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The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and the Development of Civil Society: Mazowiecki's Poland.

Martin Hugh Ferry

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University of Glasgow
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Russian and East European Studies
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Chapter 4: The Mazowiecki Government and Polish Society.

Introduction

Chapter 1 outlined the basic function of the intellectual in society as transformative. As leaders of societal progress intellectuals have the duty of mobilising the rest of Polish society behind the processes of modernisation such as industrialisation and urbanisation. To achieve this they develop ideologies or value systems to explain and reinforce societal change. We noted the danger that these ideologies, carrying with them the intellectuals' universal, or 'total' perspective, can be contrary to the interests of democratisation if practised by intellectuals in power. In the West this danger has been largely averted by the professionalisation of intellectuals and their integration with different social groups in civil society. The specific characteristics of the Polish case took the relationship between the Polish intelligentsia and society in a different direction. Integration with society was stifled by the elitism of the milieu and the underdevelopment of Polish society. The relationship between the intelligentsia and the workers and peasants tended to be patronising rather than integrative. Different, mutually hostile, values and 'visions' of Poland continued to exist. Thus ideologies such as nationalism and
Marxism tended to take on a 'totalist', exclusive perspective and spur the development of intolerant, populist agendas. For instance, in the inter-war period the intelligentsia tended to use the peasants and workers instrumentally in its pursuit of state power and this contributed to the rise of intolerant nationalism and the radicalisation of the political scene. In the early communist period, the situation was similar. The Polish intelligentsia continued to see its ultimate goal as state power rather than integration with society. The ideology of reform communism illustrated the milieu's continued concentration on the characteristics of state power. In 1956 the isolation of Polish social groups from each other was demonstrated by their separate protests against the Party-state.

In the late communist period the anti-communist intelligentsia's ideology of 'the reconstruction of civil society' suggested a unique attempt by the milieu to integrate with Polish society. However, the ultimate aim of this project was to form a critique of state power. The 'visions' of different social constituents of 'Solidarity' were sublimated into the conflict of universal categories: society versus state, good versus evil etc. Thus different visions continued to exist within the opposition movement.

In the transition period Polish society was undergoing profound socio-economic and political change in the direction of a modern,
democratic state and a free-market economy. In this context the intelligentsia could have been expected to play an integrative role: rallying Polish society behind the programme of modernisation through the formulation of an ideology which would encourage the development of a consensual, democratic political culture. However, the intelligentsia had now achieved state power and this deepened its isolation from Polish society. It could not play the role of articulating societal values to the state when occupying the state itself. Thus the conflicting visions of Poland extant in Polish society remained unarticulated at state level. The ideology introduced by the intelligentsia in power to explain and offset the austerities of the transition period illustrated the isolation of the milieu. Poland was making its 'return to Europe' and all civilised Poles should be prepared to make sacrifices in the short-term for the achievement of this goal. Those who did not subscribe to this vision were undemocratic and "beyond the pale". This was in keeping with the central role of the 'European ideal' in the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia.

However, other groups in Polish society did not share this unambiguous subscription to the project of 'returning to Europe'. Workers, peasants and the Catholic Church all had reasons to be anxious about the influence of Western European values in Polish life. All had their own visions of post-communist Poland, and these
differed significantly from the vision of a Western-style, liberal
democratic state envisioned by the 'intelligentsia in power'.

The industrial workers envisaged a 'workers state' where their
role in the Solidarity trade union, their part in the downfall of
communism and the value of their labour were finally reflected
in control over their economic destiny. Workers thus looked to
exert influence over the transition, especially on economic reform
which they thought should be directed primarily by a strong
Solidarity Trade Union and workers' co-operatives. The prospect
of increased influence from Western economic interests in
post-communist Poland increased the workers' anxiety and their
desire for control over their own destiny. This vision was not in
keeping with the development of a largely free market economy
envisaged by the 'intelligentsia in power'.

The peasantry felt that as a vital section of Polish society and one
that had been politically impotent under communism, it deserved
special allowances when it came to economic reform. This was
particularly the case with the potential expansion of Western
producers into the Polish market. Its attraction to the
conservative, nostalgic elements of populism, though contradictory
to the intelligentsia agenda, was understandable as the peasantry
harked back to the pre-industrial era when rural issues were high
on the political agenda. Its tenuous ties with the rest of Polish society meant that its disillusionment was manifested not through a battle over Solidarity's identity (as with the intelligentsia/workers conflict) but with outright rejection of the 'Solidarity ethos'.

The Catholic Church hierarchy saw Solidarity primarily as an outpouring of Poland's Catholic identity. It thus envisaged a populist, 'Catholic democracy' where, as representatives of the overwhelmingly Catholic population, it would have a major say in public issues and in the defence of Polish identity from external forces, including the secular West. This could be expected to involve support for a strong central government and for some reference in the new Constitution to Poland's 'Catholic identity'.

On their own, each vision of Solidarity could not be used as a base for the development of a democratic civil society in post-communist Poland. The populist vision of workers and peasants, its subscription to the 'will of the people' undermined the role of state institutions in the development of democracy parties, parliaments and governments. The Catholic Church's emphasis on Solidarity's national-Catholic identity was obviously exclusionary. Finally the 'European' perspective of the intelligentsia was elitist and dismissive of other perspectives.
The failure of the 'intelligentsia in power' to reconcile and integrate these competing visions undermined the attempt to institute democracy in post-communist Poland. For the duration of the Mazowiecki period, Polish society remained polarised and riven by deep, hostile cleavages. This situation made the position of the Mazowiecki government untenable. The renewal of anti-intelligentsia prejudices amongst broad sections of Polish society gave populist intellectuals sources of social support. This was reflected in the results of the presidential elections of winter 1990. The Mazowiecki government was revealed as ruling on behalf of a narrow social group rather than a broad, society-wide front committed to reform.

The first part of Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between the 'intelligentsia and power' and the major social groups in early transition Poland (the workers, the peasantry and the Catholic Church). The conflicting visions each had of post-communist Poland will be explained as manifestations of historic differences which had never been reconciled. These clashes will be illustrated through detailed examination of 'watershed issues'. The second part of the chapter will deal with the Presidential election as a clear manifestation of the isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power' from the rest of Polish society. The campaign of the Mazowiecki campaign and the profile of his vote will illustrate the fact he was
communicating with only a narrow social elite. In contrast the success of Walesa, and the populist, dark horse candidate Stan Tymynski was based on their appeal to broad social groups which had been alienated by the government of the 'best and brightest'. 
Introduction

Relations with the industrial workers were of vital significance to the Mazowiecki government. In 1990, after four decades of communist rule, Poland was an industrialised country. The industrial sector was the most important part of the Polish economy. In 1990 industry had the largest share of GNP (44.9%). The highest proportion of the working population was employed in industry (28%). Industry contributed most to national income (42.4%) and accounted for most investment in the national economy (52.9%).

The structural deficiencies of the industrial sector, shaped by communist rule, were inherited by the Mazowiecki government. Most workers were employed in large, state-owned, heavy industries such as coal-mining, steel-making, ship-building and chemicals. The backwardness of the Polish economy was largely the result of the bloated industrial sector's domination; its unwieldy structure, labour surpluses, overinvestment and intensive use of resources undermined its own efficiency and the
effectiveness of the Polish economy as a whole\textsuperscript{12}. This left Polish industry in a poor condition relative to the technologically advanced and rationalised Western firms with which it was supposed to compete in the post-communist future. During the Mazowiecki period the situation was worsened by the rapid collapse of Poland's major markets in the East (Comecon and the Soviet Union).

The industrial sector was the most pressing area of concern for economic reformers. The rationalising, modernising zeal of the Balcerowicz Plan had a profound effect on the material condition and future prospects of the industrial work-force\textsuperscript{13}. This sector was thus a vital section of Polish society. However, at the same time, it was in a fragile condition: it was sure to be the subject of far-reaching reforms and uncertain of its future\textsuperscript{14}.

Beyond these bare facts, the relationship between the industrial workers and the intellectual cadre of the Mazowiecki government involved long-term ideological and personal ties. The alliance between the working class and intelligentsia was the most important relationship within the anti-communist movement in Poland. In Chapter 2 we examined how the former brought to the opposition movement the power to bring the country's economy to a standstill and the latter brought articulation of interests.
political direction and access to elite levels of the Party-state\textsuperscript{16}. The culmination of this process had been the legalisation of the Solidarity trade union movement in 1980.

Solidarity's victory in the June 1989 elections was obviously of vital importance to the labour and intelligentsia cadres of the movement. However workers interpreted the triumph over communism differently and subscribed to another set of Solidarity symbols.

Put simply, the Solidarity of the intelligentsia was the Solidarity of the 1989 Round Table. The opposition side at the meetings reflected the preoccupation's of the Polish intelligentsia: citizens' rights and individual freedoms in the social, political and economic realms. For them 'Solidarity' was now a 'catch-all', citizens' movement with Polish society's most cultured citizens at its head. This was the Solidarity of Geremek, Michnik and Kuron\textsuperscript{16}.

On the other hand, the industrial workers supported the Solidarity of 1980-81 - the Solidarity of strong trade unions, workers' councils, general strikes and mass protests organised to win economic concessions from the regime. This was the 'Solidarity' of Lech Walesa. These different visions of 'Solidarity' had been detectable from the mid-1980s\textsuperscript{17}. However it was only
with the collapse of communism and the rise of the Mazowiecki administration that the conflict emerged into the open. With issues such as macroeconomic reform, settlement of property rights and formation of a new political system all being decided it was inevitable that these conflicting visions of Solidarity would be played out. The 'intelligentsia in power' pursued an idealistic vision of a Western-style civil society and 'civic state' based on political and economic freedoms for all Poles. The radical introduction of economic reform and free-market conditions was bound to lead to austerity for the industrial workforce but the 'intelligentsia in power' regarded this as a necessary sacrifice in its quest to institute a modern civil society in Poland. After all, the intelligentsia saw itself as a 'national' emanation. Its vision of 'Solidarity' stressed the unity of all Poles in the drive for democratisation and Westernisation, not just the interests of the industrial workers. Workers looked for some recognition of their role in Solidarity and supported the movement's traditional association with trade unions and workers' councils. Workers also anticipated strong state intervention to lessen the rigours of Balcerowicz's economic reforms. Their aspirations amounted to a vision of a 'workers' state' where the Solidarity Trade Union would be involved in some form of 'corporatist' relationship with the government. The collapse of the Solidarity-based alliance between the Mazowiecki
government and the industrial workers can thus be interpreted as the result of the emergence, or re-emergence, of conflicting visions of independent Poland between the workers and the intelligentsia. The following section will chart this conflict. It will be organised as follows: firstly there will be an examination of the split in the Solidarity Left into social-democratic or centrist and socialist camps during the transition. The groups which emerged as a result of this split will be examined as will the issues which acted as catalysts for their organisation. The Mazowiecki government's treatment of Lech Walesa will be presented as confirmation of the socio-political causes of the movement's demise.
The Crisis of Leftist Ideology During the Transition

Left-wing ideology in Poland has certain specific characteristics. As a traditionally peasant-based country, left-wing ideology in Poland tended to be confined to intelligentsia circles and had a social-democratic, theoretical rather than mass character. The communist programme of industrialisation accelerated the creation of a substantial, politically conscious labour force. The speed and scale of the transformation guaranteed the carry over of peasant culture into the industrial workforce. The majority of this sector were first or second generation peasants who retained the populist social outlook of that milieu and the suspicion of state structures. In terms of economic activism the industrial work-force was left-wing in the conventional sense. In the 1930s the Polish work-force had developed radical means of making representations to the state (through tactics such as the occupation strike) and its descendent in the 1970s continued the tradition. Its collective demands for state protection of workers’ economic interests and more powerful trade unions illustrated (not least to the dissident intelligentsia) the weaknesses of the Party-state. It was on this basis that the Solidarity movement was founded. The Solidarity Left represented the coalescence of the social democrats of the intelligentsia and the labour side of Solidarity.
We have already noted the ideological confusion inflicted on the Polish Left by communist rule. This referred not just to the post-PZPR organisations and emergent political parties (especially PPS) but also to the Solidarity Left. One must note that the Solidarity Left had played a part in creating this difficult situation. Its demonisation of the communist state in opposition times created such an aversion to socialist ideology that the Solidarity Left found itself tarred with the same brush as its old adversary. The social-democratic intellectual Adam Michnik described the results of the June 1989 elections as a 'plebiscite on communism', but one could also regard them as a 'plebiscite on the Left' as reform communists were washed away with the old hard-liners. For these reasons many members of the old opposition with ambitions to political power found it difficult to publicly espouse their Leftist beliefs.

More importantly the Solidarity Left experienced a difficult process of internal differentiation during the early transition period. Broadly speaking, the unravelling of the Solidarity Left involved the estrangement of the social-democratic, intelligentsia cadre from the labour side. The split was prompted by the former's move to a liberal, Centrist position after the appointment of the Mazowiecki administration.
The social-democratic element of the Solidarity Left was firmly identified with the interests of the Polish intelligentsia. Its origins were in the revisionist faction of the PZPR which had become disillusioned and split with the Party in the 1960's. The elite of this group was drawn from the 'Lay Left', which we have established as a predominantly Warsaw-based collection of social-democratic thinkers (such as Kuron, Michnik and Geremek). Although it had distanced itself from the PZPR it was more inclined to compromise with the Party than other leftist strands. The location of this group in the capital facilitated closer links with the communist elite and was a cause of resentment and suspicion amongst other more provincial elements of the opposition. This strand enjoyed a leading influence in the Mazowiecki government and in the OKP. Later it had a high representation in the pro-Mazowiecki government political organisation ROAD.

As the elite of this strand assumed political power it developed a new strategy which would confirm it as the chief architect of the transition process. Some of its most influential leaders began to represent themselves as Centrists, even though their ideological base remained social-democratic. Bronislaw Geremek (now Chairman of the Solidarity Parliamentary Caucus, OKP), Jacek Kuron (now Minister of Labour and Social Services) and Adam Michnik (now editor of the pro-Mazowiecki government
newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza) all adopted this stance. The shift from the Left to the Centre was justified by reference to the communist past. Forty years of communism had made the traditional political spectrum defunct. For instance Zbigniew Bujak, while contending that he located himself "in the Centre" added that "It [the traditional political spectrum] does not make sense. Up until now an attribute of the Left had always been a concern for the relationship between property and economy, but recently, all over the world, it has abandoned this doctrine. Another attribute of the Left was the pursuit of social policies, which the right has now incorporated into its programmes24.

The attraction of the Centre is obvious given the trauma which Leftist thought was experiencing in Poland at that time. While leftist ideology had been undermined by communist rule and Polish right-wing ideology with its clerical and anti-Semitic associations remained unacceptable to the Lay Left, liberalism had survived the previous decades relatively intact. Vaguely associated with commitment to political and economic freedoms it served as an ideal repository for the ideological baggage of the left-wing, anti-communist intelligentsia. Observers cited this as one of the basic reasons for this strand's manoeuvring25.
However the shift was not entirely defensive. It was also in keeping with this strand's intelligentsia pedigree. Under the influence of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia the social democrats of the Lay Left saw it as their duty to lead all sectors of Polish society through the testing times of the transition process rather than to represent the interests of the working class only. An alliance with the workers was necessary for building opposition momentum. However a broader historical perspective shows that the intelligentsia's traditional goal of achieving a Western-style civil society in Poland could not be achieved through links with the working class alone. Indeed in the past this goal seemed to be at odds with the 'selfish' economic demands of the workers. Under the old regime the workers' demands for and achievement of short-term economic concessions undermined the intelligentsia's calls for long-term systemic reform. In transition times it seemed that the goals of the workers and the intelligentsia were once again diverging along these lines.

This shift left the labour side of Solidarity in a difficult position. The political role assumed by Solidarity through the June 1989 elections, the movement's subsequent involvement in the Government and Parliament and the intelligentsia-led calls for Solidarity to become a pro-Mazowiecki political organisation had
obscured the fact that it was basically a trade union. The etatist approach of the Solidarity intelligentsia to reform of the movement clashed with the labour cadre's representative functions. In the aftermath of the elections workers demanded Solidarity's return to the role of a simple trade union. The opening speaker at Solidarity's National Convention, held on 27/6/90 also criticised the movement's overlapping political and economic functions.

The fear persisted that the emasculation of the union side of the movement would open a flood-gate whereby the labour side would lose its best people to the political side, at a time when they could least afford to. At least as important was the fear that the political wing would commandeer the mythology and symbolism of Solidarity which still held great significance for the workers. The government's appropriation of the potent 'Solidarity ethos' would obviously undermine the trade union's authority and its ability to defend workers' interests in the light of government policies.

One of the clearest indications of the ideological and social split occurring between the intelligentsia and the working-class strands of Solidarity was the former's recruitment of Zbigniew Bujak and Władysław Frasyniuk. Both were famous Solidarity labour leaders who had gradually fostered links with the Solidarity intelligentsia.
leadership. For instance, in 1980 Bujak, the leading worker activist from the Ursus plant just outside Warsaw, had been one of the first labour leaders to invite the intelligentsia-based organisations to join in the organisation of the regional Mazowsze union\textsuperscript{30}. As such they were potentially vital politicians in the effort to maintain worker-intelligentsia co-operation in the transition period.

However in Summer 1990 they became members of ROAD (the intelligentsia-based, group organised to support Mazowiecki's Presidential campaign\textsuperscript{31}). Both began to espouse the 'Centrist' ideology of the intelligentsia described above. For instance Bujak was asked "You and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk are descended from the industrial working class. Are you ruling out the participation of your old colleagues in your party?". Bujak replied "No, however one has to realise that some workers from heavy industry are not resigned to the fact that this class will pass from the political scene if it refuses to transform itself into small industries. When it defends unprofitable mines or steel-works it cannot count on support"\textsuperscript{32}.

Consequently the recruitment of Bujak and Frasyniuk, rather than fostering closer worker-intelligentsia links, increased the polarisation of both camps\textsuperscript{33}. The case of Bujak and Frasyniuk can thus be seen as symbolic of the general deterioration
intelligentsia/worker relations after the hiatus of Solidarity’s opposition period. The disintegration of the intelligentsia/worker alliance in Solidarity can be illustrated by reference to several key issues which occupied the public scene during the Mazowiecki period.
Watershed Issues

(1) The Balcerowicz Plan

Unsurprisingly the primary cause of the estrangement between the workers' and the intelligentsia was the Mazowiecki government's pursuit of economic liberalism. An obvious sign of the intelligentsia's move from the Left to the Centre was its espousal of liberal economic policies. Workers saw a section of Solidarity's political activists abandoning the ideals of social justice and equality; seeing it as an awkward obstacle, hampering free enterprise. The changed mood was noted by the Polish press which described the development of 'liberalism with an iron glove'.

The deterioration of the relationship between the intelligentsia and labour sides of Solidarity could be observed in the new parliament. As we have seen the immediate side-effects of the Balcerowicz Plan were a drastic fall in wages, a sudden drop in industrial production and rising unemployment. A large and influential workers' lobby, the Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests, opposed the Plan's most damaging consequences. Their clashes with the government underlined the clash between the intelligentsia and worker visions of post-communist Poland.
(2) Opposition to Government's Wage Policy

In October 1989 publication of the Government's policy on limiting the wage fund and indexing workers' wages to the level of inflation attracted significant Parliamentary opposition. The indexation issue had been a source of controversy from the Magdalenka talks onward. Splits in the Solidarity side over the issue had been apparent from an early stage. Bronislaw Geremek describes "a stormy debate in the National Executive Commission [at the Round Table] over the issue of indexation". Some members of the KKW, such as Lech Kaczynski argued for the removal of indexation altogether but it was eventually agreed that the practice ought to be maintained to protect the workers from the worst consequences of inflation and for the sake of social peace. An agreement was reached with the representatives of the authorities on an 80% level of indexation.

However at this point representatives from the communist-based trade union organisation, OPZZ demanded 100% indexation. Members of the Solidarity side suspected that this demand was designed to exploit splits within their camp. The controversy caused by the OPZZ's intervention in the indexation debate certainly touched a raw nerve in the Solidarity camp. Its leaders made it clear that the issue was threatening the Round Table itself.
The issue returned to prominence on 3rd October 1989 when the government presented its package of laws which changed the agreement reached at the Round Table. According to the new law workers whose wages in the third quarter of the year had exceeded the level of inflation would lose the right to fresh indexation in the next quarter. In the ensuing debate controversy was initially sparked by Jacek Kuron, the Minister for Labour and Social Policy and influential member of the Lay Left who openly questioned his own Government's stand on the issue. This was an obvious example of the classic dilemma faced by the intellectual in politics. Having performed the Polish intellectuals traditional duty of elaborating the truth as he or she sees it, Kuron honestly stated his attitude when the situation called for a more pragmatic approach.

As a result of his admission the debate was interrupted and a Sejm commission were charged with preparing a fresh package of laws. Progress in the commission was far from straightforward. After many hours of discussion it was decided to submit two different options to the Sejm. These two options reflected the wishes of the competing camps of the 'Centrists' and the 'Workers' Group'.

The first option was the Government's proposed package which was supported by the Centrists. The second option was formally
proposed by Marcin Przybylowicza who had been invited to the commission as a representative of the Solidarity Trade Union and who had the support of the Workers' Group. His proposal reflected the growing unease amongst many in the Solidarity movement over the direction the Government was taking. For Przybylowicza and those he represented, the increased cost of living in transition Poland would have to be recompensed in kind. Echoing the stance of the OPZZ at the Round Table he demanded 100%, universal indexation: every month, every worker, regardless of their level of earnings should receive an amount commensurate with the rising cost of inflation.

On Monday 16th October the Sejm met to settle the issue. In the session that followed the second option was eliminated simply because the state did not have the resources to release the compensatory funds required. It had been calculated that taking this path would cost the state budget over 1.7 million zloty. However the debate over the government-backed option aroused much more emotion than expected. An argument erupted between the commissioner Teresa Liszcz, who was seeking to amend the bill, and vice-Premier Balcerowicz himself. Balcerowicz contended that Liszcz's amendments would have a very negative influence on the inflation rate and on the reform process as a whole. The direct intervention of one of the major architects of
the Plan suggested that the issue continued to touch a raw nerve in Government circles.

In the end only minor amendments were made to the Government's proposal. Phrases such as "We have no viable alternative and "a necessary evil" were dropped from the statutes. From the full attendance at the debate and the tenor of Balcerowicz's language, it appeared that the government was signalling that rejection of this package would be regarded as a failure to accept the new Government's entire programme of economic reform before it had even began. This was symptomatic of the dogmatic approach of the intelligentsia in power to the transition process. The Sejm voted 188 for the bill and 27 against. However the tensions within the chamber and the growing splits were illustrated by the notable abstention of 133 MPs.
(3) Opposition to Government's Privatisation Plan.

The anxiety of the Lay Left and the Mazowiecki government over Parliamentary unity was heightened by the reception of the Government's privatisation legislation in the Sejm. In this case the Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests mounted much more sustained opposition to the government's plans. The economics section of this chapter hinted at why the privatisation process in the Polish context was bound to stir up political conflict. Those entrusted with the task of privatising sections of the Polish economy were faced with different and in some ways more troublesome issues than those raised by other reforms. The attempt to create a propertied class went to the very heart of the transition debate. Which social group was to benefit most from the transition period in material terms? Various social forces (the intelligentsia, industrial workers, peasantry and Catholic Church) could be expected to mobilise behind different versions of the privatisation process. In contrast to the general nature of the Mazowiecki government's other macroeconomic measures, privatisation thus required a higher degree of political activity or consensus-building.

A conflict emerged between the Centrist/Government vision of the privatisation process and the wishes of other social groups.
Studies carried out over the transition period illustrated how social and professional status influenced Poles' affiliation to different privatisation models. For instance, the sociologist Wladyslaw Adamski compared the attitudes of certain categories of worker over time (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Extreme preferences towards privatisation of industry between 1988 and 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-occupational categories</th>
<th>Attitudes towards privatisation in industry</th>
<th>Percentage of answers in the research of:</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>change of over 1988-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialists</td>
<td>For unrestricted privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>+10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>-24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>For unrestricted privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>For unrestricted privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against privatisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can see a difference in attitude to privatisation between the social elite and other groups in Polish society which widened during the transition process. While specialists, a group close to the intelligentsia in social status, approval of unlimited privatisation doubled between 1988 and 1990, among workers it weakened.

From the outset the Mazowiecki Government and its supporters in the Centrist camp of the OKP favoured a narrow, centralised privatisation model. This 'quasi-privatisation' process was the most centralised model. All enterprises that had been state-owned under the communism were transformed into joint-stock owned companies whose shares were owned by the state Treasury. The Treasury itself would become the clear legal owner of state property. After financial and legal analysis and debt restructuring the enterprise would be offered for sale through public offering of shares on the soon-to-be organised stock-market to both domestic and foreign investors.

Of vital importance in this context was the Office for Ownership Transformation appointed by the Government to oversee privatisation. It would decide the fate of each firm, taking into account its financial condition, production possibilities and proposals made by the directors and workers. The Sejm would...
have indirect control of the process, chiefly through limiting the number of privatisations made each year.

There were several reasons for the Mazowiecki government's choice of the 'quasi-privatisation' model. One was its perception as the 'Western solution'. As with other sections of the Balcerowicz Plan significant influence was exerted by the West on the character of the privatisation process. The Government's Western economic advisers, notably Jeffrey Sachs, advocated this 'British-style' philosophy of privatisation. They pointed to the necessity of maintaining some central control in such unstable economic conditions. Once again the Polish intelligentsia's idealistic admiration of Western models was a factor.

The Mazowiecki government's choice of model also suited the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. The quasi-privatisation model suited the Government's and the Lay Left's desire to preserve pro-government unity and an apolitical 'leave it to the experts' atmosphere in transition Poland perfectly. In other words, adopting this etatist model would allow the 'experts' of the Mazowiecki government to conduct the privatisation process from above; all that society had to do was passively wait for the anticipated economic benefits. At press conferences the head of the Office for Ownership Transformation,
Krzystof Lis, continually stressed that his team had rejected schemes which were ideologically attractive to one domestic group or another; choosing a cosmopolitan, intellectually aloof approach instead.

Despite the assurances of the Mazowiecki government the privatisation model it envisaged would appeal mostly to richer social groups, leaving significant parts of Polish society out of the process. Moreover the government's decision not to punish members of the old bureaucracy who had benefited from its corruption meant that many former communists would have a significant advantage over their fellow citizens when it came to profiting from the privatisation process. There was a common perception that the ex-communists were being given an unfair advantage by the privatisation process.

The Government's plan was also criticised as 'too Western'. It was criticised for failing to take into account the peculiarities of the Polish case. As a result of its unique history Polish society could not be expected to behave in the manner of their developed, Western counterparts. Societal distrust of the state and central institutions was exacerbated by the centralised privatisation model. The experience of communism and the Solidarity ethos all
suggested that Polish society would respond to a more decentralised process.

The Government's method of introducing its package increased its difficulties. It promoted privatisation proposals in a manner similar to the justification of the entire Balcerowicz Plan. According to government sources there was no sound alternative, the stability of the nation was at stake etc.

The Government's attitude reflected the Polish intelligentsia's desire to carry out the privatisation process, and the whole transition, in its own way, without interference from non-intelligentsia elements. However such an approach was completely unrealistic given the inherently political act of choosing a privatisation model. Unlike the first raft of macroeconomic reforms the Government's claim that this was the only option could not be justified and this undermined the legitimacy of the process and the Mazowiecki government as a whole.

It is not surprising that some of the most concerted opposition to the Government's privatisation plan came from workers' representatives. Almost half a century of communist domination had ensured that the industrial working class regarded state
enterprises as their property in theory, even when this had not been the case in practice. Their logic assumed that the communists had managed the state enterprises on behalf of the proletariat. It had survived the injustices of the communist period and even been strengthened by workers' pride in the role of Solidarity in the overthrow of the old regime. Now that communism was defunct the workers' anticipated greater control over their enterprises.

A survey of attitudes to the privatisation process in 1990 revealed what the workers expected of the privatisation process and how these expectations differed from other groups in the workplace (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 - Which Type of Ownership Transformation Appeals Most?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State-led</th>
<th>Privately directed</th>
<th>Enterprise led</th>
<th>Hard to Say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' Councils</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maria Jarosz 'Workers and Privatisation' in Polityka 8/9/90 p5
The clear preference of workers representatives - 'Solidarity' trade union activists, OPZZ activists and workers' Councils - was for a worker-owned privatisation model. The harmony between Solidarity and Workers council activists is understandable as worker council activists were veterans of Solidarity who were making a major effort to increase their managerial potential, and looked upon themselves as an alternative to incompetent managers\textsuperscript{53}. Managers and directors, to a certain extent, also looked to the enterprise led privatisation strategy because this would give them more influence over the process than the state-led alternative\textsuperscript{54}.

Only company directors favoured a liberal privatisation process opened up to all. It is also worth noting that the workers themselves appeared evenly split between either the worker-owned privatisation process or continued state ownership of the industrial section. This popularity of the latter option reflected the workers' unease over the uncertainties of the privatisation programme. It is interesting to note that the workers' attitude to the privatisation process is more closely matched by the OPZZ line (which also called for continued state ownership) rather than Solidarity's union activists. This illustrates the tensions within the Solidarity movement caused by
its links with the Mazowiecki government and the deterioration of its support amongst the workers.

The Government's vision of privatisation appeared to exclude the workers from the process altogether and it was greeted in the workplace with the same animosity as the rest of the Balcerowicz Plan. Jerzy Baczynski report on the experiences of the heavy industry Hut Szkla enterprise during this period gives a practical illustration of the Government's approach to privatisation and how it was received by the workers. Baczynski notes the unanimous support of the workers' council for transformation of the enterprise into joint ownership with the state. He is puzzled by the decision because it signalled the loss of the workers' existing privileges; the workers' council would be dissolved, the management would be independent of the employees, future shareholders would be able to demand - and actually make - staff reductions. Moreover, the workers would have to use their own money to buy (preferential) shares in the knowledge that at least four times more would be contributed by people from outside who could well take away the lion's share of the profits without contributing anything to the modernisation of the factory. In exchange the workers could only have the uncertain prospect of higher wages, provided the business became profitable.66.
Baczynski finds the solution to his puzzle in the 'carrot and stick' tactics of the Government. While stressing that there was no alternative to the Government's plan Balcerowicz promised to rescind the hated 'popiwek' tax (which had been introduced as part of the indexation package to punish excessive rises in workers' salaries) if enterprises accepted this form of privatisation. Other observers regarded the Government's approach with similar cynicism. For instance Kloc dismissed the Government's tactics as efforts to contrive a 'social pact' with the labour movement. The workers' dissatisfaction with the Government-sponsored privatisation plan was demonstrated at a national meeting of enterprise workers' councils held in Zielona Gora on 26th March 1990. Mazowiecki and his Cabinet were "accused of treating the workers' councils in the same fashion as the previous communist regimes."

One of the first and most important outlets for this growing disquiet was its representative Parliamentary group which espoused its own version of the privatisation process. The group for the Defence of Workers' Interests, in tandem with a small but influential workers' self-management lobby favoured the 'Employee Stock Owned' privatisation model. Under this scheme previously state-owned assets are transferred primarily to the workers of a given state enterprise. Although it is done on an
individual basis, in reality the process amounts to the introduction of group ownership of shares as shareholders can only be controlled through an enterprise workers council. This model was supported by a substantial section of Solidarity and the Group for the Defence of Workers' Interests. In contrast to the Government's 'quasi-privatisation' model the workers' self-governing model was closely tied to calls for increased decentralisation. Privatisation required the institution of bodies to administer it. The Mazowiecki government elected to create a central agency for this purpose. Workers' representatives called for the creation of local and regional bodies in enterprises to oversee the process.

As well as the provision of financial credits to help the workers buy a stake in their own enterprise representatives called for strong regional policies. On March 22nd 1990 a delegation from the labour side of Solidarity pressed the Government to proceed with the privatisation process more quickly and to exercise less centralised control over the process. In an interview with Rzeczpospolita the economist Rafal Krawczyk also criticised the centralised approach of the Government.

Draft voting on the privatisation legislation demonstrated the growing influence of the pro-worker parliamentary groups. The privatisation Agency had taken five months to arrive at its
recommendations but even greater delays were experienced in the Sejm. The Government and its supporters answered their critics by claiming that the Employee Stock Owned model left whole sections of Polish society, such as farmers, office workers and those employed in services, out of the privatisation process altogether. Legislative struggle around the privatisation bill lasted for ten months because of lack of consensus on basic principles.

When the Privatisation Act was finally adopted it offered a concession to the workers' lobby by splitting the process into two stages. In the first part either a given enterprise or the government Agency could initiate the process. Thus the split between the pro-Mazowiecki, intelligentsia-based Centrist group and workers' representative groups within the OKP was illustrated by the privatisation issue.
(4) The Walesa Factor

Although the aforementioned economic policies of the Mazowiecki government were fundamental factors in the conflict between the intelligentsia and the workers, the new elite’s treatment of Lech Walesa was equally important and more indicative of the clash of visions between the intelligentsia and workers. Immediately after the elections of June 1989 and the collapse of communism Walesa ruled himself out of political office. This move could be interpreted as another example of his political acumen or an indication of a conflict of interests between his status as leader of the Solidarity Trade Union and potential role as national statesman

Nevertheless it appears that from the moment it became obvious that Solidarity would be called upon to form the new government, Walesa had been conscious of the dangers of allowing the Warsaw-based intellectual elite to take power. Walesa’s nomination of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Premier was seen by the Warsaw intelligentsia and political observers as an attempt to get ‘his own man’ into power. He represented the traditional, provincial, Catholic intelligentsia milieu and had been one of Walesa’s closest advisers. Members of the Warsaw-based Lay Left initially voiced concerns over Walesa’s choice. Jacek Kuron, a prominent member of the Warsaw intelligentsia, while stating his
respect and friendship with Mazowiecki, questioned whether he had the qualities to lead the country through the transition.

It seemed that the new Premier was too willing to search for compromises; a quality not associated with the dogmatic outlook of the classic, Warsaw-based intelligentsia. However Mazowiecki quickly showed himself willing to co-operate with the Warsaw elite and the groups attitude to the new Premier changed quickly. This can be seen as an example of the social solidarity of the Polish intelligentsia in its quest for state power.

By the end of 1989 Walesa therefore found himself isolated from the centres of political power. Over the winter he raised his political profile and began to make discreet overtures to the office of the Presidency, often through his supporters. For instance in February 1990 several newspapers carried articles which questioned the position of Wojciech Jaruzelski and suggested that Walesa would be the ideal alternative. Typically Walesa would refuse to be drawn into an explicit announcement of his candidacy, but the message was clear enough.

However, even these relatively discreet advances were met with immediate rebuffs from Government and OKP leadership sources. At a time when one would have thought that an alliance with the most popular labour leader and charismatic figurehead of the
Solidarity movement would have given the new elite much needed social and political support it chose instead to make an enemy of him. Indeed, Bronislaw Geremek, one of the new elite's leading intellectuals, seemed to stress Walesa's potentially pivotal role.1

There are several explanations for the 'intelligentsia in power's' rejection of Walesa's ambitions. Firstly, the signs in early 1990 suggested that Polish society was willing to accept the strictures of the Balcerowicz Plan and were content with a government of experts. An opinion poll published in Polityka at the end of 1989 asked people to register their trust in members of the Mazowiecki government. The results were as follows (ranked according to popularity, in brackets % of votes counted from a general poll):

1. Jacek Kuron - Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (20)
2. Leszek Balcerowicz - Minister of Finance (10)
3. Izabela Cywinska - Minister of Culture (8.5)
4. Henryk Samsonowicz - Minister of Education (7.6)
5. Krzysztof Skubiszewski - Minister of Foreign Affairs (6.2)
6. Aleksander Bentkowski - Minister of Justice (5.5)
7. Czeslaw Kiszczak - Minister of Internal Affairs (4.9)
8. Marcin Swieckici - Minister of Foreign Trade (3.1)
9. Florian Siwicki - Minister of Defence (2.5)
10. Tadeusz Syryjczyk - Minister of Industry (2.0)
All members of the new government received some levels of support; a significant turn-around from the days of the unpopular regime and an indicator of the Mazowiecki government's social prestige.

In contrast Walesa's political fortunes appeared at that time to be in steep decline. With the union side of the Solidarity movement excluded from the public scene and undergoing a deep identity crisis its leader's personal prestige suffered. Another opinion poll compared public confidence in certain political leaders in terms of levels of approval and disapproval in the first few months of 1990. The results were as follows:
Table 4.3 - Public Confidence in Political Leaders 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jaruzelski</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mazowiecki</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balcerowicz</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Walesa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miodowicz</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapproval</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Centre for Public Opinion Research reported in Rzeczpospolita 25/7/90 and Polityka 30/6/90).

In these polls one could see a drop in levels of public trust in all the political leaders of the early transition period. This general decline was caused by the end of the new elite's 'honeymoon' with Polish society and the austerity caused by Balcerowicz's programme of economic 'shock therapy'. However Walesa, in comparison to Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz seemed to be losing
public confidence at a higher rate. Government supporters were convinced that Walesa could only rely on the support of a hard-core of followers.

However the substance of the attacks on Walesa emanating from government and intelligentsia circles suggested that there was a deeper motivation for the dismissal of his overtures. Walesa personified the aspects of Polish society which the intelligentsia in power wanted most to marginalise. In social terms the elitist ethos of the Polish intelligentsia demurred at the prospect of sharing hard-won power with non-intelligentsia elements. Walesa, with his religious devotion, passionate and at times irrational style of delivery, provincial accent and modest educational background provided the perfect foil to the profile of the sophisticated, erudite, cosmopolitan intellectual of Warsaw.

A significant proportion of the new ruling elite was socially prejudiced against Walesa. Critiques of 'the Chairman' contained elements of the elitism of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. Regardless of his personal popularity at this stage, Walesa remained a symbol of the ordinary, pious, working-class Pole. The rejection of his prospects symbolised the intelligentsia's rejection of the Polish workers' ability to contribute to the development of democracy. Walesa and his supporters were too provincial; they
lacked the necessary knowledge and competence to guide the transition and institute a Western 'civil society'\textsuperscript{76}. Statements such as "Walesa is not competent enough...because to govern one has to have some understanding of the economy, of diplomacy, of social sciences"\textsuperscript{77} and Senator Andrzej Szczypperski's open letter to Walesa which advised him to "hit the books and start learning, because it is never too late for that"\textsuperscript{78} were further illustrative of this elitism. As if to confirm the class basis of the conflict, Walesa and his supporters immediately began to attack the Government and the leadership of the OKP as a 'Warsaw-Cracow clique consisting of 'egg-heads'\textsuperscript{79}.

Some intellectuals saw the row as the inevitable result of the opposition intelligentsia's cynical manipulation of Walesa during the communist period. After the introduction of Martial Law the 'Walesa myth' had been gilded by Solidarity intellectuals as an instrument to exert political pressure on the regime from the Polish working class and from the West, both of which saw him as a hero. With the fall of communism this tactic backfired as Walesa appeared to have assumed some of the aura the intellectuals had bathed him in\textsuperscript{80}. This attitude may overstate the role of the Polish intelligentsia in creating Walesa's image. After all, he came to prominence as a workers' leader without the assistance of the intellectual. However Solidarity intellectuals contributed to his popularity as part of the cross-class Solidarity alliance.
Thus the traditional tendency of the Polish intelligentsia to patronise rather than represent the interests of the industrial workers was evident in the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and this sector in 1990. Conflicting visions of Poland, evident throughout modern Polish history emerged fully after the brief period of anti-communist unity. As the numerically dominant social category of the time, and one with a particularly important part in the Solidarity movement, the deterioration of the relationship with the workers was particularly damaging to the prospects of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The level of labour unrest rose throughout 1990. Whereas at the beginning of the year there had been only a few, random outbursts, the total amount by the end of the year reached 250. The protests involved a total number of 115,687 workers and resulted in 159,016 lost working days. This level of unrest was not comparable to the scale and organisation of the Solidarity-led protests of the early 1980s. The 1990 unrest was small and short-lived. However it illustrated worker disenchantment with the Mazowiecki administration. The analysis of Mazowiecki's vote in the Presidential elections, where he received very little support from the industrial working class, illustrates just how far the relationship between the intelligentsia and the industrial workers had declined since Solidarity's heyday.
(ii) The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry

Introduction

In 1990 the Polish peasantry represented an uncertain but potentially significant political force. About 30% of the Polish population lived in small towns and villages. Approximately 27% of the nation was directly employed in or dependent on private farms. The agricultural sector provided 14.9% of the National Income. The size of the peasantry and its role as suppliers of food-stuffs for domestic consumption and export guaranteed its importance to the Polish state. The importance of the peasantry is particularly marked in times of political and economic uncertainty where its role as a force of stability or volatility can prove decisive.

