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THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE GULF, 1958-1979

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the international history of the Gulf region during the period from 1958 to 1979. It begins with the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and ends with the fall of the Shah of Iran. Particular attention is paid throughout to the establishment of the new Gulf states and their emergence into 'modernity'.

In Chapter I we deal with the historical background of the Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Besides the historical background we also deal with recent social, economic and political developments within all of these states. Special attention has been paid to the culture, religion and society of our subjects since these factors play a major role in the domestic and external decision-making. Faysal of Saudi Arabia, for example, formed his policies according to his strong Islamic beliefs.

In Chapter II we deal with the conflicts and disputes among our subjects. Disputes over whole territory, as in the case of the Iraqi claim over Kuwait and the Iranian claim over Bahrain or disputes over islands which one state believes to be part of its national territory but which claim is disputed - the Iranian claim to the two Tunbs and Abu Musa or the Bahraini claim to Zubara, for example, or disputed claims by several parties - in the case of the Buraimi Oassis between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Oman. These claims became important as a result of the oil discoveries in our region and the establishment of new states deepened some of these conflicts. There have also been important strategic considerations at stake - for example, with regard to the Iraqi claims to the two Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan.

In Chapter III we look at the involvement of the superpowers in the region. Particular attention is given to the relationships between the United States and Iran and between the United States and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and that between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the other. Attention has inevitably focussed upon military rivalry and the development of armed forces.

In the subsequent chapters the emphasis changes. We deal with the region as a whole and look at events as they involve all the countries concerned. These chapters cover the entire period from 1958 to 1979 on a daily basis by watching its politically dynamic developments, starting with the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the emergence of the revolutionary regime in its place and ending with the downfall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. That has entailed consideration of the fate of the Iraqi revolution and the emergence and fragile independence of Kuwait. Another significant landmark is the British announcement in 1968 of their determination to bring their long-established role in the region to an end three years later. That in turn leads to a consideration of the politics of the establishment of the United Arab Emirates and also of the international aspects of the Omani question. The final chapters consider the 'Algiers Accord' between Iran and Iraq and the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Considerable note is taken of the Kurdish revolt in its various phases. The thesis comes to an end by describing the downfall of the Shah and the international evaluation of its significance.

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List of Abbreviations

ADCO	Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations
ADMA	Abu Dhabi Marine Areas
ANINOL	American Independent Oil Company
ARAMCO	Arabian-American Oil Company
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BAPCO	Bahrain Petroleum Company
BICC	British Insulated Callenders Cables
BP	British Petroleum
BPC	Basra Petroleum Company
CARE	Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ConCo	Continental Oil Company
DFTC	Development Fund for the Trucial Coast
DPC	Dubai Petroleum Company
EEC	European Economic Community
ERAP	Entreprise Francaise des Recherches et d'Activitees Petrolières
EXINBANK	The Export-Import Bank
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GNP	Gross National Product
IIC	Iranian Investment Corporation
IFP	Institut Francais du Petrole
IMDBI	Industrial and Mining Development of Iran

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INOC	Iraq National Oil Company
IOOC	Iranian Operation Companies
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
KFAED	Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
KNPC	Kuwait National Petroleum Company
KOC	Kuwait Oil Company
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company
NIPC	National Iranian Petrochemical Corporation
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFLOAG	People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf.
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
QGPC	Qatar General Petroleum Company
RAF	Royal Air Force
SAVAK	Sazman-i Etelaat Va Amjiniyat-i Keshvar (National Information and Security Organization)
TAPLINE	Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company
TASS	Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovietskogo Soyuzo
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US(A)	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WHO

World Health Organization.

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to understanding the international history of the Gulf region. The countries concerned - Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman - all have distinctive individual histories. The main purpose of the thesis is to emphasize the constant interaction between domestic and internal developments and international relationships. The detailed discussion of the first three chapters also seeks to bring out the individual social, cultural and religious characteristics of all the states concerned. It is necessary to stress the diversity of the region in order to account for some of its instability. On the other hand, the Gulf also has a certain unity within the 'Middle East'. It is proper to consider the history of Oman in this context, but not the history of Yemen. It is also apparent that some of the states discussed, notably the small ones, can be said to be 'essentially' Gulf states. On the other hand, it is apparent that other states also have problems which also turn them away from the Gulf itself. Perhaps the most striking example is Iraq with respect to the problem of the Kurds. It has been thought appropriate to consider this particular difficulty, however, because in turn it has had important consequences for Iraq as a Gulf power.

It scarcely needs to be said that the states listed in the first paragraph are not equal in size or economic and military power. During the

period under review Iran was able to aspire to the status of a substantial regional power. All the other states, in one way or another, had to take account of this development. Our stress is upon the extraordinarily rapid pace of change during the years under discussion. The enormous oil revenues presented both opportunities and difficulties. These tensions are explored, though the main focus is upon the international implications and consequences of the 'oil factor'.

The relationships between the Gulf states would have been complicated even if they had developed without the involvement of states from beyond the region. However, there was never any likelihood, given the 'oil factor' and the general strategic importance of the Gulf, that outside powers would not seek to protect or expand their interests. The period witnesses the formal decline in the British presence, for so long the major factor in Gulf politics. Formal withdrawal, however, should not necessarily be interpreted as marking the end of important contacts. Increasingly, however, it appeared to be the United States and the Soviet Union who played the major roles in the region. Both states sought to build up support in a variety of ways and with varying success.

With these considerations in mind, the structure of the thesis falls into two parts.

The first three chapters aim to provide a summary, though quite detailed, assessment of the fundamental factors which have a bearing upon the international behaviour of the 'actors'.

The remaining chapters aim to provide a detailed account of the complex interplay of the above-mentioned factors over the entire period from 1958 to 1979. Archival sources for these exchanges are either not available or not accessible. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the

purpose of the thesis is to provide a multi-dimensional assessment of the international history of the Gulf.

Chapter 1 : The Gulf States

Iraq

The state of Iraq has only existed since 1920 as a result of the British mandate under the League of Nations; before that date, under Ottoman administration and earlier, parts of the state were inevitably known by different and various names - Mesopotamia is one example. And, while Iraq can be considered as a state, we cannot simply consider the Iraqis as a nation. The most fundamental demographic division is ethnic. Between 75 and 80 per cent of the population speak Arabic, while the first language of most of the remainder is Kurdish'. In addition, within Iraq there is the traditional split in Islam between Shias and Sunnis². The significance of this religious division will be discussed separately. Thus the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds constitute the three major elements in the population of the country. At the same time, however, there are further minorities, such as the Turcomans, the Persians (who have been expelled from Iraq after living there for a few generations as a result of the current Gulf war),³ Christians, Jews and a few other communities settled in the region before the arrival of Islam⁴. These minorities are all small. In addition, there is the familiar division between those who live on the land on the one hand and those who dwell in the towns on the other. The importance of tribal organization is disappearing, but tribal considerations still have some impact on political life and ideologies and, in general, on a sense of national identity.

King Faysal, the son of the Sharif of Mecca, was the founder of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq. He was born in Mecca in 1883 but spent two decades of his early life in Istanbul - which experience gave him, amongst other things, the instinct for political survival⁵. He found himself with a kingdom as a result of the Anglo-French political manoeuvring during and at

the close of the First World War. In the 1920s, when Iraq was under British control, opposition to the status quo was growing both inside and outside the country. The British had little alternative but to rule through a friendly and co-operative local administration. Direct rule was out of the question both for political and financial reasons. In 1921, at the Cairo conference, it was decided that the best course of action was to create a monarchy in Iraq. On 11 July 1921, persuaded by Sir Percy Cox, high commissioner under the mandate, the Iraq Council of State passed a resolution formally declaring Faysal to be king. The following month his installation as king took place, though he was opposed by the Kurds, nationalists and Shia religious leaders. This position lasted for a decade. The mandate was then brought to an end and Iraq's independence was established after a treaty with Britain had been concluded in 1931. British influence remained predominant, despite this step before, during, and immediately after the Second World War, though it was not unchallenged. The Hashemite dynasty survived until the 1958 revolution which was a manifestation of revolutionary movements which began to spread in North Africa and the Middle East after 1945. The Iraqi army carried out political changes rather earlier than in some other countries of the region because it went deeper into the social and political structures of Iraq⁶. The revolution, which took place on 14 July 1958, was eventually the work of two men - Qassim and Abd al-Salam Arif - together with their supporters. King Faysal II, the crown prince, and the rest of the royal family were killed as they were leaving their quarters. Their death ended any possibility of restoring the Hashemite dynasty on some future occasion⁷. However, the establishment of a republic brought neither internal stability - since control of it was to be violently contested at intervals - nor greater regional stability, since old Iraqi ambitions surfaced and new

personal and national rivalries within the Arab world emerged. Iran and the other Gulf states were especially affected.

Iran

A new era in Iran's history also opened in 1921. That year saw the coming to power of Reza Khan, whose policies were characterized by nationalism and modernization. On 16 September 1941, Muhammed Reza Shah succeeded to the Persian throne - which his father had taken in 1925. His reign was marked by the same two emphases.

The Pahlavi family had seized control of Persia from the Qajar dynasty which had established itself in the 1780s, some forty years after the Safavids had lost their grip over the country. The Qajars, like many other Turkic tribes, had migrated from Central Asia to the Middle East during the fourteenth century, but they did not appear on the political scene in Iran until the beginning of the sixteenth century. Allying with six other Turkic and Shia tribes, known collectively as the 'Red Heads', the Qajars helped to establish the Safavids on the Persian throne^a. Despite the increasing presence of British and Russian influences, a sort of independence survived into the twentieth century. The Qajars themselves continued to be in effective power until 1921, when they were overthrown by nationalist and reformist movements. The joint forces of moderate nationalists, led by Sayyid Ziya in Teheran, and by the soldiers of the Persian Cossack Brigade at Qazvin, led by Reza Khan, planned a coup. On 18 February 1921, the Qazvin Cossacks began their advance. Two days later, Reza and Ziya met outside Teheran and coordinate their plans. On 21 February, Reza entered Teheran and seized power in a coup that was almost bloodless^a. The background to this dramatic change requires some explanation.

Deep in the heart of the Elbous mountains, some 110 kilometres north-east of Teheran, in the village of Elasht in the district of Sawadkhuh, Reza Khan was born on 16 March 1878. He was the son of Abbas Ali Khan, familiarly known as Dadash Beg, a major in the Sawadkhuh regiment, and himself the descendant of soldiers. Reza himself joined the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade as a very young man. He rose from the ranks to officer level and by his thirties he was in command of a machine gun detachment. For the first half of his life, Reza Khan was a soldier pure and simple, but it was in 1920 that a change began - for a variety of reasons. It was in that year that Bolshevick Russian troops landed at Enzeli on the Iranian shore. The Gilan Soviet Republic, which they established, was somewhat precarious. There was division between nationalists and communists and personal rivalry between their leaders. In 1921, the revolutionaries tried to liberate Teheran, but they failed. Shortly afterwards, there was a military coup in the capital, led by this officer of the Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan, with the help of Sayyid Ziya. At first, he entered into negotiations with the Gilani leaders and exploited the split between the nationalists and the Bolsheviks, but in October 1921 he attacked Gilan.

The transformation of Reza Khan into Reza Shah was slow but steady. In February he gained the title of Army Commander and in May he became Minister of War. In 1923, after gaining popularity among the people and influence in the Majlis (parliament), he came Prime Minister. In 1925 he abolished the Qajar dynasty, the exiled Shah being deposed on 31 October. On 12 December 1925 he was voted Shah by the Majlis. Reza Khan's first step, after being crowned as Shah was to adopt the ancient Persian name of Pahlavi¹⁰. During the Second World War, Iran was once again caught up in

wider international struggles and in September 1941 Reza Shah abdicated and left for exile and an unhappy death in South Africa.

When his son, Mohammed Reza Shah succeeded him, a new era of dictatorship and development began. The new ruler was at the centre of a series of circles between which there was little contact, except through him - the court, the imperial family, the central government, the provincial governments, the armed forces, SAVAK, and the police. All these institutions functioned independently of each other and each reported directly to the Shah. After the struggle for power with the Prime Minister, Mossadegh in 1953, the Shah was above all determined to have absolute control of the armed forces, whose members had to swear allegiance to the Shah himself as well as to God and country. In 1957, he created SAVAK as a further means of combating domestic opposition to the Pahlavi regime'. This agency requires particular explanation and attention.

Sazman -i Etelaat Va Aminiyat -i Keshvar (National Information and Security Organization) was to loom large in the subsequent history of Iran. Its activities were feared within the country and they were frequently criticized abroad. SAVAK was notorious for its systematic application of cruelty in operating what appeared to be an all-pervasive security system. In the 1920s and 1930s Reza Shah had possessed his own intelligence system, but SAVAK was specifically the product of a policy of repression following the crisis of 1953. It was also associated, subsequently, with the role of the United States in Iran². In the post-war period, the United States had initially been content to work closely with the United Kingdom, even though their interests in Iran did not invariably coincide². After 1953 the United States became the dominant power. It should be remembered that just after the coup the main instrument of repression was the military directorate of Teheran, led by General Teimur Bakhtiar. Under his

leadership, the two intelligence units - the military intelligence and the police intelligence - were set up under the name SAVAK. A permanent American mission was attached to it. The law establishing SAVAK contained three main articles: SAVAK was to be part of the Prime Minister's office¹⁴, its main concern was to be the obtaining of information required for the maintenance of national security, and its officials were to act as military magistrates. SAVAK was thus part of a complex security system consisting of (a) Police Units, Military Police, Town and City Police, the Imperial Guard and the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie and (b) Intelligence Units¹⁵.

This structure appeared to achieve impressive results, from the standpoint of the regime. By 1963 it seemed to have crushed the main opposition groups and prevented them from exploiting political discontent. Riots were a thing of the past. At the same time, the Shah had been very careful not to allow any officer to become too powerful within the military. In the past, several high-ranking officers had been removed because of his fear of potential threats to his position. Two examples will suffice. General Bakhtiar, who headed the organization until 1961, went into exile after he had been accused of financial misconduct and participation in plots to overthrow the regime. He was subsequently assassinated by his own former organization in Iraq in 1970¹⁶. General Hassan Pakravan was sacked in 1965 after an attempt on the Shah's life by a soldier, despite the fact that under his leadership the security forces had been reorganized and revitalized, with the result that SAVAK had become more efficient. Security units of the army stationed in or near Teheran, particularly the paratroops, were well-equipped and headed by men carefully screened for their loyalty to the Shah¹⁷. However, these two dismissals were a reflection on the Shah's own character. Further evidence of his lack of confidence can be seen in his dismissal in 1955 of Prime Minister Zahedi,

whom the Americans had seen as Iran's strongman, and in the arrest and imprisonment of General Valliollah Qarani for allegedly plotting to overthrow the regime¹⁸.

The challenge to the Shah from the army was not accidental. The security forces were a more likely source of future leadership than were the intellectual elite¹⁹. Also, since he necessarily relied upon them, the Shah allowed them extraordinary powers over life and death in Iran. For example, in August 1978, when the Rex theatre in Abadan caught on fire and over four hundred people were burnt to death, public opinion had no difficulty in believing a widely circulated account that Islamic activists, pursued by SAVAK had taken refuge in the theatre and that when SAVAK reported this to the Shah, he had personally ordered the burning of the theatre²⁰. It would certainly not have been the only massacre committed by SAVAK. According to Halliday, the number of people killed under the Shah's rule was at least twenty thousand, though Abdulhassan Bani Sadar argues for a figure of one hundred thousand. The number of the dead is not huge considering there were 6,000 prisons in Iran - a figure given to a British visitor in May 1975 by Colonel M.A. Kasavi, deputy director of the prison department²¹. But reliable statistics are difficult to come by. Even the size of SAVAK is uncertain, varying from three thousand odd given by the Shah to ten or twenty times that number suggested by Namsweek on 14 October 1974. And these were figures for full-time employees. SAVAK also a very much larger number of part-time informers, up to three million, spread throughout Iranian communities at home and abroad. Most of the informers were workers, farmers, political activists, students, teachers, and members of guilds or other associations²². Besides this direct repression, SAVAK was also responsible for censorship and propaganda. For this purpose it sometimes used some members of opposition groups to promote dissension and

confusion in their ranks. SAVAK also ran the 600-odd government trade unions. Its activities extended beyond Iran's frontiers in at least four respects: espionage and counter-espionage abroad, liaison with foreign intelligence services and surveillance of Iranian dissidents. Its task was, in effect, the identification and destruction of all those who were in any way opposed to the Shah's regime. SAVAK's use of imprisonment, torture and even death meant that not only exiled or underground opposition groups but people generally in Iran were increasingly hesitant to discuss politics at all. SAVAK could attack any place it wished to. In March 1963, for example, on the anniversary of the martyrdom of the sixth Imam the madrasa (religious school) was attacked by SAVAK. A number of students were killed and Khomeini was arrested.

The Shah maintained other intelligence services, partly as a check on one another. According to Newsweek, Iranian agents operated in the countries where Iran had a strong strategic interest, particularly in Egypt, the Gulf and Lebanon. It is well known that two foreign agencies with which SAVAK had co-operated, under US supervision, were the CIA and the FBI, while other intelligence agencies also worked part-time for SAVAK²². Its overall strength derived from the fact that it had power to arrest and detain any person at will. Political trials were held before military tribunals whose judges were either army officers or SAVAK officials. They took place in secret with no defence witnesses allowed. There were three kinds of prisons - police detention centres, court prisons, and long-term penitentiaries - to which SAVAK victims were sent. Pre-trial prisoners were locked up in small and damp cells, with inadequate washing facilities and food supplies. Medical treatment was practically non-existent and prisoners were hardly ever seen by a doctor. Political prisoners who recanted in court or who agreed to make public statements

renouncing their previous views were given lighter sentences, while those who did not recant might well remain in prison after their terms had officially expired. SAVAK used torture before trials to get information and confessions from detainees, and after trials to intimidate and pressureize prisoners so that they would make public confessions. Alleged methods of torture included whipping and beating, electric shocks, the extraction of nails and teeth, boiling water pumped into the rectum, heavy weights hung on the testicles, tying the prisoner to a metal table heated to white heat, inserting a broken bottle into the anus, and rape²⁴.

Sufficient has now been said to indicate the nature of the instrument at the disposal of the Shah. Now, however, its activities must be related to the position of the armed forces as a whole. Iran has had a long military history, but it did not have a standing national army of great strength and prestige²⁵. Indeed, by 1919, the morale of its armed forces had slumped to a degree which led Reza Khan to plan a new national army of some 40,000 men²⁶. At that time, the most effective combat troops still in existence consisted of three units established under foreign influence: in 1879 a brigade commanded by Russian Cossack officers had been set up in the northern part of the country; in 1911 Swedes established a gendarmerie for controlling and protecting the rural areas; and in 1916 the British created the South Persian Rifles in the southern part of Iran. It is understandable, therefore, that subsequently Reza Shah was anxious to build up a new army to underpin his state²⁷. In 1922, military expenditure accounted for 47 per cent of the country's total budget. In 1924 an air force was established, followed, in 1933, by a navy. Then, in rather different circumstances after 1953 his son devoted much attention to modernizing Iran's armed forces since they had rallied to his side. He also sought to reward and maintain loyalty by steadily increasing the salaries

of officers, even when, as in 1964, there was a general economic crisis²⁸. The expansion and modernization of the armed forces often appeared impressive to external observers. Of course, they were designed not only to buttress the Shah domestically but also to demonstrate the strength of the country in the region as a whole. Naturally, the scale and pace of this expansion depended upon economic factors. It is therefore appropriate to glance at the development of the oil industry at this stage.

The grant of economic concessions was a major component of Iran's foreign economic policy in the nineteenth century. Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-96) and subsequently his son Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) granted a wide variety of economic concessions to European powers. The most important of these were obtained by British or Russian interests²⁹. The British won the oil concession in 1901, and production began in 1908 - the first production in the Gulf region. Indeed, the exploitation of Iranian oil was in British hands until 1951 when the oil industry was nationalized. In 1954, after Nussadeq had been overthrown and the United States had helped to put the Shah back in power, the Americans acquired partial ownership of Iranian oil. BP retained a 40 per cent share, Shell acquired 14 per cent, CFP got 6 per cent and the remaining 40 per cent was shared out between the five major American companies, who had 5 per cent each, and a 65 per cent share for a group of minor American companies. This new agreement was supposed to last until 1994³⁰.

The rapid rise of oil production and revenues in the period 1954-58 and the substantial aid provided by the United States led to a sharp recovery in Iran's economy. However, this advance was accompanied by severe inflationary pressures, which both pushed up the price indices and unbalanced Iran's foreign transactions, leading to a large drop in foreign exchange reserves. In addition, both oil revenues and foreign aid slowed

down in 1959 and 1960²¹. But in the period 1962-71 Iran benefited from political stability and an interest in economic and social development on the part of the government that had no precedent in her modern history. Three landmarks stand out: the White Revolution of 1962/3 and the Third (1962/63-1967/68) and Fourth (1968/69 - 1972/73) National Development Plans. In 1970 and 1971 the Tripoli-Teheran agreements resulted in a sharp rise in oil revenues that was greatly accelerated by the quadrupling of oil prices at the end of 1973. Iran's oil revenues shot up from \$1.1 billion in 1970 to \$2.4 billion in 1972 and \$17.4 billion in 1974. They were estimated at \$20 billion in 1975²².

Naturally, this huge increase caused an explosive growth in Iran's economy. In 1972/3 real gross national income was growing by 23 per cent, in 1973/4 by 34 per cent, and in 1974/5 by 42 per cent. Equally naturally, such rates of growth produced severe imbalances in the economy. There was no precedent in the whole history of the world for such rapid growth and no way of evaluating the strain it would place on the social fabric of the country experiencing it. The benefits were plain, the pitfalls less obvious but none the less real. Iran's response to this unique challenge was to have consequences extending far beyond her borders²³. Revenues from oil were the cornerstone of the Shah's ambition to make his ancient country a modern world power. These revenues were largely used to supply and train technical and managerial personnel at all government levels; to finance oil exploration; to purchase military equipment of the most sophisticated character; and, as already mentioned, to finance the five-year plan 1973/1978.

The Shah's primary goals in developing Iran were to preserve and strengthen his own power and that of his family so as to ensure the survival of the monarchy and to make Iran the dominant regional power and

protector of the status quo in the Gulf region. Oil was clearly vital in that it accounted for nearly 80 per cent of government revenues and 90 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. The Shah never attached political conditions to the sale of oil, which flowed to the West without interruption during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and the Shah continued to sell oil to Israel despite strong Arab efforts to dissuade him. He reasoned that Iran and Israel shared the same security interests. And it is now to Iran's Arab neighbours on the other side of the Gulf that we now turn.

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is the largest state in the Arabian peninsula, occupying an area approximately the size of the United States east of the Mississippi river. The precise size of the population is not known exactly²⁴. The central institution of government is the monarchy and it is claimed that its authority is in turn based upon Islamic law - the Sharia - and on tradition²⁵.

Religion is the first pillar of the Saudi state, and the Sharia is strictly enforced by the governmental authorities in contact with the religious establishment, the Ulama. Islamic ideals contribute considerably to the unique character of the Saudi political system, the fundamental premise of which is the inseparability of state and religion. Since the eighteenth century, the central province, Najd, has been the home of a militant puritanical sect, the Wahhabis. Wahhabism was an essential factor in the unification of the country that was later called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Ibn Saud²⁶. The history of this state since 1931 has been one of breathtaking economic, political and social change. Once again, the enabling factor was oil, which was discovered in 1938. By the time that King Abd Al- Aziz bin Saud, who was known as Ibn

Saud in the West, died in 1953 his government was firmly committed to change.

The year 1932 is an unforgettable date in Arabian history since it was then that the modern kingdom came into existence. Iban Saud's forefathers, however, had already ruled over parts of the kingdom for over two hundred years. The founder of the family, Mohammed bin Saud (c.1703-1792) was the ruler of Dir'iyah, a Najdi principality²⁷. In 1744-45, he campaigned for a zealous religious revivalist, Mohammed bin Abd-Al Wahhals, and became the patron of his mission; with the spiritual force of Wahhabi revival and the fighting power of Al Saud, nearly all of central Arabia had fallen under Al Saud's control by the end of the century.

The modern history of Saud Arabia began in the winter of 1901-2 when Abd Al-aziz and forty selected men stole over the city wall of Riyadh on the night of 16 January 1902. They captured the capital so that all that remained was for him to win over the rest of the country. It was to take some time. In 1922 he subdued the Ibn Rashids' capital Hayil. In the meantime, he had captured Eastern Arabia from the Turks. In 1917, the British had persuaded him to co-operate with Sharif Hussayn in the crushing of the Ibn Rashids. During the First World War the two men did side with the British, though always conscious of their own interests. Britain paid the Saudis a monthly subsidy of £5,000 in order to induce them not to attack westwards²⁸. When the war ended, and British protection declined, the Saudis were again in an expansionary frame of mind. They came into conflict with Sharif Hussayn, who had declared himself the Caliph of all Moslems. However, in 1925 the Hashemites were driven into exile. A year later, in 1926, Iban Saud crowned himself King of the Hijaz. It was six years later that he announced that henceforth the whole country should be

called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He consolidated the state until his death in 1953.

Abd Al-aziz was succeeded by his eldest son, Saud, whose reign was characterized by palace intrigue and heavy spending. King Saud was also not content to spend his wealth at home. He used it to interfere in neighbouring Arab politics and even, with some encouragement from western governments, dreamed of challenging Nasser of Egypt's claims to lead the Arab world³⁹.

It was at this point, in 1958, that the only group which can be said to represent public opinion in Saudi Arabia - the royal family, princes, shayks and Ulama - joined together to protect the institution of the monarchy and the unity of the kingdom by forcing Saud to hand over all his power to his younger brother, Crown Prince Faysal. In 1964 Faysal took over completely and ruled until 25 March 1975, when he was assassinated by a nephew. King Khalid came to power after the death of Faysal and showed very little interest in politics, with the result that Crown Prince Fahad took a major role in day-to-day decision-making. King Fahad succeeded to the throne after his brother's death in 1982. Thus, despite changes of personnel, the dynasty has maintained itself through a period of rapid change. Yet that change has not been at the expense of the forces which created the state in the first place. The important role played during this period by the Ulama stems from the eighteenth-century alliance between the founder of Al Saud, Mohammed Ibn Saud and Mohammed Ibn Abd al Wahhab. The judges, the Qadis, and the Shaikhs of the larger tribes likewise continued to exercise considerable influence as members of this traditional group. The highest theological and judicial posts have been reserved for the Al Shaikh family, the descendants of Mohammed bin Abd al-Wahhab⁴⁰. Yet,

despite the manifest strength of tradition, it has been the discovery of oil which has transformed the country's importance.

In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has assumed an increasingly significant role in regional and world affairs by virtue of its geographical location, its control over key deposits of petroleum and its petrodollar surpluses. The country's considerable oil reserves and its production capability give it an importance out of all proportion to its small population or military capacity. Its political leverage in international affairs stems clearly from economic factors. Saudi Arabian oil wealth began to flow in large quantities in the early 1950s. The first oil concession was granted in 1933 and the first discovery was in 1935, although it was not until 1938 that the first exports took place in commercially significant quantities. Thereafter, the country was firmly on the path to becoming the world's greatest oil producer⁴¹. During the Second World War, the oilfields were shut down, but from 1946 Saudi Arabia began clearly to reap the benefits. In 1950 the state of Saudi finances was not always secure, even with high revenues, because of heavy spending⁴². The position steadily improved thereafter. By the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia was producing eight million barrels a day, with the capacity to rise to twenty million, compared to Iraq's two million and Kuwait's three million.

However, it is not our purpose to produce a systematic economic account of the development of the industry. Our interest lies in political terms, in the conflict between the other two great oil producers and regional powers in the Gulf area; in the use of oil as a weapon or tool in the Arab-Israeli conflict; and in the problems of OPEC and OAPEC. It is in this connexion that the rule of King Faysal was remarkable, not only in respect to the development of the oil industry but also with regard to relations with the United States. The ruler was determined to change that

relationship, but in a measured and efficient way. By steps, Saudi Arabia regained the ownership of the lands previously granted to the ARAMCO consortium. That was one of the first signs of a move towards oil nationalization. In 1967, after long and difficult negotiations, Saudi Arabia reached agreement with the oil companies which included an immediate purchase of 25 per cent of equity, and ultimately full ownership of the producing companies in their respective countries. By the summer of 1974, Saudi Arabia increased her participation share to 60 per cent and in 1975 she reached 100 per cent. It was an example which the other Gulf producers followed⁴³.

It scarcely needs to be said, therefore, that oil is the key economic factor in Saudi Arabia. However, not only is it the main source of revenue, it also provides, through ARAMCO, a framework for the training of technicians as well as for the development of smaller native industries and the encouragement of private enterprises. Much attention has been paid to the development of education in the kingdom. More generally, two five-year plans guided the economic development of the 1970s. Saudi oil revenues in the mid-1970s amounted to between 25 billion and 30 billion a year. Oil accounts for nearly all government revenues⁴⁴.

The single most important use of oil revenues has been in the field of foreign aid, especially to Egypt in the Arab-Israeli wars. King Faysal granted generous financial assistance to Egypt, recognized Egypt's military role as the main confrontation state in the struggle against Israel, and undertook to co-ordinate its own policies with those of President Sadat in the use of oil as a political weapon. During the October 1973 war an embargo on oil exports to the United States, Portugal and the Netherlands was introduced. In addition there was a general policy of adjusting production levels in accordance with the stance taken by consumer countries

in relation to the Arab-Israeli war⁴⁵. King Faysal had publicly and privately to warn Western oil men, newsmen and politicians that if the West, particularly the United States, did not adopt what he perceived to be a more even-handed policy concerning the conflict, the Arabs would have no choice but to use the oil weapon.

In this connexion, the role of OAPEC was very important. Saudi Arabia was one of the founders of the organization with Kuwait and Libya. The Saudis wanted it to be restricted to those Arab states for whom oil was the basic and principal source of national income. It has been the Saudi view that members are also expected to shoulder certain political obligations. One minister remarked that his government regarded OAPEC as to some extent a substitute for the various oil activities of the Arab League⁴⁶. It would therefore be quite inappropriate to have a non-Arab state as a member. In these circumstances, OAPEC has come to carry out two main functions. It is a means of distributing Arab oil money to non-Arab states and it also attempts to co-ordinate economic development activity. The most spectacular use of oil through OAPEC in order to obtain a political objective, namely the oil embargo, was in fact instigated by King Faysal who was angered at the massive 42.2 billion which the United States supplied to Israel during the October 1973 war. Faysal was able to make the embargo effective because of his country's commanding share of the world market at a time of near peak production⁴⁷.

This production level was in turn the result of growing world dependence on Middle Eastern oil. By the early 1970s, the Arab oil producers began to realize that oil could be used as a powerful weapon of diplomacy, especially to bring pressure on the United States and other Western nations to moderate their pro-Israeli policy in the Middle East. At this time the arrangements of the United States with Saudi Arabia and Iran

were very important, though in turn the Americans could point out the importance of the arms weapon in return for guaranteed oil supplies. Iran's unwillingness to boycott Israel was a source of irritation in Riyadh. However, the conflict within OPEC between Saudi Arabia and Iran, involved more than their different viewpoints on the question of Israel. In 1969 Shaikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, said that he would act quickly to protect his country's interests if pressures from Iran were to interfere with Saudi Arabia's normal growth rate⁴⁸. The United States, on behalf of the Western industrial world, tried to persuade Saudi Arabia to commit itself to increasing its oil output. The country had gradually become an important market for American goods and services. Following the rise of oil prices in 1973, Riyadh acquired the money to expand imports on a huge scale.

Saudi Arabia has received more attention from the United States than the other members of OPEC because, of course, it is the largest single oil producer and exporter of oil, and also because it has rather a large range of options in deciding how much oil to produce. In June 1974 an OPEC meeting was held in Ecuador. All OPEC members expected Saudi Arabia to express the desire to raise posted prices of crude production by 10-12 per cent a barrel, but the country's strong opposition to such a rise prevented it from happening⁴⁹.

EASTERN ARABIAN STATES

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman: their political development.

The Gulf, and its extension, the Gulf of Oman, have among their riparian countries the three major powers already discussed - Iraq, Iran

and Saudi Arabia - and a group of small states, namely Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Like most Arab societies today, the five monarchies/states are post-traditional and peculiarly vulnerable to the tension of modernization. Their legitimizing values are essentially rooted in kinship, religion, and custom⁵⁰. These tribal dynasties have provided not only the ruling shaikhs but also the power to maintain them - in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar in particular⁵¹. Before the discovery of oil, these states eked out a subsistence-level existence from pearling, fishing, seaborne commerce and, among the nomads, animal husbandry. However, each state is now engaged in a undertaking formidable tasks of social, economic and political transformation.

Because of the location of the Gulf as a waterway giving access to the Persian, Ottoman and Arab hinterlands, it was rather early in modern history that it became an object of attention on the part of the major powers. Like the Portuguese and the Dutch before them, the British were interested in the Gulf for both strategic and commercial reasons and entered into a number of special treaties with these states⁵². For example, the British played an important role in the development of relations between the ruling families of Bahrain, Al-Khalifa, and the Al-Thani of Qatar, as well as in Qatari-Saudi border affairs. Also, it scarcely needs to be mentioned that the British were successful in obtaining oil concessions and keeping away the American oil companies from this region. The great powers who were rivals for position and influence in the period before the First World War were Great Britain, Ottoman Turkey, Russia, Germany and France. Hence, at any one time, there were several important outside powers interested in the area, each with different motives and aspirations. The condition of the Arabs themselves was neither stable nor favourable in this period, for there was little sense of unity of purpose

or direction, or any sense of sovereignty or desire for internal peace. The relationships between the various emirates fluctuated widely between co-operation and hostility. This was the general political condition of the Gulf region as a whole before the First World War.

After 1918, the balance of power in the area changed significantly, largely because of the victory of the British and their allies and the defeat of Ottoman Turkey and its allies. Consequently, competition between Britain and Germany disappeared. Likewise, with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish presence was no longer a factor. However, in the longer term, British interests were threatened by a new presence on the horizon - the involvement of American companies backed up by their government. However, at this juncture, more needs to be said about the structure and circumstances of the individual states.

Kuwait:

The Kuwaitis trace their history back to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when Kuwait was settled by groups of tribes (of the great Anaya tribal confederation) which had left their homeland in Najd in Central Arabia searching for a more hospitable environment. Over the years, several leading clans of the original wave of emigrants - the Al-Sabahs, the Al-Ghanims, the Al-Khalids, the Janaats and the Al-Salihs amongst others - combined to create an oligarchical merchant principality presided over by the Al-Sabahs.

In 1945, Kuwait was still a traditional tribal principality under British protection - back in 1920-1 and 1929-30, for example, British forces had helped to defend Kuwait against attacks by Saudi forces⁵³. Arab traditional societies have generally failed to develop a strict and consistent system of succession comparable to the principle of

primogeniture in Europe. Succession in such tribal societies, assuming it was carried out by peaceful means, usually involved a mixture of inheritance and election, the latter often restricted to the ruling family group. The Al-Sabah, who are at the head of the Kuwaiti system, have been ruling since the early eighteenth century. They have their origins in the Anaza tribe⁵⁴. From their members were chosen the Amir, the Prime Minister, and many of the more important ministers. Traditionally, Al-Sabah shared power with aristocratic merchant families such as the Ghanims, Saqrs, Salihs, Khalids and Jana'ts. To a great extent, power-sharing has been informal⁵⁵. Power has been monopolized by the easy-going Al-Sabah family, as it has been since 1710. The tribes constitute the politically predominant sector of the elite. Latterly, however, Kuwait has become a constitutional monarchy, though there have been certain difficulties in practice. The Amir is Chief of State and the state has possessed cabinet government, a national assembly and an independent judicial system. Given its small size, however, Kuwait, like other Gulf countries, has had to rely heavily on the services provided by expatriates in the administration of government. Many such positions have been filled by able Palestinians who have been resident in Kuwait for decades.

The 1958 Iraq revolution, together with the Palestine problem, have provided a constant external stimulus to developments within Kuwait. In 1961, Kuwait gained her independence and applied for Arab League and United Nations membership. Both moves were opposed by Iraq, whose attitude constituted a real challenge to the new state's independence. Within days, British troops were airlifted back to Kuwait and were retained until Qassim of Iraq had been pressured into silence by Arab diplomatic activity. However, Iraq never gave up its formal claim, and until 1971 the British kept forces in Bahrain and a tank stockpile in Kuwait under an Anglo-

Kuwaiti defence agreement. On 20 July 1961 Kuwait did join the Arab League and on 7 May 1963 she joined the United Nations Organization. Iraqi acceptance of Kuwaiti independence on 4 October 1963 was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations, although mistrust still existed between the two states⁵⁶. For example, after 1971, when Bahrain became independent, the Kuwaitis stationed planes there to avoid a possible Iraqi surprise attack. Saudi guarantees replaced British ones⁵⁷.

British support in 1961, which was arguably crucial to the survival of Kuwait, has been criticized on various grounds, chiefly that there was no good evidence of Iraqi troop movements at the time. However, it was not only the British action which was of great importance. The independence of Kuwait was also safeguarded by the support of other Arab states, chiefly Saudi Arabia, and also, in the end, of Iran⁵⁸. That support continued, for example, in 1973⁵⁹.

As an independent state, Kuwait has displayed certain distinctive characteristics. There were three general elections for the fifty-member National Assembly: in January 1963, January 1967 and January 1971. Thus it was the only monarchy in the Arabian peninsula to have held free elections and developed a significant parliamentary system (apart from Bahrain, which held its first election in December 1973)⁶⁰. Ideologically, however, Kuwait stands with the more militant of the Arab nationalist revolutionary regimes. Perhaps for this reason, neither in Saudi Arabia nor in the other monarchies does one find a more integrated and seemingly stable amalgam of political traditionalism on the one hand and modernity on the other. Educational and cultural programmes mounted during this period have undoubtedly helped to advance the political movements set in train in the 1950s. Kuwait has come to be considered a major cultural centre in the Arab Gulf region. The educational theory is based on Arab nationalism. This is

no surprise because most of the educational staff and teachers working in Kuwait were Palestinians. The assistance of the press was especially valuable during the reign of Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed. Nationalism spread very fast but the Al-Sabah dynasty has survived. It has undoubtedly helped that the Amirs in recent decades have tended to be mild, unflamboyant and politically astute. They have also demonstrated a sense of civic responsibility. Thus, it was a year after independence that Shaikh Abdulla al-Salem announced the Kuwaiti constitution which permitted the existence of a kind of political opposition. Political parties were to be allowed a certain freedom. In practice, the Amir remains the ultimate authority, but he does consult with some fifteen of the most influential members of his clan⁶¹. The Kuwaiti National Assembly has little effective autonomy and has rarely initiated policy. However, various opinions can be expressed during its deliberations, though constant and vociferous criticism of the government is not acceptable.

Bahrain:

Bahrain is like Kuwait in that it is a tribal entity founded by a clan that emigrated from Najd in Central Arabia. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Al-Khalifa, who had settled in Kuwait, moved to the northern tip of the Qatar peninsula. In 1783 the Al-Khalifa drove out the Persian rulers from Bahrain - which had been under their control since 1760⁶². Iranian claims were revived periodically in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and especially during the Pahlavi era. In 1970, however, Iran acceded to the findings of a special UN fact-finding mission sent to Bahrain, and formally recognized Bahrain's right to independence. This was formally declared in August of the following year. At that point, Bahrain elected to follow Kuwait's lead in creating an Islamic constitutional

monarchy with a National Assembly which was to be half-elected and half-appointed.

The ruling family, however, does not have to share power with other groups, as has been stated in the case of Kuwait. The merchant group was not interested in the new Assembly, which was more attractive to a few young educated groups. Labour and some left-wing intellectuals did gain representation, but their position was not strong. The ruling family wields the preponderance of influence within the Bahraini power structure, despite the constitutional form of government⁶³. The challenge from the Left is significant, however, and this has led to an increasing reliance on the armed forces to maintain internal security.

As with the other Gulf states, industry in Bahrain naturally centres around oil. Although Bahrain shares ownership with Saudi Arabia of the Abu Safa field, with over 6 billion in reserves, in fact Bahrain will never be a major oil producer - and the wholly-owned Awali field is almost exhausted⁶⁴. Therefore, since the country was one of the smallest oil producers within OPEC and OAPEC, and in the light of the Iranian threat and claim over the Bahraini islands, and the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for supremacy in the Gulf, the Bahraini search for security led the government to establish new ties with Saudi Arabia. These links were both economic and political in character. It could be argued that the Bahraini-Saudi economic ties are basically political in substance and intention. For example, the large Bapco oil refinery in Bahrain uses Saudi crude oil, although the Saudis could use their own oil refinery at less cost. The financial aid extends from rural development on the one hand to education, the military and police forces (Saudi forces have always been seen to control any public demonstration) and the press on the other. Bahraini-Saudi banking links are also very strong. It is important, too, to mention

the opening of the Bahrain-Saudi Highway - a link had been suggested between Qatar and Bahrain in the past. The new bridge also serves as a political connexion between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and has clear security implications.

Oman:

Oman is the only country among the Gulf states with a tradition of independence dating back several centuries. For many decades Oman had a special relationship with Britain and in 1951 signed an agreement by which London agreed to Oman's independence, so long as the special economic and political position of Britain in Muscat was accepted⁶⁵.

Sultan Said bin Taymor, who reigned from 1932 to 1970, was the most important figure in modern Omani political development. He was the absolute master in the country. It appeared to be a static society. There were no hospitals or health treatment. There was no formal education. The Sultan's style of rule caused the growth of opposition. In 1955 there was the Green Mountain movement, led by Imam Galib bin Ali and Sulyman bin Hemyar, which continued until 1962. Discontent continued. In 1970 Sultan Qabous replaced his father in a bloodless coup supported by Britain⁶⁶.

It was possible to bring Sultan Said's rule to an end for two main reasons. In the first place, there was the British announcement of their impending withdrawal from the Gulf region, which would make it easier for the Yemeni-backed Dhofaris to threaten the Trucial States, and the supply of oil if they succeeded in toppling Said bin Taymor. Secondly, the ruler's prestige and credibility as a ruler had declined. His financial strictness and refusal to enter into any kind of debts made him reluctant to embark on the development of his country, even after the beginning of oil exploitation. He lost the respect of his own people by avoiding them

and staying at Salalah, and, in a period marked by the spread of Arab nationalism, his ties were with British India rather than with the Arab world.

The new Sultan Qaboos installed a council of ministers led by his uncle Tareq who had been in exile. This was the first Cabinet in Omani history. In the country there are four politically important groups: the royal family, the tribes, the expatriate advisers, and the merchant class. In many respects, the royal family is still the most important group. Local government is administered by Walis (governors) and each Wilayah, or province, has attached to it a qadi or sharia judge. In the major towns there are also municipal councils⁶⁷. Nevertheless, the royal family still has a major influence in key positions in the government, including a number of ministerial posts. Certain fundamental matters have been decided by the Sultan himself, generally without consultation and almost invariably relying on the advice offered to him by expatriates - if advice was sought at all. At any time the Sultan can invite respected Omanis to attend him for the purpose of seeking their views on matters of vital importance to the community. It is also the case that the Sultan has to pay some regard to tribal balance within the country and also to consult with the merchant communities of Muscat and Mattrah, with their minority racial groups (Khuju and Baluch). He must take note of the views of the Dhofaris. In many respects, therefore, Oman is a complex society with a distinct history which sets it apart, in certain respects, from the other small states⁶⁸.

The United Arab Emirates⁶⁹:

The United Arab Emirates consists of seven sovereign states - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ras al Khaima, Ajman, Fujaira, and Umm al-Qaiwain. Their territories lie on the southern shores of the Gulf,

extending eastwards to the Gulf of Oman. Originally, it was planned that the larger Shaykdoms of Qatar, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi and Dubai would join with the five tiny 'poor' emirates. Qatar and Bahrain refused to join, each demanding a more central role than the others were willing to grant. Until 1970, Iran's claim over Bahrain prevented these efforts being realized, and Bahrain took the initiative and lobbied for representation in the new federation in accordance with the size of its population. Qatar, which not only contested Bahrain's drive to dominate the new state politically but also remained itself in conflict with Bahrain over the claim to the Hawar Islands, held back. On 1 December 1971, Britain formally relinquished its protective role over the seven Gulf Shaikhdoms. On the following day, six of them joined the federation. The seventh, Ras al-Khaima, did not join until 10 February 1972. The provisional constitution of the United Arab Emirates, promulgated in 1971, provided for a president, vice-president, council of ministers, and a legislating body called the Federal National Council, which was made up of the seven rulers and a federal cabinet consisting of the prime minister and twenty one other ministers. Abu Dhabi provided the prime minister and eight ministers. The legislature is a National Assembly of some 40 members, of which eight represent Abu Dhabi, eight Dubai, six Sharja, and six Ras al-Khaima⁷⁰.

Abu Dhabi is the most important emirate in the federation, contributing about 90 per cent of the federal budget, in addition to financing separate development projects in other member states⁷¹. In 1966, the ruler, overwhelmed by the problems of oil affluence, was deposed by family agreement - with British encouragement - and was succeeded by his brother Shakh Zaid - the President of the United Arab Emirates. Since then, Abu Dhabi's history has been marked by successful policies in social affairs and economic development. It has grown in

international stature in the Arab world and beyond. In Dubai, the ruler, Shaikh Rashid bin Said exercises direct rule. The most important administrative body is the Dubai Municipal Council, originally founded in 1957 and given a character and corporate existence in 1961. The council of thirty members represents different sections of the community. Its decisions must be ratified by the ruler, but with his consent it can make local orders, and has power to make contracts and own lands.

In general, therefore, it can be suggested that the Federation was consolidated with greater ease and success than many had forecast. Abu Dhabi, followed by Dubai, was pre-eminent, but the disparities were not so enormous, either in size or wealth, as to make practical co-operation impossible.

Qatar:

Discussion of Qatar in the twentieth century must begin with the Al-Thani, who emigrated from the Arabian peninsula and settled in Qatar about the end of the seventeenth century⁷². The Al-Thani tribal ancestry is linked to the large Madid, one of the major Qatari tribes. The Al-Thani is the largest ruling family among the Gulf states, which helps account for the stability and institutional simplicity of its political system today. The remarkable figure for the history of modern Qatar is Shaikh Hamad bin Abdulla who reigned from 1913 to 1949. Under his rule, Qatar was nearly isolated from the general political development of the Gulf and maintained relations only with Britain and Saudi Arabia.

Qatar's relationship with Bahrain has frequently been of central significance. The history of Al-Khalifa's ties with Qatar - according to local reports in the Gulf area - goes back to the great emigration of the Arab tribes from the interior of the Arabian peninsula in

the eighteenth century. During this period, they passed through Qatar when its leaders were the Al-Mussallam⁷³. They stayed for some time and then continued their travels until they reached Kuwait. In 1766 they emigrated back to Qatar where they settled at al-Zubara. On 29 July 1783 the island of Bahrain was conquered by Al-Khalifa, thus putting to an end Persian domination. There was then much tension and rivalry between Qatar and Bahrain in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, in September 1868 an agreement was concluded between Shaikh Muhammad bin Thani and the British representative, Pelly. It made Qatar for the first time a party to the maritime truce⁷⁴. Subsequently, Bahraini-Qatari relations improved, and even became amicable. Qatar continued to pay its share of the tribute which the Bahrainis paid to the Wahhabi state. However, the situation changed when the Ottoman Turks reached Qatar in July 1871 and re-established their presence in Doha. One of the reasons why the Al-Thani allied with the Ottomans was an attempt to have the annual tax cancelled. In the last quarter of the century there were a number of occasions on which the Bahrainis raised their claim to Zubara, but Qatar categorically refused to admit it. From 1902 good relations generally prevailed until 1935 when Qatar offered an oil concession which caused the Bahrainis to remember long-forgotten Zubara. This issue has never completely faded.

Prior to the production of oil in 1949, Qatar was one of the poorest communities of the Gulf region. Its relatively large population made a precarious living from pearling and fishing. Its subsequent development has transformed its economic basis within a short space of time. In 1970, a year before its independence, Qatar became the first of the small states to have a written constitution. It provided for a council of ministers and an advisory council. The advisory council, established in 1972, consisted exclusively of members appointed by the ruler. The council,

although designed to represent major social and economic interest groups in Qatar, has no authority to do more than recommend. It is not empowered to initiate legislation of its own accord. Being of Wahhabi fundamentalist persuasion, like their Saudi neighbours, the ruling family have favoured the re-affirmation of Islamic laws and principles in public and private, expressed, for example, in the ban on the importation, manufacture and consumption of alcohol. Permission to open cinemas was somewhat reluctantly granted only in 1970. In general, therefore, Qatar can be said to offer its own distinctive blending of tradition and modernity during this period of transition.

Culture, Religion and Society

This brief survey of some of the salient structural aspects of the region is necessary but in itself insufficient to account for the full context in which political decisions have to be made. Terms like 'Iran', 'the Arabs', 'Islam' or 'tribalism' oversimplify the realities of political, social, religious and ideological life which are as complex as the pattern of events to which they give rise. For example, there is a basic division in language between Persian and Arabic, a division which might also be seen to a large extent as ethnic. Similarly, distinguishing between 'Sunni' and 'Shia' is only the first step towards understanding the variety of Islamic culture and ideology. Some more remarks on this latter point are necessary.

For Moslems themselves, Islam has always been a civilization and a comprehensive outlook on the world. It is not merely a 'religion' in the privatized and restricted sense in which that term is often used in the West. In the Moslem view, at least ideally, there are few or no aspects of individual and social life that may not be considered as immediate

expressions of Islam or which give scope for the working out of its implications. We must also not ignore the fact that Islamic culture differed from place to place and was shaped by its own regionally varied history as well as by present social realities. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to learn that Islamic culture in Saudi Arabia is very different from Islamic culture in Iran. Similarly, Islamic culture plays different roles at different social levels, whether these be defined in terms of region, race or economic class.

Generally speaking, in the Gulf region, religion remains a vital force in all societies, no matter to what sect individuals or countries belong. If we take Iran as an example, we can in many respects consider it to be a country which has been the most advanced, developed, industrialized in the entire region, but that has not significantly altered the extent to which Iranians have continued to be aware of the religious dimension of human existence. They have remained convinced of the binding character of the sharia. For this reason, it may in some sense be suggested that traditional religious beliefs have still much the same potency as modern political ideologies. On the other hand, with the rise of modern economic and secular education, political ideologies have also come to the fore in Islamic societies, albeit within settings quite different from the original European homes of these ideologies. For example, in the decade or so before the 1979 Iranian revolution, a new revolutionary ideological trend emerged and changed the climate of opinion among a segment of the intelligentsia. Indeed, it played a major part in the overthrow of the Shah.

Since Napoleon set foot in the Nile valley, Islamic lands have suffered so many defeats and threats to their existence that their power and glory has tended to become a memory of a remote past. The threats grew even more alarming when Western pressures continued, in one form or

another, long after political domination had begun to recede. These bewildering and unhappy experiences produced a cumulative effect, an indelible feeling of having suffered indignity together with a sense of injured pride⁷⁵. That psychological condition was a material factor in political responses. The section that follows looks more closely at the divisions within the world of Islam, though a comprehensive religious analysis is not possible⁷⁶.

More than 98 per cent of the inhabitants of the Gulf region are Moslems. Although probably more than 80 per cent of all Moslems in the world adhere to the Sunni sect of Islam, most of the 55 million Moslems in the Gulf region are Shias⁷⁷. This is due to the fact that nearly all the Moslems in Iran and slightly more than half of the Moslems of Iraq are Shias. The division between these Islamic sects, Shias and Sunnis, began as a political dispute but came to be distinguished by legal, theological and ritual differences⁷⁸. Shias always showed a greater tendency to political resistance to constituted authority than did Sunnis. Shias simply never recognized the legitimacy of their rulers. Besides the countries already mentioned, they were to be found in Bahrain and the Indian sub-continent. Persians whose ancestors emigrated to Kuwait, Bahrain, the U.A.E. and Eastern Saudi Arabia, brought their Shia beliefs and practices with them. In addition, periodic missions were sent out from Qum in Iran to Bahrain and other Gulf communities. The principal holy cities of the Shia are Najaf and Karbala in Iraq which, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, were visited each year by many thousands of pilgrims from Iran and other parts of the world⁷⁹.

As has been indicated, the appeal of the Shia sect has not been restricted to one particular ethnic or linguistic community. However, in other contexts within the region, a particular religious emphasis has

blended with cultural and historical factors to produce a distinct quasi-national consolidation⁶⁰. One example of this is Ibadism, which has become an integral part of Omani national culture and a political force which has shaped the development of Omani society. It is worth noting that the structure of Omani society is such that one cannot really separate religion, culture and political history⁶¹. As Wilkinson has suggested, Ibadism is productive of egalitarianism in an area of the Moslem world where there is such a well-developed sense of hierarchy that one might almost speak of a caste-system. Oman has been split on religious, ethnic and political lines since the eighth century⁶². The Ibadī ideal was to restore Islam to its pristine condition at the time of the prophet. The Ibadis are therefore Islamic fundamentalists of strict observance, seeking to establish a 'community of the just'. They are also fiercely egalitarian, in contrast to Sunni and Shia Moslems. The Ibadī do not believe that there must be a permanent and visible head of the Umma but that, if a suitable person is not available, the true leader remains hidden and the community as a whole might have to conceal its beliefs. Over time, Ibadism eventually became the ideology of Omani particularism, and is today the official religion of the state. On the other hand, not all Omanis adhere to Ibadism. All along the coast there are Sunni Moslems and there is also a large Shia presence. Many of the ancestors of the latter arrived in Oman from the other side of the Gulf over three or four hundred years ago and they are heavily represented in the merchant class. The ruling family in Oman follows the Ibadī sect. Its adherents deny legitimacy to the succession of Caliphs, except for the first two⁶³. In principle, they are in favour of an elective imamate but in practice the Al-Bu Said family has observed the custom of dynastic succession⁶⁴. The Ibadis are generally noted for their life of prayer and piety. They resemble the Wahhabis in their tendency to

look upon other Moslem sects as religiously lax in comparison with themselves. However, the legitimacy of the government and the purity of Islam has not become a major issue in Omani life. The religious base in the country as a whole is still strong and is a potent influence in the development of the nation and its people. In general, however, Ibadism has served to emphasize the individuality of Oman in the Eastern Arabian world²⁶.

A comparable position exists in Saudi Arabia with regard to Wahhabism²⁶. The role of religion in the forging of what was to become the Saudi state has already been noted. It is now appropriate to look more closely at that religious emphasis which was to become, in effect, also a political ideology underpinning the Saudi structure. The Al-Saud Wahhabism has given a sense of purpose to generations of Saudis by uniting the disparate tribes and principalities, often at war with each other, into the present-day state. Wahhabis prefer to be called Muwahidin, or 'unitarians' denoting thereby their strict monotheism. They abhor any notion of glorifying or deifying their spiritual founder. Likewise they deplore visible signs of spirituality. For example, they are buried in unmarked graves so that no one may be tempted to revere the dead. This rule applies to kings and commoners alike. The question of the worship of saints proved especially controversial. Any such suggestion was deemed to be idolatry by the Wahhabis²⁷. Ibn Saud himself put the general position forcefully in remarks he made in a speech on 11 May 1929:

'They call us "Wahhabis" and they call our creed a "Wahhabi" one as if it were a special one...and this is an extremely erroneous allegation that has arisen from the false propaganda launched by those who had ill feelings as well as ill intentions towards the movement. We are not proclaiming a new creed or new dogma. Muhammed ibn Abd Al-Wahhab did not

come with anything new. Our creed is the creed of those good people who preceded us and which came in the Book of God -the Quran - as well as that of his Messenger (the Prophet Mohammed, prayer and peace upon him).¹ He further stressed that they respected the four Imams and continued 'It is a creed built on the oneness of the Almighty God, totally for His sake and it is divorced from any idols or false innovation. The Unitarian creed is the creed of dogma which we are calling for and it is the one which will save us from calamity and catastrophe'². The Wahhabis subscribe to the most conservative of the Islamic schools of jurisprudence³.

