PHYSICAL PLANNING AS AN AGENT OF IDEOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS
OF QACENTINA, ALGERIA.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

NOMENCLATURE.

The city chosen for analysis in this thesis is discussed over three
different time-periods: Islamic, French colonial, and post-Independence.
During these periods, the town was known as Qusantīna, Constantine, and
most recently, Qacentina.  In this study, these names are used within
their contemporary context in order to emphasise the historical
perspective of the analysis.  The general exception to this is where the
name Qacentina is used in context, for example, 'pre-colonial Qacentina',
or, 'French-colonial Qacentina'.  Similarly, not only the name of the
city, but place-names have been rendered in the form in use at the time.

For the Islamic period, this has necessitated the use of the Arabic
original;  this has been transliterated using the system on the next page.
For the sake of consistency, this orthography has also been applied to
technical and other Arabic terms referred to.  Proper names have been
capitalised; other Arabic words and phrases have been distinguished by
underlining.

This logic has been also generally applied in the use of French names
and terminology in the thesis.  Elsewhere, if a term or place name has
a conventional and widely known English spelling, it has been used.

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## DECLARATION.

I declare that the following research entitled, "Physical ·
Planning as an Agent of Ideology: an Analysis of Qacentina,
Algeria", is the product of my own work, and has not been
accepted for a higher degree at any other university.

SUMMARY.

This study examines the proposition that physical planning will act
as an agent and catalyst of ideology with respect to the urban space.
Algeria is chosen for study; Qacentina is focused upon as a town which
has been subject to little published research and was particularly
appropriate, by virtue of its history, as a test case for the hypothesis.

Three consecutive historical periods are analysed, which cover the
ideological transition between Islamic pre-colonial Algeria, French
colonialism following the 1830 occupation, and a socialist Third World
nation in the process of decolonisation since the accession to
independence in 1962.  Examination of the first of these periods indicates
a strong relationship between Islamic ideology and the urban form of pre-
1937 Qacentina; moreover, physical planning such as it existed under
the Mālikī school of law, is identified as the essential agent in this
process.  Subsequently, a relationship between French colonial ideology,
and its components of capitalism and racism, and the post-1837 development
of the city is drawn.  Physical planning restates itself not only as the
agent responsible for this, but also the catalyst in the ideological
transition between Islamic and French colonial urban form.

This relationship  is also upheld for independent Algeria.  The cosmetic
nature of the nationally professed ideology is only corroborated by
analysis of the physical planning system, which although superficially
socialist, patricipatory, congruent and dynamic, in reality appears
inegalitarian, dependent and intrinsically static, precluding both
implementation and participation.  Accordingly, the effect on the city
form of Qacentina is an enforcement of the elements of the earlier

colonial division and exploitation.

Consequently, the hypothesis presented in this study is upheld; it is
also proposed that physical planning will provide an authentic indication
of the dominant national ideology at any one point in time. Moreover,
it is suggested that physical planning is likely to be more successful
when related to prevailing indigenous social and moral perceptions,
rather than to bureaucratic and technocratic mechanisms which rely on
imported methodologies.

PREFACE.

La legitimation de l'autorité résulte du
développement d'idéologies qui placent
l'humanité dans un cosmos hiérarchisé.[1]

In the last 30 years, over 70 states, mainly African and Asian, have

gained political, if not economic, independence from the former

European colonial powers, notably Britain, France and Portugal. How-

ever, in many of the major urban centres of such states, the physical-

spatial characteristics of the colonial city more or less remain.

Fanon has powerfully synthesised the intrinsic nature of this.

> The settler's town is a strongly built town, all made of
> stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets
> are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow
> all the leavings, unseen unknown and hardly though about ...
> The settler's town is a well-fed town, an easy going town;
> its belly is always full of good things. The settler's
> town is a town of white people, of foreigners.
>
> The town belonging to the colonised people, or at least
> the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the
> reservation, is a place of ill-fame, peopled by men of
> evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where
> or how; they die there, it matters not where or how. It
> is a world without spaciousness; men live on top of each
> other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread,
> of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a
> crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in
> the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs. [2]

Hence, typologically, the colonial city represented a 'dual' or

'composite' city. King's[3] study of Delhi well exemplifies this. This

derived an ideal type model of the colonial city comprising three

elements: an indigenous settlement, often preceeding the era, and some-

times conforming to Sjoberg's[4] pre-industrial city; the modern settlement

or European appendage; and finally, the addition of indigenous squatter

settlements. Variations of this have been developed elsewhere - for

example by Abu Lughod[5] in examining the North African city.

Two other typological schemes distinguish the colonial city. The
first relates to cultural identity. Redfield and Singer[6] classify the
city as orthogentic and hetrogentic, reflecting 'local' versus
'outside' cultural origins and influences respectively. Colonial cities
thus fall between the two. The second typology is based on city
function. Pirenne's[7] early distinction between political/intellectual
and economic cities was a forerunner of Nutini's[8] Latin American based
typology of cities as: administrative-bureaucratic; trading-
agricultural; mining-manufacturing; and military-religious. Fox[9] has
recently refined this, and views cities as fulfilling ideological;
administrative; mercantile; and industrial functions for the societies
in which they arise. The dominance of one over the other depends on
the society. Thus, of particular relevance to the colonial city is the
observation that, "in weak or segmentary states, the ideological
function of urban places is primary and defines the external adaption
of the city to the wider society".[10]

Component to the spatial compartmentalisation of the colonial city is

the significant under-provision of amenities in the indigenous

compared to the European sector of the city. It is thus, that Abu

Lughod has argued for the necessary "blending together of these

disfunctive fragments" to enable "the gradual emergence of a genre of

city more authentically adapted to, and projective of, [the indigenous]

culture as it modernises".[11] However, King has generalised that in the

Third World today,

> despite modifications, in most cities the basic pattern
> has often remained. As a result of initial structuring
> of inequalities whether in terms of housing, services or
> spatial standards, newcomers to the city reinforce the
> old structural pattern. Thus, low income migrants have
> tended to filter into the old (indigenous) city and its

environs ... and new elites flow into the expanded area
of the old colonial settlement. The wealthy leave the
old city to take up residence in the new.                    12

As Harrison concludes, "after two or three decades of independence, the
cities of the Third World are still the dual cities of colonial days".[13]

Therefore, although rapidly urbanising, the Third World city in essence
remains structurally static, still characterised by the inequalities of
pre-independence. Consequently, there have emerged two major themes
which have been seen as fundamental to the successful planning of the
Third World city. The first is the need for positive change, and hence
implementation (Adedlyl[14]; Koenigsberger[15]; and Moughtin[16]) or what
Zetter[17] defines as 'pro-active' rather than 'reactive' planning.
Second is the use of domesticated, indigenous and congruous techniques
and methods of physical planning (Crooks[18]; Honeybone[19]; Franklin[20];
Turner[21]) rather than normally inappropriate western and/or former
colonial systems which tend to maintain, or aggravate the problems of
Third World urbanisation (Kanyeihamba[22]; Prouzet[23]).

This suggests the concept of physical planning as a determinant process
of the development of the Third World city. However, this is a process
which has been largely ignored, and insufficiently or superficially
dealt with in the literature of the Third World city[24] - particularly
in the context of the Middle East and the Maghreb[25]. Urban studies of
the Arab world do exist, and include work on Damascus[26], Allepo[27],
Cairo[28], Fez[29], Casablanca[30], Istanbul[31], Tlemcen[32], and most recently
Algiers[33]. Generally, however, these are limited in that they are
lengthy descriptions of physical environment, regional setting,
demographic characteristics, economic institutions, architecture and
many other aspects of the city's morphology and urban life. Whilst

excellent descriptions, the predilection for physical morphology
leads to a major failing:  the neglect of urban society itself.  In
short, the processes which bring about many of the described features
are not evaluated.

This preoccupation of geographers with morphological description, at
the expense of insight into social values and social organisation, in
the study of North African cities has been criticised by Isnard in his
review of a collection of papers based on a colloquium in Paris in
1978.

> La géographie a bien pour objet l'étude de la différenciation
> des espaces – mais entendons-nous bien:  il ne s'agit pas de
> n'importe quels espaces, mais de ceux que les sociétés humaines
> construisent pour vivre et survivre, à partir de la matière
> première des espaces écologiques ... c'est l'analyse de
> l'espace organisé par une société qui met en évidence les
> problèmes relatifs à cette organisation ... l'espace n'est
> pas en lui-même doté d'un pouvoir organisateur.  Il nous faut
> remarquer que la projection au sol des mécanismes sociaux et
> politiques dépend de la perception que les hommes ont des
> différents attributs de l'espace:  ces attributs constituent
> autant d'inputs filtrés par les structures mentales d'une
> société pour entrer dans l'édifaction de l'espace
> géographique. [34]

A recent exception to this, in socio-political terms is Abu Lughod's
study of Cairo.[35]  Most recently, however, Abu Lughod has analysed the
development of Rabat from 1900 as a function of ideology and urban
planning.[36]  Whilst forming the basis of a rigorous analysis of the
city during colonialism, only a limited attempt is made to carry this
theme through to the post independence period.  An opportunity to
contribute more fully to the understanding of the Third World city is
therefore incomplete.

This thesis attempts, in part, to rectify this.  The influence of pre-
colonial, colonial and independent ideology and physical planning will

be analysed with respect to Qacentina, a city previously unstudied in

any depth over a wide chronological perspective.   This in turn is hoped

to contribute to the need for,

> a more sophisticated and penetrating ... analysis of the
> city in the past, recognising the subtle differences of
> urban societies and morphologies in different ... periods.
> Only when the principles which governed traditional urban
> spatial organisation are clearly understood can we
> determine whether they have any applicability for solution[37]
> of present day problems of urban planning.

The selection of Qacentina from within a variety of alternative

Algerian cities as a case study to test the hypothesis stated in Chapter

1 may be justified on several grounds.

It is clear that the dramatic physical setting of the city, with its

natural propensity for defense, has attracted human settlement since

earliest times and that its history of occupancy is one of continuity,

under a succession of rulers.   This contrasts for example with Wahran;

in Western Algeria, which seldom exceeded more than 10,000 inhabitants

before the French occupation and controlled a very restricted hinter-

land.   Secondly, Qacentina   under Arab occupation maintained an

important position as a 'holy place' of Islamic religion.   Again this

contrasts with Wahran, where Catholics and Jews consistently and

greatly outnumbered Muslims from 1509 until 1962, and where the original

Berber, and subsequently Arab, settlement was insignificant.[38]   Qacentina

therefore represents a major focus of Arab civilisation and Moslem

adherence and is thus particularly appropriate as a case study of

ideological influences during the Arab period.   Thirdly, as an inland

city, Qacentina belongs to the Maghreb, not merely to the Mediterranean.

Its location on the Hautes Plaines of Eastern Algeria made Qacentina

not just a natural focus for the regional economy of the relatively

humid and productive Tell, but also a natural trading centre on routes
extending from the Sahara, via the Aurés mountains, to the coast,
followed by pastoral nomads and traders. This strategic location made
for Qacentina's importance as a centre of traditional attitudes and
practices, comparable with Tilimsen, rather than the coastal centres of
Algiers, Wahran and Annaba.

This strategic importance was recognised by the French during the
colonial period. Not only was Qacentina  within easy reach of the
coast at Skikda (ex-Phillipeville), but also controlled the fertile
Hautes Plaines, and via the Rouffi and El Kantara gorges, access to
the Saharan domain. For both military and economic reasons, Qacentina
was thus a major centre of French settlement. It is therefore an
excellent example of dualism, between a traditional Arab nucleus and a
colonial adjunct; a fourth reason for selecting Qacentina as a case
study to test the hypothesis.

Fifthly, with regard to the post-independence period, it must be
recalled that Eastern Algeria bore the brunt of the war of independence,
with early insurrections in Stif and the Aurés mountains, and constant
warfare on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier. Qacentina  was thus a
major focus for both spontaneous and enforced regroupment of population
from the war zone. To this extent, Qacentina  experienced at an early
stage the process of resettlement of rural population, a process which
continued unabated throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Qacentina has thus
a greater proportion of 'spontaneous' settlement than any other
Algerian city and therefore the problems confronting the post-
independence planning structure were posed in their most acute forms.

Finally, unlike most of the coastal agglomerations, Wahran, Arzew,

Algiers, Skikda and Annaba, Qacentina has not received massive industrial and infrastructural investment related to heavy industry, hydrocarbons or port installations. The fundamental dualism of the city has thus been reinforced in the post-independence period by the accretion of spontaneous indigenous growth at a rate incapable of absorption into the real economy of the city, posing planning problems of an exaggerated order.

For all the above reasons, Qacentina offers itself in historical terms as a valid example of development during the Arab and Colonial periods, and at the same time indicative of the intransigent problems of post-independence planning and of the necessity to question the appropriateness of planning structures and practice adopted since 1962.

In addition to the above primary reasons for selecting Qacentina for study, certain ancillary reasons also conditioned the choice. In the course of 1979, links were established between the Glasgow Geography Department and the University of Qacentina, involving exchanges of staff and postgraduates. For reasons outside the author's control, these links proved only partially fruitful. Secondly, Qacentina appeared a sound choice for study as little previous work had been attempted on the city especially in the post colonial period. The present thrust of geographical research at the University of Qacentina is on the rural sector, and in particular the impact of agrarian reform post 1962 in the Constantinois. Finally, the present thesis forms part of a group of theses, either recently completed or currently being undertaken on this region, and in this sense is part of a larger corpus of research.

Alternative locations for study were considered but rejected. Algiers

was considered too large and already much researched.[39]  Wahran is
in no sense a dual city; it was essentially a European city (Spanish
then French), with only brief Turkish inter-regna 1708-1732, 1791-
1832.[40]  Annaba has been studied in great depth by Tomas.[41]
Research is also being undertaken on Skikda[42]; moreover both Skikda
and Annaba have been distorted by post independence port and

industrial developments.  Tilimsen has been exhaustively studied
elsewhere[43], whilst many smaller agglomerations, such as Sidi-Bel-
Abbes[44], are currently being investigated by Algerian geographers.
Qacentina thus emerged as a rational choice, both in terms of the
paucity of past research, and as a case study to explore the hypo-
thesis now expounded in Chapter One.

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ROUX-DUFORT.

## CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION:  STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN.

This thesis will attempt to investigate the proposition that physical
planning is an agent and catalyst of ideology _vis à vis_ the urban space.
This statement contains two assumptions.  First, that ideology can be
reflected, manifested and indeed articulated in the urban environment.
Second, that physical planning is the essential mechanism of this.

This is not to make the false assumption that the city is uniquely an
external sign of a system of beliefs, social ethics or institutions.
Undoubtedly, other factors - physical, economic and a multiplicity of
individual choices not known, influence the city form.  However, the
thesis proposes that ideology will be reflected in the urban environment,
and, where it is, physical planning can be recognised as the agent.

Before proceeding to the main body of the research, it is necessary to
elaborate the rationale of this hypothesis.

1.1.  IDEOLOGY.

Ideas do not have an independent existence:  they are held by people who
are responsible for them, both individually, and in groups. It is people
who develop ideas, and not vice versa.  The word 'ideology' (_idéologie_)
was invented by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy at the beginning
of the nineteenth century to denote the science of ideas which would
reveal to man the source of their biases and prejudices.  Subsequently,
ideology has been understood as a system of ideas or a set of closely
related beliefs, ideas, or attitudes which are characteristic to a
particular group, class or entire community (Plamenatz 1970; Bullock and
Stallybrass 1977).

More precisely, Geertz (1964) frames ideology, albeit neutrally, as a schematic image of social order. However, ideologies do not serve only to maintain social relations, or, conversely, subvert them, they also promote particular group interests (Plamenatz 1970). As Harris (1968) elaborates, whenever interests of a group are rigourously pursued, an ideology tends to be developed to give meaning, reinforcement and justification to those interests. Marx and Engels have argued, for example, that,

> for each new class which puts itself in the place of the
> one before, it is compelled, merely in order to carry
> through its aim, to represent its interest as the common
> interest of all members of society, that is expressed in
> ideal form (Marx and Engels 1970, p. 65).

This indicates the difference between ideology and philosophy in terms of their respective existence in society. Philosophy represents the pursuit of wisdom or knowledge, especially that which concerns ultimate reality, by a group or individual. From this, a system of principles for the conduct of life can be determined. Consequently, the philosophy of a society is reliant on, and derived from, reasoning. By contrast,

> ideology is not the product of thought; it is the habit or
> the ritual of showing respect certain formulas to which, for
> various reasons having to do with emotional safety, we have
> very strong ties of whose meaning and consequences in
> actuality we have no clear understanding (Trilling 1950,
> p. 286).

Indeed, for this reason, Marx often referred to ideology as, 'false consciousness'. By this, he meant a set of mistaken beliefs about matters important to, and shared by, a whole group of individuals or a community whose situation or role in society are the same. In effect, a totally distorted mind falsifies everything that comes within its range (Mannheim 1936); as such, false consciousness is both pervasive and

and persistent, and has extensive social consequences. Importantly, these beliefs are accepted regardless of their truth because they serve to justify, and to some extent, create and maintain groups rather than simply sustain them in the pursuit of the group interest. Implicitly therefore, ideologies can futher be seen as justifications which mask specific group interests (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977).

Mannheim (1936) himself identifies ideologies as different styles of thought, distinguishing between a 'total' and 'particular' concept of ideology. The former, more inclusive <u>Weltanschauungen</u>, or world view, represents a complete commitment to a way of life, an "ideology of an age or of a concrete historical social group ... when we are concerned with the characteristics and comparison of the total structure of minds of this epoch or group" (Mannheim 1936, p. 49-50). By contrast, the particular concept of ideology refers to a state of mind, attitude or idea which conflict with reality, but nevertheless are directed at stabilizing the present, or restoring the past. In effect, these ideas or beliefs are conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the recognition of which would not accord with the interests of their specific group.

Ideologies, Shils (1968) contends, ultimately aim to disrupt the value systems by conflict with, or denial of, claims, by withdrawal from them so that a purer ideal, or value, can be cultivated in isolation from the contaminated society. Implicit, therefore, in the meaning of ideology is the concept of change. Every ideology arises in the midst of an evolving culture, and since society only exists as a continuing process of existence, so do ideologies (Galois 1977). Ideologies consequently compel

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their proponents to insist on their realisation through, "a total transformation of society" (Shils 1968, p. 67). As a result, Mannheim (1936) has identified ideologies as essentially dynamic because their judgements are always measured by a reality which is in constant flux.

Two points of clarification should be made. An ideology is not a prevailing outlook. By contrast with the constituent and overlapping beliefs of a prevailing outlook, an ideology characteristically contends more strenuously for a purer, fuller idealisation of the particular perceived and moral values that exist in the society in which the ideology obtains currency (Harris 1968). Moreover, ideology is not equitable with bias, as the latter implies that it is possible to eradicate and achieve an unbiased perspective. This is contrary to the concept of ideology existing in a social historic context (Galois 1977).

## 1.2. IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN SPACE.

Geertz (1964) and Johnson (1968) both argue that, primarily, ideology is a symbol system. In addition, Rapoport (1977, p. 319) contends that "the environment can be understood as a communicative and symbol system giving concrete expression to concepts of values." This initial but perhaps tenuous link between ideology and the urban space is strengthened by Castells (1973, p. 273, 277) who, following on from his initial proposition that, "espace est chargé de sens" later contends that, "il y a une symbolique urbaine à partir de l'utilisation des formes spatiales comme émetteurs, relais et récepteurs des pratiques idéologies générales." Harvey (1973) goes further in his analysis of the philosophy of social space by stressing the symbolic importance of the city in satisfying the culture, existing order, aspirations, needs, and fears of

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society.  Furthermore, Harvey emphasises that in order to evaluate the

spatial form on the city, it is necessary to understand its creative

meaning, as well as its mere physical dimension.  Moreover, Goodman (1972)

goes so far as to warn that interpretation of the urban environment is

often totally obscured in the metaphorical language of the ideology of

aesthetics, and precludes any wider consideration of the ideologies of

culture, or politics.

The historical evidence uniting ideology and the urban space is quite clear.

The very fact that cities, Greek, Roman, Chinese, Islamic and others, can

be discussed as ideals and symbols suggest that they possess this special

quality (Lang 1952; Choay 1965).  Nazi Germany in the past and currently

communist countries today refer to cities as 'monumental propoganda'

(Goodman 1972; Rapoport 1977).  However, this is not to suggest that the

relationship between ideology and the urban environment is inherently

static.  Castells (1973) asserts, for example, that the ideological

component, and consequently the series of historical reality, is present

in all elements of urban structure.  This continuing, and parallel,

evolution of urban space and ideology is fundamental to the observation

by Lefebvre (1974, p. 187) that, "l'espace a été façonné, modélé à partir

d'éléments historiques ou naturels, mais politiquement.  L'espace est

politique et idéologique.  C'est un représentation littéralement peuplée

d'idéologie".

It is important, at this stage in the discussion, to recognise that the

concern of this thesis is not with design determinism:  that is, that

the urban environment has a determinant effect on the way people behave.

Rather, the aim is to analyse the form of the city in a cognitive sense.

However, the proposition that ideology is articulated in the urban

environment does not necessarily preclude a determinant aspect within

the overall analysis, if it is appropriate.

## 1.3. PHYSICAL PLANNING AND IDEOLOGY.

The term 'planning' can be subdivided into the concepts of 'generic' planning and 'physical' planning (Hall 1974; Rose 1974). The former is essentially an intellectual activity involving, for example, the projection and evaluation of future courses of action. By contrast, physical planning has a primary concern with, "the design, growth and management of the physical environment in accordance with predetermined and agreed policies" (Franklin 1979, p. 15).

Three contributions of physical planning within a territory can be identified. First, it should be organisational (in the institutional, bureaucratic sense). Second, it should provide a planned spatial frame-work for development of the physical environment. Third, and fundament-ally, it should provide the necessary legislation for the control, planning, and implementation of the physical development process (Dror 1963; Faludi 1973b; Franklin 1979).

It has been noted above that intrinsic to the concept of ideology is the concept of change, and consequently, the future. Similarly, "planning activity of any kind is concerned with change" (Crook 1974, p. 55) and the future (Rose 1974) or future states (Chadwick 1971). This change can be differentiated between objectives, that which is being changed, and goals, that in the name of which change is being made (Faludi 1973b). These objectives are formed from goals, which in turn are derived from values, that is, something prized as being of great worth or desirability (Chadwick 1971): in short, ideology. It can therefore be inferred that although directed at the environment, physical planning is also limited by the prevelant values and ideologies of that environment (Dror 1973). However, although constrained by

ideology, physical planning, being future directed, is simultaneously
orientated towards the achievement of values or ideologies.

This is not, however, to imply that physical planning is, in essence,
an ideologically neutral entity.  Rather, physical planning is impreg-
nated with ideology - and it is here that the Marxian interpretation of
ideology, false consciousness, introduces an important relationship
with planning.  False consciousness, according to Mannheim (1936,
p. 62), is "the awareness that our total outlook, as distinguished from
its details, may be distorted."  The Marxian position on false
consciousness is that this 'total outlook' is an essential component of
the ruling thought and action.  In terms of physical planning, this
'total outlook' is an integral part of bureaucratisation and authority,
as it reflects the mode of thought and action of bureaucrats and
technicians.  As such, Gillingwater (1975) argues that it complements
the Marxian notion of ideology, but is much more powerful.  Planning
serves the ruling interests, and, fundamentally, its underlying values
are the values of the ruling classes.  Planners then, in the sense that
they too have, and pursue,ruling interests, tend to identify with the
ruling class or ideology.  Consequently, planning values are "not
inspired by planning ideology or by a priori determinent of the public
interest, but by political processes" (Gans 1972, p. 88).  Moreover,
they are, "la réalisation d'intérêts specifiques, économiques,
politiques, idéologiques d'une classe, ou faction du bloc social
dominant dans la conjoncture historique" (Castells 1975, p. 13).

Therefore, planning can be described "in terms of the image which
bureaucracies qua bureaucrats have of society and the manner in which
they cope with, perceive and interpret social change.  In other words

with ... ideology" (Gillingwater 1975, p. 70).  Clearly this indicates

a close relationship between ideology and the bureaucratic and institu-

tional function inherent in physical planning.  However, a further major

contribution of physical planning within a territory, legislation, is

also intimately imbued with ideology.  This is illustrated by Lloyd's

(1976, p. 129) succinct observation that "Law ... one of man's main

artefacts, is inevitably deeply embedded in the ideology of the society

in which it operates".  Overall, therefore, it may be argued that

physical planning is simultaneously directed towards, constrained, and,

indeed, inherently influenced by, ideology.


1.4.  PHYSICAL PLANNING AS AN AGENT.

It is perhaps implicit in the above discussion that physical planning

goes beyond the mere explanation of spatial phenomena, thereby

distinguishing it from geography.  Whilst the latter concerns itself

with analysis, physical planning is concerned with synthesis, that is

manipulating things, and not only understanding them (Minnet, cited in

Faludi 1973b).  As Chadwick (1971) contends, whilst involving the

arrangement of spatial patterns over time, it is not these spatial

patterns that are planning.  They are objects of a process, a process

that can, moreover, be seen independently of them.  In effect, this

recognises physical planning as a human activity based on human

attributes:  consequently any analysis of physical planning must be also

concerned with the nature of these attributes and activities themselves,

rather than the mere content, and physical objects, of plans.

The role of physical planning as a mechanism and agent is also implicit

in its concern with change.  This relationship is a specific component

of Friedmann's (1973, p. 346) definition of planning as the "guidance of

change in a social system", and the similar proposition by Healey (1974)

that physical planning is particularly appropriate for inducing change,

and guiding it.  In addition, Crook (1974) extends the concern of

physical planning to involve both the guidance, and control, of systematic

change.  Other theorists have defined physical planning in similar terms.

According to their definition 'planning' is:  "the laying out of a

course of action that we can follow that will take us to our desired

goals" (Churchmann 1968, p. 7); or, "a process of human forethought and

action based upon that thought" (Chadwick 1971, p. 24).


The term 'agent', however, is not uniquely concerned with bringing

forward for consideration or inspection an effect, or change.  It is

concerned also with the exertion of power, or the means to motivate, or

manipulate, this change.

The provision of legislation undoubtedly assists this.  Further evidence

may, however, be drawn from the organisational role of physical planning.

Berger and Luckman (1971), for example, contend that a particular construct

of reality is formed by the manner in which ideas and knowledge are

perceived, and translated, into the domestic affairs of the state by

individuals.  However, this construct of reality will, necessarily, be

distorted if the earlier proposition, that the perception of the planner

as bureaucrat is concurrent with the ruling ideology, is accepted.  In

terms of this perception and translation, ideological foundations are

laid when this internalisation process is part of, and becomes embedded

in, the power structure of society.  Consequently, as physical planning

is essentially a function of government and can only operate effectively

as part of the machinery of government (Franklin 1979), it can be

reasoned that it too is part of, and embedded in, the formal power

structure of society.

## 1.5.  IDEOLOGY, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND THE URBAN SPACE.

Identified in the above discussion are three essential and interelated

concepts:  ideology, the urban space and physical planning.  From their

analysis, the following schema can be proposed.  Each society has an

ideological component.  Physical planning does not determine this, but

rather, assists society to work towards it.  Subsequently, ideology is

articulated in the urban space.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that this model is essentially

static.  As the preceding discussion emphasised, each of these three

facets are intimately concerned with both change and evolution.

Consequently, this model can be extended into the following matrix

where ideology is represented by 'I', physical planning by 'P', and the

urban space by 'U', through a series of time  denoted by the subscript

figures $_{1 \ldots n}$.  Thus:-

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
I_1 \rightarrow & P_1 \rightarrow & U_1 \\
\downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \\
I_2 \rightarrow & P_2 \rightarrow & U_2 \\
\downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \\
I_n \rightarrow & P_n \rightarrow & U_n
\end{array}
$$

Equally, this proposition is reversible.  The form of urban space at

any point in time is indicative of the planning system, which, in turn,

reflects the ruling ideology.  As a result, this matrix can be reversed,

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but with the horizontal arrows representing an indicative as opposed to deterministic relationship:-

$$U_1 \rightarrow P_1 \rightarrow I_1$$
$$\downarrow \qquad \downarrow \qquad \downarrow$$
$$U_2 \rightarrow P_2 \rightarrow I_2$$
$$\downarrow \qquad \downarrow \qquad \downarrow$$
$$U_n \rightarrow P_n \rightarrow I_n$$

In both matrices it should be noted in relation to 'U' that the development of the urban environment is generally cumulative - hence the equation, $U_1$, $U_{1+2}$, $U_{1+2+...n}$, might be more accurate. This is not, however, applicable to ideology, which intends the description of value systems, and as such, is primarily successive and not cumulative.


1.6. THE AREA OF STUDY.

A recurring, although often implicit, theme in the conclusion by Blake and Lawless (1980) on the changing Middle Eastern city is the lack of understanding of the ideological context of urban development. Indeed, a review by Sibley (1981) criticises this as an important omission in this book, and in other general research in this region. Consequently, this helps to identify a geographical area in which the propositions outlined above can be applied, whilst, in addition, contributing to filling this research void.

To assist the verification or falsification of the hypothesis, a comparative analysis between national ideologies, physical planning systems and urban form would near the ideal. However, within the financial, linguistic and time limits imposed, a detailed study of one country, and even one city, was considered more realistic, to avoid the danger of superficiality.

Algeria, (Figure 1.1), was focused on as a nation relatively ignored by

FIGURE 1.1  Algeria 1981: Regional Centres and Administrative Division.

Anglo American literature (Lawless 1980b), and almost totally so in the field of physical planning, with the exception of Brebner (1981 ; 1982). But further, as Bernard (1929, p. 92) notes, "l'histoire de l'Algérie n'est que l'histoire des dominations successives qu'elle a subies". The range of ideology within the country has been both extensive and dramatic (Table 1.1). The last 150 years have, for example, witnessed an ideological transition between: Islamic pre-colonial Algeria; French colonialism following the 1830 occupation; and a decolonising, socialist Third World Nation since the accession to Independence in 1962.

Table 1.1.   Major Ideological Influences on Algeria 860 BC to AD 1962

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 860 | – | 146 BC | Carthaginian |
| 145 | – | 439 AD | Roman |
| 439 | – | 538 | Vandal |
| 538 | – | 650 | Byzantine |
| 650 | – | 1515 | Arab |
| 1515 | – | 1830 | Turkish |
| 1830 | – | 1962 | French |

Source:  Laffont (1980, p. 26).

There are indications, moreover, that this ideological evolution has affected urban form. Sanson (1974, p. 140), for example, has described Algerian urban history as one characterised by "une succession de villes déchues", whilst Franchet (1974, p. 46) argues that, consequently, "la ville algérienne n'existe pas". This strongly suggests the existence of a relationship between ideology and the urban space – and a relation-ship to date ignored by urban research on Algeria. This is stressed by Weexsteen (1977, p. 15) in noting that, in Algeria, "un des meilleurs critères dans l'explication de l'organisation de l'espace, l'approche généalogie,* est systematiquement négligé".

A problem is posed in determining the historical period within which the hypothesis of this thesis should be tested. However, Salacuse (1975) notes that by the close of the sixteenth century, the Regency of Algeria under the Ottoman Turks had attained frontiers that it would keep until

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* Or, chronological analysis.

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the French conquest in 1830. Subsequent analysis to the present day
would, therefore, allow both consistency, and continuity.

This, in turn, enables the selection of a city for analysis. The Regency
was divided into four provinces: Algiers (Dār al-Sultan) under the direct
authority of the Dey, essentially an autocrat, and under the authority
of a Bey, three Beyliks (provinces): the east, capital (now) Qacentina
(ex-Constantine)[1]; the centre, Tītāri; and the west, capital Wahran
(ex-Oran). However, on the eve of French colonisation, the largest
cities were Algiers, Qacentina and Tlemcen (now Tilimsen) with populat-
ions of 30,000 (Le Coz 1972), 25,000 (Nouschi 1955) and 10-12,000
(Lawless 1980a) respectively. To select one of these three for study by
virtue of their size was considered appropriate. Further limitations,
though, were imposed by the exhaustive work by Lawless and Blake (1976)
on Tilimsen, and the present-day population of Algiers of almost
1.3 million, making it less manageable for study[*]. By comparison,
Qacentina, with a 1978 population of approximately 340,000 has been the
subject of little recent published research, with the exception of Loew
(1979) and Meskaldji (1979).

Moreover, a brief assessment of Qacentina within the perspective of
Algerian history indicates a certain prudence in the choice of this city
for study. Resisting conquest by the French until 1837, the predominance
of Islamic ideology in Qacentina at the time was such that,

> cette forte culture islamique ... ont mal supporté la
> conquête; celle-ci qui a fait prodigieusement progresser
> les villes littorales, a marqué Constantine d'une retard
> incontestable par rapport à celles-ci. Sans doubte, cela
> donne Constantine son originalité parmi les autres villes
> algeriénnes (Nouschi 1955. p. 387).

---

1. Décret 27-81, published on 7 March 1981, altered all the names of
towns and villages in Algeria to transliterations of their Arabic
equivalent.
* See also the recent studies of Algiers by Benatia (1978) and (1981).

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It was perhaps for this reason that the impact of the French occupation on the city was particularly severe. From 1848, Constantine was the centre of one of three departments — yet, by comparison with the other two departmental centres, Oran and Algiers, its European population at no time exceeded its Muslim population. This contrast in population composition is well exemplified by Table 1.2, for 1931. It might be assumed, therefore, that the successful dominance and control of the city by a minority population at this time implies the efficient imposition of ideology in the settlement by that minority (the colons). Indeed, in 1934, Constantine was the scene of a pogrom between 2 and 6 August, in which 23 Jews and three Muslims were killed, and 81 others were injured. This was blamed by the left-wing press on the French Colonial Administration, military activity, facist propoganda and

Table 1.2. The Population Composition of the Three Departmental Capitals in French Colonial Algeria, 1931.

|  | Europeans and Jews | Per cent | Muslims | Per cent | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algiers | 223,656 | 66.4 | 112,926 | 33.5 | 366,582 |
| Oran | 135,799 | 78.7 | 36,667 | 21.2 | 172,466 |
| Constantine | 51,142 | 48.7 | 53,760 | 51.2 | 104,902 |

Source: Ganiage (1972, p. 2).

imperialist influence in the town (Ageron 1979) — in effect, identifying the then-present components of the ideology of French colonialism in Algeria. In addition, Ageron (1979) has noted the powerful right-wing influence in the city, above all manifested in the Croix de Feu facist movement. Certainly, it was a reaction against the very force of this ideology which provoked the first anti-French agitation in Algeria following the Second World War, when, on 24 April 1945, the Préfet of Constantine reported the occurence of acts of sabotage, attacks on

property, and riots in the streets of the city (Abun Nasr 1971): a
prelude to the massacre at Stif in May 1945 and, ultimately, to the War
of Independence. The transition to post-Independence ideology has had
an equally significant effect on the city. Economic and administrative decent-
ralisation has led to a 92 per cent reduction of area between 1955 and 1974
in the administrative boundaries and jurisdiction of Qacentina. Moreover,
the regional role of the city is now being challenged by settlements
formerly regionally subservient to it. In addition, it is currently
experiencing the problems inherent to rapid urbanisation of the Third
World City.

1.7. THE RESEARCH DESIGN[2].

The framework for analysis has been effectively predetermined by the
matrix proposed under 1.5 above. For each of the three historical
periods to be studied (pre-colonial Islamic, French colonial, and post-
colonial) it is necessary to divide the presentation into ideology, the
component physical planning process, and, using Qacentina as a model,
the urban space. Subsequently an analysis of this evidence is required
with the aim to support or reject the main hypothesis. The implications
of this, whatever the outcome, needs to then be assessed.

Discussion of the three ideologies was primarily based on a literature
review. Whilst an analysis of the ideologies of Islam and decolonisation
can be formulated from predominately English language texts, or
translations, for the French colonial era and Independent Algeria
per se, the vast proportion of the literature is in French. The review
of this necessitated documentation visits to France to the Centre de

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2. A useful introductory text on undertaking research in Algeria is to
be found in Zartman (1970).

Recherches et d'Etudes sur les Sociétés Méditerranéenes (CRESM) at Aix-en-Provence, and the Centre Interuniversitaires d'Etudes Méditerranéenes at Poitiers.

These centres also contained some basic literature on Islamic urban planning, and the legal texts pertinent to physical planning in Algeria during the French occupation which, for example, were initially published in the Moniteur Universel, and subsequently in the Journal Officiel de l'Algérie. Visits to Algeria were necessary to obtain the relevant physical planning legal texts in effect since 1962, and contained within the Journal Officiel de la Republique Algérienne, and various official and unofficial (unpublished; and often restricted) circulars and advice notes. These were obtained from the Imprimerie Officielle in Alger, and coaxed from the Caisse Algérienne d'Aménagement du Territoire (CADAT) at Alger and Qacentina. The latter organisation, in conjunction with the Bureau d'Urbanisme, also held the majority of planning documents specific to Qacentina.

