
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5022/

Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.
Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture: Critical Investigations

Bridget Fowler, B.A., Department of Sociology, University of Glasgow.

Submitted to the Faculty of Social Science, University of Glasgow, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, May, 1995.
Abstract

The first part of this thesis is concerned with the exegesis of Bourdieu's theory and the second part with critical investigations of his cultural analysis. In the interpretative analysis, I shall show that it is only through an understanding of his work as a whole that it is possible to grasp his now famous work on cultural reception. In our societies, the certified knowledge of professors and the consecrated representations of Tate Gallery artists serve to underpin the world through convincing the dominated of the intellectual poverty of their challenges. Moreover, I shall show that there is a stimulating and rich tension in Bourdieu's sociology, particularly in his explorations of how economic interests are culturally legitimated. Bourdieu is a classic historical materialist, yet one who denies some of the abstractions of safe orthodoxies. This means that - in the interests of truth - his theory forces the squabbling protagonists of different traditions to live together.

Bourdieu has an impressive reassessment of the logic of a minority elite culture in which art is hijacked to fit purposes often remote from the internal meanings of the texts themselves. In the second part of the thesis, it is argued that Bourdieu's sociology of culture has not entirely extricated itself from these same ideological tentacles. Firstly, in the case of Impressionism he overemphasises its character as a rupture in techniques and has not been sufficiently attuned to its dependence on popular subjects and popular sources. Secondly in the case of middlebrow and popular literature, it is suggested that he has failed to describe adequately the nature of the popular cultural field and has also neglected the character of the cultural marginalisation of women. Finally, a study of literary consumption in Scotland challenges Bourdieu's conclusions at some points. By considering these specific substantive areas, I hope to stimulate a Bourdieusian approach.
Acknowledgements

I should like to acknowledge the encouragement of Pierre Bourdieu and to express the hope that I have not distorted his views. A huge debt is owed to David Frisby, whose learning and patience has been greatly appreciated. Carol Woodward read the manuscript and helped with French translation problems. Maureen McQuillan improved the tables. Lastly, I have been heartened and stimulated intellectually by my family. To all of these, my thanks.
## Contents

Part I: Interpretative Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction:</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: Situating Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: Bourdieu's Cultural Theory</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: Current Debates in Cultural Theory</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV: Current Debates on the Sacralisation of Art</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part II: Critical Investigations

| Chapter V: Bourdieu and Modern Art: The Case of Impressionism | 182 |
| Chapter VI: The Popular and the Middlebrow                 | 234 |
| Chapter VII: Cultural Consumption                          | 274 |
| Conclusion                                                  | 326 |
| Bibliography                                                | 338 |
| Appendices                                                  | 356 |
| Tables for Chapter VII                                      |    |
Part I:
Interpretative Studies
Introduction

Situating Pierre Bourdieu.

In the Anglo-American world, there have been two moments of Pierre Bourdieu, the first in response to the English translation of Reproduction\(^1\) in 1977 and the second at the time of Distinction in 1984. Thus although there has been recent acceptance of his importance in the fields of education, consumption and leisure, there has been no sustained analysis of his cultural theory nor any attempt to analyse works such as The Rules of Art (1992) in the light of all his other works. This thesis will therefore examine his sociology of culture, with especial reference to his analysis of literature and painting. My contention is that Bourdieu's approach is the most comprehensive and sophisticated available at present and that it is more profoundly antagonistic to idealist thought than is the work of poststructuralists such as Derrida and Foucault. Bourdieu has developed an impressive new synthesis of classical social theory in the light of late capitalism. He offers a welcome relief to anyone suffering from post-Lacanian excess on the issue of the subject.

Bourdieu's personal trajectory is well-known from the small number of other critical works on him that have appeared (Robbins, 1991, Jenkins, 1992 and Harker, 1990). I will summarise briefly. The son of a postman in a village in the SW Pyrenees area of Béarn, in France, Bourdieu is very like his contemporary, Raymond Williams, in being from the marchlands of a metropolitan country, that is to say in a peasant area within a late capitalist society. In these juxtaposed worlds, he has himself experienced some of the contrasts between pre-capitalist and capitalist life that he writes about in his works. This class and spatial marginality was enhanced by experience of the bitter confrontation between coloniser and

\(^1\) Reproduction (written with Passeron) appeared in French in 1970; the edition used is the second English one (1990). Similarly Distinction was first published in 1979.
colonised in his period in the French Army. Here he managed to secure the time and, more bizarrely, the entree to start the conversion from philosophy student to ethnographer: one mark of his radicalism in the war being the inclusion of revolutionary songs at the end of *The Algerians*. After field-work in Algeria, he returned to France, undertaking work for his doctorate (aggregation) at the University of Lille. He refused to take this partly because of the pedestrian type of knowledge on offer and partly due to the hegemony of Stalinism. However he became a university teacher at Lille, where a number of his first studies of local cultural life were undertaken, along with his early studies of school and university students. From there he progressed to the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris, where he has had a major effect on the nature of research in sociology, not least by the breadth and imagination of his own work. Since 1981 he has been Professor at the Collège de France, perhaps the most consecrated position within French sociology (Jenkins, 1992: ch 1; Robbins, 1991: Intro.). *Distinction* has sold over 100,000 copies and Bourdieu has increased his accessibility with an hour-long television appearance and numerous interviews.

Bourdieu's sociology has been labelled, with only a little exaggeration: "not only the best, but ... the only game in town" (Lash, 1993: 193). In my view, this is because he has combined elements of structuralism with approaches less hostile to the transformative potential of human beings. By these means, he attempts to gather in again the lost harvest of structuralist promise. What he has repudiated is "the prison-house of thought" (Hall, 1993: 532) in which recent forms of social theorising have been artificially polarised into extremes. Bourdieu has often recited a litany of positions to be transcended - subjectivism versus objectivism; Quixoticism versus "fixism"; idealism versus determinism; existentialism versus structuralism - all dichotomies which resemble that
between structuralism and culturalism in British cultural studies. From structuralism he has retained the notion of men and women as agents, not merely because they are determined in their relations to production, but because they are elements of a structure which exists in and through signifying practices (see for example *Language and Symbolic Power* where it is proposed that such practices are the stakes in struggles over meaning and *Logic of Practice* 1990:15). These are the classifications or representations of the world through which meanings are possible and which are embedded in each individual through the doxic or taken-for-granted ways of living which socialisation confers. Bourdieu does not use the Althusserian term "imaginary" conditions of existence, but he does write of the principle of vision and division which organises the world for each agent and, as in Durkheim and Mauss's *Primitive Classifications*, these are enfolded in the habitus as a form of "doxic knowledge". The reproduction of the dominant class, as well as extended forms of social structure, occurs through these principles, located within a historical framework - see especially *The Historical Genesis of the Fresh Eye* (Bourdieu, 1993a).

But the active side of sensuous human practice, which culturalism draws on, is also renewed in Bourdieu. Hence his important conception of improvisation and strategy, explained by recourse to jazz playing or to the quarter-back's feel for when he should take the ball and scramble. The process of the division of labour which the signifying practices instil through the rules of combination and opposition are never smooth and unproblematic. The mistake of structuralism was to see events through observers' rather than the natives' eyes. This enhanced the expectations of rule-following and underestimated the degree of creative disorder from which advantages might be derived (as in the process of stretching conceptions of genealogical units, so that parallel cousin rules of marriage might be said to govern them). This was the reason for Bourdieu's original
break with structuralism - he refers to it as "French flu" - and the source of his appeal to subjective understanding: that is, to the Goffmanesque world of games, strategy and the disjunctures of back- and front-stage. Hence his demand for an end to the "repression" of Durkheim through the "softened, sweetened, euphemised" forms of the Durkheimian heritage (Bourdieu, Chartier and Darnton, 1985:89). Retaining a concept of rupture and transformation, he has progressively returned in recent years to a radicalised idea of anomie, that is, to a discrepancy between expectations and experience with its sometimes politicising effects. Thus while he hangs on to the structuralist notion of the (political) unconscious, which is acquired with the habitus, he also possesses an understanding of practice in the sense of "experience" (or structure of feeling) which is by no means merely a passive effect of doxic knowledge (see, for example, the recent work on the Front National militant or the scientist, 1993b).

I shall argue that this concept of practice is immensely fertile. It avoids the dilemmas of necessity and choice that have bedevilled sociology and Marxism. It allows us to understand how social imperatives prompt individual position-taking in a manner which, avoiding a mechanistic model of determined action, appeals to a principle of "feeling". In this way, principles of classification are described as being laid down within us rather as an old house exerts its pleasure from an accumulation of things, as opposed to the pristine order of the interior designer3. Bourdieu's practice thus operates on the same principle as works of art themselves, that is to say, that they unify a multiplicity of discrete objects (Loesburg: 1037-8)3, harmonising imperatives based on biological needs with social imperatives.

2 This seems to me rather similar to Gramsci's notion of action in accordance with common sense, which deploys fragments of old philosophy and popular maxims.
3 Loesburg has elucidated the degree to which the habitus itself has been defined in terms which have drawn on Kant's theory of art as purposiveness without purpose. However he has omitted the fact that such aesthetic elements are translated by Bourdieu into a theory of social regulation which owes its origin to Durkheim. (Loesburg, 1983).
Further, although practice is actually experienced as "unwilled necessity", it is neither the consequence of mere mechanical reproduction nor the working out of the seed of inspiration. In an unrecognised act of understated subversion, Bourdieu has made artists' action the model for all normal skilled practices accomplished in everyday life:

The coherence without apparent intention and the unity without an immediate, visible, unifying principle of all the cultural realities that are informed by a quasi-natural logic (is this not what makes the 'eternal charm of Greek art' that Marx refers to?) are the product of the age-old application of the same schemes of action and perception, which, never having been constituted as explicit principles, can only produce an unwilled necessity which is therefore necessarily imperfect but also a little miraculous and very close in this respect to a work of art (1990a: 13).

But what marks out Bourdieu's work most clearly is his very full conception of class and of culture as a response to class experience. He must think both how the dominant linguistic classifications create a common world for all classes and how these are distinctively inflected for the subordinate class with its closer experience of material urgencies. It is this which he discusses vividly with Darnton in relation to a violent demonstration of apprentices' disaffection in 1762:

(Darnton): [T]he workers who manipulated the common code were able to mock their bourgeois superiors without the latter grasping this." (Bourdieu): "It seems that this differential use of common codes, along with all sorts of strategic and complex games made possible by the juxtaposition of understood and misunderstood parts, is a product itself of differentiated worlds" (Bourdieu, Chartier and Darnton, 1985: 92)
This is an extraordinarily difficult project. Bourdieu has been criticised for portraying an over-simplified working-class culture, so constrained by the "taste for necessity" that other principles of choice have been neglected (Frow, 1987:71, Shiaich, 1993:214). Grignon and Passeron, in particular, have emphasised developing his problematic by undertaking a "double reading in which culture can be seen as at once ideological and autonomous" (1989:73).

Bourdieu has himself begun to undertake such a project in regard to gender. It is clear that an elaborate set of gender meanings has actively sustained working-class lack of choice. Because "...the idea of masculinity has one of its last refuges in the identity of the dominated classes" (1993c:4), male bourgeois consumption can be repudiated as effeminate. In other words, there must be an immensely subtle negotiation of the sign so that its inflection fits with the experience of life (as in the conception of Voloshinov's multi-accentuated linguistic sign or Bakhtin's popular culture as "gay laughter"^4). But it is extraordinarily difficult to combine smoothly both the Durkheimian tradition of representations and the Marxist tradition of class ethos, especially with Bourdieu's insistence that popular language only acquires a counter-hegemonic freedom in the highly limited areas of pub and prisons^5. Bourdieu has consistently under-emphasised working-class freedom (versus constraint) and the culturally-creative energies that can come from underneath, as opposed to the many permutations of psychological domination. In this respect, Bourdieu might be contrasted with Walt Whitman in nineteenth-century America, who saw popular slang as the active yeast fermenting in the dough of language and insisted that linguistic development had its bases from both broad and low

^4Bakhtin is, of course, invoked by Bourdieu himself in relation to popular culture (1984: 491);
^5This point has been made by Codd (1980:135); it is also raised in Garnham and Williams' critique of the quietist aspect of his thought).
Similarly Medvedev and Bakhtin were keen to stress the centrifugal nature of the novel ("the novel is uncanonical by nature") which was, they said, generated from beneath and renewed by popular energies (1978:xxi), an insight quite foreign to Bourdieu's conception of the bestselling novel. In contrast to both these, Bourdieu's concept of habitus attributes much more causal force to the action of the dominant class. His is a self-conscious anti-populism which stresses the power of great families, great schools and even great buildings in an endless form of symbolic violence. But it possesses a fatalistic consequence, particularly acute in depicting the subordinate class, whose habitus is simultaneously defensive and the product of a colonised sense of inferiority. Although Bourdieu's theory *is* preferable to individualistic versions of rational action theory, and although it is too harsh to say of Bourdieu that there is no strategising in his conception of strategy, these difficulties weaken his sociology of culture.

Bourdieu's emphasis on symbolic domination confers on him a sort of tragic wisdom. But apart from his studies in decolonisation, he has never undertaken the sort of protracted discussion of transformation - in the form of long revolutions or slave rebellions - that distinguishes the work of, say, Barrington Moore. Bourdieu is at his best exposing the pretensions to change by unveiling a whole "highbrow" culture which is dedicated to a purely rhetorical militancy or revealing the hijacking of revolutionary terms for the purposes of distinction (1980a). But the absence of any analysis of structural change is a gap in his work.

There are other difficulties with Bourdieu's project (although some alleged problems reveal more about the deficiencies of the critics than

---

*I should clarify that I do not regard Giddens' structuration theory as any more successful in this respect, despite its similar moves to Bourdieu. However, if all the assumptions of mechanical Marxism have been eliminated, Bourdieu still regards a constructive and reflexive social science as a renewed source of "rational utopianism", and believes that this should be disseminated through the media.*
Bourdieu). It could be said that all these issues stem from the *relative devaluation of the subjective moment* in Bourdieu's theory in order to reveal the tragedy of institutions which is played out behind characters' backs. There is a Sophoclean arbitrariness producing the fate of reproduction that we are condemned to bear in this conception of class and gender. It has been attenuated in very recent years by allusions to the rejection of "destiny", but in terms that draw upon the register of radical theories of anomie rather than classical Marxist images of the ranked masses of the Left. Thus I wish to raise a range of issues dealing with the alleged over-determinism of Bourdieu, which cluster around the problematic diagnosis of contradiction and conflict in his work.

Calhoun has raised the difficulty of characterising Bourdieu's work as an inheritance from Marx, in that although it clearly lays bare inequality, it fails to characterise adequately the difference between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies (1993:68-9). In fact Bourdieu does go some way toward this by identifying the difference between the market and a good faith economy, and between impersonal power based on exams and education, as against personal power acquired by family networks, rifles and honour. However Calhoun is on to firmer ground in arguing that there is an inadequate theory of contradiction in Bourdieu. Now, his critics have failed to understand that contradictions are often masked by being naturalised, so that, for Bourdieu, paternalism is a magical form of enchantment of inequalities (1990b: 10). Furthermore, Bourdieu has presented contradictions *in his recent work*, but, with the exception of Wacquant, this has gone unnoticed (Wacquant in Calhoun et al, eds.:240). In particular, he has developed a theory of anomic experience which has many of the qualities of "class conflict" elsewhere, as in his account of the resentment of unpromoted staff which was swelled by the disappointments of the rapidly increased student body in Parisian universities (1988a), his comments, in
Le Misère du Monde, on "school sickness"; and his exploration, also in the latter, of violent, frequently racialised conflict (1993b). Despite this, he has been correctly taken to task by Calhoun for not showing the effects of capitalism specifically on other types of impersonal power and by Garnham for not revealing how capital accumulation itself imposes different imperatives from - say - Reithian paternalism in the area of cultural production in the media (Garnham, 1993: 185-7).

Both these points are well-taken. I believe that Bourdieu's work does, however, derive from what might be called the "peculiarities of the French" - especially the relative strength in French history of a "state nobility" as a meritocratically-selected group of higher civil servants and professionals which can be clearly demarcated from the industrial and financial capitalist fraction. Bourdieu's recent work has identified the contradictions between these two class fractions, especially in terms of the fate of their different styles of education, the hierarchical position of different educational institutions according to the relative power of each fraction within it and the antagonisms between them expressed as absolute gulfs in taste.

Nobody who reads Bourdieu's work since 1988 can miss the struggle for survival and open conflict that he depicts both at an individual, departmental and faculty level, within the academic world and the cultural field more broadly (1988a, 1992). But part of his pathos undoubtedly lies in the fact that conflicts of social interests are frequently detectable only through costs of individual accommodation, as in the case of the large number of peasant inheritors whose economic plight is simultaneously expressed and masked through a clumsy "unattractiveness" making them vulnerable to celibacy.

7 Frow is surely wrong to believe that there is a difficulty in converting economic capital into cultural capital, as Bourdieu claims takes place?
8 Rigby has usefully argued that the harsh struggle for survival in the academic field has been used to justify the autonomous intellectual against the heteronomous intellectual journalists of the media (1993).
There is, further, confusion about the philosophical status of Bourdieu's reflexive sociology. Some sociologists have argued for Bourdieu's ultimate position being that of perspectivism (Lash, 1993), others for realism (Wacquant, 1993), the second being, in my view, more persuasive. Moreover, his shifting "methodological polytheism" has led to uncertainty about his prescriptions for good sociological practice. It should be said from the outset that in explaining these sources of confusion, Bourdieu's heuristic principle of "bending the stick the other way" should never be underestimated. It is this which requires grasping his work as a whole rather than any small part of it.

Other objections have been made to Bourdieu. He has been held to exhibit an "individualism of his world-view", possessing no conceptualisation of a social group and dissolving mind into a mere function of the body (Jenkins, 1992:93), although in the light of his emphasis on the (political) "unconscious" and its historically changing collective outcomes this is a fantastic claim. He has been criticised for producing in Distinction a work of "cultural voyeurism" (Robbins, 1991: 129). He has been condemned for his "labyrinthine theory of practice" which is "a machine for the suppression of history" (Jenkins, 1992:97). These are strange views that I don't think can be sustained 9.

There are certain key areas of Bourdieu's cultural theory which have provoked problems that should be taken more seriously. Although there have been two single-authored books on Bourdieu so far, and important essays by Lash, Garnham, Lipuma and Calhoun (Calhoun, Lipuma and Postone, 1993; Moi, 1991; Wilson 1988 and Crowther 1994), Bourdieu has not yet had the depth of attention he deserves in the field of sociology of culture. Admittedly, there has been a critical reception of Bourdieu's work in

9It is only necessary to note Bourdieu's essay on The Historical Genesis of the Pure Aesthetic in The Field of Cultural Production (1993a:254-266) and all his early work on Algeria to realise the oddity of this claim.
the narrower compass of studies of the school, which it is outside the scope
of this thesis to consider (Halsey, 1980: 141-6; Bernstein, 1975: 161, 176-7;
MacDonald, 1978; Bredo and Fineberg, 1979). But within the broader sphere
of cultural theory, his subversive approach to legitimate aesthetics has not
been properly understood. In particular, Bourdieu's attempt to retrieve
classical Marxism from routinised banalisation has involved an attack on
literature and art as ideologies and it is the logic of this attack which his
critics have often failed to grasp.

Indeed, recent commentators on Bourdieu, in my view, have entirely
misunderstood his meaning. Thus, although my admiration for Jameson is
great, I cannot follow him when he sees Distinction merely as a study in
conspicuous consumption (1991; 131). This dismissive judgement is
unexpected since Jameson, like Bourdieu, also uses the combined
approaches of Marx and Durkheim and has a comparable interest in the
changing place of modernism in relation to power. I should mention also
Roger Huss, whose Times Literary Supplement review of Bourdieu's cultural
theory succeeds only in caricature when it describes Bourdieu as a "modest
aristocrat" engaging in a "kulturkampf" against the cultural resentment of
the masses. For Huss, Bourdieu's approach amounts to no more than a
derivative "dogged pursuit" of Sartrean theory distinguished only by a few
minor cavils about subject and method (1993: 11). Lastly, Garnham and
Williams have made some illuminating comments on Bourdieu's implicit
valorisation of a popular aesthetic in Distinction. Yet they have
misunderstood his view that the techniques for the decipherment of
canonised works might be broadly diffused, rather than class possessions
(1986).

In the chapters that follow I aim to remedy these deficiencies. I
intend to do so by two routes, First I shall provide a hermeneutic
interpretation of Bourdieu's writing insofar as it is relevant to theories of
culture. Here I shall argue that Bourdieu has indeed rescued cultural production from simplistic social theory which viewed the artist in reductive and passive terms:

"I had to take back from idealism the active side which the materialist tradition notably with the theory of reception, had abandoned it to" (1987a:14). This statement will be explored in terms of Bourdieu's unmasking of various ideologies of cultural creativity and reception, which together constitute areas of magical "belief" in contemporary societies. Secondly, I shall address through a number of substantive issues the lacunae in his thought or the areas that suffer at present from an over-schematic presentation. By these means I hope to stimulate further work in the Bourdieusian project, conceived as an important renewal of a rich tradition. There are difficulties of four main types, relating to method, descriptive status, conception of the canon and the controversy over popular art.

(1) Disputes over method

One aim of any sociological method should be the "democratisation of the hermeneutic" (1993b:923), that is to say, the restoration to the subordinate class of the same importance and complexity of motivations as are commonly attributed to canonised authors or the political elite. In part, Bourdieu's cultural theory has used methods that depend on interpretative analyses of texts, biographical materials etc., as well as innovative content analyses of essay comments or agregation reports to shed light on the binary classifications deployed by academic or critic. But his most recent methodological writings confront the wider problem of how to understand the social world, proposing a method of "participant objectivation" which will break through the disabling "objectivism"/"subjectivism" dilemma (1987a; 1993b: 905-925).

His method seems to me to have taken a 180 degree turn. A work like
The Love of Art demonstrates statistical dexterity at the cost of more complex questions of motivation. At this point Bourdieu could be labelled a methodological positivist, even if his sociology always possessed a broad historical thrust. In contrast, with his recent work, the use of the questionnaire has been excluded - almost demonised - as the crass instrument of the domination of the masses. It is crucial to accept Bourdieu's critique of the imposition of categories on the subject, a process which often evokes only silence or meretricious comments. But the retention of the instrumental/non-instrumental divide in order to quarantine an interrogation from genuine social science does not entail this kind of methodological splitting of the self versus the other based on research instruments alone. In the reception analysis that ends this book and that takes up many of the concerns of Distinction, I have chosen rather to employ the method of that earlier work. Used in unhurried surroundings, even interviews (including a questionnaire) are capable of producing that emancipatory pleasure in talking - in delivering up harshly-acquired understanding - of which Bourdieu has written so vividly in La Misère du Monde.

(2) Comparative studies.

While Distinction in particular has been praised as a rich ethnography of contemporary France (Brubaker, 1985), the scope and meaning of its assessment of the role of cultural capital in late capitalism have been questioned (Giddens, 1986). In fact, even the textual meaning of Distinction itself is fundamentally contested. Thus Robbins, who emphasizes that Bourdieu's sociology "is a concerted attempt to rescue and to celebrate the authenticity of the behaviour of ordinary people." (1991:15) has argued that Distinction is a "politically dysfunctional work" (1991:129) that can only accentuate the divergence of tastes it describes. Garnham, on the other hand, has read Distinction as "the revenge of the French rural working
class” (Garnham, 1993:181), deciphering its main thrust as a defence of popular culture (see Fowler, 1991:215-6). The national limitations in Bourdieu’s findings have been emphasised recently in a fascinating comparison of the contrasting class ethos of French and North American upper-middle class by Lamont (1992). She has stressed the divergence of views about the salience of aesthetic taste or high culture, moral awareness and economic success in a Parisian sample as against a provincial Clermont-Ferrand bourgeois group, and also between a New York and Indianapolis group. She identifies certain key differences between France and America, especially the smaller class fraction dependent on economic profits, the greater central government expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product in France (45% vs 26%), the more significant proportion employed by the State in France (31% vs 16%) and the more centralised French educational system, with its smaller educated elite (1992:144). Such differences, she argues, have resulted in greater inequality of wealth in France, fewer chances of social mobility, less ethnic diversity and also in less stress on money as a form of social closure than cultural traits such as intellectual playfulness. In her view, inequalities of knowledge have been overemphasised by Bourdieu:

Indeed in France, cultural barriers are only slightly more important than other types of boundaries and they predominate only in Paris and not in Clermont; even if Bourdieu is not concerned with the American case, it is useful to stress again that many [upper middle-class] Americans do not show signs of cultural goodwill, do not acknowledge the legitimacy of high culture and the importance [of] knowledge about it (1992: 186)

She concludes that Bourdieu’s sociology has not been sufficiently reflexive in examining the distinctiveness of its own perspective, that of Parisian intellectuals or cultural and social specialists.
But is this so? An alternative explanation of Bourdieu's rationale is that he wants to emphasise precisely the differences between metropolis and even large towns in the periphery and that Paris has a typical significance for him in being the most extreme example of the ideology of natural intellectual gifts. Thus a comparative study might not refute Bourdieu but would confirm the very trajectories and strategies that are at stake when he writes of the control over space and time that the haute bourgeoisie possesses, and that the process is merely more developed in Paris. Be that as it may, it is clearly important to explain these divergencies (of gender as well as national and regional origin) and to unravel their meaning. The reception study offered in Chapter VII on Scottish women readers is another attempt to undertake this sort of investigation and, like the work of Lamont (1992), it questions the degree to which formalism is used as the rationale for taste even in the liberal professions.

(3) The canon

Bourdieu has criticised the essentialist view of art by showing that its proponents stress the universality and timeless qualities of works of art while simultaneously excluding as valid sources of aesthetic pleasure both the charm offered by the objects of popular pleasures and the purely cerebral playfulness of the court. Hence Bourdieu's vulgar materialism shows how the economy of symbolic goods offers scarce resources (the taste for consecrated art) to serve as a strategy of distinction in a way which must favour the dominant class because of the built-in class specificity of Kant's speciously universal judgements. Bourdieu has been taken to task for this, both on the (Kantian) ground that analytical arguments about the judgement of art are not affected by empirically-existing differences in taste (Giddens) and on the ground that art, on this view, cannot be distinguished by its intrinsic value but only by its magical aura or "fetish" character in social action, a view which detracts from
artists' historic importance in resisting the demands of the culture industries (Burger, 1984:24). Both these arguments have some force. Burger is right that the canon has been at least in part constituted by the work of dissident artists. Bourdieu might issue the riposte that Burger has failed to understand that the assessment of fetishism relates to the critique of art as a "sacred island" in a bourgeois society. Nevertheless, I think there is a tension between Bourdieu's views of artistic goods as fetishes and his view that artists are prophets (1992). I shall argue that there are grounds for applying the concept of prophet with more substantive social referents than Bourdieu does and that consequently the approach to artists adopted in his writings has paid too little attention to their motives and subjective meanings. I shall suggest that the process he describes as the artistic internalisation of the high/low divide by artists fails to assess adequately the historical differences in the groups of avant-garde artists. My approach in chapter V specifically takes up his case-study of Manet and impressionism, which, I shall argue, Bourdieu misleadingly associates solely with a turn to formalism.

(4) The problem of popular art.

Finally, it has not escaped critical attention that Bourdieu has excluded any popular art from his category of canon or consecrated culture (Shusterman, 1992:172; 1993:155), even though it is not clear why this should be. Bourdieu regards the emergence of modernism as a period when the possession of culture was axiomatically equated with the monopoly of an elite minority. Except for a few folk fossils, the masses have been literally culturally dispossessed, a process which ranks at the very least with the stripping of peasants of their land and which we can now perhaps hardly recall with its full terror. The attempt to produce a few claims to the title of "working-class art" is to make the mistake of falling into pastoral mode, that is, of confusing intellectuals' accounts of the people with the
people's own view of themselves.

This thesis will explore the limitations of such a position. It will question whether the ironic interpretation of early capitalist aesthetic discourses has not caused Bourdieu to erect a historical construction of canonical closure which is too complete and too impermeable. It will suggest further that the restricted spatial arena of Bourdieu's studies have blinded him to the existence of authorship within the popular art-forms that a concept of rediscovery can bring back to our gaze. The analysis of middlebrow and popular writers contained in chapter VI suggests new perspectives on this problem.

I shall suggest that these are areas where a reassessment of cultures of resistance would be appropriate, and that this cannot be done without an examination of the gendering of genres. I shall look especially at the obstacles for women in acquiring recognition within avant-garde movements, and the emergence of women writers with considerable cultural capital in the middlebrow sphere, especially in the inter-war period. It is proposed that their works continued to make an impact on what has been called - following Felski - the feminist counter-public sphere. Arguing that some of the insights of Bourdieu's *Photography* could provide the basis for a fertile approach to working-class and peasant art, I take up some of the best-selling genres he has neglected. I shall also question Bourdieu's view that in capitalist modernity there is no popular art, a position which has been ably criticised by Shusterman (1992:192). I shall assess this in the light of British Chartist and working-class writing. Finally, I shall provide a critical investigation of Bourdieu's account of artistic reception, by introducing the results of my own study of Scottish women readers. While largely confirming the stratification of taste to which Bourdieu has alluded in *Distinction*, it will also show that literature plays a variety of roles for
popular readers which his contrast between the formalism of the aesthetic attitude and the glitz of the naive gaze has neglected.

The substantive investigations of the second part of this thesis can only make sense with a critical exposition of Bourdieu's theory and the tradition of cultural analysis of which he is a part. This is the task of the first part of the thesis. Chapter I will outline Bourdieu's general sociology so as to situate adequately his understanding of the role of culture. In the second chapter I shall introduce his analysis of the conquest of literary autonomy with modernism, and especially the division of the cultural field between commercial best-sellers and "art". The third and fourth chapters will seek to relate Bourdieu to other current debates especially in the area of modernity, postmodernity and feminist cultural theory.

Bourdieu's brilliance lies in mapping the whole of contemporary culture in terms of structural inversions and reversals. It will be argued that he possesses a powerful explanation of the changing function of modernism in time and place. Like the political economy of the heroic bourgeoisie, modernism once permitted a profoundly critical understanding. It is now objectively apologetic - serving merely to offer a form of cultural capital which can be cashed in for good jobs (1984). However, Bourdieu also claims that his theory can account for the transformative action of agents, which has of course been the traditional arena of artists and literary intellectuals. Bourdieu's reception theory neither denies that writers and artists are autonomous nor that they are capable of "singular achievements", but it does deny that culture is now an instrument of social change. It will be contended that he has underemphasised the potential for art and literature to be both critical and to imagine new alternatives.
Chapter I
Situating Bourdieu's sociology of culture

It is only possible to grasp Bourdieu's work on art and cultural reception if we understand the comparative analysis on which his whole work pivots. His childhood in the peasant area of Béarn and his time as an anthropologist in Kabylia (Algeria), shaped his analysis of the transition from precapitalist to capitalist forms and of the distinctive patterns of domination associated with modernity. My aim here is to start with Bourdieu's early studies in Algeria to show what historical preconditions are necessary for specialised and autonomous cultural fields to emerge. I shall then introduce via his major works, the theoretical areas in which he has made decisive interventions, especially the nature of symbolic violence; the role of the universities and cultural capital in the strategies of the dominant class; the resilience of popular culture; the fate of heterodox worldviews; and, finally, what might be called "proletarian emiserisation" revisited. In the process of mapping his social theory, I shall indicate the origin of his concepts and ideas, but I aim to focus on the logic of his distinctive perspective rather than the provenance of his theory. My main claim is that he has superceded various problems that have perennially plagued sociology as a critical social theory and that, at the present moment, this is the most original and cogent modelling of the social world that we have.

_The Algerians (1961)._

His early work on ethnography already shows unusual scope and an innovative departure from the authorised and mechanistic materialism of "Histmat". This book explores the breakdown of the equilibrium between artisan towns and the peasant countryside, following on the emergence of
both the class society and the ideology of race instituted by colonialism. Although Bourdieu is not listed as one of the signatories of the Manifesto of the 121, the book was written in the midst of the Algerian War and may well have contributed to those events which led to resistance to service in the French Army, such as the Jeanson networks (Alverman, 1960:46; Anon., 1960:196-7). In drawing on traditions normally insulated from each other, it bears the traces not just of the profound influence of Durkheim but also of Weber. Even more decisive are the marks of the famous Vol. I Part 8 of *Capital*, especially where Marx deals with the importance of colonialism for increasing proletarianisation.

Bourdieu points out that traditional tribal Algerian societies such as the peasant Kabylia compensated for their weak mastery of nature by elaborate and detailed social organisation:

> By a sort of phenomenon of compensation, to the imperfection of techniques there is a corresponding exaggerated perfection of the social order - as if the precariousness of his adjustment to the natural environment was counterbalanced by the excellence of the social organisation (1961:6).

This is also evident in the artisan and merchant towns, where a leisurely daily period within the public sphere developed, - at least for men - "the art and culture of social relations" (1961:62). By such statements, Bourdieu reveals that the colonialist or Orientalist discourse is subverted within his writing. Thus he stresses the democracy of Kabylian tribal organisation and the logic of social honour or symbolic capital which takes the place of the accumulation of economic capital in the Kabylian life-cycle. In general, his ethnographic analysis effectively undercuts any facile belief in the barbarism of the Islamicised Algerians.
However, Bourdieu sometimes verges on the undiscriminating nostalgia that is implicit in some representatives of "negritude". I refer in this context to his discussion of gender divisions where he seems to me to "bend the stick too far in the other direction" by stressing the multiple forms of *de facto* power available to women, despite their traditional condition of subordination to male tutelage. He claims, for example, that despite the extreme subordination of women displayed by the Shawia tribe, the women themselves possessed some countervailing influence deriving from their extraordinary gender solidarity. Those who had been widowed or repudiated by their husbands could resist extreme patriarchal controls, he contends, by judicious resort to the magical rhetoric of the evil eye. Yet he also acknowledges the ceaseless labour of Kabylian women, and their disappearance from all public life as soon as they marry. These conclusions suggest a fraught and uneasy stance, being better grounded in the evidence for the marked level of legally-monopolised male power rather than for the existence of extensive freedoms for women.

Algerian traditional society did not lack endogenous change. The Mozabite tribe in the desert cities, whose predestination beliefs and ascetic rigour Bourdieu compares to Weber's Puritan dissenters, are the main protagonists of this drama of capitalist entrepreneurial activity and industry. However Mozabite modernity did not serve - like the icy waters of egoism in the West - to drown the heavenly chorus. Rather, the profane centre of the market is viewed by Bourdieu as having *supported* the sacred centre of the mosque; while the success of the entrepreneurial action of male migrants to the cities fostered the family and communal life of the countryside\(^1\). Bourdieu's writing

---

\(^1\) The comparison is with the Protestant Ethic but the more apt analogy would have perhaps been with traditional Judaism, where Weber emphasises the ways in which the business rationality of the Jews develops within a context of great integration of family and community networks (Weber, 1952, 344-5, 382, 424).
thus stands in the tradition of Maxine Rodinson (1974) in explaining the lack of internal development of capitalism in these areas not through the influence of Islam itself but through the strength of a military dominant class committed to the resilience of non-capitalist forms.

However, the main emphasis of *The Algerians* is on the end of the old paternalist order of the great families and of its stable balance between city and country. Instead the dialectic of colonialism leads remorselessly from the appropriation of the most fertile soil by the French, to the dispersal of the Algerians on to marginal soil, followed by rapid urban proletarianisation and the explosive growth of the unemployed. The city is now stripped of its public sphere, with its daily routine of rational communication. Only its worst conditions are shown to its new inhabitants, whose lives (outside the new bourgeoisie) become ones of utter privation: "the art and culture of social relations" cannot survive the epidemics, absolute want and overcrowding of the distended urban centres (1961:62).

In the country the concentration of property and consequent sharecropping had preceded colonialism, but was greatly strengthened by it, particularly since European law legitimated individual ownership of land. This not only facilitated European takeover, it also led to an accelerated decline in tribal owned land (1/5th in 1961). "[T]his means the death sentence of the tribe", Bourdieu comments, noting the atomisation or "social vivisection" it produced. More profoundly, it provoked a shift from the "gift and counter-gift economy" to the money economy (1961:84). It is necessary to understand this clearly for Bourdieu views the gift economy as sustaining solidarity. Its abandonment was partly based on a forced modernity, partly a response to the hegemony of French culture. Rural Algerians (fellahs) had a long time-perspective in which the future was perceived as close to the present. Thus the fellah has almost a
"mystical" attachment to the soil:

land is an end in itself not a mere means of existence and work is not a way of living but a way of life (1961:103).

Money was a unit of value before colonisation, but it was not used as an abstract value. Specifically, it did not serve as speculative credit for the purpose of capital accumulation, because the future was not conceived as new. Only with the impoverishment of the fellah was there provoked the rise of the "new men" of the cities, stripped of their families and dispossessed of that temporal sense and "art of life" founded in the land. The French had precipitated "a transmutation of values" (1961:118).

It is crucial to understand Bourdieu's view of this representative non-Western pre-capitalist culture in order to grasp his view of the place of the aesthetic in modern Western life. Self-expression in the West has spawned constant vigilance to a "dialectic of distinction". Such individualism is absent in Kabylia, as is evident in the demarcation of tents on a purely formal basis by red or black. For in Kabylia, the cliche is desirable as part of a culture of politeness (set against the logic of practice) in which the cultural apprenticeship is "to guard against ... any improvisation ... in behaviour" (1961:96). Typical in this respect is oral poetry which annuls the passage of time so as to make the young aware of the noble actions of their ancestors. It thus allows the perpetual re-experience of the past within a present only weakly opposed to it. Moreover, in Kabylia, craft has not become degraded by contrast with high art.

*The Algerians* ends with a new collective development of poetry: the songs of resistance developed in the war against the French. From this society "sliding into the dizzy abyss", then, there was also salvaged a small compensation, a new culture. Within this, there was not only a popular culture
of poems registering the common experience of loss but a new French-language novel, expressing the "sense of anguish" of the educated Algerian class "between two worlds". Bourdieu frequently returns to these linked themes, the erosion of all the old communal forms through capitalism and colonialism and the compensatory dream of a sacred, set apart aesthetic sphere.

In his subsequent studies of Kabylia (1977 and 1990s), Bourdieu first introduces the ideas that have had an extraordinary impact on later sociology. First, the concept of practice, which for him means an agent makes decisions and moves his body in a "regularised improvisation" like jazz (1977:11).

The idea of practice, as I shall show, has been developed extensively in Bourdieu's later work. To what extent does this concept, associated as it is with his conversion to structuralism, successfully withstand the criticisms levelled against this approach? Remarkably well. Bourdieu manages to abandon the unacceptable Enlightenment conception of native thought as irrational (like that of the mad and children) (Ferguson, 1990:16-21). But he saves the equally important notion of the submission of ideas to a rational procedure of truth-claims as the distinguishing feature of scientific rationality, or "theoretical practise". It has been argued by Brubaker that Bourdieu's conception of the scientific habitus embeds scientific thought in the same concern for the "feel" of the game and in the same aesthetic sense of adequacy which governs practice in everyday life more broadly (Brubaker, 1993, 230-1). Now this may be true of some unusual physicists, but I do not think it is faithful to Bourdieu's Logic of Practice. Here he certainly compares practice with the aesthetic and especially with taste, but he locates practice as a feature of the everyday life of modernity, rather than that of the specialised modes of operation that prevail in science. In fact Bourdieu has explicitly
repudiated the irrationalist position that lurks in Brubaker's argument. His most recent study of sociological method explicitly uses the term "realism", thus associating himself with a tradition of thought about social science which rejects the relativist perspectivism of Kuhnian or Lyotardian paradigm theory (Bourdieu and Waquant, 1992:155)².

It is one of the most attractive features of Bourdieu's sociology that he has transcended the sterility of the objectivist versus subjectivist debate within social theory, and it is within his successive studies of Kabylia that his double rejection of the one-sided alternatives of both structuralism and existentialism, of mechanical materialism and rational action theory have been grounded. Bourdieu roots his theory of "structural constructivism" in the dialectical materialism of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* (1977:23; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:11). He locates the role of objective structures in setting limits to agents' choice of goals as well as blinkering their perceptions of reality. A theme constantly reiterated in relation to Sartre's existentialism and to Schutz's and Garfinkel's phenomenological "accounts of accounts" is that these lack a sufficient grasp of historically-developing objective conditions within which humans' social constructions can occur. Sartre, for example, neglects any analysis of revolution in terms of a response to objective conditions and constraints, making it instead a feature of a willed act of the imagination alone. But most strikingly, and to a greater degree than most sociologists, Bourdieu has understood social structures as operating not just via internalisation but through incorporation. Thus the submissiveness of

² It is not without interest that Gellner has recently developed a theory of native traditional thought which relies on substantially the same distinction as Bourdieu's monothetic and polythetic logics (see 1990a: 83-4). Like Bourdieu, Gellner argues that the fuzziness of this mode of thought fails to be a problem when the defined objects are separated in time or place (1988: 44-5).
Kabylian women is embodied in the curvature of their spines towards the ground. It is not just that social learning is engrained on the body, like the scars sometimes signifying transition to adulthood, rather it is imitated unconsciously through specific bodily actions. This stress on the unconscious and bodily expressions of the social ("hexis") (1990a:74) does not deny the emergence of complex forms of resistance but it does stress the durability of the earliest actions learnt through example or apprenticeship, that is through the mastery of practice. But to grasp his thinking on this point properly, it is necessary to note the intellectual positions which he distinguishes from his own social theory. These issues emerge particularly clearly in the concept now virtually synonymous with Bourdieu for some: that of the habitus.

*Habitus* has been variously defined in Bourdieu's theory but it is put most simply in *Reproduction* as "[the] system of schemes of ... perception, thought, appreciation and action which are durable and transposable" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990:35). Given that this implies that the subjective world is constituted in a stable pattern, Bourdieu then goes on to link habitus to a material or structural position, not unlike the Lukácsian notion of world-view. Yet whereas the western Marxist position has identified existence within the dominated class with a utopian or revolutionary world-vision, Bourdieu has stressed also the modes of ressentiment and especially resignation associated with deprivation. The habitus of the dominated frequently leads them to choose actively what they are objectively constrained to do. Thus they "make a virtue out of necessity", as in the case of women who adopt high standards for the housework they are constrained to undergo alone. Aspirations are therefore limited, as revealed in the phrase "That's not for the likes of us".

---

3 Bourdieu does not pose the question that is raised systematically in a work such as Barrington Moore's *Injustice*, that is, given the experience of (material) injustice,
What are the schemes of perception that order the Kabylian habitus? Bourdieu has portrayed some of the crucial principles in the diagrammatic descriptions of the Kabylian house and agricultural calendar. These guide how things should be done. In terms of strict logic, they are based on principles that flout the rules of contradiction. However, in a key passage, Bourdieu stresses that the polythetic rationality of the Kabylians inheres in their conception of logic of practice regulated by a longer and more episodic conception of time (1990a:12-13, 261). Polythetic logic is based on strategic consideration of interests in the broadest sense and exists in all societies. In contrast, the more "monothetic" rationality, characteristic of a tiny minority, particularly of scientists and philosophers in late capitalism, derives from the typical capacity to view things abstractly, stripped of all temporal embeddedness in events and presented in the written form which makes for theoretical understanding.

Successful practice requires the actor both to operate within a specific habitus and to act creatively beyond the specific injunctions of its rules. Put another way, the habitus supplies a regulated set of perceptions and actions, within which improvisation typically occurs. Bourdieu himself likes to use the examples of football or tennis to explain this: the player has literally a "feel for the game" such that "in the heat of the moment" he or she will make the right moves or calculations. This loose linkage with the rules and what has been done before is also pointed to in the field of painting: thus the painter not only

---

when is a revolutionary response rather than one of ressentiment more likely? While he states that crises that produce a revolutionary response emerge from the disparity of subjective expectations and objective conditions, he rarely specifies what provokes such crises. Nor does he consider the role of the imagination or desire in heightening crises, especially in contrast with Ricoeur's or Habermas's philosophical analysis of the role of art. I return to this point in chapter VII and the Conclusion.
acquires a sense of how other artists fit together in the chain of producers, but also masters the medium practically by solving the problematic issues present at any given moment (1990a:55)\textsuperscript{4}. This often distinguishes him from the art critic, who frequently lacks awareness of such difficult practical skills.

It seems to me that - like Giddens - Bourdieu has been struck by the sheer level of expertise involved in run-of-the-mill human accomplishments. Despite the existence of doxic or taken-for-granted knowledge (that which cannot be spoken), this complexity of calculation is what he sees as an endemic feature of action. It was this rejection of the mechanistic model of humans as mere bearers of structures that led Bourdieu to break with the "happy structuralism" of the period up to 1963, and to re-interpret the oppositions which he had earlier deployed to characterise the rituals and symbolism of the Kabilian world (1968). Crucial in this respect are two criticisms he makes of Levi-Strauss. First, that the latter assumes that ritual and myths are "eternal answers to eternal questions" rather than the solution to practical problems:

\begin{quote}
Beneath its air of radical materialism it is a form of idealism affirming the universality and eternity of the logical categories, while ignoring the dialectic of social structures and structured, structuring dispositions ... (1977: 203).
\end{quote}

Thus Levi-Strauss reifies into separate aesthetic or spiritual episodes, actions which have both wider significance and a precise material function. Linked to this, Levi-Strauss fails to connect ritual meanings to material experiences as well as to the subjective principles of vision and division to which these gave

\textsuperscript{4}Although the degree to which a painter possessed an iconic code which regulated his actions, even in medieval Europe and other pre-capitalist societies, has been over-emphasised by Panofsky - against this structuralist distortion, Bourdieu stresses the symbolic gymnastics of cultural production (1977:23).
The Kabylian peasant does not react to "objective conditions" but to these conditions as apprehended through the socially-constituted schemes that organise his perception. To understand ritual practice, to give it back both its reason and raison d'être without converting it to a logical construct or a spiritual exercise means more than simply reconstituting its internal logic. It also means restoring its practical necessity by relating it to the real conditions of its genesis ... It means describing the most brutally material bases of the investment in magic, such as the weakness of the productive and reproductive forces, which causes a life dominated by anxiety about matters of life and death to be lived as an uncertain struggle against uncertainty." (1990a: 97.)

However, it is also abundantly clear that Bourdieu has rejected the polar opposite of this position, by which I mean the "rational choice" theory of Elster, or earlier, the Sartrian ideas of "authentic action" or good and bad faith. In each case the reasoning is the same. Both these approaches lack a proper sense of a social institution. Thus, on Sartre he laments the fact that:

from the reified state of the alienated group, to the authentic existence of the historical agent, consciousness and thing are as irremediably separate as they were at the outset, without anything resembling an institution or a socially-constituted agent having been observed...

(1977: 76)

From Elster he has taken the "sour grapes" syndrome, but he sternly rejects the pretensions of this type of re-reading of Marxism, with its over-calculative, rationalist conception of human action. For Bourdieu, practice is informed by a kind of objective finality without being consciously organised in relation to an explicitly constituted end; intelligible and
coherent without springing from an intention of coherence and a deliberate decision; adjusted to the future without being a product of a project or a plan (1990a: 50-51).

It will perhaps be clear now that Bourdieu's characteristic way of resolving the stalemates in academic social theory is by refusing both rival positions that compete for intellectual authority, whether in terms of problematics raised outside Marxism or in terms of issues that produce the same dilemmas within it. He transcends the existing antinomies by pioneering a third alternative position or method in a manner that often seems extraordinarily fertile. I shall map out further how he has done this before returning to the field of culture to assess his achievements with a more close-grained gaze.

Symbolic Capital

Both precapitalist and capitalist societies are organised around symbolic capital - to achieve recognition as one of the Great is its ultimate mark. Algerians have a sense of honour, reputation or dignity, which is regulated particularly (although not entirely) by the sexual division of labour and it is this which motivates their actions rather than the accumulation of money or capital. Although Bourdieu uses the term "symbolic capital" as analogous to economic capital, this can be misleading. It is not the case that symbolic capital is (only) achieved in the context of a competitive "market"-based success. Rather, an important category of the possession of symbolic capital may simply mean the achievement of a human existence - as in Kabylian sexual honour - which is differentiated from animal action and which is potentially open to all humans. Thus, the contrast is perhaps with certain types of deviance, possibly only the subject of myth, and not the zero-sum competition inherent in the Western conception of "status".
It is true, as Bourdieu points out, that in class societies, every type of symbolic capital is filtered through the prisms of class domination. Action is based on collective strategies to ensure the interests of the great families, in France as much as Kabylia and through marriage as well as production. But in Kabylia symbolic profits demand the repayment of favours to retainers and are destructive of capital accumulation as an end in itself. In France, however, symbolic capital is typically converted through a circuit rather like the conversion of money into value or capital and back into money again: there is, however, no necessity to this circular transformation and acquisition of symbolic and economic capital can be in principle separated.

Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital is often arrestingly phrased and owes much to the need to move beyond a crude economic reductionism in Marxism. It is not always transparent in its clarity however, and one area I wish to introduce here will prove difficult when discussing the field of culture. I refer to the notion of "symbolic profits". Are these perceived and shared by the agent and does he/she gauge her action to achieve them? Or are "symbolic profits" the product of an objective analysis of a whole social process? If so, who is the observer and how has he/she managed to attain such a uniquely privileged, totalising perspective? Despite Bourdieu's awareness of this problem in his criticism of Levi-Strauss, this is still a difficulty in relation to his attribution of interests in symbolic capital to modernist artists.

*Time and Practice.*

Bourdieu's recent work has expanded the sense of practice to include all non-theoretical action. It characterises not just those especially near to material necessity, but every action in which time is important so that it is undertaken with a sense of urgency. Increasingly, even science has been interpreted as a set of activities involving mastery of a set of rules (which also
masters the scientist). The theoretical mode in which contradictions are isolated and rejected is now seen as only one aspect of science: hence sociology, for example, is (plausibly) viewed also as a craft.

As we have seen, Bourdieu emphasises that the fuzziness of polythetic thought, with its elaborate cosmological meanings for social differences are rational in a context where activities are separated by the passage of time. In fact, he argues that such systems of differences survive in advanced capitalism as ultimate values (1990a:1) These inform also a set of meanings - "taste" - which allows very diverse areas to be described with the same contrasting terms: cooking, appearance and philosophical essays can all be differentiated by certain major oppositions, such as brilliant/dull; bland/scintillating or noble/common. However, there is one area where these are retained with considerable complexity, and this is the sphere of art. That is to say that art operates by means of images drawn from popular analogies or textual references and it is these which trigger these mythological evaluations:

As a belated small-scale producer of private mythologies, it is easier for him [the poet] to cut through dead metaphors and go straight to the heart of mythopoetic practice ...” (1990a:94).

In order to understand political economy as ideology, Marx had to deconstruct it and show how the mutually dependent social relations of the agents of capital and the agents of labour had come into being. But a pure interest in capital accumulation also has to have other objective conditions: Bourdieu's work on Kabylia has reminded us that these are missing here, as everywhere, where there is no unadulterated pressure for profit as an end, and consequently no perception of labour as an abstract and depersonalised unit of time. Bourdieu insists that in Kabylia the man who tries to get through his agricultural work very fast and without regard for the calendrical regulation of
different jobs is thought to be crazy. Moreover, since everyone "takes pains with nature" in his/her labour, there is no conception of a timed interval of labour for a particular given task. Even after the emergence of capital accumulation, it is a "fairy story" to assume that the same objective conditions exist to make everyone concerned with it: there is an unequal distribution of the "right to pre-empt the future". Thus the peasants of Kabylia offer:

the art of living raised to an art for art's sake, founded on a refusal to acknowledge the 'business is business' or 'time is money' on which the unaesthetic lifestyle of the harried leisure classes in so-called advanced societies is based (1977:195).

By contrast, in advanced capitalism, the concern for money so dominates the whole of life that art stands out as the one area where things operate differently:

The denial of economic interest ... finds its favourite refuge in the domain of art and culture, the site of pure consumption - of money, of course, but also of time convertible into money. The world of art, a sacred island systematically and ostentatiously opposed to the profane world of production, a sanctuary for gratuitous, disinterested activity in a universe given over to money and self-interest offers, like theology in a past epoch, an imaginary anthropology brought about by the denial of all the negations really brought about by the economy (1977:197).

Cultural Capital: the inheritance of consecrated culture

In this section I want to explore these issues more deeply, before going on to look specifically at Bourdieu's theory of the perception of art.

Bourdieu introduces in his earliest works a theory of symbolic violence and misrecognition, which he returns to as late as Language and Symbolic Power in 1991. In effect, this is his theory of ideology and there are indeed
some quite striking parallels between Bourdieu and Althusser's conception of ideology as a theory and a "material practice". For both thinkers the school is the major mass modern ideological base (through such rituals as the examination). However, I want to show that Bourdieu has virtues that Althusser lacked. Although Bourdieu went through a structuralist stage in which his thought was weakened by positivism, nevertheless he developed and revised his theory as Althusser was unable to. Thus where Althusser was vulnerable to a powerful critique of his essentially functionalist and idealist conception of ideological domination, as in E.P. Thompson's *The Poverty of Theory* (1979:272-3), Bourdieu cannot be criticised in the same way. For Bourdieu's sociology is a pincer-like attack on both objectivism and subjectivism. Breaking with subjectivism, he accepts that there can be causes of social action of which the individual subject is not fully aware. But challenging also the objectivist structuralism of his own earlier work, he proposes a theory of practice which, as we have seen, is based on both collective and individual strategic activity. This is inevitably an uneasy combination, but it does get beyond the sterility of conceiving ideology as a whole ensemble of social relations. While this takes the rational kernel of Althusser's emphasis on collective representations and their coercive character in daily social relations, it repudiates Althusser's neglect of the whole vocabulary of interest. The virtue of Bourdieu is that he combines a theory of class interest and misrecognition of such interest with a theory of stable structures and social relations which comes from his Durkheimian inheritance. This in turn strengthens his conception of contradiction, which, along with symbolic violence has remained a pivotal category in his work. Although he has always stressed that commodity fetishism - with its associated pursuit of maximum profitability or exchange value - does not magically create social
conflict or fragmentation, his sociology has always unmasked contradictory interests and exposed conflict, especially in the arena of the school and the university. In this respect he has moved far beyond Althusser's over-socialised conception of man. Moreover, as I shall argue, his latest theories of the erosion of stable patterns of working-class reproduction explore precisely the increasingly violent crises in consumption and inter-ethnic relations which such contradictory interests can bring about (see, for example, 1993b:120).

To summarise then, Bourdieu from *The Inheritors* (1964) onwards, has insisted on a duality of structure in which he focuses simultaneously on individual or collective strategies. Included, therefore, is domination through a wide variety of means, from the economic operations of the market, to the symbolic intimidation through the use of academic success as a sign of grace, to the diffuse benefits of families' marriage projects.

*The Inheritors* has an Orwellian tone to it. Things are not really what they are said to be. This is signalled dramatically right from the start, where the prologue introduces us to the Ohama Indian pattern for the discovery and recruitment of new sorcerers. Everyone must compete to be a sorcerer and for this reason they must spend a period away in the wilderness awaiting a vision. But although everyone has visions, some have more authentic visions than others and curiously these are the members of the sorcerers' own kin. It is in this way that Bourdieu reveals the importance of social origins in academic attainment in so-called advanced societies. It is through the family home that the cultural capital of the school is accumulated and the absence of such cultural capital for working-class youth is a much more immoveable barrier to social mobility than material poverty. Consequently, only 6% of French

---

5 *The Inheritors* is co-authored by J.-C. Passeron.
university students were recruited from the children of farm labourers, peasants or industrial manual workers (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964:18).

Paradoxically, free culture is accumulated when the reality principle has surrendered to the dictates of pure pleasure. Moreover, behind the apparently random leisure choices of the students of the dominant class lie all their early family training, a training which disciplines their interest in artistic form even in the most popular genres like cinema and jazz. From these experiences and modes of thought emerges an ethos of preciousness and irony, a fascination with the exotic and a desire for distinction. Even within the choice of art which "liquidates the bourgeois experience" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964:29) there is concealed a cultural good-will, a "conformist anti-conformism" (1964:69). For the children of the dominated class, on the other hand, free culture has a quite different impact. Lacking the close familial contact with consecrated culture, their experience of mass culture is informed by a popular aesthetic which serves to divert them further from academic success. Consequently:

The school is the royal way to the democratisation of culture if it does not consecrate these same inequalities through reproaching students for being too scholarly ... this has the effect of devaluing the culture of the educational curriculum ...by replacing it with the inherited culture (1964:35).

This is the first formulation of the theory that those who most criticise the culture are also those most likely to benefit from it. Criticism presupposes cultural mastery. What is more, the most materially secure children of the haute bourgeoisie display their "spiritual grace" in our period not by thrift or frugality but rather by their casual ease and heretical tastes. In other words, by showing the marks of an unworldly disinterestedness, they appear distant from the "common" display of effort of the less privileged
students. There has been a transmutation of the Protestant Ethic's basic values.

Clearly this is the origin of Bourdieu's later theory of the dominated fraction of the dominant class which has undoubtedly illuminated his subsequent approach to artistic groups such as the late nineteenth-century aestheticians. Thus already in *The Inheritors*, we note the "conformist anti-conformism" which leads the children of the haute bourgeoisie to their adherence to the modernist canon (Valéry, Proust, Sartre). But in more anthropological manner, Bourdieu and Passeron stress that the root of their approach to the educational curriculum lies in their distinctive place in space and time. That is, despite the material privileges these students possess, there is also a much greater individualism among them and, compared to working-class students, a lack of secondary associations or wider communal ties. Yet if in this respect they are typical of the "cool" deracinated bohemian of the metropolis, they also have a nostalgia for integration and a cult of the utopian community. The students of the dominated class, on the other hand, are closer to material urgencies and also more traditional in their conception of space and time. They have both more experience of the serious nature of social reality and less commitment to the "game of seriousness". Bourdieu thus sketches out early on a number of the antinomies found subsequently in his work on cultural reception.

This is a fascinating theory and it seems perverse to criticise it when it emphasises the significance of the private sphere. It stresses the powerful emotional transmission of cultural sensitivity, as with the child who learns Beethoven from the mother's playing. Moreover, Bourdieu and Passeron are clearly attuned to gender difference. They refer to women being more susceptible to the authority of university professors in that their greater
attentiveness and docility facilitated them more easily than men for upwards social mobility. For all this, there are still signs that Bourdieu was himself under the impact of "la domination masculine" which he only unravelled much later (1990b). He blunts his notion of socialisation when, despite emphasising that home is the main site for the growth of the classificatory mesh through which all subsequent educational ideas must be passed, he neglects the skilled labour (especially of women) which goes into this educational matrix.

The Freudian dualism between the reality principle and the pleasure principle can also be criticised, the latter being the terrain for the acquisition of the heretical culture that later turns magically into a consecrated investment of knowledge. For, taking apart the pleasure principle, it becomes apparent that it involves also that all-too familiar but still significant area, invisible domestic work. Are we to assume that all the pains taken with the bringing-up of children can be discussed under the heading "pleasure"? Are not these sacrifices in the form of time and care for children also a kind of "labour of love", which has as its issue the cultural capital from which the child benefits? And yet Bourdieu and Passeron pass over these questions, discussing their public effects in terms only of scholastic accomplishments, rather than the survival of the pre-capitalist "good faith" economy within the home. And yet, when we pull back the veil on these mundane matters, what an extraordinary profusion of methods and modes is found. It takes work like Davidoff and Hall's *Family Fortunes* (1987) to reveal what the rationalisation of domestic labour really meant, as in the systematic inculcation of the work ethic with the use of the abacus for infants or the minute classification of the kitchen and garden like that of natural science.

*Reproduction* belongs to a happily brief ultra-positivist formulation of problems, which Bourdieu came later to pose in a more satisfactory way. This
book is particularly important for showing how a cultural arbitrary is imposed in education so as to reproduce the existing class order. In it, Marx is bounced off Weber (and sometimes Durkheim too) in a very creative manner. In particular, the Weberian notion of legitimation is used to stress, in Marxist fashion, that the act of legitimating a ruling class does not just convert power to authority but increases that power, while Weber is upbraided for ignoring the fact that the misrecognition of the culture of the dominators tends to have independent social consequences. More problematically, in my view, Bourdieu argues against a "utopian" rationalism: symbolic violence is necessary, he contends, since all teaching depends on an arbitrary cultural choice in which only one perspective from the permanently-clashing interests in advanced societies is elaborated. I would want to contest the inevitability of cultural domination in Habermasian lines, holding that arbitrariness could be replaced by undistorted communicative competence⁶.

The teachers themselves have two possible relations to this culture. They can either rest on the charisma of office, or they can see themselves rather as prophets, with their authority coming from within themselves. This is the first delineation of the notion of heterodox leaders, so important in Bourdieu's broader theory of culture. The conception of the teacher as prophet, who may articulate a message critical of the social practices of those with economic and social capital, is important. For although the model adopted to illuminate the nature of the legitimate culture is that of the alien rule of colonialists over natives, and some of the rhetorical force derives from this

⁶Bourdieu hints, by "arbitrary" that cultures become eviscerated by being institutionalised. But there are limits to the arbitrary character of orthodox culture: it was no accident that during the whole period of Nationalist-imposed apartheid, for example, only one critical film was made by a black South African (Tomaselli, 1988:23).
vision of a set of sharply-conflicting interests into which the school is inserted, nevertheless there is a massive over-simplification at the level of meaning, especially of teachers' motivations. In particular, while the "cultural arbitrary" begins to explain the powerlessness of the dominated to determine their own children's education, the problem with the book is its silence precisely about why the "natives" don't become "restless". Moreover, the prophetic type of teacher potentially implies the existence of educational pleasures attached to schooling for the working class, which then act as inducements. The school is not just the site of authoritarian rituals with educational canons, as is implied through quoting Marx on exams:

The examination is nothing but the bureaucratic baptism of knowledge, the official recognition of the transsubstantiation of profane knowledge into sacred knowledge' (quoted, 1990:141).

Rather the school culture works because it can connect precisely to the aspirations within the working class, not least because teachers see themselves as rescuing "bright" children from the harsh deformities of poverty, even while they employ categories of educability that systematically favour the dominant class. It is this cultural pleasure or hope which explains the collusion of the dominated with the school. It only continues to work its legitimating magic to the degree that some of the dominated do indeed appropriate the educational culture and that this conferral of a changed mode of existence is viewed by the dominated as a sacrifice of their own enjoyment of their children for the sake of the children's material future. Reproduction also neglects a key dimension which reduces the gap between the culture of the school and that of the dominated. This is the mediation of the national culture, with its anti-aristocratic baggage (discussed subsequently, in 1992c: 46-8) As Renée Balibar has shown, the revolutionary formation of a French national identity
was crucial in spreading a whole culture of popular manuals and popular fiction in which Parisian French was used against regional dialects to spread useful knowledge (Balibar, 1986). Benedict Anderson has described graphically how in the Philippines and Latin America the first stirrings of nationalism were linked to the rise of new men whose possession of a print culture of books and newspapers allowed them to offer a new set of social identities rather than a low place in a feudal or Imperial hierarchy (Anderson, 1983). It is this "imaginary community" which the stiff anti-functionalist positivism of Bourdieu fails to grasp yet which is a crucial part of the motor fuelling French schooling with its reproductive consequences. In brief, while the notion of prophetic educators could have been used to point to the nature of the subjective realities at stake, it was never exploited. In an understandable eagerness to reveal the objectively more favourable position of the children of the dominant class, Bourdieu fails to explain precisely how concealment of this fact is made possible by the (real) chance that marginal benefits may be won even for the children of the working class if they comply with the rules of the game.

I have suggested that there are pleasures in learning which are the precondition for the continued importance of the educational ideology. I now want to turn to other aspects of this work which I think are useful, first, the concept of educational habitus, second, the notion of upmarket and downmarket cultural wares and third, the concept of intelligence that is brought into play.

