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A Defence of Classical Rhetoric in Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence

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MA (Oxon.), PGCE (Cantab.)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education (Ed.D.)

Under the supervision of Professor Penny Enslin

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August 2013
Abstract

This study warns that Scottish education is in danger of losing a valuable and venerable element of the school curriculum: the Classics. In order to demonstrate what Scottish education stands to lose, this study defends one particular element of the Classics, rhetoric, understood as the practice of effective speaking and effective writing for the purpose of persuasion. Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence (CfE), first conceived in 2002 and implemented in 2010, is still a fledgling curricular initiative and schools are currently in an adjustment phase while existing syllabus content and pedagogical approaches are reviewed in order to better reflect the aims and purposes of the new curriculum. With increased focus on teacher autonomy, flexibility, personalisation and choice (Scottish Government 2008), now is an ideal time, I claim, to reveal and defend the contribution of rhetoric to this curriculum. This study promotes the learning and teaching of rhetoric in Scottish secondary schools, citing its potential to enrich not just the Classics but many areas of the curriculum, and makes particular claims for its contribution to cultivating critical and responsible citizens.

Set against a broader backdrop of political and philosophical influences on curriculum reform and educational policy, this research examines the origins, aims and purposes of CfE and suggests that, although clearly influenced by supranational expectations regarding employability, economic growth and adequately equipping the future workforce, the curriculum appears to uphold the value of the Arts and Humanities and places education for citizenship at its core. These moves imply progress, at least in Scotland, towards ameliorating the ‘crisis in the Humanities’ and making room for increased focus on cross-curricular skills and abilities which are considered important for responsible citizenship: literacy, speaking and listening, argumentation and debate. The retention of Classical languages in Scotland’s new curriculum offers renewed hope, at least at the policy level, for the revitalisation of Classics teaching in Scottish schools. Yet despite their inclusion in the curriculum, they have received no promotion and there are no teacher training places available in Classical languages in Scotland so, at a practical level, the future of the subjects remains in crisis. By focussing on the educational merit of just one feature of the Classics, this study aims to highlight the value of rhetoric in CfE and in so doing raise the profile and improve the image of Classical language education.
I argue that the Classical rhetorical framework, developed as a method for citizens to represent themselves effectively in public, has much to offer the development of literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking. These skills are shown to be linked to citizenship education and particular attention is paid to what is meant by ‘responsible citizenship’ in CfE. The argument is made that popular interpretations of the policy imply personally responsible or participatory conceptions of citizenship, but I promote a maximal interpretation in the form of ‘justice-oriented’ citizenship (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242). I defend that it is this conception of citizenship which is optimal for Scottish democracy both to appeal to the Scottish democratic intellect (Davie 1961) and to advance the values of wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity, the values inscribed on the mace in the Scottish Parliament (Gillies 2006). Despite ambiguity in CfE regarding the form of democracy envisaged for the 21st century, I argue that the study of rhetoric cultivates knowledge and skills which are particularly pertinent and beneficial to deliberative democracy and that in such a conception of democracy, rhetoric complements critical argumentation as a method of deliberation between citizens. I claim that it does so by facilitating narrative imagination, engaging the emotions and by providing a communicative bridge between diversely positioned deliberators.

After highlighting and defending the value of rhetoric in CfE, the study concludes with the consideration of how rhetoric might best be positioned in the curriculum and advances a number of possible pedagogical models for its delivery, the most practical of which is offered by a cross-curricular approach but the most desirable of which is conferred by Classical languages.
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Moving house, moving job (twice) and getting married during the dissertation phase of the Ed.D. certainly kept things interesting and the only reason my research stayed on track is the unfailing support shown to me by my friends and family. Where possible, they have undertaken practical tasks to relieve pressure on my work schedule, creating more time for research and without them my magnum opus would not have been possible.

Colleagues on the Ed.D. course have been a constant source of solace, particularly in the dark days, as the only other human beings who know what life is like for the part-time Doctoral researcher. For their belief in me and their enthusiasm for Classics education, I thank them. They kept me going.

Finally, I must thank the many students I have taught over the last seven years. They made me laugh, cry, worry, whoop and cringe but I can honestly say that I have never had a dull day at the ‘office’. I hope that my passion and enthusiasm for Classics and for education is what they remember about me and not the dark circles under my eyes, a direct result of late night Ed.D. reading and writing sessions. It is a very great privilege to help shape the lives of young people and I am always impressed that the study of Classics seems to exert such an impact on their world view. They were undoubtedly an impetus for this research and although, at times, they questioned my sanity in undertaking this program of study while teaching full-time in school, they should know that they contributed in no small measure to keeping me sane.
Author's Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature

Printed name  ARLENE VICTORIA HOLMES HENDERSON
### Abbreviations

List of abbreviations used in the dissertation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Level</td>
<td>Advanced Level (higher tier post-16 qualification offered by English examination boards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS Level</td>
<td>Advanced Subsidiary Level (lower tier post-16 qualification offered by English examination boards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Consultative Committee on the Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CfE</td>
<td>Curriculum for Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Cambridge Latin Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Cambridge Schools Classics Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed.D.</td>
<td>Doctorate in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>Educational Institute of Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>Free School Meals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSE</td>
<td>General Certificate of Secondary Education (first public examination in English schools, approximate equivalent of Scottish Standard Grade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTCS</td>
<td>General Teaching Council for Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTP</td>
<td>Graduate Teacher Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Human Capital Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMie</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTS</td>
<td>Learning and Teaching Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCR</td>
<td>Oxford, Cambridge and RSA examinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGCE</td>
<td>Post-Graduate Certificate in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDT</td>
<td>Qualification Design Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RME</td>
<td>Religious and Moral Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEED</td>
<td>Scottish Executive Education Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQA</td>
<td>Scottish Qualifications Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Classical rhetorical devices

**Alliteration**: Repetition of the same sound beginning several words in sequence. ‘Let us go forth to lead the land we love’. *J. F. Kennedy*

**Anaphora**: The repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of successive phrases, clauses or lines. ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair’. *Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities*

**Anticlimax**: A rhetorical term for an abrupt shift from a serious or noble tone to a less exalted one—often for comic effect. ‘In moments of crisis I size up the situation in a flash, set my teeth, contract my muscles, take a firm grip on myself and, without a tremor, always do the wrong thing’. *George Bernard Shaw*

**Antithesis**: The placing of a sentence or one of its parts against another to which it is opposed to form a balanced contrast of ideas, as in ‘Man proposes, God disposes’.

**Apostrophe**: When a writer (or speaker) uses words to speak directly to a person or an opponent, or to an imaginary person, location, deity, abstract quality or idea, not actually present. ‘O black night, nurse of the golden eyes!’ *Euripides*

**Asyndeton**: Deliberate omission of conjunctions between a series of words, phrases, or clauses. The effects of this device are to emphasize each clause and to produce a punctuated rhythm in the sentence. ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’. *Julius Caesar*

**Chiasmus**: The reversal of the order of words in the second of two parallel phrases. ‘He came in triumph and in defeat departs’.

**Ellipsis**: Deliberate omission of a word or of words that are readily implied by the context and must be supplied by the reader or listener. ‘And he to England shall along with you’. *Shakespeare, Hamlet Act III*

**Hendiadys**: A figure of speech in which an idea is expressed by two nouns connected by a conjunction instead of a noun and modifier, as in ‘to look with eyes and envy’ instead of ‘to look with envious eyes’.

**Homoioteleuton**: A figure of speech in the endings of words/phrases have similar sounds. ‘She was sweeping while the baby was wailing’.

**Hyperbaton**: A figure of speech using deviation from normal or logical word order to produce a rhetorical or distinctive effect. ‘Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall’. *Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act II*

**Hyperbole**: The use of exaggerated terms for the purpose of emphasis or heightened effect. ‘We walked along a road in Cumberland and stooped, because the sky hung so low’. *Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel*

**Litotes**: Deliberate understatement, especially when expressing a thought by denying its opposite. ‘It isn’t very serious. I have this tiny little tumour on the brain’. *J.D. Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye*

**Metaphor**: Implied comparison achieved through a figurative use of words; the word is used not in its literal sense, but in one analogous to it. ‘From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent’. *Winston Churchill*
Onomatopoeia: The use of words that imitate the sounds associated with the objects or actions to which they refer. ‘Chug, chug, chug. Puff, puff, puff. Ding-dong, ding-dong. The little train rumbled over the tracks’. Arnold Munk, The Little Engine That Could

Paradox: An apparently contradictory statement that nevertheless contains a measure of truth. ‘Art is a form of lying in order to tell the truth’. Pablo Picasso

Personification: Investing abstractions or inanimate objects with human qualities. ‘Once again, the heart of America is heavy. The spirit of America weeps for a tragedy that denies the very meaning of our land’. Lyndon Baines Johnson

Polyptoton: Repetition of words derived from the same root. ‘With eager feeding food doth choke the feeder’. Shakespeare, Richard II Act 2

Praeteritio: Allusion to something by denying that it will be mentioned. ‘It would be unseemly for me to dwell on Senator Kennedy’s drinking problem, and too many have already sensationalized his womanizing...’

Prolepsis: A technique by which an orator foresees and forestalls objections to an argument; the anticipation of possible objections to a speech. This allows the orator to provide answers to the objections before anyone else has the opportunity to raise them.

Pun: The pun, also called paronomasia, is a form of word play that suggests two or more meanings, by exploiting multiple meanings of words, or of similar-sounding words, for an intended humorous or rhetorical effect. ‘Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer by this son of York’. Shakespeare, Richard III Act I

Rhetorical question: Asking a question, not for the purpose of eliciting an answer but to assert or deny an answer implicitly. ‘Can anyone look at our reduced standing in the world today and say, “Let's have four more years of this”?’ Ronald Reagan

Simile: An explicit comparison between two things using 'like' or 'as'. ‘My love is as a fever, longing still’. Shakespeare, Sonnet 147

Synecdoche: A figure of speech in which a part stands for the whole. ‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat’. Winston Churchill

Transferred epithet: The reversal of the syntactic relation of two words. ‘Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time’. Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum est

Tricolon: A series of three parallel words, phrases or clauses. ‘Tell me and I forget. Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn’. Benjamin Franklin

Zeugma: Use of a word to govern two or more words though appropriate to only one, as in ‘I lost my keys and my temper’.

Adapted and excerpted from Corbett and Connors (1998)
Chapter One
Introduction

The motivation behind this study is three-fold: a personal commitment to the teaching of Classical languages, civilisations and literatures; a crisis in Classics education and the introduction of a new curriculum in Scotland which permits the reconsideration of, and exposes renewed potential for, certain elements of Greek and Latin teaching. In this introductory chapter, I show how each of these motivations has influenced the selection of this research study. I reveal its aims, justify its methodology and trace its evolution from my professional context.

According to Michael Russell, the Cabinet Secretary for Education and Lifelong Learning, ‘Curriculum for Excellence [CfE] is the big idea in Scottish education’ (Humes 2013: 23) so it is appropriate that I should situate my defence of rhetoric within CfE policy, to maximise the relevance of the research for contemporary policy and practice in Scotland. It is necessary to provide some background to the inception, creation and development of Scotland’s new curriculum in order to suggest that its introduction represents the dawn of a new educational age in Scotland, and in particular, one which is receptive to a resurgence of Classical language education. To achieve this, a distinction is drawn between the Scottish curricular reform and global trends in education which advantage learning in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) and tend to disregard the Arts and Humanities. It is from an acute awareness of the worrying impact these trends have had on Classics teaching that the study is partially motivated. In this regard, a broad and overarching theoretical question underpins the research study at both macro and micro levels: ‘What is education for?’. This question needs to be reconsidered urgently, I propose, and the answers (there are many) undergird and fuse the complex nexus of policy analysis, philosophy of education and political theory on which my recommendations regarding Classical language education, curriculum theory, citizenship education and democratic deliberation are based. The time is right, I contend, for a reappraisal of Classical education which highlights the potential loss to democracy, citizenship and education in Scotland if Classical languages, and rhetoric in particular, are allowed to perish.
First, I provide some autobiographical background including my educational experiences to date in order to adequately orient the personal and professional axes which frame the dissertation. Thereafter, I illustrate the importance and relevance of the research by outlining the current crisis in Classics education.

**Professional Autobiography**

At school, I loved Latin. I started learning the language of the Romans when I was 11 years old and very quickly demonstrated some aptitude. The meticulous attention to detail required for the translation of a highly inflected language appealed to the more precise faculties of my juvenile mind but the need to piece together the disparate clues and make sense of the archaeological remains of daily life in Ancient Rome called on imagination and creativity. It was this combination of linguistic focus and historical ‘detective work’ which got, and has kept, me hooked. Reading the poetry of Virgil, Ovid and Catullus and the prose of Seneca, Pliny and Cicero was just reward for the industry and application required to learn seemingly incessant grammar rules. The grammar rules required for Latin, though, pale into insignificance compared to those required for Classical Greek, as I found aged 16. By that time, I had decided that I would study Classics at university and to do so at a Classics department of good repute, I realised that I would have to learn Greek. With Greek verbs being almost interminably irregular, I questioned the sense of such an endeavour on a daily basis but as soon as the rich and timeless literature of Homer, Euripides and Herodotus became accessible to me, all trauma was forgotten. At university, I expanded my Classical horizons by studying a variety of courses including Greek and Latin literature, History, Archaeology and Philosophy, all the time fascinated by the value and enduring relevance of the ideas and events of the Ancient civilisations under study. My interest in the Latin and Greek languages and civilisations blossomed throughout undergraduate and postgraduate study and, thereafter, I felt compelled to share my passion with others. It was during teacher training that I came to understand the important part I could play in spreading enthusiasm for Classical subjects to the next generation of learners.

Since 2006, then, I have been a teacher of Classics (Latin, Greek, Classical Civilisation and Ancient History). I have taught in three secondary schools; an independent day school for girls and boys in Scotland (2006-2010), an independent day school for girls in England...
(2010-2012) and most recently in an English State-funded co-educational Sixth Form College for International students, where I teach Classical Greek and Roman Studies on the International Baccalaureate diploma programme. When I commenced the Doctorate in Education (Ed.D.) I was teaching in Scotland. I now have professional experience in both Scotland and England but have chosen to situate my defence of rhetoric in the Scottish curriculum for two reasons: firstly, the number of students studying Classics at school in England is rising but it is falling in Scotland (Cambridge Schools Classics Project [CSCP] 2007) which makes analysis of its curricular contribution more urgent in Scotland and, secondly, my own involvement with aspects of the Scottish curricular reform process.

As lead teacher in the department in my first school, I was recruited by the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) to join the Qualification Design Team (QDT) for Latin, a group established to consider how the aims and purposes of Scotland’s CfE could be best reflected in Latin qualifications at all levels. As a member of this team, I executed the overhaul and redesign of Latin syllabi content and assessment in the secondary phase of Scottish education. In performing this role since 2010, I have been tasked with thinking creatively in collaboration with colleagues from higher education as well as teachers of Classics from independent and State schools 1 about the future of Classical language teaching in Scotland. It is important to note that my involvement has been limited to the implementation of the policy and the redesign of qualifications: I did not play any role in the writing of the CfE policy documents, only SQA assessment guidance documents. In such a way, I do not consider my research to be conducted as a policy ‘insider’ (Brannick and Coghlan 2007) since the main focus for the study is a suite of documentation written by the Curriculum Review Group, a board of which I was not a member. Obviously, that I have contributed to the publication of SQA policy documentation (assessment criteria, exemplification and associated evidence of attainment), redesigned in order to better reflect the assessment needs of CfE, has encouraged me to keep abreast of wider policy development. An interest in the evolving nature, discourse and ramifications of the policy, rather than in assessment itself, has proved of particular academic intrigue. Aside from contributing to the development of innovative assessment more compatible with the aims of CfE, I am first and foremost a practitioner and this research study is firmly rooted in and

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1 Because our subjects are taught in the merest paucity of State schools in Scotland (in 2011-2012 of the 44 centres presenting candidates, 12 were in the State sector), my own experience, like that of most Classics teachers, is based predominantly in the independent sector. However, my understanding of the learning and teaching of Classics across the sectors has been informed by real and current experience through extensive collaboration with colleagues from State schools on the QDT.
supported by classroom teaching experience and membership of a profession in the throes of curricular reform.

**Why the defence of Classical rhetoric?**

Aware that it would be impossible, within the confines of an Ed.D. dissertation, to provide an adequately argued defence of Classical language education in its entirety, I have opted instead to focus on the value of just one element of Latin and Greek which I consider has particular benefit to contemporary education: rhetoric. I was first introduced to rhetoric (for examples of Ancient and modern rhetorical passages see Appendix A) by my Classics teacher, at high school, when I studied Standard Grade and Higher Latin. The rhetorical devices employed by Cicero, Rome’s foremost orator, captured my imagination and inspired me to learn more about the art of persuasion. I remember being particularly struck, as a teenager, by the enduring relevance of Classical rhetoric and its recurrent use in the ‘modern’ communication of politicians, journalists and advertisers. I felt that the ability to identify the use of specific rhetorical devices and analyse their effect allowed me to distinguish quickly style from substance while appreciating the literary benefits of eloquent communication. During my undergraduate study of *Literae Humaniores*, I contrived to choose as many rhetorical options as possible and now, privileged to cascade my knowledge of Classical rhetorical theory to young people, I find its relevance is reinforced on a daily basis. When teaching elements of rhetoric through Latin literature, I never fail to be amazed by the students’ wonder when an orator’s linguistic tricks are demystified through knowledge of the rhetorical framework as though a magician has waved a magic wand and an opaque veil of communicative stupefaction has been removed, restoring penetrating linguistic clarity. Intrigued by the powerful effect the learning and teaching of rhetoric can have on students, it seemed an obvious choice for me to pursue this ongoing fascination with Classical rhetoric at the core of my Doctoral dissertation as I identify myself as both a Classicist and an educator. In the section which follows, I explain what is meant by Classics and provide some background to the teaching and learning of Classical languages and their treatment in educational policy. This context is necessary for the exploration of what is meant by rhetoric in the next chapter.
The crisis in Classics

Classics is an umbrella term for the languages, literatures and civilisations of the Greeks and Romans. Latin and Greek are the Classical languages which give fullest and richest access to the poetry, philosophy, plays, letters, history and rhetoric of these civilisations although they can, of course, be studied in translation and in Scotland there exists an English-medium course of this type called Classical Studies. Classical Studies is considered a Social Subject in CfE, like Geography, History, Business Studies and Modern Studies and, as such, has no linguistic focus. It is primarily concerned with the social aspects of the Ancient world. Classical rhetoric is not studied as part of Classical Studies but forms a significant part of Latin and Greek syllabi in Scotland and so my defence of rhetoric is only concerned with the linguistic aspects of Classics education, about which more will be said in Chapters Two, Three and Six.

It ought to be noted at the outset that the learning and teaching of Classical subjects in school classrooms has not been the subject of many\(^2\) research studies or publications over the last century and the majority of those which do exist is based in an English curricular context. Owing to the very limited (Williams 2003) number of published works on the role of Classical subjects in Scottish education little is known about how, when and why they came to disappear from most mainstream schools. In order to outline the current crisis in Classics education, I will refer to the national picture, informed by English research studies which are illuminative of general trends in curriculum reform. Knowledge of the Scottish context has been informed by curriculum policy documentation and discussion with colleagues who have enjoyed longer careers in education than I.

In the late 19\(^{th}\) and early to mid 20\(^{th}\) centuries, secondary school education was synonymous with training in the Classics, or more accurately a training in the Latin and Greek languages. The Victorian and Edwardian attitude to the learning of Classics at school was that the linguistic aspects should take precedence over history, archaeology and philosophy. Sullivan (1965: 4) comments, rather facetiously, on the centrality of the languages: ‘[t]o be against accuracy and a sound knowledge of Latin and Greek is rather

like being against God, country and motherhood’. The mental aerobics required for translation and critical linguistic analysis were thought to be instrumentally valuable in the training of the mind. Indeed, Bolgar (1963: 8) asserts that the study of Classics facilitates ‘a clear grasp of the nature of grammar and syntax, the acquiring of a sound basis for an understanding of philology and mastery of the art of writing’.

Development in recent history have prompted the marginalisation or dismissal of Classics from this pivotal position in the school curriculum and have precipitated a concomitant decline in the number of students studying Classical subjects in schools. Technological and industrial advancements in the last century and the demand for scientists fuelled by wars and international tension, such as the Cold War, meant that the centrality of Classics in education came to be questioned since the study of literature and history did not appear to contribute directly to national advancement. Previously exalted as the ‘best key to a proper understanding of life’ (Bolgar 1963: 11), Classical languages were succeeded by Science and Mathematics as the focus of promotion in educational policy (Baker 1989, Stray 1998, Teaching and Learning Research Programme 2006, Taylor 2008, Wynarczyk and Hale 2009).

In 1960, as a result of this shift away from Classics on the school curriculum, the withdrawal of the requirement for all Oxbridge entrants to have Latin caused Classics to go into a deeper downward spiral. This was exacerbated by the Education Reform Act (United Kingdom Parliament 1988) and the associated introduction of the National Curriculum in England which stated there would be three ‘core’ subjects (Maths, Science and English) and a further list of seven foundation subjects (History, Geography, a Modern Foreign Language, Technology, Music, Art and Physical Education) and thus Classical subjects were excluded from that point onwards in many State schools. With the launch of comprehensive education, Classics attracted a reputation for being an ‘instrument of selection for an intellectual elite’ (Sharwood Smith 1977: 2) and was considered incompatible with the progressive educational agenda of the 1970s and 1980s (Baker 1989, Moore 1989, Williams 2003, Gillard 2011) since the rote learning required in Classics appeared to hark back to the post-war days of strict discipline and knowledge transmission, both of which were deemed undesirable at that time. With an urgent need for scientists and mathematicians, Classical subjects, perceived as being useless, irrelevant and remote, became unfavoured. The mystique which surrounded the ‘classically educated man, able,
by virtue of his training, to master any problem in the sphere of life, so long as it was amenable to intellectual analysis’ (Sharwood Smith 1977: 1) began to fade and Classics was thus dethroned from the dominant position it had long held in the curriculum.

Predictably, in consequence, the numbers with access to Classical subjects declined. In Scotland, Latin and Greek remained in the curriculum as optional subjects but they dwindled in popularity as schools chose to place emphasis on subjects which offered knowledge and skills which improved potential for, and could be directly applied to, employment. As Classics teachers were due to retire, departments were closed and so over the last half century, Classical language education has disappeared entirely from most Scottish schools, remaining in the merest paucity. With more teachers now leaving Classics classrooms nationally, than are entering (Beckett 2012, Hunt 2012a, b, c, 2013), the subject is precariously poised between survival and extinction. Presentations for SQA exams have declined to such a degree that Standard Grade Greek qualifications were withdrawn in 2011, as a result of SQA’s ‘low uptake policy’ (SQA 2010) and the decision was taken in the same year that no new qualifications would be developed for Classical Greek in Scotland. Effectively, the subject was axed from CfE. The fear among Classicists is now that the ‘low-uptake policy’, like the sword of Damocles, hangs ominously over the future of Latin at all levels. Thus the situation is now urgent and I fear that, unless a strong case is made for the retention of the Classics, Scottish education stands to be intellectually and culturally impoverished as a result of their removal from the curriculum.

The hazards facing the future of Classics education in Scotland and elsewhere are in part the result of shifting global trends in education policy and curricular reform. At the crux of the matter is the question which underlies all curriculum decisions, ‘What is education for?’. The answers to this question are being increasingly motivated by political and

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3 In exam diet 2011–2012, 44 schools out of 550 secondary schools and colleges in Scotland presented candidates for Latin qualifications. 24 presented candidates for Standard Grade (total presentation: 411), 1 presented candidates for Intermediate 1 (total presentation: 5), 12 presented candidates for Intermediate 2 (total presentation: 139), 35 presented candidates for Higher (total presentation: 243), 14 presented candidates for Advanced Higher (total presentation: 26). Given that the average total number of candidates per year is 50,000 (SQA 2011), those sitting Latin qualifications amount to 0.5 per cent.

4 In exam diet 2011–2012, 3 centres presented candidates for Classical Greek qualifications. Total presentation at Intermediate 2 was 15 and at Higher was 8. Given that the average total number of candidates per year is 50,000 (SQA 2011), those sitting Greek qualifications amount to 0.04 per cent.

5 After 2013, pupils wishing to gain accreditation for Classical Greek will have to be presented for an alternative qualification; General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), Advanced Subsidiary (AS) and Advanced Level (A Level) qualifications are offered by the English Oxford, Cambridge and RSA (OCR) examination board.
economic factors as nations aim to increase their gross domestic product (GDP) and become more economically and technologically competitive (Becker 1964, Kernan et al. 1997, Hartley 2003, Dale 2005, Menand 2010, Ferrall 2011, Fettner 2011). As shall be shown later in this chapter, there is evidence that these considerations have, in part, influenced the development and discourse of CfE. ‘The profit motive’ (Nussbaum 2010: 7) is prioritised by leaders and policy makers as being the key to the future health of nations, with a number of concomitant consequences. Most worrying among these is a ‘crisis in the Humanities’ which threatens the study of Humanities subjects in schools and universities across the globe. As a result of this focus on economic growth, parents are becoming increasingly impatient with schools which seek to cultivate ‘allegedly superfluous skills’ like the ability to think critically and imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person. They dismiss other abilities considered vital for democratic citizenship and campaign instead for ‘getting their children filled with testable skills that seem likely to produce financial success’ (Nussbaum 2010: 4). With employment and national economic growth playing new roles in reframing theories concerning the purpose of education, one theory in particular appears to have had a negative impact on the learning and teaching of Humanities subjects like Classics: Human Capital Theory (HCT).

Research conducted in Chicago in the 1960s produced a theory which recognised that education was ‘the single most important determinant’ of economic growth (Becker 1964: 45). Education and training were therefore considered to be an investment (not only for the individual, but also for their community, country and government) since, according to the theory, enlarged human capital impacts directly on skill creation, productivity and income. The prioritisation of human capital as a conduit through which education could be directly converted to economic output resulted in the HCT dividing the curriculum into the appreciative (subjects concerned with intrinsic value like Art, Philosophy and Classics) and the instrumental (subjects which are of value beyond themselves like Science, Mathematics and Modern Foreign Languages). Because the HCT considers that people act for economic reasons alone and are driven by return on investment, it

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cannot explain the behaviour of someone who wants to spend her time studying something without any prospect of economic returns from this education… such as learning to read and understand poems, or studying some ancient culture (Robeyns 2006: 72-73).

As a result of this theoretical perspective influencing educational stakeholders at all levels (teachers, schools, local education authorities and government education departments among others), I have heard from colleagues in local and national networks that teachers who failed to adequately justify the impact of Classics for entrepreneurship, enterprise and employability initiatives, found themselves squeezed out of the curriculum, left teaching Classics outside the school day or not at all. There may, of course, be other factors at work but the brutal division of learning into ‘directly applicable’ and ‘useless’, which the HCT promotes, has damaged the esteem of Humanities subjects like Classics. This simplification of the curriculum is ill-informed and short-sighted, in my view, since learners leave school and become members of a multi-faceted community (both local and global) where they must exercise critical judgement informed by their study of the diversity of human life: they are not simply robots working in industry or financial markets. Grave dangers lie in store for us, I believe, if we allow the HCT to suppress the study of the Humanities. I support the stance taken by Wolin (2011: 15) who defends the Humanities by identifying that in studying the events of the past, we are more able to create a future free of injustice. Furthermore, he advises that studying Philosophy equips us with the reasoning skills and moral judgement necessary for discerning justice from injustice and ‘the substantive from the superficial’. Literature, he suggests, exercises the imagination and expands our conception of what is possible and rhetoric, he says, ‘furnishes us with the capacities of linguistic self-expression in order that we might persuade our fellow citizens about the worth of our most cherished beliefs and convictions’ (Wolin 2011: 15). I concur that the Humanities offer a host of educative benefits which cannot be supplanted by instrumental subjects.

Despite the HCT excising the appreciative disciplines of the sort described here, it is acknowledged by many (see previous footnote) that a narrow focus on instrumental learning (exemplified by STEM subjects) is insufficient preparation for democratic citizenship. Indeed, to keep ‘democracies alive and wide awake’ (Nussbaum 2010: 10), the curriculum needs to offer more than instrumental knowledge: it must cultivate capacities for critical thinking, reflection and effective self-expression; all of which I consider are
offered abundantly by the study of Classics. Dewey (1966: 249) urges against a division between learning for intrinsic and extrinsic purposes, promoting instead the realisation of the value of each subject in itself, before measuring its capacity as a resource for other ends. This appears to have been the guiding principle of curriculum design in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, when Classics enjoyed prominence on the school curriculum but greater emphasis is now placed on those subjects, like Science, which ‘will help build a vibrant and sustainable economy’ (Scottish Executive 2006a: 29), because it is believed that tomorrow’s scientists and engineers will contribute directly to the growth of Scotland’s national wealth.

Another global trend which has contributed to the promotion of STEM subjects and has damaged the role of Classics in schools and society is the ‘skills agenda’ which prioritises the cultivation of skills over the isolated transmission and absorption of knowledge. CfE states that ‘the development of skills is essential to learning and education to help young people to become successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens and effective contributors’ (Scottish Government 2009b: 2). This policy move is part of ‘a worldwide trend\textsuperscript{7} for new curricular models to downgrade knowledge’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 2). In a shift away from the detailed specification of content to be covered CfE propounds a more ‘skills based’ approach.

Providing individuals with skills helps each individual to fulfil their social and intellectual potential and benefits the wider Scottish economy... [CfE] recognises the pivotal role of schools and their partners in equipping young people with opportunities to build, develop, present and demonstrate a wide variety of skills (Scottish Government 2009b: 4).

This shift from a knowledge based curriculum to a skills based one has, traditionally, been damaging to Classics teaching since the learning of Latin and Greek is so commonly associated with learning by rote, memorisation and mastering the rules of linguistic accidence, with very little focus on which transferable skills are being developed in the process. This does not mean, however, that skills are not being developed: quite the contrary. I will show, in Chapter Three, that Classical languages, and rhetoric in particular, can help learners develop literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking skills and in

Chapter Four, skills conducive to responsible citizenship. Nevertheless, proponents of the ‘skills agenda’ justify the downgrade of knowledge by citing future needs: ‘workers and citizens will need the skills to quickly acquire new knowledge, as existing knowledge forms become rapidly obsolete’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 3). It is this view that the HCT adopts; it judges knowledge of the Classical world to be obsolete, thus it cannot explain the choice of any student to prefer learning Classics over Science. Yet it is surely too simplistic to state that all those who study Science will contribute to national economic growth and yet none of those who study Classics can aspire to do so. Baroness Susan Greenfield, herself a Professor of Biomedical Science but a former student of Classics, suggests a more inclusive approach is required to answer the question, ‘What is education for?’. She suggests that Classics can usefully enrich and extend the education of young people as part of a curriculum which values the contribution of both Sciences and Arts and Humanities:

in the future our young people will need knowledge, not information - the learning of isolated facts: they will need a way of linking and understanding the vagaries of human nature, rather than a simple formula, a single date, or a sound bite. Science gives the tools, but Classics the questions and conceptual framework (Greenfield 2004: 13).

The role of Classics in providing a conceptual framework for linking and understanding diverse activities in private and public life will be explored in greater detail in the analysis of the critical faculties in Chapter Three. When preparing students for careers which may exist in the future, I acknowledge that it is becoming increasingly important to equip them with skills which help to break down artificial barriers in their learning and which promote links between different fields of knowledge. I contend that Classics can contribute positively to the cultivation of life skills which young people need to operate successfully as individuals and citizens, despite the contempt with which it is held by proponents of the HCT. At present, it is sufficient to conclude that the influence of the HCT on Humanities

Evidence suggests that those who pursue the study of Classics at university find themselves the most employable of Arts graduates. Cambridge University Classics Faculty accounts for why: "Few degrees offer the same opportunities for acquiring advanced skills in languages, analytical thinking, essay-writing, visual analysis, critical sensitivity, spotting a biased source at a hundred paces, and so on. Our students have gone on to law, journalism, film and television, banking, consultancy, marketing, museum and gallery work, teaching and academia" (University of Cambridge Classics Faculty 2007a). The fact that the study of Greek and Roman literature and civilisation is not directly applicable to accountancy or management consultancy is clearly not the problem which it is made out to be by Human Capital theorists; the skills developed as a result of studying Classics are valuable, transferable and sought-after by employers in a variety of sectors.
education has been largely detrimental, and I hold that it has contributed in no small measure to the current crisis in Classics.

In contrast, I propose that the benefits of education ought not to be judged proportionately to the economic pay-offs but rather on their capacity to expand human capabilities (Woßmann 2002: 207). By that I mean, contrary to the HCT, economic growth ought not to be considered an end in itself but could more usefully be judged as a means to expanding the freedoms which people enjoy, for example the abilities to read, communicate, and argue, to choose a more informed way, and to be taken more seriously by others (Sen 1999, Somekh and Schwandt 2007). Encouragingly, there is evidence that these human capabilities are valorised in CfE since the four capacities (effective contributor, successful learner, confident individual and responsible citizen [Scottish Government 2008: 25, see Appendix B]) are placed at the heart of the curriculum and are described as ‘purposes of the curriculum’ (Scottish Executive Education Department [SEED] 2004a: 12). There is also no evidence in CfE of the downgrade of Humanities subjects: Languages, Arts and Social Studies are given equal prominence in the curriculum areas and appear alongside Science, Mathematics and Technologies. CfE upholds the distinctiveness of the Scottish curriculum (Bryce and Humes 2003: 111) in advocating a broad general education (Education Scotland 2012) but the policy documents do also demonstrate concern for employability and economic growth. Contrary to the HCT, however, these references exhibit attendant concern for narrowing the social gap and improving the accessibility of the curriculum to all learners. CfE, then, seems to be a curriculum which cherishes the Humanities and human capacities but is one which is also designed to boost economic growth and increase employment opportunities. In order to understand the urgency of my argument for Classics, is it necessary to locate this dissertation in the context of CfE in Scotland. In the next section, I explore the supranational influences on CfE which have motivated these manifold curricular aims before analysing, in detail, the policy’s origin, development and early reception.

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9 Scottish education has resisted the worst of capitalist influences on education and is committed to developing the democratic intellect of children through a broad general education. Particular differences between Scotland and England and Wales, for example, are its autonomous legislative framework, resistance to national testing and the existence of one national examination body. The distinctiveness of Scottish education will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four.
Supranational influences on CfE

CfE calls for the promotion of an inclusive, tolerant and respectful Scotland, in which the positive potential of each young person is realised, and ‘all are equally valued as citizens regardless of accidents of nature or nurture’ (Carr et al. 2006: 13). Alongside this social aspiration, the policy also highlights the need for the curriculum to ‘enable young people to understand the world they are living in, reach the highest possible levels of achievement and equip them for work and learning throughout their lives’ (SEED 2004a: 10). These aims were influenced in part, I believe, by supranational forces which drove an agenda of higher attainment, inclusive citizenship and increased focus on employability. ‘[T]he EU’s Lisbon declaration (European Parliament 2000) called for Europe to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, with more and better jobs for greater social cohesion’ (Dale 2005: 135). Early CfE policy documents show that social factors were high on the agenda of educational change together with the need to address economic performance alongside reducing poverty.

Like other countries, we face new influences, which mean that we must look differently at the curriculum. These include global, social, political and economic changes, and the particular challenges facing Scotland: the need to increase the economic performance of the nation; reflect its growing diversity; improve health; and reduce poverty (SEED 2004a: 10).

During the initial planning and design phase of CfE, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted an investigation into the quality and equity of schooling in Scotland and in its report (2007) it identified that there was a very large gap [in motivation, opportunity and achievement] between young people in the bottom fourth band of socio-economic status and the top fourth band, with Scotland lagging considerably behind some of its comparator nations – the Netherlands, Korea, Canada and Finland…these findings suggest that young people from poorer backgrounds face significant barriers in accessing a system of high performing schools (Teese 2007: 140).
The OECD review group\(^{10}\) argued that a highly centralised control over both the curriculum and organisational structures during the 1990s ‘had been achieved at the cost of responsiveness and relevance to the educational needs of a significant proportion of the population’ (Reeves 2008: 6). Therefore they suggested that schools, education authorities and communities should be given greater autonomy and independence, at local level, to make decisions about how best to engage their students more fruitfully in the educational process (Reeves 2008: 6-7). The policy documents (Scottish Government 2008, 2009a, 2009b) released after the publication of the OECD report in 2007 reassert the importance of making the curriculum accessible to all learners. However, unlike in England, the Scottish Government did not launch any intervention schemes specifically aimed at improving academic engagement and performance of children from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The ‘pupil premium’\(^{11}\) which is paid by the United Kingdom (UK) Government to English schools to raise standards in less affluent areas has no equivalent in Scotland (Scottish Parliament 2011). Instead, the new curriculum was designed to be distinctive in explicitly moving away from central prescription, ‘towards a model that relies upon professional capacity to adapt curriculum guidance to meet the needs of local school communities’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346). Policy authors were giving teachers the task of designing a curriculum which suited their own unique subset of learners, appropriately differentiated and personalised. As such, CfE attempts to take account of current and anticipated needs deriving from economic and social changes and aims to provide a curriculum which is flexible enough to not only meet the immediate needs of Scotland’s diverse learner body but also to make progress in improving educational attainment and narrowing the gap in social cohesion. These, together with increasing the economic performance of Scotland and creating new and better employment opportunities, are the highly ambitious goals of the policy authors. It will now be illuminative to analyse how these diverse influences from supranational, national and local levels were filtered into the policy through the process of curriculum review.