However, an analysis of legal texts and physical plans inevitably leads to a partial and essentially theoretical understanding of the planning process. To facilitate a more complete comprehension of the operational and organisational aspects of physical planning, extensive discussions, both formal, and informal, were held with officials of: the CADAT; the local level Assemblée Populaire Communale (APC) and regional level Assemblée Populaire de la Wilaya (APW) at Qacentina; the Ministère de l'Urbanisme, de la Construction, et de l'Habitat; and academics at the Centre National d'Etudes et de Recherche pour l'Aménagement du Territoire, both in Algiers. In addition, fruitful discussions were also held with the CADAT at Wahran.

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An investigation of the pre-colonial and colonial urban form of Qacentina was primarily founded on material obtained from the Archives de la Wilaya at Qacentina, but also from the French Archives Nationales located at Aix-en-Provence. The post-Independence urban form of the city was partially derived from studies compiled by the CADAT. However, individual field study was an integral, and equally important, component to the analysis as documentation, and cartographic material, was often unobtainable or incomplete.

An essentially qualitative analysis and synthesis follows the presentation of these data. This will attempt to identify any positive or negative relationship between ideology, physical planning and the urban space during and between each of these three periods. Finally, the implications of the results will be assessed. In effect, this will represent a crystalisation of much thought provoked by the extensive reading and discussions with officials, academics, students and the general public of Algeria during the preparation of this thesis.

2. ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY

2.1. INTRODUCTION.

By the eve of the Ottoman conquest in 1515, the Maghreb had submitted to the domination of an imported Islamic civilisation, which instead of remaining outside the country, became an integrated part of the region (le Tourneau 1970). Although little is known about Algeria under the Turks (Colombe 1978), Guill... notes that, generally, under the empire of the Ottoman Turks, the Arab world stagnated for nearly 300 years. Accordingly Bousquet (1954, p. 63) concludes that "le bilan de l'influence Turc en Algérie est cité croant: quelques mots dans la langue, le coustumes des vieux croyants, peut-être quelque plats".

Therefore, as Etienne (1977) notes, the French in 1830 found a country which retained a secular reference in Islam. Fortunately, Islamic ideology comprises several fundamental and timeless themes; consequently, the void in the literature during this period does not entirely preclude the identification of the main lines of the inherent ideology.

2.2. ISLAM AS AN IDEOLOGY.

The basis of all Islamic ideology is the shari'a, the concrete embodiment of the Divine Will according to which man should live in both his private and social life (Nasr 1972). Rather than revealed as a complete code, the shari'a has been systematically derived from four principal roots (usul) of law: the Qur'an, the Sunna or perhaps the Hadith, the ijma', and various minor sources.

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The first of these, the Qur'an (God's word revealed to the prophet Mohammed) represents the pivot of Islamic ideology, containing the full range of principles and precepts by which the believer should order his life (Maulana 1936; Guillaume 1978; Fakhm 1970). In essence, therefore, all the sharī'a is contained in the Qur'an (Nasr 1972; Coulson 1978). The principles of the law in the Qur'an are explained and amplified in the hadīth (precedents of the Prophet), which together constitute the second basic source of the sharī'a. The literature of the hadīth is extensive, there being several collections, the most important of which are known as sihah sitta - the six Reliable Works. Among these, the bukhārī by Muhammed Ismāīl al-Bukhārī undoubtedly holds first place (Maulana n.d.; Coulson 1978), and, in conjunction with the Muwatta' by Malik Ibn Anas (see below), is the most closely followed in Algeria (Bousquet 1950). Although complementary to the Qur'an, these hadīth cannot abrogate it as its function is to interpret, and not to contradict the Qur'an.

In turn, both the hadīth and the Qur'an are understood with the aid of the concensus of the Islamic community (ijmā'), although only where the Qur'an or hadīth does not clarify a certain aspect of law. Finally, these sharī'a were complemented by analogical human reasoning (qiyās) where necessary. Amongst the minor of the law is the essentially Mālikī principle of istislāh or 'consideration of the public interest' which is a criterion for the elaboration of legal rules (Coulson 1978), although its key thought may be referred in the Qur'an itself (Qadri 1963).

These processes resulted in the creation of four distinct schools of interpretation of the sharī'a: the Hanafi; Mālikī; ash-Shāfi'ī; and Hanbali. Each of these schools tends to predominate in a particular

region of the Muslim world. The one which existed in the Maghreb and Algeria before 1515 was the Mālikī school, named after Mālik Ibn Anas (d. 796), a Medinan scholar, whose doctrine after his disciple Ibn al Qasi was fully exposed in the Mudawwana by Saḥnūn. With the arrival of the Turks in the sixteenth century, the Hanafi school to which the Ottoman authorities adhered was introduced to Algeria, with the result that both the Hanafi and Mālikī courts existed in the Regency on the eve of the French conquest (Salacuse 1975). However, the vast majority of the population remained adherents to the Mālikī school (Bousquet 1950).

Through the sharī'a, Islam upholds the primary value of religion. In all religion, Man sees himself as a subject to higher beings, expresses his sense that he has still to adapt his environment to his needs, and, moreover, that he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control (Plamenatz 1970). Religion also satisfies a need: Karl Marx for example, argues that "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of soulless creatures. It is the opium of the people" (Fischer 1973, p. 20). In total, "religion is a form of false consciousness, it is ideology" (Plamenatz 1970, p. 89). Consequently, Islamic society in its very essence has been argued by Rodinson (1974, p. 46) as an ideological society by virtue that "it openly proclaimed that its raison d'être was to serve god, to prepare the paths of god, and to obey god's orders".

Both Ansari (n.d., Vol. 1) and Ismail (1972) have gone further in identifying religion as the integrating force of Islamic ideology, politics, economics, law and other functions of society and government, uniting them "into an encompassing religious world view" (Nasr 1972, p. 95). As a belief system acting as the motive force of the entire community and reflecting a complete commitment to a way of life, Islam

can thus be equated with the <u>Weltanschauung</u> or 'total' concept of
ideology.

However, the role of religion, although fundamental, is not determinant
and all-pervasive:  the term 'islamic' must be understood in a broader
sense to include further the culture and civilisation resulting from
Muslim society (Brown 1973).  For example, by contrast with Qur'anic
ideology <u>per se</u>, post-Qur'anic ideology, of which the <u>shari'a</u> is
representative, is neither expressed in a closed body of doctrine with
well-defined limits, nor as an external force moulding society.  Rather
it represents an expression of tendencies emanating from social life as
a whole.  However, Rodinson notes that,

> this does not ... rule out in Muslim society ... a certain
> 'distancing' between ideology and the society that it is
> contemporary with.  The ideology is transmitted by
> tradition, a condensation of the social life of preceding
> ages.  It does appear ... in the more or less deceptive
> aspect of an external force ... .  Interpretation,
> unconsciously inspired by contemporary life reduces the 'distanc-
> ing' without doing away with it altogether (Rodinson 1974, p.102)

Accepting (rightly) that the Qur'an and <u>hadīth</u> are, through the <u>ijmā'</u>
and <u>qiyās</u>, open to exegesis and interpretation by subsequent society
implies that a particular  passage will be invoked in preference to
another, thus enabling interested parties potentially to introduce bias
and increase the options open to them.  Islam can therefore be
classified as a form of 'particular' ideology.  And indeed, this is
implicit in the argument by Raymond that,

> The concentration of political power exclusively in the
> hands of a foreign ruling class, and the often brutal
> exploitation of the population would to a certain extent
> justify the description of the Turkish regime in Algeria
> as 'colonial' if there had not existed between governors
> and the governed strong links such as the possession of
> a common religion, culture and social structure which
> cover these antagonisms.  (Raymond 1970, p. 284).

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Consequently, Islam can be seen as an ideology in the widest sense of the term. The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to identify the main elements of this ideology which was integral to pre-1832 Algerian society under the Turks.

## 2.3 THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY.

The Qur'an (9:97)[1] specifies that "the desert Arabs surpass the town dwellers in unbelief and hypocrisy", to the effect that Islam "aurait instauré une idéologie en opposition flagrante avec le nomadisme" (Chelhod 1965, p. 14). Subsequently, Islam became an ideology "essentiallement citadine" (Marçais 1928, p. 89), the city representing the medium by which the Muslim could completely fulfil his social duties as contained elsewhere in the Qur'an and sharī'a (de Planhol 1955; Gardet 1961; von Grunebaum 1961).

The main lines of this ideology are founded on the concept of 'obligation' or 'duty', which has been usefully categorised by Ansari (n.d., Vol. 2) as the duty to self as a spiritual, rational, physical, moral and aesthetic being; duties to other individuals; and duties relating to the societal whole. Each of these will be elaborated below.

### The duty to self.

As a spiritual being, the duty to self requires the maintenance of a constant attitude of respect and love towards God. Involved, therefore, is the cultivation of obedience, sincere devotion, gratefulness, dependence and trust in God, seeking in all actions His pleasure (Ansari n.d., Vol. 2). The prerequisite of this is the remembrance of

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1. The extracts from the Qur'an which are quoted in this thesis are taken from the translation by Dawood (1980).

God by the establishment of regular prayer.  The Qur'an (20:14) in this respect states:  "I am Allah.  There is no god but Me.  Serve Me and recite your prayers in My remembrance"; and, moreover, "attend regularly in your prayers so long as you are safe:  for prayer is a duty incumbent on the faithful to be performed at appointed times" (4:103).  Although the obligatory communal prayer was permitted in the open, it was later determined by the sharī'a that communal prayer at Friday noon must be held in a fixed settlement with a permanent population of whom at least 80 legally responsible men are present (von Grunebaum 1961).  Whilst this affirmed the importance of the city to Islam, it also established the spiritual centre, the jāmi' (mosque) as an associated and no less intrinsic ideological component of Islam.

In addition, the development of the jāmi', in line with the prescriptions of hadīth, as both a court of justice and intellectual centre (Maulana n.d.) compounded its importance, for, as a rational being, the pursuit of knowledge, inseparable from Islamic ideology (Ismail 1970), is required by the individual.  One hadīth, for example, states "the learned ones are the heirs of the prophet - they leave knowledge as their inheritance:  he who inherits it inherits a great future" (al-bukhārī, 3:10, in: Maulana n.d., p. 38 - 39).

The duty to self as a physical being requires the taking of food, drink and sleep as required to maintain good health (Qur'an 2:168; 7:31). Particularly, physical purification is commanded of the Muslim by the Qur'an (5:6) and in the hadīth collections (synthesised in Maulana n.d., p. 48 - 67).  Consequently, the public bath (hammān), previously an urban element of Roman and Byzantine periods, was adopted by the Arabs to become a typical element of the later Islamic city.  The hammān served hygenic, social and recreational functions:  for men it was a

venue for informal business conversation; for women it provided an opportunity for the exchange of ideas on household management (Sourdel-Thomine 1966). Whilst facilitating the cleansing of the exterior of the body, the bath allowed the ritual performance of ablution, and symbolically the organism, thus indirectly serving a religious purpose.

Further, Islamic ideology is explicit with respect to the duty of self as a moral being. Fundamentally opposed is the display of pride or arrogance: the Qur'an (40:36) states "Allah seals up the heart of every scornful tyrant". Ansari (n.d., Vol. 2) explains that exhaltation in one's achievements has been condemned as it leads to a person's moral decline, at least in damaging his character. Consequently, a Muslim is expected to attribute his achievements to the favour of God and to maintain humility. In this context, the Qur'an (3:190) notes: "those who rejoice in their misdeeds and wish to be praised for what they have not done - do not think that they will escape Our scourge"; and, more precisely, "do not walk proudly on earth" (17:37). Further prohibited is the display of conceit, pessimism, flattery and idleness. Moreover, the Qur'an (28:60) castigates the infidel for loving wealth and material objects: "things that you have been given are but the provision and gaudy show of this present life. Better is Allah's reward and more lasting". A further moral duty enjoined by Islamic ideology is abstenance from idle curiosity. This is derived from the command "do not follow what you do not know" (Qur'an 17:36).

Finally, the duty to self as an aesthetic being strives for the attainment of the spiritual, intellectual, physical and moral well being of the individual. Effectively this synthesises the preceeding four duties to self.

## Duties to others.

This is a key concept in Islamic Ideology, based on the dual premise of
the inherent social nature of human life and the human shortcomings at
different stages of life which necessitate assistance by other human
beings (Maulana 1936).  The Muslim therefore has a fundamental duty
towards humanity, and must abstain from all evil toward his fellow
beings in line with the statement by the Qur'an that "none shall be
wronged".

This is clearly related to a fundamental principle of Islam which is the
recognition of the individual believer, and the community of believers
(umma).  No corporate personality between is accepted as legitimate.
As Gardet (1961, p. 51) emphasises, "En Islam ... le fondement premier
sera le sentiment très fort et très constant d'une égalité de droits
absolue entre tous les membres de la communauté musulmane.  Tous
les croyants sont égaux devant la loi".  However, this does not imply
that Islam is a classless society (Vallin 1973).  A specific hierarchy
is for example established in the Qur'anic texts:  God and His law;
the prophet; the teachers; the believers – men and women; tributaries
and slaves – justifying the concept of social stratification.  Indeed
Stambouli and Zghal (1976) distinguish three principal classes in
pre-1832 North Africa which closely correspond to the distinctions –
the nobility, the military, the religieuse (including the marabouts),
and the urban and rural masses – identified in Algeria by Quétin (1846).

A comprehensive set of familial ethics are contained in the sharī'a,
outlining duties to relatives and non-relatives within one's home.
Effectively, this emphasised and promoted the family as the basic unit
of society (Gardet 1961; Nasr 1972), a unit which, prior to the advent
of Islam, had been the tribe (Coulson 1978).  The Muslim family is a

miniature of the whole of Muslim society and its firm basis: accordingly, Islam sets great value on the privacy of homelife (Maulana 1936). It is strictly forbidden, for example, to enter into a dwelling without the owner's permission (Qur'an 24:27).

Outside the family, the duties to other individuals are related through specified functional relationships. To this effect, the Qur'an (4:36) forwards the maxim "show kindness to your parents, your kindred, to orphans and to the needy, to your near and distant neighbours, to your fellow travellers, to the wayfarers and to slaves whom you own". Moreover a hadīth contained in the bukhārī (78:31; in: Maulana n.d., p. 382) specifically states, "whoever believes in Allah and the latter day should not harm his neighbour".

The duties to other individuals are also elaborated in terms of religious, personal and social manners. Modesty, for example, is required by both men and women in relation to those members of the opposite sex classed as strangers by Islam. In such an encounter, the Qur'an (24:31) requires the gaze to be lowered in respect of humility. Moreover, specific sex segregation is fostered outside the kingroup by the required wearing of the veil by women (von Grunebaum 1961) in accordance with the passage "enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils around them (when abroad)" (Qur'an 33:59).

Duties relating to society as a whole.

A fundamental duty of Islamic society is to respect the liberty of the individual within that society (Santinala 1931). In this context, the Qur'an (41:40) states "Do as you will, Allah is watching over you" and, similarly, "this is the truth from your Lord. Let him who will believe

in it, and him who will deny it" (18:29). Importantly, however, man's freedom functions only within the absolute freedom of the Creator's Will.

A further key concept pertinent to Islamic ideology in relation to the society as a whole is contained within the verse "Allah will assuredly help those who are made masters in the land, will attend to their prayers and pay the alms-tax, enjoin justice and forbid evil" (Qur'an 22:41). Ansari (n.d., Vol. 2) interprets this as the duty of promoting the spiritual and moral welfare of the people, placing, for example, a duty on the Islamic State to construct and maintain mosques. Further, he argues, the requirement to "enjoin justice and forbid evil" extends to include the enactment and enforcement of laws to ensure the proper practice of Islamic morals both to self and to others, with the ultimate aim to establish both conditions and requirements which preserve and promote human good. For the umma, or community of the faithful, "to hear and obey the authorities is binding so long as one is not commanded to disobey God (al-bukhārī 56:108; in: Maulana n.d., p. 395 - 396).

2.4. CONCLUSION.

Following this discussion of Islamic ideology, it is appropriate that the ensuing chapter should turn to an examination of the urban form of Qacentina as it was in the years preceeding French colonisation. In essence, it was a religious city: in 1843 it was noted that "Constantine est aujourd'hui la ville d'Algérie où Islamisme a la sectarisme la plus fanatique" (Aix Archives Nationales F80d); and indeed, Qacentina was a renowned centre of learning in North Africa, only surpassed by the Islamic schools at Cairo and Fez (Nouschi 1955).

It remains to determine whether the urban form of the city itself

represents a manifestation of the ideology of Islam.

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## CHAPTER THREE.

# 3. THE URBAN FORM OF QACENTINA ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH OCCUPATION, 1837

## 3.1. THE SITE OF THE SETTLEMENT.

Qacentina was, in the ninth century, known as balad al-hawā' (city in the air), offering, as Bernard (1929) notes, a perfect example of an ancient quelmâa or inaccessible fortress site. The impregnability of the site has been well documented by Maréchal Clauzel. He writes,

> la position de Constantine est admirable et sur tous les points à l'exception d'un seul elle est défendue merveill-eusement par la nature même. Un ravine de 60 mètres de largeur d'une immence profondeur et au fond duquel coule l'Oued Rhummel, présente pour escarpe et contre escarpe un roc taillé à pic, inattaquable par la mine comme la boulet. (Moniteur Universel 1836).

The settlement was founded on a trapezoid rocher of limestone formed by four geomorphological processes: the first two tectonic, producing orthogonal fault zones; the third, surface erosion by quarternary streams; and finally, contemporary subterranean erosion by the River Rhumel (Jöleaud 1907; Bernard 1937). These have combined to form a rocky plateau site which, within the distance of one kilometre, inclines from 644 metres at Qanṭara to the north to 534 metres at Sīdī Rashid to the south-west, and is bounded to the north-west and south-west by two escarpments rising to 300 metres. The gorge of the Rhumel, 2,800 metres in length completes the strategic importance of the site: flowing between escarpments which increase from 35 to 200 metres in depth, it further delimits the rocher by abandoning its south-west - north-east direction at al-Qanṭara and continuing north-westwards. As a result, unaided access to the site is only possible by the south-west face (Figure 3.1).

FIGURE 3.1  Site of Pre-1837 Qacentina: the rocher.

Source: Joleaud (1907).

## 3.2. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT UP TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Perhaps the most significant date in the early urban development of this site was 300 BC, when, during Carthaginian times, a settlement was established on the rocher (Mercier 1937). Following the fall of Carthage in 147 BC, Qacentina (then named Cirta) commenced rule under a prolonged period of Roman Occupation as the centre of the Upper Roman Empire, a Confederation notably including Mileu (now Mila), Chullu (now El Qoll) and Rusicade (now Skikda). However, the town fell after an unsuccessful revolt against Marcentius, and was razed to the ground in 311 AD , but was subsequently rebuilt in 313 by the Emperor Constantin, and took the name Constantina. At the Vandal Invasion, the city was occupied by the Barbarians, but given back in 442 by Geiseich to the Emperor. After the destruction of the western Empire, Constantina remained independent until the Byzantines, victorious over the Vandals, brought North Africa under their control in 533. It remained subject to them until the invasion of North Africa by the Arabs (Yver 1913; Berthier and Goosens 1965; Bourouiba 1978).

Consequently, the town in the seventh century began 1,000 years of predominately Islamic influence. During this period, the city was controlled for two centuries by the Hammadids of Bejaïa, before becoming within the sphere of influence of the Hafsids of Tunis between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. 1534 began over two hundred years of Turkish domination for the city (then named Qusantīna), the zenith of which was in the eighteenth century. During this period, the town was ruled by men of energy and intellect: such were Kalian Ḥasan, called Bū-kamia (1713-1736), Hasan b. Husain called Bū-Hanak (1736-1754), Ahmad al-Qullī (1756-1771) and above all Salah Bāy(1771-1792). In particular, they were variously responsible for many public works and

buildings in the settlement. Bū-kamia built the Mosque of Sūq al-Ghazzāl; Bū-Hanak made new streets and built the Mosque of Sīdī al-Akhdar; Sālah Bāy built the Mosque and madrasa of Sīdī al-Kattāni, and established a new quarter in the city (Vayssettes 1867-1869). At that time the town, situated amid intensively cultivated agricultural plains (Valensi 1969) was an important and flourishing entrepôt between Tunis and the Sahara. Each month, a caravan of 200 to 300 mules left Qusantīna for Tunis, where it exchanged gold and silver thread, embroidered clothing, gilded pipes, perfumes, woollen and silk belts, ostrich feathers and burnous for, Persian carpets, silk from Syria, precious fabric from Constantinople, and moka coffee. Grain was primarily traded with the Saharan Arabs for dates, blankets and salt (Aix Archives Nationales (AAN) F80c).


3.3.  PRE-1837 QACENTINA (QUSANTĪNA).

On the eve of the French occupation the city of Qusantīna covered 30 hectares of the rocher and was encircled by a high but irregular wall (Mercier 1903). What remains of the Turkish settlement today clearly indicates that this discontinuity of the city wall was the result of several dwelling walls being constructed flush to the face of the ravine (Plate 3.1). Access to the city was given by four gates:  three to the south-west, namely al-Bāb al-Jadīd, Bāb al-Wādī and Bāb al-Jābiya; and one to the east, Bāb al-Qantara, which was approached by a Roman bridge (Plate 3.2) ruined since the Middle Ages, but rebuilt in the late eighteenth century by Sālah Bāy (Bourouiba 1978). A useful, although impressionistic description of the exterior view of the town is

to be found in La France.

within the town ... shops,

seven madrasa (Mouette ... 1953).
Although there ...
completed 1730, ...
of Sidi al-Akhdar ...
within the city during the eighteenth century is disputed: Mouette (1958)
suggests 35, ...
(Ahd 1936) one hundred ...

A comprehensive listing ...
Constantine during the ...
shows, Mouette (1958) ...
complete, 137 small ...
ments and 227 ...
of these commercial ...
the Jewish community ...



PLATE 3.1   Discontinuity of Settlement Along Ravine Edge.



PLATE 3.2   Roman Bridge Giving Access to Bāb al-Qantara.
Source: Guernier (1948, Vol.1, p.81).

to be found in La Presse,

> Ne depasse-t-elle pas en singularité pittoresque tout
> ce qu'un peut imaginer. Quelle hallucinant de ville
> oriental à minarets d'ivoire surmontés de croissants
> de soutiendrait à côté de cet étonnant nid de maisons
> perchés sur un rocher ... sans l'aveuglante luminère
> du Midi, l'océan de tuiles de ses toits ... des
> murailles brûlées rotis ... de soleil. (La Presse
> 1847).

Within the town itself there were an estimated 1,660 houses, 500 shops,
seven madrasa (educational institutions) and five hammān (Nouschi 1955).
Although there were four principle mosques - Jami' Sūq al-Ghazzāl,
completed 1730, al-Jāmi' al-Kabīr, Jāmi' Sīdī al-Kattānī and the mosque
of Sīdī al-Akhḍar completed in 1753 - the total number of mosques
within the city during the eighteenth century is disputed:  Nouschi (1955)
suggests 35, Emerit(1951) citing Remuzat, ten, whilst Kaid Ibrahim
(AAN F80b) and Mercier (1903) go no further than 'several'.

A comprehensive listing of the variety of traders and crafts in
Qacentina during the Turkish period is given in Féraud (1872).  Else-
where,  Nouschi (1955) enumerates the existence of 33 tanneries, 75
cobblers, 107 saddlers, 135 tobacco merchants, 195 weaving establish-
ments and 227 traders in flour, milk, butter and honey.  The control
of these commercial concerns were predominately by Muslims, although
the Jewish community owned 106 of the 157 cloth merchants and, as
Valensi (1969) notes, all the gold and silver smiths.

Water was supplied in the town by seven reservoirs approximately three
square metres in surface area, by one metre in depth - but only four
contained water suitable for human consumption.  A leather cup attached
to these by a chain enabled the strict regulation of the amount of
water consumed by the individual.  All the reservoirs were replenished

daily by water brought by mule from exterior water sources, such as the River Rhumel, below the city (AAN F80b). Consequently the comment that five hammān are "peu pour la population d'une ville aussi important" (Nouschi 1955, p. 373) can be explained by this water shortage.

These mosques, traders, craftsmen, hammān and reservoirs were distributed throughout the four major hāra (quarters) which comprised the Qasaba to the north, Tābiya al-Kabīra, Tābiya al-Barrānī, and to the east al-Qanṭara, and the various subquarters of the city (Figure 3.2). Such quarters were not isolated ghettos, but rather adjacent and self contained streets and districts within the city (Ismail 1972). Mercier (1903, p. 439) documents, for example, that in Qusanṭīna, "la Kasbah formant un véritable quartier clos avec mosquée, magasins, casernes et maisons particulières".

Mercier (1903) has also identified that there existed four principal roads within the settlement. The first departed from al-Bāb al Jadīd, turned towards the north-west, and continued towards the Kasbah. The second passed in front of Dar al-Bāy, ran below the mosque and the sūq (market) of al-Ghazzāl up towards Sūq al-ºAṣr and ended in front of the mosque and madrasa of al-Kattānī. The third extended from Bāb al-Wādī towards Raḥbat as-Sūf, whilst the fourth ran between Bāb-al-Jābiya and Bāb-al-Qanṭara (Figure 3.3).

The third of these thoroughfares was bordered by the largest concentration of craftsmen and traders in the city. From Bāb al-Wādī these trades were rigourously grouped according to specialisation as follows: saddlers, cobblers, goldsmiths, blacksmiths, silversmiths, coppersmiths, carpenters, parchment makers, and, in the adjoining alley

-36-

**FIGURE 3.2** The Sub-Quarters of Qusanṭīna

Source: Mercier (1903)

FIGURE 3.3   The Four Principal Roads in Qusanṭīna
Source: Mercier (1903)

Labels within figure: Bāb al-Qanṭara, al-Bāb al-Jadīd, Bāb al-Wādī, Bāb al-Jābiya

ways, butchers (Plate 3.3) and dealers in curtains and other hangings
(Mercier 1903). Although this formed the main sūq or market of Sūq al-
Tujjār, there were secondary sūqs which served the needs of the various
hāras.

Linking the four principal roads was a complicated and irregular "dédale
de petits rues" (Quétin 1846, p. 289), "embrouillées en écheveaux
inextricable " (Gautier 1865, p. 108) branching frequently into impasses
(Figure 3.4), which were occasionally closed off by a door or gate
(Berthier and Chive 1937). Often steep (AAN F80b), these small roads
and alleyways were invariably narrow (L'Illustration 1844; Plate 3.4):
Quétin (1846) notes an average of four to five paces in width, whilst
Gautier (1865) comments that the road width was insufficient to allow
two loaded donkeys to pass each other.

Quétin (1846, p. 299) has recorded further that certain passages were,
"souvent recouvertes de voûtes". As Gautier (1865, p. 110) explains,
for the most part, the houses in Qusantīna had two storeys above the
ground floor, "plombant comme des escaliers renversés se touchaient
souvent par le haut". This is well illustrated by Plate 3.5, taken in
the hāra of Bāb-al-Jābiya. This photograph, in conjunction with Plates
3.4 and 3.6, also clearly shows, as Gautier noted in 1865, that the
exterior walls of the dwellings were almost completely blank, and,
with the exception of some small trellissed openings, generally, "sans
fenêtres exterieur, avec des portes basses ce qui leur donne l'aspect de
prison"(Quétin 1846, p. 293). This "apparence misérable" of the housing
stock in Qusantīna is also noted in a military report at the beginning
of the nineteenth century – but at the same time it records that about
a hundred dwellings, "sont vraiement belles et decouvrées avec tout le
luxe appellé oriental" (AAN F80d).

PLATE 3.3  The Butchers' sūq.



PLATE 3.4  Typical Narrow Road in Qusanṭīna.



PLATE 3.5  'Vaulted' Passages in the hāra of Bāb al-Jābiya.



PLATE 3.6  Bare Exterior Dwelling Walls.

al·Bāb al-Jadīd →

→ Bāb al-Wādī

Bāb al-Jābiya →

0    100m.

**FIGURE 3.4** The Road Network of Qusanṭīna
Source: Mercier (1903)

However, for the most part the houses were built of hollow fired bricks and clay, although some were constructed with stones taken from Roman remains in the area. The roofs were tiled over a base of reeds (Quétin 1846; Mercier 1937). The houses received light from interior courts reached from the road or impasse by a passage with either a single or dual twist. Around this court was a gallery supported on columns of wood, stone or sometimes marble, onto which let apartments by a large door and with very small trellised windows (Quétin 1846; Plate 3.6; Figure 3.5).


## 3.4. CONCLUSION

It is useful, by way of conclusion, to try briefly to bring the various themes and observations in this chapter together to give a synthetic impression of the physical form of pre-1837 Qacentina in totality. Thus, it has been seen that the city was a compact settlement of two, three or four storey dwellings, enclosed within city walls, and divided into a number of residential districts and subquarters. Dispersed throughout these were mosques, madrasa, and hammāns, and permanent markets or sūqs, each of which were organised into a hierarchy of separate trades. The four main thoroughfares of the city were inter-connected by an intricate and irregular network of minor roads or alley-ways, which frequently terminated in an impasse. The narrowness of these streets, which were defined by the bare exterior walls of the dwellings, and were overhung by projecting upper storeys, combined to create an exterior environment in contrast to the more open interiors of the dwellings.

The links between Islamic ideology and the physical environment of the

PLATE 3.7 Aerial View of Courtyard House in aḥāra Sīdī Rashīd



court

up

in

0    1m.

FIGURE 3.5  Typical Dwelling Plan in Qusanṭīna (taken
from al-ḥāra Sīdī-Rashīd)

Source: Société de Mathématiques Appliquées (1960)

settlement which are perhaps implied will be fully elaborated in a

subsequent chapter.  Preceding this, however, the next chapter will out-

line the contemporary system of physical planning.  Consequently, where

a relationship between ideology and the urban space clearly exists, it

will be possible to determine whether physical planning was the agent

which effected this.

4. PHYSICAL PLANNING IN ISLAM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTISE OF THE MALIKI SCHOOL OF LAW

Physical planning is not new to the Islamic city (Wagstaff 1980). The aim of this chapter is to verify this by discussing the administration of planning, the type of planned spatial framework, the principles of physical planning law as they are applied to the road, the impasse, overhangings and projections, the wall and particular nuisances.

# CHAPTER FOUR.

4.1. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PHYSICAL PLANNING IN ISLAM.

The previous chapter made note of the fact that Islamic ideology recognises all individuals as equal before the law. The umma, community of the faithful, is, by definition, one and indivisible. Consequently Islam does concede a separate or special status for the city and civic population (Burger 1981; Montani 1970). As von Grunebaum elaborates,

> The ancient political interest of the community, the classical ideals of bill'omenes and of the clarity of architectural (and administrative) design have been replaced by a dominant religion, by ideals of a narrow or group loyalty, by the desire to shield the family group from control and contamination, and by the concept of government as an outside agency with which one no longer identifies and which one rather wishes to keep at arm's length from the concerns of one's own social and familiar life. (von Grunebaum 1961, p. 140).

Thus, the residents of the Muslim town did not develop their own administrative machinery, but an administrative framework including the appointment of important officials such as the qadi (judge) was imposed by the state. What is more, economic life of the town (suq) at the heart of the Muslim city was, for example, regulated and controlled. Within this framework, one should not forget to offer that would have

## 4. PHYSICAL PLANNING IN ISLAM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTISE OF THE MĀLIKĪ SCHOOL OF LAW

Physical planning is not new to the Islamic city (Wagstaff 1980). The aim of this chapter is to verify this by discussing the administration of planning, the type of planned spatial framework, the principles of physical planning law as they are applied to the road, the impasse, overhangings and projections, the wall and particular nuisances.

### 4.1. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PHYSICAL PLANNING IN ISLAM.

The previous chapter made note of the fact that Islamic ideology recognises all individuals as equal before the law: the _umma_, community of the faithful, is, by definition, one and indivisible. Consequently Islam does concede a separate or special status for the city and civic population (Gardet 1961; Hourani 1970). As von Grunebaum elaborates,

> The ancient political interest of the community, the classical ideals of city oneness and of the clarity of architectural (and administrative) design have been replaced by a dominant religion, by ideals of a quarter or group loyalty, by the desire to shield the family group from dispersal and contamination, and by the concept of government as an outside agency with which one no longer identifies but which one rather wishes to keep at arm's length from the spheres of one's personal and familiar life. (von Grunebaum 1961, p. 140).

Thus, the residents of the Muslim town did not develop their own administrative machinery, but an administrative framework including the appointment of important officials such as the qādī (judge) was imposed by the state: that is by the personal will of the ruler (dey) of Dar al-Sultan, or his deputy (bey) in, for example, Qacentina and Wahran. Outside this framework, the state had nothing to offer that would take

the place of ancient municipal institutions.

According to Mālikī doctrine, the court of the qādī formed the normal
organ for the administration of the sharī'a, and the pivot of the
judicial system, performing both a duty of supreme religious merit and
a vital function of state (Coulson 1978). However, Mālikī public law
recognised the validity of other jurisdictions ranked inferior to the
qādī's court because of their restricted competence. This is
exemplified by the muhtasib, who is charged with the general super-
vision of the religious and moral welfare of the local population
(Marçais 1945), and generally acts in those cases considered beneath
the qādī's dignity (Brunot and Demanbyres 1937). Included in these,
according to Mawadī (d. 1058; Amedroz 1916), are the restoration of
water supplies and repair of ruined walls and various other town planning
functions relating to development control and enforcement.

Although an urban authority or institution per se is absent in the
Islamic settlement, this does not preclude the financing of municipal
requirements. The muhtasib can, for example, make use of funds
compiled from taxes in the city treasury for such purposes: failing
this, he can extract money from all inhabitants of substance in the
town (Amedroz 1916). Further, hubus property provided an important
source of municipal funding. Essentially an act of piety, by
establishing a hubus on his property, the settler thereby renders it
inalienable and the revenues are paid in perpetuity to a specified
religious charitable or civic beneficiary, such as a mosque, school or
hospital (Bousquet 1950; Salacuse 1975). In time these became large
scale urban assets, which, protected by religious law, provided the
funding of a large range of municipal activities: often the street

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lighting of a town was covered by funds arising from hubus assets (Stambouli and Zghal 1976).

Contingent on the absence of a municipal authority was the absence of any planned spatial framework for the development of the city. Instead planning began with the ceding of urban space to groups of individuals related by kinship, tribe, religion or ethnicism (Abu Lughod 1980a). Qusantina well exemplifies this process. Vayssettes (1858) documents how friction between the Muslim and Jewish population in the city led to the designation in 1771 by Salah Bay Bani Mustafi of a special quarter to the north of Qusantina for the entire Jewish community and those inhabitants of a co-religion. Within this area, the Jews were able to purchase land compulsorily against the payment of compensation, and proceeded to construct a principle, and secondary adjoining, roads (Eisenbeth 1952), themselves determining the form and layout of the area.

However, to accept the belief by de Planhol (1955, p. 12) that "aucune intervention ne se manifeste dans l'urbanisme et l'edilité" of the Islamic city would be presumptuous. As the remainder of the chapter will demonstrate, various physical planning controls did, indeed, exist.


4.2. PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICAL PLANNING UNDER MALIKI LAW.

Doctrine pertinent to physical planning under the Maliki school is founded on two indispensible and complementary principles: fina' and la darar (Brunschvig 1947; Bousquet 1950; Llewellyn 1980).

The first of these, the fina', is the open space in the immediate vicinity of a house: in Maliki law the owner of the dwelling possesses

all rights over this space.  The hadīth from which this concept is

derived is cited by Ibn al-Imān (1900f, p. 140):  "celui qui s'empare

dans droit d'un empan de terre, d'un champ, d'un chemin public ou du

finā' d'une maison, Dieu lui mettra un collier de sept champs au jour

du jugement".  In essence, the principle of the finā' serves to uphold

a fundamental principle of Islamic Law:  the freedom of the individual

to seek the goods of this world and the next and to dispose freely of

them (Santillana 1931).

Exceptions to this right are formulated in the ijmā' where appropriate

and in accordance with the complementary principle of lā darar, meaning

no harm or injury (derived from the general Malikī legal principle of

istislāh - the consideration of the public good).  By contrast with

Western/Roman Planning Law, this recognises that the misuse of urban

property or creation of a nuisance disaccommodates adjacent neighbours

to a greater extent than those living at a distance.  The relationship

between finā' and lā darar is well illustrated by Mawadī who states

that the use of urban property,

> gives no occasion for interference until complaint by the
> neighbour who alone is entitled to condone the act or
> impeach it, in which case the muhtasib may act, provided
> that the two neighbours are not actually at law, and may
> compel the person at fault to desist and may punish him
> as the case may require; if they be at law, the judge
> [qādī] must act".  (Amedroz 1916, p. 96).

The interplay between these two notions of finā' and lā darar will be

shown as a recurring theme within the various urban planning regulations

under the Malikī school.  The remainder of this chapter will examine

these controls as they existed in relation to the road, the impasse,

overhangs and projections, the wall, and particular nuisance.

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## The Road (sāri')

No obstruction is permitted on a public way in Mālikī law, even though a road may be wide, as the road is intended for the benefits of passers-by and not of buildings (Brunschvig 1947). Sahnūn, in this context, established in the ninth century that the site must be returned to its original state even 20 years after the obstruction appeared in the road. However, if after a period of many years (for example 60), no person has complained, and the exact origin and title of the edifice has been forgotten, it may be permitted (Ibn al-Imān 1900c). Theoretically, this aimed to "protéger l'occupant contre revendication possible des pouvoirs publics sans lui conférer un propriété plein et entière du fonds" (Brunschvig 1947, p. 132).

