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Culture Policies and Sino-Soviet Relations in
Kazakhstan and Sinkiang, 1917-60

Gerhard Schachner

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the
University of Glasgow

The Institute of Soviet and East European Studies
and
The Department of Modern History

June 1980
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This study arose essentially out of my long-standing interest in the relations between the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic. As an undergraduate in the Department of History at the University of Toronto I was able to acquire the background in Russian and Chinese history that the present research required. In the present work it was intended originally to assess the influence of the Turkic people of Central Asia on the Sino-Soviet relationship. As the research progressed it became obvious that this aspect of the Sino-Soviet question could not be dealt with without first understanding something of the Turkic people and their cultural heritage. It was from this that the present historical, political and social analysis emerged.

In the course of this work I became ever more conscious of the great debt I owe to a number of people. Foremost among these are Dr. Hannes Adomeit, Jack Gray and John A. Newth who undertook the supervision of this project. Their many thought provoking suggestions no doubt helped to improve my work and added new dimensions to it. In addition they permitted me to draw on their considerable knowledge of both the field of study and the source materials that were available.

My study of the Chinese language was assisted by Jack Gray, who taught me during 1976-77. Additional assistance was rendered in this regard by Professor Alfred L. Brown, who was instrumental in the award to me of a Post-Graduate Travel Grant by the University of Glasgow. This enabled me to attend the regular Chinese language classes at Edinburgh University during 1977-78.

I was fortunate also to become acquainted with Jack Miller. He was ever willing to assist and never hesitated to allow me to benefit from his knowledge of the Soviet Union and his experience as an editor. Similarly Dr. Vladimir V. Kusin readily provided me with numerous source references and was willing always to listen and discuss my
ideas.

The research for this thesis would have been far more difficult had it not been for the staff of the Glasgow University Library. Their dedication and willingness to help in matters ranging from my research to study accommodation have been very much appreciated. I am particularly indebted to Graham H. Whitaker and Mrs. Catherine E. Carr who dealt with the inter-library loans. Without their considerable effort some of this research would not have been possible.

This work was assisted also by those people with whom I interacted on a social level over the past several years. Alfred L. Brown and Andrew did far more than I could ever have expected to ensure that my stay was pleasant. Vladimir and Daniela Kusin generously opened their home and allowed me to spend many enjoyable and memorable hours in their company. There also were excursion trips to the Scottish Highlands with Roger A. Clarke and many hours of enlightening and enjoyable discussion with Gordon K. Anderson and Nigel R. Thorp. And, when escape became absolutely essential, I was welcomed always in the midst of relatives and friends on the Continent. I am sincerely grateful for all these people have done.

A special thanks goes to my parents. It was their foresight and courage that made this study possible. Their determination to stand in the face of adversity provided both a source of inspiration and moral support. In addition they were prepared always to lend financial support when this was needed most. It is to them that these pages are dedicated.
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SUMMARY

The object of this study is to assess the extent to which the Turkic people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang have been aligned politically and socially with the socialist societies of their respective countries. It is not intended to consider this question in the light of success or failure. There are several reasons for not doing so. It would be realistic to consider the question in this light only if a definite goal was to be achieved within a specified period of time. This was not the case in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang. There was and is no definable period of time within which Communism is to be achieved. Equally important, Communism remains a hazy expression for a state of existence that yet has to be defined in a manner that is universally accepted.

In this study the various political, cultural, religious and educational aspects of the Turkic people will be considered. The intention is to discover to what extent these traditions have been replaced by the social institutions of the socialist societies. This in turn should allow some insight into the advances made by both the Russian and Chinese Communists in their attempts to transform their respective Turkic people. At the same time the study deals with specific difficulties that the Governments had to overcome in the course of the transformation process. These include getting the Turkic people to participate in the various socialist institutions. From this there arise new questions and problems. The Islamic society of the Turkic people had not prepared the latter to participate in a modern, industrial society. They lacked the required educational background to be usefully employable in the bureaucracy on any but a superficial level. As a result non-Turkic cadres had to be used in many leading positions. This raised the question of great Russian and Han-Chinese chauvinism.

Another problem was that of attacking the traditional Turkic way
of life without alienating the Turkic people. The direct attack on Islam was complex. In general both Governments demonstrated a lack of understanding for the Islamic way of life. As a consequence they launched an attack on an Islamic orthodoxy that did not exist. Also, the Soviet policy of an outright attack forced the Soviet Government to define a new way of life for the Kazakh and other Muslim people. In China the need for this was avoided because of the less antagonistic attitude towards Islam.

To a great extent this study compares the policies of the Soviet and Chinese Governments. This in itself raises some questions. The Russian revolution preceded the Chinese by nearly 32 years. This gave the Chinese a considerable advantage. They did not have to make the same mistakes that had been made by the Soviet Union, particularly the collectivisation drive in Kazakhstan. But the Chinese not only benefitted from the Soviet mistakes. They were able also to make use of the advanced experience of the Soviet Union in advancing their economic development programme. In addition the more industrially advanced Soviet Union could and did assist the Chinese in their industrialisation.

From the discussion of the connection between the two countries their logically follows an assessment of the inter-state relationship. The intention is to discover to what extent the Turkic people influenced the Sino-Soviet relationship. But the economic question hardly can be excluded from the discussion. This in turn leads to the analysis of some of the historical, political, ideological and economic causes of the Sino-Soviet rift.
Kazakhstan
and
Sinkiang
INTRODUCTION

In this study the emphasis will be placed on two geographic regions—Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. Although they are a part of different countries, they are similar in many respects. Both were included in the larger geographic region formerly known as Turkestan and inhabited by the Turkic people. While the people were divided into different Turkic groups, they share a common ethnic, cultural and religious heritage. In addition they speak mutually intelligible languages. Although some were settled the larger proportion remained nomadic. The latter group moved about the Kazakh steppes and mountainous regions and freely crossed from eastern into western Turkestan and vice-versa. It was also common for relatives to live in both parts of the region, as there were no restrictions on access to either.

Turkestan was an ethnically homogeneous region and its division into eastern and western Turkestan was based on geographic rather than cultural differences. While this division was geographic as long as Turkestan remained independent, it became political after the region was divided by the Russian and Chinese conquests.

The Russian drive towards Asia began under Peter the Great. But this was not a systematic conquest. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Russians conquered the Kazakh steppes militarily. On the other hand, the Chinese suzerainty over eastern Turkestan had been established during the Han dynasty in 36 B.C. After the fall of the Han the region was lost. It was reconquered under the T'ang who ruled over it from 657-751. The region was subsequently conquered by the Mongols and not brought under Chinese rule again until 1759 under the Manchus. Hence, Turkestan had not only been divided into eastern and western parts. Each part was also ruled over by a different nation—east Turkestan by the Chinese and west Turkestan by the Russians.

Following the communist takeovers in Russia and China this condi-
tion prevailed. But while the people remained under foreign rule throughout the period of the conquests, no systematic attempts had been made to alter their traditional way of life. The communist takeover changed this. Marx's theories were devoted to complete social change. This change was not only limited to the social system, but also was intended to alter the thinking and values of the people living in the socialist states. These theories committed the Communists of both countries to changing the traditions of their respective Turkic people.

The aim of this study is to analyse and compare the Soviet and Chinese attempts to transform the Turkic traditions in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang in the 1917-60 period. In the course of this analysis the political, religious, cultural and educational developments within the two regions will be discussed. This discussion should offer some insights into the extent to which the indigenous people were drawn into the new social order. It also should give some indication of whether a new socialist people are emerging. That is, a people devoid of their Turkic cultural consciousness and traditions. Finally, the study will consider the relationship between the two socialist states—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The international conflict within the communist block is also a conflict between different national groups. As such it permits a wider perspective within which to frame the nationality problems. These can then be seen in the context of both the intra-block and intra-state conflict.

In the course of changing the political and cultural traditions of the Turkic people the two Governments were bound to encounter opposition. The social values of Socialism and Islam stand in direct opposition to each other. They represent the differing cultural values and material needs of two different ethnic groups. A similar situation, although not in ideological terms, prevailed within the Sino-Soviet relationship. In essence the Soviet Union and China were two countries that had different cultural values and material needs. They were to
co-exist on the basis of a common ideology. The ideology was to overcome their national differences, just as it was to overcome the differences between the national groups within each country. But in the Sino-Soviet relationship there was a crucial difference. Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic are sovereign states. This gave them the right and freedom to break their mutual ties. A similar choice is not available to the ethnic groups within each of the two states.

In this analysis it is not intended to evaluate the Soviet and Chinese efforts to transform their respective Turkic groups in terms of success or failure. These are relative terms and quite impossible to relate to a goal that is itself undefined. This goal, Communism, is a hazy expression for a state of existence that is to be achieved over a period of time. But neither this state nor the period of time in which it is to be achieved are defined. These variables make any assessment on the basis of success or failure unrealistic. For this particular study the best that may be attained is some indication of how the respective Governments intended to bring the transformation about and how the indigenous people reacted to these endeavours. Another approach, one that lies beyond the scope of the present work, is to measure the advances among similar ethnic groups in both communist and non-communist states. This sort of comparison may well produce some indication of how well the two systems are able to meet the needs of their people. It may provide also a basis for assessing the systems in terms of success and failure.

The population of Turkestan

One of the greatest problems in dealing with Kazakhstan and Sinkiang is that related to their populations. In the six districts that were incorporated largely into the Kazakh SSR in 1936—Ural'sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semira and Syr-Darya—the people were mixed ethnically. According to the 1897 and 1911 census statistics, they included Russians, Kirghiz (Kazakhs), Sarts (Turkic town dwellers),
Uzbeks, Tatars, Karakalpaks, Taranchi (settled Uighurs) and Tadjiks. In addition there were various other Turkic, Asiatic and European groups.\(^1\) So long as the influx of people into the Kazakh steppes was confined to a trickle of settlers there was little difficulty. However, this situation was changed markedly by the large-scale influx of settlers following the Russian penetration of the Asian region. In the eighteenth century Cossack colonists were settled in the most fertile regions of the Kazakh steppes. The immediate areas of settlement included the northern regions of the Ural'sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk districts and the entire Semireche district. From the latter nineteenth century onward the Europeans, primarily Russians, settled in the regions colonized by the Cossacks.\(^2\) As more land was settled, including the best agricultural and pasture land, the Kazakhs became increasingly confined in their nomadic pursuits. Consequently, some began to settle also.

For the analyst dealing with the Turkic people this mixture of people creates difficulties. The data that is available, particularly that for the post-1917 period, is often ethnically mixed. It is not immediately discernable always whether it applied to the Kazakhs, the Europeans or the other Asiatic people.

A similar difficulty arises in Sinkiang. There too the population is mixed ethnically. It consists of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Mongols, Manchus, Chinese, Tadjiks (Iranians) and Russians.\(^3\) As a result the data too is not clearly distinguishable always as applying to one particular group.

Another aspect of this problem is the relative size of each ethnic group in the two regions. For Kazakhstan reasonably comprehensive statistics are available dating back to 1897. It must be borne in mind though, that the present boundaries of Kazakhstan were established in 1936. The statistics predating this, therefore, are not entirely representative of the present region. They do allow, nevertheless, a
general overview of the population trend. (See table 1) From this trend it is evident that there was a large influx of slavic settlers—Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians—and that the Kazakhs are becoming only gradually a majority in their republic once again.

The Chinese population figures for Sinkiang cannot be relied upon, although many contradictory statistics have been published. (See tables 2 and 3) These only allow for estimates to be made of the actual size of Sinkiang's population. Since such estimates necessarily must be based on the figures that themselves are in question, the accuracy of the estimates is equally dubious. They nonetheless provide a general indicator, but they must not be accepted as absolute values under any circumstances.

In both regions the mixed populations and the different and incompatible economic pursuits of the people led to difficulties. The Cossack colonists encroached on the lands of the Kazakhs in Semireche. This resulted in disputes during the 1860's. When the Kazakhs became more politically conscious and active in the affairs of government during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the settlement of the steppes understandably received most of their attention. In Sinkiang the influx of Chinese settlers resulted in similar problems. In 1944 Chinese peasants from Honan province were settled in the Altai district. There they became one of the main causes of the Kazakh rebellion that broke out in the same year.

The geographic factor

A better understanding of the difficulties caused by the settlement of the two regions may be gained by considering some basic geographic factors. The first point to be borne in mind is the vastness of the two regions. Combined they are eighteen and one-half times larger than the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, or nearly one-half the size of the United States of America. The area of Kazakhistan is 2,756,000 and that of Sinkiang 1,707,000 square kilometers. For the
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<th>1926</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhs (Kirghiz)</td>
<td>3,644,911</td>
<td>4,168,918</td>
<td>3,713,394</td>
<td>2,794,966</td>
<td>4,234,166</td>
<td>5,289,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>633,311</td>
<td>1,851,312</td>
<td>1,279,979</td>
<td>3,974,229</td>
<td>5,521,917</td>
<td>5,991,000</td>
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<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>860,822</td>
<td>762,131</td>
<td>933,461</td>
<td>898,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>25,614</td>
<td>107,463</td>
<td>198,275</td>
<td>181,000</td>
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<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>64,235</td>
<td>76,784</td>
<td>213,498</td>
<td>136,570</td>
<td>216,340</td>
<td>263,000</td>
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<td>Uighurs (Taranchi)</td>
<td>60,999</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>51,803</td>
<td>59,840</td>
<td>120,881</td>
<td>148,000</td>
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<td>Azerbaidzhanis</td>
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<td>38,362</td>
<td>57,699</td>
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<td>Tadjiks</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td>8,179</td>
<td>7,666</td>
<td>8,075</td>
<td>15,981</td>
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<td>Tatars</td>
<td>55,252</td>
<td>77,452</td>
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### Table 2
Chinese Population Statistics for Sinkiang

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**Notes:**

*Dictionary of New Terms, Shanghai, 1953. This source also gives 400,000 Kazakhs for 1953.*

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Notes:  
- aIncludes Hui-Chinese;  
b Includes Sibos and Solons;  
c Includes Solons;  
d Includes the whole CPR;  
e Includes Manchus, Sibos, Solons and Daurs.  

early travellers, limited to animals for transportation as they were, the distances to be covered represented formidable obstacles. These were made less formidable by the advent of motor transportation. By the 1930's the automobile had eased the lot of the travellers a great deal.

Motor transport has revolutionized travel in Chinese Central Asia, and one can nowadays accomplish in a few weeks the long journeys which formerly occupied many weary months of travel by camel caravan or cart. It took one in all thirty-eight travelling days to cover the 2,550 miles by motor truck from Suiyuen, the railhead on the Chinese border, to Kashgar. This does not sound very fast, but the same journey used to take about six months by caravan, and one meets, of course, with all kinds of incidents and mishaps on the way. The roads, if they exist at all, are mere caravan trails, and, especially in the Gobi desert, one is entirely dependent on one's own resources, and each day's journey is apt to be a continuous adventure.

But the vast size of the regions is in no way indicative of the amount of land available for use. Kazakhstan may be divided into four natural geographic regions. From north to south these are the steppes, semi-desert, desert and mountains. On the southern and eastern borders are the Tien Shan and Altai ranges respectively. In the west the whole of Kazakhstan is a region of flat lands. Except for the mountains, the only change in the terrain is provided by the Kazakh Uplands of the north-east. These consist of mountains in the centre and rolling hills on the outer edges. The annual precipitation ranges from over 24 inches in the Tien Shan to less than 4 inches in the desert. In the agricultural regions it ranges from 8-16 inches.

Sinkiang's terrain is much more varied. The border of the province is a natural frontier of mountain ranges. In the west the Pamir and Karakoram ranges, the Kunlun range in the south, the Tien Shan in the north and the Altai range in the north-east. The province itself is effectively divided into two parts by the Tien Shan; Ozungaria in the north and Kashgaria in the south. In Ozungaria the annual precipitation may be as much as 10 inches, while in the Tarim basin in the south the average is less than 4 inches.
The temperatures in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang reach extremes in both summer and winter. As a result the growing season is limited. In addition the very limited annual rainfall leaves agriculture to depend on the water resources that can be utilised for irrigating the land. This severely restricts the amount of land available for agricultural use. In Sinkiang approximately 40 per cent of the total area is habitable, while in Kazakhstan approximately 11 per cent of the land was used for agriculture in 1968.7

The agriculture that has developed is of the oasis type. It depends on springs, canals, reservoirs and rivers for irrigation. These sources of water are in turn fed by the run off from the snow capped mountains. The agricultural limitations forced the settlers to cluster around the foothills of the mountain ranges, bodies of water and along river banks.

However, the limitations that the lack of water imposes do not affect only agriculture. For the industrial development of the regions water is necessary also. To avoid the over-exploitation and depletion of this limited resource a balance will have to be struck. In the long term water will determine the extent to which both agriculture and industry may be developed.
FOOTNOTES


CHAPTER I

Government in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang

I:1 Introduction

A government whose aim it is to change the social order of the state it rules is very much dependent on two factors—the extent of its political control and its ideological influence among the masses. Of course it is possible to force social change on people, but generally such forced change has proved only as durable as the power of the government that instigated or supported it. Where social change was brought about by the combination of political power and ideological influence it tended to be of a more permanent character. Political and ideological control therefore, are two indispensable ingredients in the formula for successfully changing a society. It is not necessary to control both from the outset, as a group with ideological influence among a sufficiently large proportion of the masses may gain political power by means of a revolution. On the other hand, those holding the political power may gain ideological influence by convincing the masses that the programme of their government will benefit them.

Both the Russian and Chinese revolutions gave the Communists political power while their ideological influence was limited to a relatively small proportion of their respective populations. Social change therefore, could be affected by either one or the combination of political force and ideological conversion. It was the problem of determining the correct proportion of the two elements that plagued the leaders of both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.

Among the indigenous nationalities of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang the task of changing the society was complicated by several factors. Regional governments were necessary to introduce changes, but in both regions governments had become associated with foreign colonists and
military control. These developments had been viewed as threats to the only bonding forces among the Turkic people, their religious and cultural traditions. But foreign settlement had brought additional hardships to the natives. Their lands often were simply expropriated and given to the foreigners. As a consequence of this, local intellectuals demanded that some areas of land be set aside for the exclusive use of their ethnic kinmen and that the local people be given a voice in the local administration. Before the revolutions these local demands enjoyed varied degrees of success in both regions.

Following the revolutions the respective central Governments had to establish themselves as the recognised rulers and gain the support of the indigenous people so that their revolutionary ideals could be realised. To achieve this the local distrust of foreign governments not only had to be overcome, but the people had to be convinced that their future was secure under the leadership of the Party. Union republics, autonomous regions, counties and districts allowed the leadership of both countries to reconcile the differences and contradictions arising from the union of their political ideals with the desires of the local people. While each nationality was given a nominally autonomous region, a number of political expedients ensured that the Party retained administrative and political control. In this manner Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were integrated into their respective central Party structures.

The need to overcome local distrust and suspicions was theoretically central to the entire concept. Errors on the part of the central Governments would have given the local people reason for likening communist rule to that of pre-revolution administrations. This only would have hampered the social transformation of the nationalities. It was important therefore, that all actions undertaken in the name of the Party were scrutinised carefully to ensure that they did not arouse local indignation. At the same time it was essential to draw the
Turkic people into all levels of government. During the pre-communist periods the indigenous people in both regions had been given a purely local role in the administrations. To affect the social transformation the Communists had to change this.

1.2 Historical and intellectual developments before the takeovers

Kazakh intellectual thought during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became concerned increasingly with the future of Kazakh culture. This cultural awakening coincided with the Russian attempts to replace the Tatar influence among the Kazakhs with their own. Early Kazakh intellectuals, Valikhanov (1835-1865), Abai (1845-1904) and Altynsaryn (1841-1889), unwittingly assisted the Russians in this endeavour. By advocating the increased use of Kazakh in education and encouraging Kazakhs to learn from Russian culture, literature and industrial developments, they intended to strengthen and advance their own society. But this also resulted in the increased Russification of the Kazakhs. Some of the twentieth century intellectuals were influenced by the ideas of their predecessors. Following the 1905 revolution, during which most of the revolutionary activities in Kazakhstan were undertaken by Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries, the Kazakh intelligentsia continued to be politically moderate. A. Bukeikhanov, in western Kazakhstan and M. Tanyshbaev in the east, pledged their support to the Kadets. In March 1917 they and A. Baitursunov, the editor of the newspaper Kazakh, formed the Kazakh national party Alash Orda. The primary aims of this party were to give the Kazakhs a political voice and keep Kazakhstan free from Tatar political influence. Because they did not share the Tatar dominated Central Asian political views, they organised their own national congresses. At the first of these, in April 1917, they demanded a voice in the local administration and the use of Kazakh in the schools, courts and administration. But at the second All-Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in July 1917 (until
1925 Kazakhs were officially referred to as Kirghiz) the leaders of Alash Orda made it clear that they believed the Kazakh's political future to lie in a Russian federation. These views were by no means held universally. The Kazakhs of the southern regions—Semirechye and Syr-Darya—which were the most heavily colonised Kazakh regions, tended to be far more anti-Russian. Thus, while the northern regions supported the provisional government those of the south did not. As a result the Bolsheviks did not make significant gains in northern Kazakhstan until the Civil War. After the bolshevik seizure of power the moderate views of Alash Orda prevailed. Although the third All-Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in December 1917 passed a resolution proclaiming Kazakhstan autonomous and A. Bukeikhanov headed the government of the autonomous republic, there was no inconsistency. Both the support for the provisional government and the desire to keep Kazakhstan a federative part of Russia logically led to the union of the Alash Orda with the Whites. It was the White forces' disunity, the failure to co-operate with the eastern Alash Orda leaders, the excessive demands for Kazakh support of the war effort and, likely most important, the White reprisals against the Kazakh civilian population for Red partisan activities that effectively alienated Alash Orda from Kolchak's Siberian Government. The gains of the Reds in the first year of the Civil War were a more accurate indication of the extent of this alienation than the military superiority of the Reds. In the summer of 1918 only Syr-Darya, large parts of Semirechye and the southern districts of Turgai province were under Red control. One year later the Whites were being defeated on all fronts and most of Kazakhstan had come under bolshevik control. After the Civil War, in August 1920, the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Republic was proclaimed and A. Baitursunov headed its ministry of education. But the co-operation between the Bolsheviks and Alash Orda leaders was shortlived. By 1921 the Communist Party
was severely criticising the latter and a break was imminent.

Sinkiang's history from 1930-49 bears certain similarities to the developments in Kazakhstan, but important differences must be noted. The early Kazakh intellectuals, Valikhanov, Abai and Altynsaryn, had received some of their educations in Russian schools. In the early twentieth century it was noted that Chinese government schools, in which some local students were trained to prepare them for government work, were located in Sinkiang. From this it was not clear when they were established. Furthermore, the traditional Confucian education was far removed from the Middle Eastern and even European based Turkic cultural traditions. Sinkiang's intellectuals therefore, were most likely to have been trained in mektabs and medressehs located either in Sinkiang, Russian Central Asia or the Middle East. This education reinforced their own cultural traditions and in order to preserve these, like their counterparts in Kazakhstan, the intellectuals looked to Russia for a model. Although this may not have made them entirely anti-Chinese, the alien Chinese culture and institutions undoubtedly were considered a threat. This contrasted sharply with the positive attitude that the Kazakh intelligentsia had displayed towards the Russian cultural influence.

Pre-twentieth century intellectual trends in Sinkiang are obscured by a lack of information. Valikhanov made two journeys to the province, to Kuldja in 1856 and Kashgar in 1858. It cannot be stated with any certainty, but he may have made contact with local intellectuals on these occasions. By 1931 a split similar to that between the pro- and anti-Russian Kazakhs was discernable also in Sinkiang. In the south only two leaders, Muhammad Emin Bugra and Sabit Damullah, were convinced that only armed rebellion could bring the Chinese domination to an end. Nonetheless, in 1933 the rebellion that had originated in Turfan enveloped southern Sinkiang and ended with the proclamation of the East Turkestan Republic. According to its constitution the
republic sought independence from China. This indicated that there must have been a certain unanimity among the southern intellectuals by 1933.

A similar demand was not made by the Ili regime that was set up in the three northern districts, Ili, Altai and Chuguchak, after the Kazakh rebellion in 1944. Yet the Chinese farmers who had been settled on the Kazakh's land were one of the primary causes of that particular rebellion. The demands that the rebels did make compared favourably with those of the Alash Orda leaders after the February revolution. They included; local self-government, the use of non-Chinese languages in the primary schools, while Chinese was to be compulsory in the middle schools, the right to appoint part of the provincial government and the use of Uighur and Kazakh as the languages of command for Muslim provincial troops.

Like the Alash Orda leaders the Ili government too was concerned with the Turkic culture and gaining a voice in the local and provincial affairs. But in Sinkiang the Turkic people also were disunited politically and split between the more anti-Chinese south and moderate north. Finally, the Ili group's greatest success came also at a time of Civil War. In 1949 Burhan, one of its members, and Muhammad Emin Bugra were appointed provincial Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. Both appointments were acceptable to the local population and this suggested that they may have been made to bolster local support for the Kuomintang. But the battle was lost even before it reached the province. Burhan surrendered Sinkiang to the advancing Communists on 26 September 1949.

Although armed resistance followed the takeover the scale of this can hardly be compared to the Russian Civil War that raged in and around Kazakhstan. Perhaps the most important anti-communist leader in Sinkiang was Osman Bator. He and a group of local leaders, the strongest of whom it was estimated commanded no more than several
thousand men, resisted until Osman was captured and executed in April 1951. After that the armed resistance generally crumbled.

From the Civil Wars the Communists of both countries reaped benefits which assisted them in establishing political control in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. To fight the wars the Red Armies had to be organised and deployed throughout the two countries. While Sinkiang was surrendered peacefully, the activities of Osman Bator and his followers provided a reason for communist troops to be stationed in the province. At the end of the Civil Wars both regimes therefore were left with military forces stationed throughout their respective countries. As a consequence of this the Communists were left in total political and military control. Only ideological control at the grass-roots level had yet to be established.

I:3 Marxism, autonomous areas and their governments

After their respective takeovers both the Russian and Chinese Communists were in need of a system of self-government. This had to satisfy the desires of their national minorities for self-government and permit their transition to Communism. To satisfy the former, the autonomous republics, regions, districts and counties were created. At first glance these divisions, based as they were on nationality, appeared to be contradictory to Marxist theory. But on closer examination this objection becomes dubious.

I:3:1 Origin of the concept

Several authors have noted that Marx made no definitive pronouncement on the question of nationalities. This was no oversight, but the result of Marx's method of analysis. According to this man, as he existed in capitalist society, was not natural man, but man alienated by capital and the bourgeois class society that Capitalism had created. Within this society there were class contradictions and it was within the limits of these contradictions that society moved.
Eventually the contradictions became obvious to some of the workers and after the numbers of this class conscious group became sufficient they would rebel and seize political and economic control. The new proletarian society that then was to be established was to be led by the socially most conscious workers and intellectuals, who would unite into the "ruling class." Their task was to ensure that all forms of exploitation ceased and that proletarian society was transformed into Communist society.

Marx ventured so far as to lay down ten specific tasks which the proletarian rulers of the "most advanced countries" were to implement immediately after seizing power. By formulating these tasks Marx had defined his own level of social consciousness as equivalent to that of the proletariats of the most advanced countries at the time when they overthrew their capitalist governments. The overthrow of Capitalism and the implementation of the ten tasks would in effect further raise the level of social consciousness of both the masses as a whole and their leaders. Since Marx had not experienced these developments his level of consciousness was not raised beyond the stage of implementing the tasks. Therefore he could not describe the stages that were to follow. It also was not possible to describe the sort of man or society that would comprise the socialist state except in very general terms based on Marx's philosophical perceptions of what a perfect society should be.

When the proletariat in its battle against the bourgeoisie is forced to unite as a class, make itself the ruling class by means of a revolution and dissolves the old production conditions by force, so, together with the dissolution of these production conditions it dissolves the necessary condition for the existence of the class contradictions, classes in general and, so also its own rule as a class.

In the place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and class contradictions steps an association, in which the free development of each person is the prerequisite for the free development of everyone.

Graphically, the period of transition that Marx appeared to envisage may be represented as follows.
The Marxian Transition Plotted Against Time

- Level of social consciousness rising
- Dictatorial nature of proletarian rule weakening

Direction of time

Natural man in Communist society

Level of social consciousness at which the revolution occurs

Alienated man in capitalist society

Marx foresaw a society in which man recognised that his own welfare was directly linked with that of the whole society. This realisation in turn gave rise to mutual concern among men, based on socialist rather than capitalist values. The difficulty arose in the transitional stage. The problem was how to reach that social stage of development at which individual needs were no longer put before the needs of others and all individual needs were taken care of nevertheless. Obviously Marx considered social consciousness to be both the moving and guiding force throughout the transition.

As man's level of social consciousness rose under the leadership of the proletarian rulers the dialectic i.e., the contradictions existing in man's life, would become increasingly more obvious. As he
resolved the dialectic of each stage of social consciousness, man would resolve the dialectic of his own existence in a step by step reunion of his alienated self with his natural self. The crucial point of the theory was that the proletarian rulers had to raise successfully the level of social consciousness of the masses by means of a continuous programme of socialist policies.

This theory also affected the question of nationality. Marx believed that the antagonism between the nationalities resulted from the class contradictions. Under the rule of Capitalism these national differences had disappeared to a limited extent because of international trade and multi-national corporations. The rule of the proletariat would make such antagonisms "disappear even more," as under it "The hostile attitude among nations disappears together with the contradictions of the classes within the nation." Hence, the increased social consciousness was to resolve also the national differences that existed in non-socialist societies.

National self-determination

For Marx the question of national self-determination did not even arise. After the workers had taken over it was inconceivable that any state ruled by workers should wish to develop anything but a communist society in complete unity with other worker run states. This approach was adopted also by Lenin in arguments for a united international proletariat. Both Marx and Lenin refused to sanction the division of the international proletariat for the sake of national self-determination.

This may appear to contradict the 1903 resolution that Lenin permitted to be passed at the Second Congress of the RSDRP. It favoured, "The right to self-determination for all nations entering into the composition of the state." But Lenin did not consider national self-determination to be a universal right. In 1903 he explained;

Social democracy will always struggle against any attempt
to influence national self-determination from without by means of force or whatever injustice. But undoubtedly recognition of the struggle for the freedom of self-determination does not commit us in the least to support every demand for national self-determination. Social Democrats as the Party of the proletariat, consider their positive and chief task to assist not the self-determination of nationalities and nations, but the proletariat in each nationality. We must always and absolutely strive towards an itself closely joined proletariat of all nationalities, and only in separate, exceptional circumstances can we propose and actively support demands intended to establish new class states or substituting politically fully united states for more feeble federative unions and so on.\(^2\)

Lenin obviously subordinated the right of nations to self-determination to the interests of the international proletariat. If national self-determination threatened proletarian unity it was unlikely that Lenin would have agreed to it. He also did not feel compelled to support the right of every state to separate from a larger union of states. In December 1913 he elaborated on his conception of autonomy.

We are in favour of autonomy for all parts, we are in favour of the right to separate (but not in favour of the separation of everyone!). Autonomy is our plan for building the democratic state. Separation is not in our plan at all. Separation we did not envisage at all. In general, we are against separation. But we stand for the right to separate in view of the black hundreds of great Russian nationalism which so beamirched the case of national co-operation that sometimes better political ties result after freely separating!!\(^2\)

Autonomy, according to this conceptualisation, was to be found in the socialist union of states and not in separation. Like Marx, Lenin could not even envisage that any one national group of workers would want to leave the union of worker states. After Finland did separate in 1917, he succeeded in having the question of when the time to separate was right made the decision of the socially most conscious group, the Party. The April 1917 All Russian Conference decided self-determination and separation involved two questions; the right to separate and the time when such a separation was to take place. The time the Party of the proletariat must decide altogether independently in each case, from the point of view of the interests of all social development and
the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for Socialism."\(^{25}\)

In this manner self-determination and separation too became issues to be resolved by means of social consciousness. The desire for self-determination and separation were reduced to contradictions in man's alienated existence. That, after the revolution, with the whole future of the proletarian state at stake only the socially most conscious should be permitted to resolve the issue was entirely consistent with Marxist theory.

I:3;iii The socialist transformation of the nationalities

After the Bolsheviks seized power they issued the "Declaration of the rights of the nations of Russia," which embodied Lenin's political views.

1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
2) The right of the nations of Russia to the freedom of self-determination, including separation and the forming of independent states.
3) The abolition of all, both national and national-religious privileges and restrictions.
4) The free development of the national minorities and ethnographic groups and national territories of Russia.

A concrete decree ensuing from the foregoing will be worked out immediately after the formation of a commission for nationality affairs.\(^{26}\)

This declaration granted nationalities the right to develop Communism from their own level of social consciousness. If the nations were to pass through the dialectic stages in accordance with Marx's theory this right was essential. But, at the same time, it created problems in multi-national states. Different nations were bound to be at different levels in the transitional stage. Central Governments not only had to be aware of this; but they had to act in accordance with Marxist theory in guiding the transition. It was essential, therefore, that the theory was understood by the leaders on all levels.

Lenin was well aware of this aspect of Marxism and chided those who were willing to force other nationalities to accept cultural traits of Russian origin. When it was proposed that Russian be made the national language Lenin accused the proponent of not understanding the
psychological aspect of the issue, "which is especially important in the national question and which combined with the slightest compulsion defiles, dirties and calls the progressive significance of centralism, the large state, and the unity of language into dispute."27

During the period of War Communism Lenin could hardly be credited with standing by his principles. Only after the Kronstadt rebellion had jarred him back into reality did he return to the ideals that had characterised his earlier theory. His reaction to the Georgian affair of 1922 provided convincing evidence that he had returned to the concept of change from below. At the same time Lenin's writing about the affair revealed his disappointment with his contemporaries.

Ordzhonikidze had resorted to violence in dealing with a Georgian Communist. This irritated Lenin to the point of sending Dzerzhinskii to investigate and dictating extensive notes from his sickbed.28 It upset Lenin that Ordzhonikidze had insisted on forcing his political views on the Georgian, but worse still other leading Communists were responsible for the incident. Lenin noted that Stalin's "haste and administrative zeal" and his "resentment towards notorious 'social-nationalism' " had played a "fatal role" in bringing the matter about, while Dzerzhinskii had displayed a flippant attitude in his investigation of the affair.29

It especially galled Lenin that important communist officials failed to appreciate the theory behind his nationality policies. In the stenographic notes of his dictation concerning this matter the concluding sentence of the first section, "Here already arises the most important question: how to understand internationalism?," is followed by, "I think that our comrades have not examined this most important question sufficiently."30

Lenin was so perturbed that he asked Trotsky to take the matter before the Central Committee of the Party because he could not rely on the "objectivity" of Stalin and Dzerzhinskii,31 who were prosecuting
the case on behalf of the Nationality Affairs Commission. However, this was not simply a matter of objectivity, but one of differing views between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin was the Marxist idealist, genuinely convinced that after the revolution the workers would be only too glad to follow the Bolsheviks. Stalin, on the other hand, was hardly a Marxist theoretician. He was the practical man who had to implement Bolshevik policies. Since the masses failed to respond to these policies and Stalin failed to understand the theory behind them, much less the ideals, it was only natural that he should resort to force.

Lenin also feared that the attitudes of Ordzhonikidze, Stalin and Dzerzhinskii could easily lead to the Russian Communists being branded Russian imperialists. How to achieve the far-reaching changes that Marx had envisaged among the nationalities without appearing to be great nation chauvinists remained a delicate but crucial question. Marx and Lenin overcame the difficulty by resolving the dialectic from below, thereby permitting the nationalities to transform themselves.

At the same time they were to be guided through the transformation by the socially most conscious and, so long as these were Russians or Man-Chinese, problems were bound to arise. These would in turn result in charges of great nation chauvinism being leveled by the nationalities. Lenin foresaw these charges being made if social change was forced upon the nationalities by those who failed to understand Marx's theory.

The form of the socialist multi-national state

One of the difficulties both communist parties had to resolve concerned the form their multi-national states were to take. Lenin had opposed a federation of states, a concept that he believed would weaken economic ties. As has been shown above, he also did not believe in separation from the socialist union of states. This concept left states with a simple choice. They either were sufficiently socialist to join the socialist union of states or, if they were not, they separated from it. For Lenin there existed no degrees of Communism,
either states were led by Communists or they were not.

Stalin, in his "Marxism and the nationality question," had concluded:

The right to self-determination, that is—a nation may establish itself according to its own wishes. It has the right to organise its own manner of life on the principle of autonomy. It has the right to join with other nations in a federative relationship. It has the right to absolutely separate. A nation is sovereign and all nations are equal.34

From this it was not clear entirely whether or not Stalin implied that states had the right to join in a federation with other socialist states. It certainly may be concluded from the above formulation that they did. But in the same work Stalin also condemned federalism because within its organisation he saw "elements of decomposition and separation."35 Hence, Lenin and Stalin agreed that the future multinational socialist state was to be a union.

Among the Chinese Communists the question was not so clear cut. In 1922 they advocated a "Chinese Federated Republic by the unification of China proper, Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang into a free federation."36 The Kiangsi Constitution of 1931 gave the nationalities of China the right to self-determination, including the right to "either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer."37 It was not until the 1954 Constitution that the issue was resolved decisively. Article 3 stated:

The People's Republic of China is a unified, multinational state.

Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas entirely or largely inhabited by national minorities. Such national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China.38

This statute made the question of federation or union and the right to secession purely academic. Some reasons for these changes may have been the Japanese invasion of China and the actual conditions after the Communists seized power. If the Communists had granted the right of secession during the Second World War they would have been
faced with having to recognise the Japanese puppet regimes in Manchuria and Mongolia. After 1949 Taiwan too would have had to be considered an independent state. As Mao opposed the division of China and was sufficiently traditional in his policies to want all Chinese regions to remain Chinese and those which once had been to be returned, it was likely that the communist view on separation changed after the Japanese invasion. By not granting the right to secede to any national group, the Communists made it clear that no secession in the past or future was considered to be legal or permanent. Without even the nominal right to secede, establishing union republics would have been meaningless. Instead autonomous areas, regions, counties and districts were set up.

I:4 The role of the Party

In both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China the communist parties have emerged as the only parties of any political significance. Marx had written that the Communists always represented the "interests of the whole proletariat irrespective of nationality" and, in the battle against the bourgeoisie, "the interests of the movement as a whole." How great the power of the Party was to be after the revolution could not be foretold by Marx because of the limitations his methodology imposed on him. Whatever the post-revolution significance of the Party was to be depended on its strength before and immediately after the takeover and on how its leaders interpreted Marx. Both the Russian and Chinese Communists held that the Communist Party, the Party of the proletariat, was to continue leading the countries to Communism after the revolution.

To affect the transformation the Party had to dominate all political, economic and social aspects of daily life, but it was not to force itself upon the masses. In both countries therefore, the two primary functions of the Party were to guide the workers during the transition and to raise their level of social consciousness. In coping with the
first of these tasks the Party also had to endear itself to the people, infiltrate all areas of social life and inspire the transition from below. To accomplish this its leaders had to strike a balance between the direction that was given from above to guide the transition and the degree of freedom the masses were granted to affect their own transformation. This balance could be struck only if a large proportion of the leadership personnel in minority areas was recruited from among the nationalities themselves.

Local leadership after the takeovers

Following the takeover in Sinkiang the political leaders advocated a union between the provincial leaders and the new "national democracy." In the first instance this union involved simply a change of allegiance. Instead of following Chiang Kai-shek the provincial leaders followed the doctrines of the Party. Burhan and Saifudin, the latter joined the CCP in 1950, were left in leading positions, while other civil servants of the Kuomintang regime were permitted to continue serving in the provincial government if they were willing to follow the communist ideology.41

Although many appear to have continued in their civil service positions their loyalty and suitability for such work sometimes was called into question. Complaints about the quality of the Party members in the north-west began as early as October 1951. During the Hundred Flowers and Rectification Campaign in 1957 the qualitative problem became even more obvious. A number of Sinkiang's government officials from among the indigenous nationalities were severely criticised for their local nationalist tendencies. Among them there were local leaders of some importance. They included A. Iminov, Abtubahai Shitula, Yumairshelai and Apliz Aipotula, all from the Kashgar district administration; Mu-ha-mai-ti-chiang Ma-ho-su-mu (Muhammad-chiang Mahosumu), vice-chairman of the CPPCC Sinkiang Committee; Ah-pu-tu-ju-wu-fu Ma-ho-su-mu (Abdurevov Mahosumu), deputy secretary general of the
CCPCC Committee of the Ili Autonomous chou; Je-hei-mu-chiang Sha-pierh-ah-chi-yeh-fu (Reheimu-chiang Shapirachiyev), member of the CPPCC Committee; Wang Chung-yuan, member of the CPPCC Committee and Islamic Federation; and Ah-pu-tu-je-hsi-ti'ai-lai-mu (Abdure Shidiailaimu), member of the standing committee of the Islamic Federation of the autonomous region. Those local people who had been taken into the Party and, or given government posts could not be relied upon always to be loyal to the ideals of a single united nation.

In Kazakhstan there was a similar development after the Civil War. Some of the Alash Orda leaders, including Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, served in the Kazakh Socialist Republic's government. In the first year of the existence of the republic Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov became the nucleus of a local political group. The II Congress of Soviets of 1921 and the second congress of communist organisations of 1922 blamed the Alash Orda members of the government for worsening the famine in Kazakhstan and accused Kazakh Communists of making concessions to nationalism.