The Wahhabis strongly believe that because the Shias have not belonged to the heart of Islam, at least as they have conceived that heart, they have rightly only received a fraction of the attention devoted to the Sunnis. The Wahhabi hostility towards Shias should be understood as a point of more general antipathy towards Shirk (the association of anyone or anything with God). Nevertheless, in practice, the Saudi rulers have generally tolerated the Shia communities as long as they did not cause problems or engage in offensive religious rituals in public⁴. And it is important to mention that, despite the impression of a monolith given by Saudi Wahhabism, there are many local differences in religious observance in Saudi Arabia. Yet there is no minority in Saudi Arabia to compare with the Shia of Al-Hasa, either in size or activity (numbering as many as 400,000). The Shia of Al-Hasa look for guidance to the great Shia shrines of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and to the Mujtahids (exemplars) of Iran⁵.

It could be said with some truth that just as Shiaism served to unify Iran, Wahhabism unified Saudi Arabia. In both cases, however, what began as a tool of state consolidation became a conservative brake on state policy⁶. The leadership of Wahhabism is closely tied to one hereditary family and also allied to the large by family-controlled

political system. From the beginning of the modern Saudi state, its rulers have moved steadily to moderate Wahhabism without destroying its ideological force²³.

These three examples - Shiaism, Ibadism and Wahhabism - serve to make the central point that there is considerable diversity within the world of Islam notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary. The next section will also demonstrate the pluralism, in ethnic terms, that lies behind supposed national identities.

When Westerners hear the word tribe it generally awakens the image of nomads, and certainly each of the Gulf countries has nomadic life within its frontiers. In this region, however, it is not the nomadic tribes which are the decisive social force, but rather the sedentary population who equally claim a tribal lineage. Moreover, for all, marriage and family relations reflect the dominant importance of kinship²⁴. Tribalism in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia is very different from the Iranian experience. In Iran, tribalism is politically significant in as much as tribal identities coincide with ethnic ones, as with separatist movements among the Kurds, Baluchis and others. In contrast, in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia all tribes, almost without exception are closely integrated into the government apparatus and are represented among the ruling elite. The exceptions are perhaps to be located among the merchant class in Kuwait and Bahrain²⁵.

Language is also an important factor in relation to tribalism. In Iran, about half of the population speak Persian as their native language but in the north-west are the Turkic-speaking Azeris, kinsmen of those living in nearby Soviet Azerbaijan and in the north-east, Turcomans also have their blood ties over the Soviet border. To the

southeast of Isfahan, in the central Zagros, the Bakhtiari tribes and, west of them, to the Iraqi border, the Lurs both speak a dialect of Persian. In the southern Zagros are the Turkic-speaking Qashqas. Most of the people along the Iranian coast of the Gulf and Khuzistan, east of Shatt-al-Arab, speak Arabic, although many of them also speak Persian. They are called Hawilla Arabs²⁶. North of the Khuzistan and Lurs tribal area are the Kurds, with their own language, Kurdish, which itself has many dialectical forms. In south-eastern Iran, the Baluchi tribes dominate the entire area and also figure prominently in Gulf society and politics, especially in Oman and Dubai. They are mostly Sunni Moslems. Finally, other ethnic groups are or have been present in small numbers: the Jewish community, Armenian Christians and Zoroastrians, followers of the pre-Islamic religion of Persia²⁷.

There is one safe generalization to be made about these Iranian tribes - that no generalization is valid. Some tribes are almost totally nomadic, others have settled in permanent villages, and there is a substantial difference between them. Tribal loyalties vary greatly, ranging from the intense to the lukewarm²⁸. This very great diversity in tribal structure, tribal loyalty and the extent of nomadism, is of considerable importance with reference to the development of nationalism in Iran since between a sixth and a quarter of the Iranian population are members of tribes²⁹. Generally, tribesmen were less responsive to the appeal of nationalism than were peasants. Loyalty to the tribe was generally stronger than the peasant's loyalty to the village, and hence more of a barrier to the acquisition of a higher loyalty - to the state. As agricultural methods improved, there was an increasing tendency towards permanent settlement. At the turn of the century, the most important tribes, politically speaking, were the Kurds, the Qashqas, the

Lurs, the Bakhtiari, the Khamneh complex, the Shahsaven and the Turcomans. During Reza Shah's reign, no programme to subdue the tribes was announced, nor, in all likelihood, did Reza Shah carefully calculate a plan for the destruction of tribal power. He wanted absolute power in a unified and controlled state, and the autonomy of the tribes had to be destroyed for the achievement of this goal. Other aspects of Reza Shah's programme were, however, even more effective than military action in destroying tribal cohesion and potency. The railroad and the new road system enabled the army to patrol formerly inaccessible tribal areas and to ensure the collection of taxes. On the other hand, by helping to ward off foreign invasions, the tribes can lay claim to have helped Iran acquire and retain a unique history and distinctive culture, elements that have proved extremely useful for the integration of nationalism.

When we look on the other side of the gulf, we find a comparably complex blend of traditional and modern loyalties in the emerging states. At a superficial level, ideas and tastes of the contemporary West were being avidly adopted and appeared to be obliterating what remained of a conservative and indigenous culture. Nevertheless, what is perhaps most striking of all is the resilience of the basic elements of traditional society - Islam, the tribe, and the family. They continued to shape Gulf societies¹⁰⁰. Of course 'traditionalism' can embrace many things. For our purposes, we will take it to involve at least four different forms of social organization: a desert patriarchal system, an urban-imperial system, tribal city-states, and theocratic communities¹⁰¹. Moreover, it is worth noting, politically speaking, that (Iraq apart) the traditional political leadership of the Gulf region has been much more successful in adapting, integrating and controlling the often disruptive forces of change in their territories than have other Middle Eastern leaders¹⁰².

Nonetheless, traditional societies in the Gulf area are a mosaic of religious, ethnic and linguistic patterns. There is less of a religious complexity than elsewhere in the Middle East. However, Iran and Iraq have or have recently had Christian, Jewish or Zoroastrian minorities¹⁰². These minorities were allowed to elect their own representatives to the Majlis, but members of these groups could not occupy command positions in the armed forces or major decision-making positions in government under the Shah and recent events will not have brought about any enhancement of their status and role¹⁰⁴. Apart from these minorities who were given a substantial degree of communal autonomy, slavery was a recent reality. In theory, they were at the very bottom of society, but over time those who were attached to ruling families often became merged into the ruling elite themselves¹⁰⁵.

It is well-known that the trading connexion of the Gulf with Africa had been followed by the establishment of political control along the East African littoral through the Omani dynasty of the Sultans of Zanzibar. Thus modern Omani society contains some ethnic mixture which stems from her past ties with India, Persia and Africa¹⁰⁶. In addition, it is worth mentioning the presence of the descendants of Oman before the Arab arrival. And it is no accident that many Dhofaries and Baluchis who came from 'Iran' and 'Pakistan' in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had not adopted Ibadism. They were predominantly Sunni. Then again, the small Omani Shia population is largely to be found among the well-established merchant class, descendants of Persians who had settled in the country. Indeed, at many levels in Oman it is possible to identify Persian influences. According to Cottrell, these influences were also strong in the Red Sea area and the bulk of the inhabitants of Aden and Jidda were Persians who spoke Arabic.¹⁰⁷

Another influence in Oman stems from its contacts and commerce across the Indian Ocean - the Khajas or Haidarbadis were originally of Indian extraction. One great difference between or among the various ethnic groups of Omanis is worth noting. Both Persians and, to a lesser extent, Baluchis settled on a tribal basis but 'arabized' themselves by adopting Arab customs and traditions as well as the Arabic language. Amongst the older generation there were still many who could not speak Arabic even though they had been born in Oman. In addition, they tended to retain their Indian customs and traditions. Until recently, they lived in an enclosed area within the Omani capital and prohibited any race, apart from their own, to enter the district¹⁰⁸. One other small group ought to be mentioned, namely the Zutt or Zututt, who might be thought of as 'gypsies'. They possess the lowest classification of any group within Oman¹⁰⁹. Finally, Omani society has had to try hard to assimilate the 'Zanzabaris', people of Omani origins but linguistically and traditionally Africans and racially a mixture of Arab and African.

Oman is unusual in its complexity but a blending of different elements is also characteristic, to a lesser degree, of most of the small states. The Gulf region is, almost by definition, one of contact and commerce. Intermingling is just what we would expect. In the case of Oman, we might even be able to identify six main categories of people who can to some extent be differentiated occupationally and geographically: first, the coastal population, with a tradition of trading and fishing; secondly, the population of Batinah, who are heavily involved in agriculture; thirdly, the settlement of interior Oman; fourthly, the nomads 'Badu'; fifthly, the Shihuh of the Musandam Peninsula¹¹⁰; and finally the Dhofaris with their strong links with the Yemen and East Africa.

This analysis of Oman, taken in conjunction with what has been said about Iran, indicates how difficult it has proved to apply concepts of 'nationalism' imported into the region. It is to this problem that we turn in the final section of this chapter.

Of course, in the West itself the concept of 'nation' has been the subject of much debate and disagreement¹¹. The literature is too large for extensive discussion¹². However, we take as our starting point Robert Nisbet's comment that 'modern nationalism cannot be understood...apart from those rifts and clefts in the traditional structure of human loyalties caused by economic and social dislocation, which left widening masses of human beings in a kind of psychological vacuum'¹³. Arab nationalism as an ideology and as a factor in Middle Eastern politics is a recent development. It was hardly known before the beginning of the twentieth century and it was only after the First World War that a comprehensive doctrine of Arab nationhood was elaborated. Thereupon, politicians in Iraq and Syria, enjoying a measure of independent action and able to exploit the rivalries of the great powers in the Middle East, began to attempt to create a state which would embrace the entire 'Arab nation'. Arab nationalism was a reaction against Ottoman tyranny, and against the centralization policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. It gathered strength and some coherence during and after the First World War. The great Arab Revolt of 1916 originated in that part of the Ottoman Empire least affected by the centralization policies and it was also the least politically conscious. Some writers would place the beginnings of Arab nationalism much earlier - in the Wahhabi movement towards the end of the eighteenth century, but such views seem at odds with the historical evidence. The Wahhabis were not nationalist by any acceptable definition of

the term. They were purists, rather, who wished to restore Islam to what they took to be its original purity. As we have seen, their concern was with Moslems rather than Arabs. They directed their zeal against lax, backsliding or heretical Moslems rather than towards the creation of an Arab national state.

Matters are rather different in the case of Iran. We have outlined its political development earlier in this chapter. By our period, it was politically, militarily and in terms of population, education and the establishment of a 'middle class', by far the most powerful state in the region. Alien influence had been present over many years, but Iran had not in fact become a dependency. The 'nation' was still intact. From long practice, it had achieved a feat of balance between Russia and the West. It was now capable of exercising a degree of power that could only be challenged by forces engineered from outside the Gulf region. Hence Iranian pride and nationalism seemed whole and undivided, notwithstanding what has been said about the ethnic complexity of the country. We should not forget, however, that racial differences between Persians and Arabs, so much loved by older writers, are less clear than was once supposed. The people of Iran are a racial mixture. So too are most Arabs. The differences between one group of Arabs and another may be greater than those between a group of Iranians and a group of Arabs. This point could be elaborated in a variety of contexts throughout the Gulf region. Sufficient has perhaps been said, however, to indicate that the question of nationalism in the Gulf is, in effect, every bit as complex as it has been in the history of Europe. As in Europe and elsewhere, it has provided simultaneously disruptive and unifying consequences for the region's internal and international politics. It is to these aspects that we now turn¹².

1. Lawless, R.I., 'Iraq: changing population patterns', in J.I.Clark and W.F.Fisher, eds., Population of the Middle East and North Africa (London, 1972) p.108.
2. As a matter of fact, Kurds are also Sunni Muslims, but we have no choice but to divide the Iraqi population into three societies or groups: Shia, Sunnis and Kurds.
3. Nyrop, Richard, ed., Iraq: a country study (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp.67-68. For earlier studies of the Persian-speakers in Iraq see H.Batatu, The old social classes and the revolutionary movements in Iraq: a study of Iraq's old landed and commercial classes and of its communists, Bathists and free officers (Princeton, 1978), p.40 and A.Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States (Baltimore, 1980), p.329.
4. For more information on the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq see S.Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (London, 1953).
5. The Hashimites trace their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed.
6. M.Khadduri, Independent Iraq (London, 1960).
7. F.Hanzal, 'Secrets of the Murder of the Royal Family in Iraq' (in Arabic) 14 July 1958.
8. For details of the Safavid period see P.Jackson, The Cambridge History of Iran: vol.6 The Timurid and Safavid periods (Cambridge, 1986): R.Savory, Iran under the Safavids (London, 1980): R.Savory 'The office of Khalifat al-Khulafa under the Safavids', Journal of the American Society lxxxv, 1965: A.Banani, 'The social and economic structure of the Safavid Empire in its heyday', a paper submitted to the Harvard Colloquium on Tradition and Change in the Middle East December 1967.

9. For the Qajar period see P.Avery, Modern Iran (London, 1965):
E.Bosworth, ed., Qajar Iran: political, social and cultural change 1800-1925 (Edinburgh, 1983): M.S.Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917-1923 (New York, 1952): R.L.Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892 (London, 1959).
10. For the early Pahlavi periods see A.Banani, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941 (Stanford, 1961): P.Avery, Modern Iran (London, 1965):
H.Arafa, Iran under Five Shahs (London, 1964): G.Lenczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, 1978): L.P.Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran (London, 1941): H.I.M.Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for my country (London, 1961): D.Wilber, M.Reza Shah Pahlavi: the resurrection and reconstruction of Iran 1878-1944 (Hicksville, 1975):
E.A.Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition (New York, 1968).
11. E.Kedourie and S.Haim, Towards a Modern Iran (London, 1980), p.223.
12. F.Halliday, Iran: dictatorship and development (London, 1979), p.78.
13. N.R.Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven, 1981), p.142.
14. On 7 April 1979 Amir Abbas Hovieda, the Shah's Prime Minister, was executed, according to Khomeini himself because of his 'key role in manifold crimes against the Iranian people, particularly his supervision of the activities of the Security Police SAVAK, which was an appendage of the Prime Minister's office'. Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (Berkeley)p.310.
15. F.Halliday, Iran, p.76.
16. E.Kedourie and S.Haim, Towards a modern Iran, p.236; F.Halliday, Iran p.79.
17. R.W.Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1979), p.306.
18. Keddie, Roots of Revolution p.146.
19. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p.314.

20. Ibid p.356.
21. Halliday, Iran p.85.
22. F.Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (London, 1974), p.489.
23. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p.144.
24. Halliday, Iran pp.79-80: For further details and information on SAVAK see International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran (Geneva, 1976): B.James, The Politics of Iran: groups, classes and modernization (Columbus, Ohio, 1972): A.Westwood, 'Elections and Politics in Iran', Middle East Journal vol.15 (Spring, 1961): K.Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: models of political communication and control (New York, 1966): M.Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, 1971): D.Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York, 1963): S.Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (California, 1966).
25. Banani, Modernization of Iran, p.161; Arafa, Under Five Shahs pp.63-66.
26. Cottrell, Persian Gulf States, p.152.
27. Halliday, Iran, p.66.
28. Kedourie and Haim, Towards a Modern Iran, pp.235-6.
29. For further information see F.Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914: a study in Imperialism (New Haven, 1968): J.C.Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1966)
30. In 1973 Iran took over full ownership and control of virtually all oil facilities in the country. In future they were to be operated under the auspices of the Oil High Council which consisted of three ex-officio members and four parliamentarians. It was responsible directly to the Shah.

31. 'Imported Inflation in the Middle East and OPEC nations', Middle East Economic Survey (Beirut) 21 February 1975.
32. The Petroleum Economist (London) March 1975.
33. Lenczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis, p.173: Further information on the complex developments in the oil industry can be found in A.Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New York, 1957): S.Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London, 1968): G.W.Stocking, Middle East Oil (London, 1971): B.Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York, 1973): F.Fesharki, Development of the Iranian Oil Industry (New York, 1976): Z.Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting countries: a study in governmental co-operation (London, 1972): G.B.Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (London, 1976): G.Lenczowski, Oil and States in the Middle East (New York, 1960): S.Klebanoff, Middle East Oil and US Foreign Policy (New York, 1974).
34. The UN estimates Saudi Arabia's population in mid-1984 to be 11,093,000. UN World Population Prospects (New York, 1984).
35. C.Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981).
36. D.Howarth, The Desert King: Ibn Saud (New York, 1964).
37. Dir'iyah is a Najdi principality close to the present Saudi capital, Riyadh.
38. Halliday, Arabia without Sultans, p.64.
39. G.Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia (London, 1976), p.77.
40. T.Niblock, State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London, 1981).
41. D.Long, Saudi Arabia: the Washington Papers no.39 (Washington, 1976), p.43.
42. Ibid pp.44-49.

43. D. Long, The Persian Gulf (London, 1976), p.86.
44. G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (New York, 1980), p.606.
45. P.R. Odell, The Pressures of Oil (London, 1978), pp.57-8.
46. Mikdashi, The Community, p.62.
47. M. Gordon, Conflict in the Persian Gulf (New York, 1981), p.14; Long, Persian Gulf, pp.91-2.
48. Gordon, Conflict p.46.
49. F. Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: a case study of development (London, 1978), p.46. This account has been derived from the following sources:
G. A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: its people, its society, its culture (New Haven, 1959); N. Anderson, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London, 1977); A. Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom (London, 1969); P. Hobday, Saudi Arabia (London, 1978); D. Van der Meulen, The Wells of Ibn Saud (London, 1957); D. Holden, R. Johns and J. Buchan, The House of Saud (London, 1981).
50. For further discussion see S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968); M. Halpen, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, 1968).
51. Cottrell, Persian Gulf,.
52. On the early history see N. Daud, British Relations with the Persian Gulf, 1890-1902 (London, 1957).
53. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension (London, 1969).
54. H. Winston, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality (London, 1972); R. Hewins, A Golden Dream: the miracle of Kuwait (London, 1963).

55. Long, Persian Gulf; A. Al-Shamlan, From Kuwait's History (in Arabic);
H. Wahba, The Arabian Peninsula in the Twentieth Century (in Arabic);
F. Hamza, The Arabian Peninsula's Heart (in Arabic)
56. M. A. Al-Daud, The Arabian Gulf and joint Arab action (in Arabic).
57. Halliday, Arabia without Sultans.
58. The matter was embarrassing politically because the Shaikh of Kuwait made it clear that he wanted an Arab rather than a British force. For further information see Hewins, Golden Dream, Khadduri, Republican Iraq and H. Trevelyan, The Middle East Revolution (London, 1970).
59. S. Al-Aqaad, Oil and its effect on Arab Society and Politics (in Arabic).
60. S. Joander, 'The constitutional set-up in Kuwait: recent stresses and strains', Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh vol. 21 no. 3 (1976).
61. Compared with other monarchies, Kuwait's was an experiment with limited parliamentary democracy, lasting until 1976. The Kuwait constitution declares the state to be Arab and its people part of the Arab nation. 'Arabism' is a powerful yet somewhat ambiguous legitimizing factor for the state. H. M. Al-Baharna, The Arabian Gulf States (in Arabic), Beirut, 1968.
62. C. Belgrave, Welcome to Bahrain (London, 1970).
63. Long, Persian Gulf; M. Al-Daud, The Arabian Gulf (in Arabic), Baghdad.
64. A. Al-Zayan, Bahrain from 1783-1973 (in Arabic); Al-Baharna, Arabian Gulf States.
65. Long, Persian Gulf
66. M. T. Sadiq and V. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: colonial past, present problem and future prospects (New York, 1972).

67. Long, Persian Gulf; J. Townsend, Oman: the making of a modern state (London, 1977).
68. Clements, F., Oman: the reborn land (London, 1980). The expansion of government and administration in Oman made it necessary for the Sultan to establish an office of appointments to cope with the growing paperwork and the day-to-day business of government that fell outside the province of particular ministries.
69. The area was initially known to Europeans as the Pirate Coast, but then became known later as the Trucial Coast and the seven small principalities that dotted its shores as the Trucial States.
70. P. Mansfield, The Middle East: a political and economic survey (London, 1980). There are, of course, many other varieties of federal state in the contemporary world - the United States, Canada, West Germany among them - but in the Islamic world only in Malaysia is it necessary to make complex arrangements to deal with the aspirations of individual rulers within a federal framework.
71. On the position of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs see R.S. Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates (London, 1978) Chapter eight: H.M. Al-Baharna, The legal status of the Arabian Gulf States (Manchester, 1968).
72. M. Sinan, Qatar's general history (in Arabic) Baghdad, 1966.
73. A. Abu-Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia (Beirut, 1965).
74. J.G. Lorimer, Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1908-15) republished by Gregg International (Westmead, 1970) vol. 1 Part 1B p. 801.
75. M. Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: the role of ideas and ideals in politics (London, 1970), p. 3.

76. The main divisions of the Shi'is are: 1. Jafaris or Twelvers 2. Ismaili 3. Zaydis 4. Alwis. Most Iranians are Jafari Shia because of Shah Ismail Safavi's declaration of Shism as the state religion in 1501. See Armajani, Y., Middle East Past and Present (New Jersey, 1970) p.8.
77. Cottrell, Persian Gulf States, p.305.
78. For further information see H.A.R.Gibb, Mohammedanism: a historical survey (New York, 1955), pp.85-97.
79. A.F.Al-Nefaisi, Shias Role in the Development of Iraqi Modern History (in Arabic) Kuwait, 1966.
80. The three main Islamic groups are of course Sunnis, Shias and Ibadis.
81. J.Wilkinson, Origins of the Omani state (London, 1972)
82. The Ibadis take their name from Abdulla ibn Ibad, a theologian, and they trace their history to the seventh-century Khariji secession from orthodox Islam.
83. The Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet were AbuBakr, Omar, Othman and Ali (whom the Shia believe to be the only legitimate one).
84. Ibadis believe in the rule of an elected Imam, selected in secret by religious Shaikhs and prominent laymen from the entire body of the community. See D.Hopwood, ed., The Arabian Peninsula: society and politics (London, 1972), p.76.
85. D.Hawely, Oman and its Renaissance (London, 1977), pp.167-70.
86. Within Sunni Islam there are four principal schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali. Wahhabism, in its modern mode of spiritual reform, became the official religion of Saudi Arabia. Hanbalism is the most conservative and least tolerant of all the orthodox Islamic schools. Technically, however, it is wrong to refer to the state religion as Wahhabism because the movement began as a unifying movement prior to the

- creation of the state. Saudi Arabia is the most populous Sunni state in the region. Qatar and Bahrain are both inclined to follow the Saudi lead. On a strategic level, the Saudis have been apprehensive over possible Iranian designs on Bahrain and the possibility that Shia militancy in Bahrain could provide what they would regard as a bad example for their own Shia minority. See V.Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: foreign policy, security and oil (Washington, D.C., 1981), p.25; Abu-Hakima, Eastern Arabia; A. Abd Al-Raheem, The Saudi State (in Arabic) Cairo; J.B.Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf (Oxford, 1968).
87. A.J.Arberry, ed., Religion in the Middle East (Cambridge, 1979), pp.268-9.
88. Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia.
89. Saudis rely on two main compilations of the Hanbali texts. See J.P.Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, 1983), p.71.
90. Persecutions in the 1920s, however, led to some migration of Shias from the Eastern Province. It is striking to find Crown Prince Fahad calling in 1980 for an Islam without separate denominations, to be defined by discussions with Sunni and Shia Ulama.
91. Niblock, State, Society and Economy pp.117-18; Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, theoretically limited only by the Sharia or divine law. To this day, the legitimacy of Saudi rule had been intimately linked with the religious and social message of Wahhabism.
92. L.Melikian, The Model Personality of Saudi College students: a study of national character (Princeton, 1977) p.180.
93. M.A.Al-Mani, Cultural Policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Unesco, Paris), pp.10-11.
94. Long, Persian Gulf, p.5.

95. This is the result of both being trading societies, especially before the discovery of oil. The royal families in that period joined merchants as their partners in trading ventures.
96. Called Lingawis in Bahrain, after Lingeh, a town on the Iranian coast. Also sometimes called 'Red Iranians'.
97. Long, Persian Gulf.
98. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran.
99. J. Murry, ed., Iran Today (Teheran, 1950), p.29.
100. Significant in this respect is the rise of the new middle class which, on the one hand, bridges the gap between the royal and merchant classes and the poor, and on the other hand has produced a new consciousness of the difference between the old well-established and the new classes.
101. For more details see S. M. Eisenstadt, 'Convergence and divergence of modern and modernizing societies: indications from the analysis of the structuring of social hierarchies in the Middle Eastern societies', International Journal of Middle East Studies 8 1977 and also his Tradition, Change and Modernity (New York, 1973); J. D. Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and Petroleum (Washington, D.C., 1975).
102. Throughout the Arab world there has been an increasing distaste for empty revolutionary rhetoric and, indeed, a turning back to its Islamic heritage.
103. Jews settled in the Tigris-Euphrates river-system long before the region fell under the rule of Iranian governments, and they remained long afterwards. See The Cambridge History of Iran, vol.3 (2) Chapter 24, p.909.
104. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 Jewish communities have all but disappeared in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states.


Although some 50,000 Jews have emigrated from Iran perhaps 70,000 still remain.

105. For details on slavery see W. Phillips, Oman: a history (London, 1967).
106. G.F. Hourani, Arab seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Princeton, 1951) pp.79-80. Of course there had been sailing from the Gulf ports, but the number of 'Arabs' was greatly increased by the conversion of Persians to Islam and their adoption of the Arabic language, at least for the purposes of religion, literature, official business and commerce.
107. Cottrell, Persian Gulf States, p.16.
108. The walled mini-city was called the as-soor in Arabic, meaning 'the Wall' and was located in the city of Matrah, the twin city of Muscat the capital. It is also worth mentioning that both Khajas and Hindus benefited from British protection. Some of the Khajas could also be found on the coastline in very small numbers.
109. According to the Cambridge History of Iran vol.3(2) p.766 another instrument of Safavid control was the extensive deportation of 'Zutt' - a term used indiscriminately to apply to Indian tribes of the south-east frontier.
110. Shihuh seem to be a mixture of races, but it is also believed that they may be Persians. They speak a language close to Persian, though dialects are also related to Baluch. There is also a theory that they could be some of the population from 'Hormuz' before the Portuguese conquest and destruction.
111. Well-known general works are C.Hayes, Nationalism: a Religion (New York, 1960) and H.Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: the first era of global history (New York, 1962).

112. H. Kohn, Nationalism: its Meaning and History (Princeton, 1965), pp.9-10.
113. R. Nisbet, Community and Power (New York, 1962) p.164.
114. A. M. Gomma, The Foundation of a League of Arab States: wartime diplomacy and inter-Arab politics 1941-1945 (London, 1977) p.3.

Chapter Two: Conflicts and Disputes in the Gulf Region

Since the discovery of oil in the Gulf in the 1870s and 1880s, it has been a main and recurring source of conflict in the region. This is scarcely surprising, given that the Middle East as a whole produces 30 per cent of the oil in the world, of which 15 per cent comes from the Gulf seaboard. The offshore Gulf is known to contain 10 per cent of the world's oil reserves. The region has a long and unbroken history of conflict. The British and French were both active in the region, and their rivalry was a major factor in the development of the region. The British and French were both active in the region, and their rivalry was a major factor in the development of the region.



territorial disputes has also been created as a result of the introduction of the concept of the modern state and what was an unorganized area gradually acquired by both known and prospective oil companies. The area of contention has also extended to the seabed of the Gulf. The first serious attempts to establish territorial boundaries in the region were made following the First World War, but their results were largely unenforced. The dangerous possibilities were reduced by the agreement between the British, Iraq and Saudi Arabia concerning the oil reserves in the

Chapter Two: Conflicts and Disputes in the Gulf Region

Since the discovery of oil in the Gulf in the 1930s and 1940s, it has been a major and recurring source of conflict in the region. This is scarcely surprising, given that the Middle East as a whole produces 35 per cent of the oil in the world, of which 15 per cent comes from the Gulf seabed: in total, the offshore Gulf is known to contain 10 per cent of the world's proven reserves¹.

The absence of many clear and unambiguous boundaries in this vital region is in many ways a legacy of the lengthy domination of the Gulf by the British. The British presence had frozen disputes rather than solved them, for claimants were both deterred from pressing their claims and relieved of the necessity of resolving them. There was an obvious possibility that claimants might in future seek violent solutions. Traditionally, little attention had been paid to territorial boundaries since jurisdiction over men had been of much greater significance than jurisdiction over territory. It is also important to mention that the Gulf region has a rich and varied history of human settlement and occupation. Nearly all of its surface has been settled by people of many 'nations' and tribes in the past. It is not, therefore, surprising that both islands and mainland territories are subject to conflicting claims². Additional scope for territorial disputes has also been created merely by the introduction of the concept of the modern state and what was at stake has been greatly magnified by both known and prospective oil deposits. The area of contention has also extended to the seabed of the Gulf itself. The first serious attempts to establish territorial boundaries in Eastern Arabia followed the First World War, but their frontiers were not fully demarcated. The dangerous possibilities were revealed by the quarrel between Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia concerning the Al-Buraimi Oasis,

which began in 1952 and which led to the expulsion of Saudi forces from the area by the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1955. This dispute and related issues were finally settled in 1974³. The section which follows looks at this particular issue in some detail.

Al-Buraimi is an agglomeration of nine settlements: Hili, Al-Qatarah, Al-Jimi, Al-Mutaradh, Al-Ain, Al-Muwaiqi, Sa'ra, Hamasa and Buraimi. The name Buraimi is taken from that of the biggest village⁴. Buraimi was the strategic key to inner Oman and the Gulf Shaikhdoms. The oasis measures about six miles across and is roughly circular in outline, containing a plentiful supply of good water brought from the nearby hills in underground channels. Whoever held Buraimi in force could overcome the Gulf Shaikhdoms and much of inner Oman besides.

With the creation of new Arabian states in the twentieth century, the likelihood of border disputes increased greatly. Perhaps the best-known quarrel concerned this Saudi Arabian claim for a major extension to her territory, the total area involved being much larger than merely that occupied by the collection of small villages. The claim advanced by Riyadh in 1949, for example, would have involved the loss of some 80 per cent of the territory of Abu Dhabi⁵. The Saudi claim could be taken as a logical extension of aspirations satisfied in the first three decades of the twentieth century when the Al-Saud succeeded in establishing military and political control over the plateau of the Arabian peninsula and successfully took and maintained control over the littoral areas to east and west. At the same time, they pushed north to the Euphrates and south into Yemen as far as the coast. There has not been an uncontested inch of

border on the entire circumference of what is formally acknowledged to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In 1800, Buraimi was occupied by a Wahhabi expedition despatched from Najd: a force of horsemen and camel-riders made a journey of five hundred miles across the desert to seize the oasis, hard by the foothills of the Hajar mountain range of Oman. The Saudis continued their occupation until 1818 when they were expelled by the Egyptians. But in 1824 they were successful in regaining their position in the oasis⁶. During the long reign of Faisal bin Turki, known as Faisal the Great (ruled 1834-38, 1843-65), the British had several contacts with Al-Saud. In 1843 Faisal returned from Cairo where he had been held captive by Muhammed Ali since 1838. When he first sought to occupy Buraimi, the chiefs of the area applied to Britain for protection. They were informed by the Bombay government that since the Egyptians no longer posed a threat the British position was not to be extended. Britain had no intention of interfering in the politics of Arabia further than was necessary to maintain peace in the Gulf⁷.

In 1865, Faisal died and was succeeded by his son Abdulla. In 1866, the British government gave military aid to the Sultan of Oman and encouraged him to oust the Wahhabis from the territories of Oman. Later that year, however, the differences between the British and the Saudis were reconciled. They arrived at an understanding, based on a declaration made on behalf of Amir Abdulla, dated 21 April 1866. In April 1869, the Wahhabi agent at Buraimi was shot dead, when Sayyid Azzan of Oman sent troops that ended the Wahhabi occupation. Thereafter the oasis fell more and more under the domination of the Bani Yas tribal confederation of Abu Dhabi⁸.

During the period from 1871 to 1913, with the Turkish occupation of Al-Hasa (Eastern Saudi Province), there was not much change in the position. The Turks did not exercise any jurisdiction over Buraimi. The

British government itself was not in favour of any Turkish expansion in Arabia beyond those parts which were already actually in their hands. It is important to note that in July 1913 Ibn Saud was said to have written to the Shaikh of Qatar that the Shaikh should expel the Turks from his land. To complicate matters, the old Shaikh Jassim bin Thani died and his son Abdulla, the new ruler, was reported by the Political Agent at Bahrain to have arranged to meet Ibn Saud. It was suggested that Ibn Saud might force the new Shaikh to evict the Turks or else he would himself take possession of Qatar. The Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were also reported to be making ready for a Saudi onslaught. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was understandably fearful of an attack as he was then in control at Buraimi - which Ibn Saud claimed. The Shaikhs threatened to call their Bedouin followers to repel any Saudi incursions. If this were not enough to tax British policy, Ibn Saud could also threaten Trucial Oman, which was being disturbed by the Muscat rebellion.

It is against this background that we move into the 'oil era'. The situation which has been outlined was confusing and contentious but, arguably, not of major importance. It was the development of oil-wells and their location which raised the stakes. Territorial disputes became inevitable and much more than prestige was involved⁹. In 1949, Saudi Arabia and Oman clashed over control of Buraimi; the Saudis wanted to control the area because ARAMCO, operating in Saudi Arabia, were prospecting for oil in the area. In 1952, Saudi forces, with ARAMCO's assistance, occupied the oasis - the oil company also helped to prepare the legal claims to support this occupation. In 1954, the Saudis and the British both submitted the documentation of their claims to international arbitration. In the meantime, British-officered forces occupied the villages. After 1955, the Buraimi dispute was dormant for a while. Muscat administered three villages

and Abu Dhabi six. The Saudis did not accept this outcome, but decided to leave matters where they stood for the time being¹⁰. In 1959, the United Nations became involved in the Buraimi dispute. Diplomatic relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia were broken off following the British-supported occupation of the area. Talks were resumed at the United Nations in the presence of the Secretary-General both in 1959 and in 1960. In that latter year he sent a representative to the area and he continued his mediation efforts even after the resumption of Anglo-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1963.

The dispute was not finally resolved until after British withdrawal from the region and the establishment of the United Arab Emirates. It was settled in 1974 by virtue of a final agreement by which Saudi Arabia renounced its claim to Buraimi in return for the cession by Abu Dhabi of a stretch of territory that gave the Saudis access to the Gulf east of the base of the Qatar peninsula. Moreover, the Zararah (Shaiba) oilfield, located on the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border, was to be divided between the two states¹¹.

A cognate case was the claim of Iraq to the whole territory of Kuwait. It has already been mentioned, but a few additional comments are in order. Iraq's aspirations had been aired by Baghdad politicians in the 1920s and they were repeated in broadcasts from King Ghazi's private station in the years just before the outbreak of the Second World War. It is important to note that such claims were being made before there was an awareness of Kuwait's enormous oil-wealth. Incorporation was not a sudden whim on the part of General Qassim¹².

However, his claims were undoubtedly sparked off by envy of Kuwait's vast petroleum reserves. Interest in the Gulf first began to grow with the development of the new oil fields at Zubair and Rumaila in southern Iraq in the late 1940s and with the opening of the terminal at Fao on the Gulf in 1951. Iraq's unsettled internal condition, however, continued to preclude the formation of a coherent Gulf policy. Meanwhile, Kuwait production continued to grow. In 1960, its total production was already in excess of 80 million tons. The Iraqi revolution of 1958 was a major development in the history of the Gulf and its more general aspects will be considered at greater length subsequently. We confine ourselves here to its specific implications in regard to Kuwait¹³.

The revolution turned Iraq into a major exponent of radical Arab nationalism in the Gulf area and the existence of conservative regimes appeared as an obstacle and menace to the security of the revolutionary regime in Iraq¹⁴. Iraqi-Soviet links were immediately established with the revolution, links which were to culminate eventually in the Iraq-Soviet treaty of 1972 by which the Russians gained the use of Iraqi facilities in the Gulf region. In 1968, after the British announcement of impending withdrawal from the region, the United States made clear its hope that in the long run Iraq would orient itself more towards co-operation with the West. The Russians charged both the United States and Britain with attempting to create a military bloc in the Gulf against Russia. However, this is to anticipate. Despite the significant changes brought about by the revolution, little practical interest was taken in the affairs of the lower Gulf. Kuwait alone attracted serious Iraqi governmental interest between 1961 and 1963.

There had always been some contact between Iraq and other Gulf states. For geographical and historical reasons, the strongest contact was

with Kuwait¹⁵. There were long-established economic ties between Kuwait and southern Iraq. Kuwait was dependent upon Iraq for the supply of grain, fruit, vegetables and even fresh water. On the other hand, Kuwaiti ships carried much of the trade of southern Iraq. Between July 1958 and April 1961 Qassim's attitudes even to Kuwait appeared no different from that of former Iraqi governments. They combined a grudging acceptance of Kuwait's separation with a reluctance to give overt recognition either to that separation or to the common border¹⁶. On 19 June 1961, the 1899 treaty guaranteeing British protection for Kuwait was abrogated and Britain recognized Kuwait's independence. Six days later, Qassim held a press conference in which he announced that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq¹⁷. The haste with which the claim was mounted can be explained partly by rumours circulating in the spring of 1961 that Kuwait intended to join the British Commonwealth of Nations on achieving her independence. It can also be partly explained by the state of Iraqi domestic policies in 1961. With increasing internal opposition, the Kuwait claim was a means of shifting the attention of a politically fragmented nation from domestic to foreign affairs.

On 1 July, at Kuwait's request, British and Saudi troops arrived in Kuwait, to be replaced in September by an Arab peace-keeping force established under the Arab League¹⁸. The decision to withdraw the peace-keeping force was later taken on the grounds that the threat to Kuwait's independence no longer existed. In December 1961, Hashim Jawad, Qassim's foreign minister announced that Iraq would reconsider diplomatic relations with any country which recognized Kuwait. In practice, the Kuwait dispute isolated Qassim from all Arab neighbours and it solved no internal problems. By the end of 1962, Qassim had no friend left in Iraq except a weakened communist party

and a handful of army officers, and none left outside, except the Soviet Union, itself increasingly disturbed by the Kurdish war and far more concerned with Egypt than with Iraq. Worst of all, the promise of social revolution begun in 1958 had started to falter. Land reform was in deep trouble; industrialization could make no headway; development plans could not be launched; and oil revenues were beginning to fall off. It is against this background that we must ask what had prompted Qassim to make the claim.

First of all, as a military leader, Qassim was used to issuing orders to his subordinates, both civil and military, assuming that his country would be with him. He sought to shift the focus of a divided nation from domestic to foreign affairs. Secondly, the Kuwait oil revenues looked increasingly attractive. Within a short time, Kuwait had become a major oil producer, production having reached the figure of 60 million tons, which has already been alluded to, from 17 million tons in 1950. The Kuwaiti oil revenues provoked envy in Arab lands and attracted the jealous eyes of Arab leaders who sought to achieve pan-Arab goals through territorial aggrandizement. How far Qassim was hoping to use the claim over Kuwait as a bargaining counter in subsequent negotiations remains a matter for conjecture. A bargaining counter would certainly have been of value, both so as to assure a favourable border settlement and so as to persuade the government of Kuwait to abrogate its defence treaty with Britain's.

Qassim's regime was overthrown in 1963. The Shaikh of Kuwait grasped the chance and sent a congratulatory telegram to Colonel Arif, who replied in the same vein. Following negotiations between the two countries, Iraq recognized Kuwait's independence and the two countries agreed to promote mutual economic, commercial and cultural relations²⁰. Also, in return for Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty, Kuwait declared its willingness

to end its defence treaty with Britain and indicated its intention to work towards closer links with Iraq in the long term. As a short-term indication of its special significance to Iraq it offered a financial contribution to the Iraqi economy. On 21 October the two countries signed an agreement for a £30 million interest-free Kuwaiti loan to Iraq.

The Ba'athist coup of 1968 brought about a new situation. Together with Nasserism, Ba'athism has been the most prominent revolutionary movement in Arab politics in the eyes of the outside world. Revolution is presented as the necessary means to overcome the profound disparity between the aspirations to unity among the Arab peoples and the reality of complete disunity in their national life. The Ba'ath as a party was organized in 1940 in Syria by Said Jalal, Salah al-Bitar and Michel Aflag. It emerged into the open in 1943 and held its first congress in 1947. Though the Ba'ath ideology was essentially the product of Aflag's mind, it was a blend of doctrines and principles derived partly from Arab culture and partly from western thought. The Ba'athist ideological formula projects a vision of Arab national unity based on the glories of the Arab past. While recognizing Islam's seminal contributions to Arab civilization, the Ba'athist ideology is essentially secularist and socialist. Aflag built the party on three principles: that the true nationalist movement should spring from the masses; that the Arab nationalism of the entire Arab world is one and indivisible; and, most important of all, that popular revolution was inevitable²¹.

This background helps to explain the fresh tensions that developed in the early 1970s. The projects which had been developing in collaboration over the previous few years were brought to an abrupt end in December 1972. Reports circulated of an Iraqi military build-up on the Kuwaiti border, and it became apparent that Iraq was strongly pressing its claims to the

islands of Warba and Bubiyan which dominate the estuary leading into southern Iraq. More is said subsequently concerning these islands. It was the case that possession of them would have increased the size of Iraq's Gulf shore - and its offshore oil rights - and allowed it to develop a much deeper water port in the Gulf. When negotiations proved fruitless, Iraqi troops occupied Al-Samitah, a border post in the north-east corner of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia immediately came to Kuwait's aid, together with the Arab League, and secured Iraq's withdrawal. Relations with Kuwait remained tense until the end of the 1970s.

Iraq's claim to Kuwait, although unsuccessful, was a major one, involving many different parties. It was fundamental since it was a claim to the entire territory. If it had been successful, there would have been no Kuwait. The Al-Zubara dispute, on the other hand, arose over a more modest matter, the claim by Bahrain to a piece of land on the northern coast of Qatar to which we have also already referred but which now requires amplification.

At present, Al-Zubara forms an integral part of Qatar. Bahrain's claim is based on the historical ground that Al-Zubara was the ancestral home of the ruling Al-Khalifa before their conquest of Bahrain in 1783. It appears that during the nineteenth century and before the British government concluded the agreement of 1916 with Qatar, the Shaikh of Bahrain claimed sovereignty over the whole peninsula of Qatar²². The British government in India took the view as early as 1873 that the Shaikh had no clear or important rights in Qatar, and that he should be restrained, as far as possible, from making difficulties in the area. Subsequently, by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913, the British undertook not to allow the interference of the Shaikh of Bahrain in the internal affairs of Qatar.

In the new circumstances after the end of the Second World War, fresh negotiations began. In 1949 an attempt was made to reach a modus vivendi between both countries, with the result that the Shaikh of Bahrain agreed to disclaim the ownership of any oil resources which might be discovered in Al-Zubara, provided that the Shaikh of Qatar agreed neither to interfere with the Nuaiym tribe (Bahraini subjects living in Qatar) nor to rebuild the old fort at Al-Zubara. However, no formal agreement was concluded by the two parties relating to these matters. The issue therefore remains legally unresolved, though only occasionally does it become contentious²⁴.

The presence of so many islands in the Gulf and their unequal distribution among its states is a special source of problems. While Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, have few islands, Abu Dhabi claims over two hundred. What is a naturally complicated geographical and juridical situation has been rendered more controversial by human agency as when efforts have been made to convert sand shoals into islands by erecting cairns on them²⁵.

One of the largest claims to Gulf islands was the Iranian claim to the Bahraini islands. The Iranian claims were revived periodically in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and especially during the Pahlavi era. In 1970, however, Iran acceded to the findings of a special UN fact-finding mission sent to Bahrain and formally recognized Bahrain's right to independence²⁶. Besides the Bahraini islands, however, the following islands have been focuses of controversy. We shall now outline the issues involved²⁷:

- (1) Warba and Bubiyan

Although the claim to the whole of Kuwait seems to have been dropped, the claim to these two Kuwait islands seems to be at the heart of contemporary disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraqi interest in Warba stemmed from the development of the port of Umm Qasr during the Second World War. In 1954, Iraq put forward an additional claim to some 4 kilometres of Kuwaiti-controlled coastline, west of Warba and Bubiyan. When the Shaikh of Kuwait rejected the claim, the British proposed that Kuwait should lease the island of Warba to Iraq, which in turn formally rejected this proposal in 1956²⁸.

To play an influential role in the region Iraq needed a strategically secure outlet into the Gulf and this led to territorial conflict with both Iran and Kuwait. Iraq's major means of access were through the Shatt-al-Arab and the port of Umm Qasr. In April 1969 Iraq took full advantage of heightened perceptions of an Iranian threat to press again its request for the right to station its forces on Kuwait soil so as to protect the area adjacent to Umm Qasr. In 1973, Iraqi troops crossed the border and occupied a Kuwait military post, an act which naturally elicited Kuwait's strong protests. Iraq claimed that control of the islands was necessary for the safeguarding of the passage to Iraq's naval port of Umm Qasr²⁹.

With the end of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute between Iraq and Iran in 1975, Iraq found it increasingly difficult to justify the continuing presence of its forces on the Kuwaiti coastal strip of Umm Qasr. The decision in the same year to drop support for Liberation Fronts in the Gulf and her settlement with Saudi Arabia of a border dispute in July 1975 made the grounds for occupation look even more flimsy. In 1977 Iraq announced her intention to withdraw her forces from Kuwait, and in 1979 both countries concluded an agreement giving Iraq access to the deep-water

facilities at the Kuwaiti port of Mina Al-Shuwaikh. Despite these movements towards better relations between the two countries, the primary long-term consideration in Kuwaiti foreign and defence planning remains its unsettled border dispute with Iraq³⁰. Iraq's professed motive for wanting the two islands has become that of improving the port of Fao, but it is clear that Iraqi possession would also improve its claim to offshore areas believed to be very rich in oil.

(2) Hawar Islands

Hawar lies between Bahrain and Qatar. It is located about one mile off the western coast of Qatar and can be reached on foot at low-tide³¹. The dispute started in the 1930s, when the APOC oil concession was granted. There was no Bahraini claim before the granting of the oil concession. The islands had never been inhabited on any permanent basis. In 1936 a Bahraini military garrison was stationed there³². It became plain at that time that the issue was primarily one which concerned possible oil reserves beneath the seabed. Indeed, the subsequent discovery of oil was a major factor in activating this still unsolved dispute.

(3) Abu Musa and the Tunbs

These islands were disputed between Iran and the Arab Emirates in the late nineteenth century. On 30 November 1971 Iran occupied the three islands that belonged to Sharja (Abu Musa) and Ras al-Khima ((Tunbs). Down to the present, the issue of the ownership of these islands has remained a major source of irritation in Arab-Iranian relations in the Gulf³³.

(4) Other disputed islands

There are other islands in the region which recently have been subject to dispute between Gulf countries. For example, the status of the islands of Umm al Maradin and Qaru is disputed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. They lie between sixteen and twenty-five miles off the shore of the Neutral

Zone. Kuwait considers these islands to be under her full sovereignty, but Saudi Arabia considers them to be under their joint sovereignty. Other examples include Sirri and Abu Nuayr, disputed between Iran and Sharja, and Sir Bani Yas, disputed between Iran and Abu Dhabi³⁴.

It is safe to assume that all the insular problems that have been touched on will remain sources of conflict in the Gulf region until its off-shore boundaries have been demarcated. That in turn will require a more favourable general atmosphere in the Gulf than presently exists³⁵.

Finally, in this chapter which has concerned itself with many disputes of greater or lesser importance, we turn to the dispute between Iran and Iraq which, to an extent, overshadowed all others. In September 1980, the world was shocked by the news of the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian Gulf war in the region of the oilfields which constituted the main source of Western energy. Partly for this reason, of course, it was also an area of superpower involvement. This region has naturally attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, especially since the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Conflict between Iran and Iraq had intensified with the rapid development of the oil industry, the flood of wealth into the area and, after 1971, the withdrawal of the British.

Iranian foreign policy was aimed, first, at protecting the country's own national security and, secondly, at assuming responsibility for the stability of the region and its states. Also significant was the army's pressure for more weapons and the anxiety that any successful revolutionary movement among Iran's neighbours would be a direct threat to the Pahlavi regime. Revolutionaries would be able to encourage similar movements

inside Iran. Finally, the freedom of oil tanker navigation was a major concern. Revolution in Baghdad in 1958, with the fall of the Hashemite dynasty and the beginning of a military regime threatened to undermine the Iranian position. Iran's attention, for a time, focussed on the Gulf and on Nasserism. The Shah saw the Iraqi revolution as a direct threat from the Soviet Union because of its influence on and ties with Baghdad as demonstrated by military assistance and other treaties. The presence of the Soviet Union in the Gulf was a source of great concern to Teheran²⁶. It also produced informal relations with Israel, which led to cooperation between the two countries, with the support of the United States, and the provision of assistance to the Kurdish rebellion from Teheran.

The revolution of 1958 had certainly changed some of the bases of Iraqi foreign policy, which had been independence, Arab solidarity, friendly relations with Turkey and Iran and neutrality in the East-West conflict. The newly-established ties with the Soviet Union under Qasim forced Iraq to terminate the formal agreements with Turkey and Iran, an action which aroused the hostility of Iraq's non-Arab neighbours. The domestic war with the Kurds led almost to armed conflict with Iran. In 1965, however, under Arif, Iraq promised to establish 'strong relations' with Turkey and Iran by developing trade and economic and cultural relations with them. It would take more than that to improve relations with Iran again. Their antagonism had deeper roots than the 1958 revolution, as shown by recurring disputes over such issues as the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and Kurdish nationalism.

The Shatt-al-Arab dispute can be considered as the main border problem between the two countries²⁷. Shatt-al-Arab is a large and wide watercourse into which both the river Euphrates and the river Tigris flow

near 'Karmat Ali', running together and creating one river which ends in the Gulf, separating Iraq and Iran. According to the second Ardrom treaty in 1847, the Ottomans gave up the town of Muhammarah and the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab to the benefit of Iran, but these transfers did not include the Shatt-al-Arab itself which remained under Ottoman sovereignty. This arrangement had been confirmed in the 1913 protocol which settled the Persian-Ottoman borderline. According to this treaty, Iraq considered the Shatt-al-Arab as a domestic river on its land and under its sovereignty, while Iran considered it to be an international river, in which case, according to international law, the borderline between the two countries should be the middle of the river.

The League of Nations dealt with the dispute when it decided after some time that there must be direct talks between the two countries. In 1937 the two parties reached a border agreement by which the Iranian government admitted the border corrections made during Ottoman rule, and at the same time secured a small change on the Shatt-al-Arab borderline to the Iranian benefit. The Iraqi government agreed to give up four miles of the Shatt-al-Arab in front of Abadan for the use of Iranian oil shipping. Iran, however, abolished this treaty in 1969. Iraq took the issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and the struggle continued between the two countries until 1975 when they signed an agreement during an OPEC conference.

Due to the fact that that the preliminary talks were held in complete secrecy, we cannot be sure precisely what was said. Although no agreement was reached in them it seems that the atmosphere improved. The ground was laid for the Algerian-sponsored talks between Saddam Hussein and the Shah. During the last session of the OPEC meeting, on 6 March 1975, the Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement was made public. Iraq dropped its claim on the

Shatt-al-Arab and the two parties agreed that the mainland border would be mapped out according to the Constantinople Protocol of 4 January 1913 and the border survey of 1914. It was accepted that this agreement also contained the plan for the river boundary. The two countries further confirmed that a line drawn down the middle of the Shatt-al-Arab would constitute their boundary. They also accepted a plan for a mixed committee for navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab. The Iraqis abolished the agreement after the outbreak of the war with Iran, claiming that they had only agreed to sign it under duress as a result of the Shah's military pressure. Indeed, the agreement did accomplish most of the Shah's goals, which can be summarized as follows: explicit recognition of Iran's boundary claims on the Shatt-al-Arab; implicit recognition of his status as guardian of the Gulf; an end to the Kurdish movement, (a feature of the agreement whose implications will be considered below). It had become a matter of some urgency for Iran to come to terms with Iraq, Iraqi encouragement of the Baluchi separatists had become troublesome, especially in the light of the massive military aid furnished by Russia and Iraq. The accommodation reached in 1975 between Iraq and Iran ended this tension somewhat, though later reports that Iraq could soon be rivalling Libya as a terrorist training ground were disquieting. Moreover, the war of October 1973 in the Middle East had highlighted the need for a revision of Iran's policy towards the Arab world. Relations with Iraq and Egypt improved after 1975.

Iraq presented indeed the most direct threat to Iran. It was the next largest power around the Gulf, a major Arab power but one with persistent differences with her fellow-Arabs, a radical regime beset by the Kurdish problem, as we shall see, but dissatisfied with its own access to the Gulf and for long able to threaten Iran's access in the Shatt-al-Arab. In posing a threat to Iran, Iraq enjoyed three assets. In the first

place, Iran's oil installations and traffic were vulnerable both to low-level guerrilla activity and to high-level military technology. Secondly, Baghdad had a good supply of such sophisticated equipment through the Soviet Union. Thirdly, there was the potential backing of the Soviet Union itself if things got out of hand, especially since the Soviet-Iraqi agreement of 1972 had provided the Russians, in the facility made available at Umm Qasr, with their best window on the Gulf. On the other hand, the enhanced regional importance of Iran constrained Soviet attacks on Iran, both over her rivalry with Iraq and regarding her claims in the Gulf, and in these circumstances the normalization of her relations with the Soviet Union continued. Of course, it scarcely needs to be stressed that the 1975 Iran-Iraq agreement was bilateral in character. It did not inaugurate more general co-operation between Iran and Arab states as a whole in the Gulf area, despite the fact that it was precisely at this time that there was a growing international recognition of the wealth and strategic importance of the region. Local anxiety about the possible interference of external predatory powers did not in itself lead the Gulf states to positive co-operation on sensitive areas.

It was no accident that the 1975 agreement dealt with both the Shatt-al-Arab dispute and the Kurdish issue as they could not be separated from each other. Iran gave major support to the Kurdish rebellion as a means of supporting its case in relation to the Shatt-al-Arab. She further used the Kurdish rebellion, with American support, to attract the Iraqi army to the north of the country and to diminish Soviet influence generally. However, a new factor arose, especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Iran and Iraq shared many interests, the most important being the development of their oil industries. The two countries were leading members of OPEC, especially after the 'oil crisis' of 1973. So, as a result

of the Shatt-al-Arab agreement, Iran stopped her assistance to the Kurds immediately and withdrew her troops from Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus, the 1975 agreement remained of major significance because, as long as it lasted, it removed the threat to Iranian security posed by Iraq and contributed towards diminishing Soviet influence in Iraq.

We conclude this chapter by turning specifically to the Kurds²². We have already noted that it is difficult to define to which race individuals in the different communities in the Middle East belong. People considered to be Kurds emerge from the mixing of races after many invasions. As the chief of the Kurdish rebel organization in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa, has remarked, the Kurds are those who feel that they are Kurds, exactly as the French or Germans are those who feel themselves to belong to those nationalities.

In Iraq the Kurds, as was briefly noted in the first chapter, constitute the third major element in the population. They had proved difficult to assimilate. Language had been a major stumbling block. The Kurds speak an Indo-European language close to Persian but Arabic has remained the official language of the central government and of the institutions of higher education in Iraq. Even more important has been the sense of ethnic or 'national' identity that the Kurds have developed, especially in the twentieth century. Whatever their origin, they were almost all converted to Islam. They became part of the vast Moslem empire and were often its staunch defenders. From time to time, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kurdish dynasties did arise, but they seemed to have lacked cohesion and have been unable to sustain themselves. In the twentieth century, a sense of Kurdish identity based on language, close tribal ties, customs and a shared history has inspired a Kurdish nationalist movement. However, these political groups have

generally lacked sufficient unity and co-ordination to achieve lasting results. Nevertheless, of all minority groups in the region the Kurds have been the most difficult to assimilate because of their numbers and their geographical concentration, their inaccessibility in the mountain regions they inhabit, and their cultural and linguistic identity. Even so, many bilingual Kurds have assimilated into Iraqi society sufficiently for them to play an active role in Iraqi government and society.