Sahnūn also established that the fina' must not be monopolised in any way to restrict passage (Ibn al-Imān 1900c). However, Mawardī allowed goods or building materials to be deposited on public roads for convenience or gradual removal provided no impediment is created (Amedroz 1916). Similarly, various encroachments, such as the tying up of beasts, and loading or unloading, are permitted at any time (Ibn al-Imān 1900d), providing that the advancement is so slight that nobody is inconvenienced; further he legislates that the width must be such so as to allow the passage of large objects such as a heavily laden camel. Consequently a hadith in the Mudawwana which requires a minimum of seven cubits (3.36 metres) as the width of the public street (Brunschvig 1947; de Planhol 1955) is not necessarily adhered to.

## The Impasse (sikka qair nāfidha)

This is a private way, closed at one end, belonging to the residents, who informally restrict each others' property use within this space.

Any person, for example,

> s'il s'agit d'une impasse, il n'a pas le droit de mettre
> sa porte vis-à-vis de celle du voisin ou plus près de lui
> qu'elle ne l'etait car celui-ci peut lui dire: "cet
> endroit de la rue qui se trouve devant ma porte et sur
> lequel tu veux établir une entrée pour toi, la
> jouissance m'en appartient: j'ouvre ma porte dessus, il
> me protège et, grâce à lui, je puis décharger mes transports
> près de ma maison sans nuire à personne; je ne permettrai
> pas que tu établisses une porte en face de ma maison ou
> près de ma porte, ni que tu installes là des bancs ou
> autre chose pareille". Alors puis qu'il ferait du tort
> au voisin, il devra s'absentir (Ibn al-Īmān 1900d,
> p. 97).

Consequently, the free installation or transfer of a door is effectively

restricted from being opposite, or nearly opposite that of a neighbour.

In addition, the closure of an impasse by a door is only permitted with

the mutual consent of all the neighbours (Brunschvig 1947).

## Overhangings and Projections

By contrast with Roman Law, Mālikī law, again with reference to, and

extending the notion of _finā'_, does not expressly forbid projections

over a public way. As Brunschvig (1947) remarks, Mālik himself had

purchased a house built during his lifetime which had corbels

(projections of stone, brick or wood which jut out from the face of a

wall in order to support a super-incumbent weight). Indeed, Mālik

"consulté à propos d'un balcon placé au dessus d'une rue qui, en

s'ecroulent, avait tué une personne, répondit qu'on ne pouvait rendre

responsible celui qui l'avait fait bâtir" (Ibn al-Īmān 1900b, p. 47).

The opinion of Asbag and Ibn Mājisūm differ. They only permit such

projections if they are high enough to allow riders, pedestrians and

persons carrying goods to pass beneath and alongside it without

contact (Ibn al-Īmān 1900b).

## The Wall (jidār)

The right to raise a dwelling is a corollary to the right of ownership under Mālikī doctrine. Therefore, the vertical extension of a dwelling is permitted, even if this results in the interception of light and air to the detriment of his neighbour (Ibn al-Īmān 1900c). Moreover, a man who heightens his house is not bound to block the view from his roof, but he is bound not to command a view over another house (Amedroz 1916)[1].

Indeed, all forms of visual indescretion are strictly regulated against (Brunschvig 1947). An owner of property is restricted from the placing of doors and windows which give a view into neighbouring properties and families (Llewlyn 1980). In this context, for example, Kalif 'Umar requires that an opening must be blocked if, when standing on a bed beneath it, a man can see into his neighbour's house (Ibn al-Īmān 1900b). Similarly, Ashab decrees,

> si une fenêtre est établie à hauteur d'homme elle devra
> être déplacée et mise assez haut pour que l'oeil n'y
> arrive pas; si malgrée cela la proprétaire regarde sans
> nécessité par cette ouverture, ou l'obligera à la
> boucher. (Ibn al-Īmān 1900c, p. 93).

Moreover, trellisses (mashrabiyyah) were required to be projected onto outside walls wherever a window opened. This served to satisfy the curiosity of those who were indoors and could not be penetrated by the indiscretion of those who were outside (Ismail 1972).

All decisions regarding a party wall must be taken in common. A beam,

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1. This principle extends to minarets. If the interior of the dwellings surrounding a mosque can be seen into from the minaret by the muezzin, the residents are able to prevent this — even though the dwellings may be some distance away. This is possible, according to Sahnūn "car il y a là un dommage pour eux, et ce prophète a interdit de faire du dommage". (Ibn al-Īmān 1900d, p. 100).

for example, can only be knocked into a wall with the permission of the neighbour (Ibn al-Imān 1900b).

The extension of beams beyond the outside wall, encroaching on a neighbour's property can only be prevented at the instigation of complaint by the neighbour. However, where the encroachment has been sanctioned and redress has not been exacted, it may be exacted later, and the erection complained of removed compulsorily. If work has been begun at the neighbour's consent, and he then retracts it, the other cannot be compelled to undo the work (Amedroz 1916).

## Particular Nuisance

A function of physical planning is to restrain from development in the proximity of a dwelling a number of establishments such as blacksmiths, tanneries, mills, and stables, which, by their nature produce noise, odour, vibrations, smoke or steam, and consequently are unpleasant or inconvenient. Accordingly, Malikī judges necessitate the removal of such establishments on the complaint of a neighbour – unless it is already well established (Ibn al-Imān 1900d) or the neighbour can deal with the inconvenience (Brunschvig 1947). The qādī Ibn Adbarafī', however, is more strict, and requires that one must always find the means not to annoy one's neighbours by fumes or odours, whether the establishment is old or new (Ibn al-Imān 1900d).

## 4.3. CONCLUSION.

This chapter has demonstrated the existence of various principles of physical planning in Islam – despite the absence of a relevant urban authority, institution or planned spatial framework for the Islamic city. It is the aim of the ensuing chapter to identify the specific

role of physical planning as an agent between the concurrent ideology,

and the urban form of pre-1837 Qacentina.

CHAPTER FIVE.

# 5. IDEOLOGY, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND THE URBAN FORM OF QACENTINA UNDER THE TURKS: A SYNTHESIS

For the Maghreb, a province far removed from the caliphate, the city

and its inhabitants were particularly important in functioning to

maintain the ideology of Islam (Amin 1970). As Marçais (1928, p. 100)

has concluded, "les villes sont pour l'Islam les seuls lieux où ses

adeptes puissent satisfaire à toutes les obligations de la loi, être

intégralement, spécifiquement musulmans". Whilst affirming the

importance of the city to Islam, a possible association between this

ideology and the contemporary urban space can at the same time be

inferred from these statements. Such a connection is, indeed,

indicated by comparison and analysis of the preceeding study of both

Islamic ideology and late eighteenth and early nineteenth century

Qacentina.

## 5.1. ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN SPACE.

A link can be seen to exist between the duty to self as a spiritual,

rational and physical being required by the Qur'an and various hadīth,

and the presence of the numerous mosques, madrasa, and hamman within

Qusantīna. Less facile, but nevertheless evident, is the association

between the duty to moral self required by Islam, and the urban form

of the settlement. Favouring humility from the believer, and

fundamentally hostile to the display of pride, arrogance and material

wealth (p. 25) this element of Islamic ideology is paralleled by the

generally uniform and unadorned facades of the dwellings in the city

(p. 39). In association, the requirement to abstain from idle curiosity

is similarly represented in the number (few), size (small), position and

occasional trellissing of exterior openings. To argue that this is a

function of ideology is lent support by the assertion of Brunschvig (1947, p. 140) that "si la maison musulmane a peu ou point d'ouvertures sur le dehors, c'est pour répondre aux convictions éthiques des ses habitants".

In addition, it can be seen that the almost uniform, undifferentiated and featureless exterior aspect of the dwellings in Qusantina compares, and consequently relates, to the belief in Islam that the umma or community of believers is at once one and indivisible, and equal before God.

Yet further, the external facade of the dwelling can be seen as a response to the requirement for internal privacy.  The prescribed segregation between the sexes outside the kingroup, and the importance attached to the sanctity of homelife in Islam (p. 27) necessitates both safety and security from strangers and the outside world.  This seclusion can be seen to have been given expression by the inward-looking courtyard house (Torrès Balbas 1942-7; Hourani 1970) throughout Qacentina during this period (p. 42).

Importantly, these same elements of Islamic ideology introduce a further and associated relationship between these contemporary beliefs and the urban form, but in relation to the street pattern.  Whilst the courtyard forms the definitive private space in the city, by contrast the four main thoroughfares identified by Mercier (1903) within the settlement represent the ultimate public space.  Between these two extremes is the semi private/semi public space, providing a protected area outside the dwelling for females (Abu Lughod 1980a). Figure 5.1, showing a section of the hāra Sīdī Rashid, south-east of the road linking Bāb al-Jābiya and Bāb al-Qantara in Qacentina, attempts to illustrate this spatial

public space

semi-public space

semi-public/semi-private space

semi-private space

private space (the courtyard)

Bāb al-
Jābiya

n

0    5m.

FIGURE 5.1   The Spatial Division of Part of al-hāra Bāb al-Jābiya

-56-

distinction. In addition, von Grunebaum (1961) has postulated that the numerous impasses characteristic of the Islamic city served to emphasise the concealment of Muslim women over and above the wearing of the veil.

## 5.2. PHYSICAL PLANNING AS THE AGENT BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN SPACE.

Although a relationship between the ideology of Islam and the urban form of pre-1837 Qacentina can be proposed, the concern which is paramount to this thesis is whether the contemporary physical planning (outlined in Chapter Four) acted as the agent between the two. The following discussion will attempt to indicate that physical planning did − directly and indirectly − transpose these precepts into the urban space.

Initial confirmation of this hypothesis has been suggested by Brunschvig (1947, p. 154). He notes that whilst elements of the Islamic city are in effect a manifestation of Islamic ideology, nevertheless, these beliefs "le droit ordonne et sanctionne ... il leur insuffle force et durée, il les érige en un systèm conscient et cohérent". This can be reasoned further. Physical planning law under the Mālikī school was derived from ijmā', qiyās and also the principle of jurisprudence of istislāh, the sources of which are the hadīth, and ultimately, the Qur'ān. As this also forms the very source of Islamic ideology itself, the physical planning which coexists must logically have the same ideological characteristics. And moreover, as the existence of a physical planning process implies the manipulation in some form of the urban environment, theoretically physical planning will act as a transpositor of Islamic ideology. Importantly, this assumption is upheld in practice.

Attention, for example, has been drawn to the connection between the social relationships intrinsic to Islamic ideology, and the subsequent division of the city into areas of public, semi public/semi private and private space. However, as Chapter Three demonstrates, this did not result from a planned spatial framework, generally alien to the Islamic planning process. Instead, urban space was granted to a group, and it was by this mechanism that the division between public and semi public/ semi private space developed, the latter evolving within the interior of the designated hāra or zone (Abu Lughod 1980).

Empirically it has been noted that an urban area in the vicinity of Sūq al-°Aṣr to the north of Qacentina was ceded to the Jewish community in the late eighteenth century (p. 47). However, as the street plan for the city (Figure 3.4), and accounts by early travellers (Quétin 1846; Gautier 1865) suggests, there was little or no differentiation between the general urban form of this quarter and that elsewhere·in the city — yet it was occupied by a community of different ideological and religious beliefs. This could suggest that factors other than ideology (for example, climate) were entirely responsible for the urban form[1]. However, if the relationship between Islamic ideology and the physical environment of Qacentina argued above is accepted, it can be proposed that this ideology was by some means transfused into the urban space. The Jewish community, despite retaining their own religious and other beliefs, were, nevertheless, subject to the relevant schools of Islamic law (Eisenbeth 1952; Salacuse 1975) and implicitly, planning law. Consequently, it can be forwarded that physical planning did act as an

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1.  In 1843, for example, the commissaire civil Lapaine notes that in Qacentina, of the "rues étroits et tortueuses, la plupart abritées du soleil et de la pluie par la protection des maisons et des toits de roseaux". (Aux Archives Nationales F80e).

agent between the ideology and urban form of the period.

This proposition is supported by analysis of the actual components of physical planning themselves. Specifically, it can be shown that physical planning has directly regulated prescriptions intrinsic to the Qur'an and associated hadīth. The dwelling facades, such as illustrated by Plates 3.4 and 3.6 exemplify this. Undoubtedly, these were influenced by the controls relating to the placement of doors and windows ratified by the Mālikī school (p. 51), with the purpose to prevent visual indiscretion condemned within the sharī'a (p. 27).

In addition, it has been clarified that physical planning was founded on, and oscillated between, two related principles. The first, the finā' (p. 47) in essence upheld the liberty of the individual intrinsic to the duty to the society as a whole required by Islam (p. 27), whilst the second, lā darar (p. 48) was a Qur'ānic concept (p. 20) operating with reference to the requirement by Islam to display consideration to one's neighbour (p. 27).

Referring to the former of these principles, the finā', physical planning only specifically regulated against obstructions on a public thoroughfare (p. 49). The corresponding effect of this on the urban space is elaborated by Brunschvig (1947, p. 136) who notes that the allowance elsewhere of "l'occupation du finā' au sol contribuait à rétrécir les voies et à rendre leur tracé sinueux".

Reasonably, it could be argued that this was a direct result of physical planning per se, and without ideological influence. There does not appear, for example, to be any Qur'ānic or hadīth verse which determines a labyrinthine road network. Nonetheless, this has appeared in Qacentina. However, the prescriptions of the law relative to

obstructions is derived from the principle of finā', in turn derived

from the freedom of the individual inherent in Islamic ideology.

Implicitly, therefore, physical planning has transposed this ideology

into the urban structure. The same logic can be applied to over-

hangings and projections (p. 39) illustrated in Plate 3.5.

Also implicit to the concept of finā' and an important theme in Islamic

planning is the principle that litigation is instigated by the adjacent

coresident rather than, for example, the muhtasib or qādī (p. 46). The

very informality of this process may consequently be argued as a

contributary factor to the complex and irregular urban structure of

Qusantīna, influenced as it was by, and between, the extremes of either

the excessive vigilance, or relative tolerance, of a neighbour.


Finally, although weighted in favour of upholding the concept of finā',

physical planning has also affected the city form by response to the

ideological principle of lā darar. Regulation against particular

nuisance (p. 52) by the Mālikī school exemplifies this. As the study

of Qusantīna indicated, along the main sūq (al-Tujjār) there existed

localised clusters of saddlers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and so forth

(p. 36; 39). It would thus be rational to assume that these groupings

helped prevent any litigation that a dispersed distribution could

perhaps invariably provoke. Importantly, this is not to refute that

the hierarchy of traders which comprise the sūq can be otherwise

explained by, for example, an economic basis for this homogeneity. It

does, however, propose an associated and persuasive explanation which to

date appears to have been ignored by the literature analysing this

phenomenon (Massignon 1920; Lewis 1937; de Planhol 1955; von Grunebaum

1961;Stern 1970; Blake and Lawless 1976).

## 5.3. CONCLUSION.

Following the initial establishment of a link between the contemporary ideology and urban space of later eighteenth/early nineteenth century Qacentina, this chapter has attempted to propose that physical planning, as it existed, acted as the agent of this ideology. Itself derived from the same sources as Islamic ideology and comprising certain principles of this ideology, it can be theoretically argued that during this epoch any planning action will almost inevitably be a reflection of ideology. Moreover, its effect on the urban form, in whatever manner, will similarly represent a transposition of ideology. The empirical evidence appears to both verify, and expand this proposition by highlighting specific relations between ideology and the urban space which, undoubtedly, have been forged by the physical planning process.

This may confirm the suggestion that the ideology which pervaded the pre-1837 urban form of Qacentina was, to a great extent, transmitted via the physical planning system. It remains to determine whether this relationship between ideology, physical planning and the urban space exists, albeit in a different form, in both French Colonial Algeria, and, more recently, Independent Algeria. Consequently, it will, in addition, be possible to indicate whether physical planning, in its other capacity as an agent, also acted as an initiator of ideological change. It is the intention of the subsequent section to explore and evaluate these propositions in the period between the occupation of Algeria by the French in 1830 (and Qacentina in 1837), and the accession to Independence by Algeria in 1962.

6.1. INTRODUCTION.

In general, ideologies can entail aggressive alteration from the existing society and recommend the transformation of the lives of their exponents in accordance with specific principles (Shils 1968). Additionally, they serve to justify a particular domination or resource allocation over, ### CHAPTER SIX. ### the society in which they exist (Eisenstadt 1970).

The conquest of Algeria by the French in 1830 exemplified this. French ideology, essentially colonialist, was inherently dualist, split between capitalism and racialism, with both involving brutality. Moreover, the latter fulfils the role of justifying and sustaining the pursuit of the former. To establish ideological supremacy, the French began the systematic devaluation of the existing Islamic ideology – with devastating effect. Of the indigenous society "elle crée des masses mais les empêche de devenir un prolétariat conscient en les mystifiant par la caricature de leur propre idéologie" (Sartre 1956:c.131).

Although by the mid-twentieth century Algerian nationalism began to emerge amongst the Muslim population, analysis of this will be successively excluded from discussion. Until 1962, the French remained the ruling class in Algeria and, as Marx and Engels (1970) argue, in every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas. Consequently, this chapter will deal with the dual components, components of capitalism and racialism, as they developed during this period of Algerian urban development.

## 6. FRENCH COLONIAL IDEOLOGY IN ALGERIA

### 6.1. INTRODUCTION.

In general, ideologies can entail aggressive alteration from the existing society and recommend the transformation of the lives of their exponents in accordance with specific principles (Shils 1968). Additionally, they serve to justify a particular domination or resource allocation over, or within, the society in which they exist (Plamenatz 1970).

The conquest of Algeria by the French in 1830 exemplifies this. French ideology, essentially colonialist, was inherently bipolar, split between capitalism and racialism, with both involving inequity. More-over, the latter fulfills the role of justifying and assisting the pursuit of the former. To establish ideological supremacy, the French began the systematic devaluation of the existing Islamic ideology — with devastating effect. Of the indigenous society "elle créé des masses mais les empêche de devenir un prolétariat conscient en les mystifiant par la cariacture de leur propre idéologie" (Satre 1956,p.1381).

Although by the mid-twentieth century Algerian nationalism began to resurge amongst the Muslim population, analysis of this will be necessarily excluded from discussion. Until 1962, the French remained the ruling class in Algeria: and, as Marx and Engels (1970) argue, in every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas. Consequently, this chapter will deal with the dual ideological components of capitalism, and racialism, as they prevailed during this period of Algerian urban development.

## 6.2. CAPITALISM AS A COMPONENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL IDEOLOGY IN ALGERIA.

Mathiesen (1980) has contended that law, as an ideology, plays an important role in the shaping of the conceptions of society. The colonial experience in Algeria confirms this.

French law belongs to the family of Romano-Germanic law (David 1966) and, inevitably in Algeria it reflected European civilisation, expressing ideologies and embodying institutions which had been formed in an historical European context. Thus, it was natural for the French to have recourse to their traditional branches of civil, commercial, land and public law when introducing a 'modern' legal framework for Algeria. In particular, this law was, by contrast with Islamic law, codified, and, as Julliot de la Morandière writes, "la codification est fait dans un pays ... en vue d'y accomplir des réformes profondes, des réformes de structure" (Dalloz 1951, p. 684), establishing the ideological importance, and purpose, of the receipt of French law into Algeria.

The codification of the law by Napolean , following the 1789 French Revolution, and introduced in the code civil, represented in essence a legal ideology in that it was a statement of a system of rules of law of the aspiration of goods and values of a social group (Tigar and Levy 1977), and reflected the moral, political and social spirit of nine-teenth century France (Schlesinger 1959). Consequently, Salacuse (1975, p. 147) asserts, codification and the categories of French law "not only represent the concepts of a particular legal tradition; they also reflect a particular economic experience - European capitalism ... precisely the economic system France was seeking to implant in Algeria". The code civil, for example, has been variously described by Engels as "the classic law of bourgeois society" and, "a masterly adaption of old

Roman law ... to modern capitalist conditions" (Feurer 1969, p. 276; 100). Elsewhere it has been called the code of the employer, of the creditor and of the property owner (Charmont 1908). More generally, however, Rodinson (1974) argues that the coherent, authoritarian and relatively fixed system of codified rules favoured capitalism by providing the formalistic jurisprudence needed by capitalists to safe-guard their rights without intervention from magic, morality, religion, or personal arbitrariness. These features were, of course, intrinsic to Islamic law and ideology.

Thus, it may be argued, that the introduction of French law subsequent to the statute of 22 July 1834, either in plein droit or modified form, indicates (and assisted) the implantation of capitalism in Algeria. However, the various applications of the code civil, code de commerce, code de procédure civile and code pénal (for a full list see Dalloz 1951) both reflected and heralded the metropolitan policy of assimilation. This represented the "volanté d'obtenir un régime qui permît de coloniser le pays sans tenir compte des indigères" (Ageron 1956, p. 321) with the aim to "detruire les resistances opposées par l'Islam" (Ageron 1968, p. 1230), and whilst favouring the European minority, was "à l'égard des musulmanes, un instrument de domination et de spoliation" (Sahri 1955, p. 606).

Where the assimilation of French law failed in assisting the imposition and development of this ideology, specific legal texts were introduced. To achieve the colonisation officielle which countenanced the settlement of Europeans on Algerian soil, France created a new system of land law which both reflected and facilitated the social economic formation — based on colonial capital accumulation - which it was trying to install (Salacuse 1975; Bénachenhou 1976). For example, the senatus consulte of

1863 hastened tribal disaggregation in the countryside by permitting
tribally-owned land to be divided into privately owned pieces. This was
done through a three-stage process: first, delimitation of the lands
belonging to particular tribes; second, distribution of the tribe's
lands among the tribal segments (the diwar); and third, the establish-
ment, where possible, of individually-owned property among the members
of the diwar. Once individual ownership had been established in a
particular piece of land, it could be freely sold to Europeans. The
Warnier Law of 1873 completed this by providing for the eventual
application of French law to all Algerian land, thus allowing property
sales to Europeans, and enabling the colon to gain solid and unimpeach-
able title to land purchased from the indigenous population.

The significance of this process of land law can be assessed in
connection with Marxist ontology. From an eclectic viewpoint, Marxists
assert that capitalism to develop must first destroy traditional rural
society. An economy in which families and social groups provided their
own needs could supply industry with neither a home market or cheap
labour, neither would the peasant economy deliver the necessary surplus
to capitalists. By transferring rural savings to capitalists (for
example, by the imposition of a special impôt arabe in Algeria by the
French until 1919), this differentiated the peasantry by making the
poor into 'wage-slaves' for capitalist enterprise, but transforming
the rich into capitalist farmers or (after the sale of land) into
urban capitalists. Moreover, to enlarge cash demands for products of
capital industry as it displaced rural goods, the rural population had
to be thrust from subsistence-orientated to cash-orientated production
(Amin 1973; Lipton 1977). Consequently, as Satre (1955, p. 1375)
notes, by enacting and developing this body of law in Algeria "l'Etat
français avait brutalement et artificiellement créé les conditions du

libéralisme capitaliste dans un pays agricole et féodale".

On this foundation, French agricultural capitalism began to develop,
and large commercial houses such as the Société de Crédit Foncier
Colonial et de Banque, established in 1863, began to assume increasing
importance. As the process of capital development and accumulation
began to gain momentum, the colonial agricultural sector itself began
to change, the old form of colonisation by small landowners being
replaced by large concentrations of agrarian capital closely connected
and penetrated by the dominant financial capital (Amin 1970). Between
1871 and 1898 more Algerian land was bought by French businessmen and
wealthy farmers than by French peasants through official colonisation.
Consequently, in addition to the French small-holdings in the Algerian
countryside, there emerged the large estates owned by a capitalist
class of landowners who viewed agriculture as a business enterprise,
and relied on Spanish, Maltese and Muslim labour for cultivation of
their land (Abun Nasr 1971).

By 1954, the Europeans, representing less than 12 per cent of total
population owned nearly one-third of cultivated land in Algeria.
The differentials between the social and economic organisation of
Muslim and European agriculture suggested by Table 6.1 were, in
reality, even more acute. Sixty-nine point five per cent of Algerian
Muslim holdings were under ten hectares but only accounted for 18.7
per cent of total land area. By contrast, 35 per cent of European
holdings were over 100 hectares each, occupying 91 per cent of
European land area. Furthermore, in 1953, the Europeans produced
65 per cent of gross agricultural output, including 100 per cent of
alfa, cork and sugar beet, 92 per cent of citrus fruit and 90 per cent
of wine. Approximately 58 per cent of the total output was exported
(Murray and Wengraf 1963).

Table 6.1.  A Simplified Table of Property Distribution in Algeria, 1954.

|  | Number of holdings | Area (hectares) | Average area per holding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Algerian Muslims | 630,732 | 7,349,160 | 11.6 |
| Europeans | 22,037 | 2,726,000 | 120.00 |

Source:  Murray and Wengraf (1963, p. 32)

A combination of grands colons and finance houses owned the larger properties (for example, the domaine of Ain Regada owned by the Compagnie d'Algérienne; the properties of Kéroulis, the Mitidja and La Trappe, owned by Henri Bourgeaud; the Fermes de Chélif owned by the Banque de Paris, and the Union Parisienne) and controlled the wine market, the esparto market (through the Blachette and Cenpa Group), and the cork market (through the Banque de l'Union Parisienne : BUP ). Similarly, the BUP in conjunction with Pont-à-Moussau and Rothschild, controlled all iron workings, with Penairoya (De Wendel, Rothschild, Péchinery and Mirabaud) controlling lead and zinc mining, and later owning the Société Algérienne des Produits Chimiques et des Engrais. Shiaffino owned the Société Algérienne de Navigation Charles Shiaffino et Gie, and controlled the Compagnie des Phosphates de Constantine; Lafond controlled l'Association Minère de Djebel-Djerisson (Bourdet 1952; Rondière 1955; Amin 1970).

The capitalist formation in colonial Algeria by 1954 is further demonstrated by the socio-economic structure of the population (Table 6.2):  by this date 41.6 per cent of total national income was accounted for by 11 per cent of the national population.

However, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the socio-economic and institutional formation in which the society lived was, in essence, capitalist.  Further, it is necessary to indicate that this reflected

Table 6.2.  Socio-Economic Structure of Algeria, 1954.

| Number of persons | Percentage of population | Total income (milliard old francs) | Average income per head (old francs) | Percentage national income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EUROPEANS** | | | | |
| 1,034,000 | 11.00 | 228.50 | 220,980 | 41.6 |
| **MUSLIMS** | | | | |
| 8,290,000 | 89.00 | 320.00 | 38,600 | 58.3 |

Source:  Gorz (1961, p. 1151).

an inherent ideology of the colons themselves.

The composition of the Algerian settler population, the pieds noirs,
helps to establish this.  The pieds noirs, amongst others, consisted
of political refugees from France of 1851, post-1871 Alsatian refugees
from provinces forfeited to Prussia, Italo-Slavs following Italian
unification, and French wine growers ruined by phylloxera.  In 1848,
approximately half of the immigrants were Spaniards (concentrated in
the Oranais), Maltese or Italians (mainly settling in the Constantinois),
such that by 1876, 153,000 out of a total 314,000, and in 1886, 211,000
out of a total 430,000 European population, respectively, were alien
to France (Ageron 1979).  Partly as a consequence of the law of 26 June
1889 which gave automatic French naturalisation to the children of
European colons, by 1917 it was estimated that only one French Algerian
in five was of true French descent (Horne 1979).

As a result, Murray and Wengraf argue that,

> the colons of Algeria present the pure example of arriviste
> culture.  Lacking any common social history, united by what
> could be extracted from the colonial situation, the
> colonists discovered in wealth the sign and principle of its
> social organisation.  Differential wealth established a
> hierarchy acceptable to all; neither purely aristocratic
> nor purely bourgeois, the cultural "values" of the
> Europeans were crassly materialistic.  The 'leaders' of the
> pied noirs were ... the magnates of the land and the
> profiteers of commerce and transport.  (Murray and Wengraf
> 1963, p. 36).

Forming a powerful pressure group, these grands colons exercised a form
of ideological hegemony (Bennamane 1980), themselves intervening
directly in politics as senators, deputies and councillors in the
Metropolitan and later Algerian assemblies (Bourdet 1952; Rondière
1955) with the aim of protecting and preserving the existing structure
of society.  Fundamentally, they were elected by the petits colons,
who for "la plupart désirent plus que quiconque qu'un tel système se

perpétue" (Bourdet 1952, p. 2256). This appears to confirm that
capitalism as an ideology was held almost universally amongst the
European colons as a sine qua non of society.

This same analysis can be applied in partial support of a further, but
concurrent, ideology of French colonial society – racialism. It is the
purpose of the latter part of this chapter to examine the evidence for
this second ideological bias.

## 6.3. RACISM AS A COMPONENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL IDEOLOGY IN ALGERIA.

> When you told me you wanted to leave Algeria,
> my friendship suddenly assumed the cloak of
> silence.
> Images stubborn and sharp sprang forth in
> the gateway of my memory ...
> You have been free to discover yourself at last
> such as you are.
> Concerned about Man but strangely not about
> the Arab ...
> Unperceived Arabs.
> Ignored Arabs.
> Arabs passed over in silence.
> Arabs spirited away, dissimulated.
> Arabs daily denied, transformed into the
> Saharan stage set.
> And you mingling with those:
> Who have never shaken hands with an Arab.
> Never drink coffee.
> Never exchanged commonplaces about the
> weather with an Arab.
> By your side the Arabs.
> Pushed aside the Arabs.
> Without effort rejected the Arabs.
> Confined the Arabs.
>
>                                    Fanon (1980b, p. 47; 48).

Implicit within the analysis in the preceeding section is the existence
of an inherent socio-economic disparity between the European minority
and the Muslims. As Fanon (1967; 1980b) explains, the occupying power
legitimises its domination by scientific argument, the 'inferior race'

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being denied on the basis of ethnicity.  Consequently, as Rex (1973,

p. 75) argues, "racial discrimination and racial prejudice are a

phenomenon of colonialism".  Indeed, Julien (Nova 1961, p. 31) is of the

opinion that "c'est un fait qu'on n'a pas suffisament souligné que le

racisme s'est developpé parallèlement à l'expansion coloniale".  As a

result,

> when you examine at close quarters the colonial context
> it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin
> with the fact of belonging or not belonging to a given
> race, a species.  In the colonies the economic substructure
> is also a superstructure.  The cause is the consequence;
> you are rich because you are white, you are white because
> you are rich.  (Fanon 1967, p. 30-31).

Table 6.2 demonstrates the economic inequality between Muslim and

European populations:  74.9 per cent of the former shared 34.4 per cent

of national income.  Table 6.3, showing a simplified social classifica-

tion of the urban European and Muslim population in Algeria in 1958

emphasises these disparities.  Whilst the Muslims (excluding the

unemployed) accounted for 60 per cent of the urban population, they only

received 27.4 per cent of the total incomes:  if the unemployed are

included, this differential is even greater.  Indeed, unemployment

itself was virtually unknown among the European population (Amin 1970).

The 1954 estimates of national income further stressed the inequalities

of this dual economy - an average income of 360,000 old francs per head

for the European population contrasted dramatically with an average of

29,000 old francs for the Muslims.  There was also a strong relationship

between average income per head and proportion of Muslims in the

different departments (regions).  Income per head ranged from approxi-

mately 241,000 old francs in Algiers to 24,600 old francs in Batna

(Norbye 1969).  This marked regional expression of inequality can be

attributed to the concentration of European population and industrial

Table 6.3.  Social Classification of Urban European and Muslim Population in Algeria, 1955.

| | Number of persons | | Average income (thousand francs) | Total incomes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Overall (thousands) | Per Cent | | Amount (thousand million francs) | Per Cent |
| **Europeans** | | | | | |
| Workers: | | | | | |
| factory/domestic | 88 | 29 | 400 | 36 | 13 |
| white collar | 80 | 26 | 530 | 43 | 15 |
| Professional executives/ | 114 | 36 | 1150 | 126 | 44 |
| directors | 27 | 9 | 3000 | 81 | 28 |
| Total | 305 | 100 | 950 | 286 | 100 |
| **Muslims** | | | | | |
| Workers: | | | | | |
| factory/labouring/ | | | | | |
| domestic | 225 | 50 | 150 | 35 | 33 |
| white collar | 90 | 20 | 270 | 24 | 23 |
| Professional senior executives/ | 135 | 30 | 270 | 37 | 35 |
| directors | 7-8 | | 1000-1500 | 10 | 9 |
| unemployed | 150-230 | 25-33 | | | |
| Total (excluding unemployed) | 460 | 100 | 230 | 106 | 100 |

Source:  Amin (1970, p. 70-71).

sectors in the largest cities and richer coastal plains of the Northern Tell. Interior and eastern regions primarily founded on traditional peasant agriculture trailed well behind in terms of income levels and standard of living (Sutton 1981), as is well illustrated by Camus (1958) in a series of articles submitted to Alger Républican 5-15 June 1939, which document the overwhelming poverty amongst the Muslims in the Kabylie region.

Indeed, Norbye (1969, p. 519) has been moved to argue that this dual economy "can only be compared with that of South Africa". This analogy is perhaps further demonstrated by noting the inherent discrimination against the Muslims in resource allocation in colonial Algeria. For example, before the French conquest, nearly all sedentary Muslim male children received at least a basic Qur'ānic education in Algeria (Ageron 1968). By 1954, of 1,104,000 Muslim boys between the ages of 5 and 14 years, 235,000 received a formal French education, and a further 150,000 a traditional Qur'anic education. Thus only 35 per cent of Muslim male children in the category received any form of education (the figure for female Muslim children was eight per cent).[1] Conversely, education for the colons of scholarable age was virtually universal (Aron 1958. For a full discussion of this see A.M. 1963).

The systematic discrimination in the economy and allocation of resources in education was rooted in the extreme political inequality between the European settlers and Muslim population (Kuper 1977). The colons enjoyed status as French citizens, were represented in French parliament, and

---

1. Indeed, Bennamane (1980) contends that what formal French schooling existed for the indigenous population functioned to reinforce and perpetuate the colonial capitalist ideology in Algeria by securing the reproductive mechanism of this ideology, and by integrating the population into this system with the various skills and qualifications which were necessary to directly and indirectly maintain the capital accumulation process.

had a majority representation on the Délégation Financières which by 1930 exercised appreciable control over the budget. Moreover, they elected two-thirds of the municipal councillors and three-quarters of the general councillors. By contrast, the Muslim French subjects were governed by the Code de l'Indigénant, which conferred punishment for a number of summary offences specific to the indigenous population, such as failure to report births or deaths, holding meetings without authorisation, and demonstrations (Ageron 1968).

Consequently, one further commentator, Ouzegane (1962) has been prompted to draw the acute comparison between the overall racial inequality in colonial Algeria and Afrikaner apartheid. However, as Cohen demonstrates by way of support, this more often took an implicit as opposed to explicit form.

> Les wagons de 3$^e$ classe ne sont pas officiellement réservés à l'indigène. Mais c'est là qu'il va quand même ... Les Arabes ont leurs quartiers, leur cafés et leurs cinémas où les Européens ne vont jamais. L'inférieur veut bien aller chez le supérieur mais le supérieur ne lui rend pas de politesse ... En dehors des cérémonies officielles, Arabes et Européens ne se reçoivent pratiquement pas. Les amitiés sont rarissimes, les relations sexuelles à peu près nulles, les marriages mixtes inexistants. Les enfants Européens ne jouent pas avec les 'petits arabes'. On ne le leur interdit pas. (Cohen 1955, p. 585. Emphasis added).

Indeed this, essentially tacit, form of racism which existed amongst the pied noir community is further supported by consideration of the Algeria of Pourcher's (1924) Souvenirs et Impressions Recueillies, and, to a lesser extent, the Oran of Camus' (1947) La Peste: both are societies almost devoid of an indigenous Algerian population. This, however, is perhaps explained by Cohen's observation that

> l'Arabe ne soit pas homme, le langage Européen l'atteste. Un Européen témoignait un jour devant le tribunal: "Y avait-il d'autres témoins?" demande le juge. "Oui, cinq: deux hommes et trois Arabes"; le mot est lumineux; l'Arabe n'est pas homme ... Voici encore un mot admirable entendu recemment: "C'était un Arabe, mais habillé comme personne". (Cohen 1955, p. 584).

It might be argued that this evidence is, in essence, circumstantial, and does not necessarily indicate the existence of a specific ideology of racial discrimination in French colonial Algeria per se. However, as Shils (1968, p. 70) asserts, "proponents of ideologies obdurately resist the explicit introduction of revision of their articles of belief". It may be reasoned from this statement that any resistance by the colonate to metropolitan policy will be directed against that which threatens to revise any inherent ideolgical belief. Indeed, examination of the historical evidence indicates that the intensity of colonial lobbying and direct intervention, both political and non-political, by the colonists relates most acutely with the attempted introduction by the Metropole of race reform. As Léon Blum (1963, p. 407) noted in 1947, the colons "invariablement révoltés chaque fois que les rapports des deux peuples coexistent sur la terre d'Algérie étaient envisagés par le gouvernement français sous un jour d'égalité relative".