\(^{10}\) This was a group set up to review the report and make suggestions for improvement in the priorities identified.

\(^{11}\) The UK government considers that the pupil premium, which is additional to main school funding, is the best way to address the current underlying inequalities between children eligible for free school meals (FSM) and their peers by ensuring that funding to tackle disadvantage reaches the pupils who need it most. The pupil premium was introduced in April 2011 and is allocated to schools to work with pupils who have been registered for free school meals at any point in the last six years (known as ‘Ever 6 FSM’) (Department for Education 2013a).
The genealogy of CfE

While this research study does not set out to provide a comprehensive review of Scottish curricular history, a brief summary of the genealogy of CfE is provided to elucidate this curricular reform process, contextualise subsequent analysis of the policy and facilitate engagement with the critical literature. Following the Education and Training (Scotland) Act (Scottish Parliament 2000), which states that, 'every child matters, regardless of his or her family background... and should have the best possible start in life’, the Scottish Parliament, soon after devolution in 1999, launched its largest ever public consultation exercise with the aim of improving Scotland’s educational system for future generations. By encouraging all potential stakeholders to participate in the process of reform, I consider that the Scottish Parliament initiated a program of foresight planning\textsuperscript{12}, commissioned by a government keenly aware of shifting global processes and the need to plan a curriculum for the years ahead.

The Minister for Education and Young People launched the National Debate on Schools in the 21st century in the Scottish Parliament in March 2002. Key elements of the agenda for change were greater flexibility and choice in the school curriculum and the need for well-built and well-resourced schools (SEED 2004b). A wide ‘policy community’ (Richardson and Jordan 1979, McPherson and Rabb 1988) of pupils, teachers, parents and others were invited to form discussion groups and to submit their conclusions. There existed no specific policy proposal. Rather, open questions were asked about what schools in the future should be like and what their pupils should learn. Respondents were asked to consider how pupils could learn more effectively, as well as highlighting the best and worst parts of the current system. Suggestions for improvement in curriculum design and content were sought, as well as how motivation for learning could be developed. The debate elicited over 1500 responses and it is estimated that 20,000 people took part (Munn et al. 2004: 433).

\textsuperscript{12}Foresight planning can be described as ‘a future oriented public discussion... neither a form of prediction or planning but rather an analysis of global trends, how they will affect us and how (given our resources) we might take advantage of them’ (Peters 2003: 8).
Alongside the markedly consultative process of the National Debate, the Education, Culture, and Sport Committee of the Scottish Parliament conducted its own inquiry into the purposes of Scottish education. The Committee wanted to ‘build on that [debate] by provoking debate in more depth about the key issues about the future of education’ (Education, Culture and Sport Committee Discussion Paper 2002: 1). The members of this Parliamentary review group were educators who had significant knowledge of the Scottish education system and were experienced practitioners and advisors on policy matters. This Parliamentary inquiry, then, might be seen as representative of more traditional styles of consultation but the responses from all stakeholders were collated and formed the starting point for the design of the new curriculum.

I now provide some background to the authorship of the policy and introduce the publications which constitute the suite of policy documents since reference to both is recurrent throughout the dissertation. The Scottish Executive established a Curriculum Review Group in November 2004 to build on the outcomes of the National Debate and the Parliamentary enquiry, charged with the analysing the responses and leading the process of curriculum reform. The members of this group were invited to participate and acted as representatives for all sectors of Scottish education (primary, secondary, further education, higher education and SQA). There was widespread concern among teaching colleagues, at the time, that these ‘hand-picked’ individuals did not provide a true representation of educators at each level and that the documents and policies they produced could not thus adequately communicate the diverse and variously-invested views of stakeholders in Scottish education. There was no public consultation on the formation of this group nor has the selection process been described in a transparent way. In 2004 the group produced ‘A Curriculum for Excellence’ (SEED 2004a), a document outlining ‘our vision for children and young people’ (SEED 2004a: 3) and in that publication the members of the group were named (SEED 2004a: 18). In the same year, ‘Curriculum for Excellence - a ministerial response’ (2004b) was published which provided governmental justification for the Review Group’s priorities. In 2006, an update was

13 Unfortunately, the lack of transparency in justifying the selection of the policy authors repeats the much-maligned earlier selection of a similar group, the Consultative Committee on the Curriculum (CCC) established in 1985. In response to the establishment of this group, Humes (1986: 8) comments that the membership of advisory committees constitutes a ‘leadership class’ in Scottish education, which has ‘an array of exclusionary devices with which it screens aspiring entrants’. The Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS) expressed concern that the representatives on this committee were unaware of staff opinions and attitudes to key issues and concepts. ‘Until these doubts are resolved it would seem unlikely that advice emanating from the CCC would have any standing with professional teachers’ (EIS 1988: 1). There was the concern among my colleagues in school that history appeared to be repeating itself with CfE.
published, ‘A Curriculum for Excellence: progress and proposals’ (Scottish Executive 2006a). This document served to provide further information about the design and structure of Scotland’s new curriculum together with ‘Building the Curriculum 1: the contribution of curriculum areas’ (Scottish Executive 2006b) which provided the draft outcomes for each curricular area, so that young people could see how their learning was linked together and could develop from the early level (nursery) to level four (end of S2) in a unified, coherent curriculum. These were formalised in ‘Curriculum for Excellence: Experiences and Outcomes’ (Scottish Government 2009a) but publications in the Building the Curriculum series continued, providing greater clarity on the shape of CfE: Building the Curriculum 2: ‘Active learning in the Early Years’ (Scottish Government 2007); 3: ‘A framework for learning and teaching’ (Scottish Government 2008); 4: ‘Skills for learning, life and work’ (Scottish Government 2009b) and 5: ‘A framework for assessment’ (Scottish Government 2011a). Now in the implementation stage, further details about the ongoing development of the policy are included in ‘Curriculum for Excellence Action Plan’ (Scottish Government 2011b) and ‘Curriculum for Excellence Implementation – Questions and Answers’ (Scottish Government 2011c). Alongside documents published by the Scottish Government which are informed by the findings of the Curriculum Review Group, the non-departmental public body Learning and Teaching Scotland (LTS) (called Education Scotland after 2011) has published guidance documents to help schools and teachers plan for implementation. Two of these are of particular relevance to this dissertation: ‘Participation and Learning’ (LTS 2007) which provides examples of good practice for active learning and active citizenship and ‘Developing global citizens within Curriculum for Excellence’ (LTS 2011a), a guidance document which provides a framework for the teaching and learning of three cross-curricular themes; sustainable development, international education and citizenship.

In the section which follows, I refer to these publications as I interrogate the implicit assumptions of the policy with regard to what sort of education is envisaged by the policy authors for learners in Scotland. I support my own critical examination of what CfE sets out to achieve with the critical responses of professional and academic policy stakeholders since these not only inform the policy analysis throughout this study but also contextualise my own critical engagement with the content of the policy as a teacher of Classics. In conducting a preliminary survey of the policy’s intentions and the reactions they have
provoked, the identification of pitfalls and possibilities will open up an enlarged discursive space for a deep consideration of the role of Classical languages in the curriculum and will provide a suitably situated starting point for my defence of rhetoric.

The conception of education implied by the aims of CfE: a critical commentary

The aims of CfE are aspirational and laudable; this is uncontested by a significant number of critics\textsuperscript{14} of the policy.

A Curriculum for Excellence... will provide an important impetus to achieving our vision for children and young people, that all children and young people should be valued by being safe, nurtured, achieving, healthy, active, included, respected and responsible (SEED 2004a: 3).

With these admirable objectives of the curriculum it is difficult to take issue. Indeed, for many years there were very few expressions of critical reaction to the policy simply because its flexibility and ‘high-minded tone’ (Carr \textit{et al.} 2006: 13) prevented any real interrogation of its substance. Since 2008, though, diversely positioned critics (both academics and teachers) have expressed a variety of concerns about the shape, content and direction of the policy (Reeves 2008, Bloomer 2009, Buie 2011, Ford 2011, MacKinnon 2011, Hepburn 2012, Johnson 2012). The reaction of teachers to the policy will be sketched later in this chapter: its mixed reception in schools serves to underscore the value of the pedagogical model I propose in this dissertation. For the moment, I intend to examine two criticisms of CfE which have emerged from the critical literature, both of which create opportunities for Classics, I suggest, and have implications which are integral to the subsequent development of my argument. They are: the absence of a clearly defined theoretical base for the curriculum (sometimes referred to as its ‘mixed curricular structure’) and the repeated use of undefined terms throughout policy documentation.

Many critics have raised concern that the policy documents are littered with the repeated use of generalised, undefined terms. Terms which have been isolated for particular criticism are ‘active learning’ (Priestley 2010, Priestley and Humes 2010, Reid 2012), ‘skills for learning, skills for life and skills for work’, ‘literacy and numeracy and health and well-being’, ‘enterprise, citizenship, sustainable development, international education and creativity’ (Priestley and Humes 2010), ‘critical literacy’ (Reid 2012), ‘critical thinking’ (Maclellan and Soden 2008) and ‘freedom and creativity’ (Oberski 2009). Nowhere are these explained, systematically unpacked or is their inclusion in the policy justified. Consequently there exist wide variations in the way in which these terms are understood and enacted in practice (for example Priestley comments on how diversely ‘active learning’ has been interpreted [2010: 30]). Just as certain key terms are used without detailed explanation of how they should be understood, there is a concomitant absence of instruction in how they ought to be cultivated through practical implementation of the curriculum. Instead of seeing the lack of specified pedagogic instruction as a failure of CfE as others do (Carr et al. 2006, Maclellan and Soden 2008, Oberski 2009, Priestley 2010, Priestley and Minty 2012a, Reid 2012), I think that Fairclough (2000: 25) is right in observing that ‘there is an advantage in vagueness – in ways of representing processes that are unspecific... the more unspecific they are, the more open to various interpretations by differently positioned readerships’. If CfE is ‘regarded as a broad framework document, designed to form the basis of subsequent policy development, rather than an extended rationale’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 351), its use of nebulous terms becomes less reprehensible and its flexibility becomes its unique selling point.

Furthermore, the absence of prescribed pedagogic prescription offers two key benefits: the potential for restoration of influence to minority subjects like Classics and the validation of teaching as a researching profession in Scotland. Since all curriculum areas are now invited to have input into the fulfilment of the experiences and outcomes in health and well-being, literacy and numeracy, teachers of Classics are the recipients of a rare opportunity to raise the profile and potential contribution of their subjects. This is true, too, with respect to the attributes exemplified in the four capacities: it is the very fact that terms like critical thinking and responsible citizenship are not clearly defined which provides scope, I defend later in this dissertation, for the deeper interrogation and reconsideration of rhetoric. Contribution of this sort was not possible in CfE’s
predecessor, ‘Curriculum and assessment in Scotland: 5-14 National Guidelines’ (Scottish Education Department 1987), where delineation of subject discipline was absolute. Therefore, as well as offering an increased sphere of influence for teachers of minority subjects like Classics, it also offers all teachers the opportunity to become active and engaged researchers, as the General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) desires (GTCS 2012: 8), encouraging teachers to use their knowledge, experience and research skills to critically assess what they consider these terms to mean and how these interpretations impact on professional practice. In inviting practitioners to engage with policy development locally and to use their creativity to design specific learning activities which can successfully deliver the experiences and outcomes of the curriculum, CfE promises not only the restoration of autonomy to teachers but also the revalidation of the profession as one committed to innovation and improvement through the requirement of its members to be researchers. The scope for these professional benefits would be more limited, I claim, if terms and pedagogy were strictly defined.

The second common criticism is linked to the first: not only is terminology used and its meaning not adequately articulated, the theoretical basis of the curriculum itself is nowhere clarified. The absence of any reference to what Priestley and Humes (2010: 346) call the ‘rich vein of literature in the field of curriculum development (Dewey 1938, Taba 1962, Stenhouse 1975, Kelly 1986, 1999)’ suggests that the curriculum was developed without due regard to ‘the insights of research into the curriculum, whether from a philosophical, sociological or psychological standpoint’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346). With no rigorous justification of the theoretical model underpinning the curriculum, its structure is open to criticism for being ‘problematic’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346), ill-founded and precarious. In Kelly’s (1999) view, acknowledgement and justification of a particular planning model ‘is necessary to ensure coherence and conceptual clarity about the purposes of education’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 346).

On initial viewing, the curriculum looked to be based on the process model (Kelly 1999), in which the four capacities represented the intrinsic principles of the curriculum; creating an aspirational vision of what young people could do and become if their potential were recognised and nurtured. In the pre-2006 policy documentation the lack of prescribed

15 Specific to the child, the class, the school or the community.
content looked to represent a bold departure from the status quo and provided cause for celebration: it appeared to eschew the prescription which defined previous curricular structures (for example, Standard Grade, 5-14, Higher Still) in favour of a more flexible approach which promised to restore autonomy and creativity to teachers. The excited anticipation was, however, short lived as ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ (Scottish Executive 2006b) and later policy documents dashed hopes of flexibility and autonomy, advocating some very prescriptive elements and giving answers to those (like Carr et al. 2006: 13) who had questioned what form the joined up curriculum would take. The sequential levels which separate learning into stages linked by increasingly complex learning objectives seem to suggest that CfE is rather a mastery curriculum (in which content is specified as objectives and data is used to measure performance of individuals and schools [Kelly 1999]), the same, in this respect, as the 5-14 curriculum it replaces. Additionally, the organisation of knowledge into discrete curriculum areas (Scottish Government 2006b) and the selection of precise content as experiences and outcomes within these (Scottish Government 2009a) not only appears oppositional to the founding principles of flexibility, breadth and choice but seems ‘inimical to the underlying purposes of the curriculum as expressed in the four capacities’ (Priestley and Humes 2010: 358).

The schism between process and mastery curricular models, triggered by the lack of conceptual clarity, risks marginalising the potential benefits of freedom, creativity and personalisation promised by CfE. Priestley and Humes (2010: 359) claim that because teachers are to deliver very detailed and specific outcomes, opportunities for professional autonomy and innovative teaching are reduced, ‘rendering classrooms predictable, limited and uncreative’. With this assessment of CfE’s impact, I do not entirely agree. The organisation of the curriculum into discrete areas, together with the introduction of sequential levels, does not reduce the possibilities presented by the more process-driven elements of the curriculum. What remains flexible and open to creative interpretation is the delivery of the cross-curricular themes and the four capacities which are the responsibility of all practitioners. It is in these areas, rather than as a discrete subject area, I explain in Chapters Three and Four, that rhetoric has

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16 Tension surrounds the language of ‘delivery’ in CfE. Priestley (2013b) contends that ‘good education is something that is experienced by young people; it is not delivered. Delivery implies that education is a product, rather than a process’. The linguistic implication of transmission is perhaps a remnant from the legacy of the highly prescriptive 5-14 curriculum (discussed above).
a vital role to play. Admittedly, the prescription of outcomes and experiences for each curricular area returns to a mastery model which confines learning within subject disciplines and this does, perhaps, limit the autonomy of the practitioner to some extent since the content for a certain proportion of each curriculum area is prescribed but this does not necessitate that the learning therein is predictable, limited or uncreative. Rather, the onus is on teachers, as professionals, to review their existing practice and develop pedagogical methods which facilitate fulfilment of the experiences and outcomes while furthering the aims of CfE. As was noted above, this ought not to be seen as an unreasonable expectation for a ‘researching’ profession nor should the curriculum be unduly criticised for its seemingly ‘hybrid’ model. I consider that its aims for education in Scotland are compatible with the shape and structure of the curriculum revealed in the suite of policy documents published to date although much is reliant on the willingness of the teaching profession to adapt their practice in pursuit of CfE’s new vision. The reaction of teachers, then, warrants examination as it reveals an important dimension of the relationship between policy and practice; further explanation of my own professional context and experience elucidates the origin of the present study.

**Reaction of teachers in Scotland to the development and implementation of CfE**

A relatively small number of formal research studies\(^{17}\) have been done in the area of teacher reaction to CfE. The data collected from these research projects revealed that most teachers (whether in favour of CfE or not) used the term ‘floundering in the dark’ to describe their situation at the time of the interviews (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 11). This follows comments in the popular press that ‘people are running about doing what seems best to them without any degree of co-ordination’ (MacLeod 2008) and one respondent to an EIS survey is reported to have said, “I believe that no one has any real grasp of what it is about. The more reassurances SQA and partners try to give, the more concerned and confused I have become” (Priestley 2013a). I think Priestley’s metaphor of school staff attempting to ‘negotiate the curricular minefield’ (2010: 30) is apt. As a member of teaching staff in a Scottish secondary school, in the early days of the introduction of

the policy, despite the curriculum espousing freedom and flexibility, I myself felt that it occupied a ‘danger zone’ which I had to map without exposing myself to any latent explosive devices. This was mostly due to the fact that decisions about the shape and content of the curriculum could be taken locally; inevitably schools began to restructure their curriculum. In this regard, a broader war metaphor might be in order; I observed teachers become soldiers, even crusaders, fighting for the continuation of their discrete subject on the timetable and in option blocks. Teaching and learning strategies were planned with military precision and became weapons as battle lines were drawn between adversarial teachers, keen to bring students over to their side to consolidate their position of importance within the review process. The metaphor could even be extended to describe the dynamic of staff interaction, where the curriculum leader and other members of senior management became the enemy, set on imposing their new educational agenda on the teaching staff, in an effort to bring changed practices which were deemed important, but not sufficiently justified, by those in charge. This scenario is probably a standard response to all major educational reform initiatives; it just so happens that CfE was the first I encountered in my professional career and so it was particularly keenly felt by me.

Aside from my somewhat embattled personal experience, teacher reaction to CfE, predictably, falls into three categories, those in favour, those against and those who remain unsure. Firstly, those in favour praise the opportunities presented by CfE to be ‘creative and innovative’ (Oberski 2009: 21) and welcome increased collaborative and collegial working practices (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 8). Mostly based in the primary sector, these teachers enjoy experimenting and see themselves as agents of change and professional developers of the curriculum. Frequently they embrace cross-curricular learning opportunities and prioritise making bridges between subjects, ‘whereas before the bridges were there but nobody really paid attention to them’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 13). Secondly, those who feel bitter towards the curricular reform perceive the innovation to be entirely unnecessary, simply change for change’s sake and/or politically-driven and question why it was necessary to move away from the 5-14 guidelines as the basis for pedagogical practice. As well as describing the curriculum as having shifted from ‘extreme prescription to extreme woolliness’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 11), these teachers, mostly situated in the secondary sector, are the first to criticise the assessment redesign process. They express reservations about the
compatibility of a flexible and personalised curriculum and the maintenance of rigorous and valid assessment standards, claiming that the development of assessment materials came as an ‘afterthought’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 16) to CfE yet should have been at the core of the curriculum design process from the outset. Having been involved in the creation of assessment materials for Classical languages, I would retort to these teachers that CfE aims to move away from the stressful and unfulfilling race to assessment which necessitates ‘teaching to the test’ and that delaying the development of assessment until after the policy has been adequately developed is an entirely justifiable, defensible and, indeed, sensible course of action, albeit understandably frustrating. Obviously, it is important for practitioners to understand how learning will be assessed and what absolute standards are required for the granting of qualifications but these ought not, I think, to drive the initial implementation of the new curriculum. Thirdly, those teachers whose reactions fall between these two extremes often admit to anxiety about the ‘radical revision of curriculum content’ (Priestley and Minty 2012a: 8) but say that they are becoming more open to experimentation, either by moving away from the use of textbooks by planning more active and collaborative lessons, or by increasingly handing control and choice over to pupils as to what and how they learn.

The chasm between policy intention and classroom practice has contributed to an ‘implementation gap’ (Supovitz and Weinbaum 2008) which is widened by teachers who risk ‘using yesterday’s answers to today’s problems and resorting to existing notions of “best practice”, preventing meaningful engagement with innovation’ (Priestley 2010: 34). The advent of CfE has stimulated a feeling among teachers, I think, that new approaches to teaching are encouraged by the policy authors. It is my hope, then, that the defence of rhetoric argued in this dissertation may be considered more willingly by teachers and school leaders during the present adjustment phase than it may have been under the highly prescriptive 5-14 curriculum. The first and third groups of teachers described here are likely, I suspect, to be open to suggestions regarding alternative pedagogical models and this has the potential, I contend, to herald a reconsideration of rhetoric (and more broadly the Classics). Among the second group, the very fact that someone else has considered the policy’s intentions and created a potential pedagogical solution, may mean that it receives a warm reception. The introduction of CfE has provided a new forum for the suggestion of alternative approaches to the curriculum and, given the widespread perplexity which abounds among teachers
(Bloomer 2009, Farquhar 2010, Ford 2011, Johnson 2012, Priestley and Minty 2012a, Reid 2012, Priestley 2013a), it is my feeling that there has never been a better time to relaunch the Classics. A targeted, thoroughly-considered and innovative approach which can demonstrate its fulfilment of the aims of the policy authors and engages teachers but does not place unreasonable expectations on them is a possible modus operandi. The perplexity of teachers, I hope, opens up new possibilities for rhetoric.

**Aims and methodology**

The goal of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the specific benefits and broader implications of reintroducing rhetoric into the contemporary Scottish curriculum. I claim that rhetoric offers a possible pedagogical model for the delivery of skills identified as important in CfE: responsible citizenship, critical thinking, literacy and critical literacy. It is not within the scope of this dissertation, however, to conduct a comprehensive survey of historic curriculum reform in Scotland nor does the study seek to imply that rhetoric is the panacea of the curriculum but rather I urge that rhetoric’s contribution be reconsidered in light of new possibilities presented by the inclusion of Classical languages as a subject area in CfE. As well as seeking to understand CfE as a policy innovation, the professional dimension of the Ed.D. behoves critical examination and employment of this enhanced understanding to offer prescriptive recommendations for the future conduct of educational policy and professional practice. In this case, my recommendations centre on salvaging something of educational value that is in danger of being lost. In this regard, it is hoped that this study can contribute positively to the pedagogical development process, generated by CfE and currently underway in schools across Scotland. In particular, I would be very pleased if curriculum leaders within schools would reconsider rhetoric as a possible vehicle through which aspects of literacy and citizenship education could be delivered to learners.

Not all Scottish schools teach, or indeed have ever taught, Classics, and it is an aim of this dissertation to raise the profile of Classical languages, and Classical rhetoric in particular, in the contemporary Scottish curriculum and advertise Classics as a possible curriculum mainstay both in schools with Classics departments and those currently without. While I do not expect that this Doctoral dissertation will profoundly alter the landscape of Classics teaching in the UK and beyond, it is my hope that the focus on rhetoric and the ways in
which it can be illuminated through the study of Latin and Greek may reach a slightly wider audience and may begin to reverse the decline in the perceived value of Classics teaching in schools. I have first-hand experience of Classics being seen as an odd, antiquated and minority subject in schools both by senior management and by teaching staff: I would like this dissertation to, in some way, justify the value of the subject within the current curricular initiative and consequently erode this damaging reputation, thereby strengthening, at least at some level, the position of Classics teachers in schools. A further, though more ambitious aim, is for increased collaboration among teachers of English, Religious and Moral Education (RME), Media Studies, Modern Studies and Classics and if such an ethos could be cultivated, the argument for rhetoric expounded in this dissertation might receive warmer reception and greater engagement. If teachers limit their sphere of interest and influence within predefined curricular boundaries, it is unlikely that rhetoric will fulfil its potential and make the difference I so genuinely believe it can.

This dissertation aims to expand the field of scholarship by addressing a number of small gaps in educational and philosophical research to date. In particular, Priestley (2010: 24) identifies a ‘stark absence of critique of new curricular policy’ in Scotland and given the scale of the curriculum reform, a surprisingly limited number of academic articles have been published with analysis of CfE as their focus. This study aims to critically examine the policy, using frameworks from curriculum theory and political philosophy, and to set the Scottish policy context against a wider backdrop of global trends in secondary education. The disparity between the value placed on the Classics at a policy level and its conspicuous absence in schools and classrooms across Scotland opens up space for dialogue and motivates a defence for current conditions. As was mentioned above, the role of Classics in the Scottish curriculum is vastly understudied, both in terms of curriculum analysis and pedagogical research: this study aims to redress this deficit. Of the studies where England is the focus (Bolgar 1963, Sullivan 1965, Sharwood-Smith 1977, Stray 1998, Morwood 2003, Hart 2006, Lister 2007) none has included specific examination of Classical rhetoric’s role in the curriculum, its value or contemporary relevance in secondary education. There has, though, been some research done on the learning and teaching of rhetoric in the United States of America (USA), where it can appear on undergraduate courses as a composition course or one focussed on academic writing.

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While the research conducted into the efficacy and scope of these courses is helpful in ascertaining how rhetoric is understood internationally, I outline in Chapter Two that what is meant by rhetoric in the USA is very different from Classical rhetoric and, together with the learning context being post-school, these studies are not of primary relevance to the present study. The aim is certainly not to provide a comprehensive assessment of the curricular models which promote rhetoric in the USA but rather, elements of these research studies will be used for comparative purposes within my argument which focusses on the Scottish secondary school curriculum and classroom as the learning context.

Furthermore, Classicists have conducted a great deal of research on rhetoric’s role in the development of Languages, Politics or Arts and Humanities but very little of this knowledge has, until now, informed the study of the pitfalls and possibilities of the teaching and learning of rhetoric in schools. At this time of curricular reform in Scotland, it is right to cascade the benefits of academic research and apply it to the education sector, where I consider it might be of maximum value in directing future policy and practice.

The Scottish Survey of Literacy and Numeracy (Scottish Government 2013) is tasked with measuring how well curriculum policy is translated into professional practice in classrooms, with particular focus on two priority areas: literacy and numeracy. It identified that two elements of literacy education are being taught well in schools: reading and writing. Attainment in these areas is high and shows improvement since the previous survey. The same is not true, though, for listening and speaking. Rather, in these areas, pupils are consistently performing less well and so there exists an attainment gap in listening and speaking which this defence of rhetoric seeks to narrow through the presentation of an Ancient oral argumentative structure. In Chapter Three, this structure will be analysed in detail and its potential value justified for today’s literacy classrooms, the curriculum and society. The inextricable link between rhetoric and oracy makes it not just relevant for literacy education, but for citizenship education too. The role of rhetoric in society has been studied by political philosophers and theorists who tend to dismiss its relevance for current political contexts owing to the shifting cultural, political and societal

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19 This has been done by a number of researchers already: Walter 1984, Welch 1999, Petraglia and Bahri 2003, Glenn et al. 2004, Enoch 2008, Crowley and Hawhee 2012, Murphy 2012.

norms over the last 2000 years. This study has twin aims in this regard: it sets out to augment the small corpus of research which recognises the value of rhetoric in facilitating and optimising democratic deliberation but it goes beyond the extant research to promote a partially revised conception of Classical rhetoric which allows for a more robust defence of rhetoric’s role in contemporary democratic deliberation.

Given the aims of this dissertation, its methodology necessarily combines a number of strands. Primarily a conceptual study, it is concerned with critically analysing competing conceptions of rhetoric, historically located and supported by the analysis of Classical texts. This analytical approach to the interrogation of rhetoric, in combination with my subject knowledge as a Classics scholar and my professional experience as a Classics teacher, induces the articulation of a revised conception of rhetoric through reclamation and innovation. Other concepts, like critical literacy and responsible citizenship (which I argue are underproblematised or taken for granted by policy authors, actors and stakeholders), are subjected to analysis and critique. Discussion of the wide range of possible interpretations of these concepts is informed and enriched by both curriculum theory and educational policy analysis.

Analysis of CfE policy is integral to this dissertation’s methodology. I analyse both the policy determination (this concerns how policy is made, why, when and by whom) and the policy content (this considers how a particular policy developed ‘in relation to other, earlier policies and is informed by a theoretical framework which seeks to offer a critique of policy’ [Parsons 1995: 55]). The multidimensional nature of educational policy requires analysis which is multi-framed and this dissertation seeks to examine the values, assumptions and aims of CfE by engaging with curriculum theory. Specifically I claim that curriculum theory provides a critical framework for the analysis of the evolution of the policy. The critical pedagogical theory propounded by Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007: 32) suggests that the curriculum should be treated as a ‘form of cultural politics’ and I share their appeal for students to be adequately equipped to participate in and criticise the curriculum, rather than passively receiving the authoritative messages promoted therein.
Engagement with contemporary political philosophy allows for a broader consideration of global educational trends and political theory and in this study I isolate democratic deliberation for particular analysis. The theories of leading philosophers and political theorists (for example Nussbaum, Young and Benhabib) are analysed in order to uncover the areas of contestation which exert influence on the contemporary citizenship education landscape. In so doing, I extend and supplement their positions to justify and defend my revised interpretation of rhetoric. Through analysis and argumentation, this dissertation develops and defends an account of rhetoric which identifies its potential educative and civic benefits for contemporary Scottish learners.

Outline of chapters

Chapter Two aims to provide a rich account of what is meant by rhetoric and provides an analysis of its role in education and society since it was conceived and formalised into a system of communication by the Greeks. I chart its evolution during the Roman period and assess what role the orator played in Roman education and public life, with particular reference to the published works of Cicero, the Roman Republic’s foremost orator and author of many texts that I argue are still suitable for study. Early in the dissertation, I make clear that ‘rhetoric’ itself is a contested term and that its relationship with philosophy and ethics is the subject of historic and contemporary debate. These tensions will be further explored elsewhere in the dissertation but most rigorously in Chapter Five. After summarising the positions adopted by several key thinkers, I advance a particular understanding of rhetoric for inclusion in CfE and suggest that it has much to offer modern students by combining elements of political literacy, oracy, citizenship and critical skills.

In Chapter Three, I advance the claim that rhetoric can contribute positively to the cultivation of three cross-curricular skills considered important in CfE: literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. Despite being the responsibility of all practitioners, some doubt surrounds what is meant by these terms (MacLellan and Soden 2008, Oberski 2009, Priestley and Humes 2010, Priestley 2010, Reid 2012) and how teachers might begin to deliver these skills successfully through the curriculum. I claim that these cross-curricular skills are inadequately articulated in the policy and that deeper interrogation of what is meant is required to clarify and supplement our understanding of the role rhetoric can play.
in advancing learners’ critical faculties. Specifically, I assert that the rhetorical framework offers a useful structure around which students can learn to weave arguments and that the process of doing so provides opportunities for the development and application of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. I offer a defence of rhetoric which centres on its capacity to improve learners’ ability to communicate confidently and coherently in society through increased familiarity with methods of constructing and deconstructing argument. In conducting this investigation, I refer to the critical literature in the field to enhance analysis of the policy and reinforce my defence. Building on the argument I introduced in Chapter One, that democracy needs citizens capable of reasoned and informed criticism, I outline three ways in which I consider the rhetorical framework to address shortcomings of the pedagogical tools used currently by teachers in secondary schools: a focus on speaking and listening, oral performance skills and social/political distance from the culture under study. I extend the link between literacy and citizenship in CfE by connecting the cross-curricular skills of critical literacy and critical thinking with the key capacity of responsible citizenship, something which CfE does not do, and suggest that a citizenry better equipped for argumentation may bring rich rewards for Scottish education and democracy.

Chapter Four presents an exploration of what is meant by the responsible citizen capacity but given that the policy describes the responsible citizen only briefly and shies away from fuller definition, I propose that we might better understand the intentions of the policy authors if we subject the conception of citizenship implied by the capacity to interpretation on a continuum from ‘minimal’ to ‘maximal’ conceptions (McLaughlin 1992). I argue that the policy authors have been too cautious in their vision for responsible citizenship in CfE; they appear to alienate maximal conceptions of citizenship in favour of an approach which construes citizenship minimally. Placed at the heart of the curriculum as a key capacity, CfE’s conception of the responsible citizen is disappointingly flaccid and requires support and scaffolding from deeper analysis of citizenship trends in the philosophy of education to make it fit for purpose in the dynamic civic arena of contemporary Scotland. In justifying my claims in this chapter, I point to the apparently changing nature of policy priorities and to some promising examples of best practice identified in related policy documents which, I argue, exhort a new approach to citizenship education and which motivate a maximal interpretation. ‘Justice-oriented citizenship’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242) is such a conception of citizenship which, although not currently taught extensively in schools (Westheimer and Kahne 2004, Biesta 2008, Zipin and Reid 2008, Biesta 2011, Swalwell
is the one which I think we ought to support and promote for responsible citizenship and democratic education in Scotland. That rhetoric combines skills of self-representation with those of critical analysis and active participation makes it worthy of reconsideration, I propose, as a pedagogical method for the cultivation of justice-oriented citizenship in current conditions.

Chapter Five aims to defend the reintroduction of rhetoric by considering its potential contribution to democratic deliberation. Moving beyond the claims made in previous chapters that rhetoric can contribute positively to the development of literacy and critical faculties, I aim to show that the learning and teaching of rhetoric in school has the potential to inform and facilitate democratic deliberation, a skill which I maintain is conducive to responsible citizenship in Scotland. This will involve examining complex philosophical issues surrounding the interplay between rhetoric, the emotions, truth and reason and, in my analysis, I draw on the work of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib. In this regard, I defend the position that rhetoric offers opportunities for students to learn about persuasion, coercion and empathy, and claim that it can help them to build narrative imagination through consideration of ‘the other’. In making this argument, I draw on Aristotle’s concept of deliberative rhetoric in combination with the speech-making framework provided by Classical rhetorical theory and propose that such a conception of rhetoric could, following Young, give a voice to the traditionally underrepresented and marginalised groups in society thereby improving equality and inclusion within deliberative democracy. I do, however, concede that a shift in deliberative culture from the ‘consent-obsessed’ Ancient world to the ‘discursive’ present day requires a partly revised conception of rhetoric, more relevant for current conditions, but in so presenting suggest that certain elements of Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric should be retained as they have much to offer current understandings of rhetoric and democratic deliberation.

Chapter Six presents my conclusions regarding the optimal curricular position for rhetoric. I maintain that Classical languages offer the most authentic curricular context for the learning and teaching of rhetoric for ‘deconstructive purposes’ but note that they offer limited scope for rhetorical construction and performance, elements which I concede must be delivered by other subjects across the curriculum. This limiting factor is lessened, I posit, by the additional learning and cultural benefits which stem from the study of Classical languages. I claim that CfE provides renewed optimism and favourable
conditions for the reintegration of Classical rhetoric in the curriculum of mainstream secondary schools – a renaissance which I believe will enrich a curriculum impoverished by its absence. I admit that there are, however, practical challenges to be surmounted and deeper theoretical issues to be considered before such a situation can become a reality. In the final section of the chapter I highlight some implications for my professional practice and identify areas which warrant further investigation as a result of this study.

In the chapter which follows, then, I lay the foundations for these claims by attempting to disentangle what is meant by ‘rhetoric’ from the numerous, sometimes competing, conceptions which survive from the Classical world. By demonstrating the role it played in Greek and Roman education systems and civic society, I introduce a number of key tensions created by Classical rhetorical theory which provide material for deeper interrogation later in this dissertation. By introducing the rhetorical framework and the speech-making process before embarking wholesale on the defence of rhetoric, I hope to prepare the reader adequately for the claims which follow; both culturally by providing some historical context for the Classical world and linguistically, by explaining technical terms which are central to Classical language education but which are not commonly used outside the subject discipline. It is only once the origin and purpose of rhetoric have been clarified that I can begin to defend its role in contemporary Scottish education. Chapter Two, ‘Rhetoric: multiple interpretations’ aims to provide an appropriate preliminary discussion of these issues.
This chapter sets out to explain the significance and complexity of what is meant by ‘rhetoric’ by tracing its origins in Classical Greece and examining its role in education and society in the Greek and Roman worlds. Almost since its inception, the nature, meaning and purpose of rhetoric have been contested. Current definitions of rhetoric include: the practice of oratory; the study of strategies for effective oratory; the use of language, written or spoken, to inform or persuade; the study of the relation between language and knowledge and the capacity to persuade others (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990). I consider all these definitions to be related to rhetoric but do not think that it is possible, or desirable, to attempt to distil such a complex and contested concept into a single definition. In this chapter, I advance the interpretation of rhetoric which I consider to be most relevant for contemporary Scottish secondary education and which is optimal for inclusion in CfE.