The Kurdish issue has constituted a central problem for all Iraqi governments ever since the creation of the state of Iraq in 1920. This difficulty has had both internal and external aspects. In 1946, the Kurds applied for permission to organize a Kurdish political party, but their application was rejected on the grounds that such a party was nationalist and therefore it would not operate on the same basis as other parties which accepted the legitimacy of the state. It is also relevant to note that in his demands on the Iraqi government Mulla Mustafa called for a federation of Kurdish tribes into a Kurdish province, the establishment of a Kurdish minister in the Iraqi cabinet to handle specifically Kurdish affairs and, finally, cultural independence for his people.

The coup of July 1958 brought Qassim to power, in alliance (at the outset) with a loose grouping of Communists, Kurds, Ba'athists, National Democrats and Arab Nationalists. The Free Officers sympathized with the Kurds, and Qassim offered to co-operate with their leaders in a partnership with the majority Arabs within a framework of Iraqi unity. A large number of Kurds who had been in exile were allowed to return and those in prison were released. Most important of all, of course, was the return of Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani from the Soviet Union where he had been living. He was given a triumphant entry into Baghdad, was put up in the palace of Nuri's

son, and was given a state-owned car and a cash allowance for himself and his retinue.

However, the honeymoon between Qassim and Mulla al-Barazani did not last long. Mutual suspicion developed between the two, as each perceived the other as a threat. Qassim, who had brought al-Barazani back to Baghdad partly as a counter-force to the Arab nationalists, soon began to fear that demands for Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi state, if truly granted, would lead to Kurdish independence and the disintegration of Iraq. Indeed, in 1960, al-Barazani complained to the Soviet leaders on a visit to Moscow about Qassim's treatment of the Kurds. He sought to persuade the Soviet government to put pressure on Qassim to meet Kurdish demands. In this he was unsuccessful. In his absence, Qassim began to manoeuvre against him. When Mulla Mustafa did return it was not to Baghdad but to his own homeland in rebellion.

After the fall of Qassim and the accession to power of Arif, the situation did not change significantly. The Kurds were once again in rebellion and by 1965 open hostilities were taking place. This time, however, the Iranian connexion helped to tilt the balance in favour of the Kurds in their offensive against the central government. By December, Iran was in open conflict with Iraq on the issue. In June 1966 an Iraqi-Kurdish twelve-point peace plan was framed which would have recognized Kurdish nationality but it provoked in turn a reaction from the quarter of the Arab nationalists who regarded such an admission as a betrayal. After 1968, it was the turn of the Ba'athists to grapple with the problem. By the autumn it was clear that there was not going to be a fresh start. Clashes took place between government forces and Kurdish troops. By 1969 the Kurds were receiving massive aid from Iran and Iranian units were fighting inside Iraqi territory. This aid, together with the situation on the Shatt-al-

Arab, helped to turn the tide in favour of the Kurds. In these circumstances the Iraqi government concluded an agreement with al-Barazani in March 1970. This agreement, which proved to be short-lived, temporarily ended his connexions with Iran and the contact which had been established with Israel. Between 1970 and 1974 the situation between the Kurds and the Iraqi government deteriorated, as a result of a series of steps taken by both parties. Growing isolation and assassination attempts led al-Barazani to re-establish ties with the Shah who was throughly alarmed by the extent of Soviet influence in Iraq. On 31 May 1972, President Nixon of the United states directed the CIA to advance \$16 million in aid to the Kurds and this was supplemented by massive Iranian help also. Notwithstanding this further deterioration, it should be noted that in fact the Iraqi government had gone a good distance towards meeting the demands of the Kurds. There is a possibility that without external involvement some kind of modus vivendi would have developed. In 1974 a further major outbreak of fighting took place but it went badly for the Kurds. By the winter of 1974/5 the Iraqi army was close to complete military victory. Advancing some nine miles into Iraq, it was only the assistance of Iranian forces that kept the Kurds in the fight. Then, as we have seen, in March 1975 came the Iranian-Iraqi agreement by which Iraq accepted the Shatt-al-Arab channel boundary and ceased assisting Iranian dissidents and Arab and Baluchi minorities in Iran. Iran in turn ceased assisting the Kurds, and the collapse of Kurdish resistance followed almost immediately. There could not be a more graphic illustration of the relationship between internal problems and external involvement which, as this chapter has demonstrated, existed in a multiplicity of contexts throughout the region.

1. J.C. McCaslin, ed., International Petroleum Encyclopaedia vol.12, pp.18-19, 227, 232. It should also be noted that Qatar and U.A.E. gas is estimated to constitute some 5 per cent of the world's gas reserves.
2. A.Cottrell, ed., The Persian Gulf States (London, 1980) p.67;
M.Burrell, The Politics of the Arab littoral states in the Persian Gulf region (Teheran, 1975).
3. G.Lenczowski. The Middle East in World Affairs (London, 1980), p.658.
4. A.Melamid, 'Oil and the Evolution of Boundaries in Eastern Arabia', The Geographical Review vol.44, pt.2, 1954, p.295. See also his 'The Buraimi Oasis dispute', Middle Eastern Affairs vol. 7 1956 pp.56-63 and J.B.Kelly, 'The Buraimi dispute', International Affairs vol.32 pt. 3 1956 pp.318-26.5. Cottrell, Persian Gulf States, p.67: P.Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1945-68 (London, 1973) pp.67-8.
6. Kelly, Arabia, Gulf and the West, p.61.
7. G.Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia (London, 1976) p.15.
8. P.Mansfield, The Middle East (London, 1973) p.61; Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, p.64. Amir Abdulla made unsuccessful attempts to recapture Buraimi from the Omanis in the following year. The Bani Yas had remained inveterately hostile to the Wahhabis throughout the period of the Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi. It was the Al-Wahaiyan Shaikhs of Bani Yas who had organized the confederacies which from time to time had driven the Saudis out.
9. Troeller, Birth of Saudi Arabia, p.51.
10. S.Fisher, The Middle East (London, 1959) p.538 and p.574; Clements, Oman: the reborn land, pp.51-53. By 1952, the outlines of the Saudi government's strategy had become clear. Its principal

target was the western area of Abu Dhabi, especially the Dhafrah, the Liwa and the adjacent districts where oil was believed to lie. Because Saudi Arabia had never exercised jurisdiction over these areas, the Saudi government was directing its attention towards the Buraimi oasis where it had evidence of a past connection, even if this amounted to nothing more than a series of armed occupations in the preceding century.

11. Lenczowski, Middle East, p.658 and p.680. For further information on the Buraimi dispute see J.Marlowe, The Persian Gulf in the twentieth century (London, 1962); J.B.Kelly, 'Sovereignty and jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia', International Affairs vol.34 pt.1 1958 pp.16-24, 'The future in Arabia', International Affairs vol.42 pt.4 1966 pp.619-40 and his Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London, 1964); A.S.Sahwell, 'The Buraimi Dispute: the British armed aggression', Islamic Review vol.44 April 1956, pp.13-17; Saudi Arabian Government, Arbitration for the settlement between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other: memorial of the government of Saudi Arabia (Cairo, 1955).
12. S.Longrigg, 'Iraq's claim to Kuwait', Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society vol.48, 1961 p.309.
13. H.R.Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours (London, 1963).
14. Information is derived from Khadduri, Republican Iraq and Dunn, U. Iraq under Qassim (London, 1969). In some respects, of course, the revolution weakened the ability of Iraq to act in the Gulf area. Political instability led to the postponement of long-term economic development and a slower rise in oil wealth.

15. Al-Baharna, Legal Status, Chapter 15.
16. Khadduri, Republican Iraq p.169.
17. At the same time there were telegrams from different elements in the Iraqi population urging Qassim to extend his declaration of sovereignty over Kuwait to all other territories along the shore of the Gulf.
18. The force was made up of units from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and, briefly, the UAR.
19. On the request for British involvement see R.Hewins, A Golden Dream (London, 1963) pp.280-305; Khadduri, Republican Iraq pp.166-73; see also the general overview in Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution (London, 1970).
20. For more details on Iraqi-Kuwaiti co-operation see T.Wiblock, Iraq: the contemporary state (London, 1982) pp.135-7.
21. B.Lewis, ed., Revolution in the Middle East and other case studies (London, 1972) pp.30-40; K.H.Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (London, 1968), p.185; J.S.A.Jaber, The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (New York, 1966) p.169; J.Pennar, The USSR and the Arabs: the ideological dimension (London, 1973) p.102; Y.Ibeh, Arab Political Documents (Beirut, 1963) pp.120-46. Aflag himself was born in Damascus in 1912, the son of a Greek Orthodox grain merchant.
22. J.G.Lorimer, Gazette of the Persian Gulf: Oman and Central Arabia, pp.815-6.
23. The Al-Thani, the ruling family in Qatar, rejected the claim on the grounds that al-Zubara was an integral part of the territory of Qatar. Their case was recognized as valid by the Political Resident who referred to the wearing sent to the Al-Khalifa in 1873 and to the protection agreement he had signed with Abdulla, the Shaikh of Qatar in

1935. See Y. Al-Abdulla, A study of Qatari-British relations 1914-1945 MA thesis, Montreal, 1981, pp.56-8.
24. At present, the Shaikh of Bahrain claims Zubara for two reasons: firstly, because it was his ancestors' home and secondly because it is inhabited by the Nuaiym tribe who owe him their allegiance. Baharna, Legal Status chapter 15. For further information about the earlier history of the claim see J.A.Saldanha, Precis of Katar affairs 1873-1904 (Simla, 1904); A.Farouqy, The Bahrain Islands 750-1951 (New York, 1951); Documents on the history of Qatar from the British and Ottoman Documents 1868-1949 (Doha, 1979).
25. R.Hay, 'The Persian Gulf States and their boundary problems', Geographical Journal 1954, p.441. While few of the Gulf's islands are at present inhabited, many have a long history of sporadic occupation for fishing bases or other purposes.
26. H. Al-Baharaa, 'The fact-finding mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the settlement of the Bahrain-Iran dispute, May 1970', International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol.22 July 1973 pp.541-52. See also the same author's book. F.Admiyat, The Bahrain Islands (New York, 1955); J.B.Kelly, 'The Persian Claim to Bahrain' International Affairs vol.33 no 1 January 1957; N.Khadduri, 'Iran's claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain', The American Journal of International Law vol.45, 1951.
27. These two islands lie near the junction of the Kuwait and Iraq coastlines. Bubiyan lies within one mile of the Kuwait shore and five miles from Iraq. Warba lies less than a mile from Iraq and almost two miles from Kuwait.

28. It is worth noting that these islands and their territorial waters were included in the concession area relating to Kuwaiti oil in 1951. See A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the law of the sea (Syracuse, 1979) p.118.
29. This harbour was reportedly visited in the late 1960s and early 1970s by a Soviet naval squadron, while the conclusion of the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty further added to Kuwait's concerns over Iraq's designs in the Gulf region.
30. For details see R. Litwak, Security in the Persian Gulf: sources of inter-state conflict (Aldershot, 1981).
31. There are sixteen barren islands altogether.
32. Al-Abdulla, Qatari-British relations, p.58.
33. El-Hakim, Middle Eastern States, pp.123-7; Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis, pp.378-9; on 29 November 1971 Sharja signed a controversial agreement with Iran that provided for a joint sovereignty over Abu Musa, and an equal proportion of the area's oil revenues. El-Hakim, Middle Eastern States, pp.123-27.
35. The following offshore boundaries have already been demarcated: Saudi Arabia-Bahrain (1958); Saudi Arabia-Iran (1968); Abu Dhabi-Qatar (1969); Iran-Qatar (1970); Iran-Bahrain (1972) and Iran-Oman (1975).
36. M. A. Al-Dauwd 'Russia and the Arabian Gulf' (Baghdad, 1959) and 'Talks about the Arabian Gulf' (Baghdad, 1960). Both works are in Arabic.
37. K. Al-Izzi, The Shatt-Al-Arab river dispute (Groningen, 1971); Iraq Ministry of Information, The Shatt-Al-Arab dispute in terms of law (Baghdad, 1972).
38. The following is a helpful selection from the literature on the Kurds: H. Arafa, The Kurds, an historical and political study (London, 1966); W. Eagleton, The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London, 1963); P. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (London, 1985);

T.Bois, The Kurds (Beirut, 1966); B.Ghaneeb, The Kurdish question in Iraq (Syracuse, 1981); S.Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question (London, 1963) and Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970 (London, 1981); J.Talabari, Kurdistan and the national and the Kurdish national movement (Beirut, 1971) In Arabic; C.J.Edmonds, 'The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq', Middle East Journal XIII 1959 and his Kurds, Turks and Arabs (London, 1967); D.Kinnane. The Kurds and Kurdistan (London, 1964); D.Adamsen, The Kurdish War (London, 1964); E.O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970 (London, 1973); S.C.Pelletiens, The Kurds: an unstable element in the Gulf (Boulder, 1984).

Chapter Three: The Superpowers and the Gulf

The emphasis in the first two chapters has been upon the historical complexity of the Gulf region and on the many indigenous difficulties which had to be tackled during the period of state consolidation and creation. The oil complication caused many local problems in the relationships between the littoral countries but it also brought the superpowers into the region and add the complexity of bilateral relationships. In particular, in our period of special concern, we see the growth in the influence of the United States as a major factor. It is with the ramifications of this involvement that this chapter chiefly concerned.

Direct American interest in the Gulf region dates back to the nineteenth century in Oman. It was based on commerce and gained an additional human dimension through missionary activities¹. However, the British and Russians were able to maintain the upper hand in Persia. It is useful to point out the antiquity of such contacts but they are insignificant in comparison with this subsequent American presence. The decade before the First World war sees signs of increased American interest and activity. Instead of clashing with both Britain and Russia in Persia in the quest for oil. Americans preferred to look elsewhere, such as Mosul or Kirkuk in northern Iraq, then, of course, under Ottoman jurisdiction.

The American Colby succeeded in gaining an oil concession from the Sultan in 1908 but, unfortunately for him, a few weeks after signing the agreement, the young Turks gained power and the Sultan's effective rule was at an end. Colby had to face new competition from both the German and the British². American persistence in trying to gain a Gulf oil concession finally led to an Anglo-American struggle.

The competition which did exist was fundamentally economic. It is clear that the discovery of oil made the Americans anxious to compete with

the British, despite the fact that the British tried to pretend that the Gulf was a British lake. The abolition of the European oil concessions in Russia after the October revolution in Russia had made the British even more anxious on this point in the early post-war period. For example, they had signed an agreement at San Remo on 24 April 1920 with the French. This arrangement, however, led to additional pressure on Britain as time passed. The United States would not recognize the agreement unless the British in turn agreed to an 'Open Door'. This was accompanied by attempts to threaten British interests by closing the door to British companies in areas under American sovereignty. The basic fact was that the British had no wish to depend on American oil. They argued, in any case, that an 'Open Door' policy could only exist in relation to a fully sovereign state. The countries of the Gulf were protectorates and within a British sphere of influence. However, in 1928 the Americans did succeed in reaching an agreement with Iraq and in the years that followed American oil companies gained further oil concessions in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

It was developments during the Second World War which made American involvement in the Gulf region possible. One result in 1941 was that the British government agreed to an American sea inspector in Bahrain. In 1943, the United States claimed a consulate in Bahrain but such an office was initially opposed by the British because it might lead Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran to make similar claims. In 1944, however, after long discussion, it was agreed by both sides that the American consulate in Saudi Arabia could also operate in Bahrain. During these years, the United States gained facilities in both Saudi Arabia and Oman. In 1942, an agreement was signed with Saudi Arabia which resulted in the creation of the Dhahran base. With British consent certain limited facilities were also obtained in Oman. Thus the United States did build up a certain base of influence in the Gulf

region but the British still retained their supremacy and Washington did not seek directly to challenge it².

In retrospect, this period can appear to mark the beginning of the American bid for predominance. By the Second World War, however, geological reports concerning American oil needs, plus the special survey in 1942, pointed out that the Middle East rather than the West Indies would be likely to be the main centre of exploitation and development⁴. It is well known that the most serious clash between both governments, the British and the American, started soon after the war had come to an end. Following the Second World War, initially in response to a Soviet attempt to dismember Iran, the United States built up its position through a combination of vigorous diplomacy, covert intelligence work and an extension of economic and military assistance to friendly governments. But the United States had many other concerns world-wide and in the first two decades after 1945 the Gulf region did not become a major focus of American attention. It was not until 1968, with the British announcement of their withdrawal from the Gulf in the near future, that Washington took a significantly greater interest in the region in its entirety. There was the obvious possibility that the Soviet Union might seek to fill the vacuum left by the British withdrawal, either directly or through their friends and supporters in Iraq. From this perspective, an Iran-Saudi Arabia twin-pillar guardianship of the Gulf had a great deal to commend itself to the Americans⁵.

Let us look more closely at the American relationship with Saudi Arabia. The country's growing importance to the United States stemmed partly from its political and diplomatic value as a stable monarchy hostile to communism and other forms of radicalism and partly from its economic importance insofar as it controlled more than a quarter of the world's known deposits of petroleum. It dominates the Arabian peninsula

geographically, bordering both the Gulf and the Red Sea, and lies to the south of the Israeli security zone. Decisions its leaders make regarding the use of its huge financial reserves have a significant impact on the Western economic system. As the dominant oil-producing and economic power in the peninsula and as the centre of the Islamic faith, it plays a key role in the maintenance of stability and security over a wide area. It plays a key role - in recent years a moderate one - in the deliberations of OPEC. It was becoming the seventh largest world market for United States goods, services and technology, exclusive of arms sales.

Of course, the relationship had earlier roots. In 1933 Ibn Saud had faced severe financial crisis because his main source of income, the taxation of the Haji (pilgrimage) had been undermined by the world slump of these years. Such was his plight that in return for £50,000 in gold he had given an oil concession to ARAMCO, which established ties between a major United States oil company and the Saudi state. As a result of the outbreak of the Second World War, the Haji stopped again and Ibn Saud was once more in need of alternative sources of finance. He required £10 million a year to run his country and SOCAL decided to get the money from the United States government. That money was forthcoming but Washington also became apprehensive that British influence over Saudi Arabia might grow. There was a conspicuous strengthening of bilateral ties. For example, the United States Air Force began construction of an airfield at Dhahran near the oil wells⁶. By 1947, Saudi Arabia received an estimated £100 million in aid from the United states. In 1950, ARAMCO finished the pipeline from Eastern Arabia to the Mediterranean, originally an idea conceived by the United States Navy which wanted to get supplies of oil for its Sixth Fleet operating in the Mediterranean.

In 1953 King Saud succeeded his father, and a temporary storm took place in the relationship between Riyadh and Washington. The Saudi Arabian authorities tried to acquire some independence by signing an agreement with Aristotle Onassis to build a 500,000 ton tanker fleet to transport all oil not carried by ARAMCO's existing tankers. ARAMCO fought back, and was fully supported by the United States administration. King Saud's visit to the United States ended this period of coolness in 1957 and he agreed to renew the Dhahran lease for another five years, in return for continued American military support. In 1958, Saudi Arabia received a \$25 million Foreign Assistance Act grant from the United States while in the same year she experienced a \$35 million drop in revenues as a result of the cuts in the price of crude oil. The general incompetence of King Saud added to the difficulty of doing business. A combination of American pressure and Arab League advice helped to bring about a change at the top. The Al-Saud family executive power was taken from King Saud and handed to his younger brother the Amir Faysal.

These developments are sufficient to indicate that in the specific case of Saudi Arabia, the United States had replaced Britain as the country's chief military supporter from the late 1940s. This occurred not only because a mutually beneficial commercial relationship seemed to be developing through ARAMCO but also because of a tension in British-Saudi relations occasioned by the Buraimi Oasis dispute which has been discussed in the previous chapter. The American support for the Saudis in this matter was no doubt related to the British-American competition for oil concessions. ARAMCO supported Saudi Arabia, whereas Britain was the defender of the Shaikhdoms (Abu Dhabi and Muscat)?.

Under Faysal, the Saudi-American relationship which had been developing since 1933 was firmly established, though he spent no more money

on arms sales than the former king had spent on cars and palaces. However, unlike other 'clients' of the United States world-wide, Saudi Arabia's steadily increasing oil revenues meant that she did not need to look to Washington for financial aid. There was, therefore, no 'dependency syndrome'. In oil terms, however, the United States was totally supreme and no other European countries could establish a foothold. Indeed, in oil terms in the region as a whole by 1958 the United States had replaced Britain. The oil share in the region in 1950 was 56 per cent to Britain, and 33 per cent to the United States but by 1958 the proportions were exactly reversed. Even so, it was not until a further decade, with the impending British withdrawal, that the United States had to begin to grapple seriously with the wider implications throughout the region of this substantial stake. Saudi Arabia was obviously of very great importance.

Even so, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington was more complicated than this account may so far have suggested. It did not begin and end with questions of security. It also involved the application of Western technology and training in order to develop the entire economic infra-structure of Saudi Arabia. Here was a complex and massive operation with social implications at many levels. Nevertheless, at the turn of the 1970s, it was to the United States that the Saudi government began to look in security matters. For its part, Washington was keen to strengthen Saudi Arabia. As George Ball was to write subsequently, 'We sold military hardware to the Shah on the assumption that he would be a protector in the Gulf and we would stay out of it. If today the Gulf is to be protected, we ourselves must pull the labouring oar, yet, to be fully effective we shall need the co-operation of the Saudis.' That was also true in the earlier period, though then, as later, there was an awareness of the difficulties

of creating rapidly an effective and modern armed force in a country with sparse manpower.

In turn the Saudi-Iranian relationship could become pivotal since the United States also believed that it required a close connexion with Iran. Saudi-Iranian co-operation existed in different fields but it took its most important form in the Gulf area. Iran had the larger role as a result of its bigger and fully equipped fleet and army when compared with those available to Riyadh. It was already the case that Iranian military missions operated in certain Arabian states - Oman and Yemen. But although Iran was involved to a limited degree in the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia continued to see itself as the dominant power there, both politically and militarily. At the same time, it was Iran's policy which caused more concern to the Soviet Union, especially Iranian involvement in Oman, where Iranian troops were aiding the Omanis in suppressing the guerrillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. The latter were aided by Soviet-backed South Yemen, which appeared at times to be on the brink of war with Oman.

The strategic, political and economic significance of Saudi Arabia assumed new dimensions with the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing crisis. Among the immediate consequences of the war and the subsequent oil embargo was the energy crisis. The Gulf region was directly involved. The purchasing power of oil-producing states increased substantially with the rise in oil prices. Israel became more dependent than ever upon the United States. The Western powers became divided on some basic principles underlying their policies towards the Middle East. Until the 1973 war, the Saudi leadership had been unable to translate the

kingdom's economic importance, derived from its oil resources, into political importance beyond the regional confines of the Middle East, and not always with success even there. The longstanding belief on the part of Western governments - in particular the United States - that cheap oil would be available in almost unlimited quantities for years to come ended with the 1973-4 oil embargo.

It was in 1971 that the two big OPEC leaders, Faysal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran had agreed, for the first time, to take action against oil companies that refused to pay taxes. They also used this agreement to show their peoples publicly that they were not controlled by foreign influences. On the subject of raising oil prices, OPEC members had agreed to divide the organization into three blocs on a regional basis. The most important division, which had been agreed upon earlier, for our purposes is the Gulf bloc which included Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. It also agreed that Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran would act on behalf of all of the group.

At the beginning of 1973 there was a huge general demand to use oil as a weapon in the battle against Israel, especially since the world's dependence on and demand for oil was too great to be ignored. There was much discussion in the various Arab countries on this matter. On 21 June 1973 the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, nationalized all the oil companies in his country. Newsweek magazine described the event as the start of an oil war⁸. It is important to note that the Libyan decision had been made a month after King Faysal's warning to ARAMCO in May 1973⁹. The second warning to the United States was through the managers of four oil companies whom King Faysal met in Geneva. The American reaction seems to have been that this was bluff and that when it came to the point the Arabs would never act together. Negotiations went on with the Arab producing countries

and also through Egypt and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Shaikh Yamani - the Saudi oil minister - paid a visit to Teheran to get the Iranian view on the subject of a possible Arab oil boycott. King Faysal delivered his formal warning to the United States at a press conference in July 1973. In August the Saudi warnings became stronger. In an interview on American television, King Faysal threatened the United States that he would indeed use the oil weapon unless it modified its attitude towards Zionism¹⁰.

In fact, using oil as a weapon or tool was a long and difficult operation. Initially it would appear that King Faysal had been far from convinced that oil and politics should be mixed up and it took time for him to be persuaded. It was apparent from the fact that the Congress tried to complicate the delivery of Phantom aircraft to Saudi Arabia in June 1973 that the Americans themselves were mixing arms and politics. There were also rumours that military aid to Kuwait might be cut off, thus exposing that state to possible Iraqi aggression. Gradually, however, the Saudi plan took shape. The first phase was an attempt to put pressure on the United States specifically to change its attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. If that did not succeed, the second phase would come into operation. Saudi Arabia would reduce its oil production¹¹.

On 20 October, Saudi Arabia did join the campaign to implement an oil boycott as a result of President Nixon's announcement of the American financial aid to Israel amounting to \$2.2 billion. The United Arab Emirates led the way in announcing a boycott of the United States. Among European states, the Netherlands and Portugal were singled out for severe treatment. It has sometimes been supposed that Saudi Arabia forced the United Arab Emirates into the front line and to take this initial step. There is no doubt that the boycott was a major step forward in self-assertion on the part of the Arab countries. Nevertheless, the weapon was not quite as

effective as had been hoped, for the following reasons. Some oil continued to escape to the United States through the oil companies, either with the knowledge of the country in which they operated or not. It was also the case that the oil companies decided to divide an equal share among their customers. Thus even the Netherlands, which was in theory being totally boycotted, did not suffer very significantly and had both reserves and alternative supplies. Thirdly, the policy of raising the volume of oil production, which had been general throughout the Arab oil-producing countries in the period leading up to the outbreak of the war, had resulted in there being a surplus of oil on world markets. It was difficult to make the sharp impact that was immediately desired. Equally, countries were not prepared to keep on the boycott indefinitely. It came to an end in March 1974. Of course, throughout this period the non-Arab producing countries continued their oil production throughout the boycott¹².

Nevertheless, it can be claimed that the embargo helped to bring a change in Western European attitudes, in particular. It was the occasion when one might say that the Gulf countries 'came of age' internationally. They were led, in one way or another, by Saudi Arabia. Stepping onto the world stage in this manner was significant, but it did not take long for sharp disagreements about pricing policy to emerge amongst many of the states who had appeared to have found a degree of unity. Iran wanted a higher price than the Saudis did, the reason being that the Shah urgently needed to solve his economic problems and additional revenue would greatly assist his Five-Year Development Plan¹³. Of course, the Shah did not advertize that he had other ambitions too. He wanted an even stronger army to enable him to maintain his control over his country and to extend Iran's influence in the Gulf area generally. Saudi Arabia, for her part, claimed a reasonable price for oil because her financial circumstances were much

better than Iran's. Iraq was closer in her opinion to the Saudi stand, while smaller countries such as Kuwait and Qatar were more sympathetic to the Saudi point of view⁴.

It is now appropriate to conclude this consideration of the Saudi-American relationship by certain general remarks. It can be described as being 'special'. It had its genesis, as we have seen in the major role played by American oil companies in the development of Saudi petroleum resources in the 1930s. Subsequently it was fostered by government to government co-operation and assistance. It became apparent that officials in the governments of both countries believed that the preservation and enhancement of this relationship could provide a basis for resolving political, security, economic and energy issues facing the United States and Saudi Arabia. From the perspective of Washington, decisions taken by Saudi Arabia could affect the United States balance of payments, the future of the dollar, the American, indeed the world energy equation, and the performance of the world economy as a whole. It is not surprising, in these circumstances, after the shock of the events of 1973, that the United States applied itself afresh to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We now turn to the other 'pillar' of the so-called 'twin-pillar' policy - Iran.

From the perspective of the superpowers during this period Iran inevitably appeared the key country in the Gulf region, indeed perhaps in the Middle East as a whole. Its physical size is considerable (six hundred and twenty seven thousand square miles, nearly seven times as big as the United Kingdom). Its population was substantial - in 1976 it amounted to approximately 33½ million people. Its natural resources, especially its oil

wealth, seemed to be making it a power with genuine international status. It appeared, for much of our period, that the economic and industrial transformation of Iran was one of the major successes of the modern world.

As a superpower, the United States had built up its position in the country, following the Second World War, by opposing Soviet attempts to dismember Iran. However, there was no disguising its appetite for oil. By the 1950s, United States investments in oilfields in Iran amounted to \$596 million, and it controlled about 40 per cent of the production, especially after the oil nationalization by Mussadeq. Britain was still in the lead with nearly 50 per cent¹⁵. Mussadeq had been castigated by the British, the Russians and the Americans. The British alleged that he was trying to shift control of British oil into American hands so they accused him of acting under communist instructions, thereby hoping to incite the United States against him. In fact, Mussadeq tried to enlist United States support, but with very poor success, because the result of the 1952 American presidential election brought Eisenhower and Dulles, determined anti-Communists, to power. Even though Mussadeq was not a Communist, they saw him opening the door for Communist influence, given Iran's geographical position on the border of the Soviet Union. But it shows that Washington might have accepted him if he had been able to consolidate his position and stabilize the situation. In the end, he was overthrown by a combination of internal and external foes¹⁶. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not take advantage of these developments. Stalin died in March 1953 and the uncertain position thereafter explains why nothing was done when Mussadeq fell in the following August. At that time, General Zahedi was plotting against him and his government in collusion with the Shah and of course the army had strong ties with the United States. There is no doubt that Washington, and specifically the CIA, played an active part in organizing

the coup of 19 August 1953 that ousted Mussadeq¹⁷. Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister, played a major part in restoring her brother, too. This American assistance in the restoration of the Shah increased the dependence of Teheran on Washington. A new settlement was made with foreign oil interests as a result of which five American companies gained a 40 per cent share of Iranian production.

In Iran - as in Turkey - in general American aid was welcomed and the leadership of Washington accepted. Both of these countries had contrived, more or less successfully, to remain independent during the colonial era. The appeal of the United States at this juncture was not so much that it was the ancient pioneer of anti-colonialism but that it was the new leader of the West and their natural and powerful defender against the old and familiar threat posed by Russia¹⁸. After the Second World War the United States had indeed been successful in dissolving the British and Soviet spheres of influence simultaneously. Teheran seemed to be acting astutely and reasonably in inviting this third party to take an interest in reducing the long-standing claims which both London and Moscow had to exercise influence over the region. The Soviet attitude towards Mussadeq had been ambivalent from the start. His anti-British sentiments that made him willing to undermine the British concession naturally commended him to Moscow. Yet he was an aristocrat, a landowner, a conservative who distrusted the Russians, and he was generally friendly towards the United States. There were two events which built up the Russian attitude against him. First of all, in 1944, he had been the author of a bill that prohibited any Iranian government from negotiating oil concessions with foreign countries without express parliamentary approval. Secondly, in April 1952, he had renewed the agreement on American aid to the armed forces. Mussadeq's government was informed by the Soviet Union in a formal

note on 21 May that the renewal of the agreement had placed the Iranian army under the control of a foreign power'². In general, Soviet interests were rather different from those of the United States. The Gulf appears, from the perspective of Moscow, to be an area that offers good prospects for extending its political and military influence. However, it cannot act precipitately since, if the Middle East were to come under Soviet influence this would have far-reaching repercussions on the situation in Europe as well as in Africa and Asia. In a curious way, therefore, it can be argued that geographical proximity inhibited the Soviet Union rather than providing it with an advantage.

It will already have been noted that the American position was consolidated by means of arms sales. However, it should be clear that Iran's steadily greater integration into the international system of capitalist relations enabled it to establish a much more diverse pattern of economic ties. Thus insofar as it can be said that the United States 'ruled' it did so through arms sales, through SAVAK (whose importance has already been discussed), and through trade and investments. On the other hand, Iran's capacity to resist US control lay in its being an oil power and in being a key factor in American/Soviet relations in its region. American trade and investments improved after the fall of Mussadeq. Between 1956 and 1974, American firms in Iran accounted for a third of all the capital investment. After the oil boom, in 1975 the United States accounted for 21.6 per cent of Iran's non-military imports, while it had been 13 per cent in 1970-1. Despite that, America had become less involved in Iranian affairs and petroleum issues, though it remained deeply interested. America was pleased not to be blamed for its aid to Iranian armed forces, but it was somewhat disappointed that its aid was not necessary on the scale it had been hitherto. Some American observers were afraid that the United

states might lose the co-operation of Iran. This was because the original basis of American involvement in Iran had been Teheran's fear of the Soviet Union. At that stage a powerful outside backer had seemed necessary. Now, however, it seemed that Iran was bent on trying to become an international actor in its own right and to display its independence as against both the United States and the Soviet Union²⁰. In this developing situation, the United States was not sure that Iran could be kept dependent on American arms sales. There was, therefore, a distinct loosening of the relationship between the government of the Shah and Washington. It now seemed increasingly to be based on hard economic bargaining. Indeed, in 1976-7, the Shah hinted in interviews that if arms sales to Iran were curtailed he would retaliate²¹. Trade with the United States would be restricted. He would reconsider the assistance Iran gave in promoting regional stability in the Gulf area. He would be willing to buy arms from the Soviet Union. Finally, he hinted that he might raise difficulties in relation to the current non-proliferation agreements. Improving Iranian/Soviet relations made the United States think seriously about these latent threats to her interests in the Gulf, with the result that Washington may have been less upset by the eventual fall of the Shah in 1979 that would have been expected in view of the earlier close ties.

The Shah was able to follow this less aligned international stance partly because his domestic situation in the mid-1970s appeared not unfavourable - subsequent events notwithstanding. It appeared that the army and the police were loyal to him and were effective. Although many urban political elements were still unequivocally opposed to the regime, organized political opposition was quiescent. Economic development was advancing at a very satisfying pace and oil revenues were increasing. Moreover, an economic, technological and bureaucratic elite had emerged

which possessed substantial competence and appeared to be politically neutral. There was, therefore, a certain irony in a situation whereby the Shah, who owed so much to the United States, particularly in the military sphere, now seemed on the brink of self-sufficiency and detachment. However, both the military and economic aspects of this position need further exploration in the concluding section of this chapter.

When the Shah visited Washington in July 1973, American officials encouraged him to consider the most advanced fighter aircraft in the American arsenal, the F.14 and the F.15 as possible additions to the Imperial Iranian Air Force. This encouragement was proof of the dramatic change in the American attitude towards Iran's longstanding interest in acquiring sophisticated military hardware from the United States. In comparison with the American resistance to Iranian proposals for weapons purchase in the early 1960s, the new attitude indicated clearly that the United States had recognized Iran's newly developed economic and political capability. Indeed, earlier in 1973, the United States had agreed to double Iran's inventory of F.4s and C.130s, and also provide Teheran with an aerial refuelling squadron as well as several hundred helicopters, including not only transports but also gunships and antisubmarine craft. The Shah even told an interviewer that Iran would be obtaining laser-guided bomb systems, the most effective tactical weapon delivery means used by the US Air Force²².

The American military relationship with Iran dates back to the late 1940s; in other words, the initial involvement of the United States after the Second World War was military. In 1942 and 1943 a US mission was sent out to advise the Iranian army and gendarmerie. Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf

was put in charge of the Iranian gendarmerie and he reorganized this internal security force along American lines. American influence continued throughout the post-war period, and the contract for military and gendarmerie advisers was renewed several times²².

The United States assumed a position of major influence as a result of the 1947 agreement to extend the American military and gendarmerie missions to provide for the purchase of military equipment in the United States. A 1948 military aid programme gave Iran \$60 million worth of military equipment. Col. Schwarzkopf was considered particularly valuable in maintaining the power of the Iranian government. However, the real psychological dependence increased after the return of the Shah in 1953, when the United States had an uneasy relationship with Britain in influencing Iran. The United States now became the more dominating power in Iran in ways we have already noted. It was also reflected in America's ever-growing share of military supplies and advisers, and in civilian and governmental programmes. The Baghdad Pact of October 1955 can be seen as part of this process.

Since that period of the mid-1950s, the United States has been chiefly concerned that Iran be anti-Communist, anti-Soviet and possess large military forces. In 1961-63, during the Kennedy administration, it was seen that it might be important to American strategic and economic interests to have an Iranian government with a broader internal base of support - greater efficiency, more popularity, less corruption - than existed in the 1950s. But, at least according to Halliday, there were no fears of a Soviet attack on the Iranian army. The Shah had been armed because of what had been happening inside rather than outside Iran, and that was what made US criticism of the Shah's government increase by the early 1960s. In response, the Shah did reduce the formal size of his army

from 125,000 to 100,000 men²⁴. However, within a few years, Washington's disquiet had faded, which made it possible for Iran once more to increase the flow of American arms. Two developments resulted: first, Iran began to develop a regional policy for the first time and to face Nasser's Egypt and Republican Iraq; secondly, US policy shifted from the grant to the sale of arms on credit-purchase, especially after the Iranian oil revenues increased²⁵.

Since 1968, after the British announcement of withdrawal of forces from the Gulf, Iran faced the ultimate question. How could it best secure for itself the greatest control over its own external environment under these historical new circumstances? For more than a century, not only had the Pax Britannica been a constant irritation to Iran in the south, to put it mildly, it had also had the beneficial aspect that it provided a protective shield against encroachments by other outside powers in the Gulf area. The British plan to withdraw forces from the area in 1971 compelled Iran to specify its vital interests in terms of three immediate and primary objectives: first, to safeguard the Shah's regime against internal subversion sponsored by any hostile state or group; secondly, to ensure uninterrupted passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf and the Shatt-al-Arab; thirdly, to protect Iranian oil resources and facilities on and off shore against any deliberate or, indeed, accidental disruption²⁶.

To secure these objectives Iran decided to rely first and foremost on its own military strength in the Gulf area. There were three circumstances conducive to the adoption of this posture: first, the limited ability of CENTO to cope with regional security problems; secondly, Iran's outstanding conflicts with other Gulf states; and thirdly, uncertainty surrounding the future stability of the Trucial states, Bahrain and

Qatar²⁷. Moreover, in the wake of the British announcement, Iran let it be known that it was determined to take Britain's place as the dominant military power in the region, that an alliance of Iran and Saudi Arabia would constitute the 'twin-pillars' of local strength, and that the United States would supply these states with the necessary arms and training to enable them to carry out this function²⁸.

By the 1970s, arms transfers were expected to increase as an element in the Nixon Doctrine, indicating a United States commitment to Iran and serving, it was assumed, as an alternative to a direct involvement. The arms transfer relationship took on some of the attributes of a treaty relationship. In these years the American preference was for building up the army gradually over two decades. In 1972, however, the United States agreed to sell Iran any conventional weapons it required and later, in 1973, OPEC raised the price of oil by five times which caused the largest arms boom in history²⁹. Details of Iran's defence budget, and of U.S. military sales, reproduced in the following tables, give an idea of the scale of these transactions³⁰:

1. Iran's Defence Budget, 1970-77 in US\$ millions at current prices

Year	US\$ millions	% increase on previous year
1970	880	
1971	1065	17
1972	1375	29
1973	1575	11
1974	3680	141
1975	6325	72
1976	8925	41
1977	9400	5

2. US military sales to Iran, 1950-77 in \$ millions at current prices:

1950-69	757.0		
1970	113.2		
1971	396.8		
1972	519.1		
1973	2157.4		
1974	4373.2		
1975	1021.0		
1977	1458.7	TOTAL 1950-77	17.009.4.

The dimensions of the arms boom released by Iran's outlay on defence had escalated from \$78 millions in 1954 to \$241 millions in 1964 and thence to \$3680 millions in 1974. From OPEC's price rise in 1973 to 1978 Iran spent 31 per cent of its total expenditure on military provision and between 50 and 80 per cent of that military expenditure was going on purchases from the United States²¹. By 1975, the United States had emerged as the most important of the twenty-eight states supplying weapons and military services to the Gulf countries, while the United States had been responsible for well over 50 per cent of the worldwide arms trade. The Gulf states accounted for as much as \$19.5 billions of arms²². It was one of the most rapid build-ups of military power under peacetime conditions ever seen. The reasons for the arms sales to Iran were clear. They were both strategic and economic. They were to defend the interests of the United States and promote its influence. Another factor, not often mentioned, was to lighten the burden of weapons development in the United States itself. The responsiveness of the United States was considered important and reassuring by the Iranian government, while arms influence in the region could in turn be helpful to the United States. It was assumed that the United States would have influence over the actual use of the arms supplied, particularly

in any intense or widespread conflict. Finally, the arms supplied were seen primarily in their regional, above all, in their Soviet context.

American military suppliers, like Grumman, Lockheed and Westinghouse, took over key positions in the economy and Western arms dealers and governments tried to tempt rulers not only to purchase their products but to invest in their arms industries²³. For the supplier state, the provision of arms holds several potential benefits: first, it may serve as an opening into the recipient's society and provide a key channel for influence; secondly, it may serve as a visible symbol of its commitment to the recipient and thus act as a deterrent by bolstering a regional balance of power; thirdly, it may serve as a quid pro quo in the bilateral relationship, creating an entangling dependency for the recipient and binding it closely to the supplier; and finally it may provide a means for conflict management insofar as the recipient depends upon the supplier for fresh stocks. In the Shah's case, his virtual mania for buying large amounts of up-dated and sophisticated military equipment from abroad had free rein from 1972 when the Nixon administration underwrote the Shah as the policeman of the Gulf, and agreed to sell him whatever non-nuclear weapons he wished. The Shah committed himself to billions of dollars worth of armaments, often buying the latest weapons while they were still on the drawing board²⁴.

The scale of this operation began to alarm even the Pentagon. By 1980 it predicted that there would be 150,000 Americans in the whole Gulf area, of whom 50,000 would be in Iran. What kind of commitment did this entail and what would be the consequences? It was true that the United States hoped in all of this to avoid the need for a direct military role. American assistance had enabled the Shah greatly to expand his army and create from scratch an air force and a navy²⁵. The accompanying table

provides a detailed assessment of the scale of military aid. The figures represent roughly seven per cent of all United States aid to foreign countries under the military assistance programme²⁶:

3. American military aid to Iran under the military assistance programme

1949-1969 in \$ million:

1949-52	16.6
1953-7	133.9
1958	73.0
1959	90.9
1960	89.1
1961	49.2
1962	33.3
1963	70.1
1964	27.1
1965	49.9
1966	93.5
1967	75.3
1968	85.8
1969	50.9

In the whole period from 1946 to 1970 Iran was estimated to have received a total of \$1365.6 million in military aid, some \$830 million coming under the military assistance programme and the remainder in the form of credit from the US government. It was becoming difficult to avoid asking questions about the purposes to which all this aid might really be put. The puppet could become the puppet-master in circumstances which it would not be too difficult to envisage. That in turn raised further questions about the relationship between the Soviet Union and Iran and it is to the other superpower's role that we now turn.

It has often been argued that Soviet interest in the Gulf has been not so much political as economic, but political considerations have never been absent from Soviet economic policy in the region. By increased trade with the oil-producing countries, the Soviet Union could promote its political interests. Given especially the growing need for additional oil for Eastern Europe and the cheapness of Middle East oil, the purchase of oil from Middle Eastern countries seemed a logical way to balance trade relations and to recoup the Soviet credits that had been extended to them. In the past there had been a reluctance to import oil from non-Communist countries in case there were any kind of crisis²⁷. But this argument had been rejected, because the oil imports would be quite small and for that reason the question of security hardly arose. Such general considerations apart, the Soviet Union naturally had most to do with Iran since the two countries shared a common border.

Soviet troops had been stationed in Iran during the Second World War, but after considerable dispute were persuaded to leave. In fact, some years after this event, President Truman indicated that he had sent Stalin an ultimatum, informing him that the United States would send troops to Iran if the Soviet Union did not leave and had in fact ordered preparations to be made for the despatch of American land, sea and air forces. As we have seen, the policy of resisting Soviet intrusions, had been the starting point of United States intervention in Iran and that remained a constant concern in the first decade after the end of the war. In northern Iran, a pro-Soviet regime had been established in Azerbaijan in 1945 with a demand for an oil concession to the Soviet Union. Moscow agreed to withdraw its troops from the area as a result of some American pressure but it hoped to retain an oil concession in the north with the consent of the Iranian government. Thus, by the end of 1945, the Shah, with army support, regained

sovereignty over Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union did not react militarily to this setback, but it did redouble its demands for an oil concession²². As Soviet pressure continued, the Iranian parliament was in two minds, but eventually parliament turned down the Soviet request. Politically and economically, therefore, the Soviet Union appeared to have suffered severe setbacks. The situation remained fluid, however, for some time. It was still possible that separatist and communist-dominated regimes might emerge in Azerbaijan or Kurdistan which might bring some economic compensations. And there was always the possibility that a Communist regime might be established in Iran itself. There was a native instrument for the achievement of such a goal in the form of the Tudeh Party.

An earlier Communist Party - founded in 1921 - had been crushed by Reza Shah, and under a 1931 law it became illegal. Hence, when it became possible to form a party again after the allied invasion of 1941, it was decided to call it the Tudeh Party (Party of the Masses). Its expansion and development, however, has been handicapped by a series of internal splits. The first major rift occurred in 1948 and revolved around the issue of loyalty to the Soviet Union. Although the founding members of the Tudeh Party were Marxists (and as was shown later, staunch supporters of the Soviet Union) they did not call themselves Communists²³. As with other foreign Communist Parties, however, the Soviet Union treated the Tudeh Party as an instrument of its own foreign policy. Its existence provided Moscow with an opportunity to play an active role in Iran between 1944 and 1947, during which time the Tudeh Party was a significant factor in the political life of Iran. Even some reports made by American observers at this time noted that the Communists enjoyed widespread support at this time and could have won an election. In the Mussadeq period, the Tudeh Party at first refused to support him, and only altered its approach in the latter

part of 1952, by which time the initiative had slipped from Mussadeq's grasp⁴⁰.

After 1953, Soviet-Iranian relations became generally tranquil, with the exception of the years between 1959 and 1962 when the Soviet Union was extremely critical of Iran's military links with the United States, and of the 1959 treaty between Teheran and Washington. Soviet criticisms did not end or change when the Shah announced in 1961 that he would not allow the Americans to station missiles on Iran's soil, which was one of the main issues in Soviet-Iranian relations. It was, nonetheless, a satisfactory conclusion from their standpoint. Since then, the Soviet relationship with Iran has been largely economic, since there is a considerable volume of trade between the two countries. A major crisis in Soviet-Iranian relations was only likely in two situations: in the event of a major US-Soviet clash or the emergence of a strong revolutionary movement inside Iran which the Soviet Union supported. The fragility of the Baghdad Pact proved to the Soviet Union that there was no immediate threat to its security. In 1963 Leonid Brezhnev paid an official visit to Iran. Dozens of agreements, large and small, dealing with economics, irrigation, hydro-electric power, trade and cultural exchanges were signed and implemented. One could even describe Soviet-Iranian relations as friendly. Both countries derived considerable advantages from their trade with each other.

This pattern continued. In 1966 agreements were signed for Soviet participation and aid in the construction of a steel mill in Asfahan, a machine tool factory, and water works and hydro-electric power stations on rivers whose courses ran along the Soviet frontier. The Soviet Union even began to supply the Imperial Iranian Army with a certain amount of arms and equipment on a cash basis. Business ties were further strengthened during the 1967 visit to Moscow of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hovieda. A turning

point was also reached when in 1970 Iran succeeded in exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union through the Igat trunkline. A second and parallel gasline was negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1977. Under this later scheme, Iranian natural gas supplied to the southern republics of the Soviet Union balanced the deliveries of Soviet natural gas to Eastern Europe⁴¹.

Nonetheless, as we have noted, prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran was dependent primarily on the United States and, to a lesser degree, on other Western countries for the provision of arms. Notwithstanding this association, Iran on two occasions turned to the Soviet Union for alternative arms supplies. In January 1967, in the wake of this period of normalization between the two countries which we have been considering, the Soviet Union and Iran concluded an arms agreement for \$110 million, which provided for the delivery of several hundred armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, military trucks and various items of small arms. The deal did present the Shah with an opportunity to demonstrate his independence of the United States, but it did not include any hardware of significant military value. The deal was facilitated by the attractive financial terms offered by the Soviet Union. The arrangement did nevertheless cause a considerable political stir since it represented the first instance of a member of a Western alliance (Iran was a member of CENTO) turning to the Soviet Union for arms supplies.

The second agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran was signed during an official Iranian delegation's visit to Moscow in November 1976. Valued at \$414 million, it was also a product of a period of improving relations between the two countries. Deliveries commenced the following year and included 200 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, an additional two hundred and fifty armoured personnel carriers, two hundred

ASU-85 airborne assault guns and several thousand each of SA-7 hand-held surface-to-air missiles and SA-9 vehicle-mounted low-altitude surface-to-air missiles. This was material of a different order of sophistication from the previous agreement. However, after these orders were delivered in 1978, there were no further agreements between the Soviet Union and the Shah, although clandestine shipments of Soviet arms reportedly made their way to Iran⁴².

The strength of the American position in Saudi Arabia and Iran, despite the complexities and nuances which we have noted, was balanced by the strength of the Soviet position in Iraq, although that too, as we now suggest was not without its complications from the Soviet standpoint.

We have noted that Soviet actions after Yalta were interpreted in the United States as an attempt to create a belt of Communist or client states along the borders of the Soviet Union both in Europe and the Middle East. Washington's response to Soviet moves in Azerbaijan, which we have recently discussed, constituted its first clear stand against the Soviet Union following the Second World War. We have seen that, as far as Iran was concerned, hopes of subversion, whatever they might precisely have been, gave way to a different kind of relationship. In the case of Iraq, there was no initial foothold such as Azerbaijan constituted in the immediate post-war period to constitute a basis for possible Soviet influence. We pick up our analysis, therefore, in the troubled years of the mid-1950s in the Middle East generally. It appeared that in the years from 1956-58 the Soviet Union concentrated their quest for at least influence in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Soviet activity was aroused by three events in

particular: first, the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956; secondly, the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine in the presidential message to Congress on 5 January 1957; and thirdly, the Iraqi revolution of the summer of 1958.

The combination of these events in the Middle East seemed to make the area much less stable than it had been for years. War and rebellion were everywhere to be found, and it seemed that small nations survived only when under the wing of great powers. The Soviet Union entered the area most conspicuously through their programme of assistance to Iraq after 1958 and, as already mentioned, their association with revolutionary left-wing groups throughout the region⁴³. Iraq was of particular strategic value to the Soviet Union for the following reasons: first, it is located on the Gulf, and able to supply the Soviet Union with naval facilities and airfields; secondly, it is a major oil exporters, able to guarantee the Soviet Union a substantial supply of oil; and thirdly, its resources can be used by the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies, or resold for hard currency in Western Europe. Soviet-Iraqi ties were an indication that the Soviet Union was groping for a new strategy in the Middle East and was extending its competition with the United States to new areas. This new emphasis in turn reflected changes in Soviet strategic interests, partly as a result of the enhanced importance of obtaining access to Middle East oil and gas (especially, later on, in the wake of the October 1973 war) and partly of the new importance of facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also, the new Soviet policy reflected an awareness of new profits to be made in the Middle East and a determination to gain some share of them. The interest of the Soviet Union in these aspects was of course not confined to Iraq. By the mid-70s it had become clear that there was a marked increase in Soviet interest in strengthening relations with countries possessing extractable

quantities of oil and natural gas - Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, Algeria and Afghanistan all increased their share of Soviet economic or military aid⁴⁴. Nonetheless, the Iraqi relationship remained as 'special' as the American with Saudi Arabia.

The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 marked the great divide in recent Iraqi history. Qassim co-operated closely with the Communists and within a few months they became one of the country's strongest political forces. Many key positions passed into their hands, including, to all intents and purposes, the revolutionary tribunal under Colonel Mahdawi set up to carry through a largescale purge in the country. However, while using the Communists, Qassim had no intention of allowing them to dictate his policy. Even so, they played such an active role that they came very near to achieving power in Iraq. However, the Nationalist-Communist honeymoon soon came to an end, as the Nationalists suddenly became aware that a Communist victory would lead to the complete subordination of national to Communist aims. As a result, the Iraqi Communist movement suffered a setback from which it has never recovered. The massacres of 1959 left deep scars; people were only waiting for the hour of retaliation and Qassim's pan-Arab rivals happened to be the worst enemies of the Communists.

The decline of Communist power was a great disappointment to the Soviet Union; during 1958 and 1959, Iraq had been the most promising Arab country, much more than Nasser's Egypt. Diplomatic ties between Moscow and Baghdad were restored immediately after the revolution of July 1958, and the Soviet Union offered to assist Qassim's regime in every possible way⁴⁵. In fact, on 17 July Qassim announced that Iraq's relations with foreign countries with which the former regime had come into conflict were to be rebuilt and diplomatic relations with them to be restored, including the

Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt⁴⁶. These newly-established ties with the Soviet Union forced Qassim to terminate the formal arrangements with Iran and also with Turkey, which remained only on paper, and aroused the hostility of Iraq's non-Arab neighbours. Formally, he withdrew from the Baghdad Pact on the 24 March 1959, and he also showed unnecessary hostility towards the West. The Shah interpreted these developments as a potential wedge of Soviet power extending through the very centre of the Middle East. In pan-Arab circles, it was hinted that Great Britain supported Qassim against Nasser, and went so far as to offer him arms. Qassim himself, however, preferred to purchase arms from the Soviet Union. He blamed Britain rather than the Soviet Union for the Kurdish uprising. He also more or less challenged Britain by staking a claim to Kuwait.

Qassim's policy isolated Iraq from almost all Arab as well as Western countries by stressing Iraqi independence rather than Arab unity. He excited many local jealousies. Against this background, his increasingly heavy dependence on the Soviet Union's military, economic and cultural assistance was understandable. The 1969 economic assistance agreement was the first of a series in which Iraq sought Soviet economic as well as other forms of help. Since Iran was Iraq's biggest and strongest neighbour it is easy to understand why the Shah interpreted the revolution in Baghdad as a direct threat from the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ The Iraqis were stooges for Moscow. It seemed likely that the partnership between Moscow and Baghdad would disrupt the prevailing pro-Western status quo in the Gulf. The two countries had clearly shared aims. The defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact not only weakened the Northern Tier of that organization but also seemed to suggest that the Soviet Union would be welcome at the head of the Gulf.

These anxieties are understandable but in fact, deliberately or otherwise, they were exaggerated. The primary concern of successive leaderships in Baghdad was with their own security and survival. The Kurdish problem was a constant anxiety and placed a severe constraint on any external adventures. Iraq's resources, though substantial, were not infinite. Hostility to the West, founded upon ideological considerations, did not abate but Iraqi power was severely limited. The fact that Kuwait did survive can be taken as one illustration of this weakness.

Nevertheless, trade between Iraq and the Soviet Union continued to expand. The share of the Soviet bloc countries in Iraq's foreign trade rose from 17 per cent in 1960 to 21 per cent in the following year. A new cultural agreement was signed and military collaboration continued. Since the June war, the Soviet Union had delivered arms to some states in the Middle East, and Iraq was one of them. Soviet arms became more critical than ever for Egypt and Syria, and only slightly less for Iraq which also became a front line state of sorts, deploying forces against Israel and Jordan, and which also faced the mounting threat of armed conflict with her neighbour Iran. In the area of social and cultural relations, the number of Iraqi students studying medicine abroad was increased, and the Soviet Union agreed to train annually a number of such students in its medical institutions. These were tokens of an intimacy which seemed firmly established.

It was in relation to Iran that the value of the connexion with the Soviet Union for Iraq might be tested. The United States clearly held the same basic views of Iraq as Iran. Washington considered Baghdad a destabilising influence throughout the entire region. A kind of symmetry developed with both superpowers matching each other's supplies to their respective clients. Ever since Qassim's revolution, Russia had begun to supply Iraq with sophisticated weapons, and its military aid from 1958 to

1978 totalled about \$2 billion. Various agreements consolidated the relationship. For example, in 1972 Iraq signed a fifteen-year treaty involving military co-operation. Two of its articles are of particular interest, numbers 8 and 9. The former stated that 'In the event of the development of situations endangering the peace of either party or creating a threat to peace or violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties shall contact each other without delay in order to agree their positions with a view to removing the threat that had arisen and re-establish peace' and the latter added 'In the interest of the security of both countries the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop co-operation in strengthening their defence security'⁴⁷. It is perhaps not surprising that the Shah was alarmed by these two articles. In order to reassure him, President Nixon promised to sell Iran any non-nuclear weapons it wanted in unlimited quantities and also to provide the necessary technical training. He also promised to help Iran support the Kurdish nationalists. The failure of the Soviet position in Egypt, of course, helps to explain why the Soviet Union, for its part, wanted such an agreement. Iraqi knowledge of American-Israeli co-operation with Iran on the Kurdish problem increased antagonism towards the United States. Various border incidents suggested that the cold war was about to become hot.

