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Managing Intra-state Conflicts in Africa: The African Union as an Effective Security Actor

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Politics
School of Social and Political Science
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August 2014
Abstract

This thesis seeks to analyse and explain the role of the African Union (AU) in managing intra-state conflicts in Africa. It first identifies the key reasons for the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, namely the failure of the UN and the international community to intervene in remote conflicts in Africa throughout the 1990s and the reluctance of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. Then, it points to the gap between the optimism of the AU’s founders and its implementation record: in fact, the AU’s capability to stop conflicts in Africa has produced mixed results at best.

Focusing on three different case studies – Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia – this thesis unravels the key factors behind the AU’s performance in promoting peace and security. More specifically, it argues that the AU’s effectiveness to achieve its goals is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mandate of the mission, the commitment of AU member states, and external support. By developing this argument, this thesis highlights the importance of both organisational processes and external factors with the view to contributing to the general literature on effectiveness of international and regional organisations in managing intra-state conflicts.
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Dedication

To my mother and father

To my beloved wife “Nagwa”

To my beautiful angels, and the greatest gift from Allah

“Mallak (8), Amira (5) and Aya (3)
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Undertaking a PhD is a real challenge and it represents an important phase in my academic life. During the period of working and writing my thesis, I bear responsibility for this thesis to numerous people who contributed to the final outcome. First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to have an outstanding and exceptional supervisor, Professor Maurizio Carbone. I am highly indebted to his invaluable guidance and endless encouragement, since I started this wonderful journey in 2010. Without his generous suggestions and insightful feedback, I could have never completed my thesis. I am also indebted to Dr. Kurt Mills, Dr. Cian O’driscoll, Dr. Kelly Kollman and Professor Alasdair Young for their encouragement during my period of study at Glasgow University. I am also appreciative to the Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, for its support during my fieldworks in Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum and Addis Ababa. I sincerely wish to thank all of those, who were willing to spend their time to share their ideas in the interviews, during my field trips in Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.

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DECLARATION

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPMs</td>
<td>Armed Political Parties and Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>Commission of the AU</td>
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<td>AUCA</td>
<td>African Union Constitutive Act</td>
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<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>BINUB</td>
<td>UN Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constitutive Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defence of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>EU Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
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<td>HCFA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVMM</td>
<td>Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-government Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTO</td>
<td>Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDAAs</td>
<td>Pre-disarmament Assembly Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROs</td>
<td>Regional Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Sudanese Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNRC</td>
<td>Somali National Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somalia Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGoB</td>
<td>Transitional Government of Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN joint Mission force in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>UN Office to the AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOMII</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nation Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union for National Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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Chapter 1; African Institutions and Intra-state Conflicts

1.1 Introduction

In the aftermath of World War Two (WWII), the creation of international, continental and regional organisations committed to the maintenance of peace and stability to provide welfare and economic stability was perceived as an absolute necessity for world leaders and policymakers. The creation of the League of Nations in 1919 and subsequently the United Nations (UN) in 1945 was motivated by the will of most world nations to contribute to the preservation of peace and security. However, their efforts were primarily directed to inter-state conflict management. In addition to these major organisations, several other institutions were established in the post-WWII era to ensure the maintenance of peace and security worldwide and provide welfare and economic stability. On a smaller scale, in comparison with the League of Nations and the UN’s role, the efforts of these institutions in peacekeeping during the Cold War were focusing on inter-states conflicts.

The priority to deal principally with intra-state conflict was parallel to the concern to avoid infringing the sovereignty of nation states. Therefore, only the right to intervene within inter-state disputes was included in most international and regional organisations’ Charters.

In the post-Cold War era, numerous events occurred such as the unexpected collapse of the Eastern bloc, the fall of the Berlin wall and the acceleration of the phenomenon of globalization. In fact, the euphoria which followed these events misled (gave wrong signals to) international analysts who thought that the unprecedented events would benefit the UN and other institutions making them free from the interference of the two superpowers; they were also convinced that it was the end of ideologically motivated conflicts. Dominant characteristics of social democracy such as tolerance, rationality and

---

1 Accordingly, agencies such as the Organisation of American States, OAS (1948), the Arab league (1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO (1949), the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD (1961) the Organization of African Unity, OAU (1963), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, (1967), the European Union, EU (1957) were created.

2 Indeed, all international and regional organisations’ Charters mentioned above emphasised respect for the sovereignty of their member states and non-interference in their internal affairs. See for example, the UN’s Charter, Chapter II articles, 3.4.5.6 at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml;
See also the OAS’s Charter, Chapter VI, articles, 28.29, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_a-41_Charter_of_the_organization_of_american_States.htm;
flexibility were expected to be the promoted values which would replace ideological and religious conflicts as well as ethnic bias. In this regard, Fukuyama (1992) led the way to the belief in the light of a peaceful universal consensus and the advent of an age under the emblem of a New World Order. Fukuyama argued that all the end of the Cold War had brought was the demise of socialism, or what he described as “the end of the evil empire”, and the triumph of political liberalism which would lead to peace coexistence between and within the world’s nation-states (cited by Macey and Miller, 1992). Similarly, Nkiwane (2001: 284) observed that Fukuyama asserted that “Western economic and political liberalism had triumphed over any viable systemic alternatives”. He sustained that both capitalism and democratic institutions were able to face the challenges and solve the existing contradictions, encountered by people through the ages. Consequently, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites, the world’s nation-states would live in peace, principally those who choose to implement liberal democratic reforms. Similarly, Jean (2004) argued that the end of the bipolar system who dominated the world for half a century was seen as a good sign for world politics. The occurrence of systemic changes on the international scale, after the Cold War, offered unprecedented opportunities for global solidarity and cooperation particularly in the peace and security realm (Ullman, 1991; Van Evera, 1991).

However, the reality on the ground was different from what was predicted. Once the effect of the euphoria was over, people realised that early speculations were too positive and did not hold (Waltz, 1992; Lemke, 1997; Ray, 2002). Nevertheless, the optimistic and genuine belief was eroded by the passage of time when the expectations did not materialise and soon it was noticed that the Cold War equilibrium based on imposed dualism had to be replaced by a more concrete alternative to Fukuyama’s (1992) theory. The political vacuum had to be filled, especially when some noticed a “resurgence of other pressures and antagonisms which have lain masked or latent beneath the artificial stability which an east-west balance tended to enforce” (Munro, 1999: 466).

In fact, one result of these new circumstances was the increased number of conflicts and the change in their nature, especially in regions politically weak and lacking in resources. It is widely acknowledged that in the aftermath of the Cold War the nature of the international conflicts changed from inter-state to intra-state (Carmen and Rowlands, 1998; Abass, 2003; Nye, 2005; Sarkin, 2009; Ferreira, 2009). As Nye (2005: 153) noted “of the 111 conflicts that occurred between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of new century, 95 were purely intra-state conflicts”. It is quite significant to note that most of intra-state conflicts occurred in Africa (Williams, 2011b). In addition to the dramatic
effects including human losses, destruction of infrastructure, and population displacement - which are the unavoidable consequences of wars and conflicts - the socio-economic and political developments of countries involved are also affected (UN, 2002a). In order to mitigate the dire consequences of intra-state conflicts international and regional organisations have involved themselves directly with a variety of internal conflicts. Unfortunately, their efforts were inadequate in dealing with this new wave of conflict. Scholars agree that both the various charters and the classical peacekeeping methods of international and regional organisations, especially the UN, are obsolete and do not respond adequately to the challenges presented by the increased number of intra-state conflicts (Fetherston, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1995; Zaum and Roberts 2008; Jones et al, 2010).

In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN’s failures alongside the international community’s inaction to prevent and act following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Somalia (in the 1990s) and in Darfur (1990-2003) were significant factors which convinced African leaders to create an institution able to face new peace and security challenges. Consequently, in July 2002, the African Union (AU) became a reality with the effective adoption of its Constitutive Act. The decision to establish the AU filled the gap left by the collapse of the USSR and the coming of the new geo-political and global order (AU, 2000).

The drafters of the African Union constitutive act (AUCA) were keen to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors (i.e. the authors of the OAU’s Charter) by adapting new principles and mechanisms (Gottschalk and Siegmar, 2004; Murithi, 2005). For example, in the Treaty of the AU, it is stated that the Union has the right to intervene in order to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity as well as the prohibition of unconstitutional change of legitimate order (AU, 2000, Art.4 (h) and (P)). Compared with other organisations, the AUCA is the first and only international treaty to contain such a right. Although it provides a legitimate basis for the AU’s interventions and provides its

---

3 The OAU, as will be seen later, had been the frame of reference for the political and socio-economic development in Africa for almost four decades (1963-2002).

4 In the Rwandan genocide, in almost four months up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered. See, the Report of the OAU’s International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (2001), Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 45:1, pp 123-142.

5 This new norm did not only contradict the non-interference principle of its predecessor (e.g. article 3 of the OAU) but also challenges collective customary laws of non-interference. It clashes in some ways with the interdiction to use of force included in article 2(4), (7) of the UN Charter. Indeed, there has been a big debate on the contemporary literature regarding the legitimacy of this norm and other related norms such as the responsibility to protect and the just war tradition. See O’Driscoll and Lang (2013) Just War: Authority,
founders and supporters with confidence in its ability to manage the various conflicts occurring in Africa, the reality on the ground indicates that implementing AU’s policies is very complex. The AU’s involvement in and dealing with the conflicts certainly has had mixed results and presented substantial difficulties and unexpected challenges. Indeed, there is no consensus among scholars about whether the AU was effective or not in its involvement in intra-state conflicts. Moreover, there are not enough explanations on how a judgement on the efforts of AU’s peace operations are in fact made or what the term “effectiveness” means and how it can be measured. These shortcomings and disagreements within the literature represent the question that this thesis seeks to answer:

*Has the AU been effective in the management of intra-state conflicts in Africa?*

In order to answer this first question, the thesis analyses and evaluates the AU’s involvement in different conflict zones focusing on the main elements supporting, underpinning its effectiveness in managing civil wars. Thus, the second research question of this thesis is the following:

*Under which conditions can the AU be an effective organisation in achieving peace and security in Africa?*

By answering these questions, this thesis provides a better understanding of both the extent to which the AU effectively manages intra-state conflicts and identifies the main factors which contribute to its effectiveness. The finding of a satisfactory answer to these two questions will undoubtedly enrich the literature and eventually fill the existing gaps. On one hand, early studies provided good comparison of the constitutional and institutional framework of the AU and the OAU for dealing with intra-state conflict. However, they were unable to fully assess the actual impact of the new norms and institutions of the AU on the ground. Of course, they analysed the attempts of this new organisation in managing some civil wars, but they did not sufficiently discuss or explain how and why the AU was more effective than its predecessor (Maluwa, 2003; Jean, 2004; Douglas 2004; Cilliers and Sturman, 2006). On the other hand, recent studies focusing on

assessing the effectiveness of the AU did not consider or discuss in a comprehensive way all factors either the internal or external ones which have influenced the outcomes of its various interventions (Kristina and Southall, 2006; Daley, 2007; Gomes 2008; Marshall, 2009). This thesis, in contrast, provides a more systematic analysis of the effectiveness of the AU in managing intra-state conflicts. It defines what constitutes effectiveness and how it can be measured in order to clarify the focus of the study. It also explores the conditions under which the AU can be an effective security actor.

Within this context, the central argument of this thesis is that the AU can play an effective role in managing intra-state conflicts in Africa; however, its role is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mandate of the mission, the commitment of member states and the external support.

In order to establish this argument, the rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the first section is devoted to assessing whether the OAU, the AU’s predecessor, was effective or not. It also determines the key factors that helped or prevented OAU’s effectiveness in its management of African conflicts. The chapter then discusses the existing literature on evaluating the AU as a security actor in the continent, which is crucial in highlighting the main gaps in the literature and how the current study will fill these. The subsequent section discusses the research methods, including locating the research source and explaining how the research is conducted. The final part of the chapter describes how the argument will be manifested in the rest of the thesis.

1.2 The OAU and Peace and Security

The OAU was established on 25th May, 1963 to facilitate gradual decolonization and safeguard and consolidate Africa’s political independence and territorial integrity. During the first twenty years of its establishment, the OAU provided the political platform for dialogue between African leaders, facilitating discussion on African inter-state cooperation in the political and socio-economic fields. Particularly, the support of the OAU for liberation movements helped many African states gain their independence. The new organisation also played an important role in the establishment of regional integration and cooperation groupings, in collaboration with the UN-sponsored Economic

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7 In fact, a number of regional mechanisms established under the auspices of the OAU to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration among African states in their perspective regions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (1975); the Southern African Development
Commission for Africa (ECA) (Francis, et al. 2005). However, the shortcomings and weaknesses of the organisation appeared with the outcomes of its involvement in the security domain.

Effectively, the OAU was largely unable to solve conflicts between and within its member states during the Cold War period despite its various involvements such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1965), Angola, (1975), Mozambique, (1977-1992), Rwanda, (1994), Eritrea, (1961-1991), Uganda, (1978-1981), Ethiopia (1974-1991) and Kenya (1963-1967). The OAU’s ineffectiveness was due to the fact that this institution was established to facilitate decolonization along with safeguarding and consolidating Africa’s political independence and territorial integrity. Consequently, the organisation focused on achieving these goals and neglected other issues, leading to a noticeable failure in managing conflicts (Mathews, 1984). The division of African countries between the United State of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the interests of former colonial powers had negative consequences for the effectiveness of the OAU (Maluwa, 2003; De Coning 2004). The lack of an explicit mandate in managing intra-state conflicts (Dider, 2007) was also linked to the adoption of the principle of non-interference in internal disputes\(^8\) enshrined in the OAU constitution; thus many African dictators\(^9\) were never criticized and no pressure was exerted up on them from the institution to safeguard the human rights of their citizens (Weiss, 1998; Gomes 2008). The financial and logistical constraints were also important factors of the OAU’s failure in managing conflicts (Maluwa, 2003; Francis, 2007).

After the end of the Cold War, the OAU tried to establish a new Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR)\(^10\) and created a specific division within the OAU secretariat to respond to the post-Cold War peace and security challenges. However, this institutional framework did not prevent the organisation’s failure to deal effectively with the containment and management of civil wars on the continent (Maluwa, 2003; De Coning 2004). According to Onamajuru (2005), the failure was due to the geo-strategies and geopolitics engendered by the fall of the Soviet Empire, which was believed to have led to shift the international community’s attention away from Africa and more

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\(^8\)It should be noted that this shortcoming was not peculiar to the OAU; The UN itself was subjected to criticism in this regard. Paragraph 2 of Article III of the OAU Charter, which provides for the "non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states", is supposed to be valid not only for individual OAU states but equally to the OAU as a whole.

\(^9\)For example, Mobutu the long-term president of Zaire or Idi Amin of Uganda.

\(^10\)The OAU- MCPMR was established in 1995, with a central organ to provide direction and cooperation
towards the Middle East with the first Gulf War (1991), Eastern Europe (Bosnia, 1992-1995 and Kosovo, 1998-1999) and Afghanistan (2001). Others maintain that the OAU was unable to deal with the change of the nature of wars from inter-state to intra-state conflicts (David, 2007; Zaum and Roberts 2008). Yet others maintain that the OAU’s non-intervention policy, the respect of state sovereignty and inactive institutions were the main causes of its failure in managing conflicts (Mwanasali, 2008; Gomes, 2008). The failure of the organization to prevent genocide in many places in Africa and its inability to respond to the political and socio-economic challenges in the period of intensified globalization were arguably the main factors which motivated thinking about the creation of a new organization to deal with challenges of the new millennium (Levitt, 2005; Diedre, 2008).11

In fact, the statements of some African leaders reflect the determination of Africans to rely on themselves in managing their own conflicts by strengthening their own institutions. For instance, in his speech at the 30th Session of the Assembly of the OAU Heads of State and Government in 1995, the former Head of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, observed that the African continent was entering a “new era of renaissance” and that it was important to strengthen African unity to face the new social, economic and political challenges.12 Similarly, Thabo Mbeki stated that “recent international events have confirmed the need for us Africans to do everything we can to rely on our own capacities to secure our continent’s renaissance”.13

Indeed, a number of African leaders such as the former head of Libya (Muammar Gaddafi), the former head of Egypt (Hosni Mubarak) and the former head of Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo) emphasised strengthening the OAU or replace it by a strong institution (interview with former OAU official, 09/06/2012). As Powell (2005: 9) noted, “as a response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU’s Mechanism, African leaders decided in May 2001 to devise a new security regime”. Consequently, in July 2002, the AU became a reality.

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13 Mbeki, as one of the AU’s founders, is an important figure in African politics. He is also known for its insistence on finding African solutions for Africans problems. Finally Mbeki was at the origin of the founding of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the AU.
1.3 The emergence of the AU as a security actor

The transformation of the OAU to the AU has raised several questions about its ability in achieving peace and security in Africa and thus it has received a considerable attention in the existing literature. However, before engaging with the scholarly work conducted on this institution, it is essential to underline first that the prompt establishment of the AU is considered as one of the most curious and remarkable events in interstate cooperation in modern Africa.

The main concern was about the incentives, interests and ideas that drove the AU’s speedy creation. In fact, there have been different explanations in relation to the motivations behind the establishment of this institution. For instance, scholars such as Peter (2001), Tieku (2004), Buzan and Wæver (2003) argued that the ideas or real intentions of some African leaders to reform the OAU (which eventually culminated by replacing it with the AU) were to suit their new foreign policy interests and to adapt to the new geopolitics. For example, the authors claimed that the motivations behind Colonel Ghaddafi’s attempts to establish the AU were to rehabilitate himself and his country, after several years of isolation and sanction either by the international community in general or the Arab states in particular. As for the other influential African leaders, the decisions of Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki as presidents of Nigeria and South Africa to reform the OAU were to achieve their economic and political goals at the regional and the international levels. From this explicitly expressed perspective, the AU was therefore established to accommodate the interests of the three countries, namely, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria and that the role of these influential states was the main factor in persuading the rest of African states to support the idea of transforming the OAU to the AU.

However, other scholars disagree with this first interpretation and present in fact another perspective by considering the process of the transformation of the OAU to the AU as the subsequent phase in the evolution of the Pan-Africanism movement (Adebajo, 2001; Francis, 2007 Franke, 2009). In other words, the move to create the AU was based on the fact that the OAU (the AU’s predecessor) was unable to cope with the new social, economic and political challenges after the end of the Cold War particularly the spread of intra-state conflicts in the continent. Accordingly, African states in general and not only the influential ones sought to activate the role of the OAU by updating its institutions.15

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15 For example, the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1990. Moreover, certain reluctant propositions were made in order to establish a common African policy framework (e.g. The Lagos Plan of Action). These suggestions were intended to convince
However, this institutional framework did not prevent the organisation from failing to deal effectively with the new social, economic and political challenges in the age of globalisation. More importantly, it was an able to deal with the containment and management of civil wars such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Comoros which collectively resulted in the death of millions of Africans (Murithi, 2007).

The failure of the OAU convinced the African leaders to forge closer unity in Africa in order to meet the new social, economic and political challenges (Waal, 2003; Jean, 2004; Cilliers and Sturman 2006). In fact, the aforementioned scholars have considered that the normative framework that made the creation of the AU possible can be traced back to the Pan-African ideals. These ideals, which previously motivated the formation of the OAU in 1963, were also behind the creation of the AU. Therefore, it was a collective response by all African states and not only the influential ones in order to face the new political and socio-economic challenges in the continent.

The discussion above reflects the fact that there is a disagreement between scholars regarding whether the AU was established as a device of the African powerful states realpolitik (e.g. Libya, South Africa and Nigeria) and as a tool to achieve their foreign policy interests or if it was an extension of the Pan-Africanism ideals movement and that it represented an African collective action to face the challenges of the new millennium. In order to investigate this matter, this thesis focuses particularly in the empirical chapters on the behaviour of all African states (either weak or the powerful ones) in their response to African crisis. For example, one of the questions to answer is whether or not the African response was limited to the powerful states either in setting the policies of the Union or to implement them on the ground? The other interrogation is to know whether or not the weaker states participated in the agenda of the AU and in its involvement in managing conflicts on the ground? More importantly, was there any political or economic interests behind the involvement of influential states in Africa?

Regardless of the motivations behind the establishment of the AU, this new institution has received a considerable attention from academics and researchers worldwide, since its official founding in 2002. The early literature focused on analysing and comparing the two organisations in terms of principles, institutional arrangements and what the AU seeks to

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African leaders to agree on the creation of the equivalent to the European Economic Community on Africa territory (i.e. establishing an African Economic Community).
do in the field of peace and security (Waal, 2003; Jean, 2004; Douglas 2004). These studies demonstrated that the AU differed fundamentally from the OAU in terms of philosophical ideology, ambition, institutional structure and strategies. For instance, it has been noted that while the OAU used to function with only three organs, the AU established seventeen institutions; most of them dedicated to ensure peace and security in Africa and are substantially different from the traditional tools of its predecessor. Baimu and Sturman (2003) as well as Cilliers and Sturman (2006) argued that the key bodies of the OAU could only intervene in a conflict situation if they were invited to do so by the parties to a dispute. For them, the adoption of the doctrine of non-intervention led the OAU to become a silent observer of intra-state conflicts in Africa. They pointed out that the AU has learned lessons from the OAU and consequently has assumed, as it can be seen from its legal framework and the types of institutions created, a much more interventionist stance. In this regard, Gottschalk and Siegmar (2004), Neethling (2005) and Murithi (2005) have asserted that there was a significant shift between the OAU’s non-intervention policy and the AU’s ‘non-indifference’ policy.

The optimistic image of the AU presented by analysts is nevertheless contrasted by a more pessimistic perspective on the future of this nascent institution as a security actor. In fact, the AU has received (since its establishment in 2002) harsh and negative criticism regarding its role in managing security issues in the continent to the degree to which it was simply described as the OAU without the O (Mathews, 2008) and that it is simply “an old wine in a new bottle” (Adebajo, 2001). According to Akonor (2007: 206), “the AU cannot empower and develop Africa, nor guarantee Africa’s collective security or provide a common platform for Africa’s collective diplomacy, if the AU remains the way it is today”. More pessimistically, Udornbana (2002) stated that Africans should not be led to think that a simple alteration of the denomination (from OAU to AU) will necessarily provoke a significant shift toward a more elaborated culture of human rights in their continent. He implicitly presumed that the reference in the AU Treaty to a new quality of leadership in Africa is misleading and the reality is that such a wishful thinking is not yet attainable (Udornbana, 2002). Moreover, Adebajo (2005) argued that although the AU adopted new norms, principles and aims to achieve peace and security in Africa, its role will be very weak due to the lack of political will of its member states and the relying on the support of external actors. The AU cannot escape to the dominant situation which does not presage fundamental transformation due to internal and external limitations (Williams, 2008).
However, four years of its existence, a shift in perspectives occurred within the academic research and literature and the AU’s issues were discussed in terms of its actual roles and capacity to achieve real peace and security in Africa, rather than comparing it to its predecessor. Following this new approach, some scholars considered the AU to be an effective organisation in managing intra-state conflict. In fact, they focused basically on whether the AU’s interventions had a positive effect or not, without considering factors that influenced its effectiveness. For example, Curtis (2003) argued that the AU’s interventions demonstrated that this institution is more effective than the OAU particularly in Burundi. Similarly, Murithi (2008), Sarkin, (2009) and Møller (2009a) analysed the involvement of the AU interventions in many conflict zones and concluded that the AU possesses the potential to be an effective actor in managing conflicts in its own territory. However, the authors did not explain the factors that lead the AU to be effective in this regard.

Other scholars have been more critical in evaluating the AU by analysing only some factors which contribute to the effectiveness of its missions and ignore others. For instance, Ferreira (2009) and Boshoff and Francis (2003) noted that the AU has effectively intervened in various peace missions, particularly in Burundi in 2003. They argued that the will of states (e.g. South Africa) to participate to peacekeeping missions where there are war-torn circumstances is commendable. They also considered the reluctance of the UN to be involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa as the main motivation of increasing the willingness of African states especially the influential ones to bear the responsibility of managing civil wars16. Kristina and Southall (2006) and Daley (2007) considered the efforts of African leaders (e.g. Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere) as positively affecting the AU missions, particularly in Burundi17. Other researchers such as Andrews and Holt (2007), Gomes (2008) and Marshall (2009) have argued that the AU has actually succeeded in bringing relative peace in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. They link the AU’s performance to the effectiveness of its Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Another connected strand of literature focuses upon the external support as the main factor of its effectiveness. A common theme within this debate is that the AU cannot be an effective organisation without the support of international actors such as the UN, EU and NATO (Jean, 2004; De Coning, 2007; Diedre, 2008; Bariagaber, 2008; Brosig, 2010). As

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16 (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia and Algeria)
17 The involvement of Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere (1999-2000) led to the signature of The Arusha Agreement, which considered as a basis of resolving the Burundian crisis, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Bariagaber (2008) argued, due to the AU’s financial problems, external support - particularly from the UN and the EU - was the main factor of the effectiveness of AU missions. Without international support, the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) would not have been able to achieve its mandate effectively (De Coning, 2010).

Other scholars disagree with respect to the AU’s role and results, stating that “the African Solutions to African Problems approach” (Williams, 2008)\(^{18}\) has been ineffective in managing intra-state conflicts in particular, in Darfur crisis due to the lack of financial resources and technical issues (Murithi, 2005; Williams, 2006a; Mwanasali, 2008). Others have maintained that the Sudanese government’s failure to meet its obligations and the violation of cease-fire agreement and militia attacks on civilians were the main reasons for the continuation of the Darfur crisis and the failure of the AU in this respect (Grono, 2006; Udombana, 2007; Gibney, 2007; Cristina and Linnea 2009). The sensitive question of Sudanese sovereignty prevented the AU from making real progresses towards solving Darfur crisis (Andrew and Holt, 2007; Waal, 2007; Williams, 2008; Marshall, 2009).

Following the assessments made concerning the AU’s efforts in managing intra-state conflict, it is clear that there are gaps within these strands of the debate. First, researchers in peace operations in general and in the African context in particular have focused on what it is called “problem-solving theory” which concentrates on the development of appropriate strategies for managing different kinds of conflicts and on resolutions (Paris, 2000; Tainter, 2000; Bellamy, 2004). The literature in this field looked principally at the conditions that influenced the effectiveness of peace operations. The aims of these researchers have been to determine what worked, but not necessarily how or why the objectives were met. Even if there are some studies which looked at whether peace operations keep the peace or not, there are actually several drawbacks in their evaluation. In fact, less attention was dedicated to how a judgement on the efforts of international and regional organisations’ peace operations is in fact made or what does the term “effectiveness” means and how it can be measured. More directly in relation to this study, how the AU is explicitly analysed and evaluated as an effective or ineffective organization or what were the criteria which allowed researchers to determine its effectiveness?

Indeed, most scholars consider ‘effectiveness’ as the key term generally used to measure goal-attainment, hence linking the outcomes of a procedure to the initially intended aims.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\) The fundamental principle of this method is that African states have the priority and the responsibility to deal with Africa’s intra-state conflicts and therefore, they should have a leading role in reacting to them.
Consequently, such a direct approach has been very popular among analysts who used it to evaluate a large number of international and regional organizations (Ratner, 1995; Sambanis, 2000; Bratt, 1997; Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Sherman, 2009; De Carvalho and Aune, 2010). Elgström and Smith (2006: 6), for example, when evaluating the EU’s role in international politics argued that, “according to role theory the impact of the EU can be seen in its (in) ability to achieve desired effects”. The measurement of that impact can then be evaluated through the use of the concept of effectiveness – has the EU realised its goal? Young (2006: 190) argued that this might be expressed as the release of “concrete results”. Outcomes are thus a primary factor of evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional organisations. From these scholarly perspectives, the effectiveness of any peace operation by any organisation can be determined by matching the goals of the mission (as specified in its mandate) and to what extent they have been accomplished on the ground. Even though the mandate fulfilment can be used as a standard of effectiveness, especially when it is clearly drafted, it cannot be the only way to explain the effectiveness of particular missions due to the fact that mandates are “sometimes vague, complex, and subject to change during time” (Heldt, 2002:110). When a mandate is vague, it will leave substantial room for the appearance of divergent opinions or interpretations19. Accordingly, the possibility to encounter such a situation should make assessors think about adding other criteria for evaluating a peace operation, and not rely only on the mandate.

Another approach to gauge the effectiveness of international and regional organisation’s peace operations is to consider specific achievements of the operations such as reduction in the number of casualties, the number of people fed, peace agreement achieved, and prevention of the spread of the conflict and so on. Scholars such as Hansch et al, (1994), Regan (1996) and Schumacher (2007) consider that reducing the number of fatalities or saving lives as a justification for intervention and a measure of its effectiveness. However, it is still an open question as to whether an operation is effective if it accomplished only a certain number of tasks. Apparently, effectiveness in this sense is relative.

In addition to the drawbacks of the above definitions of effectiveness, they neglect the internal process which is an important aspect of international and regional organizations’ performance in peace operations. The evaluation of the effectiveness of these institutions

19The case of NATO’s mandate for the Libyan crisis is quite edifying, the Arab League for instance, objected to the interpretation of resolution 1973 made by the NATO command during the conduct of the NFZ missions.
in peace operations does not establish whether or not they have produced an explicit outcome or had the required impact. Analysing the internal dynamics of an organisation is also essential to clearly identify the causal link between process and outcomes. Lipson (2010: 256) argued that:

“due to the fact that mandate fulfilment and outcomes have received more attention in the peacekeeping effectiveness literature, there is a need for theoretically informed research focusing on management and process effectiveness, which can then be linked to existing analyses of output and outcome performance”.

Evidence shows that an appropriate planning and good management of peace operations will lead to effective fulfilment of any mission objectives. Therefore, “effectiveness” can be theorised, calculated or measured at both levels of process and outcomes. From this perspective, the current study defines the effectiveness of international and regional organisations’ peace operations not only by considering the outcomes and how they can be measured but also by considering the process of an organisation. Thus, the effectiveness of peace operations refers to the ability of an organisation in using its resources, its prerogatives and its relationship with environmental factors or conditions in order to meet collective objectives.

The shortcomings in the existing literature were not only in relation to developing a comprehensive definition of effectiveness, but also in determining the factors which influenced it. There is no doubt that focusing on some factors and ignoring others or apply them to one case study to assess the effectiveness of international and regional organisations will lead to an incomplete and limited conclusion. This leads to the third problem - the focus on a single case study. Indeed, much of the literature has focused on Darfur crisis as a case study (e.g. Scott, 2004; Waal, 2005a, 2005b and 2007; Alex et al 2005; Strauss, 2005; Boshoff, 2005; Grono, 2006; Othieno and Samasuwo, 2006; Kagwanja, and Mutahi, 2007; Kreps, 2007; Udombana, 2007; Abass, 2007; Barnidge, 2009; Birikorang, 2009; and Cristina and Linnea, 2009) while less attention has been given to other intra-state conflicts. Further, there are clear shortcomings within the studies of Darfur, such as instances of neglecting or ignoring the consensus among African states directly involved in the crisis, as well as depreciating the position of neighbouring countries of Sudan. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that studies on Darfur
comprehensively examined all factors which influenced the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS), their results cannot be generalised due to the fact that the effectiveness of international and regional organisations vary from case to case according to variation in the environmental factors.

In fact, an approach utilising multiple case studies can be more appropriate for making reliable inferences. It allows the researcher to determine the effectiveness of an IO by comparing its activities across different cases. For instance, an operation that succeeded in reducing the conflict or saving lives more than another would be judged as more effective, this in turn, allows the analysts to evaluate why some missions are more or less effective than others. Druckman and Paul (2010: 8) argue that:

“Case-specific benchmarks inhibit the empirical verification of propositions and theories about peace operations and thereby stifle the development of general knowledge and patterns... peace operations research is already a cluster of trees, to use one metaphor, and without comparable cross-mission indicators, the forest will not be apparent”.

The present researcher considers that the unsystematic analysis of AU missions led to disagreement among scholars regarding the effectiveness of the AU as a security actor. Accordingly, and in order to move this literature forward and fill existing gaps, the current study suggests a number of improvements to address the various limitations of previous studies. Therefore, it focuses not only on whether or not the AU’s peace operations have a positive effect but also on providing a systematic analysis or a framework which could be generalized for research and practice on peace operations of international and regional organizations in general. this study concentrates chiefly on defining the concept of ‘effectiveness’ and the problems of measuring it by discussing aspects of broader circumstances where peace missions are conducted as well as possible intervening or explanatory variables. Once a number of common standards and indicators of effectiveness, as well as environmental factors, are chosen the study will compare the effectiveness of the AU in managing intra-state conflict across different case studies in order to reach to general conclusions and subsequently determine whether there is variation or not and if there is, to try to determine why this was.
1.4 Research Methods

The thesis adopts a multiple case study approach. The analysis of the various case studies aims to answer the question of whether the AU has been effective in its interventions in the management of intra-state conflicts in Africa, by analysing and assessing the internal and external factors which support or undermine its effectiveness. This thesis aims to explain the AU’s effectiveness in managing intra-state conflicts by analysing its efforts in three different case studies - specifically, Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. Although the AU has been involved either politically or militarily in no less than seventeen conflicts in the continent since its creation in 2002, these cases can be considered as a gauging test for assessing the reasons for the effectiveness of this institution.

First, they represent different types of conflicts. While the cases of Burundi and Darfur were ethnic conflicts in their nature, the conflict in Somalia was different. In terms of ethnicity the country is one of the few homogeneous African countries where its people share the same language, culture and religion (Lewis, 1993; Ahmed, 2007; Garibo-Peyró, 2012). This creates the potential to evaluate the effectiveness of the AU in managing ethnic conflicts and simultaneously its ability to deal with conflict situations where challenges are not due to ethnic clashes, religious antagonism or heterogeneous communities. In spite of their diversity, these cases will allow us to test the AU’s ability to apply its new norms on the ground. On the one hand, it examines the prohibition of the unconstitutional change of legitimate order as a new norm. Indeed, the AU intervened in Burundi due to the unconstitutional change which occurred in the country\textsuperscript{20} (an offence occurring often and considered as the common cause of conflicts in African countries such as in Rwanda, Burundi, Mauritania and currently in Egypt). On the other hand, it examines the AU’s right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity - issues which form the new paradigm within the AU. In fact, the cases of Darfur and Somalia witnessed war crimes against civilians and thus they will be appropriate cases for considering the AU’s ability to enforce the norm of preventing such atrocities on the ground.

\textsuperscript{20} Such unconstitutional change occurred when the elected president, Ndadaye Melchior, was assassinated by a small group of Tutsi officers in Bujumbura on 21 October 1993. It was that dramatic event which triggered the Burundian civil war (more details will be given in Chapter 4).
Second, they represent different types of complications that the AU had to deal with. The missions of the AU in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia are the most important in view of the size of the troops deployed on the ground (3,500 in Burundi, 17,700 in Somalia, and 12,000 in Sudan). This will facilitate evaluation of the AU’s ability and the level of coordination with other institutions in implementing the tasks of these big missions; also, it enables examination of the AU member states’ commitment to providing financial resources, troops and equipment. In each case, the focus will be on who the troop contributor-states were and which states respect their financial obligations.

Third, the outcomes of the cases were different. For instance, in terms of time, while the AU Mission in Burundi needed only one year to stabilise the situation, the mission in Somalia took seven years to accomplish its tasks and finally, after six years in Darfur the crisis had not been resolved. For this latter case, the UN eventually joined the AU’s forces. In fact, the diversity in the outcomes of these missions can provide important lessons not only regarding the effectiveness of the AU’s interventions in managing intra-state conflicts but also for other actors in this respect.

Indeed, understanding why some missions are more or less effective than others and determining the main factors behind their success or failure can offer significant solutions for policymakers to address and avoid the weaknesses of these missions. This should help to improve the effectiveness of peace operations in the future. Furthermore, these cases can help to examine the importance of external support to the AU in different conflict zones; this allows us to determine whether there are variations in the external support or not - and if there is, to try to find out why.

In analysing these case studies, this thesis relied on different types of primary sources with the view to ensuring triangulation (Brunham et al., 2004). I analysed official documents produced by the AU Assembly of Heads of States, the AU commission, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Monetary Fund, the AU Commission on International Law, as well as meeting or conference minutes from various events organised on the case study countries. This research also used publications and reports from other international and regional organisations including the General Assembly of the UN, the Human Rights Council and

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21 Compared with other cases such as Mauritania and Ivory Coast where the AU mission took a relatively short time to manage the crises, while more than one year was necessary to deal with the conflict in Burundi, and at the present time, there are still problems to resolve in both Sudan and Somalia.

22 The ‘triangulation’ process is crucial in academic research. Effectively, it is considered as a strategy for increasing the validity of evaluation and research findings, increasing confidence in accuracy and eliminating biases. For more information about this approach see, Yeasmin and Rahman (2012).
the UNSC as well as reports and agreements from the EU regarding its relationship with the AU. The documentary evidence is crucial to develop understanding of the circumstances surrounding the AU missions and the factors affecting them on the ground. I also used various newspapers sources which concentrate on AU issues or cover more general issues: Think Africa Press (online magazine focusing on global African news); the Pan African News Agency, (PANAPRESS an efficient instrument for communication about African issues) and the Africa Review (a digital news agency established in Kenya)\(^23\). Other African newspapers such as those from South Africa, Ethiopia and Sudan were also been consulted (e.g. Times live, Business day live, the Reporter, Ehiomedia and New Sudan vision). I also used a selection of Western publications – namely the Guardian, the Times, the Financial Times (all UK) and the New York Times (US) to acquire additional information about different issues where the AU was involved.

In addition, previous research, official reports and other documentation are taken into consideration and serve as a basis for deeper analysis through the interviews phase. Thus, this study adopted elite interviews as a research methodology to gain information. According to Morris (2009: 209) “elites can be defined in general as those with close proximity to power or with particular expertise”. Accordingly, four fieldwork trips were conducted for this research (59 interview sessions took place).

The first fieldwork was conducted in Libya in May 2012, and consisted of nine interviews with former Government officials and diplomats from Sudan, Burundi and Somalia (the three case study countries). It should be noted that Libya was one of the founders of the AU and one of its main supporters. This is in turn made the government officials more aware about the AU policies and its problems. Moreover, the former Libyan government established the African Studies Centre which has a number of scholars who are specialists in the African affairs. Additionally, this institution has a substantial amount of documents, studies and magazines related to the AU and its efforts in the peace and security domain.

The second trip was to Egypt in June 2012, during which eight interviews were conducted with senior officials and diplomats from Sudan, Burundi and Somalia. The fieldwork conducted in Egypt was very important, since it allowed to interview officials of the AU office in Cairo and the African Permanent Delegation to the League of Arab States. It was also crucial to visit the African Research Centre which is one of the biggest African

\(^{23}\) The Africa Review is one of Africa’s prominent media companies. Its aim is to inform about African news and to scrutinise Africa’s main social and political developments.
studies centres in the continent. As for the third trip, it was to Sudan in July 2012. Here, nine interview sessions were conducted with AMIS officers of various ranks as well as with policy makers from Sudanese Government (SG). The fourth and last fieldwork trip was conducted in Ethiopia during November 2012 at the headquarters of the AU. Nine interviews were conducted with senior officials of different institutions such as the AU commission, the PSC, the AU financial department and the department of conflict management as well as officers of the Sudan Desk, Burundi Desk and Somali Desk. In addition to senior AU officials, five interviews were conducted with senior officials from the UN office to the AU as well as three interviews with senior officials from EU Delegation to the AU. Moreover, interviews have also been conducted with academics that have been involved in and who wrote about the peace and security in general and the AU in particular (five in Libya, four in Egypt, three in Ethiopia and four in Sudan).

I opted for semi-structured interview approach. This necessitated the prior preparation of a list of topics meant to be covered, as well as a set of open-ended questions for the beginning of the interview session. It is argued that such flexibility allows pursuing relevant comments and responses through a dialogue (Gillham, 2000). Most interviews involved only one person, except for two cases where the participants required a collective interview together due to time constraints. It can be said that, by and large, the interviews sessions represented an excellent instrument for data collection and played a crucial role for the primary research, enabling me to obtain new and unpublished information. The empirical chapters of this study would not have been able to detail the situation on the ground or show the effectiveness of the AU in managing the conflict in these states, without conducting this indispensible fieldwork. For the analysis of the data obtained through the semi-structured interview sessions, the material was transcribed and the answers categorised according to themes.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis consists of seven substantive chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 is devoted to understanding the genesis of the AU and its capacity as a security actor. It starts by reviewing the literature on the role of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts since WWII. The second section of the chapter focuses on the causes of the replacement of the OAU by the AU and what are the constitutional and institutional differences between them. In this regard, the chapter shows that the AU’s institutional framework symbolizes a substantial change in comparison with the political, legal and institutional framework of its predecessor, the OAU and creates a robust security
institutional framework unparalleled in the Asian, Middle East and South American regions. Indeed, the new African security architecture can provide important lessons to the international and regional organisations in general in dealing with intra-state conflicts. It then discusses the envisaged relationship with some institutions particularly the UN. Although there was a contradiction between the new norms of the AU particularly the right of the intervention and the Charter of the UN, the AU acknowledges the primacy of the UNSC over the maintenance of international peace and security and maintains that the cooperation with the UN and other actors such as the EU and NATO is extremely important.

Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework. In order to get a proper understanding of the AU’s effectiveness, the chapter gives a comprehensive definition and clear standards for evaluating the effectiveness of peace operations. It then discusses the features of conflict environment or context (independent variables) which influence the effectiveness of the AU’s peace operations. It is argued that the design of this framework provides a systematic analysis not only for measuring the effectiveness of the AU itself, but has potential to be generalised for research and practice on peace operations more broadly.

Chapter 4 is devoted to the analysis and evaluation of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). It starts by establishing a background to the conflict and introducing the main players in the Burundian crisis. The second section examines the AU’s own response to the eruption of the conflict. It analyses the AU’s attitude towards the conflict and the circumstances leading to the deployment of its mission in the conflict zone. Then, the chapter focuses on the internal and external factors which might have influenced the effectiveness of the AU in managing this conflict. Finally, the rest of the chapter looks at the overall evaluation of the AU’s effectiveness in managing this crisis by matching its implementations with the criteria which set up in the theoretical framework. In this regard, it can be argued that the AU was effective in managing the Burundian conflict due to the commitment of its member states, the parties of dispute and the external support.

Chapter 5 focuses on the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In similar fashion to the Burundi case, the study starts by discussing the origins of the conflict and what the conflicting parties are. In measuring the effectiveness of the AMIS and the factors influenced it on the ground, it was clear that the mission was not able to put an end to the crisis due to the weak mandate, poor commitment of the member states and inadequate support of international actors. However, the outcomes of AMIS had slightly changed after three years of its deployment due to the increase of the commitment of member states and the
international support. It should be noted here that the position of conflict parties was the main obstacle not only for the AMIS but also to the on-going AU-UN joint mission.

Parallel to chapters 4 and 5, the sixth chapter concentrates on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). After discussing the regional and international attempts to manage the crisis and why did they failed, the study focuses on the political and military efforts of the AU and to what extent they influenced by the environmental factors. This analysis reveals that the AMISOM was ineffective because of reluctance of member states to meet their pledges in supporting the mission financially and logistically as well as the poor cooperation of local parties. Notwithstanding, the AMISOM’s outcomes have apparently changed since 2011 due to the increase of troop magnitude, financial support by other institutions or individual states and the adoption of enforcement approach by the AU forces against some parties who do not cease fighting and refuse to join the political process.

Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 7 reviews the main findings of the thesis and looks at the future of the AU as a security actor. In particular, it shows how the AU is different from its predecessor in dealing with intra-state conflict on the continent. For instance, the AU’s founders were keen to avoid the weaknesses of the OAU by adopting new principles, norms and mechanisms to face the civil war phenomenon considered as the main frustration to the African political and socio-economic integration and development. Moreover, the chapter reviews the results of AU’s involvement in different conflict zones, looking at its effectiveness in managing these internal wars. In particular, it identifies the main factors behind its effectiveness as well as the main obstacles in the three empirical case studies.

Indeed, the empirical cases suggest that both the capabilities of the AU and the conflict environment in which it intervenes influence its effectiveness. It has been found that the combination of the two was not the only influencing factor, since the way one relates to the other was equally significant. More support from one factor can to some extent compensates for less support from another. For instance, the gap of insufficient commitment by the AU member states in funding the AMIB was compensated by the support of external actors and so on. This in turn supports the argument of this thesis that the AU can play an effective role in managing intra-state conflicts in Africa but this is contingent upon four factors: the internal process, the commitment of member states, the mandate of the mission and external support. The last part of the chapter looks at the
future of the AU as a security actor or what does the AU have to do to improve its effectiveness in achieving peace and security in the continent.
Chapter 2: International and Regional Organisations: Conflict Management and the Emergence of the AU

2.1 Introduction
The need for international and regional institutions in contemporary world politics is crucial, albeit in some instances they are seen as playing controversial roles. Indeed, these institutions are indispensable for the management of what former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan (2002) termed as “problems without passports”, meaning that states are unable to deal with problematic situations without an external help. However, instead of being praised for implementing difficult tasks despite political and economic constraints, some of them are subject to relentless attacks and harsh criticism for producing poor results.

Although it is widely acknowledged that the effectiveness of international and regional organisations varies substantially from one organisation to the next and from case to case (Underdal, 2002; Gutner and Thompson, 2010; De Carvalho and Aune, 2010), the International Relations literature is still under-developed and has paid little attention to understand why this occurs. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the literature on the involvement of the major organisations in managing conflict to determine whether they are effective or not and what are the main conditions for their effectiveness. Answering these questions will undoubtedly help to better understand the extent of the AU’s effectiveness. Moreover, this chapter looks at the long journey of African unity, which could be better understood through a historical perspective. Consequently, the first part starts by showing how and when the Pan-Africanism movement appeared at the beginning of the 19th Century with the creation of a continental institution, the OAU.

The second section focuses briefly on the involvement of the OAU in the security field and identifies its main weaknesses/shortcomings in this regard. On the one hand, this provides a clearer understanding of the development of the Pan-Africanism movement leading to the creation of the AU. On the other hand, it helps us to ascertain the extent to which the AU learned from its predecessor. The third section then demonstrates the actual transformation from the OAU to the AU. In this regard, the focus will be on analysing the new norms and institutions of the AU which were not part of the organisational structure of the OAU. It then concludes by explaining the basis of the relationship between the AU and external actors - particularly the UN - in achieving peace and security in the continent.
2.2 Conflict management since World War II

The aftermath of WWII witnessed the creation of several organisations that were dedicated to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the globe as well as providing welfare and economic stability worldwide. Accordingly, the role of international and regional organisations in achieving peace and security cannot be seen as a new phenomenon. Indeed, these institutions have been involved in managing either inter-state or intra-state conflict for more than six decades. Certainly, the previous interventions of these institutions for such a long period can provide important lessons regarding their effectiveness in managing conflicts, the factors that influenced the outcomes and how effectiveness be improved. However, before embarking on examination of the role of these institutions in managing conflicts, it is important to consider two distinct phases: the Cold War period (1945-1989) and the post-Cold War period (1989- onward). There are many rationales behind this division such as the change in the nature of wars in the world from inter-state to intra-state conflict which in turn led to different approaches to conflict management by international and regional organisations after the end of Cold War (Miall, 1992; Zaum and Roberts 2008; Jones et al, 2010). For instance, the role of the UN in the Korean War is very different from the one the institution undertook in the Bosnian war.

Additionally, before expanding on the effective role of each of the institutions mentioned earlier, it is important to differentiate between them. The League of Nations and the UN were institutions created to prevent major forthcoming conflicts (e.g. WWI and WWII) with their incommensurable disasters. However, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, due to the geopolitical bipolarity of the world (the East-West division during the Cold War period under the leadership of the USA and the then-USSR) had different agendas, mostly to deter any aggression against their respective members rather than intervening in different parts of the world (Rubin, 1982; Ruhl, 1991; Asmus, 2002).

2.2.1 The Effectiveness of International and Regional Organisations in the Cold War Period (1945-1989)

Although the League of Nations was established prior to WWII by Part I of the Versailles Treaty (Magliveras, 1999) it is important to refer to it as the first international attempt to prevent the escalation of future conflicts into international crises as WWI had. Despite the League of Nations’ initial successes, an increased number of challenges weakened the new institution and a number of states withdrew from it (Pedersen, 2010). Its failure was
due to its dependency on superpowers to enforce its resolutions by providing troops, implementing sanctions and other missions (Gareau, 2002). The inability of the League of Nations to deal adequately with challenges such as preventing World War II proved its ineffectiveness. This institution was soon dismissed as an appropriate agent for peace and consequently the UN replaced it after WWII.

The UN inherited assets and records from its predecessor (Gibbons, 1992). Opinions regarding the UN and the League of Nations often emphasise the divergences between the two organisations, rather than looking at similarities between them. Macqueen (1999) argued that the League of Nations was in fact a kind of blueprint for the UN, not only for the shared objectives but as well in terms of organisation. For the first aspect of the debate relating to the effectiveness of the UN in solving conflicts, it is important to underline that there is no consensus among scholars as to whether this institution was effective or not. Indeed, the role of the UN in solving conflicts has been the subject of contentious debates.

Many scholars have argued that the successive failures of the UN are due to the disagreement between the members of the UNSC, who often voted for interventions in areas of close interests to them (Macqueen, 1999; Richard, 2003; Pugh, 2003; Thakur and Schnabel, 2001; Zaum and Roberts, 2008). Another group of researchers contend that UN interventions cannot be carried out without the consent of the disputants and it cannot use force to affect their behaviour (Stephen 2004; Howard, 2008). A third grouping of writers have described the shortcomings of the UN’s system for negotiating, planning, implementing and sustaining large, complex peacekeeping operations as the main obstacles that frustrated the peacekeeping efforts in managing conflicts (William, 1993; Bigombe et al, 2000). The bipolar system (in combination with the proxy wars fought on behalf of the two superpowers) is also cited by other authors as a factor which rendered the UN ineffective as a conflict manager during the Cold War (Hass, 1983; Carmen and James, 1998). According to Goulding, (1999) and David (2007) however, it is an inaccurate analysis of the root causes of the conflicts as well as a weak assessment of situations which are the main causes of the UN’s failure in solving conflicts. The problem of financing peacekeeping missions of the UN has affected its effectiveness in conflict management (Mendez, 1997; Diehl and Pharaoh 2000). Nevertheless, the UN’s achievements are also highlighted and acknowledged by other scholars who maintain that in many cases the UN has been effective, and this effectiveness is believed to be due to the large extent of autonomy from the UN headquarters which is enjoyed by the staff operating on the ground, such as for example in the case of Namibia (Howard, 2008).
Angola, Western Sahara, and Nicaragua (Williams, 1993) and the support of great powers as well as local consent (Alex et al, 2004).

Another regional organisation, the Organization of American States (OAS)\textsuperscript{24}, has been involved in promoting peace and security. Numerous scholars have argued that the OAS was ineffective in managing conflicts due to the tension among its member states which in some cases translated to military clashes such as the ones between Argentina with Chile (1978), Colombia with Venezuela (1987), the US invasion of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1998) (Hass, 1983; Lake and Morgan, 1997). The obsession about the protection of sovereignty and consequently the concerns for the potential rise of a form of supranationalism, coupled with continuing suspicions, divergent national interests and, in some cases, the involvement of external powers, have undermined OAS’s efforts in managing conflicts in Latin America (Gordon, 1987). The intent by the US to convert the OAS into an anti-communist alliance and by some Latin American states to make it an anti-dictatorial alliance created disenchantment among many member states, seriously weakening the OAS and contributing to a decline of the inter-American security system (Alagappa, 1995). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN)\textsuperscript{25} effectiveness was due to the use of diplomatic instruments (settlements of conflicts by peaceful means, and renunciation of the threat or use of force) (Herman, 2000) particularly the adoption of an incremental, consultative and consensus-based approach (Narine, 1999). However, others maintain that ASEAN was unable to manage many conflicts due to the lack of enforcement power which would allow its member states to use harsh measures on parties to dispute, (usually rely on external powers or the UN) such as for example in the case of Cambodia (Goh, 2003) Vietnam and Thailand (Alagappa, 1995).

With regard to other organisations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\textsuperscript{26} for its part did not have to be involved directly in solving conflicts in the Cold War period (Evans, 2003\textsuperscript{27}; and French, 2007). Conversely, its counterpart and rival organization, the

\textsuperscript{24} The OAS consists of 35 member states, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Grenada, Suriname, Dominica (Commonwealth of), Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, The Bahamas, St. Kitts & Nevis, Canada, Belize and Guyana.

\textsuperscript{25} The member states of ASEAN are; Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) and Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{26} NATO has added new members six times since its founding in 1949, and since 2009 NATO has had 28 members. These members are, Canada, the USA, the UK, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Iceland and Hungary.

\textsuperscript{27} See Evans, G. \textit{NATO and the responsibility to Protect}. Presentation made at the NATO Summit, 31\textsuperscript{st} March 2009, available at \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031016e.htm}. 26
Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955-1991), intervened in East Germany (1952), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1983). The interventions in question could be attributed to the military and economic power of the USSR (Rubin, 1982; Ruhl, 1991). However, it is important to underline that the military interventions by the Warsaw Pact were not for the sake of managing or resolving conflicts, but to consolidate the powers in place threatened by the people of the countries cited, rather than supporting its ideology against its western rival, NATO (Rubin, 1982; Metcalf, 2005; French, 2007). Although the interventions of Warsaw Pact were not undertaken to solve intrastate conflicts, it is important to consider other forms of involvement by regional organisations and the factors behind their effectiveness.

2.2.2 The Effectiveness of International and Regional Organisations in the Post-Cold War Period (1989-onward)

The post-Cold War era, instead of bringing peace and security to the world, saw the number of conflicts multiply, causing an increase in number and a more significant role of international and regional organisations in order to achieve political and economic development and to respond to the new challenges of globalisation (Pugh and Sidhu, 2003; Abass, 2003; Lang, 2009; Nathan, 2010; Jones et al, 2010). In the security domain, senior officials of some international and regional organisations and scholars of IR have argued that the increasing numbers and importance of these institutions - particularly the regional ones - can be traced back to a number of factors.

The first factor is the UN’s failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and its reluctance to intervene in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia (Malone, 2004; Jones et al, 2010). This raised pertinent questions as to whether it was realistic to still consider the UN as having a role as a peacekeeper, when it comes to restoring and maintaining peace and security, particularly in Africa. The apparent unwillingness or inability of the UN to act was justified by a UN senior official who stated that:

“the increase of the UN’s peace operations mandates around the world including conflict management, civilian protection, ensuring that elections occur in favourable conditions, contributing in the foundation of new governmental institutions did make a huge gap between what was required from the UN in terms of services and what the world organisation was able to deliver” (Interview, 21/06/2012).
The second factor is the political will of member states to solve conflicts in their respective regions without the interference of permanent UNSC member states. This view is supported by an AU senior official who highlighted the fact that:

“regional organizations themselves do have a particular interest in the stability of states, and act accordingly in order to contain, manage and find lasting solutions to conflicts. The main reason for that is the fact that such conflicts do affect them either directly or indirectly. For instance, the spread and eventual regionalisation of internal conflicts threatened the peace on continents. The other significant and positive element is that regional organizations are not forced to obey to a form of veto, as it is the case for the permanent states in the UNSC, who interfere in regional conflicts”. (Interview, 21/11/2012)

The third factor can be seen in the argument of IR scholars who support the idea of having regional bodies, such as Esman and Telhami (1995), Bellamy (2004) and Francis (2007). These authors have maintained that regional organisations are expected to know more about in-depth domestic issues pertaining to the area of conflict, whether about the warring parties or holding knowledge which extends from familiarity with the geographical environment, including cultural, religious, identity-related factors and an ability to communicate in the local language. All these elements are sources relevant to the gathering of needed information and intelligence crucial to effective conflict management. In addition, regional organisations may also have the advantage of rapid military deployment capabilities. Accordingly, their involvement can facilitate the effective management of and rapid solutions to conflict in their respective regions (Annan, 1998; Francis et al, 2005).

Many scholars such as Boutros-Ghali (1992), Alagappa (1995), Brahimi (2000), and Francis (2007) have argued that the dramatic change in the dynamics of the international political system after the Cold War proved clearly that no one state or organization (e.g. the UN or the USA) has appeared capable of managing conflicts in the post-Cold War world. Consequently, it is now necessary and possible to discuss security in Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East in regional and sub-regional contexts, quite independent of the global dynamic or developments in other regions. Some of the aforementioned authors have argued that regional institutions are the right answer for guaranteeing, peace, security and stability in their respective geographical areas, strong instruments to prevent or resolve conflicts, and to put in highlighting and prioritising the human rights factor by intervening when humanitarian assistance is needed (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Brahimi, 2000). When it is related to negotiating territorial disputes or intra-
state conflict, all these issues cannot be addressed outwith regional organizations (Weiss, 1998; Pugh and Sidhu, 2003).

The need for regional organisations to assume greater responsibility was formally stated by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) in a UN peace-keeping report in the post-Cold War era:

“the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the UN could not only lighten the burden of the Council, but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs”.

From the discussion above, it appears that the emerging practice of regionalising security has proliferated after the end of the Cold War not only in Africa but also worldwide. At the African level, regional and sub-regional organisations have conducted more than fifteen peace operations since the 1990s. In particular, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) conducted operations in Lesotho (1998) and the DRC (1998). Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) carried out operations in Liberia (1991 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998) and Cote d’Ivoire (2002). The Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) led peace operations in the Central African Republic (2002). Most recently, the AU deployed operations in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004), Comoros (2004) and Somalia (2007) as well as conducting political negotiations regarding the management of numerous other conflicts such as in Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005), DRC (2006), Chad (2006), Côte d’Ivoire (2007), Guinea (2007), Kenya (2008), Madagascar (2009) and Egypt and Libya (2011).

At the international level, other organisations and states had also intervened in managing conflicts, sometimes without UN authorisation. For instance, it is important to signal the involvement of NATO in a peace operation in Kosovo in 1999 and its participation in Bosnia since 1995, before the EU intervention in December 2004 as well as in Afghanistan (2003). Also, we can look to the EU’s intervention in DRC in 2003 while Italy was the main peacekeeping actor in Albania in 1997 as a representative of NATO. Russia, for its part, acting under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), provided troops to Moldova (1992), Georgia (1993), and Tajikistan (1993). Similarly, the US has intervened on the American continent in Haiti after the President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide’s departure in 2004, whilst in Asia Australia led peace operations in East Timor (1999) and the Solomon Islands (2003). These instances illustrate the fact that, despite the UN’s traditional role in the authorisation and/or conduct of peace operations, international, regional organisations and states have modified the way peacekeeping was implemented worldwide; this seems to confirm that the UN no longer enjoys a monopoly over decisions of where and when to intervene. In such circumstances, the presence of coercion forces for regional solutions together with conventional and modern opportunities offered by these institutions reflect in some ways what Walt Rostow (1990) called the “coming age of regionalism”.

Although international and regional organisations have become important actors in the political and socio-economic process in many parts of the world, they have nevertheless faced many new challenges due to the changing nature of wars from inter- to intra-state conflict. The majority of the literature reviewed takes into consideration this change which is also seen as the main cause behind unsuccessful outcomes of these organisations in managing new conflicts (Zaum and Roberts, 2008; Jones et al, 2010).

Regarding the UN’s role, there is a consensus among scholars that the end of the Cold War has signalled a dramatic increase in the number of the UN’s interventions into the internal conflicts of states (Nathan, 2010; Lipson, 2010). However, the majority of studies show that this increase has not always translated into success. Some scholars pointed out that the UN Charter focused on the prevention of interstate conflicts and was largely unprepared to deal with the complexity of this new type of conflict (Fetherston, 1994; Regan, 1996; Mearsheimer, 1995; Dived 2007; Jones et al, 2010). Others have argued that the main cause behind the UN’s failure is the inability of the SC to reach decisions about conflicts, whether due to the lack of interest of major powers or the resistance of those involved in the conflict (Jean-Marie, 2002; Seybolt, 2007). Intelligence failures, weak assessments of situations and violations of the Council’s resolutions by its members equally play an important role in the ineffectiveness of the UN (Klingebiel, 2005; Ram, 2006; Howard, 2008).

David (2004), Scott (2004) and Jones et al, (2010) have contended that although the UN has recently adapted new regulatory approaches such as the Responsibility to Protect
approach in dealing with internal conflicts, it is still having great difficulties due to complex relations among powerful states and the continued use of the veto to protect national interests such as cases in Libya (1986) and Panama (1989) when the US vetoed resolutions that had sought to condemn its attacks on these countries (Jones et al, 2010). China’s rejection of the deployment of military observers to Guatemala in 1997 (David, 2004) and Macedonia in 1999 (UN, 1999) are also worth mentioning, while the threat of vetoes from Russia and China severely restricted UN action in Darfur (Scott, 2004). There is a consensus among aforementioned writers that the right of veto has constrained the role of the UN in managing internal conflicts effectively.