After the June 1989 elections 81 MPs and two Senators hailed from peasant political organisations, including the ex-communist affiliated Polish Peasant Party 'Rebirth' which retained a well organised infrastructure and press. This represented a potentially powerful political base. The political influence of the peasantry was bound to be boosted by the revival of the historic Polish Peasant Party (PSL) which had been a considerable force in the
countryside and a serious adversary of the communist-based peasant party (ZSL\textsuperscript{87}).

The size of the agricultural sector and the potential economic and political influence of the peasantry made events in this area of vital concern to the Mazowiecki Government. The thesis has pointed to the existence of the rural/urban divide in Poland as a major barrier to the formation of consensual state/society and inter-society cleavages. It is thus regarded as a barrier to the development of a democratic, civil society\textsuperscript{88}. Moreover, with the Polish state now dominated by the predominantly urban-based intelligentsia there was a danger that the urban/rural and state/society divides could reinforce one another.

It was therefore vital that the Mazowiecki government ensured the unification of the peasantry under the banner of the 'Solidarity ethos' i.e. under the intelligentsia's vision of what a democratic, civil society amounted to in independent Poland. On the one hand the peasants' support of the Solidarity-led, evolutionary programme of reform would contribute significantly to the stability of the 'intelligentsia in power' and the success of its 'civil society' project. On the other hand a unified peasant party, organised in opposition to the reform programme could pose a great threat to the cohesion of the Solidarity movement,
the unity of the pro-Government camp in the OKP and the authority of the government itself.

This section will argue that pro-government unity was undermined by the re-emergence of historic differences between the peasantry and intelligentsia over the vision of a democratic Poland. The intelligentsia's 'etatist' approach to transition through the Mazowiecki government stirred the peasantry's traditional suspicion of the state. The return to prominence of the urban/rural divide and its associated intelligentsia/peasant, liberal/populist oppositions disrupted the intelligentsia's attempt to build a consensual framework for the development of civil society through the Solidarity movement.

A brief review of the intelligentsia/peasant relationship in the years leading up to 1989 reveals the magnitude of the task facing the Mazowiecki government as it tried to manufacture this consensus. As a class the peasantry had been alienated from the centres of political power in pre-war and communist and Solidarity opposition periods. We noted the lack of cohesion and leadership in the pre-war peasant movements.

Under communism the peasantry demonstrated its potential influence through the armed struggle against the communists.
which continued in the Polish countryside after the end of W.W.II and in the ultimate failure of the regime's collectivisation programme. The latter had important consequences for the Mazowiecki administration. Uniquely in East-Central Europe Poland in 1990 had an agricultural sector which was dominated by private smallholdings instead of state farms or co-operatives. Polish farmers' maintenance of private property consolidated their feelings of autonomy from and suspicion of the state. Nevertheless the communist regime continued to treat agriculture as of secondary importance to the expanding industrial sector. Compulsory deliveries of agricultural products to the state, restrictive taxes and under-investment further alienated the Polish peasantry from the centres of political power. The anti-state attitude of the peasantry, bolstered by its ownership of the means of production and the discrimination of the communist regime, was an obstacle to the Mazowiecki government as it attempted to overcome state/society hostilities in transition Poland.

After 1947 the peasants lost independent political representation through the forced merger of the peasant movement into the communist-affiliated ZSL. However the traditional urban/rural divide in Poland and the isolation of the peasantry as a social group meant that ZSL developed its own membership, organisations and press in the countryside. When opposition to the communist regime began to form the peasantry maintained...
its tradition of self-organisation. On the one hand farmers followed the example of the workers and organised their own independent trade union under the Solidarity banner. The Trade Union of Individual farmers Solidarity (Solidarity RI[^95]) was banned under Martial Law but it survived in the countryside with the help of the Catholic Church. In 1989 it entered several dozen MPs and Senators to Parliament.

However, although farmers associated themselves with the broad church of the Solidarity movement and remained an important part of the national consciousness, its 'sect' was organised independently of the urban-based workers and intelligentsia. The influence of the intelligentsia amongst the urban workers, which was important for giving the opposition movement a political direction towards the construction of a 'democratic civil society' was much less apparent amongst the peasantry. In his history of KOR (the primary instrument for the intelligentsia's attempts to build links with other social groups in Poland) Jan Jozef Lipski conceded this point[^94].

In his first hand report of the occupation strike of 1980 in Rzeszow by peasants demanding the registration of 'Rural Solidarity', Timothy Garton Ash stresses the desire for peasant self-determination. Autonomy of the peasantry from both the communist state and mainstream Solidarity was a priority.

[^95]: "Solidarity RI" refers to the Trade Union of Individual farmers Solidarity.
Garton Ash tells us that members of the Peasants' Strike Committee "are set on achieving a 'Gdansk Agreement for the Countryside'. Their three-page list of demands has been thrashed out by the strikers themselves, with very little help from intellectuals or 'experts'..." Thus the triumvirate of intelligentsia, Church and urban workers provided the base for the Solidarity movement's attempt to rebuild a 'democratic civil society' under Communism while the peasantry resolutely ploughed its own furrow. The peasantry's traditions of state alienation and social isolation were obstacles to the establishment of consensual state/society relations in the Mazowiecki period. The nebulous 'Solidarity ethos' of cross-class activity on which this consensus was to be built meant least to the peasantry.

In transition times the peasantry's own view of post-communist civil society emerged. It was based on an idealistic vision of pre-modern, paternalistic structures with the family farm at its base. The characteristics of the Polish peasantry's traditional conservatism: an attachment to communal values, either familial, religious or ethnic, and suspicion of cosmopolitan or foreign influences, described previously were in evidence. The link between the contemporary peasantry and traditional attitudes was based on the 'politics of nostalgia'. A strong, interventionist state, sympathetic to peasant interests was demanded. Frustration
of these wishes obviously threatened the resurrection of the peasantry's traditional feelings of alienation and resentment.

However this vision clashed with the 'intelligentsia in power's' championing of 'progressive politics' based on individual freedoms and responsibilities. This could be summarised as the clash between a 'folkish' and a 'civil' society. The introduction of a free-market economy, one of the main projects of the Mazowiecki government, encouraged industrialisation and urbanisation which necessarily threatened the peasant's traditional, rural way of life. Moreover it ushered in Western economic interests with which the peasantry would have to compete. Defending Poland from Western influences was at odds with the intelligentsia's espousal of the West as the home civilisation and the ultimate destination of transition Poland. The clash between 'Europeans' and 'nationalists' which came to prominence in the Presidential campaign of 1990 can at least partially be traced to the long-term conflict between the urban intelligentsia's progressive vision of Poland's place in a modern Europe and the peasantry's more insular, conservative outlook. The following section will examine how the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan revealed the deep divisions between the peasantry and the 'intelligentsia in power' and how this was reflected in the political arena.
The Balcerowicz Plan and Mazowiecki Government/Peasant Relations

The chief agent of the split between the peasantry and the 'intelligentsia in power' was the Balcerowicz Plan of economic reform. The Plan introduced the principles of a modern, Western, free-market economy without giving the Polish peasantry the kind of economic privileges it demanded. As a result the, the peasantry united according to its traditional agenda of conservative, defensive politics. This move was accompanied by recourse to populism which rejected the moves of the 'intelligentsia in power' to modernise the country along Western-European lines. The basic features of the Balcerowicz Plan caused a significant deterioration in the situation of Poland's peasant farmers in 1990.

The Mazowiecki government inherited an agricultural sector which had been severely damaged by the communists' mismanagement. Agriculture had been under-subsidised in deference to industrial expansion and the command system had obscured true levels of agricultural production and domestic demand. However, by freeing prices, strictly limiting subsidies, levying high taxes and encouraging foreign trade, the Balcerowicz Plan threatened the livelihood of many farmers. Immediately
after the introduction of the Plan agricultural production in many areas became totally unprofitable. This was the result of the rising cost of the means of production, inflated insurance contributions and high taxes, while the prices paid for agricultural products remained incommensurably low. Figures from 1990 illustrated the peasants' plight. Between March and December 1989 the price of tractors rose by 800% and from December 1989 to January 1990 by 1800. According to Eugeniusz Szpytwa, leader of the Trade Union of Pig-breeders and Producers, the costs of production were outstripping the profit from meat by a half: "In December the necessary fodder cost 6.6, thousand zloty but pork could only be sold for 4.5 thousand zloty. As a result entire villages are meeting the additional charge for the meat they produce...I am 156,000 zloty in deficit, not counting the wages of our workers, the death of some pigs, energy, business ventures and vets' payments. That's why we in the union can clearly observe farmers ceasing to buy fodder and liquidating their pigs...We, the toiling villages are being skinned alive."

The inexperienced new Government, dominated by the urban-based intelligentsia, also proved ill-equipped to tackle the immediate needs of the agricultural sector. The government's policy of purchasing agricultural products from the West provided an example of its inadequacy The new government was particularly conscious of the danger of food shortages at a time of
economic austerity. As a result it purchased grain and meat from the West and applied for Western food aid. However by Spring 1990 it was clear that Poland had a significant surplus of agricultural products due to overproduction and a lower level of domestic demand than anticipated. Collapse of trade with the Soviet Union meant that these surpluses could not be siphoned off to the East. The government was forced to ask the peasantry to destroy domestically produced surpluses of butter, milk and grain. In July 1990 'Polityka' reported the existence of "a 40,000 ton butter mountain which is going to go rancid".

Criticism of the Government's approach to the agricultural sector soon emerged from farming circles. The accusation that the 'intelligentsia in power' lacked the knowledge and expertise to manage the sector struck at the heart of the intelligentsia's belief in its competence as a government of the 'best and brightest'. In February 1990 the National Council of the Trade Union of Individual Farmers' 'Solidarity' criticised the "misunderstandings of agricultural problems and the attitudes and aspirations of farmers".

A conflict of interests thus emerged between the peasants and the Mazowiecki government. Farmers wanted an end to the "pricing madness". In other words, they wanted guaranteed profitability. That would be secured by setting minimum prices; a level, fixed
by the state, below which prices would not be allowed to fall. In practice this would mean that if the prices of basic agricultural products began to fall on the market, the state would have the responsibility of purchasing the surplus supplies for a guaranteed price. It would also have to protect the farmers from failed harvests.

In effect the peasantry was outlining its vision of the new Poland. It called for a strong, interventionist state which would protect what it regarded as a vital bastion of Polish society from collapse. Domestic produce had to be supported in the face of cheaper or better quality imports from the West. This was in keeping with the peasantry's traditional insularity when it came to the concept of 'Europe' and the 'West'. A 1990 poll of peasant attitudes revealed the peasantry's desire for privileged treatment from the government.108

The government's vision of the new Poland was very different. Poland was being guided by the "intelligentsia in power" back to the West. This entailed the radical introduction of a free-market economy and any deviation from the plan would undermine the entire project. To artificially set prices would be contrary to the current guiding principles of the economy, in which prices are decided by the market. If the state set the minimum prices of
food-stuffs it would have to retain subsidies in the state budget. That would mean spiralling inflation. In effect the new government was declaring its intention to modernise Polish agriculture along with the rest of the country by subjecting it to the market mechanism. This logic was repeatedly expressed by the author of economic reform, Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz.

The conflict provoked a more radical temper amongst the Polish peasants in their relationship with the government. Research conducted by CBOS at the end of April 1990 on a nation-wide scale examined the attitudes of the peasantry. The poll clearly exposed the state of increasing tension in the villages caused by the Balcerowicz Plan. 64% of those polled thought that the government's agricultural policies not only failed to promote increased production, but actually made it more difficult.

When it came to forms of protest, a significant number advocated radical measures - 19% were for strikes and demonstrations, 18% for non-payment of taxes and 11% for boycotting elections. 82% of those polled had sympathy with these protests and only 7% regarded them as unjustified. Throughout Spring and Summer of 1990 peasants staged brief blockades in various parts of the country.
There were signs that the conflict between the Mazowiecki government and the peasantry was awakening the traditional urban/rural cleavage. The complaint that "The weight of the reforms lies on the backs of the farmers" could easily be interpreted as just the latest chapter in the oppression of Poland's rural areas by the Warsaw government.

In 1990 Adam Michnik wrote of the political situation in Hungary and the conflict between the Free Democrats and the Democratic Forum. According to Michnik, the origins of the clash lay in the traditional cultural difference between urban and rural areas in Hungary. Michnik's appraisal of the urban/rural conflict as a major factor in contemporary Hungarian politics could easily have been applied to the situation in Poland in 1990. As we have seen, the urban/rural divide was a prominent feature of Polish society throughout the pre-communist and communist periods. In fact, at the same time, Polish observers were making similar points about the Polish situation. For instance Anna Tatarkiewicz identified Poland's western border as the line dividing the continent between urban-dominated countries and countries where urban/rural conflicts were still unsettled.
In this context, polls taken in Poland in 1984, 1987/88 and 1990 to discover what the public thought were the main conflicts of the time were revealing (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 "Conflicting Sides - Who is in Conflict with Whom?" (in % from a general survey).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting Sides</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities (gov't etc) versus national society</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban versus Rural</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities (old or new) versus Solidarity</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZPR, Communists, Party versus the Rest</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich versus Poor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Authorities versus New Authorities</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Parties Amongst Themselves</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Within the Authorities</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Within Solidarity</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walesa Versus Mazowiecki</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Krzysztof Jasiewicz 'Polska wyborca - w dziesiec lat po sierpniu' in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano S. Gebethnera and K. Jasiewicz eds 1993 p98).

The table illustrates the replacement of the old divide between Polish society and the communist state with a series of new
the peasantry was one of the most obvious illustrations of this upheaval. Throughout the communist era the media had served to downplay urban/rural differences. The peasant was portrayed as a tireless worker, worthy of respect but not envy\textsuperscript{116}.

The fall of communism removed the ideological motivations of this propaganda. The new freedom of the media meant that Poles began to learn more about the standard of living in different regions. Consequently the media's portrayal of the peasantry altered radically as did the farmer's popular image: "We see the peasant most often in his Sunday best in front of a single storey house with a garage, with at least one car in the background and agricultural machinery. Not since the time of the Kulaks has the intelligentsia looked at the peasantry with such envy"\textsuperscript{117}.

**Politicisation of the Peasantry**

The disenchantment of the peasantry with the Mazowiecki government was reflected in the development of peasant political organisations. Although there was sympathy amongst the peasantry for the radical protests of some of their colleagues, party political activity was the most popular option. In the CBOS poll referred to earlier 71\% of those peasants polled pointed to the need for party political action\textsuperscript{118}. With 50 members the 'Farming
Walesa could only resort to ranting and raving about Warsaw cliques and coteries that monopolised government, about wretched egg-heads who had no connection to average people, and about self-important parliamentarians who are absolutely uninterested in those who elected them" (Voytek Zubek 'Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition' Problems of Communism Jan-April 1991 p77, henceforth Zubek (a)). One of Walesa's supporters, J Maziaszki, provides an example: "The Warsaw-Cracow salon, in coalition with the former nomenklatura, is striving, just as the Gierek government did, to use the system for jobs and foreign contacts. Members of the salon have, with lightning speed acquired a philosophy to justify their status; choosing, like the aristocracy, to consider themselves better than the rest of their compatriots" (J. Maziaszki Tygodnik Solidarnosc No.24 1990). See also Wierbicki, P, 'Tantrums of the Egg-heads' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 11/5/90.

"The biggest mistake of the doctors and professors was to transform [Walesa] into gold. Now that same choir proclaims him a boor, ruthlessly reaching for government and who is audacious enough to call them, the elite, egg-heads" ('Looking askance' Kultura Nr 10/517 1990 p20).


see 'The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote' Chapter 4 p626.

Section' represented the largest formal lobby within the OKP and the possibility of its transformation into an independent political party would clearly threaten the unity of the OKP which was so vital to the plans of the 'intelligentsia in power'.

An equal threat was posed by the possible character of a unified peasant party. Unification according to the peasantry's traditional agenda was contrary to the government's desire to encourage the integration of the farmers with the rest of Polish society. An autonomous political organisation defending specific, rural values would discourage the peasantry from supporting the Solidarity-based pro-reform movement. As a result of the differing agendas mentioned above the most popular type of organisation proved to be reminiscent of the peasantry's traditional insular movements. Farmers opted above all to organise themselves into peasant parties, rallying only behind the farmers. According to polls, the majority were for the existence of one, strong peasant party which would prepare a national programme, concentrating specifically on the interests of agriculture and the villages. Only a small minority advocated organising the farmers into nation-wide, cross-class organisations119.

Up until May 1990 the traditional internecine rivalries of the Polish peasant movement had been continued by three conflicting strands; PSL 'Solidarity', PSL 'Rebirth' (formerly affiliated to the
communists) and PSL 'Wilanow' (the revived form of the pre-war peasant movement). PSL Solidarity could be traced back to a decision by farmers in 1980 to follow the examples of the industrial workers and found an independent trade union under Solidarity. Repressed during Martial Law, it began to re-emerge in 1988 and by the time of the Round table talks had around 1000 district branches. On April 20th 1989 it was officially re-registered as a trade union and in the Sejm elections of June it won 52 seats in both houses.

In August 1989 its MP's and Senators formed an independent agrarian lobby in the OKP Solidarity caucus and, under Jozef Slisz, began to move toward organising a political extension of the union. However, in December Slisz lost the chairmanship of PSL Solidarity to Gabriel Janowski. Tensions within the peasant movement over its relationship with the Mazowiecki government seemed to be behind the vote. The new chairman was considered "more economically minded and more radical vis a vis the Government".

Organising the peasantry under the auspices of an essentially workers' movement became increasingly impractical given the re-awakening of class identities. Moreover the reception given by the peasantry to the new government's agricultural policies prompted its leaders to distance themselves from Solidarity's
parliamentary representation. Despite assuming a more radical stance, PSL Solidarity continued to suffer from its association with Solidarity. The revived PSL 'Wilanow' was hostile to it for the aforementioned reasons while the ex-communist PSL 'Rebirth' always had an anti-Solidarity bias. Thus PSL Solidarity was largely absent from the process of peasant unification in Spring 1990 and this marked the victory of a traditional, conservative view of peasant organisation over a progressive, integrative approach.

PSL 'Solidarity' was the only peasant organisation which appeared to give credence to the massive social changes which had occurred under communist rule. Industrialisation, urbanisation and the development of modern notions of citizenship and nationhood all supported bringing the peasant community closer to the urban population and modern Polish society as a whole. For different reasons the two remaining peasant organisations choose to ignore these aspects of communist rule and instead concentrated on the pre-modern, conservative peasant traditions of the inter-war period.

PSL 'Rebirth' as the direct successor of the communist's peasant 'ally' the ZSL was keen to set aside the communist period and prove its credentials as a peasant party in the traditional mould.
Its chairman was Kaziemierz Olesiak, former apparatchik and ex-deputy Premier in the last communist government of Mieczyslaw Rakowski. The ZSL organisation was compromised in the eyes of the majority of the Polish peasantry by its past association with the regime. In the territorial elections of May 1990 "in practically every province the voters referred to it as 'the repainted PSL'. Since 1988 there had been a distinct dissident movement within the ZSL, directed against the organisations subjugation to Communist control. In the June 1989 elections the dissenters managed to get some of its members elected through the co-operation of Solidarity. However, the Party establishment were able to survive and neutralise internal opposition by aborting the old organisation's policies along with its name at a Congress in November 1989\textsuperscript{121}.

Though morally bankrupt the organisation possessed material assets which were attractive to the reorganising peasant movement. PSL 'Rebirth' had maintained premises, printing equipment, cars and, not least, a membership of around 300,000. At its inception it had acknowledged the wrongs committed by the communists toward the peasantry but stressed the coercive nature of the alliance with the PZPR\textsuperscript{122}. 
The claim of PSL 'Rebirth' to the traditions of the movement brought them into conflict with the other peasant organisation - PSL 'Wilanow'. Being the direct heir of the pre-war peasant tradition, PSL 'Wilanow' also stressed its continuity with pre-communist peasant organisations. It included in its membership surviving activists of the pre-war PSL. Led by General Franciszek Kaminski, it returned to the political scene as a result of the transition. It was nicknamed PSL 'Wilanow' after the location of its political base and it enjoyed the full support of the Catholic Church. As in the inter-war period, PSL 'Wilanow' strongly identified itself with Christian values and Catholic social philosophy. It was more socially conservative than its Solidarity equivalent, defending the distinct cultural identity of rural Poland. While economically it was more liberal than PSL Solidarity it criticised the government's anti-inflation package and demanded special treatment for farmers throughout the marketisation process.

Despite the historical hostility between PSL 'Rebirth' and PSL 'Wilanow', leaders from both sides realised the benefits which would accrue from unification. Essentially each side possessed assets which the other craved. Though morally bankrupt, PSL 'Rebirth' possessed material assets which were attractive to the general movement. On the other hand the leadership of PSL 'Wilanow' would undoubtedly command the moral backing and
approval of the majority of the Polish peasantry. We should also note that both strands were united in their deepening hostility to PSL 'Solidarity' and the policies of the Mazowiecki government. Kaminski and Olesiak consequently began to discuss possible unification and settled on a joint congress of both strands, to be held on the 5th May 1990. 

Events surrounding the Congress suggested that the movement would unify under the traditional conservatism of the peasantry. The influence of the Catholic Church was apparent as the Congress was preceded by a Mass where the priest spoke of the moral superiority of the villages because of their greater religiosity, work-ethic, respect for the family and relationship with nature. Outside the Congress the peasant newspapers "Dziennik Ludowy" and "Gazeta Ludowa" were joined by stalls representing nationalist and populist organisations such as the National Party (SN). On his way to the Congress one peasant delegate announced "We are going to ally with the fraternal National Party! We support a peasant/nationalist alliance".

Roman Bartoszcze was appointed leader of the unified PSL. Though relatively young, Bartoszcze appeared to be an ideal representative of the traditional, conservative image the unifying congress was trying to project. In short, he enjoyed the support of
the Catholic Church and he was committed to defending the independence of the peasant movement. During the congress Bartoszcze was firmly placed in this moral centre; Father Boguslaw Bijak a PSL leader from Wilanow described him as a 'man of the Church'.

Under the leadership of Roman Bartoszcze the unified PSL increased pressure on the Mazowiecki government for more favourable rural policies and committed themselves to producing an alternative economic plan by autumn 1990. In its vision of a Christian Poland with a strong, interventionist state PSL fitted in the Centre/Right of the political spectrum as it stood in 1990. It described itself as "of the Centre but somewhat to the Right". It was therefore potentially attractive to the gathering Right of Centre coalition being organised under the auspices of the PC. In July 1990 Slawomir Siwek, a spokesman for PC, stated his hope that the PSL would become an ally of his own organisation as it built a populist, anti-Mazowiecki front.

In September 1990 the PSL resigned from participation in the government - withdrawing all of support for its members. It wanted to stand as a 'third force', a 'dark horse' in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections, and also to profit from the conflict between Walesa and Mazowiecki. This was the beginning.
of PSL's ongoing attempt to play the role of 'king-maker' in Polish politics\textsuperscript{120}.

At the same time Bartoszcze announced that he would be running against Mazowiecki in the forthcoming Presidential elections. When Bartoszcze failed to get the necessary votes to continue into the final round of voting in the Presidential elections he transferred his support to Walesa rather than Mazowiecki. All evidence from the Presidential polls suggests that Mazowiecki's support amongst the Polish peasantry was minimal\textsuperscript{130}.

In conclusion one can see how the clash between the fundamentally contradictory agendas of the Polish intelligentsia and the peasantry undermined the social authority of the Mazowiecki government. The traditional urban/rural divide could not be overcome by the intelligentsia's vision of a unitary, civil society and its attempt to impose this view merely spurred the crystallisation of the peasantry as a source of political opposition. Stanislaw Mazan, an MP for the Polish Peasants Party 'Rebirth' voiced the peasantry's rejection of the Mazowiecki government's version of democracy and its disillusionment with the 'Solidarity ethos': "How can it be right that during a Sejm debate the Prime Minister was absent and the OKP and PZPR benches were empty? Doesn't this mean that a new coalition has been established?"
Solidarity is talking just like the communists did; identifying the Solidarity movement with the government. We battled head on with the Reds for 45 years but now democracy has commenced by kicking the peasantry in the stomach.
(iii) The Mazowiecki Government and the Catholic Church

Relations with the Catholic Church were important to the Mazowiecki government for a number of reasons. To begin with, the Church remained a particularly important social institution in Poland. It entered the transition period in a confident mood. As we have seen, its moral authority and social prestige had allowed it to reach a modus vivendi with the communist regime. As communism waned the Church built strong ties with the anti-communist opposition movement, including its intelligentsia cadre. During the late communist period the alliance between the Church and the opposition intelligentsia was vital to the success of Solidarity; its involvement as a mediator in the Round Table talks and later as a vital contributor to Solidarity's campaign in the partially free elections of June 1989 paid testament to its influence in the political sphere in the prelude to the transition.

Opinion polls from 1990 suggested that the Church remained an influential public institution during the early transition period (see Table 4.5 - ).
Table 4.5 "Who Governs in Poland Today?" (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a great extent</th>
<th>To a certain extent</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Not Much</th>
<th>Very Little</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PZPR</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSL</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPZZ</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS polls reported in 'Poland and the Poles' Polityka 30/12/89 p7).

The Church was thus commonly perceived as one of the major forces filling the vacuum in public power left by the disintegration of the Communist Party and its satellites. According to the Polish public, only Solidarity - under whose banner the Mazowiecki government was exercising power - exceeded the Church in terms of political influence.

Given the continuing public influence of the Church, its relationship with the Mazowiecki government was of vital importance. The support of such a major institution in Polish society would be vital in building a consensual civil society through Solidarity. Catholic social teaching and Christian values were a fundamental component of the 'Solidarity ethos'. It was around common values such as justice, truthfulness and individual freedom that the secular intelligentsia and the Catholic
Church came together under the auspices of the Solidarity movement. If Solidarity unity was to be maintained into the transition period then this alliance was essential. The type of catch-all social movement envisaged by Solidarity's intellectual elite would rely heavily on moralistic rather than political or economic criteria and the Catholic Church was the undoubted Polish authority in this respect.

Conversely, we have noted the Catholic Church's tendency to treat Polish society along 'organic' lines through reference to the Pole=Catholic equation. This view, which also justified a prominent role for the Church in public affairs, obviously threatened to polarise society and undermine the development of a pluralist, civil society in post-communist Poland.

This section will examine the relationship between the Catholic Church and the 'intelligentsia in power'. Traditionally the Church's association of Polish nationhood with the Catholic religion and its socially and politically conservative conception of Poland opposed the intelligentsia's liberal, progressive vision of Polish identity. However in the late communist period both groups had been supportive of the broad concepts of 'democracy' and 'civil society'. This link was based on the common demand for greater freedom of expression for Polish society. The communist government's refusal to meet this demand encouraged
co-operation between both groups in the construction of 'civil society' as a realm of Polish social life independent of communist interference. The Church/intelligentsia alliance was thus founded on rejection of communist rule rather than a common vision of Polish identity.

With the advent of the transition process, differences emerged between the Church hierarchy and the 'intelligentsia in power' over what a democratic, civil society would amount to in reality. The progressive intelligentsia cadre of the Mazowiecki government and conservative elements within the Church hierarchy had different visions of the new Poland and its relationship with 'Europe' or 'the West'. Implementing their disparate visions would entail the creation of different institutional arrangements within Polish civil society. The conflict thus involved the question of the very nature of the Polish state: should there be a secular or religious state? The following section will explain the deterioration of the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and the Catholic Church hierarchy in this context.

The Church's Vision of Post-Communist Poland

The struggle between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the Catholic Church to impose their visions on the nascent civil society
involved competing interpretations of recent Polish history. For the leaders of Poland's Catholics, such as Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the Church's roles as an independent institution in a supposedly totalitarian state and a fundamental pillar of the Solidarity movement were instrumental to the fall of the communist regime.\textsuperscript{136}

Despite the Church's attempt to present it as a product of the communist era, the conflict which developed over the role of the Church in independent Poland echoed the traditional quarrels over the nation's ultimate destiny. Was the shape of post-communist Poland to be determined along Dmowski's 'organicist' ethnic and religious criteria - he referred to Poland as "a live social organism, having a spiritual specificity derived from racial and historical bases"\textsuperscript{136} - or by Pilsudski's multi-ethnic, communitarian vision? The clash was reminiscent of the struggle between clerical and secular intelligentsia groups in Poland's previous period of sovereignty during the Second Republic\textsuperscript{137}. In 1988 a witness to this period, Czeslaw Milosz, noted the historical antecedents of Church/intelligentsia relations and predicted the rupture of 1990\textsuperscript{138}.

The historic link between the 'organicist' strand of Polish cultural identity and the Catholic faith, summarised by the Pole=Catholic
equation, was resurrected\textsuperscript{139}. In 1988 Cardinal Glemp outlined his
dream of the future Poland which was based on this long-standing
model\textsuperscript{140}. In practice this vision entailed a populist definition of
democracy. Poland was a baptised nation (96% of Polish citizens
were Catholic) and official recognition of the Church's role in
public life would, so the logic ran, only be democratic.

However, Polish society was thus generally disapproving of
Church intervention in political or public spheres. The communist
legacy appeared to be supportive of a secular system and rejection
of public institutions based on any ideology or creed\textsuperscript{141}.

Research from OBOP polls in November 1990 illustrated this:
1. Catholicism should be the state religion and the Catholic Church
should have an assured influence on decisions concerning public -
9.1%
2. The Church and Catholicism should be supported by the state
but with protection of the rights of other religions and atheists to
publicly voice their convictions and freedoms - 26.9%
3. The state should be completely separate from religious issues
which should remain a private matter for every citizen - 61%
4. Undecided - 2.9

However the idea of state institutions neutral in terms of religion was regarded by the Church hierarchy as a continuation of the anti-clerical, anti-religious and thus anti-democratic aspects of the communist state. It was this atheistic arrangement that Poland's Catholic society had found undemocratic and risen up against. The pre-communist period of the Second Republic, with its close ties between Church and State, was held up as a far worthier historical model.\textsuperscript{142}

A 'Catholic democracy' would strictly define the institutions of Poland's post-Communist civil society and the political community expected to participate in them. The 'organicist' vision of the nation naturally leads to a civil society where divisions and differences are not tolerated. Loyalty to a higher set of values takes precedence over individual or group interests. Political competition concerns the right to represent the will of 'the people' as a whole not the interplay of partial interests in society. The democratic rights of non-Catholic minority groups (such as the country's remaining Byelorussian, Ukrainian, German and Jewish and Gypsy populations) and individuals (e.g. in the areas of family planning, education, divorce, homosexuality etc.) would all be effected by the introduction of the 'Pole=Catholic' equation to the public sphere.\textsuperscript{143}
The Catholic hierarchy also shared Polish populism's traditional hostility to foreign influences. Under communist rule the Church had been a fundamental repository of Polish identity in an otherwise alien, atheistic system. In transition Poland the Church was needed more than ever to defend Poland from Western value systems. Following the defeat of atheistic communism, the excesses of the irreligious, decadent West were regarded as a new threat to Poland's moral codes.

The Church's idea of Poland's role in Europe thus inclined to the populist search for external enemies outlined in Chapter 1. Internal unity was to be supported by the identification of external threats. The Church warned that opening the country up to the rest of Europe would threaten the moral fibre of Polish society; a Pastoral letter from 1991 attacked the "blasphemy, falsehood and pornography which had engulfed the mass media." Instead Poland's Catholicism had to be protected as a precious element of national identity and a potential example to the rest of the continent which had gone astray. This message was particularly welcome in rural Poland. As we have seen, the influence of the Catholic Church was traditionally strong in the provinces. Worry over the possible effect of Western Europe's 'immoral' culture on Polish society also mirrored the rural
population's fears that opening Poland up to European influences in the economic sphere would benefit urban areas and social groups such as the urban-based intelligentsia at its expense. This attitude to Europe seemed to be the theme emerging from Pope John Paul's tour of provincial Poland in the Summer of 1991.

Differences Between Church and Intelligentsia Visions

Despite Polish society's general desire for the separation of the Church from the State, feelings on the issue were strongest amongst the lay intelligentsia. The Church's vision of Poland and its relationship with Europe contradicted that of the intelligentsia. On the one hand the intelligentsia's conception of Polish civil society was founded on an individualistic vision of democracy. This was based on the example of West European liberal democracies. The declared aim of the anti-communist intelligentsia had been the achievement of individual freedoms which were guaranteed in the West. According to the progressive ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia 'Europe' was "a talisman word synonymous with civilization".

Consequently in transition Poland the task of the 'intelligentsia in power' was to introduce Western, democratic practices. This included the guarantee of individual freedoms, secularisation of state institutions and the encouragement of economic and
cultural contacts with the West. As we have seen, the Church's populist vision of a democratic, civil society could be defined in relation to the Catholicism of the masses and a stress on national or 'Polish' values. Moreover Europe was seen as a potential threat to Polish society's moral well-being and cohesion. Wiktor Kulerski, a teacher, former member of KOR and the Secretary of State for Education under Mazowiecki succinctly outlined the fundamental conflict between the Church and intelligentsia in the Mazowiecki period along the lines of a clash between a secular and a liberal state\textsuperscript{151}.

In lay intelligentsia circles it was believed that reviving the traditional 'Polish=Catholic' formula would usher in intolerance, divisiveness, parochialism and xenophobic nationalism; all of which would threaten Poland's return to the 'Western European tradition'\textsuperscript{152}. Thus from being a partner in the reconstruction of a modern, democratic, civil society the Church, with its populist version of democracy and traditional, conservative vision of Poland was now regarded by the progressive intelligentsia as one of its main opponents\textsuperscript{153}.

One can also argue that in seeking to impose its vision on the whole of Polish society the church was mirroring the 'totalising' approach of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The Catholic church's conception of Poland's 'organic' unity was reminiscent of the
intelligentsia's elitist vision of democratisation outlined previously\textsuperscript{154}.

Of course, the Church's vision was conservative and backward-looking while the intelligentsia's was forward-looking but both shared the same desire to dominate and lead the rest of society during the transition. Consequently the most vociferous critics of the Church's political ambitions were found amongst prominent members of the lay intelligentsia who were exercising political influence through the Mazowiecki government. Their attack included a different version of recent Polish history from that presented by the Church hierarchy. The Church's role in the fall of communism was presented as much more ambiguous.

Adam Michnik, a leading member of the Lay Left, was prominent in the revision of the Church's anti-communist credentials. This is important because Michnik had been the chief architect of the intelligentsia/Church alliance under communism\textsuperscript{155}. His appreciation of the Church's historic role as guardian of Polish identity had been vital to this process. In transition times Michnik's attitude was somewhat revised; the emphasis shifted from appreciation of its role as institutional defender and spiritual centre of Solidarity to a description of its modus vivendi with the communist state\textsuperscript{155}. Again the breakdown of the relationship between the Church and the 'intelligentsia in power'...
during the Mazowiecki period can be illustrated by tracing the course of concrete political issues.

The Watershed Debate: Return of Religious Education to Schools

The Church became embroiled in several controversial public issues in 1990 such as the return of Church property, abortion and religious instruction in schools. The abortion issue is examined at the end of this section as an illustration of the Right's instrumental use of religion to build an anti-government political coalition. The debate over the return of religious education to Polish schools serves as an illustration of the general breakdown in relations between the Mazowiecki government/intelligentsia and the Catholic hierarchy. The issue was seminal as it referred directly to the clash between both group's vision of what a democratic, civil society amounted to in the Polish case. Would the special status of the Catholic Church in Poland be enshrined in restrictive new education legislation or would the Mazowiecki government follow the example of secular, Western systems?187

Religious education has a significant history in Poland, particularly so in terms of Church/intelligentsia relations. As we have seen, religious instruction in Polish schools was removed by
the Stalinist regime. In the 'thaw' of 1956 it had briefly made a comeback contrary to the wishes of the revisionist intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{158}

It was eradicated again in the early 1960s. The Catholic Church was therefore forced to organise classes through its own structures. In each parish places in church buildings were set aside for catechism lessons. In the 1970s and 1980s this practice was expanded for a variety of other uses and it contributed to the organisation of the anti-communist movement.\textsuperscript{159} Thus the issue of religious education was simultaneously a reminder of historic differences between the Church and the lay intelligentsia and a symbol of both groups' alliance during the late communist period.

After the fall of communism it became clear that the Catholic Church expected the return of full religious education in schools to be a priority for the Mazowiecki government. The Bishops' 240th Plenary Conference, held in Warsaw from April 30th May 2nd 1990 included a discussion on the re-introduction of religious education in schools. The official communique stated: "The Polish Bishops' Conference, considering demands made by the Catholic public, expressed its unanimous support for the full return of religious instruction in schools and for this to be guaranteed in
the constitution and the [projected] Law on National Education"\textsuperscript{160}.

The return of religious education was justified by the Church hierarchy in terms of its version of a democratic civil society outlined earlier. Polish society was overwhelmingly Catholic and thus the interests of democracy would be served if this fact was reflected in the educational system. Bishop Alojzy Orszulik, Deputy Secretary of the Polish Episcopate and participant at the 'Magdalenka' talks, explained the Church's position: "Now the Church was participating in the reconstruction of the state and wished to play a part in the reform of education as well...the educational system should reflect the Christian ethical values that were common to the vast majority of Polish people"\textsuperscript{161}.

Unlike an issue such as abortion, the Church hierarchy in 1990 could count on the weight of public opinion in their demand for the return of religious education. From a CBOS poll in May 1990 it was clear that the majority of Poles supported the return of religious education to schools (60% for and 27.6% against).

However support for the Episcopate's demands varied according to social background. For instance almost 80% of private farmers were for and 12% against; 74% of unqualified workers were for, 12% against; 72% of pensioners and retired for and 18% against. Most significant was the fact that the majority of members of the
intelligentsia polled were opposed to the Episcopate's plans (60% against and 25% for). The intellectual elite of the Mazowiecki government found the issue particularly difficult to resolve. As members of the intelligentsia, their attitude to the Bishops' stance was negative. The return of compulsory religious education was regarded as a significant limit on the individual freedoms the opposition intelligentsia had fought so hard for under communism. Moreover it was regarded as a significant part of the Church's strategy to institute a prominent public role in Poland.

This in itself was seen as a retrograde step for a country with ambitions to return to a predominantly secular Europe. At the outset representatives of the Mazowiecki government pronounced its reservations over the issue of religious education. Professor Henryk Samsonowicz, the Minister for Education, made it clear that he regarded the return of compulsory religious education as undemocratic.