It is implicit in all that has been said in this chapter that Iraqi-American relations were never close but it is perhaps necessary to confirm this point. It was Britain which had continued to be the major external influence in Iraq until the 1958 revolution. There was never an 'American' phase. Qassim's general stance against the West did not allow the United States any opportunity to expand its influence. Indeed, after 1967 diplomatic relations between the two countries ceased. There seemed little opportunity to mend fences with Baghdad while the American connexion with

Iran became so close. The Soviet influence in Saudi Arabia was comparably slight.

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11. R. Lacey, The Kingdom (London, 1981). pp.401-2, 440.
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17. UNO., Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East, 1951-2 p.93.
18. I. Giritli, Superpowers in the Middle East (Istanbul, 1972) p.49.
19. A. B. Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, 1963) p.8

18. A. Tulley, CIA - the inside story (London, 1962) Chapter seven; D. Wise and T. Ross, The invisible government (London, 1964) pp.108-12.
19. W. Laqueur, Soviet dilemmas in the Middle East (London, 1971); I. J. Lederer, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (Stanford, 1974) p.67.
20. Between 1956 and 1974, 43 of the 183 foreign firms investing in Iran were American, which accounted for a third of all the capital investment in the country.
21. It has also been noted that part of Iran's independent status had been the result of arms purchases which had a symbolic value apart from the use of arms for the satisfaction of the military.
22. Kayhan International Edition (Teheran) 3 March, 1973 p.1; 19 May 1973 pp.1 and 4; 22 September 1973 p.6.
23. Keddie, Roots of Revolution p.116; Richard Burt, 'Power and the Peacock Throne', Round Table 25 December 1975, pp.10-11.
24. Halliday, Iran p.92.
25. In 1964, credit rose from an initial \$48 millions to \$300 million in 1973.
26. R. Ramazani, Iran's foreign policy, pp.395-438.
27. R. Ramazani, Persian Gulf: Iran's role, pp.359-72. The earliest policy statement on the subject was made by Premier Hovieda on 17 January 1968 in a Press conference. He stated that as 'the most powerful state in the Gulf' naturally Iran was greatly interested in the stability and security of the Gulf area, and to that end Iran was prepared to co-operate with any state that desired it. See Ittilaat Harari 28 January 1968.
28. S. Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf, pp.216-31.

29. A. Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (London, 1977) Chapter fourteen; D. Tahtinen, Arms in the Persian Gulf (Washington, 1974) p.14.
30. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance. Annual.
31. Chubin, Security in the Persian Gulf pp.26-31.
32. M. Gordon, Conflict in the Persian Gulf (London, 1981) pp.18-26.
33. Ibid and A. Plascov, Security in the Persian Gulf: Modernization, Political Development and Stability (London, 1982), p.64.
34. Keddie, Roots of Revolution p.163.
35. Halliday, Iran, p.72 and Arabia without Sultans pp.62-3.
36. Halliday, Arabia without Sultans pp.65-7.
37. C. Issawi, 'Iran's economic upsurge', Middle East Journal, Autumn 1976, p.447.
38. J. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American policy (New York, 1960) p.33; see also in general P. Hammond and S. Alexander, Political Dynamics in the Middle East (New York, 1972).
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40. E. Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions (London, 1982) p.282.
41. Chubin, Foreign Relations of Iran, p.10.
42. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook (London, 1984) pp.197-8. For a good discussion of Soviet policy toward the Middle East during the Khrushchev period, including the role of military assistance see G. Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, 1971). See also J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension (London,

1969), Chapter Thirteen; M. Sheehan, Iran: The Impact of United States Interests and Policies, 1941-1954 (New York, 1968).

43. Lederer, Soviet Union and the Middle East, pp. 67-73.

44. R.O. Yacov, The Limits of Power: Soviet policy in the Middle East (London, 1979).

45. The Soviet media refrained from attacking Qassim even after he had turned against the Communists. It continued to praise the Iraqi revolution. Relations with Baghdad remained cordial, even after the Communists had been removed from their positions.

46. Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London, 1969), p. 62 and Political Trends in the Arab World p. 122. Two helpful studies by the same author are B. Rubin, The Arab states and the Palestine conflict (Syracuse, 1981) and Paved with good intentions: the American experience and Iran (London, 1980).

47. H.M. Baharna, The Arabian Gulf states: their political, legal and constitutional development (Beirut, 1973). In Arabic.

Chapter Four: The Iraqi Revolution and the Gulf, 1958-63

The military revolution in Iraq in July 1958 not only caused the fall of the monarchical system but led to the introduction of measures which suggested a socialist orientation of the new regime and created uncertainty as to Iraq's future alignment. Soon after the revolution, ideologically radical groups came out into the open. An intense struggle ensued between Ba'athist and Communist factions, each competing for the support of leading army officers. Despite Qassim's fear of Communist influence becoming too great and despite his preference for playing one faction off against the other, there was growing tension between him and Nasser, and a pan-Arab attempt to overthrow him made a short-lived alliance with the Communists possible. There were swift defensive reactions in the Gulf and beyond. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait developed links with Egypt and, in addition, Kuwait drew closer to the Shah. Iran was reported to have ordered general mobilization and to have strengthened her forces along the Iraqi border. U.S. military aid to Iran was stepped up, resulting in a Soviet diplomatic campaign against the U.S.-Iran relationship. A further effect was to disrupt growing Arab cooperation on economic issues, especially that of oil.

Beyond these precautionary measures, the international repercussions of the Iraqi revolution for the Gulf were slow to develop during 1959 and 1960. Continuing Arab resistance to the British role in the area was a more obvious feature of these years. Fighting over the Buraimi Oasis persisted, with Scouts led by British officers surrounding Hamasa village in search of guerrillas and to put a stop to the laying of minefields, while an attempt was made on the life of Sayyid Ahmed bin Ibrahim, Minister of the Interior to the British-backed Sultan of Oman. Amir Salih ibn Isa al-Harithi, the representative of the Imam of Oman, in rebellion against the sultan, was

officially received by King Saud of Saudi Arabia and the Imam and his associates were feted in Riyadh as the king's guests. On 19 October 1959, in an interview with the Cairo daily Al-Ahram, Amir Faysal denied that any contacts were taking place between Saudi Arabia and Britain over the renewal of diplomatic relations, though he had previously made clear that such a restoration would be possible provided Britain was willing to work for a solution of the disputes outstanding between the two countries, and by the end of the year diplomatic sources at the United Nations were reporting near agreement on preliminary steps to be taken in search of a settlement. During 1959, the Imam of Oman also visited Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union, to which he had been invited by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian Countries. In March 1959 a court in St Helena dismissed an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release Abd al-Rahman al Bakr, a Bahraini nationalist leader imprisoned there since 1956 after being convicted of plotting the murder of the ruler and his British adviser, Sir Charles Belgrave.

The years 1959-60 were also marked by an unsuccessful Soviet attempt to woo the Shah of Iran. In July 1959, the British government had protested to the Soviet Union at the highest level about Soviet broadcasts in Persian denouncing the Shah and his government, and in the following month, as Iran celebrated the sixth anniversary of the overthrow of premier Muhammad Massadegh, there were anti-Soviet demonstrations throughout the country and Soviet embassy staff were ordered to stay indoors. Yet in July there were already signs of a change when the verbal propaganda war was brought to an end and talks were begun. The limits of any such rapprochement became clear the following year when, on 22 September, the Soviet Union offered economic aid to Iran if the Shah would deny the United States the use of bases for any possible attack on the Soviet Union. Two days later, the Shah said at a

Teheran press conference that Iran would reciprocate if her mighty northern neighbour proffered friendship, but that his country would not buy friendship at any price. The Shah certainly found it easier to develop relationships with the Soviet Union's rivals at that time. Iran was reported to have signed an agreement with Japan, which included the dropping of restrictions imposed the year before on the import of Japanese goods. On 4 October the Shah opened the West German Industrial Fair in Teheran. Two days later, in a speech opening the eleventh session of the Senate, the Shah promised that Iran would remain a member of CENTO. Iran agreed to adopt an austerity programme to control inflation, balance her budget and halt the drain on her foreign reserves. Such a programme had been made the condition for further loans from the I.M.F. and the U.S. government. Meanwhile, the I.M.F. approved the stabilisation plan proposed by the Minister of Finance and announced that it had entered into a stand-by arrangement authorising the government of Iran to draw the equivalent of \$35 million during the next twelve months. The Fund also agreed to postponements from January 1961 until July 1963 of payments of \$17.5 million in sterling drawn by Iran in July 1960. In addition the EXIM Bank of America announced that it had authorized a \$4.3 million credit to Iran for the purchase of silos with a capacity of 60,000 tons of grain.

At the same time, there were already signs that the Iraqi relationship might benefit the Soviet Union, both in terms of a close relationship with Iraq and of disruption in the Gulf region of a kind unfavourable to the West. In the first place, Qassim's difficulties with the Iraqi Communist Party were resolved when, at the beginning of August 1959, its leadership publicly condemned its own criminal acts, emotionalism and miscalculations. Two days later, on 5 August, Qassim accepted an invitation from Khrushchev to visit Moscow. On 27 December 1959 Iraq and

the Soviet Union signed a technical training agreement, whereby the latter would assist in setting up ten big centres for training Iraqis in the fields of radio, telecommunications, oil, agriculture, machinery, river transport, electricity, metal sheet cutting, road-building and air communications. According to the Iranian newspaper Etelaat, two days before the agreement was signed, Soviet oil experts had begun building an offshore drilling platform in the Gulf. In April 1960 it was announced in Baghdad that the Iraqi Minister of Planning, Dr Talat al-Shaybani, in his capacity as acting Minister of Oil, had signed an agreement with the Soviet Technoexport Organization under which the Soviet firm would carry out oil exploration operations in the Khanaqin area. The Economic Planning Board authorized the Ministry of Industry to ratify a contract concluded with the same Soviet organization to carry out surveys and to draw up plans for improving navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and Shatt al-Arab. The Soviet Union was expected to speed up its economic aid to Iraq, and it was denied that there would be any change in the terms of its loan agreement. Mikoyan devoted much of his visit to Iraq to exploring ways of expediting work on forty three industrial and development projects specified in an earlier agreement of March 1959.

Secondly, one of the most persistent sources of conflict in the region, the Shatt al-Arab dispute, erupted on 16 December 1959 when, after a shooting incident, Iranian frontier guards were reinforced along the Iraqi frontier near the disputed area. Special precautions were also taken to protect the oil refinery at Abadan. The Iranian Majlis accused Qassim of adopting an aggressive policy towards Iran, and the Shah declared that Iran would defend its rights and its integrity in the border dispute. Teheran Radio attacked Qassim as a red servant of black imperialism. Both the United States and Britain advised moderation in handling the dispute, and

it seemed clear that Iran, despite civilian demonstrations and the movements of tanks, armoured cars and mechanized units of artillery, had no wish to let the crisis escalate. The Shah interrupted his honeymoon to confer with his Minister of War and other officials, but officials in public seemed to be back-peddalling the affair, and the army chief of information referred to military activities in the area as routine manoeuvres. The premier Eghbal, speaking at a news conference in Lahore, said he did not believe that the Soviet Union was behind the present dispute, and at Rawalpindi on 29 December he declared that although Iran would fight back with all her might if attacked by Iraq, and seek assistance from her allies, the Iranian government was confident of its legal position and held open the door for negotiations on the disputed border.

Thirdly, there was obvious fear and expectation of an Iraqi bid for Kuwait in the wake of Qassim's revolution. In April 1959 the Egyptian press reported that Communists from Iraq had attempted to overthrow the government of Kuwait, but had been foiled by the Kuwaiti authorities. In August 1959 the Cairo weekly Rauzal-Yousef claimed to be in possession of a secret document giving details of an Iraqi plan to annex, by force of arms if necessary, Kuwait and other oil-producing states in the Gulf so as to solve Iraq's financial crisis. In November, seventy-one Communists, including Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Iranians were arrested in Kuwait for, according to the public security department, organizing a cell there. The establishment of Kuwait as an independent state in 1961 saw these fears and expectations realized.

On 19 June 1961, the cancellation of the 1899 agreement between Britain and Kuwait was announced. Henceforth, Kuwait was to assume full responsibility for its internal and external affairs. An exchange of notes

between the two countries was signed, providing for consultation on matters of mutual interest and for British assistance to Kuwait if requested by that government. Kuwait then formally applied for membership of the Arab League. Delegations from Saudi Arabia and Jordan arrived in Kuwait to congratulate its Ruler on his country's independence. Arab League Secretary General Abd al-Khaliq Hasunnah stated in Damascus that the League Council would meet as soon as possible to discuss the Kuwaiti application. He indicated that the Council would undoubtedly welcome Kuwait as a full member.

On 25 June 1961, General Qassim laid claim to Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq on the grounds that it had formed part of the wilayat (province) of Basra under the Ottoman Empire. In Kuwait a state of emergency was declared and news agency despatches reported large-scale demonstrations against Iraq's intended annexation plan. The government issued a statement affirming its determination to defend the country's independence and seeking support from all peace-loving states, particularly from sister Arab states. On 27 June, Kuwait alerted its British-supported army against any incursion from Iraq. Meanwhile, the UAR, the U.S.A., Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan and Britain announced their support for the independence of Kuwait. In Baghdad, General Qassim was reported to have received many cables from all sections of the Iraqi public urging him to extend his declaration of sovereignty over Kuwait to all other links in the chain of territories along the shore of the Gulf. The Iraqi UN delegate, Dr Adnan Pachachi, said in New York that Iraq would oppose Kuwait's admission to the United Nations.

On 29 June 1961, the ruler of Kuwait, Shaikh Abdulla al-Salim al-Sabah, held a press conference at which he reported his people's determination to defend their independence, and he issued an official

statement denying that Kuwait had ever been under the control of the Ottoman Empire, citing documentary evidence of Iraqi recognition of Kuwait's independence. On the same day, Britain diverted a commando carrier and other warships from the Far East towards Kuwait and alerted other forces nearer the Shaikhdom. Al-Ahram, the Cairo daily newspaper, reported that two Iraqi brigades, fully armed and equipped had moved to the border of Kuwait. Pravda accused Britain and the United States of trying to exploit the situation to protect their oil interests. In Kuwait, the formation of a National Guard was announced. Volunteers were issued with arms and units of the armed forces were moved to the frontier. Britain was reported to have appealed to the United States the UAR and other countries in the Middle East to join her in restraining Iraq from attacking Kuwait. King Saud sent a cable to Qassim in which he appealed to him to avoid any action likely to break Arab solidarity and lead to foreign interference in the affairs of the Arab states.

On 1 July 1961 a British force comprising 600 marine commando and 14 Centurion tanks, supported by 12 Hawker Hunter jet fighters, landed in Kuwait, and a few hours later Saudi Arabian forces also entered the Shaikhdom. The Supreme Council and the Ruler had requested military assistance from Britain and Saudi Arabia after the government had begun to mass forces on the frontier in preparation for an invasion. Iraq's reaction to this action was revealed by the Iraqi delegate to the United Nations when he lodged a counter-complaint with the Security Council, claiming that Britain's intervention in Kuwait constituted an armed threat to the security of Iraq. It is also important to mention that on 27 June Britain informed Qassim that Kuwait was an independent state and that any threat to her sovereignty would be a matter of grave concern to Britain.

Meanwhile, British forces in Kuwait moved to forward positions about five miles from the frontier. Iraq called the landing in Kuwait a direct threat to Iraqi security and called on all Arabs to unite against this tyrannical imperialistic aggression. An extraordinary meeting of the Arab League Council was convened in Cairo to discuss Kuwait's membership of the League. The Iraqi delegate, Abd al-Husayn al-Qutayfi, maintained that under the League Charter a unanimous vote was required for admittance but the Saudi delegate argued that the Charter stipulated that only a majority vote was needed. The meeting was adjourned until 12 July pending the completion of the Secretary-General's consultations with the governments of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The UAR and the Soviet Union demanded that the Security Council order the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait since Iraq had renounced the principle of annexation and given an undertaking in the United Nations that it would pursue its aims by peaceful means only. The leader of the Kuwaiti delegation to the Security Council told the Council on 6 July that Kuwait would not request the withdrawal of British forces until it had received a guarantee of membership of the United Nations and a renunciation of Iraq's threat of annexation. The British delegate pledged that British forces would vanish from Kuwait as swiftly and as effectively as they had arrived if Iraq dropped her aggressive annexationist policy towards the Shaikhdom. In a further move, the Soviet Union vetoed a British resolution aimed at winning UN recognition of Kuwait's independence and deterring Iraq from annexing the state. Immediately afterwards, the Security council rejected a UAR resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of British military forces from Kuwait. During the same period, Iraq urged the postponement of the scheduled Arab League Council meeting owing to the great dangers facing the Arab world from the imperialist trio - Britain, France and Israel. The

further Qassim went in his statements the greater appeared the division between Iraq and other Arab countries, as Al-Ahram reported that nine Arab governments, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Jordan and Lebanon had declared themselves opposed to Iraq's request for postponement of the League Council meeting. The London Observer stated that the British government was now prepared to accept the replacement of British troops in Kuwait by a UN force - provided the Ruler was agreeable.

On 12 July, following a meeting between the Ruler, the British Under-Secretary for War and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, it was announced that three British battalions, together with supporting units and the aircraft carrier Bulwark would be withdrawn from Kuwait. This constituted nearly half of the total British force there. On the same day also the League Council met. The Secretary General proposed either General Qassim should withdraw his claim to Kuwait, recognize its independence and register such recognition with the Arab League and the UN Security Council, or the Arab League Council should form an Arab force to be sent to Kuwait to replace the British forces. The Iraqi delegate walked out of the meeting in protest, but was later persuaded to return. The UAR declared its support for the second alternative, with the proviso that the Arab troops concerned should come from countries which did not border Israel.

During a revolution anniversary speech in Baghdad, Qassim demanded that the British 'get out of our land' and on the second day of festivities barechested Iraqis, dressed as ancient Babylonians and Assyrians marched past Qassim shouting 'Kuwait is ours'. Qassim warned that he would take land from the Shaykhs of Kuwait and give it to the peasants if he gained control of that area. It is perhaps worth noting that the State of Kuwait is mainly desert.

On 19 July British forces began to withdraw from Kuwait and on the next day came the admission of Kuwait to the Arab League. Again, the Iraqi delegate walked out. On 21 July the League took initial steps to send an Arab force to replace British forces in Kuwait. A few days later it was reported in Beirut that Kuwait had informed Arab League states through Shaykh Jabir Ahmed al-Sabah that the arrival of a token force from various Arab states would bring about the full withdrawal of British forces. Kuwait was also offering to earmark oil revenue funds for general Arab development projects. On the following day, 25 July, in Iraq, citizens of Kuwait, of other Arab states and Palestinians working in Iraq were given the same rights and privileges as those enjoyed by Iraqis under a law promulgated that day; the decree also granted to Kuwaiti and other Arab capital investments in Iraq the same treatment as was accorded to Iraqi. General Qassim reiterated his claim to 'liberate' Kuwait on 4 August during a speech at a cornerstone-laying ceremony for a railroad equipment factory, when he was reported to have said 'We will not accept half-solutions'.

The Arab League Secretary-General arrived in Kuwait to sign an agreement with the Ruler of Kuwait regarding the replacement of the British force there by Arab League troops. On the next day Iraq demanded that the Arab League cancel Kuwait's membership and act collectively to eliminate the defence agreement between its Shaykh and Britain. On 17 August Britain announced that she had agreed to a request by the Ruler of Kuwait to withdraw British troops from the Shaikhdom.

During that time IPC was holding negotiations with the Iraqis. For example, on 23 August, after a ninety-minute meeting with some members of the Iraqi negotiating team, General Qassim issued a statement saying that negotiations were being resumed at a time when Iraq was being subjected to strong imperialist pressure from the British imperialist base in the

usurped district of Kuwait and from irresponsible elements whose actions were of service only to imperialism. On 24 August the Iraq-IPC negotiations were resumed. Before the meeting, Qassim took the IPC delegates on a tour to see the achievements of the revolutionary regime. On the following day, the British Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, returned to Baghdad following ten days of consultations in London on the oil negotiations and other matters.

In Kuwait, internal political developments were taking a new shape. On 27 August, Shaykh Abdulla al-Salam al-Sabah announced that Kuwait would hold its first general election on 1 November to choose a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution. A further IPC meeting was held in Iraq on 28 August following the earlier session. The company's delegation commented on the Iraqi points of view presented at the previous meeting. Later, Baghdad Radio said that the company's delegation was hopeful of arriving at a satisfactory solution, and it added that Qassim had told the IPC representatives that Iraq would not retreat from its existing position. Two days later, the IPC representatives agreed to a 3-week halt for consultations with the company's Board of Directors. On the same day, the Shaikh of Kuwait issued a decree providing for the establishment of a Foreign Department which would be exclusively responsible for the conduct of Kuwait's external affairs.

The Commander of the Iraqi Air Force, Jalal al-Awqati, left for the Soviet Union at this point, leading a ten-man mission. No reason for the mission was disclosed. Qassim followed his normal pattern of attacks and accusations. On 7 September, in a speech to a group of officials at the Education Ministry he was reported to have accused British imperialism of attempting to incite disturbances inside Iraq at a time when negotiations between Iraq and the IPC were in progress. A few days later, in Kuwait, the

First contingents of the Arab force began to arrive. In all 3,300 Arab troops (1,200 from Saudi Arabia, 1,200 from the UAR, 400 from Sudan, 300 from Jordan and 200 from Tunisia) were to be moved to Kuwait and their build-up was expected to be completed by 17 September. On the same day, the Ruler of Kuwait ordered the election of a Constituent Assembly to be postponed until 2 December. Next day Kuwait Radio said that the Iraqi army had mutinied the previous week when ordered to invade Kuwait. Shaykh Abdulla al-Salam asserted that the agreement for British protection of Kuwait remained unaffected. He also disclosed that a Kuwaiti economic mission would tour Arab countries to determine the needs and opportunities for Kuwaiti investment and that there was no possibility of direct negotiations on the differences between Kuwait and Iraq other than through the Arab League.

During this period, Iran had its own conflict with the Communists and the Soviet Union. For example, on 21 June 1961 Premier Ali Amini told a press conference that 'saboteurs' of the government's programme of land reform would be severely punished, whether their political views were left, right or neutral. He added that Iran hoped to find a means of removing her misunderstandings with the Soviet Union and improving relations between the two countries, though without ignoring their international commitments or breaking off ties with their Western friends and allies. It was reported that he was alluding to the statement of a National Front leader Karim Sinjabi, on 17 June calling for a revision of Iran's 1954 Agreement with a consortium of 8 Western oil companies, and for a reassessment of the country's membership of CENTO, since these agreements had been signed allegedly when the nation was not able even to comment on the merits of the pacts. In another press conference, on 24 June, Premier Ali Amini said that during the first fifty days of his government the foreign exchange position

had been improved, largely as a result of the extraordinary facilities extended to Iran by the United States.

On 18 July the government warned that the police would use whatever measures were necessary to block a rally by the opposition National Front scheduled for 21 July. And on that day the police repelled Communists and other anti-government demonstrators who showed up in protest at the government ban on the National Front rally. The rally was planned to coincide with the anniversary of the fall of the four-day rule of Ahmed Ghavam in 1952. Two days later, Iran protested against alleged Soviet efforts to bring about the overthrow of the government. Foreign Minister Husayn Qhods Nakhai complained to the Soviet Ambassador about the Soviet Union's hostile interference in Iran's internal affairs by means of recent Moscow Radio broadcasts. The following week, Iranian officials were reported to have warned National Front leaders not to attempt new demonstrations on Constitution Day 5 August. While the Iranian-Soviet tension was rising in this way, American and West German relations with Iran were improving. On 3 August the United States and West Germany were reported to have been conferring with Iranian officials on the possibility of extending a loan of about \$50,000,000 to cover the deficit in the so-called development budget for the country's seven-year plan. On 17 August it was announced in Bonn that the West German government had agreed to grant Iran a long-term credit of DM200 million (\$50 million) and provide export credit guarantees of up to DM350 million (\$87 million) for imports of West German goods and equipment to Iran. Two days later Iranian officials said that the Soviet Union had used definite forgeries to support charges that CENTO had plotted atomic attacks on parts of the Middle East, including Iran. The Shah, on 4 November, called for a partnership of the

United States and Iran to transform Iran into a showplace for the non-Communist world.

On the following day, however, the National Front called for a reassessment of Iran's bilateral mutual defence pact with the United States and her obligations to CENTO. It claimed that the agreements did not represent the people's views since the Majlis was not representative of the people at the time the agreements were undertaken. This was followed by Premier Amini's announcement that the Shah had sent him a directive calling for all possible means to stamp out corruption, to improve tax collection, to establish real justice, to attend to the needs of the people and to establish rule by the people. It was also announced at this time that the Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi would be crowned on 14 May 1963 at the climax of the 2,500th anniversary celebrations of Iran's monarchy. The Premier also declared that Iran had paid off \$69 million in foreign loans and that, through cuts in imports and a national austerity programme, the country had managed to end its trade deficit. On 17 November it was officially announced that, following a meeting between Julius Holmes, the US Ambassador in Teheran, and the Prime Minister, a loan and an outright grant were being made available immediately by the United States. The loan was intended for the completion of several of the second five-year plan projects, including overdue payments to a number of contractors, and the grant for new public works to ease growing unemployment in the country. On the same day the Iran Pan American Oil Company (IPAC) was reported to have struck oil at an off-shore well which was to be known as Darius I.

As much as Iran had to struggle internally with nationalist and communist agitators, Iraq was in a similar state. On 16 September an official admission of armed revolt among the Kurds of Northern Iraq was made in a broadcast by Baghdad Radio, which claimed that it had been put

down by the army. But on the following day travellers from Iraq reported in Beirut that the Kurdish revolt was continuing. Also the regime's failure over Kuwait was highlighted by the withdrawal of British troops and then by the Shaykh Abdulla al-Saleh al-Sabah's related departure on a visit to King Saud. A few days later, on 22 September, the United States announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Kuwait. Britain and Kuwait also agreed to establish diplomatic relations, the Foreign Office in London announcing that J. C. B. Richmond, British Consul-General in Kuwait, had been appointed ambassador and Khalifa al-Ghunayam, a merchant and member of the Kuwait Currency and Development Board, was to become Ambassador in London. In Kuwait it was also announced that the withdrawal of British troops was complete. It was reported from Cairo that the UAR Ministry of Foreign Affairs had officially informed the Kuwait government of the UAR decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with Kuwait at ambassadorial level. Qassim put a brave face on it and at least kept up the war of words. He told a press conference in Baghdad on 22 September that Britain, with the help of the United States, had engineered the Kurdish uprising. He threatened to close the British embassy in Baghdad if Britain did not stop what he called hostile acts endangering the security of Iraq. British officials on 24 September denied the accusations of British complicity in the Kurdish revolt. A report in Baghdad that Iranian authorities had arrested Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani, accused of leading the Kurdish revolt, was denied by Iranian security and officials in Teheran, but on 4 October Al-Thawra the Iraqi newspaper, claimed that Ahmed Barazani, brother of Mulla Mustafa, had surrendered to Iraq's army authorities in Kirkuk. The Iraq Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawad, told the UN General Assembly on 6 October that Britain's agreement with Kuwait was a threat to other Arab countries and to the entire Middle East area. In the meantime, negotiations

in Baghdad between Iraq and the oil companies were broken off. An IPC spokesman said the Iraqi demands included a 20 per cent participation in the company's capital and an increase in Iraq's 50 per cent share in oil profits. On 15 October, Baghdad Radio accused oil companies operating in Iraq of exploiting the wealth and violating the rights of the people, spreading intrigues and hatred and violating the provisions of the oil agreement.

As British troops were replaced by Arab forces, problems of another sort arose for Kuwait and its allies. On 12 October 1961, in a note to the Arab League, the UAR officially requested the withdrawal of its troops serving with the Arab League force in Kuwait. Alleged friction between Syrian and Jordanian contingents was the reason given. In a cable in the following week to the Ruler of Kuwait, President Nasser explained that there was undeniable evidence of a conspiracy to disrupt relations between the UAR contingent and Kuwait, for which reason he proposed the withdrawal of his contingent. On 22 October a Kuwaiti representative handed President Nasser a note from the Ruler of Kuwait asking him to reconsider his decision. At the end of that month, on 30 October, the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of Kuwait to the UN as proposed by the UAR. The Foreign Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah said in Kuwait that his government would spare no effort and use all diplomatic means to secure Kuwait's admission to the world body. It was announced in Cairo that UAR troops in Kuwait would return home soon.

In other parts of the Gulf, other territorial issues were the subject of negotiations. On 15 October, King Saud discussed the Buraimi Oasis question with the British government representative and a UN envoy and expressed hope that a peaceful solution would be reached. Two weeks later, the Saudi delegate to the UN accused Britain of having perpetrated further

acts of aggression against Oman in the previous six weeks. He spoke during a debate on the Oman question after the Political Committee overrode British and American objections to hearing a delegation of Omanis. On the following day a spokesman for Said ibn Taymor, Sultan of Oman, denied that British military action of any kind was taking place in Oman. On 30 November, the Omani office in Damascus reported that Omani commandos had attacked a British military camp at Hizwa and set fire to it. A few days later, nationalists from Oman won the endorsement of the UN political committee for their seven-year old campaign for independence from the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. In the following year, on 5 March 1962, the brother of the Imam of Oman told al-Thawrah newspaper in Baghdad that the Imam and other Omani leaders might seek diplomatic recognition for a separate state of Oman. He had been in Baghdad since 25 February for talks with Iraqi officials.

However, it was the Kuwaiti-Iraqi issue that continued to attract most attention. On 17 December 1961, in a speech broadcast by Baghdad Radio, Qassim renewed Iraq's claim to Kuwait. On the same day, Kuwait informed the Arab League that Iraq had seized 10 Kuwaiti ships off the port of Basrah and had issued a decree freezing all Kuwaiti deposits in Iraqi banks. On 23 December Qassim said that Iraq would again mobilize its forces to liberate Kuwait. This statement was made shortly after the head of the Kuwaiti department of finance and economic affairs announced in a radio broadcast that the government had decided to establish a fund for financing economic development projects in the Arab states. Britain reacted to renewed Iraqi threats by putting 200 servicemen on a 12-hour alert. Iraq, in response, drew the attention of the UN Security Council to British provocation in the Middle East, while Kuwait in turn protested to the Security Council against Iraq's continued pressure and concentration of military forces. Kuwait,

however, proceeded with its first election to the Assembly. When Kuwait Radio announced the final results of the voting, the names did not include any member of the ruling Al-Sabah family.

On 1 January 1962 the State Department in Washington began the new year by affirming American support for the Shaikhdom. It said that any attempt to threaten Kuwait's independence posed a threat to the peace of the Arab world, and added that the United States regarded Kuwait as a sovereign independent state. Two days later, the armed forces of Kuwait opened large-scale ten-day manoeuvres to test the state's defences against invasion, while in the same week it was announced that three Jordanian soldiers, serving in a medical unit with the Arab League forces in Kuwait, had been captured by the Iraqi authorities when they strayed over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The new political developments in Kuwait were taken a stage further on 8 January when the Ruler of Kuwait issued a law setting forth the constitutional system which was to prevail for the provisional period of one year during which the newly-elected Constituent Assembly would draw up the framework of parliamentary government. On 17 January, the Ruler appointed the first Cabinet under the terms of the interim constitution. The ministers would become members of the Constituent Assembly.

Meanwhile, Qassim's internal problems of the Kurdish uprising and the oil conflict with Western companies served the interests of Kuwait. It was reported on 2 January 1962 in Teheran that about 800 Kurdish tribesmen, armed with bazookas and mortars, were fighting government forces in northern Iraq. At the same time Qassim revealed that the government had received notes from the British and American governments urging him to resume negotiations with the oil companies in Iraq and to agree to arbitration. Further controversy was occasioned when the United States,

British, West German, Pakistani and Danish firms were among those affected by a notification in the official gazette requiring them either to give up their commercial agencies or to form companies in which Iraqis would hold at least 51 per cent of the capital. This gave effect to a law passed in January 1960 and it affected 26 firms holding 410 agencies. A few days later, Qassim denied reports of a cease-fire arranged with Kurdish rebels, although three days earlier there had been reports in Beirut that negotiations had taken place. On 16 January, in an address to the fourth conference of Iraqi engineers in Baghdad, Qassim called for the surrender of Kurds who had joined the revolt in northern Iraq. On the other hand, on 27 January, the acting military governor, Ali Ghalib Aziz, ordered the immediate release of 299 Kurds detained in connection with the attempted insurrection led by Mustafa al-Barazani the previous September.

As fast as Iraq was moving away from the West it was moving closer to the Soviet Union. On 6 February, Oil Minister Muhammed Salman and the Soviet Embassy's Economic Counsellor in Baghdad reviewed a contract for the sale to Iraq of an ID600,000 Soviet drilling rig. The contract also provided for the training of Iraqis in the use of the rig by Soviet technicians. This contract was followed on 28 February by an Iraqi-Soviet Union cultural agreement which would provide at least 470 Soviet scholarships for Iraqis to study in Russia. Drove Soviet students would come to Iraq to learn Arabic, and teachers of Arabic and Russian would be exchanged. In the following month, however, diplomatic difficulties began to surface between Iraq and other countries. On 17 March, Iraq announced the recall of its envoy to Japan, which had recognized Kuwait and on the following day Iraq recalled its ambassador to Iran in protest against the presentation of credentials there by the Kuwaiti ambassador. On the next day, the UAR ambassador to Kuwait presented his credentials. At the same time, Iraq's UN

representative, in a letter to the Security Council, said that Iraq would employ peaceful means to restore its legitimate rights in Kuwait and rebutted Kuwaiti allegations of provocative actions. On 26 March, when the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Abbas Aram, left for Teheran to assume the post of Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Premier Ali Amini, he said that his departure was not connected with the recall of the Iraqi ambassador from Iran.

The improving Kuwaiti economic situation surely did much to explain Qassim's persistent claim. For example, on 25 March 1962, an agreement for a Kuwaiti loan of about KD 7 million to Sudan to improve her railway network was signed between the representatives of the KFAED and a Sudanese delegation. On 3 April, the KFAED also granted a KD seven and a half million loan to Jordan for various projects, among them the Yarmuk river scheme and the expansion of the Jordanian phosphate company. On 26 April, a five-man delegation representing the West German Demag arrived in Kuwait to study a project for the construction of an iron and steel plant powered by natural gas. On 19 May, the Minister of Finance approved payment of KD2 million to Lebanon as the first instalment of a KD 5 million loan made to Beirut municipality under an agreement signed on 16 February last. On 20 May it was reported that the Cabinet would shortly discuss a bill for the creation of a national company to undertake all government construction projects in Kuwait. The bill had been drafted by a government committee and referred to the Cabinet for decision. On 30 May Shaikh Abdulla al-Salem al-Sabah officially inaugurated Aminoil's new 100,000 b/d refinery at Mina Abdulla, the new plant bringing Aminoil's total refinery capacity up to 150,000 b/d. Two weeks later, the KOC embarked on a project to increase the crude oil processing capacity of its Mina al-Ahmadi refinery to 60,000 b/d, thereby raising refinery throughput from 190,000 b/d to 250,000 b/d.

Moreover, at the time Kuwait was facing Qassim's claim over her territory she was peacefully defining her frontiers with Saudi Arabia. On 15 June, a Kuwaiti delegation left for Saudi Arabia to hold discussions with Saudi authorities on the demarcation of the frontiers between the two countries and on the administration of the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait Neutral Zone.

Saudi Arabia, at this time, was reshaping her political, social and economic views, both internationally, internally and regionally. On 17 March, King Saud received the former ruler of Qatar, Shaikh Ali al-Thani. On the following day, he issued an official statement pledging full support for Syria against Israeli aggression. Two days later, the Cabinet met under King Saud and formulated the country's domestic and foreign policies. With regard to the latter, the king declared the following objectives: co-operation with all Muslim countries; support for the Arab League and unification of all the Arab world; settlement of the Buraimi problem before resumption of relations with Britain; and re-establishment of relations with France. To underwrite his objective of support for and co-operation with the Arab world, on 1 April King Saud ordered that \$1 million be given to the Algerian government in accordance with the Arab League Council's decision to provide immediate and effective financial aid. Another aspect of Saudi activity was to be seen in King Saud's opening of the conference of world leaders of Islam held in Mecca beginning on 18 May.

In the economic field, regulations for the protection and encouragement of national industries were promulgated. The main points were as follows: equipment, machinery and spare parts imported for use in any new industry would be exempted from customs duties; the state would provide land for the construction of new factories and for employees' housing; products of local industries would be exempted from export and all other duties; the government would be authorized to take measures, such as import

restrictions, tariffs, and grants of financial assistance to local industries for their protection. The provisions were not to apply to industrial firms already enjoying special privileges. On 3 June, the Director General of the Saudi Income Tax Department, Shaikh Abd al-Jalil Abd al-Jawad, was reported to have said that his office would ask the appropriate UN committee to loan the services of a chartered accountant to assist in the auditing of the accounts of oil companies and other large commercial firms operating in Saudi Arabia. It was reported a few days later that the government had concluded a contract with the UN Special Fund to establish a pilot experimental farm and agricultural research centre in the eastern region, in the Qatif oasis. The fund was to furnish \$680,600 of the estimated cost of 41,371,600, the remainder to be provided by the government. The FAO was to organize staff and administer the five-year programme.

In another part of the Gulf political events were shaping rather differently from what was happening in Saudi Arabia. On 16 March, Shaikh Talib ibn Ali, a brother of the exiled Imam of Oman, and members of an Omani delegation visiting Baghdad, opened an Omani office there. A spokesman for the delegation said that Yahya ibn Abdulla would arrive in Baghdad shortly to take charge of this office. On the following day, an inquiry in London was told by the Solicitor-General, Sir John Hobson, that the British liner Dara which had sunk in the Gulf the previous April with a loss of 236 lives, had been sabotaged by a time bomb. He added that there was little doubt that it was the work of Omani rebels. The next day, the Omani office in Cairo denied the allegation that Omani rebels had planted the bomb on the vessel. A week later, an Omani delegation, led by Shaikh Sulyman ibn Himyur and Shaikh Talib ibn Ali, arrived in Damascus from

Baghdad to inform government leaders there of the latest developments in the Omani problem.

While the Omani conflict continued, the Kuwaiti conflict had subsided, at least for the time being, and on 19 June Kuwait celebrated the first anniversary of its independence. The Ruler ordered the payment to all state officials and employees of a gratuity equivalent to 20 per cent of their basic monthly salaries and all good-conduct prisoners who had served a portion of their sentences were ordered to be released. On the following day, Shaikh Abdulla al-Salim al-Sabah attended the opening ceremonies of al-Sabah hospital. It had a 675 bed capacity. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was able to tell the Cairo weekly Akhbar Al-Shaah that 73 friendly states had so far recognized the state of Kuwait. Moreover, the economy continued to flourish. It was disclosed that crude oil production in May 1962 had amounted to 57,811,580 barrels, 19.1 per cent higher than in May 1961. The daily average during that period was 1,848,890 barrels compared with 1,566,290 in May 1961. The average production figure for the first five months of 1962 was 1,737,140 b/d, compared with 1,676,508 for the same period in 1961, an increase of 3.6 per cent. Acting on the recommendation of the Economic and Industrial Committee, the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs had approved a proposal for contracting the British firm, Industrial and Process Engineering Consultants, to make a comprehensive survey of the country's industrial potential. The Kuwaiti government bought complete control of Kuwaiti Airways. On 17 July a Tunisian delegation, led by the under-Secretary of the Ministry of Planning and Development left Kuwait where it had been having discussions concerning the administration of assistance under KFAED.

In Iraq, the government signed in June 1962 an agreement on economic and technical co-operation with Sweden which provided for participation of

Swedish groups in the industrial, power, transport, communications and town planning projects of Iraq's economic plan. Sweden would provide experts and scholarships for training Iraqis. On 1 July the Soviet Union and Iraq signed a protocol providing for Soviet technical assistance in extending the Baghdad-Basra standard-gauge railway 39 miles northwards to Umm Qasr, the new port which Iraq was building on the Gulf, about one mile from the Kuwait border. As Kuwait celebrated the first anniversary of its independence, Qassim in the following month was preparing for the fourth anniversary of the Iraqi revolution. Two days beforehand, on 12 July, came an untimely report from Istanbul that heavy fighting between Kurdish tribesmen and Iraqi land and air forces had broken out in Northeastern Iraq. On 14 July, a military parade was held in Baghdad to celebrate the anniversary of the revolution. Premier Qassim addressed graduates at the Military College, during which he criticized Britain for having granted Kuwait bogus independence, announced that a national oil company to exploit Iraq's oil wealth would soon be set up, and promised elections to the national assembly. On 21 July, Mikhail Menshikov, former Soviet ambassador to the United States, said in Baghdad before leaving for Moscow that Iraq and the Soviet Union had reached complete understanding on general world issues. A week later, security forces uncovered an underground Communist cell headed by a man called Abdulla Saud and three members of the outlawed Communist People's Union Party. However, this did not alter Iraq's international alignment. On 25 August the Ministry of Education announced that Socialist countries had granted 497 fellowships: 420 by the Soviet Union, 10 by Yugoslavia, 20 by Bulgaria, 12 by East Germany and 35 by Czechoslovakia. A few days later, the New York Herald Tribune was banned by the Military Governor-General, Ahmed Salih al-Abdi. The order said the ban was dictated by the general interest. Whether the 'general interest' was

served by the government's Kurdish and Kuwaiti policy remained questionable. On 1 September, the IPC pipeline through Kurdish territory in northern Iraq was reported to have been cut and the flow of oil halted. On 9 September, official sources in Washington thought it worth denying that the US was offering either moral or material support to the Kurdish revolt. Iraq prepared a formal and futile protest to the International Monetary Fund against its acceptance of Kuwait as a member.

While Qassim was claiming and protesting, applying for assistance and loans, Kuwait and other Gulf states were enjoying higher increases in their already considerable oil production. For example, on 6 July it was reported that the Japanese Arabian Oil Co Ltd. had completed 31 wells in its offshore concession in the neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Well no.30 was tested as a dual producer with a daily output of 7,580 barrels. The flow at well No.31 was 7,270 b/d. On 20 July came a company announcement of the completion of its permanent shipping facilities at Ras al-Khafji in the Neutral Zone. A Kuwait mission led by Ahmed al-Bishr, technical assistant at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, left for a tour of the Shaikhdoms of Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaima and Fujaira. The two-week mission was to make recommendations concerning the most appropriate methods of channelling Kuwaiti financial assistance to the Shaikhdoms. At the same time, it was reported that in a recent press conference in Cairo Shaikh Saqr ibn Sultan al-Qasimi, Ruler of Sharja, confirmed that he had signed an oil concession agreement with John W. Mecom, which had taken over the Dhofar concessions formerly held by Cities Serviete and Richfield.

Iran's method of consolidating its presence and power in the Gulf was as distinctive as the contrasting paths of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. On 3 July the Shah returned from a four-day visit to Pakistan. A communique issued

from Rawalpindi announced that the Shah expressed concern over Afghan-Pakistani relations and offered his assistance in solving their differences. President Ayub Khan accepted. Internally, Iran had a budget crisis which led to the resignation of Premier Amini on 18 July 1962 and on the following day the Shah appointed Assadulla Alam as Premier in his place. Premier Alam told a press conference that Iran's foreign policy would remain unchanged. Domestically, he promised to continue fighting corruption, implementing social and administrative reforms and carrying out land reforms. Dr Amini, for his part, expressed regret at a news conference that his complaint, made a few days before, about tardy economic aid from the United States and the cutting off of military aid had caused misunderstanding in the State Department. He blamed these factors for his government's fall. On 21 July, Alam presented his new Cabinet to the Shah, retaining eight previous members. The Shah ordered the new government to prepare for national elections to both houses of parliament. On 11 August the Shah cancelled the \$250,000 yearly salary allowance of Crown Prince Riza for a year in order to help the budget. Premier Alam said that his government had reduced the budget deficit from \$70,000,000 to 27,000,000. The total expenditures of the revised budget were \$787,000,000. According to a new Ministry of Labour plan, all factory workers in Iran would henceforth be given a share in the profits made by their firms. On 25 August 1962, US Vice-President Johnson ended a two-day goodwill visit to Iran. Iranian policy was nevertheless to maintain a mutually satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union where it was announced in September that a pledge had been obtained from Iran that no foreign rocket bases would be established on Iranian territory. On 24 October the Deputy Foreign Minister, Masoud Furoghi, arrived in Moscow to exchange transit agreements to facilitate the movement of goods between the Soviet Union and Iran.

At the beginning of the following month another sort of crisis arose in Iran. On 1 November hundreds of Mullahs condemned rule by decree in an anti-government demonstration in Teheran. Three weeks later, it was disclosed that security forces had captured 15 persons connected with the assassination of Malik Abedi, the Fars provincial head of the land reform programme. In the following week, the government suspended a votes-for-women decree to avert a protest demonstration called by religious leaders. On 22 January 1963, Teheran police dispersed a crowd of businessmen, religious leaders and landlords protesting against the Shah's reform referendum, due to be held on 26 January, and police broke up a hunger strike in the Iranian Embassy in Washington by anti-government students. The 14 students were given suspended sentences of 30 days in jail. Over the following two days, workers supporting the Shah's reform programme beat up students at Teheran university, it was reported, for shouting slogans denouncing the ruler. The clash with 2,000 workers came after police broke up anti-government demonstrations by religious leaders. Security forces patrolled the university. Two days later, Iranian voters went to the polls to decide on the Shah's land and social reforms. It was announced later that 5,598,711 voted in favour and 415,000 against. Unofficial votes were cast by 271,179 women. The Shah issued a decree authorizing the government to implement the six-point reform programme.

On 18 February, Prime Minister Assadulla Alam resigned, together with his Cabinet, and on the following day he presented a new fifteen-member Cabinet to the Shah. On 9 March, the Agriculture Minister resigned because of lack of economic co-operation in the government. Three days later, the Premier announced the appointment of General Ismail Riahi as Agriculture Minister and of General Ariana as commander of the southern army with orders to enforce land reform in the Qashqai area. On the following day the

government ordered air and ground attacks against southern nomads warring against the land reform programme. The military governor of Fars predicted that rebel leaders would be hanged within 24 hours. This event was followed by the Shah's dedication of a \$67 million dam named after himself, which would bring power, irrigation and flood control to Khuzestan.

Meanwhile, Iraq's internal and external difficulties worsened, although on 26 September 1962 it was reported that Shaikh Rashid and 2,000 Kurdish tribesmen had crossed from Iraq into Turkey, leaving their arms at the frontier. As part of his struggle with the Communists, Qassim banned the Lebanese Communist weekly al-Waqt accusing it of discrediting Iraq, and ordered the confiscation of all issues entering the country. Good relations with the USSR continued despite this move. On 8 October an Iraqi military mission returned from Moscow, where it had viewed Soviet army manoeuvres. On the other hand, relations with the Arab League deteriorated further. Iraq announced in mid-October that it would not co-operate with the Arab League and would not contribute to its budget. A Foreign Ministry official added that the League disregarded its charter by admitting Kuwait. On 17 October, a spokesman for the Kurdish rebels, Kamuran Ali Badir Khan, said he would ask the Security Council to assure the Kurds the right of self-determination. A petition would be sent to the Council President, Valerian Zorin, calling for an end to the Iraqi government's campaign of genocide against the Kurds. Adnan Pachachi, Iraq's chief delegate to the UN said the charge was absolutely false. In the following week, Qassim said President Kennedy's decision to blockade Cuba was a threat to peace and an aggression against peoples struggling for freedom. On 30 October, Baghdad Radio reported that Qassim had received thousands of telegrams in support of the government's Kurdish policy. The telegrams emphasized brotherhood between Arabs and Kurds. Three days later, however, on 3 November, heavy fighting

broke out between government forces, including air force, infantry and tank units, and Kurdish rebels near the Turkish border. On 10 December Al-Sharq newspaper reported the discovery of a Communist headquarters in Basra by security men. The party leader was arrested and letters were found which proved Communist collaboration with the Kurdish rebels, conveniently linking together Qassim's basic problems.

While Iraq was involved in recurring conflict with the Kurds, Saudi Arabia was engaged in the Yemen where conflict with the UAR led to a break in diplomatic relations with the latter. This factor led to a closer relationship with the United States when Prince Faysal paid a visit to President Kennedy at the White House on 4 October 1962, though on 28 November the prince rejected President Kennedy's proposals for a settlement of the Yemen conflict. On 3 January 1963 Prince Faysal announced a general mobilization of the armed forces and charged the UAR and the Yemeni Republic with continuing air and sea aggression. Within two days, the High Defence Council decided to open military training centres throughout the country and the United States was asked for the return of its jet fighters to the country. Washington agreed to send a destroyer to Saudi waters as well as the fighters. The High Defence Council took a further decision to withdraw Saudi forces from Kuwait and the diplomatic position was improved on 16 January when Saudi Arabia and Britain agreed to resume diplomatic relations. There followed a Saudi request for French arms.

The Kuwait affair was gradually being wound up. On 28 January Baghdad Radio reported Qassim as saying that he had not attacked Kuwait because he did not like Arab blood to be shed. Qassim did not reveal the means by which Kuwait would be liberated. Three days later, Jordan completed the withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait. On 4 February, the Arab League announced the dissolution of the token force in Kuwait in view of the

encouraging situation along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. On the same day, Saudi Arabian forces completed their withdrawal from Kuwait and Sudanese forces were ordered to leave. As the crisis ended, so did the rule of the man who had initiated it. On 8 February, Baghdad Radio announced the death of President Qassim in a coup d'etat. All frontiers and airports were closed. Radio announcements were made in the name of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command. Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif was appointed transitional President of the Republic and a 21-member Cabinet announced. A new point in the international history of the Gulf had been reached.

The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of subsequent chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed referencing:

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Chapter Five: From the Fall of Qassim to the British Announcement of Withdrawal

The period between the fall of Qassim and the Six Day War of 1967 brought little stability or peace to Iraq, and conflict persisted in Oman and, at times, in Iran, but these years were equally striking for dynamic economic development and diplomacy in the Gulf, together with a marked readiness to co-operate and negotiate for the relief of tension.

Iraq continued to be the source of tension most difficult to relieve, though its new leaders did move quickly to defuse the Kuwaiti crisis and to repair relations with other Arab states. On the day after the overthrow of Qassim the Council of Ministers in Saudi Arabia decided to recognize the new government in Iraq. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union recognized the government of President Arif on 11 February 1963. On the same day, with Upper Volta's de jure recognition of Kuwait announced, the total number of countries which had recognized the government was eighty one. In Iraq, after the Coup, the Revolutionary Council ordered the elimination of Communists resisting the revolution, and on 14 February Communists fought government troops in Baghdad. On the following day, the Soviet Union expressed its concern about the arrests of Communists and Pravda alluded to the wave of terror and persecution against Iraqi Democrats unleashed by the new government. Determined to improve the general political and economic situation, the Oil Minister, Abd al Aziz Watari, said that the government would formulate a new oil policy based on sound economic principles, while the border between Iraq and Kuwait was reopened on 18 February. The contingent of Sudanese troops from the force organized by the Arab League in the summer of 1961 became the first to leave in recognition of the changed situation. Equally encouraging were the peace negotiations between the government and representatives of the

Kurdish rebel leader Barazani which began in Baghdad on 19 February, though the Kurds Jalal Talabani and Salih Abdulla Al-Yusufi stressed that Barazani must endorse any agreement, and this development was followed by the release of Kurdish political prisoners.

On 20 February, the Iraqi Council of Ministers lifted the restrictions imposed by the former regime on exports to Kuwait, while in Kuwait the Ministry of Finance lifted the ban imposed in December 1961 on the conversion of currency and financial transactions between Kuwait and Iraq. Iraq also abolished visas for Kuwaitis, and Iraqi Airways announced resumption of daily morning flights between Iraq and Kuwait via Basra. In the following week, on 13 March, a joint communique issued in Kuwait and Moscow announced an exchange of diplomatic relations between the two countries. These events were crowned by a delegation led by Kuwait's Foreign Minister, Shaikh Sabah al Ahmed al Sabah which paid a two-day visit to Iraq to congratulate the new Iraqi regime, by Kuwait's application for United Nations membership on 19 April 1963 and, on 7 May, by the Security Council's unanimous approval of Kuwait's application. In Beirut a few days later, the Foreign Minister, Sabah, said en route for the United Nations that Iraqi and Kuwaiti differences were family disputes, and family disputes come to an end. On 6 June, British officials said that Kuwait had not asked for revision of the defence agreement with Britain.

While Iraq-Kuwait and Iraq-Kurd relations were undergoing a process of normalization, those between Iraq and the Soviet Union were getting more difficult. On 16 March, the Iraqi government protested to the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad against recent attacks on the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow; on 5 April, the Iraq Times, quoting the Military Governor-General, reported that the property of the Communist Party in Iraq had been impounded; and on 9 April came the return of thirty six students from the Soviet Union, after

the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow had requested the authorities there to facilitate their departure. The students had been protesting against the U.S.S.R.'s propaganda attacks on Iraq. In the following week, eleven more Iraqi students arrived from Moscow with reports of mistreatment by Soviet officials. An Education Ministry official said that 1,300 Iraqi students remained in the Soviet Union. In Basra, officials reported on 16 April that they had seized a secret Communist Party Library of 25,000 books and periodicals. At the same time, it was reported that the Muslim Brotherhood had been distributing pamphlets attacking the government. On 6 May, the Soviet Communist Party declared its support for the Kurdish revolt of Mustafa Al Barazani. A few days earlier, on 25 April, in a one thousand word memorandum, the Kurds had demanded, among many other things, the election by Kurds of a Vice-President of Iraq. A civil court, on 14 May, granted the request from the authorities to dissolve the Iraqi Communist Party, and ordered the closure of party branches throughout the country.

The Kurdish issue now became central. On 18 May, Nazim Jawad, charge d'affaires at the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, said that most Kurdish tribes in Iraq were opposed to Barazani's demand for a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. On the same day, it was announced that Jalal Talabani, another Kurdish leader, had arrived in Cairo where he conferred with President Nasser and others on the Kurdish situation in Iraq, leaving again for Beirut two weeks later. At a press conference in Beirut on 5 June, Talabani said that Kurds wanted free elections for an Iraqi Constituent Assembly so that the whole people, and not a single party, would run the country. Talabani then flew to Vienna to begin a tour of European capitals, having decided to delay his return to Baghdad. On 9 June, a military court sentenced two students to five years imprisonment for displaying provocative notices about the Kurdish rebellion. On the following day, the

government announced resumption of the war against the Kurdish rebels and demanded their surrender within 24 hours, subsequently disclosing details of a plan to give Kurds decentralized rule. For their part, the Kurds published their plan for the future of their country. Baghdad Radio reported on 12 June that the Iraqi army was advancing from Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya in an attempt to launch an assault on the main centres of the Kurdish forces. Meanwhile, the Soviet government denounced the Iraqi government for undertaking military operations against the Kurds. A little later, Baghdad Radio reported that 165 Kurds had been killed and 35 wounded in recent fighting between government forces and the rebels, and that government troops had cleared ten villages in the Dohuk area. A military court sentenced two army lieutenants to five and seven years hard labour for activities which were connected with the Communist Party. Baghdad Radio added on 15 June that the Kurds had suffered heavy losses and fled from villages under intensive army fire. Army control was soon established in a further fourteen more Kurdish villages.