The bleak image about the UN effectiveness presented by some analysts is nevertheless contrasted by a more positive perspective on the achievements of the UN. There are a significant number of researchers and policy makers who have argued that the organisation in fact demonstrated real capacities and abilities in managing conflicts in the post-Cold War era. For instance, Pratt (1997), Munro (1999) and Lipson (2010) argued that there has been a sharp increase in the number of UN’s peacekeeping operations since 1989. These authors agreed that the collapse of the bipolar system, the new peacekeeping missions of the UN were no longer constrained by superpower rivalry and it became stronger than before due to the latter’s active participation. Other studies have argued that the successes of the UN peacekeeping missions outweighed the failures because of the experience of the UN in managing conflicts and the response of domestic parties in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia/Croatia and East Timor (Howard, 2008; Kirschner and Von Stein, 2009), Western Sahara, Nicaragua, Haiti and Bosnia (James, 2004). Other analysts maintained that the UN has become more active due to its adoption of the concept of humanitarian intervention approach “Responsibility to Protect” in many places such as in Iraq, Haiti, Burundi and Bosnia (Levitt, 2005; Jones et al, 2010).

The emergence of this approach resulted from the debate over the Kosovo intervention in 1991 which led the International commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty with the support of Canadian Government to issue the (Responsibility to Protest’s report) in 2001. See War, Torture and Terrorism; Lang (2009; 11); See also, Just Intervention Lang (2003; 5). Eventually, the UN adopted the responsibility to protect approach (R2P) in 2005. It consists of an emerging norm, or set of principles, based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility. It focuses on preventing and stopping four kinds of crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, which it places under the generic umbrella term of, Mass Atrocity Crimes. It should be noted that the adoption by the AU of the right to intervene in 2000 had played a crucial role in encouraging the UN to adopt the R2P approach.
Regarding NATO, even though it had originally been designated as a defence pact designed to deal with the Warsaw Pact\(^{29}\) since the 1990s, NATO became involved in many peace operations not only in the Euro-Atlantic area but most recently well beyond this region (Sloan 2005; Metcalf, 2005). The NATO interventions in conflict management have been effective due to the dual strength (i.e. economic and military) of its member states. Such advantages underpinned its effectiveness in different areas, such as the coalition’s success in the First Gulf War in Iraq and during the Second Gulf War (Gazzini, 2003), in the Balkans (Sloan, 2005; Radoman, 2007; Nation, 2011), in Afghanistan (Gompert, 2006) and in Libya (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012). In addition to its military interventions, NATO assisted the hybrid AU-UN mission in Sudan and Somalia with the provision of logistical support, particularly airlifts (Murithi, 2008).

However, there are those who disagree with the previous authors and wrote with as much fervour in criticism of NATO’s action. Robert (1999) and Metcalf (2005) state that NATO failed to protect the Kosovo Albanians from Serbian war crimes and failed to force the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo as well as the intervention breaching international law (i.e. in attacking a sovereign state without seeking a UN mandate). The authors maintain that NATO’s capabilities problem was due to the challenges of rationalising defence spending and investing a substantial amount of money which have made this institution asymmetric in terms of capabilities and the commitment of member states. The reluctance of NATO’s governments to risk the lives of their forces and the difficulty of developing a credible threat to land operations has adversely influenced its effectiveness in Kosovo (Roberts, 1999).

Another significant organisation involved in managing conflicts is the EU. Indeed, more recently the EU has moved into the management and implementation of peacekeeping missions and developed new mechanisms to deal with international crises. Scholars have underlined the fact that within the scope of EU policy special emphasis is placed on building its capabilities for civilian crisis management and the civilian dimension of peace-building (Kagan, 2003; Giegerich, 2004; Assanvo and Pout 2007; Malesic, 2011; Keohane, 2011). It should be noted that the action of the EU in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution is taking place within the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP)\textsuperscript{30} and The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\textsuperscript{31}. Following the Kosovo war, involving Europeans through the ESDP became a reality.

There is a consensus in the literature reviewed that, from 2003 onwards the EU contributed to numerous peace-support operations (i.e. In Europe, Africa and Asia) by using civilian or military resources (Nowak, 2006; Keohane, 2011)\textsuperscript{32}. Regarding civilian operations such as in the Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus, sub-Saharan African and in the Middle East, the EU has achieved impressive outcomes due to the commitment (e.g. political and material) of its member states (Giegerich, 2004; Keohane, 2011). The EU’s monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia) in 2005 supervised effectively the implementation of a peace agreement, putting an end to three decades of conflict between Jakarta and Achenese armed groups (Nowak, 2006). The EU has also provided the most significant support to the UN’s peacekeeping missions in many parts of the world due its human potential and economic power (Alex, et al, 2005).

The EU’s effectiveness was not limited to civilian operations, but has also successfully undertaken military ones. Some researchers consider that EU military operations were effective in keeping and achieving peace in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DRC, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Iraq (Giegerich, 2004; Keohane, 2011). On some occasions the EU missions were more effective than the UN ones. For instance, in 2003 the UN failed to protect civilians from armed militias in the DRC while the involvement of the EU military forces prevented more massacres on the ground in Ituri (Dobbins et al, 2008).

Even though the EU, through the ESDP, is nowadays considered to be a global security actor, some scholars argue that there are still significant challenges which have prevented this organisation from being fully effective. For instance, Nowak (2006) argued that the EU missions in Macedonia and Kosovo were not effective due to the restricted mandates preventing them from intervening during its missions. This reflects the fact that despite its own experience, the EU’s peace operation assignments abroad remains one of the most challenging tasks of its external action due to the change in the nature and scale of conflicts in the post-Cold War world. The lack of fully-fledged integration of civilian and military

\textsuperscript{30} The CFSP was established within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It aims to develop and strengthen democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and maintaining peace and strengthening international security in compliance with the principles of the most relevant regional and international treaties (e.g. the UN Charter).

\textsuperscript{31} The ESDP is a major element of the CFSP of the EU. Basically, it aims at providing the CFSP with military and civilian means that enable it to carry out activities in the field of security and defence, particularly with respect to conflict prevention and management of international crisis.

\textsuperscript{32} The EU conducted 24 operations with the deployment of 50,000–60,000 troops, only six involved military interventions, the others consisted in the deployment of police forces, border guards, observers, monitors, judges, and administrators. About the EU civilian and military operations, see Nowak, (2006).
aspects at the EU level is the main factor behind the ineffectiveness of its military missions and reflects the fact that the EU responded preferably to the demand it could address and that the majority of its missions are primarily of a civilian nature (Tardy, 2008). Similarly, Bono (2004) maintained that the EU cannot be considered an effective security actor because it lacked a military doctrine. According to Bono (2004), although the EU is involved in many peace operations it is only in the DRC where the undertaken peace enforcement actions have been autonomous from NATO. Derblom et al (2007) and Bailes (2008) also argued that there is uncertainty about the strength and promptness of such an entity compared with others which operate as a single power; the EU depends at all times on consent and consensus among its member states, and in certain occasions it also needs the approval of EU citizens. The limitations in the EU’s involvement as the leader of peace operations are due to the lack of financial and logistical support from its member states (Savković, 2010).

The reluctance of the EU’s member states in relation to sending military missions - especially to dangerous places - was confirmed to the present writer in an interview with an EU senior official (14/11/2012). This later justifies the non-intervention by the unwillingness of EU member states to expose their troops to unsafe places like Somalia. Accordingly, several authors such as Murithi (2005), David (2007) and Baeb (2008) have argued that all aspects of the EU’s support for AU peacekeeping efforts are limited to soft security and activities such as funding programmers, training people and helping the AU’s own peace operations.

Following the above discussion, it is clear that researchers generally identify two types of factors - internal and external - that influence the effectiveness of international and regional organisations. Regarding internal factors, scholars consider that the mandate of the mission, the level of coordination among the mechanisms of an organisations and the commitment of member states (e.g. political, financial and military obligations) are essential elements for the effectiveness of any institution. Regarding external factors, the literature shows that they vary from organisation to another. For instance, while the external conditions for the UN and even the EU and NATO represented in the local consent of parties of dispute and the cooperation of local population, the external support of other organisations such as the OAU, ASEAN, SADC, IGAD, and OAS lies on the political, financial and logistical support of the international community. More specifically, the support of the UN, EU, NATO and individual states represents a very significant
element since these organisations are able to provide substantial financial and military assistance.

2.3 Heritage and Transformation: the Journey from the OAU to the AU
The establishment of the AU in Lomé, Togo in July 2001 to replace the OAU which had been the frame of reference for the political and socio-economic development in Africa for almost four decades is in general regarded as a concrete manifestation of new intra-African cooperation and integration after the Cold War era. However, the quest for African unity had begun much earlier when the Pan-African unity was utilised as a political tool and ideology to liberate the continent from colonisation in the 19th Century (Murithi, 2005; Francis, 2007).

Indeed, the official founding of the OAU was the first process for the institutionalisation of the pan-African ideology. When liberation from colonial powers was achieved, the will to preserve the freshly acquired sovereignty against the former colonisers and the new rising powers induced Africans to pursue military and security cooperation. However, the spread of intrastate conflict in the continent after the Cold War and the failure of the OAU and the UN led the Pan-Africanism ideology to shift its orientation from liberation and defence of Africa to the prevention, management and settlement of intrastate conflict as the main goal of African interstate cooperation (Murithi, 2005; Franke, 2009).

Even though the development of the Pan African-ideology largely shaped the current tide of African unity, this section reflects on the immediate rationale and motivating elements that led to the replacement of the OAU by the AU. It also highlights the institutional and constitutional differences between them and to what extent this development can make a difference in the African peace and security domain.

2.4 The Pan-African Quest for Unity: the Evolution of the Idea
The idea of pan-Africanism goes back to the 19th Century as a reaction to the dehumanisation of African people by slave traders and colonialists (Mathews, 2008). The notion of this phenomenon promotes the idea that, through African Unity, the continent would be able to liberate itself from European colonialism and achieve social and political equality along with freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination (Emerson, 1962). A key feature of Pan-Africanism is that its process has taken different forms at different historical moments and geographical locations (Adi and Sherwood, 2003). According to Murithi (2005:44), “the first stage of the institutionalisation of Pan-
Africanism consisted of organising five Pan-Africanism Conferences which were held between 1900 and 1945\(^{33}\).

At this point it is worth underlining - and also quite surprising in view of the anti-colonialism agenda of Pan-africanism - that all five Pan-Africanism Conferences were held outside the African continent and that it was the African Diaspora who dominated and controlled the debates (Bujra, 2004). However, the Pan-Africanism as a strategy for social solidarity, as well as cultural, political and economic emancipation moved from a universal movement to an Afro-centric continental movement during the 1950s and 1960s (Thomas and Leonard, 2006).

Pan-Africanism as a movement brought together African nationalist leaders as well as leaders from the Diaspora to think about creating a continental institution. Such a body would be able to help Africans reach self-determination and to contribute to independence from colonial rule and bring about faster economic growth and development as well as keeping the peace and security in Africa. This led to the first conference on African soil being held in Ghana as the first black African country to gain independence in 1958 under the presidency of Kwame Nkrumah. Dubbed as the First Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), it was the first real attempt to create an African continental organisation (Thomas and Leonard, 2006). This conference was followed by other two conferences, in Tunisia in 1960 and in Egypt in 1961 (Amate, 1986).

In fact, these conferences witnessed a serious debate concerning the most suitable strategy for African unity. In this regard, it should be noted that there was disagreement between African leaders regarding how and when continental unity should be achieved. There were those – in the ‘Casablanca Group’ – who wanted a fast move towards unity and others – the Brazzaville Group – who took a more prudent perspective, arguing that it was necessary to first establish and consolidate new African states, and subsequently build up regional institutions as support (Bujra, 2004). While the first group - led by Nkrumah of Ghana – argued for immediate continental unity, the second group under the leadership of Tanzanian president Mwalimu Nyerere argued for consolidating nation states first (Franke, 2009)\(^{34}\).

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\(^{33}\) The first ever Pan African Conference was held in 1900 at the Westminster Central Hall in London, UK; the second in Paris in 1919; the third in London in 1927; the fourth in New York; and the fifth in Manchester, UK in 1945.

\(^{34}\) The Casablanca Group consisted of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The Brazzaville Group consisted of Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Benin, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Liberia, Togo, Madagascar and Nigeria.
The divergence between the two contrasting perspectives on Africa’s future led to a deadlock. The dilemma was about whether the foreseen institution should be a model of a “Federation of African States” or rather a “United States of Africa” (Adebajo, 2001; Franke, 2009). Although this division placed serious obstacles on the path of African cooperation, the heads of African states succeeded in striking a compromise between these groups which culminated later on in the drawing up of the OAU Charter. The establishment of the OAU was indeed the most significant manifestation of the earlier aspirations for unity and solidarity of the African as rooted in Pan-Africanism movement.

2.5 The Creation of the OAU: A concrete Symbol of Pan-African Unity

As discussed earlier, the OAU was established to facilitate the gradual decolonization, safeguard and consolidate Africa’s political independence and territorial integrity. Although the OAU provided the political platform for dialogue and discussion on African interstate cooperation in the political and socio-economic fields, the shortcomings and weaknesses of the organisation appeared with the outcomes of its involvement in the security domain. Effectively, the OAU was largely unable to solve conflicts between and within its member states despite its various involvements in this regard (see Table 2.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya and Egypt</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1960-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya and Chad</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda-Tanzania War</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1977-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea and Ethiopia</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1961-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1986-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad-Sudan conflict</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1978-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1967-1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1963-1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is believed that the OAU’s ineffectiveness in the peace and security realm was due to the weaknesses of its charter. In fact, the divergent views discussed earlier between the Casablanca Group and Brazzaville Group regarding establishing the first continental political organisation affected the Charter of the OAU, particularly in dealing with conflict. For example, while the Casablanca Group proposed direct political unity with a supranational authority, the Brazzaville Group preferred regional economic integration as the foundation for gradual continental unity. Accordingly, the Charter of the OAU produced a compromise document to accommodate all different views of these groups. The Casablanca Group only accepted the Charter’s principles on respect for political sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states (Francis, 2007). Consequently, the OAU Charter was based on a number of some international society principles such as respect of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Over time, the adoption of the above principles became obstacles not only to the ability of the OAU to manage conflicts but also to the progress of the process of Pan African unity in general. It should be noted here that the OAU’s Charter was influenced to a very large extent by the Westphalian state system with considerable consequences, as will be discussed below.

2.6 The Impact of the OAU Adoption of State Sovereignty and Non-Intervention Norms

The emphasis of the OAU on respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states is based on the Westphalian state system which has been considered as the foundation of the contemporary international system (Osiander, 2001). It is stated in Article 3 of the OAU’s Charter that member states solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the sovereign equality of all Member States, the non-interference in the internal affairs of states, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent status. It should be noted also that the OAU’s Charter was largely in conformity with the UN Charter. For example, Article 2(1) of the UN Charter emphasised that the organization is based on the principle of the

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35 Article 11 of the OAU Charter.
36 Indeed, the modern international legal system of sovereign states is traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia (24th October, 1648), which established the equality and independence of states, see Westphalia Treaty, available at: [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp). This system has not only been adopted in Europe but also in other parts of the world from the 17th Century onwards.
sovereign equality of all its Members while Article 2(7) provided for non-interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states.\footnote{See Article 2 of the UN Charter, available at,  \url{https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml}}

Even though adopting the above principles rendered the OAU important particularly in supporting the independent movement on the continent and preventing interstate conflict, these norms over the years became obstacles to the ability of the OAU to act effectively in the peace and security domain. The terms of the declaration related to sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states in practice prevented the OAU from complementing these two inalienable factors with safeguards such as the respect for citizens’ human rights.

On the contrary, African regional principles neglected the founding ideals of Pan-Africanism and focused instead on reinforcing governing powers and not the populations. Indeed, in the OAU’s Charter, no mention was made or any provision created regarding the protection of African people’s rights. By considering the record of the OAU it appears that its non-interventionism policy prevailed: African authoritarian regimes behaved with total impunity against their populations, without any interference to reduce or prevent the overwhelming human rights abuses regularly committed. The OAU was not anymore the organisation created by well-intentioned political leaders but a mere aggregate of African heads of state, not legitimately elected for the great majority but in power through military coups and subsequently self-appointed dictators.

This negative image informed African populations’ attitude towards the OAU. Judged impotent, the organisation had little positive effect on the lives of Africans. On the contrary, it was in some ways an accomplice through its silence to the human rights abuses perpetrated by its member states. In this regard, Mathews (1984: 79) argued that “the OAU Charter initially spoke for the African peoples still under colonialism or racial domination, but once the countries emerged to nationhood, the Charter stood for the protection of their heads of state and served as a tread union which protected them”. In other words, the OAU appears to be an institution for the heads of state, by the heads of state and for the heads of state. The OAU decided to preserve state boundaries which have been established by the colonial powers. It also insisted on the respect of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity, proscribing any intervention in the domestic affairs of member states even when their leaders butchered their own people transformed this institution in a club of dictators.

The OAU’s inability to deal appropriately with peace and security issues in Africa increased in the 1990s due to the increase in intra-state conflicts. In order to meet this new
challenge, the OAU tried to update its institutions by creating the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). However, in spite of the initial optimism, this institutional framework did not prevent the organization from failing to deal effectively with the containment and management of civil wars such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Comoros which collectively resulted in the death of millions of Africans (Murithi, 2007). Of particular significance, this new mechanism was unable to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

The failure of the OAU and the reluctance of the UN and the wider international community to respond to African security matters were among the factors which convinced the African leaders to forge closer unity in Africa and contemplate a new project of regional integration. This ultimately led to the replacement of the OAU by the AU. Nevertheless, it is important to underline here the fact that the OAU is credited with successful results in relation to the decolonisation of Africa and the struggle against apartheid (Murithi, 2007). Moreover, through its mediation role the OAU made considerable efforts in solving several disputes, including the ones involving Algeria and Morocco, Libya and Chad and also amongst Kenya, Sudan, Congo and Ethiopia (Fredric, 1989; Franke, 2009). Furthermore, the OAU played an important role in proclaiming the noble concepts of unity, solidarity and dignity in Africa.

These achievements were recognised by the African leaders at the lunch of the AU when they paid tribute to the OAU. Nevertheless, the failure to prevent and manage intrastate conflicts showed that such an organisation became obsolete. Baimu and Sturman (2003: 40) argued in this context that:

“the OAU like the prehistoric dinosaurs was facing the threat of extinction for failing to adapt itself to changed global and regional political, social and economic settings and rising up to the new challenges faced by the continent in the post-Cold War era”.

This was in fact the start of the AU project, conceived in Sirte in 1999 with the resolution of drafting a constitutional act. The AU’s Constitutive Act (AUCA) was signed a year later in Lomé, Togo on 11th July, 2000. The official inauguration of the AU occurred in Durban,

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38 In this last meeting of Heads of State and Government under the umbrella of OAU on 8 July 2002: Mr Amara Essy, Secretary-General of the OAU praised the OAU for the total decolonisation of Africa, the struggle against apartheid and the exaltation of the virtues of unity, solidarity and dignity on the continent (OAU; 2002a).
South Africa in July 2002 and represented the subsequent phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism.

2.7 The Emergence of the AU in the 21st Century: Does it Make a Difference?
The replacement of the OAU - which had been the frame of reference for the political and socio-economic development in Africa for almost four decades (1963-2002) - by the AU, represented a significant shift in relation to the norms and institutions governing multilateral relations on the continent. In fact, the AUCA and Peace and Security Council Protocol\(^{39}\) enhanced the constitutional and institutional basis for the African inter-security cooperation. This section is dedicated to describing and analysing this new African peace and security architecture. It firstly compares the AU’s institutional and constitutional framework to its predecessor in order to understand the extent to which has the AU learned from the lessons of the OAU in the peace and security realm. It then focuses on its envisaged relationship with other international actors.

2.8 The AU’s Institutional Security Framework

The AUCA is considered as the “institutionalisation of the ideals of Pan-Africanism” (Murithi, 2007:1). It has indeed expanded the AU’s source of authority in which it represents a radical departure from the political, legal and institutional setup of its predecessor. For instance, while the OAU used to function with only three organs, the AU established 17 institutions, most of them devoted to ensuring peace and security in Africa and are substantially different (See OAU [Figure 1] and AU [Figures 2 & 3] organizational charts below) from the traditional tools of the OAU (Waal, 2003; Jean, 2004; Cilliers and Sturman 2006). Accordingly, the following section will examine the AU’s specific powers and duties within its main organs, and how they are implemented. The shortcomings and strengths of the AU’s institutions will also be discussed.

Figure 2.1: The Organization Chart of the OAU

Assembly of Heads of States and Governments

The council of Ministers

Commission of Mediation
Conciliation and Arbitration

Specialized Commissions
Defense Commission
Educational, Scientific and Health Commission

African Liberation Committee – Dar es Salaam

General Secretariat – Addis Ababa. Office of Administrative Secretary General

Ex. Secretariat of African Group at the UN

Political Affairs Department

Economic and Social Affairs Department

Administrative Department

Cultural Scientific Affairs Department

OAU Scientific, Technical and Research Commission (STRC):

- Secretariat: Lagos
- Inter-African Soils Bureau (Bangui)
- Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (Nairobi)
- Inter-African Phytosanitary Council (Yaounde)
- Publications (Niamey/Nairobi)

Bureau of Health
Figure 2.2: Organisation Chart of the AU

Assembly

NEPAD

Peace & Security Council

Executive Council

ECOSOCC

Court of Justice

CHPR

Pan-African Parliament

APRM

Military Staff Committee

Permanent Representative Committee

Commission

PSD

CEWS

Panel of the Wise

APRM: African Peer Review Mechanism;
CEWS: Continental Early Warning System;
CHPR: Court of Human Right and Peoples’ Rights;
ECOSOCC: Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
Figure 2.3: Peace and Security Directorate of the AU

AU Commission/
AU Authority → AU Assembly

Peace and Security
Directorate → Peace &
Security Council

Conflict
Management
Division

Peace Support
Operation Division

Project
Management
Team

Strategic
Security
Issues
Team

Secretariat

ASMCU

Operation and
Support Unit

Integrated
Task Force

CMRPU

Early Warning
Unit

ASMCU: African Stand-by Force and Military Committee Unit;
CMRPU: Conflict Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Unit
2.9 The AU Assembly

According to Article 6(2) of the CA, the AU Assembly is designated as the Union’s supreme organ. It comprises the heads of state and governments or their representatives and headed by the Chairperson who is elected by the heads of state and government for a term of one year (CA, Art 6(1), (3), & (4)). It meets once a year with two-thirds of the total membership of the Union forming a quorum at any meeting (CA, Art 7(2)). It possesses a wide array of powers and prerogatives (CA, art 9(1)). In addition to possessing the right to decide on intervention, it determines the common policies of the Union, admits new members, receives, considers and takes decisions on reports and recommendations from the other Union organs, including the PSC (PSC protocol, Art. 4). It adopts the budget, appoints the Chairperson and other members of the commission, and gives directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and the restoration of peace. It may delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ of the Union. This means that some of the Assembly’s business can be handled by other organs such as the PSC which, as will be discussed later, might suggest the use of sanctions and humanitarian or military intervention by the Union against member states.

The unrestricted right of the Assembly to delegate either its powers or functions to any organ of the Union could lead to a number of complex situations. In this regard, Magliveras and Naldi (2002: 420) observed that this

“could potentially give rise to significant problems, since it was clearly not the intention of the Act’s drafters to have lesser organs to decide on such fundamental issues as, for example, the admission of new Member States or the establishment of new organs”.

Moreover, as stated earlier, the Assembly meets only once a year and their decisions are normally taken on the basis of consensus or at least by a two-thirds majority. Hence, it can be said that delegating responsibilities to an organ of the AU to address a large range of issues might be counterproductive and difficult to implement. This is indeed what was observed regarding the response of the AU when it took a long time before deciding to intervene, as will be seen in the empirical chapters.

40 However, it might also meet in extraordinary session if requested by a member state and approved by at least two-thirds of members.
2.10 The AU Peace and Security Council

The AUPSC was established under a Protocol which came into force on 26\textsuperscript{th} December, 2003 (AU, 2003a). At the launch, Africa’s leaders claimed that this institution “marks an historic watershed in Africa’s progress towards resolving its conflicts and the building of a durable peace and security order” (AU, 2004a). Despite the importance of this organ it has thus far attracted little scholarly attention (Williams, 2009a). Accordingly, this section will be devoted to analyse and understand the structure of the PSC in order to give a general outline of this institution.

The Membership System; Who is Allowed to Participate?

In a similar fashion to the UNSC, the AUPSC is composed of fifteen members, ten elected for the term of two years and other five are elected for three-year terms (PSC protocol, Art. 5(1))\textsuperscript{41}. Membership is based on a number of criteria, the first of which is equitable regional representation and rotation (PSC protocol, Art. 5(2))\textsuperscript{42}. The PSC protocol also lists nine criteria on which to judge candidate countries. These include the ability to pay duties, respect constitutional governance and the rule of law and commitment to uphold the principles of the Union. From its establishment in 2004 until 2013, thirty-seven states had been elected for the PSC. Nigeria is the only state which has sat permanently on the Council since its creation (see Table 2.2).

\textsuperscript{41}According to PSC protocol (art. 7(4), 8 (9), 8 (10)), states and entities, other than the official fifteen members, are allowed to participate in specific PSC sessions (i.e. the open session). For instance, officials such as the AU commissioner(s), heads of divisions within the Commission, desk officers and other members of the AU secretariat, the AU legal counsel, delegations, and parties representing governments involved in conflicts or crisis situations or representatives of Africa’s sub-regional organizations, the UN or NGOs.

\textsuperscript{42}Consequently, the five regions of the continent present candidates for election (the Central part of Africa will be represented by the members, the East by three, the North by two, the South by three and the West by four).
Table 2.2: Membership of the AUPSC, 2004-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Algeria (3)</td>
<td>Algeria (3)</td>
<td>Libya (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Libya (2)</td>
<td>Egypt (2)</td>
<td>Tunisia (2)</td>
<td>Mauritania (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Gabon (3)</td>
<td>Gabon (3)</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Congo (2)</td>
<td>Congo (2)</td>
<td>Chad (2)</td>
<td>Chad (2)</td>
<td>Congo (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Cameroon (2)</td>
<td>Cameroon (2)</td>
<td>Burundi (2)</td>
<td>Burundi (2)</td>
<td>Cameroon (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Ethiopia (3)</td>
<td>Ethiopia (3)</td>
<td>Kenya (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Kenya (2)</td>
<td>Rwanda (2)</td>
<td>Rwanda (2)</td>
<td>Rwanda (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>Sudan (2)</td>
<td>Uganda (2)</td>
<td>Uganda (2)</td>
<td>Djibouti (2)</td>
<td>Djibouti (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>South Africa (3)</td>
<td>Angola (3)</td>
<td>Swaziland (2)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (3)</td>
<td>Tanzania (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Lesotho (2)</td>
<td>Botswana (2)</td>
<td>Namibia (2)</td>
<td>Lesotho (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Mozambique (2)</td>
<td>Malawi (2)</td>
<td>Zambia (2)</td>
<td>South Africa (2)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Nigeria (3)</td>
<td>Ghana (2)</td>
<td>Nigeria (3)</td>
<td>Benin (2)</td>
<td>Nigeria (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Togo (2)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso(2)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso (2)</td>
<td>Ivory Coast(2)</td>
<td>Ivory Coast(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Ghana (2)</td>
<td>Ghana (2)</td>
<td>Mali (2)</td>
<td>Benin (2)</td>
<td>Guinea (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Senegal (2)</td>
<td>Senegal (2)</td>
<td>Mali (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, several anomalies appear when examining the above table regarding the extent to which the PSC applied its substantive requirements on its member states. First, some of these states are not able to honour their financial obligations to the Union. For example, Chad was elected as a member of the PSC in 2008 and Mauritania in 2010. However, both are poor states and suffering at the same time from security problems. Second, there are states such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and Zambia who do not respect the rule of constitutional
governance, the rule of law or human rights. Several of them also have had violent conflicts while officially on the Council board. Thirdly, some of the elected states were authoritarian regimes such as Libya, Egypt and Sudan which in turn affects the AU’s obligation to democratic principles.

Despite the fact that the substantive requirements of the PSC’s membership are not being strictly enforced, the PSC has been one of the most active organs of the AU. Since its establishment, it convened an average of five times per month and by November 2013 had held nearly four hundred meetings. More substantively, it has intervened either politically or militarily in no less than seventeen conflicts.

**Range of Issues Devolved to the AUPSC**

The principles and objectives of the AU’s security architecture were defined in the AUCA (AU, 2000). It was stated in its preamble that member states have mandated the AU and its PSC to fulfil a substantially enlarged and much more robust role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts. Accordingly, the AUPSC considered as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU, 2003a).

In fact, although the AU Assembly is considered as the chief decision making body of the AU, recent practice has shown that the AUPSC possess more powers than the Assembly. The PSC has the right to recommend to the Assembly to intervene, on behalf of the AU, in a member state in respect of grave circumstances (AUCA, Art (4)). In this regard, it is improbable that we would see a recommendation from the AUPSC overruled by the AU Assembly.

The PSC, as a key institution for the everyday management of peace and security issues, is responsible for performing a range of duties, starting with prevention and ranging to military intervention. It has responsibility for assessing the eventuality of crisis situations, sending fact-finding missions to conflict zones, authorizing peacekeeping operations, recommending intervention when convinced of the gravity of the situation and endorsing the modalities of intervention once the decision has been taken at the level of the General Assembly (PSC protocol, Art. 7(2)). Williams (2009a: 603) stated that “unlike its predecessor, the PSC is in principle able to authorise the entire spectrum of peace operations, from small peace-making missions to large-scale interventions”.

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Norms - Guiding Principles of the AUPSC

As stated in the introduction, the establishment of the AU was not only an acknowledgment of the UN’s reticence towards African conflicts but also due to the shortcomings of the OAU. Accordingly, when the AU was created there was an agreement between member states to respect the constitutional framework and to observe specific and fundamental values. Any failure by member states to abide by these principles would result with the imposition of sanctions (AU, 2000).

The PSC is guided by the principles enshrined in the CA, the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It asserts on eleven principles (PSC protocol, Art 4). The first nine principles (from (a) up to (i)) are well-known as the usual basis in the Charters of regional and international organizations (e.g. the UN, OAU, EU, ASEAN and OAS). These include the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, non-interference and respect for borders. However, the breach of fundamental values is represented in Principles (h) and (p), which form a new paradigm within the AU. These principles gave the AU the right to intervene in member states in respect of grave circumstances (e.g. war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) as well as serious threats to the legitimate order, even without the local consent of a member state. AU Member States also have the right to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the CA. This new norm not only contradicted the non-interference principle of its predecessor (Gottschalk and Siegmar, 2004; Powell, 2005; Gomes, 2008) but also challenged collective customary laws of non-interference and the UN Charter (Kioko, 2003; Abass, 2004; Levitt, 2005; Williams, 2005) as will be discussed later in detail. Interestingly, it is essential to underline that the AUCA is the first and only international treaty which contains such a right. This may lead to significant changes in the way in which the UN and other institutions deal with conflicts. Moreover, it might have significant effects on the way peace and security is understood, interpreted and on the new mechanisms to be applied. In fact, this argument is supported by a former UN official who stated that

“Although, the AU’s codification of the African norm of intervention from the outset has raised significant questions relevant to international law, particularly in regard to Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, it has the potential to change the landscape of international law and it is believed that it led the UN to adopt the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as an important norm to achieve peace and security after the Cold War” (interview, 09/06/2012).
It is worth mentioning here that the use of force in peace operations in intrastate conflict was seen as violating the fundamental norm of the Westphalian treaties, which emphasises the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state. However, the AU’s adoption of the right to intervention without state consent was established to face the new kinds of conflict after the Cold War and changed the perspective on the traditional standard of the Westphalia state. Essentially, it moved the AU to a modern trans-boundary system requiring the protection of community values. Indeed, the development of interdependence through international and regional organisations in international politics today has impacted upon the international legal system which is based primarily on respect for the autonomy and sovereignty of states. Osiander (2001: 283) argued in this regard that “[t]his development has been accompanied by an on-going swing of the pendulum away from near-total autonomy of states and by a proliferation of international and regional institutions trying to “get in” on the management of trans-border politics”.

In fact, this is what happened in Africa. Effectively, when African states decided to sign up to the AUCA they renounced the once-sacrosanct principle of sovereignty and accordingly accepted to review the status of human rights in their respective countries. They also realised that it was necessary to make concessions to the new African institution in terms of their former legal and political sovereignty. According to Levitt (2005: 226), “African leaders have consciously and willingly contracted away sovereignty for greater inspirations of peace, security, stability and development”. In reality, Africa’s shift from the norm of ‘Non-Interference’ to ‘Non-Indifference’ has restricted the concept of sovereignty and allowed the Union to use force to intervene in member states when deemed necessary, even without the local consent of the government or the parties to dispute (Kioko, 2003; Powell, 2005; Adebajo, 2008). As Kioko (2003: 819) has argued, “the principle of intervention is a shift from the cardinal principles of non-interference and non-intervention to the doctrine of non-indifference”.

This in turn led to change in the international and regional organisations’ traditional principles regarding managing conflicts to the new ones, especially with respect to internal conflict. In other words, the traditional missions could be conducted only when there is a peace agreement either in interstate or intrastate conflict. These concepts, including, neutrality and impartiality, no longer possess universally accepted meaning and are not held in the same esteem as before (Adebajo, 2008). In this regard, it seems that the UN’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect norm in 2005 was in fact inspired or developed
from the norm of the right of the intervention which adopted by the AU in 2001 (Interview with a former UN official, 09/06/2012). Indeed, the AU’s new promise of non-indifference indicated a key change in the political thinking of African leaders. It also announced the coming of an interventionist phase in the management of peace and security not only in Africa but in the international arena as a whole.

However, what is relevant here is that although all African states agreed to empower the AU with the right to intervene in critical circumstances, the practice on the ground – as will be seen in the empirical chapters – reveals a different story. Indeed, the AU was struggling to get the consent of local parties to particular disputes, which reflects the fact that there is a lack of commitment and a contradiction between the member states who on one hand agreed formally on the new norms and principles of the AU and, on the other hand, failed to respect them when it comes to implementing them concretely in real situations.

*The PSC Procedure: How are Decisions Taken?*

According to Article 8 of its Protocol, the PSC’s decision-making is vested in the Permanent Representatives Council, which is required to meet at least twice every month. However, due to the unpredictability, number, intensity and nature of African crises and conflicts since 2006, the PSC has met on average no less than five times a month (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). The other organs of the PSC (e.g. the Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Government), are required to meet at least once a year.

The agenda of the Council might be determined in light of on-going conflicts and crisis situations. Proposals can be initiated by the chairperson of the AU or any member or by the Commissioner for Peace and Security (PSC Protocol, Art. 10 (2) (a)). According to the established agenda, the PSC will select one of the three following forms for a specific meeting:

- **Formal meetings** - the main aim of such meetings is to examine a report from the AU Commission. In this case, The PSC may invite the concerned parties to participate, without a right to vote (Hull and Svensson, 2008). If the member of the Council is one of the parties of dispute or a situation under consideration by the PSC, then the member shall be invited to present its case to the Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings (PSC Protocol, Art. 9). This means that any member of the PSC which is party to a conflict under
consideration by the PSC shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict. Although this norm has been accepted by all members of the AU, it has been violated for many times as will be seen in the empirical chapters.

- Briefing sessions - during these sessions, the Commission selects and presents the main points to be discussed, which represents more an updating for the PSC about current situations rather than providing the members with a full report. Following the briefing, the PSC members have the opportunity to decide, according to the gravity of the situation, whether or not issuing a statement or a communiqué is appropriate.

- Consultations - the PSC members are expected to hold closed consultations in order to understand more about a particular conflicting situation, but without necessarily having to take an early decision. Following the preliminary consultations a closed session is hold without the invited parties or guests, who are usually requested to leave the meeting.

The other important point worth discussing regarding the decision-making processes of the PSC is that decisions of the Council “shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus and in case consensus cannot be reached, the Council “shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting” (PSC Protocol, Art. 8(12)). Even if this method offers the AU’s members an easy way to oppose Council action the debate and deliberation process means that the PSC can be considered as a ‘social environment’. Within such an environment, micro-processes of socialisation work both among PSC members and between the wider group of AU member states and the AU Commission (Williams, 2009a).

Mandates- Major Roles of the AUPSC

The PSC protocol identified six objectives for the institution. These are: to promote peace and security; anticipate and prevent conflict; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence; coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism; develop a common defence policy; encourage democratic practices,
good governance and the rule of law, and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In order to achieve these aims – which are guided by the general principles outlined above - the PSC is supported by a number of institutions, namely, the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Forces (ASF) and a Special Fund.

According to Art 3 of its protocol, the PSC “shall use its discretion to affect entry whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, and/or in collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms”. Hence, the functions of these institutions as mandated in the Protocol emphasize the importance of interdependence and synergy between the pillars to operationalise the African peace and security architecture. Accordingly, what follows is an analysis of the these organs and the envisaged system of coordination between the AUPSC and these organs which function in conjunction with the latter and which now fall for consideration.

2.11 The Different Bodies Working in Collaboration with the AUPSC

*Commission of the AU (AUC)*

In similar fashion to the European Commission, the AUC constitutes the Secretariat of the Union (AU, 2000). It intends to “facilitate, coordinate, and monitor the union’s progress toward its overarching vision of peace and security” (Williams, 2011a: 8). The Commission is the engine of the Union and thus requires people with the necessary professional skills for the effective management of continental issues, especially in the peace and security domain (Cilliers, 2003). For this reason, the mechanism is composed of the Chairman, his or her deputy or deputies and a number of Commissioners to deal with different aspects of AU policy.

The Chairperson of the Commission is mandated to act under the authority of the AUPSC (PSC Protocol, Art. 10 (1)) which endows the Chairperson with a variety of important tasks. One of these tasks is to bring to the attention of the PSC any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the continent (PSC Protocol, Art. 10 (2)). He may, through his ‘own initiative’ or when so requested by the PSC, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, or the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. In order to do so, the Chairperson is obligated to engage “in consultation with all parties involved in a
conflict, deploy efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts” (PSC Protocol, Art. 10(l)). Therefore, the AU’s Chairperson, as is the case for the UN Secretary General under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, is empowered with the required prerogatives in order to play a significant role in achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Chairperson also has the duty of bringing to the attention of the panel of the wise any matter he/she deemed important. Consequently, it is their responsibility to “ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the PSC, including mounting and deploying peace support missions” (PSC Protocol, Art. 10 (3)).

The other prerogatives of the Chairperson are to appoint the Panel of the Wise and act as the head of the ASF (PSC Protocol, Art. 11 & 13). It is essential to underline here that in the exercise of the designated functions and powers described above, the Chairperson is seconded by the AU commissioner, responsible of the Directorate of AUPSC (PSC Protocol, Art. 10(4)). The CEWS, which now requires discussion, is another organ which provides the Commission with the required information related to the possible threats to peace and security and to suggest suitable reactions aiming to foresee potential crises before they arise.

The AUC adopted strategic plans for 2004-2007 (AU, 2004b) and 2009-2012 (AU, 2009a) in order to enhance its capacity to implement various programmes, projects and activities. However, in practice it appears that the AUC has been confronted with several challenges. The first problematic issue is related to the bureaucratic gaps. There is no doubt that the effective management of peace operations required appropriate management and administrative structures both in the AU’s Headquarters (in Addis Ababa) as well as on the ground to provide first a strategic vision and then to support the various mission teams. Notwithstanding, the AUC still needs the institutional capacity and human resources to improve the AU’s effectiveness in conducting complex peace operations (Interview with African analyst, 3/6/2012).

The AUC itself recognised its weak bureaucratic processes and management systems; inadequate physical infrastructure; poor information technologies; gaps in qualitative and quantitative human resources, professionalism, commitment and motivation; weak reputation, presence and reach in the Continent and inadequate sources of funds (AU,2004b). According to the Secretary-General Report about the UN’s support to AU peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN, there are approximately 675 permanent members of staff in the AUC. However, given that AUC’s remit covers a large number of tasks, it arguably remains chronically understaffed (UN, 2010a). Indeed, this number is
very small especially in comparing with other institutions such as the EU Commission which has a staff of about 22,000, a majority of which work on issues with a soft security dimension (UNU-CRIS, 2008). According to Williams (2009a), the Peace Support Operations Division relies on only forty members involved in all aspects of AU operations (from the initial plan, launch, and maintenance of AU processes). In addition, they develop the ASF in Africa and provide the formation of the regional brigades.

Another problem of the bureaucrats within the AU Commission is related to the general unease within the AU that the commission intends to control the AU system particularly in the area of peace and security, which might lead to tension among member states. Makinda and Okumu (2007: 51) argued in this respect that “Since the AUC has been providing the secretarial support to the PSC, its member states looked like the former’s invitees”. In fact, the AUC plays the leading role in “setting the PSC timetable, proposing its agenda, preparing its draft reports, and drafting communiqués, which are usually provided only minutes before the meeting for consideration and adoption” (Makinda and Okumu, 2007: 51). The repercussions of the dominant role of the AUC were captured by Williams (2009a: 14), who argued that “Whether the commission’s bureaucrats should initiate policies or simply implement instructions from the member states remains a serious point of contention between these two groups”. In fact, it has been noticed that the AUC has taken some decisions which are in fact within the prerogatives of the PSC. In this regard, the AU mission in Comoros can be considered as a case of point: the AUC asked South Africa to deploy more troops in the country without any approval or endorsement of the PSC (Interview with an African analyst, 9/6/2012).

This instance leads to another problem regarding the interaction between the AUC and member states. Some Africans consider that powerful African states have a bigger impact on AUC policies than the small ones. Consequently, the AU can intervene only in weak states (interview with an African analyst, 12/5/2012). For instance, during the last intrastate conflict in Libya (2011), the AU was unwilling to approve UNSC intervention for the purpose of protecting civilian populations, reinforcing the argument about the weight of powerful states over the AU’s decision making. Indeed, the effectiveness of international and regional organisations depends largely on the commitment of their member states. This was confirmed by the UN Secretary General who stated that “[t]he AU’s effectiveness results from the sum of its members” (UN, 2010a). In fact, conducting

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peace operations needs financial, logistical and military support that can be provided by powerful states which in turn allows them to impose their agenda on the AUC (interview with an African analyst, 12/5/2012). In this regard, Williams (2009a:21) argued that “[d]uring the crucial start up/planning phase, powerful African leaders, and not merely commission officials, must champion the mission and play a proactive role in generating the required forces”. However, the view of some African academics – that influential states played an important role in the AUC and that the latter can do nothing against states like South Africa and Nigeria – was rejected by the Head of PSC Secretariat, Dr. Kambudzi who said that: “these are unfounded accusations, part of a mere theoretical debate, which cannot be proved” (Interview, 14/11/2012).

*The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)*

In sharp contrast to the regional mechanism of peace and security of its predecessor, the institutional framework of the AU established a Continental Early Warning System. Its objectives are to identify the possible threats to peace and security and to suggest suitable reactions aiming to foresee potential crises before they arise. It consists of two units, the situation room and the Observation and Monitoring Units. The former is located at the Conflict Management directorate of the Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module (PSC Protocol, Art.12 (2(a)). The latter on the other hand consists of the observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms that collect and process data and transmit it to the situation room PSC Protocol, Art.12 (2(b)).

In fact, this mechanism is considered by many authors as an important tool for achieving peace and security in Africa. For example, Williams (2009a: 9) argued that

“With assistance from the UN’s situation centre in New York and external donors, the AU’s situation room can now provide continent-wide coverage of conflict dynamics twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, as well as produce a range of reporting mechanisms, including daily news summaries and more substantial updates on emerging issues”.

This mechanism has made remarkable progress since its establishment and has been supported by international actors such as the UN and the EU (Franke, 2009).

Despite this progress, there are still problems which frustrate the effectiveness of the CEWS. The first problem is related to the weakness of its tools; for example, the AU
established ten situation rooms which are linked with the main room in Addis Ababa. However, they are not sufficient to efficiently monitor and analyze conflict dynamics across the whole continent (interview with an African analyst, 12/5/2012). Second, the CEWS situation room did not obtain adequate real-time diplomatic reporting and intelligence. It can be highlighted here the absence of an appropriate network for the AU, which itself suffers from a lack of embassies and political offices for information gathering. This might suggest the need for the provision of more political liaison officers (interview with senior African official, 12/11/2012).

The head of AUPSC, Dr. Wane acknowledged these shortcomings in an interview with the current researcher. He underlined that the CEWS is still in the improvement phase and needs an increase in quantity and quality of analysts and more adequate information-technology infrastructure (Interview with Dr Wane, 21/11/2012).

The African Standby Forces (ASF)

The ASF can be considered a key instrument in the envisaged response of the AU to intrastate and interstate conflict. Indeed, it seems clear that the African leaders had learned from the weaknesses of the OAU and the UN which failed to establish such an instrument (e.g. armed forces). It also seems evident that the AU, in similar fashion to NATO, tried to develop a standing force or rapid reaction force (Riggilo, 2003). The ASF can be considered as the military wing of the AUPSC established in order “to enable the PSC perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the AUCA” (PSC Protocol, Art. 13 (1)).

The force consists of military, police and civilian components and is composed of five sub-regional contingents, each composed of a maximum of five thousand troops per sub-region making the overall number of 20-25,000 troops (Alemu, 2008). These troops are based in their country of origin to be ready for rapid deployment at the appropriate time. For that reason, member states are obligated to “take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the Assembly” (PSC Protocol, Art. 13(1)). The framework of the ASF is designed to perform the military functions of the PSC, ranging from a military advice to interventions. More specifically, its framework provides six potential crisis management scenarios (See Table 2.3).

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44 The political liaison officers are currently based in Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ivory Coast, DR Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Sudan and Western Sahara.
45 See the Charter of the OAU, and Article 43 of the UN Charter.
Table 2.3: African Standby Force Design Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace building).</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.</td>
<td>90 days with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.</td>
<td>14 days with robust military force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, the six scenarios mentioned above are dedicated only to peace operations and do not authorize the ASF to engage with other security challenges, (e.g. counter-terrorism, antipiracy and maritime security, disaster management, or broader questions of security sector reform) (Williams, 2011a). In order to maintain the theme of complementarity between the AU and the UN and to undertake the functions cited in the table above, the ASF “shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the UN and its agencies, other relevant IOs as well as with national authorities and NGOs” (PSC Protocol, Art. 13(5)).

Although the original timeline of the establishment of ASF has not been met, its outcomes exceeded the prospects (AU, 2006a). The progress was not only limited to most African regions but there have also been many promising developments on the continental project as a whole (Franke, 2009). However, other researchers have different views, such as Marshall (2009) who argued that the ASF seems to be unable to react purposefully to scenario five or six (Table 2, above). Williams (2009a) also considered that the ASF faces a range of technical and political challenges, such as the lack of operational-level command and control – due to the fact that there is no instrument between the AUPSC Directorate and the ASF brigades - the lack of financial resources and poor commitment on the part of
member states. Indeed - and as will be seen in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 - there has always been a need for troops and their equipment in the AU’s missions which indicates that an effective ASF requires very high levels of African inter-state cooperation.

*The Panel of the Wise*

The Panel of Wise was officially inaugurated in December 2007. It is made up of five highly respected African personalities from various parts of the society and who have made past contributions to peace, security, and development on the continent (PSC Protocol, Art. 13(4)). In fact, the Panel can play an important role not only in the prevention of conflict but also in advising and supporting the AUPSC and the Commission once disputes have erupted, mediating and supervising agreements. For example, the Panel has engaged with several political crises, including those in Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Zimbabwe (Williams, 2011a). It is built on the key roles of prominent personalities, such as Mandela and Nyerere, who were extremely useful in armed conflict situations where massive violations of fundamental human rights were committed. Certainly, their mediating role allowed the signing on the 28th August, 2000 of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi (Curtis, 2003; Peen, 2012). As a result of the agreement the AMIB was created and deployed in 2003 (AU, 2003b).

In other instances, thanks to the role of mediation - which is in fact a well-established tradition in Africa - Kenya witnessed the intervention of the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the reconciliation process between the parties in the conflict which resulted from disagreement over elections in early 2008 (Brown, 2009). Indubitably, due to Africa’s respect for elders and influential figures such as the aforementioned personalities, the Panel has the ability to intervene and reconcile parties and promote peace and security.

*Military Staff Committee*

In theory, the Military Staff Committee is established to advise the Council on the military dimensions of its initiatives (PSC Protocol, Art. 13(8)). It meets as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the PSC. The Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of Defence Staff of the members in order to “discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa” (PSC Protocol, Art. 13(10)). For instance, immediately after its inception the first decision of the AU was to allow the deployment of 3,500 military and civilian personnel for the AMIB in April 2003 (AU, 2003b), followed in the subsequent year by the AMIS in June 2004 (AU, 2004b) and the AMISOM in March 2007 (AU,
2007a). As will be seen from Chapter 4, 5 and 6 in regard to the case studies of this thesis, despite the huge challenges the AU was able to deploy the above missions in the shadow of the reluctance of the UN and other international actors.

The Peace Fund

Subsequent to the creation of the AU’s institutional security framework, African leaders pledged “to take all necessary measures to strengthen common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them discharge their respective mandates effectively” (AU, 2000). Accordingly, the Peace Fund was established with the aim of providing the financial resources for the work of the PSC, in particular peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security (PSC Protocol, Art. 21(1)). It operates under the AUC and is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the AU, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from member states and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities (PSC Protocol, Art. 21(1)).

Since the founding of the AU, the Peace Fund received 6% allocation from the regular budget of the Union. Nevertheless, the AU’s member states seemed aware that their contribution had to rise significantly to support the efforts for peace, security and stability. They asked the Commission to take the necessary preparatory steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6 to 12% (AU, 2009b). Consequently, the AU decided to increase the percentage of the regular budget transferred to the African Peace Fund. However, in view of the fact that the increase will unfold through increases of two percentage points every year, it was going to be entirely realized in 2012 (Williams, 2011a). Although this increase may contribute to the AU’s efforts in conflict management, it will not be sufficient to deploy and sustain the current peace support operations such as the ones in Somalia and Darfur (UN, 2010a).

Indeed, the lack of financial resources is considered by many scholars as the main obstacle to the effectiveness of the AU (Murithi, 2005; Williams, 2006a; Mwanasali, 2008). This reflects the fact that not enough funding is emblematic of member states’ general unwillingness to provide the Union with adequate financial funds. While twelve African states46 pay regularly their contributions in full and on time, they also encourages other

46 Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Ethiopia, Libya, Namibia, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Swaziland, Senegal and South Africa.
member states to do so and only five member states have continued paying their dues which represents 75% of the AU’s budget with each of these five contributing 15 percent (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). Libya also paid the dues of other member states, raising its effective contribution to somewhere between 20 to 25% of the overall total (interview with Libyan diplomat, 29/6/2012). It can be observed that the recent political upheaval and changes in the Arab world, in particular in Egypt and Libya will have an incidence on the future contributions of these two countries to the AU’s budget. In particular, it appears that 49 other African countries contribute only 25% of the AU’s budget; and most of them are unable to pay the outstanding amount of their pledged commitments. For instance, most of the AU’s members do not contribute financially when funds are urgently needed to face African conflicts through the deployment of missions. Even though some initiatives were taken by the AU, in general the institution was unable to ensure viable, foreseeable, and flexible funding for its peace keeping and conflict management missions.

According to the UN Secretary-General Report, “To date, African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council continue to be funded primarily through voluntary contributions from international partners” (UN, 2010a: 11). Indeed - and as will be shown in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 - the AU, in similar fashion to its predecessor, would not be able to carry out its missions without the external support either from IOs such as the UN, the EU and NATO or from individual states such as the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Italy Canada, Norway, Japan, Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark.

However, it should be noted that the AU is taking important measures to secure sustainable, predictable and flexible financing to undertake its peace operations. For instance, the AU has been looking for various methods in order to encourage the mobilisation of private funds or by partnership between the public and private sectors. Others forms of initiatives consist of developing regional resources by African economic communities so to build local resources for the coming operationalization of the ASF. Moreover, discussions are taking place between the League of Arab States and the AU on creating an Afro-Arab peace facility to enhance the AU’s efforts in managing conflicts (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). If this becomes a reality and receives significant contributions, it would represent a major addition to and recalibration of the African Union’s resource base (UN, 2010a).

47 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa
2.12 The Relationship between the AU and the UN

The Envisaged Partnership of Cooperation with the UN under the AU’s Constitutional Framework

In view of the fact that the UN has been involved in either intrastate or interstate conflicts in African continent since its creation in 1945, the AU considered this global organisation as a critical partner in its overall peace and security architecture. According to Article 14(1) of the AUCA, “the PSC shall cooperate and work closely with the UNSC, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

However, the adoption of the AUCA’s Article 4(h) which gives the Union the right to intervene even without authorisation from the UN raises essential questions pertinent to international law, especially regarding the compatibility of the Act with long-established notions such as the main provisions on the use of force included in article 2(4) and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Additionally, the founding of the PSC raises concerns since it is unclear whether or not this body is meant to have the primacy over for keeping international peace and security and legitimating interventions, which was previously reserved to the UNSC. The concerns are apparent when one examines the legal documents of the AU and the practice until now. Therefore, it is important within this context to understand the basis of the relationship between this new organisation and the UN in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

The Similarities and Differences between the AUPSC and the UNSC

Despite the fact that the AUPSC was formed in a similar fashion to the UNSC (Maluwa, 2003), its prerogatives and powers are more clearly defined than those enumerated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Levitt, 2005). While the UN Charter gives the SC “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”\(^{48}\), the AUPSC got extended powers due to the fact that it is the “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” (PSC Protocol, Art. 9(1)). Other differences between the two bodies can be seen in their composition, organisation and working methods. For instance, in relation to composition, prerogatives and powers, the AUPSC is fundamentally different form the UNSC. While there is a distinction between the member states of the UNSC (e.g. permanent and non-permanent members), member states of the AUPSC are elected as discussed above “on the basis of equal rights” with each member possessing one vote.

\(^{48}\) Article 24(1) of the UN Charter
Another important differentiation is that there is no right of veto within the AUPSC while the concept of consensus represents the main referent in seeking resolutions (PSC Protocol, Art. 8 (12). Therefore, the AUPSC due to his prerogatives and given authority is perfectly able to make decisions without having recourse to potential threats or veto. In spite the similarity between the two institutions regarding holding closed meetings⁴⁹, the AUPSC – contrary to the conventional practice of the UNSC – prevents any of its members that is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by PSC from participation either in the discussion or in the decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation (PSC Protocol, Art. 7(3)). Notably, this provision is aimed at enhancing neutrality and impartiality in deliberations which would otherwise be at risk of being tainted by an influence of an AUPSC member state in pursuit of its national interests.

In relation to the similarities between the two organs, it can be said that the key similarity is found in member states’ obligation to respect the decisions of the two bodies. Member states’ obligations under the UN Charter regarding the SC⁵⁰ are similar to those of AU member states’ commitment to “agree to accept and implement the decisions of the PSC, in accordance with the CA” (PSC Protocol, Art. 7 (3). Another similarity related to the compatibility of the functioning of the AUPSC with the UN Charter and general international law is the fact that there is no incompatibility between the role played by the AUPSC and International Law or the UN Charter. Indeed, the AU - as with its predecessor the OAU - adopts and adheres to the principles of the UN and other international and regional organisations (e.g. the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA and OAS) such as peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, non-interference and respect for borders (AU, 2000).

However, a sharp contrast between the AU and other international and regional organisations lies in the adoption of the AU to Article 16(I) which devolves to itself “primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa” and articles 4(h) and (j) which give the AU the right to intervene in member states in respect of grave circumstances even without the consent of that member state or even authorisation from the UN (Levitt, 2005; Powell, 2005; Mwanasali, 2008; Williams, 2009a). As will be discussed further below, these new norms not only contradicted the non-interference principle of its predecessor but also challenged collective customary laws of non-interference. Moreover, the right to intervene under the AU’s constitutional framework

⁴⁹ See article 48 of the UNSC - Provisional Rules of Procedure, UN, New York, 1983, S/96/Rev.7 and article 9 of Protocol Relating to the Establishment of AUPSC.
⁵⁰ Articles 24(1) and 25 of the UN Charter
clashes in some ways with the interdiction to use of force included in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In this respect, the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion sees humanitarian intervention authorized outside the UNSC as unlawful (Roberts, 2000). Although, this contradiction has legal or lawful perspectives and that it could be an important subject to investigate by students of international law, it is pertinent to refer at least to this conflict and its potential repercussions for the relationship between universalism (embodied by the UN) and regionalism (embodied by the AU) in the peace and security domain, which is one of the main elements of this thesis.

**Clashes between the UN and the AU’s Norms**

From the discussion above, two sets of contradictions between the AUCA and the UN’s Charter are evident. The first is related to Article 16 of the PSC protocol which specifically states that the AU or its PSC have the prime responsibility for keeping the peace, security and stability in Africa. Unexpectedly enough, the same protocol, in the Preamble and in Article 17 recognise the primacy of the UNSC regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. Such apparently ambiguous provisions seem confusing with regard to the intended aim of Africans and on the role of the PSC comparatively with the role the UNSC. Hence, the question is whether the founding of the AUPSC was implied to take over the long-established primacy of the UNSC or was only established to provide secondary support whilst maintaining the primacy of the UNSC. It is genuinely puzzling for many observers, and consequently needs a close examination.

The second set of inconsistencies is found between Articles 4 of the AUCA and Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter. While the former authorizes the AUPSC to intervene in member states in instances of grave circumstances even without an authorisation from the UN, the latter obviously prohibits states and international and regional organisations from engaging in an enforcement action without UNSC authorization. According to the CA, the AU does not need UNSC authorization prior to decide to deploy troops or launching peace and security interventions in Africa.

It should be noted here that there is increased debate regarding the reluctance or inability of the UN to prevent humanitarian disasters and its unwillingness to authorise other actors to do so. This cautious behaviour induced many international and regional organisations to intervene without its authorisation (e.g. NATO in Yugoslav and Iraq and ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone). Despite the lack of respect for some articles of the UN Charter by the above mentioned organisations which justify their interventions as legitimate

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51 See UN Charter, Art. 53.
actions to prevent human tragedies, the UN still insists on respecting the principles as stated in its Charter. For example, it was stated in the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, that “We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51” (UN, 2004j) which prohibits the use of force by states without UNSC authorisation. According to Lang (2009: 12) “[n]ot only does this report insist that this Charter provision should be kept sacrosanct, it insists even “interpreting” it in new ways – an odd understanding of a legal role, to say the least”. Moreover, the same report insists that authorisation from the UN should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations undertaken by regional organisations (UN, 2004j).

Indeed, the UN’s emphasis on respecting the principles as stated in its Charter has created tension and challenges between the UN and other organisations in the peace and security domain. In this regard, the discussion between Dr. O’Driscoll and a NATO senior official lends additional support to this argument. The official recognised that NATO will face real challenges especially when working with the UN concerning the extent of its authority and jurisdiction in respect to the use of force for keeping international peace and security (O’Driscoll and Lang, 2013). In fact, the right of using force to protect civilians has been a hot topic since the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. In this respect, many scholars consider that the emergence of the responsibility to protect approach was a result to the NATO intervention in Kosovo (Alex, 2005; Lang, 2009; Marks and Cooper, 2010). Lang (2009:11-12) for example, argued that the Responsibility to Protect

“arose, at least in part, from the frustration of many that while a serious humanitarian disaster was developing in Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council would not authorise military action, which led to NATO undertaking an air war to coerce the Yugoslav leadership to halt its action against the Albanian/Muslim community”.

In the African context, the failure of the UN to prevent genocides in Rwanda, Somalia and Darfur convinced African leaders to adopt the right of intervention in order to stop war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity even without authorisation from the UN (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). Indeed, the adoption of this nascent norm can be considered as another important factor that encouraged the UN to reform its institutional framework particularly in the peace and security domain. In fact, this argument is supported by a former UN official who stated that;
“the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo led to many calls from all parts, political leaders, human rights and civil liberties organisations and academics for reform of the United Nations system and the AU’s adoption of the right of intervention in 2000 played an important role by inciting the UN to adopt the responsibility to protect in its 2005 summit as a new doctrine in contemporary and modern international relations” (Interview, 09/06/2012).

All these developments had consequences at the level of the UN. Effectively, on the 28th April, 2006 the UNSC adopted a very important resolution (Res.1674), where it is explicitly emphasised on the responsibility to protect. Such a decision was exceptional since it reaffirmed for the first time the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In addition, the new principles were confirmed by UNSC Resolutions 167952 and 170653 - although these were directed at the Darfur crisis, they later became a test of the new doctrine’s application.

Whilst the UN has adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, it insists that states or international and regional organisations cannot take any military action without its authorisation. In this regard, the Chief Political Affairs Section of the UN delegation to the AU, Dr. Abdel-Kader Haireche, stated:

“the rise of the involvement of African organisations (either by the regional one such as IGAD and ECOWAS or the continual one, the AU) in managing conflicts has been hailed and welcomed by the UN especially where they can deliver vast services. However, their activities must be conducted in a way consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN. Additionally, the relationship between the UN and regional organisations (in terms of matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security) must be governed by Chapter VIII” (Interview 21/11/2012).

This highlights the deep contradiction between the UN’s rules and Article 4 of the AUCA. However, the deliberate option of Africans member states not to consider UNSC authorization to exercise the right of intervention is neither negligence nor a simple understanding that the authorization from the UNSC would be automatic, as revealed

during an interview with the Head of the AUPSC Secretariat (Interview, 21/11/2012) and the Legal Officer of the Union (Interview, 13/11/2012). When questioned about the right of intervention under the CA and its dependence on the UNSC, the Head of the PSC Secretariat, Dr. Kambudzi, responded in a very categorical way by denying the fact. For him, there were no requirements in this respect, whether in the CA or in the PSC Protocol. Dr. Kambudzi explained that “It can be observed that the UNSC did not give a full attention to African conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s, and the evidence of that is its inability to prevent the Rwanda genocide. Therefore, we [AU] cannot rely fully on that organ and wait for the UNSC to give us the green light to intervene. Thus, we [AU] will take the responsibility and act by ourselves” (Interview, 21/11/2012).