On the other hand the government was aware of the potential for the issue to spark wider social unrest. Given the poll results it was obvious that by resolutely opposing the return of religious
education the government courted an anti-intelligentsia backlash which could severely undermine its social support. The Church hierarchy was aware that its stance could affect the government's fragility and used this to exert its influence on the education issue and others. As in the case of the abortion debate, the Church's opponents amongst the lay intelligentsia were presented as unreformed communists whose opposition to the reintroduction of religious education was in keeping with their political biographies. Tarring someone with the communist brush was, in the atmosphere of early transition Poland, a potentially devastating tactic. In an interview with Teresa Toranska, the Secretary of State for Education, Wiktor Kulerski, gave his impression of the Church's exploitation of the political biographies of the new ruling elite.

As a result a compromise was reached whereby representatives from the Government and the Conference of the Polish Episcopate formed a Joint Commission to negotiate a policy on the issue. A tense atmosphere was apparent from the outset. Wiktor Kulerski was the first choice of Minister Samsonowicz for government representative but the Church was unhappy with this choice. Under-secretary Anna Radziwill was selected instead. As the Commission debated it became apparent that the hierarchies influence was being brought to bear. The public pronouncements
of government representatives became less strident. For instance Radziwill at her first press conference as under-secretary had stated that the school should be a place for a "cult of competence" rather than the cult of religion and when asked in a Polityka interview when crucifixes and religious education would return to schools had replied "Never". By May she told the same newspaper that crucifixes were central to the lives of all Christians. The Church later demanded that Radziwill be replaced but Samsonowicz this time refused.

In August 1990 the Joint Commission published a fourteen point plan for the reintroduction of religious education to schools dealing with the academic year 1990/91. The announcement of the Commissions decision immediately caused controversy. In effect the Mazowiecki Government had decreed that religion should be taught in schools - a major step in instituting Catholicism as a state religion - without consulting the public or parliament. The controversy involved not only the substance of the issue but the manner in which religious education was being re-introduced in a supposedly democratic Poland. In the "Economist" it was reported that "Questions were raised about the power of a shadowy "Government-and-Church Council"...which had considerable influence over government decisions". For instance the SdRP (the major off-shoot of the defunct Communist Party) reported the decisions of the Joint Commission to the
Advocate for Citizens' Rights and the Constitutional Tribunal. The government side at the Joint Commission seemed to share the concern that democratic, constitutional channels were being bypassed by the Commission. The SdRP complaints were publicly recognised by the Ministry of National Education (MEN) as "right and proper for basic democracy."

It was only much later that the level of antagonism between the Episcopate and members of the government over the issue and the Joint Commissions results could be revealed. In his interview with Toranska in 1994 Wiktor Kulierski gives an insight into the gravity of the split. He reveals that he was prepared to resign over the issue along with all of his Undersecretaries. The only thing which stopped them was the awareness of the Mazowiecki Government's fragile base of social support and the fear that their actions would precipitate disintegration of the whole administration.

The Episcopate had identified a fundamental weakness in the Mazowiecki government. The rule by representatives of a narrow social group on the merit of intellectual expertise rather than through a political mandate left the Mazowiecki government uncertain of its base of support. Fear that opposition to the Church's initiatives might weaken its electoral support effectively
paralysed the 'government of the intelligentsia'. It thus gave in to Church demands even if they contradicted the intelligentsia ethos\textsuperscript{173}.

One can conclude that the transition period witnessed the breakdown of the alliance between intelligentsia and Catholic Church forces. The former had a 'progressive' vision of a Poland opened up to Western influences in social, economic, political and cultural spheres. The latter had a more conservative approach; continuing to regard Poland as a bastion of Catholic values against the 'atheistic' East and 'secular' West.

Throughout 1990 the Polish Episcopate, although officially neutral fostered contacts with emerging Right wing political forces which were voicing populist opposition to the Mazowiecki government and the Lay Left leadership of the OKP. Primate Glemp demonstrated his own political preferences by publicly receiving leaders of the right-of-centre Christian-Democratic Labour Party and the Christian National Union\textsuperscript{174}. In the Presidential campaign the Church made it known that it supported the conservative brand of Catholicism espoused by Walesa over Mazowiecki's liberal Catholicism\textsuperscript{176}. 
The Politicisation of the Catholic Church and the Rise of the Radical Right

The radical Right took advantage of the Church's continued desire to play a prominent public role. The Church hierarchy and the clerical-nationalist strand of the Polish Right had common cause. Both subscribed to the conservative form of Polish nationalism and the populist vision of Polish democracy which was as wary of Western influences in the country as Eastern intervention. Both felt that this outlook was being passed over by the more progressive 'Europeanism' and liberalism of the new elite. There was therefore a link between the conservative tradition of Polish Catholicism and the clerical tradition of the Polish Right.

The emerging radical Right saw the Church with its organisational strength and social authority as an ideal ally in its quest for political power. From Autumn 1989 onward Catholic and nationalist political organisations began to champion the cause for a closer relationship between the Church and the State in independent Poland. The Christian National Union (ZChN) stated: "The Polish Republic, as a social and political community of the Catholic, Polish nation, should be described in the constitution as a Christian state which accepts God as the Master of creation, participates in acts of worshipping God and respects the citizens' Catholic conscience."
Such attitudes did not stem from sincere religious conviction but from political ambition. The Church was championed by the Right as the implacable opponent of and victor over communism. Thus Church opponents in transition Poland were treated by the Right as unpatriotic and associated with the old regime. The intelligentsia cadre of the Mazowiecki government was opposed to Church influence in the public sphere because it was contrary to its dream of a liberal democracy. However the intelligentsia's stance fitted the radical Right's portrayal of the Mazowiecki government and its supporters as secretly linked to the old Communist authorities. The polarisation of attitudes to the Church thus served the radical Right's attempt to undermine the social authority of the Mazowiecki government.

In 1994 after ZChN had played a significant part in the government of Olszewski Wiktor Kulerski, the Secretary of State for Education under Mazowiecki, singled it out ZChN as a prime example of the Right's use of the Church as an institutional foothold. A good illustration of the link between the mobilisation of the radical right and the Catholic Church is provided by the debate over abortion in 1989-90.
The Issue of Abortion.

Abortion remains one of the most controversial issues in many Western countries, splitting societies along party-political, religious and ideological lines. However in Central Europe and particularly in transition Poland the issue was the subject of heated debate. In 1955 the Soviet Union liberalised abortion legislation, making it freely available on demand. High abortion rates proved the popularity of the move amongst Central and Eastern European societies. For instance in 1975-79, there were 218 abortions per 1,000 live births in Poland\textsuperscript{181}.

Despite this the state's liberal approach to abortion had been subject to strong criticism from certain elements, particularly the Catholic and other churches. With the collapse of communism and the advent of the transition these forces pressed for more restrictive abortion legislation. In September 1989 the Commission of the Polish Episcopate on Family Matters made it clear that, as far as the Church was concerned, the banning of abortion was an automatic step for the newly independent republic\textsuperscript{182}.

However, the Church did not enjoy the support of Polish society on this issue (as it did with religious education). In August 1991 a questionnaire by PENTOR (an independent Polish-American public opinion institute) for "Zycie Warszawy" gave the following results:
52% in favour of abortion on demand and 11% of banning abortion altogether. In March 1992 another PENTOR poll gave similar results:

1. Abortion should be banned, irrespective of circumstances: 10%
2. Abortion may be permitted only to preserve the life of the mother or to prevent the completion of a pregnancy that has resulted from rape: 21%
3. Abortion should be permitted in order to preserve the life of the mother, to prevent the completion of a pregnancy resulting from rape, and also in the case of social and economic difficulties: 15%
4. Abortion should be the woman's affair only and should on no account be penalised: 53%

Source: Euginiusz Smialowski 'For and Against Abortion' in East European Reporter Vol.5 No.3 May/June 1992 p23).

Thus almost 70% of those polled thought that abortion should be either freely available or available after consideration of the socio-economic background of individual cases. These positions were contrary to the Episcopate's policy. Indeed the actions of the Church hierarchy spurred the development of social organisations which explicitly opposed its anti-abortion policy.

Women's associations "Pro-Femina", "Ruch Samo-obrony Kobiet" ("Womens' Self-Defence Movement"), "Godnosc Kobiety" ("Women's Pride") and "Polskie Stowarzyszenie Feministyczne" ("Polish
Feminist Association\textsuperscript{9} vigorously opposed the Episcopate's stance\textsuperscript{184}.

Despite Polish society's generally pro-choice attitude the Church found some groups which were prepared to support its anti-abortion stance for political reasons\textsuperscript{185}. This process had begun in Spring 1989 when the Catholic organisations (PAX\textsuperscript{186}, UChSS, ZK-S) set up by the communist regime to counter the influence of the Church realised that the Party-state system was disintegrating. They cynically used the abortion issue in an attempt to distance themselves from certain features of their Communist pasts. Poland's abortion legislation had been liberalised in 1956/57 contrary to the doctrines of the Polish Catholic Church. However in 1989 PAX set the context for the debate by presenting these laws as the creation of the Stalinist era and thus in operation before PAX came into existence after the thaw of 1956. Stalinism had been condemned by successive communist regimes for its extreme, anti-Polish character.

At the same time MPs associated with PAX through the "Catholic Social Union" (ZK-S) proposed a set of laws on "The legal protection of the Unborn Child" to the Sejm. It called for the arbitrary prohibition of abortion (regardless of the health of the mother or child, the economic situation or living conditions of the
mother and the circumstances in which the life was conceived. The project proposed women and doctors involved in abortions be sentenced to three years imprisonment. The proposed laws were discussed stormily in the Health Commission, but in the flux of the Mazowiecki take-over the package did not find its way to the Sejm itself. However from Autumn 1989 proponents of an anti-abortion bill renewed the attack. It suited the emerging Right to subscribe to this myth perpetrated by PAX and it also portrayed the abortion legislation as a product of Stalinism (i.e. communism at its least 'Polish' most alien or 'Russian').

Emergent parties of the radical right cited the fight for anti-abortion legislation as one of their fundamental goals. In the OKP the abortion issue contributed to the crystallisation of internal differences. For instance eight MPs and Senators who were Catholic activists formed the Christian National Union (ZChN) in October 1989 within the OKP structure. In its founding resolution it stated: "We will demand respect for the Christian principles professed by the vast majority of society in social life and in education. Laws aimed at removing the Christian outlook of our social life, attacking Catholic ethics, the rights of the unborn, the rights of the family and the rights of the Church.
should be changed. The ZChN subsequently presented its "Law on the Legal Protection of the Unborn" to the Sejm. It proposed a total ban on abortion except when the mother's life was in danger and called for a two year prison sentence on the doctors who performed it.

The Mazowiecki government and its supporters in the Sejm and Senate were opposed to the rapid introduction of anti-abortion legislation for several reasons. Firstly its main constituency, the Polish intelligentsia, was the group least in favour of restrictions on abortion, seeing it as a purely private matter. This was in keeping with its generally liberal outlook. Secondly, as we have seen elsewhere, it was opposed to allowing the Church hierarchy such influence in public life, particularly when the majority of public opinion was opposed to its stand. Finally it was aware that the issue was being manipulated and agitated by certain political forces for their own benefit; a process which could undermine the government's authority.

For all of these reasons the abortion debate paralysed the Polish parliament during the Mazowiecki era. The ZChN's proposals were stalled in a Senate body throughout 1990. On 19th September 1990 the Commission voted on the ZChN's proposals. Six voted for the proposals but only nine of its fifteen members (13 men and
two women) were present. The day before the Commission voted, Zofia Kuratowska, one of its female members, who subsequently did not attend the vote, met with representatives of feminist organisations which were picketing the Senate. Dr. Kuratowska promised that during the general Senate debate she would vote against the project though "she had the impression she would be in the minority". On September 29th the Senate finally approved a draft law tightening restrictions on abortion. It rejected the clause that would have jailed women for up to two years for having an abortion but retained this penalty for doctors. Doctors could only terminate pregnancies resulting from rape, incest or when a woman's life was in danger. Only 76 of the 100 Senators took part in the vote: 56 for, one against, 19 abstained. The draft bill now returned to the Sejm where it embarked on a similarly tortuous legislative journey which outlasted the Mazowiecki government's term in office.

In an article in "Women and Life" the Senator Anna Bogucka-Skowronska tried to explain why many members of the Sejm and Senate were caught between personal support for the pro-choice lobby and fear of losing the political support of the Catholic Church in the context of forthcoming parliamentary elections. This dilemma was exacerbated by the high intelligentsia representation in the Sejm and Senate. The intelligentsia's code of morality, ethics and commitment to the
truth as it perceived it which had marked the opposition period was being compromised by the inevitable pragmatism and bargaining of political life.

Predictably the radical Right chose to interpret the stalling of the ZChN's anti-abortion proposals in the Senate as further evidence of the new elite's links with the old regime, based on the shared intelligentsia background of the opposition and reformist PZPR elites. The logic of the Right was simple: how could one term as undemocratic a set of laws designed to remove legislation which was one of the defining products of the totalitarian era?²⁰⁴

In this manner the Catholic Church was drawn into the consolidation of the Polish Right under the banner of populism and nationalism. The politicisation of the Church reached a peak in the Presidential campaign when degree of religiosity became a determining factor in voting patterns. The Pope himself was drawn into the fray. His speeches were analysed and interpreted by domestic politicians according to their own agendas²⁰⁶.

This survey of the relationship between the Mazowiecki government and different sections of Polish society has highlighted the continued existence of irreconcilable visions of Poland. The elitism and 'totalist' perspective of the intelligentsia in power meant that it regarded its vision as the best, indeed only, one to
follow. As a result the values of other social forces were disregarded. This was contrary to the Mazowiecki government's espousal of democratic values. In 1990 it also contributed to the rise of anti-state forces. Intellectuals and politicians alienated from the Warsaw ruling elite could draw on the frustrations of these social forces to build a populist, anti-intelligentsia front. The following examination of the Presidential elections should be seen in this context.
Each of [these visions of post-communist democracy] reflects deep historical allegiances that have motivated resistance to oppression and aspirations for democracy [but] their continued dominance in political life tends to undermine the construction of a democratic institutional framework and/or threatens the norm of universal political membership. (E. Kiss "Giving Politics its Place: Democracy and Collective Identity" paper presented at the Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC 1991).

The following information is taken from 'Rocznik statystyczny' GUS Warsaw 1990 and 1991.
see 'The Legacy of the Command Economy' Chapter 3 p295.

see 'The Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan' Chapter 3 p317.

"The large majority of the working population was - and still is - employed in state-owned factories and state-run institutions. These employees cannot tell where their future interests lie" (Wlodzimierz Wesolowski 'The Nature of Social Ties' in John A. Hall ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison Polity Press Oxford 1995 p118).

see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p248.

see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 p380.

see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p261.

see Chapter 3 p381.

"never before in Poland and maybe never... in Europe has migration from the countryside to the towns achieved such dimension over such a short time" (Kazimierz Piesowicz, 'Social and Demographic Consequences of World War II and the German Occupation in Poland' Oeconomica Polona No. 1 1983 p82).

see 'The Legacy of the Command Economy' Chapter 3 p295.

see Walicki (b) p97.
Krzeminski and Wladyka conclude that the old opposition Left was in a state of "paralysis": "The 'Solidarity Left' gets lost in interpretation, obfuscation, the quest for euphemisms and new words. It is on the defensive because practically it does not want to acknowledge itself" (Adam Krzeminski and Wieslaw Wladyka 'Under the Lid of the Vat' Polityka 10/3/90 p6).

Krzeminski and Wladyka note this Leftist strand characterised by a group of "noble leftists...who wove a web of political connections - stronger than political differences, based as much on social background as way of thinking" (Ibid. p6).

"Clearly their [the social democrats] claims of political Centrism are devised as a shield (their enemies would say smokescreen) against society's instinctive dislike of the Left" (Friszke p97).

Kazimierz Korab observed that "Representatives of the Left have begun to call themselves 'Europeans'...as 'intellectuals'. Instead of the workers the civic state has emerged in their field of interest" ("The Left and Right Camps of Solidarity' in Tygodnik Solidarnosc 3/8/90 p15).

"Many activists see a potential crisis in the movement giving up its representative function and taking up a role in government. That is why leaders are demanding that the Union severs itself from politics and return to its simple form. This chapter is over. The price of political involvement
is too high" (Jagienka Wilczak 'A Virtuous Dream' Polityka 18/11/89 p3).

"We have invested an awful lot in this government. Today it is time for our own interests. We will no longer tolerate this loss of authority" (Gazeta Wyborcza 28/6/90 p1).

29 Wilczak commented, "There are those for whom the 'Solidarity' placard is indispensable, without it, they argue, we are helpless, at the mercy of the government. In reality it is, after all, still 'their' government. Here everything still has to be demanded" (Jagienka Wilczak 'A Virtuous Dream' Polityka 18/11/89 p3).

30 see Kennedy (a) p89.

31 see 'Formation of Centrum and ROAD' Chapter 3 p415 and Appendix I p635.

32 Zbigniew Bujak 'West of Centre' Polityka 28/7/90 p5.

33 "Apparently substantially influenced by the environment of the intelligentsia leadership, these two potentially pivotal politicians began to abandon the interests of their native constituencies. Bearded and now attired as graduate students, they began to focus almost exclusively upon the 'Europeanness' and 'Westernness' of their movement...They seemed almost completely uninterested in addressing the issues of central concern to the urban working class" (Voytek Zubek 'The Rise and Fall of Poland's Best and Brightest' in Soviet Studies Vol.44 No.4 1992 p597).

34 "In critical circles the opinion dominates that the two workers, Bujak and Frasyniuk, who stand for the values of ROAD, have now abandoned their old class and surrendered themselves to the manoeuvrings of the Warsaw
intelligentsia (Leftists add the Right)" (Zdzislaw Pietrasik 'Themes From the Marriage' Polityka 28/7/90 p6).

Ost explains how the intelligentsia's support of a market economy played a part in the disintegration of its relationship with the workers in the transition period: "In post-Communist society, when the government takes steps to reintroduce a market economy...workers find that they have their own particular interests to defend. At this point, however, their old intellectual allies no longer care to articulate those interests. They are satisfied simply with the end of the old system, particularly as they themselves become the leaders of the new one. The alliance breaks down because the commonality of their interests breaks down" (Ost p91).

"The hard reality of the dominant political ideology of today...entails a stone-faced listening to complaints and an insistence that we have to set in motion the fly-wheel of the economy, only then will we be able to think about the rest, about poverty etc. (Adam Krzeminski and Wieslaw Wladyka 'Under the Lid of the Vat' Polityka 10/3/90 p1).

'Initial Results of Balcerowicz Plan' Chapter 3 p317.

Geremek (b) p125

Geremek tells us that "On this issue the OPZZ represented the interests of the 'establishment'; the party leadership group" (Ibid. p125)

For instance Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated pessimistically "This is a very grave situation for all concerned with the issue. Without indexation the whole agreement is impossible" (quoted in Dubinski K 'Magdalenka - Epoch-making
Lech Walesa agreed that "There will be no agreement, there will be no Round Table. The OPZZ has destroyed the well-being of the Round Table" (Ibid. p8).

Henryk Domaranczyk tells us that "The sensation of the debate was the self-criticism of Kuron, who, commenting on the recent direction of the Government's work on this issue, admitted that he had made a mistake in finding nothing of the old regime's policies worth retaining" (Henryk Domaranczyk Sto Dni Mazowieckiego Warsaw: Andrzej Bonanski 1990 p323, henceforth Domaranczyk).

"The Sejm box was full to bursting, Mazowiecki had also arrived, illustrating the significance the Government attached to this issue" (Domaranczyk p324).

Kazimierz Poznanski explains the process thus: "As there are so many variants of property rights, which differ in terms of the opportunities they offer to various social groups in meeting their economic needs and in enhancing their relative political power, serious conflicts are inevitable" (Kazimierz Poznanski 'Privatisation of the Polish Economy: Problems of Transition' in Soviet Studies Vol.44 No.4 1992 p646, henceforth Poznanski).

Adamski concludes that "Workers differ from specialists not only by their weaker support for extremely liberal solutions (unlimited privatisation), but also by a much stronger attachment to the status quo...Workers' relatively stronger attachment to "socialized" industry and relatively weaker support for extremely liberal solutions lead to the hypothesis that workers, unlike specialists, consider..."
privatisation a threat rather than an opportunity" (Adamski p230).

45 Poznanski identifies "A variety of political groupings... as supporters of strong state involvement. Among them is...the Lay Left, whose leadership recruits largely from Marxist Revisionists such as Kuron, Michnik and Geremek" (Poznanski p646).

46 Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon tells us "Privatisation strategy in Poland was based explicitly from the beginning on Western experience. Reformers wanted to transplant a proven method from developed Western countries and avoid compromise solutions" (Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon 'Privatisation Strategy and its Political Context' in Starr RF ed. Transition to Democracy in Poland New York: St Martin's Press 1993 p139, henceforth Cannon).

47 For instance Lis insisted "The solutions we are proposing are neither liberal nor socialist. We are professionals and we are drawing on the experience of other countries" (Louise Vinton 'Privatisation Plan Prepared' RFE Vol.1 No.14 16/4/90 p30).

48 Swiatkowski Cannon explains that "The Ministry of Privatisation presented its own plans for open sale of shares as 'people's capitalism', where all Polish citizens could freely buy stock. This was an unconvincing argument because behind the appearance of equality of access, there existed great inequality. It was known that Polish society was poor and only higher level Communists and black marketeers could be used to buy shares" (Cannon p128).
"Many people think that the nomenklatura is running the show just as it did in the past, without admitting its responsibility for the state to which it drove the country, delaying change and extracting personal profits wherever they are to be had" (Kazimierz Dziewanowski Tygodnik Powszechny 7/1/90).

see 'The Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform' Chapter 3 p307.

"The designers of the [privatisation] programme completely ignored its political packaging...The transition so far has been conducted from the top. It has encouraged passive adjustment...While passivity is instrumental in depressing effective demand without triggering social unrest, this approach has also been responsible for the limited impact that the privatisation process has had so far" (Bartlomiej Kaminski 'Systemic Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland: The Shadow of the Round Table Agreement' in Studies in Comparative Communism Vol.XXIV No.2, June 1991 p188).

As Swiatkowski Cannon tells us "Attacks on the Ministry's arbitrary and bureaucratic methods, its centralisation of authority, and provision of special privileges to nomenklatura and foreign investors underscored the illegitimacy of the privatisation law" (Cannon p139).

see Ibid. p139.

see Maria Jarosz 'Workers and Privatisation' in Polityka 8/9/90 p5.

see Jerzy Baczyński 'A Few Questions, Insufficient Answers' Polityka 15/9/90 p3.
"I would give that a special award as best economic idea of the season. I am afraid that the Government's type of macro-argument appears to be inadequate. If advocates of privatisation cannot find a better way of convincing the work-force that transforming the enterprise would be profitable then one can expect there to be serious unrest in the transformed business - irrespective of how decisive the majority raised amongst the workers is" (Ibid. p3).


reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 27/3/90

The chief critics of the Government plan have been the proponents of some form of employee ownership. These critics, who are an influential lobby in the Sejm, in the OKP and in Solidarity itself, have argued that the legislation...has failed to include an alternative transferring the ownership of the state-owned enterprises to the plants' workers" (Louise Vinton 'Privatisation Plan Prepared' RFE Report on Eastern Europe Vol.1 No.14 6/4/90 p30).

"As a result of the Communist experience...Polish citizens distrusted large government-run institutions...which they really did not understand. They understood employee councils which, in the public's perception, signified a decentralisation of economic decision-making and local initiative" (Cannon p.29).

reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 22/3/90 p2.

"In spite of its privatisation slogans, the government in practice covets state property, changing only the name of
the bureaucratic owner from 'social proprietor' to 'state treasury' (Rzeczpospolita 19/3/90).

for a fuller description of the conflict between the workers' representatives and the privatisation agency see Rzeczpospolita 31/1/90, 8/2/90, Gazeta Wyborcza 1,3,9,12/2/90).


Jacek Syski observed that Walesa "is caught between political and union obligations, not being able to decide on his future" (Jacek Syski 'Farewell to the Myth' Polityka 16/6/90 p1).

see Appendix II p760.

"I remember the almost hysterical hostility of opposition groups to Tadeusz Mazowiecki...That hostility was the result of conflicts among intellectual circles to which the current Premier belonged" (Smiecz, 'Looking askance' Kultura Nr 10/517 1990 p20).

"I must honestly say that I was apprehensive. I had known Tadeusz for years and my major reservations concerned his virtues: the tendency to give a hearing to as large a number of views as possible, taking time to consider before reaching a decision" (Kuron (c) p16).

"By throwing his entire political weight behind Mazowiecki's elevation to Prime Minister, Walesa and his faction hoped to stem the rapidly growing momentum of the leaders of the Warsaw intelligentsia...However, after accepting the
nomination, Mazowiecki not only did not lean on the Walesa faction, but, in contrast, virtually shut it out from participation in the formation of government. Instead, the new Prime Minister moved rapidly toward reconciliation with the leaders of the Warsaw intelligentsia..." (Zubek (c) p584).

Witold Pawlowski listed the participants in the press campaign: "'Will the President resign?' - pondered the front page of "Sztandar Mlodych". "Dziennik Ludowy", also on the front page, went a step further and asked "Who for the Belvedere?". There were five respondents, five times - Lech Walesa. "Will Walesa become President?" asked Krzysztof Czabanski in "Tygodnik Solidarnosc"
(Witold Pawlowski 'The Skin on the Bear' Polityka 3/3/90 p3).

For him Walesa was needed as "the keystone between the trade union...and the political structure representing the interests of the state" (Geremek (b) p208).

"The fact alone that all of the names of the current government were acknowledged is a big success for the Premier and the whole of his new team. All the more so as these names emerged with concrete and significant levels of trust" (Stanislaw Nowicki 'Poland and the Poles' in Polityka 23-30/12/89 p7).

"The first quarter of 1990 was conspicuous by the persistence of the high social authority of Premier Mazowiecki. The star of Lech Walesa was beginning to dim" (Gebethnera, S and Jasiewicz K Dlaczego Tak Glosowano p17).
Jacek Syski's appraisal of Walesa's standing was representative of the mood in Government circles at this time: "I cannot see either a majority in the Sejm or in the general elections, which now or in the future would give the Chairman a place in the Belvedere. Rather everything indicates that only a place in the Pantheon of History will suffice, where he would appear as something strange, shocking..." ('Farewell to the Myth' Polityka 16/6/90 p7).

In 1990 an article in the journal Kultura noted the class context of the clash between elements of the new political elite and Walesa and the dangers of dismissing the latter's political capabilities: "The emperor has no clothes, that is true, but he has extraordinary political intuition and many correct instincts in his proletarian temperament. His common nose senses the smells inaccessible to the perfumed noses of the intelligentsia" ('Looking askance' Kultura Nr 10/517 1990 p20).

"Lech Walesa is a little like a nuclear bomb whose detonation today could destroy everything in Poland (the stability of the new political system and himself). Just like a nuclear bomb he is becoming increasingly useless in peaceful and prosaic times, which are not now times of battle and of war strategies, but of the entire democratic game of interests, bidding, compromises and competence, for which the Chairman does not have the most obvious patience" ('Farewell to the Myth' Polityka 16/6/90 p7).

Missing pages are unavailable
"The peasants chances of influencing the political sphere increase sharply in times of national crises" ('The Peasantry as a Class' in Shanin p265).

see Friszke p98.

see Appendix I p704.

see Appendix I p693.

see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and Society' Chapter 1 p123.

In May 1990, as the peasant organisations moved towards unification, an editorial in the pro-Government "Gazeta Wyborcza" warned: "The Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) might shake the stability of the existing political arrangement, block the government's economic programme, and even break the parliamentary coalition with the Citizens' Parliamentary Caucus" (Gazeta Wyborcza 7/5/90 p1).

see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p186.

in 1990 private farms accounted for 76% of agricultural production, state farms 18.6% and co-operatives 5.7%, figures from 'Rocznik statystyczny' GUS Warsaw 1990 and 1991.

see Friszke p97.

see Appendix I p676.

"Naturally, KOR's work among the peasants began somewhat later than its work amongst the workers, and it is difficult today to establish the details of the process with precision" (JJ Lipski KOR University of California Press London 1985 p255).

see PSL policies in Appendix I p704.

see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124.

"it calls upon a conservatism with its roots in rural, peasant cultures, traditions which emphasise pre-war traditions of nation, family, religion, and strong national states. It is a conservatism distrustful of modernity and the secular values of post-war Western Europe" (Hockenos, Paul Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe London, Routledge 1993 p10).

"Industrialisation...lowers the importance of the countryside in the national production, curbs its 'food monopoly' by developing international trade, stimulates village-level polarisation..." (Teodor Shanin "The Peasantry as a Class" in Shanin p256).

see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 2 p124.

see 'Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan' Chapter 3 p317.

Quoted in Jagienka Wilczak 'Great Expectations' Polityka 20/1/90 p6.

see Pawel Tarnowski 'Flooded With Milk' Polityka 30/6/90.

Henryk Maziejuk 'Fears for the Future' Polityka 21/7/90 p4.

Quoted in Tygodnik Rolnikow Solidarnosc 2/2/90.

"From the outset the liberal character of the Balcerowicz Plan was not in harmony with the expectations of country-folk. It placed identical emphasis on the economy as
a whole, while the peasants, practically universally (92% of those polled), demanded special privileged treatment for agriculture, which had to help Poland out of crisis" (Jerzy Gluszynski and Grzegorz Szymaniuk 'As the Peasants See It' Polityka 21/7/90 p4).

"The demand for guaranteed minimum prices, presented so clearly by the peasant union, is impossible to accept and it is at variance with the accepted foundations of the economic game. " (Quoted in Henryk Maziejuk 'Fears for the Future' Polityka 21/7/90 p4).

"This programme was immediately branded "anti-peasant", and had a negative effect on the relationship between the villages and the realisation of the policies of the Mazowiecki government" (Gluszynski and Szymaniuk 'As the Peasants See It' Polityka 21/7/90 p4).

Jagienka Wilczak 'Great Expectations' Polityka 20/1/90 p1.

At the time Mariusz Janicki warned that the dispute between the city and the village, concerning the production of food-stuffs could go beyond economic issues and spark "historical resentments" (Mariusz Janicki 'Knight or Pawn?' Polityka 29/9/90 p5).

"The Free Democrats represent the culture of liberal political thought in Europe. The Forum looks for its roots rather in the national tradition...I see the renaissance of two major traditions of Hungarian history: ruralist and urbanist. The town and the village; two types of mentality and sensibility, two cultural mentalities and two spiritual biographies. That is the genealogy of the conflict" Michnik (k) p72.
"Our western border...is the border between the Germanic-urban Europe and the Slavic-rural Europe" (Anna Tatarkiewicz 'From the Village to Europe' Polityka 8/9/90 p16).

Jasiewicz tells us "Research indicated that, more often than in the past, conflicts were occurring in the socio-economic field, most particularly in the rural/urban one (workers, the intelligentsia versus the peasantry)" (Gebethner and Jasiewicz p99).


"One of the most dramatic conflicts to appear on the national scene is that between the cities and the villages; the intelligentsia is not able to reach an understanding with the peasantry. There is a gulf between them. As the townspeople of Klimia and Radczya say "You can lead yourselves and we will lead ourselves. Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" (Zdzislaw Pietrasik 'Themes from the Marriage' Polityka 28/7/90 p1).

"In the past cameras showed the exhausting hardships of agriculture, portraying it as arduous work, often carried out in atrocious weather, which in the cities could not possibly provoke jealousy. A city-dweller could be poorer, but he had more of the basic comforts of life (an apartment with amenities, access to culture)" (Ibid. p6).

Gluszynski and Szymaniuk 'As the Peasants See It'
*Polityka* 21/7/90 p4

Ibid. p4.

see Friszke p98.

Mariusz Janicki referred sardonically to the party thus: "The PSL, the old ZSL which has changed everything apart from its HQ, members and past" ('Knight or Pawn?' in *Polityka* 12/5/90 p5).

"According to this assumption the massed ranks of the ZSL at grass-roots level remained 'clean'. Likewise the leadership of PSL 'Rebirth' could be recognised as the heirs of Witos, Rataj and Mikolajczyk [major figures of the pre-war peasant movement]" (Aleksander Checko 'Up with the Green' *Polityka* 12/5/90 p1).

Checko observed that the congress would "naturally profit from the combination of symbolism and authority (Wilanow) and the strength of raw materials and thousands of members ('Rebirth'). This was the assumption of the agreement reached between Franciszek Kaminski and Kazimierz Olesiak" (Ibid. p1)

see Ibid. p1.

see Ibid. p1.

"Polish Political Landscape" in *Polityka* 28/7/90 see also Appendix I p704.

"The peasantry with their customary strong support for Christian values and adherence to the social teaching of the Church as a base for their programmes will...need a Centre
party. I hope that party will be the PC" (Slawomir Siwek 'Poruzumieniem Centrum - Let's Discuss' in Polityka 23/7/90 p7).

see Mariusz Janicki 'Knight or Pawn?' Polityka 29/9/90 p5.

see Appendix I p704.

see 'The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote' Chapter 4 p626.

Quoted in Jagienka Wilczak 'Great Expectations' Polityka 20/1/90 p6.

see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p259.

Nowicki observes that "From these results one can conclude that the average Pole sees Solidarity and to a lesser degree the Church as the main actors today and - judging from the votes - these are the two fundamental forces 'making politics' in Poland" ('Poland and the Poles' Polityka 30/12/89 p7).

see 'Polish Society' Chapter 1 p52, 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p149 and 'Communist Society' Chapter 2 p174.

In 1991 the "Economist" noted: "The triumph of Solidarity was seen by many as a triumph for the church, which had preached against communism, harboured Solidarity activists and paid for underground presses throughout the dismal 1980s" (‘...and unto Poland, what is God’s' Economist 25/5/91 p85).
see Roman Dmowski Mysli Nowoczesnego Polaka Grunwald Warsaw 1989 p71

see 'Intelligentsia in the Inter-war period' Chapter 2 p191.

"I think that this alliance [between the lay intelligentsia and the Church] was splendid. It is only that in Poland there has ensued an increase in nationalist tendencies which remind me - someone familiar with the inter-war period - of the alliance between the Catholic Church and right-wing politics. It seems to me that we are at a dangerous stage. Amongst the hierarchy of the Catholic Church there are certainly many people who understand this danger, but there are also many who completely fail to see how much the Catholic Church could lose, if it departs from the intellectuals or the intelligentsia. Continually there are in the Polish Church strong elements which explain various social upheavals as the work of Trotskyists, masons and Western agents" (Czeslaw Milosz Tygodnik Mazowsze January 1988).

"The problem of the Church's hostility to the modern, pluralist and liberal conception of a democratic state may be explained, in part, by the fact that many, if not the majority, of the Church hierarchy hold an inter-war vision of a democratic Poland" (Mirella W. Eberts 'The Church and Democracy in Poland' Europe-Asia Studies Vol.50 No.5 July 1998 p836, henceforth Eberts).

"Against the background of the truth of the baptised nation, one cannot flatly renounce the notion of 'Polish=Catholic" (Kultura No.7-8 1988 cited in Piotr Ogrodzinski, Henryk Szlajfer 'Two Kingdoms' East European Reporter May/June 1992 p19).
"After 45 years of living in an ideological state the vast majority of Poles are not looking for a religious or Catholic state. They are against state intervention in matters of individual conscience. ('Faith, religion, politics' Zycie Warszawy no.20 1991 p3).

At the beginning of 1991 Cardinal Glemp stated the institutional outcome of this vision when he announced his desire to end "the communist-inspired separation of church and state" ('...and unto Poland, what is God's' Economist 25/5/91 p55).

"The Catholic church states openly that democracy must obey limits that are pregiven and that cannot be altered by the principle of popular sovereignty" (Przeworski (b) p62).

"the Church found another 'enemy' of Christian values: the secular western states and its materialism, neutral schools, tolerance of abortion, drugs, but, above all, empty churches" (Urszula Nowakowska Ana's Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe Westview Press 1997 p28).

see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124.

see Pastoral Letter in Gazeta Wyborcza 13/9/91 p1.

see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry' Chapter 4 p498.

Irena Grudzinska Gross summarises the Pope's message and outlines his defensive vision of Poland in Europe: "You are the real Europe - he was saying to the audience assembled in Polish provincial towns - just hold on to your Catholicism and you are going to be more European than Western Europe... The ideal Europe of John Paul II is agrarian,
anti-modernist, devout and simple, pre-industrial and anti-intellectual [my italics]. Its identity is built against the cosmopolitanism (and abortion, divorce, crime, poverty, atheism) of Paris or London" (Irena Grudzinska Gross 'Post Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of Polish History' in East European Politics and Societies Vol.6 No.2 Spring 1992 p148).

"The possible transformation of the Catholic Church into the state Church of Poland has been seen as a threat by the intelligentsia for many decades...[and] was clearly perceived [as such] by the left-wing intelligentsia who were inclined to promote far-reaching reforms", Kosela p125).


"I think that from the start the Church saw the chance to build a Catholic democracy in Poland instead of the liberal democracies functioning in the West" ('Without a Golden Mean' in Toranska T My 1994 p194, henceforth Toranska).

"Is the Church more universal or national, more accessible or closed?...We want to return to Europe, that is fine, but Europe is a long way away not only in terms of this country's backward economy but in its clerical intolerance" (Maria Taniewska-Peszko 'Intimate regulations' Polityka 19/5/90 p10).

"It seems that the Church's idea of civil society is completely different from that understood by the democratic opposition. The range of social freedom which the Church seeks is
significantly more limited" (Arato A "The Democratic Theory of the Polish Opposition' Krytyka Nr.31 1989).

see Introduction to Chapter 3 p237.

see "The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' Chapter 2 p258.

"Let us not mythologise the Church. The opposition could rely on its goodwill only after 13 December [1981, the start of Martial Law]. Its support was not always constant. The Church was anti-Communist, but its analysis of the situation did not suggest that Communism could fall. On the contrary, it believed that Communism would exist and that was why it had to adjust itself reasonably to it... I resent the current presentation of the Church's history as one long campaign of democratic opposition" (Gazeta Wyborcza 25/4/92).

"The issue of religion in schools does not essentially have an ideological character...it is concerned with something more, namely the state treating every attitude with neutrality, without favouring one over another" (Mariusz Janicki 'A Difficult Lesson in Religion' Polityka 18/8/90 p1).

see "The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period Chapter 2 p240.

"This practice helped make the Catholic Church a centre for political activity and strengthen social bonds outside the schools and work-places, which were the focal points of Communist control and indoctrination. Such bonds facilitated the development of independent social movements such as Solidarity" (Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka 'Bishops Call for Religious Instruction in Schools' RFE Report on Eastern Europe Vol.1 No.23 8/6/90 p35-38)

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see Slowo Powszechne 4-6/5/90 p1.

reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 9/5/90 p2.

"Followers of the first [Episcopate's] option are most often of older age, residents of the villages and smaller towns, of a lower level of education and worse material conditions...On the other hand their adversaries - against the return of religious education to schools - in general represent the typical features of the social elite" (Jerzy Gluszynski 'Ringing the Bell For Religion' Polityka 16/6/90 p7).

"While in complete support of making catechism lessons accessible in local schools I am opposed to introducing religion as an obligatory subject in elementary school. That is because there exists a danger of a conflict of conscience, which the state ought to actively oppose" interview in Zycie Warszawy quoted in 'W kraju' Polityka 9/6/90 p2).

"Mazowiecki could not refuse...[because] he was branded as a 'leftist', a term which was applied to the whole group to which he belonged. After all, all of those major politicians: Kuron, Geremek, are burdened with a certain garb from the past. It is very easy to trace Kuron's or Geremek's communist past...Thus Cardinal Glemp speaking on television said that those opposed to the introduction of religious education to schools are those who had previously removed it" (Toranska p212).

see Ewa Nowakowska interview with Radziwill 'The People Are At Fault, Not the Structures' Polityka 21/7/90 p10.

see interview with Kulerski in Toranska p202.

for full text see Polityka 18/8/90 p6.
"Under considerable pressure from the Church, the Mazowiecki government moved quickly to address the problem of religious education, refraining from conducting any broad consultation on the matter or putting the issue in front of Parliament" (Eberts p821).