Iran shared with Iraq an unstable internal situation during this period. On 19 March, Iran's Minister of State, Jahangir Tafazzoli, announced that ten government troops and thirty four rebels had been killed in recent clashes in Southern Iran. The rebels were protesting against land reform. Two weeks later, police and security forces broke up demonstrations against reforms in Qum. The demonstrations had lasted for five days. In Teheran, meantime, Tafazzoli announced the banning of 71 of the capital's 141 newspapers and magazines. Prime Minister Alam announced a \$560,000 increase in defence spending, bringing the total to \$168,000,000. On 2 June, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and a European-American oil consortium agreed on the construction of a \$140 million oil refinery and

natural gas complex in Teheran. But the activities of rebels and certain demonstrations pushed such news into the background. General Bahram Ariana, Commander of the Southern Army, said in a press conference that Habib Shahbazi, chief of the Sorkhi tribe and a rebel leader in the Shiraz area, had surrendered. On 4 June, the police rounded up more than 130 religious demonstrators who were attacking the Shah's reform programme, and on the following day the government forces in Teheran had to put down religious riots. Several private and government offices were attacked and twenty persons killed or injured. Teheran was placed under martial law. General Hassan Pakravan, Teheran's security chief, hinted that President Nasser of Egypt was behind the rioting. Riots on the following day in Shiraz resulted in 5 dead and 37 injured. More than 200 people were arrested, including four religious leaders. The Premier said that the government had smashed a plot to overthrow the Shah by sabotaging Teheran's public utilities and educational institutions. The Shah took refuge for a time in the summer palace at Sa'adabad. Forty-eight hours later, tanks fired guns over demonstrators in the capital and the crowds were effectively dispersed. About 30 religious leaders had also been arrested earlier, along with Mullah Rouhaolla Khomeini, an anti-reform leader. On the same day, speaking at a land reform ceremony, the Shah blamed the riots on black reactionaries financed by a foreign government. Within a few days, the Shah was saying that general elections would be held at the end of the summer, despite the recent rioting and that women over the age of 18 would be able to vote and run for office.

Iran was also encountering difficulties with her neighbours. On 4 June, the Foreign Ministry of Kuwait accused Iran of violating its territorial sovereignty at the head of the Gulf. This was followed on 15 June by the Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources protesting,

in a note to the Iranian government, about the demarcation of offshore areas in the Gulf, but on 19 July the Iranian government approved of a list of 20 companies as bidders for offshore areas in District No 1, areas which were subjects to dispute with Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The three governments had expressed a desire to settle their claims over these areas by negotiation. In the matter of oil, it was notable that during all these troubles crude oil production in Southern Iran in July was 6,024,000 long tons compared with 5,497,000 in July 1962; total production for the first six months was 41,668,000 long tons compared with 35,768,000 the year before. Refinery throughput during July was 1,561,000 long tons, compared with 1,396,000 the year before; throughput that year was 10,430,000 compared with 9,962,000 the year before.

If oil output in Iran was rapidly rising in this way, so was tension in Iraq. On 16 June, three officers found guilty of communist activity within army ranks were sentenced to terms of up to five years hard labour by a court-martial. On the same day, a communique broadcast by Baghdad Radio said that the army had killed more than 300 followers of the Kurdish leader Mustafa al-Barazani in Mosul and, on the following day, the Soviet Defence Ministry newspaper Red Star alleged that the Iraqi government was engaged in a genocide operation against the Kurds. Two days later, the Tehran Journal reported that some 2,000 Iraqi tribesmen had sought refuge in Iran since the Iraqi government renewed hostilities against the Kurds. It was announced in Baghdad that Iraqi troops had cleared the Dinarta district in the Akra mountain range. The army apparently hoped to cut in two the territory held by Kurdish rebels by driving through Akra, Zibar and Barzan to the Turkish border. A spokesman for the Ministry of National Guidance called a statement by Tass on 15 June a break with recognized practice and a flagrant interference in an internal affair which only

concerned the Iraqi people. The TASS statement had accused the government of adopting Nazi methods of mass extermination in Kurdistan. The Soviet Union had warned, moreover, that it might terminate its programme of aid to Iraq if the government continued the military operations against the Kurds.

On the same day, four ministers were reported to have resigned in protest against the resumption of hostilities against the Kurds. They were the two Kurdish members of the Cabinet - General Fuad Arif, Minister of State for Kurdish Affairs and Ali Baba al Shaikh Mahmud, Minister of Agriculture - together with two independents, Najib Talib, Minister of Industry and Mahmud Khattab, Minister for Municipalities. In their letter of resignation, the independent ministers were reported to have asked also for the expansion of the Cabinet to include other nationalist elements - i.e. other than Ba'athists - and for general elections. On the following day, the Iraqi government denied that the two non-Kurdish ministers had resigned, but did not mention the reported resignation of the two Kurdish ministers. The Iraqi chief delegate to the United Nations, Adnan Pachachi, told a press conference that foreign quarters were inciting rebellion among the Kurds. He pointed particularly to inflammatory broadcasts from East Germany and, by implication, the Soviet Union as well. Two days later, it was reported in Beirut that 28 Communists had been executed in Iraq for their part in the Kirkuk massacre in 1959, while the Military Governor-General of Northern Iraq announced on 2 July the execution of eleven Communist criminals for acts of anarchy at Mosul, Dohuk and Tal Keif in 1959. A day later, Baghdad Radio announced that a Communist attempt to seize Al-Rashid military camp had been crushed. Investigations disclosed that Barazani Kurds as well as Communists had a hand in the attempt. Within forty-eight hours, the government reported a major victory over Barazani

followers in the north east of Iraq. It said that the rebels had been pushed back to within twenty miles of the Iranian border.

On 9 July, the Soviet Union, in a note from Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Iraqi Ambassador in Moscow, drew the attention of Iraq to the threat arising from interference by other states in events in Northern Iraq. The note implicated Syria, CENTO members Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. In Beirut, Fathi Kamal, acting Consul-General, denied that Syrian military units were engaged in military operations with the Iraqis in Northern Iraq. A day later, on 10 July, the Soviet Union declared that it would raise the Iraqi-Kurdish question in the Security Council unless outside interference ceased. AN Iraqi spokesman declared on Baghdad Radio that the Soviet Union had no right to speak about genocide. On the same day, a former military commander of Mosul, Brigadier Hasan Abbud, was sentenced to death by a military court in Baghdad on the charge of communist outrages in the abortive Shawaf uprising in Mosul in 1959. The following day, Baghdad Radio reported that about 400 Kurdish rebels had been killed in a battle with government troops in Northern Iraq the week before. Pachachi complained to the Security Council that the Soviet Union was inciting the Kurdish rebels, while the UN Economic and Social Council refused to consider a Soviet charge that Iraq was seeking the physical extermination of her Kurdish minority.

A statement was issued by the Military Governor, Rashid Salih, on 21 July, announcing that Jamal al Haydri, Abd al-Jabbar Wahbi and Muhammad Salih al Abassi - members of the central committee of the Communist Party, had been hanged. The three were involved, it was said, in the attempt of 3 July to seize al-Rashid camp. Forty-eight hours later, the Foreign Ministry announced that six diplomats from the Bulgarian and East German Missions had been expelled because they had committed acts inconsistent with their

diplomatic responsibilities. On 25 July, a revolutionary court sentenced to death twenty one more men arrested during the abortive plot of 3 July. Nineteen were soldiers and two were civilians. On 29 July, ten Iraqi students of atomic science were called back from the Soviet Union because of an alleged provocation campaign against them, according to Luay Tahrin, secretary of the Atomic Energy Committee in Baghdad. Four students were sent to continue their studies in the United States and six to West Germany.

Meanwhile, the Kurdish revolt continued, and, according to a report from the Kurdish side, on 31 July, Barazani had successfully withstood drives against him in Western Kurdistan, but partisans of the Kurdish and Democratic Party on the southern and eastern fronts had suffered a succession of reverses. Within a few days, this report was followed by Baghdad Radio's announcement of the capture of the towns of Barzan and Mazna by the Iraqi forces. A week later, a communique announced that the army had cleared Mirzatur in north west Iraq of Kurdish rebels. Arif declared over Baghdad Radio on 15 August that Barazani had fled to the Iranian border. Three days later, Iraqi officials were reported to have met with representatives of Barazani in an attempt to end the Kurdish rebellion. Kurdish sources said the meeting took place at the Kurdish village of Raniah. It was also reported, however, that Barazani had rejected an Iraqi peace offer. Moreover, an Iraqi air force delegation left for Damascus for talks on closer military co-operation, and forty-eight hours later, Arif, on an official visit to Cairo, met with Nasser for reconciliation talks. These events were explained by a report in Beirut that, despite the successes, military operations against the Kurds in Northern Iraq had slowed down due to lack of ammunition and military spare parts needed for Iraqi weapons made in the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the booming oil economies of the smaller Gulf States, as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated the restoration of friendly relations between Kuwait and Iraq. In Qatar, for example, the Qatar Petroleum Company had announced that the crude oil production during the first six months of 1963 was 4,404,000 long tons; this compared with 4,235,000 long tons in the first six months of 1962, and increase of 3.5 per cent. In Kuwait, it was reported on 21 June 1963 that crude oil production in May 1963 was at a daily average of 2,121,920 barrels, as compared with the 2,017,000 record of June 1962. The daily average for the first five months of that year increased by 0.09 per cent, compared with the corresponding period of 1962. The Cairo daily al-Ahram on 27 June quoted informed sources in Kuwait regarding an agreement reached between Iraq and Kuwait settling their dispute over Iraqi claims to sovereignty. Accordingly, Kuwait had agreed to loan Iraq ID 10 million from the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development and an additional loan of ID20 million, repayable over 20 years. In return, the Iraq government had agreed to recognize Kuwait's independence. After two closed meetings, the National Assembly in Kuwait, on 24 September 1963, issued a statement empowering the government to grant Iraq a loan to finance development projects, and on the following day the National Assembly decided to establish diplomatic relations with Iraq.

On 2 October, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Sabah Al Salam Al-Sabah, arrived in Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi government on relations between the two countries. Two days later, Iraq announced recognition of Kuwait's independence and sovereignty, and on 12 October a delegation headed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, signed an agreement under which Iraq would get an interest-free loan of ID 30 million from Kuwait, to be repaid over 25 years.

Iraq's internal instability persisted. On 12 October, a writ was issued against Mulla Mustafa al Barazani and 54 of his followers, ordering them to appear before the military court of Mosul within seven days or face trial in absentia. Rashid Salih, the Military Governor General, told a press conference in Baghdad on 19 October that a spy network distributing money and plotting against the Iraqi republic had been uncovered. On the following day it was announced that Syrian troops were fighting against the Kurds in Northern Iraq. This was confirmed seven days later when talks were held with Syrian military leaders on detailed arrangements for the deployment of military units, and on 31 October it was learned that Colonel Abd al-Sattar Rashid had been named as commander-in-chief of the National Guard, replacing Lt. Col. Munzir al Windawi, who was taking up a post in the Syrian-Iraqi military union. On 11 November, an emergency Baath party regional conference established a new regional leadership under the Prime Minister. Sadi, the Deputy Prime Minister, and four supporters were turned out of office. Two days later, the government was reported to have put down an attempted coup allegedly led by Sadi. He and his followers were deported to Madrid. Supporters of Sadi, however, temporarily regained the ascendancy. Following his deportation, forces from the National Guard demonstrated against the new regional Ba'ath leadership and protested against the elections. It was also reported that seven members of the new leadership, among whom were Foreign Minister Shabib and Interior Minister Jawad, were ordered to Beirut to make way for the national Ba'ath leadership to settle the dispute. A day later, the national leadership declared that the conference which established the new leadership was illegal and hence so was the leadership. There were also reports in Beirut of clashes in Kirkuk and Mosul between unidentified dissident elements and

Syrian troops stationed there. It was claimed that attempts were made to sabotage oil installations in the two cities.

President Abd al Salam Arif announced on 18 November that he had succeeded, with the aid of the army, in overthrowing the Ba'athist government. He ordered that the National Guard should be disarmed and announced a new Revolutionary Council with himself as its president. President Nasser announced his support for the new government, and, in Moscow, the Soviet Union was reported to have denounced the Ba'athists in Iraq for the attempted overthrow of the government. Arif named Bakr Vice-President and a new Cabinet was formed, with Tahir Yahya as Prime Minister. Thirteen new men were appointed, eight of whom remained from the cabinet that the Ba'athists had tried to overthrow. This was followed by Arif's policy statement on 21 November pointing out that neither the Ba'ath nor any other party had any legal status. At his first news conference after the abortive coup, Arif offered to make peace with the Kurds, calling them 'our brothers' and stating his determination to set the new regime on a neutral course. He said that the government would abide by all past commitments - the 17 April Cairo pact, as well as the more recent agreements for union with Syria. In a subsequent broadcast, Arif urged the Kurds as good Muslims to surrender to the government. He offered them a personal promise that they would not be harrassed if they returned and said that confiscated property would be given back. During this period, Arif was planning to form a national front of pro-Nasser groups. The political parties invited to join were the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Arab Socialist Party, the Socialist Union Movement, a former Ba'athist group, and the Independence Party.

By the beginning of 1964, both internal and external relationships seemed to have taken a turn for the better. On 1 January 1964 it was

announced in Moscow that work on the nuclear reactor being built in Iraq with Soviet aid would be completed by the end of that year. The reactor was to be used for industrial, medical and agricultural research. The British Aircraft Corporation was reported to have signed with Iraq's Air Ministry a contract worth more than £1.5 million for the supply of Jet Provost training aircraft. At the same time, it was announced that Iraq's revenue from oil had exceeded £110 million in 1963, which was £15 million more than the oil revenues during the previous year. The Central Bank disclosed that deposits in banks operating in Iraq had doubled compared with the period before the November 1963 revolution.

The Kuwait-Iraq relationship, too, was in better shape. On 20 December 1963 Kuwait had announced the appointments of Said Yaqub Shannas as ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Muhammed Ahmed Abd al-Latif as ambassador to Iraq. In Iraq, on 18 January 1964, it was reported that passports for travel between Iraq and Kuwait were to be abolished; identity cards would be sufficient. On 24 January, the Iraqi government was reported to have charged a special technical committee with conducting surveys of projects to supply fresh water from the Shatt al-Arab to Kuwait preliminary to joint talks between the two countries during the second half of February.

As to the second most important issue, the Kurdish rebellion, on 10 February military operations between Iraq and the Kurds were stopped. Arif and Nulla Mustafa al Barazani broadcast orders for a ceasefire over Baghdad Radio. The President accepted the national rights of his Kurdish brethren within the framework of the Iraqi nation and promised to confirm this in the provisional constitution. He added that detainees and convicts held or imprisoned in connection with the Kurdish uprising would be released and all moveable property which had been sequestered would be returned. Five

days later, Jalal Talabani, a representative of Barazani arrived in Baghdad at the head of a four-man delegation to negotiate with Iraqi officials on Kurdish demands for autonomy. It was also disclosed two days later that the government had decided to form a Higher Committee to direct the development of Northern Iraq.

On 18 February, the release of 450 detainees held in connection with the Kurdish revolt was ordered. During a press interview in Rania on 24 February, Barazani said that the ceasefire agreement was intended to halt the bloodshed, and that secret clauses still under negotiation would open the way either to permanent peace or to a renewal of hostilities.

Meanwhile, in Baghdad, Arif told reporters that there was absolutely no question of negotiations about Kurdish national rights because Kurds and Arabs were brothers - one family, the big family of Kurds and Arabs. Two days later, two hundred more Kurds were released from prison. On 29 February, Talabani was reported to have said that he had accepted under protest the ceasefire agreement. He said that he had ordered 6,000 men under his command in the Sulaimanya and Kirkuk regions to continue training in guerrilla tactics and to be ready for anything. Baghdad Radio declared on 1 March that a further 450 Kurds had been released. On 12 March, Barazani met with Arif and Interior Minister Rashid Nusli in Rania. It was reported that they talked about the means of converting the ceasefire agreement into a lasting political peace.

During this period, when Iraq was busy trying to make its government firm and stable, Iran was enjoying rapid economic development of many different kinds and in association with many different countries. According to the head of the Soviet Caspian shipping organization, Iran-USSR trade was on the increase. On 27 September 1963 a Czech loan of \$20 million, to take the form of a capital investment in Iranian industries was made to

Iran, and on the same day a trade agreement between Iran and Ceylon was renewed and the ban on the import of Ceylon tea was lifted. A delegation was sent to Kabul to complete negotiations for the signing of a new trade agreement between Iran and Afghanistan. The trade agreement between the European Economic Community and the government was initialled in Brussels. The agreement was the first purely commercial pact to be signed between the E.E.C. and a third country and it was expected to come into force in January 1964. On 4 October, it was announced that the Czech loan was to be used to expand Iran's sugar industry; the construction of seven new factories was to be the focal point of the programme. On the same day, a spokesman for the Teheran Electric Corporation announced that a new programme to expand the power supply to the capital would cost \$50 million. Two days later, the Shah ceremonially inaugurated a new parliament after a suspension of two and a half years. His inaugural address stressed the country's close ties with Turkey, Pakistan and other allies in CENTO. The Shah said that priority would be given to industrialization, land reform, and to aid for the co-operatives in this programme for the development of Iran.

Ten days later, on 16 October 1963, President de Gaulle of France arrived with his wife and accompanied by the French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, to begin a four-day state visit. De Gaulle's scheduled talks with the Shah and Premier Assadolla Alam concerned the prospect of French credits to aid the Iranian five-year development plan. While the French visit was in progress, the British government and the Iranian government announced on 18 October a British loan, supposedly long-term, of £2 million for the financing of selected projects in the Third Development Plan. Safi Asfia, the Director of the Plan Organization, reviewed the progress of the Plan and cited the highlights in

communications, agriculture and industry. Before his departure, de Gaulle agreed with Alam that a joint commission of French and Iranian experts should work out details of French aid to Iran. The aid was expected to be a combination of short-term credits for machinery and equipment, together with long-term cash loans directed to industries, including petrochemicals, dam and electric power projects, as well as the direct provision of heavy machinery. Another agreement signed in mid-October was between the US AID to Iran and the Pars Cotton Ginning and Oil Mill Company for a loan intended for the construction of a terminal for the bulk reception and storage of vegetable oils. The loan was made under the Cooley Loan Programme and was the first of its kind to be made to an entirely Iranian Company. On 8 November, the French Chamber of Deputies was reported as having allocated 4 million francs for technical aid programmes to Iran and on the same day talks opened in Teheran between the Minister of Economics and the Commercial counsellor at the Czech Embassy on a possible \$50 million credit. A week later, the Shah handed over the deeds of 1,200 houses built with US aid in villages which had been wrecked by an earthquake. On 17 November, the Salzgitterindustriebau of West Germany announced its plan to build a new sugar factory at Isfahan.

Then President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union arrived on a seven-day visit at the invitation of the Shah. The visit was to coincide with the final arrangements to sign an agreement for joint projects between the two countries, among them the construction of the dam on the Aras river and the dredging of the Caspian Sea swamp. In his speech to the Parliament, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was ready to grant technical and economic aid to Iran. On 22 November talks at the Foreign Trade Company ended with the formulation of USSR-Iranian transit agreements. Complete agreement was reached on Iranian routes for Soviet goods and all Soviet

routes would be available for Iranian goods. The Iranian government also applied to the United Kingdom, the United States, France, West Germany, Japan, the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank (EXIM BANK) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans totalling nearly \$140 million in order to finance schemes contained within the third Five-Year Plan. Finally, it was announced on 6 December that the EXIMBANK would provide credit to Iran for purchases of US highway maintenance equipment. It was also reported, on the same day, that Iran would purchase 80,000 tons of American wheat.

However, one untoward incident had marred this harmonious economic diplomacy. On 21 November the Iranian government announced that Soviet jet fighters had shot down an unarmed Iranian aerial survey plane over Iranian territory. Two officials were killed. The incident occurred during Brezhnev's visit. Following a protest from Teheran, the U.S.S.R. agreed on 11 December to pay half the damage sustained, though without accepting full responsibility for the incident.

On 20 December 1963 it was reported in Iran that the Ministry of Economics had drawn up a plan for the expansion of trade with the Gulf States over the next three years. Under the plan, the Ministry would negotiate for a reduction in shipping and air freight rates while the government would support investments in the textile and cement industries, provided factories were located within 100Kms of the southern coast. The Iranian oil companies were reported to have struck oil at Bushkan, near Shiraz, and at a second exploratory well near Kazeroun. On 3 January 1964 it was reported that France had granted Iran credits for 300 million Francs (\$60 million) for the purchase of French machinery or to meet the costs of French consulting engineering firms. Credits were to be utilized in 1964 and 1965 only. It was further learned that the Director of the Plan

Organization, Safi Asfia, was in Germany to sign executive agreements for 123 million Marks out of a total credit of 200 million Marks (\$50 million) of German aid to Iran. The former sum was to be used for the Sefid Rud Dam project and its irrigation network. A week later, an agreement was reported to have been concluded between the Japanese firm, Shibaura Electric and the Paath Electric Company of Iran. Parts would be supplied by the former and radios would be assembled in Iran with the help of Japanese technicians.

Alongside these developments, production of crude oil was vigorous. In South Iran the figure for 1963 amounted to 70,497,000 long tons, compared with 63,461,000 long tons for the previous year. Total refinery throughput at Abadan was 17,566,000 long tons in 1963 compared with 17,316,000 in 1962. In a speech to oil workers at Abadan on 19 January the Shah predicted an extraordinary development of the oil industry in Iran, and expressed the hope that Iranian production would rise to 100 million tons annually in the next two or three years. He attached particular importance, however, to the problem of transporting and selling oil. On the following day, Premier Assadolla Alam announced the resolutions adopted at the 5th OPEC conference and reaffirmed Iran's loyalty to the organization. Forty-eight hours later, Alam was instructed by the Shah to take over personally the direction of the Ministry of Finance in addition to his other duties.

On 31 January, the Iran National Airlines Corporation was reported to have concluded an agreement with Pan American World Airways to provide technical and management assistance over a period of three years. Other announcements seemed to provide further confirmation of Iran's rapidly increasing technical proficiency. The Iran National Company was said to be producing buses already at an estimated rate of four hundred per year - a figure due to expand to 1,600 units a year. A co-operation agreement

between the Institut Francais de Petrole (IFP) and the Iranian Plan Organization was signed in Teheran on 17 February, under which the IFP would act as consultant for the establishment of a large petrochemical complex in Iran. On 26 February, following a two-day meeting between representatives of the NIOC and the Iranian consortium a communique was issued urging the increase of exports from Abadan and noting with satisfaction the new discoveries made in the Agreement Area at Marun and Karanj. Scarcely a day seemed to pass without announcements concerning such ambitious international projects.

The most important domestic political event during this time was Alam's resignation on 7 March after 19 months in office. The Shah appointed Hasan Ali Mansor to replace him. Alam was appointed Chancellor of the new Pahlavi University, and a new cabinet was appointed. On taking office, Mansor made a number of declarations pledging that he would tackle current economic problems, review and reorganize the country's administrative machinery and implement the Shah's social reform plan.

Saudi Arabia seemed to be following a similar breakneck development pattern. For example, on 20 December 1963, at the instigation of the Prime Minister Amir Paisal, a Ford Foundation team was brought to Riyadh to make recommendations for a comprehensive reorganization of the administration. The Ministry of the Interior had been granted an allocation of SR 170 million for that purpose. On 25 December, the Council of Ministers approved the allocation of SR10 million for building temporary television stations in Riyadh and Jidda. The station was to be installed by the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Council also approved the allocation of SR73,268,750 for the first phase of the steelworks project and on the government's 75 per cent share of a new oil refinery. A few days later, on 31 January, it was

announced that the two British companies which had won the contract to repair the Maan Medina Hijaz railway would begin work in mid-February. The line would be open within thirty months. This event was followed by a report on 5 February in London that the British government had authorized the export of 300 anti-tank missiles to Saudi Arabia costing about \$1.4 million. The contract also provided for training Saudi Arabian soldiers in the use of the weapons.

Early in January 1964 it was announced that the government would participate in an Arab summit conference in Cairo. King Saud would lead his country's delegation. In the following week, Saud met with President Nasser and Vice-President Abd Al-Hakim Amer in Cairo. He also met the heads of state of Iraq, Algeria and Jordan. On 5 February, the Saudi government expressed a willingness to resume diplomatic relations with the UAR on certain conditions. On the following day, Faysal told the correspondent of the London Observer, Gavin Young, that the government would not recognize a Yemeni government controlled by a foreign state. Referring to the forthcoming discussions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia, he said that the government might seek compensation for attacks upon its territory by Egyptian forces based in Yemen but he believed that peaceful co-existence with their Egyptian brothers should be possible. On 16 February, Al-Ahram reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAR had agreed to a meeting in Riyadh on 1 March to settle their differences. The meeting was to be attended by the Iraqi-Algerian good offices mission which had visited Saudi Arabia earlier that month. On 3 March it was announced that diplomatic relations with the UAR would be resumed immediately.

There were also developments in relation to Kuwait. On 8 March an agreement regulating Saudi Arabia's and Kuwait's rights in the Neutral Zone was signed following discussions in Kuwait between Oil Minister Ahmad

Zaki al-Yamani and the Kuwaiti Finance Minister. In Kuwait itself, oil production continued to soar. On 24 December 1963, the Kuwaiti government announced that oil production in Kuwait and Kuwait's share in the production of the Neutral Zone and the off-shore area exceeded 100 million tons between 1 January and 23 December 1963. The average daily production of crude oil by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) for 1963 amounted to 1,932,798 barrels, compared with 1,833,656 during 1962. On 14 February 1964 a new agreement was announced with the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) regarding three offshore islands of Kubr, Qaru and Umm al-Naradim. It incorporated extensive revisions of the terms of the original 1949 concession agreement. It was followed by the announcement that the Ministry of Finance and Industry had decided to begin negotiations with the US firm Foster Wheeler Corporation for the construction of the projected 100 tons a day ammonia plant at Shuaiba.

Political problems as well as economic growth were also being tackled. On 11 May, Kuwait Radio announced that the Amir had contributed KD 1 million from his private funds for the building of dwellings for Kuwaitis of limited income. Five days later, in a speech during ceremonies at Aswan in Egypt, Premier Khrushchev was reputed to have made hostile remarks about the Kuwait Amir. On 21 May, the Kuwait ambassador in Cairo, Khalid Al-Adasani, commenting on these remarks, said that Kuwait was proud of her oil revenues being used in the service of the Kuwaitis and for the raising of their living standards. Two days later, it was reported in Kuwait that the Foreign Minister had called on the Soviet ambassador with a letter of protest. Officials in Kuwait would break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union if a satisfactory apology was not made for Khrushchev's comments.

In Iraq, Arif was in 1964 busy consolidating his new-found stability and the union with the UAR. On 16 March he announced that a provisional constitution would soon be proclaimed, perhaps after his return from India and Pakistan. On 22 April, the Minister of Justice, Kamil al-Khatib, was reported to have said that the provisional constitution, which the President was said to have examined in its final form, prevented any groups from forming political parties which tried to dominate the people and the country and cause them damage. He added that the constitution would be passed by the Cabinet. A few days later, the Baghdad press was reported to be expressing satisfaction that the provisional constitution was expected to proclaim socialism as Iraq's objective. On 30 April, the Cabinet approved the provisional constitution. A few days later, Arif published the new constitution declaring Iraq an Arab, Islamic, independent and sovereign state with the aim of Arab unity, beginning with constitutional union with the UAR. He indicated that he was seeking Egyptian support against the Ba'athist regime in Syria and against the return of the Ba'ath party in Iraq. On the following day, UAR Vice-President Abd al-Hakim Amer began a 4-day state visit to Iraq. On 16 May, a new law governing the National Revolutionary Council was published, which restricted the membership of the Council to 20, with the President as chairman. Its functions would include issuing the budget, ratifying international treaties and agreements proclaiming general mobilization, declaring war, accepting a truce and directing the affairs of the republic during the three-year transition period in a manner ensuring protection of the revolution and the achievement of its aims. It could also grant the President exceptional powers, including all functions of the Council for one year, renewable whenever needed and at the discretion of the President.

On 20 May, Arif, who had arrived in Cairo ten days earlier, met with Premier Khrushchev. During the following week, a military union was agreed with the UAR. It was signed in Cairo and approved by the Revolutionary Council on the following day. In a further important development on 8 June, it was reported that Iraqi troops which had been fighting the Kurds in Northern Iraq had finally returned to their permanent barracks.

In Saudi Arabia during this period the situation was entirely different because King Saud began to lose his power over his government. It was reported on 22 March 1964 in Beirut that a council of Saudi Arabian Ulama had met at Riyadh to consider a demand by King Saud that his powers as supreme sovereign be restored. He had handed the powers to Crown Prince Faysal the previous January. In the following week, on 28 March, Saud submitted to decisions of a council of the royal family and of religious leaders reducing his role permanently in the following ways: withdrawal of the Royal Guard from Saud's personal command and its transfer to the Defence Ministry; transfer of Saud's personal guard to the Interior Ministry; abolition of the royal court, which would be replaced by a special royal office; and reduction of royal expenses to a reasonable amount; the funds saved were to be added to a development budget. The king's income would be reduced from about \$40 million a year to \$20 million. Forty-eight hours later, Radio Mecca broadcast the text of Royal Decree No 52, signed by Faisal, approving Cabinet Decision No. 753. This was followed on the following day by another broadcast of the text of the fatwa and royal family decision on the transfer of state powers from Saud to Faisal.

On 1 April, the Cabinet approved the agreement with Kuwait providing for the partitioning of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone and its

territorial waters for administrative purposes, while maintaining existing arrangements for the equal sharing of its natural resources. On 12 April, the Cabinet passed a special appropriation of SR100 million from the general reserves for strengthening the armed forces. Four days later, the British press reported that Saudi Arabia was planning to build a modern air defence complex which would include high and low altitude radar, rocket-equipped supersonic aircraft and ground-to-air missiles. The government was said to be negotiating equipment purchases with America and West European firms. The British papers attributed the decision to the recent raids on Saudi territory by Egyptian aircraft based in Yemen. Ten days later, in the course of a speech to a public rally in Taaizz, President Nasser denied that the UAR harboured any evil intentions towards the people of Saudi Arabia. He called for a new era of brotherhood and understanding between Saudi Arabia and the UAR in order to preclude the possibility of Britain 'sowing dissension within the Arab nation'.

Three days later, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ahmed Yamani, announced that the contract for the first phase of the iron and steel rolling mill project would be awarded to the British firm W.H.A. Robertson and Co. Ltd. Initially, the plant would produce reinforcing bars and sections, with production to start in two years time at a rate of 45,000 tons per year, rising to 60,000 tons. Other phases of the project envisaged the addition of a 200 ton per day steel and sheet metal mill. On 16 May, a trade mission led by the Minister of Commerce and Industry went to Britain to promote further Anglo-Saudi economic relations. This was against a background of continuing oil expansion.

Aramco's annual review of operations for 1963, published that week, indicated that crude production totalled 594,591,671 barrels, exceeding the 1962 total by 39,535,283 barrels. Average daily production was 1,629,016.

an increase of 7.1 per cent over 1962. As a result of the company's exploration, development and research programmes, gross total liquid hydrocarbon reserves increased by 1,522 million during the year; estimated remaining proved reserves at the year-end were 57,811 million barrels, and remaining proved gas reserves increased by 566 standard cubic feet, bringing the year-end total to 24,096 billion standard cubic feet. Refining and exports reached record levels: Ras Tanura had processed 97,441,801 barrels, total exports had risen to 583 million barrels. Aramco had relinquished 277,306 square miles of its concession to the government on 24 March 1963, and progressive relinquishments by 1993 would reduce the company's exclusive area to 20,000 square miles, less than 3 per cent of its original exclusive preferential areas.

On 2 November 1964, the Ulama signed a fatwa deposing Saud ibn Abd al Aziz and pledging allegiance to Faysal as king. An official holiday was declared for 3 November. On the following day, a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the Consultative Council, chaired by Amir Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz confirmed the fatwa and pledged allegiance to the king. The latter said he accepted the kingship only at the people's insistence. Royal Order No 27 stated that the Cabinet would remain in its existing form. On 5 November, a general amnesty was granted on Faysal's accession to the throne and on 18 November Royal Decree No 14 was issued, amending Articles 7 and 8 of the Regulations of the Council of Ministers, making the king head of the Council and making members of the Council responsible to him.

The flurry of positive economic activity in the mid-sixties was accompanied, however, by old familiar signs of disruption: complaints about British interference, threats to the Shah, and renewed Kurdish revolts. The situation in Oman also occupied the headlines. On 16 October 1963, a British Labour MP, Robert Edwards, in a memorandum to the United Nations,

accused British troops of having used inhuman methods in Oman in 1955. On 19 October, however, Britain won the support of a UN survey team against Arab charges of suppression in Oman. The team, moreover, had found no evidence of active fighting in the area, contrary to reports from an agent of Imam Ghalib ibn Ali in Saudi Arabia and Cairo. Herbert de Ridding, the team's head, indicated that local governors and shaikhs from all over Oman said that in general they did not want the brothers Ghalib and Talib ibn Ali, or their chief supporter, Sulyman ibn Himyar, to return to the country. On the following day, N. Ayliffe-Jones, former captain in the Muscat and Oman Field Force, in a letter to the Daily Telegraph, denied the allegations of Edwards that there had been atrocities in the Sultan's 1955 campaign. In a UN Trusteeship debate on 3 December, Syria called for a commission of inquiry in Muscat and Oman. A British delegate stated in reply that the de Ridding report showed that the accusations made against Britain were false.

On 19 February 1964, Imam Ghalib ibn Ali, who was living in exile, left Baghdad for Damascus after a fifteen-day visit to Iraq. Baghdad Radio quoted him as saying that President Abd al Salam Arif had assured him that Iraq stood by the Omani people in their attempt to recover their rights and their sovereignty. In Damascus he accused Britain of sending a reinforcement of a thousand troops to Oman, and because of this he added 'we find ourselves obliged to ask for volunteers and military forces from Arab countries and friendly peace-loving nations'. The next day, Ghalib also said Amin al-Hafiz, President of Syria's Revolutionary Council, had confirmed his country's readiness to support the revolution of the Omani people in all dominions until they recovered freedom and independence. On 4 September, the UN fact-finding mission on Oman arrived in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. Five days later, the UN mission left for Kuwait after meeting Imam

Ghalib ibn Ali and members of the Oman Revolutionary Council. The following weeks, the Chairman of the Oman Cultural Committee in Cairo, Muhammed al Harithi, asked the UN mission to agree that Omanis should be granted the right of self-determination. On 16 September, the mission left for London and New York for further talks. It was to confer in London with the Sultan of Oman, Said ibn Taymur. The issue carried on into the following year. On 5 February 1965, a five-nation special committee of the United Nations (Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Nepal, Nigeria and Senegal) reported that a serious international problem had developed in Oman and called on the Imam and the Sultan to avail themselves of the facilities of the good offices committee, and on the United Kingdom to facilitate and encourage negotiations. This was followed by the Omani representatives' claim in Beirut on 13 February, that Omani rebels had killed 27 British soldiers and set fire to a military plane and a petroleum tank during the week.

In the lower Gulf, in Sharja, a new issue had been raised. On 25 June 1965 the ruler of Sharja, Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, was deposed by members of his family and was replaced by Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammed al-Qasimi, his cousin. Shaikh Saqr denied that his family had overthrown him and blamed a British colonialist plot aimed at stopping Sharja and the other Trucial States from co-operating with the Arab League and Liberationist Arab states. The ruling family, on the other hand, claimed that he was deposed for scandalous behaviour and neglect of the welfare of his people. The British political agent in Dubai announced on the same day that Britain was ready to deal with Shaikh Khalid as ruler of Sharja and its dependencies. On the following day, Baghdad Radio reported that the higher executive of the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq had met under Arif to discuss the imperialist conspiracy which had resulted in the deposition of Shaikh Saqr. Two days later, on 28 June, Shaikh Saqr arrived

in Baghdad and was given an official welcome. He said an attempt to assassinate him had been made on 10 June. He claimed that Britain had deposed him because he had asked for an amendment to the unjust and unequal treaty concluded 140 years before. There was oil in the country, he said, but Britain had not yet exploited it. He accused the British of trying to prevent the Arab League from carrying out its development plans in the Gulf emirates. After two days, Saqr left Baghdad on a tour of Arab capitals where he planned to explain the situation in the Gulf to government leaders. He promised to return to Baghdad to struggle for the liberation of the Arab Gulf. On 1 July, the Arab League's permanent Arab Gulf committee held an emergency meeting in order to discuss the Gulf situation and 'the pressure being exerted there by British imperialism'.

After a meeting with President Nasser on 3 July, Saqr said that the UAR would back his attempts to regain his position as ruler of Sharja. On the same day, Al-jumhuriya reported that King Faisal would visit Qatar and Dubai in accordance with British plans to establish an Arab bloc in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, co-operating with Britain and headed by Saudi Arabia. In Cairo, on 5 July 1965, the Arab Gulf committee rejected Britain's offer that Arab League aid to the Trucial States be made through the British-sponsored Development fund for the Trucial Coast (DFTC). A resolution condemned Britain's rejection of Arab League development programmes for the Gulf as a violation of international procedure. Secretary General Abd al Khaliq Hassuna conferred with British Ambassador Sir George Middleton and explained Arab views of the Gulf situation. Saudi Arabia the next day contributed £1 million to the DFTC and on 7 July Al-Akhbar accused Saudi Arabia of siding with a British plan to dominate the Gulf area.

The first conference of rulers of the Gulf states ended in Dubai on 8 July, with a pledge for co-operation for future development and economic aid. On the same day, in a letter to UN Secretary-General U Thant, Shaikh Saqr accused Britain of violating the United Nations charter. A Saudi Arabian spokesman said that his country's motive in aiding the Trucial States was to raise the standards of their peoples and to help them without interference in their internal affairs. Umar Saqaf, personal representative of King Faysal, denied on 19 July that Saudi Arabia had contributed to the DFTC. Saqqaf reputedly told representatives of heads of state that Saudi Arabia would participate in League development programmes for the Gulf. On the same day, Shaikh Saqr accused Britain of having made several attempts to assassinate him in co-operation with the ruler of Dubai and his cousin. He criticized a British statement that the DFTC was ready to receive contributions from Middle Eastern countries, saying that this would help Iran to colonize the Arab Emirates. In addition, he called for the abolition of the agreement with Britain, and the DFTC, and urged the League to establish a central bureau in Cairo to defend Gulf issues. On the following day, British Foreign secretary, Michael Stewart said that both Britain and Saudi Arabia were giving £1 million to the DFTC.

On 22 September 1965, the United Nations agreed to debate the question of Oman, and on 14 December of the same year, the UN Trusteeship Committee called for the immediate elimination of British domination in any form in Oman. Britain was requested to cease all repressive actions, withdraw its troops, release political prisoners and permit the return of political exiles. On 26 April 1966, unsuccessful attempts were made to assassinate the Ruler of Muscat and Oman, Sultan Said bin Taymur, during an army parade at Salala. According to witnesses, three of the five attackers

were killed and two escaped. Elsewhere, on 21 March 1966, a US-sponsored trade mission arrived in Bahrain. In Bahrain on the following day, students demonstrated for the release of those detained since riots a year before. In the following week, Jordan agreed to send two army officers to Bahrain to train the army, at the request of the Ruler. Talks on Bahraini-British relations opened in London on 11 May 1966; an increase in the rent on Britain's base was on the agenda. Here, at least, Britain's role was less controversial.

On the opposite side of the Gulf, on 21 January 1965, Premier Hassan Ali Mansor was shot and seriously wounded by Muhammed Bakhavi, a high school student in Teheran. The Shah called a Cabinet meeting and appointed Finance Minister Amir Abbas Huviyda to take over. Mansor died on 26 January and was succeeded on the following day as Premier by Huviyda. Then, on 26 April a 22-year old conscript in the royal guards attempted to assassinate the Shah. He killed two guards but was then shot dead. On 16 June, Muhammed Bokhari and three accomplices were executed for having plotted against and carried out the assassination of Premier Hassan Ali Mansor. Two other accomplices were sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite these events, the regime remained stable and the pattern of international life was resumed. On 9 July, it was learned that the Shah's visit to the Soviet Union was to be extended from a 9-day to a 13-day visit. The U.S.S.R. had offered to build an industrial complex comprising a steel mill, a machine tool plant and a factory for agricultural machinery in exchange for Iranian natural gas.

The revolt of the Kurds was still part of the pattern of international dealings. On 3 January 1965, the Minister of the Interior, Subhi Abd al-Hamid, appealed to the Kurds to help the authorities restore conditions in

their area to normal. Al Jumbuniya said that a number of Arab and Kurdish soldiers had been ambushed and treacherously killed on the Janjamal-Sulaymania road the week before. On 22 January, Ismet Sharif Vanly a spokesman for Mustafa al-Barazani, asserted in Beirut that Iraq had ignored Kurdish national autonomy and complained that union with Egypt was entered into without prior consultation with the Kurds. He also said he would deliver letters of appeal to friendly countries and the UN to prevent another war and resolve their national question justly and peacefully. In the following week Hamid warned that force might have to be employed to maintain law and order in Northern Iraq and pledged that Iraq would uphold Kurdish autonomy. Three weeks later, Al-Thaura al-Arabiya reported that a Kurdish emissary, Aqid Agha, had arrived in Baghdad to discuss with the government the reconstruction in the North. On 7 March, Kurdish leaders were reported to be expecting a government resumption of the war against the Kurds in the North. Arab press reports had indicated that the Iraqi garrisons in the North had been reinforced and the army was ready to attack. In the following week, Guidance Minister Abd al-Karim Farhan said that the government would not renew the war against the Kurds, but at the same time he warned that anyone disturbing the peace anywhere in the country would be punished accordingly. He added that the movement of army units was normal procedure. Five days later, Defence Minister Muhsin Husain al-Habib declared that the situation in northern Iraq was quiet and most of the Kurdish tribal chiefs had declared their loyalty to the government.

On 28 March, Al-Jumburiya published a thirteen-point proposal from Nulla Mustafa to Premier Tahir Yahya, asking for definition of the Kurdish area on the basis of geographic boundaries and the creation of a new district that should include all Kurdish areas in the Mosul district, the creation of a Ministry for Kurdish Affairs, and asking that Kurds might use

the Kurdish language in schools, courts and official departments in Northern Iraq. On the following day, a diplomatic informant in Beirut said that almost 50,000 soldiers of Iraq's 65,000-man army had been massed in the North for an assault against the Kurds. On 5 April, Yahya returned to Baghdad after three days of talks with President Nasser in Cairo. The latter was reported to have urged Iraq to resume its campaign against the Kurds. On 20 April, Iraq denied reports from Beirut of an army and air force assault against the Kurds in Dohuk in the Mosul district. Two days later, in Amman, Farhan, attending a conference of Arab information ministers, denied there was any fighting in the north. On 28 April, the Committee for the Defence of the Kurdish People's Rights released in Vienna an appeal to the UN Secretary-General to take up the cause of the Kurds at the UN. More reports of fighting continued to circulate in Beirut but the government claimed that only armed skirmishes against bandits had taken place in the northern area. Two days later, the Baghdad press denied reports from abroad of negotiations between the government and the Kurds. Incidentally, at this time, several members of the Ba'ath party were arrested when security forces raided and found documents in a Baghdad suburb.

Arif tried to restore a stable relationship with the Kurds. On 13 June, in a visit to the north, he stressed the need for national unity and appealed to the Kurds to destroy the saboteurs and restore stability to the area. In the following week, the government announced that pensions would be paid to families of the martyrs of the Mosul revolt staged by Abd al-Vahhab al-Shawaf in March 1959 against the regime of Qassim. On 23 June, President Arif expressed his support of the Gulf states and spoke of the brotherly ties linking Iraq and Kuwait. He also said that the Kurds, misled by Mustafa al-Barazani, were now returning to the right path. Four days

later, under a new law pardoning those who had recanted, seventeen army officers who had defected after the February 1963 revolution against Qassim and joined the forces of al-Barazani, were reinstated. On 4 July, six pro-Nasser Cabinet members resigned, allegedly over differences with Arif concerning the proposed union with the UAR, the Kurdish problem and the near-final agreement with IPC. The announcement of the acceptance of their resignations came a week later in a presidential decree. Replacements were appointed. Kurdish sources in Europe reported the use of modern artillery by Kurdish tribesmen. They charged the government with increasing nepalm bombing in the north, while on 24 August, the government denied plans to use poison gas against the Kurdish rebels. On 10 September, Arif made an inspection tour of the North, and on the next day a National Defence Council was formed, headed by the President, and including the Premier and the Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, plus the Army Chief of Staff and the commanders of the air and naval forces.

Then came the drama of an attempted coup. It was foiled by President Arif's brother, acting Chief of Staff Abd al-Rahman Arif. The ringleader, Razzaq fled the country and arrived in Cairo, accompanied by his wife and family and eight officers, on 16 September. He was reported to have intended to decalre a merger between Iraq and the UAR while President Arif was attending the Arab conference at Casablanca. Bazzaz was appointed Premier and a new government was formed on 21 September; only four of its members were new. On 2 October a committee began an investigation into the abortive coup sponsored by Razzaq.

At the same time it was reported that the Kurds had launched a new offensive in the North, inflicting considerable damage. They had established a rebel radio station, and on 24 October, Kurdish tribesmen captured a CARE convoy of supplies and an official, a certain Walter C. Cox.

Three days later, Cox was released unharmed. Baghdad News reported on 31 October that a split had occurred between the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani and his followers. On 16 November, Abd al-Rahman Arif claimed that arms captured from the Kurdish rebels bore the Israeli star insignia. Meanwhile, the government nominated its members for the unified Iraqi-UAR political leadership. They included the President, the Premier, the Ministers of Defence, the Interior, Unity Affairs, Finance, Communications, Culture and National Guidance, Planning and State, and the ambassador to Cairo, Rajad Hamid.

Then came a series of anxieties concerning the Communists. The government ordered the arrest of fifty communist leaders and the confiscation of several mobile printing presses and pamphlets on 9 December 1965. The first state security court began the trial of 81 persons (11 in absentia) accused of plotting to overthrow the regime with the help of the Communist party, and the trial began also of nine leaders of the outlawed Ba'ath party. A decree was issued releasing from house arrest Abd al-Karim Farhan, a former Minister of Culture and Guidance, and Subhi Abd al-Hamid, a former Minister of the Interior, both of whom had been confined following the 15 September coup.

On 7 December, a new government offensive was reported by the Kurds, but ten days later, Bazzaz, recently returned from an inspection of the North, said that the government would recognize the Kurds as a nation, as an ethnic but not a political entity, with their own language. Two days later, the Iranian government claimed that 100 armed Iraqis had attacked Iranians inside Iran, stolen some cattle and killed two border guards. Baghdad Radio reported that some border guards had been arrested by Iraqi authorities after crossing the border into Iraq accompanied by some Kurdish infiltrators. On 24 December, the Iranian government charged that Iraqi MIG

jets had killed one person, injured eight others and caused heavy damage when strafing four Iranian border villages for the third day running. On the following day, the government lodged a strong protest with Iraq about its increasing build-up of border forces. On the same day Al-Nanar reported a new attempt on the life of Mustafa al-Barazani. Two days later, Iraq denied violating Iranian air space or attacking Kurdish rebels inside Iran. Baghdad News reported that Iraqi planes had chased remnants of the gang of Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani and struck at forces and supplies sent from outside Iraq. On the same day, the Iranian government sent troops and jet fighters to the disputed area of the border. Foreign Minister Aram accused Iraq of abusing Iran's friendship and good will, and suggested a meeting to discuss a peace settlement. Iraq said it would co-operate in an investigation of the incidents. It was reported a few days later that Bazzaz left on 31 December for official talks in Saudi Arabia.

On 1 January 1966 there was heavy fighting between Iraqi government troops and Kurds, and several houses within Iran were reportedly damaged by gunfire during Iraqi-Kurdish battles near the border; until 3 January fierce fighting continued. On the next day the Iranian government was handed an Iraqi note of protest against the supply of material and moral aid to the insurgents in northern Iraq, and Premier Amir Abbas Hovieda said Iran would withstand aggression and had begun building up naval forces in the Gulf against external threats. Twenty-four hours later, President Arif accused Iran of aiding the Kurds, and on the same day, acting Iraqi Chief of Staff, Abd al-Rahman Arif accused Iran of opening its borders to Kurds and materially supporting them. He said that Hovieda had met with Barazani and agreed on a plan for interference in Iraq's internal affairs. Arif was reported to have received a sizable shipment of modern arms that day. On the following day the Iranian government categorically denied aiding the

Kurds or meeting with Barazani, while Arif pledged himself to fight his country's enemies. In reply to a letter from Iraq Premier Bazzaz on 8 January, Hovieda said that a joint commission to draw up an agenda for peace talks should be appointed before he went on a pilgrimage to Iraq.

On 11 January, Iraq again accused the Iranian government of provocation and threats, but on the following day, Bazzaz announced that Iraq and Iran had agreed on a peace settlement including the withdrawal of Iranian forces to a reasonable distance from the border, an end to the existing propaganda campaigns and the establishment of joint committees to discuss border problems. Faysal of Saudi Arabia agreed on the same day to use his good offices in the dispute between Iraq and Iran. Iranian official sources on 13 January, however, denied knowledge of such an agreement, and in Iraq further government-Kurdish fighting in Kirkuk, Mosul and Sulaymania was reported. After a few days, the Iranian government finally announced its acceptance of the peace settlement proposals. On 20 January, the Iranian government announced the arrest of 55 members of a secret organization, the Islamic Nations Party. They were accused of plotting an armed uprising, psychological warfare, terror, bloodshed and chaos. The army was asking death sentences for wight of them and prison sentences for forty-seven. In Iraq on 3 February several Kurdish leaders were arrested in Baghdad following the assassination of a retired army officer. Nine days later Arif met with Nasser in Cairo on the UAR-Iraqi joint leadership. Nasser promised his support in the campaign against the Kurds while Arif declared his opposition to Islamic groups active throughout the Middle East, especially in Iran, Iraq and Egypt. For his part, Barazani appealed to the United Nations on 17 February to investigate Iraq's alleged policy of persecution of the Kurdish people. On 16 March, Baghdad ~~Iran~~ claimed

large-scale Kurdish surrenders, but there were also reports of heavy fighting later in the month.

On 13 March, the second state security court issued a proclamation demanding that former premier Arif abd Razzaq and 15 army officers present themselves in court to answer charges of attempting to overthrow Arif while he was attending the Casablanca conference. They were to be tried in absentia if they failed to surrender within thirty days. The first security court announced that it would try two men charged with possessing illegal pamphlets pertaining to the banned Muslim Brotherhood. On 29 March, 12 army officers were dismissed after the discovery of an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government.

It was announced on 24 March that Premier Bazzaz would lead a delegation to the USSR in the following month. It was also revealed that President de Gaulle had accepted an invitation to visit Iraq. On the following day, Arif's brother, Acting Chief of Staff Abd Al-Rahman Arif, left for Moscow to obtain arms aid.

Then came the unexpected. On 13 April 1968 President Arif, Minister of the Interior Abd al-Latif al-Darraji, Minister of Industry Mustafa Abdulla and seven aides died in a helicopter crash near Basra. Bazzaz, under the constitution became acting president. He imposed a temporary curfew and closed the frontier. On 15 April, Abd al-Rahman Arif returned from the Soviet Union, and the funeral of the ten men killed with Arif was held in Baghdad. A day later, President Arif was buried with full military honours, and Abd al-Rahman Arif was elected president under the provisional constitution at a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the National Defence council. Arif pledged to continue the policies laid down by his brother. A new Cabinet was named on 18 April. The former Defence Minister, Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli, who was a rival candidate for the presidency and was said to

hold different views on policy towards the Kurds, was dropped from the Cabinet.

On 19 April, Arif said that Kurdish rights would be preserved within the framework of local administration. Bazzaz also revealed that there were strong and differing views concerning the administration and the election of a new president following the death of Abd al-Salam Arif. Yusuf al-Kaylani was appointed Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, replacing Qassim al-Khalaf as permanent representative at the United Nations. On 26 April, Bazzaz repealed an order placing five Kurdish leaders under restricted residence in the Kirbala district, but on the following day, Arif denied that the government was ready to negotiate with the Kurdish rebels. Arif announced that the draft oil agreement initialled between the government and the IPC would be publicly debated.

On 12 May, according to Kurdish sources, over one thousand government soldiers were killed in fierce fighting near Rowanduz and Baghdad. News subsequently reported over one thousand Kurds had been killed and some two thousand injured in the fighting. An IPC spokesman said that Kurds had caused some damage to oil installations but that operations had not been affected. On 25 May it was alleged that Iranian anti-aircraft guns had fired on Iraqi MIG fighters, violating Iranian air space. MIGs had previously attacked border villages. On a friendlier, but still martial note, a Saudi Arabian military delegation arrived in Baghdad on 21 May for a week's visit.

Indeed, the years 1965-66 witnessed a good deal of constructive diplomacy and co-operation in the Gulf, both for hostile and pacific purposes. In Saudi Arabia, for example, on 1 June 1965, there was news of a list of arms which the government had sought to buy from the USA. On the next day, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance, Industry and Commerce, Shaikh

Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, declared that Kuwait would be the first to carry out a decision to cut off Arab oil from those states which supported Israel, provided the other oil-producing countries - Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria and Libya - agreed to such measures. King Fayzal received Kuwaiti Crown Prince Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah on 12 June and three days later Fayzal and Sabah issued a joint statement saying that they agreed to take steps to bring about stability in Yemen. During this period, the Kuwaiti government signed an agreement with Iran to form a joint committee to study the dispute over the demarcation of the continental shelf in the Gulf. The Saudi government, on 20 June 1965, signed an agreement with Qatar for dividing and demarcating the land and sea boundaries between the two countries. On 8 July 1965 a Kuwait delegation, led by Minister of Finance, Industry and Commerce Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmed al-Jabir, met with Saudi government officials and agreements were reached on the division of the neutral zone, the exchange of oil information and co-operation in water studies. On 10 August, the Saudi government signed a border agreement with Jordan providing for an equal division of revenues if oil were discovered in the relinquished areas, and delineating the boundaries. The agreement was later ratified by Fayzal and Hussain. On 26 August, Nasser and Fayzal agreed to form a joint UAR-Saudi committee to settle outstanding problems between their two countries. On 10 September, Saudi Arabia agreed to help finance and construct a coastal road linking Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qiwaia and Ras al-Khaima. Another agreement, on 26 October, was reached between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia concerning the neutral zone, and on 3 November in Saudi Arabia, a royal decree promulgated the cultural agreement with Kuwait.

In oil and politics during this period, Saudi Arabia was taking a strong lead. On 11 March 1966, ARAMCO brought another offshore field, North

Qatif, on stream. Estimated output was 30,000 b/d. A few days later, Petromia awarded a \$6.7 million contract to the Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Construction Company of Japan for construction of a 12,000 b/d refinery at Jidda.

Faysal defended his call for an Islamic summit conference on 27 March in a speech to distinguished pilgrims in Mecca against criticism from President Nasser. On the oil issue, Faysal received Kuwait Minister of Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Finance and Oil, Sabah al Ahmed al Jabir. On 12 April, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources signed an agreement with ARGAS for a geophysical survey costing SR 1,683,000. Two days later, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry signed a consultative agreement with Arthur D. Little, Inc. of the United States for advice on industrial and economic development; and on the same day an Iranian oil delegation arrived for talks. On 19 April, Faysal flew to Pakistan for a five-day state visit, apparently seeking support for his proposal of an Islamic summit meeting, but the outcome was that Faysal and President Ayub Khan issued a joint communique pledging closer economic, technical and cultural co-operation. British Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Board of Trade, Lord Rhodes, arrived on 29 April in Saudi Arabia for a tour of the country and meetings with officials. Three days later, Faysal received U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Raymond Bare. He also met Lord Rhodes. A week later, on 6 May, the Ministry of Defence and Aviation signed contracts with the British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley for ground-to-air missiles and a radar network; and the next day it was announced that Faysal would visit the United States on 21 June.

During this period, rivalry between Faysal and Nasser could not be ignored, though on 6 June Faysal denied that his Islamic call was aimed at

Nasser and said that his government and the UAR were brothers. Saudi Arabia's international status and activity was certainly increasing. On 10 June 1966, the UN office in Saudi Arabia became a regional UN office for the entire Arabian Peninsula. A four-man oil delegation arrived in Kuwait for talks on the Neutral Zone offshore boundary. On 21 June, Faysal was received by President Johnson and was guest of honour at a banquet given by the President. Three days later, Faysal met with U Thant and oil officials in New York. On the same day, the Saudi government decided to raise its annual contribution to the UN technical aid programme from \$50,000 to \$300,000.

