive view of 'those men in briefcases in the capital' who do not know and would not care anyway what real life is truly like"<sup>144</sup>.

The gradual disintegration of the OKP and the proliferation of political clubs in the parliament were reflected in the battle over electoral legislation. The Sejm's Constitutional Commission formed a sub committee in June 1990 charged with forging a new electoral law. The two options debated within the committee reflected the populist and elitist attitudes to the politics of the transition. The first proposed a highly proportional system that would give parliamentary seats to parties with less than 0.2% of the national vote. It was supported by ex-communists and the PZPR's former satellite organisations in the Sejm who faced the prospect of decline to a small party or exclusion from parliament after the next elections<sup>145</sup>.

Initially the OKP advocated a straight majority system based on the 1989 electoral law. This option would have blocked access to the Sejm for all small parties and guaranteed the continued dominance of a unified OKP. It thus appealed to those who saw the OKP as a body of apolitical experts charged with the task of guiding Polish society through the transition from communism. This option was immediately rejected by the ex-communist camp

which was still numerically dominant in the Sejm. The OKP gradually shifted its support to a mixed proportional/majority voting system but this time its proposals were not only rejected by the ex-communists. The disintegration of the OKP was reflected in the opposition of several right-of-centre members who rejected the leadership's line<sup>146</sup>.

Eventually the intellectual leadership of OKP became reconciled to the fragmentation of the organisation and it threw its weight behind a proportional system; hoping to win a popular mandate through the ROAD organisation. Thus, growing political fragmentation in the Sejm and the weakness of all the old and new political parties produced a consensus guaranteeing that all existing parties would have a chance to win seats in the new legislature<sup>147</sup>. The gradual drift toward a proportional electoral system contributed to the proliferation of small parties and the fragmentation of the political system.

In conclusion, the 'intelligentsia in power' failed to institute Solidarity as an organised base of support because of the contradictory desire to introduce a consensual civil society in an elitist way. Including Polish society in the democratisation process, through, for instance, giving emergent political parties more formal representation in the Sejm or giving the trade union side

of Solidarity, symbolised by Lech Walesa a more prominent role, could have led to a more gradual expression and reconciliation of political cleavages. However, the elitist approach of the 'intelligentsia in power' could not countenance this and politics remained an elite-level process. The Polish intelligentsia has always had diverse ideological strands. In the inter-war and communist periods, the parties which emerged were made up largely of small groups of intellectuals who fought vicious, personal struggles amongst themselves with the goal of winning state power. Even in the period of unity in the late communist period deep ideological cleavages were apparent in the anti-communist intelligentsia. Now in 1990 the political scene was characterised by an acrimonious battle of intellectual elites for state power<sup>148</sup>. Solidarity throughout the 1980s could not be regarded as a 'social movement' or mass organisation. It consisted of an intelligentsia-based leadership assuming the role of articulating the negative attitude of Polish society to the state. Likewise its two, main successor parties, ROAD and PC though claiming a nation-wide base of support, were dominated by competing intellectual elites.

The political scene in early transition Poland was far from stable and representative. Parties had as yet failed to claim anything like mass support. Even in terms of their self-reported

membership, the seven 'major' parties remained elite organisations with narrow social bases. Table 3.13 presents the size of party membership on the eve of the election in 1991 when the electorate was composed of 27,516,166 persons.

Table 3.13 - : Members and parliamentarians of seven largest parties 1991

Party	Members	Seats in the Sejm
UD	15,000	62
SdRP-SLD	60,000	59*
KPN	21,000	51
PSL	180,000	50
ZChN	6,000	49
PC	40,000	42
KLD	2,500	37

\*SLD, as a coalition of SdRP and trade unions, did not register its own members. Membership of SdRP does not represent the whole organised potential of SLD.

source: Informator o partiach politycznych w Polsce Polska Agencja Informacyjna, Warsaw 1991).

As can be seen from the Table, only one party - Polish Peasant Party (PSL) - claimed membership on the level congruent with the size of the electorate. There was no correlation between the size of the membership and the electoral support of these organisations. Parties electoral popularity was based on other assets such as charisma of leaders, support from other institutions



such as the Catholic Church etc.. Parties were not structured according to the competing interests of Polish society but by the prestige of their leaders or the influence of other social institutions. Parties based on the latter criteria are obviously more fragile and prone to fragmentation. The consequences of this for the development and consolidation of liberal democracy are clear<sup>149</sup>.