The interviewee simply did not see why it would be necessary to seek authorization due to the fact that that “the UNSC system is inefficient, an obsolete organ, unable to reform its mechanisms” (Interview, 14/11/2012). In contrast, “the AUPSC offered an updated system in terms of conflict management in Africa, and consequently, there is no need any more to make a request from the UNSC for an eventual authorization to intervene in a conflict zone” (Interview, 21/11/2012). It is noticeable that the Legal Officer of the AU shares the same opinion. Effectively, the same question was asked to Mr. Fafre Camara, the Legal Officer, who responded that “in fact, the CA does not include such a requirement” (Interview, 13/11/2012). It appears then that the decision not to include the requirement for UNSC authorization was deliberate.

Similarly, another senior official from the Legal Counsel of the AU stated that the decision not to include such conditions was a deliberate decision by the AU member states following the UN’s inability to deal with the human tragedies in Somalia and Rwanda; thus the AU opted not to stay under conventional rules and systems which had failed in Africa, or to follow the policies of powerful states (Interview with a senior AU official, 13/11/2012). This shows that the decision of African member states while giving the right of intervene to the AU is not to be subjected to the UN Charter, neither to the UNSC, due to the long process it will take and a clear lack of trust in its out-dated approach to crises. Another AU Commission senior official stated as well that the AU cannot wait for the UNSC authorisation adding that “if the Africans have to wait for the UN resolutions, most people in conflict zones will die” (Interview with a Senior Official 22/11/2012).

According to what was revealed by the officials from the AU’s Office of the Legal Counsel and the PSC, when African leaders decided to include the right of effective intervention, they had the deliberate intention of adopting a role which was previously
reserved to the UNSC. Despite the fact that such a decision might clash with the UN Charter, the reprehensible peacemaking record of the UNSC in African conflicts caused the AU’s member states to be less submissive to the UNSC powers and to breach the provisions of the UN Charter. As confirmed by various interviewees, the AU openly claimed primacy over the UNSC despite the contradiction with the terms of the UN Charter which are supposedly binding upon all UN members. Nevertheless, such claims by AU senior officials are still to be confirmed on the ground and therefore this study would eventually show, through analysis and evaluation of the AU in different conflict zones, whether the AU had really rejected the primary role attributed to the UNSC by the UN Charter, or the seemingly defiant clause was only introduced to help or complement the UNSC as a subordinate body. Furthermore, the study will investigate the implications of such apparent contradictions in the relationship between the AU and the UN.

2.13 The AU and the EU

Despite the fact that the relationship between the EU and African organizations such as the OAU in the area of development cooperation started in the 1970s (Adebajo and Whiteman, 2012), the outset of the new millennium witnessed a dramatic broadening in this relationship particularly after the establishment of the AU. Indeed, this cooperation has evolved and diversified, particularly in the peace and security field. In fact, the action of the EU in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution is taking place within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Through these institutions, the EU has signed a number of treaties and agreements with the AU in order to achieve peace and security in Africa such as the EU adoption of a Common Position on the Prevention, Management and Resolution of violent conflicts in Africa on 26 January 2004\(^{54}\); establishing the African Peace Facility in March 2004 in response to the request made by the African leaders at the AU’s 2003 Maputo Summit\(^{55}\); the adoption of the Action Plan for ESDP in Africa in November 2004\(^{56}\); the Council of the EU adopted also the EU Strategy for Africa, entitled *Towards a Strategic*


\(^{55}\) The APF has been considered as a shift in approach on the part of the EU inasmuch as it transfers funds earmarked for development of peace and security initiatives.

Partnership in 2005; establishing a Delegation of the EU to the AU in 2007 and finally in November 2010: the third Africa-EU summit held in Tripoli, Libya. The above treaties reflect the fact that the EU has always been willing to work with the AU and support its conflict management efforts. Nevertheless, there are different perspectives regarding the nature and motivations of the EU’s support. In reality, many researchers consider that this support is not to help Africans but to gain economic and political interests for the EU as a global actor. Franke (2009: 259) argued that “the contemporary support by the West is driven by strategic consideration as many states are competing for political influence and access economic resources on the continent”. Similarly, Olsen (2009: 245) argued that “the development of a military conflict management policy has been and still is motivated by European concerns and European interests […] only secondly is it motivated by concerns for Africa. EU policy towards Africa was based primarily on the interests of the member states (Keane, 2004; Farrell, 2005; Sicurelli, 2008). Other researchers have argued that external actors (Westerners and not Africans) generally choose the time, the place and the way African solutions are applied due to the fact that Western help, whether financial, logistical or military, requires the fulfilment of conditions and Africans have to accept and implement strategic, operational and tactical requests of their backers (Diedre, 2008; Franke, 2009).

These perspectives regarding the EU’s support to the AU was shared by a number of African analysts who considered that the aim of the European support either individually or under the umbrella of the EU is not to help Africans but to achieve their own interests and to compete with other actors such as the US, China and Russia who see Africa as a source of raw materials. For these African analysts, the best evidence for their conclusions was the West’s swift intervention in Libya (in less than 33 days) to protect their interests in this oil-rich country. Therefore the concerns were not the safety of the Libyan people. If this was the case, why was there a clear reluctance to act spontaneously in other places such as Syria and Somalia (interviews with African analysts, 25/5/2012, 21/6/2012 and 9/11/2012)

However, some senior EU officials have a different perspective. For example, Colonel Sandy (military advisor to the EU delegation to the AU) and Dr. Batic (political advisor to

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58 On 19 March 2011, NATO began a military intervention in Libya to implement UNSC Resolution 1973. The resolution was taken in response to events during the Libyan conflict which erupted on 17 February 2011.
the EU delegation to the AU), refuted the suggestion that the EU’s motive for intervention in Libya – while simultaneously reluctant to do so in Somalia and Syria – was due to the fact that Libya has many natural resources and the others are poor (Interviews, 14/11/2012). For them, the EU had been providing huge financial and logistical support to help the Libyan people and achieve peace and prosperity not only in Africa but in many places around the globe. However, they recognised that the EU has the right to choose the best option when its interests are under threat (Interviews, 14/11/2012).

Indeed, many scholars such as Jean (2004), Bariagaber (2008), De Coning (2007) and Brosig (2010) consider the EU to be an important actor in achieving peace and economic development not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world, regardless of its own interests. In this regard, Carbone (2013: 122) argued in his analysis of the EU’s support for the AU through the APF that “the APF has gradually turned into, albeit slowly and somewhat problematically, an important component of the EU’s comprehensive approach to security (and development)”. In fact, and as will be seen in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it seems that the ethical responsibility to help poor people either in security or development matters is more relevant in explaining the motivations behind the EU’s support to the AU.

2.14 Conclusion

The main purpose of this exploratory chapter was to understand the genesis of the new organisation and its capacity as a security actor. The chapter began by reviewing the existing literature on the role of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts since the end of World War II to determine whether they were effective or not and what are the main conditions for their effectiveness and the causes for their failure. The findings of this debate are very important in developing a more systematic theoretical framework not only to get a proper understanding of the AU, but also to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts in general. The second section was devoted to the analysis of the background of establishing the AU. In this regard, it was evident that the development of this institution was based on a clear preference for avoiding past mistakes.

The quest for African unity had begun much earlier when the Pan-African unity was utilised as a political tool and ideology to liberate the continent from decolonisation in the 19th century. The chapter then focused on the causes of the replacement of the OAU by the AU and what are the constitutional and institutional differences between them. In this

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59 This has been argued by several African and European academics and scholars mentioned previously.
respect, it is clear that the AU differs fundamentally from the OAU in terms of philosophical ideology, ambition, institutional structure, constitutional framework and strategies. In fact, this argument is supported by many researchers such as Engel and Porto (2010: 3) who considered this transformation as a “decisive step which gave the new organisation a radically new vision and mission”. It marked “a new era in institution-building in postcolonial Africa” (Maluwa, 2003:157). The AUCA “provides for more robust engagement and much greater scope than its predecessor in dealing with both inter- and intra-state conflict and signs thereof” (Cilliers and Sturman, 2006: 102).

Although there was a contradiction in section four between the new norms of the AU and the UN Charter, the AU recognizes the primacy of the UNSC over the maintenance of international peace and security and maintains that cooperation with the UN and other actors such as the EU is extremely important in this regard. Indeed, it seems clear from this chapter that the founders of the AU were keen to avoid the weaknesses of the OAU by adopting new norms and creating new institutions which could face the challenges of peace and security in the new millennium. However, the question here is to what extent has the AU been effective in implementing its new norms on the ground? The subsequent chapters are dedicated to answering this question.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

The AU’s Constitutive Act provides legitimate bases for the AU’s interventions in interstate and intra-state conflict. It also provides its founders and supporters with confidence about its ability in managing the variety of conflicts occurring in Africa. However, the reality on the ground shows that implementing the AU’s policies is more complex than expected. Thus, despite its numerous interventions in conflicts, the outcomes of the AU’s missions were either considered as positive or judged unsatisfactory. It can also be added that the missions presented difficulties on the ground as well as real challenges. Therefore, the study considers the effectiveness of the AU after more than a decade of its creation. In fact, the capacity of international and regional organisations in achieving peace and security relies on their capability to work collectively in order to do the right things, at the right times, in the right ways and using the right means. However, there are various challenges facing the institutions when it comes to measuring peace operations. For example, it is essential to know how effectiveness can be defined, then to identify the difficulties which might appear when making evaluations.

However - as discussed in the introduction - researchers looking at peace operations generally focus on ‘problem-solving theory’. Therefore their studies are centred on developing adequate plans for conflicts management and resolutions (Paris, 2000; Tainter, 2000; Bellamy, 2004). The literature in this field has focused on the conditions that influence the effectiveness of peace operations. The aims of these researchers have been to find out what did and did not work but not necessarily how or why the objectives were met\(^6\). Even if there are some studies which looked at whether peace operations keep the peace or not, there are actually several drawbacks in their evaluations, as will be shown later. This does not imply that the literature has not developed a significant base of knowledge in relation to the effectiveness of peace operations. However, the current study provides a number of improvements to address the limitations of previous studies. Accordingly, the present research focuses not only on whether or not the AU’s peace operations have a positive effect, but also on providing a systematic framework which could be generalised for research and practice on peace operations beyond the specific context examined herein. This study concentrates chiefly on defining ‘effectiveness’ and

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\(^6\) Authors such as Otunnu and Doyle (1998) have sought to understand the conditions associated with peace operations’ effectiveness in order to prevent a repeat of failure or to improve future operations.
the problems associated with measuring it, and by discussing aspects of broader circumstances in which peace missions are conducted in addition to the eventual intervening or explanatory variables.

In order to achieve these aims, the first section of this chapter gives a definition and clear standards for evaluating the effectiveness of peace operations. In addition to the conceptual standards for the effectiveness of peace operation, the study also provides a number of indicators corresponding to those standards as well as several key elements which are important to any evaluation of peace operations. Subsequently, the framework is designed by focusing on the particularity of wider aims, by developing more relevant questions linked to those aims as well as indicators which can be measured in order to give accurate answers to those questions. The second section of this chapter discusses the features of the conflict environment which influence the effectiveness of the AU’s peace operations. The third section is dedicated to introducing the case studies which form the empirical chapters of this thesis.

3.2 Defining Effectiveness

The first step is to outline a specific definition for ‘effectiveness’. According to Zurn (1998: 618), the regime’s effectiveness is now a “driving force in the analysis of international relations”. Determining what constitutes ‘effectiveness’ in peace and security missions is an indispensable factor to build knowledge with regard to the elements linked with those conditions, necessary to make the right policy choices and for theoretical development (Druckman and Diehl 2010). Regan (1996) also believed that, in order to make ‘effectiveness’ operational, it is indispensable to first understand what is meant by the term, and then it will be possible to evaluate alternative strategies available to decision-makers. Therefore, it will certainly not be easy to gauge ‘effectiveness’, without first acknowledging the existence of epistemological problems. Despite the importance of these concerns, a lot of attention has been given to the independent or predictor variables (inputs), (e.g. Kirchhoff, 1977; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Ratner, 1995; and Hasenclever et al, 1996) and rather less focus has been given to the dependent variable (outcomes). Additionally, the focus has been on the factors expected to influence the effectiveness of peace operations rather than the criteria of assessing that effectiveness.

In general, the Oxford English Dictionary (2009) defined ‘effectiveness’ as “powerful in effect; producing a notable effect”. However, such a meaning does not specify the ‘direction’ of the effect, either positive or negative. Another entry to ‘effectiveness’
according to the same dictionary considered it as “the quality of being effective” (OED 2009). It is also important to distinguish ‘effectiveness’ from ‘efficacy’, that is, the first term does not imply producing a required effect. Therefore if effectiveness is mainly concerned about producing a remarkable effect, then it is essential to determine the objectives which the AU is seeking to ‘affect’.

It is important to note here that the effectiveness of international and regional organisations can be explained and evaluated from different perspectives. In other words, the effectiveness of these institutions can be measured against their economic activities (e.g. interdependent trade), their environmental cooperation (e.g. reduce gas emissions and climate change) or their collective response to achieve peace and security (e.g. managing interstate or intrastate conflicts, facing terrorism, or the proliferation of non-conventional weapons). This means that the objectives of these institutions are different depending on the field, which in turn requires different criteria to explain their effectiveness. This variation is not only limited to the different activities where these institutions are usually involved, but there is also a distinction between the objectives of these organisations even when they are involved in the one of the categories mentioned above.

Accordingly, the objectives of peace operations are generally different due to different responsibilities associated with these interventions. Therefore, the effectiveness of peace operations should not be evaluated according to generic criteria applied to a wide range of fields of action. For instance, the tasks of peace operations in managing interstate conflicts are different from those of managing intrastate conflicts. Using the same standards for effectiveness across the two types of conflict will lead analysts to miss operation-specific types of effectiveness or ineffectiveness or overlook the particular circumstances encountered. Consequently, theorizing about the effectiveness of peace operations requires a clear definition of that term as well as determining the major aims established for different types of peace operations.

The fact that a specific meaning of ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the role of international and regional organisations in peace operations is important to the process of attempting to assess the efforts of these institutions in managing conflicts. Scholars have proposed a variety of definitions and benchmarks to explain the effectiveness of individual peace operations and to determine if a particular type of operation is more effective than another.

Most scholars who assessed the role of international and regional organisations considered that the term ‘effectiveness’ generally represents the objective of a measure to be achieved,
so it links the result of a process to its original aims. Consequently, such a direct approach has been very popular among analysts who used it to evaluate a large number of institutions. For example, Elgström and Smith (2006: 6), when evaluating the EU’s role in international politics, argued that the impact of the EU can be seen through the lens of role theory as its “(in)ability to achieve desired effects”. Through the use of the concept of effectiveness, impact will be assessed with regard to whether or not the EU reached its objective. Young (2006: 190) argued that this might be expressed as the release of ‘concrete results’. Similarly, Laatikainen and Smith (2006:10) defined effectiveness (in their evaluation of the EU’s role at the UN) as the extent to which the EU achieved its objectives. Outcomes are thus a primary factor of evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional organisations.

In fact, focusing on the purpose of the mission and the extent to which this was fulfilled is the most common definition of effectiveness in the peace operations literature (Underdal, 2002; and Gutner and Thompson, 2010). For instance, Sherman (2009) considered that any intervention by an organisation is said to be effective if the outcomes match the goals and that measuring the effectiveness of an intervention requires clear, explicit and quantified objectives. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) stated that in order for an intervention to be effective, it is necessary for it to achieve its stated (or implicit) purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so on the basis of its outputs (OECD-DAC, 2007). Researchers such as Bratt (1997) adopted the same approach by comparing mission outcomes with mandates. For De Carvalho and Aune (2010), effectiveness is whether outcomes are defined and met, while other authors see effectiveness as the measurement of organisational performance relative to goals (Kirchhoff, 1977; Ratner, 1995; Sambanis, 2000). From these perspectives, the effectiveness of any peace operation undertaken by international or regional organisations can be determined by matching the goals of the mission (as specified in its mandate) and the extent to which they have been accomplished on the ground.

Indeed, this approach has the benefit of staying responsive regardless of the variations between different types of operations or sets of goals. For example, the goals of traditional peacekeeping are to monitor a peace agreement between parties in conflict or to generate the right circumstances contributing to positive outcomes of a political arrangement by the conflicting parties; whereas the aims of peace-building operations are to strengthen the political and socio-economic structures after the war. Accordingly, it is therefore inappropriate to assess different kinds of missions through the use of similar benchmarks.
due to the fact that each operation aims to achieve specific objectives according to its own circumstances. The assessment of a mission based on how it fulfilled the terms of its mandate overcome such a problem.

Although the mandate fulfilment can be used as a standard of effectiveness - particularly when it is clearly drafted - it cannot be the only way to explain and evaluate the effectiveness of particular missions, nor is it sufficiently precise to be useful as an analytical instrument for systematic empirical research due to a variety of factors. Firstly, as Heldt (2002:110) argued, “sometimes mandates are vague, complex, and subject to change during time”. The lack of clarity of some mandates leaves considerable room for the appearance of different opinions or interpretations in relation to what the substance of the mandate actually is and how best to enforce them.

Defining the goals or even a clear mandate of some interventions has proven to be complex: in some operations, such as the Multinational Force in Beirut, the coalition partners operated with different mandates (Paul et al, 1997). Indeed, and as will be seen in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the mandates of the AU’s missions were not clear and changed several times according to progress (or the lack thereof) on the ground. Secondly, focusing on goals of mandates and to what extent they have been accomplished on the ground “ignores the common purposes peacekeeping operations share regardless of mandate including the limitation of armed conflict and conflict resolution” (Alex et al, 2005: 176). In fact, several factors need to be taken into account, such as the internal process within an organisation, timeframe of implementation and unintended consequences. Effectiveness should not include only the extent to which the intervention’s goals have been accomplished, but also the unexpected and unplanned consequences of such activities (Druckman, and Paul, 1997; Pushkina, 2006).

Another shortcoming which might arise when relying mainly on the mandate as a benchmark for assessing a mission is that it will not necessarily inform us about what was really achieved on the ground. For instance, in the case of a ceasefire monitoring mandate, a mission might find itself in a totally different situation, closer to genocide than anything manageable. Assessing the mission according to the mandate might misguide an observer who would potentially conclude that the mission was a success since it was not supposed to deal with an unexpected genocide. Accordingly, the possibility to encounter such a situation should make scholars think about adding other criteria for evaluating a peace operation, and not rely only on the mandate.
Another approach to gauge the effectiveness of international and regional organisations’ peace operations is to consider the specific achievements of the operations such as reduction in the number of people killed, the number of people fed, peace agreement achieved, and prevention of the spread of the conflict and so on. For example, some authors consider that reducing the number of killing people or saving lives is a justification for intervention and thereby a measure of its effectiveness. Seybolt (2007) argued that an intervention can be considered effective when it saves lives. In the same vein, several other authors suggest that a criterion for measuring the effectiveness of an intervention consists of considering the number of lives saved (Hanschet et al, 1994; Regan, 1996; Paul and Druckman 2000; Schumacher, 2007). Additionally, the reduction of human suffering is another crucial element and a primary goal of peace missions (Birikorang, 2009). Nevertheless, considering a peace operation effective despite the limited number of tasks fulfilled is still an open question as the meaning given to effectiveness becomes relative.

Another definition of effectiveness is linked to the ability of the intervention to limit the armed conflict and promote conflict resolution (Diehl, 1994). Effectiveness of peace operations must be based on whether stopping the fighting or resolving the underlying dispute is achieved (Regan, 1996). Notwithstanding, the latter approach has been criticised on the basis that it requires a greater number of peacekeeping missions than rationally can be provided (Johansen, 1994; Braithwaite, 2012). The fact is that these operations are not meant to deal only with such issues; this approach simultaneously altered the basic principle of peacekeeping and failed to see most of the benefits of these missions (Johansen, 1994). In fact, the goals of peacekeeping operations are not limited to stopping the war or solving the underlying conflict, they also have other objectives such as understanding the root causes of the conflict, the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of appropriate circumstances to provide humanitarian assistance and deal with severe problems of starvation.

It is evident from the above discussion that there is considerable debate among scholars about what effectiveness means and how it can be measured. It is also clear that despite the importance of these definitions in determining and evaluating effectiveness, there are drawbacks for each of them which potentially affects the findings or inferences of any process of assessing peace operations. Moreover, it is obvious that the effectiveness of the internal process - an important aspect of international and regional organisations’ performance in peace operations - has been neglected within the existing literature. Assessing the effectiveness of these institutions does not imply whether or not they
produced clear outcomes or they had reached their aims. Evaluating the internal dynamics of a body is also essential to identify the link between process and outcomes.

Accordingly, it is necessary to develop a theoretically informed research programme based on management and process effectiveness, which might subsequently be related to previous analyses of output and outcome performance (Lipson, 2010). The latter argued in this regard that “If we are interested not simply in outcomes, but in the effect of organizational performance on those outcomes, then it will be necessary to direct attention to process performance as well” (Lipson, 2010: 275). Similarly, Gutner and Thompson (2010: 237) maintained that “studying outcomes alone does not allow us to evaluate the contingent and relative nature of performance”.

In fact, many scholars such as Young (1991, 1994 and 2003), Helm, and Sprinz (1999) and Underdal (2002) have emphasised the importance of considering the internal process as an important aspect of measuring effectiveness; however, their focus was mainly on environmental and economic issues while less attention has been given to effectiveness in the security domain. Even if some scholars such as Lipson (2010) and Gutner and Thompson (2010) considered internal processes and outcomes simultaneously in their analysis of effectiveness in the security field, their focus was only on the UN. Thus, they did not offer adequate indicators for the measurement of the effectiveness of other organisations’ internal processes.

Regarding the AU, most studies focus on the description of a process rather than its documented effects (Maluwa, 2003; Jean, 2004; Douglas 2004). Therefore, there is a noticeable deficiency of systematic assessments of the AU’s internal process and on the way it might have an effect on the conflict management’s outcomes. Accordingly, this study, - in a similar fashion to Lipson (2010) and Gutner and Thompson (2010) - argues that “effectiveness” must be understood as both process and outcomes.

According to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department, a mission is to plan, prepare, manage and direct peacekeeping operations to effectively fulfil their mandates which are authorised by the Security Council (UN, 2010b). Consequently, the UN formally determines a number of peace operations’ objectives: firstly, planning, preparing and managing UN peace operations. Secondly, fulfilling effectively the terms of the mandates and thirdly achieving a sustainable peace. These goals are not limited to the UN’s peace operations but they are in general a strategy for all international and regional organisations. Thus, the effectiveness of any peace operation can be analysed in terms of
each of these goals. In other words, the analysis of the effectiveness should not focus only on the outcomes of the mission, the process is also important in defining the effectiveness of any peace operation. The major limitation of focusing on outcomes to measure the effectiveness of any organisation is that “researchers cannot know if problem solving is a result or a function of efficient and skilful behaviour on the part of IOs (its staff or member-states) or of sound institutional design” (Gutner and Thompson, 2010: 237).

Indeed, linking the internal process of an organisation with the outcome(s) of its mission on the ground can explain whether the effectiveness is attributed to the active labour of the mission on the ground or the active management by the headquarters of the institution. The present study considers in this regard that scholars should not differentiate between the effectiveness of staff at the organisation’s headquarters and the effectiveness of the mission on the ground. It considers that the role of the organisation’s staff and the role of the mission in the conflict zone are complementary to each other and that they reflect the overall effectiveness of the organisation in general.

Appropriate planning and good management of peace operations will likely lead to effective fulfilment of any mission objectives. Therefore, effectiveness, impact or performance might be theorised, calculated or measured at both the levels of process and outcomes. From this perspective, the current study defines the effectiveness of international and regional organisations’ peace operations not only by considering the outcomes and how they can be measured but also by considering the process of an organisation (See Figure 1).
Figure 3.1: Concentric Circles of Effectiveness from Process to Outcomes

According to the fact that process and outcomes are important aspects of the effectiveness and the performance of any operation, a number of scholars included them in defining and measuring the effectiveness of international and regional organisations’ peace operations. For example, Gutner and Thompson (2010) offered a good start by considering the effectiveness of international and regional organisations as the process which should lead to organisational aims, through examining the organisation’s underlying capability. Similarly, Lipson (2010: 256) defined the effectiveness as “An organization’s use of its resources, technology, and relationships with its organizational environment to achieve collective goals”. In similar fashion to the above definitions, the present study considers the effectiveness of peace operations as the ability of an organisation in using its resources, its prerogatives and its relationship with environmental factors in order to meet collective objectives. This formulation, which includes the basic ability of an institution within the definition of effectiveness, also holds the idea that effectiveness involves process and
outcomes. It also links the definition of effectiveness to the collective aims which will be
detailed later.

3.3 Ascertaining International and Regional Organisations Effectiveness in Peace
Operations
As mentioned in the introduction, analysing and assessing peace operations is far from an
easy task. In a majority of existing studies the assessment by evaluators, policymakers and
scholars depends on selecting one or more indicators of the effectiveness and then
applying them to one or more case studies. Despite the importance of these studies, their
focus on assessing peace operations in general and their neglect of the key elements which
are important to any evaluation of peace operations have led to conclusions which are
inaccurate, unreliable and subjective. The present researcher argues that these elements
(both conceptual and methodological) are important not only in defining effectiveness, but
also understanding them allows us to simplify the otherwise-complex assessment peace
operations in general. These key elements are outlined in the following sub-sections.

Who is the Intervener?
Although the subject of this study is well known, it is significant to refer to the fact that if
peace interventions are to be evaluated meaningfully; an important step to take is to
determine who constitutes the ‘intervener’. Effectively, there are a number of stakeholders
in peace operations such as individual states, coalitions of the willing, and regional or
international organisations (Alexet al, 2005; Druckman and Paul, 2010; Lipson, 2010).
Even though these different actors who make up the international community do share
some goals (e.g. saving lives, limiting violence or protecting human rights) each may have
different goals or generate different standards of effectiveness. For instance, the actors
listed have a number of objectives. One might seek to stop the fighting and prevent the
spreading of the conflict to new areas. Nongovernmental organisations are mainly
cconcerned about delivering aid assistance and helping refugees and displaced people.
Individual states have their own interests, which might not converge with those espoused
by other members of the international community. The latter also has its goals which are
related to international norms such as the peaceful settlement of conflicts, protection of
human rights and economic well-being. Meharg (2009:5) underlined the fact that “there
are no agree-upon metrics, benchmarks or indicators among stakeholders”, adding that
everyone uses a variety of mechanisms and instruments to calculate what really matters for
their organisation.
The fact that stakeholders might in some situations have common aims, such as the protection of populations and the prevention of conflicts, their interests are rarely fully convergent. Consequently, it is necessary to acknowledge that effectiveness is differently interpreted, depending on the stakeholders’ interests. Gutner and Thompson (2010) argued that evaluations of effectiveness will depend on the objectives fixed as a basis for assessing that effectiveness. The authors stated that

“Scholars can narrow ambiguous or contested missions and address the “eye of the beholder” problem by selecting specific objectives or considering effectiveness or performance from the perspective of a key constituency [...] Establishing a baseline is important because it is only against a particular set of objectives and in the context of a given timeframe that effectiveness or performance can be assessed” (Gutner and Thompson, 2010: 240).

Given the fact that different actors participate in managing conflicts and that their aims and perspectives might diverge, it is necessary for any study of peace operation evaluation to determine the stakeholder under the assessment. Accordingly, it is necessary to recognise that effectiveness is defined, analysed and evaluated in different ways according to which the stakeholder is and what are its objectives.

*Time Perspective: Short/Long-Term Perspectives in Evaluating IOs Effectiveness*

Defining and measuring the effectiveness of peace operations will also depend on the choice of an analyst in adopting a short or a long-term perspective (Heldt, 2002; Alex et al, 2005; Meharg, 2009; De Carvalho and Aune, 2010). In fact, the criteria of the effectiveness from a short-term perspective are different from the criteria from the long-term perspective. For instance, effectiveness from the short-term perspective can be conceptualised as the accomplishment of objectives that occur during the course of a mission (e.g. saving lives, assisting aid delivery, preventing the spread of the conflict, and implementing a ceasefire or signing a peace agreement).

However, the effectiveness of peace operations from a longer-term perspective can be measured by looking at conditions- such as the ability of institutional roles, financial requirements, human security issues, political structures and the strengthening of socio-economic structures for more than a few years, in some instances as long as decades (Druckman and Paul, 2010). In this regard, Alex et al (2005: 178) argued that “in some cases the requirements of short-term and long-term peace may be contradictory. In
territorial disputes, for instance, cantonment may provide the only means of securing an end to violence in the short term”.

Accordingly, since short- and long-term indicators of effectiveness are different, it is necessary to distinguish between the two when deciding to focus on one over the other. In the current study, the researcher adopts the short-term perspective in ascertaining the effectiveness of the AU due to the fact that the AU is still a relatively new organisation and consequently it cannot yet be evaluated from a long-term perspective.

*Types of Peace Operations*

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of peace operations, their size, functions and strategies have been dramatically altered (Ratner, 1995; Diehl et al, 1998; Malone, 2004; Druckman and Paul, 2010). The principles of international and regional organisations have also changed in terms of managing conflicts; for instance, there is a substantial difference between the terms of the mandates given for traditional peace operations and the new ones. Effectively, the new missions do cross the sovereignty threshold recognised by the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, where a need for consent, neutrality, and limited use of force is not as crucial as the urgent aim to save lives.

The goals of peace operations are not only different between the traditional and new variants, but differences in aims among the latter also exist. For instance, although even if most missions have as their main objective the reduction of armed conflict, others have more specific goals such as election supervision, protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance or rebuilding the political and socio-economic institutions in the post conflict phase. The idea is that a variety of peace operations need, to a certain extent, various criteria to measure effectiveness. In other words, the different goals and dimensions of missions influence the way in which the effectiveness is to be analysed and assessed. Thus, it is important to determine which kind of peace operation the researcher is going to evaluate (e.g. peace enforcement, peacekeeping or peace building).

*Selecting Cases for Analysis*

Another key element in determining and measuring the effectiveness of peace operations is being able to strike a suitable balance in terms of drawing generally relevant conclusions and context-specific appraisals (Diehl et al, 1998). There is a general consensus among researchers regarding the fact that using the case studies method remains the most efficient
way for analysing the effectiveness of international organisations (Andresen and Wettestad, 2004). The standard study of the effectiveness has been based on a single case study in which description is the primary goal (Druckman and Paul, 2010). Several studies of peace operation effectiveness focused on evaluating one case study (e.g. Skogmo, 1998; Makinda, 1993; Ratner, 1995; Mays, 2002; Handy, 2005; Kreps, 2007; Udombana, 2007; Waal, 2007; Svensson, 2008; Adebajo, 2008; Diedre, 2008 and Murithi, 2009).

Although there has recently been a real concern for generalisations and the use of multiple case comparisons, the focus in the literature was on the UN’s peace operations whilst little attention has been given to the AU’s peace operations. In effect, the multiple case studies method might be more suitable to make accurate inferences. It will allow for the determination of effectiveness through a comparative process between different case studies. For instance, an operation which was successful in reducing conflicts and saving lives more than others is likely going to be considered as more effective. Accordingly, it should be possible for researchers in peace studies to agree on a number of common standards and indicators of effectiveness, so it will be possible to compare the performance of each operation and eventually make proper generalisations. For this particular study, the researcher will adopt this approach by explaining the effectiveness of the AU in managing intra-state conflicts across different cases studies in order to reach general conclusions and determine whether there is variation (or not) and if there is a variation, to try to find out why.

The different issues addressed earlier are significant not only for academic research on peace operations, but also for the actual implementation of these operations on the ground. They compel observers to pay attention to certain characteristics of the operating environment which might affect the process of data collection and consequently how inferences are made about causation. Additionally, they focus on the accuracy in assessing the progress and outcomes of a mission. I argue that to obtain a good evaluation of peace missions, it is necessary to look at the extent to which these characteristics are considered.

3.4 Measuring the AU’s Effectiveness

As discussed earlier, defining and analysing the effectiveness of international and regional organisations should consider both processes and outcomes as important aspects of the operations under consideration. However, the question to be answered once a particular definition has been adopted, is how the process and the outcomes can be evaluated to determine whether the AU’ missions were effective or not.
3.4.1 Understanding the Internal Process of the AU

Appropriate planning and good management of peace operations lead undoubtedly to the effective fulfilment of any mission objectives; this study looks at the effectiveness of the internal process of the AU in responding to intrastate conflicts. It does so by focusing on the processes within the organization in terms of whether the AU has been able to respond rapidly to the eruption of civil conflict on the continent.

Indeed, one of the most important motivations of replacing the OAU with the AU was the inability of the former to respond quickly to the escalation of civil wars and prevent genocide in Rwanda, as a case of point (Baimu and Sturman 2003; De Coning, 2004; Gomes, 2008). The internal process as a response to the eruption of conflicts has to be a main concern of any study of effectiveness. Such a process of response of any organisation flows during three particular phases: firstly the deliberation stage, secondly the making of formal decisions (resolutions or presidential statements) and thirdly acting by implementing the decisions taken through a variety of available instruments. This method is represented in the ‘process of response’ (Figure 2).

**Figure 3.2: Process of Response**

The process of response as a method has been considered by a number of scholars as an important aspect of measuring the effectiveness of peace operations. John (2009) argued that the response of the UNSC to conflict is the main measurement of its effectiveness. Diehl et al (1998) also insisted on the importance of political conditions surrounding the authorisation of missions. The focus of the above writers was on how suitable the processes within the organization are, and what are the limitations of the internal process in the response to crises. Therefore, the criteria for the measurement of effectiveness here is
whether the internal processes of the AU work or not. This can be conducted (as discussed above) by looking at the way the AU responded to the outbreak of civil wars. If the AU responds rapidly to the escalation of intra-state conflicts, its internal process can be considered effective. It should be noted here that the decision-making process is different from one organisation to another. For example, consensus among member states is a prerequisite in issuing any decision in the EU (Bailes, 2008)\textsuperscript{61} while two-thirds majorities are enough for the AU to decide to intervene or send a peace mission. This means that total consensus among the AU member states is not crucial during the decision making for peace operations.

I contend that when there is no consensus among member states regarding intervening in a conflict, the internal process is ineffective and the outcomes of the mission may be adversely influenced. According to Gutner and Thompson (2010: 238) “IOs may perform poorly because their missions do not reflect a clear consensus among states of what normative principles should be pursued or what underlying problem needs to be solved”. The lack of consensus among member states in issues such as determining which organisational actors hold authority, which are the contributor states, who are the participants in various circumstances and what are the issues which will be attended by the decision-makers. The level of coordination among member states and shifts in organizational actors’ attention represents a real test in terms of management and coordination of the peacekeeping process (March, 1978; Lipson, 2010; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).

Another aspect of how to measure the internal process of international and regional organisations in general and the AU in particular consists of examining the relationship or the level of coordination among an organisation’s mechanisms before and after sending the mission on the ground. As discussed in Chapter 2, the AU, in addition to the PSC, has established a number of separate organs (e.g. the Panel of Wise, the Standby Forces and the Peace Fund) which work in conjunction with the PSC. The latter has to cooperate simultaneously with other institutions such as the AU Commission, the AU General Assembly and the Military Staff Committee.

The focus in this regard will be on the level of coordination between these bodies regarding the AU’s response to the eruption of the Darfur crisis as a case of point. For

\textsuperscript{61}The EU depends at all times on consent and consensus among its Member States, and in certain occasions it needs also the approval of its populations. Compared to the UN and the AU, the EU planning process for peacekeeping operations involves the Member States to a higher degree.
instance, it will be pertinent to ask whether or not the different organs cooperated adequately by providing the required number of troops, their equipment and by sending them rapidly to the conflict zone. The other element is to determine was the level of cooperation between the AU headquarters and the mission’s staff on the ground. Such an approach will help not only to ascertain the level of preparation (the readiness) of the AU’s institutions in general but also to know their limits and strengths in organising and implementing peace operation missions.

3.4.2 Measuring the Outcomes of the AU’s Operations

The second aspect related to the measurement of the effectiveness of peace operations consists of assessing outcomes. In this respect, determining goals of peace operations is a prerequisite for evaluating the outcomes (has the mission achieved its stated goals?). Nevertheless, relying on the goals of a mission as drafted in the mandate is insufficient, as discussed earlier. In order to avoid the shortcomings of relying on the goals of peace operations as specified in the relevant mandate, this study adopts Druckman and Deihl’s (2010) “core goals approach”. Druckman and Deihl (2010:29) argued that “it is tempting to treat each operation as sui generis, but doing so prevents scholars from drawing generalisations and policymakers from driving lessons learned from what are essentially onetime situation”.

The above writers suggested that there are similarities in terms of general functions shared during all peacekeeping missions and, hence, it is possible to rely on some standards to assess the effectiveness which might be implemented during all missions on the ground. However, it is important to keep in mind that other functions, such as evacuation standards might differ according to the mission undertaken. It is indeed a plus for peacekeeping missions to have shared aims, albeit the more generic ones agreed upon by all stakeholders. Such a situation might represent a prerequisite for fulfilling other specific objectives. However, it should be noted here that these goals can be used as indicators for measuring peace enforcement and peacekeeping but they are not appropriate for measuring peace building missions which have different goals and require different indicators. The generic goals of peacekeeping are as follows:

Conflict Abatement

One of the main goals that peace operations seek to achieve is the reduction, or overall elimination, of armed conflict. According to Druckman and Deihl (2010: 32) “peace
operations are almost always deployed in areas in which armed conflict is present or has been in the recent past [...] the most fundamental goal, then, for such an operation is the reduction or elimination of armed violence”. Accordingly, conflict abatement will be the first indicator of measuring the effectiveness of the AU’s interventions and consequently, the first assessment question will be whether conflict or violence still exist after the deployment of AU’s mission or not.

In fact, considering the absence of war between parties of a dispute after an intervention as an indicator of effectiveness has been used widely in the literature (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Heldt and Wallensteen, 2006; Howard, 2008). Peace operations therefore can be considered effective if they separate combatants (e.g. ending armed conflict) and prevent the reoccurrence of violence. In this regard, scholars have commonly measured progress by focusing on “length of peace” (e.g. months and years after the deployment of the mission) (Fortna, 2008; Derouen et al, 2009). Deihl et al (2010) argued that the length of time without major attacks is a direct, quantifiable indicator that offers great potential for comparison across different missions. Accordingly, the length of time without the occurrence of a significant incident, following the deployment of a mission, is a clear indicator for assessing whether or not the intervention was effective.

However, the absence of warfare is not the only indicator in this regard. The reduction of armed conflict is also another indicator of measuring effectiveness. In the case of heavy fighting during the deployment of peace missions, it will be judicious to measure the levels of violence before and after the intervention of peace forces (Lombard, 2006; Druckman and Deihl, 2010). In some operations an intervention occurred while the fighting was still occurring on the ground (e.g. the empirical cases of this study, Burundi, Darfur and Somalia). In this case, there are some indicators to evaluate the relative violence levels and then, it is possible to make a judgment on whether levels have been reduced or not. The first is the ability of an intervention in saving lives; according to Seybolt (2007: 30), “saving lives is a simple, clear, non-exclusive concept that is often used by policymakers and journalists as a justification for intervention and a measure of its impact”. A criterion for measuring the effectiveness of a humanitarian intervention consists of considering the number of lives saved (Hansch et al, 1994; Paul et al, 2000; Schumacher, 2007). The reduction of human suffering is another primary goal of peace missions (Birikorang, 2009).

Therefore, the ability of an intervention in saving lives that could have not been saved otherwise is an important indicator in measuring whether the levels of violence have decreased or not and whether an intervention was effective or ineffective. The ability of an
intervener in assisting aid delivery or protecting aid operations to civilians during the war is another indicator of the effectiveness. When an intervener helps in delivering emergency aid, more lives will be saved (Seybolt, 2007). Protecting aid organisations in supplying food and medical aid is also another indicator of measuring the effectiveness of any intervention (Regan, 1996).

The number of shooting accidents also might be taken as an indicator for the reduction of the level of violence and thus peace operations might be seen as effective if they contribute to the decrease of gunfire incidents. This indicator is not limited only to shooting incidents between the parties of the dispute but also the use of firearms against peacekeepers: as discussed in the following empirical chapters, the AU troops were subject to many attacks. The number of shooting incidents as an indicator has the advantage of being quantifiable and directly comparable over time (Deihl et al, 2010). In terms of using firearms against peacekeepers, the casualties of peace operations are another indicator of measuring the severity of any armed violence (Jakobsen, 1996; Deihl et al, 2010). The number of deaths among peacekeepers is directly indicative (or at least reflects) of the level of support for the mission given by the parties of conflict. This indicator is also comparable across missions and thus it helps to determine the effectiveness from case to case.

Conflict Containment

The second key objective of peace operations is to prevent violent conflict in the area of deployment and the spread of the conflict to other regions. Peace operations do not seek to limit the intensity of violence only but also to restrict its scope. This goal is indeed essential for all peace operations because the failure to prevent the spread of conflict to new regions or the involvement of other new actors in the conflict frustrates the international and regional organisations by preventing them from carrying out their missions. In the existing literature in peace operations, conflict containment has been considered as another important indicator of measuring effectiveness of international and regional organisation’s interventions (Druckman and Diehl, 1997, 2010; Bush, 1998; Lombard, 2006; Schumacher, 2007; Nathan, 2010). In order to measure this goal, Diehl and Druckman (2010:36) divided it into two types of containment: Geographical and actor-based. From this perspective, conflict containment can be considered as the ability of an

62 For instance, the spread of conflict in Congo in 1993—4 and in 1997 had led to the involvement of new groups, states, regions at various points in time which complicate peace operations efforts to restore government authority and provide basic services. See, Ganga (1999).
intervener in preventing the spread of violence geographically\textsuperscript{63} to new areas (e.g. neighbouring states) and keeping the conflict from the involvement of new actors.

The first category (geographic scope) can be measured by looking beyond the area of deployment. The existence of any violence outside the area of deployment might be considered as an indicator of the conflict-spreading out and thus the operation failing. Some peace operations may be able to seal borders and prevent the import of arms and personnel\textsuperscript{64} that increase the opportunity for violence across the country (Diehl and Druckman, 2010). Population movements are an important instrument by which violence spreads across regions (Alagappa, 1995; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Peace operation tasks conducted in the aftermath of the Cold War are different from the traditional ones. The new missions are not only responsible for the stability within the area of deployment but they are also in charge of preventing the spread of conflict to new areas (observing boundaries and prevent bringing in of arms and personnel). Therefore, it is perfectly understandable that an evaluation of peacekeeping operation might be based on the geographic latitude of a conflict, regardless of whether or not the areas in question are not within the controlling and monitoring zone.

The second category (actor-based) can be measured by looking at the involvement of other actors (e.g. groups or states). As Diehl and Druckman (2010:38) argued, “[t]he measurement of actors in conflict seems straightforward: a simple count of states or groups that effectively intervene in the conflict and commit violent acts”. The behaviour of states in the area of conflict is essential in relation to the effectiveness of the mission (Howard, 2008; Deihl, 2008). Intrastate conflicts are more likely to occur and more difficult to solve when neighbouring countries are embroiled in civil war or strong interstate competition (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1999; Francis, 2007). Previous experience showed that the involvement of neighbouring countries with the area of conflict intensifies the fighting and generates other negative effects, such as real capital destruction and the flow of refugees.

The intervention of Ethiopian in Somalia in 2006 and the intervention of former Yugoslavia in the Bosnian conflict in 1991\textsuperscript{65} are good examples in this regard.

\textsuperscript{63} About the causes of the spread of conflicts geographically see, Braithwaite (2006).

\textsuperscript{64} One of goals of the revised mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was to provide the Lebanese authorities with the needed instruments to secure its frontiers and prevent arm trafficking or any other sort of illegal traffic. See, UN Interim Force in Lebanon, 2006. Available at, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml.

\textsuperscript{65} Regarding the intervention of the former Yugoslavia, see Meron (1998).
Therefore, the number of actors who are involved in the conflict can be considered as another indicator of the expansion of the violence. Indeed, neighbouring countries are commonly more involved than others due to specific benefits they might inherit from the outcomes of a conflict and also are wary of the negative implications if they do nothing such as the potential influx of refugees or the establishment of hostile regimes. Accordingly, they might ally with local forces, whether governmental or oppositional. In doing so, these states will likely make it more difficult to reach an agreement or to work towards a peaceful settlement. In fact, the direct or indirect participation of neighbouring countries usually produces new duties for peacekeeping missions, such as monitoring and checking the movement of these forces after an agreement has been made, reducing the number of interveners and the power of the parties involved. The achievement of such tasks is another indicator of the effectiveness of any mission.

However, conflict containment does not only depend on the ability of the intervener to prevent the spread of the conflict to other regions and the number of actors involved. Effectively, a peace operation can be also evaluated against its ability to confine or contain the violence in the area of original deployment. In this regard, a number of indicators can be identified to measure the effectiveness of the intervener in containing the conflict.

The first indicator is the use of the number of hotspots to measure the effectiveness of the operation. According to Diehl and Druckman (2010:36) “containing the violence to a limited number of cities, neighbourhoods or border checkpoints means that other areas are safe”. The focus here should be on whether the inhabitants of those regions are safe and are able to conduct normal life activities (economic, social and the like) without having to worry about their security. Sigri and Basar (2014) also argued that in order to measure the effectiveness of the intervener in reducing the severity of the conflict in the original area of deployment, it is important to consider the number of injured and killed civilians in the region, freedom of civilians’ movement and the status of human rights issues (Seybolt, 2007).

Another related metric is the ability of the peace operation in disarming the combatants (Grundy-warr, 1994; Olin, 2013; Sigri and Basar 2014). Olin (2013: 17) argued that one of the key benchmarks of assessing peace operations’ effectiveness in conflict containment is “the completion of credible disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of militias”. Therefore, the amount and quality of weaponry and ammunition seized or confiscated from warring factions or civilians and their destruction in the conflict zone is an important indicator for measuring the peace
operations’ effectiveness. Another important metric of the effectiveness of a peace operation in the conflict containment is its ability to prevent all kinds of external support (i.e. military, logistical or financial) to the parties of dispute. As it will be discussed later, the direct military intervention or inference by other actors is an important element for the spread of the conflict and hence the peace operation will be unsuccessful. However, it has been noticed that there are various types of external involvement and it will be imprudent to reduce it to a clear or direct intervention. Third-party interveners play often a damaging role and their involvement also can increase the severity of the conflict through providing the military, logistical and financial support to warring parties (Tainter, 2000; Waal, 2007; Williams, 2011b).

The participation of external actors will strengthen the fighting parties by giving them the opportunity to continue the armed struggle or to restart the conflict. As a result, the number of casualties will likely increase, while the will to participate in negotiations will be postponed or relegated until significant successes are marked by the antagonists on the battlefield (Nalbandov, 2009). Accordingly, the flow of weapons (the number, type and lethality) into the conflict zone is another important metric which reflects the severity of the conflict. The effectiveness of a peace operation here can be measured by looking at the degree to which the mission was successful in preventing, reducing significantly or eliminating the arms flow.

Third-party interveners may also provide financial and logistical support to conflicting parties. The financial support from abroad serves generally for several purposes, acquiring arms, bribing local leaders or other aims impacting negatively on the mission’s objectives. Aydin and Regan (2011: 573) argued in this regard that “analysis results from post-1945 civil wars support our expectations and show that interveners supporting opposing sides of the war increase war duration”. Therefore, the ability of the intervener in preventing, reducing and eliminating the flows of weapons as well as the financial and logistical support to conflicting parties is an important metric to measure the effectiveness of a peace operation in confining or containing the violence in the area of original deployment.

From the above discussion, it can be observed that the conflict containment can be measured by looking at to two major aspects (e.g. internal and external). The metrics of measuring the external aspect are the ability of the mission to prevent the spread of the conflict to other regions and prevent the involvement of other actors. On the other hand, the ability of the mission in reducing the severity of the conflict, protecting civilians, disarming combatants and preventing the flows of weapons and financial support to
conflicting parties are the main metrics for the measurement of the effectiveness of the mission in confining or containing the violence in the area of original deployment.

**Conflict Settlement**

The third core goal of peace operations is the ability of a particular mission in implementing a ceasefire between the parties of disputes or signing a peace agreement between them (Diehl, 1994; Robert, 1994; Druckman and Stern, 1997; Schumacher, 2007; Birikorang, 2009; Nathan, 2010). However, it should be noted here that conflict settlement is not a necessary goal for all peace operations because some are deployed after signing the peace agreement, which used to be the case for the traditional peacekeeping missions.

The question regarding the settling of the conflict is to find out whether or not the intervener has been effective in resolving the major disagreements between parties of dispute. In fact, the attempt of any intervener in bringing conflict parties together to talk is the first step of the conflict settlement process. Diehl and Druckman (2010: 44) argued that a “willingness to negotiate suggests that the parties recognise that violent conflict is not the only, and perhaps not preferred solution to the conflict […] this is a necessary transition to the peaceful settlement of the conflict”. Although convincing the conflict parties to talk and eventually sign a peace agreement is an important step to solve the conflict, it is however insufficient on its own. According to Downs and Stedman (2002: 1);

> “the two worst outbreaks of massive violence in 1990s - Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994 followed the failure of peace agreements to end those wars… of the sixteen peace agreements negotiated to end civil wars in the early 1990s, six were successfully achieved, and four only partially successful”.

Accordingly, the researcher should consider whether or not the agreements signed are implemented on the ground. In this regard, a number of indicators have to be taken into account to determine if there is peace after the signing of a ceasefire or a peace agreement. One way to determine this is to look at the behaviour of conflict participants. Behavioural indicators on violence discussed above (e.g. incidents of violence) can give some insights into whether conflicts have been solved or not. Another way may be obtained from progress reports at the level of the UN Secretary General’s office (Bratt, 1997; Diehl and Druckman, 2010). Reports from other actors such as situation reports published by governmental and non-governmental organisations, rights reports; media reports and
Undeniably, addressing the root cause of the conflict can be considered another significant indicator of conflict settlement. As Diehl and Druckman (2010) argued, researchers should also consider the extent to which provisions of the agreement address or solve the conflict issues between parties of the dispute. In this regard, conducting interviews with senior officials of the AU and the mission’s staff will be pertinent in determining whether or not there was any form of progress in the peace process. Another important indicator to measure the effectiveness of peace operations in settling the conflicts is the ability of the mission in convincing all parties of dispute to reintegrate in the political process and in its diligent and efficient supervision of the elections (Olin, 2013; Sigri and Basar 2014). The ability of the intervener in organising free and fair elections with the participation of all warring parties is a clear indicator to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. In conclusion, it can be said that succeeding in reunifying a state under one single authority following an armed conflict or a civil war represents an essential indicator of the effectiveness of a peace treaty and on the capability of the peacekeeping missions.

These three core goals (e.g. conflict abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement) are usually embraced by all stakeholders of peace operations, especially those intervening before signing a peace agreement among protagonists and thus they can be considered as the main indicators of measuring the effectiveness of any intervener’s actions. Nevertheless, this study does not pretend to have covered all duties expected to be carried out by peacekeeping operations, and accordingly it will leave the door open for other potential tasks that might be included in terms of mission specific goals and which might be different from the goals discussed above.

The framework developed for measuring the internal process in, and the outcomes of, the AU’s efforts in managing intrastate conflicts can be seen more clearly in the tables below. The wider aims of peace operations and the relevant questions linked to those aims - as well as specific indicators which can be measured in order to give accurate answers to those questions - are summarised precisely and concisely. This systematic framework can be applied for analysing the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts in general.
### Table 3.1: Process of evaluating the effectiveness of the AU (internal process)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Major questions</th>
<th>Empirical examination</th>
<th>The effectiveness of AU’s internal process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High coordination among AU mechanisms</td>
<td>Does the internal process of the AU work?</td>
<td>Measuring these indicators in different case studies</td>
<td>High, Medium, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid response to crisis</td>
<td>Has the AU respond quickly?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus among member states</td>
<td>Was there a consensus on deploying the mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.2: Process of evaluating the effectiveness of the AU (outcomes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators (goals)</th>
<th>Major questions</th>
<th>Measuring of progress</th>
<th>AU missions</th>
<th>The degree of effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- Violence abatement</td>
<td>1- Is violence still going on the ground after the deployment?</td>
<td>Peace duration (e.g. months, year or even years without armed clashes. shooting accidents, saving lives and other causalities (e.g. deaths of peacekeepers)</td>
<td>Evaluating the AU achievements against these indicators</td>
<td>High, Medium, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of conflict between parties of dispute</td>
<td>2- To what extent have levels of conflict reduced?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Conflict containment</td>
<td>1- Has the violence spread geographically?</td>
<td>The spread from the area of deployment</td>
<td>Evaluating the AU achievements against these indicators</td>
<td>High, Medium, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Prevent violent conflict in the era of deployment and the spread of the conflict to other regions).</td>
<td>2. Have other actors involved in the conflict?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Has the mission contained violence in conflict zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- conflict settlement</td>
<td>1- Has the intervener been effective in resolving the major disagreements between combatants?</td>
<td>Stability after signing a peace agreement</td>
<td>Evaluating the AU achievements against these indicators</td>
<td>High, Medium, Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending the conflict between parties of dispute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should be noted here that if the mission addresses the indicators discussed above, its effectiveness will be considered as “High”. However, if it accomplishes only some of them, its effectiveness will be considered as “Medium”. For example, some missions can play an important role in reducing the number of people killed, the delivery of aid and medical assistance to the affected population, preventing the spread of the conflict or the involvement of other actors. However, the conflict is still going on in the ground. In this case, the effectiveness of the mission can be judged as “Medium”. Notwithstanding, if the mission is not able to meet the majority of the indicators, its effectiveness will be considered as “Low”.

It would be worth mentioning here that accomplishing the intended goals for international and regional organisations particularly in the peace and security field is far from easy, this is particularly true for the AU which has to face numerous and various challenges that frustrate its efforts. Therefore, I adopt the “good enough” approach (De Coning and Romita, 2009; Meharg, 2009) to ascertain the effectiveness of the AU interventions.

The “good enough” approach focuses on what is achievable in peace operations and then replaces what is desirable. In other words, measuring the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts should not be done by referring to the ideal state of peace as a gauge - which supposes no armed conflict after intervention or deployment - or comparing it with an ideal form of conflict resolution (for example, the settlement of long-standing animosities).

Some researchers have argued that such an attitude is normatively unfair and scientifically unproductive. For instance, Stern and Druckman (1997:154) argued that “scholars at their best must define success or effectiveness in terms of making relative gains in realizing transcendent values such as world peace, justice, and a reduction in human suffering aggregated across all relevant groups in a conflict”. Interventions meant to resolve conflicts might eventually be assessed through the notion of “good enough” rather than the absolute concepts of success and failure (Ross, 2000).

The indicators discussed above for analysing and evaluating international and regional organisations’ effectiveness in managing conflicts will be applied in this study in order to measure the AU’s effectiveness in managing intrastate conflicts as a dependent variable. However, a number of factors (independent variables) are also important for explaining the effectiveness as they are posited to account for the variation in the dependent variable. The next section identifies these factors in detail and outlines how they can be measured.
3.5 Factors Influencing the AU’s Effectiveness

The literature review undertaken in Chapters 1 and 2 and the precedent section which outlined a plan for how to analyse and evaluate the effectiveness of international and regional organisations reveals that there are factors in conflict situations which influence the effectiveness of peace operations. The conflict environment can be considered a major aspect, if not the most important one, in determining the effectiveness of peace operations (Malaquias, 1996; Heldt, 2002; Diehl, 2008).

In general, environmental factors are considered as independent or causal variables in the intervention operation’s outcomes; accordingly, these factors must be given particular attention in the analysis. The researcher observed that an important amount of literature has been dedicated to the factors influencing the effectiveness of institutions such as the UN, EU and NATO (as discussed in Chapter 2). However, it is notable that the previous studies focused on some factors that affect the effectiveness of the AU’s peace operations and consequently are limited. It can be argued that the evaluation cannot be accurate without first having a better understanding of the main conditions, (e.g. considering all factors) and how they can be measured.

Researchers generally identify two types of factors which impact upon effectiveness internal and external. In this regard, certain authors have focused on internal factors that influence the AU’s effectiveness in managing conflicts. For instance, Handy (2005), Mehtler, (2005), Waal, (2005b), and Williams (2009) focused on the commitment of the AU’s member states in enhancing the effectiveness of the AU in managing conflicts. Their argument is that the human and financial resources provided by the member states of the AU are the main factors which enable this institution in effectively managing intrastate conflict.

Other experts focused on the local consent of fighting parties as a prerequisite of the effectiveness of the AU (Paris, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Waal, 2007; Marshall, 2009). This refers to the degree to which parties of disputes and authorities cooperate and support the intervention process and if the cooperation of the parties is not sustained and wholehearted, a positive result from an intervention will be difficult to obtain. In this regard, these authors argue that the sensitive question of sovereignty is the main factor behind the weak consent or the rejection of the intervention by local governments.
On the other hand, authors like Powell (2005), Murithi (2005), Udombana (2007), Williams (2008) and De Coning (2010) looked in particular at the cooperation between the AU and other institutions such as the UN, the EU and NATO as an important external factor to the AU’s effectiveness in achieving peace and security in Africa. Their argument is that due to the lack of financial resources, experience and logistic capacity in the AU, the external support particularly from the UN, EU and NATO is an indispensable factor to the effectiveness of this institution’s operations. However, these studies are more descriptive than analytical. For instance, they neither explain empirically the variation of their contribution in different conflicts in Africa nor the criterion of measuring their support.

What differentiates this study from its predecessors is the fact that it focuses on all factors (either internal conditions or external conditions) which are thought to exert an influence on the outcomes of the AU’s interventions. These variables will be examined through the study of three particular cases where the AU was involved as a leading actor in the management of conflict. Accordingly, the main variables that influence the AU’s effectiveness will be categorised as illustrated in Figure 3.
Mandate of the mission

Mandates are often political documents developed in international and regional organisations (e.g. the UN, EU, AU, NATO and OAS) that are meant to achieve broad purposes while maximizing the level of political support for them (Diehl et al, 1998). However, mandates sometimes lack clarity, and when they are vague they leave substantial room for the appearance of divergent opinions or interpretations. Therefore, a clear mandate is often cited as a factor in the effectiveness of the peace operation missions. Sambanis (2000: 9) argued that;
“it is not sufficient for the UN to send large numbers of troops to the field, if at the same time these troops are not given the rules of engagement and mandate to make peace […] a large troop deployment with a weak mandate is a sure sign of lack of commitment by the SC and creates an impediment for effective intervention”.

Accordingly, the mandate of any AU mission is expected to be one of the most important factors that influence the effectiveness of its interventions. In the case of an unclear or limited mandate for an operation, the outcomes of the intervention will be adversely affected while when the mandate of the mission is clear and fits with the conflict environment, the intervention is expected to be effective in managing the crisis. However, it is important at this stage to mention that, the AU diverges completely not only from its predecessor, the OAU, but also from other organisations in the globe who were rather unwilling to intervene in states’ internal affairs due to the respect of state sovereignty principle and the adoption of non-interference approach as discussed in Chapter 2. However, the AU’s adoption of the right of intervention in African conflicts either with or without a peace or cease-fire agreement and even without the consent of conflicting parties widen the interfering and activist position towards achieving peace and security particularly regarding intrastate conflict.

Indeed, contrary to its predecessor, the AU subscribes to the position that the protection of the endangered populations should not be sacrificed for the sake of the sovereignty of states. Nowadays, the organisation is recognized as the world’s sole regional organisation which explicitly allows itself the right to intervene in an African country conflict in the case of serious abuse, on humanitarian and human rights grounds. AU officials adhere to the notion that in the case of some conflict contexts in Africa, the priority resides in ensuring first a certain level of stability then it will be possible to work towards the establishment of peace agreements (interviews with AU senior officials, 14/11/2012 and 21/11/2012). In this regard, various researchers argue that a mandate which provides ample autonomy to confront perpetrators or actively protect targets through using force will most likely be able to reduce the killing of innocent people and impose the peace among the belligerents (Valentino, 2004; Udombana, 2007).

Accordingly, the mandate of the various AU missions will be examined or measured firstly against its principles as enounced in its CA. For instance, has the mandate of the AU
mission in Darfur (or other missions) been limited to local consent of the parties in the dispute? Does the mission’s mandate provide the right to attack the perpetrators to protect civilians as stated in its CA? The second criterion for measuring the mandate of the AU is the relationship between the mandate and the resources available. The clear mandate given and the relevant matching resources (to make this mandate workable) is a crucial factor in shaping its likelihood for managing conflicts effectively. According to the Brahimi Report (2010:10),“if an operation is given a mandate to protect civilians, therefore, it also must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate”. Therefore mandates which have detailed a number of tasks to be undertaken without full consideration of their consequences in relation to costs and resources are expected to fail in achieving their goals. The criterion here is the ability of the AU in linking the mandate of the mission to the reality of available resources.