'...and unto Poland, what is God's', Economist 25/5/91 p55.

see Appendix I p701.

see 'A Difficult Lesson in Religion' Polityka 18/8/90 pl). Janicki tells us "Its difficult to avoid the impression that the overturning of the Joint Commission's results by the Tribunal would be welcomed by MEN with a quiet sigh of relief" (Ibid.).

see Toranska p202.

Voytek Zubek comments: "Without a whimper...the self-styled 'arch-European' governing elite permitted the return of religious instruction to public schools...The Church's momentum in implementing its social agenda seemed to be unstoppable" (Zubek (a) p81).

see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka 'Polish Bishops Discuss Current Issues' in RFE Report on Eastern Europe 20/4/90 p27.

see Eberts p827.

see 'The Weakness of the Political Scene' Chapter 3 p367.

"The two are concerned with defending national culture against the flood of foreign influences; Americanisation, bolshevism, pornography etc." (Adam Krzeminski, Wieslaw Wladyka 'The Ugly Face of Europe' Polityka 4/8/90 p5).
A large place in public life was taken by those who took advantage of the Church instrumentally for their own political aims" (Interview with Wiktor Kulerski in Toranska p212).

see Appendix I p722.

see Warsaw Voice 10/5/92 pl.

"We declare and remind you that basic human rights, and thus the rights of the unborn child, depend on human nature and are its natural privilege, not the result of recognition by whatever social group" (quoted in Ewa Nowakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness' Polityka 19/5/90 p10).

"the majority of Poles accept [abortion] to be either available on demand or after a medical and ethical consultation process" (Hellen p184).

"The contention that the issue cannot be a subject of discussion is a glaring violation of the most fundamental laws of democracy and an attempt to dogmatically impose Catholic obligations on everyone. This is a totalitarian position!" (Ewa Nowakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness' Polityka 19/5/90 p10).

Krzeminski and Wladyka note "a natural affinity, although from different positions, between the radical Right and Catholic orthodoxy in the issue of abortion" (Adam Krzeminski, Wieslaw Wladyka 'The Ugly Face of Europe' Polityka 4/8/90 p5).

see Appendix I p698.
see Ewa Nowakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness' Polityka 19/5/90 p10.

Spiewak tells us that the radical Right "fought against the old abortion law as a Stalinist creation (although it was introduced in 1957)" (Spiewak p32).


see Maria Taniewska-Peszko 'Intimate Regulations' Polityka 19/5/90 p10.

quoted in Ewa Nowakowska 'Reason Loses to Fear' Polityka 29/9/90 p10.

see 'Weekly record of events' RFE/RL Vol.1 No.41 12/10/90 p49.

"A negative attitude to the project is treated as an attack on the faith and on the Church... If people do not sign the initiative it is expected, for example, that there would be a lack of support from the Church side in the approaching Parliamentary election campaign" (cited in 'Reason Loses to Fear' Polityka 29/9/90 p10).

Spiewak explained that, according to the Right, "Those who do not support the Church and the banning of abortion, derived from natural law, are Red" (Spiewak p32).

see 'Analysis of the Results of the Presidential Elections' Chapter 4 p618.
"During an audience the Pope quoted one of Mazowiecki's speeches to Polish pilgrims. ROAD sympathisers tried to interpret this as a sign of the Pope's anti-Walesa attitude. Does that mean that when he quotes Walesa, as at the beginning of September, he voices his opposition to Mazowiecki?" (Morawski, D 'The Church is not an Instrument' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 26/10/90 p3).
4(b) The Presidential Elections

Introduction

The contest for the Office of President of the Polish Republic, which was conducted in the Summer and Autumn of 1990 is worthy of close scrutiny for three reasons. Firstly, the Presidential Office was a potentially decisive influence on the development of a democratic, political system based on a consensual civil society. The construction of a democratic polity depends on achieving a balance of power between legislative and executive branches of government.

In the constitutional flux of early transition Poland the powers of the Office were uncertain. In this atmosphere the character and ambitions of the office's first post-communist incumbent could be expected to influence its powers. In turn, the eventual balance between Poland's legislative and executive branches of government was bound to influence the development of civil society. The institutions of civil society (political parties, trade unions, interest groups etc.) operate according to the balance of power between central state institutions. A strong parliament would place the emphasis on elite negotiation and competition between the political representatives of various social and economic interests. On the other hand, a strong president would
introduce a more populist arrangement with a strong leader directing affairs on behalf of a supposedly homogeneous society. Failure to achieve a balanced arrangement could result in authoritarian rule or parliamentary inertia and a potential authoritarian backlash. Both of these scenarios could obviously impede the development of liberal democracy. This section will begin by outlining the debate on the powers of the president. It will explain why the representatives of the Polish intelligentsia within the Mazowiecki government opposed the model of a strong president while Lech Walesa and his followers supported it.

Secondly, the election revealed the depth of the split between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the representatives of other social groups. The often vindictive, personal battle between Mazowiecki and the other presidential candidates, most notably Lech Walesa, tended to conceal how the different visions of the intelligentsia, workers, peasantry and Church were influencing the politics of the time. Nevertheless, the depth of animosity and the prominence of certain themes (such as anti-Semitism, anti-intellectualism, elitism, 'Europeannism' etc.) confirmed that the conflict between different visions of post-communist Poland was shaping the campaign.
In particular, an examination of the electoral campaign mounted by Mazowiecki camp will illustrate that its intelligentsia pedigree was in evidence. It will demonstrate how the influence of this lineage served Mazowiecki's campaign poorly in the election. As such the campaign's failure is seen as representative of the weaknesses of intellectuals as politicians.

The eventual results of the presidential election - where Mazowiecki came a humiliating third behind Walesa and the 'dark horse candidate Stanislaw Tyminski - were illustrative of the isolation of the Mazowiecki government in its incarnation as the 'intelligentsia in power' from Polish society in general. Mazowiecki's performance at the polls suggested that by the end of 1990 his government of 'the best and brightest' was no longer supported beyond the narrow confines of its intelligentsia constituency.

This result, in effect, ended the Polish intelligentsia's most committed attempt to lead Polish society through the transition process from the helm of the state. It was the clearest sign of Polish society's rejection of the intelligentsia's project of 'rebuilding civil society'. The defeat marked the failure of the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government to transform Solidarity into a cross-class movement which would lead Poland's 'return to the West'. The isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power'
showed its interpretation of 'civil society' and the 'Solidarity ethos' to be myths which, though vital in opposition-building under communism, did not provide a realistic blueprint for building a consensual, democratic system.
(i) Presidential-Parliamentary Models

Within the context of democratisation, Poland had no definite model of the presidency to follow. In Western democracies there is no consensus on the ideal model of parliamentary-presidential relations. Each democracy differs in terms of the functions of the presidential office. Common to each system is the perception of the president as a figurehead or representative of society as a whole. Differences arise over the amount of political power this type of single representative should exercise.

Generally speaking, presidential functions fall into two categories: ceremonial and governmental. In the former category the president acts as head of state with formal but largely symbolic functions such as representing the country on the international scene. In the latter category the president acts as head of government and can propose and amend legislation, oversee the implementation of policies and co-ordinate individual policies into a unified government programme.

Political scientists usually identify three basic models of presidential-parliamentary relations: 'Pure parliamentarianism', 'pure presidentialism' and 'quasi-presidentialism'. The 'parliamentary' model gives control of the executive to a Premier or Prime Minister (the leader of the party which has most
parliamentary support) and a Cabinet of Ministers (this similarly reflects the balance of power in the legislature). In this system the president, if there is such an office, has purely ceremonial functions. He or she formally appoints the Premier and Cabinet though these decisions have already been made. The government is responsible to Parliament as it can be forced to resign if a vote of no-confidence is carried. Great Britain is seen as one of the leading examples of the parliamentary model.

An advantage of this system is that the fusion of parliamentary and executive branches facilitates the passage of the government's programme. On the other hand, if the party system is unstable and fragmented there is the threat of frequent votes of no-confidence. Moreover the indirect election of a Premier either formally or informally through the legislature denies popular input into the political process. Also, if the legislature is dominated by a small number of large parties (e.g. the Labour and Conservative parties in the UK.) the government can be accused of dominating parliament in an undemocratic way.

The second system is purely presidential. Here the president is both head of state and head of government. He or she combines ceremonial and governmental functions. The president is elected independently of the legislature for a fixed term of office. Under this arrangement the president can initiate, propose or veto
legislation. Moreover, he or she is answerable to the 'people' and the Constitution and can only be ousted by the legislature for serious misdemeanours. A leading example of this system is the USA.

The presidential system can aid executive stability and also provide the population with a means of participating directly in the political life of the country. On the other hand, if the president hails from a different party from the one dominant in the legislature, political rivalry can be manifested in confrontations between branches of government. Political issues can become embroiled in legal or constitutional struggles. The recent case of the embattled United States presidential office under the Democrat Clinton clashing with a Congress dominated by the Republican Party provides an example of this danger. Moreover, the potential exists for presidential powers to be abused for authoritarian purposes. Although constitutional safeguards are usually central to the functioning of a presidential system South American countries provide examples of how presidentialism can descend into authoritarianism.

The final system is termed 'quasi-presidential'. In this arrangement the president is elected independently of the legislature but his or her functions are different from those under the purely presidential system. He has ceremonial but also
some governmental functions. For instance, he nominates the
premier (usually subject to ratification by parliament) and selects
cabinet ministers with the premier. He or she can dismiss the
premier and cabinet and call new elections under certain
circumstances. The president also has the power of legislative
veto. In a state of emergency he or she can rule by decree
through emergency powers.

The main characteristic of the 'quasi-presidential' system is thus
the dual centres of executive power. The premier and the
president have to share governmental functions. The relationship
between the two centres varies over time according to the
balance of power in the legislature. If the president's party holds
the initiative then he or she becomes the dominant figure in the
government and the same applies to the premier. When the
parliament is weak and fragmented the president becomes the
centre of political authority. France is seen as the prime example
of this system.

One advantage of the 'quasi-presidential' system is that it is
adaptable and can encourage stability and continuity. If the
president has strong parliamentary support he or she can become
the centre of legislative activity. If this support is absent then the
parliament becomes the main source of political power. Another
benefit is that the population can participate directly in the
election of the president. Finally the president can act as a 'supra-political' arbiter over competing parties. A major disadvantage of this system is the tendency towards dictatorial rule, noted in the presidential model. If the president's party bases itself on his or her person they can become vehicles for the president's ambitions. Parliament could thus be completely subordinated to the will of the president. Secondly the system could again create a 'stand-off' between a premier and president who hailed from competing parties.

There is no consensus on the ideal model of democratic parliamentary-presidential relations. Moreover, even when codified in the constitution, the features of the model can be altered. A striking example of this is the constitution of the Fifth French Republic. This was an attempt to overcome the parliamentary weaknesses which had plagued the Third and Fourth Republics. The solution was to incorporate both parliamentary and presidential elements. Nevertheless, under De Gaulle, the model became increasingly presidential.

The issue of parliamentary-presidential relations in Poland in 1990 included all of these wider themes in some form or another. The complexity of the Polish case was naturally heightened by the fact that the country was attempting to construct, rather than
maintain a democratic polity. Choices had to be made over which model of presidential-parliamentary relations suited the purpose of democratisation. Political scientists remain divided on the question. Most recent studies suggest that presidential systems may contribute more to the collapse of emergent democracies than parliamentary systems, particularly when combined with an extremely fragmented party system. In this situation a powerful president can dominate a fractious parliament and justify the undemocratic concentration of powers in his office. Beyond warning of these dangers, political scientist were reluctant to propose parliamentary/presidential models for Poland.

Moreover, there were no native, historical models for the Poles to follow in their quest for democratisation. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the organs of state had dominated rather than reflected the values of Polish society. We have already noted the tendency of Poland’s party system to fragmentation. The brief period of parliamentary democracy in the inter-war period had led to fragmentation and the advent of presidential authoritarianism under Pilsudski. In 1990 the nascent party system was similarly fragmented and, as noted above, this presented real dangers for the development of a democratic relationship between the president and parliament.
Communism had subordinated all institutions to the Party. Moreover the office of the president was subject to the process of political bargaining that had left most state organs in a state of flux at the onset of the transition process. At the Round Table it became clear that the communists saw the presidency as an instrument to preserve a power base in the new system. The president was to be elected by the Sejm and Senate, united in the National Assembly by a majority of votes of at least half the total membership. Under the remit of the June 1989 elections, where the PZPR and its satellites were guaranteed 65% of the 460-seat Sejm, it was safe to assume that the new president would be the choice of the communists. Thus at the Round Table the communist side sought broad legislative and executive powers for the office.

Solidarity accepted the idea of a strong president as a necessary source of stability for the transition period. This referred in particular to the perceived threat of Soviet intervention in Poland. Kuron mentions how the dangers which resulted in Poland's location at "the heart of the empire" influenced the Solidarity side during the negotiations. Nevertheless the Solidarity side at the Round Table tried to contain the office-holders potential for abuse of power by introducing a number of conditions and constraints.
At the 'Magdalenka' talks which preceded the Round Table proper the presidential office proved a controversial topic of debate. Solidarity argued against the granting of a legislative veto to the president. It also questioned the Constitution's description of his role as guarantor of the 'security of the state' (Article 28f), a phrase which in the past had justified the communist regimes' repressive policies⁹. However the communist side was insistent. General Kiszczak of the communist side replied "You gave your agreement to the formula of the president. That was in the package. We cannot agree with further considerations or modifications"¹⁰.

The result of this manoeuvring was a vague and complicated set of powers and obligations for the presidential office. For instance, the president was to be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. He could therefore declare war and appoint a Commander in Chief but only if the Sejm was not in session. He could declare Martial Law but only in a state of emergency and for a limited period of time. Moreover during Martial Law Parliament could not be dissolved or the constitution amended. The president could also nominate or dismiss candidates for Prime Minister and Head of the National Bank but these again were subject to Sejm approval. He could initiate legislation and issue ordinances but he could not issue decrees. Any legislation had to have his signature.
in order to be binding. He could propose amendments or veto legislation passed by the Sejm, but the Sejm could override him with a 2/3 majority. However, given the fact that Solidarity would be a minority in the envisaged 'contract Sejm' a communist president's veto of legislation would be unlikely to be overturned. Finally the president could call general elections but he could only do so prematurely in carefully specified situations.

The office therefore could be described as 'quasi-presidential'. It existed in a peculiar stasis between power and subservience to parliament; between a parliamentary and presidential system of government. However its status had been arrived at through elite negotiation and as part of the wider Round Table agreement. Obviously the office had been created as part of the game of 'cat and mouse' between the Solidarity and communist sides rather than through social consensus. What's more, the logic on which the bargaining of the Round Table was based (i.e. communist/Solidarity power-sharing) was made redundant by the collapse of communist rule and the rise of the Mazowiecki government. In the new atmosphere the vagueness of the president's powers became a major problem for the new elite.

The vagueness of the office ensured that the presidential election contest involved not only the identity of the incumbent but the potential evolution of presidential powers. As such it was part of
the general struggle between the intelligentsia and other social groups over competing 'visions' of post-communist Poland. The issue provided one of the main means of differentiating between the disintegrating factions of Solidarity. After the onset of the 'War at the Top' one could discern the antecedents of Centre Alliance and ROAD from their version of presidential powers.

We have already established that populism favours a strong presidential model. The populist view of society as a homogeneous community with well-defined values sees little use for a parliamentary 'talking shop' where self-serving elites detract from the effective practice of government. Walesa and his supporters saw the Polish parliament and government as the base of their new political enemies - the Warsaw-based intelligentsia and the Mazowiecki camp. A strong president was seen as a necessary counterbalance against the political power of this 'cosmopolitan' elite. A direct relationship between leader and people (primarily manifested in the general election of the president) was favoured. Walesa took this direct relationship further: as a potential president he compared himself to the 'Flying Dutchman' travelling through Poland as a trouble-shooter. Walesa and his supporters called for a presidential office with important legislative powers. They usually referred to the retention and strengthening of the president's
power of veto over parliamentary legislation and his competence to appoint prominent members of parliament and government\textsuperscript{14}.

In addition, the populist view of the wider world as a threat demanded a strong leader to protect 'Polish' values and interests. Calls for a powerful president were usually linked with the perceived need for decisiveness and direction in the chaos of the transition period; for someone who could appeal directly to the general public rather than specific groups. Walesa himself was reported as saying that Poland needed a "president with an axe" to cut his way through the post-communist wilderness\textsuperscript{15}.

A strong president would encourage the development of a civil society whose plurality and freedom was limited. Basic 'Polish' values, whether worker, peasant or Catholic based, would be transmitted directly to the leader. Interests would not be arrived at through the complex interaction of a variety of social, economic and political groups. The threat to democracy in the presidential model (noted earlier) was therefore obvious in transition Poland. Walesa could justify government by decree through reference to fundamental 'Polish' values that were not open to debate.
Mazowiecki and his supporters in the Government and OKP displayed their intelligentsia pedigree in their ambivalent approach to the issue of presidential powers. The ethos of the Polish intelligentsia combined idealisation of egalitarian principles with an elitist, messianic sense of individual leadership - so long as the individual was a cultivated, intellectual Pole. The reign of Pilsudski could be seen as a time when many sections of the Polish intelligentsia supported the rule of an authoritarian president because he filled the criteria of the politically committed Polish intellectual.

This is important as the support of the Mazowiecki government for a parliamentary system can be interpreted as a manifestation of its democratic credentials or as a vindication of its belief in concentrating power in the hands of a small group of intellectuals/statesmen - after all, the Sejm was dominated by representatives of the intelligentsia milieu. One commentator on the Polish transition saw in the person of Tyminski an ironic caricature of the Polish intelligentsia's traditional longing for a 'Great Man' who would lead the country back to the West.

However the intelligentsia's prejudice against non-intelligentsia elements, particularly as personified by Walesa ensured that his vision of the presidency was unequivocally dismissed as 'quasi-dictatorial' and authoritarian. Adam Michnik presented a
picture of an incompetent, authoritarian President Walesa hacking his way clumsily through Poland's nascent democracy.

The threat that Walesa would shape the presidency to suit his outlook (in a manner similar to De Gaulle in France) confirmed the Mazowiecki camp's support of a parliamentary model. The camp called for a president who was more of a mediator between a strong parliament and a strong government. He or she was to be a national figure-head, answerable to the Premier and Cabinet Ministers, rather than an active participant in the legislative process.

The Mazowiecki camp's commitment to a strong Parliament and Government was informed by the Polish intelligentsia's commitment to the introduction of a legalistic, democratic political system. Its liberal/elitist vision of the transition process stressed the importance of parliament as the arena for various issues and debates to be carried out. The fact that at the time parliament was dominated by Mazowiecki's supporters was obviously salient.

This model would eventually facilitate the development of a pluralist civil society with groups competing peacefully for political influence across a range of issues. However the potential disadvantages of the parliamentary model (noted previously)
were apparent in 1990. The fragmentation of the OKP within parliament\textsuperscript{a2} threatened legislative impasse\textsuperscript{a3}. The Mazowiecki camps domination of both parliament and government also fuelled the Walesa camp's accusation that democracy was being hijacked by the Warsaw intellectual elite.

In conclusion the presidential debate carried important consequences for Poland in terms of the immediate transition process as well as long-term constitutional implications\textsuperscript{a4}. It reflected the competing visions of state/civil society/society relations outlined previously. The following section will study the campaign itself. It will examine how the intelligentsia's elitist vision of Polish democracy was manifested in the Mazowiecki campaign. Primarily this will be achieved through comparison with the populist approach of his main opponent, Lech Walesa.
(ii) Comparison of the Mazowiecki and Walesa Campaigns

By Summer 1990 there were six main candidates for the presidency. Five were associated with emerging political strands which we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Mazowiecki's main constituency was the liberal intelligentsia, Walesa represented the trade union side of Solidarity and industrial workers in general. Roman Bartoszcze ran as a candidate for the peasant movement. Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz ran with the support of ex-communist organisations. Leszek Moczulski fought his campaign on behalf of the radical, independent strand. They were joined by the mysterious emigre businessman Stan Tyminski, whose campaign will be examined in the course of this section.

However, initially at least, it seemed that the Presidential campaign would amount to a head-to-head contest between the two representatives of the Solidarity movement: Mazowiecki and Walesa. Most polls taken before the start of campaigning showed these two to be clear leaders and rivals. The roots and consequences of the 'Tyminski phenomenon' can be seen as a product of the clash between these camps and will be dealt with in due course. This section will concentrate on Mazowiecki's and Walesa's candidacies. Contrasting the campaigns shows how the former's approach was informed by it's intelligentsia pedigree to it's detriment.
Electoral Programmes

A comparison of both camps' electoral platforms in terms of practical programmes shows that there was very little difference. The political programme of the Walesa camp, presented by PC, was summarised under the slogan 'acceleration'. Although intended as a critique of the Mazowiecki Government's policies it consisted, for the most part, of vague pronouncements which were not substantially different from the reform process being carried out at that time. Polish society's confusion was illustrated by the response to a Polityka poll which asked what the slogan 'acceleration' was concerned with. 61% thought it referred to a change in Government personnel, 55% the timing and range of privatisation, 38.5% growth in production, 38% elections to Senate and Sejm, 33.5% reform of citizens' committees into political groups, only 23% the election of Walesa to the presidency.

Nonetheless, during the campaign the Walesa team drew particular attention to three basic issues which were at odds with the Government's policies. These issues reflect populist themes which have been examined more fully in the previous section. The first was a call for the encouragement of political plurality and democracy. This demand was usually linked to criticisms of the Warsaw elite's control of power and it's refusal to
encourage the development of distinct political organisations, as demonstrated in the debate over the future of the OKP and the citizens' committees. Walesa himself repeated the need for "genuine pluralism" and condemned "the new monopoly on political power".

The second theme of the Walesa camp's program was economic. A group of distinguished economists who had shifted to the Walesa side began to criticise the Balcerowicz Plan. While announcing themselves to be in agreement with the general direction of economic reform they criticised what they saw as its excessive monetarism, which was impeding capital formation and contributing to economic stagnation. They also found fault with the slowness of the privatisation process which was allowing the nomenklatura of the old regime time to transform themselves into new entrepreneurs.

This argument was related to the third basic demand of the Walesa camp: to accelerate the process of bringing to account those guilty of perpetrating crimes against Polish society under the auspices of the old system. 'Decommunisation' was not to be carried out on the basis of collective responsibility but through the prosecution of those individuals who were most culpable. In one of his earliest Sejm speeches as Premier Mazowiecki described
his approach to the process of 'decommunisation'. A "thick line" was to be drawn under the communist past. General differences between communist times and the new era would be remembered but personal criticisms and vengeful attacks on certain institutions and groups were to be avoided. This attitude was in keeping with the Polish intelligentsia's negative attitude to the 'politics of nostalgia'. It was symptomatic of a determination to avoid inflaming Polish society with potentially heated issues during a rational, evolutionary transition.

However, this conciliatory approach could also be interpreted as another indication of the ongoing links between the social democratic faction of the new government and representatives of the old regime. The "Magdalenka conspiracy", dealt with previously, was a prominent manifestation of this point of view. Not surprisingly this interpretation proved most popular amongst Walesa's supporters as they called for the acceleration of the decommunisation process. Lech Kaczyński, one of the leaders of the Centre Alliance, criticised the system of "dual power which allowed members of the former establishment to retain influence while giving a new Solidarity elite exclusive control over public life". Adam Glapinski, another member of PC and Walesa supporter attacked those members of the new elite with social democratic pedigrees as rozowi (pinkos); as crypto-communists.
who secretly subscribed to Marxism and were constructing a new nomenklatura.

The Walesa camp's policy of 'acceleration' was open to criticism. It subscribed to the simplistic populist claim that getting rid of the ruling elite and replacing it with 'true' representatives of the people would solve all of society's ills. Several observers wondered how the Centre Agreement could promise to remedy the plight of workers, farmers and peasants and state employees alienated from the reform process while simultaneously advocating a more rapid restructuring of the economy along market lines.

However, the Mazowiecki camp's response, when it eventually came, offered little that contradicted the aims and structure of Walesa and the Centre Agreement. Both groups were presented in Chapter 3 as typical intellectual organisations which combined loose internal structures with a tendency to theorise on universal, moral categories. They consisted of a loose affiliation of various groups which were united by support for Walesa or Mazowiecki rather than a specific ideology. As a result both could offer little more than general statements of intent which could not arouse internal or external criticism. ROAD, which championed the candidacy of Mazowiecki presented its program in July 1990; two months after the first declaration of the PC. It's
founding aims amounted to a broad espousal of a liberal democracy and a market economy\textsuperscript{38}.

As such the organisation seemed content to echo the general, platitudeous proclamations of its rival. Moreover, while praising the achievements of the Mazowiecki government thus far, it seemed to accept the PC's assertion that certain changes in the pace and direction of the transition process were necessary\textsuperscript{39}. It thus called for an acceleration of the processes of decommunisation and privatisation, and the encouragement of political pluralism - demands first made by PC\textsuperscript{40}.

In conclusion, in terms of electoral programmes and specific policies, there was very little difference between the Mazowiecki and Walesa camps. The poverty and lack of differentiation were illustrated by the attacks exchanged between the two camps at the beginning of the campaign which were more personal than political. These assaults associated the Walesa camp with anti-Semitism and the Mazowiecki camp with an elitist vision of Poland's place in Europe. Both images served the presidential contest and the ambitions of both candidates poorly and sullied the wider image of Polish democracy. However they clearly signalled the conflict that existed between the 'intelligentsia in power' and representatives of other social groups over their respective visions of the future Poland.
Anti-Semitism in the Presidential Campaign

This section will examine the Walesa camp's association with anti-Semitism in the presidential campaign. The group's recourse to attacking the alleged Jewish origins of some of the Mazowiecki camp's most prominent figures is seen as symptomatic of an essentially authoritarian, populist outlook. The section will stress the anti-intelligentsia nature of anti-Semitism in its Polish form in order to illustrate how the 'War at the Top' between Walesa and Mazowiecki was based on class conflict between the intelligentsia and other sections of Polish society over control of the transition process and over differing versions of democracy.

Chapter 2 established anti-Semitism as a traditional under-current in Polish political life\textsuperscript{41}. As a staunchly Catholic country with a small but influential Jewish community, anti-Semitism could be expected to play some part in Polish politics. It emerged into the mainstream at times of national turmoil (such as the mid-1930s and 1968) when popular frustrations could be channelled by authoritarian populists against particular political elites or social groups for political ends. In 1990, when Poland again faced a period of socio-economic trauma one could detect anti-Semitic tendencies throughout society at grass-root and elite levels. Evidence from polls in the early 1990s suggests that a significant part of Polish society were suspicious of the Jewish community.
At the time of the 1991 parliamentary elections Krzysztof Jasiewicz polled voters with the following question: "Sometimes one hears that in our country people of Jewish ancestry play too large a role. Do you agree with this view or not?" The responses were as follows:

1. Definitely yes - 12.0%
2. Rather yes - 20.0
3. Neither yes or no - 15.1
4. Rather no - 23.4
5. Definitely no - 12.9
6. Difficult to say - 16.5

Thus almost as many of those polled supported the view that Jews were too influential as rejected it. Research published by Hockenos in 1993 suggested that 47% of Poles opposed the right of Jews to stand for parliament.

Anti-Semitism was apparent amongst Poland's social and political elites. A conflict between the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and Jewish representatives, sparked by Jewish protests in July 1989 over the presence of a Carmelite convent at Auschwitz, launched Polish-Jewish relations as a factor in the transition process. For the first time in 45 years Poland was completely free to interpret its war-time past and this brought tensions to the
surface. In August 1989 Poland's Catholic Primate, Cardinal Józef Glemp, heightened Polish-Jewish tensions in a sermon which defended the rights to maintain a Catholic institution within the walls of an extermination camp synonymous with the Jewish holocaust. Cardinal Glemp's response to Jewish protests contained stereotypical anti-Semitic undertones, such as a reference to the Jewish people's international, cosmopolitan influence.

There was also evidence of continued anti-Semitic feeling amongst Poland's political leaders. For instance Jarosław Kaczyński reports a conversation he had in 1989 with Aleksander Bentowski, head of the communist peasant organisation ZSL and soon-to-be Minister of Justice in the Mazowiecki government, concerning Jacek Kuron's ambitions to be Marshall of the Senate. Bentowski did not rate Kuron's chances: "Well you know, I have such stupid people in my group...Kuron is a Jew and they will never agree to it."

We mentioned previously that anti-Semitism was a basic component of Polish populism. However it is important to explain in more detail why the issue of anti-Semitism should emerge during the transition period. After all Poland in 1990 was close to being mono-national and mono-religious. The Jewish community represented a small part of a numerically minute group of national minorities. In the absence of official statistics for
1990 the size of Poland's minority populations was approximate. Estimates for the Jewish community ranged between 5-16,000\(^{47}\). The fact remained, however, that the Jewish community of Poland in 1990 represented a tiny minority in a total population of over thirty-eight million.

Several factors can be submitted to explain the re-appearance of anti-Semitism in 1990. Of course, it can be seen as part of the general tendency apparent in Polish society to escape from the trauma of transition through the politics of populism and nostalgia\(^{48}\). The economic and political problems of the present could be ignored by an attempt to reconstruct an idealised Second Republic. This era could be revised as a time of national independence and economic strength. A vital factor in this, so the logic ran, had been the dominance of the Polish=Catholic type over the Jews, manifested in the pre-WWII years by state-sponsored anti-Semitism\(^{49}\).

Related to this attempt to recreate the political order of the inter-war period was the desire to forget about communist rule which, in some quarters, was equated with Jewish interests. Since the arrival in Poland of persecuted and politically radical Jews in the late nineteenth century Marxism and communism had been associated with Jewish intellectuals\(^{50}\). The link was strengthened after W.W.II when Polish Jews who had survived Nazi rule either
by fleeing to the Soviet Union or by being incorporated into it in 1939 returned to swell the ranks of the PPR (Polish Workers' Party - forerunner of the PZPR) and the Communist Security Forces\(^n\). The PZPR's periodic purges of Jewish elements within the Party (such as in 1968) confirmed the "Zydokomuna" ("Jewish-Communist") as the stereotypical antithesis of the Polak-Katolik (Polish-Catholic) model. Thus in 1989, as Polish society attempted to dismiss the post-war period as an aberration in the nation's history, it was convenient to portray communism as the result of 'alien', Jewish influences in public life.

Moreover, the suspicion that the communist elite was still influencing power in transition Poland was linked to the belief that too much political power remained in Jewish hands - the government facade had changed but the Jews remained in power. As we have seen much of the artillery of the radical Right centred on the interpretation of the Round Table as an agreement between the communist regime and crypto-communist elements of the Solidarity side whose most prominent representatives were of Jewish origin.

From the perspective of this thesis it is most important to note the linkage between Polish anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism. As we have seen, the Polish intelligentsia traditionally included
Jewish elements and this had on occasion reinforced the social barriers between this milieu and the rest of Polish society. The fact that the milieu was also composed of numerically superior Catholic Poles did not detract from the potency of anti-Semitism as an anti-intelligentsia weapon.

Anti-Semitism was one of the most controversial and emotive weapons in the Polish anti-intellectual armoury. It had been employed as the liberal intelligentsia's dream of a democratic Second Republic degenerated into authoritarianism and again during the repression of the student demonstrations of 1968. Thus in 1990 anti-Semitism could be seen as a manifestation of many Poles' sense of exclusion from a government made up of Warsaw intellectuals. In 1990 the journalist Tomasz Jerz reported a conversation he had with Polish visitors to Auschwitz on the subject of the Jews of Poland. In the course of the conversation almost every luminary of the Warsaw-based 'Lay Left' intelligentsia milieu (Geremek, Mazowiecki, Michnik, Kuron), who formed the core of the post-communist political elite, was portrayed as a Jewish enemy of 'the people'.

It was in this context that Walesa and his supporters launched anti-Semitic attacks on leading representatives of the Mazowiecki camp. It was common knowledge that some of Mazowiecki's most
distinguished intellectual supporters such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron were of Jewish extraction. It is also worth noting that, although several of these figures had past links with the communists, all had suffered repression through their activities as prominent, dissident intellectuals under communism. Many still enjoyed high standing in the eyes of Polish society as a whole. Nevertheless at press conferences Walesa himself demanded they publicly stated their Jewish identity, as if it were something to hide. When Walesa realised that his remarks had aroused considerable emotion on both sides of the issue he quickly distanced himself from anti-Semitic ideology. In September 1990 he portrayed himself as a committed opponent of anti-Semitism. However it was too late to rein in the forces his camp had attempted to exploit.

Premier Mazowiecki himself was soon the subject of anti-Semitic attacks. Mazowiecki's family tree became an unlikely theme of the Presidential campaign. During a Solidarity Congress in April 1990 at which Walesa was re-elected as Chairman, a small but well-organised group demonstrated against the 'Jewish influence' in Poland, especially against Mazowiecki. Stars of David were painted on Mazowiecki campaign posters and as late as November 1990 a supporter at a Walesa presidential rally claimed that Mazowiecki's father was Jewish.
Representatives of both the Jewish, intellectual community and Catholic circles recognised and condemned the Walesa camp's manipulation of anti-Semitic tendencies to provoke an anti-intelligentsia, anti-government reaction in Polish society\(^6\).

Thus the emergence of anti-Semitism in the Polish presidential campaign of 1990 can be at least partially explained as a manifestation of the anti-intelligentsia tendencies of the Walesa camp. As such it is further proof of the growing conflicts between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the rest of Polish society. The extent to which anti-Semitic agitation served the interests of the Walesa campaign was questionable. As far as the influence of the Catholic hierarchy is concerned, we have already seen that Poles' commitment to the faith did not amount to a slavish obedience to the hierarchy's line on social and political matters\(^6\). We have also seen from opinion polls that majority support for anti-Semitism as a feature of a political campaign could not be guaranteed. Indeed there were significant parts of Polish society who regarded anti-Semitism as a scourge of Polish politics which could sully the nation's image abroad at a crucial time\(^6\).
'Europeannism' and the Mazowiecki Camp

The Mazowiecki camp countered these tactics with increased emphasis on its 'pro-European' stance. As the election heated up it's identification with the broad currents of West European liberal democracy was contrasted with the narrow parochialism of the Walesa camp. Anti-Semitism was presented as one of the most obnoxious, anti-democratic manifestations of the PC's retrograde perspective. Adam Michnik claimed that anti-Semitism constituted a valid litmus test for undemocratic tendencies. The presidential battle was concerned with Poland's future relationship with the democratic, Western world. Was the dominating attitude to be enlightened or blinkered? For instance, in an interview with Polityka, Zbigniew Bujak refused to differentiate between ROAD and PC on the basis of the traditional Left-Right political spectrum. Instead he located ROAD "To the West of Centre, meaning "closer to Western democracy, civilisation". On television Mazowiecki associated his candidacy with need for "Poland's participation in the European concert".

During the campaign leading intellectuals associated with Mazowiecki's candidacy organised a selective club of 'Europeans' to debate issues arising from Poland's 'return to the West'. Thus, although one of the stated aims of PC was European integration,
all of the aforementioned developments firmly associated ROAD and Mazowiecki's candidacy with a 'European' perspective.

As we have seen this was in keeping with the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia which had always included an adulation of Western values. Moreover, lofty discussions on the place of Poland in the European cultural transition reflected the intelligentsia's tendency to theorise on lofty, universal planes rather than become embroiled in the messy business of 'bread and butter' political issues. The appeal of 'the return to Europe' to society at large was more doubtful. The xenophobia of largely rural societies was evident in Poland's traditional suspicion of Western Europe.

In 1989 this insular current had been at a low ebb with the prospect of Poland's swift integration into the more prosperous West. However, in 1990 it became clear that the West was not going to provide serious help nor integrate Poland rapidly into the EU. The economic austerity being experienced by Polish society was a direct result of the strictures of the Balcerowicz Plan - a plan that Western institutions and advisers had helped to shape. As a result, although Poles were generally aware of the necessity of strong links with the West, they were wary and mindful of the past failures of the West to support the cause of Polish freedom. They were suspicious of Western and especially German economic motives. Would Western involvement mean
economic exploitation? A poll from 1990 carried out by Wladyslaw Adamski concerning opinions on Poland's relationship with East and West reflected this ambivalence (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Opinions on Poland’s relations with East and West in 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions on Poland’s relations with the East and West</th>
<th>Percentage of answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decidedly yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West always exploited us</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The West is morally obliged to be of assistance to Poland</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The East always exploited us</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The East is morally obliged to be of assistance to Poland</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobody will help us, we can rely on ourselves</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles expect too much from other countries</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the majority of respondents felt Poland had been abused by the East there was a sense of being wronged by the West in the past amongst a significant proportion. Expectation of political and economic assistance was mixed with a suspicion of Western motives. As a result the Mazowiecki camp's concentration on the 'European plane' was a dangerous electoral tactic. It threatened to increase the alienation of ordinary Poles pre-occupied with day to day survival from the ruling elite which was theorising on a topic which at best engendered apathy and at worst hostility. Just as with the Walesa camp's association with anti-Semitism, the Mazowiecki group's espousal of 'European' values was of doubtful electoral value.

The clash between the anti-Semitism of the Walesa camp and the 'Europeanism' of the Mazowiecki camp was a version of the inter-war conflict between different nationalist and socialist intellectual strands (represented by Dmowski's and Pilsudski) over their visions of independent Poland. As we have noted, neither was particularly democratic because they were intolerant of certain groups in society (in Dmowski's case ethnic minorities and in Pilsudski's case those who did not subscribe to his vision of

Both Walesa and Mazowiecki could be accused of similar intolerance and of failing to address the 'bread and butter' issues in transition Poland. Evidence suggests that the two candidates' substitution of these pre-occupations for meaningful political debate, alienated a significant part of the electorate. One of the most prominent manifestations of this process was the Tyminski phenomenon.

The Campaigns on Polish Television

The purpose of this section is to examine the portrayal of Mazowiecki on TV during the course of the campaign. The Premier failed to project a positive image and the Mazowiecki camp's poor handling of the media was a direct result of the intelligentsia's elitist and idealistic elements. Consequently this issue was representative of the general difficulties of the 'intelligentsia in power' which led to its isolation from the rest of Polish society and its eventual downfall. The Mazowiecki camp's limitation will be highlighted through comparison with the more popular image conveyed by Walesa.

The role of the Polish media in the campaign deserves attention for a number of reasons. Firstly, as this thesis is concerned with the development of civil society in Poland and the function of the
intellectual, the part played by the Polish media in 1990 has particular significance. In democratic countries the mass media plays a vital part in the political process, especially at election times. It is mainly through the independent, objective press and TV that parties and candidates make their policies known to the electorate. Likewise it is through those channels that voters can best register their opinions on issues and see them discussed. Further, in the West the media is one of the major means by which intellectuals can influence public debate and shape relations between state and society. As a mediatory organ between society and state and an arena for public debate, the mass media forms an important part of the functions of 'civil society' as understood by this thesis.

For the Mazowiecki government the mass media was particularly important. The administration regarded itself as a patriotic emanation of the Polish nation and, as we have seen, it continually addressed the nation as a whole. As a government of the 'best and brightest' and proponents of civil society, the Mazowiecki administration was aware of the media's vital functions in Western political systems (some of its most prominent members, such as Michnik and Turowicz, were newspaper editors). Thus the Mazowiecki camp could have been
expected to pay particular attention it's relationship with the mass media.

Secondly, the presidential campaigns of 1990 were the first to be mounted on a national scale in the conditions of completely free elections and through television free from state regulation. Although the Mazowiecki government was formally in control of TV, it did not exercise the same restrictions as previous communist regimes. For instance, each of the six main candidates were given five minutes of television coverage every evening.