This is in contrast to the Western model of parties which compete within a consensual framework on behalf of established social constituencies and ideological programmes. Thus the Polish intelligentsia's attempts to 'over-unify' civil society behind its transition programme contributed to the development of an unrepresentative, elitist political culture and this threatened to 'demobilise' civil society and stifle the development of representative democracy<sup>150</sup>.

In addition, the failure of the Mazowiecki government to institute Solidarity as a base of political support threatened its tenure. The collapse of the movement was followed by calls for immediate elections. As we have seen, the intelligentsia had always been a relatively narrow social milieu in Poland. In 1990 it was vital for the 'intelligentsia in power' to overcome the traditional divisions between the intelligentsia and other social groups if it was to

enjoy electoral success and continue to lead the reform process. In any case, if the Polish intelligentsia wanted to progress towards a Western-style democracy then the formation of a consensual political culture was necessary. The 'intelligentsia in power' could point to the late communist period as a time when such a unified vision was achieved. However, Chapter 4 will argue that anti-communism masked the competing, mutually hostile visions of Poland's future held by different social groups. Instead of integrating these visions the Mazowiecki government as a representative of the intelligentsia was caught up in the clash of these visions. The etatism and elitism of the milieu made it as intolerant as other social forces in society, despite the fact that it embarked on a process of democratisation. The failure of the Mazowiecki government to overcome its differences with the workers, peasantry and Catholic Church is explained through the intolerant rivalry of these visions. Analysis of the Presidential campaign of 1990 when Mazowiecki and his government resigned after coming a humiliating third behind Lech Walesa and Stan Tyminski, confirm the continued alienation of the Polish intelligentsia from the rest of Polish society and the consequences for the 'intelligentsia in power'.

- 1 see 'Introduction' Chapter 1 p22 and declaration of ROAD, see Appendix I p685.
- 2 see 'Civil Society' Chapter 1 p34.
- 3 "In addition to creating political institutions capable of responding to citizen input and making effective public policy, post-communist leaders have to create effective linkages between an estranged public and the political system" (Sharon L. Wolczik 'The Politics of Transition in Central Europe' Problems of Post-Communism Jan-Feb 1995 p36).
- 4 see 'Theories of Democratisation' Chapter 1 p68.
- 5 see Louise Vinton 'Four Approaches to Mass-Elite Relations' RFE Vol.1 No.50 1990 p32.
- 6 One of Solidarity's main representatives at the Round Table, Adam Michnik later stated the pragmatic approach of his side at the outset of the talks: commented: "It seemed that we were creating a balanced arrangement that would last for four years" (Gazeta Wyborcza 6/2/90 p1).
- 7 "The current Sejm and Senate are the result of a political compromise contracted at the Round Table and not the result of representative choices" (Wiktor Osiatynski 'There Is No School For Democracy' Polityka 5/5/90 p3).
- 8 see Dubinski K 'Magdalenka - An Epoch-making Transaction' Polityka 29/9/90 pp6-10.
- 9 see 'Presidential/Parliamentary Models' Chapter 4 p574.

- 10 Turn-out fell far short of expected levels. Both sides had thought that 80% would participate but it is apparent that no more than 62% of the electorate voted (see Marek Henzler 'Prognosis of Electoral Participation' *Polityka* 10/6/89 p3).
- 11 see 'W kraju' *Polityka* 14/10/89.
- 12 see David S. Marsh, Daniel N. Nelson and Bohdan M. Szklarski 'Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: the Polish Struggle' *East European Politics and Societies* Vol.5 No.2 Spring 1991 p205.
- 13 see Stanislaw Nowicki 'Poland and the Poles' in *Polityka* 23-30/12/89 p1.
- 14 "A mutual set of obligations must be defined between the state and the citizenry: if, on the one hand, the state does not enforce the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and if, on the other hand, citizens do not organise to make their rights effective and to compel the state to acquit itself of its responsibilities, the very concept of citizenship is rendered ineffectual" (Przeworski (b) p35).
- 15 "Despite the liberal critiques of the excessive concentration of state power under communism, the temptation not to dismantle inherited structures was strong...The problem was that once the period of fluidity that follows a major upheaval is over, the structures tend to crystallise..." (Schopflin p27).
- 16 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 p116.
- 17 "There is no stable, liberal democracy without an institutionalised party system" (Tomek Grabowski 'The

Party That Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Citizens' Committees in Poland' East European Politics and Societies Vol.10 No.2 Spring 1996 p214, henceforth Grabowski).