First, we can already see that the concept of habitus has begun to acquire the flexibility and richness that has made it one of Bourdieu's trademarks. For whereas he early welds together a concept of class worldview or consciousness as a set of regulatory dispositions, which are the basis for the individuals' improvised and skilled accomplishments, here he begins to apply
his theory of rationalisation or cultural autonomy to habitus. In other words, in Western societies the school is the bearer of a distinctive culture into which even the children of the dominated class can be trained if they are given a sufficiently early, Latin-based lycée schooling. Two or three cryptic remarks indicate that in France specific conditions enhanced the syncretic aspects of the educational habitus, particularly the powerful impact of the Jesuits in providing the transmission belt for a worldly secular culture and the later impact of the Jacobins in underwriting a Latin-based schooling as a revolutionary organic ideology. In other words, the Revolution of 1789 enhanced the power of the intelligentsia by making a classical education part of a cultural mission to the people. This notion of an elaborated educational habitus is fundamental, not least because it is the seed for his later idea of an artistic habitus, with its complex set of professional competencies.

Second, the belief in meritocracy is immensely powerful, as Bourdieu indicates. It leads to the self-exclusion of the excluded. Even dissenting teachers are affected by it, in that any break with canonical knowledge can lead to the accusation of providing a devalued education. However, even in this early work, we notice a tendency for Bourdieu and Passeron to attribute a greater influence to the rules of consecrated culture than actually exists. While it is quite true that consecrated culture has undermined much folk art, it is misleading to suggest as they do - that the culture industry is staffed solely by those with legitimate culture. In fact, the excluded popular culture is hardly analysed in this text. Lamont's events suggest that the media and culture industries needs more analysis: indeed, the subsequent conflicts within television in Britain, if not more widely, suggest an insecure hegemony for consecrated culture (Garnham, 1993: 189-92).

*Language and Symbolic Power (1991)*
The essays collected under this title represent not only a contribution to the issues of most outstanding importance in the philosophy of language, but also a rich series of interpretative concepts for the generation of middle-level theory. Both these initiatives allow Bourdieu to make a significant intervention in a sector which has been dominated by the subjectivism of ethnomethodology to such an extent that it has produced only the sterile vacuousness of much linguistic philosophy. Instead Bourdieu's thinking brings together objective forces, such as the possession of scarce linguistic resources or the possession of authority and reveals what consequences at the level of linguistic style and meaning emerge from these and to what extent a linguistic dimension exists within some partially-unconscious struggles.

First, he introduces an extension to the idea of economic markets, that is, linguistic markets. Such linguistic markets occur wherever language operates as an independent aspect of social interchange. Bourdieu is not concerned here with the politics of colonial linguistic domination, but rather with the hegemony of certain linguistic codes, which, when viewed as cultural capital, are linked to the dominant class. Thus in the advanced societies, where there are constrained linguistic markets, high linguistic capital brings high symbolic profits ("the profits of distinction") (1992c:55). Thus if Bourdieu's concept is applied in Britain, it is marked by the link between polite society and the polite or "proper" language. The significant possession of such linguistic capital is signalled frequently in interaction: for example through such flattering and mildly-satirical terms as "the chattering classes", expressions which in themselves render inaudible the speech of manual workers. The social reality of the existence of linguistic capital is that some feel authorised to speak, that is, they have the social assurance of possessing a mastery of language and, unlike the hypercorrectness of the insecure petty-
bourgeoisie, have the temerity to flout selected rules (1992c:62-3).

There are, in contrast, free linguistic markets where the dominant code does not produce symbolic profits. The most unconstrained linguistic markets occur in the contexts of closed institutions like the prison, where a subversive code exists instead, its freedom marked by nicknames, blasphemy and slang. Other institutions like pubs, clubs and adolescent peer-groups also permit a subversive code (1992c:98-9). Thus the manner of the publican (or perhaps, DJ) is to facilitate the sense of well-being gained from self-expression by stimulating it through the use of common language, colloquialisms etc. The subversive code operates by neutralising the effects of the euphemisms so characteristic of the dominant code, especially by unmasking their inappropriate, arbitrary or even counter-factual status.

Finally, Bourdieu introduces a third variant of the thesis that high linguistic capital brings high profits of distinction. This is his argument, elaborated in what follows as the Heidegger effect, that such profits derive from the imposition of form together with the intermingling of popular speech. Symbolic profit in this case springs from the combination of the rarity of the mastery of form together with the signs of a disinterested good-will towards the popular (1992c:148).

Style, whether it be a matter of poetry as compared with prose or of the diction of a particular (social, sexual, generational) class compared with that of another class, exists only in relation to agents endowed with schemes of perception and appreciation that enables them to constitute it as a set of systematic differences ... (1992c:39-9).

As this suggests, dominant class membership is thus joined by other social bases for the acquisition of linguistic capital. Since empirical research shows that French working-class women swear less than their men (1992c:265),
Bourdieu suggests that this more "tight-lipped" use of language from the feminine "bouche" places them in a stronger position for chances of upward mobility than the rough language from the "gueule" of the working-class male (1992c:86-8). Thus women's bodily constraints paradoxically place them in stronger position vis-à-vis the dominant linguistic code. But, as well as this promising analysis, we should of course also recall the silence of women. This is not a literal silence, but rather relates to the consequences of women's exclusion from the public sphere. It is surprising that Bourdieu fails to link his valuable category of "authorised language" to women's talk, which, in lacking those markers of educated or democratic debate (points of order etc.) was disqualified as serious for this reason.

Thirdly, Bourdieu notes the social consequences of the "nationalisation" of language, that is, in France, the emergence of the Ile de France dialect in the seventeenth century as the official language and the consequent degradation of regional speech. The phenomenon of the Revolution, he remarks was to carry much further this initial work of the Jesuits, that is, the unification and purification of the official language (1992c:48). The devaluation of the superceded "patois" was intensified from that time through the mastery of both Parisian and regional codes by the aristocracy and professionals. The national language thus sets up another arena for struggles for distinction, not least in the accompanying usage of "strategies of condescension"; that is, the acquisition of populist credentials by the conspicuous use of the vernacular (1992c:68).

There is a tension in Bourdieu between his awareness of the distinctiveness of the national language as part of the "bourgeois cultural revolution" (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985) and his concern to show the similarity of reproductive processes occurring within dominant classes through the
benefits of distinction, despite different modes of production. Thus, he does not elucidate the empowering effects of the national language as does Balibar, for example, in her discussion of how fictional characters speaking French were used in national language narratives to spread throughout the countryside both democratic ideas and technical agricultural information (Balibar, 1988). In this sense Bourdieu sidesteps such issues as the sharp debate around the politics of national languages that occurred in the 1930s and which engaged the energies of writers like Gramsci as advocates of education in the official language for the children of the dominated class, even those whose regional dialect was very different. This debate is also relevant to Bourdieu's wider cultural theory, for the linguistic battleground was mirrored in the arguments over regional poetry and the proletarian novel. Thus the innovativeness of texts in the 1930s has sometimes been measured in the degree to which the writers usurped Standard English. We shall see in chapter VI how Bourdieu discusses this issue in his analysis of popular literature, by claiming that the real addressees of the so-called proletarian novel are the urban petty-bourgeoisie or the "dominator-dominateds". In the following study of reception, it will be suggested that there is an urban working-class base for this proletarian literature, although small, and that the legitimation of regional history and speech is one of the discursive effects of popular fiction.

In brief, where sociologists see either the truth of consensus or the truth of coercion, Bourdieu's "constructivist" sociology sees both. Where Chomsky agrees with Saussure in seeing language as a universal treasure, perhaps the most graphic expression of the collective consciousness, Bourdieu

---

7 See the Scottish poets, Sorley MacLean and Hugh MacDiarmid in their use of Gaelic (or Lallans) and English (MacDiarmid, 1967; MacLean, 1975).
emphasises language use as a sign of salvation by a secular elect (as in the prerogatives of males at barmitzvahs). But this theory of linguistic representation can be extended also to (vulgar) Marxists, whose rhetoric also serves to obscure the degree to which social divisions, as in the case of classes founded on production, must counter pre-existing solidarities and may exist cohesively only on paper. Hence Bourdieu's frequent theme: "We must classify the classifiers!" (1984:467; 1991:242)

I have argued at various points in this chapter that Bourdieu's sociology is directed towards the work of critique by extending the labour of materialism associated with Marx. One area in which this is shown most innovatively is in his analysis of politics. Thus Language complements Marx's commodity fetishism with a concept of political fetishism, analogous to the former in that politicians' discourses also conceal the social relations and interests in which they are embedded (1992c:27). One crucial factor in this process is that of mandated authority (1992c:203). Bourdieu asks who is mandated to speak for a group and how they legitimate their authority. Perhaps we can apply this more widely to the theory of culture. Following on Bourdieu's comments about the linguistic legitimacy of being in touch with the popular mind, much more discussion is needed of how the linguistic forms aspiring to be popular are embedded within various genres. Stuart Hall, for example, has discussed the journalism of the tabloids as a "ventriloquism" of the popular voice. Such a concept could be elaborated in other forms of culture, especially where a novelist assumes a popular style for commercial effect, as in Bourdieu's category of types of literary production for the large-scale market.

Heretical discourses are also politically mandated. Bourdieu breaks with a residual individualism in Weber by arguing that even the charismatic prophet must attract a following (1992c:249-50), since this is the prerequisite
for the "prophecy of bad fortune". The "labour of denunciation" or dramatized deprivation then enhances a crisis which produces the potential for a major change of social identity. Here Bourdieu uses Voloshinov's conception of the clashing class or ideological accents as an inherent element of linguistic discourse, stressing that words can never be neutral.

In the labour of denunciation, new subjects can be created, but the forms of discourse seeking to rescue the inferior or debased can themselves be transitional. Again, this is a context in which studies of popular culture are illuminating. Denning has shown how in dime novels of the 1870s to 1890s in America feudal titles were appropriated with a new content, as in the phrase "Knights of Labour" (Denning, 1987: ch.9)). At stake, then is the emergence of linguistic responses to stigmatization and literary cultures of resistance taking popular forms.

The Sociology of the Academic Profession

While there has been a plentiful fiction of contemporary universities, in the writing of David Lodge, Malcolm Bradbury and others, there has been little sociological analysis of the makers of consecrated culture and their social origins. Nor has there been any extended study of the conflict of the faculties. I shall show how in this arena there appear many of the same structural conflicts and fractures that occur in Bourdieu's analysis of the art-world, not least between different fractions of the bourgeoisie. Finally, the analysis of the crisis of 1968, which acquired its distinctive aspect as a crisis of late capitalism, can be shown as being triggered by conflicts over cultural consumption. The May Events of 1968 are important in Bourdieu's sociology in part as an unsuccessful revolution, the relative frequency of which in modern French history perhaps gives his sociology its characteristic pessimism.

Bourdieu has undertaken a number of studies of cultural production.
While my main interest is in his pioneering position within the field of sociology of literature and art, I want first to situate this within his broader context of his studies of intellectuals responsible for innovation and diffusion. It is necessary to state these first in relation to power and action. In the simplest form of pre-capitalist social order such as the Kabylia of the 1960s, thinkers such as poets were not segregated, but were venerated by the whole society for their advice and for their influence as repositories of knowledge. Even within traditional societies these powerful figures began to be differentiated, as in the Weberian opposition between priests and prophets, and it is from this classification that Bourdieu has highlighted the underlying structural forces shaping modern intellectuals and artists. A key division, as we have seen, is between those who are "doxosophes" and those who are dissenting scientists or artists, or "prophets". But we can only fully grasp the nature of this fundamental polarity if it is also understood that whereas in Kabylia power is intimately linked to symbolic honour and is pursued on a personal basis, in modern societies reproduction and acquisition of power is on an impersonal basis in the form of bureaucratically-calibrated degrees and titles, monetary capital or high salaries.

In his studies of universities, Bourdieu deploys concepts of the four types of capital by now almost synonymous with his approach, that is, social capital (power gained by the sheer number of family members, retainers or network of supporters); symbolic capital (reputation or honour- including intellectual honesty); cultural capital (distinction within the autonomous fields of art and science; intellectual or educational qualifications) and economic capital (ownership of stocks and shares, and, more generally, of monetary rewards). These clearly echo Weber's categories of party, status and class, although, unlike Weber, Bourdieu argues that in modernity, there are
not accidental connections but necessary links. Thus symbolic capital is in modern societies, typically reconverted into economic profits.

*Homo Academicus* (1988) is organised around three intersecting 
oppositions within French universities, which elaborate on the earlier Kantian 
idea of a conflict of faculties. These can be stated succinctly as, firstly, between 
the "social" pole and the subordinate pole; secondly, between those in control of 
social reproduction chances and those with scientific authority and, thirdly, 
between established and obscure intellectuals.

The first pole concerns those with a "taste for order" (1988a:51) directly 
concerned with temporal power, as in the modern faculties of medicine and 
law. Because of their significance in the smooth running of the dominant 
order, these university academics are much more likely to be given State 
honours, eg the Légion d'Honneur. Typically from the haute bourgeoisie, they 
are married to women with high social honour, have large families, don't 
divorce and are usually Catholics. They are thus part of a wider social élite that 
has, simultaneously, a commitment to the spirit or ideal of the traditional 
university élite, a visceral sense of its own importance and a typical bodily 
posture (the "indefinable somethings" by which others recognise them 
(1988a:56)). Against them, the subordinate pole lacks temporal power, is 
linked to the Faculties of Science, Social Science and the Arts, and is 
constituted by members who have low social origins or belong to ethnic 
minorities, such as Jews (1988a: 49). They are associated with dissent. Perhaps 
curiously, these often have smaller families, more divorces and are less often 
religious. As members of the Left, their politics have been shaped by their 
lower social origins and by their experience of stigmatisation, their passage 
through state rather than private schools, etc. The social pole is active in the 
ceremonies of the wider society: the subordinate pole is autonomous from
The second key division is between the leading players in universities' internal regulation and reproduction and those devoid of institutional status but possessing scientific authority (especially from high citation rates) (1988a:75). Even a title such as professor can be distinguished in these terms as well as according to the age, seniority and institutional or scientific status of the title-holder. Finally, Bourdieu distinguishes between those whose rise has established them as Establishment consecrated intellectuals and those who are obscure and are unconcerned with winning traditional honours. The Establishment figures are crowned with scholastic glory ... the ultimate product of the dialectic of acclaim and recognition which draws into the heart of the system those most inclined and able to reproduce it without distortion (1988a:83).

Against them are the figures who deny the orthodoxy of their day: obscure, wayward, stubborn scholars. But here again, we note the great trajectory from obscure freethinkers or "heretics" to consecrated figures with an impact on future curricula. But paradoxically, those who have the most independent social power are the most likely to become heretics - later consecrated heretics - since material ease gives them the social assurance that permits innovation, often through the transgression of disciplinary boundaries. Here again is introduced the theme of the dominated fraction of the dominant class, so indispensable in understanding the class background of artists. Further, in this context, a distinction is made between "true" and "facile" radicalism, that is, between figures such as Hyppolite and "bogus" iconoclasts such as Barthes, where the latter gains his following not by substantive innovations but only by playing off one game against another, that is, by deploying the originality and imaginative flair attractive in the Arts Faculty in an ostensibly scientific set of
concerns (1988a: 111-112.) Genuinely path-breaking intellectuals may not acquire the number of postgraduates of other more central academics, but their mark is that they attract adherents from a number of wide-ranging fields, thus permitting an indisputable impact on posterity. Yet even lacking this, all such senior staff possess spectacular control over the time of their subordinates, for it is their business to dictate the schedule through which the lengthy thesis will be submitted and examined, as well as their manipulation which matches students with completed theses to new job-openings.

The crisis of 1968 was thus, for Bourdieu, institutional breakdown, concentrated outside the well-endowed faculties of law and medicine and precipitated by converging flashpoints of structural conflict, an educational breakdown that then spilled over into a wider conflict within certain homologous sections (1988a: 175). Most poignant, here, particularly on the part of those with temporal power in the Arts Faculties, was the attempt to retain the traditional élite origins for new recruits, at the cost of extending membership to women academics and older "agregés" from the dominant class. This objectively confined a large number of young lecturers to permanent non-promotion and caused in turn the breakdown of the protracted French thesis system of 10-15 years' preparation. The crisis was amplified through other linked groups, most conspicuously, by degree-holders with manual jobs, by media professionals or cultural producers whose occupational roles made them sympathetic to academic staff and by the more educated sections of the working-class, whose expectations had also been disappointed (1988a: 165).

At the heart of May 1968, then, was a growing and inflammatory range of frustrations, particularly centred on the subordinate pole and the consecrated heretics within it, who provoked attempts at "organic reform"
from those whose power derived from their regulation of the Institution. This, in turn, created the subjective basis within which which an objective reality such as the gap between aspirations and reality could make sense.

If *Homo Academicus* deals with crisis, resistance and (successful) preemptive reform, Bourdieu's case-study of a prophetic figure, Heidegger, takes as its theme proletaroid intellectuals, intellectual formalism and the (successful) dislocations of established fields by means of conservative revolution. *Homo* shows patrician academics undermining dissidents' claims not least by the compensatory mechanisms of intellectual autonomy themselves (consecration and incorporation). His other work published in that same year, but on inter-war Germany, shows, in contrast, how such patrician intellectuals had themselves been undermined by a different order of heretic with fateful consequences. A figure such as Heidegger possessed a capacity to manipulate academic forms which guaranteed an institutional respectability denied to the plebeian thinkers who formed the populist base of a conservative revolution.

"The illusion of autonomy" and academic euphemism: the case of Martin Heidegger.

Most studies of artists are of figures who lack temporal power. Bourdieu's case-study, Martin Heidegger, is however, an important departure from this pattern, for the subject of this monograph is a figure who as a successful philosopher and Rector of Freiburg University had reached the commanding heights of academic policy-making. It is therefore of vital importance to establish how such a position within the autonomous university field was used to develop a regressive political critique, not least because of the rise of certain parallels today to the popular politics of the 30s. What was at stake in Heidegger's Rectorship as an active member of the Nazis, was their
strategic gain in acquiring a backer who would lend them legitimacy. Heidegger's case is also important because both the ambiguity of his disavowal of Nazi support and the appeal in the 1950s and 1960s - and again in the 80s and 90s - of his radical existentialist ideas, makes it essential to study under what conditions an illiberal and anti-socialist ontology can nevertheless have an allure for a very diverse set of social theorists, including, it must be said, the early Bourdieu himself.

The answer lies in Heidegger's "imposition of form" (1988b:3). It is the importance of form, or the elevated style, which consistently masks a discourse which is otherwise identical to that of his conservative plebeian contemporaries. It is form that also makes for a certain kinship between Heidegger, with his irrationalist anti-modernism and such post-structuralists as Derrida.

The urgency of Bourdieu's own recent studies of the links between the language of euphemism and the practice of social domination now appear more sharply. His interest is in criticising not just the logic of Heidegger's own thought but also the logic of the university field. For in this, Heidegger achieved both the following of a cult-leader and also the respectability of university power. Of particular importance in my analysis of Bourdieu's sociology of culture is the fact that certain parallels are made between the position of Heidegger and that of some consecrated heretics among modern artists. Bourdieu points out that Heidegger knew what he was doing: in terms of another key opposition of the cultural field, Heidegger was like the professional painter, as opposed to the primitive discovered by a more sophisticated avant-garde. Indeed, the true parallel in terms of form between Heidegger and others, is with Marcel Duchamp, who also derived symbolic profit from introducing the popular objects of everyday life into the formal
language of serious art. Bourdieu suggests Heidegger should be read as constructing similar "retranslations" (1988b:34) or "philosophical readymades".

The other good reason for discussing this case-study is that it is one of the first examples of the development of Bourdieu's mature cultural method. The key to this method is Bourdieu's transcendence of Adorno. Any adequate interpretation of Heidegger's texts must be linked to a genetic analysis of them, in other words, to a focus on the class position of the thinker and on the objective changes in the university field. Chief among these, was the growth of a "proletaroid intelligentsia". But Bourdieu's vital insistence is that it is necessary to look at the need for Heidegger to achieve social power by an "alchemic transformation" of the contemporary field of university philosophy. Let me explain what this entails.

First it is necessary to identify Heidegger in terms of structural forces, as indeed Adorno does. As the son of Black Forest small rural craftspeople, Heidegger was drawn to portrayals of the Volk and was deeply critical of urban egalitarianism. But a structural analysis also reveals the emergence, for the first time in modern years, of trained intellectuals without jobs within the universities, that is, a proletarianised or sub-proletarian intelligentsia. Such plebeian writers, influenced by figures such as Junger, Niekisch and Spengler, possessed a conservative vision, with a Romantic quest for values that would compensate for the emptiness detected in Enlightenment conceptions of the individual ego. Their thought subverted the major oppositions of the period between culture and civilisation, between Germany and France ...as a paradigm of cosmopolitanism; between the "community" (Tonnies' "Gemeinschaft") and the "people" ("Volk") or the incoherent masses; between the Fuhrer or the reich and liberalism, parliamentarism, or
pacifism; between the country or the forest and the town or the factory ... between life and the organism ("Organismus") and technology and the dehumanising machine; between the total and the partial or disconnected; between integration and fragmentation; between ontology or science and godless rationalism (1988b:21-2).

Heidegger's role was not to be the mouthpiece of these objective social forces, even if his artisan origins linked him structurally with them. Adorno certainly argues this case, but Bourdieu insists that, on the contrary, Heidegger's identity was stamped decisively by the field of professional philosophy. What is at stake is a double refusal. On the one hand Heidegger rejected the naivety of the revolutionary conservative plebeians and produced an esoteric discourse with a distinctive ontology. On the other hand, Heidegger was a "vertical invader" within philosophical circles, who profoundly disturbed the patrician milieu of the dominant neo-Kantianism (Cassirer and other liberal philosophers). Even his appearance, with his penetrating eyes and his "existential suit" marked him off as a heretic, a prophetic figure who disturbed the everyday consensus over routine forms.

Thus Heidegger's philosophical discourse and its imposition of form produces a "ritual distance" (1988b:127) from the crude populism of anti-modernist thought. It rather euphemises the latter, by its dense metaphorical language and its invocations of "Man" without ethnographic substance.

More significantly, in inserting himself within the philosophical oppositions of the period. Heidegger alternated between an erudite, abstract ontological rhetoric relating to the pre-history of man and sudden reversions to popular language. This is what Bourdieu means by the use of "readymades", which feature as a return of the repressed and command extraordinary emotional force:
Heidegger reintroduces into the domain of academically-acceptable philosophical thought ... topics and modes of expression - and in particular an incantatory and prophetic style - which were previously confined to those sects encamped on the margins of the field of academic philosophy, where Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, George and Dostoevsky, political mysticism and religious fervour, met and mingled (1988b:69).

Thus the double significance of Bourdieu’s analysis is that it mobilises a genetic structuralism which first, stresses the class habitus of the thinker and distinctive university mode of production, secondly, shows the formal nature of the text - including its lack of intersubjective falsifiability - and, thirdly, isolates its structure as a revolutionary combination of high and low culture, which can be read as a response to the premium on form in the university.

In these ways, Bourdieu allows us to unmask the illusion of autonomy of the philosophical field. He also offers implicit analogies with the contemporary prophetic discourse concerning the transcendence of high and low in the postmodernist thought of Baudrillard and Lyotard 8. Finally, to “save” one element of Heidegger, he strips off the theological and metaphysical trappings, along with Heidegger’s neo-conservative critique of modernity and smuggles from his works a useful contraband, the phenomenological perspective on subjective time-consciousness which will be amalgamated with his realist framework on social relations. Through all his thinking, Bourdieu uses control over time as a vital social power and considers its absence indicative of social dispossession, thus enhancing Marx’s critique of abstract social labour (see

8 For an unambiguously critical analysis of the exaltation of Heidegger and Nietzsche, and the emergence in philosophy of an “aesteticism of transgression”, see Bourdieu and Wacquant,1992:154)
This work contains Bourdieu's anatomy of the ruling class and the reproductive strategies it has employed. Like most of his studies it is empirical, being based on samples of prizewinning students in the "grandes écoles" in the 1960s and 1980s and a content analysis of examiners' reports on doctoral theses.

In brief, Bourdieu explores the ways in which the modern division of labour parallels that of the medieval world (1989a:211). The medieval strata - those who pray, those who wage war and those who labour - can be linked loosely to the modern division between mental and manual labour, while the mental labour performed by the bourgeoisie is itself fragmented into an entrepreneurial fraction, an autonomous intellectual fraction and also into a State technocracy. Parodying the division of the nobility into the noblesse de robe, de cour and d'épée in the period of French absolutism, Bourdieu introduces the category of "noblesse d'état" or "cultural nobility" (1989a:210). Through this, he registers the great expansion of the bourgeois political and bureaucratic élite in the post-war period, as a necessary overhead permitting a more stable bourgeois rule (1989a:409). The segmentation itself is associated with the reproductive strategies of the French haute bourgeoisie and the dominance of certain higher educational institutions. Thus the story of the power struggle from the late 1970s in France is told obliquely by Bourdieu through its impact on the eighty-four grandes écoles. The dominance of the Sorbonne, the Ecole d'Hautes Etudes (and even the Ecole Nationale d'Administration) has been undermined by the rise of the more applied, vocational centres such as the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, the Paris Ecole de Mines and business schools. The correlative of this has been the decline both of
the autonomous intellectual and the state nobility (a kind of nomenklatura) and the rise of the power and economic capital of the entrepreneurial and top managerial strata of the bourgeois class (1989a:304):

The little schools of commerce introduce, in the bosom of the educational institution, the needs and values of their future students' employers rather than a purely scholarly logic (1989a:317).

In addition, at the "little gate" schools of St Cloud and Fontenay, both in Literature and Science (as opposed to the "great gate"), the numbers of students from the popular and middle classes decreased from the Third to the Fifth Republic (1989a:296). Thus it is possible to isolate a change of educational "reproductive strategy" which has its major impact on the weight of the different class fractions, with their inverse relationship of cultural to economic capital (1989a:314-7).

One of the strategies which are most fateful in this respect is that of the accumulation of material resources through the use of cultural capital, coupled with the end of the formal closure of the professions and top business positions against women. This means substituting a reproductive strategy based partly on highly-educated women for one based on good marriage. By employing women in these well-paid jobs, the dominant class has been able to offset a decline in its relative material position vis-à-vis other classes (271-5). Thus the spread of a rhetoric of individualism to women has actually been accompanied by a new mode of reproduction of class privileges, although sociological theory has been distracted from perceiving these consequences by its focus on relics of sexual inequality.

In brief, for Bourdieu, the cleavage between class fractions has profound consequences, since the intellectual fractions high in cultural capital value a disinterested knowledge, while the fraction high in economic capital value a
vocationally-relevant education. Such an approach illuminates also antinomies over universities and cultural policy in Britain in the last twenty years:

If the conflicts over education take the form of antinomies unsurpassed by resort to ultimate values, it is because what is at stake is the means of mastery of the instruments of cultural and social reproduction, the reproduction of the very foundations of domination, of existence and the values of the dominant groups ...(1989a:235).

Students' choices, then, reflect the constitution of the family's capital. Occasionally "cross-trajectories" occur, as in the case of professors' sons in commercial schools. Where this happens the children tend to drop out (ie a rectification over time occurs). But here Bourdieu fails to take an opportunity to theorise transformation or change, for if social determinism reasserts itself eventually, in the short run it still creates minorities that can have a disproportionate impact on events. Such a tragic vision has its own blind spots. In particular it cannot theorise the ways in which those demanding social change have drawn historically on cultural sources to legitimate their economic frustrations. Might not the cross-trajectories mentioned above be viewed as creating marginality which, under certain circumstances, can foster a different kind of transformative vision: a dissidence shorn of the facile radicalism of the fashionable dilettante?

The Misery of the World (Misère): proletarian emiseration revisited

In his studies of the university and of the grandes écoles (1989a), Bourdieu has dissected the body of the French ruling class, looking especially at the division between temporal and "spiritual" power which is manifested in the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the artist. In 1993, however, he published an extraordinary collective work which turns back to the dominated class and especially takes up from Language the plea that those who invoke
"the people" need to turn to the Algerians, Portuguese and Moroccans who experience most sharply the deprivations of the advanced societies (1992c:91).

What is important in this book is that while Bourdieu has been conducting in recent studies an attack on vulgar Marxism, he has also continued to develop a critical sociology, which revolves around the social relations of production, around capital (both economic and symbolic) and its effects. Hence while he undertook the neglected analysis of the ruling class in the work of the 1970s and 80s, we see here, in his return to the analysis of the subordinate class and "race", the subtlety and power of a sociological approach which combines both the analysis of production relations in the broadest sense, and the sophisticated exploration of reification, incorporation and systems of classification, with their Durkheimian and Lukacsian provenance.

_Misère_ is made up principally of interviews undertaken in the North of France, an area of deindustrialisation and conflicts between the migrant population and the native working class. The sharp fall in factory employment has provoked simultaneously an intensified struggle for educational qualifications and a perception of the failure of the school in meeting the needs of most working-class children, bringing about a "crisis of reproduction". Emblematic of these disasters is the Rue des Jonquilles, introduced by Bourdieu, with its low-paid and unprotected employment for some native French, its sub-proletariat of part-time or unemployed, debt-burdened families from the Maghreb, its closed factories and steelyard.

The transcribed interviews convey graphically the nature of social reality experienced at the level of many neighbourhoods, but not through a naive empiricism, in which the observer seeks merely to see things through his own eyes, but through the successive filters of a theoretical and empirical understanding. Intermingled here are both "great" and "little" miseries: for
Bourdieu's view is that if advanced societies have rolled back absolute poverty (although less than is commonly supposed), the social order of contemporary France has "multiplied through social differentiation the forms of little misery" (1993b:11). Thus this book is Bourdieu's exposition of the major types of deprivation - both dissatisfaction relative to reference groups and more stark forms of social distress, together with his mature analysis of the social contradictions within which a neo-liberal state and economy takes shape.

Considerable sections of this book assess the breakdown of relationships between migrant families and native French, despite the emergence, too, of friendships across ethnic groupings. Conversations with both parties of warring neighbours of the tower blocks reveal a deterioration provoked not just by unemployment, but also by economic and domestic anomie ("We're like pieds-noirs now", said one migrant woman "We go back there, and we're not Algerians, we stay on here, we're not French either..." (1993b: 20). Bourdieu, in a series of perceptive socio-analyses, reveals the ressentiment experienced by respondents from the native French residents, such as the old woman whose objections to the smells of her Maghreb neighbours' cooking he reads as the displaced anger of the socially-isolated member of the native working-class concerning the rich family ties and friendships of the Maghreb incomers. The illuminating interview with the Front National militant succeeds in revealing with great poignancy the fantasies of the anti-migrant in the face of a common fate of unemployment: ("The poor bloke from Ghana, he can always come here, but the poor Frenchman, what's he going to do? (1993b: 577))

A characteristic mark of Bourdieu's sociological vision is his capacity to observe with the subtlety of a Simmel the detailed forms or interstices of life coupled with the penetrating gaze of economic and other objectivist approaches. He investigates the structures of space, as he has elsewhere, but
notes here how the structures of the new urban social space intermingle with physical space. Thus, in assessing the public housing schemes in the areas of urban aid, he reveals how the "dignified" parts of the society have been dramatically reduced and relocated (1993b:159). Thus there is a reconstitution of the city through the emergence of an intensified class segregation, broadly based on the geographical division between East and West. Class divisions are thus mapped on to the city as if in two homogeneous structures, the elegant munificence of the haute bourgeois areas being thrown into relief by the deprivation of the working-class corrals. The delineation in Misère ... of the world of goods is simultaneously of cities fractured by a dualism resembling that of the colonial cities of the nineteenth-century, such as Cairo, where the physical fissure between the native and the colonial settlements became a gaping fracture between two different worlds, technologically and culturally miles apart (see Said, 1993:154-5).

These different experiences of time and place are also matched by the "end of a world": the decline of the "red neighbourhood" (1993b:407) Bourdieu here suggests that while much channelling and controlling of the working-class areas went along with the hegemony of socialists within them, this counter-socialisation has been virtually destroyed by the flight of employment. Again this is of key significance for popular culture. Thus within the housing schemes a "crisis of reproduction" (1993b:16) has occurred, marking the young inhabitants with the "the effect of destiny" (1993b:86). At its most accentuated, the devastation of the urban areas and the disappearance of jobs for skilled males has created a vicious circle where the two meanings of "reproduction" are in fact superimposed. In Bourdieu's view, these young migrants and native French youths cannot attract women and marry because of their stigmatised existence. It is especially in the "malaise lycéenne" that
there are encapsulated many symptoms of the wider distress. For here is exposed the "aggrandisement of the school", that is, the penetration of the school standards and the school consecrated culture into the culture of those strata who previously had only to achieve a minimal educational level in order to get an apprenticeship. In the absence of the factory, these now have to stay on and pursue ever-increasing academic qualifications for the sake of further accreditation. As Bourdieu defines it, the school offers "salvation chances" to the dutiful members of the working-class: "the school excludes ... but she keeps in her bosom those she excludes..." (1993b:602). The school gains the power to undermine the cultural dignity of manual labour. Within the heightened aspirations, disappointments in the school abound:

This school sickness is linked to the problems of the housing schemes and to fantasies about immigrants. Those who dramatise the school sickness and link it to the sickness of the city schemes touch unknowingly on one of the fundamental contradictions of the social world, especially in relation to the consumption of material, symbolic or even political goods (1993b:603).

Bourdieu once insisted that Distinction should only be read alongside the Logic of Practice. I suggest also that La Misère du Monde should be read as a critique or expansion of Distinction. The dominant class, in Distinction, acquires its legitimacy, but at the psychic and economic cost of more and more children being exposed to the pursuit of educational capital, which only a few can win (Model A). Misère shows the long-term tendency of the reappearance of the law of value, or of market competition (de-industrialisation, pruning of the State, et cetera), the rise of a new mandarin fraction and the decline of the old (Model B). But Model B is also increasingly unstable, leading to dependence on the seductions of market consumption for an ever-decreasing
number and the violence of State coercion for embittered minorities. In other words the "overheads" of the non-market services are increasingly stripped down, but at the cost of increasing problems of legitimacy. Reliance on the dull economic compulsion of compliance is not - for Bourdieu's team - the long-term solution to these problems of social fragmentation (pace Abercrombie, Hill, Turner and other "classical materialists"). Rather, the evidence from this study implies that the resort to pure economic logic is increasingly being supplemented by Model C - the reappearance of a proletaroid intelligentsia who focus on nations as "imaginary communities" with the consequences for ethnic conflict which are its inevitable consequence (see 1988b).

I do not want to point here to some of the omissions of this masterly work, although inevitably some exist, particularly in its silence about the way the decreasing economic dependence of women (on men) has affected at its roots the old basis for masculine domination and has instituted instead fragile and unstable forms of new household structure. However, the prophetic dissidence of this extraordinary collective intervention marks practically every page such that it would be churlish to dwell on its negative elements. Perhaps what is most remarkable in this work is that as a prophecy of bad fortune it is still nevertheless rooted in a scientific methodology. Bourdieu here has literally rethought positivism after the critique of ethnomethodology, within the heart of the ethnographic enterprise itself. He has pioneered a new form of "paradoxal" thought, neither complicit with the dominant class, nor comfortably denunciatory of the miseries of the impoverished (1993b: 159).

In its model of "participant objectification" (1988c:784; 19993b:8 ), Misère sets down an aim to which every practitioner of qualitative methods would subscribe. This is to be achieved by a constructivist sociology ("une construction réaliste" (1993b: 915)) forged out of quite revolutionary methods
of working. I refer here to the invaluable pages on genetic comprehension (1993b: 903-25), in which Bourdieu uses all his accumulated knowledge about symbolic violence in order to suggest a method in which it can most nearly be eradicated. Thus he suggests that the interview should preferably be of those close to the sociologist, linked to him or her by ties of community, childhood friendship, school bonds, etc. Second, the questions are chosen in advance through a process of provisional intuition, to fit the peculiar character of the respondent's situation, thus dispensing with the rigidity and conformity of the questionnaire. Finally - and even more pioneering - the respondents are asked to give their viewpoints not as isolated individuals but as representatives of people like themselves. Thus the interviewer chooses a mode of enquiry tailored to the needs of each respondent in which questions are advanced and adapted in a Socratic dialogue with the respondent, in which the interviewer presses him or her to the point of extreme clarity, so revealing also their hesitations and inconsistencies. These three elements mark out a methodology which bears little resemblance to the shoddy goods passing for scientific or market research techniques, which often reveal more about the questioner than about the respondent. Thus this new methodology is offered as a kind of "spiritual exercise" in which the questioner must lose himself so as to make the other's perspective shine through (1993b: 909;914). It therefore has as its justification that it liberates the need for self-expression on the part of respondents. Yet if it so liberates, it is with the aim to make the other intelligible without legitimating him or her, as in the case of racists. It must also resist that form of observation in which the interviewer shares too much of the world of the interviewee, remaining at the level of their taken - for - granted condition, to the neglect of data about their objective situation. Bourdieu uses as the test of his method its capacity to identify with the
interests and needs of the dominated class. It is by this criterion that he aims to avoid the "imposition effect" in which the questions asked are so distant from the concerns of the subjects, that their answers are arbitrary and ill-considered. His contrasting approach, by recovering the speech of small shopkeepers, workers, etc., claims to offer a richer cultural document than the novels and songs held up as popular culture:

By virtue of the exemplification, concretisation and symbolisation that they operate with, and which confers on them sometimes a dramatic intensity and emotional force close to a literary text, these interviews have something of the effect of a revelation ...In the fashion of parables in prophetic discourse, they ... make more perceptible the objective structures which the scientific work strives to expose ...(1993b:922).

The general logic of this technique is compelling, even if specific arguments lack force. Against this method, a justification could be made for including some shared questions - as I have done in chapter VII - so as to increase the comparability of the responses. Inevitably, this new turn also raises questions about his own earlier practices in the sphere of empirical tactics. In particular: he has not used this method in his earlier studies of cultural reception.

I have completed the initial project of presenting a general survey of Bourdieu's themes in order to situate his science of culture without one-sided abstraction. It is to consider this cultural theory in more detail that I now turn.
Chapter II

Bourdieu's Cultural Theory

In this chapter I shall be primarily concerned with the effects of literary and artistic canonisation and the ways in which this has cemented the claims to power of the dominant class through its superior grasp of certificated knowledge. In particular, it will be shown through Distinction that appreciation of modernist works is restricted to other artists and to those with high educational capital. I shall try to show through highlighting Bourdieu's transgressive method, that knowledge of modernism required a knowledge of iconography that could only come from understanding the old. Moreover it will be shown that the same taste (avoidance of the facile, refinement, originality etc.) permeates wider decision-making in the sphere of consumption and leisure and that it requires specific social and material pre-conditions. I shall then show that if modernism has now become hijacked to add to the dignity of the dominant class, Bourdieu's understanding of its rise accounts for it differently, that is, in terms of modernist artists as a heroic group who achieved the autonomy of the artistic field from the laws of the market. The laws of this autonomous artistic field will then be explained, along with Bourdieu's claims to have a method for the science of literature and art which is more effective than his rivals'. A brief assessment of its hidden debts and its weaknesses concludes this chapter.

Art and the Ideologies of Natural Gifts

Throughout all his cultural works Bourdieu aims to unveil the mystification caused by ideological distortion. Three linked ideologies have been the object of his recurrent dissection: the ideology of the fresh eye, the ideology of the charismatic artist and the ideology of natural taste. In terms of classic Ideologiekritik, he shows that these three attitudes systematically favour the dominant class. Thus there is an equivalence between Bourdieu's
approach and Marx's method in *Capital*, which also aims to show that economic ideology contains religious or magical vestiges. Bourdieu's method is to use Marx's critique in another sphere of production in the bourgeois period, that of cultural goods. The prevalent approach to cultural production is represented by an essentially religious attitude to the operation of a mystery. Cultural production is therefore defined as the expression of transcendental genius, and is elevated both beyond the human and beyond analysis. Cultural reception is also naturalised, so that it appears the consequence of natural distinction. It follows especially from the first, that Bourdieu's demand for a return to the social relations underlying culture means that there is no "essence" of a text, that is, no single set of interpretative rules which dictate the terms under which a text unambiguously yields up its treasures. Perhaps it is not surprising that it was also Marx who said - a propos of censorship - "Who are to be the authorised producers? And who are to be the authorised readers?" (Cited in Prawer, 1976:47). If it is not now necessary to use the punishment of death to induce compliance to the range of canonical books protected by Papal imprimatur, it is Bourdieu's view that secular canons of consecrated culture still serve authority at the cost of symbolic violence.

Bourdieu implicitly draws on descriptions of novels or poems as abstracted or fetishised commodities, in other words, as products that are sold on the market and viewed as things, independent of the specific social relations of production underpinning them. Just as Marx showed how the ideology of classical economics, with its Holy Family of land, labour and capital, depended on a magical manipulation of categories, so Bourdieu

---

1In sixteenth century France, of course, the monarchical State and theological authorities used the threat of hanging to censor the reading of Protestant texts (Lefebvre and Martin, 1976:310-2)
shows that a similar magic is at work in doxic discussions of the objects of cultural consecration:

Consequently ... a rigorous science of art must, pace both unbelievers and iconoclasts and also the believers, assert the possibility and necessity of understanding the work in its reality as a fetish: it has to take into account everything which helps to constitute the work as such, not least the discourses of direct or disguised consecration which are among the social conditions of the work of art qua object of belief (1993a: 35).

Bourdieu depicts aristocrats of culture who present themselves as supremely "justified sinners" and in this respect they are the heirs to the arrogant self-made men of the early industrial bourgeoisie. Indeed, even by characterising culture in terms of consumption, he desacralises objects which have become the focus of veneration. This is particularly marked in the case of the "high priests", those professors of English, who recoil from the crude language of "production and consumption" for the hallowed objects of their studies. However, unlike the Nietszchean refutation of Christianity as a whole secret machinery of salvation erected on suffering (Genealogy of Morals, 1966: 200), Bourdieu does not conclude that these objects of cultural awe are merely the product of mystification. Rather, the title Rules of Art suggests that it is possible to redescribe art so as to valorise it without the distortions of individualism, perhaps rather as Durkheim thought religion might be revalued as an expression of the transcendence of the social over the individual (Durkheim, 1915). For the use-value of some works may be retained after their fetishistic aspect of literary creation has been stripped from them:

one might, by ... [a] willing suspension of disbelief, choose to 'venerate' the authorless trickery which places the fragile fetish beyond the reach of critical lucidity (1993a:73).
Thus his approach to literary analysis also provides the prerequisites for an adequate understanding of the "singular vision" of Flaubert or the profundity of the symbolic revolution initiated by Manet.

But first, we need to understand the approach of Distinction. The scandalous method deployed most conspicuously in this work entails the transgression of categories, and particularly the subversion of the boundary between sacred and profane. Where Kantian conceptions of high culture are premised on an undisputable boundary-line between the works of artistic genius and everyday products - signalled by the difference between the difficult and the facile - Bourdieu insists on the prevalence of such oppositions within modes of perception and appreciation in a wide variety of areas of living. For example, he links artistic consumption and production to that of food and insists on mapping tastes across these rigidly-patrolled frontiers (1984:13; 100). This irreverent viewpoint reveals that the adoption of a preference in each of the various parameters of cooking - sweet/sour, pungent/bland, crude/delicate etc. is also a template of choice in the area of mainstream aesthetics. Tastes might be systematically elaborated in the areas considered "high" because they are more abstract or pure, such as for some types of music, but they are still subject to the same oppositions that prevail in the arena of more sensual pleasure. The main source of these tastes or needs is the habitus, a set of attitudes engrained in actors so young that they acquire an unconscious compulsive force. As one such instance, Bourdieu reports that working-class men dislike fish because it conflicts with the rules of vigorous masculinity, the bones necessitating a more delicate operation than the hearty mouthfuls felt to be proper for a man (1984:190) In this case, bourgeois men occupy the opposite "feminine" pole, opting for delicate cultivation rather than earthy directness. In other areas, such differentiations revolve less around taste for an object or indifference to it, than how it is used. The celebration of the family in
photographs rather than the enjoyment of photographic form, the preference for a Romantic landscape combining wild together with cultivated rather than the more formal aesthetic with their rigid segregation; visits to galleries to see artists other than those celebrated in contemporary trends or to see these alone: all these are interconnected choices springing from the initial acquisition of a cultural ethos (1991:57). In this context, the preference for imaginative disorder rather than repressive order marks an aesthetic opposition which Bourdieu notes as rooted in the unconscious. It marks a fundamental division between the secure and relaxed stance of the "old rich" and the rigid self-discipline of the petty-bourgeoisie (1974: 20-21).

The same principles of perception, cognition and appreciation inform all areas of cultural choice, both in the scholastic culture of duty and obligation and in the "free" culture of leisure. Moreover, in opposition to Kant, Bourdieu claims that such choices are not merely cerebral but are, literally, embodied. Even music - Kant's highest and most intellectual art - moves us,seizes us in the stomach ("ravishes" us), while we may also be "nauseated" by a wallpaper or interior colour scheme.

The habitus, from which such conscious and unconscious ordering devices derive, can be summarised in the dichotomy between the "aesthetic gaze" and the "naive gaze". This distinction takes various guises, not just in relation to general differentiations of consumption according to class and in the opposition between professional painter and untaught painter in the field of art (1992:349). The aesthetic gaze prioritizes style or the mode of representation. It is not concerned with registering or morally evaluating the nature of the empirical world but is a self-sufficient form of play.

Bourdieu estimates that only 10% of the French population were concerned with photographs as aesthetic objects in 1965 (1990c: 182).
concerned, therefore with the way images are deployed or narratives are constructed. Linked analytically to Kant's "judgement of beauty", the aesthetic gaze is part of a game of form from which certain people are excluded:

It is barbarism to ask what culture is for; to allow the hypothesis that culture might be devoid of intrinsic interest, and that interest in culture is not a natural property - unequally distributed, as if to separate the barbarians from the elect - but a simple social artifact, a particular form of fetishism; to raise the question of the interest of activities which are called disinterested because they offer no intrinsic interest (no palpable pleasure, for example ), and so to introduce the question of the interest of disinterestedness. [...] [T]here is practically no question of art and culture which leads to the genuine objectification of the cultural game, so strongly are the dominated classes and their spokesmen imbued with a sense of their cultural unworthiness (1984: 250-1).

Those possessing a naive gaze - like Rousseau in Kant's account - refuse to evaluate the beauty of a great house independent of any moral disapproval of it as a site of exploitation. They enjoy the artistic celebration of commonplace enjoyments, such as sunsets or a mother and her child. The status groups that can manipulate a rare as opposed to a common or shared cultural heritage derive symbolic profits from this. For Bourdieu the same overarching polarisation is at stake for in the aesthetic formalism of the aesthetic gaze is demonstrated also a concern for individuation or differentiation, whereas in the naive regard there is an expression of what the group shares in common. The latter embodies the collective consciousness of the social group, or rather those classes in whom the collective consciousness is most unadulterated by the social forces for distinction of market and modernity.
The habitus of the aesthetic gaze is engendered by the distance from material necessity. Like all pure gazes, it is observation which has acquired dignity from being detached from participation and action. It is the object, moreover, of time and rigour (1984:183). Here again we see Bourdieu developing a perspective which owes much to Marx. If Marx had a labour theory of value, in which the value of a commodity was based on the amount of labour-time used in its production, the consumption of symbolic goods can also be measured by the time and rigour necessary to master them (1984:350). The heart of the aesthetic is the long mastery of old texts. For it is only through this lengthy education that there can be an appreciative awareness of the power to startle which is possessed by the really new. Thus the aesthetic gaze which is fascinated with the signifier, as in the Surrealist and Dadaist avant-gardes, has as its prerequisite the saturation in earlier forms of art. It follows that the twentieth-century avant-garde concern for inter-textuality, with its nostalgia, pastiche and melancholy is merely the ideal type of the aesthetic gaze. Since the aesthetic gaze is the product of the closeness to old things, such as inherited paintings and furniture, it is the attribute of the haute bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Paradoxically, despite the iron cage of instrumental rationality constructed by a bourgeois world, a gentrified status ethics reigns in the arena of taste.

A further principle is counterposed to the time perspective fundamental to the aesthetic attitude (and epitomised in the Proustian "waste of time"). This is the perspective of space. A spatial axis that differentiates the culture of distinction from the more traditional solidaristic cultures is demarcated by the separation of the industrial from the peripheral arenas of the world-market, favouring particularly the metropolis (1984:250). The Parisian haute bourgeoisie is also opposed to its class equivalents in regions such as Lille, who possess predilections closer to the pole of "bourgeois art"
(timeless, therefore déclassé works celebrating social integration) or middlebrow, petit-bourgeois taste (a pleasure in the older classics and in "predigested" forms of culture).

One further point here. To the mental classifications such as sweet-sour, coarse-fine, banal-refined, there is a linked group of categories setting the dominant class apart from the dominated (high/low, noble/common etc.). It is these distinguished expressions of noble feeling which are associated with the serious pleasure offered to the aesthetic gaze, while the simple sensuous charms of popular entertainment are linked to the naive gaze. Popular culture, in contrast, derives its force partially from the transgressive laughter of the carnival, (especially from the iconoclasm of the grotesque body (Bakhtin, 1968)), and partially from an anti-aesthetic aesthetics, based on the absolute supremacy of the moral and political in plebeian criticism (Proudhon) (1984:491). What is it that engenders with such stability both the historical ethos expressed in the aesthetic attitude and the popular culture of the naive gaze? Only a specific time-space axis which is rooted in material existence or lived experiences could acquire such power. Its origin is to be discovered in the possession or absence of a future which is conferred in turn by access to surplus-value and especially by the sense of possessing rare skills:

This is the difference between the legitimate culture of class societies, a product of domination predisposed to express or legitimate domination, and the culture of little-differentiated or undifferentiated societies, in which access to the means of appropriation of the cultural heritage is fairly equally distributed, so that the culture is fairly equally mastered by all members of the group and cannot function as cultural capital ... (1984:228).

Bourdieu is unusual among Marxists in his anthropological inheritance, which leads him to emphasise the importance of socialisation into cultures
from a very early age. There are two sites of the aesthetic habitus, domestic transmission and scholarly culture. The earliest tastes are formed through the family and take on an emotional bodily resonance which is ineradicable: *The Well-Tempered Clavier* (Bach) is indissolubly linked with emotions of secure happiness if it has been introduced to the child from early infancy through "the "musical mother" of bourgeois autobiography" (1984: 75). Thus the route-map through which to decipher the confusing landscape of inherited music and art is early and effortlessly imparted to the bourgeois child. The school, in transmitting this canonised culture, organises it within a specific pedagogy. Where this is rational, it democratises the inherited culture; where this is absent, it diffuses the culture to a select few, thus reproducing the social structure. Bourdieu's point about contemporary France is that there is an invisible curriculum, underlying the scholarly curriculum, which "fills in" the school-imparted knowledge and which is generally available only to the offspring of the dominant class. The children from the subordinate classes who surmount the obstacles of the lycée selection and subsequent examinations become, in Bourdieu's words, "miraculous survivors".

I have discussed so far the major division within consumption, between the sacred of the pure aesthetic gaze and the profane of the popular gaze. There are also subordinate disputes at stake in cultural struggles. Within the aesthetic attitude, there is the division between the gentlemanly or aristocratic ethos, originating at the court, and the more scholarly culture of the liberal professions. This is an antagonism of seminal significance in Bourdieu's cultural theory. In a move labelled "vulgar", he notes the homology between the structure of Kantian aesthetics (which valorises the complex analytical play of the mind as against the appeal of the senses) and the world-view of the dominated fraction of the dominant class, to which, as a professor, Kant belonged, and which preserved its distinctive virtue from
its rigorous opposition to the worldly ease of the aristocracy. This becomes pivotal in Bourdieu’s later work, for artistic production itself is linked to the subaltern fraction of the dominant class, deracinated by primogeniture from the possession of temporal power. The dissident culture of the youthful haute bourgeoisie, rich in cultural capital, but lacking economic capital is a recurrent subject. At the heart of his view of modern France, therefore, there is a series of potent contradictions, not least that between the noblesse d’état and the entrepreneurial fractions of the dominant class. The cultural critique of capitalism often gains its force from those who articulate an organicist and hierarchical alternative or express a pessimistic disenchantment. It is also these antagonisms which are played out in the struggles between consecrated culture and the new avant-garde or between the Left/Right struggles represented in the mild parodies or drawing-room comedies of the Right Bank as against the social criticism of Left Bank intellectuals:

Whereas the dominant fractions of the dominant class (the "bourgeoisie") demand of art a high degree of denial of the social world and incline towards a hedonistic aesthetic of ease and facility, the dominated fractions (the "intellectuals" and "artists") have affinities with the ascetic aspects of aesthetics and are inclined to support all artistic revolutions conducted in the name of purity and purification ... and the disposition towards the social world which they owe to their status as poor relations incline them to welcome a pessimistic representation of the social world (1984: 176).

The transgressive modern intellectual is to be described later as the equivalent of the Renaissance fool. The licensed inversion of the authoritative claims of the dominant class is at once source of the crucial ambiguity of their radicalism and their limitation.

Bourdieu’s notion of cultural goodwill also plays a major part in his
analysis, especially in relation to middlebrow consumption. It is conditioned by his conception of time, for it is especially time that controls the upward trajectory of the socially-mobile office-worker in the form of a "lost present":

In the end these altruistic misers who had squandered everything on the alter ego they had hoped to be, either in person by rising in the social hierarchy, or through a substitute shaped in their own image, the son for whom "they have done everything", are left with nothing but resentment - the resentment that always haunts them in terms of being taken for a ride by the social world which asks so much of them (1984:353).

Perhaps the most well-known is Bourdieu's work on the new petty-bourgeoisie who are, conversely, educational failures from the dominant class who use their dominant taste to become the "need merchants" of the new market for cultural and symbolic goods. This group - psychiatric professionals, aromatherapists, social workers etc. - possess a "fun ethic" and a taste distinguished by its catholic expansiveness. Bourdieu is especially perceptive in noting the iconoclastic aspects of this world-view, which permits an eclectic alternation between the more creative and modernist elements of popular culture and the more accessible legitimate culture. In this mix, the body also becomes the site of a worldly discipline, depicted in language reminiscent of the Nietzschean critique of the sick moralism of earlier bourgeois culture. More telling than these, is the major dispute between the priestly attempts to monopolise culture and the prophetic strata, which is at stake in the struggle between the consecrated and unconsecrated avant-garde, the orthodox versus heterodox, even anti-art. This takes us into the struggles to monopolise sacred knowledge within the reversed world of restricted artistic production, of which more later.

Despite the many misplaced attempts to classify Bourdieu as an advocate of postmodernism, it is odd that nobody has yet pointed out how
he has creatively reworked Durkheim, especially in his studies of the ideology of the culture of capitalist modernity. Durkheim's *The Division of Labour* is in part concerned with the decline of sumptuary laws, that is the regulation of dress, food and other codes for specific occasions and social estates (consequently, the nobility alone might wear ermine or gold; items for feasts and fasts may not be eaten everyday etc). Bourdieu emphasises that the "statutory signs of distinction" in matters of cultural goods were abolished in the nineteenth century with the increased writing for the market done by the de Kocks, Feuillets and others (1971:1359). However he stresses that consumption today is *still informally structured* despite the removal of all fetters or "Chinese walls" against the free movement of commodities (Marx n.d.(1848), 53). For consumption is controlled by the habitus. Within such dispositions, differentiated by gender and class, are laid down the pleasures which later lead the actor to occupy a specific position. As Bourdieu explains, this is largely an unconscious process. The typical child from the dominated class experiences through the habitus both the exclusion from the dominant class and, more surprisingly, the willed acceptance of his/her subordinate position through visceral repulsion from the style of life of the bourgeoisie (1984: 169-75). *Taste* is the principle through which individuals occupy a certain social space:

> It continuously transforms necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences, and without any mechanical determination, it generates the set of "choices" constituting life-styles ... (1984: 175).

In other words, when supernatural and moral sanctions lose their power, it is through taste, style and even pleasure, that we come to occupy certain occupations and kin positions. The habitus creates an active willed choice to occupy certain positions, even if behind this choice there is also

---

3Brubaker (1985) is an exception to this.
necessity. My argument, then, is that Bourdieu has taken Durkheim's "sumptuary freedom" and replaced it with his notion of "free culture" or "domestic culture". In an enterprise of demystification not unlike that provoking the fin-de-siècle angst of Durkheim, Bourdieu emphasises the bizarre conjuncture of social forces such that productive labour based on the pleasures of luxury is converted into the educational laurels implicit in categorisation of "brilliance", "refinement" and "originality". Such educational classifications euphemise and disguise the underlying social classification (1988a:218). But the more menacing dimensions of these individuated social processes are never very remote.

As the synthesis of all Bourdieu's earlier writing, *Distinction* provides the most sustained analysis of artistic and non-artistic culture. It offers an extraordinary depiction of the ethos of cultural consumption of groups differentiated in space and time, and - beyond these, in their relation to the material urgencies of life. The book cuts between a Proustian perspective on

---

4Willis's sensitive study of working-class nonconformists at school, mentioned by Bourdieu in *Language* ..., shows in much the same way that their culture valorises their gay laughter and patriarchal masculinity, rejecting the consumption patterns of the middle-class school conformists as effeminate (1977).
the part of the aristocrats of culture and a Proudhonian aesthetic on the part of the skilled working-class, in a dizzying exercise of perspectival thought that has some of the scope of a modernist novelist like Musil.

The Rules of Art

The artist represents, for Bourdieu, the prophet in a theodicy of bad fortune. He/she is thus the descendent of the Old Testament prophets who upbraided the Ancient Jewish tribes for neglecting the moral law. Such prophets spoke of the social group as a totality, through their concern with its inner life. Transformed in modernity by the break with tradition, artists have become the austere critics of society and purveyors of imminent doom, recalling the voices of Amos and Isaiah. The autonomous field of art has a complex relationship with other fields. At one pole it is constituted by bohemia, the "world-in-reverse" of the fields of economic and political power (1992:121; 1993a:115). The other pole is typified by consecrated artists whose works can be used to confer a halo of dignity on those with temporal or worldly power. The genesis and development of the autonomous artistic field is mapped out in this historical sociology, from the invention of the life of the artist as a suffering, Christ-like figure, through the emergence of the professional painter with his "toy", the naive artist, to the mild ironies of Warhol and Pop. One particular theme which Bourdieu develops, parallel to the analysis of authorship by Barthes and Foucault, is a new angle on artistic genius. He also uses another idea relating to ancient Judaism to refer to the artistic vocation, the idea of a "special contract" of the Jews as a chosen people with a God who is nevertheless a universal God. As Max Weber pointed out, what came to distinguish the Jewish pastoral people
was their highly unusual interpretation of their history\textsuperscript{5}. He categorised this as a theodicy of bad fortune. For the more the Jewish people seemed neglected by their God and subjected to a whole array of catastrophic miseries, the more they believed that they alone were saved. It is this conception of the value of suffering for salvation that Bourdieu calls on in his conception of the bohemian artist. The real writer establishes his reputation only through risking rejection and experiencing suffering. Thus the invention of the Bohemian artist is the projection onto the beyond of the time-lag between supply and demand in artistic production (1971: 1359).

I shall discuss Bourdieu's case-studies of Flaubert as member of the "second bohemia" and, in the next chapter, of Manet as the representative painter of a new "institutionalised anomie". In subsequent chapters, I shall claim that Bourdieu's declared critique of Goldmann masks an implicit return to the approach offered by Goldmann in The Hidden God. It is this, I shall claim, which allows Bourdieu to develop a sociology of culture which is theoretically sounder than the internalist analyses of Foucault.

From salon to Bohemia.

In the aftermath of Louis Napoleon's seizure of power, an autonomous art-world emerged. More precisely, the art-world splits, on the one hand into the market for restricted production and on the other into the market for large-scale production, the commercial organisation of the "culture industry". Within the restricted field there is in turn an opposition between the bourgeois art of the official artists in the salons and the avant-garde art of "bohemia". For bohemia can be considered a "reversed world" or a "society

\textsuperscript{5} Ancient Judaism, on which Bourdieu draws, has a much richer historical analysis than Economy and Society, particularly in its explanation of the social relations of the prophets and the Jewish people. Could it be a less canonised text for this reason?
within a society" (1992:86), founded on a fundamental rupture with the ethos of the market and the dominant class. The bohemian principles of erotic and alcoholic excess, love and opium create a culture of transgression, further sustained by songs, linguistic puns and jokes (1992:88). The artistic habitus most characteristic of modernity is shaped by knowledge of this oppositional history and the lived experience of heterodoxy. Balzac had divided the world into three orders: he who works, he who does nothing and he who contemplates a masterpiece. The bohemian does nothing (1992:87).

What then determined this "empire within an empire" (1992:90)? Briefly, profits and persecution. Bohemia emerges within an economic boom of "profits without precedent", with the rise of the Talabots, Wengels and Schneiders and the accelerated entry of domestic workers into factories (1992:77). While Bourdieu retains the notion of fetishism to describe this aggressively capitalist turn, he also sees proletarianisation and bohemianisation as twin processes, organically tied to increased market freedom, with bohemia as a protective sanctuary against the fate of free labour. Its occupants inherited their insouciance from the remaining artisan cultures of wandering "masterless men": saltimbanques, clowns, jugglers, singers. But the Bonapartist regime after 1850, as a dictatorial state, was itself founded on the suspension of parliament and union activity: it exerted a rigid censorship with the imprisonment of political dissidents, amongst whom artists were included. Both Flaubert's and Baudelaire's works were the subject of trials. From such repression was born the "heroic period" of Bohemia (1992:76)

Bohemia was "the world turned upside down"of the haute bourgeoisie in particular, for it was opposed to both the salon, and to the academy. It thus has some parallels with the subversive rituals of carnival, although carnival was a popular holiday from noble principles of vision (and
division), whilst Bohemia was a movement of internal exiles, initially from both dominant and dominated classes. Unlike the best-selling artists of contemporary novel factories, bohemian artists despised economic rewards, seeing popular rejection as a prerequisite for artistic "salvation" 6.

Bourdieu insists that bohemian artists and writers have to be understood also against the backdrop of the changes in the artistic field itself, not least the increase in the number of artists and their concentration within Paris. This itself was a response to the new compulsory education, producing new mass publics. Such a heterogeneous development in the number of producers with interests in the field created internal structural reasons for the new division of the artistic world. This recapitulated in many ways the earlier sectarian critique of social forces hospitable to dominant material interests. Nor was the analogy with the sect lost on contemporaries. Stendhal was to comment: "I am a sectarian" (1993a:122).

Bourdieu borrows here from the theories of Weber, stressing the utility of his theories of charismatic leaders and prophets for approaches to the cultural field, but it is noteworthy that he does so in different terms to Weber. Despite Weber's stress on the continuities between art and religion, his *theory of religious interests* treats the emergence of charismatic

6 This was not unrelated, no doubt, to the fact that sales of bohemian artists was very low: Zeldin quotes the figures of *Fleurs du Mal* (1857) as 1,300, while Verlaine's *Poetes Maudits* sold even fewer (253 copies) However it should also be noted that not only did Zola have large sales, as Bourdieu acknowledges, (594,000 copies for *Nana* and *L'Assommoir*) but some other bohemian writers, also now consecrated, have had high sales at time of first publication. For example, Proust sold 449,000 copies of *Du Côté de Chez Swann* (1913), thus equalling the achievement of the "queen of romance", Mme. de Ségur (Zeldin, 1980: 8-13). These differences are inadequately explained by Bourdieu's theory.
prophets as though they are entirely independent individuals. For Bourdieu, on the contrary, if the Weberian trinity of priests, prophets and lay professionals is to be deployed in the cultural field, it must be without the assumption that these figures are structurally undetermined and therefore explicable only in terms of personality (Carlylean leadership qualities etc.) (1987b). Specific social preconditions are necessary for the emergence of secular artists as bohemian figures, while the charismatic bohemians in turn legitimate their arts with the knowledge that it is the needs of the masses of which they alone speak. This troubled relationship between the rejected poet and the people resembles the fraught relationships of the Old Testament prophets with the Israelites; the consequences of "profits without precedent" being implicitly linked in Bourdieu's account to the popular distress which calls into being the Jewish prophets.