This suggested that there may have been two reasons for purging the local leaders in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. First, their considerable local appeal and second, the following this appeal could have attracted if it were to be combined with Turkism. The recruitment of local Party members and leaders was not, therefore, only a matter of recruitment. It also involved selection. To ensure loyalty local people who were willing to subordinate their own ideals to those of the Party had to be recruited. A local following was essential if the Party was to succeed in its avowed task of guiding the masses to Communism. At the same time, it was more important even that the local following was ideologically committed to Communism.

From the local Party membership it may be possible to make some deductions about the growth of influence of the Party among the natio-
nalities. By 1959 Sinkiang had 130,000 Party members of whom 62,000 or 47.7 per cent were from among the minorities.\textsuperscript{46} In Kazakhstan the Kazakhs constituted 36 per cent of the 1926 KPSS membership, while the Russians accounted for 44 per cent.\textsuperscript{47} These large proportions of Han and Russian members indicated the degree to which the local Party organisations depended on leadership from outside the respective region. Although the proportion of the Kazakh membership fluctuated considerably during the purges, this was due largely to the effect of the reduced Russian membership. By 1960 the Kazakhs again constituted 36 and the Russians 43 per cent of Kazakhstan's Party membership.\textsuperscript{48} This represented a relatively high degree of consistency. The Chinese generally appeared more successful in recruiting Party members from among their nationalities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Sinkiang</th>
<th>CPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,546,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1956</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>4,122,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1959</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,225,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>89,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,528,452</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \textsuperscript{a}The total Party membership in Sinkiang was 130,000 in 1959 with 62,000 minority members.

The minority population of Sinkiang in 1959—calculated on the basis of the average rate of increase from 1953 to 1957 and deducting the percentage of Han-Chinese—\textsuperscript{50} was approximately 5,660,000. On the basis of this there were 10.95 minority Party members for every 1000 minority people. In Kazakhstan there were only 2.9 Kazakh Party members per 1000 Kazakhs in December 1926.\textsuperscript{51} Comparing the size of the local membership to that of the parties as a whole produced quite different results. The CCP had 13,960,000 members in 1959,\textsuperscript{52} of which Sinkiang's indigenous people accounted for .44 per cent, while the Kazakhs of Kazakhstan represented 1.69 per cent of the 639,652 KPSS members of 1926.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, while the Chinese were more successful in
recruiting Party members among their Turkic minorities they lagged behind the Russians in the proportion these constituted of the total Party membership in the first ten years of communist rule. This of course may be accounted for by the differences in the populations of the two countries. While the Soviet population was mixed ethnically, that of China was overwhelmingly Han-Chinese. In addition the population of China was much larger than that of Russia. As a result of these factors the Party membership in China was bound to be both overwhelmingly Chinese and larger.

The elective process

Apart from increasing the local Party membership there was the added difficulty of ensuring that Party members, candidates and supporters were elected to the various levels of government. Until 1936 only the lowest level of government was elected directly in the Soviet Union. The CPR adopted this system in 1953-54. This meant that each higher level in the administration was elected by that immediately below.

Following the 1953-54 election in Sinkiang it was reported that the CCP members were "ardently supported by the people" and that many elite cadres who had been trained for administrative work were re-elected. In fact in 312 hsiang (villages) out of a total of 7,088 candidates 5,248 had been re-elected. Furthermore, 63 per cent of the new Party members had been elected as "deputies to the hsiang [county] and hsiang congresses and a number of them were elected members of hsiang people's government councils and hsiang chiefs."55 By the end of 1953 Sinkiang had 6,400 minority Party members. Therefore, a total of 4,032 or 56.9 per cent of the noted number of elected candidates should have been Party members. Yet even by 1959 the Party members recruited in the province represented only approximately 1.5 per cent of its population (excluding immigrants). The proportion of Party members was not reflected in the election results. For the whole of the CPR the
CCP membership in 1959 was approximately 2.2 per cent of the population. This proportion was unlikely also to be reflected in the proportion of CCP members elected throughout China.

The nature of Sinkiang's population made recruiting Party members even more difficult. It has been estimated that 89.2 per cent of its 1953 population was rural. To complicate the matter even more a large proportion was nomadic or semi-nomadic. This combined with the difficulties of language made giving the Turkic people political instruction and recruiting Party members difficult. In Kazakhstan the situation among the rural, nomadic Kazakhs was much the same. To compensate for these difficulties and the resultant lack of Party members the election of Communists had to be ensured by other means.

Obviously the most convenient method of ensuring an election result was by limiting the number of candidates and controlling the nominations. In the Soviet Union this practice, while officially frowned upon, was encouraged nevertheless. In 1925 the Party became concerned that an insufficient number of non-Party candidates were nominated by local election meetings. To rectify the situation Party workers were admonished to ensure that non-Party candidates did appear on the voting list. From this it was obvious that the Party could and did control the proportion of Party and non-Party candidates that was elected. Until 1936 when the constitution legalised it this sort of manipulation was conducted behind the scenes. The 1936 constitution's Article 126 permitted Soviet citizens to join various "social organisations" and the KPSS, while Article 141 limited the nomination of candidates standing for election to public organisations and workers' societies, Communist Party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organisations and cultural societies. In order to nominate candidates the nominator had to belong to a political organisation.

China's election law of 1953 was not concerned with controlling the local nominations. Instead Article 49 permitted candidates who
had not been elected to a particular local people's congress to be nominated and elected to higher levels of government. This nomination procedure for elections to higher levels of government allowed undesirable candidates to be 'weeded out' and only Party supporters and favourable non-Party candidates to be elected. In the Soviet case statistics illustrated this point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Village soviets</th>
<th>Congress of soviets</th>
<th>Central executive committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of Party members elected to the lowest level of government were not comparable to the number elected to the highest levels.

Another way to control the elective process was through increased representation from the more easily penetrated urban areas. Article 11 of China's election law made allowances for this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of deputies from hsiang (villages) or towns</th>
<th>Number of deputies from cities, mining districts and industrial areas</th>
<th>Ratio of hsiang and towns to cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/500 people = 4</td>
<td>1:4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-6,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/500 people = 4-12</td>
<td>1:2 to 1:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 6,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1/500 people = 12</td>
<td>1:4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This system was applied throughout China. At the level of the National People's Congress the ratio of deputies from the provinces to those from industrial cities was 1:8.

Many aspects of the Chinese election law were refined adaptations of the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR. It too had provided for direct elections to only the urban and rural soviets of deputies. In cities each deputy was to represent 1,000 people and no city was to have fewer than 50 deputies. Villages and all rural settlements with less than
10,000 people were to elect one deputy for each 100 people, but no fewer than 3 and no more than 50 from any one village. On the basis of the 1926 census, the number of representatives elected in Kazakhstan's urban and rural soviets should have approximated the following.

The number of deputies elected to city soviets in 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City population</th>
<th>Number of cities</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Number of deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 50,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>395,055</td>
<td>50/city = 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 50,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56,871</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>451,926</td>
<td>1,357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of deputies elected to urban soviets in 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement population</th>
<th>Number of settlements</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Average population</th>
<th>Total number of delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 500</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>142,186</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1,436.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>744,858</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>7,425.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 1,999</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>1,888,330</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>18,951.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,999</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>2,659,324</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>26,611.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 - 9,999</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>525,502</td>
<td>6,111</td>
<td>5,254.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 and over</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>79,486</td>
<td>11,355</td>
<td>795.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>6,039,686</td>
<td></td>
<td>60,474.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the ratio of rural to urban candidates may have given urbanised regions more candidates the advantages that could be gained from this in Kazakhstan in 1926 were minimal. The predominantly rural population elected 97.8 per cent of the candidates. Only as the population became increasingly urbanised could the full effect of this system be realised. This was an overrepresentation of urban areas, while rural areas were underrepresented. As a consequence the mainly rural indigenous population would be underrepresented.

In largely rural Sinkiang the effect was unlikely also to be of significance. But the described conditions made local elections meaningless in the political sense. And, since all local people's councils and autonomous governments were subject to the control and guidance of the higher levels of government, the local and autonomous governments existed in name only. However, they were useful
bodies through which policies could be implemented at the local level. But to use them for this purpose the Party had to control them. If they ever succeeded in freeing themselves from this control, the local organs could be turned into dangerous national governments. Although the elective process and Party domination were intended to prevent this there appeared to be one additional safeguard in Sinkiang, the autonomous areas.

According to the election law each nationality of each autonomous area had to be represented in the local people's congresses by at least one representative. Consequently, small numbers of people had a disproportionate voice in the local governments and the elections to the higher levels. In Ining hsien a total of 113 deputies had been elected in 1954. Of these 65 were Uighur, 17 Kazakh, 8 Hui and 1 each from the Kolkzo, Uzbek, Mongol, Sibé, Tatar and Manchu nationalities. Each of these last five deputies represented fewer than 300 people, while the average for each deputy was 700. In this particular instance the Uighurs had a sufficiently large majority not to be disadvantaged, however in many of the larger autonomous districts the result could be quite different as the following statistics indicated.

The major population group and percentage of the total population of some of Sinkiang's autonomous areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomous area</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Major nationality and its percentage of the total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ili chou</td>
<td>775,000</td>
<td>Kazakhs 53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulhe district</td>
<td>21,058</td>
<td>&quot; 33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barkul district</td>
<td>24,180</td>
<td>&quot; 31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changchou chou</td>
<td>98,306</td>
<td>Hui (Dungan) 37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaesar district</td>
<td>28,830</td>
<td>&quot; 32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuutsyun'ven region</td>
<td>8,013</td>
<td>&quot; 33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushshaktal region</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>&quot; 70.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunbazar district</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borotala chou</td>
<td>41,109</td>
<td>Mongols 24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baingalan chou</td>
<td>57,168</td>
<td>&quot; 35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobukasaur</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; 58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyzyl Su chou</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>Kirghiz (Kolkoz) 35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koktirik district</td>
<td>5,172</td>
<td>&quot; 88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chokmuzat district</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>&quot; 70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashkurgan district</td>
<td>10,238</td>
<td>Tadjiks 38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeravshan district</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>&quot; 56.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was significant that the nationality for whom the area had been named was seldom a significant majority. In areas with total populations of over 10,000 they often constituted less than one-third of the total. This could have led to a decisive influence on the election results. For example, the Hui Ushshaktal national region’s population consisted of 1,234 Hui (70.9%); 463 Uighurs (26.73%); and a total of 39 people of Chinese, Mongol and Kazakh nationality, in all 1,736 people. Assuming that the delegates to the local people’s congress were elected on the basis of the regulations applying to hsian and towns having populations under 2,000 the election of 15-20 deputies was called for. If 15 deputies were to be elected each would have represented 116 or fewer people. The break-down of delegates would have been; Hui 11, Uighurs 4, Chinese, Mongols and Kazakhs 1 each. As a result 29.1 per cent of the people would have elected 38.9 per cent of the delegates giving them an undue influence in the local government. This disproportionate influence was also evident in the ethnic composition of the delegates to the provincial congress.

A comparison of the proportion of Sinkiang’s nationalities of 1953 to their number and proportion of delegates elected to the provincial people’s congress in 1953-54:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Percentage of the total population</th>
<th>Number of delegates</th>
<th>Percentage of the total number of delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han-Chinese</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui (Dungan)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz (Kolkoz)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The small minorities—Kirghiz, Tatars, Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Sibos, Daurs, Manchus and Russians—constituted 2.8 per cent of Sinkiang's total population. They were represented by 7.4 per cent of the provincial delegates, or over 2.5 times the number to which their size entitled them to. While the Hui and Uighurs were underrepresented, the Kazakhs and Han were overrepresented also. The Han-Chinese almost had double the number of delegates that their relative proportion of the population entitled them to. To some extent the demographic differences such as the differing numbers of children in each of the groups accounted for some of the discrepancy. However, as the disproportion was evident also among the Turkic groups where demographic trends tended to be similar it must be suspected that it resulted primarily from the division of Sinkiang into autonomous areas and the system of representation. It does not follow necessarily that the disproportion was due to the manipulation of the population, although the system certainly could be manipulated.

Politically Sinkiang's divisions were advantageous for the Chinese rulers. On the local level the loyalty of the small groups of nationalities and a relatively small portion of the larger groups could ensure that Party supporters dominated the government. Very small numbers of different national groups also could be moved into any one autonomous area to manipulate the election results. In addition the system made it less important to reach those groups that were nomadic and therefore difficult to indoctrinate politically.
Party could concentrate on the accessible portion of the area's population and still be sure of retaining political control.

Finally, the traditional Chinese divide and rule tactics also came into play in the divisions. During the Rectification Campaign the antagonism between the different nationalities emerged. The Mongols had advocated partitioning areas into " 'a purely Mongolian' " and a " 'purely Hān area,' " while other groups wanted industrial and mining establishments to be set up on the basis of " 'single nationalities,' " still others opposed learning the Chinese and other minorities' languages as well as cultural exchanges between the minorities. These antagonisms between the minority groups left the local government bodies even more prone to Party domination. If the Party candidates from all the nationalities voted as a single block while the remaining deputies were split along national lines, the Party did not require a majority to dominate. But, and likely most important, the national differences ensured that the minorities would not unite in any one autonomous area and thereby become a threat to Party rule. As a consequence of the divisions of the various ethnic groups the only significant area which had a indigenous majority was the Ili chou. There the Kazakhs constituted 53.0 per cent of the population (see p. 35). Therefore, if the minorities wanted to pass legislation through the governing bodies that was or could have been interpreted as hostile to the Party they had to co-operate among themselves.

1:5 Migration

When the Communists came to power both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were overwhelmingly rural. The migrants who had come to the regions before the revolutions consisted primarily of settlers searching for cultivable land. Land shortages in their native regions had forced them to either subsist or emigrate. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang this resulted in a substantial influx of people.

Following the revolutions this migration did not cease. It
increased significantly in Kazakhstan, effectively reducing the Kazakhs to a minority in their own republic by 1959. But the composition of the migrants had changed. They no longer were predominantly rural. Although agrarian workers continued to come to both regions they generally came as more land became available. Thus, Kazakhstan's rural influx during the Virgin Lands Campaign of 1954 was the first large scale immigration of Russian agricultural workers after the revolution. Lesser numbers, the victims of the purges, had been settled there at various times during Stalin's reign.

In 1958 Peking reported that most of the 60,000 people who had migrated to Sinkiang had "been placed on well-equipped mechanised farms." This indicated that they had been settled on wasteland reclaimed by the People's Liberation Army.

A large proportion of the migrants to both regions was made up also of political and administrative cadres. Their task was to administer and train local personnel. In Sinkiang of the total 1959 Party membership only 89,000 had been recruited in the province (see p. 30). This indicated 41,000 had joined the Party elsewhere, but not necessarily that they all belonged to other than the indigenous nationalities. People from the province were sent to be trained in training institutions outside and may have joined the Party while in another province. Nonetheless, it was entirely plausible that the pre-1955 migrants were largely Party members.

Some of these were appointed directly to high administrative posts in both the Sinkiang provincial and Tihua (Urumchi) municipal administrations. The appointments to both were made by Peking until the 1953-54 elections. In 1952 the mayor of Urumchi, one of the three deputy mayors and nine of the nineteen council members were natives of other provinces. In the North-west Military Administrative Committee there was only one person, An-ni-wa-erh-chia-ku-lia (Anwar-chia Kulya), who was readily identifiable as belonging to one of the indigenous Turkic
groups. The provincial government also had several First Field Army—the PLA unit stationed in Sinkiang—representatives. One of these held one of the vice-chairman posts, while others including Wang En-mao—the commander of the First Field Army—were members. Traces of this domination of the top positions by outsiders may be observed also in the leadership positions of the KPSS in Kazakhstan.

The number of Kazakhs on leading Party committees in Kazakhstan in 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Total number of cadres</th>
<th>The number of Kazakh cadres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central committee of the territorial (krai) and regional (obkom) committees</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial (guberniya) committees</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District (okrug) committees</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals as percentages</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those posts that were not filled by Kazakhs were likely to have been occupied by Party members who had been sent to Kazakhstan. As dependable local members were recruited and trained they were given administrative tasks. But this did not mean that the outside cadres were withdrawn generally as local cadres were trained. As in Sinkiang Party personnel from other regions continued to dominate top positions in Kazakhstan.

The last group of immigrants, the industrial workers, likely brought the greatest change to both regions. They came as a direct result of the natural resources suspected to be or actually located in the areas. Sinkiang's provincial government programme envisaged building up agriculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts, while gradually developing the mining, oil, metal, leather and cotton spinning and weaving industries. The latter were intended to assist the development of both foreign and internal trade. By 1956 this development was well underway and various light and heavy industrial plants had been
set up throughout the province. But this development required skilled industrial workers. Before the takeover it was claimed there were only 500 industrial workers among the minorities. By 1957 their number had increased to 125,000 or approximately 2.4 per cent of the indigenous population (excluding the Han-Chinese). Although these figures represented a substantial increase the skilled Han-Chinese workers were still required in large numbers to fill some jobs and train local personnel.

The influx of industrial workers in Kazakhstan was reflected to some extent in the growth of the urban population between 1926-59.

Kazakhstan's urban population in 1926 and 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1926 Urban percentage</th>
<th>Each nationality as percentage of urban population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>01.9</td>
<td>02.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>00.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>02.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % of total population that was urban | 08.3 | 43.7 |

While the number of urban Kazakhs increased over the 1926-59 period their share of the total urban population grew by only 2.2 per cent. In the same interval the Russian share of the total urban population decreased by only 0.1 per cent, indicating either the large scale urbanisation of the Russians or an influx. Since a great number of industrial plants were moved to Kazakhstan during the Second World War a large group of workers undoubtedly were moved along with them. In the post-war period increased industrialisation precipitated still greater demands for skilled labour. This resulted in the migration of Russian workers who in part were responsible for the increase of the
Russian population from 23.5 per cent in 1926 to 42.7 per cent in 1959. During the same period the Kazakhs decreased from 57.2 to 30.0 per cent.\textsuperscript{85} It would be erroneous to presume that the Kazakh proportion of the population decreased only as a result of the influx of Russians and people of other nationalities. According to one estimate the ravages of collectivisation had reduced the Kazakhs by approximately 1.5 million by the end of 1939.\textsuperscript{86} As a result of this decrease the proportion of the other nationalities increased. Therefore the net numerical increase was not as large as may at first have been suspected.

At present it is impossible to determine the effect the migrants had on the composition of Sinkiang's population with any degree of certainty. Until 1955 fewer than 100,000 Han-Chinese were estimated to have migrated to the north-west and Inner Mongolia, while the corresponding estimate for 1955-59 was 271,643.\textsuperscript{87} On the basis of incomplete migration statistics the population of Sinkiang for 1970 has been calculated.

### Population of Sinkiang in 1953 and 1970\textsuperscript{88}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs</td>
<td>3,640,000</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>4,707,000</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td>09.7</td>
<td>564,000</td>
<td>06.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han-Chinese</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>06.2</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui (Dungans)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>04.1</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>03.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>02.5</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>01.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz (Kolkaz)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>01.4</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>01.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>01.4</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>00.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>4,874,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \textsuperscript{a} includes 2,262,000 implied Han-Chinese migrants

If these figures were actually borne out the indigenous people of Sinkiang, like the Kazakhs, were rapidly becoming minorities in their own regions. But it was unlikely that migrants were sent to either region specifically for this purpose. The skills of the immigrants were essential in politics, administration, agriculture and industry.
Those nationalities that had been deported to Kazakhstan must be excluded from this as they were largely rural people.

While swamping the indigenous people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang with migrants may have been desirable it was unlikely to accelerate the process of national assimilation. In both regions the economic limitations restricted the size of the population. Large scale influxes without simultaneously developing the agrarian and industrial sectors could result only in hardship for both the migrants and indigenous people. To be successful a programme of mass migration had to be combined with economic development. This in turn required great capital outlay. Although both central Governments undoubtedly wished to speed up the assimilation process the expense of this particular method remained an unsurmountable obstacle. This allowed the conclusion that the need for industrial and agricultural products led to the influxes and not the policy of national assimilation.

1:6 Conclusions

It has been said of Lenin that he designed his nationality policy so as to attract the support of various nationalities. This conclusion raised some difficulties. Lenin, like the Marxist theory on which he based himself resolved the dialectic from below. If the theory was applied correctly the starting point had to be adapted to the level of social consciousness that had been reached by the nationalities to whom it was to be applied. This made the theory flexible. But even more important the nationalities were to undergo no social change except for that which they themselves desired. No change was to be forced on them. Since both Lenin and Mao adopted this theory as their ideological bases neither can be accused of opportunism. The theory determined their nationality policy and not the politics of the moment.

The greatest single difficulty that arose in the two countries was the degree to which the respective parties were to guide and control social change. When the control from the centre was excessive the
nationalities accused the Russians and Han-Chinese of great nation chauvinism. Too little guidance, on the other hand, effectively slowed or even halted the transition.

In Kazakhstan Stalin's regime resolved the difficulty through the legalist means of decrees and absolute control from the centre. Mao's policy in Sinkiang was both more subtle and closer to the theories of Marx and Lenin. But at the same time Mao drew on the traditions of Chinese government. The successive Chinese central Governments never had succeeded in imposing their rule on the local population in any other than the ideological sense. The Chinese Communists continued in this tradition by controlling the local people's congresses through the Party rather than decrees issued by the central Government. At the same time the traditional 'divide and rule' tactics were applied in an effort to keep the nationalities politically disunited and weak.

On the basis of this it may be suggested that the differences in the policies of the two countries were not to be found in differing interpretations of Marx's theory, but in the union of the theory with the Russian and Chinese traditions. In the Soviet Union the consequence was direct local rule from the centre. By contrast, the Chinese ruled their regional areas through the communist ideology which the central Government had formulated with great care.
FOOTNOTES

1 Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, p. 205.


4 Istoriya Kazakhskoi SSR, II, 38.


8 Istoriya Kazakhskoi SSR, I, 447-448.


10 Ibid., pp. 304-305.


12 Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 89-90.

13 Hayit, Turkestan zwischen Russland und China, p. 321.


16 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1964), IV, 480.

17 Ibid., 481.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 482.
21 Marx and Engels, Werke, IV, 479.
24 Ibid., XVII, 90.
25 KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh, I, 448.
27 Lenin, Sochineniya, 3rd. ed., XVII, 89.
30 Ibid., p. 134.
32 Volkova and Kamaledinova, eds., V. I. Lenin, KPSS o borbe s Natsionalizmom, p. 137.
33 Lenin, Sochineniya, 3rd. ed., XVII, 90.
34 I. V. Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1946), II, 310-311.
35 Ibid., II, 343.
37 Ibid., p. 223.
39 Marx and Engels, Werke, IV, 474.
41 Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions, p. 103.

42 Chun Chung Jih Pao (Sian), 8 October 1951, in U. B. Consulate General (Hong Kong) Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP), No., 206, 31 October 1951, p. 18.


46 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 27 September 1959, SCMP, No., 2129, 3 November 1959, pp. 11-16.


48 Ibid.


51 Tsentr'nuy Komitet VKP(b) Statisticheskii Otdel, Sotsial'nuy i Natsional'nuy Soetav VKP(b) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1928), p. 120.


54 New China News Agency (NCNA), (Urumchi), 25 April 1954, SCMP, No., 798, 30 April 1954, pp. 36-37.


56 Ibid.


58 Orleans, Every Fifth Child, pp. 70-71.


60 Studenikina, ed., Isotriya Sovetskoi Konstityutsii, pp. 744 and 746.

61 Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist Regime, p. 73.


79 Tsentral'nuy Komitet VKP(b) Statisticheskii Otdel, *Sotsial'nuy i Natsional'nuy Sostav VKP(b)*, p. 156.

80 John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas; Recruitment of CPSU first and second secretaries in non Russian republics of


83 Adapted from; Jen Min Jih Pao, 7 December 1957, SCMP, No., 1674, 18 December 1957, p. 13.; Orleans, Every Fifth Child, pp. 74 and 90.

84 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, Vsesoyuznaya Perepis Naseleniya 1926 goda, Vol. VIII.; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 goda; Kazakhskaya SSR (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962).

85 Ibid.


88 Orleans, Every Fifth Child, pp. 90-91.

89 Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, p. 49.

CHAPTER II
The Islamic Religious and Cultural Influence

II:1 Introduction

The populations of both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China contain a large number of Muslims. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang almost all the indigenous people were Islamicised to some extent, but there were great variations from one group to another in the degree to which the Islamic religious and cultural influence had penetrated. Despite these variations the Turkic people professed to be Muslims.

Marx had condemned religion as a phase in the development of society, a feudal phenomenon intended to permit the bourgeoisie to exploit the masses. This view left the communist regimes little choice but to work for the abolition of all religions, making the attack on Islam in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang inevitable. It was only in the form that the struggle against Islam was to take that the Governments had a choice. They could embark on a policy of outright religious prohibition—religion had been condemned as a bourgeois element of Capitalism—or they could treat it as a cultural manifestation of alienated man. In the latter case it would have been possible to treat religion as a cultural phenomenon that was destined to disappear as the social consciousness of man rose.

With some variations each of the two Governments applied both these methods in the course of their respective search for a permanent religious policy. But in the case of developing this policy various other internal and external factors also had to be taken into consideration. At times the Muslims were important allies in both internal and external matters. This factor made it expedient politically to gain their trust rather than to alienate them by the incautious application of religious constraints. To meet these needs the policy had to be flexible.
This flexibility was important also from a purely religious point of view. To deal with the great religious and cultural differences occurring among the various ethnic groups of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang effectively it was essential. A successful religious policy simply could not be based on an Islamic orthodoxy that existed in neither Kazakhstan, Sinkiang nor the Middle East. If a policy was to be applied it required sufficient flexibility to permit its adaptation so that it could cope with the religious and cultural peculiarities that arose. The application of such a flexible policy required also a basic understanding of both the people and culture that it was to be applied to. In fact the combination of flexibility and understanding were indispensable if the approach to the religious question was to be relevant to Islam and not to offend the Muslims.

It would have been unrealistic to expect a policy meeting all these criteria to be developed over a short period of time. Following their takeovers neither the Bolsheviks nor the Chinese had a tried and ready method for dealing with their respective Muslim populations. The Bolsheviks could not fall back on even a traditional policy. Under the Tsars the Muslims had been ruled through the Russian military, while Christian missionaries attempted to convert them to Christianity. In China the Communists fared much better. Their Confucian heritage provided them with a basis on which a communist policy could be constructed. Nonetheless, both Governments faced a similar problem. They each had to formulate a religious policy that embodied their Marxist ideals.

II:2 The formulation of a religious policy

Marx’s attitude towards religion affected the religious policies of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China differently. According to him the religious question, like the political and social, would be resolved along with the dialectic. In his opinion religion was the self-consciousness (Selbtsgefühl) of that man who had either
not yet found himself or of him who had found but lost himself again.\(^1\)

Man, then was not sufficiently self-conscious to recognise his true self. Only after he had acquired sufficient self-consciousness would man be able to recognise his true self in the superior being which he sought in heaven.\(^2\) After man had recognised himself as that superior being which he worshipped his need for all religions would disappear. Despite this more tolerant attitude towards the religious beliefs of individuals, Marx was less conciliatory towards the religious institution itself. He condemned both it and its principles.

The social principles of Christianity justified slavery in antiquity, glorified mediaeval serfdom and could, if need be, although with a somewhat unhappy mien, defend the oppression of the proletariat.

The social principles of Christianity preach the need for both a ruling and oppressed class and, for the latter, they have only the pious wish that the former may be beneficent.\(^3\)

It was Engels who applied these views to Islam. The advent of Islam he described as a religious revolution that, "like all religious movements was formally a reaction, a intended return to the old and uncomplicated."\(^4\)

Lenin too accepted these views and through him they eventually became a part of the official Soviet policy. In 1905 Lenin had described religion as, "a sort of spiritual brandy in which the slaves of capital drown their own human image and their demands for any adequate form of human life."\(^5\) In his opinion and later in that of the Bolsheviks, religion was no more than a reactionary influence that was used to subdue the masses. The task of the revolutionaries was to rid their respective countries of this influence. After the revolution the difficulty lay in achieving this aim.

From the decrees affecting the Muslims that were issued immediately after the October revolution it appeared that the Bolsheviks intended to gain their support. The 1917 decree to the workers and Muslims of Russia and the East proclaimed their beliefs, customs and cultural
institutions "free and inviolable" and at the same time asked them to support the revolution and its Government. Although this decree made various concessions to Islam the conciliatory attitude was not to last. A second decree, in February 1918, formalised the separation of the church and state and the church and schools, nationalised church property and allowed churches to make use of only such property as was required for the continuation of their religious functions. While this second decree did not attempt to legislate religion out of existence it did indicate that the basic position of the Bolsheviks had not changed. Even if the regulations were not strictly enforced, a future anti-religious policy was foreshadowed.

In Kazakhstan the question regarding strategy vis-a-vis the Muslims remained academic until the Civil War had ended. Only then were the Bolsheviks able to apply their religious policy in that region. This policy by then had been made somewhat less offensive to the Muslims than it had been during the intervening period (1918-20). Between 1918-20 anti-religious excesses by the Bolsheviks—the profaning of mosques and shooting of Mullahs—resulted in resistance in Tatarstan, Bashkiriya, the Caucasus, the Crimea and especially in Turkestan. From 1921-25 the attitude was more tolerant, tending towards a gradual transformation. By then Lenin had returned to his intention to transform the Muslims into Communists and rid them of their religious institutions by means of increased social consciousness. At the VIII Party Congress he counseled caution in dealing with the people who were dominated by Islam because they were "entirely subservient to their Mullahs." In his opinion the correct policy was to await the development of the nations and the "differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeois elements," a process Lenin considered "inevitable." This represented Lenin's pre-War Communism ideological approach for dealing with Islam.
tude towards Islamic customs. He advised that if either the requisitioning of unused living accommodation in Azerbaijan or the combating of religion in Dagestan by the direct means aroused opposition, a roundabout way should be found to achieve the same end. Unlike Lenin, Stalin did not seek to resolve the issue through the dialectic. His solution lay in the application of greater diplomatic skill.

In China the religious policy also developed over a long period of time. This policy was not rooted only in Marxism, as was that of the Soviet Union, but consisted of a mixture of Confucianism and Marxism. Traditionally the Chinese had relied on a policy of gradually convincing the non-Chinese that the Chinese culture was superior. Through this method of Sinicisation they had been able to extend their empire and conquer the alien Mongol and Manchu dynasties after these had both conquered China. These traditional means of cultural change were combined with the key Marxist principle for cultural conversion—transformation through increased social consciousness. To some extent the Confucian and Marxist ideals were complementary. Both envisaged cultural change through the recognition of a superior culture which would then be exchanged for the inferior. Undoubtedly this similarity simplified the combining of the two doctrines, a combination that produced a uniquely Chinese religious policy.

The Chinese Communists held that Marxism-Leninism considered religion a "social problem of historical nature" and was "always against the erroneous views and wrong actions in trying to solve the problem of religion by administrative decree or any other simple drastic step." Like the Confucian scholars, the Communists by 1950 did not wish to change alien cultures by means of decrees. However, this attitude did not evolve simply from a combination of Confucius and Marx.

During the war against Japan the need for an alliance with the Hui led the Communists to abandon their attempts to create Muslim soviets. Instead, in 1936, they adopted the united front policy which permitted
concessions to be made to the religious beliefs of the Muslims of Kansu and Ningsia. These affected both the civilian and military Muslim population. In the barracks the Hui soldiers of the Red Army were provided with special baths and permitted food that did not violate their religious belief. The Han soldiers were admonished to show due respect for the Muslim population and their religion. The new policy was flexible and adaptable, features that gave it permanence because they enabled it to cope with changing political conditions. After it had been introduced changes in the Muslim's culture were to be made from within rather than without. In 1936 it was the position of the Party that the Muslims in Kansu had to carry out their own "land revolution," led by their own revolutionary organisations. This attitude prevailed and following the takeover it was embodied in the laws of the People's Republic. Articles 5 and 53 of the Common Programme and Article 3 and 88 of the 1954 constitution granted to the minorities alone the right to change their customs and religions and guaranteed religious freedom for all.

By allowing the minorities to change their own culture and religion the Chinese were able to avoid some of the difficulties that the Bolsheviks had encountered as a direct consequence of their attitude towards religion. In China there was no ideological need to attack the various religions directly in order to destroy them. In the case of the Christian religion the foreign missionaries were accused of working for or being open to the influence of imperialism. To combat this influence the Christian churches of China were encouraged to sever their ties with the "imperialist influence and financial support, to the end that they may become self-governing, self-supporting and doing independent preaching." This particular form of attack was not directly aimed at the religious institution, but at what were considered negative influences within it. Furthermore the Chinese did not distinguish between the religious and cultural influence of Islam. This allowed
them to escape the need to define an Islamic orthodoxy and culture for their Muslim population. The Soviet position under Lenin and Stalin was precisely the opposite. Throughout Europe religion had played an important part in government in the past. To some extent the Marxist anti-religious attitude may be accounted for by the close links between the church and state. In China no such link existed. This in turn may have resulted in the different attitudes towards religion on the part of the Russian and Chinese Communists. By accepting the Marxist definition of religion the latter was condemned by Lenin and Stalin as an alien element in the culture of the Turkic people. This forced the Soviet Government to define a pure, non-Islamic culture for the Muslims and to mount a direct attack on Islam and religions in general. The last aspect made matters worse still. To mount a direct attack the target had to be defined, but in the case of Islam there was neither a single nor a general definition that applied to the faith of the Turkic people or, for that matter, to Islam as a whole.

II:3 Islam in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang

The religious belief and culture of the indigenous population of both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang differed from those of the Middle East. While such differences may be expected between two distant geographic regions, geographic separation cannot be responsible for the religious and cultural variations that appeared among the different Turkic groups of people inhabiting Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. These differences reflected the extent to which Islam had influenced the native cultures. Generally it seems correct to assert that the culture of the most sedentary people also was the most Islamicised. Hence, whereas the almost totally sedentary Tadjiks were the most Islamicised, the nomadic Kazakhs had been influenced hardly at all. In 1917 their culture was still a mixture of nomadism, Shamanism and Islam.

Islam had been brought to the Kazakhs through the efforts of
Catherine II. During the eighteenth century she had mosques built in the steppes and sent Tatar Mullahs to preach and teach among the Kazakhs. Despite these efforts their conversion had never been complete. Their cultural and religious traditions—nomadism and Shamanism—intermingled freely with Islam. To some extent this cultural and religious synthesis may have been the direct result of common characteristics inherent in each influence.

The cultural and religious synthesis

In both Islam and Shamanism there are heavenly deities and a belief in life after death. Although there were various other spirits that influenced different aspects of the people's lives in Shamanism, it was the heavenly god, Bai Yulgan, who was the most important. The reverence in which he was held by the Kazakhs may have been reflected in the nature of their sacrifices. These consisted of horses. Among the Kazakhs the horse was the "prestige-animal, the gauge of values and the symbol of beauty." Its sacrifice signified a rite of great importance and may have indicated that the appeal was being made to what was considered the most powerful deity. While this did not mean that with the coming of Islam Bai Yulgan simply could be called Allah, the heavenly deity did give Shamanism and Islam a basic similarity. In some parts of tropical Africa an analogous condition prevailed between the pagan religion of the natives and Islam. This was believed to have assisted in the Islamicisation of the region. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang the religious similarities of Shamanism and Islam may have played a similar role. However, there the common features were confined not only to religion. Some aspects of nomadism made it and Islam culturally compatible.

One of these features, the raising of pigs, was not a clear cut case of Islamic prohibition. Not only the Turkic but also the non-Islamic Mongolian nomads refused to raise the animals. This led to the
gious scruples, but to its incompatibility with nomadism. Although the twentieth century attitude well may be based on Islam the objection to the pig nonetheless could be rooted in nomadism. The fact that Islam originated in a nomadic society suggested that the nomadic practice was made a religious practice. In the course of time the lines of origin became blurred and the pig was opposed on religious grounds.

Another practice with a similarly blurred line of origin concerned the headdress of Kazakh women. It appeared on the steppes after traders had introduced textiles to the Kazakhs and closely resembled that worn by the oases women. Perhaps it was adopted as a substitute for the veil. The latter certainly would have hindered the women in their daily work. But at the same time its turban-like shape could have served a functional purpose. The duties of the women were not confined to the yurt alone, but also took them outside. Thus they were exposed to the full range of climatic conditions and the headdress may have been adopted to protect them from the elements.

Similar adaptations were made in religious matters. The Muslim religious festivals that were combined with celebrations found ready acceptance among the Kazakhs, whose love for festivities was well-known. Other religious rites, such as the commemorative ceremony, although not a celebration, were transformed effectively into such by the Kazakhs. However, the more sombre religious practices; the five pillars of the faith—Salat (prayer), Saum (fasting), Zakat (giving of alms), Haji (pilgrimage) and Jehad (holy war)—were seldom observed or entirely ignored.

The culture of the Kazakhs in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was therefore neither Islamic, nomadic nor Shamanistic. It was a combination of the three. In this combination Islam was the least influential. In 1921 it was noted that Islam had failed to affect even the status of Kazakh women, while it had succeeded in doing so in the other Islamic areas of Russia.
Although there were religious and cultural differences among the different Turkic groups within the two regions they were all united by the common bond of Islam. In the case of the Kazakhs this seemed contradictory. They were hardly Islamicised. Nonetheless, they and all other Muslims were members of the Muslim Community, the **Umma**.

II:3:ii The Muslim Community

It would be wrong to assume that the Muslim Community was founded on the basis of religious and cultural conformity. Neither of these existed either within the Community or in Islamic civilisation. The latter has been described as "a sort of series of levels, a gradation going from a hard central historicogeographical core toward the more moderate forms, and from these to the peripheral regions subject to frank copartnership of cultures." This diversity became an accepted feature of the Muslim Community.

Perhaps the most remarkable and necessary aspect of Sunni Islam was its flexibility. Its lack of rigidity almost invited diversity in the religious and cultural pattern of the various groups of Muslims by legitimising various interpretations of Koranic teaching. While this flexibility was not necessarily inherent in Muhammad's teaching it became the basis for Sunnism, the school that sought to prevent a splintering of the Muslims after Muhammad's death. At that time unity was threatened by the differing interpretations of the Koran which the religious leaders of various regions gave and the lack of a link between the Islamic and Arabic cultures and traditions. In order to maintain and strengthen Muslim unity the Sunni school developed a particular method for interpreting the teachings of the Prophet. Their concern became not to define what was acceptable, but to reject that which was opposed to Islam. This approach allowed them considerable breadth in deciding whether or not the actions of individuals or groups were Islamic. Still greater flexibility was introduced into this pro-
It was claimed that these traditions originated from the teaching of Muhammad. His followers observed the Prophet giving decisions on various issues and reported these decisions to others who reported them to others still and so on. These decisions became the basis of Sunni tradition. On occasion it was necessary to invent traditions to enable the Community to meet changing conditions and to reassure Muslims that their practices were in accord with the Prophet's teaching. As a direct consequence of these methods Sunni Islam became flexible and adaptable, constantly able to meet the demands of a changing Islamic World. By no means should it be assumed that this need was met by continuously fabricating new traditions. On the contrary, great efforts were made to verify that reported traditions were in fact based on Muhammad's teaching. The lack of rigidity only allowed for the introduction of new traditions if they could be substantiated on the basis of accepted teaching.

Among the Sunni Muslims, the group to which the Turkic people generally belong, the flexibility was sufficient to accommodate all the differing forms of Islam and accept these as part of the Community. No preconditions were made for membership in the Umma beyond the general claim to be a Muslim. This requirement was unlikely to bar anyone, but it also was no carte blanche.

While a good Muslim was not one whose belief conformed to an accepted statement of faith it nevertheless had to conform to an accepted code. And although there was no universally accepted definition for a Muslim for purposes of Community membership, the acceptable code of behaviour became more defined on the local and individual levels. If it is assumed that the Muslim's religious life occurred on three levels; that of the individual's commitment to Allah, his commitment to his local Muslim community and his commitment to the Umma, all but the last required his adhering to a definite code.

On the individual level each Muslim made a bargain with Allah.
This was a personal bargain insofar as it was struck between the individual and Allah, but it committed the believer to meeting the requirements of his faith. For if the bargain truly was one of the heart it entitled him to a place in Paradise.\textsuperscript{30} But to be entitled to this reward it was necessary to lead a life that pleased Allah, a requirement that the individual fulfilled in his personal life and within the life of the local Muslim community. In the case of the local community this meant that the individual conformed to that behaviour pattern which his local community considered acceptable.

The local behaviour pattern likely was derived from the Islamic traditions of the local areas, legalised by virtue of having been based on the judgements of Muhammad. Thus, according to the claims of Chinese Muslims, Muhammad's maternal uncle came to Canton in 633, built the first mosque there and lies buried in the city.\textsuperscript{31} No doubt many of the traditions of the Chinese Muslims are based on his authority as a carrier of traditions. Over the years these traditions were added to and modernised by those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. It has been noted that returning pilgrims introduced new ideas and founded new sects among the Kansu Muslims.\textsuperscript{32} These new sects may not have been long-lived or even very popular, but they illustrated the degree to which returning pilgrims could influence the life of the local community. By being able to add to existing traditions in this manner local communities were able to modernise continuously.

As a member of the local community of believers the individual was required therefore to adhere to the local Muslim traditions. These in turn were accepted as Islamic by the Umma of which the local community and the individual were a part. This made the claim to be a Muslim a great deal more than a simple expression of faith. As well as a statement of faith it was a commitment to a way of life and an expression of loyalty to the Muslim Community.
II:3;iii Muslims, nationalists and communists

In both the Soviet Union and China the Muslims were committed to the Community of believers. At the same time they had been divided into national groups, given national republics, counties, districts and regions and generally encouraged to adopt the communist way of life. The evidence suggested that some accepted the communist way of life, joined the Party and continued to be Muslims.