- 18 see Lewis (c) p791.
- 19 "Not so much replacing or appearing to substitute for the institutions of civil society parties may more appropriately be seen as belonging neither to civil society nor to the state. They are rather the essential link between civil society and the state and one of the key buckles that holds the major components of the body politic together" (Paul Lewis, 'Civil Society and the Development of Political Parties in East-Central Europe' The Journal of Communist Studies Vol.9 December 1993 No.4 p6)
- 20 see Appendix I p691.
- 21 see Appendix I p709.
- 22 see Appendix I p693.
- 23 see Appendix I p695.
- 24 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 p380.
- 25 Trybuna Ludu 25/10/89 quoted in Louise Vinton 'Disintegration of Polish Communist Party Continues Unabated' RFE/RL 28/11/89 p6.
- 26 see Appendix I p701.
- 27 see Appendix II p753.
- 28 "The parliamentary camp of the old PZPR, today transformed into the faction or coterie of the ~~PKLD~~, is now

united only by a fear of political (parliamentary) annihilation...it is well known that the majority of its members have no future beyond the next elections" (Jacek Syski 'Turning-point' Polityka 24/3/90 p1).

- 29 "They are prepared to surrender their political identity in order to extend their quasi-existence in parliament" (Ibid. p1).
- 30 see the protests from ex-communists over the return of religious education, a stance which received some support in government circles, in 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Catholic Church' Chapter 4 p530.
- 31 see Appendix I p666.
- 32 see Voytek Zubek, 'The Reassertion of the Left in Post-communist Poland' Europe-Asia Studies Vol.46 No.5 1994 p801.
- 33 "The class of this [Rightist] formation is in this case of secondary importance...individuals of this type hail from every social stratum, as evident in the most important centres of learning as with manual labourers, as much in the cities as in the villages. In this strand there is no favoured social category. Everything begins not from the State and institutions but from the individual and the group. These individuals and those involved in their groups differ among themselves." (Kazimierz Korab 'The Left and Right Camps of Solidarity' 'Tygodnik Solidarnosc 3/8/90 p15).
- 34 see Pawel Spiewak 'Our Right Leg' in Res Publica Spring 1992 p32, henceforth Spiewak, Marek Henzler 'The Right Leg' in Polityka 10/3/90 p3, henceforth Henzler, and Andrzej Friszke 'The New Political Parties' East European

Reporter Vol.4 No.2 Spring/Summer 1990 p96, henceforth Friszke.

- 35 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism' Chapter 2 p261.
- 36 see Spiewak p32.
- 37 Henzler stresses the importance of "Its ethos of political independence, freedom of religion, speech, opinion, association and also economic freedom...the inviolable law of private property and the unrestricted liberty of a free market economy" (Henzler p3).
- 38 see Appendix I p717.
- 39 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia under Early Communism' Chapter 2 p235.
- 40 see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 pl90.
- 41 "It inherited from the old conservative tradition...cautious thinking, moderation and a deeply historical point of view" (Spiewak p33).
- 42 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism' Chapter 2 p260.
- 43 see Appendix I p668.
- 44 see 'The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism' Chapter 2 p260
- 45 see Appendix I p722.
- 46 "The basis of the Centre-Right has to be religion...which gives it a certain fundamental system of values" (Henzler p3).

- 47 According to Spiewak "Clerical conservatism carries with it a certain dynasty which does not transfer easily to political activity" (Spiewak p33).
- 48 'The Politicisation of the Catholic Church and the Rise of the Radical Right' Chapter 4 p532.
- 49 the politicisation of the peasantry is examined in detail later, see Chapter 4 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' p503.
- 50 see 'The Inter-war State' Chapter 2 pl77.
- 51 see Appendix I p727.
- 52 see Appendix II p762.
- 53 "They are generals without an army, without a group or milieu, loudly-acclaimed but incapable of mobilising on a large scale, lacking the support of permanent institutions..." (Ludwik Dorn Tygodnik Powszechny 14/7/85, quoted by Adam Michnik in 'Different voices' Kultura No.5 1986 pl1).
- 54 "The diffusion and disintegration of the political scene did not mean the ideological homogeneity of distinct parties" (K. Palecki ed. Elity Polityczne w Polsce PAN Warsaw 1992 pl64, henceforth Palecki).
- 55 see Mariusz Janicki 'The Polish Political Panorama' Polityka 4/8/90 p4.
- 56 see Palecki pl63.
- 57 see Ibid. pl64.
- 58 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 pl16.
- 59 see Appendix II p735.