The changes cited above in the wider power relations and their impact on cultural production explain the genesis of a formally autonomous field. Its subsequent development is by means of disruptions in the field, that can be viewed as symbolic revolutions or transformations which have the long-term effect of the "purification" or aestheticisation of literature and art. This can be characterised as a movement from the initial romantic bohemia of the 1830s, to the second "realist" bohemia, constituted largely by plebeian intellectuals (1840s onwards). This is then followed by the bohemia of the 1850s and 60s, drawn from the dominated fraction of the dominant class, which was to reject realism and to turn instead towards style (1992: 110-118). It is this moment of the conquest of artistic "autonomy" which particularly interests Bourdieu, characterised as it is by a dual change, the initial appearance of a set of relations which change the artistic habitus, pushing the writer towards a more allusive text, for example, and also the
shadowed ideological expression of this change in the charismatic view of
the poet (1992:92).

The trajectory of each individual artist - Gautier, Baudelaire or Flaubert
- he links not merely to their class origins, or, as Sartre has done, to their
position in the family and in the family romance. In order to make the
trajectory of each artist totally explicable it is also necessary to depict the
artists' action within the autonomous art-world. Such strategies take as
their backdrop the 1850s' "invention of the life of the artist", that is, the
artist's disinterestedness, the Christ-like suffering that is the proof of
extraordinary vision and the dialectic of distinction (or the logic of
perpetual surpassment). Thus the unmasking of artistic ideologies means
that the highly spiritual self-presentation of the artist must be coolly
scrutinised in the light of his/her artistic interests, as well as the
characteristics of the field of power. This implies that the artist with
cultural capital in general and with knowledge of the collective inheritance
of art in particular, is alone capable of becoming a powerful player.
Unresourced by rent and undercapitalised with education, rural plebeian
intellectuals are only eclipsed within the brilliant circuits of their more
favourably-placed rivals. Their fate was typically to retreat from the
metropolis and to seek refuge outside it, as the writers of regional novels
etc. It is for these reasons that the Bohemia of autonomous art is based on
a "double rupture" (1992: 115), a simultaneous recoil both from bourgeois
culture and from popular culture. Bourdieu thus clarifies with this second
Bohemia the exact dimensions of the trend towards artistic formalism.

The realist Bohemia then represents a parallel to the 1848 political
movements within the artistic field. The social art of Champfleury, Bonvin,
Courbet, Duranty, Castagniari and Desnoyers is captured in the "bohemia
dorée" so christened by Henri Murger, which was the home both of
deracinated bourgeois groups as well as stigmatised minorities. Baudelaire
is an active figure of revolution within this circle; Flaubert a more peripheral presence. This was a circle dominated by artists of artisan or poor petty-bourgeois origins (1992:134). Being thus absolutely constrained by time and money, they had no opportunity to accumulate in leisurely manner the capital in terms of knowledge of art history which marks the artistic habitus.

This moment of creative realism, which leaves its great remains in Courbet's reworkings of popular woodcuts and in Baudelaire's visions of metropolitan fragmentation and abandonment is a transitional phase only. To it is owed Baudelaire's negative image of the future as the "puerile utopia of art for art's sake" (1992:89). The pure art which superceded it has to be understood as both rejecting the alliance with the people of the First Bohemia but at the same time as rejecting extreme formalism, in which the exposing ethical gaze of the artist is silenced by means of an exclusive focus on the means of representation alone.

There is a tension between the two presentations of the "proletaroid intelligentsia" in this account of Bohemia, structural and historical. On the one hand there is a continuing conflict between the recruits from the dominant class and those from the subaltern classes within the bohemian space. On the other hand there is the possibility of periodising these antagonisms, which are linked also to the role of the state and to the interests of the (industrial) bourgeoisie. Thus if the 1848 February revolution represented a temporary recapitulation of the 1830 revolution, with the bourgeoisie ranged against the finance aristocracy in an alliance with the people, this was the moment also for the proletaroid intellectuals and realism (1992:40).

Bourdieu's argument is that the "double rupture" with both the dominant class and the people is the generating principle of Flaubert and Baudelaire's art. It ushers in the aesthetic of modernity, a pure art which
repudiates engagement and false idealism. In my view, the originality of Bourdieu lies in his description of this pure art and its recuperated fate in a way which seeks to transcend the false dichotomy within Marxist aesthetics between the epistemological naivety of Lukacsian realism and the modernism of Adorno. Bourdieu's theory of artistic capital, productive freedom and the long time-span for disinterested success claims that in the restricted field the artists who have acquired reputations have been those who represent the dominated fraction of the dominant class, and not the subordinate class. This has entailed a "fragile alliance of artists and people" (1994:146). In this alliance, success in terms of the "dialectic of distinction" constantly removes the painter from the mass base he aims at. The typical fate of artists is that they progressively reinterpret their concerns in terms of "how it is said" rather than "what is said", that is, they are increasingly concerned with the distinctiveness of their means of representation (1992:197).

Bourdieu's major emphasis is thus on the "contradictory class location" of the artist, a space which is simultaneously dominated and dominant. This site engenders a sense of marginality which leads artists to develop their analytical potential in an artistic way of seeing and to perfect new techniques as artistic means of production. At the same time their location threatens constantly to reduce their accountability to the widest public and to narrow their world-vision to that of the cultivated members of the ruling class, due to the structural limitation imposed by the field of restricted production. This tragic vision of art is sufficiently flexible to permit both the celebration of an individual modernist like Flaubert, but also an unambiguous description of the perspective to which the viewpoint of pure art corresponds.

The bohemia of pure art has not discarded what has gone before:
Baudelaire never denied what he learnt from the most disinherited regions of the literary world - most favourable to a critical and global perception, disenchanted and complex, crisscrossed with contradictions and paradoxes - ... this world, in relation to the total social order, in its nakedness and its poverty, while it threatened his mental integrity - was the only place for liberty and for the inspiration for insurrection (1992:100).

Hence Baudelaire's intellectual integrity was contained within this opposition to the world of power despite the dandyism and blasphemies which separated him from the respectable working class. His suspicion of the people is an endemic feature of the "elect elitism" of the second bohemia.

Flaubert’s goal of extending the scope of the novel led him to distance himself simultaneously from best-selling fiction, which won its acclaim by flattering the public, and also from the classical gaze which insists on noble forms and noble subjects. Instead he wants "to write well about the mediocre" (1992:140) and to work on the level of form to make the real apparent (1992:142). This "realist formalism" requires a new intertextuality of the novel - a revalorisation of the great writers of the past whilst challenging the conventions of the former Academic monopoly, so as to divorce them from a cult of form for its own sake.

This required the "institutionalisation of anomie" or the de-regulated championning of the new in art: "[E]ach creator is authorised to introduce his own nomos, with works bearing - without antecedents - their own norms of perception" (1992:103; 1993a:333). In reintroducing the term "anomie" (the absence of rules) in connection with the second bohemia, Bourdieu again explicitly connects the artistic formations of modernity with Durkheim's pioneering exploration of the declining regulation of consumption. Further, his discussion of the division of the artistic field between restricted and large-scale production, which is the result of the
increase in the numbers of cultural producers, also resembles Durkheim's description of the increased density (of population) which brings about the organic division of labour. Durkheim is the brooding theoretical presence behind much of *The Rules of Art* from its title onwards, but it is the "radical Durkheim" who stresses the connection between social structures and mental classifications on whom he draws, not the structural functionalist Durkheim. Durkheim was himself aware of the exposed structural location of artists and writers, since it is these groups he explicitly links to suicidogenic currents.

More important, for Bourdieu, is Durkheim's image of anomie modernity which takes - and inverts - contemporaries' fears of the mob or crowd. For Durkheim, social development is inextricably tied to the twin phenomena of the lonely figure who rejects tradition and demands the pursuit of new paths, and the supportive crowd, whose collective effervescence suspends normal categories and legitimates the new (1915: 218-9).

Bourdieu extends the idea of an artistic new nomos through his studies of Flaubert and Baudelaire, the Symbolists, Marcel Duchamp etc. The bohemians have a collective identification with a "niche of madness", in which there was a reversal of the economic world (1992:141). Their works have a transgressive force. They obtain the pure pleasure of breaking the rules, but also - like the fool- they lay bare illusions, and in this lies their value.

Thus in *L'Education Sentimentale*, Bourdieu moves from an orthodox reading which stresses the author's position as a novelist of disillusionment to a reading of the text as a more serious "model of social aging" (1992:61). On this account, Frederick, in his pilgrimage through Paris and Le Nogent, seeking to find love, creativity, friendship and material sufficiency, is doomed to discover only their monstrous incompatibility. Thus
L'\textit{Education Sentimentale} is for Bourdieu the presentation within a literary text of a sociologically realist model of social life.

Frederick is drawn in different directions by his clamorous needs. For Mme. Arnoux he feels an uplifting love which, although shared by her, can never become sensuous. For Mme. Dambreuse, the wife, and subsequently, widow of an immensely powerful banker, he is willing to propose marriage until her destitution makes her repugnant. For Rosanette, the courtesan of the demi-monde - he feels sexual pleasure but is irritated by her disparity of education and social incompatibility. Politically, his actions are equivalently self-cancelling. Like many bourgeois, he turns to the Revolution at the outset of 1848, but his role is one of passive support, not active engagement on the barricades. He distances himself from the stupidity of proceedings in the radical political clubs and casts his die with the Dambreuse banking circle. In this milieu he is equally hostile to their preparedness to imprison their enemies and use money to buy political advantage. This is a literary unmasking of the real nature of Louis-Napoleon's coup. Frederick's memory of the abortive brothel visit, where he and Deslauriers, his friend, lacked either money or courage to experience the embraces of the prostitutes, is for Bourdieu the emblem of the unheroic nature of Frederick's circle. It also aptly summarises the political debacle played out on the stage of the State by the leaders of the 18th Brumaire.

For Bourdieu, then, L'\textit{Education Sentimentale} cannot be read, as Lukacs suggests, as a novel, which, by interiorising events rather than by expressing them through objective action, fails to reach the triumphs of the earlier critical realism of Stendhal or Balzac. It is not simply that the artist has now become a passive observer rather than an active force in history as Lukacs suggests in \textit{Studies in European Realism} (1978). Rather, for Bourdieu, the bohemian novelist is a realist although the term itself has become a stake in the struggles over the aesthetic arena. What Flaubert
reveals through the image of Frederick's hesitations and his clashing avowals to different social worlds, is not the weakness of this personality but instead, the fragmentation of the social world. Within the highly-structured fields of power of modernity, Flaubert depicts a world in which only tragic individual distortion or exploitation is possible. In an allusion to Weber, Bourdieu suggests that Flaubert also lays bare the mutual incompatibility of the salvation through the erotic, through artistic creativity or through business success. In Frederick, the author achieves an image of social worlds polarised in terms of their possession of temporal or spiritual power, and an image of Frederick as the homeless wanderer who cannot choose between such values. In this novel the artist himself becomes a monstrosity (1992:151). Pure art is like pure love: both are disembodied and hence opposed to life, sterile perversions (1993a:157).

In representing Frederick as a type like himself, Flaubert neither simply reflects his social world nor merely depicts his own hesitations. Going beyond these unhappy alternatives, he offers a sociological view of things, though one concealed by literary form. Sociology lays bare what fiction creates in veiled form. In this respect, fiction can subdue the terror of the present. Flaubert said "I want to make something of the real, which is rare" (1992:140). Like the adolescent, the writer denies reality by constructing an imaginary world. But through this fiction two purposes are served at a stroke. First the writer reveals the complex structures of the field of power. Second - and here Bourdieu recalls Adorno - artistic practice opens up the possibility of transcending the reified world precisely because literary form depends on the imaginary universe of illusion. Thus the possibility of literature is also a talisman of the possibility of thinking and acting differently:

Frederick's trajectory is, one might say, an Aufhebung of what is involved in Frederick's position: Flaubert has passed over an
indeterminate state close to Frederick's in the field of power to a homologous position in the literary field (1992:54; 1993a:173).

This literature is "the reconciliation of the irreconcileable" (1992:114) in the sense that it possesses both an affinity with art for art's sake but also a deeper social or ethical commitment, going beyond the conventional expressions of the ethical in "social art". In his disenchantment, Frederick's aphorisms such as "fraternity is the great invention of social hypocrisy" actually operate as the ethical penetrations of the stale rhetorics through which Left careerism etc is concealed. Bourdieu sees in Flaubert an "art for art's sake of transgression and revolt". Rather than read aestheticism as complicity with the bourgeois world, Bourdieu reads it as an anarchist revolt against that world. The ethical nihilism or neutrality which it presents is then linked to a deeper critical impulse. To this end, Flaubert destroys the pyramidal construction of the earlier novel form and disrupts the simplicity of perspective (1992:164). This, for him and for subsequent modernists, is a condition of penetrating to the essential relations which exert the strongest causal force is the abandonment of the simplicity of a single perspective. Bourdieu carefully makes analogies between art and literature. Using Panofsky on modernism, he argues that the multiplicity of perspectives, the fragmentation of the personality, the notion of space as aggregated rather than unified, the loss of an unambiguous point of view all contribute to the decline of Enlightenment conceptions based on the Cartesian rational subject (1992:163)7:

This text, which, refusing to make a pyramidal construction and to

7These readings of modernism are also a feature of Simmel's sociology. In the only reference to Simmel of which I am aware, Bourdieu stresses the closeness between his own concept of aesthetic attitude and Simmel's aesthetic disposition in which the interest in pure, contentless form derives from the experience of those who possess sufficient leisure to "live to see" (1971: 1372-3).
reveal perspectives, is conceived as a discourse without a beyond, from which the author although eliminated, is, like the God of Spinoza, immanent and coextensive with his creation: it is this in itself which is the viewpoint of Flaubert” (1992: 164).

I quote this passage because nothing clarifies more the degree of finality of the break with Lukács at this point. Bourdieu is not arguing that Flaubert’s art is a lesser form as Lukács believed, psychologically enriched but, in relation to the critical realists, socially reduced. He certainly accepts Lukács’ view that Flaubert’s novels represent the product of contemplation rather than an active sense of being in the world and also shares his conclusions about the artists’ loss of popular appeal, but this does not represent for him a loss of artistic scope. Thus Bourdieu uses Lukács’ own criterion for literature - that it should understand the essential relational connections of modern society - as a critique of the narrowness of Lukács’ own canon, just as in the 1930s, Brecht had turned Lukács’ critique of modernist formalism into a critique of Lukácsian formalism.

**Bohemia and Social Origins**

Flaubert is typical of bohemians of the second period in being the son of a member of the liberal professions. His father, a surgeon, encouraged his son’s protracted education, supporting his travels in Egypt and the Middle East. Interestingly, his father himself seems to have refused the standard Orientalist disdain for the Islamic East, for he insists that his son continue to write on his holiday, without acquiring the responses of a "grocer" (1992:128). In thus hinting at an anti-bourgeois family world-view, Bourdieu suggests that Flaubert’s own antipathy to this politically dominant class had deeper origins than the writer’s structural opposition to market and utilitarianism. In his origins, Flaubert resembles other writers of the period, such as the Goncourts and the d’Aurevilly, who are also either from the liberal professionals or from the regional nobility. He is
a member of the dominated fraction of the dominant class, because he was temporarily impoverished in the 1848 period, an heir who had not yet inherited and who thus depended ignominiously, like Frederick at the novel's start, on allowances from home. Yet, as Bourdieu quotes Zola, this merely meant that "rent took the place of sales" (1992:124). Distance from commercial writers and from the need to get a living by discovering the taste of the wider public was thus granted by the inner assurance of economic independence. Such freedoms could permit more artistic experiments and the accumulation of other elements of cultural capital. This point is crucial for Bourdieu's structural depiction of the bohemian artist who is the equivalent in the cultural field of the politician who lives "for" politics rather than the politician who lives "off" politics (Gerth and Mills, 1947:85-6). The bohemian affiliation permits the fullest occupancy of the artistic habitus, or the particular pattern of cognition, and appreciation prevalent at the time. A precondition for this is mastery of the collective labour of the field, that is, the literary inheritance. It is only as a consequence of socialisation into the "cultural mode of production" with its norms imposed constantly on each productive member that significant productive advances are possible, in Bourdieu's view, and a new nomos can be created. This requires social time due to the slow process of acquisition of this collective labour and is only available to the children of the dominant class. Additionally, it requires a certain social place. Bourdieu insists that it is only on condition of deserting their country existence and coming to the city that the possibility for a creative contribution to modern art can occur. He does not spell out the manner in which the experience of the metropolis might have its decisive impact on modern art except through his reference to Baudelaire's writing on the poet and the modern painter. However, he uses two examples of figures who are representative of destinies divergent from Flaubert and Baudelaire.
Courbet and Champfleury are emblematic of these alternative possibilities. Both became members of the first bohemia but their resulting social trajectories are profoundly different. Courbet represents the last great successful realist painter, in Bourdieu's view. His reputation is made before Louis-Napoleon's seizure of power and is thus connected to the progressive bourgeoisie's engagement with the "social question". Further, Courbet was able to be a larger-than-life rustic in Paris, a figure whose conviviality and common speech heightened the identification of the painter with the peasantry (1992:366-7). For Champfleury, on the other hand, although writing even before literature had fled from the openness of texts to the culturally uninitiated, it was impossible to compensate for his distance from the metropolis. He attempted to develop the realist novel as Courbet had realist painting, but the lesser availability of the collective labour of literature led him to take up only ponderously slowly positions which had been adopted quicker by others. Champfleury's failure to acquire recognition and to become a "name" led him to accept, out of necessity, another strategy: that of becoming a regional or "peasant" novelist. By becoming successful in this he became cut off from literature in the restricted field. Champfleury is the model for all lower-class writers who abandon their rural roots in the modernist period without being able to compete successfully in the city. It is also in this light that Bourdieu emphasises the passage of time which leads some members of the Parnassian symbolist group to readjust by turning to the production of psychological novels (1992:176).

Given the prevailing field of power and their position within the space-time axis, it is the dominated sons of the dominant class who are poised to take possession of the aesthetic field. It is these social origins which alone confer on the writer or artist the necessary resilience to become the "accursed" figures of the poet or modern painter. If bohemia is then the
enclosure of madness, there still persists within it inequality in the chance of receiving recognition as charismatic. Only those who are buttressed by material supports can endure the perils of initiating a style which has not yet been "banalised". It is only through the process of routinisation of the avant-garde, when the works literally become readable, that such artists acquire the fruits - or symbolic profits - of their iconoclastic action. So Bourdieu argues, using Duchamp's image, that each avant-garde movement is like a double-barrelled shotgun: it is fired once at its start but then goes off again after a long period of social ageing (1992:227). This dual reception depends on the social formation of an art-loving public, for they are the instrument through which the movement can be consecrated. It also depends on the fusion or interlocking of the art-world with the world of power, a process which in itself is the signal for a new avant-garde to surpass the old. Bourdieu's distinctive use of the term "banalisation" thus refers to the gathering "refamiliarisation" of a "defamiliarising" art-work (1992:198-9). Consecration, then, is not merely a process of the routinisation of a defamiliarising vision, it is the subjection of meaning to the authoritative interpretation of those with linguistic capital and other forms of temporal power. The analogy of avant-garde prophets depends partly on the dialectic movement of a prophetic sect into a church, accommodated to the world. But there are also overtones in Bourdieu's banalisation of "symbolic revolution", of Weber's poignantly dystopian reading of the necessary dilution of socialist practices after revolutions. The mass of hangers-on drawn into a movement once it looks like being on the winning side not only have material interests in the movement. They also possess a rhetoric that itself "banalises" the genuinely defamiliarising content of the renovating original message. I shall draw attention to this issue later.
Permanent revolution or symbolic revolutions as a structural feature inherent in art itself, develops only after 1850 with the "institutionalisation of anomie" (1993a:52-3). Art now proceeds through a process of "purification" which inevitably separates "pure art" or "literature" from those who possess only primary school education. Such revolutions in "ways of seeing" require the same kind of dedicated labour as that of the professional scientist. Bourdieu insists that what is at stake in such a revolution is never negligible, for it affects the mode of perception of every actor, the liberty to use the name "artist", to police boundaries to exclude pretenders but also to impose their world-vision on everyone:

To define the frontiers, defend them, control the entry-ports is to defend the order established in the field: the great upheavals indicate the eruption of newcomers, who, by their numbers and social quality alone, bring innovations (1992:313).

The logic of the artists' position is structured by the delicate balance, between originality and a disinterestedness on a virtuoso scale, as the artists' integrity is linked to the production of his works in a way which is not the case for scientists. For the artist complies with the social needs expressed in the terms "spiritual" or "altruistic" which have been displaced from everyday social production by the rationalisation of the capitalist economy. This draws artists towards "an alliance with the people". Hence one of the glittering prizes is to associate the author or movement with popular art. For Bourdieu, this obscures the question of who the real bearers of the movement are. Taking such claims at their face value risks identifying such art with popular culture, which itself is restricted to a naive gaze. The possession of the artistic capital necessary to make a successful career in art also cuts off artists from the workers and political revolutionaries whom they had once championed. The real dilemma is whether to remain popular (ie comprehensible) or whether to appear to
abandon the initial public by going for a more difficult form. It is the nature of the cultural field itself - and also the relatively privileged social origins of bohemian artists that leads them to associate true disinterestedness with rarity. They seek distinction, not solidarity. The quest for distinction is in part unconscious, for those artists coming from the old haute bourgeoisie already possess a "natural" distinction. The art dictated by such concerns is incompatible with production for the masses. So consecration and banalisation of a movement generate a new wave\(^8\).

The pursuit of distinction is overdetermined, being the consequence of the occupation of both in the field of power and the social field of art. The act of taking a position in the restricted field of literary or artistic production exposes the writer to the logic of that game or "illusio". Only the extraordinarily resilient individual can resist throughout a whole working life the judgement of the institution "art" which bestows recognition of his/her works. In this sense, Bourdieu's exploration of the art-world emphasises the penetration of the social into even the most apparently private and isolated of acts and reminds the reader of Durkheim on suicide or Goffman on deep structures within everyday life.

**Deviant cases: Zola and Rousseau**

If Bourdieu's theory of modernism is to be plausible, it must account for cases of writers who were exceptional in gaining critical acclaim and a popular following. The only candidates for this are those who have emerged

---

\(^8\) This position-taking in the literary field has been closely described by Balibar and Macherey:

"The root of this constitutive repression is the objective status of literature as an historic ideological form, its relation to the class struggle. And the first and last commandment in its ideology is: "Thou shalt describe all forms of class struggle save that which determines thine own self"." (Balibar and Macherey, 1981:86).
to prominence after the expansion of the reading public: Dickens and Balzac are thus inadmissible.

Zola's reputation seems genuinely anomalous. How could he have acquired simultaneously enormous sales for his books, prominence in defining the life of the intellectual and eventual literary recognition? The answer, in Bourdieu's view lies in the historical contradictions exposed in the Dreyfus Affair. For in the defence of the Jewish military officer condemned to death, it was Zola who redirected the attention of the authorities, with his celebrated manifesto, *J'Accuse*. By such a courageous political intervention, Zola thus became transformed into a literary figure (1992:185-9). His novels, which had attracted notoriety for their application of a scientific investigatory method to subjects that had had been thought to be lacking in dignity, became suddenly recuperated for Literature. Moreover Bourdieu shows Zola's adoption of the field of large-scale production as the chosen terrain for his activities to be itself exceptional. It was because of the early death of his father and his consequent lack of an inheritance that Zola was forced to move into the more commercial popular genre of the novel in the first place. His marginality in this sector ultimately permitted his recuperation.

The consecration of the naive painter, such as Henri (Le Douanier) Rousseau, is also a special case. If there is a refusal of bourgeois and working-class taste and standards of excellence, in modernism, how is the emergence of the naive painter to be understood? For there seems to have been a series of such painters (Alfred Wallis could be mentioned in the case of Britain, Grandma Moses for America, etc.) The answer suggested by Bourdieu is that the naive became a part of a couplet in modernism. He/she was the plaything of a field dominated by the professional modernist artist (1992:339). We can only really understand Rousseau if we grasp that the essential relations in which he was placed within the cultural field led him
to become the counterpart of Marcel Duchamp, a figure in whom are crystallised the most pure form of the subversive strategies of the new oppositional avant-garde. Hence the *playful* "destruction" of the Mona Lisa and other venerated cultural icons and the insistence on the role of *chance* in the adoption of the signature "Mutt", rather than the over-serious suggestion that this might be an allusion to a contemporary comic. Such mocking resistance to attributions suggests the freedom of the totally autonomous artist to defy the art institution. But Rousseau's role becomes clearer too. For he also represents the polar opposite of the academic gaze, (i.e. of the perspectival space, chiaroscuro and classical subject): as do all the artists of "L'art brut" (schizophrenics etc.). Whereas Rousseau represents a response close to the distance from the art-world of the amateur painter, Duchamp's "readymades" are founded on his astute feel for the needs of the art-world (including the demands for esoteric knowledge) which was conferred on him as part of a family with generations of professional painters ("Duchamp was in the field like a fish in water" (1992:343)). Rousseau, then, is the model for Bourdieu's handling of popular art.

Bourdieu's most recent work, *The Historical Genesis of the Pure Aesthetic* and *The Genesis of the Eye* has extended the analysis of the "ideology of the pure eye" undertaken in *Distinction*, where it appeared as the "aesthetic attitude". What Bourdieu aims to show in these late works on culture is the essentialism and idealism of the dominant mode of reception. Against a static structuralism, he emphasises that the work can only be understood historically, arguing that this position does not entail a relativist aesthetic. Against the philosophical "interactionist" aesthetics of Danto and Dickie, he argues that their correct emphasis on the autonomous power of gallery-owner and critic has also to be understood within specific historical limits.
The argument is in part a provocation - an attempt to bring to the surface the subterranean struggles over the legitimacy of rival disciplinary perspectives in art history. Part of his irony is displayed in noting that recent philosophical analyses of art have adopted a nominalist position, hijacked from sociological symbolic interactionism. This claims that artworks are solely those so labelled, by members of the art-institution mandated to perform acts of recognition, in part by the tactic of setting such objects within the framing of a certain space. Thus Danto argues that it is the gallery recognition of Warhol's *Brillo Pads* that permits his acrylics or silk-screens to become art. The explanation of the force of the art-world in being able to exert this impact on other agents he derives from Durkheim's *Elementary Forms*, although where Durkheim had insisted that the unconscious is history, Bourdieu asks us to consider that the "a priori is history". In other words, the aesthetic categories, considered as analytically separable from ethical meanings and empirical propositions, are conferred by the "social group", in modernity, by specialised professionals, private gallery-owners or dealers etc, who regulate canonicity or battles over value, in the absence of an academy. Like post-structuralists, Bourdieu accepts that such judgements of value take the form of binary oppositions (original vs banal, complex vs simplistic etc); unlike these, he argues that it is the social group as a whole that legitimates these choices, especially where these works are to be set apart in sacred places, literally, in Paris, the "pantheon".

*The Genesis of the Eye* is subtly arresting however, because it shows that such autonomy is relative and that it is *constrained within certain limits by the world of power*. Fifteenth century Italian painting was organised around a mode of reception that was not yet premised on a purely disinterested taste. This is because art had not yet emerged as an institution, "rationalised" around its one differentiating element, style.
Consequently there is an extraordinary homology between the reception of
the late medieval master-painter and that of popular art today.

It is paradoxical that art is less mystified when it has not yet become
separated from supernatural religion, but this is Bourdieu's claim. For it is
the critical discourse of modernity that has made as an operative test of use-
value works of art so remote from "transient" market-expressed exchange
values that these have had to claim total universality and total timelessness
for the genuine work of art. Such overblown claims have their parallel in
the aura of the artist. Whereas the fifteenth century artist had economic
needs in preserving a traditional family life, the modern artist is attributed
with an ascetic spirituality, which is devoid of all material interests.

Ghirlandaio was concerned with the regularity and adequacy of his
payment. The artistic economy was not yet a tabooed sphere, potentially
capable of challenging the disinterested presentation of the artist.

Third, in the autonomous field the consumption of art is freed of all
external constraints - of Church, State, patron. In the fifteenth century, on
the other hand, the patron had a very wide sphere of influence both in the
subject and the style. The patron might specify the colours to be used,
especially in the case of the most costly of all, ultramarine. In terms of
reception, the material had not yet become split from the spiritual. For
piety could be measured in the monetary investment in the painting itself.
The greater the value of the art, the greater the relief from time in
purgatory.

Medieval contracts between artist and public were divergent from the
modern in that the iconographical interpretation of the work was
dependent on signs that were very widely diffused: in sermons, fairs, dances
perhaps like modern comic strips. According to Bourdieu, differences in
interpretation were possible, but they were grounded in the lexicon or
iconology used within the religiously-based collective consciousness of the
group and common to artist and public. In contrast the autonomous artist is one whose signs are legible only to the few. The resulting fragmentation of the collective consciousness is the cost of artists' freedom in the choice of style and subject.

Benjamin had argued that the "signature of the master is a fetish". In Bourdieu's words, he draws attention to the "magical circle of belief which can make any object the subject of a formalist aesthetic. Bourdieu goes further, to stress the collective activity necessary to sustain this: it is not just the role of the artist but the rationales for his distinction created by museum curators, critics, teachers etc that are decisive. Moreover the language employed for these purposes is sufficiently flexible and vague to accommodate extraordinary combinations of diverse and incompatible works.

The concepts of art history have not been cleansed of their origin within a specific habitus.

Something strange has happened here. Artistic language has become part of an autonomous set of social relations premised on inclusion and exclusion, but it still retains the traces of its origins in a set of binary oppositions (heavy/light; brilliant/dull; original/conformist). These are - as we have seen - multivalent signs in relation to social class usage. They possess the appearance alone of neutrality. In reality it is the dominant social power which confers positive and negative connotations on these terms.

It is worth noting that Bourdieu aims to destroy essentialism without resorting to relativism. By locating a work within a particular period, its "necessary" existence is revealed:

But historicising them means not only (as one may think) retrieving them by reading that they have meaning solely through reference to a determined state of the field of struggle; it also means restoring to them necessity by removing them from indeterminacy (which stems
from a false eternalisation ... The historicising of forms of thought offers the only real chance, however small, of escaping from history. (1993a:263-4)

This is a provocative passage. Bourdieu is claiming that the sociological historical method can release art-works from their imprisonment within the class coffin of an Institution "Art" dominated by aestheticism and by the monopolisation for a few of the spiritual aesthetic grace. The objective meaning of the text can then be revealed and the work put to other purposes and practical uses, placed differently within the social relations of domination (struggles over class, environment, gender, etc.) etc.

In other words, historical sociology permits the work to be removed from its pedestal where it touches the "transcendent" or becomes the vehicle for weak organic-Romantic abstractions about "life", "experience" etc. Instead it is situated within its intellectual provenance and its author's being in relation to time and space. This does not make writers "mouthpieces of myths" but makes possible the sort of appreciative return of the text to its generative cultural and social circuits. Through these means art and literature become not the vehicles of self-referential formal games operating as claims to distinction, but ways of thinking and feeling concerned with interventions in the world of action. Thus although he gives no hint of how this might occur, Bourdieu reveals clearly that he is an advocate of a changed mode of reception. His own earlier arguments retain their relevance concerning the institution of a "rational pedagogy" to diffuse the codes of art production, and the social preconditions for this (1990c; 1991).

Critical Issues in relation to Bourdieu's sociology of culture

There are three main areas that I wish to introduce in criticising Bourdieu's cultural theory. First, I want to raise a dissenting issue about
Bourdieu's interpretation of Kant as a formalist. With some irony, Bourdieu labels his analysis of Kantian theory "a vulgar critique of pure critiques of judgement" (1984:485). He notes that for Kant art was the more pure the more it was segregated from an immediate or naive pleasure in certain categories of sense-data. In this sense it was a pleasure of a highly abstract and rationalist kind, premised on the denial of the senses and the privileging of intellectual capacities above all other modes of response. Bourdieu claims that such a separation of enjoyment from artistic pleasure could only be the consequence of a double repression, in which the self is distanced not only from the aristocracy but also from the people. Kant's own aesthetic philosophy, he suggests, possesses an elective affinity with his habitus as a professor and by virtue of this, with membership of an economically powerless fraction of the dominant order.

He thus takes issue with the Kantian view that a judgement such as "this is a good painting" can be simultaneously subjective and universal, or valid for everyone. Bourdieu's own field work shows the enormous divergence of tastes and explains these in terms of the existence of different kinds of habitus. Why then, did Kant want to insist on universalism? The argument that Bourdieu hints at is that the sense of the universal is itself derived from the peculiar power of the "sacred". In other words, it results from the impact of the "conscience collective" or the respect for the group. By foregrounding the empirical discovery of clashes of taste, and the lower-class perception of their cultural inferiority, Bourdieu highlights his own powerful use of Durkheim's conscience collective or the false universalism of the aesthetic ideology.

This argument is one he returns to in a number of studies (1984, 1990c). I think it would be wrong to read Bourdieu as a postmodernist proposing an nihilist critique of the Enlightenment subject. Yet it is clear from his own evidence in Photography that Kant's universal cannot be
simply dissolved into the sublimated expression of individual self-interest. For example, Bourdieu shows that peasants and workers enjoy certain family portraits and photographs recording local celebrations. More relevantly, he states that they have a conditional aesthetic - a photograph of a dead soldier, for example, is not described simply as "beautiful", that is, of universal aesthetic importance. Rather, they stress "it could be used to show the horrors of war" (1990c, 86). Thus peasants and workers are making a distinction between a purely personal photograph (which might reasonably have no artistic value for anyone else) and powerful shots of the dead which would jolt the observer into a recognition of the cost of war. Thus we can conclude when working-class people reject a Mondrian, this does indeed raise certain difficulties with modernist critics' notion of a "universal" aesthetic judgement that is held to exist as an analytical a priori - independent of any social codes or conventions. But Bourdieu's own argument depends on elaborating on the subordinate class's assumptions, as above, about a general interest, leaving us to conclude that his real target is not Kant but aestheticism and formalism. Against Bourdieu, the Kantian value of disinterestedness does not impose an aestheticist conception of art, since beauty as Kant conceives it does include "resistance to evil" and the "sensuous representation of the ends of humanity" (Kant, 1911, 79). There has been, of course, a twentieth century purification of art and a consequent trend to the creation of a purely painterly "second reality" but Kant could hardly be said to have anticipated this in his aesthetics. Bourdieu is certainly right to criticise Kant for an elitist exclusion of naive enjoyments of the pleasures of form, which were dismissed because of their dependence on additional charm (sunsets, etc.). However, despite some important assessments on the historical context of art, he has not proved the entire inconsistency of the Kantian problematic (see Crowther 1994). There are further points that can be briefly sketched out here but will be
elaborated in the following chapters.

Second, Bourdieu has underestimated the unevenness of the trend to formalism in modernity. This argument will be developed more fully later. Here I want to suggest that there are particular difficulties with his division of culture into the field of large-scale commercial production and that of restricted production. I shall suggest that he has underestimated the capacity for work of artistic power to arise in the first field. Bourdieu's conception of popular art is particularly disparaging and I shall challenge this.

Third, I want to question the over-simplified conception of artists and writers. It is argued that this group comes from the dominated fraction of the dominant class and possesses a common habitus with consumers from this class. As such, the artist's drive to distinction invariably distances him or her from "the people". I shall argue that in certain cases artists can remain "prophets" even if they seek symbolic domination.

The whole of Bourdieu's sociology is concerned with the emergence and explanation of the use of secular culture to buttress the ruling class as part of a conservative ideology. But the precise character of literature and art in this role is unclear. On the one hand, the formalism of the aesthetic gaze (the over-refined dandyism of technique, to use Arnold Bennett's phrase) seems to be vested in the restricted field as the attribute of museum curators, critics etc. - especially the more patrician of these (1991:95-6; 1993a:261). On the other hand, he seems to hold that it is the attribute of artists, who emphasise the aesthetic gaze in order to win a reputation (1980a:266). It is this which is the artists' achilles heel, leading them in middle age to distance themselves from the public whose interests they formerly took up in order to satisfy their bourgeois customers.

There is in fact an unresolved tension in Bourdieu's theory here. He has two views of the artist. First, the artist is an austere and ascetic prophet-
figure, as in both the theory and practice of Baudelaire (1992:88-103).

Second, given his dominant class habitus, the artist aims at a professional reputation which will ensure him the potential to resume a relatively privileged domestic lifestyle. This second view involves the artist playing a double game. He is going for a bohemian, anti-capitalist strategy but is hedging his bets by tailoring his painting etc to the expressed wants of his bourgeois customers or patrons. In this way, exchange-value is never expelled from the Bohemian Garden of Eden but slips in like a snake when the artist is most off-guard.

Which is his final emphasis? I think that Bourdieu has been pushed into determinist and pessimist conclusions. In these the texts are permanently allied to a hegemonic project. But perhaps it is necessary to look more closely at the sociology of reading formations (in the broadest sense). When might these be reorganised, tending to transform rather than reproduce the ruling class? To ask these issues is to raise the sort of questions that were raised about the "Institution" of Literature in the 1960s and 1970s.

In this period, a number of writers - particularly on realism - argued that canonised Literature could not be regarded as immune from ideology (Bennett, 1981). For Eagleton, Baldick, Balibar and Macherey, and others, the argument was not so much about the texts themselves but about the relations into which they are put, some of which may serve to create ideological effects. There is evidently an identity of views between these arguments and those of Bourdieu above.

---

9 Bourdieu goes further and sometimes represents artists as particularly venal: "One soon learns in conversations with these [gallery-owners] that, with a few illustrious exceptions seemingly designed to recall the ideal, painters and writers are deeply self-interested, calculating, obsessed with money and ready to do anything to succeed". (1980a: 266)
But Bourdieu is still unclear. We are left with a set of questions about modernity. In what contexts might artists be able to operate as genuine prophets even if they originate from the dominant class? Emphasis should be placed on the texts, and not on the personal dispositions of the authors. This is to restate the question raised by Benjamin, viz at what historical moments and in what structural forces will the author be pushed to an aesthetics of politics as opposed to an aesthetic of style? It also raises the sort of issue touched on by Raymond Williams as to the "anti-bourgeois character of much bourgeois cultural production " and by Edward Thompson as to the placing of texts (e.g., Shakespeare, Mrs. Gaskell, Gillray, Cruikshank) within a popular radical tradition at certain points (Williams, 1979:155-6; Thompson, 1968, 809-810). Finally, it raises absorbing questions about the context in which such anti-bourgeois artists are prepared to take the risks and discomforts of becoming austere prophetic figures.

In this context, the role of exile and internal or external emigration among writers has been especially emphasised (Eagleton, 1976:133-4). This seems to me to merit more thorough research. I might mention here the example of Rushdie as someone who has roots in the dominant class of a post-colonial society, but whose experience of migration has led him to articulate the experience of the subordinate masses. Rushdie writes of the poet "bringing newness into the world" for this reason. We might use his own case to illuminate the trajectory through which this occurs (1988:272).

Bourdieu's tantalisingly brief comments on how a sociological analysis of production affects literary value reinforces these views, not least in his assessment of Flaubert's "singular" achievement (1992:9-14). For by removing the singularity of the creator in order to emphasise social relations, literary experience can be rediscovered "through the work of reconstruction of the space in which the author is
found, encircled like a point. To understand this point in literary space in this way, a point from which is also formed a singular viewpoint on this space, is to know and to feel the singularity of this position and of he who occupies it and the extraordinary effort - at least in the case of Flaubert - which is necessary to make it exist" (1992:4).
Chapter III

Current Debates in Cultural Theory.

In this chapter I shall locate Bourdieu's approach to the institution of art within key perspectives in the sociology of culture and cultural studies. His important contribution to the controversy over modernity provides the launching-point for a mapping exercise which seeks to explore the "intertextuality" of his own thought about the sacralisation of culture. The aim is not only to elucidate his distinctive contribution but also to point to alternative paths that he has failed to develop. I shall start by focussing on the debate over postmodernism, claiming his strategic importance in *Distinction* but stressing also the need to locate this work in the light of his subsequent sociological history of modernism. I shall then proceed to identify both his debts to - and difference from - Lukacs, Goldmann, Benjamin and Foucault.

*Bourdieu and the Debate over Modernity*

After 1850, the experience of everyday life in a world increasingly moulded by the designs of a bourgeois patriarchy produced a new mentality in art. Bourdieu seeks to defamiliarise the complex divisions of artistic modernity, encoded within the cliched couplet "modern art". It is his view that by relating art to the field of capitalist power, the nature of the autonomous "demands of art" can be elucidated by means of a contrast with the conditional aesthetic of feudalism, and its meaning within the entire world-view of modernity thus be brought to light. Similarly, Marx had regarded the critique of religion in modernity as initiating the critique of all social relations, and Trotsky had regarded Futurism as the modernist critique of the Aestheticist cult of beauty, itself inextricably bound to the "stagnant and smelly character of everyday life which produced that aesthetics" (1960: 145).
Bourdieu’s central move is to characterise the experience of capitalism as engendering a complex inversion of the cosmos, in which the worldliness of the businessman is negated in the otherworldliness of the artist. Although in many respects he can be justly described as "a Weberian lamb in Marxist wolf’s clothing" (Nice, 1978:30), it is in his concern to turn Foucault right way up, as Marx had earlier done to Hegel, that we can decode Bourdieu’s theory as undertaken in the spirit of Marx. As we shall see - like Foucault - Bourdieu wants to seize the classics - "the gift of the dead" [...] from the "sanctuary of History and the fetishised authors" to put them back into liberty (1992:13). Unlike a Foucauldian approach, the living experience or subjectivity of the author is not eliminated but is situated within a network of objective relations, especially those of the professional field, class and family. Such sociological work does not diminish the work of art, as conservative critics believe, rather it provides a rich accompaniment to it, which compensates for the earlier "angelism" of the interest in pure form (1992:15).

Since modernism for Bourdieu is now "a world we have lost", it is only by reassessing the artistic mode of existence, especially the symbiotic relations of the "second bohemia" with the repressive brutality of the first dictatorship of the industrial bourgeoisie that we can reconstitute that world. The persecution of Baudelaire, Flaubert, Lecomte de Lisle and others, together with the censorship and imprisonment of their publishers represents the heroic moment of modernism which has now passed. For the coming-into-being of autonomous art is an oppositional movement even although it declared itself to be about style or form. The rupture of

---

1The heroic movement was definitively over by the 1871 Commune when these aging writers repudiated the Communards (Lidsky, 1970:45). Flaubert, who was 50, had already written that "Politics is dead, just like theology. It’s lasted 300 years and that's enough." (1869) (1970:34) Lidsky, cited by Bourdieu, provides an important analysis of responses to the workers’ movement in terms of the closeness to Paris and the age of the writer (1970:42-44).
Flaubert and Baudelaire in literary history has to be understood, Bourdieu suggests, as that of the first avant-garde. By using this benchmark we can see the entire ensemble of the modern relations of cultural legitimacy being set up in place, just as the first factories installed a new set of authority divisions when machino-facture had not yet supplanted manufacture. In other words, the laws of modern art are only possible because of the break with realism first broached by Baudelaire and Flaubert. Their actions inaugurated the succession of avant-gardes within the cultural field. Through their precarious projects we can also penetrate plainly to the economic and educational resources that made their production possible and which are often obscured today. The art-world of late modernism, by contrast, has gravitated to a different position in relation to power. Objectively it serves to reproduce rather than to subvert the dominant class.

By means of this analysis of Flaubert and Baudelaire, Bourdieu sustains a view of contemporary culture which is more powerful than recent accounts of postmodernism. My contention is that Bourdieu's work is best understood as a sociological rebuttal of the history of much crude postmodernist thought. But it also marks clearly the breaks as well as the dialectical continuities of the present with the heroic period of modernism. In comparison with other recent French theorists such as Lyotard and Baudrillard, for Bourdieu the grand narratives of the first generation of Enlightenment thinkers are still unfinished: hence his indictment of the "false radicalism" or inadequate social science of historical political movements which claim to authorise their action through the name of the subordinate class. Bourdieu does not "dance lighteartedly upon the waters of difference" among the "feline ironists and revellers in relativism" (Soper,
1991: 122). But nor is it possible to see Bourdieu as "against postmodernism", as though it merely encapsulated an irrelevant "poverty of theory". I shall briefly outline the theory of modernity in order to highlight the nature of Bourdieu's contribution, although it must be stressed that Parisian post-structuralism - from which Bourdieusian theory is an offshoot - has to a considerable extent taken place in isolation from Anglo-American debate.

It is necessary initially to distinguish the new social relations and distinctive culture of modernity and to probe the question of the links between the two. Debate has focussed on the cultural co-ordinates of creativity, and - more specifically- on whether creativity in the late modern metropolis is doomed to exhaustion and decline (Orr, 1986; Anderson, 1984; Burger, 1984). Anderson and Burger have both argued that neomodernism is characterised by a culture which produces only artistic kitsch, in which the recycling of older ideas is prevalent. Modernism in this late epoch has thus been associated with the failure of the avant -garde and to an expectation of eternal cultural repetition of earlier cultural forms (Anderson, 1984; Orr, 1986.).

The merit of the modernity thesis as originally outlined by Berman(1983) is that it grasped imaginatively the wider dimensions of the change in traditional societies implicit in the drama of development. Emphasising the antagonistic class forces and the clash of modes of production, Berman's initial account nevertheless avoids economic reductionism in its presentation of cultural production within the varied

8 I am inspired by a scientific conviction which is not fashionable today, since one is post-modern ... This scientific conviction leads me to think that, if one grasped the social mechanisms [preventing a real scientific internationalism] this is not in itself sufficient to master them, but one increases the chances of mastering them, inasmuch as these mechanisms rest on misrecognition." (1990d:2). In the same lecture, Bourdieu argues that the interests of certain minor intellectuals have obscured the close links between the historical and social critique of rationalism (from Durkheim to Foucault) and the neo-Kantian rationalism of Habermas (1990d:7).
experiences of urban modernity. This perceptive formulation hinges on three major epochs of modernity. First, from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, there is the appearance of the new, but without the vocabulary to explain it (it is prefigured, for example, in Rousseau's revolt against the artificiality of the court and the reaction to the tradition of the salon).

Secondly, from 1790-1890 in Europe, Britain and America, there was a simultaneous experience of the old world and the new, together with the emergence of the idea of modernity and modernisation, especially in the thought of Marx, Nietzsche, Whitman and Baudelaire. These major theorists of modernity posited its dialectical character: they welcomed the modern world but recognised its contradictions. Although they possessed an exhilarating sense of disenchantment, summed up by Berman in Marx's phrase "All that is solid melts into air", they noted also new forms of domination within modernity, not least, the subjugation of aesthetic values to the law of the market. Thirdly, the twentieth century experience is premised on the expansion of modernism to the whole world but also on the loss of faith in collective capacities to shape a progressive future, which Berman encapsulates as the "flat totalisations" of the metropolis. Within this globalisation of capitalism, new modernist arts triumph in the periphery, as in the work of Marquez, Fuentes or Llosa Vargas.

Parallel to the work of Bourdieu (1992), the structure of feeling of the urban modernists, with their secularisation, disdain for established authority, and avid delight in the machine has been illuminatingly described by both Berman and by Frisby (1985). Succinctly summarised by Baudelaire, modernity received its most lyrical (and regressive) paen of praise in the Italian Futurist Manifesto. Founded on the increasing supremacy of the new capitalist mode of production, with its ramifying exchange circuits and detail division of labour, the new metropolises of urban Europe established unprecedented forms of urban existence which
turned lives upside down, not least in the architecture of the public sphere and in the new modes of communication (Schorske, 1961: ch.2)\(^3\). To this should be added the late nineteenth century "consumer revolution", especially in the city arcades with their "exotic-chaotic" array of colonial commodities and domestically-produced mass luxuries (Benjamin, 1973; Williams, 1982; Featherstone, 1990). Accompanying these changes in production and consumption was also a new conception of the cosmos, resulting from the displacement of the bourgeois certainties of the early modern Copernican universe by the uncertainty principle and relativism of late modernity. Such a transition also generated a shift from the pursuit of work and pleasure in early capitalism, which had itself succeeded the feudal quest for religious happiness, to the ceaseless striving for "excitement" in late modernity (Ferguson, 1990: 241-260).

Berman was thus the pioneer of a wider debate about modes of production which embraced the phenomena once classified as the cultural revolution of capitalism (see, for example, Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). Along with the constant revolutionising of production, Berman explored other significant features of the post-Enlightenment bourgeois social order. Thus the geometrical structures of the new civic design of St Petersburg or the Haussmanisation of Paris and other city centres, permitted also the easier imposition and policing of urban discipline. The consequent decline of the autonomous working-class dwellings within the medieval slums and the artisan trades carried out within them transformed the housing of the poor into dangerous enclosures and created the new phenomenon of the tragic victims of development. Along with the blossoming of sociability in boulevards and cafes, the lonely figure of the poet or flaneur emerged, with his forensic and aesthetic enquiry into lower-class modes of life. Frisby has

\(^3\)Schorske notes that the building of the new cultural monuments of Vienna contributed to the emergence of an "aristocracy of the spirit" (1961: 45).
also brought the insights of Benjamin, Simmel and Kracauer to expose the experience and meaning of the unparalleled extension of exchange and money. Thus direct knowledge of the rapid rise and falls of fortunes in the metropolis engenders a cool calculativeness on the part of city dwellers. For both dominant and subordinate classes, capitalist institutions create the co-existence of extremely rationalised, routine forms of life with their opposite, the adventure or the phantasmagoria, especially those visions of plenty which are stimulated by unprecedented commodities. The anonymity of the modern city facilitates also the transformations of gender relations implicit in the rise of "new women".

Frisby also offers an account of modernity that emphasises its new cultural forms. These arise most poignantly from the tragic sense of "culture" as a reified and overwhelming force. Yet they are also apparent through the assembled objects of newly-constructed art galleries and arcades, which distill a new awareness of space and time, or through new popular literary genres such as the detective novel which play with the opacity of social relations (Moretti, 1983: Palmer, 1978).

The debate between Anderson and Berman renews older questions about the causes of cultural creativity, but this time in the context of modernism (Marx, 1973: 110-111; Sorokin, 1964; Kroeber, 1963). It seeks, in particular, to explain the ebbs and flows of modernist movements within the social locations of modern Western bourgeois societies. In a key essay responding to Berman's book, Anderson has christened the period from 1890-1930 the period of "high modernism", the years of Kafka, Joyce, Musil, Braque, Picasso and Matisse; of cubism, expressionism, surrealism and dadaism. Anderson suggests that the extraordinary flowering of creativity in these years depended not just on the social locations for modernity but on vital cultural co-ordinates. Three of these are central: the persistence of a monarchy or imperial power of an autocratic type; the
institution of an academy with an official art, against which the avant-garde protested; and finally - the adoption of socialism by the European working class (1984:104). After the Second World War, these conditions crumbled, along with the disappearance of monarchies in Greece, Italy and the Austro-Hungarian empire, and the pre-capitalist, traditional worlds of which they were a part. When the juxtaposition of the older world with the new became less tense, the modernist movement it spawned became exhausted. The avant-garde was no longer linked to a substantive rationality but rather to a demand for the shock of the new dominated solely by the "tyranny of the calendar" (1984: 113). Modernism was now shown up as an empty category - by which Anderson means that it has become adapted to the calculative rationality or exchange-value which it once spurned (as an instance of such thought, see Bowness et al (1964)4). The only sites in the present from which great art can emerge are those of the global periphery, such as Latin-America, where artists confront the contrast in total social being between tradition and modernity.

Has metropolitan art lost the soil in which it once flourished? A similar argument is made by Orr, although he makes an exception of the neo-Modernist flowering which occurred in the mid-1960s. Whereas Anderson holds that post-1930 (metropolitan) art has - despite exceptions - only weakened forms, Orr argues for a more significant revival of modernism through the works of Antonioni, Bergman, Godard, the Rolling Stones, and the Beatles. Also attacking the determinism and pessimism of Anderson's case, Berman has argued that if the twentieth century has lost the grasp of potentiality as well as negation that the nineteenth century

4"Naturally, the bitterness dies and the fugitive comes back in triumph: the routine is built into the institution. But underground the search for the genuinely unacceptable, the despicable and the disgusting begins over again. It is a process of action and reaction, the instability of imaginative art that has been institutionalised. It is a truer and crueller basis for the academy than any of the upholstered aesthetics of other times" ( Bowness et al,1964:18).
thinkers possessed, there were still grounds for holding that great modernist work could be undertaken in the present. Like Ernst Bloch, Berman believes that art may still flourish on the hopes rising again after political disappointment (Berman, 1984:119-20; Bloch, 156-8). On this view, the works of artists connected with ecological issues - the nature/human nature axis - can still sustain major new artistic ideas. Moi (1985) has commented in similar terms on the exclusion within the modernist canon of much significant work by women, despite the links at the philosophical level between the multiple realities with which women writers have been preoccupied and the interest in the mind, for example, of surrealism. The implication of her argument is that modernism is only now bearing fruit in this area. For all these reasons, we might want to qualify the monolithic image of cultural decline that Anderson has presented.

The subsequent cognitive mapping of postmodernist culture reveals certain distinctive elements of the claimed break with modernism (Jameson, 1991; Lash and Urry, 1987; Jencks, 1986). Firstly, there is the belief that cultural producers can no longer disclose the world because of the crisis of representation (Jameson, 1984). Only play on existing stereotypes is possible. In a world of simulacra and images, it is impossible to distinguish the authentic or real. Related to this, secondly, there is a crisis of creativity, so that the author is limited to pastiche or blank parody, in other words, to the recapitulation of earlier patterns of representation but without the earlier stable sense of ethics. Thirdly, postmodern culture lacks the consensus over time and the logical use of language that pervaded Enlightenment culture - for this reason, Jameson typifies it as schizophrenic (1983: 119-122). Fourthly, postmodernism occupies a

Postmodernism is used by Jameson to cover the work of Greenaway, Lynch, Warhol, Venturi, Pynchon; Crowther discusses German artists like Kiefer and Baselitz while Harvey also analyses the film version of P.K.Dick's *Bladerunner* under this category.
different location from modernism, partly because of the canonisation of the latter. It entwines itself with the commercial messages or with best-selling cultural products that used to be kept apart from high culture. Pop art and punk music - both "postmodernist" - are used to sell Levis. The suspicion of the market that characterised the sacred or auratic art of the period up to the 1960s is replaced by a playful acceptance of the commodity, as in the arrival of cyber-punk films at art cinemas. In the most spectacular interface between nature and society, architecture, it is claimed by postmodernist historians that the new double-coded buildings - integrating the popular and the modernist - can alone heal deep-rooted social conflicts. Networks of resistance against dominant discursive formations are celebrated as the surviving locations of critical thought, but these are restricted to limited local areas where the vernacular can reappear or to insulated interpretative communities where an identity of perspective can be maintained.

There are several types of critique that can be made of these theories (Dews, 1987; Rose, 1991a; Harvey, 1989; Callinicos, 1989). As Harvey and Eagleton have warned, networks of dissidence are vulnerable to ideological volatility. They may turn into dark irrationalist traps heralding a return to the aestheticising of politics of the 1930s (Harvey, 1989:304; Eagleton, 1990:396). Postmodernism overestimates the significance of subjectivist philosophies. It exaggerates the distinctiveness of its time. It fails to grasp the continued stratification of cultural consumption, in which the dominated class lack access to high culture, while it lacks any inkling of the power of cultural legitimacy. Even in terms of art, its claims are doubtful. Its double-coding and use of pastiche is not unique to this period. Double-coding is rather a feature of many earlier forms of art, as in the use of Renaissance images in the eighteenth century (Rose, 1991b). Further, while

---

*Monta, Watanabe, Shirai ... Izogaki and Takayama are using travesty as a kind of mirror-image genre of cultural confusion, and if it's practised long enough it may have the unintended consequence of uniting a fragmented society* (Jencks, p 73)
there was an undoubted wariness of the kitsch of the culture industry, modernism by no means repudiated all popular art forms, but rather had what Huyssen has called a "competitive pas-de-deux with mass culture" (1990:24). Moreover the desire to de-sacralise art is common to both important groups of modernists and to postmodernism. Indeed, the confusion over periodisation has had a disabling effect on most of these theories: Le Corbusier's "postmodern" Ronchamps chapel was built in 1925, Doctorow's *Rag-Time* - also categorised in this way - was written in the 1940s, and while most postmodernism is said to date from the late 60s, others have identified the entire post-war culture as possessing these forms (for example, Gilbert and Gubar, 1988).

There is nevertheless undoubtedly a "shift in sensibility" since the 60s, or a new structure of feeling (although less plausibly the "transformation" claimed in the movement's self-conception (Jameson, 1983: 125)). Whether or not the cultural and social theories that make up postmodernism can be held to be consistent and whether or not it has any value, the phenomenon exists at the level of beliefs, with its own creative figures and with cultural critics who elaborate the rationales of its artists. As far as generalisation is possible, these highly heterogeneous cultural phenomena are characteristic rather of a revival of earlier irrationalist forms of modernism, typified in the novels of Svevo (1930) or Celine (1952), for example, rather than in a distinctive renewal of utopian thought.

The structural factors underlying the postmodern structure of feeling are undoubtedly the collapse of the post-war social-democratic "consensus" resulting from the global restructuring of capitalism as well as the new international division of labour (Callinicos, 1989: 162-4), with its consequent impact on the struggle for educational capital, to which Bourdieu's "school sickness" is a response. Together with the return to more exploitative, older methods of accumulation, this has resulted in a
simultaneously greater competitiveness (for example, the fateful inter-city economic competitions underpinning the Cities of Culture razamatazz), the destruction of pre-capitalist enclaves throughout the sphere of work and the orchestration of new experiences of leisure, not least through the ideology of compulsory consumption (Sklair, 1991:139-159). Changes such as the turn to holidays abroad on a mass basis and - of course - the Coca-colaisation of the world have created a strangely homogeneous eclecticism, well summarised by Lyotard in his celebrated portrait of the 1990s bourgeois:

Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one wakes to reggae, watches a Western, eats MacDonald's foods for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and retro clothes in Hong Kong ... (1987: 76).

Space and time have become dramatically compressed in the new global culture, dominated by the exchanges of a transnational capitalist class (Harvey, 1989:156).

A key motif in postmodernism has been the exhaustion of the avant-garde, although what is at stake in fact is the continued existence of critical or two-dimensional forms of literature and art. The phenomenon of "art embraced by the arms of power" most clearly marks the gulf from modernism's earlier location (Cockcroft, 1974; Zukin, 1982). This co-option of the avant-garde took place in the USA from the 60s of the Kennedy years, although it originated in the Cubist period (1907-12), when Americans were already buying French painting. Its arena was not just the auction-room and the museum, but the "Gold Coast of lofts", the urban middle-class emulation of artists' practices of living in industrial warehouses (Zukin, 1988). Artists have passed by a quantum leap from marginal figures to
mainstream professionals, some of whom make a lucrative living off art? (Zukin, 1982: 435; Featherstone, 1990:17). The ramifying effect of this was the domestication of bohemia and modernism's loss of its subcultural character. "The irony in all of this is that the first time the U.S. had something resembling an "institution art" in the emphatic European sense", writes Huyssen, "it was modernism itself, the kind of art whose purpose had always been to resist institutionalisation" (Huyssen:193).

It is within this fractured debate on modernity and postmodernity that Bourdieu's *The Rules of Art* and *Distinction* offer a powerful alternative to existing theory. What Bourdieu has done is to provide an updated study of the changing structural position of modernist movements after High Modernism on the lines of Macherey in France and the cultural materialist Literature Teaching and Politics group in Britain. It is by combining their approaches with techniques and concepts first used in the historical studies of sects by Weber, that he has introduced a fertile new analytical terrain. In the process he has produced the historical genesis of the *first French avant-garde* which clarifies its very different relation to the field of power in the 1850s to comparable artistic groups - say, the Woosters - in the 1980s and 90s. Bourdieu's theory identifies knowledge of legitimate art with the possession of social and economic power. But it has the important advantage over the critics of postmodernism of a much more detailed discussion of both the mechanisms of cultural legitimacy and of the

---

7 In this respect, Zukin's excellent study of the American field of art is important in that it possesses a two-pronged empirical strategy - it explores initially the changes in the housing markets which facilitated the successive transformation of industrial warehouses, by artists and the bourgeoisie, in a movement that created an extended group of patrons for modern art outside the public galleries; simultaneously, it examines how the tax mechanisms facilitated private ownership of paintings and thus increased prices by extending the size of the collecting public: these two elements changed the market structures for painting by increasing the number of artists who made a lucrative professional career out of the restricted field of art. It would be desirable to have more empirical analyses of corporate art ownership and its effects in the same period.
nature of the art-world itself. In this respect it can be compared with the work of Becker although - as I shall show - Becker's vivid phenomenological study fails to situate the art it discusses sufficiently in a historical perspective.

For Bourdieu, the virtues of revolt and resistance in relation to artistic freedom are now forgotten or denied (1992:76). Yet the decisive moment of modernism was the creation after 1848 of a world apart, separated from bourgeois salons and the market, in which art could be preserved by subterranean critique. It is this embattled confrontation with a new dominant class that produces the answering demand for pure art in the writings of Flaubert and Baudelaire. Along with other members of the second bohemia, they are representative types of a new type of autonomous writer. It is not just that their situation as writers of literature is itself threatened by the market. That had also been the case earlier for Stendhal and Balzac. It is rather that the repression of civil liberties resulted in the imprisonment of publishers, editors and writers within a new culture of bourgeois parvenus which quickly distanced the bourgeois class from the ideas for civic change envisaged in the February Revolution. Bourdieu is thus in agreement with Lukács, who writes of the "crisis into which triumphant capitalism plunges the arts" after the failure of the 1848 revolution (Lukács, 1978: 148).

The world on the margins, which these writers established was one diametrically opposed to the use of literature to make money, as in the case of contemporary "cultural proletarians" (Marx, quoted in Prawer, 1976:310). On the contrary, the work of art which was worthwhile was one that cannot pay. Flaubert expresses this as a disdain for the crowd: "When you don't address yourself to the crowd, it's fair enough that the crowd shouldn't pay you" (1992: 121). The perfection for which he worked involved the contradiction of a search for pure form that will make the real appear real.
unlike the Academy writers who wanted form to bring out the ideal (1992:142).

Bourdieu's originality lies less in linking the origins of modernist literature to the external determinants of the writers than in introducing the concept of artistic habitus, or learnt dispositions, through which artists expressed their social position in a distinctive artistic philosophy or set of meanings. Adorno had written in Negative Dialectics that "dwelling in the core of the subject are the objective conditions" (quoted by Shulte-Sasse, in Burger p. xvii) and it is this insight which could be said to sum up Bourdieu's sense of artistic habitus too. The key difference he claims from earlier writers is that the objective conditions are not simply a product of external class position but are also shaped by the agents of the independent yet dominated world of art, with their commitments, alliances, competitive anxieties and interests (1993:286-7).

The avant-garde group composed of Flaubert and Baudelaire was one that was indeterminate or marginal in class terms. It lacked plebeian origins but could not identify securely with the aristocracy either. Although V. de l'Isle Adam was the offspring of a very distinguished noble family, the others were sons of minor aristocrats from the regions (de Banville, B. d'Aurevilly and the Goncourts), of a colonial planter from Reunion (Leconte de Lisle) a top civil servant (and the nephew of a general) (Baudelaire) or from the liberal professions (Bouilhet, Fromentin, along with Flaubert, as I have already shown). In five cases they had studied law (Flaubert, de Banville, B. d'Aurevilly, Baudelaire and Fromentin ) (1992:127). Their means of living came from rent and their expectations were of inheritances.

Implicit in both Baudelaire's and Flaubert's modernist formalism was a turn from the field of power towards those who possess none. Thus the birth of an independent art was a fraught, contradictory movement for
these children of privileged upbringing which reveals an unextinguished ethical aspect at the heart of their concern with style: "[I]t is certain that [in the heroic phase of the conquest of autonomy], the ethical rupture, as one sees clearly with Baudelaire - is a fundamental dimension of all the aesthetic ruptures" (1992:93). Baudelaire turned against earlier realist writers, with their "hatred of museums and libraries", but never denounced what he had also learnt from the realism.

Flaubert’s transformation of literature had been labelled, dismissively, a loss of perspective (Lukacs, 1978:143). For Bourdieu the denial of the pyramidal construction of narrative both represents and heightens the break with the collective consciousness and sets Flaubert off, with his handful of readers, on their vertiginous path of lonely construction. Obliquely referring to the tragic world of Pascal for whom God was present but always hidden, Bourdieu suggests that modernism has a similar conception of the hidden quality of ethical law which it expresses.