The building of the Chilliishii irrigation canal in Kazakhstan entailed the destruction of the shrine of Es-Abyz. Not only were the local Mullahs successful in having the shrine rebuilt, they also managed to recruit the assistance of the local Party organisation for the task. In the course of these efforts on behalf of Islam the local Party neglected the harvest work. As a result three Kazakh Party members were expelled from the Party and two others were given severe reprimands. This particular incident highlighted the problem the two parties had to come to grips with. By virtue of having joined the Party Muslims did not cease necessarily being Muslims. To some degree this duality may be explained by the emphasis on the heart in Islam and the flexibility of the faith.

According to one Turkic believer it was the emphasis on the purity of the heart that had attracted him to Islam. This was hardly conclusive evidence, but it suggested that the Muslims differentiated between an inner and outer commitment. As long as the commitment to Islam—the inner commitment—was maintained in the heart and the local community did not object, there was nothing to prevent Muslims from joining the Party. Whether they were Muslims or Communists first was revealed by their actions in matters related directly to Islam. In the case described above the faith was placed before the Party and the work in the fields.

A similar duality appeared in connection with the national identi-
ty of the Muslims. The Turkic nomads had lacked all conception of a nation or national identity. Even after they settled in a single area they remained Muslims first and only secondarily identified themselves as residents of a town or district. As such they lacked all sense of belonging to a particular stock of people. In Sinkiang the Turkic people who had settled permanently identified themselves according to the names of their oases cities. The residents of Kashgar were Kashgarliks, those of Turfan, Turfanliks and so on. To some extent this may have been due to the nomadic heritage rather than the influence of Islam. Their lack of permanent settlements did not allow the nomads to be identified with a single place. Furthermore, the extended family made up their basic social unit, the aul. In Kazakh society there were larger social units; several aul formed a sub-clan, these joined into clans, which formed tribes and they united into hordes. But apart from a general consciousness of belonging to a larger group there was no close or permanent bonding force other than Islam. Those unions that were entered into were based on a common cause and after this had been achieved the bond no longer held.

It was only Islam and the membership in the Muslim Community that gave all Turkic people a common bond. This was based on the spiritual union of the whole Muslim World rather than national sentiments. It may have been for this reason that the Soviet propagandists attempted to dispel the Turkic people's belief that Islam was a part of the cultural tradition of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Given the Soviet ideological position on religion this argument followed logically. At the same time it forced the Government into the position of having had to both create cultural traditions for the Turkic people and instil the latter with national sentiments for these newly created traditions. In this light the Central Asian republics and the national areas of Sinkiang may have been created especially for the purpose of raising the national consciousness of the indigenous people.
Although the Turkic people apparently accepted this new national identity it also became a part of their Muslim identity. A Kirghiz anti-Islamic propagandist in responding to a Kirghiz youth who had asked him whether he was a Muslim replied that he did not believe in God. Therupon the youth scolded, "'How dare you say that! You too are a Kirghiz!'" \[38\] To the youth being a Kirghiz and Muslim were one and the same. This suggested that the dynamics of modern Turkic nationalism were similar to those of the Middle East.

The nationalism that has arisen in the Middle East was based on a consciousness of belonging to a region whose people had common linguistic, historical, cultural and religious ties and shared important interests. It was not based on racial similarities. \[39\] Arab nationalism therefore may be looked upon as the local Muslim community extended to include those people tied to it by non-racial bonds. This concept allowed the Kazakhs to identify themselves as Kazakhs but, as in the case of the Kirghiz youth, the term Kazakh and Muslim were interchangeable. Taken in this sense the national identity was little more than the local community of believers expanded to include a region.

Nasser's concept of national unity also appeared to have taken this general direction. He envisaged a union of Muslims that was based on three units; the single Arab state, the union of Arab states and the union of all Muslims. The last he believed possible on the basis of the common faith. \[40\]

The concept of nationalism in the Muslim World therefore was not a means for racial identification, but an acknowledgement of a shared interest or common cultural bond. Furthermore, nationalism, like all aspects of Muslim life, became a part of the Community and was subordinated to the interests of the whole. To be a Uighur, Kazakh, Uzbek etc., was no more than for an Arab to be Egyptian, Jordanian or Palestinian. In the final reckoning all were Muslims.
It hardly can be denied that Confucianism, Christianity, Islam and various other doctrines share some ideals with Communism. They all were based on a concern for humanity. This influence gave each a socialist leaning insofar as the emphasis of the concern was on social justice and the common good. The differences appeared in the role and rights of the individual. Only in Communism were the rights of the individual subordinated to the rights of the society as a whole. In the other doctrines it was from the rights of the individual and that individual's concern for humanity as a whole that a socially more just society was to emerge. In the Middle East this concept gave birth to Islamic-socialism.

Arab-socialism was based on the concept of mutual responsibility. It was intended to foster a society in which both the individual and the society had a responsibility towards each other and neither sought to dominate the other. This was not at all alien to the Marxist concept of the relationship between the individual and society—the dedication to end the exploitation of individuals and the establishment of a social order that was free from oppression. But there the similarity between Islamic-socialism and Communism ended. The Muslim ideal of mutual responsibility, unlike the ideals of Marxism, was not based on man's but God's word. This made Islam basic to Arab-socialism and it was religion that dominated and defined the social order. Consequently Islamic-socialism did not and could not oppose institutions that had been sanctioned by Koranic law. One of these was private property. To attack private property or a similar institution would not have been an attack on a single institution, but an attack on the whole concept of Islamic law. This would have made any socialist doctrine supporting such an attack unacceptable to the Muslims.

The basic need to respect Islam and its institutions has been con-
sidered a great drawback for Arab Communists attempting to gain a foot­hold in the Middle East. Although their radicalism may have stood them in good stead, their atheism and anti-Islamic policies left them lacking in popular support. But as one author noted, not necessarily without the possibility of greater success in future.

For an independent radical party of the left there are good prospects in the Middle East, but the communists are not yet an independent party and they would have to pay more than lip-service to Islam, to disavow dialectical materialism and to give up any idea of nationalizing the land. In other words, it would involve their ceasing to be communists and turning into a national-socialist party. This is by no means impossible; they have already gone a long way towards it. Perhaps this is the road on which they may one day succeed, provided, of course, that they prevail over the many competitors who have already staked their claims in this promising field.43

Even radical Middle Eastern politicians had to reckon with the force of Islam if they hoped to gain wide-spread support. This appeared equally true of other Muslim states. In Pakistan where Islamic-socialism also has become a means for social justice Pakistani Muslims held that social justice and the common good were not to be achieved at the expense of the rights that had been granted by Islamic-law. It was through the latter that Islam was deemed able to strike "a balance between individualism and collectivism."44

The acceptance of the God given law as just also endowed Islamic-socialism with a non-revolutionary character. There was no call for a revolutionary overthrow of the social order. The call was for the application of Islamic-law in order to restore the egalitarian state that was rooted in Islam.45 The solution to the social problems lay not without but within the Islamic social order.

II:4 The application of the religious policies

Considering the great religious and cultural variations manifesting themselves in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang a direct attack on Islam was bound to be difficult. The differences that occurred among the Turkic groups of people had to be taken into account. These differences also
made it necessary to launch separate attacks on the individual groups. In addition national traditions had to be defined to replace those of the Islamic societies. The Soviet Government, as has been noted, was in precisely this position after the Civil War. It was determined to destroy the religious influence. The Chinese, on the other hand, had a more flexible attitude and adopted what has been termed a "gradualist policy" for dealing with the Muslims.46

The Soviet Government had been warned as early as 1921 that its policy towards the Muslims should be one of caution. Sultan-Galiev, the Bolshevik's Tatar fellow-traveller, had warned that a separate religious policy was necessary for each group of Muslims and Islam as a whole if the Muslims were not to be alienated. He noted that Islam contained a "civil-political element," whereas in other religions "only the spiritual-ethical motif" prevailed. In addition the communist propagandists had to give due consideration to religious and cultural differences amidst the various Muslims and refrain from attacking Islam. Such an attack, Sultan-Galiev claimed, would cause the Muslims to look upon the Communists as they had upon the Christian missionaries of the Tsarist period. Of the various Muslim groups he considered the Kazakhs the least Islamicised and likely to be the most receptive to anti-religious propaganda. 47

Neither Lenin nor Stalin heeded this advice when it was given. Even after he had returned to the dialectic approach to deal with religion, Lenin continued to look upon all religions purely as religions. Stalin never concerned himself with changing the people's religious attitudes from below. His method was to use laws, decrees and repression to force change from above. As his powers increased his inability to apply Marxist-Leninist theory forced him to rely on the legal machinery of the State. The tragedy of Stalin's rule was not that he controlled the legal machinery, but that he was able to make arbitrary decisions about that which was legal and illegal.
After Lenin had ceased participating actively in the Soviet Government Stalin's powers increased. The increase in his powers was reflected in the policy towards Islam. As Stalin's powers grew the attacks on Islamic institutions intensified. In 1923 the powers of the Islamic courts were restricted and in 1927 they were abolished. The land holdings of mosques—these were private endowments to mosques called waqfs which supported the religious and educational institutions—were liquidated between 1925-30. In 1926 the direct attack on the religious institution itself began. Mullahs were charged with various crimes and, in 1928, mosques were transformed into cultural centres. At the same time a resolute struggle was waged against Muslim customs. This intensified onslaught on Islam was hardly unique. Stalin dealt with all persons, religions and institutions suspected of opposing his rule in the same way.

The Chinese policy towards Islam, with the exception of the Cultural Revolution, stood in direct contrast to that of Stalin. As the Red Army was about to enter the Muslim regions of the north-west the soldiers were instructed about the various Islamic religious and cultural customs and specifically prohibited from acting in any manner that was offensive to the Muslims. With some justification it could be argued that these policies, like those of the Bolsheviks in 1917, were the policies of the moment, designed to win the Muslims over to the side of Communism. There can be little question that both the Russian and Chinese Communists were concerned about alienating the Muslims. But unlike the Bolsheviks the Chinese were able to translate their concern into a policy that was relatively consistent. In China the concern also did not end after the takeover. Following it Mao was as intent as ever to avoid a direct confrontation. Generally whenever Peking became directly involved with Sinkiang's Muslims its policy had the appearance of having been designed for this particular purpose. The regulations that were passed exempted the mosques from property taxes and the
animals slaughtered for Muslim festivals from slaughtering taxes. They declared the three great Muslim festivals public holidays for all Muslims and stipulated that Muslims were to be given a five per cent trading discount on these holidays. This indicated that since 1936 Peking had been intent on gaining the trust of the Muslims rather than arousing their suspicion. Accordingly the policy for dealing with Islam was designed to maintain the unity that had been achieved. In Sinkiang the provincial government also actively pursued a union between the people and religion. This policy was in tune with the attempts in Peking to align the interests of both the Muslims and the Communists and to convince the former that the latter represented their interests.

A similar linking of interests did not occur in the Soviet Union until the outbreak of hostilities with Germany in 1941. This event transformed the Muslims into useful intermediaries. Through them Stalin intended to gain Arab support for the Soviet cause. In order to make the internal Communist-Muslim alliance appear more than a political expedient, the persecution of the Muslims had to cease. A similar strategy was employed to gain the support of various other groups within the USSR.

In both the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic the need for an alliance with the Muslims continued well after the Second World War had ended. After 1949 both states sought support in the Middle East. Their respective Muslim people provided them with useful links to the Arab countries. As a result a policy that fostered internal unity was important to both Moscow and Peking. The Muslims in the Middle East only had to be convinced that this unity actually existed. At the same time this policy was useful to both regimes in another way. Through it they could achieve their ultimate aims, the complete abolition of Islam.
The uneasy alliance

The Chinese made great efforts to convince the Muslims that Islam and Communism were not mutually exclusive and that the interests of the Muslims coincided with those of the Government. The foreword of the 1952 translation of the Koran into Chinese attempted to reconcile the Islamic and communist teachings. It was unlikely that the believers could have been reached simply by means of this translation. In the past the Muslims had not sanctioned such translations for fear of destroying the sanctity of the Book of the Prophet. The translation that had been made in the 1920's had apparently never reached the Muslim regions of the north-west. This was some indication that the 1952 translation was unlikely also to be widely accepted and therefore an ineffective means through which the two doctrines could be reconciled.

The Chinese Islamic Association was used also for reconciliation purposes. But it appeared more effective for spreading propaganda outside the country than within. It was founded in 1953 with Burhan, the Chairman of Sinkiang's provincial government, as its chairman. At its first meeting the association sent three messages. These left little doubt that the association was a political rather than a religious body.

The message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung expresses gratitude for his policies on nationalities and religion. The message to the Chinese People's Liberation Army calls the army men "the defenders of the interests of all nationalities" in China.

Hailing the brilliant victories of the Chinese People's Volunteers against the American aggressors, the message declared that the Muslims "will support you and strive for the complete victory of the 'resist American aggression aid Korea' struggle and a just and reasonable settlement of the Korean question." In the Soviet Union similar support for the Government's policies had been expressed by the Muslims since 1941. It was difficult to assess the degree to which these statements were representative of the
opinions of the Muslims in both countries. Generally, they were official statements made on their behalf. This did not make them necessarily a true expression of their opinions.

Although the Governments were able to control the official organisations of Islam, this did not give them the means for affecting changes in the lives of individual Muslims. A Chinese Government spokesman had noted that the abolition of Islam could be undertaken without opposition after the Muslims had accepted the communist way of life.  

The key difficulty lay in getting the Muslims to accept communism without the application of direct pressure. Cadres attempted to influence the lives of individuals by convincing them that the Muslim "feudal society" and religion were relics from the past and should be replaced by the moral principles of the new society. These attacks on individuals and families were direct and presented a certain amount of danger. They could have aroused the indignation of those whose beliefs and culture were criticised. In one such incident, Peking's Muslim community threatened to destroy the Kwang Ming Jih Pao, when the newspaper described Muhammad as a thief. Although the Government warned against such action, a Muslim member of the CPPCC, Ma Chien, wrote an article to right the wrong. To avoid such confrontations another means had to be found for influencing the Muslims. Both Governments discovered this to lie within the religion itself.

Through the Chinese Islamic Association and the four regional directorates of Muslim religious affairs in the Soviet Union—the Kazakhs came under the Directorate for Sunni Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan—both regimes effectively controlled the officially sanctioned religious leaders and the official Islamic institution. To gain this control even the Chinese had not been adverse to launching a direct attack. In Hsi-ning the land of the largest mosque in China was confiscated in 1949. As this land had supported both the mosque and advanced students of the Koran, the mosque's teaching function could
But there was no question of leaving Islam without Imams or Mullahs. In 1955 the Chinese Islamic Association established the Institute of Islamic Scriptures in Peking to train religious leaders for Islam. However, through their control of the religious training facilities and their programmes, both Governments effectively controlled the future of official Islam. At the same time the two states were able to influence the beliefs of individuals through the new trainees.

In the Soviet Union the official clergy attempted to establish a spiritual link between Islam and Communism. They claimed that the building of Communism was the realisation of God's plan for a just society and that this followed after prayer in those matters pleasing to Allah. This was an attempt to create new traditions and make these acceptable to the Muslims. The Islamic practices of fasting and not working on religious holidays were no doubt disrupting field work, especially during the critical sowing and harvesting periods. Although both Governments had declared the Islamic religious holidays official holidays they undoubtedly were keen to change this. During the Great Leap it was reported in China that the Uighur and Hui peasants of Turfan had turned out for work on the Ramadan holiday. It was not stated whether they had done so on their own initiative or with the encouragement of the local religious leaders. In the Soviet Union the official clergy was the initiator of such changes. One Imam instructed the believers that they did not have to be absent from work during the Kurban-Bairam festival. If the two Governments were successful in influencing Muslim traditions in this manner Islam could be used to sow the seeds of its own destruction. By continuously introducing new traditions the Islamic religion could be gradually secularised. One difficulty in pursuing this course was the loyalty of the religious leadership to the two regimes.

After the takeover the Chinese, like the Bolsheviks after theirs,
recruited fully trained Imams to make the Government's policy known among the Muslims. In the Soviet Union these religious leaders likely fell victim to Stalin's terror, but if the Chinese experience was any indication, Stalin's suspicions would have been well-founded. Peking was unable to control the message that its recruits preached. In the case of one Imam this was hard core religion rather than the policy of Socialism. This, of course, was only one case, but a similar practice was noted among Chinese Buddhist monks. These activities therefore may have been wide-spread.

While these attempts were made to influence Islam from within the Soviet Union also mounted a vast propaganda campaign to encourage change from without.

II:4:ii Anti-Islamic propaganda

In its propaganda campaign the Soviet Government faced endless difficulty in making the propaganda effective. As early as 1922 its lack of effectiveness was noted. At the XII Party Congress the previously published anti-religious literature was condemned generally as unsatisfactory. In future such literature was to address itself to questions concerning the origin of the World, life and human relations, the counterrevolutionary activities of the religions and churches, "especially the Russian Church, its origin, evolution, position in relationship to class society and the liberation activities of the proletariat and peasants at the decisive moment." It was decided also that "forms and methods" had to be developed to deal with the "religion connected mediaeval prejudices" of the Muslims, with due consideration to be given each ethnic group. The primary concern of anti-religious propaganda in the 1920's was the reactionary nature of religion. This characterisation also found its way into anti-Islamic propaganda. According to one of the first anti-Islamic propagandists, "In the final analysis, in national affairs, the mosque always has
played a treacherous, reactionary role in collusion with the enemies of genuinely independent countries."69 This became the framework within which Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda was written. Much of it was devoted to proving again and again that Islam, like all religions, was a sham and existed only to assist the exploiters and not, as it claimed, for the benefit of the people.70

Much of the dullness of anti-Islamic literature can be attributed to the frame of reference within which it had to be written. To a lesser extent it was due to the failure of the writers to understand the religion. The frame of reference was forced upon the authors by the ideological position of the State. According to this all religions were tools for exploitation. The only departure from this framework was the addition of the scientific aspect after the Second World War. Henceforth Islam was described as reactionary and unscientific and the struggle against it was one of the "materialist scientific world outlook against that of unscientific religion."71 Neither of these characterisations was able to deal with the basic problem in the struggle, the faith that did not give way to either repression or the scientific or unscientific nature of Islam. In addition there still remained the problem of the content of the propaganda.

In 1956 the quality of anti-Islamic propaganda was assailed as being "not only mistaken but also harmful." The critic ventured even so far as to suggest that the works of great pre-revolution islamists like Barthold, Goldziher and others be reprinted and that the works of foreign scholars be translated because of their value for social-scientific work.72 This concern was well-founded. As a consequence of the framework the propagandists were not able to consider the special features of Islam among the Turkic people. While their work tended to criticise Islam generally this did not make it applicable to the particular regional conditions of Kazakhstan.

Much was made of the apparent inequality between the sexes and the
lack of legal rights for women, particularly with reference to the choice of a second husband if they were widowed. In Kazakh society women did have few rights until they were married and even the marriage was pre-arranged. But the young Kazakh male also was not able to choose his partner, leaving him and the young woman in similar positions. Following her marriage the legal status of the woman changed dramatically. The dowry belonged to her and could be seized only if her husband committed a crime and was unable to pay the fine. After she had borne a son her rights became even greater; if her husband was sufficiently wealthy she could demand a yurt of her own, refuse to marry her husband's brother if she was widowed, hold her husband's estate in trust until her son came of age and remarry at her pleasure choosing her mate from among a wide range of kin. On the other hand, until she had borne a son she could easily be divorced and the dowry did not have to be repaid. After the birth of a son divorce was difficult as the extended family had a direct interest in the child and the dowry had to be repaid. These practical difficulties made divorce a far more complicated matter than the legal simplicity of the proceedings suggested. The freedom of the male depended largely on his wealth and the influence of his family. If a man could afford to pay back the dowry and the scorn of his family left him unmoved, divorce was a simple matter even after the woman had borne a son. But the closely knit family unit of Kazakh society suggested that among even those who had the economic means few would have gone against the wishes of their families.

There may be some justification for arguing that women and men were treated differently under the laws pertaining to promiscuity. A woman who had lost her virginity and was able to keep this a secret until after her marriage could be sent away by her husband. The latter could retain her dowry and demand a sister in her place without paying a second bride-price, while the scorned woman could then be married off
at the bride-price of a widow. Adultery was considered an even more serious offence. Women found guilty of it were put to death. These laws appeared to place the onus on the women, while the men were allowed to escape.

The social, legal and economic factors of Kazakh society may be said therefore to have protected the women against the legally superior status of men. While the Soviet propagandist was not entirely wrong to assert that the status of men and women was unequal, the generality of the statement misrepresented and oversimplified a very complex social structure. In purely religious matters the propagandist emerged in a worse light still.

In Uzbekistan an interviewer asked Muslims, "Why do you believe in God?" Most of the replies were to the effect of because I am a Muslim or, if I do not believe I will no longer be considered a Muslim. From these the interviewer concluded that many Muslims believed simply because of their traditions. Although this conclusion had some merit, it was hardly satisfactory. The answers which the Muslims gave were the best simple answer that could be given to the question. They also indicated a strong identification with Islam in that being a Muslim and believing were considered inseparable. To be a Muslim was to believe and to believe was to be a Muslim. There was no evidence of a lack of conviction, on the contrary, the answers effectively demonstrated that those who responded were convinced believers.

In China the absence of a direct offensive against Islam precluded a widespread propaganda campaign. Instead, as has been noted, cadres undertook a more direct attack on families and individuals. In these Islam was attacked also as reactionary and unscientific and the cadres proved tactless and ill-informed. Thus, the propaganda attacks of both countries were limited by at least one common factor, the lack of factual knowledge. This factor was less significant in the Chinese case because the attack on Islam was not as systematic as that of the
Soviet Union. It was carried out also at the individual rather than the country-wide level. For the Chinese this attitude proved beneficial in dealing with the cultural aspects related directly to Islam.

II:4;iii Internal factors

The Chinese Government passed three decrees in the early 1950's. They were the land reform, marriage and burial laws. Had these been enforced strictly in Sinkiang—and indeed throughout China—they could have led to a great deal of social and economic disruption.

The land reform law was intended to socialise agriculture. In the north-west this law was to be applied in 1952, but by the middle of that year only a rent-reduction and anti-despot campaign had been carried through in Sinkiang. The agriculture of the province was to be socialised nonetheless, but by the more gradual means of educating the masses. Only after the education campaign had been carried through was the status quo in pastoral areas to be disturbed. There were a number of sound reasons for this course of action. According to Peking they included a concern for the cultural and religious customs of the minorities and the protection of the livestock industry. Considering the ravages that collectivisation had brought to the Kazakh steppes, the last was particularly sensible.

The application of the marriage and burial laws was deferred also in the minority areas on the grounds that the minorities had their own religions and customs. It must be noted that the burial law—which made cremation mandatory in an effort to increase the arable land—also was not applied rigidly in the remainder of China. Burial was also a deeply rooted Chinese tradition. According to traditional beliefs the soul and body were rejoined after death. If the latter was destroyed the soul wandered eternally in search of the body and could not rest. In deference to these customs the Government deemed it appropriate not to apply the law until the people had been educated properly.
In Sinkiang the marriage law—it was intended to end feudal marriage practices—had a special supplement. This stipulated that Turkic people could marry two years before the minimum age stated in the law and that they were not bound by the clauses pertaining to divorce and inheritance. It was not until 1959 that Saifudin suggested the supplement should be abolished. There could be little doubt that these considerations were concessions to Islam. All the legal provisions of the three laws contravened well-defined Koranic laws pertaining to property, divorce, marriage and inheritance. But it must not be ignored that the Chinese were equally prepared to make concessions to Chinese customs. This suggested that the policy was to avoid unrest rather than a real concern for the old cultures.

II:4;iv External factors

Some of the policies towards Islam which both Governments pursued were intended also to improve their images in the Muslim World, particularly the Middle East. One means for achieving this aim was through the annual pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Both regimes had permitted and supported these since the mid-1950's. Although the number permitted to make the journey were few in comparison to the total number of Muslims in each country, this could hardly have troubled the Muslim communities.

While each Muslim was to undertake one pilgrimage to Mecca or Medina during his life-time few in Sinkiang and Kazakhstan were in possession of the financial means to allow them to do so. As a substitute Muslims in both regions had found accessible alternatives. These were the tombs of local Muslims who were considered great religious men. If the visits to some of these shrines were repeated or made to a particular shrine, such as the tomb of Baha-ed-din Naqshbandi near Bukhara, they were considered the equivalent of the pilgrimage to Mecca or Medina. In this way the Muslims of both regions were able to fulfill
the requirements of their religion. For this reason the reinstitution of the right to undertake pilgrimages to the Holy Land had little direct impact on the lives of the Muslims. Indirectly, however, it benefitted the Muslim community and certainly the two Governments.

The Soviet Union was determined to limit the influence of the West in the Middle East. To achieve this Moscow had turned a blind eye even to the persecution of Communists by the Arab regimes that had been responsive to the Soviet attempts to establish closer ties. 85

Since the early 1950's the Chinese too sought to extend their political influence in the Third World. Their motives were not only political but also economic. Until the late 1950's the United Nations' blockade limited Chinese trade to the communist countries and the Third World. This made the natural resources from the latter, especially Egyptian cotton, useful for relieving domestic shortages. The Sino-Egyptian trade protocol of August 1955 allowed China to purchase raw cotton in Egypt, while Egypt bought Chinese rolled steel. 86 As both countries had participated in the 1955 Bandung conference the diplomatic contacts that led to the agreement well may have been made there. These negotiations would have made the Chinese all the more aware of the influence that could be gained through various channels. Consequently they may have encouraged pilgrimages to the Middle East even more.

By their presence the pilgrims demonstrated the religious freedoms which their own Governments upheld. They also emphasised this point in conversations with the Arabs. 87 But while the pilgrims were able to make contacts with Arabs on the basis of a common bond and while this may have proved helpful in diplomatic and other dealings between the countries, the pilgrimages also were useful for another reason. The returning pilgrims acquired a great deal of prestige among their fellow Muslims. This additional prestige and religious authority may have provided official Mullahs and Imams with greater influence in changing
local Muslim traditions.

The Muslims of each country also were able to benefit from the renewed contact with the Middle East. Muslim visitors from the latter came to both the Soviet Union and China. During China's negotiations with Egypt in 1955 some Egyptian delegates and the World Peace Assembly delegates from Arab countries visited Sinkiang. And in 1958 President Nasser visited Tashkent. These renewed contacts forced both Governments to keep at least those mosques in good repair that were likely to be visited. Although neither of the two Governments contributed to these mosques on a regular basis they helped pay for repairs nevertheless. But at the same time in China those mosques not likely to be visited by foreigners were permitted to decay and wash away. No doubt the situation in the Soviet Union was similar.

It was beneficial for the Muslim communities of both countries that at least some mosques were kept in repair. But the contacts also forced the Governments to be still more tolerant towards the Muslims although the basic anti-Islamic policy of neither regime had changed. Nonetheless, both appeared to have become reconciled to a temporary, but lengthy period of co-existence with Islam.

II:4.v Islam and Communism the co-existing ideals

As has been noted some of the ideals of Communism and Islamic-socialism were quite similar. In principle the two should have had little difficulty in co-existing, but neither communist regime was prepared to accept Islamic-socialism. In the Chinese case this may be only assumed on the basis of their unchanged belief that religions would eventually disappear. Without Islam, Islamic-socialism simply would be transformed into Socialism. In the Soviet Union propagandists have been more outspoken on this issue.

They contended that the two ideals were irreconciliable. Communism had freed mankind from religious oppression, including that of
Islam. It was a secular and not a religious ideal. According to this point of view religion and Communism simply were not compatible. This view was applied not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the Muslims of other countries. Pakistan's Islamic-socialist Maududi and his ideas were attacked bitterly and condemned. "The reactionary essence of Pakistan's variant of the theory of 'Islamic-socialism' manifests itself most fully in the interpretations of feudal ideologues like A. A. Maududi." These attacks made it difficult to justify the more tolerant policy towards Islam that Moscow had displayed since 1941. Unlike the Chinese, whose attitude was tolerant from before their take-over, the position of Moscow became contradictory. This the Soviet propagandists dealt with by claiming that it was not the ideological position of the Soviet state, but that of Islam which had changed.

The victory of the October socialist revolution, the liquidation of the exploitation of classes, the success of socialist construction and the active part in this construction of the overwhelming majority of the masses compelled the Muslim clergy to introduce corrections in their preaching of Islam's social principles to adapt them to the new social-economic conditions.

On the basis of these changes and the continued adaptation of official Islam it was possible to tolerate the latter. But in the past such changes had not been as one-sided as the propagandists would have had their readers believe.

II:5 The historical perspective

The traditional method for dealing with Islam in the Soviet Union has been to break the 1917-60 period down according to the great historical events that followed the revolution. With some variations in dates, this produced five time-spans; the revolution and Civil War 1917-20, the post-Civil War to the beginning of outright opposition 1921-28(29), the terror 1928-38(41), the Second World War and immediate post-war 1939-47, and the post-1947 period. Although these divisions were useful for analysing the influence of each period on the religious
policy, for the purposes of this discussion it may be more appropriate to consider the period a unit, a single period of continuous policy development.

Following the Civil War the Bolsheviks were faced with running a multi-national state. To cope with this a policy had to be developed that could satisfy the needs arising from the ideals of the Bolsheviks and the needs of the people. Lenin's vacillation well may have been the result of his search for policies that could deal with the various issues as they arose. When he did return to his pre-revolution political framework in 1922, his illness and death prevented it from becoming the basis for the development of future policies. From this it did not follow necessarily that Lenin's ideals were simply rejected. There was surely some doubt that Stalin could understand much less apply the pre-1917 and post-1922 Leninist theories.

As the leader of the Soviet state Stalin therefore faced an arduous task. He had to follow what little Marxist-Leninist tradition had been established. In addition he had to develop a policy to meet those needs which he had been unable to fit into the Marxist-Leninist framework. The result was a totalitarianism based on both Leninism and Stalinism. As Stalin's dictatorial powers increased his own ideas began to dominate more and more. The various external factors also added to the difficulties of developing a consistent policy. During the Second World War the need for closer ties with the Muslims of the Middle East effectively reversed the religious policy. It was transformed into a policy of tolerance rather than outright repression. How Stalin would have dealt with the Muslims after the War is difficult to assess. Although the attitude towards them in the 1945-53 period was more tolerant it was not until after Stalin's death that pilgrimages became annual events.

The changes under Khrushchev and those who followed him occurred within the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework. Those who followed
Stalin undoubtedly had no stomach for his extreme religious policies. On the other hand, the growing Soviet sensitivity to external public opinion also demanded policy changes. However, the anti-religious ideals were not repudiated. The result was a repositioning of the policy in response to the new inputs. This shifted it towards moderation, a position that placed the post-Stalin leaders somewhere between the policies of Stalin and Lenin.

In the development of China's religious policy the pattern also ranged from forcing communist institutions on the Hui to the more tolerant attitude of the united front. With the exception of the Cultural Revolution the tolerant attitude generally appeared to prevail. Perhaps the Chinese policy was the direct consequence of the confucian tradition. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Chinese had a tradition that they could draw on in dealing with the religious and cultural customs of the Muslims. The confucian tradition was said to have influenced Mao considerably. On the basis of these long-standing practices and the need for tolerance a religious policy could have been formulated.

The religious policies that were developed in each country were evolved independently. Until 1949 the Chinese Communists had no need of a Soviet type policy. After 1949 it was too late for the Chinese to adopt the Soviet policy. By then they had formulated their own and this was unlikely to change. But the Soviet experience in applying their policy to the Muslims, particularly the collectivisation, was useful for the Chinese. The Chinese also did adopt Soviet policies in those areas in which they lacked political experience—the development of a political system and of an educational policy. But even in these cases they adapted these Soviet policies to the Chinese situation.

In future the religious policies of the two countries, but especially that of the Soviet Union, are likely to undergo further changes. This will be the result of the rapidly increasing Muslim population, affecting primarily the Soviet Union. Following the 1959 census it
could hardly escape the notice of Soviet demographers that the Turkic people of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were increasing far more rapidly than the Russian population of the USSR.

Population increases between 1959 - 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1959 census</th>
<th>1970 census</th>
<th>increase over 1959 in per cent</th>
<th>1979 census</th>
<th>increase over 1970 in per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>114,113,579</td>
<td>129,015,140</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>137,397,000</td>
<td>06.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>6,015,416</td>
<td>9,195,093</td>
<td>52.86</td>
<td>12,456,000</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazkhs</td>
<td>3,621,610</td>
<td>5,298,818</td>
<td>46.31</td>
<td>6,556,000</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>968,659</td>
<td>1,452,222</td>
<td>49.92</td>
<td>1,906,000</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjiks</td>
<td>1,396,939</td>
<td>2,135,883</td>
<td>52.90</td>
<td>2,898,000</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>1,001,585</td>
<td>1,525,284</td>
<td>52.29</td>
<td>2,028,000</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the rapid increase of the Turkic people and other Muslims of the USSR, it was estimated that by the end of this century the total Muslim population will reach 100 million as opposed to 150 million Russians. Although a direct challenge to Russian authority is unlikely to occur, the sheer number of Muslims in future again may give the Soviet Government the impetus for altering its policy towards Islam.

In China a similar problem is unlikely to arise. But increases in the Muslim population of Sinkiang may make already scarce land for agriculture even more so. This could lead to dissatisfaction and possibly local rebellion against the Han-Chinese in the province, but as in the case of the Soviet Union, wide-spread unrest appears unlikely.

For both regimes the most desirable solution appears to be a further move towards co-existence with Islam. In the past political necessity was able to bring vast changes to anti-Islamic policies and it is very likely that it will do so in the future. The alternative, of course, is for both Governments to adopt policies of outright repression.

II:6 Conclusions

It seems fair to conclude that neither the Russians nor the Chinese had a clear understanding of Islam and that this was the root of
the difficulties that arose. The lack of understanding was not the only source of difficulty, but the others—the division of Islam into religious and cultural influences—had a multiplier rather than a causal effect. For the Chinese the difficulties were less serious because they avoided direct confrontations with the Muslims. Their combination of this policy with greater religious tolerance made understanding Islam less important until the cadres attempted to re-educate the Muslims. At that juncture the lack of understanding on the part of cadres could easily be interpreted as Han-chauvinism, especially when Han cadres encouraged Muslims to change their way of life. Thus, while the Chinese may have avoided a direct confrontation on the political plane it was likely to occur on the educational.

There could be little doubt that the Chinese benefitted from their more tolerant attitude. It helped them avoid the widespread unrest that the repressive methods of Stalin had resulted in. Another benefit, perhaps less direct, was that the Muslims in China may have been more inclined to show goodwill towards the Communists than their counterparts were willing to show towards the Soviet Government. This may have been of little real significance in political terms. Any rebellions in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang in any case would have been limited in scale. Consequently they could be crushed easily. Nevertheless, retaining the goodwill of the Turkic people would have made their cultural transformation a less difficult task.

It must be noted also that the transformation of the Muslims was not a simple matter of exchanging one culture for the other. The importance and merits of each came into play. In China the superiority of Confucianism had allowed it to dominate other cultures. Although Islam had been influenced by Confucianism it was in no danger of being dominated. There were several reasons for the survival of Islam. It was itself a highly developed culture, the Muslims were well represented in China's population and they were united by their faith. But
there may have been an even more significant factor, the teaching of Islam itself. According to this Islam was the highest religion and culture. Furthermore, Islam made the believers aware that the Chinese was not the only advanced culture in the World. As a result Confucianism had few attractions for the Muslims.

The Muslims' attitude towards Communism was likely similar. Each doctrine claimed superiority over the other and was secure in this belief. In addition each embodied a complete political, social and cultural system. To some extent it even could be argued that both were religious systems—Communism in its worship of Marxism—Leninism. As a result of these factors the cultural transformation was unlikely to be either easy or a task that could be accomplished over a short period of time. Over this long period the small, seemingly insignificant factors that resulted in the alienation of the Muslims would loom even larger. But the communist ideology was not equipped to deal with other cultures from any but a position of strength. To the Communists their own ideological superiority and purity were as unquestionable as the inferior status and reactionary nature of Islam.

The need for unity forced the leaders of both countries to re-assess their respective positions and move towards greater tolerance. How far this will go in future is difficult to estimate. Among the Muslims of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang there was little indication that either their religion or culture had undergone marked changes. This and the future increase in their numbers could result in new concessions from both Governments, possibly even acceptance and co-existence.
FOOTNOTES

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., IV, 200.
4 Ibid., XXVIII, 247.
5 Lenin, Sochineniya, 3rd. ed., VIII, 419.
7 Ibid., pp. 109-110.
10 Stalin, Sochineniya, IV, 362.
14 Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist Regime, pp. 36, 45, 77 and 90.

22 Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule, p. 96.

23 Ibid., pp. 42-45.


28 Ibid., pp. 124-125.


41 Isma'il Mazhar, "Mutual or Joint Socialist Responsibility—Not


44 Maududi, Islamic Way of Life, pp. 70-71.


46 Dreyer, China's Forty Millions, p. 171.

47 Sultan-Galiev, "Metody antireligioznoi propagandy sredi Musul'man," Zhizn Natsional'nostei, Nos., 29 and 30 (14 and 23 December 1921), 2-3 and 3 respectively.


50 NCNA (Peking), 6 July 1951, SCMP, No., 129, 6-7 July 1951, pp. 11-12.; Wang, China Land of Many Nationalities, pp. 58-59.; NCNA (Peking), 3 December 1951, SCMP, No., 228, 4 December 1951, p. 5.

51 Sinkiang Jih Pao (Urumchi), 5 October 1954, p. 2.

52 I-fan Yang, Islam in China (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1958), pp. 57-59.


54 NCNA (Peking), 17 May 1953, SCMP, No., 572, 16-18 May 1953, pp. 35-36.


59 Kao, The Imam's Story, pp. 37.


Kao, *The Imam's Story*, pp. 6 and 11.


Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule*, p. 41.


August 1952, pp. 16-18.


90 Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 65.

91 L. Klimovich, "Vostok probudilya!," Nauky i Religiya, No., 1, (January 1966), 36.


93 Ashirov, Evolyutsiya Islam v SSSR, p. 25.


96 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Itogi Vsesoyusnoi...

CHAPTER III
The Role of Education

III:1 Introduction

The greatest challenge facing any government from the day it attains power is to ensure that it creates a long-lasting impression on the masses. In this way governments are able to ensure that their policies will be continued. To create this impression both popularly elected and non-elected governments must introduce policies that benefit the population as a whole. But the benefits of these policies are not always immediately apparent. This makes it necessary to convince the general population that long-term benefits will indeed materialise in the future.

To convince the masses of these long-term benefits the educational system may be used. For this work the educational system utilises two broad channels, one informal and the other formal. The informal channel consists of the newsmedia and various other reported and printed outlets that may be used by a political group to publicise itself and its policies. The formal educational system, consisting of all state controlled bodies ranging from schools to communes, may be used as a means for political education.

In both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China the regimes relied on the educational system to popularise their rule. Among the Russian and Chinese people proper education had become the widely accepted means for social mobility. This attitude made both groups more willing to enroll their children in schools. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang the situation differed markedly from this. Among the Turkic people both the function and content of the educational system had been different. It became necessary therefore, to introduce a system for educating the Turkic people in the European philosophical traditions so that they could understand the values of the new society.
But even before this system could succeed the traditional Turkic attitude towards education had to be changed. This sort of dilemma brought the two central Governments face to face with the difficulties that transforming the Turkic people entailed. These were added to by practical problems. The different Turkic languages made the translation of various teaching materials and the fostering of teaching cadres knowledgeable in these languages essential. In addition provisions had to be made to make it possible for nomads and their children to attend the schools. These difficulties were added to further by the low literacy rates. They prevented all but verbal contacts between the cadres conversant in the local languages and the indigenous people. To popularise a new regime under these conditions was no doubt a difficult and exceedingly slow process. To educate the Turkic people for the new society even slower.

The difficulties were made even more complex by the time factor. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese regime was able to grant their respective Turkic people a lengthy period of adjustment. The demands of industrialisation and modernisation made a speedy transformation essential, particularly within the educational system. But speeding up the process was likely to cause even greater difficulty. Among the problems arising was that of training sufficient numbers of cadres with the required technical qualifications. On the whole the Turkic people lacked the formal educational prerequisites that allowed entrance to the programmes training cadres in highly specialised fields. This placed both the Russians and Chinese in awkward positions. They dominated the leadership role in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang respectively. At the same time they were the carriers of the new social ideals. From these two factors arose the greatest challenge for both Moscow and Peking. Both had to convince the Turkic people that the Russian and Han people had not come to the two regions to dominate, but to help build the new society. This too had to be achieved through education.
Following the communist takeovers in Russia and China it was only a question of time before the existing educational system in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was altered. The new regimes were pledged to changing the social values of the people under their rule. This pledge only could be honoured if the masses were convinced that the new culture was superior to the old. In order to convince the masses re-education was necessary. However, the traditional Muslim schools were not suited for this task. These schools also could not train the specialised personnel that an industrial society required. This did not mean that the schools were unable to meet the educational requirements of their societies generally. They had met these without undue difficulties in the past, suggesting that the problems that did arise resulted from a shift in the educational ideals. As the two regions became increasingly dominated by alien social values the Muslim schools were less and less able to play a significant role.

Throughout the Islamic World education was closely tied to the mosque. It was not necessarily the case that Islam actively sought to dominate and control the lives of people through the educational system. The grip that the religion had on the people made this unnecessary. The entire state was ruled on the basis of Islamic social and political ideals. From this also sprang social obligations. Like the mediaeval church in Europe, Islam too was the only body that felt an obligation and possessed the necessary resources to educate the people it ruled.