Following Cicero (de Oratore 3.2), I hold that rhetoric requires eloquence but that it goes beyond the capacity to communicate effectively to encompass the power of persuasion. Classical rhetorical theory is a sensitive and complex theory of language which, from its inception, sought to demarcate and describe the operation of language in human affairs but at no point did it claim to include within its scope ‘virtually all forms of discourse and symbolic communication’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 2). I do not agree with the view of Weaver et al. (1970) that rhetoric is synonymous with communication and deny that rhetoric is necessarily present when one person addresses another.

Of primary importance is the tension which exists between rhetoric as effective discourse and rhetoric as persuasive discourse. At the crux of this tension is the intention of the orator and the extent to which, in aiming to persuade, self-interest or the public good act as motivators. If rhetoric is viewed as a system of effective and articulate self-representation, it need not involve ‘the use of empty promises and half-truths’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 1) nor should it be linked to vacuous and malevolent verbal entrapment, ‘excessive subtlety, manipulation and deceit’ (Pernot 2005: 44). These slights are indicative of the
widespread mistrust of rhetoric which has influenced its public perception from the Classical world to this day. I contend in this chapter, and in Chapter Five, that this negative view of rhetoric is erroneous: communication itself is neither admirable nor deplorable, rather that it is the intention and moral standing of the orator and the willingness of the audience to be persuaded which influence such value judgements.

As I see it, rhetoric is a very particular form of communication which selects, from the vast realm of human discourse, occasions for speaking and writing that can be regarded as persuasive in intent. My approach in this chapter will be to identify the key areas of contestation which influence and inform the claims and argumentation in subsequent chapters. In order to illuminate these areas of contestation, I will present the theories of key Classical thinkers: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. To adequately introduce their positions it is necessary to provide details of their context which will involve sketching related areas of rhetorical theory including: the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, genres of rhetoric and parts of speech, the Roman reinterpretation of Greek rhetoric, the role of rhetoric in Classical education and the conception of the ideal orator. It is on this broad explanatory foundation that the claims and argumentation in later chapters will be built. In concluding this chapter, I link the art of rhetoric with the way in which knowledge is created by argument and the way in which ideology and power are extended through discourse. This leads to discussion in Chapter Three of the relationship between rhetoric and critical skills.

**Origins of rhetoric in Classical Greece**

Until the fifth century BC, Greece was ruled by tyrants and there was little need for self-representation. For the ordinary citizen, prestige and reputation were measured in military prowess, the currency of success from the heroes of Homer’s epic poems to the veterans of the Peloponnesian wars. Stories were transmitted orally and speeches were delivered by oligarchs and plutocrats without concern for structure or style; their power ensured the

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21 In Homer’s *Iliad*, for example, young heroes like Achilles are mighty warriors while older ones like Nestor are impressive speakers. Physical education was thought vitally important for Greek youths as it was their preparation for war. It was felt that the ability to speak well came with age and experience, was of secondary importance to martial prowess and therefore had no place in the education of the young.
desired outcome so there was no need for persuasion. However, in 476 BC Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Syracuse, was overthrown and a democracy was formed. Under this despot, the land and property of many common citizens had been seized; for the first time, these ordinary people flooded the courts in an attempt to recover their property through oral self-representation. A certain Corax (about whom very little is known) devised an art of rhetoric which comprised simple techniques for effective presentation and argumentation in the law courts and permitted ordinary men to make their cases in public (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2, 24). His chief contribution was in helping to structure judicial speeches into various parts: prose, narration, statement of arguments, refutation of opposing arguments, and summary. This structure serves as the basis for all later rhetorical theory.

Rhetoric thereafter became ‘a major cultural force’ (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 20) in the golden age of Pericles (480-404 BC) and was closely tied to the development of new forms of government and social organisation (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 20). In democratic Athens, generals took their orders from the assembly, which reached decisions after listening to the arguments on either side (Thucydides acknowledged the importance of oratory by including speeches of this sort in his history of the Peloponnesian war [Book 2]); thus it was of prime civic importance (and often a matter of war or peace, death or life) for men to be able to express their views eloquently and articulately and to persuade their peers. Rhetoric quickly became an attractive subject of study and men inspired by the rhetorical structure created by Corax began to travel around Greece teaching others how to represent their interests in public. These teachers were known as Sophists (wise men) and, over time, they devised their own conception of rhetoric which they offered to teach those who could afford their fees. The Sophists should not be seen as ‘populist-minded teachers’ (Poulakos 1987: 101) wishing to educate the masses and bring succour to the hitherto voiceless and marginalised. Rather, their motivation for teaching rhetoric was to impart the secrets of effective persuasive argumentation for personal financial gain (Plato, *Hippias Maior*, 282c-d, Tell 2009).

The Sophistic conception of rhetoric then, aware of the need for their paying customers to be successful in persuading others, attended increasingly to devising persuasive techniques rather than to constructing logical arguments. Thus the Sophists are accused of reframing the rhetorical theory pioneered by Corax, moving it away from a framework in which arguments are most articulately phrased to the emotional and psychological manipulation
of the audience. This shift from rhetoric being used as an honest and ethical method of self-representation to one which facilitated success, regardless of the pursuit of truth, attracted early criticism. Gorgias, one of the few Sophists for whom we have literary evidence, is vilified by the historian Diodorus (Biblioteca historica 12.135) for abusing rhetoric by employing naively exaggerated effects and laboured constructions which seemed ridiculous and excessively contrived in order to persuade his audience. Evidence survives, too, of Socrates’ dialogue with Gorgias, and it is in this, and other works of Plato, that we find a battle line drawn between rhetoric and philosophy. Plato views both the Sophists and rhetoric as being dishonest, unethical and unscrupulous and this area of contestation warrants further consideration.

Plato

Plato recorded two dialogues between his teacher, Socrates22, and the Sophists, Gorgias and Protagoras. For Plato, rhetoric is the producer of persuasion (Gorgias 453a). He treats persuasion as a matter of deception and questions the possibility of communication altogether, while in Protagoras, it appears that he viewed rhetoric as ‘making the weaker account the stronger’ as a method of improving a person’s or city’s objective condition (Schiappa 1999: 54). He identifies two types of rhetoric: common rhetoric and true rhetoric (Gorgias 517a). Common rhetoric is the misuse of rhetoric (Gorgias 457a-1-2) commonly associated with the egotistical and profit-driven Sophists and their clients. True rhetoric has little in common with what people normally call rhetoric: it goes beyond ordinary rhetoric to the realm of philosophy. It is really a science used in the service of justice (Gorgias 527c) and the discourse of the philosopher (Pernot 2005: 51). Plato’s philosophical conception of rhetorical theory can be distinguished from Sophistic rhetorical theory by its commitment to truth, even when truth conflicts with personal success (Schiappa 1999: 10). In exposing this tension between common and true rhetoric, Plato makes a clear distinction between the rhetorical life, which consists in looking for material success for oneself and for others and the philosophical life, which is directed toward the good and consists of taking care of one’s soul and educating one’s fellow citizens, whatever the cost to oneself (Hippias Major 304a-b, Theaetetus 172c). This raises

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22 We cannot be sure how accurately Plato recorded the words of Socrates (Bonazzi et al. 2009) nor the extent to which the views expressed by Socrates in the dialogues have been influenced by Plato’s own philosophical stance. Therefore, to ensure consistency in referencing throughout the dissertation, I conflate Socrates’ position with that of Plato.
questions concerning responsible citizenship and the extent to which citizens communicate as a result of selfish or selfless motivations: deeper analysis of the contested conceptions of citizenship are presented in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five an attempt is made to reconcile rhetoric with democratic deliberation despite the tensions surrounding self-representation, self-interest and truth. The relationship between citizens, politics and communication is fundamental in this discussion and it must be remembered that the Platonic criticism of rhetoric is undoubtedly influenced by his contempt for democracy as a political model. For Plato, common rhetoric is the expression of a perverted way of seeing politics and as an adversary of the democracy, he can only denounce the art of oratory which was one of the mainsprings of this type of government (Pernot 2005: 46). Plato’s damming criticism concludes that rhetoric is not an art, but an imitation of an art, in that it does not rest upon a true knowledge of its object (Gorgias 462c).

Aristotle

Aristotle, however, claimed that rhetoric was an art but one of a special character (Rhetoric 1.1), not a science with its own subject matter, but a discipline unconcerned with the truth of its own conclusions. Aristotle saw rhetoric not as the art of persuading but rather the faculty of ‘finding out in each case the existing means of persuasion’ (Rhetoric 1.1355b25-26). It is in this distinction that Aristotle’s view differs most from Plato’s. Whereas for Plato rhetoric was seen as a powerful force which promised easy victory over victims to be subjugated, Aristotle held that rhetoric was useful for bringing the truth to light, since some people could not be convinced by facts. If it is right to defend oneself by force, he thought it right to be able to do the same by words. His treatise introduces technical categorisation of rhetoric including the division of speeches into four parts (the introduction, the statement of the issue, the argument and the conclusion [Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.13]) and identifies the means for rhetorical discovery by analysing everything conducive to persuasion (Pernot 2005: 42). He admits that the power of words can be misused, but contends that so can all good things (Rhetoric 1.1.1355b).

23 However Plato included the study of rhetoric in the curriculum of his Academy because his aim was to prepare civic leaders (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 25) and he felt that it was important for potential political figures to understand ways in which they could best engage and address their fellow citizens.
Whereas Plato favoured dialectic (the method of argumentation used by two or more people holding different points of view about a subject, who wish to establish the truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments), Aristotle saw it as a practice fraught with difficulty, typically marked by frustration rather than ease of achievement (Topics, Wardy 1996). Aristotle clarified the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric: whereas dialectic is persuasive discourse exclusively based on logos (logical argument), rhetorical persuasion also relies on ethos (credibility or character of the speaker) and pathos (emotional connection with the audience), irrational elements of communication which improve the relationship between the speaker and the audience (Rhetoric 1, 2). I argue in Chapters Three and Five, following Aristotle, that rhetoric is a compound discipline in which a dialectical component is supplemented by knowledge of how to arouse, or appeal to, an audience’s emotions and influence their impressions of a speaker’s character. Aristotle’s ideal orator knows the cognitive competencies and pertinent mental associations of those listening to him and is ready to exploit forces already present in the listener. He builds on pre-existing ideas and recognised values, and in this way he can effect the mystery of persuasion: to induce someone to think something they were not thinking before by introducing a new thought into the mind of the listener from known and accepted premises. This aspect of Aristotelian rhetorical theory is of central significance to my claim that rhetoric can help cultivate narrative imagination and empathy in learners, which will be subjected to rigorous philosophical analysis in Chapter Five. There too, I build on Aristotle’s conclusion that rhetoric can act as an aid to reaching agreement on questions demanding immediate action in everyday life. It is this deliberative function of rhetoric, promoted by Aristotle as one of three rhetorical genres that I claim is the most valuable conception of rhetoric for citizenship and democracy in Scotland.

**Roman reinterpretation of rhetoric**

Indeed, the political system at Rome under the Republic was highly conducive to the practice of deliberative rhetoric, a system of communication inherited from the Greeks.

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24 Aristotle’s orator is male because only men in Ancient Athens were permitted to participate in public affairs. Hereafter I use the masculine pronoun in cases where I refer to the Classical conception (Greek and Roman) of the orator. A gender-neutral pronoun will be used later when referring to modern conceptions of the orator.

25 The other two are forensic (law court speeches) and epideictic (eulogies). Although not central to the argument in this study, more will be said about these genres in the discussion of rhetorical exercises in Chapter Three.
Whereas Aristotle’s conception of deliberation was exercised among wealthy and educated Greek citizens, the Roman Republic presented the orator with a number of fora in which to utilise rhetoric for deliberative purposes. The Senate, open only to elected representatives from Italy’s political and military elite, provided a discursive space in which views on political questions could be expressed orally by members of the body of elders and the consensus, once agreed, would be acted upon by elected magistrates. Unlike modern political assemblies, senators had not necessarily decided in advance which way they would vote and so the debates were real: powerful speakers, regardless of their position in the hierarchy, had the chance of influencing the outcome (Clarke 1996: x). However, orators also had to be able to address a much larger, more diverse crowd in the form of the contio, Rome’s public assembly open to all inhabitants regardless of social, political or economic status. Understandably, the art of deliberative rhetoric had to develop in order to accommodate the diverse needs of these multiple audiences since the content, style and tone of the orator’s speech before the Senate and the contio would have to be quite different.

And these ends can be achieved with less apparatus in the Senate, as that is a wise deliberative body, and one should leave room for many others to speak, besides avoiding any suspicion of a display of talent, whereas a public meeting (contio) permits of the full employment of powerful and weighty oratory and required variety... But as the orator’s chief stage seems to be the platform at a public meeting, it naturally results that we are stimulated to employ the more ornate kind of oratory (Cicero, de Oratore 3.333-34, 338).

This quote, written by the foremost orator of the Roman Republic, indicates that within deliberative rhetoric, the Romans developed a scheme which regulated the different levels of language which an orator could employ depending on his audience. These included embellished style (ornate), fitting style (apte) and modest style (decore). In choosing which style to adopt, the orator had to exercise his critical faculties and identify with the mood and sympathies of his audience. In a development of the Aristotelian concept of the orator’s pathos I argue in the next chapter that the learning and teaching of rhetoric helps cultivate critical faculties since, as Cicero held, communicators must make judgements about their audience in order to demonstrate awareness of their needs, thereby maximising their persuasiveness. Cicero himself is most famed for his use of the Asiatic style (Brutus 95, 325) in forensic oratory which left juries stunned and captivated by his use of ornate and embellished language, delivered with dramatic and emotional flourish. It is this style
of communication which has the greatest potential to seduce those unfamiliar with the rhetorical theory and it is for this reason that I consider it vital for learners to become familiar with rhetoric so that they can deconstruct all the types of communication with which they are bombarded in today’s world. Cicero’s publications on rhetoric have provided a rich resource for rhetorical theorists for two centuries and the works of particular relevance to the argument expounded in this dissertation are: *de Inventione* (a handbook for orators on how to best structure speeches), *de Oratore* (a fuller statement of rhetorical principles in dialogue form), *Topics* (a rhetorical treatment of common topics) and *Brutus* (a discussion of famous orators). In *de Inventione* (Book 3), for example, Cicero expands on Corax’s and Aristotle’s technical categorisation of rhetoric by delineating the parts of a speech\(^{26}\) (*partes orationis*) in order to ensure effective and persuasive communication. Cicero’s rhetorical works provide a window into the interpretation and reinterpretation of the Aristotelian rules of the genre and demonstrate how, for Cicero in the Roman Republic, rhetoric was more than persuasive discourse. It had a role to play in defending civic institutions. Setting forth the rules of rhetoric amounted to considering the conditions for the healthy functioning of the State (Pernot 2005: 114) and it is on this conception of rhetoric as a mainstay of civilisation that I build in Chapters Four and Five. It was with the belief that rhetoric was a civic virtue that the first century AD educator Quintilian placed it at the centre of the liberal arts curriculum in his school.

**Quintilian and rhetorical education**

Quintilian’s aim was to produce the good man speaking well, one who combined a Platonic commitment to virtue and absolute truth with the Ciceronian focus on effective public service (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 35). Quintilian’s ideal orator had to marry mastery of the art of rhetoric with oratorical competence and embody the moral conviction and social quality of someone who was devoted to the traditional institutions and values of Rome (Pernot 2005: 96). He was the sort of man the people could trust. According to the Roman historian Tacitus, gaining the trust of the nation was vital as it led to success.

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\(^{26}\) These are the *exordium* or opening, the *narratio* or statement of facts, the *divisio* or *partitio*, the statement of the point at issue and exposition of what the orator proposes to prove, the *confirmatio* or exposition of arguments, the *refutatio* or refutation of the opponent’s arguments, and finally the *conclusio* or peroration.
The more able a man was at speaking, the greater the ease with which he attained high office and the greater his pre-eminence among his colleagues in office; he obtained more influence with the powerful, carried more weight with the Senate, possessed a higher reputation with the people (Tacitus, *Dialogus* 36.4).

In gaining the trust of the audience, Quintilian advised that the orator was required to speak with careful consideration and to rely on his status (including age, nobility and prestige) to guarantee the worth of his words. In an extension of the Aristotelian conception of *ethos*, which held that orators were listened to not for their words in themselves but for their position in the city, Quintilian introduced additional essential elements to rhetorical discourse including the orator’s weightiness (*gravitas*) and his personal authority (*auctoritas*). *Auctoritas*, an ‘elusive but vital mix of personal impressiveness and charisma with influence and connections’ (Steel 2001: 13), played a vital role in elevating the speaker’s words and persuading his audience, as did his trustworthiness, forcefulness and brevity. The effectiveness of the orator, then, did not depend solely on the quality of the oratory.

This introduces another area of contestation: what is more important, true knowledge of the subject being discussed or the ability to deliver an effective speech, informed by rhetorical theory? For Quintilian, true knowledge of the topic under discussion was a prerequisite for the orator to successfully persuade, otherwise he would be a fraud. This view echoes Plato’s, that it is most important for the orator to know the subject, to know it accurately for what it is, and to tell the truth. Under these circumstances, Plato thought that the plan of the oration would follow naturally from the subject itself and the words would take care of themselves (Pernot 2005: 50). Aristotle is less concerned with the communication of truth, but rather that the orator speaks to make political and social life function on solid legal and moral foundations (Pernot 2005: 116). Pernot (2005: 115) summarises this area of contestation well:

The question is one of knowing whether rhetoric is a technique without content, a collection of recipes applicable at will to any topic, or if it is a complete art – putting into play all a person’s qualities, supposing wisdom and knowledge in its expression and exercising its ability to persuade because of its inherent value.
The extent to which Cicero believed that the orator had to have strong moral conviction is unclear. Stroh (1975) and Steel (2001) identify instances where Cicero manipulates facts in his forensic speeches to produce a persuasively distorted account of events. Cicero has Crassus state (de Oratore 2) that ‘no one can be eloquent about anything of which he is ignorant’, but this statement is conjoined with the denial that ‘no one can speak eloquently about the very thing he knows, even if his knowledge is perfect, if he is ignorant of how to make and polish an oration’ (Wardy 1996: 101). Thus for an orator to be successful Cicero held that eloquence, knowledge of the subject and familiarity with rhetorical rules must be intertwined. It is with Cicero’s position that I have most sympathy in this area of contestation although in Chapter Five I propose a slightly revised conception of rhetoric which accommodates the use of rhetoric in deliberative conversation in contrast to Cicero’s conception which limits rhetoric to monological performance in public.

Because rhetoric and oratory were to the fore in public arenas and were instrumental in the execution of Roman laws, politics, literature, philosophy and religion, knowledge of the rhetorical framework and the ability to apply it became a high priority in post-elementary education. Indeed, Benson and Prosser (1972: vii) claim that ‘rhetoric played the central role in ancient education’. Once Roman boys had learned arithmetic, reading and writing (which included an emphasis on the study of grammar as this was regarded an important prerequisite to the acquisition of the elaborate declamatory style [Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 34]), they hurried off to rhetorical schools such as the one run by Quintilian, to be taught how to speak and to argue. Indeed, Quintilian produced the first codified textbook on the theory and practice of rhetoric, the Instituto Oratoria, which is divided into theoretical, educational, and practical constructs. A rhetorician, by the end of his training, should have been able to tell a story, defend a case, make a display or engage in argumentative dialectic (Wardy 1996: 103). At times during the early Republic, teachers of rhetoric and rhetorical schools were treated with suspicion. This was perhaps because Roman aristocrats sought to limit the power and influence of ‘new men’ who did not descend from aristocratic families and so would not have experienced rhetorical training. Naively, it was believed that if these new men could not find teachers to train them in how to speak and argue well, they would be paralysed into inaction. Unsurprisingly, this intervention did not displace rhetoric from the school curriculum for long and, despite the ‘evolutions of institutions and the vicissitudes of history’ (Pernot 2005: 87), the study of

27 In 161 BC, a decree of the Senate expelled philosophers and rhetoricians from Rome. Again in 92 BC, Crassus, as censor, issued an edict with his colleague forbidding schools of rhetoric.
rhetoric continued to include the study of Greek and Latin grammar, classical literature and history, logic and the composition and delivery of speeches. There was a virtual equation of an enlightened education with rhetorical training and in the evolving civic dynamic from Republic to Empire, rhetoric had changed from being primarily a political weapon to being the principal ingredient in Roman education and cultural life, a position it held ‘until the end of antiquity’ (Clarke 1996: xiii). Rhetoric has suffered a turbulent status in education since Classical times but it is not within the scope of this study to conduct a historical survey of its inclusion in the curriculum. Rather, I focus only on the present day and in the final section of this chapter, I identify how rhetoric is being interpreted and taught in the USA as a compositional course focussed on fluency in academic writing. I demonstrate how it is differently interpreted by Classics teachers in Scotland, as a tool for literary criticism. Neither of these interpretations does justice, I claim, to the potential educational benefits of rhetoric, hence the urgency of this study.

Rhetorical pedagogy today

Where rhetoric is currently taught, it is viewed through different lenses. From my professional experience in the Classics classroom, the study of rhetoric involves the close analysis of Classical literature in Latin and Greek, investigating how the author has used the rhetorical framework and rhetorical techniques to communicate in a particular way. Several times in its long history, the study of rhetoric has contracted to simply the study of style, consisting of memorizing long lists of techniques (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990: 6). I argue in the chapters which follow that the study of rhetoric is a far richer and more diverse discipline than simply learning lists of rhetorical techniques, although familiarity with these is an important stage in the learning process. Knowledge of rhetoric helps interrogate the impact of communication and facilitates improved understanding of authors’ motivations. In Scotland it is only in Latin and Greek28 that students have any contact with the basic elements of Classical rhetorical theory and even then this exposure is limited to the deconstruction of prose and verse literature.

28 Subsequent discussion will be limited to Latin as the withdrawal of Greek described in Chapter One will be very difficult to reverse.
In the USA, rhetoric is viewed through a different lens. Sometimes called ‘writing across the curriculum’, rhetoric appears as a first year course in almost half of the universities in North America (Bourelle 2009: 35). Taught, in the main, by English instructors, this brand of rhetorical education is often linked to improving expression in academic writing (Berlin 1988, Fleming 1988, Berlin 1996, Booth 2004) and has developed since the 1970s as a composition course to combat poor literacy levels among high school graduates upon arrival at university (Bourelle 2009). While these courses can involve the construction, delivery and criticism of argumentation, they require little awareness of Classical rhetorical theory and do not include the study of Latin or Greek literature or language (Murphy 2012). In cases where an advanced course of study in rhetoric is offered, this tends to incorporate logical reasoning and critical thinking (Turner 1998, Kugelmass 2008) rather than the study of rhetorical techniques or the delivery of speeches (Crowley and Hawhee 2012).

Essentially, the American rhetorical model is exclusively concerned with writing. In Chapter Three I demonstrate ways in which I consider rhetoric to be of value in the improvement of writing skills but I argue that it contributes to literacy which also involves reading, speaking and listening. The optimal approach to rhetoric, I contend, is one which allows learners to both construct and deconstruct communication and critically analyse theories of discourse, composition, and argumentation. This model of rhetorical pedagogy was the norm in the Classical world but has become fragmented in contemporary conditions. In the following chapters, I will suggest that the rhetorical theories of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian outlined here are valuable not only for the learning and teaching of rhetoric but also for the preparation of citizens for democracy. In the Classical world, rhetorical ability was inextricably linked with citizenship and I argue in Chapters Four and Five that this Classical conception of rhetoric has the potential to boost political literacy and help learners to understand how language choices ‘form character and make good citizens’ (Neel 1988: 211).

In many ways the opposition of Plato to rhetoric, summarised in this chapter, is just as important as the support of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian: it is from the intricate, complex and tangled web of contested meaning that a revised conception of rhetoric will, I hope, rise like the proverbial ‘Phoenix from the ashes’. This chapter did not set out to define rhetoric: it has, however, given some indication of the multiple and, at times,
divergent interpretations of the term from thinkers in the Classical world to educators in the present day. As a first step in stimulating such a rebirth, the next chapter defends rhetoric in CfE by identifying its contribution to cross-curricular skills promoted in the policy; literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking.
Chapter Three
The contribution of rhetoric to three cross-curricular skills

This chapter outlines the possible contribution rhetoric can make to the development of three skills, identified as being cross-curricular in CfE: literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. Despite these skills being the responsibility of all practitioners, some doubt surrounds what is meant by these terms (MacLellan and Soden 2008, Oberski 2009, Priestley and Humes 2010, Priestley 2010 and Reid 2012) and how teachers might begin to deliver these skills successfully through the curriculum. After a brief analysis of how these three skills are conceived in CfE, I defend a possible model for their teaching through rhetoric. Specifically, I propose that the Classical rhetorical framework offers a useful structure around which students can learn to weave arguments and that the process of doing so provides opportunities for the development and application of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. I offer a defence of rhetoric which centres on its capacity to improve learners’ ability to communicate confidently and coherently in society through increased familiarity with methods of constructing and deconstructing argument. This, in turn, would help them to base their beliefs, opinions and actions on considered judgement which is of particular importance for the cultivation of responsible citizens, the subject of the next chapter.

Firstly I will investigate the depiction of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy in Scottish education policy in an attempt to clarify what is meant by these three cross-curricular skills. Secondly, my claim that the study of rhetoric is able to contribute positively to the acquisition and development of these skills is supported with close reference to the Classical rhetorical framework, the Literacy/English experiences and outcomes (Scottish Government 2009a) and the effective contributor key capacity in CfE. Thirdly, building on the argument I introduced in Chapter One, that democracy needs citizens capable of reasoned and informed criticism, I outline three ways in which I consider the rhetorical framework to offer benefits additional to the pedagogical tools used currently by teachers in secondary schools: a focus on speaking and listening, oral performance skills and social/political distance from the culture under study. Finally, I build on the link made between literacy and citizenship in CfE by connecting the cross-
curricular skills of critical literacy and critical thinking with the key capacity of responsible citizenship, something which CfE does not do. Furthermore, I claim that an increased focus on argumentation will reap rich rewards for Scottish education and democracy.

**Literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy**

Literacy

In 2002 the Scottish Executive released the ‘National Statement for Improving Attainment in Literacy in Schools’ (Scottish Executive 2002a). This included the establishment of the ‘Home Reading Initiative’ (Scottish Executive 2002b) to encourage parents to read with their children in an effort to boost literacy levels for both adults and children in Scotland. In 2003, upon the launch of the Scottish Survey of Achievement (2006c), the Executive renewed its support of this statement by announcing that it would take action against schools which failed to develop adequate literacy skills in their pupils. In 2004, the Scottish Executive’s findings (SEED 2004d: 1) into children’s competence in the three Rs showed that half of early years to secondary pupils were not reaching national standards in writing. Consequently the reform package, ‘Ambitious, Excellent Schools’ (SEED 2004c), was launched in November 2004. These initiatives, however, generated minimal improvement and, as a result, literacy received greater emphasis in CfE and became a cross-curricular priority in the new 3-18 curriculum.

Competence and confidence in literacy, including competence in grammar, spelling and the spoken word, is essential for progress in all areas of the curriculum. Because of this, all teachers have responsibility for promoting language and literacy development. Every teacher in each area of the curriculum needs to find opportunities to encourage children and young people to explain their thinking, debate their ideas and read and write at a level which will help them to develop their language skills further. With an increased emphasis upon literacy for all children and young people, teachers will need to plan to revisit and consolidate literacy skills throughout schooling and across the curriculum (Scottish Executive 2006b: 16).

The literacy experiences and outcomes reflect this curricular imperative and take as their focus the development of skills in using language, particularly those that are used regularly.
by everyone in their everyday lives. Alternative conceptions of literacy which are based on reading and writing alone and which are limited to the printed word have been rejected as archaic by CfE policymakers, who are keen to ‘future-proof’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 20, 23, 111, 126, 127, 150, 151, 2009b: 32, 36) the definition of literacy, conscious of the potential for ongoing educational and technological change. Literacy has been redefined within CfE as,

the set of skills which allows an individual to engage fully in society and in learning, through the different forms of language, and the range of texts, which society values and finds useful (Scottish Government 2009a: 1).

This definition is intentionally far less prescriptive than the one in Scotland’s previous 5-14 curriculum which emphasised the substantive content of literacy with spelling, punctuation and grammar featuring prominently (Scottish Education Department 1991). In a shift away from the prescription of knowledge, the literacy framework in CfE specifically prioritises three groups of skills: listening and talking, reading, and writing. Each of these areas is thought to be essential for successful learning in all areas of the curriculum, hence the involvement of all teaching staff, regardless of their individual specialism. Literacy is thus prioritised in the policy literature, being linked to employability and lifelong learning: ‘being able to read and write accurately, to listen carefully and to talk clearly about ideas will increase the opportunities for young people in all aspects of life’ (LTS 2011a: 1). It is envisaged that all teachers will make important contributions to ‘developing and reinforcing literacy skills through the learning activities they plan... and through communicating with young people’ (LTS 2011a: 1). Employers, too, have a responsibility to ensure that employees are ‘supported to develop the literacy skills they need to do their job and to advance their career’ (Scottish Government 2010a: 11). While I understand that literacy is linked to employability, I consider that its impact has greater reach; it is vital for the functioning of democracy as it enables deliberation, self-expression and collaboration. Although literacy is certainly of significance to all learners within

29 The American National Assessment of Adult Literacy (2003) provides such a definition of literacy: ‘literacy is the ability to use printed and written information to function in society, to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and potential’.

30 In response to ‘Offender learning: options for improvement’, the government encourages all agencies who work with young people and adults in the justice system to ensure that resources are directed to identify and support those with specific literacy needs (Scottish Government 2010b: 12). Hence it is a policy priority that young people who are neither in school nor in employment are still given appropriate access to literacy education.
society, I will limit my discussion to school learners who are in the secondary phase of their education as this is where my professional context and primary interests are situated.

Critical thinking

Literacy, as I have indicated, receives renewed focus in CfE and, as a skill thought necessary for all young people to engage fully in society, has become the responsibility of all teachers. Another skill which is considered essential for all young people is critical thinking, which, as an attribute of the effective contributor capacity (the learner can ‘apply critical thinking in new contexts’ [Scottish Government 2009b: iii]), forms part of the core of the curriculum. Unlike literacy, there is no definition of critical thinking provided in CfE and only five of the eight curricular areas detailed in ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ (Scottish Executive 2006b) make mention of it. This begs the question, what does critical thinking actually involve? How might a student know if he/she were competent at the skill? I reproduce the explanations supplied in the policy documentation in an effort to discover what conception of critical thinking CfE depicts:

(a) Health and Wellbeing: ‘Personalisation, critical thinking, active learning and the development of practical and performance skills and practical abilities should be features of the learning and teaching in health and wellbeing programmes’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 10).

(b) Languages: ‘Learners will exercise their intellectual curiosity by questioning and developing their understanding, and use creative and critical thinking to synthesise ideas and arguments’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 13).

(c) Religious and Moral Education: ‘Learners will develop the skills of reflection, discernment, critical thinking, and deciding how to act when making moral decisions’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 22) and ‘in accordance with an informed conscience’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 27).

31 Though what is meant by ‘new contexts’ is not made clear.
32 There is no reference to critical thinking in the curriculum areas of Expressive Arts, Mathematics or Technologies. This is perhaps an oversight within the suite of policy documents as my discussions with teachers of these subjects suggest that there are a number of ways in which critical thinking is incorporated into the teaching and learning in these areas.
(d) Science: ‘Through first-hand observation, practical activities, open-ended challenges and investigations, and discussion and debate, children and young people can develop a range of skills in critical thinking as well as literacy, communication and numeracy’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 31) and ‘through involvement in a wide range of open-ended experiences, challenges and investigations they can develop critical thinking skills and appreciate the key role of the scientific process in generating new knowledge’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 32).

(e) Social Studies: ‘learners will develop the capacity for critical thinking, through accessing, analysing and using information’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 34) and ‘as their knowledge and understanding broadens through investigative, creative and critical thinking – individually and in groups – children and young people can develop attributes which will be important for their life and work’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 35).

These descriptions of the curriculum’s possible contributions to the development of critical thinking do not provide one coherent conception of what is meant by the skill. Rather, it would appear that critical thinking can encompass synthesis of ideas, reflection, analysis, investigation and creativity, with none of these being of primary importance in the cultivation of the skill. With such limited elaboration of what is meant by critical thinking in CfE, it will be necessary to augment the policy extracts with reference to the critical literature in the field to provide an adequate foundation on which to build my defence of rhetoric for the development of the skill.

Critical thinking has been variously described as ‘the correct assessment of statements’ (Ennis 1962: 83), ‘reasonable, reflective thinking that is focussed on deciding what to believe or to do’ (Ennis 1981: 143) and ‘[a] student’s ability to be accurate and seek accuracy, be clear and seek clarity, be open-minded, restrain impulsivity, take a position when the situation warrants it, and be sensitive to the feelings and level of knowledge of others’(Marzano, Pickering and McTighe [1993] in Bers 2005: 16).

The ability to decide what to believe, in a wide variety of contexts, is, in my view, an especially important tool to have in modern life. The etymological root of ‘critical’ is ‘kritikos’ in Classical Greek which means ‘judge’ and this forms the basis of my argument that any attempt at thinking critically must, by necessity, aim to make some sort of
judgement. In this regard, I disagree fundamentally with the definition provided by McPeck (1981: 156) who suggests that a critical thinker is someone who ‘knows how to suspend judgement for the purpose of using his epistemic understanding of an issue, and does in fact do so’. The suspension of judgement, central to McPeck’s account, misses the point entirely. Rather, making judgement is at the forefront of the ability and a necessary component of the ‘critical’ skill. CfE is explicit about the need for learners to be able to apply critical thinking in new contexts (Scottish Government 2009b: iii) and I interpret this to mean that they require training in methods of assessing, analysing and decoding information which allows them to critically examine their own stance and arrive at a considered judgement which they are subsequently able to justify. More will be said about the skill of critical thinking later in this chapter. I move now to an initial analysis of a related skill, critical literacy.

Critical literacy

Like critical thinking, critical literacy requires the exercise of judgement but in relation to the construction and deconstruction of communication. In this sense, it combines elements of critical thinking and literacy. There exists, however, some ambiguity as to what exactly is meant by critical literacy; Reid (2012) conducted research with Scottish teachers relating to the presentation of critical literacy in CfE and records confusion and concern among them as to what this skill actually comprises. Despite regular references to critical literacy in CfE policy documents, in only two places are explanatory details provided:

In particular, the experiences and outcomes address the important skills of critical literacy. Children and young people not only need to be able to read for information: they also need to be able to work out what trust they should place on the information and to identify when and how people are aiming to persuade or influence them (Scottish Government 2009a: 1).

Literacy experiences and outcomes emphasise the development of critical literacy. Progress here can be seen as children move from dealing with straightforward information towards analysing, evaluating and being aware of the trust that they should place on evidence (Scottish Government 2009a: 3).
It is also referred to as an ‘advanced literacy skill’ (Scottish Government 2010a: 4) and gradation of the skill into levels of complexity is supported by the critical literature with respect to the development and application of critical skills. I have identified three levels from the discussion of the skill in the critical literature. At its simplest level, it appears to be concerned with the ability to state the main purpose of a text and draw inferences. At its more complex level, it is a method of approaching discourse that foregrounds and questions power relations\(^{33}\) (Shor and Pari 1999: 21). At its most complex, it acts as an impetus towards change, encouraging learners to take on the world at large and, by understanding systems of injustice, to arm themselves to challenge those systems of privilege and power (Cooper and White 2006: 31). It calls for a predisposition to deconstruct and critique all forms of discourse, exposing systems of dominance, oppression and advantage (Cooper and White 2006, Stevens and Bean 2007).