Two historical events exemplify this. The first, in 1936, occurred when the French prime minister Blum of the Front Populaire government of socialists, communists and social radicals, and Viollette, a former Governor General of Algeria, forwarded a plan which would have enfranchised 25,000 Muslims (out of six million) by granting citizenship without, as previously required, renounciation of their statutory right to Islamic law. Whilst introducing the principle of the separation of political right from private status, the project also proposed one representative per 20,000 electors in the French Chamber of Deputies, and envisaged an evolutionary process of political assimilation.

As a threat to the supremacy of the pieds noirs, "si le projet Blum-Viollette ne menaçais pas cette suprématie dans l'immédiat, il risquait de l'amenuiser peu à peu jusqu'à l'annihiler complètement" (Le Tourneau

1962, p. 331). On presentation of the plan to parliament, the colonial machine of press campaigns in both Algeria and France, and Metropolitan parliamentary lobbying moved into action, "opérèrent une telle contre offensive que le projet ne fut même pas présente devant les chambres" (Camus 1958, p. 111). They succeeded: the combined opposition of the colons and the French right prevented the parliamentary execution of the plan throughout 1937. Displaying a complete complicity of the Algerian administration with the colonial lobby, in February 1938, the Féderation des Maires et Adjoints Spéciaux d'Algérie voted 298 to two in favour of unanimous resignation and paralysis of the administration of the project came up for discussion in the Metropolitan assembly (Le Tourneau 1962). The replacement of Blum by the right—wing government of Daladier in 1938 led to the project being dismissed by Senate without discussion.

The second incident which demonstrates resistance by the colons to reform which threatened their continuing a system of racial discrimination occurred following 1947. Earlier, in March 1944, an·ordonnance had given equal rights to both Muslim and French removing discriminatory legislation, opening civil and military careers and increasing Muslim representation on municipal councils to 40 per cent. However, the Statut de l' Algérie of 20 September 1947 went further and decreed Algerian Muslims as French citizens with the title Muslim French, whilst allowing the retention of Muslim status. Moreover, the 1947 statute tabled five reforms demanded by Muslims for many years: democratically elected local councils; the suppression of the military government of the Saharan territory, and their replacement by civic départements; the recognition of Arabic as an official language alongside French; the separation of Church and State for Muslims as with other religions; and the electoral enfranchisement of Muslim women. In addition, it

established the major institutional innovation of an Algerian National Assembly of 120 members, chosen equally from two colleges voted by predominately French Algerians and Muslim Algerians.  However, a procedural clause was inserted into the statute whereby its five crucial reforms would be made subject to the approval of the Algerian Assembly.  Further the decision of the Assembly, theoretically taken by a simple majority could, on the demand of the Governor General, the Commission of Finances or one quarter of the members of the Assembly be made conditional on a further two-thirds majority.  This, as Murray and Wengraf (1963) argue, ensured that the Assembly would be the perfect instrument for the continued domination of the European minority.  It remained to ensure that this majority would not be at risk, "which the pied noir politicians set about achieving with ruthless efficiency"(Horne 1979, p. 70).

Sweeping victories in the 1947 municipal elections for the Muslim nationalist Mouvement pour le Triomphe de Libertés Democratiques (MTLD) Party alarmed the colons  who feared that this could recur in the 1948 National level elections for the Assembly.  However, in the first of these April 1948 elections, the swing towards the nationalists in the second, Muslim, college accelerated, and obtained a 50 per cent total.  As Clark (1960, p. 53) dryly observes, these first results "left people wondering whether the Administration had matters fully in hand".  The danger was, however, averted in the run-off election of April 11.  Horne notes,

> There was widespread evidence of 'stuffing' of election boxes by ... local officials; in some villages registration cards were never issued; in others heavily armed police (sometimes supported by tanks) assumed a menacing presence, and at Dechyna, where the populace refused to vote, the grandes mobiles opened fire, killing seven;

> nationalist election meetings were broken up and numerous
> arrests made.  At Guelma and Sétif ... the results were
> simply never announced.  Discrepancies between the first
> and second run-offs, too, were suggestive; at Guelma
> Messali's MTLD candidate got 6,544 votes on the first and
> only 96 on the second; at Blida 10,647 was reduced to
> 2,534.  (Horne 1979, p. 70-71).

In all, the nationalist vote was reduced to 24 per cent in the lower

college, and in the upper, the swing was firmly to the right in favour

of the Union Algérienne, a block of parties from which socialists and

communists were excluded.

This technique of electoral falsification was reinforced by the next

elections to the Algerian and National Assemblies in 1951.

> Les moyens employés sont connus:  corruption sous les formes
> classiques, constitution autoritaire des listes de
> candidats; pressions exercées localement par ... les
> administrateurs de communes, déploiement de forces et
> atmosphère de répression autour des bureaux de vote
> obligation faite à l'Elécteur de Voter sans passer par
> l'isoloir, provocation d'incidents servant de prétexte
> à l'expulsion des délégués des partis d'opposition au même
> à l'evacuation totale des bureaux de vote, bourrage des
> urnes, et pour finir, falsification pure et simple des
> resultats".  (Jeanson 1952, p. 2221).

At Djelfa neither the MTLD or other nationalist Union Démocratique du

Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) parties got a single vote, whilst the

government candidate received 800 - out of 500 eligible voters; at

Port Gueydon, 23,671 votes were cast, 23,645 registered for the

government candidate.  As Clark (1960) shows (Table 6.4) the increasing

perfection of this system of rule is well demonstrated by the progressive

elimination of nationalist representatives in the Algerian Assembly.

The protection by the colons of caste privilege appears to suggest,

therefore, that racism was a fundamental ideological component of

Table 6.4.  Second College Representation in the Algerian Assembly.

| Party | 1948 | | 1951 | | 1954 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Percentage vote | Seats | Percentage vote | Seats | Percentage vote | Seats |
| MTLD | 30 | 9 | 0.7 | 4 | 0.0 | 0 |
| UDMA | 18 | 8 | 11.0 | 5 | 5.0 | 5 |
| PCA[1] | 2 | 0 | 4.3 | 0 | 1.3 | 0 |
| Others | 50 | 43 | 84.0 | 51 | 93.7 | 55 |

1.  PCA: Parti Communiste Algérien.

Source:  Clark (1960, p. 86).

that social formation.  Nevertheless, it is useful to indicate briefly

the full scope of this discrimination.  The pied noirs were not only

anti-arab; also, as Ageron (1977, p. 53) notes, "les préjugés anti-

sémitics furent toujours fortes dans la population coloniale".  Indeed,

Ageron (1979, p. 60) later goes so far as to use the term "antijudaïsme

algérien" in preference to "antisémitisme".

This discrimination originally manifested itself in the opposition of

the European settlers to the Crémieux Decrees of 1870 which conferred

automatic French citizenship on Algerian Jews.  Consequently, anti-

semitic newspapers - L'Antijuif and Algérie Français, for example - were

established, radical anti-Jewish parties won the municipal elections in

Constantine in 1896 and Oran in 1897 (Ageron 1979), and various minor

pogroms instigated by the Catholic Maltese, Spanish and Italian pied

noirs (Horne 1979) throughout the country, climaxed in the Algiers Riot

of January 1898 (see Corré 1980).  By the Second World War, the European

colons were overtly demonstrating their enthusiasm for facism (Kuper 1977),

itself a system both anti-democratic and non-liberal, and characterised

by racism and anti-semitism (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977).  This was

indicated by their participation in extreme right wing political movements,

by their press, in their collaboration with the Vichy Government, and in

their response to Jewish persecution (Nora 1961).  Particularly signifi-

cant in this latter connection was the repeal of the Crémieux Decrees of

1870 by Pétain's regime, thereby recinding the full naturalisation

accorded to the Jewish population.  Yet, on the testimonies of several

Algerian Jews, Horne (1979, p. 59) is able to note that during all this

time "there was barely a breath of anti-semitism from any Muslim quarter".

## 6.4.   CONCLUSION.

"In 'early stage' development communities", Apter (1964, p. 18) has

argued, "authority becomes recognised on the basis of those ideologies

that lay claim to superior planning or rationality, and that provide

moral bases for social development purposes".  Implicitly, this recog-

nises the ideological determinants of 'interest' and 'strain' disting-

uished by Geertz (1964):  in the former men pursue power; in the latter

they free anxiety in an effort to correct socio-psychological disequili-

brium.  Undoubtedly, this chapter has established clear parallels

between these concepts of ideology, and the dominant ideology of French

colonial Algeria as it actually existed.  The relation to the interest

theory of ideology requires little elaboration.  The importation of

European capitalism and the associated exploitation of the country - as

facilitated by the introduction of codified, and where appropriate, new,

law - was, unquestionably, the raison d'être of the colons.  Whereas

the interest motivation can be applied to the formation of the ideology

of capitalism as it existed, the notion of strain explains the inherent

racist ideology of the colonists.  The relative insecurity of what was,

to the colons, an essentially alien environment, in which they were in

the minority, necessitated this ideology as, "ideology bridges the

emotional gap between things as they are and as one would have them be,

thus ensuring the performance of roles that might otherwise be abandoned

in despair" (Geertz 1964, p. 55).  Consequently, from the point of view

of morale, racism sustained the colons as individuals or as a group, by

effectively denying the existence of the indigenous Algerian population

either outright - or as (equal) human beings.  Where this ideology could

not sustain morale it became cathartic, and manifested itself in

symbolic enemies ('The Jews') which enabled emotional tension to be

displaced.

The ensuing chapter will recount the development of Qacentina during
the period 1837 to 1962. Whilst it is the aim of a later chapter
specifically to examine the links between the ideology discussed above,
and the urban space, nevertheless, it may be discerned that the
ideologies of both capitalism and racialism have had a significant and
determinant effect on the physical form of the city as it developed
during this period.

## CHAPTER SEVEN.

# 7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF QACENTINA BETWEEN 1837 AND 1962

## 7.1. INTRODUCTION.

After prolonged and repeated attempts by the French expeditionary forces, first under the command of Clauzel in 1836, and then under Valée in 1837, Qusantīna was finally captured on 13 October 1837 (for a full account, see Mercier 1903). As Berthier and Chive (1937, p. 477) affirm, the city, renamed Constantine by the French, was, at that time, "une ville à l'image d'une civilisation absolument différente de celle dont la France allait apporter les bienfaits". Consequently, as Berque (1958, p. 24) notes, the town underwent "colossales perturbations que l'âge colonial, qui est aussi, pour l'Afrique du Nord, l'âge capitaliste ... a imprimés au corps de la ville".

The most comprehensive analysis of the various estimates of the population of Qusantīnà on the eve of colonisation is provided by Nouschi (1955). He concludes that an estimate of approximately 25,000 persons is the most realistic. By 1954, the population of the city had attained 111,375 inhabitants. This chapter will detail the development of the city, during and beyond this era to Independence in 1962.

## 7.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL QACENTINA (CONSTANTINE).

The precarious start to the French occupation of Algeria resulted in the colons initially installing themselves in existing settlements rather than creating new ones (de Planhol 1957). Although this

occupation of the pre-colonial Islamic city was originally perceived as temporary, nevertheless, significant modifications to the urban structure began.

The first impact on Qusantīna was the construction of a military garrison in 1840 on five hectares of land following the complete demolition of existing dwellings in the Qasabah (Mercier 1903). However, in 1844 the irregular street pattern of the town was extensively altered by the superimposition of an orthogonal form, and which effectively segregated the rocher into two distinct quarters: European and Arab. The main lines of these roads converged outside the city walls to the south, on what later became the Place Nemours. Buildings were demolished within the European zone, creating open squares, such as Place Maréchal Foch in what had been the Sūq al-Ghazzāl. The settlement not only became spatially dominated by this colonial urban plan (Figure 7.1) with its broad avenues (Plate 7.1: ex-Rue Georges Clemenceau), but also by its architecture. The mosque in the Sūq al-Ghazzāl was converted to a Catholic cathedral, Notre Dame des Sept Douleurs, and there were, in addition, new administrative buildings (the Préfecture (1849) and the Municipalité (1854)). Moreover, to counteract the problems of obtaining water experienced in Qusantīna (p. 35-36), a major engineering project had been commenced by the military in 1843 which built a duct from the settlement on the rocher to connect with a spring on the plateau of Mansourah, east of the city. On completion in 1847, this syphoned 468,000 litres of water a day to Constantine (L'Illustration 1847).

In total, this urban development reflected the increasing number of European inhabitants in the city. In 1852, there were 4,462 Europeans compared to 31,393 Muslims (Aix Archives Nationales F80e). However, by

-84-

PLATE 7.1
(ex) Rue Georges Clemenceau



PLATE 7.2
(ex) Boulevard Victor Hugo



PLATE 7.3
(ex) Place Joffre

1873 the European and Muslim populations had increased to 17,000 and 34,700 persons respectively.

By 1873 the colons also inhabited 15 hectares of the rocher, five of which were the garrison (named the Casbah), whilst 15 hectares, four of which were the Jewish ghetto, was reserved for the indigenous population. In addition, the walls of the pre-colonial settlement to the south of the rocher had been dismantled. European architecture continued to dominate all new constructions: notably the Théâtre (1883), Hôtel-de-Ville (1895-1902) and Hôtel de Postes (1917).

This characteristic urban and architectural form was similarly manifested in a new quarter established by the settlers to the south-west of the city. This quarter, Saint-Jean, was centred around a square (Place Gambetta), was constructed in la style parisienne, and was approached by wide tree-lined roads (for example, Boulevard Victor Hugo: Plate 7.2). However, the construction of this quartier corresponded with the construction of a further caserne (Bardo) south of the city.

The main obstacle to development south of the original settlement on the rocher had been Coudiat Aty, a steep-sided outcrop. In accordance with directives of Napolean III in 1865, the surface of this was levelled - although the operation only commenced in 1896, and was not completed until 1930. Nevertheless, this achievement was seen as a landmark in the colonial development of Qacentina by virtue of the fact that these "nouveaux quartiers, largement percés, bien aérés, garnis de construction modernes ont permis de decongestionner la vielle ville et en ont transformé l'aspect" (Guernier 1948, p. 138). The style is well exemplified by Plate 7.3, of Place Joffre. The district became the centre for European commerce and administration which dominated the employment structure of Constantine (Table 7.1). Moreover, the quartier

Table 7.1. The Employment Structure of Constantine in 1931.

Employment (per thousand total active population)

| | Males | | Females | |
| | Europeans | Muslims | Europeans | Muslims |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fishing | 0.17 | 0.24 | – | – |
| Forestry/Agriculture | 9.77 | 20.90 | 0.49 | 1.29 |
| Mining | 1.17 | 1.00 | 0.03 | – |
| Manufacturing | 161.58 | 53.00 | 48.29 | 9.00 |
| Transport/Labouring | 44.31 | 108.11 | 1.42 | 1.82 |
| Banking/Commerce | 73.64 | 94.26 | 20.62 | 0.16 |
| Civil Service | 116.18 | 92.05 | 14.87 | – |
| Professional | 25.94 | 10.17 | 17.30 | 0.23 |
| Domestic | 7.21 | 15.04 | 20.95 | 28.79 |
| | 439.97 | 394.77 | 123.97 | 41.29 |
| | | 834.74 | | 165.26 |
| | | | 1000 | |

Source: Gouvernement Général d'Algérie, 1934.

was spatially and visually separated from the settlement on the rocher
by the Place de la Brèche (literally meaning a breach or gap) which
effectively served as a cordon sanitaire. Indeed, the impact of this
was heightened by 1937, when the Brèche, originally public gardens, was
covered over by a vegetable market, the roof of which became a vast
terrace (Plate 7.4).

The southward expansion of the city during this period continued, first
encompassing the plateau of Bellevue, and the further to develop Bellevue
Supérieur. These were elegant, low density residential quarters, their
villas either fashionably neo-mauresque in style, but more frequently
in the style of the bien français. Across the River Rhumel on the rive
droite, construction of the faubourg Sidi Mabrouk had also begun,
following the establishment of a military presence in the adjacent
caserne Quartier Gallifet. Two kilometres from the centre of Constantine,
this faubourg had been founded by a group of colons with the intention of
creating a satellite town to be truly European in character, and capable
of surviving as an independent community. However, the expansion and
dynamism of the centre ville, particularly following the levelling of
Condiat Aty, thwarted this intention. By 1937, the faubourg consisted
for the most part of small suburban villas (Plate 7.5), and none of the
envisaged commercial development had occured.

Circulation within, and access to and from the city was improved by the
construction of two bridges across the ravine of the Rhumel: the stone-
built 27 arch Sidi Rached, 247 metres long and 12 metres wide, and the sus-
pension bridge Sidi M'Cid (Plate 7.6) designed by Arnodin, and 168 metres
long, 175 metres above the river. Both were inaugurated in 1912. More-
over, a 'ring road' to the Rocher, the Boulevard de l'Abîme was built,
part of which was tunnelled through the edge of the plateau. This

PLATE 7.4
La Brèche


PLATE 7.5
Villas at Sidi Mabrouk


PLATE 7.6
Sidi M'Cid Suspension Bridge

**FIGURE 7.1 Constantine 1919.**
Source: Berthier and Chive (1937).

represented a fraction of the 80 kilometres of new roads built between 1837 and 1937 in the city. External as well as internal communications were improved with the construction of the Route Nationale and railway station in 1870, connecting the town with Bône (now Annaba) and later Algiers.

In effecting the development of Constantine, the French had spent more than 500 million francs in the 35 years prior to 1937 (Lespès 1937). Although by 1919 the hybrid character of the city was clearly identifiable (Figure 7.1), the visual juxtaposition between the Muslim and European quarters of the centre ville was complete by 1937 (Plate 7.7).

This, however, also symbolised social disparities within the town (already indicated by Table 7.1). In 1919, the European and Arab populations had increased to 36,333 and 36,783 respectively. By 1937, of the total population of 113,777, 54,409 were European and 59,368 Muslims (Gouvernement Général d'Algérie (GGA) 1936). Correspondingly, the built-up area of the city had grown from a surface area of 30 hectares in 1837 to 239 hectares 100 years later. This evolution is represented schematically in Figure 7.2; a detailed plan of Constantine in 1936 is given in Figure 7.3[1]. But, as Table 7.2 indicates, an analysis of this development by quarter and ethnicity indicates that the colons, representing under 50 per cent of the total urban population, occupied more than 80 per cent of the municipal land surface, with corresponding gross densities of approximately 1,428 and 279 persons per hectare for the Muslim and European population respectively. Notably too, the military occupied nearly 25 per cent of the total developed

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1. This map is folded into the back pocket of the thesis.

PLATE 7.7 The Juxtaposition Between European and Muslim Quarters

1837      1873

1919      1937

1959

O ⊢——⊣ 1km.

FIGURE 7.2   Growth of Constantine 1837-1959.

Table 7.2.  The Spatial Breakdown of the Surface Area of Constantine
in 1937 by Quarter and Race.

|  |  | Surface area hectares |
|---|---|---|
| **EUROPEAN TOWN** | | Total: 125 |
| Quarter: | European Rocher | 10 |
| | Saint-Jean | 22 |
| | Coudiat Aty | 6 |
| | Bellevue | 40 |
| | El Kantara and Lamy | 31 |
| | Sidi Mabrouk | 16 |
| **MILITARY TOWN** | | Total: 60 |
| Quarter: | Kasbah | 5 |
| | Quartiers d'Artillerie | 12 |
| | Trann des Equipages | 12 |
| | Parc à Faurage | 3 |
| | Caserne des Sénégalais | 1 |
| | Garde Mobile | 5 |
| | Gallifet | 10 |
| | Demonte | 6 |
| | Chars | 3 |
| | Bardo | 3 |
| **MUSLIM TOWN** | | Total: 42 |
| Quarter: | Rocher | 12 |
| | Bardo | 10 |
| | Quartier 11 Novembre | 6 |
| | Traverse du Pont d'Aumal | 5 |
| | Route Bien Fait | 5 |
| | Sidi Mabrouk Supérieur | 4 |
| **JEWISH QUARTER** | | Total: 12 |
| Quarter: | Ghetto | 3 |
| | Sidi Mabrouk Supérieur | 8 |
| | Cité Laloum | 1 |

Source:  Berthier and Chives (1937, p. 484).

area of the city.

The 1948 Census (GGA 1949) revealed a total population of 114,340 persons in Constantine, 77,000 of whom were Muslims. For the most part, this population was concentrated within three areas of the city. Of the total number of inhabitants, 40 per cent resided in the centre ville, a figure which included 38.5 per cent and 80 per cent of the total Muslim and Jewish populations in the city respectively. Saint-Jean contained the second highest concentration of population, with 10,247 inhabitants, representing 9.1 per cent of the Muslims and 17 per cent of the Europeans in the city. Ranking third was Sidi Mabrouk, occupied by 7.5 per cent and 9.8 per cent of the Muslim and European communities respectively.

By 1954, the population of Constantine had increased to 148,000 persons, 102,000 of whom were Muslims. Despite the different enumeration boundaries used in the 1954 Census, a number of spatial and demographic changes within the city may be indicated. In the six years between 1948 and 1954, the population of the rocher increased minimally from 44,391 to 44,562 persons – but reflected a substantial decrease in the percentage of the total urban population inhabiting this quarter, from 38 per cent to 31 per cent. With the exception of Faubourg Lamy, where the inauguration of the first HLM$^2$, Cité Gaillard, augmented the number of Europeans, the proportion of indigenous population in most quarters elsewhere increased. El Kantara, for example, experienced a growth in its Muslim population from 41 per cent to 66 per cent during this period. But overall,

---

2.  These Habitations à Loyer Modéré were municipally owned complexes let out with fixed low rents.

PAGE MISSING IN

ORIGINAL

>23,000 musulmans nouveaux se font place dans les divers
>quartiers de Constantine. Leur part dans la population
>augmente dans les vieux quartiers périphériques où les
>maisons les plus dégradées leur sont abandonnées par les
>Européens, ainsi que dans les banlieues accidentées où
>ils s'installent en gourbis. Mais elle diminue dans
>les quartiers où s'élèvent de nouvelles unités d'habita-
>tion, qu'il s'agisse de construction privée ou d'HLM.
>De 1948 à 1954 la ségrégation s'est aggravée. (Faudutti-
>Rudolph 1961, p. 47).

The War of Independence from 1954 to 1961, and the subsequent insecurity

of the countryside particularly in the east where there was a relatively

high density of rural population in the Aures and Kabylie, initiated a

massive rural-urban exodus. This, undoubtedly, was provoked by the anti-

guerrilla strategy of regroupement, the organised location and

concentration of the rural population, by the French following with-

drawal of the Front de Libération Nationale guerrilla forces to the

countryside (see Lesne 1962). In the Constantine region alone, 724,575

persons were regrouped in 737 centres (Meskaldji 1979). The result, as

Bourdieu and Sayad (1964, p. 21) argue is that "les regroupements ont

accéléré l'exode vers les villes d'individus qui n'avaient plus rien à

perdre".

Consequently, by 1960, the population of Constantine had been augmented

to an estimated 200,000 persons. The proportion of this population

resident on the rocher had been reduced to almost one-fifth, but by

contrast the quarters of Bardo had expanded from 10,300 to 30,000

people, Sidi Mabrouk from 11,000 to 35,000, whilst Sidi M'Cid increased

by a total of 35,000 inhabitants during this six year period. Figure 7.4

demonstrates the overall increase, and changes in the relative importance

of residential quarters and their racial composition between 1948 and

1960.

**1948**

Lamy Extérieur
Faubourg Lamy
Rocher
Sidi M'Cid
El Kantara
Saint Jean
Sidi Mabrouk
Bardo
Bellevue
Bardo Extérieur

**1954**

Rhumel
Bou Merzoug

**1960**

Rhumel
Bou Merzoug

40,000 inhabitants
10,000
0

n
0    1km.

● Muslims
○ Europeans [1]
▨ Jews [1]

1. These Categories Combined for Enumeration after 1948 ; 2. after 1954.

**FIGURE 7.4  Changes in Racial Distribution by Residential Area, 1948–1960.**

Source: Faidutti·Rudolph (1961, p. 45; 48; 49)

During this twelve years, there was a parallel, and associated change in the urban form of the city. From 1937, few additions had been made to the built-up area owing to the Second World War. In 1948 a series of new residential developments commenced, the location and type of which are demonstrated schematically in Figure 7.5. Although the building of low density European dwellings continued (notably in Bellevue Supérieur) an increasing number of seven to ten storey blocks of flats appeared, the majority of which were sited on the fringes of the city. These were part of either the HLM complexes, such as Quartier de la Remonte in Sidi Mabrouk (Plate 7.8), let out with fixed low rents, or, the mixed-economy Compagnie Immobilière Algérienne (CIA) 'Logéco' projects, which provided for example 1,200 dwelling units at El Bir.

However, the most significant, but unofficial, impact on the urban environment was the proliferation of bidonvilles (shanty towns) and gourbis (one-room dwellings of dry mud and straw). By 1954, 7,000 persons, representing 3.5 per cent and seven per cent of the municipal and Muslim population of the city respectively (Descloîtres et al 1961) had installed themselves around the quartiers of Bardo, Sidi Mabrouk and Saint-Jean, providing a landscape in sharp contrast to the small villas and pavillons of the European residential quarters. As Descloîtres et al generalise, these bidonvilles were of

> plaques de tôle ondulée qui, ailleurs, courrent les
> maisons, mais ici servent de murs, créneaux de branchages,
> de feuillages poudreux, rideaux de roseaux inclinés au-
> dehors, panneaux de portes, planches de caisses, bric-à-
> brac de matériaux étrangement réunis. Tout cela est
> superposé, entassé avec prodigalité comme autant de
> croûtes ou de carapaces, cloué, assujetti, lié avec de
> vielles pointes, des bouts de bois, du fil de fer et même
> de la ficelle. (Descloîtres et al 1961, p. 15).

The description is well exemplified by Plate 7.9 of a bidonville

**FIGURE 7.5  New Residential Construction in Constantine 1948–1960.**

Source: Faidutti-Rudolph (1961, p. 50).

Legend:
- HLM Flats
- HLM Flats Under Construction
- Private Detached-Housing
- Private Flats
- Private Flats Under Construction

For:
- 10,000 people
- 2,500
- 0

0 — 1km.

Rhumel

Bou Merzoug

PLATE 7.8   HLM Complex, Quartier de la Remonte



PLATE 7.9   Bidonville at Pont du Diable

dwelling taken in the Pont du Diable[3] district.

Table 7.3 underlines the housing inequalities within the city in 1959: 91 per cent of the European population inhabited the superior quality housing stock of the town, whilst 29 per cent and 33 per cent of the Muslim population lived in either the gourbis or shanty settlements — accounting for 44,000 and 61,000 persons respectively. The disparities, however, were yet more extreme. In 1954, 85 per cent of the colons in Constantine had water within their dwelling: but only 18 per cent of the Muslim population, 54 per cent of which had to obtain water outside their dwelling. In 1954, there was an average of 3.8 persons per dwelling in the European quarters of the city, but 6.3 persons per dwelling average amongst the Muslim community, 60 per cent of which occupied a dwelling of only one room (Société de Mathématiques Appliquées 1960). In the madina area, predominately inhabited by the Muslims, an average density of 0.17 persons per square metre was estimated (Faidutti-Rudolph 1961).

In 1960, as the War of Independence reached its climax, one observer wrote of Constantine,

> strife frequently flares here. At such times soldiers
> rush to ... seal off the old quarter ... Concertinas of
> barbed wire stood ready to seal off each street leading
> to the central Place de Nemours. Elaborate screens
> protected every large cafe from grenades. The police,
> bedevilled by terrorism ... since 1954 had completely
> barricaded certain sections of the Moslem quarter (La
> Fay 1960, p. 774; 794).

---

3. Admittedly, this photograph was taken 20 years later, in 1980. However, the Pont du Diable bidonville had been rapidly established by 1960, and the photograph, for the purposes of this chapter, well exemplifies the general description of such quarters recorded at this time.

Table 7.3. <u>Occupation of Housing Stock by Type and Race in Constantine, 1959.</u>

| Housing Type | European | | Muslim | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | number | per cent | number | per cent |
| Gourbi | | | 8,200 | 29 |
| Bidonville | | | 9,400 | 33 |
| Traditional Arab | 1,000 | 9 | 5,600 | 20 |
| Recasement | | | 500 | 2 |
| Low rise prefabricated | | | 800 | 2 |
| European: pre-1954 | 9,400 | 83 | 3,000 | 11 |
| post-1954 | 900 | 8 | 800 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 11,300 | 100 | 28,360 | 100 |

Source: Société de Mathématiques Appliquées (1960, p. 16).

Dramatically, this perhaps represents the last tangible and direct

influence of French colonialism on the physical form of the city.


## 7.3. CONCLUSION.

> Colonisation had its impact not only on the level and
> distribution of urbanisation but, even more strikingly,
> on the internal ecological order of North African cities
> which, as a result, are now all more or less fragmented
> into subquarters of highly varying character, quality,
> and appearance, often juxtaposed against one another with
> little interaction or integration (Abu Lughod 1976,
> p. 201).

> Il y avait en, d'abord, la sphère initiale de la medina.
> Puis sur elle, contre elle, autour d'elle, les
> géométries de la villeneuve. Enfin l'extension demesurée,
> et l'assaut vengeur du faubourg contre le centre et les
> beaux quartiers (Berque 1958, p. 41).

As this chapter has demonstrated, Qacentina, on the eve of Algerian

Independence in 1962, clearly exemplified these axioms of the North

African city. In effect the town had developed into the 'dual-city'

(as Berque indicates above, comprising a minimum of three rather than

two sub-cities) representative of colonisation; indeed, Qacentina was

attributed with physical-spatial characteristics which closely paralleled

the ideological foundations of French colonial society. This relation-

ship will be specifically analysed in the concluding chapter of this

section. Preceding this, however, the next chapter will outline the

physical planning system as it existed during the French occupation.

Consequently, it will be possible to assess whether physical planning

was, as in pre-colonial Qacentina, the agent between ideology as it was

manifested in the urban space.

## CHAPTER EIGHT.

## 8. PHYSICAL PLANNING IN FRENCH COLONIAL ALGERIA

In discussing planning in Algeria, Roux-Dufort (1961, p. 16) stated that "l'urbanisme est essentiellement une oeuvre collective qui ... se réalise dans le temps". It is the purpose of this chapter to summarise Algerian physical planning as it had developed in the period between 1830 and 1961. This will be presented under the general categories of planning agencies; plan formulation; land for planned development; development control and planning standards.

### 8.1. PLANNING AGENCIES.

The Ordonnance of 28 September 1847 applied to Algeria the Metropolitan law of 1837 on the communes. Subsequently towns such as Constantine were administered by a Conseil Municipal, the executive of which was the Maire. The Maire had responsibility for physical planning, being charged with police municipal (see 8.4 below), matters of expropriation, and later the administration of the permis de construire. In 1848, the Arrêté of 9 December divided Algeria into three départements of Oran, Algiers and Constantine, under the auspices of a Préfet, appointed by the Métropole. The Préfet was responsible for approving applications of lotissement, and through the Service Départmental de l'Urbanisme et de la Construction preparing and ratifying urban plans. However, approbation for an urban development plan was necessary from the Délégué du Gouvernement Général en Algerie (DGGA) for towns over 50,000 inhabitants.

There were two other major planning agencies in existence in French colonial Algeria. The first of these were the Associations Syndicales de Propriétaires established in the nineteenth century, and the second was the Caisse Algérienne d'Aménagement du Territoire, instituted towards

the end of the French occupation.

The concept of the Association Syndicale de Propriétaires (ASP) was introduced to Algeria by the law of 21 June 1865. This could take one of three forms:

L'association libre (free association), a body subject to private law, and formed by the unanimous agreement of all concerned.

L'association autorisée (sanctioned association), having a majority varying between two-thirds and three-quarters of which were owners, according to its intended function. The ASP was authorised by the Préfet, and consequently acquired the quality of a public organisation with associated public powers (for example, expropriation).

L'association forcée (a 'forced' association), created by the Préfet when the proprietors were unable to form a required association. Each of these three types of ASP played an important role in the process of remembrement and lotissement (see 8.3, below), and thus in the process of urbanisation in general.The existence and importance of this agency of physical planning was affirmed in 1960 by Décret 60-959 (Journal Officiel de l'Algérie (JOA) 1960a).

In 1956, Article 88 of the decision 56-011 by the Assemblée Algérienne created an industrial and commercial civil body with full financial autonomy to operate in Algeria. Named the Caisse Algérienne d'Aménagement du Territoire (CADAT),

> cet établissement aura pour objet de faciliter le
> developpement des zones industrielles en Algérie ...
> il pourra aquérir et revendre les terrains appropriés et
> procéder dans l'intervalle à tous aménagements
> d'infrastructure indispensables ... la camptabilité de
> la caisse sera tenue sous la forme commerciale (Article
> 88-1, 4).

The CADAT was to be controlled by a <u>Conseil de Surveillance,</u> comprising
the following:

- the Secretary General of the Algerian administration
- a representative designated by the Minister of Construction
- the Director General of Finance
- the Director of Public Works, Construction and Transport
- the Director of Energy and Industrialisation
- the Director of Agriculture and Forestry
- the Vice President of the <u>Banque d'Algérie</u>
- a representative of the HLM designated by the DGGA.

(Article 88-2 as modified by <u>Décret</u> of 13 June 1960 ratified by
decision of 60-005 of DGGA).

The administrative council of the CADAT was to comprise:

- the Director
- a representative of the <u>Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations</u>
- one representative of the <u>Caisse d'Equipement pour le Développe-</u>
  <u>ment de l'Algérie</u> and one representative of the <u>Banque de</u>
  <u>l'Algérie</u>, each appointed by those respective establishments
- four members appointed at the discretion of the following:

  the Director General of Finance
  the Director of Public Works, Construction and Transport
  the Director of Energy and Industrialisation
  the Director of Agriculture and Forestry

(<u>ibid</u>).

A maximum advance of 500 million francs was to be allowed to finance
the operations of the CADAT (Article 88-3). An annual report of the
activities of the organisation was to be deposited at the office of the
<u>Assemblée Algérienne</u> (Article 88-5).

8.2. PLAN FORMULATION.

Although the first legislation which universally and expressly dealt with

the provision of town plans in Algeria did not appear until 1919, there had appeared in 1844 an act of particular significance to the present study. This was the decree of 9 June 1844, entitled <u>Constantine</u> - <u>Administration</u>.

Article 1 of this required that "la ville de Constantine sera divisée en deux quartiers, un quartier indigène et un quartier Européen", delimited on an adjoining map[1]. Article 7 of the ordonnance stipulated the similar division of the suburbs of the city. Finally, this was enforced by Article 5, requiring that "aucun Européen ou Israélite étranger ne pourra s'établir ni devenir locataire, propriétaire ou détenteur d'immeuble, à quelque titre que ce doit, dans le quartier indigène". (<u>Moniteur Universel</u> 1844, p. 805).

The Metropolitan law of 14 May 1919 (introduced to Algeria under <u>Décret</u> 5-722 (JOA 1922) and modified by <u>Décret</u> 7-1025 (JOA 1925)), established "plans d'aménagement d'embellissement et d'extension des villes". These were required to be undertaken for all settlements of 10,000 persons or over. However, these plans had only a limited effect, and were restricted to preserving the traditional appearance of towns and to opposing haphazard development of estates on their outer boundaries. Forty years later, the Metropolitan Decree of 58-1463 (31 December 1958) was rendered applicable in Algeria by the ordonnance of 60-960, on 6 September 1960 (JOA 1960b). This provided for two categories of plans: the <u>Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur</u> and the <u>Plan de Détail</u>.

The former was to be instituted in all communes of over 10,000 inhabitants (Chapter 11, Article 6.2°). Otherwise, a plan could be established where, for example, there had been destruction due to fire or war (Article 6.3°), there was a projected rapid demographic increase, in the commune, or it

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1. The original of this map has been unable to be traced, even at the primary source, the <u>Moniteur Universel</u>. However, the division roughly extended along the route between Bāb al Wādī and Raḥbat as-Sūf as it existed in pre-1837 Qacentina (see page 36 and Figure 3.3).

was deemed necessary to preserve the historical attributes of a settlement within it (Article 6.5$^\circ$).

Importantly, the plan was intended to discuss the general land uses and to fix the essential elements within a framework for development (Chapter 1, Article 1). Consequently, Article 2 established the division of the area into different zones according to the principle land use — housing, industrial or rural areas. Further, it outlined the main routes of communication and delimited the areas to be used for public works (water, gas, electricity and telephone), and for public interest (wooded areas, monuments and ancient buildings, and open space). The plan should also have regulated and prohibited the installation or expansion of new or existing industrial premises where required. In addition, the Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur was required to include specific regulations with respect to development control.

The Plan de Détail completed the Plan Directeur as required, being applicable to certain sectors or quarters covered by the latter plan, and able to provide for variations from that plan. The areas concerned were, for example, quarters for renovation, areas of public interest (such as open space), and zones requiring intensive servicing (Article 3).

The Plan Directeur for Constantine had already commenced in 1959. The first report (Calsat 1959) outlined briefly (in all, 24 pages) and in general terms the present situation of the city, and, subsequently, identified areas of particular concern: namely housing, and transport and circulation within the agglomeration. By 1961, a strategic plan for the city in accordance with the 1960 legislation had been produced, taking a 20 year perspective for development, with a projected population of 350,000 persons. The Plan Directeur (Figure 8.1) was accompanied by a

Rocher

P

P

P

P

U

P

n

0    500m.