In addition to adequate resources, the mandate must not be limited in terms of its size, particularly troop magnitude. In other words, is there any limitation in the AU’s mandates in relation to the number of troops or have the governments of host states limited the troop magnitude? In this regard, some scholars have suggested that the effectiveness of peace operations depends on the size of the deployed forces (McDermott, 1998; Alex et al, 2005; Straus, 2005). The focus will be on looking at the different mandates of the AU to determine if and under which circumstances the African institution has limited the number of troops. The final criterion of measuring the mandate is about whether it was clear or not, it would be conjectured that mandates with a big number of tasks might cause mandate overload. In this respect, many studies claim that a clear mandate is an important factor to the effectiveness of the peace operations. According to the UN (2010b:38) “To achieve and maintain its credibility, a mission must therefore have a clear and deliverable mandate, with resources and capabilities to match; and a sound mission plan that is understood, communicated and impartially and effectively implemented at every level”. One of the most important factors relating to the effectiveness of peace operations is a credible and achievable mandate (Brahimi Report, 2000). Doyle et al (1997) and Ferreira (2009) highlighted the importance of avoiding ambiguous mandates which can adversely affect the outcomes of peace operations. Similarly, Knoll (2005: 659) demonstrated that “an ambiguous mandate can render an international administration an inherently unstable, if

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not destabilizing, policy institution”. Other researchers such as Urguhart (1987) and Meharg (2009) emphasised the significance of feasibility of the mandate.

What can be assumed from the above studies is that in order to make peace operations more effective, every mandate should be adequately clear, allowing the Force Commander to clearly understand what he is expected to implement. Nevertheless, clarity of the mission’s mandate alone is no guarantee of effectiveness. Another key parameter is the feasibility: Can the peace force practically fulfil the tasks as indicated in the mandate? It might happen that certain tasks are above the capability of the peacekeeping force sent initially, and consequently a more capable peace force should be sent on the field.

To establish whether the mandate is clear, achievable, and feasible, the study focuses on two dimensions: the number of tasks in the mandate and the duration of a certain set of tasks. The first dimension is interested in looking at the number of tasks that the mission has been given by the AU. There are a number of general tasks of peace operations such as conflict prevention, implementing a ceasefire or peace agreement, ceasefire monitoring, preventing the spread of the conflict, civilian protection, disarmament, ensuring that elections are held fairly, providing adequate training for local police forces, monitoring the withdrawal of belligerent parties, assisting the return of refugees and displaced people, civil administration supervising, and disbandment monitoring. Therefore, the focus will be on the key objectives (core goals) of peace operations which were discussed in the first section (e.g. conflict abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement). In addition to considering the mission’s goals as specified in its mandate which might differ from the goals mentioned above. The second dimension is mandate duration, the criterion here will be around whether there is a balance between a certain set of tasks and the given time; it is plausible to expect that the longer peace operation missions have been mandated to achieve a certain set of tasks, the more likely the missions will be effective in achieving its objectives.

In light of foregoing, a testable proposition around this variable is that a clear mandate with adequate resources and sizeable number of troops can increase the effectiveness of the AU. In contrast, a vague mandate with inadequate resources and limited troops will likely decrease its ability to effectively carry out its mission.
The commitment of AU member states

A second important factor is the commitment of member states. Nathan (2010) argued in this regard that in spite of the variations among factors that constitute and affect the function of international and regional organisations, the leading general factor is that these institutions represent forums of states. This is their principal quality since all the other key features – mandate, norms, decision-making modalities, goals, strategies, programmes, structure, capacity and culture – are generated by their members (Nathan, 2010). Other scholars suggest that member states rather than organisations are to blame for the poor performance of international and regional organisations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Carment and Rowlands, 1998). Druckman and Paul (1997: 162) argued that “when the UN peace operation failed to achieve its goals, the responsibility will be on member states rather than the UN mission”. In fact, the commitment of member states is not the only factor of the success or the failure of any organisation but it can influence, to a very large extent, the effectiveness of that institution. When any organisation issues a clear mandate with a plan for adequate resources and sizeable troop magnitude, its member states have to be willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of membership by paying their dues, providing the required number of troops and respecting the constitutional governance and the role of law. In order to understand the extent to which the commitment of member states influence the AU’s effectiveness, this study identifies a number of criteria that help to measure the effect of this factor on the outcomes of AU missions. These indicators are the political obligation by member states, the financial and logistical obligation, and the involvement of influential states.

States use formal international and regional organisations to manage both their everyday interaction and more dramatic episodes, including both interstate and intrastate conflicts (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). These institutions must consist of at least three states among their membership and which are established by an official agreement (e.g. a treaty, a charter or a statute) (Karns and Mingst, 2010). Indeed, in any single treaty establishing these organisations, member states must agree and sign upon a number of principles and objectives which determine the road map of the labour of any organisation. The effectiveness of any organisation depends on the extent to which its member states respect its principles and their willingness to work collectively to achieve its objectives. When international and regional organisations work with a degree of autonomy or without any intervention from their member states in its agenda, they will likely be more effective in accomplishing its objectives. However, it can be said that, these institutions are highly constrained by their members, especially the prevailing ones. So, the autonomy of these
institutions might be limited, while interference might occur during their operations and their opinions and recommendations might be ignored (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Consequently, the political obligation of member states is the first indicator of measuring the commitment of member states to the relevant institutions. In the African context, the AU has adopted a number of principles and objectives in order to achieve peace and security in Africa. All AU member states are either committed to respect these principles in order to achieve peace and security on the continent. However, the respect of these principles by the AU’s member states is insufficient as will be seen in the empirical chapters. In fact, some actors have an interest in fuelling conflicts and engorging instability (Druckman and Paul, 2010). Diehl (2008) argued that the chance to reach a lasting settlement and a real peace often is largely dependent, albeit if not completely, on the behaviour of neighbouring countries. Therefore, the position in neighbouring countries can influence the effectiveness of peace operations everywhere. If the bordering countries of the host state support the peace mission, the mission will be expected to effectively implement its objectives. According to Druckman and Paul (2010: 143-144) “the operational environment of peace operations will be less stable when the bordering states are engaged in their own intra-state conflicts”. Intrastate conflicts are more likely to occur and are more complicated to solve when neighbouring countries are embroiled in civil war or strong interstate competition (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1999; Francis, 2007).

Accordingly, the indicator that helps to measure the political obligation of member states is the extent to which they respect the principles and aims of their own organisation on the ground (e.g. supporting one side of parties of disputes). As discussed in the first section regarding the measurement of the effectiveness of internal process and how it affects the outcomes of the AU’s missions, the consensus among all member states - especially the powerful ones - on the AU interventions is considered as the first and foremost condition of the AU’s effectiveness. It has been seen as preponderant when member states of the AU agree to act as one group and to speak with one voice (Handy, 2005; Mehler, 2005; Diedre 2008). Diedre (2008) argued that the African states were able to a very large extent to manage, speak, negotiate and act as one block in their intervention in Togo in 2003. They achieved their aims by banning Togo’s leaders from travelling, by stopping arms shipments to the country, and by expulsion of the country from the Economic Community

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67 Regarding the principles and objectives of the AU, see Chapter 2 pages 49-51.
68 The conflict in Togo started when the president of Togo, Africa’s longest-ruling dictator, Gnassingbé Eyadema, died in 2005. The armed leaders made his son, Faure Gnassingbé, president of the country, which led to protests and demonstrations by the Togolese people, who called on the AU and others to bring pressure on the government.
of West African States (ECOWAS) which is closely tied with the AU. However, there was a variation in the consensus among member states upon the AU’s intervention operation. While there had been consensus among African states on the AU intervention in Togo - including its neighbouring countries - there was disagreement (as it will be shown in the empirical part of this research) on other AU interventions, such as in Darfur in 2003. In light of what was developed earlier, a testable proposition around this variable is that when there is a consensus and political obligations about the decisions or the mandates of the AU particularly by the neighbouring countries, the intervention is more likely to be effective in achieving its aims.

Another criterion focused on is the host state’s responsibility. As discussed above, all African states adopted the principles of the AUCA including the respect of human rights and the right of the Union to intervene to stop war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the question to be addressed here is whether or not the host states cooperated with the AU mission in order to solve the conflict and protect civilians. In fact, the sensitive question of sovereignty induces organisations to find a way for obtaining what is called “local consent”. According to Druckman and Paul (2010: 148) “Local consent refers to the local groups and authorities cooperating and supporting the peace operation; military officials often refer to it as (permissiveness) of the environment, whereas, others designate it as the degree of consent”. This form of consent has been a prerequisite of the UN’s peace operations and their effectiveness since its establishment in 1945 (Ratner, 1995). The local consent is needed for both kinds of conflicts (interstate and intrastate).

In situations of interstate dispute, consent must be obtained from the nations’ governments and if it is an intrastate conflict, the other disputants must usually agree to refrain from military force and this consent is a necessary condition for success (Diehl, 1988). Similarly, David (1966: 557) argued that “Where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain”. However, international and regional organisations - particularly the UN - have been criticised for seeking to obtain the local consent of parties of disputes before their interventions and their impartial interventions, even in instances where a state commits mass murder, genocide or war crimes (Totten, 2004). Väyrynen (1985: 8) argued that “if the UN must always have consent of the parties of dispute and impartiality is its goal, the local powers will be able to negotiate aid on their own terms”. Similarly, Wesley (1995) contended that adopting this approach could lead to the use of interveners as mere pawns in domestic power politics.
The above writers emphasise that the most effective way for international and regional organisations to reduce the severity of a war or protect civilians is to directly challenge the perpetrator or to assist the target of the brutal policy. This debate can be linked to the AU’s adoption of the right of intervention in 2001 and to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect approach in the UN in 2005 where these institutions might find it necessary to intervene without the local consent of parties of disputes in order to protect civilians and prevent any genocide, such as the once in Rwanda. In fact, the local consent can influence the AU’s effectiveness as will become clear in the coming chapters. This factor will be measured by looking at the way the parties of the conflict have cooperated with the AU mission and respected the principles and objectives that have been adopted by all member states of this institution. The expectations in relation to this variable is that when the latter is reached, the AU’s intervention will be more effective than when it is rejected by one or both parties of disputes. Additionally, when the intervention is aimed at the perpetrator, the intervention will be more effective in reducing the severity of the conflict and solving it.

The second criterion of measuring the commitment of member states is their logistical and financial obligations. As discussed earlier, a clear mandate should be matched with adequate resources and sufficient troop numbers. However, this cannot be done without a proper commitment from the member states. Indeed, in recognition of the importance of the financial and logistical support, African leaders pledged to take all necessary measures to strengthen the AU institutions and to provide them with the relevant powers and resources to enable them to fulfil their respective mandates effectively. Accordingly, the investigation here will be to find out whether the African states met their pledges or not. In other words, the study focuses on measuring the contributions of African states either logistically or financially.

As discussed earlier, the number of soldiers deployed on the ground is one among the most significant factors which influence the AU’s effectiveness. Therefore, this study will look at the states’ military contribution to the AU’s missions. The focus will be then on whether or not the member states have been willing to provide adequate numbers of troops. Furthermore, the researcher will try to determine if there is any variation among them (i.e. the motivations for the troop contributors, especially the influential ones) in sending troops.

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69NATO defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the movement, acquisition or provision of services and maintenance of forces. See, NATO (2006) Logistics support for NATO operations, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/logistics/logistics-e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/logistics/logistics-e.pdf).
and the reasons behind this\textsuperscript{70}. It is also essential to identify which states respect their financial obligations and to consider if there is any variation in their contribution to different case studies.

\textit{External support from other organisations}

The AU is a relatively young institution and as such faces numerous challenges when dealing with the complexities of the conflicts occurring in the African continent. However, it is essential to observe that the AU is not the only actor conducting missions on the ground, since in Africa there are several other international and regional organisations involved in peacekeeping and security. Although different institutions might have their own agendas, priorities, incentives and individual programmes, it is also becoming more common to launch joint initiatives, as will be shown below.

As a young organisation, the AU had to benefit from the long experience of all its predecessors in the management of conflicts, in particular organisations such as the UN and the EU. Accordingly, the drafters of AUCA emphasised on building a strong relationship with the UN and other organisations based on cooperation and mutual recognition of joint responsibility. Indeed, and as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, several writers consider the partnership between the AU and its international partners as important and an additional factor in achieving peace and security in Africa in its own right (Diedre, 2008; Bariagaber, 2008; De Coning, 2007; Brosig, 2010). According to EU Managing Director for Africa Westcott (2011:7)\textsuperscript{71} “We can only achieve these aims of peace and prosperity for African people through partnership with other actors in international community”.

Thus, this study looks at the partnership or collaboration between the AU and other well-known organisations and investigates if the partnership of the AU with these various institutions has been fruitful in terms of conflict managements and mission outcomes. In addition, it looks at the support of individual states in promoting the efforts of the AU in managing intra-state conflicts.

\textsuperscript{70}This criterion will be applied also in measuring the financial support of African states which is another factor of the effectiveness of the AU peace operations.

\textsuperscript{71}Westcott is the EU Managing Director for Africa in the (European External Action Service EEAS), See Dr Westcott’s speech in Brussels on 18th October 2011, “A New Framework for European Relations with Africa” where he underlined the necessity to develop a strong relationship between the AU and the EU.
The role of the UN

Despite the emergence of the “African Solutions to African Problems approach”, the founders of the AU acknowledged that the UN had to be one of its main partners for the AU and in its efforts in managing conflicts in Africa. In fact, since its creation in 1945, the UN has been playing a key role and served as an important collaborator in managing conflicts in Africa. This relationship has been developed especially after the establishment of the AU at the outset of the new millennium through a number of treaties and agreements which aim to overcome the obstacles and the challenges of achieving peace and security in Africa. These agreements reflect the extent to which the UN and the AU have been keen and willing to work together in order to achieve peace and security in Africa. However, the most essential elements for assessing the effectiveness of the partnership are the outcomes of the latter on the ground.

Indeed, many researchers have sought to evaluate the relationship between these organizations in terms of managing conflicts in Africa, particularly intrastate conflicts. Nevertheless, there are differences not only in their approaches but also in their findings. There is a kind of optimism from some writers who have argued that the joint efforts of both organisations in managing intrastate conflicts embodies a changing standard in the way peacekeeping operations are undertaken and that it has increased the AU’s effectiveness in many places such as for example in the case of Burundi (Svensson 2008; Murithi 2009), Somalia (Ralph, 2005) Sudan (David, 2007; Murithi 2009) and Togo (Mehler, 2005; Diedre 2008).

However, another faction of researchers tend to be more pessimistic in their judgments, arguing that there are political and economic constraints and considerations that frustrate the development of a more effective collaboration between them such as insufficient funding and shortages of troops when needed (De Coning 2007; Williams, 2008; Omorogbe, 2011). The lack of technical equipment, the inability of rapid deployment, limited mandates and the targeting of the AU and UN troops by parties of dispute as it will be seen in the empirical Chapters (Festus, 2004; Barnidge, 2009). Moreover, some researchers have claimed that the overstressing of the UN’s insufficient financial, logistical

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73 Such as signing a joint declaration on the enhancement of the UN-AU cooperation (UN, 2006a), adopting the General Assembly resolution 61/296 on Cooperation between the UN and the AU (UN, 2007a) establishing the High-Level Panel between the UN and the AU (UN, 2011a), and establishing the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), (UN, 2011b).
and human resources led to the failure of UN peacekeeping operations which in turn led to unwillingness on the part of the UN to become involved in African conflicts in general (Malan, 1999; Howard, 2008). This unwillingness by the member states of the UN has adversely influenced the AU’s effectiveness at the outset of the 21st Century (Zaum and Roberts, 2008; Richard, 2008).

Even though these studies explain some aspects of the relationship between the two organisations and the challenges facing them on the ground, it appears that there are a number of drawbacks in their analysis. Firstly, they do not indicate or explain to what extent the UN had an influence on the effectiveness of its partner in different places. In other words, there is a gap in the existing literature regarding why there has been a variation or disproportional involvement of the UN in Africa. Secondly, the existing literature does not provide a systematic evaluation of the contribution of the UN. In other words, their evaluations depend on assessing the outcomes of the partnership of the UN and the AU in managing intra-state conflicts without measuring different aspects of the contribution of the UN (e.g. financial support, political and logistical support) in different case studies.

In order to address these gaps in a direct manner, the current study starts by measuring all aspects of the contribution of the UN to different intrastate conflicts. However, due to the fact that some other organisations (e.g. the UN and the EU) have been involved on the ground in many African conflicts, there might be a risk regarding whether achieving the above goals is attributed to the AU or to other interveners. In order to overcome this dilemma, this study limits its scope to analysing and evaluating only the effectiveness of the AU when it was taking the leading role on the ground and when the role of other organisations was only limited to the financial and logistical support. This study will not consider the cases once the AU mission is replaced by the UN Mission or changed to become hybrid in its nature.

The UN’s support will be divided into two categories, financial resources and political and logistical support. These groups will be measured in different three cases. The researcher asserts that by measuring the contribution of the UN in different conflicts while taking into consideration the variation of its participation will allow comparison of the influence of the

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74 The majority of studies have focused on evaluating the relationship between the UN and the AU in the Darfur crisis and neglected other conflicts such as in Somalia, Burundi, Mauritania, Togo etc.
UN’s support on the AU’s effectiveness across different missions and to determine why some missions are more or less effective than others.

The EU and NATO

The discussion in Chapter 2 of the agreements and treaties signed between the AU and the EU reflects the fact that both organisations had always been willing to work together in order to achieve peace and security in Africa. Notwithstanding, what is important here are the outcomes of this partnership on the ground. In fact, several authors have focussed on the role of the EU in the field of peace and security in Africa and its support to African organizations, including the AU. For example, Fernanda (2004) and Bono (2004) both focused on the EU’s mission in the DRC which was considered by the UN as a successful mission as it restored security and brought an end to the immediate crisis (UN, 2005a). Other interventions, such as the EU’s Police Mission in Kinshasa, the EU’s missions in Eastern Chad and the North-Eastern Central African Republic were also quite successful (Assanvo and Pout 2007).

Other writers such as Murithi (2005), David (2007) and Bach (2008) focused on the EU’s support for AU peacekeeping efforts in terms of all aspects of soft security and activities such as funding programmers, training people, helping African regional organisations and the AU peace operations particularly the EU’s support mission to the AMIS and the AMISOM. However, despite the multidimensional support received by the AU from the EU in order to achieve peace and security in Africa, there are some authors who are quite critical about this partnership and who argue that the contribution of the EU to peacekeeping in Africa has turned out to be practically unsatisfactory (Sloan, 2005, Mathews 2008). This might be explained by the fact that these scholars did not take into consideration the important numbers of missions the EU had to conduct all over the world, hence reducing its involvement in African conflicts (interview with senior EU official, 14/11/2012). Despite all the early criticism, the EU, due to its current involvement in Africa, is expected to be one of the important factors for the effectiveness of the AU.

The objection which can be made here is the fact that despite the importance of previous studies in explaining the role of the EU in Africa they nevertheless failed in providing a

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75 About the EU’s mission in DRC, see Council decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the launching of the EU’s military operation in the DRC and UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003).
real examination regarding the extent to which the relationship between the EU and the AU has influenced the effectiveness of this later. The failure might be due to several reasons. Firstly, the majority of these studies focused on the conflicts where the AU was not involved such as in the DRC and the EU’s Police Mission in Chad. Secondly, there was no comparison between the involvement of the EU in different conflicts at the same time which could explain the variation of its involvement such as for example why the EU intervened militarily in the DRC and Darfur and not in Somalia or Burundi. Thirdly, there was not a real examination of the relationship between the EU and the AU in terms of level of the coordination and the main challenges which adversely influence the effectiveness of the AU peace operations.

Accordingly, the present study seeks to address these questions by measuring the support of the EU to the AU missions in different conflicts. In similar fashion to measuring the contribution of the UN to the AU missions, the study will consider the financial resources and logistical support that the organisation provide in different case studies, the main objective being to determine the extent to which the EU has affected the AU’s effectiveness.

Another important organization which can influence the effectiveness of the AU is NATO. There is no doubt that the role of this institution has constantly increased in peace and security domain particularly after the Cold War. In fact, since the 1990s, NATO became involved in areas beyond its members’ territory, initially in the Euro-Atlantic area but most recently well beyond this region, in Iraq during the first Gulf War, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, as well as during the Second Gulf War (Metcalf, 2005). The fact that the UN recently mandated NATO to intervene in Libya to protect civilians is a good example that encourages the AU to build a strong relationship with NATO especially in terms of achieving peace and security in Africa. This perspective was shared by a number of scholars such David, (2006), French, (2007), Murithi, (2008) and Nation, (2011) who argued that the partnership between the AU and NATO is very important to the AU’s effectiveness in managing conflicts and preventing genocides such as the one occurred in Rwanda or the everlasting ones in Darfur and Somalia.

Therefore, this study will consider NATO as another variable that influences the effectiveness of the AU’s involvement in conflict management. It will look at its support to the AU interventions in some intrastate conflicts, and the relationship between the two organisations and how it can be made more operational. A testable proposition around this
variable is that without significant contributions from the EU and NATO, it is unlikely that the AU would have been able to be effective in managing intrastate conflicts.

**Individual states’ support**

External support to the AU is not limited to the institutions cited above; the AU has also received huge support from individual states such as the US, the UK, Italy, France, China, Japan, Denmark, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden. Indeed, the financial and logistical assistance by these states played an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of the AU in managing intra-state conflicts as will be seen in the empirical chapters. It is important to investigate the level of contributions from the above listed countries in different contexts.

The internal and external factors discussed above are believed to exert an influence on the outcomes of the AU’ interventions. If the factor is properly implemented, it will increase the ability of the AU mission but it will more likely decrease its ability to effectively carry out its mission if the function of the factor is negative (see Table 3.3 below).

**Table 3.3: Measurement of internal and external variables of AU’s effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables from the internal environment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Variables from the external environment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Empirical examination</th>
<th>Degree of the AU’s effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate of the mission</td>
<td>Is it clear, feasible and achievable or not?</td>
<td>UN, EU and NATO support</td>
<td>Political, Logistical and Financial Support</td>
<td>Applying these variables to different case studies</td>
<td>High, Medium and Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The commitment of member states</td>
<td>Number of Troops, Equipment, Financial Support and local consent</td>
<td>Individual States’ support</td>
<td>Political, Logistical and Financial Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6 Introduction of the Case Studies, the AU Missions in Sudan, Burundi and Somalia

As explained above in more detail, analysing and assessing the AU’s effectiveness in managing intrastate conflict is not an easy test due to the variation in the intervened factors which have a big impact on the outcomes of AU peace operations. In order to understand this puzzle, this thesis focuses on three intrastate conflicts where the AU intervened with a variation in the involvement of the independent variables. The examination of the AU missions in different cases will not only determine the effectiveness of this institution but also helps to determine the extent to which the independent variables have influenced the outcomes of the AU interventions and the reasons behind their variation from case to another.

As discussed in the introduction, since its creation the AU has been involved in several intrastate conflicts such as Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Togo, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Mali, Comoros, Sudan and Somalia. However, the present study examines only three particular cases (i.e. Burundi, Sudan and Somalia) to answer the main questions of the thesis. Indeed, these cases represented different types of conflicts, different types of complications and they end up with different types of outcomes. This in turn formed an important examination of the emerging norms at the regional and international levels. On the regional level, it helped to examine the new norms of the AU such as the right of intervention and the prohibition of unconstitutional changes of legitimate governments. On the international level, these conflicts represented a real challenge and a test to assess the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a new doctrine of the UN in the new millennium as well as other international actors such as the EU and NATO.

An important element that should be underlined here is the considerable debate on the academic literature regarding the main approaches that leads to intrastate conflicts. The first approach is related to the political economy of intrastate conflicts. It sees intrastate conflicts motivated by the will to have the control over natural resources such as minerals, food, and land (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; David, 2006; Williams, 2011). The second approach concentrates on the role of and the weakness of the state (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003). For example, intrastate conflict in Somalia has been going on since the 1990s despite the fact that Somalia is one the most homogenous countries in Africa. The third approach is related to identity-based wars (Francis, 2007; Williams, 2011b). It
focuses on ethnicity and identity as a major cause of intrastate conflicts such as in Sudan, the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Burundi.

Indeed, there is agreement among analysts that understanding the main sources of the civil wars and armed conflict would potentially provide indicators and strategies on how to respond effectively to complex conflicts and to build peace especially in Africa. Annan (1998) argued that past responses to conflicts in Africa have often failed due to the misunderstanding of the context within which conflicts are situated or how to address the causes. Accordingly, this study will pay more attention to the root causes of the selected case study and to what extent has the AU addressed them on the ground. However, believes contend that although understanding the main causes of conflict is important, they do not have a big influence on the intervener or the severity of the conflict. For instance, even though the conflict in Burundi was ethnic in nature, the AU took only one year to manage it, while it has been struggling for almost eight years to manage the conflict in Somalia which is one of the few homogeneous African countries where its people share the same language, culture and religion.
Chapter 4: The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

4.1 Introduction

Since it is establishment in 2002, the AU has intervened either politically or militarily in no less than seventeen conflicts in the continent and the Burundi conflict was in fact the first case of its endeavours to manage such conflicts. Accordingly, it can be argued that the conflict in Burundi might be considered as a test to the AU’s effectiveness in managing intrastate wars.

The political instability of the country is an essential factor in the pre-conflict period and Ayebare (2010:81) observed in this regard that “Burundi has been a land of long-lasting political violence since its independence in 1962”. However, the most recent violent conflict in Burundi was triggered on October 21st, 1993. On that particular date, the newly elected President Ndadaye Melchior was assassinated (Boshoff et al, 2010; Jeng, 2010). This led to “revenge attacks on Tutsis across the country, which in turn provoked retaliation against Hutus by the Tutsi dominated armed forces” (Peen, 2012: 377). In Burundi, the clashes between the parties of dispute, Tutsis and Hutus, cost the life of an estimated 300,000 people, most of them were civilians and up to 1.3 million were made refugees and internally displaced (Crisp, 2006; and Boshoff et al, 2010). This made Burundi one of the ten top “refugee-producing” countries around the world (Crisp, 2006). The catastrophic consequences of the Burundian conflict reached ‘genocide levels’ (Svensson, 2008; Boshoff et al, 2010), and were considered by the UNSC as nothing else than a genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus (UN, 2000a).

Accordingly, the eruption and the escalation of the conflict in Burundi a decade after the Rwandan genocide raised pertinent questions, particularly in relation to the lessons learnt by the international community in general and the African community in particular in responding to civil wars and preventing their tragic consequences. Peen (2012:373) stated that focusing on the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) helps to “explore the AU’s nascent approach to peacekeeping and to investigate the relationship between the Union’s aspirations, experience and prospect to provide ‘African solutions to African problems’ in

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Ndadaye Melchior was a Hutu. The Hutu ethnic group is the largest of the three main population divisions in Burundi. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, 85% of Burundians are Hutu, while the Tutsi ethnic group represents 14% of Burundi citizens. "The World Fact book: Burundi."
the security realm”. The conflict in Burundi might offer a clear examination of the ability of the political and militarily settlement tools of the AU (Kwasi, 2011).

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the AU’s intervened in Burundi due to the unconstitutional change which occurred in the country. Consequently, this conflict formed an important example of the emerging norms at the regional and international levels. On the regional level, it illustrated the new norms of the AU such as the prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government. On the international level, this conflict represented a real challenge and a test to assess the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a new doctrine of the UN as well as other international actors such as the EU and NATO. This has inspired a number of scholars who attempted to evaluate the ability of this emerging organisation to manage intrastate conflicts in the continent. However, their perspectives, analyses and conclusions were different not only regarding the effectiveness of the Burundi mission but also in relation to the causes which helped (or undermined) the mission to achieve its objectives on the ground. In fact, some scholars focused simply on whether or not the AMIB has had a positive effect, without considering factors that influenced the AU’s effectiveness.

For example, Curtis (2003) argued that the AMIB was effective in implementing a ceasefire among the parties of the dispute and subsequently sending peacekeepers for monitoring purposes. However, the author did not explain the factors that led to this achievement. Similarly, Murithi (2008) analysed the involvement of the AMIB and to what extent the mission achieved its tasks, but did not analyse the factors which contributed to the AU’s effectiveness in Burundi. In fact, many authors, such as Othieno and Samasuwo (2006), Sarkin (2009) and Møller (2009a) overlooked the root causes of the conflict or considering all the internal and external factors which influenced the outcomes of the mission. Despite the importance of these studies, their focus was on assessing the effectiveness of the AMIB in general and neglected the key factors which influenced the outcomes. This led their conclusions to be incomplete and leave open questions about what influences the effectiveness of the AU.

In contrast, other studies are more critical in their evaluations of this mission, with the arguments based on analyses of some factors which contributed to the AU’s effectiveness. Nonetheless, the results of these studies are usually insufficient due to the fact that they focus on some factors while ignoring others. For instance, Boshoff and Francis (2003) and
Ferreira (2009), argued that it was the willingness and efforts of African states, such as South Africa and Nigeria, which contributed to successful peacekeeping in war-torn states. Kristina and Southall (2005) and Daley (2007) argued that in addition to the commitment of member states particularly South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire and the DRC, the efforts of influential individual African leaders (e.g. Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere) positively affected the AMIB.

There is no doubt that African states are one of the basic pillars of the AU and its efforts in achieving peace and security across the continent. However, the willingness and the commitment of AU member states are not enough to keep with the numerous challenges and the variety of intrastate conflicts in Africa, especially in the shadow of the shortage of logistical and financial resources committed to dealing with these. In fact, as will be shown later, the commitment of AU member states was not the only factor that encouraged the AMIB since other factors also had an impact (e.g. the mandate of the AMIB, local consent and external support) on the mission. Indeed, the financial and logistical support of AU member states was not adequate to carry out the AMIB (Cilliers and Sturman, 2006; Murithi, 2009; Williams, 2011a). As it will be illustrated in section three, this gap was filled by the support of the international actors such as the UN, the EU and individual states.

Accordingly, another connected strand of literature within the debate has focused on the external support as the main factor of its effectiveness. A common theme within this debate is that the AU cannot be an effective organisation without the support of international actors such as the UN, EU and NATO (Bariagaber, 2008; Derblom et al, 2008; De Coning, 2010; Brosig, 2010). As Bariagaber (2008) argued, due to the financial problems of the AU, the external support particularly from the UN and the EU was the main factor of the effectiveness of AMIB and other missions. Similarly, Derblom et al (2008) considered that the AU is greatly dependent on the support of the UN, the EU and other donor states such as the USA and Canada. These authors mentioned the case of Burundi as evidence that the AU cannot be effective without the contribution of these influential actors. Without international support, the AMIB would not be able to achieve its mandate effectively (De Coning, 2010).

Contrary to the above studies, some scholars analysed and evaluated the AMIB by considering some internal and external factors. For instance, Franke and Esmenjaud (2008)
argued that the effectiveness of the AMIB in stabilising the situation in Burundi and preparing the ground for the subsequent UN operation was due to the support of the two hegemonic states (South Africa and Nigeria) and the external support from the western world. Powell (2005) maintained that regardless of the fact that the commitment of AU member states and the commitment of the international community were insufficient, they were behind the ability of the AMIB in achieving its tasks effectively. Williams (2006, 2008) also argued that the AU played an essential role in stabilising the situation in Burundi due to the commitment of some member states and the support of the international community.

What makes William’s (2006, 2008) studies more relevant is the fact that the author explained, in terms of the internal factors, the African states who contributed to the AU with financial guarantees, troops and logistical support for the AMIB and how the reluctance of other states had adversely affected the ability of the mission in resolving the conflict quickly. In terms of external actors, William emphasised that the “African solutions to the African problems” approach is not enough without the help of global actors. Although William’s studies give importance to the analysis of the commitment of the AU member states and the support of international actors in relation to their strengths and weaknesses, they did not examine other factors which have influenced the AU’s effectiveness, including in the case of the AMIB. For example, William neither refers to the mandate of the mission nor the local consent of parties to the dispute or the position of neighbouring states.

Focusing on one or multiple factors to analyse and evaluate the AMIB while ignoring other factors was not the only problem with the existing literature. The neglect of the internal process of the AU is another problem. As a matter of fact, the effectiveness of the internal process - which is an important aspect of any IO’s performance in peace operations - has been neglected by the existing literature on the AMIB which has predominantly focussed on the outcome. Moreover, there was no consensus among scholars regarding whether the mission was effective or not. While some scholars argued that the AMIB was effective in managing the conflict in Burundi, such as Murithi (2008), Boshoff et al (2010), Svensson (2008), Jeng (2010), and Been, (2011), other analysts have disagreed/ Examining the role of the AMIB and the results of the mission, they have stated that the AU was ineffective in managing not only the Burundian conflict but also in other places such as in Darfur and Somalia. For instance, Williams (2008: 327) argued that “the transformation of the AMIB
proves that the AU is unable to sustain its missions for a long time”. Omorogbe (2011:1) also maintained that “resource challenges undermined the AU’s ability to take effective action, and ultimately led to calls for the UN intervention”. The AU’s intervention in Burundi has not been effective due to the lack of support from its members as well as from other international actors (Kumar, 2009).

In my view, the unsystematic analysis within these various studies of the AMIB led to these dissimilar results. Accordingly, and in order to move the existing literature on the subject forward and fill the existing gaps, the study focuses on all the internal and external factors which are identified as having the potential to exert influence on the effectiveness of the AMIB. It will also analyse the internal processes of the AU regarding issuing its mission in Burundi and links it to the outcomes. Within this context, this case offers a real examination of the argument of this study which is the AU can play an effective role in managing intra-state conflicts, however its effectiveness is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mission’s mandate, the commitment of member states and the external support.

In order to introduce this argument, the chapter is divided into four main sections. It begins by giving the historical background and introducing the main players in the Burundian conflict. The second section examines the AU’s response to the eruption of the conflict. It analyses the AU's attitude towards the conflict and the circumstances leading to the deployment of its mission in the conflict’s zone. In this respect, major focus is given to the political and military efforts of the AU in managing the conflict. Then, the study focuses on the internal and external factors which influenced the AMIB’s effectiveness. Finally, the rest of the chapter looks at the overall evaluation of the AU’s effectiveness in managing this crisis.

4.2 Establishing the Background to the Conflict in Burundi

In order to underpin the analysis, the first step consists of identifying the root causes of the conflict and then examining both the dynamics and the complexity inherent to that particular problem. Such a process might eventually lead to the strategies to be adopted in order to deal effectively with complex conflicts, through appropriate management strategies and prompt solutions. Therefore, and in order to fully understand this crisis, it is
important to look at the wider geographical context before examining the conflict in Burundi.

The Burundi state, being one of Africa’s oldest nation-states, is also a country which until the present time did not go through geographic modifications of its landscape (Lemarchand, 1994). However, such an acknowledged advantage was not reflected when it comes to political and social realms. Since its independence in 1962, the country went through five coups, recurrent massacres, genocides, repressions, three assassinations of kings/presidents, three Republics and three new constitutions (Ayebare, 2010). In fact, the political dominance of the Tutsi minority was the main cause of conflict. Even though the Hutu ethnic group constitute more than 85% of the population, it is considered the second ethnic group as the Tutsi minority of around 14 % holds the principal power positions since the independence of the country (Svensson, 2008; Jeng, 2010).

Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the most relevant view of the conflict in Burundi is one that is mainly ethnic in nature and emerged as a result of the minority rule, where the Tutsi minority have dominated the Hutu majority. In fact, the colonial powers had their role in creating or at least exacerbating the ethnic division in Burundi. Curtis (2003) argued that the German colonial administration and later the Belgian privileged the Burundian royal family and Tutsis until independence. From this perspective, the dominance of the Tutsi minority is a historical product of the Burundian kingdom, encouraged first by German colonialism and later by Belgian colonial rule. The post-colonial regime continued the policy of ethnic exclusion. Indeed, the Tutsi elites, particularly from the Southern province of Burundi, continued to dominate the political, military and economic structures (Curtis, 2003; Peen, 2012).

It is worthy of note that the intrastate conflict in Burundi was hugely influenced by the civil war in Rwanda, where the population is also divided between a Tutsi minority and Hutu majority. The dominance of the Tutsi which was supported by Belgian colonialism was the main cause behind Rwanda’s Hutu revolution in 1959 (Williams, 2011b). In the aftermath of the Hutu uprising, thousands of Tutsi had to flee Rwanda and seek refuge in Burundi. This ethnic upsetting accentuated the problem in terms of ethnic hatred, it was like adding oil to the fire. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda continued and led eventually to the 1994 genocide, where nearly a million Tutsis and Hutus were killed (Staup, 2000; Alan, 2001).
Indeed, the Hutu revolution in Rwanda and the continuation of their insurrection to end the dominance of the Tutsi minority in the political, military and economic structures has transferred to its neighbouring Burundi with parallel characteristics. This uneven power division, repeatedly exploited by the Tutsi leadership, resulted in several Hutu rebellions (Svensson, 2008; Peen, 2012) such as in 1972 and in 1987. All the ensuing political instabilities and conflicts were due to repeated clashes and competition between Hutu and Tutsi groups including the reoccurrence of the conflict in 1994 (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). In fact, the new wave of conflicts drew not only African attention but also global attention due to the fear that the crisis would spill over to neighbouring states such as Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC (interviews with Burundian diplomat, 29/05/102 and a senior AU official, 14/11/2012).

As will be discussed in the coming sections, since 1993 this state has attracted a multitude of conflict prevention efforts and more standard humanitarian and development programs which were unprecedented for an African country (Zartman et al, 2006). For almost a decade a series of peace activities took place to end the conflict either by individual states (e.g. neighbouring states) or regional or international organisations (e.g. the OAU and the UN). However, they failed to do so due to the unwillingness of Burundi’s political parties to make concessions and sign the peace agreement (interview with Burundian diplomat, 29/05/2012).

Therefore the present study tries to determine whether or not the efforts made following the AU’s intervention in 2003 were more effective than the previous attempts in ensuring peace and stability. It evaluates whether the AU was vested with the appropriate will, knowledge, skills, resources, and a clear mandate to face the challenge represented by the conflict. It will also be essential to ascertain whether the initial expectations of the AU were too optimistic.

4.3 The New Conflict in Burundi

The new wave of violence in Burundi occurred immediately following the introduction of a multiparty system in the country in 1992 (Zartman et al, 2006; Boshoff et al, 2010). The

78 In 1972, Hutu rebels entered into Burundi from neighbouring Tanzania and attacked Tutsis, resulting with the killing of thousands of people. The Burundi army reacted violently to the Hutu attack, not distinguishing between rebels and Hutu civilians. In total, between 100,000 to 200,000 people were massacred. Nearly 150,000 people had to flee the country and to take refuge in Rwanda and Tanzania. 

79 In 1987, another conflict occurred in the North of Burundi when President Buyoya seized power through a bloody coup. This led to Hutu revenge and the killing of a number of Tutsis. The military’s intervention provoked the death of nearly 20,000 Hutus. Due to the great number of refugees in camps, these places became breeding grounds for recruiting Hutu fighters and future rebellions in the beginning of 1990s many rebel attacks has been launched into Burundi.
The beginnings of the new political era in 1992 were promising, with real intentions and attempts to run the country democratically. For instance, the new system “introduced the country’s first democratically elected Hutu President Ndadaye Melchior and a Parliament dominated by the Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)” (Peen, 2012: 277).

The move from military to civilian rule and to a more democratic political system instead of the precedent oligarchy allowed the election of a Hutu as a president for the first time in the nation’s history (Zartman et al, 2006). The newly-elected president tried to balance the power between his ethnic community and the Tutsis by first including in his government several Tutsis and by conducting reforms at the level of the army. However, the Tutsis remained very cautious and were worried of retaliations from the Hutus (interview with Burundian diplomat, 29/05/2012; see also: Boshoff et al, 2010; Peen, 2012).

According to this perspective, the result of the 1993 election was not considered by Tutsis as a democratic victory but as a Hutu victory. In this regard, Lemarchand (1996: 182) provided an accurate picture of the Tutsi perception of the results: “what is now emerging is institutionalisation of the tyranny of an ethnic majority, in short, a Jacobine state under Hutu control”. The fear of Hutu revenge and the desire to retake the power again encouraged a group of Tutsi officers to attack the presidential palace on 21st October 1993, murdering President Ndadaye as well as numerous high-ranking officials of FRODEBU, among them the speaker and deputy speaker of parliament (Zartman et al, 2006).

The assassination of Ndadaye led to renewed violence in Burundi. Many retaliatory attacks were committed on Tutsis throughout the country, which in turn motivated retaliation against Hutus by the Tutsis controlling the armed forces (Powell, 2005). These violent ethnic clashes cost the lives of 300,000 people in Burundi - most of them civilians - the exodus and internal displacement of 700,000, of these 400,000 Hutu fled to Tanzania (Weissman, 1998; Peen, 2012; UN, 2012a).

**4.4 The Parties to the Dispute**

Although the Burundian political parties initially formed before independence in 1962 (Boshoff et al, 2010), they became more organised after the attempt to run the country democratically during 1992-1993. According to Zartman et al, ( 2006:62) “One of the most significant aspects of the brief democratic experiment was that it elevated those involved in the Tutsi-Hutu ethnic conflict from crude mob-like organisations to official and well organised political parties”. As will be explained later, the political parties were not formed on political or constitutional bases but chiefly organised along ethnic grounds.
Accordingly, the major protagonists in the dispute were the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) representing the Tutsi and the Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) representing the Hutu (Svensson, 2008; Boshoff et al, 2010).

It is essential to highlight here the fact that each political party has a military wing. While the army was the military wing of UPRONA - the Tutsi-dominant political party - the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) was the military wing of FRODEBU (Daley, 2007; Peen, 2012). Both of these parties and their military wings were supported by other small political parties and military groups (Zartman et al, 2006; Peen, 2012). These are the main players in the Burundian conflict which undermined (as will appear later in the discussion) the efforts to solve the conflict due to the fact that the position of each of them regarding the conflict depended on their perceptions of the conflict. In other words, if one party considered itself in a weak position within the government, it would have withdrawn from it and declared war against the others. However, if it was satisfied with its share in the government, it would have automatically accused the other parties of not respecting the agreement (interview with Burundian Diplomat, 29/05/2012).

4.5 The Regional Effort to Solve the Burundian Crisis

After the catastrophic consequences of the assassination of Ndadaye in 1993, the OAU intervened politically to end the conflict. Its laborious negotiations were culminated by forming a coalition government. Although the president of the new government Cyprien Ntaryamira was from Hutu, the Tutsi elite restored the power (Boshoff, et al, 2010). However, this progress did not last for long. Only four months later, President Ntaryamira and Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana were assassinated as well. Their aeroplane was targeted and shot down over Kigali under still unclear circumstances (Zartman et al, 2006; Jeng, 2010). The efforts of the OAU continued and led to an agreement on 10th September 1994 (the Convention of Government [CG]) between the conflicting parties to put an end to the violence and appointed Sylvestre Ntibantunganya as head of the government. Nevertheless, the agreement failed and led some Hutu politicians to rejoin armed groups such as the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) which responded with attacks on civilians (Krueger and Krueger, 2007; Boshoff, et al, 2010).
It should be noted that while the conflict escalated again in Burundi in 1994, another ethnic conflict occurred simultaneously in Rwanda where the Hutus conducted a systematic massacre on a huge scale (e.g. genocide) of Tutsis. This event aroused the fears of many African states that the Burundian conflict could be regionalised especially due to the fact that military coalitions of various Tutsi factions were ruling the country. Consequently, bordering governments and other African states\textsuperscript{80} responded by launching the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi in 1995 to work on bringing a peace solution to the country\textsuperscript{81}. The collapse of the CG added to the withdrawal of Hutu politicians convinced the government to request regional military intervention (Zartman et al, 2006). This was supported by presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjmin Mkapa of Tanzania who invited the parties of the dispute to a summit in June 1996 and sought to persuade President Ntibantunganya to agree to let a regional peacekeeping force intervening in his country.

Nevertheless, the Burundian army and Major Pierre Buyoya - who replaced Ntibantunganya in a coup on 25\textsuperscript{th} July 1996 - did not accept any regional intervention (Boshoff et al, 2010). Buyoya announced immediately the suspension of the Constitution and decided to replace it with a three-year Transition Decree. Furthermore, all political parties were suspended and their leaders invited to participate in multi-party talks (International Crisis Group, 1998). This decision led Burundi’s neighbouring countries to impose comprehensive economic sanctions, expecting Burundi to restore the suspended constitution (Peen, 2012). The initiative taken by Burundi’s neighbours in imposing sanctions was backed by the OAU and the UNSC in Resolution 1072 (UN, 1996a). The resolution condemned the coup of the elected government and requested simultaneously the immediate restoration of the constitutional government and the necessity to reopen political negotiations. As a result, Burundi’s government withdrew from the negotiations and persuaded Tutsis that Nyerere, who was the architect of the process, was far from the right person because he was biased towards the Hutu cause (Svensson, 2008; Boshoff et al, 2010).

Despite continued efforts to solve the conflict in Burundi, there was no official agreement between the conflicting parties until 28\textsuperscript{th} August, 2000 when the Arusha Peace and

\textsuperscript{80}Such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Zambia, and Ethiopia.  
\textsuperscript{81}This initiative starts in November, and was led by Nyerere, former resident of Tanzania, and the presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC.
Reconciliation Agreement was signed. The involvement of several important African personalities - namely President Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and Jacob Zuma - was the main factor in reaching this agreement (Zartman et al, 2006). The Arusha agreement was the real starting point of the Burundian peace process due to the fact that it put the main basis of power-sharing between the Tutsis and Hutus (interview with Burundian official, 29/05/2012). According to Ayebare (2010:83) “The Arusha Agreement was a watershed accord since it directly addressed the issue of ethnicity in Burundi and devised a power-sharing arrangement that guaranteed security to the minority Tutsi and democracy to the majority Hutus”. In addition, it can be said that the Arusha agreement represented a phase in a much larger plan, which aimed to offer African solutions to African conflicts (Boshoff et al, 2010). Indeed, it has been observed that all ceasefire agreements signed later, between the parties in conflict, were based on the Arusha agreement for power-sharing. Despite the importance of Arusha agreement, it was not completely comprehensive since some parties did not sign it (UN, 2004a). Following the Agreement, many ceasefire agreements were signed between the government of Burundi and opposition parties but it was not until 2006 that all parties of dispute had signed an agreement with the government of Burundi under the auspices of the AU.

The failure of the regional attempts to persuade the conflicting parties to come to the negotiating table and stop the fighting was due to the incapacity to provide and deploy a peacekeeping mission which was extremely needed in Burundi (interviews with Burundian diplomat, 29/05/2012 and senior AU official, 13/11/2012). Indeed, and as will be shown later, the deployment of the AMIB played an important role not only in stopping the fighting between the parties but also in convincing them to join the mainstream political process.

4.6 The Response of the AU

Before analysing whether or not the AU responded rapidly to the eruption of the new conflict in Burundi, it is important to underline the fact that for this particular case it would be unfair to blame the AU for not being able to prevent the occurrence of the conflict in the first instance. This is because the tools of the AU - particularly the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which is intended to prevent civil wars - had not yet been established. This justification was also forwarded by a senior AU official who stated that:

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82 See, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord.pdf
“The AU cannot be blamed for not being able to prevent the eruption of Burundian conflict since the fact that the CEWS which is a responsible tool for data collection, analysis and communication of the information for conflict prevention came into force on 26th December, 2003, well after the outbreak of new Burundian crisis which started in 1994” (Interview, 14/11/2012).

Therefore, the study will not look at the AU’s effectiveness in preventing the eruption of the Burundi conflict, but rather focuses on its response after the outbreak.

It can be said that the approach to solving the conflict changed dramatically once the AU came into being, essentially for two reasons. First, despite the request by the Burundi government for a regional military intervention after the collapse of the 1996 peace process, neither the OAU nor neighbouring states were able to intervene militarily or at least send an observation mission. Second, it was also stated in the Arusha Agreement in 2000 that the government of Burundi was to submit a request for an international peacekeeping force to the UN. Notwithstanding, the UNSC refused to authorise a peacekeeping force claiming that there was no peace and comprehensive ceasefire agreement to keep (interview with former UN official, 01/07/2012; interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012; and interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012).

Moreover, in 2002 two ceasefire agreements were signed under the auspices of the Regional Peace Initiative between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) (Agoagye, 2004). It was stressed in the first agreement - signed on 7th October, 2002 - that the truce should be verified and controlled by peacekeepers and mandated by the UN or the AU (AU, 2003c). However, for the second time, the UN was hesitant to mandate the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, claiming that there was no a comprehensive and all-inclusive ceasefire in Burundi (interview with former UN official, 01/07/2012; interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012; and interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012). In addition, it was confirmed in the second agreement - signed on 2nd December, 2002 - that the whole implementation of the agreement was to be under the responsibility of the AU (i.e. both verification and control). The shifting from a UN to an African mission, in combination with reluctance within the UN to deploy troops without first having agreed on a

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83 See Protocol V of the Arusha Agreement.
84 See Article III of the Ceasefire Agreement between the TGoB and the (CNDD-FDD), available at [http://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%203%20Ceasefire%20agreement.pdf](http://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%203%20Ceasefire%20agreement.pdf)
comprehensive ceasefire agreement, led the AU to deploy a mission in Burundi in April 2003.

On one hand, the discussion above reflects the weaknesses of the UN as the primary operational organisation for peacekeeping on the African continent. This supports the observation made and discussed in Chapter 2; effectively, the UN’s failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and its reluctance to intervene in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia raised pertinent questions as to whether it was realistic to still consider the UN’s role as a peacekeeping actor to rely on when it comes to restoring and maintaining peace and security, particularly in Africa. On the other hand, it also reflects the fact that regional organisations can be more effective than the UN in managing conflicts in their own regions. These views are supported by an interview with a former UN official who stated that:

“The reluctance of the UN to act following Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 and its unwillingness to intervene in Burundi for almost ten years (1994-2004) provoked tough criticism to the global organisations and encouraged many regional and international organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, AU and NATO to involve in managing conflicts and sometimes without an authorisation from the UN” (Interview, 01/07/2012).

The seemingly unwillingness or inability of the UN to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi was justified by a senior UN official who stated that:

“the increase of the UN’s peace operations mandates around the world including conflict management, civilian protection, ensuring that elections occur in favourable conditions, contributing in the foundation of new governmental institutions did make a huge gap between what was required from the UN in terms of services and what the world organisation was able to deliver” (Interview, 21/06/2012).

Indeed, and as will be seen later, the UN’s role was limited to support the efforts being undertaken by the AU. This is not to imply that the UN did not participate in the Burundian conflict at all. Subsequently, I will discuss its role in the peace process and how it eventually replaced the AMIB with its own mission. However, the gap left by the inability
of the OAU and the reluctance of the UN to intervene in Burundi highlights the crucial importance of the intervention of the AU in changing the approach for the resolution of the conflict.

In fact, sending a peace mission after one year of the AU’s establishment can be considered an indicator that it undoubtedly marked a new departure from the practice of the OAU. However, the rapid response of the AU to the Burundian conflict is not the only feature which reflects its effectiveness, it is also important to evaluate the outcome of its efforts on the ground to ascertain the capacity of this new organisation in managing intra-state conflicts. Accordingly, the AU’s activities will be formulated through a two-pronged strategy: a political approach and an operational one. The former consists of finding a durable political agreement (settlement) between the conflicting parties, while the latter focuses on direct intervention and deployment of the AMIB.

The Political Settlement Tools
The efforts of the regional initiative to solve the conflict in Burundi were not successful since the fighting did not stop despite the signing of the Arusha Agreement on 28th August, 2000. This led the regional heads of state to mandate the AU to identify the intransigent groups and to make the appropriate recommendations if they continued outside the peace process (AU, 2002a). This initiative was an attempt to encourage AU member states to work collectively, and to decide unanimously how to deal decisively with the security problem posed by the rebel groups who refused to sign the Arusha Agreement (Murithi, 2005). Many African states supported this declaration, including Tanzania, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique and Kenya. In order to operationalize the Arusha Agreement, the AU sent its Special Representative in Burundi, Ambassador Mamadou Bah, to discuss the progress of the ceasefire negotiations and the creation of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry (AU, 2002a).

In order to persuade all conflict parties - particularly CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL - to sign a comprehensive ceasefire, the former Chairperson of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, organised a summit with the neighbouring countries of Burundi in Dar-es-Salaam on 6-7th October, 2002. According to the recommendations of that Conference, CNDD-FDD and

85 This agreement did not satisfy all the parties, since some of them refused to sign it. The Agreement was signed by 17 Burundian political parties, the government and the National Assembly. However, the main insurgent groups refused to sign (i.e. the (CNDD-FDD) and (PALIPEHUTU). See Protocol V of the Arusha Agreement (28 Aug 2000).
PALIPEHUTU-FNL were requested to restart political negotiations with the transition government with the aim of reaching a ceasefire agreement within a month. This summit was considered as a positive step to restore peace, security and stability in Burundi as well as the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement (AU, 2002a). The continued efforts by the AU culminated in the signing of a comprehensive ceasefire between CNDD-FDD, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the TGoB on 2nd December 2002 in Arusha (AU, 2003d). The signing of the ceasefire agreement by the conflicting groups on the side-lines of the Dar-As-Salaam Summit was welcomed by the UNSC (UN, 2002b).

The signing of this agreement was vital to the peace process in Burundi (AU, 2003d). According to the report of the AU’s chairperson, the success of the AU in bringing all parties of the dispute to the negotiating table and signing a ceasefire agreement for the first time was an important factor not only in deploying an AU peacekeeping mission but also in achieving other objectives such as cessation of fighting and renouncing to all what can endanger the full implementation of the peace process. Following the recognition of PALIPEHUTU-FNL and CNDD-FDD as political parties, some calm was observed in the country (AU, 2003d). After signing the ceasefire agreement, the only remaining challenge was the lack of a reliable and trusty peacekeeping force to control its proper implementation. This gap was filled by sending the AMIB in April 2003 with a remit “to lead the process for verification and monitoring of the cease-fire; the establishment of joint liaison teams, composed of representatives of all the signatory parties and the African Mission, to operate at national, provincial and local levels” (AU, 2003b).

The diplomatic and political efforts of the AU to achieve peace and security in Burundi have continued even after the replacement of its mission by the UN mission. In May 2004, the AU decided in its 9th meeting to incite the parties of the dispute to make greater efforts towards a peaceful conclusion of the conflict. This could be done by accepting the modalities of the AU, such as the organisation of transparent elections, and by facilitating the disarmament and reintegration process of the combatants. The AU also welcomed the adoption by the UNSC, on 21st May, 2004 a resolution authorizing the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Burundi (AU, 2004a). However, the AU requested the AUC Chairperson to ensure that the AU maintained a permanent observer mission in Burundi, to keep supporting the implementation of the peace process and cooperate with the UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi (ONUB) (UN, 2004b). In November 2004, the AU observed that in Resolution 1545 related to UN involvement in Burundi it was not specified that political leaders had to be protected. In order to fill this gap, the AU created
the Protection Force within the AMIB. Accordingly, it was decided that the Protection Force was required to work under the AU mandate and to keep providing protection to Burundi’s political leaders, as well as any other support needed, during the transition in Burundi and in close cooperation with the UN mission (AU, 2004c).

The AU was present in Burundi even after the success of the presidential election. When Pierre Nkurunziza was elected on 26th August, 2005 the AU emphasised that there was a need to encourage and protect the efforts of the new government and to strengthen peace and rebuild the country. In this regard, the AU asked officials in its office in Burundi to submit, at the right time, a full report on what the AU’s contribution should be to ensure the reconciliation process and bring peace to Burundi. Moreover, the report should consider what will happen with the force meant to protect Burundi’s political leaders, (in accordance with the decision adopted by the AUPSC at its 20th Meeting held on 15th November, 2004) (AU, 2005b). On 19th June 2006, the AUPSC requested from the AUC Chairperson to keep supporting the peace, national reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Burundi. In addition, the African organisation encouraged the Chairperson to consider and implement all necessary measures with all AU partners, in order to monitor and assess the effective implementation of a peace agreement in Burundi (AU, 2006b). In September 2006, the Burundian Government sent a Note Verbale, formally requesting the AMIB to take the appropriate measures to protect not only the PALIPEHUTU-FNL leaders but also provide safe corridors through which they would pass. Accordingly, the AU strengthened its mission in Burundi by nominating two senior military officers as the AU’s representatives in the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) and renting working premises for the JVMM86, and the Headquarters of the protection force. Moreover, the AU arranged to send military observers to represent the AU in the Joint Liaison Teams (JLT)87. In July 2007, the AU emphasized the role of socio-economic development in enhancing the peace process in Burundi (AU, 2006c) and called upon the international community to provide the necessary assistance to the people of Burundi. In this regard, the AU also called on the donor community to honour their pledges with a view to facilitating post-conflict reconstruction (AU, 2007a).

86 The JVMM was inaugurated on 11th October. JVMM involves the AU, the UN and the Burundian parties. Under the activities devolving upon the JVMM, “the AU will be required to assist with the provision of security for combatants during their movement towards the assembly areas as well as the protection of the leadership”.

87 The Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) consisting of representatives of all belligerents, the UN and the AU. Its main task is to verify and control of the ceasefire agreement.
The chronological, detailed and prolonged analysis of the AU’s political efforts reveals that it did not spare any efforts to solve the Burundian conflict. It also reflects that the AU is more effective than its predecessor. Nevertheless, it might be ambiguous or even overstated to say that AU’s effectiveness results from its political efforts. The various efforts on the ground played a role and should be taken into account when assessing the AU effectiveness in intrastate conflict management.

*The Military Settlement Tools*

The need for military intervention or a peace keeping mission was explicitly requested as an essential tool to solve the Burundi conflict. As discussed earlier, it was stated in Article 8 of the Arusha Agreement that “immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the UN a request for an international peacekeeping force”\(^88\). It was also stated under Article III of the October 2002 ceasefire agreement that the TGoB and the APPMs agreed that the “verification and control of the ceasefire may be conducted by a UN mandated mission, or an AU mission”\(^89\). Conversely, the ceasefire signed in December 2002 confirmed in Article III that the verification and control of this agreement should be conducted by the AU\(^90\). As discussed in the previous section, the AU accepted to deploy its mission after the explicit reluctance of the UN to fulfil this task.

The heads of state agreed to the creation of the AMIB at the level of a meeting of the Central Organ at its 7\(^{th}\) Ordinary Session on the 3\(^{rd}\) February 2003 (AU, 2003e). It was the AU’s first deployment of armed forces. It mandated for an initial period of one year, subject to renewal and “pending the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force to be mandated by the UNSC” (AU, 2004d). The AMIB was an integrated operation consisting of military forces from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa in addition to observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (interview with senior AU official, 14/6/2012). The main contributor was South Africa which sent 1,600 troops then Ethiopia 980 troops and Mozambique which sent 280 persons. At its height there were 3,335 troops deployed in Burundi (Jeng, 2010; Peen, 2012).

The major objectives of the AMIB were to monitor and control the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; to support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on

\(^{88}\) See, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.

\(^{89}\) See Article III of the Ceasefire Agreement between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD on December 2002, available at [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdbdatabase/peace/Bar%20200031116.pdf](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdbdatabase/peace/Bar%20200031116.pdf)

\(^{90}\) See Article III of the Ceasefire Agreement between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD.
how to reintegrate the fighters; establish appropriate conditions for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission; and to help the return of political and economic stability in Burundi (AU, 2003b). As it will be shown in analysing the mandate of the AMIB, these objectives were implemented through several operational tasks. The AMIB sought to achieve the above objectives since its deployment in April 2003 until it was replaced by the UN operation. On the 21st May 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1545 authorising the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi (ONUB) (UN, 2004b). After one month, AMIB was formally taken over by and absorbed into the ONUB (the acronym ONUB being used in all languages) (UN, 2004b).

An interesting point which should be underlined here is the fact that the transformation of the AMIB to the ONUB is evidence for what has been argued earlier: that the role of the UN in Africa can be only complementary to the role of the AU which creates a new norm in international relations. Indeed, this transformation is the first process in terms of the security cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. It can be considered as an ideal example of the relationship between universalism and regionalism in the 21st Century and suggests relevant solutions for future AU-UN security and peacekeeping operations.

It should be also noted that this shift was very soft and helped to complete the efforts of the AMIB (interview with former UN official, 01/07/2012 and interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012). The ONUB mandate was successfully concluded on 31st December 2006 (UN, 2006b). This success led to transfer the ONUB to a new UN mission - the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) by UNSC Resolution 1719 of 25th October 2006 (UN, 2006c). However, the question to answer here is whether or not the success of the UN mission was a consequence of the AMIB effectiveness in stabilising the situation in Burundi. The next section will look at the effectiveness of the AMIB and the extent to which the mission helped to solve the conflict in Burundi.

4.7 Explaining the Effectiveness of the AMIB

As stated in the theoretical framework, understanding the effectiveness of international and regional organisations should proceed on two distinctive stages. The first level focuses on understanding the internal process of an organisation. The second level consists of analysing the outcomes of the intervention. Nevertheless, before explaining the AMIB effectiveness, it is important to discuss the conflict environment which influences to a very large extent, the outcomes of any intervention and help to reach accurate conclusions.
4.8 Factors Influencing the AMIB’s Effectiveness

The internal and external factors that exert an influence on the effectiveness of international and regional organisations are the mandate of the mission, the commitment of member states and the external support either by IOs or individual states. Accordingly, the following section is devoted to analyse these factors and how they affected the effectiveness of the AMIB.