It appears to me that the conception of critical literacy promoted by CfE is at the simpler end of the complexity spectrum and that what is meant is closer to ‘critical hermeneutics... the study of discourse and textual strategies’ (Cooper and White 2006: 143) or critical reading. Critical reading, a sub-skill of critical literacy, emphasises such skill-based tasks as distinguishing fact from opinion and, at a more advanced level, recognising propaganda in texts. Critical reading asserts that through ‘careful, thoughtful exegesis meaning which resides in texts can be deduced’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 6). In essence, engaging in critical reading is a search for a verifiable reading, whereas critical literacy is the endeavour to work within multiple plausible interpretations of a text. Gee ([1996] in Stevens and Bean 2007: 25) summarises very well: ‘part and parcel of being a critical reader is being able to recognise the various discourses, or ways of being, doing and acting that are communicated via texts’. Critical literacy, however, at its most developed level motivates social or political action to redress inequalities and injustices. Despite critical literacy being noted in CfE as an important skill, it is not associated anywhere in the policy literature with transformation through action. I therefore claim that the conception of critical literacy in CfE is a diluted one, equivalent to the less sophisticated skill of critical reading, and that such a move represents a missed opportunity for policy makers as critical literacy in its stronger form is, I think, a highly desirable educational goal for Scottish learners. In the next chapter, I illustrate this missed opportunity in more detail by proposing a new link between critical literacy and responsible citizenship. Here, I elaborate

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\(^{33}\) Interestingly, this meaning was called social-epistemic *rhetoric* by Berlin (1988, 1996).
on my claim that the study of rhetoric can not only fulfil the aims of critical literacy education as it is conceived in CfE but can also take learners beyond critical reading to develop more refined critical literacy skills.

Rhetoric (including critical hermeneutics, metalanguage\(^{34}\), critical reading and discourse analysis) provides a tool-kit, I suggest, which helps learners develop literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy skills and provides for them a valuable and relevant method for seeing beyond the veil of verbiage, the occluding ‘rhetoric’ surrounding every aspect of daily life from schooling to politics and advertising. In this regard, I analyse rhetoric’s potential role in fulfilling the Level Four\(^{35}\) experiences and outcomes of CfE in relation to these three cross-curricular skills to support my claim. I have identified particular ways in which rhetoric can contribute to the English and Literacy experiences and outcomes. In order to demonstrate these contributions, I have selected three key features from Classical rhetorical theory, which I consider to relate directly to the three cross-curricular skills. These will be illustrated through the following connections: audience awareness (literacy), organisation of ideas (critical thinking) and rhetorical techniques (critical literacy).

**Awareness of audience (literacy)**

In Quintilian’s school of rhetoric, boys\(^{36}\) had not only to identify and select what they were going to say based on what they could infer about the level of linguistic sophistication of their likely audience, but they were also required to practise adjusting their position mid-speech in response to audience reaction. These exercises contributed to the development of literacy since they demanded that learners express their position using vocabulary appropriate to both the nature of their argument and the needs of their listeners. There were additional factors to consider; for the Greeks and Romans, the effectiveness of an orator did not depend solely on the quality of the oratory but rather, following Aristotle, on the *pathos* and *ethos* appeals which included adaptability, bearing and deportment. The orator needed to know how best to address and affect his audience both through *what* he said and

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\(^{34}\) Known as ‘language about language’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 25).

\(^{35}\) It is expected that most learners will achieve Level Four outcomes and experiences in the early years of secondary school. I have chosen this level as it corresponds most closely to my professional context (Level One is Early Years, Level Two is Primary Four, Level Three is Primary Seven).

\(^{36}\) Only boys received rhetorical training in the Ancient world. Some girls attended primary school but the majority of their education concerned household tasks, taught by members of the family.
how he said it. This ability to use words wisely relied on a good command of literacy skills and continues to form part of the education thought vital for young people as is shown by the experiences and outcomes of CfE:

Having explored and analysed the features of spoken language, I can use these independently, adopting and sustaining an appropriate register to suit my purpose and audience. 
ENG 4-03a

When listening and talking with others for different purposes, I can:

- communicate detailed information, ideas or opinions
- explain processes, concepts or ideas with some relevant supporting detail
- sum up ideas, issues, findings or conclusions.

LIT 4-09a

I can communicate in a clear, expressive manner when engaging with others within and beyond my place of learning, and can independently select and organise appropriate resources as required.
LIT 4-10a

I can engage and/or influence readers through my use of language, style and tone as appropriate to genre.
ENG 4-27a

I can independently select ideas and relevant information for different purposes, organise essential information or ideas and any supporting detail in a logical order, and use suitable vocabulary to communicate effectively with my audience.
LIT 4-06a

Scottish Government (2009a: 131, 132, 134, 144)

As was the case in the Classical world, it is still considered important for learners to acquire skills which will allow them to gauge the purpose of different types of communication and to tailor the content, style and tone to the needs of their audience. One approach taken to fulfil these literacy outcomes has been identified as an example of good practice: learners at Beeslack Community High School in Penicuik (Education Scotland 2013) are trialling the use of ‘literacy mats’ which provide models of different types of
writing (for example, letter, press release, short story, newspaper argument) and remind users of the success criteria for each type. Coloured, laminated sets of these mats are available across the school so that young people can use them whenever they are producing text in a specific format. While these might support learners in the skills of organising ideas and choosing appropriate language, I am concerned that the strategy breeds dependence on school-based resources and does not adequately inculcate the necessary skills for self expression, creation of texts, audience-awareness and logical ordering. My concern stems from uncertainty about how these learners might cope in unfamiliar circumstances when they leave school and enter further training or work – will they take a mini laminated version of the literacy mats with them (in their wallets) to which they may refer? Might they, deep down, lack confidence in their abilities to make appropriate choices concerning vocabulary, structure and argument because of their dependency on the mats? An alternative approach, I suggest, is offered by rhetoric. At the heart of Classical rhetorical theory was the responsibility of the orator to gauge his audience and use appropriate vocabulary and style to suit its linguistic awareness and needs. The study of rhetoric offers a systematic and versatile framework which, if practised and supported in the classroom, removes the need for supplementary resources and helps learners acquire and improve literacy skills, delivering lifelong benefits beyond the experiences and outcomes of CfE.

In support of this claim, I point to the primary stage in the Classical rhetorical speech-making process, inventio, which demands that students learn basic planning skills and ask ‘discovery questions’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 100) concerning the nature and content of what they want to communicate as well as encouraging them to consider carefully their audience. This ensures that students not only analyse their position from various social and emotional perspectives but also that they structure their communication in such a way that it will deliver their message with maximum effect to any given audience. The rhetorical framework places emphasis on the selection and delivery of the right words for the task, foregrounding vocabulary acquisition and application. This is a prerequisite for the ability to rouse an audience’s emotions and appeal to their collective and individual needs, which is a fundamental characteristic of the good orator (Quintilian, Institution Oratorio 12, 2.10). I acknowledge that CfE does not have, as its purpose, the creation of good orators per se. Rather, it seems more likely that it aims to create young people who are adept at

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37 For example who, what, why, where, when, how and through what means?
communicating effectively in everyday life but I claim that the ability to plan, structure and deliver sound arguments, through the study of rhetoric, is highly beneficial to learners of literacy. Use of literacy mats as showcased in Penicuik is certainly one method of improving learners’ confidence in literacy but I caution that such confidence is short-lived and highly reliant; there is the need to cultivate literacy alongside critical skills if learners are to enjoy genuine and transformational confidence in their ability to express themselves orally and in writing. The study of rhetoric includes, at its most basic level, the study of language, style, tone and oral presentation but it goes beyond the features linked with literacy education to incorporate the critical thinking skills required for classification and arrangement in the *disposito* stage. As was seen above, the literacy outcomes in CfE require learners to select information independently and organise it in a logical order; here too rhetoric can help.

**Organisation of ideas (critical thinking)**

In this section, I explore the connection between critical thinking and the organisation of ideas and show, in the discussion which follows, how literacy and critical thinking are foundational to the development of critical literacy. Critical thinking helps students to organise their thoughts and formulate their ideas in relation to a particular subject and allows them to analyse and synthesise how a ‘small group of concepts fits together as a logical system to make up the foundation of a discipline, or how those concepts fit in with the central questions’ (Nosich 2005: 66). The arrangement of one’s ideas and decisions regarding the most effective way to structure them (*disposito*) constituted perhaps the most fundamental stage of the rhetorical process but, with the loss of rhetoric from the curriculum, these same skills have become associated with critical thinking and frequently act as indicators of ‘critical’ abilities. When composing argument, critical thinking is required when ordering the ideas one wants to expound. Yet critical thinking encompasses a wide range of skills, some of which involve organisation, others of which require judgement and analysis. For example, Knight (1992: 67) identifies that critical thinking includes, ‘identifying all the possible ways to organise [information], understanding the implications of each classification system and finally choosing a particular scheme of organisation for a stated reason’. To do so in a rational way requires the ability to judge the plausibility of specific assertions, to weigh evidence, to assess the logical soundness of inferences, to construct counter arguments and alternative hypotheses (Nickerson, Perkins
and Smith 1985: 4-5). There has been some separation, however, of thinking skills and critical skills. Thinking skills such as: argumentation, definition, problem solving and decision making, conceptualisation or classification and creativity (Knight 1992: 67), are required at the initial stages of such an endeavour. Yet ‘critical’ skills are needed to monitor and improve the quality of that judgement and include interrogation of thought at a deeper level: ‘interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, presentation of argument, reflection and disposition’ (Bers 2005: 16), explanation and self-regulation (Calderone 2005). The Classical rhetorical framework combines these skills and for this reason I propose that it offers a valuable pedagogical model and is worthy of reconsideration within CfE.

As was shown in Chapter Two, for the Greeks and Romans rhetoric involved planning, writing, learning and delivering communication, usually in the form of argument with the goal of persuasion. While the shifting cultural norms between the Ancient world and current conditions mean that the role played by argumentation in society has changed (the implications of this change will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Five), the need for students to be able to consider carefully the content, order and presentation of their ideas is still acknowledged as relevant in CfE.

By considering the type of text I am creating, I can independently select ideas and relevant information for different purposes, and organise essential information or ideas and any supporting detail in a logical order. I can use suitable vocabulary to communicate effectively with my audience.
LIT 4-26a

Using what I know about the features of different types of texts, I can find, select, sort, summarise, link and use information from different sources.
LIT 4-14a

I can make notes and organise them to develop my thinking, help retain and recall information, explore issues and create new texts, using my own words as appropriate.
LIT 4-15a

Scottish Government (2009a: 137, 143)
These skills, I suggest, correlate closely with the *inventio* (planning stage described above), the *dispositio* (arrangement), and the *refutatio* (refutation of the opponent’s argument) stages of the rhetorical framework. These steps all involve the ability to select and organise information, offering opportunities for the exercise and improvement of both critical thinking skills and literacy skills. There has been much criticism (Knight 1992, Brown 1998, Barnes 2005, Paul 2005) of current educational trends which fail to teach students the fundamentals of argumentation with the result that students are unable to break arguments down into premises and conclusions, and to spot common fallacies, leaving them oblivious to ‘questionable classifications, unknowable or questionable statistics, and covert biases’ (Knight 1992: 66). There are already alternative pedagogical methods which seek to address these deficiencies in the teaching of argumentation, for example Beyer (1988) recommends for text production the formulation and execution of basic step-by-step approaches for problem solving: recognition, representation, formulation of a solution plan, execution and evaluation. Browne and Keeley (1986) and Knight (1992: 67) teach frameworks of interpretation which require students to a) identify the presence of an argument, b) delineate conclusions and premises, including missing premises c) analyse each premise independently, including any common fallacies associated with the premise d) ask what other information or points of view should be considered and e) determine, finally, if they are persuaded to accept the conclusion and for what reasons. I claim that these pedagogical approaches aim at a more simplistic study of critical thinking than the approach provided by rhetoric. In support of this position, I highlight two features: the efficiency of the rhetorical framework and the unique contribution of the *refutatio*.

Firstly, knowledge of the whole rhetorical framework requires that rhetors think critically about the evaluation of components including definition, cause, consequence and effect both when constructing and analysing communication. The current pedagogical approaches are limited to either construction or analysis; this effectively doubles the learning required by students and does not offer as efficient an approach as the combined approach encapsulated by rhetoric for the study of argumentation. Secondly, the inclusion of the *refutatio* in the rhetorical framework requires deeper critical thinking skills because it compels the students to put themselves in another person’s situation (usually their opponent) and forces them to see the world as ‘the other’ sees it, requiring them to frame questions that they might otherwise never ask (Knight 1992: 68). The *refutatio* requires

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38 *exordium, narratio, dispositio, confirmatio, refutatio* and *conclusio.*
students of rhetoric to go beyond the basic critical thinking needed to consider possible approaches and construct one position, to actually articulate an incisive counter-argument and provide justification for their own superior position. In this way, the rhetorical framework model not only delivers the opportunity for critical thinking skills but actually demands a higher order skill from students, one they will undoubtedly find challenging but which promises to enhance their cognitive understanding and reasoning abilities.

Once the key ideas and the structure of the argument have been identified and organised, consideration must be given to how best to communicate these to the audience, which requires the application of critical literacy skills. As outlined above, critical literacy skills exist at three levels of complexity and I suggest that only the first two of these levels are represented as desirable in CfE but contend that the strongest level is not encouraged. I claim that rhetoric can contribute to a fuller development of the skill and, in support, point to the centrality of rhetorical techniques in Classical rhetorical theory. In the next section, I evaluate ways in which renewed focus on these linguistic devices could improve critical literacy.

Rhetorical techniques (critical literacy)

Critical literacy, understood at its simplest level as the ability to state the main purpose of a text and draw inferences, is accorded importance in CfE as is shown by the following experiences and outcomes.

To show my understanding across different areas of learning, I can:
- clearly state the purpose, main concerns, concepts or arguments and use supporting detail
- make inferences from key statements and state these accurately in my own words
- compare and contrast different types of text.

LIT 4-16a

As I listen or watch, I can:
- clearly state the purpose and main concerns of a text and make inferences from key statements
- compare and contrast different types of text
• gather, link and use information from different sources and use this for different purposes.
LIT 4-04a

Throughout the writing process, I can review and edit my writing independently to ensure that it meets its purpose and communicates meaning clearly at first reading.
LIT 4-23a


But as was suggested earlier, I think this basic conception of critical literacy ought to be expanded, moving it beyond literacy and bringing it closer to the conception which includes the exercise of judgement and higher order thinking skills. Developed critical expertise in the construction and deconstruction of communication, rather than the ability to summarise, will, in my opinion, allow learners to ‘engage fully in society’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 1). The use of rhetorical techniques is pervasive in texts of all kinds and the ability both to persuade and to recognise persuasion in the communication of others is pleasingly represented in CfE’s conception of critical literacy.

To help me develop an informed view, I can identify some of the techniques used to influence or persuade and can assess the value of my sources.
LIT 4-08a

To help me develop an informed view, I can recognise persuasion and bias, identify some of the techniques used to influence my opinion, and assess the reliability of information and credibility and value of my sources.
LIT 4-18a

I can persuade, argue, evaluate, explore issues or express and justify opinions within a convincing line of thought, using relevant supporting detail and/or evidence.
LIT 4-29a

Scottish Government (2009a: 133, 139, 144)

Rhetoric is often associated with persuasion and a vital part of Classical rhetorical education, both for construction and deconstruction purposes, is a study of the techniques and tropes used by the orator to improve the style and impact of his communication. Study
of this sort is still prescribed today in both English (SQA 2000: 6) and Latin (SQA 2008: 17) at Standard Grade level\textsuperscript{39}. The study of rhetorical techniques in English, however, makes for a diluted form of learning since the linguistic features used in Classical literature are more plentiful and diverse and offer increased exposure to communication designed to persuade. To support this position, I shall compare the rhetorical techniques commonly studied by students in English and Latin. Through the study of English students typically encounter figures of speech including: metaphor, simile, alliteration, hyperbole, anticlimax and rhetorical question. Through the study of Latin they encounter all of these as well as chiasmus, tricolon, apostrophe, praeteritio, litotes, antithesis, prolepsis, ellipsis, polyptoton and homoioteleuton\textsuperscript{40}. While many people may not have heard of these lesser known rhetorical techniques, I claim that exposure to an increased number of literary devices facilitates deeper learning of critical literacy. These techniques continue to be used in contemporary communication (Leith’s [2011] book identifies numerous examples from the speeches of modern politicians) so the greater students’ familiarity with their formation and possible manipulative effect, the more likely it is that they can decipher what is meant from the manner in which it is delivered. Surely the more informed students feel about language, the more confident they will be in applying their critical skills to the germane tasks\textsuperscript{41} of construction and deconstruction?

Moreover, I suggest that the study of rhetoric at school equips students with the ability to recognise the use (and abuse) of these techniques in the communications they encounter through enhanced critical literacy skills but also improves their literacy skills by integrating these rhetorical techniques into their own written and spoken communications. Rhetorical devices can be taught in English but the study of Latin literature offers an authentic and linguistically rich body of literature written expressly for rhetorical purposes. The ‘rhetorical’ literature of Cicero, for example, acts as a model of good argumentation which showcases the appropriate and effective use of a wide range of linguistic techniques. The corpus of such literature is greater in Classical Greek and Latin than it is in English and this, together with the rich legacy of rhetorical pedagogy, behoves Scottish teachers, tasked with delivering literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy in CfE, to reconsider

\textsuperscript{39} The first public exams taken by students (aged approximately 15) in the Scottish school in which I taught. Other exams (Intermediate One and Two) are offered by SQA at this level but I have not taught these courses.

\textsuperscript{40} These rhetorical techniques occur commonly in Latin literature and examples of their use are explained in the glossary on pages ix and x.

\textsuperscript{41} Also referred to as ‘analysis and genesis’ by Newlands and Murphy (2010: 18).
the potential contribution of rhetoric. Furthermore, I maintain that rhetoric has a unique role to play in the curriculum by uniting in one framework these three cross-curricular skills. In this way it offers a more efficient pedagogical approach to curricular skills which are currently treated separately and delivered in isolated ways by practitioners.

A possible pedagogy: suasoriae and controversiae

In this section, I point to the merit of exercises used by teachers of rhetoric in the Classical world and argue that they offer a useful pedagogical model for us today since they provide a more efficient method for the cultivation of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy education, than ‘modern’ exercises which vary in challenge, scope and effect. I highlight two advantages of employing rhetorical exercises in the teaching of these cross-curricular skills: firstly, the social and cultural protection they offer and secondly, the increased focus on speaking, listening and the impact of oral presentation. First, I will outline the educational merits, as I see them, of the rhetorical exercises undertaken by Roman learners to further substantiate my argument that they should be revived.

Quintilian and Cicero provide details of the two types of rhetorical exercises given to students of rhetoric two thousand years ago. It is clear that even in the Roman world, rhetorical ability was considered to be a developmental process; after appropriate knowledge of the parts of speech had been acquired, it was necessary to work on application of the skill. Learning how to read closely and write substantively were preliminary skills on which rhetorical ability could be built. The developmental nature of the process of becoming critical, both Ancient and modern, is summarised well, I think, by Glaser ([1985] in Cromwell 1992: 38) who suggests that three elements are needed:

‘attitude of being disposed to consider in a thoughtful, perceptive manner the problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s experience, knowledge of the methods of logical enquiry and reasoning and skill in applying these methods’.

Critical thinking, therefore, is not something which can be passively absorbed, it requires active engagement and the application of knowledge and reason. Bers’ (2005: 15) tripartite
division of critical thinking identifies three stages of knowledge. Declarative knowledge requires that a student knows the facts and the concepts of the discipline. Procedural knowledge requires more sophistication; the student knows how to reason, inquire and present knowledge in the discipline. The final stage is called metacognition and is an advanced thinking skill: the student at this level is able to set goals, determine when additional information is needed and assess the fruitfulness of a line of inquiry. I propose that these can be broadly compared to literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. The similarity between Ancient and modern approaches to these skills and abilities suggests that they are of enduring value and it is to the success of Rome’s rhetoric that I think we should look for pedagogical inspiration.

Suasoriae and controversiae were designed to instil in students of rhetoric this combination of attitude, knowledge and skill. The suasoria exercise, while occupied with flights of fancy of what might have been and the imaginative anachronism of placing oneself in history, also taught the rhetorical, logical, and compositional structure (disposito). In this activity, the student was asked to imagine himself\(^\text{42}\) as a figure from history (or mythology) and present an argument outlining his choice of action in a dilemma. Quintilian gives examples including Numa considering whether to be king (Instituo Oratoria 2, 4) and Cato considering whether to marry (Instituo Oratoria 3, 5). Other topics are drawn from the comparison of things, for example whether a country or city life was more desirable, and whether the merit of a lawyer or a soldier was the greater and whether political offices should be sought. Another element of Roman rhetorical training was the composition of controversiae, fictional law cases, in which the student had to ‘act’ either for the defence or the prosecution. In both exercises, argument was formulated according to the rhetorical framework and was supported with carefully considered, reasoned points and justified conclusions. I would say that suasoriae and controversiae are the ancestors of modern critical thinking exercises. Paul (2005: 32), discussing contemporary approaches to the teaching of critical thinking, emphasises that students ‘must think their way through what they read and write’. The framework provided by rhetorical exercises provides learners with a strategy for the organisation of their thoughts and formulation of their critical response.

\(^{42}\) Again, the male pronoun is used because only boys received rhetorical training in the Ancient world.
The benefits of reviving rhetorical exercises include increased linguistic confidence, more emphasis on checking assumptions and the exercise of informed judgement. In the critical skills classroom, which, I argue could be a rhetoric classroom, students are helped to acquire the skills to catch language in the act of formation and to recognise and assert the effects of that formation. Being critical thus ‘involves adopting an active, challenging approach to reading and textual practices’ (Cooper and White 2008: 200). The distinction that critical thinking requires not only a disposition but a willingness to engage with the thinking process in a concerted fashion begins to explain why many critical thinking courses have ‘failed’ to achieve their objectives, simply because the curriculum designer presupposed active, willing participation from the students in the pursuit of changed thinking processes (Jost 2003, Brookfield 2005, Paul 2005). By studying rhetoric, students will be acquiring a lifelong predisposition to exercise considered judgement when faced with the multiple and often conflicting messages they receive from texts, films, novels, digital sources, political figures and a host of other discourse forms (Stevens and Bean 2007). Through the exercise of critical skills, Brookfield suggests this is possible, by recognising and researching the assumptions that undergird thoughts and actions then ‘hunting them down and checking them’ (Brookfield 2005: 50). Clearly, practice is essential for this process; students must have plenty of opportunity to be ‘rhetorical’ in class.

**Rhetorical exercises and students’ situated perspectives**

There has been some debate among practitioners as to whether critical thinking instruction should be grounded in student experience. Those in favour (Dlugos 2003, Petraglia and Bahri 2003, Bers 2005, Nosich 2005) suggest that when students apply reason to determine how some subject matter relevant to themselves conflicts with or reshapes their own real-life goals, assumptions, decisions, and points of view, they become more engaged with the subject matter and more committed to acquiring the skill. Petraglia and Bahri (2003: 35) identify discussions about divisive issues (for example, race, religion, gender, sexuality) as being particularly useful in cultivating critical thinking skills and developing empathy. From my own classroom experience, I know that when students feel what it is like to be moved by powerful rhetoric, positively and negatively, they realise that they also possess the power to do so. What becomes problematic, however, is when students have strong
feelings on a topic but have not yet developed their rhetorical ability adequately to express their position in a reasoned way. In these circumstances, emotions can run high and tongues can begin to speak rather too freely. Brookfield (2005: 55) suggests an alternative approach. He considers that critical thinking should be targeted as an incremental movement in which learners begin far away from their own ideas and experiences and gradually move toward direct analysis of them.

To be ‘critical’, a student should be able to both analyse and evaluate concepts with which they are personally acquainted and familiar and they should be able to organise and formulate basic ideas about something relatively unknown. This means that students must first learn the mental protocol of identifying and researching assumptions by looking at familiar ideas and actions from a distinctly unfamiliar vantage point. Asking questions of this sort, concerning the historical, social and political contexts that permeate and foreground any text is integral to the inventio stage of the speech making process. The reintroduction of rhetorical suasoriae (and conceivably controversiae) achieves these objectives but offers additional protection for students from discussions of sensitive and divisive issues which have the potential to socially alienate them from their peers and teaching staff. Debates and exercises based on fictional or remotely historical events, provide alternative contexts, which begins to address a deficiency of some current methods of teaching critical thinking. Brookfield (2005: 51) identifies ‘cultural suicide’ as a failure of the approach suggested by Petraglia and Bahri above; students fear that if they critically question conventional assumptions, justifications, contemporary structures, and actions too far then they risk being excluded from the culture that has defined and sustained them up to that point in their life. While I do not think that the content of literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy lessons ought to be censored or prescribed, as it is surely the responsibility of the teacher to exercise appropriate professional judgement in the selection of discussion topics, I do think that the development of critical skills should be free from personal trauma or social discomfort and maintain that suasoriae and controversiae have unique contributions to make in this regard, especially in the early stages of critical literacy development43.

43 Debates and discussions based on ‘real life’ issues and opinions are better suited to the advanced stages of critical literacy study, as here they can contribute to transformation through social action, the goal of the most developed concept of critical literacy about which more will be said in the next chapter.
The democracy of fifth century BC Athens and the Republic of first century BC Rome offer ideal, self-contained societies which can serve as case studies for the exercise of critical literacy. When teaching rhetoric, Roman educators encouraged students to take on the persona of a variety of characters, real and fictional, from all ranks and locations throughout the Empire in an effort to get the boys to think, speak and act as ‘others’. Of course, retrieval of this approach today would require that students develop a clear understanding of the mechanics of such societies and that they become knowledgeable enough to position themselves on both sides of a social crisis. It is not only *suasoriae* and *controversiae* which can offer social protection for learners of rhetoric; the study of Classical literature offers a rich forum for the safe expression of ideas and opinions. Bean and Moni (2003) and Harper and Bean (2006) recommend the use of multicultural literature as a powerful vehicle for teaching critical literacy practices. I would argue that Classical literature (including but not restricted to rhetorical treatises) is indeed valuable for this purpose as the non-fictional letters of Pliny, Seneca and Cicero on slavery, the role of women and the treatment of foreigners provide an insightful counterpart to the themes of fictional plays which include: the effect of war on society (*Aristophanes’ Lysistrata*); the individual’s struggle against authority (*Sophocles’ Antigone*); and xenophobia, marriage and betrayal (*Euripides’ Medea*). Stevens and Bean (2007: 26) highlight issues such as democracy, freedom, equity and social justice and claim that these lend themselves to critical literacy questions and discussion; these are the core themes of much Classical literature, particularly Greek tragedy. In an interesting inversion of the common allegation that Latin and Greek are ‘dead’ languages, irrelevant to citizens of the 21st century, the Classical texts I have identified (and many others) provide fertile ground for the presentation of knowledge as a social construction linked to norms and values (the aim of critical literacy according to Aronowitz and Giroux [1985: 132]), and they demonstrate modes of critique that illuminate how, in some cases, knowledge serves very specific economic, political, and social interests. In teaching the aforementioned texts, these are exactly the questions which would be asked. By removing current conditions from the society under study, the focus on argumentation through *suasoriae* and *controversiae* or the appreciation of Classical literature, also has the potential to reduce the tension between schools being places of authority, and critical literacy demanding that the authority be questioned. Thus the ‘protection’ on offer to students is also extended to teachers who are, themselves, positioned outside the cultural context being discussed without jeopardising
the powerful transformative role of critique which can advance students’ confidence with language, self expression and engagement in communication with others.

**Speaking and listening**

The focus of *suasoriae* and *controversiae* was the construction and delivery of a speech. The argument expounded thus far is vulnerable to the criticism that speech making is of lesser value in contemporary society than it was in the Classical world (given the current widespread publication of written communication from books and magazines to blogs and Twitter) and, as such, is no longer an important aim for school education. Taking this view, the pedagogical approach offered by rhetoric may not appear so valuable for learners in the 21st century. In response to this position, I contend that although the speech is the focus of Ancient rhetorical education, the rhetorical framework can be used when constructing or deconstructing any written or spoken communication44 which involves making and justifying an argument. In this regard, the rhetorical exercises described above fulfil many of the desired activities associated with the aims of critical thinking according to Paul (2005: 30):

> to provide occasions on which students think their way to conclusions; defend positions on difficult issues; consider a variety of points of view; analyse concepts, theories and explanations; clarify issues and conclusions; solve problems; transfer ideas to new contexts; examine assumptions; assess alleged facts; explore implications and consequences; and increasingly come to terms with the contradictions and inconsistencies of their own thought and experience.

They are, then, I contend, still highly relevant and fulfil many of the desired outcomes of literacy and critical skills. The promotion of literacy in CfE exhorts teachers to create situations where students can:

44 By CfE’s definition, ‘a text is the medium through which ideas, experiences, opinions and information can be communicated’ and can be ‘spoken, heard, written, visual or mixed media’ (Scottish Government 2009b: 10).
listen, talk and share... thinking; debate... ideas; read, find, select, sort and summarise information; understand and compare texts; write; develop and use effective vocabulary (creating texts) and build on the many languages used in Scotland (LTS 2011a: 2).

The results of the Scottish Survey of Numeracy and Literacy (Scottish Government 2013) indicate that of the three areas in the literacy framework, listening and talking skills are the least developed among Scotland’s secondary school learners. Of the children surveyed, only 46 per cent were performing well or very well in ‘listening and talking’ (Scottish Government 2013: 18). These results demonstrate that the time is right to consider a new approach. That the experiences promote the importance of listening and talking and of effective collaboration in the development of thinking and in learning suggests to me that conditions are conducive to an increased focus on argumentation. By argumentation, I do not mean the aggressive exchange of resolutely held positions with the aim of ‘winning’; rather I assert that argumentation involves reasoned and structured communication which can lead all sides to new positions, although more will be said about this role for rhetoric in Chapter Five. Here, my focus is to show that the rhetorical framework provides more than a tool for the construction and deconstruction of arguments, it has the potential to increase learners’ confidence in speaking and listening and offers an alternative pedagogical approach which Scottish teachers might usefully consider.

Listening skills are important since the vast majority of decisions that we make about everyday events are made on the basis of hearing oral arguments – from the claims of advertisers or politicians to assessments of world events and social phenomena. Speaking skills, too, are vital as Shor and Freire (1987: 73) highlighted, urging teachers to tell their students, ‘you need to learn how to command the dominant language, in order for you to survive in the struggle to transform society’. Knight (1992: 69) suggests that a possible

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‘Reading’ at S2: 84 per cent of children surveyed are performing well or very well (Scottish Government 2013: 10) and ‘writing’ at S2: 64 per cent of children surveyed are performing well or very well (Scottish Government 2013: 14). Only 1 per cent was performing beyond the expected level in each area of literacy education.

\[46\]

10,100 pupils and 4900 teachers in 2,100 schools took part (Scottish Government 2013: 1).

\[47\]

Brookfield (2005: 51) notes that ‘impostorship’ occurs when students feel, at some deeply embedded level, that they possess neither the talent nor the right to become critical thinkers. When asked to critically analyse the ideas of experts, learners often feel under-qualified to do so and worry that criticism marks them out as disrespectful. Here, I think the rhetorical framework acts as a great leveller as the stages of the process provide a ‘way in’. Hirshberg (1992: 115) notes that when students improve their ability in structuring arguments, they are empowered through the development of their thinking skills.

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The role of Classical languages in this regard will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six.
way to support the ‘habit of analysing oral arguments’ is to ‘make every discussion an exercise in argumentation’. This approach encourages students to become accustomed to asserting and defending positions and evaluating the strength of all arguments as they are presented in the relative ‘safety\(^49\) of the classroom. Through disagreement and challenge, arguments can be probed, criticised and weak positions revealed. Roman rhetorical exercises, I claim, provide a useful method for the creation of a classroom culture focussed on improving speaking and listening skills through the study of argumentation. In these circumstances, students have the opportunity to combine creativity\(^50\) with critical thinking in an atmosphere that encourages the free play of ideas which is, in turn, supportive of the construction and delivery of sound arguments. More needs to be done to improve students’ speaking and listening skills, both to increase standards of literacy but also to facilitate fuller participation in civic life. Rhetoric can provide additional preparation for citizenship: as well as skills associated with speaking and listening, it equips students with heightened awareness of the impact of subliminal and non-verbal techniques (for example, hand gestures, voice variation and speaker to audience eye contact) used to persuade. With the widespread use of audio and video media outputs for communication and advertising purposes, this additional dimension of rhetorical study is worthy of careful reconsideration.

\textit{actio} – the Roman rhetorical art of delivery and performance

If students are to feel confident in analysing the connection between knowledge and power, they must consider not only what is communicated but also how it is communicated, taking into account the use of body language and voice; I am concerned that this element of speaking and listening skills is underrepresented in current literacy curricula, especially since it is estimated that 65 per cent of meaning is communicated nonverbally (Burgoon 1985). CfE does not prescribe that oral performance skills or presentation styles should be learned in the curriculum but these formed an integral part of Roman rhetorical training;

\(^49\) Teachers can lessen the fear of participation by setting the tone and explaining that beliefs and opinions are respected but bad arguments are challenged.

\(^50\) Thinking creatively, described as a sub-skill of critical thinking by Hirshberg (1992) and Knight (1992) encompasses the habit of using alternative thinking strategies and asking hypothetical questions.
actio (delivery) was the fifth canon of speech\textsuperscript{51} which every orator had to consider when writing and practising his communication. Delivery, Cicero asserts in \textit{de Oratore} 3, 56:

has the sole and supreme power in oratory; without it, a speaker of the highest mental capacity can be held in no esteem; while one of moderate abilities, with this qualification, may surpass even those of the highest talent.

Through delivery, the orator sought not only to persuade and move the audience's minds, but also to recommend himself to them, as was explained in Chapter Two: the Romans believed that the outward appearance of a person was an image of their inward personality and character. Their manner of dress, walking and gestures was indicative of the sort of man he was (\textit{ethos}) and this impacted on the audience's perception of his status and trustworthiness. In terms of voice, Quintilian tells that the ideal orator had to have the voice of a tragic actor and the delivery of a very good stage professional (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 3, 111). He thought it advisable for students of rhetoric to undertake lessons in enunciation, gesticulation, and miming from a professional actor and training in body movements from a good gym instructor (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 3). Training in posture and gesticulation, too, were vital for the future orator, and he notes the movements which help, and those which damage the performance, systematically passing from the head to the feet. He provides examples of the sorts of gestures students of rhetoric must learn. Some are expressions of emotion; certain head movements show shame, doubt, admiration, or indignation he says (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 3, 71). He does not, however, describe them as they are too well known – though, unfortunately, not to us. With hand signs he often is more instructive not least because, as he writes, 'they are almost as expressive as words' (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 3, 86). 'Wonder', both surprise and admiration (\textit{admiratio}), is best expressed, he suggests, as follows:

the right hand turns slightly upwards and the fingers are brought in to the palm, one after the other, beginning with the little finger; the hand is then reopened and turned round by a reversal of this motion; regret or anger is indicated by the clenched fist, pressed to the breast (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 3, 104).

\textsuperscript{51}These are \textit{inventio} (invention), \textit{dispositio} (arrangement), \textit{elocutio} (style), \textit{memoria} (memory) and \textit{actio} (delivery).
The gestural language together with the rest of the performance is directed towards the emotions, not the reason\textsuperscript{52}, of the audience: 'all emotional appeals will inevitably fall flat, unless they are given the fire that voice, look, and the whole comportment of the body can give them' (\textit{Institutio Oratoria} 11, 2). The body signs of the orator demonstrate his own emotions which in turn are used to excite similar emotions in the audience. Thus, gestures serve the aim of \textit{psychagogia} (‘winning of men's souls', as Plato deprecatingly called it [\textit{Phaedrus} 261a]); a goal attained by targeting the emotions, not the intellect of the audience, especially when addressing huge crowds of fellow citizens or judges in Greece or Rome. The study of rhetoric reveals that gestures underline and amplify the message of language by stressing the emotional, non-rational elements of communication. In arguing that students need increased awareness of these non-verbal methods of persuasion to help them become adequately critical consumers and producers of communication, I point to the rich body of material offered by the rhetorical exercises described by Quintilian and Cicero. \textit{Suasoriae} and \textit{controversiae} offer opportunities to promote activities which foreground speaking and listening, skills which are essential for the cultivation of literacy in CfE. However, as has been demonstrated by the additional benefits conferred by the rhetorical framework’s focus on \textit{actio}, I consider that rhetorical exercises make important contributions to critical thinking and critical literacy skills too.