On 1 August, the Saudi government announced its opposition to the UAR proposal to postpone the fourth Arab summit conference and said that if the meeting did not take place it would freeze its financial commitments to summit-inspired bodies, but on 22 August the government said it would adhere to its financial commitments to the Arab League.

At home, on 14 July, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources notified other ministries that all communication with oil companies must be done through it. On 25 July, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments exchanged instruments of ratification on the agreement to partition the Neutral Zone, originally signed in Tayif on 6 July. On the following day Faysal received a Spanish industrial delegation seeking oil exploitation rights in the offshore area and in August Spain was offered concessions in the central region and offshore areas of the Red Sea.

In other parts of the Gulf there were important financial and commercial developments in June 1966. On 2 June Britain agreed to give Bahrain £1 million for the use of military facilities and an annual grant of £500,000 starting in July 1968. On 3 June, Ashraf Lutfi, OPEC Secretary General, visited the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan. On 6

June, Dubai Petroleum, a subsidiary of the US-owned Continental Oil Company (ConCo), struck commercial oil in the offshore area of Dubai. On 16 June, Qatar, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaima and Fujaira decided to convert from the Gulf rupee to the Saudi riyal as a result of the 5 June devaluation of the Indian rupee. Abu Dhabi adopted the Bahraini dinar and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was undecided. On 29 June, Britain agreed to pay Sharja £100,000 annually for the rent of land and services to establish a military base. Payments were due to begin on 1 August. ConCo announced on 1 July a second commercial strike in its offshore Dubai area.

On 6 August Shaikh Shakhbut was deposed by members of his family and his place was taken by his brother Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan. There were no incidents following this ousting. On the next day Shaikh Shakhbut was granted temporary asylum in Bahrain. Two days later, Shaikh Zaid pledged to undertake largescale development projects. Ominously, perhaps, the former British Labour minister, Christopher Mayhew, attacked British defence spending in the Gulf States shortly before a new British financial adviser, Mr Thompson, arrived in Abu Dhabi on 29 August.

In Kuwait, on 3 June 1966, Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah denied that the government had proposed the creation of a federation of Gulf Shaikhdoms. In the following week, the Amir Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, ended a four-day visit to Iraq during which agreement was reached to form a border committee, and instruments of ratification were signed for the economic co-operation agreement. Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah reiterated the government's opposition to alliances and pacts within the Arab nations. On 3 July, a law was passed providing for the establishment of a General Board for South Arabian and Arabian Gulf states to coordinate Kuwaiti participation in their development. On 24 July, the Kuwaiti

government appealed to the UAR to reconsider its decision not to attend the fourth Arab summit conference but on 4 August the government agreed to the proposal for the summit's postponement.

In Iraq, on 1 June 1966, a cultural co-operation agreement had been signed with the USSR. Two days later, the Iraqi government had received from the USSR about £1.5 million worth of equipment for three vocational training centres. On 6 June the trial of 319 alleged conspirators had a hearing before the first state security court before adjourning until the following month. On the next day, Minister of Defence Shakir Muhmud Shukri said that the armed forces had recently liberated 800 square kilometres of land from the Kurdish insurgents, and on 15 June Premier Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz announced that the government was preparing a new comprehensive plan to settle the Kurdish problem. This announcement was followed by Baghdad Radio's announcement on 18 June that Bazzaz would visit Turkey on 1 July and Moscow on 27 July.

On 21 June, Al-Akhbar of Baghdad reported that fighting between Kurds and government forces had stopped in the north. Al-Thawra al-Arabiya said that an important Kurdish delegation had arrived in Baghdad in response to Bazzaz's appeal for a settlement, and on 29 June Bazzaz announced a twelve-point peace plan to end the civil war in the north. Baghdad Radio reported that Arif and Bazzaz had received telegrams from Mustafa al-Barazani approving the plan. The next day, Arif, supported by the army and presidential bodyguard, crushed a second coup attempt by the former premier Arif Abd al-Razzaq. Eight soldiers were reported killed and fourteen wounded. A curfew was imposed in Baghdad. On the next day, 1 July, Baghdad newspapers reported that the coup leaders had been arrested near the capital. Bazzaz returned from a two-day visit to the UAR on 24 July and said that the Iraqi-UAR leadership would meet in September, and on 27 July

he began a seven-day official visit to the Soviet Union. On 3 August, a joint communique issued in Baghdad and Moscow said that relations between the countries would be developed and trade expanded. Three days later, Baghdad Radio announced that Bazzaz had resigned and that Najih Talib had been asked to form a Cabinet. After intensive contacts with political groups, a new Cabinet was formed on 9 August. Four days later Talib announced that the purpose of his government was to rally all national and patriotic forces for joint action. A day later, Pachachi, the Foreign Affairs Minister, denied newspaper allegations that Bazzaz's government had failed, had been in league with reaction and imperialism and had not been loyal over the Yemen problem. The Cabinet decided to release civilian detainees arrested following the coup. On 21 August Talib said the Kurdish plan would be upheld and expressed the hope for unity with the UAR. On the following day, Rajab Abd al-Majid, Deputy Premier and Interior Minister, began a four-day visit to the UAR. In the following week Talib issued an order desequestrating properties and funds belonging to 241 persons which had been impounded during hostilities with the Kurds.

During this unstable period in Iraq, Iran's moves to promote rapid economic development continued. On 3 June 1966, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville led a delegation to Teheran to discuss the use of a \$60 million credit negotiated in 1963. The Ministry of Economic Affairs granted permits for the establishment of five food processing and packing plants involving an investment of Rs 100 million, and for a \$1 million fish-meal factory to be established in the south, with the co-operation of a Japanese firm. On 6 June, the High Planning Council allocated Rs 2,785 million to build and equip ten international airports capable of receiving the heaviest aircraft. Two days later, the government announced markets for

National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) crude oil had been found in Argentina, India and Japan.

On 11 June, the government signed a draft agreement with Pakistan and the Reynolds Company of the US for the construction of a 20,000 ton aluminium plant at Dezful. On 17 June economic negotiations were held with the Ceylonese Minister of Commerce and the same day Iran's Pan American Oil Company discovered a productive field 12 miles north of the Cyprus field. The Plan Organization approved several projects also on that day: railway developments, establishment of a geological centre and the construction of a cement factory. A Soviet delegation arrived in Teheran on 19 June to discuss the iron and steel works to be built near Isfahan with Soviet aid. On 23 June a contract was signed with a British company, Mirreles National, to supply eight generators to provide power for Mazandaran and Kaahan. Two days later, a seventeen-man mission from Teheran Chamber of Commerce arrived in London for a twelve-day visit. They were to tour Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester.

On 30 June, rail rates were cut by as much as 50 per cent as a move to strengthen the State Railways. On 1 July the Planning Council allocated a further Rs 300 million for the machine tool plant being built at Tabriz. On the same day, the Iranian Oil Operating Companies discovered oil 24 miles northeast of Ahwaz. Rumanian Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer arrived in Teheran on 12 July for trade talks. On 15 July, a British firm, Ruston and Hornsby Ltd of Lincoln, won a £1.6 million contract to supply 13 generators to provide power for five towns, and Standard Telephones and Cables of London was awarded £500,000 worth of contracts to supply control equipment for development at Bandar Mashur, which would replace Abadan as the major refined oil products port. It was also reported that the government had decided to build a plant to produce piping required for the proposed south

Iran/USSR gas pipeline. The Plan Organization also allocated Rs 11,47 million for mineral surveys.

The World Bank approved on 20 July a \$25 million loan to the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI) to meet foreign exchange costs of projects to be financed over the next two years. On 22 July, the Higher Planning Council allocated an additional Rs762 million for the Farahnaz Dam project, bringing the total allocation to Rs 2,900 million. On 29 July, Torrance Speciality Fixtures of the US won a \$10 million contract to supply a mill to roll pipe for the trans-Iranian natural gas line. On 5 August it was announced that Bank Melli was to open a branch in London. French companies won contracts for the supply and installation of a television transmitter and the construction of a 230,000-volt electric link between Teheran, Mazandaran and Gorgan.

Rumania agreed on 8 August to supply \$40 million worth of tractors and ploughs and to exchange another \$52 million worth of goods over the next five years. On 19 August the National Iranian Petrochemical Corporation (NIPC) announced the formation of a joint company - the Shaput Company - with Allied Chemicals of New York to exploit natural gas reserves. As a result of the 1963 credit negotiations, it was agreed that a French firm would build the Shah Abbas Kabir dam on the Ziyandurd river. A trade mission began a tour to Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The government on 26 August placed an order for five destroyers, surface-to-air missiles and patrol boats with Britain, for an estimated £22-£36 million. On 27 August, NIOC signed a revolutionary oil agreement with ERAP of France under which ERAP would be a contractor to the government rather than a concessionaire or partner.

The Shah and his wife on 1 September 1966 began a week's tour to Bulgaria, and on the following day Bulgaria agreed in principle to purchase

Iranian oil. On 7 September the Shah began a week's visit to Hungary. Two days later, the Export-Import Bank of Washington authorized a \$9 million loan for an 82.5 megawatt generator in Teheran. The next stage of the tour was a five-day visit to Poland. On 16 September the Iranian Oil Operating Companies (IOOC) had set up an Iranian Investment Corporation (IIC) with a subscribed capital of 420 million rials. France agreed to extend an \$80 million credit as a corollary to its 27 August oil agreement. On 23 September the United States agreed to sell the Iranian government fighter planes and air-to-air missiles. On the same day, cultural agreements were signed with Hungary and Poland. On 30 September India agreed in principle to supply 70,000 tons of railway lines in return for 1,000 million rials worth of petrochemical products. The Ministry of Economic Affairs on the same day granted Iran National a licence to manufacture Iran's first home-made car. Billard and Camperon-Bernard of France signed contracts to build the Shah Abbas dam near Isfahan on the Ziyandurd River. Technoexport of the USSR agreed to undertake seismic surveys and prospecting operations in the Caspian Sea on behalf of the National Oil Company (NIOC). A week later, on 7 October, the EXIM Bank authorized a \$13.1 million loan to finance the proposed petrochemical complex at Abadan. On 14 October, British Insulated Callenders Cables Ltd (BICC) won a £500,000 contract to supply the Teheran Regional Power Authority with cables and conductors, and on the same day ENI of Italy made two oil strikes, one onshore and the other offshore. In the following week the National Iranian Shipping Company was established to carry out all Iran's shipping activities. The Ministry of Economic Affairs issued permits for the operation of a lead mine near Damaghan and a coal mine near Amol. A canvas manufacturing company was also established. Teheran Radio reported that contracts had been concluded to supply two towns in Khurasan Province with running water. Premier Abbas Hovieda warned

the IOOC on 24 October to meet government demands for increased oil production and a week later a British delegation arrived to study petroleum needs. It was announced on 1 November that Britain would help finance the natural gas pipeline from Iran to the USSR. On 4 November Vered of Israel was awarded a \$14 million contract to build an earth dam near Shiraz. Economic talks with Poland began in Warsaw on 9 November. Later that month the Shapur Chemical Company contracted to build a \$170 million petrochemical complex at Bandar Shapur. The Abadan Petrochemical Company awarded Lummus Ltd a £7.5 million contract to construct a petrochemicals complex next to NIOC's Abadan refinery and the Walmsley Group of Britain was awarded a £1 million contract to build a test linerboard plant for Teheran Paper Mills. The Ministry of Economic Affairs licensed Citroen of France to produce its 'deux cheveaux' car in a plant near Teheran. On 29 November, the government and IOOC agreed on a compromise solution on the demand for increased oil production. While this hectic and dynamic process of change was being pursued in Iran, significant if less spectacular developments were taking place elsewhere in the Gulf, some of which at least seemed to point to greater co-operation in the region.

On 4 September 1966 the Iraqi government complained to the Arab League that measures against cholera adopted by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were threatening its economy - Iraq was hit by a cholera outbreak. The five countries were asked to simplify measures in accordance with international regulations. On 16 September the government said that it would not participate in the continental shelf talks with Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenev ended a four-day visit to Baghdad on 30 October and an announcement on the following day stated that an atomic research centre was to be built. However, this was open to various interpretations. A

reassuring note was struck during a meeting between Defence Minister Shakir Mahmud Shukri and Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al Barazani, the latter promising to cooperate fully with the government's twelve-point programme. On 8 October the disbanded Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party announced support for a national coalition. President Arif on 26 October began a five-day tour of the north to check on Kurdish rehabilitation programmes.

A spirit of co-operation was also manifest elsewhere in the Gulf. In October the Ruler of Abu Dhabi Shaikh Zaid held unofficial talks with the rulers of Dubai, Sharja, Ras al-Khaima, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman on the possibility of economic unity or federation. In Saudi Arabia, Faysal reaffirmed that his call for Islamic co-operation had no personal aims, but even so Saudi-UAR relations were not cordial. When, on 6 November, UAR planes operating from Yemen bombed the oasis of Najran killing four persons and wounding ten, the UAR told the Saudi government that the raid had been a mistake, but on 27 January 1967 the Ministry of Defence and Aviation announced that ten Egyptian planes had raided Najran again that morning. Three days later, the government instructed the UN delegate to inform Secretary General U Thant of the air raids on Najran. On 9 February 1967 the licences of the Cairo Bank and the Bank Misr to operate in Saudi Arabia were revoked. Within two days, on 11 February, Al-Ahram reported that King Faysal and members of his family would lose property in Egypt worth over \$44.8 million under an Egyptian confiscation order.

Iraqi-Iranian relations did improve. On 19 December 1966, after a six-day official visit to Iraq, Foreign Minister Abbas Aram of Iran announced that Iran and Iraq had agreed to form a joint committee to consider frontier problems, the question of the continental shelf and exploration of oil fields, and on 13 February 1967 it was announced that President Arif would pay a state visit to Iran from March 14-20. On 16 February, the

Cabinet approved a plan for reorganizing the only legal party in Iraq, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). No details were given. A month later, it was reported that Kurdish leaders were being consulted on joining the ASU, Iraq's only political body and on 20 February it was announced that a conference of all national groups would be held on 24 February to discuss a new basis for the ASU.

In Teheran discussions were held to modify the current Soviet trade agreement by an expansion of trade from \$40 to \$140 million annually and by an extension from three to five years of each period covered in the agreement. On 9 February the Soviet Union and Iran concluded an arms deal worth £32 million. The Soviet Union was to provide armoured troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns in exchange for light goods, cotton and natural gas. A few weeks earlier, on 13 January, Iran had arranged \$220 million of credits with Britain, France and Germany's banking houses to finance a pipeline from Iran's southern oil fields to Astara on the Soviet border. A trade agreement was signed between Iran and the USSR on 2 March and trade in the next five years expected to be \$540 million. Arif, the Iraqi president arrived in Iran on 14 March for a six-day state visit. On 9 April the Shah called for an election of a constituent assembly to amend the constitution. The proposed amendment would enable the Shah to appoint a regent in case of his death until Crown Prince Riza was twenty.

On 16 April, Soviet Deputy Premier Nikolai Baibakov and a thirteen-man delegation ended an eleven-day visit during which it was announced that the USSR would import twice as much natural gas as it was already doing, to be paid for by increased Soviet participation in Iranian industrial projects. A day earlier NIOC and the USSR reached an agreement giving Russia the right to explore and drill for oil. Russia agreed to buy up to 20 billion

cubic metres of natural gas as well as large quantities of Iranian oil. On 22 April former US Vice-President Nixon conferred with the Shah.

In Iraq, too, there was more economic than military news. On 3 March the chairman of KFAED, Abd al Latif al-Hamad arrived to discuss Iraq's projected paper and electrical equipment plants. KFAED was expected to finance the 15 million dinar projects and on 9 March a joint communique issued at the end of the talks stated that a free trade policy would be pursued and barter deals to increase trade would be also encouraged. On 20 April, however, Kuwait and Iraq were recalling their ambassadors and moving their troops to the frontier after an Iraqi patrol had crossed the border near the Rumaila oil field and on the same day the authorities in Baghdad uncovered a communist ring that reportedly planned to assassinate military leaders. Tension remained very near the surface.

On the other hand, the Iraqi government on 3 May reached an agreement with IPC over disputed royalties. The company agreed to pay about £14 million as an interest-free loan on future production. On 10 May a National Coalition Cabinet was sworn in, described as including all political and racial groupings, as well as military blocs. President Arif, in a speech on Cabinet policy, emphasized four main areas of the government's programme; internal affairs and national unity; agriculture, industry and exploitation of mineral wealth.

The outbreak of the Six-Day war, however, inevitably produced a fresh crisis. A two-day meeting of the oil ministers of all Arab oil producing states ended on 5 June 1967 in Baghdad. The meeting agreed to three resolutions: the suspension of oil supplies from reaching any state which agreed to or supported aggression against any Arab state; that any aggression would mean that properties of that country's companies and nationals would be subject to war resolutions; and that all Arab states

should hold an emergency meeting to implement the war regulations. On the same day, the Egyptian Armed Forces Supreme Command charged that American and British planes had provided fighter cover over Israel during raids by Israeli aircraft. The Command said it had actual proof that American and British aircraft carriers played a role in the Israeli aggression. Both the US and Britain denied the charges.

Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait declared war on Israel, while in Kuwait, on the same day, all oil companies in the country were placed under the direct control of the military governor and all demonstrations were banned. In Iraq on the following day the government instructed the IPC to shut down its pipelines. Saudi Arabia's government on 7 June announced that all oil shipments to countries aiding the Zionists were to be cut off. Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain announced the suspension of oil loading operations. The Iraqi government broke off diplomatic relations with the USA and this was followed by an Iraqi delegation on 9 June, led by Deputy Premier Ismail Mustafa, to King Faysal for discussions on the coordination of Arab solidarity to achieve victory and, two days later, by the arrival in Teheran of the Foreign Minister, Adnan Pachachi for an informal visit. On 12 June ARAMCO restarted oil production. The ban on loading tankers bound for the United States and Britain was maintained and, on 14 June, the Kuwaiti government and other Gulf states announced that loading of oil into tankers would be resumed, provided that the tankers gave signed guarantees that none of the oil would reach the USA or Britain.

On 15 June the Iraqi government announced a boycott of all goods made in the United States, Britain and West Germany, while on 22 June Minister of Finance Abd al-Rahman Habib announced that the government had withdrawn all its balances and deposits in British and American banks, and closed all airports to American, British and West German aircraft. On 30 June Mecca

Radio asked all oil-producing countries to consider carefully the effects on their economies of their oil embargo directed against the United States, Britain and West Germany. It suggested that the embargo was hurting the Arab economies more than it was hurting the West; within two days a committee was formed under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs to review the state budget in the light of the oil stoppage. In Iraq, the Soviet President Podgorny arrived early in July in Baghdad for talks where, on 10 July, Arif resigned as Prime Minister and appointed Tahir Yahya to head a new government. In Kuwait the next day the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani arrived for talks on the Arab oil embargo directed against the United States, Britain and West Germany. In Iraq, Prime Minister Yahya announced on 28 July that the government would seek increased royalties from foreign oil companies and would maintain the oil embargo against countries that had aided Israeli aggression against the Arabs. On 4 August the government lifted the oil embargo on most Western European countries but continued to ban shipments to the United States, Britain and West Germany. On 2 September the Saudi Arabian government announced its decision to resume the pumping of oil to all countries without exception, and on the following day, in Kuwait, the Cabinet likewise decided to resume the pumping of oil to all countries.

The Iraqi Oil Minister announced on 28 November that a Soviet delegation of oil experts had arrived for talks with NIOC with a view to drawing up an agreement for oil exploration and development in the northern part of the country, and on 17 December the USSR signed an agreement to speed up the establishment of five Soviet-financed industrial projects in the country. This was followed by the USSR's agreement, in an exchange of letters on 24 December, to assist NIOC in the development of its oil industry by providing aid for drilling production in Southern Iraq, helping

the transport and marketing of the oil produced and carrying out exploration for oil in specified areas in return for the delivery of Iraqi crude. Meanwhile, in Iran, on 29 November the USA celebrated with Iran the official end of American aid to the country and this was followed by the arrival of an Iranian military delegation in Moscow on 1 December reportedly for talks on acquiring more Soviet arms. Here indeed appeared to be a major stage in the international history of the Gulf region.

Chapter Six: Prelude to British withdrawal and the establishment of

The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of the preceding and subsequent chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed referencing:

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Chapter Six Prelude to British withdrawal and the establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1967-1971

On 16 January 1968 the recent display of unity and co-operation among the Gulf powers was put to the test. The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, addressing the House of Commons, announced that Britain would withdraw its forces from the Gulf by 1971 but he declared that Britain's basic interest in the prosperity and security of the region remained. The next day, Bahrain's ruler, Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, ended a two-day official visit to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Faysal on the implications of Britain's defence cuts in the Middle East. A joint communique was issued stressing the need to strengthen mutual cooperation and agreeing to continue with plans for a causeway linking the island with Saudi Arabia. On 18 January, Bahrain's Director of Information Shaikh Muhammad bin Mubarak al-Khalifa said he hoped the British would not withdraw before 1971 since defence would be a serious problem. He added that Bahrain felt threatened by Iran's claims. On 21 January, Shaikh Zaid bin Suitan of Abu Dhabi and other rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms reportedly offered to pay the entire cost of maintaining British forces in the area, but on the following day British Defence Secretary Healey rejected such an offer.

In Iran on 28 January Prime Minister Hovieda explained his country's attitude towards the British withdrawal from the Gulf, saying that Iran had always favoured regional collaboration but that one point had to be made clear, namely that developments in the region did not concern countries situated outside the Gulf area. On the same day, an official Kuwaiti delegation headed by Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah ended a day's visit to Bahrain as part of a factfinding tour of the Gulf which also included visits to Qatar and Dubai before the end of the month. On 31

January, the Shah announced the cancellation of his state visit to Saudi Arabia, set for 3-8 February. Three weeks later, on 19 February, Abu Dhabi and Dubai announced that the two countries had formed a federation for joint action on issues of foreign affairs, defence, internal security, citizenship and immigration. Internal affairs and judicial matters would continue to be dealt with separately. Bahrain's ruler, Shaikh Isa, was at this time on a short private visit to London. On 27 February, the nine Gulf Amirates agreed to establish the Federation of Arabian Gulf Amirates to safeguard their mutual security, safety and interests. The Federation, to take effect on 30 March, would have as its executive body a Federal Council, whose decisions would be subject to ratification by a Supreme Council.

On 1 March, the Bahrain government announced that all Saudi Arabian citizens would be allowed to hold land and real estate in Bahrain and would enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by Bahrainis. On the day, the Kuwait newspaper al-Ray al-Amm reported that the Ruler of Bahrain would be the first President of the Federation of Arab Emirates, with Dubai as the capital of the federation. However, on 1 April 1968, the Iranian government announced that it would not tolerate the new Emirate Federation, calling it British inspired, and said it reserved all its rights in the Gulf and would not in any shape or form tolerate historic inequity and injustices. On 3 April, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a three-day visit to Muscat and Oman, after agreeing to the issue of a joint currency and to undertake complete economic, technical and cultural co-operation. On 11 April came the decision of the UN Special Committee on Colonialism to appoint a five-man team to report on conditions in Muscat and Oman. On 13 April the Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai met in Abu Dhabi reportedly to discuss steps towards a closer union.

On 19 April, a British special envoy, Sir Harold Beeley arrived in Baghdad for five days of talks with acting Foreign Minister Khayrallah. This had followed President Arif's announcement on 17 February that if Britain asked officially for the renewal of diplomatic relations Iraq would agree; and on 1 May they were restored fully. In a further development, on 17 May the Lebanese newspaper al-Anwar reported that two Kurdish ministers, Ihsan Shirzad (Works and Municipalities) and Abd al-Fatah al-Shahi (Development in the North) had offered their resignations in protesting against the government's suppression of the Kurdish newspaper al-Taakhi in May and these resignations were accepted by the president on 22 June. On 26 May, Soviet ships ended a sixteen-day goodwill visit, which was followed incidentally on 5 June by two Soviet ships on a five-day goodwill visit to Iran. On 11 June, the period for objecting to sentences connected with the 1966 Kurdish rebellion was extended for two months.

In contrast to the attitude of Iran, Iraq expressed support for the emirates and on 16 June, the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah ended a day's visit to Baghdad with a communique in which both countries expressed their complete willingness to back the Federation of Gulf Emirates in all political, economic, cultural and technical fields. On 29 June the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that the import of British goods, forbidden since the June war, was permitted.

Baghdad Radio reported on 17 July 1968 that a coup had overthrown President Arif in order to preserve the 14 July revolution and the revolution of 8 March. Arif had been sent abroad. The announcement said that all Iraqi airports and government offices were closed and a twenty-four hour curfew had been imposed. A day later, Major-General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr was appointed President and the Prime Minister, Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif issued a communique which laid emphasis on the corruption of Arif's

government and stressed the necessity of bringing to account those responsible for the June war defeat. A Foreign Ministry announcement on 21 July said that the government was not considering the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USA since it had supported Israel at the expense of the Arabs. During the same day, Prime Minister Nayif, accompanied by the editor of a Kurdish newspaper, Salah Yusufi, flew to Irbil province to meet with the Kurdish leader al-Barazani. On the following day, Foreign Minister Hani said that Iraq would honour all her foreign agreements.

On 30 July, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a communique ousting Prime Minister Nayif and some Cabinet members. President Bakr was appointed Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. A day later, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a communique explaining the change of government saying that the ousted officials had tried to divert the revolution into a right wing reactionary direction and had tried to abolish the INOC. Three days later, the Revolutionary Command Council issued a statement pledging itself to bring about a peaceful settlement which would safeguard the interests, security and stability of the country and the rights of the Kurdish people in the North; on the following day it announced that it would establish an academy of Kurdish culture and grant scholarships to Iraqi Kurds to study in foreign universities.

At the same time as the Iraqis were trying to restore internal security, the Gulf States were making arrangements for theirs. On 26 May, the Rulers of Qatar, Bahrain and the Trucial states ended a three-day meeting in Abu Dhabi with a communique saying the Rulers would meet again on 1 July, though the meeting was in fact postponed until 6-7 July in Abu Dhabi. The organization of emirates, it was agreed, would include the Higher Council of the Gulf Emirates, with Deputy Ruler of Qatar, Shaikh

Khalifa bin Hama al-Thani, elected as its first chairman. The Council Chairmanship would rotate, as would the place of meeting and the federal council of notables. A budget of \$140,000 was adopted. On the following day, the Chairman of the Federation began an official five-day visit to London and on 15 July the Ruler of Sharja arrived in London for an extended visit as the guest of the British government. On that day, the Chairman said that his government would welcome foreign investment and technical skills and announced incentives including a limit on import duties, minimal tax on income and profits, and absence of restrictions on the removal of capital and profits.

Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran had ended on 12 June a two-day conference at the White House with President Johnson, getting his assurance of support in building an adequate modern defence force. A few weeks later, on 2 July, Crown Prince Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia also met President Johnson. On 20 August, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth, Yamani, arrived for a visit to Teheran and on the following day Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on the demarcation of the Gulf continental shelf. On 25 August the Ruler of Ras al-Khaima Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed ended a ten-day state visit, while on the same day the Ruler of Fujaira arrived for a visit at the invitation of the Iranian government. On 18 September, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi arrived in London for talks with British Foreign Secretary Stewart. In Iran, two squadrons of F-4 Phantom II aircraft entered service with the armed forces. The Shah and Empress Farah began a ten-day visit to Moscow on 24 September, while a visit to the United States on 4 December was announced on 18 October. On 25 September the Kuwaiti paper Akhbar al-Kuwait reported that Sharja's Ruler had reaffirmed his country's ownership of Abu Musa island. On 11 October the Ruler of Dubai began a week's official visit to Iran and two days later the

rulers of the seven Trucial States ended a day's meeting in Dubai. On 18 October they approved a development budget of £2 million, with Abu Dhabi providing £1.7 million and Britain £300,000; and on 23 October the Gulf rulers agreed in principle to form their own armed forces. On 28 October, in a bill submitted to the Senate, Iran agreed to recognize Saudi Arabia's sovereignty over al-Arabiya Island, and Saudi Arabia was to recognize Iranian sovereignty over al-Farisiyya Island. On 6 November Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Takriti ended a three-day official visit to Kuwait and said that Iraq did not wish to suggest a particular form for a Gulf Federation so long as the Gulf preserved its Arab character. A week later, the Shah of Iran began a three-day official visit to Kuwait.

In Iraq in the period after the overthrow of Arif's regime and the revival of Ba'ath Party influence, the internal situation seemed to be still unstable. On 24 August 1968 it was announced that the Revolutionary Command Council had decided to dissolve the Preparatory Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. On 12 September, fighting broke out between Iraqi border guards and Kurdish nationalists who had taken refuge in the Iranian town of Karim Abbad. Two Iranian villagers were killed and several injured. A new provisional constitution was promulgated on 21 September, which concentrated almost all executive power in the Revolutionary Command Council, including all legislative powers, until such time as the National Assembly convened its first meeting. Natural resources were declared the property of the state, which would guarantee their sound exploitation. On 24 September the Revolutionary Command Council decreed that 21 March would be known as Kurdish Day and would be a national holiday. Three days later, it decreed that all Iraqi students expelled for political reasons would be allowed to return to their colleges and universities. On 3 October, reports in Beirut indicated that a clash had taken place near Baghdad on 27

September between Arab Nationalists and Nasserites and the Iraqi police force. The Beirut daily Arab World reported on 4 October the suspension of the Kurdish newspaper al-Taakhi. On 6 October a military delegation led by Army Chief of Staff Ibrahim Faysal al-Ansari ended a ten-day visit to Poland and the USSR. On 7 October, the Beirut daily Bayraq reported that an attempted coup had been thwarted on 28 September by the arrest of eighty people, most of them army officers. On 12 October a private newspaper al-Nur, published by Kurdish intellectuals, began publication, while on 27 October the Beirut daily al-Anwar reported that fighting had broken out in the North between followers of the Kurdish leaders Barazani and Talal Talabani. On 17 November, the Ministry of Culture and Information announced the suspension of the al-Taakhi for fifteen days because of the paper's negative attitude towards all positive steps and achievements of the government in the national sphere. On the same day, Baghdad Radio reported the assassination of former Foreign Minister Nasir al-Hani.

On 18 November, as part of its effort to make a 'fresh start', the Ba'ath Party abolished the public holiday celebrating the 1963 overthrow of Qassim. A Kurdish representative, Kamuran Badr Khan, sent a letter to UN Secretary-General U Thant on 19 November asking for a UN mediator to intervene in the dispute between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, while the Iraqi embassy in Iran denied local and foreign reports of renewed clashes between Kurds and the government. The Syrian official daily al-Thawra said on 20 November that right-wing elements had been responsible for the anti-Ba'ath purge on 18 November 1963 and said that the present Defence Minister Takviti had worked in close association with former President Arif. On 4 December, the confessions of three Iraqis were broadcast in which Abd al-Hadi al-Bajjari told of a group he had formed with CENTO and certain neighbouring countries to reactivate the Kurdish

movement in the North. On 18 December, the government approved an amendment to the penal code prescribing the death penalty in wartime for anyone convicted of certain intelligence activities. On the same day, it was announced that former Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz and former Defence Minister Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli had been arrested on charges of participating in alleged spy networks. The Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan announced its forces had captured eleven soldiers and killed four others. A curfew was imposed on Halabajah district. The London Times reported on 19 December that the Iraqi air force had been used against a big force of followers of Kurdish leader Barazani and over 50 Kurdish and Iraqi soldiers killed. Baghdad Radio announced on 27 December that five Iraqi officers had been retired, among them the Chief of Staff.

Meanwhile the Shah of Iran had been continuing on his travels. On 17 November he ended a ten-day visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: joint communique noted the support of their respective countries for stability in the Gulf area and their continued desire for co-operation. Prime Minister Hovieda ended a two-day official visit to the United States on 6 December where he had had talks with President Johnson. On 11 December Iraqi Defence Minister Takriti and Foreign Minister Shaykhali ended a six-day visit to Teheran for talks which were said to be fruitful and to have removed all past differences and coolness in relations between the two countries. The Deputy Ruler of Qatar began a five-day visit to Iran on 29 December.

In the meantime, there had been developments affecting the smaller Gulf states. On 16 November, a meeting of the Federal Council of the proposed federation of the Gulf states, which was to have been held in Qatar, was postponed until 26-28 November, when it met in Sharja. It was reported in Aden on 26 November that the Dhofar Liberation Front would

change its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, and would extend its operations throughout the Gulf region. On 30 November, a four-man Jordanian military mission began a four-day visit to Abu Dhabi for talks on military aid. The Chairman of the Oman delegation, Shaikh Sulayman bin Himyar, circulated a statement to the UN Trusteeship Council on 6 December charging that a wave of arrests and suppressive measures by British forces was sweeping Oman. Britain denied the charge. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf announced on 12 December that it had killed or wounded 65 men of the Muscat and Oman forces in a clash near Salala. The UN General Assembly on 18 December adopted a resolution deploring the refusal of Great Britain to stop dominating Oman and deplored foreign exploration of oil resources without the consent of the people. It was announced on 29 January 1969 that the meeting of the council of the federation, which was to have been held on 28 January, had been postponed until 7 March. In a significant statement the Shah of Iran said on 4 January 1969 that if the people of Bahrain did not want to join his country, Iran would never use force to oblige them to do so, but it could not tolerate something which belonged to Iran being ceded to others.

In Iraq, the Ba'ath Party was still trying to cope with internal instability. The Minister of Culture Sallum said on 11 January that a special department of Kurdish culture would be established at his ministry, while on 27 January Kurdistan Radio reported that several clashes had been taking place between government and Kurdish forces over the previous few days. Fourteen Iraqis convicted on spying for Israel were executed in Baghdad and Basra on 27 January. Three days later, Baghdad Radio accused Zionist, American and British intelligence of waging an anti-Iraqi campaign over the 27 January executions, adding that the tight-lipped silence by

Arab progressive forces regarding this assault on Iraq was incomprehensible.

Joint Iraqi-Iranian meetings concerning the demarcation of the continental shelf began on 1 February. The delegates also discussed the settlement of frontier problems in general and the joint use of the waters of frontier rivers. Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Umar al-Saqqaf ended a two-day visit for talks with President Bakr on 3 February. The Ba'ath Party broadcast a policy statement on 7 February recommending a scientific reform of the government to eliminate corruption, calling for implementation of the 29 June statement on the Kurdish problem and stressing that the Arab character of the Gulf should be preserved. Soviet ships began a goodwill visit to the port of Umm Qasr on 15 February. On 1 March the IPC installations at Kirkuk were attacked, reportedly by Kurds led by al-Barazani. There was further trouble on 6 March when Iraqi troops fired on three Iranian fishermen in the Shatt al-Arab in waters claimed by the Iranian government, with one fisherman killed. Reuters published reports on 14 March of a clash between Kurds, led by al-Barazani, and Iraqis, near the army garrison at Zakho, where five people were killed and twenty wounded. While the Iraqi Foreign Minister was on an official six-day visit to the Soviet Union Iraqi officials arrested and later released some Iranian fishermen in Khorowabad on 23 March. A clash between rival Kurdish groups on the Turkish-Iraqi border was also reported, with followers of Barazani claiming to have killed twenty one and captured nineteen on 9 April. The voice of Iraqi Kurdistan reported that Kurdish ground fire had brought down an Iraqi Air Force MIG-17.

The Iraqi government informed the Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad on 15 April of its decision to enforce its territorial rights in the Shatt al-Arab, including the requirement that Iranian ships using the waterway

strike their colours and refrain from carrying Iranian navy personnel. The Iranian government then publicly announced on 19 April that it had abrogated the 1937 agreement on the Shatt al-Arab because of alleged Iraqi violations of the agreement and that it had put its frontier troops along the river on alert. The day following this Iranian announcement, Saudi Minister of state for Foreign Affairs, Umar al-Saqqaf, began a visit to Iran. On 22 April, the Iranian government announced that an Iranian freighter had sailed down the Shatt al Arab under military escort, and, within a few days, on 25 April, a second freighter did the same. On the following day, the Iranian Foreign Ministry formally rejected an Iraqi protest. In turn, on 29 April, the Iraqi government denounced Iran's rejection of the 1937 agreement and said it considered the treaty still binding. A Foreign Ministry spokesman on 2 May stated that Iraq would be willing to begin negotiations with Iran, given a return to the situation prior to Iran's abrogation of the 1937 treaty. The Iranian delegate at the United Nations, Vakil, said on 9 May that his country was prepared to conclude immediately a new treaty with Iraq under which the sovereign rights of both countries in the Shatt al Arab would be safeguarded. Baghdad Radio announced on 12 May that an army officer had been convicted by a revolutionary court of spying for Iran and the American CIA; two days later ten more men were convicted of spying for Israel, the United states and Iran would be executed.

Discussions, meetings and agreements among the smaller Gulf states themselves and with the bigger ones were taking place during these months. The Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai signed an agreement on 16 February establishing a neutral zone between their two states. The rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Rasal-Khaima met in Dubai on 24 February to discuss progress on the proposed Gulf Federation and other matters. Agreement was

reached on the border between Abu Dhabi and Ras al-Khaima. On the same day, the Crown Prince of Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa, ended a five-day official visit to Iraq. The Ruler of Ajman met with King Faisal on 4 March and two days later the Council of the proposed federation ended a two-day meeting in Dubai after agreeing on a unified currency, the establishment, in principle, of a sub-committee to draft a federal budget, a unified postal system, council procedural rules and the formation of committees to discuss federation foreign policy and the level of salary for council members. Peking Radio broadcast on 7 March a military communique issued by the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf saying that its forces had been active in Dhofar and Aden, killing or wounding more than one hundred British mercenaries. In Riyadh on 18 March it was announced that the Saudi government would appoint a cultural attache to the proposed Gulf Federation.

Shell signed a concession agreement on 15 March for about 970 square kilometres of onshore territory in Ras al-Khaima. Five days later, the Rulers of Qatar and Abu Dhabi signed an agreement demarcating the offshore areas and establishing the ownership of islands. All revenues and other payments from the Bundug field were to be shared equally. On 21 March the Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a two-day visit to Qatar, and Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Takriti, Foreign Minister Shaykhali and Information Minister Sallum ended a ten-day visit to the Gulf States on 13 April. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi named his son Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid as heir apparent on 21 April. Diplomatic travel continued on 3 May, when the Ruler of Qatar began a three-day visit to Bahrain, while on 14 May the rulers of the proposed Federation's states ended a five-day meeting in Doha (Qatar) after agreement had been reached on drafting an interim constitution. Bahrain's Ruler regretted, however, that the conference had failed to agree on

important steps necessary for setting up the Federation. The Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs began a two-day visit to Kuwait on 17 May for talks with his opposite number.

In Iraq, the Minister of Oil and Minerals, Rashid al-Rafai, said 'we shall not tolerate an increase in production in any country at the expense of Arab oil output as a whole or at the expense of Iraqi oil in particular'. Baghdad Radio reported that seven Iraqis tried under a law forbidding conspiracy against the safety of the revolution had been sentenced to death. President Bakr denounced Iran's illegal ambitions in Iraqi territory and waters as well as in the Arab Gulf, and said that Iran's activity as well as the Barazani guerrilla movements were attempts to force a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the Israeli front. A day later, on 18 May, the Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, arrived in Iraq on a five-day visit.

On 19 May, the Beirut daily al-Anwar published an Open Letter to the Shah of Iran by former Saudi Minister of Oil Tariqi, in which he took exception to the Shah's slanders against the Arabs and suggested that the best solution to Iran's revenue problems would be for Iran to take action with the backing of the producing countries to raise its tax rates on oil production. Bahrain's Finance Director, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, had just ended a day's visit for talks about 'Arabian Gulf affairs' in Saudi Arabia. Dubai's Crown Prince, Shaikh Maktum bin Rashid, had begun a visit to Iran which was to last for several days. He was followed, a few days later, by the Ruler of Sharja. Meanwhile, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf issued a communique saying that its forces had killed or wounded 79 Muscat troops in early May.

In Iraq, President Bakr said that a number of former ministers and directors of ministries were among the imperialist agents and members of

spy networks recently arrested in Iraq. The Lebanese Arab World reported that full-scale fighting between Kurdish leader Barazani's forces and Iraqi regular forces had been resumed. In Kuwait, Bahrain's Finance Director ended a day's visit about Gulf affairs. Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai ended a two-day official visit on 21 May. He had had talks with President Bakr and government officials. A day later, Baghdad Radio reported a clash between police and tribesmen in the Arabistan area in which seven policemen were killed, while the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) said on 23 May that the Iraqi government wanted a peaceful and just solution to the Kurdish problem and that a new law for local self-government in the northern districts would be issued soon. Baghdad Radio reported on 25 May that Michel Aflaq, Secretary-General of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party, had arrived in Baghdad. In Iran on 28 May, US Secretary of State Rogers ended a four-day visit during which he had attended the CENTO meeting and had separate talks with the Shah and government leaders.

King Hussein of Jordan ended a two-day visit for talks with the Shah on 29 May, reportedly concerning the Shatt al-Arab dispute, and two days later the Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai ended a two-day visit to Iraq for talks, after which he said there was very great hope that the Shatt al-Arab dispute could be settled peacefully. On 29 May British Foreign Secretary Stewart confirmed that Britain would withdraw its troops from the region by 1971, as planned, and said that the defence of the region would then be the responsibility of the Gulf States.

On 1 June, the Kuwait daily al-Rai al-Am reported the Shah's statement that the initiative for the resumption of diplomatic relations should come from Egypt but that Iran now did not require any formal apology as a prelude to discussion. Further, the Shah said that he would welcome the settling of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute through international legal means

and that the future of Bahrain should be determined by an internationally supervised plebiscite. Bahrain's Foreign Affairs Department said on 4 June that it viewed with concern and strongly opposed recent Iranian statements which referred to Iran's 'lawful' claim to Bahrain.

Iraq's Defence Minister Takriti ended an eight-day visit to the USSR on 3 June for talks which he called very cordial and fruitful. Four days later, a former Mayor of Baghdad, Madhat al-Hajj Sirri, confessed to having been a CIA agent since 1960. He said he had been recruited in Beirut by a Time and Life correspondent, Abu Said Abu-Rish, and said that the Kurdish rebels under Barazani were receiving aid and arms from the CIA. On 11 June a self-styled CIA agent, Yusuf al-Mimar, appeared on Baghdad television telling of a US plan against the state in co-operation with former Prime Minister al-Bazzazz, former Defence Minister al-Uqaili and other politicians. On the following day, Baghdad Radio announced that former President Arif had been a spy for the CIA and Israel. Baghdad Radio broadcast on 17 June a former Interior Minister, Rashid Muslih's confession that he had been a CIA agent and said that he, former Defence Minister al-Uqaili and former Finance Minister Zaki had been hired by an Iraqi living in Lebanon and had worked under the direction of former US Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson. Two Soviet warships ended a five-day goodwill visit on 19 June and the Iraqi News Agency announced that former Iranian security chief Bakhtiar had been granted political asylum in Iraq.

On 21 June, INOC signed an agreement under which the Soviet firm Machino-export agreed to supply INOC with equipment and services for oil exploration and development worth up to \$72 million in the al-Halfayah region and other regions assigned to INOC, including fields where the presence of oil had been established. On 5 July, the USSR signed an economic and technical agreement providing for the granting of several

large loans to finance projects including dams costing an estimated \$56 million, an iron and steel mill and a \$70 million loan for the development of the northern Rumaila oilfield by INOC. The following day, Deputy Prime Minister Ammash returned from a twelve-day visit to the USSR. Baghdad newspapers reported on 8 July that twenty Iraqis, including former Prime Minister al-Bazzaz and former Chief of Staff al-Ansari, would be facing a revolutionary court on charges of conspiracy against the state. It was announced on 9 July that an Office for Kurdish Affairs was to be set up, directed by Murtada Hadithi.

Opening four days of celebrations of the 17 July revolution, President Bakr said on 14 July that the Revolutionary Command would safeguard internal progressive achievements and national socialist aims and would make the country free from foreign exploitation of its native natural resources. A clandestine Kurdish radio station reported on 22 July a clash between Kurdish forces and Iraqi troops in the Khalisan area, with seventy Iraqi troops reportedly killed. However, speaking at the UN on 23 July, Iraq's delegate Adnan Raouf said that his country was willing and prepared to refer all disputes concerning the application of the Iraqi-Iran boundary treaty of 1937 to the World Court and to abide by the Court's decision. On 28 July, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a four-day visit to Iraq with a communique which referred to the support of the two countries for the Palestinian cause and stated that the proposed Gulf Federation constituted an urgent national demand and was to be regarded as a constructive step along the road to Arab unity.

On 18 August, the Iraqi government announced that twelve Iraqis charged with spying for Israel had been ordered to stand trial and that they were part of the spy ring referred to the previous day by Army Intelligence. The Minister of Economic Affairs Quduri announced on 25

August that with effect from the following day the importation of goods from Iran or trans-shipped through Iran was prohibited. Baghdad Radio reported that fifteen Iraqis convicted of spying for Israel and the United States had been executed and the Revolutionary Court sentenced a further six people to death in absentia on 26 August. On 27 August the government ordered that all private newspapers excepting al-Nur were to be closed down. Three days later it ordered that all Iraqi tourists in Lebanon leave within twenty-four hours because of the continuing Lebanese press attacks against Iraq; an Iraqi embassy spokesman in Beirut later reported the extension by a day of this time-limit. Two more Iraqi civilians and one Iraqi soldier convicted of espionage for Israel and the US CIA were executed on 8 September.

The London Evening News published on 9 September an interview in which the Shah said that if his proposal for a referendum in Bahrain was turned down he would recognize neither a Gulf Federation of which Bahrain was a member nor an independent state of Bahrain. Five days later, Baghdad Radio announced that Iraqi troops had killed thirty Iranian soldiers and captured fourteen as they attempted to cross the border to help the Kurdish leader Barazani. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the report. On 12 September, the Iraqi Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim al-Shaykhli, arrived in Kuwait for talkswith government officials. In Saudi Arabia, Minister of Communications Muhammad Umar Tawfiq signed an agreement under which the Iranian company ITCO would make studies on the access roads connecting rural areas in the Eastern Province and parts of the Central Province with the main cities. The Iraq Foreign Minister Shaykhli on 15 September ended his four-day visit to the Gulf states where he had had talks on the deteriorating situation generally in the Middle East, the future defence of the Arabian Gulf, and preparations for the Islamic summit conference. Three days later, on 18

September, The Times of London reported a statement by the Ruler of Bahrain that he would accept the idea of a UN commission to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain about their future. However, the report was subsequently denied by official sources in Bahrain. Qatar signed an agreement on 20 September with Iran delimiting the boundary separating the countries' offshore areas. Baghdad Radio announced on 24 September that Koi Sanjac, north east of Kirkuk, had been recaptured from the Kurds. On the following day the Minister of Oil and Minerals Rifai pointed to the rise in production in other areas of the Gulf and accused foreign oil companies of maintaining offtake at a level which conformed only to their plans and objectives, and warned that further measures to bring about the direct exploitation of all Iraq's natural resources would result from this attitude on their part.

The Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended on 4 October a four-day visit for talks with the Shah of Iran on Iranian relations with the Gulf states. Two days later, the Shah warned that Iran's defensive role in the Gulf would be substantially increased with British withdrawal from the area, and that enormous armament expenses would have to be faced. Such statements help to explain why, at this time, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister was visiting East Berlin seeking support from Eastern bloc countries. Meanwhile, claims and counter-claims were being made about the war with the Kurds. On 9 October Shafiq Qazzazz presented a document to the UN General Assembly charging that Iraqi troops had destroyed the Kurdish village of Dakan in August and on 13 August Barazani said that Kurdish losses in the struggle against Iraqi troops amounted to 20,000 killed and wounded, 3,000 villages destroyed and over 200,000 people made homeless. He said that the Defence Ministry statistics showed that the cost of the tyranny and oppression was 500 million. During this period it is also worth noting that on 12

October Minister of the Interior Amir Fahad ibn Abd al-Aziz ended a three-day visit to London where he had talks with Foreign Office ministers. And on 17 October, King Faysal received the ruler of Ras al-Khaima. Three days later, on 20 October, Minister of the Interior Fahad ended an eight-day visit to the United States for talks with President Nixon and other government figures. The scale of these visits, criss-crossing the Gulf area at this time indicates the extent to which the British announcement had changed the atmosphere in the region. The rulers of the small states were having to learn to conduct their own affairs in the knowledge that the British shield would shortly be withdrawn, while both Iran and Iraq more or less sought to replace that shield themselves.

The first meeting of the Supreme Council of the proposed federation ended a two-day session on 22 October after electing Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi as President, Shaikh Rashid of Dubai as Vice-President and the Shaikh of Bahrain as Prime Minister. Abu Dhabi was selected as the provisional capital but it was agreed that a permanent capital would be built between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The Consultative Assembly would be composed of 36 members, with four from each emirate. Addressing the final meeting of the Supreme Council of the proposed federation on 25 October, the British political agent in Abu Dhabi, James Tradwill, read a message from the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Stewart Crawford, on negotiations over the federation saying that Britain would be extremely disappointed if these difficulties could not be overcome. After the message was read, the Rulers of Qatar and Ras al-Khaima walked out and the latter later accused the British of flagrant intervention. However, the final communique affirmed the determination of the rulers to federate, saying that the Supreme Council hoped to proclaim as soon as possible the birth of the independent state of the Gulf Emirates.

The Iranian Foreign Minister emphasized that so long as the future status of Bahrain had not been legally clarified in accordance with applicable and accepted international principles, the Federation would in no circumstances be acceptable to Iran. On 26 October the American TV programme 'Meet the Press' broadcast an item in which the Shah said that Iran needed to sell more oil abroad to finance its imports and that if the United States would consent to increase its imports of Iranian oil, Iran would, for every cent made, spend it locally to buy American goods. He said that the major threat to the region obviously could not be Soviet, but rather it stemmed from what he called weak and corrupt countries where the elements of subversion would have free ground for their activities. In Kuwait two days later, on 28 October, speaking at the opening of the National Assembly, the Amir outlined economic plans to raise the standard of living, including desalting and telecommunications projects. He also reported that the rate of oil production growth had maintained an acceptable level and that the oil companies had been particularly active in expanding production capacity.

In Iraq, the Jordanian Foreign Minister ended a day's visit on 31 October saying that he hoped the talks on the Shatt al-Arab dispute would produce fruitful results. On 4 November the Iraqi government announced that it had acquitted 21 people who were on espionage charges. The Revolutionary Command Council amended the constitution on 9 November, expanding the Council from 5 to 14 'because the principle of collective leadership requires the admission into the RCC of the party's leaders who participated in the 17 July 1968 revolution', and giving the President supreme command of the armed forces. On the following day, Al-Thawra reported that Saddam Hussain al-Takriti had been appointed Vice-President of the Council. Le Monde Weekly published reports on 12 November of continued fighting during

August and September between Kurdish and government troops, including, on 22 August, the massacre of the inhabitants of Dakan by government troops and, on 21 September, the capture by Kurdish troops of the Dakan Dam.

The Beirut weekly al-Sayyad reported on 27 November that six people in Iraq, including former Interior Minister Rashid Muslih had been sentenced to death for spying for the CIA. Former Premier Bazzaz had been acquitted on spying charges but was nonetheless sentenced to prison for fifteen years for conspiracy against the government. The Kurdish radio announced on 8 December that its forces had attacked Iraqi army camps in two assaults 'last week' killing 25 Iraqi soldiers and wounding many others. The Voice of Kurdistan Radio further reported on 19 December that its forces had shot down two Air Force MIG-17s in the first week of December. On 9 December, Chief of Staff Shihab ended a ten-day official visit to the USSR for talks with officials on questions of mutual interest and on 16 December Baghdad Radio reported two agreements with the Soviet Union to survey the Shatt al-Arab canal and build a shipyard in the country. The New York Times on 29 December quoted reliable sources in Baghdad as saying that a high level government delegation was ready to meet with Kurdish leader Barazani if he were willing to confer and on 12 January 1970 Le Figaro reported the arrival 'a few days ago' in Paris of an arms-purchasing mission to negotiate a contract for 50 French Mirages. The Foreign Ministry denied the report. A few days later, on 21 January, the RCC issued a communique saying that on the night of 20 January 'a traitorous, malicious group, in collusion with foreign elements' had attempted to overthrow the government. All members involved in the plot were arrested. Baghdad Radio announced that 16 people, including 11 army officers, 2 police officers, and 3 civilians had been executed in connection with the attempted coup. On the following day, the government ordered the expulsion of the Iranian

ambassador and four officials on the pretext that the diplomats had been meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq. The Iranian consulates in Baghdad, Kerbala and Basra were closed. Iraqi Radio announced that a further eight army officers and 3 civilians were executed for their part in the attempted coup. In Iran, on the same day, the government notified the Iraqi ambassador and four of his staff that they were to leave the country within twenty-four hours. All Iraqi consulates were closed and Iraqi consular officers expelled. Explaining the action, the Foreign Minister accused the ambassador and his staff of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.

A three-man special court announced on 24 January that the last three of the plotters in the attempted coup in Iraq had been executed. On the same day the government reportedly offered an amnesty to all Kurdish tribesmen who had been participating in insurrection in the north. Deputy Premier Takriti said that talks with Barazani to lay down a final peace formula had begun. Four days later, Le Monde Weekly reported that Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani had been sent into exile, and in the following week, on 5 February, Le Monde reported that the Iraqi government had requested, and would receive, Turkish mediation in its dispute with Iran. Iranian Prime Minister Hovieda presented the 1970/1 budget to the Parliament on 8 February and said that the increase of almost 50 per cent in defence expenditure was necessary because of Iraqi provocation and the critical situation in the Gulf, indeed in the Middle East generally.

In the Gulf itself, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf had issued a communique on 26 November 1969 reporting a clash with two British ships at Rakhyut during which one of the ships was severely damaged. The Front claimed to have hit one of the British planes called in as a reinforcement. The Trucial States Development Council met in

Sharja on 8 December fortalks on the approaching budget. A few days later, on 13 December, Bahrain Radio reported that talks between the rulers of Qatar and Abu Dhabi on the proposed federation had been successful. On the same day, the UN General Assembly voted to deplore continued British presence in Muscat and Oman. On 19 January 1970, the Ruler of Bahrain announced the country's first Cabinet, which would be called the Council of State and would replace the Council of Administration. It is worth noting that the Ruler of Sharja ended a six-day visit to Iran for talks thought to cover the proposed federation, the demarcation of the continental shelf and general expansion of trade. On 9 February, the Ruler of Dubai ended a two-day visit to Abu Dhabi for talks with Shaikh Zaid on the importance of strengthening friendship between the two countries and on the following day the Ruler of Dubai arrived in Qatar for talks on the proposed federation. The Sunday Times of London published on 15 February 'reliable reports' of an attack by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf 'some weeks ago' on an airstrip at Salala which was reportedly so accurate that British RAF personnel narrowly escaped death and the base had to be reinforced by other British military personnel. On 21 February the Chinese News Agency Hsinhua published reports by the PFLOAG that fierce fighting had taken place along the Hamulin highway in central Dhofar, with large numbers of British troops attacked. On 17 March Britain confirmed that reinforcements had been sent to the RAF contingent at Salala following the PFLOAG attacks.

On 23 February, the Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister Shaikh Saad al-Abdulla, ended a visit to Iraq and on 2 March began to six-day visit to Bahrain; a few days later, an adviser to Saudi King Faysal, Kamil Adham, arrived in Kuwait for talks with the Amir, while Jordanian King Hussain ended a day's visit to Abu Dhabi on 24 March. On 28 March, UN Secretary

General U Thant announced that he had agreed to use his good offices on the question of the future status of Bahrain at the request of Britain and Iran and had appointed the Director-General of the UN mission to the country; on the following day, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Zahedi, announced a government decision not to use force in its claim over Bahrain and said that the government would accept the findings of a UN mission sent to the island. During this time, the Qatar amirate proclaimed itself on 2 April 1970 an independent and sovereign state and promulgated a provisional constitution to come into force within three months, providing for a ten-man Council of Ministers and a thirty-three man Consultative Council with twenty members chosen from directly-elected candidates by the Ruler. The Crown Prince was named Prime Minister. Four days later, the Kuwaiti Al-Rai al-Am published a statement by a senior official replying to a query on Kuwait's view of Qatar's independence. He declared that Kuwait would be willing to establish relations with the Arab Gulf Federal State. On the same day, Al-Mahar published an interview in which the Prime Minister of Qatar said that the constitution stipulated that Qatar's policy was based on the inevitability of the emergence of the Federation of Arab Emirates and Qatar's inseparable adherence to it. At the same time, the declaration of independence and the constitution provided the country with an alternative juridical and political status should the Federation fail. On 7 April, a delegation of the PFLOAG, led by General Command Executive Committee member Talal Said Mahmud, ended a six-weeks visit to Communist China.