*Mandate of the mission*

It has been highlighted in the theoretical framework that a clear mandate is often cited as a factor in the effectiveness of the peace operation missions. In the case of an unclear or limited mandate for an AU operation, the outcomes of the intervention will be adversely affected. Therefore, the focus here will be to examine whether or not the mandate of the AMIB was clear, realistic and achievable. In order to address the issue and give an answer to the above question, the study looks at a number of indicators.

The first indicator is the extent to which the AU applied its principles as enounced in its CA. For example, the CA establishes that AU troops in the conflict zone have the right to use their arms against the aggressors to protect civilians. Thus, the focus here will be on whether or not the AU was able to apply this norm on the ground. The second criterion is the relationship between the mandate and the resources available. The third indicator is the size of the mandate. In other words, is there any limitation in the size of the AU mandate in relation to the number of troops? The final criterion is about whether the mandate was clear or not, as it was conjectured that mandates with a big number of tasks might cause mandate overload and affect the effectiveness of the intervener on the ground.

However, before analysing, measuring and evaluating the cited indicators against the AMIB mandate, it is important to look at the objectives of this mission as specified in its mandate. The objectives of the AMIB were to:

- Oversee the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements.
- Support disarmament and demobilization initiatives and advise on reintegration of combatants.
- Strive towards ensuring that conditions favourable for the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping mission.
• Contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi (AU, 2003e).

These objectives were implemented through a number of operational tasks which are as follows:

• Establish and maintain liaison between the Parties.

• Monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements.

• Facilitate the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and Technical Committees for the establishment and restructuring of the National defence and Police Forces.

• Secure identified assembly and disengagement areas.

• Facilitate safe passage for the Parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas.

• Facilitate and provide technical assistance to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process.

• Facilitate the delivery of the humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons.

• Coordinate mission activities with UN presence in Burundi.

• Provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders (AU, 2003b).

By looking at the above aims and tasks of the AMIB, it appears that the mission did not specifically include the protection of civilians. It was mandated only to use force in self-defence, to ensure its autonomy in terms of movement, to protect its own personnel and equipment as well as returning leaders and refugees. Although the mandate of the AMIB was issued in accordance with the UN principles, international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict (AU, 2003b), the AU was unable to implement the principles as enounced in its CA and which are linked with the first criterion of measuring and evaluating its effectiveness on the ground.
In other words, it is clearly stated in the AUCA that the Union has the right to intervene in order to stop war crimes. Nevertheless, it is evident that the AU was not able to apply this norm on the ground since its mission mandate was limited to protect its own personnel and equipment as well as returning leaders and refugees. In fact, the AMIB depended upon the local consent of conflicting parties, and its mandate was ambiguous regarding whether the mission had the right which would allow for intervention to stop war crimes (crimes which were real, witnessed and recorded in Burundi) (interview with Burundian diplomat, 09/06/2012). Accordingly, the AU fell down in addressing its new norm by using force against the perpetrators to protect civilians.

In terms of the second criterion, which is the balance between the mandate and the resources available, the AU was suffering from inadequate resources to carry out its mission. For example, even though the decision to deploy the AMIB was taken on the 2nd April 2003, the main providers of troops, Ethiopia and Mozambique, did not deploy until October 2003 due to economic restraints (interview with Burundian diplomat, 09/06/2012). It should be noted here that the AU had decided that the troop contributing countries were to be supported during the first two months and maintain a reserve of fourteen days throughout the mission (AU, 2003b), which is very hard for the majority of African states to achieve (interview with former UN official, 01/07/2012; interview with Burundian diplomat, 29/5/2012). The previous example does not only prove that there was not a balance between the mandate of the mission and available resources but shows also that there was a problem in terms of troop magnitude. The relatively small number of troops of the AMIB affected its effectiveness to completely implement its tasks on the ground (interview with Burundian diplomat, 09/06/2012; interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012; 20/11/2012). In terms of the clarity of the mandate, it seems that the significant number of tasks did cause mandate overload and affected the mission’s effectiveness on the ground. The multiplicity of objectives in the shadow of limited resources did affect the clarity and feasibility of the AMIB’s mandate (interview with UN senior official, 21/11/2012; interview with Burundian diplomat, 09/06/2012).

Commitment of Member States

In order to understand the extent to which the commitment of member states influenced the AMIB effectiveness, the study focuses on a number of criteria (identified in Chapter 3) which are the political commitment by member states, the financial and logistical commitments, and the involvement of influential states.
In order to measure the commitment, the focus will be on whether the member states of AU have respected the principles and objective adopted unanimously regarding the Burundian conflict\textsuperscript{91}. Indeed, the political obligation of AU member states regarding the Burundian conflict was significantly high. This is because the fact that all AU member states were willing to solve the conflict, particularly the neighbouring states which did not spare their efforts to accomplish peace in Burundi (interviews with AU senior officials, 13/11/2012). Indeed, and as has been highlighted in Chapter 3, the position in neighbouring countries can influence to a very large extent the effectiveness of any mission. If the bordering countries of the host state support the peace mission, the mission will be expected to effectively implement its objectives (Francis, 2007; Diehl, 2008). In fact, it was not only the neighbouring countries of Burundi who were willing to solve the conflict but also all African states. This was confirmed by a senior AU official who stated that:

“The general consensus among member states at the AU headquarters in 2003 to intervene in Burundi proves that all AU members, particularly the neighbouring ones were willing to end the war. This in turn had a positive impact on the outcomes of the AMIB” (Interview, 21/11/2012).

While the member states met the criterion in terms of political commitment, they failed to fulfil the second criterion which is the military and logistical commitment. For instance, there was a problem in relation to the troop magnitude. On the one hand, the number of troops was small (3,335 troops including civilian components) especially comparing to the tasks of the mission’s mandate. The mission was struggling to implement several tasks simultaneously due to the small number of its troops (interview with Burundian official, 20/6/2012 and interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012). On the other hand, the fact that only three member states constitute the AMIB (Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique) from a possible fifty-four confirms that the AU depended on the participation of a small handful of main troop-contributing countries. The reluctance of the rest of member states to participate was due to economic restraints, especially amongst those which are considered as poor states (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012)\textsuperscript{92}.

\textsuperscript{91}About the AU’s principles and objectives see Chapter 2, page 49-51.

\textsuperscript{92}As it is well known, the poorest countries in the world are in Africa. According to the UN’s report, 33 of the 48 poorest countries in the globe are in Africa and thus they are unable to participate by sending troops
In fact, the financial shortcomings of the AU have also affected the will of its member states to send troops not only to Burundi but also on other missions. According to the AU’s ‘concept of self-sustainment’, countries which are willing to provide troops for missions should ensure their maintenance during the first two months of deployment (AU, 2003b). Such a provision is open to harsh criticism since the required condition represents impossibility for several of the AU’s member states (interview with African analyst, 12/06/2012).

This is what was observed regarding the two troop contributor-states (Ethiopia and Mozambique) to the AMIB. For instance, Ethiopia from the start was concerned since the government was not sure it could maintain its troops in Burundi and participate in the operation over a sustained period of time. Eventually, it was the United States of America who financed the Ethiopian deployment while the UK decided to sponsor the Mozambican deployment (Svensson, 2008; Boshoff et al, 2010). However, these external contributions were not able to prevent the delay of the deployment of the main body of Mozambican and Ethiopian troops (interview with Burundian diplomat, 09/06/2012).

In addition to economic restraints, the fragility of the ceasefires and the continuation of armed clashes have also been considered as another factor fuelling the reluctance of many member states with respect to participating in AMIB. The scepticism with regard to the success of the numerous peace processes, the overt enmity of some parties of the dispute towards the AMIB and that the mission itself might provoke even more casualties were the main reasons behind the reluctance of many African states directly intervene (interviews with senior AU officials, 09/11/2012, 20/11/2012). Despite this justification, other officials from diverse organisations such as the EU have a different perspective. They have argued that despite the AU having a membership of fifty-four states, the AMIB personnel consisted of troops from only three countries which in turn reflected the reality that the commitment of AU members was not as expected by the AU, the EU and the UN officials (interview with senior EU official, 17/11/2012).

The AU not only consistently struggled to organise the requisite military personnel but also could not obtain a range of military assets needed for its mission in Burundi. Even after the deployment of troops, the AMIB remained under-equipped in other ways. It should be noted that among the assets in uppermost demand in difficult African conflicts such as Burundi, Sudan and Somalia are: helicopters (utility and attack); armoured personnel carriers; communications and intelligence equipment; unmanned aerial vehicles; and night vision goggles. It was clear that the AMIB suffered from serious funding problems particularly in these specific categories. According to Boshoff et al (2010:70), “even though it was appreciated of the funds contributed by donors, AMIB suffered from a serious lack of indispensable equipment which had logistical as well as operational implications”.

The funding problems of the AMIB were due to weak financial resources and the reluctance of the international community to fully finance the operation and enable it to reach the fixed objectives (Jeng, 2010; Peen, 2012). Consequently, the insufficient financial and logistical help by its partners and sponsors prevented the AMIB to fulfil its aims and implement entirely its peacekeeping measures. The reasons behind the reluctance or insufficient support of external actors will be discussed in the coming section. The insufficient commitment of the AU member states was not only in terms of military magnitude and equipment but there was also a problem in financing the AMIB.

Despite the AU setting up a special fund to finance the mission (AU, 2003e) the greatest part of the costs was covered by external partners. For the first year, it was estimated that the total budget was about US$110 million (for the deployment, operations and sustainment of the mission). However, following the first fourteen months, the budget reached a total of US$134 million. Such an amount represents in fact more than one third of the whole AU Commission budget for 2003 (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). Out of the $50m promised to the AU, only $10m was provided, not including the contributions of the US and the UK (Agoagye, 2004; Svensson, 2008). This reflects the fact that inadequate funding is emblematic of member states’ general unwillingness to provide the organization with sufficient financial resources.
The Local Consent of Parties to Dispute

In the Burundian conflict, the antagonistic parties were the TGoB and the Hutu rebel movements which had been represented by two main groups - CNDD and PALIPEHUTU. Regarding the TGoB’s attitude, the AMIB enjoyed full cooperation in terms of sites of the mission’s camps, the peace negotiations with other parties, the efforts of disarmament and the return of refugees (interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012). This attitude conforms to the requirements and agreements made with the TGoB.

Effectively, it was stated in the Arusha Agreement in 2000 and under Article III of the October 2002 ceasefire agreement that verification and control of the ceasefire could be conducted by a UN mission, or an AU mission. Eventually, and as agreed between Burundi’s authorities and the AU Mission, the AMIB was authorised to operate in Burundi through its Status of Force of the African Mission in Burundi (SOFA). What is important to highlight here is the fact that SOFA was able to ensure the freedom of movement of the AMIB and such an achievement was essential and helped considerably in fulfilling its mandate (Boshoff et al, 2010).

Conversely to the position of the TGoB, the opposition parties, particularly CNDD and PALIPEHUTU, did not cooperate fully with the AMIB (interviews with senior AU officials, 09/11/2012 and 20/11/2012). Indeed, the reluctance of some parties to fully cooperate with the AMIB had adversely influenced its efforts in implementing its objectives. For instance, when the Arush Agreement was signed, various armed offshoots of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU rebelled against their political parties at Arusha and wanted to be granted a new status of independent organisations (Boshoff et al, 2010). Although when an agreement was reached with most parties in Pretoria in August 2004, there was still uncertainty in regard to a few parties who were reluctant to accept several elements included in the peace agreement (ICG, 2004).

Moreover, some parties threatened the AMIB but the mission was not intimidated and made it clear to the armed parties its determination to fulfil its mission (interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012). These examples show the extent to which had the AMIB struggled to deal with and persuade these parties to join the peace talks and to reintegrate them in the national army and government of Burundi.
External Support from other Organisations

The role of the UN

Despite the fact that the UN was involved in the Burundian conflict since its upsurge, its efforts have been criticised particularly regarding its reluctance to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi where it was badly needed. Indeed, the major world organisation was reluctant to deploy a mission until the situation became stable after the deployment of the AMIB (Agoagye, 2004). Moreover, its support to the AMIB was very limited (Svensson, 2008; Jang, 2010; Been, 2011). According to the UNSC Report on Burundi, ‘the mission suffered from a serious lack of funds and logistic support’ and that these “constraints under which AMIB is operating prevent the force from fully implementing its mandate” (UN, 2004a). Despite such explicit recognition of the intricacy of the situation in Burundi, the UN did not provide the AMIB with any support until October 2004, approximately six months after deployment (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012). In this regard, Boshoff et al (2010) argued that many opportunities were wasted for managing the conflict due to the delays of the UN logistical support to the AMIB.

This is not to imply that the UN did not contribute to the resolution of Burundian conflict. However, from whichever angle it is viewed, it can be observed that the approach of the UN regarding African conflicts changed since the end of the Cold War, as argued in Chapter 2. In fact, the AMIB empirically confirmed this argument or new approach of managing conflicts, where the preliminary response to a conflict comes from African organisations while the complementary role of the UN comes once the situation is stable on the ground. This argument was also confirmed by a UN senior official who stated that:

“the rise of UN’s peace keeping missions worldwide created huge gaps between the enormous needs required from the UN and what this international body was able to provide. This in turn has forced the UN to enhance the African actors, mainly the AU, to deal with the African conflicts, at least in the first instances, to react quickly when faced with emergency situations or make it much easier to the involvement of the UN” (interview, 9/05/2012).

This is what happened with the case of Burundi. After more than ten years of reluctance to intervene (since 1994) due to the complexity of the situation on the ground, the UNSC

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93 It is essential to underline that the role of the UN is sometimes limited to only financial and logistical support as it will be seen in the case of Somalia conflict.
passed Resolution 1545 (UN, 2004b) to authorise the deployment of ONUB when the situation became more stable. Despite the delay, the deployment of ONUB improved the image of the UN amongst Africans (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012).

The role of the EU

Despite the fact that the EU has been often willing to support the African organisations especially when it comes to the peace and security, its role in supporting the AMIB was not satisfying (interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012). The lack of EU support can be explained, to some extent, by its unfamiliarity and uncertainty with the newly founded AU. In fact, it was the AU’s first military peacekeeping operation and such a factor was not encouraging either for the EU or for other potential donors. Moreover, the AU’s predecessor did not enjoy a great reputation in Europe due its ineffectiveness in managing conflicts in the continent (interviews with senior AU officials, 09/11/2012 and 20/11/2012; interview with Burundian diplomat, 20/06/2012).

Furthermore, the behaviour of some African states harshly restricted the quality and sustainability of the external support either by the EU or individual states such as the UK, Germany, France Italy and so on (interview with senior EU official, 14/11/2012). In this regard, Omach (2000; 73) argued that “States participating [in international capacity building programmes] do so with the primary motive of strengthening their military forces to deal with internal conflicts rather than the need to participate in regional peacekeeping”.

Indeed, some African states such as Nigeria, Uganda and Senegal were involved in such behaviour (Cilliers, 1999; Frank, 2009).94 Such resultant behaviour of some African states had adversely affected the external support to African organisations including the AU, especially in its early stages. However, this impression (as it will be noted in the other cases) has been changed since the support of the EU and its individual states has increased dramatically in the last few years due to the notable difference between the ability of the AU and its predecessor the OAU in managing intrastate conflicts. The truth that the AMIB did a lot with the little resources it had convinced the EU and other potential donors to increase their support to the efforts of the new organisation in its intervention in other conflicts in the continent (interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012).

94 Nigeria as the hegemonic state in the continent which is considered one of the main troop contributors to the African peace operation was accused of using material and training mainly provided for the activities of ECOWAS and the AU and instead to use them against the rebels in Niger Delta region. Uganda was also accused of using its troops which were trained and equipped under the Western capacity-building programmes in its campaign agonist the Lord’s Resistance Army, at the same time as Senegal who did the same in its activities in the Casamance territory. See, Frank, Security cooperation in Africa (2009), page 270.
Despite the influence of the above matters on the support of the EU and other donors to the AMIB, the EU was not completely absent. It was present and supported the AMIB in some ways. For instance, the disarmament, mobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants was one among other duties of the AMIB mandate. In order to achieve this task, the AMIB established quarters at Muyange during June/July 2003 to disarm members of the CNDD and the PALIPEHUTU (AU, 2003b). However, the fact that the site lacked proper infrastructure, and there was no food medical supplies available in the shadow of the limited financial resources prevented the achievement of this task (interview with Burundian diplomat, 20/6/2012)\(^5\). This financial gap for the proper implementation of the DDR programme induced the AU to request the EU to fill this gap by supplying food and medical aid, due to the fact that fighters kept coming in great numbers through the region in August 2003.

It was necessary to obtain extra funding because the expected twelve month period was not enough and the process continued for another seven months until the end of March 2005. At that point, all fighters disarmed and were settled in the appropriate camps (Boshoff et al, 2010). The full amount provided by the EU to the AMIB was €25 million (Carbone, 2013). This in fact was a major contributor to the success of the DDR operation and other tasks of the AMIB (interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012).

**Individual States’ Support to the AMIB**

The support by external actors to the AMIB was not only limited to IOs, there were also several states which had their role in financing and supporting the mission, such as the US which contributed US$6.1 million and the UK provided US$6 million to back the deployment of the Ethiopian and Mozambican forces (Svensson, 2008). Moreover, there were other individual states which participate in financing the AMIB such as Italy: €200,000; Denmark: US$1 million for insignia and medals; Germany: €400,000 (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012).

Indeed, the financial support by the above states was an important source in filling the gap which was left by the low levels of commitment of AU member states and enabled the AMIB to carry out its tasks. In fact, the AU not only sought to build a strong relationship with international and regional organisations as discussed earlier but it has also engaged in signing many agreements with individual states particularly the powerful ones such as the

\(^5\)The first intention of the AMIB was to implement a DDR programme funded by the World Bank and other donors but the World Bank, various UN organisations and most humanitarian NGOs were reluctant to finance and assist the DDR process.
US, China and Canada. For example, there is a strong partnership between the US and the AU, and a special focus on the development of mutual interest areas, particularly in peace and security. According to an interview with a senior AU official:

“since the establishment of the U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU) in 2006, the US did assist consistently the AU and supported its peace and security programs (i.e. such as the African Standby Force, and a pan-African military corps). In addition to its financial contribution, it has also shared its expertise to the continuing expansion of a sound maritime strategy and was heavily involved in the building of an indispensible medical planning capability of the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). To fill the shortage of the necessary communication equipment, the US provided it. The required training was also added as a support to the AU, which aimed to develop an African communication structure made of regional standby brigades and ongoing peace support operations” (Interview, 20/11/2012).

The AU has also sought to build a strong relationship with China as an important actor in international arena in the 21st Century. In fact, both sides agreed to build a strategic partnership through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was launched in November 2006 (AU, 2006b). According to an interview with a senior AU official:

“the aims of this initiative is to deepen cooperation between China, the AU and its member states in peace and security domains, as well as providing funding system for AU peacekeeping missions, developing an African Standby Force, training a greater number of AU peacekeepers and officials in peace and security areas” (Interview, 20/06/2012).

According to the same senior AU official, the AU has been working closely with a number of European states (e.g. the UK, France, Italy and Germany, etc.) particularly in the peace and security domain. In fact, the European countries not only supported the AMIB but also other AU missions, as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6. However, the interest here was about whether the individual support of these states is linked to the EU or not. In other words, we need to know whether the huge contribution of these states to the AMIB fell under the umbrella of the EU, or represented only these countries independently. The answer of a senior EU official was as follows:
“the support of individual European states is not included within the EU support, (or it is not a part of the EU contribution). These countries pay their financial duties to the EU as member states and the EU does not have any problem if these states are willing to provide their own support individually in order to help other actors or to achieve or protect their national interests” (Interview, 14/11/2012).

4.9 The Effectiveness of the AMIB

The evaluation of the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in general must not be focused (as discussed in the theoretical framework) only on the outcome of the intervention but also on the internal process, which represents an important aspect of the effectiveness of these institutions. To measure the effectiveness of the internal process, two indicators have been identified. The first one is the general consensus among the AU’s member states in issuing the resolution of the intervention and responding quickly to the crisis.

The second criterion is the level of coordination among the AU’s mechanisms in applying the aims of its mission on the ground. Regarding the first criterion, although the AU had been established only a year earlier the member states were unanimously agreed to intervene in Burundi, particularly its neighbours (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012 and 20/11/2012). The fact that the AU was able to intervene after one year of its launch in a location where the UN was reluctant to get involved confirms on the one hand that this nascent organisation responded rapidly to the Burundian conflict and, on the other hand, that it is increasingly stronger than its predecessor. In terms of coordination among its mechanisms, even though the AU was in its early stages, the level of coordination between its tools on the ground and its headquarters in Ethiopia in managing the peace process as well as the military activities seemed promising (interviews with senior AU officials, 12/11/2012 and 13/11/2012). Indeed, the political and military efforts of the institution reflects the fact that the AU responded rapidly to the conflict and effectively linked its political and military activities which led (as will be seen shortly) to the stabilisation of the situation in the country.

As outlined earlier, measuring the outcomes will not be only against the tasks of the mission as specified in its mandate but also against the core goals of peace operations, which are violence abatement, violence containment and violence settlement. Accordingly, the study looks at the extent to which these indicators have been addressed on the ground.
Regarding the first criterion, violence abatement or the ability of the intervention in reducing the conflict between parties of dispute, the mission was effective in supervising the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The presence of the AMIB and the deterrence activities conducted allowed the reduction of violence and helped to establish a safe environment as a prelude to peace. Looking at the conflict deaths and missing persons, the mission was most active in reducing the severity of the conflict particularly the casualties figures among the combatants and civilians in the fighting area (interview with Burundian diplomat, 20/06/2012). The mission was also effective in protecting food and medical supplies as it was able to reach its final destination by moving progressively from a location to another (interviews with senior AU official, 13/11/2012). The AMIB was able not only to control the violence but also contributed to the prevention of its intensification and diffusion (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012, 20/11/2012; interviews with senior UN officials, 29/05/2012 and 21/11/2012; interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012).

Indeed, these perceptions by senior officials of different organisations seems to challenge the argument of many scholars who argue that the AU was not effective in its intervention in Burundi such as Akonor (2007), Williams (2008) Kumar (2009) and Omorogbe (2011). As has been argued, the AMIB was able to manage effectively armed conflict and to ensure viable conditions to facilitate the implementation of the peace and ceasefire agreements, the DDR programme, the UN deployment, the furthering of all political processes and to favour Burundi’s economic development.

In relation to the second criterion, the conflict containment the mission was effective in this regard as well. As discussed in the theoretical framework, conflict containment involves the success in preventing the violent conflict in the era of deployment, the spread of the conflict to other regions and containing the conflict in the area of original deployment. With respect to the first indictor, the mission was able to prevent both the spread of the conflict and the involvement of other actors particularly form Burundi’s neighbour Rwanda where the country has the same ethnic groups (interview with Burundian diplomat, 20/06/2012). Moreover, the AMIB was effective in containing the conflict in the areas of deployment. This has been noticed by considering other metrics such as the reduction of casualties among fighting parties as well as among civilians, the prevention of the flows of weapons and disarming combatants by implementing the disarmament, mobilisation and reintegration program (DDR). Indeed, the AMIB was not

96 Regarding the DDR see page 143.
only effective in stabilising the situation in Burundi but also helped facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced people and delivery of humanitarian aid (interview with senior AU official, 13/11/2012; and interview with Burundian diplomat, 20/06/2012). In this regard, Agoayye (2004:14) estimated that 95 per cent of the country was stable at the end of the AMIB deployment. It should be noted here that there is an interaction (i.e. mutual influence) and positive effect between conflict abatement and conflict containment. Undoubtedly, the AMIB was able to reduce not only the conflict shooting incidents but as well to lessen the intensity of the main new conflict instances. Furthermore, the mission, by minimising the casualties, impacted positively on the prevention of conflict expansion.

In relation to the last criterion, the conflict settlement or the ability of the intervention in ending the conflict between parties of dispute, the AMIB was effective in meeting this indicator. In fact, conflict abatement and conflict containment have a positive influence on the effectiveness of conflict settlement. As discussed earlier, some parties of dispute did not sign the Arusha Agreement for Burundi. However, the political and military efforts of the AU brought these parties to the negotiating table along with the TGoB which eventually led to the Burundian general election in 2005 (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 12/11/2012). According to Been (2011: 381), “the highlight of AMIB’s achievements with regard to the provision of peace and security was the way in which it assisted CNDD–FDD members to safely return to Burundi and formally take part in the peace process”.

The achievements of the AU in settling the conflict peacefully were not limited only in bringing the parties of dispute together but also in disarming and demobilising some of them. For instance, in spite of the insufficient resources, 189 members of the CNDD–FDD and FNL were disarmed and protected by the AMIB in that region. Another 39 people joined the number cited above in November 2003 (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). Moreover, AMIB also reached an agreement on eleven Pre-disarmament Assembly Areas (PDAAs) (Been, 2011). Indeed, the return of refugees, internally displaced people, the reintegration of parties of dispute to the political process and their participation in the elections in 2005 are clear metrics for the effectiveness of the AMIB in managing the Burundian conflict.

These achievements of the AMIB facilitated the conditions for a UN mission which was unwilling to intervene in the country (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 12/11/2012; interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012). Accordingly, the UNSC agreed to deploy a mission (ONUB) which started its operations on 1st June
2004 (UN, 2004b). In this regard, Boshoff et al (2010:67) argued that “AMIB made the task of the UN much easier, since it could build on the good relationships and collaboration between the Burundi political and military opponents established during AMIB’s period of involvement”. The authors conclude that the AMIB represented one of the AU’s major achievements, despite lacking adequate resources throughout; it had nevertheless the internal capacity and willingness to make major efforts under hard circumstances.

The above results can meet to a very large extent that the basic argument of this study - that the AU can play an effective role in managing intra-state conflicts in Africa. However, its effectiveness is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mission’s mandate, the commitment of member states and the extent of external support. This differentiates the current study from the existing literature; it does not limit itself to look only at whether the AU was effective or not but it further analysed systematically why it was effective. In fact, the AMIB was influenced by a number of factors (see Table 4.1 and 4.2 below).

**Table 4.1: The extent of the influence of Independents variables on the effectiveness of the AMIB (the dependent variable)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independents variables from internal environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Independents variables from external environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- consensus among member states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1- UN support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- coordination between the AU institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2- EU support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- the financial and logistical commitment of member states</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- Individual states support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- the mandate of the mission and the local consent of parties to dispute</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2: the extent of the effectiveness of the AMIB (the dependent variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The main goals</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>AMIB effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Abatement</td>
<td>1-the reduction, or overall elimination, of armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- saving lives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- protecting aid organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Containment</td>
<td>1- Prevent the spread of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- prevent the involvement of other actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- containing the conflict in the area of original deployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
<td>1- signing a peace agreement between all parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- treating the root causes of the conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- organising free and fair election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed in the theoretical framework, environmental factors are independent or causal variables in the effectiveness of peace operations outcomes (dependent variable). Progress towards implementing the core goals (e.g. Conflict Abatement, Conflict Containment and Conflict Settlement) as benchmarks of effectiveness are influenced by the environmental factors. The relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables can be clearly seen from the above analysis of the AMIB’s effectiveness. Indeed, these variables discussed above reveal the relevance of the AU capabilities and the environmental context in which it engaged to the success of its intervention in Burundi. Firstly, the consensus among African states to solve the conflict - particularly by the bordering states of Burundi - positively affected the AMIB's outcome. Secondly, although the mandate of the mission was restricted, especially when it comes to the limited use of force, the cooperation by the parties of dispute helped the mission to achieve its tasks. Thirdly, the external support either by IOs such as the UN and the EU or by individual states such as the US, the UK and Italy had also a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the AMIB in achieving its tasks particularly in filling the gap left by the AU members states which were unable to meet their financial and logistical commitment. Indeed, the latter point leads to a significant note regarding the AU’s effectiveness in managing intrastate conflicts in its region. It is the fact that it cannot sustain its mission for a long time. As it has been noted above, the AU asked the UN to replace its mission in Burundi. This is indeed was a result to the financial and logistical limitations of the AU.
The analysis of the AMIB shows that the AU’s competences in terms of action, funding and coordination in its undertakings in Burundi were achievable (realisable) thanks to the close cooperation with local, regional and international actors involved in the conflict and its regulation. The extent of support for the mission from AU member states and mechanisms, combined with the above listed external support were decisive for the effectiveness of the AU mission in Burundi. This particular case shows how the interaction between these different factors is intertwined (i.e. more support from one can compensate for the lack of support from another). In other words, the Burundi case suggests that the capacities of the mandated organ added to the conflict environment in which it intervened had an impact on its effectiveness. It has been established that the two aforementioned elements combined do not represent the main influencing parameters; the relationship between the two shows an equal significance. If there is less support from one factor, the other will compensate. For example, when there was a scarce financial commitment from AU’s member states for the AMIB, the external actors made the necessary compensation.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter examined a number of the major issues explored throughout the theoretical framework and highlighted their relevance to this case study. It began with an analysis of the conflict in Burundi and highlighted the fact that the situation was on the brink of genocide due to the fighting between the ethnic groups in Burundi, namely the Tutsis and the Hutus. It also showed the manner through which the Burundian conflict also bestowed the AU a real test to assess its relevance in African peacekeeping domain as a new organisation. In spite of its new establishment and its limited resources, the AU led the peace operation from the outbreak of hostilities. The early intervention by the AU had effectively stopped the armed clashes and prevented the occurrence of a new genocide in the continent. The AMIB also monitored the implementation of Arush agreement which in turn confirmed undoubtedly that the AU marked a departure from the practice of its predecessor.

It can be said that the AU through AMIB had a key role in Burundi in terms of securing the conflict transition. The mission was able to substantially manage the violence of the armed conflict, to such an extent that the stabilisation which was achieved in turn encouraged the deployment of the UN. According to a senior UN official, the major part of Burundi was stable after the intervention of the AMIB (interview, 21/11/2012). The AU also ensured the safe return and protection of exiled leaders in order that they can participate in the peace
negotiations and eventually be politically involved in the formation of a new government. Therefore, the AMIB reinforced the political settlement in Burundi and effectively addressed the root causes of the conflict. This shows how a small AU peacekeeping mission can achieve substantial objectives by managing the military and political aspects of an armed conflict, even in the absence of world organisations such as the UN. This reflects the fact that the AU demonstrated its relevance as a future partner for the UN in participating in the management of intricate conflict situations on the African continent.

Meanwhile, as expected, the tragedy in Burundi presented the international community in particular the UN and the EU with an opportunity to reconstruct its confidence, as well as legitimacy as international actors that had broken down after the disappointment of Rwanda. Nevertheless, it was not a good sign to see the reluctance of the international community in relation to intervening in Burundi and relying mainly on the efforts of a new-born organisation such as the AU.

It was also found that, despite the effective management by the AMIB of conflict in Burundi, it had nevertheless encountered several challenges. One of them is the lack of sufficient support from its member states as well as from external donors. It was observed that AMIB did not have the required and appropriate resources necessary for the implementation of its plans with regard to the establishment and protection of all the areas chosen for ex-soldiers or to sustain them, despite their increasing numbers. This fact was acknowledged by the UN Secretary General Report on Burundi which stated that ‘the mission suffered from a serious lack of funds and logistic support’ and that these ‘constraints under which AMIB is operating prevent the force from fully implementing its mandate’ (UN, 2004a).

However, the AMIB, despite the flagrant lack of finance, did make a difference on the ground and the positive results obtained convinced potential donors to participate and to give more support to the efforts of the new organisation. As it appears in other cases, the AU’s performance confirms that it is more and more effective than its predecessor. Consequently, it has attracted not only IOs but also other donor countries to support its efforts particularly in the field of peace and security (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012 and 20/11/2012; interviews with senior UN officials, 29/05/2012 and 21/11/2012; and interviews with EU officials, 14/11/2012).
To sum up, the Burundi case suggests that the capacities of the mandated organ added to the conflict environment in which it intervened had an impact on its effectiveness. It has been established that the two aforementioned elements combined do not represent the main influencing parameters; the relationship between the two shows an equal significance. If there is less support from one factor, the other will compensate. For example, when there was a scarce financial commitment from AU’s member states for the AMIB, the external actors made the necessary compensation. Certainly, the incapability or inability of AU’s member states to meet their obligations revealed the incongruence between the official approval for the AU’s new norms and principles and the reluctance to contribute to their implementation in real conflict situations. These norms include the right of intervention to stop wars as well as the prohibition of unconstitutional change of legitimate order which was the case of Burundian conflict. Based on these results, it can be said although there has been a big improvement in ‘the African solution to African problems’ approach, the ‘Africanisation’ of peace and security is far from being achievable while it is still heavily relying on the external support to be able to carry out its peace missions.
Chapter 5: The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

5.1 Introduction
The AU was heavily involved in the peacekeeping mission in Burundi when another crisis emerged, this time it was in the Darfur region of Sudan (Strauss, 2005). This crisis has been described as the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world. The citizens of Darfur witnessed one of the worst atrocities in terms of war crimes (UN, 2006d). In fact, the Darfur crisis combined the worst of everything: armed fighting, extreme violence, starvation, disease, sexual assault and human casualties (Strauss, 2005; Adebajo, 2008). There have also been mass displacements and coercive migrations, forcing millions of people to seek refuge in camps (Rafiqul, 2006). These consequences create a large humanitarian crisis and are regarded by many as genocide. The eruption and the escalation of the Darfur crisis a decade after Rwanda’s genocide raised important questions, particularly in relation to the lessons learnt by the international community in general and the African community in particular in responding to civil wars and preventing their tragic consequences.

Paradoxically, the escalation of the Darfur crisis and the complexity of its nature nevertheless offered significant prospects for the improvement of peace and security. Indeed, the Darfur crisis represented another important test for the AU in improving its overall security architecture and assuming its principal role as a promoter of peace, security and stability in Africa. Moreover, the tragedy in Darfur was an opportunity for other international actors to improve their conventional image, not particularly appreciated by the various African populations. Accordingly, this conflict formed another conclusive opportunity to examine the emerging norms at the regional and international levels. On the regional level, it helps to examine the AU’s new norms such as the right to intervene in order to stop war crimes. At the international level, it represents a real challenge and a test.

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98 An estimated 2.5 million people have been internally displaced in Darfur; while over 200,000 have sought refuge across the border in Chad, as well as an estimated 200,000 people have reportedly died as a result of the armed conflict since 2003.
to assess the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a new doctrine of the UN in the new millennium.

In fact, in contrast to the literature on the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has received more scholarly attention. Since the eruption of the conflict in 2003, scholars in the field of peace and security studies were involved in analysing and evaluating the efforts of the AMIS. As will be noted, there are different perspectives and findings among the studies conducted. On the one hand, authors such as Ralph (2005), Susan (2006), Murithi (2008) and Powell (2008) have argued that the AU framework and its practice in Darfur demonstrate that there was a clear move from the previous African regional norm of non-interference in the affairs of member states to that of non-indifference. AMIS helped the adoption of a ceasefire by the parties in conflict and thus contributed to the reduction of the number of casualties in the region (Kreps, 2007; Andrews and Holt 2007; Murithi, 2008). On the other hand, other scholars have disagreed with regard to AMIS’s role and performance, stating that it has been ineffective in managing the Darfur crisis due to the lack of financial resources and complicating technical issues (Williams, 2006b; Udombana, 2007; Williams, 2009a). Others have maintained that the failure of Sudan’s government to meet its obligations and the violation of ceasefire agreement and militia attacks on civilians were the main reasons for the continuity of the Darfur crisis and the failure of the AU in this respect (Grono, 2006; Gibney, 2007). The sensitive question of Sudanese sovereignty prevented the AU to make real progresses towards solving Darfur crisis (Waal, 2007; Williams, 2008; Marshall, 2009).

This disagreement among scholars reflects that there might be something missing in their studies and can be considered also as a motivation to make a new analysis and re-evaluation of the AMIS. I contend that the diversity of the findings of the existing literature was due the fact that these analyses were not sufficiently inclusive. In other words, while the focus of some scholars was on assessing AMIS effectiveness in general and neglected the key factors such as the internal process, the mandate of the mission, member states’ commitment and the external support, others focused on some factors while ignoring others which might influence the outcomes of any organisation. For instance, many researchers - such as Strauss (2005), Boshoff, (2005) and Williams (2009a) - involved directly in assessing the responses of the AU and the international community without addressing the root causes of this crisis. Indeed, the knowledge of the historical
background is indispensable in any given situation and the Darfur case is a typical illustration of that inevitable need.

In similar fashion to the Burundian case, researchers generally considered two types of factors: internal and external. Regarding the internal factors, certain authors consider that AMIS has been effective in bringing relative peace in Darfur due to the complementarily and effectiveness of its institutions (e.g. the coordination between the AU’s organs and the mission on the ground). In this regard, Moller (2009a) considered that the AU has actually succeeded in bringing relative peace at least in Sudan due to the effectiveness of its institutions, in particular, the PSC. Mathews (2008) referred to the AUCA and judge it as instrumental in the successful establishment of an elaborate organisational setup which has actually helped the AU in managing intra-state conflicts including Darfur crisis, while Marshall (2009) stated that AU institutions emphasised its capability to conduct African peace operations to promote stability. Williams (2009a) also mentioned the effective role played by the PSC in managing the conflict in Darfur.

Other scholars have focused on the role of the AU’s member states as one of the internal factors that influence the AU’s effectiveness in managing Darfur crisis. For instance, Mehler (2005), Waal (2005b) and Diedre (2008) focussed on the commitment of the AU’s member states in enhancing the AMIS’s effectiveness. They argued that the human and financial resources provided by the member states of the AU were the main factors which helped in reducing human suffering in many conflicts including Darfur. However, in the shadow of the absence of the essential capabilities, this approach presents an important level of risk, resulting in failure as well as an impossibility to fulfil the people expectations. Furthermore, the credibility of the peacekeeping forces will be undermined and weakens the institution under mandate (i.e. responsible). In fact, many scholars have emphasised that even though the AU did intervene in several conflicts in Africa, the logistical and financial commitment of member states have been real obstacles for its effectiveness (Cilliers and Sturman, 2006; Kreps, 2007; Murithi, 2009; Williams, 2011a).

As Williams (2011a) argued, despite the fact that African leaders pledged to take all necessary measures to strengthen the AU institutions by providing them with the relevant powers and resources to fulfil their respective mandates effectively, there was still a gap between the mandates of the AU and the resources made available. All the above writers agreed with Williams (2011a) and argued that the commitment of member states has
frustrated the ability of the AU in managing effectively the conflict in Darfur. In measuring the commitment of AU member states, the authors focussed mainly on the African states’ contribution to the Darfur crisis in terms of troops, finance and logistics and concluded that the support was far from sufficient compared with the challenges on the ground. However, they overlooked other important aspects which affect the commitment of member states such as the consensus among them on sending the AMIS, the mission’s mandate and the position of bordering countries.

Another connected strand of literature within the AU in Darfur debate focuses upon external support as the main factor which determined its effectiveness. The main argument of this debate is that the AU’s effectiveness basically depends on external support, particularly from the UN, the EU, NATO and individual states. Even though the role of external actors is an important factor to the AU’s effectiveness, it is not the only factor in this respect. The fact that African states provided the AU with more than 30,000 troops in just three states (e.g. 17,500 in Somalia, 12,000 in Darfur and 3,500 in Burundi) challenges the argument that external support is the main factor in the AU’s effectiveness in managing intra-state conflicts, including Darfur. There is no doubt that the external support is an important factor to the AU’s effectiveness but it is not the only one.

Similar to the AMIB, there are a number of limitations in the existing literature on the Darfur crisis. The first one is that the analysis and assessment of any mission is expected to evaluate the effectiveness of an IO’s peace operations not only by considering the outcomes and how they can be measured but also by considering the process of an organisation. As discussed in the theoretical framework, linking the internal process with the outcomes is crucial in analysing and evaluating the effectiveness of any international or regional organisation. The second shortcoming observed when reviewing the literature is the apparent disregard for some essential factors such as the mandate of the mission and the local consent of both parties to dispute. Indeed, neglecting the internal process and some important factors in many studies which influenced the effectiveness of the AMIS is likely to give an incomplete picture of the outcomes of this mission. Accordingly, and in order to contribute further to the existing literature on the subject and fill the existing gaps, the present researcher focuses on all internal and external factors which are believed to exert an influence on the effectiveness of the AMIS. It will also analyse the internal process of the AU regarding the establishment of a peace mission in Sudan and subsequently link it to the outcomes. By doing so, this case can provide another real test.
for analysing and assessing the effectiveness of the AU in managing intrastate conflict and, at the same time, reflects the extent to which the argument of this study is valid.

In order to develop the argument, the chapter is divided into four main sections. It begins by giving the historical background and introducing the main players in the Darfur conflict. The second section examines the AU’s own response to the Sudanese state’s failure to protect the people of Darfur from the ongoing tragedy. It firstly analyses the AU’s attitude towards the conflict and the circumstances leading to the deployment of its mission in the conflict zone. In this respect, major attention is given to the internal process of the AU in order to know whether this works or not, as well as finding out if there was a consensus among the AU’s member states on sending the mission. Then, the study focuses on factors that influenced the effectiveness of the AU in managing this conflict, most notably the commitment of member states, the mandate of the mission and the role of external actors such as the UN, EU, NATO and influential states. The final section provides an overall evaluation of the AU’s effectiveness in dealing with this crisis by matching its applications with the criteria of the theoretical framework.

5.2 Establishing the Background to the Darfur Conflict

The neglect of the root causes of the Darfur crisis and to the extent to which the AU has addressed them on the ground was identified as one of the main gaps in the existing literature. Therefore, the current study pays more attention to understanding the causes, dynamics and complexity of this conflict and how has the AU dealt with them. However, and in order to completely understand this crisis, it is significant to quickly look at the wider geographical context before examining the western region of Sudan where the conflict is taking place.

Sudan is an Arab state in North Africa and is also considered as a part of the Middle East (Davison, 1960). It is a member of key organisations such as the UN, the AU, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as serving as an observer in the World Trade Organization. Sudan suffered from more than 21 years civil war between the North and South. The civil war came to an end when the two parties of the conflict agreed to sit at the negotiation table and eventually peace

100 Before the independence of the South, Sudan was the largest country in Africa with a total territory of 2.5 million square kilometres.
102 On the civil war between North and South Sudan, see Flint and Waal (2005).
talks were held between the Sudanese government (SG) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The outcome of the peace talks was the signature, in 2005, of an agreement known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)\textsuperscript{103}. However, that agreement was rather fragile and although it ended the civil war between the North and South of Sudan, there was still a considerable tension between them until the 9\textsuperscript{th} July, 2011 when the South was recognised internationally as a new state, independent from the government of Khartoum. This was the result of a referendum were 98.83\% of the people of South Sudan voted for the scission from the North\textsuperscript{104}. As will be shown, the civil war between North and South of Sudan had a huge impact on the Darfur crisis.

5.3 The Darfur Conflict since 2003: Historical Background and the Main Parties Involved

The word ‘Darfur’ is a coined term from ‘Dar’ – the homeland and Fur which is one of the many tribes of Sudan. Darfur is the largest region of Sudan, nearly the size of France with some 493,180 square kilometres and a population of approximately 7.5 million (Daly, 2007). The population of Darfur consists mainly of agrarian African and nomadic Arab tribes. Despite mixed marriages between these two categories and living together for centuries, a factor which lowered the level of cultural divide and traditions between the groups, tensions never fade away between Darfur’s agrarian and nomadic populations (Abass, 2007).

Several writers observed that the inter-community violence of the past was exacerbated by the droughts of the mid-1980s (Waal, 2005a). The extreme drought, desertification and other natural catastrophes which savaged the Darfur region led to constant frictions and conflicts over grazing spaces and farmlands (Powell, 2005; Fage and Tordoff, 2001). Although these analysts consider the current conflict as a result of long-standing struggles over natural resources (mainly land and water) between farming and nomadic communities, some analysts have suggested that close to thirty-five years of marginalisation by SG in Khartoum also lies at the heart of the Darfur crisis (Reno, 2000; Aleksii, 2005). In this regard, Abass (2007: 417) argued that “Well-entrenched belief,

\textsuperscript{103} About the CPA, see Crisis Group Report, ‘Sudan’s CPA, Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing No. 50,13 March 2008; available at\ http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B050-sudans-comprehensive-peace-agreement-beyond-the-crisis.aspx

\textsuperscript{104} See South Sudan’s Declaration of Independence, available at\ http://worldnews.about.com/od/sudan/qt/South-Sudans-Declaration-Of-Independence.htm
among the Darfur African tribes, that successive governments of Sudan have pursued policies that disadvantaged them in contrast to their Arab counterparts”. The combination of these factors prompted the mobilisation in 2001 of two loosely aligned Darfuri rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The conflict in Darfur was triggered in February 2003, when the SLM/A and JEM attacked several government institutions in the region (AU, 2005a; Usman, 2006; Waal, 2007). In April 2003, The SLM/A’s attacks escalated and spread to El Fasher (the capital of North Darfur State). The response of the SG consisted in arming and involving Arab militias known as the ‘Janjaweed’\textsuperscript{105} to fight the insurgents on their side. Waal (2005b:129) stated that “the Sudanese government consistently franchised its counter-insurgency operations to the Janjaweed militias” providing them with military intelligence, air force support and allowing them to operate with complete impunity and thus creating an “ethnic-free zone” (UN, 2005a).

This point is extremely important and relevant with regard to the fact that the response of the Government has shifted the nature of the conflict. This argument was confirmed by a UN senior official (interview, 29/6/2012) who stated that:

“while the fighting in Darfur was over resources (primarily land and water) between farming and nomadic communities, it soon became as well an ethnic conflict between Arab and African tribes in the region due to the apparent support of the government to the Arab trips in Darfur”.

However, despite these measures and the heavy support for the ‘Janjaweed’, the SG was incapable of countering efficiently the Darfurian insurgency. Two reasons have been invoked for the failure of the Sudanese state. Firstly, an important part of its national army was concentrated in the South to counter the SPLM/A (for more than twenty years). This factor weakened the national army and rendered it ill-equipped (UN, 2005a). Secondly, the significant number of Darfurians in the national army made them reluctant to fight their own people (Abass, 2007).

\textsuperscript{105}Janjaweed is formed from the Arabic words for “man”, “gun” and “horse”; locally referred to as the Janjaweed because they operate on horseback.
It is important to observe here that while the SG was supporting the Arab tribes, the rebels had the support of the local people since the beginning of their military activities (Flint and Waal, 2008). The eruption of violence between the Janjaweed backed by the SG and the SPLM/A and JEM - which had the support of local people - led to tragic consequences (interview with former UN official, 31/05/2012).

The Janjaweed began intentionally targeting civilians from the Fur, Masaalit, Tunjur, Zaghawa and other tribes, accused of helping the rebels106 to try to gain access to land and water occupied by non-Arab farming communities. It was reported that Janjaweed perpetrated killings on a large scale, as well as rapes, lootings and other tactics such as deliberate starvation of people through a systematic destruction of the population’s means of living. The rebels were also involved in violent activities against police and humanitarian convoys as well as abducting and killing civilians107.

The clashes between the parties of the dispute, as discussed earlier, led to catastrophic consequences. Indeed, the serious grave crimes committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide. This can be seen in the UN Secretary General’s statement on Sudan to the Security Council when he described the situation as “the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world” (UN, 2006d). The conflict was perceived as an examination of the AU’s capacity to resolve conflicts occurring in Africa and its determination to implement entirely the relevant principles stipulated in its CA. The Darfur case will be also a real test of the relationship between the AU with other international actors in preventing and solving civil wars on the African continent.

5.4 The Response of the AU

Regarding the AU’s response, it can be observed that African leaders considered the conflict in Darfur as an opportunity to prove to the international community that the AU was perfectly capable of solving disputes occurring within the continent108. Similarly, the AUC Chairperson, Konaré, stressed the importance of the AU showcasing its capability as

106 Many other tribes were also subject to attack such as the Tama, Tunjur, Berti, Bergit, Dorok and Eringa. See Human Rights Watch. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/features/darfur/index.html.

107 These findings are reported in a number of reports by IOs, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UN, 2004k), Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, See for example, Policy Documents - UNHCR Refworld Sudan, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country POLICY.UnHCR..SDN.456d621e2..0.html

108 AU’s special Representative to Darfur region, Nigerian Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, has put the significance of this conflict for the legitimacy of the Union stating “We stand or fall in Darfur”. See “Sudan: Interview with Amb Baba Gana Kingibe, Head of AMIS”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Nairobi, 19 July 2005, available at http://newsite.irinnews.org/Report/55494/SUDAN-Interview-with-Amb-Baba-Gana-Kingibe-head-of-AMIS.
an actor in international peace and security: “Africa must not only act in Darfur, Africa must *be seen* to act” (cited by Flint and Waal, 2008: 119 [emphasis added]). In this regard, there was also a strong conviction from AU’s member states that the Union should take the lead in the management of African conflicts. For instance, the leaders of Libya, Chad, Sudan, Egypt and Nigeria, as well as the AUC Chairperson, Konaré, met in Tripoli (Libya) in October 2004 and rejected any foreign intervention by any outside country in what was seen as a purely African issue (AU, 2004e). This was also the perception of many other African states that intended to chart their own future by themselves, and were adamant with regard to their will to rely on their own capacities\textsuperscript{109}.

Accordingly, the AU’s official documentation reflects the determination of the member states to play the main role in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. In September and July 2004 the PSC issued statements where it was underlined that the AU had to pursue its efforts in solving the conflict (AU, 2004b). The motivations of the AU’s member states showed the intention of Africans of using African norms and working together to find solutions to their own problems.

From a theoretical point of view, these facts reflect that the response of the AU and its member states was effective in managing the conflict in Darfur. However, the effectiveness of AU and its member states does not depend only on the speeches of African leaders or the statements of AU officials. Certainly, the main concern here is whether or not the AU’s confident stance and statements made were concretely translated into action on the ground. In this regard, and in a similar fashion to the analysis of the AMIB, the AU’s activities in Darfur can be analysed through two approaches: political and operational. While the former consists of finding a durable political agreement between the parties to conflict, the latter focuses on the direct intervention and deployment of AMIS.

*The Political Settlement Tools*

The conflict in Darfur began in February 2003; however, the first response by the AU was on 5\textsuperscript{th} March, 2004 (AU, 2005a) which confirms that the AU did not response rapidly to the Darfur crisis. The AU started by expressing its preoccupations through public statements, highlighting the “serious humanitarian situation in the Darfur region”, and reproving the behaviour of the Janjaweed armed militia as well as the aggression of

peaceful people and the destruction of their means of living (Interview with Sudanese analyst, 24/06/2012; AU, 2004k). These early statements were supported by the determination of the AU to have a leading role in convincing the parties in conflict to sit at the negotiation table in N’djamena (Chad), in March 2004, through the mediation of the Chadian President Adriss Deby (Interview with senior AU official, 18/11/2012). As a result of the meeting an agreement, known as the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA), was signed on the 8th April, 2004 by the main parties involved in the armed conflict (AU, 2005a). The agreement required the parties to cease hostilities for renewable 45-day periods, to free ‘prisoners of war’ and to facilitate humanitarian access to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other civilian victims. The SG also agreed to neutralise the militias. Notwithstanding, additional Chadian attempts were unsuccessful because the rebels questioned the impartiality of Chadian President Deby as a mediator (Roland, 2006; Julian, 2006). In May 2004, the AU assumed leadership of the peace talks and through its mediation the SG and the rebels signed an “Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and Deployment of Observers” (AU, 2004g).

As it will be discussed in depth below, this agreement represented the basis for the creation of the AMIS which later became, in July 2004, a full-fledged peacekeeping force (Iyob and Khadiaglala, 2006). Actually, the AU’s role was not limited to the drafting and implementation of the ceasefire agreement since the young organisation took the lead in finding a political solution to the crisis. Although the peace talks had made some progress, including producing signed protocols on the enhancement of the humanitarian and security situations, the ceasefire agreement collapsed before the mediation team of the Union could present its draft Declaration of Principles for resolution of the conflict. The failure to reach a permanent agreement was due to the reluctance of the SG to respect the engagements made and meet its security obligations (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). Such an attitude induced the other party of the conflict to suspend its participation in the peace talks in December 2004 following the increase in hostilities and the full-scale offensive by the government forces and its loyalist militias (in particular the Janjaweed tribe) against the rebels on the ground. After which, the peace talks were suspended until June 2005 (Iyob and Khadiaglala, 2006).

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The political efforts by the AU to settle the Darfur conflict were reinitiated in June 2005 by the AU’s Special Envoy for the Darfur Talks and Chief Mediator, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim (AU, 2006d). The peace talks culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)\textsuperscript{112} between the SG and the SLM/A group, in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006 (Iyob and Khadiaglala, 2006; Abass, 2007). Even though the international community hailed the DPA as a main success and although many people hoped that it may ultimately put an end to the conflict, there was not any significant change or progress on the ground. The DPA performance fell far short and subsequently failed to fulfil the expectations of the people of Darfur\textsuperscript{113}.

According to Laurie Nathan (2006: 12), a member of the AU’s mediation team that produced the DPA, “The DPA of 5 May 2006 has not led to peace and stability and in certain respects has heightened conflict in Darfur”. In the same vein, Brickhill (2007:2) stated that “almost a year after SG and rebel factions signed the DPA, the humanitarian and security situation has deteriorated in the troubled western region of Sudan”. In order to solve the Darfur crisis, negotiations restarted under the auspices of the AU in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007. However, the Sirte peace negotiations were shaky from the beginning due to the absence of key rebel leaders (UN, 2007b; Heleta, 2008). As highlighted in the theoretical framework chapter, the local consent of parties of a particular dispute is a prerequisite for ensuring the effectiveness of any intervener either politically or military. Accordingly, the political settlement process did not make any progress in the absence of the major rebel leaders.

The political efforts of the AU continued even after the transformation of its mission to a hybrid with the UN in 2008. The two organisations worked jointly to mediate a political solution to the conflict under the UN-AU mediation committee which was appointed on 28\textsuperscript{th} August, 2008 and led by Djibril Bassolé as a Chief Mediator (AU, 2008a). Despite the involvement of the latter in a number of peace talks between the rebels and the SG with the support of the Government of Qatar, the peace process continued to face serious challenges after 2007 (AU, 2010a). This was due to fighting between the government and rebel forces and inter-communal violence (UN, 2013). According to the AUC chairperson, the lack of good will and confidence and the sustained fighting between the parties of the dispute have

\textsuperscript{112}The official document on the DPA is available at: [http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/DPA.pdf](http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/DPA.pdf)

frustrated the efforts of the AU, the UN and other actors to solve the conflict peacefully (AU, 2013).

The Military Settlement Tools

The AU military intervention in Darfur began in June 2004 with the deployment of AU monitors (AU, 2004h) in order to operationalise and lead the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) signed by the parties of the conflict in May 2004. With the aim of providing protection to its observers, the AU agreed at its July Summit to deploy over 300 troops from Nigeria, Gambia and Rwanda as well as 60 military observers from 17 African states (AU, 2005d). The AUPSC made a statement in July 2004 where it was mentioned that through the creation of this force the intention was to provide a strong and significant peacekeeping mission presence on the ground with an appropriate mandate, able to ensure the concrete implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The PSC stated clearly that it considered the “protection of the civilian population” as a priority and key objective of the revived operation (AU, 2004i). The disarmament of militias such as the Janjaweed and their neutralisation represented also another aim of the mission, in order to have access to the populations at risk and facilitate the conveyance of humanitarian assistance. Later that year another communiqué was issued by the PSC, explaining the new mandate of the mission with a revised version of the AU deployment. The communiqué envisaged a more important presence of the AMIS during the first year, eventually renewable on a yearly basis according to the circumstances on the ground. The number of people involved had to be over 3,320 personnel including military forces, observers, and civilians (AU, 2004i).

The AMIS was extended through early 2006 to reach some 6,000 military personnel with 1,500 police civilian officers. The AUPSC defined the tasks of the AMIS as monitoring and ensuring that the parties complied not only with the HCFA but also to respect all future agreements. In addition, the mission was expected to help in the course of confidence building, to participate in securing the environment in order to facilitate the conveyance of humanitarian relief to the populations previously isolated. It was also important to ensure that the safe return of displaced populations and refugees to their homes; the end of all violent actions, especially the militias’ attacks and intimidation against civilians. It was also essential to convince the SG to respect its engagements and make more significant

efforts to disarm the militias under its control; as ensure the protection of local populations constantly threatened and, lastly, show its intervention forces and military capabilities by conducting frequent patrols and eventually establishing provisional outposts to dissuade any form of aggression against civilians by militias (AU, 2004i).

Even though the AMIS's new mandate had led to positive effects on the ground (as will be discussed later), the failure of the mission in implementing the goals mentioned above forced the AU to call the UN to transform its mission from AMIS to an operation within the framework of cooperation between the AU and the UN in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (AU, 2006e). Accordingly, following a fifteen-member vote, the UNSC consensually passed resolution 1769 on 31st July, 2007 which authorised the establishment of the AU/UN joint mission force in Darfur (UNAMID) (UN, 2007c). Even though the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID was to take place in December 2007, the force's full deployment was not expected before mid-2008 at the earliest (UN, 2008).

5.5 Analysing the Effectiveness of AMIS
Concurrent with the previous case, in order to assess the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in general and specifically the AU, it is necessary to proceed through two distinctive stages. The first focuses on measuring and evaluating the internal process of the AU. The second consists of measuring and evaluating the outcomes of the intervention. Nevertheless, prior to the final evaluation of the AU's effectiveness in its intervention in Darfur, it is important to analyse the environmental factors to facilitate reaching accurate conclusions. Accordingly, in this section the study analyses these factors separately and discusses the extent to which they influenced the outcomes of the AMIS.

5.6 Factors influencing AMIS’s effectiveness

*Mandate of the mission*
First, it is significant to observe that two mandates were given to the AMIS. Initially, the AU mandated the AMIS to monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA (AU, 2004j). In order to make operational the HCFA, the AU decided to initially deploy 60 military observers to monitor compliance of the agreement and later added a 300-strong protection force to provide security and safeguards for the unarmed observers. It soon transpired that the personnel deployed were insufficient and that the security and humanitarian situation would not have improved unless extra people such as observers and protection forces were
supplied (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2013). Accordingly, on 20th October, 2004 the AU authorised the enhancement of its mission to over 3,320 personnel, including military personnel, observers, civilian police, as well as civilian personnel (AU, 2004j). In another agreement made in April 2005, it was mentioned that the AMIS’s deployment was to reach within six months the target of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and civilian staff. Thus, the mandate of AMIS was as follows:

- Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps
- Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the Parties
- Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population
- Monitor and verify efforts of the SG to disarm Government controlled militias
- Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the SG
- Provide visible military presence by patrolling and by the establishment of temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population
- Assist in the development of proactive public confidence-building measures
- Establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police authorities
- Establish and maintain contact with community leaders to receive complaints or seek advice on the issues of concerns
- Observe, monitor and report the effective service delivery of the local police

The second AMIS mandate gave some powers under Article 9 and 10 to allow the mission to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, utilising mandated resources and capabilities and in accordance with the rules of engagement (AU, 2004j). Notwithstanding, these provisions are weaker than those formerly articulated in the July 2004 PSC communiqué, mainly because the SG rejected the expansion of the AU’s mandate to include the protection of civilians, arguing and insisting that fulfilling this obligation was its own responsibility (interview with AU officials 14/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 21/11/2012; interviews with UN officials 29/05/2012 and 21/11/2012). Therefore, AMIS did not have a clear protection mandate; rather, it seems that there was a
contradiction in terms. For instance, on the one hand AMIS was supposed to be responsible for civilian protection as stated in paragraph 5 of its mandate; the mission must protect civilians “whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability”. On the other hand, it formally acknowledged in the same paragraph that “the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the SG” (AU, 2004j).

In fact, the observations made above prove that, in the Darfur case, the AU was unable to implement the principles as enounced in its CA and which are linked with the first criterion of measuring and evaluating its effectiveness. It is evident that the AU was not able to apply the norm of the right of intervention on the ground. The mandate of AMIS was carved out with the supposition that the SG would provide primarily first-line protection to the civilian population in the Darfur region and lead on to compliance with the HCFA. Unfortunately, these assumptions were not realised. It can be said that the AU failed to invoke article 4 of the CA in its mandate, which would have allowed for intervention in “grave circumstances”, specifically war crimes and crimes against humanity which were real, witnessed and recorded in the region of Darfur.

It is also evident that there was a gap between AMIS’s mandate and the available resources. Indeed, since the initial stages of the deployment, AMIS suffered from an acute lack of resources and basic logistics. According to Mensah (2005: 16) “the AMIS had no sound logistics plan and capacity”, in that much important equipment such as vehicles, communication tools, stationery, furniture and sufficient petroleum oils and lubricants to support the operations were not supplied until late November 2004. Additionally, there was a problem in terms of troop magnitude. In fact, since the first deployment of AMIS there was a constant and urgent need for an increased number of troops. Accordingly, there was a call from several international institutions for strengthening the force of the AU and enabling it to perform the tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and putting an end to the Darfur conflict (Mensah, 2005).