\textbf{Why critical skills require a more considered approach}

There ought to be a coherent and robust approach to the teaching and learning of critical skills in Scottish classrooms. In addition to the reasons outlined above, there are two further factors which ought to be considered; the role played by critical skills in lifelong learning and the connection between critical literacy and citizenship. Firstly, helping students develop well-honed critical filters to deconstruct how they are being positioned by messages in texts and, equally important, how to construct their own messages is an aspect of lifelong learning (Brookfield 2005: 49) which, I have suggested, rhetoric can help to improve. It does so, I claim, by enriching the learning of school pupils through its provision of a framework for the decoding and encoding of communications, written and

\textsuperscript{52}This concept was introduced in Chapter Two and the tension between reason, passion, the emotions and rhetoric will be connected with the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib in Chapter Five.
oral. The overwhelming nature and amount of communication in today’s world (Stevens and Bean 2007) makes critical thinking an essential skill, I argue, and more must be done to boost students’ ‘limited skills to decipher, question, validate, and reason’ (Barnes 2005: 12). Detailed understanding of linguistic techniques will, I have argued, better prepare learners to express their ideas coherently and persuasively (in debates, academic settings and in everyday conversation) and application of the rhetorical framework will improve learners’ critical skills, allowing them to pick apart the specificities of power, representation, and purpose laden in all texts. Given that we are all now potential consumers to be swayed by highly creative, cunning and powerful media messages designed to get our attention, and ultimately to persuade us to purchase products (Stevens and Bean 2007: 23), the agenda for improving the teaching and learning of critical skills is urgent. Browne and Meuti ([1999: 162] in Barnes 2005: 6) identify that ‘critical thinking is perhaps the most oft-cited post-secondary learning objective, although common classroom practice belies its importance’. Unfortunately, schooling has tended, in its use of textbooks and other print-based texts, to privilege superficial, factual-level comprehension while leaving questions of power and representation unexplored (Stevens and Bean 2007). The wide-reaching impact of digital communication means that critical skills practitioners can no longer afford to think only locally but need to pay attention to the lifelong benefits for learners of being able to analyse and question the social, cultural and economic effects of globalisation on language use, opportunity and power. Students need to be taught to evaluate not only the content of a text but also how it does its work, what language choices are made and why. Discourse analysis at this micro-level is crucial in aiding students to use texts critically as meaning-making tools between themselves and the world around them. Brown (1998: 177) insists that

> development of the critical faculties, to which all people are potentially heirs, is not a means to an end, nor even one of many desirable ends; it is the primary social end.

By the ‘primary social end’, I think Brown means the capacity to be a critically informed and aware citizen within an active and collaborative civic society. I concur with Brown’s view that the ability to exercise critical skills is a vital goal of education and brings lifelong benefit to those who become ‘critically’ competent and confident. Furthermore, the ability
to think critically has also been associated with improvement in collaborative and civic skills. Thinking critically involves working with (and sometimes against) one’s relationships with others, physically or mentally, in order to address contingent situations (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 25) and, in this sense, it ‘helps the individual cooperate with others’ (Glaser 1985: 26). As was shown above, the use of suasoriae and controversiae compels learners to present arguments for both sides which requires them to consider opinions, feelings and motivations of those with alternative views. This exercise in empathy provides helpful preparation, I argue, for participation in the civic sphere. And the structured exploration of definitions, language use, assumptions, evidence, reasoning, and conclusions has the potential to cultivate democratic habits of mind and facilitate collaboration. For Glaser (1985) critical thinking combines an intellectual ability, a strategy for dealing with the world and a factor contributing to good citizenship. Kretovics (1985: 51), challenging the focus on functional literacy in US educational policy, makes a connection between the formal teaching of critical skills and participation in civic matters. He claims that critical thinking and critical literacy provide students with the conceptual tools necessary to critique and engage in society, more aware of its inequalities and injustices.

The ability to examine, digest and ponder not only what is communicated but to ask questions of the ‘gaps, spaces and interrelationships between and among pieces and systems of knowledge’ (Cooper and White 2006: 200) is vital, in my view, for Scottish learners as they develop as citizens in a democracy. Indeed, an aim for the new Scottish curriculum is to ‘be inclusive, be a stimulus for personal achievement and, through the broadening of pupils’ experience of the world, be an encouragement towards informed and responsible citizenship’ (Scottish Executive 2004a: 11) and if learners are to become such citizens, they must move beyond simply understanding the meaning of communication to ‘filtering it for positionalities, agendas and purposes’ (Stevens and Bean 2007: 17); key skills facilitated by the critical faculties and given structure, I argue, by the study of Classical rhetoric. The ability to see beyond meaning to positionality helps learners to adapt to new contexts, a skill considered important in the effective contributor capacity of CfE. When students learn how to ‘read the world and their lives critically and relatedly’

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53 There is a pervasive body of evidence to suggest that the study of critical thinking can accelerate the development of students’ higher order thinking and literacy abilities, as well as improving their motivation for learning (Lochhead and Clement 1979, Chaffee 1985, Chance 1986, Schonfield 1987, Chaffee 1992, Olson and Babu 1992, Brown 1998).
(Shor and Pari 1999: 20), they develop a critical consciousness, fostering the capacities to deal with ambiguity, negotiate the bewildering pace of social and technological change and to search for justice and equity by reading the meanings behind the text. Students accustomed to the practice of argumentation and the exchange of ideas and opinions through debates or discussions are more likely, I suggest, to begin to share willingly their own social and political positions and are also better placed to develop a collective vision of what it might be like to live in the best of all societies. In searching for ways in which such a vision might be made practical, I claim that rhetoric, by requiring that students prepare and deliver their arguments in a logical order and in accordance with the common framework encasing the five canons of speech, boosts their self-confidence and motivates them to engage actively as citizens ‘in shaping the future of their society rather than accommodating to it’ (Nickerson, Perkins and Smith 1985: 5).

I have shown, in this chapter, that rhetoric can help deliver several of the literacy and English experiences and outcomes as well as one element of the effective contributor capacity in CfE. In this regard, I have suggested that the rhetorical framework offers a pedagogical possibility for the combined learning and teaching of three cross-curricular skills: literacy, critical thinking and critical literacy. Furthermore, advantages of rhetoric over current pedagogy were highlighted: the increased exposure to linguistic techniques used to persuade, the social protection offered by suasoriae and controversiae for students and teachers, the efficient progressive framework for argument formation, the focus on non-verbal methods of communication and the impact of voice and delivery (actio) and the centrality of critical skills which can have additional benefits for lifelong learning and civic collaboration.

The curious treatment of critical literacy revisited

In concluding this chapter, I revisit the curious treatment of critical literacy in CfE. As was discussed above, the conception of critical literacy in CfE appears to aim at something beyond reading for understanding and the exercise of ‘advanced literary skills’ including analysis, interpretation and evaluation. I have already made the point that these skills are consistent with critical reading or critical hermeneutics but do not, in my view, encompass the social and political dimension which is required in the more common conception of
critical literacy (Shor and Pari 1999, Cooper and White 2006, Stevens and Bean 2007, Cooper and White 2008, Darder et al. 2009). The approach adopted in CfE may be the result of a misinterpretation of the term; Cooper and White (2006: 32) comment that the popularisation of the words “critical literacy” guts it of its radical content and trivialises its meanings’. What makes critical literacy ‘radical’ is that, after critiquing relationships among language use, social practice and power to unveil social inequalities and oppressive institutional structures, there is an expectation that steps will be taken to redress any power imbalance, calling for systemic change through political engagement and social action (Cooper and White 2006: 17). Oriented toward self in social context, critical literacy combines questioning received knowledge and immediate experience with the goals of challenging inequality and, crucially, developing an activist citizenry (Shor and Pari 1999: 10). This is the point at which I believe that the teaching of rhetoric and the teaching of critical literacy intersect with citizenship education; rhetoric offers a critical framework for the analysis and genesis of communication and by equipping learners with the critical skills they need to be able to express themselves in an appropriate and articulate way, they are better placed to become politically literate and socially active. This connection between critical literacy and citizenship does not exist in CfE, with detrimental implications, I believe, both for the policy and for the students it aims to educate. In the next chapter I explore in more depth what is meant by the key capacity of ‘responsible citizen’ in Scotland’s CfE and consider ways in which the study of rhetoric in the curriculum can cultivate and fulfil its associated skills and attributes.
Chapter Four

Responsible citizenship: a capacity in need of philosophical analysis and pedagogical development

In this chapter I continue to develop my argument for the reintroduction of rhetoric in the school curriculum with particular reference to its potential contribution to citizenship education, one of the curriculum’s key capacities. I revisit the claim made in the previous chapter that rhetoric can contribute positively to the cultivation of critical skills but here claim that these abilities are of particular use to citizens as they learn how to conduct themselves responsibly in society. I explore what is meant by the responsible citizen capacity but given that the policy describes the attributes of the responsible citizen only briefly and shies away from fuller definition, I propose that we might better understand the intentions of the policy authors if we subject three areas of the attributes to interpretation on a continuum from ‘minimal’ to ‘maximal’ conceptions (McLaughlin 1992). These are: citizens’ knowledge and understanding; their critical reasoning ability and their proclivity to participation. In analysing how these categories have been conceived in CfE, I argue that the policy authors have been too cautious in their vision for responsible citizenship; they appear to alienate maximal conceptions of citizenship in favour of an approach which broadly construes citizenship minimally but which consequently yields more questions than answers. This creates ambiguity for teachers and students as to what responsible citizenship requires and is likely, I think, to give the impression that maximal interpretations are undesirable: a dangerous outcome which I fear has the potential to dilute the potency of citizenship education now and in the future.

Placed at the heart of the curriculum as a key capacity, CfE’s conception of the responsible citizen is disappointingly flaccid and requires support and scaffolding from deeper analysis of citizenship trends in the philosophy of education to make it fit for purpose in the dynamic civic arena of contemporary Scotland. In concluding this chapter, I point to the apparently changing nature of policy priorities and to some promising examples of best practice identified in related policy documents which, I argue, exhort a new approach to citizenship education and which motivate a maximal interpretation. ‘Justice-oriented citizenship’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242) is such a conception of citizenship which, although not currently taught extensively in schools (Westheimer and Kahne 2004, Biesta
2008, Zipin and Reid 2008, Biesta 2011, Swalwell 2013), is the one which I think we ought to support and promote for responsible citizenship and democratic education in Scotland. That rhetoric combines skills of self-representation with those of critical analysis and active participation makes it worthy of reconsideration, I propose, as a pedagogical method for the cultivation of justice-oriented citizenship in current conditions.

**Minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship**

McLaughlin (1992: 236) identifies that ‘much of the ambiguity and tension contained within the concept of citizenship can be roughly mapped in terms of minimal and maximal interpretations of the notion’. I consider McLaughlin’s distinction to be instructive for the present endeavour since it allows for multiple interpretations of citizenship to be viewed as part of a continuum, not as discrete theories (McLaughlin 1992: 236). Since all conceptions of citizenship exist within a fluid civic domain inhabited by divergent political beliefs and are set against the contested nature of democracy itself, the continuum facilitates a method of philosophical analysis which eschews precise definition and fixed classification. Indeed, the responsible citizen capacity in CfE seems to imply a variety of conceptions and there is the potential for confusion in trying to determine the extent to which knowledge and understanding, critical reasoning and participation are necessary or desirable features. In order to establish a philosophical foundation for the further analysis of CfE policy which follows, clarification of what is meant by minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship will be helpful.

Four features of citizenship which McLaughlin identifies to illustrate the difference between minimal and maximal interpretations are: identity, virtues, political involvement and social prerequisites. In terms of identity, a minimal interpretation of citizenship centres on the legal status granted to a citizen. A maximal interpretation sees identity manifest itself as the conscious membership of community and a shared commitment to democratic culture. In this sense, identity ‘is dynamic rather than static in that it is seen as a matter for continuing debate and redefinition’ (McLaughlin 1992: 236). The virtues required by a citizen within a minimal conception are primarily local and immediate in character. This might involve helping others through the demonstration of public-spiritedness, for example by participating in a neighbourhood watch initiative. Interpreted maximally, the citizen has
a responsibility to seek social justice for all. In a minimal interpretation of citizenship, political involvement extends only to the exercise of individual voting rights whereas the maximal interpretation requires full participation in democracy. Social prerequisites concern the extent to which citizenship is seen as an ‘egalitarian status in terms of theory and intention’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237) in which case a minimal interpretation is content that citizenship is granted and a maximal one is concerned that social disadvantages of various kinds must be considered if that status is to be achieved ‘in any real and meaningful sense’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237). In the exploration (of what is intended by CfE’s ‘responsible citizen’ capacity) which follows, I use the framework provided by minimal and maximal interpretation to try to determine where on the continuum CfE’s intended approach rests. A useful starting point for such a quest is the contextualisation of CfE’s capacity within the broader education for citizenship policy landscape.

**Education for citizenship and the responsible citizen capacity**

In the UK, in the last two decades, there has been renewed interest in education for citizenship. A Citizenship Advisory Group was established in the 1990s (chaired by Professor Bernard Crick) to articulate the contemporary meaning of citizenship, drawing on philosophical ideas dating back to Ancient Athens but essentially focussing on modern democracy. The National Curriculum Council concluded that ‘education for citizenship is essential for every young pupil’ (Jones and Jones 1992: 30) and in the Crick Report (Crick 1998), citizenship was recommended as a separate subject on England’s national curriculum. In 1999 LTS, presumably prompted by the innovation south of the border and motivated by the advent of devolution, investigated the present and future role of citizenship in Scottish schools and created a paper for discussion and development entitled ‘Education for Citizenship in Scotland’ (LTS 2002). This, together with the 2006 publication by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of education (HMIe) ‘Education for Citizenship’, informed the inclusion (Biesta 2008) of ‘responsible citizen’ as one of the four capacities, and a purpose of the new curriculum in Scotland.

Within CfE, responsible citizens are depicted as individuals who have ‘respect for others’ and ‘commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life’ and who are able to
develop knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland’s place in it; understand different beliefs and cultures; make informed choices and decisions; evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues; [and] develop informed, ethical views of complex issues (SEED 2004a: 12).

I suggest that these attributes can be separated into three categories of ability which citizens must possess to qualify as ‘responsible’ in CfE. One concerns the extent of citizens’ knowledge and understanding, another concerns their critical reasoning ability and the third concerns participation. I shall subject each of these categories to analysis using the framework of minimal and maximal interpretation described above.

Knowledge and understanding

The conception of citizenship promoted by CfE acknowledges that citizens must learn about ‘the world and Scotland’s place in it’ as well as undertaking the task of understanding ‘different beliefs and cultures’, both of which require the acquisition of knowledge but are not directly linked to any deeper civic skills. The privileging of the individual’s knowledge and understanding in this way is indicative of a minimal interpretation of citizenship which prioritises the provision of information and does not require ‘understanding of virtues and dispositions of the democratic citizen conceptualised in fuller terms’ (McLaughlin 1992: 238). For example, an interpretation of developing ‘knowledge and understanding of the world and Scotland’s place in it’ and understanding ‘different beliefs and cultures’ at the extremely minimal end of the continuum might be exemplified by students learning about a cultural phenomenon which will have limited impact on their understanding of democratic citizenship. This might, for argument’s sake, include the study of the range of costumes worn by Greek folk dancers across towns and regions of the archipelago. Learners could develop understanding of this different culture through the study of local traditions of fashion, music and performance and could conduct a comparative study with Scotland. Such an activity would, as far as I can see, satisfy the two attributes of the capacity which relate to cultural understanding but could equally be an activity conducted as part of the Social Studies or Expressive Arts curricula. There is nothing about this type of activity which makes citizens more responsible, rather it only serves to make them more informed; the two are not directly linked. Admittedly, CfE’s exhortation through the capacity that responsible citizens ‘understand different beliefs’
affords investigation of slightly more controversial issues which may have more to contribute to the development of responsible citizenship. For example, the development of knowledge and understanding surrounding the issue of female genital mutilation by the Oromo tribe in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya will certainly help Scottish citizens feel more aware of and informed about alternative beliefs and their concomitant cultural practices but possessing knowledge is not enough to engage responsibility, in my view.

Citizens become responsible, I suggest, when they possess the skills to critically analyse alternative beliefs and can articulate and defend their views in a way which shows respect for others and an awareness of democracy and social justice. The focus on the individual amassing knowledge in order to understand alternative social and cultural approaches is undoubtedly one stage in the process. Indeed, knowledge and understanding are closely linked with the aims of international education and the development of global citizens (LTS 2011a). Knowledge and understanding certainly have a preparatory role to play but are insufficient for responsible citizenship, in my view, since they stop short of improving students’ sense of agency or advancing their competence in political literacy, elements which I consider necessary to move beyond a basic conception of citizenship. The absence of any explicit mention of shared commitment to public virtues and social justice, combined with the focus on the individual’s knowledge and understanding aligns with a minimal interpretation of citizenship; McLaughlin suggests that such conceptions do not have any ‘concern to ameliorate the social disadvantages that may inhibit the students from developing into citizens in a significant sense’ (McLaughlin 1992: 238). The danger of a minimal interpretation of this kind being taught in schools is that it can lead students to receive ‘merely an unreflective socialisation into the political and social status quo’ (McLaughlin 1992: 238) which is insufficient, I advance, both for education and democracy in Scotland.

Critical reasoning

At this stage, it is helpful to remember that citizenship, according to McLaughlin (1992: 237) should not be considered as a set of distinct concepts but is better viewed as a ‘continuum of interpretations’ in which minimal conceptions are no less concerned with ‘ideological content or significance’ (McLaughlin 1992: 237) than their maximal
counterparts. Rather, the main difference concerns the degree of critical understanding and questioning that is seen as necessary to citizenship. In this regard, upon first reading, it appears that the conception of citizenship promoted in CfE does not consider critical faculties important since it makes no explicit mention of them. However, upon closer inspection, it is clear that critical ability is considered desirable since, according to the capacity, responsible citizens must be able: to apply the knowledge they have gained to complex issues; to evaluate, which involves judging both sides of an issue; and to make decisions in an ethical manner. These skills require more than knowledge and understanding; they command engagement from the critical faculties. As was discussed in the previous chapter, rhetoric has much to offer the cultivation of critical thinking and critical literacy skills. I will return to the role of rhetoric towards the end of this chapter; the focus here is on ways in which the development of critical faculties can fulfil aspects of responsible citizenship.

A summary of what is meant by critical thinking is provided by Kuhn ([1999] cited in Maclellan and Soden 2008: 32) and revisiting it here will be instructive. She identifies that critical thinking involves separating beliefs from evidence; imagining beliefs alternative to one’s own and knowing what evidence would support these; providing evidence which supports one’s own beliefs while rebutting the alternatives and weighing up reasons for believing what is alleged to be known. Although critical skills are not explicitly mentioned in the responsible citizen capacity, a strong connection is made between them in the LTS (2002) ‘Education for Citizenship’ document which claims that education for citizenship must promote ‘the need to base opinions, views and decisions on relevant knowledge and on a critical evaluation and balanced interpretation of evidence’ (LTS 2002: 12). The ability to interrogate beliefs, critically examine evidence and apply reason is closely connected with the skills included in the responsible citizen capacity which indicates that responsible citizens ‘make informed choices and decisions; evaluate environmental, scientific and technological issues; [and] develop informed, ethical views of complex issues’ (SEED 2004a: 12). Despite the lack of overtly ‘critical’ language in the responsible citizen capacity, the Curriculum Review Group suggested the importance of being able to subject values, responsibility and matters of social justice to critical scrutiny in a purpose of the curriculum:
to make our young people aware of the values on which Scottish society is based and so help them establish their own stances on matters of social justice and personal and collective responsibility (SEED 2004a: 11).

The ability to establish one’s own stance is inextricably linked, in my view, to the exercise of critical judgement and in a later policy recommendation, being a responsible citizen requires ‘critical and independent thought’ (HMIe 2006: 3). The approach favoured by the policy authors of implying but not specifying the development of critical abilities in relation to responsible citizenship is an interesting choice and it suggests a minimal conception of citizenship once again centred on individual ability and disposition. It seems somewhat incongruous to me that they should avoid so completely any connection between citizenship and critical skills since included in the attributes is ‘the commitment to participate responsibly’ (SEED 2004a: 12) in various spheres of civic life. I wonder how it is possible to enable learners to discern responsible participation from irresponsible participation without clear support for the centrality of critical skills in citizenship. If read closely and interpreted maximally, the responsible citizen capacity requires that citizens develop and exercise critical skills to allow them to subject aspects of their lives (both personal and public) to critical scrutiny.

The connection between responsible citizenship and leading the examined life has long been considered strong (elements were raised for discussion in Plato’s Apology, Aristotle’s Politics, St. Augustine’s Confessions and Descartes’ Meditations) but perhaps the CfE policy authors were all too aware of contemporary objections to such a conception of citizenship. An objection to a maximal interpretation of critical reasoning in CfE’s responsible citizen capacity comes from those who wish to retain democratic autonomy because it creates space for citizens to choose the extent to which they participate in democratic processes. Following this view, any demand that citizens participate or engage critical reason is ‘to go beyond the demands of liberal neutrality’ (Galston 1989: 100 in McLaughlin 1992: 241). Freedom, Galston maintains, ‘entails the right to live the unexamined life as well as examined lives’ so public education ought not to induct citizens into the belief that critical reason is an essential skill for citizenship. This view is characteristic, I assert, of the extremely minimal end of the continuum of citizenship. Yet the responsible citizen capacity, one of the four key capacities at the core of Scotland’s new curriculum seems to imply that the ability to reason critically is desirable in order to
make informed decisions and develop ethical views about complex issues. Where does the challenge from democratic autonomy leave critical reasoning and responsible citizenship?

This tension is eased if the curriculum is viewed as the vehicle through which citizens learn the skills and knowledge they require to reason and participate in society and if they retain the choice to exert these skills fully, partially or not at all at various stages throughout their lives. In such a way the capacity as currently conceived can, I think, survive this challenge since it can facilitate both minimal and maximal interpretations, although I claim that it ought to be interpreted maximally. While I agree that, to preserve democratic autonomy there ought to be no compulsion to reason critically, I consider it vital for responsible citizens to learn the skills required for critical reasoning, whether they then choose to apply them immediately and extensively or not. A sensible location for these skills to be developed, I affirm, is in the school, and as was explained in the previous chapter, critical thinking and critical literacy, both of which rely on critical reasoning ability to establish opinions and positions after careful consideration of all factors of influence in any given situation, are important elements of education for citizenship. The ability to judge the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic factors is vital to undergird responsible participation.

Participation

Just as the responsible citizen capacity is open to minimal and maximal interpretations in terms of critical reasoning, the same is true with respect to participation. The policy authors again appear to have chosen their wording with meticulous precision, perhaps eager to tread the path of least resistance in an effort to avoid as much contestation as possible from political theorists and philosophers of education. The responsible citizen capacity says that citizens must hold a ‘commitment to participate responsibly in political, economic, social and cultural life’ (SEED 2004a: 12) but does holding a commitment to participate actually motivate or involve participation? Clearly there has to be some willingness on the part of citizens to put their learning into practice. For example if, as Biesta (2008) suggests, the conception of citizenship implied in CfE is taken to correlate to Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004: 241) description of the ‘personally responsible’ citizen, such a citizen would be expected to participate by ‘picking up litter, obeying laws, staying
out of debt, contributing to food or clothing drives or volunteering to help those less fortunate in a soup kitchen or senior centre’ but as I see it, such a person could be a responsible citizen in CfE if they knew how to do these things and possessed commitment to participate but did not actually take part. The wording of the capacity, then, seems to require only a minimal interpretation of participation. Such a minimal interpretation accommodates democratic autonomy by not requiring participation (just the commitment to do so) but the validity of this conception is undermined by subsequent policy documents which, in contrast, promote active and participatory conceptions of citizenship for which a maximal interpretation is required. I now support this claim with reference to policy literature and identify some potential hazards associated with these conceptions of citizenship. Subsequently, I suggest that the philosophical contention surrounding participation and its inconsistent treatment in CfE create complications for the conception of responsible citizenship intended on Scotland’s new curriculum.

**Active and participatory citizenship**

The commitment to participate becomes connected with ‘active citizenship’ in CfE, a term which does not appear within descriptions of the responsible citizen capacity but is mentioned in other policy documents (‘Building the Curriculum 1’ [Scottish Executive 2006b: 15, 35, 36], ‘Building the Curriculum 4’ [Scottish Government 2009b: 44], and throughout the guidance document ‘Developing Global Citizens within CfE’ [LTS 2011a]) as being an important element of citizenship education. Yet it attracts very uneven treatment in the experiences and outcomes (Scottish Government 2009a); only the curricular area of Modern Languages is associated with the development of active citizenship. Through the study of Modern Languages, learners ‘gain insights into other ways of thinking and other views of the world and therefore develop a much richer understanding of active citizenship’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 172). Languages are also said to offer ‘opportunities for interdisciplinary work by providing a global dimension to a variety of curriculum areas and, particularly, to the areas of active citizenship and cultural awareness’ (Scottish Government 2009a: 176). In the development of global citizens, all curriculum areas are exhorted to encourage ‘children and young people to develop and articulate their own informed world view and become active citizens as well as creative, critical thinkers’ (LTS 2011a: 13). ‘Active citizenship’, then, appears in CfE in piecemeal
fashion without any clear explanation of what it means or how it might be best cultivated in learners. This is perhaps an indication that its meaning was not well understood by policy authors, that they were unable to reach consensus on its importance or that they desired to leave the capacity open to multiple interpretations. Analysis of its use in the four policy documents identified above suggests that active citizenship denotes moving beyond personal responsibility to active participation in which critical reasoning and collaboration with others is required. In demanding these extra dimensions (collaboration and critical reasoning), active citizenship mitigates a risk associated with a more general conception of participation: that participation can militate against responsible citizenship.

As Kymlicka and Norman argue (1994: 361), ‘emphasising participation does not yet ensure that citizens participate responsibly – that is, in a public-spirited, rather than self-interested or prejudiced way’. In fact, citizens who choose to participate vociferously in public might do so for their own gain, at the expense of ‘less powerful groups whose needs are greater’ (Enslin and White 2003: 122). Central to the conception of active citizenship is the need for learners to make choices which are informed by their critical faculties and which conform to ethical and responsible standards of conduct. I propose, then, that this challenge to participatory citizenship can be defused by stressing commitment to morality and virtues, beyond the local, which is required by maximal conceptions of citizenship. The act of participation is neither virtuous nor base by nature, rather it is the intention of the participant which is of primary significance in determining its morality. In the context of a pluralistic democracy, what is required is the concrete specification of which public virtues ought to be upheld. This represents an opportunity for the exercise of active citizenship and, as I will argue in the following chapter, I consider that the process can be facilitated by democratic deliberation. Active citizenship, then, requires a maximal interpretation of citizenship and, as reference to the critical literature attests, it goes beyond mere participation to demand a commitment to responsible participation informed by open and robust methods of democratic deliberation; ‘engaging in debate, discussion and controversy, and using skills of engaging with and arguing with alternative viewpoints’ (Ross 2008: 69) ‘in the search for possible answers’ (Brown and Fairbrass 2009: 6). This commitment to participate in controversy and deliberate with others is far removed from minimal interpretations of the capacity which stem from the focus on cultural knowledge, understanding and the possession of ‘commitment to participate responsibly’. That later

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54 It is likely that they would be acutely aware of the unpopularity of Scotland’s previous 5-14 curriculum, owing to the highly prescriptive nature of its content (Priestley and Minty 2012a, Priestley and Biesta 2013).
policy and guidance documentation provides a clear impetus towards a more ‘active’ conception of citizenship highlights the changing priorities of citizenship in CfE and indicates that, as the suite of policy documents develops, the conception of responsible citizenship is becoming increasingly ambitious, prescriptive (LTS 2011a) and less sympathetic to minimal interpretation. There are, however, some risks attached to active citizenship which make it potentially undemocratic and exclusive and which ought to be examined.

Despite being closely connected with participation in CfE, the conception of active citizenship described in CfE appears to limit qualifying acts to those performed in the public sphere. There is no mention of active citizenship in relation to activity done ‘in the private realm by way of reproduction and care of dependents’ (Enslin and White 2003: 119). This public conception of active citizenship poses the risk that activity done at home does not qualify as active and, consequently, those who actively participate in the private sphere are not seen as performing their civic duty and cannot be citizens ‘at home – at least beyond a minimal sense of citizenship’ (Enslin and White 2003: 119). There is certainly a tension here since responsible citizenship is limited to commitment to participate in ‘political, economic, social and cultural life’; the absence of any reference to private or domestic life implies that CfE has not given due consideration to this tension associated with activity. The citizen is a very complex being and requires sensitive treatment across the continuum of citizenship but particularly within maximal interpretations, such as those demanded by active citizenship. The role of the individual is inadequately developed in CfE, I suggest, since citizens are also private individuals whose situation can make participation difficult. The authors of CfE, however, appear to have insufficiently considered the ramifications of active citizenship since there is no indication of alternative ways in which citizens can participate actively in society. I caution that such an approach has the potential to marginalise the participation of some citizens and that the absence of a coherent approach to the inclusion of active citizenship on the policy agenda means that it remains open to minimal and maximal interpretation. The reluctance of the policy authors to promote the critical engagement (with others through democratic deliberation) required for the conception of active citizenship defined by Ross (2008) and Brown and Fairbrass (2009) above, in both public and private, does a disservice, I think, to schools, teachers and learners as there is less likelihood that a maximal interpretation will be pursued.
A maximal interpretation of active citizenship, though, offers exciting possibilities for an increased focus on political literacy and could accommodate increased awareness of the democratic dimensions of participation. Located ‘predominantly at the social end of the spectrum’ and lacking ‘an explicit political and democratic dimension’ Biesta (2008: 45) considers the personally responsible conception of citizenship which is implied by CfE (given that six of the seven defining features of the responsible citizen capacity focus on individual abilities and attitudes) to be inadequate for preparing citizens to participate responsibly in advancing democracy. A fundamental problem with the conception of the personally responsible citizen is that it is overly oriented to social life (for example, giving to charity, volunteering and environmental projects [LTS 2011a]) and is not sufficiently directed toward political participation. There is the danger that ‘voluntarism and kindness are put forward as ways of avoiding politics and policy’ leading to young people ‘learning that citizenship does not require democratic governments, politics, and even collective endeavours’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 243). The resultant conception of citizenship promotes inclusive and participatory ways of social interaction in a range of communities, ‘but not necessarily or explicitly in the context of political and democratic practices and processes’ (Biesta 2008: 45). Biesta, though, has perhaps been a little hasty in his condemnation. I consider that CfE provides scope for positive change in this regard since responsible citizens have ‘the commitment to participate responsibly in political life’ which creates opportunities for the teaching and learning of deeper and richer conceptions of democratic participation. ‘Developing Global citizens within Curriculum for Excellence’ ([LTS 2011a] published after Biesta’s 2008 remarks) also indicates that teachers ought to cultivate political aspects of citizenship. In their teaching, they ought to ‘demonstrate democratic principles through pupil voice and participation in all aspects of classroom practice’ (LTS 2011a: 14) while delivering ‘the knowledge, skills, values, attitudes and attributes required for children and young people to participate and contribute actively and successfully as global citizens’ (LTS 2011a: 20); perhaps the clearest indication to date that a maximal interpretation is favoured. In fulfilling such aims, I consider it vital for responsible citizens to feel empowered as political actors who have an understanding both of the opportunities and the limitations of individual political action, and who are aware that real change (affecting structures rather than simply operations within existing structures) often requires collective action through public and political initiatives. CfE does, I think, hint that the political dimensions of citizenship are important in citizenship education and this ought to become a cue for teachers to do more to promote awareness of forms of political literacy that position democratic citizenship beyond
individual responsibility. Encouragingly, the types of participation exemplified as good practice in ‘Participation and Learning’ (LTS 2007) indicate that these more ambitious aims are being targeted in response to the responsible citizen capacity in CfE and that a strongly maximal interpretation is considered desirable.

**The case for difficult citizenship and the role of rhetoric in its development**

In ‘Participation and Learning’, participation is highlighted as a priority in current Scottish educational policy:

The rationale for Curriculum for Excellence has at its core the notion of improved student participation in order to develop the four capacities: successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens and effective contributors. The same policy perspective can be found in other legislation and guidance, such as; Determined to Succeed, Better Behaviour – Better Learning, Assessment is for Learning and the Additional Support for Learning (Scotland) Act (LTS 2007: 6).

‘Improved student participation’ is not intended to mean simply increased participation but rather the examples of good practice suggest that the conception of student participation implied is undergirded by critical reasoning and used as a method of transformation with social justice as its end. In one example from the document, a pupil in Primary Seven launched a school action group to consider access needs for disabled pupils when he experienced difficulty in assisting a fellow pupil in a wheelchair to get around the school. Another example concerns a group of ‘young Gypsy Travellers from across Scotland who run workshops in schools to try to change attitudes and to challenge the discrimination that many face on a daily basis’ (LTS 2007: 41). These initiatives attest to a maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship in which learners are educated to be able to take responsibility for social and political problems which may, or may not, affect them and are equipped with appropriate tools to seek systematic solutions. This interpretation I consider to align well with ‘difficult’ (Bickmore 2005) or ‘justice-oriented’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242) citizenship. ‘Difficult’ citizenship ‘requires raising questions about the stories underlying geographic, political, and historical phenomena, and thereby disrupting the
repetition of comforting knowledges’ (Bickmore 2008: 60). ‘Disruption’ comes much closer to the concept of activity which I associate with ‘responsible’ citizenship and this view of ‘justice-oriented’ citizenship represents a paradigm shift from the law-abiding, environmentally aware and charitable activity associated with personally responsible participation. In this maximal interpretation of citizenship, students are encouraged and empowered to take effective political action since this conception of citizenship calls explicit attention ‘to matters of injustice and to the importance of pursuing social justice... by analysing and understanding the interplay of social, economic and political forces’ (Westheimer and Kahne 2004: 242). This resonates with what was, for Crick, the essence of education for citizenship, that students should have an ‘inquisitive turbulence about the manifold relationships of ideas to institutions’ (Crick 2000: 15).

In contrast to the local priorities conceived within a minimal interpretation, responsible citizenship construed maximally requires that activity is informed by the critical faculties and supported by an explicit understanding of democratic principles, values and procedures on the part of the citizen. I am not suggesting that students must, necessarily, be encouraged to start campaigns, protest or become warriors for social causes but am rather of the opinion that the ability to ask difficult questions and pursue solutions oriented to social justice form part of responsible citizenship within a political society and, as I argued above, a sensible location for the development of these skills is the school. I have shown that responsible citizenship as conceived in CfE is open to multiple interpretations and this flexibility represents exciting possibilities for increased focus on the teaching and learning of difficult citizenship in Scottish schools. It is this empowering and transformative form of citizenship which I consider has the most to offer Scottish education and democracy and which we ought to promote in a maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship. In so doing, I argue that rhetoric has a unique and valuable role to play.

Rhetoric, critical reasoning and political involvement

There are possibilities, I posit, for rhetoric to facilitate the learning and teaching of a maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship; as a pedagogical tool it can boost critical literacy and increase political involvement. I defend this position by highlighting its contribution to improvement in self expression and critical skills which, crucially, allow
citizens to articulate the complexity of their participation. The rhetorical framework thus offers a route to democratic confidence for young citizens, in that it foregrounds a range of skills and competencies which equips them with germane skills vital for responsible citizenship: the ability to deconstruct the communication of others and to construct communication which effectively expresses their views. This ability to ‘recognise and respond thoughtfully to values and value judgements that are part and parcel of political, economic, social and cultural life’ (LTS 2002: 12) was recognised as a key feature of education for citizenship as described in ‘Education for citizenship: a paper for discussion and development’ (LTS 2002). Furthermore, CfE states that the curriculum ‘must promote a commitment to considered judgement and ethical action’ and ‘should give young people the confidence, attributes and capabilities to make valuable contributions to society’ (SEED 2004a: 11). I think the teaching and learning of the rhetorical framework provides an ideal preparation for the fulfilment of these aims, since, as was shown in the previous chapter, it combines research, argument formation, justification, consideration of alternative viewpoints and effective delivery. It can act as a vehicle, I maintain, for effective self expression and a tool which facilitates active participation through the articulation of complex civic issues in a collaborative and deliberative manner. In this connection, I consider that rhetoric has the potential to empower students, make them more critically literate, build their confidence and help them come to know and ‘value their potential for positive action’ (LTS 2002: 12). The awareness of this potential and the ability to harness it is beneficial, I maintain, when undertaking the ‘disruption’ encouraged by difficult citizenship.