- 60 "The project of civil society was not the only project of the anti-Communist opposition. Totalitarian Communism was likewise thrown out in the name of nationalist doctrines...ladled out with the arsenal of the nationalist Right of the inter-war period - the idea of the 'Catholic state of the Polish nation'...Thus two great ideas stood before one another: humanism and nationalism; Europeanism and particularism" ('The Trap of Nationalism' Gazeta Wyborcza 10-11/2/90).
- 61 "In this socio-political as well as psychological situation, there is a demand emerging within the circles of the new elite for enemies with whom to do battle: whose conspiracies and menaces can be unmasked and condemned, in the face of whom one can appeal for unity, consensus and self-denial" (Jacek Syski 'Turning Point' Polityka 24/3/90 p4).
- 62 "We have entered a period of division of a new type, appropriate to the idea of post-totalitarian evolution. The democratic idea will now collide with the longing for autocracy, the European idea with nationalist provincialism, the open society with the closed society" (Adam Michnik 'A Trade Union is no Longer Enough' Gazeta Wyborcza 6/8/89).
- 63 "The governmental team...saw the main threat to the program as coming from society, especially from large segments of the industrial working class and the peasantry, likely to be hard hit by the economic austerity measures. In the mindset of the Solidarity intellectuals, any type of spontaneous mobilization from below was likely to be of an egalitarian, anti-market type. This egalitarianism, it was further feared, could easily blend with right-wing chauvinist attitudes deeply rooted in the masses. Could it be that the

majority of society was not ready for democracy?"  
(Grabowski p238).

- 64 see Appendix II p737.
- 65 see Appendix I p675.
- 66 "for the ailing society, demands for entitlements, the questioning of the government's policy and calls to backtrack from the tough economic course may prove hard to resist...Societies that have just entered the democratic path are always susceptible to the dictatorial temptation, cheap demagoguery, and political wizardry...Social frustration, justified by the state of the economy, may every day turn against democracy. After all, it happens that people in despair willingly put the noose around their necks"  
(Geremek B Rok 1989: Bronislaw Geremek Opowiada, Jacek Zakowski Pyta Warsaw: Plejada 1990 p366, 380, henceforth Geremek (b)).
- 67 see 'A Polish Hell?' Gazeta Wyborcza 2/4/90 p1.
- 68 see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and the State' Chapter 1 p120.
- 69 "According to current opinion, both at home and abroad, the overthrow of the Communist system was brought about by 'Solidarity'. Furthermore it initiated a great breach in the East European block and stimulated an avalanche of transforming movements - the so-called 'Spring of Nations' (Jozef Lipiec 'Who Overthrew Real Socialism?' Polityka 25/8/90 p3).
- 70 see Tygodnik Solidarnosc 23/3/90 p15.
- 71 Timothy Garton Ash 'Revolution in Hungary and Poland' New York Review of Books 36.13 17/8/89 pp 9-15.

- 72 Alfred Miodowicz 'Let's Stay Ourselves' Polityka 2/12/89 p10.
- 73 see Bernhard (a) p333.
- 74 Tygodnik Solidarnosc 5/1/90 p2 cited in Ibid. p333.
- 75 see Grabowski p215.
- 76 see Andrzej Florczyk, Tomasz Zukowski and Jaroslaw Najdowski 'Who Voted for Solidarity?' Gazeta Wyborcza 16-18/6/89.
- 77 "The process by which Solidarity gained its initial electoral victory did not necessarily indicate a situation in which public support for the citizens' committees was unqualified...the June turnout...reflected the electorate's preoccupation with the material problems of everyday life...which even Solidarity could do little to ameliorate in the long run" (Lewis (a) p100-101).
- 78 in an OBOP poll from March 1998 on most sympathetic public figures Kuron came first with 74%, Geremek sixth and Balcerowicz tenth, cited in 'W kraju' Polityka 18/4/98 p2.
- 79 "Though there are hundreds of parties and political associations in Poland, Solidarity remains the only organisation with the political strength and popular support to lead Poland through the transformation" Bernhard (a) p333).
- 80 addressing a tenth anniversary meeting at Warsaw University with a speech, "August 1980 and the Solidarity Decade", Bronislaw Geremek declared his faith in Solidarity as a symbol of unity: "the ethos of Solidarity is neither an