The funds that supported the Muslim schools did not come directly from the religious institution, but from a *waqf*. These funds had been established from bequests that the mosque was to administer. The bequest generally was made to support a "work pleasing to God," and
consisted of land that provided a continuous source of income. This income was used for the upkeep and support of the school, the upkeep of the mosque to which the school was attached and for the salary of the teacher. Since the endowment was of a religious nature and administered by the mosque the schools were attached directly to the religious institutions. At the same time the mosque was the only viable source of teachers. The only person sufficiently literate to teach was the local Mullah. This tied the religious and educational institutions even more closely.

The primary schools or mektebs, were attended by boys up to the ages of eleven and thirteen and girls to the age of eleven. Their curriculum was designed to acquaint the students with the Islamic way of life. The children learned to read and write some Koranic verses. This generally consisted of copying and memorising the verses and not in the acquisition of the ability to read and write, leaving the primary education few visible benefits. The Arabic that had been learned bore little relation to the daily life of most students and tended to be forgotten after the student left the mekteb. In the mekteb the student also was not taught his native language, leaving most of the people completely illiterate. On the whole the education consisted of the forced memorisation of an elementary primer containing several prayers and religious social mores written in Arabic. It was these prayers and religious social mores that gave the education its real significance. They provided the bases on which the childrens' future lives were conducted. It was to this teaching that the good conduct and dignity of the Turkic people have been ascribed to.

Such practical knowledge as was required for dealing with the affairs of the family's household was acquired from the father when the son entered the family business. During the 1920's Turkic people in Sinkiang who had never attended school nonetheless were found to be capable of adding sums. No doubt the basic skills had been handed
down from father to son. While the education at the primary level was concerned with the social aspects of Islamic society rather than specific skills, the secondary institutions or medresseh, were to foster specific academic skills.

The attendance at the medresseh was limited. These schools generally were located in the cities of Central Asia which meant the students had to be able to pay for their lodgings and food. This limited the attendance to those boys whose fathers had the financial means to allow their sons to study either in one of the Central Asian cities or even in Constantinople. At the medresseh the students learned to read and write and were schooled in Arabic, philosophy, theology, the shariat, Persian, Turkish, logic, some basic arithmetic, history and geography. Those who completed the course were eligible to become teachers at medresseh or hold religious offices. The latter automatically involved the graduate in the administrative work of the Islamic state.

With rare exception girls were not schooled beyond memorising the elementary primer and remained completely illiterate. Those who had been educated beyond this were members of a few upper-class families. They had attended one of the small number of girls' schools located in larger cities such as Tashkent and Bukhara. In latter life these women were found to be exceedingly well informed about a wide range of subjects, primarily because their reading had not been confined to the curriculum of the medresseh. Many of them were able also to write. Within the confines of their homes the women of the upper-class Turkic society had greater opportunity to pursue an education than did the men. Their seclusion afforded them the necessary leisure and their wealth and status well may have given them greater access to books than even some of the men who had been educated enjoyed. In terms of literacy and general knowledge therefore, the educated women well may have been better educated than the medresseh educated male.
In Kazakh society neither the mekteb nor the medressah were particularly significant. At the bidding of Catherine II Muslim schools had been established in the steppes. These had Tatar Mullahs as teachers. As a result Tatar became the language of education and the official administrative language in the relations between the Kazakhs and the Russian Government. The Kazakhs resented this Tatar domination and petitioned Nicholas I in 1830, requesting that no more clerics were appointed to and no more mosque schools established in the Kazakh steppes. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Russians began to consider the Tatar influence a threat to their own hegemony in the steppes. To increase the Russian influence a school system was introduced that was based in part on the ideas of the Russian orientalist N. I. Il'minsky. From this there eventually emerged a "Russian-native school" that was intended to teach Kazakh children the Russian language and generally familiarise them with the Russian culture. In an effort to reach the children of the Kazakh nomads aul-schools were established. They relied on Mullahs or Kazakh teachers and moved about with the nomads. Between 1895 and 1913 the number of Russian-native and aul-schools increased at an impressive rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian-native Schools</th>
<th>Aul-schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Increase as percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>276.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures indicated the growing attention that the education of the Kazakhs was accorded in St. Petersburg. Only the Kazakhs were no more prepared to accept the Russian-native and aul-schools than they had the Tatar dominated religious schools. They simply refused to send their children to them. In those regions where attendance was made
compulsory, wealthy Kazakhs hired the children of the poor. These they then sent to the Russian schools in place of their own children. Even by the early twentieth century this resistance had not been broken. In 1913 the proportion of Kazakh students in the total of 2,011 schools in Kazakhstan accounted for only 7.5 per cent of all students. While this hardly could be assessed as a total failure, it was only a qualified success. These figures also indicated that the resistance of the Kazakhs towards the Tatar dominated religious schools had arisen not only from the fear of being culturally dominated. A good deal of the resistance encountered by both the Tatars and Russians in their efforts to educate the Kazakhs was the natural resentment that any group of people was likely to demonstrate towards strange institutions. Its primary ingredient was not so much the fear of being dominated but suspicion. Only the small intellectual group of Kazakhs even could be aware of the dangers that the dominance of an alien educational system held for the Kazakh culture. But they, particularly Valikhanov, Abai and Altynsaryn, also considered the Russian educational system the only hope for maintaining the Kazakh cultural traditions. Their concern was not to exclude the Russian type of education from Kazakhstan, but to ensure that it was utilised to modernise Kazakh society thereby strengthening the Kazakh culture.

In Sinkiang the situation was largely similar to that of Kazakhstan. There the education of the Turkic people was almost entirely in the hands of the mosque. A small number of Turkic children were accepted into the Chinese Government schools which educated the children of the Chinese administrators living in the province. These schools provided the Turkic children with a Chinese education. The graduates from them were employed in post and telegraph offices, as tutors for the children of Chinese officials or as interpreters for magistrates. In the latter position they acted as intermediaries between the Chinese magistrates, who on the whole were unable to speak the local languages,
and the Turkic people.

These students were essential for the political administration. To encourage them to enroll in the Chinese schools the Turkic students were provided with free school uniforms and paid one tael per month.\textsuperscript{10} In Kazakhstan the Russians too had established schools to train Kazakhs as interpreters,\textsuperscript{11} and here also the costs were no doubt borne by the State. The fact that the Chinese even paid Turkic children to attend the Government schools suggested that they, like the Russians in Kazakhstan encountered difficulties in attracting the desired number of students from among the Turkic population.

While the attitude of the Turkic people in both regions to a large extent may be explained by mistrust and suspicion, their general attitude towards education must be considered also. A formal education simply did not have the same value to them as it did to the European and Chinese societies of the day. The life of the Turkic people tended to be practical rather than academic, while their cultural traditions were oral rather than written. In Kazakh society the mores, beliefs, emotions and ideals all were expressed in the folk literature and epos.\textsuperscript{12} This continued to be oral until the late nineteenth century. The need for a written language or even the ability to read or write was very limited. To base an assessment of the level of the education attained by the Turkic people on their level of literacy therefore was erroneous. Such an assessment only could indicate the degree to which the Chinese, Middle Eastern and Russian educational ideals had penetrated the Turkic regions. Conversely, in terms of the socialist transformation, the lack of literacy indicated that the degree of penetration had been limited and that the greatest part of the work remained to be done after the Communists came to power.

In the new policies advocated by the Communists universal education played a prominent role. This education emphasised literacy and socialist values, all of which demanded a different attitude towards
education on the part of the indigenous people. It fell to the new regimes to convince the local people that the new educational policies and values should be adopted. That their traditional ideals should be exchanged for the Marxist educational and social maxims.

III:2;ii Marx on education

The educational policies of the new regimes were based on the views of Marx. The latter did not consider nineteenth century European education a means for achieving enlightenment through study and discussion, but the tool for the enslavement of mankind. He argued that man originally had been free to be either a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic, just as it suited him and without the necessity of being any of these. This natural state had been destroyed by the rise of the bourgeois class which had become the ruling class. As the ruling class the bourgeoisie ruled society not according to the concept of philosophy, but in accordance with its own conception of philosophy.

In each epoch the thoughts of the ruling classes are the ruling thoughts, thus, the class which is the ruling material power of society is at the same time its ruling ideological power.

Like the ideologues of all other ruling classes so too the ideologues of the bourgeoisie came to dominate. But unlike previous dominating ideologies the bourgeois ideals were intended to safeguard the continued existence of the bourgeoisie. To achieve this end it was necessary to enslave the remainder of mankind and to ensure the continued existence of Capitalism on which the existence of the bourgeoisie depended. Only by gaining wide-spread acceptance for its ideals could the bourgeoisie maintain its own position. To achieve this end it transformed "the doctor, the lawyer, the preacher, the poet, the man of science into its paid workers." Through them the bourgeois ideals were spread among the people, turning the latter into beings whose entire existence was devoted to strengthening Capitalism and the bourgeoisie. For the vast majority of the people this education was no
more than the "training for a machine-like existence." In fact it was the means by which man had been separated from his natural state of existence.

It was the task of the Communists to free man from the bourgeois ideological domination so that he was once again free to follow his own human instincts without external guidance. Marx did not however intend to replace the bourgeois ideology with that of Communism. He did not consider Communism an ideology, but a movement.

For us Communism is not a condition that must be produced, an ideal according to which reality will have to adjust itself. We term the actual movement which dissolves the present condition Communism.

According to this definition Communism was not a state that could be achieved, but a movement that was necessary to destroy Capitalism. Having accomplished this task it too was destined to disappear. This was to leave the new workers' state without any external ideologies. It was to be guided increasingly by the social consciousness of man as this consciousness itself increased. The task of the educational system lay in ensuring that the social consciousness of the new society grew rapidly.

Although Marx was unable to foretell what form the educational system was to take after the advent of the Communists' rule, he did make suggestions for reforming the education of workers in bourgeois society. He understood education to consist of three elements; mental training, physical training and a polytechnic education. The latter was to,

impart the general principles of all production processes and, at the same time, familiarise the young person with the practical purpose and handling of the elementary instruments of all branches of production.

This was an indication that the aims of the education were not to train specialists, but to familiarise young people generally with the production process. Marx also believed that education should be combined with productive labour so long as the labour was educational and
not exploitive. He divided the students into different age groups and assigned each a limited period of time that was to be spent in daily productive work. The 9-12 year olds were to spend two hours in daily labour, the 13-15 year olds four hours and the 16-17 year olds six hours. As a result of this combination of training, education and work, Marx believed the working class would be raised "far above the niveau of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie." Their education would have made the working class children more class conscious and brought them closer to revolution and freedom. Meanwhile, the children of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie were being trained still in their own ideological tradition, leaving them unprepared for the new society.

Marx stipulated that in the immediate post-revolution period education should be combined with material production. This suggested that he, at his own level of class consciousness, considered his educational programme the best means for rapidly raising the class consciousness of the workers during the first stage of the transitional period.

Lenin's attitude towards education was based on the ideas of Marx. The combination of education with labour and the theoretical with the practical in polytechnics appealed to Lenin. It was included in the bolshevik party programme of May 1917. In this Lenin proposed:

Free and compulsory general and polytechnic (acquaintance with both the theory and practice of all main branches of production) education for all children of both sexes up to 16 years; closely connecting the training of children with socially productive labour.

This set the general pattern for Soviet education, although the emphasis was placed increasingly on specialised education. In the polytechnics the classroom training was combined simply with some practical work in the field in which the student had specialised.

In China Mao too emphasised that practical experience combined with theoretical training were the fundamentals of socialist education. In 1937 he had outlined the position of the Communists as favouring
"the concrete and historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, and of knowledge and action..."\textsuperscript{23}

Although the views of Lenin and Mao seemed similar, there were great differences in the application of their basic principles. Lenin interpreted Marx as having proposed that students should gain limited experience in productive labour. Their theoretical education in polytechnics was to be combined with practical training in the general field of study to provide the students with a broader outlook. Mao, on the other hand, held that students should have to engage in manual labour for a time, doing jobs not related necessarily to their studies. Hence, while the Soviet view was that practical experience was to help produce a better specialist, the Chinese considered practical work a means for moral training. This attitude may have been the cause for the different points of emphasis in the educational systems of the two countries. While the emphasis in the Soviet Union was on the polytechnic education, it lay on the combination of education with productive labour in China.\textsuperscript{24} However, this explanation was hardly complete.

There were economic and demographic differences that also must be considered in explaining the different attitudes.

III:2;iii The economic and demographic influences on education

The Russian and Chinese Communists had differing attitudes towards industrial development. To some extent this influenced their educational policies. Whereas the Bolsheviks were familiar with the modern industry of 1917 Europe and emphasised the modernisation and development of Russian industry, the experience of Mao, until 1949, had been limited to the backward industry of China. After 1949 the Chinese too emphasised modernisation and industrial development just as the Bolsheviks had. Nonetheless, the Chinese were lagging in their appreciation of the role that the specialist played in modern industry. The problem was complicated further by the lack in China of the educational facili-
ties to train the required number of specialists. In fostering specialised personnel practical training became the most important aspect, while theoretical training was provided on a limited scale. In the Soviet Union this problem was not as acute. Some training institutions for industrial specialists had been set up in the years prior to the revolution. These and the existing specialists provided a greater base for training new personnel.

The attitude towards specialists also differed in the two countries. Mao was more inclined to rely on practical on-the-job training than the Bolsheviks had been. This was less critical in the more forgiving agricultural sector, where the penalty for the lack of knowledge was a lower yield rather than absolute failure. In the industrial sector, however, the case was quite different. During the Great Leap vast quantities of steel were produced in communal foundaries, the quality of much of which was too poor to allow it to be used. Although the Chinese Government had encouraged the increased training of specialists, particularly in engineering, health and education, by 1958 their numbers undoubtedly were insufficient still. It was unlikely also that this situation had been changed even by the time of the Cultural Revolution. During that turmoil the training of specialists and education in general was accorded once again very little priority.

It has been noted already that the levels of industrial development played a role in the attitude towards education. Another point arising from this concerned the purpose for which people were being trained. The Russia of 1917 was a reasonably developed, albeit backward, industrial nation. By comparison China in 1949 was overwhelmingly agricultural. In China this not only reduced the need for industrial specialists, but also shifted the purpose of education.

Mao emphasised sending the young people into the countryside to work and gain practical experience. This theme was echoed throughout China. Wu Yu-chang, the chairman of the National Committee of the
The trade union of educational workers noted that:

Labor education should permeate the whole educational process in the middle and primary schools. The students should, on the one hand, be taught to love labor and be good at labor. ... In the conduct of labor education, attention should also be directed to training the students to conscientiously observe discipline. This is essential not only to the successful conduct of education but, what is more important, to cultivating in the students the thought and habit of strict observance of discipline and obedience to collective interests, thus preparing them well for future participation in labor. All this should be closely linked with the education on patriotism.27

From this it emerged that the emphasis was not so much on practical labour itself, but on the ideal of labour. It was considered important that students learned to work hard in all their endeavours and especially for the construction of Socialism and for their socialist fatherland. They were to acquire also a willingness to go to any part of China if this was required by the Government. This fitted in well with the advice given to students in 1955 by the vice-minister of education Yeh Sheng-t'ao. He counselled junior middle school graduates who could not pass the entrance examinations of any schools to work in the countryside. "In future, we shall develop correspondence schools and night universities like those of the Soviet Union, and will have many chances to study."28 This also suggested labour education had another purpose. The size of the Chinese population obviously added a demographic dimension to the educational policy. By sending young people into the countryside to work the overcrowding of the limited number of higher educational institutions could be prevented.

In the Soviet Union this danger did not arise. The population was much smaller than that of China and scholarship not as universally revered as it was in the Chinese tradition. As a result the Soviet educational authorities were under little if any pressure to limit the number of applicants to Soviet higher educational establishments.
III:2;iv Education as the means for transforming society

From the above it may be concluded that education was not intended only to train people to fulfill specific functions in society. It was to influence also the social attitude of the trainees by indoctrinating them in the social values of the new society. In their respective constitutions both regimes had pledged themselves to the total transformation of their societies. This task they could achieve only by teaching the masses new moral values. Through this teaching the individual was to be transformed into a collective person and a society of individuals into a collective society. In this respect the transformation of the Turkic people in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was no different from the transformation that the Russian and Han-Chinese societies had to undergo.

Traditionally education was a device for social mobility by means of which the individual could gain greater social status and better his daily life. In the new societies, however, education was to serve society as a whole and not the desires of the individual. The student had to learn that the state made the final decision about the studies he was to pursue. In China this not only prevented the overcrowding of the educational institutions but also ensured that students opted for those courses that were most necessary for the work of the initial re-construction period. This permitted the state to enroll students in institutions where there was room and in courses essential for the re-construction effort. The students simply had to accept that their duty was to society as a whole and not to themselves.

The social aims of education were similar in both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This applied especially to their respective Turkic regions. In 1923 the Bolsheviks had pledged themselves to step up the socialist educational work among the people in the national republics so as to wipe out local nationalism and great
Russian chauvinism. After this work had been completed the interaction and intermingling of the various races and the solidarity within the socialist state should have been enhanced greatly. The Chinese modeled their social education on that of the Soviet Union and pursued a similar policy. It was out of this policy that the greatest educational problems arose. Both the Russians and Han-Chinese advocated the complete transformation of the Turkic society. It was through the educational system that both Governments sought to convince the Turkic people that neither the Russians nor the Chinese were promoting these radical changes for chauvinistic reasons.

It may be justified to conclude that the basic purpose of the governmental educational systems in both regions remained the same before and after the revolutions. Throughout the aim was to teach the moral values of the dominating social system. But the task after the revolutions had been complicated by what had gone before. A system that had placed little value on the skills required by an industrial society was suddenly replaced by one that insisted on modernisation and needed the skills that had previously been rejected. For the population of the two regions this meant both a social and economic change from a non-industrial Islamic society to a industrial socialist society. To deal with the new tasks that emerged a well-educated group of Turkic people was essential.

III:3 Fostering cadres for the Turkic regions

Both central Governments actively recruited cadres to work among the people as a whole. The cadres were not simply propagandists, but experts in various fields of endeavour. They were to lead the people in building the new society and to stand out as model people of that new society. They were to be emulated by the remainder of the population. This made it essential that the cadres were well-suited for these tasks and carefully chosen.
The Chinese issued specific requirements for those wishing to train as teaching cadres. Except for cadres requiring specific technical educations, they were to have an above primary school education, be willing to join the armed forces and be "politically pure."\(^{33}\) In the Soviet Union the national commission for education, Narkompros, applied similar standards. In 1924 one of its leading members, A. V. Lunacharskii, outlined what was expected of Soviet teachers.

Above all, it is necessary that the teacher was really imbued with the precise consciousness of character and the importance of that role which he was called upon to play in the cultural history of the world's first socialist republic. We do not demand, of course, that each teacher was a party Communist but, as much acquaintance as is possible with the basic ideals of our party, with the ideals of the great Lenin, with the course and aims of our revolution, is indispensable for every teacher.\(^{34}\)

Essentially, both Governments required their cadres to be sympathetic towards their political and social aims. If the cadres were to work effectively for the social transformation this was a necessary prerequisite. It was the formal educational requirement of the Chinese that must have caused difficulties. While this may have been reasonable in the Han-Chinese areas, it was unlikely that in 1949 many Turkic people in Sinkiang could have met them.

III: Cadre training and the effect of illiteracy

In 1959 the Chinese claimed that, "At the beginning of liberation there was a 90 per cent illiteracy rate among the workers and peasants of the self-governing region, ten years later there were 100 illiterates per 10,000 people."\(^{35}\) This considerable reduction in the illiteracy rate suggested that the nation-wide campaign begun in 1951 to wipe it out,\(^{36}\) had been quite successful. Nevertheless, in Sinkiang the task was not completed even by 1959. In Kashen, a city in the Kashgar district, 249 illiteracy liquidation classes were organised in 1958,\(^{37}\) while of the total 1.5 million young and middle aged illiterates in the entire province 85 per cent were learning to read and
write at the end of 1958. 38

The Soviet Government had been confronted by a similar task in Kazakhstan during the 1920's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Per cent literate before 1917</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Per cent literate in 1926</th>
<th>Per cent literate in 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Kazakhstan SSR</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Kirghiz SSR</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Turkmen SSR</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjiks</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Tadjik SSR</td>
<td>03.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbek SSR</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic problem concerning the definition of literacy among the Turkic people has been dealt with already. But even in terms of the commonly accepted definition—some ability to read and write—the pre-1917 figures appeared excessively low. One late eighteenth century traveller among the Kazakhs indicated that the businessmen were able to write receipts and that in some one-third and in others all the people could read and write their own language. 40 This presumably meant the Arabic script. In the early twentieth century a Russian official had received a letter from a Kazakh family, written in the Arabic script but translated into Russian. 41 The translation indicated that the letter may have been written by someone other than the family in question. Nonetheless, although these accounts may have been somewhat optimistic, they did indicate that literacy among the Kazakhs was not as rare a phenomenon as the Soviet statistics made it out to be.

In comparing the figures for the pre-1917 period with those of 1926 and 1939 it must be borne in mind also that both the latter represented the literacy rates for the whole republic. The figures may have been inflated by the European settlers who were far more likely to be literate than the Turkic people. But on the whole the 1939 figures appear inflated by comparison to those of 1926.
The figures for both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang did provide some indication of the problem that illiteracy represented. They also indicated that its eradication would require several decades. During this time written communication with the Turkic people was severely restricted and the extent of verbal communication depended on the ability of the cadres to use the indigenous languages. In the recruitment of cadres the ability to use the Turkic languages became increasingly important. So much so that both Governments emphasised the recruitment of cadres from among the indigenous people despite their lack of the formal educational prerequisites.

In 1950 Burhan advocated that interpreters be trained from among the Turkic people and even suggested that native cadres should teach each other their own language. At the same time he noted that although a large number of people had come forward for training, there had been a decline in the quality of the cadres. This suggested that the educational requirements expected by the Chinese from those training as cadres were waived in Sinkiang. In Kazakhstan the Bolsheviks had likely done the same. The conditions in the region simply did not permit any other course of action. Both Governments required the cadres immediately after their respective takeovers. Consequently the emphasis had to be placed on recruitment and not on the level of education attained by the prospective recruits. In Kazakhstan the problem was demonstrated by the campaign to wipe out illiteracy. The campaign was undertaken in the native language. This demanded that large numbers of native teaching cadres were trained. To wait until these recruits had improved their general level of education would have held up the campaign.

The training of native cadres

One problem both regimes were faced with was the lack of educational institutions to teach the new social values. While in 1949
Sinkiang had one higher educational institution there were nine in 1960 with a total of over 6,000 students. Before the revolution the gymnasium in Orenburg had served the higher educational needs of the Kazakhs. By 1960-61 the number of institutions in Kazakhstan was 28 with a total of 77,135 students. These figures reflected some of the educational developments that had occurred in the region. However, they failed to reveal the difficulties that had to be overcome in the course of establishing the institutions.

The immediate need after the respective takeovers was for teaching cadres able to use the Turkic languages. These could have been recruited from among the non-Turkic people. After training them for three or four years they should have been able to teach in the Turkic languages. On the other hand the training period could be shortened by recruiting native cadres and training them over a short period of time, primarily in the political and practical matters related to their tasks. Peking developed two programmes based on a combination of these options. The first was divided into two parts consisting of "regular and short courses." In the regular courses cadres and intellectuals who had mastered both "their native tongue and the Chinese language" were to be trained over two or three years, while in the short courses administrative and military cadres were to be prepared over a short period of time. The second programme consisted of a four year course in the Uighur language and political science that was given by the Central Institute for Nationalities in Peking. In addition to the four years spent in course-work the students of the first class to graduate also had spent one year and one-half doing field-work in Sinkiang. This effectively stretched the course to a period of five and one-half years and it was not until August 1955 that the first class graduated. With the exception of two Hui students the graduates were all Han-Chinese. The various courses provided three levels of cadre training facilities, preparing cadres for work on one of three levels within the political
hierarchy. On the lowest of these were administrative cadres trained for general work, on the next level the specialists for translating and work in special branches and on the highest level the top level political administrators.

Under the circumstances, it was unlikely that Peking could have introduced a different policy from the one that was followed. Among the Turkic trainee cadres few, if any, could have met the entrance requirements for the higher educational institutions and middle schools. To admit them at all "special standards" were applied and those who had been admitted were to take "make-up courses." After passing this hurdle there remained the language difficulty. Since the instruction at the training institution was generally given in Chinese by Han instructors the lessons had to be translated in the classrooms. In effect this slowed the teaching process by as much as one-half. As a result it became necessary to either lengthen the training period or reduce the content of the courses.

In Kazakhstan similar difficulties were encountered. The senior teachers in schools were frequently Russians and their lessons had to be interpreted. At the higher educational institutions the instructors too were likely to have been Russian. The lengthening of the courses that the translating of the lessons caused in some instances could be overcome by the introduction of highly specialised fields of study. In these the subject matter was reduced to the bare essentials of a single area within a specialised field. One example of this may have been the University of the Workers of the East which was established in 1921 to train Central Asians as "lecturers to organise Party schools and soviet construction in the local area." The graduates were given limited training and used for political work and basic administrative tasks. In the 1930's the emphasis shifted to the collectivisation and industrialisation. This created a demand for agricultural specialists. The higher communist agricultural schools were set up
in 1932 to train these. By 1935 the six schools that were located in Kazakhstan had a total enrollment of 2,188 students of whom 1,546 or 73 per cent were Kazakhs. Although some doubt may be expressed about the agricultural specialists and their qualifications—it was not entirely clear whether they were charged with propaganda work or agricultural tasks—the concept of specialists became well established in Soviet education.

The Chinese adopted the specialised training programme in 1953. In addition to the Central Nationalities Institute in Peking the Sinkiang Nationalities College in Tihua, the Cadres School of the CCP Sinkiang Sub-Bureau and the Cadres School of the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government all had been established to train political and administrative cadres for Sinkiang. Throughout 1949-59 nine institutes specialising in particular fields were set up also. But the Chinese went a step further than had the Russians. They not only trained cadres in narrowly specialised areas, but also shortened the period of time allowed for each course. By 1955 there were complaints that this had overburdened the students and reduced the quality of the cadres. While these complaints were general in that they applied to the whole of China, the problem may have been even more pronounced in Sinkiang. At the same time it may be expected also that similar difficulties were encountered in Kazakhstan.

In the higher educational institutions the Turkic people faced several disadvantages. They lacked the basic training for the specialist courses and the linguistic difficulties prolonged their programmes or reduced them to the barest essentials. These problems made it dubious that upon graduating the native cadres had either comprehended what they were taught or been adequately prepared for their tasks. Until native cadres could be recruited from among the students who had passed through the entire educational process, training vast numbers of highly qualified native cadres remained a difficult if not a nearly
impossible task.

III:3;iii Meeting the demand for cadres

In addition to the qualitative problem there was one of quantity. As the various governmental activities in the two regions increased the demand for cadres grew. This made the task of recruiting qualified cadres even more difficult. For the Bolsheviks there was little alternative but to train the required personnel in the best available manner. In 1949 the Chinese, on the other hand, had a distinct advantage over the Bolsheviks. Unlike the Bolsheviks in 1917 the Chinese were able to send people abroad for training, particularly to the Soviet Union.

As early as 1950 Burhan advocated that people of promise from Sinkiang be sent away for training. While 11 students were sent to the Soviet Union in 1954, 568 went to institutions in the interior regions of China. These students were not to be trained only as specialists for industry and agriculture. In 1959 it was noted that, "higher educational institutions sent 27 people to the Soviet Union and 167 to the interior to train as teachers, some have already returned to take up teaching duties." Some of those sent to the training institutions in the Soviet Union and interior regions of China were trained as teachers in specialised fields. When they returned to Sinkiang they were to train others. Among these students there must have been a large proportion of natives. By 1959 the indigenous people were said to account for 69 per cent of the teaching staff in the higher educational institutions of the province. The fact that people were sent outside of the province for their training once again indicated how limited were the educational facilities within Sinkiang. This situation had not changed by 1959. There also was a large influx of cadres from other provinces. This may have been an indication that the Chinese were encountering difficulties in recruiting suitable Turkic cadres. Either
they were not available or they were not coming forward for the cadre training programme. This became particularly evident in a comparison between the number of cadres working in Sinkiang and the number that could have graduated from training institutions there.

Cadres working in Sinkiang in 1952 and 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of cadres</th>
<th>The proportion of the total that were native</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>As a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>(44,721)</td>
<td>30,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>25,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Number in brackets has been calculated)

Incomplete statistics for the number of cadres graduated from training institutions in Sinkiang by 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of institution</th>
<th>Date first class graduated</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Number of graduates by 1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadre institution of Sinkiang Sub-Bureau</td>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>(3,132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two unnamed specialist institutions</td>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tihua Nationalities College</td>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>5,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10,152</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Number in brackets has been calculated)

While these statistics were incomplete they did provide a general impression. According to this of the more than 40,000 cadres that worked in Sinkiang in 1953 only one-quarter (one-third of the native cadres) were trained in the local training institutions. The remainder had received their training in either the Red Army, the institutions of the interior or abroad. In addition there was the considerable influx of Han-Chinese cadres from other regions.

Han and non-Han cadres in Sinkiang
These figures indicated a dramatic increase in the number of Han cadres after 1955. This was no doubt a direct consequence of the lack of technical specialists among the native cadres. Following the dissolution of the Sino-Soviet Joint-stock companies in 1954 and increasing efforts to develop the industrial sector, the demand for technical cadres must have grown considerably. The lack of native specialists made it inevitable that the number of Han cadres would increase and that in Sinkiang they would become a majority in the specialised technical fields.

A similar development may be traced in Kazakhstan. There the Russian domination of the ranks of cadres having higher and middle specialist educations was evident still in 1966. In part this could be attributed to Soviet policy, but it was possible also to argue that the imbalance resulted primarily from the lack of qualified Kazakhs.

**Kazakh and Russian cadres with higher and middle specialist educations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Higher education</th>
<th>Middle specialist education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number % of total</td>
<td>Number % of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>61,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>67,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>77,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>42,600</td>
<td>97,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>54,300</td>
<td>111,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lack of native people who could be trained as specialists was
apparent in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. During the collectivisation
drive industrial development and industrial relocation of the 1930's
and the post-war developments the demands for technical specialists was
far greater than the number that could be provided locally. Of the
32,000 specialists that were required in 1933 only 5,500 could be re-
cruited in the educational institutions of Kazakhstan. This trend
continued. While the absolute number of Kazakh specialists nearly
doubled between 1959-66, that of the Russian specialists also nearly
doubled in the same period. This indicated that there had been a con-
siderable influx to meet the increased demands of particular programmes
such as the Virgin Lands scheme and increased industrialisation.

The influx of cadres into the two regions did not indicate a
reluctance on the part of either the Russians or Chinese to train local
people. It was unlikely that over a short period of time an adequate
supply of native cadres could be trained in either region. To train
indigenous people was in the interest of both Governments from the
point of view of goods socialist government and the Marxist ideals.
These concepts demanded racial equality. In addition the native cadres
were essential for overcoming the language difficulties and the cultu-
ral barriers. The difficulty was the educational base of the indige-
nous people. This had not prepared them for the demands being made by
the new regimes. Only those who had entered the new socialist educa-
tional system after the takeovers would have been at all able to meet
the required standards. The training at the primary and secondary
levels therefore became crucial in fostering the cadres of the future.

III:4 The education
of children

The success of the Soviet and Chinese regimes did not depend on
replacing the old order with communist governments, but on passing on
the revolutionary ideals to the next generation. Only if these ideals
continued to guide the Governments of the two states after the old
revolutionaries had expired could the revolution be termed a success. The task of inspiring the children of the two countries with the spirit of Socialism fell largely to the primary and secondary schools. Since both Lenin and Mao accepted that the course of the revolution depended entirely on the young people, the formal education of youth played a dual role. While equipping students with basic skills which would allow them to function in the new society and preparing them for further study, it also made them the carriers of the socialist ideals.

To achieve these aims a balanced curriculum that fostered desirable qualities in the students had to be developed. In both states the result was a balance between core subjects consisting of language, mathematics, science, history and geography and secondary subjects that were intended to develop specific or general skills such as art, music and labour among others. The core subjects were emphasised to a greater extent than the secondary subjects. This was an indication that education was intended to foster those subjects considered essential to industrial society. At the same time it was to develop social attitudes that were consistent with the ideals of Socialism.

III:4;1 The primary and secondary schools

Although the basic educational system of the two countries differed in form the purpose was the same. Until the reform of 1966 the Chinese model was similar to the American. It consisted of six years elementary, three years junior middle and three years senior middle school. These were followed by further studies at specialised or higher educational institutions. The Soviet system, until the reform of 1958, was composed of a four year primary, a seven year incomplete secondary and a ten year or complete secondary school, after which the student could attend either special, vocational or higher educational institutions. Since 1958 the first three primary and secondary schools have been replaced by a eight year school which was broken down into
The Soviet and Chinese Educational Systems

Chinese education since the mid-1960's

- Universities, Institutes and other colleges
  - Teacher training institutes
  - Teacher training. col. (senior)
  - Junior college
  - Senior high school
  - Senior teacher training school
  - Vocational secondary school
  - Junior high school
  - Teacher training school (junior)
  - Upper primary school
  - Lower primary school
  - Kindergarten

Soviet education since 1958

- Higher educational institutions (V.U.Z.)
  - Secondary specialised technicalums
  - Vocational technic.
  - Eight-Year school
  - Kindergarten
  - Nursery

Adapted from; Price, Marx and Education in Russia and China, p. 83.; Grant, Soviet Education, p. 73.
the elementary first four grades and the secondary last four. 63

It was the educational system that provided the most suitable means for shaping the social attitudes of children. Although the traditional religious schools and a number of non-religious institutions had existed in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang before the revolutions their number had been insufficient to allow for the introduction of universal primary education. This made it essential to build and equip new schools. In Kazakhstan there were between 9,423 and 9,594 elementary and secondary schools by 1960-61, 64 while Sinkiang had some 4,800 primary schools in 1959 and 250 middle and secondary schools in 1960. 65 These figures revealed that a large number of schools had been opened. Some questions may be raised about how extensive an education they were able to provide. In 1953 the Chinese launched a campaign to discourage elementary school graduates from expecting to go on to middle school. Instead they were encouraged to enter the workforce upon graduating. In 1954 only one-third of the elementary school graduates entered middle schools. 66 Besides attempting to prevent overcrowding these measures also suggested that the Chinese lacked the financial resources to allow all children to be educated beyond the primary level. In Sinkiang the situation was even worse. Even by the end of 1958 only "two-thirds of the counties" provided a universal primary education. 67 This was certainly an indication of financial difficulties. In addition other problems, particularly that of language, must be considered.

III:4;ii Linguistic difficulties in elementary education

The linguistic difficulties also made themselves felt in the teaching of children. Those cadres who had been assigned to teach in the Turkic areas had either to be able to speak the local languages or have their lessons translated. But until sufficient numbers of Turkic teaching cadres had been trained there were bound to be difficulties in staffing schools.
In Kazakhstan teaching in Kazakh was limited to the first two years in primary schools immediately after the founding of the Kazakh SSR. The remaining grades were taught in Russian. In addition there was a lack of textbooks in Kazakh. It was claimed that only at the end of the first five year plan, in 1932, did it become possible to teach all grades in almost every school in Kazakh. Because of these difficulties the education that Kazakh children received until the end of the first five year plan likely did not go beyond teaching them basic literacy in their own language. A marked change occurred in August 1948. In that year Russian was introduced as the teaching language from the second half of the first year in all Kazakh schools. Although every Kazakh child had until then had the right to be instructed in the native language this was no longer to be the case. Henceforth Kazakh was to be learned as an additional subject in the native-language schools. This placed an additional burden on native children. In effect they had to learn Russian, Kazakh and a foreign language, while Russian children learned only Russian and Kazakh as a foreign language. It has been suggested that this was one reason why the Kazakh children attended the Russian rather than the native language schools.

In Sinkiang the Turkic children also were taught in their native languages. One report in 1957 noted that because written languages had been coined for 25 nationalities "many national minorities" could use their own languages to learn "cultural and scientific knowledge." Among these were Uighur, Kazakh and Uzbek. But, as in the Soviet Union, so in China the attitude towards the indigenous peoples in Sinkiang underwent some change. Following the Rectification Campaign the study of Chinese became obligatory in higher educational institutions, "and the teaching of specialised courses in higher educational institutions has come gradually to be conducted in Han lan-
guage. Chinese was taught intensively also in the first and second grades, i and erh nien-chi, as it was claimed children in these grades had learned approximately 2,000 Chinese vocals within three months. Hence, both regimes had resorted to drastic measures to overcome the difficulties that emerged in the teaching process itself and in the production of teaching materials.

The early problems that the Soviet Union faced in producing Kazakh textbooks have been noted already. For the Chinese the Soviet printing facilities for the Turkic languages proved a great advantage. By 1951 various books had been printed on Soviet presses for the Chinese. Among these were 1,284,000 elementary school textbooks in Russian, Chinese, Uighur and Kazakh. In this manner the Chinese were able to avoid the shortages of textbooks that had plagued the Soviet Union in its infancy. But the Chinese had no intention of becoming dependent on Soviet books. In 1951 the Sinkiang People's Publishing House was established, "to edit, translate and publish books and periodicals mainly for the Sinkiang minority peoples." By mid-1952 it had published over 680,000 copies of textbooks in Uighur, Kazakh and Mongolian. For the Chinese it made good sense to establish their own printing facilities. The Soviet textbooks were based on Soviet experiences, while the Chinese required books that were relevant to their own history. Although the Soviet books were of great value no doubt as models and basic schemas, they had to be supplemented with Chinese materials if Chinese children were not to become more familiar with Soviet events than those of their own country.

III:4;iii Mobile and boarding schools

Another problem that had to be resolved in both regions was that of making physical contact with the children of the nomads and drawing them into the schools. In 1958 the school attendance in Kashen was reported to have reached 99 per cent of all school age children.
Whether a similar claim could be made among the nomads of the two regions was difficult to establish. Both Governments did make efforts to reach the children of nomads through mobile schools. These travelled along with the nomads to overcome the problem of reaching the children and adults alike. Little was known about the actual educational work that was done in the mobile classrooms, but the introduction of the boarding schools suggested that the mobile schools were considered a novel rather than a practical solution to the problem.

In Kazakhstan the efforts to establish boarding schools began in 1921. At least one boarding school was to be set up in each Kirghiz (Kazakh) volost. The intention was to keep the children of the nomads in boarding schools while the adults were away on the cattle drives. More "special schools for the children of live-stock herders" were established on the basis of the regulations that had been introduced in 1953 and 1960. As a result of these 379 boarding schools were established with, presumably in 1960, some 17,000 children.

From Sinkiang reports indicated that elementary schools received food and lodging, shih-su, paid for by the Government. From this it appeared that the boarding schools were used also among the nomads of the province. On the whole the boarding schools in both regions were likely better equipped than the mobile schools and therefore able to provide better educational facilities for the children.

The problems that the two Governments encountered in both the primary and secondary schools of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were diverse and plentiful. To solve them required more than building schools and training teachers. Perhaps the most important requirement was time. The practical difficulties related to the cultures and customs of the Turkic people were unlikely to be overcome in a few years. Furthermore for as long as any part of the Turkic cultural identity remained intact the adherence to the old customs was likely to continue. This aspect
made it especially important to re-educate the adult population.

III:5 Adult education

Except for those who entered cadre training institutions or one of the various other educational facilities, the two regions were left with a group of people that had to be educated through other means. Their education took both a formal and informal form. The formal education took place in either spare-time, winter or correspondence schools, or through the various other programmes that were offered to adults. On the informal level it consisted of that which was provided to all members of the new society. It was acquired in the course of interacting with other people on a social, professional or political level. Both the formal and informal educations were highly organised and served a dual function. On the one hand they were useful means through which the social transformation could be fostered, while on the other, they could be used as a means for spreading specialised, practical knowledge.

III:5 Formal education for adults

The greatest cultural resistance that the two regimes encountered in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was that coming from the adult population. All cultural traditions were most strongly rooted in this segment of the population. To complicate things even more they also represented the proportion of the population that was most difficult to influence because they were removed from the educational process. In order to acquaint them with the policies of Socialism courses catering specifically to adults had to be developed. The first opportunity for such courses was the campaign to wipe out illiteracy.

Almost from the outset both regimes launched campaigns against illiteracy. These were easily combined with propaganda work and both Governments utilised teaching materials in these courses that propagated Socialism. These attempts to popularise the political regimes
in no way detracted from the benefits of the courses. Since the Turkic people were living in larger societies that were intent on industrialisation, literacy could but assist them by raising their standard of social life. It also had to be borne in mind that the adult educational programme went beyond teaching literacy.

Adult education provided a unique opportunity for reaching the nomads. To some extent it was carried on in the same mobile classrooms in which the children of the nomads were taught. These schools and adult education in general provided a channel through which both Governments were able to pass on factual information about agriculture and livestock breeding. In Sinkiang the winter schools were used to train peasants in methods for improving their farming techniques.

The depth of the training that could be provided in adult education classes was limited by the level of education that those taking the courses had attained. As this level of education among the adult population of the two regions rose more academically oriented spare-time educational programmes could be developed. The additions that the Governments made to the spare-time courses in later years allowed students to use these to both acquire and upgrade their academic qualifications. This effectively transformed spare-time education into a subsidiary training institution for skilled workers. In this capacity it functioned like a formal educational establishment, except that it was intended to serve those who no longer had or never had been given the opportunity to attend full-time institutions.