Political involvement, interpreted maximally, requires participation, but as was indicated above, participation can be a problematic concept. Of particular interest here, is that participation does not necessarily demand that students consider and engage with issues beyond their immediate concerns and responsibilities. I claim that rhetorical training can improve the ‘responsibility’ of citizenship because it involves reflection, articulation and deliberation. The use and development of critical skills to reflect on and articulate the reasoning behind participation not only validates the civic activity but also encourages students to think beyond their immediate rights and responsibilities to consider what participation may be required of others (either individuals or institutions) to further the social or political cause. Rhetoric furnishes learners with skills to articulate the complexity of their active participation, a facet of citizenship education which I consider we ought to
promote in the hope that when they are asked to articulate and critique their participation in, for example, local problem-solving civic initiatives, students might come to realise that activity of this nature does not confer deeply transformative effects (Ross and Munn 2008) and that their efforts can have greater impact. The ability of individuals within society to hold and articulate different conceptions of the good life, different values and different ideas about what matters to them is vital, I think, to the functioning of a democratic society and education for citizenship is linked to the development of ‘a healthy and vibrant culture of democratic participation’ (LTS 2002: 9) which helps young people ‘develop strategies for dealing effectively with controversy’ (LTS 2002: 9) as ‘controversy is normal in society and sometimes has beneficial effects’ (LTS 2002: 12). I argue that rhetoric can provide a common communicative framework for diversely positioned participants, equipping citizens with tools to articulate their dissent and reject any perceived homogeneity. This process of reflection, articulation and deliberation may, as a result, open up increased cognitive space for more detailed consideration of alternative conceptions of society and lead to a better understanding of, and commitment to, justice-oriented citizenship.

**Education for democracy in Scotland: some recommendations**

Responsible citizenship, then, is a capacity of the curriculum which is open to minimal and maximal interpretation. Upon initial reading, that six of the seven features of the capacity involve individual skills, attitudes, dispositions and abilities might suggest that a minimal or personally responsible conception of citizenship is implied, however I hold that the inclusion of ‘commitment to participate responsibly’ indicates scope for more maximal and participatory conceptions of citizenship. Participation and active citizenship are variously presented in the suite of policy documents and insights from philosophy of education show that, inadequately considered, they can endanger maximal interpretations of democracy. Having explored complications arising from personally responsible, active and participatory conceptions of citizenship I suggest that a more desirable conception of responsible citizenship for Scottish democracy is difficult or justice-oriented citizenship since these go some way to redress the deficit in political literacy (Phillips, Piper and

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55 This idea will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.
Garratt 2003, Biesta 2008) and generate scope for increased empowerment of learners as social transformers.

Democracy in Scotland needs a more robust approach to the cultivation of responsible citizens than is envisaged by minimal interpretations of the capacity. This claim is based on the distinctive nature of Scottish education, democracy and culture. As Humes (1983: 151) notes, a cohesive and enduring feature of Scottish culture is the ‘resistance to ongoing English cultural imperialism’ and in the negotiations for autonomy I argue that Scots require the skills to articulate their distinctiveness and to represent their ideas in local, national and global debates about citizenship, education and democracy. Paterson (2000) summarises the distinctive traditions of Scottish education in terms of four themes: social openness, the public character of the system, breadth, and passion for ideas. Traditionally, education in Scotland has rejected capitalist and consumerist influences and has instead been based on non-elitist, non class-based, meritocratic and egalitarian principles (Campbell 2000: 4) with concerns for ‘social fairness’ (Keating 2009: 107). Synonymous with this system is the ‘lad o’ pairts’ (Raffe 2004: 3, Freeman 2009: 328), the young man of humble background to whom education offers opportunity and advancement and who is able to rise through this democratic system. The egalitarian nature of Scottish education means that there is a commitment to everyone having the opportunity to have their say and I claim that Scottish democracy requires that young Scots should have not only knowledge of their rights and how to exercise them but they need to be equipped with skills to take action (with others or independently) ‘and to contribute informed opinions to discussion and debate’ (Deuchar 2003: 30). They need the communicative competence to engage in cultural and community development and change (Deuchar 2003: 36). The maximal interpretation I promote extends beyond pedagogical approaches which privilege the transmission of knowledge and cultivation of personal responsibility to focus on the cultivation of critical reasoning, self-expression and political participation. Therefore I affirm that the time is right to reclaim a strategy from the Classical past, more suited to the aims of justice-oriented citizenship, and my suggestion centres on the learning and teaching of rhetoric.

This chapter has indicated that citizens’ ability to articulate and explain their participation through the exercise of critical reasoning is important for a maximal interpretation of responsible citizenship. According to Aristotle, to lead the good life and to fulfil our
humanity, we must enter into the *polis* as citizens and into political relationships with other citizens. He saw politics as an activity among free citizens which concerned how they governed themselves by public debate (Crick 2008: 16) as ‘to be political and to live in a *polis* meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through violence’ (Arendt 1958: 26-27). Rhetoric, one method of operation for this communication was so successful that it became a necessary skill for participation in democracy and there is much to be gained, I maintain, from revisiting the Classical conception of responsible citizenship which was inextricably linked to critically informed oral participation. This focus on democracy, talking and citizenship will be pursued in more detail in the next chapter which further advances my claim that rhetoric can play an important role in preparing citizens for participation in democratic deliberation.
Chapter Five
Rhetoric for democratic deliberation

This chapter aims to defend the reintroduction of rhetoric by considering its potential contribution to democratic deliberation. Building on the claims made in previous chapters that rhetoric can contribute positively to the development of literacy and the critical faculties, I aim to show that the learning and teaching of rhetoric in school has the potential to inform and facilitate democratic deliberation, a skill which I claim is conducive to responsible citizenship in Scotland. This will involve examining complex philosophical issues surrounding the interplay between rhetoric, the emotions, truth and reason and, in my analysis, I engage with the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Young and Benhabib.

Central to my argument is a clear distinction between Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric and that of Plato and Kant; I emphasise that rhetoric need not be associated with vacuity of meaning or the occlusion of truth for nefarious ends. Following Aristotle, I promote a positive conception of rhetoric which is valuable to citizens as ethical and responsible individuals operating within democracy where there is a need to collaborate in civic decision making. Young (1996, 1997, 2002) acknowledges the value of rhetoric for democratic deliberation but Benhabib (1996) refutes the claim that it is of use. My argument moves beyond these positions: I contend that Benhabib has not fully considered the contribution rhetoric can make to deliberation yet I accommodate only part of Young’s suggestion regarding the use of alternative methods of communication. In addressing the objections of Kant and Plato to rhetoric, I suggest that the emotions have an important role to play in engaging reason, developing critical skills and making decisions. In this regard, I defend the position that rhetoric offers opportunities for students to learn about persuasion (and coercion) and empathy, and can help them to build narrative imagination through consideration of ‘the other’. In making this argument, I draw on Aristotle’s concept of deliberative rhetoric in combination with the speech-making framework provided by Classical rhetorical theory and assert that such a conception of rhetoric could, following Young, give a voice to the traditionally underrepresented and marginalised groups in society thereby improving equality and inclusion within deliberative democracy. I do, however, concede that a shift in deliberative culture from the consent-obsessed model favoured in the Ancient world to the discursive model preferred in the present day requires a partly revised conception of rhetoric, more relevant for current conditions. But in so presenting, I suggest that certain elements of Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric should be
retained as they have much to offer current understandings of rhetoric and democratic deliberation.

First, expanding on my interpretation of the intentions of CfE with regard to responsible citizenship, and building on the discussion in the previous chapter about the distinctiveness of Scottish democracy, I consider what space is made for democracy in CfE policy and explain why I hold democratic deliberation to be a suitable political goal for education in Scotland. Secondly, I identify ways in which rhetoric, when practised within a context of democratic deliberation, can contribute positively to the cultivation of literacy skills, critical faculties and citizenship. My argument centres on the claim that rhetoric provides an accessible, adaptable and common communicative framework which is of benefit to those deliberating within democracy. I acknowledge, however, that tensions surround this position; rhetoric has been seen as inconsistent with democratic deliberation because it is commonly associated with inequality of status and is thus accused of being exclusionary; it appeals to the emotions, not reason; it can aim at self-interest, not the common good; and it is monological and therefore may not be conducive to deliberative discussion or conversation. I raise and respond to each of these objections in turn, drawing on the theories of both Ancient philosophers and modern deliberative theorists to defend and promote the value of rhetoric in the Scottish curriculum and for society.

**Democratic education in Scotland**

‘Education for Citizenship in Scotland’ (LTS 2002: 6), a policy which predates CfE, explicitly linked the need for citizenship education to the ‘advent of the Scottish Parliament’, the establishment of which encouraged a ‘fresh focus’ on the importance of people living in Scotland ‘being able to understand and participate in democratic processes’. Concerns about ‘disaffection and disengagement from society’ (LTS 2002: 6) led the review group to conclude that education had a ‘key role’ to play in fostering a modern democratic society, ‘whose members have a clear sense of identity and belonging, feel empowered to participate effectively in their communities and recognise their roles and responsibilities as global citizens’ (LTS 2002: 7). Despite this clear link between citizenship and democracy in 2002 policy documentation, there is no mention of democracy in CfE’s ‘responsible citizen’ capacity (nor in any of the other three). In fact,
‘democracy’ appears only once in all six CfE policy documents released prior to 2011. The sole reference comes in ‘Building the Curriculum 1’ which states that the Social Studies curriculum area can teach about ‘decision making in a democracy’ (Scottish Executive 2006b: 37) as part of the ‘People in Society’ topic. The complete absence of ‘democracy’ or explicit mention of democratic aims in the vision and purpose of the curriculum documentation is a surprising, some might say, worrying, omission. The omission is especially strange when considered alongside the multiple references to democracy and democratic citizenship contained in the guidance document, ‘Developing Global citizens within CfE’ (LTS 2011a), which is very clear about the democratic goals of citizenship education inspired by the new curriculum: in facilitating the development of citizens now, ‘the practitioner nurtures an active, democratic and participatory ethos’ (LTS 2011a: 17) by utilising a ‘variety of approaches’[56] to learning which make connections to real-life contexts’ where ‘the learner participates in democratic processes’ (LTS 2011a: 16). Teachers should ‘encourage democratic and participative methodologies in the learning and teaching of global citizenship’ (LTS 2011a: 13).

The guidance document, then, makes it clear that teachers have a role to play by modelling democracy in their teaching methods for the cultivation of global citizens. It seems incongruous to me that a rich understanding of, and commitment to participate in, democracy is desirable for global citizens but is beyond the standard required for responsible citizens. I find this disparity interesting. Biesta (2008: 47) comments that the ‘framework for education for citizenship is rather implicit about its normative orientations and political choices’, perhaps to maximise its appeal to a broad political and ideological spectrum. As was highlighted in Chapter One, such vagueness does not help teachers or students, though, as they are left questioning for what sort of society the curriculum needs to prepare citizens. If the CfE policy and guidance documents are taken holistically, as a suite of related policy publications, I consider that CfE points broadly (though frequently implicitly) towards democracy as its political goal despite lacking philosophical and empirical bases for this perspective. As I showed in the previous chapter, the policy authors expected that engagement with the curriculum would equip students with the skills necessary to participate actively and responsibly in society. The LTS (2011a) guidance

[56] The approaches to learning are: outdoor learning, active learning, creativity, ICT in education, collaborative and co-operative learning.
document is instructive in this regard. One of the key principles for developing global citizens is to:

develop an awareness and understanding of engagement in democratic processes and be able to participate in critical thinking and decision making in schools and communities at local, national and international level (LTS 2011a: 14).

Alongside this awareness and understanding of democratic processes, ‘our democratic societies need creative people who recognise the importance and value of participation and making their voices heard’ (LTS 2011a: 8). One way in which I propose this aim can be fulfilled is through the promotion of democratic deliberation, informed and facilitated by the teaching and learning of rhetoric. Rhetorical training supports the creation of useful discourse by citizens, and provides the tools and perspectives that enable democratic audiences to evaluate, and critique, the discourses they encounter, skills which I consider essential for responsible citizens, successful learners, confident individuals and effective contributors in Scottish democracy.

**Democratic deliberation**

According to Bohman (1998), Dryzek (2000), Chambers (2003) and others, democratic theory has taken a ‘deliberative turn’ (Hansen 2012: 12). Deliberation is conceived of as a process in which arguments on both sides of a problem or issue are considered by members of the public who participate in decision making on matters of relevance and importance to public life, as equals. It assumes that no one can determine beforehand what the right answer to the given political question is; and therefore, ‘a prima facie duty exists to hear different viewpoints and to give them, and those who present them, the sort of respect we would ask for ourselves’ (Bentley 2004: 115). Deliberation offers citizens with opposing views the opportunity to explain and justify the foundations of their beliefs in an effort to transform the alternative opinions held by fellow deliberators and in so doing

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58 Hansen (2012: 20-21) provided empirical data which support this claim. There were no academic articles published on deliberative democracy before 1989. Between 1989 and 1995, there were nine. In the period 1996-2010, there were 508, published across 39 different academic fields.
enable all sides to reach new and acceptable positions for collective action (McDonald 2012: 200). Importantly, participating in public deliberation of this sort can be seen as constituting citizenship (Asen 2004: 189) since individuals become citizens by discursively - and I suggest rhetorically - engaging one another collaboratively and critically in the public sphere. Having to articulate your position, listen to others, adjust your position and formulate new positions exercises the skills I have hitherto connected with the teaching and learning of rhetoric: literacy (particularly listening and speaking), critical literacy and critical thinking. In Athens, the practice of democracy was predicated on the assumption that citizens possessed the capacity to reason together, in public (as well as in private), and that the results of those deliberations would (in general and over time) conduce to the common good. Composing, delivering, criticising and judging arguments are skills at the core of democratic deliberation, I argue, and the exercise of these cross-curricular skills ‘promotes democratic practice immediately’ (Ivie 2002: 277) and provides an ideal opportunity for students to use their rhetorical knowledge for the purpose of civic participation. As was argued in Chapters Three and Four, the linguistic and analytical skills studied as part of rhetorical education contribute positively to the cultivation of competence and confidence in civic participation and the production of citizens who can critically assess the complex dimensions of democratic decision making. Ober (2005: 130) reminds us that the legacy left to us by Classical Greece has much to offer our contemporary understanding of deliberation: then, as now, deliberating ‘meant listening as well as speaking; accepting good arguments as well as making them’.

**Deliberative rhetoric**

Aristotle, in addition to his definition of rhetoric discussed in Chapter Two (‘the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever’ [Rhetoric 1356a2]) wrote that the function of rhetoric is to ‘deal with things about which we deliberate’ (1357a12) and in the Nicomachean Ethics, he describes deliberation as a kind of excellence of thinking (1142b15) used when we deliberate about future things which are in our power, fluid, open to change and not fixed (1112b7). In Politics (1.1253a2) he claimed that we are political animals and as such our happiness as individuals depends to a great extent on what happens in our community. Young et al. (2010: 433) endorse Aristotle’s conclusion that we are political animals and suggest that
'we must reframe politics as our job description’. In the Classical Athenian conception of the *polis*, discursive engagement in civic life was inextricably linked to the duty of citizenship and the process of democratic deliberation is one aspect of Athenian political life which I propose warrants reconsideration in the current climate. Aristotle claimed that the political community is centred around communication with each other concerning what we think is ‘advantageous and harmful, and therefore just and unjust’ (*Politics* 1253a3). Democratic deliberation necessarily involves speech and argument because it requires the sharing of our reasoning, and the means by which we communicate our reasoning to each other in public deliberation is the particular form of persuasive speech Aristotle called deliberative rhetoric (*Rhetoric* 1.3.1358b5). Thus for Aristotle, deliberation is a kind of argumentation or collective thinking in which a group is trying to decide on the best course of action in a situation requiring choice but also involving uncertainty. Deliberative rhetoric seeks to persuade us that one course of action rather than another will best serve the common good or advantage (*Rhetoric* 1351b). As such, it has two basic elements: some form of public reasoning, in which citizens exchange their views about matters of common interest; and an opportunity to consider together this exchange of opinion and argument to reach decisions about which collective action to support. In the Greek model, deliberative rhetoric was integral to the political life of the *polis*; it was an art which was meant for everyday politics within the citizen body and was necessary for the improvement and advancement of civic life, minor or major.

In demanding the construction, analysis and adaptation of argument, Aristotle’s conception of deliberative rhetoric could be viewed as a tool for communicative empowerment which has the potential to lead individuals and groups to action. For this reason, and given the worrying backdrop of civic disengagement (Dewey 1927, Putnam 2000, Putnam and Feldstein 2003, Hogan 2008, Nussbaum 2010, Biesta 2011) I consider that the time is right to re-evaluate the possible contribution of rhetoric to democratic education. Dewey (1927: 208) argued that the means of political learning lay in communication, ‘the essential need’, he wrote, ‘is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.’ In the new millennium, the USA is still trying to address this deficiency in its education system: Putnam (2000) lists many initiatives underway in the USA to improve civic engagement, replenish the nation’s social capital and to rebuild deliberative communities. Surprisingly,

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59 By this I mean the requirement to adapt content and delivery mid-speech in response to audience reaction.
however, Hogan (2008: 76) records that few of these efforts have emphasised the most fundamental requirement of a sustainable deliberative democracy: citizens with the communicative competencies needed to participate in civic life. If citizens are to participate competently and confidently, it is vital that they know how to articulate their own views and how to listen to others.

The best answers to problems of political alienation and civic disengagement are to be found not in new information technologies, but in a revival of some of the oldest traditions in rhetorical theory and practice (Hogan 2008: 77).

I concur with Hogan’s position and suggest that the teaching and learning of rhetoric is complementary to the successful enactment of democratic deliberation. Aristotle’s conception of deliberative rhetoric, I believe, has potential benefits for democratic education in Scotland and while I do not hold that rhetorical training is a necessary condition of citizenship, I defend that it has much to offer the cultivation of responsible citizens, particularly through increased linguistic and critical competence in deliberative contexts. There are, however, objections to this view from theorists who consider rhetoric unsuitable for deliberative purposes. I intend to consider four of the most challenging objections to my claim that rhetoric contributes positively to democratic deliberation and these I shall now address as challenges from; equality, emotions, self interest and monology.

**The challenge from equality**

Norval (2007: 65), among others, notes that arguments for equality are central to democratic deliberation as we must treat each other as equal partners, ‘individuals must be given the space to speak, and we must listen to each other, and justify our positions to one another’ (Norval 2007: 22). Historically, rhetoric, as a method of communication, has been considered unequal since in Classical Greece only those who were free-born male citizens were permitted to participate in public discussions and in Rome rhetoric arguably became a tool of the elite to manipulate the commoners into voting a particular way in judicial and

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deliberative contexts. In both Greece and Rome, women, slaves and foreigners were voiceless; they had no political rights and were helpless to effect any change in their positions. Hence the restriction of rhetorical education and practice to learned men might be seen as a contributory factor to the ongoing suppression of already marginalised members of society. Modern criticisms of the use of rhetoric in deliberation object to these origins which seem undemocratic by modern standards and lambast its use by, largely, wealthy, well-educated, Caucasian men with a particular personal interest, these being found primarily among the politicians of developed, Western nations. There are a number of intertwined issues which need to be untangled, here, to properly evaluate rhetoric’s alleged incompatibility with equality in democratic deliberation. How does rhetoric fit with argumentation and is there just one acceptable method of communication within deliberative contexts? If there are multiple methods, what value is added by the rhetorical framework? Aiming at persuasion and most effective in conflictive environments, can rhetoric be reconciled with the democratic aims of deliberation and its commitment to equality of participation and influence? It is to these questions that my argument now turns.

Benhabib holds that there is just one accepted form of communication within deliberative democracy: critical argumentation (1996: 82). Her stance here echoes Habermas (1993: 163) who held that argumentation was ‘the only truly legitimate mode of discursive communication as it renders the deliberative process rational and confers on it authority’. She defends this position by privileging the peculiar rhetorical structure of the rule of law and insisting that the moral ideal of impartiality is a regulative principle which should govern not only our deliberations in public but also the articulation of reasons by public institutions (1996: 83).

She suggests that without such a focussed approach to the equality and impartiality of communication, the open justification of opinions and the admission of reasons and motivations behind particular stances, neither the ideal of the rule of law nor reasoned deliberation can be sustained. Benhabib’s position is contrary to that of Young (1997) who argues that such a restricted approach within deliberation is exclusionary. She considers that it attempts to homogenise and neutralise what differentiates us as participants in the
deliberative process and hence negates the distinctive situated knowledge and understanding that diversely positioned participants can bring to the deliberative process (1996, 1997). She advocates a move beyond deliberative democracy to what she terms ‘communicative democracy’ (1997: 60) where the uniformity and impartiality of communication are abandoned in favour of a more inclusive model of communication which accommodates social and cultural difference. Young justifies this position by highlighting that the ‘norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people’ (1997: 63) and proposes ‘three elements that a broader conception of communicative democracy requires in addition to critical argument: greeting, rhetoric and storytelling’ (1997: 69). These, she suggests, recognise the situated nature of the speakers and ‘supplement argument by providing ways of speaking across difference in the absence of significant shared understandings’ (1997: 69). In promoting more inclusive methods of communication within communicative democracy, I consider that Young’s selection of rhetoric is of particular interest. Whereas Benhabib discounts it from democratic deliberation because it moves people to action ‘without having to render an account of the bases upon which it induces people to engage in certain courses of action rather than others’ (1996: 83), Young recognises its positive capacity to ‘get and keep attention’ and to situate the ‘speaker, audience, and occasion’ (Young 1997: 71) which, she holds, serves a connecting function 61.

These divergent positions concerning rhetoric stem from brief discussions of the subject by both Benhabib (1996, 2002) and Young (1996, 1997, 2002); elements of the position of each are commendable but I consider that there is scope for a deeper interrogation of the issues surrounding their divergence. Like Benhabib, I will advance that critical argumentation has an important role to play as a method of communication within democratic deliberation but will argue that alone, it is not enough. If we lose rhetoric, as Benhabib suggests, I claim that we lose something important from citizen exchange and citizen education. Following Young, I will suggest that it is necessary to engage and embrace difference when communicating with the ‘other’ within democracy and that

61 This connection is informed ‘by historic-mythical narratives, as well as by more personal memories of life in the community’ (Bentley 2004: 130) which play an important part in forming identity and discourse within democratic dialogue. There is a schism, then, between those who consider that deliberation takes place between people who are basically the same (for whom the restriction of speaking style to critical argumentation limits the negative impact of difference) and those who acknowledge that citizens are not uniformly positioned (for whom self-expression is considered to be matter of personal preference).
accounts which include other forms of expression are superior to Benhabib’s. However, following Benhabib, I question the validity of Young’s recommendation of storytelling and greeting as suitable communicative media for public deliberation, focussing instead on the educative benefits of rhetoric which are, I think, more central to democracy. In an elaboration of Young’s position, I defend rhetoric’s capacity to reach ‘the other’ by focussing on the opportunity it presents to participants within deliberation for the cultivation of empathy and narrative imagination through *ethopoeia* and *refutatio*.

Benhabib may have prematurely discounted rhetoric, I suggest, without fully appreciating that critical argumentation is a necessary preliminary stage in the speech making process. I contend that rhetoric is thus compatible, at least in part, with the focus on critical argumentation she proposes. *Confirmation* required that orators present logical arguments supported with evidence to support their position (Cicero, *de Invenzione* 1.24-41; Cicero, *de Oratore* 3.52-201; Quintilian, *Instituto Oratoria* 5.1-12). If critical argumentation is viewed as a subsidiary skill of rhetorical competence, there is little conflict with ‘contemporary deliberationalists [who] tend to think that there is only one right way to conduct a reasonable discussion, only one acceptable way to talk’ (Shiffman 2004: 110). Because the rhetorical framework presents a unified method of communication, I maintain that deliberators are more likely to experience equality in representation, participation and influence than if Young’s alternative communicative methods of storytelling and greeting are accommodated.

I acknowledge that greeting can act as a lubricant for discussion and can welcome disengaged groups into deliberation but I do not consider it to be a profound ingredient in the deliberative process. Storytelling can certainly make contributions to deliberation although it may have more of a role to play in association or exemplification than in argumentation. In evaluating the implications of the story, the plurality of deliberators and their diverse cultural and narrative understanding may actually involve them constructing their own internal explanatory arguments which might undermine the attempt at improving understanding across diversity, although it could simultaneously contribute to improved equality in communicative *representation*. Benhabib (1996: 83) notes that democratic deliberation requires ‘discursive language which appeals to commonly shared and accepted public reasons’ and identifies that greeting would produce arbitrariness since the power of a greeting can be hard to detect and that storytelling could lead to capriciousness since
there will be those who cannot understand the story. While I do not doubt that some people may feel most able to communicate within deliberative settings using greeting or storytelling, I concur with Benhabib (1996) in identifying that there are risks attached to encouraging such approaches, including the spread of confusion and misinterpretation among deliberators since I contend that there remains a need for argumentation at some level in all forms of deliberative communication. Both greeting and storytelling have their place within deliberation but of the three elements of communication which Young (1997) suggests as necessary supplements to argumentation for deliberation, I consider rhetoric to be the most substantial. Rhetoric, then, ought to be the first step in preparing Scottish citizens for democratic deliberation and we ought not, initially, to encourage the alternative types of discourse Young wants to accommodate. This position is motivated by my primary concern; what we teach in the classroom prepares students for life beyond and, in this regard, I consider the purpose of democratic education to be to induct everybody into reasoned critical argument.

Rhetoric can minimise perplexity within deliberation, I propose, since it offers a communicative method which combines critical argumentation (Benhabib’s chosen method) and some of the more inclusive elements Young suggests. In addition to critical argumentation, rhetoric promises an additional advantage which I consider merits attention in response to Benhabib’s rejection; by necessarily regarding, articulating and responding to the positions of ‘the other’, it enables a connection between speaker and audience which is enhanced by the consideration of emotions, narrative imagination and empathy. Whereas critical argumentation is associated with the production of appeals to reason and logic based on evidence about things known, rhetoric involves persuasive argumentation in conflictive environments where uncertainty abounds. Matters for discussion within democratic deliberation tend to involve disagreement regarding how best to proceed collectively when the eventual outcome is unknowable. Rhetoric, then, through its persuasive appeal to the emotions in reaching consensus is more suited to deliberation than critical argumentation alone which presumes that one argument can be conclusive and final when the subject matter is unknown, a position which Aristotle thought was untenable (Rhetoric 1. 112b7).

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62 The extent to which consensus ought to be regarded as the end of deliberation is contested (Bohman 1996, Young 1997, Chambers 2003, 2009, Dryzek 2010). Clearly, citizens need to make decisions but if consensus is required, it is likely that the most dominant participants in deliberation will ‘win’. This endangers the inclusive nature of the process.
Classical rhetorical theory represents another improvement on critical argumentation, I contend, because the inclusion of *refutatio* (refutation of opponent’s argument) as one of the parts of speech requires that the speaker consider opposing positions and, after articulating them, respond to them in a critically informed way. In many cases, this involves the use of *ethopoeia*, a technique which required orators to put themselves in the place of others and give a speech as that other character. The obligatory process of ‘becoming the other’ (Cicero, *de Inventione* 1.42-51, Quintilian, *Instituto Oratoria* 5.13), represents for contemporary deliberative democracy a valuable opportunity to engage with the thoughts and feelings of marginalised and oppositional groups and should lead to improved mutual understanding and respect between participants in deliberative settings. In this sense, rhetoric goes some way to cultivating narrative imagination and empathy which may contribute to the transformation of original position which Young considered important to the discursive process (1997: 68).

**The transformative potential of rhetoric**

That members of deliberative communities are diversely positioned is clear and Benhabib’s concept of ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ recognises that ‘within discourses, each should have the same right to various speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the moral conservation’ (2002: 107). It is difficult, though, to balance such a notion of egalitarian reciprocity with her preference for critical argumentation as the uniform method of communication, as within critical argumentation there are bound to be variances in citizens’ argumentative ability (if it can be learned through experience, we can foresee a general increase in ability over time). Diversity in individual experience can, in turn, contribute to the perception of authoritativeness in a deliberative forum and we can reasonably see that members of the community with both more life experience and more argumentative ability will have a more robust sense of which speech acts are useful and which are incompatible with deliberative consensus. Critical argumentation can be taught through reference to logic, literacy and causality but I contend that rhetoric offers a structured, defined and accessible framework, which provides

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63 This is Nussbaum’s term and encompasses a broad meaning including ‘cultivating powers of imagination that are essential to citizenship... [and] the capacity for sympathetic imagination which will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different from ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and other, but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us’ (1997: 85).
a more cohesive practical communicative solution, offering particular value to those who are traditionally poorly represented within deliberative contexts.

In subversion of the view that rhetoric is a tool for perpetuating inequality I agree with Crowley and Hawhee (2012: 5) who claim instead that it offers an avenue to ‘rectifying power inequities among citizens’. In this regard, it can empower them ‘to move from being governed to having agency’ (Hauser 2008: 255) and can equip them with the capacity to negotiate across difference. Beyond the ‘bonding’ function of rhetoric outlined by Dryzek (2010: 327) (this concerns communication between people who are similar in social background, therefore not inclined to air differences and as a result associate only with those who agree with them), I consider that rhetoric can be viewed as a bridge ‘between people with different social characteristics and backgrounds’ (Dryzek 2010: 327) thereby improving the equality of opportunity to participate in discursive fora. A bridge is necessary, I suggest, because in deliberative democracy, conflict is inevitable. ‘For a rhetorical democracy to flourish, controversies should be welcomed, encouraged, stimulated, and even organised in order to implicate ordinary citizens in decision making’ (McDonald 2012: 201). A healthy society is, in my view, marked by conflictive relations and rhetoric serves as an invention resource for establishing and negotiating the ‘relations by which it continually produces itself’ (Hauser 2008: 240). Conflicts among groups and classes permeate modern democratic societies and conflictive relationships represent the origin of rhetoric; they ‘are the wellspring from which rhetorical practices flow’ (Hauser 2008: 238). The rhetorical framework, then, can act as a bridge between those traditionally trapped in asymmetrical power relations to communicate using a uniform method: it represents an opportunity to link differently situated and differently disposed actors when they ‘call into question the opinions of others... bring them into the light for examination and negotiation, and... listen to each other’ (Crowley and Hawhee 2012: 5). I see a rich vein of training within communication and citizenship education for rhetoric to represent freedom from victimisation and the repositioning of those who have historically been unheard, as well as those whose early education, upbringing, and cultural roots have discouraged active participation in civic life.

64 More will be said in the next chapter about the conception of rhetoric which could fulfil this aim. While the Classical rhetorical theory and speech-making process are highly instructive in ‘bridging’ rhetoric, Latin and Greek have little to offer the construction of contemporary deliberative communication. Hence I propose that communications are delivered in English but in concert with the Classical model. In helping build this skill, both Classical and modern speeches (for example those of Winston Churchill or Barack Obama in Appendix A) could be usefully analysed.
In time, this bridging function of rhetoric could have positive ramifications including: narrowing the gap in social cohesion and improving confidence and competence in civic engagement, two areas which were marked for improvement in Scotland by the 2007 OECD report. Hauser (2008: 244) suggests that ‘equity is essential to maintaining horizontal relations among citizens participating in a deliberative process that is more than nominally democratic’ and rhetoric, I posit, because of the structured nature of the framework, widens access and grants equity to the contributions of all citizens in deliberative processes. Its contribution to understanding ‘the other’ and articulating their position necessarily involves critical engagement at an emotional level which contributes positively, I argue, to the cultivation of narrative imagination and empathy. However, this could also be seen as a negative feature of rhetoric within democratic deliberation if speakers inappropriately appeal to the emotions and passions of fellow citizens rather than their reason. That rhetoric includes persuasive appeal not just to reason, but also to passions, desires and appetites makes it eminently useful to democratic deliberation, I will suggest. Following Aristotle and Young, I claim that the emotions play a vital role in civic decision making and that the centrality of emotionally persuasive appeals to rhetorical communication is positive both for reaching consensus in deliberative settings and for helping citizens to develop their critical faculties.

**The challenge from the emotions**

Within Classical rhetorical theory, the orator can engage and employ his own emotions, and those of his audience, in three ways. First there is the gauging of the audience’s emotion by the orator, in which he considers how he might best align his words to successfully persuade his listeners to come to accept a specific claim. When an orator invents new arguments, he ought to begin the process within the citizens’ opinions rather than outside them, Aristotle (Rhetoric 2.1) suggests, since through the study of the structure of people’s characters and emotions he could find deliberative pathways within which to best frame his arguments. Young considers rhetoric to be of benefit in this regard since it involves ‘orienting one’s claims and arguments to the particular assumptions, history, and idioms of [the] audience’ (Young 2002: 65). Secondly, through the delivery of ethopoeia and refutatio the orator uses ‘empathy to figure out what his audience is thinking about an issue, what they accept on the issue, or can be brought to accept’ (Walton 2004:
and begins to engage and stir up suitable emotions through his performance. I made
the argument above that the need for speakers to consider both the sympathetic and the
dissenting voices within the communities in which they communicate improves their
awareness of the ‘other’ within contemporary democratic deliberation. Successful public
speakers, then, will generally have to measure the emotional temperature of their audience,
incorporate corresponding sensitivity into their arguments and acknowledge that the
audience’s emotional position plays an important role in the argumentative process.
Thirdly, the final stage in the emotional process, the Classical orator selects the appropriate
level of language (for example, embellished style [ornate], fitting [apte] or modest
[decore]), shaping the speech to the audience’s perceived emotional needs and displaying
emotion himself, commensurate with the content and aims of his speech. Connolly urges
that the appeal to and display of emotion ought not to be seen as ‘extra seasoning’ (2007:
147), but rather a crucial step in the communication of ideas.

For Plato, this appeal to the audience’s particular emotional needs was deceitful and
rhetoric’s propensity to delight and please the people’s appetites made it nothing more than
a form of flattery (Gorgias 463b) or manipulation which was incompatible with reason.
The adaptation of oneself to the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of an audience amounted
to trickery and was inconsistent with the behaviour of a good citizen (Gorgias 503b). Thus
rhetoric was, for Plato, a type of speech which he likened to the art of cooking; used to
cater to, and to indulge, the undisciplined and restless appetites of the people (Gorgias
464b). It created the appearance of grace and pleasure in the conscious embellishments of
speaking and performing by appealing to the senses, an appeal thought inappropriate for
rational speech (Gorgias 472c). In Plato’s view, the philosopher uses speech to instruct,
and thus to improve the listener, aiming at what is best for them by appealing to reason
which acts as the guide and ruler of the soul by ‘disciplining the appetites and controlling
the passions’ (Fontana 2004: 42). Rhetoric, in contrast, he saw as ‘knack’ (Gorgias 462c),
‘a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words’ (Phaedrus 261a) and he saw
rhetoricians as men who ‘steal away our souls with their embellished words’ (Menexenus
235a); in this way, he despised the ‘negative effect of rhetoric’s persuasive appeals on the
capacity of auditors to exercise rational judgement’ (Shiffman 2004: 101).

Plato’s concerns were shared by Kant who also complained of rhetoric’s incompatibility
with reason. Conceiving of rhetoric as a dialectic which borrows from poetry only so much
as is needful to win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgement and to deprive them of their freedom (Kant, *Critique of Judgement* 53. 172), he believed that rhetoric ‘moved men like machines’ (*Critique of Judgement* 5. 328n). In contrast, reason ‘is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto’ (Kant, *Critique of pure reason*, A738-739, B766-767). In this conception, the appeal to the emotions of the audience acts as a barrier to reason, hindering citizens’ exercise of freedom. The criticism of rhetoric by Plato and Kant, that it is irrational, anticipates more recent arguments by some advocates of deliberative democracy, who contend that true democracy is characterised by reasoned public discourse. Habermas stated that deliberations should be determined ‘by the force of the better argument’ so that participants in deliberation are ‘required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them or criticising them’ (McCarthy 1975: 108), a position which draws on Plato’s condemnation of rhetoric for not explaining the reason anything happens, and is clearly the impetus for Benhabib’s criticism of rhetoric highlighted above. Certainly, the modern conception of democratic deliberation rests on the assumption that when a group of people get together and deliberate, if they weigh the relative merits of both sides of an issue thoughtfully and carefully, the conclusion they arrive at is reason-based and supported by objective evidence (Walton 2004: 303).

Hence democratic deliberation in current conditions becomes a rational basis for action. In the Ancient world, however, deliberation was seen as representing an important framework of argumentation in its own right, including appeal to the passions and emotions to support a conclusion and I consider that this represents an approach to deliberation which is worthy of reconsideration. With reference to Aristotle’s conception of deliberative rhetoric, I intend to contest the position taken by Plato, Kant, Habermas and Benhabib by suggesting that rhetoric can helpfully supplement critical argumentation for democratic deliberation because the appeal to emotions improves judgement by engaging practical reason and providing richer opportunity for the development of critical faculties.