Thirdly the transformation of the political scene was still at a very early stage. The candidates for the presidency lacked nation-wide party organisations through which they could appeal to the electorate on a nation-wide scale. The ability of the media to address Polish society as a whole was thus significant. Finally, the lack of substance apparent in the camps of Mazowiecki and Walesa in terms of policy differences (see above) concentrated voters' attention on the personalities and public images of both candidates. Obviously Polish television was the main medium for conveying these public images. The following analysis refers to J. Bralczyk's and M. Mrosowski's study of the Mazowiecki and Walesa camp's use of Polish television to project their candidate's image.
There were some similarities between the Mazowiecki and Walesa campaigns mounted through Polish television. Firstly, in terms of format, both candidates tended to avoid making many personal policy statements; relying instead on their high personal prestige in Polish society. This was in keeping with the lack of a detailed political programme in both camps and the similarity of their electoral platforms. Instead, supporters of Mazowiecki and Walesa testified to their personal strengths and qualities. Montage sequences reminded audiences of the prominent part played by the candidates in the fall of communism and the advent of the transition.

However, when one compares the tone of the two television campaigns, difference emerge. The campaign mounted by the Walesa camp on television resembled in tone the popular, 'up-beat' models of contemporary, Western electioneering more closely than it's avowedly 'pro-Western' rival. This is because Walesa's populist electoral platform suited this style of electioneering. He was continually presented as a 'man of the people'. Walesa stressed this popular image by frequently addressing the audience directly and repeating the phrase "I am strong through your strength and wise through your wisdom." The model of a strong president with direct ties to 'the people' was thus emphasised.
Simplistic solutions were given for the problems facing transition Poland. Active participation in political and economic life by everyone in Polish society would lead to profitability and democracy. Although, as we have seen, the logic of these promises could be questioned, their influence on a society experiencing severe economic austerity cannot be underestimated. The Walesa campaign also utilised it's candidate's humour and sense of irony to some effect. Elements of anti-Walesa propaganda, such as the Mazowiecki camp's portrayal of him with a menacing axe were adopted by the Walesa camp as humorous, pro-Walesa symbols. In sum, in it's populist, positive and light-hearted approach to the television campaign, the Walesa camp reproduced some of the features of successful, Western-style electioneering.

The tone of the Mazowiecki's campaign was markedly different. Mazowiecki's montage sequences most frequently presented him as a man removed from the people: a 'man of State', Premier of the first non-communist Government and close acquaintance of other luminaries of the Solidarity movement. This associated the candidate with the political elite rather than with Polish society in general; a strategy perfectly in keeping with the elitist elements of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia but out of step with modern electioneering techniques.
The Mazowiecki camp was also reluctant to indulge in the positive, simplistic assessments of Poland's situation presented in Walesa's broadcasts. The economic difficulties of the transition process were treated as unfortunate but inevitable. It appeared that the ex-dissidents of the Mazowiecki camp interpreted Walesa's appeals to societal mood through television as another manifestation of the group's inherent populism. It also regarded these tactics as similar to the 'dishonest' manipulation of information and the media under communist control. As representatives of the Polish intelligentsia they were committed to presenting the truth as they saw it. Thus they gave a sombre, realistic presentation of Poland's problems.

Mazowiecki's personal demeanour during these broadcasts matched this uncomfortable message. He lacked the humour and self-irony of Walesa and seemed uneasy in the glare of publicity. The Premier's performance was such that during the course of the campaign he became associated with a tortoise from the "Polish Zoo" television cabaret. Mazowiecki's inability to communicate effectively with the society he deigned to lead was emblematic of the alienation of the 'intelligentsia in power' from society in 1990.

The "lack of will to win" was a direct result of the Polish intellectual's political dilettantism: the genuine belief that he had
a moral right and duty to rule. Mazowiecki's background should have been enough to convince the electorate of his suitability for office without recourse to demeaning political competition in the public arena. In any case intellectuals are not best equipped for the cut and thrust of everyday political competition and electioneering.}

In conclusion the intelligentsia pedigree of the Mazowiecki government was apparent in the Premier's presidential campaign and it accounted for many of its weaknesses. While Walesa seemed to have accepted the need to engage society as the key to successful media campaigns in modern democracies the Mazowiecki camp with its subdued tone, unpleasant message and attempt to portray Walesa as a scapegoat appeared to the populace more as a reminder of the interminable and vindictive political broadcasts of the communist past. Just as with that other organ of civil society, political parties, the relationship between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the media was ambivalent and uneasy. Both political plurality and a free media were regarded as vital for the functioning of a democratic civil society. However both were also regarded by the intelligentsia as potential centres from where the forces of populism could threaten its vision of the transition to democracy in Poland.
Despite these stylistic differences, the campaigns of Mazowiecki and Walesa were, as we have seen, similar in terms of content. The resultant exchange of personal insults and employment of anti-Semitic and pro-European rhetoric alienated sections of Polish society who were also disillusioned at the acrimonious disintegration of the Solidarity movement. The following section will explain the meteoric rise of the unknown Stanislaw Tyminski as the direct result of this situation.
(iii) The Tyminski Phenomenon

The weaknesses of the Walesa and particularly the Mazowiecki campaigns provide much of the explanation for the rise of Stanisław Tyminski as a 'dark-horse' candidate in the race for the Presidency. We have already noted the programmatic vagueness of the Walesa and Mazowiecki camps. In addition ROAD's tendency to indulge in elitist ruminations on the theme of 'Europe' was continually criticised by Walesa's followers while the latent anti-Semitism of certain strands associated with PC was denounced by Mazowiecki's group. This exchange proved mutually damaging.

Tyminski owed much of his popularity to the general sense of disillusionment with Solidarity politicians caused by this personal in-fighting. More pertinently for this thesis Tyminski's sudden popularity illustrates the alienation of a significant part of Polish society from the Mazowiecki government. Table 4.7 illustrates Polish society's attitude to the leaders of the reform process before the Presidential campaign began.
Table 4.7: Nett Support For Public Figures November '89 - March '90 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November 1989</th>
<th>January 90</th>
<th>February 90</th>
<th>March 90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T Mazowiecki</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Walesa</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Jaruzelski</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Balcerowicz</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Gazeta Wyborcza 17/4/90.

Those polled were asked to express whether the activities of the above-mentioned public figures were concordant with their own interests. The relative nett support was calculated by deducting the % who said no from the % who said yes. One of the most obvious conclusions to be drawn from the above table was the general decline in public support for those people prominent in the transition process. In this way one can detect a rising tide of social discontent with the effects of systemic and economic reform and dissatisfaction with those who were associated with it.

Analysing the results from the perspective of the presidential elections one can state that even in the first few months of 1990 the path was being cleared for the arrival of a populist, maverick candidate such as Stan Tyminski.

An examination of Tyminski's electoral platform supports this argument. Tyminski was regarded as an establishment outsider;
untainted by association with either the despised old regime or
the unpopular transition process. In addition, his personal
financial success, achieved in the West was important. His
attraction to a society which still nursed an idealistic conception
of the West (regardless of its attitude to transition Poland) as a
land of opportunity stood in contrast to the domestic economic
hardship engendered by the Government-led transition.

Ironically, as we have seen, the Polish intelligentsia had
contributed significantly to this ideal vision of the West.
Tyminski's campaign was vague and at times bizarre. Attacks on
Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz accusing them of "treason" were
mixed with accusation that foreign forces wanted to make Poland
an "enclave of white slaves". Questions on his own political
background (rumours of links with the communist security police
abounded) and his proposals for economic reform were either
avoided or answered with references to the vague generalities
contained in his book "Holy Dogs". Nevertheless Tyminski's
electoral campaign stressed the candidate's credentials as an
economic success in the West and an establishment outsider; both
factors which appealed to the most disaffected sections of the
Polish electorate. Tyminski's success was thus directly linked to
the level of popular frustration with the transition process and
society's alienation from the 'intelligentsia in power'.

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An analysis of the votes garnered by Mazowiecki confirm that his appeal, his vision of the transition process, was limited to the intelligentsia constituency. As such an analysis of the vote can serve as a fitting conclusion to a Chapter 4 which have examined the isolation of the intelligentsia from other social groups in Polish society during the Mazowiecki period.
(iv) Analysis of the Results of the Presidential Election

The analysis of the results of the Presidential election which follows will illustrate the Mazowiecki camp's failure to appeal to an electorate outside it's natural intelligentsia constituency. The Walesa and Tyminski vote will be revealed as a much more articulate criticism of the conduct of the 'intelligentsia in power' than Mazowiecki's supporters conceded.

The proceeding examination of the results of the 1990 Presidential elections is based primarily on information gathered on the day of the elections by OBOP in association with the German organisation INFAS and on Thomas Zukowski's analysis, 'The Results of the Presidential Voting: The Polish Political Map in Autumn 1990' in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano? p61-70. The examination shows the extent to which the Mazowiecki government alienated sections of Polish society. This alienation referred to specific regions and social groups. The high level of abstention, the unexpected popularity of Tyminski and Mazowiecki's inability to challenge Walesa all paid testament to this. A close examination of the socio-economic and geographical background of the voters for Tyminski, Walesa and Mazowiecki points to the failure of the 'intelligentsia in power' to realise its project of civil society based on a broad societal front.
The actual results of the elections were as follows:

25/11/90 - 1st Round of the elections - 16.7 million out of a possible 27.55 million voted - 60.6%

Roman Bartoszcze: 1.18m (7.2% of actual votes, 4.3% of potential)
Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz: 1.15m (9.2% and 5.5%)
Tadeusz Mazowiecki: 2.97m (13.1% and 10.8%)
Leszek Moczulski: 0.41m (2.5% and 1.5%)
Stanislaw Tyminski: 3.80m (23.1% and 13.8%)
Lech Walesa: 6.57m (40.0% and 23.9%)

9/12/90 - Second Round of the Elections - 14.65m people out of 27.44m entitled voted (53.4%)

Stanislaw Tyminski: 3.68m (25.8% and 13.4%)
Lech Walesa: 10.62m (74.3% and 38.7%)

Who Did Not Vote?

Around 10.8 million of the people entitled to vote in the first round of the Presidential election did not participate. A certain, rather small section of those were the result of spoiled papers or mistakes in electoral procedures. Others were people unable to
vote through illness or travel difficulties. However the vast majority consisted of those people who had made the conscious decision to stay at home on election day. As such these can be regarded as people alienated most from the electoral campaign and the politics of the transition period.

Statistics reveal the abstentions were greatest in the villages (around 42%). This reflected the continued influence of the traditional rural/urban and intelligentsia/peasant dichotomies examined earlier. Mapping the vote also confirms the depth of regional differences in transition Poland. Participation in the vote differed according to particular regions. This is to be expected if we remember that the regions were experiencing various levels of economic development and social cohesion at that time. Those regions which were suffering most from the consequences of economic reform, where the influence of Solidarity and the Catholic Church was weakest produced the lowest turn-outs. This pattern referred primarily to regions in the North and East of the country. On the other hand the turn-out was higher in the urban conurbation's of Central and Southern Poland.

The proposition that a significant section of non-voters were registering their disaffection from the politics of the transition period is confirmed by research of public opinion. The results of pre-election research by OBOP showed that around 2/3 of those
who did not vote on the 25th November did not take part in the territorial elections either. In 1989-90 there thus emerged what one could call a "silent minority" who as a rule did not vote.

The Stanislaw Tyminski Vote

Analysis of the Tyminski vote supports the argument that a significant section of Polish society had become estranged from the Solidarity and Mazowiecki-led transition process. Generally speaking, Tyminski's support came from those socio-economic and geographical areas where turn-out for the elections was lowest. People supporting Tyminski were least likely to have participated in the territorial elections (according to pre-election research by OBOP 2/5 of Tyminski's voters did not go to the local elections). This shows how the phenomenon of the mobilisation of a section of "passive and apolitical" people by the presidential elections was significantly related to the emergence of Tyminski.

The profile of Tyminski's constituency matched those groups in Polish society which had lost most from the reforms and those which had traditionally been distant from the political elites and intelligentsia circles of Warsaw. Tyminski's vote was dominated by inhabitants of small and medium-sized towns (half of his voters lived in towns of 11-100,000 people). In the cities traditionally
associated with the intelligentsia - Warsaw and Cracow - he received less than 11% and 8% respectively. Tyminski was most often voted for in regions suffering from high unemployment. In regions where the Solidarity tradition was weak Tyminski received around 10-15 points more than in centres with a more pro-Solidarity outlook.

Tyminski was popular amongst younger voters\textsuperscript{35}. People of 35 years and below constituted 55% of his supporters, compared to 35% with Walesa and 40% with Mazowiecki. In terms of socio-economic background, the Tyminski voter again corresponded with those categories which had suffered most as a result of the transition. Workers accounted for 40% and poorly qualified white-collar workers 24% of his vote. He was least popular amongst the intelligentsia (5%). This reflected the milieu's disdain for Tyminski's crude, populist campaign.

If we combine regional variations with those regarding age and profession, then the disparities in Tyminski's popularity and the social polarisation he profited from become clear. Amongst young workers in underdeveloped areas he obtained 40% of the vote, whereas amongst the intelligentsia from more developed regions he got less than 4%.
According to polls Tyminski's voters were mostly critical of Solidarity. They were against privatisation and the existence of unemployment. Only 23% of them approved of the Balcerowicz Plan. The majority of Tyminski's voters were opposed to the banning of abortion and compulsory religious education in schools. They also demanded a definite limitation of the role of the Church and priests in everyday life (around 70%). These were people for whom all of Solidarity's proposed models of civil society - the intelligentsia's 'community of European citizens', the Trade Union's vision of worker organisation, the Catholic Church's 'community of believers' - held no relevance. 
The Walesa Vote

An analysis of the Walesa vote in the elections confirms the isolation of the intelligentsia within the Solidarity camp. While Walesa appealed to the worker, peasant and Catholic strands of the Solidarity tradition, Mazowiecki's popularity was limited to his own intelligentsia milieu. Although Walesa was able to draw on a variety of sources of support his was predominantly a Catholic, working-class constituency. Around 40% of workers favoured him over the other six candidates. He was least popular amongst the intelligentsia (29%) as well as students (25%).

While the Walesa vote generally traversed the urban/rural and Warsaw/provincial divides he was most often voted for in areas of the former Galicia, the Congress Kingdom and districts known for their Solidarity tradition (Gdansk, Wroclaw). These were regions of low criminality and a high level of religiosity, supporting Solidarity in the parliamentary elections of 1989 and the territorial elections of 1990. A positive link was discernible between voting for Walesa and declaring belief in God and regularly practising religion.

The opinion polls taken at election time illustrate the importance of the social, economic and political issues which have been presented in this thesis as catalysts for the split in the 'Solidarity'
camp. People voting for 'Walesa's way' combined a generally liberal vision of a "healthy economy" with a traditional, conservative vision of social life. They were most stridently opposed to abortion and supportive of religious education in schools. They supported a prominent role for the Solidarity trade union and were rather critical of the Mazowiecki government and the Balcerowicz Plan (only 41% supported it).

The relative unimportance of Walesa's electoral platform in comparison to his personal image was illustrated by the fact that his supporters rarely referred to his program (which differentiated them from the followers of other candidates). It was most important to recognise him as a "true Pole" (37%). Thus the populist campaign run by the Walesa campaign succeeded in portraying him as a 'man of the people', in contrast to the disinterested Warsaw coterie of intellectuals.
The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote.

While Walesa found popularity amongst broad sections of Polish society, the sources of support for Mazowiecki were limited in socio-economic and geographical terms to intelligentsia bases. This was symptomatic of the isolation of the Mazowiecki government as the 'intelligentsia in power' and the rejection of its vision of the new Poland.

The salience of the urban/rural, intelligentsia/peasant divide was illustrated by the fact that only 7% of the electorate in rural areas gave him support. As the size of town or city grew so did support for the Premier. Consequently support for Mazowiecki showed clear regional differentiation, with the more developed regions, which were benefiting most from the transition, tending to side with Mazowiecki. The Premier had most voters in the Western part of the country (the Recovered Territory, Wielkopolska), and above all in urban areas, particularly Warsaw. From analysis of the links between supporting Mazowiecki and the characteristics of territories and their communities one can say that this candidate was supported by the most affluent, urbanised, economically developed regions with substantial intelligentsia populations.
A study of the socio-economic background of the Mazowiecki vote clearly confirms him as the candidate of the intelligentsia (he took first place in the intelligentsia vote, receiving 42% of the votes), the students (37%), private businessmen (25%) and white-collar workers (24%). His worst performance was amongst workers (11%) and farmers (only 5%).

Research on the opinions of Mazowiecki's voters on social, political and economic issues also associated them strongly with the agenda of the intelligentsia established in this thesis. They were advocates of liberal economics (privatisation, acceptance of the inevitability of unemployment) and a moderately liberal vision of community life (they were against compulsory religious education in schools, they did not want a law prohibiting abortion, they were least likely of all electorates to support the death penalty). They were pro-Government and moderately pro-Solidarity.

The socio-economic homogeneity of the Mazowiecki support led some sociologists to conclude that his voters represented the first social group in post-communist Poland to act politically in a 'Western way' i.e. to vote in accordance with their social status and/or economic or social interests rather than vote for specific political figures or according to general, nation-wide criteria such as religion, anti-communism etc.
This was encouraging for the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government who were trying to build a Poland where competing interests were expressed within a unitary civil society. However, given the fact that the intelligentsia remained a narrow milieu in Poland, Mazowiecki's lack of support amongst the workers and peasants and his low popularity in certain regions proved fatal.

In conclusion, analysis of the 1990 presidential elections supports the contention that the fall of the Mazowiecki government can be explained, at least partially, by the conflict between the 'intelligentsia in power' and other social groups over the shape of post-communist Poland. The 'intelligentsia in power' was unable and unwilling to accommodate the different agendas apparent in Polish society in its attempt to lead the process of democratisation. Mazowiecki fought the campaign as an intellectual and his electorate was limited largely to the intelligentsia milieu.

Walesa's defeat of Mazowiecki in the election had profound effects on the transition process. As anticipated, Walesa immediately attempted to strengthen presidential powers. This prompted conflicts with parliament and government and constitutional crisis (a danger referred to in our examination of presidential models). He demanded more power over domestic affairs over and above his extensive authority in the fields of defence and foreign
affairs. Walesa clashed several times with post-communist
governments and parliaments. He called for powers to dissolve the
Sejm because of the perceived weakness of government coalitions.
For instance, in early 1995 he claimed that the Pawlak-led
SLD/PSL coalition was not moving fast enough on the issue of
privatisation. This eventually led to the dismissal of Premier
Pawlak⁶⁸. Conflict between government, legislature and president
obviously hampered the establishment of a democratic polity.
Walesa's attempt to concentrate authority in his person ran
contrary to the diffusion of political power which, I have argued,
is central to the development of a democratic, civil society. Instead
it suited the populist vision of a 'Great Man' fighting for basic,
Polish values.

In addition, the defeat of Mazowiecki signalled the end of the
intelligentsia's most concerted bid to exercise political control
over the transition process. In the aftermath of the humiliating
not just by Walesa but Tyminski, Mazowiecki handed in his
government's resignation. Typically the Premier and his
supporters equated the election result as a defeat for democracy.
After all, in the opinion of the Polish intelligentsia, it was the only
native exponent of Western democracy. Mazowiecki handed in
his government's resignation as if, in the words of one
commentator, "he had taken offence at the nation's decision⁶⁹.
From his base in the Polish parliament Bronislaw Geremek
castigated the same society whose democratic impulses his colleagues had previously acclaimed\textsuperscript{90}.

Chapter 4 has charted the deterioration of state/society relations in Mazowiecki's Poland. The different, and often conflicting, political cultures within Polish society emerged fully onto the scene in 1990 when the country's post-communist destiny was being decided. The intelligentsia, far from being able to synthesise these differences into a unified, tolerant political culture was very much part of this process. The etatism of the milieu meant that it was unable to play the mediating role between state and society which in the West contributed to the rise of democratic civil societies. Instead the long-standing tension between state and society in Poland was magnified by the traditional hostilities between the intelligentsia and other social categories.

The isolation of the milieu was manifested in the failure of its attempt to build an integrative ideology for post-communist Poland. The vision of Poland's 'return to Europe' served only to illustrate the gap between the " intelligentsia in power" and the rest of Polish society in 1990. In terms of the consolidation of democracy the gap between state and society was threatening to the consolidation of democracy in Poland. At best Polish society in 1990 retained the political passivity of the communist period. This attitude obviously undermines the efficacy of political institutions,
regardless of how democratic their design. At worst, the gap could be exploited by populists to mobilise Poles in radical opposition to the state. Once again this type of political movement was inimical to the tolerance and plurality of Western-style civil societies.
Conclusion to Thesis: The Post-Communist Intelligentsia and Civil Society

The thesis set two, related tasks: to examine the dynamic of state/society relations in Poland's early transition period from communism to liberal democracy, and to evaluate the role of the 'intelligentsia in power' in this process. We charted the changing relationship between state and society in early transition Poland from three perspectives. Firstly we were mindful of the consequences these processes held for the consolidation of democracy in that country. However we were also conscious of the influence Polish events had on broadly comparable situations elsewhere in post-communist East-Central Europe. The thesis was also concerned with the contribution the unprecedented events in Poland in 1989-90 had on contemporary, Western political theory.

The fundamental question which united these three perspectives was simple: how can a balanced, democratic model of state/society relations be achieved? In other words, what is the glue that binds a community of citizens to its political rulers in a mutually beneficial way? The comparative historical approach to analysing democratisation served us well in this respect. It contends that studying the historical experience of given categories can provide insights into the democratisation process. Our examination of the historical development of state/society relations can explain many
of the most significant political events in the late communist and early transition period.

This approach produced four possible solutions to our quest for an equitable model of modern citizenship: co-operative, neo-liberal, nationalist and republican. The co-operative solution holds that citizenship should be concerned solely with the individual's economic activity. The power of the state should be limited to guaranteeing workers freedom of production. According to Marx wider political issues and democratic values are only important so long as the struggle of labour for dominance continues.

The experience of the Solidarity Trade Union provides an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the co-operative model in terms of democratisation. On the one hand the anti-communist movement was based on the militancy of Polish workers and their desire to be rid of interference from the communist regime. Demands for self-government in the workplace were at the heart of Solidarity's republican model of self-government dealt with below. The programme of Solidarity's first National Congress in 1980 stated "Genuine self-management of employees will be the basis of the self-governing republic".

However, in terms of constructing a modern, democratic model of citizenship the co-operative solution is also flawed. In complex,
contemporary societies it is unfeasible to limit the state to
economic regulation and the presence of highly differentiated
work-forces makes economic regulation without political conflict
unrealistic. In practice states exercising power in the name of the
workers (as the Polish communist regime did) rapidly move to
the foreground and state regulation has superseded economic
self-management.

The co-operative model's preference for economic rather than civil
rights was apparent in the Mazowiecki period. The Polish labour
movement placed priority on paternalism, welfarism and social
security. It demanded exclusive treatment from the state and
struggled to come to terms with the fact that trade unions were
just one type of association trying to influence the
decision-making process. The populist vision of workers and
peasants, their subscription to the 'will of the people' undermined
the role of state institutions in the development of democracy
parties, parliaments and governments. The struggle of the labour
movement to come to terms with the post-communist condition,
particularly the introduction of the free market, was illustrated
by strike activity, Solidarity's identity crisis\textsuperscript{3} and the
marginalisation and radicalisation of its trade union splinter
groups. The tensions between economic and political objectives
and related clashes between worker and intelligentsia-based.
strands of Solidarity have returned to prominence since the Solidarity/UW coalition government took office in 1997.

Similar tensions were evident to varying degrees in East-Central Europe, although the tradition of worker radicalism was weaker in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Hungary tripartism between trade unions, employers associations and the government guaranteed the labour movement some say in the political process but reports suggest declining union membership and fragmentation as unemployment rises. In Czechoslovakia tripartism also eased Trade Union tensions created by the transition but even here the labour movement has become increasingly restive as the workers' standard of living declines. Thus the experience co-operative ideals in Poland and East-Central Europe contributed little to the resolution of worker egalitarianism into an acceptance of the conditions of modern liberal democracies. The harmonisation of liberal and egalitarian aspects of citizenship remains a challenge.

The second potential solution to our quest for a democratic model of citizenship is provided by neoliberalism. This suggests that equitable state/society relations can be achieved simply by ensuring the free play of market forces. Democratic freedom is equated with freedom of consumer choice and the state's role is to guarantee this condition. This strand emerged in Poland in the
second half of the 1980s with the continued decline of the communist command economy, doubts over the efficacy of worker-led protests and the rise of neo-liberalist administrations in Britain and the United States. Elements of the technical or professional intelligentsia in the anti-communist movement and communist reform camps came to view the creation of free market conditions as vital to Poland's future development. In the Mazowiecki period representatives of the neo-liberal strand (such as Balcerowicz) took up prominent political positions and with the plight of the economy worsening and pressure from Western institutions the economy was liberalised instantaneously.

The deficiencies of neo-liberalism as the base of democratic citizenship were apparent in Poland from the outset. While freedom of consumer choice is a necessary aspect of democracy it is not inherently democratic. Consumers come to the market with unequal resources. If citizenship is based on the individual's activity in the market-place alone then it follows that many will be excluded from full status. Moreover, as with the co-operative model - the power of the state is theoretically limited but practically increased by neo-liberalism. Market rules and regulations and provision for social welfare must be enforced by a strong central agency. This model of state/society relations does not make for healthy citizenship because individuals relate to political authority according to rational market criteria rather
than through moral obligation. Concentration on economic issues again neglects the multitude of social and political issues which influence contemporary societies. In Britain and the United States neo-liberal administrations alienated significant sections of their societies and sparked serious unrest. In transition Poland, where the distribution of resources was radically unequal tension on state/society relations contributed to the radicalisation of the political scene and threatened to destabilise the state. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the pace of economic liberalisation also divided the reform camp and alienated citizens. The neo-liberal approach to transition was a major factor in the re-emergence of former communists. Under the banner of social democracy they promised to ease the pace and lessen the depredations of market liberalisation and became a significant political force at the expense of the former anti-communist oppositionists.

The third solution to our quest for a new model of citizenship is nationalism. According to this a citizen's loyalty to the state is guaranteed by his or her membership of a historic, national community. Nationalism was historically linked to democratic aspirations, where the struggle for national freedoms and individual freedoms were united. This was certainly the case of Poland from partition times up to the late communist period. National sentiments were mobilised by the anti-communist opposition by portraying the authoritarian regime as an alien
'Asiatic' system imposed on Western, democratically-inclined Poland.

However, in terms of the consolidation of democracy, the nationalist solution has obvious weaknesses. Once liberation is achieved nationalism does not define what type of state, society or economy should develop. What is worse, in times of hardship nationalism attempts to simplify the relationship between state and society according to the rule of the 'will of the people'. Populist nationalism can be channelled against other nations and especially internal 'enemies' and minorities. Again these dangers were apparent in transition Poland. Economic austerity and political uncertainty mobilised the chauvinistic, anti-Semitic strand of Polish nationalism which sought to define the rights of citizenship in strictly limited terms. The Catholic Church's emphasis of Poland's national-Catholic identity threatened the freedom of ethnic, and religious minorities and limited the rights of women in transition Poland.

Czechoslovakia and Hungary also witnessed the rise of populist nationalism and in both cases it threatened the establishment of liberal, democratic relations between state and society. The most dramatic illustration of this process was the break-up of the Czechoslovakian state in 1993. The separation of the Czech and Slovak lands occurred through the manipulation of nationalism.
by Premiers Meciar and Klaus for political ends. Opinion polls at the time suggested that the majority of the population was committed to a common state but attempts at co-operation and political negotiation were overridden by the emotional intensity of nationalism. At the same time discussion about the split of Czechoslovakia dwarfed other pressing political and constitutional issues. Slovak nationalism subsequently developed increasing hostility towards Hungarian and gypsy minorities and the influence of the Catholic Church in the public sphere was marked by the limitation of abortion rights. The rights of the Czech Republic's gypsy population also became the subject of controversy. Although post-communist Hungary was ethnically homogeneous, the limitation of the rights of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania meant that ethnic nationalism played a large part in the politics of the transition. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the dominant political force of the early transition period, included extreme, right-wing nationalist elements (e.g. vice-president Istvan Csurka).

The basic problem with all these proposed solutions to our quest for a democratic model of state/society relations - co-operative, neo-liberal and nationalist - is their exclusivity. Each is intolerant of other perspectives and this restricts their vision of citizenship. Complex, contemporary societies are comprised of men and women, acting as individuals or as part of associations. Their
activities can be motivated by a variety of overlapping social, political and economic issues and the modern, democratic state ought to be able to respond to them.

This brings us to the last potential solution to our quest: the civil society argument. It suggests that democratic state/society relations ought to be based on civic or republican ideals - on the engagement of all citizens in the exercise of political power. This argument can be traced in the West from Aristotle to Rousseau's idea of the 'social contract' to contemporary demands by marginal groups in society (such as ethnic minorities, environmental groups and feminist organisations) for inclusion in the political process. The civic ideal is seen as a corrective to the fragmentation and disequilibria of modern society. One political vehicle of this neo-classical concept of citizenship is the 'new social movement' which unites individuals from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds behind ethical issues such as feminism, environmentalism etc.. These movements encourage the participation of all members and are organised in a non-hierarchical way.

Our examination of this argument in the Polish context is inextricably bound to the second basic task of this thesis which was to trace the influence of the Polish intelligentsia on the transition. Generally speaking, the intellectual idiom is seen as an
important social category in the development of democratic, civic aspirations. As autonomous producers of culture they bring a universal perspective to critiques of state power and help shape and articulate the interests of society. As such they are a fundamental part of civil society, understood as a mediatory realm between a responsive, representative state and a pluralist, consensual society. The 'civil society project' in Poland can thus be seen as a project of the intelligentsia.

There was a strong civic element to the anti-communist opposition in Poland. The regime reversed the republican ideal and called on Poles to defer from political activity outside that sanctioned and controlled by the state. From the mid-1970s attempts were made to build new social movements in defence of basic human rights and in opposition to communist authoritarianism. The rise of grass-roots environmental and peace movements in the West in the 1970s coincided with the emergence of oppositional movements in East-Central Europe. Growing concern with basic human rights in the West may have influenced the work of Westward-looking intellectuals in East-Central Europe who sought to create some 'social space' for the civic aspirations of the communist opposition.
Polish society gradually disengaged from the party-state and the regime's distorted version of republicanism and deserted the public sphere. The series of popular, anti-state outbursts, evident from the late 1950s onward, signalled this move. By the late 1970s substantial parts of Polish society had demonstrated their tendency to regard the state with at best sullen indifference and at worst outright hostility: workers' protests demanded the right to organise non-state trade unions, peasants maintained their traditional hostility to state institutions, the Catholic hierarchy resolutely defended its unique status as an independent social institution in communist Poland and the intelligentsia's calls for freedom of expression were repeated with increasing regularity. The state, constrained by external pressure from the Soviet Union, presiding over a collapsing economy and bereft of ideological legitimacy was unable to halt this process. This was the background of the new model of 'self-organising' republicanism introduced by the anti-communist intelligentsia. It presented an alternative arena for Poles to participate as 'citizens': to play an active part in influencing decisions which effected their lives. The project united a myriad of underground Solidarity groups, trade unions, the unofficial press, intellectual and Catholic discussion groups of all shades. The official, public
sphere was shunned and the civic aspirations it denied were allowed expression in an 'underground state'.

The republican element of the anti-communist opposition in Poland was openly referred to by its leading intellectuals. Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik referred to as the 'self-organising' or 'self-governing' Republic. Michnik stated that "The leading idea of Solidarity is to achieve a Self-Governing Republic and not to seize power". This 'self-limiting' or 'antipolitical' project of the late communist period was successful as an attempt to unite Polish society in opposition to the state. It demonstrated to both state and society that Poles were willing and able to organise themselves outside the control of a regime which, theoretically, laid claim to all social initiatives.

It may have seemed to observers that in communist Poland the 'people' were participating as citizens to a greater degree than in the jaded West. However the issues at the heart of modern citizenship and democracy - how the myriad, fragmented experiences and interests of contemporary society can be welded into a consensual, democratic model of state/society relations - were not addressed. Opposition to the communist state was enough.
Solidarity was not a new social movement in the Western sense of the term. Internal contradictions were apparent from the outset. The movement meant different things to its various constituencies: to the intelligentsia it was an expression of Polish society's republican, democratic tendencies, to workers and to a lesser degree peasants it was primarily a trade union to be used in negotiations with the state, to the Catholic Church it was an expression of the nation's inherent piety. Each strand had its own vision of citizenship and state/society relations and these political tensions were apparent from Solidarity's inception. The clash between the Warsaw-based intelligentsia who wanted to create a more centralised body and regional leaders who clung to the ideal of local, grass-roots activism was emblematic of Solidarity's ongoing identity crisis.

Moreover, despite the rhetoric, the liberal, Western model of citizenship which emphasises the rights of individuals and the duty of the state to guarantee them was absent. The model of the 'self-governing Republic' was forged in opposition to the party-state. The state remained the ascendant power in this social contract as Polish society continued to regard it as a dominant force to protest against rather than as an equal partner to interact with.
The divisions within the opposition and the traditional dichotomy between state and society in Poland influenced the civic solution to the concept of citizenship in 1990. The Mazowiecki government's attempt to continue this model of republicanism and the anti-communist 'new social movement' model into the transition period reflected its intelligentsia pedigree and illustrated its weaknesses. Civic enthusiasm was only one of several undercurrents in 'Solidarity' and an idealistic and theoretical one at that.

The belief that Polish society had been mobilised solely by the desire to become more politically free and active and that this feeling could be used as a motivating force for the balancing of state/society relations was unrealistic. No state is fully answerable to the political activity of its individual citizens. The size and complexity of modern polities means that even in a liberal democratic system the state cannot act solely in response to the political activity of the people.

The republican solution can be criticised for neglecting the myriad interests of the modern citizen. Political activity has to compete with economic and social functions that are at least as important to the individual. There is a type of intellectual utopianism and elitism apparent here. From Aristotle onward citizenship was an exclusionary category - only those capable of
appreciating the rights and fulfilling the duties of citizenship rationally were worthy of the status.

Intellectual elitism was evident in the anti-communist movement in Poland. The level of political activity of the engaged intellectual who could spend a lot of time in the dissemination of samizdat or the organisation of underground meetings could not be matched by workers or peasants whose occupations did not overlap with opposition activity. The roots of Solidarity were and are the subject of fierce debate. However, it is safe to say that the Polish intelligentsia did not solely initiate and lead anti-state protests in Poland from the outset. Rather, representatives of the milieu gradually rose to the forefront of a society-wide process of estrangement from the communist state and self-organisation. That the intelligentsia should interpret its role as of paramount importance in organising opposition is a direct legacy of its historical experience. The 'life-world' of representatives of the milieu is based on a feeling of national mission, a certain life-style which stresses self-sacrifice and moral as well as intellectual rigour. From this comes an assumption of social superiority (the noble roots of the milieu notwithstanding) which demands the role of leadership.

The elitist, exclusionary republicanism fashioned by the Polish intelligentsia was evident in 1990. The Mazowiecki government
presented the post-communist model of Polish citizenship in terms of a cultured appreciation of the 'democratic West'. This certainly excluded many Poles who were uncertain of or felt hostile toward Western influence on the transition process. The 'intelligentsia in power' attempted to appropriate the organisational structures and, at least as importantly, the symbolic weight of 'Solidarity'. Reference to the intelligentsia's own 'Solidarity ethos' of civic, democratic idealism privileged intellectuals over the rest of society. Moral and theoretical discourses are the stock in trade of the political intellectual. Participation in public discourse was limited to a narrow social and political elite.

Moreover, the intellectual elite, ideologically heterogeneous as always, was itself divided over what the 'Solidarity ethos' represented. In a manner reminiscent of the inter-war period, Solidarity (and the OKP in particular) began to disintegrate into bickering political clubs of intellectuals. The dividing lines of the emergent political scene tended to involve the personal conflict between cosmopolitan and populist intellectuals, between virulent, anti-communist and moderate intellectuals with a revisionist past, between Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals and so on. In this way the gap between the agendas of the 'intelligentsia in power' and the rest of Polish society widened.
It is important to note that those intellectuals who now took up roles in the state apparatus were immersed in this adversarial model of state/society relations. As far as the new ruling elite was concerned, the state was the dominant, if not the sole instrument of democratisation. The condition of Poland in 1989 meant that there was little alternative to an overwhelmingly state-led transition. Above all it is important to keep in mind the international and geopolitical context of the Mazowiecki era. Mazowiecki took office at a time of great political flux and its activities were constrained by circumstances.

Soviet power was still evident throughout East-Central Europe and in Poland itself. The country's army and security services, not to mention its bureaucracy, were still dominated by communists. The intentions of the Soviet Union regarding Poland and her neighbours remained uncertain. In these circumstances, and given Poland's doleful recent history, there was a strong belief that the nation's survival was at stake. Poland's new government had to make a 'fait accompli'; it had to take an irrevocable step into the post-communist future. As the first country in the region to take this path Poland was, as ever, aware of the importance of its fate for East-Central Europe. Thus the radical introduction of a market economy and the desire of the 'intelligentsia in power' to keep a tight grip on state power can be explained at least
partially by the uncertain atmosphere of the early transition period.

However, the Mazowiecki government's approach to the transition also reflected the traditional etatism of the intelligentsia milieu. Our study of the historical journey of the Polish intelligentsia revealed it as an ideologically diverse milieu united by a desire to lead Poland into the modern age through the instrument of the state rather than through mere criticism of state power. Each ideological strand (socialist, nationalist, secular, clerical etc.) regards itself as the rightful incumbent of state office and seeks to mould society as a single body according to its vision. Society could be mobilised as patriotic Poles against foreign forces, peasants against landowners, Catholics against non-Catholics, rightists versus leftists, communists against anti-communists, 'Europeans' against 'chauvinists' etc..

The sole aim of political activity was control of the state rather than the representation of specific values and interests on behalf of society. This model of political action is contrary to the interests of liberal democracy because it fails to represent the true interests and values of society to the state. Instead the political scene is fragmented and radicalised by an internecine battle between rival intellectual elites.
Moreover, given the regular periods of profound socio-economic trauma and flux in recent Polish history it also gave rise to the possibility that populist forces may lead a reaction against the processes of Modernity. Sections of the intelligentsia unhappy with the direction of progress and their own role in it could mobilise frustrated social forces in Polish society to reverse progress and hark back nostalgically and unrealistically to an Edenic past. Polish populism can contain a vision of a religiously and ethnically pure Poland which is intolerant of the pluralism associated with modern democracies.

In this way the experiences of the "intelligentsia in power" confirm the dangers to democracy when individuals or groups become politically active as intellectuals. During its term of office the Mazowiecki administration came close to contradicting Shelley's belief that 'poets are the unofficial legislators of the world' as vital posts in government and parliament were occupied by historians, journalists, academics and the like. Exercising political power on account of 'knowing what is best' is not conducive to liberal democratic procedures. In times of upheaval intellectuals feel the responsibility to 'choose a road' for their societies. They produce and criticise ideas which may or may not perform a significant ideological function in a changing
society. However, for democracy to flourish, these ideas cannot be imposed through the instrument of the state. The political rule of intellectuals instead results in the rise of a new, etatist regime. This is undemocratic, even if the ultimate aim is the development of democracy. Democracy cannot be imposed. Civil society develops gradually through the interaction of a responsive state and an autonomous society. The intellectual has a vital role in this process as a prominent defender of societal autonomy and critic of the state and must thus renounce the attempt to build empires, even the 'empire of civilisation'.