Thus around Flaubert and Baudelaire and Zola the new public sphere takes shape. It has its own economic ethic and its own economic order, its own work ethic and its own status order. From this region there gradually emerges the new charismatic role of the artist, or, in Bourdieu’s terms, the transubstantiation of the artist. Within the avant garde literature develops not just by incorporating the work of earlier writers, but by embracing the thought of the advanced scientific thinkers of the epoch. Bourdieu cites the role of Cuvier, Darwin and Lamarck for Flaubert (1992: 147) with whom might be compared Barbara Hepworth and the constructivist Circle’s adoption of Einstein and Maxwell (Martin et al, 1975:245).

The mid-1880s marks the maturation of the avant-garde. New laws now structure the literary field. Although they are responses to a specific epoch, the rules acquire the character of timeless ahistorical necessities, as in the Formalist insistence that art de-familiarise the real. The dualist
structure by means of which art signals its distance both from the market and from naive taste, is condensed into the new rule that the accumulation of symbolic profits is inversely related to the accumulation of economic profits, the rule of artistic disinterest. By the late nineteenth century a new hierarchy of genres will be founded on this assumption, with poetry receiving precedence, then the novel and then drama. The novel itself is segmented in a pyramid of esteem, starting at the top with the psychological novel and then marked by the pre-eminence of the naturalist novel over the novel of manners, the regional popular and the industrial novel, a hierarchy in which the last four subordinate genres are excluded from the category of "literary" altogether. The social capital possessed by the readers also has its impact on the work's artistic status: the higher their capital, the more likely that the work will be greeted enthusiastically.

Whether the avant-garde fosters a committed or pure art is dependent on the nature of the historical period. Here two principles determine the specific character of the modernist movement, first the external class forces, such as a shift away from trade unions on the part of the working class or the turn to spiritual issues on the part of the bourgeoisie (both of which explain the turn to the psychological novel at the end of the nineteenth century), second, the dialectics of consecration, in which a new movement bids for dominance against a more established set of authors within the literary field. Bourdieu refers to this as the laws of transformation and conservation.

While each movement comes into being with a sense of its own distinctiveness, and even of constituting a whole new world of art, certain underlying regularities can be detected through the discourses of the mature avant-garde. Of these, three principles of new artistic practices stand out, the constancy of change; the rigour and strenuousness of artists' actions and the order which art creates within the chaos of the world.
Avant-garde art gains its poignant conception of its own radical struggle less from any committed character it demands from its members than from the sheer weight of the existing educational system. Moreover, the cost of the new rules of art was that art became progressively less popular. Molière's maidservant might have been consulted over his endings (just as Lenin's cook was to be able to run the ship of state) but not even Tolstoy's peasant was able to help with his novels, states Lukács (1978:201). Bourdieu has erected the exclusive character of modernism into a structural trait. What he calls the "production of belief" in modernism is based on its permanent distance from workers' and petty-bourgeois taste.

When the consecration of modernists extends to the ordinary educational system - schools, museums etc. - then the final stage of modernism has taken place. The key historical change is the new phenomenon of collective belief. In other words, the high market-price of impressionist and other modernist paintings can no longer be explained simply in terms of the law of value, that is, the cost of the work is related to the cost of producing a worker (the painter) with the appropriate skills. Hence Bourdieu argues that the material value only represents the outer husk of art. Its inner kernel is its expression of spirituality or genius, which is what evokes collective veneration. While the great liquidity of wealth in the modern period has facilitated the soaring prices of artworks as commodities, the underlying process is the operation of the consecration process. The fetishism of economists veils the fact that it is collective belief which creates the creator:

In opposition to objects made without any, or only slight, symbolic significance (which is no doubt more and more rare in the era of design), the work of art, like religious goods and services, amulets or various sacraments, only acquires its value as the consequence of a collective belief felt as a collective misrecognition, collectively
produced and reproduced (1992:244).

Bourdieu is undoubtedly right that such collective beliefs in the art heritage serve as the fiduciary guarantee of value, but it might also be asked whether art has not turned now into a stable (global) store of value, like cattle for the Azande, at a time when nationalised currencies are too volatile to serve this function.

Several conditions of the avant-garde art of early modernism have now changed. There has been a decline in the numbers of those like Flaubert and Baudelaire, who are supported by allowances and can sustain themselves without selling their work; even the existence of state benefits is only in the long term a marginal impact in this respect. The high prices of modernist works have rebounded on the claimed "disinterestedness" of the artist, showing that art is not always inimical to bourgeois levels of income (1984:231-2; 1992:211). Finally - and most strikingly - there has been a change in the response of the dominant class to artists: since the haute bourgeoisie has long ceased being rigorously ascetic and thrifty, it is art that has become the spiritual "point d'honneur" of the bourgeoisie (1993:44; Huyssen, ch.10). Bourdieu's model of social aging implies that what separates the "commercial" from the "professional" now is the interval of time that is imposed between labour and reward for the latter (1992:211; Sanguineti, 1973). Such changes have been introduced to justify the view that the epoch of modernism is now passed. Bohemia as a location of subversion loses its power and becomes ineffective: dissidence is authorised by change for its own sake.

Bourdieu's work is devoid of the anti-humanist melancholy which has so permeated the thought of Foucault and Lyotard. Bourdieu writes of art and consumption like many of those who have associated themselves with postmodernism but he sets these spheres within a totalising perspective. I shall argue that a critical subtext can still be decoded within his work and
that his apparent perspectivism is merely a stage of the analytical process and therefore not vulnerable to the type of attack that Habermas has levelled so brilliantly against Foucault, Bataille, and Derrida (Habermas, 1987).

One key area is the change in relation to power of art, which has now become part of the dominant class's consumption: "the cultivated disposition". There are two main reasons for this. First, secularisation: in a period of widespread disillusionment with traditional religions for scientific reasons, art can be offered as a source of spiritual grace (hence the importance of its claim to universal value). Second, artistic distinction and the taste for difficult works provide profits of distinction or symbolic capital. These can be related to educational capital as measured by educational achievements in relation to time. Such achievements are in turn the result of possession of a habitus which is identical to that of the school and which is linked to the scholastic capital of parents and their distance from material necessity.

It follows that art can no longer be seen as an enclave culture or an "Iona island" of retreat from advanced capitalism as Adorno had done. The shock of the new in Bourdieu is precisely to register this historical change in the objective relations of social space. The empirical study of reception thus permits a social unmasking of the relations of culture which raises new hypotheses about social interests, including those of socialist intellectuals.

For Bourdieu, aestheticism is the dominant masculine disposition of our time, in sharp contrast to the ethical response to the aesthetic which still characterises women. Such an assessment in terms of style alone unites two groups with a taste for luxury: the intellectual haute bourgeoisie

---

8The legitimation of the avant-garde is measured by the acceptance of abstract expressionism, especially by teachers and other professionals (1984:94-5).
and the new petty-bourgeoisie. Often adopting a radical "countercultural" aesthetics which is exemplified in new artistic goods, the rejection of ascetic self-denial distinguishes the new from the old petty-bourgeoisie. Such a shift to fun and aestheticism, which liberates the body as a site of pleasure, can be partly explained by commercial interests: "It may even be wondered if the ethic of liberation is not in the process of supplying the economy with the perfect consumer whom economic theory has always dreamed of ... (1984: 371). The cult of art is intensified by the discrepancy between subjective radicalism and objective position, or by political disappointment (1984:368).

In Bourdieu's view, the "lazy positivists" forget that it is the nature of the conflicts over power which determine the competitions within social space by establishing the parameters of positions - the rules of art, the rules of the market etc. (1984: 94). What is important in this context is the way Bourdieu describes the link between distinction in literature and the material world. The "gentle violence" of literary missionary work democratises the cultural heritage, offering it to all (1984: 229). But such frontstage democratisation is often combined with a backstage demand for a favourable conversion rate through which high scholastic capital is cashed in for high levels of material capital. The general interest of the dominant class requires universalistic educational selection as the main mechanism for the competitive struggle. Given the weakness of trade unions, a new mode of domination has been institutionalised in the metropolitan countries which, by "substituting seduction for repression, public relations for policing, advertising for authority, the velvet glove for the iron fist; pursues the symbolic integration of the dominated classes by imposing needs rather than inculcating norms" (1984: 154).

The consequence is a profound attack on the remaining forms of social solidarity. Endlessly delayed entry into labour markets, continuous
education and cooling-out mechanisms for rejection operate to depoliticise frustration and to soften awareness of failure as anything other than a personal loss of honour:

Whereas the old system tended to produce clearly demarcated social entities which left little room for social fantasy [...] the new system of structural instability in the representation of social identity and its legitimate aspirations tends to shift agents from the terrain of social crisis and critique to the terrain of personal crisis and critique (1984: 156).9

In other words, Bourdieu's distance from postmodernism lies in his continued retention of an objectivist understanding and his repudiation of what Lyotard calls "temporary epistemological contracts". For behind the group differences explaining position-taking in cultural and other forms of consumption, there exists a backstage struggle for the possession of power and the capacity to shape the future: the first is understood in terms of the binary oppositions of structuralism; the second by historical materialism or realism. Thus taste leads us often to refuse what we can't have (amor fati) just as women traditionally have prided themselves on their refusals of egoism. But a scientific constructive sociology can show that there may well be limits to the objective process6 that create the magic of turning frustrations into subjective taste. When expectations are out of kilter, taste results in hatred of destiny. It is with this possibility that a break with tacit acceptance can occur. In one pregnant passage of Distinction, Bourdieu describes a scenario of social fragmentation in terms borrowed from a radicalised Durkheimian theory of anomie: "Everything suggests that an abrupt slump in objective chances in relation to subjective aspirations is likely to produce a break in the tacit acceptance which the dominated

---

9 Compare Durkheim on the structural forces creating individuation (Suicide, 1989: 252)
classes previously granted to the dominant goals, and so to make possible a genuine inversion of values" (1984: 168)

**Situating Bourdieu: Dialectical Materialism and Genetic Structuralism**

Despite the rules of the game in which distinction is achieved through the denial of predecessors, Bourdieu himself is in a line of descent from Lukács, Goldmann and Benjamin. We should not be misled by the fact that he also examines what might be called "the Lukács phenomenon": that is, the position of global policing in the cultural field by which intellectuals become mandated to substitute themselves for the subordinate class in the interests of power (1991: 180-183). However, Bourdieu's response to Lukács has not been solely critical.

The theory of practice developed by Bourdieu is dedicated to the classical aims of social criticism, especially the Enlightenment critique of magic. In this respect, it continues Marx's analysis of capitalist society, with its fundamental concern for demystification and its insistence that "the real is the relational". There is thus a continuity with some of the guiding ideas of the "Hegelian" work of Lukács. This continuity is masked partly by a self-censuring code which protects Bourdieu's sociology from falling foul of the laws of intellectual fashion, partly by a methodological refusal to engage in prediction of the future.

Lukács' originality was to have combined Marx with elements of Weber to produce a wider account of the historical genesis of capitalist society. Thus Bourdieu, like Lukács, is aiming to criticise the eternal laws of economics in order to get behind the "given". Like Lukács, his objectification of social facts or appearances is aimed at reaching a deeper knowledge of unconscious underlying realities, or as Lukács put it, the "class-conditioned unconsciousness of one's own socio-historical conditions" (1971: 52). Lukács had been distinctive not just in penetrating behind the outward appearances of the "economic set-up", to their essential form, but
in uncovering other linked forms of reification, which he derives from Max
Weber, especially the law, and bureaucracy. Lukács develops from Weber's
theory of rationalised worlds of art, politics etc., a theory of their effect on
the working-class. Within this, Lukács had deployed Weber's emphasis on
the multiple characters of dispossession in bourgeois society, in a way
which now seems to resemble very closely Bourdieu's problematic of taste.

"What" - he had asked -

if the proletariat finds the economic inhumanity to which it is
subjected easier to understand than the political and the political
easier than the cultural, then all these separations point to the still
unconquered power of capitalist forms of life in the proletariat itself.

(Lukács 1968: 77).

This reified consciousness is precisely the subject of Bourdieu's method of
objectification, his armoury of statistical techniques, questionnaires etc.

making up a "constructivist sociology" which will reveal the disinheritance
of which Lukács writes.

Lukács had seen capitalist society as characterised by a sphere - art -
in which man becomes human by playing. For him, the typical response to
such play was the aestheticisation of reality, that is, the emergence of a
contemplative approach to the activities represented, as in the imagined
landscape of the countryside which is the product of a distanced gaze, at
odds with the peasants' view and thus only appearing at the end of
feudalism (1968: 158). Bourdieu goes further - this distance will become his
"aesthetic attitude". The dominant class has used the art-world to recreate
the status divisions of a precapitalist society (the "aristocracy of culture",
"distinction", "pretension") which Lukács had thought the "economic set-
up" itself would destroy. Bourdieu will even elaborate on Lukács' view that
man finds himself confronted by "fetishistic forms which generate illusions"
(Lukács, 1968: 14), arguing that the creator him/herself has become the object of fetishism (Bourdieu, 1993b: 148).

The theoretical class consciousness which Lukács so problematically "imputed" to the working-class and which vies with its actual "empirical psychological consciousness", has in Bourdieu become the social scientists' theory of practice. Such scientific practice retains the Lukácsian impulse to reject all dualisms - especially that between subjective and objective - as befits a post-Feuerbachian theory of humans who act in the world self-consciously. Bourdieu's form of practice also has its "rational utopianism" (cast in the logic: "If you want x then y" (1993b: 48; 25)), but this has been profoundly affected by the crisis of working-class reproduction. For in Bourdieu, the empirical-psychological consciousness of the working-class has resulted in a popular culture which in this period is overwhelmingly defensive, colonised, carnivalesque (1984: 491) and which appears devoid of any transformative power.

Lukács' later aesthetic theory presents a more simplistic model of social development, which is then linked to literary forms. His concern is not to attribute the writer to a class of origin or, indeed, to a class destination for its works, but to specify the conditions in which literature flowers and significant form emerges. His conception of literary realism, whether that of Shakespeare or Balzac, depends on the linked ideas of an "extensive totality", or the representation of all significant social milieux, and an "intensive totality" or the depiction of social types who are also complex individual types. The delineation of conflict between worldviews is fundamental to this view of literature, both through the narrative form itself and through the expression in sustained dialogue of characters' antagonisms. Lukács' argument was that critical realism retained the consciousness of the whole community through the values of their representative, the writer, as in the instances of Dickens, Stendhal and
Tolstoy. These forms are all potentially popular in the sense that their understanding of the social is complex and dialectical. They penetrate beneath the everyday given world to reveal the underlying forms of conflict and estrangement: it is this which distinguishes these works from their uncritical twins (1969). These works are not mere reflections. For Lukács, the novelist could only construct his/her subject adequately when the author is part of action within the public sphere and when s/he is still in touch with collective consciousness. Naturalism, condemned for its mechanistic elimination of subjectivity and the entire tradition of literary modernism (over-subjectivist) were dismissed on the weak grounds that their techniques failed to fit the rules of classical realism.

For Bourdieu, in contrast, modernist movements preserved literature from both the threats of power and the market. But there was a cost for such movements and the cost gives Bourdieu's work a certain Lukácsian resonance. For bohemian modernism loses its closeness to the roots of popular action and to a communal form of collective consciousness. It is this which permits an anticapitalist, anti-institution, art to gradually come to play the role of legitimating the class it opposes. Granted, Bourdieu issues his strictures against Lukács' "short-circuited" theory of literature, which neglected the professional and avant-garde structures behind the modernist permanent revolution (1993b:140). Yet, especially in his work on reception, Distinction, it could be said that Bourdieu expresses in some ways "the revenge of the Lukácsian". In other words, he adopts the same empirical problematic as Lukács, but in very different historical circumstances. This is not to say that Bourdieu rejects modernism as Lukács did, nor does he concern himself with a normative aesthetics. It is to say, rather, that through sociological empirical analysis he comes to an assessment of its role which is discomforting to those who would like to believe that modernism is still a revolutionary weapon.
It is no accident that in his task of constructing rules for the analysis of literature Bourdieu has designated his approach the "genetic" sociology of culture. The term recalls the "genetic structuralism" of Goldmann, and through him, the reworking of Durkheim and Piaget, as well as Lukács. Yet Bourdieu seems to use Goldmann only as a butt for his criticism (1992:284-6). He levels an attack on Goldmann for producing a reductive sociology of literature impaired by analytical short circuits. Goldmann had written a Lukácsian exercise which categorised types of novel and drama, from critical realism to the nouveau roman. This had linked them to successive epochs of capitalism, while it also abandoned Lukács' own bleak appraisal of modernism (1964). Given the overwhelmingly hostile reception to this work, Bourdieu is on safe territory: not only did Goldmann arbitrarily refuse to theorise the literature/popular literature distinction, but in his sweeping historical periodisation he had omitted any reference to the cultural structures moulding artists' ideas 10.

Yet there is a profound debt owed by Bourdieu to Goldmann which I think will be apparent to anyone who knows *The Hidden God*. For in this work Goldmann was entirely free of the mechanistic, unmediated relation between the economy and literature. In *The Hidden God*, Goldmann has an awareness of the internal field of writing which is fundamental to his interpretation of the Pascal and Racine texts. Moreover, this internal field overlapped with the field of religious thought and practice, just as literature has overlapped with politics both before and after the 1850s. Since Bourdieu has stated emphatically that "the sociology of religion is the sociology of culture of our time" (1980b:197), it is unthinkable that he did not realise the fertile uses to which Goldmann put his study of the relations between Jansenist theology, the field of power and the field of literature. My claim,

10Williams a little later was to suggest that sociology should look at schools, guilds, brotherhoods etc. (1981: ch 3).
then, is that this is the model for Bourdieu's own approach to Flaubert and the "second bohemia".

Superficially, it appears that the closest work to Bourdieu's in this study is *The Family Idiot*, Sartre's study of Flaubert. Indeed, Bourdieu clearly finds elements of this approach valuable. He has emphasised especially the dynamic within the bourgeois "family romance" in which Flaubert was caught as the second son, that is, the child marginalised from the family property and ill at ease with patriarchal authority. He accepts, with Sartre, that it was this set of family relations which led Flaubert to abandon the family home and to cut himself off among the members of the second bohemia. However, psychoanalytic phenomenology is reduced to a minimum in Bourdieu's study, partly perhaps to minimise sterile repetition, more likely because Sartrian thought has been rejected for its retention of an excessively voluntaristic set of assumptions about human action. In particular, Sartre's conception of "authenticity" is repudiated because it denies the social construction of knowledge, summed up in the term "habitus", and is too close to its subject to be critical of the myth of the uniquely creative artist (1992: 266-9)11.

None of these problems exist with *The Hidden God*. In fact, despite the different evaluations of the body and desire, there is a similarity between the reverse utopia of the bohemian world and the rigorous other-worldly asceticism of the Port Royal convent. So it may be worth a short digression to see how far it has been used as the basis for a method by Bourdieu and what difficulties might be presented by adopting this schema.

Goldmann's problem was to explain the emergence in French seventeenth-century thought of Racine, the main architect of French tragic drama, and Pascal, the pioneer of the mathematics of the roulette wheel.

11 However, it should be noted that Sartre does himself use a concept of "habitus" in Vol. I of *The Family Idiot*, to mean the "internalisation of the external world".
(for gambling in this world) and the theological wager on the existence of God (for the next) (1964: 91). What united these creative developments was the idea of a tragic vision (1964: 26; 34). In Pascal's *Pensées* this took the form of the paradox of a hidden God, one whose existence appears to be denied by the character of the world, yet who retains an ultimate power (1964: 36-8). This simultaneously present and absent God is in terms of epistemology, the source of a divine revelation, in terms of morality the guarantor of a rigorous piety and in terms of political practice, the purpose of a radical flight from the world. Pascal's philosophical position was founded at once on a denial of rationalism and a demand for abstention from all civic political involvement. In parallel terms, Racine's *Phèdre* concerns the impossibility of any compromise with the world (1964:376-9). What produced this literature of despair?

The idea of a God who had absconded from the world is one that can be contrasted with the Calvinist God who has predestined for hell all but a saved elect. Whereas the elect must have faith in their election and must prove it, the Jansenist has no such "technology" for optimism and consequently, no inner-worldly activism. What experiences in the field of power might create the terrain favourable for such theological perspectives? Goldmann argues that there were a series of royal measures that created fundamental differences in the relationships of fractions of the dominant class. As absolutism developed, with its peasant base, it displaced the class of the recently ennobled group of legal professionals - the noblesse de robe - and replaced their administrative role by the "intendants", a class fraction that was more bureaucratic in ethos, lacking the autonomy conferred on the "noblesse de robe" by their legal training. The intendants were thus admirably flexible and could be tuned to the political needs of the absolute monarchy. A further subordinate dynamic was the political castration of the feudal aristocracy, whose domestication at Court and ban on military praxis
led them also to a sense of enforced marginality (1964:26). Here then we have the combined forces of two groups whose objective relegation from influence was matched by their subjective sense of decline. At the same time neither was in the position to vent their grievances because of the continued dependence on the monarchy for their remission of taxes and salaries (1964: 120).

If the bourgeoisie, in forging the developing capitalist economy, selected from the range of possibilities in Calvinism not its traditional economic ethic but a dynamic, modern "rational" economic ethic, the Jansenist critique of the Catholic Church took a different form. In this case it was the experience of declining class fractions that was the decisive moulding force (1964:105). Moreover, Jansenism itself possessed different ideological wings and each writer took an internal trajectory from one to the other between 1637 and 1677. The Convent of Port-Royal (outside Paris) was the setting for first, the hegemony of the Barcos circle, an extremist wing which argued that the test of salvation was the retreat from the world into the Convent itself (1964:157). This group was superceded as the dominant ideological influence within Jansenism by the less extreme followers of Arnauld, whose centrism allowed epistemologically for a limited place for rationalism within the "factual sphere" and whose emissary prophecy permitted the good to remain a force for conversion within the secular world (1964: 393). The Jansenists as a community moved from the extreme to the moderate position, from Barcos to Arnauld. Pascal, on the other hand moved in the opposite direction in his personal development (from the pessimistic vision of *Les Provinciales* to the stark dichotomic vision of *Les Pensées*, in which Barcos's rupture takes the form of a paradoxical refusal). Racine's perspective is the reverse of Pascal's. Racine initially argued for a confrontation between God - or authentic values - and the world, only much later contending that such a rupture was not irremediable, but might be
transcended. This softening of ideological stance can be decoded from the shift from *Britannicus, Andromaque* and *Phèdre* to the Arnauld-influenced intellectual stance of *Esther* and *Athalie* (1964:149).

Thus for both Goldmann and Bourdieu the biographical method is radically unsuited to explain the texts. What is at stake, instead, is the existence of a series of homologies or structural equivalences between fields that were much less autonomous than in late nineteenth-century France. Goldmann shows the changes in the chances for economic rewards on the part of a recently-ennobled group, the parallel decline in their political power and their continued dependence. He shows that Jansenism's incapacity to fight free as a reformed church from the power of the Papacy possessed similar structural traits. But he also possesses an analysis of an ideological world at Port-Royal which is structurally close to that of Parisian Bohemia for Bourdieu. The place of politics and art in later periods is taken by the revolutionary theological world of Jansenist Catholicism.

Within these spaces Goldmann's various modes of opposition are elaborated in terms that will later be recalled even in the language through which Bourdieu makes us understand the splits within Bohemia. Within the crucible of the struggles undertaken by Goldmann's "transindividual subjects", new structures of feeling emerge. Equally, for Bourdieu the highest degree of intensity is found by the literary agents of the autonomous field, protected by "la rente" - their inheritance - even if money conferred on all writers the liberation from patronage. The "singular achievements" of Flaubert - or earlier, Pascal's and Racine's tragic literary

---

12 He writes of the literary field as "most favourable to a critical perception ... criss-crossed with paradoxes" (1992: 100), of the paradoxical economy (1992:123), and of Baudelaire, whose *Fleurs du Mal* alternated rapidly between perspectives of participation and exclusion, as a purer revolutionary than Flaubert (1964: 114:116), much as Baroos is contrasted by Goldmann with Arnauld.

13 See Zola: "Money has liberated the writer; money has created modern literature" (quoted 1992:136).
vision - are only explicable in terms of the positions taken up within the reverse world.

Seventeenth-century France also saw the birth of the modern writer in another, more prosaic sense, as Bourdieusian historians have shown. The setting-up of academies and the multiplication of salons alongside them created the arena for new kinds of literary conflict (for example, between the Ancients and the Moderns or between the new linguistic purists versus the court nobility) (Heinich, 1987; Viala, 1985: 31-3; 173). Academic freedom was only "distant and limited" (Viala, 1985: 175), although it was already of enormous strategic significance if a writer was able to gain a wide public. Rather than detract from Goldmann's study, it adds another dimension to it to realise that Pascal and Racine were also academicians, salon members and recipients of literary honours (Viala, 1985: annexe 2). No doubt a position such as Pascal adopted as an academician who had his transgressive Provinciales published secretly was a transition to the greater independence of the novelist in the following century. His use of the letter form and of imagined communications between writer and reader created an extraordinary vehicle for ideas that could gain a readership from a new literary market, composed of the bourgeoisie and nobility, male and female (Viala, 1985: 174). Here is another, mediating set of institutions, which provide both sustaining and inhibiting effects within the literary field, providing new criteria of success as in the inclusion on the curriculum, and new chances for mediocrity as in the conformity of even seventeenth-century academicians (Viala, 1985: 197; 49). They thus flesh out the picture Goldmann had already provided with his account of the intellectual life of Port Royal but they do not significantly undermine it.

Benjamin's "illuminative flashes" and Bourdieu's socioanalysis.

I shall suggest in this section that Benjamin's writing provides the "dialectical images" for Bourdieu's more empirical approach. From the
urban landscapes of modernity sketched out by Benjamin, there gradually take shape a series of distinctive themes concerning especially the historical dimensions of cultural production and reception. For Benjamin, the community role of literature in pre-literate societies, in which a story was common to a whole group of storytellers has as its opposite the fetishism of the artist's signature in the twentieth century. Equally, the functional aesthetic of unnamed T'ang potters contrasts with the mixture of idealised spiritual drives and the economic interests of their twentieth-century collectors. Nor did he see modernity as itself fixed: the growing aestheticisation of the commodity in the West was made more poignant by the appearance of new genres in the Moscow he visited in the 1920s, such as the collective documentary realism of the newspapers. It is this profound historical view of the variety of artistic institutions which gives Benjamin's approach its power. Perhaps unwittingly, Bourdieu converts Benjamin's aphorisms into theories which are tested through both historical and quantitative methods of research.

Benjamin's cryptic notes on reception illuminate the phenomenon of the re-sacralisation of literature which preoccupies Bourdieu. His ironic comments on the "pre-history" and the "after-history" of a work of art suggests precisely a social theory of the production and the consumption of literature and the peculiar role of time:

For a dialectical historian, these works incorporate both their pre-history and their after-history - an after-history by virtue of which their pre-history too can be seen to undergo constant change. They teach him how their function can outlast their creator, can leave his intentions behind; how its reception by the artists' contemporaries forms part of the effect that the work of art has on us ourselves today, and how this effect derives from our encounter not just with
the work, but with the history that brought the work down to us (1979: 351).

Bourdieu writes similarly not just of the re-interpretation of the pre-history of artworks, but also of the sequestration for other purposes of consecrated radical texts (1993a: 256).

Benjamin’s essay on oral narratives, The Storyteller (1973), also fits closely with Bourdieu. For although the work of art has not yet been secularised completely in pre-capitalist societies, so that its aura springs from this closeness to the religious life of the community, it is also a less elevated form of communication than the aesthetic in bourgeois society. The circle around the storyteller means that the story is not mystified as is the work of the genius from the Renaissance on. It springs out of common experience and can be adapted to social needs. In this way it is remote from art in modernity which derives its authenticity from its uniqueness and its authority from its distance from the spectator. Bourdieu similarly emphasises the communal role - often of a quite practical kind - served by the bard or poet in tribal Kabylia, especially the importance of conveying to the young the "noble past": "this past is not experienced as such, that is as something left behind and situated some distance back in the temporal series, but as being lived again in the presence of the collective memory" (1961:96). In striking opposition to the West, Kabylian cultural apprenticeship serves "to impose an impersonal form of thought on personal feeling. In these formulas is expressed a whole philosophy of dignity, resignation, and self-control" (1961: 96). Thus, against the multiple distinctions of modernity, the Kabylian decorative aesthetic is limited to contrasts such as between black and red tents, that is to "the purest kind of formalism" (90). Benjamin’s storyteller has his or her modern counterpart in the figures of both collector and author; but these have been shaped by the sharpest expression of the bourgeois division between mental and
manual labour: that of the opposition between genius and anonymous drudge (1979:359). For this reason, Benjamin views the European future as potentially lying with a displacement of the art institution itself, either on the model of the Soviet newspapers, which he reported as relying heavily on readers' letters, or by developing from the masses' enjoyment of shocks the potential for defamiliarising perceptions within the popular arts. As I have shown, Bourdieu has similarly identified the "invention of the artist" and the dispossession of the masses which accompanied it, but his analysis is devoid of countervailing structures that might prefigure a different future.

Postmodernists have seized on the loss of aura but have neglected Benjamin's bleaker view of the opposite potential, that of the resacralisation of art. Thus, starting with the avant-garde and l'art pour l'art "the distorted nature of art in class society produces forms which objectively "mock ... the masses"", according to Benjamin, "despite the subjective views of the artists." (Buck-Morss, 1989:69). Bourdieu quotes Benjamin on the fetishistic qualities of the artist's signature in such revolutions of the avant-garde (1993c:148). Unlike Bourdieu, however, for Benjamin some avant-gardes possess the tools for an active disenchantment. In his view, the importance of the Surrealists' use of shock and memory was to counter the re-mythification of capitalism and wake Europe from the collective dream in which it slept (1979: 225-9). The Surrealists could best serve a revolution if they used the "image sphere" to create a "profane illumination". This alone could break the contemplative approach to art and destroy the seductive use of art as a "pendant" for "snobbery" (1979:234). In his terms, this "short-circuited the bourgeois historical-literary apparatus" (Cited in Buck-Morss, 1989:57). If Benjamin aims, therefore, to retrieve the weft of history through dialectical imagery, Bourdieu resembles him in his use of socioanalysis.
Is it a coincidence that photography has a parallel place in both writers' perspective? For Benjamin, early photography possessed a formality and dignity which derived partly from the studied pose and partly from the aura of the portrait painting for which it was a cheap substitute; Bourdieu refers to the distinction of Brassai. Yet for neither Benjamin nor Bourdieu is twentieth-century photography itself a consecrated genre (Benjamin, 1979: 192; Bourdieu, 1990c: 65). Hence Bourdieu writes of it as a "middlebrow art" that cannot perform any function of contributing to the dignity of the collector. It is therefore bereft of interest to the haute bourgeoisie who might invest in an art-form with more return on capital (1990c: 68-70). Those who invest in it most, particularly as members of camera clubs, are typically lower professionals or politically-conscious workers. In doing so, they seek to wrench it from the aestheticism of their teachers and to combine technical knowledge with their own set of visual values. There are traces in Bourdieu's portrayal of the camera club aficionado of Benjamin's earlier conception of the author as producer.

Benjamin may also have introduced French theorists to the exploration of consumption. The subterranean shocks of modernism, he hoped, would destroy "commodity phantasmagoria". But this could only be approached by recognising the allure of the new order of consumption, especially through an archaeological reconstruction of the Parisian arcades as the industrialised emblems of high capitalism. The aesthetic desire for the beautiful commodity, which had first taken shape in the arcades, linked individuals together as members of a mass rather than a class. Thus the same kind of drilling that fits the industrial worker for maximum productivity begins to be applied to market seduction. It is partly in this that the tragedy of culture consists (Benjamin, 1973: 166). Distinction renews these key themes. For Bourdieu, the department-store is "the poor man's gallery" (1984: 565) and while the working-class habitus is still
moulded predominantly by the taste for necessity, the depiction of the new petty-bourgeois pleasures of consumption recalls also Benjamin's analogy with the industrial worker's drilled responses, a training carried out as much in the family and peer-group as through the media.

Finally, it is perhaps no accident that Benjamin defined Baudelaire as a "secret agent" against his own class while Bourdieu isolates Flaubert, Baudelaire and Manet as founders of the second bohemia. In both writers, the fundamental concern is to show the paradoxes of the "cultural treasures that are piled up on humanity's back" (Benjamin, 1979:361). Thus Benjamin: "we are instructed in the reading of Baudelaire precisely through bourgeois society, and indeed, already long since not by its most progressive elements." (Cited in Buck-Morss, 1989: 55) For him, as for Bourdieu later, the consecration of the "secret agent" means that difficult feats of analytical subtlety are needed to pose differently the question of the avant-garde's meaning from that of the "bourgeois literary and historical apparatus", which only "preserved cultural objects from oblivion at the cost of their revolutionary use-value" (Buck-Morss, 1989:128, 55). One consequence is the reappraisal of the subjective experience of the metropolis such that Benjamin came to see revolution as merely the emergency brake on the locomotive of history. Bourdieu's sociology is stripped of all historicist predictions. It retains its only echo of Benjamin's prophetic Marxism in its brief allusion to a "rational utopianism" (1993c:48).

Foucault: the Bourdieusian Critique

Bourdieu's criticism of authorship, his analysis of practice and his notion of position-taking within a set of possibilities of a given cultural field have also an uncanny resemblance to the thought of his contemporary, Michel Foucault. Here I want to pinpoint more clearly some elements of convergence of Bourdieu with Foucault but also crucial differences from him, a divergence which must be attributed to their different traditions.
Put formulaically, Foucault has more Nietzsche and Durkheim in his thought than Marx, while with Bourdieu the proportions are reversed. The differences between the two writers are crystallised in differences of style. Bourdieu's style is often difficult, with lengthy sentences, neologisms, whole batteries of sub-clauses. Foucault's is trenchant, elegant and richly erudite. Beneath these contrasts there are major divergences in methodology and theoretical practice, as I shall show. The Order of Things (1970) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1989), especially, include an ambitious reading of intellectual history in the West, which constitutes a new mapping of knowledges in time and space. As such, it is these two sources, with the addition of his essay on authorship, which encompass Foucault's cultural theory and which will be the main source of my comparison.

From The Order of Things comes Foucault's premonition of the end of history, now no longer an uncommon motif. Its final words are a menacing inversion of Pascal's wager:

As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of a recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, ...if some event were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then we can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea (1970:387).

Whether a new "man" will appear in his place the positivist anti-humanism of Foucault leaves chillingly open. Bourdieu's theory, on the other hand, possesses no such speculations. As a critic of intellectuals' use of "the people" for status objectives, i.e. to heighten their own appearance of disinterest, Bourdieu is silent about the future and deliberately leaves his philosophy of history unenunciated. Moreover, in contrast to Foucault,
Bourdieu has a very clear sense of the concentration of power in the State and dominant class, although he also shares the latter's conception of its microscopic dispersal through the socialisation of bodies and minds.

At first there appear certain parallels between the work of Bourdieu and Foucault's *Order*. Bourdieu's analysis of the Kabylean cultural world depicts the same mode of classification based on analogy as does Foucault's characterisation of the pre-capitalist episteme. But the differences between the two are more striking. For Bourdieu's break with structuralism is premised on seeing individual agents as actively struggling with their conditions of life in capitalist agriculture or domestic production and it is in the context of these that Kabyleans make and transmit meanings. Foucault's *Order*, by contrast, delineates incompatible epistemes but there are no clear material realities and social structures to which these correspond. Even the organising principle of Foucault's episteme are questionable. It is not clear, for example, why he omits from the medieval episteme both the logic and the heritage of classical thought so as to leave nothing but a popular culture founded on "similitudes".

*The Archaeology of Knowledge* provides the rationale for Foucault's method and thus is most clearly relevant to Bourdieu's project (1992; 1993a). To what extent has there been simultaneous discovery in the work of the two formidable thinkers? I shall start with what Bourdieu christens "the cultural field" and Foucault "the field of discourses", or the field of "strategic possibilities" (Foucault, 1989:77). Unlike ideologies - which mystify or confuse a clear understanding of the object - Foucault's discursive formations are characterised by aids or incitements to consciousness. Like Durkheim's "collective representations" these are elementary forms of thought which are "never-said" but which exist behind the surface of appearances as unquestioned continuities. Within these unquestioned relations are suspended more complex, elaborated
developments. Thus archaeology requires that the student "depersonify things" so as "to conjure up their rich, heavy, immediate plenitude, which we usually regard as the primitive law of a discourse that has become divorced from it through error, oblivion, illusion ..." (1989:48). Moreover a discursive formation becomes material or reified, rather like Althusser's ideological practices. Thus, for example, clinical discourse should not be understood as determined by a set of interpretative rules or descriptions but just as much by "a group of hypotheses about life and death, of ethical choices, of therapeutic decisions, of institutional regulations, of teaching models" (1989: 33). Further, for Foucault, the specific discursive formation of psychopathology has both real, non-discourse-dependent relations such as bourgeois families' relations with the courts, and also a wider set of discursive linkages with other cultural fields, such as that of religion or sexuality. All of these condition its own development. Its discursive practices therefore cannot be the products of a transcendent individual subject, such as the Cartesian ego. They derive from rules, such as the nomination of certain mandated persons who possess authority to speak or the regulated right to think. It follows that the status of the enunciative statement depends on the development of the field, what has been said already, what has happened. Not only is a discourse a "fragment of history" or more precisely, a "body of anonymous, historical rules always determined in time and place", but it can be thought of as "one great text": a sort of great, uniform text ... which reveals for the first time what men 'really meant', not only in their words and texts, their discourses and their writings, but also in the institutions, practices, techniques and objects that they produced (1989:118).

Now there are clear parallels between Bourdieu's rules of the cultural field and Foucault's discursive formations. To Foucault's mapping of discourses in time and space we might link Bourdieu's tracing of the
historical genesis of the work of art; to Foucault's status of the enunciative statement, we should compare Bourdieu's institutions (academies, Royal Societies etc.); to Foucault's warning that discourses are not merely the effects of material structures, we should parallel Bourdieu's conclusion that conflicts in the field of art can never be entirely explained by conflicts in the field of power. There are even closer parallels: Foucault's attack on transendent authorship with Bourdieu's strictures against the charismatic theory of the artist's inner grace or Bourdieu's emphasis on artistic "habitus" with Foucault's "intersecting discourses" in art. In other words, both attack a mystical or rationalist view of individuality, much as Durkheim did in the early years of the twentieth century (Lukes, 1973: 488). Nor is this quite all. The notion of "rupture" rather than a slow progression of ideas has its twin in Bourdieu's "symbolic revolution", while both emphasise that the ideological is supplemented by taken-for granted understandings, knowledges or doxa, with their capacity to control thought and body. Lastly, both use the conception of reverse discourse. In this sense, Foucault's opposition between dominant and reverse discourses of homosexuality can be compared with Bourdieu's claim that to speak of a popular aesthetic is to misleadingly create a reverse ethnocentrism, since such a popular aesthetic is remote from the cult of beauty for beauty and the sort of experiences which condition this (1971:1373).

These points of alignment should not veil the very real differences between the two. It is difficult to see how Foucault's power microcosms might be mapped on to more causally-effective social structures. Moreover, his disarming treatment of each discursive formation "as a sort of great uniform text" reveals the limit of his aspirations to develop a sociology as opposed to an interpretative study. His "materiality" is only spoken or written materiality.
Foucault’s defence of an "author-function" rather than a "free subject" in literature and art has produced a predictably outraged response from those who have an investment in a radically under-socialised conception of the artist in Western art-history. On the surface, there seems to be agreement between Bourdieu’s emphasis on the cultural field and Foucault’s stress on exploring how "discourse is articulated on the basis of social relations". Foucault has criticised the view that the free subject enters the density of things, plucks meaning and profundity from these engagements and struggles to attain his own originality and authenticity in the creative act. Using the model of science or maths, where the "I" who writes the treatise is a purely constructed "I", he claims that a similar author function in art would eliminate the unacceptable claim in Western culture that the solitary subject has written texts in which "contradictions are resolved [;] where the incompatible elements can be shown to relate to one another" (Caughie, 1981: 287-8). Thus for Foucault the author is merely responsible for discourses that are controlled elsewhere; it is understandable why Rushdie has opposed this reductive determinism. Bourdieu has a different model of authorship.

In his theory, the Cartesian free subject also takes a battering. Moreover, literature and art still leave traces of the contradictions running through the personality, which are not entirely resolved. But Bourdieu does not seek to explain all texts in terms of the evolution of genres, different avant-garde trajectories or simply the working out of a discursive mentalité (for example, concerning madness or Orientalism) within the cultural field. Rather he wants us to consider the choice of positions within an artistic group or field in the context of the material experience of the author and the educational formation linked to this. For Bourdieu, then, Foucault’s discourse-dependent acts of anonymous authors will be shown to have an unnecessarily idealist cast itself, confined within the de-oxygenated
air of the heavens. His own model seeks to occupy the sort of territory maintained in Britain and America under Raymond Williams' influence as "cultural materialism". A theory of practice such as both Bourdieu and Williams have outlined works better here: the author can have a certain degree of creative choice within the conditions set by his/her class and education and in the context of positions available within the cultural field. In Bourdieu's social theory, the author has, as the result of formal education, an artistic habitus, as well as a socialisation into the cultural field (and position-taking) and a habitus shaped by experiences in the field of class power. But s/he is still capable of "newness" in the sense that a new paradigm or a new problematic can be initiated. Even in the pre-capitalist world, some capacity for independent innovation is credited to the author (see 1990a:94; also Pollock, 1988, Rushdie, 1988).

Bourdieu's theory has great merits over other poststructuralist theory. It remains to probe a little more carefully how his model stands up to comparison with other influential syntheses of the field. In the next chapter I want to examine the fascinating empirical and historical detail of recent studies of the institutions of art.

14 For example, Rushdie could be most effective if he transcended the earlier generation's forms of migrants' writing, which were realist (eg Zangwill, *Children of the Ghetto*, 1909) and worked within the surrealist tradition, a position for which he was qualified by cultural and economic capital.

15 Compare the poet, in *Satanic Verses*, who remarks under threat of imprisonment: "A poet's work: to name the unnameable, to point at frauds, to take sides, start arguments, shape the world and stop it from going to sleep. And if rivers of blood flow from the cuts his verses inflict, then they will nourish him." (1988: 97) - a statement, which begins as a "multi-functional aesthetic" (Bourdieu), and becomes in the last sentence aestheticist.
Chapter IV

Current Debates on The Sacralisation of Art

Bourdieu's genetic approach to art is both indebted to theories of the sacralisation of art and enhances them. I have already noted the borrowings from the sociology of religion with which Bourdieu has invigorated the field of literature and art (priests, prophets, heretics, etc), which had a Weberian derivation. Burger has clarified a conception of the avant-garde which has vital lines of continuity with the Marxist analysis of religion (1984). I believe that borrowing a general perspective from studies of religion is useful analytically and is not merely a form of intellectual insult. Moreover I shall show that close parallels can be shown between Burger and Bourdieu.

Peter Burger and Bourdieu

Burger claims that, following the decline of realism after 1848, it is at the moment of aestheticism in the following years that the field of art acquires the landmarks, such as the divide between high and low, that are to be so crucial in the twentieth century:

\[\text{It is not without interest that Trotsky's Literature and Revolution (1960)[1924] makes many of the same moves that Bourdieu makes. First, Trotsky imports from religion the model of writers as prophets ("Art, don't you see, means prophecy. (1960:168), influential critics as "priests of the bourgeois literary tradition" (1960:130) and of "canonisation within school textbooks" (1960:128). Secondly, he views the artist as determined within his cultural practice by the class, tribal and national solidarities of which s/he is a member as well as influenced by urban modernity: "Language changed and complicated by urban conditions, gives the poet a new verbal material and suggests ...new word combinations for the poetic formulation which strive to break through the dark shell of the subconscious" (1960:167). This is quite compatible with Bourdieu's account of the "cultural unconscious". Thirdly, the production of aesthetic value for Trotsky has historically not been the product of the peasantry or workers, barring a handful of worker-poets. (Paraphrasing Valery, he points out: "Every peasant is a peasant, but not everyone can express himself." (1960:61). Much more significant has been the contribution of the intelligentsia, crushed by Tsarism, who needed support from the lower strata and "tried to prove to the people that it was thinking only of them, lived only for them and that it loved them "terribly". (1960:168) Finally, foreshadowing Bourdieu's critique of popular art, Trotsky criticises the wishful populism of Proletkult which seeks the hothouse growth of working-class art instead of accepting that art can only emerge when the material conditions for it have come into being.}\

the full unfolding of the constituent elements of a field is the condition for the adequate possibility of that field. In bourgeois society, it is only with aestheticism that the full unfolding of the phenomenon of art becomes a fact and it is to aestheticism that the historical avant-garde movements respond (1984:17).

The pre-condition for the criticism of art is, then, the free choice of techniques for maximum effect; the stripped-down concentration on artistic means is intensified as the category of content ebbs. For Bourdieu, the cultural field has to be seen in the same way, as I shall argue in the case of Impressionism. 1850, the boundary for both writers, signals the point at which the reverse world makes its stylistic rupture, inaugurating different publics never before so stratified by taste.

Both Burger and Bourdieu focus on the historical genesis or the social preconditions for the avant-garde. For Burger, the emergence of an autonomous art occurs alongside the decline of feudal dependency, the rise of free exchange and the loss of the need for images of cultural legitimation. The acquisition of artistic freedom means both positive changes - with the capacity to explore unchecked aesthetic experience, but also negative elements, not least, the loss of its capacity for social communication. This is heightened with aestheticism, for its loss of all political ideas was to be immediately surpassed with the self-critique of art in the avant-gardism of Surrealism and Dadaism (and indeed Russian Futurism). Initially, then, there had to be the crisis of art which was experienced as a block to production by Mallarmé, Verlaine and others. This was a crisis precipitated by the new shrinkage of experience now that the artist, too, was a specialist, a crisis in which the nature of art itself was the recurrent subject of debate. It is this autonomy, with its illusory and objective elements, which provided the turning-point for the avant-garde.

In Burger there is one crucial difference from Bourdieu. While
Bourdieu's historical account of the "rules of art" keeps much of the emphasis of Burger on modernism as an enclave for values that are expelled from an instrumentally rational capitalist order, there is a much less clear division between modernism and the avant-garde than in Burger. For Burger, the avant-garde represents a critique of the institution of art itself. The sublation of art for the avant-garde is the end to its sensuous existence as a territory of playful pleasure, achieved at the cost of conformity to domination and quantitative rationality elsewhere. An art that is re-incorporated in everyday life denies two kinds of apartness, that of the uniquely creative genius and that of the passive public. Duchamp's readymade, and especially his send-up of creative originality with the signed urinal, is for Burger emblematic of this demystification of genius: an end to the "individual creation of unique works", while Breton's poetry was offered to the audience in a strategy designed so that the baton of artistic production could be taken up communally. For Bourdieu, by contrast, the recurrent and organised structure of the avant-garde with its demands and manifestoes merely represents a continuation of modernism's primacy of form, and especially of its semiotic opacity and consequent incomprehensibility to the dominated class. Burger sees the avant-gardes as failing, with their work co-opted for posthumous existence alongside the heterogeneous art-objects of the museum. Similarly, the role of time is also theorised by Burger, and consequently the neo- avant-gardes' strategic choice of readymades or objets trouvés especially for a market is viewed as debarring them from the category of self-critical artistic activity. For both, the avant-garde is transformed as the mechanism of consecration recuperates and co-opts. Hence Burger's pathos in depicting the juggernaut of the art-institution. Ostensibly itself merely neutral mediation, the institution of art reveals historically its specific function in bourgeois society, that of "the neutralisation of critique" (Burger, 1984:13).
A crucial difference lies beneath this apparently trivial matter over whether or not avant-gardes are conflated with modernist movements. Both Burger and Bourdieu agree that the (re)sacralisation of art has occurred with the reception of the aestheticist movement - especially in the 1890s - and that this has created a powerful resource for the function of art in the sphere of cultural legitimation. But there are very real differences over motivations.

For Bourdieu, disinterestedness is to be understood principally as a strategy of distinction: the altruistic goal to end the separation of art from life is - like the appeal to the people - part of the artistic habitus. What the artist is really concerned with is his/her reputation - the stakes of the game make the need for recognition as an artist paramount over all other ends. For Burger, on the other hand, the avant-garde represents a type of sectarian movement, looking chiliastically to the end of the bourgeois world, even if the weapons it brings to bear on this are those only of artistic technique. Burger is undoubtedly too sweeping in this assessment. Italian Futurism has many of the avant-garde qualities he describes, yet it was politically swept by "modernolatry" (Castelnuovo and Ginsburg, 1981:72) and by a fervour for war, the submission of women and reactionary political regimes. It is therefore necessary to classify the types of modernism in terms of the artists' subjective "missions", the objective meaning of their texts and their unintended social consequences.

By focussing solely on the birth of modernism after 1848, Bourdieu fails to assess fully the nature of avantgardism. Due to his concern to "bend the stick the other way", his provocative accounts of Dadaism and Surrealism reveal the professional and economic interests of artists within the autonomous art-world and heighten attention to their strategies of

---

9 On this point, see Carey (1993), who explores the conception of the mass, suburbia and women in the writings of British avant-gardes, noting especially the retention of elitist ideas in the novels of D.H. Lawrence and Wyndham Lewis, in comparison with a middlebrow writer such as Arnold Bennett.
distinction. Here he omits the *ideal interests* of artists and their subjective reasons or commitment for doing as they do. In particular, Bourdieu confusingly conflates an economic interest in the material sufficiency necessary for intellectual work with an interest in economic *domination*.

Bourdieu needs to go beyond the birth of heroic modernism to explain the nature of later avant-gardes more fully. For example, if the case of Scottish Art Nouveau is taken, it possessed an avant-gardist moment from 1890 to 1901, as it moved from the autonomous art of aestheticism to a progressive spearhead aiming to dissolve the boundary between art and life (Eadie, 1990). For this brief period, a group of Glasgow artists and the architect, C.R. MacIntosh, rejected the view that art should serve merely as a romantic "other" to the instrumental logic of capitalism and envisaged its rational development beyond a narrow formalist concern for beauty. Thus the key components of the visual ideology of Scottish Art Nouveau stressed the sublation of the art-life distinction, as well as the art-science distinction:

... machine-made goods did not have to be plain or ugly: [...] machine techniques did not violate integrity of design. Under MacIntosh, the Glasgow Art Nouveau movement signalled the attempt to rationalise art and to integrate it with objective society at the same time as it emphasised individuality, creativity, spontaneity, and experimentation...

(Emie, 1990: 25).

Of course, it is necessary to explain the nature and transitory character of the conjunctural features conducive to MacIntosh's brief flowering as an architect and the extraordinary burst of group activity around him, but Bourdieu neglects analysis of the conditions for movements of this type to emerge. He fails to identify the sources for the continuous re-emergence within capitalism of such group disinterestedness. Instead, he focusses on the invidious quest for recognition and even for (long-term)
economic rewards\(^3\). It is perhaps only by applying the sort of analysis that Troeltsch (1931) and Niebuhr, (1957: 20-21) [1929] applied to sects that we can end the dualism of fatalistic materialism (Bourdieu) and idealising avant-garde culture (Burger). That is, it is necessary to classify the features which made some movements more easily and quickly recuperable than others.

Both Burger and Bourdieu conclude that the moment of the avant-garde is past. However the heritage of Dada is the change in the representational system itself (Burger, 1984:62). The (non-avant-garde) experiments with collage in Cubism heralded the end of the work of art justified as illusory reality: the construction of non-organic fragments as in montage (Heartfeld, Brecht, Dos Passos) completed the break with the classical aesthetics of imitation. Thus even if it is in strict terms a contradiction to speak of a tradition of the avant-garde -for the inter-war avant-garde is incompatible with any artistic tradition - both Burger and Bourdieu are agreed that the rupture consolidated by Dadaism created a symbolic revolution that further disenchanted the world.

But Bourdieu strips off the residual aura of art that still clings to Burger's critical science. The difference appears at its most striking in the response to Brecht. If Burger's social theory has been powerfully motivated by the defeat of the avant-garde's utopian gamble, it still gains some crumbs of comfort from the ideal-typical mode of artistic resistance which Brecht summons up. For Bourdieu, by contrast, a further level of demystification exists. In this, the "illusion" of "cultural communism" must be destroyed as one of the principal enemies of a clear-sighted sociological analysis (1993(b): 1-2). Brecht must be exposed as offering a "populist" perspective, in which the art of the dominant class merely disguises itself as the art of the masses. If, for Burger, Brecht is an exemplary "materialist" writer, for the Bourdieusian

\(^3\) Bourdieu may also have in mind the analysis of political parties by Michels. Again, the critique of Michels' oligarchy rule could be extended to Bourdieu.
approach to literature, Brecht is not materialist enough, since he refuses to see that the programmatic appeal to the working-class might guarantee his own symbolic capital. His political theatre is part of the same socialist opiate that intellectuals enjoy consuming.

There is a danger of committing an intentionalist fallacy here, as opposed to an interpretative analysis of the texts, their external determinants and their effects. Bourdieu's analysis ignores the significance of a "radical canon" amongst working-class trade-unionists with an oppositional cultural tradition (see, for example, Willett's account of the extensive movement for a "new civilisation" that developed in Germany in the second half of the 1920s, in which the figures of Brecht, Grosz, Heartfeld, Piscator and Masereel played a significant role (1979:91-111)). If "Brecht" figures in this way merely as an author to be unmasked, it is because Bourdieu's reductive analysis touches, in this respect, on the aspects of the cultural field on which he is weak. This includes popular art (see chapter VI) but also the artistic developments that have taken place on the global periphery or within the European "regions", which partially counter the ethnocentrism and class exclusiveness found in the literary and artistic establishment. Indeed, it seems to me that these voices from the periphery might confirm Bourdieu's ethnography of the metropolis precisely by their cultural distance from its institution of art. I do not want to idealise these developments. Recent work by Durand (1989) suggests that some of the same sociological dynamics that Bourdieu has isolated in Parisian modernism have their counterparts in the Third World, as in the use of culture as capital and its transformation into economic capital in Brazil in the last thirty years. However within some post-colonial or anti-colonial discourses it is possible to discern writers, for example, who articulate the experience of the disenfranchised or subaltern masses and whose readership is derived from all the literate. Within this category an important group of writers could be described as "hybrid" in the sense that
exposure to the imperatives of migration has profoundly affected their worldview. Most centrally, these writers are working in areas where the break of the literary field between restrained and expanded production is only embryonic, as in the cases of Arguedas (Peru), or Poniatowska (Mexico). Here, the novel stands in a close relation to a culture of resistance and encompasses traces of community popular arts not unlike the older epic forms. One instance is Poniatowska's testimonial narratives (but see also Said on contrapuntal narratives (1992: 258-65); Babha, 1993: chs. 9 and 11, Spivak, 1988, chs 12 and 14).

The dynamic of consecration outside France.

The organising principle underlying Bourdieu's work on modernity is that art requires the apparatus of the sociology of religion because of its sacralisation. He is not the first person to argue this: the analogy is present in Coleridge's references to a "spiritual clerisy" or priesthood, in the Leavises' mission of English and Poggioli's conception of avant-gardes as sects. But his systematic and defamiliarising application of religious language is distinctive, from his conception of the artist as suffering Christ, to the view of the museum as a collection of ceremonial objects, or the institutional church adapting to heresiarch protest by taking over elements of popular culture. What he has not done, however, is to enquire fully into the historical origins and co-ordinates of this process of sacralisation, especially outside France. Here the recent work done in the United States is very valuable, although it is weakened by a tendency to empiricism. The American conception of the canon is in urgent need of a more systematic theory of class reproduction and cultural legitimation such as that provided by Bourdieu.

Levine's Highbrow/Lowbrow (1988) addresses itself to the question of why in contemporary radicalism claims for recognition for groups such as U2 are always in terms of their greatness as popular artists and not as artists as such. Why the policing of a barrier between the popular and the high? And for
how long has great art been understood as unpopular (1988:5)? His answer claims convincingly that all the evidence in America suggests that the division between high and low is as recent as the product of the second half of the nineteenth century and that it has to be related to the dynamic of capitalism.

His arguments are restricted to the reception of culture, although I think it would be possible also to suggest that a change in the social origins of authors has occurred too. He illustrates his case with two sustained case-studies on the reception of Shakespeare and opera, both of which show the democratic nature of audiences in the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century. Thus, the theatres in the first half of the nineteenth century were like early twentieth century cinemas, drawing a representative range of occupations, including prostitutes and the habitués of gambling saloons, miners and farmers (1988:21). Going to a Shakespeare play was not a duty undertaken for the sake of status or respectability. Rather Shakespearean drama was presented - along with acrobats and jugglers - to audiences which were often boisterous and spontaneous in their responses to both actors and the acts represented (1988:23). In keeping with Bourdieu's view of popular culture, participation by the audience meant that the texts were not sacrosanct "[Shakespeare] was treated as common property to be treated as the user saw fit" (1988:42). Levine attacks particularly the modern view that Shakespeare was understood by the lower classes only for his oratory and narrative action but not for his dramatic or poetic artistry. The historical records rather suggest that the moral conflicts, ambitions and political clashes were as clear to the lower class sections as to the élite. Sophisticated and frequent burlesques of Shakespeare and the allusions to his plays in political speeches presupposed a common understanding of Shakespearean drama: "Shakespeare was part and parcel of nineteenth century discourse" (1988:37).
The turning-point at which popular culture began to take a separate path from that of the wealthy gentry can be located in the bitter Astor Place riots of 1849, which left 22 dead. Theatregoers and a crowd of 10,000 fought over class - divisiveness in drama and especially over the merits of aristocratic or more robust, democratic styles in the acting of Macbeth (1988:63-65).

The loss of popular involvement in Shakespeare is linked by Levine to the decline of melodrama and oratory, the presence of larger numbers of non-English speaking migrants and the organisation of theatres by entrepreneurs who assumed a cultural hierarchy (1988:46-7,79). The consequences of this decline were momentous:

By the turn of the century, Shakespeare had been converted from a popular playwright whose dramas were the property of those who flocked to see them, into a sacred author who had to be protected from ignorant audiences...(1988:72).

The organisation of the symphony orchestra studied by DiMaggio (1986) reveals the same pattern of the collapse in spontaneous popular support and the consequent need to bolster audiences with the calls to duty rather than incitements to pleasure. The late nineteenth century reveals a whole series of musical organisations - from Souza's brass band to the Boston Symphony Orchestra - couching the language of their invitations to audiences with appeals to a strict sense of order. This domestication or "taming" of the audience took on corresponding forms in the development of the elite provision of culture elsewhere: plumbers' overalls, for example, became out-of-place in the first New York museum. It was accompanied by the loss of autonomous control by musicians with the growth of new professional managements under overall direction from civic bourgeois elites. The outcome was a bifurcation of high and low culture - a classification of
taste which was to become a taken-for-granted assumption in the construction and segregation of public territories:

When we look at Boston before 1850 we see a culture defined by the pulpit, the lecturn and a collection of artistic efforts, amateurish by modern standards, in which effort was rarely made to distinguish between art and entertainment, or between commerce and culture [...] By 1910, high and popular culture were encountered far less frequently in the same settings (DiMaggio, 1986:195).

Such segregation and the accompanying rise of cultural entrepreneurship had as its bottom line the creation of class closure. Art was ring-fenced from the market, while the appointment of professional musicians, art historians etc., supported a base for the creation of difficult new forms with long time intervals in acceptance. The consequence was a classification in which the "dignified parts" of the culture were separated from the rest. Crucially, this was done by means of framing devices by which certain aesthetic products were selected, championed by the élite (for example, the Boston Brahmins) and set apart by a specialised mode of appropriation. It thus became impossible to envisage in Boston by the turn of the century the chorus of 10,000 and the orchestra of 1000 that had celebrated the end of the civil war. Art instead became the terrain of incompatible currents of a class closure and democratizing missions to the people: "The tension between monopolisation and hegemony, between exclusivity and legitimation was a constant counterpoint to the efforts at classification of American urban élites" (1986:209). A similar approach to such missions of culture is the important historical analysis of the provision of education in literature through the institutionalisation of English Studies in Britain by Balick (1983).

The studies of Levine and DiMaggio are essential evidence of how a secular high culture replaced the Protestant Ethic as the basis for cultural
legitimation, a process which the American avant-gardes were powerless to stop (Crane, 1987). But they need also to be explained by associating them with wider cultural changes especially the rationalisation of work (Taylorism and other deskilling initiatives) which had the effect of creating a pervasive belief in the stupidity or bestialisation of the manual worker (Palmer, 1975; Sohn-Rethel, 1978). Finally, Levine's disingenuous enquiries as to why the psychic investment in the high-low division is so great need to take account of the significance in America of culture as a means of class closure and mobility, from the IQ test pioneered after the classification of high culture to the instituting of a meritocratic labour market (Lipuma, 1993:27-8). In brief, these powerful studies of the disinheriting of a people from their culture need to be placed within more sophisticated assessment of educational practice and reproduction such as those provided by Bourdieu and his colleagues.

Strangely, it is also in the context of the sacralisation of culture that I would place Becker's work. The radical defamiliarisation provided by Art Worlds (1982) derives from its refusal to sacralise specific genres of culture and its embrace of both popular and high artistic spaces as common spheres of professional activity. This gives his approach its debunking informal tone, with its departure from the conspicuous consumption of art and the usual reverence for a "higher seriousness" (Bloch, 1986) and its replacement of these with concepts from the sociology of occupations. Becker's work is valuable because it, too, wants to deconstruct the image of the suffering charismatic artist so central to sacralisation of culture by pointing to the cooperative work and social conventions underlying cultural production. The further gamble that Becker suggests is that it is possible to lay bare the same kind of processes at work in the performances of Mozart and the Pogues, Trollope and Catherine Cookson.

Becker's tradition is that of phenomenology. His is the conception of the social actor which restores to him or her, as subject, the capacity for
meaningful action on the world, not just through adapting specific roles within scripted parts, but also in transforming social organisations through their practice. Becker's brilliance lies in transposing onto art-worlds a perspective that had its baptism of fire in deviancy theory. This clearly fits with Bourdieu's complaint that structuralism has ignored the subjective meanings of individual experience. Becker is also right that there are gaps in many traditional Marxist approaches to art: his role is to get to the parts that such theories fail to reach.

For example, art objects are made and distributed through collective involvement. Taking each others' parts, people create worlds of art, established through networks of participants linked co-operatively together (1982:31). By collectively labelling their efforts artistic activities, individuals subjectively allocate values, thus "making that world possible" (1982:67). In certain contexts, these world-creating activities also render the objects created artistically valid as well4. Support-personnel are normal in artistic production (1982:1) and the poetic name "muse" may underplay the skilled or even virtuoso nature of the services offered. Not only, for example, did Sonya Tolstoy write seven fair copies of War and Peace, but Tolstoy's reading of her own diaries about marriage came to fruition in the complex presentation of female protagonists in his novels (Smoluchowski, 1987:68).

Similarly, Bourdieu stresses the significance for the second bohemia of supportive conviviality within two cafés.

What is more, the writer needs the audience for the work to be sustained and for a world-view to be developed through a series of products. Artistic work, like other kinds of work, possesses a division of labour which depend on shared traditions:

4 Performance art - as the fusion of both dramatic and visual forms - is a contemporary example of an art-world that derives most of its audience from other practitioners and is struggling to impose its self-definition as art on the outside world.
Even so self-sufficient a poet as Emily Dickinson relied on psalm-tune rhythms that an American audience would recognise and respond to. All art works then, except for the totally individualistic and therefore unintelligible works of an autistic person, involve some division of labour among a large number of people ...(Becker, 1982:14).

Again, Bourdieu has emphasised shared traditions by noting the "hierarchy of genres" that persisted beneath the fluctuating rhythm of modernist movements, to be occasionally flouted, as in Flaubert's choice of the inferior form of the novel as against poetry.