The new society was based on the theory of collectivism as opposed to that of individualism. In order to transform a capitalist society into a socialist society the people had to be convinced that collectivism was more desirable for them than individualism. To accomplish this all aspects of the socialist society had to stand out as models.
worthy of emulation. Two such models, Lenin and Mao, continued to be presented as members of a society that everyone wished to belong to. But it was not intended that only the leaders should stand out as socialists. The Party, its various organisations, the army, the worker and peasant organisations and all organisations of the socialist society in general played a role in gaining the support of the masses for Socialism. It was their task to win the individual over to the collective at his place of work and in both his private and social life. In this way the individual was to be transformed into a socialist.

Perhaps the best illustration of the concept was the transformation of agriculture that Lenin and Mao envisaged. In 1923 Lenin had advocated establishing producer co-operatives supported by State funds. He believed that the co-operatives would act as models and lure the rural masses to pool their resources in similar co-operatives. The forced collectivisation under Stalin did not permit the experiment to be completed and made further appeals to the rural population unnecessary. Mao's programme for transforming agriculture was similar to that of Lenin. In 1953 he stated, "Make a success of the agricultural producers' co-operatives and a big expansion of the mutual-aid teams will follow." Mao too believed that if the co-operatives were shown to be successful individual peasants would join in mutual-aid teams so that they also could benefit from co-operation. There followed the admonition to strive for "quantity, quality and economy" in setting up co-operatives. By economy Mao meant, "no failures; failures are a waste of the peasants' energy, with the bad end-result of losses both politically and in the production of grain." In the political sense the failure of the co-operatives would have slowed the socialisation of agriculture by driving the peasants away rather than attracting them to the co-operatives. To avoid failure the Chinese did as Lenin had done, they established model co-operatives and state farms at the expense of the State.
In Sinkiang the People's Liberation Army units had reclaimed vast \newblock \textit{reas of wasteland. On this they set up mechanised collective farms. These were to serve as models "for agricultural production in Sinkiang province."} \textsuperscript{88} It was subsequently claimed that these farms had yielded \textit{record harvests.} \textsuperscript{89} In setting these records the modern equipment and techniques available to the state and PLA farms no doubt helped. But the claims made the collective effort appear all the more convincing. The forced communalisation of the Great Leap, like the collectivisation in the USSR, largely ended the experiment to attract the peasants in this manner.

All other aspects of socialist life were to serve as similar models. The young people and their organisations were widely used in this way. Lenin's wife, Krupskeya, one of the leading Soviet Commissars of education, envisaged the role of \textit{Komsomol} members and pioneers "as links connecting the broad masses of students with their youth and children's movements." \textsuperscript{90} They were to advertise the movements and bring others into them. In Sinkiang the youth movements organised activities that were especially attractive to young people. While the New Democratic Youth League of China organised a summer camp for the minority children, the pioneers were able to go to their own summer camp. \textsuperscript{91} These organisations too were to transform the individual into a collective socialist person through education.

\textbf{Conclusions}

The functions of the formal and informal educational processes in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic were intended to transform the society and individual alike. At the same time they were to be the medium for training experts. These were not to be just experts. They were to be socialist experts. Their expertise was to be relevant to a socialist society and they were to be totally devoted to the building of Socialism. It had been noted that Mao desired "to harmonize the two conflicting imperatives of 'conscious action' by individuals and im-
peccable social discipline." If this statement was to mean that Mao expected individuals to consciously act in accordance with what he considered to be Socialism, the same could be said of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev among others. This is not to say that they wanted the system to produce an unthinking person. Rather it was to train people to organise themselves and their thoughts within a socialist framework. The student was to be trained to think up and apply socialist solutions to problems, but under no circumstances was it intended that he should cease to think.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty that arose was the dilemma of having to reconcile directly opposed needs. According to socialist theory the Turkic people were to undertake their own transition in their own time. At the same time the economic requirements put pressure on the Soviet and Chinese Governments to recruit increased numbers of Turkic cadres and bring more non-Turkic experts into the two regions. This in turn exerted ever increasing pressure on the Turkic people to speed up their own social transformation.

But the influx of non-Turkic cadres also raised important social questions. Whenever Russian or Han-Chinese cadres held top positions in the Turkic regions the indigenous people were likely to consider this great nation chauvinism. This feeling was enhanced further by the fact that the new social ideals were brought to the regions by the Russians and Chinese. As a result the challenge to the educational system was very complex. It had to quickly raise the social-consciousness of the Turkic people to the level where they would no longer feel they were being dominated culturally. At the same time it had to convince the same people to relinquish their cultural heritage for Socialism.

To a large extent the success of this endeavour depended on how the non-Turkic cadres conducted themselves and on the expectations of the central Governments. Equally important was the degree to which the
indigenous people were permitted to control their own affairs. Given the low standard of formal education among the natives, the central Governments hardly could expect a socialist industrial people to emerge in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang within a few years after the respective revolutions. But at the same time, so long as the social transformation of the indigenous population had not taken place the native cadres could not be trusted to take charge of the local affairs. This posed the authorities a real dilemma. Neither central Government was prepared to run the risk of putting local people in complete control and yet the native cadres were indispensable in the local work. Burhan had noted in 1950 that, "Sinkiang is a region of many nationalities, if a large number of cadres is not fostered from each nationality to take part in the work of each department, the work will not be good work." There was no reluctance to train native cadres in either region. But as the Turkic cadres were trained and became confident in their work they also wanted to assume positions of leadership.
FOOTNOTES


2. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, p. 212.


9. Istoriya Kazakhskoi SSR, I, 546. From this source it was not clear whether the 2,011 schools included both the Russian-native and aul schools as well as the purely Russian language schools, or only the latter. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 64., took the figure to be only that of the purely Russian language schools. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, p. 219., on the other hand, accepted the number as including all types of schools on the Kazakh steppes in 1914. This latter view was supported by Soviet compilers. The Central Statistics Board of the USSR Council of Ministers', Cultural Progress in the U.S.S.R.: Statistical Returns (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958), pp. 100-101., gave the total number of schools in Kazakhstan for 1914-15 as 2,011 with 105,239 pupils.


14. Ibid., p. 44.


16. Ibid., p. 477.

17. Marx and Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, p. 32.


20 Ibid., p. 195.
21 Ibid., IV, 482.
22 Lenin, Sochineniya, 3rd. ed., XX, 305.
31 KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh, II, 441-443.
35 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 18 September 1959, p. 3.
37 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 13 June 1958, p. 3.


43 Zhizn Natsional'nosti (Moscow), No. 8 (14), 26 April 1922, p. 11.


46 NCNA (Peking), 20 August 1955, *SCMP*, No. 1121, 1 September 1955, p. 5.


48 Nove and Newth, *The Soviet Middle East*, p. 86.

49 Zhizn Natsional'nosti (Moscow), No. 11, 28 May 1921, p. 1.


53 *Sinkiang Jih Pao*, 18 September 1959, p. 3.

54 Ibid.


57 Adapted from; McMillen, "Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Sinkiang 1949-73: Revolution Integration vs. Regionalism," p. 126.; NCNA (Tihua), 17 November 1952, *SCMP*, No. 454, 18 November 1952,
58. *Tsentr'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Kazakhstan,* (1968), p. 258. In the original the percentage for Kazakhs with higher education for 1959 and 1966 was given as 23.8 and 25.7 per cent respectively. According to my calculations these figures should be 23.7 and 25.8 per cent as given in the table.


68. *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 10 June 1950, p. 3.

69. Ibid.


73. *Sinkiang Jih Pao,* 18 September 1959, p. 3.
74 NCNA (Tihua), 15 February 1951, SCMP, No., 68, 16-17 February 1951, p. 5.
75 NCNA (Tihua), 4 July 1952, SCMP, No., 369, 6-8 July 1952, p. 25.
76 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 13 June 1950, p. 3.
78 Zhizn Natsional'nostei, No., 11, 28 May 1921, p. 2.
80 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 18 September 1959, p. 3.
83 NCNA (Tihua), 4 November 1953, SCMP, No., 684, 6 November 1953, pp. 24-25.
86 Mao, Selected Works, V, 131.
87 Ibid., p. 134.
CHAPTER IV

The Turkic Reaction to the New Ideals
and to the New Societies

IV:1 Introduction

After the central Governments established their respective political, religious and educational policies they were faced with a most important challenge. They had to convince the Turkic people to participate and adopt the new cultural traditions that were part of the new society. It was not enough that the Turkic people participated in the governmental organisations, abandoned some of their religious practices and sent their children to the newly established educational institutions. Such participation indicated only that the anti-religious policies had affected worshippers and the education of children in state schools had been made compulsory. It gave no indication whether the traditional culture of the Turkic people had been replaced by that of the new society either in whole or in part.

The depth of that cultural change which had occurred could not be measured in changes that were decreed or enforced by law. These included the prohibition of religious services and compulsory education. The only accurate reflection of the attitude of the indigenous people towards the new social culture was their reaction to those aspects of the new culture that could not be enforced by laws or decrees. Only this reaction could reflect the extent to which the socialist culture had replaced the Turkic culture. One cultural change that was voluntary was intermarriage. The intermingling and mixing of different ethnic groups was a basic aspect of socialist theory. At the same time the Turkic people could not be forced to intermarry with non-Turkic people. The number of intermarriages between Turkic and non-Turkic partners were an indication therefore of the extent to which the Turkic people accepted the theory of socialist internationalism. In addition
they indicated to what extent the Turkic people were willing to interact with non-Turkic people.

The two regimes also ran into difficulties in the course of fostering the spirit of internationalism. To a considerable extent these may have resulted from the policies that were pursued. According to Marxist ideology national differences were to disappear. The people of different ethnic groups were to intermingle freely, learn from each other and exchange desirable cultural traits. This caused some considerable difficulties. While the national cultures were fostered, each national group also had to be prepared to give up its own culture either in whole or in part. This philosophy resulted in contradiction and confusion. On the one hand the Turkic people were taught to be proud of their cultural heritage, arousing a desire to protect the local traditions, while on the other hand, they were expected to give these up for the ideals of Communism. A backlash was bound to result as the Turkic people were first pushed towards their own distinct cultural identity and a new Turkic cultural awakening. Then, secondly, they were expected to relinquish their newly found culture for the socialist culture of the Soviet and Chinese regimes.

It might be argued that the Soviet and Chinese Governments could have avoided these difficulties by pursuing a policy of direct integration. Using this policy the Turkic people could have been forced to become part of the Russian and Chinese cultures. One obvious objection to such a policy was that it was likely to lead to widespread opposition. This would have made implementing it difficult if not impossible. But even more important, Marxist ideology categorically opposed precisely this sort of expedient. According to it, cultural change was to occur because the natives recognised the superiority of Socialism and its culture vis-à-vis their own. Consequently, both regimes had to pursue a policy of cultural conciliation and mutual cultural respect.
Furthermore, they were ideologically committed to developing and advancing what the Communists considered to be underdeveloped cultures. They could not deviate from this policy even if it encouraged local cultural protectionism and a movement for political freedom and independence.

If these movements appeared among the indigenous people the Governments had to channel them in such a way that they led to the development of socialist societies in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. This was the most important task facing both Governments. The whole purpose for developing the Turkic cultures had been to raise the social consciousness of the Turkic people. This in turn was to make them more inclined towards Socialism. The extent to which the indigenous people accepted the ideals and values of Socialism therefore was an indication of how far they had advanced towards the socialist society.

IV:2 The political intentions of the central Governments

In analysing the policies of the Russian and Chinese Governments there arose an immediate problem. This was related to their intentions in their respective regions of Turkestan. Politically these appeared reasonably clear-cut. In the past both states were primarily concerned with securing their borders and safeguarding themselves from attack. After the Communists came to power security remained the immediate problem, as anti-communist forces were active in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. It was only after the hostile forces had been defeated that the Marxist ideals of World-wide revolution could be invoked to justify the territorial expansion into Turkic territory.

At the same time there were aspects of tradition that had to be considered. The Russians and Chinese had ruled their respective territories of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang for considerable lengths of time, especially in the case of the Chinese. This may have added to the desire to keep the formerly annexed territories within their respective
spheres of control. A further consideration of traditional rule were the Tsarist and imperial Chinese attempts to Russify and Sinicise the Turkic people. Since Communism too advocated cultural uniformity and national singularity there may have been reason to suspect that these policies contained an element of tradition. Because of these similarities the Russian and Chinese imperial policies to some extent continued to exist side by side with the ideological basis of the communist states.

IV:2;1 The Turkic people under traditional Russian and Chinese rule

It has long been maintained by Soviet historians that the Russian expansion into Kazakhstan and Central Asia was undertaken to check British designs on Central Asia. This made it appear that the occurrences in the regions were no more than the colonial rivalry that had developed between the two imperialist states in the course of their battle over spoils. The Russians undoubtedly had been concerned about the British expansion in the Far East. But it was not entirely correct to suggest that this was their only concern in the drive to subjugate Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Other considerations included the need to protect Russian settlers and traders from attack by unruly Kazakhs. There also was a general desire to gain control over the Kazakh steppes and the hope that control over the region would lead to increased Russian trade with Turkestan and India. From this it followed that there were some very good political and economic motives for the Russian drive into Turkestan which began early in the nineteenth century. Although these reasons no doubt influenced the Russian decision to conquer the region, they themselves were not decisive.

Apart from the general aim of conquering the region, particularly the Kazakh steppes, the Russian Government had no immediate plans for Turkestan. It may be argued then, that the immediate concern was to gain military control, but not necessarily to dominate. Further evi-
evidence supporting this view may be found in the fact that after the Russian conquest the lifestyle of the Kazakhs remained largely unchanged. No attempts were made to Russify the Kazakhs or to force them to adopt Russian customs. The primary concern of the Russians was to maintain military control over the region and to ensure that no attack against Russia could be launched from it.

By no means should the imperialist designs of the Russian Tsars be dismissed entirely. The Russian rulers were no less inclined to enlarge their domains than the other European rulers. But the thrust of Russian imperial expansion was southward, towards the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and not towards the Far East. In the latter region Russian policy, with the exception of maintaining Russian military control, was left to the military commanders like General K. P. von Kaufman, the first Governor General of Turkestan. One of these policies concerned the settlement of the Kazakh steppes.

The settlers moved into the steppe region after the Russian conquest. At first they consisted of Cossacks. These the Russians settled there as military colonists. In addition there were illegal settlers and exiles from European Russia. It was not until 1869 that von Kaufman developed his master plan for settling his administrative region. Even then it was not until 1884 that the Russian Government took active steps to bring Russian settlers into Turkestan. Perhaps the most important factor in bringing about this shift in Russian policy was the economic importance that Central Asia had acquired for the Russian textile industry. As a consequence of the Crimean and American Civil Wars, Russia had been left without a source of raw cotton. This forced her to turn to the cotton growing regions of Central Asia. By 1911 one-half of the Russian cotton needs were met by cotton from Central Asia. Because of the economic importance it was only natural that the protection of the region should be paid greater atten-
tion. It also followed that settlement provided a logical solution to both the problem of protection and increased production. But despite the support of the Government the settlement of the steppes proceeded slowly.

Population of the steppe region and Turkestan guberniya by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>Rural number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>690,432</td>
<td>450,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkic</td>
<td>6,891,989</td>
<td>6,287,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>164,297</td>
<td>74,765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1897 only 12.4 per cent of the total population of the steppe region and Turkestan guberniya was non-indigenous. This represented a relatively slow increase from the start of the Russian conquest. But between 1897-1911 the non-indigenous proportion of the population more than doubled, comprising 27.2 per cent of the total. Of the non-indigenous people the Russians constituted 10.0 per cent in 1897 and 24.0 per cent in 1911. As the table above indicated, the greatest proportion of the Russians were settlers. They settled on the rich farmland that had been part of the Kazakh grazing grounds. These were reduced further still by the Turkic people who had turned to agriculture also. As a result the land at the disposal of the nomads decreased and they were in turn gradually forced to alter their way of life.

As the pastureland decreased the Kazakhs were forced to reduce the size of their herds and to turn towards a semi-nomadic existence. They engaged in both live-stock raising and agriculture and became increasingly sedentary. This development the Russian administration of the steppe region viewed with considerable satisfaction. The settling of the nomads reduced their need for land still further. In the opinion of the Russian officials this was a positive development. It freed more land that had not been used efficiently previously for settlement.
and the growing of wheat. From these developments it followed that the change in the nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakhs did not result directly from Russian policy, but was a by-product of it. The historical developments rather than the policy brought about the change. As a consequence the nomads were not only forced to seek an alternative means of earning a living. They also had to become politically active in order to defend their culture and traditional rights. The latter became even more significant as those Kazakhs who persisted in the nomadic traditions were crowded out by settlers and forced to seek out the poorest grasslands for their herds. This reduced their livestock even further. For the Kazakhs it was not merely a battle for their traditional way of life therefore, but for survival. It was hardly surprising then, that they mounted a political campaign in favour of restricting the colonisation of the steppes.

The policy of the Chinese in Sinkiang was in some respects similar to that of the Russians in Central Asia. By the nineteenth century the Chinese state was composed of many people of differing cultural heritages. Throughout the course of Chinese history these people had been incorporated into the Chinese state and into its culture. It was not clear in what way those considering themselves Chinese differed from those who were not considered Chinese. Generally it was believed that in the early periods of Chinese history—the Western Chou, 1122-771 B.C.—these differences were cultural rather than physical. To be Chinese it was not necessary to be ethnically derived from a certain group of people, but to conform to the Chinese culture and way of life. The culture rather than the ethnic origin determined whether people were Chinese.

So long as the people who were to be enveloped by the Chinese way of life were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood there was little real difficulty. Through their common agricultural pursuits the
Chinese and non-Chinese already shared a common culture and those physical differences that did exist were unlikely to be marked. During the Western Han period, 206 B.C.-8 A.D., military expansion brought the Chinese culture to the agriculturally limited steppe regions. There the differences between the Chinese and the Barbarians were both physical and occupational. Furthermore, the life in the steppe regions was not easily altered by adopting the Chinese culture. The base there was not agriculture but nomadism. The steppes therefore provided a natural barrier for Chinese cultural expansion.

For the Chinese Government it was essential to maintain a balance in the region where the Chinese and steppe cultures interacted. It has been suggested that the Great Wall may be considered as, "an effort on the part of the state to fix this frontier and to limit the proper field of Chinese activity as well as to exclude the peoples of the steppe." According to this view, the intention was not to overlay the steppe culture with the Chinese, but to ensure that the Chinese fringe areas did not acquire the steppe culture. The extent to which the Chinese culture penetrated beyond the Great Wall depended largely on the attitude of the rulers of the non-Chinese regions on the other side. If the local rulers were closely allied with the Chinese they may have encouraged their subjects to adopt Chinese customs. But this was certainly not always the case.

Following the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, the first Manchu emperors discouraged the Sinicisation of the Manchu people in order to preserve the Manchu cultural heritage. These efforts were foiled by the political necessities imposed on the rulers. In the first instance there occurred a mass exodus of Manchus into China proper. The migrants tended to adopt the Chinese customs and culture. Second, there were underpopulated areas in Manchuria, notably the Liao-tung plain in the south. Chinese colonists were encouraged to settle there. In ad-
dition political and criminal exiles were sent to the province from China proper. They were joined by illegal Chinese immigrants. Finally, in 1880, Chinese soldiers were sent to safeguard the border from the Russians. This continuous stream of Chinese immigrants gradually swamped the Manchus. By the latter nineteenth century the population of Manchuria was 14 million of which 80 per cent were Chinese. This made the transformation of Manchuria into a totally Chinese province but a question of time.

There were obvious differences between Manchuria and the steppes. In the former there was rich farmland available whereas in the latter the arable land was severely limited. Without doubt it was the availability of land that attracted the majority of Chinese colonists. Furthermore, while Manchu immigrants settled inside the Great Wall a similar development was unlikely to occur among the Turkic people. The latter could only be Sinicised, therefore, by an influx of Chinese settlers. Although such an influx did occur, it was not sufficiently large to affect the Turkic culture. Of the 3,729,000 people in Sinkiang in 1940-41, only 294,000 or 7.9 per cent were Chinese. Under these conditions it was more likely that the Chinese would be Turkicised rather than the Turkic people Sinicised.

All these developments added weight to the theory that the Chinese were concerned with keeping the steppe culture out of China and confining their own influence to within the Great Wall. But as the case of Manchuria demonstrated, the Chinese also were willing to expand their cultural frontiers beyond the Great Wall. Before 1949 they generally appeared to have accepted that the cultural differences between the settlers of China and the nomads of the steppes were too great to be bridged. This may have been due to the limited arable land available in the steppes. As a result the traditional means of Sinicisation, the envelopment of a people by Chinese farmers and their culture could not
be employed and the traditional Chinese cultural expansion suffered a momentary set-back.

In Sinkiang the Chinese Government had to content itself with the role of nominal ruler. The evidence tended to suggest that both the Turkic people and Chinese rulers were reasonably satisfied with this sort of relationship. At the top of the administrative structure were a Chinese Governor and district Magistrates, all appointed by Peking. On the local level the Chinese system of government relied on the native bureaucracy to deal with the administrative duties. These local native administrators were indispensable for the Chinese administration. Generally the Chinese officials were unable to speak the Turkic languages and kept themselves aloof from the native population. The Chinese army stationed in Sinkiang towards the end of the nineteenth century numbered between 7-8,000 troops. These troops were hardly a sufficient number to stave off a determined and united Turkic attack. From this lack of military strength it may be concluded also that the Chinese rule in Sinkiang did not depend on military might, but on a harmonious relationship and the co-ordination of the interests of both the Turkic and Chinese bureaucracies. At the same time the combined bureaucracies depended on the benevolence of the local people. These were generally well-disposed towards Chinese rule so long as the Turkic way of life was not interfered with and the tax burden kept at a reasonable level. It was not until the twentieth century, under warlord rule, that difficulties arose. During the 1911-49 period land was appropriated from the nomads and given to both Turkic and Chinese farming colonists. By using this method the ruling warlord kept the people divided and fighting among themselves rather than facing the ruler as a united group.

There were some similarities between the policies of imperial Russia and China. Neither regime attempted to force their culture on the
Turkic people in their respective sphere of influence. No doubt both
desired and fostered the Russification and Sinicisation processes in
their respective regions, but neither was inclined to force change.
One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the rulers of both
countries were confident that their respective cultures were superior
to those of the Turkic people. As a result they would have been con-
vinced that in due time the Turkic people too would recognise their
cultural inferiority and adopt the superior cultures. Such a philoso-
phy made coercion unnecessary and prevented large-scale internal
strife. This permitted both Governments to continue their policies of
maintaining control over the regions and preventing the formation of
united political factions that were opposed to their rule.

The attitudes of the central
Governments after the takeovers

Following the communist takeovers the attitudes towards the vari-
ous ethnic groups changed. The ideological view towards the nationali-
ties was that they should merge into one group of closely united peo-
ple, working for their common interests which were embodied in the
socialist state. It was not expected that the revolution would occur
in every country of the World simultaneously. According to Marx the
battle against the bourgeoisie first was to assume a national charac-
ter, with the proletariat of each country dealing with its own bour-
geoisie. Only gradually would the revolution spread throughout the
World.

It was the duty of the Communists to ensure that the struggle of
the individual countries was not divorced from the World-wide movement.
Marx believed the Communists were the socially most conscious element
in the workers' movement and subsequently charged them with the task of
keeping the international aims in sight. Their duty was to steer the
remainder of the proletariat in the direction of international revolu-
tion. Hence, the communist movement was a international movement
transcending all national differences. Although the proletariat had to establish itself as a single national group in the first instance, Marx believed the national antagonisms between the proletariats of different countries would disappear completely after the class contradictions had been resolved. The unifying bond between the World proletariat was to be their common belief in Communism. It remained for the leaders of the various national revolutionary movements to overcome the national interests of their own groups and maintain proletarian unity. They not only had to convince the Party members, but also the working masses that they all benefitted from such unity.

This defined the communist policies towards the various nations from the outset. The nations were to be joined into one. Lenin accepted and promoted this aim. According to him its realisation would "end not only the existence of a humanity splintered into small states and every isolated nation, not only draw nations together, but also amalgamate them." It was this policy of amalgamation that gave rise to fundamental problems. The culture that the people living in a proletarian state were to adopt had never been defined. In the multinational state this question became especially acute. Lenin adamantly opposed attempts to have Russian made the national language of the communist movement and bitterly resented Ordzhonikidze's treatment of a Georgian Communist. He did not envisage resolving the cultural question by forcing the Russian or any other culture on the other national groups. This he associated with great Russian chauvinism and all that the Communists opposed. It was in the rise of internationalism and increasing social consciousness among the masses that Lenin foresaw the solution of the cultural question. In his opinion there were "elements of democratic and socialist culture" in each nationality's culture. These had to be adopted and amalgamated into the "International culture of democracy and of the World-wide workers' movement." Which
cultural aspects from each nationality were to be adopted was to be decided by the socially conscious. As the level of social consciousness among the proletariat rose they too, according to Lenin's theory, would be able to distinguish the acceptable and non-acceptable cultural elements of each nation. Their level of consciousness would prevent national sentiments from interfering with the choice of those cultural aspects that would benefit the new socialist culture. This theory left no room for force. The rising level of social consciousness permitted for decisions to be reached amicably, making all force superfluous.

A major departure from the Leninist attitude came with the rise of Stalin. By 1929-30 Stalin not only wanted national cultures to merge into one general culture in both form and content, but there also was to be "one general language." Lenin had opposed lifting one language above the others, citing the example of Switzerland where three languages were able to co-exist on equal terms. In his 1913 writing on "Marxism and the nationality question" Stalin had depreciated the importance of the language question, dismissing the debate on a common European language as "jargon." By 1929-30 he had departed considerably from this view. The reasons for the shift remain obscured. As so many of the policies of Stalin it may have been caused by the desire to speed up the transition to Socialism. The change then could have been brought about simply by his general impatience. On the other hand, Stalin well could have been a great Russian chauvinist intent on promoting the Russian culture.

On the question of a general language the Stalinist policy has proved to be long-lived. In 1977 it was suggested again that Russian be made "the language of international intercourse" within the Soviet Union in all matters pertaining to "the processes of building and strengthening Socialism." In language, at least, the trend was definitely towards Russification and assimilation. The policy change lent
the Soviet nationality policy a distinct assimilative character. The
different national cultures were no longer to blend together as Lenin
had envisaged. Instead the new culture was to be decreed from above.
As cultural changes were forced on the people it became necessary to
define the culture that they were to adopt. In general that culture
was likely to be that most familiar to those having the political power
to decree the change.

Mao's thinking on the new Chinese culture tended to be similar to
that of Lenin. Like the latter he too believed that a culture, in this
case the Chinese, would benefit by absorbing useful aspects from other
cultures. Similarly Mao believed that the new World culture would be
formed by linking the new-democratic culture of China with the social-
ist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations.

It [the new-democratic culture of China] links up with
the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other na-
tions and they are related in such a way that they can ab-
sorb something from each other and help each other to deve-
llop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revolu-
tionary national culture it can never link up with any reac-
tionary imperialist culture of whatever nation.30

The process envisaged by Mao was not simply one of cultural assi-
milation, but the merging of cultures. Only the most progressive ele-
ments from each culture were to be incorporated into the new culture.
This was to make the new culture even more progressive. The attitude
of Mao towards the different cultures within China was similar. In
1944 he suggested that the masses in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border
region be called upon to struggle against "their own illiteracy, super-
stitions and unhygienic habits." The means for convincing the masses
to conduct this struggle was to be education at all age levels.31 This
did not mean that the communist policy was to encourage the national
groups to break with their own culture and adopt that of the Han commu-
nists. On the contrary, like Lenin, Mao too intended to encourage the
cultural developments among the nationalities. The Chinese Communists
were to assist the various nationalities in the endeavour to free their respective cultures from bourgeois domination and aid local cultural development. 32 This was hardly a policy intended to allow the Han-Chinese to become culturally dominant in the minority regions. It was intended to raise the cultural and educational niveau of the minorities in an effort to raise their level of social consciousness. After this had been achieved Mao had no doubt that the minorities would choose the socialist rather than the capitalist mode of life.

Neither the policy of Lenin nor that of Mao permitted cultural assimilation. Both advocated the merging of cultures and the evolution of a totally new World culture. They did not propose the replacing of a weaker culture by a stronger, as in the assimilative process. For similar reasons integration was not a suitable alternative. It too entailed the disappearing of the weaker culture into the stronger. Under the communist leadership no culture was to disappear. The new World culture was to evolve from all cultures by incorporating features from each of them. This was hardly possible through either assimilation or integration. It was feasible only through the willingness of each cultural group to accept those aspects of each others culture that would result in the development of a higher cultural form. This required an alignment of the various groups of people with the ideals of Socialism. Hence, it would appear appropriate to term the policies of Lenin and Mao those of politically aligning their respective minority people with the political and cultural aims of the leadership.

Although Stalin's policy became increasingly assimilative after 1928, he also had considered assimilation incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. In 1928 he wrote, "You know of course, that the policy of assimilation is undoubtedly excluded from the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism as a anti-national policy, counterrevolutionary and as a ruinous policy." 33 After 1928 Stalin changed his tack. By 1929 he was convin-
ced that the Russian culture was the basis of the new socialist culture. Mao, on the other hand, was not overly impressed by the Soviet nationality policies. In 1956 he noted, "In the Soviet Union the relationship between the Russian nationality and the minority nationalities is very abnormal; we should draw lessons from this." This indicated that Mao had some misgivings about the Soviet policies of the post-Stalin era, possibly even about those of Stalin himself.

There were definite differences and similarities between the cultural policies of the imperial and communist rulers of the two countries. Under imperial rule assimilation, albeit without force, was the desired goal. The Communists, on the other hand, were ideologically committed to a policy of political alignment and the evolution of a new World culture from all national cultures. The basic prerequisites for this policy were patience, flexibility and, above all, their absolute confidence in their own cultural superiority. But the Communists had not developed a purely proletarian culture and the old Russian and Chinese culture had to be transformed. In their work among the Turkic minorities the communist cadres of both countries may have lacked the cultural confidence that the imperial governors had. While the Soviet and Chinese communist culture were both relatively new, that of the Turkic people was ancient. Thus it may have been the Turkic people who believed themselves culturally superior to the Communists. The attitude towards cultural change also was quite different under Communism. Under the imperial rulers cultural change had certainly been encouraged, but it was not a matter of policy. Cultural change under Communism was not only encouraged, but an intrinsic element of communist ideology. It was this ideology that governed the communist attitude towards all cultures.

IV:3 Regional integration

In both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang it was not only a matter of alig-
ning the Turkic people politically. Both regions also had to be developed economically and integrated into the economy of their respective country. Until the people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang felt themselves a part of and actually benefitting from an association with their respective central Governments it was unlikely that they would willingly accept Socialism as an alternative. At the same time the economic development entailed some immediate difficulties. It not only brought economic changes to the regions, but also clashed with the local way of life. To avoid alienating the Turkic people due attention had to be paid their culture and traditions. The failure to do so could easily result in confrontation rather than economic and regional integration. Another aspect that played a part in the regional integration of the two regions was their respective economic importance to the Soviet Union and China. A brief analysis of the transportation and industrial developments in the areas will provide some insights into this.

IV:3;i The development of transportation

Following the bolshevik revolution Kazakhstan, like Sinkiang after the communist takeover, was an isolated region. In Sinkiang the existing trade was limited by the lack of transportation. The former consisted primarily of luxury items not readily available in the region and easily transportable by caravans. The situation in Kazakhstan was analogous to that of Sinkiang. The Trans-Siberian railway and its branch-line to the Fergana valley skirted the outer fringes of Kazakhstan, leaving the vast interior with no rail links. While the Turk-sib railway, constructed in 1929-31, linked the south-eastern border of Kazakhstan to the existing line, the interior region continued to depend on caravan tracks. It was not until 1940-53 that the railway system was again extended on a large scale.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Railways Kilometers</th>
<th>Increase as percentage of 1960 total</th>
<th>Roads Kilometers</th>
<th>Percentage with hard surface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>-14.9</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5,223</td>
<td>00.3</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6,581</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>106,600 (105,700)</td>
<td>1.4 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>8,212</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>108,900</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8,407</td>
<td>01.7</td>
<td>108,700</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>9,449</td>
<td>09.1</td>
<td>108,100</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>9,467</td>
<td>00.2</td>
<td>108,100</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>9,473</td>
<td>00.1</td>
<td>108,100</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>9,580</td>
<td>00.9</td>
<td>108,500</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>11,471</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>107,400 (107,400)</td>
<td>nd (10.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(figures in brackets are from 1968 source.)

These figures cannot be used as accurate indicators—the discrepancies in the two sources used indicated that there were inaccuracies. Nevertheless, they did indicate a general trend in railway building in Kazakhstan. According to this there were three periods of considerable activity: 1928-32, the building of the Turksib, 1940-53, the relocation and development of industry in Kazakhstan and 1956-60, the Virgin Lands Campaign and continued industrial development. There was no great increase in road construction. Instead the emphasis was placed on improving the existing roads.

Whereas the Trans-Siberian railway had provided a link between Kazakhstan and the heartland since the nineteenth century, there was only a caravan track linking China proper with Sinkiang. In 1943 the Kuomintang Minister of Communications, Chang Kia-ngau, planned to construct a railway from Tianshui to Lanchow and Lanchow to Sinkiang.37 But these plans did not come to fruition until after the Communists took over. Consequently the region was left to depend entirely on road transportation until the Lanchow-Urumchi line reached Sinkiang.

In the early 1950's the transportation of the region itself was dependent on draught animals.38 This made it less surprising that the
Chinese Government paid greater attention to the repair and construction of roads than to the building of railways. While the entire length of the Lanchow-Urumchi railway, had it been completed to the Soviet border, would have been approximately 3,470 kilometers, some 10,800 kilometers of highway was prepared for motor vehicle traffic. In 1949 only approximately 3,000 kilometers of highway had been open to motor traffic. There appeared to have been no allowance for existing caravan tracks in the 1949 figure. In view of the dependency on animal power these would have been far more important than motor roads. Only as motor transport became more important could the motor roads come into their own. Nonetheless, their growth did indicate the direction of future transportation developments in Sinkiang.

The development of motor transport in Kazakhstan likely had been similar to that of Sinkiang. Initially caravan tracks were transformed into motor roads which became less important as the rail network was developed. One important consideration in the building of the major railway lines was their strategic significance. Both the Trans-Siberian and Lanchow-Urumchi lines facilitated the movement of troops. No doubt it was the strategic consideration that determined the route along which the two lines were built. They connected major economic and administrative centres. Their branch-lines, such as that into the Fergana valley, were built primarily for economic reasons. This indicated that the purpose of the main lines was to serve those centres vital for strategic, administrative or economic reasons. The internal rail system and roads were constructed as the industrial development in the regions themselves or in other regions made them necessary.

Initially the internal railway system of Kazakhstan was to facilitate the transportation of raw materials to the Urals for processing. Thus, the railway building of the inter-war period was not necessarily
connected with industrial development in the region itself. To a considerable extent this was reflected in the allocations of investment funds to Kazakhstan.

Investment in three sectors of Kazakhstan as percentages of total investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>All industry</th>
<th>Agriculture excluding kolkhozes</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1928</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Five year plan 1929-1932</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Five year plan 1933-1937</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Five year plan 1938-1941</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war years 1941-1946</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Five year plan 1946-1950</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Five year plan 1951-1955</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until the Second World War the largest proportion of total investment was allocated to industry and transportation. The agricultural sector remained in the background except in the first five year plan, during which there was famine. Throughout the War years and immediately afterwards the industrial and transportation sectors received more than one-half of the total investment. A dramatic change was not evident until the Virgin Lands Campaign beginning with the fifth five year plan. From then onward the industrial investment declined to the pre-war level, while agricultural investment increased. Out of this investment pattern emerged the general economic development pattern of Kazakhstan. Up to the Second World War a considerable proportion of investment had been allocated to industry and transportation. During
the War the industrial proportion increased even more, whereas the agricultural declined. Although the emphasis on industrial development was maintained to the end of Stalin's rule, there was a gradual shift towards agriculture from 1946 onward. The investment pattern indicated that the economic development of Kazakhstan in any one of the periods was conducted by placing the emphasis on different sectors of the economy.

The primary difference between the economic development of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was the development of individual sectors in the former and the whole economy in the latter region. Between 1949-54 the economy of China was administered on a regional basis. In the various regions—Sinkiang fell within the North-West region along with Kansu, Shensi, Tsinghai and Ningsia—the industrial undertakings relied on the resources found within each region. Initially Sinkiang was cut off also from the other four provinces of the north-west. Its economic development had to be undertaken independently from China with whatever assistance was available from the Soviet Union. With the introduction of the first five year plan in 1954 the regional administration was dissolved in favour of central planning. It was not until after 1957 that the control from the centre was relaxed. The lack of efficient transport made it dubious that the economy of Sinkiang could have been integrated effectively into a centrally planned economy until 1960 when the Lanchow-Urumchi railway had been completed. Until then Sinkiang had to be largely self-reliant.

The large population of China made the production of foodstuffs a continuous and major concern. Despite the emphasis on industrial development after 1949, agricultural development was bound to be of primary importance. The initial emphasis on regional development allowed the regional administrators to decide the priorities. In Sinkiang these were the food supply for the People's Liberation Army units
stationed in the province. By no means did this exclude industrial development from the plan of the local administrators. In both 1950 and 1955 it was a diversified economy, including the agricultural, live-stock raising, heavy and light and oil industries that was to be developed. This placed the emphasis on developing the whole economy rather than on individual sectors as in Kazakhstan. To what extent this difference in the development of the two regions was due to actual planning as opposed to differences in the traditional needs of the Russian and Chinese was difficult to assess. Certainly the Russian emphasis on industrial development was a continuation of the imperial policies, just as the Chinese emphasis on food supplies was a necessary continuation of China's imperial policies. On the basis of this it may be argued that the development pattern of both countries had been pre-ordained, not by the ideological but by the economic and geographic conditions.

The agricultural needs no doubt also had an important effect on the policy of reclaiming wasteland. In Sinkiang the PLA units were primarily responsible for this work.

Wasteland reclaimed by PLA Production Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total area by end of period in hectares</th>
<th>Increase in hectares</th>
<th>Increase as percentage of total in 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-51</td>
<td>66,667</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-53</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>46,333</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-57</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>547,000</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-60</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The addition of arable land from 1949-60 was considerable and reflected the need for foodstuffs by both the PLA and later the Chinese Government. At the same time the reclaimed land could be distributed to the landless population. This avoided the need to dispossess the
the landowners in order to make land available for re-distribution.
The decrease in land reclamation after 1957 was due to a change in
Chinese policy. In Sinkiang large-scale reclamation programmes were
stopped. However the small-scale reclamation that was undertaken by
individual collective farms was continued and encouraged.

In Kazakhstan the increase in arable land after the Virgin Lands
Campaign was even greater than in Sinkiang. This development was not
undertaken to make land available for kolkhoz or sovhoz settlements.
The land was intended to help meet the growing need for foodstuffs in
the Soviet Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total sown area in hectares</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease in hectares</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease as percentage of total area in 1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>4,171,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3,289,000</td>
<td>- 882,600</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6,800,600</td>
<td>3,519,600</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7,854,300</td>
<td>1,045,700</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>9,716,900</td>
<td>1,882,600</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>20,626,900</td>
<td>10,912,000</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>28,661,500</td>
<td>8,032,600</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>27,996,100</td>
<td>- 665,400</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>28,561,300</td>
<td>565,200</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>28,570,400</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decrease in 1959 indicated that difficulties were encountered
in keeping newly reclaimed land productive. Such difficulties arose
for a number of reasons. The failure to fallow the land and poor far-
mimg skills resulted in reduced yields and dust-bowls especially after
1958. These problems were by no means confined to Kazakhstan. Both
regions were susceptible to dust-bowls. But the Chinese tended to be
more conscious of the danger. One of the priorities of the provincial
government of Sinkiang in 1950 was to plant forests and the afforesta-
tion work apparently became an annual task of the PLA. Another dif-
ficulty encountered in both regions was that of alkali soils. The
cause of this was the improper irrigation of the land, particularly insufficient drainage as a result of which large quantities of water evaporated leaving mineral deposits in the upper layer of the soil.\textsuperscript{50}

From 1958 onward efforts were made to reverse this trend in Sinkiang. One method was to wash the soil with underground water. In 1960 it was claimed that by means of this process 55,000 hectares of alkali land had been reclaimed.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the drawbacks the large cultivable areas of newly reclaimed wasteland had definite advantages. Because of the relatively small populations in the two regions most of the produced foodstuffs could be shipped to other regions. Kazakhstan hardly stood out for its total contribution to the Soviet agricultural GNP. Since 1961 the region was a consistent third in the USSR, lagging well behind the Ukraine.

The proportion of agricultural GNP—including live-stock—contributed by Kazakhstan and the Ukraine and the State purchases of wheat from the two regions\textsuperscript{52}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Proportion of GNP as percentage</th>
<th>Proportion of total State wheat purchases as percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was the amount of wheat that Kazakhstan was able to make available to the State that made its importance as the second 'bread basket' of the USSR more obvious. A similar situation prevailed in the industrial sector.

In Sinkiang the situation was similar. The industrial output of the province compared to that of Shanghai province, a major industrial region, presented a gloomy picture.

| Gross value of industrial output of Sinkiang and Shanghai provinces in millions of yuan in 1952 constant prices\textsuperscript{53} |
The industrial output of Sinkiang compared to that of Shanghai was hardly impressive. Yet as a producer of some key products its significance increased dramatically. In 1961 the north-west accounted for 9.5 per cent of the Chinese ingot steel output, most of which apparently came from the iron and steel works at Payi and Hami in Sinkiang. Although this figure represented under one-tenth of the total steel output, most of the steel from the north-west could be shipped to other regions. In this way the region contributed substantially to the national economy. The industrial contribution of Kazakhstan to the national economy was also considerable.