Thus this intelligentsia-led, 'civic' solution to our quest for a democratic model of state/society relations is flawed. As with the other solutions democracy is undermined by exclusiveness and a refusal to tolerate the complexity of human, civil society. We have already stated that 'civil society' is a vague, problematic concept. However, this vagueness is caused by its attempt to incorporate the myriad, complex activities and associations (political, social and economic) in modern society. The inclusiveness implicit in this attempt is valuable in itself and suggests that the 'civil society' solution is at least a good starting point in our ongoing search for a democratic model of state/society relations. "The civil society argument...challenges [other models'] singularity, but it has no singularity of its own."
In general, one can conclude that the involvement of the intelligentsia in the state during the Mazowiecki period lessened the chances for the achievement of a democratic, civil society in the short-term at least. Of course democratisation requires institutional and elite, state-level change. But for institutions to be truly democratic society must be mobilised to participate in them in a democratic way. Social as well as political democracy must be developed. This was especially the case in a society with deep, unresolved political, economic and cultural cleavages (based on the different historical experiences of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia and their varying relationships with the Catholic Church). Thus, in terms of the development of a democratic, civil society the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia was ambiguous. On the one hand the milieu's roots in the European intellectual idiom guaranteed a basic commitment to individual freedoms and the ideals of modern citizenship associated with Western liberal democracies. On the other hand, its sense of superiority and disparagement of Polish society's democratic tendencies convinced it that democracy had to be introduced in an etatist, elitist manner. Such an approach obviously contradicts the pluralist essence of a democratic, civil society.

The practical consequences of this flawed model of republicanism were apparent in the disintegration of Solidarity, the low level of electoral turnouts and the fragmentation, polarisation and
weakness of the party political scene. The activities of non-government organisations associated with civil society in the thesis (such as political parties, professional associations and trade unions, feminist organisations etc.) were frequently ignored by the post-communist state. New political leaders took the republican ideal to its extreme and defined democratic legitimacy in terms of national election results rather than taking into account the varied interests of modern societies. Clashes between the state and society-based organisations often culminated in radical questioning of the legitimacy of state institutions and the Mazowiecki government. This paid testament to the continued pathological condition of state/society relations in Mazowiecki's Poland. In the liberal, post-communist age, when political rule is supposed to be exercised through consensus rather than coercion, this situation weakens the Polish state.

Amidst the socio-economic turmoil of 1990, the elitism of the Mazowiecki government, the rise of populism and the disintegration of the Solidarity movement ensured that the project of the 'intelligentsia in power' to introduce democracy lasted just over 12 months. The Polish intelligentsia can be seen as a revolutionary milieu which became the first victims of the revolution. Those attributes which served it so well in mobilising society against the state (commitment to 'total', moral categories) were not suited to the messy business of everyday 'politicking' in
a democracy. This was particularly apparent in the presidential elections where the style and substance of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki campaign failed to mobilise any sector of Polish society outside the Premier's natural intelligentsia constituency.

Joanna Kurczewska depicts the plight of representatives of the Mazowiecki government as caught between the categories of intellectual and politician. They could not be classed as intellectuals because they were exercising political power and they were not politicians because they were guided in their actions by moralising, utopian considerations rather than pragmatism. The political pre-occupations of the intellectual luminaries of the former opposition (Poland's 'European heritage', the importance of maintaining truth, morality and dignity in public life etc.) were seen as anachronistic in a post-communist country making the myriad adjustments necessary with the advent of a market economy and democratic polity.

The fate of republican idealism in Poland was mirrored to varying degrees elsewhere in East-Central Europe. In communist Czechoslovakia Charter 77, led by Vaclav Havel called for opposition through reference to civic rights. Havel's vision was, if anything, more idealistic than Polish opposition intellectuals'. Individuals were to act as much as possible as self-sufficient
citizens and live according to their own norms without the support of social institutions which existed in Poland. However, Civic Forum and its sister organisation in Slovakia 'Public Against Violence, the transition period representatives of this democratic, republican strand, soon divided and dissolved over political and socio-economic issues. As with Solidarity, the alliances which made up Civic Forum were too heterogeneous to foster consensus and unity. Havel, though elected President, was powerless to halt this process of polarisation which led to the break-up of the state itself.

In Hungary the old opposition included elements of the general 'self-organising' or 'anti-political' strategy of its Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts. Awareness of the rights and duties of citizenship was to be promoted in society to express Hungarians' separation from the party-state and/or exercise pressure on the regime. However, after the collapse of communism, civic solidarity gave way to political fragmentation and polarisation and voter alienation. The former opposition quickly split into competing factions, some of which questioned the concept of liberal democracy outlined by the old Hungarian opposition. The core of intellectuals behind the 'civic' aspect of the old opposition (such as Kis and Konrad) was associated with the Alliance of Free Democrats which was marginalised soon after the collapse of communism. The more successful offshoot of the opposition the Democratic Forum subscribed to a more conservative, restrictive
vision of civil rights. The situation was such that in 1991 liberal
and left wing intellectuals attempted to revive the civic spirit of
the 1980s through the Democratic Charter which specified
seventeen criteria for democracy. It renewed the call for social
self-organisation. This could be seen as a return of the critical;
intelligentsia to its pre-transition role. However it returned in
drastically changed circumstances, having failed in its efforts to
shape the transition through the state. It was also now competing
for public attention with proliferating social interests: "Having
made its excursion into professional politics, the intelligentsia
returns to the sites of the politics of 'movements' but its voice will
not be decisive any more: it will be lost in the noise of the social
interest conflicts of the new democracy".107

Having outlined the weaknesses and failures of the intelligentsia's
brief experience of political rule, one must acknowledge the
substantial achievements of the period. We have already stated
that the accomplishments of the Mazowiecki period were
fundamental to the achievement of a relatively healthy market
economy and relatively stable democracy in the long-term. In the
period 1989-90 the 'intelligentsia in power' enjoyed a unique level
of broad societal support, of the sort accorded in Poland to
representatives of the traditional intelligentsia. Although this
'honeymoon period' was short-lived it was long enough for the
Mazowiecki government to lay down the framework for the development of a market economy and a democratic political system\textsuperscript{108}. One truth that has emerged from our examination of transition politics is that the consolidation of democracy in Poland and East-Central Europe in general will be a fraught, long-term process. One decade after the dramatic events of 1989-90 allows a clearer perspective on the merits of the rule of the 'best and brightest' but the further passage of time will clarify its achievements and failures.

What can be said is that, after all the tragic events of modern Polish history, the "intelligentsia in power" at last came to understand that the rule of law rather than revolutionary or utopian fervour was all important. Non-violence was a basic tenet of the anti-communist intelligentsia in Poland and East-Central Europe as a whole. The commitment to peaceful protest is fundamental to the development of a tolerant, consensual democracy. Despite the etatism of the milieu the Mazowiecki government held to the laws of the democratic game. It was openly contemptuous of the results of the presidential elections but it accepted them. One must recognise the moderation and commitment to the rule of law of the "intelligentsia in power" in a time of radical change\textsuperscript{109}.
The question remains over the future of the intelligentsia as a milieu in Polish society. Chapter 3 examined the identity crisis of the intelligentsia in the conditions of a market economy and liberal democracy. A crisis of identity was caused by the technical intelligentsia's potential transformation into a Western-style managerial class and the creative intelligentsia's political marginalisation and economic impoverishment. Ironically, the reforms introduced by the 'intelligentsia in power' undermined the status of the milieu.

However, given the framework of the intellectual's role in Western civil societies, the professionalisation of the technical intelligentsia and the retirial of the creative intelligentsia from the pursuit of state power can be seen as positive developments. As we have seen, in the West intellectuals function as disinterested critics of state power and societal opinion makers. They are active in civil society as mediators between state and society. In Mazowiecki's Poland the intelligentsia was associated with the state and could not perform this bridging role. Instead it attempted to legislate a democratic, civil society from the state down. This was an unrealistic aim.

Zygmunt Bauman lists three choices for the post-communist intelligentsia - the independent intellectual, the organic intellectual representing the interests of specific social interests or
the professional or technocrat. The technical intelligentsia as professionals and managers can swell the ranks of the emergent middle social strata. As stated in Chapter One, the presence of an established, stable middle class is recognised by most political scientists and sociologists as important to the consolidation and maintenance of democracy.

The involvement of the creative intelligentsia within the state is not necessarily conducive to the consolidation of democracy; it is much more important that such intellectuals play a mediating role between state and society. Having performed its revolutionary, state-focused function, the Polish intellectual could retreat into the types of occupation associated with the category in the West.

Although the future facing the creative intelligentsia in 1990 may have appeared bleak, the gradual development of middle-strata in society provides potential markets for cultural consumption and the integration of the milieu. We have already noted the ongoing identity crisis in the Western intellectual idiom caused by its isolation from the structures of political power and dependence on the state, industries or academia. The similar tensions felt by the politically marginalised creative Polish intelligentsia (the feeling that they are now addressing a significantly reduced
public) in the post-communist period can, paradoxically, be seen as a sign that their country is becoming more 'Western'.

In the meantime I would argue that there is perhaps one last project for the Polish intelligentsia. Despite the progress made in Poland and throughout East-Central Europe since 1990 down the path of democratic consolidation we have already established that it is a long term process. So long as there is a need for the reinforcement of democratic principles in Polish society, a gap will exist for the intellectuals to play a leading role as the country's foremost exponents of these values. Intellectuals are also bound to have a prominent role in a country still trying to express its national identity in the post-communist period.

In this context, Poland's prospective integration into the European Union could be significant. As we have seen, in 1990 the vision of Poland's 'return to Europe' played a significant part in the alienation of the 'intelligentsia in power' from the rest of Polish society. At that time the workers, peasants and Catholic Church feared the intrusion of European economic and cultural interests on Poland. However, in the current atmosphere of relative prosperity and stability, and with the prospect of integration with the European Union within the next decade, there is an opportunity for the intelligentsia to mobilise Polish
society behind the 'return to Europe'. A 'pro-European' ideology could appeal to workers who see a new labour market in the EU and to farmers and the emergent bourgeoisie who see in it an enlarged market for their goods and services. Thus there is a greater chance that the 'Europeannism' of the intelligentsia can help consolidate a unified, democratic culture in Poland.

The prospect certainly unites the technical and creative strands of the intelligentsia. The need for a new level of bureaucracy and administration offers the technical intelligentsia increased job opportunities and status. Poland's integration into the European Union can be seen as the logical culmination of the creative intelligentsia's journey home to the 'democratic West'.

In this context, it is interesting to note the recent work of Ivan Szelenyi, a prominent observer of the historical journey of the East-Central European intelligentsias. In the 1970s he and George Konrad wrote a critique of the state socialist order, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, which charted the rise of the intelligentsia to power within the system based on the merger of communist bureaucrats and the technical intelligentsia. Szelenyi subsequently revised some of his conclusions, taking into account the intransigence of the communist bureaucracy.

However, in the post-communist period he sees a new alliance between the technical intelligentsia who are involved in running
the state and the creative intelligentsia which help legitimise the rule of technocracy through shaping public opinion. The cause of European integration can be seen as binding force in this new alliance. The recent elections in Poland where the archetypal technocrat Leszek Balcerowicz was appointed Finance Minister and the equally archetypal traditional, creative intellectual Bronislaw Geremek became Foreign Minister is emblematic of this post-communist alliance. The issue of European union, currently high on Poland's political agenda can thus be seen as, perhaps, the Polish intelligentsia's final mission to reform the Polish state in line with the practices of Western liberal democracies and mobilise Polish society behind a European perspective; to consolidate democratisation and reinforce the structures of Polish civil society by integrating them with the civil societies of Europe.
"As the nations of East Central Europe engage in their transition to democracy, the type of political regime chosen becomes of paramount importance. In this respect the relationship between the executive and legislature is probably the most important institutional problem facing any political system" (Crawford p278).


see Scott Mainwaring 'Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination' Comparative Political Studies 26 1992 pp198-228.

"Should Poland adopt a parliamentary or presidential system...Since most empirical studies are limited to the OECD countries and most consider institutional features one at a time, we do not yet know enough to make such recommendations" (Przeworski (b) p46).

see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p175.

see 'The Weakness of the Party Political Scene' Chapter 3 p349.

see 'The Communist State' Chapter 2 p209.

see Jacek Kuron Moja Zupa p11.

Bronislaw Geremek, from the Solidarity side, stated: "It is not our intention to limit the President's authority, but we think that there is no need to give him a veto with the force of law...We feel that the Senate veto that requires a 2/3 Sejm majority to over-rule is enough. We don't consider
the Presidential veto an appropriate law (K. Dubinski 'Magdalenka - Transakcja Epoki' published in Polityka 29/9/90 p7)

Ibid. p8.

Those who took part in the 1989 negotiations have conceded that they countenanced a degree of confusion in the Round Table agreement's provisions on Presidential powers, the better to curb the President's ability to control future events. In so doing, however, the opposition did not anticipate how quickly Communist control would collapse, and soon they were to find themselves heir to an untidy political structure (see Dick Howard 'Constitutional Reform' in R.F. Starr ed. Transition to Democracy in Poland New York 1993).

see 'Populism' Chapter 1 p107.

"I am not an advocate of classical presidential concepts, French, Italian or American. I want to surprise everyone" (quoted in 'Why I will not vote for Lech Walesa' Gazeta Wyborcza 27-28/10/90).

Slawomir Siwek, a prominent supporter of Walesa and member of PC called for "A strong, self-limiting president..." ('Centre Alliance - Let's Discuss' Polityka 28/7/90 p7).

see Gazeta Wyborcza 20/6/90 p2.

"This understanding of the state and constitutionalism was the logical product of Poland's modern history...a history created not by capitalism but by the intelligentsia elite, descended from the déclassé nobility and attempting to retrieve their lost authority and influence over the political
scene" ("There is no School for Democracy" Polityka 5/5/90 p3).

17 see Chapter 2 p191.

18 see Zubek (c) p598.

19 see 'The Walesa Factor' Chapter 4 p480.

20 "He wants to be a president 'with an axe' who will govern by decree...Walesa was always a charismatic leader and he never respected statutes or programmes. He has acted as if he does not understand the basics of democratic procedure" ('Why I will not vote for Lech Walesa' Gazeta Wyborcza 27-28/10/90).

21 Zbigniew Bujak, one of the leaders of ROAD stated "The presidential office remains important and it must be given suitably strong powers. However we are opposed to a president who can freely decide the composition of the Government. We ought to strive doggedly for the strong position of Parliament and it's best that a majority of Parliament forms a strong Cabinet. Thus we are for a president with a potentially significant influence on political stability in the country and, above all, on international relations" ('West of Centre' Polityka 28/7/90 p5).

22 see Diagram 3.12 Chapter 3 p413.

23 for instance, see the tortuous passage of privatisation legislation in the Sejm Chapter 4 p468.

24 As Krzeminski and Wladyka commented at the time: "The emerging conflict over the Presidency goes deeper than a row concerning the person of Walesa" ('Style and Rights' Polityka 7/7/90 p1)
for a detailed profile of the six main candidates see Appendix II p757.

e.g. polls in Stanislaw Kwiatkowski 'Mixed Feelings' Polityka 7/7/90 p6

see PC and ROAD sections in Appendix I, p680 and 685.

see Kwiatkowski "Mixed Feelings" Polityka 7/7/90 p6.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, one of the founders of the Centre Agreement stated that "PC is an attempt...to organise political activity amongst members of citizens' committees, political parties and people who up to now have not been associated with organised interests" (Kaczynski, J, 'Hatchet or Program?' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 29/6/90 p3).

Quoted in Louise Vinton 'Centre Alliance and ROAD' RFE Vol.1 No.38 21/9/90 p15.

For instance, Stefan Kurowski, while admitting that his "major assumptions did not contradict Balcerowicz's programme" nonetheless stated: "Unfortunately Balcerowicz is not a leading privatiser. He is a leading monetarist, but for us large-scale privatisation is necessary" (‘Hatchet or Program?’ Tygodnik Solidarnosc 29/6/90 p3).

"Mazowiecki intended to carry out a revolution without revolutionary symbols and acts of revolutionary vengeance...This approach had above all to lay history aside, since each form of appeal to the past was dangerous" (Krol M 'Evolution, restoration, amnesia' in Res Publica Year 5 No.5 1991 p23).

see Chapter 3 p396.
Quoted in 'Centre Alliance and ROAD' RFE Vol.1 No.38 21/9/90 p15.

"Unfortunately, as a result of the current conditions, a fusion has been carried out, at least partially, between the 'reds' of the old political elite and the 'pinks' of the new one. The most vivid manifestation of this is the creation of a Byzantine structure of privileges, favouring the old Communist nomenklatura, and today the 'hybrid' nomenklatura (set apart, given better health services, resorts at home and abroad, access to scarce goods and privileged pension schemes" (Glapinski, A, 'What Does Walesa Want?' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 31/8/90 p5).

"There appears to be a contradiction between the Centre Agreement's commitment to radical economic measures as the key to a successful transition to capitalism and the way in which the 'acceleration' programme is being presented to the public by Kaczynski etc." (Louise Vinton 'Centre Alliance and ROAD' RFE Vol.1 No.38 21/9/90 p15).

see 'Formation of Centre Alliance and ROAD Chapter 3 p415.

"A stable parliamentary democracy and political pluralism; the rule of law, civil liberties, equal rights for citizens regardless of religion, philosophy or extraction; limiting the role of the state; rebuilding local self-government; creating a social, market economy of the Western type" (Founding Declaration of ROAD 16/7/90 Information Bulletin in Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.1 p212).
"The Mazowiecki government has accomplished much...It is realising the transition program, but we see its weaknesses and the need for corrections" (Ibid. p212).

"The pro-governmental ROAD decided to imitate both the ideology, and for the most part, the organisational structure of its opponents...the most blatant imitative aspect was the open acceptance of Walesa's concept of acceleration" (Zubek (c) p595).

see Chapter 2 p177 and 251.


"Dear Jews, do not talk with us from a position of a nation raised above all others and do not dictate terms that are impossible to fulfil. Don't you see, esteemed Jews that openly opposing the Carmelite nuns hurts the feelings of all Poles and violates our hard-won sovereignty. Your power is in the mass media, at your immediate disposal in many countries. Do not use it to spread anti-Polonism...If there is no anti-Polonism there will be no anti-Semitism here" (see "The row over nuns at Auschwitz' The Economist 2/9/89 p46).

see Interview with J. Kaczynski in Toranska p90.

see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124.

see 'Pre-election Poland' The Economist 17/11/90 p74.
"Today anti-Semitism is the language of nostalgia, of resentment, of feeling victimised, and of economic wishful thinking" (Gross p147).

see 'Inter-war Society' Chapter 2 p177.

see Davies (b)p252.

see Ibid. p266.

see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124 and the 'Polish Society Under Communism Chapter 2 p251.

"Anti-Semitism is a part of political life...directed against Jews, of course, but also against intellectual, political and economic elites who are "nominated" to be Jews" (Gross p147).

"Look at 'Solidarity', they are Jews...those who are taking over the government...Bronislaw Geremek?...He is a Jew and a Stalinist. He wrote his doctorate on Parisian womanisers. A Pole would not do that. Tadeusz Mazowiecki is certainly a Jew but still manages to imitate a Catholic. Adam Michnik is the grandson of a rabbi from Lwow and the brother of a Stalinist murderer. Jacek Kuron is a fanatical communist and personal enemy of Primate Wyszynski..." (Tomasz Jerx Niedziela w Oswiecimiu' Kultura Nr 10/505 1989 p85).

"People of Jewish extraction ought not to conceal this fact. I would like this issue to be clarified so that anti-Semitic slogans stop appearing on walls. Jews are great patriots, they have contributed much to culture, but the moment they conceal their Jewishness they provoke an anti-Semitic reaction" ('W kraju' Polityka 4/8/90 p2).
see 'I Have Given Proof That I Am Not An Anti-Semite' in Gazeta Gdanska 11/9/90, cited Zubek (a) p79.

reported in 'Walesa Elected Once Again' Dziennik Zwiazkowy 23/4/90 p1.

see 'Past and President' in The Economist 17/11/90 p74.

"Expressing nonsense about "egg-heads" and dividing people according to racial criteria into Jews and non-Jews, encourages the adherents of anti-intellectual populism and anti-Semitic phobia. These people will now support Walesa's ambitions to the Presidency. Walesa says "I am a true Pole, born here". It seems that there are some kind of "unclean Poles" ('Why I will not Vote for Lech Walesa' Gazeta Wyborcza 27-28/10/90 p1).

see "Mazowiecki Government and the Church" p518.

"With regard to Poland, it is too early to say what the consequences of Glemp's attitude will be for relations between the Catholics and remaining Jews there. The least one can say is that the immediate impact of Glemp's words has been to reinforce the latent distrust between specific social groups, to facilitate disputes about religious and spiritual issues, and to damage Poland's image abroad in a situation in which the country is desperately in need of Western support and aid" (Jan de Weydenthal 'The Auschwitz Convent Controversy' RFE 6/9/89).

"Today...when anti-Semitic opinions are expressed in Poland, Jews are not the issue. The question is whether or not there will be a Polish democracy" (cited in Hockenos, Paul Free to
Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern

63 see 'West of Centre' in Polityka 28/7/90 p1.

64 quoted in Anna Uhlig 'Images of the Presidential Candidates
in the Course of the 1990 Electoral Campaign' in Dlaczego
Tak Glosowano op. cit. p127.

65 Adamski notes a : "common sense of being wronged in the
past by both the East and the West" (Adamski p164).

66 "Those same intellectual dissidents who were most
outspokenly 'European' in their pronouncements and ideas
are now multiply discredited with the local electorate"
(Tony Judt "The end of which European Era?" Daedalus

67 Zubek notes how the 'Europeanness' of the Mazowiecki
campaign "was met with admiring understanding within the
intelligentsia milieu, it hardly advanced the broader political
cause of the governing elite in the campaign" (Zubek (c)
p597).

68 see 'The Intelligentsia in Inter-war Poland' Chapter 2 p191.

69 see 'The Tyminski Phenomenon' Chapter 4 p614.

70 see 'Prezydencka kampania wyborcza w telewizji
konstruowanie (auto) portretow kandydatow' in Gebethner
and Jasiewicz p144.

71 "At every opportunity the montage sequence showed Walesa
amongst the crowds - as the leader of a mass social
movement" (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p155).

72 Ibid. p155.
"It seemed that the Walesa faction had stumbled upon a pattern of political competition very similar to that characterising most electoral campaigns in the West. Discussion of the merits of certain socio-economic issues was intertwined with 'feel-good' messages that involved rosy, over-optimistic promises. While in the West such campaigning has its devoted critics in academic and intellectual circles, few political campaigns are mounted without incorporating these elements" (Zubek (c) p597).

"Mazowiecki and his supporters presented the future as difficult, entailing a strenuous examination for society. Blood would not be shed, but sweat and tears - yes. The electorate - wise, mature, responsible, impervious to populism - ought to accept his program" (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p162).

"unconvincing, uncomfortable... monotonous and lengthy statements, an anxious facial expression, forced smiles, avoiding eye contact with the audience... everything gave the impression of weak commitment to the campaign and lack of will to win" (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p164).

see 'The Elections: Don't Let's be Shocked' Gazeta Wyborcza 3/10/91 p3.

"Although intellectuals usually have a wide knowledge of realities, which allows them to behave as politicians... it has a rather theoretical character. This type of knowledge is not usually suited to taking decisions, argumentative skills, convincing less educated people. It is seldom accompanied by a genius for public speaking" (Anna Radziwill 'Intellectuals in Politics' in Res Publica 2/1990 p137).
"People and organisations standing for the political philosophy of Mazowiecki are incapable of organising action, preferring talk rather than action. The PC on the other hand, while energetic, does not have a programme and is suspected of attracting hidden, radical Rightist groups whose battles are only beginning to emerge...creating a brutalisation of political culture" ('Style and Rights' Polityka 7/7/90 p1).

"Tyminski's popularity was provoked by the clear rivalry between the two Solidarity candidates. It weakened the influence of the Solidarity camps' symbol as an integrating force in society. It convinced a good part of society that the Government and it's Premier were ineffective and Walesa and his side unsuitable - thus all of them were incompetent" ('Wyniki głosowana: mapa polityczna polski jesienia 1990' in Dlaczego Tak Głosowano p76).

"Analysing this information from the perspective of the Presidential elections one can conclude that even then - in the first 1/4 of 1990 - this was an early incubation period for that which emerged in the form of the Stan Tyminski phenomenon" (The Genesis and Politico-Systemic Background of the Presidential Elections' in Dlaczego Tak Głosowano p34).

see Bralczyk and Mrozowski in Dlaczego Tak Głosowano p159.

see "The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry Chapter 4 p500.

what Zubek terms "impressionable provincial youth" (Zubek (a) p82)
"From the aforementioned data it is clear that treating the 'Tyminski camp' as a group of "deviants" (as was often the case in the post-election publicity) is unjustified. It was rather a group generally understood as "outsiders", people finding themselves - because of a tangle of social, political, psychological and cultural factors - as it were "on the outside" of the process of systemic transition being carried out by the Solidarity camp (Tomasz Zukowski in Gebethner and Jasiewicz p67).

"Walesa was the only candidate who had significant support amongst every social and demographic group...he was first and foremost a candidate of the workers" ('Dlaczego Tak Głosowano?' p63).

"For sociologists, the electorate of Tadeusz Mazowiecki became a new arena in the political arena of Poland...the first social group where a political position was defined by social position and interests, not by value system and symbols" (Weclawowicz p118).

Zukowski observes that "These statistics give the impression that the working class element of the electorate located itself almost entirely outside the Premier's camp. This must have led to the defeat of the candidate" (Gebethner and Jasiewicz p68). Zubek agrees that "The inability to appeal to voters outside the native intelligentsia milieu was the ROAD Achilles' heel" (Zubek (c) p597).

"Walesa was by far the most interventionist President in the region and provoked constitutional crises on a number of occasions to have his way - for example, in his dismissal of
individual ministers or premiers with whom he was displeased" (Crawford p296).

99 see 'Poland's Peculiar Election' The Economist 1/12/90 p74.

98 "Poles are not adult enough for democracy" he told Polish television. (Quoted in Ibid. p74).
Notes to Conclusion of Thesis

91 see Conclusion to Thesis p642


93 see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity' Chapter 3 p393.

94 see Mares, Musil L and Rabusic L 'Values and the welfare state in Czechoslovakia' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p91.

95 see 'Western intellectuals' Chapter 1 p88.

96 see Michnik (c) p90.

97 see Chapter 2 p264.

98 "Moralizing politics give an advantage to political intellectuals over party politicians, the language used is more familiar to them as a political discourse is their true field" A. Bozoki "Intellectuals in a New Democracy: The Democratic Charter in Hungary" East European Politics and Societies Vol. 10 No. 2 Spring 1996 p207, henceforth Bozoki.

99 see Mingiu p334.


"Eastern Europe has already demonstrated that importing free political parties, parliaments, and presses cannot establish a democratic civil society; imposing a free market may even have the opposite effect. Democracy grows from the bottom up and cannot be imposed from the top down. Civil society has to be built from the inside out. The institutional superstructure comes last". (B.R. Barber, 'Jihad vs. McWorld', The Atlantic, Vol.269, No.3 1992 pp53-63, cited in G. Ekiert 'Peculiarities of Post-Communist Politics: The Case of Poland', Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XXV, No.4, December 1992 p361).

For instance, see the frustration of women's representatives and feminist associations in the abortion debate.

"Generally speaking, the intelligentsia is departing from the social and public stage because the organizational and symbolic context required for its existence and for the carrying out of its self-appointed tasks has come to an end (the state now belongs to us, we are fully independent from a foreign power)" Joanna Kurczewska "The Polish Intelligentsia: Retiring from the Stage' The Polish Sociological Bulletin No.2 1992 p154 henceforth Kurczewska).

see Ibid. p152.

"They are perceived as culturally marginal and an embarrassment, a reminder of the time when most of their audience did not wish to associate with them and an annoying prolongation of the dissident conscience with which most Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and others had, and still have, little in common" (Judt p3).

"In Poland, the 85 to 90% approval rating that Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government enjoyed during the first several months of the post-communist transition allowed crucial economic reforms to be enacted. Those reforms withstood the subsequent turmoil in Polish politics, and enough time passed by 1993 to enable the informal norms of Polish society to adjust at least partly to a free-market economy" (M. Kramer 'Blue Collar Workers and the Post-Communist Transitions in Poland, Russia and Ukraine' Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol.28 No.1 1995 p10).

"We have to recognise that the whole process was in the hands of exceptionally moderate people. We should be grateful to them...This may offend the theoreticians of revolution, the seekers of revenge, and utopias, but it is more likely to produce long-term, successful change" (Daniel Chirot 'The Lessons of 1989: Comments on Janos Kis' East European Politics and Societies Vol. 12 No. 2 Spring 1998 p389).

see 'The Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform' Chapter 3 p309.

"The 'post-Solidarity' intelligentsia itself undermined the basic distinguishing features of the ethos, features that had set it apart from other social groups" (Kurczewska p154).

The diversity of political leaders [since 1989] is suggestive of a decline in the status of intellectuals. As with Polonia Reconstituta in 1918, intellectuals who had struggled alongside other social groups for an independent country seem to have been marginalized once the task was accomplished. Dissident intellectuals were seen as political amateurs, and new leaders, less well known, needed only a respectable past to launch a political career. But that is not so different from the situation in established democratic systems - an important sign that democratic politics in Poland are normal" (Raymond Taras Consolidating Democracy in Poland Oxford 1995 p180).

Until there is an unquestioned consensus in society that democracy has no alternative, intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe will have a chance to play another gig as "civil magicians of democracy or as nationalistic counterpoints to it" (Bozoki p207).

The European Community, the construction of a new administrative level above states, offers the next great opportunity for the intellectuals' claim to power. It provides a new site for intellectuals' employment, in the administrative and regulatory commissions that become available. But perhaps even more dramatically, it gives intellectuals a new kind of power in the opportunity to legislate a new community of nations and individuals. I believe too that this is probably the intelligentsia class project that will most facilitate the retention, or expansion, of democracy..." (Kennedy (b) p75).

Here is the most obvious representation of the class compromise at the apex of the post-communist social
structure: the new 'avant-garde' of the technocratic dominant fraction, the financial managers, use their specialized knowledge about tax loopholes to allocate funds to the new 'avant garde' of the dominated fraction, most notably, the media. In this way, the loyalty of humanistic intellectuals is gained" (Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, Eleanor Townsley 'The Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism' New Left Review No.222 March/April 1997 p81).

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Introduction

The purpose of the following guide is to give some impression of the roots, characteristics, leading cadre and policies of parties which feature in this thesis and were prominent in the early transition period. Although concerned with each organisation's role in the 'Mazowiecki era' the post-1990 experiences of some of the more influential ones are also included. The major sources for this guide are: Krystyna A. Paskiewicz ed. Polskie partie polityczne: charakterystiki dokumenty Official publication Wroclaw 1996 (henceforth Paskiewicz) and Inka Slodkowska ed. Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.2 Official publication Warsaw 1995, (henceforth Slodkowska).

Italicised names feature in Appendix II 'Profile of Prominent Political Figures'
1. Pre- 'Solidarity' Anti-communist Organisations

KOR: Committee for the Defence of Workers and
KSS-KOR: Committee for Social Self-Defence

Founded in 1976 as a response by a wide range of Polish intellectuals to communist persecution of protesting workers. Among its most prominent founders were Jan Jozef Lipski, Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. The committee worked quite openly (although not officially and legally) gathering and co-ordinating money and information to use in the defence of persecuted and imprisoned protesters. This stimulated the development of a substantial underground press. From 1977 onward it gradually widened its activities to the whole field of human rights, a move which illustrated the Polish intelligentsia's civic, rather than purely working-class perspective (the organisation's name was changed to the 'Committee for Social Self-Defence'). The founding of KOR is regarded by most observers as a turning point in Polish society's opposition to communism. It was the first time intellectuals and workers had united in the pursuit of a common goal and from this moment one could talk of an organised, nation-wide opposition. Despite this KOR was continually prone to internal divisions over ideological outlook and tactics. Dissolved in 1980 as a response to the legalisation of the 'Solidarity' Trade Union and also as a result of deepening
internal divisions. Nevertheless KOR members such as Kuron and Michnik went on to become prominent in the Round Table negotiations, Mazowiecki administration. Some remain noted figures in Polish politics, for instance as members of UW which is part of the 1997 governing coalition.
ROPCiO: Movement in Defence of Civil and Human Rights

Founded in 1977 by intellectuals including Andrzej Czuma and Leszek Moczulski as an alternative opposition organisation to KOR. It emphasised its patriotism and opposed communist rule more radically than KOR. Typically its members were more Catholic-oriented and/or economically liberal than the core of KOR intellectuals. Suffered more from communist repression and deeper splits. In 1979 Moczulski left to form the radical, nationalist KPN and Aleksdander Hall left to form the Christian-Democratic 'Young Poland Movement' effectively splitting the organisation.
2. Solidarity Organisations

NSZZ 'Solidarity': Independent Self-Governing Trade Union
'Solidarity'

Created in 1980 after increased food prices sparked strikes on Poland's Baltic coast and elsewhere. The government accepted the twenty-one demands of strikers in Gdansk led by Lech Walesa, including free trade unions. Solidarity realised the main aims of the Gdansk Agreement (signed 31/8/80). With the advice of anti-communist intellectuals such as Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, it organised the free trade unions into regional structures and presented the communist authorities with the first mass opposition movement (in 1981 it had around 10 million members). In September and October 1981 the 1st National Assembly of NSZZ 'S' Delegates took place, at which Lech Walesa was elected to the leadership. After the introduction of Martial Law (13/12/81) the Union was delegalised by statutes introduced 8/10/82. Some Union structures carried out illegal, underground opposition activities although in a state of dispersal. Most leading activists were interned and imprisoned. The underground work of the Union was based on its basic structures: directed by the Provisional Co-ordinating commission (TKK). After the 1986 amnesty for political prisoners, Lech Walesa founded the Provisional Council of Solidarity (26/8/86) composed of Bogdan
Boruszewicz, Zbigniew Bujak, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and others. On 25/10/87 the national Executive Commission was founded to take on the powers and functions of these bodies. Its leader was Lech Walesa. After the Round Table talks and the ratification by the Sejm of the "Laws concerning associations" (7/4/89 referring to "union pluralism"), Solidarity was reregistered (17/4/89). The Union played the main role in the organisation of the citizens committees for the June 1989 elections and leading the electoral campaign of the Solidarity-opposition candidates for the Sejm and Senate. After the elections, in August 1989, Lech Walesa accomplished the creation of the OKP-ZSL-SD coalition, ending the post-war monopoly of the PZPR authorities. At the 2nd National Congress of Delegates in Gdansk (19-25/4/90, attended by 451 delegates) Lech Walesa was again elected Union leader (with 75.5% of the vote). Lech Kaczyński and Stefan Jurczak were elected deputy leaders. The Assembly decided that "Solidarity" had a twofold character: a trade union and social movement. It decided that it was possible to participate in elections and represent the Union in parliament. Despite the settlements reached these issues persisted within the Union e.g. on the theme of politicisation or trade union representation. Walesa resigned from the leadership at the end of 1990 when he was elected President of the Republic. In February 1991 Marian Krzaklewski defeated Lech Kaczyński in the contest to replace Walesa as chairman. 'Solidarity' remains important in contemporary Polish
politics. The first three administrations in post-communist Poland were formed under its name. The victory of 'Solidarity Electoral Action' (AWS) in the 1997 parliamentary elections demonstrates its continued influence.
KO 'Solidarity': Citizens' Committee 'Solidarity'

The Citizens Committee was created as an informal group of around 60 NSZZ "Solidarity" activists and intellectual advisers (Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek etc.) as well as members of NSZZ RI 'S' and representatives of creative and artistic opposition groups. As such it represented organisational recognition of the increasing importance of the intelligentsia strand to the post-Martial Law Solidarity movement. They met for the first time in May 1987 at the invitation of Lech Walesa who believed that the approaching negotiations of the Solidarity movement with the communist authorities was best left to intellectuals. In December 1988 it took the name: the Citizens' Committee by the leader of NSZZ "Solidarity" (with around 130 members). The aim of the Committee was to "present the independent opinions of social groups, the expression of social needs and interests and the introduction of programmes of action". Henryk Wujec was appointed Secretary of the Committee. Members of the Committee were participants and advisers of the Solidarity-opposition side at the Round Table talks. After the conclusion of the Round Table the National Executive Commission of NSZZ "Solidarity" instructed that the body be transformed into the Citizens' Committee "Solidarity" (8/4/89). Its task then was to select candidates for the Sejm and Senate, to organise and lead the National Electoral
Bureau and the election campaign, and to co-ordinate activities in the emerging territorial and local citizens' committees throughout the country. After the elections of 4/6/89 the Committee reverted to its old name (22/6/89). However with the appointment of the first 'Solidarity government', different opinions emerged amongst members and union activists concerning its political role and duties (although point 3 of the resolution issued by the Committee (7/10/89) stated: "The Committee, as an inspirational, advisory and subservient body definitely does not claim authority, and likewise it cannot take the role of a co-ordinating centre for political organisations and associations"). There was a manifestation of these disputes, for example, at the Conference on the Solidarity Ethos (8-9/12/89). After Lech Walesa appointed his supporter and union activist Zdislaw Najder to the Committee leadership (22/2/90), he widened KO membership to include more of his supporters and removed Henryk Wujec from the post of secretary (1/6/90). The dispute deepened in the Committee itself and in the local citizens' committees. It was complicated by personal issues and the "War at the Top" between Mazowiecki and Walesa supporters. After a series of meetings called by Najder and Wujec (e.g. 31/3/90, 29/4/90, 13/5/90, 17,24,30/6/90) a group of KO members associated with the latter left the Citizens' Committee together with a section of the local citizens committees. From 31/3/90 the composition of the KO widened to include representatives of (mostly pro-Walesa) groups such as ChDSP, UPR,
Kld, ZChN, RPP etc. 27/10/90 it changed its name to the Citizens' Committee by Lech Walesa (leader - Zdislaw Najder). Announced its support for Walesa in the presidential election (14/10/90). Some Sejm deputies continued to sit as the rump Solidarity Citizens' Committee, campaigning to reduce the social costs of reform. It earned a place in the Sejm in the period 1991-93 but lost all its Sejm seats in the general elections of 1993.
OKP: Citizens' Parliamentary Club

Constituted 23/6/89 as the Parliamentary club of the opposition-Solidarity side. Made up of 161 MP's and 99 Senators. Led by Bronislaw Geremek. Initially at least the OKP provided Solidarity's political representation. In the first half of 1990 the first group and political divisions appeared within the OKP. Despite internal conflicts the OKP managed to maintain some level of formal unity and parliamentary co-operation up to the presidential elections of December 1990.
NSZZ RI 'Solidarity': Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers 'Solidarity'.