Industry

Residential

Tourist Development

Zone Vert

Forest Protection

Military

Redevelopment

Agricultural Protection

Administration/Commerce

P    Plan de Détail

Recreation

Primary Road

New Junction

U    University

FIGURE 8.1 The Plan Directeur for Constantine

Source: Calsat 1961

short document, the Reglement d'Aménagement (Calsat 1961).  This outlined various urban planning servitudes for the town, regarding, for example, parking (Article 5H), water and sanitation (Article 6H) and construction height (Article 13H).  The general nature of these is well exemplified by Article 3H (housing) which requires:  "les constructions pourrant être édifiées dans les quartiers sous réservés du respect des donnés générales du Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur, des lois, ordonnances décrets, arrêtés et codes en vigeur en Algérie et applicables en la matière".  Article 1H of the document proposed Plans de Détail for the quarters of Bellevue, Mansourah, Boufrika, Bardo and the Rocher.

## 8.3.  LAND FOR PLANNED DEVELOPMENT.

Physical planning in French colonial Algeria was not confined to the enforcement of town planning regulations, but also to the realisation of any planning operations provided for in the plans.  This was achieved through the acquisition of land (expropriation), construction, and making land available for private use (lotissement and, later, through the Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité).

### Expropriation

Expropriation - compulsory purchase - may be recognised as further assisting positive physical planning as it enables unconstructed land to be freed for either private or public development.  Consequently this played an important role in the urban development of Algeria by the French, especially in conjunction with the pursuit of their policy of colonisation libre.

This concept of expropriation was originally contained within the Décret

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of 3 May 1841. Entitled <u>Expropriation pour Cause d'Utilité Publique</u>, this
allowed expropriation not only "pour toute les causes prémier et déterminée
pour la loi français" but equally, "pour la fondation des villes, villages
ou hameaux ou pour l'aggrandissement de leur enceinté ou de leur
territoire" (<u>Bulletin Officiel du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie</u> 1841).

Intrinsic to this, however, was the basic notion of French administrative
law, <u>domaine</u> (public property).  Previously, under the order of 7 December
1830, all public <u>hubus</u> property was requisitioned by the colonial
authorities (see Aix Archives Nationales F80f).  Thereafter, the <u>domaine</u>
administration collected revenues from such property to provide for
expenses and the upkeep of mosques, schools and other municipal activities
supported by the <u>hubus</u> (see Chapter 4, p. 46).  Later, in 1844, the
ordinance of October 1 brought an end to the inalienable nature of the
<u>hubus</u> property, whereby the ultimate ownership of the property had been
reserved for god.  Consequently, this could no longer be viewed as a
valid objection to property transactions between a Muslim and European,
and it was thus possible for settlers to take possession of <u>hubus</u> land.

In association with the ordinance of 21 July 1846, the 1844 legislation
was able to extend the expropriation of land for the <u>domaine</u> by providing
for the verification of titles to land.  By this process, 'vacant' land
was incorporated into the <u>domaine</u>, unless owners, either European or
Muslim, obtained from investigating commissions documentary proof of the
authenticity of their rights in the land they held.  Thus each property
was delimited precisely within a distinct topographic and judicial
determination, and with a registered owner.  However, the legislation
went further, by allowing land to be expropriated "<u>sans titre</u>" (without
title) by the authorities to assist development in particular urban areas
(Algiers, Bône, Blida, Mostaganem and, later, Constantine).

## Lotissement

Once incorporated into the domaine, land was sold or auctioned to the
colonate who purchased it and were able in municipal areas to prepare
the land for development by the provision of roads, and the subdivision
of the residual into building plots. This they were able to finance by
the difference between the purchase and sales price. It was this
parcelling of the land which was known as lotissement.

In essence, lotissement was an operation purely of private law (Blumann
1977). It was not until the statute of 5 July 1922 (JOA 1922) that the
process became a public operation in officially allowing a municipality
to expropriate land for streets and other public uses, and parcel the
remainder into building lots. Similarly, this operation was also
financed by the difference between the purchase and resale price of the
land.


By 1960 lotissement had appeared on the Algerian statute as an operation
essentially realised by the private individual. Lotissement was thus
defined as an operation having as its object the voluntary division into
plots of landed property by simultaneous or successive sale of leases
with the view to the construction of dwellings, gardens or industrial
and commercial premises.

Under this law, the owner who decided to make a lotissement was required
to obtain an administrative authorisation, issued by order of the Préfet.
The application had to be accompanied by detailed plans making apparent
the various elements of the subdivision (roads, parking, buildings). It
needed also to indicate the programming of works.

The prefectoral authorisation was to be accompanied by lotissement
regulations which would play the part, to some extent, of a detailed town

plan, and would impose on the original owner various requirements and controls in the public interest. This could have covered such matters as public services, amenities and the height of buildings.

## Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité (ZUP)

The ZUP (priority urban development zone) was introduced to Algerian planning law in 1960 by Chapter V of Décret 60-960 (JOA 1960b). They possessed a double objective: first, a directed concentration of buildings within a geographical zone to avoid the costly dispersion of those public works the cost of which fell on the commune; and second, to combat speculation in land caused by any town planning operation (Blumann 1977). The ZUP itself,

> consistait à délimiter un périmètre ... dans lequel la collectivité publique décidait d'acquérir la maîtrise des sols et de réaliser les infrastructures et les équipements nécessaires pour y concentrer l'effort de construction de l'agglomération, tout en y gelant le prix des sols par le jeu d'un droit de préemption (Comby 1977, p. 553).

The zones, for a minimum of 100 and a maximum of 500 dwellings, were to be designated by an arrêté of the DGGA (Article 1). Management of the ZUP could be undertaken by the municipality, a public corporation, or by a concession company for public works (Article 2). The commune or other agency could arrange for purchasers of land within the zone to be assisted by loans from the Caisse d'Equipement pour le Développement de l'Algérie so as to realise urban development (Articles 5, 7, 8), after which the land within the zone would be put on sale.

The creation of a ZUP had two effects. On the one hand, an obligation to erect buildings within the zone, which was to be enforced by the refusal of the permis de construire for other purposes (Article 1), and on the other hand, the existence of a ZUP gave for a period of two years (or, at the discretion of the Délégué Général, longer) to the commune

or other agency a right of pre-emption so as to acquire any land at a
fixed price (Chapter VII, Article 4).

8.4.  DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND PLANNING STANDARDS.

During the nineteenth century, development control and planning in
Algeria were part of the police municipale, where various regulations,
such as the police de constructions were contained within a diversity of
rules.  In its origin planning law was not distinguishable from building
law; moreover, these various regulations could vary between communes.
Elsewhere, there were rules relating to historic monuments (30 March
1887), dangerous buildings (21 June 1898, relevant to édifices
menaçant ruine), and various controls formulated and imposed by the
commune concerning public highways or public health, under the law of
15 February 1902.  All of these were concerned with the siting, size and
external appearance of buildings.

The form of these controls was changed with the introduction of the law
of 55-900 of 7 July 1955, which introduced national level regulations
applicable throughout Algeria.  In addition this legislation introduced
the permis de construire (building permit).  The function of this control
is summarised by Dalloz (1962, p. 964),

> l'exercise du droit d'édifier des constructions devrait
> être subordonné à une autorisation administrative.  Elle
> a pour objet de coordonner les initiatives individuelles
> privées ou publiques tant en vue de les subordonner aux
> règlements d'hygiène et de sauvegarde de l'intérêt
> général que de les mettre en harmonie avec les plans
> d'aménagement et d'urbanisme.

The grant of a permis de construire was an administrative act, whereby
the public authority stated that building and construction projects were

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not contrary to any town planning provision (contained, for example, in the Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur). The applicant had the right of permission if the project conformed to planning regulations - if not, the authority had the right to refuse. The authority could either grant or reject permission; it did not have discretion to refuse, and had only compétence liée so to act (that is, to only refuse in circumstances laid down by the law).

The application to be submitted comprised four parts: a plan of the situation of the proposed construction at either 1:5000 or 1:10,000 scale; a plan to the scale of 1:200 or 1:500 detailing the type, aspect, materials, and colour of the edifice; a notice of the work envisaged; and finally a plan at a minimum of one centimetre to one metre, including servicing of the building. The application was to be sent by the landowner to the Maire of the commune and the departmental director of public works. In principle the Maire was competent to make the decision with the advice of the latter authority: if there was disagreement between the two, the decision had to be made by the Préfet.

8.5. CONCLUSION.

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 have discussed French colonial ideology and the urban development of Qacentina during this period, respectively. It is the purpose of Chapter 9 to determine initially whether a relationship exists between the two. Consequently, it will, on the basis of the preceding summary in this chapter, be possible to evaluate whether physical planning acted as an agent of ideology in relation to the urban space.

# CHAPTER NINE.

# 9. IDEOLOGY, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND THE URBAN FORM OF FRENCH COLONIAL QACENTINA: A SYNTHESIS

## 9.1. IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN SPACE.

The juxtaposition of the European-style city to the pre-colonial settlement of Qacentina was emblematic of the colonial city. As Fanon (1980a, p. 29-30) observed in 1959, "the colonizers ... [in Constantine] have surrounded the native city; they have laid seige to it. Every exit from the Kasbah ... opens on enemy territory". King (1976, p. 39) effectively explains this by arguing that, in order to maintain its self identity, a colonial community needed to provide "a culturally familiar and easily recognisable environment which ... was a formal visual symbol providing psychological and emotional security in a world of uncertain events". Indeed, this is consistent with the conclusion of Chapter 6, above, which asserted that the need for this psychological and emotional security by the colons accounted for the very existence of the ideology which prevailed during that period. This implicit link between ideology and the physical environment can, however, be more definitely demonstrated in French colonial Qacentina.

An administrative report on the city in 1844 noted that, "le but principal immédiat de la colonisation est de faciliter l'etablissement de notre domination sur les arabes" (Aix Archives Nationales F80e; see Figure 9.1). That same year, as Chapter 7 has noted, one of the first major intrusions by the colons onto the form of the settlement was represented by the three boulevards which disected the indigenous city. As an urban form per se, these undoubtedly correspond to the form of Hausmann's Paris, the city which, according to Hugo-Brunt (1972), inspired the architects of colonialism. Hausmann's plan was founded on the concept of régulariser

which, as Choay (1965) elaborates, served to regularise the disordered

city, and to symbolise a new order by a layout which would disentangle

it from the past. Benjamin (1968, p. 87) goes further, by identifying

the main precept of Hausmann as 'l'embellissement stratégique'. The

streets, he suggests, were designed to allow the rapid movement between

the barracks and working class quarters in the city: moreover, the

width of the roads helped prevent the erection of barricades. In

Constantine the boulevards symbolically rationalised the intricate street

pattern of the Turkish settlement: in addition they allowed the army

rapid access from the French garrison at the Kasbah to quarters throughout

the city (Figure 7.1, p. 92).


Whilst facilitating military domination by the colons, this change to

pre-colonial settlement simultaneously represented the initial ideological

'domination sur les arabes' with respect to both capitalism and racism.

As Engels wrote of capitalist society in 1872,

> The expansion of ... modern cities gives the land in certain
> sections of them, particularly in those which are centrally
> situated, an artificial and often enormously increasing
> value: the buildings erected in these areas depress this
> value, instead of increasing it, because they no longer
> correspond to the changed circumstances. They are pulled
> down and replaced by others. This takes place above all with
> centrally located workers' houses, whose rents, even with the
> greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase
> above a certain maximum. They are pulled down and in their
> stead shops ... and public buildings are erected. Through
> its Hausmann in Paris, Bonapartism exploited this tendency
> tremendously for swindling and private enrichment (Engels
> 1975, p. 20).


The analogy with Qacentina in the mid-nineteenth century is clear. Arab

dwellings on the rocher were demolished, and replaced by shops and public

buildings - for example, the Préfecture in 1849; the Municipalité in 1854.

Engels, however, continues by arguing that the outcome of this is that the

proletariat are forced out of the centre of town towards the periphery —

Le but principal immédiat de la colonisation est de faciliter
l'établissement de notre domination sur les arabes;

FIGURE 9.1 Extract from Aix Archives Nationales F80e on Constantine,
Dated 1844.

yet the building industry, which is offered a much better field for speculation by more expensive dwelling houses, builds workers' dwellings only by way of exception. In 1843, it had already been noted that in Constantine, "les Européens ont déjà depossédé la population indigène du tiers des immeubles", with the result that "les indigènes feront forcées d'émigrer - ou ils résterant en ville prolétaire, misérables" (Aix Archives Nationales F80e). New residential construction after this was initially confined to the residential areas of Sidi Mabrouk, Faubourg Saint Jean, and Bellevue, characterised by the pavillon, and were inhabited by the colons. As late as 1961, Faidutti-Rudolph (1961, p. 50) was able to raise concern in connection with "le divorce qui existe entre l'augmentation de la population et celle du logement". Comparison of Figures 7.4 and 7.5 demonstrate this by indicating little relationship between the new residential construction and the increase in Muslim population in the city between 1948 and 1960. Elsewhere, Loew (1979) has noted that although 3,000 dwellings per annum were planned to be built in the city between 1959 and 1962, during this period only 6,000 were actually constructed, mainly in Bellevue, and primarily owner-occupied.

Indeed, by the close of the period of French colonisation, the settlement was a distinct and tangible representation of the capitalist city proposed by Harvey (1973). Thus, the physical structure of the city combined the symbolic city centre of Coudiat Aty, with its emphasis on prestige and status; the affluent neighbourhoods of, for example, Bellevue and Sidi Mabrouk; the areas of public HLM housing, such as the Cité Gailliard; and the gourbi and bidonvilles (p. 99). The socio-economic segregation of the colonial city which this reflected appears in stark contrast to the original, and largely indifferentiated quarters of the precolonial settlement (Chapter 3).

As Lefebvre (1974, p. 262) argues, "le capitalisme s'est maintenu par la conquête ... de l'espace".[1] This assertion is well supported by the development of Qacentina. As the town expanded, so did transport facilities, with 80 kilometres of roads built between 1837 and 1937, and the construction of the bridges of Sidi Rached and Sidi M'Cid (p. 88), aswell as the provision of services such as electricity, gas and water introduced to the city (for example, p. 84); and, as the natural corollary, the construction industry. Societies such as the Société Lavie à Constantine, Société d'Energie Electrique, and Société Algérienne des Eaux were owned and controlled by the grands colons – for example Blachette (Rondière 1955). Similarly the construction companies were also privately owned, assisting further capital accumulation by the colons. As Table 6.3 demonstrated, in Algeria almost 50 per cent of the indigenous workforce were employed as labouring or domestic staff; as Table 7.1 for 1931 demonstrated, in Constantine itself 35.2 per cent of the Muslims employed in the city worked in the service industry (in transport, as labourers, or domestic work). This was compared to 13.1 per cent of the European workforce in the city. Table 6.2 and 6.3

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1. Lefebvre, lucidly, explains this as follows: "considérons ... la ville. Ce fut une réalité historique, une formation sociale pre-capital-iste: pensez à la cité antique, à la ville médiévale. Le capitalisme s'en est emparé, il remanie la ville historique selons ses exigences economiques, politiques, et 'culturelles'. La ville, plus ou moins éclatée en banlieues, en périphéries, en agglomérations satellites, devient à la fois centre de pouvoir et source de profits immenses. L'aggloméra-tion urbaine ... en fait partie littéralement: elle fournit les multiples services, transports et sous traitances dont ne peuvent de passer les entreprises. Il y a dans la ville moderne une veritable consommation productive de l'espace, des moyens de transports, des batîments, des routes et rues. S'y emploie une immense force de travail aussi productive que la force de travail destinée à l'entretien et à l'alimentation des machines. C'est là, à mon avis, un des secrets de ... capitalisme. La force de travail qui s'emploie dans la production et l'entretien de l'espace, dans les transports, dans les multiples activités nommées 'services', est généralement peu payée et faible la composition organique du capital investi ... . La ville historique se dégrade; la consommation de l'espace historique correspond à la production de l'espace capitaliste. (Lefebvre 1972, p. 263. Author's italics).

indicate the clear differentials between the incomes of the Muslim and European population in Algeria generally. Consequently, it may be concluded that the expansion of city, primarily using (and exploiting) an indigenous workforce, generated associated construction and service activities to the profit of the colons.

Indeed, Bourdieu (1979) in a survey of the indigenous population of seven peripherally sited housing estates in Constantine[2] in 1960 found that increased expenses, such as rent, were aggravated by the appearance of new expenses to the residents, which included transport costs and charges for services, such as gas, electricity and water. His analysis indicated that the occupants of these flats were spending an average of 15.5, 8.5, 6.0 and 3.5 per cent of their disposable income on rent, service charges, upkeep and transport, respectively. If the average expenditure of 11 per cent on furniture is accounted, this gives a total of 44.5 per cent of the total disposable income of the inhabitants being spent in association with the dwelling. This compares with an approximate figure of 10 per cent in the previous housing situation (Bourdieu 1979). Even more significantly, however, Bourdieu concludes that these modern appartments required a change in life-style by the indigenous population, of whom only a privileged few were able to make the successful cultural and economic transition. Thus, he argued,

> modern housing has made possible the development of a
> (petty) bourgeoisie whose whole life-style, its values and
> its aspirations, separates it from the proletariat and
> sub-proletariat of the shanty-town and old urban areas.
> The conditions required of those who cross the 'threshold
> of modernity' are such that it is here a boundary between
> classes (Bourdieu 1979, p. 91).

On this evidence, therefore, it may be argued that Qacentina, by the end of the colonial period, was an instrument of the colons in maintaining

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2. These were: Les Mûriers, Le Bon Pasteur, Anatole France, El Bar, Les Apôtres, Les Plantanes, Les Pins, and Cité Gaillard.

capitalist production and accumulation, and in exacerbating the existing

class-structured society, itself a characteristic feature of the

capitalist city (Harvey 1973).

However, the city was not only a physical manifestation of economic

stratification. It also represented an inherent apartheid. This was

initially demonstrated by the division of the original Turkish

settlement following a military recommendation in 1844 (Figure 9.2),

later enacted by the Ordonnance of June 1844 (p.108). This was but one

example of how, in Rapoport's (1977) terminology, "culture-specific

design" both stressed and ensured the social and ethnic segregation of Con-

stantine in accordance with this particular ideological trait. Else-

where, racial interaction within the city was similarly controlled by

the use of space, distance, and the suburb.

As the examination of the development of the city during the period of

French colonialism indicated, at an early stage, that the quarters,

such as Saint-Jean, Bellevue and in particular Sidi Mabrouk, established

by the colons were situated at some distance from the indigenous

settlement (p. 88). Moreover, the generous use of space and distance

within the colonial districts contrasted markedly with the dense, tight

spaces of the Turkish settlement (Chapter 3). Figure 9.3 exemplifies

this. In effect, the colonial quarters represented an environment

incongruous to the culture, lifestyle and behaviour of the Muslim

population (in effect, the ideological contrast emphasised by the

comparison of Chapters 2 and 6). The outcome of this on controlling

social interaction is most easily assessed in relation to movement. In

the Muslim settlement, mobility was limited: areas and services were

accessible (Chapter 3). By contrast, in the European quarters, physical

space in relation to movement was such that the largely pedestrian native

$2^{\circ}$. définir et délimiter le quartier Européen, d'après les
nécessités probables et au délà de ces limites, nul Européen
ni pourrait ni bâtir, ni habiter, ni devenir propriétaire ou
locataire d'aucun immeuble, sous peine d'amende, de nullité
des baux ou actes de cession de vente, d'expulsion immédiate
de la ville.

FIGURE 9.2 Extract from Aix Archives Nationales F80e on Constantine,
Dated 1844.

The Rocher
(Muslim)

n

0          100m.

Sidi Mabrouk
(European)

FIGURE 9.3  Constantine: Contrast in the Use of Space and Distance
between Parts of The Rocher and Sidi Mabrouk.

-125-

population would find low density spaces difficult to traverse, uncomfortable climatically (cf. p. 58, note 1), as well as becoming easily visible and hence, easy to control.

This underlines the very essence of the Brèche or cordon sanitaire, separating the madina from the Coudiat (p. 88). The use and control of space is such that Berque (1955, p. 35) is able to observe that, "la vielle ville est ... perchée de sécantes comme à Constantine à moins qu'une "ville nouvelle" ou "ville Européenne" resurgisie arbitrairement loins de vieux remparts: tel fut le principle lyauteyen". The term "lyanteyen" applied to Qacentina by Berque provides a key concept in the wider comprehension, and affirmation, of the representation of ideology in the urban space during this period. In essence, "lyauteyen" is a planning paradigm which can be ascribed to Marshal Lyautey. As resident général of Morocco, he was primarily responsible for instituting what Abu Lughod (1980b) qualifies as 'urban planning for apartheid'. The underlying principles are elaborated by Lyautey himself:

> Toucher les moins possible aux villes indigènes. Aménager à leurs abords, sur les vastes espaces encore libres, la ville Européenne, suivant un plan réalisant les conditions les plus modernes, large boulevards, adductions d'eau et d'électricité, squares et jardins, autobus et tramways, et prévoyant aussi les possibilités d'extension future ... L'Essential, sur ce point capital, c'est qu'il y ait le moins de mélanges possible entre les deux ordres de villes. (Lyautey 1927, p. 452, 453; 451. Emphasis added).

A clear relationship between French colonial ideology and the contemporary urban form of Qacentina can therefore be identified. As Cohen (1955, p. 586-587) succinctly writes "entre la ville Européenne et la ville indigène il y a la distance interstellaire du colonialisme". The remainder of this chapter will explore the main tenet of this thesis: whether physical planning can be identified as the agent in effecting this relationship.

## 9.2. FRENCH COLONIAL PHYSICAL PLANNING AS AN AGENT OF CAPITALISM AND RACISM.

It might be reasonably argued that the transposition of ideology onto the urban form of Constantine can be attributed to the military presence in the city (p. 86; 88; 102). In part, this is true, at least to the extent that through the use of physical force, or by acting as a deterrent, the colons ensured the imposition of the components of ideology. By contrast, it was physical planning per se which was the determinant and essential agent of ideology as it pervaded the urban space.

Section 9.1, above, has drawn attention to the relationship between the colonial development of Qacentina and capitalism. There is evidence that physical planning has played a role in this. Satre (1955, p. 1383), for example, has commented that in Algeria, "les institutions françaises sont celles d'une démocratie bourgeoisie fondée sur le capitalisme". Indeed, it is logical to infer that the contemporary ideology will be reflected in, and will also determine, the legal and organisational framework of physical planning in French colonial Algeria. Chapter 1, under section 1.4, has already argued that the ruling ideology will permeate the formal power structure of society, and this is particularly true of Algeria between 1830 and 1960 when the various agencies of physical planning were almost exclusively composed of colons. Reference to Le receuil des procès-verbaux des séances du Conseil Municipal de Constantine which records the decisions taken by this élite with respect to the development and planning of the city clearly indicates the role of the local physical planning agencies as mediators between ideology and the urban space.* The various responsibilities of the Maire and Préfet (p. 105) further indicate the presence of an ideological bias. Chapter 1 (p. 15) has earlier drawn attention to the right-wing political orientation

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* There were intriguing glimpses to this during the author's first, reconnaissance, visit to Qacentina. Frustratingly, however, these documents were reclassified as restricted following the transfer of the city archives during the main field-study period.

of the city at the close of the nineteenth century.

By the close of the colonial era, it is possible to indicate more clearly

how physical planning was influenced by ideology, and, consequently,

acted as an agent between ideology and the urban environment. The

institution of the Statute of 20 September 1947 (p. 76) whose aim,

according to Jeanson (1952, p. 2220) was to "sauvegarder integralement

les structures de l'exploitation coloniale", has already been noted.

Importantly, this established the Assemblée Algérienne, "chargée de

gérer ... les intérêts propres de l'Algérie" (Article 6 of the Statut

de l'Algérie quoted by Jeanson(1952, p. 2221)). Implicitly, these would

be the ruling interests:  those of the colons.  Article 39 of the Statut

ensured this by providing a procedural clause which required any decision,

at the request of the Gouvener Général, Commission de Finance or one

quarter of the Assemblée Algérienne, to be made conditional on a further

two-thirds majority vote.  Thus,

> the colons' negative power was greatly enhanced by the
> Statute:  they could fail to ratify liberalizing initiatives
> from across the Mediterranean, and under the 'two-thirds'
> rule, could systematically block unwelcome measures proposed
> by the Muslims in the second college. (Murray and Wengraff
> 1963, p. 58).

Undoubtedly, the ideological bias that this infers was aided by electoral

falsification (p. 77, 78).  However, not only does this imply the

influence of ideology on post-1947 planning legislation, but also in the

institutional organisation of physical planning itself.  The establishment

of the CADAT in 1956 (p. 106), in fact represented an organisation which,

par excellence, reflected the particular interests of the colons.  This

is suggested by the absence of any Muslims in the cadre from which the

members were drawn, and indicated by the direct influence of grands colons

(p. 69) themselves on the organisation.  Examples of this can be drawn

from Rondière (1955):  Schiaffino and Cudot were directors of the Banque

d'Algérie, of which the vice president and one representative had to
appear on the Conseil de Surveillance and Conseil d'Administration of the
CADAT, respectively.  Furthermore, Lafond was a member of the Commission
d'Enérgie, and de Seriguy a member, and one-time vice president of the
Assemblée Algérienne, both organisations of which were represented on the
CADAT.  That the CADAT influenced the urban development of Qacentina
within particular ideological parameters is evident.  As Chapter 8
(p. 106) notes, the CADAT was responsible to "faciliter le développement
de zones résidentielles".  Section 9.1 above notes the significant bias
during this period in favour of locating new residential zones within the
predominately European quarters of the city.

The further role of physical planning as the precipitator of the ideology
manifested within Qacentina during the period of French colonisation can
be partially, but nonetheless clearly, verified by the physical, racial
and administrative segregation of the city elaborated within the urban
plan and regulations attached to the Ordonnance of 9 June 1844 (p. 108).
Over one hundred years later, the relationship between this aspect of
physical planning, ideology and the urban space remained.  The urban plan,
however, had developed into a more subtle ideological agent.

The form of the plan d'urbanisme for the city, outlined in the previous
chapter, produced a plan (Figure 8.1) with a 20 year time horizon, during
which time modification during implementation was not anticipated.
Consequently, the planning agency can be identified as operating a
programme thought to satisfy its objectives.  The provision of an ideal,
static environment which this represents, is characteristic of 'blue-print'
planning (Faludi 1973).

The method of preparation of the plan d'urbanisme affirms this suggestion.
The initial survey of the existing situation and proposals for various

remedial action outlined in Calsat (1959), and the subsequent master-plan (Calsat 1961, p. 109; 111) closely parallels the format of 'survey-analysis-plan' which Hall (1974) sees as intrinsic to 'blue-print' planning. Crucially, Cahmis (1979) equates this with the rational deductive ideal in planning (Figure 9.4).



**FIGURE 9.4 The Deductive Ideal in Plan Formulation.**
Source: Cahmis (1979, p.28)

The deductive ideal signifies an attempt to deduce a plan and a set of actions from a set of goals and objectives. These "planning goals are constructed by ideologies and particularly by the ideology of the dominant class" (Cahmis 1979, p. 34). Implicitly, therefore, a link may be initially concluded between the mode of planning and the inherent ideology of French colonial Algeria.

However, the use of a deductive approach helps to avoid raising questions about the goals, and shifts the emphasis from initial premises to the process itself – hence the qualification by Cahmis of the deductive ideal as rational. Significantly, this introduces a specific relationship between this mode of planning and capitalism. Marx and Engels (1970, p. 66), for example, note that each ruling class, "to give its ideas the form of universality represent them as the only _rational_ universally valid ones" (emphasis added). The goals of society are thus inferred to

be the outcome of a rational process. Cahmis (1979) convincingly examines
the principle of rationality and indeed, rational planning, through a
historical analysis of the concept from Adam Smith's natural order of
laissez faire economics through to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
In conclusion, he reasons, "the natural is rational and capitalism is
both" (Cahmis 1979, p. 19). In effect, the goals of society are

perceived as the outcome of a natural process (the market mechanism), thus
obscuring that they are the imposed goals of the dominant class (Meyerson
1973).

This connection between rationality and capitalism is additionally
proposed by Weber (1947). His argument asserts that in terms of formal
rationality, that is, the efficient relation of means to given ends, the
most rational of all processes is capitalism. In these terms, Hirst
(1976) remarks, this rationality can lead neither to equity nor social
justice. As a result, Sidi Boumedine, by way of compounding support for

this dialectic, is able to state that in Algeria,

> l'urbanisme institutionnel colonial qui est une production
> au capitalisme a servi à organiser, justifier, légitimer
> sous le couvert des organisations spatiales formalisées
> dans les schémas un découpage arbitraire du territoire ...
> urbain ... en vue du meilleur fonctionnement de l'exploita-
> tion coloniale (Sidi Boumedine 1973, p. 89).

The Plan d'Urbanisme for Constantine (Figure 8.1) goes some way to
exemplify this rhetoric. Effectively, the Plan projected the division
of the city into a series of built-up zones (housing, industry, and so
forth), buffered from each other by 'zones verts' designated for leisure
activities, parkland and woodland. In essence, this represented a non-
integrated land-use strategy for the city. The exclusive concentration
of one particular land-use within a specific zone undoubtedly enabled
economies of scale to be achieved in industrial development by the colon
and metropolitan owned companies, and in housing construction with regard

to the provision of infrastructure. But at the same time, this actively
discriminated against the urban poor in the city. The survey by Bourdieu
(1979) undertaken in 1960, cited above, stressed the hardship caused by
excess travel costs and journey time imposed on the Algerian family in
the town by the non-integration of land-use then in existence.

If this form of zoning acted as a representation of French colonial
ideology, so too did the Zones à Urbaniser par Priorité (p. 113).
Admittedly, they facilitated the development of large public flat-
complexes, such as at the Quartier de la Remonte (Plate 7.8), let out
primarily to Muslims at fixed, low rents. However, in retrospect, the
ZUP has been criticised as representing zones which are "affectés quasi
exclusivement au logement social et reservées à la population la plus
défavorisée. Elles ont, des lors symbolisé, une evidente ségrégation
par l'habitat" (Jégouzo and Pittard 1980, p. 164).

It has been argued above that there existed a strong relationship between
the expansion of the city and capitalist ideology. Consequently, it may
be inferred from the introduction to Algeria in 1841 of legislation
relating to expropriation for the purpose of construction (p. 112) that
physical planning was the agent of this ideology. Further support for
this is suggested by the fact that this legislation was not received from
France, but, by contrast, represented an entirely innovatory concept.
Indeed, it was not until over 100 years later that the law of 7 August
1953 conferred this legal principle as an instrument of physical planning
within the Metropole itself. However, if this legislation initially
assisted urban expansion - and capitalism - in nineteenth century
Algeria, the influence of ideology on this process was undoubtedly
compounded by the legislation of 1844 and 1846, and 1873 (p. 112; 65).
This was done by extending the principle of expropriation to the degree

that all land was to be incorporated into the domaine unless documentary

proof of authenticity of rights in land were obtained from an investiga-

ting commission (acquisition of land sans titre, p. 112).  In concept

alone, this led to the possibility of fraud.  French colonial Algeria

was organised under two systems of law:  the Roman-Germanic school of

French law (p. 63), and the Malīkī school of Islamic law (p. 21).

Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the colons were familiar with

French law and procedure, whilst the Algerians were not.  Moreover,

Algerians would be reluctant to revalidate their ownership through the

French system, since this involved the transference of their rights from

the Islamic to the French court.  This afforded the opportunity to the

colons to register land which they had not actually purchased, and/or

to register doctored land deeds.  Ageron (1979, p. 95) notes, for example,

that the law of 1873 "permit surtout aux hommes de loi et aux spéculat-

eurs de licitier des propriétés musulmans indivisés et d'aquérir à bon

compte des propriétés individualles", both around settlements, and in the

rural areas.

The assistance of this legislation in the process of capital accumulation

and exploitation by the colons is clear.  This process, was, however,

accelerated by the expropriation of hubus property (p. 112).  Land

illegally alienated from the hubus was bought by the municipality of

(then) Constantine and resold at a profit to the colons who built on

land that had been improved and readied for urban development by funds

supplied either by their purchase price, or the difference between

their purchase and sale prices.  This has been alluded to by Mercier

(1903).

The Association Syndicales de Propriétaires (p. 106) completed the means

by which expropriation both represented and effected the development of

Qacentina within the parameters of French colonial ideology. Whilst

recognising that the right of expropriation belonged exclusively to the

powers of state, in essence it also allowed the delegation of police

powers to private constructors and companies chartered by the French,

such as the Association Syndicale de Propriétaires de Bellevue

registered in 1873. The process was simple. French officials declared

land to be for public purpose. All the legal owners of the relevant land

(that is land which had been registered in French as opposed to Islamic

courts) would subsequently form a private company of shareholders to

which authorities ceded police power. Only 75 per cent of the owners

needed to consent to this - moreover, association could be forced. The

syndicate then divided land and reassigned lots at their discretion.

Consequently, this provided the opportunity to rid quarters of potential

Muslim inhabitants if they did not hold title to French registered land.

Alternatively, they could be reassigned with unsuitable or valueless lots.

Although it was difficult to obtain actual documentary proof of particular

instances of such corruption, it is almost sufficient to note that by

1937, the French owned and occupied 80 per cent of urbanised land at

Qacentina.


French colonial urbanisation of Qacentina was undoubtedly assisted by

lotissement (p. 113) which facilitated the subdivision of 'illegally'

expropriated land into regular plots. Thus, the land surrounding the

city became a better economic proposition for providing services (water,

electricity, and roads) and sale by the municipality, and hence more

attractive for purchase and construction by the colons. And whilst

facilitating the implantation of capitalism, lotissement, by enabling

the division of physical spaces analysed under 9.2 above, served further

to control racial interaction in the city.


The housing standards intrinsic to the police de constructions and later

the permis de construire (p. 114) also served a dual ideological purpose.
First, these were both founded on the principle that development should
only be allowed if it was in the public interest:  in other words the
ruling interest of the colons.  This implicit racial discrimination was
reinforced by the necessity of any potential development to comply to
the building standards formulated by the colonial administration in the
city.  Houses were set back from the road (for example, Plate 7.5),
precluding courtyard type dwellings; windows were consequently exterior
to the dwelling, their size determined by an index relating to the floor
surface of the room; bathrooms and other utilities were required.  By
rigourously imposing European standards on new development in the city,
these physical planning standards were exclusionary vis à vis the Muslim.
It is notable that the only significant development undertaken during the
French colonial occupation of Qacentina by the indigenous population was
the essentially illegal, and defiant, form of the bidon and gourbiville
(p. 99).

9.3.  CONCLUSION.

In 1932, during a conference in Paris on urban planning in the colonies,
de Tarde delivered what was considered as a "spirituel et brillant
exposé" (Royer 1932, p. 27) on the subject of physical planning in French
North Africa.  His speech effectively corroborates the assumptions
expressed on the role of physical planning as an agent of ideology in
Algeria during this period.

> Il est certain que l'urbanisme, ce n'est pas dessiner sur
> la table des épures de plan d'extension, ni composer au
> bureau des projets de législation, c'est exécuter les plans
> sur le terrain, c'est faire de cette législation une réalité
> vivant.
>
> Abordons maintenant le chapitre des conditions.  Eh bien,

d'abord, je <del>v</del>iens de le dire, pas d'urbanisme sans une
législation. Une législation aussi simple, aussi pratique
que possible. Pas draconienne au sens où on l'entend
d'habitude ... mais plutôt, si l'on peut dire, <u>imperialiste ...</u>
cette legislation, <u>vous en savez les points essentiels:</u>
<u>prévoyant un plan d'ensemble avec des servitudes, de larges</u>
<u>expropriations par zones; des redistribution de terrains ...</u>
<u>une reglementation étroit de lotissements des constructions</u>
<u>en général.</u> (de Tarde 1932, p. 28. Emphasis added).

He continues by stating that "Le premier [principe d'urbanisme] vous le

connaissez bien: séparation de la ville indigène et de la ville

Europeenne. On vous a dit les raisons politiques, hygiéniques,

économiques, esthétiques qui imposent cette solution" (de Tarde 1932,

p.29). It is wholly significant that he cites aesthetic reasons after

those of political, hygenic and economic.

In 1959, Jovy, in his paper on physical planning in French colonial Algeria,

made two notable points. The first was that in planning contemporary

urban development, "il est ... indispensable que chaque dépense soit

assurée d'une rentabilité maximale" (Jovy 1959, p. 47). Second, he stressed

that, "il est inutile et même psychologiquement nuisable de construire

pour les autochtones musulmanes des logements différents de ceux qui

sont mis à la disposition des Européens" (Jovy 1959, p. 42).

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that there appears to be a

distinct relationship between ideology, physical planning and the form

of Qacentina as it developed in French colonial Algeria. This closely

corresponds to the conclusion in Part One of this study which also

positively identified physical planning as an agent of ideology. However,

it may be additionally concluded that physical planning had also acted as

an initiator or catalyst of ideological change with respect to the urban

space between Islamic and French colonial Algeria. It is the purpose of

Part Three to investigate whether this relationship also holds true

for post-Independence.