### The industrial output of Sinkiang compared to that of Shanghai

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sinkiang</th>
<th>Shanghai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>3,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>6,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>12,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>27,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>33,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>43,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>51,893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sinkiang as a percentage of Shanghai: 2.4, 2.6, 3.4, 2.3, 2.3, 2.7, 3.3

While these contributions to the Soviet economy were substantial, there were other areas in which Kazakhstan and Central Asia were of even greater significance. The entire region accounted for 20 to 100 per cent of Soviet copper, strontium, antimony, mercury, cadmium, lead and tungsten, 48.3 per cent of sodium sulphate, 25.4 per cent of iodine, 35.8 per cent of bromine, 7.6 per cent of sulphur, 33 per cent of phosphorite, 90 per cent of raw cotton, 57 per cent of Karakul, 16 per cent...
of wool and 12 per cent of fruit. Central Asia and Kazakhstan were indispensable therefore as the suppliers of some raw materials.

While Kazakhstan was acknowledged as the chief Soviet base for non-ferrous metals, the Soviet source gave no indication as to what proportion of the total needs were actually met by the region. In the production of rolled non-ferrous metals the Soviet figures accorded Kazakhstan a very modest role in comparison to the other republics. Its proportion of the total production fell from 0.7 per cent in 1952 to 0.6 per cent in 1958 and remained at that figure until 1962. Although other regions no doubt produced more non-ferrous metal products, Kazakhstan was the primary source of raw materials. Figures for this tended to be omitted in the Soviet sources. Perhaps this was an attempt to disguise the real economic importance of the republic. A non-Soviet source indicated that Kazakhstan stood out as the primary source for chrome, vanadium and copper in addition to other non-ferrous metals. The region was also second in the production of raw wool in the USSR. Only the RSFSR produced more, but as the figures indicated the production of Kazakhstan was increasing steadily.

Raw wool clipped in thousands of tons and as percentage of total for USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>234.9</td>
<td>321.8</td>
<td>356.8</td>
<td>371.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>121.4 (51.7)</td>
<td>159.8 (49.7)</td>
<td>178.7 (50.1)</td>
<td>185.1 (50.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>37.2 (15.8)</td>
<td>57.8 (18.0)</td>
<td>65.3 (18.3)</td>
<td>74.9 (20.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures in brackets are percentages of total production)

Many of the mineral resources located in Kazakhstan and Central Asia were to be found also in Sinkiang. The live-stock industry of the province not only provided meat and animal fats, but was also the most important source of raw wool for the Chinese woollens industry. In addition the cotton and textiles of the province supplied the textile mills of the southern provinces, while gold and oil too were located in
Sinkiang. In 1958 the production of gold was increased to 24,000 ounces per year and 200,000 tons of oil were allocated to other provinces. 62

Hence, both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were industrial and agricultural regions from which large proportions of raw and semi-processed goods were channeled into the economies of their respective states. Their economic development not only fostered the development of the primary industry of the two regions, but provided already existing industrial centres with a new source of raw materials. The economic development effectively integrated Kazakhstan and Sinkiang into the central economies of their respective states.

These developments were by no means negative. Both regions benefitted from increased development and modernisation. Furthermore, the improved transportation facilities resulted in reduced prices for some foodstuffs. Before the Lanchow-Urumchi railway was constructed the food price indices for August 1951—using December 1950 as 100—were; 245.4 in Urumchi, 213.9 in Lanchow, 154.8 in Sinning, 115.7 in Ningchuen and 103.1 in Sian. 63 The indices demonstrated that the further the city was removed from a railway line the greater the increase was in the price of food. The completion of the railway link therefore should have substantially reduced the prices of some foods in Sinkiang.

At the same time there were reasons to be wary of the new developments in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. The larger agricultural areas and large-scale industrial enterprises required greater quantities of water, perhaps the most limited commodity in the regions. In both the run off from the melting snow-caps and, to some extent, rainfall provided limited supplies of water for agriculture and industry. If the requirements were in excess of the run off, they had to be met from the ground water supply. This was the case in Soviet Central Asia. By the mid-1950's the level of the Caspian Sea had fallen to nearly 2.5 meters
below its long-term level. One Soviet response to appeals to replenish the Caspian consisted of an economic comparison weighing the advantages of using the same amount of water to irrigate land. The argument was presented as a choice between "more than 40 million tons of wheat and 1-1.5 million tons of meat—on the one hand and 0.2 million tons of Caspian fish—on the other." In the debate on water the ecology and the diminishing ground water table did not seem particularly important. Soviet discussions of the late-1960's continued to emphasise increasing the water available for use. In Central Asia one solution envisaged diverting water from the Yenisey and Ob rivers to agricultural and industrial regions. There were no suggestions for limiting the use of water, only for increasing the amount for use.

The official concern in Sinkiang was similar to that in Kazakhstan. It was directed towards improving the use of water by increasing its flow to the land and to industry and storing it in newly built reservoirs. This attitude, which was displayed by both Governments, only could result in a reduction of the water table. Given the limited rainfall and run off its replenishment would take a very long time. But without water neither industry nor agriculture could be sustained. In both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang it therefore may not be a case of achieving a high level of economic development, but one of achieving a level of development that can be maintained without the danger of over-exploiting the natural resources.

The ecological problems were by no means obvious in the 1950's and they may not have been perceived as problems by the indigenous people even after that date. Nonetheless, they will have to be dealt with in the future. Some aspects of the increased economic development and regional integration that the indigenous people became keenly aware of were the influx of non-Turkic people, the destruction of their traditional way of life and the exploitation of the natural resources.
One difficulty raised by the increased level of development was that of work allocations to Turkic cadres. Those of the local population who had been trained as cadres no doubt expected to be put into responsible administrative posts. In addition the increasing number of local graduates also expected an opportunity to supervise or work in their areas of specialisation. If these hopes were disappointed and Russian and Han cadres appointed to supervisory posts, the local cadres were unlikely to be particularly well-disposed towards non-Turkic cadres. These flames of discontentment would have been fanned if in addition the non-Turkic cadres displayed attitudes that could be interpreted as great nation chauvinism.

The difficulties that arose were not confined to the local level. In the governmental and party structures as well as the local work, Russian and Han cadres dominated the leading positions. As long as the indigenous people were badly educated this state of affairs could be justified. But the argument was limited to the earliest periods of development and became increasingly weaker as trained local cadres became available. Then the indigenous people had good cause for discontentment if they were being overlooked for important positions.

Leadership positions in the government and party structures

From the appointments of Chairman and Vice-chairman of the provincial government in Sinkiang there emerged some remarkable ethnic consistancies. In the 1949-55 period Burhan was Chairman and Kao Chin-ch'un, of the First Field Army, and Saifudin were Vice-chairmen. Saifudin became Chairman in 1955, while the First Field Army continued to be represented by Kao Chin-ch'un and Hsin Lan-t'ing as Vice-chairmen. From 1958 onward only the latter served in this post. After the election of 1954 local people were appointed as Vice-chairmen also, three in 1955, two in 1958 and three in 1965. The question that arose from
this concerned the political functions that the local people performed rather than their numbers.

What well may have been the two most important posts in the provincial administration, the Chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee and the Director of the Commercial Department, were filled by Chinese First Field Army personnel. Similarly Burhan was the Chairman of the Sinkiang CCP and Saifudin of the Nationalities Affairs Committee. These appointments were filled in this way throughout the 1949-65 period. There were similar developments in the party. The First Secretary in Sinkiang was always the First Field Army Commander and only in the 1952-65 period was Saifudin appointed as one of the secretaries. He remained the only non-Chinese in the secretariat throughout the 1949-65 period. This indicated that both the provincial government and party structures were controlled by Chinese or those natives who were loyal to Peking.

In Kazakhstan the developments were similar. Between 1955-72 the native proportion in the party secretariat, central committee departments, presidium of the council of ministers and all leading administrative posts was below 50 per cent. Only among the general members of the council of ministers did the indigenous population constitute 50-74 per cent of all representatives. A comparison of the staffing of leading governmental and party positions in the two regions indicated that there were some similarities.

The percentage of natives of the total number of occupants of leading government and party posts in Sinkiang (1949-1965) and Kazakhstan (1955-1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posts (Sinkiang/Kazakhstan)</th>
<th>Per cent of all holders in Sinkiang that were natives</th>
<th>Per cent of all holders in Kazakhstan that were natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/Republican Government</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-chairmen/Deputy chairman</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posts</th>
<th>Per cent of all holders in Sinkiang that were natives</th>
<th>Per cent of all holders in Kazakhstan that were natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chm. of Fin. &amp; Eco. Comm./Chm. of Gosplan</td>
<td>00.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir. of Consumer Dept./Chm. of Sovnarkhoz</td>
<td>00.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir. of cultural &amp; ed. Dept./Culture &amp; ed. combined</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir. of Civil affairs</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averaged percentages of natives

|                                          | 53.6                                                 | 57.8                                                  |

**Party Structure**

| 1st Secretary                        | 00.0                                                 | 33.0                                                  |
| Secretaries/CC Secretariat            | 13.6                                                 | 29.5                                                  |
| Dir. of Propaganda                   | 00.0                                                 | 100.0 (Dept. of propaganda 00.0)                      |

| Dir. of Work/Organisation of party work | 00.0                                                 | 20.0                                                  |
| Dir. of cult. aff. & ed. dept./Culture | 50.0                                                 | 100.0                                                 |
| Dir. of organisation dept./Organisation Sect. | 00.0                                                 | 00.0                                                  |
| Dir. of rural work dept./Agricultural Sect. | 100.0                                                | 40.0                                                  |
| Dir. of Fin. & Trade dept.            | 00.0                                                 | NA                                                    |
| Dir. of Pol. & Legal dept./Party state control Sect. | 100.0                                                | 00.0                                                  |

Averaged percentages of natives

|                                          | 29.3                                                 | 40.3                                                  |

In both regions key posts related to finance, trade, policy making and planning were dominated by non-natives, while culture and education were largely filled by natives. An interesting departure from the Soviet model was the Chinese tendency to put natives in charge of internal security and legal affairs in both the governmental and party structures. Perhaps the Chinese leadership considered itself more secure in Sinkiang because of the PLA troops stationed there than the
Russians thought their position to be in Kazakhstan. But while the average proportion of Turkic people in the governments of the two regions were very nearly equal, those of the two party organisations differed markedly, falling well behind those of both governments. This was an indication no doubt that both the political and party organs were dominated by Russians and Chinese and that they rather than the Turkic people were in control. In the Chinese case, where the time that had elapsed since the revolution was short, this might have been expected. This was not the case in the Soviet Union. There the Russian predominance pointed to other problems, possibly even a policy of outright political domination.

IV:4;ii Education as a factor in the employment of Turkic cadres

It could be argued that the low proportion of Turkic cadres in governmental and party work was the result of a lack of qualified native recruits. While this argument was not totally unfounded it was not entirely correct, especially in Kazakhstan. In the 1960-61 school year the number of Kazakh students in the higher educational establishments of Kazakhstan approached that of the Russian students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrollment in the higher educational establishments of Kazakhstan in 1960-6170</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This near equality in the number of students was not reflected in either the number of Kazakh cadres working in Kazakhstan or in those having higher educational qualifications. Between 1959 and 1966 the Kazakhs averaged 24.2 per cent of the yearly totals, while their Russian counterparts averaged 53.8 per cent. Even more remarkably, the range of fluctuation in the yearly percentages was only 2.2 per cent.
for the Kazakhs and 1.9 per cent for the Russians. A similar consistency appeared in the number of Kazakh scientific workers in Kazakhstan between 1950-60.

Kazakh scientific workers in 1950-60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of scientific workers in Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3,305</td>
<td>9,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Kazakh scientific workers as number and (per cent) of total</td>
<td>739 (22.4)</td>
<td>2,290 (23.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Kazakh Dr. of Science as number and (per cent) of Kazakh scientific workers</td>
<td>19 (2.6)</td>
<td>42 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Kazakh Candidates of Science as number and (per cent) of Kazakh scientific workers</td>
<td>181 (24.5)</td>
<td>597 (26.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here too the range of total fluctuation for the Kazakh personnel was very slight, only 1.4 per cent. However, the number of Kazakhs who had a Doctorate of Science degree declined in proportion to the total number of Kazakh scientists. At the same time the number of Candidates of Science increased. It was the consistency in the 1950-66 period that was most remarkable. Throughout the sixteen years the number of Kazakh scientific workers always represented 22.4-25.8 per cent of the total number of scientific workers in Kazakhstan. This extremely limited fluctuation suggested that the figures may have been tampered with or that the number of Kazakh cadres was increased artificially to maintain their proportion of the total. To some extent these suspicions were supported by the figures themselves. Their consistency simply did not make sense against the background of events in Kazakhstan. First, the large influx of non-Turkic people in the 1950-60 period should have produced a marked fluctuation. However the figures remained stable. Second, this stability should have been reflected also in the school pattern of Kazakhstan. This too was not the case. The figures for the primary school attendance suggested that the proportion of students
that went beyond the seventh grade was very low compared to the total enrollment.

Total enrollment in primary, seven year, eight year and middle schools of Kazakhstan in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>I-IV Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>School Grades V-VII Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>VIII-XI Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927-28</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>07.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>00.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>06.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>03.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>09.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>07.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>07.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>09.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although these figures did not indicate the number of pupils that went on to higher educational institutions, they did suggest that the number qualified to do so was unlikely to be very large. The loss of pupils after the fourth grade was striking. Only the years 1953-54 and 1955-56 were exceptions. This no doubt was due largely to the influx of people during the Virgin Lands Campaign. It was possible only to guess at the reasons for the reduction in the number of pupils after the fourth grade. The Turkic people may have withdrawn their children, particularly the girls, after they had received the traditional five or six years of formal education. On the other hand the failure rates in the first four grades may have been enormous, causing the numbers in them to rise. But certainly for one reason or another a large proportion of the children in Kazakhstan did not go beyond, more correctly far beyond, the fourth grade even in the 1961-62 school year. This made it extremely unlikely that the proportion of Kazakh scientific workers and those with higher educational qualifications could have been as constant as the statistics showed them to be.

It was not possible to present a similar analysis for the 1949-60 period in Sinkiang, as the figures were lacking and the educational
system had not had sufficient time to train the necessary cadres in any case. By 1960 those advances that had been made through the formal educational system were insignificant by comparison to the total number of cadres required in the province.

Enrollment in the educational institutions of Sinkiang in 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Total number of students including Han-Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinkiang University</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight institutes of higher learning</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 middle and secondary technical schools</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary schools</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,086,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest number of students were obviously still acquiring their primary and secondary educations. In the meantime the Han and PLA cadres were relied upon mainly to fill top level administrative posts. At the same time the various cadre institutions and the PLA did train local cadres, but the level of training they received did not prepare them for top level posts. It has been noted already that most of the Turkic cadres were trained over the period of a few months in what were little more than introductory courses on the new politics of China. This not only made the qualifications of these cadres suspect, but also called into question the value of the training programme and, above all, the loyalty of those who had been trained.

The Central Nationalities Institute in Peking trained both Han and minority nationality cadres. The latter were encouraged to practice their cultural traditions while attending the institute. This policy not only was consistent with the Government nationality programme, but also permitted Han students the opportunity to acquaint themselves with some aspects of the Turkic and other cultures. However, this lenient attitude towards the cultures of the minorities also may have
given minority students the impression that their cultural traditions did not have to change under communist rule. If this attitude was present and perhaps even wide-spread among the Turkic cadres it limited their usefulness in both leading positions and the work related to the transformation of the Turkic people in general. Furthermore, the very loyalty of those displaying this sort of attitude would have been in doubt. To some extent it may have been precisely this problem that was illustrated by the number of graduates from the cadre institutions of Sinkiang who joined the CCP and NDYL.

Graduates who joined the CCP and NDYL after graduating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>(Year or period)</th>
<th>Number and (percentage) of those who joined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior Department of the cadre institute of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP</td>
<td>(1951)</td>
<td>77 (7.4) 726 (69.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-west Institute of Nationalities</td>
<td>(1950-54)</td>
<td>68 (2.6) 338 (13.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures were far too limited to allow hard and fast conclusions to be drawn from them. Nevertheless, those for the North-west Institute of Nationalities suggested that in the 1950-54 period relatively few cadres joined either the CCP or NDYL. To some extent this cast doubt on their commitment to both Communism and the Party. In addition these doubts made the ability of these cadres to convince the Turkic people of the advantages of Communism equally dubious.

Another problem the Chinese faced was related to the number of Turkic people available for training. It was difficult to project whether the Chinese were more successful in their educational endeavours in Sinkiang than the Russians had been in Kazakhstan. In 1951 the number of minority children in the schools of north-west China was given as 3,000. The total primary school enrollment of the north—
west in 1954 was 430,000, while the number of children of herdsmen enrolled in the mobile schools was claimed to have been over 46,000. \(^78\) A report of 1953 claimed that the 1951 figure had increased by 60 per cent. \(^79\) As the 1951 figure was rather low for the entire north-west it was conceivable that it had resulted from an error. Certainly a figure of approximately 30,000 minority students would seem more appropriate. On the basis of this figure and the 60 per cent increase in 1953 a minority enrollment of 48,000 would have been reached by the latter date. This figure was more compatible with the claimed 46,000 children of the 1954 report. These figures still failed to account for the sedentary population. In 1960 the total enrollment in the intermediate and primary schools of Sinkiang was 950,000, while its population should have been approximately 6,251,356. \(^80\) Of this figure the given primary and intermediate enrollment represented 15.3 per cent. Without an age distribution of Sinkiang's population it could not be established whether this included all school age children. The 1939 and 1959 figures for Kazakhstan provided what may have been a not altogether irrelevant comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>08.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Children in Kazakhstan by age as percentages of the total population. \(^81\)

These figures also represented an abnormal situation. As a result of the population losses of the collectivisation, purges and war the number of young children were a larger proportion of the total population than they normally would have been. It also was not obvious what number of children fell into the primary and intermediate school age group. Given these distortions the 15.3 per cent figure for Sinkiang appeared to represent at least a majority of the school age children.

The degree to which the traditional Turkic educational attitudes
had been superseded by those of the new society did not seem particularly marked in Kazakhstan. For Sinkiang the evidence was insufficient for a definite conclusion to be reached. But if Kazakhstan could be taken as a general indicator for the Turkic people the advances made in the schools of both regions should have been approximately the same. Thus, the supply of qualified Turkic people who could be recruited for cadre training may have been limited not for the lack of educational facilities alone, but also because of the continuation of the traditional practices.

IV:5 Changes in the social and cultural traditions

After their respective takeovers both Governments had made promises to safeguard the cultures of their minorities. These promises may have been a double edged sword. Because of them the Turkic people expected their cultural traditions to be respected, while the Communists were committed to cultural change. Consequently, it had to be expected that the Turkic people would resist cultural changes for these reasons and also because of the natural resistance within a society towards cultural change.

It could not be denied that considerable cultural change had taken place in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. However these changes did not necessarily involve the replacing of the Turkic traditions with those of the new society. In some cases they were no more than the modernisation of the Turkic culture and a readjustment of the values of the new society.

IV:5:1 Agriculture and live-stock raising

In both countries one of the primary concerns after the takeovers was the reorganisation and communalisation of agriculture and animal husbandry. According to the statistics, the collectivisation of agriculture in Kazakhstan was completed within approximately five years. In Sinkiang the collectivisation proceeded more gradually, especially in
According to the plan of October 1955 agricultural producer co-operatives in Sinkiang were to have increased from 1,700 to 5,100 by 1956, bringing a total of 17 per cent of all peasant households into the co-operative movement. By 1957 the proportion of peasant households in co-operatives was to have been 36 per cent and 85 per cent by 1960. The plan was revised upward in December 1955. The new plan envisaged 41 per cent of peasant households to be co-operativised by 1957 and 92 per cent by 1959. Among the live-stock herders this gradual co-operativisation process was to be still more gradual. Even by mid-1957 only approximately 20 per cent of the pastoral Mongol, Kazakh, Kolkoz, Tadjik, Yuku and Solon households had joined co-operatives. But not only was the co-operativisation to be gradual, the process itself was hardly comparable to the full-scale collectivisation movement of the Soviet Union.

A CCP Central Committee directive published in 1957 permitted those who joined co-operatives to continue raising privately owned live-stock and engage in small-scale private enterprise. In addition special allocations of live-stock were to be made to Mongol herdsman to meet their requirements of meat, milk and animal transport, while the Uighurs were permitted larger orchards so that their private production of fruit could continue. This co-operative movement was far removed from Stalin's collectivisation and it may have been specifically intended to avoid both the losses of live-stock and the local opposition that the latter had aroused in Kazakhstan. At the same time co-operativisation based on the Chinese programme fitted in well with the local traditions.

In neither Kazakhstan nor Sinkiang was mutual-aid a new concept that had been introduced by the Communists. Oases agriculture had always demanded communal work. The irrigation ditches were dug by all
those engaged in agriculture and water rights were subsequently shared out in accordance with the labour each person had contributed. Only the underground irrigation channels or kariz tended to be financed by the wealthy landlords. These then rented the water to the peasants for a share of their crops. The expenses of digging the kariz combined with the risks of not striking water made them undertakings that few peasant communities were able to afford. Among the live-stock herders the communal spirit prevailed also and live-stock herding was a group undertaking. This may have resulted from the geographic conditions of the regions. The nomads traversed considerable distances and the movement of live-stock demanded a reasonable supply of labour. At the same time the larger number of people provided some protection from raiders.

Among the Turkic people these conditions made mutual-aid a necessity of daily life. But there was a crucial difference between their concept and that of the Communists. In the terminology of the latter it meant a permanent union whereas the Turkic people joined together for specific tasks or during particular seasons. To some extent this character of mutual-aid was accepted by the two regimes. In 1954 it was noted that of the more than 50,000 mutual-aid and co-operative organisations in Sinkiang only 5 per cent of the mutual-aid teams were permanent organisations. This tended to indicate that the traditional joining together of the Turkic people simply had been given a new name.

Until the establishing of the 451 people's communes in 1958 the Chinese agricultural policy in Sinkiang met with little resistance. The primary reason for this was no doubt that the changes which had been implemented did not affect the traditional practices to any great extent. The mutual-aid teams and co-operatives had not affected private property. But the communes did, and both they and the communalisa-
tion of the land and live-stock were opposed. The difficulties that resulted from this resistance must have affected production considerab-
ly. This was indicated by the reallocation of some of the communal lands to their former owners for private use during the reorganisation of the communes in 1959. The reorganisation also permitted a more flexible policy in the commune administration. One commune in the Urumchi hsien consisted of two groups, the settled farmers and herdea-
men. Each group concentrated on its own activities and catered to the needs of the other group. While the farmers grew fodder the herdsmen continued herding the animals. Except for the fact that both groups were organised in a single commune there seemed to have been little change in their traditional way of life and the nomads continued roaming as before.

A similar pattern had emerged in Kazakhstan after the collectivi-
sation. The live-stock herdsmen continued to graze the kolkhoz herds by moving them from one seasonal pasture to another. One kolkhoz engaged in live-stock herding was "Bel'bazar." It consisted of 116 households of which all but 15 were Kazakhs. Of these 15 households 13 were Azer-
baidzhanis and 2—the assistant manager and carpenter—Russians. The cattle drives of the kolkhoz were carried on over four seasons and covered distances of 100 kilometers or more. These examples indica-
ted that the traditional nomadic herding patterns had continued both in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang and that the lives of the nomads remained much as they had been before the takeovers. The one difference under commu-
nist rule was that instead of being organised in clans as before the herders now were a part of the kolkhoz unit. Many of these develop-
ments were the result of necessity rather than nomadic opposition to change. Although there was a need to pacify the indigenous population it was necessary also to employ the live-stock herdsmen and maintain the herds. The traditional herdsmen were no doubt the best suited for this
task. Furthermore, geographic conditions determined the form of livestock herding in the regions. The grazing grounds were limited and this necessitated the movement from one grazing ground to another. Hence the climatic conditions had made nomadism necessary and this climatic necessity continued under communist rule. The lives of the Turkic herders were modernised to some extent no doubt by improvements in feeding and livestock rearing techniques and generally by improvements in their domestic living conditions. In addition there was a greater opportunity to settle permanently in kolkhoz settlements. The number that did so could not be determined.

IV.2 Cultural changes

Just as the kolkhoz did not end the wandering of the livestock herders, so it did not end the adherence to their traditional customs. On the contrary, it may have perpetuated the latter. The Kazakhs of the "Bel'bazar" kolkhoz all belonged to one kinship group of the old horde. It was noted also that the conditions were similar in other kolkhozes. There too the total Kazakh membership consisted of a single kinship group. Having a single Kazakh clan as the largest single membership group of a kolkhoz may have prevented the intermingling of the Kazakhs with the other nationalities and the cultural exchanges that would have resulted from this intermingling. In "Bel'bazar" it was noted that in 1950 the traditional Kazakh family and marriage customs continued, including; searching out a bride among different kin in another kolkhoz, the bride price and polygamy. It also was not only a matter of the Kazakhs of "Bel'bazar" clinging to their own cultural traditions. That they continued to do so was evidence that their spirit of internationalism had not been raised appreciably. This was particularly evident from the number of international marriages. By the late-1930's the intermarriages among the Kazakhs were the lowest among the Turkic people of Soviet Central Asia.
The intermarriages of the titular nationality of each republic in 1936 as percentages of the total number of marriages entered into by each sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic and nationality</th>
<th>Intermarriages as percentage of all marriages</th>
<th>Intermarriages entered into by</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan—Kezakhs</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan—Uzbeks</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia—Kirghiz</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkestan—Turkmen</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan—Tadjiks</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of this data little could be said about the nature of the intermarriages themselves, except that men were more likely to enter into them than women. There was no indication of the number of marriages between Turkic and non-Turkic people, or more precisely, between Turkic people and Russians. The existence of intermarriages generally suggested that they should have occurred also between the Turkic and Russian people. These appeared to have been rare. This was especially the case for intermarriages between Russian men and Turkic women. Mixed marriages in Central Asia tended to be primarily between Muslims, either within the Turkic group or between Turkic Muslims and non-Turkic Muslims such as Arabs. Of 82 mixed marriages with Arabs between 1936-38 only one was between a Turkic man and Arab woman and only one between a Arab man and Russian woman. Generally this pattern seems to have continued. Even in the 1960's mixed marriages involving Russian and Turkic people from among the urban population of Frunze were not particularly numerous. Those between Russian men and Turkic women even less so.

Intermarriages registered in Frunze.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turkic men to Russian women</th>
<th>Turkic women to Russian men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, even in 1963 few of the mixed marriages entered into in Frunze were between Russian men and Turkic women. Of the 28 listed only three women were of the local Turkic Muslims. On the basis of this it was likely that the 1960 figure included non-Turkic women also.

Although marriages between Turkic men and Russian women occurred more frequently, they often involved a complete change for the women. They tended to live in the aul of their Turkic husbands where they were exposed to and gradually adopted the Turkic way of life. Although Soviet sources claimed this led to a mixing of cultures this was not always the case. Many of the Turkic customs were adopted by the Russian woman and one of the latter, married to a Kirghiz, quite frankly admitted that, "'in my homeland I live according to my rules, but here I must live according to theirs.'" This was not to say that the Russian women had no effect on the lives of their Turkic mates. Their influence, however, was restricted to the immediate family and involved what were rather minor matters like giving their children both Turkic and Russian names.

From this it may be concluded that the traditional marriage pattern in Kazakhstan and Central Asia had not broken down. Although detailed information was lacking for Sinkiang it seemed reasonable to assume that conditions there were similar to those in Kazakhstan.

The status of women

In both regions there have been movements to take women out of the home and bring them into the work-force. These endeavours were intended to provide women with equality and end all sexual discrimination. In China the pre-conceived notion was that women in some areas of the north-west had not been permitted to work in the fields before the
Communists took over. As the Turkic women always had performed a great deal of the manual labour this view was quite erroneous. But the arguments were intended primarily to draw more women into the labour force available to agriculture and industry. In Sinkiang, as a result of the small population, there was labour scarcity, while in Kazakhstan and in the remainder of the Soviet Union there was a general shortage of men. Drawing women into the work-force therefore became essential, although the political significance for doing so must not be overlooked. So long as the women remained confined to their own households influencing them politically was far more difficult than it was once they had joined the work-force.

Among the Turkic women, especially among those of the nomads, working in the fields or tending the live-stock could not be taken for evidence that they had been liberated or that their social values had changed. Throughout their history they had done a good deal, if not most of the field work or that connected with the live-stock. Soviet and Chinese statements claiming that Turkic women were active in such duties, only indicated that those particular traditions and practices affecting women had not changed. Evidence of the extent to which the local cultural traditions had changed would have been a large number of women moving upward into high positions for which extensive educations and training were required. Such figures were lacking for Sinkiang. For Kazakhstan it was possible only to establish a general trend based on the total number of women in the work-force, the CP of Kazakhstan and those who were full members of the CC of the CP of Kazakhstan.

Women of all nationalities in the work-force, the communist party of Kazakhstan and as full members of the central committee of the communist party of Kazakhstan.
These figures showed that the women were underrepresented in both the central committee and the party in comparison to the total proportion of the work-force that they constituted. While these figures did not reveal how Kazakh women fared it may be possible to calculate a general trend. In 1927 Kazakh women constituted 2.1 per cent of all Kazakh party members. Assuming that their membership increased by the same proportion as that of the women in the Kazakh CP and the CC of the Kazakh CP, they should have constituted approximately 9.1 per cent of women party members and 9.6 per cent of the full women CC members of Kazakhstan by 1971. Of the 15 full women members of the CC in 1971, this should have given the Kazakh women one, possibly two full members, or 0.7-1.3 per cent of the full members of the CC. While this methodology was obviously open to errors it nonetheless allowed a general indication. According to this the Kazakh women lagged well behind the European women in the top party positions of Kazakhstan. A similar trend appeared in education.

Of the 360,000 women holding higher and middle specialist qualifications in Kazakhstan in 1967 only 57,000 or 16 per cent were Kazakh women. This was a slight improvement over the number of Kazakh wo-
men enrolled in higher educational institutions in Kazakhstan during the 1960-61 school year. Then they numbered 11,195 of a total of 77,135 students or 14.5 per cent, while Russian women constituted 24.7 per cent. Of the total 1960-61 enrollment in higher educational institutions in Kazakhstan women constituted 45.8 per cent. In the whole of the USSR they accounted for 43.5 per cent of all students in such institutions. On the basis of this it may be concluded that the ratio of men to women in the higher educational institutions was nearing 1:1. This ratio was inconsistent, however, with the number of women graduates and suggested either artificially inflated figures or an extraordinarily high failure rate. At the same time, while the figures showed that Kazakh women made up a considerable proportion of the women students in Kazakhstan they continued to lag well behind their European-Russian counterparts. Although it was not possible to state conclusively that this was the result of lingering cultural traditions and resistance to change these possibilities could not be ruled out entirely.

IV:5;iv Language reforms

Both central Governments opted for reforming the Turkic languages of their respective regions by introducing new scripts. In Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan the latin alphabet was introduced in 1924, only to be replaced by the cyrillic in 1939–40. Several suggestions have been made for these two changes. One was that the Russians feared that the introduction of the latin script in Turkey could make Central Asia more susceptible to Pan-Turkism. According to another theory, the two changes following one another as they did served to sever the Turkic generations linguistically from each other. This in turn permitted for more rapid cultural changes. Each of these propositions may have been a consideration in making the changes. However, Stalin's determination to make the Russian culture the culture of the USSR would
appear to have been the decisive factor. Not only did the cyrillic alphabet make the Turkic languages appear closer to the Russian language, it also made it unnecessary to learn two alphabets. Furthermore, the written similarities of the two languages no doubt encouraged the use of Russian loan words. From this it followed that the introduction of the cyrillic alphabet was the logical step on the road towards Russification.

The change to the latin alphabet in 1924, however, may have been a direct consequence of the internationalist thinking among the Bolsheviks. Some supported the use of the latin alphabet for the Russian language, perhaps in an effort to establish closer bonds with the European proletariat. The fact that the various people of the USSR who lacked written languages of their own were given latin scripts also lent this theory additional weight.

In China the reasoning concerning the language question was similar to that in the Soviet Union. In 1956 the Turkic people were to be provided with cyrillic scripts, but in 1956 the latin script was adopted instead. At the outset the Chinese too were concerned with preserving the linguistic unity within the worker's states. This attitude changed during 1957, perhaps as a result of the Hundred Flowers period and the Rectification Campaign that followed. In 1957-58 there were demands in Sinkiang for union republics similar to those of the Soviet Union. "The local nationalists use learning from the experience of the Soviet Union as an excuse, advocate the establishing of union republics to oppose the unity of our fatherland." Given this attitude among some within the province Peking was unlikely to encourage even closer ties with the Soviet Union by introducing the cyrillic script. No doubt the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship also figured in the decision.

The reforms introduced by Peking were clearly intended to draw the
Turkic people closer to the Chinese language. Any resistance to the scheme was considered unpatriotic and the scheme itself was based on the Latin phoneticisation used for Chinese. But the Chinese also left little doubt as to their intentions in introducing this particular scheme.

In this way, where language is concerned, a bridge of convenience can be built between the Uighur or Kazakh on the one hand and the Han and the other peoples using the Roman alphabet, on the other. This will promote cultural exchanges and solidarity among the various nationalities.111

In official pronouncements on the subject it was made quite clear that new words and technical terms that were lacking in the Turkic languages had to be borrowed from the Chinese. 112 This unyielding attitude was a considerable change from the hitherto gradualist policies towards cultural changes among the Turkic people. It was unlikely that the policy change had come about only out of fear that the Soviet influence in Sinkiang could increase. A more likely explanation was that it resulted from the revelation of the Hundred Flowers period and the Rectification Campaign. During these it had become obvious that the gradualist policy had not achieved the transformation of the minorities. Worse still, the Rectification Campaign revealed that in Sinkiang there existed considerable dislike if not actual hostility for the Chinese people. These reactions made it essential to draw the Turkic people closer to the Han-Chinese and, as in the Soviet case, language was the obvious tool.

Among the Turkic people the language reforms resulted in even greater dislike for the Russians and Chinese. The indigenous people of Sinkiang refused to learn Chinese, while the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan refused to learn Russian.113 Such resistance could only be limited in its duration. The children in schools were taught in the Russian and Chinese languages and had little choice but to learn these if they hoped to advance. Nevertheless, among the Kazakhs there was particu-
larly fierce resistance to adopting loan words from the Russian. It was advocated that instead of adopting Russian loan words new Kazakh terms should be coined and that the use of Russian expressions when equivalent Kazakh terminology existed be avoided.\textsuperscript{114} This was not a simple refusal to change, but the refusal to be swamped by what was vaunted as the superior Russian or Chinese culture. In both regions the Turkic people apparently considered the language reforms a danger to the continued existence of their own cultures and languages. While they may have been perfectly willing to modernise their cultures, they were not willing to adopt another culture and language in place of their own. This attitude did not augur well for the socialist transformation and the drawing together of people adhering to different cultures. It especially indicated a lack of the socialist internationalist spirit among the Turkic people.

IV:6 The union of nationalities and the Turkic expectations

In their respective minority regions the two central Governments were constantly confronted by two problems. These they termed great nation chauvinism and local nationalism. Generally it was believed the former fostered the latter. To some extent this was no doubt so, but it was not necessarily the only cause for local nationalism. The educational, political and social policies of the two Governments also could have resulted in the phenomenon by encouraging political, cultural and various other expectations among the indigenous people. Neither of the two Governments may have wanted to fullfil these expectations and the resulting dissatisfaction that was shown by the local people may have been interpreted as a manifestation of local nationalism. In the latter case it would have been more accurate to define it as the failure of the two Governments to convince the local people of the benefits of a common socialist culture and policy.
IV:6;1 Political, cultural and employment dissatisfaction

In both regions there was considerable local reaction to the policies of the Centre, the non-Turkic cadres occupying leading positions and the general influx of non-Turkic people. This led to resentment towards the Russians and Chinese, destroying rather than fostering the concept of national unity and that of a single nation. The extent of the resentment in Sinkiang became evident during the Rectification Campaign.

One of the most frequently made demands by those who were officially condemned as local nationalists was for an independent Sinkiang. The reason for these demands was attributed to the belief of the local nationalists that Sinkiang's "organisations were dominated by the Han and self-government was nothing more than an empty slogan." This argument the Government attacked with the claim that Sinkiang was being governed democratically.

For example in all the districts all ranks of people's representatives number 63,314. Among these the minorities have 58,711 people or 92.7 per cent; all ranks of people's representative committee members number 19,612 people, among them the minorities make up 92.3 per cent. In the area of fostering minority cadres and building Party organisations enormous successes have been achieved also. At present there are a total of 106,026 cadres in the self-governing region, among them the cadres of the minorities number 62,233 or 53.64 per cent.

It was dubious that the local people were swayed by this argument. They were primarily displeased by the manner in which the local administrative machinery functioned. Locally it was feared that the Han-Chinese had come to the province for no other reason than to exploit it. The reasons for these fears could be discovered in the events that followed the takeover.

In 1954 there had been considerable criticism of both the Han and Turkic cadres. The former stood accused of displaying great nation chauvinism or "Great Hanism" and the latter of local nationalism. But
the Han cadres also were accused of showing disrespect for "the functions and powers of minority cadres." These were early indications that the relationship between the Han and Turkic cadres was hardly congenial. It was not until the Hundred Flowers period that some light was thrown on the extent of the local discontent. Then even high ranking Turkic cadres, the heads of the water conservancy and grain departments, believed the number of Han cadres in Sinkiang too large and that Turkic cadres were being neither trained in sufficient numbers nor given positions carrying any real responsibility. The latter charge—that Han cadres were placed in charge while minority cadres were to do the work—was echoed repeatedly. This revealed that the Turkic cadres were keenly aware that they were not in charge of the affairs related to the region.

The dissatisfaction also was not confined to the failure to make use of Turkic cadres. Another target for local criticism was the PLA production and construction corps. It was accused of being a "'independent government' and a 'independent monarchy' " and that "the production and construction corps was able only to reclaim wasteland, but unable to organise other economic matters." In addition the industrial policy for the industrialisation of Sinkiang came under attack. There was concern that the pace of industrial development had been too great and that industry had crowded out agriculture. This last complaint may have been some evidence that the local people were being affected by water shortages as the industrial development of some oases increased.

While these complaints allowed some insight into the practical difficulties and the resulting dissatisfaction with communist rule, the Rectification Campaign also revealed what may have been the most important concern of the central Government. This was the ideological problem that the complaints had made obvious. From the complaints it
emerged that the indigenous people were not only dissatisfied, but that they continued to think in terms of their own locality and society rather than in those of a socialist community. Obviously the socialist transformation had not yet been achieved. To encourage greater success in future it was not only local nationalism that had to be struggled against but also those cadres who had failed to encourage social change and the past policy of the Party. During the Rectification Campaign demands were voiced for changes in the attitude of the Party leadership towards the national customs of the minorities.

...under the influence of revisionism from 1956 up to the eve of the rectification movement and anti-rightist struggle, we neglected in our cultural work, and even in our entire ideological work, to propagate socialism. We ignored the general, unduly stressed the particularities of the different nationalities, confined ourselves to these particularities, misinterpreted 'national characteristics,' and regarded as 'national characteristics' the backward customs and habits that hampered production and national progress, respected them.122

The new attitude was that in the past the transformation had not been pressed sufficiently from above. To rectify this anomaly cadres, especially those from among the minorities, were to be trained. They were to acquire the political attitude that would facilitate a complete transformation to Communism. In particular cadres had to be made to understand the difference between the bourgeois and proletarian conceptions of nationalities.123 This attitude prevailed throughout the Great Leap and communalisation period. However, the reorganisation of the communes tended to indicate a return to what was perhaps not the pre-Rectification Campaign attitude but certainly one that was more relaxed than the post-Rectification policy.

Many similar problems had been evident also in Kazakhstan. In 1923 one of the tasks of the Bolsheviks was to struggle against local nationalist tendencies. At the same time Party workers of Russian origin were cautioned against displaying great Russian chauvinism in the various nationality regions.124 There was concern also over local nationa-
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lism. In 1920 there had been demands for the creation of a "'great Turkic federation' of 'Republics of the Turkic nations'" and even while the national republics were being established there were demands from local nationalists.

The Kazakh nationalists demanded the creation of 'greater Kazakhstan' on the territory from the Bukhara steppes and Siberia to the Volga, the Uzbek nationalists—the creation of the 'greater Uzbek state,' the Kirghiz nationalists—'greater Kirghizia.'

These Turkic tendencies towards regionalism in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were indications that the expectations of the Turkic population in general had not been met. The demands for greater self-determination and local control showed that the people were not satisfied entirely with their system of government and local administration. Generally they feared that the Russians and Han-Chinese swarming into their respective regions were little more than exploiters.

In Kazakhstan there was reason for believing this. In 1920 "approximately 11,500 'rabochikh-prodotryadchikov' from Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other cities of Central Russia," arrived in Kazakhstan. There, according to one source, they were to set the national economy in motion and train local people in production skills. Another definition indicated that in the 1917-20 period these particular people were sent from various cities to requisition grain and see to it that this reached the cities. The events that followed—collectivisation, industrialisation and the Virgin Lands Campaign—no doubt reinforced the feeling that Kazakhstan was being exploited by the Russians. The condescending attitudes towards and outright discrimination against Kazakh workers, also was not conducive for fostering a feeling of friendship between the Russians and natives.