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65 As was explained earlier in this chapter, Benhabib comments that rhetoric ‘moves people and achieves results without having to render an account of the bases upon which it induces people to engage in certain courses of action rather than others’ (1996: 83).
Aristotle argued that judgement about the possible courses of action presented in the public sphere ought not to exclude partiality and passion as, together with the emotions, they have important roles to play in deliberative situations (Rhetoric 2.1378a). He held that emotions such as pity, shame and friendship were connected to our capacity to judge issues and choose courses of action (Rhetoric 1378a22-24). The political emotions of anger, honour, and their relatives help give citizens the mixture of ‘sympathy and detachment’ (Rhetoric 1368b-1369a) that make for good practical judgement. His theory centres around the conception that emotions and reason are not separate components of the psyche but rather that neither can operate without the influence of the other (or can even be made to do so entirely [Rhetoric 1356a]). Following Aristotle, Nussbaum (1986: 214) supports the cooperation of reason and emotion and warns that

if we starve and suppress emotions and appetites, it may be at the cost of so weakening the entire personality that it will be unable to act decisively; perhaps it will cease to act altogether.

This view conflicts with the approach taken by proponents of democratic deliberation who, by adopting critical argumentation as the only acceptable method of communication, treat citizens as if they were solely intellects, without emotions. This approach is not conducive to effective decision making within deliberation, however, because, as Cicero noted, ‘men decide far more problems by hate, love, lust, rage, sorrow, joy, hope, fear, illusion, or some other inward emotion than by reality, or authority or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute’ (de Oratore 2.178). Emotions engage judgement rather than obscure it and I hold (following Aristotle, Cicero and Young) that citizens’ decision-making capacity is enhanced by the collaboration of reason and emotion, a position made impossible by the purely rational deliberation required by Plato, Habermas and Benhabib.

Furthermore, the judgements we make cannot, I think, be conceptualised as the outcome of a single motivational cause, but are rather the result of a wide and variable combination of competing motivations. That rhetoric requires an emotional connection between the speaker and the audience often reveals these motivations and situated interests and provides opportunities for the development of critical faculties. Citizens come to view each other not as passive consumers but as autonomous deliberators who are deserving of respect and whose practical judgement deserves to be engaged, not just, I maintain,
through logical reasoned argumentation but by speakers who stir up their emotions to execute particular emotional reactions from them. Exposure to persuasive and emotive appeals of this sort is a positive attribute of rhetoric within deliberation precisely because it necessitates that citizens engage their critical faculties and employ their powers of practical reasoning in the realisation that ‘empathy, emotion and reason are all necessary ingredients’ (Connolly 2007: 148) in making judgement and that deliberative decision-making should be informed not just by critical argumentation but by all aspects of personality and experience. Aristotle repeats in *Nicomachean Ethics* (10.9), that the best deliberative judgements are made when individual emotional responses are subjected to criticism by the rational awareness of circumstances and events. This does not equate to emotion being dominated by reason but rather requires that the germane faculties work in tandem. That rhetorical communication affords importance to persuasive appeal to the emotions allows participants in democratic deliberation to develop critical skills in analysing ‘the various ways something can be said, which colour and condition its substantive content’ (Young 2002: 64-65) and this presents opportunities, I maintain, for richer critical analysis. But what if speakers do not have the good of the community as their core purpose? The abuse of rhetoric for self-seeking ends will now be examined.

**The challenge from self-interest**

Having argued that appeal to the emotions is a positive attribute of rhetoric and useful when used in democratic deliberation, I now sound a note of caution by identifying that there are hazards involved with excessive appeals to emotion. If used inappropriately, rhetoric can be made to serve self interest and persuasion can work against the common good, both outcomes which are incompatible with the aim of democratic deliberation. By outlining Plato’s concerns in this regard, I will show that there are risks involved for commitment to reason and truth but contend, following Aristotle, that rhetoric itself is, indeed, compatible with the search for truth (and by extension the common good). I claim that the risks are inextricably linked to the ethics of the speaker and audience. Democratic education, I propose, ought to include some training in civic virtues and I maintain that rhetoric can provide a useful forum for the acquisition, exercise and development of excellence in such virtues as thinking and speaking for noble purposes within deliberative democracy.
Plato expresses concern that rhetoric aims at the gratification of citizens and claims that by neglecting the common good and privileging self-interest, orators treat ‘the people like children, attempting only to please them’ (Gorgias 502d). In aiming to please the passions and appetites, rather than to instruct or improve the mind and soul, Plato treats rhetoric as a matter of obscurantism and denies that it is an art, claiming that it is but an imitation of an art, in that it does not rest upon a true knowledge of its object (Gorgias 453a). He points to the ability of orators to argue both sides of an issue as evidence for their lack of true knowledge. Because, for Plato, reason leads to a single, simple truth, he concluded that the orators’ ability to use clever words for diverse positions goes against reason and hinders the discovery of truth.

He whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes unjust... he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite (Phaedrus 261d).

In such a way, then, Plato thought that orators used rhetoric to make ‘the weaker account look the stronger’ (Schiappa 1999: 54) in an effort to improve their own individual position within society, ‘to save one’s own skin to wrest a liberty which is only license, and to take power at any cost’ (Gorgias 466c, 486a-d) (Pernot 2005: 47). Socrates even has the Sophists Polus and Callicles admit (Gorgias 466c, 486a-d) that political rhetoric is designed ‘to pursue the competitive advantage of the orator, at the expense of his adversaries and auditors, by means of duplicitous, emotionally manipulative speeches’ (Shiffman 2004: 99). Such a disregard for truth is potentially problematic for contemporary theories of democratic deliberation which aim at the common good and rely on

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66 The abuse of rhetoric was not limited to the Sophists in Classical Athens. Cicero tells how orators sometimes used ethnically objectionable techniques which philosophers would find ‘not only wanting in discretion but positively unseemly and disgraceful’ (de Oratore 1.53.227). The space of politics in Ancient Rome, more than in Greek democracy, was filled by dispute, contingency, inconsistency, unreason, and passion hence why Roman politics were awash with orators who sought to distort the public good by fooling citizens into allowing the interest of some partial association to claim their loyalties rather than thinking of the good of the whole. This individualistic or ‘interest-based’ model (Healy 2011: 297) was, at times, used as a technique of deception: ‘Cicero had boasted that he had thrown dust in the eyes of the jury in the case of Cluentius’ (Quintilian, Instituti Oratoria 2.17.21).

67 At this stage it is important to acknowledge that a considerable number of tensions surround the extent to which democratic deliberative theory aims at justice and/or truth and the extent to which it relies on shared moral commitments and/or reason (Benhabib 1996, Knight and Johnson 1997, Hauser and Benoit-Barne 2002, Hicks 2002, Young 2002, Chambers 2003, 2009). I do not propose to address these issues in detail since they are not of primary importance to the present study. Instead, I restrict my discussion to an exploration of ways in which the potential abuse of rhetoric for the purpose of self-interest can be reconciled with its use as the most desirable method of communication within democratic deliberation.
commitments to inclusion, equality and reason from participants (Hicks 2002). What must be remembered here, though, is that Polus, Callicles and Gorgias were Sophists who were committed to the pursuit of power without regard to any ethical motive (Gorgias 452e), thus they do not represent the best use of rhetoric in society. Plato describes rhetoric as a producer of persuasion (Gorgias 453a) used by orators who behave like vultures, swooping on and attacking vulnerable prey\(^68\) (Garsten 2009: 177). Within such a conception of rhetoric, the orator has no need to know the truth about that which he speaks, rather he simply has to discover a ‘technique of persuasion so as to appear among the ignorant to have more knowledge than the expert’ (Gorgias 459d). He, therefore, has no knowledge of what is right or wrong, noble or base, just or unjust; he is simply pleasing the people and pretending to be knowledgeable for the sake of securing his own ends.

Plato’s concerns regarding rhetoric’s potential to deceive are shared by Kant who viewed rhetoric as ‘the art of deluding by means of a fair semblance’ (Critique of Judgement 53). In the forum of civil law, he considered rhetoric unsuitable because it allowed for ‘talking people over and of captivating them for the advantage of any chance person’ (Kant 1951: 171). For Kant, as for Plato, it was through an appeal to the passions that the orators moved, and deceived their audiences. He warned that rhetoric robbed ‘their verdict of its freedom’ (Critique of Judgement 192) by winning over men’s minds to the side of the speaker using coercive power to deny autonomous decision making, thereby preventing an adequate opportunity for reason to weigh the matter.

However, I cannot agree with Plato or Kant in their dismissal of rhetoric for the purposes of public deliberation since I identify as fundamentally flawed their conception of rhetoric as one which is, at its core, coercive. I reject that this is so. I suspect that Plato has conflated rhetoric with Sophism and in so doing has misinterpreted the full scope of rhetoric, ignoring its capacity to improve discourse in the public sphere through eloquent argument formation and, through persuasion, to expedite deliberative decision making. At the heart of my defence lies the assumption that not all use of rhetoric is necessarily to deceive or occlude truth. By concentrating on the abuse of rhetoric to serve the nefarious ends of Sophistic, politically ambitious, vain-glorious men, Plato is simply identifying one

\(^{68}\) Plato depicts the citizenry (demos) as one that was ‘easy to manipulate, gullible, distracted, and lacking motivation for the task of self-governance’ (McDorman and Timmerman 2008: xv) so Garsten’s simile here is apt in representing the Sophists as predatory.
of many vices to be found in the public arena and I consider that his dissatisfaction would be better directed towards the men, not the realm of rhetoric. Aristotle clarifies this point: nothing makes an argument, claim or position persuasive in the abstract (*Rhetoric* 1356b27). It has to convince another person, who as we saw above in Aristotle’s account of deliberative rhetoric, will have an individual character and will be subject to various irrational (as well as rational) influences. While rhetoric may be a catalyst, it is not, I defend, a producer of persuasion. As I see it, persuasion in the strict sense identifies a way of influencing that is neither manipulation nor pandering. The speaker who manipulates his audience in order to bring them to a belief or action without their consent, as Kant thought orators moved men ‘like machines’ (*Critique of Judgement* 5. 328n), has not persuaded but coerced. In contrast, the speaker who merely finds out where his audience itches and then scratches there, as Plato thought pandering Athenian orators did, has failed to change his listeners’ minds at all. To truly persuade people is to induce them to change their own beliefs and desires in response to what has been said. Although the passive voice is used ‘being persuaded’, we recognise the difference between being persuaded and being indoctrinated or brainwashed; the difference lies in the active independence that is preserved when we are persuaded. An orator does not coerce; he merely puts words into the air. Thus I reject the notion that rhetoric has the propensity to bring about a mindless conformity in its adherents, moving people ‘mass-like (Plato), crowd-like (Kierkegaard) and herd-like (Nietzsche)’ (Jost and Hyde 1997: 10). This allegation ignores the part to be played by members of the audience. In the brief moments of conscious or unconscious reflection that occur while we listen to a sales pitch or a campaign speech, an active process of evaluation and assimilation occurs in our minds (Garsten 2009: 7) enabling us to make a judgement. The extent to which that judgement is influenced by the choice and arrangement of words depends on the extent to which the audience is willing to be persuaded.

Factors governing the willingness of the audience to be persuaded include the ethical education of the orator, the ethical education of the audience and the extent to which the audience has the opportunity to develop critical faculties when digesting communication within the public sphere. Admittedly, there is nothing inherent to the art of rhetoric which prevents its use for unethical ends. Reciprocity within deliberation becomes untenable and moral transparency is occluded when the commitment to the common good is sacrificed for reasons of self-interest. There are inescapable tensions here, between Aristotle’s claim
that rhetoric, used justly, can do much good (*Rhetoric* 1355b) and its infamy for being a powerful instrument of public thinking that can be used deceptively, to make a bad argument look good (Walton 2004: 297). However, rhetoric, I defend, still offers something a democratic polity should desire: non-coercive persuasion which is fundamental to the ethics of deliberative democracy (Chambers 1996). The solution, I suggest, lies not in removing rhetoric from deliberation but rather in educating against the abuse of rhetorical power through appropriate citizenship education. It is likely that this ‘should be directed at least in part to the sorts of virtues that promote the ethical use of power’ (Bentley 2004: 132) and should equip students with skills to distinguish the dispositions or states of character that tend to undermine the exercise of civic virtues. In this regard, I think that rhetoric has a valuable role to play in helping citizens to recognise that ethical, evaluative and emotional climates determine the form and extent of persuasion.

The misuse of rhetoric and excessive appeal to emotions undoubtedly bring hazards. Yack (2006: 433) reminds us that ‘emotions help us judge the value of competing proposals, [but] we must be willing to accept the risks that they will mislead us as well’. The best defence against the abuse of power, I contend, is the wide distribution of power. Since rhetoric is a linguistic form of power and it can be taught, it follows that it should be taught. The power rhetoric provides has to be supported by a sound ethical grounding since the way rhetoric is practised will depend on the moral character of the practitioner. Since moral character is something that is developed through education, rhetorical practice will only ever be as good as the broader education citizens receive so, following Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 2.6.1106a), I propose that ethical learning must be studied alongside the art of rhetoric. Cicero suggests that citizens, if they allow their reason and emotions to work in tandem as Aristotle suggested, need not be disengaged hearers of the sweet music of a speech (*de Oratore* 2. 33-34), pleased and gratified by speakers’ rhetoric, but rather they can become trained listeners of music (*aures eruditae*), judging orators by their *logos, pathos* and *ethos* (Connolly 2007: 127). It is this training of critical faculties and orienting of moral compasses which should enable citizens to filter the positive uses of rhetoric from the corrupt ones. In democratic deliberation, citizens can think collectively and responsible citizens (interpreted maximally as discussed in the previous chapter) should engage their critical faculties to consider the best course of action not just for themselves but for others.
Instead of isolating rhetoric from democratic deliberation because it can be misused to serve the self-interest of the few, a more fruitful approach might be to view rhetoric as a communicative framework for the many for the exchange of ideas, which permits the additional benefits of learning about the governance of reason and emotion. By exercising the critical faculties to develop filters for rhetoric’s ethical and unethical use, then, citizens have the opportunity to develop critical skills at a deeper level than if communication within deliberation were restricted to critical argumentation. While I hold that this is the case, there exists a strong challenge to the suitability of rhetoric as a communicative method within deliberation. As I have already discussed, central to theories of democratic deliberation is equality of opportunity of political influence whereby an individual’s assent to an argument advanced by others must be uncoerced. Also crucial, though, is that individuals must have equal capacity to advance persuasive claims (Knight and Johnson 1997: 282). Although I have argued that rhetoric provides a structured, accessible and common framework for communication which facilitates equal participation, I turn now to consider whether this notion of dialogue is fundamentally incompatible with Classical rhetorical theory.

The challenge from monology

In addition to the challenges presented by rhetoric’s emotional appeal and its abuse for self-interest, it is also criticised by contemporary democrats\(^69\) because, as a monological form of communication used by a speaker to persuade an audience with no right of reply, it does not meet the moral requirement of equal political participation in deliberation. As was outlined in Chapter Two, rhetoric originated from the need for Greeks to represent themselves through the articulation of their rights to settle disputes after tyranny was overthrown. In this sense, rhetoric was conceived as a monological endeavour which involved one man speaking for each ‘side’ of an issue, others listening then voting to determine the outcome. Although Aristotle hints at a time in the fifth century BC when deliberative rhetoric was used for the collective consideration of the best course of action for a community of citizens to take through reasoned (and impassioned) communication, since the formal structuring of the parts of speech developed by Cicero and Quintilian in

\(^{69}\) Benhabib’s (2002) commitment to ‘egalitarian reciprocity’ maintains that each individual has the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation. Equality also dominates Bohman’s (1996: 16) list of the basic normative requirements and constraints on deliberation.
the Roman era, rhetoric has once again become a pursuit associated with the delivery of speeches in agonistic civic circumstances. Herein lies a problem: deliberation, nowadays, is meant to be a forum for the exchange of ideas (Chambers 2009) and contemporary theories of democratic deliberation look to conversation as an ideal. Conversation is a dialogical method of speaking which, not relying on a defined structure, is at odds with the Classical conception of rhetoric which, being rooted in competition, manifested itself in carefully structured speeches delivered in conflictive environments like debates. The monological nature of rhetoric (by which I mean the lack of provision for ongoing discussion), I concede, is difficult to reconcile with democratic deliberation as it is currently conceived but I advise that rhetoric ought not to be entirely dismissed from the realm of deliberation as it retains some features of value. What follows is justification for a partly revised conception of rhetoric.

In order to maximise rhetoric’s contribution in current conditions, certain characteristics of Classical rhetorical theory must be abandoned. The monological nature of rhetoric which demanded adherence to one’s original persuasive appeal must be relaxed in favour of an openness to ‘learning from, and being challenged by’ (Simpson 2001: 89) the views of other citizens. This can also include the dialogical element of adjusting their position to suit audience and circumstances. In a refinement of the adversarial nature of rhetoric, I suggest that in today’s democracy, it could be more usefully oriented toward collaboration and compromise. This does not necessarily entail the abolishment of rhetoric to make room for conversation, however, since I foresee potential risks with conversation. For Cicero, conversation (sermo) was a theoretical activity designed to uncover and explore philosophical questions conducted in private by elite and aristocratic men. That conversation is more suited to small groups than to an assembly is highlighted by Shiffman (2004: 110) who admits that it represents a ‘formidable cognitive therapy, a reasonable method for improvement and is good for the soul’ but is a peculiar way to get large groups of people with common and divergent interests to agree to bind themselves to a particular course of action. It strikes me that conversation can only lead to further conversation, discussion to more discussion and in a deliberative sphere where issues of civic importance require to be debated and consensus reached, the structure provided by the rhetorical

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71 As was highlighted earlier, this is a contested area of deliberative theory (see Manin 1987, Bohman 1998 and Dryzek 2010 for more extended treatment of the tensions) which cannot be fully investigated in the current study.
framework offers a possible benefit in this regard. In contrast to the private domain in which Cicero viewed conversation, he saw rhetoric as a method of communication more suited to a wider, open and popular forum. In such a context, it was a political and moral enterprise which aimed to persuade an audience or assembly to act in a particular way.

Rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, aims to culminate in a conclusive decision since the proponent of the argument already has an agenda; a viewpoint or thesis that he/she wants the others to accept, unlike deliberation, which is more open to alternative courses of action and is usually more collaborative in nature (Walton 2004: 310). I suggest that the Classical conception of rhetoric ought to be revised and its meaning reshaped to accelerate consensus through multi-logic exchange between participants. For this to be so, there must be more willingness than in the Ancient model to develop and evolve one’s position for the good of the community. This does not, however, have to be the result of an exclusive focus on common ground: in valorising only what we have in common, there is a missed opportunity to cultivate genuine ‘respect for difference... commensurate with the justice requirement central to the deliberative model’ (Healy 2011: 298). Rather, the tenability of each party’s views needs to be held open to critical intersubjective appraisal in appropriately structured discursive forms (Healy 2011: 303) and it is here that rhetoric is essential in situating critical faculties at the centre of democratic deliberation. The eventual decision, far from being imposed by force or other nefarious means, issues out of the rhetorical and competitive struggle for advantage located within the public space of deliberation. In such a way, I claim, the persuasive and focussed style of rhetorical communication can contribute positively to democratic deliberation both by allowing the force of the best argument to win and by helping citizens foster the rhetorical skills of critical listening, constructing arguments and, most importantly within deliberation, engaging in argumentation.

The use of Classical rhetoric, then, in contemporary conceptions of democratic deliberation has been shown to survive, relatively unscathed, three key challenges. Rhetoric can help support equality in deliberation through promoting the understanding of difference because it necessarily involves seeing situations from the other’s perspective. It is more suitable for democratic deliberation, in this regard, than storytelling or greeting since it offers greater accessibility of meaning through a single communicative framework designed for use in the public sphere. Furthermore, the presentation of both sides of the issue and the prior
consideration given to the views of others within the rhetorical framework may expedite the decision making process more than storytelling and greeting which are likely to facilitate ongoing discussion but may not be conducive to decision-making or collective action, owing to their lack of focussed argumentation. Both in streamlining the deliberation process and in moving beyond communication focussed on logic to include identification with opposing views, I consider that rhetoric represents an improvement on argumentation within democratic deliberation. By appealing to the emotions, rhetoric admits input from non-rational aspects of the psyche which, according to Aristotle, makes for better civic deliberation than purely reason-based methods of communication. While rhetoric need not aim at the common good and can be abused for self-interest, Aristotle says that the abuse of rhetoric is no worse than the abuse of other things (Rhetoric 1.1.1355b). Since nothing is persuasive in itself, the use of rhetoric within deliberation represents an opportunity for citizens within democracy to cultivate critical reason and ethical conduct by reflecting on and evaluating communication which appeals to their reason, passions, appetites and emotions – material which is more richly critical than rational argumentation alone.

The most challenging objection to rhetoric undoubtedly stems from the tension between argumentation and conversation: unfortunately, being monological from its inception, rhetoric is not easily reconcilable with conversation or discussion. Rhetoric may help to present a persuasive pitch or accelerate consensus within deliberation by arguing opposing sides of an issue but I acknowledge that its agonistic approach is of value only in public and formal settings for deliberation. Rhetoric as a method of persuasive communication has limited relevance to more informal deliberative settings which rely on ongoing exchange through conversation and which are considered vital stages within the democratic deliberation process (Hauser 2008) so a partly revised conception of rhetoric is suggested. I propose that the strict divisions of the parts of speech of the rhetorical framework are relaxed, rhetorical communication is used for multi-logic purposes and there is a heightened commitment from all participants to the capacity of rhetoric to move all parties to new ground rather than narrowly to ‘win’ one’s case. A healthy deliberative democracy requires exercise of the critical faculties and I have explained ways in which rhetoric can contribute positively to the cultivation of critical skills: through critical argumentation, ethopoeia and refutatio. In this regard, I see more in rhetoric than Young

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72 Deliberation ought to be about the quality of the thinking, speaking and listening so the number of citizens involved is not important. Chambers (2009) suggests that informal conversation between citizens is as deliberative as the delivery of critical argumentation in mass democracy.
does and by elaborating on her account of rhetoric, I defend that rhetoric can make a more profound contribution to deliberation than greeting or storytelling (these methods of communication are, however, complementary to rhetoric and, as I stated above, have their place within deliberation). Yet I concede that if rhetoric is to enjoy a revival in public deliberation, it must eschew narrow historical and political agendas and ‘reemphasise the practical tools of democratic citizenship’ (Hogan 2008: 82) which I have identified as communicating responsibly by listening and speaking for noble purposes and exercising critical skills informed by robust ethical standards. This mirrors very closely Aristotle’s suggestion regarding deliberative rhetoric from 2500 years ago; and in suggesting that a useful way to improve civic engagement is by looking to ‘some of the oldest traditions in rhetorical theory and practice’ rather than new information technologies, Hogan (2008: 77), I think, is right.
Chapter Six
Conclusion

Previous chapters have defended the inclusion of rhetoric in the curriculum; this final chapter sets out to identify its optimal position therein. I claim that Classical languages offer the most authentic curricular context for the learning and teaching of rhetoric for ‘deconstructive purposes’ but note that they offer limited scope for rhetorical construction and performance, elements which I concede must be delivered by other subjects across the curriculum. I consider carefully some possible pedagogical approaches which would accommodate the learning and teaching of Classical rhetoric in CfE and make particular suggestions which, on the one hand, prioritise its study through Classical languages but which, on the other hand, simultaneously uphold the value of contributions from other subject disciplines, most notably English, Modern Studies and Media Studies. The merit of a cross-curricular approach to the learning and teaching of rhetoric is acknowledged while the unique contribution of Classical languages within such a scheme is valorised and their wider educational benefits promoted. Challenges, both theoretical and practical, to the curricular solution I advance for rhetoric are considered which both facilitates the analysis of this study’s innovative contributions to the field of scholarship and prompts identification of further areas of development for this research. Finally, I reflect on ways in which my professional practice has been transformed as a result of undertaking this study and consider the concomitant implications for my multiple roles within education: as a Classics teacher, an advisor on syllabus design and assessment and as a researcher.

Defending Classical languages as the most authentic context for the learning of rhetoric

There are three reasons why I consider Classical languages to be the most authentic context for the learning of rhetoric: the abundance of Classical literature written expressly to be persuasive; the enriched learning experience which comes from approaching rhetoric through another language and the increased exposure to rhetorical techniques. Firstly, as I explained in Chapter Two, rhetoric was integral not only to education systems of the Classical world but to the effective functioning of politics and, because it played such a
vital role in civic life, there exists a significant corpus of literature which records and showcases the inception, development and legacy of rhetoric in the Ancient world. The survival of this body of material lends Classical languages an advantage for the teaching and learning of rhetoric since the Classical rhetorical texts, adhering strictly in content and style to the forensic, deliberative and epideictic rhetorical frameworks, have much to offer the modern student of rhetoric as they allow the student to read texts which were produced for explicitly rhetorical purposes. As I explained in Chapter One, I have witnessed through my own professional practice the positive reaction and genuine engagement with learning which result from the teaching of these ‘original’ Classical rhetorical texts in Scottish secondary schools. In particular, the forensic speeches of Cicero form part of existing Scottish Latin qualifications and I have often observed how successful Cicero’s literature is in captivating students’ interest and improving their ability to identify and critically evaluate the use of persuasion in communication.

Moving now to the second justification for Classical languages being the most authentic context for the study of rhetoric, students are able to increase their critical faculties by questioning and examining the author’s choice and placement of words for persuasive effect through close linguistic analysis of the Latin used by Cicero in his law-court speeches. This micro-level interrogation and appreciation of literary techniques involves reading closely, reflecting on the complexity of rendering Latin into English while being true to the author’s original intention with regard to rhythm, sound, connotation and tone. This combination of Latin translation and rhetorical evaluation involves higher order thinking skills and is, I defend, a more richly rewarding learning experience than either analysing Classical rhetorical literature translated into English (where nuance and literary depth can be compromised) or indeed modern uses of rhetoric such as the speeches of

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73 My classroom experience is limited to the teaching of Latin rhetorical texts since rhetorical literature does not currently feature on the Classical Greek qualifications syllabi at secondary school level. I consider, however, that the speeches of Demosthenes (1990) and Lysias (1990) could be very usefully studied by learners of Classical Greek, as an alternative to the currently prescribed philosophical text by Plato. However, as was outlined in Chapter One, SQA has placed Classical Greek under its low-uptake policy and financial constraints threaten the continued assessment of the subject in Scotland. Much more could be said about the potential value of Classical Greek in the teaching and learning of rhetoric and this represents an area for possible further research.

74 At Higher (SQA 2003a) and Advanced Higher (SQA 2003b) levels, but recently also at the new CfE National 5 level (SQA 2012).

75 There is not scope in this study for the use of data to support this statement but further quantitative study and the collection of related data in this area could be of value.

76 This skill was previously called ‘interpretation’ on Latin assessment policy documentation but has been, aptly in my view, renamed ‘literary appreciation’ after the CfE syllabus and assessment review.
contemporary politicians (which tend to include fewer ‘purple patches’ than their Classical predecessors).

Thirdly, while it is true that the recognition and analysis of rhetorical techniques can be taught in English language and literature lessons, it is worth restating that which was highlighted in Chapter Three that, at school level, the features covered for English exam preparation tend to include: metaphor, simile, transferred epithet, alliteration, onomatopoeia, personification and pun. In Latin at the same level, many more features including, but not limited to, tricolon, hendiadys, anaphora, asyndeton, zeugma, chiasmus, synecdoche, praeteritio, homoioteleuton, paradox, hyperbaton, polyptoton, ellipsis and apostrophe are exemplified in the rhetorical literature and lead students to encounter, evaluate and appreciate a wider field of persuasive discourse. The forensic speeches of Cicero are brimming with these literary devices (see glossary for further explanation) and offer a rich, ‘purple’ rhetorical tapestry for close examination, while being of a level suitable for study at school. As was indicated in the previous chapter, Cicero employed such a range of rhetorical techniques to engage the emotions and minds of the jury in an effort to persuade them that he was representing the side of the good men within the Republic, either by showing that his client was innocent of wrongdoing if appearing for the defence or by questioning incisively if he were appointed as prosecutor. The concentrated use of these techniques is significantly more plentiful in rhetorical literature written in Latin than in English. Political speeches, such as those of Churchill and Obama, arguably come closer than any other literary genre in English to the extensive use of rhetorical devices but even they fail to include the expansive range of techniques evident in Classical rhetorical literature. The study of Classical rhetoric, therefore, provides richer preparation for the analysis of modern English communications.

This is not to say that rhetoric cannot be taught through English; it can. However I claim that the study of rhetoric in English necessitates a diluted form of linguistic analysis which is limited from the outset. If rhetorical knowledge, linguistic acuity and the capacity for critical judgement are considered important in the development of responsible citizens and

77 Purple patches (from Latin purpureus pannus, Horace, de Arte Poetica 14-15 [Horace 1929]) of communication are ‘brilliant or ornate passages in a literary composition’, called purple because they are bright-hued, splendid and associated with the Roman ruling class who wore purple bordered togas. Purple dye was very expensive in the Ancient world because it was extracted from murex shells so was the preserve of the wealthy and elite members of society, the same people who attended school and were taught rhetoric.
critical thinkers, then I consider that the corpus of literature written in Classical languages offers fertile ground for the learning and teaching of these skills. The connection which I have made between the study of rhetoric and the development of citizenship, literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking provides, I think, a compelling call for the re-evaluation, reinvigoration and reintegration of rhetorical education in Scottish schools and the most authentic pedagogical context, I maintain, is offered by Classical languages.

**Educational value vs. efficiency revisited**

There are three challenges to this position which stem from a tension between the most efficient method of including rhetoric in the curriculum, and the most educationally valuable method. Firstly, opponents of Classical languages might claim that too much Latin has to be studied before rhetorical learning can begin for this to be a viable pedagogical option. Secondly, there is genuine research evidence that assessments in Latin are more challenging than other curriculum subjects so the teaching of rhetoric through the medium of Classical languages may exclude some students who would be otherwise included if the context for instruction were English. Thirdly, the fact that the study of rhetoric in Latin can only ever be deconstructive leads some critics to suggest that Classical languages can only prepare learners with half the skills they need. In this section, I reject the first two of these challenges, offering counterarguments which I consider more compelling than the objections but some concession is required in response to the third challenge. In the spirit of CfE this concession will take the form of increased collaboration with other curriculum subjects in the delivery of rhetoric.

The first challenge, then, highlights the sheer volume of basic and intermediate language work which needs to be undertaken before the study of rhetorical texts in Classical languages can commence. Although I remain resolute in my position that learning about rhetoric is of significant benefit to students in secondary school, I do acknowledge that Classical languages are intellectually demanding and syntactically rigorous, so the path to the study of rhetorical literature in Latin and Greek is both long and arduous. In my experience, students must study Latin for at least three years before their language work is sufficiently robust to begin reading unadapted Latin literature (of the kind written by Cicero and including linguistic devices appropriate for rhetorical study by students). There
is, undoubtedly, an argument worthy of consideration from those who identify the inefficiency of this approach. To learn Latin just to optimise understanding of the origin and importance of rhetoric is, to some extent, unjustifiable when a satisfactory understanding can be achieved, with less toil, through English. In response to this position I cite two counter-arguments; one stems from the danger of measuring school subjects by their efficiency and extrinsic value, the second concerns the additional benefits of Classical language learning.

As was discussed in Chapter One, and as Nussbaum (2010: 127) notes, curricula across the globe have been increasingly adapted to produce ‘applied skills suited to profit making’ and, as a result, the Arts and Humanities ‘are being cut away’ and dismissed as ‘useless frills’ in the context of an overriding imperative ‘to stay competitive in the global market’ (2010: 2, 133). The dissolving of the Humanities is linked to the political agenda for education to be driven by national economic performance or individual income rather than the recognition that they are integral to life as a citizen of the world. The result, she complains (2010: 51), is that ‘abilities crucial to the health of any democracy’ are being lost, especially the ability to ‘think critically... to probe, to evaluate evidence, to write papers with well-structured arguments, and to analyze the arguments presented to them in other texts’ (2010: 55). She argues for the return of a course which calls for ‘attention to logical structures’ and thus ‘gives students templates that they can then apply to texts of many different types’ (Nussbaum 2010: 55). I would posit that the rhetorical framework is ideally placed to provide a viable and valuable solution to fill this void. Yet I agree that ‘critical’ skills and related abilities will look ‘dispensable if what we want are marketable outputs of a quantifiable nature’ (Nussbaum 2010: 45), and if we embrace an ‘economic growth paradigm rather than a human development paradigm’ (Nussbaum 2010: 24). Learning need not be, and in my view ought not to be, driven by extrinsic factors nor its validity measured in terms of ‘efficiency’. It is true that the study of Classical languages and literatures does not, perhaps, offer the fastest or most direct route to rhetorical knowledge but, as I have already argued, it offers the most authentic context for comprehensive and robust rhetorical learning and if the development of literary and civic skills is deemed important, it makes sense to me for us to look to the creators and masters of the craft for instruction.
I offer now the second counter-argument in response to the challenge that learning rhetoric through Classical languages is inefficient. The study of Latin, I propose, offers far more than simply the authentic context for the study of rhetoric, which, although undoubtedly valuable, ought not to be seen as the singular goal for Classical language learning. Rather, Latin must be valued for the additional contributions it makes to the overarching purposes and principles of CfE as well as its ability to improve the development of the four capacities (see Appendix B). Classical languages can contribute positively to the acquisition and improvement of cross-curricular skills including literacy and citizenship, claims which have been examined in depth in Chapters Three, Four and Five, as well as providing significant opportunities for cross-curricular learning activities with other curriculum areas, for example Health and Wellbeing, Numeracy, History, Art, Modern Languages, Science, Mathematics, Geography and Religious Studies. Transferable skills, such as the ability to pay meticulous attention to detail, so important in the translation of inflected languages, bring benefits to learners in their studies across the curriculum. Furthermore, the study of Classical languages provides an enlarged cultural compass and improved linguistic foundation for learners on which they can build a myriad of cross-curricular skills and abilities. I suggest that the reintegrations of Classical languages in the curriculum be considered, then, not simply for the sake of promoting the study of rhetoric, but also for the many associated contributions they can make to a rounded education for Scottish young people. To recap, I acknowledge that they do not represent the most efficient approach to the learning and teaching of rhetoric, but I maintain that they provide the most educationally valuable approach given their concomitant contributions to skill development; preparation both for learning across the curriculum and for lifelong learning.

Laying aside the educational benefits of studying Classical languages for the moment, the second challenge concerns their suitability for inclusion in the curricula of Scottish mainstream secondary schools owing to research which identifies that Classical languages are more difficult than other subjects in the curriculum. Indeed there exists some doubt among education professionals as to whether the study of Latin, and

78 Research conducted by Prof. Coe at Durham University in 2006 concluded that GCSE and A Level Latin were between one and two grades harder than other subjects (Coe 2006: 9, Weeds 2007).
particularly Greek, is realistically accessible or achievable for all learners. In the initial stages of language learning, I believe that all students can successfully grasp the key linguistic patterns which govern the operation of the languages. As the study of accidence and syntax progresses, however, the irregularity of Greek verbs and the number of noun declensions make it a language which is almost exclusively studied by students of ‘high academic ability’ 80. Latin is arguably more accessible to students of a wider ability range (there is certainly a better selection of published resources 81 which allows for more differentiation than in Greek 82) yet it too demands much from learners both in terms of memorisation of noun declensions and verb conjugations as well as the ability to understand the structure of clauses and the complex syntax of a highly inflected language. Being academically demanding and requiring a high degree of linguistic skill and exactitude, might Latin and Greek actually be considered exclusionary, then, to students of lower ability? And if so, surely this suggests that Latin and Greek are not the ideal curricular vehicles for the study of rhetoric, appearing, as they do, to be positively undemocratic and divisive rather than providing relevant and accessible content within a coherent and unified approach to promoting linguistic equality?

Classical languages certainly have a reputation for being divisive; there exists a gap in curricular provision between well-resourced independent schools where the Classical tradition has remained in place for centuries and State schools (Lister 2007: 89) in which either there is no Classics teacher or the teaching of Classical languages is limited to the most able students for example, the top set for French. For decades, the perception that only academically gifted students were suited to the study of Latin and Greek has prevented generations of interested students from accessing a Classical education. I see CfE as an opportunity to reverse this trend and to make the curriculum more democratic, narrowing the gap between provision in the private and public sectors. Latin and Greek 2011) express concern that the style and content of assessment in Latin and Greek are exclusionary to pupils of weaker academic ability.

80 This category is problematic for some and relies on measurement of attainment which does not, I know, necessarily truly reflect achievement or intellectual potential. I use it here because it is commonly associated with learners of Greek in my professional context and in the critical literature (Sharwood Smith 1977, Lister 2007).