Both Becker and Bourdieu have illuminated the question of how many conventions an art-work uses. This refers not just to the rules covering harmony in music or metre in verse, but to more taken-for-granted conventions, such as the use of precious metals in jewellery - rejected by Pre-Raphaelites - or the length of a concert (1982: ch.2). In Bourdieu's concepts, this work allows us to prise apart the "doxic" assumptions that still endure even beneath the surface of artistic revolutions. One of the most innovative sections of Art-Worlds advances perspectives from deviance theory within this unexpected context, proposing that artistic action varies from the total and quiescent compliance that produces the banal piece (muzack, or board-room art) to various strategies of transgression or ignorance of the rules. Naive painters, for example, use some conventions, such as standard-sized canvases or oils, but - like the Cornish fisherman, Alfred Wallis - break a number of other rules, such as those of perspective. What distinguishes their art from those of other non-naturalist painters is that they have no knowledge of the history of art (1982: 258-68). Mavericks, on the other hand, have been trained in art-schools and academies but then go on to break the rules: Charles Ives, for example, demanded several orchestras in different park locations. Folk artists are equally remote from the main professional art traditions as naives, using family patterns or collaborative community work as the source of ideas,
as in the case of Aboriginal paintings or Paisley shawls, in which the original purposes were cultic or utilitarian (1982:246-58). The craft tradition may also be treated transgressively for artistic effects, but this time usually by professionals (see, for example, Beuys' pottery dinner plates, with their fur centres) (1982: 280). Again, the couplet of professional artist and the "toy", the naive - as in Duchamp and Rousseau - suggest the echoes of Becker in Bourdieu, this time round played with an eye for the perverse pleasures in the disjunction between professional and naive habituses within a post-perspectival world.

Aesthetic evaluations from critics operate as validation for artists - in Becker's view, critics are part of the resources that artists use to make their depictions of the world plausible. While evaluations by critics are the object of intense conflict, Becker also shows that a relativist aesthetic has replaced earlier philosophies of art, in which the title "art" is saved for the judgements of any competent agent - for example, a museum director - rather than awarded to art-objects evaluated in accordance with substantive rules (1982:149). Finally, Becker asks the fascinating question about artistic means of production, why is it that certain artistic revolutions don't take off? Why did the industrial technology that produced photographs eventually become accepted as amenable to art - or jazz become a thriving art-world in the 1920s - when the more widely-available stereoscopes failed to generate a similar art product (1982:ch.10)? Although he fails to provide definitive answers, Becker and Bourdieu have a similar problematic. Bourdieu's analysis of the failure of photography in France (in 1968) to achieve anything other than middlebrow artistic status shows that answers to such questions would need to take into account the key questions of who backs it, that is, whether they possess the monopoly to define an art as legitimate and whether it can be used by producers and consumers for social distinction:
On the one hand, like any practice that brings artistic values into play, photography is an opportunity to actualise the aesthetic attitude ...but on the other hand, precisely because photographic practice, even in its most accomplished form ... comes very low in the hierarchy of artistic practices, subjects feel less imperatively obliged to exercise their aesthetic sense (1990c:65).

As Becker points out, for an art-world to acquire recognition and its products to become canonised, it needs to move from the local to the national or international level, it needs subjects that are not too rooted in the local culture (Indian films don't travel well), consumers who have social power (jazz acquired an influential audience among the black bourgeoisie), and aesthetic defences among critics/practitioners. Stereoscopy - for example - acquired a national market, and even a place in the curriculum but never managed to cut its ties with the commercial world and move into the autonomous art orbit. For Bourdieu the appeal to internal aesthetic accreditation is the key factor (1993:41-2), along with the question of the social capital of the practitioner of the art. For Becker, on the other hand, more attuned to the legitimisation of "heresiarch" popular arts like jazz, the key factor in stereoscopy's downfall lay precisely in the technological/social interface. His heretical conclusion implies comparisons with industrial decline:

My guess is that stereography failed to change its imagery and machinery rapidly enough to avoid the stigma, deadly in a style-conscious society, of being out of date (1982: 349).

There are points of tension and disputes even in the detached art-worlds of late modernity explored by Becker - and indeed Bourdieu shows that in certain avant-garde struggles, fights led to broken bones. Thus, using the empirical studies of Hans Haacke, Becker reveals that museum directors' artistic judgements are out of step with both professional painters and the
public. The latter two groups believe that directors are less responsive to some works - such as those which are more politically radical - precisely because they are accountable to wealthy trustees. But, paradoxically, such reports of aesthetic clashes and their blasphemous explanation by recourse to non-aesthetic facts only highlight very poignantly the limitations of Becker's predominantly subjectivist account. His own accounts show the need to deepen analysis of the structuring relations in the world of power which mould individuals' taste behind their backs. Despite this gap, Bourdieu's cultural theory partly incorporates the innovative work of Becker as an important advance in the phenomenological perspectives on the contemporary cultural field. Both have emphasised the heuristic value of bracketting off objective conditions so as to highlight the life-worlds of artists - including how they decide on what is valuable and go about collectively realising their goals.

When Bourdieu takes up Becker he retains his method of examining actors' definitions, seeing painters as rational agents involved in practices within an intersubjective world which he entitles the cultural field. But he seeks also to go beyond Becker to restore structural determinants, which surface in the different amounts of power agents have to nominate art in the example above. In Bourdieusian work on museums, for example, there is the same interest in artistic perception and evaluation as Becker displays but these are explored in relation to class habitus and the amounts of educational, social and economic capital that each agent brings to bear on his experience:

As the visiting rates empirically established increase from one to ten between the levels of the CEP and the BEPC [exam], it can be seen that ...the effect of the school is at least three times as important as any direct action on the level of supply"(1991:105; see also Durand, 1989).
Becker has countered the tendency to economic reductionism in the Marxist sociology of art, but regrettably replaces it with a one-sided stress on groups which bypasses objective relations. Hence the justice of Bourdieu's criticism (1992: 288): Becker's musicians, film-directors and maverick sculptors act as if marooned in their desert island art-worlds, stripped of the structures influencing their interpretations. It is almost as though, beyond the use of conventions, the artist is a tabula rasa.

Yet there are, in turn, elements of Becker's phenomenological approach which have been grossly neglected by Bourdieu. Becker gathers rich examples of art being produced in the maelstrom of clubs and pubs and film studios of the modern city, in other words emerging from the commercial, large-scale field. This is a possibility Bourdieu only fleetingly considers (1993: 39). Indeed, Bourdieu has no category for the "canonisation of art from a popular base", despite the case of the detective novel (for example, Dashiel Hammett), Benjamin's insistence that Art Nouveau posters were "the commodity of a commodity" (Eadie, 1990, 34) and Russian Formalist theory. Yet in the historical sociology of modernity there are at least four crucial ways in which these fields have become permeable, taking the example of the visual arts alone.

First, simple crossovers occur as in the case of Picasso and Braque, who used painters' varnishes and popular newspapers for their collages and so "made a thinkers' art out of workers' artifices" (Varnedoe and Gopnick, 1990:36). A similar use was made of graffiti by Dubuffet and of comics by Mirò, this latter powerfully affecting the Surrealist mainstream (1990: 85 and 173). Second, developments in the popular field are taken up from the sphere of lower-class culture and later "trickle down" to popular culture once more in a wheel movement, as when the Cubists' use of found materials, exploited by the Russian Futurists, subsequently became the "official public language of a nation" [1990: 52]. Thirdly, there are forms which are developed by the same
artists in both popular arts and in the "citadel of the avant-garde", as in the
Kin-der-Kids comic strips for the Hearst papers drawn by Feininger, which
were adapted to quite different political and formal effects in his
contemporary Expressionist paintings. Picasso's comic strips for _L'Humanité_
are another example (1990: 166-7; 181). Finally, modernist styles can be
extended in popular media, as in the delicately linear Art Nouveau comic
strips painted by Winsor McCay (1990:162). Such instances counter
Bourdieu's assumption that modernism and popular genres exist in
hermetically-sealed fields. They reveal also the originality and intensity which
have sometimes emerged in sites quite cut off from the recondite imagery of
the academic and modernist traditions.

Art and Gender Relations

Bourdieu chooses the writing of Virginia Woolf to epitomise the new
relations of the sexes. He views Woolf on the outside of women's culture
looking in, able to set into a new perspective the precise nature of the élite's
participation in ruling relations. For it was she who perceived the domestic
culture that made these possible, from the encouragement of men to embody
the performance principle and thus "create the world", to the parochial nexus
of kin and the emotional responsibility for personality which was the
corresponding terrain of women. However apart from that use of Woolf, a
major omission from Bourdieu's analysis of cultural production to date is any
attempt to explore systematically how art relates to gender as well as to class.

I have shown that Bourdieu's cultural theory is organised around a
dichotomous model in which the major division is between the art of
feudalism, which is the possession of both the lord and the peasant, and the
art of capitalist modernity, with its form-language set apart from the ordinary
cultural equipment of both the bourgeoisie and the people: a new nomos in
which consecration is based purely on style.
What this portrayal of the cultural field omits is any sustained analysis of this period and the way in which the atrophying of feudal relations left its traces on novels and paintings. In particular recent literary studies have been exploring the ways in which gender relations became a crucial terrain for the moral critique of the aristocracy from the eighteenth century onwards. New conceptions of male domination permeated the highly popular novels of Richardson and through him to canonised and uncanonised writers subsequently, having a vital influence in France as well as England. Recent work on ideology has suggested that it was not just the dynamism and sense of collective self-justification that created the promethean energies of the early members of the Protestant sects but that there originated from Protestant middle class intellectuals a revised conception of patriarchy and a new female sexuality on which could be modelled the social contract of individualism. The emergence of feminist Foucauldian studies has allowed further exploration of this simultaneous repression and intensification of the erotic. For example, Nancy Armstrong's sustained and erudite new reading of the British eighteenth and nineteenth century novel suggests new links in the light of this between the field of power and the literary field (1987).

Her argument is that a new set of sexual relations became the "grammar" on which was founded the morality of the family and the household and the new image of the nation, in opposition to the wider lineage relations and use of political force by the aristocracy. This trickled down to working-class modes of sociability and trickled up to moralise the aristocracy. The novel, the secular conduct book and the sermon were among the most important private and public devices for transmitting this new conception of women, while it was this morality that bore the brunt of binding together an imaginary national community, beyond both the centripetal family and political factions of feudalism or the relations of wage-labour and capital of the capitalist economy.
The novel is fundamental to the establishment of female authority within the domestic sphere in part because the novelist is associated with the middle-class female voice, outside the rough babble of the market-place and the formal public sphere. Since the household represented an arena of neutral convergence on which different classes and factions could agree, the sexual contract could command widespread support. It was less constrained by the conflicting interests that quickly obstructed the Enlightenment project elsewhere (Armstrong, 1987: 69). Viewed in this light, the newly literate working-class readers could be seen as bearers of the new idea of consumption, sexuality and the domestic woman.

*Pamela*, in particular, possesses a cultic resonance as a novel dealing on the one hand with an unprecedented demand for sexual respect on the part of a servant, and with a revolutionary new marriage contract for the minute surveillance of everyday life (see also Fowler, 1991). Indeed, *Pamela* can plausibly be seen as a paradigm of the new gendering of the domestic economy, especially given the resonance of its subtext of nation as an imagined community:

[They] appeared to have no political bias, these rules took on the power of natural law and as a result they presented ... readers with ideology in its most powerful form (1987: 60).

Bourdieu has noted the role of women as mediators between the dominating and dominated classes (1984), but has not linked this to the novel. The precise character of such literary representations of women needs careful theorising. For example, there are crucial differences between a Foucauldian analysis, such as Armstrong's, which identifies only a single discursive formation (or ideology) and the British culturalist tradition, which has read the canonised nineteenth century novel as the site in which discordant experience or social conflicts could be registered, and in which, in the mid nineteenth-century, the legitimacy of the gentry is invoked against
the industrial market order (see, for example, Williams in *Writing in Society*, on Dicken's *Hard Times*). Within its capacious form, even anti-capitalist popular culture might be mined to critical ends. It is thus crucial to know how Bourdieu views the earlier realist cultural field.

Further - in qualification of Armstrong - it has also been shown that newly-acquired skills of literacy were put to very different uses by the working-class or radical readers and contributors to Owenite periodicals, as Taylor has argued in her accounts of the rise and fall of *feminist socialism* (1810-1840) (Taylor, 1982). Moreover, although a Foucauldian approach has some purchase on the eighteenth century, it emphasises too much the homogeneously doxic or ideological character of the nineteenth-century bourgeois novel, especially in its claim of the displacement of class conflict onto the sexual arena. Such an approach plays down the images of conflict and deficiency in the "Condition of England" novels of the 1830s and 40s, especially those in which the representations of women writers were filtered through their practical knowledge of workers' domestic lives. Developing a different feminist perspective, Lovell has argued à propos of Mrs. Gaskell:

For it is women and their suffering in the family which provide the angle of vision in a melodramatic plot in which that suffering can take tangible and heightened forms ... it is this angle of vision on the condition of England question which legitimates Gaskell's authority to speak, to write in her authorial persona as educated, womanly sympathizer, first hand observer, although an outsider, of the suffering of the working class (Lovell, 1987:88).

Thus women's writing in particular depicted the discrepancies of the domestic ideology, especially for dowryless, "redundant" women, or emphasised the traps sprung in economic dependence (Newton, 1985). Thus

---

5There were of course, numerous exceptions: see, for example, E.P.Thompson's account of Blake, *Witness against the Beast* (1993) which shows quite different undercurrents in radical Protestant thought.
even consecrated writers reveal a variety of ways in which women could go about Bourdieu's role of "mediator" in the relations between the classes, and especially in the hands of women writers themselves, the novel by no means introduced an unproblematic new form of masculine domination.

At the same time, Bourdieu's analysis has hardly begun to theorise the role of gender in the uncanonised writers of mass fiction genres, such as the sensation novels or the tale of terror. Halberstam's recent analysis of *Dracula*, for example, has shown how its narrative structure condenses a number of different social panics in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus the image of Dracula himself could be emblematic of both the usurious Jew and the predatory aristocrat in order to summon up disordered social and sexual relations (1994).

In brief, a more carefully-nuanced analysis of the novel is necessary for Bourdieu's analysis of the cultural field and its troubled relationship with contemporary ethical and political struggles. Feminist theory has uncovered further dimensions of cultural legitimation, permitting us to remedy some of the silences of Bourdieu's essay on *Masculine Domination*. This type of approach is essential also for France, where, without the Protestant origins of the new middle class relations between the sexes, it was aristocratic reformers such as Montesquieu and the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie (Rousseau and Comte, for example) who were the bearers of the new divisions between the genders (Landes, 1988). Bourdieu suggests in passing that femininity has historically been important in producing the moral basis of bourgeois culture and its forms of taste in consumption, and also that working-class culture prides itself on its uninhibited masculinity (1984: 190). He has not yet elaborated the links between gender and cultural production which would explain the persistence of such mythical oppositions.

---

6 As Landes has suggested, even Flora Tristan, a socialist of the 1848 Revolution, was unable to think outside the gender divide in which women's family responsibility was incompatible with paid work.
What is more, if Bourdieu is right about the major investments of cultural capital needed for the decoding of "high culture" in the twentieth century and for modernist forms in particular, then this also possesses implications for social change which he does not draw from his evidence. For in "non-literary" sites, cultural reception takes a different form. In these contexts, literature has still been credited with the transformative power that domestic fiction once had in the critique of the aristocracy, and it is this which prompted the trial in 1928 of Radcliffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness* and the recent Clause 28 controversy. Thus, in rather similar terms to Bourdieu, Felski is surely right to ask questions about the social effects of the modernist aesthetic imperative in feminist theory (see Kuhn, 1982; Moi, 1985; Moi, 1986). As she remarks, Kristeva and Cixous have returned to the presymbolic for their avant-gardist feminist strategy in a project for a "revolution". Kristeva has been ably satirised by Felski:

> her focus on the psychogenesis of texts blinds her to the issues of literary context and reception. This is a curiously private revolution: the poet, solitary, original and unique, and the critic/semiotician are the only participants it requires (1989:38).

A Bourdieusian cultural analysis might also take account of the fact that realist aesthetic forms continue to have great popularity, for example, in the American reading groups that sprang up over the country in the 1970s. Such readers defined themselves negatively against the formalist concerns of academic critics (Long, 1987:319). While such groups take for granted some elements of bourgeois life, as in their work ethic and religious optimism, others had a more democratic openness and an emphasis on learning (Long: 318). More research would be needed to reveal how far their reading was used backstage as evidence of an exclusive spirituality or "natural cultivation". But it is from groups such as these, as well as less formal networks, that the feminist "counter-public sphere" is drawn. Within this, the autobiographical
novel and the confessional novel have had a particularly important role as accelerators of feminist social change, both being forms which are less divorced from "life" than the self-reflexive, playful and ironic mode of modernism (Felski, 1989). Despite his analysis of Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*, Bourdieu has not yet assessed what resources or "ideological accumulators" exist which might bypass gender or class domination. Although he has registered with great pathos the sense of political marginality expressed by lower-class women, he has not questioned the contexts in which women's cultural intimidation is reduced (1984:406-11).

The last two chapters have introduced Bourdieu's sociology of modernity. The historical genesis of the avant-garde has been used to illuminate the sacralisation of art in the present. I have suggested that Bourdieu's sociological analysis of contemporary ideologies of art is able to go beyond Foucault in providing an account of the objective competitive struggles in which the aesthetic gaze and cultivated disposition has arisen. Unlike Foucault's study of doxic knowledge or episteme, Bourdieu has provided a fuller account of the nature of the relationships of the cultural field, the profits of distinction which are its stages and the reconversion strategies which link it through a process of conversion to the field of power. I have shown that with secularisation and the rise of cultural legitimation, so-called "meritocracy", art has become monopolised by the dominant class as a means of closure against the dominated. This fate has now befallen the avant-garde. There is clearly a convergence here in all advanced capitalist societies, although Bourdieu needs to specify the *different historical trajectories* of each. Unlike Europe, high culture in America possessed a popular base until the 1870s.

The recent development of work in gender and the realist novel has illuminated how the popular reception for early novels made possible a domestic ethic and concept of nation which permitted the agrarian and
industrial bourgeoisie to acquire a moral charter for rule. It is suggested that Bourdieu could extend his study of realist forms within the eighteenth and early nineteenth century novel to show the ideological means by which new conceptions of the feminine self and body entered the political, economic and ethical arenas. Equally Bourdieusian explorations of the antinomies of modernism could be extended into the field of gender. Here critical questions about the nature of feminist identification with modernist "revolutions of the word" and its relation to educational capital have been posed in the debate on feminist aesthetics (Moi, 1985; Felski, 1989; Lovell, 1980; Marcus, 1992).

In the context of modernity, I have suggested that Bourdieu needs to distinguish further between avant-garde and other modernist movements. I have outlined ways in which Bourdieu's "hierarchy of genres" might be approached (along the lines of the sociology of sects) to include more systematic and historical explanations of the origins and nature of various types of modernism. Using the example of Scottish Art Nouveau, the sociological conditions for progressive rather than regressive or reactionary modernist movements can be further clarified.

Finally, I have suggested that Bourdieu has not entirely succeeded in extricating his own approach from the aesthetic formalism he attacks, especially in the reification of the distinction of the restricted and extended cultural fields. If Bourdieu is right that there is no popular aesthetic, the claim that there is no popular art is contestable (1984:395), as I shall argue in chapter VI. Moreover, the crossovers between low culture and the avant-garde are much more numerous and complex than he has suggested. In this respect the phenomenological approach to the arts proposed by Becker has certain important advantages over Bourdieu's hermeneutic explorations of artists' strategies. The remaining chapters seek to deepen understanding of Bourdieu's principle theories of culture, while also providing test-cases in which their validity can be assessed.
Part II:

Critical Investigations
Chapter V
Bourdieu and Modern Art:
The Case of Impressionism

There are several reasons why a study of Bourdieu's cultural theory should assess his work on Impressionism. First, it is clear that Bourdieu deploys this example to develop a sociological explanation of the birth of the autonomous artist analogous to the earlier birth of the capitalist entrepreneur. Bourdieu explains the free art of modernism by revealing structures and perceptions which derive from both the field of power and the field of culture. He explores especially the key moment in the nineteenth century when deskilling or the increasingly fragmented division of labour highlighted the "hyper-skilling" of the artist. This was also the moment in which the vindication of the rights of genius had to be asserted, to justify artists who had failed in market terms. The new conception of genius in France, from the 1850s, equated artistic commitment with non-economic goals (1971:1350). Yet in Bourdieu's tragic view, the main struggle against the bourgeois order in the name of that art was destined to be conducted by the members of the dominant class themselves and to be carried out in terms of a struggle for significant form (1971).

Formal achievement as the only guarantee of genuine art is signified, first, in the authentic artist's experience of suffering, which itself offers proof of talent, and second, in resignation in the face of the work's impenetrability by the uneducated "popular gaze". In order to show the interest of Impressionism, we need to pause for a moment on the "invention of the life of the artist". Initially (in 1975) Bourdieu explains the fundamental elements of the artistic habitus as consisting in a state of
indeterminacy which is linked to the aesthetic disposition. But this
indeterminacy within the image of the artist presupposes a repudiation of
the collective consciousness (including its bourgeois and popular
dimensions), such that the artist is "without hearth or home, without law
or faith" (1975:70). This is the intellectual precondition for the ethos of the
artist - he is empowered by this rootlessness and secularism, which in
exposing him to solitude, also make him the "sovereign Berkeleian
observer"(1975:70).

There are also material preconditions, for the artist's career is
structurally linked to a material experience which Bourdieu believes has
its origin in the inheritance patterns and personalities of the dominant
class. Put more strongly, the dedication to an artistic life is a response to
the social experience of insecurity among bourgeois and aristocratic
young men, either second sons or in the initial deprived of their
anticipated inheritance. The commitment to art can then be read as an
expression of sour grapes in which a negative state, the necessity of
poverty, is transformed positively into a virtue, temporary material
dispossession into a special kind of seeing. This ressentiment which
consists in "making a virtue of a necessity" figures as a frequent
Bourdieusian motif and is in his view deeply symptomatic of the cunning
of class reason¹.

The main psychological parameters of the bohemian artist are now
established. They lie in a double negation, the rejection of the work of
capital valorisation in the bourgeois vocation and the denial of the latter's
claims to moral legitimacy:

¹The material roots of this bohemian ethic are explained as a cultural investment
in suffering, much as Weber expanded on Marx's account of religion to pinpoint
the appearance of a theodicy of bad fortune among the Israelites, whose belief in a
special contract with God became more firmly held the more they were tested by
the misfortunes of exile and diaspora.
aesthetic disinterestedness has its origins in practical roots, the indeterminacy of artistic life - in indeterminacy submitted to as a destiny, the chosen curse from failure (1975: 69).

The consequence is the emergence of a new art-world, outside the field of power which the artist positively elects.

These general ideas are first fleshed out on the visual arts in Bourdieu's essay on Manet and his Impressionist followers. This article was followed by The Rules of Art (1992), in which Manet appears as part of the "Holy Trinity" of the Second Bohemia along with Flaubert and Baudelaire. As I have shown, Bourdieu certainly develops here a (Baudelairian) view of Flaubert as an artist committed to establishing a new form for the novel but who possesses as well a deeprooted moral critique of a "brutalised and greedy" society (Baudelaire, 248-50). Yet Manet, on the contrary, is approached only in terms of his formal innovations.

Bourdieu is writing a book on Manet. It may well be the case that he will then explore also the social meanings of his art and not just his formal significance. At present, this potential Bourdieusian synthesis does not exist. This chapter will therefore approach his study of Manet and Impressionism to pinpoint certain symptomatic weaknesses in his account of movements of artistic modernity.

I want to show that Bourdieu has provided a method for the sociological study of art but that his writing on Manet and early Impressionism has misinterpreted its character. Far from being the first major milestone on the route to the depoliticised painterly qualities of abstract art, Impressionism - at least until the mid 1870s - depicted the new spaces and types of urban modernity. It demythologised the spectacle

---

2 Bourdieu has contended, however, that Clark's interpretation of Manet has "bent the stick too far in the opposite direction" (Private interview, May 1993.)
of leisure and liberated consumption from its traditional centres. In so doing, it showed the tensions as well as the freedoms of the new social strata of the Second Empire. Its visual codes detected the first traces of the split later to be so pronounced within the modern personality, between the *consuming self* and the *producing self*.

Bourdieu's treatment of the new autonomy of art is an explicit attempt to stir the reader from a clichéd understanding of history. It presents us with bohemia as a world in reverse, but this time contrasted with the academy as the basis for organising all national artistic activities. In this way, Bourdieu wishes to rescue Manet from the condescension of a posterity that no longer finds scandalous the scandal he created amongst his first critics. When, as in *Distinction*, studies of contemporary reception show that the bourgeoisie now feels a close affinity for the art of the Impressionists (1984: 292), Bourdieu wants to show that at its genesis things were different: the ideological structures of Impressionism and the bourgeoisie appeared neither elective nor in affinity.

To revitalise the historical grasp of the field Bourdieu’s strategy is to sidetrack the now over-familiar Marxist concepts of artistic proletarianisation, alienation and development through changes in artistic forces of production. Instead, Bourdieu approaches the symbolic revolution of Manet as an artistic *Reformation*, that is to say, the shift from one "Church" with a priesthood that monopolises orthodoxy to a state of competing cults. This is a fundamental change in the organisation of artistic legitimacy or what Bourdieu calls the "production of belief" - the equivalent in ideological terms to the departure of a nation's banking system from the gold standard. The Durkheimian language of nomos (a regulated existence) and anomie (lack of regulation) is captured from the lexicon of tired positivist criminology so as to help construct the stakes involved in artistic change. On this account, the the achievement of the
pinnacle of a "timeless and universal" appeal are competitive trophies shared by both academicians and modernists. The difference is that in the restructured field, the artist ceases to be "the high-level civil servant of Art" (1993a:243).

Both the academy and the avant-garde adapted to a succession of artistic styles but only within modern art is the artist totally independent in relation to the State. Like the monk bound by the Rule of St. Benedict or the priest controlled through the Papal hierarchy, the artist within the academic system is forced to submit himself (women were excluded) to the authority of the State, which is exercised through Salon juries, provision of prizes and a system of commissions. As a civic delegate, he must depend on its hieratic power to consecrate his work. This alone gives the painter his authorisation and justifies his high fees. In bohemia, in contrast, the production of belief via the acquisition of a reputation is a process stripped of the security offered by official competitive success.

A word is necessary about the academy to supplement Bourdieu's remarks. This institution had been imported into France in 1648 using the Italian academy as its model, permitting a key distinction to be made between the practitioners of liberal arts and mere guild workers or craftsmen (Whites, 1965:ch.1). Reorganised in 1663, it achieved a systematic and bureaucratised form of control over the arts, an exchange in which professionalism was the artist's stake and conformity to State validation its price. Anthony Blunt (whose Stalinism made him perhaps the only Western art historian truly qualified to judge such command systems of the artistic economy) labelled the French Academy "the closest and most complete State control ever exercised before the present century" (1970:322). It became compulsory not only to submit to the State hierarchy but to attend mandatory art theory classes, thus rupturing the bonds that had earlier drawn art to craft through a shared emphasis on practice. France
thus acquired "the most fully developed form of academic training known in Europe" (Blunt:1970:324). In the initial years of the new Academy: "all were orthodox and there were no heretics" (1970:325)

Yet by 1863 the academic system was in tatters. Bourdieu describes this as the bankruptcy of the fiduciary capital of the State artistic culture, that is, of the system through which

the State, rather like a central bank, creates the creators

 guaranteeing the credit or fiduciary currency represented by the


From the 1880s the Academy ceased to control the Ecole des Beaux Arts. The tones in which Bourdieu describes this are in terms of the educational crisis faced by another type of "homo academicus" - that of students and university staff in 1968. What emerged from these challenges and changes was a collective conversion to a new structure of exhibition and distribution based on the critic-dealer system (Bourdieu,1993a;Whites, 1965). From that time on there is the emergence of a "new eye", the spectator of modernity. "Manet dooms the academic eye" (Bourdieu, 1993a: 248) and in doing so creates a "new world".

Bourdieu implies that Manet is the Cohn- Bendit of this academic world. He massively subverts the institution of art by refusing submission to its sacred authority. To this "hieratic" (sacred) art, born from the moral career of discipline and order of the priestly hierarchy, Manet's art possesses the upstart originality of one who appears to lack rigour. In a brilliant perspectival gaze, Bourdieu thus renews the potential for a historical understanding of Manet using an interpretative study of contemporary reviews. He foregrounds, first, the view of the threatened academicians and subsequently that of the Manet circle.

The priestly type of academic eye demands total fidelity to the set of prescribed noble subjects and to the normative set of techniques for
bracketing off artistic form. Although not enforcing the degree of stereotyping imposed on Indian temple sculptors, the mid-nineteenth century academy demanded absolute conformity to a variety of rules. These required that formal considerations of colour and line should in all cases be subordinated to the moral presentation of the subject. Within this, a legitimate portrayal of the social hierarchy was prescribed, with the hero elevated above the mundane figures of banker, peasant, etc. Specific techniques were also debarred, such as brushwork revealing individual strokes. Taken together, state bureaucratisation of art had created an apparatus calculated to enhance narrative readability for the allegorical subject of the painting (Bourdieu, 1993a: 245). There had already been a dilution of control over the arts in the nineteenth century, leading to a struggle between the "inner gaze" (as in eighteenth century art, especially that of Watteau) and the externality of the "academic gaze" (as demonstrated in the Revolution's Classical style, David etc, and the history painting of the Second Empire). These style wars were linked to a struggle between classes over cultural reception: while the restored aristocracy favoured the refined elegance of Watteau, the nouveau riche bourgeoisie of Louis-Philippe's and Louis-Napoleon's regimes chose the discreetly eroticised classicism of Orientalism or the post-classical pastiche of the "juste milieu", dominated by an eclecticism of form and a similar hotch-potch of ideas.

Bourdieu's study of contemporary reviews shows that Manet's Salon submissions were ridiculed by his academic detractors as incompetent but also iconoclastic paintings. Jean Clay has amplified this by revealing that much of the moral outrage at The Execution of Maximilien was provoked by reading the painting as a type of formal play. On Clay's account, the formal organisation of the painting reduced attention to its subject, the death of the French puppet-governor at the hands of the Mexican
nationalist army. A series of dramatic contrasts in the interlarded strata of whites, for example, served to diminish the simplicity of the subject Manet had drawn from newspaper reports and thus disrupted the expected response. Thus, like Bourdieu, Clay reads Manet as anticipating through his style a later modernism, in which the sign becomes more noticeably detached from its denoted objects, as in the later styles of pointillism and tachism. Manet's originality lies in "suspension images in a new way" or "recycling" old images: "Manet treats the artistic heritage the way Benjamin's flaneur handles merchandise. The Louvre is a passage, a market-stand, where the painter strikes his bargain" (Clay, 1985:3).

Similarly, in abandoning classicism in his paintings of racing, Clay argues that Manet conveys the speed of the horses by new devices, such as "unfinished" lines of hatching. However, unlike Bourdieu, Clay also argues that this artistic anomie - which always falls short of the degree zero of painterly dismemberment - was matched by Manet's interest in social meanings and in particular, in the qualities of modernity.

For Bourdieu, the essence of newness in art was the attack on the hegemony of literary or narrative values so as to remove the appearance of natural necessity in the choice of means of representation (1993a:247). Thus the painterly constructivism evident in Manet's sketchy brushstrokes or the tonal weight of his patches of colour is the consequence of the anti-illusionistic demystification of the artistic prophet. As in a Brechtian gaze at classicist certainties, the "new eye" promotes the conflict over style to a political act: one which in itself destroys the taken-for granted classifications rooted in the rules of form. For regulation is always linked to the sense of order imposed by the academic artist as a delegate of the State. He is right, surely, that such art was a crucial part of the cantilevered supports for a much wider set of representations which had once extended from bottom to pinnacle so as to legitimate the whole
regime of Louis-Philippe.

Bourdieu uses his hermeneutic skills to take, successively, the position of the invaders and the defenders of the established cultural field of nineteenth century French art. The full heterodoxy of Manet and the Impressionists can only be grasped by reading these aesthetic duels as struggles over the purpose of painting. For these defenders (and some others) the new art represents a failure to signify. It possesses a cold objectivism which is in itself an attack on the intricate order of the classical cosmology and especially on the salience of the traditional moral order within the ideal mythical or historical composition. Then, by a dazzling shift of position, Bourdieu discloses the opposite perspective: the new art’s defence of a symbolic revolution in which artistic conventions become a matter of free enquiry. There is a deeper structural opposition here that Bourdieu has noted in passing elsewhere: the opposition between the logic of a theory articulated with power and that of the experimental practicing artist (1980b:29)\(^3\). Thus in order to understand the significance of events which led from the 1863 Salon des Refusés to the end of the Ecole des Beaux Arts’ control over teaching in the 1880s, we have to see it as the decline of a monopolistic group with its own professional interests. But not just that: the end of the academic monopoly denied the dominant class and the State a law-like, official consensus over the representations of the real, just as the end of the sumptuary laws of feudalism meant the end of a fixed, traditional style of life. This opened up art as a new sphere of collective insecurity as painters struggled to earn recognition as artists. Insecurity is heightened by dependence on the operation of the market but it is not explicable by the market alone:

\(^3\) One of the implications of these nineteenth century French conflicts over painting is that the 1930s’ duel between Lukacs and Brecht bears certain analogies with them. See the conclusion.
From now on no one can claim to be an absolute holder of the nomos even if everyone else has claims to the title. The constitution is, in the true sense of the word, an institutionalisation of anomie. This is a truly far-reaching revolution, at least in the realm of the new art in the making, it abolishes all references to an ultimate authority capable of acting as a court of appeal: the monotheism of the central nomothete gives way to a plurality of competing cults with multiple uncertain goals (Bourdieu, 1993a:252-3).

Here is Bourdieu's key presentation of the cultural field of Impressionism. The significance of Manet in particular and the Impressionists as a group is that they inaugurated the modern freedom of the arts, located within "the restricted field of cultural production". Especially important for Bourdieu is that this new painting was founded not just on the rejection of bourgeois art but on the rejection of a social art founded on Realism.

This is a brilliant analysis of the old nomos and of its transformation. But it has a teleological view of Manet: it reads his paintings as the first stop on the autonomous path to abstract expressionism. In this respect, he interprets Manet and the Impressionists as dominated by a "truth to media" which itself derived from a symbolic revolution (Bourdieu, 1992:160; 1994:148-9). On this view, Manet is emblematic of a new specialisation in art. Like the scientist in physics, he has broken with the normative ways of seeing. His triumphs are necessarily esoteric. For whereas in artistic revolutions, it is those who have most artistic capital - are most artistically-well-endowed - who engineer change, in political revolutions, it is those with least social and economic capital who back transformations. However, I want to argue first, that Manet is not just revolutionary by innovating new means of production. He is also revolutionary in the choice of subject and its
meaning. Secondly, while Bourdieu is correct in seeing the emergent organisations of art as a new anomie (that is, a new narrowing of the sphere of control by the collective consciousness), he has failed to explore the ways in which this artistic de-regulation both reflected and represented the economic anomie of the new consumer industries (Durkheim, 1952:254-8).

Bourdieu is right that Manet and Impressionism have to be understood in terms of positions taken up within the autonomous field, and in part as an movement of renewal springing from a critical response to an older, established generation (in this case, of Realists). He just doesn't carry this far enough.

In other words, if Realism had a rural subject, Impressionism had an urban focus. If Realism depicted work, Impressionism depicted leisure. But leisure now - unlike seventeenth century Dutch painting - is marked unmistakeably by high capitalism and its transformation of everyday life. Consequently Impressionism enters into the historical moment of organised commercial culture, in order to produce from it the general, or to use Baudelaire's more familiar words "La modernité, c'est le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent, la moitié de l'art dont l'autre moitié est l'éternel et l'immuable" (cited in Frisby, 1985:14). It captures that moment in which classes begin to mix in a new urban setting and in which sociability bursts out of the bounds of family and Church.

Bourdieu's reading of Manet and the genesis of the modern avant-garde is the dominant modernist one. It stresses the formal dimension of Manet's work, explaining his artistic rupture precisely by his mastery of the whole field (that is, the reworking of the old). Thus, just as Heisenberg and Bohr spearheaded new paradigms, Manet is viewed as a professional, whose painterly concerns sprung from the new paradigm emerging with the crisis of academic authority. The crisis itself is created by an
unprecedented change: a small number of authorised painters in Paris became engulfed by a flood of painters trying to live off art. (One historical study has revealed that 3,000 painters lived in Paris by 1863 with 200,000 reputable canvases presented to the Salon jury each year (Whites, 1965: 83)). In tones tellingly close to Durkheim's (materialist) explanation of the new division of labour of capitalism as the consequence of increased population, Bourdieu situates the birth of modernism in the new division of artistic labour. From now on there will be a restricted field with appeal to the educated viewer, ring-fenced within an expanded field, containing both bourgeois best-selling art (Horace Vernet etc.) and social art, for example that of Courbet, Ribot. The aesthetic disposition of the educated public creates the "fresh eye" that supports a new world. For this reason Bourdieu suggests that contemporary critics utterly misconceived the projects of both Manet and Whistler when they insisted on reading narratives into paintings such as Manet's The Absinthe Drinker or Whistler's Girl in White. Manet created, says Bourdieu "the unbearable lack of meaning" (1993a:249) in which there is a break with the readability of myth or the old history-centred painting. Contemporary critics refused to understand that the paintings of both Manet and Whistler, in Bourdieu's view, were principally concerned with modes of representation, that is, with the initiation of a break from Renaissance perspective and objectivism, in order to stress, by means of optical "effects", the subjective ordering of the perception of the outside world. For the academic painters' depiction of the ideal, of a set of public values, had now disappeared. Where previously art had (as in the medieval world) been a kind of comic strip, available for everyone and reinforcing political-moral values, now its underlying unity beneath its diversity of subject was its form. The purest expression of this is the ideology of aestheticism in which beauty for
beauty's sake becomes the complement of work for work's sake (1971:1373).

The artistic revolutionaries' position-taking is also supported by the new material structures of the field. The new paradigm is grounded on the market-price and on the critic-dealer system. On this structural terrain artists designated themselves as beings despised and rejected of men, sensing, like Flaubert, that "the blood of Christ quickens in us" (quoted, Grana, 1964:125). In brief, this conception of artistic ideology is Bourdieu's equivalent to Foucault's category of "author".

Bourdieu's formalist interpretation of Manet does have some resonance. It is immediately clear by seeing, amongst Impressionists, a Realist painting such as Sèges's En Pays Chartrain (1884) how much the abandonment of perspective and naturalistic colour-values, and the spontaneity of sketchy brushstrokes have subsequently become routine. Despite this, my view is that Bourdieu's own historical genesis of Manet and anomie is in itself insufficiently historical. In drawing on Durkheim's analysis of anomie in The Division of Labour, Bourdieu discovers that the redivision of the artistic field creates a differentiation so wide between commercial artists and the avant-garde that these seem almost like different species, afterwards highlighted by the late-nineteenth century segmentation between "high-brow" and "low-brow" taste.

But this subsequent problematic should not be used to impose a classification of the events of Manet's life from 1850s until the 1880s. Bourdieu's interpretative mapping of the field of visual arts at this point is itself sometimes weakened by the same binary opposition between form and function that he wants to explore as an ideological classification. Rather, Manet in particular and the Impressionists in general failed to gain a public understanding of their work because they wanted to do things which were often the work of popular genres. They were exploring
the new set of social relations. To put it at its most bland, painting, for them, needed a new iconography. This is concerned with the nature of modern existence, and especially with the experience of the "new social strata" whose entry into the spectacular arena of modern consumption was being initiated.

Bohemia and the artistic field.

Manet and later, the Impressionists, were inhabitants of the new world of bohemia. Bohemian cultural production became fused with the various secular cultures of this-worldly rejection founded under the impact of Romanticism, such as the 1830s Suicide Club (Grana: 1964:79-80).

The bohemian world, as we have seen, reversed the rigorous control over the senses that the pursuit of profit demanded and mocked the valorisation of the ruling minority's culture, now totally intertwined with money. To this enclave gravitated those artists who identified with the marginal groups that were excluded from Louis-Napoleon's society. Amongst them were flaneurs such as Manet, whose interest in exploring the new signs of the city and the underworld of modernity transcended the more limited perspectives of dandyism. Both Baudelaire and Manet broke out from the world of the aristocratic salon and the anglicised bourgeois order to a concern with modern society that combined both a scientific, taxonomic and an artistic interest in social relations.

The bohemian public sphere of the metropolis had to be constantly renewed because it was also only a fragmentary period in the life of each artistic group. As Bourdieu suggests, choice of a bohemian existence is chronologically linked to the "indeterminacy" of the young, overshadowed as these are by consecrated artists with their reputations made. The intense experience of powerlessness of the young corresponded to their repudiation of the market. As they became older, a combination of the adoption of a professional identity and the impact of greater economic
needs as they acquired wives, mistresses and children, provoked an accommodation to the market. Bourdieu notes that this period of maturity was typically marked by a more ascetic work-discipline in a pale reflection of the vocational exigencies and specialisation demanded outside bohemia by the market. Corroboration for this can also be found in the regularity and frequency of the output of these painters (Whites, 1965: ch. 4). Such a work-ethic is again often to be understood in terms of a social habitus derived from the dominant class.

This process was completed in the Impressionist world by the 1880s. By this time the painters were getting older but, more importantly, they had been repudiated by a new unconsecrated avant-garde, the Symbolists. Labelling the Impressionists collectively as "ouvriers" in 1880, the latter founded their precarious artistic existence on the inner experience of the isolated self (Gamboni, 1989: 52). Indeed, the group ethos of the Impressionists may have been particularly strong because the art-world was in a process of restructuring after the collapse of the academic system but before the extension of the dealer system made paintings into an ordinary commodity (signalled by Durand-Ruel's first mass purchase of low-priced Manets in 1870) (Hamilton: 155). Thus the anonymous cooperative world of Impressionism's "Society of Indépendents" represents this transitional "time of the societies" within the public sphere, before the economic impact of the dealer-collectors broke up this guild-like solidarity (Gamboni, 1989: 51). In this connection, it is illuminating that the Impressionists took on the collective title "les intransigeants" in the 1870s, following the attack by Spanish anarchists on the Spanish Government. Mallarme's comment on the simplification of visual principles inherent in the movement aligns it interestingly with the nature of popular artistic motifs as "the eyes of the "energetic modern worker"."

(Eisenman, 1992: 193).
Bourdieu asks us to deconstruct the artistic text by supplementing the classic Marxist and psychoanalytic approaches with studies in the art-Institution itself. Schematically, then, analysis of the Impressionists should include the following dimensions:

(1) the artists' position in the cultural field (restricted or expanded (commercial) production), especially the position-taking in which the artist engages with others of his generation. This has the effect of separating him or herself from the older generation of the avant-garde. In terms of Manet and Impressionism, these positions vary, reflecting Manet's earlier date of birth and his consequent stronger orientation to the Salon, to which he always sent his paintings. The Impressionists, however, sought independent means of exhibiting their work in the Second Empire, both in the state Salon des Refusés and beyond the auspices of the state. Here it is worth recalling the strength of hostility to these painters in the nineteenth-century (Hamilton, 1954:1), which must surely be linked to the subterranean culture through which they sought to sustain their deviance.

(2) the position in terms of class or class fraction. In this respect, the Impressionists were a mixed group: Manet, who was the son of a magistrate and whose mother's father had been a powerful diplomat, possessed the habitus closest of all the artists to the haute bourgeoisie; Degas was the son of the owner of a finance house whose business went bankrupt in this period - which did not prevent him acquiring a substantial inheritance; Monet was the son of a successful shop-keeper and Renoir was the child of a tailor and a laundress, - the only working-class member of the group. Bazille and Sisley are described as middle class, as - later - was Cézanne, whose father was a small tradesman and later a banker; Pissarro, like Monet, had lower middle class origins (Whites, 1965:112).

(3) the trajectory of the family within the class from which they come.
For example, Mallarmé's turn to symbolism is understood as a bitter concern for pure art that chimes in with the experience of the declining aristocracy and their powerlessness to control economic events (1993a:57).

(4) the position of the artist within the family: the psychoanalytic dimension, as presented in detail in Sartre's *The Family Idiot*.

This method allows Bourdieu to explore the artists' social relations, especially his/her cultural authority - his distinctive power and its unanticipated material benefits. It contrasts with the residual idealism of the current author debate. But it has omissions that I shall now clarify.

I want to argue *against* this interpretation of Manet's art as a formalist modernism. The recent turnabout in Manet studies has cast doubt on this as have new studies of Impressionism. However before I introduce this point, I want to refer briefly to Realism: indeed Bourdieu himself recommends that we consider the ideas shared in common and not just the points of differentiation between two styles.

**Realism**

It has now become clearer what distinguishes Impressionism from Realism (including as Impressionist both pure landscapes and the scenes of modern life) but in order to separate the two it is necessary to see the break made by the most powerful Realists with academic painting.

Bourdieu writes little about Realism, merely, as we have seen, distinguishing the first, Realist moment of proletaroid intellectuals from the second bohemia of Baudelaire, Flaubert and Manet, which he sees as the cradle of modernism. Within this, he notes the persistence of a Realist group of "proletaroid intellectuals" within the second bohemia (Bourdieu, 1992:92) led by its theoretician, Champfleury, and including Courbet, Bonvin and Gautier among its members (1992:110). The Realist school persisted into the 1870s and 80s, at which point they took the title
There were major differences within the Realist school at the level of cultural politics, for example between the uncompromisingly oppositional art of Courbet and the State-commissioned works of the many Realists who were close to propaganda in their depictions - Bonhomme's portrayals of the extraordinary Factories at Le Creusot or the Workshop with Mechanical Sieves at the Factory of La Vieille Montagne with their contented workers (Weisberg, 1980: 74 and 76). But in general, Realists produced paintings that had an uneasy tension between their depiction of the nation as undergoing major change and their sympathetic depiction of the victims of that change: see for example the work of Meissonnier, Antoine Leleux and Teissert, all of whom showed in the Realist Salon of 1850-1. In fact, both Realism and Manet's circle constituted a break with the academy, but they possessed different responses to capitalist modernity. In understanding this, it is necessary to follow Bourdieu's own method for art and literature more comprehensively than he himself does in his essay on Manet.

The Realists broke with the supremacy of myth and history painting in the academic tradition so as to paint lower-class subjects, especially peasants and the rural bourgeoisie. They relied upon methods that used sketches or painting in "plein air", cut off from the usual conventions of the studio and often drawing on popular images (Schapiro, 1978: 49-53, Weisberg: 6-7). Courbet especially represented the nature of rural life and work to very diverse groups, from the metropolitan crowds of all classes for the annual Salons to rural fair-goers (Frascina et al p 78-9, Clark, 1982a: 85). His subjects were derived particularly from the social conflicts that came to their peak in the 1848 February revolution and which permeated his later work. Such tensions produced a crisis in the

---

4 A recent writer on realism, Weisberg, regards the difference between the two as elusive (Weisberg, pp16-18)
country as small landowners became dispossessed by usurious capitalists. Courbet's painting, already alive to traditional poverty and to the demanding rhythms of agricultural labour, began to reveal the strange paradox of charity being given by beggars to starving peasants, or to highlight the reappearance of Jews as convenient scapegoats in the country areas by the identification of himself as an artist with the wandering Jew. Bourdieu's historical periodisation of bohemia should not obscure the fact that Courbet's painting continued throughout that point of "rupture" of the nomos which is dated with Manet.

Millet, despite his competence with classical conventions, also developed a new iconography of modern life. Taking his family from the Paris cholera scare in the 1830s, Millet settled in Barbizon, a village in the first open arable land beyond the forest of Fontainebleau. Here his painting took on a progressively starker portrayal of images of country labourers, displacing the organicist illusions of the pastoral code with its basically harmonious character of rural life. There is a world of difference between the landscapes of Theodore Rousseau, with their images of a nurturing and healing nature and the Realism of Millet. Predictably, the reviews of his most significant paintings of rural work (Sowing, The Haymakers Resting, Hagar and Ruth in the Desert, Women Gathering Faggots, The Diggers) make it clear that the dominant class did not find Millet's representations of rural life to its taste. In the 1850s, Millet was considered increasingly troublesome, even, like Courbet, a socialist (Clark, 1982b:81.

Daumier should also be mentioned at this point, in terms of his development of an art of satire and political caricature. Especially in his drawings, he delineated the marginal groups of wanderers and the hunted performers known as "saltimbanques", who transgressed the rigid controls of public entertainment of 1853 by singing at rural fairs and in the poorest
inner-city districts of Paris.

Thus it was not the art commissioned by the Bureau des Beaux Arts that was important in the period after the 1848 revolution. Rather, it was the art of more overtly reactionary painters like Millet, whose experience led them to create public painting out of their private world.

As Clark points out:

Millet’s subject-matter became dangerous, the one bone left in the gullet of the Empire, the one class not to get its pickings from the economic boom (Clark, 1982b:81).

In being positioned close to those criminalised by the new laws against wood-gathering, who were passing from peasantry to an impoverished semi-proletarianised existence, Millet was able to draw on a series of motifs from Michaelangelo and Renaissance art in a new way. Remarking that "this "fus[ed] traditional forms with obdurate unlikely subject-matter" (1982b:122), Clark notes the distinctiveness of this ability:

How strange an ability this is! Or perhaps it is stranger that no other artist had it, and that art in the nineteenth century showed everything of modern life except those who lived it. [...] Daumier and Millet [...] are in improbable contact with the commonplace (1982b:122).

A recent Foucauldian study has questioned the distinctive anti-bourgeois character of Millet’s painting and thus implicitly challenged the interpretation above (Green, 1990). Nicholas Green has argued that Barbizon artists aided the development of "nature tourism", which had its origins in the area in the 1840s. No doubt, but there was a telling time-gap between the key works of Millet from 1846 to the mid 1850s and the development of an artists’ colony in the 1860s, along with the influx of urban bourgeois to take up residence or commute to the area. Indeed, Green himself shows that the population remained the same between 1846-
56 (1990: 296 and 305). There is a more crucial point at stake. As Marx suggested, there has always been a Romantic anti-urban response to bourgeois society. However, the simplistic attempt on the part of Foucauldians to produce a single metropolitan vision - a uni-dimensional ruralism - begs too many pressing historical questions concerning the nature of the underlying alignments involved. For the moment of the 1840s, it is clear that the discontents of the Louis-Philippe monarchy and its financial aristocracy produced a composite form of peasant and bourgeois protest which surfaced in the February Revolution but spectacularly decomposed after. Schapiro (1978) has shown that the movement of Realism associated with Courbet, Champfleury, Buchon and Dupont had a quite different set of spectators (including peasants) and a quite different set of sources from later movements of art. An interest in arts outside the high academic tradition led these professional painters to immerse themselves with naive cultures, deriving both from folk-songs and from the long tradition of anti-clerical anti-feudal popular protest found in cheap engravings. Within their art, images of work played a crucial radical political role. As Schapiro pointed out:

> In the forties and fifties, the mere representation of labour on the scale of the *Stone-breakers* and *Knife-grinders* was politically suggestive (1978: 51).

To summarise: I am arguing that within Realism there had emerged a vital break with academic conventions that is uncharted by Bourdieu: the flouting of the dominance of history painting so as to engage with the painting of modern life. This art was still constrained by the rules, juries and exhibitions of the Salon. Manet's painting was a vital step in the development that led to the ending of the academic monopoly. But it was not because he instituted a revolution at the level of form alone. Rather it was because he also continued the Realists' fascination with contemporary
experience, although now, like Baudelaire who mediated between the two
bohemias, the friend of both Daumier and Manet, there was to be a turn to
the "artificiality" of the city.

Manet - and later the Impressionists - are the first subculture to be
concerned with the expansion of the commodity into the market for
personal needs, which Marx calls "Department II". In particular,
Impressionism was interested in depicting the new leisure-pleasure
economy, the "colonisation of everyday life" with sites of "spectacular
consumption" [Clark, 1985:p.9). The 1850s was not the first time at which
consumption had become fashionable for the bourgeoisie. The Orléanist
monarchy had also seen the emergence of promenades along the
boulevards, the arcades and chic shopping. However this first
metropolitan gaze had gone hand-in-hand with an artistic preference for
landscape; consumption and environmental anxieties about disease
preoccupied an urban stratum that assuaged its anxieties with the suburb,
the country house and the "spectacle of nature". Green is right when he
argues that:

It was in and through the type of modern urbanism that crystallised
in the 1830s and 1840s' Paris that the conditions for a new discourse
on nature were laid down. The spectacle of nature weaves together
those urban conditions and their ideological readings of space with
the range of practices - rural visits and excursions, the diorama,
country houses - through which they were played out
(Green, 1990:5).

Manet and the Impressionists possessed a metropolitan gaze as well,
but one that was turned inward on the city itself, and on the distinctive
institutions of that re-made popular culture of the Second Empire. He
stressed that a poet should always "avoid those places where the rich and
joyous congregate and should feel drawn to everything "feeble, destitute,
orphaned and abandoned" (cited in Grana: 136). The Impressionists also were pulled to the "paradis artificiel" of the metropolis with its multiple and mysterious cultures of existence re-ordered by capitalism and money.

Drawing on such new subjects and breaking with the old iconographies of revolution was the only feasible strategy when the threat of censorship and jail awaited those who crossed permissable limits in the Second Empire. Nor was the threat an empty one: Manet's friend Richepin was jailed for satirical literature which Manet himself had illustrated (Kasl, 1985:50).

The new interest in sites of spectacular consumption is epitomised in the ballets, the music at the Tuileries, the bar at the Folies Bergères, the newly-opened cafés- concerts, the racecourses and the expanding seaside resorts. Rosalind Williams has described these untraditional social relations as creating a democratisation of luxury. Many more people, she writes, were to experiment with discretionary consumption, to become familiar with its intellectual and sensual pleasures and with its consequences of envy, vanity and ennui ...the consumer revolution becomes far more than a rise in economic statistics or available goods. It is more like the Copernican revolution, the overthrow of one world picture by another; the replacement of the cramped, heliocentric world of consumption by a vast, centreless universe (Williams, 1982: 57).

Bourdieu raids Durkheim on anomie to describe the new painting of Manet, but he has perhaps overlooked in this context Durkheim's use of anomie as a deregulation of traditional lifestyles with new consumption patterns. He himself has ignored how close to Marx is Durkheim's interest in the anomie created by new markets. For it is also anomie that is

---

5 See Sue's *Mysteries of London*, and also the continued resonance of this title, both in the radical work of Reynolds on London and Lippard's dime novels set in Chicago (Denning, 1987: 101-3).
a consequence of the commodity battering down all resistance to it (Marx, nd: 53). In other words, it is not enough to describe Louis-Napoleon's regime as profits without precedents (as Bourdieu does), for it was also associated with two interlinked phenomena: the revolution in consumption and the emergence of the department store. Oddly, although Durkheim had characterised modernity as an epoch in which desire in general is loosened from its restraints, this theme is also strangely absent in Bourdieu. And yet artists' acquisition of freedom had surely also exposed them to the effects of both that anomie and to the "cold wind of egoism" of which Durkheim wrote that it "freezes their hearts and weakens their spirits" (quoted, Lukes: 195), and to which he linked the high rate of suicide among "men of letters", second only to those for entrepreneurs. Marx had explained how artists were unusual in having to create a need for artistic meaning, ie to create the demand for the goods they produce (1973:92). Durkheim is surely right about the consequences:

"Now he may assume to have the whole world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement?" (1989: 255-6) "Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned, but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn becomes reality.... This very lack of organisation characterising our economic condition throws the door open to every sort of adventure...


Nor can it be presumed that the bohemian rejection of commercialism entirely protected artists themselves from the effects of the expanded consumption of art, with the world market centred on Paris. Bourdieu fails to consider precisely how the anomie of art was also tied to this new leisure-pleasure economy, in turn linked by Durkheim to his account of anomie:

A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless

It is this thirst that the painters were also to investigate.

The rise of the department store, new life-styles and Impressionism.

The department store that arose in Paris, New York and London, like the 1867 and later Expositions, were the show-cases of international trade and colonialism (see Miller, 1981:ch.2; Williams, 1982:62). They collected together the ingredients of new life-styles in an exotic-chaotic style (Williams, 1982:69) which catered to "the theatre of dreams" (Ferguson, 1990:68). Ancestors of today's glitterati, the customers discovered that the new mass-consumption:

displayed a novel and crucial juxtaposition of imagination and merchandise, of dreams and commerce, of collective consciousness and economic fact. In mass consumption the needs of the imagination play as large a role as the needs of the body. Both are exploited by commerce, which appeals to consumers by inviting them into a fantasy world of pleasure, comfort and amusement (Williams, 1982:12).

By the 1880s, Paris was to become the pioneer city of the new visual idiom of public imagination, the advertising poster (Varnedoe and Gopnik, 1990). This extraordinary change in the circulation of commodities created by the increased dependence on the universal market, went hand-in-hand with the needs of factory-owners for non-traditional retailing outlets such as Samaritaine (1869), or Bon Marché, by 1877 the world's biggest trading establishment, which could respond with the coaxing of demand by the proprietor.

The new form of shop was marked by the standardisation of prices, and the loss of the personal dimension expressed in haggling. It created shopping as a form of leisured search for the ultimate dream-commodity, since it ended the traditional obligation to buy on entry. The great shops
created their own worlds. Idealised graphic images of the act of consumption of their clothes, food and other goods diffused images of bourgeois family life on an unprecedented scale. Yet, paradoxically:

"Consumption itself became a substitute for being bourgeois" (Miller, 1981: 184-5) Moreover, the rhythm of buying was now increasingly orchestrated by the shops' own timescale of seasons and cultural events. A whole cycle of communal meals, Christmas parties and musical soirées was initiated in these semi-public semi-private spaces. The department stores were even intricately linked to new leisure activities, such as cycling, via the sale of equipment, as well as originating their own new pathology, kleptomania (Miller, 1981:201).

I want to argue, following Clark, that Impressionism was the imaginative representation of the new "urban idylls" that had thus emerged for the first time in Paris, the city of modernity. In this respect, the key aspect of Impressionism is its unmasking of the character of urban experience. Unlike Realism, it did not explore the world of work (a powerful exception is Monet's *Les Déchargeurs de Charbon* (1875). So Monet painted the industrial area of suburban Argenteuil but only under snow, disguised, while his portrayals of the recently-constructed Gare St Lazare show *trains but no drivers*. However, as we shall see, it was a form of painting that was concerned with the oblique impact of industry on the new rural sites of hectic weekend amusement. And in the paintings of Manet and Degas, especially, some of the conflicts and tensions of modernity are laid bare.

Impressionism's depiction of the bourgeoisie at leisure also encapsulates some of the aspirations towards free time of the working-class. The new kinds of mass market goods (clothes, holidays, etc.) were luxuries and adornments that in themselves expressed aesthetic needs and which should be seen as shared by both bourgeoisie and working-class.
Working-class culture was founded on a double negation, provoking the desire to escape work as the degradation of labour but also to assert, against dominant culture, the dignity of labour. As Green puts it:

"Dressing, speaking, thinking not like waged labour was paradoxically integral to "being" working class" (Green (paraphrasing J. Ranciere's La Nuit des Prolétaires), 1990:7) Impressionism, then, is a focal point for exploring the rise of the "Society of the spectacle", that is, a qualitative leap forward in consumption in which images or visual depictions have a crucial role to play. The Situationists in the 1960s explored the ways in which a popular culture intertwined with consumption had been fostered by the newer media:

The spectacle is the moment when the commodity has achieved the total occupation of social life ...the world one sees is its world. [...] At this point in the "second industrial revolution", alienated consumption becomes for the masses a supplementary duty to alienated production (Debord, para. 42).

Impressionism is the first register of the allurements of the new mass production and the money-economy.

I want to emphasise that in the unprecedented social relations of modernity, Impressionism was not simply relaying bourgeois discourses or ideologies about leisure. But nor was it wholly negative towards urban modernity, as so many modernist artists were to become by the 1890s ⁶. I suggest rather that Impressionism was an ironical and critical discourse, not least through its juxtaposition of the old with new and ugly modern objects so as to undermine any simple romantic myths, for example, those of the countryside. More importantly, I want to accept that in Manet

⁶ In this sense we might compare Impressionism with the eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers such as Goethe and Marx, who develop a dialectical view of modernity, seeing it as possessing positive and negative elements (Berman, 1983).
especially there is a kind of demystifying modernism. This has the effect of accentuating social contradictions. In other words, the role of flaneur that Manet adopts makes him into an active figure, unmasking the "mysteries of the city". In contrast, Bourdieu's view of Manet's practice as an artist restricts his transformative impact to that of innovation in form.

I am anxious about Bourdieu's polarisation of kitsch (or popular culture) and art. The art of the academy had obtained a popular audience as well as an elite one, even if the academic hierarchy of artistic genres represented the last flourish of a feudal world-view (Whites, 1965:79-80). However ambivalent his ultimate stance towards the fetishism of (high) culture, I think Bourdieu reads back into Impressionism the total detachment from the culture industry which was the product of a later period. This dates particularly from the 1880s following the sacralisation of high culture (Levine, 1988:132). Bourdieu reifies and imposes an over-rigid classification on a fluid field. Instead, I prefer the idea of seeing Impressionism rather as a "subculture of resistance", which shared the modernists' initial interest in a "brokerage between high and low", especially those forms of popular entertainment and leisure, which were the only areas left unconstrained in a repressed social order (Crow, 1985:258). It is the fascination of the Impressionists with the new popular cultures emerging in the 1850s which alone explains why Manet made drawings from the photographs of *nudes*, at that time seen as pornographic (Clay, 1985:30). Only this absorption can explain why he and his friends frequented and painted the café-concerts where working-class

---

7In this context, it is noteworthy that Impressionists first appeared as the *Anonymous Society of Painters, Sculptors and Engravers, etc.* in an exhibition at the studios of the photographer, Nadar - and photography was certainly not canonised (Eisenman, 1992:189).

8Crow argues that the "forced marginalisation of the artistic vocation" (1985:244) implicit in the 1852 slogan "l'art pour l'art" should not veil the fact that in the Second Empire leisure channelled energies turned from the banned public sphere and from the aridity of official art.
women sung contemporary songs, often with an insouciance and subversive humour that caused the censor to swoop. Manet's impulse to mix class signifiers, by imitating the speech and walk of Parisian urchins shows this receptivity quite starkly, too, however unsustained and self-conscious (Crow, 1985:248). The same desire both to explore scientifically and to celebrate vitality can explain Degas's attraction to the ballet, which - although once a court art - had the place in Paris of the 1860s of disco-dancing now.

In what ways did the Impressionists reveal the meaning of modernity? I shall chart the subjects they chose and then discuss the distinctive character of their representations. Partly because of constraints of space, I shall focus on questions of content, but I do not want to deny Bourdieu's argument that there were massive changes in technique, including the abandonment of the Renaissance use of perspective. The artistic rupture created by Manet certainly existed, but it occurred because he developed a way of showing together the objective outer world of the metropolis and the inner world through which it was experienced (Hanson, 1977: 134; Shiff, 1992;187). In this new fusion, Manet and the Impressionists transcended the classifications of the period: they combined elements of Realism - up to then restricted to the representation of lower class life - and symbolism - seen at that date as the images of dreams (Hanson, 1977:134)

Street fashion

The Impressionists did not paint Parisian department stores. Yet it is the shops' positive view of consumption as a kind of permanent fair that also emerges in their view of the fashionable middle class strolling through the urban parks, the cafes and out in the new boulevards:

See for eg Caillebotte's Rue de Paris, Temps de Pluie, (1877), Renoir's Les Parapluies (1881-6). Manet's The World Fair of 1867 is indicative of his
response to urban crowds, those spaces where the "I" confronts the "Not-I" (Clay).

The Parks

Louis-Napoleon ordered new green places, partly for their own sake, partly for their political expediency as a safety-valve. "Nature" marched hand-in-hand with modern industry. The new parks were literally man-made; the Buttes Chaumont were converted from the old place of execution into a terrain of controlled urban walks and family entertainment; a fake mountainous landscape was arranged with a concrete-based lake, waterfalls and a grotto with fake stalactites in 1867. The much-extended Bois de Boulogne had an ersatz "American savannah" and "mountains and valleys from Switzerland", lawns, an artificial lake fed by new artesian wells and 400,000 new trees (Herbert, 1988: 145).