From the reaction of the indigenous people it was unimportant whether the policies of the central Governments were intended for the eco-
nomic exploitation or development of the regions. The failure to in­clude the Turkic people in the policy formation and local administra­tive processes in a meaningful way gave rise to a great deal of mis­trust. This was so especially in Sinkiang. Among the dominated na­tionalities this was likely to give rise not only to resentment towards the dominating nationality, but also to a feeling of helplessness. Neither of these were encouraging signs that the socialist transforma­tion had proceeded very far. Furthermore, as long as these feelings were present it was unlikely that such a transformation could occur. IV:6;ii Change and the Islamic and cultural traditions

The Turkic people of both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were in no posi­tion to show their dislike for the policies of their respective central Governments through open rebellion. They could resist only by refusing to accept the new culture. This form of resistance was particularly suitable for an Islamic society. The emphasis on the purity of the heart rather than on the actions of the believer and the lack of reli­gious show in daily life allowed the believers to retain their tradi­tions in private, while seemingly being good Communists in public. Also, sunni Islam did not stand in the way of modernisation even if this affected the religion itself. The differences that resulted from the changing values among the different generations could be accommo­dated because of the flexible sunni approach. Rather than permitting such differences to become insurmountable each generation accepted that there could be changes so long as what was accepted as the basic spirit of Islam remained intact. The evolutionary process was an intrinsic part of Islam. It permitted the adaptation to changing external condi­tions without compromising the existence of Islam itself.

Even when such changes were radical departures from the Islamic traditions, such as the attempted secularisation of Islam by Atatürk in Turkey, Islam reasserted itself. Not only did the Turks of Turkey con­
continue to consider themselves Muslims, they even made Atatürk a part of their Islamic tradition by attributing great religious significance to him.¹³⁰ This demonstrated both the flexibility of Islam and its capability for dealing with those forces opposed to it. The latter were transformed into an honourable part of the Islamic tradition. Thus the Turkic Muslims of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang also may have adopted some aspects of Communism as part of their traditions. But as in Turkey this was unlikely to make them lesser Muslims. Perhaps the most notable group of Muslims to have remained faithful despite wide-spread cultural changes were the Hui-Chinese. Although they have become almost indistinguishable from the Han-Chinese they remain Muslims.

This aspect of Islam, combined with the possibility of an Islamic revival and the large population increases among the Muslims of the Soviet Union must give the Soviet regime reason for concern. In the past Muslim nationalism was characterised as a negative nationalism, based on the desire of the Muslims to rid themselves of a alien, dominating power. In these endeavours a leading role was attributed to Islam.¹³¹ It was entirely conceivable that Islam could play such a role in Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia. The difficulty for the Chinese remained the possibility that any unrest in the USSR could spread to Sinkiang.

But the Soviet and Chinese Governments not only have been confronted with a religion far more adaptable than their own ideology. The latter has placed them also in the positions of fostering the Turkic culture and in doing so fostering a separate sense of identity for the Turkic people. By creating separate republics, autonomous regions and areas and encouraging the Turkic written languages and literature an awareness of the Turkic heritage was bound to arise. Thus their ideology had forced both Governments into a position of working against rather than for the union of the various ethnic groups into a single
socialist nation. Although the Kazakhs lived in the cities rather than in the steppes, they displayed no great longing for the Soviet culture. Insofar as literature may be taken as an indicator, their longing remained for the steppes and their traditional life.

... At five a halter was entrusted to me, however,
I did not learn for long—
and at fifteen, on a tall bay runner
I brought to bay a strong wolf.
But here a townsweller I,
son of the market square,
in a streetcar I change melodiously...
Ah but in the disfavoured Kazakh steppes
I am always that same—
shaggy urchin.132
...

This and other poetry reflected a longing for the happier days spent on the steppes rather than for the life in cities. Over nearly half a century Communism had failed to change this longing in the Kazakh poet. Although the need to change it to a longing for Socialism became even more urgent in the present than it had been in the past, it seemed unlikely that it can be achieved in the near future.

IV:7 Conclusions

The obvious conclusion that emerged from the above was that both Governments have failed to make much headway in transforming their respective Turkic people. Although there were definite changes in the exterior aspects of daily life the indigenous people have retained most of their cultural traditions. Since the Kazakhs have clung to their traditions despite the length of time they have been under Soviet rule it was difficult to envisage that greater changes have occurred in Sinkiang. Consequently it seemed reasonable to suggest that the extent and speed of the cultural change in both regions has been approximately the same.

For both communist regimes the lack of a marked advance in transforming the Turkic people had both ideological and political implica-
tions. The failure of the Turkic people to embrace Communism wholeheartedly was an ideological embarrassment. It was even more pronounced because of the Marxist claim that given the opportunity to do so the workers and poor throughout the world would willingly embrace Communism. Instead the Turkic people of both regions developed their own cultural heritage. These developments, especially in literature, did not produce a Soviet Central Asian literary heritage that espoused Socialism, but one that was exclusively Turkic and held high the traditional values of the Turkic people. For the two Governments it remained to evaluate these literary and cultural developments against the contemporary situation in the Islamic World. Against the background of the Islamic revival in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan neither of the two Governments can exclude the possibility that their respective regions will be affected.

In Sinkiang the problems appeared much the same as in Kazakhstan. Within the province the economic disruption that could be caused by political unrest would be less serious for the Chinese economy than similar unrest in Kazakhstan would be for that of the Soviet Union. For the Chinese the real danger continued to be from a Turkic population running amuck on the Soviet side of the border. The latter would be in a position to lend both moral and material support to their ethnic kinsmen in Sinkiang. There can be little doubt that both countries can easily deal with a rebellion by the Turkic Muslims. However, World opinion, especially within other Muslim regions such as the oil-rich Middle East, could hardly be sympathetic if their Muslim brethren were butchered mercilessly. At a time when the USSR too is becoming more dependent on oil from the Middle East and China is turning to the world for assistance in its modernisation programme—for which the Middle East could provide a great deal of financial support—all internal unrest in the Turkic region may be dealt with best through diplomatic
rather than military means. At the same time, however, both regimes must avoid the development of a separate Turkic state in Central Asia if the socialist ideology concerning national unity is to retain any significance.

Chinese history provided a precedent for dealing with alien cultures without resorting to forced assimilation. Although the Hui have not been totally Sinicised they were tolerated as a cultural group within China. A similar development is not unlikely in Sinkiang and, perhaps, in Kazakhstan. On the surface Moscow and Peking would continue ruling the Turkic people, while the Turkic culture would remain unchanged except for the natural evolutionary changes occurring within the Islamic culture. Then the question would revolve around which culture—the Islamic or the socialist—would be the more adaptable. The latter characteristic likely would decide which would dominate the regions.

Since neither regime had much success in destroying the Islamic culture and institutions in the past co-existence appeared a reasonable alternative. One difficulty that arose from this was that the continued existence of Islam also kept the possibility of an Islamic revival alive. Thus, while co-existence well might become the policy initiated by both central Governments, their doing so would be tantamount to admitting defeat. Furthermore, it would not be the Russians and Chinese who would be agreeing to co-exist but the Turkic people.
Footnotes


5Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, pp. 109-118.

6Ibid., p. 166.


8"Zemel'nye poriadki za Uralom," in Aziatskaya Rossiya, ed., by Glinki et al., I, 542-543.

9Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, pp. 68-69.; Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, pp. 153-155. Although both authors agreed that the colonisation of the steppes led to a decline in the Kazakh economy, Pierce argued that this decline began before the Russian settlers came. During the late nineteenth century a succession of harsh winters had reduced many Kazakhs to extreme poverty already.

10Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, pp. 64-66.; Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, pp. 260-261.


15Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 103-106.


18. Ibid., pp. 18-20.


22. Ibid., p. 474.

23. Ibid., p. 479.


31. Ibid., III, 185-187.

32. Ibid., III, 255-256.; V, 296.


36. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Kazakhskoi SSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Alma-Ata: Gosstatizdat, 1957), pp. 241 and 248-249.; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskii Upravlenie, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1968 g.*, pp. 195 and 201. These sources differ on the distances covered by automobile roads in 1940. The 1960 figure of the 1968 source also was well below what would be expected on the basis of the figures given in the 1957 source. It was likely that some adjustments were made in the 1968 source for what may have been exaggerated figures during Stalin's rule. Since for the present purpose the figures have been used demonstratively rather than as absolute values their accuracy was of no overdue concern.


39 NCNA (Urumchi), 18 October 1959, SCMP, No., 2122, 23 October 1959, pp. 15-16.

40 NCNA (Urumchi), 30 September 1957, SCMP, No., 1625, 7 October 1957, p. 29.


46 NCNA (Tihua), 3 October 1951, SCMP, No., 188, 4 October 1951, pp. 16-17.; NCNA (Tihua), 2 August 1953, SCMP, No., 624, 5 August 1953, pp. 30-31.; NCNA (Urumchi), 28 September 1957, SCMP, No., 1628, 10 October 1957, p. 35.; NCNA (Urumchi), 31 July 1960, SCMP, No., 2312, 8 August 1960, p. 23. For 1957 a total of 327,000 hectares of reclaimed wasteland was given in NCNA (Urumchi), 30 July 1957, SCMP, No., 1582, 2 August 1957, p. 8., the figure of 660,000 hectares which has been used seemed to be the more likely of the two, but this was by no means certain.


48 Conolly, Beyond the Urals, pp. 223-225.


52 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo
SSSR za 60 let: Yubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 278-279 and 316.


54 Ronald Hsie, "Changes in the Location of China's Steel Industry," in Industrial Development in Communist China, ed., by Li, pp. 129-130.


59 Conolly, Beyond the Urals, p. 160.

60 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu, p. 311.


63 Economic Yearbook (Hong Kong), 20 January 1952, SCMP, No., 288, 5 March 1952, p. 17.


67 McMillen, "Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Sinkiang 1949-
73: Revolution Integration vs. Regionalism," pp. 72-77


69 Adapted and calculated from Hodnett, Leadership in the Soviet National Republics, pp. 101-103.; McMillen, "Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Sinkiang 1949-73: Revolution Integration vs. Regionalism," pp. 72-77. Although attempts were made to list the equivalent functionary positions for the two regions, a complete correlation may not have been achieved.

70 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Vysshee Obrazovanie v SSSR: Statisticheskiy sbornik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, 1961), pp. 136-137.

71 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe Khozyaistvo Kazakhstan, (1968), p. 258.

72 Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Vysshee Obrazovanie v SSSR, pp. 210-211 and 213.


77 NCNA (Sian), 27 June 1951, SCMP, No., 125, 28 June 1951, p. 11.

78 NCNA (Sian), 10 January 1954, SCMP, No., 725, 12 January 1954, p. 34.


80 Calculated on the basis of the yearly growth rate of 3.49 per cent suggested in; Orleans, Every Fifth Child, pp. 86-87.


84 NCNA (Peking), 8 July 1957, SCMP, No., 1578, 26 July 1957, pp. 6-8.

86 Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 159-160 and 163.

87 Chun Chung Jih Pao (Sian), 6 January 1954, SCMP, No., 742 (Supplement), 8 February 1954, p. XXXVII.

88 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 26 November 1959, SCMP, No., 2167, 31 December 1959, pp. 36-41.

89 NCNA (Urumchi), 21 December 1959, SCMP, No., 2164, 28 December 1959, p. 21.


95 Borzykh, "Rasprostranennost Mezhdnatsional'nykh Brakov v Respublikakh Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane v 1930-kh godakh," pp. 94-95.


101. Tsentral'nuy Komitet VKP(b) Statisticheskii Otdel, Sotsial'nuy i Natsional'nuy Sostav VKP(b), pp. 138-139.


104. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Vysshee Obrazovanie v SSSR, pp. 136-137 and 127.


108. Ibid., p. 134.


110. Sinkiang Jih Pao, 7 October 1958, p. 3.


115. Jen Min Jih Pao, 26 December 1957, p. 4; Sinkiang Jih Pao, 29 June 1958, p. 2; 25 August 1958, p. 3.

116. Sinkiang Jih Pao, 7 October 1958, p. 3.

117. Ibid.


1957, pp. 32-34.; NCNA (Kashgar), 30 November 1957, SCMP, No., 1672, 16 December 1957, pp. 5-6.

120 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 29 June 1958, p. 2.
124 KPSS v Resolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh, II, pp. 439 and 441-443.
131 Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 74.
CHAPTER V

Kazakhstan and Sinkiang in the Context of Sino-Soviet Relations

V:1 Introduction

In 1960-61 the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China came to an official end. Since then analysts have been attempting to discover what caused the Sino-Soviet dispute. Their analyses brought numerous factors to light. These and their number suggested that the reason for the rift was not to be found in any one factor.

An assessment of the Sino-Soviet interaction in Central Asia, particularly Sinkiang, may add a new dimension to the existing factors in the dispute. By examining the local demographic, economic, geographic and political factors it may be possible to discover their significance in the dispute.

The first of these, population, heightened the awareness that the relations between the Russians and Chinese had been conducted for a considerable length of time. But these were recent by comparison to the interrelationship between the Turkic people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. It was the Turkic interrelationship that represented the traditional pattern of interaction in this region. This pattern changed only after the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the nineteenth century.

Until the Russian conquest the Chinese had been the only foreign conquerors in the region. Following the Chinese conquest of East Turkestan the traditional pattern of interaction among the Turkic people remained largely undisturbed. This was due primarily to the Chinese insistence on tributary rather than trade relationships. The lack of interference left the Turkic people free to continue their traditional practices. But these conditions were affected by the rising and falling fortunes of the Chinese military. When the Europeans arrived in
the region the Chinese military weakness became a real problem. The inability of the Chinese to control the local population encouraged and abetted the political intrigue that made the local population little more than pawns in the great game of power politics.

Although not only the Russians and Chinese were involved in Sinkiang, they became and remained the main protagonists. As their control over their respective Turkic regions tightened boundaries were delineated. This made the inter-Turkic relations more difficult. After the Chinese Communists came to power the interaction in Central Asia became dominated increasingly by the Sino-Soviet relationship. In theory the rise of Socialism should have encouraged the interaction between the Turkic people of the two countries. The gradual worsening of relations between the two socialist states, however, resulted in the increased confinement of the Turkic people to their respective regions of residence.

The Turkic people were only one aspect of the Sino-Soviet relationship in this region. Since the 1930's the Soviet Government showed considerable interest for the natural resources located in Sinkiang. After the founding of the Chinese People's Republic this interest was renewed. To some extent the Chinese appeared to have welcomed the Soviet involvement. This may have been due to geographic considerations. Sinkiang was effectively isolated from China. Its only connection to the other Chinese provinces of the north-west was a caravan track.

In the past the geographic factor had been an important consideration for successive Governors of the province. Its remoteness added to the difficulty of controlling it militarily. Consequently the Turkic people enjoyed considerable political freedom, while the province suffered from a lack of military protection. Also the Governors lacked the military power to control the local people and quash rebellions.
This situation encouraged foreign intervention, intrigue and even local rebellions.

Another aspect of the geographic factor was its effect on trade and economic development. It effectively limited the choice of trading partners and gradually their number was reduced to one, the Soviet Union. The early economic development of the province too was dependent on Soviet equipment and expertise. This economic and commercial involvement gave Moscow considerable scope for increasing its political influence in the region. Such increased influence in turn gave rise to Chinese suspicions that Moscow's interests went beyond the economic development of and trade with Sinkiang, but extended to detaching the province from China. If this was so, communist rule had not changed the traditional problem of Central Asia. This was the interference of foreign governments in the internal affairs of the region.

Sinkiang, a traditional sphere of foreign influence

The region that will be dealt with primarily in this chapter is East Turkestan or Sinkiang. While there was no Chinese activity in Kazakhstan both the Russian and the Soviet Governments were very active in Chinese Turkestan. But interest in this region was not confined to the Russians alone. The British, Germans and Americans, among others, also became involved. However, of the European powers, the Russian and British influences predominated. From an economic point of view the foreign interest in Sinkiang—including that of China—was baffling. The region was too remote to allow economic benefits to accrue to either the Chinese or British and it was unlikely that the Russians could have benefitted materially before the 1930's. This left only imperial rivalry and expansionism to explain the foreign interests, no doubt assisted by internal weakness.

The political and military instability of Sinkiang

For the first Manchu rulers of China East Turkestan had become a
troublesome neighbour. Unruly Mongolian tribesmen used Sinkiang as a base from which they undertook repeated attacks on both Mongolia and Tibet. Although the Chinese sent punitive missions in retaliation for these attacks, it was not until 1755-65 that they actually conquered the region. Even then a conquest had not been planned by the Ch'ing rulers. Had it not been for the emergence of a tribal empire dominated by the Mongols the Chinese may not have undertaken the conquest at all.¹ This permitted the Chinese action to be seen as a defensive effort, intended to prevent a militarily powerful northern neighbour from emerging.

The Chinese conquest did not end the political instability in Sinkiang. It was followed by considerable fighting both among the various tribes and against the Chinese.² During the 1864-77 period the Chinese Government was preoccupied with the Taiping and Moslem rebellions. As a result it was unable to deal with the unrest in Sinkiang. This permitted Yakub Beg to seize power and rule part of the province—Kashgaria and parts of the north—from 1865-1876. It was during his rule that the Russian and British rivalry began in Sinkiang proper.

Both powers accepted Yakub Beg's rule and concluded agreements with him. Russia in 1872 and Britain in 1873.³ Their reasons for recognising his rule differed only slightly. While the British considered him a welcome buffer between Russia and the British sphere of influence in India, Russia saw him as a safeguard for its interests in Sinkiang, especially its newly gained foothold in Ili. Thus, the independent but more stable regime of Yakub Beg suited both the British and Russians. But the Chinese upset the new status quo by reconquering the region in 1877.

The traditional goal of Chinese rule in the province was to maintain internal control rather than to safeguard the region from British and Russian intrigue. Such undertakings were beyond the capabilities
of imperial China in any case. By the end of the nineteenth century its military power had shown itself incapable of withstanding the Europeans. This left Sinkiang precariously balanced on weak Chinese rule while both Britain and Russia sought to tip the scale in their respective favour. The rivalry between the two powers continued until the outbreak of war in 1914. Only then did the representatives of the two countries in Sinkiang assume the hitherto unaccustomed role of supporting each other against increasing Chinese hostility towards foreigners generally, but especially towards the Russians. The respite from foreign interference did not last. From 1911 the provincial Governors were unable to muster sufficient military forces of their own to overcome local unrest. Furthermore, they had no defence against the growing military might of their northern neighbour. The situation was made worse by the withdrawal of Britain as an effective check to Russian expansionism. Thus, after 1918 there was no effective force to counter the Russian threat to Sinkiang.

The Russian conquest of the Central Asian Khanates had not followed a plan carefully worked out in St. Petersburg. This view has been disputed in modern Chinese scholarship. One writer claimed that since 1759 the Tsars have attempted to take over and exploit Sinkiang and that the Soviet Union has followed the same expansionist policy since Stalin. Such long-term plans were difficult to support on the basis of the events that occurred in Central Asia. During the mid-1860's the Russian generals in Central Asia on the whole were able to devise and follow their own quite independent policies. In St. Petersburg the Foreign Ministry and War Ministry were divided over the conquests. While the former opposed, the latter supported the generals. The Tsar, on the other hand, was happy to accept the new territories as part of his empire, thereby lending his tacit support to the
generals. The difficulties that arose from the lack of a policy were added to by the actual conditions prevailing in Central Asia. Vast distances made communication between subordinates and their superiors difficult. In addition the forces opposing the Russians were relatively weak and disorganised. As a result even minor local commanders with relatively small forces at their disposal could win victories over individual khanates. The increased likelihood of success only encouraged greater independent action in the hope of gaining individual honour and glory.

It was not until late in the nineteenth century that an overall strategy for the Far East emerged in St. Petersburg. But this too seemed closely tied to Russia's European policy. The weakening of the Ch'ing dynasty had brought the major European powers to China. This effectively transferred Russo-European rivalries to the Far East and demanded a corresponding readjustment of the Russian foreign policy. Thus, a policy had to be designed that prevented the European powers from gaining a foothold in what Russian policy makers considered the Russian sphere of influence in Asia. One plan put forward and accepted was that of Badmaev. In 1893 he had suggested that Mongolia, Tibet and north-west China should be detached and brought under Russian rule. Witte, the Finance Minister, accepted this plan. In his supporting letter to Alexander III, Witte pointed out that the plan, "undoubtedly will have a powerful influence in all relations of European countries with the Asiatic East and especially in the relations with Russia—not only with the Asiatic East, but also with the European West." While this was a further indication that the eastern foreign policy was not separated from the European policy, Witte's pronouncements also had to be considered with care. By emphasising the foreign policy advantages vis-à-vis the European powers Witte may have intended to gain the support of the Tsar for his economic policies. These included building
the Trans-Siberian railway and industrialisation schemes, all of which required the Tsar's approval. While Badmaev's plan may have been fantastic, elements of it continued to reappear in Russian policy.

In the aftermath of the Boxer rebellion in 1900 the Russians attempted to gain exclusive rights in those Chinese provinces that bordered on Russia, including several districts of Sinkiang. Hence, what may have been fantasy when Badmaev proposed it originally became part of Government policy in the twentieth century. By the time of the October revolution these efforts had come to naught, but the Soviet foreign policy continued to follow this aspect of Tsarist policy. The Soviets carved out spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva and Sinkiang. Their attempts were rewarded with greater success than those of the Tsars. Outer Mongolia became a Soviet sphere of influence in 1945 and Tannu Tuva was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1944. Only Sinkiang remained Chinese.

The continued independence of Sinkiang to a large extent was a direct consequence of the policies pursued by the first three successive Governors after the fall of the Ch'ing. After the bolshevik takeover all three, Yang Tseng-hsin (1912-28), Chin Shu-ten (1928-33) and Sheng Shih-ts'ai (1933-44), pursued pro-Moscow policies. The first steps in this direction were taken during the Russian Civil War. Some White Kazakh forces had crossed into Sinkiang and the provincial government assured the military commander of Semipalatinsk in March 1919 that these forces would be disarmed. This agreement was followed by others. In May 1920 it was agreed to establish diplomatic relations and trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union and to repatriate refugees and Kazakhs who had fled from Russia. Another agreement in June 1921 asked for Soviet help in dealing with White forces in the Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) district and, in September 1921, an agreement was signed allowing the Red Army to liquidate White forces in the
Altai district. In addition each of the three Governors in due course fell back on Soviet military support either for dealing with the White Russian forces or to maintain his own rule against local opposition. It was to be expected that such assistance carried a price. In the case of Sinkiang it was the gradual transformation of the province into a Soviet sphere of influence.

This did not mean that Stalin wanted to dominate the province militarily. The fact that he failed to do so when given the opportunity spoke against this. His primary concern seemed to have been the creation of a buffer between the Soviet Union and China. The semi-independent warlords fulfilled this demand admirably. Furthermore, by the early-1930's Moscow also was in economic control of the province. Of Sinkiang's foreign trade 82.5 per cent was with the Soviet Union. In addition the development and exploitation of its mineral resources was in Soviet hands. The provincial Governor was excluded from the production process and unable to oversee the nature and quantities of the minerals that were mined and shipped to the Soviet Union. This indicated that the influence of Stalin was supreme until 1942 when Sheng Shih-ts'ai broke with Moscow and realigned Sinkiang with Chiang Kai-shek's Government. When Sheng expelled the Russians they meekly capped the main oil well, removed the refinery equipment along with their armed forces and departed. The Soviet withdrawal may have been prompted by Stalin's fear that a forced occupation could cause difficulties in the European alliance against Germany. Above all he may have seen it as a threat to the supplies from the United States and to the second front in Europe. At the same time the Red Army was fully engaged in fighting Germany. A second engagement, even if only minor, was hardly to be welcomed. Finally, Japan could be offended by a Soviet move into China and launch a counter attack. For all these reasons it was sound strategically to withdraw from Sinkiang.
Stalin may have believed also that it would be possible to restore the dominant position of Moscow at some future date. The Kazakh rebellion, which began in November 1944, did provide some opportunity for reactivating the Soviet activities. Soviet agents certainly were among the rebels. One of them, Saifudin, was a member of the KPSS until 1950, when he joined the CCP. The rebellion also received the active support of Soviet agents and that of both the ethnic kinsmen of the rebels from across the border and the Soviet consulates in Sinkiang. It was difficult to assess to what extent the events in the three districts that rebelled—Ili, Chuguchak and Altai—both before and after the East Turkestan Republic had been set up were influenced by Moscow. Whatever the Soviet gains, however, they were lost after the Chinese Communists came to power.

Soviet activities in Sinkiang after 1949

As a result of the takeover in 1949 some aspects of the situation prevailing in Sinkiang changed markedly. The PLA was able to deal with local unrest. This ended the need for Soviet military intervention. In the economic sphere, however, the need for Soviet assistance increased. Only the conditions under which it was to be rendered should have changed, since both countries were governed by communist regimes. Such assistance as they rendered each other should have been given in the spirit of Socialism.

Stalin and Mao in Sinkiang

Generally Stalin dealt with Mao as he had with the previous Governors of Sinkiang and Chiang Kai-shek. A glimpse of the Moscow attitude was provided at the Yalta Conference of 1945. There Stalin demanded that the status quo be upheld in Outer Mongolia, that Dairen be made a international free port with a preferential status to be accorded the Soviet interests, that Port Arthur be turned into a Soviet naval base and that the Chinese Eastern and Southern Manchurian railways be opera-
ted jointly by China and the Soviet Union. These demands were embodied in the treaty of friendship and co-operation signed by the Soviet Union and China on 14 August 1945. This treaty indicated that Chiang had succeeded in getting some safeguards written into the text. He was assured of Soviet assistance and support to maintain his Nationalist Government "as the central Government of China," Soviet respect for Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, Dairen and Port Arthur and that there would be no Soviet interference in the internal affairs of China with particular reference to Sinkiang. Although Chiang was forced to make the concessions Stalin wanted he also had secured—for whatever Stalin's assurances were worth—the joint Chinese-Soviet border.

With the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime this agreement became void. In 1950 it was replaced by a new treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This treaty limited the period of joint operation of the Chinese-Changchun railway and the Soviet use of Port Arthur and Dairen to the signing of a peace treaty with Japan or to 1952 if such a treaty was not signed. The agreement also made 300 million American dollars of credits available to China and established three Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies in Sinkiang. These were to exploit the oil and non-ferrous metals of the province and provide a joint aviation service. An additional joint-stock company, the Sino-Soviet ship building company, was established in Dairen. The companies in Sinkiang were to operate for a period of thirty years. These agreements gave reasons for concluding that Mao had fared even worse than Chiang in the negotiations with Stalin. One indication that there had been considerable differences in 1950 was the length of time spent negotiating. It took over three months to finalise the agreements. Mao gave further indications of such differences in papers released after the Sino-Soviet rift had been made public.
In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. On the question of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the joint-stock companies and the border we adopted two attitudes: one was to argue when the other side made proposals we did not agree with, and the other was to accept their proposals if they absolutely insisted. This was out of consideration for the interests of socialism.

The indication was that Stalin had forced his will on Mao and the terms of the 1950 treaty demonstrated that the Soviet intentions after 1949 had not changed. In the new treaty the period for the joint operation of the Chinese-Changchun railway and that for the Soviet use of Port Arthur and Dairen were reduced from the original thirty years of the 1945 treaty to three years. However, the joint-stock companies were a new addition in 1950 and in Sinkiang they were to operate for thirty years. To Mao it must have appeared that the communist takeover in China had changed little in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

For Stalin the joint companies may have been a means for gaining concessions in China. Khrushchev, in his memoirs, accused Stalin of as much and even blamed him for arousing Mao's suspicions about the Soviet intentions, thereby endangering Sino-Soviet relations. But the intentions of Stalin towards Sinkiang were not entirely clear. Although it was unlikely that he intended to take the province over, it could not be ruled out entirely that he sought to detach it gradually in a manner similar to that employed in Outer Mongolia.

Benefits from the joint companies in Sinkiang

It would have been inappropriate to assume that the joint companies benefitted only Moscow. The Chinese too drew benefits from them. Each country has refrained, however, from publishing complete statistics covering the operations. As a result the benefits derived by each state remained impossible to calculate. Even estimates were hazardous because some of the benefits were not immediately obvious and their values not easily calculable.

The companies were founded on the understanding that their produc-
tion would be "divided equally between the USSR and China. Similarly, all expenditures of the companies and profits will be divided between the parties." This agreement raised immediate difficulties for the Chinese. They lacked the necessary capital and the geographic isolation of Sinkiang made it difficult, if not impossible, to ship the products to China proper. Apparently these difficulties were overcome by having the Soviet Union supply the necessary capital equipment and technical know-how, while the Chinese provided the raw materials and labour. Through this exchange the Chinese were able to acquire industrial equipment and plants as well as a skilled labour force. At the same time they could repay the Soviet credits with the products that were produced in Sinkiang. This arrangement had some real benefits for the Chinese and they readily acknowledged the aid given through the joint undertakings. In public statements they vowed to remember the Soviet people's "friendly, brotherly help, the Soviet experts' selfless work and internationalist spirit." There could be little doubt that these acknowledgements were sincere and that Peking was grateful for the economic assistance that Moscow had rendered. The less visible benefits were acknowledged in a similar manner.

Sinkiang now has large-scale mining enterprises, a big, integrated complex of petroleum plants, and also power plants, all equipped with Soviet installations and run by thousands of technicians and workers who have been trained by Soviet experts. The output of modern industry now comes to 20 per cent of the total value of Sinkiang's industrial output. The general lack of technical training institutions in Sinkiang made the training provided by Soviet experts all the more valuable. For this reason the Chinese were keen no doubt to establish proper training programmes. One of these was established by the joint petroleum company in 1953.

A Technical Institute has been set up in Tihua, capital of Sinkiang Province, by the Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Petroleum Company. The school provides four years of training in prospec-
dressing and oil refining with guidance by Soviet experts in these fields.

Among the 199 students who have already enrolled are people of the Han, Uigur, Kazak, Uzbek, Khalkha, Tatar, Sibo and Russian nationalities.30

But this was not the only means for training skilled and semi-skilled workers. By 1954 the Sino-Soviet non-ferrous and rare metal company was credited with having trained over 370 specialised technical cadres and more than 5,000 technical workers "in the fields of drilling, mining, ore-dressing and machinery." Similar activities were attributed to the Sino-Soviet petroleum company, aviation company and the Chinese-Changchun railway.31 Hence cadres were being trained not only in specialised institutions, but also on-the-job. The training was given by the Soviet specialists who in effect performed two roles. They assisted in setting up China's industry and training Chinese workers and specialists. Consequently their withdrawal in 1960 must have been a considerable loss for the Chinese.

The benefits of Sino-Soviet trade

Another aspect of the joint companies was their significance for Sino-Soviet trade. Essentially they provided a means for bridging the gap between the inability of the Chinese to pay for imports and the need for industrial goods. But there were other factors that also had to be considered. Among these the geographic isolation of Sinkiang which made trade with the Soviet Union essential.

The export of agricultural and pastoral products from Sinkiang to the Soviet Union doubled between 1950-53, while in 1950 approximately 70 per cent of the consumer goods came from the Soviet Union. After the opening of the Tianshui-Lanchow railway in 1952 consumer goods from China proper reached the province. The rail-link also altered the composition of the imports from the Soviet Union. Henceforth 70 per cent of these were made up of industrial equipment and supplies rather than consumer goods.32 This dependence on Soviet industrial goods continued
until the end of 1959 when the Lanchow-Urumchi railway reached Hami. Only then did it become possible to conduct an unlimited exchange of heavy and bulky industrial goods between Sinkiang and the other Chinese provinces.

Hami on the edge of the Gobi Desert in east Sinkiang has become a busy traffic centre since the new Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway reached the town at the end of 1959. Trains are arriving daily with full loads of rolled steel, building material and other commodities from Anshan, Shanghai and other areas and leaving with petroleum from Karami, cotton from the Tarim Basin, Turfan raisins, Hami melons and other goods. The price of nearly 10,000 kinds of goods have been reduced since shortly after the first train reached Hami.33

It may be concluded then that for the Chinese Sino-Soviet trade in Sinkiang had not been a simple exchange of goods, but a necessary economic function for the economic development of the province. This was true especially for the 1949-59 period. By contrast, it has been argued that the Soviet Union derived no economic benefits from these ties with the People's Republic. On the contrary, according to this argument, the Soviet economic support granted the Chinese effectively slowed Soviet economic growth. On the other hand it may be argued that Sino-Soviet trade stimulated Soviet manufacturing industry and that imports from China added to the consumer goods available in Soviet shops. Against this it was argued that the overall volume of Sino-Soviet trade was insufficiently large to have any real impact on either the Soviet production or the Soviet consumer.34 These arguments, whatever their individual merits, drew attention to one very important point. The aid that Moscow granted Peking, regardless of its amount, was a debit on the Soviet balance sheet. The difficulty lay in assessing whether the Kremlin was able to transform this debit into a credit at the expense of the Chinese.

It has been suggested that the Chinese exports to the Soviet Union were generally of lesser value to the Soviet economy than Soviet exports were to the Chinese.35 While this well may have been true for
many of the goods from China, a case could be made to prove that this particular argument did not apply to Sinkiang. Soviet figures indicated that goods known to be found in the province made up a considerable proportion of Sino-Soviet trade.

Selected Soviet imports from and exports to China in thousands of rubles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crude oil</th>
<th>Non-ferrous metals and alloys</th>
<th>Wool</th>
<th>Natural silk</th>
<th>Silken fabric</th>
<th>Animal hides</th>
<th>Cement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>224,829</td>
<td>94,571</td>
<td>86,003</td>
<td>13,941</td>
<td>22,841</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>201,704</td>
<td>85,704</td>
<td>93,926</td>
<td>36,482</td>
<td>35,375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>206,986</td>
<td>95,617</td>
<td>85,181</td>
<td>31,787</td>
<td>53,692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>195,626</td>
<td>84,876</td>
<td>65,270</td>
<td>21,639</td>
<td>59,174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>219,613</td>
<td>87,746</td>
<td>69,375</td>
<td>13,771</td>
<td>34,092</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>44,044</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>10,792</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>30,768</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>4,004</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>8,876</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above goods as percentages of total Soviet trade with China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures permitted some interesting deductions. Foremost among these was that these goods made up a considerable proportion of the Chinese exports to the Soviet Union. The decline in this proportion, beginning with 1958, may have been an indication that more of the goods were being used in the Chinese manufacturing industry. This would have been true especially after the Lanchow-Urumchi railway reached Hami in 1959. A noteworthy gap in these figures was that for
Soviet crude oil imports. The joint oil company in Sinkiang surely must have shipped oil to the Soviet Union. By 1955 the company was no longer operating as a joint company, hence the Soviet Union may no longer have imported crude oil from China. However, the Chinese figures for exports to the Soviet Union going back to before 1955 also failed to list crude oil exports, but did indicate that petroleum products were among the Chinese imports from the Soviet Union. It was inconceivable that no oil was exported to the Soviet Union between 1950-54. Moscow may not have published such figures for strategic reasons. On the other hand, the Russians may not have kept the Chinese informed of how much oil was being taken out of Sinkiang. In this case it would have been prudent not to publish any figures at all.

It was important to note also that some of the products from Sinkiang were of considerable value. Both the natural silk and non-ferrous metals and alloys had a high industrial and monetary value. They also could be resold on the world market. This gave Sinkiang a significant role in Sino-Soviet trade as a whole, but especially in the Chinese repayment of the Soviet credits.

The dissolution of the joint companies

The joint companies should have permitted for the economic development of Sinkiang to proceed from approximately 1950 until the province was linked to the remaining provinces by the railway. In this period they could have played an important role in ensuring that this development was systematic. To some extent the companies did perform this function, but there also must have been some discontent. In October 1954 they were dissolved. The Soviet shares were taken over by the Chinese as of 1 January 1955 in return for payment. "The value of these shares will be reimbursed in the course of a number of years, to be delivered to the Soviet Union in goods such as those usually exported from the Chinese People's Republic." From the premature dissolu-
tion of the companies it may be deduced that the Chinese were unhappy with this particular arrangement.

The Rectification Campaign revealed that the post-1945 activities of the Soviet Union in China had been criticised during the Hundred Flowers period. It had generally been implied that the Soviet Union had taken advantage of China by removing machinery from Manchuria and occupying Port Arthur. Although those who made these allegations were criticised in turn during the Rectification Campaign, the substance of the remarks was never denied. There also was no obvious link between the critics and the Chinese leadership. Nevertheless, the Chinese may have used the Rectification Campaign to air their grievances against the Soviet Union. In 1977 this certainly was the Soviet interpretation of both the Hundred Flowers period and the Rectification Campaign. It was alleged they had been used for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes, that mass anti-Soviet demonstrations were organised and that those who had criticised the Soviet Union, including Lun Yün, were rehabilitated. If this interpretation was correct—it was written long after 1961—it indicated that by 1957 there was considerable anti-Soviet feeling in China. To some extent this could have resulted from the 1950 treaty. Its similarity to the 1945 treaty and the failure to make allowances for the fact that China was also a communist state aroused considerable resentment. Consequently, the Chinese Government would have felt gratified by the criticisms that had been voiced. In this light the dissolution of the joint companies in 1955 was the first step taken by the Chinese to reassert their independence from Moscow.

Unity and diversity within the communist block

In 1949 the differences in the respective levels of economic development in China and the Soviet Union were immense. While the former was an agrarian state the latter was among the foremost industrial powers of the World. Added to these differences was that of population.
The Chinese population was almost three times that of the Soviet Union.

These differences called for differing economic development strategies. They had to be suited to the prevailing conditions in China and not those in the Soviet Union. Even at the time of the October revolution Russia had been more industrialised than China was in 1949. It was not difficult for the Chinese Communists to devise their own economic development policy. They had a long history of not following the orders from Moscow. In March 1958 Mao even went so far as to state that the Chinese revolution had succeeded because the Chinese Communists acted "contrary to Stalin's will." Their success gave the Chinese even greater claim to independent action.

Differing development strategies

Unlike Stalin, who had insisted on the development of Soviet heavy industry at the expense of agriculture, Mao wanted the Chinese economy to be developed as a single unit. He foresaw the simultaneous development of both heavy and light industry in combination with agriculture. His reasons for this deviation were that China's backwardness and semi-feudal and semi-colonial state demanded an approach that placed the emphasis on the development of industry and the gradual transformation of agriculture. It was claimed that this policy was perfectly consistent with the Leninist principles for socialist development during the transition period. By taking this approach the Chinese did not deny the validity of the Soviet case. Their argument was that there could be different development strategies and that the particular economic and social conditions of China could not be overcome with the strategy that Stalin had used.

It was not until 1956 that Mao formalised his strategy in his "On the Ten Great Relationships." He argued that it was important to meet all the needs of the people by simultaneously developing heavy and light industry with agriculture. The emphasis was to be on fulfilling
the needs of the people even if, in order to do so, light industry and agriculture had to be developed more extensively than heavy industry.\textsuperscript{45} This in effect set out the strategy that culminated in the communalisation of agriculture and the industrial policies of the Great Leap. It has been suggested that by 1956 "Mao was in full rebellion against the Russian model."\textsuperscript{46} While Mao without doubt was moving away from the Soviet model by 1956 it would appear to overstate the case to impute to him a full-scale rebellion by this date.

It was difficult to gauge how prepared Moscow was to accept the Chinese strategy for development. At the XX Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev certainly opened the floodgates to diversity when he denounced Stalin. Perhaps even more significant, he endorsed the Chinese and Yugoslav strategies for developing Socialism.\textsuperscript{47} There could be little doubt that Khrushchev intended to foster unity through limited and controlled diversity. But in 1956 the Poles and Hungarians too had deviated from the Moscow line. Even worse for unity, the Chinese and Moscow differed in their interpretations of the developments in Eastern Europe. The Chinese tended to be more sympathetic than the Russians and only opposed the developments in Hungary after the uprising had begun. It has been suggested that the Chinese intention was to avoid a split in the communist block.\textsuperscript{48} This contention was borne out generally by the 1957 world congress of communist parties held in Moscow. There Mao apparently rejected Khrushchev's offer to split the World into two spheres. In the one, consisting of Asia and Africa, the Chinese experience in developing Socialism was to be the model. The Soviet model was to be followed in the other sphere, consisting of Western Europe and the Americas.\textsuperscript{49}

This account, if accurate, indicated that both Mao and Khrushchev were intent on preserving the unity of the block which was threatened by the doctrinal differences that had been developing between them.
Both leaders were caught also in ideological webs of their own making. Mao, if he was to continue with his own development strategy in China, had to endorse diversity in ideological interpretation. Khrushchev, on the other hand, desired greater flexibility within the block, but panicked when this threatened Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. When the Chinese differed with Moscow on Eastern Europe Khrushchev no doubt suffered even greater discomfort. He well may have concluded that Mao was making a bid for the block leadership. To prevent this eventuality the proposal for splitting the World into a Chinese and Russian sphere of influence was sensible. A compromise that allowed greater diversity without threatening Moscow's leadership of the block was necessary.

The statement released after the 1957 world congress of communist parties indicated that an attempt had been made to find such a compromise. In the statement the Soviet Union was proclaimed the leader of the socialist countries. At the same time all socialist states were granted an equal status within the block and permitted to apply Marxism-Leninism to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in their respective countries. While this statement endorsed diversity it also provided Moscow with the means for controlling the influence of the Chinese. In effect it limited the Chinese experience to the non-industrial countries, while the industrialised countries were to follow the experience of the Soviet Union.