Meanwhile, the seemingly endless round of visits and exchanges took place. On 12 April the Ruler of Ras al-Khaima began a visit to Abu Dhabi for talks with Shaikh Zaid; and on the same day, the Ruler of Qatar ended a six-day official visit for talks on improved relations and increased trade

and economic assistance with Iran. On the following day, the Deputy Ruler of Qatar arrived in Abu Dhabi. In London, The Times published an interview in which the Shah of Iran said the Gulf states should organize their own peace and security. He pledged Iranian co-operation with the proposed Federation or with the separate states if they chose to remain independent, and emphasized that Iran would prevent the Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island from falling into hostile hands. On the next day, 14 April, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Umar al-Saqqaf, ended a five-day visit to Iran and said the two countries would co-operate in defence of the Gulf region. The UN Special Representative Winspeare Guicciardi, ended his three-week fact finding mission in Bahrain on 18 April and on 29 April, a Bahraini delegation, led by Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman began a two-day visit to Kuwait for talks with government leaders. On 6 May, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid, ended a three-day visit for talks with King Faysal. Three days later, the Ruler of Dubai arrived for the same purpose. In Kuwait on 12 May the Iraqi Vice-President ended a three-day visit for talks on the Gulf and the Palestine problem.

In Iraq itself, the government News Agency had reported the execution, on 2 March, of a police-officer convicted of complicity in the January attempted coup, and on the same day the announcement was made of the death sentence passed in absentia on former Prime Minister Abd al-Razzaq Haif. However, the main developments again concerned the Kurds. The RCC announced on 11 March a settlement of the Kurdish problem. It was agreed that the Iraqi people were to consist of two main nationalities, the Arabs and the Kurds. Amendments to the Constitution would provide for a Kurdish Vice-President, proportional representation of Kurds in the Legislature and Cabinet and Kurdish to be an official language, with Arabic, in areas where Kurds were in a majority. Plans were to be drawn up providing for

development of the Kurdish areas in education and agriculture. Two days later, Kurdish leader Barazani said that the 11 March plan met the ambitions of the Kurdish people and the objectives of their struggle for national independence. In an interview with the Iraqi news agency on 15 March, Barazani said that the development of natural resources would be the responsibility of the central government because the laws and sovereignty of the state of Iraq were indivisible. On 18 March, the RCC formed a nine-man committee headed by Murtada Hadithi to supervise the implementation of the 11 March settlement. On the following day, Al-Jumhuriya reported that the government had made a special allocation of IDs 3 million for reconstruction and development in the Ruwandiz region. On 28 March, a three-man Soviet military delegation began a two-week visit, and on the same day the South Yemeni Defence Minister, Ali Nassar Hasani began a three-day official visit. The Kurdish al-Nur ceased publication at the request of the Ministry of Culture and Information on 30 March; and on 25 April, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Murtada Hadithi said that all irregular forces in northern Iraq had handed over their arms to the government and been disbanded. On 26 April the New York Times reported a 'recent' statement by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party warning of suspicious movements in the Gulf which were part of imperialist reactionary schemes and accused Arab reaction of collaboration with Iran, Britain and the United States in an effort to keep the oil-producing region under the domination of imperialism and international monopolies.

Notwithstanding such accusations, the Gulf rulers continued their exchanges. On 16 May 1970 the Ruler of Abu Dhabi began an official visit to Iran; on the next day, the Ruler of Dubai ended a two-day visit to Kuwait for talks with Prime Minister Shaikh Jabir on Gulf affairs; on the following day, 18 May, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince ended a day's visit to

Bahrain and a day later the Iraqi Minister of Economic Affairs began a four-day visit to Kuwait. On 20 May, Kuwaiti Minister of the Interior and Defence Shaikh Saad al-Abdulla denied reports that Kuwait was sending a token force to Bahrain, but in the event of threats to the security of any Emirate Kuwait would not hesitate to do so. He said that the existing situation locally taken together with international developments demanded the immediate birth of the federation in order to safeguard the security and welfare of the area. On the same day, Iran officially notified the British government of its claim to Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands and strongly implied that if the British government did not act to stop drilling operations in the area pending a settlement, Iran would take matters into its own hands. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Zahedi announced on 24 May that the government would recognize Bahrain at any time it declared its independence and on the following day an eleven-man Iranian goodwill mission ended a three-day visit to Bahrain for talks with the ruler Shaikh Isa on Gulf security.

In Qatar on 29 May the first Council of Ministers was announced, and in Kuwait the Ruler of Abu Dhabi Shaikh Zaid ended a three-day visit for talks on the proposed Gulf Federation. A British minesweeper on 1 June intercepted an Occidental rig nine miles east of Abu Musa and ordered it to move off. Speaking on 7 June while on a brief visit to Dubai, Saudi King Faysal denied that his government had been making secret arrangements with Iran and said his country stood behind the Gulf States in the spirit of Islam and Arabism. A day later, L'Express quoted the Shah as saying that when the British left the Gulf it must be for good and that no other power should replace them; he said that on the question of oil the whole present system of exploiting companies must disappear. Iran herself was quite able

to produce her own oil. The companies must cease to exploit the countries of the region.

On 16 June, the President of Bahrain's State Council ended a four-day visit to Iran which he said had been a complete success. He declared that he had been impressed by the Shah's great understanding of the need for peace and stability in the Gulf area. Ten days later, on 26 June, the Shah and Empress Farah ended a four-day state visit to Finland after a statement by the Shah rejecting any British decision to remain in the Gulf after 1971, but adding that British forces under the provision of the UN Charter might remain if there was an organization that extended a formal request or invitation to the British or others to come to its assistance. On 28 June, Ajman's heir to the throne began a visit to Kuwait for talks on the proposed federation, and on the next day the Deputy Ruler of Qatar paid a brief visit for talks with the Amir and the Prime Minister. On the same day, the Middle East Economic Digest reported a press statement distributed in Beirut announcing the formation of the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. Its announced aims were to support the revolution in Dhofar and to establish revolutionary and progressive conditions in the region. On 30 June the Ruler of Ras al-Khaima ended a five-day visit for talks with ministers on maintaining the Arab character of the Gulf.

The London Daily Telegraph reported on 7 July that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman's forces had smashed a rebel group in Oman trained by Chinese in Iraq and reportedly armed with weapons smuggled in from South Yemen. In Kuwait on the following day the Iranian Foreign Minister, Zahedi, ended a three-day visit with a communique saying that the two countries had agreed that a Gulf Federation would achieve the stability that was fundamental to the progress and prosperity of the area and agreed on

increasing bilateral trade. Two days later, the Shah met the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, for talks concerning British intentions in the Gulf. On 13 July the Ruler of Dubai said that 'the whole coast people and rulers would support the retention of British forces in the Gulf, even though they might not give a direct answer out of respect for the general Arab view'. On the following day, the Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi said that Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed on the necessity of British withdrawal from the Gulf by the end of 1971, and on the same day he began a three-day visit for talks with King Faysal about the Gulf. Four days later, on 18 July, Iraqi President Bakr proposed the establishment of an Arab defence alliance in the Gulf area to include the main Gulf emirates, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Reuters reported on 20 July that an assassination attempt on Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammad of Sharja had failed.

However, the New York Times on 26 July reported that the Ruler of Muscat and Oman, Sultan Said bin Taymour had been overthrown by his son Qabus bin Said in a palace coup on 23 July. Qabus explained that he had watched with an increasing anger the inability of his father to use the new-found wealth of his country for the needs of its people; that was why he had taken control. He declared his support for the proposed federation on 31 July. He also announced that restrictions against smoking, dancing and eyeglasses were lifted; a clinic was established; palace slaves were freed; and a general amnesty was declared. The uncle of Sultan Qabus, Tariq bin Taymour, was requested to act as Prime Minister and returned from exile on 1 August. During the following week Sultan Qabus announced that in future Muscat and Oman would be known as the Sultanate of Oman, that freedom of travel was restored and restrictions against the importing and ownership of agricultural machinery were lifted. The Middle East Economic

Digest reported on 4 September that the Omani Prime Minister was saying that Oman planned to apply for UN and Arab League membership 'to make ourselves known to the world'. He added that a parliament and government representative of the people would be set up in accordance with a popularly-approved constitution.

A three-man delegation from Bahrain arrived in Teheran on 6 September for preliminary talks on demarcation of territorial waters. Baghdad Radio said on 10 September that the purpose of British envoy Sir William Luce's visit to the Gulf states was to persuade the Gulf Rulers of the necessity of keeping British troops in the region. On the following day Sir William ended his talks with the Gulf Rulers and on 16 September he left Baghdad after two days of talks. On the same day, President Bakr called for a steadfast Arab front to support the guerrillas. Luce said in Cairo on 22 September that Britain was not insisting on the formation of a Gulf Federation as a condition for the withdrawal of British troops but she was trying very hard to implement federation. Kayhan International reported on 10 October that the Shah had written to Sultan Qabus bin Said of Oman in cordial terms - 'our geographical proximity and common religion necessitate the forging of friendly ties between Iran and Oman, especially in view of the impending developments in the Gulf region'. Three days later, Luce returned to Bahrain for further consultations and the London Financial Times reported that Iran had warned Britain it would not recognize a Gulf Federation unless Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands were accepted. In Kuwait on 20 October, in a speech at the opening of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister said that Kuwait would accept no settlement not agreed to by the Palestinians. He welcomed the accession of Sultan Qabus bin Said in Oman and expressed the hope that the Gulf Federation would be formed soon. On the same day, Oman's Prime Minister

said that the Sultanate must settle its own internal problems and could not join an Arab Gulf Federation, though it might be willing to join in a loose union at a later date.

On 6 November, the Iranian ambassador to Britain, Amir Afshar, said that his country would not overlook its right to certain tiny islands in the Gulf which belonged to Iran. Six days later, Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi said concerning the Gulf that 'our idea is to deter any foolish ideas and to maintain stability'. He stated Iran's claims to Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands: 'These islands have been ours and they are going to be ours. There is no compromise. Look at the Chinese Communists in Aden. If these islands go all our interests will be damaged.' As if to underline his point, on 20 November South Yemen's Defence Minister Ali Ahmed Antar left Iraq after a seven-day visit.

On 23 December, an Iranian government spokesman said that a plot to assassinate 28 Iranian leaders had been broken up by security forces. It was alleged that the late General Taimour Bakhtiar had conspired with Iraqi Ba'athists to overthrow the government. Twenty men were arrested. Two weeks later, on 6 January 1971 units of the Soviet fleet arrived in Umm Qasr on a goodwill visit marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Iraqi army. On 20 February Teheran Radio said that Iran's policy in the Gulf was based on its indisputable ownership of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands. There was a reminder of its power to implement such a policy three days later on 23 February when Premier Amir Hovieda said that recent oil price increases would permit an increase in the defence budget from \$722 million to \$895 million and a thirty per cent increase in the development budget for the year beginning 21 March. On the other hand, there was a further sign of Iraq's improved stability on 22 February when Al-Taakhi said that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) had decided to turn over to the

government heavy weapons and a broadcasting station, in accordance with the 11 March 1970 Declaration.

The British government announced on 1 March that the treaties with the Gulf States would expire at the end of 1971 and most British forces would be withdrawn. Proposals for aid and a treaty of friendship with the proposed Gulf Federation were also announced. Ten days later, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister left Saudi Arabia after talks to co-ordinate policies for promoting a Gulf Federation. On 14 March, the Trucial States Council ended a two-day meeting. A statement said that the question of the states joining UN agencies had been discussed, but a decision had been postponed until the federation issue was settled. In Iran, on 25 March, Foreign Minister Ardshir Zahedi said significantly that the British withdrawal from the Gulf would be a big diplomatic victory for Iran.

The official Omani newspaper Al-Watthan reported on 27 March that the army had begun a spring offensive against rebels in Dhofar and that the rebel harbour at Sadah had been captured. In Kuwait, after talks, Special Egyptian envoy Hasan Sabri al-Khuli left on 29 March for a tour of the Gulf emirates, and on 12 April Abu Dhabi's ruler, Shaikh Zaid, returned after a visit to Cairo. A joint communique stated that UAR President Anwar al-Sadat expressed support for efforts to establish a Gulf Federation. Three days later, Bahrain's State Council described Kuwaiti-Saudi efforts to bring about the Gulf Federation as positive and encouraging. On 21 April, a joint Kuwaiti-Saudi delegation ended a tour of the Gulf States and reported full understanding of the mission's proposals by the Gulf States. On the following day, Bahrain announced that it had accepted the Kuwaiti-Saudi proposals for a federation, but on 29 April the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister said that Qatar had voiced certain reservations about them.

US Secretary of State William Rogers arrived on 1 May in Riyadh and met King Faysal. Five days later, on 6 May, British Envoy Sir William Luce renewed his mission to the Gulf, arriving in Bahrain for talks on the proposed Gulf Federation. On Iran two days later, an Iranian spokesman said that Iranian ships had been ordered to shoot down any British planes that might be violating Iranian airspace, as had allegedly occurred in the previous week over the Tunbs islands. The next day, however, Britain protested against the charge that British planes had made threatening flights over Iranian ships and islands in the Gulf. On 16 May, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, while on a trip to the Far East, met the Shah at Mehrabad Airport. He went on to visit Nationalist China, Japan, the USA and France. In Kuwait on 20 May Luce met the Foreign Minister to discuss the proposed Gulf Federation. Two days later, he flew on to Iran after visiting Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. A few days later, the Saudi Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqaf also arrived in Kuwait for discussions with the Foreign Minister on the subject of the Gulf Federation. A meeting of the Deputy Rulers of the Gulf Emirates scheduled for 29 May to discuss the proposed federation was postponed. On the following day, the London Sunday Telegraph reported that Britain had authorized the sale of 140 Chieftain tanks to Iran. It also reported on 11 June that Britain would retain naval forces in the Gulf after land and air forces were withdrawn by the end of 1971.

An agreement on the demarcation of the continental shelf was signed on 17 June between Bahrain and Iran: and on 28 June, Iranian Foreign Minister Ardshir Zahdi returned from a four-day visit to Bahrain. On the following day, Premier Hovieda said Iran would take the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands by force unless they were turned over peacefully when British forces were withdrawn from the Gulf. Three days later, on 29 June, Iraqi Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim Shaykhali called for a united Arab response against

Iran's expansionist schemes in the Gulf. On the same day, in Kuwait, Premier Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Jabar told the National Assembly that efforts to accelerate the formation of a Gulf Federation had not gone as hoped.

On 1 July, Abu Dhabi's first Cabinet was formed, and on 18 July it was announced that Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujaira had agreed to form a federation that would have a Supreme Council of the six amirs, a Cabinet and an elected Consultative Assembly. In the following week, Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi said the new federation would take over the defence and foreign affairs responsibilities from Britain as soon as possible. He added that a federal army based on the trucional Oman Scouts would be formed, while the states would also retain defence forces of their own. Over the next few days, important ministers from both Abu Dhabi and Qatar arrived in London for talks with the British Prime Minister Edward Heath. On 5 August the Iraqi Foreign Minister left Kuwait after three days of talks on the Palestine question and Gulf Affairs. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 13 August that Ras al-Khaima had issued a statement saying that it was not prepared to accept the veto rights given to some states under the draft constitution of the Gulf Federation.

On the following day, Bahrain's Ruler declared Bahrain an independent sovereign state and on 15 August Bahrain signed a friendship treaty with Britain calling for consultation in time of need. Bahrain formally applied for UN membership on 16 August. A day later, Bahrain's Foreign Minister, Muhammed bin Nubarak al-Khalifa said Bahrain's independence did not conflict with its efforts to establish a Federation of Arab Gulf Emirates. Moscow Radio said on 17 August that Britain had foisted the new friendship treaty on Bahrain.

On 26 August, Iran and Oman announced that diplomatic relations had been established between the two countries. On 1 September Qatar declared its independence from Britain, terminating the special treaty relations and all agreements, engagements and arrangements arising therefrom that were concluded with the British government. On 2 September, Iraq announced that full diplomatic relations would be established with Bahrain and the Shah of Iran welcomed the independence of Qatar. The Iranian Foreign Minister stated that an Iranian embassy would be established there 'in due course'. On 7 September, Abu Dhabi's Minister of Oil returned from Iran where he said an agreement had been initialled demarcating the continental shelf between the two countries.

On 23 September the British Special Envoy Sir William Luce returned to London after a three-week tour of the region. Five days later, the London Guardian published an interview in which the Shah said 'no power on earth can stop us from claiming the Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs' and added 'Why should we compromise?' On 2 October, Luce arrived in Teheran for talks on the future of the Gulf. In Abu Dhabi, the first National Assembly opened on 3 October. Ruler Shaikh Zaid told the Assembly that a constitution of the Union of Arab Emirates would soon be announced. He said the Assembly would discuss laws and make recommendations. He expressed the hope that in time Assembly members would be elected rather than appointed. On the same day it was announced in Saudi Arabia that ambassadors would be exchanged with Bahrain. Oman was admitted to the United Nations on 7 October. Three days later, Luce returned to the region for a ten-day tour. On 21 October, Iran Premier Hovieda said Iran was ready at any time to enter negotiations with Iraq to settle the dispute over Shatt al-Arab. On 26 October, Iraqi Acting Minister of Education Abd al-Sattar al-Jawari left for a tour of the Gulf States as President Bakr's personal emissary. It was

announced on 27 October that Oman and the United States had agreed to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. On the following day, Kuwait's Foreign Minister rejected military occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands by Iran and favoured preserving their Arab character. A day later, Iraqi special envoy Ahmad Jawari arrived in Muscat during a tour of the Gulf States. He stressed Iraq's full readiness for joint action to maintain the Arab character of the Gulf.

On 2 November, the Ruler of Sharja denied reports that he had refused a proposal to partition the island of Abu Musa with Iran. He said negotiations with Iran were continuing in an amicable fashion. Every effort was being made to preserve the integrity of the Arab homeland. Six days later, on 8 November, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Sabah said Iran had refused proposals of the Gulf states to lease Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands to Iran for 99 years or to station joint Arab-Iranian forces on the islands. On 18 November the London Times quoted Luce as saying that Iran and Britain had sorted out their differences over the disputed islands. He returned to London on 19 November after six days of talks in Iran and one day in Sharja. On 29 November, the Ruler of Sharja announced an agreement with Iran under which the people of Abu Musa island would remain under Sharja's jurisdiction. However, Iranian forces would be based on one point on the island and Sharja would receive up to \$7.5 million in oil revenue annually. On the following day, Iranian forces arrived on the islands. Ras al-Khaima, which also laid claim to the Tunbs, lodged a protest with Britain - which was still responsible for the emirate's defence until 1 December. Baghdad Radio claimed that diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain had been broken off because of the incident. On 1 December, the Deputy Ruler of Sharja survived an assassination attempt. On the following day, Abu Dhabi, Sharja, Ajman, Fujaira and Umm al-Qaiwain

proclaimed the independence of the United Arab Emirates and the new federation signed a new friendship treaty with Britain.

This was indeed a historic achievement in the Gulf Region but it did not signify that the region as a whole had found stability. For example, there was in Al-Jhawra on 27 November a report that dozens of Kurds had been arrested in recent weeks and charged with plotting sabotage and political assassination. Nevertheless, there was some reason to look to the new year with a certain optimism.

The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of the preceding and subsequent chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed referencing:

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Chapter Seven: The Background to the Algiers Accord, 1971-1975

On 3 December 1971, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss Iran's occupation of the three Gulf islands. Three days later, at the opening of a special session of the Arab League Council called to discuss the Iranian action, Iraq appealed to all Arab countries to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and Iran. Baghdad Radio on 7 December said that the new Iranian ambassador to Kuwait had returned to Teheran after being refused an audience to present his credentials to the Amir on 1 December. On 8 December, Combat of Paris quoted the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Khalatbari as saying that Iran could aid the Iraqi Kurds militarily if open conflict started with government forces. On the same day, Libyan Radio said Libya had proposed to land troops on the three Gulf islands two days before the Iranian occupation but that certain Gulf states had objected. The Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Dubai for talks on the Iranian action in the Gulf. The UN Security Council meanwhile unanimously approved the admission of the United Arab Emirates to the UN.

The United Arab Emirates announced their first Federal Cabinet on 9 December. Two days later, Iraqi Information Minister Shafiq al-Kamali said that Iran's occupation of the three islands was the result of collusion between Iran and imperialism, and was aimed at threatening the area's revolutionary movements. In Kuwait, the National Assembly called on the government to cut diplomatic and economic relations with Britain and Iran in retaliation for Iran's occupation of the three islands in the Gulf. The Foreign Minister of the UAE arrived in Riyadh for talks with King Faysal on strengthening neighbourly relations and Sultan Qabus of Oman also arrived in Saudi Arabia for talks. The Saudi government extended diplomatic recognition to Oman on 14 December. On 16 December, the Washington Post

reported 'diplomatic sources' as saying that Ras al-Khaima had offered the United States military bases in return for diplomatic recognition, but that the US administration had refused. In Iraq, meanwhile, the Soviet Defence Minister, Andrei Grechko ended a four-day official visit and on 19 December the USSR signed an agreement for co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

The first meeting of the Cabinet of the UAE, on 20 December, approved a law under which the UAE assumed control of the Trucial Oman Scouts as the basis of the new state's defence forces. In the following week, the USSR announced diplomatic recognition of the UAE. On 29 December, an Omani communique reported that 39 Dhofari rebels had been killed since October, that a total of 355 had surrendered in 1971 and that the rebel forces were running short of supplies since their lines of communication had been cut. Sultan Qabus announced on 2 January 1972 the resignation of Premier Tariq bin Taymour for health reasons. Teheran Radio announced that the first trade agreements with Saudi Arabia had been reached. Two days later, the Iranian government notified the UN that a dangerous situation had been created by the expulsion of more than sixty thousand Iranians from Iraq. The New York Times on 6 January quoted State Department officials as saying that an executive agreement with Bahrain had been signed on 23 December allowing the US to set up a naval station on Bahrain as a flag-showing operation to manifest the interest of the United States in the area. On 8 January Associated Press reported that the Iraqi government had halted the expulsion of Iranians after protests by Kurds that the expulsion had led to nineteen deaths. In Iran on the same day the Foreign Minister said that his country had absolutely no more territorial claims in the Gulf and would not use its strategic position to block transit in the region. In Bahrain, on 9 January, the Foreign Minister said that reports of a naval base agreement

between his country and the United States were exaggerated and that Bahrain had merely granted continued use of port facilities used by the United States for twenty five years. He stressed that the USA would not take over the former British naval base.

On 13 January, the official Iranian delegation to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization conference in Cairo withdrew because of a conference resolution regretting Iran's occupation of the three islands. On the following day the Middle East Economic Digest reported that Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia were holding talks with Iran concerning the occupation.

Then came several internal developments which testified to the underlying condition of uncertainty. Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammed, Ruler of Sharja, was killed on 25 January in an attempted coup d'etat by Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan. Troops of the UAE helped to put down the coup. Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammed, brother of the late Ruler, was appointed in his place. Also, on 22 February, Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani took over in Qatar. He promised to modernize the administration, cut consumer prices and raise civil service and military salaries by twenty per cent. On 11 February, Ras al-Khaima joined the UAE and the federation thus took on what was to be its final form.

The Iraqi Foreign Minister ended an official visit to Kuwait on 3 May and a joint communique was issued which denounced Iran's occupation of the three islands. Baghdad's anger had not disappeared in the intervening months. Later that day, he arrived in Bahrain for further talks on the Gulf situation, and by 8 May he had completed talks with the government of the UAE also. A joint communique reiterated that the three islands remained Arab despite the Iranian occupation.

In Saudi Arabia during these months oil questions appeared to be receiving the highest priority. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 25 February that King Faysal had warned ARAMCO that it would have to agree to Saudi participation in the company if it was to avoid compelling the Saudi government 'to take measures to implement participation'. On 11 March, ARAMCO accepted in principle the Saudi demand for twenty per cent participation by the government in the company; on the same day, OPEC accepted ARAMCO's offer of twenty per cent participation in the company by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. On 20 March formal negotiations began with ARAMCO in order to work out the details of an agreement.

In Iraq on 17 February a government delegation led by Vice-President Saddam Hussain, returned from Moscow. A joint communique said that further talks would be held to raise relations to a higher level in treaty form. The USSR promised support for the Iraqi oil industry and said regular ties would be established between the Soviet Communist Party and the Ba'ath Party. It was announced that the Iraq, Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies had agreed in principle to twenty per cent participation by the government in the oil industry. (It should be noted that the British Foreign Secretary had been having talks about Gulf Affairs and bilateral matters in Teheran at the same time). In Baghdad on 6 April the Soviet Premier arrived for an official five-day visit and three days later signed a fifteen-year treaty of friendship between the USSR and Iraq. Kosygin declared that the treaty was not aimed at any other country. On the following day, Le Figaro quoted Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barazani as saying that things were going badly between the Kurds and the government and that if Baghdad continued its policy, the Kurds would once again be obliged to take up arms and

resume war. A Soviet naval squadron began a five-day visit to the port of Umm Qasr on 11 April - thus giving a visible sign of Soviet support.

The Iraqi government reported on 15 April that their troops had fought a four-day battle with Iranian forces on the border at Khanqin after Iranians had opened fire on a police vehicle on 11 April. The Iranian government denied Iraqi charges and said Iraq had attacked six Iranian border guards with troops and artillery. Four days later in Iran four terrorists were executed after a military tribunal had found them guilty of trying to overthrow the government. On 25 April, a Soviet economic delegation left Iraq after signing a protocol for Soviet aid to iron, steel, electrical and oil development projects. Two days later, the Revolution Command Council ratified the fifteen-year friendship treaty with Russia. Baghdad Radio said on 26 April that a complaint had been submitted to the UN warning that Iran's repeated military attacks against Iraq were a threat to peace in the Middle East, while on 2 May the Iranian government accused Iraq of initiating a three-hour gun battle on the border. Four days later, the Iranian government announced that a complaint had been filed at the UN charging that Iraq was the main source of support and subsidy for subversive elements in the Middle East. It was further announced that the government had called up military reservists in the western provinces for fresh training. There was no doubt what significance Iran would read into the news that two Communists had been appointed to the Iraqi Cabinet on 14 May, along with seven other new ministers.

On 30 May, President Nixon arrived in Teheran for talks with the Shah on an official one-day visit. Officials reported on 3 June that three Iranians and six Iraqis had been killed in border clashes the day before. The Shah met British Prime Minister Edward Heath in London on 22 June during the course of a four-day visit to Britain. During a press conference

in London he said that Iran would purchase the Anglo-French supersonic jet liner Concorde and that Iran was shopping for arms, millions of dollars worth of the best it could find, short of atomic weapons. He also said that Iran was not pressing for participation at all in the oil industry, but was seeking terms for getting more oil for its own purposes, such as refining and marketing abroad, and for a new price agreement linking prices to a constant purchasing power in Western markets. On 13 July, the London Jewish Observer reported that the USA had agreed to sell Iran F-14 and F-15 fighters and laser-guided bombs. On 18 July, President Bakr of Iraq stressed in a speech his country's sincere desire to establish neighbourly relations with Iran. Various press sources reported that Iran was reacting to this speech with some interest. On 5 August, King Hussein of Jordan left Iran after a ten-day private visit and talks with the Shah.

Meanwhile, an Omani delegation had flown to Beirut on 18 May at the beginning of a tour to explain Oman's position in the border dispute with South Yemen. A week later, according to Beirut's al-Hawadith Oman had requested that Arab League observers be stationed on the border with South Yemen to reduce bordertension. On 28 May Oman said that ten rebels had been killed in attacks on supply lines in South Yemen and that Oman would meet aggression with aggression. Sultan Qabus issued a decree on 18 July extending Oman's territorial waters to 12 miles and on 21 July an Omani army communique reported that 28 guerrillas had been killed in Dhofar during an attack on an army post. British-piloted planes helped to drive off the attack, according to the report. The PFLOAG reported on 2 August that its forces had occupied the town of Mirbat in Oman for some time after shooting down three British helicopters and killing 125 British and Jordanian soldiers. Meanwhile the Sultan pressed ahead with other schemes.

Qabus announced on 22 October the establishment of a Supreme Planning Council which he would head personally.

The Defence Ministry of the UAE reported on 11 June that the Defence Force, supported by units of the army of Abu Dhabi, had restored order on the borders of Fujaira and Sharja. Saudi Defence Minister Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz met President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers on 15 June and on 1 July Sultan returned home after a two-week visit to the United States and declared that the two countries would continue to cooperate in building Saudi armed strength. Rogers arrived in Bahrain on 2 July for a two-day official visit and on 3 July, having met with Bahrain's leaders, he said that facilities for the US Navy had been discussed and that such facilities posed no threat to any state, including the USSR. He then paid a two-day visit to Kuwait, leaving on 4 July. The Council of Ministers of the UAE issued a statement on 13 July requesting the major oil companies to comply immediately with the demands of the oil producing states for participation in the oil industry. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was quoted on 4 August in Cairo's al-Mussawar as saying that the proposal to use Arab oil as a political weapon against the United States should be ruled out. He added that an oil boycott would be feasible, but very complex. However, he warned that United States interests in the region were in for a long hot summer.

The London Daily Express reported on 23 August that Iran had placed an order for £100 million worth of military equipment during the Shah's most recent visit to London. Empress Farah of Iran arrived in China on 1 September for a ten-day visit to establish a closer understanding between the two countries. President Bakr of Iraq flew to Moscow on 14 September for official talks. On 19 September, a joint communique at the conclusion of the discussions stated that the two sides were satisfied with the

development of their co-operation and that agreement had been reached on specific measures to reinforce Iraq's defences. Two days later, Iraqi Oil Minister Hammadi ended talks in Moscow after signing an agreement by which the USSR would accept payment for all debts up to 1980 in crude oil. The next day, talks began in Baghdad between the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Ba'ath Party aimed at resolving differences. On 22 September, Yemeni Economic Affairs Minister Abdulla al-Asnaj ended four days of talks on the dispute between Yemen and South Yemen. On the following day, Saudi Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqqaf arrived in Iraq for three days of talks on bilateral relations and the common border; on 29 September he talked in London with British officials about the situation in the Gulf. On 30 September, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani proposed, in a speech at the Middle East Institute in Washington, that the US give Saudi Arabia an exemption from the oil import quota in exchange for Saudi investment in the United States. The New York Times quoted a US official as saying that the US was studying Yamani's interesting suggestion, though it had not been formally proposed.

On 10 October the Shah flew to the USSR for official talks and, two days later, the USSR signed an agreement to increase trade tenfold by 1978. In Kuwait on 13 October al-Nahar quoted the Kuwaiti Defence Minister as saying that discussions had been opened with a number of arms suppliers. Earlier, on 25 September, a Kuwaiti delegation in Rome had criticized the United States and Britain for supplying Iran with large quantities of advanced military equipment. In Iraq, on 17 October, al-Thawra reported that talks to discuss grievances between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the government had begun in an atmosphere of clarity and frankness, but on 2 November al-Thawra accused the Kurds of collaborating with Iranian intelligence and importing illegally Iranian arms. Three days later the

paper said that the criterion of loyalty for officials of the KDP was the extent to which they challenged the government and the law. It also stated that there were Kurdish plans to blow up army bases. Beirut's al-Hayat reported on 9 November that 90,000 troops had been moved to the north on special manoeuvres and on 15 November al-Thawra said that suspected reactionary elements within the KDP would have to be removed if peace was to be ensured in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranian Kayhan International reported on 11 November that the Shah had said that the GNP would double in five years and that Iran's naval power would have to be increased several times because Iran's defensive frontiers extended beyond the Gulf and into the Indian Ocean.

On 1 December, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fulbright ended a two-day visit to the UAE and on the same day he arrived in Kuwait for a three-day visit and met the Amir. On 4 December Fulbright met King Faysal in Saudi Arabia on 4 December and on the following day Sultan Qabus met King Faysal. Saudi Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqqaf arrived in Iran on 7 December for four days of talks on ways to promote stability in the Gulf. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 8 December that full Kuwaiti diplomatic relations with Iran had been restored with the return of the Iranian ambassador. On 10 December the Saudi Foreign Minister said in Teheran that he had met the Shah and found that no differences existed between the two countries. Saqqaf said that the Gulf States should unite to defeat conspiracy in the region. The Saudi Defence Minister left Kuwait on 23 December after talks with his Kuwaiti counterpart, but three days later he denied that he was trying to organize an alliance in the Gulf region. On 2 January 1973 the Iraqi News Agency reported that two Iraqi soldiers had been killed and four wounded in a clash with Iranian troops at Mondali on the border. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 5

January that Richard Helms, former head of the CIA had been appointed the new United States ambassador to Iran. Le Monde of Paris reported on 6 January that the Shah had informed British Petroleum on 14 December that Iran would take full control of the oil industry when existing agreements expired.

It looked, therefore, as though the year 1973 was opening in much the same way as 1972 had done; oil and security issues appeared inextricably mixed. On 8 January the Kuwaiti government signed the oil industry participation agreement negotiated by Yamani on behalf of the five Gulf States. In Iran on 23 January the Shah confirmed that his country would take over all domestic oil operations in 1979. Bahrain's Weekly Mirror reported on 13 January that Oman had captured large caches of Chinese-made weapons in a week-long sweep in Dhofar, while on 16 March the Middle East Economic Digest quoted Sultan Qabus's announcement of a new Defence Council to co-ordinate the government campaign against the PFLOAG. He arrived in Qatar on 27 March after official talks in the UAE. The New York Times on 22 February quoted US official sources as saying that Iran had recently contracted to purchase \$2 billion worth of military equipment from the USA. The Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei arrived in Iran on 24 February for wide-ranging discussions, and on 4 March Premier Abbas Hovieda presented to the parliament a new budget of nearly \$7 billion, of which \$2 billion would be for defence. Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Iran on 14 March to attend the inauguration of a steel mill in Asfahan. On 16 March, the Shah said the oil companies had handed over total operation of the oil industry to Iran, with the ownership of all installations. China signed a trade agreement with Iran on 8 April providing for an annual exchange of goods worth \$70.4 million.

Meanwhile, a new source of tension had been created by Iraq. On 1 March the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had returned from Iraq after talks in Baghdad on border delineation. On 3 March, an Iranian government news agency reported border clashes with Iraqi units. There was a further development on 20 March when the Kuwaiti government announced that Iraqi troops had occupied the border post of al-Samitah and shelled another. Iraq, for its part, accused Kuwait of starting the shooting and said two Iraqis had been killed. A state of emergency was declared in Kuwait and the border with Iraq was closed. On the following day, Kuwaiti troop reinforcements were sent to the Iraqi border. Arab League Secretary General Mahmud Riyad arrived in Kuwait to mediate in the dispute with Iraq, and Lebanon also offered its good offices. The Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam arrived in Iraq to discuss the dispute, and Damascus radio said that he would proceed to Kuwait after his meetings in Baghdad. There were also possible international implications in another move at this time: the Washington Post reported on 23 March that Iran had proposed to Oman a plan to inspect all ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz to control pollution and regulate or monitor arms shipments.

On 24 March, the Kuwaiti government said that two Iraqi jets had violated Kuwaiti airspace. The Cabinet and Assembly held emergency sessions to discuss the border situation. On the same day, Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussain returned from talks in Moscow. A joint communique said that the two sides reaffirmed their desire for deeper ties. The Saudi Defence Minister Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz arrived in Bahrain on 25 March for talks on the Gulf situation. The Egyptian Special Envoy and Information Minister Murad Ghalib left Iraq on 28 March after a three-day visit and the Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad al-Zayyat also arrived for talks before going on to Kuwait on 30 March for further discussions there. On 30 March the Middle

East Economic digest reported that the Iraqi Vice-President returned from Moscow after his talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin.

The purpose of all this activity then began to emerge. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Murtada Abd al-Baqi al-Hadithi said on 4 April that Kuwait had to give up the Gulf islands of Warba and Bubiyan to Iraq, one for military purposes and one for an oil terminal. He said that without the islands Iraq would not be a Gulf state. On the following day, Iraq reported that its troops had withdrawn from land occupied on 20 March. Beirut's al-Sayyad on 5 April quote the Iraqi Foreign Minister as again saying that the Gulf islands previously referred to should be Iraqi. He said they were of the utmost importance to Iraq since any force stationed on them could cut off Iraq's access to the Gulf. On the next day, the Iraqi Foreign Minister arrived in Kuwait to begin talks on the border problem and, according to the Beirut daily al-Nahar Iraqi forces started to withdraw from Samitah border post in Kuwait. The Middle East Economic Digest reported that the Kuwaiti government would reconsider its policy of giving financial aid to the Arab conflict with Israel if the confrontation with Iraq continued. On 8 April 1973 al-Hadithi left Kuwait after two days of talks on the border problem and on the same day the British Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, arrived in Jidda for talks with the Saudi government. The Kuwait Minister of State Abd al-Aziz Hussain, said on 9 April that Iraqi and Kuwaiti views of the border problem were quite different and that contacts would be resumed shortly.

On the same day, Iranian Premier Hovieda arrived in London for five days of talks with Prime Minister Heath. On his return from his European tour, Hovieda stopped over at Moscow airport on 17 April for a meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Kuwaiti government announced on 26 April that army troops had reoccupied the border post at Samitah. Also on that day

King Faysal met the Egyptian Minister of War. The Bahraini Defence Minister arrived in Iran on 28 April for an official five-day visit and, on the following day, the Egyptian Minister of War travelled on to Kuwait for a two-day visit. On 7 May the Shah attended major air and naval manoeuvres in the Straits of Hormuz and, at a banquet honouring Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 11 May, he said that Iran would not stand by should any misfortune befall Pakistan - no doubt he was thinking of the Baluchistan problem inside Pakistan and relations externally with India and Bangladesh. He also declared that Iran would do everything possible to keep open the Straits of Hormuz. On 23 May Pakistani service chiefs began high-level talks in Teheran.

Britain announced on 10 May a contract with the Saudi Arabian government to help operate Saudi air defences. The British Minister of State for Defence, Ian Gilmour, said that two thousand Britons would be employed for five years on the project. Informed sources said that the contract was worth \$625 million. King Faysal arrived in Paris on 14 May for a five-day official visit and to discuss arms purchases. On the following day he met the French President, Georges Pompidou, and it was announced that the two men had agreed to increase political, military and economic co-operation between their respective countries. The Washington Post that day reported that Kuwait was about to order \$500 million worth of US military armaments, including 160 tanks, 32 Crusader jet fighters and anti-aircraft missiles. On 18 May it reported that Saudi Arabia was negotiating to purchase up to 19 warships from the USA. Pentagon officials reported that negotiations were underway to sell Saudi Arabia a limited number of F-4 Phantom jets. Kuwait, too, was seeking to buy Phantoms. A spokesman said that the countries of the region would have to take on more of their own security procedures following Britain's withdrawal from the region. He

added that the USA would not make sales which would place Israel in jeopardy, and that oil was another consideration. On 4 June, the Kuwaiti government said its projected \$500 million worth of arms purchases in the West were for defensive purposes only. On the following day, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister concluded a two-day visit to Bahrain, a joint communique declaring that preservation of the region's security and prosperity called for continuous co-operation and effective solidarity between its states to counter foreign intervention.

The New York Times on 7 June reported US officials as saying that Egypt had urged Saudi Arabia to buy French Mirage jets instead of US Phantoms so that the Saudi air force would be compatible with the Libyan air force in the event of hostilities with Israel. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 8 June an agreement between Kuwait and Iraq under which Iraq would increase water supplies to Kuwait from the Shatt al-Arab waterway. On 9 June the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister arrived in Oman for a three-day visit and talks with Sultan Qabus as part of a ten-day tour of the Gulf states from which he returned on 11 June and which he said had had positive results. Sharja's Ruler Shaikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi arrived in the United States on 11 June after a two-day visit to Britain. Bahrain and Kuwait signed a long-range economic agreement on 19 June, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister describing it as a decisive step forward towards Gulf unity and forecasting similar agreements with Oman and the UAE. Oman announced on 21 June that ten men had been executed and others sentenced to long prison terms for plotting to overthrow the government. The men charged were members of the PFLOAG. The Washington Post reported on 22 June that an Indian air force mission was in Iraq to train Iraqi pilots to fly Russian-built MIG jets under a secret agreement signed two months previously. On the following day India denied that it was helping Iraq to fly MIG 21s. A

spokesman said that a small Indian air force team had been in Iraq for fourteen years. Iraq's relationship with the USSR was certainly becoming even more intimate. An agreement was reached on 25 June to form a joint planning committee to aid Iraq's economic development.

Iran's Teheran Journal reported on 27 June that Kurdish leader Mustafa Barazani had warned the Iraq government to pull its troops out of Kurdish regions or face total war. The report added that eleven men had been killed and twenty-two wounded in two days of clashes beginning on 24 June. On the following day, press reports in Teheran said fighting between the Iraqi army and the Kurds had spread to mountainous areas near the Iranian border. Two days later, on 30 June, the Christian Science Monitor reported that clashes between Kurdish forces and Iraqi army troops in the Kirkuk region had entered their third day. On 1 July, the Iraqi Defence Minister was assassinated and the Interior Minister wounded after being abducted from Baghdad to Zarbatiya. Baghdad Radio said that the leader of the plot, Security Chief Nazim Kazzar, had been arrested.

In Kuwait on 3 July the National Assembly ratified a bill providing \$1.43 billion for defence spending over a seven-year period and approved a government request for £575 million for defence purposes. This followed US Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary James Noyes's visit to Kuwait on 16 June to discuss arms purchases. In Riyadh on 5 July King Faysal met the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Khalatbari. On the following day the Christian Science Monitor quoted King Faysal as saying that Saudi Arabia would like to continue friendly ties with the United States but that this would be difficult unless the US took a more even-handed policy in the region. The Petroleum Minister Yamani was quoted as denying a report that an agreement has been reached with the United States on investment by Petromin in the United States.

In Iraq, Kazzar and 22 others were executed on 7 July for participating in the attempted coup d'etat. On 11 July an agreement was reached between the Ba'ath Party and the Communist Party under which the Communists would be permitted to participate in a ruling Council of Ministers. The New York Times reported on 13 July that negotiations had been resumed between the government and the Kurdish leaders to settle their differences, and on the same day Vice-President Saddam Hussain said Iraq would welcome moves by Britain or the United States which could lead to the normalization of diplomatic relations. On the following day, President Bakr amended the constitution to name himself President, Premier and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces with power to appoint or dismiss any official, including the Vice-President. Three days later, he said the terms of the 11 March declaration to the Kurds would be fulfilled in 1974. On a less optimistic note, the Kurdish paper al-Taakhi said on 26 August that Kurds in Sinjar province had staged a strike the previous day to protest against an Iraqi army attack in the area a few days earlier. On the following day the official daily al-Thawra confirmed that troops had clashed with the Kurds in Sinjar several days earlier in an effort to wipe out sabotage activities.

On 20 August, a Kuwaiti delegation headed by the Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah arrived in Baghdad for talks on the border dispute and on the same day the Defence Minister of the UAE arrived in Teheran for a six-day official visit. On 1 September, the Kuwaiti Amir concluded a four-day visit and series of talks with King Faysal. The Saudi Defence Minister said on 6 September that Saudi Arabia would not make arms deals with strings attached, and that defending the independence of other Arab countries was self-defence for Saudi Arabia. Ten days later, the French Defence Minister returned to Paris from Saudi Arabia after a five-day visit and talks on

arms sales. Diplomatic relations with West Germany were resumed on 18 September after an eight-year break. On 23 September King Hussein of Jordan met King Faysal during a military ceremony in Tabuk in the north-west region where the latter was opening a major military base. In Iraq, on 28 September, a curfew was imposed in Baghdad and outward flights from the airport halted while police searched for agents and traitors who were being blamed for a series of murders. On the following day, the curfew was lifted, although police continued to search for the alleged killers.

On 1 October the British Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, arrived in Iran for a four-day visit. The following day the government announced the arrest of twelve persons for plotting to kill the Shah during a cinema award ceremony. The Washington Post reported on 2 October that the USSR had sent Iraq 12 TU-22 jet bombers with a range of 2,250 km. On 5 October the Middle East Economic Digest reported that the first trade agreement between Iran and East Germany had been concluded and that it was to last for five years. On the following day the West German Economics Minister Hans Friederichs arrived in Iran for a week's visit to discuss joint economic activities which he said would link the two countries economically and politically in a way unprecedented anywhere. On 8 October, the Iraqi government announced unilaterally the restoration of diplomatic ties with Iran and offered to begin negotiations in either capital to settle outstanding differences. A week later, Iran announced that diplomatic relations had been officially resumed with Iraq. On the same day, Iraq was elected to a two-year term on the United Nations Security Council.

Arms and oil continued to be related diplomatic themes. The US State Department said on 19 November that the United States was ready for talks on the possible sale of F4 Phantom jets to Saudi Arabia, despite the oil embargo. The next day, Jordan's King Hussein concluded a three-day visit

and talks with the Shah on the Middle East situation. On 16 December, the French Industry minister, Jean Charbonnel arrived in Iraq for two days of talks on expanding oil purchases and eight days later official French Radio reported that France had concluded an agreement with Saudi Arabia to purchase three million tonnes of crude oil a year. On 4 January 1974 the Middle East Economic Survey cited reports that France and Abu Dhabi had concluded an agreement to exchange 35 Mirage jets for oil supplies. Three days later, on 7 January, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani confirmed that it had been agreed to sell France 800 million tonnes of crude oil over a twenty-year period in exchange for armaments, including Mirage jet fighters. Two days later, a British Minister of State, Lord Balniel, left London for a tour of the Gulf states to discuss receiving oil supplies. On 10 January the New York Times cited US sources as saying Iran had agreed to buy 30 US F-14A jet fighters for \$900 million. Beirut's Al-Nahar reported on 25 January that France had agreed to supply arms, including highly developed missiles, to Saudi Arabia in return for oil. On the same day, the New York Times quoted Kuwaiti officials as saying that the French Foreign Minister, during a visit to Kuwait, had offered military arms and industrial investments in exchange for oil. In Iran it was announced on 9 February that a \$5 billion oil agreement had been reached with France and on the same day the French Foreign Minister concluded a three-day visit to Iraq by announcing that France was seeking closer ties with Iraq and would offer technical assistance to help Iraq's economic development.

While this rather frantic round of oil diplomacy was in progress, the struggle for Oman was intensifying. On 18 November 1973 Oman accused South Yemeni aircraft of bombing a military post in Oman and on 23 November Oman appealed to the United Nations to halt South Yemeni aggression. In a letter to the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, Oman said that units of south

Yemen's regular army were penetrating Omani territory. On 29 December a PFLOAG spokesman said Iran had sent additional troops to fight rebel forces in Oman's Dhofar province and that an estimated 30,000 Iranian troops were then in Oman. On 8 January 1974 three members of the Kuwait parliament claimed that Iran had put a force of 1,500 men and 25 helicopters into Oman to attack South Yemen.

Despite the recent restoration of diplomatic relations, the Iraqi government reported on 10 February that an artillery and armour clash with Iran had resulted in 70 Iranian and 24 Iraqi casualties. It charged Iran with overflying Iraqi airspace and with provoking a smaller skirmish on 4 February. On the following day Iran in turn accused Iraq of aggression in this border clash and demanded compensation for the victims. On 12 February the Iraqi government requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and accused Iran of massing troops along the border. Iran sent a strong note of protest to Iraq. On 15 February the UN Security Council opened a debate on the border clash which each side accused the other of initiating. At this point, on 16 February, the new Iraqi ambassador, Midhat Ibrahim Juma, presented his credentials to the Shah. Iraq and Iran again blamed each other in the Security Council on 20 February for recent border fighting. Al-Saayad of Beirut reported on 21 February that the Baghdad government was on the verge of an open break with the Kurds over the question of control over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk.

Eventually, on 28 February, the UN Security Council decided on a one-man three-month investigation of the border trouble between Iraq and Iran. On 5 March three Iraqi soldiers were killed and twelve wounded in clashes on that border and on the next day heavy casualties were reported on both sides as fighting continued. A day later, Iraq reported four more soldiers killed and dozens wounded in new clashes with Iranian forces. On 11 March,

the Iraqi government proclaimed local self-rule for the Kurdish minority in the north and on the following day gave the Kurds fifteen days in which to accept the plan for autonomy. Two days later, on 14 March, fighting broke out between Kurdish insurgents and government forces in northern Iraq. On 16 March the Pesh Merga, the Kurdish militia, was reported to be in control of large sections of Northern Iraq.

It was reported on 17 March that Iran had agreed to the Iraqi government's request for a cease-fire along the border. A week later President Bakr said that the government intended to enforce the Kurdish autonomy plan. Soviet Defence Minister Grechko left Baghdad on 26 March, one day ahead of schedule. Baghdad Radio also announced that a mutual understanding had been reached between the Iraqi government and Kurdish rebels. The government also announced decrees implementing the plan for Kurdish self-rule that it had proclaimed earlier. On the following day, Mulla Mustafa Barzani said that Kurdish and Iraqi government troops faced the possibility of all-out war. On 1 April, Kurdish rebels were reported to have repulsed a government force of some 3000 troops in the Alibey Pass. The force was attempting to relieve besieged garrisons near Ruwandiz and Zebar. A week later, President Bakr replaced five Kurdish ministers who belonged to the Kurdish Democratic Party. On 10 April diplomatic ties were resumed with Britain after a thirteen-year break. On the same day, however, Vice-President Saddam Hussain accused the USA of supplying the Kurdish rebels via Iran, and accused Iran of massing troops along the border to 'encourage Kurdish insurgents in our north'.

Kurdish officials claimed on 13 April that four Iraqi MIGS had bombed Kurdish ground forces near Kirkuk and five days later Kurdish Radio reported that Iraqi planes had destroyed eleven Kurdish villages. It was also reported that the Kurds had killed twenty Iraqi soldiers. On the

following day, Kurdish rebels declared all-out war against the Iraqi government. The decision was apparently made as a result of the alleged execution of eleven Kurdish leaders by the government. Two days later, on 21 April, Taha Muhyi al-Din Maruf, a Kurdish diplomat, was appointed a Vice-President in Iraq. On 25 April it was reported that Iraqi tanks were pushing forward under heavy fire to relieve a besieged government garrison in Zakho. Hussain said that a firm economic siege would be imposed on areas held by Kurdish rebels. On the following day the Soviet press accused Turkey of arming and abetting Kurdish rebels. It was reported on 29 April that government forces had captured Habur Bridge and had lifted the siege at Zahko. It was also reported that Iraqi forces had mistakenly shelled a Turkish border village. On 3 May Kurdish rebels were said to have blown up two oil and gas tanks in the Kirkuk region, while on 10 May it was reported that Iraqi troops had set fire to the Kurdish town of Zakho. Fifty government troops were reported killed. It was further reported on 10 May that Iranian border guards had killed four Iraqi guerrillas who were attempting to kidnap four Iranians. Two Iranian soldiers had been killed.

Elsewhere in the Gulf, Kuwait signed a contract with France on 16 February to purchase armaments for about \$85 million. On 22 February, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Qaysal-Zawawi, in a speech at the Lahore conference said that Arab countries which gave aid to South Yemen were helping Marxist rebels in Dhofar province. Sultan Qabus of Oman arrived in Teheran on 2 March for a week's visit and on the same day US Secretary of State Kissinger spent six hours in Riyadh. On the following day the Kuwaiti Defence and Interior Minister announced that twenty-four Kuwaiti pilots would go to the United States for training. It was acknowledged on 7 March that Iran had started playing an active military role in the guerrilla war in Dhofar Province in Southern Oman. On 2 April,

one Omani soldier was reported killed and two others wounded in fighting with rebels. Three days later, on 5 April, the Arab League was said to be setting up a five-member committee to mediate in the dispute between Oman and South Yemen. On the same day, Saudi Arabia and the USA announced an agreement to expand economic co-operation and to negotiate an American supply of weapons for Saudi defence requirements, while on 15 April it was also announced that the United States had agreed to modernize Saudi Arabia's National Guard at a cost of \$335 million.

According to the Arab World on 9 May, Bahrain had offered its good offices to resolve the border dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. A new transatlantic link with the Gulf was the establishment at the end of May of diplomatic relations between Kuwait and Cuba, while on 6 June the Deputy Premier of Saudi Arabia reinforced old links when he was welcomed in Washington by President Nixon. Two days later, an agreement was signed with the Americans providing for wide-ranging military and economic arrangements. On 9 June it was announced that ARAMCO and the government of Saudi Arabia had reached a settlement whereby the Saudis would take a majority 60 per cent ownership of the company's concessions and assets, a move apparently aimed at giving the Saudis more bargaining power at the meeting of OPEC to be held in Quito, Ecuador. According to May production figures, Saudi Arabia had become the leading oil producer in the world, having surpassed the USA. On 14 June President Nixon arrived in Jidda and was welcomed at the airport by King Faysal; four days later, the possibility of a Saudi purchase of special US Treasury issues was reported, and on 20 July US Treasury Secretary Simon met King Faysal to discuss possible Saudi investment of oil revenues in the USA. On 29 July an agreement was initialled between the UAE and Saudi Arabia to settle their long-disputed and undefined border of several hundred kms.

As the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict wore on, the Kurdish leader Barazani asked for UN intervention on 7 June in what he described as a 'war of genocide' being waged by the Iraqi government. On 19 June four Kurdish nationalists were executed by the government. Further heavy fighting was reported in the Esbil area of Northern Iraq, with twenty-one soldiers killed. Two days later Reuters reported that Kurdish rebels had launched an offensive aimed at capturing Kirkuk. The rebel force claimed to have killed 63 government soldiers and to have taken 200 prisoners.

Iran's relations with Iraq, on the other hand, became more relaxed. On 21 May UN Secretary-General Waldheim said that Iran and Iraq had agreed to prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of troop concentrations along their common borders, and agreed to resume talks on bilateral issues. Dixie Lee Roy, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission arrived in Teheran on 25 May with five top officials for discussions on co-operation between the two countries on plans to develop a major nuclear capacity in Iran. On 28 May the UN Security Council approved an agreement between the two countries to end their border dispute and to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. It was reported on 7 June that Iran had increased from 30 to 80 the number of F-14A fighter planes ordered from the United States. On 20 June, the Saudi Foreign Minister ended talks with the Shah.

In response to the question of whether Iran would someday have nuclear weapons, the Shah said on 23 June that there was no doubt about it, and that it would be sooner than expected. This led to government denials on the following day that the Shah had actually said that Iran would develop nuclear weapons. By then the Shah had reached Paris where he was welcomed by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and on 25 June an agreement for technological co-operation was signed with France, followed two days later by a ten-year development agreement valued at \$4 billion. The

agreement included, significantly in view of the Shah's remarks, provision for the sale of five nuclear reactors, while on 30 June a ten-year agreement for the supply of uranium fuel was signed with the United States. Moreover, on 5 July it was reported that agreements had been concluded with South Africa for co-operation in nuclear power generation and the expansion of trade. A week later, however, on 12 July, Iran asked the UN to take action to keep nuclear weapons out of the Middle East.

On 22 July, an Iranian loan of \$1.2 billion to Britain to bolster its economy was announced and on 25 July two agreements were signed with Oman dealing respectively with cultural matters and the continental shelf between the two countries. The Grumman Corporation disclosed on 13 August that Iran had offered to lend it enough money to continue production of the F-14 fighter plane. On the same day, a continental shelf agreement was signed with the UAE, defining the boundary along the median line. Later, on 3 October the Corporation disclosed that Iran's Bank Mili had put up \$75 million, which, together with a \$125 million loan from some American banks, would produce the F-14 plane Iran desired. In general, there seemed almost no limit to Iranian ambition. A preliminary agreement was signed between Iran and a West German firm on 19 November for the purchase of two nuclear plants. On 20 November the Shah concluded a three-day visit to the USSR for talks on economic issues and on the Middle East situation.