## 10.1. INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER TEN.

## 10. THE IDEOLOGY OF INDEPENDENT ALGERIA

### 10.1. INTRODUCTION.

The Algerian War of Independence was one of the most brutal struggles for liberation that the world has known (see, for example, Horne 1979), and marked the last desperate attempt of the modern world to retain the concept of North Africa as a southern part of Europe (Mazrui 1980). However, Le Coz (1976, p. 8) also comments on "la brutalité de la vacance de l'aire coloniale", indicating the wider effect on the country of the exodus of over 90 per cent of the European colons following Algerian independence.  In June 1962 a policy of terre brûlée was inaugurated by the pied noirs founded on the rationale that "if Algérie français could not be preserved, then Algeria must be reduced to what it had been in 1830.  The Muslims should not have the benefit of anything created by the colons." (Clegg 1971, p. 40).  Consequently, the departure of the colons was accompanied by the widespread destruction of buildings, machinery, communications and administrative records.  Furthermore, the exodus of the colons also represented an almost complete departure of all Algeria's cadre of doctors, managers, administrators, engineers, teachers and skilled manpower.  Few Muslims were able to take over production, commerce, or provide professional or technical expertise (Ottaway 1970).

The legacy of colonisation, of which this was the final humiliation, has had an impact from which the country is still recovering.

The World Bank (1980) categorised the world into 38 low income, 52 middle income, 18 industrialised, five capital surplus oil exporters and 12 centrally planned economies.  The first three categories are ranked according to gross national product (GNP) per capita.  Algeria, with a GNP per capita of 1260 U.S. dollars consequently falls within the "middle

income" countries (bounded by a GNP _per capita_ of between 360 and 3500

U.S. dollars), ranking seventy-second in ascending order.  However, the

use of this single criterion may be seen to overstate significantly the

level of development of post-Independent Algeria.  For example, the

literacy rate of those people of 15 years or above in 1975 in Algeria

was 37 per cent (compared to the average for all middle income countries

('r') of 71 per cent).  Life expectancy at birth was only 56 years (r =

61 years); the average annual rate of population increase was 3.2 per cent

(r = 2.4 per cent).  Although in 1977, Algeria's population had received

an average 99 per cent of the required daily calorie supply, this

compared unfavourably to an average of 108 per cent of required calories

_per capita_ for the class.

These indicators clearly distinguish the level of development in post-

Independent Algeria from that of the former colonial power, France,

emphasising the contradictions of colonisation.  By contrast, France's

GNP _per capita_ at 8260 U.S. dollars in 1978 was six times higher than

that of Algeria's; the adult literacy rate was 99 per cent; life

expectancy at birth was 73 years; there was an average daily calorie

intake of 131 per cent of the requirement.  Moreover in 1977 one doctor

and nursing person per 630 and 220 people respectively compared to one

physician and nurse for each 5,360 and 1,490 persons in Algeria.

It is against this background that Algeria, as a Third World, newly

developing country constructed an ideology of socio-economic development

which was inherently antipathetic to that of the colonial era.  It is the

purpose of this chapter to examine the elements of this ideology.

## 10.2. THE IDEOLOGY OF INDEPENDENT ALGERIA.

Nkrumah (1962) has argued that national liberation, or decolonisation, necessitates three objectives: political freedom - that is, complete and absolute independence from control by any foreign government; democratic freedom - requiring liberation from political tyranny and establishment of a democracy in which sovereignty rests in the mass of the people; and, fundamentally, social reconstruction, entailing freedom from poverty and economic exploitation, and improvement of the social and economic conditions of the people. For the newly independent state therefore, formal independence alone is incompatible with authentic colonisation: there must also be involved a conscious move toward the transformation of that society. It is Nyerere's (1967, p. 22) contention that, for the decolonising country "the choice is not between change and no change: the choice for Africa is between changing and being changed - changing our lives under our own direction or being changed by the impact of forces outside our control".

Fanon indicates the end to which this change may be directed. In order to transform a nominal independence into a real one, he contends, decolonisation can only be authentically revolutionary if it is also authentically socialist. More simply, to achieve national liberation, "what counts ... is the need for a redistribution of wealth" (Fanon 1967, p. 78). Whilst Desfosses and Levesque (1975) maintain that socialism in the Third World context represents a search for a development model and a response to anti-imperialist sentiments, Nyerere (1967, p. 208), by contrast, reasons that "all of us accept that socialism and the maintenance of inequalities are incompatible". As Berque (1964, p. 156) notes, "les stratégies de l'emancipation ont dû s'accomoder de ces inéqualités".

By way of assertion, Ouzegane (1962, p. 304), considered as one of the

principal theoreticians of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which

became Algeria's official party after Independence, had written: "pour

construire une République moderne, il nous faut rénover l'armature

idéologique de l'Etat Algérien en le dotant d'une Constitution

démocratique facilitant le triomphe de la justice sociale". Accordingly,

in May 1962, the Programme pour la réalisation d'une révolution

démocratique et populaire (Tripoli Programme) was introduced. "Chargé

théoretiquement de préparer les premier rouages idéologiques" (Dahmani

1979, p. 291) of Independent Algeria, this saw a state subscribing to

socialist principles in which large areas of production would be

collectivised and rational planning would be introduced. Although

tempered by respect to Islam, nevertheless this represented an ideological

victory for the left-wing elements of the FLN (Ottaway 1970); however,

by 1963 the term 'Islamic socialism' was being discretely advanced by

the regime with the aim to counter serious Islamic religious reactions

to the government's pursuit of a Marxist ideology (Vallin 1973).

Nevertheless, the commitment to socialism was affirmed in 1964 by the

Charte d'Alger, which contained the most complete doctrinal statement

of Algerian socialism to date. Whilst still "très largement compte de

l'appartenance de l'Algérie au monde arabo-musulman et de son attache-

ment aux valuers islamiques" (Collin 1969, p. 659), at the same time it

represented,

> a testament to the endeavours of a small group of
> intellectuals to donate a radical Marxist theory with
> Trotskyist overtones to the Algerian Revolution. [A]s
> the official programme of the FLN, the bureaucracy paid
> it lip service, while quietly ignoring every one of its
> recommendations. (Clegg 1971, p. 128).

Consequently, concern was quickly raised as to the authenticity of the

socialism adopted under the leadership of Ben Bella (see, for example, Chaliand 1965). Despite agrarian reforms and autogestion (workers' self-management) being introduced, no real attempt was made to make socialism a serious political and economic force. Minces, (1965, p. 2213), cites, for example, the introduction of autogestion, used ultimately "comme un alibi qui devait donner au peuple l'impression de 'socialisme'". And indeed, Bennamane (1980), has positively stated that at Independence the guise of a rhetorical commitment to socialism enabled the Algerian bourgeoisie to consolidate their bargaining power. As Clegg (1970) explains, in the absence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie the only channel for upward mobility lay through the ranks of administration or party. Consequently, state socialism corresponded with the interests of this class as it situated political and economic power with them as members of the administration. Thus, at this time, Bennamane (1980) strongly contends, Algeria's declared ideological adherence to socialism was, in reality, a myth. Various opposition to Ben Bella's policies culminated in a swift and bloodless coup d'Etat in June 1965 by the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armée Nationale Populaire, Houari Boumediene, subsequent to which, in a speech of July 5 1965, he proclaimed "le socialisme verbal" to be dead.

Boumediene embarked on a socialist programme which comprised five main elements: further nationalisation to regain control of the nation's natural resources, which culminated in the nationalisation in February 1971 of the major French oil companies operating in the country; the restructuring of the economy by placing considerable emphasis on rapid industrialisation based on hydrocarbon and petroleum products; decentralisation of power and administrative reform; extensive agrarian reform under the Charte de la Révolution Agraire (1971); and the decree

of 16 November 1971 concerning socialist management of industrial

undertakings.

At this time Helie (1973) perceived Algerian ideology as a result of

bipolar tension between Marxism, and a synthesis of the contrary demands

of adherence to traditional Arab culture and modern industrial values.

More specifically, the former pole she identified as scientific,

following the Marxist idea of socialism, and representing a technique

for development — as testified to by the strength of Marxist influence

which permeated the vocabulary of the press and leader's speeches, the

proclaimed ideology, and in a certain number of decisions taken and

effectively applied (state control of a large segment of the means of

production, the single party). The second pole, was, by contrast,

component to what Helie identified as specific or Arabo-Muslim socialism.

This represented a combination of the dual contradiction between

observance of the values of the industrial world and fidelity to

traditional values. In effect, this was analogous to the view expressed

by Ouzegane that,

> dans la lutte révolutionnaire contre le régime colonial,
> les Algériens avaient compris ... l'Islam ... comme support
> idéologique mais l'incompatibilité de l'Islam et du
> socialisme est une image fausse de la théorie sous Marxiste.
> Leur co-existence reflète une réalité economic-sociale et
> exprime un certain rapport des forces à l'intérieur des pays
> sous développés. (Ouzegane 1962, p. 304, 305).

Nevertheless, concern as to the real nature of Algerian ideology

increased after the June 1965 coup by Boumediene. In 1969 Collin

(1969, p. 660) claimed, "on se rend compte que le système n'a plus de

socialiste que le nom et que le terme de capitalisme d'Etat lui

conviendrait beaucoup mieux, un capitalisme d'Etat reposant sur la

technocratie et les sociétés nationales fortement centralisées." This

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was also argued by Alleg (1970)[1]. Five years later, Ammour et al (1975, p. 160) had gone so far as to write that "l'idéologie sécrétée par l'administration tend à d'imposer comme idéologie officielle et comme idéologie dominante, à faire l'unité de façade du bloc au pouvoir, à légitimer politiquement sa stratégie en disimulent la nature de classe".[2]

Nellis, in 1977, forcibly agreed with these claims.

> The policies of the 1965-1971 period *were* thoroughly state capitalist, and the single-minded pursuit of centralism and industrialisation by such means has left a legacy of rural stagnation and lack of capital, and has been responsible for the emergence of a comparatively wealthy, powerful, and ideologically 'untrustworthy' upper bureaucratic élite which is an important barrier to the construction of a more egalitarian society. (Nellis 1977, p. 533. Author's italics.)

But his argument goes further. Fundamentally, he suggests that this was necessary to create the foundations, and conditions in which a particular brand of socialism could be created and sustained in Algeria in the post-1971 period.

The nature of this was soon apparent. In 1976 the first coherent, and synthetic, elaboration of Algeria's ideological base was introduced by the Charte Nationale produced by the FLN, following much public debate. This was, and remains, in essence, the national "texte idéologique" (Bouzar 1981, p. 43), and itself emphasised that "le fonction idéologique est vitale pour ... la mobilisation permanente du peuple autour des objectifs de la Révolution". Approved by 99.18 per cent of the electorate in the referendum of 19 November 1976, it is reasonable to argue that the Charte, at least in theory, represents an inherently

---

1. Raffinot and Jacquemot (1977) have more recently provided a convincing critique of Algerian ideology as being one which is essentially state capitalist.

2. Indeed, Knauss (1977) has asserted that the Révolution Agraire, component to Algerian socialism, aimed to neutralise effectively a highly revolutionary peasantry and to extend political control over those same people.

Weltanschauung ideology. Indeed, in 1981, M. Messâadia, a member of the

Comité Central of the FLN stated that "la Charte Nationale est la seule

source et l'expression réelle des aspirations des masses" (Révolution

Africaine 1981, p. 15).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the economic development

strategies and minutiae of the Charte Nationale. However, on examination,

several broad ideological themes emerge: national socio-economic devel-

opment founded on socialism, necessitating a redistribution of wealth;

the requirement of change and consequently the implementation of policies;

the necessary use of domestic, indigenous and congruent methods and

techniques of development; and participation by the public in national

development.

The first of these, socialism, was reaffirmed by the Charte Nationale as

the foundation of Algerian national development. The Charte clearly

indicated that this strategy was a prerequisite to the achievement of

national liberation, emphasising, for example, that "le socialisme est

la seule voie capable de parachever l'effort conscient et inlassable de

décolonisation" (FLN 1976, p. 15). This bond was affirmed by the state-

ment that "tous les pays qui luttent pour une independence réelle

s'engagent dans une dialectic socialiste" (FLN 1976, p. 25).

The socialism propounded by the Charte is seen to comprise three

associated and interdependent objects: first, the consolidation of

national independence by emancipating the nation from all traces of

imperialist and neo-colonial influence; second, the formation of a

society free from exploitation of man, by man; and third, promotion of

man and his unconstrained development. For the realisation of this

socialism, five principles were identified:

(i)　the abolition of human exploitation by the control and
　　　　　　　　ownership by the state of the means of production;

　　　　　(ii)　integrated, democratic, and harmonious development,
　　　　　　　　industrialisation and agricultural modernisation and a
　　　　　　　　command economy;

　　　　(iii)　the right, honour and necessity of employment;

　　　　　(iv)　priority in satisfying the needs of the masses;

　　　　　(v)　freedom of the individual and his promotion as a responsible
　　　　　　　　citizen.

Crucially, these principles were seen to "comporter également l'elimina-
tion des inégalités et des contradictions qui subsistent en sein de
notre société et de notre économie comme séquelles leguées par l'exploita-
tion colonial et comme produit des structures sociales héritées du
passé" (FLN 1976, p. 120).  In addition, socialism within the context
of the above framework "s'affirme comme un moyen de repartition equitable
des fruits et des charges de développement" (FLN 1976, p. 32), and to
"concrétise l'option fondamentale de la Révolution qui consiste à
éliminer la misère et à garantir des conditions de vie convenable à
chaque citoyen sans aucune distinction" (FLN 1976, p. 83).

The _Charte_, however, stressed that "le socialisme en Algérie ni procède

d'aucune metaphysique matérialiste ni de rattache à aucune conception

dogmatique etrangère" (FLN 1976, p. 23).  This strongly aligns with the

ideology of decolonisation advanced by various African political

theorists.  Dia (1960), Mboya (1964), and Nyerere (1967), for example,

assert that the realisation of genuine African socialism necessitates

the infusion of African values; similarly Fanon (1967, p. 78) contends

that decolonising countries "ought to do their utmost to find their own

particular values and methods, and a style which shall be peculiar to

them".

This introduces a component, and recurring, theme of the Charte Nationale: the need for the use of congruent resources, methods and techniques to effect national development. Again, this has clearly been developed from the ideologies of post-colonial national development advanced by almost all the African political theorists and politicians. Dia (1960, p. 36), for example, has noted that "L'indépendence risque d'être une fiction si elle ne peut être effectivement exercée". Touré (1959) elaborates by correctly observing that the anti-colonial struggle does not end with independence, but is recommenced against the consequences of the colonial regime by the adaption of methods and structures, spirit and population to the new requirements of national life. Consequently, Fanon (1967) has argued that the process of modernisation inherent to decolonisation must preclude westernisation. As Mazrui (1980) asserts, the employment of such skills and styles, unless indigenous and domesticated perpetuates dependency, and, as a result, is contrary to the attainment of authentic decolonisation and, subsequently, liberation. More specifically Senghor (1971, p. 216) has proposed that "la décolonisation institutionelle est un préalable à l'abolition de fait colonial".

Accordingly, in 1971, Boumediene proclaimed that "il est ... nécessaire de procéder à une refonte totale de notre legislation ... par une adoption aux besoins et aux objectifs de la révolution socialiste" (Balta and Rulleau 1978, p. 135). This was affirmed five years later by the Charte Nationale which stated that "les lois ont pour objet d'etablir la régle qui regissent l'édification de la société socialiste ... ceci implique un effort permanent de refonte et de réaménagement de notre legislation pour l'adapter aux objectifs de la Révolution" (FLN 1976, p. 55). However, the Charte also recognises the need for an associated,

and concerted, reappraisal of human, as well as other resources.  In

this context, the Charte views education as vital to counter the dual

danger of "inspiration néo coloniale et bourgeoisie", and "certain

concepts conservateurs".  More fully, it is argued forcibly that,

> il serait pour le moins paradoxal qu'un pays révolutionnaire
> en pleine mutation ... accédant à la modernité et à
> l'édification rationnelle d'une société socialiste, continue
> à subir les aléas et parfois les carences d'un système de
> pensée non encore approprié à ses ambitions legitimes
> (FLN 1976, p. 66),

and concludes that "il faudra algérianiser le enseignement" (FLN 1976,

p. 67).

Undoubtedly, the corollary of this is the requirement for systematic and

progressive implementation to effect development.  The vocabulary

consistently used in the text of the Charte Nationale, such as "édifica-

tion", "progrès", "développement", all strongly suggest a dynamic,

rather than static approach to development.  More specifically it notes

that "le processus socialiste ne se présente pas d'emblée d'une façon

homogène mais par bonds successifs" (FLN 1976, p. 29).

This particular facet of post-Independence development ideology is

extended and reinforced by the Charte Nationale, by the repeated

reference to the need for public participation – and in this respect

echoes the Charte d'Alger; and earlier, the maxim by Ouzegane (1962,

p. 304) that "pour construire une République moderne ... les forces

populaires ne seront pas demobilisées".  Accordingly, it is stressed

in the Charte Nationale that "le développement du pays et l'amélioration

des conditions de vie des masses populaires dépendent en premier lieu de

l'engagement de chacun à assumer ses devoirs de citoyen" (FLN 1976, p. 56).

Moreover, it is emphasised that as an "expression fidèle des aspirations

des travailleurs et de paysans, defenseur des masses populaires, l'Etat socialiste leur donne les moyens de participer à la gestion des affaires publiques" (FLN 1976, p. 54). In effect, this recognises the assertion by Fanon (1967, p. 151) that "where the people are invited to partake in the management of the country, they do not slow movement down, but on the contrary they speed it up"; equally "we ought never to lose contact with the people that has battled for the concrete betterment of its existence" (Fanon 1967, p. 150). Indeed, the principle of this latter can be seen to explain the cultural and religious adherence to Islam reaffirmed by the Charte Nationale. Arabic is recognised as the official language of Algeria, and Islam as the religion of the State.

However, the professed aim of participation by the public in national development has been questioned. Alienation of the masses has been generally alluded to by Ammour et al (1975), Dahmani (1979), Entelis (1979) and others: and specifically by Barate (1978) with regard to administrative organisation of the country, and by Brebner and Briggs (in press) with respect to the 1000 villages socialistes policy introduced as part of the Révolution Agraire. Moreover, Bennamane (1980, p. 48) has forcibly argued that, "if Islam has been successfully used in mobilizing the impoverished masses against colonialism, at independence, and still today, it is being used successfully to hinder and destroy any authentic socialist tendency of Algerian society". Effectively this echoes both Watt (1968) and Rodinson (1977) who warn of the danger that Islam may be used in connection with socialism by ruling groups to justify policies whilst discreetly advancing their own interests.

Indeed, most recently, Benhouria (1980, p. 435) has strongly asserted

the formation of a "nouvelle classe dominante algérienne - la bourgeoisie nationale"; Sutton (1981, p. 353) has gone further by maintaining the continuing existence of "participatory socialist statements from government ministers as a smoke-screen behind which the meritocratic bourgeoisie has been strengthening its control". However, Benhouria (1980) has not only lucidly demonstrated how this 'smoke-screen' has effectively covered the internal domination of the Algerian bourgeoisie, but also obscured the increasing dependence of the country's economic development, largely financed by foreign loans, on the world trading system. Consequently, he shows, Algerian investment, prices and salaries are controlled externally by fluctuations in the capitalist markets in London, Paris and New York, rather than by autonomous internal policy making.

It is perhaps thus, that Sutton (1981, p. 369) has noted that although progress, albeit limited, towards the ideological goal of greater social and regional egalitarianism "can be shown in social terms, in the field of income and employment opportunities, marked disparities continue to give cause for concern". However, as Benhouria again underlines, these disparities are in reality more acute. For example, he draws attention to,

> Les avantages en nature que ces différentes catégories sociales s'octroient selon des modalités diverses sont déterminés par les fonctions diverses qu'elles occupent dans la système de domination sociale: les voitures attribuées aux cadres supérieurs et aux membres de leur famille, les villas et aménagées pour les loger, l'utilisation exclusive de certaines réalisations touristiques et de loisirs comme les complexes de la Sonatour, certains clubs sportifs de tennis, d'équitation, etc ... . Inutile de chercher qui est le propriétaire individuel de tel bien, d'une voiture ou d'une villa par exemple, car il n'existe pas: la voiture appartient à l'enterprise ou à l'organisme administratif concerné, la villa à la wilaya ou a tel autre etablissement public. La consommation se réalise ici dans le cadre de la propriété d'Etat; c'est la forme propre d'appropriation

d'une fraction de la plus-value par les catégories sociales
dominantes du capitalisme d'Etat. (Benhouria 1980, p. 326,
327. Author's italics.)

Indeed, the reality of this ideological contradiction is such, that
Bouzar (1981, p. 44) was able to write in <u>Révolution Africaine</u> (the
official organ of the <u>Front de Libération Nationale</u>) of "égalitarisme
mythique et élitisme réel" in Algeria.


10.3. CONCLUSION.

It has been correctly asserted by Fredj (1981, p. 479) that "l'époque

coloniale a pris fin, en droit, avec les indépendences et la constitution

d'Etats nationaux, mais la libération nationale est demeurée l'idéologie

fondamentale autour de laquelle se mettent en place les affrontements".

Undoubtedly, this maxim of post-colonial ideology clearly aligns with

the professed ideology of independent Algeria, where the components of

socialism, positive change, the use of domestic, indigenous and

congruous methods and techniques for development, and public participa-

tion, are all antithetic to the ideology of French colonialism.


However, the argument by Dahmani (1979, p. 79) that Algeria "pour les

uns ... est socialiste (tendence officielle ou officieuse), pour les

autres elle est de type 'bureaucratique', 'techno-bureaucratique',

capitalisme d'Etat, mi-féodale et mi-socialiste", perhaps draws

attention to the intrinsic complexities, and deficiencies, of the

ideology of present day Algeria. Indeed, as this chapter has indicated,

it may be observed that the practise of Algerian ideology appears to

defy the very elements it officially exalts. Consequently, it might be

concluded that Algerian ideology represents a dichotomy; official

ideology serves a cosmetic purpose to obscure an ideology which, in

essence, purports inequity, incongruent and dependent methods and

techniques of development, a lack of implementation, and an absence of

public participation.  From the discussion of Qacentina and physical

planning in the subsequent two chapters, it will be possible to

determine whether physical planning has acted as an agent and catalyst

in the transposition of these elements of ideology onto the urban space.

# CHAPTER ELEVEN.

11.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF QACENTINA: 1962-1980

In 1954, the population of Qacentina was approximately 111,000 persons.

By 1966, it had increased to 241,000 persons, which represented an annual

growth rate of 6.8 per cent for the period, and a total population

increase of 121 per cent.  By 1977, the population of the city was

officially recorded at 355,059, representing a growth rate of 3.8 per cent

per annum.  Bendjelid (1976) explains this by drawing attention to the

fact that only a small percentage of the demographic growth after 1966

is due to migrant arrivals in the city.  This is by contrast with other

Algerian cities:  Wahran, for example, had a growth rate of 1.5 per cent

and 4.5 per cent for the two respective periods.*(p.166) This chapter will aim

to identify the changes in the urban form of the city of which this

demographic increase was part.


11.1.  THE POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT OF QACENTINA.

The rapid demographic growth of the city which followed the accession to
independence reflected a more general trend amongst Algerian cities which
was generated by an influx of peasants seeking employment.  However,
Qacentina was particularly affected by the migration because of tens of
thousands of refugees returning from Tunisia.  Many of the peasants took
shelter in half-finished developments begun in the last years of French
Algeria, such as at Le Bousquet, where 153 uncompleted dwellings were
occupied.  Construction on these had begun as the first phase of a
projected development of 848 apartments.

> The fact that these apartment buildings [in Constantine]
> had no plumbing or electricity, sometimes not even doors
> and windows, did not stop them.  They settled in with
> their families, and often their sheep and chickens,

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> obstinately resisting all efforts to evict them.  Later,
> other migrants crowded into the bidonvilles which had been
> vacated by former inhabitants who had become squatters in
> abandoned French dwellings.  ... Most of the Algerians who
> moved into "bien vacants", the former French apartments,
> could not or would not pay rent or water and electricity
> bills.  It took authorities four years to even make an
> inventory of the thousands of "bien vacants" and even longer
> to get the new occupants to pay their bills.  In the meantime,
> buildings began to deteriorate as no-one was in charge of
> making repairs.  Broken down elevators, filth in the hallways
> and staircases, and leaking pipes became distinctive marks
> of buildings in the cit[y].  (Ottaway 1970, p. 36-37.
> Author's italics.)

It is important to note that, due to the low percentage of the European

population in the city during colonisation, the number of biens vacants

at 3,304 in 1962 (Meskaldji 1979), was  by contrast with other French

colonial Algerian towns  such as Bône, Algiers and Oran, also low.

Consequently, unlike elsewhere in Algeria, the biens vacants in

Qacentina were insufficient to absorb effectively the incoming migrants.

The impact of this on the post-independent development of the city has

been significant.


In 1966, the shortfall in the number of dwelling units for the town's

population was estimated at 10,163.  Between 1966 and 1972 the urban

population of Qacentina increased by 93,000 persons — necessitating, at

an average of five persons per dwelling, an additional 18,000 housing

units.  The accumulated deficiency in the housing stock of approximately

28,000 indicates the inadequate level of housing construction after

Independence.  By 1966, 695 dwellings had been completed at Le Bousquet.

The Plan Triennal (1967-1969) programmed 750 dwellings to be constructed

in the city, all of which were built in Bellevue as flats.  The First

Four Year Plan (1970-1973) allocated 600 flats to the city, of which only

500 were eventually completed — 400 at Hippodrome and 100 at Bellevue.

In 1972, a landslide at the Quartier Sabatier led to the initiation of a

Programme Spécial to reconstruct 8,370 dwellings destroyed — of which only

5,325 were completed.  The Second Four Year Plan (1974-1977) allocated

5,900 dwellings for the city; by 1980, 2,870 had been completed: 1,090 at Ziadia, and 1,780 distributed among Cité Daski, Cité Chasseurs and Mansourah. Currently, a Zone d'Habitat Urbain Nouvelle has been planned two kilometres south of the city at Polygône, to comprise 4,000 dwelling units.

The spatial distribution of housing type throughout the city is shown in Figure 11.1. As Loew (1979, p. 61) comments, the city can be depicted as "un tissu urbain discontinu dont les bidonvilles sont les traits d'union". Plate 11.1 reveals the often anarchic development which has resulted. Further characteristics of this infilling between the formal housing sector by the informal housing sector is demonstrated by the Carrières Lentini to the north-east of the city. Figure 11.2 shows the proliferation of the bidonville between 1973 and 1980; Plates 11.2 and 11.3 respectively indicate the visual juxtaposition between this habitat spontané and the apartment building, and the precarious construction of the bidonville on the edge of the quarry. Plate 11.4 of another bidonville at the Pont du Diable, and Plate 11.5 of a gourbiville at Sidi M'Cid both exemplify further the unsafe nature of these housing sectors – the former with respect to construction (see the collapse of the wall to the far right of the photograph), and the latter with respect to siting.

Yet, as Table 11.1 indicates, in 1973 the bidonvilles and gourbivilles represented 13.8 per cent of the total housing stock of the city, occupying 17.3 per cent of constructed residential land. However, this in turn represented only one third of what are officially classed as habitats précaires in Qacentina. This comprises autoconstruction dwellings (Plate 11.6) which are self-built breeze-block constructions, and the housing in the original Arab quarter on the Rocher. The decay of these buildings, the majority of which date back to the late eighteenth

**Legend:**

- Pre-Colonial
- Early Colonial
- Villas
- Public Flats
- Recasement
- Autoconstruction
- Gourbiville
- Bidonville

n

0        500m.

**FIGURE 11.1   Spatial Distribution of Residential Areas by Type: Qacentina 1980**

Map labels: Rhumel, Haibedei, Cité Gaillard, Lentini, Ziadia, Sidi M'Cid, Sabatier, Rocher, Amirouche, El Kantara, St. Jean, Kitouni, Bardo, Pont du Diable, Avenue de Roumanie, Sidi Mabrouk, Oued El Had, Cité des Plantanes, Cité Mûriers, Ameziane, Bouzid, Arcades Romaines, Bentellis, Hippodrome, El Bir, Bellevue, Cité des Chasseurs, 4ème Km., Bellevue Supérieur, University, Bou Merzoug

PLATE 11.1 Typical Anarchic Development in Qacentina.



PLATE 11.2 Visual Juxtaposition between Formal and Informal Housing: the Carrières Lentini.



PLATE 11.3 Quarry-Edge Bidonville at Lentini.

FIGURE 11.2 Growth of Informal Housing at the
Carrières Lentini 1973-1980.

Legend:

- (hatched) Autoconstruction
- (dotted) Bidonville
- S Scrap Depôt
- (crosshatched) Small-Scale Brick-Construction Works
- (black) Public Flats

n

0 ___ 75 m.

PLATE 11.4 <u>Bidonville.</u>



PLATE 11.5 <u>Gourbiville</u> at Sidi M'Cid.

Table 11.1  Changes in the Housing Stock of Qacentina between 1966 and 1973.

| | 1966 surface hectares | per cent | 1973 surface hectares | per cent | 1973 number dwellings | per cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bidonville | 40.4 | 10.7 | 50.2 | 11.7 | 3816 | 8.2 |
| Gourbi | 22.4 | 5.9 | 24.1 | 5.6 | 2604 | 5.6 |
| Autoconstruction | 76.5 | 20.3 | 76.4 | 11.8 | 7711 | 16.6 |
| Traditional Kasbah | 15.9 | 4.2 | 15.2 | 3.7 | 5431 | 11.1 |
| Recasement | 39.4 | 10.5 | 47.5 | 11.1 | 3991 | 8.6 |
| Villas | 80.2 | 21.3 | 80.2 | 18.1 | 3508 | 7.6 |
| European style flats | 38.4 | 10.2 | 38.4 | 8.9 | 8527 | 18.4 |
| Collective[1] | 63.5 | 16.9 | 97.4 | 22.7 | 10285 | 22.1 |
| Unclassified | | | | | 834 | 1.3 |
| Total | 376.7 | 100 | 429.4 | 100 | 46617 | 100 |

Source:  CADAT (1973).

1. The category 'collective' comprises public sector flats of the type shown in Plate 11.8.

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and early nineteenth century is well illustrated by Plate 11.7 which

helps explain the decrease of 0.7 hectares covered by this area between

1966 and 1973.

By contrast, the land percentage occupied by the public sector collectif

dwellings (Plate 11.8, showing, for example, development at Arcades

Romaines) and recasement have increased by a total of 42 hectares.

However, not only does this represent a differential in the development

between the formal and informal housing sector in Qacentina at this time,

but also in their morphology.  Figure 11.3 demonstrates the essence of

this.

At the end of 1979, 1,300 dwellings had been completed at El Gamaas to the

east of Sidi Mabrouk, and 700 prefabricated chalets to the west of the

city in the valley of Oued Melah.  Apart from this, official figures for

new dwelling construction between 1973 and 1980 in the city were either

contradictory or unavailable.  However, it was clear that most new

construction was either in the category of habitat spontané or in the

form of new detached villas through the city.  What may be deduced is an

increase in density between 1966 of 4.7 persons per dwelling, and 1977 of

7.2 persons per dwelling (Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan 1978).

New public housing in Qacentina has been allocated according to occupation

of the applicant.  Demands by the Enseignement Supérieur have been

completely satisfied, Enseignements primaire et secondaire 90 per cent

satisfied, and demands by administrative cadres and Sociétés Nationales

40 per cent satisfied (Meskaldji 1979).  Otherwise, acquisition of a new

dwelling is frequently achieved by Le Piston (string pulling).  Moreover,

it is frequent practice for the beneficiaries of new housing in the city

unofficially to surrender the tenure of / dwelling to another party.  No
                                   their previous

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
PLATE 11.6

Autoconstruction Dwellings
at Lentini.



PLATE 11.7

Urban Decay on the rocher.



PLATE 11.8

Collectif Dwellings at
Arcades Romaines

i - Pont du Diable

ii - Bentellis

0        50m.

⊖ Bidonville          ⊕ Five-Storey Blocks of Flats.

FIGURE 11.3   Morphological Difference Between Informal and Formal
Housing in Qacentina.

Source:  i - Meskaldji (1979, p.67)     ii - CADAT

documents exchange hands — instead the key to the flat is exchanged for sums averaging 10,000 DA (approximately £1,100). The scarcity of housing has led to further speculation. According to research by Merrouche et al (1978,p. 58), "il est signaler que les beneficiares de logements dit modernes en ville vendent leurs anciennes maisons à des prix éléves aux migrants venus d'installer en ville".

Deficiencies in the urban structure of the city have led to other forms of speculation. The retail infrastructure established by the French in the city has little changed since the early twentieth century. Consequently, the majority of retail outlets are concentrated on the rocher, ranging from two small department stores, the Nouvelles Galéries and Galéries Algériennes, to artisan crafts such as silversmithing, to individual retail outlets and stalls for foodstuffs in the sūq (cf. Chapter 3, Plate 3.3 for butchers). Over and above this are the informal sector, the ambulants, street vendors, knife grinders (see Plate 11.9), and so forth. The absense of comparable retail services in the peripheral areas of the city has enabled shopkeepers to fix prices illicitly on goods, especially fruit, vegetables and meat, exceeding by far the prices set by the State. This was initially indicated by the national purge on such activity in 1978 (El Moudjahid 1978), and included arrests in Qacentina of a number of grocers in for example, the housing quarters of Cité des Mûriers, Cité El Bir, and Cité Améziane.

This price speculation was undoubtedly facilited by the city's public transport system. In mid-1980, the bus company, the Régie Communale des Transports de Constantine (the RCTC) was carrying an estimated 50-60,000 persons a day, against a potential demand of 160,000 persons daily. Although at least 100 buses were needed to provide a viable service, the RCTC only owned 65 vehicles — of which, 22 were operating on 18 routes, 32 were out of action, and 11 were seconded to national corporations. At

the periphery of the town. Certain suburbs such as Sidi Bou Driss and Jledia were still not serviced by public transport, whereas other suburbs - Ain Sinara [...] [...] were only serviced by one bus per hour. [...] inhabit in the city: the topography, [...] and in 1972 there were only 23,842 pri[...]



PLATE 11.9

Knifegrinders, Exemplifying the Ambulants

The inadeq[...] compounded by the difficulties that the [...] to vehicular movement. In 1960 a str[...] [...] bridge of Sidi Rached, which necessitated [...] into the city, the center of the city. Fur[...] surfaces of the roads in the centre have [...] and pavement (Plate 11.10). This problem has been aggravated by the high density of pedestrian flows.

The irregularity of the streets, the high development [...] have also prohibited the effective [...] easy to these dwellings. These st[...] are [...] residents in 1972 [...] census [...] of these households are [...] majority, 5,[...] rely on bottled gas [...] the city is connected to water although 28 [...] both pr[...] although the number [...] compensated for by the large extent [...] exist in the town. Five sections [...] holds obtain their water from other [...] [...]. The [...] are [...] [...] only source [...] [...]



PLATE 11.10

Problems of Vehicular Circulation on the rocher.

the periphery of the city, housing suburbs such as Cité des Mûriers and Ziadia were still not serviced by public transport, whereas other suburbs - Ain Sinara, Cité Améziane and Châab Ersas - were only serviced by one bus per hour. There is little alternative transport in the city: the topography prohibits bicycles for example, and in 1976 there were only 23,842 private cars registered in the entire wilaya.

The inadequacies of transport provision are compounded by the difficulties that the physical fabric of the city poses to vehicular movement. In 1980 a structural fault has appeared in the Bridge of Sidi Rached, which aggravated access to, and traffic circulation within, the centre of the city. Furthermore, the irregularity and narrowness of the roads in the centre have led to difficult vehicular access and movement (Plate 11.10). This problem has been exacerbated by the high density of pedestrian flows.

The irregularity of the streets and high density buildings on the rocher have also prohibited the effective provision of electricity, gas and water to these dwellings. These account for some of the 20 per cent of the 9,122 households in 1977 in the city not connected to electricity. Of these households 144 are only serviced by piped gas, whilst the majority, 8,533, rely on bottled gas. Conversely, 88 per cent of the city is connected to water although 25 per cent of these dwellings were without bath or shower - although the scarcity of these facilities is partly compensated for by the large number of public baths or hammān which still exist in the town. Five thousand five hundred and eighty seven house-holds obtain their water from wells, tanks and stand-pipes outside the dwelling. The bidonvilles are particularly badly affected: Table 11.2 indicates the only quarters provided with water facilities, clearly minimal for both the number of population and number of subscribers. This situation is aggravated by the erratic supply of water in the city, particularly during the summer, when water is frequently available for

Table 11. 2 _Bidonvilles with Water Provision:   Qacentina 1977._

| Quarter | Number Subscribers | Number Public Fountains | Number of Inhabitants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sabatier plus | | | |
| Amirouche | 200 | 3 | 8504 |
| Ben Bouzid | 200 | - | 2608 |
| Bardo | 170 | 1 | 1340 |
| Pont du Diable | 70 | 1 | 868 |
| Chalet des Pins | 140 | 1 | 2136 |
| 4ème Km | 190 | 2 | 1130 |
| Halbedel | 390 | 1 | 3470 |
| Sidi M'Cid | 110 | 1 | 900 |

Source:  Meskaldji (1979, p. 24).

between only two to five hours per day. The theoretical capacity of the water supply of between 93 and 110 litres per person per day is significantly reduced by industrial usage, and a loss of 25 per cent due to pipe leakage. There has been no increase in the supply of water to the city since 1968.