empty slogan nor a political programme: it is a social bond. On this basis the Mazowiecki government was formed...It is vital to maintain the political landscape based on the principle which united workers, peasants and intellectuals ten years ago" (Gazeta Wyborcza 26/8/90 p1).

- 81 "Polish Solidarity can no longer be understood as a democratic union and social movement defending society, but rather as an elite association devoted to a state-level politics designed to move Poland toward becoming a "normal" country (Kennedy (b) p17).
- 82 "Solidarity must recognise that citizens have problems distinct from those of workers or consumers and that the task of democratising the state and civil society cannot be resolved into the struggle for economic democracy. It is now faced with a new dilemma. Solidarity needs to be both a trade union and a citizens' movement. A trade union which has to decide everything cannot remain a Trade union for very long. Political questions can only be expressed through a citizens' movement (Adam Michnik 'A trade union is no longer enough' Gazeta Wyborcza 6/9/89 p1).
- 83 see Kurier Polski 17/7/89, cited in Grabowski p240.
- 84 "This would be good for Polish democracy..Time will tell who will be our equivalent of the Democrats and Republicans" (Zbigniew Bujak 'West of Centre' Polityka 28/7/90 p5).
- 85 see Chapter 1 p99.
- 86 see 'The Mazowiecki Government as a 'Government of the Intelligentsia' Chapter 1 p82.
- 87 see Grabowski p221.

- 88 see Appendix I p672.
- 89 see Grabowski p244
- 90 see 'The Intelligentsia in Late Communist Poland' Chapter 2 p260.
- 91 see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124.
- 92 "As it tries to ignore the enormous changes in social structure, values and popular attitudes, the conservative-populist right wing is forced to refer to its mission as that of the voice of the nation, and has to analyse society through affective, traditional means rather than modern, rational ones" (Hellen p31).
- 93 see attitude of Walesa camp in presidential campaign 'Presidential-Parliamentary Models' Chapter 4 p583.
- 94 "The nation itself has father of Polish industry...rearing successive generations in a spirit of patriotism and Christianity, relating the past achievements of its forebears" (Anna Matalowska 'By the Right March' Polityka 12/5/90 p3).
- 95 Spiewak describes the process thus; "The Central Citizen's Committee committed the mistake of the first-born; they did not allow [emergent political forces] access to their institutions, considering from the outset their representatives to be radicals, extremists who would be unfit to participate in the delicate games with the outgoing regime. That gave the Right a political argument which lasted for at least four years (its most distinctive example being the 'Magdalenka conspiracy')" (Pawel Spiewak 'Our Right Leg' Res Publica Spring 1992 p33).

- 96 see Grzegorz Wojciechowski talks to General Czesław Kiszczak 'The Secrets of Magdalenka' Polityka 8/9/90 pp9-16.
- 97 see Appendix I p697.
- 98 see Krzysztof Dubinski 'Magdalenka: The Transaction of the Epoch' in Polityka 29/9/90 p10.
- 99 quoted in Anna Swidlicka 'The Round-Table Talks Convene' RFE/RL 3/3/89 p5.
- 100 see 'Anti-Semitism in the Presidential Campaign' Chapter 4 p594.
- 101 Marek Henzler 'Who Emerged from the Table?' Polityka 16/6/90 p6.
- 102 see 'The Royal Road' Tygodnik Powszechny No 19 1992.
- 103 "The new elite has closed itself off...Many experts from my generation feel themselves at a disadvantage while those in government are overloaded with responsibility and not infrequently have assumed positions higher than their level of competence..This style of celebrating one's own importance can lead to complexes and long-term marginalisation. The communists spoke the same way. They also used the argument of hardships and initiation. In both cases we have to deal with the division of a new avant-garde from the rest of society" (interview with Dzennika Baltycki quoted in Marek Henzler 'Who Emerged from the Table?' Polityka 16/6/90 p6).
- 104 see Appendix II p747.
- 105 see Appendix II p680.