The border with Iraq remained troubled, despite agreement to talk. On 17 August it was reported that Iraq had been shelling the Qasr-i-Shirin area since 4 August and on 24 August that Iraqi infiltrators killed three Iranians in an attack on a border post. In Iraq on the following day a new amnesty was declared for Kurds, provided they laid down their arms within twenty days. On 29 August Iraq accused Iran of massing troops along the border in violation of the 7 March ceasefire agreement but the next day the

two-week-old talks between Iraq and Iran in Istanbul on border problems ended in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. However, there was no such understanding with the Kurds. More than 70,000 Iraqi Kurds were said to have fled to Iran from Iraqi military attacks and on 7 September Iraqi planes were reported to have bombed the village of Kuhnih Lahijan killing fifteen people. On 15 September Kurdish forces began an offensive against army positions in Rawandiz and Qala Diza, and next day four Iraqi soldiers were reported killed in border skirmishes with Iranian troops. Three days later, rebel Kurdish forces claimed to have killed 300 Iraqi troops and have launched a counter-offensive in the Kirkuk area.

Elsewhere, on 17 October, the Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs announced that Iranian troops which had been helping in the war in Dhofar were being withdrawn. He arrived in Iran for talks on 25 November. That day the US aircraft carrier Constellation and two destroyers entered the Gulf on a familiarization deployment during CENTO naval manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean. On the following day the United States said that the carrier had completed its exercises in the Gulf and was returning to the Indian Ocean. Three days later, on 29 November, the Middle East Economic Digest reported that an Iraqi naval unit had concluded a goodwill tour the previous week of the Arab Gulf states. Its commander called for the setting up of a joint Arab naval force in the Gulf to protect Arab interests against threats to the tranquillity of the region.

In Iraq on 2 December the Communist Party organ Tariq al-Shah reported that Party leader Salim Khabbaz had been assassinated by Kurds. On 4 December the French Defence Ministry reported that a contract had been signed to supply Saudi Arabia with \$800 million in military arms. On 9 December, in Kuwait, the Defence Minister said an agreement had been signed with the USA to purchase 'the most up to date surface-to-air missiles' and

a large number of jet fighter planes. On 16 December the Iraqi government said that two Iraqi jet fighters had been shot down near the Iranian border by American-made Hawk missiles. Two days later, Iran said that it had shot down two Iraqi planes which had violated Iranian airspace. The Cairo Al-Ahram reported on 22 December that President Anwar al-Sadat was in contact with the two countries to try to help resolve border tension. The Egyptian Foreign Minister arrived in Baghdad for talks with President Bakr on 29 December. Two days later the Iraqi government accused Iran of shelling Iraqi villages.

On 3 January 1975 France announced that Iran had loaned the French Atomic Energy Commission \$1 billion for fifteen years for a ten per cent share in an planned uranium enrichment plant in the Rhone Valley. On the same day, the Iraqi newspaper al-Thawra called for a quick response from Kuwait to Iraq's 'practical and flexible proposals' for ending the border dispute and said that any visit to Kuwait by Vice President Saddam Hussain to discuss the issue must have the 'prerequisites of success'. On 8 January a special diplomatic delegation departed from Iraq for visits to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Yemen and South Yemen to explain Iraqi policy in the Iraq-Iran border dispute. It was announced on 9 January that the USA had agreed to sell to Saudi Arabia 60 F5 jet fighters for \$750 million. The United States said that the sale would contribute to the legitimate self-defence needs of Saudi Arabia. On the following day, the Sultan of Oman met President Ford in Washington. The relations between the two countries were described as excellent. The Iraqi Foreign Minister arrived in Saudi Arabia on 11 January and held talks with King Faysal which were described as frank and fraternal. On the same day Hovieda said Iran had spent \$250 million in caring for Kurdish refugees from Iraq whose number had now reached 120,000. It was announced in Iraq on 19 January that a group of pro-Iranian spies

had been executed and that talks in Istanbul between Iraqi and Iranian officials on the Kurdish and Shatt al-Arab problems were broken off after four days. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Khalatbari said that no decisions had been taken.

Britain announced on 20 January that the USA was seeking occasional use of airfield facilities on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman. The USA confirmed this, saying that use of the base was needed on a contingency basis as an alternate landing base for carrier planes. The New York Times reported on 24 January that terms had been agreed upon for the complete takeover of ARAMCO by the Saudi government whose monetary reserves were said by the IMF on 2 February to have reached \$14 billion by the end of 1974 and to be the third largest in the world after West Germany and the United States. On 2 February Iran had guaranteed Oman's airspace by committing Iranian planes to defend Oman against intruders should Oman request it. In the following week the New York Times reported on 8 February that US anti-tank missiles and several instructors had arrived in Oman 'recently'. It was also reported in the USA that US military veterans were being recruited by a private firm under a Defense Department contract to train Saudi troops to defend oilfields.

The Iranian Pars News Agency said on 9 February that Iraqi troops had attacked border positions but had been driven back by border police. On the next day, the New York Times cited sources in Beirut as saying that Iraq was seeking a conference of Arab states of the Gulf region to protest against Iranian aid to the Kurds. UN Secretary-General Waldheim arrived on 12 February for talks with King Faysal on international problems and on 16 February he went on to Bahrain. On 1 March Amman Radio announced that 31 Jordanian British-made Hawker Hunter fighters were to be given to Oman and a combat battalion would be sent to Dhofar. Some of the aircraft had arrived

by the end of the month. On 28 March the Libyan News Agency reported that Chairman al-Qadhafi had sent a warning to Oman and the Arab League that Libya would wage war against Sultan Qabus unless Iranian troops were expelled from Oman. The Shah himself appeared quite unconcerned. On 2 March he had announced that Iran had become a one-party state to be governed by a new party, the National Resurrection Party, 'for at least the next two years'. Premier Hovieda would lead the party. Two days later it was announced that the state would purchase up to eight nuclear reactors from the USA as part of a \$15 billion trade agreement. Secretary of State Kissinger called it the largest agreement of this kind ever signed between two countries. However, on 5 March Qadhafi arrived in Saudi Arabia for an official visit and met King Faysal. On the following day, Bahrain's Foreign Minister said that the future of American naval facilities and commercial relations would depend on the American stand on peace and stability in the Middle East.

Peace and stability at long last seemed to have been boosted after the conclusion of a conference of OPEC heads of state in Algeria. President Boumediene announced on 6 March that an agreement had been reached between Iraq and Iran that completely eliminated the conflict between two brotherly countries. A communique issued in Algiers on 7 March revealed that Iraq and Iran had agreed to proceed with a permanent demarcation of their land frontiers, to delimit their river frontier according to the Thalweg line, and to control their borders with a view to definitive cessation of all subversive infiltrations on both sides. The Shah, on the same day, returned to Iran and said that the agreement signed with Iraq finally ended the ancient differences between the two countries. It was not a development which had been widely forecast and, in the light of all that had been

happening it all seemed a little too good to be true. Nevertheless, for the time being at least, a turning point appeared to have been reached.

The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of preceding chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed referencing:

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Chapter Eight: From the Algiers Accord to the Downfall of the Shah
1975-1979

One consequence of the Algiers Accord was quickly apparent. Iran cut off aid to the Kurds. While offering a general amnesty to Kurdish rebels up until 1 April, the Iraqi government launched a major offensive in the north on 7 March and its rapid progress was admitted by the Kurds. One of their spokesmen, Aziz Reza, conceded on 8 March that Iran's decision to cut off supplies would be a serious setback to their bid for real autonomy and democracy within Iraq, but he said that they would continue the struggle by switching to guerrilla tactics. On 12 March the New York Times, quoting sources in Teheran, said that the Iranian decision meant that the Kurds were already running out of supplies.

A further example of Gulf accord was announced on 12 March after Kuwait's Premier, Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah had concluded a four-day visit to Saudi Arabia. A joint communique said that the problems of the Neutral Zone Partition Agreement had been discussed and solutions agreed upon. The Saudi Defence Minister Sultan bin Abd al Aziz said that the broad outlines of an offshore boundaries agreement were also determined. Bahrain also made a beneficial deal. According to the Middle East Economic Digest on 14 March, the USA had agreed to a 600 per cent increase in the rent paid for the use of naval facilities. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government announced on 13 March a two-week ceasefire with Kurdish rebels at the request of Iran to allow Kurdish refugees to cross to Iran. Fighting was at first reported to be continuing, but on 15 March a Kurdish spokesman in Iran said that it had ceased. On the same day talks began in Teheran between Foreign Minister Abbas Khalatbari and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hamadi on implementing the 5 March Algiers Accord. The Algerian Foreign Minister Abdel Aziz Boteflika

was also present. The Kurdish leader Mustafa Barazani said on 22 March that the fighting was over, that the Kurds had now no foreign support, and that he might take refuge in the United States.

Three days later, on 25 March, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated by a nephew, Faisal bin Musaid bin Abd al-Aziz, during a reception at the palace in Riyadh. An official announcement said that the assassin was mentally deranged. Crown Prince Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud was crowned in Faysal's place. Faysal was buried in the capital on the following day. On 28 March, King Khalid issued a decree saying that he would be keeping the Cabinet of his predecessor. He would himself be both Premier and Foreign Minister.

Iran's Premier Abbas Hovieda arrived in Iraq on 25 March for an official four-day visit. On 29 March Turkey reported the renewal of heavy fighting between Iraqi troops and Kurds near the Turkish border. A joint communique was issued at the conclusion of Hovieda's visit saying that the two sides were determined to expand co-operation in all fields of mutual interest. Within two days of 31 March the general amnesty for Kurds choosing to surrender was extended to 30 April. A joint committee from Iraq and Iran began work on defining the land border between the two countries. The Iraqi army was ordered to advance into Kurdish-held areas and to take control. The Shah revealed on 9 April that the Kurdish leader Barazani had taken up residence with his family somewhere near Teheran. He added, however, that Iran had ended its support of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq because it was useless bloodshed that could not come to anything. It had to be settled by negotiation. The Iraqi Vice President arrived in the Soviet Union on 14 April for an official visit. On the following day, an agreement

for the peaceful development of nuclear energy was signed with the Soviet Union.

In Saudi Arabia on 31 March, the Deputy Premier Prince Fahd delivered a policy statement on behalf of the new government. It said that the building of Saudi military forces would continue, that the nation would do everything possible to regain the lost rights of the Palestinian people, that a consultative assembly would be established within the system of government and that Faysal's policies would be sustained. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown, arrived on 12 April for talks with King Khalid on arms sales. On 18 April a border agreement was signed between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi negotiator, Abd al-Rahman al-Shaikh said the agreement was in accordance with the previous understanding. He also said that it now fixed the final demarcation.

The Foreign Ministers of Iran and Algeria began talks in Baghdad on 19 April on implementing the Algiers accord. On 23 April President Anwar al-Sadat concluded a three-day visit and talks with King Khalid and then arrived in Iran on 24 April for talks with the Shah. Afterwards, on 28 April, the Shah arrived in Saudi Arabia for a two-day visit and talks with King Khalid. On 27 April the Iraqi Vice-President called for a regional defence structure in the Gulf to replace all foreign military bases; two days later he arrived in Iran for an official visit. In Iraq itself on 4 May a military parade was held in Baghdad celebrating the end of the Kurdish rebellion. On 15 May the Shah conferred with President Ford on the first day of a visit to the USA. The next day the Shah inspected American military aircraft. On 18 May, the Shah denied reports that there were 40,000 political prisoners in Iran. He said that there were less than 3,000 persons in prison and they were there not for their political views but

because of terrorist acts. Three days later, on 21 May, two US military officers were killed by terrorists in Teheran. Bahrain's Defence Minister ended a four-day visit to Iraq on 23 May after talks on means of co-ordinating solidarity and action among the Gulf states and, on 24 May, Bahrain's premier arrived in Iran for an official four-day visit. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani said on 27 May that the United States had assured his government that there would be no military confrontation between the two countries. On the same day, after meetings with the Shah in Teheran, US Senator Edward Kennedy said that an unregulated flow of arms to the region might not be in Iran's interest or in the interest of the region as a whole. The New York Times reported on 31 May that a multi-million dollar contract had been signed with Rockwell International of the USA to build a communications intelligence base in Iran. On 7 June the Shah warned of an unholy union between black reactionaries and stateless reds in opposition to national policy in his country.

King Khalid met Sultan Qabus of Oman on 8 June. The following day the New York Times reported that Iran would purchase three used submarines from the USA. Security officials reported on 10 June that religious conservatives had rioted in Qum on 5 and 7 June to protest against changes promoted by the government's policies. In Kuwait on the same day Saudi Crown Prince Fahd concluded an official visit and a joint communique said that the two sides had stressed their determination to strengthen their co-operation. This was, perhaps, just as well in view of the threat by Libya's Premier Abd al-Salam Jallud the following day to turn the Gulf region into a war zone comparable to the recent one in South East Asia, unless Iranian troops were withdrawn from Oman. On 12 June, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ended a four-day visit to Iraq, the first by a member of the Saudi royal family

in fifteen years. Fahd said that there was complete agreement on the issues discussed during the visit. On the next day in Iraq a treaty was signed with Iran, including a comprehensive delineation of the border. On 17 June Libyan Premier Jallud arrived in Iraq for a one-day visit.

In Iran, police reported on 29 June that four political saboteurs had been killed the previous day in a gun battle near Teheran. An agreement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was signed on 2 July to divide the neutral zone by a straight border line through the middle where possible, or as near as possible. On 3 July Fahd ended a three-day visit and talks in Iran on regional issues. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 4 July that military advisers from Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had arrived in the UAE to help draw up plans to integrate the Emirate's defence forces. On the same day the Beirut al-Anwar quoted Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia as saying that his country wanted good relations with both East and West on the same footing in so far as their policies did not damage Saudi interests. Two days of tlks with ARAMCO in Geneva finished on 6 July and Oil Minister Yamani said that negotiations for a 60 per cent takeover of ARAMCO were nearing completion. On the same day the Shah met the Secretary-General of the Arab League in Teheran. On 10 July, the Boston Globe claimed that the USSR had halted arms deliveries to Iraq in June, presumably as a protest against that government's conciliatory policy. Saudi Prince Fahd flew to France for an official visit on 21 July amnd on the following day had conversations in Paris with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing about oil sales and French investments in Saudi Arabia. Two days later, on 24 July, an agreement was signed with France which included provisions to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In Iran, it was announced on 29 July that two terrorists responsible for killing two US Air Force Colonels on 21 May had been arrested . On 4 August it was reported that more than 7,750 persons had been arrested in a crackdown on profiteering. A week later police said that they had arrested four more terrorists involved in the killing of American military advisers. On 26 August, talks were concluded with an Iraqi delegation on sharing water and shipping in the Shatt al-Arab. On 1 September Sultan Qabus of Oman arrived for talks with the Shah. The Middle East Economic Digest reported on 19 September that the first contingent of Jordanian troops stationed in Oman had been withdrawn; two days later the last contingent of Jordanian troops arrived in Amman having been withdrawn from Oman. On 18 October Iran said that Iranian forces were mopping up after they had captured a key rebel stronghold in Dhofar province.

In Kuwait it was reported that the Defence Minister had said that his country did not want to join in a Gulf military alliance. Meanwhile, Iraq's Vice-President Saddam Hussain had returned from France on 11 September, after confirming that France had agreed to the sale of arms - such as the Mirage jet. On 1 November, a US intelligence official said that the CIA had supplied the Kurds with millions of dollars worth of arms in 1972 at the request of the Shah of Iran. The Iraq News Agency announced on 3 November that an Israeli spy, Alexander Harun, who worked with the Kurdish rebels, had been hanged. A nuclear collaboration agreement with France was signed on 18 November in Baghdad during a visit by the French Minister of Industry and Research. On 29 November it was disclosed that the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barazani had been visiting the USA for nearly seven weeks and State Department officials confirmed that he had met Under-Secretary of State Joseph Sisco during his visit.

On 12 December, the Grumman Corporation acknowledged that it had arranged to pay Iranian lobbyists more than \$20 million in commission as part of a \$2 billion deal to sell Iran 80 F-14 fighters, but contended it was normal practice. Three days later, the New York Times reported that a US Senate sub-committee on multinational corporations would investigate the disclosures by the Grumman Corporation. On the same day a Pentagon spokesman said that the USA had offered to sell Iran 10 Awacs surveillance planes at \$187 million each. On 19 January 1976 the Shah said that the USA was asking unnecessarily for additional guarantees that would not be given with respect to eight nuclear power plants included in an economic co-operation agreement signed in March. On 27 January the New York Times cited US Defense Department sources as saying the head of the US military mission in Iran, Major-General Hoyt Vandenberg Jr., had been removed because he was too abrasive. It was further reported on 3 February that Iran was threatening to cut back its arms purchases from the USA because of sharply rising arms costs and a drop in Iran's oil revenues.

On 10 February, Iran released a note by the President of the Grumman International which said that the corporation would pay Iran \$28 million in commission on the F-14 deal, but Grumman's Chairman said it had not agreed to pay the entire amount and that negotiations were still going on. Four days later, on 14 February, the Deputy Minister of War said that he was determined to extract a \$28 million penalty rebate from Grumman International and would, if necessary, deduct it from future payments for Grumman aircraft.

In Oman as well as in Iraq government forces seemed to have prevailed in 1975. Sultan Qabus announced on 11 December 1975 that the ten-year insurrection in Dhofar province had ended and on 24 December he accused

South Yemen of massing troops and making other preparations with hostile intentions, while continuing artillery fire across the border. The following day, South Yemen denied the charges by Qabus and said the accusation had been made in order to justify the retention of Iranian troops in Oman. On 9 January 1976 Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Yusuf al-Alawi said that how long Iranian troops would remain in Oman depended on whether a solution could be seen to the problem of South Yemen. A related development was reported on 6 February in the Middle East Economic Digest ; the first Omani ambassador to Iraq in six years had arrived in Baghdad.

The reduction of armed conflict in the Gulf region was not accompanied by any slackening in arms purchases, while the detente between Iraq and Iran merely led to more attention being focused on the Shah's internal difficulties and the problems these occasioned for his alliance with Washington. On 18 February 1976 Iranian Vice-Minister of War Hasan Tufanyan denied reports that Iran would reduce its purchases of Grumman F-14 jet fighters. On the same day the US Defense Department said it intended to sell Saudi Arabia construction equipment worth \$893 million for work on port and military facilities. On 20 February the Middle East Economic Digest reported that Britain had won a contract to supply Kuwait with 150 Chieftain tanks. The Middle East Economic Survey discussed the signing by Iraq and Saudi Arabia of a final border demarcation agreement for the Neutral Zone.

The New York Times reported on 5 March that Iran had formally dispensed with the services of a US advisory mission to its state police and on 14 March the Shah warned the USA that Iran could hurt America as badly, if not more so, than it could hurt Iran if the US Congress imposed

an embargo on arms sales to the Gulf region. On 28 March, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia ended a few days tour of a number of Gulf states - Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE and, on 8 April, Iranian Premier Hovieda ended a two-day visit to Saudi Arabia for talks with Crown Prince Fahd. Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussain arrived in Riyadh on 13 April at the start of a tour of Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. A report from Iran on 27 April said that three members of an Islamic Marxist extremist group had been killed the week before in a gun battle with security forces in Teheran. US Federal Administrator Frank Zarb said on 9 May that the Iranian government had been holding talks with US companies about bartering billions of dollars worth of oil for American products; two days later, on 11 May, three US companies confirmed that they had been negotiating a multi-billion dollar barter deal of oil for military equipment with the Iranian government. The New York Times on 15 May reported that the Iranian National assembly had approved a Treaty of Boundaries with Iraq during the week, after negotiations had resolved some final specific issues. On 18 May it was reported that at least eleven terrorists had been killed after the assassination of three Iranian security officers in Teheran. On the following day the New York Times reported that Iran had announced the arrests of four people in connection with the slaying of Mulla Abd al-Hasan Shamsabadi in April.

The Libyan Premier Abd al-Salam Jallud arrived in Baghdad on 18 May and met Saddam Hussain. On the following day in Iran officials announced that ten guerrillas and four passers-by had been killed at three hideouts in northwest Teheran. The newspaper Ratakhiz claimed on 22 May that Libya had paid \$100,000 to Iranian terrorists who opposed the Shah and had arranged to pay further sums in the future. King Khalid arrived in Teheran

on 24 May for talks with the Shah, and two days later the Kuwait newspaper al-Siyah reported that Iran was seeking to raise a \$1.2 billion loan from Saudi Arabia. On the same day, the deputy director of SAVAK denied charges that the organization tortured political prisoners. This was countered on 28 May by the International Commission of Jurists which said that there was abundant evidence showing the systematic use of impermissible methods and of torture of political suspects in Iran. During a visit to France, Premier Hovieda denied on 28 May that Iran had any intention of using nuclear plants, to be built for her by France, in order to develop nuclear weapons. On 29 May, Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Baghdad on a four-day visit. The Middle East Economic Survey reported on 31 May that Iran had signed contracts worth \$1.2 billion for the purchase of two French nuclear power plants. On 1 June, about fifteen Iranian students occupied their Consulate General in Geneva to protest against the repression of political dissidents in Iran.

The Sultan of Oman arrived in Teheran on 21 June for talks with the Shah on Gulf security. The Saudi aspect of this security was the subject of a New York Times report on 22 June. It cited a Raytheon Company spokesman as saying that the company had contracted with Saudi Arabia to provide it with a \$1.03 billion anti-aircraft Hawk missile defence system.

Increasingly, the Shah was simultaneously preoccupied with internal and international security. A policeman killed ten communist terrorists, including two women, in a gun battle in Teheran on 29 June. On 5 July a general amnesty was announced for a number of terrorist organizations not already on wanted lists. A day later, Pakistan Premier Ali Bhutto arrived in Teheran for three days of talks with the Shah and Premier Hovieda. The significance for the Shah of the American connection was underlined in a US

Senate study on 1 August which argued that after President Nixon had decided in 1972 to sell Iran any conventional weapons systems that it wanted, Iran had become so dependent on US personnel to operate the systems it had bought that it could not go to war without US support on a day-to-day basis. Five days later, on 6 August the Shah met US Secretary of State Kissinger in Iran. Later the Shah told reporters that the USA must continue to sell arms to Iran or risk instability in the area. On the following day, at the end of a two-day meeting of the Iranian-American Joint Commission, the two countries announced that Iran planned to spend \$10 billion on military purchases from the USA between 1976 and 1980. On 27 August Kissinger told a Senate subcommittee that the USA had agreed to sell Iran 160 F-16 fighter planes at a cost of about \$3.4 billion. On the next day terrorists killed three American employees of the US firm Rockwell International in Teheran. A few days later, the Turkish Daily News reported that Switzerland had expelled an Iranian diplomat accredited to the United Nations for being involved in prohibited intelligence activities.

Saudi-US relations over arms purchases were also under scrutiny. On 1 September, the White House asked the Congress to permit the sale of 850 Sidewinder and 650 Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. Previously, 2,000 Sidewinders and 1,500 Mavericks were to have been sold. Three weeks later, on 24 September, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted by 8 to 6 to block the sale of 650 Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. On 26 September, the Middle East News Agency reported that Saudi Arabia had threatened to impose a new oil embargo against the USA if Congress enacted legislation against the Arab oil boycott. On the following day, Saudi Arabia denied published reports that it had threatened the USA with an oil embargo either in connection with anti-boycott legislation or with the sale

of US missiles. That day Kissinger met the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and subsequently it reversed its vote blocking the Maverick missile sale.

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's arrival in Teheran on 4 October for a four-day visit confirmed the more cordial link with Paris. The Shah and the President signed a nuclear co-operation agreement on 6 October by which France would build two nuclear reactors in Iran. Signs of US concern over tension and instability in Iran grew. On 17 October Iran said that security police had killed at least five terrorists during the previous week. On 25 October the Shah said that the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff George Brown had apologized for suggesting in an interview that the Shah might be thinking of reviving a Persian empire. US officials announced on 2 November that the US ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms, had decided to retire from his post. On the same day, an Iranian Embassy counsellor was critically wounded by a gunman in Paris; an Iranian terrorist organization claimed responsibility and a day later French police detained ten Iranians for questioning about the wounding of the Iranian diplomats. On 4 November the Iranian Cabinet was reshuffled. On 16 November officials said a terrorist linked to the killing of the three Americans in August had been killed with a companion in a clash with police the day before. The Grumman Corporation said on 6 December that it was being sued for \$114.6 million concerning the sale of 80 Grumman F-14 jets to Iran. The Iranian government announced on 23 December that security forces had killed eight guerrillas and captured eleven in two gun battles in Teheran. On 1 January 1977 a report of the US State Department on human rights in Iran was made public by a House of Representatives Committee.

Iran and India signed an agreement on 25 February for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on 11 April the USA and Iran signed a nuclear co-operation pact. On 13 May the new US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met the Shah during a visit to Iran and on 8 June the State Department denied reports that the USA had made a decision not to sell to Iran 250 F-18L fighter planes. But the impact of international criticism of the Shah was obvious. The New York Times reported on 23 June that the International League for Human Rights, a UN affiliate, had protested to the Shah that it had evidence of mass arrests and torture of Iranian citizens at home and of harassment of Iranian citizens abroad by secret police.

In Bahrain on 29 June the government announced that an agreement giving US naval vessels rights at the port of Jufayir would be terminated on 1 July. The talks between Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Minister Shaikh Saad al-Abdulla al-Sabah and Saddam Hussain ended in Baghdad on 3 July. It was agreed to set up a joint committee to work out a settlement. On 20 July Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops began to withdraw from frontier positions as a result of a disengagement agreement reached the week before. The US Defense Department notified Congress on 7 July of a proposed \$1.2 billion sale of seven radar planes to Iran, but on 28 July US President Carter agreed to withdraw the notification and resubmit it to Congress in the year. On 31 July Iran indicated that it was withdrawing its request to buy the radar planes. Premier Amir Abbas Hovieda resigned on 7 August and on the following day Jamshid Amuzgar was named as Premier and the members of the new Cabinet were introduced to the Shah. Carter asked Congress on 7 September to agree to the sale of \$1.2 billion worth of AVACS radar planes to Iran. On 13 September gunmen on the French Riviera attacked a car in which Princess Ashraf Pahlavi was riding, killing one person and wounding

another. The Princess herself was unhurt. In the following month, on 7 October, the US Senate majority leader Robert Byrd urged an immediate moratorium on arms sales to Iran. Iran signed contracts with France on 16 October for two megawatt nuclear power plants and a ten-year supply of enriched uranium fuel. On 8 November Iran confirmed that it had purchased seven AVACS planes from the USA and on 14 November the Shah arrived in the USA for talks with US leaders. On the following day he met President Carter in Washington where opponents of the Shah clashed with his supporters near the White House and 119 people were left injured.

The Shah arrived in Muscat on 5 December for a four-day visit to Oman and on 8 December he returned to Iran after talks on Gulf security and economic co-operation. The next day, Italian police arrested twelve Iranian students who had entered the Iranian Embassy in Rome, burned documents and committed acts of vandalism. On 15 December, the Grumman Corporation said that a compromise settlement had been reached with Iran in which \$24 million of spare parts for F-14 interceptors would be delivered to Iran.

Meanwhile, the London Financial Times reported that troop movements on both sides of the northern border between Oman and the UAE reinforced reports that Oman was claiming a northern portion of Ras al-Khaima. On 16 December the Middle East Economic Digest cited Omani Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary Yusuf al-Alawi as saying that Oman did indeed claim part of Ras al-Khaima where oil had been discovered, but that it was not considering the use of force to back up its claim. On 29 December the UAE President flew to Oman to meet with Sultan Qabus on this border issue. The Amir of Kuwait died of a heart attack on 31 December and Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah succeeded.

It was on the last day of 1977 too that President Carter arrived in Teheran and had talks with the Shah. On 9 January 1978 a demonstration by dissidents in Qum resulted in at least five deaths when police fired on the protestors. On the following day, the Shah met King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh for talks on the Middle East situation and bilateral relations. On 2 February the Shah arrived in New Delhi on a four-day visit. Students clashed with police during demonstrations against the Shah. There were riots against the government in Tabriz on 18 February, leaving six dead and a hundred and twenty five injured. Tanks and troops were still patrolling the streets two days later. On 21 February the death toll was stated to have reached nine. Troops were finally withdrawn on 23 February. Four days later, East German police stormed the Iranian Embassy in Berlin and arrested Iranian students who had occupied the building. On 16 March a motion to censure the government for its handling of the riots in Tabriz was introduced into parliament. The New York Times reported that the government had announced a shakeup of the Tabriz branch of SAVAK. King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Teheran on 23 March for talks with the Shah. Demonstrators in three towns on 2 April attacked public buildings, causing some damage. Four days later Iran said that it had smashed a Soviet espionage network and arrested a retired Iranian general. On 13 April East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer ended a twenty-four visit to Teheran during which he had talks with the Shah concerning the incident in Berlin in February. Police arrested a total of 83 people on 22 April for distributing anti-government pamphlets in a number of towns and villages and it was reported on 2 May that security forces had surrounded Azerbaijan university in Tabriz after a long and violent clash between supporters and opponents of the Shah. Four days later, on 6 May, security policemen

arrested 23 students in Babol after an anti-government demonstration turned violent. Two days later police clashed with dissidents in several cities. Disturbances in Qum and Tabriz left at least seven people dead. On 10 May rioting against the government broke out in Qum once more and also in other cities. The Shah postponed a planned trip to Eastern Europe and took command of troops acting to break up demonstrations by thousands of rioters in Teheran. On 15 May troops patrolled the capital after opponents of the Shah called for the closure of all stores. The next day police clashed with students in Teheran University. The New York Times reported on 22 May that police had arrested fifteen people after a bomb had exploded in Qum. In the following week, on 31 May, about 2,500 students rioted at Teheran University and on the next day police used tear gas to break up a demonstration by female students at the same institution. On 3 June dormitories at the University were closed because of the riots. On 6 June the Shah named Nimat Allah Nasiri, the head of SAVAK, to be ambassador to Pakistan.

A general work slowdown, called by religious leaders, took place in Qum on 17 June. Peaceful protests against the government were also held in Tabriz and other cities. Two days later, on 19 June, the Pan-Iranist Party was officially revived after its leader and three others announced their resignation from the Rastakhiz Party. Minister of Information Daryush Humayun said that membership of the Rastakhiz Party was voluntary and there would be no recrimination against those who left it. On 24 July a Cabinet reshuffle occurred and on the following day riots in Mashhad resulted in the death of a policeman. King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Teheran again on 27 July for a private visit and two days later the Egyptian Vice-President Husni Mubarak met the Shah in Teheran. On 1 August the government

confirmed that seven people had been killed and more than three hundred arrested in riots in thirteen towns during the week. Disturbances in Shiraz left three people dead and on 10 August about a hundred and thirty people were arrested. A day later clashes between police and demonstrators left four people dead in Isfahan. A curfew was imposed. On 12 August, demonstrators and police clashed in Shiraz. Several deaths were reported and on the following day a bomb exploded in a restaurant in Teheran killing one person and injuring forty five. On 17 August the Washington Post reported that the USA had turned down a request by Iran to purchase 31 F-4G fighter bombers. It also quoted Information Minister Humayun's accusation that the Palestine Liberation Organization had helped foment recent riots in Iranian cities.

On 19 August there was a fire at a cinema in Abadan in which at least 377 people died. A day later a cinema in Shiraz was destroyed by arsonists, and a bomb exploded in a restaurant. In Teheran on 21 August an export bank branch was set on fire. On the same day the Abadan police chief said that ten people had been arrested for their role in the fire. The Abadan victims were buried on 22 August. Demonstrations after the mourning ceremonies turned into riots and on the following day tanks and troops took up position in Abadan to prevent rioting. The Iranian Embassy in The Hague was attacked on 23 August by nine Iranian students who issued a statement blaming security police for starting the fire in Abadan and then surrendered to the Dutch police. Two days later, on 25 August, anti-government demonstrations erupted into violence again in Abadan.

On 27 August, a new Cabinet was sworn in. The Washington Post on 30 August reported that Iraq had returned an Iranian alleged to have confessed to playing a role in the Abadan arson, after he had attempted to enter Iraq

illegally. In Mashhad on the following day, police opened fire on demonstrators killing two people. About 150 people were arrested in Los Angeles on 1 September after a demonstration against the Shah had turned violent. Three days later, the Washington Post reported that riots over the weekend in Teheran and fourteen other cities had left at least twelve people dead. On the same day, peaceful demonstrations were held in Teheran and other cities, but it was reported that four people had been killed in clashes between demonstrators in the city of Ilam.

On 6 September the government ordered a ban on public processions and meetings without official permission. Yet on the following day a mass rally was held in the capital. Demonstrators demanded the ousting of the Shah and his replacement by the exiled religious leader Ayat Allah Ruh Allah Khumayni. On 8 September the government declared a six-month period of martial law in Teheran and eleven other cities. Troops fired on anti-government demonstrators in Teheran killing at least 86 and injuring 205. On 9 September the Shah postponed a visit to East Germany and Rumania in order to deal with the unrest at home. Former Premier Hovieda resigned his post as Minister of the Imperial Court on the same day. Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq arrived in Teheran and met the Shah. On 10 September, one person was killed in Qum when troops fired into a crowd. On the same day in a telephone call to the Shah, President Carter expressed regret at the recent violence in Iran and hoped that the movement towards political liberalization would nevertheless continue. Nine members of parliament disrupted and then walked out of a speech by Premier Imami. On 12 September the government arrested or issued warrants for scores of opponents of the Shah. Two days later, the Teheran Domestic Service reported that former Minister of Culture Mansur Ruhani and former

Agriculture Minister Faridun Mahdavi had been arrested. The government received a vote of confidence in the Majlis on 16 September by a vote of 176 to 16. Debate prior to the vote of confidence was televised nationally. The next day eighteen opposition MPs walked out of the debate on the introduction of martial law in the twelve cities. On 24 September police fired into the air to disperse demonstrators in Golayegan.

In Saudi Arabia on 30 September King Hussein of Jordan met Crown Prince Fahd in Jidda and on 2 October the Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussain arrived there also to meet Fahd before going on to Kuwait where he had talks with Crown Prince Shaikh Saad al Abdulla al-Sabah. In Iran itself the government promised on 3 October to meet in full the demands of striking bank, telecommunications and oil refinery workers. Three days later, on 6 October, exiled opposition leader Khomeini flew to Paris from Iraq where he had lived for more than eleven years. On 8 October Health Minister Mazdhi resigned his post. Iran's ambassador to the United States, Ardashir Zahedi met the Shah on 9 October to discuss the disturbances. On 11 October journalists staged a strike to protest against military censorship. Troops and student demonstrators clashed in Teheran. Two days later the government agreed to the demands of the journalists. Also on 13 October the opposition National Front Party called a peaceful general strike for 16 October. On 15 October the government deployed tanks in Teheran on the eve of the threatened general strike. It was reported three days later that the Minister of Science and Higher Education, Mahavandi, had resigned in protest against the wage increase awarded after strikes. On 22 October police opened fire on demonstrators in Hamadan killing five people.

On the following day, the government said that 1,451 prisoners would be released to mark the Shah's birthday. Justice Minister Bahiri said that those released would be fully compensated. On 24 October, however, riots took place in the town of Gorgan: government buildings, cinemas, banks and other structures were burned by rioters and the next day similar attacks were made in Rasht. On 26 October snipers in Jahrom killed the police chief and critically wounded the martial law administrator of the town. Troops clashed with student demonstrators once more in Teheran. The next day rioting in several towns and cities left a further five people dead. On 29 October the government dismissed or retired 34 senior officials of the intelligence organization SAVAK. Bahiri and Minister of State Azmun tendered their resignations on 30 October and the new Cabinet was announced. On the next day, the oil industry was paralysed by a strike. Also on the last day of October Crown Prince Riza met President Carter in Washington. Carter reaffirmed American support for the Shah on 3 November. The opposition National Front leader Karim Sanjabi met Ayat Allah Khomeini in Paris. In Teheran itself violent demonstrations again erupted with at least ten people killed. On 5 November demonstrators in Teheran toppled a statue of the Shah at the university and set hotels and public buildings alight. The British Embassy was set on fire, but troops repulsed an attack on the United States Embassy. Imami resigned the Premiership.

From Paris on 5 November came a declaration from Khomeini and Sanjabi that they would not support any coalition government unless the Shah agreed to a referendum on the monarchy. On 6 November, when the new military Cabinet was named, Khomeini said that the opposition would find some other means of solving the problem if political methods failed. The military government announced on 7 November that it had arrested fourteen prominent

officials, including the former head of SAVAK and six former Cabinet ministers, while on the following day former Premier Hovieda was arrested. The military government announced that 54 indictments of former public officials and businessmen had been issued on charges of corruption. The Shah ordered an investigation into all investments and business dealings of the royal family.

Such concessions failed to quell disorder and were accompanied, in any case, by more familiar measures. On 11 November the military government arrested Sanjabi in Teheran. When demonstrations took place in Ahwaz and Khorramshah, eight people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and troops. On the following day, the military government ordered striking oil employees to go back to work and threatened to dismiss those who refused. On 13 November oilfields reported that more than 60 per cent of their workers had returned to their jobs. On 14 November demonstrators again clashed with troops in the bazaar of Teheran and there were clashes in Sunqur and Lahjan between security forces and demonstrators which left a total of six people dead. On the same day, however, oilworkers in the Abadan refinery and the offshore installations returned to work, though higher absenteeism was reported in the Ahwaz fields. On 16 November the new ministers were presented to the Shah by Ghulam Riza Azhari; on the same day troops clashed with demonstrators protesting against the Shah in Mashhad, Isfahan and other cities. On the following day, an armed forces parade was held in Teheran. A statement issued by the Acting Chief of Staff pledged to preserve the constitution and the monarchy. However, further demonstrations took place in eleven cities across the country. Troops fired on demonstrators in Mashhad, killing at least three people.

US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal arrived in Jidda on 17 November for a two-day official visit to Saudi Arabia. The following day Empress Farah left Teheran for a visit to Baghdad and al-Najaf in Iraq, while Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was against any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iran. On the following day the United States issued a statement saying that it did not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The Iranian government released a further 210 political prisoners. Blumenthal arrived in Abu Dhabi on 19 November on a two-day official visit. On 20 November the bazaar of Teheran reopened for business at the end of a strike lasting one month. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing warned Khomeini on 21 November not to call for violence in Iran from French territory. On the same day, the army took over the operation of an electric power station near Teheran after a strike by workers had blacked out the capital. That day also Treasury Secretary Blumenthal met the Shah in Teheran on oil matters and on the next day he met the Amir in Kuwait. On the same day in Iran the Majlis voted by 191 to 27 with 6 abstentions to approve a government programme to restore order. Troops clashed with demonstrators in the bazaar of Teheran. The government reported that three people had been killed in demonstrations in Shiraz during the previous two days and on 23 November clashes between demonstrators and security forces in two towns near Shiraz left two people dead.

Three days later, on 26 November, demonstrations and work stoppages were carried out in all major cities in response to a call for a one-day strike by opposition and religious leaders. At least nine people were killed in demonstrations in Gorgan. King Hussein of Jordan appeared in Teheran once more. The Kuwaiti Amir met King Khalid in Riyadh on 28

November and on the following day the President of the UAE also arrived to confer. In Iran Premier Azhari announced a ban on all processions in any form during the month of Muharram and banned all religious gatherings not cleared in advance. It was announced, however, that laws in Iran would be revised to conform with Islamic principles. On 30 November the Qatari Amir also arrived in Riyadh for discussions with King Khalid. On the following day clashes took place in Teheran between soldiers and demonstrators who were violating a curfew. On 2 December, when demonstrators defied a ban on marches on the first day of Muharram, soldiers dispersed the demonstrators, killing at least six people. Other protests were held in Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire. On 3 December troops fired on protestors in Teheran. Ayat Allah Khumayni urged a resumption of strikes by oil workers in Iran and called on the armed forces to desert if ordered to fire on demonstrators. On the following day the French government issued a further warning to Khumayni to show reserve in his pronouncements. Renewed strikes crippled oil production. Urban guerrillas attacked a police station with grenades, killing one policeman. On 5 December, Azhari blamed the strife in Iran on saboteurs who were the tools of foreigners. On 6 December, Karim Sanjabi, leader of the opposition National Front, was released from prison. He said the next day that he would refuse to join any coalition government under the illegal monarchy. The USA announced that it would allow dependents of US personnel to leave Iran at government expense. On 8 December Azhari lifted the ban on processions for a forty-eight hour period. On the same day in Bahrain the Kuwaiti Crown Prince met with Bahrain's Amir in Manama.

On 10 December, hundreds of thousands of protestors marched through Teheran in a peaceful demonstration against the Shah. Smaller demonstrations took place in Qum, Mashad, Tabriz and other cities and on

the next day, massive demonstrations continued throughout the country. In Isfahan troops clashed with rioting demonstrators, killing five people. Amnesty International accused Iran of continuing to torture political prisoners. On 12 December the Kuwaiti Crown Prince ended a visit to Qatar during which he had talks with the Qatari Amir, and on the same day he met the UAE Vice-President Shaikh Rashid in Abu Dhabi. In Iran soldiers fired on rioters in Isfahan, killing at least forty people. Most oil workers refused to return to work in the oilfields. President Carter stated that it was uncontrolled statements made from foreign countries that were encouraging violence and had exacerbated the situation in Iran. He stated that the Shah had the support and confidence of the United States but that the United States had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran. On the following day, 13 December, Ayat Allah Khomeini said that henceforth any head of state who supported the Shah would be deprived of Iranian oil and all treaties with his country would be considered annulled. At the same time, troops in Isfahan led a demonstration in support of the Shah and forced some motorists to join in the demonstration. On 14 December the Shah met Sanjabi and other opposition leaders in an effort to form a coalition government; on the same day demonstrators for and against the Shah confronted each other in Isfahan and other cities. Three men in military uniforms opened fire at the Levizan military camp. On 15 December the Ayat Allah called for a general strike to support striking oil workers and declared a day of mourning to be observed for those killed in the disturbances.

Three days later, on 18 December, troops in Tabriz refused to fire on anti-Shah protestors. A day of mourning was held for those killed in demonstrations. Clashes took place in Qum and Tabriz. On the same day, Ayat

Allah Hussain Ali Muntaziri met Khumayni near Paris. In Oman on 19 December the Kuwaiti Crown Prince had talks on consolidating bilateral relations. The New York Times cited Iranian government sources as saying that the Shah had ruled out the possibility of a Regency Council as a solution to the political crisis. Ayat Allah Mutaziri said he had been tortured by SAVAK while in the prison from which he had been released in October. Two days later, on 21 December, the Majlis moved to adjourn early and delay a censure debate. On 23 December, soldiers opened fire on demonstrators in Mashhad, killing thirteen people, while on the same day gunmen murdered a US oil executive and an Iranian oil official in separate attacks near Ahwaz. On the next day, US Embassy guards fired into a crowd that had gathered outside the Embassy when projectiles were thrown into the Embassy grounds. Students demonstrated in Teheran. Sanjabi said on 25 December that the only solution would be for the Shah to abdicate. The following day petroleum exports halved as production fell to the level of domestic consumption. Soldiers in Teheran fired into a funeral procession on 27 December, killing their own colonel and five others. Demonstrations in the capital turned into riots. The USA stated on the same day that it believed that the Shah had an important role to play in the transition to a stable political situation. On 28 December, strikes closed the central bank and the state airline. Oil refineries stopped production. Oil rationing began. As demonstrations continued in Teheran, Pravda reported that a special group had been sent to the US Embassy in Teheran to help keep the Shah in power. On 29 December a National Front leader Shahpur Bakhtiyar said the Shah had asked him to form a government. US officials said an aircraft carrier task force had been ordered to depart from the Philippines for possible movement to the Gulf. The State Department revealed that the

Shah's mother had arrived in the United States. On 30 December the National Front expelled Bakhtiyar. Demonstrators in Mashhad hanged three police agents and when troops arrived on the scene they fired into the crowd. Rioting was repeated in Mashhad and other cities the following day leading to renewed clashes with troops. The US government advised dependents of Americans in Iran to leave the country. Similar recommendations were made by Canada and Britain.

On 1 January 1979, the government said that the death toll from violence in Mashhad during the previous two days was 170. On the same day the Shah said that he would like to take a vacation if the situation permitted. Air traffic controllers struck in Teheran, closing down the airport. On the following day, 2 January, violence in Qazvin left an undetermined number of casualties. Troops at Teheran airport were reinforced to enable foreigners to depart from the country. In the United States, Iranian demonstrators marched on the home of the Shah's sister in Beverly Hills, California, starting fires and causing damage. On 3 January Bakhtiyar said he had formed a Cabinet. Both houses of parliament passed votes inviting him to head a government. The Shah on the same day appointed Abbas Qarabaghi as Chief of Staff and on 4 January he signed a decree appointing Bakhtiyar Premier before leaving Teheran for a holiday in a nearby resort. The United States said it was prepared to co-operate fully with the new government. Army Commander Ghulam Ali Uvaysi left Iran for the United States. It was reported that he had resigned. Two days later, on 6 January, the Cabinet was presented to the Shah. The Ayat Allah Khomeini called the new Cabinet illegal and a plot against the people. The Shah appointed a new military governor of Teheran. Newspapers were published for the first time in two months. On the same day the Shah said he would take a

rest after he had become confident about what was happening in the country. On the following day, 7 January, demonstrations again took place in Teheran and other cities and on 8 January it was reported that Faridun Jam had refused to serve as War Minister. An anti-government demonstration was held in Qum. US officials said that their government had advised the Shah that it would be best for stability in Iran if he left the country temporarily. It was reported that Azhari had already left on grounds of health.

On the next day, 9 January, strikes and demonstrations continued in Teheran and other cities and it was announced that the Shah would turn over the private holdings of the royal family to the Pahlavi Foundation. He also named Abd al-Ali Badrai Commander of the Army. The government ended martial law in Shiraz. On 10 January, Ayat Allah Khomeini said relations with the United States would be good so long as Washington left Iran to decide its own destiny. The following day US Secretary of State Vance said that the United States felt a decision by the Shah to form a Regency Council and leave the country had been a sound decision and said the new government should be given every chance to find a peaceful solution. Jafar Shafaqat was named War Minister. Bakhtiyar pledged to disband SAVAK, to abolish martial law and free all political prisoners. He announced that 868 political prisoners had been released earlier in the day. On the following day, 12 January, the United States said it had urged the military to give full support to the government. The next day a Regency Council that would carry out the duties of the Shah after his departure was announced. On the same day Khomeini announced the formation of a Council of the Islamic Revolution that would be charged with selecting and installing a provisional government in Iran. Demonstrators marched in Teheran after ceremonies reopening Teheran University had taken place and on the next day

demonstrators in support of Khomeini were active on the streets of Teheran. On 15 January the Senate approved the appointment of Bakhtiary. Ten diplomats at the Iranian Embassy in the United States said that they would not work with Ambassador Ardshir Zahedi. An American engineer was murdered in Kerman.

On 16 January the Shah left Iran and flew to Aswan in Egypt where he was met by President Anwar al-Sadat. The Ayat Allah Khomeini hailed the departure of the Shah as the preface to his victory. The Majlis, however, approved the appointment of Bakhtiary. On the following day, 17 January, the Ayat Allah called on Cabinet Ministers to resign their illegal posts. President Carter urged the Ayat Allah to give the new government a chance to succeed. On the same day renegade troops in tanks and jeeps fired on anti-government demonstrators in Ahwaz. Newspaper accounts put the death toll at more than ten people. The New York Times reported that Justice Minister Yazdi had resigned. On 18 January Ayat Allah Shariatmadari expressed the fear that Iran might be faced with terrible turmoil if the government were toppled suddenly. The head of the Regency Council, Jalal al-Din Tihrani travelled to France to meet Khomeini. In Iran clashes between demonstrators and troops took place in Ahwaz and Dizful. On the following day, 19 January, Khomeini refused to see the Head of the Regency Council unless he resigned his post. On the same day, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched in Teheran in support of Khomeini. The next day Khomeini said he would return to Iran in a few days, but on 21 January Bakhtiary said that he was the legitimate ruler of Iran and would defend his post. On 22 January Ayat Allah Mahmud Talaghani warned that the Iranian people might undertake a holy war against the army if it attempted a coup. Meanwhile, Tihani resigned from the Regency Council and delivered his

resignation to Khomeini. The Shah arrived in Marrakesh on a private visit by King Hassan of Morocco. In Iran the Chief of Staff Qarabaghi said that the military would support the Bakhtiary government.

On the 23 January about 1,200 special troops marched in support of the Shah in Teheran. The State Department said on the following day that the USA had agreed to send 200,000 barrels of diesel fuel and gasoline to Iran. When, on 25 January, the government closed the airport in Teheran Khomeini postponed his scheduled return to Iran and condemned the government for its treasonable action. More than 50,000 people gathered in Teheran in support of the government. The government said that it would start enforcing a prohibition on public demonstrations. On the following day, demonstrations were nonetheless held against the government in Teheran. At least fifteen people were killed when soldiers fired on the demonstrators. Troops clashed with demonstrators in Tabriz. On 27 January demonstrations against the government continued in the capital after the closure of all the airports was extended until further notice. It was, however, announced that Bakhtiary would fly to France to discuss the future of the nation with Khomeini. Khomeini promptly retorted that he would not meet Bakhtiary unless the Premier first resigned, and he urged Iranians to struggle for an Islamic republic to the last drop of blood. Further demonstrations took place in Teheran and further killings.

On 29 January the government announced that it would re-open the airports on the following day. Demonstrators rioted in Teheran. The US Consul in Isfahan was beaten by a hostile crowd. The government said that a \$6.2 billion contract for the construction by a French concern of two nuclear plants had been cancelled. On 30 January the government authorized the return of Khomeini to Iran. The US Embassy ordered all government

dependents to leave the country. On 31 January columns of troops moved through Teheran in support of the government. On 1 February the Ayat Allah Khomeini returned to his homeland from his exile in France. At least three million people lined the streets to welcome him. Even more than the 1958 revolution in Iraq, the Iranian revolution of 1979 was to change the course of international history in the Gulf, and would do so more promptly and drastically than all the bustling diplomacy and arms dealing of the previous twenty years.

The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of preceding chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed referencing:

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Chapter Nine: Conclusion

In this thesis we have examined the international history of the Gulf region during the period from 1958, which marked the end of the Iraqi Hashemite dynasty and the birth of a revolutionary Socialist regime which was totally new to the area, until 1979 which was marked by an even more remarkable event: the downfall of the strong Shah, whom some had seen as an 'American King'. It was obvious when the Shah left Iran on 16 January 1979, even to his most ardent supporters, that whereas a year earlier he could rightly have claimed to have been in full control the situation in the ensuing twelve months had rapidly deteriorated. He lost control of the administrative system he had developed so painstakingly to enable him to govern Iran. The failure of the Shah's organizational hierarchy to respond to the first serious challenge to his regime in two decades contributed, more than any other factor, not only to the demise of that particular Shah but also to the ending of the monarchical system in Iran, a system that had lasted, in different forms, for many centuries. The Shah's fall not only ended the American 'sweet dream', but it brought the smaller Gulf states together in a common search for security in the light of the threat the new regime in Iran might pose.

Over the twenty-one years with which we have been concerned the region went through various experiences which might be described as 'normal' for new-born countries and nations. The states had to adjust to far-reaching internal social and economic changes in a difficult international context. It is not surprising that there were certain initial difficulties and setbacks before a real degree of positive co-operation proved possible. In the early 1960s there was an understandable concern with domestic social and economic developments. Overshadowing all was the

increasing interference and involvement of the superpowers, particularly because both Iran and Iraq needed assistance with technology and the supply of arms. The rivalry between Iraq and Iran has emerged in our study as constant, only occasionally modified by apparent accords and agreements. That rivalry, of course, finally issued in a war which is still continuing.

Notwithstanding their need to co-operate against external pressures, we have noted among the smaller Gulf states a series of obstacles to more fundamental unity. These obstacles had, in varying degrees, racial, political, ideological or economic causes. They created or reinforced a strong sense of individual self-interest. Generally speaking, however, we have noted that the roots of the tension between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in Arab politics lie in different understandings of the nature of Arab identity and nationalism. An acceptance of a common language, a common heritage and, to an extent, a common history has existed alongside differing emphases of potentially great significance. We have seen the extent to which, on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states have stressed Islam rather than Arabism while on the other Iraq has stressed both Arabism and Socialism.

We have seen that it was the differences between Iran and Iraq which gave great scope for the activities of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. Local rivalries therefore were caught up in, and sometimes transformed by, this wider international dimension. Even so, the Gulf states were generally willing to accept Iraq's domestic regime so long as it was not accompanied by active interference in their own affairs. Likewise in the case of Iran. Events since 1979 suggests that our decision to end the thesis in that year is wise. The balance of power and the political atmosphere has changed considerably in the aftermath of the

Shah's departure. In this new situation, however, there still remains the necessity for the Gulf states to cope with the complexity of nationalism, regionalism, language and culture, and economic and social change in an international environment which remains uncertain. It has been this need which has led to the work of the Gulf Co-operation Council. It has been welcomed by the Gulf people and seen as the positive outcome of these two decades of political development which we have tried to trace. Despite all the conflicts and disputes which have emerged from time to time it can be seen as a positive achievement. Of course, certain substantial differences of conviction and interest remain, but the pattern of connexions and contacts which we have sought to trace seems to rule out simple struggles between 'Arabs' and 'Persians', or between 'Sunnis' and 'Shia' as the fundamental cause of conflict. These differences have only become important, from time to time, for political or economic reasons.

The achievement of security remains vital since 'instability' serves as a pretext for outside intervention, colonial or otherwise. Whatever the motives for that intervention, either Soviet or American, our thesis suggests that it is in any case likely to have many unintended as well as intended consequences. Security, of course, is not only vital for the states of the Gulf region themselves, but it is also important for the whole world, given their geographical location and their petroleum, gas and mineral reserves. That security is only likely to be achieved by negotiations at regional level, by practical co-operation, trust and non-interference from outside. It is in this context that the elaborate network of visits by rulers and their advisers, which we have traced, must be seen. Political stability also requires both social and economic progress and, in turn, the achievement of greater stability would allow a reduction in

military spending and the further diversion of resources to more beneficial long-term developments. The fate of the Shah suggests, in any event, that massive military expenditure can in turn become counter-productive.

There is, therefore, no firm 'conclusion' which can be reached about the international history of the Gulf, although we can point to the continuing work of the Gulf Co-operation Council in establishing a clear locally-based perspective. Although no mention of defence or security was made in the original constitution, the summit meeting which ratified its constitution also issued a statement rejecting any foreign presence in the Gulf region. The Supreme Council of Ministers in November 1981 agreed to include defence co-operation in the activities of the Council. As a result, defence ministers met in January 1982 to discuss a standardization of weapons. Ground forces of the member states held a joint military exercise in October 1983, followed by naval and air exercises in 1984. In November 1984 member states agreed to form a joint defence force for rapid deployment against external aggression, comprising units from the armed forces of each country under a central command. Between 1981 and 1986 the Council made repeated offers to mediate in the war between Iraq and Iran. In November 1986 the Supreme Council reiterated its demand that Iran should agree to submit to mediation in the conflict and urged Iran to stop its attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf.. It scarcely needs to be said that these appeals have not yet been successful. The international history of the Gulf has still to be settled.

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The arrangement of his bibliography reflects the character of the thesis. It integrates a wide variety of printed materials but is not based on archival sources. The printed materials are in English and Arabic and they are separately listed in the two languages. The English-language bibliography is arranged, so far as possible, by topic, though it will be apparent that many books touch on more than one area.

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NOTE

It may be helpful to give an indication of the nature of the material in the three fundamental compilations which have been heavily drawn upon in the latter chapters of this thesis, namely Keesing's Contemporary Archives, The Middle East Journal and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. The former two draw their information from a variety of 'Western' English-language newspapers and journals and from material published in the Middle East. They include Arab Report and Record (London), The Arab World (Beirut), The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), The Economist (London), The Manchester Guardian Weekly (Manchester), Kayhan International (Teheran), Middle East Economic Digest (London), Middle East Economic Survey (Beirut), Le Monde (Paris), New York Times (New York), Washington Post.

Material monitored by the BBC relating to the Gulf is chiefly derived from Baghdad Radio, Cairo Radio, Damascus Radio and Teheran Radio. The radio transmissions themselves sometimes quote material published in the leading national Arabic-language newspapers, such as Al-Ahram. The individual newspapers have been identified in the text.

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