The tertiary sector still predominates the economic structure of the city; furthermore, this activity is still concentrated in the centre ville. Of 52,560 employed in the town in 1977, 1,122 worked in agriculture, 11,104 in industry, 8,207 in the Batîment et Travaux Publics (Building and Public Works) sector, and 32,127 in the service sector. Table 11.3 emphasises this employment structure in the city. Undoubtedly, a corollary of this structure is the structure of income in the city. As Table 11.4 indicates, this is by no means equitable: 35.27 per cent of the population of Qacentina receive 63.03 per cent of income.

Whilst the city has experienced a 92 per cent reduction in its administrative jurisdiction since 1954, it has, by contrast, reaffirmed its religious preeminence. Officially designated a religious city by the Algerian Government after Independence, the former églises have been converted, or reconverted to mosques: for example Notre Dame des Sept Douleurs is again the mosque of Sūq al-Ghazzāl. Currently under construction in Bellevue is the mosque of Emir-Abd-al-Kader, which will be the largest mosque in Africa; other smaller scale mosques have proliferated throughout the city since 1962. Cafés in the city close at 8 pm, and in accordance with Islamic doctrine, alcohol is forbidden.

Since 1962 the city has also reasserted its role as an educational centre; however, although an improvement, only 176,401, or 63.7 per cent of the city's population over six years of age, are literate (Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan 1978). There now exist 100 primary schools, 12 secondary

Table 11.3  Employment Structure of Qacentina 1977.

| Occupation | Number Employed | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Professional | 6,981 | 13.2 |
| Managerial | 3,805 | 7.2 |
| White Collar | 8,732 | 16.6 |
| Shopkeepers/Sales Representatives | 1,711 | 3.2 |
| Service Workers | 6,050 | 11.5 |
| Artisans | 18,013 | 34.2 |
| Unskilled labourers | 4,505 | 8.5 |
| Agricultural labourers | 732 | 1.3 |
| Others | 2,030 | 3.8 |
| Total | 52,560 | 100 |

Source:  Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan (1978, p. 123).

Table 11.4  <u>Income Distribution in Qacentina, 1976.</u>

| Income (Algerian Dinars) | Percentage Income | Percentage of Population Employed |
|---|---|---|
| 0-  500 | 0.01 | 0.79 |
| 501- 1000 | 0.05 | 0.94 |
| 1000- 2000 | 0.25 | 2.44 |
| 2001- 3000 | 0.58 | 3.88 |
| 3001- 4000 | 0.56 | 2.36 |
| 4001- 6000 | 3.44 | 10.08 |
| 6001- 8000 | 4.14 | 8.65 |
| 8001-10000 | 7.70 | 12.51 |
| 10001-15000 | 20.23 | 23.68 |
| 15001-20000 | 18.35 | 15.34 |
| 20001-30000 | 20.43 | 11.96 |
| 30001-50000 | 17.85 | 6.53 |
| over 50000 | 6.40 | 1.34 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

Source:  Association Algérienne pour la Recherche Démographique
Economique et Sociale (1979, p. 157).

schools, and 22 technical colleges. In addition, the University contains

13,000 students, the majority of whom are based on the campus at Boufrika,

designed by Oscar Niemeyer (architect of Brasilia). Insufficient

capacity, however, has necessitated certain departments to occupy part of

the former caserne of the Casbah on the Rocher.


11.2. CONCLUSION.

The next chapter will outline the physical planning system as it exists

in independent Algeria. Subsequently, it will be possible to determine

whether the development of Qacentina discussed in this chapter will, in

alignment with its earlier form as an Islamic settlement, and its

modification and extension during the period of French colonisation, be

embued with contemporary ideology, a process in which physical planning

may be identified as the agent.

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* (see page 148.) It should be noted in comparing population growth rates
between 1954 and 1966 and 1966 and 1977 that in the former period the
wartime rural-urban exodus probably increased Qacentina's population more
than Wahran's, whilst the exodus of Europeans from Wahran had a more sig-
nificant effect on that city's population evolution.

# CHAPTER TWELVE.

12.  PHYSICAL PLANNING IN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA

12.1.  INTRODUCTION.

To avoid considerable lacunae on independence the law of 31 December 1962
provided for the continued application of existing colonial legislation
in Algeria unless it challenged national sovereignty, or was explicitly
discriminatory.  Most of the French colonial planning legislation was
retained until it was replaced by the introduction of the first truly
Algerian physical planning legislation (initially in 1967 - see 12.3
below - but for the most part, between 1974 and 1976).  Until this time,
physical planning in Algeria was essentially ad hoc.  As Chapter 10 has
indicated, Algeria was, in the sixties, still undergoing internal political
upheavals, and it was not until the publication of the Charte Nationale
in 1976 that a definitive statement of the real orientation of national
ideology existed.  At the same time, national priority had been given to
economic development, with formal urban development, such as at Qacentina,
being undertaken within the context of Programmes Spéciaux, the Plan
Triennal or the Four Year Plan (p. 149).  Critically, there was no
connection between economic and physical planning (Brebner 1981a).

Consequently, an outline of physical planning in independent Algeria and
any ensuing analysis will, necessarily, be concerned with physical
planning as it has been introduced by independent Algeria per se.  It is
only against these components that the hypothesis of this study can be
reasonably applied with respect to the contemporary ideology, and in
relation to the urban form.

The following analysis can best be subdivided into a discussion of:
planning agencies; plan formulation; development control and planning

standards; land for planned development; and planning education.

## 12.2. PLANNING AGENCIES.

Urban planning and development in independent Algeria is administered

on three levels: national, regional and local. Since 1975 this has been

organised through a territorial hierarchy of 31 wilayat (plural of wilaya)

at the regional level, and 676 communes (arabised to baladia) at the local

level. Although there is an intermediary level of 158 daira (districts),

their role in physical planning is negligible.

National level responsibility for planning is primarily through the

Ministère de l'Urbanisme, de la Construction, et de l'Habitat (Ministry

of Town Planning, Housing and Construction), which, in 1979 replaced the

Ministère de Travaux Publics et de la Construction (Construction and

Public Works). This is charged with the preparation and effecting of

broad national policy and planning strategies (for example, decentralisa-

tion, urban and rural housing programmes) and is responsible for various

planning sanctions and enforcement.


Since 1968, the Ministre d'Urbanisme has been directly responsible for

various bureau d'études (research units) concerned with physical planning.

The first of these national agencies was the bureau d'études of Travaux

Publics Architecture et Urbanisme (Public Works, Architecture and Town

Planning) - 'ETAU'. Owing to a lack of clearly defined objectives and

organisational and financial difficulties, ETAU was disbanded in 1970,

but was succeeded at the end of 1971 by the CADAT (the Caisse Algérienne

d'Aménagement du Territoire)[1]. This is organised through regional and

local level directions (departments). ECOTEC (the Bureau National

1. Other than the acronym, there was little continuity between this
agency and the CADAT organisation formed under the earlier French colonial
system (p.106).

d'Etudes Economiques et Techniques, the National Office for Technical and

Economic Research) which was set up in 1967 under the Secrétariat d'Etat

au Plan, has, since 1967, been responsible to the Ministre d'Urbanisme.

To date, it has provided urban studies on Wahran, Tihert, Sidi Bel-Abbès

and Beskra.

Inter-ministerial consent is required to ratify certain planning operations.

This is necessary between the Ministère de l'Intérieur (the Home Office),

the Ministère des Finances (the Treasury) and the Ministère de

l'Urbanisme,de la Construction, et de l'Habitat, for example, in particular

aspects of expropriation.

There are various other national level agencies connected with planning.

These include national corporations concerned with infrastructural

provision, such as SONELGAZ (Sociéte Nationale de Electricité et Gaz)

and the PTT (Postes et Télécommunications). In addition, the Banque

Algérienne de Développement (Algerian Development Bank) is responsible for

advancing loans to enable the implementation of certain planning opera-

tions.

Each of the 31 regions is administered by an Assemblée Populaire de la

Wilaya (APW), the executive of which is the wali. This is elected

quinquenially by the Party (the Front de Libération Nationale). Attached

to the APW is a Direction de l'Urbanisme de la Construction, et de

l'Habitat (DUCH). The APW is concerned with budgetary allocation within

the region and the general social and economic development of the wilaya.

The DUCH has primarily strategic planning responsibilities.

The communes are managed by an Assemblée Populaire Communale (APC), whose

constitutional base is contained within the Code Communale (JORA 1967).

It is elected trienially by universal suffrage. The APC is concerned
with local level development in six sectors: housing, transport, tourists,
industrial, agricultural and cultural, and the initiation, approval and
enforcement of particular statutory planning instruments.

From time to time, a comité technique may be established. This is
required, for example, to determine a provisional périmètre d'urbanisa-
tion (urban boundary). In this case, the comité technique consists of
several ministerial representatives and is chaired by the president of
the APC concerned.

12.3. PLAN FORMULATION.

In 1967, Article 156 of the Code Communale reintroduced the Plan d'Urban-
isme Directeur (PDU) to physical planning in Algeria - albeit in a
modified framework - by requiring that "dans la cadre du Plan Nationale
d'Aménagement du Territoire, l'Assemblée Populaire Communale établir le
plan directeur d'urbanisme de la commune" (Journal Officiel de la
République Algérienne (JORA) 1967). Implicitly, therefore, physical
planning was integrated into national planning, a supposition which was
affirmed by Circulaire C-2 PMU in 1974 which introduced the Plan de
Modernisation Urbaine (PMU) to physical planning. Henceforth it was
specified that "le PDU constitue le guide physique de l'action (schéma
d'affection des sols) et de son contrôle (aspect réglementaire)", whilst,
"le PMU constitue le cadre d'action (programme hiérarchisé d'investisse-
ments)" (Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan 1974b, p. 22). In effect, this frame-
work for urban development in post-colonial Algeria, was, Guerroudj
(1980a, p. 21) argues "du produit l'ambition à l'abord être de fait des
PDU des instruments de planification, à l'instar de ce qui se passe dans
les pays socialistes".

The initiative for preparing the PDU by the APC is commenced by delimit-
ing the périmètre d'urbanisation for study. This is required by Ordinance
74-26, Article 2, to "couvre les terraines déjà urbanisée ainsi-que les
terraines urbanisable à court-terme compte tenu des projets de réalisa-
tion des réseau d'infrastructure, et des équipements public". Décret 75-
103 (JORA 1975a) Article 6 elaborated further principles for this
delimitation, such as future population growth, and the organisation of
residential areas into coherent units. Further advice was contained in
Note 683-PU produced by the (ex) Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la
Construction which warned of the dangers of defining a périmètre either
too extensive or too circumscribed. Importantly, however, the Note
stressed that the périmètre d'urbanisation must correspond to the admini-
strative boundaries of the commune(s) and not just that of the urban area.
This stipulation aimed to safeguard against the PDU being produced in
isolation and not respecting the surrounding areas.

The PDU itself should, according to Circulaire C-1 PUD (Secrétariat d'Etat
au Plan 1974a) be formulated in accordance with the following four-stage
procedural model:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Analysis | 8-9 months |
| Phase 2 | Perspectives | 4-5 months |
| Phase 3 | Propositions | 4-5 months |
| Phase 4 | Plan | 3-4 months |

Furthermore, the PDU must include development plans at a scale of either
1:50,000 or 1:25,000, and be accompanied by written reports. These must
analyse the physical situation of the city, taking into account any
development constraints imposed by the site, the state of the urban fabric,
the spatial implications of the PDU on the surrounding landscape, and
identifying available urban expansion zones; the socio-economic character-
istics of the area within the périmètre d'urbanisation, taking into
account demographic trends and employment, housing, educational and

infrastructural provision; projected development within a ten year perspective. Subsequently, the PMU must be formulated to provide the financial framework for action.

Plan formulation in practise:  the PDU for Qacentina.

The PDU for Qacentina comprised four parts.  The first of these, prepared by ETAU, was Phase A*, which provided a detailed physical survey of the site of the city and its surroundings.  In particular, this undertook an exhaustive written analysis of various geological, topographic, hydrographic and agricultural features.  Subsequently, Phase A produced four maps, which, on a grid square base schematically indicated physical constraints to future urban development.  The first map identified gradients of less than ten per cent, of 10-20 per cent and greater than 20 per cent.  The following map delimited the geo-technical potential of the land surrounding Qacentina, whilst the third map indicated land of high agricultural value.  The final of the four maps identified constraints on development imposed by noise, flooding and woodland.  These maps were then all superimposed to provide a 'seive' analysis, eliminating the various physical constraints and consequently identifying land suitable for future urban expansion.

Phase B of the PDU, prepared by the CADAT, by contrast provided a socio-economic analysis of Qacentina with the aim of determining "les besions et surtout permettre l'orientation en matière de politique urbaine" (CADAT 1973, p. 8) of the town.  This comprehensively assessed the present and future demographic characteristics and housing, industrial, and infrastructural requirements of the city.

From the conclusions of the analyses component to both Phase A and B, Phase C, also prepared by the CADAT, translated these into two develop-

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*For dates of Phase A, B, C, and D of the Qacentina PDU see Table 13.1, p. 194.

ment plans: the Schéma d'Orientation and the Schéma Directeur d'Occupation du Sol. The first of these, the Schéma d'Orientation (Figure 12.1) was in effect a strategic guide for the urban expansion of the city in both the long and short term. In essence, the plan advocated the extension of the town by developing satellite settlement poles at El Kroub, Aïn Smara, Hamma Bouziane and Didouche Mourad. Industry was to be developed in autonomous industrial zones. The aim of this plan was, therefore, to enable the growth of Qacentina to be confined to the urban periphery and outlying settlements, thereby preventing further pressure on an already insufficient urban infrastructure.

The second plan, the Schéma Directeur zoned the city itself according to general land use characteristics and perspectives (Figure 12.2). This produced the following typology:

Zone

UA    The historical centre (the rocher)

UB    Town centre (the Coudiat) administrative high density

UC    Administrative mixed density

UD    Predominately residential blocks of flats and characterised by a large deficit in infrastructure and amenities

UE    Dominated by villas, but with insufficient infrastructural provision

UF    Public housing

UG    Zone necessitating service infrastructure prior to development

UH    Projected medium term extension

UI    Short term industrial extension

UJ    University and sports facilities

UK    Land prohibited to development due to land instability

UL    Land prone to natural hazards (landslides, flooding) and interdispersed with bidonville and autoconstruction housing.

Zones UB to UH were then allocated with a Coefficient d'Occupation du Sol (COS), averaged from the existing land use, and defined as "le rapport exprimant le nombre de metre carré de plancher hors oeuvre susceptible

FIGURE 12.1  Proposed <u>Schéma Directeur</u> for Qacentina 1974-1977.

Source: CADAT (1973).

Legend:
- Existing Urban Settlement
- Short-Term Expansion
- Long-Term Expansion
- Primary Road
- Existing Industry
- Projected Industry
- Limits to Development

Map labels: Hamma Bouziane, QACENTINA, Ain Smara, El Kroub

0    2km.

**UA**   The Historic Centre (the Rocher)

**UB**   Administrative High Density Town Centre (The Coudiat)

**UC**   Administrative Mixed Density Zone

**UD**   Predominated by Blocks of Flats; Deficit in. Infrastructure and Amenities

**UE**   Dominated by Villas; Infrastructure Insufficient

**UF**   Public Housing

**UG**   Zone Necessitating Service Infrastructure Prior to Development

**UH**   Projected Medium Term Extension

**UI**   Short Term Industrial Extension

**UJ**   University

**UK**   Development Prohibited due to Land Instability

**UL**   Land Prone to Natural Hazards; Dominated by Informal Housing

**FIGURE** 12.2 The <u>Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur</u> for Qacentina in 1973:
Land-Use Zoning.

Source: CADAT (1973)

FIGURE I2.3  The Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur for Qacentina in 1973:
Zoning by Coefficient d'Occupation des Sols

Source: CADAT (1973)

d'être construires par metre carré de sol (surface foncière) sous réserve des autres régles et des servitudes grévant l'utilisation du sol" (CADAT 1973, p. 71).  In effect, the COS is equal to:

The total constructed ground surface area of the building
Surface area of the building plot

Therefore, to determine the permitted floor area of a building, it is necessary to multiply the surface area of the plot by the relevant COS for the zone (Figure 12.3).

Phase D, subtitled "L'Instrument Juridique d'Utilisation du Sol" reinforced this concept of zoning.  In effect the phase réglementaire of the PDU, this contained detailed development control guidelines for each individual zone.  These controls, to be legally binding in both public and private development, were scheduled under 12 articles:

Article 1    Classes of development and land use prohibited in the zone

Article 2    Classes of development or land use subject to special conditions

Article 3    Mandatory provision of open space and amenities with development

Article 4    Improvements of road and public works

Article 5    Vehicle access and parking regulations

Article 6    Servicing and sanitation

Article 7    Minimum and maximum housing, commercial and industrial densities

Article 8    Regulations relative to open space

Article 9    Regulations regarding height and position of constructions relative to roads

Article 10   Regulations relative to the height and position of opposite constructions

Article 11   Regulations relative to height and position of neighbouring constructions

Article 12   Miscellaneous controls.

Table 12.1, exemplifying Article 1 for the zones $UE_2$ and UH, indicates

how these zoning ordinances were meant to operate in practise.  Effectively
all new residential development is prohibited in zone UE$_2$, whilst, by
contrast, the regulation of residential development is more liberal in
zone UH - designated for future urban expansion.  In both cases, and in
accordance with the Schéma d'Orientation, industrial development is
excluded from both urban zones.

The Plans and legal restrictions on development control contained in
Phase C and Phase D of the Qacentina PDU were considered sufficient to
manage a projected urban population for the city of 700,000 by the year
2000. However, it should be noted that the PDU for Qacentina has still
not been ratified by the city's APC.

12.4.  DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND PLANNING STANDARDS.

The Permis de Construire.

Following the introduction of the permis de construire to Algeria by the
French colonial administration in 1955, its function as an instrument of
development control in the physical planning of independent Algeria was
reaffirmed, clarified and strengthened by Ordonnance 75-67, Articles
1-12, in 1975 (JORA 1975c).  Consequently, a permis de construire was
required for each new construction with the exception of:  communes where
settlements are less than 2,000 inhabitants; constructions which are in
the interest of national defence, as authorised exclusively by the
Ministère de Défense; work and restoration of national buildings and
historic monuments; subterranean work in connection with oil, gas,
electricity and telecommunications; and educational establishments
(JORA 1975c, Article 2).

Each application for a permis de construire must constitute four copies

Table 12.1.  Qacentina PDU Phase D:  Schedule of Article 1 Applicable to Zones UE$_2$ and UH.

|                                | Zone | UE$_2$ | UH |
|--------------------------------|------|--------|----|
| **The following development is prohibited:** | | | |
| individual or collective dwellings | | x | |
| flats                          | | x | above three floors |
| Lotissements                   | | | x |
| industrial establishments[1]   | | | |
| Class 1                        | | x | x |
| Class 2                        | | x | x |
| except: petrol stations        | | max. 2000 litres | |
| artisanal workshops            | | x | x |
| Class 3                        | | x | x |
| except: tobacco manufacture    | | | |
| textile industry               | | | |
| pharmaceuticals                | | | |
| paints and tarnishes           | | | |
| perfume manufacture            | | | |
| camping and caravaning         | | x | x |
| scrap iron, demolition material and other scrap depôts | | x | x |
| creation and extension of cemetries | | x | x |
| mining                         | | x | x |

Source:  CADAT (1976).

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1.  The three classifications are based on those produced by the Institut National d'Hygiène et de Securité (1973).

Class 1.  Industrial establishments which due to noise, fumes or risk of incenderie must be sited away from residential areas (examples include hydrocarbon installations, metal founderies).

Class 2.  Industry not necessarily required to be separated from residential areas, but approved only under certain conditions (for example textile works, paper mills).

Class 3.  Industry which presents no inconvenience for neighbouring land use or public health, and may be integrated into residential areas (for example, cafés, bakers).

of each of the following diagrams: plans at 1:5,000 or 1:2,000 scale
showing the site, situation and servicing of the proposed development;
drawings at 1:200 (or 1:500 for development over three hectares)
indicating the aspect, height, surface area, and proximity to neighbour-
ing buildings; and detailed architectural drawings at a scale of one
centimetre to one metre of the proposed development itself (JORA 1975d,
Article 1). This dossier must be sent to:

(i)   the president of the APC in the commune in which the
      construction is to be realised (JORA 1975a, Article 3)

(ii)  the appropriate wali for all constructions of national
      or regional concern such as telecommunication, hydro-
      carbon or air, sea, or land transport, installations
      (JORA 1975c, Article 4.1$^{o}$)

(iii) the Ministre d'Urbanisme for all collective or individ-
      ual constructions of more than 500 dwellings or where
      the projected building(s) involve land over four
      hectares or exceeds 10,000 square metres in surface area
      (JORA 1975c, Article 4.2$^{o}$).

The decision to grant a permis de construire must be notified within 45
days of any application being submitted to the APC, and two months if the
application has been submitted to the Ministre d'Urbanisme or the wali.
(JORA 1975c, Article 7). The permis de construire is valid for two years
from the date of notification (JORA 1975c, Article 11).

Each application for a permis de construire is initially tested for
compatibility with the PDU (where it exists) and, subsequently, assessed
for conformity with the planning standards contained within Décret 75-110
(JORA 1975e). These relate to the provision of space between buildings,
access requirements, services, drainage, the provision of open space
(Chapitre 1, 11 and 111), and residential building standards (Chapitre 1V).
Of these, Articles 28 and 30 are perhaps representative examples of the
general scope and form of the residential standards outlined. Article 28,

-180-

for example, requires that

- all principal rooms must have a minimum floor area of ten
  square metres, of which the smallest dimension must not be
  less than 2.7 metres;

- the kitchen must not be less than six square metres in area;

- the height between floor and ceiling must not be less than
  2.6 metres;

- all windows must be at least one-eighth of the floor surface
  of the room;

- there must be a minimum of one salle d'eau for each dwelling
  of two or more principal rooms.

Article 30, moreover, specifies that:

- the walls and floors of the kitchen must be both waterproofed
  and washable;

- the kitchen must contain a sink fitted with a drain and taps,
  be provided with adequate ventilation, and have an extractor
  fan for steam.

Controls and Sanctions.

To ensure respect for the permis de construire and planning standards,

various controls and sanctions have been introduced, primarily under

Ordonnance 75-67 (JORA 1975c, Titre 111). Article 34, for example,

requires the presentation of a permis de construire before drinking water

can be connected to any development. However, more comprehensive control

is achieved through the certificat de conformité (JORA 1975c, Article 34;

JORA 1975d Chapitre V11).

Thirty days from the completion of work and new development, the

beneficiary of the permis de construire must submit a déclaration to this

effect to the president of the APC. In conjunction with the director of

L'Infrastructure et Equipement au Wilaya, the president is then obliged

to verify whether the construction complies with the building and planning

regulations, and to the development sanctioned by the permis de construire itself (JORA 1975d, Article 44, applying JORA 1975c, Article 34). If these conditions are met, a certificat de conformité is required to be issued within 15 days. As Article 34 stresses,

> ce certificat vaut permis d'habiter si la construction est destinée à l'habitation; il est exigible pour la réalisation des branchements s'électricité, de gaz et de téléphone; il autorise l'admission du publique et du personnel si la construction est destinée à l'industrie et au commerce.
> (JORA 1975c).

If any part of Ordonnance 75-67 are contravened, the APC can, following a warning of 48 hours, serve an arrêté d'interruption des travaux in a suitably urgent case. A copy of this must be sent to the Ministère Public (JORA 1975c, Article 37). If work continues after the issue of this injunction, a fine may be imposed on the guilty party of between 1,500 and 300,000 DA, and/or an imprisonment of between 15 days and three months (JORA 1975c, Article 38). In addition, the legal courts can order the demolition of any irregular work over, under, or on the ground, and require that the land be returned to its original state. A fine may be imposed of between 20 and 500 DA for each day of non-compliance with this decision. If after a period specified by the courts the land has not been returned to its original state the president of the APC or the wali "peut procéder d'office à tous travaux nécessaires à l'exécution de la décision de justice aux frais et risques du bénéficiare des travaux irréguliers ou de l'utilisation irrégulière du sol" (JORA 1975c, Article 42).

One further safeguard ensures compliance with the various physical planning standards. Article 4 of the Arrêté of 19.2.1971 (quoted in Benatia 1981) stipulates possession of a permis de construire as one of four conditions before someone wishing to build a house can become a beneficiary of a loan from the Caisse d'Epargne et de Prévoyance (National Saving and Provident Society).

## 12.5.  LAND FOR PLANNED DEVELOPMENT.

The ability of government or individual to carry out development is
constrained by the availability of land.  In terms of use and actual
legal access to it, land availability must be related to the resources
and needs of the individual, and be in sympathy with objectives of
national development.

Land which the Europeans left behind after Independence in 1962 came under
the realm of bien vacants, and this notion formed the basic justification
of the government's assertion of control.  In 1963 the Algerian government
began the process of nationalising various types of property, enterprises,
and land; in May 1966 all unoccupied property evacuated by the colons were
taken over by the State.  However, non-exploitative private property is
also an integral part of the new social system in Algeria; moreover,
individual ownership of land (and other immovable property) for family or
personal use is guaranteed (see the Code Civil (JORA 1975a, Livre lll,
Titre 1) and the Charte Nationale).

Importantly, in the developing countries, "control over building land ...
can be a powerful tool to steer the timing and location of private sector
investment in accordance with public sector plans and development
strategies, and thereby ensure implementation" (Koenigsberger 1977,
p. 53).  The relevant statutory instruments available to physical
planning in independent Algeria are those relating to the Zone d'Habita-
tion Urbain Nouvelle and Zone Industrielle; lotissement; and the réserves
foncières.  Each of these will be outlined below.

## The Zone d'Habitation Urbain Nouvelle and the Zone Industrielle.

The ZHUN (Zone d'Habitation Urbain Nouvelle) – new urban zone programmed
for 1000 or more dwellings – which had been introduced by the colonial

authority in 1960, was retained as a statutory planning instrument in independent Algeria by Circulaire 355 of the 19 February 1975 (Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la Construction 1975a). The planning of a ZHUN is, consequently, practised as follows:

- the site is determined by, and in accordance with, the PDU. A dossier de création (commencement proposal) is prepared by a relevant planning agency (to date, principally the CADAT);

- the approbation of the dossier de création is by the Ministère de L'Urbanisme, de la Construction et de l'Habitat who sanctions it with an arrêté;

- the dossier de création is then sent through the wilaya authority to the Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire (Ministry for National and Regional Development) who assess the particular infrastructural requirements of the site;

- subsequently, a dossier d'aménagement, detailing the architectural and infrastructural development of the ZHUN is undertaken by the CADAT or other planning agency, liasing with other appropriate bodies such as architects and engineers;

- the dossier d'aménagement is again required to be ratified by the Ministère de l'Urbanisme;

- a dossier d'execution must then be prepared by a planning agency to allow the development of the ZHUN to be commenced.

The Direction de l'Urbanisme, de la Construction et de l'Habitat is responsible for coordinating the development of the ZHUN which is undertaken by relevant departments of the APC. Finance for the ZHUN is from various sources: SONELGAZ and the PTT for some infrastructural provision; the APC (for schools, for example); and so forth.

By contrast, the development of the Zone Industrielle (ZI) is the unique responsibility of the CADAT and is solely financed by the Banque Algérienne de Développement (BAD). Introduced by Circulaire 683 of 30 April 1975 (Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la Construction 1975b), the ZI represents an area selected for intensive change to industrial use class one and two (see note under Table 12.1) within a specified period. The

delimitation of the ZI is recommended to preserve the maximum amount of
agricultural land, protect neighbouring residential areas from any
subsequent pollution, respect the minimum employment per hectare ratios,
and involve a minimal cost outlay for technical and infrastructural
installation.  Following this, the procedure involved is well synthesised
by Guerroudj:

> après acceptation d'une fiche technique la ZI est individualisée
> par la plan et le financement nécessaire avancé par la BAD à
> la CADAT.  Sur la base d'une dossier de création celle-ci
> aquiert les terrains après déclaration d'utilité publique, fait
> les études nécessaires ou les sous traite éventuellement, pas
> des marchés avec des entreprises grâce au préfinancement de la
> BAD, revend les terrains aménagé au prix coûtant aux industriels,
> récupère le coût de ces prestations et rembourse la BAD grâce à
> ces revenus (Guerroudj 1980b, p. 68).

### Lotissement.

Lotissement was, for the first time, formally introduced into the physical
planning process of independent Algeria in 1975 by Ordonnance 75-67 (JORA
1975c, Articles 13-32) and Décret 75-109 (JORA 1975d).  This former text,
under Article 13, defined lotissement as,

> toute opérations ayant pour effet la division en deux ou
> plusieurs lots d'une ou plusieurs propriétés foncières quels
> que soient les motifs la provoquant en vue de la création
> d'habitations ou d'etablissements administratifs, industriels
> ou commerciaux (JORA 1975c).

Applications for a permis de lotir by either a public body or private
individual, must be sent for approval to the wali of the region in which
the lot is sited, for all lotissement intended for residential development
of less than 25 hectares and all other development less than 200 hectares.
Any proposed lotissement exceeding this must be sent to the Ministre
d'Urbanisme (JORA 1975c, Article 15).  The demand for a permis de lotir
must comprise four copies (five if sent to the Ministre d'Urbanisme) of
the following (one of which must be sent to the appropriate APC):

(i) a plan showing the location of the land;

(ii) plans detailing land boundaries and topography, its relationship with neighbouring constructions, the delimitation of the proposed lots, present infrastructural provision, parking and open space, and the value of the constructions to be erected on the lots;

(iii) a notice listing the proposed lots and their surface area, the nature of the land use, the importance of the lotissement, the number of dwellings or industrial employment the lotissement will provide, the required electrical, gas and water infrastructure, and its means of provision;

(iv) a work schedule, indicating the total cost and phasing of the operation;

(v) a cahier de charges, fixing such obligations as the enclosure, and the general management and maintenance of the property (JORA 1975d, Article 26/A).

The application for a permis de lotir may be refused where the lotissement affects national security or adversely affects adjoining sites, countryside or urban areas, or when it is in violation of the dispositions contained in the PDU (JORA 1975f, Article 17) or under Décret 75-110 (relating to planning and construction standards).

Effecting lotissement before receiving a permis de lotir is subject to fines ranging from 1500-300,000 DA. Non-conformity with the conditions attached to a permis de lotir is punishable by a fine ranging from 50-500 DA per day until rectified. If this rectification is not completed within the time specified the wali is empowered to undertake the necessary work at the expense of the lotisseur (JORA 1975c, Articles 45-47).

Réserves Foncières

By comparison with, for example, the ZHUN and lotissement, the introduction of the legislation pertaining to the réserves foncières was a complete innovation to physical planning in independent Algeria. Enacted by Ordonnance 74-26 (JORA 1974) and implemented by Décrets 76-27, 28 and 29 (JORA 1976), the réserves foncières gave the APC the monopoly in purchasing

and selling land for development.  Finance to do this comes from the

commune itself, loans from institutions such as the Banque Algérienne de

Développement, and from budgetary allocations attached to the plan de

modernisation urbaine (JORA 1976c, Article 8).  The relevant land is sited

within the périmètre d'extension futur, as designated by the PDU, and all

land within the périmetre d'urbanisation (JORA 1974, Articles 2 and 3).

The APC takes possession of the land it requires according to its needs

and as programmed annually by an arrêté from the wali.

The urban land may be transferred either for the benefit of the State,

public establishments, and socialist enterprises (JORA 1976a, Article 5),

or to private beneficiaries (JORA 1976a, Article 10).  The land

constituting the réserves foncières is destined for use - housing,

commercial, industrial and other - determined by the PDU:  furthermore,

the construction must conform to the zoning ordinance and COS (Coefficient

d'Occupation du Sol) relevant to the area (JORA 1976b, Article 3). How-

ever, this is in accordance with the proviso of Article 2 of Décret 76-28

which requires that each residential construction on land constituting

the réserve foncières must allow a minimum of 20 square metres surface

area per person, and a minimum of 160 square metres per family, up to a

maximum of 400 square metres.  Moreover, industrial development must allow

between 20 square metres and 50 square metres per employee - up to a

maximum of 30 employed persons (JORA 1976b, Article 7).  Furthermore,

Article 4 of this décret classifies agglomerations into three categories,

A, B, and C, fixing a minimum COS of 0.40, 0.35 and 0.30 respectively

for residential development as determined by the availability of land in

each agglomeration.  These conditions of development as applied to a

particular réserve foncière must be contained in a cahier de charges.

displayed by the APC for a period of between one to two months.  The

cahier de charges must also stipulate:  details of the nature and

situation of the land to be sold; the origin of land ownership; criteria

of suitable applicants; price and conditions of the sale; and the
deposit each candidate must present (varying between five and ten per
cent of the cost of transfer of the land) (JORA 1976a, Articles 12, 13
and 15). All beneficiaries of the land, as determined by the APC and
approved by the wali (JORA 1976a, Articles 17 and 18) are subject to
Ordonnance 75-67 and Décrets 75-109 and 75-110, relative to the permis
de construire and permis de lotir (JORA 1976a, Article 17). Consequently
the land must be constructed upon following possession within a period
of three years for residential development, and within two years if
destined for industrial use (JORA 1976b, Article 6).


## 12.6. PLANNING EDUCATION.

Following independence in 1962, physical planning was primarily taught
in the form of urban planning options to architectural and engineering
courses. In 1971, planning became fully integrated at the under-
graduate level, as a corporate part of the Diplôme de Géographie
offered at the universites of Algiers, Wahran and Qacentina. A choice
of four core courses were made available to students:  urban planning;
.regional planning; rural planning; and cartographic techniques.
Similarly, in 1976, a five-year Diplôme d'Ingénieur was inaugurated,
organised according to the options of:  urban and regional planning;
environmental planning; and cartographic techniques. The first
entirely post-graduate qualification in physical planning was made
available in 1977 at Algiers, offering a masters degree in Urbanisme
et Planification Territoriale. Subsequent to the establishment of these
courses, approximately 350 students have graduated with some planning
education.

There are three main planning research institutions in Algeria. Two
are in Algiers: the Centre de Recherche en Architecture et Urbanisme
(CRAU) and, less directly, the Centre National d'Etudes et de Recherches
en Aménagement du Territoire (CNERAT). In Qacentina there is the
Centre Universitaire de Recherche, d'Etudes et de Réalisations (CURER),
currently negotiating the institution of a '3$^e$ cycle' (doctorat) in
town planning in collaboration with Paris VIII-Vincennes University,
France.


12.7. CONCLUSION.

The preceding analysis of physical planning provides the third variable
pertinent to the hypothesis of this thesis. Thus, the ensuing chapter
examines whether a relationship exists between physical planning,
ideology, and the urban form of Qacentina, in independent Algeria.

# CHAPTER THIRTEEN.

## 13.  IDEOLOGY, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND THE URBAN FORM OF POST—INDEPENDENCE QACENTINA:  A SYNTHESIS.

## 13.1.  IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN FORM OF QACENTINA.

It is axiomatic from the professed Algerian national ideology, that a new pattern of the city should be developed in independent Algeria which, in antithesis to the colonial era, clearly indicates the inherent unity of the people and the classlessness of society. Socialist urban space should, intrinsically, possess no sharp distinction or structural division between areas of marked social deprivation and economic, social, and environmental advantage should cease to exist (Fisher 1962; Stretton 1978).  Consequently, "l'espace qu'anime le décolonisation n'est donc pas un espace neutre sujet aux propogations multilatérale ... cet espace-là elle le réintègre.  Elle l'organise" (Berque 1964, p. 174-175).

However, it may be proposed that the post—colonial development of Qacentina defies this maxim.  There is, for example, little evidence of any attempt at land—use integration in the city – despite the deficiencies and social bias identified as inherent in non—integrated land—use during French colonialism (p. 131-132).  The retailing infra-structure has little altered since independence, and several peripheral housing quarters are still not (nor planned to be) formally serviced (p. 159).  Similarly, the tertiary employment sector which dominates economic activity in the city remains concentrated in the centre of the city (p. 163), whilst industry is sited on the periphery or exterior to, the agglomeration.  The effect of this is clear when assessed in conjunction with the deficiencies of the public transport system (p. 159).

Quarters such as Cité des Mûriers and Cité Ameziane without public

transport have experienced incidents of retail price speculation (p. 159).

Furthermore, it can be reasoned that this has resulted in excess time,

travel and costs to work being imposed on the inhabitants of these

quarters[1] in order to counter these structural deficiencies in the

urban structure.

The inherent discrimination in service provision which this suggests is
more than implicit. Certain householders (and subscribers) in the
formal, and particularly the informal, housing sectors have still not
been serviced with water, gas and electricity (p. 161). An inevitable
corollary of this is the effect on health, especially in the bidon and
gourbivilles which is likely to be caused by the lack of water and
sanitation.