The call for increasing the number of troops came as well from leading Sudanese politicians, such as the First Vice President of the Sudan, Ali Othman Taha. In his speech, delivered during the 5120th meeting of the UNSC in February 2005, insisted on the need to send more personnel and explicitly stated that
The authority, capacities and forces of the AU should be enhanced – financially and operationally – so that it can complete its deployment and undertake the tasks of monitoring the ceasefire and putting an end to the security incursions that have cast a long shadow over the humanitarian involvement and efforts to achieve a peaceful political settlement\textsuperscript{115}.

In its assessment report, the AU (2005b) confirmed the crucial need for an increase in the number of its troops on the ground. The shortcomings highlighted above indicate some deficiencies in the AMIS’ mandate, which prevented the proper management of the conflict and thus a negative impact on the AU’s effectiveness. It can be concluded that the shortcomings of the devised mandate of the AMIS, far from being adequate actually represented one of the factors which contributed to the incapacity of the AMIS to deal with the crisis, the AUPSC itself recognising its own failure at this regard (AU 2005c).

\textit{The commitment of member states}

To measure the commitment of AU member states to the AMIS, their commitment will be measured against two main indicators: the political obligation of member states and the financial and logistical commitments. Regarding the political obligation, it can be observed that some AU members did not respect the principles and objectives which they agreed upon in 2001 in order to achieve peace and security in the continent. For instance, it is worth recalling the behaviour of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Al Gaddafi. Despite being a co-founder of the AU (Robert, 2008), Gaddafi was nevertheless accused by many African states of interfering in their internal affairs. Omar Al Bashir, the actual Sudanese president\textsuperscript{116} explicitly accused Gaddafi of supporting, financially and militarily, armed movements in Darfur, while the president of Chad, Idriss Deby, additionally affirmed that rebellions against the national government were backed by the Libyan regime (interview with Sudanese analyst, 14/06/2012). There is no doubt that in view of their vicinity and their rulers’ interests, neighbouring countries can influence the effectiveness of peace operations everywhere. If the neighbouring countries of the host state support the peace mission, then the likelihood of a mission to achieve its objectives is enhanced.

\textsuperscript{115}See the 5120the Meeting of the UNSC, Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan, 8 February 2005, p 6, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8306.doc.htm

\textsuperscript{116}The president of Sudan (Omar AL Bashir) is wanted by the international Criminal Court (ICC) due to the war crimes committed by the Sudanese national army.
Another example of the lack of respect for their engagements by some AU member states was their support for the SG in limiting the AMIS mandate and preventing the support of the international community, especially the UN. For instance, on the 11th of August 2004, the Rwandan President Paul Kagame asserted his intention to use force to protect civilians even without authorisation or a proper mandate, and confirmed that his government would not stand by and watch innocent civilians being hacked to death as happened in his country in 1994 (interview with senior AU official, 11/11/2012; see also Cohen and Williams, 2006). In fact, influential African countries such as Nigeria disagreed with this interpretation of the mandate. President Obasanjo affirmed on the 3rd of July 2004 that his forces would only intervene in coordination with the SG (interview with Sudanese senior official, 17/06/2012; interview with AU senior official, 11/11/2012). The SG was very pleased to hear such statements and Sudan’s foreign minister, Abdelwahad Najeb, strongly criticised Kagame’s understanding of the mandate. He tried to impose his views by affirming that the mandate for AU troops was very clear: protection of AU monitors, adding that the protection of civilians was the clear responsibility and duty of his government (interview with senior Sudanese official, 17/06/2012; interview with Sudanese analyst, 14/06/2012).

At the international level, some African states supported the SG in its opposition to UN involvement, such as UNSC resolution 1547 (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012) which reflected the Council’s intention to mandate a peace mission for the monitoring of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (UN, 2004d). Despite the fact that the position of African states regarding the Darfur crisis was an important factor which undermined not only the AU’s efforts but also those of international actors such as the UN, the literature has paid little attention to this factor. Indeed, some African states insisted that the crisis in Darfur remained an internal conflict and argued that according to international law external actors should not intervene, either directly or indirectly and regardless of the motives, in the internal or external matters of another state118. For instance, when Algeria had a seat on the UNSC as a non-permanent member, the Algerian delegate rejected US proposals for authorising over-flights in the Darfur region to verify the parties’ respect for the ceasefire, describing it as an unacceptable assault on Sudan's

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sovereignty (UN, 2004e). In fact, some African states not only failed in their mission to protect civilians in Darfur but also prevented the involvement of other actors which were keen to provide support (interview with senior AU official, 11/11/2012). However, it is important to recall that other African states such as Rwanda had a divergent position (from that of Algeria, for instance) since it called for the expansion of the AU mandate in order to protect civilians (Cohen and William, 2006). Such a divide had a negative impact on the effectiveness of AMIS, with no consensus possible.

Another criterion of measuring the commitment of member states is their financial and logistical contribution to the AMIS. In terms of the logistical contribution, despite the high number of member states in the AU (54) there has always been an urgent need for more troops in Darfur, and only five countries - less than ten percent - responded to the AU (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). In fact, the AMIS depended on the participation of a small handful of main troop-contributing countries, namely Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal and Ghana\textsuperscript{119}. The AU was not only consistently struggling to marshal the requisite military personnel but also for a range of military assets needed for its complex peace operation in Darfur. Since its initial deployment, it was clear that the AMIS lacked the most crucial military equipment which was ultimately provided by external actors (as dealt with in the next section). This setback has been the main obstacle to operational effectiveness (Mensah, 2005). Indeed, the reluctance of the majority of AU’s member states to participate in the AMIS is one of the most important factors behind the struggling of the AU in Darfur until now. However, given the low participation rate among member states, this left significant opportunity for the expansion of AMIS.

Regarding financial support, the African leaders, keen to see the PSC playing a central role in managing conflicts in Africa, provided this organ with very expansive mandates. Nevertheless, the available resources of the AU did not match the parameters of the mandate. In fact, without the contribution of external actors, the AMIS would never have survived. For example, for the first deployment of AMIS in June 2004, about 80% of the estimated budget (approximately US$26 million) came not from African states but rather from external actors. Additionally, following the decision to enhance AMIS on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 2004, the budget of the mission increased to an estimated total of over $227 million. A total of offer $190.5 million was been pledged by AU Partners (AU, 2005d).

\textsuperscript{119}Regarding the reluctance of AU member states to send troops, see Chapter 4, pages 136-139.
Despite the external support, the AU was initially struggling to finance its mission until the shift to a joint mission with the UN’s peacekeeping forces in 2008 (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012).

The Local Consent of Parties to Dispute

In the Darfur conflict, the parties of the conflict have been the SG and the two main rebel groups the SLMA and JEM. Regarding the government’s attitude, although Sudan is a signatory to various international human rights such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966)\(^{120}\); the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)\(^{121}\); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)\(^{122}\); the four Geneva Conventions of 1949\(^{123}\); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)\(^{124}\) and the AUCA - all of which seek to support human rights and protect civilian populations and prevent the violation of their rights - Sudan neither respect the rights of the people in Darfur nor cooperated fully and sincerely with the AU’s efforts to solve the conflict (interview with UN official, 29/05/2012). In fact, the SG not only limited the mandate of the AMIS but also continued committing atrocities against its own citizens (interview with UN official, 20/06/2012). This argument supported by many analysts such as Andrew and Holt (2007), Waal (2007), Williams (2008) and Marshall (2009) who argued that Sudan occasionally violated the ceasefire agreement since 2004. Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in June 2004, the Government forces of Sudan attacked many villages, including bombardment by helicopters, killing civilians and destroying property (AU, 2005a).

It is important to underline here that it was not only the SG which was responsible for abusing the peace agreements; the rebels were also responsible for violating the ceasefire agreement and in some cases attacking the AMIS. According to the AU’s (2005a) report,

“the activities of armed robbers, which included highway robbery, vehicle snatching and attacks on police stations and villages, resulting in loss of arms


\(^{121}\)See the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html


and ammunitions, have continued unabated. Police stations have become the target of armed robbers, militias and other groups, as they are an easy means of acquiring weapons”.

At the same time, the Darfur rebels were also accountable for violations of the HCFA (Mensah, 2005). Moreover, these attacks extended to AMIS personnel who were subjected to increasing ambushes, hostage taking and armed attacks (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012; See also, CNN (2007) and BBC (2005)). In fact, both parties in the dispute have been unwilling to cooperate with the efforts of the AU mission by violating the ceasefire agreement and committing human rights abuses, as well as attacking the mission itself which in turn adversely influenced the AMIS’s effectiveness.

External Support from Other Organisations

The role of the UN

The eruption of the Darfur crisis in 2003 (almost ten years after the Rwandan massacre) aroused disconcerting questions, particularly with regard to the lessons learnt by the UNSC which was blamed for not being able to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Accordingly, the triggering of the Darfur tragedy was a challenge and an opportunity for the UN to remake an image lost due to past failures and to profit from the new chances which appeared in the 21st Century.

As Waal (2005b) pointed out, the disaster in the region of Darfur formed the first noticeable case for the application of the emerging doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, where a need for consent, neutrality, and limited use of force is not as crucial as the urgent aim to save lives. In the Darfur conflict, it was clear that the SG not only failed to protect its population but on the contrary, perpetrated atrocities against its own citizens. The obligation to protect automatically flowed to the international and regional organisations including the AU, the UN and the wider international community in general. Accordingly, as the first response to the Darfur crisis, the UNSC adopted the Resolution 1556 (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) (UN, 2004f) which declared that the humanitarian crisis in Darfur posed a threat to international peace and security and asked the SG to disarm the Janjaweed within thirty days. However, the UNSC was unable to supervise the implementation of its requests and to react against the SG for failing to intervene (interview with UN official, 20/12/2012). Moreover, it was stated in the resolution that the
leading role in finding political as well as military solutions to solve the conflict was left to the AU; in this regard, the UNSC supported such a role being played by AU.

An interesting point should be underlined here is the fact that a number of states (e.g. the US, the UK, Spain, Chile and Germany) along with the UN, pointed to the AU as bearing primary responsibility to prevent the SG from committing atrocities against its own population. Notwithstanding, the position of the UN and some of its members was not based on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine which was signed at the UN World Summit in 2005 by 170 states, among them the SG. At this summit, the participating countries reaffirmed their readiness, keenness and willingness to take “collective action”, in a timely and decisive manner through the UNSC to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity where the national authorities manifestly failed to do so (UN, 2005f).

However, although war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were real, witnessed and recorded in Darfur, the pitiful response of the UN proves its inability to act adequately and prevent the tragedies which occurred in the Darfur region. In fact, the response of the UN to the Darfur crises emphasised, on the one hand, the serious fears regarding the ability of this international institution in managing intrastate conflict and its dire consequences. On the other hand, it appears that the Responsibility to Protect was only emphasised during meetings and conferences and remained in fact just a moral issue. The reaction of the UN was criticised by a senior AU official (interview, 20/11/2012) who stated that:

“it was surprising and far from being expected that the international community in general and the UN in particular will leave the responsibility of protecting population in Darfur to one year old organisation (e.g. AU). This concerning position induced and indeed justified the adoption by the AU of the right of intervention even without authorisation from the UN”.

Despite its disappointing response, the UN’s efforts continued in order to solve the Darfur conflict. Four months after adopting Resolution 1556, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1564

(UN, 2004g), which aimed to identify individuals frustrating the peace process and sanction them, but this tool was used very slowly, cautiously and inefficiently (interview with UN official, 12/06/2012). On 19th November, 2004 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1574 (UN, 2004h). It was stated under this Resolution that the UNSC strongly supported the decisions of the AU to increase its mission in Darfur to 3,320 personnel and to improve its mandate to take in the tasks listed in paragraph 6 of the October 20th 2004 AUPSC communiqué (AU, 2004j). Moreover, it urged member states to provide the AMIS with the required equipment, logistical, financial, material, and other necessary resources. It also threatened the SG by imposing sanctions if it did not completely cooperate with the AU (UN, 2004i). In March 2005, and as a response to the continued violations of the ceasefire agreement and abuses of human rights, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1593 which referred the matter in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) acting under its Chapter VII mandate (UN, 2005b). In Resolutions 1585 (UN, 2005c) and 1588 (UN, 2005d), the UNSC imposed a selective arms embargo on parties to the Darfur crisis. In 2006, when the situation in Darfur had shown no progress in spite the efforts of the AU, the UNSC - recognising the quagmire situation of Darfur and its inability to deal with this on its own via the peacekeeping operation - agreed to support the transition of AMIS to a UN operation, albeit within the framework of the partnership between the AU and the UN in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa (AU, 2006f).

The UN responded by adopting Resolution 1590 (UN, 2005e) which established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). However the plan devised - which consisted of deploying a UN peacekeeping force - was promptly and vigorously opposed by the SG (interview with UN official, 12/06/2012). Sudanese President Al Bashir saw the UN peacekeeping operation as a colonial enterprise meant to subjugate his country. He then declared that his government would fight against such troops (interview with senior Sudanese official, 17/06/2012; interview with Sudanese analyst, 14/06/2012; and interview with senior AU official, 11/11/2012). Due to the categorical objection of the SG against a UN Mission, an alternative was proposed: the creation of a hybrid mission. This solution was also

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\[126\] See Wall (2007), Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect. See also, Agency France Press (AFP), February 27, 2006, Basher threatens foreign forces, available at: [http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?73981-Bashir-threatens-foreign-forces-(sudan-pres)](http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?73981-Bashir-threatens-foreign-forces-(sudan-pres)). See also, Alfred De Montesquiou, Sudan rejects U.N. compromise deal on Darfur. ‘colonization’ forces, the Seattle Times, Tuesday, December 5, 2006, available at, [http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20061205&slug=darfur05](http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20061205&slug=darfur05)
initially resisted by the SG and it was only after long and intensive negotiations that it finally agreed and accepted the AU-UN mission (interview with senior AU official, 11/11/2012). Consequently, the UNSC passed Resolution 1769 (UN, 2007c) authorising the establishment of UNAMID which is still operating in the conflict zone.

The involvement of the UN in Darfur was not limited to the political efforts discussed above; the world organisation has also supported the AMIS financially and logistically. According to the AUC’s Chairperson, it was not possible to deploy and sustain the AMIS without the support of the UN and other AU multilateral and bilateral partners (AU, 2005a). For instance, the total budget for the enhanced AMIS estimate to $227,295,443 and a large part of this budget was received from the UN (interview with senior AU official, 12/11/2012). Moreover, since the initial stages of deployment, the AMIS suffered from an acute lack of resources and fundamental logistics which negatively influenced its operational effectiveness. Indeed, the AMIS was not only in a need for military assets but also lacked basic logistics such as office equipment, stationery, furniture, vehicles, sufficient petroleum oils and lubricants and communication tools. The logistical support from the UN played an important role in filling this gap (interview with senior AU official, 12/11/2012).

Despite the fact that the financial and logistical support of the UN played an important role in enhancing and sustaining the AMIS, the UN received harsh criticism regarding its response to the Darfur crisis. In fact, a number of scholars such as Waal (2005b and 2007) Williams (2006a), Usman (2006), Udombana (2007) and Sarkin (2009) argued that the inability of the UN to intervene in Darfur for almost six years (2003-2008) reflected its failure in applying the Responsibility to Protect as a new norm on the ground. This failure was evident in the words of the former Secretary general Kofi Annan who stated that:

“to judge by what is happening in Darfur, our performance has not improved much since the disasters of Bosnia and Rwanda. Sixty years after the liberation of the Nazi death camps, and 30 years after the Cambodian killing fields, the promise of “never again” is ringing hollow”127.

In fact, it can be said that the UN’s efforts have been unconvincing and relatively ineffective even after sending its mission in 2008 to join the AMIS. Such a deduction is based on the fact that the conflict is still going on after almost six years (2008-2014) of its presence on the ground (interview with African political analysts, 22/06/2012 and 10/11/2012). However, officials from the UN and AU have different perspectives in this regard. They consider that the UN-AU joint mission has played an important role in reducing the levels of the conflict, protecting civilians in the region and addressing the root causes of the conflict by convincing the SG to give more rights and powers to the people of Darfur. The interviewees explain that the slow progress of the AMIS and the joint mission in solving the conflict was mainly due to the position of the conflicting parties who have not fully cooperated since the eruption of the crisis in 2003 (interviews with senior UN officials, 29/05/2012 and 20/11/2012; and interviews with senior AU officials, 11/11/2012 and 21/11/2012).

In fact, two facts can be drawn from the above discussion. First, both institutions failed to apply the new norms in the Darfur crisis (e.g. the Responsibility to Protect for the UN and the right of intervention for the AU) since they were not able to deploy troops without the consent of the SG. The second fact is related to an argument developed in Chapter 2: that the approach of the UN regarding African conflicts changed since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, and as with the case of Burundi, the AMIS confirmed empirically that the first response to African conflicts comes from African organisations while the complementary role of the UN comes once the situation is stabilised (even by a modest degree) on the ground. This is what happened with the case of Darfur. After almost six years of reluctance to intervene due to the complexity of the situation on the ground, the UNSC passed Resolution 1769 (UN, 2007c) authorising the establishment of UNAMID which is still operating in the conflict zone.

Indeed, the transformation of the AMIS to the UNAMID and the AMIB to the ONUB is evidence to the fact that the role of the UN in Africa can be only complementary to the role of the AU which creates a new norm in international relations. Indeed, this transformation is the second process (after the transformation of AMIB) in terms of the security cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. It can be considered as an ideal example of the relationship between universalism and regionalism in the 21st Century and suggests relevant solutions for future AU-UN operational relations.
The EU has substantially supported the efforts of the AU to stabilise the situation in the Darfur region with a broad range of measures since January 2004. This support included financial, personnel and political backing to the Abuja peace talks process and the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFC) as well as assistance with planning, equipment, technical and financial support to AMIS.\textsuperscript{128} According the AUC’s Chairperson (AU, 2005d) the budget of the AU Observer Mission in Darfur in 2004 amounted to about US$26 million. The EU pledged US$12 million in the process of operationalising the Headquarters and the sites for the various sectors. In addition, when the AU decided to enhance its mission in Darfur in terms of troop magnitude and equipment, the EU contributed by giving US$11,080,000, which represent 80% of the total contribution by the EU of US$12 million, within the framework of the Peace Facility (AU, 2005d).

The support of the EU to AMIS was not limited to the financial enhancement. The EU also provided the AMIS with logistical equipment. Notably, an appreciable number of military and civilian personnel\textsuperscript{129} during the two-and-a-half-year mandate, including 30 police officers, 15 military experts and two military observers. Furthermore, a police officer and a political advisor were provided to help EU’s Special Representative for Sudan in Addis Ababa\textsuperscript{130}. This contribution helped in filling the gap left by lower levels of support from AU member states (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012).

Here, an important observation can be made: the support of the EU to the AMIS was more important relative to its support for the AMIB, which suggests that the EU was convinced that the AU is more effective than its predecessor and that it must be supported (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). This suggestion was confirmed by senior EU officials (interviews, 14/11/2012) who stated that:


\textsuperscript{129}The EU sent the civilian-military support mission to AMIS on 18 July 2005 in response to a request of the AU. See, Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the EU civilian military supporting action to the AMIS; Council Joint Action 2007/245/CFSP of 23 April 2007 amending Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the EU Civilian-military supporting action to AMIS.

“the AU’s involvement and effective management of the conflict in Burundi, which was simultaneous with the sending of another mission to Darfur, persuaded the EU and its member states to increase their financial, logistical and military support to the AU in order to enhance its efforts in achieving peace and security in the continent”.

However, despite technical and financial support for the AMIS, the EU - in similar fashion to the UN - left the AU to take the leading role in managing the conflict and finding a political settlement, as well as deploying troops to protect civilians and the delivery of relief supplies. Indeed, it was evident that the EU was not willing to deploy its own peacekeepers to the Darfur region as it did in the DRC (2003), Bosnia (2004) and Afghanistan (2001). The reluctance of the EU to intervene in Darfur was explained by a senior EU official (interview, 14/11/2012):

“the involvement of the EU in a number of conflicts such as the ones in the DRC, Macedonia, Bosnia and Afghanistan and the fact that conducting a peace operation in Darfur would require a high number of troops and financial resources made the member states unwilling to involve themselves in such adventure”.

The AU also received support from NATO, following a request from the former131. Notably, NATO provided airlift for additional AU troops into the region and by training AU personnel. Although NATO’s support finished on 31st December 2007, after the shift of AMIS to the UNAMID, it expressed its readiness to consider any future requests for support for the new UN-AU hybrid mission (NATO, 2007).

States Support to the AU

The AU not only sought to build a strong relationship with international and regional organisations, but also engaged in signing many agreements with individual states particularly powerful ones such as the US, China, Canada and a number of European

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131 On 26 April 2005, the AU asked NATO to consider the possibility of providing logistical support to help expand its mission in Darfur. In May 2005, the AUC’s Chairperson, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, visited NATO Headquarters – the first ever visit of an AU official to NATO – to provide details of the assistance request. The next day, the North Atlantic Council tasked the Alliance’s military authorities to provide, as a matter of urgency, advice on possible NATO support.
states. Parallel to the AMIB, the AMIS received huge support from several states such as those listed in table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Financial Support for AMIS from Individual States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Financial contribution (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>15,037,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,730,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,311,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>554,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6,507,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18,404,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40,386,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70,502,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Interview with senior AU official, 16/11/2012.*

Evidently, the financial support from these states represented an important source in filling the gap left by the lack of financial commitment from AU member states (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). Certainly, the funding from these states enhanced AMIS’s capacity to carry out its tasks. However, their attitude regarding the Darfur crisis adversely affected not only the efforts of the AU but also the UN. In fact, while there was consensus among UN member states in managing the conflict in Burundi, there was a division in their position in Darfur, particularly among the permanent members of the UNSC. For example, there were divisive debates regarding Resolution 1556 which was changed during the negotiation phase from explicitly referring to sanctions to the broader notion of “measures as provided for in Article 41 of the UN Charter” (UN, 2004f).

Indeed, this resolution was supported by some members but at the same time rejected by others. The US was among those who support not only this resolution but also called for further action (e.g. humanitarian intervention). However, a striking paradox can be noticed in the reaction of the US in comparison to its response to Rwanda civil war in 1994 (Heinze, 2007). Nick (2006:627-628) argued in this regard that:
“there is a tragic irony about the US response to Darfur when compared with its response to Rwanda some 12 years earlier. Then, the Administration did everything it could to avoid calling Rwanda a genocide - engaging in all sorts of semantics to avoid making that judgement, fearing that if it did it would have to take far stronger action than it was prepared to. This time round there has been little hesitation in labelling Darfur a genocide, in the light of far more ambiguous evidence - apparently on the cynical grounds that doing so did not impose any commensurate obligation to intervene”.

The US’ insistence on humanitarian intervention in Sudan was considered by many UN member states as a façade for gaining access to raw materials in Sudan (interview with former UN official, 29/05/2012). This might be a logical interpretation since “US oil firms repeatedly emphasized the potential significance of Sudan’s oil fields for the US economy” (Williams, 2005: 35).

It should be noted here that while the UK backed the UN’s sanction on Sudan and the US call for humanitarian intervention, other permanent members such as Russia and China refused imposing sanctions on their ally (e.g. the Sudanese government) and decided to protect their own political and economic interests (interview with former UN official, 29/05/2012). China’s opposition to intervention was arguably connected to its reliance on Sudanese oil (Taylor, 2006). Similarly, economic interests were behind Russian opposition, particularly “since it has sold around $150 million worth of military equipment to Sudan, and in 2002 a $200 million oil deal with the Sudanese government fell through” (Williams, 2005: 33).

France had a different attitude towards that issue and in the first instance was against the sanctions because its officials thought that such policy would “push the Sudanese back to their wrong behaviours or misdeeds” (BBC, 2004). In fact, France’s policy on Darfur was not very clear; its disagreement with the US allegation of genocide in Darfur might suggest that it wanted to check American power in the same way as it did for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, it was suggested that the French intended to safeguard their energy-related interests in Sudan (interview with African analyst, 09/06/2012; and interview with former UN official, 29/05/2012)\textsuperscript{132}.

\textsuperscript{132} See also, Shurkin, Michael, France and the Darfur Crisis, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Centre on the United States and Europe, 2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/01/01france-shurkin.
In the meantime, Pakistan, as a non-permanent UNSC member, decided to join China by abstaining on Resolution 1556. It considered that the aforementioned resolution’s threats of economic and diplomatic sanctions were too harsh and did not accept the necessity to impose “mandatory measures” on the Sudanese government (UN, 2004i). Moreover, the representative of Pakistan, Dr. Akram, reminded the Security Council of the privileges of Sudan as a sovereign state:

“the Sudan is an important member of the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the United Nations. As a United Nations Member State, the Sudan has all the rights and privileges incumbent under the United Nations Charter, including to the sovereign, political independence, unity and territorial integrity - the principles that form the basis of international relations”.133

In the same manner, some member states of the Arab League - Such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Syria (Sudan is also a full member) - expressed through various statements their deep disapproval and opposition to the regime of sanctions, regardless of the circumstances. According to these states, sanctions would have a negative impact on the civilian populations and would not help solving the Darfur conflict (Interview with former UN official, 29/05/2012; and interview with senior AU officials, 16/11/2012 and 20/11/2012).

It is clear from the above discussion that the different perspectives of UN member states regarding the Darfur crisis led to a notable division between the permanent members. On one hand, China and Russia placed considerable emphasis on the concept of sovereignty and considered the conflict as an internal affair which in turn justified the reaction of Sudan as a sovereign state. On the other, the US, France and UK insisted on the primacy of human rights over the notion of sovereignty and considered the action of SG as crimes against humanity (interview with UN former official, 29/05/2012). However, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these states agreed that the situation in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region (interview with UN senior official, 21/11/2012).

In fact, the position of China and Russia had adversely affected the reaction of the UN against the Darfur crisis. According to Scott (2004) the threats of China and Russia of veto had severely restricted UN action in Darfur and the economic interests of these states were

the main motivations of their position. Indeed, the disagreements among the permanent and non-permanent states of the UNSC negatively affected not only the response of the UN but also the effectiveness of the AMIS in managing the conflict in the region (interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012; and interview with senior AU officials, 16/11/2012 and 20/11/2012).

5.7 The Effectiveness of the AMIS

As established earlier in the thesis, understanding the effectiveness of the international and regional organisations in general and the AU in particular must not focus only on the outcomes. The internal process is an important element as well.

Explaining the Internal Process

To measure the internal process’ effectiveness, two indicators have been identified. The first one is the general consensus among the AU’s member states in issuing the resolution of the intervention and if they responded quickly to the crisis. The second criterion is the level of coordination among the mechanisms of the AU in applying the aims of its mission on the ground. Regarding the first criterion, although the decision on sending the AMIS was reached consensually, in reality there was a division among the AU’s member states regarding the conflict in Darfur. In contrast to the Burundian conflict, some African states consider the Darfur crisis as an internal issue and supported the SG while others supported the rebel movements (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012; and interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012).

A striking paradox here is that some African states could agree and (sometimes under pressure) to vote or accept the AU resolutions. However, their behaviour on the ground is totally different. This is what happened in the Darfur crisis where all AU members agreed for the deployment of the AMIS but simultaneously they stood with a party against another one (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). As noted by Sturman and Hayatou (2010), although all the AU’s decisions had been reached through consensus, the use of face-saving language by African representatives was meant rather to show goodwill and to appear as agreeing. Accordingly, it is necessary for analysts to interpret what is produced in press releases or communiqués.

Even though discussions during the Council sessions are quite heated, the resultant communiqués are worded to give the impression that there was actually real consensus among the member state representatives. The writing of documents to be released to the
public consists of a long process, where the wordings are intensely examined and subject to drafting and redrafting to satisfy all AU member states. The fact that there are some disagreements among African states regarding some issues even after the decision is taken was confirmed by a senior AU official (interview, 13/11/2012):

“some African states do agree on the decisions of the AU at its headquarters in Ethiopia although they are not satisfied about some of the AU resolutions. Their agreement was to avoid appearing as an obstacle to the continental interest. However, their subsequent comportment on the ground diverged with the aims of the AU. In the Darfur case, the position of some states such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria was to back the SG and against the external intervention. These states consider the Darfur conflict as an internal affair and that the attempts of some powerful states to intervene are meant to weaken the country, divided it as what happened in the case of Sudan and to achieve their economic interests”.

Recalling the divisions between the permanent UNSC members, the lack of real consensus among African states as well as external actors regarding the AMIS has also affected the effectiveness of the level of coordination between its tools on the ground and its headquarters in Ethiopia in managing the peace process as well as the military activities.

On the one hand, the involvement of some member states in providing the rebel groups with financial and military support did not only enable them to attack the government forces but also the AU peace forces. On the other hand, the support of some African states and some foreign states such as Russia and China to SG encouraged it to challenge the external intervention or at least to work at its own terms (interview with AU senior officials, 13/11/2012). This separation in the regional and international environment or the position of different states has not only weakened the level of coordination among AU’s instruments but also the overall outcomes of its mission (Interviews with EU senior officials, 14/11/2012 and Interview with UN senior official, 21/11/2012).

Interpreting the AMIS’s Outcomes

As outlined earlier, evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional organisations must consist of analysing the internal process and link it with the outcomes. As was expected in the theoretical framework, when there is no consensus among member states in
intervening in a conflict, the internal process is ineffective and the outcomes of the mission will be adversely influenced. This hypothesis can be confirmed if the outcomes of the AMIS are examined. Although the AU responded quickly to the conflict in Darfur by initiating the political process and sending a peace mission to support the ceasefire, its outcomes were not as satisfactory as was expected. Regarding the first criterion, violence abatement, the mission was not able to end the conflict between parties of dispute or at least reduce it and thus the mission was ineffective in supervising the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

Regarding the second criteria, conflict containment, the AMIS was not able to avert the spread of the conflict to other cities in the region of Darfur as well as to prevent the involvement of other foreign groups to the conflict from Sudan’s neighbouring state (i.e. Chad) (interview with senior AU official, 14/11/2012). Moreover, the AMIS was not able also to prevent conflict in the era of deployment. Even though the mission helped the civilian populations, it was ineffective due to the fact that the fighting between the parties continued on the ground and provoked death, casualties and the displacement of populations. These instances reveal the failure of the conflict containment with tragic and dire consequences.

A final core goal is conflict settlement or the ability of a particular mission in implementing a ceasefire between the parties of disputes or in succeeding in reaching a peace agreement between them. In fact, the failure of the mission in the addressing the first two core goals (e.g. conflict abatement and conflict containment) had a negative impact on the third goal (e.g. conflict settlement). The continued fighting on the ground between the parties of dispute and the external financial and military support to both of them had affected the ability of the AU to solve the conflict or at least to persuade the warning parties to respect the peace agreement. The failure of the AMIS to implement the ceasefire and stop the fighting led in turn to the collapse of the peace talks (interview with former UN official, 31/05/2012 and interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012).

Indeed, the view of non-African senior officials that the AMIS was not effective in managing the Darfur crisis was shared by many scholars in the field such as Albert (2007), Adebajo (2008), Murithi (2008) and Moller (2009a). These scholars argued that the AMIS was not effective in maintaining the security and stopping the killing of civilians.

134 About the consequences of the conflict see page 147 of this Chapter.
Nevertheless, a number of the AU’s senior officials, as expected, have a different perspective and more positive evaluations; this is arguably unsurprising due to the fact that they are representing the AU. They maintain that despite the new establishment of this organisation, the severity of the conflict and the helplessness of the parties of dispute, the AU had sent about 8,000 troops who worked effectively to stop the fighting in some parts of the region, deliver humanitarian assistance and protect many civilians. These officials opined that it is unfair to expect that a nascent organisation such as the AU will be able to achieve an ideal peace in the most complicated civil war in the world in a relatively short time (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 12/11/2012).

Regardless of the above controversial debate between African officials and officials from non-African organisations, the present study argues that the AMIS did achieve some of its objectives on the ground. Although the AU failed in putting an end to the conflict, its involvement had positive effects. The amendment of its mandate in 2004 empowered officers to act according to the circumstances, such as ordering protective deployments to trouble zones. Indeed, thanks to their presence and non-interfering tasks, AMIS managed to ensure the stability of the situation in various areas of Darfur (interviews with senior AU officials, 13/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 12/11/2012; and interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012). In fact, in areas where AMIS was present numerous attacks on civilians were prevented, reducing to a certain extent the level of human suffering (UN, 2005f; Ralph, 2005; Susan, 2006; David, 2007; Møller, 2009a).

The AU’s intervention in Darfur, for all its imperfections was possible due to this institution taking on a leading role independently, whilst deliberately avoided by most international actors, among whom figures the powerful UNSC. As Rice and Andrew (2007) have argued, the AU was the only international actor willing to face bullets to save civilians in Darfur. Without the AU’s intervention, it is unlikely that another actor would have been keen to be involved in Darfur, and it is highly improbable that even the UN would have considered intervening with a peace mission as it was the case in 2007. Therefore, it can be said that AMIS’ outcome was better than the complete absence of a mission. Its intervention contributed positively even by a modest degree to the peace and security in the region. Although the AMIS did contribute positively in stabilising certain parts in the region and protect civilians, its achievements were not as expected due to the unavailability (or absence) of environmental factors which were available (or present) in the previous case of Burundi. Indeed, the harshness of the conflict, the restricted nature of
the mandate, the position of conflicting parties, the division between member states as well as the international community had made the AU and its mission in Darfur a very complex operation, a mission impossible to achieve. (See Table 5.2 and 5.3 below)

Table 5.2: The extent of the influence of Independents variables on the effectiveness of the AMIS (the dependent variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independents variables from internal environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Independents variables from external environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- consensus among member states</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1- UN support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- coordination between the AU institutions</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2- EU support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- the financial and logistical commitment of member states</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- Individual states support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- the mandate of the mission and the local consent of parties to dispute</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: the extent of the effectiveness of the AMIS (the dependent variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The main goals</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>AMIS effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Abatement</td>
<td>1-the reduction, or overall elimination, of armed conflict</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- saving lives</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- protecting aid organisations</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Containment</td>
<td>1-Prevent the spread of violence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The effectiveness of the mission is Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- prevent the involvement of other actors</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- containing the conflict in conflict zone</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
<td>1- signing a peace agreement between parties</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- treating the root causes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What can be observed firstly from Table 5.2 and 5.3 is the strong relationship between the independents variables and the dependent variable. The availability of environmental factors contributed positively to the effectiveness of the AMIB in achieving the core goals and ultimately solves the conflict in Burundi. However, the absence of environmental factors in the Darfur case affected negatively the outcomes of the AMIS. This in turn allows the researcher to observe that the effectiveness of international and regional organisations depends on a combination of factors which might vary from one case to another.

This is can be noted by comparing the AMIB and the AMIS. In fact, the change in the independent variables identified in Chapter 3 undermined in various ways the capacity of the AU to put an end to the Darfur conflict. Firstly, there was no consensus among African states about how to solve the conflict, which in turn affected the effectiveness of the level of coordination between AU institutions and the outcomes of the mission as a whole. Secondly, the mandate of the AMIS was restricted by the SG in which the peacekeeping forces were not authorised to use the force to protect civilians. Thirdly, the political, logistical and financial support of AU member states was not adequate and it is clear that without the external support the AMIS could not survive.

These findings meet, to a large extent, the argument of this study that the AU can be an effective organisation in managing intra-state conflicts. However, it has been shown that AU’s effectiveness depends on four factors, the internal process, the mandate of the mission, the commitment of its member states and the external support. Another significant observation made regarding the effectiveness and the ability of the AU in managing intrastate conflict in Africa is that, due to several factors, this regional organisation cannot sustain its missions on a long-term basis. For instance, as seen in the chapter dedicated to the AMIB, the AU asked the UN to replace its mission in Darfur. This is indeed was a result of the financial and logistical limitations of the AU.

**5.8 Conclusion**

This chapter examined a number of the major issues identified in the theoretical framework and examined their impact on the Darfur case. Firstly, it began with an analysis of the conflict and demonstrated Sudan’s reluctance to follow the new international standards in terms of the protection of populations. Nonetheless, the chapter also showed the manner through which the Darfur crisis also bestowed the AU a real test to assess its relevance in African peacekeeping domain as a new organisation. In spite of the relatively late deployment of its mission, the AU led the peace operation from the outbreak of hostilities.
Some of its activities undoubtedly marked a departure from the practice of its predecessor the OAU. However, the failure of the AU’s member states, particularly Sudan, in meeting their obligations showed the existence of a deep gap between the official acceptance of new norms and principles and the capacity to concretely implement them in real conflict instances including the right of intervention.

However, the Darfur conflict should not be only considered for an evaluation of the case for intervention but also by examining the impediments which appeared during that very intervention. The recourse of the concept of sovereignty is still interpreted by many African states in a way which impede any deployment meant to save populations or stop recurrent violence against the basic human rights of people. Such a problem was encountered by the AMIS, who was not able to deploy without the green light from Khartoum. Nevertheless, the AU’s failure in Darfur does not deprive it from the merit of being the only institution who took on a leading role, deliberately avoided by most international actors. Although if it is not really possible to drew causal links in particular in situations so intricate as Darfur, it is possible to argue that AMIS, without putting an end to the conflict, was nevertheless able to reduce the number of casualties in this conflict.

Regarding the obstacles which impeded the achievement of the mission objectives, it appears that the complexity of regional politics, the historical background of the region, the reluctance of AU member states to provide sufficient troops and personnel, the restricted nature of the mandate, logistics and the reluctance to provide financial means, all these elements provoked tough criticism of the African organisation. The AU’s leading role in Darfur affected positively the future way of addressing the issue of peace and security, despite the frustration of having African states - keen to make pledges during meetings but unable to respect and honour their engagements or the very principles they seek to uphold - including the promise to intervene in given situations as outlined in the AUCA. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the AU framework and practice in the Darfur conflict show a clear move from the old African concept of non-interference in the affairs of member states to the one of non-indifference in the face of dire circumstances.

Meanwhile, the tragedy in the Darfur region presented the international community in particular, the UN, the EU and NATO with an opportunity to reconstruct its confidence, as well as legitimacy as international actors, that had broken down after the disappointment of Rwanda. However, it is regrettable to see the resignation of the international community,
ready to accept the Darfur conflict as a fate and is willing to consider this case as a “low intensity conflict in Sudan”, in the same manner as other African conflicts, “leaving it to humanitarian agencies to keep millions alive in Darfur at a subsistence level” (Grono, 2006: 630).
Chapter 6: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

6.1 Introduction

African conflicts, as those of the other continents, present their own peculiarities. The Darfur and Burundian cases discussed previously showed specific features unobserved in the Somali case. In fact, the conflict and instability of this country puzzled many observers and experts in conflict resolution, who were unable to fully understand and then explain the situation of permanent conflict. Effectively, in terms of ethnicity the country is one of the few homogeneous African countries. Furthermore, Somalis share the same language, culture and religion (Lewis, 1993; Ahmed, 2007; Garibo-Peyró, 2012). A striking paradox is that this country has never achieved lasting peace or stability in the last two decades (since the early 1990s), and the enduring civil war has been one of the most devastating one in modern African history.

Since the outbreak of the conflict, it has been estimated that 350,000 to 1,000,000 Somalis have died (Møller, 2009b:8). More than one million became refugees and 1,356,845 were registered as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) (UN, 2011c). This data is illustrative of one of the most important human catastrophes witnessed in the 20th Century (Menkhaus, 2007). Effectively, this conflict was not only limited to this African region but it has also threatened international peace and security. According to Møller (2009b:4):

“the consequences of the Somali conflict was not so much the high numbers of refugees and IDPS or the severe malnutrition among the Somali population, but rather the new threats to the international shipping posed by the surge of piracy off the Somali coasts”.

Accordingly, the Somali conflict can offer another test of the AU’s effectiveness. On the one hand, it represents an interesting example which will help us to assess the ability of the AU to deal with conflict situations where challenges are not due to ethnic clashes, religious antagonism or heterogeneous communities. On the other hand, while AU missions in response to the Darfur and Burundi conflicts were eventually transformed to hybrid missions (i.e. effective partnerships between the UN and the AU) on the ground, there was a reluctance to do so in Somalia. The UN’s unwillingness to join the AU will help to determine the role of the AU mission and assess its effectiveness for a relatively long time without the involvement of the UN as it happened in previous conflicts. Additionally, it is essential to understand the various incentives of the UN and the EU in intervening in African intrastate conflict.
The Somali conflict raised significant questions, mainly in relation to the lessons learned by the international community in general and the African community in particular in responding to civil wars and preventing human tragedy. It represents a clear opportunity to examine the emerging norms at the regional and international levels. At the regional level, it is important to examine the new norms of the AU such as promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa\textsuperscript{135}. At the international level, this conflict represented a real challenge for - and an opportunity to assess - the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a new doctrine of the UN as well as other international actors such as the EU and NATO. In this regard, Hull and Svensson (2008) argued that examining the experiences of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could increase understanding of the AU as a security actor as well as the challenges facing the organisation in establishing and managing future peace operations. According to Møller (2009b), the Somali case presents a situation where it is possible to determine and analyse several actors: either African neighbouring countries’ regional and global international bodies; great powers; or other categories of non-state actors. In fact, the Somali conflict has encouraged a number of researchers who have attempted to analyse and assess the AU’s intervention in Somalia to determine the ability of this emerging organisation to manage intrastate conflict. However, their perspectives, analyses and conclusions were different not only regarding the AMISOM’s effectiveness but also in relation to the causes which helped or undermined the attainment of the mission’s objectives.

Similar to the literature dedicated to the previous cases, some scholars focus simply on whether the AMISOM has had a positive effect or not, without considering the root causes of the conflict or the factors that influenced the effectiveness of the AU. Andrews and Holt (2007) and Franke (2007), for example, argued that despite the fact that the AU actually succeeded in bringing at least relative peace to countries such as Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, its mission in Somalia is not effective. Similarly, Baker (2007: 120) argued that “the AMISOM demonstrated that there is a glaring gap in the AU’s capabilities in managing internal wars in the continent”. However, the authors did not explain either the root causes of the conflict nor the factors that undermined the mission. From this perspective, it is not clear from what basis they drew their conclusions. Although they mentioned some factors, such as the commitment of member states or the role of

\textsuperscript{135} See Chapter 2 page146 and 147 regarding the AU principles, these principles can be examined through the Somali conflict due to their relevance; For example, Para (b) of the AUCA defends the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; as will be shown, Ethiopia intervened militarily in Somalia without consent from the AU and many African states considered this intervention as an invasion of a sovereign state.
international community, the indicators used to measure the impact on the outcomes of the
AU mission were not stated in these works.

Other studies are more critical in evaluating this mission through the analysis of certain
factors which affected the AU’s effectiveness. However, their results are unsatisfactory as
they focus on some factors whilst neglecting others. For example, Baker (2007) focused on
the commitment of member states of the AU. He found that despite the authorisation given
by the AU for the deployment of AMISOM with a planned force of some 8,000 African
peacekeepers, in the end only Uganda and Rwanda sent troops. Thus, in his view, the
military and logistical shortcomings were the main cause of the poor outcomes to the
AMISOM. De Coning (2007) disagreed with Baker’s conclusions and maintained that the
number of troops was not the main challenge facing AMISOM; Africa provided 28 percent
of the UN’s uniformed peacekeepers. In his view, it is the financial problems and the
limited mandate of the mission that prevented the AU from effectively managing the
conflict. Franak (2006) argued that the weakness of the state and the absence of a central
authority in Somalia were the main causes behind the huge difficulties encountered by the
AMISOM.

Contrary to the above studies, Bogland et al (2008) argued that, despite its shortcomings,
the AU had carried out an impressive number of diplomatic assignments, sent observers
and conducted several and extensive peacekeeping operations in the most dangerous
regions such as Somalia. For them, this reflected the member states’ will to make decisions
and support the AU. In fact, most researchers have agreed that internal factors, especially
concerning the commitment of member states, have been fundamental to the AU’s
effectiveness.

A number of researchers analysed the support of international and regional organisations
and the impact of this issue on the AU’s effectiveness. For instance, Møller (2009b)
focused on external actors in Somalia. He argued that the UN’s intervention in the 1990s
had a negative rather than positive impact on the conflict and in the 2000s, its support (as
alongside the EU) for AMISOM had been limited. The author concludes that the most
effective external actors were non-state ones, such as humanitarian agencies and the
Somali Diaspora across the world. These two elements have mitigated the humanitarian
catastrophes brought about by other external actors. Assanvo and Pout (2007), who looked
at the EU’s role in supporting the AU missions (particularly in Somalia), argued that the
assistance provided for setting up and funding the African Peace Facility (APF) represented one of the most important undertakings of the EU in the context of its strategy towards Africa. The authors also provided details about the EU’s financial support for Africa since the 1990s - including the AMISOM - and underlined that the AMISOM could not survive without the EU’s support.

Bariagaber (2008), who concentrated on the role of the UN in Africa, argued that the new developments in the continent represented by the willingness of African states, under the umbrella of the AU,136 encouraged the UN to work closely with this institution. Other contrasting opinions were given by researchers such as Othieno and Samasuwo (2006) Pushkina (2006) and Goulding (2008), who have argued that the support of the UN for AU missions, including that in Somalia, were insufficient as developed countries, - the main actors in the UN - preferred deploying their citizens in missions outside Africa. Additionally, the successive failures of UN interventions in internal conflicts, such as that in Somalia in 1990 and 1993, were due to disagreements within the UNSC where the permanent members would often vote for interventions in areas of close interests to them (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001; Zaum and Roberts 2008). Although these studies looked at important aspects of the role of external actors in supporting the AMISOM, relying only on the external factors as the main component of assessing the AU is far from sufficient since there are other factors which have their impact on the AU’s effectiveness such as the commitment of AU’s member states, mandate of the mission and the local consent of the conflicting parties.

Indeed, a substantial number of scholars realised that relying only on external or internal factors to analyse and evaluate the AMISOM is inadequate; accordingly they broaden their research by considering internal and external factors simultaneously. In this respect, Franke and Esmenjaud (2008) argued that AMISOM has not been able to effectively manage the conflict because of a combination of these factors. At the internal level, there was a remarkable lack of political and financial commitment of AU member states to the AMISOM. At the external level, the support from international actors like the US and France, but also the UN and EU, was limited due to the selective policy adopted by these actors. In other words, such involvement of western actors and support for ‘African solutions’ is not provided unless the following criteria are met: first, their immediate

136 Nevertheless, they do not explain the UN’s support for the AMISOM in detail or why it was unwilling to join the AMISOM as it did in Darfur and Burundi.
interest is either inexistent or negligible; second, their immediate interest is not enough relevant to intervene directly or alone; and finally, the efforts need long-term and permanent commitments which are not their favourite option (Franke, 2008).

In contrast to the previous authors, Derblom et al (2008) and Williams (2009b and 2011a) argued that without UN and EU support, AMISOM cannot survive. They also acknowledged the existence of difficulties which frustrate their relationship such as for example structural imbalances in, and impediments to, coordination among the UN, EU and AU. In their analysis of internal factors, the above authors found a gap between the AU’s ambition and the financial and political commitments of African states, suggesting that such a gap would disappear with the intervention of external support. Similarly, Waal (2009) argued that the external support to the AMISOM is a significant factor to its effectiveness. However, the commitment of AU member states is also an important factor. For him, the main reason behind the difficulties of the AMISOM was the failure, fragility of the Somali state, and when the AU needed to expand the number and the scope of its tasks it found itself unable to achieve these objectives in the absence of strong central government.

Although the existing literature on AMISOM explains important aspects and factors surrounding the conflict, a number of shortcomings in these various analyses have been noticed. Firstly, the AU’s internal process when issuing the AMISOM’s mandate has been neglected. Secondly, the neglect of the root causes of the conflict, as well as other essential factors such as the mandate of the mission, the position of bordering states and the local consent of both parties to dispute. Thirdly, there was no comprehensive comparison made with other cases where the AU intervened. Finally, most of the literature was based on analyses conducted during the first three years of the deployment of AMISOM, at which point the outcomes were not yet satisfactory. However, the mission subsequently made concrete progress; as will be shown later on, the deployment and peace keeping management became more effective after the third year.

It is evident from the above discussion that there are considerable gaps in the existing literature analysing the AMISOM’s effectiveness. In fact, neglecting the root causes of the conflict, focusing on some factors while neglecting others, as well as evaluating the outcomes without considering the internal process (which is argued here to be the

137 Regarding the importance of the internal process and these factors see Chapter 3.
cornerstone of the reaction) might have led to the inaccuracies in their findings. Accordingly, and in order to enrich the current literature on the field and address the perceived shortcomings, this study focuses on the root causes of the conflict and on all internal and external factors which are identified as likely to affect the work of the AMISOM. It will also analyse the AU’s internal process regarding issuing its mission in Somalia and links it to the outcomes. Applying this framework will help fill the gaps in the literature and to investigate the validity of the argument developed so far in this study.

In order to do so, this chapter is divided into four main sections. It begins by giving the historical background and introducing the main players in the conflict. The second section is devoted to analysing the regional and international attempts to manage the conflict. The third section examines the AU’s own response to manage the conflict in Somalia. In this respect, a major focus is given to the political and military settlement tools of the AU in managing the Somali conflict. Then, the study focuses on the factors which influenced the AMISOM’s effectiveness. Finally, the chapter looks at the evaluation of the effectiveness of the AU’s management of the Somali crisis by matching its performance with the criteria developed in the theoretical framework.

6.2 Establishing the Background to the Somali Conflict

Somalia gained its independence in 1960, although it was not politically unified before that date. It was by the merging of two former colonies, the British Somaliland (in the North) and the Italian Somaliland (in the South), that the new Somali Republic was born with a new constitution voted by the Somali people and introduced on 20th July 1961 (Lewis, 2008). The first Somali president was Osman Daar (1961-1967), followed by his former Prime Minister Ali Shermarke (1967-1969). In 1969, this latter was assassinated following a military coup conducted by General Siad Barre, who became the de facto new president of the country (Hull and Svensson, 2008). After twenty years in power, Barre was deposed by a coalition of northern and southern clan forces.

In fact, the independence movement appeared in the Somaliland region in 1988 following the Ogaden war138. This was the beginning of the collapse of the Somalia state (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/06/2012). Following the uprisings of independent groups, the government reacted by conducting a brutal campaign against the separatists mainly through heavy bombardment of the city of Hargeisa (Ahmed and Green, 1999). However,

the short victory of Barre’s regime did not last and Somaliland forces overcame his military campaign and declared their independence in 1991\textsuperscript{139}. It should be noted here that the decision to declare independence was taken despite disagreements expressed by representatives of the other regions of Somalia. According to Drysdale (1991) and Prunier (1994), despite the adverse opinion of the Somali National Movement’s political leaders, and due to a popular pressure, independence was proclaimed in May 1991.

Meanwhile, the other parts of the country were also unravelling (Ahmed and Green, 1999). For instance, in Mogadishu, Barre was also weakened by inter-clan fighting, and he used the state’s weapons against the citizens of its own capital city. This behaviour provoked a popular uprising and accelerated the fall of Barre, who had to flee Mogadishu in January 1991 (Philipp, 2005)\textsuperscript{140}. The overthrow of Barre’s regime in 1991 triggered other armed conflicts between Somali factions eager to take control of the country’s political leadership (Hull and Svensson, 2008; Lewis 2008).

Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the most relevant view of the conflict in Somalia is mainly a conflict of power which emerged as a result of the desire of many clans to rule the country after the collapse of the dictatorial regime (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Abild, 2009). Accordingly, this conflict is different from the other cases studied in the preceding two chapters in terms of the root causes of the conflict, which in turn provides another situation which can be assessed in order to ascertain the effectiveness of the interveners (either international or regional organisations or individual states) in dealing with conflicts where challenges are not the result of ethnic clashes, religious antagonism or heterogeneous communities.

However, the question raised here is why there has been bloody fighting since 1991 in Somalia which is an ethnically homogeneous state with the same language, religion and culture as well as a strong national consciousness. In fact, three reasons can be identified as the main factors of this dispute. These factors had adversely affected the Somali social and political structure which consists of clan families and clans which are subdivided into sub-clans. The Somali clan system (as can be seen from Figure 6.1 below) has two main lineage lines, the Samale and the Sab, which break into six major clan-families: Digil, Rahanweyn, Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir (Mansur 1997: 128).

\textsuperscript{139} This unilateral declaration has not been acknowledged yet by the international community.

\textsuperscript{140} Siad Barre died later in exile in Nigeria.
The first factor which affected the unity of Somali society, and is to be considered as the main cause of the Somali civil war, was colonialism. Italy, Britain and France controlled the Somali regions by splitting it into an Italian colony, another was the British protectorate of Somaliland, while the French colony took over Djibouti; the North Eastern Province was incorporated to Kenya and Ogaden became part of Ethiopia (Abild, 2009). This division had a formidable impact on all aspects of Somali society across the economic, social and political spectrums (Garibo-Peyró, 2012). In fact, when the colonial powers outlined the internal boundaries and those with its neighbours did not totally consider the fundamental economic need for pastoral clans to periodically migrate between pasture land and water wells. For example, the Marehan and Bah-Gari clans continuing to dwell on the Italian side were cut off from essential pasturelands on the Ethiopian side, while having access to traditionally-used water wells in the Shabelle Valley. According to a Somali diplomat (interview, 23/06/2012), “this division brought new ideologies and different cultural values that had its influence on the unity of Somali state and its people who found themselves part of different centralised political systems”. The separation of Somalia into two parts (British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland) negatively affected the
unity of the country and formed the ground of strong competition among the clans in these regions.

The second cause of the Somali civil war was the authoritarian role of Barre who took power through a military coup. It should be noted that Somalia experienced a brief period of democracy between 1960 and 1969. Upon independence, “this new state was given a liberal constitution guaranteed not only the unity of two Somali territories but also democracy and a forum that sanctioned multipartism with guarantees to de jure freedom of expression” (Garibo-Peyró, 2012: 113). During that period, considerable political differences encouraged a proliferation of political parties “to the point where Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel” (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 69). Nevertheless, this democratic process ended after Barre’s successful military coup. Considering himself as one of Africa’s “Big Men”, Barre immediately suspended the country’s constitution and banned all forms of political and professional association (Ahmed and Green, 1999). In order to consolidate power, Barre favoured some Somali clans over others by incorporating them in the national army and other important sectors in the country (interview with Somali analyst, 23/06/2012). The dimensions of this policy deepened the divergences between the Somali clans and led to uprisings against the Barre regime, which eventually led to the independence movement of the Northern part of the country.

The third factor that influenced the eruption of the Somali crisis is related to the regional intervention in the country’s internal affairs, particularly by Ethiopia whose involvement in the Somali conflict goes far back in history. According to Hull and Svensson (2008: 20) “[t]he two countries have rivalled over ethnic and religious differences throughout their past”. The role of colonial powers in giving parts of Somali land to the Ethiopian Empire in 18th Century was the most important reason behind the tension between them (interview with Somali analyst, 23/06/2012). In fact, Ethiopia was given the Ogaden region through an agreement with Britain in 1897 which had been a part of Somalia (Garibo-Peyró, 2012). Afterwards, Britain handed over other parts belonging to an independent Somalia (Elmi and Barise, 2006). These land issues were the main cause of two wars (1964 and 1977) between Ethiopia and Somalia (Hull and Svensson, 2008). In addition to armed clashes, both countries supported opposition and armed groups within their territories. For instance, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was established in Ethiopia and supported by the Ethiopian army to carry out guerrilla warfare across the border (Ahmed and Green,
As will be seen later, the involvement of Ethiopia has continued until now and has not only been limited to frontier wars or supporting rebellion movements, but invaded Somalia in 2006.

Drawing upon the above discussion, it can be said that the Somali crisis is an outcome of contradictions and conflicts between different factors that had weakened the unity of Somali society and led to the collapse of its state. Parallel to this, it is not surprising that a bloody war can occur even within the most homogeneous states like Somalia and confirms the fact that ethnicity is not the only source of African conflicts. The conflict on power, economic resources and the lack of social justice are important factors of intrastate conflict. In fact, due to the factors mentioned, a full scale civil war erupted in Somalia, provoking one of the most devastating conflicts in modern African history where more than half a million people were internally displaced, half a million sought refuge in Ethiopia and between 350,000 and 1,000,000 Somalis had died (Møller, 2009b).

These dreadful consequences encouraged, or at least forced, both international and regional organisations and individual states on the regional and international levels to try to put an end to the tragic events in Somalia. However, these attempts failed to achieve this aim prior to the AU’s involvement in 2007. Indeed, the rationale behind assessing the regional and international attempts to solve Somali conflict before the AU’s intervention is to identify the reasons contributing to their failure and to what extent the AU has considered and/or successfully avoided them in its attempt to solve this crisis.

6.3 The International Response to the Somali Conflict

The first reaction of the international community to civil war in Somalia was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 733 in January 1992, calling for an arms embargo, UN humanitarian assistance and a cease-fire (UN, 1992a). This reaction did not change things on the ground due to the inadequate implementation (interview with former UN official, 03/06/2012). On 24th April 1992, after mediating a ceasefire agreement UNSC Resolution 751 established the UN Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM) to supervise the agreement and protect the humanitarian relief effort that was taking place due to a severe famine (UN, 1992b). Nonetheless, the mission failed due to the small number of troops and the opposition of some parties such as the Aideed faction (Hull and Svensson, 2008; Garibo-Peyró, 2012). The UNOSOM was unable to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance or even itself from the attacks of the Aideed faction as UNOSOM’s use of force was limited to self-
defence (interview with former UN official, 03/06/2012). With this scenario, the UNSC increased UNOSOM troops from 500 to 3,500 and gave them the right to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (UN, 1992c). These changes occurred, as the special representative of the UN Mohamed Sahnoun declared, without consulting either the delegation of UNOSOM itself in Mogadishu nor the Somali leaders or community elders as was previously the case (Sahnoun, 1994). Consequently, this marginalisation was not welcomed by some Somali leaders, such as the General Aidid who reacted by blocking the port of Mogadishu and holding 500 Pakistani blue hats captive (Lyons and Samatar 1995; Garibo-Peyró, 2012).

The failure of UNOSOM and the looming of a humanitarian catastrophe induced the US to intervene militarily with other states under UNSC Resolution 794 to create a safe environment to provide humanitarian aid (UN, 1992d). The mission conducted by the United Task Force (UNITAF)141 “known as Operation Restore Hope” (Robert, 2008: 53) has been judged as positive since it was able to re-establish a certain order and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/06/2012). Its effectiveness was due to the fact that the mission’s mandate was issued in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (interview with UN official, 03/06/2013). Indeed, following the killing of many Pakistani peacekeepers the UNSC changed UNITAF’s mandate, issuing Resolution 837 to give UNITAF troops the right to use “all necessary measures” to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid (UN, 1993a). The firepower of UNITAF intimidated the warring factions in Somalia which led to the restoration of law and order in most major urban areas in the country (Othman, 2011).

However, some scholars disagree with regards to the UNITAF outcomes. They have argued that the mission failed to remove the belligerents, was unable to bring stability and had to withdraw from the country in 1994. For instance, Hull and Svensson (2008) and Adamu (2009) argued that the death of 500-1,000 Somalis and eighteen US soldiers at the hands of Aideed’s militia in Mogadishu on 3rd August 1993 induced the US government to withdraw its troops from Somalia and asked the UN to replace the UNITAF.

In response to this request, the UNSC recommended the creation of another mission, UNOSOM II, in 1993 as a transition from the existing UNITAF and the replacement of UNOSOM I (UN, 1993b). Nonetheless, UNOSOM II was seen as a threat by the parties in

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141 A US-led multinational coalition consisting of over 38,000 troops from more than 20 countries, see Murphy (1995).
the conflict, in particular by Aideed\textsuperscript{142} whose militia targeted UNOSOM troops and threatened to attack any future peace missions (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/06/2012). According to Garibo-Peyró (2012), UNISOM II had serious problems from the outset which led to its failure, such as the lack of logistics, troops and the apprehension felt by its member components relating to their own safety more than that any serious concern for Somali civilians who were supposed to be protected. Such an attitude led Somalis to consider the troops as an occupying force interfering in their internal affairs (interview with Somali analyst, 23/06/2012). Clashes between Somali militia and the UNOSOM II resulted in the death of 6,000 Somalis and 83 peacekeepers (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995).

Consequently, the UN withdrew its mission from Somalia and implemented its decision by 31\textsuperscript{st} March 1995. The withdrawal of the UN and the US combined with the absence of state authority, extreme insecurity and massive aid inflows created a new type of business people – “the warlords” (Hartley 2004, 2008). This environment was profitable for these warlords\textsuperscript{143}, who gained from the stalemate of insecurity. Accordingly, the conflict continued further through the exploitation of human aid, the sale of arms and the expropriations of lands. Another element which was generated by the instability was the unavoidable choice for civilians to seek protection from warlords of their own clans (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/06/2012).

Finally, the whole insecure and unstable atmosphere was exploited by the warlords, who saw in the situation a worthy source of income; all efforts made by aid agencies were ineffective due to the warlords’ permanent presence and armed interventions. Since that time, the international community has been reluctant to intervene again in the Somali conflict and thus its role has been limited to the financial and logistical support for African efforts to solve this conflict.

\textbf{6.4 The Regional Response to the Somalia Crisis and the Emergence of New Parties}

The African response to Somali conflict started immediately after the overthrow of Barre with the holding of two reconciliation meetings in Djibouti in June and July 1991 to establish a Somali government. These first initiatives were unsuccessful due to the fact that

\textsuperscript{142} Aideed considered the presence of the international force as an obstruction to the realization of his political ambitions to be the president of Somalia and thus challenged and declared the war against them.