- 106 see Toranska T My Warsaw Oficyna Wydawnicza MOST 1994 p93.
- 107 Wprost 4/7/93 quoted in Ray Taras Consolidating Democracy in Poland Boulder Colorado: Westview Press 1995 p133.
- 108 "The new parties in Polish politics are Catholic, nationalistic and right-wing. They claim for themselves a continuity of resistance against communism, and they reject dissident intellectuals as left wing and cosmopolitan, elitist and alienated" (Gross p147).
- 109 An editorial in the Solidarity Trade Union newspaper "Tygodnik Solidarnosc" on the tenth anniversary of the legalisation of "Solidarity" in August 1980 made this connection: "The dispute which has recently been carried on within Solidarity was a conflict over the form and characteristics of Polish democracy" ('Bread and Freedom' in Tygodnik Solidarnosc 31/8/90 p3).
- 110 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p260.
- 111 "Solidarity was a composite movement with contradictory elements. It's unity was based first and foremost on a negative attitude to the communist system and the crises it had created. If there was a common vision in Solidarity it was for the overthrow of the unjust and inefficient system" (Jozef Lipiec 'Who Overthrew Real Socialism?' Polityka 25/8/90 p3).
- 112 "The point is that the formula (and identity) of Solidarity does not fit the new configuration of social forces and the

rapidly intensifying social conflict" (Jadwiga Staniszkis 'The Obsolescence of Solidarity' Telos Summer 1989 no.80 p50).

- 113 The pro-government economist, Jacek Syski commented "The Solidarity movement is undergoing erosion as is the mythology it represents. Solidarity's social base and the social base of the Solidarity-led government will continue to undergo even greater decomposition...As a social movement, as a Trade Union, as an unfailing ethos or ultimately as a myth it has succumbed to erosion" (Jacek Syski 'Turning Point' Polityka 24/3/90 p4).
- 114 see Wierbicki, P, 'Family, Retinue, Court' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 10/11/89 pp1,5.
- 115 see Staniszkis, J, 'The Danger of Latinisation' in Tygodnik Solidarnosc 10/11/89 p3.
- 116 see Andrzej Walicki 'From Stalinism to Post-Communist Pluralism: The Case of Poland' New Left Review 185, 1991 p109, henceforth Walicki (b).
- 117 "This line is repeated in "Tygodnik Solidarnosc" and in interviews with Jaroslaw Kaczynski (he recently told Timothy Garton-Ash that Michnik and Geremek [Warsaw intellectuals with influence in the Mazowiecki administration] do not trust the common man" (Wojciech Sadurski 'The Constitution and Populism' in Polityka 8/9/90 p1).
- 118 "If a [freely elected] President's activities are to be checked by parties representing important social interests then perhaps we are heading in the right direction. If, as is happening now, his role is limited by people representing



their own interests or those of marginal parties it will be worse...we will have a political conflict, a hybrid between a democratic President and an undemocratic state" (Czabanski, K, 'Hybrid' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 28/8/90 p3).

- 119 see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 p380.
- 120 see Millard p121.
- 121 see Appendix II p749.
- 122 see Jan Lopuszanski 'Split in the OKP?' LAD 8/5/90, henceforth Lopuszanski p6.
- 123 see Slodkowska I Party i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-1991 pXVI, henceforth Slodkowska.
- 124 "They were created to mark differences in respect of ideology between sections of the OKP membership and the OKP as a whole" (Ibid.).
- 125 There now exists several distinctly differentiated groups within the OKP" (Lopuszanski p6).
- 126 see A. Wieczkorowski 'Unity or Pluralism?' East European Reporter Vol.4 No.2 Spring/Summer 1990 p102, henceforth Wieczkorowski.
- 127 see 'Privatisation' Chapter 4 p468.
- 128 Aleksander Checko observed "The situation in the Sejm is changing. A single, strong PSL parliamentary club is certainly attracting new sympathisers. It is stimulating opposition within the OKP" (Aleksander Checko 'Up with the Green' Polityka 12/5/90 p1).