In turn, this introduces the apparent inequalities in housing.
Undoubtedly it is impossible to divide people equally into the physically
inequal housing stock which existed in the city on accession to
independence. Subsequently, however, it appears that inequalities in
the housing stock have been perpetuated. Most recently, new construction
has been dominated by private villas and European-style flats (p. 156) -
which are allocated to a particular socio-economic class (p. 156). This
bias towards the upper income groups in the city has been countered and
contrasted by the other category where housing construction has
increased - albeit illegally - the bidonville. Simultaneously, this
represents a manifestation of the deficiency in formal housing
provision in the city (p. 149) and the inherent, and acute, socio-
economic differentials (p. 163). Indeed, one fosters the other: it has

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1. As Bourdieu's (1979) study has shown in the colonial era (see
p. 132).

been indicated that the shortfall in housing has enabled beneficiaries
to sell their previous dwelling at a vastly inflated price (p. 159),
thereby, it may be argued, consolidating their own class supremacy.

In this context, therefore, the development of Qacentina since 1962
appears in conflict with the professed aims - egalitarianism, non-
exploitation - intrinsic to Algerian socialism (p. 143).  The
proliferation of the informal housing sector, however, indicates
further incipient conflict between contemporary ideology and the urban
development of Qacentina.  This has been illustrated by the morphology
of the bidonville, and, to a lesser extent, autoconstruction.  For
example, as Figure 11.3 of a bidonville at Pont du Diable shows, the
plan is characterised by narrow irregular alleyways, dwellings with a
small courtyard, and few outward openings (Plate 11.4.  See also the
gourbiville in Plate 11.5).  This introversion of form closely parallels
the pre-1837 urban form of the city characteristic of Islamic ideology
(Chapter 5.1), and reflects the reaffirmation of Islam as the religion
and a cultural force of independent Algeria (p. 140; 146).  However,
this habitat spontané is initiated, and constructed by, the population
themselves.  By contrast, the formal housing sector, initiated, and
constructed by the State, is characterised by the essentially extrovert
European style dwellings and apartments, with large exterior openings,
no interior patio, and each well distanced from the other (p. 156).
Thus, from the ideological standpoint, a relationship between the
contemporary governmental ideology and the urban space cannot be drawn.
Moreover, the imposition of what is, in essence, a culturally alien
dwelling form, also effectively contradicts one further principle of
the official national ideology; this is with respect to the use of
congruous and domestic modes of development (p. 145; 146 ).

Finally, there appears to be an antipathy between post-independent

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development in the city, and the ideological component of change and implementation (p. 139; 147). This may be exemplified by the unimpeded decay of the urban fabric in the original Arab quarter on the rocher (p. 156): this, coupled with the deficiency of new housing provision, has to a large extent been responsible for the increase in density in the city from 4.7 to 7.2 persons per dwelling in 1966 and 1977 respectively (p. 156). Further examples are demonstrated by the urban congestion on the rocher caused by uncontrolled vehicular circulation and pedestrian/vehicular conflict (p. 161), and again, by the inherited, centralised retail infrastructure which has remained unaltered (p. 159) despite residential expansion on the periphery of the city.

13.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICAL PLANNING, IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN FORM OF QACENTINA.

Although it has been established that, contrary to expectations, there appears to be little connection between official, state ideology and the urban space in contemporary Qacentina, it is, nevertheless, still necessary to investigate what relationships exist between the other tenets of the hypothesis proposed in this thesis. Consequently, this section will aim to identify any links between physical planning and ideology, and, as the corollary, physical planning and the urban form of the city.

Theoretically, there should be a clear connection between the change intrinsic to the process of post-independence ideology (p. 139; 147) and national development, and the requirement of physical planning, by definition (p. 6) to ensure that change takes place. Koenigsberger (1977) emphasises that there must be no divorce between plan and implementation; similarly, Alonso (cited in Weitz 1973, p. 206) notes,

"where the society is in the process of change, urban plans must
themselves be processes not static pictures". It needs to be stressed
that implementation must be inherent to any mode of planning adopted by
a developing state (Moughtin 1978).

It has been seen that the PDU is formulated in accordance with a four-
stage procedural model (p. 171). From conception to completion, this
process takes from between 19 and 23 months - and initially suggests a
mode of planning able to respond quickly to a situation of rapid
urbanisation. In Qacentina, the formulation of the PDU took six years
(see Table 13.1). Moreover, the failure of the APC to ratify the PDU in

Table 13.1. Timespan of the formulation of the Plan d'Urbanisme
Directeur for Qacentina.

| Phase | Date submitted | Date approved |
|-------|---------------|---------------|
| Phase A | 1970 | 1970 |
| Phase B | 4.12.1973 | 6.12.1973 |
| Phase C | 27.01.1975 | 17.06.1975 |
| Phase D | 8.06.1976 | contested by the APC |

1976 has resulted in the situation where no plan for the city has ever
been realised.

Generally, therefore, a specific link can be drawn between this failure
of effective plan formulation in physical planning and the anarchic
development in the city (p. 150). One specific example may be cited.
Table 12.1 (p. 179), showing the development schedule relevant to zone
UE$_2$ contained in Phase D of the PDU, may be compared to development at
the Carrières Lentini (p. 150) encompassed by this zone. The develop-
ment of bidonville dwellings, and small scale brickworks and scrap
depôt all may be classed as prohibited development within the intended
planning zone. Formal sanction of Phase D of the PDU may have
prevented this.

There is further evidence that the formulation of the PDU has precluded

implementation. The component stages in the production of the PDU (the

initial analysis of the existing and future situations, proposals for

remedial action, and the subsequent plan) closely resembles the format

of 'Blueprint' or 'Master Planning' – discussed in Chapter 9 (p. 130).

Indeed, Guerroudj, then an architect/planner with the CADAT in Oran, has

noted that,

> On se trouve ... confronté à la contradiction classique
> entre la coherence et la flexibilité, nécessité évidente
> de tout projet à long terme. Cet aspect contradictoire
> vient de ce que le PDU achevé devient un produit fini en
> ce sens qu'il ne peut plus évolver. (Guerroudj 1980a,
> p. 25. Emphasis added.)

Essentially, this establishes the PDU as a static, rather than dynamic,

mode of physical planning. The absence of any provision for review or

'feedback' during and after the formulation of the plan in the

procedural model emphasises that modification during implementation is

not anticipated. This, ironically, presupposes that the PDU is operated

in an environment of complete certainty, and, furthermore, that such

control over the environment is complete. As Payne (1977, p. 70)

correctly argues, such plans are apt to become a parody of reality as

the concept of some future static state "frustrates the ability of such

programmes to ever achieve their objectives since cities in urbanising

countries are not likely in the forseeable future to approach anything

like a 'stable state'".

Indeed, the experience of Adenlyl (1975) affirms that even those master

plans taking two or three years to prepare are often found to be out-

dated, as population, economic activities and aspirations had grown

faster than the planners had envisaged. Moreover, the proposals

contained within these plans were found by some African governments,

particularly Nigeria, to be too expensive, or, in some cases, to display little or no affinity to the socio-economic and physical realities of the cities concerned. The continuing use in Algeria, therefore, of the PDU in its present guise as master or blueprint plan is essentially ill-conceived. In addition, it bears little affinity to the ideological components of change, implementation and the use of appropriate techniques for development purported by the Algerian government. This concern, however, is exacerbated by analysis of the final format of the PDU itself - the plan - from which a bias against the urban poor may be detected, directly contradicting the principles of social justice component to official post-colonial ideology.

This is exemplified by the rigid zoning which constituted the proposed urban plan: within each such district of the PDU for Qacentina the use of land is controlled by a locally enacted zoning ordinance (p. 173; 177). As d'Souza (1980) emphasises, variations in land-use and land-use standards can result in serious disparities by enforcing social segregation between areas, and conferring the best urban services to higher income groups, leading to a monopoly of advantage by these groups. Sidi Boumedine (1973, p. 88) has specifically argued that the application of zoning by Coefficient d'Occupation du Sol (see p. 173) was "permettent à l'urbanisme technique d'expliquer, justifier et légitimer ... la ségregation sociale objective".

In addition, land-use segregation often induces hardship and inconvenience on the poor citizen. Sidi Boumedine further indicates that,

> les terrains disponibles pours les logements dits sociaux
> sont rejetés à l'extérieur de la ville, là où les
> investissements d'aménagement de l'Etat sont trop faibles
> pour qu'il y ait survalarisation des sols, les habitants
> en sont quittes de les payer en fatigue et en temps des
> transports pris sur la durée nécessaire à la restauration
> de leur force de travail. (Sidi Boumedine 1973, p. 90).

The proposed Schéma d'Orientation for Qacentina (p. 173; Figure 12.1)
may be taken as a case in point.  It is clear that the projected housing
and industrial zones are sited on the periphery of the city.  In part,
topographic constraints on the development of the city justify this.
The absence of land—use integration does, however, suggest an inherent
discrimination.  The problems of public transport within the city
which have enabled shop keepers in the peripheral housing areas illicitly
to fix excessive prices on goods, helps to confirm this.  Paradoxically,
the study by Bourdieu (1979) undertaken in 1960 stressing the hardship
caused by excessive travel costs and journey—time imposed on the
Algerian family from similar zoning by the colonial planning admini-
stration (p. 132), may be appropriately evoked.

It is possible to suggest, therefore, that the mode of plan formulation
in independent Algeria is inappropriate to the prevailing situation; that
it prohibits effective and continuous implementation; and that, in its
present form, it defeats attempts to plan towards a 'socially just'
city.  In essence:  little relationship exists between this facet of
contemporary physical planning, and these aspects of contemporary
ideology, in Algeria.  In contrast, these same deficiencies bear a
strong affinity to the development of the city since 1962.  However, to
understand the deficiencies inherent in the PDU introduces a further
intrinsic ideological conflict.  In France in 1967, the Plan d'Occupation
des Sols (POS), derived from the Loi d'Orientation Foncière of 1967,
was introduced.  This provided for detailed zone and site-specific
regulations which would be legally binding on individuals, and
developers, who applied for planning permission within an urban commune,
or group of communes, covered by a Schéma d'Aménagement d'Urbanisme.
Thus, conceptually, the POS is analogous with the PDU; moreover the
deficiencies of the latter echo those of the former.  Despite the

intention, there have been considerable delays in the preparation of

the POS (Lena 1979), taking, as Wilson notes, six to seven years from

conception to approval. Furthermore, she adds,

> The POS displays no flexibility of content. Once produced
> it is incapable of responding to changes in the social and
> economic environment which effect land uses; in other
> words it is a set of rigid regulations about development.
> (Wilson, forthcoming).

The similarities with the criticisms of the PDU are apparent. Telling-

ly, Wilson concludes that it is difficult to identify any technical

improvements in content of the POS from their predecessor plans of the

1958 Act (and introduced by the Ordonnance of 60-960 to Algeria: see

Chapter 8, p. 108).

Yet, the use of congruent and domestic, or domesticated, techniques

has been seen as an important component of development in the official

ideology of independent Algeria (p. 146). And indeed, effective

physical planning in a decolonising and developing nation is itself

dependent on this same component. Honeybone (1978), for example,

indicates that the existing machinery and methods of urban planning in

developing countries have frequently been seen as inadequate for the

needs of planning for extensive, and rapid, change. But, as Bugnicourt

(1973) stresses, resolution of this by 'Le Mimétisme' can only obstruct

national development. Models and techniques which have been developed

in the industrialised states are not only infrequently calibrated, but

embody metatheoretical assumptions which are inappropriate to the

circumstances of the developing nation (Crooks 1971). As the 'Turner

School' of planning emphasises (see most recently Turner (1980)),

settlement planning in developing countries presents a multitude of new

problems that cannot be solved by a transfer of western methods.

Consequently, Weitz is able to conclude that,

> We cannot copy the developed countries, and more than
> that, we cannot follow in historical footsteps. We need
> a new, quite different approach and technique of planning
> for those countries that are now in an entirely different
> situation from the societies that today constitute the
> developed countries. (Weitz 1973, p. 200).

This is heavily contingent on the provision of appropriate, and

adequate, human, as well as other resources (Adenlyl 1975), and thus

the approach to physical planning education by a developing nation is

a vital mechanism of any ideology requiring the rigourous and

systematic reorientation away from culture bound perceptions. Zetter

accurately assesses this position.

> The planner ... is unlikely to find an education
> heavily based on theory, methodology, and analytical
> techniques of great value; he is geared up with
> inappropriate knowledge, operational values and skills.
> He needs less the understanding of reactive and central
> philosophies, but a clear understanding of a range of
> proactive roles in initiating development and in
> guiding and managing implementation processes. (Zetter
> 1981, p. 27).

The genuine concern in Algeria for planning education led to the

government, in conjunction with the United Nations, to organise the

Colloque Internationale sur le Formation et la Recherche en

Aménagement du Territoire[2] which was held in Algiers in January 1980.

Although primarily concerned with education for national and regional

planning, some discussion was specifically devoted to urban planning.

This, however, tended to focus on the experiences of West Germany,

outlined by Wertz, and more particularly France, presented by Merlin.

Although, more appropriately, set in a Third World context by

Phlipponneau, at the same time this firmly viewed planning as an

applied geography. Indeed, physical planning was heralded at the close

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2. The proceedings of this may be found in the Cahiers de
l'Aménagement de l'Espace, 9, 1980, published by the Centre National
d'Etudes et de Recherches pour l'Aménagement de l'Espace, Algiers.

of the conference as "la nouvelle vocation de géographie" (El
Moudjahid 1980).

At once, this introduces an inherent deficiency of planning education
in Algeria. To entrench planning within the parameters of related
disciplines (geography and engineering) indicates a failure to
recognise physical planning as a discipline in its own right, and
cannot but detract from its pluri-disciplinary foundations. Signifi-
cantly, however, distinct parallels can be drawn with the structure
of planning education in France, where Wilson (1981, p. 5) notes, for
example, that, "leur programme est restreint et leur but est évidement
de former des ingénieurs et non des urbanistes". Examination of the
existing courses in physical planning in Algeria (p. 188) verifies
this confusion - and provides further evidence of this dependence.
The subject areas tend to be elaborated in the context of the
European city and its intrinsic land-use structures, urban property
mechanisms, and redevelopment policies. This is awkwardly interposed
with various aspects of planning theory (land-use principles, the
planning seers, and planning law) using French experience with
reference to texts such as Blumann (1977) (in 1980 already outdated by
various reforms in French planning law). Planning techniques,
management and procedural theory are ignored. Overall, there is little
consideration given to the aims and activities of fast urbanising
environments. In sum, there appears a flagrant disregard for those
principles, cited above, of indigenous and appropriate planning necessary
in the Third World.[3]

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3. Indeed, it might be argued that the proposed research link between
CURER in Qacentina and Paris VIII-Vincennes University in France
(p. 189) will only aggravate this situation.

The components of planning education, therefore, are more indicative

of an ideology of dependence not independence.   As

dos Santos qualifies,

> dependence is a conditioning situation in which the
> economies of one group of countries are conditioned by
> the development and exploitation of others.  A
> relationship of interdependence between two or more
> economies or between such economies and the world
> trading system becomes a dependent relationship which
> some countries can expand through self-impulse while
> others, being in a dependent position can only expand
> as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant
> countries which may have positive or negative effects
> on new immediate development.  (dos Santos 1973,
> p. 76.  Emphasis added).

This, of course, expands beyond the human planning resource.  The

deficiencies and dangers of imported and/or received physical planning

legislation have been assessed elsewhere by Kanyeihamba (1980) for

anglophonic Africa, and by Prouzet (1980) for francophonic Black

Africa.  But, by comparison, the problems faced by Algeria appear

particularly acute.

The complete reconstruction of Algerian legislation proclaimed by

Boumediene, and advocated by the Charte Nationale has already been

noted (p. 145).  However, it is important to recognise that although

colonial law is in direct contradiction with socialist law, it

nevertheless follows it chronologically.  Thus, physical planning law

can, in a newly independent state, be expected to include initially

characteristics which are intrinsic to both colonial and post-

colonial legal systems whilst it is in transition from the one society

to the other.  As Szabó has noted,

> characteristics of the actual individual legal system
> of various socialist countries include in addition to
> general features, specific traits which are in part no
> doubt elements of historical origin ... it was only

> after a certain amount of social experience had been
> gained in the new, that is socialist, conditions that
> a basis was formed for coming to clearer conclusions
> on specific traits and on how to give them effect in
> the individual socialist legal system.  (Szabó 1975,
> p. 112-113).

Consequently, the continuing application of basic statutes is not in

conflict with post-independence ideology in Algeria, providing that

the whole system is to be later transformed in accordance with the

particular traits and specific needs of the country.  This provides

time in which developing countries such as Algeria "ought to do their

utmost to find their own particular values and methods and a style

which shall be peculiar to them" (Fanon 1967, p. 78).  What is not

integral to the attainment of ideological principles is the application

of received or imported (physical planning) legislation and techniques

where the situation and requirements are inappropriate.  The PDU has

well exemplified this.

It is possible, however, to identify some positive relationships

between professed post-independence Algerian ideology and physical

planning.  Some statutory instruments, such as the ZHUN, introduced as

the Zone à Urbaniser par Priorité in 1960 by the colonial authority

(p. 114), and essentially an operation controlled and financed by the

state, have, understandably, been retained with little modification

(p. 183); in France the corresponding ZUP (Zone à Urbaniser par Priorité)

was superceded by the Zone d'Aménagement Concerté (ZAC) in 1967, to

facilitate increased private initiative in the development of these

zones.  By comparison, however, some tools concerned with providing

land for development in Algeria continue to be applied, or imported,

without appropriate evaluation, and without adaption, to the prevailing

development environment.

Lotissement helps illustrate this.  Introduced into Algerian

legislation in 1919 (p. 113), lotissement was later defined as,

> l'opération et le résultat de l'opération ayant pour objet
> ou ayant en pour effet la division volontaire en lots d'une
> ou plusieurs propriétés privées, par ventes ou  locations
> simultanées ou successives, en vue de la création
> d'habitations, de jardins ou d'etablissements industriels
> ou commerciaux.  (Journal Officiel de l'Algérie 1960).

Received into the legislation of post-colonial Algeria, lotissement was,
for the first time, formally introduced to the physical planning process
of independent Algeria in 1975 (p. 185) by ordinance 75-67, where, under
Article 13, it was redefined as,

> toute opérations ayant pour effet la division en deux ou
> plusieurs lots d'une ou plusieurs propriétés foncières
> quels en que soient les motifs la provoquant en vue de la
> création d'habitations ou d'etablissements administratifs,
> industriels ou commerciaux.  (JORA 1975).

The similarity in phraseology between the two definitions is clear.
This is not to be so naive as to suggest that the 'redefined' legisla-
tion on lotissement is automatically inappropriate.  Nevertheless, by
enacting this legislation in 1975, the Algerian government were
effectively reaffirming a piece of foreign legislation, which, at the
time, was subject to much criticism in the country of origin, France,
itself.  This controversy, in fact, led to a much simplified definition
being introduced in 1977 to the French Code d'Urbanisme (Journal Officiel
de la Republique Français (JORF) 1977) under Article R.315-1 which, for
example, dispensed with the reference "d'une ou plusieurs propriétés",

regarded as particularly vulnerable to misinterpretation (Hortus 1978).
Despite this, the same clause was retained in the redefinition of
lotissement introduced to Algerian legislation in 1975.

Chapter 12 (p. 181) has provided some general indication of the scope
and form of residential planning standards in Algeria.  Clearly these

appear to accord with the principle established in the Charte Nationale
(FLN 1976, p. 186) that to "loger dans les conditions decentes et selon
les normes minimales du confort moderne est un élément fondamental de
l'amélioration du niveau de vie des masses". Yet, despite the relation-
ship between physical planning and ideology that this would suggest, on
closer examination, the converse is indicated. This may be demonstrated
by a qualitative assessment of the standards contained within Décret
75-110, by their comparison with the residential planning standards of
an industrialised country. France, as the former colonial power,
appears an appropriate example. And indeed, analysis of the standards
contained within the French Code de la Construction et de l'Habitation
(JORF 1978) indicates, by contrast, the provision of a more flexible,
broader, and less rigourous set of residential planning standards. Two
specific examples may be cited. First, Article 32 of Décret 75-110
requires that the toilet must be contained separately from all other
rooms in the dwelling, including the bathroom. The latter regulation
is, by comparison, not contained within the relevant Article R111-3 of
the French Code (nor is it in British legislation). Second, Article 31
of Décret 75-110 specifies that a space of 0.7 square metres be retained
in the salle d'eau for the installation of a washing machine (a scarce,
luxory item in Algeria). The absence of any such requirement in the
French Code indicates what are perhaps extreme targets of Algerian
residential planning standards.

Admittedly, as Stretton (1978) argues, high standards prevent the
political dilemma of building tomorrow's slums today. But, as Turner
(1967) stresses, high planning standards in the developing countries are
often unattainable by the mass of population. The proliferation of the
illegally constructed bidonvilles in Qacentina (and elsewhere in Algeria)
indicates an inability by their inhabitants to meet even the basic

planning standards. Consequently, it might be argued that this
inherent discrimination in physical planning standards is, in essence,
antipathetic to the professed ideological aims of egalitarianism and
non-exploitation. Conversely, to accept that these planning standards
have directly or indirectly propagated the informal housing sector in
the city, suggests a relationship between physical planning and the
urban space.

Support for this is given by further assessment of the implications of
enacting such standards. The construction of high quality dwellings
which conform to the relevant standards necessitate a greater input of
building materials per unit. Where supply is fixed, this will result
in a smaller potential number of dwellings being constructed than are
possible using lesser standards (which require a lower input of building
materials per unit). The situation in Algeria is, moreover, aggravated :
in 1977, plaster, tile, cement and brickworks were operating at only
28, 38, 50 and 80 per cent of their respective production capacities
(Société Nationale des Materiaux de Construction 1979). In addition, as
the demand for housing in Algeria well exceeds supply, it can be
speculated that, as a result, the fewer, albeit good quality, dwellings
in the public sector, will tend to be allocated to the upper as
opposed to the lower income groups. Indeed, it has been shown in
Chapter 11 (p. 156) that this has been the case in Qacentina, with
demands by the enseignement supérieur for new housing being satisfied
100 per cent.

Brebner (1982) has drawn attention to a further aspect of the planning
standards which repudiate a relationship between this instrument of
physical planning and post-independent Algerian ideology, but, never-
theless, affirms a connection between physical planning and the urban
space. He argues that the planning standards appear to pay little

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respect to the social and cultural traditions of the Algerian people by favouring the extraversion of the European-style dwelling, rather than the introversion of the dwelling fundamental to Islamic ideology (p. 55). This contradicts the cultural adherence to Islam seen as intrinsic to Algerian post-colonial ideology (p. 140; 147a) and articulated in the urban form of the bidonville (Figure 11.3). Consequently, it might be argued that physical planning has fostered the development of an informal housing sector (thereby affiliating it to urban form), whilst prohibiting positive participation by the population (p. 146) in development control, seen as essential to effective physical planning and development in developing countrol, (Koenigsberger 1977; Moughtin 1978), thereby disassociating it from this facet of official Algerian ideology.

The direct and indirect discrimination inherent in the planning standards are compounded on examination of the corresponding control available to the planning authority through the use of the permis de construire. As a concept, the permis de construire appears both an appropriate and just means of development control, being founded on the principle that no-one has the right to develop land as he wishes, unless the development is seen as publically desirable. However, under Ordonnance 75-67, Article 35 requires all development to be officially sanctioned by a certificat de conformité with respect to compliance with the permis de construire and associated planning standards. This certificat is an important means of development control as it must be produced before any development can be connected to electrical, gas, water or telephone services (p. 181). In both theory and practice (p. 161) this undoubtedly imposes formal bias against the urban informal housing sector; again this indicates a negative relationship between governmental ideology and planning.

One further safeguard ensures compliance with these planning standards. The possession of a _permis de construire_ is a legal necessity before any one wishing to build a house can become a beneficiary of a loan from the _Caisse d'Epargne et Prevoyance_[4] (p. 182). As the only society of its kind in Algeria, the enforcement of planning controls and standards is virtually guaranteed.

In essence, therefore, development control and planning standards in Algeria tend to oppose the professed ideological concepts of equity, non-exploitation, participation and religious and cultural adherence to Islam propounded by post-independent Algeria. Nevertheless, there appears to be a distinct relationship between physical planning and the contemporary urban development of Qacentina. This contradiction is similarly engendered by the role of physical planning in the provision of land for planned development.

The introduction of the legislation pertaining to the _réserves foncières_ (p. 186), although originally embodied in the French _Code d'Urbanisme_ (Article L.221) from 1967, was, nonetheless, a complete innovation to physical planning in Algeria. By giving the APC the monopoly in purchasing and selling land for development, this aimed to assist a more rational and controlled land use in urban areas by the state, particularly where sufficient land would not otherwise become available for development. At the same time, property speculation was prevented.

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4.  Article 4 of _Arrêté_ 9.2.1971, which also stipulates that the savings account be held for more than 36 months, and that, to qualify for a loan, the account must have accrued an interest of more than 350 DA. As the interest rate is 3.5 per cent, this implies a deposit of 10,000 DA. The inbuilt discrimination is demonstrated by Table 11.4 (p. 165) which indicates that 41.65 per cent of the population of Qacentina earn less than 10,000 DA per annum. Indeed, Weexsteen (1978, p. 227) has observed that this system "va ainsi constituer un clivage social certain, assorti qu'elle sera de ségrégation spatiale et morphologique".

Indeed, the use of a similar planning instrument in Stockholm since the end of the nineteenth century has reduced the component cost of land of any dwelling to an average of ten per cent of the total — compared to an average of 36.1 per cent in Paris (Jégouzo and Pittard 1980). Consequently, the introduction of the réserves foncières to Algeria has been described by Belayat (1976, p. 161) as, "une étape décisive dans la construction du socialisme". However, the link between this instrument of physical planning and Algerian ideology, is on closer examination, less obvious. In practice, a particular social stratum is favoured by the operation of the réserves foncières in their present form.

For example, Article 2 of Décret 76-28 requires that each residential construction on land constituting the réserves foncières must allow a minimum of 20 square metres surface area per person, and a minimum of 160 square metres per family, up to a maximum of 400 square metres. Without doubt, this tends to encourage the construction of detached housing on much of the réserves foncières destined for private residential use: for a family of eight, 160 square metres of the total 400 square metres is used for the dwelling, and the excess 240 square metres for a court or garden. Alternately, on the réserves foncières used for public housing development, the minimum standards become the maximum standards: for a family of eight, 160 square metres is the total acceptable.[5]

In Qacentina, the actual size of the building plots within the réserves foncières have tended to sanction the individual, rather than the

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5. These anomalies are cited by Benatia (1981) in his study of the development of Algiers.

collective, dwelling                    .  This explicitly establishes a

liaison between physical planning and recent formal housing development

in Qacentina (p. 156) and implicitly between physical planning and

informal housing development (by propagating a housing deficiency by

effectively restricting the number of new dwelling units constructed;

and by prohibiting the purchase of land plots by the urban poor at a

realistic price which a smaller lotissement would allow).

Attached to the sale of the residential land of the <u>réserves foncières</u>

is the <u>critère d'attribution</u> which requires a dwelling to conform to

the relevant planning standards.  This may appear reasonable, but for

the criticisms of these standards outlined above.  The bias against

the lower income groups goes further, however.  In Qacentina, some

applicants have wished to buy land, but initially construct a temporary

dwelling, such as a <u>gourbi</u>.  Other private individuals have similarly

wished to purchase land, but defer any development for five to ten

years.  The texts of the <u>réserves foncières</u>, though, clearly state that

the beneficiary must build within three years of receipt of land

(whilst, in France, the texts of the <u>réserves foncières</u> do allow five

years).  It can be argued that the stipulation of three years enables

rapid and controlled urban development by the planning authorities,

and, implicitly, displays an affinity with the need for dynamism

component to Algerian ideology (p. 145).  Nevertheless, the question -

development for whom? - is prompted.  The applicant for the <u>réserve</u>

<u>foncière</u> must have the capital to both buy land, and construct a

dwelling of reasonable standard.  An inherent inability for the

majority of the population of Qacentina to attain this is indicated by

the classification of incomes in the city shown in Table 11.4 (p. 165).

This does not, therefore, appear to encourage the shift towards a more

egalitarian distribution of resources.

In addition, the intricate legal texts and complex procedures involved in the réserves foncières - 'cauchemardesque' in the opinion of one official interviewed - have resulted in mismanagement, and led to delays in freeing land in Qacentina, thus curbing implementation by constraining the speedy provision of land for planned development[6]. A further example of the lengthy and complex bureaucratic procedure integral to the provision of planned land for development in Algeria is represented by the ZHUN (p. 184). The efficiency of the procedure is reduced by the necessity of three different dossiers, each requiring ministerial consent, before the actual development of the ZHUN can be commenced. The inherent delay is significant: in 1980, only 37 ZHUNs were achieved out of a total of 149 ZHUNs instigated at various times since 1975 (Guerroudj 1980b). Only a further 16 had reached the stage of preparing a dossier d'exécution. In Qacentina itself only two of six proposed ZHUNs have been completed: at Ain El Bey and at Polygône. This apparent inaction has been exacerbated by the multiplicity of agencies required to effect development (p. 169) with departments and organisations operating independently from, or in conflict with, others (Brebner 1982). By restraining implementation, therefore, those statutory instruments have also restrained the effective planning of the development of post-colonial Qacentina: and consequently may be seen to bear little relationship to this facet of ideology professed in independent Algeria.

The bureaucracy inherent to physical planning not only prohibits

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6. This has occurred elsewhere in Algeria. In 1980, for example, the new APC at Wahran took control, to discover that 613 lots of the city's réserves foncières had been transferred during the term of office of their predecessors to public construction companies, housing coopera-tives, and private individuals. However, the procedure of land transfer had been bypassed, and over one-half of the land transactions were founded purely on the submission of a simple letter or request. (Brebner 1982).

effective implementation, but further impedes effective participation

by the public. Doubtless, the complexity and formality of procedure

will escape the competence of the majority of the urban population in

Algeria. In 1977, the illiteracy rate of those over nine years of age

was in the urban centres 44.3 per cent; and, in the rural areas,

71.1 per cent (Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan 1978). In Qacentina itself,

the percentage of population over six years of age who were illiterate

was 36.7 per cent (p. 163). There is the added problem in East

Algeria of a large percentage of the population speaking Berber, rather

than Arabic or French - the languages in which the Journal Officiel

and planning documents are published. Many urban dwellers, and in

particular, the migrant, are therefore unable to participate fully in

the development process - and are not equal in fact if they are in law.

The danger of this has been well synthesised in the observation that,

> ce qui est le plus à craindre aujourd'hui, c'est que le
> deshérité, le prolétaire, l'Algérien economiquement
> faible, celui qui doit le plus profiter des effets de la
> consolidation et du développement du socialisme, adopte
> le comportement le plus antisocialiste, tant l'expérience
> reçue depuis l'independence, lui donnent l'intime
> conviction que le socialisme c'est la cohabitation de
> bidonvilles pour les travailleurs et de quartiers
> residentiels paradisiaques pour ceux du pouvoir et les
> comparses. (Benamrane 1980, p. 232).

13.3. CONCLUSION.

It was argued in Chapter 10 that the professed ideology of post-1962

Algeria was, in essence, cosmetic. Instead, it was suggested, the

ideology was more realistically purporting a contradictory ideology

characterised by inequity, the use of incongruent and dependent methods

and techniques of development, a lack of implementation and an absence

of public participation. And indeed, this has been a major theme

recurrent in the analysis in this chapter. The post independence

development of the city appears to have done little to alleviate, and

in places has enforced, elements of the earlier colonial division and

exploitation. The statutory instruments of planning, such as

exemplified by the réserves foncières, although superficially socialist

in concept, in reality operate to enforce these inequities. Again,

whilst theoretically adapted to the needs of fast urbanising

environments, components such as the PDU and the ZHUN in actuality

have precluded rapid implementation. Indeed, the dependence on

foreign methods and techniques has not only contributed to, but

exacerbated this situation.


Consequently, there is an association between the ideology of

independent Algeria and the urban development of Qacentina. Second,

there appears to be an affinity between post-independent ideology and

physical planning in Algeria. Third, there exists a relationship

between physical planning and the development of the urban space.

Therefore, it may be concluded that physical planning for the post-

colonial period has again asserted itself as an agent of ideology

vis à vis the urban space.

## 14.   CONCLUSIONS.

The preceding analysis has strongly supported the main tenet of this thesis: that is, physical planning is an agent of ideology _vis à vis_ the urban space. First, this relationship was shown by examining Islamic ideology, encompassing the duties to self, to others, and to society as a whole, physical planning under the  Mālikī school, and the urban morphology of Qacentina (as Qusanṭina) before 1837. Similarly, there appeared a distinct relationship between the components (capitalism and racism) of French colonial ideology, the contemporary physical planning, and the subsequent form of Qacentina (as Constantine) between 1837 and 1962.

This relationship was also upheld of independent Algeria. The essentially cosmetic traits of professed ideology were only corroborated by examination of the physical planning system, which although superficially socialist, participatory, congruent and dynamic, in reality appeared inegalitarian, dependent, and intrinsically static, precluding both implementation and participation. Accordingly, the effect on the city form of Qacentina has been one which has primarily enforced elements of the earlier colonial division and exploitation.

Consequently, this has demonstrated one major and determinant process of the Third World city; the city form              is closely associated with                              the planning structures and practice adopted since 1962. Two other points may be reasoned from this. First, it has affirmed the necessity for a wider chronological perspective in understanding the problems, and formulating the solutions of the Third

World city.  Second, it may be suggested on the basis of the evidence
presented in this thesis, that physical planning is likely to be more
successful when related to prevailing indigenous, social and moral
perceptions, rather than bureaucratic or technocratic mechanisms which
rely on imported methodologies.

It has been also apparent that physical planning tends to serve the
ruling interest; to some extent it may be seen as an internal survival
mechanism by which the dominant class can enforce its own value system
through the propogation of their own goals and values.  Physical planning
has certainly been seen as an initiator of ideological change as well as
an agent per se of ideology  between Islamic, French colonial, and
independent Algeria.  But, as a corollary, it has been shown that physical
planning is perhaps effective in preserving the socio-political status
quo.

In the general sense, the study perhaps indicated the problems and
pitfalls of socialism as a realistic ideology for  a newly independent
developing state.  At the same time, it has indicated that the loosely
applied socialism in Algeria has perhaps been more successful than the
doctrinaire variety – as testifed by the political stability of the
country in spite of its ethnic diversity, wide social and spatial
disparities in living standards, and the existence of a substantial
urban proletariat living in marginal conditions of housing and employment.

In conformity with the reversed matrix proposed in Chapter One (p.11),
it has been demonstrated that Qusantina, Constantine and Qacentina each
reflected the prevailing system of physical planning, which in turn,

was indicative of the contemporary ruling ideology. It was, therefore, possible to ascertain from physical planning per se the contemporary ideological traits. The death of President Boumediene in 1978, and the election of Chadli Bendjedid as president marked a new phase in the post-independent development of Algeria. In 1980, a special session of the Front de Libération Nationale openly criticised the emergence of a nouveau riche, corruption and the Government's economic and social policies. This led to a fundamental reorganisation of the party, and a pledge to continue la révolution (Maclean 1980). At present, the very first code d'urbanisme for independent Algeria is being prepared by the Ministère d'Urbanisme et de la Construction et de l'Habitat in Algiers. Analysis of this should prove an accurate measure of Algeria's commitment to, authenticity of, and progress in attaining its currently professed ideology. It is necessary to realise that the resources on which the country's development are based are finite, whilst population expansion is, by contrast, potentially infinite. Therefore, effective physical planning is required now, while resources are available. As Brebner (1981, p. 55) has concluded, 'until a more concerted attempt at totally integrating planning and development policies is made ... real progress in national development will be elusive '.

Undoubtedly, a requirement of this is a cadre of planners trained in the appropriate manner: in turn, improved training will only be effective if the proposed code d'urbanisme is successful at the level of implementation. This poses broader issues of financial provision, administrative efficiency, decentralisation and participation. At present, these can only be realms of speculation.

It is hoped that the present thesis will be of value as a 'datum' against which future developments in physical planning may be evaluated in due

course. Although not an objective of the thesis, it is hoped also
that the study contributes in the wider sense to the general issue
of the strategic priorities of Algerian development. In this respect,
physical planning is but one aspect of broader options at a political
level; consequently, it is both appropriate and instructive to recall
the words of Talleyrand: 'all that is exaggerated is insignificant'.
This thesis concludes with the hope that a historical view of the
relationship between ideology, urban form and physical planning in
Algeria has provided a useful context within which to appraise the
future evolution of an increasingly urbanised country.

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# PLAN DE CONSTANTINE

CONSTANTINE

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Bois de la Légion d'Honneur

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Sidi Mabrouck Supérieur

Faubourg Gallieni

Quartier Gallifet

Mansourah

Koudiat Aty

Village Arabe

Quartier de la Menonie

la Brèche

Sidi Mabrouck Inférieur

Faubourg S. Jean

le Bardo

Couvent du Bon Pasteur

Terrain de Manœuvres

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