Organised in 1980-81 after a wave of peasant strikes (e.g. in Ustrzyki Dolne, Rzeszow); registered 12/5/81. Delegalised and broken up during Martial law (its leader, Jan Kulaj, co-operated with the Martial Law authorities). In March 1987 the Provisional National Council of NSZZ RI 'S' was set up and it decided to work publicly. Its new leader was Josef Slisz, who was re-elected in March 1989. At that time the Union was joined by "Rural Solidarity" which was led by Jan Kozlowski. NSZZ RI 'S' joined the opposition-Solidarity side at the time of the Round Table talks and June 1989 elections. Jozef Slisz became an OKP Senator and Vice-Speaker of the Senate and around 50 members were OKP Senators and MPs. The 4th National Congress of NSZZ RI 'S' took place 15-17 December 1989 at which Gabriel Janowski was elected to take the place of Jozef Slisz as leader. Janowski was considered more "economically minded" and more radical vis a vis the Mazowiecki government. In the course of 1990 the new leadership conducted discussions with the government about making corrections to agricultural policies. However, the more radical outlook of the Union meant that this was combined with other types of pressure, such as road blockades (e.g. 11/7/90). In May 1990 the National Council of the Union acknowledged the necessity of behaving with political neutrality if unity was to be
achieved in the countryside. On the 16/10/90 rejected the earlier proposition of the presidium that support should be given to the leader of the union, Gabriel Janowski, as a presidential candidate. Instead the Union's support was given to Lech Walesa.
PSL 'Solidarity': The Polish Peasant Party of Solidarity

Founded in September 1989. At an OKP meeting 21/9/88 NSZZ RI 'S' leader Jozef Slisz announced its creation as a party political extension to the Solidarity trade union, organising the political representation of the countryside. Over time the Union and its party became divided concerning relations with the Mazowiecki government. This split within Solidarity’s peasant organisations was emblematic of the general process of estrangement occurring at that time between the purely Trade Union members of the movement and those who wanted Solidarity to play a more political role as supporters of the Mazowiecki government. The first sign of this came when Slisz lost the ballot for the chairmanship of NSZZ RI 'S' to Janowski. In February 1990 the Provisional Executive committee was elected, under the leadership of Slisz. The committee, in the name of the party, rejected the proposition that it participate in the Congress of United Peasants Movements, though a section of its membership did attend. PSL 'S' shared NSZZ RI 'S' disillusionment with the treatment of the peasants by the Balcerowicz Plan. It looked for changes in the agricultural policy of the government, above all concerning the restructuring of agriculture. However it was more conciliatory to the government than NSZZ RI 'S' and did not take part in the protests of other peasant organisations. Nevertheless PSL 'S' was
angry with the government for choosing only one of its members to join the Mazowiecki government while the compromised ZSL enjoyed a high representation in the Cabinet. Favoured cultural and material integration of Poland's rural and urban areas. Although it identified its constituency as "the peasant stratum" it added the qualification "We do not think that a party representing peasant interests has to be an exclusively peasant party. It ought to have a nation-wide character."
3. Post-Solidarity Organisations

PC: Centre Agreement

Ideological/Organisational Roots
The roots of this organisation lie in the 'Solidarity' movement. It was formed 12/5/90 in Warsaw and registered as a party in March 1991. It was one of the products of the 'War at the Top' - the disintegration of the Solidarity camp. This process was initiated by groups under the leadership of Jaroslaw Kaczynski. These groups concentrated around Lech Walesa and his candidacy for the Presidency. The intention of Kaczynski was the pluralisation of political life, the avoidance of complete Solidarity unity and the ending of the dominance of the so-called 'post-Solidarity Left'.

To begin with PC was an incohesive, many-stranded movement. It had four basic currents: Christian democrat, liberal, unionist and peasant. Amongst its signatories was a group of MP's and Senators of the OKP, citizens' committee activists, members of KLD, PSL 'S' and representatives of extra-Parliamentary groups such as democratic groups (e.g. SD, Centrum Demokratyczne, Ruch Wolnych Demokratow) and Christian Democratic organisations (e.g. the Union of Christian Democratic Parties, the Christian Democrats, the Christian Labour Party).

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After its transformation into a unified party it situated itself on the centre-right with the characteristics of Polish Christian Democracy (chadecja): "We subscribe to Christian ethics and are convinced that Poland requires a strong political force in the centre"4. It had the ambition of joining the current of the West European strand of Christian Democracy (particularly the German CDU): "We formed as a synthetic party, uniting conservative-liberal and Christian-Democratic elements5.

Constitutional Policy

PC's declared base is natural law and Christian values and the social teaching of the Catholic Church which stresses freedom, human dignity and private property. The basic political aim for the PC is the creation of a modern, strong state based on traditional values: "The overriding issue is Poland's rights of state. We believe that neither wealth, freedom nor justice will be attained for citizens without strengthening the authority of the Polish state"6. Strengthening state authority included a call for a strong President: "We believe that Poland needs a President who is an actual co-author of change. The person of the President should represent a trustworthy guarantee of the introduction of democratic, systemic reform"7. Of course this also suited the PCs support for Walesa's presidential ambitions.
The Christian Democratic side of PC appears particularly in the recognition of the authority of the Church. However it stopped short of calling for constitutional recognition of this power. PC supported the ratification by the Sejm of a concordat between Poland and the Vatican as quickly as possible. In abortion discussions it was definitely for restrictive legislation and against the organisation of a general referendum on the issue (most opinion polls show Polish society's consistent support for liberal abortion laws).

Economic Policy
The economic programme of PC is based on private property and a free-market economy. It demands significant limitation of state intervention, permissible only in the period of systemic transformation. Economic reform ought to be in keeping with the rapid distribution of property to society through universal privatisation using a variety of methods (including worker-owned and general offering). PC appreciated some of the Mazowiecki government's economic reforms - halting inflation, introducing market mechanisms, making prices realistic, making the zloty transferable. However it condemned the Balcerowicz Plan for failing to realise 'democratic capitalism'. Instead of giving equal chances of riches to all it allowed the financial elite to prosper at the expense of ordinary Poles with deep recession, fall in real
wages and unemployment taking their toll. These criticisms were linked to PC's vague policy of 'acceleration' of reform.

**Foreign Policy**

In the field of foreign policy the main PC objective was Poland's entry into the process of European integration as quickly as possible. Full membership of the European Union and NATO is seen as a vital step in ending Poland's submission to Russia: "The main political vector in Polish politics is a pro-European orientation. This aspect demands entrance to a united Europe with the European Union at its heart".

**Political Fortunes**

In practice PC in the early transition period was a vociferous, anti-communist force. It called for immediate 'decommunisation' and the removal of the old 'nomenklatura' political elite. PC launched a sustained attack on the Mazowiecki government's policy of the 'thick line' drawn under the communist pasts of many politically influential people. For instance it strongly criticised the fact that the government tolerated the continued practice of 'nomenklatura privatisation': "We warn that Poland's meagre financial reserves, which are being freed by the market system, are concentrated in the hands of foreign investors and the Polish financial elite whose finances are the product of the corrupt economic system of the past".
During the Mazowiecki period 41 MP's and 12 Senators belonged to the PC Circle in the OKP. PC activists who organised the Presidential campaign of Lech Walesa, such as Jaroslaw Kaczyński, Teresa Liszcz, Slawomir Siwek and Jacek Maziarski took up positions as Secretaries of State in the Chancellery of the President. However in 1991 Kaczyński and Walesa fell out when the Olszewski government, of which PC was a coalition partner criticised the President. Up to the parliamentary elections of 1993 representatives of PC sat in the Sejm and participated in the coalition governments, particularly that of Jan Olszewski. However Kaczyński failed in his attempts to strengthen the base of this Centre-Right, Catholic identity and failed to secure executive roles for PC members. After 1993 PC left for extra-parliamentary opposition. Characteristic of the PC and particularly its leadership is a tendency to spectacular fall-outs resulting in the resignation of many well-known activists e.g. Christian Democratic politicians under leadership of Olszewski left to form Forum of Christian Democratic Thought. PC is also plagued by corruption scandals surrounding some of its prominent members. However it has returned to the parliament with around 20 MPs, including Jaroslaw Kaczyński winning seats in the 1997 elections as part of the electoral coalition 'Solidarity Electoral Action' (AWS). During the Mazowiecki period the PC.
press organs were "Tygodnik Solidarnosc" and "Tygodnik Centrum".

ROAD: Citizens' Movement - Democratic Action
(subsequently UD: Democratic Union and UW: Freedom Union)

Ideological/Organisational Roots
Organisations whose roots lay in the intelligentsia cadre of KOR and the Solidarity movement. Its membership included people of Solidarity origins and well known opposition names Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jacek Kuron, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Bronislaw Geremek. On the 10th June 1990 sections of MP's and Senators from the OKP, groups of activists from Citizens' Committees and Catholic circles were invited by Jerzy Turowicz to a meeting in Krakow, at which the Democratic Alliance (SnRd) was founded. This was an informal structure which supported the Mazowiecki government and opposed the PC. However its role was quickly taken over by ROAD, founded 16/7/90 in Warsaw (amongst the 101 founding signatories of the new group one could find the majority of Alliance signatories, supported, among others, by leading 'Solidarity' intellectuals such as Adam Michnik and union activists from the citizens' committee movement such as Zbigniew Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk. These had not accepted the conception of the movement proposed by the group centred around Zdiszlaw Najder and Lech Walesa). On 30/9/90 the
Founding Council of ROAD officially supported the candidacy of Tadeusz Mazowiecki for the Presidential Office, and his electoral campaign was organised by members of ROAD. After Mazowiecki's defeat in the Presidential elections ROAD members helped form the Democratic Union (UD). Registered as a party 11-12/5/91 with Mazowiecki as leader and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Aleksander Hall and Jacek Kuron as deputy leaders. The parliamentary club of UD was formed in January 1991 with Bronislaw Geremek as its leader. On 23/4/94, as a result of defeat of the post-Solidarity camp in the 1993 parliamentary elections and the rise to power of the ex-communists of SLD, the UD transformed itself into the Freedom Union (UW).

The ROAD - UD - UW strand suffered from the type of internal ideological disputes which plagued the Solidarity movement during the transition period. A major cause of this problem was the attempt of its political leadership to form a 'catch all' party, a legacy of its roots in the elitist, intelligentsia milieu which traditionally appealed to all citizens rather than specific social constituencies. It situated itself on the political spectrum between the moderate Left and Centre-Right. The pragmatic party Centre, represented by Bronislaw Geremek, Andrzej Wielowiejski and Leszek Balcerowicz among others, looked to unite all post-Solidarity forces, regardless of programmatic differences. This created problems concerning the creation of a clear vision.
because both party fringes pulled in different directions. The Left, represented by figures such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik wanted a social-democratic character while consistently supporting radical, neo-liberal economic reform initiated by the Balcerowicz Plan. It saw the party as a 'catch-all' Centrist organisation with a primarily economic orientation (supporting the development of small and medium sized businesses). Political opponents of UW suspected this strand of wanting to form an alliance with the post-Communists. On the other hand the Right flank, represented by Jan Maria Rokita, wanted the party to become a Christian-Democratic-Conservative organisation. After the 1995 elections the UW Right called for a UW-ZChN-Solidarity alliance. This strand was suspected by the Left of having clerical tendencies. Controversies between these strands resulted in a failure to create a single party vision. Nevertheless there were some identifiable policies.

Constitutional Policy
It called for a parliamentary system of government with limited presidential powers: "UD sees parliament as the fundamental institution of a democratic system...The president ought to be answerable to the state and not responsible for specific policies"10. Although there were clear ideological differences between the secular Left of the party and the more traditional, Catholic Right over Church/state relations it generally emphasised the need for
Poland to have a secular state with a clear separation of Church and state institutions: "We support the autonomy and explicit independence of the state and the Catholic Church"11.

**Economic Policy**

In terms of economic policy the goal was the institution of a market economy of the type envisaged by the Balcerowicz Plan: "The road to prosperity leads through long-term systematic efforts to improve the organisation and solidity of labour and build market institutions, achieve a stable currency, privatisation of the Polish economy and opening it to the outside world"12.

**Foreign Policy**

Poland's close participation in the process of European integration was a fundamental policy of this strand, in keeping with the pro-European attitude of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: "The fundamental aim of foreign policy is the integration of Poland into the political and economic structures of Western Europe"13.

**Political Fortunes**

Generally speaking, the electoral performance of these organisations has been disappointing. Despite the consistent presence of a nationally well-known, knowledgeable, essentially pragmatic elite it has not established itself as a dominant force. The internal ideological splits mentioned above have contributed
to this. Moreover, in the face of the clear dominance of the Polish scene by the extreme emotions of the post-communist/anti-communist dichotomy the centrist, moderation and intellectual pragmatism of UW caused a decline in its political influence. Finally, it was identified from 1989-93 as the strand held responsible for the costs of economic transition (a significant part of Polish society still views the Balcerowicz Plan negatively). The zenith of this strand in terms of political power was clearly the first six months of the Mazowiecki administration when many of its most prominent future members controlled parliament and government. The ROAD circle in Parliament numbered 25 MP's and 23 Senators. UD was the winner of the parliamentary election of 1991. However the modest scale of the victory and the success of the ex-communist SLD in second place dealt severe blows to the party's ambition to become the dominant political force in the country. The Christian-democratic-Catholic Olszewski government coalition distanced the secular forces in UD. The party returned to prominence after the former Solidarity parties managed to unite and form a coalition under UD member Hanna Suchocka. Her government pursued the economic and political reform initiated under Mazowiecki. However it fell foul of internal splits as moral and ideological issues such as Church/state relations, abortion and de-communisation dominated political life. After the rise of the SLD/PSL coalition in 1993 it fell from power. In the Presidential
In the course of the campaign the UW candidate Jacek Kuron, from the Left of the party, was publicly criticised by the Right of the party. As a result the Right camp was dismissed by the party authorities. Leszek Balcerowicz was elected to the leadership in April 1995, replacing Mazowiecki. That change was related to internal arguments over the party's future. The programme of the new leadership is geared toward pragmatism and strengthening party discipline. The culmination of this process was UW's securing of third place in the 1997 elections with 13.37% of the vote and its entrance into a governing coalition with 'Solidarity Electoral Action'. Balcerowicz and Geremek have been appointed to top posts in the new administration. The UW electorate is mainly the intelligentsia, financial circles, inhabitants of large towns and cities, advocates of reform and pro-European Poles. Its press organ remains 'Gazeta Wyborcza'.
4. Communist and Communist 'Satellite' Organisations

PZPR: Polish United Workers Party

The communist party, vassal of the USSR, formed 16/12/48 as the product of the union of the Polish Workers Party (PPR) and the so-called "Lubelski" (pro-Soviet Union) part of the Polish Socialist Party. The ruling party in Poland 1944-89 (in 1976 articles concerning the "leading role" of the PZPR were added to the Polish constitution). It created an authoritarian system of government and a centralised party-state apparatus behind the facade of a three party system with the SD and ZSL. The most recent First Secretaries were Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mieczyslaw Rakowski. Its main press organs were "Trybuna Ludu" and "Nowe Drogi". Tadeusz Fiszbach a PZPR member was vice-Speaker in the Sejm after the June 1989 elections. At the 12th Plenum of the PZPR (28-29/7/89) Jaruzelski resigned as First Secretary (he had just been elected President of the People's Republic of Poland by the National Assembly). His position was taken by Rakowski. At the 16th Plenum of the PZPR (6/1/90) plans to institute a new left-wing party were ratified. The final PZPR Congress took place 27-30/1/90. 1636 delegates took part, elected by over 1,132,000 PZPR members. They passed the resolution concerning the self-liquidation of the party and the transformation of the Congress into the founding Congress of a new left-wing party.
1196 delegates declared themselves for the institution of the SdRP and elected *Aleksander Kwasniewski* to its executive council. It also decided to take possession of the PZPR's substantial properties. Over 140 delegates decided to institute the USdRP, electing Tadeusz Fiszbach as leader. It decided to renounce the property and legacy of the PZPR.
ZSL and PSL 'Odrodzenie': United Peasant Party and Polish Peasant Party 'Rebirth'.

The ZSL was created in 1949 in Warsaw after the pro-communist People's Party absorbed the remnants of the traditional Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Basically it filled a subservient role as a satellite peasant party of the PZPR. One can however point to certain independent activities (e.g. participation, from April 1989 onwards in the All Poland Social Committee for the Rebirth of the Peasant Movement). At this point one must also bear in mind the urban/rural divide in Poland, evident even under communism. This allowed the ZSL to build its own sizeable membership in the countryside, gain considerable wealth and develop its own lively press. After the June 1989 elections the ZSL co-operated with NSZZ 'Solidarity' and was part of the unsuccessful attempt to form a governing coalition around the PZPR. Instead in August 1989 a Solidarity-ZSL-SD coalition was created. The ZSL's participation in the coalition ensured that its members were prominent in government posts and parliamentary positions. In the Mazowiecki government Czeslaw Janicki was vice-Premier and Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Food (until 6/5/90). Minister of Justice was Aleksander Bentowski, Minister of Health and Social Welfare was Andrzej Kosniak-Kamysz and Bronislaw Kaminski was Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources. The ZSL had 76 members in the Sejm including the
Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz. This situation sparked the protests of emergent peasant organisations who pointed to the ZSL's compromised past. However the ZSL was attempting to distance itself from its communist satellite period by becoming a 'historic' party; stressing its roots in the pre-war PSL and claiming to be the leading representative of the Polish peasantry. On 11th September 1989 Roman Milanowski, the leader of the ZSL in communist times and a symbol of the party's subordination under communism (he was also head of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship), resigned. Dominik Ludwiczak was elected in his place by the party's 9th Plenum. On 26/11/89 an extraordinary congress of the ZSL took place which transformed it into PSL 'Odrodzenie'. Kazimierz Olesiak was elected leader, Chairman of the Governing Council was Jozef Zych and honorary President was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. The press organs of the party were "Dziennik Ludowy" and "Zielony Sztandar". Participated in the unification of the peasant movement in 1990.
SD: Democratic Party

Founded in 1939. The SD had been a satellite organisation of the communists, fulfilling, in part, the role of representative of business or 'private initiatives'. In 1990 it claimed its constituency to be "individual businessmen and the free trades".

The leader of the SD, Jerzy Jozwiak (who had replaced Tadeusz Mlynczak at the party's 14th Congress 17-20th April 1989) together with Lech Walesa and Roman Wilanowski made possible the first non-communist governing coalition (17th August 1989). In the Mazowiecki Government Jan Janicki from the SD was vice-Premier, and Aleksander Mackiewicz was Minister for the domestic market. In the Sejm Teresa Dobielinska-Eliszewska from the SD was a vice-Marshall. In October 1989, an all-party referendum elected to retain the party's name. This was acknowledged by some as a defeat for the reformers and the wasting of a chance to gain some credibility in society. The decision initiated a further disintegration and re-organisation of the party. Although generally supportive of the Government (with the exception of the liberal economic policies of Balcerowicz) the instability and constantly changing membership and leadership of the SD made it hard to ascertain its true orientation. For instance, while the SD was largely critical of the Balcerowicz Plan a number of its MPs had been known to defend
it in the Sejm. However it definitely favoured more state interventionism and the welfare state.
OPZZ: All-Poland Trade Union Alliance and
RLP: Working People's Movement

The OPZZ was created 24/2/84 as an organisation uniting the
so-called 'neo-unions' (trade unions created after the introduction
of Martial Law and delegalisation of unions active under the
Solidarity banner). Its leader was Alfred Miodowicz who, from
1987, was a member of the political bureau of the PZPR. From the
beginning the OPZZ played an important political role as a rival
to NSZZ 'Solidarity'. During the Round table talks it was often a
fiercer opponent of the Solidarity-opposition side than more
pragmatic members of the governing coalition side. In the
Parliament formed after the June 1989 elections 11 MP's affiliated
to the OPZZ were elected. Miodowicz was rejected in the elections
along with the rest of the PZPR membership. The RLP was
organised by Miodowicz (10-11/10/89) as a "left-wing political
forum" representing the emerging political aims of the OPZZ. The
Union decided to support both Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and
Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the Presidential elections.
PAX

Created as a political group in 1945 from an initiative by Boleslaw Piasecki, it was closely linked to the weekly newspaper "Dzis i Jutro". Served as an instrument of the PZPR to rival and undermine the authority of the Catholic Church. In 1952 it was granted the status of association. From 1947 onwards it had a small representation of MPs in successive Sejms all of whom co-operated with the PZPR. PAX participated in the June 1989 elections as part of the governing coalition and obtained 10 mandates. Leader Zenon Komender resigned his position 11/8/89 and Maciej Wreszcza was elected in his place. Supported Lech Walesa in the presidential elections. Its press organs were "Słowo Powszechne" and "Zorza".
5. Post Communist Organisations

SdRP: Social Democrats of the Polish Republic.

**Ideological/Organisational Roots**

Founded in February 1990. The major product of the disintegration of the PZPR. Abandoned democratic centralism and the dictatorship of the proletariat and embraced parliamentary democracy and the mixed economy, although critics suspected that its rank and file were still radical leftists. It identified its new constituency as "the 'middle' class. This is a base which will be much broader than in the case of PZPR". In its founding declaration it stated: "We are for civil society...parliamentary democracy and a multi-party system". It was keen to represent itself as part of Poland's social-democratic as opposed to the Marxist tradition which suffered from its communist links: "Our ideas are linked to the Polish socialist tradition, with the common goals of the Polish Left and with the common heritage of international socialism". In economic terms its outlook was similar to West European social-democracy. It presented itself as a party of moderation and technical competence.

**Constitutional Policy**

SdRP preferred a parliamentary system of government with a single house of parliament and a strong Prime Minister or
Chancellor. Presidential powers were to be strictly proscribed.: "The Sejm is the highest state organ in terms of legislation"17. It was avowedly secular: "We stand for the division of Church from State in relation to the religious beliefs of citizens"18.

Economic Policy
Social-democratic. It supported the introduction of the free market but with state intervention in certain areas of the economy to guarantee social welfare: "We are for a market economy together with elements of interventionism and social responsibility on the part of the state"19. It called for the involvement of workers in the privatisation process and distanced itself from the much criticised 'nomenklatura privatisation' process conducted by other former PZPR members: "It is vital that laws for employees to jointly decide over ownership transformation...Transformation of state property cannot degenerate into speculation over national assets" (Ibid. p97).

Foreign Policy
SdRP recognised the necessity of co-operation with NATO, EU and particularly Poland's immediate neighbours: "Poland should base its security on building European structures of co-operation and integration"20.
Political Fortunes

On 31/1/90 the old MP's Club of the PZPR transformed itself into the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left (PKLD) which included 22 SdRP MP's, 30 from the USdRP and 116 ex-PZPR members who were not affiliated to any party. Wlodzjemierz Cimoszewicz became leader of the Club 23/3/90. The leadership of the SdRP in this period was: Aleksander Kwasniewski - leader of the Executive Council, deputy leader was Tomasz Nalecz, general secretary was Leszek Miller. The party's fortunes can be divided into two periods. The first, which lasted up to the parliamentary elections of 1993 was one of political isolation. In 1991 the post-communist organisations formed an electoral alliance - the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which won 60 seats in the Sejm and four in the Senate. This period was spent in opposition to the various 'Solidarity governments'. SLD criticised the negative effects of economic transition, the tightening of abortion legislation and the return of religious education. The second period began with the victory of SLD in the 1993 elections where it won 171 seats in the Sejm and 38 in the Senate. The result was seen as Polish society's reaction against the Solidarity governments whose rule had been marked with economic austerity and constant internal wrangling. Together with PSL, SLD formed a governing coalition under Pawlak of PSL. From there SLD general continued in the direction of reforms made by previous governments, though it re-opened debates on abortion
and the proposed concordat with the Vatican. In 1995 a vote of no confidence replaced Pawlak with SLD's Jozef Oleksy which effectively put more power in this camp. In 1995 SdRP candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski was elected President of the Republic, leaving the camp in an extremely powerful political position. However accusations that Oleksy was an agent of USSR, made by Walesa's presidential campaign team in 1995 damaged the government. In the 1997 parliamentary elections SLD suffered a surprising reverse. Despite actually improving its electoral performance on 1993 SLD came second to 'Solidarity Electoral Action'. The ability of the Solidarity camp to unite in a way it failed to in 1993 contributed to this as did the fact that some voters continue to vent their discontent with economic difficulties on the ruling party. The anti-communism of the Solidarity camp ruled out a coalition with SLD and it formed one with the post-Solidarity UW instead. This consigned the post-communist to political opposition once again, though Kwasniewski will be President until the year 2000 at least. The press organ for this camp is "Trybuna".
USdRP: The Social-Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland and
PUS: Social Democratic Union of Poland

The other offshoot of the defunct PZPR. A smaller but prominent
and more truly reformed group led by Tadeusz Fiszbach. At the
time of the founding congress of the USdRP (7/4/90) the decision
was taken to change its name to PUS. Its leader was Tadeusz
Fiszbach, deputy leaders were Kazimierz Kik, Jacek Wodz and
Wieslawa Ziolkowska. Earlier at a session of the Sejm
(23-24/3/90) instituted the Parliamentary Club of the PUS under
the leadership of Wieslawa Ziolkowska (members had previously
been affiliated to the PKLD). Claimed its main constituency was
"the technical and humanistic intelligentsia and highly qualified
workers" (Mariusz Janicki 'Polish Political Panorama' Polityka
4/8/90 p4). Its press organ was "Gazeta Wspolna".
6. Reactivated Historic Organisations

PSL: Polish Peasants' Party

Ideological/Organisational Roots

Reactivated peasant organisation. The first steps taken in rebuilding the pre-WWII Polish Peasant Party were: the formation of the Independent Peasant' Movement of 'Solidarity' (by Hanna Chorazyna, Michal Bartoszcze, Jozef Taliga), declaration of the reactivation of the historic PSL (10/6/88 by a group around Henryk Baka) and the first Congress of the Independent Peasants' Movement (25/6/89) and subsequent meeting (held in Wilanow 15/8/89) of the old activists of the pre-war PSL, veterans of the war time Peasants' Battalions, representatives of NSZZ RI 'S', Peasant Youth Union etc. at which decision was taken to resume activities of PSL (F. Kaminski, former Commandant of the Peasants' Battalions became honorary President and a 24-person Chief Executive Committee was chosen). In September 1989 four PSL MPs formed the Circle of PSL MPs together with four MPs who had left ZSL. The circle was led by Roman Bartoszcze. A series of meetings in Spring 1990 by representatives of Solidarity, ex-ZSL and pre-communist peasant representatives culminated in the Congress of the United Peasants' Movement which took place on 5th May 1990. The unified PSL was created. (leader of the Governing Council - Roman Jagielinski, leader of the Chief
Executive Council - Roman Bartoszcze, honorary president
Franciszek Kaminski).

PSL saw its roots in the traditions and beliefs of the peasantry: the Peasant Party (SL) created in 1895, the Peasant Battalions, the ideas and programmes of the peasant movement, particularly Wincenty Witos and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. It took neo-agrarianism as a basic programme, the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and also recognised selected elements of socialism and so-called 'democratic socialism'. Its major concerns are "acting for the security and political and economic sovereignty of Poland...introducing appropriate socio-economic rules and defending the rights of citizens and the interests of the peasant class in society"21.

Constitutional Policy
In systemic questions PSL advocated a parliamentary-cabinet system of government: "Parliament has to be the highest form of government in the sovereign state". The traditional bases of PSL power lie in the rural, provincial areas and this was reflected in the party's call for a strong local tier of government with tax-raising powers and representation in Warsaw: "PSL is for authentic self-government in rural areas and villages we must strengthen and regenerate the districts and provinces"22. PSL saw all institutions and associations as autonomous, including Church
and state. Though referring to Christian ethics it proposed the separation of these bodies.

**Economic Policy**

In economic terms PSL supports a regulated market economy with broad state intervention and a closely controlled process of modernisation: "PSL believes that a market system must be related to designated state intervention". It regards the basis of Polish agriculture in strong family farms and demands guaranteed minimum prices for agricultural products from the state as well as a limitation on the import of goods which could be produced and exported in Poland: "The state has to guarantee the profitability of agricultural production. To achieve this aim it should employ methods used all over the world (grants, credits, taxes) and a minimum pricing system for products". It also calls for the strengthening of the rural infrastructure. In general terms PSL also calls for social welfare provisions (the right to free education, medical treatment, subsidised prescriptions, nurseries and cultural institutions, unemployment benefit and above all benefits for large families and pensioners).
Foreign Policy
In foreign affairs it supports a certain degree of integration into EU and NATO, but with protection of state sovereignty. From this point of view it called on the government to renegotiate Poland's association with EU. This was in keeping with the peasantry's fears of unfair competition with the economies of more developed Western states.

Political Fortunes
PSL is a very important party in the post-communist political system. It has support amongst the majority of village inhabitants but also has bases in the primary professions and unqualified workers. After 1989 it played a prominent part in all parliamentary elections and in the creation of successive governments. As a coalition partner it was 'acceptable' to the right and the left, to anti-communists and ex-communists. Taking advantage of this situation it held its coalition partner SLD in check during the Pawlak administration because PSL offered it the only opportunity to take part in government. PSL (and previously ZSL) had representatives in the Mazowiecki, Bielicki, Olszewski, Suchocka, Pawlak and Oleksy administrations. Speaker of the Sejm under Mazowiecki was Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, at that time the most popular PSL activist in Poland. In the Presidential election of 1990 Bartoszcz was its candidate. In July 1991
Bartoszcze was ousted at an acrimonious congress and replaced by the former state farm manager Waldemar Pawlak. PSL was a junior partner in the 1991 Olszewski government and Pawlak was briefly Prime Minister in 1992 (however he failed to build a coalition). PSL emerged from the 1993 elections as the second largest party in parliament, behind SLD. It formed a coalition government with Pawlak as Prime Minister. Although PSL exercised substantial political power during this period the coalition suffered from a lack of unified attitudes on many issues, particularly economic reform where the more interventionist PSL line was contrary to SLD's basic commitment to a free market system. After a vote of no-confidence Pawlak was replaced by SLD's Oleksy as Premier. Pawlak ran against Kwasniewski in the 1995 presidential elections but attracted only 4.3% of the vote. In the 1997 elections PSL suffered from its attempts in the past to play king-maker. It came in fourth place with 7.31% of the vote and 27 seats in the Sejm. PSL's association with the SLD served it poorly and it was not invited to become part of the ruling AWS-UW coalition.
PPS: Polish Socialist Party

Ideological/Organisational Roots

Reactivated in November 1987 as a continuation of the pre-war party of the same name which was founded in Paris in 1892. It saw its roots in party's tradition of the left-wing, independent emigration and in the leftist democratic opposition of the communist period. Declared itself as a party of the left, of the workers. Leader of its governing council was Jan Jozef Lipski. The press organ of the party was "Robotnik".

In 1988 the party experienced a series of splits over attitudes to the Round Table process. Younger, more radical elements rejected the agreement. Thus three groups participated in the June 1989 elections claiming the tradition of the PPS.

1. The so-called 'non-adjectival' PPS: under the leadership of Jan Jozef Lipski. After the June 1989 elections Lipski became an OKP Senator and Kazimierz Blaszczyk and Henryk Michalak became OKP MP's. It had several hundred members, including several pre-war socialists.

2. PPS - RD: Rejected the agreements reached at the Round Table talks. Acted together with radical groups such as "Fighting
Solidarity" or "Freedom and Peace" (was at two congresses of the Anti-Systemic Opposition held in February and May 1989). The 1st National Congress of the PPS - RD took place in December 1989, where Piotr Ikonowicz, Artur Smolko and Józef Pinior were elected to the party leadership.

3. TKK PPS - created by the most radical young members of the PPS (linked to the editors of some party journals such as "Warszawianki". Protested against "the impotence and weakness of political parties"; its leader was Grzegorz Ilka.

At the beginning of 1990 lengthy discussions led to the unification of these three factions into a Unified Electoral Block for the territorial elections. Subsequently the 25th Congress of the PPS (27-29/10/90) was attended by members of all the factions. Lidia Ciolkoszowa became Honorary President and Jan Józef Lipski leader of the Governing Council. In the Presidential elections the PPS did not support any candidate, maintaining that parliamentary elections should be given priority.

Constitutional Policy

In systemic matters it supported a parliamentary-cabinet system: "The highest legislative authority is the parliament"25. The President was to act as an arbiter between different branches of government. It called for a strong local-government tier with representation in parliament as a state organ which has
legislative initiative in socio-economic issues. The party put emphasis on referenda as a means to express public opinion.

On the issue of Church-state relations PPS is radically secular. According to its members religious belief was a private matter and not part of the political arena. It calls for a definite separation of Church and state: "The constitution must guarantee the division of Church from state". It criticised the return of religious education to public schools.

**Economic Policy**

In economic terms PPS advocates a market economy but gives the government the right and duty to intervene in its operation for the good of the people. Each individual has the inalienable right to work and it is the duty of the state to shape the free market to favour the workers. It supports ownership transformation in accordance with the wishes of workers, and the creation of co-operatives, local government enterprises and workers' councils. It opposes the repurchasing at a very low price of existing industries by foreign capital, fearing that Western interests may 'colonise' the Polish economy. PPS noted "the tendency [of foreign capital] to take advantage of our difficult economic situation to dominate the Polish economy to the detriment of Polish society". Foreign investment is to be encouraged while guaranteeing the rights and participation of trade unions and workers' councils.
PPS demands heavy state intervention to rebuild the infrastructure of Poland's rural areas. It looks for consistent, long term government support through credits, the encouragement of new technology and a policy of guaranteed minimum prices for agricultural products.

**Foreign Policy**

In terms of foreign policy, PPS calls for close links with other post-communist countries which have similar socio-economic problems. Although generally favouring Poland's place in the process of European integration, the aforementioned fears of 'economic imperialism' by the strong economic forces of European Union countries made PPS cautious.

**Political Fortunes**

Despite a populist program, promising society that it will take care of its sufferings, PPS has not gained many members. This can be explained by several factors. The traditional weakness of PPS as a predominately émigré organisation made up of a small elite of activists did not lend itself to the post-communist development of a mass organisation. PPS likewise suffers from the 'nostalgia' party syndrome. Reliance on the ideology of an organisation which has been defunct during four decades of radical change can be anachronistic. Finally the negative influence of the communist
period on the fortunes of the left in post-communist Poland is obvious. Apart from PZPR-successor parties PPS was the only organisation willing to place itself on the left in 1990 (see Chart). The damage done to left-wing ideology by communist rule not only undermined PPS social popularity but caused internal splits. The traditional hostility of the PPS to Communism was increasingly opposed by pragmatic members who sought closer ties with post-PZPR parties. A decisive moment came in the 1993 elections where a group of PPS members joined the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Three members of this group became MPs. By the 1995 elections PPS declared its support for the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski.
SP: The Labour Party (subsequently ChD SP: Christian Democratic Labour Party)

Organisational/Ideological Roots
Party of nostalgia revived 12th February 1989 as a continuation of the pre-war Christian Democrat (chadecja) organisation of the same name. In a bulletin in 1989 it emphasised its pre-communist roots, and six of its resolutions were taken from the programme of the SP in 1945. Closely linked with the Christian Democratic Club of Political Thought. Both groups were led by Wladyslaw Sila-Novicki a prominent lawyer who had represented many persecuted workers and opposition activists under communism. Backed by the still influential ZNAK movement which comprised several dozen Catholic Clubs of the Intelligentsia (KIK), the influential weekly newspaper 'Tygodnik Powszechny' and the 'Znak' monthly. Its program emphasised values similar to Western European Christian Democracy.

Constitutional Policy
Christian values were to form the framework of Polish life but not in an institutional way. While close to the ZChN on most issues, SP placed more stress on Catholic social teaching.
Economic Policy

Although in favour of privatisation it supported a limited role for the state in the economy and espoused social services and welfare systems.

Political Fortunes

In 1989 the SP made it clear that it hoped to initiate the foundation of a wider Christian-democratic movement in Poland. At the 3rd Congress of the SP (28-29th April and 2nd June 1990) a new name was chosen: The Christian democratic Labour party (ChD SP). Wladyslaw Sila Nowicki became leader of the Main Council. In September 1990 the ChDSP appealed to all Polish Christian-Democrat groups. As a result of inter-party friction (related, for instance, to Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki being put up as a candidate for the Presidency) the majority of members of youth groups (such as the Young Christian Democrats) left the ChDSP. They were followed by a group of activists who then founded the "United" Christian-Democratic Party (ChDS "Z"). SP activists questioned the representative character of the opposition-Solidarity side at the Round Table talks and the June '89 elections. Only two of its proposed candidates had been accepted into Solidarity's citizens committees: Walerian Piotrowski (who became an OKP Senator) and Marek Rusakiewicz (who obtained a mandate as an MP in the OKP) and this increased its
opposition to the Mazowiecki government. Not prominent in terms of political power but still influential.
7. Radical new parties

K-LP UPR: The Conservative - Liberal Party "Union of 'Realpolitik"

Ideological/Organisational Roots

Registered as a party 6th December 1990. Related personally and ideologically with the Movement for Realpolitik (RPR). Founders of the UPR were, among others, Janusz Korwin-Mikke Stefan Kisielewski, Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, Tomasz Gabis and Aleksander Jedraszczyk. Led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke who was a member of SD 1968-82 and adviser to NSZZ 'Solidarity' in the 1980s.

As its name suggested the organisation was politically right wing and conservative with radically liberal economic policies. Its programme was largely based on the British Conservative Party's from the 1980s. Its roots lay in the emergence of neo-liberal economists in the early 1980s. In the aftermath of Martial Law they saw the disintegrating economy as the biggest threat to Poland's future and attempted to propose socio-economic change without necessarily challenging the political status quo. Poland's economic plight was seen as the result not only of the communist system but also of the heavy demands of the Solidarity Trade Union for workers' rights and privileges.
At the very beginning of the Mazowiecki period UPR was an association which co-operated with similar organisations, holding conferences or participating in other liberal and Centre-Right groups. This changed after the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan and the first few months of the Mazowiecki government. In March 1990, during a 'Symposium of the Centre-Right in Poland' held in Poznan, Korwin-Mikke called the government and its supporters "the Left, masking the propertied nomenklatura - that is NSZZ 'Solidarity', OKP and Citizens' Committees". UPR came to espouse a much more radical programme which called on the Right to reject the new political order. At a 'Congress of the Polish Right' held in June 1990 the UPR criticised other liberals for co-operating with the Mazowiecki government and 'Solidarity'. Two UPR members, Senator Andrzej Michalski and MP Andrzej Zawislak who had entered parliament under the aegis of Solidarity, resigned after being criticised for participating in the work of OKP, Centre Alliance (PC) and Congress of Liberal Democrats (K-LD).

**Constitutional Policy**

Democracy was not the priority of UPR. Its basic aim was to find the best way to realise its economic programme. Members of the party stressed that it was not important who introduced its policies, a tyrant or a representative of the majority, so long as they are introduced. The freedom of the citizen could be limited
only when the life, freedom or property of other people were threatened. The basic function of the state was the protection of freedom and property. With this in mind it proposed a radical change in trade union legislation. It wanted Poland's withdrawal from the International Labour Organisation, compulsory transformation of trade unions into "ordinary associations" and the "removal of all additional privileges for unions and their members". This explains its hostility to the first 'Solidarity' government as an administration unduly influenced by the trade union movement.

In January 1990 it issued an appeal to President Jaruzelski to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections. When this was refused it began to collect signatures for a referendum on the need for immediate and radical changes. It called for institutional reform with a reduction in the number of MPs to 120 and the appointment of a Council of State which had the right to veto legislation and a strengthening of Presidential powers. Its traditional aspect was reflected in a call for Christian (though not specifically Catholic) values to be the moral base of Polish society and the Constitution. Thus Church and state were to be clearly separated.
Economic Policy

UPR called for the immediate introduction of a completely free market economy, extreme reduction of the state role and abolishment of social benefits: "Each part of the economy has to carry full responsibility for its activities - to take the profits or suffer the losses". Similarly privatisation was to be carried out as rapidly as possible regardless of any controversies surrounding nomenklatura' privatisation or the rights of employees. It called for "Privatisation of the means of production as quickly as possible and without any limits". UPR wanted a significant limit in taxation and the future introduction of a "general, equal basic rate".