\textsuperscript{143} The phenomenon of warlords spread throughout Somalia with major figures such as Aideed and Ali Mahdi rising to prominence.
Aideed, the most influent Somali warlord contested the outcomes and the endorsement of Ali Mahdi as president (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/05/2012). Subsequently, several regional meetings were held from 1991 until 1999\textsuperscript{144}, but the agreements made were not respected and the fighting continued.

However, on 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2000, the Djibouti conference\textsuperscript{145} produced the Arta Declaration and the constitution of the Transitional National Government (TNG), the first government since the ousting of Barre in 1991 (UN, 2000b). Indeed, the conference led to a peace agreement, with the forming of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and a TNG mandated for three years. Despite these developments, in 2001 a contender to the TNG appeared under the name of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), the members of this Council were all warlords from various Somali areas. Eventually, the TNG and the SRRC did reach an agreement, giving birth to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (AU, 2004k). The efforts of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) were successfully rewarded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional Charter which gave the TFG a five year interim mandate and stated that an election would be held in 2009 (AU, 2004k).

Meanwhile, various Islamist organisations, centred on a long-standing network of local Islamic courts in the capital Mogadishu, formed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and a rival administration to the TFG of Somalia, with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as their head (Hassan, 2007). Due to its activities in providing security for people in Mogadishu and other areas, the UIC had effectively built a popular base in the country (interview with Somali diplomat 29/05/2012). According to the AU (2006g: 4) “the UIC system, an entity that, for the last decade, has run not just the Courts but also provided a rudimentary schooling system and health facilities” and thus UIC received the support of local population which in turn increased its ability to become a strong actor in the Somali theatre.

The above discussion shows that the establishment of TFG led to the emergence of new players in Somalia. The antagonism and the fighting between Somali clans shifted towards a confrontation between the TFG and its rivals; the UIC and the SRRC. All parties to the

\textsuperscript{144} Such as In Ethiopia in 1993; Cairo, 1994; Nairobi, 1994; Ethiopia, 1996-1997; and Cairo, 1997. Similar conferences were held in Jeddah, Cairo, Egypt, Sana and Nairobi, but all failed to make a progress in stopping the fighting in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{145} This conference was held in Djibouti following the initiative of the IGAD.
conflict had supporters either within or outside (interview with Somali analyst, 23/06/2012). In face of the severity of the dissension and fighting between the actors as well as the growing military capacity of the UIC, it was clear that an external intervention was inevitable. Effectively, this is what was happened when the leader of TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf, requested the intervention of a multinational peacemaking force to prevent the increased leverage of the UIC (AU, 2005e). However, this demand was disregarded by the international community - including the UN - claiming that there was no peace to keep in Somalia (interview with UN official, 21/11/2012).

It was against this background that the AU authorised IGAD to deploy a Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) (AU, 2005e). Nonetheless, this mission never materialised due to the lack of financial resources and the absence of consent of some parties of the dispute (Møller, 2005). The composition of the mission posed a big challenge for the deployment especially in terms of the neutrality of troop contributing countries (UN, 2005g). For instance, government officials issued a press statement in Nairobi welcoming AU troops, but categorically opposed the deployment of troops from the frontline states (e.g. Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti). An additional worry was the unwillingness of the UN to lift the arms embargo imposed in 1992, despite the TFG’s request for a specific exemption to facilitate the restoration of security through government forces and a peace-making operation (Hull and Svensson, 2008).

On the ground, the UIC became stronger and gained control of most of the Somali regions which induced the TFG to request military assistance from Ethiopia (Mollar, 2005; Baker, 2007). Indeed, in 2006, Ethiopia intervened militarily due to the reluctance of the international community to be involved and the failure of IGAD's mission (interview with Ethiopian diplomat, 10/11/2012). It seems that this intervention was suggested by the US. In fact, the Americans backed and supported Ethiopia’s intervention politically, military and financially to strengthen the TFG against the dominant UIC (Hull and Svensson, 2008). The justification for this unprecedented and extremely offensive intervention was to stop the growth of an Islamist regime that had taken root in Mogadishu, with suspected links to US-designated terrorist organisations. In late 2006, TFG forces with Ethiopian ground forces and air support, engaged the UIC, marking the beginning of the end for the

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latter (interview with Ethiopian diplomat, 10/11/2012). However, Ethiopia’s intervention and presence was not welcomed by the population and the insurgency grew again, prompting the Ethiopian authorities to withdraw their troops before the situation spiralled out of control (Heitman, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Accordingly, the Ethiopian government agreed to withdraw its troops and asked the international community to provide a peace support operation, as called for by IGAD, the AU and the UN (AU, 2007b). However, the reluctance of the UN to replace the Ethiopian forces compelled the AU to authorise the deployment of its mission in Somalia in 2007 (AU, 2007c).

6.5 The Response of the AU

Despite the fact that African states authorised the AU to assume an extensive and much more vigorous role in order to prevent, manage and solve African conflicts, the AU’s response to Somalia’s crisis was not satisfactory (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/05/2012). This perception seems to be plausible since the AU, founded in 2002, did not intervene in Somalia until 2007 despite the gravity of the situation. However, AU officials have different views as will be discussed later.

Despite the delay in sending a mission to Somalia, the AU was not completely absent from the earlier attempts to resolve the Somali conflict. Indeed, since its formation it actively participated in attempts to solve the conflict peacefully before finally sending its own mission. The AU’s involvement in Somalia can be analysed (as with the two preceding cases) through two approaches: political and operational. While the first approach consists of finding a durable political agreement between the parties of the dispute, the second focuses on direct interventions and the deployment of the AMISOM.

The Political Settlement Tools

Despite its new establishment as a new African institution, the AU was not only involved in Somalia’s political peace process but it also tried to send a military mission into the zone of conflict after 2003. The AU started by supporting the IGAD-led Somalia National Reconciliation Conference147 held in Kenya in 2002 (AU, 2002b). The signature parties requested IGAD, the AU and the wider international community to support and monitor the implementation of the Declaration (AU, 2003f). Following consultations between the AU and IGAD, a Joint Technical Fact-Finding Mission was sent to Somalia. The report

147 The Conference produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure.
issued by the mission mentioned the formal request of most Somali parties and large sections of the population to the AU to send to the country a military force to disarm all military militias and armed groups (AU, 2003f).

In response to this request, the AU asked the Interim Chairperson on the Reconciliation Process in Somalia to undertake the essential consultations with IGAD and the Somali parties towards the establishment of such a mechanism, and to take all necessary steps required for the mobilisation of the financial and other resources required (AU, 2003f). On 28th June, 2003 the AU dispatched a Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia to consult further with the Somali factions for the deployment of an Observer Mission (AU, 2003f). However, due to the Somali political and military circumstances and the reticence and unwillingness of certain parties to cooperate, the mission decided that more preliminary work was necessary before thinking of deploying Military Observers on the ground (interview with AU official, 17/11/2012). It was considered that an Observer Mission, although essential, had to be incorporated into a more elaborate, larger and well-equipped force (AU, 2003f). In fact, the decision of the AU to adjourn its observation mission after almost one year of consultation with Somali leaders reflected the fact that the AU was not able to implement its new norms on the ground, especially the right to intervene to stop war crimes even without the consent of the parties of the dispute.

Despite the AU’s failure to send an observation mission, its continued efforts with IGAD to find an inclusive solution to the conflict in Somalia was rewarded by the agreement reached following the 15th Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) on 15th July 2007 which gave birth to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (AU, 2004a). The establishment of TFG was considered as a big achievement for the AU and IGAD as one of its arms on the continent (interview with AU official, 17/11/2012). This argument seems to be convincing since the last attempts either by the regional or international actors failed to establish such a central government since 1990.

Although it had been assumed by the AU, IGAD and international observers that all Somali parties and factions adopted the Transitional Federal Charter unanimously, soon disagreements appeared between the TFG and a number of Somali leaders (AU, 2004k). In fact, these disagreements were not only between the TNG and its rivals such as the UIC but also among the leaders of this new government148. According to Menkhaus (2007:

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148 About the main disagreements see, AUPSC 6th session, 29 April 2004, (PSC/PR/2) (VI) Page 1, Para 2.
“Some of the militia leaders named to the TFG cabinet refused even to sit in the same room with the TFG leadership, begging the question of how they were supposed to govern as a group”.

For sure, persistent disagreements and the predominant insecurity were concerning elements vis-à-vis the intention to deploy AU Military Observers in Somalia (interviews with AU officials, 17/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 21/11/2012). However, the continued pressure of the AU and IGAD led to a noticeable progress in the peace process particularly with the establishment of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as President of TFG. Abdullahi requested the AU’s support for his Government through the deployment of a 15,000 to 20,000-strong peacemaking force to prevent the destabilisation of the country (AU, 2005e).

Consequently, the AU agreed in January 2005 in principle for the deployment of an AU peace support mission in Somalia (AU, 2005e). Nevertheless, the decision of the member states of IGAD to deploy a peace mission in Somalia on 31st January, 2005 made the AU reluctant and relied on IGAD’s mission to support the TFG (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/06/2012). However, AU peacekeeping regulations stipulate that sub-regional organisations such as IGAD are expected to assume the lead for fielding AU peacekeeping missions within the areas under their jurisdiction. Indeed, this was the perception of AU officials who consider IGAD as one of its mechanisms to undertake some of its tasks and under its authorisation (interviews with AU officials, 17/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 21/11/2012).

Accordingly, the AU requested the PSC to mandate IGAD to deploy a peace support mission and in order to support it, the AU sent a fact-finding mission to Somalia, composed of military experts and representatives from the AU Commission, the IGAD Secretariat and the League of Arab States. The AU also invited the UN, EU, Italy and Sweden to provide representatives to the Mission. However, this request was not fulfilled; those invited invoked security reasons for not participating (interview with AU senior official, 21/11/2012; and AU, 2005f). In May 2005, AU welcomed the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding Mission and authorises the deployment of the (IGASOM). This decision was welcomed by the UNSC

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149 This applied to IGAD in the north-eastern Africa region.
150 The AU mandated the (IGASOM) with a number of tasks and it will take over the mission thereafter.
in a presidential statement on 15th March, 2006 (UN, 2006e). However, and as discussed in the last section, the IGAD’s mission never materialised 151 prompting the AU to involve itself directly by sending the AMISOM in January 2007 (AU, 2007c). AMISOM deployment was authorised by the UNSC resolution 1744 on 20th February, 2007 (UN, 2007d).

In addition to the deployment of AMISOM, the AU took a number of steps in furtherance of the Somali peace process by holding several meetings between 2007 and 2008 to solve the conflict. Through these meetings, the AU did not only try to persuade all Somali stakeholders to join the peace process but further pressured on all member states and the larger international community to provide adequate support in order to enhance the ability of the Somali institutions. It also called on the UNSC to impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, either from inside or outside the region152, particularly Eritrea, who was accused of aiding Al-Shabaab and other armed groups (AU, 2010b). The AU furthermore requested the UNSC to urgently consider the Somali case, by authorising the deployment of an international stabilisation force followed by a peacekeeping operation replace AMISOM and contribute to both the long-term stability of the country and its reconstruction. However, despite these calls, the UN has not been willing to accept this task (interview with AU officials, 17/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 21/11/2012). While the UN did not consider the option of replacing the AU’s mission in Somalia, it has been nevertheless willing to support the mission politically, logistically and financially as will be discussed later.

In order to support the positive developments in the peace process in Somalia in 2010, the AU had to be aware of the political development and avoid the political vacuum; since the fact that the transitional period for the TFP ended on 20th August, 2011 (AU, 2011a). The AU asked the Heads of State to reach a consensus in order to extend the term of the current TFP. Indeed, this is what was agreed upon in the Kampala Accord on 9th June, 2011 where Somali parties accepted to defer elections of the President, Speaker and his deputies for twelve months after August, 2011 in order to adequately prepare and complete priority transitional tasks153. The extension of TFG was welcomed by the AU (AU, 2011a).

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151 Regarding the reasons of the failure of IGASOM, see this Chapter, page 203.

152 In fact and as will be discussed later, many African states and other foreign states had involved in supporting either the TFG or its rivals which had adversely affect the peace process in the country.

On 16th February, 2012 the AU welcomed the initiative of the permanent representative of the UK to the AU (Gerg Dorey) to hold a conference on Somalia in London (AU, 2012a). It was agreed at the London Conference that there must be no further extensions to the Transitional Federal Institutions’ mandate which was expected to end in August 2012 and it was agreed on replacing it with a representative government. Following the London Conference, a noticeable political development has been made in Somalia in particular; the grassroots approach to participatory democracy and coordinated efforts of the Traditional Elders, the Technical Selection Committee, International Observers, the establishment of the National Constituent Assembly, the adoption of a new Constitution and the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament on 20th August, 2012 (AU, 2012b). On 28th August, 2012 Professor Mohammed Sheikh Osman was elected as the speaker of the government with two Deputies (AU, 2012c). The AU and its partners welcomed the successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia, which culminated with the election, on 10th September, 2012 of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as the new President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (AU, 2013).

According to the AU (2012a), these developments represented landmark achievements unprecedented in the two preceding decades of the country’s many false starts at peace-making. This positive improvement was acknowledged by the UNSC in Resolution 2033 recognising the progress made through effective cooperation between the UN and the AU’s efforts in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security, particularly in Somalia (UN, 2012b).

Through the above detailed analysis, it can be observed that the security situation in Somalia was at its highest point of severity when the AU deployed its mission, which was reflected by the reluctance of the international community including the UN and the failure of IGAD to intervene in the country. Another observation is related to the gradual improvement either in the security situation or regarding the political process since 2007. Although the progress was slow, the AU efforts had effectively led the transition in Somalia which ended with the formation of the present federal government. As will be discussed later, the current situation in Somalia is far better than before, which confirms the AU’s effectiveness in comparison with the OAU, especially when considering the fact that the AU was involved simultaneously in other complicated intrastate conflicts such as the ones in Sudan and Burundi. Undoubtedly, the AU’s effectiveness is not only due to its

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political efforts, but also to its deployments, logistics and military efforts in the conflict zone. All these elements were significant for the overall assessment of this organisation in relation to the management of intrastate conflict.

**The Military Settlement Tools**

As discussed in the previous section, the failure of IGAD in sending its mission to Somalia made it necessary for the AU to shift from IGASOM into an AU Mission. Accordingly, the AU decided in its 69th meeting held in Addis Ababa to deploy the AMISOM (AU, 2007c). The UN endorsed, through Resolution 1744, the AU’s intention to establish a mission in Somalia underlining the urgency of the development (UN, 2007d). The major aim of AMISOM was to provide support for Somalia’s TFIs in their stabilisation efforts and in the pursuit of political dialogue and reconciliation. AMISOM was also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to create the necessary conditions for reconstruction, reconciliation and sustainable development of Somalia (AU, 2007c). The mission has three components: Military, Police and Civilian, which were to work hand in hand to achieve the mission’s mandate.

According to the Report of the AUC Chairperson in January 2007, there were two considerations behind the deployment of the AMISOM. The first related to the fact that the response of the AU and the deployment of its mission were made with the acknowledgment that the AU is the main responsible body for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa (AU, 2007b). This important and emphasised conception of the role of the AU was explicitly mentioned in the Report of the Chairperson, submitted during the 69th meeting of the PSC:

> The AU is the only Organization the Somali people could readily turn to as they strive to recover from decades of violence and untold suffering. We have a duty and an obligation of solidarity towards Somalia (AU, 2007a).

The AU’s willingness to deploy military forces in Somalia, without beforehand ensuring a ceasefire agreement and in highly volatile circumstances on the ground (in terms of security) reflected a strong commitment to make a change.

The second consideration behind the AMISOM deployment was that the AU mission would be replaced by a UN mission within a short timeframe. Due to the financial and
logistical limitations of the AU, the material and human resources cost of its missions in Burundi and Darfur, the Union was not able to sustain another peace operation for a long time (interview with AU official, 21/11/2012). For that reason, it was agreed that once the situation was stabilised and a conducive environment was created, the UN would take over the mission, in view of its experience, expertise and aptitude to conduct multidimensional peacekeeping missions.

Accordingly, the AMISOM was mandated for only six months and with the apparent intent that the mission will be replaced by a UN mission or at least to shift to a hybrid mission as the case of Darfur and Burundi (interview with AU official, 21/11/2012). Therefore, the AU requested the UNSC several times to take over the mission. Nevertheless, the UN has been reluctant and unwilling to take over this task until today, which in turn obligated the AU to extend the AMISOM’s mandate nine times. Thus, the AU was the first actor to react for the Somali conflict as for Burundi and Darfur cases.

The intention of the AU to have the pre-eminence in Somalia appeared through the strong commitments of its member states to respond to the crisis. Although the African states assumed the responsibility to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia under the auspices of the AU, their commitment did not materialise on the ground especially in the early stages of the mission. The AU’s plan was to send a mission composed of nine battalions with 850 personnel each (a total of 7650) supported by maritime and air components as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team (AU, 2007b). However, until January 2008, only two battalions were deployed (AU, 2009c). In fact, the

155 See AU doc, 163rd meeting, PSC/MIN/Comm.4 (CLXIII), 22nd December 2008: AU doc, 245th meeting, PSC/MIN/Comm.4 (CLXIII), October 2010; AU doc, 293rd meeting 13th September 2011, PSC/PR/COMM (CCXCIII) and AU doc, 80th meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXX) 9th January, 2012. The AU asked the UN, in all these different instances to participate by sending a peacekeeping mission to replace the AMISOM.

156 The AU renewed the AMISOM mandate nine times. The first mandate was on 19th January 2007 for six months; see AU doc, AUPSC communiqué, 69th meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX) Para 8. The first extension was on 18th July 2007 for other six months, see AU doc., AUPSC communiqué, 80th meeting, PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXX) Para 15. The third extension was on 22nd December 2008 for two months; see AU doc, AUPSC communiqué, (PSC/MIN/Comm.4 (CLXIII)), Para 13. The fourth extension was for three additional months, starting from 11th March 2009, see also AU doc AUPSC communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXXVII), Para 14. The fifth extension was for seven months starting from 17th June 2009, see AUPSC Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM.(CXIV), Para 16. The sixth extension was for a period of twelve months, beginning from 17th January 2010, see AUPSC communiqué, 214th meeting, PSC/PR/Comm.(CCXIV), 8th January 2010, Para 13. The Seventh extension was for a supplementary period of twelve months, beginning from 17th January 2011, see AUPSC communiqué, 258th meeting, PSC/PR/COMM.3 (CCLVIII), 20th January 2011, Para 13. The eighth extension was for a further period of twelve months with effect from 16th January 2012, see AUPSC communiqué, 206th meeting, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCVI), 20th January 2011, Para 11. The ninth extension starts on 15th January 2013 for an additional period of six months pending the outcomes of the consultations between the AU Commission and the United Nations Secretariat on the future of AMISOM, see AUPSC communiqué, 206th meeting, Assembly/AU/3(XX) 27-28th January 2013, Para 32.
commitment of AU member states was not satisfying particularly in providing the mission with required troops (see Table 6.1).

**Table 6.1: The military magnitude of the AMISOM from 2007 to 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Required Troops</th>
<th>Total Troops Available</th>
<th>Contributing states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7650</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7650</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>3450</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>5268</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7,200 ([The number reached the UN-authorized strength of 12,000 at the end of the year])</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,731</td>
<td>Uganda and Burundi Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Zambia (Djibouti and Kenya)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data obtained from an interview conducted with senior AU official, 16/11/2012.157

It is evident from Table 6.1 above that the commitment of member states was not as expected, especially in the first four years of AMISOM’s deployment. Although many African states pledged to participate by sending troops or equipment only Uganda and Burundi did honour their pledges. Notwithstanding, the military magnitude of the mission has increased sharply since 2011 to reach the UN-authorized strength of 17,731 uniformed personnel due to the involvement of other African states by sending troops to the mission (AU, 2012b).

The AU’s ability to deploy this high number of troops while it was also providing at the same time more than 12,000 soldiers to other peace missions reflects significant differences with its predecessor. It also confirms that this nascent organisation can be considered as a stronger partner to the UN and other actors in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. This conclusion is explained in the coming section.

### 6.6 Explaining the AMISOM’s Effectiveness

As established, explaining the effectiveness of the AU’s AMISOM proceeds according to two distinctive stages. The first level focuses on understanding the internal process. The second level consists of measuring and evaluating the outcomes of the intervention.

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157 See also Hull and Svensson (2008) and Møller, (2009b).
However, and as outlined previously, it is pertinent at the outset to discuss the environmental factors.

6.7 Factors Influencing the AMISOM’s Effectiveness

The following section is devoted to the analysis of the internal and external factors that exert an influence on the effectiveness of international and regional organisations (e.g. the mandate of the mission, the commitment of member states and the external support either by IOs or individual states).

*Mandate of the mission*

In a similar scale to the previous cases, before analysing and measuring the indicators which were set up in the theoretical framework against the AMISOM’s mandate, it is important to look at the tasks of this mission as specified in its mandate. Even though the AMISOM’s mandate has been renewed nine times, its main tasks have remained consistent despite additional small tasks which were added due to the developing the situation on the ground. The objectives of the AMISOM were to:

- To provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation
- To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance
- To create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia (AU, 2007c).

To fulfil this purpose, AMISOM was also given a range of tasks which were as follows:

- To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders
- To provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions
- To assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia
- To provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts
- To monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation
- To facilitate humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs
To protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence (AU, 2007c).

Through the analysis of the above objectives and tasks of the AMISOM, it appears (as with the cases of Burundi and Darfur) that the mission was not given an explicit mandate to protect civilians. It was allowed only to use force in self-defence, to protect their equipment, installations and other assigned personnel. Accordingly, the AU did not mandate the AMISOM as a peace enforcement mission which has the right for instance to force factions to the peace table. AMISOM was considered only as a peacekeeping operation due to its dependence upon the local consent of Somali factions and the ambiguity of the mandate regarding whether it had the legal right to protect civilians from attack. However, the AMISOM military policy recently changed (from 2010 onwards) which affected the outcomes as will be discussed later.

Indeed, the observation made above suggests that the AU falls down for the third time following the cases of Burundi and Darfur in addressing its new norms, especially when it comes to the protection of civilian people. In other words, the AU was not able to apply the norm of the right of intervention on the ground despite the fact that crimes against humanity were real, witnessed and recorded in Somalia. It is also evident that there has been a gap between the mandate of the AMISOM and the resources available for implementation. Certainly, since the initial stages of the deployment, the AMISOM suffered from an acute lack of resources and basic logistics (Menkhaus, 2007; Omorogbe, 2011). Additionally, there was a problem in terms of troop magnitude. Like the AU’s previous missions, AMISOM has suffered from troop-generation difficulties as well as from shortage of equipment (Hull and Svensson, 2008; Mollar, 2009b). However, the troop magnitude of AMISOM increased after 2011 due to more states becoming troop-contributors, which in turn led the mission to achieve noticeable developments in the political and security issues of the country.

In terms of the clarity of the mandate, it seems that a significant number of tasks caused mandate overload and affected the mission’s effectiveness. The multiplicity of objectives in the shadow of limited resources and a small number of troops did affect the clarity and feasibility of the AMISOM’s mandate. Indeed, it is hard to envisage the success of a mission such as the AMISOM, with only 7,650 soldiers, in a territory as vast as Somalia. Fulfilling AMISOM’s tasks as delineated in its mandate requires more resources in terms
of peacekeepers and full availability and access to the needed supplies and equipment (interview with senior UN official, 2012). The shortcomings highlighted above indicate some deficiencies in AMISOM’s mandate, which prevented the proper management of the conflict and had a negative impact on the mission’s effectiveness regarding finding solutions to the unfolding conflict, particularly in its first four years.

**Commitment of Member States**

Despite African states’ pledges in the AU’s treaty to work together to achieve peace and security on the continent, their actual commitment was far from satisfactory. The noticeable political support for unity, manifested on many occasions by the African states within the AU, fell short when it comes to the fulfilment of their pledges, such as providing troops for AMISOM (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). After authorising its mission in Somalia, the AU requested peacekeeping troops from its member states and received pledges from nine countries. However, these same pledging states were unable to give specific dates regarding the sending of their troops (interview with AU official, 09/11/2012). As discussed in the previous section, only Uganda and Burundi have honoured their promises and deployed their troops in support of the AU during the first four years of the mission.

In fact, several reasons might be at the origin of the reluctance of some AU members to meet their pledges. Firstly, there was a sort of scepticism with regards to the success of the numerous peace processes, the overt enmity of factions towards AMISOM and its mission might provoke casualties (interview with AU analyst, 20/05/2012). This perception was confirmed by the Head of PSC Secretariat, Dr. Kambudzi (interview, 21/11/2012) who stated that:

“the failure of the UN’s first mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992, the failure of the United Task Force (UNITAF) in 1992 and the UN’s second mission (UNOSOM II) in 1993, rose doubts about the possibility of a new institutions like the AU to make a change where the most powerful organization such as the UN and influential states like the US failed to do so. This is in turn made African states reluctant to participate in the AMISOM”.

158 South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Ghana and Burundi.
From this perspective, it seems that African states share the same fears of the UN member states which were not enthusiastic to participate in a UN mission due to the possibility of endangering or of losing the lives of their own troops due to the fragility of the ceasefires and/or the continuation of the armed clashes. This was confirmed by a former UN official (interview, 29/05/2012) who stated that:

“the continuity of armed clashes among Somali militias after the weak intervention of the UN and the apprehension felt by the UN’s mission members components as regards to their own safety more than that any serious concern for Somali civilians who were supposed to be protected convinced Somalis to consider the UN’s troops as an occupying force interfering in their internal affairs. This led to many armed clashes between Somali militia and the UN’s mission which provoked the death of 6,000 Somalis and 83 peacekeepers. Indeed, the severity of the conflict and the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement made UN’s member states afraid of losing their troops in such unsecure environment which led eventually to withdrawal their troops from the UN’s mission in 1995. Consequently, the UN withdrew then its mission from Somalia, and implemented its decision by 31st March, 1995”.

This justification seems to be the main incentive for African states especially after the increase of the troop contributor-states to the AMISOM when the situation in the country started to be more stable. As discussed earlier, the troop magnitude of the AMISOM has increased from 1,600 in 2008 to 17,731 uniformed personnel in 2012. This increase has played an important role in stabilising many parts of the country and in the developments which the Somali peace process witnessed recently (interviews with senior AU officials, 17/11/2012, 20/12/2012; and interviews with senior UN officials, 29/5/2012 and 21/11/2012). However, while AU and UN officials were satisfied with the commitment of African states in terms of their participation in sending troops to the AMISOM, other officials from diverse organisations such as the EU (interview with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012) have different perspectives and argued that:

“although the AU has got 53 member states, the AMISOM personnel consisted of troops from only two countries (Uganda and Burundi) for the first four years of the mission which in turn reflects the reality that the commitment of AU members was not as expected”.
The second reason is that the economic restraints - especially for those considered as poor states - and the absence of guarantees regarding complete funding means (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). In fact, the will of AU member states has also been affected by the financial shortcomings of the AU. Consistent with the AU’s ‘concept of self-sustainment’, countries providing troops to AU’s missions are required to ensure their maintenance in the first two months of deployments (AU, 2003b). Indeed, this condition, which represents a veritable challenge and accordingly is open to harsh criticism, knowing that the condition required is an insurmountable obstacle for numerous African states. According to Hull and Svensson, (2008:8) “the AU has relied on the troop contributing countries being self-sustaining during deployment […] this has made both Uganda and Burundi heavily dependent on logistical and economical support from outside states and organisations”.

This in turn reflects the fact that the AU is not only consistently struggling to organise the requisite military personnel but also to obtain a range of military assets needed for its peace operation in Somalia. According to an interview with a senior AU senior official (interview, 14/11/2012):

“the AMISOM was not appropriately equipped well after the deployment of its troops. The mission indeed suffered from lacking of important equipment such as helicopters (utility and attack), armoured personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment and night vision goggles”.

The AMISOM also suffered from inadequate funding from the first year of its deployment. In this regard, the AUC chairperson reported on 8th January, 2008 that although the total budget for AMISOM for a year was $622 million, only $32 million had been contributed, with pledges of a further $10.5 million and € 5.5 million originating exclusively from AU partners, namely the EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the League of Arab States (AU, 2008b). Even though many actors pledged to support the AU logistically and financially, the funds and logistical support mobilised for AMISOM still fell far short of what was required (interview with AU official 16/11/2012). The struggling of the AU to get sufficient resources to fund its mission in Somalia was not only in the first year, the mission suffered also from inadequate resources in its second and third years. This can be noted in the report of the AUC chairperson on the situation in Somalia on 8th January 2010;

“support to AMISOM has not been optimal and, considering the precarious operating environment, I call upon all our partners to ensure optimal, sustained,
predictable and guaranteed funding support to enable the AU meet its obligations in reimbursements to AMISOM TCCs for troop allowances and their equipment deployed in the Mission (AU, 2010b).”

The above statement reflects the fact that the logistical and financial commitment of member states has been one of the most important obstacles of the AMISOM effectiveness.

Unlike the Burundian case but quite similar to the Darfur case, the fulfilment of the political obligation of AU member states in the Somali conflict was not satisfactory, particularly the efforts of its neighbours. In fact, by looking at the immediate neighbourhood, it appears that several states in the horn of Africa have played a major role in the Somali conflict. Effectively, (as was confirmed in interview with Somali diplomat, 20/06/2012), “Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya did intervene in the internal affairs of Somalia”. For instance, it was evident that the Ethiopian government was heavily involved in the process which brought the TFG to power and it is also thought that Ethiopia influenced later the election of the president Abdullahi Yusuf because it was seen as an ally (interview with African analyst, 12/06/2012). Cornwell (2006) pointed out that, by backing the TFG, Ethiopia knew that this body and its president would not reclaim the Ogaden region of Somalia as their own territory. As discussed previously, Ethiopian forces had to intervene militarily in the country in order to strengthen the TFG against the ever more dominant UIC. This intervention was not welcomed not only by the oppositions of the TFG but also by many African and non-African states (Heitman, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007).

Accordingly, the non-impartial political and military intervention of Ethiopia, by supporting one party against others, renewed the insurgency and impacted on the prospects for resolving the Somali crisis. In contrast to Ethiopia, the position of other bordering states was different. While Djibouti and Kenya were willing to help all parties of dispute to negotiate and stop the fighting, Eritrea backed the UIC and other armed groups against the TFG (interview with Somali diplomat, 20/6/2012). As will be discussed in the next section, the AU strongly condemned the involvement of external actors and required the UN to impose sanctions against them.

To sum up, it can be said that the commitment of AU member states was not high or particularly strong in the first four years where it was obvious that the mission was struggling from inadequate troops, equipments and financial resources. Moreover, some
AU member states did not respect the principles, aims or norms of the AUCA as they originally promised by intervening in the internal affairs of Somalia. Consequently, their behaviour, instead of helping the resolution of the conflict, fuelled it further and undermined the efforts of the AU and its partners to solve it. However, the involvement of the rest of member states under the umbrella of the AU in the shadow of the reluctance of the international community by sending 17,731 troops who played (as will be seen later) a significant role in stabilising the majority of the country, gives a positive aspect to the commitment of AU member states in this regard.

*The Local Consent of Parties of Dispute*

In reality, the AMISOM did not gain the consent of all the Somali parties although the AU’s mission was authorised by UNSC Resolution 1744 (UN, 2007c). Indeed, a number of reasons can be identified for the widening of the disagreements between the parties and undermining the effectiveness of the AU at the same time.

Firstly, the fact that one of the major goals of the AMISOM’s mandate was to protect the TFG members and consider it as the legitimate government created scepticism among the other parties in conflict (e.g. UIC and SRRC) who considered AMISOM as a biased mission (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/05/2012). Therefore, the troops of the mission were not welcomed as neutral peacekeeping soldiers supporting the general reconciliation and peace process. Those who backed the TFG regarded the role of AMISOM as an indispensible instrument for the success of the peace process. Conversely, the adversaries of the TFG believed that the AMISOM was clearly advantaging their opponents and that it was contrasting with their own political objectives.

Secondly, it is stated in Article 8 (Par.9) of the PSC Protocol that any member of the PSC which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the PSC shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation (AU, 2003a). Despite this explicit statement, the AU was unable not only to prevent Ethiopia from participating in the negotiations and decision-making processes of the PSC regarding this conflict, but also to prevent the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia.

Even though this norm has been accepted by all members of the AU, it was violated for a second time. As shown in the Darfur study, the SG objected to this norm when the Darfur
crisis rose for the first time on the AU’s programme. Following the insistence of some states, the Sudanese representatives withdrew from the discussions (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012).

Similarly, Ethiopia violated this norm when its ambassador insisted on leading the meetings of the AUPSC in 2007 regarding the conflict in Somalia (interview with Somali diplomat, 20/06/2012). Such a behaviour surprised several AU member states who voiced their disapproval to the participation of Ethiopia in PSC meetings to discuss the Somali dispute (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012) despite the justification of Ethiopian government that this intervention was an act of self-defence against the UIC (AU, 2007b) and it was undertaken upon the request of the TFG (Hull and Svensson, 2008). However, The Somali opposition parties and some African states\footnote{For example, Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership due to Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia, as well as its participation in the meetings of the AUPSC in this regard.} refused to recognise the TFG as a legitimate government and accordingly this later was not habilitated to require an intervention from any external actor. As Møller (2009b:29) argued “the TFG was merely a government in name; it must surely have been Ethiopia who asked the TFG to ask it for assistance, thus receiving a fig-leaf of legality”.

As a consequence, the widespread perception of the other parties of the conflict - as well as part of the Somali population and a number of African states - was that AMISOM, by protecting and consolidating the position of the TFG, was in reality supporting Ethiopia’s foreign political agenda (interview with Somali diplomat, 20/06/2012). The third cause that created widespread disagreement and fuelled the conflict among the Somali parties of the dispute was the external support of various actors to these parties. Indeed, a number of actors have been involved in the Somali conflict including neighbouring states, IOs, and foreign states (see Figure 6.2).
From the above figure (as confirmed by senior AU officials interviewed, 17/11/2012, 20/12/2012; and 21/11/2012) it is clear that all parties of the dispute have their external supporters who were willing to provide them with financial and logistical equipment.
Indeed, there was a wide variety of reasons behind the involvement of the above actors in the internal affairs of Somalia. However, the concern here is not about the causes of this external support rather than its consequences on solving the conflict. It can be said that the involvement of external actors impacted negatively on the Somali conflict and exacerbated the situation on the ground rather than helping to resolve it.

By demanding explicitly that AMISOM protect TFG installations, the AU waived with the assumed impartiality expected from an organisation conceived for peacekeeping purposes. The idea to present the TFG’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Somalis was not accepted by Somali opposition parties. In fact, it was rather fiercely contested, providing more backing for those sceptical about the neutrality of the AU forces, and who claimed that AMISOM was helping an illegitimate government and following the will of the IGAD countries as well as President Yusuf, leader of the TFG (Hull and Svensson, 2008; Mollar, 2009b). Consequently, the AMISOM attitude compelled other Somali factions to consider it as a body of foreign soldiers intervening in Somalia and to declare war against it (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012). This is what happened on the ground when the first 400 AU peacekeepers were “welcomed” at the airport of the capital city of Somalia with eight mortar rounds and after only two days the mission suffered its first casualties as rebels injured two Ugandan peacekeepers (interview with Somalia diplomat, 20/06/2012).

In light of the foregoing, it can be said that AMISOM deployed without the advantage of acceptance by some parties of the dispute. In such conditions, AMISOM found itself in difficulty in fulfilling its tasks and supporting the reconciliation process, while several factions were not agreeing on the proposed reconciliation. It is far from easy to implement a disarmament process and count on the collaboration of parties when faced with the manifest hostility of factions towards AMISOM.

The Role of UN
As discussed previously, despite the UN attempts in 1992 and 1993 to intervene in Somalia, it was not able to reconcile the Somali factions and it had to withdraw its two missions after the bloody confrontations with some parties of the conflict. This in turn led “the UN reticence to intervene in African conflicts” (Malan, 1999:48). Indeed, since it withdrew in 1995, the UN did not respond to several requests from the AU and its role

160 About these requests, see this Chapter, page 210.
has been limited to provide political, financial and logistic supports to the AU. In terms of political support, the UN enhanced the AU by adopting Resolution 1744 which allowed the African organisation to establish AMISOM for a period of six months and to take all measures, as appropriate, “to implement its mission’s mandate” (UN, 2007c). Although the UN did not respond positively with regard to the AU’s requests to take over its mission or to at least participate more significantly, it nevertheless consistently supported the renewal of the AU’s mission mandate. Moreover, the UN has deployed a team of military and civilian experts to the AU Headquarters to support mission planning and management (interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012). However, it was observed that the UN’s political, financial and logistic support to the AMISOM was insufficient in the first two years of the mission (interview with senior AU official, 09/11/2012). This was reported as follows by the AUC after six months of the deployment of the AMISOM:

“in spite of the numerous appeals made by the AU, the financial and logistical support mobilized so far, which comes mainly from the AU partners, is far short of what is required to fully deploy the Mission (AU, 2008b).

Due to the lack of financial resources, the AU repeated its plea in June 2008 for UN deployment with the provision of a logistical and financial package in the interim (AU, 2008c). The UN responded by adopting Resolution 1863 on 16th January, 2009. In this resolution, the UNSC officially asked the UN Secretary General to arrange for more consistent support from the UN in terms of logistics and for the delivery of peacekeeping equipment to AMISOM. Furthermore, the establishment of a trust fund and finance the AMISOM operation was requested. For this last point, it was suggested to organise a donors’ conference to ask for contributions (UN, 2009a). Accordingly, on the 7th April, 2009 the UN General Assembly approved a UN logistical support package for AMISOM of $71.6 million (UN, 2009b). Furthermore, a significant consignment worth $15 million was given to AMISOM (UN, 2009c)\(^\text{161}\). According to a former UN official (interview, 18/11/2012)

“the continued enhancement of the UN to the AMISOM was not only limited to its own financial and logistical support; the world organisation has also held a number of donors’ conferences to solicit contributions to trust fund which was established by the UN to finance the AMISOM”.

\(^\text{161}\) The shipment includes key infrastructure items, namely: generators; refrigeration units; catering equipment; prefabricated buildings; and sanitation systems, in addition to medical equipment and armoured vehicles.
For instance, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon chaired a donor conference on Somalia, which was hosted by the EU on 23rd April 2009 in Brussels and under the joint auspices of the UN, the AU, the EU and the League of Arab States (UN, 2009d). In this conference, the UN Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions received about $851,000 million and the Trust Fund for AMISOM received $25 million. In addition, at the bilateral level the AU received a total of $16.6 million (UN, 2009e).

From the above discussion, it appears that the UN has not spared any efforts to provide its support for the AU’s mission in Somalia, which undoubtedly has had its influence on the effectiveness of the AMISOM. However, the question raised here is why the UN has been unwilling to take over the AMISOM or at least to join it on the ground, as was the case in Darfur and Burundi, even though the UN expressed its intent to establish a Peacekeeping Operation in Resolution 1863 (UN, 2009a). According to a senior UN official (interview, 21/11/2012), this later explained that the UN’s reluctance was due to the conviction that its member states were unlikely to pledge enough peacekeeping troops for the deployment of a UN mission. In fact, when the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations sent notes verbales to sixty Member States to confirm whether or not they would be willing to participate concretely through the sending of troops, in case the UNSC passed a resolution for the sending of a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The ten member states who responded were clearly against participating (UN, 2009b).

In the shadow of the reluctance of its member states, the UN has been unable to send a peacekeeping mission which would have required at least 22,000 troops (interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012). Accordingly, the UNSC decided on 29th May, 2009 not to send a multinational force to Somalia and confirmed instead its logistical support to the AMISOM as an alternative (UN, 2009f).

The Role of the EU

As an important resource for external funding support for Africa, the AU asked the EU to provide - in a predictable and coordinated manner - the required financial, technical and logistical support to facilitate the deployment of AMISOM (AU, 2007c). The EU responded promptly to the appeal by offering US$19.5 million for the peacekeeping force during the first week of January 2007 (before the deployment of AMISOM) (interview with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012). The EU established in 2004, the African Peace Facility (APF) in response to the request made by the African leaders at the AU’s 2003 Maputo Summit to support peace and security operations undertaken under the AUPSC.
Through this institution, the AU received in the first four years (2007-2010) €142 million from the EU to fund its mission. In the last two years (2010-2012), the EU provided the AMISOM with an additional $147 million and US$82 million to be contracted (interviews with senior EU officials, 14/11/2012). This makes the overall contribution of the EU to AMISOM about $411 million. It should be noted here that the above amount was dedicated only for the AMISOM and does not include the contribution of the EU to other AU missions and peace activities. For instance, between 2004 until September 2010, a total sum of €597 million had been allocated through the APF. These allocations were given to support a number of AU activities (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3)

Table 6.2: The EU support to the AU, Allocations (2009-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Allocation (3 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU dialogue</td>
<td>£65M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
<td>£200M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
<td>£15M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Audit, mentoring, evaluation, technical, assistance, (finance) lessons and visibility</td>
<td>£7M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>£13M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>£300M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: the EU delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14/11/2012.

Table 6.3: The EU support to the AU, Allocations (September 2011- Dec 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Allocation (3 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operationalisation of APSA and Africa-EU dialogue</td>
<td>£ 40M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
<td>£240M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
<td>£ 2M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Audit, mentoring, evaluation, technical, assistance, (finance) lessons and visibility</td>
<td>£6 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>£ 12M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>£300M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: the EU delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14/11/2012.

The contribution of the EU was not only limited to financial support as it was also involved in supporting the Political, Diplomatic and military efforts of the AMISOM to stabilise the

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situation in Somalia. For example, on 30th August, 2011 a total of 900 Somali troops finished a six month military preparation in Uganda and were trained by the EU Training Mission (EUTM). The first promotion of 1,000 Somali troops were trained by the EUTM and graduated in 2010, which illustrates an aspect of the EU’s contribution to the efforts to help stabilising Somalia (AU, 2011b).

In light of what was discussed above, it is clear that the EU is an important partner to the AU, particularly in peace and security and thus it is one of the most important factors in the AU’s effectiveness. However, and as highlighted in the previous section regarding the role of the UN, an important question is still unanswered: why has the EU been unwilling to intervene on the ground with the AU in Somalia while it did so in other African conflicts such as in Darfur, Chad and the DRC? In this regard, several authors have argued that all aspects of the EU’s support for AU peacekeeping efforts are limited to soft security and activities such as funding programmers, training people, and helping the AU peace operations (Murithi, 2008; Powell, 2005; Tardy, 2008; David, 2007; and Bacb, 2008). According to a senior EU official (interview, 14/11/2012), EU member states were unwilling to expose their troops in dangerous places like Somalia. Another important question which should be raised is related to the increased support of the UN and the EU for the AU’s efforts in the peace and security domain. Even though the involvement of these organisations in Africa is very old, the current study finds that their support has increased gradually since the establishment of the AU. For example, while their support to the AMIB was not satisfactory, it increased in Darfur and further still in supporting the AMISOM. Therefore, the question here is: why has the contribution or the support of these institutions to the AU increased gradually since the establishment of the latter until now?

Indeed, the answers to this question from interviewees were very similar, regardless of who was interviewed (i.e. several officials from different organisations). Senior AU officials considered that the effectiveness of the AU’s efforts in managing conflicts has convinced its partners to increase their support to this new organisation. Similarly, EU and UN officials acknowledged that due to the effectiveness of the AU in comparison with its predecessor, it has attracted not only international and regional organisations but also other donor countries (as discussed below) to support its efforts particularly in the field of peace and security.
States Support to the AU

In similar fashion to the previous cases, the support from external actors to the AMISOM was not only limited to international and regional organisations such as the UN and the EU, there were also several states which played a role in financing and supporting the mission such as the USA, Italy, Sweden and China. Indeed, the financial support by these states was an important source in filling the gap which was left by the lower levels of commitment of AU member states, thereby enhancing the AMISOM’s ability to carry out its tasks. It should be noted that the US provided the greatest financial support. For example, in 2007 the overall contribution of the USA to Somalia was over $168.2 million. $78.7 million of that total was dedicated to the AMISOM mission. The remainder of the overall amount ($89.5 million) was dedicated to humanitarian aid (interview with senior AU official, 16/06/2012). The USA’s contribution to the AMISOM was allocated through numerous spending categories (e.g. different projects), as shown in Table 6.4. The contribution not devoted to the AMISOM was allocated to the financing of different programmes (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.4: The USA Contribution to the AMISOM in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Ugandan Deployment</td>
<td>$19.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Training &amp; Equipment to Uganda and Burundi (ACOTA Program)</td>
<td>$7.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Monies earmarked for Equipment &amp; Training, logistics support to AMISOM, and security sector reform</td>
<td>$40.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi Deployment 20 November 2007</td>
<td>$14.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$81.1 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AU Financial Department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16/11/2012.

Table 6.5: The USA Contribution to Humanitarian Aid in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>$60.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>$12.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Conflict Stabilization</td>
<td>$17.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$89.5 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AU Financial Department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16/11/2012.
In addition to financial support, the USA provided military equipment for the troop contributing countries participating in the AMISOM. According to a senior AU official (interview, 16/06/2012):

“Since its initial deployment in March 2007, the USA has provided the AMISOM with over $341 million. Its support includes military equipment, logistic and financial support, a full-time Peace and Security Advisor to the AU Peace Support Operations division, and training the troop of contributing countries of the AMISOM. The support of the USA since the deployment of AMISOM armed forces till today has played an important role in stabilising Somalia”.

Since its inception in 2007, AMISOM received considerable support from China as well. However, the biggest contribution came after signing an agreement between the AUC and China on 23rd December, 2011 to enhance the Chinese support for the AMISOM. Within this, it was agreed that China would provide equipment and material worth 30 million RMB (equivalent to US$4.5 million) to AMISOM (interview with senior AU official, 16/06/2012).

According to the AUC Chairperson, there were other individual states that supported the AMISOM such as the UK which contributed £8.5 million for AMISOM deployment and provided backing for the establishment of AMISOM Support Management Planning Unit (SMPU) (AU, 2008b). Moreover, other bilateral assistance came from states such as Italy, France, Germany, Sweden and Japan who were involved in supporting the Somali National Army (SNA) directly through undertaking a variety of training programmes in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; the United States and Italy have also provided stipends to some SNA soldiers (AU, 2008b). In fact, states’ support for AMISOM played an important role in enhancing the mission to achieve its objectives and stabilise the situation after two decades of civil war (interview with senior AU official, 21/11/1012).

6.8 The Effectiveness of AMISOM

The analysis of the IO’s effectiveness in general and the AU in particular must not focus only on the outcomes of the intervention but also on the internal process, which represents an important aspect of the effectiveness of any international or regional organisations.
Explaining the Internal Process

The first criterion of measuring the effectiveness of the internal process is the general consensus among the member states in issuing the resolution of the intervention and if they responded quickly to the crisis. The second criterion is the level of coordination among the mechanisms of the AU in applying the aims of its mission on the ground.

Regarding the first criterion, Although African states have mandated the AU to play a much more robust role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts, the AU’s first response to the Somalia crisis was not satisfactory (interview with Somali diplomat, 29/05/2012). This observation is plausible since it was clear from the discussions presented in the last sections that the AU was in some ways reliant on the IGAD’s efforts or supporting its endeavours to solve the crisis. According to an African analyst (interview, 14/06/2012):

“it was evident that the AU was reluctant (since its establishment in 2002 till 2007) to send a peace keeping or peace enforcement mission to end the conflict in Somalia and its role was only limited to support the efforts of IGAD. In fact, the AU was hiding behind IGAD”.

However, AU officials have categorically refuted the claims that the AU was relying or hiding behind IGAD efforts. They considered that this institution represented one of the AU’s instruments to solve African crises - particularly in the horn of Africa - and thus it worked under its authority. Moreover, the AU was involved simultaneously in two other complex conflicts (Burundi and Darfur) with 12,000 peacekeepers deployed, making it problematic for this nascent institution to engage in a further mission in Somalia (interview with senior AU officials, 09/11/2012, 20/11/2012 and 21/11/2012). This justification is plausible but managing intrastate conflicts and protecting civilians remains definitively the responsibility of the AU.

In fact, and as discussed previously, the AU was indirectly involved (since its creation in 2002) in efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully before sending its mission, which is still operating today. Nonetheless, the lack of consensus among its member states - specifically the contrary positions of neighbouring states - was the reason behind the delay in deploying the mission to Somalia (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). This is true since some states like Ethiopia were supporting the TFG; other neighbouring states
like Eritrea were supporting its rivals. This division was not only among the bordering states of Somalia but also between other African and foreign states which in turn adversely influenced the AMISOM’s effectiveness (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012).

While the divergences among AU member states, especially for the first four years, have been acknowledged it remains to be determined whether or not there has been a good level of coordination among the mechanisms of the AU in applying the aims of its mission on the ground as the second criterion of measuring its internal process. AU officials maintained that the coordination among the mechanisms of the AU’s headquarters in Ethiopia and the AMISOM leaders has been very satisfactory despite many challenges, regarding either the financial and logistical problems or the dangers of the situation on the ground. However, scholars such as Powell (2005), Møller (2009b) and Williams (2009a) have a different view. For instance, for Williams (2009b: 527) “the struggling of the AU in mustering, deploying, funding and managing its mission proves the inability of the AU and its institutions to manage simultaneously three conflicts (e.g. Burundi, Darfur and Somalia)”. These conclusions may be true to some extent, yet they cannot be generalised for two reasons. Firstly, these studies were conducted during the first three years of the mission and consequently their findings are might be obsolete or out-dated. Secondly, the situation in the country improved in the last three years which reflects that the coordination among AU tools is certainly one of the factors behind this change.

**Measurement of AMISOM’s Outcomes**

In order to measure the outcomes of the AMISOM, the study looked at three indicators (violence abatement, violence containment and violence settlement) and other specific goals in the AMISOM mandate. Regarding the first criterion, violence abatement, it is hard to say that the AMISOM was effective particularly in the first four years of its deployment. This is what was observed in the previous sections; the mission struggled or failed to reduce the severity of the conflict in the first three years of its deployment. It was also ineffective in saving combatants or civilian lives as well as in protecting the aid delivery (provided by external organisations) to civilians due to the continued clashes between conflicting parties (interview with Somali diplomat, 20/06/2012).

In relation to the second core goal, conflict containment, the AMISOM was ineffective in containing the conflict either from external or internal aspects. As discussed in the theoretical framework, conflict containment involves success in preventing the spread of the conflict to other regions and limiting the involvement of new actors in the dispute.
However, it was clear that the mission was not able (or did not manage) to contain the conflict which eventually spread from the capital city Mogadishu to other Somali cities and rural areas and in the same time the AMISOM failed to prevent the support of external actors to the fighting parties (Derblom et al, 2008; Williams 2009b).

Regarding the internal aspect, the AMISOM was not able in containing the conflict in the area of regional deployment. As it was shown in the previous sections, the mission failed to stop the fighting or at least reduce its severity. It was also unable to stop the flows of arms from external actors (interview with Somali diplomat, 20/06/2012, interview with African analyst, 26/05/2012). In fact, the failure of the mission regarding conflict abatement and conflict containment has had a negative impact on conflict settlement where the mission was not able to bring all antagonist parties to the negotiating table. This finding is supported by many scholars such as Franke (2006, 2007) Andrews and Holt, (2007), and Baker (2007) who argued that the AMISOM failed in solving the conflict due to the lack of financial and logistical support from both its member states and international actors.

However, this study also finds that the outcomes have been positive particularly in the last four years (e.g. 2010-2013) despite the numerous obstacles encountered. This judgment was based by looking not only at the extent to which the mission has addressed its aims on the ground but also by evaluating its contribution in the overall security situation in the country. The AMISOM’s effectiveness in achieving its aims can be seen in different aspects. In relation to conflict abatement, the success of the AU in bringing the main warring parties to the negotiating table and the establishment of TFG and other institutions led to the reduction of the intensity and severity of the conflict.

In terms of humanitarian work, AMISOM did secure in an effective manner the needed humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and key Mogadishu streets) (interviews with senior AU officials 16/11/2012, 21/11/2012; interview with former senior UN official, 29/05/2012; AU, 2008b; AU, 2011a; UN, 2012b; See also, Hull and Svensson 2008; Murithi, 2008; and Wiklund, 2013). AMISOM did secure in an effective manner the needed humanitarian corridors (seaport, airport and key Mogadishu streets). This achievement allowed the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Somali population in areas previously inaccessible. AMISOM escorted humanitarian convoys headed during the distribution points in various areas of Mogadishu and its suburbs (interviews with senior AU officials 16/11/2012, 21/11/2012; interview with former senior UN official, 29/05/2012; International Crisis Group, 2011; AU, 2008b; AU, 2011a; UN, 2012b; and Wiklund, 2013).
Moreover, without trying to convince the Somali of its good intentions as a force protection tool, AMISOM made available field hospitals and medical personnel and offered medical services to the population although if originally, such facilities were meant to serve and to provide medical attention for its own peacekeeping troops\textsuperscript{164}. Regarding security, the AMISOM effectively protected the TFG and government institutions as they carry out their functions and guards key infrastructure such as the Adden Adde International Airport, the Sea Port and State House (Villa Somalia). Additionally, it protected AMISOM workforce, installations and equipment ((interviews with senior AU officials 16/11/2012, 21/11/2012; interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012; interviews with senior EU officials, 14/12/2012; AU, 2008b; AU, 2011a; UN, 2012b; and Wiklund, 2013).

In relation to conflict containment, the AMISOM was able to effectively prevent the support of other actors which were supporting the conflicting parties militarily or financially (particularly the neighbouring states). To face this challenge, the AU called on the UNSC to impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, either from inside or outside the region particularly Eritrea, who was accused of aiding Al-Shabaab and other armed groups (AU, 2010b). The success of the AU in preventing the involvement of other actors and in averting the flow of weapons and financial support to the conflicting parties has had a positive impact in containing the conflict in the country and contributed to the reduction of its severity.

In fact, the effectiveness of the AMISOM since 2010 in achieving the first two core goals (e.g. conflict abatement and conflict containment) have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the conflict settlement. According to AU officials, the AU was not only effective in the humanitarian and security issues but also in political affairs. In this regard, they maintain that the AU effectively aided the TFG through the Political Affairs Unit of AMISOM in order to establish an inclusive political process, rebuild state institutions and make them perform efficiently, implement a national vision and plan for the transition based on the Djibouti Agreement (interviews with senior AU officials, 09/11/ 2012, \textsuperscript{164} Due to the intensity of problems in Somalia, AMISOM Medical facilities had to be the one medical point where the resident population around the capital city Mogadishu and its suburbs depend upon. The three hospital departments treat more than twelve thousand (12,000) patients per month on average. Their treatments differ from chronic medical diseases to surgical cases both acute and chronic. Above 90 % of these patients are from the local population together with TFG troops and officials most of them requiring emergency surgical interventions. See AU Mission In Somalia, available at: http://amisom-au.org/
20/11/2012; 21/11/2012; AU, 2008b and AU, 2011a). This perspective was shared by the UN secretary-general’s report (2nd October, 2009) which stated that the AMISOM demonstrated its ability to protect the TFG and government institutions (UN, 2009c).

It should be noted also that the outcomes of the mission have apparently changed since 2010 due to the increased troop magnitude, financial support by international and regional organisations or individual states and the adoption of enforcement approach by the AU forces against some parties who do not stop fighting and refuse to join the political process such as UIC and the Al Shabab movement. The advantage of applying the enforcement policy has recently stabilised the majority of the country and led the successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia (AU, 2012b). The AU partners (e.g. the UN and the EU) welcomed this successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia, which culminated with the election on 10th September, 2012 of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as the new President of Somalia (AU, 2013).

The argument that there has been a positive change in the political and security situation in Somalia is supported by a number of other senior IO officials (e.g. UN and EU) who observed that there is a big difference in the situation in Somalia between the two periods 2007-2010 and 2010-2012 (interviews with senior UN officials, 29/05/2012, 21/11/2012; and senior EU officials, 14/11/2012). At the same time, the UN and EU officials seemed very satisfied regarding the level of coordination between them and the AU. For instance, officials of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) acknowledged that there is close cooperation between the AMISOM Humanitarian Affairs Unit, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, WFP and other UN agencies and NGOs. The collaboration was mainly to establish coordination mechanisms and sharing information (interviews with senior UN officials, 29/05/2012 and 21/11/2012).

Speculation about what would happen in Somalia if the AU did not intervene in the shadow of the international community’s reluctance supports the argument that the AU can be considered as an important and effective actor in managing intrastate conflict in Africa. Nevertheless, many drawbacks can be observed in its mission in Somalia which adversely affected its performance or at least slowed it considerably. As discussed earlier, these drawbacks are related to the poor commitment of AU member states, the absence of local
consent, the form of involvement of neighbouring states and the lack of international support.

These factors were indeed behind AMISOM’s struggles to achieve its aims on the ground, particularly in the first four years. However, the improvement of these conditions since 2010 has led in turn to increased AMISOM effectiveness, not only in managing the violent conflict and securing conditions conducive to successes in the political process, but also in preventing further violent conflict in the area of the deployment and its spread to other regions. The increased commitment of AU member states, greater international support and the use of force against the aggressors has changed the image of AMISOM from a failed mission to an effective one. This is summarised in Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, below.

**Table 6.6: The extent of the influence of Independents variables on the effectiveness of the AMISOM (the dependent variable) (2007- 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independents variables from internal environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Independents variables from external environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- consensus among member states</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1- UN support</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- coordination between the AU institutions</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2- EU support</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- the financial and logistical commitment of member states</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- Individual states support</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- the mandate of the mission and the local consent of parties to dispute</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.7: the extent of the effectiveness of the AMISOM (the dependent variable) (2007-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The main goals</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>AMISOM effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Abatement</td>
<td>1-the reduction, or overall elimination, of armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- saving lives</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- protecting aid organisations</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Containment</td>
<td>1-Prevent the spread of violence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- prevent the involvement of other actors</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- containing the conflict in conflict zone</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
<td>1- signing a peace agreement between parties</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- treating the root causes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: The extent of the influence of Independents variables on the effectiveness of the AMISOM (the dependent variable) (2010-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independents variables from internal environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Independents variables from external environment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- consensus among member states</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1- UN support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- coordination between the AU institutions</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2- EU support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- the financial and logistical commitment of member states</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3- Individual states support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- the mandate of the mission and the local consent of parties to dispute</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.9: the extent of the effectiveness of the AMISOM (the dependent variable)
(2010-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The main goals</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>AMISOM effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Abatement</td>
<td>1-the reduction, or overall elimination, of armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- saving lives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- protecting aid organisations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Containment</td>
<td>1-Prevent the spread of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- prevent the involvement of other actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- containing the conflict in conflict zone</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
<td>1. Signing a peace agreement between parties.</td>
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<td>2- treating the root causes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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In fact, the Somali case provides explicit evidence to the argument that the independent variables can influence to a very large extent, the dependent variable. This is what can be observed from the tables above. In the first three years of its deployment, the mission was unable to implement any of its strategies or to reach any of the core goals and the ineffectiveness of the mission was due to many environmental factors such as the poor commitment of AU member states, the absence of local consent, the form of involvement of neighbouring states and the lack of international support.

However, the improvement of these conditions since 2010 has led in turn to increased AMISOM effectiveness. The effectiveness of the AMISOM in terms of Conflict containment (e.g. the reduction of the severity of conflict, saving lives and ability to deliver humanitarian aid) as well as it is effectiveness regarding conflict containment (e.g. prevent the spread of the conflict, the involvement of other actors, prevent the flow of weapons and protecting civilians) have had a positive impact on conflict settlement. Indeed, the AMISOM was able to manage in an efficient manner the violent conflict and secured the conditions conducive to successes in the political process. As discussed in the previous sections, the military and political efforts of the AU since its intervention in Somalia have recently stabilised the majority of the country and led the successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia (AU, 2012b). The AU partners (e.g. the UN and the
EU) welcomed this successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia, which culminated with the election on 10th September, 2012 of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as the new President of Somalia (AU, 2013).

In fact, the establishment of TFG and other government institutions as well as the success of the elections on the 10th September, 2012 were considered as a big achievement for the AU and an evidence for its effectiveness in managing an armed conflict that lasted more than two decades after the failure of the regional and international attempts to solve it. An important observation here is related to the extent of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable. It is evident that the change in the environmental factors has changed the outcomes of the intervention. The increased commitment of AU member states, the greater international support and the possibility to use force against the aggressors have changed the image of AMISOM from an ineffective mission to an effective one.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter examined a number of the major issues explored throughout the theoretical framework and highlighted their relevance to this case study. It began with an analysis of the conflict in Somalia and highlighted the fact that the root causes of African conflicts are not necessarily the same. The chapter also showed the manner through which the Somali case also bestowed on the AU a real test to assess its relevance in African peacekeeping. In spite of its involvement in Burundi and Darfur and the severity of the conflict in Somalia, the AU assumed the responsibility by authorising its mission for the third time to a place which was deliberately avoided by most international actors including the UN. Despite the relative delay of the deployment of its mission, the AU managed to operate efficiently amidst the outbreak of hostilities.