It is this socially-constructed nature reserve in the city that is the scene of many Impressionist paintings, from Manet's 1862 Concert in the Tuileries, to Berthe Morisot's Summer's Day (1879), Monet's Le Parc Monceau (1878) and various representations of chic picnics from Manet's bizarre Déjeuner sur l'Herbe to Monet's similarly-titled elegant and organised occasion (1865-6). Renoir's Skaters in the Bois de Boulogne (1868) and his The Swing (1877), are portrayals of unselfconsciously alluring young women in this urban pastoral. Through these park portrayals, Renoir provided utopian images which he codified into a wider critique of academic painting and rationalised industry in his ideas for a "Society of Irregulars". Many of his paintings are representations of sociability and a joyful sensuality which fit with the wish-fulfilments of popular culture, see, for example, his Dance at the Moulin de la Galette (1876).

The Café-Concerts
Just as London developed a vibrant music-hall culture after the Chartist 1848, Paris had its commercial bars and cafés where working-class singers, especially women, performed to a crowd of men or couples, some desultory in their interest in the singer, some in rapt attention. Their number grew from perhaps two dozen in 1860 to nearly 200 in the 80s (Herbert, 1988:82). Clark has shown that while this popular performance was not part of the old artisan tavern society that championed socialism in 1848, it was still, coarse and vigorous, with lyrics that fell foul of the political proprieties or the bourgeois sexual delicacies of the Second Empire (Clark, 1985:306-310). Over 2,200 cafés and café-concerts were closed by the anti-Commune junta, which attributed considerable power to the oppositional democratic ideas of the singers (Herbert, 1988:87).

The cafés-concerts were mixed in their customers, in ways that were still strangely new. They contained not just plebeian prostitutes, the "proletaire d'amour", like the absinthe drinker painted by Degas (Absinthe, 1876), but also "counter-jumpers" (the respectable shop assistants) and clerks, both groups being members of "the new social strata" or petty-bourgeoisie. A sizeable minority of observant members of the bourgeoisie also broke with the conventions of good society to go, aloof from each other in their collective pursuit of urban authenticity (Herbert, 1988:91). The paintings of the cafés emphasised the directness, sensuality and break with decorum that prevailed, stressing the lack of distance between the half-dressed performers and the audience through the use of non-Western framing devices and collapsed space (See Manet's Café- Concert (1878), Degas's The Glove (1878), and Aux Ambassadeurs (1877)).

Race-Tracks

Longchamps, in the Bois de Boulogne, was built in the last third of the century and racing became a key pleasure site of modernity, not just among the returned aristocrats but among the new entrepreneurs and
industrialists. It was an especially Anglicised sport (Le Jockey Club etc,) which was the counterpart in leisure of the English investment of capital into the rail network and much new industry. This also provoked the attention of Manet and especially Degas, whose experimental painting of racehorses and their jockeys developed a formal innovativeness that was particularly attuned to the presentation of speed and of the competition: "[Degas's] jockeys" writes Herbert

are lurid entertainers who jostle one another in dense packs ... they prepare for the competition which Degas's society said was the essence of progress. His genius is to have created pictures that render the strains that underlay this "progress''. Instead of a whole body, or a whole scene, with its traditional unities, we are parts. We have to understand the relationship between them and this reconstruction becomes our mode of comprehension."...Degas's dynamism with its choppy rhythms and abrupt shifts look forward to the twentieth century's thirst for motion (1988:169-170).

Boating

The countryside was a place of retreat if even only for a day. As I have already hinted, the landscape genre itself is a product of bourgeois culture, and indeed our ideas about the countryside are shaped by urban realities: "it is the material and cultural fabric of the metropolis which is seen to set the terms for the social production of the countryside." (Green:11). In other words, while of course rural life predated industrial capitalism, the urban bourgeoisie created a whole new way of seeing the countryside.

The Impressionists helped to crystallise and diffuse this new structure of feeling. They painted in the new down-river beauty spots that spawned artists' colonies as the vanguard of weekend trippers, villages such as Chatou, Croissy, Bougival (La Grenouillère), or the small industrial town also on the Seine, Argenteuil, now accessible by rail for the petty-
bourgeoisie. In terms of technique, these depictions of reflections and the way light releases the prismatic potential of water were as extraordinary as Turner's earlier Impressionist treatment of seas in England (see, eg both Monet's and Renoir's paintings of *Sailboats at Argenteuil* (1874). But perhaps just as epoch-making was the break with the elitism of the romantic gaze and with the disdainful appeal to high culture implicit in patrician derision of popular enjoyments. Instead Manet, Pissarro and Seurat register, but only obliquely, the imposition of new labour-processes and an enhanced time discipline by their inclusion of images of factory chimneys. In Manet especially, the tensions of the brief weekend are evident even in the midst of pleasure, see for example his touchingly over-dressed and anxious young Parisienne, with her partner on an outing in a hired boat (*Argenteuil, Les Canotiers*, 1874). Seurat's juxtaposition of an industrial landscape with stiff youths, half-dressed in work-clothes, provides the clearest contrast between industrial life and the brief moments of leisure. (*Une Baignade à Asnières*, 1883-4)

**The Holiday**

The modern institution of the seaside holiday with its ersatz architecture appears in many of the Impressionists' paintings. The town is imported, so to speak, along with the Parisian holiday-makers in their decorous fashions, Degas clarifies the whole social base of bourgeois fashion and, incidentally, the academic convention of the nude by revealing in one Gauguin-like study, the unaffected sensuality of country girls swimming naked (*Peasant Girls Bathing in the Sea at Dusk*, 1875-6). We have to understand then, an opposition between their naked spontaneity and the stiff formality of the urban bourgeois visitors in his other paintings of the beach, in which a utopian impulse makes the girls the site of hopes to shed the constraints of bourgeois lives. Manet in Normandy also simultaneously explored new subjects with a new economical and direct
style. Shifting from his stereotyped "romantic gaze" - fishing boats, moonlit skies, beaches with exotic local fishermen - he experimented with sketchily-painted family groups on the beach in town-clothes, shown pursuing their rituals of pleasure: the whole visitors' substructure discreetly hidden.

It is perhaps Monet who most clearly opened up an ironic perspective on the new social relations of the seaside. His numerous holiday paintings coolly record the stiff separation of these bourgeois family members, the emblems of nationality in the flags everywhere, penetrating and intermingling with the sought-for "nature", the casino eclipsing the church in his view of the promenade at St. Adresse, as though to highlight the arbitrary fortunes created by the new speculative commercial ventures. Within such an ironic mode, from the 1860s to the mid 1870s, Impressionism created the seaside for its subject:

[The] world of vacation hedonism ... Morisot shared with Manet, Monet and Renoir the invention of a colouristic language that rose from the study of leisure and outdoors light, those paired circumstances that proved so vital to early modern art (Herbert:284)

It was only at the end of his life that Monet came to paint the depopulated landscapes of the Normandy coast, along with his turn to water-lilies, and to stress in these beach scenes the ravaging destruction of an angry sea. It is as though there was now a gulf between nature and the human world, that was lacking before.

Ballet

The retrieval of ballet from its degraded status after the 1789 Revolution was a late nineteenth century invention. Ballet was thus a more unstable art-form than it is now. This was because of the association between the disclosed legs (i.e. the uninhibited sexuality) and the vitality of the dancers which linked them to the lower classes. When Morisot,
Renoir, Cassatt and Degas painted the ballet, they were displaying a world of working-class performers. Degas dedicated half of his whole output to studies of dancers. He was particularly concerned to unmask the real social relations of the girl workers, who often came from the poorest part of Paris, and whose labour might be the support of a whole family. He shows them not just in the public view, but also in rehearsal, looking exhausted as they sit waiting around. They often became prey to the predatory gaze of the bourgeois men, such as the Jockey Club members, who were prepared to transgress respectability by going into the backstage world. The girls are often with their mothers whose role appears to be to strike a good bargain for the girl in terms of marriage or lovers. It was only subsequently, in the late 1870s, that lower middle class girls entered ballet, and much later for girls with social or other capital.

This may explain the nature of Degas's portrayals of the dancers. Certainly he broke in a quite revolutionary way with the whole set of academic conventions for depicting women, and, especially, with the classical poses obligatory for the nude. A sculpted study of a woman shows her standing awkwardly examining her foot, a pastel represents a girl whose upper torso is bent double between her legs. Especially in his maquettes and his larger sculpture, Degas portrays his dancers taken unawares, poses in which the women's faces are often almost abstract, as though their main significance is their manual labour-power. Marx had described the mechanisation of assembly-line workers as producing a form of alienation: similarly, ballet for Degas leads to the robotisation of the dancers, their bodies disciplined into the repetitive patterns (Herbert: 128; Kracauer, 1975). Thus, on the one hand, in Degas's cynical materialism, race-horses and ballet-dancers are merely interchangeable instances of trained flesh. On the other hand, his admiration for their skill and grace is evident in his sculpture of a Petit Rat, The Little Fourteen-year-old.
Dancer. His sonnet to her acknowledges that she has produced a strange beauty from the mixture of ethnic groups and the poverty of the harshest urban areas. In this case, Degas's artistic honesty pushes him in directions at odds with the prevalent racism of class and ethnocentrism, attitudes with which he himself dabbled as is evident in his reading of Lombroso's criminology. Testimony of the latter are his pastels of delinquent boys at the law-courts, with the same Mongolian faces as the Little Dancer. 

Bridges

Finally, I want to stress how much we have lost the emblems of modernity in Impressionism which would have repelled their first public: the massive geometrical ironwork of Caillebotte's *Le Pont de l'Europe* (1876), for example, bravely takes up half the picture's space. Monet uses new bridges to destroy the romantic view of the pure country and the traditional character of rural pastimes. *The Railroad Bridge, Argenteuil*, (1873) and (1874), indicates this, being used to frame small leisure sailing boats. Rather than an unfortunate intrusion into the picturesque, the uncompromising concrete bridge and revolutionary communications implicit in the train it bears are revealed as the condition for the bourgeois leisure of yachting.

Manet as the Catalyst for Impressionism

As Bourdieu realises, Manet's career poses the question of formalism especially sharply. Yet the recent turnaround in Manet studies has balanced his revolutions in form with reappraisals of the meanings of his works.

Despite the brilliance of his typification of bohemia, Bourdieu understates its precise significance for Manet as the location of stigmatised groups. Manet painted various pictures of bohemians in his

---

*See the Exhibition of Degas Sculpture, Feb., 1994, Burrell Gallery, Glasgow.*
early work: *Les Saltimbanques* (drawing 1861), *Buveurs de l'Eau* (drawing, 1862) and *The Old Musician* (1862), *Gitane A La Cigarette* (1862). Further work has now shown that the artist did not just associate himself with bohemia as a refusal of the ascetic work ethic of the bourgeoisie. In fact Manet was valorising the image of gypsies in a quite oppositional manner, for gypsies had historically been associated with the stigma of outcasts, seen as Jews or their associates, child and animal thieves by the rural peasantry and pariahs by authorities (Brown, 1978:31). The gypsies who had encamped triumphantly on the Champs Elysées during the 1848 Revolution, had been recently evicted:

During the events of 1848, the saltimbanque fair that sprang up on the Champs Elysées ... was regarded as a metaphoric democratic city where everyone was accepted ... (1978:53).

Manet championed the gypsies as their quarters in Little Poland in Paris, shared by artists, were being transformed by reconstruction under Louis Napoleon. A strict penal code now condemned gypsies to be transported if they transgressed rules limiting performances to fairs (and to a minimum period of immigration) and restricting them to the boundaries of towns such as Paris (Brown, 1978:39, 41). Manet in *The Old Musician* identified the artist - or himself - with the old fiddler, a gypsy. In doing so, he aligned the life of the artist not with the idealised romantic figure that was the emergent stereotype of the gypsy, but with an illegal and degraded outsider, more like the older migrant workers of post-war Europe. Such transgressive Realism also linked the artist to the saltimbanque's tradition of socio-political satire and to the sensuality and female independence of gypsy women (Brown, 1978:444). In particular, *The Old Musician* (based on a Hungarian gypsy violinist) suggested Manet's admiration for the indomitable strength of the communities of migrant gypsies: *"The Old Musician"*s depiction of the gypsy/artist is probably a tangible indication of
the degree to which Manet himself has internalised feelings of marginality. (1978:525) [...] it is this "cool" quality that helps to define Manet's modernism" (1978:527).

Bourdieu refers to Couture's rejection of *The Absinthe Drinker*, quoting the hostility of Manet's teacher's to the muddy colours of this 1859 Salon exhibit. However, much more is at stake than this, since this image of a ragpicker is also Manet's self-portrait, that of the artist sifting through the materials he had collected. Manet's painting is a playful pastiche of Velasquez which deviates sharply from the current caricatures of this Parisian "type" to indicate the working-class need to get drunk. Manet's painting was "providing language in which to speak about the marginal parts of Second Empire society within the celebratory space of the Salon." (Burchardt-Lager, 1985:25)

It is possible just to read this as an early rebellion to be quickly supplanted by the pleasures of the elegant flâneur later on. Yet this underplays the continuity in Manet's liberal Republicanism, a radical position for the period. Manet's *Execution of Maximilian* (of 1867), of which the lithograph was censored, has been most convincingly interpreted as a critique of French colonial adventuring, since the Mexican Juarist army that killed the French puppet-ruler Maximilian has been depicted by Manet in uniforms made to resemble those of the French (Hanson, 1977:115-6). What is more, Manet's portrayals of *Civil War* and *The Barricade after the Commune of 1871* contained coded attacks on the MacMahon Presidency for the killing of Communards, not least those taking refuge in the Madeleine. It is commonly agreed that Manet's lithographer hid the stone on which they were done to avoid repression.

It is plausible that the same bitter critique led Manet to the various versions of *The Rue Mosnier Decked Out in Flags*. The earliest portrayal bleakly contrasts a man (a Communard?) crippled from war with the flags
of the State holiday ordered by MacMahon. The sobriety of official
celebration is possibly also hinted at, quite unlike the exuberance of a
working-class carnival (Kasl, 56-7). Finally, there is the (unfinished)
portrayal of the exile of a journalist, Oliver Paine, who was a liberal critic
of the Third Republican regime: the late date, 1881, reveals the
continuities in Manet's public concerns (Hanson). All these works invite a
re-evaluation of the painter. The portrait of the artist as an aestheticist
dandy is replaced by one who is by no means animated exclusively by
political concerns, but whose interest in contradiction and social tensions
discloses consistently radical interests (Hanson, 1977: 126).

Perhaps the best summary of Manet's response to the painting of
modern life is by Clark. He argues that the Impressionist circle (including
Manet) saw modern society as no longer about social classification, but
about freedom and individuals. But, in the 1860s and 1870s, their use of
irony permitted disclosure of the ambiguity of modernity, and especially of
the continued impact of class within the spectacle of consumption.

The most clearcut case for this view is the painting Olympia.
Contemporary critics were outraged by Manet's remake of the Venus of
Urbino by Titian. In a content analysis of the reviews, Clark revealed that
only six of these saw the picture as about class and prostitution. Instead,
the reviews deplored the omen of the morgue she was thought to
represent, the dirty, coal colour of her outline, her indiarubber skin, her
ugliness.

Clark suggests that what the critics repudiated was a figure who
refused to stay in a known and familiar place as did the conventional
courtesan or the mistress; instead, Olympia is emblematic of the vast army
of around 120,000 prostitutes in Paris, many of whom were unregistered
(1984:105). He reads money as liberating the working-class girl from
submission to her clients. Manet flouts with a new Realism all the
academic rules that made the nude sexless and innocent. The painting disturbs because class is imprinted on her body:

Desire was the property now - the deliberate production - of the female subject herself. It was there in her gaze, her consciousness of being looked at for sexual reasons and paid accordingly... (1984:131).

It might be added to this compelling characterisation, that the painting gains poignancy when it is seen not just as a representation of a working class woman but as one whose composure and luxury is heightened by the spontaneous compliance of her black servant. Senegal had become a French colony in 1858; Morocco a French protectorate in 1860. In choosing in 1862 to lay bare so clearly the new patterns of ethnic division within the lower-class, Manet was perhaps prefiguring the subtle social consequences of imperial power with its capacity to incorporate all strata around a fictive national community.

Manet was the key transitional figure in the restructuring of the cultural field which took place from the 1850s. What fuelled the universally hostile reception to Manet's early work was a sense of his danger. It was not just that he was seen as a madman by Thora and others (Hamilton, 1954:122) but that he was a dangerous madman: he was a satellite around which younger painters moved like lesser planets. Manet had effectively succeeded in founding a new school and Zola's first major review created a manifesto for the new movement. Despite the desire for official recognition demonstrated by his submissions to the Salon, the network around cafés and his independent exhibition set up rival structures, within which the Impressionists and Manet influenced each other. Ultimately, as Bourdieu and others pointed out, these laid a new set of artistic production relations (the critic-dealer market system) freed of the necessity of acceptance by the Salon and based only on the market.

By the 1880s, Manet and the Impressionists had become more adapted
to the art market. If, through the nineteenth century, Paris had become a European city of culture; by the end of the century, it was the centre of a global market for art (Whites, 1965:8; ch. 3). The dealer-critic system that had emerged in the interstices of the academy in response to the new bourgeois public had - by the late 1880s - undermined it and created a new unregulated network of consumption. But it also created a structure in which high material rewards went to those who made their names in "this commerce which was not commerce" (Bourdieu). At the end of their lives, the Impressionists earned the salaries of other middle class professionals. Durand-Ruel, for example, sold his 35 Manets for 800,000 francs (Whites: 126) and gave 5850 francs for the Bar at the Folies Bergère (Hamilton: 271). Although Manet died too young to make money out of art, Monet, Pissarro and Renoir, after thirty years of poverty, were making substantial incomes, Degas was comfortably off and only Sisley of the original group was lacking a middleclass income. Perhaps also they were adapting to the culture of those who bought them.

The argument of this chapter has been that it is not sufficient to approach Manet simply in terms of his "barbarous" or misunderstood style. Certainly, given the significance of academic brushwork as artistic currency in the 1850s, Manet's "weakness" in this respect represented a radical departure from ruling conventions, as also did his "failure" to constrain his colours within the linear construction of pictorial space and to organise figures within that space convincingly, part of which may indeed have been due to inadequate technique (eg the figure of the woman in the background in Déjeuner had provoked much debate on this score). However, as Zola's review made crystal clear, stylistic innovation was not alone important. What was also apparent was a new sense of realism. Castagnary, the Realist critic, might have attacked Manet for not addressing sufficiently "society as it is" but it remains true that Manet's
painting both opened up new spaces - the theatre and the boulevard rather than the cathedral and the palace - and depicted new personalities, through whom the subjective experience of modernity was conveyed. In other words, with Manet we have ignoble subjects, ignoble styles and even ignoble pastiche.

As much as Courbet, Manet's painting was "a dance with ideology" - it is this disruptive power that lies behind his political liberalism, his "madness" - made more effective by its artistic allusions - his new themes of consumption and leisure, middleclass idylls and fears. In this sense I argue that Manet cannot simply be seen, with Bourdieu, as the painter who abandoned "finish", destroyed solidity, disrupted perspective conventions and introduced black in solid masses: rather these changes in signifier occurred because the relations he depicted were simultaneously cut free of tradition, and provided graphic representations of the new impact of money and class.

Women and the new Anomie in Art.

I have already touched on the change in conceptions of women as they entered into the realm of commodities in an independent, individualistic way. This opens up the question of male domination in the art-world of Impressionism and about this Bourdieu is curiously silent. He has not explored adequately how the new way of seeing in Impressionism channelled into art the new leisure, consumption and popular cultural spheres. If he had done so he would have noted that the "new eye" was still a "male eye", that it is no accident that he writes of charismatic prophets and not of prophetesses. If we are going to link art to power, it is not just class origin and family position but also gender divisions which should be analysed in relation to the restricted and expanded field of art production.

Manet and Impressionism developed an art which interrogated taken-for-granted categories of bourgeois reason. Since the Enlightenment
these had opposed abstract rationality to the discrepant and disquieting voices of colonised natives, the child and the mad (Ferguson, 1990:ch. 1).

Manet's appropriation of the bohemian as the image of the artist reveals the undermining of eighteenth century bourgeois certainties. But this did not extend to the last of the Enlightenment "others"; women. They remained distanced from the new evaluative principles of Impressionist art in key aspects of cultural practice.

It is surprising that Bourdieu does not theorise the inhospitable space of the first avant-garde to women more systematically. For understanding their omission from traditional art-histories does not mean merely putting the women back in, discovering a hidden heritage lost in auction rooms or even a subculture with subterranean connections. It means rather perceiving how the whole field of cultural production is structured in such a way as to marginalise women artists. This occurs through the basic categories of traditional art history, the monograph and catalogue raisonné, which celebrate the single creative individual, the division between art and craft and the privileging of certain forms of art over other types of artistic expression. Bourdieu's insistence on the historical genesis of the work of art is incomplete unless it also extends this same treatment to the work of women producers. It is surprising that despite the generative binary classifications of culture that Bourdieu deploys, he has hardly started to chart the precise cultural expressions through which male domination became a second nature even within the artists' world-in-reverse.

Bohemian space had no clear boundaries. Contrary to the implication of nostalgic artistic tourism (Mark Twain's San Francisco etc.), the Impressionists were not enclosed within an exotic enclave. Rather they colonised certain public spaces, some of which became identified with bohemian ideas eg the Cafe Guerbois, others of which retained their own
social worlds, although ones that were permeable by the painters.

Bourdieu gives us a very good idea of this when he charts onto a Paris city map the social worlds of *L'Education Sentimentale*; the house of the Dambreuses, that of the Arnaux, and the "demi-monde" existence of the courtesan Rosanette (1993a:149, 1975: 86). These imaginary locations, like that of the artist, traverse very different class territories etc. In terms of the public spaces of the metropolis, it is clear that for bourgeois or aristocratic women parks, cafés, bars, nightclubs and boulevards could only be experienced within a couple. Thus, unless, like Bonheur, you obtained a licence to disguise sexual identity with trousers, it was impossible to wander observantly. No woman artist could conceive as Baudelaire did the poet, of her halo falling off and getting dirty while trailing through the slum backstreets. Thus as painters, women were excluded from much of the new leisure-pleasure economy. We need to discover what contradictions existed within the roles of artists and women that were distinctive to their gender. Bourdieu's category of habitus and artistic habitus as the internal disposition corresponding to external social position can provide us with a crucial tool for this purpose, suggesting why so many women painters have been unable (in the nineteenth century) to become as strongly innovative as were a minority of the male painters. His *The Rules of Art* alerts us to divisions between regional or naive artists vs metropolitan professional artists. But it needs to be expanded to account for the ways in which artists are both moulded by gender positioning and represent it. Recent work has suggested some useful leads to follow here.

In the Second Empire women painters were doubly marginalised. First, there were social constructions of artistic genius that cut off women from the solitary heretic role that Bourdieu identifies with the birth of artistic anomie (Battersby, 1989). Second, there were repressive restrictions on
women that meant they were precluded from adopting the role of "invisible man" or flâneur while also being constrained to experience themselves as quintessential consumers. The new department stores created the first link between women and consumption, invoking the customer as a bourgeois woman in advertisements (Bowlby, 1985: 20-21) or playing on female daydreams in décor, as in the adornment of the whole of Bon Marché in bridal white for the spring sales (Miller, 1981: 168).

Bowlby notes the new aestheticisation of industry through which department stores wooed specifically female customers: "The dominant ideology of feminine subjectivity in the late nineteenth century perfectly fitted women to receive the advances of the seductive commodity offering to enhance her womanly attractions. Seducer and seduced, possessor and possessed of one another, women and commodities flaunt their images at one another in an amorous regard ..." (Bowlby: 32) These new incitements to fantasy and consumption as play became difficult for a woman artist to combine with serious production.

It is true that the women in some respects benefited from the decline of the academy and its institutionalised patriarchy: the emergence of independent studios in which women painters could be taught meant an unprecedented increase in the numbers of women painters in Paris. (Some of the new distribution arrangements also favoured them: women painters appreciated the juryless Salons of the Independents, from 1848 (Weisberg, 1980: 316, Frascina et al: 1993: 239)). The demise of the academic hierarchy of genres also potentially benefited women since those subjects with the highest prestige (eg history-painting) were often contrasted with the more feminine low-prestige subjects such as still life (the artist hero of Zola's L'Oeuvre speaks of the depiction of a carrot being

---

However, Marie Bashkirtseff's well-known image of well-dressed women painters in L'Académie Julien (c.1880) dates from after the demise of the old Academy's monopoly.
pregnant with revolution (Zola, 1886:46). Yet the prohibition of the lifeclass and hence the nude continued for women. The emergence of the new division of the artistic field did little to reduce the salience of gender in restricting the access of women to modern painting and we shall see why.

A fundamental principal of exclusion was provided by the invention of the life of the artist as that of a suffering Christ or prophetic figure, premised as these were on the principle of genius. This form of secular self-annihilation and rebirth was not available to women (Battersby, 1989). In both Kantian and Romantic aesthetics, the genius was distinguished from the mere craftsman by his possession of the knowledge of artistic rules, coupled with his uniqueness of vision. Women could serve as muses to draw out male qualities of vision but they could not themselves take on this lonely and magisterial role. Edmond de Goncourt expressed pithily the essentialist conception which precluded women's equivalence with men in art: "there are no women of genius, and... if they manifest it, it is by some trick of nature, in the sense that they are men" (quoted Frascina et al., 1993: 231).

The women Impressionists had to negotiate this barrier. For some, an effective marriage bar meant that they gave up painting even if talented (Edmé Morisot) (Parker and Pollock, 1981:43). Others viewed their work less as the public and professional activity identified with male artists, but instead one that they combined with domesticity and especially the management of the bourgeois household (for example, Berthe Morisot). It is noteworthy that none of the women Impressionists had to live off art, as Bonheur had done in the 1840s and as the working-class artists' model, Suzanne Valadon, was to do in the 1880s. It is the consequent lack of self-image as pioneering bohemians that may well explain why painters like Morisot or Cassatt, however strong and subtle in developing the light
palette and sketchy brushstrokes associated with Monet especially, failed to develop the experimental drive of Manet, Seurat and some of Monet's own work. Their distinctive angle of vision led them to a domestic Realism and particularly, to a less distanced representation of the female or child subject, but not to the epoch-making new subjects represented by Déjeuner, or The Bar at the Folies Bergères or St Lazare. Not surprisingly, the representations of their own activities by their fellow male Impressionists indicate the relatively hidden character of their work. Manet's paintings of Morisot never depict her painting: rather she is shown as part of a family group (The Balcony) or as a well-dressed girl sitting in leisure in a comfortable interior. Even his painting of a woman artist at work, Eva Gonzalez, denies her any vivid subjective experience of her acts as a painter: she appears in evening dress delicately touching up a canvas, with her face averted.

Such differences in artistic trajectory and habitus for men and women had their origin in the exclusion of women from the bourgeois public space. Joan Landes has pointed out that the term for a public man (homme publique) means one who has a creditable, disinterested commitment to the social and to an anticipatory future (1988:3). (Une fille publique, on the other hand, is a prostitute). The rise of the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century, which Habermas located in precise spatial terms to the coffee houses and taverns of large towns and to the growth of individuality in the architecture of domestic private space, was accompanied by a model of communication that transcended class and property interests. Landes, however, has pointed out that such a public sphere did not - even in an imaginary unity - transcend gender interests (1988:56-7). While the French Revolution's Constitutional Assembly under the Giroudins had permitted women the right to work, to the vote, to crèches, to divorce, the Jacobins had rescinded these freedoms. The Napoleonic Code had finally
put the nail into the coffin, refusing women access to the vote and to independent professional careers. In brief, "Marianne" in Delacroix's famous image of the 1830 Revolution suggested only a figurative image of the nation as female and not that the emancipation of women was to be tied to bourgeois and popular demands. By the 1848 Revolution, even the socialist Flora Tristan saw women as supporting their husbands in fighting class inequalities from a positioning within domestic space, while Comte's positive religion offered women inducements to champion morality within a new secular cult of the family.

How does this conception of the gendering of space affect the Impressionists' art? I want to suggest that the sphere of consumption liberated men for a whole new way of seeing but that this was not the case for women. This is because respectable women were denied access to many of the new sites of modernity, sites which were always available to the "lions" of the Jockey Club. Clark was the first to show the Impressionists "trespassing" on such popular or risqué spaces, but a gender perspective on the women Impressionists is only unevenly offered. The subjects of Impressionism are revealingly totted up by Pollock in a table entitled the "erotic territories of modernity" which graphically differentiates between the "ladies" portrayed in the parks and theatre loges by both male and female painters (Cassatt and Morisot) and the "fallen women" of the backstage theatre, the cafés, the folies and the brothels, the subjects of Manet, Guys, Degas, to a lesser extent - Renoir but none of the women (Pollock, 1988:73)11. In other words, the bohemian space possesses certain parallels with the bourgeois public sphere.

11 Nochlin has argued with some force that the relative absence of work in Impressionism noted above is by no means total and especially does not extend to workers in the new service sector, many of whom were women - ballet dancers, barmaids, waitresses, singers etc (1989:43). She shows that Morisot did explore the division of labour within women's work in her Wet Nurse and Julie (1875) (1989: ch 2), a point which could also be exemplified through her Un Percher de Blanchisseuses (1875), although in the latter the scale of the working women
These women painters nevertheless possessed a distinctive iconography, one which does not necessarily pervade women's cultural production but which is symptomatic of the normative strength of the seclusion of women in the nineteenth century. Their paintings betray their restrictions, for we can see how the angle of vision creates enclosures (balustrades, verandas, fences) within which their female subjects are placed (see for example, Morisot's *The Harbor at L'Orient*, (1869) or her *On the Balcony* (1872), Pollock: ch. 3). Even without these motifs, other pictorial devices have created similar effects. Pollock suggests that the compression of space is a frequent element of Cassatt's work as in the seclusion of the figure of a woman behind a tapestry frame in *Woman With Tapestry Frame*, thus creating a visual homology for the highly-constrained experience of bourgeois women within domestic crafts and indeed their social confinement. Further, the changed angle of vision transforms what is seen, so as to heighten empathy. Children are represented from a point parallel with their own height: a woman's face is shown averted, retaining some of its privacy, rather than full face and dominated by the artistic eye. Women workers, such as the wet-nurses painted by Morisot and Cassatt, are presented more as part of a community of women caring for children, than as exotic or erotic subjects. Even where the emphasis is on women's appearance and dress, as in Cassatt's representation of her half-undressed maid, or her *Woman in Black at the Opera* (1879), the subjects appear more contemplative than in many portrayals by male painters.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries public sphere was construed as the expression of the universal interests of humankind in rational communication. However, the other new institutions of the bourgeois world - and especially the new relations of production - intruded into the depicted is tiny, as though part of a romance of work as in nostalgic visions of peasants.
public sphere, turning its clubs, philosophical societies and institutes into the narrower domain of the middle-class rather than the working-class; the male rather than the female (Habermas, 1987; Landes, 1988). Despite its oppositional ethic and its repudiation of class apartheid, bohemian society turns out to have a similar false universality at its heart, for it concealed a set of social conditions effectively excluding women. Although he has a perceptive awareness of the gap between rhetoric and interests, Bourdieu fails to convey fully the rich yet ambivalent sectarian worlds of the metropolis.

Bourdieu’s perspective on Impressionism takes very much the conventional view of Impressionism as a revolution in form, even while it provides a social account of its historical genesis. I have suggested that this fails to take account of the artists’ interests in new types of bourgeois and popular culture. However, it is permissible to accept Bourdieu’s concern for the attenuated place of objective representation within the Impressionist art, but only at a much later date.

But this new account of the re-division of the artistic fields differs from the older accounts of Fry, Greenberg, Rosenberg et al. For it is not simply “truth to media” or the formal logic of an anomic cultural field that produces the re-division. Rather, a historical genesis is provided. The action of the avant garde, as early as the mid-1870s, reveals the widening ripples of detachment, first within the urban context and later the social world as a whole. A brief moment of euphoria surrounding the break-out from traditional leisure rules led Manet and the Impressionists to associate themselves with the new social spaces and the new urban strata in experiences bounded still by the realities of class and work, and in depictions still capable of the verve of the traditional carnival. But gradually the new autonomous art of the later Impressionism and post-Impressionism foregoes Pissarro’s peasant, Caillebotte’s narrative interests
in his subjects (which came to seem old-fashioned and redundant) and Manet's sharp critical awareness of the social realities of the metropolis through the percipience of the flâneur. A similar point can be made about Monet. By the 1880s a gulf between the natural and the human worlds had opened up. Monet now paints angry seas and deserted beaches as though to point to the revenge of the elements on the social. It is at this point of the deepened disenchantment of the world, associated too early by Bourdieu with Manet's "fresh eye", which now precipitates the singular interest in the "permanent revolution" of form. In other words, Bourdieu's weakness, in terms of Impressionism is his failure to show its early character and the potential for the restricted field to develop artistically in several different trajectories, each profoundly affected by the nature of the specific period and the constituents of the avant-garde. Despite these omissions, Bourdieu's analysis provides the important parameters of a new sociological history of the development of capitalism, the class nature of the avant-garde and the critic-dealer system. In Greenberg, on the contrary, artistic autonomy is presented as an aesthetic imperative, as an embattled and lonely modernist remnant struggles with historicist certainty in a perpetual conflict against kitsch.

Bourdieu has written on numerous occasions of the battle over social classifications implicit in changes in representations: "The struggles among writers over the legitimate art of writing contribute through their very existence, to producing both the legitimate language, defined by its distance from the "common" language, and belief in its legitimacy" (1991:58) His emphasis on the conflicts within linguistic signs ("Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us that in revolutionary situations common words take on different meanings." (1991:40 and n.29, 264)), could easily be extended to the study of Manet and the Impressionists. Moreover, Bourdieu never reduces representations to mere superstructural insignificance, instead
representations are part of every action, an element of society in the mind.

Yet, for all this, Bourdieu still views Impressionism as a group of painters unduly obsessed with the effects of light and with the desire to impress on the spectator the conventional nature of colour. He has neglected the fact that Manet and the earlier Impressionists were extending the scope of Realism to include the utopian moments of everyday life and that they possessed a subcultural outlook, that linked them with other forms of resistance. This does not imply that they were always successful in the goal of resistance (Clark has written of Olympia as a painting that cannot solve the contradictions inscribed in its contours (1980: 39)) but it did provide a kind of ironic, distanced perspective on social relations within a regime that, under Louis-Napoleon and President MacMahon, had a protofascist character. Bourdieu in his anxiety to prick the inflated bubble of the cult of art removes these elements from view.
Chapter VI:
The Popular and the Middlebrow

My aim in this chapter is to reassess the economy of symbolic goods. I shall be concerned especially with the division between the fields of restricted and expanded cultural production, or in other words, between fine art and the culture industry. The fundamental opposition in the cultural field for Bourdieu, stems from creators' social relations with their readers or patrons that is, in Valéry's terms, between an art which is created by its public and art which creates its own public (1966: 167). I shall suggest that in his work of unmasking ideologies of art, Bourdieu has left unquestioned certain social classifications. These classifications or representations have as their stake the fundamental questions of the origin of art, and the nature of the charismatic individuals who produce it. While Bourdieu is perceptive in seeing bohemia as an inversion or reverse discourse of classical political economy, I want to problematise further the divisions of the cultural field between "high" and "low" culture. I shall suggest that Bourdieu is still under the spell of certain tacit assumptions maintained by the priests who monopolise cultural authority. In particular, Bourdieu's own line of enquiry needs to be deepened into a feminist materialism.

Bourdieu shockingly exposes the mysteries of the work of art by revealing the social consequences of the well-known economic barrier to creativity. In practise, this limits receptiveness towards what Max Raphael called "the demands of art" to those who possess sufficient funds or a family to support them during the years when they are withheld recognition by the public. Only agents with these advantages can sustain themselves in the metropolitan centre, where they are better placed to experience and distill through the rules of art the great waves of collective effervescence. Granting this, it is essential to ask whether the Divide between high and low culture is
shaped solely by the material experience and social psychology of class relations. Bourdieu has certainly begun the very important task of periodising and mapping the location of cultural production. He notices, for example, that the French realist novel written outside the metropolis and by writers originating from the subordinate class became marginalised as a lesser, "regional literature" after the period 1850. Following the approach to Impressionism, I shall claim that gender divisions have also created its specific trajectories within these laws of space and time. Given that Bourdieu has portrayed masculine domination as in many ways the paradigm of all power relations, it is odd that he has not yet integrated this analysis into his cultural theory.

How does Bourdieu think masculine domination works? His answer derives from taking Kabylia as a limiting case. Here masculine domination is the consequence of collective, public organisation, quite unlike its transitory expression within the psychoanalytic cure or poetic licence, through which in the modern West it perpetuates its subterranean existence. By thus highlighting the nature of masculine honour in a world where it is assigned the mark of a truly human existence, Bourdieu's account is distinguished from other feminist interpretations. It is especially through its powerful depiction of *society within the mind* that it achieves its impact. He makes us see the aura radiating from male power itself so that it creates a social unconscious, capable even of denying the fact of repression.

Such well-established power does not need ideologies (in the sense of legitimating theories). Nor does it depend simply on physical force. Instead, in Western societies, masculine domination is accomplished by the workings of educational institutions and particularly through the cultural capital

---

1In this respect, Bourdieu deepens the historical study of Lukács, who had shown that realism represents in literature the experience of a transition from peasant or feudal societies to capitalist ones and that realism in Russia (Tolstoy) or Norway (Ibsen) occurred later because of the uneven development of capitalism.
acquired by men. By contrast, in Kabylia, such domination is the "natural attitude", the common-sense or doxic world-view that is anchored to everyday experience in structures where gender is stringently and elaborately differentiated. For Kabylians it is taken for granted that to be male is to be a universal being, segregated by honour from confrontation with the intimate, physical dimension of family existence. In turn, women are condemned to see themselves pejoratively, possessing the negative virtues engendered by their exclusion from the agora or public sphere and constrained to recognise their purely private and subordinate existence:

Women, who are bad by nature have to be placed as soon as possible under the benificent protection of a man ...woman is like a young shoot that bends to the left; whereas a man is like a straight stick (1966:227).

Even the use of specific walls in the Kabylian house or the fountain in the Kabylian village are regulated by gender, however ironically approached. The gender divisions that in the West are residual but still active, as in the fear of putting a baby boy in pink clothes, are linked in Kabylia to a much more complex cosmology in which gender orders not only the entire agricultural calendar (sowing, harvesting etc.), but all the domestic crafts, and especially the cooking practices of the household. Practice is governed by choices which will ensure matching: a man who wants his penis to swell should choose foods that also swell in cooking or in the stomach (rice etc.). The substance of gender attributes are socially arbitrary. Hence Kabylians denigrate capacities such as quickness, cunning and calculative action, since for them these are linked to activities in the market-place undertaken by women, whereas in the West the same qualities are attributes of males and are prized.

Male domination possesses a further general trait that is revealed most sharply in Kabylia: that of the "somatisation" of the relations between men and women. The social order literally makes its mark on the body. It thus
transcends ideology. At the most simple, the woman's bent body testifies to years of decorously walking behind her man, her eyes downcast; the husband on the other hand retains his straightness. Or circumcision, apparently separating younger from older males, in fact serves in reality to distinguish all males from females. Thus, attacking all natural essentialisms, Bourdieu notes that on the frail biological difference between the sexes is constructed a whole edifice of gender-differentiated experiences, which come to be felt as a second nature. The collective creation of the socio-somatic body, he christens the "institution effect".

For Bourdieu, Kabylia demonstrates the familiar Janus faces of power, which he draws out with striking clarity. Its first face is revealed in the "social unconscious" of male domination which associates it with all other noble, disinterested incitements to the exercise of power, in which power is considered as an element of a protective paternalism. The other face is harsher, deriving its character from violence and symbolic force. In this the male comes to stand for the legitimate power of the social itself, "the pitiless and inexorable power of necessity" (1990:23), which requires the violence of the knife and the executioner and through which is exerted the force of the social over recalcitrant natural beings. Since women and children are part of the natural world of laissez-faire and laissez-aller, male power must be imposed by prising all the children - and especially the boys - from the shelter and sustenance of women.

Masculine domination for Bourdieu thus rests on an essentialism, just as race and class are forms of essentialism. The sexual habitus ensures the misrecognition of the consequences of the long process of socialising the body:

In this case the work aimed at transforming into nature the arbitrary product of history finds its apparent foundation in the appearance of the body, at the same time as it creates very real effects on the body.
and inside the brains; that is to say, that both in reality and in the representations of reality, the thousand-year project of socialisation of the biological and of biologising the social, which reverses the relation between cause and effects, also makes come into view a naturalised social construction ... (1990: 12).

Excluded from the public and sacred spheres where the universal character of the male sex manifests itself, Kabylian women are trained for inferiority by the inculcation of appropriate emotions of subordination: modesty, shame and timidity. Thus their self-exclusion completes the historical process of structural exclusion, and the genesis of the antagonistic image of women lies in these relations. Women are condemned through their submission to possess only negative virtues (such as sexual purity); to be endowed only with deferred power (such as "the power behind the throne"); to be independent only through the ruses and other survival tactics which simultaneously incur scorn for their pettiness.

But, most importantly, it is male "libido dominandi" which ensures masculine investment in power, whether in the academic, artistic or political worlds. Bourdieu’s is one of the richest accounts we have of the social psychology of patriarchy, not least its use of Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse as a representation of disenchanted female gaze. For Woolf's narrative devices not only create aesthetic distancing, through which all male societies can be perceived as the equivalents to the tribal worlds of savages, but they isolate both the passion with which men are involved in public life and the child-like egotism for which women castigate them. Yet the profound seriousness of the arenas within which men invest their energies enhances their dignity, while women's cultural energies are forcibly divided: a necessary consequence of their culturally-induced preoccupation with children and matters of life and death.
Woolf, read from the position of professorial eminence, suggests the challenging view that men's possession of power is in itself attractive. The political "libido dominandi" creates an aura around male sexual libido. Women, in turn, have the magical power to reflect back the male image as twice as big as they are "naturally": "[Because of] the differential socialisation predisposing men to love games of power, women to love men who play them, the masculine charisma is partly the charm of power, the seduction that the possession of power exerts itself on the body, the sexuality of which is politically socialised." (1990: 25)

In short, moving in the orbits of male power, women enhance men's quest for distinction:

Everything leads one to suppose that the condition for women's liberation is a mastery of those mechanisms of domination which had up to now prevented us from seeing that culture - that is, the asceticism and sublimation through and by which humanity is inscribed - cannot be understood otherwise than by a set of social relations of distinction affirmed against a nature which is composed of dominated groups - women and poor people, colonised groups, stigmatised groups... It is clear that without being in all cases and at all times totally associated with rebarbative nature, against which are organised the games of culture, women still enter into a dialectic of pretension and distinction more as objects than as subjects (1990: 31).

More as objects than as subjects ... I shall return to the implications for women and culture shortly. Bourdieu's 1990 account of Kabylia treats the control over women as so effective that their autonomy is virtually absent. His initial treatment of the gender division of labour in *The Algerians* (1958) characterises women's responses differently. Kabylian civilisation here possesses its *discontents*, such that women who can no longer tolerate their
condition, or who had been repudiated by their husbands adapt the secret magical resources of their own gendered world to turn the evil eye or, in desperate cases, to provoke their husbands' death. In this work, the prerogative of divorce from their wives is certainly a testament to male power, but it represents also a continued discrepancy between men's desires and women's compliance, with the use of gender solidarity on the part of women to protect little strategies of resistance. Bourdieu's acknowledgement of the ceaseless labour of Kabylian women, and their total disappearance from all public life after marriage indicated a harsh realism about the massive stakes involved in Kabylian men's retention of their legally-monopolised patriarchal power.

By 1990, perhaps to combat feminist utopianism, Bourdieu depicts most starkly only the collusion of women with their oppressors. Despite this undoubted oversimplification, his conception of symbolic violence throws into relief the existence of inequalities of power, rather than the mere difference theorised by some Lacanian disciples. This complex theory thus offers a welcome contribution to feminist theory.

Bourdieu's treatment of masculine domination in contemporary Western societies is only fragmentary. Following his analysis, it could be argued that where education and the law have been wrested from overt patriarchal divisions, where capital can be accumulated as efficiently by Ms. as by Mr. Moneybags, and where the reserve army of unemployed labour can be of either sex, then the cultural obeissance to male power appears arbitrary. This creates a generalised crisis, even if not an explosive one. However, against the grain of most socialist feminism which has presented the working-class as the embarrassing site of traditional patriarchy, Bourdieu takes a different tack, highlighting how changes in the position of women have had divergent effects in different classes, not least in the peasantry (see eg Bourdieu, 1972). Particularly in the dominant class, female cultural capital, acquired through
education, is converted into economic capital in highly-paid jobs. Women's liberation thus has an accidental fall-out in the creation of a new strategic resource within bourgeois families for the social reproduction of their own power (1988: 376-411).

But while Bourdieu has usefully articulated the linkage of gender with class, he has still left unexplored much of the transformations of gender within the sacred island of culture. This terrain has become the seed-bed for proliferating crises, not unlike those conflicts of expectation and reality that created the instabilities he charted in the university world [1988: 164]

**Bourdieu's Masculine Domination and the cultural field.**

One of the resources men might have which he has not theorised concretely is precisely their passionate involvement in the artistic "illusio". Put another way, there exists also a *gendered* difference in what Bourdieu has called the "production of belief", the collective processes through which a writer is attributed with an inner grace. Such a gendered belief was perhaps at stake in leading Mrs. Gaskell in her preface to *Mary Barton* to disavow her mastery of political economy (1985:38 (1848)).

Huyssen has recently suggested that the whole epoch from 1850 to 1960 was premised on a form of masculine cultural domination in which the art of the masses was distanced *as though it were a woman*. If modernism was precisely *valorised* by Adorno and others, as the subversive "Agent Orange" of the capitalist social order, the culture industry was dismissed in tropes which aligned it with feminine consumption and degraded femininity. Mass culture was the vamp who, in peddling style without substance, ministered the sensual pleasures of entertainment but reneged on the austere and uncomfortable demands of art. Huyssen's interpretation of texts such as *Madame Bovary* falters uncomfortably over Flaubert's explicit identification with Emma, even with her love of romances, but he is right that modern literature certainly possesses many alternative examples of the dangerously
seductive lure of popular culture. I need mention only Grassic Gibbon's contrast between Ake Ogilvie's poetry and romantic fiction in *Grey Granite* (1934) or the earlier tragedy of development of George MacKay Brown's *The House with Green Shutters*, in which a servile wife, enfeebled by a diet of fantasy from her romantic magazines, fatally weakens the promethean drive of a Scottish entrepreneur. Of course, the trope of a feminised mass culture is not the only means of valorising modernism: images of mass culture as a *plague* can also be found in the writing of American post-war intellectuals (Ross, 1987:328-9). Nevertheless Bourdieu should have been alerted to the peculiar disadvantage under which women labour in struggles over consecration.

Bourdieu has been one of the most powerful critics of artistic ideologies. Yet his accounts of the new divisions of the cultural field fail to question whether the social existence within which the sectarian movements of modernism took shape did not itself involve for women an occupation of contaminated space and thus distanced it from women's participation.

As Bourdieu points out, the art-worlds of modernity have been profoundly shaped by the priests or critics who possess the legitimate monopoly of judging or consecrating a writer. Such judges must produce rationales for their choices, but the terms in which they do so include folk categories which retain an unavoidable imprecision and context-dependence, as in the aesthetic concepts of "beauty", "soigné" and "finish", in which the specific meanings shift according to the logic of the artistic epoch (1993a:262.) Consequently, the history of the whole artistic field is involved in any validating judgement. Moreover, despite artistic autonomy, the specialised language of aesthetics is itself shaped historically by struggles over the principles of vision and division, fundamental to which has been the drive to express a distance from the popular. Thus both within art and the wider intellectual or educational fields, the binary oppositions between
brilliant and dull, distinguished and vulgar, personal and banal, original and common, fine and crude, etc., betray, through their linguistic origins, the way of life of a dominant - even noble - class (1984: 494; 1989: 31).

We can accept with Bourdieu that these terms set up their own constraining pressures, even if he forgets that they can also be stretched for new and democratic uses. He has, however, neglected the existence of a similar set of evaluative judgements in which masculinity is prized in the artistic field. These tended to marginalise women, not least within the early and high modernist movements.

The situation for women writers has been as difficult in France as in England, despite the early impact of de Stael’s Corinne (1807) (Moers, 1978: 43: 183). Monique de Saint Martin’s study (1990) shows that these obstacles persisted well after the appearance of Georges Sand, under the "golden age" of Louis Philippe's rule. By the end of the nineteenth century it was possible for a woman to be a writer publicly, but only at the cost of being associated with scandal: otherwise the shameful literary activity had to be kept secret (1990: 54). As a consequence, the emergence of an autonomous literary terrain was one kept separate from women's literary activities. Unless the woman writer had the protection of a legitimate male guardian, as in the case of the widow of Alphonse Daudet, such writing was classified as popular literature or journalism (1990: 55). Even then, women writers were still mainly from the comfortable sections of the bourgeoisie, especially from those which possessed cultural capital. Admitted in only tiny numbers to the Society of Letters, the chief explanation advanced was the view that women excluded themselves because they refused to write for the sake of the work of art, and stressed extra-literary ends. Saint Martin concludes:

It is impossible to understand the differences separating the trajectories of literary men and literary women without taking into account the logic of the literary field which by its genesis and its
functionning, its values and its representations tends to give more
indulgence and more recognition to men than to women (1990: 56).

Art and literature were taken more seriously and distinguished writers
could acquire greater consecration in France than in Britain, as was obvious
in the "dialectical relationship" of Paris to London (Bradbury and McFarlane,
1976:174). Paradoxically, the more effective exclusion of women in France
serves as one measure of the greater social investment at stake.

In Britain, the relative prominence of Virginia Woolf and Katherine
Mansfield should not obscure the marginalisation of the other modernist
women writers: Dorothy Richardson, H.D. (Hilda Doolittle), Carrington,
Edith Sitwell, Bryher, and Dora Marsden. It is Woolf that Bourdieu draws on
for his female gaze at male power: she is one of the "lucides exclues" (a term
which he uses also of Flaubert). Woolf's negotiation of the public/private
division aimed to introduce innovations in form-language which would suit
the new subjects deriving from the repressed hopes and private worlds of
consumption and desire. But her case is atypical: she can be regarded as one
of Bourdieu's "miraculés", who escape their social fate. Clearly canonisation of
Woolf was aided by her unusual range of literary assets, not least the number
of her novels - neither too few nor too many - and by the importance of her
eyary literary and social criticism in achieving her vindication through appeal
to a female subculture (see Lovell, 1987:130-2; Gilbert and Gubar,
1988:166;250). Moreover, Woolf's membership of the Co-operative Women's
Guild gave her an angle of vision that included wider material and historical
questions as well as feminist issues. Bloomsbury's links to the economic and
social field of power itself is her asset, with its Whig roots among the great
liberal professional and entrepreneurial families, and its paternalist concern
with the underdog; conferring on her a position in an cultural division of
labour that was remarkable (Williams, 1980: 159-89). More practically,
Woolf's novels could be published by Leonard Woolf's Hogarth Press, while his

244
support for her literary project gave her a social capital which should not be under-estimated (Moi, 1991: 1040; Bowlby:1988:65).

Bourdieu fails to confront both the bumpier route to consecration for the other modernist women writers and the distinctive barriers for women presented by the linguistic innovation characteristic of modernism, as a consequence of their relative exclusion from academic life. Further, although there were expressions of solidarity for women and although women figured as the financial patrons and even co-editors:

the rise of the female imagination was a central problem for the male imagination ... Indeed it is possible to argue that a reaction-formation against the rise of literary women became not just a theme in modernist writing but a motive for modernism (Gilbert and Gubar, 1988:156)

D.H. Lawrence is of course a representative misogynist, with a mystical romanticism that valorised women only insofar as they stayed as passive figures at home and loathed the modern "half-women" who threatened to supercede them (1950:31-4). Wyndham Lewis's domestic tyranny - he refused to allow his wife to have children and gave away the illegitimate children of his mistresses - is quite compatible with Vorticism's general response to feminism (Carey, 1992:170) In this respect, the British movement shared the opinions of its Italian counterpart, Futurism, through which Marinetti's Manifesto had issued a declaration of war against women (Boccione). Pound shows the clearest strategic practice towards women in his tenure as literary editor of The New Freewoman². Capitalising on Dora Marsden's dual commitments as editor to both feminism and to an imagism which would "cleanse the poetic language of abstraction", he symbolically cleansed the paper of its feminism by persuading her to rename it The Egoist (Thacker,

² Blast 1, 45, was also the early site of anti-semitism, containing Pound's lines "Let us be done with Jews and jobbery, / Let us SPIT upon those who fawn on the JEWS for their money...", quoted Dasenbrock, 1985:88)
Pound's trophy in this victory was the triumph of a hard and rigorous aesthetic against the "flaccidity" or "soft mushy edges" of those of rival modernist groups (Thacker, 1994: 87). In the microcosm of the little magazine it can be judged with what asperity the feminine qualities Bourdieu has isolated in his essay on male domination are tested against the necessity and severity of the masculine world and found wanting (1990: 23). And if art-worlds rely for their "professional rationales" on the writing of sympathetic literary critics, as he has also proposed (1993a: 259-60), then he needs to introduce the feminist critics - male or female - who have struggled to reject the old patriarchal "sense of order" and its associated linguistic classifications.

**Women and the Social Structures of Modernism**

There are other reasons why women's cultural activities have not fitted easily into the dissident culture of modernism. Modernism itself has two main sites: the mature money economy and the metropolis (see Simmel 1978: 477; Bourdieu, 1992: 365-6). Of course, the experience of city life is common to both sexes: Benjamin's brilliant comments on shock and on gambling and Simmel's observations about the speed of change possible in the metropolis from rich to poor, of the cool cynicism and the quick-witted, innovative action of the city-dweller apply to both men and women, because they are rooted in the nature of bourgeois commodity exchange and the ebbs and flows of industrial production. But the bitterness of modernist critique stems particularly from the contrast between instrumental reason and Enlightenment reason, between linear clock time and the subjective sense of duration: contrasts stemming from masculine contexts of work and bureaucracy. For women, often still linked to a domestic culture permeated by use-values and by a sense of time linked to immediate human needs, these alienating elements were less heightened (Kristeva in Moi, ed., 1986).
Raymond Williams has stressed the importance of the contexts of modernism, with both banality and insight (1989). It is blindingly obvious that modernist writing comes from a series of experiences of metropolitan capitalism that heighten the distance between subjective meanings and the collective consciousness, and in which social distance breeds despair and cynicism. Yet he has shown in much more detail than Bourdieu that other forms of writing have persisted into twentieth century Europe where these sites of modernity and their typical structures of feeling are absent, both in the rural periphery and in isolated industrial or mining communities (1980, 213-32). What is also more distinctive in Williams' conception of modernism is his focus on the nature of exile, and especially on expatriates' sense of a cosmopolitan mass in the poorer districts of London, Paris, Prague and Vienna. For even where modernism was the work of natives, it was often expatriates that provided the catalyst. The modernist focus on the nature of the signifier, so important in the case of Dadaism and Futurism, had an elective affinity with the experience of non-native speakers, who were drawn to focus intellectually on the nature of language. Formalist games with the phonic qualities of words stem from this understanding of the arbitrary character of language - hence the experimental concern for "rare rhythms" or for "revolutions of the word" that unified much literary exploration (Williams, 1989:46).

Bryher wrote "We were all exiles...It is our destiny" and linked the loss of home to women's empowerment (Griffin, 1994: 6). Yet women were much less likely to be among bohemian exiles. There were rarely allowances available to young women as there were for young men to settle in strange

---

3 The metropolis was the centre of migration. Indeed, London had more Soots than Aberdeen, more Irish than Dublin and more Catholics than Rome in 1890 (Bradbury and McFarlane, 1976:180). Paris, with its art-loving expatriates, lodgers and unstable households was already showing the cracks in both extended and nuclear families as early as the 1880s (Herbert, 1988).
towns and establish themselves without kin (Davidoff and Hall 1990, Flint 1994). Nor could they travel alone. Moreover, modernist circles had their location in the cafés and taverns that provided conviviality within a male public sphere, as in the case of the Black Boar in Berlin for German symbolism or the Café Guermont for Parisian Impressionism (Bradbury and MacFarlane, 1976:200; Wilson, 1992:93). More strongly, the aesthetic of the initial movements, including Naturalism, was embedded in moments of urban illumination which possessed specific dangers for women writers. In this reverse process of crossing the tracks, women could less easily disguise themselves, as Jack London did to investigate the background to his *The People of the Abyss*, nor could they become flâneurs, as did Morrison or Gissing in the East End. Even the subsequent turn to Symbolism required a level of philosophical competence which would have been beyond the reach of women, who had only recently been granted access to higher education (Gamboni, 1989:32), while their physical seclusion was also matched by the policing of their reading. Indeed, despite the appearance of the "new woman", the regulation of women and girls within the respectable bourgeoisie still extended to every item of their cultural diet (Flint 1993, ch 4). These modes of control extended into the 1920s and beyond.

If Bourdieu has neglected the sexual habitus of male power, to which movements of modernism became so frequently adapted, can the central classification of Bourdieu's cultural theory be sustained? Could it be that, in the case of women, cultural production has taken different forms, cutting across his polarisation between art (autonomous production) and entertainment (heteronomous production); sitting uneasily with his categories of commercial production: bourgeois art, middle-brow pastiche and the naive political moralism of industrial art (1993:45)? Is his denial of the

---

4: It was one of the attractions of Cook's first package holidays in the 1850s in Britain was that they offered single women the possibility of travelling abroad (Urry:24).
existence of "significant form" outside modernism merely a historical report
of the efficacy of contemporary classifications, or does it represent a
blindness in his own analysis? It is necessary to retrieve those cultural
expressions which the modernist gaze passed over, but which continued to
exist in both rural and industrial areas (1992: 365-6).

Feminist reappraisals of what Bourdieu calls the "social novel" make this
issue more pressing (1993a:63). It is unnecessary to enter the debate between
adherents of realism or modernism to recognise that a group of writers
existed which counted amongst its members women endowed with
considerable cultural capital, yet who have been in some way excluded from
the bounds of high culture (Light, 1991:x, 6-8)⁵. Indeed it is possible that the
acquisition of university education by the first generation of women may
even have fuelled the adoption of more esoteric literary forms by male writers
who feared intensified competition, a development that would parallel the
break with realism that Bourdieu notes in the case of Impressionism (Gilbert
and Gubar, 1988:36)⁶. Some statistics from British studies can be assembled
to suggest a different picture from Bourdieu of the "entertainment" section.

Cultural capital, women and popular genres: empirical studies

Historically, only 4% of British canonised writers have been women
(1994)⁷. Even in the most recent period, empirical analysis of British
literature suggests that women are less likely to get Arts Council backing
than are men. They thus miss out on the recognition which is frequently the

---

⁵ I am aware of the debate about the periodisation of modernism: for these purposes I
am adopting the definitions of modernism of Brecht and Lunn, which emphasise the
importance of de-familiarisation by means of form (Lunn: 1982: 2 and ch.2)

⁶ I cannot assess the situation in France, but the writing of Monique de Saint Martin
has suggested that the first generation of French women intellectuals (Well, de
Beauvoir etc) both possessed considerable cultural capital themselves and had
families who were also very well-educated and moved in artistic circles. The
downward economic mobility of their families appears to have been an experience
they shared, permitting the pioneering daughters to continue their studies (Saint
Martin, 1989) This may also have been the case in Britain.

⁷ This statistic derives from the data-base of the Dictionary of National Biography in
the University of Glasgow.
first stage of the consecration process. There are proportionately fewer women (33%) than men (67%) who are awarded either Creative Writing Bursaries or Fellowships, and 73% of the grants to publishers are for texts written by men as against only 27% for texts by women (Arts Council, 1981-91). A further study of the 1970s Arts Council applications reveals that fewer women than men were successful in their bids for subsidies for current novels (24 as against 56) (McGuigan, 1981: 23-29). Sexual discrimination was also accompanied by other social and geographical imbalances, with successful applications massively biased towards the metropolis and the Home Counties and grants to writers given to those already most materially well-endowed. One implication of this is that it is still more difficult for women than men to gain literary recognition - to "make their mark", as Bourdieu says, or to reap the symbolic profits of their labour.

Possibly as a consequence of this structure of the literary field, a greater number of women have turned to the despised middlebrow and popular literary genres, just as historically women expressed a sense of injustice by their hostility to the authorised priesthood (Cohn, 1962: 165-76). Public library loans in the popular genres do indeed reveal the disproportionate numbers of women authors successful in socially-degraded literary forms. Thus in the year 1991-2, 40 (61%) of the books most frequently borrowed were written by women and only 26 (39%) were by men (Public Lending Right, 1993). Predictably, the books in most frequent demand were in the popular categories, and among these female authors figured more prominently than male.

Such patterns can all be explained without disrupting Bourdieu's

---

8Unsurprisingly, the beneficiaries had occupations within the liberal professions and especially within lecturing or teaching, rather than employment in manual or petty-bourgeois jobs. (McGuigan, 1981:63-4). Similar backgrounds for writers have been shown in France, Charie, 1981:12)

9For analysis of the growing feminisation of the cultural field, see Randall Collins (1989) and Zukin (1988).
formulation. What is unexpected in terms of his classification of the cultural arena is the fact that this category of popular and middlebrow writer also contains women who are the holders of considerable educational credentials and/or social capital. The biographies of one such category of popular writers permit a content analysis of the qualifications of romance and Gothic writers in Britain and America (Vinson, 1983). As might be expected, the overwhelming number are women. If we take references within these biographies to educational qualifications as a measure of cultural capital, as indeed Bourdieu does himself in *Distinction*, then the relatively large number of women who have higher education becomes apparent: 33% of the British and 72% of the American women writers, have university degrees. They therefore possessed the cultural capital which would normally be a key requirement for entry into the restricted literary field. This suggests that amongst those women "living off" writing, there are a group with high qualifications who might otherwise have received the respect of those who "live for writing", ie engage in a legitimate cultural activity. As it is, they experience the cynical dismissal of the educated public that is the popular writers' fate. ("To be a best-selling writer", once remarked Ed McBane, "is to be guilty of white-collar crime" (Worpole, 1984: 21))

Taking the 1890s as the period when modernism emerges in Britain, an empirical study of the women writers born from 1870 can be undertaken using the biographical resource of the *Dictionary of Women Writers* (Todd, 1989). Omitting literary critics and historians, it is possible to survey the 155 remaining writers (novelists, playwrights, poets, children's writers) in order to discover the structure and volume of their economic, social and artistic capital. First, there is extraordinary convergence with the positions

---

10 It should be noted that the criteria for selection are not made entirely clear. Writers in the popular genres are quite properly not excluded for this reason alone, but they are sometimes included simply because of their personal following or historical interest rather than on literary grounds (eg Ngaio Marsh, Enid Blyton). However, this only affects at most 29 or 19% of the 155 writers in this period.
of male authors as detailed by Bourdieu for France. Women writers, too, have been overwhelmingly located in London or the Home Counties. While a common pattern has been a retreat in later life to the country, which could well be linked to the British cultural pleasure in the pastoral, the crucial element is that writing from uninterrupted experience of the rural periphery is virtually absent in this period. What is even more striking is that writing from industrial cities and towns outside London is also extremely rare, even for women of bourgeois origin. This distribution of writers suggests that there are whole communities, occupations and patterns of material existence which have yet to be portrayed in literature.

In terms of class origins, it is unfortunate that the fathers of women writers are not always described in terms of occupation or other economic determinants (33%). Of those women writers who can be so clearly designated, most are from the dominated fraction of the dominant class: they come from the families of liberal professionals (26% or 41/155), clergy (6% or 9/155) and the "state nobility" (the military elite, civil servants and politicians (6% or 10/155)). It is thus evident that there is a close relationship with the older "traditional intelligentsia" of Gramscian theory. Indeed, if we take the bourgeoisie proper in the sense of industrial or merchant capitalists and bankers - Bourdieu's dominant fraction of the dominant class - this site is surprisingly rare among the fathers of women writers in this period (only 6% or 9/155). This contrasts with the social origins of earlier cultural groups, such as the PreRaphaelite painters and poets, which were specifically from manufacturers (Williams, 1980). Perhaps also surprising is the fact that more of the women writers come from the aristocracy or large landowning class (8% or 12/155) than from the working class (6% or 10/155) or the petty-bourgeoisie (6% or 9/155). In brief, British women writers in the period of modernity come from the privileged strata, however fraught and dissentient their relationship with them. They have acquired the sense of distinction
which goes with this habitus, whatever their other resentments, competitive failures or unhappiness. In this respect too they simply duplicate the pattern of male writers (Bourdieu, 1993a, Gamboni, 1989, Charle, 1981).