Foreign Policy

In terms of foreign affairs UPR did not want Poland to join the European Union or international economic organisations because they were too bureaucratic. Membership would limit the flow of commodities and capital: "UPR perceives a threat in the form of the bureaucratic model of European integration, it being an attempt to impose socialist solutions on the nations of Europe at a supra-national level...attempts at supranational economic regulation and protectionism are threatening to Poland's development". However it supported Poland's membership of NATO in the interests of national security.
Political Fortunes

In the June 1989 elections Janusz Korwin-Mikke failed to win a mandate as a Senator for Wroclaw. In October 1990 he announced his candidacy for the Office of President but failed to get enough signatories. His ambitions initiated a split within the party. In the 1991 elections UPR won 2.26% of the votes and three seats in the Sejm. In 1992 UPR was particularly prominent in the heated debate on decommunisation. In 1993 it increased its share of the vote to 3.4% but failed to clear the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation. Korwin-Mikke ran for the presidency again in 1995 but got only 2.4% of the vote. This led to further splits in the party as followers of Lech Walesa left to found the Party of Realpolitik (SPR) in January 1996. UPR continues to be a vociferous advocate of tax limits. It recently helped register the Association for the Defence of Tax-payers (STOP).
ZChN: Christian Nationalist Union

Ideological/Organisational Roots
The founding Congress of ZChN took place 28/10/89, attended by around 300 representatives of 20 formations and informal groups. It was registered as a party in December 1990, led by Professor Wieslaw Crzanowski. It described itself as a party of the Right, on some questions Centre-Right, with a conservative rather than Christian Democratic character. Only people of the Roman Catholic faith could join the party. It saw itself as a new political party, but drawing on different currents from the past: independent, nationalist, Christian-nationalist and Christian sections of the peasant and worker movements and generally to the tradition of conservative thought. As a Catholic-Nationalist party ZChN was influenced by the traditions of the National Democratic Party (endecja) which dominated the Polish Right from the mid 19th century until 1945, its most distinguished leader being Roman Dmowski.

In terms of organisational antecedents ZChN has roots in the opposition movements of the 1970's ROPCiO and the Young Poland Movement (RMP). These organisations split in the 1980's into groups such as The Political Club "Order and Freedom" (leader Marek Jurek), The Political Society Young Poland (associated with Government Minister Aleksander Hall), The Polish Politics
Movement (led by another old RMP activist Tomasz Wolek), The Political Club "Freedom and Solidarity" (led by Antoni Macierewicz, founder member of KOR, editor of 'Glos'). However the founding of ZChN began to reunite many of these old groups and one of its basic aims was the creation of a broad movement of Catholic Poles. Its founders emphasised that the group unified on the grounds of a common experience of the struggle with the communist system. This gave the party a decidedly anti-communist aspect.

ZChN declarations could be grouped under two headings: the nation and the Catholic religion. Ideas such as the 'common good', freedom, solidarity, state welfare, the family, the national community, independence and private property were all prominent. Its founding declaration outlined the National/Catholic orientation of its policies: "ZChN appeals to everyone who supports state independence, stands for the interests of the nation and basing public life on the principles of Catholic ethics".

Constitutional Policy

In the political sphere ZChN saw pluralisation as vital and criticised the Mazowiecki government's attempts to stifle the process: "Repressing the emergence of parties with an opposition pedigree can strengthen the transformed parties of the old
communist coalition"34. The Catholic, moral outlook adopted by ZChN led to a radical approach to 'decommunisation'. People and organisations contaminated with a communist past were to be removed from power and brought to justice as quickly as possible. The President is regarded as the highest political authority in the state, appointed by general election and with extensive legislative powers. ZChN also called for the strengthening of the local tier of government.

ZChN wanted Poland's Catholic identity reflected in public life: "The Catholic religion is an expression of truth, which is obligatory in personal and public life". In the transition period this included the revision of all laws made under the rule of the 'atheistic' communists: "Laws and institutions aiming to destroy the Christian outlook of our social life, attacking Catholic ethics, the rights of unborn children, the rights of the family and church ought to be changed"35. In Parliament it pressed for the ratification of laws protecting the rights of the unborn child. It was also prominent in the debates on religious education.
Economic Policy

The party's approach to economic reform was informed by nationalism, Catholic social teaching and hostility to communists. It favoured a free market model, particularly its emphasis on individual enterprise but advocated government intervention in the economy for the duration of the transition process, in order to protect Polish interests. It demanded far-reaching privatisation to take property from communist hands and give it to as many ordinary Poles as possible. Ultimately ZChN saw its constituency as a new, propertied class.

Foreign Policy

In terms of foreign relations, defence of the newly attained Polish independence and sovereignty was the first priority and ZChN was thus wary of complete commitment to the EU. Nevertheless it supported closer links with other Central European countries.

Political Fortunes

The ZChN circle in the OKP had 8 MP's and Senators, including Marek Jurek, Stefan Niesiolowski and Jan Lopuszanski. Members of the ZChN were involved in the citizens committee movement and other self-governing local initiatives, such as the Lodz Citizens Alliance, the Citizens' Democratic and Pluralist Alliance, the Union of Catholic Laity and the Christian Citizens'. In the presidential
elections the ZChN supported the candidacy of Lech Walesa. After the October 1991 parliamentary elections ZChN was prominent in the Catholic-led coalition government of Jan Olszewski. ZChN's fundamental, Catholic outlook contributed to the moral and ideological conflicts (e.g. over separation of Church and state, abortion and de-communisation) which plagued the two subsequent Solidarity coalition governments. After the defeat of the Solidarity coalition in 1993 ZChN was removed from government structures. It then began to split into two internal strands: very pragmatic (represented by Ryszard Czarnecki, Stefan Niesolowski and others) and unswervingly Nationalist-Christian-Fundamentalist (Jan Lopuszanski and Marek Jurek). Different conceptions of the party's relations with Lech Walesa contributed to the split. In the presidential elections of 1995 the party publicised its own candidate - Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz - but Lopuszanski and others supported Walesa. However it has returned to political prominence as one of the largest parties in 'Solidarity Electoral Alliance' (AWS) which won power in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Around 20 ZChN members have entered parliament under the auspices of AWS. The press organs of the ZChN are "Wiadomosci Dnia" and "Glos" and "Sprawa Polska".
KPN: Confederation of Independent Poland

Ideological/Organisational Roots

Founded on 1st September 1979 in Warsaw as a conspirational independence organisation, registered publicly as a party 21/8/90. Founder and leader was Leszek Moczulski who along with other KPN activists split from ROPCiO opposition organisation in 1979. Several members been arrested many times during the communist period. Moczulski was also Chief Commander of the Rifle Club, a youth group associated with the KPN which had been revived 6/8/89. It claimed to represent "the young intelligentsia, private businessmen and the 'combatant' intelligentsia". A nationalist, populist party, it drew on the Polish tradition, exemplified by Pilsudski, which set the achievement of Polish independence above all other targets and blamed most of the nation's ills on external factors. However, in keeping with Pilsudski's multi-ethnic vision, the nationalism of KPN did not include ethnocentrism or anti-Semitism. Radically anti-communist and anti-Soviet, it regarded the communist state as alien and set the achievement of complete independence as it's most important goal. As a result it opposed the Solidarity moderates who were involved in the Round Table talks, remaining outside the Solidarity part of the opposition. In March 1990 it published its 'Programme for the Reconstruction of the Independent State of the Third Republic'. The main thrust of this was a refusal to
accept the legitimacy of the communist state and the laws and institutions of the communist period. Importantly the KPN regarded the forthcoming Presidential elections of December 1990 as the founding moment of the post-communist era - "The first act of the newly-born Third Republic". This implicitly questioned the legitimacy of the Round Table agreement and the authority of the Mazowiecki government.

**Constitutional Policy**

This radical attitude was also reflected in KPN's approach to institutional reform. It saw a desperate need for immediate and far-reaching reform of the state because the procedures and personnel of the old system were still in position, acting as an impediment to reform: "Retaining the old state system must lead to complete catastrophe for the state". KPN thus called for the immediate introduction of a completely new constitution and parliamentary elections. It also demanded a strengthening of political power at regional and local levels. This reflected the fact that KPN enjoyed strong grass roots support in certain areas traditionally associated with militant, anti-communist resistance and protests, particularly Cracow, Lodz, Upper Silesia, Poznan (where commemorations of the Red Army massacre of officers at Katyn were regularly organised with the involvement of KPN members in the 1980s) and Szczecin.
Economic Policy

Its economic priorities were to build up the state treasury, to initiate fair privatisation, to revise the tax system, to equalise conditions of development for all sectors. To emerge from recession KPN advocated the use of cheap credits for economic investment. State intervention in social life was to be limited and the administrative structures of the state reduced. The system of pension, health and social assistance benefits had to be divided from the budget. Payments for the relief of the unemployed must be recompensed by work in public services.

Foreign Policy

In international politics KPN saw Poland in a leading role between East and West in terms of economic contacts and integration. However its nationalism was evident in its view of union as a 'Europe of fatherlands'.

Political Fortunes

In the June elections KPN put up 16 candidates as MP's and 5 as Senators. However only one member of the KPN made it to parliament, the OKP Senator Andrzej Fenrych (who ran as a member of Solidarity's national list). At the beginning of 1990 the KPN took up a position of opposition to the government. In the territorial elections of May 1990 120 KPN members were elected to councils. Leszek Moczulski ran as a candidate for the
Presidency (receiving around 2.5% of the vote), with the support, for instance, of 'Solidarity 80'. In the period 1989-91 the KPN organised many protest actions e.g. in support of freedom for Lithuania from the USSR, the removal of the Red Army from Poland, justice for those persecuted under Martial Law, liquidation of PZPR (members occupied PZPR premises). In 1989 it formed the 'Rifle Club' preparing the young to defend the fatherland. The KPN was thus suspected of having undemocratic, chauvinistic tendencies. Differences existed within KPN between those who wanted to adopt an explicitly Rightist identity and those (including Leszek Moczulski) who wanted it to remain committed to Polish independence and the fight against Communism and its legacy. In the 1991 elections it campaigning on a radical anti-establishment platform, directed against the former system and Solidarity and won 7.5% of the vote. During the third party congress in March 1989 and again in 1994 members resigned, accusing Moczulski of being too dictatorial. In 1991 KPN won 46 places in the Sejm and 4 in the Senate. However it did not enter the Olszewski coalition because of disagreements over its proposed policy of decommunisation. In 1993 it won 22 places in the Sejm. In 1995 it joined a Patriotic camp with supporters of Walesa's candidacy. This camp went on to become part of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) which won the 1997 elections
and thus gained some limited access to political power. Its press organs are "Droga", "Gazeta Polska" and "Opinia".
Appendix II Profiles of Prominent Figures

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Introduction

The following section lists the biographical details of some of the most important actors in the politics of the transition period. The intention is to illustrate the ideological diversity of the Polish intelligentsia milieu and identify these figures with the various social and political bases established in the thesis. Although some personalities were not of obvious political influence at the time they are included as a representative of a particular ideological strand. The profiles draw on information from a variety of sources, particularly Hanna Malarecka-Simbierowicz et al., *Nasi w sejmie i senacie* (Warsaw: Volumen 1990) and Roger East and Jolyon Pontin *Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe* (Pinter Great Britain 1997).

Information on political organizations mentioned here in *italics* can be found in Appendix I 'Guide to Political Organizations'
1. The Lay Left

Adam Michnik

Born 14/10/46 into an intelligentsia family with Jewish and communist backgrounds. His father was a well-known communist party activist before the war, spending eight years in prison. In 1961 Michnik was co-founded the discussion group 'The Club In Search of Contradictions'. As a student of history at Warsaw University he twice protested for students' rights. In March 1965 he protested as part of Kuron and Modzelewski's Open Letter to the Membership of the PZPR (he was sentenced to two months in jail). In March 1968 he was expelled from college for his part in the student protests against state censorship. He was arrested shortly afterwards and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Freed under the 1969 amnesty, he worked for two years worked as a welder in the Rosa Luxembourg Steelworks, an experience many observers regard as vital to his own and the intelligentsia's strengthening links with the industrial workers. In 1975 he completed his studies as an extern student at the History Faculty of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. He was a member of KOR (1977-80), joint-founder and lecturer in the Association of Educational Courses (TKN, 'The Flying University'). From 1977 he edited a series of independent publications (Information Bulletin, 'Zapis', 'Krytyka'). In 1980-81 he was an adviser to NSZZ
'Solidarity's' Mazowsze Regional Body, and to the Solidarity Commission for Steelworkers in the Lenin Steelworks in Nowa Huta. He was interned after the declaration of Martial Law in December 1981, charged with attempting to overthrow the system. He was freed in the amnesty of 1984. Michnik was arrested again in February 1985 and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Freed in 1986 amnesty. Adviser to KKW (National Executive Committee of Solidarity) and was a member of the KO (Citizens' Committee). He participated in the plenary debates of the Round Table (the 'Magdalenka') and in the group negotiations dealing with political reform and the sub-group dealing with the mass media. From May 1989 he was editor in chief of Solidarity's electoral newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza". Elected to the Sejm 4/6/89 as MP for Bytom (with 70.19% of the vote). Michnik was member of the Sejm Commissions on Culture and the Mass Media, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. He is an historian, essayist, political journalist, author of many articles and books, among others, "The Church, The Left, A Dialogue" (1977), "The Chances of Polish Democracy" (1984), "Such Times...Concerning Compromise"(1985), "Polish Questions"(1987) etc..
Bronislaw Geremek

Born 6/3/32 in Warsaw into an intelligentsia family. During the period of occupation he studied in secret, and after the war in the grammar school in Wschow and in the pre-University B. Limanowski College in Warsaw. He studied history at the University of Warsaw. From 1956-58 he continued his studies at the Sorbonne. He worked in the History Institute of PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences), where in 1960 he received his doctorate. From 1962-65 he was Director of the Centre for Polish Culture at the University of Paris and lecturer of Polish History at the Sorbonne. In 1970 became assistant professor at the History Institute of PAN, he headed the Study of the History of Polish Culture in the Middle Ages. He lectured at many Universities abroad. In 1985 he was dismissed from his work at PAN for political reasons. He was reinstated in 1989 and appointed assistant professor. Honourary doctor of Utrecht, Tours and Columbia University (New York), A. Jurzykowski laureat winner, member of the Polish and French PEN Club, Polish Historical Society and the Association of European Culture.

1948-1950 Geremek was a member of the ZMP (Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej: Polish Youth Union) - the communist youth organisation. He was a member of PZPR from 1950-1968 when he resigned after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. From 1978-80
lecturer of the TKN (the underground 'The Flying University'). In August 1980 he joined the group of experts in the MKS (Inter-Factory Strike Committee) in Gdansk. He was then one of the principal advisers of KK NSZZ 'Solidarity' (National Committee of the Trade Union 'Solidarity'). He was interned after Martial Law and released in 1982. After being released he was adviser to the TKK (Provisional Co-ordinating Commission of the Trade Union 'Solidarity') and Lech Walesa. Arrested in May 1983, he was freed under the amnesty of July that year, then he became adviser to KKW (National Executive Commission of Solidarity) and leader of the commission for political reform in the KO (Citizens' Committee). Participated in the plenary debates of the Round Table (the 'Magdalenka') and was joint chairman of the group dealing with political reforms. Elected to the Sejm 4/6/89 as MP for Suwalki (75% of the votes). Chairman of the Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Sejm Constitutional Commission, Chairman of the OKP. After the Mazowiecki period Geremek became a prominent member of UD and UW. After the latter's success in the 1997 general elections he was appointed Foreign Minister in the AWS-UW coalition government.
Jacek Kuron

Born 3/3/34 in Lwow into an intelligentsia family. After secondary school he studied history at Warsaw University. In March 1953 he joined the *PZPR* as a student and became a dissident, liberal voice in the party. He was expelled a year later for refusing to stop his criticisms. From 1954 to 1961 he established a party, the "Walterows" (the so-called Red Scouts). In 1956 worked jointly with workers councils in Zerania and took part in the reform movement at Warsaw University. Rejoined the communist party, from which he was finally expelled in 1964 and arrested for writing, together with Karol Modzelewski, the 'Open Letter to Members of the PZPR' (he was imprisoned for three years). Arrested again 8/3/68 accused of inspiring the so-called 'March Events' (he was imprisoned for three and a half years). In 1975 he was co-author of the 'Letter of 59' - a protest against the preface of the Constitution of the People's Republic where the 'leading role' of the PZPR and Poland's alliance with the USSR were emphasised. A year later he was one of the creators of *KOR* and one of its most active members. He was a lecturer for the underground 'Flying University'. He was arrested in August 1980 together with other opposition activists but freed under the Gdansk Agreement. In 1980 he was adviser to *NSZZ 'Solidarity'* (Solidarity Trade Union's National Committee). Interned after Martial Law, charged with trying to overthrow the system. Freed
as a result of the amnesty in 1984, he was active in Solidarity's underground activities. Member of the KO and participant in the 'Magdalenka' discussions. At the Round Table he worked on the political reforms group and in the working group for electoral law. Elected to the Sejm as MP for Warsaw-Zoliborz (65.88% of the vote). Regarded as a possible prime minister, he instead became Minister of Labour and Social Politics in the Mazowiecki Government. Also member of the Sejm Commissions of Administration and Foreign Affairs Kuron has subsequently become respected as one of Poland's elder statesmen. His popularity is regularly recorded in opinion polls. However he received only 9% of the vote in the 1995 presidential election where he ran as the candidate of the UW. Historian, author of articles collected and issued by the independent press: "Politics and Responsibility" (1984), "To Win over the Silent Majority" (1988), "My Soup"(1990), describing his experiences of the transition period.
Henryk Wujec

Born 1/1/41 in Bilgoraj into a peasant family. He studied at mathematics and physics at Warsaw University, finishing in 1970. From 1968-78 he worked in the Tewa Selimfabricates factory in Warsaw. From 1962 he was a member of the Warsaw Catholic Club of the Intelligentsia (KIK). While a student he took part in the so-called March events of 1968. He was co-organiser of help for the workers of Radom and Ursus in July 1976, and a KOR activist. In 1977 he became a member of KSS 'KOR' and was one of the founders and editors of 'Robotnik'. One year later he was dismissed from work at 'Tewa'. He worked for the 'Flying University' and organised independent workers groups. From August 1980 active in the formation of the trade union movement. In 1980 he joined the presidium of the Regional Authority of the NSZZ Solidarity and was then head of trade union education and university workers, he organised workers self-government. He was interned after Martial Law, charged with trying to overthrow the system. 13/8/84 freed under amnesty. Imprisoned again from 1/6/86 to 13/9/86. He remained active in Solidarity's underground structures. He participated in the Round Table negotiations as a member of the group dealing with the pluralism of the union. Elected to the Sejm as MP for Zamosc, member of the Sejm Commissions on Political Economy, the Budget
and Finances. Secretary of the Solidarity Parliamentary Caucus (OKP).
2. Andrzej Steimachowski - Liberal Catholic

Born 28/1/25 in Poznan. His father was a professor at Poznan University and judge at the High Court, imprisoned by the Soviet authorities in Brzesc. It is thought that he was killed in the Katyn massacre of Polish officers by the Russian Army. In the war years Andrzej was a soldier of the AK. In 1947 he completed his studies of law at Poznan University and in 1950 received a doctorate in legal studies. In 1957 he took up a position in the judicature for the representation of workers pilgrimages to Czestochowa. From 1962 he was professor at Wroclaw University and from 1969 at Warsaw University. He also lectured at the Academy of Catholic Theology. 1972-1975 was leader of the Council of the Polish Teachers' Trade Union at Warsaw University. From 1975 he was a member of the Primate's Council for Church Building and for several years a member of the Episcopal Commission "Lustitia et Pax" and from 1979 the Episcopal Commission for the ministry to the Farmers. 1987-90 leader of the Warsaw Catholic Club of the Intelligentsia (KIK). In August 1980 he was an adviser to the MKS in Gdansk Shipyard. 1980-1 was an expert in the Centre for Socio-Professional Work at the KK NSZZ 'Solidarity' and adviser to NSZZ RI 'Solidarity. Remained a Solidarity adviser during Martial Law. He played a prominent role in the advent of the Round Table talks and participated in the 'Magdalenka'. At the Round Table he was
co-leader of the agriculture discussion group and member of the working group on private farmers trade union legislation.

Elected as Senator for Bialystok. Chosen as Speaker of the Senate, he could thus lead debates in the house and oversee proceedings.

He was prominent in the early transition period as an advocate of anti-abortion legislation.
3. Jan Jozef Lipski - Socialist

Born 25/5/26 into intelligentsia family with tradition of patriotic resistance. His father Roman Lipski was deported to Russia after the school strike of 1905. During the Nazi occupation Jan Jozef studied at the clandestine study groups. In 1942 became involved in Polish resistance movement and in 1943 was a soldier in the 'Baszta' regiment of the AK (Polish underground army). Took part in the Warsaw Uprising. 1946-1953 he studied the philology of Poland at Warsaw University, working simultaneously in book publishing. From 1961 worked at the Institute of Literary Research PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences), received a doctorate. 1956-57. He became editor and head of the cultural department of the weekly newspaper "Po Prostu" which had a tradition of independence from the communist authorities. 1957-1959 leader of the Crooked Circle Club (KKK). In 1964 he was co-organiser of the 'Letter of 34', then co-initiator and signatory of numerous protests, eg in 1975 against the preface of the Constitution of the People's Republic which dealt with the leading role of the PZPR and the alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1968 he helped organise support for persecuted students and academics. In September 1976 he was one of the founders of KOR. He was put under arrest from May-June 1977. Active in 1980 in NSZZ 'Solidarity', among other things, as a member of the Mazowsze Regional Leadership and delegate to the first National Congress in
Gdansk. After the introduction of Martial Law he got into the "Ursus" works and participated in protest strikes. Arrested in January 1982 charged with leading the strikes. He was absent from the trial because of poor health, and stayed in hospital under the guard of the SB (secret police). He was released conditionally in May 1982 and went to London for health treatment. After returning to Poland he was arrested again for his activities in Solidarity's underground structures, then freed under amnesty. In 1987 co-founder of the recreated PPS (Polish Socialist Party), he became head of it's Governing Council. Elected Senator for Radom province 4/6/89. Leader of the informal Parliamentary 'Group for the Defence of Workers Interests' which had ties with the PPS. He wrote "The Committee for the Defence of Workers - the Committee for Social Self-Defence 'KOR'" and "Two Fatherlands - Two Patriotisms".
4. Jaroslaw Kaczynski

Born 18/6/49 in Warsaw into an intelligentsia family. Father was a soldier in the AK. In 1967 took his degree and in 1971 finished the Law Course at Warsaw University. In 1967 he received a doctorate from the University's Law Faculty. After his studies he worked in the Institute of Political Science, Learning and Higher Education. He published a few educational works. From 1976 he was a member of KOR, he helped repressed workers in Plock, he was then a member of the Interventionist Bureau of KSS 'KOR', the part of the Committee which organised relief efforts for persecuted workers. Member of the editorial team of the independent magazine 'Glos'. In 1980 he helped the strike in Wroclaw and then he became leader of the Legal section of the Centre for Social Research in NSZZ Solidarity’s Mazowsze Regional Base. After the introduction of Martial Law he returned to the editorship of 'Glos'. In 1982 he became a member of the Helsinki Committee in Poland, and continued to be active in underground Solidarity. He took part in the Round Table negotiations in the Group dealing with political reforms and the Group for legal and judicial reforms. Elected as a Senator representing Elblag province (on the Baltic Coast, near Gdansk). This reflected his power base which was closer to Lech Walesa's constituency than that of the Warsaw-based intelligentsia which dominated the Mazowiecki government. Member of the Sejm
commissions on Human Rights and Law and Order and the Constitutional Commission. From October 1989 was editor in chief of "Tygodnik Solidarity". One of the main organisers of PC and appointed its leader in May 1990.
5. Marek Jurek - Nationalist Catholic

Born 28/6/60 in Gorzow Wielkopolski to a working class family. His grandfather on his mother's side was a volunteer on the Polish/Bolshevik war of 1920 and a soldier in the AK. He attended secondary school in Gorzow Wielkopolski and then studied history at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (finished in 1983). After his studies at elementary school he wrote for Catholic and opposition periodicals. In 1989 member of the editorship of "Signs of the Times" in Rome. In 1978 became active in ROPcio (The Movement for the Defence of Human and Citizens' Rights in Poland). In 1979 one of the founding group of the RMP (Young Poland Movement) and member of it's governing council. In 1980 he entered NZS (Union of Independent Students). At the same time he and his colleagues founded in Poznan the academic organisation "Pro Patria" of which he was leader. After the proclamation of Martial Law he went into hiding and then became member of the editorial staff of "Polish Politics", around which was concentrated the activities of RMP. In 1987 co-founder and leader of the Wielkopolski Political Club "Order and Freedom". 4/6/89 elected to the Sejm as MP for Leszno. In 1989 he joined the leadership of ZChN. Member of the Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs.
6. Neo-Liberals

Leszek Balcerowicz

Born 1947 in Lipno. He is a professor of economic science. He studied at the Faculty of Foreign Trade at the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw as well as St John's University in New York. He was a member of *PZPR* but left the party after the delegalisation of Solidarity in 1981. He then worked as an adviser to *NSZZ Solidarity*. From September 1989 to December 1991 vice-Premier and Minister of Finance in the Mazowiecki and then Bielicki governments. He was the architect of the politically risky Balcerowicz Plan, the first and most radical pro-market reform programme in post-communist East-Central Europe. He was sacrificed for political reasons with the appointment of the Olszewski government in 1991. He joined *UW* on its formation in 1994 and was elected leader the following year. After UW's success in 1997 general elections he returned as Finance Minister and deputy Prime Minister.
Andrzej Zawislak

Born 15/3/37 in Warsaw to an intelligentsia family. Studied at the Faculty of Political Economy at Warsaw University until 1963. In 1967 he studied abroad through a Ford Foundation grant at Columbia University. Worked in the Economic Research Institute's Planning Commission for the Council of Ministers. In this period he took a doctorate in the main school of Planning and Statistics in 1971. In 1974 he studied at the Wharton School of Commerce in New York. He then worked in the Faculty of Management at Warsaw University. In 1979 he qualified as a professor. He also worked at the Catholic University in Lublin. Lectured at many foreign universities, including Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Istambul, Budapest and Oxford. In the second half of the 1970s he was member of the Seminar group "Experience and Future": a group of intellectuals and activists who tried to forge links with reformers in the PZPR, such as Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Andrzej Wasilewski, on the basis of the need for liberal economic reform rather than political transformation. In 1980 he was member of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union of Scientists, Technicians and Education workers and then a member of the Schools Commission of NSZZ 'Solidarity' at Warsaw University. Long-term consultant of the 'Solidarity' leadership on economic matters. Founding member of the 'Industrial Society and Economic Action', a liberal lobby propagating the ideas of
free-marketism, connected with Solidarity, although critical of its pro-labour tendencies. Activist of liberal groups, participant and signatory of 'National Congress of Liberals'. Member of UPR in 1989 but expelled in 1990 for fostering close links with PC.
7. Aleksander Kwasniewski: Former Communist

Born 1954. A member of the PZPR from 1977 to its demise in 1989-90. Graduated from the University of Gdansk as a Transport Economist. Journalist on 'Standard of Youth'. A member of the governments of the latter half of the 1980s, he was responsible for Youth and Sport. President of the Polish Olympic Committee (1988-92), chaired the Social Political Committee under Rakowski. Participant in the government side at the 'Magdalenka'. With the demise of PZPR in 1990 he became President of SdRP and leader of the leftist electoral block it dominated SLD. In 1991 he was elected to the Sejm. 1993-5 he served as Chair of the National Assembly (combining Sejm and Senate) commission charged with drafting a new constitution. Elected President in 1995 where he presented himself as a moderate, pragmatic politician and attracted a crucial part of the floating vote.
8. Andrzej Fenrych: Radical Nationalist

Born 7/11/22 in Poznan. His father was a farmer, mother a teacher. His father was an artillery commander in the Wielkopolska Uprising who fought as a volunteer in September 1939, was taken prisoner by the Red Army and was subsequently listed as missing. During the war Andrzej and his family were forcibly moved from Wielkopolska to Tarnow. He worked in the timber industry and on a farm estate. In 1944 he fought in the ranks of the Home Army (AK). He was injured in one of its operations. After the war he returned to Poznan. He studied at the Economics High School in Krakow while still working. From 1950 he worked in a high school in Tarnow as deputy director of the economics department. He received a distinction of the first order from the Minister of Education for outstanding work in education. In 1979 he took early retirement as a war invalid. From 1979 he headed the Tarnow branch of the Union of War Invalids. In 1980 he joined NSZZ 'Solidarity'. He was a co-founder of the Circle of Combatants in Tarnow. He took part in the first National Rally of Combatants belonging to Solidarity in October 1981. During Martial Law he participated in the independent life of Tarnow, he wrote articles in the underground press, organised annual commemorations of the war-time Katyn massacre of Polish soldiers by the Red Army. He worked in the Church's Ministry for working people. In 1988 he became chief of the Tarnow branch of
the *KPN*. In 1989 was elected Senator for Tarnow and was member of the Commissions of Culture, Media, Science and Education and Local Self-governement.
Czeslaw Milosz - Traditional Liberal Intelligentsia

Born 30/6/11 in Szetejnie, Lithuania (then Tsarist Russia), to part Polish, part Lithuanian parents. His father was an engineer. His family was constantly on the move because of work. He was educated in Wilno (Vilnius) at the Zygmunt August Gimnazyum and at the King Stefan Batory University where he graduated with a degree in law. During his studies he participated in the work of the University Polish Studies Group. In 1935 he received the Diplome Superieur d'Etudes Francaises Modernes from the Alliance Francaise in Paris. Was active in the Warsaw Underground during WWII. Between 1946 and 1951 he served as a member of the Polish Foreign Service as a cultural attache in New York, Washington and Paris. Despite his initial sympathies for radical change he broke with the communist regime and became a political exile. A celebrated poet, essayist and translator he received Nobel Prize for Literature in 1980. "The Captive Mind", a depiction of the plight of the intellectual in communist Eastern Europe, is regarded as one of his most influential works. However his works were not officially published in communist Poland. Towards the end of the communist era he visited Poland and met with students and intellectuals.

Roman Bartoszcze

Born 1946 into a peasant family in Lubelszczyzn. His father was beaten up by the communist Citizens' Militia (MO) in 1981 during protests. His brother Piotr, a NSZZ RI 'Solidarity' member died in mysterious circumstances. Roman is a private farm owner. He led a national peasant strike in 1981. In 1981 he became a member of the national presidium of NSZZ RI 'Solidarity' and leader of of the Union's Bydgoszcz Regional Council. He was interned in 1982. Member of the Citizens' Committee (KO). In 1989 became MP in the Sejm under the mandate of the Citizen's Committee, nominated as a candidate by PSL. From November 1989, one of the leaders of the reactivated PSL. Elected as its leader in March 1990. Ran for President in the elections of 1990. In the campaign he presented himself as a representative of the peasant movement, linking himself to its century-old traditional programme. Was obviously supported by the PSL, but also the Voluntary Fire Brigade, the Peasant Youth Movement and the Peasant Women's' Guild and the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives and Organisations. These organisations nominally accounted for three million members. He also drew support from nationalist circles and, towards the end of the campaign he received the backing of "Solidarity 80", The Christian-Democratic
Labour Party and its leader Jan Sila-Nowicki. Bartoszcze had to prove that the PSL was completely transformed from the ZSL and done this through propagating the conservative-nationalist values of the traditional peasants' movement. He came fifth in the first round of voting with 7.2% of the vote. In 1991 he was ousted from the PSL leadership at an acrimonious Congress and replaced by the ex-ZSL member Waldemar Pawlak.
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

Born 1950 in Warsaw, from an intelligentsia family, graduate of the Law Faculty of Warsaw University. Doctor of Law and bursar of the Fulbright Fund (1980/81). Owned private farming enterprise. In 1990 he was MP in the Sejm as a member of the now defunct PZPR, Chairman of the Parliamentary Klub of the Democratic Left (PKLD). Only one of the six major candidates not to be interned or imprisoned during Martial Law. Represented that part of the democratic left with an anti-Solidarity orientation. His candidature was regarded as part of the attempt of this group to resist political exclusion. For many of his potential voters, however, he still 'smelt' too much of the PZPR. He was supported by PKLD, SdRP, Women's Democratic Union (UDK), the Union of Co-operatives (US), the Union of Polish Socialist Youth (ZSMP), the Council of Social-democratic Youth (RMS) as well as part of the OPZZ. The candidacy of Cimoszewicz was announced in and supported by the daily newspaper "Trybuna". Came fourth in the first round of voting with 9.2% of the vote.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki

Born 1927 in Plock, a descendent of a traditional, landed intelligentsia family. Graduate of the Law Faculty of Warsaw University and prominent journalist. Initially linked to PAX but from 1967-71 MP in the Sejm as a member of the more independent and critical Catholic Parliamentary group ZNAK. Active in the Warsaw Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) where eventually he became vice-Chairman under Andrzej Stelmahowski. Founder and long-time editor of the Catholic monthly "WIEZ". In 1980 adviser to the Inter-Factory Strike Committee in Gdansk and subsequently to NSZZ 'Solidarity'. Interned during Martial Law. Then became editor of the Solidarity newspaper 'Tygodnik Solidarnosc'. One of the major negotiators from the Solidarity camp at the 'Magdalenka' and the Round Table talks themselves. From September 1989 he was Premier at the head of the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe in 43 years. His support for 'shock therapy' - the radical programme of economic reform - was strongly opposed by Walesa and the labour movement. The subsequent 'War at the Top' led directly to Presidential contest between Mazowiecki and Walesa. Mazowiecki's candidacy was supported by those groups espousing the 'Solidarity ethos' of pro-government unity and opposing the election of Lech Walesa. These included ROAD, FPD, and the Krakow Democratic Alliance (which was linked with the
Catholic-oriented daily paper "Tygodnik Powszechny"). Also had the support of a few local citizens' committees and a section of MPs and senators in the OKP. His candidacy was announced in and supported by the newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza". However he came a humiliating third behind Walesa and Tyminski with only 18.1% of the vote. His government immediately resigned.

Mazowiecki became leader of UD in 1991 and its led its successor party UW from 1994-5. From 1992-5 Mazowiecki was UN Special Envoy on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, responsible for investigating war crimes.
Leszek Moczulski

Born in 1930 in Warsaw. A lawyer and graduate of the Law Faculty of Warsaw University as well as it's Academy of Political science. Joined the PZPR during his studies and was also active in the Polish Youth Movement (ZMP) (1948-56). Author of the book "The Polish War, 1939" (pub. 1972) as well as "Revolution Without Revolution" (pub 1979) which contained his programme of how Poland could regain it's independence. In the second half of the 1950's he engaged in illegal, pro-independence organisations. Moczulski was regarded with suspicion by some dissident intellectuals due to his involvement with General Moczar's chauvinistic-militaristic PZPR camp in the late 1960s. Moczulski and others had written articles critical of the 'revisionist' student and intellectual protests of 1968. In 1977 he was co-founder and spokesman of ROPcio. In 1979 he founded the radical, pro-independence KPN, of which he was chairman. Harassed by the authorities throughout the late 1970's, arrested in August 1981 and released in 1986. Received only 2.5% of the vote in 1990.
Stanislaw Tyminski

Born in 1948 in Pruszkow (outside Warsaw) into a blue-collar family. Had a technical secondary school education. Left Poland in 1969, emigrating for economic purposes. As well as Polish, he holds Canadian and Peruvian citizenship. In 1990 he presented himself as a self-made man. According to the official version of his life, he was head of Transduction Ltd. which owned cable television in Peru and agricultural land in Canada. Suspicions were raised over his background during the campaign. He was also leader of a marginal party in Canada (the Libertarian Party). He published a book "Holy Dogs" in Poland which initially was supposed to provide advice on how to build a business. It later became the vehicle for the candidate's political and economic platform. He financed the campaign himself. He arrived in the country at the beginning of the campaign process and presented himself as an independent candidate, drawing on his popular image as an establishment outsider. These tactics, in the context of the government-led programme of austerity and the ongoing disintegration of Solidarity earned him second place in the first round of voting with 23.1% of the vote. Lost to Walesa in the second round of voting.
Lech Walesa

Born in 1943 in Popowo on the Baltic coast near Gdansk into a peasant family. Had a basic technical education. From 1967 he worked as an electrician in the Gdansk Shipyard. One of the leaders of the workers' protests during the December 1970 unrest. Sacked for criticising the official trade unions in 1976. In 1978 he was co-organiser of the Free Trade Unions. In August 1980 he stood at the forefront of the historic Gdansk Shipyard strike. From Spring 1980 he was Chairman of NSZZ Solidarity. After the introduction of Martial Law he was interned and lived in seclusion for eleven months. Returned to work in the Gdansk Shipyard under permanent surveillance from the SB (secret police). He maintained unbroken contacts with the leaders of the underground structures of NSZZ Solidarity and performed his duties as Chairman of the Union. In 1983 he was honoured with the Nobel peace Prize. In 1986 he created the Provisional Council of Solidarity, and in 1987 he founded the National Executive Commission. During this period he incessantly called for dialogue and the preservation of peaceful methods in battling for reforms and systemic change. Despite attempts by the state's propaganda to discredit him and isolate him from the opposition, he remained the unquestioned leader of Solidarity. He participated in the Magdalenka and Round Table Talks, though giving deference to the intellectual elite of the movement during the negotiations.
the Parliamentary elections of 1989 he was not a candidate for either of the Chambers of Parliament. He instead gave his support to all of the candidates running under the auspices of KO. After the elections he was the actual creator of the formal coalitions (Solidarity with the ZSL and SD) which made possible the formation of the Mazowiecki government. In April 1990, at the second Congress of NSZZ Solidarity, he was re-elected as the Union's Chairman. The congress also proposed his candidacy for the Presidency. Dissatisfied with the direction of reform under Mazowiecki and his own political isolation, he announced his intention to run for the presidency. Lech Walesa stood, beyond all doubt, as a symbol of the whole Solidarity movement, which had made a great contribution to the overthrowing of the regime and, indeed, the demise of communism in Eastern Europe as a whole. The election of Lech Walesa to the position of President was supported not only by NSZZ Solidarity but by the majority of local citizens' committees. In October 1990, the conference of the citizens' committees formally gave it's support to his candidacy. He also found support in several Polish intelligentsia and intellectual circles. Amongst the emergent political parties, he was supported by PC, KL-D, ZChN, PSL 'Solidarity', part of KPN, PAX etc.. He was also backed by the majority of the OKP and by the weekly newspaper "Tygodnik Solidarnosc". Won the elections and became President. He left Solidarity in order to appear to stand above politics, but had already alienated many of his Solidarity
allies, particularly amongst the movement's intelligentsia cadre. In 1992 Walesa was tainted by allegations of collaboration with the communist-era secret police. He formed a new party deliberately modelled on the party of government during Pilsudski's interwar authoritarian regime, called the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), but it performed poorly in the parliamentary elections of 1993. The victory of the ex-communists in these elections gave Walesa the opportunity to re-establish his anti-communist credentials. The result was increasingly hostile confrontations between the President and the leftist governments of Pawlak and Oleksy, which undermined public confidence in the political process. His bid for re-election as President in 1995 failed. Having alienated many voters with his confrontational style he was defeated by Aleksander Kwasniewski. Walesa's bitter accusation of electoral fraud, his allegations of treason against Oleksy and the publicity surrounding his claim that he would have to return to the shipworks to earn a living maintained his profile. With Solidarity Electoral Action's victory in the 1997 elections and the next Presidential elections scheduled for 2000 one should not underestimate his political ambition or his potency as the figurehead of Solidarity.
"This stage is for egg-heads, for sitting and working out programs" (Bez Dekretu No.13, 1986 cited in A. Smolar, P. Kende p40).

see Jacek Moskwa, Informator Parlamentarny OKP and Komitetow Obywatelskich, 1989 p3 see Slodkowska p6

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'Deklaracja Porozumienia Centrum' Tygodnik Solidarnosc nr 20 18/5/90 p2.

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see Ibid. p266.

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36 Mariusz Janicki 'Polish Political Panorama' Polityka 23/7/90 p3.

37 see Slodkowska p255.

38 Ibid. p255.
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