- 129    Wieczkorowski p103.
- 130    "The first time we clashed in the OKP", he continues, "was in October 1989 when it was proposed that we all form a united front. We were all decidedly against that...Parallel to that we initiated legislation on the status of political parties, independent of and in opposition to the Left which is manipulating the OKP Presidium" (Lopuszanski p6).
- 131    Ibid. p6.
- 132    see Wieczorkowski p102.
- 133    see 'Let's wait with the splits' Gazeta Wyborcza 8/3/90 pl.
- 134    see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 p380.
- 135    Grabowski concludes: "By stubbornly refusing greater institutionalisation, the Committees were making themselves irrelevant...By the time of the first fully free parliamentary elections in October 1991, the Committees had disappeared without a trace" (Grabowski p247).
- 136    "People are realising, simply, that those who profited from the old system are likewise profiting from the new one, often their situation is even improved, and it is this situation which ordinary people are unable to tolerate. It will result in frustration which could lead to the organisation of a populist movement" (Kaczynski, J, 'What is to be done with the Presidency?' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 19/10/90 p12).

- 137 see 'Comparison of the Mazowiecki and Walesa Campaigns'  
Chapter 4 p589.
- 138 see Appendix I p685.
- 139 see 'Comparison of the Mazowiecki and Walesa Campaigns'  
Chapter 4 p592.
- 140 Adam Krzeminski and Wieslaw Wladyka identified "Two  
concurrent, leading groups" (Adam Krzeminski, Wieslaw  
Wladyka 'Style and Rights' *Polityka* 7/7/90 p6, henceforth  
Krzeminski and Wladyka)
- 141 "All of you who see in Jerzy Turowicz [a prominent  
Krakow-based intellectual] a symbol of the continuity of  
Polish culture, of progressive Catholicism and 'Europeanism'.  
All of you who see in Michnik the fine tradition of the  
'Free Left', in Bujak the best example of working-class  
culture, determination and obstinacy. Those who  
appreciate in Geremek clear thinking, the ability to  
compromise and an understanding of Europe" (Ibid. p6).
- 142 Jacek Kuron Moja Zupa Warsaw: Polish Official Publication  
BGW 1991 pl04, henceforth Kuron (c).
- 143 Krzeminski and Wladyka p6.
- 144 Z. Bauman 'After the patronage state' in Bryant and  
Mokrzycki p24.
- 145 see Krzysztof Leski 'A thousand flowers or two roses?'  
Gazeta Wyborcza 13/9/90 cited in D. McQuaid 'The war over  
electoral law' RFE/RL Vol.2 No.31 2/8/91 pl1-27, henceforth  
McQuaid.

- 146 They broke ranks with the OKP "because they feared its leadership, at that time still headed by Bronislaw Geremek, was trying to impede the development of political parties" (McQuaid p11-27).
- 147 see also G. Ekiert 'Peculiarities of Post-communist Politics: The Case of Poland', Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XXV, No.4, December 1992 p361.
- 148 "The early stages of party formation had very much the character of a top-down process - in marked contrast to the representative and society-based conception of the political party articulated in the early legislative proposals of the Mazowiecki government. The actual way in which the parties did come into being corresponded far more closely to the elite, intelligentsia-based politics which were being practised" (Lewis (b) p792).
- 149 Setting the context for his study of the May 1990 local elections, Jalowiecki pointed out that "On the local scene , parties present in Warsaw and seen on TV do not exist and have little chance to take a deeper hold" (Bohdan Jalowiecki *Narodziny demokracji w polsce lokalnej* Warsaw: Warsaw University 1996 p53).
- 150 Analysing the results of the election, the Polish political scientist Tomasz Zukowski observed: "the deep division in the Solidarity camp which one could succinctly describe...as the separation of it's intelligentsia-liberal values from it's popular-traditional values...As a result of the division, for the elite and the mass of the electorate, emotional, programmatic and to a certain extent cultural barriers were created, which weakened (perhaps fatally) the 'confederation of a unitary, civil society'" ( Tomasz Zukowski 'Wyniki

głosowania: mapa polityczna polska jesienia 1990' in  
Stanisław Gebethner and Krzysztof Jasiewicz Dlaczego Tak  
Głosowano Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN and Instytut  
Nauk Politycznych UW Warsaw 1993 p75, henceforth  
Gebethner and Jasiewicz).