In their choice of husband or partner, these patterns emerge even more strongly, especially the predominance of the dominated fraction of the dominant class. Some of these writers did not marry; 13 (or 8%) are stated to be single, with a further 22 whose status in this respect is less clearly defined. Of those who did marry, or who co-habited, 34% (53) of partners, by far the largest number, are from the liberal professions, and 10% (16) from the civil service, army or politicians. A tiny number - 4% (6) - come from industry or banking. Only one writer was married to a man doing manual labour (Jessie Kesson). A similarly small minority of partners as of fathers comes from the petty-bourgeoisie (5% or 7). The number from the aristocracy (or owners of large estates) had declined amongst the husbands in relation to the fathers from 12 to 3 (2%), while none were clergymen. Finally, only one of the partners was a farmer, a fact which also documents the predominantly urban character of this group. To use a rather different language of class, the brief details described in these writers' biographies allow us to glean that, whatever the personal tragedies or economic difficulties, their existence has passed within the broad borders of the upper middle class.

Bourdieu has pointed to the high cultural capital of modernist artists and writers in France from the 1850s onwards. The similarities in this sample of women writers, despite its inclusion of a minority from the popular genres, is quite remarkable. 79 of the women (51%) had acquired cultural capital through university, art school and drama college, of whom a further 7 also possessed postgraduate degrees. Thus these are not uneducated writers nor are they autodidacts, unaffected by the scheduled learning of the school. The key role of Oxbridge in particular in the production of writers is also
immediately apparent, with as many as 30 writers (19%) having attended Oxford or Cambridge colleges, seven of the writers graduating from Somerville alone. The most typical trajectory was a period of study at Oxford (22), Cambridge (8) or London University (15) preceded by attendance at private schools, either independents or Girls' Public Day School Trust (23 or 15%). Of course, generational membership is crucial in this respect, since access to universities has become progressively easier and families more prepared to pay for or support their girls' higher education. In the earlier period, of women born 1870-1895, there were relatively few women with higher education. Consequently as many as 35 (23%) of the writers listed had secondary education only, followed in the case of those with social capital, by finishing schools (7, 5%) or travel abroad (18 or 19%). Even as recently as the upbringing of the detective novelist, Baroness James (born 1920), however, families might be unprepared to finance their daughters at university, as in her case, while many of the earlier writers such as Radcliffe Hall (1880-1943) had been educated only by governesses (13, 8% of the total sample). Despite these, and the many important exceptions such as Woolf, Lessing, Spark and Prawer who did not go to university, the most frequent trajectory is the passage from boarding or high school, through one of the élite universities, before beginning a writing career. The rigorous formal education appropriate to a ruling class is thus combined with the esprit de corps of the reputable schools and colleges, producing the sense of distinction which facilitates achievement in the arts.

Even in the small number of writers with a lower class background, cultural capital has in most cases been achieved by meritocratic ascent. The case of Margaret Forster might be mentioned here, whose father was a fitter and who proceeded to grammar school, Somerville and to teaching before starting her literary career. Consequently, the numbers of women writers who - like Sheila Delaney - failed the 11+ or who were never considered worth
educating - like Flora Thompson - is a tiny fraction: a minority of a minority. Whatever the barriers to women's consecration as writers or their marginality in terms of modernism, in the post-war period they have not been negligibly endowed with (certified) cultural capital.

A recurrent feature of women writers' lives is the fact that they have what might be called flippantly, trouble with patriarchy. Unlike Mrs. Gaskell or Sarah Stickney Ellis, the personal lives of later women writers are strewn with affaires, unhappy marriages or in a minority of cases, the decision to become lesbian. The diversity of subjective meanings in these areas makes it extremely unwise to pretend to calibrate such experiences exactly but if to the single, divorced, those with affaires or unhappily married we added the small numbers of illegitimate writers instanced in the biographies, the proportion, half the writers fail to occupy normatively approved positions (78). It is difficult to estimate whether writing is a cause or consequence in these patterns, nor do we have comparative studies of male writers that might help to evaluate their meaning. Nevertheless, these dossiers of loss and frequent isolation do suggest that the woman writer has an understanding of the family which is at odds with the contemporary nostalgia for the patriarchal past. It is from these personal dislocations as well as the experience of different modes of production that the most significant works have emerged.

What has emerged with crystal clarity from the above survey of modern women writers is that there are vast tracts of British culture that have not yet been recorded in literary writing: ways of life and structures of feeling which have not yet been submitted to scrutiny. It is not just a question of the multiplicity of working-class perspectives that are missing, nor even the absence of black women writers, but that the nature of the industrial bourgeoisie and its impact on the country is itself still largely unrepresented. And when such areas have thrown up writers (eg Phyllis
Bentley, Jessie Kesson) it is they who are more exposed to the ravages of the collective literary memory.

Bourdieu's category of "middlebrow"

It is particularly interesting that, in the case of women's writing, canonisation can often occur late, and may be the work of a pioneering critic working outside the politics of the mainstream (as in the case of Emily Bronte, consecrated much later than Charlotte Bronte (Leavis, 1979:60) or Mrs. Gaskell, whose reputation owed much to Williams (1961). I want to discuss a category of accessible women author, more or less contemporary with high modernism, whose concerns are not uniquely those of the private sphere and who, for this reason, are engaged in a "woman to people discourse" as much as a "woman to woman" discourse (see Lovell, 1989:87-8). Whilst thus widening the subject of the novel they also demonstrate considerable narrative skills. Nor is their story-telling totally devoid of modernist technique, for devices such as the presentation of multiple realities, or even a Joycean stream of consciousness, are accommodated within a realist form. But the important point is that, in contrast with the most experimental products of modernism, which are dependent on decoding strategies accessible only to the few contemporary artistic producers, these writings bear some continuities with the realist works of the last century. Unlike the formulaic romance, this literature is free of the banality, the absence of risk and the collusion with a dominant ideology which ensues when a writer is solely concerned with instrumental values or, to paraphrase Weber's sharply-polarised dichotomy, "living off" rather than "living for" writing (Gerth and Mills, 1947).

It is necessary now to reassess Bourdieu's cultural theory in the light of this writing. He notes that middle-brow art, like legitimate art, is the product of professionals, but that it derives from "competition for conquest of the market" and that it is linked with the "self-censorship" of the writer so as
to appeal to the average reader (1993a:125-6). The middlebrow and the work of "pure art" are twins: both reveal a similar focus on professional technique and the logic of pure art leads the artist as much as the writer of popular fictions to by-pass serious economic and political issues (1993a:128). My suggestion is that this is too restrictive a view of the middlebrow and that it risks contributing to the very reification of cultural divisions Bourdieu desires to expose.

The inter-war novels of writers such as Winifred Holtby, Margaret Kennedy and Catherine Carswell, even some of Daphne du Maurier's writing (for example, *Rebecca*) cannot be described in these terms. Many of these novels were organised around a critical view of social and sexual inequality. Some are structured by a (middle-class) radicalism, and by the pacifism and internationalism generated by the First World War (Holtby, Jameson, West etc.), others, like Du Maurier and Compton Burnett, were informed by a paternalist conservatism. These ways of seeing are encoded within pliable realist forms which sketch out the lines of an extensive totality, even while

11Leavis herself identifies the middlebrow novels with their possession of a "herd instinct" "the appeal to recognition by others - in their thousands" (1932:43), characterised by their belief in social hierarchy and a distrust of art. She comments: "a middlebrow standard of values has been set up .. a middlebrow standard of values claiming moreover to represent literary enlightenment" (p.34). Within this category, two types are distinguished: first, the novels of Gilbert Frankau or Warwick Deeping in which the: "writers are using the techniques of Marie Corelli and Florence Barclay to work upon and solidify herd prejudice and to debase the emotional currency by touching grosely on fine things" (p.65), and secondly, a category including Wilder, Cather and Priestley: "respected middling novelists of blameless intentions and indubitable skill, "thoughtful", "cultured", "impressive" but lacking interest for the highbrow reader. From the latter's perspective, they are "all on the traditional model and therefore easy to respond to, yet with an appearance of originality". But Q.D. Leavis also defended the "proletarian" writing of Grace Lumpkin (Mulhern, 1979:147). It is in the light of this heterodox judgement that we might challenge the apparent transparency of this distinction between middlebrow and art.

12 However the middlebrow contrasts with aestheticist assumptions. More paradoxes exist: the "logic of the dialectic of distinction is continually liable to degenerate into an anomic quest for difference at any price" (1993 117), while middlebrow publics may also read the great works of the past, although these are always much too old-fashioned and much too easily-accessible to "prove" their cultivation (1984).

13 It should be noted that Winifred Holtby wrote the first biography of Virginia Woolf.
they may lack the sustained coruscating dialogues or layered complexity of design of, say, Joyce's *Ulysses*. But as Alison Light has cogently argued recently, the "historical squint" at canonical cultural elites has left aside other groups and obscured the ways in which such women writers were seeking to re-inscribe their own experiences of modernity within forms which were very familiar (Light: 8). High and low may thus share more than is at first suspected. Indeed, as in the writers above, the division between realism and modernism is itself one of the first classificatory victims of the critical encounter.

What if these so-called middlebrow novels represented also a repressed tradition of the new? Indeed, it is possible that they were suspect in literary terms precisely because, despite the freshness of their subjects, they sold well. What appears in the twentieth century as "middlebrow" exists as the "social novel" whose death Bourdieu describes in the face of the late nineteenth century rise of modernism. These female authors do not inhabit a literary space. For the most part living outside the arenas of the traditional ruling class, lacking the metropolitan and country houses of the ruling elite, the education at major public schools, they also lacked the power to cross the magic boundary into art.

Many of these uncanonised novels have their origins in the great impulse towards radicalism of the inter-war period with its manifestations in the democratisation of education, the seizure of power at local level to extend popular housing and to eliminate urban disease, the feminisation of the public sphere which extended to women the rational culture and choices of the bourgeois citizen. Thus, for example, Holtby's *South Riding* (1936) is focused on "the drama of English local government" and concerns the transition from the administration of the county by the feudal landed gentry ("whose God is order") to a new, bureaucratised progress. This is not the

---

14 This was a Book Society choice for 1936 (Brittain: 409)
"classless commonwealth of equals" which is the dream of both the heroine, a head-teacher, and her friend, a socialist printer. One narrative strand concerns the sense of loss at the destruction of hopes for "a new order of government, planning dignity, planning beauty, planning Enlightenment" (1936:126). But tradition no longer works either, its harsh loss signified by the rejection of the romance form. The unfulfilled love between the gentleman farmer and the young head-teacher is cut short by his death: passion and social position are doomed to be at war. Nevertheless, *South Riding* is the story of a new drama being played out: "daily revolutionising the lives of ... men and women" yet "part of the unseen pattern of the English landscape" (1936:5) From the Byzantine complexity of local interests, some meaning is saved. A new village is constructed out of wasteland to rehouse slum-dwellers. The trained energy of educated women can be put to realistic projects. Declaring that "I'm a spinster and, by God, I'm going to spin" (1936:67), the head-teacher channels her formidable work ethic into creating a democratic secondary school. The ending celebrates her rejection of suicide as she turns once more to healing the severed high and low cultures of Yorkshire life. If she will not cheat the working-class scholarship girl with her love of Shakespeare, she will also encourage the children to enjoy "the dogs, the speed-track, the films".

In this context, the uncanonised voice of Rebecca West can also be remembered. In *The Judge* (1980) (1922) she produced a narrative of infractions of patriarchy which has a tragic realism. Much as the warnings of a wise woman might, it serves as a double admonition, both to transcend "the old sexual story" but - more strikingly - of the dangers of flouting the patriarchal law and community common sense. Told partly through flashbacks, its principle dichotomy is between the compliant woman (Ellen's mother,) and the transgressive woman (her fiance's mother, Marion), both profoundly damaged in different ways by their men and the gender order. The
seventeen year-old Ellen defines her mother as a good child who has never snatched - "a specialist in disappointment" (1980:193) - who has reaped only a harvest of respectable self-annihilation. She dies anonymously as number 93 in a public hospital gulag:

and they looked for one moment into the long cavern of a ward, lit with the dreadful light that dwells in hospitals, while the healthy lie in darkness, that dreadful light which throbs like a headache and frets like a fever, the very colour of pain. This light is diffused all over the world in these inhuman parallelogrammatic cities of the sick ... (1980:183).

But this novel principally concerns those women who fly in the face of the patriarchal sense of order. Ellen's lover, Richard, is an illegitimate child. His mother's sin was the infraction of his father's feudal arranged marriage for the sake of a more passionate alliance; defined socially, therefore, in terms of excess, her punishment exerts a horrific cost. Seven months pregnant, she is stoned by the villagers and barely survives without miscarriage: she is thus driven to seek refuge from further sanctions by a marriage of convenience with her lover's butler. After her son is born, this servant's duplicitous rape - a "black sacrament" - produces another, unloved child who grows up indebted, unemployed, friendless. Marion herself exists through the concentration of every social impulse and sexual need into the love for her illegitimate son. The transgression of the normal patriarchal law creates an answering disharmony between the illegitimate and the legitimate sons. Richard, enjoying a surfeit of maternal love, possesses the flaw of contemptuousness beneath apparent heroism. He is a superman, beyond moral law:

Think of what sport industry's going to be during the next half-century while this business of capital and labour is being fought out, particularly to a man like me who is outside all interests, who,
thanks to you [his mother] doesn't belong to any class (1980:337). As the recipient of devotion, he has the strength for the chemist's lonely, intensive work, and is rewarded with the highest scientific honours, and a contract with "illimitable power ...over men and machines" (1980:339). But even through his engagement he possesses a passion for his mother which approaches sexual intimacy. After her suicide, this erupts in fratricide and a pact of death with Ellen. Thus despite her feminist disavowal of both older women's trajectories: "neither the dirty bed of gratification nor the harsh pallet of renunciation" (1980:80), Ellen is still destroyed by her love.

*The Judge* is also a narrative of nation. It turns in part on a Scotland/England contrast in which the Scottish Enlightenment figures as the critique of English feudalism (1980:96-7). Scotland permits a privileged seeing because it is free of the old order of estates - amongst its grocers are its city fathers, while it harbours much of the industry that sustains Britain. But it possesses also the oppressive voice of Calvinism that trumpets through the sanctimonious employer, destroying the peace of mind of the "wee typist" and ensuring her turn from work to the dependency of marriage. West thus continues the study of "unsensual" nations, through the story of a sexual schizophrenia akin to that of Stevenson's *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, but told through a female voice.

In these two examples, we can recognise powerful storytelling that can communicate to any intelligent reader. In explaining them it is possible to employ Bourdieu's own idea of symbolic domination, but to extend it towards a view of centre-periphery relations in which the periphery offers a different canon rather than being simply belated. The implications of Bourdieu's study of the modernist cultural fields can then be drawn out in ways that he has not yet pursued. Specifically, it is necessary to forgo the assumption that difference is always *detrimental to the periphery*, and to break with the kind of thinking in which everything new radiates from the
centre. Castelnuovo and Ginzburg explain this:

In the case in which one comes to recognise different canons, these will hardly be examined in their turn except on the basis of the dominant paradigm, by a procedure which gives birth to judgements of decadence, corruption, qualitative decline, vulgarity (1979: 58)

- a point with which these writers have taken issue in their study of medieval European art history, using as example the case of the "active resistance" of the twelfth century autonomous artists in the periphery at Chartres cathedral (1981:60-61). They suggest instead that innovation has many sources and that it often springs from "encounters of two cultures" (1981:62), from changes of public or changes in the artists' region.

In both cases of peripheral writer mentioned above, the women lacked sufficient means to support themselves without writing for a living: they were not inheritors. Both West and Holtby had cultural capital: West had been educated at a good Edinburgh school, despite the genteel poverty of a family abandoned by an ex-army Captain, who drifted into journalism. She herself turned to journalism (for the *Freewoman* and *Time and Tide*), while also being the mother of an illegitimate son. Holtby had an Oxford education at a time when this was still rare, just missing a First.

Holtby also possessed considerable social and symbolic capital: both her mother's and her father's family were long-established gentlemen farmers, she lived as a child on a farm of nine-hundred acres in the East Riding of Yorkshire, which was (and still is) feudal, self-enclosed and clannish. The claims on her time demanded by a conscience still trained in rural paternalism were later to conflict with the time for more aesthetic interests (Brittain, 1940), and the choice of a more accessible form for her writing perhaps springs from this same distance from egoistic individualism. Yet her

---

15 Of West, GB Shaw remarked "She could handle a pen as brilliantly as ever I could, and much more savagely".
family's life was also fundamentally changed by modernity in the form of an agricultural workers' strike which ruined her father financially and from which he never recovered.

This family trajectory of decline is overlaid by her own academic and professional success, as she became a headmistress like her main protagonist. Holtby's writing was also mediated by an artistic group of educated Northern women, among them Vera Brittain, Phyllis Bentley and Storm Jameson who acted as cultural accumulators, much as Bourdieu argues for the artistic habitus common to the Flaubert group in the second bohemia. Against the poets' colonies of Oxford, then, the distinctiveness of their origins and their feminism provided a sustaining wider identity for each writer.

**Popular Art and Cultural Distinction**

The model of the cultural field that Bourdieu has adopted must be understood as a historical socioanalysis of the repressions of a culture and a society. It is a cultural theory delivered in an ironic mode and stripped of any prescriptive or valorising dimension. Bourdieu's aim, then, is to follow the Durkheimian *Rules*, that is, to make an objective analysis of judgements of aesthetic value in other words, "to classify the classifiers" (Durkheim, 1974:87; Wolff, 1983: 48-9). In doing so, he proposes a theory of the nature of popular culture, characterising it solely by its ethical/political concerns, chief of which is the aim of integrating art and life. However, his studies of the historical genesis of art and literature have not yet elaborated on the clashes over cultural value in which some popular types or genres of writing are systematically excluded from the literary field, or their producers neglected. In contrast, within the parallel field of the critical analysis of religion sociological studies of disputes have adopted a less restrictive approach. Troeltsch, for example, described sectarians' disputes with the Churches.
about theological and pastoral principles such as the literal interpretation of biblical rules or the nature of a poor church.

In Bourdieu's analysis of the art-worlds of capitalist societies, *there is no popular art* (1992:83; 1993c). This view has been opposed most vigorously by Shusterman who has accused Bourdieu of accepting too readily the dominant class's hostility to popular art, evident in the diatribes against kitsch in the works of leading American writers such as Gans and Greenberg:

Bourdieu, ... rigorously exposes the hidden economy and veiled interests of the so-called disinterested aesthetic of high culture but nonetheless remains too enchanted by the myth he demystifies to acknowledge the existence of any legitimate popular aesthetic (1992:172).

Against Bourdieu, Shusterman has argued brilliantly for the claims of rap as a complex, politically responsive, popular art-form in the hands of its most talented performers. At best, he argues, Bourdieu's arguments about the absence of popular art apply only to French society and French cultural institutions, which may indeed have obscured the artistic expression of working-class experience. In fact it is clear that Bourdieu accepts the maturity of the popular arts in pre-capitalist societies, but that he denies the possibility of their existence within capitalist modernity. This position is at odds with other historians, notably American, who are increasingly unwilling to demarcate a stable, elevated tradition from degraded popular genres, arguing that such classifications are in a state of constant evolution (Levine: 1988: 241; Ross, 1989). The case of jazz in the US offers further evidence for Shusterman's case. Jazz grew up precisely in working-class urban areas like St Louis, rather than in the pre-capitalist cotton fields of Alabama. It is a musical expression which depends equally both on tradition and on the principle of innovation and it is jazz that is at the root of all subsequent rock and roll and much so-called commercial music (Ross, 1989: ch. 3). Yet when...
Bourdieu discusses jazz in the French context of *Distinction*, he refers to it solely as an area to which heresiarch bourgeois children take flight, seeking refuge from overcrowded areas of consecrated art.

Why should Bourdieu have held this view? He argues

We could say of certain populist exaltations of "popular culture" that they are the "pastorals" of our epoch ... As an inverted celebration of the principles that undergird social hierarchies, the pastoral confers upon the dominated a nobility based upon their adjustment to their condition and on their submission to the established order (think of the cult of argot or slang and more generally, of "popular language", of the passésiste extolling of the peasants of old or, in another genre of the glorifying descriptions of the criminal underworld or, today, of the veneration of rap music in certain circles (1983c: 83).

The rationale for Bourdieu's position derives from both Marxist and Weberian cultural theory (see, for example, Goldmann, 1964: 56, where a similar dismissal of all popular art occurs). Unlike a straightforward materialism, Bourdieu does not see financial barriers as the main obstacle to production. His argument can be summarised briefly:

First, the cultural producers of the dominant class have themselves produced a counterfeit popular art, for by attaching the label "popular" onto a work, they can be credited with disinterestedness. This in turn is the basis of a claim to distinction. Thus for Bourdieu, what is passed off as popular is in fact populist: "The Brechtian alienation can be the gap through which the intellectual affirms, even in the heart of popular art, his distance from popular art, so as to make popular art intellectually acceptable and ... more profoundly, his distance from the people [as the means of gaining the profits of distinction]." This position has the merit of repeating Marx's attack on Sue for disguising his *Les Mysteres de Paris* as a genuinely popular novel when it was the work of a professional writer (*The German Ideology*).
Secondly, there is a claim that the existing popular culture in bourgeois societies takes other forms than those of art, a view of which Williams in *Culture and Society* was the most notable exponent, although he was later to abandon it (1980: 213-232). For this reason Bourdieu argues that working-class culture can be brought to view only through the democratisation of the hermeneutic posture (1993b: 923), a practice that occurs under the aegis of social science, and not through the proletarian novel or today, rap.

Fourthly, there is a pre-eminence of the professional in all forms of modern art, with the exception of naifs, who lack any viable independent existence (see ch. III, above). Bourdieu's concept of artistic habitus and practice also depends on a model of the professional artist gauging his actions in the light of knowledge of the prior history of art. This model of practice relies, I suspect, on Bourdieu's tacit theoretical debt to Weber. Weber claimed that musical developments in the West had been structured through a radically anti-traditional organisation and techniques, which was pioneered by professionals within the churches (1958 [1921]). For example, in the Western religious and secular musical structures a revolutionary new harmonic system based on thirds and fifths had ushered in a contrapuntal polyphony, with its characteristic forms such as the fugue, sonata and symphony. But Weber's assessment of a rational progression of musical form was also blind to the new and traditional popular music which emerged autonomously alongside the main professional centres in the West and which, like jazz later, was to be increasingly recuperated within Western music.

---

16A parallel musical technology based on a formalised notation - permitting chords to be played both between and vertically within staves - produced new levels of unprecedented complexity and predictability for group performance. Weber argues that so fundamental are these musical assumptions that even when atonal music is composed, as a dialectical reaction to tonality, it still relates back to the expectations generated by tonal forms. This seems to resemble very closely Bourdieu's notion of "heresiarch" projects in modernism which depend closely on the artistic orthodoxy of the classical tradition.
Bourdieu does instance cases of such recuperation, but his account lacks any adequate assessment of what is to be recuperated. This is a theory of parasitism in which the host organism has only a shadowy presence.

Bourdieu's position has certain justifications. There are enormous obstacles for painters and writers writing from within the working-class. Indeed, the frequency of the autobiographical novel among those who have manual occupations can be explained precisely because it is the literary form most easily mastered in the absence of the necessary time to develop an artistic habitus. Even within these terms, women's occupations and experience have only rarely been considered sufficiently dignified to merit the attention of readers (Corrigan, 1991). The "proletarian" writing of Greenwood (1986 (1933)), Smedley (1977 (1929)), Commons (1951) and others conform to this type since it requires little literary investment compared with other genres. Indeed, in a view very similar to Bourdieu's, Roy Johnson has argued that there is only one British working-class novel which could be said to have any value in literary terms: Grassic Gibbon's The Soots Quair. "[There is] a complex problematic poised to arrest the development of a form which is difficult enough to master anyway, given the shortage of time, cultural education and opportunity for undisturbed reflection which is generally available to the working-class." (1975: 94). In effect, Johnson is using an appeal to cultural capital to explain the absence of such skills. Despite these apparent materialist credentials, I shall suggest that both his and Bourdieu's views verge on a racism of class and are ultimately too restrictive.

It is not that Bourdieu denies the existence of a popular culture, as will be readily grasped if his work on photography and on other forms of consumption is understood. It is rather that he regards the socialisation into language as a socialisation into the recognition of symbolic power. The only circumstances in which such power is effectively subverted are in the tightly circumscribed areas in which the working-class has an autonomous domain -
in cafes, prisons, and the underworld, where slang expresses "a vision, developed essentially to combat feminine (or effeminate) "weakness" and "submissiveness" through which the men most deprived of economic and cultural capital grasp their virile identity and perceive a social world conceived purely in terms of toughness" (1991: 96).

Bourdieu's argument rests too much on a zero-sum formulation. For despite these constraints of language, British historical studies have shown how independent cultures emerged in factories and mines, particularly where these have been located within a homogeneous community, or linked with workers' libraries. Even the existence of a dominated language cannot inhibit all popular artistic developments within it. Again, it is no accident that in Britain the richest of these developments have leant on the culturally rich vernaculars of the Scottish and Welsh (Ortega, 1982: 141). The training necessary to express such popular literary and artistic needs depends on the availability of some leisure, but not essentially on professional skills, (see, for example Levine, Becker, op.cit. and Moorhouse, 1991:174, 180).

In brief, Bourdieu's arguments are powerful but finally unconvincing. It is mistaken to exclude from consideration the novels of miners (such as Lewis Jones, who wrote Cwmardy in trade union meetings) or the autobiographical novels of Afro-American women such as Maya Angelou, who wrote her extraordinary Tell Me How The Caged Bird Sings after full-time work as a bus-conductor. If the education of a Proust is the only possible twentieth century equipment for writing, then not only the writing of working-class authors, but the writings of many young people, ethnic minorities - even the post-colonial novelists - would have to be dismissed: indeed the absence of any discussion of youth culture is significant given Bourdieu's enormous span of subjects. Thus in this respect, we should

17 There is a brief discussion of the nineteenth century regional or industrial novel in The Field of Cultural Production, but it is subsumed under the category of "entertainment", even if only ironically.
seek to explore the cultural field quite differently from Bourdieu, by challenging his category of "entertainment" and leaving open the possibility that works of artistic value might appear outside the field of bohemia and modernism. In other words, we should develop the theory of plebeian intellectuals, so far only used by Bourdieu in the analysis of philosophy and fascism.

In Britain, we can trace one such line of descent, creating an alternative canon which is by no means a secure component of the Great Tradition, yet from which the popular romance, the detective novel - and even the American dime novel have constantly drawn. The tradition of working-class novels began with the great unfinished *Sunshine and Shadows*, by the wool-comber and architect of the Chartist Land Plan, Thomas Wheeler. Although its lack of an ending suggests an uneasy rupture with more orthodox devices of narrative closure, its harsh images of the confining nature of early industrial capitalism, its redundant and harried artisan hero, its extraordinary distopia of cottonopolis and metropolis show the working-class becoming for the first time the subject of its own literary experiments. Wheeler's novel is at the furthest pole from the enclosed, almost parochial class realities of later industrial fiction. It creates an epic perspective on the colonial world arena, as in the vivid narrative of transportation to the West Indies where the hero sees the substitution of one form of unfree labour (indentured) for another (slavery), and reflects on the similarities between the Caribbean worker and the British factory-worker.

The best-known of this tradition is the *Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, in which a vigorous, Bunyanesque prose is deployed to undo the effects of misrecognition in the protagonists' Daily Obscurer. In the difficult path of wresting the mind from common-sense the novel is used - with flat characters and immense objective detail - as sermons had been used to popularise Puritanism. Part of this relies on the caricatural assembly of
minor characters so as to undermine the doxic respectability of the ruling class. Hence such figures as Sir Graball d'Encloseland (the squire), Slyme (the slavish model worker, Misery), the foreman who delivers work known to be shoddy, Rushton, Didlum and Grinder, the decorating firm and the Church of the Shining Light, an organisation for hypocrisy and mystification, all of whom derive from the long plebeian habit of cocking a snook at authority. *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*’ greatest strengths are in its depiction of its central figures’ degradation of labour - the worm in the bud of craft skills. Owen, its housepainter hero, is the living embodiment of an ideal of workmanship but condemned to forgo the exercise of his knowledge. In particular, the novel reveals the paradox of a global system of communication which makes available to workers Persian and Indian designs, but at the same time denies their capacity to develop or reproduce them. Hence the poignant pleasures of decorating the Moorish room for an exceptional customer where the creative side of his skill can be shown. The division of labour and decline of craftsmanship had been described many times, but it has been rarely expressed with such inner passion before.

Grassic Gibbon's *A Scots Quair* is justifiably the most securely consecrated of these fictions, not least for its depiction of the "elimination of the Scottish peasantry" in *Sunset Song*. But it is also technically ambitious, for Gibbon's use of classic realism is intertwined with modernist techniques, such as Cloud Howe's polyphonic voices. Its power derives from the complexity of its vision, and especially from the tension between the naive belief in progress of its youthful factory labourer and the cyclical peasant stoicism of his country mother, creating an unresolved and dialectical tension within the novel.

The limited canonisation of Gibbon should not distract from the wealth of other working-class novels - modernist and realist, pessimistic or visionary. In terms of the current interest in cultural hybridity, an earlier
generation of powerful migrant authors should be remembered, James Handley, for his Liverpool/Irish novels (*An End and a Beginning* for example), or Patrick MacGill for his novel cycle *Children of the Dead End, Moleskin Joe, The Rat-pit* and *Glenmornan* (1983, 1915?), a composite picture of the "fistic" culture, the hopes, above all of the stoic resilience of the Irish navvies whose historic contribution was to build the reservoirs, railways and hydroelectric works in Scotland. It also tells the story - to illuminate, to advise, to warn - of the Irish women hired in gangs for Lowland potato picking and more selectively for sexual services. Written at a time when 17,000 women were reckoned to be prostitutes in Glasgow alone, *The Rat-Pit*, especially, reveals the trap specific to female migrant workers, the links binding manufacturing and sexual wage-labour.

The novels of diaspora, proletarianisation and work have been largely the products of men. For this reason, Ethel Carnie (Holdsworth)'s *This Slavery* (1925) is unusual. It centres on women workers in a Lancashire textile mill. Their experience is conveyed through the story of two sisters, Hester, who enters a loveless marriage to a mill master - and Rachel, who becomes a strike leader. At the climax, as the workers starve in a bitter strike, Hester unexpectedly retails news gained confidentially from another employer. After her speech, which reveals the masters' secret powerlessness, she is killed by soldiers called out by the employers. The strike, nevertheless, succeeds. In this novel, it is a woman, Rachel, who criticises the economistic restrictiveness of many trade unionists, and Rachel who reads *Capital* and dreams. Less lyrical but more compelling than her dreams are the novel's small realist details, of women's tiredness, for example, or of hunger: "We seem to do nothing but talk and think about grub ... Our bodies get in the way. We're a set of pigs kept grovelling in the ground.".. or again, in ironical reflections on workers' endurance: "To starve quietly, unobtrusively and without demonstration, is perhaps the greatest art civilisation has forced on
the masses" (1925: 190).

From this brief survey, it appears that Shusterman is right when he argues that in Bourdieu's sociology of art there is no possibility of canonising existing popular culture. But this is not because Bourdieu rules out a priori such a possibility. It is more likely to be due to the better-entrenched "nobility of culture" in France than in Britain or America. To this extent it could be argued that in his cultural theory Bourdieu has been partially "captured" by dominant ideology himself. Bourdieu's classification of the cultural field - like Goldmann's before him - leans too much on the values of the priestly or mandarin strata. It must problematise these further. In doing so it should further reveal the objective force that such values acquire, in this case those between high and low culture, operating so as to censor out classifications of popular genres in terms of literary value. It might thus reveal further the relationship between plebeian intellectuals and folk history, as Bourdieu has already broached in his theory of working-class culture and the carnivalesque. For, as Ricoeur has suggested, from such texts also may be generated an important social "imaginary" or utopian hopes (Ricoeur, 1991).

Conclusion

One aim of this chapter has been to show that although Bourdieu has considered masculine domination as an aspect of symbolic violence, he has failed to follow through all the implications of this. Bourdieu has used Woolf, but his deployment of To The Lighthouse shows only how women indirectly sustain male political and economic power by finding such power attractive. He fails to ask whether the lower survival-value of women's texts might not be evidence of their reduced ability to represent themselves rather than be represented, as Said has concluded is the case with Orientalism. A major achievement of feminist literary theory is to have shown how women's texts have been excluded from the arena of consecrating activities. Due to
somewhat different mechanisms, the similar exclusion of the literature of labour has necessitated its periodic recovery (Klaus, 1982.).

Bourdieu has shown that the knowledge necessary to adequately decode aesthetic texts has been denied the subordinate class. I have shown that the division of the cultural field into "serious" and "commercial literature" cannot be totally separated from the gender of the implied reader, as Lovell has claimed in relation to the low literary esteem of woman to woman discourse (1987: 132).

The main argument in this chapter is that the problematic division between modernist art and middlebrow or popular entertainment has to be confronted more centrally. I have shown that in the case of women, cultural capital can be linked to "middlebrow" texts. I have challenged Bourdieu's view that in capitalism it is impossible to find popular art alongside the literature of the dominant class and genre. Rather than argue that it is only after a revolutionary transformation of schoolteaching that working-class children will have the tools for deciphering art, I want to claim that there is a production of artistic texts now, but that this is hidden and unconsecrated. Thus popular and women's writing is doomed to be seen as "ethical" or "political" rather than literary.
Chapter VII
Cultural Consumption

Bourdieu's works, *Distinction* (1984) and *The Production of Belief* (1980a) are based in part on empirical studies of reading and readers' tastes. My own work on women's uses of literacy is aimed at assessing, in Scotland, the impact of class on culture. But it is less pessimistic than Bourdieu's tragic cynicism. It suggests that disagreements over literary pleasure, and other conflicts in the terrain of cultural politics, have a more complex relationship to the readers' class position than Bourdieu supposes. In comparison with France, my study suggests a less direct relationship between class of origin and cultural consumption. It reveals the greater role of social mobility in this area and indicates that it is premature to dismiss any hopes of art as a weapon of emancipation.

Bourdieu distinguishes four groups, those with "legitimate" taste; those with popular culture; those with middlebrow taste, who know only the most accessible works of the masters and finally, the autodidacts (a variant of middlebrow taste), who have acquired their knowledge of high culture through the insecure route of self-education. Such groupings are basically determined by the polar opposition between legitimate and popular culture.

Decodings of art vary according to educational level, by class and by gender. Bourdieu stresses that much art and literature is indecipherable to those who do not have the intellectual "route-maps" to chart its meaning and significance.

Such an ironic assessment of the meaning of culture does indeed contain a brilliant display of insight into class antagonisms, and into the preconditions for the assurance of the cultural "nobility" (1984:24). Bourdieu
sees the possession of such legitimate culture as partly a quantifiable product, defined by how much "cultural capital", or education conferring approved cultural skills, is possessed. It is also partly a qualitative disposition or ethos, which he calls the "aesthetic attitude". The heart of this ethos, according to Bourdieu, is the negation of popular culture, with its taste for realism, its unquestioned moral and political judgements and its pleasure in renowned natural beauties (sunset, tropical paradise etc). In contrast, the inner meaning of the legitimate "aesthetic attitude" is the principle of form or style. The commitment to style creates both a highly-allusive culture and also the "symbolic violence" with which popular culture is abhorred. It is marked also by a refusal to take things seriously, that is, the insistence on a game-like detachment.

High cultural capital results in a disinterested, non-utilitarian "investment" in legitimate works, metaphorical or literal. Yet it, too, turns out to be "dripping in blood from every pore" as Marx said of economic capital. For its bearers are those with inherited wealth or old money and it is expressed through an aesthetic disposition or attitude: "which tends to bracket off the nature and function of the object represented and to exclude any "naive" reaction - horror at the horrible, desire for the desirable, pious reverence for the sacred - along with all purely ethical responses, in order to concentrate solely on the mode of representation [or form]." (1984:54).

Those without cultural capital remain in what Kant and Bourdieu call, provocatively, barbarism. The popular aesthetic embodies a "naive gaze", portraying as beautiful objects such as snowy mountains and attractive young women, while excluding from artistic representation objects such as
cabbages or butcher's shops, which are viewed as "ugly" or "meaningless". Popular readers look for a strong plot, with well-demarcated characters, concluding in a happy and logical ending. Melodrama is a paradigmatic case with a strong, clear morality or set of political principles. Such popular aesthetics revolve simultaneously around a taste for glittering, sumptuous consumption and holidays as relaxation from scarcity (for example, gilt furniture, carnivals), pleasure in the subversion of the pretensions of the great (as in pub comedians) and a desire for ethical reaffirmation (as in melodramatic narrative). Popular "barbarism" binds individuals in solidarity, whereas consecrated taste is marked by the pleasure in individual uniqueness and originality. These qualities are empirically linked to economic success.

However, this analysis of popular culture has one omission. Working class culture, at least in Britain, has incorporated its own formal attack on form. Is there no French equivalent to punk, which implied calculated stylistic aggression against consecrated culture and against all expensive cultural forms, with its conspicuous "bad taste" in safety-pinned noses, crude hair-dyes, and profane cheap synthetics? Bourdieu fails to see how such subversive, often non-verbal jokes about dominant culture validate the subordinate world-view. If new and vivid images can be such an important ingredient of the politics of popular culture, Bourdieu's dichotomy between the aesthetic disposition

---

1 Bourdieu has not explained adequately all his own findings. Table 2 (1984:36) shows that the highest number of respondents who thought that cabbages could indeed make an interesting photograph did indeed come from the most highly-educated groups. However, he neglects to explain how respectively 67.5% and 49% of the two most educated groups found such a subject either meaningless or ugly.

2 This attack originated among art-students, but it was taken up and amplified within the working-class. On punk, see Hebdige, 1979: 44-5; 65-6.
and popular taste begins to be more difficult to sustain.\(^3\)

*The Scottish Study.*

In my own research, I looked particularly at the consumers' motivations, that is, whether people searched for entertainment and fantasy alone or whether they enjoyed the knowledge acquired through realist forms. Early interviews revealed that further debates - such as that between modernism and critical realism - had little meaning to my respondents, so this issue has been ignored. However, the art/entertainment dichotomy separates "art" from entertaining diversions which depend on a magical interference with reality, by substituting an ego-sustaining armoury in place of truth. It is this division of taste which most concerned me.\(^4\)

I initially classified cultural consumption in the reading groups according to Bourdieu's categories. The criteria used were derived from literature only, whereas other art forms figure prominently in the French study. I also allocated women to groups by a less rigorous and intimidating method, for where Bourdieu examined the extent of knowledge, I have simply reported the respondents' stated preferences. Thus in the final classification the category of "barbarism" was rejected in favour of less ironic labels, designating, first, those whose taste was for "formulaic"

---

\(^3\)Garnham and Williams have in my view misread Bourdieu's work as a valorisation of popular culture. On the contrary, it is only possible to understand Bourdieu's quote from Kraus ("If I have to choose between two evils, I choose neither" (1984:466)) as meaning that both popular and legitimate culture are distorted forms within the class structures of late capitalism. Bourdieu's contrast between "form" and "function" recalls Schiller's indictment of a society split into different social types: the speculative or analytical spirit which admires form, but in which imagination and sympathy is lacking; the business spirit and the sensuous spirit of the uneducated people, limited entirely by their function (1954 (1793-5): Sixth Letter).

\(^4\)Bourdieu (1980a:270) interprets critical or visionary art as expressing only a transient interest in demystification on the part of young intellectuals and professionals before they attain power. He neglects to examine those historical moments when such interests permit a fusion of the radical intelligentsia with the working-class, or with a national movement of liberation.
romance; second, those enjoying less formulaic, transgressive romance and family sagas, and, third, those inheriting a radical canon, hostile to romance. To these groups I added Bourdieu's original designation of legitimate and middlebrow groups, the latter distinguished from the former by its knowledge of "minor works of major arts".

There are then five readership groups:-

(i) Legitimate taste
(ii) Middlebrow taste
(iii) Radical canon of popular literature
(iv) Non-formulaic, or less formulaic, un canonised women's fiction: the "Cookson" group.
(v) Formulaic romantic fiction

Altogether 115 women from the West of Scotland were interviewed in 1986-7, with 34 consenting to a second discussion after reading two novels which I lent them.

Each woman was asked her "favourite" writers and whether there were any writers they disliked. In order to discover more precisely their preferences, I constructed a list of novelists with representative titles, avoiding the most familiar classics, such as Jane Eyre or Oliver Twist, so as to assess more easily the real cultural cleavages between women. Titles were necessary since for many popular readers it was titles rather than authors which served as keys to memory. Catherine Cookson, Barbara Cartland, Colleen McCullough, Victoria Holt and Maisie Mosco were included as currently popular writers whose books belong to different sub-genres. There then followed a group of three contemporary writers occupying different ideological positions but all likely to be included in the future in university curricula: Marge Piercy, Doris Lessing and Margaret Drabble.
Dead canonised writers were exemplified by George Eliot (Middlemarch and Mill on the Floss specified), Thomas Hardy (Jude the Obscure) and Lewis Grassic Gibbon (A Scots Quair), with Robert Tressell's Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists as the most celebrated novel of the unofficial radical canon. Women were also asked their responses to various genres, including "romantic fiction", a deliberately ambiguous designation which those with middlebrow or legitimate taste sometimes found puzzling, ("Is War and Peace romantic fiction?" asked one reader, not without justification). I also included historical fiction, thrillers and detective stories; science fiction; Mills and Boon novels. Those who reported a dislike of the genre of "romantic fiction" were asked to give their reasons.

Introducing the Groups: Cultural Attitudes and their Social Parameters.

Legitimate Culture

The criteria adopted to measure legitimate culture was knowledge of writers who represented the official literary culture of modern Britain as designated by their inclusion on the curriculum of the school or university. Familiarity with these texts is viewed by Bourdieu as the possession of cultural capital. No attempt was made to define the acquisition of legitimate culture in terms of an attachment to the "aesthetic attitude," or the consideration of art in terms of form or beauty alone. Instead I decided to assess empirically how often readers' knowledge of legitimate culture led to the adoption of a formalist aesthetic attitude, in which questions of style are central, as opposed to the ideas or politics of the texts.

Insert Table I

The Range of Reading.

Pleasure in legitimate works is most often linked to disdain for romantic fiction and the expression of a sense of pollution by it. For example, one
woman asked to read Marie Joseph's formulaic story, Lisa Logan, exploded: "It's the epitome of all I hate! It's so badly written I felt depressed, in a black mood, the whole time I was reading it." However, legitimate culture does not automatically bestow a visceral intolerance towards contemporary romantic fiction. A minority who had acquired a disposition favourable to "serious fiction" occasionally read a Mills and Boon novel. They confessed these private, behind-the-scenes departures from legitimate taste as I imagine Kinsey's respondents must have yielded up their perversions for scientific scrutiny, fully aware of the pejorative connotations of such consumption in the perspective of the intelligentsia. The more profound their sense of inner distinction or election; the more legitimate their usual diet, the more these women neutralized their deviance. They exonerated their occasional incursions into commercial culture with reference to illness, fatigue or the need for light reading on holiday or in travelling. Yet condescension towards the formulaic romantic novel was not a monopoly of the legitimate cultural group, for such denigration emerged strongly amongst many of the "Cookson" and radical canon groups. These dismissals were framed with reference to the youth, senility, ignorance or traditionalist femininity displayed by romantic fiction devotees.

So deeply entrenched are high cultural fortifications against the besieging barbarian forces of downmarket kitsch that only two of those possessing legitimate taste were prepared to flaunt their omnivorous reading. In this respect, the claims of postmodernist theorists that both high and popular culture are consumed today by the same groups are wide of the mark. Symptomatically, the two women concerned subtly subverted

---

5 Two in the sample; a further two outside it.
official cultural taboos by singing the praises of romantic fiction precisely as the narcotic antidote to modern angst or depression; stressing that romances comforted them through the appeal of their nursery-rhyme moral certainties, the reassuring cadences of uniform structure and the dependable excitement of the strong plot. Their opinions are perhaps also a key to the aesthetic views of those women with a predilection for such fiction, who were not always articulate about the reasons for their enjoyment of the romantic novels they read so avidly.

It was also notable that the few legitimate readers who still occasionally turn to Mills and Boon have working class origins and are in professional or administrative work within the public sector. In this respect, they lend some support to Lash and Urry's view of the distinctively catholic postmodernist tastes of the new service class, who alternate between popular and high culture. Moreover, while the traditional romance was generally held in disdain by legitimate readers, the quasi-feminist romance, by writers such as Barbara Taylor Bradford, Shirley Conran or Judith Krantz was less contaminating, and might be chosen for holiday reading.

As the traditional romance genre is the bearer of women's duties to love and fulfill their social obligations within the sphere of the family, it is hardly surprising that the "emancipated" women so often repudiated it. This latter group was most evident in the "legitimate" category. Within the formulaic romance, the quest for independence is conflated with greed for wealth, luxury and an overblown id: small wonder, then, that for these women shifting from modern literary fiction to such a genre disturbs the fragile economy of the psyche.

6Lash and Urry, 1987: 244-7.
The Middlebrow Culture

Middlebrow readers displayed a deference to legitimate culture and a pleasure in being associated with it. But without higher education in youth, the route to its acquisition was long and hard: hence there occurred the substitution of easier works for the heavier ones, a process which Bourdieu calls "allodoxia" (1984:323). Many of these readers, and those of the "Cookson" group, had promised themselves that they would undertake this more difficult reading at a later date: "I'm going to read all the classics when I retire", commented one middle-aged clerk in a characteristic declaration.

New imitations of well-established legitimate culture were popular amongst the middlebrow group. The success of The Edwardian Country Woman's Diary exemplifies this phenomenon, in which respectability was linked both to reproduction of the old and to images of natural harmony. It can be connected, too, to the deference to the dominant class within middlebrow novels, a characteristic noted by Queenie Leavis in the inter-war period and still evident in the literature favoured by this group (1979:64-5,70).

However although the middlebrow mainstream can be categorised by its "cultural goodwill", there are difficulties in allocating some middlebrow individuals to the group. Such women offered examples of writers whom they have read as prescribed authors (Balzac, Jane Austen, Tolstoy), but they also quote best-selling popular texts, for example Dennis Wheatley's thrillers and Marguerite Steen's and Judith Krantz's romances. This suggests that genre fiction or romanticised biography offers the most lasting memories of unparalleled literary pleasure. Such oscillation between dutiful conformity to a culture associated with authority and a guilty pleasure in best-selling works is one mark of the petty-bourgeois
middlebrow group, who, like the radical public, constantly lamented lack of
time for reading.

Yet, on closer inspection, the middlebrow classification is an umbrella
over mutually exclusive readerships. One quite divergent group is the
category of thriller devotees, which I have placed under this heading. Such
women appreciated particularly female writers such as Agatha Christie, P.D.
James and Emma Latham. They also enjoyed certain male writers like
Dashiel Hammett, although other best-selling male authors, most notably Ian
Fleming, failed to elicit any praise from the women interviewed. The group of
thriller readers were least in awe of "highbrows". Another quite distinct
category liked the fantasy epics of the Stephen Donaldson type, while
several younger readers referred to science fiction, especially Isaac Asimov,
Ray Bradbury, Frank Herbert and Anne McCaffrey. A third type, particularly
widespread amongst older women, possessed a "negative aesthetic of
respectability" revolving around the excision of swear words and the
maintenance of a discreet silence about sexuality. These readers often
preferred nineteenth and early twentieth century novels and were happiest
with a fiction that was only partially secularised. Such ascetic values served
to cut them off from writers of currently popular family romances.
However, their social world-view was remarkably congruent with those
underpinning the family romances, especially their work ethic, their
celebration of women's invisible labour and their longing for a rural
community.

Middlebrow readers of this type are not in tune with the modern world.
They live out their lives in a spirit of nostalgia, feeling a sense of loss
and lack of control as dominant structures of feeling. In brief, the
middlebrow group presents a longing to be cultured but a profound realisation of their inadequate means.

Popular Culture

The Radical Canon

Although they are unlike the women with legitimate culture in lacking the formal education in which older elements of culture have been prescribed, readers of the radical canon treasure the "unconsecrated" radical pantheon of socialist or working class writers. Emile Zola's *Germinal*, Lewis Jones' *Cwmardy* and *We Live*, Jack London's *The Iron Heel*, Lewis Grassic Gibbons' *A Soots Quair* are the texts of the labour movement, which have circulated by word of mouth recommendation for decades amongst groups of both women and men. Some of these novels are, or have been until the 1970s, totally excluded from academic culture, such as *Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, "the painters' bible". Yet others have been belatedly recognised by legitimate culture such as Zola or Grassic Gibbon. However, although the discovery of these novels often gives the working class public a pleasure in reading which is not merely "entertainment", their long hours of work limited the frequency and range of their self-education. Moreover, even where the radical canon was the cultural core of their world, other reading, purely for pleasure, was done as well. Thrillers or Catherine Cookson's novels were most often reported in this context. Thus individuals often possess catholic tastes and a wide stock of knowledge which floods irrepressibly out of any typology adopted for classification.

This group was particularly hostile to the reliance of other lower class women on the escapist dreams offered by the romance. "They'd do better organising, than reading that rubbish and crying their eyes out" said one such
reader. "What do you need fantasy for if you are going to change the world?"
asked another.

Non-Formulaic but Uncanonised Women's Fiction: The "Cookson" group.

As we have seen, Bourdieu's popular aesthetic is a mixture of sensual "spectacular delights" and works structured by political or ethical imperatives. "Cookson" readers had no higher education but were sufficiently perspicacious to require elements of realism rather than social myths within their novels. They wished to educate themselves when they read. However pleasure in fantasies of individual happiness, especially a vision of well-deserved material success, were still important redemptive elements for these women. Thus most of them saw reading as primarily about light entertainment and only secondly about instruction. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table I, thirteen of them, just under a third, had read some of the English and Scottish classics. These readers showed a sophistication about the formulaic novel which was absent among the majority of the romantic fiction group. However, they looked for historical novels in particular and were unhappy with realist novels about the present, especially those written from a critical perspective. They also rejected naturalist novels revealing only the surface of working class existence, many readers criticising the absence of strong plots or the inadequate development of characters. Although it was not uncommon for either the "Cookson" readers or middlebrow readers to have some acquaintance with British canonised novels especially those of the Brontes, Dickens and Hardy, they were happiest reading both recycled versions of old romances or the family romances of Colleen McCulloch, Catherine Cookson and Barbara Taylor Bradford in which the heroine displayed strength and independence as well as acquiring the inevitable material success. From these often highly articulate popular
readers emerged a *popular canon*: writers who were considered to be of very good quality, but selected independently of the judgements of those with consecrated taste.

Analysis of the favourite writers of the readers of popular culture shows that the authors who most often appear are: Catherine Cookson, who elicited nineteen spontaneous commendations; Virginia Andrews, mentioned by seven women; Barbara Taylor Bradford, with six references, Agatha Christie, with five, Christine Marion Fraser, with four, and Margaret Thompson Davis, with three. If these were mentioned spontaneously as the favourite writers of these groups, a category of "anathematised writers" might also be constructed. Although specific writers were disliked by individuals and although women were mostly repelled by the science fiction and horror genres, only one woman writer elicited constant disapprobation. This was Barbara Cartland, concerning whom one distillery-worker asked, bitterly: "What does she know about us, or care?" As well as this respondent, from the radical category, eleven of the "Cookson" group and three from the romantic fiction group emphasised their antagonism to the values represented by Cartland. The "Cookson" group, which was distinguished by its greater readiness to accept new ideas and its more developed cultural range, was also unlike the romantic fiction group in being able to name the writers whom they preferred. In contrast, the relative lack of importance in making analytical judgements about their reading is indicated by the fact that as many as a quarter of the romantic fiction group could not recall which writers they disliked. The "Cookson" group, that is, the individuals who preferred the more modern popular women writers, appeared to have been much more selective, for only four out of the thirty-nine who answered this question were unable to give the names of disapproved writers.
The Formulaic Romance Group

This group was distinguished from others by their degree of unqualified commitment to romantic love stories as a genre. They all replied in the affirmative when asked whether they liked either Mills and Boon or romantic love stories. However even these readers parodied a type of sentimental story which they considered only suitable for young girls, using terms like "lovey dovey" or "mushy" to indicate their disgust. As we shall see many of these women stressed their preference for "fiction" and, in particular, for a novel world constructed around idealised principles. The romantic fiction category wanted stories that were moulded closely to their fantasy needs rather than to the realist depiction of specific social types. They consciously linked romance reading to the harrowing or enervating experiences they had had during the day: reading at night was an equivalent to a strong drink. Given this overwhelming need for relief through fantasy it is not surprising that this group was less selective about their reading; their intense commitment was to romance as a genre rather than to distinctive creative writers. This has led in at least one library in the West of Scotland to the development of an elaborate hieroglyphics amongst the readers. In order to eliminate the undesirable potential for re-reading, each reader resorted to her own mark - a flower, initials, etc. under the lending slip, as a permanent tally of her use.

Insert Table II

Class and Reading Preference

The Class Origins and Destiny of Each Reading Group
To what extent are these cultural groups class-determined? Or, to put it in Bourdieu's terms, how far are we witnessing one part of a transformation process in which economic capital is converted into cultural capital, later to be converted back into economic capital in the form of educational credentials for high-income job advancement? Working with the imperfect Registrar-General's occupational codes for class, both expected and unexpected relationships emerge. As might be anticipated, a major gulf in the women's occupations existed as between the romantic fiction group at one pole and the legitimate culture group at the other, the former possessing a higher class position than that of the popular culture groups and the middlebrow closer to the higher class positions of the legitimate culture group. The "Cookson" or non-formulaic romance category, together with the tiny radical canon, were constituted partly by the cleaners and factory workers who dominated the formulaic romance group, partly by a greater proportion of clerical workers, sales workers and primary school teachers. These groupings were reproduced constantly in response to my questions, suggesting that beneath the shifting and brilliant kaleidoscope of individual attitudes were stable and deep-rooted differences in social experience and world-views. The association between relatively high class position and legitimate culture on the one hand and low class position and formulaic fictional choice on the other hand seems to suggest that Bourdieu is correct to argue that the real determinate basis for culture is the closeness or distance from material necessity, or from the urgent practical matters of everyday life.

However the matter is not quite as simple as it first appears. Within this legitimate culture group were women who have or have had working class jobs and who left school at the earliest opportunity, women
who lacked the educational achievements and class comforts normally associated with the enjoyment of legitimate works. For example, an elderly print worker talked of her voracious reading of Russian classic novels and a Marks and Spencer sales assistant in her late fifties, as the mother of nine, commented that she had always had romantic fiction banned from her house. Her own reading was nineteenth century English and Russian novels, particularly those recommended in her sons' booklists as they trained to be teachers. The disparate social locations of a minority of individuals with legitimate culture needs to be acknowledged, although overall the pattern is the predictable one.

The romantic fiction group was composed of the greatest number of women from semi- and unskilled labour (class 4 and 5) and only two lower professionals, nurses, whose categorisation in these instances as class 2 was less a mark of great professional expertise than the outcome of poor coding rules. As many as 48 per cent of the romantic fiction group appear formally to be "non-manual" because of their preponderance in shop assistant and secretarial work, however only one-fifth of their husbands were in non-manual jobs. As far as could be judged from the interviews, their identities were working class. There is a stark difference between these women and those of the legitimate culture group, with one member in class 1, fourteen of their members in class 2, 91 per cent in the non-manual categories and with 78 per cent of their partners similarly non-manual. Fifteen or 58 per cent of the women with legitimate culture had higher education but only four (15 per cent) of the next closest group possessed middlebrow or petty-bourgeois taste, and none of the popular culture groupings.

In general the Scottish study replicates Bourdieu's findings that class plays a key role in creating the disposition or "habitus" in which
to master legitimate literature. Class positions distributed the decision of the arena within which to read, the propensity to return to literature for education as against immediate entertainment, the delight in fantasy. Put another way, class determined the nature of the social contract of readers with writers. To a lesser extent, their material distance from privation also influenced their hostility to romantic fiction. Indeed, as more women remain in the labour market, I would expect this class cleavage to increase. The community of women at home which was, in the nineteenth century, the social base of the patriarchal romance, will be progressively eroded. It is for these reasons that I am sceptical of Peter Mann's conclusions that formulaic romance reading is "that much better than what might be called the "mass" taste" and that among its readers are "a fair number of reasonably well-educated women" (1969:12).

In one respect the Scottish legitimate culture group can be distinguished sharply from Bourdieu's similar French group; that is, in the character of their social class origins. In France this group was from professional and large employer/top manager background: only for these did the academic demands of the school possess an affinity with the aspirations, ideas and concepts of their parents. In Scotland, however, the origin of the twenty-six women with legitimate culture were more varied, with ten having working class backgrounds. Surprisingly, in this respect their origins were more diverse than that of the middlebrow women. Nor were the working class fathers of the legitimate group all from the labour aristocracy. They include a porter, two labourers, two factory workers (unskilled), a forestry worker, chauffeur and boiler maker. Thus just under a half of the fathers of those with legitimate culture were non-manual workers, in comparison with the more comfortably-placed two-thirds of fathers from the middlebrow group fathers.
The greatest contrast is then between the middlebrow and the romantic fiction group, in which only two of the 23 fathers had non-manual jobs, or the radical canon group, in which only one of the five fathers was non-manual.

How are we to interpret the surprisingly diverse class origins of those with legitimate culture? One possible explanation would be that the results are an artificial consequence of differences in methodology rather than any real break in the circuit proposed by Bourdieu: "economic capital produces cultural capital, which is transformed in turn into economic capital". By selecting questions referring to literature rather than photography and painting, by reliance on the claims to knowledge rather than tests of knowledge, my results may have expanded the category of sophisticated readers beyond the number that would have been yielded by the French approach. It is also true that my respondents were gathered more from the dominated fraction of the dominant class, that is, because of their gender and the disproportionately few older women in this group, they were in a relatively low position on the professional or administrative career ladders. This is matched by their tendency to prefer recent writers, valued for charting areas of experience hitherto unexplored in literature.

A more likely explanation, in my view, is that the transformation of economic capital into legitimate culture is not such a simple mechanism of conversion as Bourdieu's theory suggests. In other words, to amend his image of "the aristocracy" of taste, in Scotland, at least, there is also a "nouveau riche" cultural group whose possession of legitimate culture derives entirely from school. The growth of this class fraction corresponds to the specific conjuncture of post-war late capitalism until about 1973. It represents an extension of the general law of capital accumulation resulting in the state's expansion of the welfare sector and the growth of private services (Payne,
1987: 123, 127). This is a political mechanism permitting the stabilisation of the dominant class: a counter-tendency to the process of the economic destruction of the older petty-bourgeoisie (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, 1980: ch 1.).

What we are witnessing in this educational rise of the daughters of working-class men and women is a growth of the intermediate stratum. This stratum, cut off from the immense economic power and wealth of the bourgeoisie, has nevertheless acquired a level of economic comfort and security lacked by their parents. This has been called the development of the "new services" occupations, classified as class 2, and requiring educational credentials for entry. If this is right, then Bourdieu has over-simplified the nature and effect of the "symbolic violence" he claims is employed in school by the denial of working-class culture. Despite his category of the "new petty-bourgeoisie", social mobility is mentioned in the French study only briefly, and usually in the context of the inflation of educational credentials (1984: 137). My research supports findings suggesting that, in situations of high employment, some working-class children find their desire to learn and the availability of good jobs triumphs over any disillusionment. Furthermore, the strong Scottish meritocratic ethos in the education system introduces an element of conflict with the conservative cultural trend of secondary school education. It thus operates so as to permit a small stream of lower-class children up the academic escalator. Finally a small group of women had been forced to leave school at the lowest legal age to contribute to family income, but had developed a preference for the serious novels of

---

7Bourdieu and Passeron's Les Heritiers, however, identifies such a strand of working-class girls whose docility to authority makes them receptive to pedagogic authority (1964:93).
legitimate culture rather than formulaic fiction. Such women had acquired an inner confidence about their own intelligence, confirmed by requests from their teachers to stay on, but had been blocked by their position in the class structure. They later developed their own education when they had sufficient leisure opportunities. The Marks and Spencer's shop assistant, referred to earlier, was interviewed when she was re-reading Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*. She commented:

If I'm going learn something from it then I'll try it. Some people are not interested in learning - that doesn't mean to say they are stupid, but they just want something to relieve the drabness and give a wee bit of pleasure for an hour or two.

Her husband had started at fourteen as an apprentice joiner and was now a construction manager in a firm operating on large contracts. They had, she said, always wanted to "better" themselves, materially and through education.

We've always had lots of books in the house. Do you remember the stalls in the Barrows where you could get poetry books for sixpence or a shilling? When we didn't have more than twopence we used to spend it on books. My husband and I were one-offs. How did we get this idea? There was something in the individual that wanted this education. Also, looking back I can remember thinking "some day I'll get to the other side of that railway wall!" I left school at twelve and started out as a labourer in a biscuit factory, later I became a dressmaker. I had eleven children, nine lived, and as they got older they used to bring their books in and we'd discuss them. It's difficult to keep on reading as you're learning your children, but later Frank, who was training to be a teacher, introduced me to Russian novels..."."
Another four women had also become "autodidacts". These respondents had been strongly influenced by the labour movement in which they or their families had been closely involved. One representative of this category is a shorthand-typist, an ex-shop assistant, now serving on a Family Panel, whose husband moved from skilled working-class to management work. Her reading was sparked off by her socialist grandfather, who challenged her Catholic cosmology with his Darwinian views on evolution, and by her husband, who was thrown out of his family home for atheism. A major influence on their lives was their local Communist party branch in the 1940s. She commented wryly:

I'm getting into poetry gradually - Sappho for example. I've read Homer's *Odyssey* twice, I like Greek myths, Robert Graves' *I Claudius*... I'm very fond of Shakespeare, and of some modern writers, Graham Greene and George Orwell, for example. I like to re-read several times to absorb the critical views of the writers.

A lab technician had a father who was a strong I.L.P. man, the solitary ferryman on the Finnieston ferry. He introduced her to the anarchist theory of Guy Aldred and to the novels of Upton Sinclair, Jack London, Howard Spring, Howard Fast, Robert Tressell, Ethel Mannin and Grassic Gibbon. This was her way in to the wide range of writers she currently reads, including Jane Austen, Simone de Beauvoir, Guy McCrone and Marge Piercy.

Another ex-shop assistant, who became a manageress, had her intellectual development fostered by both her own family and by her husband. The education of women had been important for her parents, her grandmother having attended the classes of John MacLean, the Scottish socialist and teacher of political economy, who died in jail as a conscientious objector in World War One. She herself regards "all books [as] a form of escapism for
everyone" but would never use romantic fiction such as Mills and Boon: "I agree that's what the reader wants but it's got nothing to do with my image of life... They are just pure fantasy...which gives them a sense that life would be wonderful for them...you pick up such books and gain nothing from them." She feeds her own desire for "enlightenment" from the news and her reading, although she added "I don't think stories give you hope...I don't think anything gives you hope."

Five of the six "autodidacts" interviewed had been influenced strongly by the various radical traditions inherited within their families, to the service of which these women actively place their energies. None of them, in addition, had known great poverty. A generation gap is obvious: those who went to school before the Second World War valued education and felt that class, or, more strongly, social injustice, had deprived them of further schooling; younger women had to overcome working-class anti-intellectualism. While the latter had initially protected them from internalising the modern "bourgeois" or dominant class view equating personal worth with academic achievement, these particular people had also been exposed to countervailing perspectives. Chief among these were the immigrant's respect for literacy, or the radical slogan "knowledge is power". Through these routes the young women could maintain their distance from the anti-educational elements of the peer group.