This trend in Soviet intra-block policy became even more pronounced in 1958. In that year Moscow acknowledged that the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture was a necessary condition in China, where "the primary position in economics is still occupied by agricultural production." A similar position was adopted in response to the communalisation of agriculture. It was claimed that the people's communes had grown out of the Chinese co-operatives and were a step towards Communism. At the same time the Soviet ideologues made
clear that the Chinese development pattern was limited in its application.

It is believed that the European socialist countries, united in a single economic union of mutual-aid, comprise a particular economic zone and will be the first to achieve Communism. The Asiatic socialist countries, being more general in their economic and cultural development, comprise another regional zone and will also achieve Communism jointly.53

With or without the consent of Mao the Soviet strategists had divided the socialist countries into economic regions. For the sake of unity division had been introduced. There was little if any evidence to suggest that Mao was in fact seeking the leadership of the block at this time. It has been claimed that he was prepared to take over if the Moscow leaders proved too weak to provide effective leadership and that he delighted in his growing prestige in Eastern Europe.54 The intervention in Eastern European ideological matters only indicated that Mao was prepared to debate ideology in the wider context of the block and not only in its application to China and other Asian and African countries. On the whole it appeared that by 1957 Moscow and Peking had agreed to disagree in matters relating to the development policies in socialist states.

Military power and the problem of diplomatic recognition

Another element of the differences between Moscow and Peking was that of arms control. This question was connected closely with the Chinese quest for World-wide diplomatic recognition as the Government of China. While the USSR was accorded recognition in the World community of nations the People's Republic was passed over for Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan regime. Mao was anxious to change this state of affairs.

As early as 1949 he had stated that the People's Republic would be prepared to "do business and establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty."55 It was not China
who spurned diplomatic and other exchanges with the non-Communist countries.

In the first instance Peking relied on the Soviet Union to present its views and plead for China's admission to the United Nations. Until 1957 Mao generally supported Moscow on the broad topic of nuclear disarmament. There may have been good strategic reasons for this, particularly in the early-1950's. In this period the Soviet nuclear capability was inferior to that of the United States and the Chinese were concerned that nuclear weapons might be used against them in Korea. While this influenced the Chinese strategy until after the Korean War, the fact that no nuclear weapons were used no doubt allayed these fears. Some evidence of this and the subsequent shift in Chinese strategy was provided by the first bombardment of Quemoy in 1954.

The bombardment was significant from a strategic point of view. Both Peking and Taiwan were allied to Moscow and Washington respectively. By forcing a military confrontation Mao demonstrated that Peking was still a force to be reckoned with and could not simply be ignored. According to a recent account the bombardment of the off-shore islands in 1958 also was a demonstrative operation and not an attempt to seize the islands. By not seizing the islands, Mao declared, Peking could cause Chiang Kai-shek "discomfort any time we want." He might have added Khrushchev's name to that of Chiang. Moscow had reason for worry. If the Americans had responded to the Chinese bombardment, either in 1954 or 1958, the result could have been a military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Another element of the 1954 bombardment, perhaps one that surprised the Chinese, was the reaction of the Russians. Following the crisis a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev went to Peking. There they agreed, among other things, to terminate the joint-stock companies, the Soviet presence in Port Arthur, to build a railway link to
extend the Lanchow-Urumchi railway to Alma-Ata and the granting of 520 million rubles in long-term credits to the Chinese. It was suggested that these negotiations occurred because both sides recognised the need for redefining their relationship after Stalin died. While Khrushchev no doubt was keen to redress the balance and seek the good will of other block members, this explanation seemed inadequate. The negotiations were a complete and overwhelming victory for the Chinese. Furthermore, coming as they did immediately after the bombardment of Quemoy, they suggested that Khrushchev was inclined to buy peace in the Taiwan Straits. His primary concern may have been that the actions of Peking should not be permitted to undermine the disarmament negotiations to begin in July 1955. Although the Chinese were not invited to the disarmament conference, the crisis did provide them with an indication of how great were their powers to coerce.

Perhaps it was because of this newly discovered power that Peking set its course in a direction that was diametrically opposed to Moscow's disarmament policies. In 1955 an agreement signed between Peking and Moscow was to assist the Chinese nuclear research programme. Because of Moscow's policy to limit the spread of nuclear weapons this agreement was unlikely to result in the development of a Chinese nuclear device. But the Chinese view was not in accord with this policy. According to Peking, Moscow had agreed in 1957 to grant them even greater nuclear assistance. This was to include sample nuclear materials. Although the existence of a 1957 agreement was never denied by Moscow, there must be some doubt about the Chinese interpretation of its terms. An alternative view was that Moscow had agreed to no more than the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons under Russian control on Chinese territory. This hardly would have satisfied the Chinese. Nuclear weapons on Chinese soil but under Soviet control could not be equated with a Chinese nuclear force. These weapons were unlikely to
open the door to Chinese participation in disarmament conferences. That Mao wanted to be included in such conferences was made obvious in February 1958. Then the Chinese actively supported the call for a disarmament conference to be attended by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, but also the Chinese hoped that "France, Canada, India, Egypt and China" would take part in it. However, within two years the Chinese view changed. From expressing the hope that they would be included they went to passing a resolution in 1960. According to this China did not consider itself bound by any agreement reached in conferences in which the Chinese had not participated. This indicated that Mao had decided to insist on Chinese participation in international disarmament conferences for reasons of prestige and that he had lost faith in the ability of Khrushchev to represent both the Chinese point of view and interests. To a considerable extent this attitude could be justified.

In 1963 the Chinese charged that in 1959 the Russians had colluded with the United States. The Soviet response to these charges indicated that the matter at issue was that of nuclear weapons. Apparently Moscow had agreed not to give China nuclear arms if the Americans did not provide such arms for the Federal Republic of Germany. By refusing to be bound by agreements reached on their behalf by other states the Chinese sought recognition for both their point of view and the right to make their own policy.

The difficulties arising from the two policies were thus made obvious. Mao believed China could gain world-wide recognition if she became a nuclear power. It has been held that this was responsible in part for the nuclear programme and development of nuclear arms in China. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was committed to arms control and peaceful co-existence, policies that could not be reconciled with the Chinese quest for nuclear arms. To resolve these policy contradic-
tions both sides resorted to coercive measures. The bombardment of Quemoy in 1958 was intended to bring pressure to bear on Moscow and the United States. The Chinese by then had several reasons for doing so. They included coercing Moscow to provide them with tactical nuclear weapons and increasing the military commitment to China. In the relations with non-block states the crisis also proved advantageous. It restarted the ambassadorial talks between China and the United States, while in the United Nations the Soviet Union made a strong plea for China's admission in place of Taiwan. But while pressure was brought to bear and the Chinese achieved some positive results, Mao also discovered that Moscow was not prepared to use its nuclear advantage for bringing pressure to bear on Washington. Khrushchev, as a result of the Chinese action, did become all the more aware of the danger that the Chinese represented for his policy of peaceful co-existence.

It followed that within the block there were problems peculiar to each state. To resolve these in accordance with socialist internationalism flexibility and a desire for compromise were essential. Either one or both these qualities were lacking in the ideological and policy differences that had emerged. Both states insisted that their particular needs were to be met even when this resulted in two contradictory policies. The result was more likely to be disunity than unity.

Population as a factor in Sino-Soviet relations in Sinkiang

In Sinkiang the local population may have had a significant influence on the Sino-Soviet relationship. The deep-seated differences among the different Turkic people could have been exploited to create political unrest. But doing so also entailed some risks. There was the danger that the unrest could be transformed somehow into a strong pro-Turkic anti-foreign movement. This could then spill over into the territory of the other state and result in a Central Asian independence...
movement. Unrest among the Turkic people on either side of the Sino-Soviet border therefore had to be considered a double edged sword. Nevertheless there was some genuine dissatisfaction on both sides of the border.

In Sinkiang Turkic dissatisfaction with Chinese Communist rule was caused in part by the belief that the Chinese denied the Turkic people the measure of independence that their kinsmen across the border enjoyed under Soviet rule. Given this attitude, especially if it was widespread, an independence movement would not have been too difficult to foster.

The movements for greater independence and autonomy

The close association with the Soviet Union had some distinct disadvantages for the Chinese. One of these was the commitment to learn from the Soviet experience. Another was especially peculiar to Sinkiang. During the Hundred Flowers period and the Rectification Campaign the indigenous people demanded greater independence. They compared their own provincial administration to the union republics of the Soviet Union. This comparison left the Chinese leadership open to the charge that it had chosen to apply that part of the Soviet experience that suited it and ignored that part which would have provided the Turkic people with greater independence. In explaining their actions the Chinese invoked the view that the two countries had differing needs and that this necessitated different systems.

The Soviet Union's Communist Party on the basis of its own state's circumstances established union republics, exactly in accordance with its federative system. However, the federative system is not the only system to be adopted by all socialist states. On the basis of the different circumstances in each state the general principle, that socialist people are equal, the solution of a country's internal national question may assume a different form.71

By claiming that socialist countries could use different methods for dealing with their internal national problems, so long as the guiding principle was the same, the Chinese allowed themselves consider-
able latitude in applying the Soviet experience. At the same time the explanation allowed an attack on those who had advocated union republics in Sinkiang.

Local nationalists pretend to learn from Soviet experience, saying the Soviet Union utilised a federative system and set up union-republics, why does China not utilise a federative system and set up union republics. They demand that Sinkiang be made a union republic, this is an oppositional tendency and reactionary activity that is destructive to the unity of the state.72

In this criticism those who had advocated union republics were branded elements that failed to appreciate the basic socialist principles of the Chinese and Soviet states. In fact it was claimed that the independence movement had been instigated by the imperialists.73 While the demands for Soviet type union republics hardly supported the claim that the demands were made by anti-communists, there was no evidence either to suggest that Moscow was meddling. Even in the open polemics that followed the Sino-Soviet split no charges of Soviet meddling before 1962 were made. On the strength of this it was reasonable to conclude that the demands for union republics were voiced by the local inhabitants. They had made them no doubt in the sincere belief that their ethnic kinsmen across the border enjoyed greater autonomy under the Soviet system than they did in Sinkiang. In contemporary Chinese writing this argument too has been refuted. One source claimed that the union republics have become only another means for suppressing the non-Russian nationalities.

Through repeated far-reaching liquidations and replacements from the Central Committee of the Party to the union republics, from the self-governing regions to the national districts, the important tasks of the Party and Government organisations throughout Russia are monopolised by new bourgeois elements or such volunteers as demonstrated themselves to be reliable native upper class elements. They depend on the power concentrated in their hands to madly oppress and persecute all non-Russian people.74

This less charitable view of the Soviet union republics contrasted sharply with that of the earlier period. But it hardly could have
influenced the Chinese leadership in the 1950's. Another difficulty with the union republics was that they would have permitted the division of Sinkiang according to the ethnic groups and presumably allowed each Turkic group a national republic of its own. But given the fact that the population of the province was far more mixed than that of the Soviet Central Asian region the Chinese hardly could divide the region into national republics without uprooting and relocating large numbers of people. This prospect alone made union republics unfeasible.

Another worrying factor about the demands for union republics was that they could have been made by local nationalists. In this case union republics would have become the first step towards an independent Sinkiang. This also raised the prospect of an independence movement sweeping through the whole of Central Asia. Just as the local people in Sinkiang were informed about the Soviet union republics, so the inhabitants of the latter would have known about the developments in Sinkiang. In this case Sinkiang well might have become the rallying point for local nationalism for the whole of Central Asia. The ethnic ties between the Chinese and Soviet regions were certainly an important consideration for both the Chinese and Soviet Governments.

One aspect of Stalin's strategy in the 1930's was the security of Soviet Central Asia. The Japanese drive into Manchuria and eastern China worried the Soviet leader. He feared Japan could gain control of northern China, including Sinkiang. If the Japanese had succeeded they would have been in a good position to mount attacks on the Soviet Union. This made Sinkiang Stalin's first line of defence. To ensure its stability the Governor had to be kept in a reasonably strong position and friendly towards Moscow. At the same time intrigue among the indigenous people, especially by Japanese agents, had to be prevented. Such intrigue was dangerous, especially because it could spill over
into the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that Stalin formulated his war-time policy towards Sinkiang on the basis of these considerations. His post-1945 policy may have been based on similar concerns. According to the 1945 treaty the Soviet Union could not interfere in the internal affairs of Sinkiang. This made it necessary to find a way of legitimising Soviet intervention in the province in the event that this became necessary.

In the past both Britain and imperial Russia registered people living in Sinkiang as their citizens. This was a ploy to give their respective Governments greater influence in dealing with the local government. Stalin resorted to similar tactics. In November 1945 and January 1946 decrees of the Supreme Soviet granted approximately 120,000 Kazakhs, Uighurs, Russians and others who had emigrated from Russia and the USSR to Sinkiang the status of Soviet citizens legally living abroad. If these 'Soviet citizens' were thought to be in danger Soviet intervention would have been conceivable and could have been legitimised on these grounds.

This was not to say that Stalin sought to gain control of Sinkiang in the post-1945 period. On the contrary, he refused to take the province over when it was offered to him in 1941 and again in 1949. His immediate policy concern was to prevent the status quo in Sinkiang from being upset and to safeguard the region from foreign influences. In general this remained the Soviet policy after Stalin's death.

After 1961 whenever the polemics of China and the Soviet Union turned to the north-west border and its people there was considerable caution and ambiguity about what was said. In 1963 the Chinese charged the Soviet leaders with misusing the KPSS organs and their personnel in Sinkiang. They were accused of having undertaken "large-scale insurrectionist activities, inciting and coercing many tens of thousands of Chinese citizens to run away to the Soviet Union." This outburst
well could have been prompted by the need to explain why Turkic people were crossing the border into the Soviet Union. According to a Soviet source over 113,000 people fled from Sinkiang to the Soviet Union in the periods of April-June 1962 and October 1962-May 1963. Both the Chinese and Soviet sources agreed that the people did cross into the Soviet Union and that they numbered several tens of thousands.

No doubt the Chinese were smarting from the mass exodus. By blaming it on Soviet subversive activities the need to justify it on the basis of local reasons was cleverly circumvented. Another possibility was that the Chinese were ridding themselves of the 'Soviet citizens' that Stalin had decreed to be living legally in Sinkiang. But this appeared rather remote. According to the Soviet sources the migration was brought on by internal conditions in Sinkiang. One refugee who then had been living in Kazakhstan for less than three years explained that the Turkic people in Sinkiang suffered persecution and repression and that the province was being Sinicised. "Peking does not disguise its intention to 'Sinicise' Sinkiang, to fence it off from its northern neighbour—the USSR—with a blank wall." The basic problem with these polemics was some question about their validity and therefore their significance for the Sino-Soviet dispute. While it was unlikely that either the Russians or the Chinese would incite the Turkic population in the other state, such charges were made by the Chinese in 1964.

With the stepping up of anti-Chinese activities by the leaders of the C.P.S.U. in recent years, the Soviet side has made frequent breaches of the status quo on the border, occupied Chinese territory and provoked border incidents. Still more serious, the Soviet side has flagrantly carried out large-scale subversive activities in Chinese frontier areas, trying to sow discord among China's nationalities by means of the press and wireless, inciting China's minority nationalities to break away from their motherland, and inveigling and coercing tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. Not only do all these acts violate the principles guiding relations between socialist countries, they are absolutely impermissible even in the relations between countries in general.

It was difficult to decide whether these charges amounted to any—
thing. By 1963 the Sino-Soviet dispute had become a heated issue. Both sides were attempting to gain the support of the international communist movement for their respective point of view. While the Chinese were accusing Moscow of border infractions, the latter made similar charges against Peking. The difficulty lay in sorting out how much of these charges was justified and how much was pure allegation intended for propaganda purposes. Although hard facts on which to base a conclusive analysis were lacking the practical conditions of the period may disprove some of the allegations.

The Chinese charge that the Russians used "the press and wireless" to sow discord among the Turkic people in Sinkiang raised some doubts. The problems of illiteracy have been noted already. Given these limitations any real appeal through the written media could be only of limited value. Similarly the wireless could provide only a limited outlet in the early-1960's. Although this was the period of the 'transistor revolution' in the industrial countries of the West, radio receivers were not yet household items in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang. Most, if not all of the people in these two regions depended on the speaker boxes provided by their respective Governments. These only received broadcasts relayed by a State controlled radio receiver. Consequently the listeners were unable to listen to the programmes of their own choice. In the 1960's these conditions made all appeals over the wireless fruitless. In more recent years the situation may have changed as more radios became available. As a consequence these regions now could be vulnerable to broadcasts originating in third countries, particularly other Muslim states.

The Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border difficulties also gave rise to some questions. One concerned the population which traditionally pastured its herds on one side of the border in summer and on the other side in winter. There was some evidence that suggested that this practice
generally continued until about 1960.

The population in the border regions maintained broad ties, engaged in lively trade, set up cultural exchanges, resolved economic problems through their joint efforts, assisted each other and together struggled against natural disaster. The Soviet authorities allowed the Chinese population to engage in the making of hay, to occupy state farmsteads, to catch fish and participate in other economic activities in part carried out on Soviet territory. 86

Although it was not specifically stated this statement strongly suggested that traditional nomadic grazing practices were still being carried on. Hence the difficulties that arose in the Buz-Aigyr region during the summer of 1960 may have been a response to Soviet attempts to close the border to the nomads. 87 The local co-operative activities also entered into manufacturing and the marketing of consumer goods. In 1959 contracts for the exchange of goods were signed between Kazakhstan's consumer organisation and the Sinkiang provincial trade organisation. They ensured the exchange of locally produced goods between the two regions. 88 By no means did this mean that there was a completely free and uncontrolled border traffic between the two regions. Indeed for the trade to be organised it had to be controlled. This interaction did indicate, however, that there were few real border problems in the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan region. Those that did arise may have resulted from the traditional practices of the indigenous people rather than actual border differences.

Socialist Internationalism

Another aspect of the Sino-Soviet relationship was the theory of socialist internationalism. It was to provide the framework for the relationship between socialist countries. But it also may have given rise to expectations that could not be fulfilled. Not necessarily because the expectations were unrealistic, but because of differing views about their general importance. The difficulty then became one of definition. Socialist internationalism could be taken to imply that
all expectations of socialist states were to be fulfilled, or that only some would be fulfilled. The latter also implied that someone had to decide on which expectations were to be met.

This difficulty was compounded further by the vast economic, social, political and demographic differences between China and the Soviet Union. To a great extent these factors were decisive in determining the basic policies of each state. It then followed also that each state had to develop its own policies. The goal was to solve the problems that arose in each state within the framework of socialist internationalism.

The views of Marx and Lenin on this theme have been discussed already in a different context. One of the crucial points was that different cultures were to disappear into the new world culture. This view made the differences between states unimportant during the period of the proletarian dictatorship. Each ruling proletariat was to guide its respective state to Communism. As more states underwent the revolution there were bound to be differences, but these had to be resolved with all concerned being prepared to give and take. There could be no dominating state within the grouping of proletarian states.

It was in this regard that Mao made a fundamental error in 1949. He proclaimed, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it." This left the Chinese in a subservient position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. They were the student while Moscow did the teaching. There could be little doubt that this was not what Mao had intended. In an earlier part of the same speech he stressed the bases on which the new China would enter into internal and external relationships.

(1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That is, unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, form a domestic united front under the leadership of the working class, and advance from this to the establishment of a state which is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.

(2) Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.90

This left little doubt that the external relationships were to be conducted on the basis of mutual equality. The countries with which Mao expected to enter into this sort of relationship were the Soviet Union and the East European states. It was to these states also that he believed China could turn to for help. "Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front."91 This gave some indication of how Mao understood socialist internationalism. To him it represented a framework within which he could find genuine and friendly help. In 1975 the Soviet definition of socialist internationalism was very similar to Mao's understanding of the concept.

Socialist internationalism above all signifies mutual-aid in repelling imperialist aggression, united action in the struggle for preserving peace, active support for national-liberation and social revolutionary workers in capitalist countries, close co-operation for the purpose of building up the might and for the further development of all peaceful systems of Socialism and each individual country. Socialist (proletarian) internationalism is the highest stage in the development of contemporary international law.92

The idea of mutual assistance and support were all there. Only one point was lacking, that of equality within the socialist block and this was what was really at issue for Mao.

There was no question that the Soviet Union led the socialist block. But this did not mean there were to be no differences. On the contrary, within the block all states were to be equals. This implied that while the Soviet Union was the economically most advanced socialist country, it did not have the right to dictate the policy to the
remaining block members. The leadership position of Moscow was due to its greater experience not to its ideological superiority. Furthermore, Mao believed that the socialist states would assist each other in their economic development and that such assistance would not be tied to ideological agreement or unanimity.

On the question of Soviet development aid the Chinese had few if any complaints. After the Second World War the Soviet Union was hardly in a position to extend credits to the Chinese. Nevertheless the credits granted Peking between 1950-61 amounted to approximately 1,370 million American dollars. While this compared favourably with the Soviet credits extended to other communist states, the Chinese may not have benefitted from the partial annullment of debts the former had been granted. In addition the Chinese fared worse in a per capita allocation of the credits than did the other communist countries. Although Mao could hardly expect the Soviet Union to extend credits on a per capita basis the inequality of the system employed in aid distribution may have rankled with Peking nonetheless.

By granting other block members what were greater credits on a per capita basis Moscow may have offended Mao's sense of equality. But an even more significant factor was the unwillingness of the Russians to help the Chinese without being coerced. The Quemoy crises were two such attempts. In 1954 the intention likely was to coerce the United States. That Khrushchev in the end had to bear the brunt of the episode was accidental rather than intentional. However, by 1958 there could be little doubt that the bombardment was intended also to cause Khrushchev despair. The co-operative spirit in the relations between the two states by then had been largely exhausted. Although the open break did not come until 1961 the relationship based on any semblance of socialist internationalism for all intents and purposes had ceased to exist in 1958.
V:7 Conclusions

The Sino-Soviet difficulties could not be attributed to either a single factor or to a specific time period. From the above analysis it appeared that the differences began with the treaty of 1950 and became greater over the next ten years. There were basic differences between the two countries. To bridge these and maintain block unity both Peking and Moscow had to place that particular goal before all others. This did not occur. In their foreign policies the two states followed different lines based on their particular priorities. But their policy aims not only differed, they were diametrically opposed. They placed and drove both Governments forward on a collision course.

In addition to the foreign policy differences there were differences over the economic development strategies. On the whole these were not beyond solution. But the doctrinal differences raised the spectre of leadership difficulties and this in turn the question of leadership within the block. Although it could not be stated with any degree of certainty it was unlikely that the Chinese aspired to the block leadership. Mao no doubt wanted to be heard within and without the block, but this was consistent with the Chinese position. They were fighting for diverse opinions within Socialism. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was willing to liberalise the Soviet leadership, but feared also that this liberalisation would undermine his own position. To him Mao could but appear as a challenge, especially after the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. These attitudes resulted in less flexibility and greater division within the block. If this pointed to any particular problem it was that neither Moscow nor Peking were able to communicate their intentions to each other.

Within the context of the overall Sino-Soviet relationship the difficulties in Sinkiang tended to be relegated to a secondary position. On the whole this was justified. Either the region was too sen-
sitive and therefore had to be avoided as a friction point, or Sino-
Soviet difficulties there were of minor importance. In fact both these
contentions could be supported. To some extend they even logically
followed one another.

Both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang have military significance. At Lake
Balkhash in Kazakhstan the Soviet Union has a missile guidance and tes-
ting site, while the Chinese have nuclear installations at Lop Nor in
Sinkiang. Any Soviet or Chinese military activity in this area could
but arouse the keen interest and suspicions of the other country. For
this reason conflicts in this particular region no doubt have been
minimised. This reduced the Sino-Soviet difficulties there to insigni-
ficance. But the same reasoning did not apply to unrest among the
indigenous people.

The technological improvements and rise in the standard of living
may be a source of danger in future. If radios capable of picking up
foreign broadcasts become widely available to the Turkic people they
could become receptive to the cries of Muslims in other countries.
This well might become a greater factor in creating unrest in the regi-
os than the agents of the past ever could have been. If wide-spread
unrest were to result on either side of the border the most immediate
problem would be containing it. Both the Russians and the Chinese
would seek to prevent the unrest in the other region from spilling
across the border. At the same time their interests demand that they
ensure that local rebellions are quashed and that the status quo is
maintained. To maintain peace in the region the two Governments even
might be prepared to co-operate with each other. On the other hand if
such co-operation were not given and a rebellion in one country threa-
tened the security of the whole area one state well might invade the
other to ensure that the rebellion would be quashed. To some extent
this may explain the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The in-
tention may have been to contain the Muslim revival that had crept to the Soviet border. According to this analysis the Sino-Soviet relations in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang may be far more vulnerable to external factors than they are to internal ones. Third countries, especially Muslim countries, could create great difficulties for the two Governments. Hence, the population factor may assume far greater significance in the future than it has had in the past.

2 For accounts of the 1765-1865 period see; Hayit, Turkestan zwi-Russland und China, pp. 131-139.; Lamb, "Sinkiang under the Manchus and the Chinese Republic," in Central Asia, ed., by Hambly, pp. 298-300.


4 Skrine and Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar, pp. 237-239.


6 David MacKenzie, "Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. the Turkistan Generals (1863-1866)," Canadian Slavic Studies, III, No. 2, (Summer 1969), 310-311. The evidence suggested that this situation remained largely unchanged throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It generally has accepted that the annexation of Ili in 1871 was undertaken on the initiative of General von Kaufman. See; Hsi, The Ili Crisis, p. 31. In the early twentieth century Russian consular officials in Kashgar and the military personnel in Tashkent were accused of conniving on their own initiative to bring Sinkiang under Russian rule. See; Skrine and Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar, pp. 197-198 and 205-207.

7 V. P. Semennikov ed., Za Kulisami Tsarizma: Arkhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva (Leningrad: Gosudarstvenoe Izdatel'stvo, 1925), pp. 68-75. Badmaev proposed building a branch-line from the Trans-Siberian railway to run from lake Baikal through Urga to Lanchow. At the same time, under the guise of a trading company, Russian paid Buriat agents were to foment rebellion among the Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan people of China. After the rebellion against the Manchus had occurred, Badmaev believed these people would seek the protection of the Tsar, giving Russia access to vast new regions, riches and a large population.

8 Ibid., p. 78.


McLean, "The New Dominion," pp. 132-135.; Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier*, pp. 12-14.; Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*, p. 105. Although there was a general consensus that the rebels were assisted by the Soviet Union, it was pointed out also that the extent of this assistance remained unknown. Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover*, p. 247.


It was not entirely clear when the Joint Ship Building Company was established. Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 130-139.; indicated the company was established at the same time as the other joint companies. Kurdyukov, Nikiforov and Perevertailo eds., *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya 1917-1957*, p. 303.; stated that four joint companies were established in 1950 and 1951. In SCMP there were two references to the company in 1954, but without a founding date. NCNA (Deiran), 4 June 1954, SCMP.
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25 Stuart Schram ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters; 1956-71, trans., by John Chinnery and Tieyun (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), p. 101. The talks and letters collected in this source were released during the Cultural revolution. This raised some question about their actually dating from the period indicated in the originals. They also could have been changed to reflect the new conditions of the Sino-Soviet relationship. There was no way of being certain whether these documents were in fact actual or doctor accounts.


29 NCNA (Urumchi), 28 October 1957, SCMP, No., 1642, 31 October 1957, p. 23.

30 NCNA (Tihua), 17 May 1953, SCMP, No., 574, 20 May 1953, p. 20.


32 Ta Kung Pao (Tientsin), 24 May 1953, SCMP, No., 584, 6-8 June 1953, pp. 9-10.

33 NCNA (Ham), 30 July 1960, SCMP, No., 2312, 8 August 1960, pp. 24-25.

34 Walter Galenson, "Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and Communist China," in Study of the Soviet Economy: Direction and impact of Soviet growth: Teaching and Research in Soviet Economics, ed. by Nicolas Spulber (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1961), pp. 45-48.; Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, pp. 174-179. While Galenson argued that the Soviet export of plants to China hindered Soviet growth directly, Eckstein maintained that the total amount of exports and imports to and from China was such a small proportion of the total Soviet trade that its impact on the Soviet economy was negligible.

35 Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, pp. 170-172.


37 Ta Kung Pao (Peking), 1 January 1958, SCMP, No., 1704, 3 Febru-
ary 1958, pp. 39-42.


39 Lun Yun criticised the Soviet Union for removing machinery from the north-east in 1945; Jen Min Jih Pao, 19 June 1957, p. 5. Wang Yunsheng had written a history of Port Arthur and included the ten years that the port was under Soviet administration (1945-55) as part of its tragic history. For this he underwent self-criticism. Jen Min Jih Pao, 23 August 1957, p. 7.


47 Pravda, 17 February 1956, p. 4.


55 Mao, Selected Works, IV, 416.


58 Wilson, Mao, p. 338.


64 NCNA (Peking), 4 February 1958, SCMP, No., 1708, 7 February 1958, pp. 40-42.


67 Halperin and Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, p. 63.


71 Sinkiang Jih Pao, 7 October 1958, p. 3.

72 Ibid.

74 Yung Chia, Chin-jih ti su-lien shih ko tsu jen-min ti chia yu: Ta lien hai-yun chu kong jen li lun tsu (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she ch'u-pan, 1978), p. 27.

75 Pravda, 26 May 1933, p. 4.

76 Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, pp. 21-25.; Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, pp. 209-214.

77 Skrine and Nightingale, Macartney at Kashgar, pp. 233-234.


79 In 1941 Sheng Shih-ts'ai proposed that Moscow establish a Soviet regime in Sinkiang. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p. 80. On pp. 117-118 Whiting claimed that the Russians made a proposal to make Sinkiang independent in 1949 when the Chinese Communist forces marched into Kansu. This offer was refused by the local military commander T'ao Shih-yueh. Another view of the 1949 events was offered in, Dreyer, China's Forty Million, pp. 83-85. According to this assessment Chiang Kai-shek offered Moscow economic concessions in Sinkiang which in effect would have given Stalin economic control of the province. The Kuomintang leaders apparently hoped that this would keep the region out of Mao's grasp, but Moscow rejected the offer.

80 Jen Min Jih Pao, 6 September 1963, p. 3.


82 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 29 September 1963, p. 4.


85 A Soviet report in 1949 claimed that the herdsmen in Kazakhstan had radios connecting them to their raion (district) centres. See; Pravda, 4 August 1949, p. 4. This was likely a reference to receivers connected to the kolkhoz network, over which programmes received in the raion centre were rebroadcast to the various kolkhoz villages. The programme itself was controlled from the raion centre. In Sinkiang it was planned that by 1956 every pastoral and agricultural district was to have at least one "listening station," which could receive relays from the Sinkiang People's Broadcasting Station. NCNA (Urumchi), 29 November 1955, SCMP, No., 1180, 2 December 1955, p. 29. This indicated that the Soviet and Chinese radio systems operated on a similar basis.


87 In the summer of 1960 herdsmen from Sinkiang crossed into Soviet territory in the Buz-Aigyr region of the Tien Shan. They did not

88 Neishtadt, Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Kazakhskoi SSR, p. 264.

89 Mao, Selected Works, IV, 423.

90 Ibid., p. 415.

91 Ibid., p. 417.


93 Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, p. 181.
CONCLUSIONS

On the whole the difficulties that arose in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were analogous. This made it possible to treat the two regions as one in the concluding remarks. The overwhelming conclusion was that in both regions there occurred a confrontation between the new socialist culture and the Turkic traditions. What remained to be discussed was how this confrontation developed. To a considerable extent both its severity and longevity were direct consequences of the policies pursued by the Soviet and Chinese Governments.

The period of communist rule brought significant political, social and economic changes to the regions. These were both positive and negative. Although the effects of the changes were important in their own right, they also fostered a more significant development which the central Governments neither had envisaged nor desired. This was an increased local cultural and political consciousness, a direct product of the modernisation process.

To achieve any sort of modernisation in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang the traditional practices of the indigenous people had to be overcome. They also had to be replaced by what was an alien system in the eyes of the local population. This required a re-education programme. Its aim was to replace the traditional Turkic values with those of Socialism. By the mere fact of its existence and certainly because of its content the re-education programme was an attack on the Turkic culture. The latter was branded inferior both by implication and in the actual educational work. This was unlikely to convince the Turkic people to relinquish their traditions. On the contrary, it was more likely to stimulate and reinforce their awareness of these traditions. The result was the entrenchment of the Turkic cultural traditions and an inevitable cultural clash.

The cultural and political awareness was heightened also by the
direct actions of the two Governments. Both emphasised the participation of the Turkic people in the political process. Thus political thought and awareness were encouraged. In addition both the actual participation in the political process, even if only to elect a local candidate, and the constant exposure to political propaganda aroused local interest. The Turkic demands for a greater say in the running of their own affairs and more extensive local autonomy indicated the extent of this interest. They also indicated that the increased awareness was a Turkic political awakening. Those who had made the demands obviously were interested in the political process and the place of the Turkic people within it. A similar interest in the Turkic culture was fostered by the formal educational system. Although this system neglected the Turkic cultural tradition for the study of the Russian and Chinese cultures, its negativity could arouse only a greater Turkic self-awareness. The Turkic children needed only to look at their European and Chinese counterparts to become aware of their physical differences. In addition most, if not all of the Turkic children learned a different language in the home and had been exposed to their own culture. To leave these differences unexplained or accord them secondary importance only could increase the Turkic interest for their own cultural heritage.

There was considerable evidence of this cultural and political awareness. It found expression in the demands for; greater political participation, greater autonomy, the more extensive use of the Turkic languages and the preservation of the local culture. In addition it was reflected in the continued adherence to Islam and the poet's yearning for the steppes. But this could have been only the thin end of the wedge. The education of the Turkic people has lagged behind that of the Russians and the Chinese. As more Turkic people achieved the educational standards of the Russians and Chinese their demands would
would no doubt become more pronounced.

In the educational process this produced considerable difficulties for the two Governments. To transform the Turkic people education was necessary, but this very education produced local Turkic cultural and political consciousness rather than a socialist attitude. Essentially the difficulty was one of equilibrium. A balance needed to be struck in the education of the Turkic people. It was necessary to emphasise the local and socialist cultures sufficiently to satisfy the desires of both the indigenous population and those of the central administrations. At the same time this process had to produce Turkic people who were devoted to the ideals of Socialism. This balance remains to be struck in both regions.

To equate the Turkic cultural and political consciousness with the Western concept of nationalism would have been quite erroneous. The sense of Turkic identity that arose in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang remained a cultural and political awareness devoid of nationalism. It was a feeling of belonging to a religious and cultural group not a consciousness of being a member of a national group. As such it was an awareness that continued to encompass all the Turkic people of Central Asia and not only one particular group. This prevented the division of the Turkic people into national groups of Kazakhs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Turkmen and Tadjiks. Furthermore, the Turkic people continued to identify with other Islamic groups in and outside their respective states. They therefore were and remain susceptible to the religious and cultural influences from abroad.

Within the multi-national socialist states based on a social order devoted to cultural unity the emergence of the Turkic cultural and political awareness were bound to result in friction. Rather than cultural uniformity and unity they encouraged diversity and thus, animosity between the Turkic people and the Governments. In order to overcome
this the local culture had to be suppressed. This in turn allowed the Turkic people to charge the Russians and Chinese with cultural chauvinism. In their view the Russians and Chinese were attempting to present their own respective cultures as superior to the Turkic culture. This effectively reduced the problem to a struggle between cultures.

According to Marx the new socialist culture was to evolve from the combination of all the old cultures with the socialist ideals. This required someone to decide which aspects of each culture were to be included and which were to be rejected. If the decisions were made by the socially most conscious elements they had to convince the less conscious that their choices indeed were proper and necessary for the development of a better society. This produced two difficulties; first, it limited the choices of the people and, second, it made a cultural confrontation inevitable.

On the question of choice, the Turkic and for that matter all the people living in the Soviet Union and People's Republic were limited. The Governments of both states remained dedicated to establishing a higher social order. At the outset these aims could be appreciated only by the socially most conscious group and they alone could understand the policies designed to foster the new society. The remainder of the population had to accept on trust that whatever they themselves were working for would benefit them and their offspring. This made the choices those of the group that had the political power. In making the choices the ruling group took for granted that the masses were in full agreement. Their only mandate for this assumption was the political fact that they had been able to seize political power and maintained their political and military rule. After the seizure of power the masses were directed according to the ideals of the political leaders. No doubt Marx had not envisaged this as a permanent feature. However, rule by an elite—in this case the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat—entailed the danger of dictatorial rule. Its most vivid exam-
plies were the Stalin era, the period of the Great Leap and the Cultural
Revolution. During these periods the culture to be adopted was dicta-
ted from above. Even more important, the periods indicated that during
the preceding years the proletarian dictatorships had failed to con-
vince the masses of the benefits of Socialism.

Under these circumstances a prolonged battle between the different
cultural values had to ensue. But this in no sense was a struggle be-
tween social and political ideals. This battle had arisen from the
attempts to transform the Turkic people socially and politically. It
was a battle between conflicting cultural values. As such it could be
reduced to a confrontation between the Turkic and the alien—Russian
and Chinese—cultures, or the Turkic and non-Turkic. At the grass-
roots level Marxism did not even enter into the struggle. The issue
was simply that of a conflict between the Muslim believers on the one
hand and the Russian and Chinese unbelievers on the other.

Another means for winning the indigenous people over to the commu-
nist cause was the new socialist economic system. By meeting the ma-
terial needs of the masses the new economic system was to demonstrate
its superiority over the old mode of production. There could be little
doubt that the economic, social and political values of Socialism were
more likely to bring about the industrialisation of Kazakhstan and Sin-
kiang than the Islamic social order. It has been argued, however, that
these developments would have occurred also if after 1917 Central Asia
had become independent or the mandate of a non-communist power. This
development even might have prevented the ravages that the collectivi-
sation wreaked upon Kazakhstan. A question that arose from this argu-
ment was whether as much could have been accomplished in as short a
period of time under a non-communist regime. The heavily centralised
system of Communism allowed the economic developments to be undertaken
on the basis of State directives rather than the immediate needs of the consumer. Consequently it has been argued that the strong central directing force benefitted the industrial development of Central Asia.² However, it was not at all certain that this forced development could win the Turkic people over to Communism.

By failing to meet their material needs the economic system was more likely to alienate the Turkic people. As a result the leaders of the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic were deprived of what may have been the most promising means for convincing the indigenous population of the advantages of Socialism. In the short term an immediate fulfilling of the local material needs would have demonstrated the central Governments' concern for their respective Turkic people. The failure to do this helped set the course on confrontation rather than co-operation. The policy itself, therefore, may have fostered resistance instead of winning the support of the Turkic people.

But the economic difficulties combined with the growing cultural and political consciousness in the two regions, helping to increase the latter even more. The overall effect of all the above factors was greater local resistance to change. This in turn prolonged the period of transition, the length of which was not defined in any case. Equally ill-defined was the relationship between communist states during the transitional period. The difficulties that arose from this were demonstrated by the intra-state nationality problems and the inter-state relations between the two communist states.

Before the rise of Tito and Mao the Russian leadership position of the communist block remained unchallenged. Although not by intent, both Tito and Mao changed this situation. Both had gained power without help from Moscow and, unlike Moscow's puppets in Eastern Europe, Tito and Mao were free to base their policies on their own interpretations of Marxism-Leninism.
The needs of the Russian and Chinese states were obviously different. However, within the communist block the ideological bond was not sufficiently strong to withstand the adaptations that were necessary. Instead the fear that greater freedom for the block members would not preserve unity but sow the seeds of disunity was allowed to snap it. Paradoxically, in the intra-state nationality problems this fear yet may prove correct. The search for greater freedom that was fostered through the educational system may lead to disunity within the Central Asian region and to the reestablishment of the state of Turkestan. The Sino-Soviet dispute in this sense could be taken for a preview of the intra-state splintering of the future.

Just as the Chinese were expected to follow Moscow's line, so the Turkic people in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were expected to follow the line laid down by their respective central Governments. The evidence suggested some allowances were and continue to be made for local needs. The more recent Soviet attitude towards Islam indicated some attempts were being made to find a way that allowed a temporary co-existence of Islam and Communism. The Chinese have pursued this sort of policy since 1949. Nevertheless, the basic policy of both states remained anti-Islamic and blended into the Turkic and non-Turkic conflict. The effect of the policy will be to give the Turkic people a little more room for manoeuvre. This in turn may permit a further reinforcement of their cultural heritage. At the same time the central Governments, by initiating the policy of co-existence, have 'climbed' down from the more radical Marxist position. If this was the first sign of a weakening resolve to destroy Islam outright the policy of temporary co-existence is likely to evolve into one of permanent co-existence. On the other hand, if the antagonism persists, the battle of cultures is equally likely to continue.

The outcome of this battle may be one of several. One of these is
that Communism and Islam simply will continue to stand opposite one another in a state of permanent antagonism similar to that of religion and atheism. The long-lived existence of Islam in China suggested this to be a likely development. Other possibilities include the complete destruction of either Communism or Islam. This appears rather remote, especially in the case of Islam. It has been adapting for centuries, while Communism has proved far less adaptable over a very much shorter period of time. The Sino-Soviet rift provided ample evidence of its ideological inflexibility. While Islam is unlikely to dominate either the Soviet Union or Chinese People's Republic, its past history suggested that it would continue to do so in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang.
FOOTNOTES


APPENDIX

Maps
KAZAKHSTAN and the Stepnoy kray

KA Z A K H S T A N
Major

Roads

Reproduced from:
Atlas razvitiya khozyaistva
i kul'tury SSSR: Moscow 1967
Reproduced from:
Atlas razvitiya khozyaistva
i kul'tury SSSR: Moscow 1967
Reproduced from The Times Atlas of China (London 1974)
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