Most of the literature reviewed (particularly the research conducted in the first four years) consider that the AMISOM failed in achieving its mandate tasks. However, the Somali conflict should not be only assessed by considering an intervention on the ground but also by examining the impediments which appeared during that very intervention. The lack of a strong central government in Somalia for more than seventeen years makes it too difficult for the AMISOM to manage the conflict and implement peace in a short time. In addition, several obstacles prevented the achievement of the mission objectives, such as the historical background of the region, the unwillingness of AU member states to provide
sufficient troops and personnel, the restricted nature of the mandate, logistics and the reluctance to provide financial means. All these combined factors made the AU vulnerable to tough criticism. Although these obstacles negatively affected the performance of the AMISOM in its first four years, it is undeniable that through its activities it marked a departure from the role played by the OAU. It was found also that the AMISOM’s effectiveness was influenced by the increased contribution of African member states and external factors such as the UN, the EU and individual states, particularly since 2010, allowing it to become more effective in managing the conflict and stabilise the country.

Another important point to underline is that the AU has effectively (for the first time) implemented on the ground article 4(h) of its CA, allowing the Union to intervene even without the consent of parties to the dispute. Indeed, it seems that the AU started to apply this norm on the ground after more than ten years of its establishment when its mission in Somalia directly challenged the perpetrators (the UIC and the Al Shabab Movement) and managed to expel them from many Somali cities (interview with senior UN official, 21/11/2012).

To sum up, the Somalia case can be considered as an example of the AU’s effectiveness as a key actor in managing intrastate conflict. However, it will be too optimistic to depend on the AU as the only actor to achieve peace and security in Africa, since there is a deep gap between the member states’ official acceptance of new norms and principles and the capacity to concretely implement them in real conflict instances. This in turn means that the turn towards the total ‘Africanisation’ of peace and security cannot be seriously conceived or considered in the short- or medium-term, mainly because the process still relies in the main part on external support for carrying out its peace operations.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In the aftermath of the Cold War the nature of conflicts has changed from interstate to intrastate conflicts (Nye, 2005; Sarkin, 2009; Ferreira, 2009). In addition to the destruction and displacement due to internal conflicts, they have prevented the socio-economic and political development of post-colonial Africa. In fact, peace and security represent the necessary preconditions for achieving political and socio-economic development in any society, country, or region of the world. Broad economic development and prosperity are possible only in peaceful circumstances. It is important to observe that most intrastate conflicts have occurred in Africa.

The rise and dire consequences of intrastate war, together with the reluctance of the UN and the international community to intervene, were among the main factors that prompted the establishment of the AU. The appearance of this new organisation represented a substantial change in Africa. It showed firstly that the AU’s predecessor - the OAU - was an ineffective institution and that it was thus necessary for Africans to find other instruments to face the challenges of the new millennium. Nevertheless, besides the initial great hopes of the founders and proponents of the AU, who considered this institution as the one which would play a dominant and ambitious role in the resolution of conflicts, it appears that the reality is not exactly what the proponents of the AU had envisaged.

A large number of studies have been dedicated to the evaluation of the AU’s role in the management of intrastate conflict. However, the analysis and the assessment of the effectiveness of this new African body and its various organs (devoted to security issues, particularly its PSC) has been in some ways neglected. Despite the importance of this organ, it has attracted little scholarly attention. In addition to the fact that there is disagreement within the literature regarding whether the AU has been effective or not in managing intrastate conflict, recent studies did not consider or discuss in a comprehensive way all factors, either the internal or external, which have influenced the outcomes of AU’s various interventions (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2006; Kristina and Southall, 2006; Daley, 2007; Murithi, 2008; Sarkin, 2009; Møller 2009a). This thesis has attempted to fill this gap by exploring the genesis of the AU’s establishment, its constitutional and institutional framework (in Chapter 2) and empirically evaluating the practices of the AU in different conflict zones, with a particular focus on the internal and external factors which influenced its effectiveness in the promotion of regional peace and security (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The basic argument of this thesis was that the AU can play an effective role in managing
African intrastate conflicts. However, its role is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mandate of the mission, the commitment of member states and the level of external support.

This conclusion summarises the central findings. In this regard, I reiterate the core argument of the study and discuss its significance in relation to the questions posed at the outset. I posit that the analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of international and regional organisations does not only establish whether or not they have produced an explicit outcome or had the required impact. Effectively, analysing the internal dynamics of an organisation is also essential to clearly identify the link between these processes and the observable outcomes. Moreover, it is essential to analyse and assess the impact of key internal and external factors that exert an influence on the effectiveness of these institutions in relation to their involvement in managing intrastate conflicts. Overall, I determined that the focus of the present study has allowed me, in several aspects, to contribute to the existing literature, expanding the concepts developed by previous scholars and by drawing them into one original piece of research. I conclude the chapter by giving some suggestions based on my personal thoughts on the research and by answering the questions which appeared during the research and writing process.

However, before exploring the central findings of this thesis, some methodological issues need to be dealt with such as the definition of “effectiveness”, the key elements (both conceptual and methodological) in explaining and evaluating the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in the peace and security field, and the major factors which support or undermine effectiveness in conducting peace operations.

In reference to the issue of effectiveness, the existing literature has generally considered this as a key word generally used to denote goal-attainment, linking the outcomes of a procedure to the initially-intended aims (Sambanis, 2000; Bratt, 1997; Laatikainen and Smith, 2006; Sherman, 2009; De Carvalho and Aune, 2010). In contrast, this study defined it as “the ability of an organisation in using its resources, its prerogatives and its relationship with environmental factors or conditions in order to meet collective objectives”. While the earlier literature focused on outcomes as a primary factor of understanding and evaluating regime effectiveness (Ratner, 1995; Sambanis, 2000; Elgström and Smith, 2006; Young, 2006; Gutner and Thompson, 2010) the definition developed here included the basic competence of the organisation. It also embraced the idea that effectiveness covers the decision-making process as well as the outcomes of
actions adopted. It is also clearly relates the definition of effectiveness with collective aims, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Defining the regime’s effectiveness was not the only conceptual contribution to understanding the role of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts; the thesis also illustrated how identifying the main elements (e.g. who is the intervener, time perspective, types of peace operations and selecting cases for analysis) are crucial in developing a proper understanding of effectiveness. Moreover, the thesis identified a number of internal and external factors that can influence, to a very large extent, the effectiveness of international and regional institutions in this regard. As this theoretical framework was suitable for understanding and assessing the effectiveness of the AU in the current study, it would be possible to apply it for analysing other international and regional organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO, ASEAN and OAS. In fact, the criteria established in Chapter 3 regarding defining the effectiveness, and how it can be measured as well as the whole factors influencing it, are not AU-specific but could be measured across various institutions.

Another conceptual contribution of the study is related to the adoption of the concept of “effectiveness” rather than the term “success” as the appropriate approach for analysing, understanding and evaluating the role of the international and regional organisations in managing conflicts. Accomplishing the intended goals for these institutions particularly in the peace and security field is far from being easy, and this is particularly true for the AU which has to face numerous and various challenges frustrating its efforts. In other words, measuring the effectiveness of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts should not be done by referring to the ideal state of peace as a gauge which supposes no armed conflict after intervention or deployment, or comparing it with an ideal form of conflict resolution (e.g. settlement of long-standing animosities). Some researchers contented that such an attitude is normatively unfair and scientifically unproductive. For instance, Stern and Druckman, (1997: 154) argued that scholars at their best must define effectiveness or even success in terms of making relative gains in realising transcendent values such as world peace, justice, and a reduction in human suffering aggregated across all relevant groups in a conflict. Conflict-resolution interventions should perhaps be evaluated according to the concept of “good enough” rather than the absolute concepts of success and failure (Ross, 2000). If the ideal state of peace is considered as a gauge to assess the role of international and regional organisations in managing conflicts, all interventions of these institutions, either by the UN or others such as the EU, NATO,
ASEAN and the AU will be considered ‘failed’ missions. Accordingly, the question which should be asked when it comes to evaluating the role of these institutions in their involvement in managing conflicts is to what extent the intervention does more good than harm.

7.2 Main Findings

Several findings were obtained following the discussion of the AU’s establishment, its constitutional and institutional framework and its involvement in different conflict zones. These findings highlight the role and contribution of the AU in terms of its effectiveness in managing intrastate conflicts and achieving peace and security in the African continent. In general, these findings may have implications for the role of other international and regional organisations in solving conflicts.

7.3 The AU’s Missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia

Earlier discussions showed that the AU’s institutional framework represents a significant departure from the political, legal and institutional framework of the OAU (Gottschalk, and Siegmar 2004; Neethling, 2005; Murithi, 2005). It also created a robust security institutional framework unparalleled in Asia, the Middle East or South America (Baimu and Sturman, 2003; Cilliers and Sturman, 2006; Gomes, 2008). However, it appears that the results on the ground were not as predicted. Several challenges arose when attempting to apply this framework in different conflict zones.

Burundi

The results of the first empirical chapter’s examination of the AMIB provide evidence that the AU can effectively manage intrastate conflict in Africa. Indeed, the AMIB was not only effective in fulfilling the terms of its mandate but also in containing and settling the conflict. Such achievement encouraged the UN to send a mission after its long reluctance to participate in peace-building process in Burundi. Despite its recent establishment and limited resources, the early intervention by the AU led the peace operation from the outbreak of hostilities and effectively stopped armed clashes and prevented the occurrence of a new genocide on the continent.

Indeed, most regions of Burundi became stable due the intervention of the AMIB (UN, 2004b; Agoagye, 2004; Boshoff et al, 2010; Been, 2011). For example, Agoagye (2004: 14) estimated that “95 per cent of the country was stable at the end of the AMIB
deployment”. Accordingly, it can be said that the AMIB reinforced the political settlement in Burundi. This shows how a small AU peacekeeping mission can achieve big objectives by managing the military and political aspects of an armed conflict. Moreover, it confirmed that the AU was fundamentally different from the practice of its predecessor, the OAU, and demonstrated its relevance as a future partner for the UN in participating in the management of intricate conflict situations in Africa.

The AU’s effective management of the Burundian conflict was indeed influenced by many factors, such as the general consensus among African states - particularly Burundi’s neighbouring states - to solve the conflict. The general agreement among member states to intervene in Burundi proved that all AU members were willing to end the war in the country. However, while the AU members were completely obligated to their political duties, they failed to meet their military and logistical commitments. As shown in Chapter 4, there was a problem in the military magnitude and the equipment of the AMIB. This gap was filled by external actors such as IOs (e.g. the UN or EU) and individual states (e.g. the US, the UK, Italy, France and Germany, etc).

Accordingly, it can be said that the effectiveness of the AMIB was due to a combination of internal and external factors and that the mission would not have been effective in the absence of one of them. Without the involvement of African states under the umbrella of the AU in the shadow of the reluctance of international actors, genocide might have happened in Burundi as was the case in Rwanda. Furthermore, the AU would not have been able to effectively manage the conflict without the support of external actors. This suggests that the AU can effectively manage intrastate conflict on the continent, but it cannot sustain its mission for a long time without assistance.

Sudan

The results of the second empirical chapter suggested that the AMIS was ineffective due to several factors, particularly in the first year of its deployment. First, the restricted mandate of a small observation mission; the mandated contingent was only composed of eighty military observers, insufficiently armed, and represented a protection force of merely 300 troops. This small mission worked as a de facto ceasefire monitoring force. However, most of its efforts were dedicated to troop protection instead of saving the threatened populations. Such comportment negatively affected the legitimacy of the mission. Since the members of the AMIS were unable to stop attacks but instead showed up to write a
report afterwards. This practice convinced the rebel parties to consider it as biased towards the Sudanese government. The second problem is related to the weak commitment of AU member states regarding sending troops and providing the mission with military and logistical equipment. This resulted from the division among African states with regard to their understanding of the Darfur crisis. As discussed in Chapter 5, while some states considered the conflict as an internal affair, others criticised the position of the Sudanese government and supported the rebel groups which consequently affected the AMIS’ effectiveness. The third factor is related to the weak support of the international community as external actors were not only reluctant to intervene in Darfur but also did not provide the AMIS with sufficient support.

However, the outcomes of the AMIS had changed slightly following July 2004 when the AU issued its mission with a broader mandate. The latter was explicitly restricted to the protection of the civilian populations which were under imminent threat and close to the fighting, according to the resources available and the capacity. It was also implied that there was an expectation that the security of the civilian population would be ensured by the Sudanese authorities. Additionally, AMIS had the duty to provide military presence through patrols and establishing temporary outposts to prevent unrestrained armed groups from taking aggressive action against the population. The clause concerning the protection of civilian populations opened the way for a new norm of allowing the use of force to protect populations from genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes during AU-sanctioned peace operations.

In fact, the new mandate of the AMIS had encouraged not only the member states of the AU but also the external actors to increase their financial and logistical support. The involvement of many African states increased the number troops to reach some 7,500 personnel. On their part, the external actors had to bear the greater part of the costs of the AMIS which included financial, military and logistical support. According to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, it was not possible to deploy and sustain the AMIS without the support of the UN and other AU multilateral and bilateral partners (AU, 2005a). Despite the noticeable increase of the commitment of the African states and the support of the international community, the outcomes of the AMIS were not sufficient since there were consistent documented aggressions on most humanitarian organisations and even the AMIS forces were not spared.
This study suggested that the ineffectiveness of the AMIS in managing the conflict was due to two major factors. The first is related to the restricted mandate which failed in the protection of civilian populations due to political considerations. Effectively, the AU’s member states were unable to challenge the Sudanese authorities suspected to be guilty of atrocities in Darfur. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Government of Sudan rejected the expansion of the AU’s mandate to include the protection of civilians, arguing and insisting that fulfilling this obligation was its own responsibility. This in fact leads to the second factor which frustrated the AMIS’s efforts to effectively manage the conflict: the local consent of conflict parties. Indeed, the AMIS was not only restricted by the Sudanese government but also by the rebel groups who extended their attacks to AMIS and later UN personnel were also subjected to various forms of abuse (i.e. armed attacks, ambushes, and hostage taking operations)\(^{165}\).

Despite the fact that the AU failed in putting an end to the conflict, its involvement had positive effects. The amendment of its mandate in 2004 empowered officers to order, if necessary, protective deployments to trouble zones. Indeed, thanks to their presence and non-interfering tasks, AMIS managed to ensure the stability of the situation in various areas of Darfur. In fact, in areas where AMIS was present numerous attacks on civilians were prevented, reducing the level of human suffering to a certain extent\(^{166}\). With its intervention in Darfur, for all its imperfections, the AU was the only institution which took on a leading role, deliberately avoided by most international actors including the powerful Security Council. As Rice and Andrew (2007) argued, the AU was the only international actor willing to face bullets to save civilians in Darfur. Without the intervention of the AU it is unlikely that another actor would have been keen to be involved in the Darfur crisis, and it is highly improbable that even the UN would have considered intervening with a peace mission as was the case in 2007. However, it can be said that AMIS’s outcome was better than the absence of a mission at all. Its intervention contributed positively to the peace and security in the Darfur region.

**Somalia**

The results of the Chapter 6 suggested that the AMISOM was not effective in the first three years of its deployment. The lack of a strong central government in Somalia for more than


\(^{166}\)See UN, 2005a; Ralph, 2005; Susan, 2006; David, 2007; Diedre 2008; Kreps, 2007; Udombana, 2007; Powell, 2008; Murithi, 2008; Gomes, 2008; Barnidge, 2009 and Møller, 2009a.
seventeen years made it too difficult for the AMISOM to manage the conflict and implement peace in a relatively short time. In addition, there were a number of obstacles which impeded the achievement of the mission’s objectives, such as the involvement of neighbouring states in supporting the conflicting parties, the unwillingness of member states of the AU to provide sufficient troops and personnel, the restricted nature of the mandate, logistics and the reluctance to provide financial means. The combination of all these factors brought the AU harsh criticism by several scholars such as (Franke, 2007; Baker, 2007; Derblom et al, 2008; Møller, 2009b; Williams, 2009b and 2011a).

However, the results of AMISOM have improved since 2010 due to a variety of factors. First, the increased commitment of AU member states in terms of contributing to the military magnitude and/or logistical support. For instance, the number of the mission troops was raised from 1,600 in 2008 to 17,731 in 2012. Second, there was a substantial increase in logistical and financial support from IOs such as the UN, the EU, NATO and individual states. Third, the adoption of an enforcement approach by the AU forces against some parties who did not stop fighting and refused to join the political process such as the UIC and Al Shabab movement. An important point which should be underlined here is that the AU had effectively (for the first time) applied article 4(h) of its constitutive act on the ground. This particular provision gives the Union the right to intervene in serious circumstances even without the consent of the host state or parties to the dispute. Indeed, it seems that the AU started to apply this norm on the ground after more than ten years of its establishment when its mission in Somalia directly challenge the perpetrators (the UIC and Al Shabab Movement) and managed to expel them from many Somali cities.

Certainly, the three cited factors arguably led to an increase in the effectiveness of the AMISOM not only in terms of managing the violent conflict and secured conditions conducive to success in the political process, but also in preventing the violent conflict in the area of the deployment and the spread of the conflict to other regions. Indeed, the efforts of AMISOM have stabilised the majority of the country and led to the successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia, which culminated with the election, on 10 September 2012, of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as the new President of Somalia (AU, 2012b). The AU’s partners (e.g. the UN and the EU) welcomed this successful conclusion of the transition in Somalia which culminated with the election on 10th September, 2012 of Mr Hassan Sheikh Mohamed as the new President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (AU, 2013). Accordingly, it is possible to say that despite the shortcomings of the AMISOM - particularly in the first three years of its deployment - the mission was
effective in managing the conflict in Somalia after more than twenty years of an absence of any central government and after the failure of the UN’s attempts to resolve the situation.

More generally, the AU has intervened in more than fifteen conflicts in a relatively short time (between 2003 and 2010), some of which are the most complicated intrastate conflicts in the world (e.g. Burundi, Darfur and Somalia) (Møller, 2009a; Williams, 2011b) where this new institution deployed more than 30,000 peacekeeping personnel. The involvement of the AU suggests that this new institution is more effective than its predecessor, the OAU in managing intrastate conflicts in Africa. This argument is supported not only by senior AU officials (as it is expected) but also by senior officials from different organisations such as the UN and the EU (interview with senior UN officials, 01/07/2012 and 21/11/2012; and interview with senior EU official, 14/11/2012) which in turn means that the AU is “a new wine in a new bottle” instead of “an old wine in a new bottle” as argued by some analysts (e.g. Adebajo, 2001; Udornbana, 2002; Akonor, 2007) when this institution was established in 2002\(^{167}\).

However, the effectiveness of this nascent organisation is contingent upon good preparation, a clear mandate, the commitment of its member states, and the support of international actors. As was evident form the case studies, both the capabilities of the intervener and the conflict environment influence effectiveness. It has been found that the combination of the two was not the only influencing factor, since the way one relates to the other was also highly significant. More support from one factor can to some extent compensate for less support from another. For instance, the insufficient commitment from AU member states in funding missions was compensated by the support of external actors and so on. Indeed, the failure of AU member states to meet their obligations showed the existence of a deep gap between the official acceptance of new norms and principles and the capacity to concretely implement them in real instances of conflict. These norms include the right of intervention to stop crimes against humanity as well as the prohibition of unconstitutional change of legitimate order, which was the case in the Burundian conflict. Based on these results, it can be said that although there has been a big improvement in “the African solution to African problems approach”, the “Africanisation” of peace and security is far from achievable while it is still heavily reliant on external support to be able to carry out its peace missions.

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\(^{167}\) See Chapter 1, page 8 and 9.
7.4 The African Security Architecture: The AU as a Security Actor

The findings of this thesis can be seen not only as important contributions to the debate about the AU as a security actor, but they also provide important lessons to the international and regional organisations in general. The major contributions of the thesis are as follows:

1. The discussion in Chapter 2 on the genesis of the AU shows that the founding of this institution is far from accidental, but was well thought out and carefully considered. The development of the institution was based on a clear preference for avoiding past mistakes. It came after long and huge efforts of the OAU/AU to transform effectively the organisation’s ability to manage African conflicts. The method used by AU’s predecessor, the OAU, since 1963 for the management of conflicts was based on the use of diplomatic channels and means in order to prevent their outbreak. Nevertheless, due to the absence of organs a proper mechanism such as the ones established later by the AU (e.g. the PSC), African states were unable to deal with full-grown situations which necessitated decisive military forces such as peacekeepers or peacemakers. The African states considered then that the use of force in order to maintain the role of peacekeeping and enforcement action was the responsibility of the UN. The Rwandan Genocide in 1994 changed these perceptions, with Africans questioning more and more the will and the ability of the UN to live up to its responsibilities on the African continent. African states were deeply disappointed by the behaviour of the international community in general and the UN in particular. The UN was unable to prevent the atrocities in Rwanda, with the killing of approximately 800,000 innocent civilians in less than four months. The extent of the genocide provoked a change in African hearts and as a result they were convinced that instead of relying on the UN it was only by taking the responsibility to solve armed conflicts on the continent into their own hands that things would improve. Several initiatives were taken and serious efforts were made to create a proper mechanism to prevent, reduce or effectively manage conflicts. It was against this background that the AU was created in 2002. Therefore, the origin of the AU suggests that this organisation was founded with the intention to solve African conflicts by African means in order to avoid the occurrence of tragedies like the Rwandan one of 1994. It also suggests that the AU’s role was to take primacy from the UN for the management of peace, security and stability of Africa.
The provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU (Art 4(h)) and the Protocol which established the AUPSC (Art 16 and 17) support the fact that AU is meant to take primacy. For example, Article 4(h) of the CA authorises the intervention of the AU in a member state immediately following the occurrence of grave circumstances. The power to order an intervention against a member state is the exclusive authority of the UN except when it is a question of self-defence or at the request/with the consent, of the host state. Though for the AU, the intervention included in the CA does not fall under either of the two exceptions since in the first instance the AU does not have specific territory to defend, and in the second, its interventions do not depend on the consent of member state. Accordingly, the AU is authorised through its main organ, the PSC, to intervene in a member state following the occurrence of tragedies such as genocide and war crimes. It is essential to underline here that the legal instruments conferring such a right do not necessitate authorisation from the UNSC (in compliance with Article 53 of the UN Charter). Therefore, by inserting the right to intervene in the Constitutive Act, Africans wanted to make clear that the AU, through its PSC, will be playing the UNSC’s previous role and by doing so showed their resolve to act freely from the UN system. It is essential to recall here the statement of Sam Ibok (former Director of AUPSC’s Directorate) who insisted that the AU was not an instrument of the UNSC, implying clearly that the AU was able to act autonomously (Abass, 2003).

The empirical evidence in the three case studies showed that the AU is the first institution responsible for dealing with African conflicts essentially for three reasons. First, in the reviewed cases (Burundi, Darfur and Somalia) the AU responded promptly politically and militarily. Second, that it was first to react means that the AU considers itself as the primarily-concerned institution for the sufferings in Africa. Third, the missions undertaken showed a high willingness to solve the conflicts by African actors. It also happened in the case of Darfur that the AU went as far as refusing external participation in the matters, insisting on control over the military and political solutions for the conflict. In fact, the role of the UN in these conflicts was rather to act as a backstop to the AU. Accordingly, it can be said that the approach of the UN regarding African conflicts changed since the end of the Cold War, as it is no longer willing to intervene until a certain degree of stabilisation of the situation on the ground has been achieved. As noted from the case studies, the UN was reluctant not only in Burundi but also in other cases on the continent (e.g. Darfur and Somalia).
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the African states have the primary responsibility for dealing with security problems. This in turn suggests that the relationship among the UN and the AU after the Cold War established a new norm which presents the new framework of cooperation between regionalism and universalism in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. This also suggests that although there is a contradiction between the AU’s role and the UN charter, there was a high level of coordination and cooperation among them, as was stated by senior officials from both institutions. The AU framework is committed to an approach that is based on cooperation rather than competition with the UN and has constructed a strong relationship with the UN and the wider international community (Powell, 2005; De Coning 2007; Barndge, 2009; Murithi 2009).

2. Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 contributed to the existing literature on the role of international and regional organisations in managing intrastate conflict by highlighting the new norms and methods which can make these actors more effective. Indeed, understanding the institutional and constitutional framework of the AU and analysing its outcomes in different cases reveals that the regionalisation of African peace and security offers valuable lessons for the UN in particular and other institutions in general (e.g. the EU, NATO, the OAS and ASEAN). This is with regard to important concepts such as: the right to intervene or the use of force against member states; collective peace and security; the norm of non-interference; the enquiry of UN reform regarding the responsibility to protect and the sovereignty of states; and the impact of the cooperation between regionalism and universalism (e.g. the hybrid mission in Burundi and Darfur) and its result in norm making. The transformation of the AMIB into the ONUB and the AMIS into the UNAMID is evidence to what has been argued earlier, that the role of the UN in Africa can be only complementary to the role of the AU which creates a new norm in international relations.

Indeed, this transformation is the first process in terms of the security cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. It can be considered as an ideal example of the relationship between universalism and regionalism in the 21st Century and suggests relevant solutions for future AU-UN operational relations. It should be also noted that this shift was very soft and helped to complete the efforts of the AU missions in Darfur and Burundi. Accordingly, this study argues that the AU framework holds specific mechanisms through which it can enhance cooperation with the UN under Chapter VIII, as well as provide important lessons for other international and regional institutions. This indeed

168 See Chapter 4, page 147, Chapter 5, page 174 and Chapter 6, page 220-223.
challenges the general belief that the European architecture of security presents the most appropriate ways of dealing with situations at the regional level, despite the fact that the AU is still unable to apply these norms properly on the ground.

3. Another contribution is the potential impact of Africa's shift from the norm of non-interference to that of non-indifference on enhancing the role of international and regional institutions in managing intrastate conflict in the new millennium. In fact, two important aspects can be drawn from adopting such a norm. Firstly, this transformation demonstrates that the formation of the UN Charter (1945) and other international and regional organisations were not designed to manage intrastate conflict and protect human and individual rights but were calculated to manage interstate conflict and protect the sovereignty of their member states, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Certainly, the founding of the AU in 2002 was based on the express need to review and to amend the international legal system in order to face the new kind of conflict (intrastate wars) in the aftermath of the Cold War. This reflection is pertinent due to the fact that Africa’s institutional transformation from the OAU to the AU changed the perspective and, instead of the traditional standard of the Westphalia state, it moved to a modern trans-boundary system requiring the protection of community values. Accordingly, the regional norms contained in the AUCA not only restate the legality of the principles and values discussed in Chapter 2 but also erode some traits of the one-time inviolable doctrine of sovereignty. Moreover, the use of force in peace operations in intrastate conflict was seen as violating the fundamental norm of the Westphalia treaties which emphasised the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another.

As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the new way of thinking of the African leaders derives from a general consensus; that if tragedies such as the Rwandan genocide were to be relegated to the horrors of history, a review of the doctrine of sovereignty was absolutely necessary. Due to their previous understanding of the concept of sovereignty, Africa’s transformation has the potential to redraw the field of international law. This is mainly accurate since 53 member states of the AU represent a quarter of the membership of the UN, and this will indeed impact the gradual erosion of sovereignty as a major norm. Certainly the effect of such change by the AU is apparent through its huge involvement towards the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect as a new doctrine in the contemporary and modern history in international relations.
The second aspect of Africa’s shift from the norm of non-interference to non-indifference is linked to the first. In fact, the restriction of the AUCA to the concept of sovereignty - particularly when it comes to stopping war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, which are considered as fundamental values of the international community - allows the African Union to use force and intervene in its member states even without the local consent of the government or the parties of the dispute. This in turn might have influenced the international and regional organisations to change their traditional principles regarding managing conflicts to new ones, especially in relation to internal conflicts. In other words, conventional peace operations might occur only following the signature of a peace agreement for interstate or intrastate conflict. Notions of neutrality and impartiality are no longer unanimously accepted and have lost the esteem they use to hold. Once again, it seems that the UN’s adoption of the Responsibility to Protect norm in 2005 was in fact inspired or developed from the norm of the right of the intervention which was adopted by the AU in 2001\textsuperscript{169}. The adoption of such a norm, at both regional and international levels suggests that there is a clear shift from traditional peace operations, since peacekeepers troops are empowered in taking tougher actions to protect civilian populations.

4. Another important contribution of this study is that the effectiveness of international and regional organisations depends on a combination of factors which might vary from one organisation to another. For instance, NATO’s need for external support in its interventions is less important than the need of the AU or other institutions due to the economic and military power of its member states. However, good planning before the intervention (the internal process), a clear mandate for the mission which allows the use of the force when necessary, high commitment from the member states in providing financial and logistical support and a degree of external support are, arguably, indispensable factors for the effectiveness of any international or regional institution in managing intrastate conflict.

7.5 The AU, African Security Cooperation and International Relations Theory
As discussed in the introduction, the emergence of the AU was considered by some scholars such as Peter (2001), Tieku (2004), Buzan and Wæver (2003) and Daived (2007) as a device of the African powerful states realpolitik (e.g. Libya, South Africa and Nigeria) or as a tool to achieve their foreign policy interests while it was considered by other scholars as an extension to the ideals of the Pan-Africanism movement and that it

\textsuperscript{169} See Chapter 2, page 51.
represented an African collective action by all African states to face the challenges of the new millennium (Adebajo, 2001; Francis, 2007 Franke, 2009).

In fact, it was evident from the deeper analysis of the constitutional and institutional framework of the AU in Chapter 2 that there is no distinction between the member states of the AU. It was also clear from the empirical examination in Chapters, 4, 5 and 6 that no one state in Africa can intervene on its own to manage, solve or enforce peace in Burundi, Somalia and Darfur. However, the cooperation under the umbrella of the AU enabled African states to restore peace in Burundi after ten years of civil war, Somalia after twenty years of fighting and relatively in Darfur. More significantly, it was evident that the participation of African states in managing these conflicts was not limited to the powerful states. Indeed, the effective interaction of many African states - either the influential ones (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt) or small ones (e.g. Rwanda, Senegal, Tunisia and Ghana) - under the umbrella of the AU challenges the argument that the AU was established to suit the new foreign policy interests of some influential states. In this regard, it is appropriate and relevant to question what benefits will result from the engagement of some African weak states such as Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia and even for the larger and more influential states such as South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia in involving to manage the conflict in Burundi (through their financial and logistical support to AMIB) which is a poor state. This evidence does not suggest that the states involved in Burundi gained economically and politically as some scholars mentioned above argued rather than helping to restore peace and ending the human tragedy in this African state.

Similarly, the involvement of some African small states such as Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritania as well as some African powerful states such Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa and Libya in the AMIS lends further support to the argument that the AU was established to solve the African problems by the participation of all African states either the influential states or the weak ones.

The argument can be also applied for the Somali case where a number of weak states (e.g. Uganda, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Zambia, Djibouti and Kenya) and influential states (e.g. Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Egypt and Nigeria) have been working altogether under the auspices of the AU since 2007 to restore the peace in Somalia. It is
difficult to contend that the involvement of all these states was primarily motivated by military, political or economic interests. The fact is that the enthusiasm of African states to solve their problems by their own means encouraged them to work collectively in many conflict zones to achieve peace and security as their primary responsibility. This ethical accountability has indeed persuaded the rest of international community - either IOs or individual states - to enhance the African response to African civil wars, both financially and logistically.

The discussion above supports the argument that the AU was not established as a tool to achieve the foreign policy interests of African influent states but rather it was an extension to the ideals of the Pan-Africanism movement and reflects the enthusiasm of African states to solve their problems by their own means under the umbrella of the AU. However, this argument needs further investigation and scrutiny through the lens of the leading IR theories (e.g. realism, liberalism and constructivism) in explaining the motivations of African states to work collectively under the auspices of the AU as a security community.

In this regard, it is important to refer to the fact that the theoretical contribution of this study lies in understanding effectiveness as a gauge to analyse the role of international or regional organisations in managing intrastate conflict and to determine the main factors which support or undermine it on the ground. However, there are potential opportunities to use this thesis as a starting point to engage with major IR theoretical approaches (e.g. realism, liberalism and constructivism) and their argumentations regarding the emergence of the African interstate security cooperation.

Indeed, the potential for IR theory to be harnessed in order to examine the African security community is overlooked by the existing literature. Even though many studies have been written about collective and cooperative security arrangements in the post-Cold War world, most of this literature has focused on the advanced world and its institutions, such as the EU and NATO, at the expense of third world regions such as Africa. Thus, there have only been a small number of thinkers and analysts who offered a variety of perspectives to provide an adequate conceptualisation of African’s security dynamics.

Indeed, exploring this area would be pertinent and could further enrich the discipline in the security domain. However, incorporating IR theoretical analysis here was beyond the scope of this thesis for two main reasons. First, to the focus of the analysis was centred on the role of an important regional institution, specifically the AU in managing complicated
conflicts such as Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. This also necessitated consideration of the external role of other international actors such as the UN, the EU, NATO and powerful states in supporting the AU. The depth of analysis required to satisfy these aims naturally constrained the scope of my thesis. Second, detailed theoretical analysis of the emergence and development of the African security architecture would be necessary to ascertain the explanatory capacity of particular IR theories; this would involve engaging with another set of research questions. However, these factors will be taken into consideration and explored in further studies in the future, building on the contribution I have made here.

However, it is still interesting to briefly consider how some broad IR theoretical approaches might allow us to explore questions which could lead us to insights into the motivations behind African states’ preferences for collective efforts to manage intrastate conflict in Africa. For instance, was the emergence of African security a reflection of the distribution of power based on the self-interested calculations of the powerful states as classical and neo-realists argued in general, such as Deutsch et al (1957), Waltz (1979), Buzan (1992), and Mearsheimer (2001)? Alternatively, was it a reflection of democratic values and common interests as argued by both classical liberals and neo-liberal institutionalists, such as Jervis (1988), Van Evera (1991) Ullman (1991), and Keohane and Martin (1995)? Finally, were norms, identity and security culture the main elements of the emergence of the African security as argued by constructivists such as Wendt (1992), Adler (1997), Hay and Rosamond (2002), Risse (2003) and Karns and Mingst (2010)?

Within this context, the following sections discuss briefly the main assumptions of these theories and the literature in this regard.

Great power coercion and material calculations

Realist scholars see states in pursuit of their national interests as far more important than other factors. They argue that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world, based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers and do not have any independent effect on state behaviour (Deutsch et al, 1957; Waltz, 1979; Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 1979; Buzan, 1992; Mearsheimer, 2001). Even neo-realists, who recognise the usefulness of international and regional organisations particularly after the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War period, insist also on the continued primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of (human) security (Buzan, 1992; Mearsheimer, 2001). In this perspective, both classical realists and neo-realists see peace as something that can only be settled through power (i.e. by the use of force) and not by international and
regional institutions (negotiations, arbitrations, conciliations or military intervention by international or regional organisations).

In the African context, there have been some attempts that focused on the realism as the appropriate approach to understand the African security arrangements in the post-Cold War. David (2007) argued that the role and contribution of institutions including African Union are underpinning by neo-realism, which assumes that regional security threats exist, thus it is in the interests of states, in particular, the sub-regional hegemon to maintain order and stability and establish security communities in order to respond to external security threats. Similarly, Buzan and Wæver (2003: 55) argued that “Africa’s security dynamics are shaped by the relative material capabilities within its various “mutually exclusive” regional security complexes”. In the same vein, Goldgeier and McFaul (1992) considered Africa as part of a global periphery in which security forces at work might be described in realist terms as devices useful for power struggle (as defined by Thomas Hobbes). Within this context, realists argue that military threats from neighbours, and internal threats from insurgents continue to threaten the existence of African states and thus these threats compel leaders in the periphery to work together in order to consolidate their rule and preserve the stability of the state.

However, many scholars considered that applying realist accounts in the African context is problematic for both empirical and conceptual considerations. For example, in an empirical sense, Williams (2007) argued that the concentration of realism on sovereign states as primary actors is often inappropriate for explaining Africa’s contemporary security dynamics. For instance, such a perspective is likely to neglect the important role of non-state actors, despite the fact that nowadays they play key roles in conflict management. Williams (2007: 255) concluded that “Realist-inspired approaches are poorly equipped to analyse state–society interactions of a neo-patrimonial nature and their impact on the development of ostensibly ‘national’ security policies”. Similarly, Franke (2009) maintained that both realist and liberal accounts are unable or inappropriate to explain the inter-state security cooperation in Africa. In this regard, he pointed out five empirical realities which challenged the rationalist-systemic theories when applied to Africa:

“the empirical realities such as the nature of the state in Africa, the particular nature of security problems, the proliferation of regional and continental cooperation schemes, the role of unifying ideologies such Pan-Africanism and the extent of norm diffusion in Africa challenge the rationalist theories of inter-state security cooperation” (Franke, 2009: 18).
For Franke (2009), the inappropriateness of realism and liberalism to explain the African security community is due to the fact that both of them use a type of analysis based on predetermined conditions which in fact relate principally and explain the behaviour of a Western state. In other words, the assumptions of rationalist-systemic theories were based on European historical elements which are inadequate and inapplicable in explaining the emergence of security cooperation in Third World, especially, due to the fact that the dynamics of the Western world are different from the ones in Africa. In a broader context, Nathan (2010: 2) contended that “it is no longer tenable empirically to claim that international institutions serve only the interests of great powers and are not a cause of peace” as argued by realists.

In fact, the efficacy of realist accounts has not been tested, because realists tend to dismiss the suitability of their theory to such issue areas. For instance, they did not explore the interests and ideas of the key founders of the AU (e.g. Olusegun Obasanjo, Thabo Mbeki and Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi as presidents of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya). In other words, what were the real motivations of these actors behind their ideas or intentions to reform the OAU which eventually culminated by replacing it with the AU? The extraordinary summit organised by Qaddafi in Sirte in 1999 was meant to ‘discuss ways and means of making the OAU effective’, and African leaders such as Mbeki and Obasanjo supported Ghaddafi’s decision which was considered as an excellent opportunity to propose to the other head of African governments a real reform of what they saw as an obsolete organisation (i.e. the OAU). Indeed they wanted reforms which suit their interests and reflect the aims of their foreign policy (interview with African analyst, 12/06/2012). This argument is supported by Tieku (2005: 267) who maintained that:

“the decisions of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to reform the OAU to suit their policy interests and the attempts of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi to use continental integration as a route to rehabilitate himself and his country from the many years of isolation”.

Accordingly, an important question can be raised when it comes to analysing the motivations of the African interstate security cooperation: does the AU’s formation reflect power politics on the continent? Indeed, many assumptions could be put to the test by

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looking at the AU and questioning whether the logic of realist arguments was present in its initial establishment and how states actually utilise the AU for their own political and economic gains.

*Democratic principles and economic calculations*

Contrary to the perspective of realists, liberal theorists are generally optimistic when it comes to the role of international and regional organisations in achieving peace and security (Buzan, 1992; Mearsheimer, 2001). Liberals usually have a positive view of human nature and believe that individuals share self-interests and thus can engage in both collaborative and cooperative social action, either domestically or internationally, which results in great benefits for everybody at home or abroad (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985).

Consequently, liberals are confident about the prospects of making the world safer and more peaceful. The positive perception of liberalism in international politics relies on three key elements, “firstly, liberal theorists consider states as the main actors in international politics, secondly, in view of their political nature, democratic states pursue integrative and cooperative policies and they do not go to war against other democracies and thirdly, liberals believe that political and economic calculations are more important than the calculations of power (as realists claim) in explaining the behaviour of states” (Mearsheimer, 2001). The elements mentioned above are common to almost all international theories. Nevertheless, while the school of realism suggests that achieving and consolidating cooperation is indeed far from easy, liberals argue that through states and institutions it is possible to address constructively and efficiently potential conflicts (Krasner, 1982; Simmons, 1998).

In fact, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, people belonging to the liberalist school of thought challenged the pessimistic opinion of the realists relative to the nation’s peaceful and cooperative relationship (Milner, 1992). In the 1990s the liberal theory was supported by an important amount of literature. Such contribution focused on explaining how international and regional organisations might be used in order to encourage states to cooperate in the management of multilateral interventions (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Wendt, 1992). Liberals based their reasoning on the fact that the occurrence of systemic changes on the international scale, which resulted from the end of the Cold War after the collapse of the USSR and the fall of Berlin Wall made possible the development of new concepts (Ullman, 1991 and Van Evera, 1991).
In fact, the occurrence of these systemic changes at the international level have been considered by the so-called neoliberal institutionalism as the appropriate conditions for successful collective action in international politics in general and in the field of peace and security in particular (Ullman, 1991; Van Evera, 1991).

Neoliberals predicted that

“the perceptible and increasing commitment, by East European states and Russia to democratic principles; the universal move toward free-market economics; a sincere will to work toward the diminishing of militarism; and the deep believe that the era of conventional balance of power politics was over are the main conditions to formulate the concept of the construction of institutions and states as a viable solution” (Van Evera, 1991: 9-10).

Without this change in principles, rules, and norms among states, cooperation would be hard to achieve (Jervis, 1988; Van Evera, 1991; Ullman, 1991). As Keohane and Martin (1995: 39) have observed, “the neo-liberal institutionalists only expect inter-state cooperation to occur if states have significant common interests”.

In light of foregoing, it can be said that the main assumption of the liberal peace argument is that states which constitute a security community share a collective identity of democratic and social values and common interests which in turn generates a powerful inhibition tool against any state’s aggressive dispositions. In such circumstances, international and regional organisations would play a central role in identifying common interests, aggregating the individual preferences of member states, and implementing multilateral interventions. In short, neoliberal institutionalism would suggest that democratic states have interdependent interests which might be pursued throughout international institutions.

In fact, researchers such as (Abrahamsen, 2005) considered that the spread of the liberal values in Africa particularly since the 1990s such as promote of free trade, create economic and political institutions, development aid can be seen as a technique of government whereby Africa comes to conform to the liberal values and that the African security cooperation can be best explain by the liberal approach. Similarly, Alhaji (2005) argued that the development and consolidation of a democratic ethos in Africa would lead to the eventual development of a security community.

Although the liberal assumptions can be very useful in explaining many issues in international politics, especially in the emergence of international and regional
organisations and their role in peace and security, applying them to the African context can be problematic (Franke, 2009 and Williams, 2007). The first problem is related to the liberal claim that democratic states are unlikely going to engage in armed conflicts with each other. According to Williams (2007), liberals argued that these states recognise each other as democracies and act in accordance with such recognition. However, Williams challenged the idea that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other by asking an important question - how do they recognise each other as liberal democracies? In other words, if a state fails to recognise another as liberal democracy, then it may go to war with that state. In fact, the matter of recognition in the African context is very difficult, if not impossible, due to the fact that some African states claim that they are democratic but they are the most dictatorial systems in the world such as Libya, Egypt, Zambia, Algeria and Sudan (interview with senior AU official, 20/11/2012). The fact that there are different political systems in Africa such as liberal systems as well as dictatorial and authoritarian regimes prove that the assumptions of classical and neo-liberals are inadequate and inappropriate to understand the African security dynamics or the African countries’ collective response to security threats in the continent (interview with African analyst, 19/06/2012).

Franke (2009) also argued that the liberals and realists focused only on material considerations and common interests as the driving forces to establish security communities and they neglect the cultural dimensions of Africa’s security dynamics, such as the process of socialisation and security cultures among African states. Finnemore (1996) also argued in this regard that realist and liberal theories do not provide good explanations about the role of the international and regional organisations in shaping patterns of humanitarian military intervention and they are rather focusing on the material and national interests. She concluded that realist and liberal theories focused only on the material and national interests instead of regional and international norms such as protecting civilians, stopping war crimes and achieving peace and security which encourages states to work together. Liberalism has little chance of success in explaining formulations of the state in Africa and the cooperation between African states (Taylor, 2009).

In similar fashion to the previous section, Finnemore (1996) Williams (2007), and Franke (2009) argued that liberal accounts cannot explain the emergence of the African security community. However, their conclusion is not convincing because they did not comprehensively test these accounts in the African context. It might be true that democratic peace thesis has little purchase here, but neoliberal ideas about security cooperation among states via regional institutions could have explanatory power in understanding at least some
aspects of the African security cooperation under the auspices of the AU. In fact, looking at the behaviour of some influential states such as South African and Nigeria can lend additional support to this argument. For example, Tieku (2005: 253), argued that:

“Nelson Mandela was aware that the end of the Cold War and the spread of neo-liberal ideas had rendered the radical populist and socialist ideology of his African National Congress (ANC) unattractive […] While the internal reorientation of the ANC was ongoing, Mandela’s government, mostly through public speeches and policy documents, signalled that the foreign policy of the new South Africa would be guided by liberal internationalism”.

Accordingly, it was publicly announced in 1996 that South African policies will be based on three main factors/aims ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR). Such a strategy has been designed on purpose to attract foreign investment and to transform the country to a competitive trading state worldwide (Peter and Sipho, 1988). Similarly, Peter (2001: 239) contended that:

“the recognition among South African policymakers that access to the international economy and foreign aid and investment are crucial to successful internal reconstruction and development has definitively made South Africa a firm proponent of the neo-liberal model of development”.

The same analyst observed that a pledge for the promotion of democratic principles and the will to respect human rights throughout Africa increased significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union (i.e. 1989 onward with the end of the Cold War). Peter considers African political systems, based on democracy, either in new regimes or in those where a reformist process is occurring, symbolise open political systems which should allow them to be widely involved in future foreign policymaking process.

From the above discussion, it can be assumed that the spread of liberal principles in Africa after the Cold War era (e.g. respect for the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and the participation of African citizens in public affairs) encouraged African states to work together where the benefit from increased institutional cooperation are valued socially, economically and politically. In fact, the neo liberal institutionalism cannot only be used to explain the interaction and cooperation among African states but it has also the potential to explain the interaction and cooperation between African institutions (e.g. the AU) and other regional and international institutions (e.g. the UN, the EU and NATO). Indeed, the interaction of these institutions and their support to the AU can be tested form the
neoliberal institutionalist approach. This cooperation might be understood through the analysis of the mutual interests of these actors around a shared value of multilateral institutionalism.

Norms and Identity

Converse to the perspective of rationalist-systemic theories, constructivism represents an intersubjective method which stresses the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency. Essentially, it considers that human beings cannot exist and consequently be understood independently from their social environment and interactions. Such circumstances generate the concept of community, a sense of belonging to a certain group, which imposes restraints on individuals’ behaviour. It is also assumed that interests are socially constructed and being part of a community means accepting its share of duties and responsibilities (Wendt, 1992; Adler, 1997; Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Risse, 2003). Constructivists assume that the international system is a set of ideas, a system of norms, created by a given people for a particular aim. In turn, such norms and ideas can undergo processes of changes and such changes in identities, norms and beliefs shape the behaviour of nation-states (Wendt, 1992; Karns and Mingst, 2010). More specifically in the context of the material covered in this present research, constructivists predict that the effects of norms, identities, environmental relations and cultural institutions are pivotal in shaping national security interests or policies and thus encourage states to work together in managing security issues. By utilising constructivist perspectives, it is possible to explain better the creation of new social values and their influence on international relations (Wendt, 2007).

In fact, many scholars have considered constructivism as the best approach to explain and understand the African inter-state security cooperation. For example, Frank (2007:4) emphasised “the importance of constructivist concepts such as collective identities, norm diffusion, social learning and community-building in the development of cooperation among African states”. In the same vein, Williams (2007: 278) argued that “ethical and normative norms about what it means to be ‘African’ play an important role in defining what calculate as legitimate security challenges and the appropriate form of response”. These authors contended that the gradual development of the African cooperation has been motivated by the idea of Pan-Africanism since the 19th Century. Thus, the process of norm socialisation which forms the African identity is significant in understanding the African security community. In another study Franke (2008: 2) asserted this point by arguing that, “ideational factors such as shared historical experiences and common aspirations,
ideologies like Pan-Africanism, concepts like the African Renaissance are important in understanding and evaluating the inter-state security cooperation on the continent”. Müller (2001) also concluded that the theoretical perceptions on security cooperation do not appear to entirely fulfil the expectations as regards to the challenges faced today in terms of security. Theories such as Realism, Rational Choice or Liberalism are considered to have been unable to succeed. Consequently, it can be said that the theory of Constructivism – which emphasises concepts and behaviour based on culture, its dealing with the relationship between material and ideational elements and the relationship between structure and agency – might be the more relevant theory to explain security cooperation.

Similarly, Finnemore (1996) argued that the failure of realist and liberal theories in explaining humanitarian intervention increases the credibility of constructivist approach which attends to the role of international norms in shaping patterns of humanitarian military intervention. For him, regional and international security norms such as protecting civilians, stopping war crimes and achieving peace and security can encourage many actors from different continents to work together. He concluded that realist and liberal theories focused only on the material and national interests instead of regional and international norms such as protecting civilians, stopping war crimes and achieving peace and security which encourages states to work together. Franke (2007:4) argued in this regard that:

“While the realist – neo-liberal institutionalists debate has been primarily concerned with studying the barriers to cooperation, constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett concentrate on how, under certain conditions, translational forces and state interactions can generate the trust, reciprocity, hared knowledge and common identities necessary to transform global politics and overcome Hobbesian anarchy”.

Despite the fact that many scholars consider Constructivism as the appropriate approach not only to explain the interstate security cooperation in Africa but the security arrangements in other parts of the world, it has nevertheless been criticised by many scholars such as Hopf (1998) and Kratochwil (2005). These authors criticised the explanatory power of constructivism to the degree to which they do not consider it as a theory but only an approach. However, if it is a theory, it is just a theory of process and do not necessarily generate a substantive outcome. In fact, scholars such as Goldgeier and McFaul (1992); Buzan and Waever, (2003) and David, (2007) argued that African security cooperation cannot be explained by constructivism and it can be best described by the realist approach.
Moreover, the argument that the respect of regional norms and the principles of the AU is an important factor behind the collective security arrangements in Africa is still questionable. In fact, it was observed from the case studies of this thesis that some member states can simply violate the norms and principles of the AU when there are against their national interests. For instance, it is stated in Article 8, (Para. 9) of the PSC Protocol that “Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation” (AU, 2003c).

However, this norm was violated in Darfur and Somalia cases. As was illustrated in the Darfur chapter, the Sudanese Government objected to this norm when the Darfur crisis rose for the first time on the programme of the AUPSC. Following the insistence of some states, the Sudanese representatives decided to withdraw from the discussions. Similarly, Ethiopia violated this norm when its Ambassador insisted for leading the meetings of the AUPSC in 2007 regarding the conflict in Somalia. This action astonished many member states who voiced their disapproval to the participation of Ethiopia in AUPSC meetings to discuss the Somali dispute.

In fact, the violation of the new norms of the AU as a new organisation by one of its member states can affect to very large extent the adherence or the position of other members to these norms in the future which in turn adversely affect the position of the AU as a neutral actor in promoting peace and security in the continent. As the international relations theorist Wheeler (2000: 5) argued, “the violation of a norm by one party does not invalidate the norm itself rather than the reaction of others to the role-breaking behaviour demonstrates the extent to which they collectively subscribe to the norm”. Indeed, the violation of the AU’s new norms by influential states might support (to some extent) the neorealist claim - forwarded by the likes of Waltz and Mearsheimer - that states only act in accordance with international regional norms when it is in their interest to do so.

It is evident from the above discussion that there is disagreement among a small number of researchers involved in the theoretical debate regarding the assumptions and the expectations of the major IR theories and the emergence of African security architecture. This reflects the fact that there is a huge gap in the existing literature. Indeed, it is still unclear, for analysts and researchers, whether African states did form a new entity in order to confront an external enemy, to prevent inter-state wars or to achieve economic or
material gains as realists and liberalists anticipated or rather to overcome common problems arising from the proliferation, intensity and violence of Africa’s intrastate conflicts. In other words, can the elaboration of multi-level security cooperation, the solidarity and the collective action taken by African states under the auspices of the AU be better explained by realism, liberalism or constructivism? Undoubtedly, a number of questions can be raised in this regard such as: does the AU’s formation reflect power politics on the continent? How do states actually utilise the AU? To what extent can the adoption of liberal principles by African states, the development of their regional institutions and the cooperation with other international institutions be explained from a neoliberal institutionalist point of view? Were norms, identity and a security culture the main elements of the emergence of the African security community?

In fact, the varied IR theories could be used to generate and subsequently answer a variety of different research questions. It is not necessarily the case that each of these theories be treated as competition with each other, since all of them can shine light on different problems. Such a discussion would be an interesting subject for a future research programme and needs extensive work.

7.6 Recommendations: The AU, A Way Forward

The empirical findings of this thesis demonstrate that the AU can be an effective institution in dealing with matters related to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. However, its effectiveness relies upon four conditions: good preparation, the content of the mission’s mandate, the commitment of member states, and the external support provided. Nevertheless, in order to enhance its effectiveness in the promotion of regional peace and security the following recommendations should be given effect.

1. The discussion of the genesis of the AU in Chapter 2 and its practice in different conflict zones in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 reveal that the AU seems to confer the primacy on the maintenance of African peace and security to its own responsibilities. Nonetheless, the UN Charter gives such primacy to the UNSC, as reflected in Article 24. This move to assume pre-eminence by the AU is likely to create a conflicting situation with the UN and a more complex and pressured relationship. It is fundamental to have between the two institutions a convergent perspective and understanding with regard to their respective powers and responsibilities. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter assigns only specific roles for regional organisations, save on exceptional circumstances where the use of force may be authorised by the UNSC. There is not any specific mention in that particular chapter or in
others prefiguring explicitly the type of peace enforcement role such as the one put in place and enforced in the last decade by either the AU or other organisations. Additionally, Chapter VIII did not foresee the new forms of relationship which appeared after the Cold War between regional organisations and the UN.

It is absolutely necessary to regulate and formalise such a relationship to prevent tension and pressure. For that reason, this thesis recommends that the AU and the UN should commit themselves by devising a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding which determines clearly and explicitly the respective powers and responsibilities of the UN and the AU. It is only by undertaking such a task that uncertainty and tensions will be avoided. The drafting of a Memorandum of Understanding would facilitate the relationship and ensure that the actors are complimentary and not competitors. Furthermore, it is essential that the AU, when making its laws, ensure that they do not conflict with the UN Charter system which is the main source of legitimacy which gives the right to intervene to various institutions or states. African legislators, on the contrary, should produce laws consistent with the UN Charter. Therefore, it will be pertinent for the AUPSC to negotiate with the UNSC before any potential intervention, in order to be in symbiosis and not clash with the UN Charter system.

The AU’s founding should not be considered as designed to challenge the UN’s primacy, but rather as an instrument established to help the UN by filling particular gaps. Both institutions should cooperate and not compete by strengthening their partnership. Accordingly, the annual meeting between these two organisations has to be reinforced and developed in order that both can contribute to peace and security in Africa. On the other hand, the two institutions should liaise and be in permanent contact and dialogue with other organisations such as the EU, the Arab League, the OAS, and NATO. These organisations do have a certain political and economic influence and are indeed a major asset in preventing, reducing and stopping human tragedies such as the ones covered in the selected case studies. It can also be very beneficial to establish with the contribution of organisations’ special forces intended to act in concert with the AU Standby Force in the prevention and stopping of the spread of major violations of human rights. These regional mechanisms will be of huge importance; implementing these goals will be possible through undertaking regular training exercises and providing military assistance through operating with AU troops, a hybrid AU-UN force or an all-UN force - as occurred in Sudan and Burundi, albeit at later stages of the respective conflicts. Finally, permanent members of
these organisations should provide the required means to the AU and international partners’ missions, in term of staff (experts, advisers, and so on) and military personal (peacekeeping troops) as well as financially and logistically. It goes without saying that all the above organisations should officially recognise the AU’s principles of non-indifference and adopt common policies on the Responsibility to Protect.

Although the Responsibility to Protect was adopted by the UN in 2005, it has been rarely implemented and often subject to extensive criticism such as in the case of Libya. However, the AU’s implementation of non-indifference and the Responsibility to Protest’s norms even by modest degree, can serve as good indicators of where and when they can produce positive outcomes. In fact, the AU actively emphasises and promotes its position of non-indifference and Responsibility to Protect in the African arena. Such a stand might encourage individual states, as well as regional and international institutions worldwide to follow suit and adopt it too. Indeed, further investigating the concepts of the Responsibility to Protect (through literature/commentaries) and the principles of non-indifference represent an important subject to investigate in order to improve the application of these norms in a productive way to protect civilians and to achieve peace and security not only in Africa but also worldwide.

2. Applying the ‘African solutions to African problems’ approach under the umbrella of the AU should be met with the institutional capacity of this institution. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, African leaders have given the AU expansive mandates in order to achieve peace and security on the continent. The problem, however, the restriction in the resource capacity of the African institution remains. It does not match the indispensable needs to enforce such ambitious and extensive mandates that have been devised. For instance, the entire budget for the PSC for 2010 was $695,000, while a single mission such as AMISOM requires more than $800 million for a single year (interview with senior AU official, 9/6/2012). The gap between the financial needs and the budget allocated to the missions is enormous. Further, the financial limitation of the institution to implement its own decisions has been witnessed as the case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 highlighted.

It is pertinent to highlight the fact that without the generous help from external contributors it would have been very difficult for the AU to conduct its first missions. The Council will face very serious challenges in situations where external donors are reluctant to participate financially or are late to respond to the AU’s calls for help. Accordingly, before deciding to
involve the AU and entrust the PSC with the primary role in the maintenance of Africa’s peace and security, African leaders should be more cautious in terms of the missions’ mandates and provide the necessary means for the institution. Therefore, AU member states should be aware that they are expected to play a primary role in terms of responsibilities towards the Union. The minimum requirement is, for instance, to pay their contributions and respect the deadlines for such payment. It is worth noting that the PSC would benefit when the contributions are paid since a substantial amount of such contributions is dedicated to the Peace Fund, the main financial source of the organ. Additionally, member states should finance the PSC and provide military support and logistics according to the PSC’s requests. In situations where the capacity of the institution is neglected internally, the consequences will be dire and the PSC’s responsibilities will not be fulfilled, which will by the same token affect both the credibility and legitimacy of the AU.

3. An important finding of this study is that most efforts to develop the new African peace and security architecture focus on military capabilities while less attention has been given to improving the civilian capabilities of the AU’s activities in managing conflicts. As was evident from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the AU was not capable of recruiting and deploying adequate numbers of civilian personnel such as police, justice and corrections officers as well as expert trainers to build local capacity in these areas. The AU acknowledges its lack of capabilities in this domain and the commission has already begun to build up a peace and security standby roster to help during eventual peace and security civilian deployments, including mediation. Certainly, civilian skills are crucial in all aspects and in every dimension of conflict management: prevention and early-warning, mediation, and peacekeeping, as well as peace building programmes. As shown in the case studies, despite the lack of sufficient members of civilian personnel and mediators, the AU’s cautious negotiations and mediation - even with difficult states such as Sudan - can lead to agreements that contain tough mandates, giving peace operations the duty to protect civilian populations in conflict zones. Therefore in order to improve its effectiveness the AU should pay particular attention to strength its mediation capacity and ability to provide a sufficient number of civilian personnel. Moreover, imposing economic sanctions can be another effective tool in this regard by putting pressure on regimes that fail to follow the AU’s principles. The successful imposition of sanctions against Togo (2003) and Mauritania (2008) can be considered as a case of point.\(^{171}\)

\(^{171}\) For more information about the successful sanctions on Togo, see Chapter 3, page 105.
7.7 Closing Comments

Finally, it is useful to return to the original questions – Has the AU been effective in the management of intra-state conflicts in Africa? And under which conditions can the AU be an effective organisation in achieving peace and security in the continent? The main way in which I have contributed to the debates over the role of the AU is by using distinctive approaches to develop the analysis. These two questions can be answered together: the AU can play an effective role in managing African intrastate conflicts; however, the extent to which its role is effective is contingent upon four conditions: the internal process, the mandate of the mission, the commitment of member states and the level of external support. This is a new contribution to the academic literature and advances the analysis of how the AU has responded to the intra-state conflicts in Africa. The intention was to add a new perspective on the effectiveness of this relatively new institution, while simultaneously making a contribution to the ongoing academic debates on how we can understand and improve the effectiveness of the AU in the peace and security domain.
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Interviews

The interviews took place in several instances between May 2012 and November 2012. As in the various sections of the chapter, I refer to the date on which the interview took place, no specific date is provided below in order to preserve the anonymity of some interviewees. It is necessary to specify also the fact that many officials from different organisations were unwilling to be named as well as certain diplomats and analysts, particularly those who are closely involved in the selected case studies. In fact, the attitude of some interviewees is perfectly understandable in view of the sensitiveness of the study especially in Darfur and Somalia cases. Thus, the following names are those of the people who do not have any objection to being mentioned by name.

African Union Officials

El Ghassim Wane, the Head of the AUPSC
Jean Ping, the Chairperson of the AUC
Admore Kambudzi, Secretary of AUPSC
Diallo Aboubacan, the Head of the conflict management division of the AU
Tarek A. Sharif, the Head of Division Defence and Peace and Security Department
Rodney Kiwa, Head of Somali Desk,
Simon Badza, Political officer in the Peace and Security Department
United Nations Officials

Abdel-Kader Haïreche, Chief, Political Affairs Section UN Office to the AU (UNOAU)

Ali Al tricky, the former Head of the General Assembly of the UN

Eugene Owsus, UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and UN Humanitarian Coordinator

Makane Faye, the Chairperson of the United Nation Economic Commission in Africa (UNECA)

European Union Officials

Colonel Sandy Wade, the Military Advisor of the EU delegation to the AU

Bogdan Batic the Political Advisor of the EU delegation to the AU