The romantic fiction readers lack both economic capital and knowledge of high culture. Class and the dependency of women are linked together in the romantic fiction category but within two sharply defined sub-groups, in which the act of reading has different meanings. The first group of women could be said to exist on a precarious cliff from which they are constantly threatened with the removal of the attributes of individualism, (such as the
right to financial decision-making and to independence of movement), to be thrown into a pit of servility and insecurity. More than any other group of women they were dogged by crises: the sudden deaths in their forties and fifties of their husbands or nervous breakdown lasting for years at a time, traumatic marriages in which they were the victims of battering, absentee husbands, long term unemployment. They were additionally exposed, as women, to charges of intellectual inferiority. If not physically vulnerable, then, they lacked confidence: their conversation was punctuated by self-criticisms as to their stupidity or ignorance. As I shall show, these represented a particularly privatised group, cut off from involvement in public political issues and unable to see a solution to their grievances. Such grievances seemed all the more hopeless from their experience of the sacrifices made by their men in working class employment. Acutely aware of poverty, the greatest number were nevertheless limited in their capacity to understand the class structure by the coexistence of fatalism with an individualist vision of society. Representative individuals can be chosen to illustrate these points.

A cook who had been unemployed for several years was an avid reader of Mills and Boon, as well as of Agatha Christie. She was medically unfit for work and looked much older than her thirty-one years. Heart failures resulting from constitutional weakness had allowed her husband to gain the legal custody of her children after divorce. "I have a friend", she said, "who has 296 Mills and Boon and she passes them on to me. My friend was thinking of setting up a second-hand bookshop. All Mills and Boon are good but each is completely different from the others...I tried War and Peace once, but shut it half-way through - oh my goodness. I couldn'ae understand it." She also produced one of the clearest statements I was given of the wrongs of
women: "we should have better jobs for women. They should have better pay and the right to speak; women are often just told to "shut up".

A girl of nineteen, the daughter of a migrant Asian market trader, had been unemployed since leaving school three years ago. She oscillated between anorexic self-punishment and blithe optimism that she was "on the road to success" and would soon acquire the good clerical job for which her commercial skills qualified her. The alternative to unemployment was sales work within the shops of the Indian community, which she had already tried, where pay was as little as £50 for sometimes a seven-day week. She read Mills and Boon and Enid Blyton, recalling that *Fiddler on the Roof* had been the one book that had made an impact on her. "Mills and Boon is just to relax your mind, a pastime...the truth is covered up in almost any book I've read."

An ex-nurse, Jane Bishop, who had left school at fifteen, commented: "I'm not very bright." One of the two lower professionals in this group, she recently separated from her husband, an optician, after a long and unhappy marriage. She is now in her early forties.

I wasn't allowed any friends - I think I would have had more liberty in jail than with my husband. I was a nurse before I married but there were pressures on me not to take a job although we had no children. I couldn't have a job because we moved around. He just wanted someone to cook and clean and run after him: a second mother, not a wife! I've settled down since I left him (I was down to six stone). The doctors said I wasn't fit to work and might not be able to cope even with the Refuge [Women's Aid Refuge]: now it's my name on the rent book and on the front door.

She read romances, especially when married "[maybe] it was to compensate for what I wasn't getting in the marriage". She still enjoyed Mills and Boon,
Silhouette and other romantic fiction, as well as "mysteries" by P.D. James, Dick Francis and Frederick Forsyth. Reading mainly in bed at night, Jane preferred a formulaic novel with a happy ending: "unhappy endings don't make me sleepy".

In sharp contrast, another group of formulaic romance readers were working women, with husbands in skilled or lower managerial jobs, who felt their lives to be well under control. These women had low occupational aspirations, stable jobs, a strong family consciousness and happy marriages: although not without their problems, the desire for more freedom was alien to them. They were also better off financially than their parents and economically secure; experiences which perhaps prompted them to define British society as free from deep-rooted conflicts of interest. Within this perspective, romantic fiction was valued both for its epic qualities and for its reassertion of their assumptions of how things "ought to be". The hero represented a positive, exemplary figure, a modern counterpart of the idealised nobleman of feudal epics. Reading the romance had a redemptive effect not dissimilar to the ritual of daily prayers. These women were not looking for art but for the fiction embodying community values, or a version of them.

Some of the multiple deprivations found in the first romantic fiction category similarly affected the "Cookson" group or the non-formulaic romance readers, to be offset by a stronger culture of resistance in their own families. Thus experiences of material and family crises had pushed these women, too, into depression and nervous breakdown on occasion, leading them into the spasmodic search for the immediate magical escapes bestowed by romance or thrillers. At other periods, their suffering receded, allowing them a greater freedom. One objective then was to develop their understanding of the world through reading novels. Whereas the genre
romantic fiction readers, looking back from old age, would stress the hard lives they have had, for these women the intermittent character of money worries or ill health gave them, in their more stable periods, the material and psychological basis to explore ideas - the history of Glasgow (as in the novels of Jan Webster), Cornish tin mining via Susan Howatch, the Irish potato famine through the stories of E.V. Thompson. Even here, however, there was a positive evaluation of fantasy escapes, as in the much greater tolerance of happy endings, or "not too much reality" as one reader put it. It becomes clear now what sustains Cookson's recipe of demystification plus fairy tale ending. It is the uneasy coexistence of a desire for knowledge as well as the more sharply-felt search for oblivion, the latter requiring a pursuit of illusion to rekindle the flames of hope. In contrast, the greater secularisation of thought and the more comfortable material lives of the legitimate culture group endowed them with sufficient psychological reserves to accept realism, even cast in those modernist forms dominated by angst and despair. Of course, all fiction offers a form of enjoyable escape by educating the reader about a world which is not his or her own, but the vast majority of readers of modern best-selling women's fiction disliked realism unembellished by any of the traditional figures of hope. In contrast, a majority of middle class women with legitimate culture said they could face depressing novels even if they were themselves depressed. I am suggesting then that class shapes the pattern of needs to be satisfied in the personal leisure/pleasure economy so that the search for magical escapes via fantasy is more often found in the most exploited or oppressed groups.

There is a paradox here that I have found throughout these interviews: those with the worst lives, who were most in need of the knowledge conveyed in literature, were least likely to have access to it. Those
with the most comfortable lives enjoyed the insights of realism needed by others.

If class has this vital role I am attributing to it in determining the taste for types of fiction, what of the largely working-class readership for the radical canon? Such women turn to socialist literature in general and working class novels in particular. These are, of course, realist works and thus include a bleak analysis of deprivation, mass cyclical unemployment and the resort to fascism. However they also developed from the problematic hero of middle class novels a collective, positive hero (the working class itself) which is the embodiment of their hopes for human transformation and whose leadership expresses the utopian potential for rational control. The readers of the radical canon rejected the nihilist assumptions informing some literary modernism, arguing instead for a less atomistic conception of society. Still imbued with the conclusion that humans can intervene to shape history, the novels they read were underpinned by the same world views and hopes. Thus the pessimistic gaze of realism was balanced for them by awareness of alternative possibilities, the individualistic fantasy of the romance replaced by the active role of the dominated class. Take, for example, Marion Munro, 59, whose first job at 14 was in a chemist's shop. There she was influenced by an older man who told her "remember: use your vote", instructed her on health and gave her books to read. "Being at work I began to read and that became my university". Later she became a machine operator at Rolls Royce and tells (with ironic tones) of how she had to argue for improved wages for the skilled women workers by comparing them with a group of unskilled male floor-sweepers! At this time, she participated in the production of a woman shop steward's play, which was taken to the local Palace of Arts in Glasgow and shown to all the workers. Recently she had become interested in Indian
philosophy and Green issues, although still an active socialist. She liked "stories about the working class, especially by Zola - it sounded awfully cruel but it was a cruel hard world. *Germinial* [the account of a nine months' long miners' strike in France ending in defeat] is a particular favourite, also Lewis Grassic Gibbon...if you have time!" Another member of this group said, "I was born a trade-unionist!" (N.U.M. canteen manageress, ex-sample). She especially liked Tressell's *Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists*: "That novel always confirms you in your socialism. I read books when I'm feeling depressed to remember how much people had to suffer to gain our basic rights, even going to jail. That gives me a boost." She found Cookson and romantic fiction "too repetitive".

The middlebrow group had fewer educational achievements and lower occupational positions than the legitimate culture group although their social origins were more often middle class. They had no aspirations to what they termed "highbrow taste", but they carefully distinguished their preferences from the profane enjoyment of Mills and Boon and other romantic fiction writers. A typical comment was made by a single woman of 58 who was an export checker on the shop-floor of Collins' publishing house: *Pride and Prejudice* is a brilliant book. I'm trying to get my nieces onto the classics - don't start reading Mills and Boon!" However, although she liked *War and Peace* she comments that "if I can't get in after two pages then I get rid of them!". She enjoys cowboy stories and historical fiction as well as the nineteenth century "classics", although more detailed enquiry revealed she had read none of the works of George Eliot or Thomas Hardy. Clearly for her

---

56% of the middlebrow group had middlebrow fathers (44% of them lower professionals). In comparison, only 46% of the legitimate group had middle-class fathers, and of these, only 35% were lower professionals.
novels also serve important wish-fulfilment functions: "I like some that start at the bottom and struggles - or maybe a doctor doing something brilliant I'd like to do...but I like something down to earth as well".

It is useful to distinguish sub-groups within the middlebrow category. Many women perceived literary culture as an area of timeless, universal, human values to be appreciated rather as nature might be enjoyed in a reserve within an urban industrial region. "Culture" here has connotations of a refuge from actual life rather than as a shock to preconceptions (see Freud, 1964:188; Leavis,1979: 70). Jane Smith typified these attitudes. She alternated between horror stories and the works of John Galsworthy, John Masefield and other representatives of the traditional English intelligentsia, whose writings valorize imperialism, elitism and old money. Another respondent, Marjorie Lindsay, was also peculiarly consistent in her use of culture as a retreat from modernity, apparent in both her impassioned defence of the traditional regulation of sexuality in fiction and the importance of an uncorrupted, purified language. Her perception was shaped by a sense of social and cultural decline from a more healthily religious epoch.

An assistant librarian showed another pattern of the middlebrow group, a sense of awe and respect towards Literature coupled with an immediate delight in older romantic fiction or readable biographies of bohemian artists: "If you've read a lot of the classical novels, you demand more - many modern novels are just ephemeral. They must come up to a standard of plot or they don't involve me - for example The Agony and the Ecstasy does do this." Her uses of literacy have to be linked also to her wider world-view, which was shaped by the experiences of an upwardly-mobile father. Identifying with her father, this middle-aged woman exuded contempt for local working class trade-unionism, voicing instead a commitment to the
market and to a rigorous work ethic. Moreover in her case the oscillation between striving for "culture" and enjoying spontaneously the pleasures of romantic fiction were linked to her tremendous ascetic struggle to achieve education for the sake of a career.

Many non-manual members of this group distinguished themselves from "highbrows", but also distanced themselves from the readers of mere pulp fiction by emphasizing their enjoyment of the neo-medieval epics of writers such as Stephen Donaldson or of the thriller as a form. Thriller writers were sometimes spontaneously evaluated in ideological terms: "I like Dashiell Hammett because he has a social conscience," commented one secretary. Within the middlebrow circle was a subgroup of readers such as this woman who explicitly mentioned both lack of money and lack of time as precluding serious reading. These respondents viewed such deprivations as channelling their energies away from otherwise desirable objectives, one of which was the consumption of expensive new books by feminist publishers.

Reading, Pleasures and Belief

Bourdieu has described cultural stratification as creating variations in the predispositions adopted towards literature and other arts. Developing these in a different direction from Bourdieu, the respondents' divergent needs for realism, fantasy and utopia were explored by including a series of questions about their views of the purpose of literature. Of course there are underlying motivations which are difficult to establish through interviews and may not be adequately represented here, for example, the view that the possession of culture characterises a spiritual elite and that such knowledge cannot be distributed universally (Bourdieu, 1984:466-500; Simmel,
1978:440). However, by asking whether readers liked a formula, enjoyed an imaginary world or desired a record of direct experience, I was seeking to uncover what lay behind emotional reactions and heterogeneous fictional preferences, to haul into the light of consciousness the readers' latent preconceptions. Unprepared as many of the women were for this line of enquiry, their answers did reveal the same lines of fissure in opinion observed on earlier matters.

The romantic fiction and the legitimate group were consistently polarised. The legitimate group searched in literature for the underlying truth about people, and about their own society in particular. A member of this group, a music teacher, threw out a surprising comment which illustrated this:

My son is much more interested in football than in reading any books. I think you find so much about people from novels. I would rather he never played an instrument than that he gave up reading.

*Insert Table III: Attitudes to Literature*

For the romantic fiction group, conversely, literature had the status of story-telling. Their novels were clearly perceived as "fiction", an illusory reality still associated with the child-like pleasure of simple forms. For its fans, the traditional romance had the status of mythology, divorced from their experience of late capitalism. Thus the shell of fairytale form was still intact and preserved the charm of wish-fulfilment, while the duty of representation of reality was conferred uniquely on television and newspapers (See, Benjamin, 1973: 83-109). It is true that the romantic fiction group were still prone to make deprecating comments: "That's too far-fetched", which shared some qualities of the legitimate distaste for unrealistic fantasy. Yet their primary investment was in fiction as a
technology of "coping". Between these two groups, with their incompatible choices of realism and fantasy, the other readers lived out various intermediary positions.

I asked the question: "Do you like books or stories about how things really are?", an enquiry which purposely left ambiguous the definition of reality. The legitimate group all replied affirmatively. Despite the powerful norm of realism in literary theory (or perhaps unaware of it), the majority of romantic fiction readers did not want realism (58%; 15). Such a response emerged clearly in the interview with a retired cook, who joked about her constant reading ("I shall die with a book in my hands!"). She wanted her novels to be light, "entertaining" stories, instancing the writing of Victoria Holt, Jeffrey Archer and Sydney Sheldon. Similarly, another romantic fiction reader declared innocently: "I prefer to think about happy things."

Interestingly, the "Cookson" group was much closer to the legitimate public on this question, with 67% (28) turning to the novels for realism. The greater retreatism of the middlebrow group was mirrored in their lesser preference for "things as they really are" in comparison with the "Cookson" readership (50% versus 67%). Unsurprisingly, the radical canon group were all champions of a realist aesthetic.

The romantic fiction readers did not mistake their best-selling formula fiction for realism. Very few were "cultural dopes". Only eight readers, a small fraction of this group, said that the romantic novels or People's Friend fiction that they enjoyed revealed images of social reality. These particular women demonstrated both profound conservatism and patriarchal preconceptions: their everyday discourse harmonised with the fictional discourse of much romance.
When asked if they would like to read more stories about ordinary people and their problems, such as unemployment or housing, the same stark polarisation emerged, with 70% (19) of the legitimate group reacting positively. Only half of the romantic fiction group said this would appeal to them, while almost as many, eleven, turned their backs on realism. A typical negative reply stated a reluctance to read a novel for "what you can find in newspapers" or a more deep-rooted aversion to representations of conflict or alienation.

This can also be linked to the enjoyment of a formulaic structure, a concept which had to be explained to many readers. While it is commonplace for critics to differentiate between "serious" and genre fiction, in which the latter are distinguished in terms of uniform narrative or ideological structures, other readers' reactions to formulaic devices have not been clearly mapped. I asked: "Do you like books to be written to a formula? This may include a good twist at the end. For example, a heroine is introduced, has plenty of adventures and ends up getting her man."

None of the legitimate group enjoyed the romantic formula. Indeed, 23 (85%) actively disliked it, for the question often elicited a nauseated disgust. Yet the romantic fiction readers reversed this, twenty, or 77%, linking their pleasure to such a mythic narrative structure and the play of stereotypes. As on other issues, the "Cookson" group straddled the two camps evenly, while middlebrow taste was closer to the negative recoil of those with legitimate culture. The middlebrow response was summed up by a primary teacher: "I love the Brontes, Jane Austen and the classics, but I usually read modern writers. I had read about six Cooksons and six Wilbur Smiths, but after that I

9Three of the legitimate group stipulated that their interest would depend on how well-written the novel was.
had worked out their formula. I gave them up because they were too predictable. Interestingly, the positive thriller formula was much more acceptable than the romantic formula, perhaps because of its weaker links with the culture of traditional women.

Implicit in the formulaic structure are certain conceptions of heroism. Leading male protagonists are overwhelmingly either gentry, businessmen or professionals. Readers were asked whether the publishers' view that this is what they wanted was accurate. Again, reactions varied according to the readership group. Twenty of the romantic fiction group preferred such heroes and only one disliked them. On the other hand, the legitimate group responded much more negatively: ten disliked such heroes and only four liked them.

Asked whether "ordinary people" could be heroes, the same constellation of group responses emerged, with a majority of romantic fiction readers stating that they disliked such heroes (nine against; seven for), whereas all the legitimate group answered affirmatively.

This matter is less trivial than it first appears. Although the romance can be interpreted as a parable of unalienated society, it is instructive that so many of the lower class readers of popular fiction could accept only members of the dominant class as candidates for idealisation. Implicitly this suggests that the good fortune of such heroes is deserved. This assumption is part of the architecture of conservative fantasy, although precisely how such fantasies and images effect political actions is a notoriously complex question.

Do readers like happy outcomes? Predictably, the kaleidoscope of opinion crystallized into similar patterns in answer to this question. Only

---

10Again the middlebrow and "Cookson" group were divided on this, while the radical canon group responded as the legitimate readers had done.
of the 26 legitimate readers and ten (24%) of the "Cookson" readers answered affirmatively, in comparison with fourteen (53%) of the romantic fiction group. If Kermode is right in regarding the happy ending of the Victorian novel as a sign of trust in the social order or a belief in progress, the readership for formulaic fiction still retained such social optimism (see Kermode, 1967:64). Their preferred genre displayed recycled elements of the Victorian novel. Such readers were distanced from the pessimism of many forms of modernism.

Finally, my respondents were given four possible rationales for reading fiction and were asked to consider how many described their own motives. The proffered reasons were:- "distraction and pleasure from reading", interest in "a record of lived experience", pleasure in "an imagined world of harmony with a happy ending" and a concern for "the critical ideas of the writers". This question acted as an accurate barometer of all the "cultural indications" elicited by earlier questions. Once again, the predilection of the formulaic fiction group was for novels as distraction or pleasure. They could not conceive of an interest in the critical ideas of writers. Yet as many as fifteen (56%) of the legitimate group chose this as at least one of the reasons why they read, along with a smaller proportion (12 or 28%) of the "Cookson" group. Other women, from the various popular culture groups, made disarmingly self-deprecating comments about their capacity to understand critical ideas: "Interest in the writers' critical ideas? Oh no, that's far beyond me!" (Secretary, 40-60, "Cookson" group.)

It is possible that popular readers might have enjoyed social criticism without recognising it in these terms: telling against this interpretation, however, was the fact that even interest in literature as a record of lived experience seemed to vary. Only nine of the twenty-six romantic fiction readers mentioned a concern for fiction which embodied
such experience. For the legitimate, "Cookson" and radical groups, however, this was a key role for novelists - and was related to their perception that they could write a novel about their own personal experiences. Indeed, these readers responded positively and with great warmth to this account of their reasons for reading. In contrast such an interest in realism was not viewed as important by the middlebrow readers, many of whom self-consciously pursued "fictions": only a minority of this group had any commitment to the representation of lived experience.

In conclusion, while bearing in mind all Brecht wrote about drama for pleasure as the means of extending people's ideas, interviews do bear out the momentous significance of the disposition towards "instruction" or serious art, rather than "entertainment". For 30% of the readers - the proportion sharply varying in the different reader groups - the role of the writer as bearing witness to the truth and acting as a critical, dissident or even prophetic figure, is unknown or devalued. In addition, the novel as a form in which experience can be encoded for a contemporary or later public is unimportant for large numbers of popular readers. Thus for many of the working class and middle class women who are members of the world of best-selling fiction, the ideological universe is closely stitched up and unified. Such readers must bear any discontents they have as individual deprivations, shared at most with others in their immediate communities. They remain unaware of a tradition of opposition or dissent in literature. As I shall show too, the majority remain in ignorance of the historical moments when working class resistance and demands for popular rights have been most concerted and formidable.

What were the other defences of escapism made by readers of romantic fiction? This section aims to recover and clarify the meanings of romantic
fiction in the perspectives of its readers. The needs of popular readers for imaginary alternatives to their present narrow and unsatisfactory lives led to a temporary refuge in the world as a magical garden. The belief in miracles may have lost its revealed, theologically ratified basis but human needs produce brief suspensions of disenchantment. Such miraculous subversions of social laws can produce outcomes embodying the suppressed hopes of daily existence, an elaborated sigh of "If only....".

First, then, a number of women referred to the vicarious sexual pleasures of the romance. An elderly cleaner listened tolerantly while other women around her criticised the genre: "Well" said she, producing a large pile of Mills and Boon novels, "when I go off to my bed alone, I like to take these with me!". An unemployed girl of nineteen, of Indian origin, qualified her commitment to the Mills and Boon genre by saying "Yes, I do like them, but you never read them when you've got a man of your own." Publishers of formulaic fiction issue precise instruction to writers on their representations of sexuality, some colour-coding their products so the consumer can tell immediately the degree of eroticism promised. Aficionados pointed with irony to the recent narrative strategies used to permit the liberalisation of the genre, yet also to the rapid satiating of the public for "bodice-rippers". Romantic fiction, to use Roland Barthes' terms, provides pleasure rather than bliss, that is to say, its images of desire must succumb to social regulation (1975). However even within this genre, the emerging diversity of formulae reveal shifts in need between different categories of women, as for example, houseworkers and paid workers, older and younger generations.

Secondly, the magazines and romances provided fantasies of power and plenty. Within these fantasies, the wishful image of sexually attractive heroes are to be unadulterated by alien traces of mundane reality. One of
the romantic fiction group, Margaret MacKenzie, also a cleaner, had been through a disastrous period of physical assault from her first husband, an alcoholic who parcelled out his life between home and jail. Her comments on magazine romance in which a young girl marries an impecunious fruit farmer revealed her conception of a proper hero: "You can't have a hero who is a fruit farmer! He should be someone like a millionaire businessman and the heroine should be his secretary." This emphasis on the material plenitude summoned up by the proper ending of a romantic story was sharply at variance with the attention to non-material issues in much minority cultural criticism of the bourgeois epoch.

The association of the hero with the status conceptions of the dominant class was also made crystal clear by Jill Wheelwright. She belonged to the "Cookson" group and enjoyed detective stories and horror stories, while her favourite writers included Victoria Holt, Colleen McCulloch, Susan Howatch and John Masefield:

I enjoy...not too much reality. I accept that it's not real but I can get enough reality in everyday life. I like to enjoy what I read because there's enough that's depressing. I accept that the lowly shepherd is just as much a gentleman as the great man in his castle but that doesn't mean that I want to read about him.

A houseworker of 50, Jill is the wife of a despatch clerk and the daughter of a policeman. She expressed great distaste for realist works, such as Joan Lingard's children's novels about the Northern Irish troubles.

Another woman spoke spontaneously of the attractions of a temporary release from the hard grind of housework, stressing the dream-like quality of the romance:
As you get older you get more mellow. I can see it's awful nice to read a book where everything in the garden is rosy and everything just goes according to plan. Maybe for people without a job and in with children, it's a case of transference: if you've got a low income and it's difficult to get an adequate diet...it takes you away from that planning out and managing you have to do - it's lovely to read about the sunny lands of Australia and up pops this wonderful man...it's like the women in my mother's day who went and wept over Errol Flynn - they forgot they had done a whole load of washing that day, in the outside wash house and the big stone boiler, with the whole thing ready for ironing later on. It was a wee bit fantasy island, and I think most people realise it's only a picture and not really living [...] You would read them on holiday, like Mills and Boon, you'd read them on a train...my mother read People's Friend and Women's Weekly, not the lurid type - Secrets and True Confessions. Those had women like a gypsy woman with her bosoms showing - that was a sin and a traitor against the state - that was just not on, you know!11

Two aspects of this perception of the escape are significant. First, although distancing herself by alternating between her own perspective and generalisations about others, the older woman nevertheless attributes a degree of choice and self-awareness to the readers of romantic fiction. Second, she helps us see that internalized filters of repression continued to operate in the magical release of the magazine story, as Freud explained in the case of dreams. Within some forms of patriarchal control, women's sexuality is so profoundly suppressed that it cannot even be liberated in fantasy. The

11The speaker is a manageress of 59, the widow of a commercial traveller. Her favourite authors were Cronin and Steinbeck. She was allocated to the "Cookson" group.
importance of "the imaginary world" was stressed once again by another reader with working class roots, the daughter of an Irish labourer:

When people's lives are very hard and physically exhausting, that's when you want escapism most - that's when I want soap operas on T.V. You can read about the wealthy son of a landowner, about the corruption of money and the care of children, these are universal issues. It doesn't matter how much money you've got as long as you're a good person, for example, people think they're better than J.R. Romantic fiction is often the only use women have for their imaginations...their sexual lives may be a disappointment, they're hankering after an attractive man: it's important to them, but they're not allowed to talk about it.

This woman was a community worker of twenty-eight. She had rejected romantic fiction in her teens as "nonsense...very boring and poorly constructed. If I like any romantic fiction I'd probably call it something else". Particularly enjoying Jane Austen, George Eliot, Dostoevsky, Doris Lessing, Barbara Pym and Simone de Beauvoir, she was classified as possessing legitimate taste.

The status of the upper class hero has also to be grasped within the miracle of escapist fiction, as a cypher of success. Although shared by many, this opinion was expressed most pithily by a divorced working class mother, a member of the romantic fiction group. She was asked whether the publishers were right in assuming people prefer rich businessmen and gentry heroes:

The readers want winners. I suppose I do, too. Everyone loves a winner: it gives you a sense of contentment - you say, "well, it was easy for them, so there's a chance for me!" I wouldn't mind reading about
ordinary people, someone who's loved, popular: you can be a winner in that way, too.

She preferred historical fiction, and stressed that she was an "unadventurous reader". It was noteworthy, however, that she commented, somewhat inconsistently in this context: "*Farewell to Arms* sticks in your mind."

A research assistant with higher education stressed the aesthetic appeal of modern romantic genre products in terms of the suspense and ultimate reassurance created by the strong plot and good characterisation, within a known framework:

They have a good storyline, it doesn't take long to read them and you don't have to stop and savour the language all the time...there is a pleasure in knowing the girl is going to survive, not get killed off and that she'll finally end up with her man. The interest is in what happens to her in between" ... "You can definitely distinguish between sales and quality. For example, Barbara Cartland sells more than Catharine Cookson but Cookson is much better. The snobbery of professional women towards these novels makes me defensive about them, defensive for the women who read them, who aren't stupid and could read the Doris Lessings but wouldn't want to... "Literature" novels often disturb people because she's living in this great house and all she's doing is moaning. For people who've not got much materially this is intensely annoying and some who have got good lives nevertheless find it irritating.

The use of novels for fantasy purposes was not restricted to those pre-political or conservative women already mentioned. Cynicism or disaffection about contemporary British society may nourish a turn to fiction for the
expression of desire. A community worker was asked whether she enjoyed reading about "how things really are". She replied:

How things really are? I know how things really are, the job tells me. I like something that takes you away to Tahiti or somewhere, away from routine. You can say, oh! that's nice - [but] you do get a bit fed up with the aristocracy and the gentry - it's nicer to get an ordinary man: to get a bit of realism. Kitchen maids ending up with the gentry, it just doesn't happen! It would be better to have Joe Bloggs, labourer. But most women want an escape, though.

In her forties, her husband a draughtsman in Yarrow shipyards, she was a full time worker with the unemployed. Conducted among her clients, this interview was a stark reminder of the miseries of recession. She had supported Militant Tendency for the last few years and had been reading Tony Benn's *Arguments for Socialism* with approval. Yet simultaneously she commented on her pleasure in Jean Plaidy: "Jean Plaidy makes history very interesting - she's the Queen's favourite author and what's good enough for the Queen is good enough for me!" This reader was a woman of paradoxes, not just as a socialist and a royalist but also as a Militant supporter who felt that she had a special gift of communication, as well as a committed member of her local spiritualist church. She commented at the end of her interview: "There's too little caring in this world." Her literary taste included early Catherine Cookson and Doris Lessing novels, Pearl White, Margaret Mitchell's *Gone With the Wind* and John Jakes' *North and South*. A member of the "Cookson" group, pleasure in escapism united her with her political antagonists.

A minority of the romance reading group and many of the "Cookson" category required a balance between realism and fantasy. They actively sought to use their reading to compensate for their own formal educational
deficiencies. I became increasingly aware how many women stressed this
element of learning through fiction in which the genre elements of happy
ending and contrived plot developments became merely formal elements
subordinated to the novels' representation of history. The ideological message
of the novel was of crucial importance for this group. For such readers,
romantic literature had been a mere transient stage of the life cycle, before they
discovered a literature that was somewhat more critical and less dependent on
myth. A Renfrew woman made this point clearly:

I like to read about social history, social change, the Renaissance of
learning...I used to read about the trade union movements...I was
shocked to find out from one book recently that it took almost a
hundred years to reduce the working week to forty hours...I've also
read novels: Alasdair MacLean's novels about the "black gold" - the oil,
books about the Highland Clearances. One author I did like was A.J.
Cronin, The Citadel. I also liked All This and Heaven Too, Papa Married
a Mormon, The Grapes of Wrath: I think it was to learn about other
countries [...] Mills and Boon are pleasant but you don't learn anything:
books should be of educational value, even if it's just to know about
another country.12

A retired cleaner had catholic tastes but emphasized her pleasure in
historical fiction:

I like the classics, like Wuthering Heights. I like A Woman of
Substance and Mazo de la Roche...but my preference is historical fiction.
Catherine Cookson is very down to earth and her books are very good.
It's all about life as it was...she's outright about everything she says.

12See the manageress, note 11.
Cookson was the doyenne of this school of writers, highly esteemed for their historical analysis, of which Emma Blair, Jessica Stirling, Margaret Thompson Davis, Helen Forrester and Jan Webster were representative figures. These readers stressed the need to grasp the humiliations of subordinated and totally powerless groups, so that historical repetition might become impossible. This was expressed graphically by Elizabeth Kelly, a supervisor in a fire-station:

I prefer to read authors who write about the "other end": not the royalty, but how the other classes lived. Agnes Short comes to mind, what she writes is based on fact, her stories are set in the 1400s. Let's face it, living conditions today are about a thousand per cent better than they were in Dickens' day and I am interested in why they have improved. For example, I like E.V. Thompson who writes on tin mines in Cornwall and how the different factions of a family go on from working in the tin mines, how they have improved.

She discussed *The Spoiled Earth* by Jessica Stirling, part of the "Social Democratic" genre of family saga: "Mirren [the heroine] remains constant to the miners throughout. She manipulates him [the coal owner] without him being aware of it, so that he won't evict a family or act in other ways like that. Let's face it, it's about the mine owners getting mince on their table instead of steak, so as to care for other people" 13. This legitimation of a capitalism which conforms to the values of brotherhood, compassion and altruism was a constant theme of the readers:

I like to read family sagas on holidays: stories about the pioneers going to America, the Plymouth fathers; trade unions in America. They're light

13Aged between 40 and 60, the reader was single and a member of the "Cookson" group.
and trivial but not quite to the degree that Dr. Kildare is. At least they tell you about the backstreets of New York! I also like historical biography and read the old classics again - George Eliot, Dickens, Jane Austen.

A primary school teacher whose father had been a baker, she reiterated the views of many Cookson readers in avoiding contemporary realism:

I think I like something with a bit of a bite - not mere romance - for example politics - Trouble at t'Mill. But I don't know that I do want more books on "how things really are". I sometimes feel I've got my head in the sand, but just as I get upset hearing about wee children abused so I don't want to think about it. That's why I prefer books about things as they were and not things as they are.

Many respondents made similar comments about their preference for historical novels. See, for example, the Collins' worker who said "I tend to look for something that's actually happened rather than something that's going to happen - maybe the industrial revolution. I was never a reader until I read [Winston Graham's] Poldark series and they are more lower class than what they have these days." ¹⁴ This same pursuit of historical realism coupled with inner resistance to the analogous pursuit of contemporary realism was evident in an ex-teacher's enthusiastic preference for entertaining reading:

I like hysterical romances! I like a happy ending and I like them to be historical, such as Valerie Fitzgerald's Zemindar, about the Lucknow seige...what I feel is lacking in James Bond is the

---

¹⁴ An unskilled factory-worker of 39, this reader was a strong Scottish Nationalist; she, also, was allocated to the "Cookson" group.
background...if you take books like the *Poldark* series, I feel I'm learning something about Cornwall from that.¹⁵

Lastly, a Collins' export clerk revealed her repugnance towards modern writing, which was bleakly dismissed as "kitchen sink novels". Yet she too expressed a great desire to learn about the past: "We live in frightening times. I want to get away into a different world...perhaps that's why I like the historical novel. I'm interested in another age, how they lived, their different values." ¹⁶ Whether her appetite was for truth or for mythology masquerading as history, my interviews were too blunt an instrument to reveal.

*Radicalism and Feminism*

Several questions elicited the reader's degree of class consciousness or individualism. Two in particular were important, because they served to polarise women in terms consistent with broad Left and Right divisions. The responses should not be translated into the different context of party support nor be used as gauges of active commitment.

The initial question asked respondents to choose between models of social inequality in Britain at present. Three images were offered as alternatives: first, that Britain is made up of two main classes such that the more power one class has, the less power the other has (the "class conflict" image); secondly, that British society is composed of individuals with different amounts of money, or thirdly, that society is made up of groups with different amounts of status. 57% of those answering opted for the "class conflict" image. This was a surprisingly high number in the light of earlier studies of consciousness.

*Insert Table IV: Reading Preference and Views on Politics and*  

---

¹⁵A houseworker, and former primary-school teacher, aged between 23 and 39, this reader had a skilled manual worker background: "Cookson" group.  
¹⁶An export worker at Collins, aged 59, also "Cookson" group.
Women were next asked whether top positions were awarded on the basis of merit: "People say that anyone can get to the top if they have ability and work hard. Would you agree or disagree with this?" 57% dissented from this claim, the remainder justifying their agreement by citing illustrative individual cases of social mobility. Such individuals are not hard to find, especially in Scotland where 36% of the service class (Class 1) had fathers who were working class in comparison with 16% in England. Nevertheless, the pessimism of the majority was better supported by recent research, which showed that only 1 child in 14 from the Scottish working class made his or her way into the service class (Class 1) 17.

Those disagreeing with this claim grounded their replies on two arguments. First, that patronage continues: "It's who you know that counts, not what you can do." secondly, by the knock-on effects of the recession: "Children don't try at school if there's not the end-product in jobs."

Interestingly, the respondents showed a touching faith in the "democratic intellect", or the operation of meritocratic equality inside the school. The unequal class distribution of academically-relevant knowledge was never once cited as a barrier to social mobility.

Yet even disenchantment appears from this study to be unevenly distributed. Disillusionment about the opportunities for class ascent were expressed by 70% of class 1 and 2 but only 40% of class 4 and 44% of class 5. A somewhat different pattern emerged with the "class conflict" image which

---

17For Scotland, see Payne, 1987:127, and for England, Goldthorpe et al, 1980:45-9. Goldthorpe argues persuasively both that absolute mobility has increased and class inequalities have remained unaltered in Britain. Economic growth can hide the persistence of class inequality (1980: 252). Bourdieu, in contrast, recognises only an insignificant amount of mobility in France, claiming that class closure prevents it (1984:81). This argument is less compelling.
was chosen by a striking three-quarters of class 1 and 2, by 63% of class 5 but only by 47% of routine non-manual, clerical and sales workers 18.

Pleasure in reading legitimate books was linked to the adoption of the "class conflict" view, which was held by 76% of this group. Reading romances, on the other hand, was tied to a preference for the conception of society as a hierarchy of money or of status, only 39% perceiving inequality in terms of antagonistic classes. The same pattern emerged on the social mobility question. Very high levels of disillusionment with the conception of modern Britain as an open, non-discriminatory society were displayed amongst those with legitimate taste, (84%), despite the fact that considerable numbers of this group had themselves experienced personal improvement. On this topic, the romantic fiction group were again much less disenchanted, since only 44% (8) of this category expressed their disagreement with claims for the openness of modern Britain.

Questions also probed women's commitment to dependence on men's earnings, their maintenance of the traditional gender responsibility for childcare and their rights to abortion. Feminist attitudes varied proportionately with class and education, but even more sharply with reading preferences. 73% of the legitimate group and all the tiny radical canon sample held feminist views, compared to only 13% of the formulaic romantic fiction group, 38% of the middlebrow and 34% of the "Cookson" readers.

Nobody upheld subordination to men, but traditional views of women's obligations were defended more frequently by women who read for entertainment - especially genre romance - while those with a taste for realism

---

18 See Lovenduski's assessment of the effects of gender on voting (1986: 132-3). Dunleavy and Husband argue that political views, including voting patterns, are structurally determined by work in the public or private sector, union membership and the manual/non-manual divide, as well as by gender. 11985:, 128-33)
strongly supported women's rights as individuals. The accentuated experience of oppression by many formulaic fiction readers merely strengthened their belief in the ideal expressions of the traditional ordering of the private sphere. They turned to a "good family story" for compensatory dreams, in which the deficiencies of their own family experience were magically rectified. Since they lived in the West of Scotland, these women were also asked: "What does the term "Red Clydeside" mean to you?" I had in mind the rent strike and the successful resistance to eviction during World War One, the objection to conscription on the grounds of class internationalism and the development of a non-sectarian, non-sectionalist trade unionism especially from 1912-22 (Hinton, 1973).

Striking differences emerged in the degree of information about public life, many working-class women being totally unaware of the resonance of these events in the history of their own class ("Is it Jimmy Reid and the Upper Clyde Work-in?" asked one). Yet others invoked their personal connections with dramatic force ("Soldiers all over the country in George Square! My grandfather put in jail!") Ignorance was unevenly distributed among the readership groups, only two members of the legitimate group being uninformed on this topic and none of the radical canon, although as many as a third of the "Cookson" group knew nothing. The most remarkable indication of alienation was furnished by the formulaic romance readers, almost two-thirds of whom (sixteen of the twenty-six) were unable to answer the question about Red Clydeside at all 19.

19Significant numbers of men may also lack knowledge of the public sphere (Siltanen and Stanworth, 1984). Of course, the remoteness of these largely working-class women from the public world derives partly from the sense that their voices are unimportant there (see Bourdieu, 1984: ch. 8).
Six areas of the interview related to the respondents' perspective on British society. When these answers were all assessed, so as to link them to an underlying world-view, definite associations appeared between the degree of political radicalism (of the Left) and the women's reading preferences (see Table III, above). This appears to be inexplicable simply in terms of the distribution of "dominant" and "radical" views in each class, for radical views were possessed slightly more frequently in the legitimate and radical canon groups than would be predicted by overall class correlations with such groups. Yet it is unlikely that a world-view is derived from reading alone. Rather, it seems more probable that a number of inter-locking material and cultural experiences, such as autonomous work in a non-manual occupation, higher education and self-education within the labour movement, predisposed these women towards a taste for realism rather than fantasy. The reading-groups then operate as arenas or types of social contract with writers, into which entry is conditioned, firstly, by structural forces of class, age and education, secondly, by family cultures and, thirdly, by choices reflecting deeper-rooted differences in personality. On this argument, reading merely reinforces the world-view to which the reader is drawn for other reasons. However, my evidence cannot rule out the conclusion that the type of literature consumed has some independent effect on ideas. On this view, art may indeed be a weapon for human emancipation, or, conversely, as in the arena of romantic fiction, literature may anaesthetise its readers' responses by dependence on stereotypes, dominant ideas and regressive myths.

It has been assumed too readily that earlier cultural divisions relating to class have collapsed in the wake of avant-garde modernism. In this respect Bourdieu is correct that the market for culture is deeply segmented and that economic capital (possessed over generations) provides the habitus for
legitimate taste. The Scottish research has shown, however, that this simple model has to be elaborated to take account of the presence of different routes to both cultural capital and legitimate taste. Most strikingly, I have drawn attention to a new stratum which possesses such educational resources and which is found mainly in public sector administrative and professional occupations. In the period of economic growth from the 1960s to the early 70s, there emerged "lasses o' pairs" - women who had working class origins, but whose schooling provided the route to relative success. Such a group had an ambivalent or ironic perspective on "high culture", from which they were already distanced by the components of the Scottish national culture. Nevertheless, there was an immense gulf between this group and those working class women who had been cut off from education, consequently moving in a world in which radical political and literary intellectuals had no impact. Secondly, by distinguishing "autodidacts" from those who possessed cultural capital, Bourdieu risks making his thesis tautological. Rather than stress simply the manipulation of social closure, by which the well-read working class minority is excluded by a "spiritual aristocracy" of the old ruling class, we might note their rejection of a cultural diet composed solely of popular thought. These women accumulated cultural capital instead through an arduous passage of self-education, sometimes participating at one remove in the scheduled learning opening up for their socially-mobile children, sometimes fired by a political curiosity stoked by the labour movement. The democratic strand of Scottish politics has perhaps helped sustain a wider access to knowledge than in Bourdieu's France which, on his account, has preserved a more deeply entrenched minority culture and power despite its 200 year-old revolutionary tradition.
Thirdly, Bourdieu links class position to attitudes in a quite unproblematic manner. My study suggested that these correlations are not constant. The vast majority of Scottish women with cultural capital did not feel drawn to an aestheticist cultivation of form. Rather, there was a consistent concern to address literature in terms of the moral or political criteria drawn from liberal/socialist humanism, transmitted through the schools in part as the Leavisite critical assault against a regressive and nostalgic élitism.

Finally, Bourdieu fails to observe popular culture with the same perception that he displays in unmasking the charades of the grande bourgeoisie, whose disinterested commitment to art provided a cloak of legitimacy over the naked preservation of power. He comments with enigmatic opacity that where popular culture is concerned "Necessity imposes a taste for necessity or the resignation to the inevitable" (1984:380). This hardly does justice to the heterogeneous character of mass culture and the need to assess its character as ideology and utopia.

I have addressed in this comparative study some of the contrasts with Bourdieu's empirical conclusions and detailed areas where his work has gaps. The central parameters of his analysis of cultural production and reception are, in my view, correct. More challenging analysis can only result from applying to cultural groups the apparatus already developed to study conflicts between ideas and interests in other contexts (Niebuhr's (1957) work on the fate of sectarian political loyalties in crises compares with Bourdieu's use of Lidsky's assessment of the first avant-garde, for example). Such work is difficult in the hectic fashionable currents - whether positive or negative - around postmodernism.
Conclusion

"As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no distinction between them [...] As subjects of exchange their relation is that of equality [...] and if one individual, say, cheated the other, this would happen not because of the nature of the social function in which they confront one another, for this is the same, in this they are equal; but only because of natural cleverness, persuasiveness, etc, in short only the purely individual superiority of one individual over another" (Marx, 1973: 240-1)...

Bourdieu's project has been shaped over the years to show - as Marx had done earlier - that the theory of the market equality of individuals quoted above veils the existence of social distinctions. The field research on which Distinction is based reveals that supposedly natural or individual tastes are in fact founded on social constructions which have been elaborated over generations, through the habitus. Where Marx had analysed only the inequality of the capital/labour contract, Bourdieu has shown the re-emergence of inherited distinction in the different relation to both pedagogic knowledge (cultural capital) and to the area of artistic production and consumption. He has challenged meritocratic beliefs with a theory of cultural legitimation based on the fact that, in becoming the spiritual core of bourgeois individuality, art and literature have become sacralised. The adornment of such consecrated knowledge enhances the dignity of the person, leaving those deprived of it with an internalised consciousness of ignorance. Baudelaire remarked that the bourgeoisie would be enormously strengthened if they possessed not only money but knowledge (1972:47). Bourdieu shows that this has in fact come about.

Bourdieu has developed a theory of practice and a concept of the habitus which is adequate to the complexity of social reality. Whilst grounded on the dull material compulsion of everyday economic needs, this approach addresses a realm that goes beyond the ideological battle into the
arena of doxic assumptions that are "written on the body" itself. In my view, this theory of practice does provide us with a genuine advance over preceding social and cultural theory in that it is rigorously determinist, yet it also conceives of agents as active, transformative figures. It is thus entitled to the use of the term "practice" which has an honourable descent from the Theses on Feuerbach. Bourdieu's synthesis rejects either objectivist or subjectivist alternatives much as an important line of cultural theory has refused the choice of either of the two paradigms, structuralism and culturalism, in the period after Althusser. Like Williams' cultural materialism, Bourdieu's theory is irreconcilably opposed to the total colonisation of the subject by ideology, as in Levi-Strauss's structuralism, and it is the critique of this "new idealism" that he makes in his work of the break (1968). Like Giddens, he became deeply critical of "the dead tradition" of structuralism (Giddens, 1987: 194). Both sociologists take from historical materialism the significance of space and time in social life (Giddens, 1981) and criticised structuralism for its over-reliance on Saussurean linguistics as a model of linguistic transformation and social action. But Bourdieu provides a more fertile soil for sociology than structuration theory. It saves the best aspects of Lukacs' Hegelian Marxism but fuses it with a much more elaborated notion of socialisation. In particular, Bourdieu maps anthropology onto historical materialism to give a fuller account of culture. It is thus no accident that some of the most brilliant of his insights into the restricted field of art recall the Bakhtinian/Voloshinov school and its work of criticising formalism (Medvedev and Bakhtin, 1978).

Bourdieu is concerned to carry this troublemaking practice of sociology into the most intimate and seemingly private areas of collective life, such as the family photograph taken by the father of the peasant family. In order to do so he will need to assess the distinctive characterisation of art that
emerged initially with romanticism. These are the charismatic theory of
authorship and the notion of the fresh eye. I have argued that the Scottish
reception analysis has confirmed his broad theory of consumption,
although there are differences in detail (chapter VII). However, his view
that the "illusory" beliefs in authorship are simply this society's "magic" is
more contentious.

It is now possible to weigh up the gains and losses in Bourdieu's
attempt to reveal, through slogans like "the death of the author", the nature
of bourgeois art-worlds. Bourdieu's skill is in revealing the hidden
prerequisites for active participation in legitimate art in the period after
1850, not just the possession of a high degree of educational capital -
ensuring a "code of codes" - but also a specific location in space and time.
He convincingly reveals that the objective consequence of the
commoditisation of literature and the increasing number of "literary
proletariat" was for a strategy of distinction to emerge on the part of
culturally well-endowed authors.

Bourdieu has commented in his account of pre-capitalist Kabylia
that peasant practice has to be grasped in terms of cosmological
classifications of time and space. In the work on the development of
modernism he has also focussed on time, as I have shown: he writes of the
social aging of modernist movements as they move from heterodoxy and
rupture to consecration, of the permanence of artistic revolution, of the
transience of judgements of value such that those who lack the artistic
perspective to seize the moment in the competitive struggle have to flee,
beaten, to the country (as in the case of Cladel and Champfleury). In other
words there is here a phenomenology of avant-gardes which is based on
lived time, with its strange oscillations between the speed and contingency
of shifting judgements and the eternal consecration for the "creators" (see
eg 1993a:52-3). This same phenomenology of time is used in the work
on contemporary class realities where he develops Bachelard's theme of the "causality of the probable" (1974). Elegantly avoiding both finalism (voluntarism) and mechanistic determinism, he develops the notion that the habitus of each individual is regulated by the probable fate of the group. Their habitus ensures that the dominant class alone experience time as endowing them with a secure future. Against them, he contrasts both the subproletariat (especially of migrants) who have no future and who respond by giving themselves up to dreams and a capitulation to the fatalism of natural fertility, and the petty bourgeoisie, who, still experiencing the moral rigour of early ascetic Puritanism, contrive literally to make themselves small in terms of reproduction and appetites in order to undergo their project of an upward trajectory. Condemned to a present of the constant striving for the future, they experience also the loss of their past, since it is this striving that will alone dominate their memories. In contrast, and with relevance to modernism as well as finance and science, the haute bourgeoisie can afford to speculate, to risk "everything" - since precisely in being secure they will never risk everything (1974).

In describing the post-1850s division of the field, Bourdieu delineates also an ideology about art that defined it rhetorically as the opposite form of production from that based on instrumental rationalisation. In other words, he has outlined a discourse about high and low in which "art" or "serious writing" de facto excluded both producers and consumers from the dominated class as part of the logic of a minority culture.

By reconstructing the historical genesis of art for art's sake, Bourdieu reveals that this became a classification of immense power, just as scientific racism was to become in the same period (Orientalism, anti-semitism etc.). Because it was a generally-shared social representation of culture it was irrelevant if one or two critics refused to define art in terms
of style and an educated culture, or if a handful of artists had non-elite origins, as in the case of James Joyce or D.H. Lawrence. A realist portrayal of a mill town such as Ethel Carnie’s *This Slavery* (see Chapter VI) was ineligible to fit the category “art”, just as later only parodies of popular forms might earn the label. Because the discourses of art and literature were based on rarity, they were, in his view, closed to participation by the subordinate classes. Consequently popular culture could only exist within this moral economy as a “reverse ethnocentrism”, since to include it under this designation was to magically efface the nature of the relations between the classes underlying the dominant class’s concern for style (1971:1373). I have challenged this view of high and low by revealing what it left out, but Bourdieu may reject such critical investigations as failing to take account of the symbolic power of such social classifications.

Bourdieu’s alternative to the charismatic magic of creation requires substituting a theory of *refraction* for the the liberal individualism implicit in sacralised art. His socio-analysis demands that the author should be seen as subject to social determinants, deriving from his or her position within the cultural field, the amount of social, economic and cultural capital s/he possesses and the trajectory experienced within a specific family. Rather than portraying art as the outcome of a mystical effusion, the artist is engaged in a series of struggles to make a mark. “Natural” distinction is now revealed to be the appearance of an artistic agent who is most endowed with a knowledge of the history of the field, and for whom a good fit exists between the structure of the works and the perspective of a category of consumers (1993c: 143-4).

---

1For the same reason, rejection of the formalism inherent in production within the restricted field often served merely as another form of reverse discourse. In this respect, the aesthetic populism of some recent critics shows the symbolic violence exerted by the first by simply turning it on its head.
Such an approach permits an explanation of art which is remote from the idealising conception of the ideology of art. One of its merits is that it insists on attributing material and professional interests to artists, thus undermine the trope whereby the working-class only has material and sectional interests while the middle class has ethical objectives. A further merit: Bourdieu sees the artist in his/her active practice as no longer merely the site for the play of discursive forces, in contrast with the Foucauldian version of authorship. He is therefore persuasive when he envisages this science of literature and art having emancipatory consequences:

Paradoxically, sociology liberates in liberating people from the illusion of liberty, or, more exactly, in misplaced belief in illusory liberties (Bourdieu, 1987a: 26).

However, Bourdieu goes beyond refraction to an extreme disenchantment derived from a tragically neo-machiavellian view of the working of social mechanisms. It is this which has provoked resistance. Such resistance, he acknowledges, has its origins in the fact that the author gives voice to universal interests, despite the fact that historically artistic alliances with the dominated classes have been so fragile. This is an important concession. For Bourdieu's disenchantment is too radical, in danger of always effacing moments when artists may bear witness to the truth so as to highlight only how they use artistic works for status purposes or accommodate to power. I have argued that we need also to see some artistic movements as being the modern equivalent to a poor church. Rather than throw out the baby with the bathwater in a tragic view of the logic of consecration, we need to ask for how long and under what circumstances, do groups of mature artists serve the role of disclosing the real (Habermas) or acting as a critical subculture (Crow)?

I am also less convinced by Bourdieu's wholesale "vulgar" critique of
Kant. It does seem to me that we can keep a modified sense of genius even if this conception has to be rethought to bypass Kant’s continued retention of elitist and masculinist assumptions from the court tradition. Here we might transfer into art the account Bourdieu gives of prophetic movements in religion which, he argues, become possible once social needs have created the suspension of everyday life (1987b). The art-worlds of charismatic prophets or geniuses have other social pre-conditions, of course - material necessities, a minimal use of conventions or artistic rules, collective structures of support (Becker, 1982).

Much of the shock of *Les Règles* (1992) comes from the radicalism with which it approaches modernist artists’ interests in distinction. Artists’ groups are treated rather like skilled industrial workers striving to retain their conditions of life by demarcation rules and restrictive practices. In their case, these are transmitted through the institution of art in the form of increasing the cultural capital (esoteric language, the cult of spontaneity), the denial of the social world (as in the adoption of the psychological novel (Huysmans) or the symbolist painting (Redon)) and the dangerous anti-bourgeois tactic of “flaunting... convergences” between the political vanguard and the artistic avant-garde, all the while maintaining a prudent sense of distance (1993a).

Members of the dominant class appear distinguished because, being born in a distinguished position - their habituses - their constituted social nature - is immediately adjusted to the immanent demands of the game and they are thus able to affirm their distance from others without having to do so, that is to say, with the naturalness that is the mark of the distinction called ”natural” (1987a: 21-2).

By such means is the reader cruelly shaken out of the ”love of art” in which art had become the spiritual ”soul” of the bourgeoisie.
However, in the face of an undiscriminating aesthetic populism, conflating commercial and aesthetic considerations (which is also the case with some legitimating mechanisms like the Booker Prize), it is perhaps time to re-evaluate this stance. I suggest then, that without wanting to return to Romantic ideology, that it is now necessary to emphase again that artists are still potentially the prophets of late bourgeois society. We can thus restore to them (in a less idealising manner) the significance of "bringing newness into the world", of daring to criticise when others keep quiet and of giving shape to those anticipations of the future that are based on a feasible utopia (Bloch, 1986: Ricoeur, 1994). This means taking further some of Bourdieu's brief comments on cultural production within the periphery and from less well-represented groups within the terrain of "art".

In other words, my anxiety with Bourdieu is that he remains too close to the Althusserian sense of institutional ideology, with its passive view of authorship. We need to propose a more active sense of the author as possessing in his/her artistic practice the capacity to (partially) see through and develop the great cultural discourses of his/her period. It would be a paradox if the work of sifting through popular genres for distinctive products ("frail fetishes") were to be abandoned out of a dislike for the bourgeois humanist individualism of auteurism. In searching for a solution to this I want to stress the potential of Bourdieu's logic of practice. For within Bourdieu's own theory of social agents there is a conception of the skilled nature of all human agents which applies also to artists (1990a:55). We can emphasise the historical genesis of the artist but also his/her strategic choices - just as Williams stressed the need to look at an active composition as well as the conditions of composition, at the structure

---

8Bourdieu himself may be re-evaluating it, too: see his dialogue with the artist, Hans Haake, in which he notes that the frequent passage from the radicalism of youth to middle-aged conformity and self-censorship, is one that is rejected by a fraction of artists, especially in the face of changes in the field of power (1995).
of feeling and the lived experience which shaped that activity, as well as the hegemonic ideas.

Bourdieu's view of consecrated culture aims to show that although criticism might have its High and Low Church cults (Quiller-Couch versus the Leavises in Britain), its overall effect was to create a high cultural discourse which had the effect of colonising working-class autonomous culture. It is this regulatory element of culture which Thompson taxes Williams with underestimating in his process of subverting the minority tradition with the "long revolution" towards the democratisation of culture (1961). And it is this reason which I think leads Bourdieu to satirise the proletarian culture movement as one more attempt to turn the worker into a petty-bourgeois with a book under his arm, in a kind of "populiculture" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:82-3). Bourdieu's work can be linked to other historical studies of literary ideology (e.g. Balibar, 1986) and especially in Britain to the studies of the social function of criticism and English Studies (Eagleton, 1984). Here Baldick's work has been especially important in arguing that it is impossible to view critics' "social, political or religious interests as separate pursuits outside their literary criticism "proper". A critical history which adopted such a perspective would be inadequate" (Baldick, 1983: 150)

I have argued that the literary terrain was one that the working-class writers saw themselves as a site for the crucial struggle over representations - first, in Wheeler's eyes, to cancel out hostile images of "the democrat in warpaint" and then to create new and fertile forms to foster Chartist ideas. It is this dissident internal transformation of culture for quite different popular ends that Bourdieu does not theorise. A similar case can be made about middlebrow fiction by women writers (chapter VI) a more surprising gap given his earlier illuminating study of photography as a middlebrow art (1990 (1965)). In other words, he weakens his description
of both the restricted and the expanded field by systematically occluding
the possibility of literature and art having at some juncture possessed an
emancipatory consequence. If we are to regard literature and art as a cult
which neutralises deviance we need also to look at the way their "magic"
can be stolen for other purposes, and to study those networks camped
outside the gates of the institution. Equally, Bourdieu appears to make the
institution or field too pervasive if he does not admit that there can be
"literature" and literary critics who are not dominated by formalism. In this
sense, Bourdieu, Baldick and others influenced by structuralism have over-
emphasised the degree of ideological insulation and integration within the
autonomous art-world and underemphasised the different practices
elsewhere. Lamont's astringent criticisms about the limits to the
sacralisation of art and its effects are worth recalling in this context, as is
the fact that, en route to consecration, art has not always been the product
of small enclaves but has debated popular ideas and created a popular
following.

Bourdieu's work, I suggest, is neither elitist, nor relativist, as some
have claimed. However, it does have some weaknesses, which are the
obverse of its strengths and these have been the focus of the case-studies. A
more specific criticism of the kind outlined already has been raised by
Burger, who has quite rightly attacked Bourdieu's *Distinction* for its view
that the work of art is merely a form of fetishism (see 1984: 250 - "culture
might be devoid of intrinsic interest"...). Burger contends that the
modernist canon has been the creation of dissidents. It is noteworthy that
in fact Bourdieu has amended his formulation in later works to defend the
"frail fetishism" of these works, while insisting on a genetic analysis.
Bourdieu is approaching a Durkheimian explanation of canonised art, in

---

As representatives of popular literature Bunyan, Defoe, Richardson, Balzac,
Dickens and Tolstoy can all be mentioned, but the total list is much greater.
which he conceives of it in terms similar to the analysis of religion in *Elementary Forms*. I am reminded in his recent response (1992) of Durkheim's view that:

> religious thought is very far from a system of fictions, the realities to which it corresponds can still only be expressed in religious form when transfigured by the imagination (1915:367-8).

In his latest arguments, then, Bourdieu implicitly recognises that *Distinction* over-emphasised the monopoly of formalism and seeks to see art and literature as the main area of struggle over social representations.

As Bourdieu's work has progressed, he has held out less and less hope that the cultural sphere might contribute to further democratisation. Although his initial works emphasised radical pedagogy, his later work views authentic popular culture as the product of social research itself or as restricted to small enclosures. However, despite his understandable refusal to engage in prediction, his theory of practice already suggests junctures at which love of one's fate - working-class amor fati - no longer holds. In particular, the new model of domination premised on market consumerism is only feasible so long as expectations do not depart too savagely from real experience, and there is reason to think that this situation has already been reached in many inner-city areas. It is at this point that artistic and literary texts could be put to quite a different use. As Bourdieu himself has consistently emphasised, materialism is not just a question of material interests. It is also based on a set of beliefs and conditions:

*Materialism*, which leads us to believe that material conditions determine belief, causes us to forget that belief - the belief in the primacy of material conditions - is also at the basis of materialism. (...) it is forgotten that materialism, too is itself the product of material conditions, those very conditions that lead to the recognition of the primacy of material stakes (and material conditions) (1983:2).
It is this concern with the suspension and production of belief that is the organising principle of Bourdieu's sociology of culture. For if his subjects can understand reflexively the mechanisms that create the reproduction of the grande bourgeoisie which he has himself exposed, these determining forces will lose their effectiveness.
Bibliography

(All publishers are in London, with the exception of Polity (Cambridge) and those specified beneath)


Bourdieu, P. (1993a) *Field of Cultural Production*, Polity


Bowness, A., Gowing, L. and James, P. (1964) 54-64: *Painting and Sculpture of a Decade*, Tate, Catalogue raisonné.


---

1This book arrived too late to be considered in the above text.


Garnham, N. (1993) 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary and Television',


Holdsworth, E., Carnie (1925) This Slavery, London Publishing Company.


Kasl, R. (1985) 'Edouard Manet's Rue Mosnier, Le Pauvre, a-t-il une patrie?' Art Journal (Chicago), Spring: 49-58


Lovell, T., (1980) Pictures of Reality, BFI.


(see also Clark, T. (1980) 'Reply to Wollen', *Screen*, 21(3)).

Worpole, K. *Reading by Numbers*, Comedia.


Appendices
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knows modern writers such as:</th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>M'brow</th>
<th>'Cookson'</th>
<th>Romantic</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Drabble</td>
<td>20 (77%)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marge Piercy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doris Lessing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knows at least two earlier writers:</th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>M'brow</th>
<th>'Cookson'</th>
<th>Romantic</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Eliot</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
<td>7 (44%)</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Hardy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Tressell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassic Gibbon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knows novels by both groups of writers</th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>M'brow</th>
<th>'Cookson'</th>
<th>Romantic</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 (77%)</td>
<td>2 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Number interviewed | 26 | 16 | 42 | 26 | 5 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Women's occupation</th>
<th>Total occupations</th>
<th>Legitim.</th>
<th>M'brow</th>
<th>'Cookson'</th>
<th>Romantic</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2(2%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25(22%)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 non manual</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41(36%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 manual</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16(14%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7(6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24(21%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>115</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table III</td>
<td>Attitudes to Literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Like to read novels about 'how things really are'?</strong></td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>M'brow 'Cookson'</td>
<td>Romantic</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24(93%)</td>
<td>8(50%)</td>
<td>28(67%)</td>
<td>8(31%)</td>
<td>5(100%)</td>
<td>73(63%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes, also likes fantasy</td>
<td>2(8%)</td>
<td>1(6%)</td>
<td>1(2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4(3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5(31%)</td>
<td>9(21%)</td>
<td>15(58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29(25%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2(13%)</td>
<td>4(10%)</td>
<td>3(12%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9(8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Reasons for reading</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest in critical ideas of writer</td>
<td>15(56%)</td>
<td>5(31%)</td>
<td>12(29%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3(60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction or pleasure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(6%)</td>
<td>4(10%)</td>
<td>10(38%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction or pleasure</td>
<td>9(35%)</td>
<td>7(44%)</td>
<td>15(36%)</td>
<td>7(27%)</td>
<td>1(20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in a record of lived experience</td>
<td>16(62%)</td>
<td>7(44%)</td>
<td>28(67%)</td>
<td>9(35%)</td>
<td>4(80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in an imaginary world of harmony</td>
<td>9(35%)</td>
<td>5(31%)</td>
<td>7(17%)</td>
<td>9(35%)</td>
<td>1(20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Enjoyment of a formula in romantic novels and family sagas</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure in a formula</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4(25%)</td>
<td>16(38%)</td>
<td>20(77%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike of a formula</td>
<td>23(88%)</td>
<td>9(56%)</td>
<td>17(40%)</td>
<td>3(12%)</td>
<td>5(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure important, not romantic formula/other</td>
<td>2(8%)</td>
<td>1(6%)</td>
<td>3(7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1(4%)</td>
<td>2(13%)</td>
<td>6(14%)</td>
<td>3(12%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Notes** |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Either sole reason stated or given with other reasons. |
| 2. Sole reason. |
| 3. Combined with other reasons. |
Table IV  Reading preference and views on politics and feminism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reading Group</th>
<th>Political radical</th>
<th>Elements of radicalism</th>
<th>Not radical</th>
<th>Feminist</th>
<th>Elements of feminism</th>
<th>Traditional views on women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate (26)</td>
<td>16 (64%)</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
<td>19 (73%)</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M'brow (16)</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (13%)</td>
<td>10 (63%)</td>
<td>6 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (19%)</td>
<td>7 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Cookson' (42)</td>
<td>9 (23%)</td>
<td>13 (33%)</td>
<td>18 (45%)</td>
<td>14 (34%)</td>
<td>10 (24%)</td>
<td>17 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic (26)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>20 (78%)</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
<td>10 (38%)</td>
<td>13 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical (5)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 (32%)</td>
<td>23 (21%)</td>
<td>53 (47%)</td>
<td>46 (41%)</td>
<td>25 (22%)</td>
<td>42 (37%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers and percentages are slightly divergent from reading group totals due to unclassifiable responses.