81 Current textbooks used in the teaching of Latin include: ‘Ecce Romani’ (Scottish Classics Group 1982), ‘Oxford Latin Course’ (Balme and Morwood 1996), ‘Cambridge Latin Course’ (CSCP 1998) and ‘So You Really Want To Learn Latin?’ (Oulton and Douglass 1999). Of these, the Cambridge Latin Course is the most accessible to learners of all abilities and is supported by a website and e-learning resource which provide differentiated activities.

82 Greek textbooks are notoriously pedestrian and include very little visual or cultural stimuli. In general, they assume familiarity with Latin and explain the formation of grammar features through reference to Latin counterparts (Balme and Lawall 1995, Wilding 1997, Taylor 2003).
provide, in my view, the most authentic curricular context for the study of rhetoric and expose students to a greater intensity of linguistic strategies to persuade and should, therefore, be considered a valuable option for all students. Given the correct support, I think Classical languages need not be the preserve of the academically gifted if students of ‘weaker’ ability and less enthusiastic inclination towards the Classics are guided appropriately when translating, analysing and evaluating unadapted Latin literature. Yes, a high degree of linguistic skill is required but it is the responsibility of the teacher to ensure that students acquire sufficient support to enable them to engage with the literary merit of the texts. In my professional practice I have witnessed a number of students who struggled with the complexity of the language yet engaged purposefully with the texts under study, and benefited both intellectually and culturally from the endeavour. The study of rhetoric through English-language based teaching and learning activities is an easier option for both the teacher and learner under these circumstances and may well be a more realistic goal but leads to an inferior learning experience, in my view.

The third and perhaps most threatening challenge to the study of rhetoric through Classical languages is the fact that only the deconstruction of rhetorical language can be studied in Latin and Greek; the construction and performance of rhetorical communication is not possible at secondary school level owing to the difficulty of composing in Latin and Greek. Translating into Classical languages is not expected at any level for SQA qualifications and is only required in a small number of university Classics degrees. The fact that the study of rhetoric through Latin and Greek provides exposure to only deconstruction and does not offer preparation or tuition for the construction of rhetorical text in Classical languages might suggest that these subjects can only provide half the required learning for students of rhetoric. Yet I contend that this is not so. As has already been stated, Classical rhetoric provides a rich preparation for the analysis of modern communication and the richness of Classical rhetorical literature is far greater than its English-language counterparts. It therefore makes good sense to use the authentic context provided by Latin

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83 Although, interestingly, there has been a recent move to reintroduce prose composition as a compulsory element (10 per cent) of assessment in Classical languages at GCSE level in England (Department for Education 2013b, 2013c). The proposals, currently under consultation, suggest that very basic linguistic manipulation will be required so there is no expectation that school pupils will be able to compose according to the rhetorical framework.

84 Oxford, Cambridge, Durham, Edinburgh, Bristol, Warwick and St Andrews universities require that students do prose composition (discussion with Coderch at conference 2008) although, from my experience at Oxford and Cambridge, this is in the form of sentences to be translated from English into Latin and Greek. The composition of extended passages is done only for competitions (for example, Cambridge and Oxford Classics Faculties’ Latin and Greek Composition prizes) and in these cases, the English passage is provided. It is not necessarily rhetorical in content.
and Greek for the delivery of deconstructive rhetorical skills. These skills supply a necessary foundation for the development of constructive skills and it is vital that students have a firm command of the language in which they will be constructing rhetorical communication. As far as I can see, the application of skills learned through the analysis of Classical literature can only enrich and enhance the construction of contemporary speech and text in English through vocabulary acquisition, linguistic agility and a critical understanding of the way in which language can be used to persuade. These skills become more straightforward, I claim, after the close analysis of Greek and Latin literature. While construction in Latin and Greek would certainly offer more scope for the use of certain linguistic devices which are difficult to replicate in English, this ability does little to build the rhetorical capacity which will contribute to linguistic equality and effective self-representation within a modern deliberative democracy, for obvious reasons\(^\text{85}\). As was highlighted above, to deserve a place on the mainstream school curriculum, the study of Classical languages needs to be about more than the enhancement of rhetorical awareness. In this regard I would suggest that the valuable transferable skills which result from the study of Classical languages (including increased cultural and historical sensitivity, better attention to detail and improved grammatical understanding\(^\text{86}\)) lend further support to the argument for their reintroduction to the curriculum. I stop short, however, of decreeing that the study of Latin and Greek are vital for the study of rhetoric. While acknowledging that they have an important, relevant and helpful role to play, I admit that they are not strictly necessary for the study of rhetoric but are rather desirable for their contribution to a richer and deeper understanding of rhetorical theory and practice.

What contributions can be made by other subjects?

English, then, has an important role to play in providing a vehicle for the composition of communication and the practice of rhetorical invention and performance. As was shown in Chapter Three, a number of the experiences and outcomes in CfE for English and literacy

\(^{85}\) Latin and Classical Greek are no longer spoken languages so the ability to declaim in these languages is not conducive to the fulfilment of the aims of rhetoric I have highlighted elsewhere: responsible citizenship, literacy and critical literacy.
\(^{86}\) Unfortunately there is not scope within this study for a detailed analysis of the value of a Classical education; this could be the focus of another Doctoral dissertation. Some research into transferable skills which result from the study of Classics was conducted by the University of Cambridge Classics Faculty [2007b] which identified a range of ‘intellectual skills, communication skills, organisational skills and interpersonal skills’. I must limit my discussion here to the role of Classical languages in the cultivation of rhetorical skills.
include elements which I consider to fall under the remit of rhetorical education; thus a partnership approach to the teaching of rhetoric through Classical languages and English has the potential to work very effectively. This might be usefully complemented by extra-curricular opportunities (operated as optional lunch-time or after-school clubs), for example student debating or Model United Nations competitions.

Aside from English, I consider that important contributions can also be made by Religious and Moral Education (RME), Modern Studies and Media Studies. RME offers opportunities to critically analyse the beliefs, scriptures and sermons of diverse faith groups which may be written to persuade others to become followers. In this connection, students have plenty of opportunity to employ and develop critical thinking and critical literacy skills as well as becoming increasingly aware of their role as citizens in a multi-faith world87. Modern Studies includes direct study and analysis of political life and can include the analysis of modern (and some historical) political speeches. It encourages students to probe their own considerations on the rights and responsibilities of citizens while expecting them to articulate their position competently. The ability to consider and ask difficult questions is a key feature of Modern Studies education (Maitles 2003) and here, the subject has a significant role to play in educating for democratic citizenship. Modern Studies is located at an intersection of the curriculum – where politics, communication studies and citizenship meet; it occupies space between the Humanities and the Social Sciences. This makes it a very useful and cross-curricular subject for the delivery of rhetorical education88. I contend, though, that it does not offer sufficient detailed study of language to be able to teach exclusively about rhetoric, hence my recommendation for an inter-disciplinary approach which combines the study of politics and citizenship with speeches from the Classical world which exemplify the rhetorical framework. As has been suggested earlier, the study of political speeches (see Appendix A, for example those of Churchill or Obama) provides an alternative to the study of Classical rhetorical literature but, for the reasons outlined above, does not replace Classical

87 Two CfE outcomes are particularly relevant here: ‘Having reflected upon a considered range of beliefs, belief systems and moral viewpoints, I can express reasoned views on how putting these beliefs and values into action might lead to changes in society’ RME 4-09a (Scottish Government 2009a: 225) and ‘Through researching a range of traditions, practices and customs of world religions, I can consider the place of these in contemporary life’ RME 4-06a (Scottish Government 2009a: 224).

88 Modern Studies outcomes which include aspects of rhetoric are: ‘I can evaluate conflicting sources of evidence to sustain a line of argument’ SOC 4-01a and ‘I can debate the reasons why some people participate less than others in the electoral process and can express informed views about the importance of participating in a democracy’ SOC 4-18b (Scottish Government 2009a: 293).
languages as the most educationally valuable vehicle for the learning and teaching of rhetoric.

Media Studies\(^{89}\), too, offers possible input to the teaching and learning of rhetoric in Scottish schools. It prepares students to see beyond the way in which events are reported in the media or reinterpreted by Hollywood to distinguish fact from fiction, truth from make-believe. Given how digitally and technologically advanced our society has become, Media Studies is perhaps in a stronger curricular position for delivering rhetorical education to students as it is not generally criticised, as Latin is, of being out of date and irrelevant for young people in Scotland today. Welch (1999: 101) notes that the high number of ‘HUTs, households using television, and the machine’s ubiquity has changed rhetoric’. Television has become so heavily implicated in people’s acquisition of language that there ought to be training in how to be effective decoders of the communication content and style, seen and heard, on television. Media Studies can go some way to providing ‘training in the grammar, vocabulary, and ideology of digital communication’ (Welch 1999: 134), especially important given the tendency for the communication ‘power mongers of post-Fordism to intellectually colonise our citizenry’ (Welch 1999: 189). Without the capacity and ability for critical judgement, the television companies and producers will narcotise us into believing unquestioningly and consuming what they so imprecisely call ‘information’ and ‘content’. Communication on television is often rhetorical and involves persuasion: thus there exists an inherently rhetorical relationship between television and computers and the social and literary analysis of communication technologies. Welch (1999: 179) uses a pair of powerful metaphors which show the intersection of rhetoric, media and technology with captivating imagery,

\(^{89}\) CfE outcomes which relate to Media Studies but which can usefully deliver aspects of rhetorical learning are: ‘I can evaluate the role of the media in a democracy, assess its importance in informing and influencing citizens, and explain decisions made by those in power’ SOC 4-17b (Scottish Government 2009a: 294), ‘I can understand how advertising and the media are used to influence consumers. HWB 2-37a (Scottish Government 2009a: 92), ‘I know that popular culture, the media and peer pressure can influence how I feel about myself and the impact this may have on my actions’ HWB 3-46b/ HWB 4-46b (Scottish Government 2009a: 96) and ‘Through research and discussion, I have contributed to evaluations of media items with regard to scientific content and ethical implications’ SCN 3-20b (Scottish Government 2009a: 277).
if television offers a Niagara Falls of rhetorical artefacts, both graphic and spoken (and both based on writing), then the digital world offers an Atlantic Ocean of rhetorical artefacts and performances, also written, graphic and spoken.

Through Media Studies, students can discover that cultures are composed of their rhetorics, and online technologies are at the centre of our current culture; therefore to be cyberliterate there is the need to go beyond merely being a user. Learners need to become active participants in the discussion, critiquing, challenging and anticipating how these technologies are designed, implemented and used (Gurak 2004: 191). I agree with Gurak (2004: 194) that the future of cyberliteracy needs to be critical, observant and activist and share her call for a curriculum that helps students understand and critically evaluate the rhetorical features of digital communication (Gurak 2004: xvi). This aim, I defend, resonates well with the cultivation of responsible citizens who, as a result of their study of rhetoric, exhibit literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking skills. Although a far cry from the study of rhetoric in Latin or Greek, the need for input from other subjects on the school curriculum is a result of the changing nature of rhetoric in contemporary society. This is no blight on Classical languages, rather it is an indication that as certain aspects of language and humanity stay the same, others change and, as Ovid sagely advised (Metamorphoses 15.662) ‘omnia mutantur nos et mutamur in illis’, ‘as all things change, we change with them’. The onus on educators, therefore, is to ensure that learners receive the best preparation each curricular area has to offer for the optimal study of rhetoric.

What, then, is rhetoric’s optimal curricular position? The extent to which rhetoric ought to be viewed as a content-rich standalone subject in the curriculum is dependent to some degree on the current and future shape of CfE policy. Currently, rhetoric does not appear as a discrete subject within any of the curriculum areas, so it is difficult to imagine how such a scenario could arise except if the curriculum were subject to a review after the initial implementation process and the completion of a school cohort. Supposing that this review does not take place for the foreseeable future, I assert that there remain two other possible courses of action. Rhetoric could either be seen as a discrete subject but delivered as a short-course or it could be viewed as a cross-curricular skill, becoming the responsibility of many practitioners to embed it within their subject curriculum. If rhetoric were taught as a short course, it could complement citizenship education through a life skills or personal development programme (Chaffee [1992] and Knight [1992] showcase how critical
thinking can be approached in this way). While there is nothing inherently flawed in this approach, it runs the risk of rhetoric not being treated seriously by either staff or pupils; viewed from the outset as an add-on, dispensable and of limited direct value to curriculum and, by extension, the learner. Under such conditions, I do not think that rhetoric would make a successful re-entry to the school curriculum and would, quickly and without fuss, be marginalised or axed.

If conceived as a cross curricular skill rhetoric could remain linked to a deep vein of linguistic and literary knowledge but, as Gaonkar (1990: 345) has commented, would no longer be ‘overburdened with content’. Emptied of the values and languages of a particular community in a particular time and place it could ‘become a portable, content-free process that could be used to respond discursively to any situation, anywhere, any time’ (Fleming 2003: 96). This, I think, is the most fruitful approach to adopt as it allows for flexibility within schools concerning which staff (teachers of Classics, RME, Modern Studies, Media Studies or others) and students will be involved in the teaching and learning of rhetoric and it supports CfE’s focus on skills while contributing directly to the four capacities.

**Rhetoric in CfE: the practicalities of pedagogy**

Aside from the theoretical challenges which threaten the reintroduction of Classical rhetoric, there are some practical complications which require consideration too. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter One, there is an acute shortage of qualified Classics teachers not only in Scotland, but in the UK (Hunt 2012a, b, c, 2013) with the result that there are now more teachers of Classical languages leaving the profession than there are entering, which has led to the closure of an increasing number of Classics departments in schools in the last decade (including Trinity High School in Renfrew, Our Lady and St. Patrick’s in Dumbarton, Cleveden Secondary in Glasgow as well as several others). Some hope is offered by the Graduate Teacher Program\(^{90}\) (GTP) which allows a small number of trainees to complete the teaching degree while employed as a full-time graduate teacher within a

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\(^{90}\) One of these is operated by the Kings Educational Consortium in Birmingham which trains three Classics teachers per academic year (Hunt 2012b), in addition to the twenty who are trained within the traditional University system. Such an annual increase of more than ten percent could quickly become significant for the Classics teaching profession and could begin to reverse the closure of departments and decline of support in schools.
school and college initial teacher training partnership. Additionally, as part of the Bachelor of Education degree in primary education at the University of Glasgow, student teachers can choose to pursue an elective in Latin, which is taught by the Classics Faculty in conjunction with the School of Education. Students of this very popular elective course have commented that their English grammar has improved as a result of their study of Latin and that it has made easier the learning of other languages (Seith 2009). A promising development from this elective is that teachers are cascading their enthusiasm for and knowledge of Latin to the pupils in the schools in which they teach after graduation and there exists a suitable textbook to revitalise Latin in the primary sector. Admittedly this elective is not a standard offering across primary teacher training institutions nationwide so the impact on the future of Classical language study is certainly limited. There are, however, encouraging signs that the tide may be turning and any renewed interest in Classical languages makes their reintroduction into the mainstream school curriculum all the more viable.

Nevertheless it would remain challenging to locate and employ sufficient Classicists to deliver the Classical language elements of the sort of rhetorical program of study I have suggested in all Scottish schools. Rhetoric also forms just one small pocket of the study of Classical languages, therefore it is entirely conceivable that even those who are qualified to teach Latin and Greek may not actually know much about Ancient rhetoric or have any desire to teach it. As has been outlined in this chapter, teachers of other subjects can play an important role in the delivery of rhetorical knowledge and skills but the prospect of additional subject knowledge and teaching responsibilities has the potential to intimidate, alienate or infuriate some teachers at a time of curricular upheaval. Given the policy landscape of CfE (and reaction to the policy summarised in Chapter One), an attempt to integrate the teaching of rhetoric might be met with ill-favour by staff who see it as the imposition of yet another, unrequested change making further demands on their knowledge, energy and time. More positive reactions may be forthcoming from staff well-disposed to curriculum change: those who are keen to embrace the flexibility offered by CfE may be enthusiastic to participate in the teaching of a cross-curricular program of

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91 So successful was the course that students asked for a more advanced version to be offered in subsequent years so that they could continue their study of Latin.
92 ‘Minimus’ (Bell 1999) charts the adventures of Minimus, the small mouse, as he travels along Hadrian’s Wall and observes daily life in Vindolanda Roman fort.
rhetorical study or undertake appropriate training to enable them to do so. It is impossible, at this early stage of conceptualisation, to second-guess the reaction of teaching staff; until such an initiative is actually introduced and the staff consulted on their views at varying stages of the process, reactions can be only hypothetical or conjectural.

Secondly, it will be a matter of trial and error, I think, to determine at which age it is most beneficial to introduce learning about rhetoric. From my own professional experience, I have found that students respond positively when they reach a fairly advanced level of literacy and linguistic agility, aged approximately 15. However, my experience is limited to the teaching of rhetoric through Classical languages and it may be that rhetoric could be more usefully studied earlier, through RME, Modern Studies, English or Media Studies. What I am certain of, though, is that the model operated in the USA of having composition courses delivered by English language specialists at undergraduate level is inadequate. Undoubtedly, this encounter with rhetoric occurs too late; as I described in Chapter Three, criticality is an essential skill prior to higher education, a justification for the situation of my defence of the learning and teaching of rhetoric in the school curriculum. The argument I propound that learning rhetoric contributes positively to responsible citizenship resonates with the Scottish concern for young people to ‘fully understand and be able to play their part as citizens of a democratic society’ (Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] in Frazer 2003: 67) and supports the belief once held about the aim of education being the enabling of students to become citizens of the community. In this regard, I consider the earlier the exposure to rhetoric, the better. This ideal appears influenced by the Aristotelian view of the role of rhetoric: to educate citizens for an active and productive life of participation in the polis. I agree with Turner that this conception of rhetorical studies is of very great importance and should ‘appear at the centre of a liberal arts education that prepares those who partake of it not merely for an occupation but rather for a lifetime of learning’ (Turner 1998: 334).

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93 Lee, Bers and Storinger (1992) note that collective training seminars and teaching a new cross-curricular skill (critical thinking) made for a more cohesive faculty within a US community college and Litecky (1992: 87) suggests that the teaching of an additional cross-curricular skill has the capacity to generate innovative teaching. Hence the introduction of rhetoric may herald welcome professional development opportunities for staff.
Rhetoric and responsible citizenship: why we need both Aristotle and Cicero

Turner (1998: 332) is right, I think, that we need ‘to equip our students to be better critics and consumers of the mediated forms that permeate their lives’, and I propose that rhetorical studies offer a wealth of frameworks within which such analysis can fruitfully proceed. In Chapters Three and Four, I showed how the construction of communication and the capacity for self representation are becoming increasingly important in a society dominated by party politics and media spin. A renewed focus on rhetoric aims to endow students with appropriate skills to make informed, ethical decisions. In Chapter Five I highlighted the benefits of rhetoric for citizenship, making a link between the study of rhetoric and deliberative democracy and arguing that the rhetorical framework provides a suitable and helpful structure around which citizens in Scotland might usefully construct their communications for improved communicative equality. The learning and teaching of rhetoric has the potential to make Scotland a better and more democratic place for all citizens if students are given appropriate preparation in school to be fully participating citizens, made aware of their capacity for critical thinking and critical literacy. The knowledge of how to apply these skills is directly related to the two-fold demands of rhetorical expertise: constructing and deconstructing communication. Yet when constructing communication, there is a fine line between using rhetorical techniques to improve the oratorical quality and manipulating the emotions of fellow citizens through linguistic ‘cleverness’. This age-old challenge to rhetoric, explored in Chapters One, Two and Five continues to be of concern; will the reintroduction of rhetoric in schools produce a society of linguistic tricksters? I sympathise to some extent with the anxiety displayed by this view since CfE is designed to improve Scottish education, not to encourage the reintroduction of unsavoury curricular elements. In response to this concern, I have two remarks to make. Firstly, students are certain to encounter attempts to engage their emotions which aim to persuade and may even experience the manipulation of their emotions and obfuscation of facts, simply by participating in civic life. The pedagogical approach I propose highlights that it is both helpful and right to learn about this skewed use of language in an authentic and educational context as part of a wider and balanced programme of communication studies rather than encountering it for the first time in a

94 As Scotland prepares for an independence referendum next year there is already an increase in the quantity and pointedness of political communication in both print and digital media (Deans 2013).
more nefarious setting. Secondly, a focus on Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric rather than Cicero’s would mollify any potential disquietude in this regard since Aristotle views rhetoric as the discovery of any possible means of persuasion in communication whereas Cicero suggests that it should be used to help orators achieve their aims, regardless of the desires of the audience. While I consider that knowledge of both approaches to communication is vital for contemporary rhetorical education, I acknowledge that Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric is more morally defensible. It does, however, offer limited scope for learning about self-expression and performance hence why I think the syllabus content for modern rhetorical education should be informed and influenced both by the Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptions of rhetoric.

Revisiting the aims of the study and identification of areas for further development

Chapter One identified that the aim of this dissertation was to defend the learning and teaching of Classical rhetoric in Scotland’s CfE. There, I claimed that this research study was innovative in a number of ways, three of which warrant restatement here. Firstly, the defence of Classical languages in Scottish education has not attracted much research (except for Williams 2003) and this is the first study to have been conducted on the role of Classical languages in CfE. Secondly, since its inception, there has been little critical analysis of the CfE suite of policy documents (Priestley 2010: 27) so in examining the conceptions of responsible citizenship, literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking, this study augments a small corpus of critical literature on CfE policy. Thirdly, although research has been (and is being conducted) on the learning and teaching of rhetoric in tertiary and higher education (particularly in the USA), there is a gap in the examination of rhetoric in the secondary school curriculum (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 10). In this way, this dissertation attempts to enrich this impoverished field of Classics education research and seeks to contribute to the field of Scottish curriculum studies scholarship.

In considering the question, ‘what is education for?’, this dissertation has argued that in Scotland, the answers to this question are subject to social, political and economic influence at national, international and supranational levels. The question and its answers require to be continually reappraised and with a referendum for independence on the
political horizon in 2014, there will be an increasingly urgent need for research to keep pace with political changes, particularly in the analysis of the aims of education and the conception of citizenship promoted by Scotland’s politicians, policy-makers and educators. Future empirical research could usefully augment the findings of this conceptual study and could, for example, investigate the capacity of the rhetorical framework as a practical pedagogical strategy for the improvement of literacy in school pupils. Future conceptual research studies into curriculum theory and education policy, though, are also vital. They will help to maximise understanding of curricular aims while revealing the motivations behind policy discourse. This critical analysis is essential to ensure that education in Scottish schools is fit for purpose in the 21st century and is adequately underpinned by detailed theoretical and philosophical consideration.

Rhetoric does, however, appear to be making something of a comeback in the philosophy of education. A recent edition (44, 6) of the Journal of Curriculum Studies focussed on ‘Revisiting the rhetorical curriculum’ and included articles on rhetoric’s relationship with paideia and Bildung (Biesta 2012), the rhetorical nature of the curriculum (Rutten and Soetaert 2012a, 2012b), rhetoric and illiteracy (Mortensen 2012) and the nature of rhetorical education (Brummett 2012). Based on the ‘new rhetoric’ movement these articles were not concerned with the contemporary value of Classical rhetoric, nor did they situate their discussions in the secondary phase of education. Encouraging though this special strand of curriculum studies research is, this dissertation advises the extension of such research into the secondary school curriculum as it is in this context that I consider the revitalisation of rhetoric can have most immediate and valuable impact, as was outlined in Chapters Three and Four. While a consideration of the value of ‘new rhetoric’ in CfE could provide a useful parallel to the defence made here for Classical rhetoric, my primary concern from the outset of this study has been the retrieval of Classical languages for Scotland’s current and future learners. It is possible, however, that the examination of ideas from ‘new rhetoric’ could prove fruitful in supporting the claim I have made that rhetoric can make a dual contribution to the development of critical faculties and responsible

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95 Hyslop-Margison and Ayaz Naseem (2007: vii) suggest that empirical research is concerned with ‘the tangible and observable, and hence can count, measure, and predict... commanding the largest funding and unequivocal respect’. Some pragmatic educators (especially those in the quagmire of CfE implementation) may engage more willingly with innovative pedagogical approaches upon presentation of empirical findings. 96 A movement which sought to reinterpret Classical rhetoric ‘as a means of understanding and living successfully in a world of symbols’ (Herrick 2004: 223), pioneered by scholars such as Kenneth Burke, I.A. Richards, Richard Weaver, Richard McKeon, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (Rutten and Soetaert 2012b).
citizenship, concepts which I suggest ought to be read together but which are not connected in CfE.

In Chapter Five, I proposed that aspects of Ancient and modern democratic theory, previously considered irreconcilable, could be compatible if a partially revised conception of rhetoric is advanced which operates dialogically rather than monologically and paves the way for improved private and public communication and deliberation. By accommodating this revision, I made the claim that rhetoric can act as a unifying method of communication, acting as a bridge between people from differing social backgrounds by cultivating in learners a more profound sense of empathy, realised through the practice of narrative imagination in the common composition of arguments. Contrary to the notoriety rhetoric has attracted over centuries, which was explained in Chapters Two and Five, at the crux of this dissertation is the exhortation to move beyond such an uncritical and superficial analysis of rhetoric and to reconsider its value as a civic virtue. While there have been some basic studies (Copson 2006, Watson 2011) on the contribution of Classical languages to citizenship education, these have been based on ‘knowledge and understanding’ elements of citizenship and did not engage with participatory, active and ‘difficult’ conceptions of citizenship. Based exclusively on pedagogical practice in English schools teaching the Cambridge Latin Course (CLC), the value and impact of these studies could be increased, I suggest, if their findings were reconsidered and informed by an enhanced understanding of the richly complex relationship between Classical languages, citizenship and the critical faculties. It is elements of the complexity, interdependence and importance of this relationship which this dissertation has sought to articulate.

Certain aspects of CfE, it has been argued, are insufficiently articulated with the result that terms like ‘critical literacy’ and ‘active citizenship’, as Chapters Three and Four highlighted, are not clearly understood by teachers. More needs to be done in the future, I propose, to help teachers understand the implications of contested terms in CfE if they are to feel confident in the delivery of the new curriculum. Critical literature shows that these concepts are more complex than the way in which they are conceived in CfE and this lack of clarity also has the potential to threaten the quality of students’ learning in these areas. A possible solution to this problem might be the production of guidance documentation which distils the critical literature into a selection of practical strategies which teachers could choose to integrate into their teaching.
Implications of the study for professional practice

The value of the Ed.D. dissertation is not simply the contribution it makes to the field of knowledge but is also the training and skills which are developed as a result of the research exercise and which can be redeployed in professional educational contexts (Andersen 1983, Nelson and Coorough 1994, Townsend 2002). There are two main areas of my professional practice which I consider to have been transformed as a result of this research study: my professional commitment to citizenship education and my competency as an educational professional beyond my role as Classics teacher. There are two citizenship-related developments of note. Firstly, by conducting a detailed interrogation of what is meant by responsible citizenship, my own understanding of citizenship education improved dramatically and I became more conscious in my daily teaching activities of the contribution I could make not just to a student’s ability to, for example, recognise and translate accurately a particular grammar feature in Latin but rather I have become increasingly aware of how I can help guide their growth and development as citizens. This has prompted me to afford more importance and time in my lessons to the student voice and the modelling of democracy; decisions regarding lesson content and assessment are sometimes made collectively by the students, often with representatives for conflicting views making their case. This provides an opportunity for students to participate in deliberative communication and gives them practice in experiencing a form of civic society which provides preparation for ‘the real thing’. I have found this transformation of my practice incredibly rewarding and it has renewed my commitment to the value of talking and listening within rhetorical education.

Secondly, this research required the analysis of the LTS (2011a) document, ‘Developing Global Citizenships within CfE’ and the policy evaluation I completed in that regard has prompted me to pursue additional professional initiatives. Inspired by the value of international education and the maximal interpretation of global citizenship, I have become involved in Comenius school partnerships, sponsored by the British Council, which facilitate the exchange of knowledge and understanding between staff and pupils in schools across Europe. Through e-twinning and school visits, I now actively seek to generate links between cultures and peoples for the mutual benefit of education and citizenship. This is an area of professional development of which I knew nothing prior to the commencement of
this research study and which I attribute to a particular focus in current Scottish educational policy.

Because this study has involved detailed analysis of CfE policy and the assessment of its impact on my own professional practice as a Classics teacher, I consider that my wider professional competency has been transformed in four ways. Firstly, I have delivered in-school staff development training on ‘literacy across learning’ based on the research I conducted in the dissertation phase. I previously lacked confidence in my ability to engage in professional dialogue with colleagues, since my claims were based simply on a ‘hunch’ but with the benefit of rigorous academic investigation and extensive critical analysis of the policy, I relished the opportunity to share and develop new ideas. Secondly, and a result of this free-flowing professional dialogue, I have engaged more actively in collaboration with colleagues. This dissertation has suggested that the most efficient way to deliver rhetoric in CfE is through a cross-curricular approach and this has been influenced in no small measure by the discovery of ways in which Classics can enrich activities in other subjects and be enriched by them, prompted by the intention of CfE as a ‘joined up curriculum for the 21st century’ (Carr et al. 2006: 13). For example, I collaborated with colleagues in Chemistry, Art and Mathematics on a ‘silver’ theme, with colleagues in Design and Technology, Geography and Physics on a ‘cosmology’ theme and with colleagues in English, Modern Languages and Music on an ‘Environmental issues’ theme. Having the professional courage to approach teaching colleagues in other departments and to suggest new ideas has certainly been influenced positively by the conduct of this study and the success of these activities has improved my perception of the aims and intentions of CfE. Thirdly, my reaction to CfE has been transformed by the conduct of this study. As a member of staff, my initial reaction was one of despair since so much was left unsaid: where was the syllabus and which resources were being recommended? However, analysis of the policy confirms that, although not perfect, CfE embodies an ambitious program of improvement for Scottish schools with aims for both learning and teaching which are worth pursuing. Finally, the fact that CfE places greater onus on teachers to be creative and innovative has dovetailed very neatly with the research imperative of this study. In defending Classical rhetoric, I have had to think critically and creatively about its optimal position in the curriculum and the process of doing so has made me not only a better researcher but also a better teacher. The stimulation I have gained from the conduct of this study has made me determined to continue my role as a
researcher within education\textsuperscript{97}; something I hope to fulfil no matter which branch of education my career follows.

**Concluding remarks**

This dissertation has highlighted a possible new role for Classical rhetoric which correlates with the purposes and principles of CfE and which has the potential to be of academic, social and civic benefit to learners in Scottish schools. I have shown the impact such a curricular innovation might have on the cultivation of responsible citizenship and have made direct connections between the study of rhetoric and the development of three cross-curricular skills, literacy, critical literacy and critical thinking. The capacity for critical awareness and judgement has become more of a priority in education, I contend, since the expansion in use of technology, media and electronic methods of communication. More than ever, learners are confronted by mixed messages which compete for their support and promotion; they must be equipped with suitable knowledge and skills to critically evaluate these messages to determine their veracity. I agree with Glaser that being critical is more than a desirable educational objective; it also ‘helps the individual cooperate with others’ (1985:26). The capacity to exercise critical judgement, then, can be viewed as ‘an intellectual ability, a strategy for dealing with the world’ (Cromwell 1992: 38) and, in my view, a factor contributing to good citizenship. Rhetoric acts as the foundation for the acquisition of critical skills and, as I showed in Chapter Five, has the potential to contribute to deliberative democracy, a political system in which the art of thinking together is combined with effectively engaging in discourse that does not just try to win but that moves all ‘sides’ into new territory. At its best, rhetoric can become a curricular imperative whose end is the development of a certain kind of person: engaged, articulate, resourceful, sympathetic, civil – a person trained in, conditioned by, and devoted to what was once called eloquence (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 24).

\textsuperscript{97} In fact, I have already identified a project on which I hope to commence work in the near future, which has critical literacy as its focus.
In order to become rhetorical, I contend that students need exposure to the considered construction and deconstruction of communication in concert with the rhetorical framework and a theoretical vocabulary for reflecting on and making sense of their rhetorical experience. The critical ability which grows out of the skills associated with creation and interpretation of communication may help them to observe that ‘every communication situation is unique’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 24) but crucially that they are suitably equipped to respond in an appropriate, responsible and articulate way. It is hoped that the reintegration of rhetoric into the mainstream curriculum might help ameliorate what Eagleton (2013) has called a ‘crisis of criticism’; he suggests that there are elements of contemporary Western culture which conspire against literary sensitivity and that there is an important job to be done in making society more attentive to the word and encouraging people to ‘read closely’ (Batholomew 2013: 23). It is my hope that the learning and teaching of rhetoric can do exactly this.

This dissertation, though, aims to raise the possibility of reviving in our time an art of rhetoric whose subject is bigger than a basic verbal skill and whose impact is greater than a critical theory. Terril (2011: 296) contradicts the view of Plato by suggesting that an education in rhetoric ought to be seen as ‘something more than merely the training of tongues’. As I highlighted in Chapter Five, following Young (1997), I shun the common identification of rhetoric with a focus on building a science of argumentation as a method for participating in deliberative democracy. Rather, I consider such a ‘science of argumentation’ to be a dreadful slight on the complexity and richness of Classical rhetoric’s legacy. Following Aristotle, I would prefer rhetoric to be viewed as a training in civic discourse, an integral element in the formation of citizens, that has intellectual integrity, moral attraction and practical application to a variety of communicative situations. I propose that the role of Classical rhetoric in the curriculum should be even broader and more ambitious; it ought to involve the development of an art that, once learned, ‘confers on students a genuine practical and ethical ability’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: 105). In this regard Booth (2004: xii) suggests, and I agree, that ‘the quality of our lives, especially the ethical and communal quality depends to an astonishing degree on the quality of our rhetoric’. If this is so, it follows that ‘the teaching of rhetoric – of how to think together and talk together and read and write together – is the most important of all vocations’ (Petraglia and Bahri 2003: ix) hence my call for its role in Scotland’s CfE to be urgently reviewed.
Appendix A Rhetorical passages

Cicero, *In Catilinam I*, 1-2

*Cicero accuses Catiline, a dissenting noble youth, of hatching a plot to overthrow the government of the Roman Republic.*

How long will you (continue to) abuse our patience, Catiline? For how much longer will that rage of yours make a mockery of us? To what point will your unbridled audacity show itself? Did the nocturnal garrison on the Palatine, the watch patrols of the city, the fear of the people, the assemblies of all the good men, this most fortified place of holding the Senate, the faces and expressions of all these people [the senators] not move you at all? Do you not realise that your plans lie revealed? Do you not see that your plot is already held in check by the knowledge of all these people? Do you think that any of us do not know what you did last night, what you did the night before, where you were, who you summoned, and what plans you made?

O what times (we live in)! O what customs (we pursue)! The Senate understands these things; the consul sees these things; this man, however, lives. He lives? No indeed, he even comes to the Senate. He even takes part in public affairs. He points out and designates with his eyes, individuals amongst us for slaughter. But we, brave men, seem to do enough for the state, if we avoid the rage and the weapons of that man. You, Catiline, should have been led to death already long ago by order of the consul, that ruin, which you are devising against us, should have been conferred upon you.
Barack Obama, US Presidential election victory speech, 5th November 2008

Opening

If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible; who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer.

It’s the answer told by lines that stretched around schools and churches in numbers this nation has never seen; by people who waited three hours and four hours, many for the very first time in their lives, because they believed that this time must be different; that their voices could be that difference.

It’s the answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican, black, white, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, gay, straight, disabled and not disabled - Americans who sent a message to the world that we have never been just a collection of individuals or a collection of Red States and Blue States: we are, and always will be, the United States of America.

It’s the answer that led those who have been told for so long by so many to be cynical, and fearful, and doubtful of what we can achieve to put their hands on the arc of history and bend it once more toward the hope of a better day.

It’s been a long time coming, but tonight, because of what we did on this day, in this election, at this defining moment, change has come to America.
America, we have come so far. We have seen so much. But there is so much more to do. So tonight, let us ask ourselves - if our children should live to see the next century; if my daughters should be so lucky to live as long as Ann Nixon Cooper, what change will they see? What progress will we have made?

This is our chance to answer that call. This is our moment.

This is our time - to put our people back to work and open doors of opportunity for our kids; to restore prosperity and promote the cause of peace; to reclaim the American dream and reaffirm that fundamental truth - that out of many, we are one; that while we breathe, we hope, and where we are met with cynicism and doubt, and those who tell us that we can't, we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people: yes, we can.

Thank you, God bless you, and may God bless the United States of America.
Winston Churchill, Speech to House of Commons, 4th June 1940

I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone.

At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty’s Government—every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation.

The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength.

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail.

We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.
Appendix B The four capacities of CfE

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